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Title: The Prince

Author: Niccolò Machiavelli

Translator: Luigi Ricci

Release date: April 23, 2018 [eBook #57037]
Most recently updated: November 16, 2022

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/57037

Credits: Marc D’Hooghe

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PRINCE
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THE PRINCE
BY

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY

LUIGI RICCI

HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW
NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN
BOMBAY CALCUTTA AND MADRAS

1909

PREFACE

Of all Machiavelli's works The Prince is undoubtedly the greatest; and a
new English edition of it is likely to be welcome to all those who have not
the advantage of reading it in the classical Italian original.
For a true appreciation of Machiavelli, impossible in a brief Preface, I must
refer the English reader to Macaulay's Essay on the Italian historian and
statesman.[1] In it he will see how our Author's ideas and work were
wrongfully and wilfully misinterpreted by the very men who, while
profiting by his wisdom, have with great ingratitude criticised the statesman
and defamed his name, as that of the inventor of the worst political system
ever imagined. Yet, as his whole life was an indefatigable and unremitting
endeavour to secure for his native Florence a good and popular government,
and as he lost his great office of Secretary to the Florentine Republic on
account of his avowed liberal opinions, it is not only unjust but ridiculous to
accuse him of helping tyrants to enslave the people. What he did was to
show in the most deliberate and in the plainest way the arts by which free

peoples were made slaves; and, had his words of advice been always
heeded, no tyrant in Italy or elsewhere could have been successful in his
policy. That he was not listened to, and his advice scorned and spurned, was
not Machiavelli's fault.
Those who still share the opinion of his interested detractors should read his
private correspondence with the leaders of liberal ideas in Italy—many of
his letters being still left unpublished in the MS. Collection of Giuliano
Ricci in the National Library, in the Riccardiana Library (No. 2467), in the
Government Archives (Strozzi, Nos. 133 and 1028) of Florence, in the
Barberini Library, and in the Collezione Gonnelli of the Palatine Library in
Rome.
LUIGI RICCI.
22 ALBEMARLE STREET,
LONDON, W.
[1] "Machiavelli" by Thomas Babington Macaulay is available at Project
Gutenberg in Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 1, ebook
55901.]

CONTENTS

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI TO LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT

Chapter
1. The various kinds of Government and the ways by which they are
established.
2. Of Hereditary Monarchies.
3. Of Mixed Monarchies.
4. Why the Kingdom of Darius, occupied by Alexander, did not rebel
against the successors of the latter after his death.
5. The way to govern Cities or Dominions that, previous to being
occupied, lived under their own Laws.

6. Of New Dominions which have been acquired by one's own Arms
and Powers.
7. Of New Dominions acquired by the Power of others or by Fortune.
8. Of those who have attained the position of Prince by villainy.
9. Of the Civic Principality.
10. How the strength of all States should be measured.
11. Of Ecclesiastical Principalities.
12. The different kinds of Militia and Mercenary Soldiers.
13. Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops
14. What the duties of a Prince are with regard to the Militia.
15. Of the things for which Men, and especially Princes, are praised or
blamed.
16. Of Liberality and Niggardliness.
17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better to be loved or
feared.
18. In what way Princes must keep faith.
19. That we must avoid being despised and hated.
20. Whether Fortresses and other things which Princes often make are
useful or injurious.
21. How a Prince must act in order to gain reputation.
22. Of the Secretaries of Princes.
23. How Flatterers must be shunned.
24. Why the Princes of Italy have lost their States.
25. How much Fortune can do in human affairs, and how it may be
opposed.
26. Exhortation to liberate Italy from the Barbarians.

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI

TO

LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT

SON OF PIERO DI MEDICI

It is customary for those who wish to gain the favour of a prince to
endeavour to do so by offering him gifts of those things which they hold
most precious, or in which they know him to take especial delight. In this
way princes are often presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, gems, and
such-like ornaments worthy of their grandeur. In my desire, however, to
offer to Your Highness some humble testimony of my devotion, I have been
unable to find among my possessions anything which I hold so dear or
esteem so highly as that knowledge of the deeds of great men which I have
acquired through a long experience of modern events and a constant study
of the past.
The results of my long observations and reflections are recorded in the little
volume which I now offer to Your Highness: and although I deem this work
unworthy of Your Highness's notice, yet my confidence in your humanity
assures me that you will accept it, knowing that it is not in my power to
offer you a greater gift than that of enabling you to understand in the
shortest possible time all those things which I have learnt through danger
and suffering in the course of many years. I have not sought to adorn my
work with long phrases or high-sounding words or any of those allurements
and ornaments with which many writers seek to embellish their books, as I
desire no honour for my work but such as its truth and the gravity of its
subject may justly deserve. Nor will it, I trust, be deemed presumptuous on
the part of a man of humble and obscure condition to attempt to discuss and
criticise the government of princes; for in the same way that landscape
painters station themselves in the valleys in order to draw mountains or
elevated ground, and ascend an eminence in order to get a good view of the
plains, so it is necessary to be a prince to be able to know thoroughly the
nature of a people, and to know the nature of princes one must be one of the
populace.

May I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will accept this little gift in the
spirit in which it is offered; and if Your Highness will deign to peruse it,
you will recognise in it my ardent desire that you may attain to that
grandeur which fortune and your own merits presage for you.
And should Your Highness gaze down from the summit of that eminence
towards this humble spot, you will recognise the great and unmerited
sufferings inflicted on me by a cruel fate.

THE PRINCE

CHAPTER I

THE VARIOUS KINDS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE WAYS BY
WHICH THEY ARE ESTABLISHED

All states and dominions which hold or have held sway over mankind are
either republics or monarchies. Monarchies are either hereditary ones, in
which the rulers have been for many years of the same family, or else they
are those of recent foundation. The newly founded ones are either entirely
new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or else they are, as it were, new
members grafted on to the hereditary possessions of the prince that annexes
them, as is the kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain. The dominions thus
acquired have either been previously accustomed to the rule of another
prince, or else have been free states, and they are annexed either by force of
arms of the prince, or of others, or else fall to him by good fortune or merit.

CHAPTER II

OF HEREDITARY MONARCHIES

I will not here speak of republics, having already treated of them fully in
another place. I will deal only with monarchies, and will show how the
various kinds described above can be governed and maintained. In the first
place, in hereditary states accustomed to the reigning family the difficulty
of maintaining them is far less than in new monarchies; for it is sufficient
not to exceed the ancestral usages, and to accommodate one's self to
accidental circumstances; in this way such a prince, if of ordinary ability,
will always be able to maintain his position, unless some very exceptional
and excessive force deprives him of it; and even if he be thus deprived of it,
on the slightest misfortune happening to the new occupier, he will be able to
regain it.
We have in Italy the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who was able to
withstand the assaults of the Venetians in the year '84, and of Pope Julius in
the year '10, for no other reason than because of the antiquity of his family
in that dominion. In as much as the legitimate prince has less cause and less
necessity to give offence, it is only natural that he should be more loved;
and, if no extraordinary vices make him hated, it is only reasonable for his
subjects to be naturally attached to him, the memories and causes of
innovations being forgotten in the long period over which his rule has
existed; whereas one change always leaves the way prepared for the
introduction of another.

CHAPTER III

OF MIXED MONARCHIES

But it is in the new monarchy that difficulties really exist. Firstly, if it is not
entirely new, but a member as it were of a mixed state, its disorders spring
at first from a natural difficulty which exists in all new dominions, because
men change masters willingly, hoping to better themselves; and this belief
makes them take arms against their rulers, in which they are deceived, as
experience shows them that they have gone from bad to worse. This is the
result of another very natural cause, which is the necessary harm inflicted
on those over whom the prince obtains dominion, both by his soldiers and

by an infinite number of other injuries unavoidably caused by his
occupation.
Thus you find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying
that dominion, and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who have
helped you to obtain this possession, as you will not be able to fulfil their
expectations, nor can you use strong measures with them, being under an
obligation to them; for which reason, however strong your armies may be,
you will always need the favour of the inhabitants to take possession of a
province. It was from these causes that Louis XII. of France, though able to
occupy Milan without trouble, immediately lost it, and the forces of
Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it from him the first time, for the
inhabitants who had willingly opened their gates to him, finding themselves
deluded in the hopes they had cherished and not obtaining those benefits
that they had anticipated, could not bear the vexatious rule of their new
prince.
It is indeed true that, after reconquering the rebel territories they are not so
easily lost again, for the ruler is now, by the fact of the rebellion, less averse
to secure his position by punishing offenders, investigating any suspicious
circumstances, and strengthening himself in weak places. So that although
the mere appearance of such a person as Duke Ludovico on the frontier was
sufficient to cause France to lose Milan the first time, to make her lose her
grip of it the second time was only possible when all the world was against
her, and after her enemies had been defeated and driven out of Italy; which
was the result of the causes above mentioned. Nevertheless it was taken
from her both the first and the second time. The general causes of the first
loss have been already discussed; it remains now to be seen what were the
causes of the second loss and by what means France could have avoided it,
or what measures might have been taken by another ruler in that position
which were not taken by the King of France. Be it observed, therefore, that
those states which on annexation are united to a previously existing state
may or may not be of the same nationality and language. If they are, it is
very easy to hold them, especially if they are not accustomed to freedom;
and to possess them securely it suffices that the family of the princes which
formerly governed them be extinct. For the rest, their old condition not
being disturbed, and there being no dissimilarity of customs, the people
settle down quietly under their new rulers, as is seen in the case of

Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been so long
united to France; and although there may be some slight differences of
language, the customs of the people are nevertheless similar, and they can
get along well together, and whoever obtains possession of them and wishes
to retain them must bear in mind two things: the one, that the blood of their
old rulers is extinct; the other, to make no alteration either in their laws or in
their taxes; in this way they will in a very short space of time become united
with their old possessions and form one state. But when dominions are
acquired in a province differing in language, laws, and customs, the
difficulties to be overcome are great, and it requires good fortune as well as
great industry to retain them; one of the best and most certain means of
doing so would be for the new ruler to take up his residence in them. This
would render their possession more secure and durable, it is what the Turk
has done in Greece; in spite of all the other measures taken by him to hold
that state, it would not have been possible to retain it had he not gone to live
there. Being on the spot, disorders can be seen as they arise and can quickly
be remedied, but living at a distance, they are only heard of when they get
beyond remedy. Besides which, the province is not despoiled by your
officials, the subjects are pleased with the easy accessibility of their prince;
and wishing to be loyal they have more reason to love him, and should they
be otherwise they will have greater cause to fear him.
Any external Power who wishes to assail that state will be less disposed to
do so; so that as long as he resides there he will be very hard to dispossess.
The other and better remedy is to plant colonies in one or two of those
places which form as it were the keys of the land, for it is necessary either
to do this or to maintain a large force of armed men. The colonies will cost
the prince little; with little or no expense on his part, he can send and
maintain them; he only injures those whose lands and houses are taken to
give to the new inhabitants, and these form but a small proportion of the
state, and those who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never do
any harm to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not injured and
therefore easily pacified; and, on the other, are fearful of offending lest they
should be treated like those who have been dispossessed of their property.
To conclude, these colonies cost nothing, are more faithful, and give less
offence; and the injured parties being poor and scattered are unable to do
mischief, as I have shown. For it must be noted, that men must either be
caressed or else annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small injuries,

but cannot do so for great ones; the injury therefore that we do to a man
must be such that we need not fear his vengeance. But by maintaining a
garrison instead of colonists, one will spend much more, and consume in
guarding it all the revenues of that state, so that the acquisition will result in
a loss, besides giving much greater offence, since it injures every one in that
state with the quartering of the army on it; which being an inconvenience
felt** by all, every one becomes an enemy, and these are enemies which
can do mischief, as, though beaten, they remain in their own homes. In
every way, therefore, a garrison is as useless as colonies are useful. Further,
the ruler of a foreign province as described, should make himself the leader
and defender of his less powerful neighbours, and endeavour to weaken the
stronger ones, and take care that his possessions are not entered by some
foreigner not less powerful than himself, who will always intervene at the
request of those who are discontented either through ambition or fear, as
was seen when the Ætoli invited the Romans into Greece; and in whatever
province they entered, it was always at the request of the inhabitants. And
the rule is that when a powerful foreigner enters a province, all the less
powerful inhabitants become his adherents, moved by the envy they bear to
those ruling over them; so much so that with regard to these minor
potentates he has no trouble whatever in winning them over, for they
willingly join forces with the state that he has acquired. He has merely to be
careful that they do not assume too much power and authority, and he can
easily with his own forces and their favour put down those that are powerful
and remain in everything the arbiter of that province. And he who does not
govern well in this way will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he
holds it will meet with infinite difficulty and trouble.
The Romans in the provinces they took, always followed this policy; they
established colonies, flattered the less powerful without increasing their
strength, put down the most powerful and did not allow foreign rulers to
obtain influence in them. I will let the single province of Greece suffice as
an example. They made friends with the Achæi and the Ætoli, the kingdom
of Macedonia was cast down, and Antiochus driven out, nor did they allow
the merits of the Achæi or the Ætoli to gain them any increase of territory,
nor did the persuasions of Philip induce them to befriend him without
lowering him, nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to
allow him to hold any state in that province.

For the Romans did in this case what all wise princes should do, who look
not only at present dangers but also at future ones and diligently guard
against them; for being foreseen they can easily be remedied, but if one
waits till they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady
has become incurable; it happening with this as with those hectic fevers
spoken of by doctors, which at their beginning are easy to cure but difficult
to recognise, but in course of time when they have not at first been
recognised and treated, become easy to recognise and difficult to cure. Thus
it happens in matters of state; for knowing afar off (which it is only given to
a prudent man to do) the evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But
when, for want of such knowledge, they are allowed to grow so that every
one can recognise them, there is no longer any remedy to be found.
However, the Romans, observing these disorders while yet remote, were
always able to find a remedy, and never allowed them to proceed in order to
avoid a war; for they knew that war was not to be avoided, and could be
deferred only to the advantage of the other side; they therefore declared war
against Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not to have to fight them in
Italy, though they might at the time have avoided either; this they did not
choose to do, never caring to do that which is now every day to be heard in
the mouths of our wise men, to enjoy the benefits of time, but preferring
those of their own virtue and prudence, for time brings with it all things,
and may produce indifferently either good or evil. But let us return to
France and examine whether she did any of these things; and I will speak
not of Charles, but of Louis as the one whose proceedings can be better
seen, as he held possession in Italy for a longer time; you will then see that
he did the opposite of all those things which must be done to keep
possession of a foreign state. King Louis was called into Italy by the
ambition of the Venetians, who wished by his coming to gain half of
Lombardy. I will not blame the king for coming nor for the part he took,
because wishing to plant his foot in Italy, and not having friends in the
country, on the contrary the conduct of King Charles having caused all
doors to be closed to him, he was forced to accept what friendships he could
find, and his schemes would have quickly been successful if he had made
no mistakes in his other proceedings.
The king then having acquired Lombardy regained immediately the
reputation lost by Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his
friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and Bentivogli, the

Lady of Furlì, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and
Piombino, the inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Sienna, all approached
him with offers of friendship. The Venetians might then have seen the
effects of their temerity, how to gain a few lands in Lombardy they had
made the king ruler over two-thirds of Italy. Consider how little difficulty
the king would have had in maintaining his reputation in Italy if he had
observed the rules above given, and kept a firm and sure hold over all those
friends of his, who being many in number, and weak, and fearful one of the
Church, another of the Venetians, were always obliged to hold fast to him,
and by whose aid he could easily make sure of any who were still great. But
he was hardly in Milan before he did exactly the opposite, by giving aid to
Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. Nor did he perceive that, in taking
this course, he weakened himself, by casting off his friends and those who
had placed themselves at his disposal, and strengthened the Church by
adding to the spiritual power, which gives it such authority, further temporal
powers. And having made the first mistake, he was obliged to follow it up,
whilst, to put a stop to the ambition of Alexander and prevent him
becoming ruler of Tuscany, he was forced to come to Italy. And not content
with having increased the power of the Church and lost his friends, he now
desiring the kingdom of Naples, divided it with the king of Spain; and
where he alone was the arbiter of Italy, he now brought in a companion, so
that the ambitious of that province who were dissatisfied with him might
have some one else to appeal to; and where he might have left in that
kingdom a king tributary to him, he dispossessed him in order to bring in
another who was capable of driving him out. The desire to acquire
possessions is a very natural and ordinary thing, and when those men do it
who can do so successfully, they are always praised and not blamed, but
when they cannot and yet want to do so at all costs, they make a mistake
deserving of great blame. If France, therefore, with her own forces could
have taken Naples, she ought to have done so; if she could not she ought
not to have divided it. And if the partition of Lombardy with the Venetians
is to be excused, as having been the means of allowing the French king to
set foot in Italy, this other partition deserves blame, not having the excuse
of necessity. Louis had thus made these five mistakes: he had crushed the
smaller Powers, increased the power in Italy of one ruler, brought into the
land a very powerful foreigner, and he had not come to live there himself,
nor had he established any colonies. Still these mistakes might, if he had

lived, not have injured him, had he not made the sixth, that of taking the
state from the Venetians; for, if he had not strengthened the Church and
brought the Spaniards into Italy, it would have been right and necessary to
humble them; having once taken those measures, he ought never to have
consented to their ruin; because, had the Venetians been strong, it would
have kept the others from making attempts on Lombardy, partly because the
Venetians would not have consented to any measures by which they did not
get it for themselves, and partly because the others would not have wanted
to take it from France to give it to Venice, and would not have had the
courage to attack both.
If any one urges that King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the
kingdom to Spain in order to avoid war, I reply, with the reasons already
given, that one ought never to allow a disorder to take place in order to
avoid war, for war is not thereby avoided, but only deferred to your
disadvantage. And if others allege the promise given by the king to the pope
to undertake that enterprise for him, in return for the dissolution of his
marriage and for the cardinalship of Rohan, I reply with what I shall say
later on about the faith of princes and how it is to be observed. Thus King
Louis lost Lombardy through not observing any of those conditions which
have been observed by others who have taken provinces and wished to
retain them. Nor is this any miracle, but very reasonable and natural. I
spoke of this matter with Cardinal Rohan at Nantes when Valentine, as
Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called, was
occupying the Romagna, for on Cardinal Rohan saying to me that the
Italians did not understand war, I replied that the French did not understand
politics, for if they did they would never allow the Church to become so
great. And experience shows us that the greatness in Italy of the Church and
also of Spain have been caused by France, and her ruin has proceeded from
them. From which may be drawn a general rule, which never or very rarely
fails, that whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful, is ruined
himself; for that power is produced by him either through craft or force; and
both of these are suspected by the one that has become powerful.

CHAPTER IV

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, OCCUPIED BY ALEXANDER,
DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF THE LATTER
AFTER HIS DEATH.

Considering the difficulties there are in holding a newly acquired state,
some may wonder how it came to pass that Alexander the Great became
master of Asia in a few years, and had hardly occupied it when he died,
from which it might be supposed that the whole state would have rebelled.
However, his successors maintained themselves in possession, and had no
further difficulty in doing so than those which arose among themselves
from their own ambitions.
I reply that the kingdoms known to history have been governed in two
ways: either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and
permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince and by barons, who
hold their positions not by favour of the ruler but by antiquity of blood.
Such barons have states and subjects of their own, who recognise them as
their lords, and are naturally attached to them. In those states which are
governed by a prince and his servants, the prince possesses more authority,
because there is no one in the state regarded as a superior besides himself,
and if others are obeyed it is merely as ministers and officials of the prince,
and no one regards them with any special affection. Examples of these two
kinds of government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France.
All the Turkish monarchy is governed by one ruler, the others are his
servants, and dividing his kingdom into "sangiacates," he sends to them
various administrators, and changes or recalls them at his pleasure. But the
King of France is surrounded by a large number of ancient nobles,
recognised as such by their subjects, and loved by them; they have their
prerogatives, which the king cannot deprive them of without danger to
himself. Whoever now considers these two states will see that it would be
difficult to acquire the state of the Turk; but having conquered it, it would
be very easy to hold it.
The causes of the difficulty of occupying the Turkish kingdom are, that the
invader could not be invited by princes of that kingdom, nor hope to
facilitate his enterprise by the rebellion of those around him, as will be
evident from reasons given above. Because, being all slaves, and bound, it
will be more difficult to corrupt them, and even if they were corrupted, little

effect could be hoped for, as they would not be able to carry the people with
them for the reasons mentioned. Therefore, whoever assaults the Turk must
be prepared to meet his united forces, and must rely more on his own
strength than on the disorders of others; but having once conquered him,
and beaten him in battle so that he can no longer raise armies, nothing else
is to be feared except the family of the prince, and if this is extinguished,
there is no longer any one to be feared, the others having no credit with the
people; and as the victor before the victory could place no hope in them, so
he need not fear them afterwards. The contrary is the case in kingdoms
governed like that of France, because it is easy to enter them by winning
over some baron of the kingdom, there being always some malcontents, and
those desiring innovations. These can, for the reasons stated, open the way
to you and facilitate victory; but afterwards, if you wish to keep possession,
infinite difficulties arise, both from those who have aided you and from
those you have oppressed. Nor is it sufficient to extinguish the family of the
prince, for there remain those nobles who will make themselves the head of
new changes, and being neither able to content them nor exterminate them,
you will lose the state whenever an occasion arises. Now if you will
consider what was the nature of the government of Darius you will find it
similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore Alexander had first to
completely overthrow it and seize the country, after which victory, Darius
being dead, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the reasons
discussed above. And his successors, had they remained united, might have
enjoyed it in peace, nor did any tumults arise in the kingdom except those
fomented by themselves. But it is impossible to possess with such ease
countries constituted like France.
Hence arose the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece against
the Romans, owing to the numerous principalities which existed in those
states; for, as long as the memory of these lasted, the Romans were always
uncertain of their possessions; but when the memory of these principalities
had been extinguished they became, with the power and duration of the
empire, secure possessions.
And afterwards the latter could, when fighting among themselves, draw
each one with him a portion of these provinces, according to the authority
he had established there, and these provinces, when the family of their
ancient princes was extinct, recognised no other rulers but the Romans.

Considering these things, therefore, let no one be surprised at the facility
with which Alexander could hold Asia, and at the difficulties that others
have had in holding acquired possessions, like Pyrrhus and many others; as
this was not caused by the greater or smaller ability of the conqueror, but
depended on the dissimilarity of the conditions.

CHAPTER V

THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR DOMINIONS THAT,
PREVIOUS TO BEING OCCUPIED, LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN
LAWS.

When those states which have been acquired are accustomed to live at
liberty under their own laws, there are three ways of holding them. The first
is to ruin them; the second is to go and live there in person; the third is to
allow them to live under their own laws, taking tribute of them, and creating
there within the country a state composed of a few who will keep it friendly
to you. Because this state, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot
exist without his friendship and protection, and will do all it can to keep
them, and a city used to liberty can be more easily held by means of its
citizens than in any other way, if you wish to preserve it. There is the
example of the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and
Thebes by creating within them a state of a few people; nevertheless they
lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
destroyed them, but did not lose them. They wanted to hold Greece in
almost the same way as the Spartans held it, leaving it free and under its
own laws, but they did not succeed; so that they were compelled to destroy
many cities in that province in order to keep it, because in truth there is no
sure method of holding them except by ruining them. And whoever
becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy it, can expect to be
destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive for rebellion in the name of
liberty and of its ancient usages, which are forgotten neither by lapse of
time nor by benefits received, and whatever one does or provides, so long
as the inhabitants are not separated or dispersed, they do not forget that

name and those usages, but appeal to them at once in every emergency, as
did Pisa after being so many years held in servitude by the Florentines. But
when cities or provinces have been accustomed to live under a prince, and
the family of that prince is extinguished, being on the one hand used to
obey, and on the other not having their old prince, they cannot unite in
choosing one from among themselves, and they do not know how to live in
freedom, so that they are slower to take arms, and a prince can win them
over with greater facility and establish himself securely. But in republics
there is greater life, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance; they do
not and cannot cast aside the memory of their ancient liberty, so that the
surest way is either to destroy them or reside in them.

CHAPTER VI

OF NEW DOMINIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED BY
ONE'S OWN ARMS AND POWERS

Let no one marvel if in speaking of new dominions both as to prince and
state, I bring forward very exalted instances, for as men walk almost always
in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their actions by imitation, and
not being always able to follow others exactly, nor attain to the excellence
of those they imitate, a prudent man should always follow in the path
trodden by great men and imitate those who are most excellent, so that if he
does not attain to their greatness, at any rate he will get some tinge of it. He
will do like prudent archers, who when the place they wish to hit is too far
off, knowing how far their bow will carry, aim at a spot much higher than
the one they wish to hit, not in order to reach this height with their arrow,
but by help of this high aim to hit the spot they wish to. I say then that in
new dominions, where there is a new prince, it is more or less easy to hold
them according to the greater or lesser ability of him who acquires them.
And as the fact of a private individual becoming a prince presupposes either
great ability or good fortune, it would appear that either of these things
would mitigate in part many difficulties. Nevertheless those who have been
wanting as regards good fortune have maintained themselves best. The

matter is also facilitated by the prince being obliged to reside personally in
his territory, having no others. But to come to those who have become
princes through their own merits and not by fortune, I regard as the greatest,
Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like. And although one should
not speak of Moses, he having merely carried out what was ordered him by
God, still he deserves admiration, if only for that grace which made him
worthy to speak with God. But regarding Cyrus and others who have
acquired or founded kingdoms, they will all be found worthy of admiration;
and if their particular actions and methods are examined they will not
appear very different from those of Moses, although he had so great a
Master. And in examining their life and deeds it will be seen that they owed
nothing to fortune but the opportunity which gave them matter to be shaped
into the form that they thought fit; and without that opportunity their
powers would have been wasted, and without their powers the opportunity
would have come in vain. It was thus necessary that Moses should find the
people of Israel slaves in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that
they were disposed to follow him in order to escape from their servitude. It
was necessary that Romulus should be unable to remain in Alba, and should
have been exposed at his birth, in order that he might become King of
Rome and founder of that nation. It was necessary that Cyrus should find
the Persians discontented with the empire of the Medes, and the Medes
weak and effeminate through long peace. Theseus could not have showed
his abilities if he had not found the Athenians dispersed.
These opportunities, therefore, gave these men their chance, and their own
great qualities enabled them to profit by them, so as to ennoble their
country and augment its fortunes. Those who by heroic means such as these
become princes, obtain their dominions with difficulty but retain them
easily, and the difficulties which they have in acquiring their dominions
arise in part from the new rules and regulations that they have to introduce
in order to establish their position securely. It must be considered that there
is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor
more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the
reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only
lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this
lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the
laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not
truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.

Thus it arises that on every opportunity for attacking the reformer, his
opponents do so with the zeal of partisans, the others only defend him half-
heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger. It is necessary,
however, in order to investigate thoroughly this question, to examine
whether these innovators are independent, or whether they depend upon
others, that is to say, whether in order to carry out their designs they have to
entreat or are able to force. In the first case they invariably succeed ill, and
accomplish nothing; but when they can depend on their own strength and
are able to use force, they rarely fail. Thus it comes about that all armed
prophets have conquered and unarmed ones failed; for besides what has
been already said, the character of people varies, and it is easy to persuade
them of a thing, but difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And so it is
necessary to order things so that when they no longer believe, they can be
made to believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not
have been able to make their institutions observed for so long had they been
disarmed, as happened in our own time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who
failed entirely in his new rules when the multitude began to disbelieve in
him, and he had no means of holding fast those who had believed nor of
compelling the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such men as these have
great difficulty in making their way, and all their dangers are met on the
road and must be overcome by their own abilities; but when once they have
overcome them and have begun to be held in veneration, and have
suppressed those who envied them, they remain powerful and secure,
honoured and happy. To the high examples given I will add a lesser one,
which, however, is to be compared in some measure with them and will
serve as an instance of all such cases, that of Jerone of Syracuse, who from
a private individual became Prince of Siracusa, without other aid from
fortune beyond the opportunity; for the Siracusans being oppressed elected
him as their captain, from which by merit he was made prince; while still in
private life his virtues were such that it was written of him, that he lacked
nothing to reign but the kingdom. He abolished the old militia, raised a new
one, abandoned his old friendships and formed new ones; and as he had
thus friends and soldiers of his own, he was able on this foundation to build
securely, so that while he had great trouble in acquiring his position he had
little in maintaining it.

CHAPTER VII

OF NEW DOMINIONS ACQUIRED BY THE POWER OF OTHERS
OR BY FORTUNE

Those who rise from private citizens to be princes merely by fortune have
little trouble in rising but very much in maintaining their position. They
meet with no difficulties on the way as they fly over them, but all their
difficulties arise when they are established. Such are they who are granted a
state either for money, or by favour of him who grants it, as happened to
many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, who were
created princes by Darius in order to hold these places for his security and
glory; such were also those emperors who from private citizens became
emperors by bribing the army. Such as these depend absolutely on the good
will and fortune of those who have raised them, both of which are
extremely inconstant and unstable. They neither know how to, nor are in a
position to maintain their rank, for unless he be a man of great genius it is
not likely that one who has always lived in a private position should know
how to command, and they are unable to command because they possess no
forces which will be friendly and faithful to them. Moreover, states quickly
founded, like all other things which are born and grow rapidly, cannot have
deep roots, so that the first storm destroys them, unless, as already said, the
man who thus becomes a prince is of such great genius as to be able to take
immediate steps for maintaining what fortune has thrown into his lap, and
lay afterwards those foundations which others make before becoming
princes. With regard to these two methods of becoming a prince,—by
ability or by good fortune, I will here adduce two examples which have
taken place within our memory, those of Francesco Sforza and Cesare
Borgia.
Francesco, by appropriate means and through great abilities, from citizen
became Duke of Milan, and what he had attained after a thousand
difficulties he maintained with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare
Borgia, commonly called Duke Valentine, acquired the state through the
fortune of his father and by the same means lost it, and that although every
measure was adopted by him and everything done that a prudent and
capable man could do to establish himself firmly in that state that the arms
and the favours of others had given him. For, as we have said, he who does

not lay his foundations beforehand may by great abilities do so afterwards,
although with great trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,
then, one considers the progress made by the duke, it will be seen how firm
were the foundations he had laid to his future power, which I do not think it
superfluous to examine, as I know of no better precepts for a new prince to
follow than the example of his actions; and if his measures were not
successful, it was through no fault of his own but only by the most
extraordinary malignity of fortune. In wishing to aggrandise the duke his
son, Alexander VI. had to meet very great difficulties both present and
future. In the first place, he saw no way of making him ruler of any state
that was not a possession of the Church. And in attempting to take that of
the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not
consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the protection of
the Venetians. He saw, moreover, that the arms of Italy, especially of those
who might have served him, were in the hands of those who would fear the
greatness of the pope, and therefore he could not depend upon them, being
all under the Orsinis and Colonnas and their adherents. It was, therefore,
necessary to disturb the existing condition and bring about disorders in the
states of Italy in order to obtain secure mastery over a part of them; this was
easy, for he found the Venetians, who, actuated by other motives, had
invited the French into Italy, which he not only did not oppose, but
facilitated by dissolving the marriage of King Louis. The king came thus
into Italy with the aid of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander, and
had hardly arrived at Milan before the pope obtained troops from him for
his enterprise in the Romagna, which he carried out by means of the
reputation of the king. The duke having thus obtained the Romagna and
defeated the Colonnas, was hindered in maintaining it and proceeding
further by two things: the one, his forces, of which he doubted the fidelity;
the other the will of France, that is to say, he feared lest the arms of the
Orsini of which he had availed himself should fail him, and not only hinder
him in obtaining more but take from him what he had already conquered,
and he also feared that the king might do the same. He had evidence of this
as regards the Orsini when, after taking Faenza, he assaulted Bologna and
observed their backwardness in the assault. And as regards the king, he
perceived his designs when, after taking the dukedom of Urbino, he
attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from that enterprise;
whereupon the duke decided to depend no longer on the fortunes and arms

of others. The first thing he did was to weaken the parties of the Orsinis and
Colonnas in Rome by gaining all their adherents who were gentlemen and
making them followers of himself, by granting them large pensions, and
appointing them to commands and offices according to their rank, so that
their attachment to their parties was extinguished in a few months, and
entirely concentrated on the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity for
crushing the Orsinis, having dispersed the adherents of the Colonna family,
and when the opportunity arrived he made good use of it, for the Orsini
seeing at length that the greatness of the duke and of the Church meant their
own ruin, convoked a diet at Magione in the Perugino. Hence sprang the
rebellion of Urbino and the tumults in Romagna and infinite dangers to the
duke, who overcame them all with the help of the French; and having
regained his reputation, neither trusting France nor other foreign forces in
order not to have to oppose them, he had recourse to stratagem. He
dissembled his aims so well that the Orsini, through the mediation of Signor
Pavolo, made their peace with him, which the duke spared no efforts to
make secure, presenting them with robes, money, and horses, so that in their
simplicity they were induced to come to Sinigaglia and fell into his hands.
Having thus suppressed these leaders and made their partisans his friends,
the duke had laid a very good foundation to his power, having all the
Romagna with the duchy of Urbino, and having gained the favour of the
inhabitants, who began to feel the benefit of his rule. And as this part is
worthy of note and of imitation by others, I will not omit mention of it.
When he took the Romagna, it had previously been governed by weak
rulers, who had rather despoiled their subjects than governed them, and
given them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the province was
a prey to robbery, assaults, and every kind of disorder. He, therefore, judged
it necessary to give them a good government in order to make them
peaceful and obedient to his rule. For this purpose he appointed Messer
Remiro d' Orco, a cruel and able man, to whom he gave the fullest
authority. This man, in a short time, was highly successful in rendering the
country orderly and united, whereupon the duke, not deeming such
excessive authority expedient, lest it should become hateful, appointed a
civil court of justice in the middle of the province under an excellent
president, to which each city appointed its own advocate. And as he knew
that the harshness of the past had engendered some amount of hatred, in
order to purge the minds of the people and to win them over completely, he

resolved to show that if any cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders,
but through the harsh disposition of his minister. And taking him on some
pretext, he had him placed one morning in the public square at Cesena, cut
in half, with a piece of wood and blood-stained knife by his side. The
ferocity of this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction and
amazement. But to return to where we left off.
The duke being now powerful and partly secured against present perils,
being armed himself, and having in a great measure put down those
neighbouring forces which might injure him, had now to get the respect of
France, if he wished to proceed with his acquisitions, for he knew that the
king, who had lately discovered his error, would not give him any help. He
began therefore to seek fresh alliances and to vacillate with France in the
expedition that the French made towards the kingdom of Naples against the
Spaniards, who were besieging Gaeta. His intention was to assure himself
of them, which he would soon have succeeded in doing if Alexander had
lived. These were the measures taken by him with regard to the present. As
to the future, he feared that a new successor to the Church might not be
friendly to him and might seek to deprive him of what Alexander had given
him, and he sought to provide against this in four ways. Firstly, by
destroying all who were of the blood of those ruling families which he had
despoiled, in order to deprive the pope of any opportunity. Secondly, by
gaining the friendship of the Roman nobles, so that he might through them
hold as it were the pope in check. Thirdly, by obtaining as great a hold on
the College as he could. Fourthly, by acquiring such power before the pope
died as to be able to resist alone the first onslaught. Of these four things he
had at the death of Alexander accomplished three, and the fourth he had
almost accomplished.
For of the dispossessed rulers he killed as many as he could lay hands on,
and very few escaped; he had gained to his party the Roman nobles; and he
had a great share in the College. As to new possessions, he designed to
become lord of Tuscany, and already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and
had assumed the protectorate over Pisa; and as he had no longer to fear the
French (for the French had been deprived of the kingdom of Naples by the
Spaniards in such a way that both parties were obliged to buy his
friendship) he seized Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena at once yielded,
partly through envy of the Florentines and partly through fear; the

Florentines had no resources, so that, had he succeeded as he had done
before, in the very year that Alexander died he would have gained such
strength and renown as to be able to maintain himself without depending on
the fortunes or strength of others, but solely by his own power and ability.
But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn his sword. He left
him with the state of Romagna only firmly established, and all the other
schemes in mid-air, between two very powerful and hostile armies, and
suffering from a fatal illness. But the valour and ability of the duke were
such, and he knew so well how to win over men or vanquish them, and so
strong were the foundations that he had laid in this short time, that if he had
not had those two armies upon him, or else had been in good health, he
would have survived every difficulty. And that his foundations were good is
seen from the fact that the Romagna waited for him more than a month; in
Rome, although half dead, he remained secure, and although the Baglioni,
Vitelli, and Orsini entered Rome they found no followers against him. He
was able, if not to make pope whom he wished, at any rate to prevent a
pope being created whom he did not wish. But if at the death of Alexander
he had been well everything would have been easy. And he told me on the
day that Pope Julius II. was created, that he had thought of everything
which might happen on the death of his father, and provided against
everything, except that he had never thought that at his father's death he
would be dying himself. Reviewing thus all the actions of the duke, I find
nothing to blame, on the contrary, I feel bound, as I have done, to hold him
up as an example to be imitated by all who by fortune and with the arms of
others have risen to power. For with his great courage and high ambition he
could not have acted otherwise, and his designs were only frustrated by the
short life of Alexander and his own illness.
Whoever, therefore, deems it necessary in his new principality to secure
himself against enemies, to gain friends, to conquer by force or fraud, to
make himself beloved and feared by the people, followed and reverenced
by the soldiers, to destroy those who can and may injure him, introduce
innovations into old customs, to be severe and kind, magnanimous and
liberal, suppress the old militia, create a new one, maintain the friendship of
kings and princes in such a way that they are glad to benefit him and fear to
injure him, such a one can find no better example than the actions of this
man. The only thing he can be accused of is that in the creation of Julius II.
he made a bad choice; for, as has been said, not being able to choose his

own pope, he could still prevent any one being made pope, and he ought
never to have permitted any of those cardinals to be raised to the papacy
whom he had injured, or who when pope would stand in fear of him. For
men commit injuries either through fear or through hate.
Those whom he had injured were, among others, San Pietro ad Vincula,
Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. All the others, if assumed to the
pontificate, would have had to fear him except Rohan and the Spaniards;
the latter through their relationship and obligations to him, the former from
his great power, being related to the King of France. For these reasons the
duke ought above all things to have created a Spaniard pope; and if unable
to, then he should have consented to Rohan being appointed and not San
Pietro ad Vincula. And whoever thinks that in high personages new benefits
cause old offences to be forgotten, makes a great mistake. The duke,
therefore, erred in this choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

CHAPTER VIII

OF THOSE WHO HAVE ATTAINED THE POSITION OF PRINCE
BY VILLAINY

But as there are still two ways of becoming prince which cannot be
attributed entirely either to fortune or to ability, they must not be passed
over, although one of them could be more fully discussed if we were
treating of republics. These are when one becomes prince by some
nefarious or villainous means, or when a private citizen becomes the prince
of his country through the favour of his fellow-citizens. And in speaking of
the former means, I will give two examples, one ancient, the other modern,
without entering further into the merits of this method, as I judge them to be
sufficient for any one obliged to imitate them. Agathocles the Sicilian rose
not only from private life but from the lowest and most abject position to be
King of Syracuse. The son of a potter, he led a life of the utmost wickedness
through all the stages of his fortune. Nevertheless, his wickedness was
accompanied by such vigour of mind and body that, having joined the
militia, he rose through all its grades to be prætor of Syracuse. Having been

appointed to this position, and having decided to become prince, and to
hold with violence and without the support of others that which had been
granted him; and having imparted his design to Hamilcar the Carthaginian,
who with his armies was fighting in Sicily, he called together one morning
the people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to deliberate on matters of
importance to the republic, and at a given signal had all the senators and the
richest men of the people killed by his soldiers; after their death he
occupied and held rule over the city without any civil disorders. And
although he was twice beaten by the Carthaginians and ultimately besieged,
he was able not only to defend the city, but leaving a portion of his forces
for its defence, with the remainder he invaded Africa, and in a short time
liberated Syracuse from the siege and brought the Carthaginians to great
extremities, so that they were obliged to come to terms with him, and
remain contented with the possession of Africa, leaving Sicily to
Agathocles. Whoever considers, therefore, the actions and qualities of this
man, will see few if any things which can be attributed to fortune; for, as
above stated, it was not by the favour of any person, but through the grades
of the militia, which he had gained with a thousand hardships and perils,
that he arrived at the position of prince, which he afterwards maintained by
so many courageous and perilous expedients. It cannot be called a virtue to
kill one's fellow-citizens, betray one's friends, be without faith, without pity,
and without religion, by which methods one may indeed gain an empire, but
not glory. For if the virtues of Agathocles in braving and overcoming perils,
and his greatness of soul in supporting and surmounting obstacles be
considered, one sees no reason for holding him inferior to any of the most
renowned captains. Nevertheless his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity,
together with his countless atrocities, do not permit of his being named
among the most famous men. We cannot attribute to fortune or merit that
which he achieved without either. In our own times, during the reign of
Alexander VI., Oliverotto du Fermo had been left a young boy under the
care of his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, who brought him up, and
sent him in early youth to fight under Paolo Vitelli, in order that he might,
under that discipline, obtain a good military position. On the death of Paolo
he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being of
great intelligence, and active in mind and body, he became one of the
leaders of his troops. But deeming it servile to be under others, he resolved,
with the help of some citizens of Fermo, who preferred servitude to the

liberty of their country, and with the favour of the Vitellis, to occupy
Fermo; he therefore wrote to Giovanni Fogliani, how, having been for many
years away from home, he wished to come to see him and his city, and in
some measure to revisit his estates. And as he had only laboured to gain
honour, in order that his fellow-citizens might see that he had not spent his
time in vain, he wished to come honourably accompanied by one hundred
horsemen, his friends and followers, and prayed him that he would be
pleased to order that he should be received with honour by the citizens of
Fermo, by which he would honour not only him, Oliverotto, but also
himself, as he had been his pupil. Giovanni did not fail in any duty towards
his nephew; he caused him to be honourably received by the people of
Fermo, and lodged him in his own houses. After waiting some days to
arrange all that was necessary to his villainous projects, Oliverotto invited
Giovanni Fogliani and all the principal men of Fermo to a grand banquet.
After the dinner and the entertainments usual at such feasts, Oliverotto
artfully introduced certain important matters of discussion, speaking of the
greatness of Pope Alexander, and of his son Cesare, and of their enterprises.
To which discourses Giovanni and others having replied, he all at once rose,
saying that these matters should be spoken of in a more secret place, and
withdrew into a room where Giovanni and the other citizens followed him.
They were no sooner seated than soldiers rushed out of hiding-places and
killed Giovanni and all the others. After which massacre Oliverotto
mounted his horse, rode through the town and besieged the chief magistrate
in his palace, so that through fear they were obliged to obey him and form a
government, of which he made himself prince. And all those being dead
who, if discontented, could injure him, he fortified himself with new orders,
civil and military, in such a way that within the year that he held the
principality he was not only safe himself in the city of Fermo, but had
become formidable to all his neighbours. And his overthrow would have
been difficult, like that of Agathocles, if he had not allowed himself to be
deceived by Cesare Borgia, when he besieged the Orsinis and Vitellis at
Sinigaglia, as already related, where he also was taken, one year after the
parricide he had committed, and strangled, together with Vitellozzo, who
had been his teacher in ability and atrocity. Some may wonder how it came
about that Agathocles, and others like him, could, after infinite treachery
and cruelty, live secure for many years in their country and defend
themselves from external enemies without being conspired against by their

subjects; although many others have, through their cruelty, been unable to
maintain their position in times of peace, not to speak of the uncertain times
of war.
I believe this arises from the cruelties being used well or badly. Well used
may be called those (if it is permissible to use the word well of evil) which
are committed once for the need of securing one's self, and which
afterwards are not persisted in, but are exchanged for measures as useful to
the subjects as possible. Cruelties ill used are those which, although at first
few, increase rather than diminish with time. Those who follow the former
method may remedy in some measure their condition, both with God and
man; as did Agathocles. As to the others, it is impossible for them to
maintain themselves. Whence it is to be noted, that in taking a state the
conqueror must arrange to commit all his cruelties at once, so as not to have
to recur to them every day, and so as to be able, by not making fresh
changes, to reassure people and win them over by benefiting them.
Whoever acts otherwise, either through timidity or bad counsels, is always
obliged to stand with knife in hand, and can never depend on his subjects,
because they, through continually fresh injuries, are unable to depend upon
him. For injuries should be done all together, so that being less tasted, they
will give less offence. Benefits should be granted little by little, so that they
may be better enjoyed. And above all, a prince must live with his subjects in
such a way that no accident should make him change it, for good or evil; for
necessity arising in adverse times, you are not in time with severity, and the
good that you do does not profit you, as it is judged to be forced, and you
will derive no benefit whatever from it.

CHAPTER IX

OF THE CIVIC PRINCIPALITY

But we now come to the case where a citizen becomes prince not through
crime or intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens, which
may be called a civic principality. To arrive at this position depends not
entirely on worth or entirely on fortune, but rather on cunning assisted by

fortune. One attains it by help of popular favour or by the favour of the
aristocracy. For in every city these two opposite parties are to be found,
arising from the desire of the populace to avoid the oppression of the great,
and the desire of the great to command and oppress the people. And from
these two opposing interests arises in the city one of three effects: either
absolute government, liberty, or license. The former is created either by the
populace or the nobility depending on the relative opportunities of the two
parties; for when the nobility see that they are unable to resist the people
they unite in creating one of their number prince, so as to be able to carry
out their own designs under the shadow of his authority. The populace, on
the other hand, when unable to resist the nobility, endeavour to create a
prince in order to be protected by his authority. He who becomes prince by
help of the nobility has greater difficulty in maintaining his power than he
who is raised by the populace, for he is surrounded by those who think
themselves his equals, and is thus unable to direct or command as he
pleases. But one who is raised to the leadership by popular favour finds
himself alone, and has no one or very few who are not ready to obey him.
Besides which, it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by fair dealing and
without inflicting injury on others, whereas it is very easy to satisfy the
mass of the people in this way. For the aim of the people is more honest
than that of the nobility, the latter desiring to oppress, and the former
merely to avoid oppression. It must also be added that the prince can never
insure himself against a hostile populace on account of their number, but he
can against the hostility of the great, as they are but few. The worst that a
prince has to expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned, but from
hostile nobles he has to fear not only abandonment but their active
opposition, and as they are more farseeing and more cunning, they are
always in time to save themselves and take sides with the one who they
expect will conquer. The prince is, moreover, obliged to live always with
the same people, but he can easily do without the same nobility, being able
to make and unmake them at any time, and increase their position or
deprive them of it as he pleases. And to throw further light on this part, I
would say, that the nobles are to be considered in two different manners;
that is, they are either to be ruled so as to make them entirely depend on
your fortunes, or else not. Those that are thus bound to you and are not
rapacious, must be honoured and loved; those who are not bound must be
considered in two ways, they either do this through pusillanimity and

natural want of courage, and in this case you ought to make use of them,
and especially such as are of good counsel, so that they may honour you in
prosperity and in adversity you have not to fear them. But when they are not
bound to you of set purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a sign that they
think more of themselves than of you; and from such men the prince must
guard himself and look upon them as secret enemies, who will help to ruin
him when in adversity. One, however, who becomes prince by favour of the
populace, must maintain its friendship, which he will find easy, the people
asking nothing but not to be oppressed. But one who against the people's
wishes becomes prince by favour of the nobles, should above all endeavour
to gain the favour of the people; this will be easy to him if he protects them.
And as men, who receive good from those they expected evil from, feel
under a greater obligation to their benefactor, so the subject populace will
become even better disposed towards him than if he had become prince
through their favour. The prince can win their favour in many ways, which
vary according to circumstances, for which no certain rule can be given,
and will therefore be passed over.
I will only say, in conclusion, that it is necessary for a prince to possess the
friendship of the people; otherwise he has no resource in times of adversity.
Nabis, prince of the Spartans, sustained a siege by the whole of Greece and
a victorious Roman army, and defended against them his country and
maintained his own position. It sufficed when the danger arose for him to
make sure of a few, which would not have been enough if the populace had
been hostile to him. And let no one oppose my opinion in this by quoting
the trite proverb, "He who builds on the people, builds on mud"; because
that is true when a private citizen relies upon the people and persuades
himself that they will liberate him if he is oppressed by enemies or by the
magistrates; in this case he might often find himself deceived, as happened
in Rome to the Gracchi and in Florence to Messer Georgio Scali.
But when it is a prince who founds himself on this basis, one who can
command and is a man of courage, and does not get frightened in adversity,
and does not neglect other preparations, and one who by his own courage
and measures animates the mass of the people, he will not find himself
deceived by them, and he will find that he has laid his foundations well.
Usually these principalities are in danger when the prince from the position
of a civil ruler changes to an absolute one, for these princes either command

themselves or by means of magistrates. In the latter case their position is
weaker and more dangerous, for they are at the mercy of those citizens who
are appointed magistrates, who can, especially in times of adversity, with
great facility deprive them of their position, either by acting against them or
by not obeying them. The prince is not in time, in such dangers, to assume
absolute authority, for the citizens and subjects who are accustomed to take
their orders from the magistrates are not ready in these emergencies to obey
his, and he will always in doubtful times lack men whom he can rely on.
Such a prince cannot base himself on what he sees in quiet times, when the
citizens have need of the state; for then every one is full of promises and
each one is ready to die for him when death is far off; but in adversity, when
the state has need of citizens, then he will find but few. And this experience
is the more dangerous, in that it can only be had once. Therefore a wise
prince will seek means by which his subjects will always and in every
possible condition of things have need of his government, and then they
will always be faithful to him.

CHAPTER X

HOW THE STRENGTH OF ALL STATES SHOULD BE MEASURED

In examining the character of these principalities it is necessary to consider
another point, namely, whether the prince has such a position as to be able
in case of need to maintain himself alone, or whether he has always need of
the protection of others. The better to explain this I would say, that I
consider those capable of maintaining themselves alone who can, through
abundance of men or money, put together a sufficient army, and hold the
field against any one who assails them; and I consider to have need of
others, those who cannot take the field against their enemies, but are
obliged to take refuge within their walls and stand on the defensive. We
have already discussed the former case and will speak in future of it as
occasion arises. In the second case there is nothing to be said except to
encourage such a prince to provision and fortify his own town, and not to
trouble about the country. And whoever has strongly fortified his town and,

as regards the government of his subjects, has proceeded as we have already
described and will further relate, will be attacked with great reluctance, for
men are always averse to enterprises in which they foresee difficulties, and
it can never appear easy to attack one who has his town well guarded and is
not hated by the people. The cities of Germany are extremely liberal, have
little surrounding country, and obey the emperor when they choose, and
they do not fear him or any other potentate that they have about them. They
are fortified in such a manner that every one thinks that to reduce them
would be tedious and difficult, for they all have the necessary moats and
bastions, sufficient artillery, and always keep in the public storehouses food
and drink and fuel for one year. Beyond which, to keep the lower classes
satisfied, and without loss to the public, they have always enough means to
give them work for one year in these employments which form the nerve
and life of the town, and in the industries by which the lower classes live;
military exercises are still held in reputation, and many regulations are in
force for maintaining them. A prince, therefore, who possesses a strong city
and does not make himself hated, cannot be assaulted; and if he were to be
so, the assailant would be obliged to retire shamefully; for so many things
change, that it is almost impossible for any one to hold the field for a year
with his armies idle. And to those who urge that the people, having their
possessions outside and seeing them burnt, will not have patience, and the
long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince, I reply that a
powerful and courageous prince will always overcome those difficulties by
now raising the hopes of his subjects that the evils will not last long, now
impressing them with fear of the enemy's cruelty, now by dextrously
assuring himself of those who appear too bold. Besides which, the enemy
would naturally burn and ruin the country on first arriving and in the time
when men's minds are still hot and eager to defend themselves, and
therefore the prince has still less to fear, for after some days, when people
have cooled down, the damage is done, the evil has been suffered, and there
is no remedy, so that they are the more ready to unite with their prince, as it
appears that he is under an obligation to them, their houses having been
burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence.
It is the nature of men to be as much bound by the benefits that they confer
as by those they receive. From which it follows that, everything considered,
a prudent prince will not find it difficult to uphold the courage of his

subjects both at the commencement and during a state of siege, if he
possesses provisions and means to defend himself.

CHAPTER XI

OF ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

It now remains to us only to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, with
regard to which the difficulties lie wholly before they are possessed. They
are acquired either by ability or by fortune; but are maintained without
either, for they are sustained by the ancient religious customs, which are so
powerful and of such quality, that they keep their princes in power in
whatever manner they proceed and live. These alone have a state without
defending it, have subjects without governing them, and the states, not
being defended, are not taken from them; the subjects not being governed
do not disturb themselves, and neither think of nor are capable of alienating
themselves from them. Only these principalities, therefore, are secure and
happy. But as they are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind
cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and
maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish
man to discuss them.
However, I might be asked how it has come about that the Church has
reached such great temporal power, when, previous to Alexander VI., the
Italian potentates,—and not merely the really powerful ones, but every lord
or baron, however insignificant, held it in slight esteem as regards temporal
power; whereas now it is dreaded by a king of France, whom it has been
able to drive out of Italy, and has also been able to ruin the Venetians.
Therefore, although this is well known, I do not think it superfluous to call
it to mind. Before Charles, King of France, came into Italy, this country was
under the rule of the pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of
Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had to have two chief cares:
one, that no foreigner should enter Italy by force of arms, the other that
none of the existing governments should extend its dominions. Those
chiefly to be watched were the pope and the Venetians. To keep back the

Venetians required the ruin of all the others, as in the defence of Ferrara,
and to keep down the pope they made use of the Roman barons. These were
divided into two factions, the Orsinis and the Colonnas, and as there was
constant quarrelling between them, and they were constantly under arms,
before the eyes of the pope, they kept the papacy weak and infirm. And
although there arose now and then a resolute pope like Sextus, yet his
fortune or ability was never able to liberate him from these evils. The
shortness of their life was the reason of this, for in the course of ten years
which, as a general rule, a pope lived, he had great difficulty in suppressing
even one of the factions, and if, for example, a pope had almost put down
the Colonnas, a new pope would succeed who was hostile to the Orsinis,
which caused the Colonnas to spring up again, and he was not in time to
suppress them. This caused the temporal power of the pope to be of little
esteem in Italy.
Then arose Alexander VI. who of all the pontiffs who have ever reigned,
best showed how a pope might prevail both by money and by force. With
Duke Valentine as his instrument, and on the occasion of the French
invasion, he did all that I have previously described in speaking of the
actions of the duke. And although his object was to aggrandise not the
Church but the duke, what he did resulted in the aggrandisement of the
Church, which after the death of the duke became the heir of his labours.
Then came Pope Julius, who found the Church powerful, possessing all
Romagna, all the Roman barons suppressed, and the factions destroyed by
the severity of Alexander. He also found the way open for accumulating
wealth in ways never used before the time of Alexander. These measures
were not only followed by Julius, but increased; he resolved to gain
Bologna, put down the Venetians and drive the French from Italy, in all
which enterprises he was successful. He merits the greater praise, as he did
everything to increase the power of the Church and not of any private
person. He also kept the Orsini and Colonna parties in the conditions in
which he found them, and although there were some leaders among them
who might have made changes, there were two things that kept them steady:
one, the greatness of the Church, which they dreaded; the other, the fact that
they had no cardinals, who are the origin of the tumults among them. For
these parties are never at rest when they have cardinals, for these stir up the
parties both within Rome and outside, and the barons are forced to defend
them. Thus from the ambitions of prelates arise the discords and tumults

among the barons. His holiness, Pope Leo X., therefore, has found the
pontificate in a very powerful condition, from which it is hoped, that as
those popes made it great by force of armies, so he through his goodness
and infinite other virtues will make it both great and venerated.

CHAPTER XII

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MILITIA AND MERCENARY
SOLDIERS

Having now discussed fully the qualities of these principalities of which I
proposed to treat, and partially considered the causes of their prosperity or
failure, and having also showed the methods by which many have sought to
obtain such states, it now remains for me to treat generally of the methods
of attack and defence that can be used in each of them. We have said
already how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations good,
otherwise he is certain to be ruined. The chief foundations of all states,
whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And as there
cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are
good arms there should be good laws, I will not now discuss the laws, but
will speak of the arms. I say, therefore, that the arms by which a prince
defends his possessions are either his own, or else mercenaries, or
auxiliaries, or mixed. The mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and
dangerous, and if any one keeps his state based on the arms of mercenaries,
he will never stand firm or sure, as they are disunited, ambitious, without
discipline, faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they
have no fear of God, and keep no faith with men. Ruin is only deferred as
long as the assault is postponed; in peace you are despoiled by them, and in
war by the enemy. The cause of this is that they have no love or other
motive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not
enough to make them ready to die for you. They are quite willing to be your
soldiers so long as you do not make war, but when war comes, it is either
fly or be off. I ought to have little trouble in proving this, since the ruin of
Italy is now caused by nothing else but through her having relied for many

years on mercenary arms. These were somewhat improved in a few cases,
and appeared courageous among themselves, but when the foreigner came
they showed their worthlessness. Thus it came about that King Charles of
France was allowed to take Italy without the slightest trouble, and those
who said that it was owing to our sins, spoke the truth, but it was not the
sins that they believed but those that I have related. And as it was the sins of
princes, they too have suffered the punishment. I will explain more fully the
defects of these arms. Mercenary captains are either very capable men or
not; if they are, you cannot rely upon them, for they will always aspire to
their own greatness, either by oppressing you, their master, or by oppressing
others against your intentions; but if the captain is not an able man, he will
generally ruin you. And if it is replied to this, that whoever has armed
forces will do the same, whether these are mercenary or not, I would reply
that as armies are to be used either by a prince or by a republic, the prince
must go in person to take the position of captain, and the republic must send
its own citizens. If the one sent turns out incompetent, it must change him;
and if capable, keep him by law from going beyond the proper limits. And it
is seen by experience that only princes and armed republics make very great
progress, whereas mercenary forces do nothing but damage, and also an
armed republic submits less easily to the rule of one of its citizens than a
republic armed by foreign forces. Rome and Sparta were for many centuries
well armed and free. The Swiss are well armed and enjoy great freedom. As
an example of mercenary armies in antiquity there are the Carthaginians,
who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers, after the termination of
the first war with the Romans, even while they still had their own citizens
as captains. Philip of Macedon was made captain of their forces by the
Thebans after the death of Epaminondas, and after gaining the victory he
deprived them of liberty. The Milanese, on the death of Duke Philip, hired
Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, who having overcome the enemy at
Caravaggio, allied himself with them to oppress the Milanese his
employers. The father of this Sforza, being a soldier in the service of the
Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her suddenly unarmed, by which she was
compelled, in order not to lose the kingdom, to throw herself into the arms
of the King of Aragon. And if the Venetians and Florentines have in times
past increased their dominions by means of such forces, and their captains
have not made themselves princes but have defended them, I reply that the
Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the capable

leaders whom they might have feared, some did not conquer, some met with
opposition, and others directed their ambition elsewhere. The one who did
not conquer was Sir John Hawkwood, whose fidelity could not be known as
he was not victorious, but every one will admit that, had he conquered, the
Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza had always the
Bracceschi against him, they being constantly at enmity. Francesco directed
his ambition towards Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the
kingdom of Naples. But let us look at what followed a short time ago. The
Florentines appointed Paolo Vitelli their captain, a man of great prudence,
who had risen from a private station to the highest reputation. If he had
taken Pisa no one can deny that it was highly important for the Florentines
to retain his friendship, because had he become the soldier of their enemies
they would have had no means of opposing him; and in order to retain him
they would have been obliged to obey him. As to the Venetians, if one
considers the progress they made, it will be seen that they acted surely and
gloriously so long as they made war with their own forces; that it was
before they commenced their enterprises on land that they fought
courageously with their own gentlemen and armed populace, but when they
began to fight on land they abandoned this virtue, and began to follow the
Italian custom. And at the commencement of their land conquests they had
not much to fear from their captains, their land possessions not being very
large, and their reputation being great, but as their possessions increased, as
they did under Carmagnola, they had an example of their mistake. For
seeing that he was very powerful, after he had defeated the Duke of Milan,
and knowing, on the other hand, that he was not enterprising in warfare,
they considered that they would not make any more conquests with him,
and they neither would nor could dismiss him, for fear of losing what they
had already gained. They were therefore obliged, in order to make sure of
him, to have him killed. They then had for captains Bartolommeo da
Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, Count di Pitigliano, and such like, from
whom they had to fear loss instead of gain, as happened subsequently at
Vailà, where in one day they lost what they had laboriously gained in eight
hundred years; for with these forces, only slow and trifling acquisitions are
made, but sudden and miraculous losses. And as I have cited these
examples from Italy, which has now for many years been governed by
mercenary forces, I will now deal more largely with them, so that having
seen their origin and progress, they can be better remedied. You must

understand that in these latter times, as soon as the empire began to be
repudiated in Italy and the pope to gain greater reputation in temporal
matters, Italy was divided into many states; many of the principal cities
took up arms against their nobles, who, favoured by the emperor, had held
them in subjection, and the Church encouraged this in order to increase its
temporal power. In many other cities one of the inhabitants became prince.
Thus Italy having fallen almost entirely into the hands of the Church and a
few republics, and the priests and other citizens not being accustomed to
bear arms, they began to hire foreigners as soldiers. The first to bring
reputation for this kind of militia was Alberigo da Como, a native of
Romagna. The discipline of this man produced, among others, Braccio and
Sforza, who were in their day the arbiters of Italy. After these came all those
others who up to the present day have commanded the armies of Italy, and
the result of their prowess has been that Italy has been overrun by Charles,
preyed on by Louis, tyrannised over by Ferrando, and insulted by the Swiss.
The system adopted by them was, in the first place, to increase their own
reputation by discrediting the infantry. They did this because, as they had no
country and lived on their earnings, a few foot soldiers did not augment
their reputation, and they could not maintain a large number and therefore
they restricted themselves almost entirely to cavalry, by which with a
smaller number they were well paid and honoured. They reduced things to
such a state that in an army of 20,000 soldiers there were not 2000 foot.
They had also used every means to spare themselves and the soldiers any
hardship or fear by not killing each other in their encounters, but taking
prisoners without a blow. They made no attacks on fortifications by night;
and those in the fortifications did not attack the tents at night, they made no
stockades on ditches round their camps, and did not take the field in winter.
All these things were permitted by their military rules, and adopted, as we
have said, to avoid trouble and danger, so that they have reduced Italy to
slavery and degradation.

CHAPTER XIII

OF AUXILIARY, MIXED, AND NATIVE TROOPS

Auxiliary forces, which are the other kind of useless forces, are when one
calls on a potentate to come and aid one with his troops, as was done in
recent times by Julius, who seeing the wretched failure of his mercenary
forces, in his Ferrara enterprise, had recourse to auxiliaries, and arranged
with Ferrando, King of Spain, that he should help him with his armies.
These forces may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous for
those who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they
conquer you remain their prisoner. And although ancient history is full of
examples of this, I will not depart from the example of Pope Julius II.,
which is still fresh. Nothing could be less prudent than the course he
adopted; for, wishing to take Ferrara, he put himself entirely into the power
of a foreigner. But by good fortune there arose a third cause which
prevented him reaping the effects of his bad choice; for when his auxiliaries
were beaten at Ravenna, the Swiss rose up and drove back the victors,
against all expectation of himself or others, so that he was not taken
prisoner by the enemy which had fled, nor by his own auxiliaries, having
conquered by other arms than theirs. The Florentines, being totally
disarmed, hired 10,000 Frenchmen to attack Pisa, by which measure they
ran greater risk than at any period of their struggles. The emperor of
Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, put 10,000 Turks into Greece,
who after the war would not go away again, which was the beginning of the
servitude of Greece to the infidels. Any one, therefore, who wishes not to
conquer, would do well to use these forces, which are much more
dangerous than mercenaries, as with them ruin is complete, for they are all
united, and owe obedience to others, whereas with mercenaries, when they
have conquered, it requires more time and a good opportunity for them to
injure you, as they do not form a single body and have been engaged and
paid by you, therefore a third party that you have made leader cannot at
once acquire enough authority to be able to injure you. In a word, the
greatest dangers with mercenaries lies in their cowardice and reluctance to
fight, but with auxiliaries the danger lies in their courage. A wise prince,
therefore, always avoids these forces and has recourse to his own, and
would prefer rather to lose with his own men than conquer with the forces
of others, not deeming it a true victory which is gained by foreign arms. I
never hesitate to cite the example of Cesare Borgia and his actions. This
duke entered Romagna with auxiliary troops, leading forces composed
entirely of French soldiers, and with these he took Imola and Forli; but as

they seemed unsafe, he had recourse to mercenaries, and hired the Orsini
and Vitelli; afterwards finding these uncertain to handle, unfaithful and
dangerous, he suppressed them, and relied upon his own men. And the
difference between these forces can be easily seen if one considers the
difference between the reputation of the duke when he had only the French,
when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he had to rely on himself and
his own soldiers. His reputation will be found to have constantly increased,
and he was never so highly esteemed as when every one saw that he was the
sole master of his forces.
I do not wish to go away from recent Italian instances, but I cannot omit
Hiero of Syracuse, whom I have already mentioned. This man being, as I
said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, immediately recognised the
uselessness of that mercenary militia which was composed like our Italian
mercenary troops, and as he thought it unsafe either to retain them or
dismiss them, he had them cut in pieces and thenceforward made war with
his own arms and not those of others. I would also call to mind a figure out
of the Old Testament which well illustrates this point. When David offered
to Saul to go and fight with the Philistine champion Goliath, Saul, to
encourage him, armed him with his own arms, which when David had tried
on he refused saying, that with them he could not fight so well; he
preferred, therefore, to face the enemy with his own sling and knife. In
short, the arms of others either fall away from you, or overburden you, or
else impede you. Charles VIII., father of King Louis XL, having through
good fortune and bravery liberated France from the English, recognised this
necessity of being armed with his own forces, and established in his
kingdom a system of men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards King Louis his
son abolished the infantry and began to hire Swiss, which mistake being
followed by others is, as may now be seen, a cause of danger to that
kingdom. For by giving such reputation to the Swiss, France has
disheartened all her own troops, the infantry having been abolished and the
men-at-arms being obliged to foreigners for assistance; for being
accustomed to fight with Swiss troops, they think they cannot conquer
without them. Whence it comes that the French are insufficiently strong to
oppose the Swiss, and without the aid of the Swiss they will not venture
against others. The armies of the French are thus of a mixed kind, partly
mercenary and partly her own; taken together they are much better than

troops entirely composed of mercenaries or auxiliaries, but much inferior to
national forces.

CHAPTER XIV

WHAT THE DUTIES OF A PRINCE ARE WITH REGARD TO THE
MILITIA

A Prince should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any
other thing for his study, but war and its order and discipline, for that is the
only art that is necessary to one who commands, and it is of such virtue that
it not only maintains those who are born princes, but often enables men of
private fortune to attain to that rank. And one sees, on the other hand, that
when princes think more of luxury than of arms, they lose their state. The
chief cause which makes any one lose it, is the contempt of this art, and the
way to acquire it is to be well versed in the same. Francesco Sforza, through
being well armed, became, from a private position, Duke of Milan; his sons,
through wishing to avoid the fatigue and hardship of war, from dukes
became private persons. For among other evils caused by being disarmed, it
renders you contemptible; which is one of those disgraceful things which a
prince must guard against, as will be explained later. Because there is no
comparison whatever between an armed man and a disarmed one; it is not
reasonable to suppose that one who is armed will obey willingly one who is
unarmed; or that any unarmed man will remain safe among armed servants.
For one being disdainful and the other suspicious, it is not possible for them
to act well together. And yet a prince who is ignorant of military matters,
besides the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be esteemed by his
soldiers, nor have confidence in them. He ought, therefore, never to let his
thoughts stray from the exercise of war; and in peace he ought to practise it
more than in war, which he can do in two ways: both by action and by
study. As to action, he must, besides keeping his men well disciplined and
exercised, engage continually in hunting, and thus accustom his body to
hardships; and on the other hand learn the nature of the land, how the
mountains rise, how the valleys are disposed, where the plains lie, and

understand the nature of the rivers and swamps, and to this he should
devote great attention. This knowledge is useful in two ways. In the first
place, one learns to know one's country, and can the better see how to
defend it. Then by means of the knowledge and experience gained in one
locality, one can easily understand any other that it may be necessary to
venture on, for the hills and valleys, plains and rivers of Tuscany, for
instance, have a certain resemblance to those of other provinces, so that
from a knowledge of the country in one province one can easily arrive at a
knowledge of others. And that prince who is lacking in this skill is wanting
in the first essentials of a leader; for it is this which teaches how to find the
enemy, take up quarters, lead armies, arrange marches and occupy positions
with advantage. Philopœmen, prince of the Achæi, among other praises
bestowed on him by writers, is lauded because in times of peace he thought
of nothing but the methods of warfare, and when he was in the country with
his friends, he often stopped and asked them: If the enemy were on that hill
and we found ourselves here with our army, which of us would have the
advantage? How could we safely approach him maintaining our order? If
we wished to retire, what ought we to do? If they retired, how should we
follow them? And he put before them as they went along all the cases that
might happen to an army, heard their opinion, gave his own, fortifying it by
argument; so that through these continued cogitations there could never
happen any incident when leading his armies for which he was not
prepared. But as to exercise for the mind, the prince ought to read history
and study the actions of eminent men, see how they acted in warfare,
examine the causes of their victories and losses in order to imitate the
former and avoid the latter, and above all, do as some eminent men have
done in the past, who have imitated some one, who has been much praised
and glorified, and have always kept their deeds and actions before them, as
they say Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Cæsar Alexander, and
Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon,
will perceive in the life of Scipio how gloriously he imitated him, and how,
in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those
qualities of Cyrus described by Xenophon.
A wise prince should follow similar methods and never remain idle in
peaceful times, but by industry make such good use of the time as may
serve him in adversity, so that when fortune changes she may find him
prepared to resist her blows.

CHAPTER XV

OF THE THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY
PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

It remains now to be seen what are the methods and rules for a prince as
regards his subjects and friends. And as I know that many have written of
this, I fear that my writing about it may be deemed presumptuous, differing
as I do, especially in this matter, from the opinions of others. But my
intention being to write something of use to those who understand it, it
appears to me more proper to go to the real truth of the matter than to its
imagination; and many have imagined republics and principalities which
have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for how we live is so far
removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for
what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his
preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in
everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not
good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain
himself, to learn how not to be good, and to use it and not use it according
to the necessity of the case. Leaving on one side then those things which
concern only an imaginary prince, and speaking of those that are real, I state
that all men, when spoken of, and especially princes, who are placed at a
greater height, are noted for some of those qualities which bring them either
praise or blame. Thus one is considered liberal, another miserly; one a free
giver, another rapacious; one cruel, another merciful; one a breaker of his
word, another faithful; one effeminate and pusillanimous, another fierce and
high-spirited; one humane, another proud; one lascivious, another chaste;
one frank, another astute; one hard, another easy; one serious, another
frivolous; one religious, another incredulous, and so on. I know that every
one will admit that it would be highly praiseworthy in a prince to possess
all the above-named qualities that are reputed good, but as they cannot all
be possessed or observed, human conditions not permitting of it, it is
necessary that he should be prudent enough to avoid the disgrace of those
vices which would lose him the state, and guard himself against those
which will not lose it him, if possible, but if not able to, he can indulge

them with less scruple. And yet he must not mind incurring the disgrace of
those vices, without which it would be difficult to save the state, for if one
considers well, it will be found that some things which seem virtues would,
if followed, lead to one's ruin, and some others which appear vices result, if
followed, in one's greater security and well being.

CHAPTER XVI

OF LIBERALITY AND NIGGARDLINESS

Beginning now with the first qualities above named, I say that it would be
well to be considered liberal; nevertheless liberality used in such a way that
you are not feared will injure you, because if used virtuously and in the
proper way, it will not be known, and you will not incur the disgrace of the
contrary vice. But one who wishes to obtain the reputation of liberality
among men, must not omit every kind of sumptuous display, and to such an
extent that a prince of this character will consume by such means all his
resources, and will be at last compelled, if he wishes to maintain his name
for liberality, to impose heavy charges on his people, become an extortioner,
and do everything possible to obtain money. This will make his subjects
begin to hate him and he will be little esteemed being poor, so that having
by this liberality injured many and benefited but few, he will feel the first
little disturbance and be endangered by every accident. If he recognises this
and wishes to change his system, he incurs at once the charge of
niggardliness; a prince, therefore, not being able to exercise this virtue of
liberality without risk if it is known, must not, if he is prudent, object to be
called miserly. In course of time he will be thought more liberal, when it is
seen that by his parsimony his revenue is sufficient, that he can defend
himself against those who make war on him, and undertake enterprises
without burdening his people, so that he is really liberal to all those from
whom he does not take, who are infinite in number, and niggardly to all to
whom he does not give, who are few.
In our times we have seen nothing great done except by those who have
been esteemed niggardly; the others have all been ruined. Pope Julius II.,

although he had made use of a reputation for liberality in order to attain the
papacy, did not seek to retain it afterwards, so that he might be able to make
war on the King of France, and he earned on so many wars without
imposing an extraordinary tax, because his extra expenses were covered by
the parsimony he had so long practised. The present King of Spain, if he
had been thought liberal, would not have engaged in and won so many
enterprises. For these reasons a prince must care little for the reputation of
being a miser, if he wishes to avoid robbing his subjects, if he wishes to be
able to defend himself, to not become poor and contemptible, and not to be
forced to become rapacious; this vice of niggardliness is one of those vices
which enable him to reign. If it is said that Cæsar attained the empire
through liberality, and that many others have reached the highest positions
through being liberal or being thought so, I would reply that you are either a
prince already or else on the way to become one. In the first case, this
liberality is harmful; in the second, it is certainly necessary to be considered
liberal, and Cæsar was one of those who wished to attain the mastery over
Rome, but if after attaining it he had lived and had not moderated his
expenses, he would have destroyed that empire. And should any one reply
that there have been many princes, who have done great things with their
armies, who have been thought extremely liberal, I would answer by saying
that the prince may either spend his own wealth and that of his subjects or
the wealth of others. In the first case he must be sparing, but in the second
he must not neglect to be very liberal. This liberality is very necessary to a
prince who marches with his armies, and lives by plunder, sacking and
extorting, and is dealing with the wealth of others, for without it he would
not be followed by his soldiers. And you may be very generous indeed with
what is not the property of yourself or your subjects, as were Cyrus, Cæsar,
and Alexander; for spending the wealth of others will not diminish your
reputation, but increase it, only spending your own resources will injure
you. There is nothing which destroys itself so much as liberality, for by
using it you lose the power of using it, and become either poor and
despicable, or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hated. And of all things that
a prince must guard against, the most important are being despicable or
hated, and liberality will lead you to one or other of these conditions. It is,
therefore, wiser to have the name of a miser, which produces disgrace
without hatred, than to incur of necessity the name of being rapacious,
which produces both disgrace and hatred.

CHAPTER XVII

OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER
TO BE LOVED OR FEARED

Proceeding to the other qualities before named, I say that every prince must
desire to be considered merciful and not cruel. He must, however, take care
not to misuse this mercifulness. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, but his
cruelty had settled the Romagna, united it, and brought it peace and
confidence. If this is considered a benefit, it will be seen that he was really
much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid the name of
cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A prince, therefore, must not mind
incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects
united and confident; for, with a very few examples, he will be more
merciful than those who, from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to
arise, from whence spring murders and rapine; for these as a rule injure the
whole community, while the executions carried out by the prince injure
only one individual. And of all princes, it is impossible for a new prince to
escape the name of cruel, new states being always full of dangers.
Wherefore Virgil makes Dido excuse the inhumanity of her rule by its being
new, where she says:
Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.
Nevertheless, he must be cautious in believing and acting, and must not
inspire fear of his own accord, and must proceed in a temperate manner
with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence does not render
him incautious, and too much diffidence does not render him intolerant.
From this arises the question whether it is better to be loved more than
feared, or feared more than loved. The reply is, that one ought to be both
feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much
safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting. For it may
be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers,
anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain; as long as you benefit them,
they are entirely yours; they offer you their blood, their goods, their life,

and their children, as I have before said, when the necessity is remote; but
when it approaches, they revolt. And the prince who has relied solely on
their words, without making other preparations, is ruined, for the friendship
which is gained by purchase and not through grandeur and nobility of spirit
is merited but is not secured, and at times is not to be had. And men have
less scruple in offending one who makes himself loved than one who makes
himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being
selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose; but fear is maintained by
a dread of punishment which never fails. Still, a prince should make himself
feared in such a way that if he does not gain love, he at any rate avoids
hatred; for fear, and the absence of hatred may well go together, and will be
always attained by one who abstains from interfering with the property of
his citizens and subjects or with their women. And when he is obliged to
take the life of any one, to do so when there is a proper justification and
manifest reason for it; but above all he must abstain from taking the
property of others, for men forget more easily the death of their father than
the loss of their patrimony. Then also pretexts for seizing property are never
wanting, and one who begins to live by rapine will always find some reason
for taking the goods of others, whereas causes for taking life are rarer and
more quickly destroyed. But when the prince is with his army and has a
large number of soldiers under his control, then it is extremely necessary
that he should not mind being thought cruel; for without this reputation he
could not keep an army united, or disposed to any duty.
Among the noteworthy actions of Hannibal is numbered this, that although
he had an enormous army, composed of men of all nations and fighting in
foreign countries, there never arose any dissension either among them or
against the prince, either in good fortune or in bad. This could not be due to
anything but his inhuman cruelty, which together with his infinite other
virtues, made him always venerated and terrible in the sight of his soldiers,
and without it his other virtues would not have sufficed to produce that
effect. Thoughtless writers admire on the one hand his actions, and on the
other blame the principal cause of them. And that it is true that his other
virtues would not have sufficed may be seen from the case of Scipio (very
rare not only in his own times, but in all times of which memory remains),
whose armies rebelled against him in Spain, which arose from nothing but
his excessive kindness, which allowed more license to the soldiers than was
consonant with military discipline. He was reproached with this in the

senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him a corrupter of the Roman
militia.
The Locri having been destroyed by one of Scipio's officers were not
revenged by him, nor was the insolence of that officer punished, simply by
reason of his easy nature; so much so, that some one wishing to excuse him
in the senate, said that there were many men who knew rather how not to
err, than how to correct the errors of others. This disposition would in time
have tarnished the fame and glory of Scipio had he persevered in it under
the empire, but living under the rule of the senate this harmful quality was
not only concealed but became a glory to him. I conclude, therefore, with
regard to being feared and loved, that men love at their own free will, but
fear at the will of the prince, and that a wise prince must rely on what is in
his power and not on what is in the power of others, and he must only
trouble himself to avoid incurring hatred, as has been explained.

CHAPTER XVIII

IN WHAT WAY PRINCES MUST KEEP FAITH

How laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith and live with integrity,
and not with astuteness, every one knows. Still the experience of our times
shows those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for
good faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse men's brains, and
who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their
foundation. You must know, then, that there are two methods of fighting,
the one by law, the other by force: the first method is that of men, the
second of beasts; but as the first method is often insufficient, one must have
recourse to the second. It is therefore necessary to know well how to use
both the beast and the man. This was covertly taught to princes by ancient
writers, who relate how Achilles and many others of those princes were
given to Chiron the centaur to be brought up, who kept them under his
discipline; this system of having for teacher one who was half beast and
half man is meant to indicate that a prince must know how to use both
natures, and that the one without the other is not durable. A prince being

thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must imitate the fox and the
lion, for the lion cannot protect himself from snares, and the fox cannot
defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognise
snares, and a lion to frighten wolves. Those that wish to be only lions do not
understand this. Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by
so doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons which made
him bind himself no longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would
not be a good one; but as they are bad, and would not observe their faith
with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them. Nor are legitimate
grounds ever wanting to a prince to give colour to the non-fulfilment of his
promise. Of this one could furnish an infinite number of modern examples,
and show how many times peace has been broken, and how many promises
rendered worthless, by the faithlessness of princes, and those that have been
best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But it is necessary to be
able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner and
dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present necessities,
that one who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be
deceived. I will only mention one modern instance. Alexander VI. did
nothing else but deceive men, he thought of nothing else, and found the way
to do it; no man was ever more able to give assurances, or affirmed things
with stronger oaths, and no man observed them less; however, he always
succeeded in his deceptions, as he knew well this side of the world. It is not,
therefore, necessary for a prince to have all the above-named qualities, but
it is very necessary to seem to have them. I would even be bold to say that
to possess them and to always observe them is dangerous, but to appear to
possess them is useful. Thus it is well to seem pious, faithful, humane,
religious, sincere, and also to be so; but you must have the mind so
watchful that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change
to the opposite qualities. And it must be understood that a prince, and
especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things which are
considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state,
to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion.
And, therefore, he must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to
the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not
deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated.
A prince must take great care that nothing goes out of his mouth which is
not full of the above-named five qualities, and, to see and hear him, he

should seem to be all faith, all integrity, all humanity, and all religion. And
nothing is more necessary than to seem to have this last quality, for men in
general judge more by the eyes than by the hands, for every one can see, but
very few have to feel. Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what
you are, and those few will not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who
have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of men, and
especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the end is everything.
Let a prince therefore aim at living and maintaining state the state, the
means will always be judged honourable and praised by every one, for the
vulgar is always taken by appearances and the result of things; and the
world consists only of the vulgar, and the few find a place when the many
have nothing to rest upon. A certain prince of the present time, whom it is
well not to name, never does anything but preach peace and good faith, but
he is really a great enemy to both, and either of them, had he observed
them, would have lost him both state and reputation on many occasions.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT WE MUST AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

But as I have now spoken of the most important of the qualities in question,
I will now deal briefly with the rest on the general principle, that the prince
must, as already stated, avoid those things which will make him hated or
despised; and whenever he succeeds in this, he will have done his part, and
will find no danger in other vices.
He will chiefly become hated, as I said, by being rapacious, and usurping
the property and women of his subjects, which he must abstain from doing,
and whenever one does not attack the property or honour of the generality
of men, they will live contented; and one will only have to combat the
ambition of a few, who can be easily held in check in many ways. He is
rendered despicable by being thought changeable, frivolous, effeminate,
timid, and irresolute; which a prince must guard against as a rock of danger,
and manage so that his actions show grandeur, high courage, seriousness,

and strength; and as to the government of his subjects, let his sentence be
irrevocable, and let him adhere to his decisions so that no one may think of
deceiving him or making him change. The prince who creates such an
opinion of himself gets a great reputation, and it is very difficult to conspire
against one who has a great reputation, and he will not easily be attacked,
so long as it is known that he is esteemed and reverenced by his subjects.
For a prince must have two kinds of fear: one internal as regards his
subjects, one external as regards foreign powers. From the latter he can
defend himself with good arms and good friends, and he will always have
good friends if he has good arms; and internal matters will always remain
quiet, if they are not perturbed by conspiracy; and even if external powers
sought to foment one, if he has ruled and lived as I have described, he will
always if he stands firm be able to sustain every shock, as I have shown that
Nabis the Spartan did. But with regard to the subjects, if not acted on from
outside, it is still to be feared lest they conspire in secret, from which the
prince may guard himself well by avoiding hatred and contempt, and
keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is necessary to accomplish,
as has been related at length. And one of the most potent remedies that a
prince has against conspiracies, is that of not being hated or despised by the
mass of the people; for whoever conspires always believes that he will
satisfy the people by the death of their prince; but if he thought to offend
them by doing this, he would fear to engage in such an undertaking, for the
difficulties that conspirators have to meet are infinite. Experience shows
that there have been very many conspiracies, but few have turned out well,
for whoever conspires cannot act alone, and cannot find companions except
among those who are discontented; and as soon as you have disclosed your
intention to a malcontent, you give him the means of satisfying himself, for
by revealing it he can hope to secure everything he wants; to such an extent
that seeing a certain gain by doing this, and seeing on the other hand only a
doubtful one and full of danger, he must either be a rare friend to you or
else a very bitter enemy to the prince if he keeps faith with you. And to
reduce the matter to narrow limits, I say, that on the side of the conspirator
there is nothing but fear, jealousy, suspicion, and dread of punishment
which frightens him; and on the side of the prince there is the majesty of
government, the laws, the protection of friends and of the state which guard
him. When to these things are added the goodwill of the people, it is
impossible that any one should have the temerity to conspire. For whereas

generally a conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this
case he must also fear afterwards, having the people for an enemy, when his
crime is accomplished, and thus not being able to hope for any refuge.
Numberless instances might be given of this, but I will content myself with
one which took place within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale
Bentivogli, Prince of Bologna, ancestor of the present Messer Annibale,
was killed by the Canneschi, who conspired against him. He left no
relations but Messer Giovanni, who was then an infant, but after the murder
the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This arose from the popular
goodwill that the house of Bentivogli enjoyed at that time in Bologna,
which was so great that, as there was nobody left after the death of Annibale
who could govern the state, the Bolognese hearing that there was one of the
Bentivogli family in Florence, who had till then been thought the son of a
blacksmith, came to fetch him and gave him the government of the city, and
it was governed by him until Messer Giovanni was old enough to assume
the government.
I conclude, therefore, that a prince need trouble little about conspiracies
when the people are well disposed, but when they are hostile and hold him
in hatred, then he must fear everything and everybody. Well-ordered states
and wise princes have studied diligently not to drive the nobles to
desperation, and to satisfy the populace and keep it contented, for this is one
of the most important matters that a prince has to deal with. Among the
kingdoms that are well ordered and governed in our time is France, and
there we find numberless good institutions on which depend the liberty and
security of the king; of these the chief is the parliament and its authority,
because he who established that kingdom, knowing the ambition and
insolence of the great nobles, and deeming it necessary to have a bit in their
mouths to check them; and knowing on the other hand the hatred of the
mass of the people to the great, based on fear, and wishing to secure them,
did not wish to make this the special care of the king, to relieve him of the
dissatisfaction that he might incur among the nobles by favouring the
people, and among the people by favouring the nobles. He therefore
established a third judge that, without direct charge of the king, kept in
check the great and favoured the lesser people. Nor could any better or
more prudent measure have been adopted, nor better precaution for the
safety of the king and the kingdom. From which another notable rule can be
drawn, that princes should let the carrying out of unpopular duties devolve

on others, and bestow favours themselves. I conclude again by saying that a
prince must esteem his nobles, but not make himself hated by the populace.
It may perhaps seem to some, that considering the life and death of many
Roman emperors that they are instances contrary to my opinion, finding
that some who lived always nobly and showed great strength of character,
nevertheless lost the empire, or were killed by their subjects who conspired
against them. Wishing to answer these objections, I will discuss the
qualities of some emperors, showing the cause of their ruin not to be at
variance with what I have stated, and I will also partly consider the things to
be noted by whoever reads the deeds of these times. I will content myself
with taking all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus
the philosopher to Maximinus; these were Marcus, Commodus his son,
Pertinax, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. And the first thing to
note is, that whereas other princes have only to contend against the
ambition of the great and the insolence of the people, the Roman emperors
had a third difficulty, that of having to support the cruelty and avarice of the
soldiers, which was such a difficulty that it was the cause of the ruin of
many, it being difficult to satisfy both the soldiers and the people. For the
people love tranquillity, and therefore like princes who are pacific, but the
soldiers prefer a prince of military spirit, who is insolent, cruel, and
rapacious. They wish him to exercise these qualities on the people so that
they may get double pay and give vent to their avarice and cruelty. Thus it
came about that those emperors who, by nature or art, had not such a
reputation as could keep both parties in check, invariably were ruined, and
the greater number of them who were raised to the empire being new men,
knowing the difficulties of these two opposite dispositions, confined
themselves to satisfying the soldiers, and thought little of injuring the
people. This choice was necessary, princes not being able to avoid being
hated by some one. They must first try not to be hated by the mass of the
people; if they cannot accomplish this they must use every means to escape
the hatred of the most powerful parties. And therefore these emperors, who
being new men had need of extraordinary favours, adhered to the soldiers
more willingly than to the people; whether this, however, was of use to
them or not, depended on whether the prince knew how to maintain his
reputation with them.
From these causes it resulted that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being
all of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and benign,

had all a sad ending except Marcus. Marcus alone lived and died in honour,
because he succeeded to the empire by hereditary right and did not owe it
either to the soldiers or to the people; besides which, possessing many
virtues which made him revered, he kept both parties in their place as long
as he lived and was never either hated or despised. But Pertinax was created
emperor against the will of the soldiers, who being accustomed to live
licentiously under Commodus, could not put up with the honest life to
which Pertinax wished to limit them, so that having made himself hated,
and to this contempt being added because he was old, he was ruined at the
very beginning of his administration. Whence it may be seen that hatred is
gained as much by good works as by evil, and therefore, as I said before, a
prince who wishes to maintain the state is often forced to do evil, for when
that party, whether populace, soldiery, or nobles, whichever it be that you
consider necessary to you for keeping your position, is corrupt, you must
follow its humour and satisfy it, and in that case good works will be
inimical to you. But let us come to Alexander, who was of such goodness,
that among other things for which he is praised, it is said that in the fourteen
years that he reigned no one was put to death by him without a fair trial.
Nevertheless, being considered effeminate, and a man who allowed himself
to be ruled by his mother, and having thus fallen into contempt, the army
conspired against him and killed him. Looking, on the other hand, at the
qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus, extremely cruel and rapacious;
to satisfy the soldiers there was no injury which they would not inflict on
the people, and all except Severus ended badly. Severus, however, had such
abilities that by maintaining the soldiers friendly to him, he was able to
reign happily, although he oppressed the people, for his virtues made him so
admirable in the sight both of the soldiers and the people that the latter
were, as it were, astonished and stupefied, while the former were respectful
and contented. As the deeds of this ruler were great for a new prince, I will
briefly show how well he could use the qualities of the fox and the lion,
whose natures, as I said before, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.
Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, Severus, who was leader of the
army in Slavonia, persuaded the troops that it would be well to go to Rome
to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been slain by the Imperial guard,
and under this pretext, without revealing his aspirations to the throne,
marched with his army to Rome and was in Italy before his design was
known. On his arrival in Rome the senate elected him emperor through fear,

and Julian died. There remained after this beginning two difficulties to be
faced by Severus before he could obtain the whole control of the empire:
one in Asia, where Nigrinus, head of the Asiatic armies, had declared
himself emperor; the other in the west from Albinus, who also aspired to the
empire. And as he judged it dangerous to show himself hostile to both, he
decided to attack Nigrinus and deceive Albinus, to whom he wrote that
having been elected emperor by the senate he wished to share that dignity
with him; he sent him the title of Cæsar and, by deliberation of the senate,
he was declared his colleague; all of which was accepted as true by Albinus.
But when Severus had defeated and killed Nigrinus, and pacified things in
the East, he returned to Rome and charged Albinus in the senate with
having, unmindful of the benefits received from him, traitorously sought to
assassinate him, and stated that he was therefore obliged to go and punish
his ingratitude. He then went to France to meet him, and there deprived him
of both his position and his life. Whoever examines in detail the actions of
Severus, will find him to have been a very ferocious lion and an extremely
astute fox, and will see him to have been feared and respected by all and not
hated by the army; and will not be surprised that he, a new man, should
have been able to hold the empire so well, since his great reputation
defended him always from that hatred that his rapacity might have produced
in the people. But Antoninus his son was also a man of great ability, and
possessed qualities that rendered him admirable in the sight of the people
and also made him popular with the soldiers, for he was a military man,
capable of enduring the most extreme hardships, disdainful of delicate food,
and every other luxury, which made him loved by all the armies. However,
his ferocity and cruelty were so great and unheard of, through his having,
after executing many private individuals, caused a large part of the
population of Rome and all that of Alexandria to be killed, that he became
hated by all the world and began to be feared by those about him to such an
extent that he was finally killed by a centurion in the midst of his army.
Whence it is to be noted that this kind of death, which proceeds from the
deliberate action of a determined man, cannot be avoided by princes, since
any one who does not fear death himself can inflict it, but a prince need not
fear much on this account, as such actions are extremely rare. He must only
guard against committing any grave injury to any one he makes use of, or
has about him for his service, like Antoninus had done, having caused the
death with contumely of the brother of that centurion, and also threatened

him every day, although he still retained him in his bodyguard, which was a
foolish and dangerous thing to do, as the fact proved. But let us come to
Commodus, who might easily have kept the empire, having succeeded to it
by heredity, being the son of Marcus, and it would have sufficed for him to
follow in the steps of his father to have satisfied both the people and the
soldiers. But being of a cruel and bestial disposition, in order to be able to
exercise his rapacity on the people, he sought to amuse the soldiers and
render them licentious; on the other hand, by not maintaining his dignity, by
often descending into the theatre to fight with gladiators and committing
other contemptible actions, little worthy of the imperial dignity, he became
despicable in the eyes of the soldiers, and being hated on the one hand and
despised on the other, he was conspired against and killed. There remains to
be described the character of Maximinus. He was an extremely warlike
man, and as the armies were annoyed with the effeminacy of Alexander,
which we have already spoken of, he was after the death of the latter elected
emperor. He did not enjoy it for long, as two things made him hated and
despised: the one his base origin, as he had been a shepherd in Thrace,
which was generally known and caused great disdain on all sides; the other,
because he had at the commencement of his rule deferred going to Rome to
take possession of the Imperial seat, and had obtained a reputation for great
cruelty, having through his prefects in Rome and other parts of the empire
committed many acts of cruelty. The whole world being thus moved by
indignation for the baseness of his blood, and also by the hatred caused by
fear of his ferocity, he was conspired against first by Africa and afterwards
by the senate and all the people of Rome and Italy. His own army also
joined them, for besieging Aquileia and finding it difficult to take, they
became enraged at his cruelty, and seeing that he had so many enemies,
they feared him less and put him to death. I will not speak of Heliogabalus,
of Macrinus, or Julian, who being entirely contemptible were immediately
suppressed, but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse by saying
that the princes of our time have less difficulty than these of being obliged
to satisfy in an extraordinary degree their soldiers in their states; for
although they must have a certain consideration for them, yet it is soon
settled, for none of these princes have armies that are inextricably bound up
with the administration of the government and the rule of their provinces as
were the armies of the Roman empire; and therefore if it was then necessary
to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it was because the soldiers

could do more than the people; now, it is more necessary to all princes,
except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people than the soldiers, for
the people can do more than the soldiers. I except the Turk, because he
always keeps about him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand
cavalry, on which depend the security and strength of his kingdom; and it is
necessary for him to postpone every other consideration of the people to
keep them friendly. It is the same with the kingdom of the Soldan, which
being entirely in the hands of the soldiers, he is bound to keep their
friendship regardless of the people. And it is to be noted that this state of the
Soldan is different from that of all other princes, being similar to the
Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either a hereditary kingdom or
a new one, for the sons of the dead prince are not his heirs, but he who is
elected to that position by those who have authority. And as this order is
ancient it cannot be called a new kingdom, there being none of these
difficulties which exist in new ones; as although the prince is new, the rules
of that state are old and arranged to receive him as if he were their
hereditary lord. But returning to our matter, I say that whoever studies the
preceding argument will see that either hatred or contempt were the causes
of the ruin of the emperors named, and will also observe how it came about
that, some of them acting in one way and some in another, in both ways
there were some who had a fortunate and others an unfortunate ending. As
Pertinax and Alexander were both new rulers, it was useless and injurious
for them to try and imitate Marcus, who was a hereditary prince; and
similarly with Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus it was pernicious for
them to imitate Severus, as they had not sufficient ability to follow in his
footsteps. Thus a new prince cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, in his
dominions, nor is it necessary for him to imitate those of Severus; but he
must take from Severus those portions that are necessary to found his state,
and from Marcus those that are useful and glorious for conserving a state
that is already established and secure.

CHAPTER XX

WHETHER FORTRESSES AND OTHER THINGS WHICH
PRINCES OFTEN MAKE ARE USEFUL OR INJURIOUS

Some princes, in order to securely hold their possessions, have disarmed
their subjects, some others have kept their subject lands divided into parts,
others have fomented enmities against themselves, others have endeavoured
to win over those whom they suspected at the commencement of their rule:
some have constructed fortresses, others have ruined and destroyed them.
And although one cannot pronounce a definite judgment as to these things
without going into the particulars of the state to which such a deliberation is
to be applied, still I will speak in such a broad way as the matter will permit
of.
A new prince has never been known to disarm his subjects, on the contrary,
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, for by arming
them these arms become your own, those that you suspected become
faithful and those that were faithful remain so, and from being merely
subjects become your partisans. And since all the subjects cannot be armed,
when you benefit those that you arm, you can deal more safely with the
others; and this different treatment that they notice renders your men more
obliged to you, the others will excuse you, judging that those have
necessarily greater merit who have greater danger and heavier duties. But
when you disarm them, you commence to offend them and show that you
distrust them either through cowardice or lack of confidence, and both of
these opinions generate hatred against you. And as you cannot remain
unarmed, you are obliged to resort to a mercenary militia, of which we have
already stated the value; and even if it were good it cannot be sufficient in
number to defend you against powerful enemies and suspected subjects.
But, as I have said, a new prince in a new dominion always has his subjects
armed. History is full of such examples. But when a prince acquires a new
state as an addition to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that state,
except those who in acquiring it have sided with you; and even these one
must, when time and opportunity serve, render weak and effeminate, and
arrange things so that all the arms of the new state are in the hands of your
own soldiers who in your old state live near you.
Our forefathers and those who were esteemed wise used to say that it was
necessary to hold Pistoia by means of factious and Pisa with fortresses, and
for this purpose they fomented differences among their subjects in some
town in order to possess it more easily. This, in those days when Italy was
fairly divided, was doubtless well done, but does not seem to me to be a

good precept for the present time, for I do not believe that the divisions thus
created ever do any good; on the contrary it is certain that when the enemy
approaches, the cities thus divided will be at once lost, for the weaker
faction will always side with the enemy and the other will not be able to
stand. The Venetians, actuated, I believe, by the aforesaid motives,
cherished the Guelf and Ghibelline factions in the cities subject to them,
and although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, they yet
encouraged these differences among them, so that the citizens, being
occupied in their own quarrels, might not act against them. This, however,
did not avail them anything, as was seen when, after the defeat of Vaila, a
part of those subjects immediately took courage and took from them the
whole state. Such methods, besides, argue weakness in a prince, for in a
strong government such dissensions will never be permitted. They are
profitable only in time of peace, as by means of them it is easy to manage
one's subjects, but when it comes to war, the fallacy of such a policy is at
once shown. Without doubt, princes become great when they overcome
difficulties and opposition, and therefore fortune, especially when it wants
to render a new prince great, who has greater need of gaining a great
reputation than a hereditary prince, raises up enemies and compels him to
undertake wars against them, so that he may have cause to overcome them,
and thus raise himself higher by means of that ladder which his enemies
have brought him. There are many who think therefore that a wise prince
ought, when he has the chance, to foment astutely some enmity, so that by
suppressing it he will augment his greatness. Princes, and especially new
ones, have found more faith and more usefulness in those men, whom at the
beginning of their power they regarded with suspicion, than in those they at
first confided in. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governed his state
more by those whom he suspected than by others. But of this we cannot
speak at large, as it varies according to the subject; I will merely say that
these men who at the beginning of a new government were enemies, if they
are of a kind to need support to maintain their position, can be very easily
gained by the prince, and they are the more compelled to serve him
faithfully as they know they must by their deeds cancel the bad opinion
previously held of them, and thus the prince will always derive greater help
from them than from those who, serving him with greater security, neglect
his interest. And as the matter requires it, I will not omit to remind a prince
who has newly taken a state with the secret help of its inhabitants, that he

must consider well the motives that have induced those who have favoured
him to do so, and if it is not natural affection for him, but only because they
were not contented with the state as it was, he will have great trouble and
difficulty in maintaining their friendship, because it will be impossible for
him to content them. And on well examining the cause of this in the
examples drawn from ancient and modern times it will be seen that it is
much easier to gain the friendship, of those men who were contented with
the previous condition and were therefore at first enemies, than that of those
who not being contented, became his friends and helped him to occupy it. It
has been the custom of princes in order to be able to hold securely their
state, to erect fortresses, as a bridle and bit to those who have designs
against them, and in order to have a secure refuge against a sudden assault.
I approve this method, because it was anciently used. Nevertheless, Messer
Niccolo Vitelli has been seen in our own time to destroy two fortresses in
Città di Castello in order to keep that state. Guid' Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino,
on returning to his dominions from which he had been driven by Cesare
Borgia, razed to their foundations all the fortresses of that province, and
considered that without them it would be more difficult for him to lose
again the state. The Bentivogli, in returning to Bologna, used similar
measures. Therefore fortresses may or may not be useful according to the
times; if they do good in one way, they do harm in another.
The question may be discussed thus: a prince who fears his own people
more than foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has greater fear
of foreigners than of his own people ought to do without them. The castle of
Milan built by Francesco Sforza has given and will give more trouble to the
house of Sforza than any other disorder in that state. Therefore the best
fortress is to be found in the love of the people, for although you may have
fortresses they will not save you if you are hated by the people. When once
the people have taken arms against you, there will never be lacking
foreigners to assist them. In our times we do not see that they have profited
any ruler, except the Countess of Forli on the death of her consort Count
Girolamo, for she was thus enabled to escape the popular rising and await
help from Milan and recover the state; the circumstances being then such
that no foreigner could assist the people. But afterwards they were of little
use to her when Cesare Borgia attacked her and the people being hostile to
her allied themselves with the foreigner. So that then and before it would
have been safer for her not to be hated by the people than to have the

fortresses. Having considered these things I would therefore praise the one
who erects fortresses and the one who does not, and would blame any one
who, trusting in them, thinks little of being hated by his people.

CHAPTER XXI

HOW A PRINCE MUST ACT IN ORDER TO GAIN REPUTATION

Nothing causes a prince to be so much esteemed as great enterprises and
setting a rare example. We have in our own day Ferdinand, King of Aragon,
at present King of Spain. He may almost be termed a new prince, because
from a weak king he has become for fame and glory the first king in
Christendom, and if you regard his actions you will find them all very great
and some of them extraordinary. At the beginning of his reign he assailed
Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation of his state. At first he did
it leisurely and without fear of being interfered with; he kept the minds of
the barons of Castile occupied in this enterprise, so that thinking only of
that war they did not think of making innovations, and he thus acquired
reputation and power over them without their being aware of it. He was
able with the money of the Church and the people to maintain his armies,
and by that long war lay the foundations of his military power, which
afterwards has made him famous. Besides this, to be able to undertake
greater enterprises, and always under the pretext of religion, he had
recourse to a pious cruelty, driving out the Moors from his kingdom and
despoiling them. No more admirable or rare example can be found. He also
attacked under the same pretext Africa, undertook his Italian enterprise, and
has lately attacked France; so that he has continually contrived great things,
which have kept his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished, and occupied
in watching their result.
And these actions have arisen one out of the other, so that they have left no
time for men to settle down and act against him. It is also very profitable for
a prince to give some rare examples of himself in the internal
administration, like those related of Messer Bernabò of Milan, when it
happens that some one does something extraordinary, either good or evil, in

civil life, and to take a means of rewarding or punishing him which will be
much talked about. And above all a prince must endeavour in every action
to obtain fame for being great and excellent. A prince is further esteemed
when he is a true friend or a true enemy, when, that is, he declares himself
without reserve in favour of some one against another.
This policy is always more useful than remaining neutral. For if two
neighbouring powers come to blows, they are either such that if one wins,
you will have to fear the victor, or else not. In either of these two cases it
will be better for you to declare yourself openly and make war, because in
the first case if you do not declare yourself, you will fall a prey to the victor,
to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one who has been defeated, and you
will have no reason nor anything to defend you and nobody to receive you.
For, whoever wins will not desire friends whom he suspects and who do not
help him when in trouble, and whoever loses will not receive you as you did
not take up arms to assist his cause. Antiochus went to Greece, being sent
by the Ætoli to expel the Romans. He sent orators to the Achæi who were
friends of the Romans to encourage them to remain neutral, on the other
hand the Romans persuaded them to take up arms on their side. The matter
was brought before the council of the Achæi for deliberation, where the
ambassador of Antiochus sought to persuade them to remain neutral, to
which the Roman ambassador replied: "As to what is said that it is best and
most useful for your state not to meddle in our war, nothing is further from
the truth; for if you do not meddle in it you will become, without any favour
or any reputation, the prize of the victor." And it will always happen that the
one who is not your friend will want you to remain neutral, and the one who
is your friend will require you to declare yourself by taking arms. Irresolute
princes, to avoid present dangers, usually follow the way of neutrality and
are mostly ruined by it. But when the prince declares himself frankly in
favour of one side, if the one to whom you adhere conquers, even if he is
powerful and you remain at his discretion, he is under an obligation to you
and friendship has been established, and men are never so dishonest as to
oppress you with such ingratitude.
Moreover, victories are never so prosperous that the victor does not need to
have some scruples, especially as to justice. But if he to whom you adhere
loses, you are sheltered by him, and so long as he can, he will assist you;
you become the companion of a fortune which may rise again. In the

second case, when those who fight are such that you have nothing to fear
from the victor, it is still more prudent on your part to adhere to one; for
you go to the ruin of one with the help of him who ought to save him if he
were wise, and if he conquers he rests at your discretion, and it is
impossible that he should not conquer with your help. And here it should be
noted that a prince ought never to make common cause with one more
powerful than himself to injure another, unless necessity forces him to it, as
before said; for if he wins you rest at his discretion, and princes must avoid
as much as possible being at the discretion of others. The Venetians united
with France against the Duke of Milan, although they could have avoided
that union, and from it resulted their own ruin. But when one cannot avoid
it, as happened to the Florentines when the pope and Spain went with their
armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince ought to join for the above
reasons. Let no state believe that it can follow a secure policy, rather let it
think that all are doubtful. This is found in the nature of things, that one
never tries to avoid one difficulty without running into another, but
prudence consists in being able to know the nature of the difficulties, and
taking the least harmful as good. A prince must also show himself a lover of
merit, and honour those who excel in every art. Moreover he must
encourage his citizens to follow their callings quietly, whether in
commerce, or agriculture, or any other trade that men follow, so that this
one shall not refrain from improving his possessions through fear that they
may be taken from him, and that one from starting a trade for fear of taxes;
but he should offer rewards to whoever does these things, and to whoever
seeks in any way to improve his city or state. Besides this, he ought, at
convenient seasons of the year, to keep the people occupied with festivals
and spectacles; and as every city is divided either into trades or into classes,
he ought to pay attention to all these things, mingle with them from time to
time, and give them an example of his humanity and magnificence, always
holding firm, however, the majesty of his dignity, which must never be
allowed to fan in anything whatever.

CHAPTER XXII

OF THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

The choice of a prince's ministers is a matter of no little importance; they
are either good or not according to the prudence of the prince. The first
impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains is from seeing the men
that he has about him. When they are competent and faithful one can always
consider him wise, as he has been able to recognise their ability and keep
them faithful. But when they are the reverse, one can always form an
unfavourable opinion of him, because the first mistake that he makes is in
making this choice. There was nobody who knew Messer Antonio da
Venafro as the minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who did not
consider Pandolfo to be a very prudent man, having him for his minister.
There are three different kinds of brains, the one understands things
unassisted, the other understands things when shown by others, the third
understands neither alone nor with the explanations of others. The first kind
is most excellent, the second also excellent, but the third useless. It is
therefore evident that if Pandolfo was not of the first kind, he was at any
rate of the second. For every time that one has the judgment to know the
good and evil that any one does or says, even if he has no invention, yet he
recognises the bad and good works of his minister and corrects the one and
supports the other; and the minister cannot hope to deceive him and
therefore remains good. For a prince to be able to know a minister there is
this method which never fails. When you see the minister think more of
himself than of you, and in all his actions seek his own profit, such a man
will never be a good minister, and you can never rely on him; for whoever
has in hand the state of another must never think of himself but of the
prince, and not call to mind anything but what relates to him. And, on the
other hand, the prince, in order to retain his fidelity ought to think of his
minister, honouring and enriching him, doing him kindnesses, and
conferring on him honours and giving him responsible tasks, so that the
great honours and riches bestowed on him cause him not to desire other
honours and riches, and the tasks he has to fulfil make him fearful of
changes, knowing that he could not execute them without the prince. When
princes and their ministers stand in this relation to each other, they can rely
the one upon the other; when it is otherwise, the end is always injurious
either for one or the other of them.

CHAPTER XXIII

HOW FLATTERERS MUST BE SHUNNED

I must not omit an important subject, and a mistake which princes can with
difficulty avoid, if they are not very prudent, or if they do not make a good
choice. And this is with regard to flatterers, of which courts are full,
because men take such pleasure in their own things and deceive themselves
about them that they can with difficulty guard against this plague; and by
wishing to guard against it they run the risk of becoming contemptible.
Because there is no other way of guarding one's self against flattery than by
letting men understand that they will not offend you by speaking the truth;
but when every one can tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A prudent
prince must therefore take a third course, by choosing in his state wise men,
and giving these alone full liberty to speak the truth to him, but only of
those things that he asks and of nothing else; but he must ask them about
everything and hear their opinion, and afterwards deliberate by himself in
his own way, and in these councils and with each of these men comport
himself so that every one may see that the more freely he speaks, the more
he will be acceptable. Outside these he should listen to no one, go about the
matter deliberately, and be determined in his decisions. Whoever acts
otherwise either acts precipitately through flattery or else changes often
through the variety of opinions, from which it happens that he is little
esteemed. I will give a modern instance of this. Pre' Luca, a follower of
Maximilian, the present emperor, speaking of his majesty said that he never
took counsel with anybody, and yet that he never did anything as he wished;
this arose from his following the contrary method to the aforesaid. As the
emperor is a secret man he does not communicate his designs to any one or
take any one's advice, but as on putting them into effect they begin to be
known and discovered, they begin to be opposed by those he has about him,
and he is easily diverted from his purpose. Hence it comes to pass that what
he does one day he undoes the next, no one ever understands what he
wishes or intends to do, and no reliance is to be placed on his deliberations.
A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes,
not when others wish; on the contrary he ought to discourage absolutely
attempts to advise him unless he asks it, but he ought to be a great asker,
and a patient hearer of the truth about those things which he has inquired of;

indeed, if he finds that any one has scruples in telling him the truth he
should be angry. And since some think that a prince who gains the
reputation of being prudent is so considered, not by his nature but by the
good councillors he has about him, they are undoubtedly deceived. It is an
infallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised,
unless by chance he left himself entirely in the hands of one man who ruled
him in everything, and happened to be a very prudent man. In this case he
may doubtless be well governed, but it would not last long, for that
governor would in a short time deprive him of the state; but by taking
counsel with many, a prince who is not wise will never have united councils
and will not be able to unite them for himself. The councillors will all think
of their own interests, and he will be unable either to correct or to
understand them. And it cannot be otherwise, for men will always be false
to you unless they are compelled by necessity to be true.
Therefore it must be concluded that wise counsels, from whoever they
come, must necessarily be due to the prudence of the prince, and not the
prudence of the prince to the good counsels received.

CHAPTER XXIV

WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

The before-mentioned things, if prudently observed, make a new prince
seem ancient, and render him at once more secure and firmer in the state
than if he had been established there of old. For a new prince is much more
observed in his actions than a hereditary one, and when these are recognised
as virtuous, he gains men more and they are more bound to him than if he
were of the ancient blood. For men are much more taken by present than by
past things, and when they find themselves well off in the present, they
enjoy it and seek nothing more; on the contrary, they will do all they can to
defend him, so long as the prince is not in other things wanting to himself.
And thus he will have the double glory of having founded a new realm and
adorned it and fortified it with good laws, good arms, good friends and

good examples; as he will have double shame who is born a prince and
through want of prudence has lost it.
And if one considers those rulers who have lost their position in Italy in our
days, such as the King of Naples, the Dukè of Milan and others, one will
find in them first a common defect as to their arms, for the reasons
discussed at length, then we observe that some of them either had the
people hostile to them, or that if the people were friendly they were not able
to make sure of the nobility, for without these defects, states are not lost that
have enough strength to be able to keep an army in the field. Philip of
Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but the one who was
conquered by Titus Quinteus, did not possess a great state compared to the
greatness of Rome and Greece which assailed him, but being a military man
and one who knew how to divert the people and make sure of the great, he
was able to sustain the war against them for many years; and if at length he
lost his power over several cities, he was still able to keep his kingdom.
Therefore, those of our princes who had held their possessions for many
years must not accuse fortune for having lost them, but rather their own
negligence; for having never in quiet times considered that things might
change (as it is a common fault of men not to reckon on storms, in fair
weather) when adverse times came, they only thought of fleeing from them,
instead of defending themselves; and hoped that the people, enraged by the
insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This measure, when others
are wanting, is good; but it is very bad to have neglected the other remedies
for that one, for nobody would desire to fall because he believed that he
would then find some one to pick him up. This may or may not take place,
and if it does, it is not with safety to you, as that defence is known to be
cowardly and not to be depended on; and only those defences are good,
certain and durable, which depend only on yourself and your own ability.

CHAPTER XXV

HOW MUCH FORTUNE CAN DO IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW
IT MAY BE OPPOSED

It is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that
worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by
their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no remedy
whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil much about
them, but let things be ruled by chance. This opinion has been more
believed in in our day, from the great changes that have been seen, and are
daily seen, beyond every human conjecture.
When I think about them at times, I am partly inclined to share this opinion.
Nevertheless, that our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it
may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows
the other half or a little less to be governed by us. I would compare her to
an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees
and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other; every
one flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to
oppose it; and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can
make provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises it will
either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous. It
happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where no measures
have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury where she knows that no
dams or barriers have been made to hold her. And if you regard Italy, which
has been the seat of these changes, and who has given the impulse to them,
you will see her to be a country without dams or barriers of any kind. If she
had been protected by proper measures, like Germany, Spain, and France,
this inundation would not have caused the great changes that it has, or
would not have happened at all. This must suffice as regards opposition to
fortune in general. But limiting myself more to particular cases, I would
point out how one sees a certain prince to-day fortunate and to-morrow
ruined, without seeing that he has changed in character or otherwise. I
believe this arises in the first place from the causes that we have already
discussed at length; that is to say, because the prince who bases himself
entirely on fortune is ruined when fortune varies. I also believe that he is
happy whose mode of proceeding accords with the needs of the times, and
similarly he is unfortunate whose mode of proceeding is opposed to the
times. For one sees that men in those things which lead them to the aim that
each one has in view, namely, glory and riches, proceed in various ways;
one with circumspection, another with impetuosity, one by violence,
another by cunning, one with patience, another with the reverse; and each

by these diverse ways may arrive at his aim. One sees also two cautious
men, one of whom succeeds in his designs, and the other not, and in the
same way two men succeed equally by different methods, one being
cautious, the other impetuous, which arises only from the nature of the
times, which does or does not conform to their method of proceeding. From
this results, as I have said, that two men, acting differently, attain the same
effect, and of two others acting in the same way, one arrives at his good and
not the other. From this depend also the changes in fortune, for if it happens
that time and circumstances are favourable to one who acts with caution
and prudence he will be successful, but if time and circumstances change he
will be ruined, because he does not change his mode of proceeding. No man
is found able to adapt himself to this, either because he cannot deviate from
that to which his nature disposes him, or else because having always
prospered by walking in one path, he cannot persuade himself that it is well
to leave it; and therefore the cautious man, when it is time to act suddenly,
does not know how to do so and is consequently ruined; for if one could
change one's nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never
change. Pope Julius II. acted impetuously in everything he did and found
the times and conditions so in conformity with that mode of proceeding,
that he always obtained a good result. Consider the first war that he made
against Bologna while Messer Giovanni Bentivogli was still living. The
Venetians were not pleased with it, the King of Spain and likewise France
had objections to this enterprise, notwithstanding which with his fierce and
impetuous disposition he engaged personally in the expedition. This move
caused both Spain and the Venetians to halt and hesitate, the latter through
fear, the former through the desire to regain the entire kingdom of Naples.
On the other hand, he engaged with him the King of France, because seeing
him make this move and desiring his friendship in order to put down the
Venetians, that king judged that he could not refuse him his troops without
manifest injury. Thus Julius by his impetuous move achieved what no other
pontiff with the utmost human prudence would have succeeded in doing,
because, if he had waited till all arrangements had been made and
everything settled before leaving Rome, as any other pontiff would have
done, it would never have taken place. For the king of France would have
found a thousand excuses, and the others would have inspired him with a
thousand fears. I will omit his other actions, which were all of this kind and
which all succeeded well, and the shortness of his life did not suffer him to

experience the contrary, for had times succeeded in which it was necessary
to act with caution, his ruin would have resulted, for he would never have
deviated from these methods to which his nature disposed him. I conclude
then that fortune varying and men remaining fixed in their ways, they are
successful so long as these ways conform to each other, but when they are
opposed to each other then they are unsuccessful. I certainly think that it is
better to be impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman, and it is
necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be
seen that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who
proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the young,
because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity.

CHAPTER XXVI

EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

Having now considered all the things we have spoken of, and thought
within myself whether at present the time was not propitious in Italy for a
new prince, and if there was not a state of things which offered an
opportunity to a prudent and capable man to introduce a new system that
would do honour to himself and good to the mass of the people, it seems to
me that so many things concur to favour a new ruler that I do not know of
any time more fitting for such an enterprise. And if, as I said, it was
necessary in order that the power of Moses should be displayed that the
people of Israel should be slaves in Egypt, and to give scope for the
greatness and courage of Cyrus that the Persians should be oppressed by the
Medes, and to illustrate the pre-eminence of Theseus that the Athenians
should be dispersed, so at the present time, in order that the might of an
Italian genius might be recognised, it was necessary that Italy should be
reduced to her present condition, and that she should be more enslaved than
the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, and more scattered than the
Athenians; without a head, without order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated, and
overrun, and that she should have suffered ruin of every kind. And although
before now a spirit has been shown by some which gave hope that he might

be appointed by God for her redemption, yet at the highest summit of his
career he was thrown aside by fortune, so that now, almost lifeless, she
awaits one who may heal her wounds and put a stop to the rapine and
pillaging of Lombardy, to the rapacity and extortion in the kingdom and in
Tuscany, and cure her of those sores which have long been festering.
Behold how she prays God to send some one to redeem her from this
barbarous cruelty and insolence. Behold her ready and willing to follow any
standard if only there be some one to raise it. There is nothing now she can
hope for but that your illustrious house may place itself at the head of this
redemption, being by its power and fortune so exalted, and being favoured
by God and the Church, whose leadership it now occupies. Nor will this be
very difficult to you, if you call to mind the actions and lives of the men I
have named. And although those men were rare and marvellous, they were
none the less men, and had each of them less occasion than the present, for
their enterprise was not juster than this, nor easier, nor was God more their
friend than He is yours. Here is a just cause; for that war is just which is
necessary; and those arms are merciful where no hope exists save in them.
Here is the greatest willingness, nor can there be great difficulty where
there is great willingness, provided that the measures are adopted of those
whom I have set before you as examples. Besides this, unexampled
wonders have been seen here performed by God, the sea has been opened, a
cloud has shown you the road, the rock has given forth water, manna has
rained, and everything has contributed to your greatness, the remainder
must be done by you. God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us
of freewill and the portion of the glory that falls to our lot. It is no marvel
that none of the before-mentioned Italians have done that which it is to be
hoped your illustrious house may do; and if in so many revolutions in Italy
and so many warlike operations, it always seems as if the military capacity
were extinct, this is because the ancient methods were not good, and no one
has arisen who knew how to discover new ones. Nothing does so much
honour to a newly-risen man than the new laws and measures which he
introduces. These things, when they are well based and have greatness in
them, render him revered and admired, and there is not lacking scope in
Italy for the introduction of every kind. Here there is great virtue in the
members, if it were not wanting in the heads. Look how in duels and in
councils of a few the Italians are superior in strength, dexterity, and
intelligence. But when it comes to armies they make a poor show; which

proceeds entirely from the weakness of the leaders, for those that know are
not obedient, and every one thinks that he knows, there being hitherto
nobody who has raised himself so high both by valour and fortune as to
make the others yield. Hence it comes about that in all this time, in all the
wars waged during the last twenty years, whenever there has been an army
entirely Italian it has always been a failure, as witness first Taro, then
Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, and Mestri. If your illustrious
house, therefore, wishes to follow those great men who redeemed their
countries, it is before all things necessary, as the true foundation of every
undertaking, to provide yourself with your own forces, for you cannot have
more faithful, or truer and better soldiers. And although each one of them
may be good, they will together become better when they see themselves
commanded by their prince, and honoured and supported by him. It is
therefore necessary to prepare such forces in order to be able with Italian
prowess to defend the country from foreigners. And although both the
Swiss and Spanish infantry are deemed terrible, none the less they each
have their defects, so that a third order might not only oppose them, but be
confident of overcoming them. For the Spaniards cannot sustain the attack
of cavalry, and the Swiss have to fear infantry which meets them with
resolution equal to their own. From which it has resulted, as will be seen by
experience, that the Spaniards cannot sustain the attack of French cavalry,
and the Swiss are overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a complete
example of the latter has not been seen, yet an instance was furnished in the
battle of Ravenna, where the Spanish infantry attacked the German
battalions, which observe the same order as the Swiss. The Spaniards,
through their bodily agility and aided by their bucklers, had entered
between and under their pikes and were in a position to attack them safely
without the Germans being able to defend themselves; and if the cavalry
had not charged them they would have utterly destroyed them. Knowing
therefore the defects of both these kinds of infantry, a third kind can be
created which can resist cavalry and need not fear infantry, and this will be
done not by the creation of armies but by a change of system. And these are
the things which, when newly introduced, give reputation and grandeur to a
new prince. This opportunity must not, therefore, be allowed to pass, for
letting Italy at length see her liberator. I cannot express the love with which
he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered under these
foreign invasions, with what thirst for vengeance, with what steadfast faith,

with what love, with what grateful tears. What doors would be closed
against him? What people would refuse him obedience? What envy could
oppose him? What Italian would rebel against him? This barbarous
domination stinks in the nostrils of every one. May your illustrious house
therefore assume this task with that courage and those hopes which are
inspired by a just cause, so that under its banner our fatherland may be
raised up, and under its auspices be verified that saying of Petrarch:
Valour against fell wrath
Will take up arms; and be the combat quickly sped!
For, sure, the ancient worth,
That in Italians stirs the heart, is not yet dead.

THE END

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