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Title: The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2)
its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the
present day

Author: Fred T. Jane

Illustrator: W. L. Wyllie

Release date: March 15, 2025 [eBook #75616]

Language: English

Original publication: United Kingdom: The Library Press, limited,
1915

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Transcriber’s Notes
This is Volume I of a two-volume set. Volume II is available
at Project Gutenberg:
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75617. Index references to
pages within that volume are double-underlined here.
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THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET

SUBMARINES IN THE CHANNEL.

THE
BRITISH BATTLE
FLEET
ITS INCEPTION AND GROWTH
THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES
TO THE PRESENT DAY
BY

FRED T. JANE
AUTHOR OF “FIGHTING SHIPS,” “ALL THE WORLD’S AIRCRAFT,”
“HERESIES OF SEA POWER,” ETC., ETC.
With Illustrations in Colour
from original water-colour drawings by

W. L. WYLLIE, R.A.
And Numerous Plans and Photographs.

Vol. I.
London
The Library Press, Limited
26 Portugal St., W.C.
1915

TO THOSE
WHO IN ALL AGES BUILT THE SHIPS OF
THE BRITISH NAVY
AND TO THE UNKNOWN MEN
WHO HAVE WORKED THOSE SHIPS
AND SO MADE POSSIBLE THE
FAME OF MANY ADMIRALS.

PREFACE

T HIS book is not intended to be a “history” of the British Navy in the
generally accepted sense of the term. For this reason small space is
devoted to various strategical and tactical matters of the past which
generally bulk largely in more regular “naval histories”—of which a
sufficiency already exist.
In such histories primary interest naturally attaches to what the
admirals did with the ships provided for them. Here I have sought rather to
deal with how the ships came to be provided, and how they were developed
from the crude warships of the past to the intricate and complicated
machines of to-day; and the strictly “history” part of the book is
compressed with that idea principally in view. The “live end” of naval
construction is necessarily that which directly or indirectly concerns the
ships of our own time. The warships of the past are of special interest in so
far as they were steps to the warships of to-day; but, outside that, practical
interest seems confined to what led to these “steps” being what they were.
Thus regarded, Trafalgar becomes of somewhat secondary interest as
regards the tremendous strategical questions involved, but of profound
importance by reason of the side-issue that the Victory’s forward bulkhead
was so slightly built that she sustained an immense number of casualties
which would never have occurred had she been designed for the particular
purpose that Nelson used her for at Trafalgar. The tactics of Trafalgar have
merely a literary and sentimental interest now, and even the strategies which
led to the battle are probably of little utility to the strategists of our own
times. But the Victory’s thin forward bulkhead profoundly affected, and to
some extent still affects, modern British naval construction. Trafalgar, of
course, sanctified for many a year “end-on approach,” and so eventually
concentrated special attention on bulkheads. But previous to Trafalgar, the
return of the Victory after it for refit, and Seppings’ inspection of her, the
subject of end-on protection had been ignored. The cogitations of Seppings
helped to make what would have very much influenced history had any

similar battle occurred in the years that followed his constructional
innovations.
Again, at an earlier period much naval history turned upon the
ventilation of bilges. Improvements in this respect (devised by men never
heard of to-day) enabled British ships to keep the seas without their crews
being totally disabled by diseases which often overmastered their foes. The
skill of the admirals, the courage of the crews, both form more exciting
reading. Yet there is every indication to prove that this commonplace matter
of bilges was the secret of victory more than once!
Coming back to more recent times, the loss of the Vanguard, which
cost no lives, involved greater subsequent constructional problems than did
the infinitely more terrible loss of the Captain a few years before. Who
shall say on how many seeming constructional failures of the past,
successes of the yet unborn future may not rest?
A number of other things might be cited, but these suffice to indicate
the particular perspective of this book, and to show why, if regarded as an
orthodox “history” of the British Navy, it is occasionally in seemingly
distorted perspective.
To say that in the scheme of this book the ship-builder is put in the
limelight instead of the ship-user, would in no way be precisely correct,
though as a vague generalisation it may serve well enough. In exact fact
each, of course, is and ever has been dependent on the other. Nelson himself
was curtailed by the limitations of the tools provided for him. Had he had
the same problems one or two hundred years before he would have been
still more limited. Had he had them fifty or a hundred years later—who
shall say?
With Seppings’ improvements, Trafalgar would have been a well-nigh
bloodless victory for the British Fleet. It took Trafalgar, however, to inspire
and teach Seppings. Of every great sea-fight something of the same kind
may be said. The lead had to be given.
Yet those who best laboured to remove the worst disabilities of “the
means” of Blake, contributed in that measure to Nelson’s successes years
and years later on. Their efforts may surely be deemed worthy of record, for
all that between the unknown designer of the Great Harry in the sixteenth

century and the designers of Super-Dreadnoughts of to-day there may have
been lapses and defects in details. There was never a lapse on account of
which the user was unable to defeat any hostile user with whom he came
into conflict. The “means” provided served. The creators of warships
consistently improved their creations: but they were not improved without
care and thought on the part of those who produced them.
To those who provided the means and to the rank and file it fell that
many an admiral was able to do what he did. These admirals “made
history.” But ever there were “those others” who made that “history
making” possible, and who so made it also.
In dealing with the warships of other eras, I have been fortunate in
securing the co-operation of Mr. W. L. Wyllie, R.A., who has translated into
vivid pictorial obviousness a number of details which old prints of an
architectural nature entirely fail to convey. With a view to uniformity, this
scheme, though reinforced by diagrams and photographs, has been carried
right into our own times.
Some things which I might have written I have on that account left
unrecorded. There are some things that cold print and the English language
cannot describe. These things must be sought for in Mr. Wyllie’s pictures.
In conclusion, I would leave the dedication page to explain the rest of
what I have striven for in this book.
F. T. J.

PREFACE TO NEW EDITION

T HIS book was originally written three years ago. Since it was first
published the greatest war ever known has broken out. To meet that
circumstance this particular edition has been revised and brought to date in
order to present to the reader the exact state of our Navy when the fighting
began.
Modern naval warfare differs much from the warfare of the past; at any
rate from the warfare of the Nelson era. But if men and matériel have
altered, the general principles of naval war have remained unchanged.
Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the wheel of fortune has
brought us back to some similitude of those early days when to kill the
enemy was the sole idea that obtained, when there were no “rules of
civilised war,” when it was simply kill and go on killing.
To these principles Germany has reverted. The early history of the
British Navy indicates that we were able to render a good account of
ourselves under such conditions. For that matter we made our Navy under
such training. It is hard to imagine that by adopting old time methods the
Germans will take from us the Sea Empire which we thus earned in the
past.
F. T. J.
18th June, 1915.

CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE

I. THE BIRTH OF BRITISH NAVAL POWER 1

II. THE NORMAN AND PLANTAGENET ERAS 10

III. THE TUDOR PERIOD AND BIRTH OF A REGULAR
NAVY 35

IV. THE PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS 59

V. THE EARLY FRENCH WARS 88

VI. THE GREAT FRENCH WAR 133

VII. FROM THE PEACE OF AMIENS TO THE FINAL
FALL OF NAPOLEON 165

VIII. GENERAL MATTERS IN THE PERIOD OF THE
FRENCH WARS 194

IX. THE BIRTH OF MODERN WARSHIP IDEAS 211

X. THE COMING OF THE IRONCLAD 229

XI. THE REED ERA 264

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

IN COLOUR

FROM PICTURES BY W. L. WYLLIE, R.A.
PAGE
SUBMARINES IN THE CHANNEL Frontispiece
WARSHIP OF THE TIME OF KING ALFRED 3
RICHARD I. IN ACTION WITH THE SARACEN SHIP 13
BATTLE OF SLUYS 25
PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR, 1912 31
THE “GRACE DE DIEU,” 1515 39
THE SPANISH ARMADA, 1588 51
THE END OF A “GENTLEMAN ADVENTURER” 55
BLAKE AND TROMP—PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS 77
BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA AT SEA 117
THE “FOUDROYANT,” ONE OF NELSON’S OLD SHIPS 143
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, 1805 173
THE END OF AN OLD WARSHIP 191
A TRAFALGAR ANNIVERSARY 205
THE OLD “INVINCIBLE,” 1872 293

SHIP PHOTOGRAPHS

“SALAMANDER,” PADDLE WARSHIP 217
OLD SCREW WOODEN LINE-OF-BATTLESHIP
“LONDON” 221
“WARRIOR” 251
“ACHILLES” (WITH FOUR MASTS) 259
“MINOTAUR” (AS A FIVE-MASTER) 261
“BELLEROPHON” 269
“ROYAL SOVEREIGN” 273
“WATERWITCH” 277
“CAPTAIN” 289
“VANGUARD” 297
“HOTSPUR” AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED 309
“DEVASTATION” AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED 313

PORTRAITS

PHINEAS PETT 67
SIR ANTHONY DEANE 93
GENERAL BENTHAM 155
JOHN SCOTT RUSSELL 245
SIR E. J. REED 265

PLANS, DIAGRAMS, ETC.

PHINEAS PETT’S “ROYAL SOVEREIGN” 71
POSITIONS OF THE FLEETS AT THE OUTBREAK OF
WAR 167
EARLY BROADSIDE IRONCLADS 255
REED ERA BROADSIDE SHIPS 281
REED ERA TURRET SHIPS 285
RAMS OF THE REED ERA 301
BREASTWORK MONITORS 305

THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET.

I.

THE BIRTH OF BRITISH NAVAL POWER.

T HE birth of British naval power is involved in considerable obscurity
and a good deal of legend. The Phœnicians and the Romans have
both been credited with introducing nautical ideas to these islands, but of
the Phœnicians there is nothing but legend so far as any “British Navy” is
concerned. That the Phœnicians voyaged here we know well enough, and a
“British fleet” of the B.C. era may have existed, a fleet due to possible
Phœnicians who, having visited these shores, remained in the land. Equally
well it may be mythical.
Whatever share the ancient Britons may have had in the supposed
commercial relations with Gaul, it is clear that no fleet as we understand a
fleet existed in the days of Julius Cæsar. Later, while England was a Roman
province, Roman fleets occasionally fought upon British waters against
pirates and in connection with Roman revolutions, but they were ships of
the ruling power.
Roman power passed away. Saxons invaded and remained; but having
landed they became people of the land—not of the sea. Danes and other
seafarers pilaged English shores much as they listed till Alfred the Great
came to the throne.
Alfred has been called the “Father and Founder of the British Fleet.” It
is customary and dramatic to suppose that Alfred was seized with the whole
modern theory of “Sea Power” as a sudden inspiration—that “he recognised
that invaders could only be kept off by defeating them on the sea.”

This is infinitely more pretty than accurate. To begin with, even at the
beginning of the present Twentieth Century it was officially put on record
that “while the British fleet could prevent invasion, it could not guarantee
immunity from small raids on our great length of coast line.” In Alfred’s
day, one mile was more than what twenty are now; messages took as many
days to deliver as they now do minutes, and the “raid” was the only kind of
over-sea war to be waged. It is altogether chimerical to imagine that Alfred
“thought things out” on the lines of a modern naval theorist.
1
In actual fact, what happened was that Alfred engaged in a naval fight
in the year 875, somewhere on the South Coast. There is little or no
evidence to show where, though near Wareham is the most likely locality.
In 877 something perhaps happened to the Danes at Swanage, but the
account in Asser is an interpolated one, and even so suggests shipwreck
rather than a battle.
In 882 (possibly 881) two Danish ships sank: “the rest” (number not
recorded) surrendered later on.

WARSHIP OF THE TIME OF KING ALFRED.

In 884 occurred the battle of the Stour. Here the Saxon fleet secured a
preliminary success, in which thirteen Danish ships were captured. This
may or may not have been part of an ambush—at any rate the final result
was the annihilation of King Alfred’s fleet.
In 896 occurred the alleged naval reform so often alluded to as the
“birth of the British Navy”—those ships supposed to have been designed by
2
Alfred, which according to Asser were “full nigh twice as long as the
others ... shapen neither like Frisian nor the Danish, but so as it seemed to
him that they would be most efficient.”
Around these “early Dreadnoughts” much has been weaved, but there
is no evidence acceptable to the best modern historians that Alfred really
built any such ships—they tend to reject the entire theory.
The actual facts of that “naval battle of the Solent” in 897 from which
the history of our navy is popularly alleged to date, appear to be as follows:
There were nine of King Alfred’s ships, manned by Frisian pirates, who
were practically Danes. These nine encountered three Danish vessels in a
land-locked harbour—probably Brading—and all of them ran aground, the
Danish ships being in the middle between two Saxon divisions. A land fight
ensued, till, the tide rising, the Danish ships, which were of lighter draught
than the Saxon vessels, floated. The Danes then sailed away, but in doing so
two of them were wrecked.
All the rest of the story seems to be purely legendary. Our real “island
story”—as events during the next few hundred years following Alfred
clearly indicate—is not that of a people born to the sea; but the story of a
people forced thereto by circumstances and the need of self-preservation.
It is a very unromantic beginning. There is a strange analogy between it
and the beginning in later days of the Sea Power of the other “Island
Empire”—Japan. Japan to-day seeks—as we for centuries have sought—for
an historical sequence of the “sea spirit” and all such things as an ideal
islander should possess. Neither we nor they have ever understood or ever
properly realised that it was the Continentals who long ago first saw that it
was necessary to command the sea to attack the islanders. The more
obvious contrary has always been assumed. It has never been held, or even
suggested, that the Little Englander protesting against “bloated naval

armaments,” so far from being a modern anachronism, an ultra-Radical or
Socialist exotic, may really claim to be the true exponent of “the spirit of
the Islanders” for all time. That is one reason why (excluding the mythical
Minos of Crete) only two island-groups have ever loomed big in the world’s
history.
When Wilhelm II of Germany said: “Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem
Wasser,” he uttered a far more profound truth than has ever been fully
realised. Fleets came into being to attack Islanders with.
The Islanders saw the sea primarily as a protection existing between
them and the enemy. To the Continental the sea was a road to, or obstacle
between him and the enemy, only if the enemy filled it with ships. The
Islanders have ever tended to trust to the existence of the sea itself as a
defence, except in so far as they have been taught otherwise by individuals
who realised the value of shipping. Those millions of British citizens who
to-day are more or less torpid on the subject of naval defence are every whit
as normal as those Germans who, in season and out, preach naval
expansion.
The explanation of all this is probably to be found in the fact that the
earliest warfare known either to Continentals or to Islanders was military
warfare. The ship as at first employed was used entirely as a means of
transport for reaching the enemy—first, presumably, against outlying
islands near the coast, later for more over-sea expeditions.
Ideas of attack are earlier than ideas of defence, and the primary idea of
defence went no further than the passive defensive. King Alfred, merely in
realising the offensive defensive, did a far greater thing than any of the
legendary exploits associated with his history. The idea was submerged
many a time in the years that followed, but from time to time it appeared
and found its ultimate fruition in the Royal Navy.
Yet still, the wonder is not that only two Island Empires have ever
come into existence, but that any should have come into existence at all.
The real history of King Alfred’s times is that the Continental Danes did
much as they listed against the insular Saxons of England, till the need was
demonstrated for an endeavour to meet the enemy on his own element.

In the subsequent reigns of Athelstan and Edmund, some naval
expeditions took place. Under Edgar, the fleet reached its largest. Although
the reputed number of 3,600 vessels is, of course, an exaggerated one, there
was enough naval power at that time to secure peace.
This “navy” had, however, a very transient existence, because in the
reign of Ethelred, who succeeded to the throne, it had practically ceased to
exist, and an attempt was made to revive it. This attempt was so little
successful that Danish ships had to be hired for naval purposes.
A charter of the time of Ethelred II exists which is considered by many
to be the origin of that Ship Money which, hundreds of years later, was to
cause so much trouble to England. Under this, the maintenance of the Navy
was made a State charge on landowners, the whole of whom were assessed
at the rate of producing one galley for every three hundred and ten hides of
land that they possessed.
This view is disputed by some historians, who maintain that the charter
is possibly a forgery, and that it is not very clear in any case. However, it
does not appear to have produced any useful naval power.
That naval power was insufficient is abundantly clear from the ever
increasing number of Danish settlements. In the St. Bride’s Day massacre,
which was an attempt to kill off the leading Danes amongst the recent
arrivals, further trouble arose; and in the year 1013, Swain, King of
Denmark, made a large invasion of England, and in the year 1017, his son
Canute ascended to the throne.
Under Canute, the need of a navy to protect the coast against Danish
raids passed away. The bulk of the Danish ships were sent back to
Denmark, forty vessels only being retained.
Once or twice during the reign of Canute successful naval expeditions
were undertaken, but at the time of the King’s death the regular fleet
consisted of only sixteen ships. Five years later, an establishment was fixed
at thirty-two, and remained more or less at about that figure, till, in the reign
of Edward the Confessor trouble was caused by Earl Godwin, who had
created a species of fleet of his own. With a view to suppressing these a
number of King’s ships were fitted out; but as the King and Godwin came
to terms the fleet was not made use of.

Close following upon this came the Norman invasion, which of all the
foolhardy enterprises ever embarked on by man was theoretically one of the
most foolish. William’s intentions were perfectly well known. A certain
“English fleet” existed, and there was nothing to prevent its expansion into
a force easily able to annihilate the heterogeneous Norman flotilla.
How many ships and men William actually got together is a matter
upon which the old chroniclers vary considerably. But he is supposed to
3
have had with him some 696 ships ; and since his largest ships were not
over twenty tons and most of them a great deal smaller, it is clear that they
must have been crowded to excess and in poor condition to give battle
against anything of the nature of a determined attack from an organised
fleet.
No English fleet put in appearance, however. Harold had collected a
large fleet at Sandwich, but after a while, for some unknown reason, it was
dispersed, probably owing to the lateness of the season. The strength of the
fleet collected, or why it was dispersed, are, however, immaterial issues; the
fact of importance is that the fleet was “inadequate” because it failed to
prevent the invasion. A neglected fleet entailed the destruction of the Saxon
dominion.

II.

THE NORMAN AND PLANTAGENET ERAS.

W ILLIAM the Conqueror’s first act on landing was to burn all his
ships—a proceeding useful enough in the way of preventing any
of his followers retiring with their spoils, but inconvenient to him shortly
after he became King of England. Fleets from Denmark and Norway raided
the coasts, and, though the raiders were easily defeated on shore, the
pressure from them was sufficient to cause William to set about recreating a
navy, of which he made some use in the year 1071. In 1078 the Cinque
Ports were established, five ports being granted certain rights in return for
policing the Channel and supplying ships to the King as required. But the
amount of naval power maintained was very small, both in the reign of
William the First and his successors.
Not until the reign of Henry II was any appreciable attention paid to
nautical matters. Larger ships than heretofore were built, as we assume
from records of the loss of one alleged to carry 300 men. It was Henry II
who first claimed the “Sovereignty of the British Seas” and enacted the
Assize of Arms whereby no ship or timber for shipbuilding might be sold
out of England.
When Richard I came to the throne in 1189, fired with ambition to
proceed to the Crusades, he ordered all ports in his dominions to supply him
with ships in proportion to their population. The majority of these ships
came, however, from Acquitaine. The fleet thus collected is said to have
consisted of nine large ships, 150 small vessels, thirty galleys, and a number
of transports. The large ships, which have also been given as thirteen in
number, were known at the time as “busses.” They appear to have been
three-masters. The fleet sailed in eight divisions. This expedition to the
Holy Land was the first important over-sea voyage ever participated in by
English ships, the greatest distance heretofore traversed having been to
Norway in the time of Canute. This making of a voyage into the unknown

was, however, not quite so difficult as it might at first sight be supposed to
be, because there is no doubt whatever that the compass was by then well-
known and used. Records from 1150 and onwards exist which describe the
4
compass of that period. A contemporary chronicler wrote of it:—

“This [polar] star does not move. They [the seamen] have an art
which cannot deceive, by virtue of the manite, an ill brownish stone to
which iron spontaneously adheres. They search for the right point, and
when they have touched a needle on it, and fixed it to a bit of straw,
they lay it on water, and the straw keeps it afloat. Then the point
infallibly turns towards the star; and when the night is dark and
gloomy, and neither star nor moon is visible, they set a light beside the
needle, and they can be assured that the star is opposite to the point,
and thereby the mariner is directed in his course. This is an art which
cannot deceive.”

The compass would seem to have existed, so far as northern nations
were concerned, about the time of William the Conqueror. Not till early in
the Fourteenth Century did it assume the form in which we now know it,
but its actual antiquity is considerably more.
In connection with this expedition to the Holy Land, Richard issued a
Code of Naval Discipline, which has been described as the germ of our
Articles of War. Under this Code if a man killed another on board ship, he
was to be tied to the corpse and thrown into the sea. If the murder took
place on shore, he was to be buried alive with the corpse. The penalty for
drawing a knife on another man, or drawing blood from him in any manner
was the loss of a hand. For “striking another,” the offender was plunged
three times into the sea. For reviling or insulting another man,
compensation of an ounce of silver to the aggrieved one was awarded. The
punishment for theft was to shave the head of the thief, pour boiling pitch
upon it and then feather him. This was done as a mark of recognition. The
subsequent punishment was to maroon a man upon the first land touched.
Severe penalties were imposed on the mariners and servants for gambling.
Of these punishments the two most interesting are those for theft and
the punishment of “ducking.” This last was presumably keel-hauling, a

punishment which survived well into the Nelson era. It is to be found
described in the pages of Marryat. It consisted in drawing the offender by
ropes underneath the bottom of the ship. As his body was thus scraped
along the ship’s hull, the punishment was at all times severe; but in later
days, as ships grew larger and of deeper draught, it became infinitely more
cruel and heavy than in the days when it was first instituted.
The severe penalty for theft is to be noted on account of the fact that,
even in the early times, theft, as now, was and is recognised as a far more
serious offence on ship board than it is on shore—the reason being the
greater facilities that a ship affords for theft.

RICHARD 1st IN ACTION WITH THE SARACEN SHIP.

On his way to the Holy Land, Richard had a dispute at Sicily with the
King of France, out of which he increased his fleet somewhat. Leaving
Sicily, somewhere between Cyprus and Acre he encountered a very large
Saracen ship, of the battle with which very picturesque and highly coloured
accounts exist. There is no doubt that the ship was something a great deal

larger than anything the English had ever seen heretofore, although the crew
of 1,500 men with which she is credited by the chroniclers is undoubtedly
an exaggeration.
The ship carried an armament of Greek fire and “serpents.” The exact
composition of Greek fire is unknown. It was invented by the Byzantines,
who by means of it succeeded in keeping their enemies at bay for a very
long time. It was a mixture of chemicals which, upon being squirted at the
enemy from tubes, took fire, and could only be put out by sand or vinegar.
“Serpents” were apparently some variation of Greek fire of a minor order,
discharged by catapults.
In the first part of the attack the English fleet was able to make no
impression upon the enemy, as her high sides and the Greek fire rendered
boarding impossible. Not until King Richard had exhilarated his fleet by
informing them that if the galley escaped they “should be crucified or put to
extreme torture,” was any progress made. After that, according to the
contemporary account, some of the English jumped overboard and
succeeded in fastening ropes to the rudder of the Saracen ship, “steering her
as they pleased.” They then obtained a footing on board, but were
subsequently driven back. As a last resource King Richard formed his
galleys into line and rammed the ship, which afterwards sank.
The relation of Richard’s successor, King John, to the British Navy, is
one of some peculiar interest. More than any king before him he appears to
have appreciated the importance of naval power, and naval matters received
more attention than heretofore. In the days of King John the crews of ships
appropriated for the King’s service were properly provisioned with wine
and food, and there are also records of pensions for wounds, one of the
earliest being that of Alan le Walleis, who received a pension of sixpence a
5
day for the loss of his hand.
King John is popularly credited with having made the first claim to the
“Sovereignty of the Seas” and of having enacted that all foreign vessels
upon sighting an English one were to strike their flags to her, and that if
they did not that it was lawful to destroy them. The authenticity of this is,
however, very doubtful; and it is more probable that, on account of various
naval regulations which first appeared in the reign of King John, this

particular regulation was fathered upon him at a later date with the view to
giving it an historical precedent.
In the reign of King John the “Laws of Oleron” seem to have first
appeared, but it is not at all clear that they had any specific connection with
England. They appear rather to have been of a general European nature. The
gist of the forty-seven articles of the “Laws of Oleron,” of which the precise
5
date of promulgation cannot be ascertained, is as follows:—

“By the first article, if a vessel arrived at Bordeaux, Rouen, or any
other similar place, and was there freighted for Scotland, or any other
foreign country, and was in want of stores or provisions, the master
was not permitted to sell the vessel, but he might with the advice of his
crew raise money by pledging any part of her tackle or furniture.
“If a vessel was wind or weather bound, the master, when a change
occurred, was to consult his crew, saying to them, “Gentlemen, what
think you of this wind?” and to be guided by the majority whether he
should put to sea. If he did not do this, and any misfortune happened,
he was to make good the damage.
“If a seaman sustained any hurt through drunkenness or
quarrelling, the master was not bound to provide for his cure, but might
turn him out of his ship; if, however, the injury occurred in the service
of his ship, he was to be cured at the cost of the said ship. A sick sailor
was to be sent on shore, and a lodging, candles, and one of the ship’s
boys, or a nurse provided for him, with the same allowance of
provisions as he would have received on board. In case of danger in a
storm, the master might, with the consent of the merchants on board,
lighten the ship by throwing part of the cargo overboard; and if they
did not consent, or objected to his doing so, he was not to risk the
vessel but to act as he thought proper; on their arrival in port, he and
the third part of the crew were to make oath that it was done for the
preservation of the vessel; and the loss was to be borne equally by the
merchants. A similar proceeding was to be adopted before the mast or
cables were cut away.
“Before goods were shipped the master was to satisfy the
merchants of the strength of his ropes and slings; but if he did not do

so, or they requested him to repair them and a cask were stove, the
master was to make it good.
“In cases of difference between a master and one of his crew, the
man was to be denied his mess allowance thrice, before he was turned
out of the ship, or discharged; and if the man offered reasonable
satisfaction in the presence of the crew, and the master persisted in
discharging him, the sailor might follow the ship to her place of
destination, and demand the same wages as if he had not been sent
ashore.
“In case of a collision by a ship undersail running on board one at
anchor, owing to bad steering, if the former were damaged, the cost
was to be equally divided; the master and crew of the latter making
oath that the collision was accidental. The reason for this law was, it is
said, ‘that an old decayed vessel might not purposely be put in the way
of a better.’ It was specially provided that all anchors ought to be
indicated by buoys or ‘anchor-marks.’
“Mariners of Brittany were entitled only to one meal a day,
because they had beverage going and coming; but those of Normandy
were to have two meals, because they had only water as the ship’s
allowance. As soon as the ship arrived in a wine country, the master
was, however, to procure them wine.
“Several regulations occur respecting the seamen’s wages, which
show that they were sometimes paid by a share of the freight. On
arriving at Bordeaux or any other place, two of the crew might go on
shore and take with them one meal of such victuals as were on board,
and a proportion of bread, but no drink; and they were to return in
sufficient time to prevent their master losing the tide. If a pilot from
ignorance or otherwise failed to conduct a ship in safety, and the
merchants sustained any damage, he was to make full satisfaction if he
had the means to; if not, he was to lose his head; and, if the master or
any one of the mariners cut off his head, they were not bound to answer
for it; but, before they had recourse to so strong a measure, ‘they must
be sure he had not wherewith to make satisfaction.’
“Two articles of the code prove, that from an ‘accursed custom’ in
some places, by which the third or fourth part of ships that were lost

belonged to the lord of the place—the pilots, to ingratiate themselves
with these nobles, ‘like faithless and treacherous villains,’ purposely
ran the vessel on the rocks. It was therefore enacted that the said lords,
and all others assisting in plundering the wreck, shall be accursed and
excommunicated, and punished as robbers and thieves; that ‘all false
and treacherous pilots should suffer a most rigorous and merciless
death,’ and be suspended to high gibbets near the spot, which gibbets
were to remain as an example in succeeding ages. The barbarous lords
were to be tied to a post in the middle of their own houses, and, being
set on fire at the four corners, all were to be burned together; the walls
demolished, its site converted into a marketplace for the sale only of
hogs and swine, and all their goods to be confiscated to the use of the
aggrieved parties.
“Such of the cargoes as floated ashore were to be taken care of for
a year or more; and, if not then claimed, they were to be sold by the
lord, and the proceeds distributed among the poor, in marriage portions
to poor maids and other charitable uses. If, as often happened, ‘people
more barbarous, cruel, and inhuman than mad dogs,’ murdered
shipwrecked persons, they were to be plunged into the sea till they
were half-dead, and then drawn out and stoned to death.”

Those laws, unconnected though they appear to be with strictly naval
matters, are none the less of extreme interest as indicating the establishment
of “customs of the sea,” and the consequent segregation of a “sailor class.”
It has ever to be kept very clearly in mind that there was no such thing as a
“Navy” as we understand it in these days. When ships were required for war
purposes they were hired, just as waggons may be hired by the Army to-
day; nor did the mariners count for much more than horses. The “Laws of
Oleron,” however, gave them a certain general status which they had not
possessed before; and the regulations of John as to providing for those
engaged upon the King’s service—though they in no way constituted a
Royal Navy—played their part many years later in making a Royal Navy
possible, or, perhaps, it may be said, “necessary.” Necessity has ever been
the principal driving force in the naval history of England.
To resume. The limitations of the powers of the master (i.e. captain) in
these “Laws of Oleron” deserve special attention. “Gentlemen, what think

you of this wind?” from the captain to his crew would be considered
“democracy” carried to extreme and extravagant limits in the present day;
in the days when it was promulgated as “the rule” it was surely stranger
still! Little wonder that seamen at an early stage segregated from the
ordinary body of citizens and became, as described by Clarendon in his
“History of the Rebellion” a few hundred years later, when he wrote:—

“The seamen are a nation by themselves, a humorous and fantastic
people, fierce and rude and resolute in whatsoever they resolve or are
inclined to, but unsteady and inconstant in pursuing it, and jealous of
those to-morrow by whom they are governed to-day.”

To this, to the earlier things that produced it, those who will may trace
the extreme rigour of naval discipline and naval punishments, as compared
with contemporaneous shore punishments at any given time, and the
extraordinary difference at present existing between the American and
European navies. The difference is usually explained on the circumstance
that “Europe is Europe, and America, America.” But “differences” having
their origin in the “Laws of Oleron” may play a greater part than is
generally allowed.
The year 1213 saw the Battle of Damme. This was the first real naval
battle between the French and English. The King of France had collected a
fleet of some “seventeen hundred ships” for the invasion of England, but
having been forbidden to do so by the Pope’s Legate, he decided to use his
force against Flanders. This Armada was surprised and totally destroyed by
King John’s fleet.
After the death of John the nautical element in England declared for
Henry III, son of John, and against Prince Louis of France, who had been
invited to the throne of England by the barons. Out of this came the battle
of Sandwich, 1217, where Hubert de Burgh put into practice, though in
different form, those principles first said to have been evolved by Alfred the
Great—namely, to attack with an assured and complete superiority.
Every English ship took on board a large quantity of quick-lime and
sailed to meet the French, who were commanded by Eustace the Monk. De
Burgh manœuvred for the weather gauge. Having gained it, the English

ships came down upon the French with the wind, the quick-lime blowing
before them, and so secured a complete victory over the tortured and
blinded French. This is the first recorded instance of anything that may be
described as “tactics” in Northern waters.
The long reign of Henry III saw little of interest in connection with
nautical matters. But towards the end of Henry’s reign a private quarrel
between English and Norman ships, both seeking fresh water off the Coast
of Bayonne, had momentous consequences. The Normans, incensed over
the quarrel, captured a couple of English ships and hanged the crew on the
yards interspersed with an equal number of dead dogs. Some English
retaliated in a similar fashion on such Normans as they could lay hands on,
and, retaliation succeeding retaliation, it came about that in the reign of
Edward I, though England and France were still nominally at peace, the
entire mercantile fleets of both were engaged in hanging each other, over
what was originally a private quarrel as to who should be first to draw water
at a well.
Ultimately the decision appears to have been come by “to fight it out.”
Irish and Dutch ships assisted the English. Flemish and Genoese ships
assisted the Normans and French. The English to the number of 60 were
under Sir Robert Tiptoft. The number of the enemy is placed at 200, though
it was probably considerably less. In the battle that ensued the Norman and
French fleets were annihilated.
This battle, even more than others of the period, cannot be considered
as one of the battles of “the British fleet.” It is merely a conflict between
one clique of pirates and traders against another clique. But it is important
on account of the light that it sheds on a good deal of subsequent history;
for the fashion thus started lasted in one way and another for two or three
hundred years.
Nor were these disputes always international. Four years later than the
fight recorded above, in 1297, the King wished to invade Flanders with an
army of 50,000 men. The Cinque Ports being unable to supply the requisite
number of ships to transport this army, requisitions were also made at
Yarmouth. Bad blood soon arose between the two divisions, with the result
that they attacked each other. Thirty of the Yarmouth ships with their crews
were destroyed and the expedition greatly hampered thereby.

Two events of importance in British naval history happened in the reign
of Edward I. The first of these, which took place about the year 1300, arose
out of acts of piracy on foreigners, to which English ships were greatly
addicted at that time. In an appeal made to Edward by those Continentals
who had suffered most from these depredations, the King was addressed as
“Lord of the Sea.” This was a definite recognition of that sea claim first
formulated by Henry II and which was afterwards to lead to so much
fighting and bloodshed.
The second event was the granting of the first recorded “Letters of
Marque” in the year 1295. These were granted to a French merchant who
had been taking a cargo of fruit from Spain to England and had been robbed
by the Portuguese. He was granted a five year license to attack the
Portuguese in order to recoup his loss.
In the reign of Edward II the only naval event of interest is, that when
the Queen came from abroad and joined those who were fighting against
the King, the nautical element sided with her.
The reign of Edward III saw some stirring phases in English history.
With a view to carrying on his war against France, Edward bestowed
considerable attention on naval matters, and in the year 1338, he got
together a fleet stated to have consisted of 500 vessels. These were used as
transports to convey the Army to France, and are estimated to have carried
on the average about eighty men each.
Meanwhile, the French had also got together a fleet of about equal size,
and no sooner had the English expedition reached the shores of France than
the whole of the south coast of England was subjected to a series of French
raids. Southampton, Plymouth and the Cinque Ports were sacked and
burned with practical impunity. These raids continued during 1338 and
1339; the bulk of the English fleet still lying idle on transport service at
Edward’s base in Flanders. A certain number of ships had been sent back,
but most of these had been as hastily sent on to Scotland, where their
services had been urgently needed. Matters in the Channel culminated with
the capture of the two largest English ships of the time. A fleet of small
vessels hastily fitted out at the Cinque Ports succeeded in destroying
Boulogne and a number of ships that lay there, but generally speaking the
French had matters very much their own way on the sea.

Towards the end of 1339, Edward and his expedition returned to
England to refit, with a view to preparing for a fresh invasion of France
during the following summer.
As Edward was about to embark, he learned that the French King had
got together an enormous fleet at Sluys. After collecting some additional
vessels, bringing the total number of ships up to 250 or thereabouts, Edward
took command and sailed for Sluys, at which port he found the French fleet.
He localised the French on Friday, July 3rd, but it was not until the next day
that the battle took place.
The recorded number of the enemy in all these early sea fights requires
to be accepted with caution. For what it is worth the number of French ships
has been given at 400 vessels, each carrying 100 men. The French, as on a
later occasion they did on the Nile, lay on the defensive at the mouth of the
harbour, the ships being lashed together by cables. Their boats, filled with
stones, had been hoisted to the mast-heads. In the van of their fleet lay the
Christopher, Edward, and various other “King’s ships,” which they
captured in the previous year.

BATTLE OF SLUYS—1340.

The English took the offensive, and in doing so manœuvred to have the
sun behind them. Then, with their leading ships crowded with archers they
bore down upon the main French division and grappled with them. The
battle, which lasted right throughout the night, was fought with unexampled
fury, and for a long time remained undecisive, considerable havoc being
wrought by the French with the then novel idea of dropping large stones
from aloft. The combatants, however, were so mixed up that it is doubtful
whether the French did not kill as many of their own number as of the
enemy; whereas, on the other side, the use of English archers who were
noted marksmen told only against those at whom the arrows were directed.
Furthermore, the English had the tactical advantage of throwing the whole
of their force on a portion of the enemy, whom they ultimately totally
destroyed.
This Battle of Sluys took place in 1340. In 1346, after various truces,
the English again attacked France in force, and the result was the Battle of
Cressy. A side issue of this was the historic siege of Calais, which held out
for about twelve months. 738 ships and 14,956 men are said to have been
employed in the sea blockade.
Up to this time the principal English ship had been a galley, i.e.,
essentially a row boat. About the year 1350 the galley began to disappear as
a capital ship, and the galleon, with sail as its main motive power, took its
place. Also a new enemy appeared; for at that time England first came into
serious conflict with Spain.
To a certain extent the galleon was to the fleets of the Mid-Fourteenth
Century much what the ironclad was to the last quarter of the Nineteenth
Century, or “Dreadnoughts” at the end of the first decade of the Twentieth
Century.
The introduction of this type of vessel came about as follows:—
A fleet of Castillian galleons, bound for Flanders, whiled away the
monotony of its trip by acts of piracy against all English ships that it met. It
reached Sluys without interference. Here it loaded up with rich cargoes and
prepared to return to Spain. The English meanwhile collected a fleet to
intercept it, this fleet being in command of King Edward himself, who
selected the “cog Thomas” as his flagship.

The English tactics would seem to have been carefully thought out
beforehand. The Castillian ships were known to be of relatively vast size
and more or less unassailable except by boarding. The result was that when
at length they appeared, the English charged their ships into them, sinking
most of their own ships in the impact, sprang aboard and carried the enemy
by boarding. The leading figure on the English side was a German body-
servant of the name of Hannekin, who distinguished himself just at the
crisis of the battle by leaping on board a Castillian ship and cutting the
halyards. Otherwise the result of the battle might have been different,
because the Castillians, when about half only of the English ships were
grappled with them, hoisted their sails, with the object of sailing away and
destroying the enemy in detail. Hannekin’s perception of this intention
frustrated the attempt.
The advantages of the galleons (or carracks as they were then called),
must have been rendered obvious in this battle of “Les Espagnols-sur-Mer,”
as immediately afterwards ships on the models of those captured began to
be hired for English purposes.
Concurrent, however, with this building of a larger type of ship, a
decline of naval power began; and ten years later, English shipping was in
such a parlous state that orders were issued to the effect that should any of
the Cinque Ports be attacked from the sea, any ships there were to be hauled
up on land, as far away from the water as possible, in order to preserve
them.
In the French War of 1369, almost the first act of the French fleet was
to sack and burn Portsmouth without encountering any naval opposition.
In 1372 some sort of English fleet was collected, and under the Earl of
Pembroke sent to relieve La Rochelle, which was then besieged by the
French and Spanish. The Spanish ships of that period had improved on
those of twenty years before, to the extent that (according to Froissart),
some carried guns. In any case they proved completely superior to the
English, whose entire fleet was captured or sunk.
This remarkable and startling difference is only to be accounted for by
the difference in the naval policy of the two periods. In the early years of
Edward III’s reign, when a fleet was required it was in an efficient state, and
when it encountered the enemy, it was used by those who had obviously

thought out the best means of making the most of the material available. In
the latter stage, there was neither efficiency nor purpose. The result was
annihilation.
How far the introduction of cannon on shipboard contributed to this
result it is difficult to say exactly. In so far as it may have, the blame rests
with the English, who were perfectly familiar with cannon at that time. If,
therefore, the very crude stone-throwing cannon of those days had any
particular advantages over the stone-throwing catapults previously
employed, failure to fit them is merely a further proof of the inefficiency of
those responsible for naval matters in the closing years of Edward III’s
reign. Probably, however, the cannon contributed little to the result of La
Rochelle, for, like all battles of the era, it was a matter of boarding—of
“land fighting on the water.”
The reign of Richard II saw England practically without any naval
power at all. The French and Spaniards raided the Channel without
interference worth mention. Once or twice retaliatory private expeditions
were made upon the French coast; but speaking generally the French and
Spaniards had matters entirely their own way, and the latter penetrated the
Thames so far as Gravesend.
In the year 1380, an English army was sent over to France, but this, as
Calais was British, was a simple operation, and although two years later
ships were collected for naval purposes, English sea impotence remained as
conspicuous as ever. In 1385, when a French armada was collected at Sluys
for the avowed purpose of invading England on a large scale, no attempt
whatever seems to have been made to meet this with another fleet.
Fortunately for England, delays of one kind and another led to the French
scheme of invasion being abandoned.
Under Henry IV, matters remained much the same, until in the summer
of 1407, off the coast of Essex, the King, who was voyaging with five ships,
was attacked by French privateers, which succeeded in capturing all except
the Royal vessel.

PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR—1912.

This led to the organisation of a “fleet” and a successful campaign
against the privateers. The necessity of Sea Power began to be realised
again, and this so far bore fruit that in the reign of Henry V no less than
1,500 ships were (it is said) collected in the Solent, for an invasion of
France. But since some of these were hired from the Dutch and as every
English vessel of over twenty tons was requisitioned by the King, the large
number got together does not necessarily indicate the existence of any very
great amount of naval power. This fleet, however, indicated a revival of sea
usage.
In 1417, large ships known as “Dromons” were built at Southampton,
and bought for the Crown, but these were more of the nature of “Royal
Yachts” than warships. The principal British naval base at and about this
period was at Calais, of which, at the time of the War of the Roses, the Earl
of Warwick was the governor.

The first act of the Regency of Henry VI was to sell by auction such
ships as had been bought for the Crown under Henry V. The duty of keeping
the Channel free from pirates was handed over to London merchants, who
were paid a lump sum to do this, but did not do it at all effectively.
Edward IV made some use of a Fleet to secure his accession, or later
restoration. Richard III would seem to have realised the utility of a Fleet,
and during his short reign he did his best to begin a revival of “the Navy”
by buying some ships, which, however, he hired out to merchants for trade
purposes; and so, at the critical moment, he had apparently nothing
available to meet the mild over-sea expedition of Henry of Richmond. So—
right up to comparatively recent times—there was never any Royal Navy in
the proper meaning of the word, nor even any organised attempt to create an
equivalent, except on the part of those two Kings who we are always told
were the worst Kings England ever had—John and Richard III. Outside
these two, there is not the remotest evidence that anyone ever dreamed of
“naval power,” “sea power,” or anything of the sort, till Henry VII became
King of England, and founded the British Navy on the entirely unromantic
principle that it was a financial economy.
Such was the real and prosaic birth of the British Navy in relatively
recent times. It was made equally prosaic in 1910 by Lord Charles
Beresford, when he said, “Battleships are cheaper than war.”
There is actually no poetry about the British Navy. There never has
been—it will be all the better for us if there never is. It is merely a business-
like institution founded to secure these islands from foreign invasion.
Dibden in his own day, Kipling in ours, have done their best to put in the
poetry. It has been pretty and nice and splendid. But over and above it all I
put the words of a stoker whose name I never knew, “It’s just this—do your
blanky job!”
That is the real British Navy. Henry VII did not create this watchword,
nor anyone else, except perhaps Nelson.

III.

THE TUDOR PERIOD AND BIRTH OF A
REGULAR NAVY.

T HAT Henry VII assimilated the lesson of the utility of naval power is
abundantly clear. Henry VII it was who first established a regular
navy as we now understand it. Previous to his reign, ships were
requisitioned as required for war purposes, and, the war being over, reverted
to the mercantile service. The liability of the Cinque Ports to provide ships
when called upon constituted a species of navy, and certain ships were
specially held as “Royal ships” for use as required, but under Henry ships
primarily designed for fighting purposes appeared. The first of these ships
was a vessel generally spoken of as the “Great Harry,” though her real
name seems to have been The Regent, built in 1485. Incidentally this ship
remained afloat till 1553, when she was burned by accident. She has been
called “the first ship of the Royal Navy”; and though her right to the honour
has been contested, she appears fully entitled to it. The real founder of the
Navy as we understand a navy to-day was Henry VII.
Another important event of this reign is that during it the first dry dock
was built at Portsmouth. Up till then there had been no facilities for the
underwater repair of ships other than the primitive method of running them
on to the mud and working on them at low tide. While ships were small this
was not a matter of much moment, but directly larger vessels began to be
built, it meant that efficient overhauls were extremely difficult, if not
impossible.
Yet another step that had far reaching results was the granting of a
bounty to all who built ships of over 120 tons. This bounty, which was “per
ton” and on a sliding scale, made the building of large private ships more
profitable and less risky than it had been before, and so assisted in the
creation of an important auxiliary navy as complement to the Royal Navy.

The bounty system did more, however, than encourage the building of
large private ships. The loose method of computing tonnage already
referred to, became more elastic still when a bounty was at stake; and even
looser when questions of the ship being hired per ton for State purposes was
at issue. Henry VII, who was nothing if not economical, felt the pinch; the
more so, as just about this time Continentals with ships for hire became
alarmingly scarce. Something very like a “corner in ships” was created by
English merchants.
Henry VII was thus, by circumstances beyond his own control, forced
into creating a permanent navy in self defence. He died with a “navy” of
eighteen ships, of which, however, only two were genuinely entitled to be
called “H.M.S.” He had to hire the others!
This foundation of the “regular navy” is not at all romantic. But it is
how a regular navy came to be founded—by force of circumstances. Henry
VII, “founder of the Royal Navy,” undoubtedly realized clearer than any of
his predecessors for many a hundred years the meaning of naval power. But
—his passion for economy and the advantage taken by such of his subjects
as had ships available when hired ships were scarce, had probably a deal
more to do with the institution of a regular navy than any preconceived
ideas. In two words—“Circumstances compelled.” And that is how things
stood when Henry VIII came to the throne.
The nominal permanent naval power established by Henry VII
consisted of fifty-seven ships, and the crew of each was twenty-one men
and a boy, so that the Great Harry, which must have required a
considerably larger crew, would seem to have been an experimental vessel.
The actual force, however, was but two fighting ships proper.
Under Henry VIII, however, the policy of monster ships was vigorously
upheld, and one large ship built in the early years of his reign—the
Sovereign—was reputed to be “the largest ship in Europe.” In 1512 the
King reviewed at Portsmouth “twenty-five ships of great burthen,” which
had been collected in view of hostilities with France. These ships having
been joined by others, and amounting to a fleet of forty-four sail,
encountered a French fleet of thirty-nine somewhere off the coast of
Brittany.

This particular battle is mainly noteworthy owing to the fact that the
two flagships grappled, and while in this position one of them caught fire.
The flames being communicated to the other, both blew up. This
catastrophe so appalled the two sides that they abandoned the battle by
mutual consent; from which it is to be presumed that the nautical mind of
the day had, till then, little realised that risks were run by carrying
explosives.
The English, however, were less impressed by the catastrophe than the
enemy, since next day they rallied and captured or sank most of the still
panic-stricken French ships.
Henry replaced the lost flagship by a still larger ship, the Grace de
Dieu, a two-decker with the lofty poop and forecastle of the period. She was
about 1,000 tons. Tonnage, however, was so loosely calculated in those
days that measurements are excessively approximate.
When first cannon were introduced, they were (as previously remarked)
merely a substitute for the old-fashioned catapults, and discharged stones
for some time till more suitable projectiles were evolved. Like the catapults
they were placed on the poop or forecastle, as portholes had not then been
introduced. These were invented by a Frenchman, one Descharges, of Brest.
By means of portholes it was possible to mount guns on the main deck and
so increase their numbers.

THE “GRACE DE DIEU” 1515.

Although the earliest portholes were merely small circular holes which
did not allow of any training, and though the idea of them was probably
directly derived from the loopholes in castle walls, the influence of the
porthole on naval architecture was soon very great indeed. By means of this
device a new relation between size and power was established, hence the
“big displacements” which began to appear at this time. The hole for a gun
muzzle to protrude through, quickly became an aperture allowing of
training the gun on any ordinary bearing in English built ships. The English
(for a very long time it was English only) realisation of the possibilities of
the porthole in Henry VIII’s reign contributed very materially to the defeat
of the Spanish Armada some decades later. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to
say that the porthole was to that era what the torpedo has been in the present
one. Introduced about 1875 as a trivial alternative to the gun, in less than
forty years the torpedo came to challenge the gun in range to an extent that
as early as 1905 or thereabouts began profoundly to affect all previous ideas
of naval tactics, and that by 1915 has changed them altogether!

Another great change of these Henry VIII days was in the form of the
6
ships. At this era they began to be built with “tumble-home” sides, instead
of sides slanting outwards upwards, and inwards downwards as heretofore.
With the coming of the porthole came the decline of the cross-bow as a
naval arm. In the pre-porthole days every record speaks of “showers of
arrows,” and the gun appears to have been a species of accessory. In the
early years of the Sixteenth Century it became the main armament, and so
remained unchallenged till the present century and the coming of the long-
range torpedo.
Henry VIII’s reign is also remarkable for the first institution of those
“cutting out” expeditions which were afterwards to become such a
particular feature of British methods of warfare. This first attempt happened
in the year 1513, when Sir Edward Howard, finding the French fleet lying
in Brest Harbour refusing to come out, “collected boats and barges” and
attacked them with those craft. The attempt was not successful, but it
profoundly affected subsequent naval history.
Therefrom the French were impressed with the idea that if a fleet lay in
a harbour awaiting attack it acquired an advantage thereby. The idea
became rooted in the French mind that to make the enemy attack under the
most disadvantageous circumstances was the most wise of policies. That
“the defensive is compelled to await attack, compelled to allow the enemy
choice of the moment” was overlooked!
From this time onward England was gradually trained by France into
the role of the attacker, and the French more and more sank into the
defensive attitude. Many an English life was sacrificed between the
“discovery of the attack” in the days of Henry VIII, and its triumphant
apotheosis when centuries later Nelson won the Battle of the Nile; but the
instincts born in Henry’s reign, on the one hand to fight with any advantage
that the defensive might offer, on the other hand to attack regardless of
these advantages, are probably the real key to the secret of later victories.
The Royal ships at this period were manned by voluntary enlistment,
supplemented by the press-gang as vacancies might dictate. The pay of the
mariner was five shillings a month; but petty officers, gunners and the like
received additional pickings out of what was known as “dead pay.” By this
system the names of dead men, or occasionally purely fancy names, were

on the ship’s books, and the money drawn for these was distributed in a
fixed ratio. The most interesting feature of Henry VII and Henry VIII’s
navies is the presence in them of a number of Spaniards, who presumably
acted as instructors. These received normal pay of seven shillings a month
plus “dead pay.”
The messing of the crews was by no means indifferent. It was as
follows per man:—

Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday: ¾ lb. beef and ½ lb. bacon.
Monday, Wednesday, Saturday: Four herrings and two pounds of
cheese.
Friday: To every mess of four men, half a cod, ten herrings, one
pound of butter and one pound of cheese.

There was also a daily allowance of one pound of bread or biscuit. The
liquid allowance was either beer, or a species of grog consisting of one part
of sack to two of water. Taking into account the value of money in those
days and the scale of living on shore at the time, the conditions of naval life
were by no means bad, though complaints of the low pay were plentiful
enough. Probably, few received the full measure of what on paper they were
entitled to.
Henry VIII died early in 1547. In the subsequent reigns of Edward VI
and Mary, the Navy declined, and little use was made of it except for some
raiding expeditions.
When Elizabeth came to the throne the regular fleet had dwindled to
very small proportions, and, war being in progress, general permission was
given for privateering as the only means of injuring the enemy. It presently
degenerated into piracy and finally had to be put down by the Royal ships.
No sooner, however, was the war over than the Queen ordered a special
survey to be made of the Navy. New ships were laid down and arsenals
established for the supply of guns and gunpowder, which up to that time
had been imported from Germany. Full advantage was taken of the
privateering spirit, the erstwhile pirates being encouraged to undertake
distant voyages. In many of these enterprises the Queen herself had a

personal financial interest. She thus freed the country from various
turbulent spirits who were inconvenient at home, and at one and the same
time increased her own resources by doing so.
There is every reason to believe that this action of Elizabeth’s was part
of a well-designed and carefully thought out policy. The type of ship
suitable for distant voyages and enterprises was naturally bound to become
superior to that which was merely evolved from home service. The type of
seamen thus bred was also necessarily bound to be better than the home-
made article. Elizabeth can hardly have failed to realise these points also.
To the personnel of the regular Navy considerable attention was also
given. Pay was raised to 6/8 per month for the seamen, and 5/- a month with
4/- a month for clothing for soldiers afloat. Messing was also increased to a
daily ration of one pound of biscuit, a gallon of beer, with two pounds of
beef per man four days out of the seven, and a proportionate amount of fish
on the other three days. Subsequently, and just previous to the Armada, the
pay of seamen rose to 10/- a month, with a view to inducing the better men
not to desert.
The regular navy was thus by no means badly provided for as things
went in those days; while service with “gentlemen adventurers” offered
attractions to a very considerable potential reserve, and so England
contained a large population which, from one cause and another, was
available for sea service. To these circumstances was it due that the Spanish
Armada, when it came, never had the remotest possibility of success. It was
doomed to destruction the day that Elizabeth first gave favour to the
“gentlemen adventurers.”
Of these adventurers the greatest of all was Francis Drake, who in 1577
made his first long voyage with five ships to the Pacific Ocean. Drake,
alone, in the Pelican, succeeded in reaching the Pacific and carrying out his
scheme of operations, which—not to put too fine a point on it—consisted of
acts of piracy pure and simple against the Spaniards. He returned to
England after an absence of nearly three years, during which he
circumnavigated the globe.
There is little doubt that Drake in this voyage, and others like him in
similar expeditions, learned a great deal about the disadvantages of small
size in ships. Drake, however, learned another thing also. Up to this day the

crew of a ship had consisted of the captain and a certain military element;
also the master, who was responsible for a certain number of “mariners.”
The former were concerned entirely with fighting the ship—the latter
entirely with manœuvring it.
This system of specialisation, awkward as it appears thus baldly stated,
may have worked well enough in ordinary practice. It did not differ
materially from the differentiation between deck hands and the engineering
departments, which to a greater or less extent is very marked in every navy
of the present day.
Drake, however, started out with none too many men, and it was not
long before he lost some of those he had and found himself short-handed.
His solution of the difficulty is in his famous phrase, “I would have the
gentlemen haul with the mariners.” How far this was a matter of
expediency, how far the revelation of a new policy, is a matter of opinion. It
must certainly have been outside the purview of Elizabeth. But out of it
gradually came that every English sailor knew how to fight his ship and
how to sail her too, and this amounted to doubling the efficiency of the
crew of any ship at one stroke.
Of Drake himself, the following contemporary pen-picture, from a
7
letter written by one of his Spanish victims, Don Franciso de Zarate,
explains almost everything:—

“He received me favourably, and took me to his room, where he
made me seated and said to me: ‘I am a friend to those who speak the
truth, that is what will have the most weight with me. What silver or
gold does this ship bring?’
“... We spoke together a great while, until the dinner-hour. He told
me to sit beside him and treated me from his dishes, bidding me have
no fear, for my life and goods were safe; for which I kissed his hands.
“This English General is a cousin of John Hawkins; he is the same
who, about five years ago, took the port of Nombre de Dios; he is
called Francis Drake; a man of some five and thirty years, small of
stature and red-bearded, one of the greatest sailors on the sea, both
from skill and power of commanding. His ship carried about 400 tons,

is swift of sail, and of a hundred men, all skilled and in their prime, and
all as much experienced in warfare as if they were old soldiers of Italy.
8
Each one, in particular, takes great pains to keep his arms clean; he
treats them with affection, and they treat him with respect. I
endeavoured to find out whether the General was liked, and everyone
told me he was adored.”

Less favourable pictures of Drake have been penned, and there is no
doubt that some of his virtues have been greatly exaggerated. At the present
day there is perhaps too great a tendency to reverse the process. Stripped of
romance, many of his actions were petty, while those of some of his fellow
adventurers merit a harsher name. Hawkins, for instance, was hand-in-glove
with Spanish smugglers and a slave trader. Many of the victories of the
Elizabethan “Sea-Kings” were really trifling little affairs, magnified into an
importance which they never possessed.
But, when all is said and done, it is in these men that we find the birth
of a sea spirit which still lingers on, despite that other insular spirit
previously referred to—the natural tendency of islanders to regard the water
itself as a bulwark, instead of the medium on which to meet and defeat the
enemy.
The Spanish, already considerably incensed by the piratical acts of the
English “gentlemen adventurers,” presently found a further cause of
grievance in the assistance rendered by Elizabeth to their revolting
provinces in the Netherlands. Drake had not returned many years from his
famous voyage when it became abundantly clear that the Spaniards no
longer intended quietly to suffer from English interference.
Spain at that time was regarded as the premier naval power of Europe.
Her superiority was more mythical than actual, for reasons which will later
on be referred to: however, her commercial oversea activities were very
great. The wealth which she wrung from the Indies—though probably
infinitely less than its supposed value—was sufficient to enable her to equip
considerable naval forces, certainly larger ones numerically than any which
England alone was able to bring against them.
Knowledge of the fact that Spain was preparing the Armada for an
attack on England, led to the sailing of Drake in April, 1587, with a fleet

consisting of four large and twenty-six smaller ships, for the hire of which
the citizens of London were nominally or actually responsible. His real
instructions are not known, but there is little question that, as in all similar
expeditions, he started out knowing that his success would be approved of,
although in the event of any ill-success or awkward questions, he would be
publicly disavowed.
Reaching Cadiz, he destroyed 100 store ships which he found there;
and then proceeding to the Tagus, offered battle to the Spanish war fleet.
The Spanish admiral, however, declined to come out—a fact which of itself
altogether discredits the popular idea about the vast all-powerful ships of
Spain, and the little English ships, which, in the Armada days, could have
done nothing against them but for a convenient tempest. On account of this
expedition of Drake’s, the sailing of the Armada was put off for a year. So
far as stopping the enterprise was concerned, Drake’s expedition was a
failure. Armada preparations still went on.
It is by no means to be supposed that the Armada in its conception was
the foolhardy enterprise that on the face of things it looks to have been. The
idea of it was first mooted by the Duke of Alva so long ago as 1569. In
1583 it became a settled project in the able hands of the Marquis of Santa
Cruz, who alone among the Spaniards was not more or less afraid of the
English. In the battle of Tercera in 1583, certain ships, which if not English
were at any rate supposed to be, had shown the white feather. Santa Cruz
assumed therefrom that the English were easily to be overwhelmed by a
sufficiently superior force, and he designed a scheme whereby he would use
556 ships and an army of 94,222 men.
Philip of Spain had other ideas. Having a large army under the Duke of
Parma in the Netherlands, he proposed that this force should be transported
thence to England in flat-bottomed boats, while Santa Cruz should take
with him merely enough ships to hold the Channel, and prevent any
interference by the English ships with the invasion.
Before the delayed Armada could sail Santa Cruz died; and despite his
own protestations Medina Sidonia was appointed in Santa Cruz’s place to
carry out an expedition in which he had little faith or confidence. His total
force at the outset consisted of 130 ships and 30,493 men. Of these ships

not more than sixty-two at the outside were warships, and some of these did
not carry more than half-a-dozen guns.
The main English fighting force consisted of forty-nine warships, some
of which were little inferior to the Spanish in tonnage, though all were
much smaller to the eye, as they were built with a lower freeboard and
without the vast superstructures with which the Spaniards were
encumbered. As auxiliaries, the English had a very considerable force of
small ships; also the Dutch fleet in alliance with them.
The guns of the English ships were, generally speaking, heavier, all
their gunners were well trained, and their portholes especially designed to
give a considerable arc of fire, whereas the Spanish had very indifferent
gunners and narrow portholes. The Spaniards themselves thoroughly
recognised their inferiority in the matter of gunnery, and the specific
instructions of their admiral were that he was to negative this inferiority by
engaging at close quarters, and trust to destroying the enemy by small-arm
fire from his lofty superstructures.
The small portholes of the Spanish ships, which permitted neither of
training, nor elevation, nor depression, are not altogether to be put down to
stupidity or neglect of progress, for all that they were mainly the result of
ultra-conservatism. The gun—as Professor Laughton has made clear—was
regarded in Spain as a somewhat dishonourable weapon. Ideals of “cold
steel” held the field. Portholes were kept very small, so that enemies relying
on musketry should not be able to get the advantage that large portholes
might supply. To close with the enemy and carry by boarding was the be-all
and end-all of Spanish ideas of naval warfare. When able to employ their
own tactics they were formidable opponents, though to the English tactics
merely so many helpless haystacks.
On shore, in England, the coming of the Armada provoked a good deal
of panic; though the army which Elizabeth raised and reviewed at Tilbury
was probably got together more with a view to allaying this panic than from
any expectations that it would be actually required. The views of the British
seamen on the matter were entirely summed up in Drake’s famous jest on
Plymouth Hoe, that there was plenty of time to finish the game of bowls
and settle the Spaniards afterwards!

THE SPANISH ARMADA—1588.

Yet this very confidence might have led to the undoing of the English.
The researches of Professor Laughton have made it abundantly clear that
had Medina Sidonia followed the majority opinion of a council of war held
off the Lizard, he could and would have attacked the English fleet in
Plymouth Sound with every prospect of destroying it, because there, and
there only, did opportunity offer them that prospect of a close action upon
which their sole chance of success depended. Admiral Colomb has
elaborated the point still further, with a quotation from Monson to the effect
that had the Armada had a pilot able to recognise the Lizard, which the
Spaniards mistook for Ramehead, they might have surprised the English
fleet at Plymouth. This incident covers the whole of what Providence or
luck really did for England against the Spanish.
To a certain extent a parallel of our own day exists. When
Rodjestvensky with the Baltic fleet reached Far Eastern waters, there came
a day when his cruisers discovered the entire Japanese fleet lying in

Formosan waters. The Russian admiral ignored them and went on towards
Vladivostok. The parallel ends here because the “Japanese fleet” was
9
merely a collection of dummies intended to mislead him.
The first engagement with the Spanish Armada took place on Sunday,
June 21st. It was more in the nature of a skirmish than anything else. The
Spaniards made several vain and entirely ineffectual attempts to close with
the swifter and handier English vessels. They took care, however, to
preserve their formation, and so to that extent defeated the English tactics,
which were to destroy in detail what could not be destroyed without heavy
loss in the mass. So the Spaniards reached Calais on the 27th with a loss of
only three large ships.
They there discovered that Parma’s flat-bottomed boats were all
blockaded by the Dutch, and that any invasion of England was therefore
entirely out of the question. It must have been perfectly obvious to the most
sanguine of them by this that they could not force action with the swifter
English ships, while they could not relieve the blockaded boats without
being attacked at the outset. In a word, the Armada was an obvious failure.
On the night of the 28th, fire ships were sent into the Spanish fleet by
the English. This, though the damage done was small, brought the Spanish
to sea, and the next morning they were attacked off Gravelines by the
English. The battle was hardly of the nature of a fleet action, so much as
well-designed tactical operations intended to keep the enemy on the move.
It resulted in the Spaniards losing only seven ships in a whole day’s
fighting. The only really serious loss that the Spaniards sustained was that
they were driven into the North Sea, with no prospect of returning home
except by way of the North of Scotland.
Followed for awhile and harried by a portion of the English fleet,
which fell upon and destroyed stragglers, the Spaniards were driven into
what to most of them were unknown waters and uncharted seas. To the last
the retreating fleet maintained a show of order. Fifty-three ships succeeded
in returning to Spain.

THE END OF A “GENTLEMAN-ADVENTURER.”—THE “REVENGE.”—CAPTURED BY
SPANIARDS, 1591.

Stripped of romance this is the real prosaic history of the defeat of the
Spanish Armada. The wonder is not that so few Spanish ships returned, but
that so many did! The loss in Spanish warships proper appears to have been
little over a dozen all told, and of these not more than three at the outside
can be attributed to “the winds.”
Havoc was undoubtedly wrought, but the “galleons” which “perished
by scores” on the Scotch and Irish coasts were mainly the auxiliaries,
transports, and small fry; the battle fleet proper kept together all the time,
and with a couple of exceptions the ships reached home together as a
10
fleet.
At no time in the advance of the Spanish—probably at no time in the
retreat either—could the English have engaged close action with any
certainty of success. Victory was attributable solely and entirely to the
evolution of a type of ship, fast, speedy and handy, able to hit hard, and

which had been more or less specially designed with an eye to offering a
very small target to the clumsily designed Spanish style of gun mounting.
It was “history repeating itself” in another way. As Alfred overcame the
Danes by evolving something superior to the Danish galleys; so, in
Elizabethan days, there was evolved a type of warship meet for the
occasion.
From the defeat of the Armada and onwards, English naval operations
were mainly confined to raiding expeditions against the Spanish coast, with
a view to checking the collection of any further Armadas. These operations
were chiefly carried out by the “gentlemen adventurers”; but the real Navy
itself was maintained and added to, and at the death of Elizabeth in 1603, it
consisted of forty-two ships, of which the 68-gun Triumph of 1,000 tons
was the largest. This Navy was relied upon as the premier arm in case of
any serious trouble.

IV.

THE PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS.

W ITH the accession of James I peace with Spain came about, but the
Dutch being ignored in the transaction, out of this there arose that
ill-feeling and rivalry which was later on to culminate in the Dutch wars.
In James I’s reign no naval operations of great importance took place,
but considerable interest attaches to the despatch of eighteen ships (of
which six were “King’s Ships”), to Algiers in 1520. This was the first
appearance of an English squadron in the Mediterranean.
Under James I the numerical force of the Navy declined somewhat. The
11
art of shipbuilding, however, made considerable advance. A Shipwrights’
Company was established in 1656, and Phineas Pett, as its first master, built
and designed a 1,400 ton ship named the Prince Royal. Pett introduced a
variety of novelties into his designs, and the Prince Royal and her
successors were esteemed superior to anything set afloat elsewhere at the
time.
Here it is desirable to turn aside for a moment in order to realise the
influences at work behind Phineas Pett. It has ever been the peculiar fortune
of the Royal Navy—and for that matter of the inchoate “Navy” which
preceded its establishment—to have had men capable of “looking ahead”
and forcing the pace in such a way that new conditions were prepared for
when they arrived.
Of such a nature, each in his own way, were King Alfred, King John,
Richard III, and Henry VII, but greater than any of these was Sir Walter
Raleigh, whose visions in the days of Elizabeth and James I ran so clearly
and so far that even now we cannot be said to have left him behind where
“principles” are concerned. Drake was the national hero of Elizabethan
days, but in utility to the future, Raleigh was a greater than he, albeit his
best service was of the “armchair” kind.

The following extracts from Raleigh’s writings, except for geographical
and political differences, stand as true to-day as when he wrote them about
300 years ago. The idea of a main fleet, backed up by smaller vessels, the
idea of meeting the enemy on the water and so forth, are commonplaces
now, but in Raleigh’s time they were quite otherwise. The italicised portions
in particular indicate quite clearly in Elizabethan words the naval policy of
to-day.

“Another benefit which we received by this preparation was, that
our men were now taught suddenly to arm, every man knowing his
command, and how to be commanded, which before they were ignorant
of; and who knows not that sudden and false alarms in any army are
sometimes necessary? To say the truth, the expedition which was then
used in drawing together so great an army by land, and rigging so great
and royal a navy to sea, in so little a space of time, was so admirable in
other countries, that they received a terror by it; and many that came
from beyond the seas said the Queen was never more dreaded abroad
for anything she ever did.
“Frenchmen that came aboard our ships did wonder (as at a thing
incredible) that Her Majesty had rigged, victualled, and furnished her
royal ships to sea in twelve days’ time; and Spain, as an enemy, had
reason to fear and grieve to see this sudden preparation.
“It is not the meanest mischief we shall do to the King of Spain, if
we thus war upon him, to force him to keep his shores still armed and
guarded, to the infinite vexation, charge and discontent of his subjects;
for no time or place can secure them so long as they see or know us to
be upon that coast.
“The sequel of all these actions being duly considered, we may be
confident that whilst we busy the Spaniard at home, they dare not think
of invading England or Ireland; for by their absence their fleet from the
12
Indies may be endangered and in their attempts they have as little
hope of prevailing.
“Surely I hold that the best way is to keep our enemies from
treading upon our ground: wherein, if we fail, then must we seek to
make him wish that he had stayed at his own home. In such a case, if it

should happen, our judgments are to weigh many particular
circumstances, that belong not to this discourse. But making the
question general, the position, whether England, without that it is
unable to do so: and, therefore, I think it most dangerous to make the
adventure. For the encouragements of a first victory to an enemy, and
the discouragement of being beaten to the invaded, may draw after it a
most perilous consequence.
“Great difference, I know there is, and diverse consideration to be
had, between such a country as France is, strengthened with many
fortified places, and this of ours, where our ramparts are but the bodies
of men. But I say that an army to be transported over sea, and to be
landed again in an enemy’s country, and the place left to the choice of
the invader cannot be resisted on the coast of England without a fleet to
impeach it; no, nor on the coast of France, or any other country, except
every creek, port, or sandy bay had a powerful army in each of them to
make opposition.... For there is no man ignorant that ships, without
putting themselves out of breath, will easily outrun the soldiers that
13
coast them.
“Whosoever were the inventors, we find that every age hath added
somewhat to ships, and to all things else. And in mine own time the
shape of our English ships hath been greatly bettered. It is not long
since the striking of the topmast (a wonderful ease to great ships, both
at sea and in harbour) hath been devised, together with the chain pump,
which takes up twice as much water as the ordinary did. We have lately
added the Bonnet and the Drabler. To the courses we have devised
studding-sails, topgallant-masts, spritsails, topsails. The weighing of
anchors by the capstone is also new. We have fallen into consideration
of the lengths of cable, and by it we resist the malice of the greatest
winds that can blow. Witness our small Millbroke men of Cornwall,
that ride it out at anchor half seas over between England and Ireland,
all the winter quarter. And witness the Hollanders that were wont to
ride before Dunkirk with the wind at north-west, making a lee-shoar in
all weathers. For true it is, that the length of the cable is the life of the
ship, riding at length, is not able to stretch it; and nothing breaks that is
not stretched in extremity. We carry our ordnance better than we were

wont, because our nether over-loops are raised commonly from the
water, to wit, between the lower part of the sea.
“In King Henry VIII time, and in his presence at Portsmouth, the
Mary Rose, by a little sway of the ship in tacking about, her ports being
within sixteen inches of the water, was overset and lost.
“We have also raised our second decks, and given more vent
thereby to our ordnance lying on our nether-loop. We have added cross
14
pillars in our royal ships to strengthen them, which be fastened from
the keels on to the beam of the second deck to keep them from setting
or from giving way in all distresses.
“We have given longer floors to our ships than in elder times, and
better bearing under water, whereby they never fall into the sea after
the head and shake the whole body, nor sink astern, nor stoop upon a
wind, by which the breaking loose of our ordnance, or of the not use of
them, with many other discommodities are avoided.
“And, to say the truth, a miserable shame and dishonour it were for
our shipwrights if they did not exceed all others in the setting up of our
Royal ships, the errors of other nations being far more excusable than
ours. For the Kings of England have for many years being at the
charge to build and furnish a navy of powerful ships for their own
defence, and for the wars only. Whereas the French, the Spaniards, the
Portuguese, and the Hollanders (till of late) have had no proper fleet
belonging to their Princes or States. Only the Venetians for a long time
have maintained their arsenal of gallies. And the Kings of Denmark and
Sweden have had good ships for these last fifty years.
“I say that the aforenamed Kings, especially the Spaniards and
Portugals, have ships of great bulk, but fitter for the merchant than for
the man-of-war, for burthen than for battle. But as Popelimire well
observeth, ‘the forces of Princes by sea are marques de grandeur
d’estate—marks of the greatness of an estate—for whosoever
commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the
trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently
the world itself.’

“Yet, can I not deny but that the Spaniards, being afraid of their
Indian fleets, have built some few very good ships; but he hath no ships
in garrison, as His Majesty hath; and to say the truth, no sure place to
keep them in, but in all invasions he is driven to take up of all nations
which come into his ports for trade....

* * * * *
“But there’s no estate grown in haste but that of the United
Provinces, and especially in their sea forces, and by a contrary way to
that of Spain and France; the latter by invasion, the former by
oppression. For I myself may remember when one ship of Her
Majesty’s would have made forty Hollanders strike sail and come to an
anchor. They did not then dispute de Mari Libero, but readily
acknowledged the English to be Domini Maria Britannici. That we are
less powerful than we were, I do hardly believe it; for, although we
have not at this time 135 ships belonging to the subject of 500 tons
each ship, as it is said we had in the twenty-fourth year of Queen
Elizabeth; at which time also, upon a general view and muster, there
were found in England of able men fit to bear arms, 1,172,000, yet are
our merchant ships now far more warlike and better appointed than
they were, and the Navy royal double as strong as it then was. For these
were the ships of Her Majesty’s Navy at that time:

1. The Triumph
2. The Elizabeth Jonas
3. The White Bear
4. The Philip and Mary
5. The Bonadventure
6. The Golden Lyon
7. The Victory
8. The Revenge
9. The Hope
10. The Mary Rose
11. The Dreadnought
12. The Minion
13. The Swiftsure

to which there have been added:—

14. The Antilope
15. The Foresight
16. The Swallow
17. The Handmaid
18. The Jennett
19. The Bark of Ballein
20. The Ayde
21. The Achates
22. The Falcon
23. The Tyger
24. The Bull

“We have not, therefore, less force than we had, the fashion, and
furnishing of our ships considered, for there are in England at this time
400 sail or merchants, and fit for the wars, which the Spaniards would
call galleons; to which we may add 200 sail of crumsters, or hoyes of
Newcastle, which, each of them, will bear six Demi-culverins and four
Sakers, needing no other addition of building than a slight spar deck
fore and aft, as the seamen call it, which is a slight deck throughout....
“I say, then, if a vanguard be ordained of those hoyes, who will
easily recover the wind of any other sort of ships, with a battle of 400
other warlike ships, and a rear of thirty of His Majesty’s ships to
sustain, relieve, and countenance the rest (if God beat them not) I know
not what strength can be gathered in all Europe to beat them. And if it
be objected that the States can furnish a far greater number, I answer
that His Majesty’s forty ships, added to the 600 beforenamed, are of
incomparable greater force than all that Holland and Zealand can
furnish for the wars. As also, that a greater number would breed the
same confusion that was found in Xerxes’ land army of 1,700,000
soldiers; for there is a certain proportion, both by sea and land, beyond
which the excess brings nothing but disorder and amazement.”

I have quoted from Raleigh at considerable length—a length which
may seem to some out of all proportion to the general historical scheme of
this work. But of the three possible “founders of the British Navy,” King

Alfred by legend, King Henry VII by force of circumstances, and Sir Walter
Raleigh, Knight, by his realisation of certain eternal verities of naval
warfare, the palm goes best to Raleigh, to whose precepts it was mainly due
that England did not succumb to Holland in the days of the Dutch wars.
Compared to the struggle with the Dutch, neither the Spanish wars, which
preceded them, nor the great French wars which followed, were of any like
importance as regarded the relative risks and dangers. And the interest is the
greater in that where the United Provinces were, about and just after
Raleigh’s time, Germany stands towards the British Navy to-day.
In 1618 the Duke of Buckingham was appointed Lord High Admiral
and continued in that position after the accession of Charles I. Of the
incapacity of the Duke much has been written, but whatever may be said in
connection with various unsuccessful oversea enterprises, for which he was
officially responsible, naval shipbuilding under his régime made very
considerable progress.
Things were quite otherwise, however, with the personnel. Abuses of
every sort and kind crept in unchecked, and the men were the first to feel
the pinch. The unscrupulous contractor appeared, and with him the era of
offal foods and all kinds of similar abuses, of which many have lasted well
into our own time, and some exist still. The money allotted for the men of
the fleet became the prey of every human vulture, the officers, as a rule,
being privy thereunto. Besides food, clothing also fell into the hands of
contractors who supplied shoddy at ridiculously high prices, with the
commission to officers stopped out of the men’s pay.
Pay, nominally, rose a good deal, and in 1653 reached twenty-four
shillings a month for the seaman, but the figures (approximately equal in
purchasing value to the pay of to-day) convey nothing. The men were half-
starved, or worse, on uneatable food, and their clothing was such that they
went about in rags and died like rats in their misery.
The first naval event in Charles I’s reign is mainly of interest because
of the peculiar personal circumstances that attended it. One King’s ship and
six hired ships were despatched, nominally to assist the French against the
Genoese. On arriving at Dieppe, however, the English officers and men
discovered that they were really to be used against the revolted French
Protestants of La Rochelle. This being against their taste, they returned to

the Downs and reported themselves to the King. They were ordered to sail
again for La Rochelle. One captain, however, point blank refused to do so.
The other ships went, but the officers and men, with a single exception,
having handed their ships over to the French, returned to England.
Little or nothing seems to have been done in the way of punishment to
the mutineers (possibly on account of public opinion). But the incident
sheds an interesting sidelight on the state of the Navy at the time. It is
hardly to be conceived that the Army at the same period could have acted in
similar fashion with equal impunity.

PHINEAS PETT, 1570–1647.
From the contemporary portrait by William Dobson in the National Portrait
Gallery.

The history of the British Navy of this period is the history of a navy
lacking in discipline, and its officers divided against each other. Such
expeditions as were undertaken against France and Spain signally failed. It
is usual to attribute these failures to the mal-administration of the Duke of
Buckingham, an unpopular figure. But whether this is just or not is another
matter. The entire Navy was rotten to the core in its personnel. But

Buckingham’s share in it would seem to have been inability to understand
rather than direct carelessness.
Under the Duke’s régime the building of efficient warships continued to
progress. The “ship money,” which was to cause so much trouble inland
later, is outside the scope of this work, save in so far as its direct naval
aspect is concerned. This, of course, was the principle that inland places
benefited from sea defence quite as much as seaside districts. A great deal
of the money was undoubtedly spent on shipbuilding; indeed, some of the
trouble lay over alleged (and seemingly obvious) excessive expenditure on
the “Dreadnought” of the period, Phineas Pett’s Royal Sovereign, a ship
altogether superior to anything before built in England, and the first three-
decker ever constructed in this country. She was laid down in 1635 and
launched in 1657. An immense amount of gilding and carving about her
irritated the economically minded, but it is questionable whether the
objections were well informed.
Just about this time elaborate ornamentations of warships was the
“vogue,” and it carried moral effect accordingly. What to the uninitiated
landsmen merely spelt “waste of money on unnecessary display” spelt
something else to those who went across the seas. Even in our own present
utilitarian days a fresh coat of paint to a warship has been found to have a
political value; and fireworks and illuminations (seemingly pure waste of
money) have played their share in helping to preserve the peace.
John Hampden, according to his lights, was a patriot, and according to
the purely political questions with which he was concerned he may also
have been; but on the naval issue of Ship Money he was little more or less
than the First Little Englander, and hampered by just that same inability to
see beyond his nose which characterised the modern Little Englander who
protested against “bloated naval expenditure.” The intentions were excellent
—the intelligence circumscribed.
A contemporary account of the Royal Sovereign is as follows:—

“Her length by the keele is 128 foote or thereabout, within some
few inches; her mayne breadth or wideness from side to side, 48 foote;
her utmost length from the fore-end to the stern, a prova ad pupin, 232
foote. Shee is in height, from the bottom of her keele to the top of her

lanthorne, 76 foote; she beareth five lanthornes, the biggest of which
will hold ten persons to stand upright, and without shouldering or
pressing one on the other.
“Shee hath three flush deckes and a forecastle, an halfe decke, a
quarter-decke, and a round house. Her lower tyre hath thirty ports,
which are to be furnished with demi-cannon and whole cannon,
throughout being able to beare them; her middle tyre hath also thirty
ports for demi-culverin and whole culverin; her third tyre hath twentie
sixe ports for other ordnance; her forecastle hath twelve ports, and her
halfe decke hath fourteen ports; she hath thirteene or fourteene ports
more within board for murdering-pieces, besides a great many loope-
holes out of the cabins for musket shot. Shee carrieth, moreover, ten
pieces of chase ordnance in her right forward, and ten right off,
according to lande service in the front and the reare. Shee carrieth
eleven anchores, one of them weighing foure thousand foure hundred
pounds; and according to these are her cables, mastes, sayles, cordage.”

Ex. Fincham.

THE ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
The dotted lines represent a ship of the time of 1850.

It remains to add that the ship was extraordinarily well built. She fought
many a battle and survived some fifty years, and then only perished
because, when laid up for refit in 1696, she was accidentally burned. And
about sixty-three years ago (1852) naval architects still alluded to her with
respect, nor did their designs differ from her very materially.
Wherever and however Charles I and the Duke of Buckingham failed,
their shipbuilding policy cannot but command both respect and admiration.
It is the curious irony of fate that—excepting King Alfred, and also Queen
Elizabeth—it is the Sovereigns of England with black marks against them
who ever did most for the Navy or understood its importance. And
understanding what the Navy meant, generally secured these marks at the
hands of some quite well meaning but intellectually circumscribed
prototype or successor of John Hampden, to whom “meeting the enemy on

the water” was an entirely indigestible theory, and a waste of money into
the bargain. There is no question whatever that to them the sea appeared a
natural rampart and ships upon it pure superfluity, save in so far as
inconvenience to the shore counties might result. Later on, Cromwell, of
course, acted on a different principle—but Cromwell was an Imperialist.
Hampden was merely the “Insular Spirit” personified.
In 1639, a naval incident occurred which goes to discredit the popular
idea of the impotence of the British Navy under Charles I, whatever its
internal condition. Naval operations were in progress between Holland and
France on the one side, and Spain on the other. The British fleet was fitted
out under Sir John Pennington (that same Pennington who had commanded
the squadron which refused to attack La Rochelle) with orders to maintain
British neutrality.
The Spanish fleet took refuge from the Dutch in the Downs, whereupon
Pennington informed the rival admirals that he should attack whichever of
them violated the neutrality of an English harbour. The Spanish having fired
upon the Dutch, the Dutch Admiral Van Tromp applied to Pennington for
permission to attack the Downs. This was given, and the bulk of the Spanish
fleet destroyed. The incident suggests that the English fleet was recognised
as a neutral able to enforce its orders against all and sundry.
In connection with this, it is interesting to record the existence of a
naval medal of the period, bearing the motto: “Nec meta mihi quae terminus
orbi”—a free translation of which would be, “Nothing limits me but the size
of the World.” However short practice may have fallen, Charles and his
advisers had undoubtedly grasped the theory of “Sea Power.”

THE CIVIL WAR.
When the Civil war began in 1642, the regular fleet consisted of forty-
two ships. It was seized by the Parliamentarians and put under the Earl of
Warwick, who held command for six years. With his fleet he very
effectually patrolled the Channel, rendering abortive all over-sea attempts to
assist the King with arms and ammunition.
On Warwick being superseded in 1648, the fleet mutinied, and
seventeen ships sailed for Holland to join Prince Charles; but upon Warwick
being reinstated the bulk of the fleet returned to its allegiance to the

Parliamentarians. That the Parliamentarians were fully alive to the
importance of naval power is evidenced by the fact that they seized every
opportunity to lay down new ships; and “Parliament” once in power made it
very clear indeed that the Sovereignty of the Seas would be upheld at all
costs.

THE FIRST DUTCH WAR.
Some forty years before, Sir Walter Raleigh, discussing the rise of the
Dutch United Provinces, remarked: “But be their estate what it will, let
them not deceive themselves in believing that they can make themselves
masters of the sea.” He advised the Dutch to remember that their inward
and outward passages were through British seas. There were but two
courses open to the Dutch: amity with England or destruction of English
naval power.
Since both nations had large commercial fleets, rivalries were
inevitable; and for some long while previous to 1652, both sides were ready
enough for a quarrel. Minor acts of hostility occurred. The Dutch failed to
pay the annual tax for fishing in British waters. In May, 1652, a Dutch
squadron refused to pay respect to the English flag. It was fired on
accordingly, and after some negotiations, war was declared two months
later.
The war is interesting because it saw an end to the old ideas of cross-
raiding with ships regarded primarily as transports in connection with raids
or to cover such. In this war fighting on the sea for the command of the sea
first made a distinct appearance. Its birth was necessarily obscure and
involved, both sides having the primary idea of attacking the commerce of
the enemy and defending their own, rather than of attacking the enemy’s
fleet. The earlier battles which took place were brought about by the
defence of merchant fleets.
None of the battles of 1652 were conclusive, and though marked with
extraordinary determination on both sides the damage done was, relatively
speaking, small. The general advantage for the year rested slightly with the
Dutch, mainly owing to Tromp’s victory over Blake, who was found in
considerably inferior force in the Downs.

In February of the following year Tromp, with a fleet of seventy
warships and a convoy of 250 merchant ships, some of which were armed,
met Blake with sixty-six sail in the famous Three Days’ Battle.
In the course of this fight the Dutch lost at least eight warships, and a
number of merchant-men variously estimated at from twenty-four to forty.
The English admitted to the loss of only one ship. At the end of the third
day, however, Blake drew off, and the Dutch admiral got what was left of
his convoy into harbour.
Oliver Cromwell being now in full power, naval preparations were
pressed forward with unexampled vigour, and on June 2nd an English fleet
of ninety-five sail under Monk and Deane met Van Tromp and forced him to
retreat. Reinforced by Blake with eighteen more ships the English fleet
renewed the battle, ultimately driving Van Tromp into harbour with the loss
of several ships.
On the 29th July the Dutch ran the blockade and came out. On the 31st
a battle began in which Van Tromp was killed, and the Dutch with the loss
of many ships driven into the Texel.
The English fleet, though it lost few ships, appears to have been badly
mauled in this final battle, on account of which the Dutch claimed a victory.

BLAKE AND TROMP. PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS.

In the following month the Dutch fleet again came out, and under De
Witt took one convoy to the Sound and brought another back without
interference. Just afterwards, however, their fleet was so severely injured by
a tremendous three days’ gale that further naval operations were out of the
question. Overtures for peace were therefore made, and concluded.
The types of English warships in this first Dutch war are given in
Pepys’ Miscellany as follows:—

Length Breadth. Depth.
Burthen Highest No. of
Rate. Name. of Keel.
Tons. Men. Guns.
ft. ft. in. ft. in.
First Sovereign 127 46 6 19 4 1141 600 100
Second Fairfax 116 34 9 17 4½ 745 260 52
Third Worcester 112 32 8 16 4 661 180 46
Fourth Ruby 105½ 31 6 15 9 556 150 40
Fifth Nightingale 88 25 4 12 8 300 90 24
Sixth Greyhound 60 20 3 10 0 120 80 18

The principal Dutch vessels were conspicuously inferior to the best of
these English ones, and the war may be said to have been considerably
decided by ship superiority. In the peace that followed—which was really
very little better than an armed truce—the Dutch set themselves to build
warships more on English lines. And, as we shall presently see, they
15
evolved from the war, future strategies based on its lessons.
Considering the number of battles and the desperate nature of them, it
is perhaps curious to note the relatively small amount of damage done. With
the advent of the porthole and the consequent multiplication of guns a
hundred and fifty years before, it had seemed that any naval engagement
must result in swift mutual destruction. Much the same kind of idea
obtained as when at the end of 1910 a squadron of Dreadnoughts almost
instantly obliterated a target five miles off. But as in the Armada fights, so
in this First Dutch War, an immense amount of fighting was done with
comparatively, and relatively to what might have been anticipated, small
harm on either side.
This result is partly to be attributed to the fact that defence increased
with offence. The warship proper was designed to stand hammering, and
every increase in size, involving increased gun-carrying capacity, involved
also increased strength of construction. Something may also be put down to
the very inferior artillery then in use, and the great deal of boarding which
took place.
There is some reason to believe that Cromwell, with his complete
recognition of the advantages of naval power, with his assiduous energy in
the creation of a strong fleet, recognised—as perhaps both Buckingham and
Phineas Pett had done before—the advantages of the “big ship.” Yet under
his rule no appreciable advance in size took place. Nor, for that matter, did
it take place any time within a hundred and fifty years later on.
The reason is interesting. It was purely a matter of trees. The length of a
ship was circumscribed by the height of trees; other dimensions by similar
hard facts. The beam was dependent on the ship’s length; while the draught
was governed by the harbours and docking facilities. It is doubtful whether
any man ever sought to solve the problem of an invincible navy with more
energy than Oliver Cromwell; yet under his rule nothing in the way of
improvement was evolved at all comparable with the step taken with the

Royal Sovereign under the weaker Charles Stuart—Buckingham régime.
The limitations of the tree proved the limitations of the ship.
When Cromwell died, his record was left in numbers. The Navy at his
death consisted of 157 ships. His architectural improvements were but a
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new form of bottoms.
Oliver Cromwell had not been long dead when the Navy—then under
Monk—decided to restore the Monarchy. It sailed to Holland, embarked
Charles II and James, Duke of York, and established Charles on the throne
without opposition. Monk is popularly regarded as a political time-server.
But in his change of sides he made one very important stipulation: that
Charles was to pledge himself to the upkeep of the fleet. The fleet
accomplished the Restoration. The bulk of evidence is that it did so with
little regard for any issue other than the naval one.

THE SECOND DUTCH WAR.
The second Dutch War broke out in 1665. As usual a state of unofficial
war had preceded it. Both sides, having thought over the first war, had come
to the conclusion that protecting their own merchant ships and attacking
those of the enemy at one and the same time was an impossible proposition.
Both officially ordered their merchant ships to keep inside harbour; but
in both nations there were traders who took their own risks at sea and found
warships handy to protect them. None the less, this war is of much
importance as the first in which the command of the sea, fleet against fleet,
received general recognition.
The battles themselves of this war are of little interest. They were
marked by that same equality of courage and determination which was an
outstanding feature of the First War. Slight early English successes led to
little but attacks on merchant shipping; then the Great Plague paralysed
English efforts. The Dutch got to the mouth of the Thames, but a sudden
sickness among their crews scared them off after a sixteen days’ blockade.
Following this the French took side with the Dutch; but inconclusive
fighting still resulted, till the Dutch, imagining that they had done better
than they really had, found themselves engaged in the battle of the North
Foreland.

Defeated in this they retired to Ostend, and the English scored on their
trade by landing operations and harbour attacks, the result of which Admiral
Colomb has estimated as proportionately equivalent to sixty-six million
pounds’ worth of damage at the present day! But it was conceded on the
English side (vide Pepys) that it was mainly a matter of luck that this
immense blow was struck.
Shortly after this event, the Insular spirit asserted itself with what in
these days is known as “Economy and Efficiency.” The Duke of York
(afterwards James II) opposed it, but it was generally carried that the Dutch
were defeated, and that a few economical fortifications would save the
country against any further Dutch danger. No one having knowledge of the
Dutch agreed. Indeed, the situation was precisely the same as when a few
years ago the British Government cut down the Naval Programme. Charles
II, peace talk being in the air, cut down expenses probably for his own ends;
British Governments of the 1906–1907 era cut down with a view to
expending the saving on “social reforms.” But the practical results were
identical. The Dutch in their era did what the Germans did in our own—met
the decrease by an increase. They omitted to consider the ethics involved;
they looked merely after their own ends. The result was a great Dutch attack
on the Thames, which, though not so serious as the similar previous English
attack on them, produced an enormous amount of mischief.
That the Dutch did not bombard London itself was purely a matter of
contrary winds and luck. They did destroy numerous new warships on the
river, and Sheerness fell entirely into their hands. “Dutch guns were heard
in London”—to quote the popular histories. Actually luck favoured the
English, and diplomacy secured a peace which the reduced fleet could never
have achieved. The pen, for the moment, proved mightier than the sword.
England obtained thereby a peace favourable to her, while the Dutch
secured a breathing space to enable them to prepare for the Third Dutch
War, which, had the Second been carried to its end against them, would
never have occurred.

THE THIRD DUTCH WAR.
This War also began in the usual way—irregular attacks on commerce,
without any declaration of war, and in March, 1672, an English Squadron
wrecked havoc on the Dutch Indiamen. As in the Second War, the Dutch

after this prohibited their merchant ships from proceeding to sea. No such
prohibition took effect in England, where the merchant navy rapidly
increased.
In the Second War the French were the allies of the Dutch. In the Third,
they joined in with the English. In both cases their underlying political
motive appears to have been to egg Great Britain and the Dutch on to
mutual destruction. The assistance actually obtained by the Dutch from the
French in the Second War was a minus quantity, and though in the Third,
French ships actually joined the English fleet, the advantage therefrom
ended there.
The allied fleet, under the command of the Duke of York, consisted of
sixty-five English and thirty-six French warships, twenty-two fire ships, and
a number of small craft. This fleet lay at Sole Bay (Southwold on the
Suffolk coast). Here they were surprised by De Ruyter with ninety-one men
of war, forty-four fire ships, and a number of small craft.
The Royal James, flagship of the Earl of Sandwich, who commanded
one of the two divisions of the English Fleet, was attacked and destroyed by
fire-ships, and the Earl was drowned in attempting to escape. The French
Squadron under D’Estrées fell back and took little part in the fight. None
the less, however, victory rested with the English, and the Dutch retreated to
their own coasts, and were blockaded in the Texel. On shore the Dutch were
badly pressed by the French armies, their naval energies being restricted
accordingly.
With the approach of winter, the Allied fleet was broken up and
returned to its harbours. In the early part of the following year, the Dutch
conceived the project of blocking the English fleet in the Thames, and
prepared eight ships full of stones with that object in view. This appears to
have been the first instance of a device similar to that more recently
unsuccessfully undertaken by the Americans, at Santiago de Cuba, in the
Spanish-American War, and by the Japanese, at Port Arthur, in the Russo-
Japanese War. The Dutch attack was never actually made; presumably
circumstances did not admit of it. In the view of Admiral Colomb, it was
frustrated by the English fleet putting to sea at an earlier date than had been
expected.

The Allied fleet formed a junction off Rye, in May. It consisted
altogether of eighty-four men-of-war, twenty-six fire-ships and auxiliaries.
The English divisions were commanded by Prince Rupert and Spragge. The
third division was under D’Estrées as before, but in order to avoid a
repetition of what had happened at Sole Bay, the French ships were
distributed in all three divisions of the fleet, instead of in a single division as
they previously had been.
Having embarked a number of troops, the Allies sailed for Zealand, and
found the Dutch fleet concentrating at the mouth of the Scheldt. It consisted
of about seventy men-of-war, under De Ruyter, Tromp and Bankert. For
some days, owing to fog and bad weather, no fighting was possible; but on
the 28th of May, the Dutch weighed anchor and a battle of the usual sort
took place, both sides claiming victory. The loss of life in the Allied fleet,
crowded as it was with troops, was very heavy, and no attempt was made to
follow up the Dutch, who had retired inside the mouth of the river.
On the 4th of June, the Dutch fleet again came out. The English retired
before it. An entirely inconclusive action eventually resulted, after which
each fleet returned to harbour.
Having embarked a number of fresh troops at Sheerness, the Allies
again put to sea and appeared on the Dutch coast. No landing was, however,
attempted; and on the 10th of August the final battle took place. The French
fleet on this occasion was allowed to act by itself, and, as before, drew off
and left the English to shift for themselves. Spragge, having had two
flagships disabled, was drowned in moving to a third, and victory, such as it
was, went to the Dutch. No further battles took place, and in 1664 peace
was concluded.
The net result of these three wars was in favour of the English, but
mainly on the trade issue.
At the beginning of the First, the Dutch had by far the larger merchant
shipping. At the end of the Third, the proportion was reversed.
Although tactics, as we understand them, cannot be said to have been
employed, certain definite war lessons were undoubtedly learned. It came to
be thoroughly believed that the principal use of a fleet was to attack the
fleet of the enemy; and on that account these wars are an important feature
of English naval history.

Following the conclusion of peace, the English Navy was entirely
neglected, and the condition of the ships became so bad that in 1679 a
Commission was appointed and thirty new ships were laid down. But the
majority of these ships, having been launched, were allowed to decay;
Charles II’s early interest in the fleet having become a dead letter in his later
years.
When James II came to the throne in 1685, he appointed another
Special Commission, and the repair of the Navy was systematically
undertaken. The personnel, however, was neglected. It remained in a very
dissatisfied state, and tacitly agreed to his deposition.
At the abdication of James II, in December, 1688, the Navy consisted
of 173 ships, manned by 42,003 men, and carrying 6,930 guns. Of these
ships, nine were first-rate, 11 second, 39 third, 41 fourth, 3 fifth, and 6
sixth. There were 26 fire-ships and 39 small craft. The best of the first-rates
in those days was the Britannia. She was of 1,739 tons, carried 100 guns
and a crew of 780 men. Her length was 146 feet, her beam 47 feet 4 inches,
and her draught 20 feet. The second-rate ships were 90 gun-vessels, third-
rate 70 guns, and fourth-rate 54.
During James II’s reign, bomb vessels were first introduced and regular
establishments of stores were instituted. It is somewhat difficult to assess
how far naval progress was actually indebted to this, the first King of
England who was a naval officer, and how far to the efforts of a determined
few who realised the absolute importance of naval power. Probably of
17
James I, as of all the Stuarts, it may be said that they realised the
principle, but required pressing to act upon it. To thus acting may be traced
the unpopularity of at least some of the Stuarts—there are practically no
signs that the nation generally understood the importance of a powerful
Navy. All the indications are in a contrary direction.

V.

THE EARLY FRENCH WARS.

T HE accession of William of Orange and the French support of James
soon brought about a war. Early in 1689 James invaded Ireland with
French ships and men. He did sufficiently well there for a considerable
English army to be employed against him, and in the summer of 1690,
William himself went over to take command, leaving Queen Mary as
Regent with little save the militia as military defence and a more or less
unprepared fleet.
A Jacobite rising in England was planned. In conjunction with it the
French proposed to hold the Channel in superior force to cover the landing
of troops in England, and then, by a blockade in the Irish Channel, prevent
the return of King William and his army. The attitude of the English fleet
was uncertain—a strong Jacobite element being in it—and the scheme was
generally a very promising one for the French.
A personal appeal from Queen Mary is said to have secured the
allegiance of the English fleet: but in everything else the subsequent French
failure was due only to luck and the wisdom of the British Admiral, Lord
Torrington.
It was more or less realised that the French would concentrate at Brest.
Squadrons were sent out to interfere with this, but convoys and the like
bulked largely in their orders. There is not the remotest indication that the
Home Government appreciated the danger, which ended in Torrington
finding himself opposed by a greatly superior French fleet, which he was
ordered to fight at all costs.
Therefrom ensued the battle of Beachy Head, a defeat and a “strategical
retirement to the rear” for which Torrington was subsequently court-
martialled and acquitted. He alone appears to have realised that his defeat

would have meant the success of the French plans, while so long as he
could avoid action the threat of his existence must interfere with invasion.
The French movements throughout were somewhat obscure. On the
25th June, according to Torrington, they might have attacked him but did
not do so. When the battle took place on the 30th, it was Torrington who
attacked. In the subsequent retreat, the French pursued for four days, but did
so in line of battle and without much energy. They captured or destroyed
five disabled ships, but of real following up of the victory there was none.
The Anglo-Dutch fleet took shelter at the Nore; but the French drew off
at Dover, and sailing west attacked Teignmouth and then returned to Brest.
Their failure to follow up and destroy Torrington has never been
satisfactorily explained.
The panic which they had created in England bore early fruit. Thirty
new ships were laid down. Of these seventeen were eighty-gun ships of
1000 tons, three were 1050 tons but carried seventy guns only, the
remaining ten, sixty-gun ships of 900 tons.
In 1692 another Jacobite rising was planned, and a French army
collected to assist it. Taught by the experience of Beachy Head the Anglo-
Dutch fleet concentrated early. It consisted of no less than ninety-eight
18
ships of the line, besides frigates and auxiliaries, the whole being under
command of Russell. A descent upon St. Malo was the principal objective
contemplated.
Neither side appears to have had much conception of the intentions of
the other. De Tourville, with a fleet of only fifty ships of the line, is
supposed to have sailed under the impression that the Dutch had not joined
up with the English.
In the fog of early morning on May 19th, he blundered into the entire
Anglo-Dutch fleet off Cape La Hogue, and sustained a crushing defeat. At
least twenty-one French ships of the line were lost in the battle itself or
destroyed in the harbours they had escaped into.
Following upon this victory came a lull in operations. It would seem to
have been the English idea that the French fleet, having been beaten and
dispersed, all that remained to do was to get ready to defeat the new fleet

that France was preparing, and so the year 1693 passed uneventfully, except
that damage was done to trade on either side.
In July, 1694, the Allies made a move, bombarding Dieppe and Havre
from a squadron of bombs which had been specially prepared. In
September, Dunkirk received attention from a new war device called
19
“smoak-boats” the invention of one Meerlers, which did not
inconvenience anyone very much. Meerlers also had “machine ships,”
which likewise did no harm. These appear to have been an elementary idea
on large scale of the modern torpedo—improved fire-ships.
A fleet was generally busy defending trade in the Mediterranean, where
for the first time it was permanently stationed. Nothing in the way of fleet
action was attempted by the French, and the next few years were spent in
privateering on their part, and bombardments of ports which sheltered
privateers on the part of the Allies.
English naval estimates in 1695 amounted to £2,382,172, and the
House of Lords, in an address to the King, advocated an increase of the
fleet on the grounds that it was essential to the nation that its fleets should
always be superior to any possible enemy. A French invasion was projected
in the winter months; but abandoned on the appearance of a fleet under
Russell.
There is no question that in this war the French did more mischief with
their privateers than with their fleet. English trade suffered very heavily;
and there were continual complaints about the inability of the fleet to
suppress the corsairs, a Parliamentary enquiry being eventually made into
the matter.
The French privateers—“corsairs” is the more correct term—were in
substance a species of naval militia, of a quite different status from English
privateers sailing under letters of marque. They hailed principally from St.
Malo; trading in peace time and preying on commerce in time of war. There
were special regulations under which they were governed. The owner had to
deposit a sum of about £600 with the Admiralty as security. He had to pay
ten per cent. of the profits to the Admiralty and five per cent. to the Church.
Two-thirds of the balance was his profit, the remaining third went to the
crew. Often enough the privateer was a royal ship, let out for the purpose,
and in the years following the battle of Cape La Hogue, most of the French

frigates were on this service, with naval officers and men on board very
often.
The privateers carried few guns, their object being to capture prizes,
not to sink them. They sailed mostly in small squadrons, so making a
considerable number of guns, and were rarely particular about using false
colours. It was therefore comparatively easy for them successfully to attack
weak convoys: some dealing with the warships and others making prizes;
and the inefficiency laid to the blame of the English fleet in trade protection
at that period was, in some measure, at any rate, due to a failure to
appreciate the enormous difficulties. Duguay-Trouin himself records using
the English flag to approach an English warship, and firing on her under
these colours.
The unhandy warships of those days, faced with light enemies, which
they could never overhaul, had a tremendous task set them. That the Navy
of William III era successfully defended anything against men like Duguay-
Trouin and Jean Bart, is of far more moment and more to be wondered at
than any failures. In this particular war the fast lightly-armed corsair
reached its apotheosis at the hands of veritable experts to a degree
impossible to-day, or for that matter, ever hereafter, unless aircraft prove
able to act as “privateers” of the future—a role which, to date, has been
entirely forgotten in all discussions as to the value of aircraft.

ANTHONY DEANE.

In 1697, the peace of Ryswick was signed. According to Burchett, the
net result of the war was the loss of fifty English warships and fifty-nine
French ones. The historians generally indicate that the French were worn
out with the struggle; but on the whole the English seem to have been well
out of the war also.
It was about this time that Peter the Great appeared in England, and
engaged John Deane, brother of the famous naval architect, Sir Anthony, to
go back to Russia with him to establish a navy. This is the first instance of
the foundation or reorganisation of a foreign navy by this country. The
experiment was by no means very successful; the bulk of the English naval

officers taken over by Peter being men who, for various reasons, had been
dismissed from the Royal Navy. Some proved incompetent, and all of them
were quarrelsome.

WAR OF THE SUCCESSION.
The war of the Spanish Succession synchronised with the accession of
Queen Anne, in 1702. In the interval following the peace of Ryswick the
French fleet had had considerable attention paid to it. The principal
innovation consisted in increasing the size without (as hitherto) increasing
the armament in ratio. The French three-deckers were now built of 2,000
tons instead of 1,500 as formerly. The superior sailing qualities, ever a
feature of French ships, were still further enhanced.
In England, though shipbuilding had also been vigorously pursued,
improvements commensurate with those of France were not made. English
ships of the period were, generally speaking, overgunned.
At the outbreak of the war of the Succession, the fleet consisted of
seven first-rate, fourteen second-rate, forty-five third, sixty-three fourth,
thirty-six fifth, twenty-nine sixth, eight fire ships, thirteen bombs, and ten
yachts—a total tonnage of 158,992; an increase of about a third in thirteen
years. The first-rates were a new type of ship; the second-rates consisted of
the old type first and second rates—the three deckers of ninety guns and
special service eighty-gun two deckers. The third-rates were the staple
battle type—two deckers of seventy guns on home service and mounting
sixty-two guns when sent abroad. The fourth-rates carried nominally fifty
guns and forty-four on foreign service.
One third of the naval power of Europe was English; France and
Holland between them made up another third, the balance being represented
20
by the rest of the Powers. Though the phrase, “Two Power Standard,” was
then unknown, the fleet, representing as it did the result of agitations in
Parliament and elsewhere for suitable naval power, was clearly based on a
similar general idea, and the Two Power Standard theory may be dated from
the time of William of Orange.
The general idea of the campaign on the English side was combined
naval and military attack on Ferrol—the fleet, consisting of fifty English
and Dutch ships of the line and some frigates and transports to the number

of 110, being under Sir George Rooke. The military element amounted to
12,000 troops under the Duke of Ormonde. Nothing came of the attempt
owing to internal dissentions; and the expedition was on its way back when
news was received of Chateau-Renault with a French-Spanish fleet of
twenty-one warships at Vigo. A combined attack was delivered and the
entire hostile fleet was sunk or captured without much loss, and a valuable
convoy captured also.
In this year there also happened the greatest disgrace that ever befell
the Royal Navy. Admiral Benbow, who had risen from the “Lower Deck,”
was detached with six ships of the line to the West Indies, where he met a
French squadron of five, under du-Casse. Two of his captains refused to
engage the enemy altogether, and the others, save one, did so but half-
heartedly. Benbow was mortally wounded and a French victory gained. On
their return to England two of the captains were executed “for cowardice,”
but timidity had actually nothing whatever to do with the business. It was
purely and entirely an act of personal hostility. It is generally put down to
Benbow’s lowly origin; but officers of the Benbow class were so plentiful,
21
and Benbow had so long been in important positions afloat, that the
“obvious reason” played but a minor part. Benbow’s great defect was a lack
of that “personality” of which in later years Nelson was the prime exponent.
Coupled with this was the state of much of the Navy generally owing to
Jacobite intrigues with those who were unable to forget their old allegiance
to the Stuarts.
In 1703 very special orders were issued as to cutting down expenditure
on non-essentials in ship construction. In this year the ornamental work so
conspicuous in ships of the Stuart era was reduced almost to extinction.
The naval events were inconsiderable. A few French prizes were made,
and it was found from these that the French theory of increasing dimensions
without increasing the armament had reached such a stage that fifty-gun
22
French ships were larger than sixty-gun English ones, but it was not for
some years that practical attention was directed to the point.
In 1704 there took place another of the combined naval and military
operations peculiar to this war. This was to Lisbon and in connection with
the Austrian Archduke Charles. It is mainly of interest because it led to the
more or less accidental capture of Gibraltar, and in that it otherwise had

much to do with the prevention of a junction of the French Brest and Toulon
fleets which was destined to loom so largely in future history that to this
day “junctions” remain a principal “idea” for naval manœuvres.
Sir George Rooke, who commanded the main fleet, had with him forty-
eight ships of the line and details; Sir Cloudesley Shovell was in the
channel with some twenty-two more.
The Brest fleet sailed for Toulon under the Count de Toulouse. They
were chased without effect by Rooke, till near Toulon, when on the evening
of May 29th, he gave up the pursuit as too risky, and returned to Lagos,
where Shovell joined him on June 16th.
The combined English fleet being now assumed superior to the
combined French fleet, attacks on Cadiz and Barcelona were contemplated,
but as insufficient troops were available it was decided to attack Gibraltar
instead. The motive for doing so does not appear to have been anything
greater than that the King of Portugal and the Archduke Charles were
worrying the fleet to “do something.” Gibraltar was suggested and settled
on, apparently, as being as suitable as any other place.
Gibraltar lies at the end of a narrow peninsula. On this peninsula, on
July 21st, 1,800 marines from the fleet landed under the Prince of Hesse. As
they carried only eighteen rounds per man, the presumption is obvious that
either little opposition was expected or else that the attack was merely
delivered to satisfy those who had urged that something should be done.
The former is generally assumed to be the case, but the latter is by no
means improbable. In any case, the marines met with little opposition and
demanded the surrender of the fortress, while some of the English ships,
under Byng, were warped into bombarding positions under a mild fire from
the forts. This occupied a whole day.
Early on the 23rd, fire was opened on both sides, and the inhabitants of
the town fled to a chapel on the hill. The bombardment continued till noon,
when the “cease fire” was ordered, so that results might be ascertained. It
was found that some of the batteries were disabled, and it was then decided
to land in the boats and capture them.
On the cessation of fire, the inhabitants, mostly women and priests,
who had fled out of the town, began to come back. Sir Cloudesley Shovell

(who was on board Byng’s flagship) ordered a gun to be fired across these;
whereupon they all ran back to the chapel in which they had been sheltered.
This gun was taken by the fleet generally to be a signal to re-open the
bombardment. Under cover of this firing, the landing party got ashore, and
had things much their own way till about a hundred of them were killed or
wounded by the blowing up of the Castle.
At this they began to retreat, but reinforcements arriving, they retrieved
the position and captured other works without difficulty, establishing
themselves between the town and the chapel where the women had taken
refuge. Giving this as his reason, the Governor capitulated next day. His
entire garrison, according to Torrington’s Memoirs, consisted of but eighty
men. The Anglo-Dutch force lost three officers and fifty-seven men killed,
eight officers and 207 men wounded.
Thus the capture of Gibraltar, “the impregnable.” At Toulon, a large
French fleet was getting ready for sea—a fleet quite large enough to have
done to the English what Teggethoff, in 1866, did to the bombarding
Italians at Lissa.
There seems little doubt that Rooke under-estimated his fleet. On the
other hand, as he had look-outs, and the wind was not in the enemy’s
favour, the risks he actually ran were trifling compared to those taken by
Persano. From which many lessons have been deduced and morals drawn.
In actual fact, however, it is greatly to be doubted whether either
commander thought round the matter at all. The “science” of naval warfare
is a thing of quite modern origin, and the strategies displayed by most
admirals in the past—if studied with an unbiassed mind—are just as likely
to be luck as forethought. Analogous to this is Ruskin on the artist Turner.
Turner painted wonderful pictures: Ruskin found wonderful meanings in
them. These “meanings” were, however, more news to Turner than to
anyone else!
On August 10th, the French fleet, reported as sixty-six sail, was sighted
thirty miles off by a look-out ship. Rooke’s fleet at that time was short of
five Dutch ships which he had sent away, twelve other ships were watering
at Tetuan—miles away from him—and all the marines of the fleet were on
shore at Gibraltar as garrison. The light craft were sent into Gibraltar to

bring back half the marines as quickly as possible, while the main fleet
retreated to pick up the Tetuan division, and later got its marines on board.
The French, meanwhile, either ignorant of the state of affairs, or else
from general incompetence, made no attack at the time, and it was not till
the 13th that battle was joined by the English bearing down on them. The
resulting engagement was indecisive, and the fleets withdrew to repair
damages. The French, however, declined to renew action, eventually
retreated to Toulon, and never attempted a fleet action again during the war.
Rooke’s fleet consisted of fifty-three ships of the line. The French had
fifty-two, of which they lost five.
Following the battle of Malaga, the marines were landed again at
Gibraltar, together with some gunners and forty-eight guns. The fleet then
returned to England, leaving at Lisbon a dozen ships under Sir John Leake
—the only ships which, after survey, were considered not to be in urgent
need of refit at home. This squadron was subsequently reinforced by eight
ships of the line.
The French and Spaniards presently invested Gibraltar by land and sea.
In the first attempt the blockading fleet was short of supplies and had to
retire to Cadiz. Leake arrived, but finding nothing there returned to the
Tagus.
The French then sent a light squadron to assist the siege, and the whole
of those were surprised and captured by Leake, on October 29th, 1704.
There is reason to believe that this action saved the fortress, as a grand
assault was on the tapis.
Leake remained at Gibraltar three months, during which time stores
and some 2,000 troops were brought in from England; then, the garrison
being now in no straits, the English ships withdrew in January, 1705, to
Lisbon to refit, leaving the land investment to proceed. In March, a
squadron of fourteen French ships of the line appeared off Gibraltar, but
owing to a gale only five got into the harbour. Here they were presently
surprised and captured by the English. The remaining ships fled to Toulon
and the siege was then raised—having lasted five months.
From these operations it is abundantly clear that the English had by
now realised that Gibraltar was perfectly safe so long as its sea

communications were kept open. De Pointis, the French Admiral, realised
the same thing, and in the whole of the naval operations he appears to have
been obeying, under protest, orders from the French Government, which at
no time appears to have realised the futility of such operations in face of a
superior Anglo-Dutch fleet.
Following the abandonment of the siege of Gibraltar, the French
became very active with their corsairs, inflicting heavy losses on English
trade. On the ultimate inutility of this guerre de course much has been
written; but perhaps hardly proper attention has been bestowed on the other
side of the question. The French had small stomach for anything of the
nature of a fleet action, and there is little or no reason to suppose that had
they concentrated on line operations any success would have attended their
efforts. Their personnel was generally inferior. Their materiel on the other
hand was superior, and the problem really before them surely was, not
which method, “grand battle” or guerre de course, was better, but how best
to inflict damage with the means available. And here the guerre de course
held obvious promise.
In the summer of 1705, a combined land and sea attack was delivered
on Barcelona, the Earl of Peterborough being in supreme command of both
forces. The town surrendered on October 3rd. The history of Gibraltar was
then repeated. The fleet withdrew, leaving Leake with a few ships to watch.
The enemy then invested the place, which was relieved just in time by
Leake so heavily reinforced that the French squadron made no attempt to
fight him. A variety of other towns was then captured by combined attacks,
also the Balearic Islands, except Minorca.
In 1706, combined operations on the north of France were arranged for,
but ultimately abandoned owing to the weather. Ostend was captured in this
year; but a combined attack on Toulon, in 1707, signally failed.
In 1708, the French attempted combined operations on Scotland and
reached the Firth of Forth with twenty sail, but an English squadron under
Byng arriving they sailed away again at once. The superior mobility of the
French was evidenced by the fact that Byng’s pursuit resulted in nothing but
the capture of an ex-English ship which could not keep up with her French-
built consorts. The Anglo-Dutch combined operations of the year resulted in
the capture of Minorca. Minor operations took place in the West Indies.

1709 passed mostly in the relief of places which had been acquired and
were now besieged. In 1710, the French became more active, capturing one
or two English warships and making a combined attempt against Sardinia.
This last was frustrated by Sir John Norris. An English attempt on Cette in
the same year proved a failure; but conspicuous success attended similar
operations in Nova Scotia.
In the following years the principal of such operations as took place
were on the American coast. Of these, the chief was an abortive attack on
Quebec, mainly remarkable for an extraordinary escape of the entire
English fleet one night in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. A military officer, one
Captain Goddard, insisted that he saw breakers ahead. As no one would
credit him he finally dragged the Admiral out of bed and up on deck, by
which time the fleet was close on to the breakers. As things were, seven
transports were wrecked and nearly a thousand soldiers drowned. The
23
warships very narrowly escaped.
This disaster led to the abandonment of the expedition. Peace was
declared in 1713. The English loss in the war was thirty-eight ships,
mounting 1,596 guns; the French lost fifty-two ships, mounting 3,094
24
guns. A very large number of English ships became unserviceable during
the war, because, despite the fact that many new ships were built and that
the bulk of the ships lost by the French entered the English service, the
entire navy diminished by twenty-five vessels.
Most of the ships were in poor condition, and in the early years of
George I’s reign, large sums had to be expended on refits. Foul bilge water
was the main cause of internal decay, and in 1715 organised steps were
taken for the ventilation of the bilges. A certain increase in size for ships of
all classes was also ordered, those of 100 guns being increased by 319 tons,
and the eighty-gun ships by sixty-seven tons. This increase, however, by no
means brought the tonnage to gun ratio down to the French limits, nor were
the improvements in underwater form of much serious moment. The French
maintained a superiority in this respect which they held till the present
century. To-day, of course, the situation is completely reversed, and for any
given horse-power any British ship is appreciably faster than a French
25
one.

Some special attention was also devoted to the preparation of timber
for immediate use in shipbuilding. This subject was first drawn attention to
in 1694, and the net result of the enquiries in 1715 did not really go much
further. It was not till eleven years later that the problem was seriously
grappled with.
In 1715, an English fleet under Norris was in the Baltic, acting against
Sweden and allied with the Russians and Danes, Peter the Great himself
being in chief command. Nothing of moment happened. These operations
extended to 1719, when sides were changed.
In 1718, Spain, which had recently made some considerable efforts
towards the creation of naval power, used her power for an attack on Sicily.
Admiral Byng arriving with a superior English fleet, attacked and destroyed
the greater part of the Spanish squadron in the Battle of Cape Passaro. No
state of war existed. The Spaniards had attacked an English ally, and this
was Byng’s only excuse for action. A few months later war was formally
declared against Spain, and early in 1719 a curious replica of the Armada
took place. Forty Spanish transports, escorted by merely five warships,
sailed from Cadiz for the coast of Scotland; the idea being that the 5,000
troops which they carried should co-operate in a Jacobite rising. This
“Armada” was dispersed by a severe gale off Cape Finisterre, and only a
small fraction of it reached the coast of Ross, where a landing, easily
defeated by the military, was made. It is noteworthy that no fleet met the
expedition, and it was not till a month after its dispersal in a gale that Norris
sailed to look for it.
The remainder of this particular war, which lasted only three years, was
devoted to the re-conquest of Sicily and the capture of Vigo. Peace was
concluded in 1721. In the course of this war the usual combined attack was
made upon Gibraltar in 1720; but the arrival of an English fleet easily
relieved the garrison.
At and about this time the Russian fleet, hitherto allies, became the
enemy, and early in 1720 Admiral Norris was despatched to assist the
Swedes against them. He appears to have done very little save squabble
with the Swedish admiral as to precedence. In any case the Russians did
much as they listed against the Swedish coast till Sweden had to sue for
peace, and Russia became the predominant Baltic naval power. Her position

as such was the more extraordinary in that the Russian fleet was technically
very incompetent. The situation was mainly brought about by the personal
genius of Peter the Great. His ships were generally the speedier, and he
issued the strictest orders that no enemy was to be engaged unless at least
one-third inferior in power. In the presence of an enemy the Swedes
26
considered nothing, the English comparatively little. The brain of Peter,
was, therefore, an easy match for them, despite the technical inferiority of
his personnel. This campaign is a most striking illustration of Alexander the
Great’s maxim “that an army of sheep led by a lion is better than an army of
lions led by a sheep.”
In 1726, an Anglo-Danish naval demonstration against Russia took
place at Kronstadt, but nothing came of the incident, which was repeated
equally ineffectually in the following year, when larger preparations were
made.
In 1726, the preservation of ships’ timbers came once more on the
tapis, when the results of some experiments, commenced six years before,
were inspected. Up to about 1720, woods were prepared for use by a system
known as “charring.” This consisted in building a fire one side of the plank
and keeping the other side wet till the required condition was produced.
One, Cumberland, invented a system known as “stoving.” By this, the wood
was put into wet sand and then subjected to heat till the juices were
extracted and the wood in suitable condition. A ship was planked with both
systems, side by side, and on these being examined in 1726, it was found
that while the “stoved” planks were in good condition the “charred” ones
were already rotten.
A grateful country vaguely presented Cumberland with one tenth of
whatever might be the saving which his system would produce.
Cumberland, however, was equally vague, since he could supply no data as
to the amount of heat or time of subjection, and experiments had to be
carried out in the Yards in order to ascertain this. The authorities were
apparently still ascertaining when one Boswell, of Deptford Yard, in 1736,
hit upon using steam, and his system became at once general—though a few
years later it was replaced by boiling the timber.
When George II came to the throne the country was at peace, but this
peace was mainly and entirely secured by the policy of Walpole, who kept

the Navy on a war footing. Feeling against Spain ran so high on account of
the action of the Guarda-Costas in searching English ships in the West
Indies, that Walpole’s hands were forced in 1739. In the House of
Commons, Captain Vernon announced that with six ships he could capture
Porto Bello. Promoted to Rear Admiral, he essayed the task, and
accomplished it, by coming into close range and landing under cover of a
bombardment. His loss was trifling—nineteen killed and wounded, all told.
The garrison turned out to have been only 300 strong, of whom forty
surrendered. The rest had either been killed or had fled. It is to be observed
that no state of war existed at the time.
War with Spain was declared in October, 1739. The English fleet in
commission consisted of thirty-eight ships of the line, and there was a
reserve of twenty-four ready for immediate service. There were also thirty-
six minor vessels in commission and eight in reserve.
An interesting circumstance of this war was the whole-world scale on
which naval operations were planned. In substance the scheme was as
follows:—Admiral Vernon was to attack the east coast of Darien. Captain
Cornwall was to round the Horn, attack the west coast of Darien and then
go to the Philippines, where he was to meet Captain Anson, who was to
voyage thither via the Cape of Good Hope. The scheme was not carried out
in its entirety, as the Cape of Good Hope expedition never sailed, Anson
being substituted for Cornwall.
Vernon, having been reinforced with a number of bombs and fire-ships,
proceeded, in March, 1740, to attack Cartagena, which he bombarded for
four days without much material result. Then he proceeded to Chagres,
which, after a two days’ bombardment, surrendered to him. A considerable
Spanish squadron being reported on its way out, and a French fleet
(suspected of hostile designs) also sailing, Vernon withdrew to Jamaica,
where he lay till reinforced by twenty ships under Ogle.
Ogle performed his voyage without adventure, except that six of his
ships encountered a French squadron and fought it for some little time
under the impression that a state of war existed. The error being discovered,
27
the squadrons parted with mutual apologies.
Ogle arrived in January, 1741. After a short refit the fleet sailed to look
for the French and observe them. They presently learned that the French,

short of men and provisions, had gone back to Europe. Upon receipt of this
news it was decided to attack Cartagena.
Vernon had with him twenty-nine ships of the line, twenty-two lesser
craft and a number of transports, carrying 12,000 troops. The seamen and
marines of the fleet totalled 15,000. For a time some success was met with,
but divided councils, mutual recrimination between Navy and Army,
sickness in the troops, all did their share, and eventually the attack was
28
abandoned.
Attacks on other places led to no happier results, and while efforts were
thus being frittered away in the West Indies, the commerce was suffering
badly. Petitions from the commercial world to Parliament were of almost
daily occurrence. Vernon requested to be recalled, and eventually was
superseded, but his successor fared no better than he.
Meanwhile, we must turn aside for a moment to consider the operations
of Anson. The following items in connection therewith are summarised
from Barrow’s Voyages and Discoveries, published in 1765.
On arriving at Madeira, Anson, who had left England on the 13th of
September, 1740, learned of a Spanish squadron, under Pizarro, lying in
wait for him. This squadron, attempting to round the Horn ahead of Anson,
encountered a furious gale, and was eventually driven back to Buenos
Ayres, with only three ships left, and these reduced to the utmost
extremities. A second attempt to round the Horn fared no better, and
eventually Pizarro returned to Spain in his own ship, manned chiefly by
English prisoners and some pressed Indians. These latter mutinied, but not
being joined by the English prisoners, as they had hoped, were defeated.
Anson left Madeira on November 3rd, 1740, and shortly afterwards his
crews fell sick, through lack of air, the ships being too deep for the lower
ports to be opened. Anson had several ventilating holes cut. Then fever
came, carrying off many. Just before Christmas he arrived at St.
Catherine’s, Brazil, but his hopes of recruiting his men’s health were
abortive. His own flagship, the Centurion, lost twenty-eight men dead and
had ninety-six others on the sick list.
On January 18th, 1741, Anson sailed for the Horn. A gale scattered his
squadron, one ship being separated for a month; eventually, however, all

rejoined. There followed three months’ tempests rounding the Horn. Scurvy
appeared, and the ships got separated again. Finally, on June 9th, the
Centurion alone reached Juan Fernandez, short of water and only about ten
men fit for duty in a watch.
A few days later the Tryal appeared at the island, her captain, lieutenant
and three men being all who were available for service. A third ship, the
Gloucester, appeared on June 21st, but so short-handed was she that,
though assistance was sent her, it took her an entire fortnight to make
harbour! On August 16th, the victualler ship, Anna Pink, arrived, all her
crew in good condition, she having put into some harbour en route. Of the
other three ships, two (the Severn and Pearl), failed to round the Horn and
returned to Brazil; the third, the Wager, was wrecked.
In September, a sail was sighted. The Centurion put to sea and found
her to be a Spanish merchant ship. From the prisoners it was learned that a
Spanish squadron from Chili had been on the look out for Anson, that a ship
had been lying off Juan Fernandez till just before his arrival, but that
assuming him lost they had now all gone back to Valparaiso.
Thereafter several prizes were taken, one being fitted out to replace the
Tryal, which was abandoned. The Anna Pink had also had to be abandoned
as useless.
Now began the most extraordinary part of the enterprise. Treasure ships
were captured, thirty-eight men landed, held up and captured Payta, a good
half of these attired in feminine costume, which they found in houses
wherein they had sought substitutes for their rags—only one man drunk in
all the sack of the town—the terror of prisoners, who, when released,
refused to accept liberty till they had thanked Anson for his courtesy—
Anson’s insistence on treasure being divided equally between those who
attacked and those who kept ship, while giving his own share to the
attackers—the night chase of a supposed galleon which turned out to be but
a fire on shore—the fearful sufferings of boats’ crews sent out to look for
29
the treasure ship —the release of prisoners, and the Spanish reply thereto
by the despatch of luxuries to the English—the final loss of the Gloucester,
worn out by keeping the sea—the arrival at Guam of the Centurion with
only seventy-one men capable of “standing at a gun” under even any
emergencies—these things belong to special histories. Here it suffices to

give but a general outline, of which the first event is that having reached
Macao and refitted, Anson went into the Pacific again, and, having given
his men considerable training in marksmanship and gun-handling, finally
intercepted and captured the Spanish treasure ship that he sought.
On his subsequent return to China with his prize, the experiences of
“Mr. Anson” (as he is generally called throughout the history from which I
quote) were mainly of a personal nature. Visited by a mandarin who showed
a liking for wine, Anson had to plead illness and delegate his duties of glass
for glass to the most robust officer he had. He provisioned by weight with
ducks (found to be filled with stones to make them heavier) and pigs filled
with water. Ultimately he had to go up to Canton with (so far as I can
ascertain) the first instance of a crew in regular uniform. To quote from the
entertaining contemporary narrative:—

“Towards the end of September, the commodore finding that he
was deceived by those who had contracted to supply him with sea
provisions; and that the viceroy had not, according to his promise,
invited him to an interview, found it impossible to surmount the
difficulty he was under, without going to Canton and visiting the
viceroy. He, therefore, prepared for this expedition: the boat’s crew
were clothed, in a uniform dress, resembling that of the water-men of
the Thames. There were in number eighteen, and a coxswain; they had
scarlet jackets, and blue silk waistcoats, the whole trimmed with silver
buttons, and had also silver badges on their jackets and caps.”

Leaving Macao, the Centurion reached the Cape of Good Hope on the
11th of March, 1744. From here, signing on forty Dutchmen, Anson
proceeded home.
So ended the most prodigious oversea combined enterprise ever before
attempted. Anson was not the first to circumnavigate the world, but few had
done so before him, and on that account the real purpose of his expedition
has been generally overlooked in the circumnavigation feat.
As ever in British naval history luck was with him; but something more
than “luck” must have been in an enterprise where Pizarro, sent to intercept

him, gave up, while Anson fought through the perils of Cape Horn, with his
sickly crews and crazy ships.
To resume the general history of the war. In October, 1742, the Victory
(100) was lost, presumably on the Caskets, though her actual fate was never
ascertained. France had now entered into the war; her fleet consisted of
forty-five ships of the line; the corresponding English fleet totalling ninety
ships of the line.
In 1742, Ogle succeeded Vernon in the West Indies, and a series of
small bombardments resulted, usually without success.
Formal hostilities with France (delayed as was the custom of the time)
were declared in 1744, and outlying possessions changed hands. Anson, in
command of the Channel Fleet in 1747, defeated and captured the Brest
fleet, and some minor actions took place, mostly in connection with
convoys. The war ended in 1748; its net naval results being as follows:—

English. Spanish. French.
Warships lost or captured 49 24 56
Merchant ships captured 3,238 1,249 2,185

The economy order referred to on a previous page was possibly in part
responsible for the bad showing made by the English as warships in this
war. In any case the standardisation of classes had disappeared, and no two
ships were of the same dimensions. Many ships were found so weak at sea
30
that they had to be shored up between decks, and of all the complaint was
continual that they were very “crank” and unable to open their lee ports in
weather in which foreign ships could do so. The seamanship, however, was
of a high order compared to that of either the French or Spaniards; possibly
the very badness of the English ships helped to make the seamanship what
it was.
After the war many constructional improvements were suggested and
some few of them carried into practice. Among the prizes of the war was a
Spanish ship, the Princessa of seventy guns, which attracted general
admiration. In 1746, a glorified copy of her, the Royal George, was laid
31
down. At and about this time an era of slow shipbuilding set in; for
example, this Royal George was ten years on the stocks. The slow building

was part and parcel of the naval policy of the period, and in no way to be
connected with what any such tardiness would mean to-day.
A ship on the stocks was more easily preserved from decay than one in
the water. With precisely the same idea the authorities at the end of the war
disbanded the bulk of the personnel. Upon a war appearing likely, the press-
gang was always available to supplement any deficiency in the rank and file
not filled by allowing jail-birds to volunteer.
Officering the fleet was a less easy matter. The choice lay between
retired officers more or less rusty, and the best of the “prime seamen,” who
had been afloat in such warships as were retained in commission. The
Admiralty selected its officers from both indiscriminately. There is this
much, but no more, warrant for the idea that in the old days the sailor from
forward could rise to the highest ranks, while to-day he cannot do so. The
fact is correct enough, but the circumstance had nothing to do with
inducements and encouragements. Once on the quarter deck the tarpaulin
seaman, if he had it in him, might win his way to high rank and fame, as did
Benbow, Sir John Balchen, Captain Cook, and several others. But he
obtained his footing on entirely utilitarian grounds which passed away
when a more regular system of personnel came into custom.
In the year 1753, a Dr. Hales was instrumental in one of the greatest
improvements ever effected in the navy. To him was due the adoption of a
system of ventilation with wind-mills and air pumps. The immediate result
was a very great reduction in the sickness and death-rate on shipboard, the
Earl of Halifax placing it on record that for twelve men who died in non-
ventilated ships, only one succumbed in the ventilated vessels.
Early in 1755, a war with France became probable on account of
hostile preparations made in North America. As a matter of precaution a
French squadron on its way out was attacked and two ships captured.
Something like three hundred French merchant ships were also taken during
the year. War, however, was not declared on either side!
Early in 1756, news was received of French designs on Minorca, a
considerable expedition collecting at Toulon. After some delay, Byng left
England with ten ships of the line, picked up three more at Gibraltar, and
sailed to relieve Minorca, where Fort St. Philip was closely invested by

15,000 troops. Supporting these last was a French squadron of twelve ships
of the line, under La Gallisonniére.
On Byng arriving, La Gallisonniére embarked 450 men from the
attacking force to reinforce his crews, and on May 20th ensued the battle of
32
Minorca, which resulted in the defeat and retreat of Byng. Ten days later
the British force in the island surrendered.
Byng was subsequently court-martialled and shot at Portsmouth for
having failed to do his utmost to destroy the French fleet. His ships were
indifferently manned and in none too good condition. He encountered a
better man than himself, and there is no reason to suppose that had he
resumed action, anything but his total defeat would have resulted. At the
same time, the execution of Byng, pour encourager les autres, probably
bore utilitarian fruit in the years that were to follow. The execution has
since been condemned as little better than a revengeful judicial murder; but
a realisation of the circumstances of the times suggests that other motives
than punishment of an individual were paramount.

BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA AT SEA.

War was formally declared shortly after the fall of Minorca. No events
of much moment marked the rest of the year 1756, but early in the
following year, Calcutta, which had fallen to the natives, was recaptured by
Clive, assisted by a naval force.
In 1758, the Navy consisted of 156 of the line and 164 lesser vessels.
The personnel was 60,000.
The situation at this time was that in North America the French
colonies were being hotly pressed, Louisbourg being invested. The French
had a species of double plan—to relieve Louisbourg directly, and also the
usual invasion of England.

The relief of Louisbourg came to nought; a Toulon squadron which
came out being driven back by Osborne, while Hawke destroyed the
convoys in the Basque Roads. Louisbourg finally fell, four ships of the line
that were lying there being burned, and one other captured, together with
some smaller craft.
Nearer home, combined naval and military attacks were pressed upon
the French coast, Anson wrecking havoc on St. Malo, while Howe
destroyed practically everything at Cherbourg.
The invasion of England project remained, however. In 1759, the
French had somewhere about twenty ships of the line, under De Conflans,
at Brest, twelve at Toulon, under De la Clue, five with a fleet of transports
at Quiberon, five frigates at Dunkirk with transports, a division of small
craft and flat-bottomed boats at Havre, and a squadron of nine ships of the
line with auxiliaries in the West Indies.
These were watched or blockaded by superior British squadrons in
every case—the maintenance of blockades being mainly possible owing to
the improved ventilation of the ships. Provisions were still bad and scurvy
plentiful, but the blockade maintained was better and closer than anything
that the French can have anticipated. This war, indeed, saw the birth of
scientific blockade in place of the somewhat haphazard methods which had
previously existed. In part, it arose from a better perception of naval
warfare, the study of history and the growth of definite objectives. But since
side by side with these improvements tactical ideas were nearly non-
existent and ships in fighting kept a line of the barrack-ground type
33
regardless of all circumstances, improvements in naval architecture may
claim at least as big a part as the wit of man. Ideas of blockading and
watching were as old as the Peloponnesian War, but means to carry them
into effect had hitherto been sadly lacking.
To resume, the French fleets being cornered by superior forces, had no
option but to wait for lucky opportunity to effect the usual attempted
junctions. This opportunity was long in coming, and meanwhile Rodney
made an attack on the invading flotilla at Havre, bombarded it for fifty-two
hours, and utterly destroyed the flat-bottomed boats which had been
collected.

In July, 1759, Boscawen, having run short of water and provisions, had
to withdraw from Toulon to Gibraltar, where he began to refit his ships, and
De la Clue, learning of this, came out of Toulon in August, slipping through
the straits at midnight, with the English fleet in pursuit shortly afterwards.
De la Clue had intended to rendezvous at Cadiz, but having altered his
mind, made the almost inevitable failure of getting all his ships to
34
comprehend it. So it came about that daylight found him near Cape St.
Vincent, with only six sail, and eight of Boscawen’s ships (which he at first
took to be his own stragglers) coming up. In the action that followed, three
of the French ships were captured, two burned and one escaped. The
stragglers of the French fleet got into Cadiz as originally directed, and a few
months later escaped back to Toulon.
Thurot, with a small squadron, slipped out from Dunkirk, in October,
merely to intern himself in a Swedish harbour.
Hawke continued his blockade of Brest, being now and then driven off
by gales, and during one of these absences, Bempart, with his nine West
Indian ships, got into Brest. The Brest fleet was apparently very short-
handed, or else the West Indian squadron in a very bad way; in any case the
crews of the latter were distributed among the former, and De Conflans
sailed with only twenty-one ships on November 14th.
The expeditionary force which he proposed to convoy lay at Quiberon,
which place owing to weather he did not make till the 20th. There he
sighted and gave chase to the blockading English frigates, and in doing so
met Hawke’s fleet of twenty-three ships of the line.
In the battle of Quiberon which followed, the French lost six ships of
the line. Eleven, by throwing their guns overboard, escaped into shallow
water, the remainder reached safety at Rochefort. Two English ships ran
35
aground, otherwise little damage was sustained.
Out of these happenings the French fleet—which, in this year alone,
lost thirty-one ships of the line—ceased to have any importance; while to
the general naval activity of the English must be attributed the capture of
Quebec, by Wolfe.

In 1760, the British ships of the line had sunk to 120 in number, though
the personnel rose to 73,000. Naval operations were mainly confined to the
relief of Quebec and the consequent capture of the whole of Canada, and
the suppression of privateering—over a hundred French corsairs being
captured in 1760 alone.
The results of privateering have been put at 2,500 English merchant
vessels being captured in the four years ending 1760; the French merchant-
ship loss being little more than one-third. In 1761, when French naval
power had practically ceased to exist, 812 English merchant ships were
captured. It must, however, be borne in mind that every year saw great
increases in English shipping. Heavy as the numerical losses were, they did
not exceed ten per cent., and the bulk of vessels captured were coasters.
French mercantile losses were considerably smaller, but simply for the
reason that France had fewer and fewer ships to lose, for her trade was
being swept from the sea. English trade on the other hand grew and
multiplied exceedingly. It may even be argued that so far from really
injuring our trade, the guerre de course in this war actually fostered it by
the enhanced profits which safe arrival entailed, this attracting the
speculative. But for the speculative the loss of larger vessels would have
been smaller than it was. These were they, who, on a convoy nearing home
waters, sailed on ahead, chancing attack in the hopes of the greatly
increased profits to be made by early arrivals. Ships which obeyed the
orders of the escorting warships were very rarely captured.
The following years saw the capture of Pondicherry, Dominica, a
successful attack on Belle Isle and also a general loss of French colonial
possessions. To quote Mahan, “At the end of seven years the Kingdom of
Great Britain has become the British Empire.”
In 1762, Spain declared war. She had a fleet consisting nominally of
eighty-nine sail, but joined in far too late to be of any assistance to France.
No naval battle of importance took place.
Peace was signed early in 1763. By it England secured Canada from
France, and Spain lost Florida.
During this war the usual complaints about ships’ bottoms were made,
especially from the West Indian Station; and in October, 1761, the

Admiralty ordered a frigate to be sheathed with thin sheets of copper as an
experiment. This was at first found extremely successful, but after the lapse
of a few years it was noted that chemical action had set up between the
copper and the iron bolts at the ships’ bottom—most of these bolts being
rusted away.
Experiments were, however, continued, since, though the life of a
copper bottom was but three to four years, its general advantages were very
great. Ultimately iron bolts were abandoned in favour of copper ones. The
cost of this came to £2,272 for a ship of the first-rate, and was only
relatively satisfactory.
Ever since the Treaty of Paris in 1763, friction had been growing
between the Home Country and the North American Colonies. The causes
which led to it concern the British Navy only in so far as it was used for the
harsh enforcement of the regulations entailed by the Treaty in question—
regulations which bore heavily on the Colonists. The rest of the story is
merely the tale of political incapacity at home.
The American Colonists, in addition to a few fast sailing frigates which
they handled with unexpected aptitude, possessed a so very considerable
mercantile fleet that it was estimated that 18,000 of their seamen had served
in the English ships in the late war with France. Consequently, the Colonists
were in a position to fit our privateers, and with these, in the first eight
years of the war, they captured nearly 1,000 English merchant ships. Their
own losses were, however, greater, and it is probable that despite all the
military blunders which characterised English conduct of the war, the
Colonists would eventually have been worn down but for the active
intervention of France in 1778, and Spain a little later.
As regards naval operations against the Americans themselves, these
were mainly in the nature of sea transport. Where they were otherwise, they
were of an inglorious nature, owing to the total inability of the Home
Government to appreciate the position. The naval story of the war is, in the
main, the story of frigates attempting difficult channels, and going aground
in the attempt. It is of interest mainly because in 1776 one David Bushnell
made the first submarine ever actually used in war, and attempted to
torpedo the English flagship, Eagle (64). He reached his quarry
unsuspected, but the difficulties of attaching his “infernal machine” were

such that he had to rise to the surface for air and abandon the enterprise. His
subsequent fate was undramatic—he and his boat were captured at sea on
board a merchant ship, which was carrying him elsewhere for further
operations.
France, which had been rendering considerable secret assistance to the
revolted Colonists, had, ever since the Treaty of Paris, been steadily
building up her Navy, till she had eighty ships of the line and 67,000 men.
The efficiency of the personnel had been increased by the enrolment of a
special corps of gunners, who practiced weekly. Efforts—which, however,
were only moderately successful—had also been made to break down the
serious class rivalries between those officers who were of the noblesse and
those who were tarpaulin seamen. But the majority of officers were skilled
tactically, and special orders were issued that to seek out and attack the
36
enemy was an objective. Here, again, another weak point existed:
d’Orvilliers, who commanded the main fleet, also received orders to be
cautious—orders very similar in tenor to those by which his predecessors in
previous wars were hampered.
The fleet of Great Britain, spread over many quarters of the world,
including ships being fitted, consisted of about 150 ships of the line, besides
auxiliaries; but the actual available force of Home water fleet with which
Keppel sailed just before the opening of the war was twenty ships only!
Capturing two French frigates and learning from them that thirty-two
ships were at Brest, Keppel got reinforcements of ten ships, and on the 27th
of July, 1778, met d’Orvilliers, also with thirty ships, off Ushant. The battle
lasted three hours, when the fleets drew apart without any material result
having been achieved. The tactical ability lay with the French, and but for
the inefficiency of the leader of one French division, the Duc de Chartres
(the future “Phillipe Egalité”), would have done so still more. Yet, though
Keppel had obviously done his best, public opinion in England had
expected a great naval victory, and Keppel was the subject of a most violent
controversy, which soon developed on political lines.
At and about the time of the battle of Ushant, D’Estaing, with twelve
ships of the line and five frigates, reached the Delaware. The English fleet
under Howe, which consisted of only nine inferior ships of the line, took

refuge inside Sandy Hook. D’Estaing came outside and remained ten days
in July, but then sailed away.
His failure to operate has been put down to the advice of pilots, but
more probably, as pointed out by Admiral Mahan, he had secret instructions
not to assist the Colonists too actively. The destruction of Hood’s fleet
would have meant the capture of New York, peace between England and
America, and a considerable force released for operations against France.
Most of the subsequent movements of the year seem to have been coloured
by a similar policy. In 1779, the West Indian islands of St. Vincent and
Grenada fell into the hands of the French. Subsequently D’Estaing returned
to the North American Coast, but no important operations took place there.
Finally he returned with some ships to France, sending the others to the
West Indies.
Spain declared war against England in 1780. Her fleet then consisted of
nearly sixty ships of the line, which—like the French—were in a more
efficient state than in previous wars. Her prime object was the recovery of
Gibraltar.
A combined Franco-Spanish fleet of sixty-four ships of the line
appeared in the Channel, causing an immense panic in England. The only
available English fleet consisted of thirty-seven sail of the line, under Sir
Charles Hardy, and this wandered away to the westward, leaving the
Channel quite open to the allies, who, however, also wandered about
without accomplishing anything. As usual with allies, there were divided
councils, and in addition the French fleet, having had to wait long for the
unwilling Spaniards, was badly incapacitated from sickness. Thus, and thus
only, is their failure to invade to be explained: they had 40,000 men ready
to be transported over, also a naval force ample to defeat any available
English fleet, and able to cover landing operations as well.
When the war first began, there was in France an English admiral—that
same Rodney who had destroyed the invading flotilla at Havre in the
previous war—who by reason of his debts was unable to return to his own
country. In private life he was a merry old soul of sixty or so, and at a
dinner one night boasted that if he could pay his debts and go back to
England, he would get a command and easily smash the French fleet.

Hearing this, a French nobleman promptly paid his debts for him, and
sarcastically told Rodney to go back and prove his words.
Rodney, who had the reputation of being an able officer, but nothing
more, got home in 1779. In 1780, having secured a command for the West
Indies, he left Portsmouth with twenty sail of the line and a convoy for the
relief of Gibraltar. Off Finisterre, he captured a Spanish convoy carrying
provisions to the besiegers. Off Cape St. Vincent he fell in with eleven
Spanish ships and attacked them at night, in a gale, blowing up one, and
capturing six. Thence he proceeded to Gibraltar, relieved it from all
immediate danger, Minorca also; and then sailed for the West Indies. Here,
on April 17th, some three weeks after arrival, he met the French under
Guichen, and made the first attempt at that “breaking the line” associated
with his name. The attempt was not a success, as his orders were
misunderstood by several of his own captains and his intentions realised
37
and foiled by his opponents.
This action was indecisive; as also were two more that followed.
In this year (1780), Captain Horatio Nelson, then only twenty-two
years old, made his first appearance in the Hinchinbrook (28), in an attack
on San Juan, Nicaragua. He succeeded, after terrible loss of personnel from
disease.
A Spanish squadron then joined the French, but an epidemic—that
most fruitful of all sources for the upsetting of naval plans—overtook it.
The Spaniards were incapacitated and the French returned home. Rodney
went to New York, where his operations delayed the cause of the Colonists;
then returning to the West Indies, operated against the Dutch, who had by
now joined the French and Spaniards.
The general position of Great Britain, in 1781 and 1782, was well nigh
desperate. Gibraltar was only held by a remarkable combination of luck and
resolution. To quote Mahan, “England stood everywhere on the defensive.”
She fought with her back to the wall. In the East Indies, Suffren kept the
French flag flying: and things were generally at a very low ebb, when in
1782 Rodney “broke the line” in the victory of the Battle of the Saints.
On April 9th, the fleets had come into contact without much result on
either side. On the 12th, De Grasse, being then in some disorder, with

thirty-four ships, encountered the English with thirty-six in good order.
Rodney and Hood broke the line in two places. Admiral Mahan has been at
pains to show us that this result was much a matter of luck and change of
wind, and that the victory was by no means followed up as it might have
been. One French ship was sunk and five were taken, including De Grasse
himself, whose losses in his flagship, the Ville de Paris, were greater than
those in the entire English fleet.
To the nation at this juncture, however, anything savouring of victory
was a thing to be made the utmost of, and Rodney has probably received
more than his meed of merit over what was mainly a matter of luck.
Two features of special interest in connection with this battle are that,
though up to it, British ships had recently, owing to coppering, proved
better sailers than the French; in the sequel to this fight, the French proved
equal to sail away. The rapid deterioration of coppering, already mentioned,
may account for some of this, but in this battle there is also reason to
believe that the French fleet instituted firing at the rigging. Contemporary
statements exist as to the French having made a wonderful number of holes
in English hulls without much material result, but these may be dismissed
as pardonable temporary bluster. More germane is the fact that the English
38
ships were supplied with carronades —harmless at long range and deadly
at short—for which reason the French tried to keep them at a distance, so
that altogether superior efficiency with men and weapons would seem to
have played a greater part than any tactical genius on the part of Rodney, in
whom a dogged insistence to get at the enemy was ever the main
characteristic rather than “thinking things out.” The Mahan estimate of him
sorts better with known facts than the estimate of his accomplishment at the
time.
As regards Rodney himself, it is interesting to record that Navy and
Party were so synonymous at the time that he, being a strong Tory, had
already been superseded by political influence when he won the battle that
broke French power in the West Indies. It lies to the credit of the Whigs that
both he and Hood, his second in command, received peerages; but the most
difficult thing of all to understand to-day is, that in a life and death struggle
such as this war was, the personal political element should have managed to
find expression.

In 1782, Gibraltar, which had been twice relieved, was once more in
grievous straits. The French had evolved floating batteries for the attack,
similar in principle to those which, some seventy years later, were to figure
so prominently in the Crimea.
Being merely armoured with heavy wood planks, however, they were
easily set on fire with red-hot shot, and the great bombardment failed long
before the relieving force, under Howe, arrived. The garrison, however,
were in great straits for supplies, and their real relief was Howe’s fleet,
which the combined Franco-Spanish squadrons did not dare to attack.
The Treaty of Versailles, in 1783, followed soon afterwards. By it the
United States of America were recognised, Minorca was given up, but most
of the captured West Indian islands restored to Great Britain.
Just before the close of the war, the relative naval strengths were
39
assessed as follows:—

Description Great
France. Spain. Holland.
of Vessels. Britain.
Ships of the Line 105 89 53 32
Fifty-gun Ships 13 7 3 0
Large Frigates 63 49 12
Small Frigates 69 54 36 {28
Sloops 217 86 31 13
Cutters 43 22 0 0
Armed Ships 24 0 0 0
Bombs 7 5 14 0
Fire-Ships 9 7 11 6
Yachts 5 0 0 0
Total 555 319 160 79

In this list it is interesting to note the British inability to maintain even
a Two-Power Standard in ships of the line, whereas in sloops and such like,
an enormous preponderance prevailed. For the suppression of privateering
on the coastal trade, these small craft proved very useful. Also worthy of
40
note is the decline of the fire-ship as a naval arm.

The figures as a whole suggest with much clarity that had the Allies
been able to act together, Great Britain would never have emerged from the
war so well as she did.
The ten years’ peace that followed was little more than a breathing
space. War was constantly apprehended, and known improvement in French
ships were such that they had to be carefully watched. The frigates built in
England were made longer than before, with a view to keeping pace with
French sailing qualities.
Considerable interest was taken in how far the country was self-
supporting in the matter of timber for shipbuilding, a certain reliance on
foreign supplies having previously existed. At, and about 1775, the cost of
shipbuilding for the East India Company had exactly doubled in a few
years. The home supply trouble arose, partly from the increased size of
shipping, partly from the tendency of owners to fell trees as early as
possible. Out of which special oak plantations were set up in the New
Forest and elsewhere, though oak happened to cease to be of value for
shipbuilding long before they had grown large enough for the larger
timbers.
The question of repairs also came in for consideration, an average of
twenty-five years’ repair totalling the cost of a new ship. At and about this
time also, the building of ships by contract in peace time was first
recommended on the grounds that thus the private yards would be better
available in case of war.
Regular stores for ships in the dockyards were also instituted, with a
41
view to the speedy equipment of ships in reserve. It was mainly owing to
this last provision, introduced by Lord Barham in 1783, that, though when
the war of the French Revolution broke out in 1793 but twelve ships of the
line and thirty lesser vessels were in commission, a few months later
seventy-one ships of the line and 104 smaller craft were in service. The
number of men voted in 1793 was 45,000.

VI.

THE GREAT FRENCH WAR.

T HE first incident of the war was connected with Toulon, which was
partly Royalist and partly Republican. The story in full is to be
found most dramatically rendered in Ships and Men, by David Hannay.
Here it suffices to say that the Royalists and Moderates having coalesced at
the eleventh hour, surrendered the town to Admiral Hood; that the British
Government repudiated Hood’s arrangements, and that eventually in
December, 1793, he was compelled to evacuate the place after doing such
damage as he could and bringing away with him a few ships of the French
42
navy. The incident little concerns our naval history, the Navy being but a
pawn in the political game of the moment. Indeed, it is mostly of some
naval interest only because two figures, destined to bulk largely in future
history, loomed up in it—Captain Horatio Nelson, of the Agamemnon, who
laughed when the Spanish fleet excused its inaction by saying that it had
been six weeks at sea and was disabled accordingly; and Napoleon, who, as
much as anyone, served to hurry the English out.
Early in 1794 the British fleet had ninety-five ships of the line in
commission, besides 194 lesser vessels. The personnel amounted to 85,000.
The centre of interest was the French Brest fleet. Under Villaret-
Joyeuse, a captain of the old Navy, made Admiral by the Terrorists, whose
cause he had espoused, this fleet was by no means inefficient, like the
undisciplined Toulon fleet had been. It carried on board the flagship Jean
Bon St. André, the deputy of the State, who, whatever his faults, realised
the meaning of “efficiency.” The bulk of the crew were men who had done
well in America. Howe, on the other hand, commanded a somewhat raw
fleet, hastily brought up to strength and still by no means “shaken down.”
Howe’s orders were threefold—to convoy a British merchant fleet; to
destroy the French fleet; and to intercept a convoy of French grain coming

from America.
From the 5th to the 28th May, Howe was keeping an eye on Brest and
looking for the French convoy, the interception of which was more
important than anything else, as France was dependent on these grain ships
for the means to live.
On the 28th, the French fleet was sighted a long way out in the Atlantic.
Villaret-Joyeuse, who was out to protect the grain convoy at all costs, drew
43
still further out to sea, Howe following in pursuit. Towards evening, the
last French ship Revolutionnaire (100), was come up with and engaged by
six British (seventy-four’s), of which one, the Audacious, was badly
crippled. The Revolutionnaire herself was dismasted, but was towed away
by a frigate in the night.
This particular incident is one of the most prominent examples of the
power of the “monster” ship as compared with the “moderate dimension”
44
ship of the period. The six did not attack her simultaneously, and some
were never closely engaged. She was magnificently fought also; but even
when these elements are subtracted, the fact of the extraordinary resisting
power exhibited remains. As only the Audacious, which attacked last, did
much harm to the Frenchman, the explanation in this particular case
probably lies in the stouter scantlings required for a ship of 110 guns,
compared to smaller ships.
On the following day the action was renewed. Villaret-Joyeuse allowed
his tail ships to drop into range of the leading British vessels with a view to
crippling them. Howe cut the line, but being somewhat outmanœuvred by
the French admiral, obtained no special advantage therefrom. Some of the
French ships were, however, disabled, and had to be towed in the general
action that was to follow later.
Two days’ fog now interrupted operations, but on Sunday, June 1st,
battle was joined. The opposing fleets then consisted as follows:—

British. French.
3 of 100 guns. 1 of 120 guns.
4 of 98 guns. 2 of 100 guns.
2 of 80 guns. 4 of 80 guns.

16 of 74 guns. 19 of 74 guns.
25 26

This gives 2,036 British to 2,066 French guns, but as, at least, one
Frenchman was considerably disabled, there was probably a slight British
superiority.
Howe, more or less, arranged his heavy ships to correspond with the
heavy ships of the enemy, and having hove-to half-an-hour for breakfast,
45
flung the old fighting instructions to the winds and bore right down into
the enemy. In the melee that ensued, some of the English failed to close, and
seven of the French drifted to leeward out of action.
Of the French fleet, two eighty-gun and four seventy-four’s were badly
mauled and eventually struck, while a seventh French ship, the Vengeur
46
(seventy-four) was sunk. Four were badly disabled, but drifted to leeward
out of the fight. On the British side a number of ships were badly damaged.
The fleets, having drawn apart, Villaret-Joyeuse succeeded in getting a
portion of his fleet into some sort of order again, and threatened the
disabled English ships. Howe protected these, but did not renew action; and
the French, with the disabled ships in tow, made off.
Such was the battle of “the glorious First of June.” Howe has been
greatly blamed since then for not having followed up his victory, but there
are not wanting indications that the caution of Curtis, his captain of the
fleet, who pleaded with Howe not to re-engage lest the advantage gained
should be lost, was justified. Villaret-Joyeuse, the captain, hastily placed in
command of a large fleet, was one of the most, if not the most, capable
admirals France ever had against us. How badly all the French ships had
suffered we now know, but the means of telling it were absent then. The all-
important question of intercepting the grain convoy was also possibly
present in Howe’s mind.
Be that as it may, the convoy was not intercepted. It reached France in
safety, and all question of starving the Revolution into surrender was at an
end. On that account the battle was reckoned as a victory by the French as
47
well as in England.

Other naval events of this year (1794) were the capture of Corsica, by
Hood; and in the West Indies, the capture of Martinique and St. Lucia.
Guadaloupe was also taken, but quickly re-captured. Among the prizes of
the year was the French forty-gun frigate Pomone, which proved infinitely
faster than anything in the English fleet. This led to much discussion in the
House of Commons. A considerable party denied that any such superiority
existed; others alleged that even if so, British ships were better and more
strongly built. Others again attributed the circumstance to the heavy
premiums awarded by the French Government to constructors who
produced swift sailing ships.
Nothing of much moment came out of the discussion. Orders were
issued that ships were to be built a little longer in future, and with the lower
deck ports less near the water than heretofore, but the general tendency to
over-gun ships in relation to their size still remained.
For the year 1795, the personnel of the fleet was increased to 100,000,
and provision was made for a very considerable increase of small craft. The
Dutch declared war in January, but the year was not marked by any
operations of much moment so far as they were concerned.
The principal theatres of naval operations were in the Mediterranean
and the Channel. This year is marked by a curious indecisiveness, which
had much to do with the formation of Nelson’s (who was serving in the
Mediterranean as captain of the Agamemnon, sixty-four), subsequent
character as an admiral.
The British fleet consisted of fifteen ships of the line, under Hotham.
The French had got together fifteen sail at Toulon. These made for Corsica,
in March, and on the way captured one of Hotham’s ships, the Berwick.
With the remainder, Hotham put to sea, and on the 12th, off Genoa, he was
sighted by the French. His fleet was in considerable disorder, and in the
view of Professor Laughton, the incapacity of the French alone averted a
disaster. In the desultory operations of the next two days, two prizes were
taken and two English ships crippled. Nelson, who was mainly responsible
for the prizes, urged Hotham to pursue and destroy the enemy, but the
48
admiral refused.
In July, Nelson, who was on detached service, was met and chased
back to Genoa by the whole French fleet, which, however, drew off when

Hotham’s fleet was sighted. Hotham, with a greatly superior fleet, came out,
and eventually found the enemy off Hyeres. Chase was ordered and one
French ship overhauled and captured; then, on the grounds that the shore
was too near, Hotham hauled off.
These operations (or lack of them) on the part of Hotham, are important
49
beyond most. In the view of Professor Laughton, Hotham’s indecision
was mainly responsible for the rise and grandeur of Napoleon’s career.
Vigorous action on his part would have written differently the history of the
world. As like as not, in addition to no Napoleon, there would also have
been no Nelson, to go down as the leading figure in British naval history.
The survival of the French fleet rendered possible that invasion of Italy
which “made” Napoleon, and those sea battles which made Nelson our
most famous admiral.
Villaret-Joyeuse (who had commanded the French fleet in the battle of
the First of June) displayed considerable activity in 1795, capturing a
frigate and a good many merchant ships. The weather, however, was against
him, and he lost five ships of the line wrecked. He, notwithstanding, kept
the sea with twelve ships of the line, and with these met Cornwallis with
five, off Brest, on June 16th. Cornwallis retired, but was overhauled the
next day, and his tail ship the Mars, (seventy-four) badly damaged, the
French, as usual, firing at the rigging. Cornwallis, in the Royal Sovereign,
(100) fell back to support the Mars, but was well on the way to be defeated
when he adopted the clever ruse of sending away a frigate to signal to him
that the Channel fleet was coming up. The code used was one known to
have been captured by the French, and they, reading the signals, hastily
abandoned the pursuit and made off.
Three days later, Villaret-Joyeuse did actually encounter the Channel
fleet, under Hood (now Lord Bridport). He made off south, chased by
Bridport, who had fourteen ships, mostly three-deckers, of which the
French had but one. After a four days’ chase, Bridport came up with the tail
of the enemy, off Lorient. A partial action ensued, in which three French
ships were captured, after which Bridport withdrew. He gave as his reason
the nearness to the French shore—exactly the reason that Hotham gave for
neglecting a possible victory. In both cases, the reason was rather trivial.
The practical assign it to the old age of the admirals concerned. To the

imaginative, these two almost incomprehensible failures to take advantage
of circumstances gave some colour to Napoleon’s theory of “his destiny.”
In this year, a number of East Indiamen were purchased for naval use.
One of these, the Glatton, (fifty-six) was experimentally armed with sixty-
eight pounder carronades on her lower deck, and forty-two pounders on the
upper. On her way to join her squadron, she was attacked by six French
frigates, of which one was a fifty-gun, and two were of thirty-six. She easily
defeated the lot—another instance of the “big ship’s” advantage in minor
combats. Despite this instance of what might be done, the heavy gun idea
made no headway, and the Glatton remained a unique curiosity, till many
years later the Americans adopted it to our great disadvantage.
Towards the end of 1795 (December) Hotham was replaced in the
Mediterranean by Sir John Jervis—an admiral of unique personality, who
left upon the Navy a mark that easily endures to this day. Somewhat
hyperbolically it has been said of him that he was the saviour of the Navy in
his own day, and the main element towards its disruption in these times!
Jervis had made his mark in the War of American Independence, as
captain of the Foudroyant. Discipline was his passion; and by means of it,
he had made an easy capture of a French ship. Thereafter, he became a
unique blend of martinet and genius.
He was the first openly to re-affirm Sir Walter Raleigh’s theory, quoted
in an earlier chapter, that fortifications were useless against invasion, and
that only on the water could an enemy be met successfully, combatting Pitt
himself on this point. When the Great War broke out, his first employment
was in the West Indies, where he achieved St. Lucia, Martinique and
Guadaloupe. He went to the Mediterranean, at a time when France was
numerically superior to us in the Channel, and when Spain was daily
expected to declare war. The fleet to which he went was like all others,
tending to a mutinous spirit, and finally he had to go out in the frigate
Lively. In those days, for an admiral to take passage in anything less than a
ship of the line was considered a most undignified thing. It rankled so with
Jervis that he never forgot it, and years after harped upon it as a grievance.
Of such character was the man who took command in the Mediterranean at
the end of 1795.

In 1796, the personnel of the Navy was increased to 110,000. Jervis, in
the Mediterranean, did little beyond blockading Toulon, and training his
fleet on his own ideas. Spain declared war in October; but her intentions
being known beforehand, Corsica was evacuated, and at the end of the year
the Mediterranean was abandoned also, Jervis with his entire fleet lying
under the guns of Gibraltar. Nothing else was possible.
Elsewhere invasion ideas were uppermost in France, and 18,000 troops,
convoyed by seventeen ships of the line and thirteen frigates, sailed from
Brest for Bantry Bay, at the end of the year. Only eight ships of the line
reached there; a gale dispersed the transports and nothing happened in the
way of invasion. The only other event of the year was the capture of a
Dutch squadron at the Cape of Good Hope. Matters generally were,
however, so bad, that attempts were made to secure terms of peace from
France. These attempts failed.
The year 1792 saw 108 ships of the line and 293 lesser vessels in
commission. Something like sixty ships of the line were building or
ordered, also 168 lesser craft. The first incident was the Battle of Cape St.
Vincent (14th February, 1797). The Spaniards, having come out of
Cartagena, were making for Cadiz, when sighted by Jervis.
The rival fleets were:—

British. Spanish.
2 of 100 guns. 1 of 130 guns.
3 of 98 guns. 6 of 112 guns.
1 of 90 guns. 2 of 80 guns.
8 of 74 guns. 18 of 74 guns.
1 of 64 guns. 27
15

The battle is mainly of interest on account of Nelson’s part in it. The
Spaniards were sailing in no order whatever, the bulk of them being in one
irregular mass, the remainder in another. Jervis, in line ahead, proposed to
pass between the two divisions, and destroy the larger before the smaller
could beat up to assist them. The Spaniards, however inefficient they may
have been in other ways, saw through this manœuvre, and their main body

was preparing to join up astern of the British, when Nelson, in the Captain,
flung himself across them and captured two ships by falling foul of them
and boarding. Three other ships were captured, the rest escaped. In this
battle, as in those of the year before, the same caution about following up
the victory was observed, and the age of the admiral concerned has again
been produced as the reason. But the thoughtful—taking the previous career
of most of those concerned into consideration—may suspect the existence
of some special secret orders about taking no risks, as yet unearthed by any
historian. The only really workable alternative is Napoleon’s “destiny”
theory already alluded to. Of the two, the secret order hypothesis is the
more practical. Into the whole of these victories not properly followed up, it
is also possible, though hardly probable, that the mutinous state of the
personnel entered.

THE “FOUDROYANT” ONE OF NELSON’S OLD SHIPS.

In the battle of Cape St. Vincent, the Spaniards had an enormous four-
decker, the Santissima Trinidad, of 130 guns. She was the first ship engaged
by Nelson, and was hammered by most of the others closely engaged as
well, but her size and power saved her from the fate of the rest of the ships
that were with her.
It is difficult even now to assess the exact situation of the mutineers of
1797. The organised self-restraint of the Spithead Mutiny is hard to
understand, when we remember the heterogeneous origin of the crews. “Jail
or Navy” was an every-day offer to prisoners. Longshoremen, riff-raff,
pressed landsmen, thieves, murderers, smugglers, and a few degraded
officers, were the raw material of which the crews were composed. They
were stiffened with a proportion of professional seamen, and it is these that
must have leavened the mass, and kept the jail-bird element in check.
Pay was bad, ship life close akin to prison life, discipline and
punishments alike brutal, and the food disgracefully bad. It was this last that
brought about the mutiny. There is an old saying to the effect that you may
ill-treat a sailor as you will, but if you ill-feed him, trouble may be looked
for! One or two isolated mutinies, like that of the Hermione, were due to a
captain’s brutality; but mainly and mostly bad food and mutiny were closely
linked.
50
Commander Robinson draws attention to the fact that the pursers
themselves were hardly the unscrupulous rascals they were supposed to be
on shore, and that the system and regulations of victualling were recognised
by the seamen as at the bottom of the mischief.
The same authority quotes a contemporary:—

“The reason unto you I now will relate:
We resolved to refuse the purser’s short weight;
Our humble petition to Lord Howe we sent,
That he to the Admiralty write to present
Our provisions and wages that they might augment.”

Discontent had, of course, long been brewing, but the Admiralty seems
to have been without any suspicions. They dismissed the petition as being

in no way representative; later, having received reports to the contrary,
ordered Lord Bridport’s fleet at Spithead to proceed to sea. On April 15th,
when the signal to weigh anchor was made, the crews of every ship manned
the rigging and cheered. No violence was offered to any officer; the men
simply refused to work. Each ship supplied a couple of delegates to explain
matters, and after an enquiry, their demands were granted and a free pardon
given. Delays, however, ensued, and on May 7th, the fleet again refused to
put to sea.
On this occasion, the officers were disarmed, confined to their cabins,
and kept there, till a few days later a general pardon was proclaimed, when
this mutiny ended. A similar mutiny at Plymouth was equally mild.
Of a very different character was the mutiny at the Nore, which broke
out on May 13th, under the leadership of the notorious Richard Parker.
Parker was a man of considerable parts, said to have been an ex-officer
dismissed the service with disgrace, and to have entered as a seaman. He
possessed undoubted ability and considerable ambition. He very clearly
aimed at something more than the redress of grievances, since his first act
was to put a rope round his own neck by instigating the crew of the
Inflexible to fire into a sister ship, on board which a court-martial was being
held. Subsequently, delegates were sent to the Admiralty with extravagant
claims, which—as Parker may have anticipated—were ignored.
Eleven ships of Admiral Duncan’s fleet (then blockading the Texel) had
joined Parker by the first of June. Duncan was left with but two ships in
face of the enemy. By showing himself much and making imaginary signals
Duncan managed to conceal the facts from the Dutch: but he had
considerable trouble to keep his two ships from joining the mutineers now
blockading the Thames.
There is reason to believe that Parker was in touch with the
Revolutionists in France and the dissatisfied Irish, but the bulk of the
mutineers were altogether uninfluenced by political ideas. The mutiny
began to waver. The ships at other home ports were unsympathetic, and
Parker and his friends found men cooling off. In order to keep things
51
together it was their custom to row round the fleet and inspect ships
suspected of being “cool,”—the side being piped for them. In one case,
however, the boatswain’s mate refused to do so, and flung his call at their

heads. On coming on board, they sentenced him to thirty-six lashes for
“mutinous conduct!” On June 10th, despite this disciplinary system, two of
the mutineer ships sailed away under fire from the others, and on the 14th,
Parker’s own ship surrendered and handed him over to the authorities. He
was hanged on June 29th.
In the Mediterranean fleet, mutiny broke out in two ships off Cadiz, but
Jervis (now Earl St. Vincent), compelled the mutineers to hang their own
ringleaders. In connection with this, Nelson, who was now rear admiral
commanding the inshore squadron, wrote to St. Vincent—

“I congratulate you on the finish, as it ought, of the St. George’s
business, and I (if I may be permitted to say so) very much approve of
its being so speedily carried into execution, even although it is Sunday.
The particular situation of the service requires extraordinary measures.
I hope this will end all the disorders in our fleet: had there been the
same determined spirit at home, I do not believe it would have been
half so bad.”

It is noteworthy that in Nelson’s own ship there was no trouble
whatever. The ship had had a reputation for insubordination, but shortly
after Nelson joined her, a paper intimating that no mutiny need be feared
was dropped on the quarter-deck. Nelson brought with him a reputation for
taking a personal interest in his men. Then, as now, hard work and a dog’s
life were not objected to, provided the personal equation were present.
St. Vincent proceeded to stamp out the embers of mutiny in his own
fashion. He set himself to invest his rank with every circumstance of pomp,
awe and ceremony. Every morning he appeared on the quarter deck in full
dress uniform, paraded the Marines, and had “God save the King” played
with all hats off. His regulations were catholic enough to embrace
lieutenants’ shoe-laces. In all the pomp that he created the mutinous spirit
was smothered.
To him is due the vast abyss between the quarter-deck and lower-deck
which marks the Navy of to-day. Whether this, advantageous as it was a
hundred odd years ago, is equally advantageous now, is another matter. It
makes a barrier altogether different from that existing between officer and

man in the Army—it is something closely akin to the racial differences
mark in India; and this sorts ill with the democratic ideas of to-day, when
class distinction is quite a different matter from what it was a hundred years
ago.
There are still possible two views of the question. One is embodied in a
letter I received some few years ago from a man from the lower-deck. He
wrote, “When I was a boy in a training ship, my captain seemed to me
something as far away and above me as God himself, and the impression
thus created I have carried with me towards all officers ever since. Though
in private life I might meet his brother with feeling of perfect equality, I
could never be other than ill at ease meeting an officer in the same
conditions.”
Here, at any rate, is the psychology of what St. Vincent aimed at. To-
day, however, one is far more likely to hear about “the side of officers,” or
that “officers, when cadets, are taught to regard the men with contempt!”
The conditions are such, that despite mixed cricket and football teams,
mutual sympathy between officers and men is well nigh impossible.
Of “the great God Routine” which St. Vincent set up, it is beyond
question that it is to-day an irritating superfluity to both officers and men
alike.
To resume. As the Spaniards obstinately refused to come out from
Cadiz, St. Vincent sent Nelson in to bombard them with mortar boats; but
this attempt to force them out did not succeed. Following upon this, Nelson,
with three seventy-four’s, one fifty, three frigates and a cutter, was
despatched to Santa Cruz. On the night of July 24th, he led a boat attack in
person. Most of the boats missed the Mole and were stove in. Such as
reached the Mole were met by a withering fire. Nelson was struck on the
right elbow by a grape shot, and taken back to the Theseus, where his arm
was amputated. Troubridge took command of the 300 odd men who had got
ashore, and being surrounded by the Spanish, made terms, whereby the
Spaniards found boats for his party to return to their ships. The squadron
rejoined St. Vincent, and Nelson sailed for England to recover.
The blockade of the Texel had been vigorously maintained till October,
when Duncan returned to Spithead to refit. He had no sooner done so than
the Dutch, under De Winter, came out—presumably with a view to reaching

Brest. Duncan’s frigates, however, promptly reported them, and sailing at
once he met them off Camperdown, on October 11th.
The rival fleets were:—

British. Dutch.
7 of 74 guns. 4 of 74 guns.
7 of 64 guns. 7 of 64 guns.
2 of 50 guns. 4 of 50 guns.
16 15

Duncan’s original plan was the old fashioned ship-to-ship system, but
in the actual event, the Dutch line was broken. One of the Dutch fifty-gun
ships fell back to avoid the Lancaster (sixty-four), five others for some
reason or other following her; the remaining nine fought desperately, till
further resistance was impossible.
The prizes were:—two seventy-four’s, five sixty-four’s, two fifties, and
a couple of frigates. Both the captured fifties were lost; the other ships were
with great difficulty got to England. All were found to have been damaged
beyond repair, and some of Duncan’s ships were in little better condition.
His losses in personnel were over 1,000 in killed and wounded. His crews,
it is interesting to note, consisted mostly of Parker’s erstwhile mutineers.
During 1797, a few frigates only were lost. These included the
Hermione, whose crew mutinied and handed her over to the enemy. The
brutality of her captain, Pigot, whose idea of efficiency was to flog the last
52
two men down from aloft, was the cause of this particular outbreak.
In 1797, a large ninety-eight gun ship, the Neptune, was added to the
Navy, also a seventy-four and a sixty-four. Private yards launched no less
than forty-six frigates and smaller craft, and the total number of warships
53
built, building and projected, was 696.
For the year 1798, the personnel voted was 100,000 seamen and 20,000
marines; and the total Naval Estimates amounted to £13,449,388.
In France, Buonaparte was forging to the front, and he threw himself
into those schemes for the invasion of England which so appealed to the
French mind and so terrified the British public. Ireland was selected as the

most suitable spot, and two expeditions were prepared, one at Rochefort,
the other at Brest. Of these, one, the Rochefort expedition, materialised in
August, reached Killala Bay, in Ireland, and soon afterwards had to
surrender to the English Army. The Brest expedition, escorted by a line of
battle ship and a number of frigates, was more or less annihilated by
Admiral Warren, on October 12th.
As already stated, the Mediterranean had become a species of Franco-
Spanish lake. St. Vincent was outside Gibraltar, and he was still there when
Nelson, in the Vanguard, arrived to join him as rear-admiral, at the end of
April.
Nelson, with a small squadron, was at once despatched to discover
what the French were doing at Toulon. Rumours of all kinds were current.
He found fifteen ships of the line and a great many transports, news of
which he sent to the Admiral. On the top of this came a gale, which
dismasted the Vanguard. She was, however, towed into San Pietro, Sardinia,
and hastily re-fitted, and four days later the ships were off Toulon again,
only to find that the French had sailed.
Reinforced by ten sail of the line, under Troubridge, Nelson now sailed
in search of the French fleet. Reaching Alexandria and finding nothing
known there of the French, he worked back to Syracuse, where he
revictualled in cheerful disregard of the neutrality remonstrances of the
Governor. Thence he returned eastward, and having received information of
where the French had last been seen, eventually found them anchored in
Aboukir Bay, where he attacked them on the evening of August 1st, 1798.
The rival fleets were:—

British. French.
13 of 74 guns. 1 of 120 guns.
1 of 50 guns. 9 of 74 guns.
14 10, also 4 Frigates.

The French, under Brueys, were drawn across the Bay in a “defensive
position.” They were in no way a very efficient force, some of the ships
being old and short of guns, all of them rather short-handed, and even so,
manned with many new-raised raw men. On the other hand, they were so

sure of the safety of their position that their inshore guns were not cleared
for action. By all the naval theory of the day this idea of impregnability was
justified.
The battle itself was simple enough. Nelson came down with the wind
on the French van, approximately putting two of his ships one on either side
of each of the Frenchmen, and so on, the rear being unable to beat up to
support them. The result was the practical annihilation of the French fleet.
Of the thirteen ships of the line, only two escaped in company with two
frigates.
So complete a naval victory had never before been known. In all the
battles of the previous two or three hundred years, the percentage of losses
to the vanquished had been small. The battle of the Nile, therefore, received
an attention perhaps beyond its intrinsic worth. As Nelson wrote to Howe:
—“By attacking the enemy’s van and centre, the wind blowing directly
along their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a few
ships.” The real point of interest is not the result, which was foregone, but
Nelson’s ability to see his opportunity and to make the utmost of it. Therein
lay his superlative greatness.
Of the prizes, three were found to be new and good ships. One of them,
the Franklin, was renamed Canopus, and as late as 1850 was still on the
effective list of the British Navy.
The defeat of the French at the Nile had far reaching effects. Russia,
Austria, Turkey, Naples and Portugal formed with England a great anti-
French Alliance. A large Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean, but
accomplished no services there. It was under suspicion of having private
designs on Malta rather than of assisting the Alliance.
From 1762 onward, when Catherine the Great came to the throne of
Russia, an enormous number of retired or unemployed English officers took
service in the Russian Navy. To one of these, Captain Elphinstone (who
subsequently re-entered the British service), has been traced the origin of
the idea upon which Nelson acted in the battle of the Nile. To another,
General Bentham, originally a shipwright, who returned to the British
service in 1795, was due a revolution in dockyard management. To him was
due the introduction of machinery into dockyards: a matter needing much
diplomacy and caution, as popular feeling against machinery then ran high.

However, by 1798, Bentham had steam engines installed in the dockyards.
He also commenced the first caisson known in England, using it for the
great basin at Portsmouth Yard. In the face of considerable opposition he
also introduced deep docks, basins and jetties at Portsmouth, for the speedy
fitting out of ships.
In 1799, the personnel was settled at 120,000, and the Naval Estimates
were £13,654,000.
In April of this year, the French, under Bruix, with twenty-five ships of
the line, came out of Brest, which was being cruised off by Bridport with
sixteen sail. Having warned Keith, who was blockading Cadiz, and St.
Vincent, who lay at Gibraltar, Bridport fell back on Bantry Bay, where he
was reinforced with ten ships.

GENERAL BENTHAM.

Bruix ran down south, his orders being to join the Spaniards in Cadiz,
54
but the weather was unfavourable and his crews so illtrained that he made
no attempt to attack Keith’s squadron, but ran on into the Mediterranean.
Keith himself joined St. Vincent at Gibraltar.
On May 11th, St. Vincent arrived at Minorca with twenty sail. Nelson,
with sixteen ships (of which four were Portuguese) was scattered over the
Mediterranean, his base being at Palermo. On the 13th, Bruix reached
Toulon, and a week later seventeen Spaniards from Cadiz reached
Cartagena.
To prevent these joining up with Bruix, St. Vincent lay between the two
bases: but the risk that either fleet might suddenly fall on Nelson was such,

that he sent four of his ships to him. He was, however, presently reinforced
with five ships, bringing his net total to twenty-one.
St. Vincent’s health having now given out, he handed the fleet over to
Lord Keith, who learned that Bruix, with twenty-two sail, had left Toulon
on the 27th May; but for some reason or other made for that place. Bruix
reached the Spaniards at Cartagena, without interference, on June 23rd, and
so had thirty-nine ships to oppose the British twenty-one. These, falling
back upon Minorca, were there reinforced by ten ships from home, thus
bringing the total up to thirty-one.
Meanwhile, Bruix putting to sea again at once, made for Cadiz, which
he reached on July 12th, and leaving again on the 21st, made for Brest;
Keith, some two weeks behind him, in pursuit.
The net result of Bruix’s cruise was that the French fleet at Brest rose to
the enormous total of ninety warships, collected to cover an invasion of
England. As, however, Napoleon, who was to command, did not reach
France until October, nothing was done in 1799, thus allowing ample time
for the concentration of English ships. Had the Brest Armada struck at once,
matters for England had been none too rosy, since the only force guarding
the Channel was Bridport’s fleet of twenty-six sail, at Bantry.
August saw 20,000 Russians landed at the Helder from British
transports. These captured the Texel fortifications, inside of which lay what
was left of the Dutch fleet. The Dutch admiral declined to surrender, but his
crews refused to fight, and eventually the ships were handed over without
firing a shot. The ships were found to be antiquated in design and badly
built, and were never of any use to the English Navy.
In the latter part of this year, two Spanish frigates were captured by
four English. These ships were bringing home the year’s South American
treasure. The prize money divided among the four captains amounted to
£160,000.
Twenty-one vessels were lost during the year. Only three of them,
however, were lost by capture, and of these the largest was a ten-gun brig!
The prizes of the year consisted of eight French frigates, five Spanish
frigates and twenty-four Dutch ships. In this year also the very fast French
privateer, Bordelais, was taken, being chased and overhauled by the

Revolutionnaire, an ex-French frigate, and the only frigate in the Navy at
this time able to catch up with French ones.
The personnel granted for the year 1800, was 110,000, with an
additional 10,000 for March and April only. The ships in commission were
100 ships of the line, seventeen small two-deckers and 351 frigates and
lesser craft.
No naval fighting of much importance took place, but the year was
otherwise very momentous. Napoleon, who had made himself First Consul,
was busy reorganising the French Navy, and one of his first acts was to
offer terms of peace. These, however, were refused by the British
Government.
On July 25th, the Danish frigate, Freya, out with a convoy, was met by
some British ships. She refused to allow “the right of search.” Firing
followed, and the Freya was captured. An embassy, to explain matters to the
Danes, went, accompanied by a fleet of nine ships of the line, five frigates
and four bombs, under Admiral Dickson.
This action—the intentions of which were obvious—aroused the
resentment of the Russian Emperor Paul. Nelson’s suspicion that the
Russians wished to capture Malta for themselves, have already been alluded
to. These intentions came to light now; for Paul, having got himself
declared Grand Master of the Knights of St. John of Malta, seized some 300
British merchant ships in Russian ports, and said that he would not let them
go till Malta (which was then besieged and about to fall to the British) was
given up to him.
The British Government ignored the Malta claim, and many of the
British merchant ships equally ignored the Russian orders about remaining
in harbour. Quite a number sailed away; the rest, however, were seized and
burned, by Paul’s orders. To reinforce himself against very probable
reprisals, Paul—presumably influenced by Napoleon—formed the “Armed
Neutrality.” Russia and Sweden signed on December 16th, and on the 19th,
Denmark and Prussia.
Meanwhile, Malta, which had been blockaded and besieged by the
British ever since the battle of the Nile, was in grievous straits. In February,
1800, the Genereux, seventy-four (one of the two ships of the line which

escaped from the Nile), left Toulon, with some frigates, intent on relief. She
was, however, intercepted and captured by Nelson.
In March, the Guillaume Tell, the other survivor of the Nile, which had
been lying at Malta, attempted on the night of the 30th to run the blockade
to procure help. In doing so, she encountered the British frigate Penelope,
which chased her, attacking her rigging. The firing brought up two ships of
the line, Foudroyant and Lion, but the Frenchman made such a defence that
both these were disabled before she was reduced to submission, and it was
to the Penelope frigate that she ultimately struck. This particular fight is
generally reckoned as the finest defence ever made by a French ship.
Malta was eventually starved into surrender, and the final capitulation
took place on the 5th September, 1800, after a siege of practically two
years.
The capture of Malta was perhaps one of the finest exhibitions of
“Admiralty” in the whole war. No waste of life in assaults took place: the
fortress was systematically starved into surrender by the judicious use of
Sea Power to prevent any relief.
In this year (1800), several ships were lost, the principal being the
Queen Charlotte (100), which was accidentally burned and blown up off
Capraja, on the 17th of March. The majority of her crew perished with her.
Eighteen other ships were wrecked, while two (a twenty gun and a fourteen)
mutinied and joined the enemy. These were the only British ships that
actually changed hands. Captures amounted to fourteen ships of from eighty
to twenty-eight guns, and a large number of privateers and small craft.
The year 1801 saw the Estimates at £16,577,000. The personnel voted
was 120,000 for the first quarter of the year, after which it was to rise to
135,000, with a view to dealing with the Armed Neutrality. The number of
ships in commission was substantially the same as in the previous year.
The avowed objects of the Armed Neutrality were to resist “the right of
search,” to secure any property under a neutral flag, that a blockade to be
binding must be maintained by an adequate force, and that contraband of
war must be clearly defined beforehand. In substance, they amounted to the
free importation into France of those naval stores of which she stood most
in need. Wisely enough the British Government decided to break up the

coalition by diplomacy, if possible, and failing that, by force. Incidentally, it
may be noted that the Tsar, who was at the head of the coalition, was more
or less a madman, in possession of a very considerable fleet.
In March, 1801, a fleet of twenty ships of the line and a large number
of auxiliaries, under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson as second in command,
sailed for the Baltic. On arrival at Copenhagen, the Danes were found to be
moored in a strong position under cover of shore batteries. The attack was
confided to Nelson with twelve ships, which fared badly enough for Parker
55
after the battle had lasted three hours to make a signal to withdraw.
Nelson, however, disregarded this, and continued till the Danish fire began
to slacken an hour later. But as the Danes continually reinforced their
disabled ships from the shore, and fired into those which had surrendered,
the slaughter promised to go on indefinitely. Things being thus, Nelson,
under a flag of truce, threatened to set fire to the damaged ships and leave
their crews to their fate unless firing ceased. It has been alleged that this
was a clever piece of bluff in order to extricate his ships from an awkward
position: but all the evidence goes to show that he was fully in a position to
carry out his threat, while as he made no attempt to move during the
negotiations the bluff story is absurd. It appears to have been an act of
humanity, pure and simple.
Ultimately, the bulk of the Danish fleet was surrendered, and a fourteen
weeks’ armistice arranged, Nelson explaining that he required this amount
of time to destroy the Russian fleet!
Subsequently the Swedish fleet was dealt with, but it took refuge under
fortifications. About the same time news came that the mad Tsar had been
assassinated, and that his successor had no wish to continue hostilities.
Nelson (now Commander-in-Chief) appeared off Kronstadt, under the
guns of which the Russians had taken shelter in May. Negotiations
56
followed, and ultimately Russia was granted the right to trade with
belligerents—probably a diplomatic concession in order to detach her
sympathy from France.
In the meantime, Napoleon’s invasion schemes were shaping. To this
day it is unknown whether he was serious or not at this, or for that matter,
any other period. That he intended his preparations to be taken seriously (as

they were by all save Nelson) is clear enough. It is further clear from his
vast preparations that he would have used his flotilla had the chance
occurred; but the mere fact that he never attempted actual invasion is of
itself sufficient answer to all the homilies that have been written about
Napoleon’s inability to understand “Sea Power.”
The army at Boulogne, the flat-bottomed boats, all served to keep
England in a panic, and that was worth much. He had experience to guide
him. Past experience was an English attack on the flotilla like that of
Rodney many years before. In August, 1801, such an attack came, Nelson
directing it. It was found fully prepared for and defeated with ease.
In the Mediterranean, Ganteaume, who had left Brest with seven ships
of the line convoying 5,000 troops, reached Alexandria, but before he could
disembark his soldiers, Keith appeared, and he hurried back to Toulon.
Linois left Toulon with a small squadron, and was driven into
Algeciras, where he beat off Samaurez and a considerably more powerful
squadron. Retreating from this, Samaurez fell in with a Spanish squadron,
the ships of which, in the confusion of a night action, attacked each other,
with the result that the two best ships were destroyed.
In October, 1801, the preliminaries of the Peace of Amiens were signed
and hostilities ceased.
The total losses to the enemy in the war are given as follows by
Campbell:—

French. Dutch. Spanish. Total.
Ships of the line 45 25 11 81
Fifties 2 1 0 3
Frigates 133 31 20 184
Sloops, etc. 161 32 55 248
Total 516

The corresponding British loss was only twenty-one ships of all
classes, and of these only two ships of the line were captured. The bulk of
British losses was accounted for by wrecks.

VII.

FROM THE PEACE OF AMIENS TO THE
FINAL FALL OF NAPOLEON.

W ITH the Peace of Amiens the usual reduction of the Navy took place.
The 104 ships of the line in commission the year before sank to
thirty-two in 1802. The personnel fell to 50,000.
It may here be remarked that of the ships put out of commission a great
number were unfit for further service: 111 ships of various classes being in
so bad a way that they were sold or broken up. Many others were cut down
to serve in inferior rates.
Early in 1803 it became abundantly clear that Napoleon was preparing
for a new war, and in May, war was declared on him by the British
Government. It is of interest to note that Napoleon, in dismissing the British
Ambassador, said to him that he “intended to invade England,” adding that
he considered it might be “a very risky undertaking.” At the time war was
declared Napoleon was not quite ready, and never regained the ground thus
lost.
Little or nothing happened to show that a great naval struggle was in
progress. The French ships lay secure in harbour; the British tossed outside
in ceaseless blockade work. But these months of seeming inaction settled
the fate of France. The French crews, never very efficient, grew less and
less so in harbour, while every day outside hardened the British and added
to their efficiency. Seeing that the British personnel, which was but 50,000
at the early part of the year, was suddenly expanded to 100,000 in June, the
advantages of this shaking down of raw crews were obvious enough. When
eventually battle was joined, the difference between the English and the
French personnel was such that for every round got off by the latter, any
British ship could fire three! Victory was won long before a single battle
shot had been fired. Trafalgar was made a certainty by the great blockades.

When war broke out the general disposition of the hostile squadrons
was as follows:—(the figures in brackets representing frigates and small
craft)—

British. French.
Outside. Inside.
Toulon 14 (32) 10 (6)
Ferrol 7 (4) 5 (2)
Rochefort 5 (2) 4 (7)
Brest 20 (11) 18 (7)
Texel to Dunkirk 9 (21) 5 (11)

The invasion flotilla was distributed about Boulogne to the tune of
1,450 of the flotilla, 120 brigs and a few frigates. In the Texel district were
645 more of the flotilla.
Reserve squadrons were stationed in home waters ample to deal with
the small craft defending flotillas.
So passed away the year 1803. Both sides reinforced their squadrons as
rapidly as new ships could be produced. Beyond this nothing happened.

POSITIONS OF THE SHIPS OF THE LINE AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

The year 1804 opened with the same lack of result. Napoleon made
himself Emperor in May, and to some extent weakened his squadrons by the
removal from them of officers suspected of Republican views. In July,
however, things were nearing completion, and Latouche Treville was put in
supreme command of the whole expedition against England. He received
explicit orders to evade Nelson (who watched Toulon) and to rendezvous at
57
Brest for invasion purposes. He died, however, in August and the plans
fell through.
After some delay, Villeneuve was appointed in his place; but instead of
the invasion idea there came plans of oversea enterprises, possibly designed
with a view to drawing all British forces of the moment away from the
Channel, thus leaving things clear for an invasion. But again there comes
the doubt whether Napoleon ever expected this to succeed, whether he
really thought of much else than keeping England perturbed and busy while
he matured plans for other parts of Europe, and whether he did not realise
that “Sea Power” had its limitations as well as its advantages, and never
really sought anything further than to cause Britain to spend so much in
naval defence that she had little left to subsidise his Continental foes with.
Better than most men he was able to estimate Nelson’s limitations. He
clearly estimated fully enough that Nelson was no particularly brilliant
strategist, and that he was more likely to forecast correctly what Nelson
would do, than was Nelson to divine his purpose. He under-estimated
indeed what Nelson really did mean,—the particular genius which made
Nelson invincible as a leader of men, how Nelson was a tactician able to
gauge exactly the competence of the enemy and to win victory by doing
seemingly foolish things accordingly.
At least, it would appear that there Napoleon erred. But there is no
judging Napoleon—the strangest mixture of genius and charlatan that the
world has ever seen or is ever likely to. It is even unsafe to say that
Napoleon did not foresee Trafalgar; unsafe to believe that, in his view,
French fleets had no purpose other than to keep the English occupied.
Napoleon is ever the one man in history that no one can ever surely know,
whether we take him as the biggest liar who ever lived, or as the greatest
genius the world has ever known.

In January, 1804, the British Fleet in commission consisted of seventy-
five ships of the line, with forty others in reserve; 281 lesser craft were in
commission and a few in reserve.
The intentions of Spain had long been mistrusted in England. As a
precaution, the Spanish treasure fleet was attacked without warning, and
over a million pounds’ worth of booty secured. Spain, thereupon, made her
intentions clear, and declared war. A few lesser ships changed hands during
the year; but even the minor happenings were of small account.
In the year 1805, the number of British ships built, building and
ordered, stood at 181 ships of the line, and 532 lesser vessels besides troop-
ships, store-ships and harbour vessels. The personnel was 120,000 and the
Naval Estimates £15,035,630.
Napoleon’s “Army of Invasion” now amounted to a nominal 150,000
58
men in the Boulogne district alone, men all trained in embarking and
disembarking. The famous “Let me be master of the Channel but for six
59
hours” had been uttered. If ever invasion were seriously contemplated it
was so in this year 1805.
There followed those well-known operations—the “drawing away of
Nelson,” of which so much had been written.
In substance, Napoleon quite understood the situation so far as Nelson
was concerned. He understood that Nelson’s fleet did not watch Toulon
closely. He understood that if Villeneuve came out from Toulon when
Nelson was not close by, Nelson would blindly seek him, probably in the
wrong direction.
In this, and up to a certain point beyond, Napoleon was entirely correct.
But he made one error. He regarded Nelson as a fool. In estimating Nelson
to be easily outwitted he was not perhaps far wrong; but beyond that, he
failed to understand the man with whom he had to deal.
It was these qualities of Nelson that rendered any invasion hopeless.
Nelson had seen enough to know that the fighting value of the enemy was
small, and that for him to attack at all costs and all hazards meant no hazard
to the result. With one single idea, to find the enemy and destroy him, he

was just the one enemy for whom Napoleon’s genius had no answering
move.
Villeneuve got out of Toulon on January 20th. He cruised about, Nelson
cruising elsewhere looking for him. Eventually, Villeneuve, damaged by a
gale, returned to Toulon, whence he presently emerged again on March
29th, and sailed for the West Indies. Ten days after he had done so, Nelson
learned that the French had passed Gibraltar on April 8th; but delayed by
contrary winds and lack of information, the British fleet was a long way
behind. As for Villeneuve, he picked up six Spaniards at Cadiz, and went to
the West Indies with seventeen ships of the line. Nelson followed far behind
with ten. He pressed on so hard, however, that he reached Barbadoes on
June 4th, the same day that Villeneuve, not so very far away, left
Martinique, where he had been lying.
Therefrom, Nelson sailed south to Trinidad, off which he arrived at the
same time as Villeneuve, sailing north, came off Antigua.
On June 11th, Villeneuve (whose crews were already sick) set out to
return to Europe. Two days later, Nelson, who had gone north again,
followed suit.
These hole and corner movements, impossible to-day, are not of much
interest, save in so far as they indicate the certainty of information in these
days and the uncertainty in those.
The “decoyed away fleet” idea has nothing in it, because in any such
scheme Villeneuve could surely either have doubled back when half-way, or
in any case would not have remained in the West Indies.
Nelson sent ahead fast frigates, with information that Villeneuve was
returning; consequently arrangements for his reception were made. Off
Finisterre, Villeneuve encountered Calder, and an indecisive action resulted.
Two Spanish ships were captured. The following day, Villeneuve attempted
to attack, but wind and weather prevented. On the third day the wind
shifted, but Calder failed to attack. For this he was subsequently court-
martialled and severely reprimanded.
60
Nelson, meanwhile, touched Gibraltar, then proceeded north to join
Cornwallis off Brest, and thence to England in his flagship Victory.
Villeneuve, having picked up a few more ships at Ferrol, making his total

61
force twenty-nine sail, put into Cadiz, off which Collingwood maintained
a weary blockade of him.

BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. 1805.

Early in September, news reached England that Villeneuve was at
Cadiz, and Nelson left Southsea Beach on September 14th, sailing next day.
Collingwood, off Cadiz, had been reinforced up to twenty-four sail. A
martinet officer of the old type, it is likely enough that had Villeneuve come
out, he might have done something against the worn-out blockaders. The
arrival of Nelson, on September 28th, changed all this. Collingwood’s red
tape restrictions were countermanded, and the spirit of the entire fleet
changed accordingly. As usual, Nelson spared no effort to keep the men fit
and healthy.
On the 19th October, Villeneuve came out—driven thereto by threats
from Napoleon. As Napoleon had broken up his Boulogne camp on August
26th and by now had the greater part of that army in Germany, his forcing
Villeneuve to sea is one of those mysteries which can never be fathomed.
He acted in the teeth of naval advice, and there are few more pathetic

pictures in history than the disgraced Villeneuve putting to sea to known
62
certain defeat, endeavouring to fire his men with hope.
On the 20th October, the Franco-Spanish fleet was at sea with thirty-
three ships of the line, the British consisting of twenty-seven. Nelson let the
enemy get clear of the land, and then on October 21st, attacked them off
Trafalgar.
Of this battle so much has been written that any detailed description
here is superfluous. To this day, the historians dispute as to what the exact
tactics were, and it is doubtful whether anything will ever get beyond
Professor Laughton’s summary in his Nelson. Here the most emphasis is
laid on the fact that in his memorandum of October 9th, Nelson expected to
handle forty ships against a still larger hostile force. All these matters are,
however, but for the academicians. The main facts are that Nelson correctly
gauged the inability and gunnery inefficiency of the enemy and sailed down
on them in two lines ahead, they lying in line abreast—a position which,
had they been able to shoot well, promised them victory better than any
other.
As an exhibition of tactics, Trafalgar was not even original—Rodney in
the past had done something very similar. On no principle of “theory” was
Nelson right. Simply and solely his genius lay in ability to calculate the
human element, to lay his plans accordingly, and to achieve certain victory
on that!
Villeneuve did all that was possible; and several of the French ships
fought with remarkable courage. But nothing could avail them against
Nelson’s understanding that it was quite safe to take this risk of sailing end-
on into them and then overwhelming a part of them with superior numbers.
After some four hours’ fighting, eighteen of the enemy, including
Villeneuve’s flagship, the Bucentaure, were captured, and the rest drew off.
Nelson himself, within about twenty minutes of falling foul of the
enemy, was mortally wounded by a musket shot from the tops of the
Redoubtable.
The losses to the allied Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in killed and
wounded were extraordinarily heavy, averaging something like 300 or more
per ship. In one, the casualties amounted to five in every six. This enormous

loss was due to the raking broadsides of the English vessels, which wrought
terrible destruction.
Nelson’s last order had been to anchor. Collingwood, on whom the
command now devolved, saw no object in this; to which is generally
attributed the fact that most of the prizes were lost in a gale that followed
the battle. Some were wrecked, some re-captured by the enemy off Cadiz,
some destroyed to prevent re-capture. All told, only four of the eighteen
prizes ever reached Gibraltar. These were the Swiftsure (an ex-British ship),
and three of the Spaniards, Bahama, San Ildefonso, and San Juan
Nepomuceno. All were old and worthless.
From the battle, Dumanoir had escaped with four French ships. With
these he made for the Mediterranean, but being intercepted by Sir R.
Strachan, was compelled to surrender his damaged ships after a short
action. One of the captured ships, the Duguay Trouin, was renamed
Implacable, and till quite recently was a training ship at Devonport.
Although some considerable Franco-Spanish naval force still existed, it
was now so scattered in different parts, and so blockaded, that danger from
it was no longer to be apprehended. In December, however, two divisions of
the Brest fleet, the first consisting of five ships of the line and three other
vessels, under Vice-Admiral Leissegues, and the second of six ships of the
line and four other vessels, under Rear-Admiral Willaumez, evaded the
blockade. They were destined for the West Indies and the Cape respectively.
On February 6th, 1806, off San Domingo, Leissegues was met by Sir John
Duckworth, and seven ships. Three of the French were captured and two
others were run ashore and destroyed. Willaumez eventually reached the
West Indies also, but did not accomplish anything of moment, and having
lost four ships, finally returned to France.
In 1806, the British personnel was 120,000. Estimates £18,864,341.
Fleet 551 ships, of which 104 were of the line. This year was mainly
remarkable for the extraordinary inaction displayed by the French, who lay
sheltered in creeks and inlets along the coast. However, some of their
frigates were captured by boat attack.
For 1807, the personnel was 120,000, afterwards increased to 130,000.
Estimates £17,400,000. Seven hundred and six ships in service, 104 of them
being of the line.

In this year a special system of education for shipwright apprentices
and the establishment of a school of naval architecture was recommended.
It was not, however, until some years later that anything was actually done
in this direction, the old haphazard system of construction being still
followed.
In this same year the “18-gun brig-sloop” appeared, no less than
twenty-five being ordered. These vessels were of about 380 tons, and
carried sixteen thirty-two-pounder carronades and two long six-pounders.
They were found to be extremely useful vessels. During this year the
Turkish and Italian Navies were suspected of being likely to pass into the
hands of France. Sir John Duckworth was, therefore, sent to Turkey with
orders to force the Dardanelles and demand the surrender of the Turkish
fleet to the British. Failing this he was to capture or destroy it and to
bombard Constantinople.
On the 19th of February, the fleet ran through the unprepared
Dardanelles without much injury. It was fired on by a small Turkish
squadron, most of the ships of which were destroyed. The neighbourhood of
Constantinople was reached; but the Turks refused to agree to what was
demanded and busied themselves with strengthening the fortifications of the
Dardanelles.
On the 1st of March, Duckworth, having done nothing, save realise his
awkward situation, came down through the Dardanelles, running the
gauntlet of guns which threw stones weighing nearly half-a-ton, some
considerable damage being done to such ships as were hit. These guns were,
in some cases, holes bored in the rocks filled with powder and stones;
others were genuine “monster guns.”
Operations against Copenhagen, under Admiral Gambier, were opened
on a considerably larger scale. He had under him eighteen ships of the line,
forty lesser vessels and nearly 400 transports. This fleet arrived early in
August, and demanded the surrender of the Danish Navy until such time as
peace should come about, when it would be returned to its original owners.
This being refused, troops were landed, and on the 1st of September,
Copenhagen was bombarded and presently surrendered. Fifteen ships of the
line and ten other vessels were given up, and one ship, which tried to
escape, was captured. Three ships of the line were found building; two of

these were taken to pieces and carried away; the third, being more nearly
completed, was destroyed. All the naval stores were also brought away from
the dockyard, necessitating the employment of no less than ninety-two of
the transports.
Only five of the prizes were considered worthy of taking into the
British service. Of these, one was the Christian VII (eighty), of 2,131 tons.
This ship was so good that four copies of her were built for the British
Navy.
In the winter of this year, Sir Sydney Smith, with nine ships of the line,
blockaded the Tagus and demanded the surrender of the Portuguese fleet, or
else the retirement to South America of the Prince Regent, who naturally
enough (and as had been expected) accepted the latter condition and went to
South America with the bulk of his fleet. During the year, Curacoa was
surprised and captured from the Dutch; St. Thomas and Santa Croix were
taken from the Danes. The French being now in possession of Portugal,
Madeira was also taken possession of by the British.
Losses to the extent of thirty-nine British ships were sustained during
this year, mostly by wreck; one sloop, two brigs and six cutters being the
only ships captured by the enemy. At the end of 1807, Russia, which had
hitherto been an ally, declared war, owing to the peace of Tilset. England,
Austria and Sweden were thus at war with the rest of the continent.
Russia had eleven ships of the line under Senyavin in the
Mediterranean. Senyavin made a bolt for the Baltic with most of them, but
having got as far as the Tagus found himself blockaded by Sir Sidney
Smith.
A squadron was sent under Samaurez to the Baltic in June to co-operate
with the Swedes against the Russians who were in Rogerswick harbour. An
attempt was made to destroy the entire Russian fleet, but owing to a strong
boom the operation failed. The blockade was continued for two months,
after which the British fleet retired.
For 1808, the personnel was 130,000. Estimates, £18,087,500. Ships of
the Navy, 842; of which 189 were of the line. Of these, seventy-six were
74-gun ships.

Napoleon had been steadily renovating his Navy ever since Trafalgar,
and it now consisted of over sixty ships of the line, besides at least twenty
others completing.
A certain increase of naval activity consequently ensued, and early in
the year Admiral Ganteaume, with five ships of the line, escaped from
Rochefort in a gale during the absence of the blockading fleet and
succeeded in reaching Toulon. Here he was joined by five more ships of the
line and some frigates and transports. He sailed again and effected the relief
of Corfu and thence returned to Toulon.
In August, the Russian Admiral, Senyavin, who all this time had been
blockaded in the Tagus, offered to surrender his ships to the British on
condition that they should be given back after the war and that he and his
men should be free to return to Russia. These terms were agreed to.
This year saw the launch of the Caledonia of 120 guns, the largest ship
yet built in England. She was of 2,616 tons. An interesting item in
connection with this ship is that she was designed and ordered to be laid
down as long ago as 1794, but steps to build her were not taken until
eighteen years later.
For 1809, the personnel was 130,000. Estimates, £19,578,467. Ships of
the Navy, 728; of which 113 were of the line. In this year the maintenance
allowance of the British fleet, which had been £3 15s. 0d. per man per
month, was increased to £4 16s. 0d.
In February, owing to a gale, the British fleet blockading Brest had to
withdraw; and Willaumez came out with the object of collecting a few ships
at Rochefort and Lorient, and then sailing to relieve Martinique. He was,
however, found and blockaded in the Basque roads, and attack on him by
fire-ships was suggested.
In April, Lord Cochrane was sent out with a squadron to attack by fire-
ships. Three of these were the special invention of Cochrane. The hold of
each was filled with powder casks and sand, covered in with big booms and
topped with hand grenades and rockets.
On the 11th, Cochrane, leading the expedition with one of his
“explosion vessels,” went in to attack; to discover that the enemy had
anticipated things and built a boom. This, however, was struck by

Cochrane’s vessel, which was then blown up, shattering the boom to pieces.
The rest of the fire-ships came down through the gap, but were badly
handled in the majority of cases, and no French ships were fallen on board
of. The “explosion vessels” had, however, created such a panic that the
French ships cut their cables and drifted ashore, except one ship, which was
grappled with, but succeeded in disengaging.
When day broke, the French ships were seen to be mostly ashore, and
Cochrane urged immediate attack. Gambier, however, displayed
considerable lack of energy, consequent on which many of the French got
off. Three ships were, however, captured and destroyed, and two others
were destroyed by the French themselves.
Cochrane thought that it should have been possible to destroy the
whole fleet, and made use of his being a Member of Parliament publicly to
oppose the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier. Gambier then demanded a
court-martial, which was undoubtedly “packed.” He was acquitted; and
Cochrane, one of the most brilliant officers of the Navy of that day, was
compelled to leave the Service. Until his re-instatement, many years
afterwards, he spent his career in the service of the revolting Spanish
colonies in South America.
Napoleon had long been fortifying and improving the Scheldt, and in
1809 the decision to destroy it was come to. The expedition, which left
England on the 28th July, consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line, thirty-
nine frigates or intermediates, fifty-four sloops or brigs, together with 400
transports, carrying 39,000 troops, under the Earl of Chatham. The fleet was
commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Strachan.
The object of the expedition was to destroy all ships there and demolish
the dockyard and fortifications. But, owing to delays, the French had ample
warning of the impending attack, and put all their ships up the river out of
reach. It was also found impracticable to attack the dockyard or Antwerp.
Flushing was therefore blockaded, and surrendered on the 15th August. One
thirty-eight gun frigate was captured, and a frigate and a brig building in the
dockyard were burned, while the timbers of a seventy-four gun ship that
was building were carried away to Woolwich, and a ship, afterwards named
the Chatham, built from them.

Walcheren was also captured. Twelve thousand troops were left
garrisoning Walcheren. Of these, nearly half died of disease in the swamps,
after which the place was evacuated.
In October, a French squadron with transports slipped out of Toulon
during the absence of Collingwood, who was blockading the port with
fifteen ships of the line and a number of smaller vessels. On the evening of
October 24th, three French ships of the line and a frigate were sighted and
chased. On the following morning two of the ships of the line were driven
ashore, where their crew set fire to them and abandoned them; the other
ship of the line and the frigate managed to get into Cette, whence they
subsequently got safely back to Toulon. Of the convoy, the transports and
the smaller vessels, which had made up the rest of the French squadron,
some were captured, the others ran into Spanish harbours and took shelter
under the fortifications. Eleven of these had taken shelter at Rosas, and
were cut out by boat attack.
The remaining naval operations of the year were the capture of
Senegal, Cayenne, and French Guiana.
In the Baltic, the Russian fleet was blockaded. One or two boat actions
were the only incidents of the year.
For the year 1810, the personnel rose to 145,000, and the total
estimates amounted to £18,975,120. The number of ships in commission
were 108 ships of the line and 556 lesser vessels.
In the Mediterranean, Collingwood resigned his command on account
of ill-health, and died on his way back to England. He was succeeded by Sir
Charles Cotton. There were no incidents of moment, for though the French
had been busily building ships inside Toulon, the only use made of these
was one or two small sorties when the blockading force happened to be
weak.
In the Channel, French frigates and large privateers were very active.
Of the privateers, several were captured or destroyed, but the frigates held
their own.
Abroad, Guadaloupe was captured by a combined naval and military
attack in a series of operations in the Antilles.

In July, the Isle of Bourbon was captured, and following this an attack
was then made on Mauritius, which was the head-quarters of a considerable
French privateer fleet. The first attack was delivered by Captain Pym on
Grand Port. He had with him four frigates. Two French frigates and two
smaller vessels lay inside.
On August 22nd, the first attempt was made, but owing to Captain
Pym’s ship, the Sirius, getting aground, it was delayed until next day. In the
next day’s attempt, both the Sirius and Magicienne ran aground, almost out
of range. The other two ships, Iphigenia and Nereide, got in and drove the
French ships ashore. Firing from them, however, still continued, and
ultimately the Nereide had to surrender. The two British ships which had
run ashore were blown up by orders of Captain Pym. The Iphigenia
succeeded in getting out of the harbour with the crews of these two ships,
but while warping out was surprised and also captured by another French
squadron. The entire attack proved a failure. The incident is mainly of
interest as being the only instance in the war in which a British squadron
sustained defeat.
Following upon this, a more serious attack was made on Mauritius;
10,000 troops were embarked, accompanied by one ship of the line and
twelve frigates. A landing was effected at the end of November, and the
island subsequently surrendered.
In the Baltic, Sweden, which had hitherto been a British ally, joined the
French side. The Russian fleet was still blockaded by Admiral Samaurez,
but as the Tsar was known to be wavering in his allegiance to Napoleon, no
actual hostilities took place against him, and during the greater part of the
year British merchant ships freely traded with Russian ports.
When peace was declared between England and Russia, the ships of
Senyavin which had been captured in the Tagus were restored, but they
contributed nothing to naval history. During the year, five frigates were
captured from the French and two British frigates were captured by the
enemy. British losses of the year included one ship of the line and seven
frigates wrecked or blown up to prevent capture, as well as some smaller
vessels.
For the year 1811, the personnel remained at 145,000. The Estimates
were £19,822,000, and the number of ships in commission were 107 of the

line, and 513 of inferior rates.
A considerable blockading squadron was still maintained off Toulon,
but the French ships there, though they occasionally came out into the
Road, were extremely careful to avoid any engagement.
On March 13th, a small battle, which took place off Lissa between six
French frigates, accompanied by five smaller vessels, under Dubourdieu,
and a British squadron consisting of three frigates and a twenty-two gun
ship, commanded by Captain William Hoste, indicates very clearly the
inferiority to which the French fleet had fallen. One French ship was driven
ashore and two others surrendered.
This sort of thing was in no way unique, and a single ship action of the
same year is an even more startling example. The British sloop Atlanta
(eighteen) met and engaged the Entrepennant (thirty-two). After an
engagement lasting two-and-a-half hours the French frigate struck, having
lost thirty men killed and wounded, the total loss to the British ship being
only five men wounded.
In this year the island of Java was captured from the Dutch, and there
were a number of small actions in the Channel, mostly the attacks of
praames on small British ships. The total loss to the enemy consisted of
three French frigates captured, two French frigates destroyed and one
wrecked. Two Venetian frigates were also captured. The losses to the British
Navy during the same period were much more heavy: three ships of the
line, five frigates and an eighteen-gun brig-sloop were wrecked. Three
small ships were captured and various other small vessels became
unserviceable, the total loss in these amounting to fifty-one.
In January, 1811, the report of the Commission of 1806 was first
brought into operation by the introduction of apprentices to be trained at the
Royal Naval College, at Portsmouth. This was known as the School of
Naval Architecture, and was the first genuine attempt at introducing science
into naval construction. Students were given three days technical work a
week and three days theoretical in mathematics and theory, under Dr.
Inman. From the School of Naval Architecture the students were sent to the
Navy Office, and also to the various dockyards, for the study of routine.
Unfortunately, however, the experiment was received with disfavour by
many of the old-type of dockyard officer, with the result that most of the

students were either not proficient or else became disgusted and found
employment elsewhere.
For the year 1812, the personnel still remained at 145,000. The
Estimates were £19,305,759. Ships in commission amounted to 102 ships of
the line and 482 lesser vessels, with a certain number of ships in reserve. At
and about this period various experimental ships were built, of which the
most interesting was the floating battery Spanker. She was of somewhat
amateur construction; intended to carry guns of the largest size and mortars
for bombardment and harbour defence. The main deck had an over-hang
fitted with scuttles, down through which guns could be fired. The idea of
this was, that supposing she were attacked by boats, these would go under
the over-hang and very easily be destroyed. In practice, however, there was
so much miscalculation that the over-hang was only a few inches above the
water-line. The ship was also found to be so unmanageable that she was
very shortly relegated to harbour service.
The blockades of Toulon and the Scheldt were continued, but nothing
of much naval interest took place. A small French squadron broke out of
Lorient, but after cruising about for three weeks and making a few prizes,
returned to Brest and was blockaded there.
In the Baltic, peace was made with Sweden, and war definitely broke
out between France and Russia, this being the war which culminated in
Napoleon’s disastrous invasion of Russia.
In the Channel and in the Mediterranean a number of single ship
actions took place, and one ship, the Rivoli (seventy-four), built at Venice
for the French Navy, was captured. This particular ship held out for 4½
hours, and at the time of her surrender had only two guns left available and
fifty per cent. of her crew were out of action. She was captured by the
Victorious (seventy-four).
The most important naval event of the year was the American
declaration of war against England. The war had been prepared for some
time, and the American Navy, such as there was of it, was in a very efficient
and up-to-date state. It contained no ships of the line, but a number of very
heavily-armed frigates, manned by well-trained crews. In the single ship
actions that ensued the Americans were almost invariably victorious.

For the year 1813, the personnel was 14,000; the Estimates
£20,096,709. Ships in commission, 102 of the line and 468 inferior vessels.
The problem of meeting the American frigates was very seriously
considered and a certain number of large ships were razeed with a view to
meeting the American frigates on more even terms.
The most famous event of the year was the fight between the Shannon
(British) and the Chesapeake (American). The former was rated at thirty-
eight, but actually carried fifty-two guns. The latter was rated at thirty-six,
but carried fifty. She had done well, but at the time of the fight had just
been re-commissioned with a new crew, of whom a number were British
deserters and some forty were Portuguese. The Shannon, on the other hand,
had been in commission for some years; and Captain Broke had assiduously
trained his men in gunnery, having anticipated the “dotter” of to-day.
Being in this state of efficiency he came off Boston and sent in a
challenge to the captain of the Chesapeake. Whether the challenge was
actually received or not, the Chesapeake came out accompanied by yachts
crowded with sightseers and a cargo of handcuffs for the anticipated British
prisoners.
Firing was not opened until the two frigates were only fifty yards apart.
It lasted only about ten minutes, when the Chesapeake being almost blown
to pieces, the Shannon fell aboard her and carried her by boarding in
another five.
The rest of the war with America, which lasted well on into 1815, is of
no great naval interest except for the side issues involved. In a series of
actions, the American big gun theory was triumphantly demonstrated, and
more than once small British squadrons were wiped out. No material result,
however, followed in consequence. On the other hand, Washington was
attacked in 1814, and the public buildings burned, again without much
material result. The real interest of the war lies in side issues.
The submarine appeared in this war, but the American authorities
refused to give it any official sanction, and attempts made against British
ships were by private individuals who had ignored the express orders of the
American authorities. None of the experimenters were successful, but this
was mainly a matter of luck.

A matter of greater interest was the construction of an American war
vessel, the Fulton. The Fulton—which was driven by a steam paddle in the
centre of the vessel, and was armoured with wood so thick that none of the
shot of the period could get through it, was armed with two 100-pounder
guns on pivot mountings and carried a ram shaped bow—can undeniably
lay claim to being the precursor of the Monitor or Merrimac, and also to
being the first steam warship. She took too long to complete, however, to
take any part in the war; but had the war continued, few British ships could
have survived her attacks, presuming her to have been seaworthy.

THE END OF AN OLD WARSHIP.

To resume: 1813 as regards the French was not productive of much in
the way of naval operations. The French had by now built so many new
ships at Toulon that they were actually superior to the blockading British
squadron. But they made no attempt to use this superiority, and nothing

resulted except a few small skirmishes. A few insignificant captures were
made on the British side.
At the beginning of the year 1814, there were ninety-nine ships of the
line in commission and 495 lesser vessels. The personnel amounted to
140,000, and the estimates £19,312,000.
A number of single ship actions took place between frigates, and in
most of these a considerable improvement in French efficiency was noted.
Nothing, however, was done with the larger ships, and the war ultimately
ended with the deportation of Napoleon to Elba.
No sooner was peace declared than the fleet was greatly reduced and a
large number of ships sold or broken up. Nineteen ships of the line and
ninety-three other vessels were thus disposed of. The personnel for the year
1815 was reduced to 70,000 for the first three months and 90,000 for the
remainder of the year. The estimates stood at £17,032,700, of which
£2,000,000 was for the payment of debts.
The re-appearance of Napoleon and the events which culminated in the
battle of Waterloo did not lead to any naval operations, and with the final
deportation of Napoleon to St. Helena, a further reduction of the fleet took
place. The estimates sank to £10,114,345, and considerable reductions of
officers and men were made.

VIII.

GENERAL MATTERS IN THE PERIOD OF
THE FRENCH WARS.

N AVAL uniform, as we understand it, first came into use for officers in
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the days of George II, who so admired a blue and white costume
of the Duchess of Bedford that he decided then and there to dress his naval
officers in similar fashion. No very precise regulations were, however,
followed, and for many years uniform was more or less optional or at the
fancy of the captain.
The first uniform consisted of a blue coat, with white cuffs and gold
buttons. The waistcoat, breeches, and stockings were white. The hat was the
ordinary three-cornered black hat of the period with some gold lace about it
and a cockade. Other officers wore uniforms which were slight variants
upon this: while as special distinguishing marks only the captain (if over
three years’ seniority) wore epaulettes upon both shoulders. A lieutenant
wore one only.
From time to time the uniform was altered slightly, mostly as regards
the cuffs and lapels; but enormous latitude was allowed, and some officers
even dressed as seamen.
There was no general uniform whatever for the men; though
circumstances led to the bulk of the men in any one ship being dressed
more or less alike.
This was the result of the “slop chest.” This was introduced about the
year 1650, and amounted to nothing more than a species of ready-made
tailor ship at which men at their own expense could obtain articles of
clothing. Later on it became compulsory for newly-joined men, whose
clothes were defective, to purchase clothing on joining, to the tune of two
months’ pay.

These articles being supplied to a ship wholesale, were naturally all
alike, and so the men of one ship would all be more or less uniformly
attired. Men of another ship might be dressed quite differently, though also
more or less like each other. But any idea of uniform as “uniform,” right up
to Trafalgar, was entirely confined to one or two dandy captains, and they
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mainly only considered their own boat’s crews. Some fearful and
wonderful costumes of this kind are recorded.
Uniform wearing of the “slop chest” variety was, however, always
regarded as the badge of the pressed man and jail bird. The “prime seaman”
who joined decently clad was allowed to wear his own clothes, and these
were decided by fashion. There were dudes in the Navy in those days, and
contemporary art records a good deal of variety. In our own day, when
exactitude is at a premium, it has erred badly enough to depict bluejackets
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with moustachios. In the old days it was probably even more careless still.
Consequently everything as to the costume of men in the Nelson era
required to be accepted with caution. It is, however, clear from the more
reliable literary and descriptive sources that the dandy sailor existed very
freely. The “prime seaman” loved to hall-mark himself by his costume.
On board ship in dirty weather he wore anything and his best when
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coming up for punishment. In a general way fashion always worked from
the officers’ uniform, with fancy additions. A natty blue jacket was the
essential feature, with as many brass buttons as the owner could afford. A
red or yellow waistcoat seems to have been a la mode. Trousers, preferably
of white duck, but sometimes of blue, were also “the fancy.” Sometimes
these were striped. In all cases they were ample, free, and flowing, as they
are at the present day. Convenience of tucking up on wet decks is the usual
explanation; but there is good reason to believe that idle fashion of the
Nelson days had just as much or more to do with the modern bluejacket’s
trousers.
The quaint little top hat of the midshipman was generally worn by the
Lower Deck dandy. A pig tail was also a sine qua non during the period of
the Second Great War.
The origin of the pigtail is wrapped in some mystery. It has been
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variously ascribed to copying the French Navy and to imitating the

Marines, who wore wonderfully greased pigtails at this period.
To complete the rig the seamen used to decorate themselves with
coloured ribbons let into their clothes. They lived a hard life, and much has
been written upon the subject. But the evidence generally tends to prove
that the “prime seaman” as a rule had a far better time than those who
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(failing to recognise that conditions have altered to-day) appear to realise.
The lack of liberty, entailed by the presence of so many men who would
assuredly desert on half a chance, was so general and so long-standing that
it is doubtful whether it was felt to any really great extent. Customs cover
most things.
To our modern ideas the punishments afloat were horribly brutal; but
here again it is necessary to remember the difference in era. Floggings and
kindred punishments were plentiful enough ashore; and there is a good deal
of evidence to indicate that they were taken as “all in the day’s work
afloat.” The victim was usually “doped” by his messmates, who saved up
part of their rum tots for the purpose, and the horrors of the cat have
undoubtedly been somewhat exaggerated. It was undeniably brutal and
cruel; but, to select a homely simile, so were dental methods a few years
ago. Our fathers submitted to things in this direction which none of us
would, or, for that matter, could stand nowadays. The bulk of contemporary
evidence is that the (to our eyes) brutal punishments of the Navy of a
hundred odd years ago were never regarded as serious grievances by those
who stood to undergo them.
The actual grievances revolved entirely around the administration of
undeserved punishments. A certain number of captains misused their
powers and prerogatives, but only a small percentage did so. At no time
does the average captain appear to have been a brutal bully. This is,
however, to be qualified by the midshipmen, of whom a certain number
deliberately bullied men into doing things for which they got brutally
punished afterwards. But outside this the conditions were by no means so
horrible as generally depicted. The real sufferers were the pressed
landsmen, who certainly learned to be seamen in a very hard school.
It is necessary, however, even here to remember the times and the
conditions. This view is borne out by the Great Mutiny. The mutineers, even
at the Nore, never demanded the abolition of the cat. When trouble was

connected with it in any way, it was over its unreasonable use, as, for
instance, in the insensate flogging of the last two men off the rigging, which
led to the Mutiny in the Hermione. This—which entailed punishing the
smartest men since these had furthest to go—goaded the “prime seamen” to
desperation and sympathy with the landsmen element afloat, which was
ever in a semi-mutinous condition. It is impossible to hold that Captain
Pigot of the Hermione did not deserve his fate. But Pigots were
comparatively rare, and captains like Nelson by no means scarce. Nelson
had no hesitation in flogging men, but he flogged justly, and no troubles
ever occurred in any ship commanded by him. For that matter it was
characteristic of the time that a captain might be a Tartar, and yet be quite
popular with his crew so long as he was just. The “prime seamen” who
formed the nucleus of the ship’s company realised the necessity of severe
measures and strict discipline in order to tame the human ullage which
made up the rest of the crew.
In this connection it is interesting to note that towards the end of the
period there began to creep in the commencement of a later classification of
ratings not liable to corporal punishment.
Had life afloat in the days of the Great War been quite as terrible as it is
often depicted as having been, the volunteer element of trained seamen
could hardly have existed, nor could the glamour of the sea have brought so
many raw volunteers as it did. When a ship was commissioned, the first
step was advertising for men. The advertisements were specious and
alluring enough; but the captain’s character generally had most influence on
the response; and all the essential seamen element, unless they had spent all
their money, were pretty wary as to who they shipped with.
To be sure it did not take the seaman long to lose his money. On a ship
paying off he received a considerable accumulated sum, and every kind of
shark and harpy was on the lookout to relieve him of it. He got gloriously
drunk and so remained while the money lasted, and in this condition the
press-gang often got him.
The press-gang was a legalised form of naval conscription. In theory
any seafaring man who could be laid hands on might be taken; in practice
all was fish that came to the press-gang’s net.

The press-gang, armed with cudgels and cutlasses, used to operate at
69
night, generally in the naval towns, but at times also further afield. It laid
hands upon all and sundry, hitting them over the head if they resisted.
A cargo secured, the men were taken on board and kept between decks
under an armed guard pending examination by the captain and surgeon.
Certain people, such as apprentices or some merchant seamen, were exempt
and had to be liberated. Badly diseased men were also let loose again.
Verminous and dirty folk were scrubbed with a brutality which created
subsequent cleanly habits. Their clothes were either fumigated or else
thrown away altogether, and fresh clothing supplied from the “slop chest” at
so much off their pay.
If within a fortnight the pressed man cared to call himself a volunteer
70
he received a bounty; but, whether he volunteered or not, once aboard the
ship there he remained till death or the paying off of the ship years later. It
was this confinement to the ship which led to so much agitation, and was
made one of the principal grievances of the mutineers at Spithead.
On the side of the authorities it has to be remembered that had any man
been allowed ashore he would certainly never have been seen again, at any
rate, so long as he had any money. In most fleets also, an attempt at a
substitute was made by allowing ship to ship visiting. Such visits invariably
resulted in drunken bouts and subsequent floggings. Nelson went further—
he instituted theatricals on shipboard. It is generally clear that—very
crudely, of course—the authorities were not blind to the desirability of
relieving the tedium of imprisonment on board ship.
The feeding of the men in the days of the Great War is generally
considered to have been villainous. It was one of the causes of the Mutiny;
but there is some reason to believe that it was not invariably bad. Rodney’s
fleet is said to have been excellently provisioned, and much of what has
been written about “thieving pursers” in the past is now known to be
mythical. It was a classical legend that the purser stole and swindled with
bad food. He might do so, and many did. But all did not, either from
honesty or because they did not get the chance. Under Nelson or Rodney an
unscrupulous purser stood to have a very bad time indeed, and there were
others very keenly alive to the fact that good feeding and efficiency went
hand in hand. The bad food at the time of the mutinies seem to have been a

feature of that particular time, and even so due rather to mismanagement
than much else. For the rest, the real culprits were economists on shore,
who had no connection whatever with the Fleet, and were merely interested
in husbanding the financial resources of the country.
The provisions as made were almost uniformly good, and the stories of
unscrupulous contractors who, in league with the pursers, foisted inferior
food on the Fleet, may mostly be dismissed. Such cases occurred now and
again, but comparatively rarely. “Rogues in authority” were mainly
mythical. There are yarns by the score. There are corresponding yarns to-
day, quite as plentiful, which the careless historian of the future will no
doubt swallow. For example, at the present day it is an article of faith with
every bluejacket that the first lieutenant pockets odd sixpences out of the
canteen, and nothing ever can or ever will remove the impression.
It is absolutely absurd; but within the last ten years I have had it chapter
and verse all about the peculation of 1s. 4d. by a first lieutenant whose
private income ran well into five figures! It is a sea-legend so hoary that
bluejackets honour it, no matter how ridiculously improbable. The purser of
the days of the Great War was not perhaps entirely clean handed, but as
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Commander Robinson has pointed out, even at the Spithead Mutiny, when
the provision question was very much to the fore, the mutineers did not
complain of the purser, but of the system and regulations. It was people on
shore, not the man afloat, who, when it came to the point, mixed up the
instrument with the handlers thereof.
The Spithead trouble, which was purely naval (the Nore Mutiny was
more or less political) arose entirely, so far as food was concerned, out of
the economists already referred to. Vast stores of provisions had been
accumulated, and many were going bad. Pursers received very strict orders
to use up the old “likely to decay soon” before touching the new. The result
was the issue of decayed pork, stinking cheese, and mildewed biscuits to an
unprecedented degree. A badness that had hitherto been more or less
occasional chanced just about the Mutiny period to be general.
The men were by no means starved or badly fed, presuming the food to
be good. The usual scale was somewhat as follows:—A daily issue of a
pound of biscuit and a gallon of beer or else pint of wine; and when these
were exhausted, one gill of Navy rum diluted with three of water twice a

day. On Tuesdays and Saturdays an issue of 2lbs. of beef was made; on
Sundays and Thursdays 1lb. of pork. Over the week the issue of other
articles was 2lbs. pease, 1½lbs. oatmeal, 6ozs. of butter, an equal amount of
sugar, and 12ozs. of cheese and half-a-pint of vinegar nominally per man;
but actually every four men took the provisions of six. Nine pounds of meat
a week could hardly be called starvation fare even to-day, and in those times
it was an extraordinarily liberal diet for men who at home would not have
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had anything like it. Except in cases with admirals like Collingwood (who
in the matter of understanding the ratio of health to efficiency was about the
most incompetent admiral the British Navy ever had), it was generally seen
to that, whenever possible, fresh provisions could be purchased from traders
who regularly visited blockading fleets.
Furthermore, rations were normally varied so far as circumstances
would permit, and when possible fresh beef and mutton were substituted for
the salt meat allowance. Nelson went to almost extravagant lengths in these
directions; but the majority of other officers were not far behind. Whatever
hell the Lower Deck of the Fleet entailed, the blame in hardly any case lay
with the officers, executive or otherwise, but entirely with civilian officials
and Members of Parliament with ideas of their own about economy. All the
reliable evidence is to the effect that the responsible authorities desired their
fighting men to live (relatively speaking) like fighting cocks, that the
difference between the ideal and the real was due to civilian influence, and
that even so it was only really thoroughly bad just before the Great Mutiny.
Had it been a regular thing the Mutinies would probably never have
happened, the men would have been too used to the conditions to find in
them a special cause of complaint.
The whole trouble in messing in the old days arose out of quality, not
quantity. The beef and pork were almost invariably bad, owing to the
system of using up the old provisions first, with a view to economy. Every
ship carried tons of good provisions going bad, while those already bad and
decayed were being consumed. Consequently the men starved in the midst
of relative plenty.
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It remains to add that the officers fared little better. On the whole,
taking their general shore food into consideration, it may be argued that
they fared worse. As a rule, they had to eat what the men ate, a fact too

often forgotten by those who believe that the officers of those days
generally peculated on provisions for the men.
Both aft and forward there was one consolation. Liquor was plentiful
enough for anyone who wanted to be half seas over by eventime. So was
the hard life lived, with an occasional battle to break the monotony.
To both officers and men battle seems to have been the “beano” of to-
day. Conditions on board were not rosy enough to make life worth clinging
to, while battle meant a good time afterwards to those who got through
unscathed. There was only one terror—being wounded. The horrors of the
cockpit are beyond exaggeration. The surgeons did their best. They were
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poorly paid men and expected to find their own instruments: only if they
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could not did they borrow tools from the carpenter.

A TRAFALGAR ANNIVERSARY.

They heated their instruments before use so as to lessen the shock of
amputation; they doped their patients with wine or spirit so far as might be.
They took all as they came in turn, whether officer or man. If anyone
seemed too badly wounded to be worth attention they had him taken above
and thrown overboard. If, at a hasty glance, taking off an arm or a leg, or
both, seemed likely to promise a cure, they gave the wounded man a tot of
rum and a bit of leather to chew, and set to work! The wounded who
survived were treated with a humanity which makes the “more humanity to
the wounded” of the Spithead mutineers a little difficult to understand at
first sight. They were fed on delicacies; and anything out of the ordinary on
the wardroom table was always sent to them. They also got all the officers’
wine.
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On the other hand, time in the sick bay was deducted from their pay,
and they were liable to all kinds of infectious diseases caught from the last
patient.
To satisfy the demands of the economists, lint was forbidden and
sponges restricted, so that a single sponge might have to serve for a dozen
wounded men. Blood-poisoning was thus indiscriminately spread, and a
wounded man thus infected with the worst form of it, was mulcted in his
pay for medicines required. When the Spithead mutineers demanded “more
humanity to the wounded” those were the things that probably they had in
mind. It has further to be remembered that a man wounded too badly to be
of any further use afloat was flung ashore without pension or mercy. The
surgeons were fully as humane as their brethren ashore, possibly much
more so, from the mere fact that any community of men flung together to
sink or swim together compels common sympathies. To the men the purser
was classically a thief, the surgeon a callous brute, the officers generally
brutes of another kind. This cheap view of the situation has been
perpetuated ad lib. But all the best evidence is to the effect that, as a rule,
and save in exceptional cases, most of those on board a warship pulled
together, and that all strove to make the best of things. Things to be made
the best of were few, no doubt, and the grumblers and growlers are the folk
who have left most records. Allowing for the different era, similar growls
can be found to-day. To-day the contented man says nothing; the
discontented says a little, and outside sympathisers say a great deal. The
truth probably lies with the actually discontented’s version somewhat

discounted. In the days of the Great War, the same fact probably obtained.
Unquestionably the seaman proper loved the sea and his duty, despite all
hardships and drawbacks. To this fact is to be attributed the easy victories of
the Great Wars, and, relatively to corresponding shore life, sea life afloat
77
can hardly have been quite so black as most people delight to paint it.
The pay of the Navy of the period remains to be mentioned. It ran as
follows:—

Captain—6s. to 25s. a day, according to the ship, plus a variety of
allowances.
Midshipmen—£2 to £2 15s. 6d. a month.
Surgeons—11s. to 18s. a day, with half-pay when unemployed.
Assistant-Surgeons—4s. and 5s., with half-pay when unemployed.
Chaplains—about 8s. 6d. a day, with allowances.
Schoolmasters—£2 to £2 8s. a month, with bounties.
Boatswains—£3 to £4 16s. a month.
Boatswain’s Mate—£2 5s. 6d. a month.
Gunner—£1 16s. to £2 2s. a month.
Carpenter—£3 to £5 16s. a month, according to the ship.
Quartermaster—£2 5s. 6d. a month.
Sailmaker—£2 5s. 6d. a month.
Sailmaker’s Assistant—£1 18s. 6d. a month.
Master-at-Arms—£2 0s. 6d. to £2 15s. 6d. a month.
Ship’s Corporals—£2 2s. 6d. a month.
Cook—11s. 8d. a month and pickings.
Able Seaman—11s. a month (33s. a month after 1797).
Ordinary Seaman—9s. a month (25s. 6d. a month after 1797).
Landsman—7s. 6d. a month (23s. a month after 1797).
Ship’s Boy—13s. to 13s. 6d. a month.

As a rule the men received their pay in a lump when the ship paid off.
Hence those extraordinary scenes of dissipation with which the story books
78
have made us sufficiently familiar. Jews and women soon fleeced the Tar,
who was generally too drunk to know what he was doing, there being
dozens of willing hands ready to see to it that he was well plied with liquor.

FLAGS.
In the year 1800 the Union flag was altered to its present form by the
incorporation of the red cross of St. Patrick. This flag, the Union Jack, was
79
used for flying on the bowsprit, and at the main masthead by an Admiral
of the Fleet. To hoist it correctly, i.e., right side up, was a special point of
importance in the Fleet of Nelson’s day, and many a foreigner seeking to
use British colours got bowled out from hoisting the flag incorrectly, i.e.,
without the greater width of white being uppermost in the inner canton
nearest the staff. To this day many people on shore do the same.
The ensign was coloured according as to whether the Admiral was “of
the white,” “blue,” or “red.” It was flown, as till quite recently, from the
mizzen peak.
For battle purposes this variety ensign died out after Trafalgar, where,
in order to avoid confusion, Nelson ordered all ships to fly the white ensign
—he himself being a Vice-Admiral of the white, while Collingwood was
Vice-Admiral of the blue. Trafalgar was thus the first battle to be fought
deliberately under the white ensign.

IX.

THE BIRTH OF MODERN WARSHIP IDEAS.

I N 1816 took place the bombardment of Algiers, whereby 1,200 Europeans
who were in slavery were released. None of these, however, proved to be
British subjects. A noticeable feature of the bombardment was the heavy
damage done by the large ships engaged.
For the year 1817 the personnel stood at 21,000 only. Ships in
commission were fourteen of the line and 100 lesser craft. Two hundred and
sixty-three (of which eighty-four were of the line) were laid up “in ordinary”
and the remaining ships were condemned.
In this year a new rating of ships was introduced. Up till now the
carronades had not been included in the armament of ships. Under the new
rating they were included, and so the thirty-eight gun ship actually carrying
fifty-two guns appeared for the first time with her proper armament.
Although the Navy was so reduced, considerable attention was paid to
shipbuilding and improvement of construction. Trussed frames were
introduced, and a variety of other inventions which had long been in use in
France. Much attention was paid to the strong construction of the bow, with a
80
view to resisting raking fire. Sterns were also made circular to enable more
guns to bear aft. A curious objection to this was made on the grounds that in
time of war it was the enemy who would be in retreat and most in need of
stern fire, and that by the introduction of this into the British Navy the enemy
would copy and so have the advantage of being better able to defend himself
than heretofore! It was, however, pointed out that perhaps war vessels
propelled by steam might be met with in blockades, and that it would be
extremely important to sail away from these and be able to destroy them while
so doing!
The years 1818 and 1819 passed uneventfully. The personnel was 20,000,
and the estimates averaged between six and seven million pounds. They
remained at about this figure for several years, and beyond some slight

operations in Burmah, in 1824, the British Navy performed no war services
till the year 1827. In the Burmese operations, the Diana, a small steam paddle
vessel took part. It is also of some interest to record that Captain Marryat, the
naval novelist, commanded the Lorne (twenty) in these operations.
In 1827, the combined fleets of England, France and Russia met those of
the Turks and Egyptians at Navarino, in connection with the war between
Turkey and Greece. The allied fleet consisted as follows:—

Three ships of the line.
BRITISH { Four frigates.
Several other vessels.
Three ships of the line.
FRENCH { Two lesser vessels.
Two schooners.
Four ships of the line.
RUSSIAN { Four frigates.

The combined Turko-Egyptian fleet consisted of three ships of the line,
fifteen large frigates, eighteen corvettes, and a number of gunboats, etc.
The Turkish fleet was anchored in the harbour. The combined fleet sailed
into the harbour and anchored to leeward of the Turks. These fired upon some
English boats and a general action ensued, in which the greater part of the
Turko-Egyptian fleet was destroyed with the loss of somewhere about 4,000
men. The Allies lost 650, and the principal English ships were so damaged
that they had to be sent home for repairs.
At and about this time, and right on for some years, an enormous number
of experiments were carried out between ship and ship with a view to
improving the sailing qualities, and side by side with this, the question of
propulsion other than by sail was first seriously considered. A certain number
of small steam tugs had been added to the Navy, there being no less than
twenty-two such built in the reign of George IV. Of these the largest was built
in 1835. Very little reliance was placed on steam at first for any possibilities
outside towing and harbour work, and a great deal of energy was expended in
devices to enable ships to be moved by manual labour. In place of the
“sweeps” of ancient history, paddles were fitted, and in 1829 the Galatea
(forty-two) frigate was thus moved at a speed of three knots in a dead calm.

The Galatea was commanded by Captain, afterwards Admiral Sir
Charles, Napier, who so long ago as 1819 had been concerned in financing an
unsuccessful attempt to run iron steamers on the Seine. The first ship in which
hand paddles were tried was the Active, frigate. No success was met with, but
Napier evolved a different system for the Galatea. Those of the Active were
worked by the capstan; Napier installed a series of winches along each side of
the main deck. It took about two-thirds of the ship’s company to work them.
The earliest known use of steam was as long ago as in the year 1543. The
account of it was in the original records which had been preserved in the
Royal Archives of Simancas, among the State Papers of the city of Catalonia,
and those of the Naval Secretary of War, in the year 1543, and was extracted
on the 27th August, 1825, by the keeper, who signed his name “Tomas
Gonzalez.”
The inventor, a naval officer named Garay, never revealed the secret of
his invention, but mention is made of a “cauldron of boiling water” and
“wheels of complicated movement on each side of the vessel.” He succeeded
in obtaining a speed of “two leagues in three hours,” also “at least a league an
81
hour” with his device, fitted to a 200-ton vessel named Trinidad. Honours
were bestowed on Garay, but the monarch who had patronised him, being
busy with other matters, did not follow up the invention. Otherwise much
naval history might have been different from what it is.
In 1736, Jonathan Hulls took out a patent in England for a stern wheel. It
should be remembered that at this time the question of means of propulsion
other than by sail was eagerly considered, and that paddles came to be tried in
the place of oars, with a view to more continuity of action. Steam ideas
somewhat trended to the idea of sucking water in forward and ejecting it aft.
The screw propeller also was known certainly at as early a date as the paddle.
In 1789, a sixty-feet boat was driven for nearly seven miles an hour with
a twelve horse-power engine, but for a very long time nothing was expected
except canal work and towing. Even as steam progressed, it did so in the
merchant service first.
By the year 1818, however, the Americans had built a sea-going steamer,
Savannah, which crossed the Atlantic to Russia. On her return voyage the
United States was reached twenty-five days after leaving Norway.

In England, in the year 1821, a steam mail service, between Holyhead and
Dublin, was established, and in 1823 a steam mail service between England
and India was seriously asked for, and in 1829 the subject again came upon
the tapis.
In 1839, the steam liner Great Britain, was laid down. She was 322 feet
long overall and a beam of fifty-one feet, and a displacement of 2,984 tons,
with 1,000 horse-power. It was originally intended to make her a paddle-
vessel. Instead of that, however, she was made a screw-steamer, and made her
first trip in December, 1844, when she succeeded in exceeding her anticipated
speed.
This serious attention to steam in the mercantile marine naturally attracted
considerable interest in the Navy, the more so as two naval officers, Captains
Chappel and Claxton, were the principal promoters of the mercantile
enterprises. It was, however, generally pointed out that useful as steam might
be for such purposes, it was unsuitable for warships proper, on account of the
liability of the machinery to damage, and the practical impossibility of
combining paddles with sailing. It was laid down that the first essential of a
warship was to be able to sail, that if steam power could be usefully applied as
an auxiliary it might be “desirable.”
After considerable experiments and investigations, it was found possible
to place the machinery under the water-line, but the paddle-wheels were still
exposed, and the armament space available was so slight that steam did not
gain much favour.
The first steam vessel actually brought into the British service was the
Monkey, built about the year 1821. She was bought into the service and used
as a tug.
In the following year, the Comet was specially built for the packet
82
service, but none of these were steam warships.
In 1843, the success of the Great Britain influenced the Admiralty, and
the Penelope (forty-six) was cut apart and lengthened by sixty-five feet, and
had engines of 650 horse-power fitted to her.
In 1844, the Earl of Dundonald (Cochrane) submitted plans to the
Admiralty for a steamer of 760 tons, called the Janus. This vessel was built
with an engine of his own design, but as this was a failure, ordinary engines
were fitted.

In all these steamers the gun-fire was chiefly end-on, but in 1845 the Odin
and the Sidon, especially designed for broadside fire, were put in hand.
So long ago as the year 1825, the paddle was recognised as a source of
danger for warships, and in that year a two-blade propeller, designed by
Commander Samuel Brown, was accepted.
In 1836, Ericsson (subsequently to be of Monitor fame) patented some
propellers in England, but as he met with very little sympathy from the
authorities, he retired to America. The main objections to the propeller
appears not to have been due to any lack of appreciation so much as
opposition from those who had invested heavily in paddle-propulsion plant.

SALAMANDER PADDLE WARSHIP.

In 1842, however, the Admiralty seriously took the question up. The
Rattler, of 777 tons, and 200-horse-power, was lashed stern-to-stern with the
paddle-yacht Electro of the same displacement and horse-power. Both ships
were driven away from each other at full speed, and the Rattler succeeded in
towing the Electro after her. After this, in 1844, a screw frigate, the Dauntless,
was ordered to be constructed; but as late as the year 1850, steam was merely
regarded as an auxiliary, and received little or no consideration outside that.

The use of iron instead of oak as a material for shipbuilding was first
seriously considered about the year 1800. In 1821, an iron steamer was in
existence, and in 1839 the Dover was ordered to be built for Government
service as a steam packet. In 1841, the Mohawk was ordered by the Admiralty
for service on Lake Huron, but the first iron warship for the Royal Navy
proper was the Trident, of 1850 tons and 300 horse-power, built at Blackwall,
by Admiralty orders, in 1843.
Iron, as a material for warship construction, was looked on with
considerable suspicion, both in England and in France. Experiments were
conducted at Woolwich with some plates rivetted together like the sides of an
iron ship, these plates being lined inside with cork and india-rubber (the first
idea of a cofferdam). It was expected that this preparation, which was known
as “kamptulicon,” would close up after shot had passed through and prevent
ingress of water. This was found to be quite correct, but the egress of shot on
the other side had quite the opposite result. The plates were sometimes packed
with wood and sometimes cased with it, but the general result of the
experiments was held prejudicial to the use of iron, which was supposed to
splinter unduly compared to wood.
The importance of deciding whether warships should be built of iron or
wood was accentuated by the necessity of replacing those heavy warships
which had been converted to auxiliary steam vessels. All such proved to be
cramped in stowage and bad sea boats.
So long ago as 1822 shell-guns had been adopted. Consequently, in the
experiments as regards iron, shell-fire had to be taken into consideration.
In 1842, experiments were made with iron plates three-eighths of an inch
thick, rivetted together to make a total thickness of six inches. It was,
however, reported that at 400 yards these were not proof against eight-inch
guns or heavy thirty-two pounders. These matters were taken into
consideration by Captain Chads, whose official report was as follows:—

“The shot going through the exposed or near side generally makes a
clean smooth hole of its own size, which might be readily stopped; and
even where it strikes a rib it has much the same effect; but on the
opposite side all the mischief occurs; the shot meets with so little
resistance that it must inevitably go through the vessel, and should it
strike on a rib on the opposite side the effect is terrific, tearing off the

iron sheets to a very considerable extent; and even those shot that go
clean through the fracture being on the off side, the rough edges are
outside the vessel, precluding the possibility almost of stopping them.
“As it is most probable that steam vessels will engage directly end-
on I have thought it desirable to try to-day what the effect of shot would
83
be on this vessel so placed, and it has been such as might be expected,
each shot cutting aways the ribs, and tearing the iron plates away
sufficient to sink the vessel in an instant.”

THE LONDON—TWO DECKER WOODEN CONVERTED SCREW SHIP OF THE LINE.
Designed by Sir William Symonds. Launched 1840. Damaged at the bombardment of Fort Constantine,
Sevastopol, 1854. Turned into hulk at Zanzibar, 1874.

In 1849 an official report stated that:—

“Shot of every description in passing through iron makes such large
holes that the material is improper for the bottom of ships.
“Iron and oak of equal weight offering equal resistance to shot, iron
for the topsides affords better protection for the men than oak, as the
splinters from it are not so destructive.
“Iron offering no lodgment for shells in passing through the side, if
made with single plates it will be free from the destructive effects that
would occur by a shell exploding in a side of timber.”

Certain modifications were then introduced and tried in the year 1850,
and Captain Chad’s report was that:—

“With high charges the splinters from the shot were as numerous and
as severe as before, with the addition in this, and in the former case, of
the evils that other vessels are subject to, that of the splinters from the
timber.
“From these circumstances I am confirmed in the opinion that iron
cannot be beneficially employed as a material for the construction of
vessels of war.”

As a result of this report, seventeen iron ships which were building, the
largest being the Simoon, of nearly 2,000 tons, were condemned; and it was
definitely decided that ships must be built of wood, and that iron in any form
was disadvantageous.
The advantages of the shell were fully understood, and at least half of the
guns of the ships of the line of the period were sixty-five cwt. shell guns.
Experiments had fully taught what shell-fire might be expected to accomplish.
General Paixham, the inventor of the shell gun, had long ago stated that
armour was the only antidote to shell, and the fact that armour up to six inches
had been experimented with indicates that this also was understood. Between
the appreciation of the fact and acting upon it, there was, however, a decided
gulf. In the British Navy, as in others also, the natural conservatism of the sea
held its usual sway.
Matters were at about this stage when, in the year 1853, the Russian
Admiral Nachimoff, with a fleet consisting of six ships of the line, entered the

harbour of Sinope, on the 30th November, 1853, and absolutely annihilated,
by shell fire, a Turkish squadron of seven frigates which were lying there. The
damage wrought by this shell-fire was terrific. “For God’s sake keep out the
shells!” is generally believed to have been the cry of most naval officers about
that period, though there is some lack of evidence as to whether this demand
was ever actually made, except by the Press. The terrible effect of shell-fire
was, however, obvious enough; but as stated above it was really well-known
before the war test that so impressed the world.
When the Crimean War broke out in 1854, the British personnel stood at
45,500, and the Estimates were £7,197,804. On the 28th March, war was
formally declared. Naval operations in the Crimean war were almost entirely
of secondary note. Some frigates bombarded Odessa, in April, and a certain
amount of damage was done along the Caucasian coast.
In September, the British fleet, consisting of ten ships of the line, two
frigates and thirteen armed steamers, convoyed an enormous fleet of Turkish
and French warships crammed with troops for an attack on Sebastopol. The
Russian fleet lay inside that harbour and made no attempt whatever to destroy
the invading flotilla, though it might easily have done considerable mischief,
if not more. Instead of that, the ships were sunk at the entrance of the harbour,
and the siege of Sebastopol presently commenced. On October 17th, the
Allied fleet attempted to bombard Fort Constantine, but the ships were soon
defeated by the shore defences and many of them badly injured.
The French, who had formed somewhat more favourable opinions of iron
armour than we had, had, after Sinope, already commenced the construction
of five floating batteries which were to carry armour. They were wooden ships
of 1,400 tons displacement, with four-inch armour over their hulls. They
carried eighteen fifty-pounder guns and a crew of 320. As originally designed
they were intended to sail, although they were fitted with slight auxiliary
steam power. When completed they were found unable to sail, so pole masts
were fitted to them. Artificial ventilation was also supplied and their funnels
were made telescopic. The designs of these vessels were sent to the British
Admiralty, who, after considerable delay, built four copies, the Glatton,
Meteor, Thunder, and Trusty. These, however, were not completed in time to
take any part in the war.
So soon as the French armoured batteries were ready they were sent out
to the Crimea, where they joined a large fleet which had been prepared to

attack Kinburn, which was bombarded in October, 1855. In a very short while
the forts were totally destroyed, and with very small loss to the armoured
batteries. The effect created by this was so great that four more armoured
batteries were ordered in England, the Etna, Erebus, Terror, and Thunderbolt.
In the Baltic, to which a British fleet, under Admiral Napier, had been
sent, the Russians kept behind the fortifications at Kronstadt, and nothing was
accomplished beyond the bombardment of Sveaborg, and the destruction of
the town and dockyard. Some small bombardments also took place in the
White Sea and on the Siberian coast, where Petropavlovsk was attacked and
the attack was defeated, and such other actions as took place were generally
unsuccessful. It had become abundantly clear that against fortifications
wooden ships had very small chance of success.
Incidental items of naval interest are that in this particular war Captain
Cowper Coles mounted a sixty-eight-pounder gun upon a raft named the Lady
Nancy. This attracted so much attention from the small target, light draft and
steady platform, that Coles was sent home to develop his ideas. In this war,
also, mines appeared, the Russians dropping a good many off Kronstadt.
Those used by the Russians were filled with seventy pounds of powder, and
exploded on contact by the familiar means of a glass tube of sulphuric acid
being broken and the acid falling into chlorate of potash.
No material damage was done to ships by this means, but a considerable
number of those who had picked them up and investigated them were injured.
The ingenuity and new means of offence were, however, by no means
confined to the Russians, for a Mr. Macintosh, after the failure of the first
bombardment of Sebastopol, evolved a system of attacking fortifications with
a long hose supported by floats, through which naptha was to be pumped.
Being set alight with some potassium, the fort attacked would be immediately
smoked out.
Experiments at Portsmouth having proved that this system was “simple,
certain and cheap,” Mr. Macintosh proceeded to the Crimea with his invention
at his own expense. He was eventually given £1000 towards his expenses, but
no attempt was made to employ the system. It is by no means clear how the
necessary potassium was to be got into the water at the requisite spot.
The same war also produced the fire-shell of the British Captain Norton.
This appears to have been a resurrection of the old idea of Greek fire. It could
be used from a rifle or from a shell-gun, and like the previous invention

“rendered war impossible,” and again like the previous invention does not
appear to have ever materialised into practice.
On the practical side more results were achieved. The Lancaster gun
which fired an oval shot was actually used with success in the war. From it the
rifled gun presently emerged. There also emerged the then amateur invention
of one Warry, who invented a new type of gun capable of firing sixteen to
eighteen rounds per minute. The idea of wire wound guns was also apparent,
84
and Mr. Armstrong (as he then was), suggested the idea of percussion shell.
It is interesting to note that these last were received with extreme
dissatisfaction in the Navy on the grounds that they might go off at the wrong
time.
Of the Crimean War, however, it may be said that though it was not noted
for naval actions, it was probably the most important war in its indirect results
on the Navy that ever took place. It brought in the armoured ship, the rifled
gun, and what was ultimately to develop into the torpedo. It saw the crude
birth of “blockade mines” and rapid fire guns; everyone of them inventions
that, judging by the slow progress of steam, would—failing war to necessitate
swift development—have been still in the experimental stage even to-day.
In our own times war having ever been a nearer possibility than in the
1850 era, peace progress has always been more rapid, and no invention of
practical value ever failed to secure full tests. Yet there were not wanting those
who prophesied that the Dreadnoughts of to-day merely reproduced in another
form the 120 screw ships of the line of sixty years ago; and that the next great
naval war might well bring about changes every whit as drastic as any that the
Crimean War caused to come into being.
The torpedo had become fully as great a menace to the modern ship of the
line as the shell gun was to the big ship of 1853. The submarine was an
infinitely greater menace to it than the crude Russian mines of the Crimean
War ever were. Endless potentialities resided in aircraft.
Wherefrom it was well argued that out of the next great naval war
(despite whatever lesser wars in between may have taught), the battleship was
likely to be profoundly modified.
That it will be swept out of existence was improbable. The whole lesson
of history is that the “capital ship” will ever adjust itself to the needs of the

hour. It has always been the essential rallying point of lesser craft—the mobile
base to meet the mobile base of the enemy.
Meanwhile, it is beyond question that at the time of the Crimean War the
British Navy from one cause and another was little better than a paper force. It
is plain enough that little remained of the fleet of the Nelson era. The fleet
“worried through,” but very clearly it had reached the end of its tether.
The reason why will be found in the next chapter.

* * * * *

The above paragraphs were originally written in 1912. Since then
much has happened. In this edition they have only been revised to the
extent of substituting the past for the present tense. Nothing has occurred
to alter what then was the obvious.

X.

THE COMING OF THE IRONCLAD.

T HE period immediately following the Crimean War saw a gradual
change in the relations between England and France. In 1858 a panic
similar to those with which later years have familiarised us began to arise,
and in December, 1858, and January, 1859, a committee sat under the
Administration of Lord Derby “to consider the very serious increase which
had taken place of late years in the Navy Estimates, while it represented that
the naval force of the country was far inferior to what it ought to be with
reference to that of other Powers, and especially France, and that increased
efforts and increased expenditure were imperatively called for to place it on
a proper footing.”
This committee found that whereas in 1850 there were eighty-six
British ships of the line to forty-five French ones, this ratio had altogether
ceased to exist; and that both Powers had now twenty-nine screw ships of
the line. Any other large ships had ceased to count.
In 1859 there also appeared the famous “Leipsic Article,” commenting
on the decline of the British Fleet and the rise of the French. Certain
extracts from this, though dealing with the past for the most part, are here
given en bloc, for they indicate very clearly the circumstances in which,
under pressure from German influences, the modern British Navy came to
be founded. It is, to say the least of it, questionable whether but for this
Teutonic agitation public opinion in England would ever have been aroused
from its lethargy in time. This epoch-making article appeared in the
Conversations Lexicon, of Leipsic.
After some prelude the article referred to the appearance of the French
Fleet in the Crimean War:—

“The late war in the East (Crimean) first opened the eyes of
Englishmen to the true position of affairs, and it was not without some
sensation of alarm that they gazed at this vision of the unveiled reality.
Here and there, indeed, an allusion, having some foundation in fact,
had been heard, during the Presidency of Louis Napoleon, and had
drawn attention to the menaced possibility of an invasion of the British
Isles; but such notions were soon overwhelmed by the derision with
which they were jeeringly greeted by the national pride.
“Those expressions of contempt were, however, not doomed to be
silenced in their turn by the sudden apparition in the autumn of 1854 of
thirty-eight French ships of the line and sixty-six frigates and corvettes,
fully manned and ready for immediate action. During the three
preceding years Louis Napoleon had built twenty-four line-of-battle
ships, and in the course of the year 1854 alone thirteen men-of-war
were launched, nine of which were ships of the line. In addition to
these, the keels of fifty-two more, comprising three ships of the line
and six frigates, were immediately laid down. The English had thus the
mortification to be obliged not only to cede to their allies the principal
position in the camp, but also reluctantly to acknowledge their equality
on that element whereon they had hoped to reign supreme....

* * * * *
“If we carried our investigation no further than this we should
naturally conclude that, with such a numerical superiority, sufficient in
itself to form a very respectable armament for a second-rate power,
England has very little to fear from the marine of France. We must not
forget, however, that quality as well as numbers must be considered in
estimating the strength of a Fleet. When we take this element into our
calculations, we shall find the balance very soon turned in favour of
France. We perceive, then, that while the English list comprises every
individual sail the country possesses, whether fit for commission or
altogether antiquated and past service (and some, like the Victory, built
towards the close of the last or the beginning of this century), the
French Navy, as we have observed, scarcely contains a single ship built
prior to the year 1840; so that nearly all are less than twenty years old.
This is a fact of the greatest importance, and indicates an immense

preponderance in favour of France. Though many of England’s oldest
craft figure in the ‘Navy List’ as seaworthy and fit for active service,
we have no less an authority than that of Sir Charles Napier (in his
Letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1849) that some are mere
lumber, and many others cannot be reckoned upon to add any
appreciable strength to a Fleet in case of need. Independently, too, of
the introduction of the screw, such fundamental changes have been
introduced, within the last fifty years, both into the principles of naval
architecture and of gunnery, that a modern 120-gun ship, built with due
regard to recent improvements, and carrying guns of the calibre now in
ordinary use, would in a very short space of time put ten ships like the
Victory hors de combat, with, at the same time, little chance of injury to
herself.
“It is time, however, to turn our attention to another important part
of the material, namely, artillery. Under this head we purpose
designating, not only to the number of guns and their calibre, but also
the mode in which they are served, for in actual warfare this, of course,
is a primary consideration. If we take the received history of naval
warfare for the basis of our investigation, we cannot fail to remark one
notable circumstance in favour of the English, which can only be
ascribed to their superiority in the use of this arm. That circumstance is
the important and uniform advantage they have had in the fewer
number of casualties they have sustained as compared with other
nations with whom they may have chanced to have been engaged. To
prove that our assertions are not made at random, we subjoin some
statistics in support of this position. In April, 1798, then, the English
ship Mars took the French L’Hercule; the former had ninety killed and
wounded, the latter 290. In the preceding February there had been an
engagement between the English Sybil and French La Forte, in which
the killed and wounded of the former numbered twenty-one, and those
of the latter 143. In March, 1806, the English ship London took the
French Marengo; the English with a loss of thirty-two, the latter of 145
men. On the 4th November, 1805, two English ships of the line
engaged four French vessels, and the respective losses were, again, 135
and 730. On the 14th February, 1797, in an action between the Fleets of
England and Spain, the English lost 300 and the Spaniards 800. On the
11th of October of the same year, in the engagement off Camperdown

between the English and Dutch, the respective losses were 825 and
1,160. On the 5th July, 1808, the English frigate Seahorse took the
Turkish frigate Badere Zuffer, and of the Turks there fell 370 against
fifteen English. Finally, in the same year the Russian ship of the line
Wsewolod was taken by two English ships of the line, with a loss to the
latter of 303, and to the former of only sixty-two.
“This contrast, so favourable to England, has been constantly
maintained, and can only be attributable to her superior artillery. Her
seamen not only aimed with greater precision, and fired more steadily
than those of the French and of other nations, but they had the
reputation of loading with far greater rapidity. It was remarked, in
1805, that the English could fire a round with ball every minute,
whereas it took the French gunners three minutes to perform the same
operation. Then, again, the English tactics were superior. It was the
universal practice of the French to seek to dismast an adversary; they
consequently aimed high, while the English invariably concentrated
their fire upon the hulls of their adversaries; and clearly the broadside
of a vessel presents a much better mark to aim at than the mere masts
and rigging. British guns were also usually of higher calibre, for though
they bore the same denomination, they were in reality much heavier.
Thus, the English Lavinia, though nominally a frigate of forty guns,
actually carried fifty; and thirty-six and 38-gun frigates nearly always
carried forty-four and forty-six. The English ship Belleisle, at Trafalgar,
though said to be a seventy-four, carried ninety pieces of ordnance,
while the Spanish ship she engaged, though called eighty-four had, in
fact, only seventy-eight guns. From this disparity in the number and
calibre of their guns, as well as in the mode in which they were served,
it resulted that France and her allies lost eighty-five ships of the line
and 180 frigates, while her antagonist only suffered to the extent of
thirteen ships of the line and eighty-three frigates.
“It was not until the close of the war that France became fully
aware to what an extent her inferiority in the above respects had
contributed to her reverses; otherwise the unfortunate Admiral
Villeneuve would not invariably have ascribed his mishaps to the
inexperience of his officers and men, and to the incomplete and inferior
equipment of his vessels. The truth was, that not only was the artillery,

as we have shown, inferior, but the whole system in vogue at that
period on board French ships was antiquated, having continued without
reform or improvement for two hundred years; it was deficient, too, in
enforcing subordination, that most essential condition of the power and
efficiency of a ship of war.”

The French inscription maritime is then dealt with at great length, after
which occur the following passages, even more interesting perhaps to-day
than when they were written:—

“In considering, then, what perfect seamanship really is, we must
first adopt a correct standard by which to estimate it. The English sailor
has been so long assumed as the perfect type of the genus seaman, that
the world has nearly acquiesced in that view, and even we in Germany
have been accustomed to rank our crews below the English, though it is
an unfair estimate. There are no better sailors in the world than the
German seamen, and there is no foreign nation that would assert the
85
contrary. On the other hand, it has also been the fashion universally
to abuse French seamanship, and to speak of her sailors as below
criticism. None proclaimed this opinion more loudly than the English;
but in doing so they recurred to the men they had beaten under the
Revolution and Bonaparte. The Crimean War, however, opened their
eyes, and taught them that the French sailors of to-day were no longer
the men of 1806, and that, to say the least, they are in no respect
inferior to the British. England had for years been compelled to keep up
a large effective force always ready for action, in consequence of the
nature of her dependencies, which, as they consist of remote colonies
across distant seas, required such a provision for their protection. This
gave her an immeasurable superiority in days gone by. But since
France in 1840 discovered her deficiency, it has been supplied by the
maintenance of a permanent experimental Fleet, which, under the
command of such Admirals as Lalande de Joinville, Ducas, Hamelin,
and Bruat, has been the nursery of the present most effective body of
officers and men; which, since 1853, have not ceased to humble the
boasted superiority of England, besides causing her many anxious
misgivings.

“Anyone who had the opportunity of viewing the two Fleets
together in the Black Sea or the Baltic, and was in a position to draw a
comparison, could not fail to be convinced that everything connected
with manœuvring, evolutions, and gunnery was, beyond comparison,
more smartly, quickly, and exactly executed by the French than by the
English, and must have observed the brilliant prestige which had so
long surrounded England’s tars pale sensibly beside the rising glories
86
of her rival.”

That this was not merely captious criticism is borne out by the
following extracts from “The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir
Charles Napier, K.C.B.”:—

“We have great reason to be afraid of France, because she
possesses a large disposable army, and our arsenals are comparatively
undefended—London entirely so—and we have no sufficient naval
force at home. Of ships (with the exception of steamers) we have
enough; but what is the use of them without men? They are only
barracks, and are of no more use for defence than if we were to build
batteries all over the country, without soldiers to put into them.

* * * * *
“Such were our inadequate resources for defence, had the Russians
been able to get out of the Baltic, and make an attempt on our
unprotected shores.

* * * * *
“The great difficulty consisted in the manning of such a fleet.
Impressment was no longer to be thought of; but, strange to say, the
Bill which had passed through Parliament, empowering, in case of war,
the grant of an ample bounty to seamen, was not acted upon, and
consequently most of the ships were very inefficiently manned—some
of them chiefly with the landsmen of the lowest class. Nothing had
been done towards the training of the men, and no provision was even

made to clothe them in a manner required by the climate to which they
were about to be sent....
“Our Ambassador likewise warned the British Government that the
Navy of Russia could not with safety be under-estimated, and,
moreover, the Russian gunners were all well trained, while those of the
British Squadron were most deficient in this respect. The object of the
Russians, in wishing to get their best ships to Sveaborg, was the
impression that Cronstadt would be first attacked; in which case,
calculating on the strength of the forts to repel an assault, they would
have fresh ships wherewith to assail our disabled and weakened fleet,
87
should they be obliged to retreat. Sir Hamilton Seymour warned our
Government of the great number of gunboats the Russians could bring
out, eighty of which were to be manned by Finns, fifty men to each
boat....

* * * * *
“Such,” says the author of the biography, “were the reasons, no
doubt powerful enough, for hurrying off, even without pilots, the ill-
appointed and under-manned squadron placed under Sir Charles
Napier’s command, at this inclement season of the year, when the
periodical gales of the vernal equinox might be daily expected. The
squadron, on leaving Spithead, consisted of four sail-of-the-line, four
blockships, four frigates, and four steamers (not a single gunboat); and
with this force, hastily got together, for the most part manned with the
refuse of London and other towns, destitute of even clothing, their best
seamen consisting of dockyard riggers and a few coastguard men—and
without the latter, it has been alleged, the squadron could not have put
to sea—with this inefficient force did Sir Charles Napier leave our
shores, to offer battle to the Russian Fleet, consisting of seven-and-
twenty well-trained and well-appointed ships of the line, eight or ten
frigates, seven corvettes and brigs, and nine steamers, besides small
craft and flotillas of gunboats, supposed in the aggregate to number one
hundred and eighty....

* * * * *

“It is, probably, an unprecedented event in the annals of war, or, at
least, in those of our history, that a fleet should be sent out, on a most
momentous service so ill-manned that the Commander was directed to
endeavour to ‘pick up,’ if possible, foreign seamen in foreign ports, and
so ill-provided with munitions of war, that he was restricted in the use
of what he most required, in order to render his inexperienced crews as
efficient as possible. It is equally worthy of record that the Board of
Admiralty, throughout the whole campaign, never supplied the Fleet
with a single Congreve rocket, although it was no secret that great
numbers had been made in London for the Russians, to whom they
were of far less use than to the British Fleet, which could not well
undertake any bombardment without them. The Board of Admiralty
must have been perfectly aware of the conditions, in these respects, of
that Fleet on whose efficiency so much depended, and from which so
much was expected, for, in a letter to Sir Charles Napier, from a
member of that Board, I find it recorded as his opinion, that the
Emperor of Russia ought either to burn his Fleet, or try his strength
with the British Squadron whilst he mustered double their numbers,
and whilst our crews were ‘so miserably raw!’ Yet this inefficiency was
fully and frankly admitted by Sir James Graham, from whom
infrequent instructions arrived to supply the deficiency of good men by
picking up foreign sailors in the Baltic. The anxiety of the First Lord
upon this point was excessive. He was continually inquiring whether
the Admiral had been able to ‘pick up any Swedes or Norwegians, who
were good sailors and quite trustworthy.’ He was told to ‘enter them
quietly.’ If he could not get Swedes and Norwegians, ‘even Danes
would strengthen him, for they were hardy seamen and brave. There
was, it is true, a difficulty with their Governments, but if the men
enlisted freely, and came over to the Fleet, the First Lord did not see
why the Admiral should be over-nice, and refuse good seamen without
much inquiry as to the place from whence they came.’
“Admiral Berkeley, moreover, instructed the Admiral to the same
effect. ‘Have any of your ships tried for men in a Norwegian port? It is
said that you might have any number of good seamen from that
country.’ On the 18th of March the Admiral had been apprised that the
James Watt, the Prince Regent and Majestic would now join him; ‘but
men are wanting, and it is impossible to say how long it will be before

they are completed.’ On the 4th of April Admiral Berkeley stated:
‘Notwithstanding the number of landsmen entered, we are come nearly
to a dead standstill as to seamen; and after the James Watt and Prince
Regent reach you, I do not know when we shall be able to send you a
further reinforcement, for want of men! Something must be done, and
done speedily, or there will be a breakdown in our present rickety
system.’”

The German article produced a great stir in England. This was followed
up by the publication in 1859 of The Navies of the World, by Hans Busk,
M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, who, while nominally casting cold
water on the “Leipsic Article,” added fuel to the fire. This writer was one of
the first to concentrate attention upon the fact that the French were building
“iron-plated ships.”
From this scarce and remarkably interesting work I quote the
following:—

“The determination of the French Government to build a number
of iron or steel-cased ships imperatively obliges us to follow their
example. The original idea of plating ships in this way, so as to render
them shot-proof, is due, not, as is generally supposed in this country, to
the present Emperor, but to a Captain in the French Navy, who, about a
quarter of a century since, suggested that all wooden vessels should be
sheathed with composite slabs of iron of fourteen or fifteen centimetres
in thickness; that is to say, with stout plates of wrought-iron having
blocks of cast metal between. A similar suggestion was made among
others by General Paixhans; but one of the first to reduce it to practice
was Mr. Stevens, of New York, the well-known steamship builder, who
about ten years ago communicated to Mr. Scott Russell the results of a
long series of experiments, instituted by the American Government, for
the purpose of testing the power of plates of iron and steel to resist
cannon-shot. Mr. Lloyd, of the Admiralty, proposed the adoption of
plates 4ins. in thickness, instead of a number of thinner sheets, as
recommended by the Emperor. The English and French floating
batteries were, as is well known, protected upon Mr. Lloyd’s plan.
From trials recently made, however, it has been pretty well ascertained

that this iron planking, on whatever principle applied, will only repel
hollow shot or shells; heavy solid projectiles of wrought iron, or those
faced with steel, having been found, on repeated trials, to perforate the
thickest covering which has ever been adopted, and that, too, even at
considerable ranges.
88
“Mr. Reed, already alluded to, proposes to protect only the
midship portion of the ship, and to separate it from the parts fore and
aft by strong watertight compartments, so that, however much the
extremities might suffer, the ship would still be safe and the crew
below protected; but, as he himself admits, there would obviously be
no defence against raking shot.
“The French vessels last alluded to, follow the lines and
dimensions of the Napoleon (one of the best, if not the finest ship in
their Navy); but they will only carry thirty or thirty-six guns, and the
metal sheathing will be from ten to eleven centimetres (about 4¼ins.)
in thickness. Two similar ships are to be commenced here forthwith;
and as the First Lord of the Admiralty has prophetically warned us that
they will be the most expensive ships ever constructed in this country,
it is earnestly to be hoped that they may be found proportionately
valuable, should their powers ever come to be tested; they will each
cost from £126,000 to £130,000, or £4,200 per gun; the ordinary
expense of a sailing man-of-war being about £1,000, and of a steamer
from £1,800 to £2,000 per gun.”

After this follow various statistics of the French Fleet of no particular
interest here except for the following passage:—

“Irrespective of the above are the four frégates blindées, or iron-
plated frigates, two of which are now in an advanced state at Toulon.
“These ships are to be substituted for line-of-battle ships; their
timbers are of the scantling of three-deckers; they will be provided with
thirty-six heavy guns, twenty-four of them rifled, and 50-pounders,
calculated to throw an eighty pound percussion shell. Such is the
opinion of French naval officers respecting the tremendous power of

these ships, that they fully anticipate the complete abolition, within ten
89
or a dozen years, of all line-of-battle ships.”

Here it is desirable to leave ships for a moment and deal with the
corresponding stage of gunnery, which began to take on its modern form
contemporaneously with the ironclad ship. In 1858–9 began that contest
between the gun and armour, which can hardly be said to be ended even in
our own day, for improved kinds of armour are still being sought and
experimented with. To quote the work of Hans Busk and its contemporary
summary:—

“A number of guns, cast at Woolwich, were sent to Mr.
Whitworth’s works at Manchester to be bored and rifled. In April,
1856, trial was made with a brass 24-pounder of the construction above
described. The projectiles employed on that occasion varied from two
to six diameters in length, and a very rapid rotary motion was
communicated to them. The gun itself weighed 13cwt.; the bore,
instead of being of a calibre fitted to receive a spherical 24-pound shot,
was only of sufficient capacity to admit one of 9 pounds. The
hexagonal bore measured 4ins. in diameter, and was rather more than
54ins. long. It was entirely finished by machinery, and the projectiles
were fitted with mathematical precision, the spiral in both cases being
formed with absolute accuracy. The gun, externally, had only the
dimensions of a 24-pound howitzer, but it projected missiles of 24
pounds, 32 pounds, and 48 pounds each, the additional weight having
been obtained by increased length. Upon this new system, then, it will
be seen that guns capable, under the old plan, of supporting the strain
of a 24-pound ball, may be made with ease to throw a 48-pound shot;
the reduction of the calibre allowing of a sufficient thickness of metal
being left to ensure safety. The 32-pound and 48-pound projectiles used
in the above experiments were respectively 11¾ins. and 16½ins. in
length. They were pointed at the foremost extremity, being shaped and
rounded somewhat like the smaller end of an egg. At the base they
were flat, and slightly hollowed towards the centre. The gun was
mounted for the occasion upon an ordinary artillery carriage, which

shows no symptoms of having been strained, nor of being in any way
injured by the concussions to which it had been subjected.

* * * * *
“Subsequently, some further experiments were made with the same
gun with reduced elevation, when the projectiles, striking the ground at
comparatively short distances, rebounded again and again till their
momentum was expended. The first shot thus fired weighed 32 pounds,
the charge of powder being only 3 ounces, and the gun having an
elevation of 2 degrees. The projectile made its first graze at a distance
of 92 yards, furrowing the ground for about 7ft., and leaving distinct
indications of its rotary axial motion. It rose again to an elevation of
about 6ft., grazing, after a further flight of 64 yds. The third graze
(owing probably to the hard nature of the soil at the point struck) was at
a distance of 70yds. further; after which it traversed some ploughed
land, grazing several times, coming finally to rest after having
accomplished altogether a distance of 492yds.
“The second shot also weighed 32 pounds; the charge, as before,
consisted of 3 ounces of powder; but this time the elevation given to
the gun was 3 degrees. The projectile first grazed the ground at a point
108yds. from the muzzle; the second graze was 126yds. further; but
happening to touch the lower bar of an iron fence—a circumstance
which appeared to affect its flight—it dropped finally after having
accomplished 490yds. Some further experiments were then made with
shot weighing 48 pounds each.
“These very reduced charges rendered it necessary to make use of
wooden wads to fill the cavities in the base of the projectiles. This had
a tendency to reduce very much the power of the gun.
“A further trial with the hexagonal gun was made at Liverpool on
the 7th of May. Several shots, varying from 24 to 48 pounds in weight,
were fired. The first, weighing 24 pounds, with a charge of 11 pounds
of powder, attained a distance of 2,800 yards, the elevation given
having been 8 degrees. These experiments could hardly be said to have
exhibited the maximum capacity of the gun, having been interrupted by
the rapid rising of the tide. The average range of several 48-pound

shots was 3,000 yards, but there is little doubt that a much greater
distance will be achieved when Mr. Whitworth has perfected some
guns he is now constructing.
“A good deal of attention having previously been drawn to the
subject of Armstrong’s gun, respecting which few particulars had been
allowed to transpire, on the 4th of March last the Secretary-at-War
made an official statement to the House, and gave some details as to its
alleged capabilities. Without describing its construction, he stated that
one piece, throwing a projectile of 18 pounds, weighed but one-third as
much as the ordinary gun of that calibre. With a charge of 5 pounds of
powder, a 32-pounder attained a range of 5¼ miles; at 3,000 yards its
accuracy, as compared with that of a common gun, was stated to be in
the proportion of 7 to 1. At 1,000 yards it had struck the target 57 times
successively, and after 13,000 rounds the gun showed symptoms of
deterioration. In conclusion, it was said that the destructive effects
occasioned by this new ordnance exceeded anything that had been
previously witnessed, and that in all probability it was destined to
effect a complete revolution in warfare.”

Armstrong’s own statement was:—

“Schemers whose invention merely figure upon paper, have little
idea of the difficulties that are encountered by those who carry
inventions into practice. For my part, I had my full share of such
difficulties, and it took me nearly three years of continual application to
surmount them.... Early last year a committee was appointed to
investigate the whole subject of rifled cannon. They consisted of
officers of great experience in gunnery; and after having given much
time for a period of five months to the guns, projectiles, and fuses
which I submitted to them, they returned a unanimous verdict in favour
of my system. With respect to the precision and range which have been
attained with these guns, I may observe that at a distance of 600 yards
an object no larger than the muzzle of an enemy’s gun may be struck at
almost every shot. At 3,000 yards a target of 9ft. square, which at that
distance looks like a mere speck, has on a calm day been struck five
times in ten shots. A ship would afford a target large enough to be hit at

much longer distances, and shells may be thrown into a town or fortress
at a range of more than five miles. But to do justice to the weapon
when used at long distances, it will be necessary that gunners should
undergo a more scientific training than at present; and I believe that
both the naval and military departments of Government will take the
necessary measures to afford proper instruction, both to officers and
men. It is an interesting question to consider what would be the effect
of the general introduction of these weapons upon the various
conditions of warfare. In the case of ships opposed to ships in the open
sea, it appears to me that they would simply destroy each other, if both
were made of timber. The day has gone by for putting men in armour.
Fortunately, however, no nation can play at that game like England; for
we have boundless resources, both in the production and application of
iron, which must be the material for the armour. In the case of a battery
against a ship, the advantage would be greatly in favour of the battery,
because it would have a steady platform for its guns, and would be
made of a less vulnerable material, supposing the ship to be made of
timber. But, on the other hand, in bombarding fortresses, arsenals, or
dockyards, when the object to be struck is very extended, ships would
be enabled to operate from a great distance, where they could bid
defiance to land defences.”

After some observations, the author continued:—

“Notwithstanding the high estimation in which Sir William
Armstrong’s guns are held, and deservedly so from their great intrinsic
merit, they have certainly in Mr. Warry’s great invention a rival that
may eventually be found to eclipse them.
“The Armstrong gun cannot be fired oftener than three times a
minute, and the bore, it is said, has to be constantly sluiced with water;
whereas Warry’s admits, as has been affirmed, of being discharged 16
or 18 times a minute, or 1,000 an hour, without difficulty, though of
course not without heating, as some reporters have misrepresented.
Guns of the former description are expensive, and must be made
expressly by means of special machinery. Mr. Warry, on the other hand,
asserts that he can convert every existing gun into a breech-loader upon

his principle, and at a moderate outlay: an advantage of the greatest
moment at the present time.
“This gun is fired by means of a lock. On one side of the breech
there is a lever, so contrived that by one motion of the hand it is made
to cock the hammer and to open the chamber. A second movement
closes the charger again, pierces or cuts the cartridge, places a cap on
the nipple, and fires the gun almost simultaneously.
“With a due supply of ammunition, therefore, a destructive torrent
of shot and shell may be maintained ad libitum. It is not difficult to
form a conception of the havoc even one such gun would occasion if
brought to bear upon the head of an advancing column.
“The inventor has, besides, made application for a patent for a new
coating he has devised for all kinds of projectiles, in lieu of any leaden
or metallic covering, which has been found very objectionable in actual
practice. The new coating, it is said, reduces the ‘fouling’ to a
minimum.
“But we cannot turn even from this very brief consideration of the
improvements in modern cannon without offering a few observations
relative to an invention of a different kind, but one that may possibly
prove of greater moment than either of the guns that have been
described. This is the composition known as ‘Norton’s liquid fire.’ In
the terrific character of its effect it rivals all that has been recorded of
the old Greek fire; at the same time it is perfectly manageable, and may
be projected from an Enfield rifle, from a field-piece, or from heavier
ordnance. The composition Captain Norton uses consists of a chemical
combination of sulphur, carbon, and phosphorus. He merely encloses
this in a metal or even in a wooden shell, and its effect upon striking
the side or sails of a ship, a wooden building, or indeed any object at all
combustible, is to cause its instant ignition. This ‘liquid fire’ has
apparently the property of penetrating or of saturating any substance
against which it may be projected, and such is its affinity for oxygen
that it even decomposes water and combines with its component
oxygen. Water, consequently, has no power to quench it, and if burning
canvas, set on fire in this way, be trodden under foot and apparently
extinguished it soon bursts again into flames.”

It is not uninteresting to reflect that although Norton’s liquid fire came
to nothing, yet the present century has already seen three variations on the
idea.
The first instance is the type of big shell used by the Japanese at
Tsushima. Little is known as to their exact composition, but they were
undoubtedly extremely inflammable. Captain Semenoff in “The Battle of
Tsushima” thus describes them:—

“The Japanese had apparently succeeded in realising what the
Americans had endeavoured to attain in inventing their ‘Vesuvium.’
“In addition to this there was the unusual high temperature and
liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything.
I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst. Of course, the
steel did not burn, but the paint on it did. Such almost non-combustible
materials as hammocks, and rows of boxes, drenched with water, flared
up in a moment. At times it was impossible to see anything with
glasses, owing to everything being so distorted with the quivering,
heated air.

* * * * *
“According to thoroughly trustworthy reports, the Japanese in the
battle of Tsushima were the first to employ a new kind of explosive in
their shells, the secret of which they bought during the war from the
inventor, a colonel in one of the South American Republics. It was said
that these shells could only be used in guns of large calibre in the
armoured squadrons, and that is how those of our ships engaged with
Admiral Kataoka’s squadron did not suffer the same amount of
damage, or have so many fires, as the ships engaged with the
battleships and armoured cruisers.”

The second instance is the Krupp fire shell designed for use against
dirigible balloons. The third is the “Thermite shell,” which, early in 1912,
was proposed for adoption in France. It was calculated that one 12-inch a.p.
shell exploding would melt half a ton of steel.
The following passage from Hans Busk is of interest:—

“In 1855 Mr. Longridge, C.E., proposed to construct cannon of
tubes covered with wire wound round them so tightly as almost entirely
to relieve the inside from strain. On the 25th of June of the same year
Mr. Mallet read a paper advocating the construction of cannon of
successive layers of cylinders, so put together that all should be equally
strained when the gun is fired; thus the inside would not be subject to
fracture, while the outside would be useless as in a cast mass. His
method of effecting this was, as is well known, to have each cylinder
slightly too small to go over the one under it till expanded by heat, so
that when cool it compresses the interior and is slightly strained itself.
Thirty-six-inch mortars have been made on the principle, and if they
have failed with 40lbs. of powder, cast-iron must have failed still less.
In 1856 Professor Daniel Treadwell, Vice-President of the American
Academy, read a paper to that body recommending the same principle
of construction; and Captain Blakely has himself for some years been
endeavouring to urge its adoption by argument and direct experiments.
In December, 1857, some trials were made with guns constructed by
that officer; and the result of a comparative trial of a 9-pounder with a
cast-iron service gun of similar size and weight gave results proving the
soundness of his views; for Captain Blakely’s gun bore about double
the amount of firing the service gun did, and being then uninjured, was
loaded to the muzzle, and was thus fired 158 times before it burst.”

JOHN SCOTT RUSSELL.

From these contemporary extracts it will be seen that by 1859 the germ
of nearly every modern idea in connection with gunnery existed, and has
since developed somewhat on “trial and error” lines for at any rate the
greater part of the intervening period.
The contemporary situation as regards defence is also best summed up
from the authority from whom the above gunnery extracts are taken:—

“The result of numerous trials appeared to convince those best
competent to judge of such matters that iron plates, or, rather, slabs,

eleven centimetres (about 4½ins.) in thickness, would offer adequate
protection to a ship from the effects of hollow shot. Acting upon this
impression, four floating batteries, resembling in most respects those
constructed here, were ordered to be built, and notwithstanding the
enormous difficulties connected with such an undertaking, these four
vessels were turned out, complete in all respects, in ten months—an
astonishing instance of the resources of French dockyards and the
ability of French engineers.
“From this event may be dated the commencement of a new epoch
in naval tactics. The next problem was to determine whether a form
better adapted for progression than that of these batteries could not be
given to vessels sheathed in a similar manner. Hence originated the
iron-plated frigates (frégates blindées). The intention of their designer
is, that they should have a speed and an armament at least equal to that
of the swiftest existing frigates, but their colossal weight, and
consequently their great draught of water, must almost preclude the
fulfilment of this expectation. Should they prove successful, a number
of larger ships of the same kind are to be commenced forthwith. It is
difficult to understand how, in the case of these ships being found to
answer, it will be possible for us to avert a real “reconstruction” of our
Navy, or, how any other nation, aiming to rank as a maritime Power,
can avoid the adoption of a similar course. In fact, the necessity has
been appreciated, and we are already at work. But a good deal has to be
accomplished ere the use of such vessels become universal. If these
iron-plated vessels do resist shell, it seems certain, as has been already
stated, that solid shot will either perforate at short ranges any thickness
of metal that has yet been tried, or will so indent the sheathing at longer
distances that the internal lining and rib-work of oak will be riven,
shattered, loosened, or crushed to an extent that would almost as
speedily put the ship hors de combat as if she had but been built after
the old fashion, much, as in days gone by, upon the introduction of
gunpowder into warfare, the use of armour was found rather to
aggravate, than to ward off, the injuries inflicted by gunshot. It was the
result of the operations against Kinburn that more particularly gave rise
to the high opinion at present entertained in favour of these vaisseaux
blindées. Unwieldy and cumbersome as they appeared, they were
certainly a great improvement upon the floating batteries used by the

French and Spanish against Gibraltar in 1782. Those were merely
enormous hulks, destitute of masts, sails, or rigging; their sides were
composed of solid carpentry, 6ft. 6ins. in thickness, and they carried
from nine to twenty-four guns. When in action, streams of water were
made to flow constantly over their decks and sides, but notwithstanding
every precaution, such an overwhelming storm of shell and red-hot shot
was poured upon them by the English garrison that they were all
speedily burnt. Not so the Devastation, La Lave, and La Tonnante
before the Russian fortress above mentioned, on the memorable 14th
October, 1855. At 9 p.m. they opened fire, and in an hour and twenty-
five minutes the enemy was silenced, nearly all the gunners being
killed, their pieces dismounted, and all the ramparts themselves being
for the most part demolished. To accomplish this destruction in so short
a space of time, the three batteries, each carrying eighteen fifty
pounders (supported, of course, by the fire of the English vessels),
advanced in very shallow water within 800 yards of the walls,
receiving themselves very little damage in comparison with the
immense havoc they occasioned.”

From the above extract it is clear that the “impenetrable coat of mail”
idea, popularly supposed to have led to the introduction of ironclads, never
existed to any appreciable extent. Indeed, when the Committee, alluded to
on an earlier page, concluded its labours in 1859, it merely recommended
the conversion of nineteen more sailing ships into steamers. It was Sir John
Pakington who decided to lay down a couple of “armoured steam frigates,”
and to build them of iron instead of wood.
The French frégates blindées were wooden ships, armoured. John Scott
Russell is said to have been Pakington’s chief adviser in this matter of
building iron armoured ships and disregarding all the laborious conclusions
of Captain Chads against iron hulls.
As regards the general recommendations of the committee already
referred to, these had resulted in 1861 in there being no less than sixty-
seven wooden unarmoured ships of the line building or converting into
“screw ships.”
The two iron-plated steam frigates were decided on without any
popular enthusiasm concerning them. Now and again retired Admirals paid

surreptitious visits to the French “blindées” and returned with alarming
reports; but, with the possible exception of flying machines, no epoch-
making thing ever came in quite so quietly as the ironclad. The wildest
dreamer saw nothing in it beyond a variation on existing types. The ironclad
was something which, by carrying a great deal of weight, could keep out
shell; beyond that no one seems to have had any particular ideals whatever,
except perhaps Sir Edward Reed.
Early in 1859 designs for a type of ship to “answer” the French frégates
blindées were called for, and fourteen private firms submitted designs. All,
however, were discarded.
90
Details of the designs submitted were as follows: —

Wt. of Wt. of I.H.P.
Displ’m’t. Speed.
Designer. Length. Breadth Armour Hull of
Tons. Knots.
Displ. Displ. Eng.
Laird 400.0 60.0 9779 13½ .11 .51 3250
Thames Co. 430.0 60.0 11180 .10 .58 4000
Mare 380.0 57.0 7341 .13 .46 3000
Scott Russell 385.0 58.0 7256 .18 .38 3000
Napier 365.0 56.0 8000 13½ 4120
Westwood & Baillie 360.0 55.0 7600 13½ .16 .36 4000
Samuda 382.0 55.0 8084 13½ .16 .57 2500
Palmer 340.0 58.0 7690 13½ 4500
Abethell 336.0 57.0 7668 2500
Henwood 372.0 52.0 6507 .18 .40 2500
Peake 354.9 56.0 7000 .14 .46 3000
Chatfield 343.6 59.6 7791 .14
Lang 400.0 55.0 8511 15 .14 .53 2500
Cradock 360.0 57.6 7724 .20 .42 2500
Admiralty Office 380.0 58.0 8625 14

The Abethell and Peake designs were wooden hulled, all the others iron
ships.
The two ships, Warrior and Black Prince, as actually laid down,
differed from the Admiralty design in certain details. The beam was

increased slightly, and the displacement rose from 8625 to 9210.
The Warrior was laid down on the 25th May, 1859, at the Thames
Ironworks, Blackwall; the Black Prince a little later at Glasgow.

THE WARRIOR, AS COMPLETED, 1861.

In substances they were ordinary “wooden frigates,” built of iron
instead of wood, with armour to protect most (but not all) of the guns. This
was done by a patch of armour amidships, covering about 60% of the side.
It was deemed advisable to protect the engines; otherwise as like as not the
armour would have been over the battery only. Waterline protection was
entirely unrealised, the steering gear of the Warrior being at the mercy of
the first lucky shot.
This, as Sir N. Barnaby has pointed out, was due to accepting existing
conditions:—

“The tiller was necessarily above the water-line and was outside of
the cover of the armour. The wooden line-of-battle ships, with which
the designers of these first iron-cased ships were familiar, had required
no special water-line protection, and when wheel ropes or tiller were

shot away the ship did not cease to be able to fight. The line-of-battle
ships, which they knew so well, had a lower, or gun deck about four
feet above the water-line, and an orlop deck about three feet below the
water-line. Between these two decks the ship’s sides were stouter than
in any other part, and shot did not easily perforate them. When a shot
did enter there, between wind and water, as it was called, ample
provision was made to prevent the serious admission of water.
“In this between-deck space the sides of the ship were kept free
from all erections or obstructions. The ‘wing passages’ on the orlop
were clear, from end to end of the ship, and they were patrolled by the
carpenter’s crew, who were provided with shot plugs of wood and
oakum and sail cloth with which to close any shot holes. As against
disabled steering gear there were spare tillers and tiller ropes, and only
injury to the rudder head itself was serious.”

It is easy to-day to indicate where the old-time designers erred; and
later on they realised and repaired their error with commendable
promptitude. The really interesting point is that British designers evolved
the ideal thing for the day, while the French evolved the idea of the ideal
thing for the to-morrow. Unhappily for the latter, their evolution was unable
to survive its birth till the day of its utility. La Gloire, the first French
ironclad, was broken up more years ago than any can remember; the
91
Warrior and the Black Prince, though long ago reduced to hulk service,
still float as sound as when in 1861 the Warrior first took the water. To the
French belongs the honour of realising what armour protection might mean;
but to England goes the credit of reducing the idea to practical application.
The Warrior was designed by Messrs. Scott Russell and Isaac Watts,
the Chief Constructor. Her length between perpendiculars was 380 feet. She
carried originally a uniform armament of forty-eight 68-pounders smooth
bores, weighing 95cwt. each. These fired shell and cast-iron spherical shot.
The guns were carried as follows:—Main deck, thirty-eight, of which
twelve were not protected by armour. On the upper-deck, ten, also
unprotected.
This armament was subsequently changed to two 110-pounder rifled
Armstrongs on pivot mountings, and four 40-pounders on the upper-deck;

while the main-deck battery was reduced to thirty-four guns. At a later date
it was again altered to four 8-inch 9-ton M.L.R., and twenty-eight 7-inch
6½-ton M.L.R.
In addition to her armour the Warrior was divided into 92 watertight
compartments, fore and aft. She had a double bottom amidships,
considerably subdivided (fifty-seven of the compartments), but no double
bottom in the modern sense.
The Warrior’s engines, by Penn, were horizontal single expansion. On
trial they developed 5,267 I.H.P., and the then excellent speed of 14.079
92
knots. Her six hours’ sea speed trial resulted in a mean 5,092 H.P. and
13.936 knots.

FRENCH LA GLOIRE
WARRIOR & BLACK PRINCE
HECTOR
ACHILLES
MINOTAUR
NORTHUMBERLAND

EARLY BRITISH BROADSIDE IRONCLADS

Save for her unprotected steering gear, the Warrior may be described as
a brilliant success for her era. She was launched on December 29th, 1860,
and completed in the following year. The Black Prince was completed in
1862.
The Warrior and Black Prince, under a system which long endured in
the British Navy, were followed by a certain number of diminutives, of
which the first were the Defence and Resistance, of 6,150 tons, with speeds
of just under 12 knots, and an armament of 16 guns. The armour was the
same, but the battery protection was extended fore and aft, so that all guns
were inside it. These ships were completed in 1862.
Three more ships were projected, of which the Hector and Valiant,
completed in 1864 and 1865, were of precisely the same type as the
Resistance, but displaced 6,710 tons, with about a knot more speed, and
carried a couple of extra guns.
A third ship, originally intended to have been of the same class, was the
Achilles, but, mainly owing to the influence of Mr. Reed (of whom more
anon), who pointed out the danger of unprotected steering gear, her design
was altered and a complete belt of 4½-inch armour given to her instead of a
partial one.
Those changes in the design, together with an increased horse-power
which produced on trial 14.32 knots, advanced the displacement of the
Achilles to 9,820 tons, while the armament was brought up to fourteen 12-
ton guns and two 6½-ton. The weight of armour was 1,200 tons.
The Achilles, like many another ship that was to follow her, was the
“last word” of her own day. No expense was spared in seeking to secure a
maximum of efficiency in her. As originally completed she was a ship-
rigged vessel, but with a view to improving her sailing efficiency, this was

subsequently altered to a four-masted rig, which proved so little successful
that eventually she reverted to three masts again.
In the meantime the authorities were so pleased with the Achilles that
three improved editions of her were designed. They were not completed
until a new type of ship, which was completed before they were, replaced
them; but chronologically they followed close upon the Achilles. They were
laid down in 1861, and designed by Isaac Watts. They were named
Agincourt, Minotaur, and Northumberland. They differed in minor details,
but in substance were all about 1,000 tons more than the Achilles, and their
increased displacement mostly went in one inch extra armour protection
(5½-inch against 4½-inch).
As originally designed they were intended to mount seven 12-ton and
twenty 9-ton guns, but at a very early date the first two were given a
uniform armament of seventeen 12-ton. A small portion of this armament of
the upper deck was provided with armoured protection for right-ahead fire.

THE ACHILLES AS A FOUR-MASTER.
Photographed about 1866.

In appearance they were magnificent ships, fitted with five masts.
Being 400 feet between perpendiculars they were the largest ships of their
time, and at sea always proved very steady under both sail and steam.
These ships were the subject of violent disputes between the Controller
of the Navy and their constructor. The Controller insisted that they were
extravagantly large ships, as compared to French ships. The constructor
insisted that it was essential that for any given power and protection a
British ship must be larger than a foreign one, because of her more extended
93
probable duties, and the consequent necessity of a larger coal supply.

THE MINOTAUR, 1867, ORIGINAL RIG.

At and about this period there were a number of wooden ships-of-the-
line building, which had been laid down from the year 1859 onwards.
Following the French fashion, they were converted into ironclads. These
ships, displacing from 6,100 to 6,830 tons, were the Repulse, Royal Alfred,
Zealous (laid down 1859), Caledonia, Ocean, Prince Consort, Royal Oak
94
(1860).

The upper-decks of these ships were removed, and they were fitted with
side armour, which was 4½ inches in the earliest to be treated, and 5½
inches in the latest. All of them carried sixteen 9-ton guns and four 6½-ton,
with provision for ahead fire.
The experiment, though useful as a temporary expedient, was very
expensive, and several of the ships had to be lengthened before anything
could be done to them. None of them were very successful, and most of
them disappeared from the Navy List at an early date.
This ends the period of “broadside ironclads”; of the best of which it
may be said that they were nothing but efforts to adapt new ideals to old
methods.

XI.

THE REED ERA.

I N 1862 Mr. (afterwards Sir) E. J. Reed, was appointed Chief Constructor,
and proceeded at once to produce the type of ship chiefly associated
with his name. His ideals ran in the direction of short, handy ships of
medium size, as heavily armed as possible, and with a good turn of speed.
His arguments in favour of these ideals he afterwards described as
95
follows:—

“The merits of ironclad ships do not consist in carrying a large
proportion of weights to engine-power, or having a high speed in
proportion to that power; but rather in possessing great powers of
offence and defence, being comparatively short, cheap, and handy, and
steaming at a high speed, not in the most economical way possible, but
by means of a moderate increase of power on account of the moderate
proportions adopted in order to decrease the weight and cost, and to
increase the handiness.”

Generally speaking, his views were very revolutionary. The greatness
of Sir E. J. Reed lay in the fact that he was the first man to conceive of the
ironclad as a separate and distinct entity. Previously to him the ironclad was
merely an ordinary steamer with some armour plating on her.

SIR E. J. REED.
From a portrait made when he was Chief Constructor of the British Navy

His first ship was the Bellerophon, of 7,550 tons displacement. She
embodied distinct novelties in the construction of her hull, described by her
95
designer in the following passages:—

“The Warrior and the earlier ironclads are constructed with deep
frames, or girders, running in a longitudinal direction through the

greater part of the length of the ship, combined with numerous strong
transverse frames, formed of plates and angle-irons, crossing them at
right angles. In fact, up to the height of the armour the ship’s framing
very closely resembles in its character that of the platform or roadway
of a common girder bridge, in which the principal or longitudinal
strength is contributed by the continuous girders that stretch from pier
to pier, and the transverse framing consists of short girders fitted
between and fastened to the continuous girders. If we conceive such a
platform to be curved transversely to a ship-shape form, and the under
side to be covered with iron plating, we have a very fair idea of the
construction of the lower part of the Warrior. If, instead of this
arrangement, we conceive the continuous longitudinal girders to be
considerably deepened, and the transverse girders to be replaced by so-
called ‘bracket-frames,’ and then, after curving this to a ship-form, add
iron-plating on both the upper and the under sides, we have a
correspondingly good idea of the construction of the lower part of the
Bellerophon. The Bellerophon’s construction is, therefore, identical in
character with the cellular system carried out in the Menai and other
tubular bridges, which system has been proved by the most elaborate
and careful experiments to be that which best combines lightness and
strength in wrought-iron structures of tubular cross-section. The
Warrior’s system, wanting, as it does, an inner skin of iron—except in
a few places, such as under the engines and boilers—is not in
accordance with the cellular system, and is inferior to it in strength. As
regards safety, also, no comparison can be made between the system of
the Warrior and that of the Bellerophon. If the bottom plating is
penetrated, in most places the water must enter the Warrior’s hold, and
she must depend for safety entirely on the efficiency of her watertight
bulkheads. If the Bellerophon’s bottom is broken through, no danger of
this kind is run. The water cannot enter the hold until the inner bottom
is broken through, and this inner bottom is not likely to be damaged by
an ordinary accident, seeing that it is two or three feet distant from the
outer bottom. Should some exceptional accident occur by which the
inner bottom is penetrated, the Bellerophon would still have her
watertight bulkheads to depend on, being, in fact, under these
circumstances in a position similar to that occupied by the Warrior
whenever her bottom plating is broken through; while an accident

which would prove fatal to the Warrior might leave the Bellerophon
free from danger so long as the inner bottom remained intact.”

As to be related later, the Vanguard disaster tended to contravert this
optimism—but of that further on. The point of present interest is the
recognition and establishment of a principle which, however commonplace
to-day, was in those days a complete novelty and a special feature of the
iron ship as a peculiar war entity.
Equally of interest, in some ways more so, are the following
anticipations of torpedo possibilities. The torpedo is such a familiar thing
to-day that it is hard to throw ourselves back into the point of view
necessary to appreciate the prophetic instincts of the man who created the
first vessels which can really be called “battleships.”

“It may be proper in this connection to draw attention to the fact
that the probable employment of torpedoes in a future naval war has
not been lost sight of in carrying out these structural improvements. Up
to the present time torpedoes have been used almost solely for coast
and harbour defence, and have, under those circumstances, proved
most destructive, as a glance through the reports of the operations of
the Federal Fleet at Charleston and other Confederate ports will show.
It is still doubtful, however, whether these formidable engines of war
can be supplied with anything like the same efficiency at sea under the
vastly different conditions which they will there have to encounter. The
Americans have, it is true, proposed to fit torpedo-booms to their
unarmoured ocean-cruisers, such as the Wampanoag, and a naval war
would doubtless at once bring similar schemes into prominence.
Nothing less than actual warfare can be expected to set the question at
rest; but whatever the result of such a test may be, it is obviously a
proper policy of construction to provide as much as possible against the
dangers of torpedoes; and it must be freely admitted that the strongest
ironclad yet designed, although practically impenetrable by the
heaviest guns yet constructed, would be very liable to damage from the
explosion of a submerged torpedo. No ship’s bottom can, in fact, be
made strong enough to resist the shock of such an explosion; and the
question consequently arises: How best can the structure be made to

give safety against a mode of attack which cannot fail to cause a more
or less extensive fracture of the ship’s bottom, even if it does no more
serious damage? In our recent ships, as I have said, attempts have been
made to give a practical answer to this question. Seeing that the bottom
must inevitably be broken through by the explosion of a torpedo which
exerts its full force upon the ship, it obviously becomes necessary to
provide, as far as possible, against the danger resulting from a great in-
flow of water. This is the leading idea which has been kept in view in
arranging the structural details of our ships to meet this danger, and the
reader cannot fail to perceive that the double bottom and watertight
subdivisions described above are as available against injury from
torpedoes as they are against the injuries resulting from striking the
ground.”

THE BELLEROPHON, COMPLETED 1866.

Details of the Bellerophon were as follows:—

Displacement—7,550 tons.
Length—300 ft. between perpendiculars.
Beam—56ft. 1in.
H.P.—6,520.
Mean Draught—26ft. 7ins.
Guns—Ten 12-ton M.L.R., five 6½-ton M.L.R. (changed in 1890 to ten 8-
in. 14-ton B.L.R., four 6-in., six 4-in. ditto.)
Armour (iron)—Belt 6in., Battery 6in., Bulkhead 5in., Conning tower 8in.
Speed—14.17 knots.
Coal—650 tons.
Launched—1865; completed, 1866.
Cost—Hull and machinery—£322,701.

The 12-ton guns were on the main deck, the 6½-ton on the upper deck,
two of them being in an armoured bow battery. The Bellerophon, completed
in 1866, was ship rigged, and carried the then novel feature of an armoured
96
conning tower, abaft the mainmast. She proved extremely handy, her
turning circle being 559yds. as against 939yds. for the Minotaur and
1,050yds. for the Warrior. A balanced rudder, introduced in her for the first
time, helped this result to some extent; but the well thought-out design of
this, the first real “battleship,” was the main cause.
The Bellerophon was followed by a series of “improved Bellerophons,”
which will be dealt with later. First, however, it is necessary to revert to the
coming of the turret-ship.
So long ago as the Crimean War Captain Cowper-Coles had introduced
the Lady Nancy, “gun-raft,” previously mentioned in connection with that
war. In the year 1860 his plans had matured sufficiently for him to make
public the designs of a proposed turret ship, with no less than nine turrets in
the centre line, each carrying two guns which were to recoil up a slope and
return automatically to position.
There has been much discussion in the past as to whether Coles or
Ericsson, the designer of the Monitor, first hit upon the turret-ship idea. As
a matter of fact neither of them invented it, as the idea was first propounded
in the 16th century, and “pivot guns” had long existed. In so far as adapting
the idea to modern uses is concerned, Ericsson was first in the field, but his
turret revolved on a spindle. The merit of the Cowper-Coles design was that

he evolved the idea of mounting the turret on a series of rollers, thus
making it of real practical utility.

THE ROYAL SOVEREIGN, 1864.

Coles’ ideal turret ship was not received officially with any great show
of enthusiasm; as a matter of fact it was an impracticable sort of ship. The
famous fight between the Monitor and the Merrimac, early in 1862, in the
American Civil War, was, however, followed by a perfect “turret craze.”
Turret ships were popularly acclaimed as essential to the preservation of
British naval power. The idea of a sea-going ship without sail power was
unthinkable; but the turret ships for coast defence purposes were demanded
with such insistence that in 1862 Captain Coles, now more or less a popular
hero, was put to supervise the reconstruction of the old steam wooden line-
of-battleship Royal Sovereign into a turret ironclad.
This ship was originally a three-decker. Coles cut her down to the
lower deck, leaving a freeboard of ten feet. The sides were covered with

4½-inch iron armour. Four turrets were mounted on Coles’ roller system,
the forward turret carrying two and the other three one 12½-ton guns. These
turrets were generally five inches thick, but at the portholes were increased
up to ten inches. They were rotated by hand power. There was one funnel,
in front of which a thinly armoured conning tower was placed. Three pole
masts were fitted. This ship was completed in 1864, and was fairly
successful on trials. The cost of conversion was very heavy, and being
wooden-hulled her weight-carrying ratio was small, 1837 tons to 3,243
tons, weight of hull.
Coles was at no time satisfied with this old three-decker an a proper
test of his ideas, and his agitation was so far successful that the Prince
Albert was presently built to his design. She was an iron turret-ship,
generally resembling the Royal Sovereign, though carrying only one gun in
each turret.
Particulars of her are:—

Displacement—3,880 tons.
Length—240ft. p.p.
Beam—48ft. 1in.
H.P.—2,130.
Mean Draught—20ft. 4ins.
Speed—11.65 knots.
Coal—230 tons.
Guns—Four 9-in. 12-ton M.L.R.

To the same era belong three armoured gunboats—Viper, Vixen, and
Waterwitch—of about 1,230 tons each, armed with a couple of 6½-ton
M.L.R. guns, armour 4½ins. The Waterwitch, which was slightly the
heavier, was fitted with a species of turbine, sucking water in ahead and
ejecting it astern (a very old idea revived). This was moderately successful,
as the trial speeds of the three were:—

Viper—8.89 knots.
Vixen—9.59 knots.
Waterwitch—9.24 knots.

In the Vixen twin screws were for the first time tried.

The Prince Albert was completed in 1866, the same year as the
Bellerophon. Long before she was completed, Coles was agitating for the
application of his principles to a sea-going masted ship.

THE WATERWITCH, COMPLETED 1867.

Sir E. J. Reed has left it on record that his attitude in the matter was that
of an interested observer. He was at no time blind to the advantages that the
turret system conferred; but, unlike the Coles’ party, he was equally
observant of its disadvantages. At a very early date he threw cold water on
the masted turret-ship idea, and insisted that for a sea-going turret-ship to
become practicable she must be mastless. He further pointed out that for a
given weight eight guns could be mounted broadside fashion for four
carried in turrets.
He developed his own ideas in the Hercules, laid down in 1866. The
Hercules, except that recessed ports were introduced to supply something
like end-on fire to the battery, was an amplified Bellerophon. Particulars of
the Hercules (which was always a very successful ship) are:—

Displacement—8,680 tons.
Length—325ft.
Beam—59ft. ½in.
Mean Draught—26ft. 6ins.
H.P.—6,750.
Guns—Eight 18-ton M.L.R., two 12½-ton M.L.R., four 6½-ton M.L.R.
Armour (iron)—9in. 6in. Belt and Battery.
Speed—14.00 kts. (14.69 on the measured mile trials).
Coal—610 tons.
Cost—Hull and machinery, £361,134.

The Hercules was completed in 1868, contemporaneously with the
completion of the Agincourt and Northumberland, which were very slowly
finished.
At and about the same time the Penelope was built. She was designed
for light draught and river service, her maximum draught being kept down
to 17½ft. She carried eight 9-ton guns and had a 6-inch belt. Sir E. J. Reed
being absent from office, his chief assistant, afterwards Sir N. Barnaby, was
mainly responsible for this ship. She was given twin screws.
Captain Coles meanwhile continued to demand turret-ships, and in
1865 submitted a design for a sea-going turret-ship, which was referred to a
Committee of Naval Officers. They declined to approve the design, but
expressed much interest in the principle involved, and recommended that an
Admiralty design on similar principles should be worked out, and a ship
built to it. This eventuated in the Monarch, which in substance was an
ordinary ironclad of less freeboard than usual (14ft.) with two turrets on the
upper deck, carrying each a pair of the heaviest guns then in existence (25
tons).

BELLEROPHON.
HERCULES.
AUDACIOUS.

SULTAN.
ALEXANDRA.

BROADSIDE AND CENTRAL BATTERY SHIPS OF THE
REED ERA.

It is difficult to ascertain what part (if any) Sir E. J. Reed had in the
design of the Monarch. At a later date in the work already referred to (1869)
97
he criticised her severely enough.

“I have already intimated that the enlarged adoption of the turret
system has usually been associated in my mind with those classes of
vessels in which masts and sails are not required. It is well known that
others have taken a wider view of its applicability, and have contended
that it is, and has all along been, perfectly well adapted for rigged
vessels. I have never considered it wholly inapplicable to such vessels:
on the contrary, I have myself projected designs of sea-going and
rigged turret-ships, which I believe to be safe, commodious, and
susceptible of perfect handling under canvas. But most assuredly the
building of such vessels was urged by many persons long before
satisfactory methods of designing them had been devised; and my clear
and strong conviction at the moment of writing these lines (March 31,
1869) is that no satisfactorily designed turret-ship with rigging has yet
been built, or even laid down.
“The most cursory consideration of the subject will, I think, result
in the feeling that the middle of the upper deck of a full-rigged ship is
not a very eligible position for fighting large guns. Anyone who has
stood upon the deck of a frigate, amid the maze of ropes of all kinds
and sizes that surrounds him, must feel that to bring even guns of
moderate size away from the port holes, to place them in the midst of
these ropes, and discharge them there, is utterly out of the question; and
the impracticability of that mode of proceeding must increase in
proportion as the size and power of the guns are increased. But as a
central position, or a nearly central position, is requisite for the turret,
this difficulty has had to be met by many devices, some of them
tending to reduce the number of the ropes, and others to get them

stopped short above the guns. In the former category come tripod
masts; in the latter, flying-decks over the turrets; the former have
proved successful in getting rid of shrouds, but they interfere seriously
with the fire of the turret guns, and are exposed to the danger of being
shot away by them in the smoke of action; the latter are under trial, but
however successful they may prove in some respects, they will be very
inferior in point of comfort and convenience to the upper decks of
broadside frigates. In the case of the Monarch, which has a lofty upper
deck, neither a tripod system nor a flying deck for working the ropes
upon has been adopted. A light flying deck to receive a portion of the
boats, and to afford a passage for the officers above the turrets, has
been fitted; but the ropes will be worked upon the upper deck over
which the turrets have to fire, and consequently a thousand
contrivances have had to be made for keeping both the standing and
running rigging tolerably clear of the guns. It seems to me out of the
question to suppose that such an arrangement can ever become general
in the British Navy, especially when one contrasts the Monarch with
the Hercules as a rigged man-of-war. Nor is the matter at all improved,
in my opinion, in the case of the Captain and other rigged turret-ships
in which the ropes have to be worked upon bridges or flying-decks
poised in the air above the turrets. Such bridges or decks, even if they
withstand for long the repeated fire of the ship’s own guns, must of
necessity be mounted upon a few supports only; and I am apprehensive
that in action an enemy’s fire would bring down parts, at least, of these
cumbrous structures, with their bitts, blocks, ropes, and the thousand
and one other fittings with which a rigged ship’s deck is encumbered,
with what result I need not predict.
“It is well known that both in the Captain and in the Monarch the
turrets have been deprived of their primary and supreme advantage,
that of providing an all-round fire for the guns, and more especially a
head fire. This deprivation is consequent upon the adoption of
forecastles, which are intended to keep the ships dry in steaming
against a head sea, and to enable the head-sails to be worked. When it
first became known that the Monarch was designed with a forecastle
(by order of the then Board of Admiralty) there were not wanting
persons who considered the plan extremely objectionable, and who
took it for granted that as a turret-ship the new vessel would be fatally

defective. The design of the Captain shortly afterwards, under the
direction of Captain Coles, with a similar but much larger forecastle,
was an admission, however, that the Board of Admiralty did not stand
alone in the belief that this feature was a necessity, however
objectionable. Both these ships, therefore, are without a right-ahead
fire from the turrets, the Monarch having this deficiency partly
compensated by two forecastle (6½-ton) guns protected with armour,
while the Captain has no protected head-fire at all, but merely one gun
(6½-ton) standing exposed on the top of the forecastle.”

Time has shown that he was quite correct in his views; but in 1866 and
the years that followed he was regarded as unduly conservative and non-
progressive.

ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
TYPICAL U.S. MONITOR.
SCORPION.
CAPTAIN.
MONARCH.
REED IDEAL OF A MASTED TURRET SHIP.

TURRET-SHIPS OF THE REED ERA.

Captain Coles objected to the Monarch altogether. He insisted with
vehemence that she did not in the least express his ideas. She had a high
forecastle, also a poop; these features depriving her of end-on fire, except in
so far as a couple of 6½-ton guns in an armoured forecastle supplied the
deficiency. The Admiralty replied that a forecastle was essential for sea-
worthiness; but Coles was so insistent that eventually he was allowed to
design a sea-going turret-ship on his own ideas, in conjunction with Messrs.
Laird, of Birkenhead, who had already had considerable experience in
98
producing masted turret-ships. Coles was given a free hand. As a naval
officer his form of turret displays the practical mind; as a ship designer he
was simply the raw amateur. The Captain, which he produced, accentuated
every fault of the Monarch, except in the purely technical matter of rigging
being in the way of the guns. Coles got over this by fitting tripod masts
99
(which Laird’s had evolved before him ); but for the light flying bridges of
the Monarch he substituted a very considerable superstructure erection. For
the Monarch’s armoured two-gun forecastle, which he had so violently
condemned, he substituted a much larger unarmoured, one-gun structure.
Owing to an error in design, his intended 8-ft. freeboard was actually only
6ft., and his ideal ship resulted in nothing but a Monarch of less gun power,
and of 8ft. less freeboard. Her fate is dealt with later. Details of the two
ships are:—

Captain. Monarch.
Displacement 6900 tons. 8320 tons.
Length (p.p.) 320 feet. 330 feet.
Beam 53 feet. 57½ feet.
Draught 25ft. 9½in. (mean). 26ft. 7in. (max.)

Guns Four 25 ton M.L.R., Four 25 ton M.L.R., three
two 6½ ton, do. 6½ ton, do.
100

Coal 500 tons.
101 630 tons.
Speed 14.25 kts. (twin 14.94 (single screw).
screws).
Waterline 8.6 inches. 7.6 inches.
Belt
Turrets 13.8 inches. 10.8 inches.
Completed 1869. 1869.

It has been said that Captain Coles was tied down by Admiralty ideas
that a sea-going ship must have auxiliary sail power. All the evidence is,
however, to the effect that not only did he recognise this limitation from the
first, but that he concurred with it and believed his design to fill the
conditions best. It failed to do so, the Monarch under all conditions doing
far better than the Captain on trial (except occasionally under sail).
Sir E. J. Reed’s objections to the Captain design have already been
mentioned. He was not the only critic, since Laird’s, of Birkenhead, who
built the ship, were so suspicious of the design that they requested the
Admiralty to submit her to severe tests for stability.
The ship, however, came through these tests very well, and the public
were more convinced than ever that she was the finest warship ever built.
One or two naval officers who had criticised her also modified their
opinions after she had done a couple of very successful cruises across the
Bay of Biscay. Her crew had the utmost confidence in her. She was
commanded by Captain Burgoyne, and Captain Coles was also on board her
when she made her third cruise in September, 1871.
On the 6th September she was off Cape Finisterre in company with the
Channel Fleet, consisting of the Lord Warden, Minotaur, Agincourt,
Northumberland, Monarch, Hercules, Bellerophon, and the unarmoured
ships Inconstant and Bristol. Admiral Milne came on board her from the
Lord Warden, and drew attention to the fact that she was rolling a great
102
deal, but nobody on board the Captain agreed with him that this was
dangerous. During the night a heavy gale suddenly arose, and in the

morning the Captain was missing. Eighteen survivors reached the land with
the story of what had happened.

THE CAPTAIN.

From this it appears that about midnight the ship was under her
topsails, double reefed. She had steam up, but was not using her screw. The
ship gave a heavy lurch, righted herself, and the captain gave the order, “Let
go the topsail halyards,” and immediately afterwards, “Let go fore and main
topsail sheets.” The ship, however, continued to heel, and “18 degrees” was
called out. This increased until 28 degrees was arrived at. With the ship
lying over on her side some of the crew succeeded in walking over her
bottom, and these were practically the only survivors. Immediately
afterwards the ship went down stern first. There were at this time some five
and twenty survivors, including Captain Burgoyne and Mr. May, the gunner.
Some of these were in the launch, others clinging to the pinnace, which was
floating bottom upwards. Captain Burgoyne was amongst those who were
clinging to the pinnace, and that was the last seen of him. A few of the men
in the pinnace succeeded in jumping into the launch and so escaped. The
rest were never seen again.

The subsequent court-martial placed it on record that “the Captain was
built in deference to public opinion and in opposition to the views and
opinions of the Controller of the Navy and his Department.” The instability
of the ship and the incompetence of Captain Coles to design her were
emphasised.
After the loss of the Captain considerable panic on the subject of turret-
ships arose. The Monarch was submitted to a number of tests which,
however, generally proved satisfactory, and there was never anything to be
said against her except that the forecastle and the poop necessitated by her
being a rigged ship, negatived one of the principal advantages of the turret
system.
To the loss of the Captain is to be traced some of the extraordinary
opposition which the Devastation idea subsequently encountered.
The various writings of Sir E. J. Reed make it abundantly clear that just
as in the Bellerophon he had realised that an ironclad battleship must be
something more than an old-type vessel with some armour on her, so he
realised from the first that the ordinary sea-going warship with turrets on
deck, instead of guns in the battery, was no true solution of the turret
problem. There is ample evidence that he studied the monitors of the
American Civil War with a balanced intelligence far ahead of his day,
taking into consideration every pro and con with absolute impartiality, and
applying the knowledge thus gained to the different conditions required for
the British Fleet. It is no exaggeration to say that he was the only man who
really kept his head while the turret-ship controversy reigned; the one man
who thought while others argued.
He swiftly recognised the tremendous limitations of the American low-
freeboard monitors, and at an early date evolved his own idea of the
“breastwork monitor,” which began with the Australian Cerberus, and
ended with the predecessor of the present Dreadnought. The ships of this
type varied considerably from each other in detail; but the general principle
of all was identical. All, whether coast-defence or sea-going, were
“mastless”; all, while of low freeboard fore and aft, carried their turrets
fairly high up on a heavily armed redoubt amidships. Side by side with
them he developed the central battery ironclads of this particular era. He

ceased to be Chief Constructor before either type reached its apotheosis; but
all may be deemed lineal descendants of his original creations.

THE OLD “INVINCIBLE.” 1872.

First, however, it is desirable to revert to the Reed broadside and central
battery-ships.
The Audacious class, which followed closely upon the Hercules, and
were contemporary in the matter of design, were avowedly “second-class
ships,” intended for service in distant seas. The ships of this class, of which
the first was completed in 1869 and the last in 1873, were the Audacious,
Invincible, Iron Duke, Vanguard, Swiftsure, and Triumph. As the sketch plan
illustrations indicate, the main deck battery in them was more centralised
than in the Hercules, while instead of the bow battery they carried on their
upper decks four 6½-ton guns capable of firing directly ahead or astern.

Excluding the converted ships, the Audacious was the eleventh British
ironclad to be designed in point of date of laying down, but in the matter of
design she followed directly on the eighth ship—Hercules.
Her weights, as compared with the Bellerophon, were:—

Name. Weight of hull. Weight carried.
Bellerophon 3652 tons. 3798 tons.
Audacious 2675 tons. 3234 tons.

In some of these ships the principle of wood-copper sheathing was re-
introduced; the iron ships having been found to foul their hulls more
quickly than wooden hulled ships. The Swiftsure and Triumph (the two
latest) were the ones so treated. Sir E. J. Reed was not responsible for the
experiment, which was entirely an Admiralty one. It proved successful
enough, the loss of speed being trifling.
103
Details of the Audacious class:—

Displacement—6,010.
Length—280ft.
Beam—54ft.
H.P.—4,830.
Mean Draught—23ft. 8ins.
Guns—Ten 12-ton M.L.R.
Coal—500 tons.
Belt Armour—8ins. to 6ins.

Audacious Iron Duke Invincible Vanguard Swiftsure Triumph
Speed 13.2 13.64 14.09 13.64 13.75 13.75
Builder of
Glasgow Pembroke Glasgow Jarrow Jarrow
Ship
Builder of
Ravenhill Ravenhill Napier Maudslay Maudslay
Machin’y
Launched 1869 1870 1869 1869 1870 1870
Completed 1869 1871 1870 1871 1872 1873

Cost—Hull
& £246,482 £196,479 £239,441 £257,081 £258,322
Machin’y

The sheathing increased the displacement of the two latest ships by
about 900 tons in the Swiftsure, and some 600 tons in the Triumph. These
two were single-screw ships only, whereas all the others were twin-screw.
In September, 1875, the Vanguard was rammed and sunk by the Iron
Duke.

THE VANGUARD, COMPLETED 1874.

The finding of the Court Martial was as follows:—

“The court having heard the evidence which had been adduced in
this inquiry and trial, is of opinion that the loss of Her Majesty’s ship
Vanguard was occasioned by Her Majesty’s ship Iron Duke coming
into collision with her off the Kisbank, the Irish Channel, at about 12-

50 on the 1st September, from the effects of which she foundered; that
such collision was caused—First, by the high rate of speed at which the
squadron, of which these vessels formed a part, was proceeding whilst
in a fog; secondly, by Captain Dawkins, when leader of his division,
leaving the deck of the ship before the evolution which was being
performed was completed, as there were indications of foggy weather
at the time; thirdly, by the unnecessary reduction of speed of H.M.S.
Vanguard without a signal from the vice-admiral in command of the
squadron, and without H.M.S. Vanguard making the proper signals to
the Iron Duke; fourthly, by the increase of speed of H.M.S. Iron Duke
during a dense fog, the speed being already high; fifthly, by H.M.S.
Iron Duke improperly shearing out of the line; sixthly, for want of any
fog signals on the part of H.M.S. Iron Duke.
“The court is further of opinion that the cause of the loss of H.M.S.
Vanguard by foundering was a breach being made in her side by the
prow of H.M.S. Iron Duke in the neighbourhood of the most important
transverse bulkhead—namely, that between the engine and boiler
rooms, causing a great rush of water into the engine-room, shaft-alley,
and stoke-hole, extinguishing the fires in a few minutes, the water
eventually finding its way into the provision room flat, and provision
rooms through imperfectly fastened watertight doors, and owing to
leakage of 99 bulkhead. The court is of opinion that the foundering of
H.M.S. Vanguard might have been delayed, if not averted, by Captain
Dawkins giving instructions for immediate action being taken to get all
available pumps worked, instead of employing his crew in hoisting out
boats, and if Captain Dawkins, Commander Tandy, Navigating-
Lieutenant Thomas, and Mr. David Tiddy, carpenter, had shown more
resource and energy in endeavouring to stop the breach from the
outside by means at their command, such as hammocks and sails—and
the court is of opinion that Captain Dawkins should have ordered
Captain Hickley, of H.M.S. Iron Duke, to tow H.M.S. Vanguard into
shallow water. The court is of opinion that blame is imputable to
Captain Dawkins for exhibiting want of judgment and for neglect of
duty in handling his ship, and that he showed a want of resource,
promptitude, and decision in the means be adopted for saving H.M.S.
Vanguard after the collision. The court is further of opinion that blame
is imputable to Navigating-Lieutenant Thomas for neglect of duty in

not pointing out to his captain that there was shallower water within a
short distance, and in not having offered any suggestion as to the
stopping of the leak on the outside. The court is further of opinion that
Commander Tandy showed great want of energy as second in
command under the circumstances. The court is further of opinion that
Mr. Brown, the chief engineer, showed want of promptitude in not
applying the means at his command to relieve the ship of water. The
court is further of opinion that blame is imputable to Mr. David Tiddy,
of H.M.S. Vanguard, for not offering any suggestions to his captain as
to the most efficient mode of stopping the leak, and for not taking
immediate steps for sounding the compartments and reporting from
time to time the progress of the water. The court adjudges Captain
Richard Dawkins to be severely reprimanded and dismissed from
H.M.S. Vanguard and he is hereby severely reprimanded and so
sentenced accordingly. The court adjudges Commander Lashwood
Goldie Tandy and Navigating-Lieutenant James Cambridge Thomas to
be severely reprimanded, and they hereby are severely reprimanded
accordingly. The court imputes no blame to the other officers and
ship’s company of H.M.S. Vanguard in reference to the loss of the ship,
and they are hereby acquitted accordingly.”

HOTSPUR
French Ram TAUREAU (1865)
GLATTON
RUPERT

RAMS OF THE REED ERA.

This disaster drew attention to the ram, the more so when it became
known that the Iron Duke was uninjured. Ram tactics had, of course, been
heard of before, and had been discussed at great length by Sir Edward Reed
in 1868. At that date, although one or two special ram-ships had been built,
Sir E. J. Reed had expressed a certain amount of scepticism as to whether
the ram could be successfully used in connection with a ship in motion, and
pointed out that in the historical instance of the Re d’Italia at the battle of
104
Lissa, the ship was stationary. He further had written:—

“Even if the side were thus broken through, any one of our iron-
built ships would most probably remain afloat, although her efficiency
would be considerably impaired, the water which would enter being
confined to the watertight compartment of the hold, enclosed by
bulkheads crossing the ship at a moderate distance before and abaft the
part broken through. In fact, under these circumstances the ship struck
would be in exactly the same condition as an ordinary iron ship which
by any accident has had the bottom plating broken, and one of the
hold-compartments filled with water, so that we have good reason to
believe that her safety need not be despaired of, unless, by the blow
being delivered at, or very near, a bulkhead, more than one
compartment should be injured and filled. All iron ships can thus be
protected to some extent against being sunk by a single blow of a ram,
and our own vessels have the further and important protection of the
watertight wings just described; but wood ships are not similarly safe.
One hole in the side of the Re d’Italia sufficed to sink her; but this
would scarcely have been possible in an iron ship with properly
arranged watertight compartments. The French, in their latest ironclads,
have become alive to this danger, and have fitted transverse iron
bulkheads in the holds of wood-built ships in order to add to their
safety. No doubt this is an improvement, but our experience with wood

ships leads us to have grave doubts whether these bulkheads can be
made efficient watertight divisions in the hold, on account of the
working that is sure to take place in a wood hull. This fact adds another
to the arguments previously advanced in favour of iron hulls for
armoured ships; for it appears that an iron-built ship, constructed on the
system of our recent ironclads, is comparatively safe against
destruction by a ram, unless she is repeatedly attacked when in a
disabled state, while a wood-built ship may, and most likely will, be
totally lost in consequence of one well-delivered heavy blow.”

This is in strange contrast to the fate of the Vanguard, but the finding of
the court-martial indicates that the precautions taken were hardly such as
were contemplated by the ship’s designer! Furthermore, she appears to have
been struck immediately on one of the watertight bulkheads, and so, instead
of being left with seven of her eight compartments unfilled, she had only
six unfilled. The shock, also, was such that most of the other bulkheads
started leaking; and in addition to this the double bottom is said to have
105
been filled with bricks and cement, and so less operative than it might
otherwise have been, since any shock on the outer bottom would thus be
immediately communicated to the inner one.
The actual successor of the Hercules, in the matter of first-class ships,
was the Sultan. She differed from the Hercules merely in a somewhat
increased draught and displacement, and increased provision for end-on
bow fire—four 12½-ton guns able to fire ahead being substituted for the
one smaller gun in the Hercules.
This end-on fire was given because ram-tactics were then coming
106
greatly into favour. Particulars of the Sultan, which was the last of the
central battery ironclads to be designed and built by Sir E. J. Reed, are as
follows:—

Displacement—9,290 tons.
Length—325ft.
Beam—59ft. ½-in.
H.P.—7,720.
Mean Draught—26ft. 5ins.

Guns—Eight 18-ton M.L.R., four 12½-ton M.L.R.
Coal—810 tons.
Armour (iron)—9ins., 8ins., and 6ins.
Speed—14.13 knots (single screw).
Builder of Ship—Chatham.
Builder of Machinery—Penn.
Cost—Hull and machinery, £357,415.
Launched—1870; completed for sea in 1871.

CERBERUS.
DEVASTATION.
FURY.
DREADNOUGHT.

BREASTWORK MONITORS.

Sir E. J. Reed’s “breastwork monitors” have already been referred to.
They were received with little enthusiasm by the Admiralty, and the first of
them were merely Colonial coast defence vessels. These were:—

Displ’m’t. Speed. Armour. Turret
Name. Completed.
Tons. Knots. Inches. Armour.
Cerberus 3480 9.75 8 10 1870
Abyssinia 2900 9.59 7 10 1870
Magdala 3340 10.67 8 10 1870

In general design all were identical, a redoubt amidships carrying two
centre line turrets and a small oval superstructure between. Twin screws
were employed.
The belief in the ram already alluded to had by now attained such
proportions that a ship specially designed for ramming was called for, and
the Hotspur was the result. Nothing written by Sir E. J. Reed (and he wrote
a great deal) indicates that he was in sympathy with her design, though
nominally responsible. The Hotspur was not even a turret-ship. She carried
107
a fixed armoured structure of considerable size, inside of which a single
25-ton gun revolved, firing through the most convenient of several ports.
She was fitted with two masts with fore and aft sails. Particulars of her
were:—

Displacement—4,010 tons.
Length—235ft.
Beam—50ft.
H.P.—3,060.
Mean Draught—21ft. 10ins.
Guns—One 25-ton M.L.R., two 6½-ton.

Belt Armour—11in. to 8in.; complete belt.
Turret Armour—10in.
Coal—300 tons.
Speed—12.8 knots (twin-screw).
Builder—Napier, Glasgow.
Launched—1870; completed, 1871.
Cost—Hull and machinery, £171,528.

She was built solely and simply as an “answer” to a series of “rams”
projected for the French Navy, apparently more with an Admiralty idea of
not being caught napping “in case,” than from any belief in her efficacy.

THE HOTSPUR, AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED, 1871.

Sir E. J. Reed’s ideas in the matter of turret-ships now found expression
in four ships of the Cerberus type enlarged. These were the Cyclops,
Gorgon, Hecate, and Hydra. Like their prototype, they were of the
breastwork type, and differed only in having an inch more belt armour and a
displacement of 3,560 tons. Differing from them, and perhaps more on
Reed lines, was the Glatton. Her special feature was the introduction of
water to reduce her freeboard in action. She had a single turret only, but her

belt was 12ins. thick, and she represented the, then, “last word” in coast
defence ships, so far as the British Navy was concerned. Details of her are
as follows:—

Displacement—4,910 tons.
Length—245ft.
Beam—54ft.
H.P.—2,870.
Mean Draught—19ft. 5ins.
Guns—Two 25-ton M.L.R.
Armour (iron)—12-10in. Belt Turret, 14in.
Coal—540 tons.
Speed—12.11 knots (twin screw).
Builder of Ship—Chatham Dockyard.
Builder of Machinery—Laird.
Floated out of Dock—1871; completed, 1871.
Cost—Hull and Machinery, £219,529.

The last ship of this group was the ram Rupert, of 5,440 tons, laid down
at Chatham, in 1870. She was, in substance, merely an enlarged Hotspur,
carrying two 18-ton guns in a single revolving turret forward and two 64-
pounders behind the bulwarks aft. Her armour was slightly inferior to the
Glatton’s: her speed considerably higher—14 knots being aimed at, though
it was never reached. She was one of the very few ships which had their
engines built in a Royal Dockyard, hers being constructed at Portsmouth
Yard.
About the year 1890, when re-construction was very much to the fore,
the Rupert was re-constructed. She was given a couple of 10in. breech-
loaders instead of her old 10in. M.L., a military-top, and a few other
improvements. The net result of this re-construction was that when, after it,
she first proceeded to coal she began to submerge herself almost at once.
Her torpedo tubes were awash before she had received her normal quota of
coal, and she was, generally, the most futile example of re-construction ever
experienced.
The failure was such that thereafter no further attempt to modernise old
ships was ever made; instead, a policy of “scrapping” all such was

introduced. This is probably the best service that the Rupert ever rendered
to the Navy. She demonstrated for all time that—so far as the British Navy
was concerned—modernising was a hopeless task. It took France and
Germany many years to learn a similar lesson. To-day, it is generally
recognised that, as a ship is completed, she represents the best that can be
got out of her; and that any attempt to improve her in any one direction
merely spells reduced efficiency in some other. Hence the apparently early
scrapping of many ships of later date and the present day proverb, “Re-
construction never pays.”
The whole of the series, however, can only be regarded as
improvements on the old Prince Albert idea. Sir E. J. Reed’s real answer to
the Captain was the Devastation, designed in 1868, but not completed till
1873; at which date he had left the Admiralty. The Devastation and the
Thunderer (completed four years later than her sister) cost Sir E. J. Reed his
position. In them he introduced all his ideas as to what the sea-going turret-
ship should be. He carried the Admiralty with him; but before ever the
Devastation was set afloat, it was “proved” to the satisfaction of the general
public that she was an “egregious failure.” The date of her design is about
1868, though, as mentioned above, she was not completed till 1873. The
Dreadnought of more or less these times was nothing in the way of novelty
compared to the Devastation of the later sixties.
Details of the Devastation (laid down Nov., 1869), were:—

Displacement—9,330 tons.
Length—385ft.
Beam—62ft. 3ins.
Mean Draught—25ft. 6ins.
H. P.—6,650.
108
Guns—Four 35-ton M.L.R.
Belt Armour—12in. and 10in. (iron).
Turret Armour—14in. (iron).
Coal—1,800 tons.
Speed—13.84 knots (twin-screw).
Where Built—Portsmouth Dockyard.
Builder of Machinery—Humphrys.
Launched—1871; completed, 1873.

Cost—Hull and Machinery, £353,848.

On her trials the Devastation proved completely successful. An
interesting and little known item in connection with her is that as designed
109
she was to carry two signal masts, one forward of the turrets, one aft. For
these, on completion, a single mast on the superstructure was substituted.

THE DEVASTATION, AS COMPLETED, 1873.

How the Devastation, even after successful completion, was received
by the public can be gleaned from the following extracts from the
110
contemporary press:—

“It is a weakness with the officers and men of any of Her Majesty’s
ships to ‘crack up’ the vessels to which they belong, and it is rarely that
a bluejacket growls openly against his ship. The warm confidence
expressed in the ill-fated Captain by her unfortunate crew is well

remembered, and is sufficient to prove that even the first of this
necessarily uncomfortable class of monitors was not met by the seamen
of the Fleet in any complaining spirit, but that they submitted to the
discomforts imposed upon them with characteristic cheerfulness.
When, therefore, an unmistakable feeling of dissatisfaction prevails
throughout a ship, and no hesitation is shown in expressing it, we may
be certain that there is some valid reason for so unusual an occurrence.
We hesitated to give currency to reports which reached us during the
cruise of the Devastation around the coast with the Channel Squadron,
as we had good reason to believe that it was the intention of the
Admiralty to pay her off, and berth her in Portsmouth harbour as a
tender to the Excellent, the advantage of so doing being that a very
large number of men passing through the School of Gunnery would
thus be enabled to become acquainted with the latest improvements in
the turret system.... But since the arrival at the Admiralty of Rear-
Admiral Hornby, late in command of the Channel Squadron, who
certainly should be able to form a correct estimate of the Devastation’s
fitness in every respect for sea service, it has been determined that she
shall be ordered to Gibraltar, there probably to remain during the
coming winter as a kind of ‘guardo.’ A cruise across the bay in the
month of November is not looked forward to by the present crew, who
have had a little experience both of being stifled by being battened
down and of being nearly blown out of their hammocks when efforts at
ventilation are made by opening every hatch. Her qualities as a sea-
boat have been fairly tested, and the present notion of filling her up
with stores for six months’ further service, and then stowing her away
at Gibraltar, leads to the conclusion that on this point at least the value
of the counsel of the First Lord’s new Naval adviser is not altogether
apparent.
“... It is needless to comment on the facts. They speak for
themselves. The condensers will be repaired, no doubt, and
strengthened and modified; but no engineer can guarantee that they
will not fail again, or, if they turn out a permanent job, that the
cylinders will not split, or some other of the mishaps to which marine
engines in the Navy are subject may not happen. If the failure takes
place in the day of battle it will constitute little short of a national
calamity. Even as it is, it must be looked on as a most fortunate

circumstance that the sea was perfectly smooth and the vessel near a
port. Had the breakdown occurred during the six hours’ run of the ship
—which was to have been made on Wednesday—and in a stiff breeze
blowing on a lee shore, the ship might have been lost before an effort
could have been made to save her. Very important improvements in
marine engines of large size must be made before we can reconcile
ourselves to the adoption of mastless sea-going monitors.”

With such labour and travail was the modern British battleship born!
Public opinion decidedly modified naval construction—leading, as it did, to
111
a considerable delay with the Thunderer, the re-designing of the Fury,
and the building of some old-type ships which else had probably never been
constructed.
As already mentioned, Sir E. J. Reed left the Admiralty before the
Devastation was completed. None the less the ships which immediately
followed were in all essential particulars “Reed Ships,” and so are included
in this chapter.
The Devastation, owing to the Committee on Designs, received certain
minor modifications before completion. These mainly concerned the
hatches. Her sister ship, the Thunderer, built at Pembroke and engined by
Humphrys, was held back, pending the Devastation’s trials, and not
completed till 1877.
Save that in one turret she carried a couple of 38 ton (12.5-inch) instead
of 35 ton (12-inch) guns, she was a replica of the Devastation.
A third ship of the same type, named the Fury, was in hand, but
criticisms of the Devastation caused her to be re-designed, and she was
eventually completed as the Dreadnought. In her the very low freeboard
forward and aft of the Devastation type was done away with and freeboard
maintained at a uniform medium height.
The Devastation and Thunderer had their armour-plates amidships
pierced with square portholes. These with some reason were attacked as
likely to weaken the armour very considerably, and the Dreadnought was
built entirely wall-sided and so depended on artificial ventilation, known in
the Navy in those days as “potted air,” even more than her predecessors.

Particulars of the Dreadnought:—

Displacement—10,820 tons.
Length—320ft.
Beam—63ft. 10in.
Draught—26ft. 9in.
Armament—Four 38-ton M.L.R., two 14in. torpedo tubes.
Armour (iron)—Belt 14-11in., Bulkheads 13in., Turrets 14in.
H.P.—8,210 = 12.40 knots.

In the original design of the Fury provision was made for a conning
tower with a heavily-armoured communication tube. She proved a very
successful ship. No sisters were ordered, probably because the Admiralty
wished to see how she did before committing themselves to the type. Ere
she was finished a different fashion in warships had set in. The cost of the
Dreadnought was about £600,000.
The Alexandra was designed long after Reed had left the Admiralty.
That famous constructor had nothing whatever to do with her. None the less
she was the apotheosis of his box-battery ironclad ideas and for that reason
is included in his era. She was simply an “improved Sultan.”
Particulars of her:—

Displacement—9,490 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)—325ft.
Beam—63⅔ft.
Draught—26½ft.
Armament—Four 25-ton M.L., ten 18-ton M.L., four above-water torpedo
dischargers (14in.)
Armour (iron)—12-6in. belt, flat deck on top of it. Bulkheads 8-5in.
Battery 12-6in.
Horse-power—9,810 = 15 knots.
Coal—680 tons = 2,700 knots at 10 knots (nominal).

She was built at Chatham Dockyard; engined by Humphrys; completed
for sea, 1877.

Four of the 18-ton guns were carried in an upper deck battery, and had
end-on training. The other guns were carried in the main-deck battery,
which was some 10ft. high. The 25-ton guns had a right-ahead training.
After completion she served as Mediterranean flagship, though at the
bombardment of Alexandria the flag was transferred to the Invincible,
which, being of lighter draught, was able to enter the inner harbour. At a
later date (about 1890) she was “partially reconstructed.” For her original
barque rig a three-masted military rig was substituted, and six 4-inch Q.F.
were mounted on top of her upper deck battery. She has been described as
the apotheosis of Reed broadside ideas, and a very apotheosis she was. No
broadside or central battery ironclad of the British or any other Navy ever
equalled her, and she dropped out of the first rank only because the big gun
rendered broadside ships entirely obsolete.

GUNS IN THE ERA.
The principal guns (all M.L.R.) in the Reed Era were as follows:—

Penet’n Iron
Muzzle at
Weight in Bore in Length in Weight of Muzzle
Velocity.
tons. inches. Calibres. Projectile lbs. Energy. f.t. yds. yds.
f.s.
2000 1000
38 12.5 16 810 1575 13,930 16 18
35 12 13½ 707 1390 9470 13 15
25 12 12 609 1288 7006 11 12
25 11 12 544 1314 6560 13 14
18 10 14½ 406 1370 5360 10 12
12½ 9 14 253 1440 3695 9 10
9 8 15 174 1384 2391 7 8
6½ 7 16 112 1325 1400 6 7

In the early part of the period Armstrong breech-loaders up to 120
pounders had been in use, but the elementary breech blocks were so
unsatisfactory that the Navy quickly discarded them, and adhered to
muzzle-loaders long after all other Powers had given them up.
The big muzzle loaders tabulated were of a very elementary type also.
They were made by shrinking red hot wrought-iron collars over a steel tube;

and it was never quite certain how far the interior would be affected. The
projectiles never fitted accurately, with the result that there was
considerable leakage of gas and very erratic firing. The rifling consisted of
five or six grooves into which studs in the projectile fitted.
In 1872 some experiments were carried out, the Hotspur firing at the
Glatton’s turret at a range of 200 yards. The first shot missed altogether, the
other two struck the turret, but not at the point aimed at. The turret was not
appreciably damaged, though theoretically it should have been completely
penetrated. This eventually led to the invention of an improved gas check—
reference to which will be found at the end of the Barnaby Era.

UNARMOURED SHIPS OF THE ERA.
Contemporaneously with the Hercules the Inconstant was designed.
She was inspired by the United States Wampanoag, a type of large, fast,
unprotected, heavily-gunned frigate, to which the Americans had always
been partial. The Wampanoag, as a matter of fact, never reached
expectations, whereas the Inconstant was a decided success so far as she
went. She marked, so far as the British Navy was concerned, the first
appearance of the theory that speed and gun power—in other words, “the
offensive”—might be developed advantageously, at the cost of defensive
arrangements, a theory which still survives in the “battle-cruisers” of to-
day, though of course in a very modified form. None the less, the Inconstant
represents the germ idea of our present battle-cruisers, and is supremely
important on that account.
Particulars of the Inconstant were:—

Displacement—5,780 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)—337⅓ ft.
Beam—50¼ft.
Draught (mean)—25½ft.
Guns—Ten 12½ ton M.L.R., six 6½ ton M.L.R.
H.P.—7,360 = 16 knots (trial 16.2).
Speed—Sixteen knots (trial 16.2).
Built at Pembroke Dockyard. Completed for sea 1868 at a cost of
£213,324. She had an iron hull, wood-sheathed and coppered. A coal

supply of 750 tons gave a nominal radius of 2780 miles. She was ship-
rigged and sailed well.

She was followed by a couple of variants on her, the Raleigh and Shah,
the former 5,200 tons and the latter 6,250 tons.
The Shah was originally named the Blonde, but rechristened out of
compliment to the Shah of Persia, who was visiting England at the time of
her launch.
At a later stage in her career (1877) the Shah, then flagship on the S.W.
Coast of America, fought a much-criticised action with the Peruvian turret-
ship Huascar, a Laird-built monitor, carrying a couple of 12½ ton guns,
launched in 1865, and generally of the same type (though smaller) as the
British Hotspur and Rupert.
The Huascar had been seized by the Revolutionists and practically
turned into a pirate ship. In attacking her the British Admiral de Horsey
gave hostages to fortune, seeing that it was an axiom of those days that an
unarmoured ship was helpless against an ironclad monitor. He had,
however, no alternative.
As things turned out, the Huascar never succeeded in hitting either the
Shah, or the Amethyst which accompanied her, while the British flagship,
having a speed advantage, the efforts of the Huascar to ram her were futile.
The Huascar was hit about thirty times, and one man was killed on board
her, but the damage done to the turret-ship was practically nil. The
engagement is of further special interest as for the first time a torpedo was
used from a big ship in action. The range, however, was too great and no hit
was secured.
During the night following the action an attempt was made to torpedo
the Huascar from the Shah’s steam pinnace, but the enemy could not be
found. Yet it is probable that the knowledge of the Shah’s torpedoes was the
reason why Pierola surrendered the Huascar next morning to the Peruvian
fleet.
It must have been abundantly clear to him that he had next to nothing to
fear from the British gun-fire, while a single water-line hit from him would
probably have put the Shah entirely at his mercy, save in so far as her
torpedoes might make attempts to ram fatal to him.

END OF VOL. I.

A SHORT GLOSSARY OF COMMON NAVAL
TERMS.
ABAFT.—Behind or towards the stern of the vessel. Thus one would
say that the aftermost turret guns in any ship are “abaft” the mainmast.
ABEAM.—On the side of a vessel amidships. To say an object is
abeam (or on the beam) means that its bearing by compass is at right angles
to the vessel’s course.
ADMIRALTY, BOARD OF.—That department of State which is
responsible for the proper constitution, maintenance, disposition, and
direction of the Fleet in its material and personal elements, executing the
duties formerly charged upon the Lord High Admiral; it is presided over by
the First Lord (a Cabinet Minister) and consists of Naval Officers—the Sea
Lords—and Civil Officials.
AHEAD.—In advance—an object is said to be ahead of the ship when
its compass bearing is nearly the same as the vessel’s course.
AHEAD FIRE.—The discharge of guns along the line of the keel
directly ahead of the vessel.
AMIDSHIPS.—Generally speaking, in the middle portion of a vessel.
The point of intersection of two lines—one drawn from stem to stern, the
other across the beam (or widest part)—is the actual “midships.”
ANCHOR.—A ship carries several distinct kinds of anchor: the
bowers, which are always used for anchoring or mooring the ship; the sheet
anchor, as an auxiliary to the bowers; the stream and kedge anchors, which
can be used for special purposes.
ANTI-TORPEDO ARMAMENT.—Those guns in a ship which are
specially mounted for repelling attack by torpedo craft.
ARC OF FIRE.—That sector of a circle through which a gun can be
moved or trained for effective practice.

ARMAMENT.—The weapons of offence with which a ship is armed,
including guns and torpedo tubes.
ARMOUR.—Any effective covering which protects a ship. The
following specify a few main features of armour protection:—
1. Armour Belt.—The vertical belt of armour which forms the
citadel or fortress of a ship, and may extend right
forward to the bows and right aft the stern.
2. Side Armour.—Vertical armour placed on the exterior of a
ship, being both the belt and additional thereto.
3. Armoured Deck.—A curved steel deck protecting the
engine room and other vital portions of a ship inside the
citadel. A ship may have as many as three armoured
decks.
4. Armour Backing.—A thick layer of teak which acts as a
cushion behind the armour and to which it is secured.
5. Bulkhead Armour.—Vertical armour in the interior of the
ship, placed across it from side to side.
ASTERN.—The opposite to ahead.
ASTERN FIRE.—The discharge of guns along the line of the keel
directly astern of a vessel.
ATHWARTSHIPS.—At right angles to the keel.
AUXILIARY.—A ship—not necessarily a fighting ship—which forms
a component part of a Fleet. These include Repair vessels, Hospital ships,
Depôt, Submarine and Destroyer Mother-ships, Colliers, etc.
AUXILIARY ENGINES.—The machinery employed for boat-
hoisting, pumping, electric lighting, refrigerating, ventilating, and other
purposes on board ships.
BACKSTAYS.—Ropes stretched from a mast or topmast head to the
sides of a vessel—some way abaft the mast—to give support to the mast
and prevent it going forward.

BALLAST.—Weighty material placed in the bottom of a ship to give
her “stiffness”; that is, to increase her tendency to return to the upright
position when inclined or heeled over by the force of the wind or other
cause.
BALLISTICS.—That branch of science particularly devoted to the
theory of gunnery.
BARBETTE.—The steel platform or mounting on which a power-
worked gun rests and within which it revolves.
BARGE.—A general term given to flat-bottomed boats. The Admiral’s
(or Captain’s) Barge is usually a special steamboat belonging to a warship
reserved for the use of the Admiral or Captain.
BATTEN.—Long strips of wood used for various purposes.
To batten down.—To cover up and fix down, usually spoken
of hatches when they are covered over in rough
weather.
BATTERY.—That portion of a ship’s armament inside the citadel. The
entire armament is frequently spoken of as a “battery.”
BATTLE CRUISER.—A vessel combining the speed and other
essential qualities of a cruiser with an armament and protection sufficient to
enable her to take her place in the fighting-line beside the battleships.
BATTLE PRACTICE.—An annual practice carried out in the Navy,
to test the battle or fighting efficiency of the component parts of a ship’s
armament.
BATTLESHIP.—A ship specially designed to take and give the hard
knocks of a Fleet action.
BEAK.—The extreme fore part of a vessel.
BEAM.—The widest measurement across a ship.
BEARINGS.—This word properly belongs to the art of navigation, in
which it signifies the direction (by compass) in which an object is seen.
BEFORE.—Forward or in front of; the opposite to abaft.

BERTHON BOAT.—A collapsible boat used in destroyers and small
craft.
BETWEEN DECKS.—In a vessel of more than one deck, to be
between the upper and the lower.
BINNACLE.—The fixed case and stand in which the compass in any
vessel is placed.
BLOCKADE.—So to besiege a port that no communication can take
place from seaward.
BLUE PETER.—A square blue flag with a square white centre,
hoisted to denote that a vessel is about to sail and that all persons concerned
must repair on board immediately (the letter “P” in the international flag
signal code.)
BOOM.—A boom is a pole extending outboard—i.e., away from the
sides of a vessel.
Lower and Quarter Booms.—Booms, conveniently placed, to
which boats can make fast.
BORE.—The interior diameter of a gun at the muzzle; also the name
given to the interior of a gun. Also a word used to express a sudden rise of
the tide in certain estuaries as in the Severn.
To bore.—When down by the head a ship is said to “bore.”
BOTTOMRY.—The hull of a ship pledged as security for a loan.
BOWS.—A term indicating those portions of a vessel immediately on
either side of her stem (q.v.). Differentiated in association with the terms
“Port” or “Starboard.”
BOWSPRIT.—A pole of “sprit” projecting forward from the stem of
the ship.
BOX THE COMPASS.—To name the points of the compass in
regular order, i.e., in the direction taken by the hands of the clock.
BREAKWATER.—An artificial wall or bank, set up either outside a
harbour or along the coast, to break the violence of the sea and so create a
smooth shelter.

BREECH.—The end of the gun into which the projectile and cartridge
are inserted when loading.
BREECH-BLOCK.—A heavy steel block which seals the breech
when the gun is loaded.
BREECH-LOADER (B.L.)—Formerly a gun which was loaded at the
breech end as opposed to a muzzle-loader. Now used to denote a gun the
cartridge of which is not contained in a metal cylinder.
BROADSIDE.—The number of guns which can be brought to bear on
one side of, or the total weight of metal which can be fired at once from
either side of a ship.
BULKHEAD.—A structure, transverse or longitudinal, dividing the
interior of a ship into compartments.
BURDEN.—The capacity of a vessel, as 100 tons burden, etc.
BURGEE.—Properly a flag ending in a swallow-tail. Yacht clubs’
burgees are frequently “pennants” which are flags ending in a point.
CADET, NAVAL.—A youth who is under training to become a
commissioned officer in the Navy.
CAISSON.—A hollow, watertight vessel which can be raised or sunk
by compressed air or water, and which is used when building foundations
under water; or, specifically a lock gate used for closing the entrance to dry
docks.
CAISSON DISEASE.—A disease to which divers are subject.
CALIBRE.—The calibre of a gun is the diameter of the bore (q.v.).
This diameter is used as a unit of measurement. Thus, a 50-calibre 12-in.
gun is a 12-in. gun which is 50 ft. long, etc.
CAMEL.—A hollow tank or vessel filled with water and placed under
the hull of a stranded ship. When well secured, the water it contains is
pumped out, and the buoyancy thus created helps to lift the ship to which it
is attached.
CAPITAL-SHIP.—A general term for all warships of such high
standard in fighting capacity as would enable them to take part in a Fleet
action.

CAREEN.—To heel a ship or make her lie over on one side.
CASEMATE.—An armoured gun-emplacement in the side of a ship.
CATAMARAN.—Properly a species of sailing craft used in the Indies.
The heavy wooden rafts which are used to protect the ship’s side when she
is lying alongside a dockyard wall.
CAULKING.—The operation performed in making the sides or
wooden decks of a ship watertight.
CLASS.—A ship is said to belong to a certain “class” when there are
others identical in appearance or design.
CLEARING.—The passing of a vessel through the Customs after she
has visited a foreign port.
COAMING.—A raised edge of iron or wood placed round a hatchway
to prevent water from washing below.
COASTAL-DESTROYER.—A large torpedo-boat not considered
sufficiently strong structurally to do more than coastal work.
COASTGUARD.—A semi-naval organisation of seamen, mostly
living along the shores of the United Kingdom intended originally for the
prevention of smuggling, but now converted into a force for the defence of
the coast or to assist wrecks.
COMMISSION.-A ship is said to be commissioned when she is
manned for service in the fleet.
A commission, the length of time the crew remain in a ship;
the order by which a person becomes an officer.
COMMODORE.—A Naval Captain specially appointed to take
command as such of a squadron of war vessels, or perform some special
duty not assigned to an officer of flag rank.
COMPLEMENT.—The total number of officers and men forming the
crew of a ship.
COMPOSITE BATTERY.—A battery consisting of more than one
type of gun.
CON.—To direct the steering of a vessel.

CONNING-TOWER.—An armoured compartment in a ship from
which she can be steered, or the gun-fire in an action controlled if
necessary. A ship may have more than one conning-tower.
CONTINUOUS VOYAGE, DOCTRINE OF.—The doctrine or
principle which enables contraband of war to be captured when consigned
to a neutral port, but intended for a belligerent.
CONTRABAND.—Munitions of war or other goods which are
prohibited entry into a belligerent State.
(a) Absolute Contraband, material which is always contraband.
(b) Conditional Contraband, material which may be declared
contraband.
CONTROL STATION.—A platform whence range-finding
instruments are managed, or from which the gunnery officers of a ship
control gun-fire in an action.
CONVERSION OF MERCHANTMEN. The right or practice of
converting merchant vessels into warships on the high seas or in neutral
ports.
CONVOY.—A number of merchant steamers crossing the ocean under
the protection of warships.
CORDITE.—The explosive used in guns for discharging projectiles.
COUNTER.—That portion of a vessel which overhangs the keel
towards the stern (q.v.).
COUNTER MINING.—To lay out and explode mines in the vicinity
of hostile ones, in order to destroy them by percussion.
CRANK.—A vessel is said to be crank when she lists over easily.
CRUISER.—A warship of high speed, usually employed in scouting,
commerce protection, and special service. They fall into various
categories:—
(a) Armoured Cruiser, a vessel having vertical external armour.
See also “Battle-Cruiser.”

(b) Light Cruiser, a vessel with deck protection only; or, if
armoured, of but small size and with a thin belt.
(c) Unprotected Cruiser, a cruising vessel having no armour;
included in the Light Cruiser class.
CRUISING SPEED.—The most economical speed from the point of
view of fuel consumption at which a ship can travel.
DEMURRAGE.—Compensation paid to the owner of a vessel when
she has been detained longer than her time for unloading.
DERELICT.—A ship whose crew have abandoned her when at sea.
DESTROYER.—A large type of torpedo-boat originally intended to
destroy such craft by gun-fire—now, with submarines, the chief medium for
torpedo-attack.
DEVIATION OF THE COMPASS.—The amount of the variation of
a ship’s compass from the true magnetic meridian, caused by the proximity
of iron.
DIRECTOR TOWER.—An armoured compartment in a ship whence
torpedoes are fired.
DISPLACEMENT.—The weight of water a ship displaces when
floating.
Normal Displacement.—The weight of water a ship displaces
when she has her normal amount of stores, etc., on
board.
DOCK.—A place in which a ship may be placed for repair or loading
and unloading. See “Floating Dock” and “Graving Dock.”
DOCKYARD.—The works, etc., where ships are built or repairs can
be carried out. In the Government dockyards ships are commissioned and
supplied with stores, ammunition, coal, etc.
DRAUGHT.—The vertical distance between the lowest portion of the
keel and the water line.
“DREADNOUGHT.”—Battleships and cruisers evoked by H.M.S.
Dreadnought, which was the first ship to be armed with one type of big

gun. “A.B.G. ships”—All-big-gun-ships.
“DREADNOUGHT” CRUISERS.—Cruisers derived from the
principle of design of H.M.S. Dreadnought, now called Battle Cruisers
(q.v.).
ECHELON.—Guns are said to be mounted en echelon when they are
not mounted symmetrically but are placed diagonally athwart-ship.
ENGINES.—The reciprocating, turbine, or internal-combustion
machinery for propelling vessels.
ENSIGN.—(Usually pronounced “ens’n.”) The flag carried by a ship
as the insignia of her nationality or the nature of her duties.
ESTIMATES.—The annual estimate or expenditure on the Royal
Navy for its administration, personnel, and for the upkeep or building of
new vessels.
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY—The Cabinet Minister who
presides over the Board of Admiralty. See “Admiralty.”
FIRST SEA LORD.—The Senior Naval Officer serving on the Board
of Admiralty.
FLARE.—The over-hang of the upper part of a ship’s sides beneath
the forecastle. The peculiar outward and upward curve in the form of a
vessel’s bow. When it hangs over she is said to have a “Flaring Bow.”
FLEET.—A number of vessels in company, be they war or other
vessels.
FLEET IN BEING.—An inferior naval force, capable of action and
influencing or impeding the operations of an enemy.
FLEET RESERVE.—Short-service men who have left continuous
service, but are liable to be called upon in case of war.
FLEET-UNIT.—A vessel fit to form a unit in a fleet.
FLOATING DOCK.—An oblong floating structure in which a ship
may be placed, and out of which the water may be pumped, bringing her
above water-level, so that the bottom of the ship can be repaired, etc.; they
have usually no motive power.

FLOTTENVEREIN.—The German Navy League.
FLUSH DECK.—A deck having neither raised nor sunken part, so that
it runs continuously from stem to stern.
FORE AND AFT.—In the direction of a line drawn from stem to stern
of a vessel—at right angles to athwartships.
FORWARD.—In front of—the forepart, in the vicinity of the bows of
a vessel.
GRAVING DOCK.—A dock excavated out of the land into which
entry is made from seaward.
GUN.—A weapon used for firing shot or shell. See “Breech-loader”
and “Q.F. Gun.”
GUNBOAT.—A small type of slow cruiser armed with light guns,
specially adapted for harbour or river service.
GUN-COTTON.—A high explosive used in torpedoes and submarine
mines, etc.
Wet Gun-Cotton.—Gun-Cotton with a certain percentage of
moisture in it; it is useless as an explosive unless dry
gun-cotton is present to detonate it.
GUNLAYER.—A man specially qualified to train (lay) and fire a gun.
Gunlayers’ Test.—An annual practice carried out in every ship
to test the efficiency of the gun-layers individually.
GUN-POWER.—The fighting efficiency of a ship expressed in the
total weight of metal capable of being discharged in a single broadside or a
specified period of time.
HALYARD.—A rope with which a sail, flag, or yard is hoisted.
HARVEYISED.—Armour made by the “Harvey” process. Now
obsolete.
HATCH, HATCHWAY.—An opening in the deck of a ship through
which persons or cargo may descend or be lowered.
HEAVY GUN.—Any gun greater than and including a 4-in. Q.F. or
B.L.

HOG.—When a vessel has a tendency to droop at her ends she is said
to hog.
HORNPIPE.—The dance once popular among the sailors of the
British Navy and still sometimes performed at festive times.
HOSPITAL SHIP.—An auxiliary vessel specially designed for the
reception of sick and wounded men; by nature of her duties and under rules
of International Law she is immune from attack.
HULL.—The body, framework, and plating of a vessel.
HURRICANE DECK.—In large steamships a light upper deck
extending across the vessel amidships.
HYDRO-AEROPLANE.—A seaplane. (q.v.)
HYDROPLANE.—A type of boat the flattened keel of which is so
constructed that, after a certain speed has been attained, the hull rises in the
water and skims lightly over the surface, thus driving forward above rather
than through the water. The hydroplane cannot rise into the air and fly.
IDLERS.—Those, being liable to constant duty by day, who are not
required to keep the night watches, such as carpenters, sail-makers, etc.,
also called “Daymen.”
JACK-STAFF.—A flagpole for flying the Union Jack, invariably at
the bows of the ship.
KEEL.—That portion of a ship running fore and aft in the middle of a
ship’s bottom.
KEEL-PLATE.—The lowest plate of all in the keel; this plate is the
first to be laid down when building is commenced.
KNOT.—The unit of speed for ships. A ship is said to be going x
knots, when she is going x sea (or nautical) miles in one hour. One sea mile
= 6,080 ft.
N.B.—The word knot should never be used to indicate distance.
KRUPP STEEL.—Steel hardened by a special process discovered and
applied at Essen.

LABOUR.—When a vessel pitches or strains in a heavy sea she is said
to “labour.”
LANDLOCKED.—Sheltered on all sides by the land.
LARBOARD.—The old term for port. (q.v.)
LATITUDE.—Distance north or south of the equator, expressed in
degrees.
LAUNCH.—To place a ship in the water for the first time.
LAY DOWN.—To commence building a ship.
LEE.—Or Leeward (pronounced Loo’ard). The side of a vessel
opposite to that upon which the wind blows.
LIGHTER.—A powerful hull or barge with a flat bottom, used for
transporting heavy goods, such as coal, ammunition, etc.
LIST.—A vessel is said to have a list if she heeled temporarily or
permanently to one side.
LOG.—The instrument used to measure a vessel’s speed through the
water. Also the ship’s daily journal.
LONGITUDE.—Distance east or west of a first meridian, expressed in
degrees.
MAGAZINE.—The place on board ship or on shore where
ammunition is stored.
MAN.—To place the right complement of men in a ship or boat to
work her.
MARINE.—A soldier specially trained for sea service. “Soldier and
sailor too.”
MAST.—The tall structure in a ship formerly for the carrying of sail,
but now carrying control stations, fighting tops, and wireless telegraphy
apparatus.
MASTER.—The Captain of a merchant vessel who holds a master’s or
extra master’s certificate.

MINE.—A weapon of war which is placed in the sea by the enemy,
and explodes on a ship striking it; or can be fired from the shore or ship by
means of an electric current.
MINEFIELD.—A space near a harbour specially devoted to mining
operations.
MINE-LAYER.—A ship specially fitted to lay mines out.
MINE-SWEEPER.—A ship whose duty it is to discover and destroy
the enemy’s mines in order to leave a clear passage for friendly craft.
MOLE.—A stone break-water or sea-wall.
MOOR.—To anchor a ship with two anchors.
MOTHER-SHIP.—A depot ship for torpedo craft, submarines, etc.,
victualling and issuing stores to the crews of the vessels under her
command controlled by her officers.
MUZZLE ENERGY.—The force which is propelling the projectile
when it leaves the gun.
MUZZLE VELOCITY.—The speed at which a projectile is travelling
when it leaves the gun.
NAUTICAL MILE.—One sixtieth of a degree of latitude. It varies
from 6,046 ft. at the equator to 6,092 ft. in lat. 60° N. or S. The nautical
mile for speed trials, generally called the Admiralty Measured Mile, = 6,080
ft., 1.151 statute miles, 1,833 metres.
NAVIGATION.—That branch of science which teaches the sailor to
conduct his ship from place to place.
NAVY LEAGUE, THE.—A strictly non-party organisation formed in
January, 1895, with Admiral of the Fleet, Sir G. Phipps Hornby, G.C.B.,
etc., as its first President, for the purpose of urging upon the Government
and the electorate the paramount importance of a supreme Fleet as the best
guarantee of peace.
Its agencies are employed in all parts of the Empire spreading
information on matters affecting the Royal Navy.

NUCLEUS CREW.—The essential part of a crew of a ship such as the
gun-layers, petty officers, etc. Some ships are manned by nucleus crews
only, being completed to full strength in case of mobilisation. Such ships
are sometimes colloquially known as “Nucoloid.”
OAKUM.—The substance to which old ropes are reduced when
unpicked.
OCEAN GOING DESTROYER.—A large type of torpedo boat
destroyer, specially designed for service in any wind or weather.
ORDNANCE.—A general term applied to guns collectively, and to the
Department concerned with them.
ORLOP DECK.—The lowest deck in the ship.
PAY OFF.—To end a “Commission.”
PENDANT OR PENNANT.—A long, pointed flag.
Paying-off Pennant.—A long streamer hoisted at the
mainmast of a war vessel to denote she is “paying off.”
POOP.—An extra deck on the after part of a vessel.
PORT.—The left-hand side of the ship as you stand looking forward.
PRIMARY (or main) ARMAMENT.—The largest guns mounted in a
ship.
PRIZE.—In war time, any vessel taken at sea from an enemy.
PROJECTED.—A ship is said to be “projected” before keel plate is
actually laid.
PROTECTIVE DECK.—See “Armoured Deck.”
PROW.—The beak or pointed cutwater of a ship.
Q.F. GUN.—Quick-firing gun. A gun the cartridge of which is
contained in a metal cylinder, as opposed to the B.L. gun.
QUARTERS.—A term indicating those portions of a vessel
immediately on either side of her stern (q.v.). Differentiated in association
with the terms “Port” or “Starboard.” “Quarters” also designates the living
space for the personnel and the stations of the crew when in action.

RAKE.—The inclination of the mast (or funnels) from the
perpendicular; the “rake” is very nearly always in a direction aft, but when
the mast slants forward it is said to have a “Forward rake.”
RAKISH.—Having a smart or fast appearance. (Applied to ships.)
RANGE.—The distance in yards of the object fired at. The extreme
range is the longest distance to which a projectile can be fired by any
particular gun.
RANGE-FINDER.—An instrument used for determining ranges.
RATE.—The classification of a vessel for certain purposes.
RATLINES.—Small lines crossing the shrouds of a ship and thus
forming ladders.
REFIT.—To place a ship in dockyard hands for overhauling her
machinery, etc.
REPAIR SHOP.—A Fleet auxiliary (q.v.) which is fitted with a
foundry, etc. on board, and can carry out minor repair work.
RIBS.—The timbers which form the skeleton of a ship or boat.
RICOCHET.—A leap or bound such as a flat piece of stone makes
when thrown obliquely along the surface of the water. Generally spoken of
with reference to projectiles. A “ricochet hit” is made when a projectile hits
the enemy or target after it has first struck the water.
RIG.—The rig of a vessel is the manner in which her masts and sails
are fitted to her hull.
RIGGING.—The system of ropes in a vessel whereby the masts are
supported and the sails hoisted. There are two kinds of rigging, viz.,
standing rigging and running rigging, the latter term including all movable
ropes.
ROLL.—The oscillation of a vessel in a heavy sea.
SAG.—A drooping or depression. A ship is said to sag when her centre
tends to droop below the line joining her stem and stern; the opposite to
hogging.
SALVO.—A discharge of fire from several guns simultaneously.

SCOUT.—A light, swift, protected cruiser specially adapted for
scouting work.
SCREENING CRUISERS.—Cruisers separated from the battle fleet
to deceive the enemy as to the Fleet’s position.
SEAPLANE.—The official naval designation of the Hydro-aeroplane
which is a man-carrying apparatus equally capable of flight in the air and
navigation on water. Also called Navyplane, Waterplane, Flying-Boat,
Airboat.
SEARCH, RIGHT OF.—The right to search neutral vessels for the
discovery of contraband.
SECONDARY ARMAMENT.—The guns which support the primary
armament.
SHEET.—The rope attached to a sail so that it can be “worked” as
occasion demands.
SHROUDS.—Strong ropes (generally wire) which support the mast
laterally.
SLIP.—The wooden “way” on which a ship is built.
SPEED TRIALS.—Trials carried out periodically to test a vessel’s
speed.
SQUADRON.—A number of ships under command of a single officer.
STANCHION.—An upright post supporting the deck above in a ship.
STARBOARD.—The right-hand side of the ship as you stand looking
forward.
STAYS.—Strong ropes supporting spars and masts in a ship.
STEM.—The “nose” or “cutwater” of any ship.
STERN.—The aftermost part of a vessel.
STRAKE.—A line of planking extending the length of a vessel.
STRATEGY.—The disposition and handling of Squadrons or Fleets to
dominate the forces of an enemy or control the time or place of an
engagement. The broad disposition of naval forces.