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Title: History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4)

Author: Great Britain. War Office

Compiler: John Frederick Maurice

Release date: February 23, 2009 [eBook #28158]
Most recently updated: July 29, 2010

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF
THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA 1899-1902 V. 1 (OF 4) ***

Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all other
inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling has been maintained.

The errors noted in the errata have been corrected in the text.

The maps at the end of this file are not of the best quality, other maps are
currently not available; this file will be updated when the missing maps or maps
of better quality are found.

HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
1899-1902

COMPILED BY DIRECTION OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE, K.C.B

WITH A STAFF OF OFFICERS

VOLUME I

LONDON
HURST AND BLACKETT LIMITED
1906

All rights reserved

PREFACE.

The decision of His Majesty's late Government, mentioned on the first
page of this history, was not finally given till November, 1905. It was,
therefore, not till December 12th, 1905, that I was able to obtain approval
for the form in which the political facts connected with the war are
mentioned in the first chapter. Since then the whole volume has necessarily
been recast, and it was not possible to go to page proof till the first chapter
had been approved. Hence the delay in the appearance of the volume. I took
over the work from Colonel Henderson in July, 1903. He had not then
written either narrative of, or comments on, the military operations.

F. Maurice.

May 22nd, 1906, London.

CONTENTS.

VOLUME I.

chap. page

I. Preparation for War 1
II. The Outbreak of the War 35
III. The Theatre of War 54
IV. The Boer Army 68
V. The British Army 87

VI. The Navy in the Boer War 96
VII. Talana Hill 123
VIII. The Retreat from Dundee, and the action of Rietfontein
142
IX. Elandslaagte 157
X. Lombards Kop 172
XI. The Arrival of Sir Redvers Buller 196
XII. Advance from the Orange River 211
XIII. Belmont 218
XIV. Graspan 229
XV. The Battle of the Modder River 243
XVI. The Raid on Southern Natal 261
XVII. Operations round Colesberg up to the 16th December 275
XVIII. Stormberg 285
XIX. Halt on the Modder River before Magersfontein 304
XX. The Battle of Magersfontein 316
XXI. Sir Redvers Buller in Face of Colenso 332
XXII. Colenso, December 15th, 1899 351
XXIII. Lord Roberts' Appointment to the Command in South
Africa 376
XXIV. Operations Round Colesberg—December 16th, 1899, to
February 6th, 1900 389
XXV. Lord Roberts at Capetown; reorganises 408
XXVI. The Army Moves Forward 428

APPENDICES.

No. page
1. Reinforcements sanctioned on 8th September, 1899 453
2. Distribution of British Forces on 11th October, 1899, in
Cape Colony 455
3. Distribution of British Forces on 11th October, 1899, in
Natal 456
4. Strengths of the Forces of the Transvaal and Orange Free
State 457
5. List of H.M. Ships and Vessels serving on the Cape Station,
October 11th, 1899, to June 1st, 1902 460
6. Approximate Strength and Casualties at Various
Engagements described in Volume I 462
7. The Expeditionary Force as originally organised and sent
to South Africa 471

8. The Composition and Distribution of British Troops in
Southern Natal, 23rd November, 1899 477
9. Reinforcements Landed in South Africa up to the 13th
February, 1900, other than those given in Appendices 1
and 7 478

10. Distribution of Troops in South Africa on 11th February,
1900, when the March from Ramdam began 485
Glossary 492

Index 497

LIST OF MAPS AND FREEHAND SKETCHES.

(In separate case.)

MAPS.

General Map:—South Africa.
Special Maps:—

No. 1. Index Map.
No. 2. Relief Map of South Africa, to show Topographical
Features and Theatre of War.
No. 3. Northern Natal.
No. 4. Southern Natal.
No. 5. Talana. October 20th, 1899.
No. 6. Elandslaagte. October 21st, 1899.
No. 7. Rietfontein. October 24th, 1899.
No. 8. Lombards Kop. October 30th, 1899. Situation before 7
a.m.
No. 8 (A). Lombards Kop. October 30th, 1899. Situation from 7
a.m. to Close of Action.
No. 9. North Cape Colony and Part of the Orange Free State.
No. 10. Belmont. November 23rd, 1899. Situation prior to
Capture of Gun Hill.

No. 10 (A). Belmont. November 23rd, 1899. Situation prior to
Capture of Mont Blanc.
No. 11. Graspan. November 25th, 1899. Situation at 9 a.m.
No. 12. Modder River. November 28th, 1899. Situation at
about 3.30 p.m.
No. 13. Magersfontein. December 11th 1899. Situation at 4.30
a.m.
No. 13 (A). Magersfontein. December 11th 1899. Situation at 8
a.m.
No. 13 (B). Magersfontein. December 11th, 1899. Situation at
3.30 p.m.
No. 14. Stormberg. December 10th, 1899.
No. 15. Colenso. December 15th, 1899. Situation at 8 a.m.
No. 15 (A). Colenso. December 15th, 1899. Situation at 11 a.m.
No. 16. Operations around Colesberg.
No. 17. South Africa. Map showing the approximate situation
on the 31st December, 1899.

FREEHAND SKETCHES.

Talana.
Rietfontein.
Modder River.
Magersfontein.
Stormberg.
Colenso.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED ON THE MAPS.

A. & S. Highrs. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Art. Artillery.
Art. Pos. Artillery position.
B.M.I. Bethune's Mounted Infantry.
Bn. Battalion.
Border. Border Regiment.
Br. Brigade.
Car. Carabineers.
Cav. Cavalry.
Cold. Gds. Coldstream Guards.
Co. Company.
Devon. Devonshire Regiment.
D.G. Dragoon Guards.
Dns. Dragoons.
Durh. L.I. Durham Light Infantry.
E. Surr. East Surrey Regiment.
Fus. Fusiliers.
Glouc. Gloucester Regiment.
Gordon., or
Gordon Highlanders.
Gordon Highrs.
Gren. Gds. Grenadier Guards.
Gds. Guards.
Highrs. Highlanders.
Hosp. Hospital.
How. Howitzers.
Hrs. Hussars.
I.L.H. Imperial Light Horse.

King's King's Liverpool Regiment.
K.O.Y.L.I. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
K.R. Rif. King's Royal Rifle Corps.
Lrs. Lancers.
L.I. Light Infantry.
Liv'rp'ls King's Liverpool Regiment.
Manch. Manchester Regiment.
M.B. Mountain Battery.
M.I. Mounted Infantry.
N. Car. Natal Carabineers.
N.F.A. Natal Field Artillery.
N.M.R. Natal Mounted Rifles.
North'd Fus. Northumberland Fusiliers.
North'n. Northamptonshire Regiment.
N. Lan. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.
Prs. Pounders (e.g., Naval 12-prs.).
Queen's Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment.
R.E. Royal Engineers.
R.F.A. Royal Field Artillery.
R.H.A. Royal Horse Artillery.
Rif. Brig. Rifle Brigade.
R.I. Rif. Royal Irish Rifles.
R. Irish Fus. Royal Irish Fusiliers.
R. Innis. Fus. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
R. Fus. Royal Fusiliers.
R. Muns. Fus. Royal Munster Fusiliers.
R. Sc. Fus. Royal Scots Fusiliers.
R. Welsh Fus. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
S.A.L.H. South African Light Horse.
S. Gds. Scots Guards.
Sco. Rif. Scottish Rifles.
T.M.I. Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry.
Prince of Wales's Own West Yorkshire
W. Yorks
Regiment.

MAPS TO VOLUME I.

Pains have been taken to embody in the maps all topographical
information existing up to date. A very considerable amount of valuable
triangulation has been executed over portions of South Africa, but no
systematic detailed survey has ever been made by any of the South African
colonies or states. Maps have, however, been compiled by both Cape
Colony and Natal. The former has prepared and published a map extending
north as far as Lat. 26° 30'; this includes the Bechuanaland Protectorate and
the Orange River Colony, but the topographical detail shown over these two
areas is exceedingly scanty. The scale of the map is one inch to 12.62 miles.

The Natal Government have a map similarly prepared and drawn in the
office of the Inspector of Schools, and published on a scale of one inch to
five miles. Both these maps are very fair general maps, and show with
rough accuracy the railways, main roads and large rivers, but the
delineation of hills is little more than suggestive.

Of the Orange Free State and Transvaal the only general maps published
are based on the farm surveys. As these surveys show only those
topographical features which serve to fix the farm boundary, omitting all
other features, the map resulting from their compilation is not of much use,
especially for military purposes.

Of the north of Natal there exists a series of one inch reconnaissance
surveys of the communications from Ladysmith to the Orange Free State
and Transvaal frontiers, with sketches of the whole of the Biggarsberg and
Laing's Nek positions, made in 1896 by Major S. C. N. Grant, Royal
Engineers, assisted by Captain W. S. Melville, Leicestershire regiment, and
Captain H. R. Gale, Royal Engineers.

It is from these sources, as modified here and there by special surveys
made during or since the war, that the general maps 1, 3, 4, and 9 have been
compiled.

Of the site of the battle of Talana no special survey has been made since
the war, and map 5 is a reproduction of a portion of Major Grant's
reconnaissance sketch before referred to.

Maps 6, 7, and 8, of the battles of Elandslaagte, Rietfontein and
Lombards Kop, are prepared from surveys made since the events occurred,
by No. 4 Survey section, Royal Engineers, working under Captain H. W.
Gordon, R.E., and maps 14 and 16, of Stormberg and Colesberg, have been
prepared also from sketches made by the same section.

Maps 10, 11, 12 and 13, of Belmont, Graspan, Modder River and
Magersfontein, are from sketches made by Nos. 2 and 3 Survey sections,
under Captain P. H. Casgrain, R.E. The two sections on map 12 are from
drawings by Lieut. J. Cuthbert, Scots Guards.

Map No. 15, of Colenso, is from a sketch made immediately after the
relief of Ladysmith by Major S. C. N. Grant, R.E., assisted by Captain P.
McClear, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and Lieut. S. A. Wilkinson, The King's
(Liverpool) regiment, and the sections from a sketch by Lieut. M. G.
Pollock, R.E.

In most instances the special survey of the site of the battle has had to be
extended by enlarging portions of the general maps on smaller scales. This
sometimes causes a difference in the amount of detail shown in different
areas of the same map, but this is unavoidable if the map be made to
illustrate, not only the action itself, but also the preceding and subsequent
movements.

The six panoramic sketches embodied in this Volume are facsimile
reproductions of a selection made from a number executed by the late
Captain W. C. C. Erskine, Bethune's Mounted Infantry.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN THE TEXT

A.A.G. Assistant Adjutant-General.
A.D.C. Aide-de-Camp.
A.S.C. Army Service Corps.
B.L. Breech-loading.
Battn. Battalion.
Brigade division=2 batteries of horse, or 3
of field artillery, commanded by a Lieut.-
Brig. divn.
Colonel. (The term has since been
changed to "brigade.")
Captn. Captain.
C.B. Companion of the Order of the Bath.
Cost, Insurance, Freight: i.e., under the
contract so designated the price paid
C.I.F. included the cost of the article, its
insurance while on the voyage, and
freight.
Companion of the Order of St. Michael
C.M.G.
and St. George.
Col. Colonel.
C.O. Commanding Officer.
Comder. Commander.
Cos. Companies.
Coy. Company.
C.R.A. Commanding Royal Artillery.
C.R.E. Commanding Royal Engineers.
C.S.O. Chief Staff Officer.
Cwt. Hundred-weight.

D.A.A.G. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for
D.A.A.G.I.
Intelligence.
Det. Detachment.
D.C.L.I. Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
D.G.O. Director General of Ordnance.
G.O.C. General Officer Commanding.
Govt. Government.
H.L.I. Highland Light Infantry.
H.M.S. His (or Her) Majesty's Ship.
I.L.H. Imperial Light Horse.
in. inch.
I.S.C. Indian Staff Corps.
Knight Commander of the Order of the
K.C.B.
Bath.
Knight Commander of the Order of St.
K.C.M.G.
Michael and St. George.
K.O.Y.L.I. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
K.R.R. King's Royal Rifle Corps.
Lieut. or Lt. Lieutenant.
Lt.-Col. Lieutenant-Colonel.
L. of C. Lines of communication.
L.I. Light Infantry.
Maritzburg Pietermaritzburg.
M.B. Mountain battery.
m/m millimetre.
M.I. Mounted Infantry.
M.L. Muzzle-loading.
N.N.V. Natal Naval Volunteers.
N.S.W. New South Wales.
N.S.W.L. New South Wales Lancers.
N.Z. New Zealand.
N.C.O. Non-commissioned officer.
O.F.S. Orange Free State.

pr. pounder.
P.T.O. Principal Transport Officer.
Q.F. Quick-firing.
Q.M.G. Quartermaster-general.
Regt. Regiment.
R.M.L. Rifle-muzzle-loading.
R.A.M.C. Royal Army Medical Corps.
R.A. " Artillery.
R.B. Rifle Brigade.
Royal Royal Commission on the War in South
Commission. Africa (1903).
R.E. Royal Engineers.
R.F.A. " Field Artillery.
R.G.A. " Garrison "
R.H.A. " Horse "
R.M.A. " Marine "
R.M.L.I. " " Light Infantry.
R.N. " Navy.
R. S. Fusiliers Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Sec. Section.
S.A. South Africa.
S.A.R. South African Republic.
Scots Greys 2nd Dragoons.
Sqdn. or Squadn. Squadron.
Tel. Telegram.
T.B. Telegraph battalion.
V.C. Victoria Cross.
W.O. War Office.

LIST OF ERRATA.

Page 2, line 13 from top, omit "(Arabic)".
" 14, line 2 from bottom, for "Sir H. Escombe" read "the
Right Hon. H. Escombe."
" 78, first marginal note, for "of" read "in."
" 128, second marginal note, for "comma" read "full
stop."
" 144, line 3 from top, for "The troops a Ladysmith" read
"The troops at Ladysmith."
" 144, last marginal note, omit "full stop" and read on.
" 160, bottom marginal note, for "full stop" read
"comma."
" 256, line 6 from bottom, for "Major T. Irvine" read
"Captain T. Irvine."
" 337, line 12 from bottom, for "semi-colon" read
"comma."

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

CHAPTER I.

PREPARATION FOR WAR.

of The war in South Africa which began on October 9th, 1899,
y. ended so far happily on the 31st May, 1902, that, chiefly in
consequence of the tactful management of the negotiations with the leaders
who then guided them, those who had till then fought gallantly against the
British Empire agreed to enter it as subjects of King Edward. Under the
circumstances, His Majesty's late Government considered it undesirable to
discuss here any questions that had been at issue between them and the
rulers of the two republics, or any points that had been in dispute at home,
and to confine this history to the military contest. The earlier period is
mentioned only so far as it concerns those incidents which affected the
preparation for war on the part of Great Britain, and the necessary
modifications in the plan of campaign which were influenced by the
unwillingness of Her Majesty's Government to believe in the necessity for
war.

ion Oct. When, on October 9th, 1899, Mr. Kruger's ultimatum was placed
99. in the hands of the British Agent at Pretoria the military situation
was as follows. It was known that the Boer Governments could summon to
arms over 50,000 burghers. British reinforcements of 2,000 men had been
sanctioned on the 2nd of August for a garrison, at that date not exceeding
9,940 men; and on the 8th September the Viceroy of India had been
instructed by telegram to embark with the least possible delay for Durban a
cavalry brigade, an infantry brigade, and a brigade division of field artillery.
Another brigade division and the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers were also
ordered out from home. The 1st battn. Border regiment was despatched
from Malta, the 1st battn. Royal Irish Fusiliers from Egypt, the 2nd battn.
Rifle Brigade from Crete, and a half-battn. 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry from Mauritius. The total strength of these reinforcements, ordered
on September 8th, amounted to 10,662 men of all ranks. On the same day,
the 8th September, the General Officer Commanding in South Africa, Sir F.
Forestier-Walker, was directed by telegram to provide land transport for
these troops. For details see Appendix I.

forces. The whole of these reinforcements, with the exceptions of the
9th Lancers and two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards, whose

departure from India was somewhat delayed by an attack of anthrax, a
brigade division of artillery, the 1st Border regiment and the 2nd battalion
Rifle Brigade, were landed in South Africa before the actual outbreak of
war. Including 2,781 local troops, the British force in Natal was thus raised
to 15,811 men of all ranks. In Cape Colony there were, either under arms or
immediately available at the outbreak of war, 5,221 regular and 4,574
colonial troops. In southern Rhodesia 1,448 men, raised locally, had been
organised under Colonel Baden-Powell, who had been sent out on the 3rd
July to provide for the defence of that region. Thus the British total in South
Africa, 27,054, was at least 20,000 smaller than the number of the burghers
whom the two republics could place in the field, irrespective of any
contingent that they might obtain from the disaffected in the two colonies.
Early in June Sir Redvers Buller had been privately informed that, in the
event of its becoming necessary to despatch an army corps to South Africa,
he would be the officer to command it. On June 8th, the Commander-in-
Chief had recommended that as a precautionary measure an army corps and
cavalry division should be organised and concentrated on Salisbury Plain.
He had proposed that one complete army corps, one cavalry division, one
battalion of mounted infantry, and four infantry battalions to guard the lines
of communication, should be sent out to South Africa, and he was most
anxious that the expeditionary force should be assembled beforehand, so as
to render it more effective for war purposes. The course of the negotiations
which were then being carried on convinced Her Majesty's Government that
any such step would tend to precipitate war, and, the weakness of our troops
at the time in South Africa being such as it was, that it would be impossible
to reinforce them before serious attack might be made upon them.
Moreover, there was this further difficulty, that adequate attention had not
been directed publicly to the circumstances in South Africa which caused
anxiety to the Government.

s of It was always possible to think that the preparations for war on a
large scale, which were undoubtedly being made both by the
Transvaal and by the Orange Free State, were the result of the anxiety
which had been caused to the rulers of those republics by the circumstances
of the Jameson raid. Every attempt by any statesman at home to bring the
facts, as they presented themselves to those behind the scenes, before the
world, was open to the imputation of being deliberately designed to lead up

to a war which it was intended to bring about. Thus it was the very
weakness of our position at that time in South Africa which made it difficult
to relieve the military danger. Any premature effort to place our power there
in a condition of adequate security tended to suggest to foreign states that
the movements made were directed against the independence of the two
republics; tended to shake public confidence at home, and even to excite
jealousy in our own colonies. All through the long negotiations which were
carried on during the summer and autumn months of 1899 it seemed better,
therefore, to incur even some serious risk of military disadvantage rather
than to lose that general support of the nation, whether at home or in the
colonies, which would be secured by a more cautious policy, and to hope
against hope that a peaceful solution might be reached.

quate In one respect there would appear to have been a
th." misunderstanding between the Government and their military
advisers as to the sense in which the reinforcements sent to South Africa
were sufficient for the temporary protection of our interests on the sub-
continent. It is remarkable that in the evidence subsequently given by the
soldiers, not only do they admit that they anticipated beforehand that for
this purpose the strength would be adequate, but that they assume, at the
end of the war, that it had as a matter of fact proved so. This can obviously
only be understood in the sense that the numbers then in South Africa were
able to retard the Boer operations until a large army was thrown into the
country. On the other hand, Lord Lansdowne, describing what was
evidently the meaning in which this language was understood by himself
and his colleagues, says: "I am not a soldier, but I never heard of sending
out reinforcements to a country which might become the theatre of war
merely in order that the reinforcements might successfully defend
themselves against attack; they are sent there, I imagine, for the purpose of
securing something or somebody." And again: "I should say not sufficient to
prevent raids and incursions, but sufficient to prevent the colonies from
being overrun." It appears necessary, under its historical aspect, to draw
attention to this discrepancy of view, because it is one that may be liable to
repeat itself.

delayed. Another point influenced by the unwillingness of Her Majesty's
Government to believe in the possibility of the Orange Free State,

with which we had had for many years relations of the greatest friendliness,
appearing in arms against us, was this: that it delayed for a very
considerable time the determination of the general plan of campaign on
which the war was to be carried on. Practically, supposing it became
necessary to conduct an offensive war against the Transvaal, the choice of
operations lay between a movement by way of Natal and one by way of the
Orange Free State. Any advance by Natal had these serious disadvantages.
In the first place, the mountain region through which it would be necessary
to penetrate was one that gave very great advantages to the Boer riflemen.
In the second place, it lay exposed, as soon as Northern Natal was entered,
to attack throughout its entire length from the Orange Free State. On the
other hand, the march by Bloemfontein opened up a country much more
favourable for the operations of a regular army, whether that march, as was
originally proposed, followed the direct line of railway through
Bloemfontein, or, as it did ultimately, the railway to Kimberley and thence
struck for Bloemfontein.[1] There remained, indeed, a third alternative,
which had at one time been proposed by Lord Roberts, of a movement
outside the Orange Free State through the north-western portion of Cape
Colony, but this had ceased to be applicable at the time when war was
declared. As a consequence of the uncertainties as to the ultimate attitude of
the Orange Free State, and the extreme hope that that State would not prove
hostile, it was not till the 3rd October that Lord Lansdowne was in a
position to say: "We have now definitely decided to adopt the Cape Colony
—Orange Free State route. It is intended that a force of 10,000 men should
remain in Natal, on which side it will make a valuable diversion; that about
3,000 should be detailed for service on the west side (Kimberley, etc.), and
that the main force should enter the Orange Free State from the south."

of force. In all schemes for possible offensive war by Great Britain,
subsequent to a memorandum by Mr. Stanhope, of 1st June, 1888,
[2] it had been contemplated that the utmost strength which it would be
necessary for us to embark from our shores would be that of two army
corps with a cavalry division. Those army corps and the cavalry division
were, however, neither actually, nor were they supposed to be, immediately
ready to be sent out. To begin with, for their despatch shipping must be
available, and this, as will be shown more in detail in a subsequent chapter,
was a matter which would involve considerable delay and much

preparation. During the time that the ships were being provided it would be
essential that the successive portions of the army for which shipping could
be obtained should be prepared for war by the return to the depôts of those
soldiers who were not immediately fit for service, and by their replacement
by men called in from the reserve to complete the ranks. None of these
preparations could be made without attracting public attention to what was
done. The reserves could not be summoned to the colours without an
announcement in Parliament, nor, therefore, without debates, which must
necessarily involve discussions which might be irritating to Boer
susceptibilities at the very time when it was most hoped that a peaceful
solution would be reached. It was not, therefore, till the 20th September that
the details of the expeditionary force were communicated to the Admiralty
by the War Office, nor till the 30th that the Admiralty was authorised to take
up shipping. Meantime on September 22nd, a grant of £645,000 was made
for immediate emergencies. On the 7th October the order for the
mobilisation of the cavalry division, one army corps, and eight battalions of
lines of communication troops was issued, and a Royal proclamation calling
out the army reserve was published. Of the excellent arrangements made by
the Admiralty a full account will be found hereafter.

cheme of The scheme for mobilisation had been gradually developed
isation. during many years. The earliest stage was the appearance in the
Army List of an organisation of the army in various army corps. This was
chiefly useful in showing the deficiencies which existed. It had been drawn
up by the late Colonel Home, R.E. In August, 1881, it was removed from
the Army List.

us stages Practically no mobilisation scheme really took shape until 1886,
eme. when Major-General H. Brackenbury,[3] on assuming office as head
of the Intelligence branch, turned his attention to the question. The
unorganised condition of our army and the deficiency of any system for
either home defence or action abroad formed the subjects of three papers,[4]
in which he showed that, at the time they were written, not even one army
corps with its proper proportion of the different departmental branches,
could have been placed in the field, either at home or abroad, while for a
second army corps there would have been large deficiencies of artillery and
engineers, and no departments. For horses there was no approach to an

adequate provision. The urgent representations contained in these papers
were strongly taken up by Lord Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, and
pressed by him on the Secretary of State for War,[5] with the result that a
committee of two, Sir Ralph Thompson[6] and Major-General H.
Brackenbury, was appointed to investigate the matter.

ivision Their enquiry was entirely confined to the question of obtaining
ry out. the maximum development from the existing cadres. Their report
was divided under three headings, the first of which dealt with the "Field
Army," and laid down that two army corps and lines of communication
troops was the field army which the regular troops, as they then stood, were
capable of producing. The subjects of "Garrisons" and "Mobilisation for
Foreign Service" were dealt with under the other two headings. Ultimately a
Mobilisation sub-division, which was transferred from the Intelligence
department to the Adjutant-General's department in 1889 and to the
Commander-in-Chief's office, in 1897, was created.

to 1898. Working on the lines laid down, the mobilisation section first
produced a complete scheme in 1890. Mobilisation regulations
were issued in 1892. Further revised editions followed in 1894, and again in
1898. All were worked out on the basis of using what was available, and not
what was needed.

me in In the spring of 1899, in anticipation of possible events, the
mobilisation section turned their attention to the requirements of a
force for South Africa. Seeing that the regulations of 1898 dealt principally
with the mobilisation of the field army for service at home or in a temperate
climate, considerable modifications, relating to such points as regimental
transport, clothing, equipment, and regimental supplies, were necessary to
meet the case of operations carried on in South Africa. Special "Regulations
for the Mobilisation of a Field Force for Service in South Africa" were
accordingly drawn up, with the object, not of superseding the Mobilisation
regulations of 1898, but "in order to bring together, in a convenient form,
the modifications necessary in those regulations." These regulations were
completed, printed, and ready for issue in June, 1899. In their general
application they provided for the preparation in time of peace of all that

machinery which, on the advent of war, would be set in motion by the issue
of the one word—"Mobilise."

ss in The mobilisation, thus carefully prepared in all its details
ce. beforehand, proved a complete success. Ninety-nine per cent. of
the reservists when called out presented themselves for service, and 91 per
cent, were found physically fit. The first units, twenty companies of the
Army Service Corps, were embarked on the 6th of October. The
embarkation of the remainder of the expeditionary force was begun on the
20th of October, and, with the exception of one cavalry regiment, delayed
by horse-sickness, completed on the 17th November.

units At an early stage in the war it became very plain that mere drafts
d. of details to replenish units would not suffice, but that organised
reinforcements would have to be sent. Even before the embarkation of the
field force was completed, orders were given for reinforcements to be
despatched; and within three months from that time the mobilisation of four
more divisions, fifteen extra batteries of artillery and a fourth cavalry
brigade, was ordered.[7]

th The machinery of the Mobilisation sub-division was equal to the
ng. task and continued to work smoothly, while the Adjutant-General's
department was enabled, with little difficulty, to find men to complete units
on mobilisation.[8] All these units were brought up to their establishment
from their own regimental reserves. In order to keep them up to their
strength it was estimated that it would be necessary to send out a series of
drafts, calculated on a basis of 10 per cent. for every three months.[9] This
was the system which was put into operation from the first, and
subsequently adhered to as far as possible, drafts being detailed from
regimental reserves. It was, however, soon found necessary to introduce
modifications in accordance with the wastage which varied in the different
arms, as well as in the different units.[10] In addition to the regular stream of
drafts, special drafts had occasionally to be sent out to make good instances
of abnormal loss. Especially was this the case with infantry battalions.[11]
quate Consequently, the regimental reserves of some units were
e. exhausted before those of others, and it became necessary to draw
on the reserves of other corps which had more than they required, their

militia reserves being selected for the purpose. By the time the war had
lasted a year the equivalents of five drafts on the 10 per cent. basis had left
England. But a limit had been reached. "By the end of a year's campaigning
our infantry reserves proper, including the now non-existent militia reserve,
were exhausted, a point which was emphasised by Lord Lansdowne in the
following words in his minute of 2nd June, 1900....:

"'Two points stand out clearly: (1) That in future campaigns we must
expect demands on a vast scale for infantry drafts; (2) that our reserve is not
large enough and must be increased.'"[12]

Short service had made it possible to build up a reserve substantial
enough to minister to the unprecedented requirements of the regular army
for a year. Without it, the end of our resources in trained men would have
been reached at a very early stage.

wing, One difficulty arose. Staffs of many formations, such as those of
esults. mounted infantry, ammunition columns and medical field units, did
not exist. The completion of these new creations for the original field force
necessitated the borrowing of officers and men from other bodies, which, as
was supposed at that time, would not be mobilised. As the strain continually
grew more severe it was found necessary to mobilise successive divisions
and additional batteries. Then, not only had the loans to be made good to
those depleted, but nearly the whole of the personnel had to be found for the
further number of fresh organisms which were called into existence. This
could only be done by yet more borrowing. The difficulty, therefore,
progressively increased. More particularly was this the case with the
ammunition columns, the creation of which, together with the additional
batteries of artillery, caused a drain on artillery reservists, which resulted in
their being absorbed more quickly than those of the other branches of the
service.[13] All these special bodies, though essential for war, were outside
the peace establishment of the army. It became, therefore, necessary to call
out "the whole of the remainder of the Army Reserve, in order to be able to
utilise the services of reservists belonging to Section D., none of whom
could, by law, be called out until all the reservists of all arms, in Sections A.
B. and C. had been called up."[14] This was done by special Army Order on
December 20th, 1899.[15]

tanhope's There was little breathing time between the successive
orps embarkations of the mobilised divisions from the commencement
ded.
on 20th October, 1899, to the completion on 18th April, 1900, with
the result that in the space of six months more than the equivalent of the
two army corps and the cavalry division, laid down in Mr. Stanhope's
memorandum as that which we should be prepared to send abroad in case of
necessity, had left our shores. By the despatch of these troops, followed by
later demands for reinforcements, our organised field army was practically
exhausted, and home defence, "the primary duty" of the whole army, was
enfeebled to a dangerous degree. In place of the army corps, "partly
composed of regulars and partly of Militia," required by the memorandum,
there remained for home service a few regular troops, some hastily formed
"Reserve Battalions," and such of the embodied Militia, the Yeomanry, and
the Volunteers, as had not already gone abroad—all being for the most part
unorganised, partially trained, and not fully equipped.

nd Mr. Stanhope's view of the "improbable probability"[16] of the
ds supplyemployment of "an army corps in the field in any European war"—
ts.
and if not in Europe, then where else?—certainly not in South
Africa—had had its effect. In respect of numbers, it imposed a limit on the
powers of preparation; and the condition of affairs was precisely expressed
by the following sentence: "The war conclusively proved, therefore, that
Mr. Stanhope's memorandum did not make sufficient allowance for the
general needs of the Empire."[17]

Intelligence and Maps.

Whatever interpretation might be placed as between the Governments on
the accumulation of warlike stores in the Transvaal and Free State, it had
been obviously the duty of the Intelligence department of the War Office to
watch these as closely as the prevailing conditions permitted. This had been
done ever since 1896, when the Commander-in-Chief had directed the
department to undertake the investigation. The material thus obtained was
collated in June, 1898, in the form of a handbook, entitled, "Military Notes
on the Dutch Republics of South Africa," which set forth in a concise form
the military strength, armament, organisation and tactics of the Boer army.
A revised edition of this book was issued in June, 1899. Other handbooks,

containing special reconnaissances executed in the more important
strategical localities of South Africa, and summaries of information as to
the various states and colonies, were also prepared with a view to the
possibility of active operations. The Royal Commission on the South
African War was able to pronounce in its Report (paragraph 257) that the
information contained in these handbooks, as well as in a "valuable" series
of memoranda extending over several years, was in many respects
remarkably accurate.

— Adequate military maps of the vast theatre over which the
vaal and operations of the 1899-1902 war subsequently spread could only
State.
have been produced by the employment for many years of a large
survey staff. The production of correct maps of the Transvaal and Free State
on a scale of four miles to the inch would alone have taken five years to
complete, and would have cost £100,000. The state of tension existing
between Great Britain and the two republics in the years immediately
preceding the war rendered it impossible to undertake any serious work of
this description within those States.

—Cape As regards the Cape Colony and Natal, the survey of all self-
atal. governing colonies has been, and still is, regarded by the Imperial
Government as a matter for the Colonial Governments. The survey of Cape
Colony alone on a scale large enough for tactical purposes would have cost
£150,000, and it would have been perfectly useless to ask the Treasury to
sanction the provision of any such sum. A map, on a scale of twelve and a
half miles to an inch, had been produced by the Survey department of the
Cape Government, covering Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, and
part of the Transvaal, and arrangements were made with the Colonial
Government for supplies of this for issue to the troops on the outbreak of
war. Of the northern parts of Natal two military maps, produced during the
previous wars on a scale of four miles and one mile to an inch were
available. But, though copies of one of these maps were subsequently
reproduced by the Boers and used by them in their operations on the
Tugela, it was well known that they were not accurate and had not been
corrected up to date. By arrangement, therefore, with the Natal Government
and at their expense, the Director of Military Intelligence sent Major S. C.
N. Grant, R.E., from England, in 1896, to execute a more careful

reconnaissance of the portion of Natal north of Ladysmith. Recognising that
the map thus produced might prove insufficient, Sir J. Ardagh, in 1897,
urged personally on the Right Hon. H. Escombe, the Prime Minister of
Natal, the importance of continuing this survey, and the latter promised to
endeavour to make such arrangements as he could, although he stated that
political considerations rendered it difficult for him to ask the Natal
Parliament to provide funds for a survey of the colony avowedly for
military purposes. Sir H. Escombe's Ministry subsequently went out of
office, and the only map of Natal existing at the outbreak of war, besides
those above referred to, was one on a scale of five miles to an inch prepared
locally for educational purposes.

gence For the Transvaal and Orange Free State the compilation, from
nd all the material available, of a map on a scale 1-250,000 was
s.
commenced in January, 1899, by the Intelligence division; twelve
sheets were completed and issued before October, 1899, and the remainder
shortly afterwards. In the same year a map of the Transvaal, compiled by C.
Jeppe from farm surveys, was produced under the auspices of the
Government of that State. A limited number of copies of this map were
obtained by the Intelligence division and issued on the outbreak of war to
the higher staffs. Subsequently in January, 1900, Colonel G. F. R.
Henderson, Lord Roberts' Director of Military Intelligence, was fortunate
enough to seize at Capetown a thousand copies of this survey, and maps
were compiled from them by the Field Intelligence department. These
proved of great service in the advance northward.

e The provision of maps for the many possible theatres of war in
on. which British troops may be employed is a difficult question. In the
present case the above statement will account for the fact that the maps
provided by the War Office at the outbreak of the South African war were
pronounced by the Royal Commission on that war to have been, "with
perhaps one exception, very incomplete and unreliable" (paragraph 261).

These matters preparatory to the war were not, in the ordinary work of
the departments, separated by any distinct break from the routine necessary
after hostilities had begun.

The Distribution of responsibility between the several offices in regard to
the despatch of an army to the field was as follows. The Adjutant-General's
department was charged with all that affected the actual personnel—the
flesh and blood—in such matters as the necessary qualifications of age or
service, the completion of cadres with specialists, and the maintenance of
recruiting. It was the province of the Military Secretary's department of the
Commander-in-Chief's office to select the staffs and allot the commands.
The provision of equipment, clothing, and ordnance supplies was the duty
of the Director-General of Ordnance; with the Quartermaster-General rested
the provision of animals to complete the war establishment, supplies of
food, and, in conjunction with the Admiralty, arrangements for sea
transport. The two departments of the Director-General and Quartermaster-
General, long before the final sanction was given, had worked out on paper
the details of future requirements.

nal Apart from those proposals of the Commander-in-Chief to which
at War it had not been possible for Her Majesty's Government to accede,
e.
for the reason already given, the several officers at Headquarters
had done what they could to make for possible future events such
preparation as did not involve expenditure. Sir Evelyn Wood, both as
Quartermaster-General and as Adjutant-General, carried on a vigorous
private correspondence with the several General Officers Commanding at
the Cape, and it was at his instance that as early as the autumn of 1896
contracts were made with Messrs. Weil, who had complete command of the
Cape market, for the supply of horses, mules, and wagons at short notice
when called for. He sent for one of the firm to come to England, but a
decision was given in the spring of 1897 against immediate action. In April,
1898, he again asked that the whole subject, both of transport and of the
despatch of cavalry and artillery to South Africa, should be taken up.
Moreover, in 1897, he had pressed for horse-fittings for shipping, fearing
the trouble in this matter, which subsequently actually occurred. On taking
over the duties of Adjutant-General on October 1st, 1897, he, in view of the
extensive territory lately acquired in Rhodesia, proposed the addition of
9,000 infantry to the army. The Commander-in-Chief, in forwarding this
memorandum, added to his request an additional 4,000 men beyond what
Sir E. Wood had recommended. As late as February, 1898, the transport,
necessary to make the troops in South Africa fit to take the field, was

refused, though pressed for by the Commander-in-Chief, in consequence of
a private letter to Sir E. Wood, which showed Sir A. Milner's anxiety on the
subject. To suppress a small rebel Basuto chief it would have required a
month to get transport ready. At a time when a man so intimate with South
African affairs as Mr. Rhodes was deriding all fears of Boer power, war was
not believed to be imminent, and the long habit of saving the public purse
during peace time was operative against expenditure, which would not be
needed if there were no war and no need for suppressing Basuto rebels. The
same cause had delayed till April, 1897, the necessary supply of horses to
infantry regiments, at which date £36,000 was granted for this purpose.
Both these horses and the training of mounted infantry at home had been
repeatedly asked for by Sir Evelyn Wood as Quartermaster-General, by Sir
Redvers Buller as Adjutant-General, and by Lord Wolseley as Commander-
in-Chief.

Equipment and Transport.

From the great variety of countries and climates, in which it has been the
fate of the British army to be engaged for the last hundred years or more, it
has always been impossible to foresee what the particular equipment
required for any given expedition would be.[18] To keep up permanently all
the transport animals and the large reserves of food supplies needed for both
animals and men would have been wasteful extravagance. In one campaign,
only human porterage had been possible; in another, only transport by river
boats; in another, it had been necessary to rely chiefly on camels; in
another, on the development of canal and railway communication.
Therefore, much time is always needed before it is possible so to prepare a
British army that it is ready to wage war. An army is as little able to march
till it is supplied with the necessary transport as a man would be without
proper shoes, or a cavalryman without his horse. For such a war as was in
prospect in South Africa, ranging possibly over tens of thousands of square
miles, immense quantities, both of animals and vehicles, would be needed.
A considerable proportion of these could no doubt be procured in the
country itself, but from the numbers required it was necessary to extend our
purchases over almost all the civilised world. This was another of the cases

in which the necessity not to provoke war tended to prevent preparations for
war.

transport The question of land transport, on which so much of the conduct
of a campaign must depend, was one of the highest importance.
The nature of the South African country, and the absence of roads, rendered
it necessary that transport vehicles, intended for horse-draught, should be
adapted for draught by animals suitable to the country and likely to be
obtainable—namely, oxen and mules. The form of the wagons in use had
been settled twenty years before on South African experience, by a
committee consisting of Sir Redvers Buller and Colonel H. S. E. Reeves,
but the South African brake, not being convenient for home service, was no
longer used, so that this had to be supplied. Moreover, it was necessary to
convert the carriages to pole draught for mule traction. The Director-
General of Ordnance[19] asked, on July 26th, 1899, for authority to carry out
this change, involving an outlay of £17,650, but at this time, for reasons
already given, sanction was refused to any expenditure on preparations for
despatching an army to South Africa.

"On the 1st September the Director-General of Ordnance again asked for
authority. On the 5th September, in putting forward a schedule of
requirements, he pointed out that this service would take ten weeks, and
said the sanction of those items should be given at once, on account of the
time required to manufacture and obtain them, and that if put off till the
force is ordered to mobilise it would be impossible to guarantee their being
ready in time."[20]

. In the still existing circumstances, neither the importance of the
demand, nor the smallness of the sum asked, saved the requisition
from sharing the fate of others, and authority for the expenditure was not
received until the partial grant of September 22nd.[21] Once begun, the work
was actually carried out in sixteen days less than the estimated time, but the
delay was sufficient to prevent sixteen or more units from being
accompanied by the vehicles of their regimental transport.[22]

G. Early in September an arrangement had been come to between
des the Director-General of Ordnance (who, under normal conditions,
es.
was responsible for the provision of all transport vehicles and

harness) and the Quartermaster-General, whereby the latter undertook the
furnishing of transport wagons and harness for supply trains and parks. This
in fact was carried out in South Africa.

G. and The Quartermaster-General, in response to demands from the
es. General Officer Commanding in South Africa, had sent two
months' reserve supplies from time to time since the beginning of June for
the troops already there. On receipt of the authority of September 22nd, one
month's reserves for 50,000 men, 12,000 horses and 15,000 mules were
ordered, and these were shipped by October 30th. Further expenditure was
sanctioned on September 29th. Another month's supplies for the same
numbers were therefore ordered to be despatched about November 18th.
The provision of such quantities took time and, in consequence of the delay
in obtaining sanction for expenditure, the Quartermaster-General was hard
pressed in furnishing the supplies early enough, but succeeded in doing so.

Remount Department.

The provision of horses and mules to complete the war establishment for
mounted units was one function of the Quartermaster-General. The
Inspector-General of Remounts was charged, under him, with the detail
work connected therewith. As far back as 1887 a system of registration of
horses had been established in order to form a reserve to meet a national
emergency. With the aid of this reserve, it was calculated that horses could
be provided in sufficient numbers to complete the mobilisation of the force
laid down in Mr. Stanhope's memorandum and to make good the wastage of
the first six months. The number estimated for these purposes was 25,000.
[23] No difficulty, it was thought, would be experienced in obtaining this
number and, with the supply for six months' wastage in hand, time would
be available to arrange for meeting further demands if they arose.

ase of Transport mules would in any case have to be purchased abroad
and and records were preserved of the resources of different mule-
s.
producing countries; but there had been no expectation of having to
supplement, to any extent, the home supply of horses. The Inspector-
General of Remounts had personal experience of horse purchase in
Argentina, and the success which had attended his transactions there,

coupled with his knowledge of the market, led him to believe that there
would be no difficulty in obtaining from that country a supply of good and
suitable horses, sufficient to meet any demand that might be reasonably
expected.[24] Information regarding the horse markets of other countries did
not go beyond such personal knowledge as a few individuals in the
department happened to possess. So enormous did demands eventually
become, that it is open to question whether, had all possible information
been at command, there existed for sale anywhere a sufficient number of
horses of the right age and stamp, trained to saddle and in condition, to
furnish the numbers required.[25] Purchases of horses were, indeed, made in
South Africa before the war, under the orders of the General Officer
Commanding in that country. This was done as a mere matter of local
convenience, not as a preparation for war. Furthermore, in the middle of
September financial approval was given for the purchase "of 260 Australian
horses to replace the next year's casualties."[26] Illusions as to the
sufficiency of the home supply were speedily dispelled by the unforeseen
conditions accompanying the transition from peace to war. Not only was the
Remount department required to provide horses and mules for a far larger
British army than had ever before taken the field, but that army was
operating at an immense distance from its base over a larger extent of
country than any over which a British army had ever before been called
upon to act. Besides this, no force previously sent into the field by any
nation has included in its composition such a large proportion of mounted
men. Consequently, the demands on the Remount department were of
unprecedented magnitude.[27]

nce of What contributed not a little to these demands was the absence
s. of preparation in South Africa in establishing beforehand depôts
from which a regular supply could be maintained, and in which imported
animals could rest after the voyage and become to a certain extent
acclimatised before they were used in the field.

l In June, 1899, the Inspector-General had represented the
sion of necessity of sending out a proper remount establishment to receive
s.
animals, and a supervising staff. This proposal was only adopted to
the extent that, on June 22nd, sanction was given for an Assistant-Inspector
of Remounts, accompanied by a small staff, to go to South Africa. In

August, 1899, approval was given for the retention of the existing depôt at
Stellenbosch as a temporary measure, while on the Natal side "the present
depôt" was reported by the Officer Commanding troops as being "sufficient
for all that the War Office had sanctioned."[28]

s and Estimates of the number of mules which would be required to be
purchased abroad for regimental transport had been worked out in
June. A limited number had already been obtained in South Africa, and
before the war broke out the General Officer Commanding there had
entered into contracts for the supply of 1,470 additional animals. This met
the immediate necessity, and the subsequent purchases from all parts of the
world enabled every unit landing in Cape Colony to be completely
equipped with regimental transport when it reached its concentration
station.[29] In Natal ox-transport was principally used as being more suitable
for the country.

als from In order to supplement this supply and "with a view to possible
d. contingencies, about the middle of July, 1899, commissions of
officers, to make preliminary enquiries, were sent to the United States of
America, to Spain and to Italy."[30] In order that these preparations,
indispensable if war was declared, should not tend to excite war, the
Secretary of State had given instructions that these officers should not
attract attention to their mission. They were not allowed to make any
purchases until they received instructions. These were telegraphed on 23rd
September, 1899, authorising the buying of 1,000 in Spain, 3,000 in Italy,
and 4,000 at New Orleans.

for The conveyance of mules (but not horses) from ports abroad was
. carried out by the Admiralty, and some difficulty was experienced
at first in chartering ships suitable for the purpose. The first ship-load did
not arrive in South Africa until 8th November. Mules for troops from India
were shipped under arrangements made by the Indian Government in
conjunction with the Admiralty Transport Officer.

nds fully The department succeeded in furnishing, and even in exceeding,
the numbers demanded from time to time. It had undertaken the
transport of horses purchased abroad, an arrangement which, while
relieving the Admiralty, caused no competition, as a different class of ship

was required. Horses and mules purchased in various countries were poured
into South Africa. They were used up almost as soon as they arrived.

ulties of There was no arrangement made for easy and rapid expansion.
unt "The Inspector-General of Remounts could do no more with the
tment.
organisation with which he was furnished; his functions were
strictly limited, and his staff even more so. It was inevitable that when a
department so equipped, and with no provision for expansion, was called
upon to extend its operations largely, there must be some lack of system."
[31] In addition to these difficulties, the department had to face others. It was
from the first made the object of attacks in the Press and in Parliament. It
was scarcely possible that the circumstances as here recorded should be
understood. To the labours of the officials, already worked to breaking
strain, was added the duty of preparing constant written explanations of
their actions, and this to an extent that seriously interfered with the despatch
of their current business.

Army Service Corps.

There was no difficulty in bringing the personnel of the transport
companies and supply detachments of the Army Service Corps up to the
war establishment laid down for them. Yet the total strength of the corps,
with its reserves called up, was far below what was required to meet the
calls which were eventually made on it. "After withdrawing nearly every
officer of the corps from England and stations abroad it was necessary to
employ in South Africa 126 additional officers of other corps up to June,
1900, which number was increased to nearly 250 later on in the war. To
replace officers in England and stations abroad, 98 retired and reserve
officers were employed. The transport personnel (non-commissioned
officers and artificers) of the companies in South Africa, when they were
subsequently divided into two, was hardly sufficient to carry on the work,
but a large number of promotions were made to fill up the deficiencies.
With the supply branch in South Africa, 364 civilians were engaged as
clerks, bakers, and issuers, and civilians were employed at every station at
home to take the place of Army Service Corps clerks."[32]

Drivers On the other hand, the nature of the transport in South Africa
e A.S.C. rendered the employment of native mule and ox drivers almost
imperative. A surplus of Army Service Corps drivers was thus created
sufficient to enable 600 to be lent to the Royal artillery, leaving enough to
be retained for duty at home and abroad. The duties of four remount depôts
in Cape Colony and one in Natal were also carried out by the Army Service
Corps during the first part of the war until relieved by remount depôts from
England and India.

despatch A notable feature in connection with the Army Service Corps
S.C. was its employment, before the outbreak of hostilities, in a rôle that
was essentially preparatory. For the first time in the history of the corps,
transport companies and supply detachments were sent in advance of the
troops whom they were to serve, and prepared the way for them. With the
despatch of two companies in July to make good the transport of the
existing force in South Africa, five officers also proceeded to South Africa
to assist in organising the supply and transport duties in the event of a large
force being sent out.[33] Further embarkations took place in September and
October, and the remainder of the Army Service Corps units, detailed for
duty with the army corps, embarked before war had actually been declared,
and before any of the troops of the army corps had sailed. The advantages
attending these measures were that not only did all units on arriving at their
concentration stations in South Africa find their transport ready for them,
but the transport and supply services generally were organised and in
working order for their share of the operations.

Royal Army Medical Corps.

In respect of preparations, even up to the two army corps standard, the
Royal Army Medical Corps was weak in numbers. Barely sufficient in its
personnel even for peace requirements, it possessed no organisation for
expansion in war. The establishment of officers was designed to provide for
the bearer companies and field hospitals of two army corps and a cavalry
division, with seven stationary and three general hospitals on the lines of
communication. This only allowed for under 3 per cent. of the troops
having beds in general and stationary hospitals. Without withdrawing
officers from the colonies,[34] the aid of 99 civil surgeons would be

required. These gentlemen were to be selected when their services were
needed, but as there was no registered list, no claim on the service of
anyone could be exacted. When the field army was provided for, the home
hospitals were entirely denuded of personnel. The work was carried on by
retired officers and civil surgeons. The establishment of non-commissioned
officers and men was designed only for peace purposes, and beyond the
reserve there was no estimate for additions in case of war. A state of war
was to be met by civilian assistance, increased employment of women
nurses, and active recruiting. An increase of establishment which had been
proposed for the estimates of 1893-4 and successive years had gradually
obtained complete sanction by 1898.[35] The increase of the army as a
whole and the known weakness in South Africa caused demands for yet
larger numbers in the estimates of 1899-1900. The Army Board were not
disposed to recommend more than a portion of these additions.[36] The
difficulty of obtaining sanction for expenditure on measures of greater
urgency required that that which was considered of less importance should
be dispensed with, so the hospital orderly had to be rejected in favour of the
soldier to fill the ranks. To provide the general and stationary hospitals that
accompanied the First Army Corps with complete personnel, it became
necessary to denude the bearer companies and field hospitals of the Second
Army Corps. It is not surprising, therefore, that "war having been declared,
and practically the whole available personnel having been swept off to
South Africa with the first demands, it became necessary to seek for other
means of supply."[37] Hospital equipment was dealt with by the Director-
General of Ordnance, but with surgical and medical stores the Army
Medical Department was itself concerned. Funds to replace the old-
fashioned instruments then in use were asked for in 1896, and between that
date and the outbreak of war great improvements had been made. The
change, however, had not been universally completed, and on the outbreak
of war a few instruments of comparatively antiquated type were still to be
found in South Africa. A similar argument to that which prevailed against
the increase of personnel met the several requests for storage room. It was
represented that the indifferent storage available deteriorated the
instruments and made the drugs worthless. On the other hand, the
perishable nature of drugs renders it inadvisable to keep a large amount in
store, besides which, ample supplies can always be purchased in the market.
The subsequent experience went to prove that there was no difficulty in this

matter. Throughout the war the department was wonderfully well equipped
as regards drugs and instruments, and no branch was more successful than
that concerned with medical supplies.

Army Veterinary Department.

On the outbreak of war the Director-General of the Army Veterinary
department was responsible to the Adjutant-General for the efficiency of his
department and the maintenance of veterinary supplies. The superior control
was subsequently transferred to the Quartermaster-General. The proportion
of the veterinary service which should accompany a force on active service
was not laid down. Not only was there no organisation to admit of
expansion but, owing to the unattractive conditions attaching to service in
the department, the number of officers was actually below the authorised
establishment. In addition to the discharge of ordinary duty, heavy demands
were made by the Remount department for veterinary officers to assist in
the purchase and transport of horses and mules. It was necessary, therefore,
almost from the first, to engage civilian veterinary surgeons.[38] The
personnel of the department did not include any subordinate staff. The
Director-General[39] of the department was in process of adopting, with
improvements, the Indian system of equipment, for which he had himself
been responsible. The amount of this equipment which it had been possible
to prepare before the outbreak of war was insufficient, but the deficiency
was remedied by indenting on India for four field veterinary hospitals and
100 field chests, which enabled the supply to be kept up to the subsequent
demands.

Inspector-General of Fortifications.

This officer was responsible for engineer stores. The nature of those
required depends largely on the country in which the campaign is to be
carried on; therefore, practically no reserve was maintained of such
ordinary items as can easily be bought in the market. Of manufactured
goods, such as railway plant, telegraph material and pontoons, which
require time for production, there was an insufficient reserve, notably of the
last named. In order to send out a number sufficient to meet the probable

requirements in South Africa, all reserve pontoons, including some of
questionable value, were collected, and the country was denuded. This
deficiency had been represented on different occasions, but for want of
funds nothing could be done towards the provision of new pontoons until
October, 1899.

Ordnance.

Of all the departments, this was subjected to the greatest strain and was
the least prepared to meet it. The reasons were as follows. For some years
previous to 1897 the system in force was that, although the Director-
General of Ordnance was charged with the supply of stores to the army, the
financial control and the entire direction of the ordnance factories rested
with the Financial Secretary to the War Office, who belonged to the
Ministry of the day. No supplies could be obtained by the former unless
with the permission and by the order of the latter. The system conduced to a
lack of sympathy of motive, which caused a disinclination on the one part
to ask for what on the other there would be more than a disinclination to
give. This tended to crystallise the national proneness to defer until the
emergency arose the measures necessary to meet it. It followed, then, that
while attention was given to the needs of the moment, practically all
provision for the requirements of the future was relegated to the
background. A further defect in the system was that it resulted in there
being no proper understanding between those who had intimate knowledge
of what was required by the army and those who were responsible for
manufacture.

enry During the three years that Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
enbury's Brackenbury had been President of the Ordnance Committee at
ntment.
Woolwich he had been impressed by the unsatisfactory working of
the system and, on being offered the appointment of Director-General of
Ordnance, in November, 1898, he urged that the direction of the ordnance
factories should be transferred to the holder of that appointment. The matter
was discussed by the Cabinet and, on its being decided to make the transfer,
Sir H. Brackenbury took up the appointment in February, 1899. The transfer
was effected by the Order in Council of March 7th, 1899, which
enumerated the duties with which the Director-General of Ordnance was

charged,[40] and included in them that of the direction of the manufacturing
departments of the army. The financial control of the factories still remained
with the Financial Secretary.

of The Secretary of State himself had felt some concern as to the
nce condition of affairs in the Ordnance department and it was on his
.
initiative that Sir Henry Brackenbury was selected to set matters
right. On taking up the duties of Director-General of Ordnance, the new
chief commenced an enquiry into the condition of the armament and the
state of reserves of all ordnance stores. In the early months of the year the
greater part of his time and attention was taken up by the important question
of replacing the obsolete armament of our sea defences. From June onwards
the whole energies of the department were directed towards meeting the
requirements of the force which might possibly have to take the field. It was
not until the despatch of this force that the true barrenness of the land came
to be revealed, and melancholy was the outlook it presented.

ng to Early in 1899 the Director-General of Ordnance issued
C. confidential instructions to General Officers Commanding districts
regarding special scales of clothing and equipment for the field force
contemplated for service in South Africa. These instructions enabled
demands to be prepared, so that they could be put forward without delay on
the order to mobilise.

od of Wherever storage buildings were available the war equipment of
ng units was kept on their charge. In other cases it was apportioned to
ment.
units but held in store for them by the Ordnance department. When
mobilisation was ordered, there was war equipment practically complete to
enable two army corps, a cavalry division, and lines of communication
troops to take the field.

ing. The special clothing prescribed for South Africa entailed an
entire change of dress—helmet, body-clothing, and boots. Sanction
had been given in April, 1899, for the storage of a reserve of khaki drill
suits,[41] of which the amount authorised would have been insufficient, but
fortunately the Clothing department had a surplus which enabled a
complete issue to be made on mobilisation. It had been represented from
South Africa, with the support of the Director-General of the Army Medical

Service at home, that serge was more appropriate to the climate than cotton
drill, and the substitution had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief
on August 18th. No steps towards effecting the change could be taken until
the grant of September 22nd, and the first three divisions embarked with
cotton drill clothing.[42] It is probable, however, that even had the money
been forthcoming when the change was first approved, not more than half
the amount required could have been obtained in the time. One difficulty
experienced in connection with the issue of clothing was that of providing
each unit with the right number of suits of particular sizes. Many of the
reservists who presented themselves on mobilisation were found to have
increased considerably in figure, and consequently much fitting and
alteration was necessary. This caused delay. At that time the boot for foreign
service differed in pattern from that for home service, and an issue of the
former was made. The supply on hand was only sufficient to allow a
complete issue to men of the mounted services, while dismounted soldiers
had one pair of each pattern, reservists having home service pattern entirely.
The sudden demand on the market for the materials necessary for these
articles of clothing entailed a considerable increase of cost, without, at the
outset at least, ensuring provision of the best quality.

At the outbreak of war the authorised war equipment was
ment. practically complete, and there remained the equipment for a third
army corps, but suitable only for service at home. Beyond this, there was no
provision of special reserves to meet the continual drain by service in the
field abroad. Such reserve material as there was for batteries of both horse
and field artillery was speedily exhausted; while to provide heavier
ordnance it was necessary to draw upon the movable armament for home
defence. More speedy still was the exhaustion of gun ammunition, and not
even the suspension of Naval orders in the factories, with loans from the
Navy and from India, could enable demands to be complied with quickly
enough. Similarly, the deficiencies in other stores, such as camp equipment,
vehicles, harness, saddlery and horse-shoes, made themselves apparent at a
very early date in the war.[43]

ases Any idea that may have existed that the ordnance factories and
d. the trade would be able to meet all demands from week to week
was quickly dispelled. The supply could not keep pace with the need, and in

some cases the exhaustion of the home market necessitated large purchases
in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Of rifles and other weapons at
this time the store was ample, except in the case of sabres, of which, owing
to a contemplated change in pattern, the reserve had been allowed to fall
very low. There was a complete reserve of ball ammunition of the kinds
approved for use in the earlier part of 1899, viz.: Mark II. and Mark IV., the
IV. latter having an expanding bullet. During the summer of 1899 it
was found that under certain conditions the Mark IV. ammunition
developed such serious defects that, apart from the inexpediency of using a
bullet which the signatories to the Hague Convention[44] had condemned, it
was deemed advisable to withdraw this particular kind of ammunition as
unsuitable for war purposes. This meant that two-fifths of the reserve was
unserviceable.

ming On 15th December, 1899, as the result of his enquiry, Sir Henry
e from Brackenbury put forward his report to the Commander-in-Chief, in
O.
which he enumerated in detail the various deficiencies of stores
brought to light by the war in South Africa. The condition of affairs was
such as to cause grave apprehension. To use his own words: "That war has
now disclosed a situation as regards armaments, and reserves of guns,
ammunition, stores and clothing, and as regards the power of output of
material of war in emergency which is, in my opinion, full of peril to the
Empire; and I, therefore, think it my duty, without waiting to elaborate
details, to lay before you at once the state of affairs, and to make proposals,
to which I invite, through you, the earnest and immediate attention of the
Secretary of State." These proposals dealt with the provision of armaments,
reserves of ammunition, stores and clothing, and the improvement of
factories and storage-buildings, with the object of putting the country in a
condition of safety and preventing the possibility of the recurrence of the
state of affairs disclosed.[45]

hand. In his minute Sir Henry Brackenbury also insisted on the
necessity of a free hand being given in time of war to the Inspector-
General of Fortifications as regards works and buildings, and to the
Director-General of Ordnance as regards armaments, stores and clothing.
He had, through the Army Board, on the 22nd September, brought to the
notice of the Secretary of State the difficulties and delays inseparable from

the financial system which obtained in peace time, and had been granted
practically what he asked in his expenditure for the supply of the army
during the war. On this point Sir Henry Brackenbury remarked in his report:
—

"It is only by such a free hand having been given to us since the outbreak
of war in October that it has been possible to supply the army in the field,
and even so, owing to the want of reserves, we have been too late with
many of the most important articles."

The tale of deficiencies was thus summed up by the Secretary of State:—

"It is, I think, abundantly clear from Sir H. Brackenbury's
owne's Report, that we were not sufficiently prepared even for the
equipment of the comparatively small force which we had always
contemplated might be employed beyond the limits of this country in the
initial stages of a campaign. For the much larger force which we have
actually found it necessary to employ our resources were absolutely and
miserably inadequate. The result has been that the department, even by
working under conditions which have nearly led to a breakdown, has been
barely able to keep pace with the requirements of the army."[46]

Colonies.

Offers of assistance had poured in from Greater Britain from the moment
that the imminence of war in South Africa was realised. It was not the first
time that our kinsmen had sent their sons for the general service of the
Empire. In 1881, within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the news of the
action at Laing's Nek, two thousand men of the Australian local forces had
volunteered for employment in South Africa, but were not accepted. Four
years later, eight hundred colonists from New South Wales were welcomed
for service at Suakim, while a special corps of Canadian voyageurs was
enlisted for the advance up the Nile. But on neither of these occasions was
the tender of patriotic help so welcome to the Mother Country as in the
present instance, for it was felt that the whole Empire was concerned in the
contest for the establishment in South Africa of equal rights for all white
men independent of race, and that it was, therefore, peculiarly fitting that

the younger States of the great Imperial Commonwealth should make the
quarrel their own. As early as July, 1899, Queensland, Victoria, New South
Wales, the Malay States and Lagos, had tendered their services, and Her
Majesty's Government, though not then able to accept the offers made, had
gratefully acknowledged them. In September, Queensland and Victoria
renewed their proposals, and further offers of assistance were received from
Canada, New Zealand, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, and
Hong Kong. The majority of a squadron of the New South Wales Lancers,
which had been sent to England to undergo a special course of training at
Aldershot, also volunteered for South Africa. As regards Natal and Cape
Colony, it was assumed as a matter of course, both by the Colonial troops
themselves and by the Imperial and Colonial Governments, that they would
cheerfully do their duty if called out for local defence. The whole of the
Natal local forces were mobilised for active service on 29th September,[47]
the day after President Kruger commandeered his burghers. A portion of the
Cape Volunteers were called out on 5th October, and the remainder during
the first month of the war.[48] On the 3rd October the Secretary of State for
the Colonies telegraphed to various Colonial Governments a grateful
acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the services of their
contingents, indicating in each case the units considered desirable. It was
not found possible to take advantage of the offers of some of the Crown
Colonies, but from the self-governing Colonies, troops numbering about
2,500 of all ranks were accepted.[49] These proved but the advance guard to
the total force of nearly 30,000 men from Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
India and Ceylon, who at various times represented Greater Britain in the
army of South Africa.

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.[50]

ce plans It has been convenient to carry the statement of the measures
al adopted for preparation at home in certain matters beyond the
rities.

actual date of the declaration of war. It is now necessary to view the state of
affairs in South Africa at that time. Although British preparations for war
had been retarded by the hope of the Queen's Government that the grave
issues with the Dutch Republics might be determined by diplomatic action,
yet the weakness of our military position in South Africa had long been felt
as keenly by the local military authorities as it had been by the Headquarter
staff at the War Office. In schemes for the defence of the British colonies,
submitted in 1896 and 1897 by Lieut.-General Sir W. H.
enough. Goodenough, who was then commanding in South Africa, the
extraordinary extent of the frontiers to be defended, the disadvantages
entailed by their shape, and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the
Boers over the handful of British troops then in South Africa, made it
necessary to base the protection even of the most important strategical
points on sheer audacity.

Office to A letter addressed by the War Office to General Goodenough's
Butler successor, Lieut.-General Sir W. Butler, on 21st December, 1898,
98.
had requested him to reconsider his predecessor's proposals, and to
report at an early date the distribution of troops he would make in the event
of war with the two Dutch Republics. In a review of the strategical
situation, that despatch drew attention to the fact that the troops then
stationed in the command "would be inadequate for any other than a
defensive attitude, pending the arrival of reinforcements from England." In
the same paper the effect of the frontiers on the questions, both of defence
in the earlier stages of the war, and of the ultimate form of offence, is so
fully treated that it will be convenient to quote here the official statement of
the case. It must be premised that it is assumed in it, as in fact proved to be
the case, that both sides would tacitly agree, for the sake of not raising the
native difficulty, to treat Basuto territory as neutral. That mountain region
was therefore throughout considered as an impassable obstacle:—

98, from "The frontiers of the Transvaal and the Free State are
conterminous with English territory for over 1,000 miles, but the
defence of this enormous frontier by Her Majesty's troops is impossible to
contemplate. Southern Rhodesia, although a possible objective for a Boer
raid, must rely entirely for its defence upon its own local forces, and,
although the line from Kimberley to Buluwayo is of some strategic

importance, yet its protection north of the Vaal river would be altogether out
of our power during the earlier stages of the war. Basutoland may also be
eliminated from defensive calculations, as its invasion by the Boers would
be improbable; moreover, the Basutos, if invaded, would be able for some
time to maintain an effective resistance.

"The frontier, therefore, the observation and defence of which appears to
need definite consideration, may be held to extend in Cape Colony from
Fourteen Streams bridge in the north to the south-west corner of
Basutoland, and to include in Natal the triangle, of which Charlestown is
the apex, and a line drawn from Mont Aux Sources to the Intonganeni[51]
district of Zululand the base.

"The mountains and broken country of Basutoland and Griqualand East,
which lie between Natal and the Cape Colony, are unpierced by railways
and ill-supplied by roads. It must be accepted, therefore, that a force acting
on the defensive in Natal will be out of touch with a force in Cape Colony,
and the two can only operate from separate bases.

98 from "As regards the Cape frontier, for the portion lying between
Basutoland and Hopetown railway bridge,[52] the Orange river
forms a military obstacle of some importance, impassable, as a rule, during
the first three months of the year, except at the bridges, and even at other
times difficult to cross, owing to its quicksands, and liability to sudden
flood. Between Hopetown railway bridge and the Vaal the frontier is,
however, protected by no physical features and lies open to invasion.

"As regards the Natal frontier its salient confers on the enemy facilities
for cutting our line of communications, and for outflanking at pleasure the
positions of Laing's Nek and the Biggarsberg. This facility is accentuated by
the influence of the Drakensberg, which forms a screen, behind which an
enemy can assemble unobserved and debouch on our flanks through its
numerous passes. These passes, however, have been recently examined and
found to be for the most part but rough mountain tracks available for raids,
but unsuitable for the advance of any large force accompanied by transport.
To this Van Reenen's Pass, through which the railway and main road issue
from Natal into the Free State, and Laing's Nek (across and under which the
main road and railway pass into the Transvaal) are notable exceptions, and

the possession of these two passes necessarily carry with them great
strategical advantages.

"An appreciation of the relative importance of the defence of the two
frontiers of Cape Colony and Natal would, no doubt, be assisted if the line
by which the main advance on the Transvaal will ultimately be undertaken
were determined; but I am to say that in the Commander-in-Chief's opinion
the plan for offensive operations must depend upon the political and
military situation of the moment, and cannot now be definitely fixed. The
fact, however, that an offensive advance will ultimately be undertaken, as
soon as sufficient forces have arrived, must be especially borne in mind in
considering arrangements for the first or defensive stage of the campaign."

The despatch then stated that the following should be taken as the basis
of Sir William Butler's arrangements for frontier defence: "The latest
information in the possession of the War Office as to the military strength of
the two States will be found in the recent pamphlet entitled 'Military Notes
on the Dutch Republics of South Africa,' copies of which are in your
possession. You will observe that in that publication it is estimated that the
total forces of the two republics amount to over 40,000 men, and that of
these some 27,000[53] would be available for offensive operations beyond
their frontiers. It is known that projects for such offensive operations have
actually been under the consideration of the War department of Pretoria, but
although an attempt may be made on Kimberley and the northern strip of
Natal may be occupied by the Boers, yet it is considered to be unlikely that
any further serious advance into the heart of either colony would be
undertaken. Raids, however, of 2,000 to 3,000 men may be expected, and it
is against such raids that careful preparation on your part is necessary."

99. Sir Sir W. Butler, being occupied by other duties, did not reply to
utler's this despatch until pressed by telegrams at the beginning of June of
the following year. He then reported by telegraph and in a letter to
the War Office, dated 12th June, 1899, that he intended, in the event of war,
to divide the troops in Natal into two; one part at Dundee-Glencoe with
orders to patrol to the Buffalo river on the east, Ingagane on the north, and
the Drakensberg Passes on the west, and the other at Ladysmith, with
instructions "to support Glencoe and maintain the line of the Biggarsberg,

or to operate against Van Reenen's Pass should circumstances necessitate."
In Cape Colony he proposed, with the small number of troops then
available (i.e., three battalions, six guns and a R.E. company), to hold the
important railway stations of De Aar, Naauwpoort and Molteno (or
Stormberg), with strong detachments at Orange River station, and possibly
Kimberley, and outposts at Colesberg, Burghersdorp, and Philipstown. It
will be seen, therefore, that, while deprecating the actual occupation of the
Drakensberg Passes and of the Colesberg and Bethulie bridges over the
Orange river, which had been proposed by his predecessor and approved by
Lord Wolseley, Sir William Butler did not shrink from the forward policy of
endeavouring to bluff the enemy with weak detachments stationed in close
proximity to the frontier.

n-Powell It was in conformity with this policy that, in July, 1899, the War
ut. Office despatched Col. R. S. S. Baden-Powell, with a staff of
special service officers, to organise a force in southern Rhodesia. It was
hoped that, in the event of war, his column might detain a portion of the
Boer commandos in that quarter, since its position threatened the northern
Transvaal. To his task was subsequently added the organisation of a
mounted infantry corps which, based on Mafeking, might similarly hold
back the burghers of the western districts of the South African Republic.

e of The cloud of war rapidly spread over the whole of the South
s. African horizon, and the strategical situation became sharply
defined. As regards the determination of the plan of offence referred to in
the above War Office despatch, the difficulty was due to the hope
entertained by the Cabinet that, in the event of war between this country
and the Transvaal, the Orange Free State would remain neutral. The choice
in that case would have lain between an advance based on Warrenton, i.e.,
on the Kimberley-to-Mafeking railway, or a movement parallel to the Natal-
to-Johannesburg railway. By the middle of 1899, however, the Headquarter
staff at the War Office were convinced that, if war should supervene, the
two republics would make common cause. A memorandum, entitled, "The
Direction of a Line of Advance Against the Transvaal," was prepared by the
Intelligence division on that basis and submitted on 3rd June, 1899. It was
contended in this memorandum that the lack of any railway between
Fourteen Streams and the Transvaal capital eliminated that route from

consideration, and that the choice now lay between the line running up
through the centre of the Free State and the Natal route.

etter line. In comparing the relative merits of these two routes it was
shown that strategically the Natal line would, owing to the shape of
the frontier and the parallel screen of the Drakensberg, be constantly
exposed to dangerous flank attacks, while the flanks of the Free State route
would be comparatively safe. "The Basutos' sympathies will be entirely
with us, while on the west the garrison of Kimberley will hold the
approaches."

ns. Tactically, it was pointed out, the Natal route traversed "an ideal
terrain for the Boers," and crossed the "immensely strong" position
of Laing's Nek. On the other hand, a force advancing by the Free State
route, once over the Orange river, would have only to deal with the Bethulie
position, and would then reach open plains, which "afford the freest scope
for the manœuvres of all three arms."

usion. Furthermore, the Free State route could be fed by three distinct
lines of railway from three ports, while the Natal route would be
dependent on a single line and one port. The memorandum, therefore,
submitted the conclusion that "the main line of advance against the
Transvaal should be based on the Cape Colony, and should follow generally
the line of railway through the Orange Free State to Johannesburg and
Pretoria."

In June it became evident that the vague designs of the Boer
ened. Governments against Natal, of which the British Intelligence
department had had cognizance in the previous year, were taking definite
shape, and that, at any rate, so far as the Transvaal forces were concerned,
the eastern colony would probably become the main object of their attack.
The only British reinforcements immediately available were therefore
assigned to that colony. On the Cape side it was manifest that the
determining factor was the attitude of restless elements within the colony
itself. It was known that secret agents from the Transvaal had, during the
past two years, visited many parts of the colony, and that arms had been
distributed by those agents. The investigations of the Intelligence
department had, however, failed to discover proofs of the establishment of

such organisations as would enable any formidable rising in the colony to
coincide with a declaration of war by the republics. It was fully realised that
it could not but be the case that there would be among many of the Dutch
colonial farmers some natural sympathy with their kinsmen, and that a
certain number of the younger and wilder would possibly slip across the
border to join the enemy's forces; but it was believed that, provided this
class of the community was not encouraged by any sign of weakness to
enter into relations with the republics, they would be, as a whole, loath to
throw off their allegiance to a State to which they and their forefathers had
for many generations been loyal, and under whose rule they had enjoyed
equal liberties, self-government and much prosperity.

ctive If these conclusions were sound—and the course of events
during the first month of the war was to prove their general
correctness—it was highly desirable that detachments of British troops
should remain in the northern districts of the colony, and thus carry out the
double function of encouraging the loyal while checking lawless spirits, and
of retaining possession of those lines of railways, the use of which would be
a matter of vital importance to the field army in its subsequent advance
from the coast. It was obvious that these isolated posts of a few hundred
men would run serious risks. Thrust forward in close proximity to the
enemy's frontier, they were separated from their base on the coast by some
four to five hundred miles of country, throughout which there might be
possible enemies; thus their communications might at any moment be cut.
Furthermore, until troops arrived from England or India, no reinforcements
would be available for their assistance. But the alternative of abandoning
the whole of the northern districts of Cape Colony to the enemy, and thus
allowing them to enforce recruitments from colonists who might otherwise
live in peaceful security under the British flag, involved dangers far graver,
and was, in fact, never contemplated by the military authorities either in
London or at the Cape, except in the remote contingency of war with some
maritime Power coinciding with the outbreak of hostilities with the Boer
Republics. Moreover, by the middle of September, 1899, the organisation
and training of Colonel Baden-Powell's two newly-raised corps, the one at
Tuli and the other near Mafeking, were already sufficiently advanced to
afford good hope of their being able to sustain effectively the rôle which

had been assigned to them, while arrangements were being taken in hand to
secure Kimberley from being captured by any coup de main.[54]

tier- Although, therefore, at that moment the only regular troops in
er adopts Cape Colony were three and a half battalions of infantry, two
r's plan.
companies Royal engineers, and two companies of Royal Garrison
artillery, General Sir F. Forestier-Walker, who, on September 6th, 1899,
arrived at Cape Town, replacing Sir William Butler, decided to adhere to his
forward defence policy, and to carry out unchanged the arrangements
contemplated by him. Thus, by the end of September, a series of military
posts had been formed encircling the western and southern frontiers of the
Free State at Kimberley, Orange River station, De Aar, Naauwpoort, and
Stormberg, each post including a half-battalion of regular infantry, and a
section of engineers. To Kimberley were also sent six 7-pr. R.M.L. screw
guns, and to Orange River station, Naauwpoort and Stormberg, two 9-pr.
R.M.L. guns each. Each of these three-named had also a company of
mounted infantry. The guns were manned by garrison artillerymen from the
naval base at Cape Town. By arrangement with the Colonial authorities the
Cape Police furnished various posts of observation in advanced positions.
Behind the weak line thus boldly pushed out in the face of the enemy there
were no regular troops whatever in the Colony, except half a battalion and a
handful of garrison gunners in the Cape peninsula.

edvers Sir F. Forestier-Walker had, however, the satisfaction to find that
ves. these dispositions, which he had carried out on his own initiative
after consulting the High Commissioner, fitted in well with the plans of Sir
Redvers Buller, and were acceptable to that officer. A telegram from Sir
Redvers, dated London, 29th September, 1899, informed Forestier-Walker
that an expedition made up of an army corps, a cavalry division, and seven
battalions for the lines of communication would be sent out to South Africa
and would advance on Pretoria through the Free State. That general was
therefore directed to make, so far as was compatible with secrecy,
preliminary arrangements for the disembarkation of this army at the three
ports, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London. In acknowledging these
orders on the following day, Sir F. Forestier-Walker accordingly reported by
telegram that he would arrange for the disembarkation bases and that he
was establishing advanced depôts at De Aar, Naauwpoort, and Stormberg;

[55] Sir Redvers Buller, in a message despatched from London on 2nd
October, replied:—

"Your proposals are just what I wish, but I feared suggesting depôts at
Naauwpoort and Stormberg, as I did not then know if you had sufficient
troops to guard them. It will not do to risk loss. I leave this to your local
knowledge."

er Steps On the 7th of October, 1899, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers
fence. landed at Cape Town from England and were sent on the 10th to
De Aar; a wing of the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers left Stellenbosch by train
for the same destination on the 9th. Stores were already accumulating at De
Aar but, having regard to Dutch restlessness in the vicinity of Naauwpoort
and Stormberg, Sir F. Forestier-Walker, after personal inspection,
considered it inadvisable to risk any large amount of material at either until
more troops could be spared to hold them. For the moment it appeared to
him desirable to concentrate all available mobile troops at the Orange River
station, where he retained command of both banks of the river, and thus, as
soon as adequate strength was organised, could operate thence towards
Kimberley or on some point in the Free State. The energy of Lieut.-Colonel
R. G. Kekewich, Loyal North Lancashire regiment, who had been
despatched to Kimberley to take command, assisted by Mr. Cecil Rhodes
and the officials of the De Beers Company, had placed that town in a fair
state of defence. At Mafeking it was realised that Colonel Baden-Powell's
troops would be unable to do more than protect the large quantities of stores
accumulated by merchants at that station against the formidable Boer force
which was concentrating for attack upon it. Nevertheless, by so doing,
Baden-Powell would fulfil the rôle assigned to him, since he would prevent
large numbers of the enemy from engaging in the serious invasion of the
exposed frontier territories of Cape Colony. The actual distribution of
troops in the Colony at the outbreak of war is shown in Appendix 2.

defence Reports on the frontier defence of Natal had been submitted
nerals during the years 1896-7, by Major-General G. Cox, who was then
nd
enough, holding the sub-command of that colony, and by Lieut.-General
. Goodenough. After a careful examination of the question whether
the tunnel under Laing's Nek, the Dundee coalfields to the south,

and Van Reenen's Pass could be protected with the troops available, General
Goodenough decided that none of these could be guarded. Having then only
one regiment of cavalry, one mountain battery, and one infantry battalion,
he thought it better to concentrate nearly all of them at Ladysmith, the point
of junction of the branch railway to Harrismith with the main line to the
Transvaal, sending only small detachments to Colenso and Estcourt. On the
despatch to Natal, in the second quarter of 1897, of reinforcements,
consisting of another cavalry regiment, a second battalion of infantry, and a
brigade division of artillery, temporary quarters were erected at Ladysmith
for this increase to the garrison of the colony, and Sir William Goodenough
informed the War Office that in case of emergency he proposed to watch the
whole frontier with the Natal Police, to hold Newcastle with colonial troops
and to despatch most of the cavalry, one field battery, and half a battalion of
infantry to Glencoe to cover the Dundee coalfields. The remainder of the
regular troops, consisting of a battalion and a half, a few cavalry, and two
batteries, would be placed at Ladysmith, where a detachment of a battalion
and the mountain battery would be kept ready to occupy and entrench itself
at Van Reenen's Pass. These proposals were approved for execution on an
emergency "so far as the exigencies of the occasion may admit."[56]

defence Sir W. Butler's report of 12th June, 1899, adopted practically the
W. same plan of defence. To a suggestion as to a possible occupation
r, /99.
of Laing's Nek,[57] General Butler had replied that he did not think
the immediate possession of that place of great importance and that its
occupation by a weak force would be a dangerous operation. The regular
troops in Natal had at this date been only reinforced by one more battalion,
and consisted of but two cavalry regiments, one brigade division field
artillery, one mountain battery, and three infantry battalions. To these must
be added the Natal Police, a corps about 400 strong, admirably trained as
mounted infantry, and nearly 2,000 Colonial Volunteers of the best type.

st of The communication of this scheme of defence to the Natal
Ministry in July, 1899, led them to prefer an urgent request that
rnment,
99. sufficient reinforcements should be sent out to defend the whole
colony. In the long telegraphic despatch addressed on 6th
September, 1899, by the Governor, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, to the
Colonial Office, it was urged that: "In the opinion of the Ministers, such a

catastrophe as the seizure of Laing's Nek, and the destruction of the
northern portion of the railway ... would have a most demoralising effect on
the natives and the loyal Europeans in the colony, and would afford great
encouragement to the Boers and their sympathisers." The announcement
from home of the early despatch of reinforcements from India which was
received by Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson in reply to this telegram, did not, in the
opinion of Sir F. Forestier-Walker, or of Major-General Sir W. Penn
Symons, who had succeeded General Cox in the local command of Natal,
justify a deviation from the scheme of defence put forward by their
predecessors. Apart from the difficulty of a water supply for a force
occupying Laing's Nek, it was felt that such a forward position would be
strategically unsafe, and would impose on the troops in Natal a task beyond
their powers. On the other hand, the decision to give the coalfields at
Dundee the protection contemplated by Sir W. Butler was adopted.

25th, /99. By the 24th September the Governor told General Symons that
oe held. the gravity of the political situation was such that the dispositions
of the troops previously agreed on for the defence of the colony must at
once be carried out. The necessary permission to act having been obtained
by telegram from the General Officer Commanding South Africa, the 1st
Leicester and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, with a squadron of the 18th
Hussars were entrained at Ladysmith for Glencoe on the morning of the
25th September, the remainder of the 18th Hussars, with a mounted infantry
company and two field batteries reaching Glencoe by march route on the
26th. The gaps these changes made in the Ladysmith garrison were filled
up, the 5th Lancers, 1st King's Royal Rifles, and 1st Manchester being
ordered to move to that place from Maritzburg.

eorge Sir George White had been despatched early in September from
, Oct. England to command the troops in Natal. When, on October 7th, he
wishes to
raw from arrived and assumed command, he found that the forces at his
oe. disposal were divided into two bodies, the one at Glencoe and the
other at Ladysmith. On leaving England he had been given no
instructions on the subject, nor had the previous correspondence with the
local military authorities as to the defence of Natal been seen by him, but he
held that from a military point of view the only sound policy was to
concentrate the whole of the British troops in such a position that he would

be able to strike with his full strength at the enemy the moment an
opportunity offered. He determined, therefore, to withdraw the Glencoe
detachment and assemble the whole at Ladysmith, the importance of which
was increased by the preliminary dispositions of the Boer commandos, to
be described later. The Governor, on being informed of this intention,
remonstrated against the withdrawal from Glencoe in terms which are thus
recorded in his subsequent report of the interview to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies:—

st by "Now that we were there, withdrawal would, in my opinion,
rnor. involve grave political results, loyalists would be disgusted and
discouraged; the results as regards the Dutch would be grave, many, if
not most, would very likely rise, believing us to be afraid, and the evil
might very likely spread to the Dutch in Cape Colony; and the effect on
our natives, of whom there were 750,000 in Natal and Zululand, might
be disastrous. They as yet believe in our power—they look to us—but if
we withdraw from Glencoe they will look on it in the light of a defeat,
and I could not answer for what they, or at all events a large proportion
of them, might do."

White Influenced by these strong representations and especially by the
and suggestion that the evacuation of Glencoe might lead to a general
s
oe. rising of the natives—a very grave consideration in the eyes of an
officer with long Indian experience—the British commander
decided to acquiesce for the moment in the separation of his troops which
had been arranged by Major-General Symons. Sir George conceived,
however, from the Intelligence reports before him that the bulk of the Boer
commandos were assembling behind the screen of the Drakensberg, and
that the northern portion of Natal would be their primary and principal
object. He retained his own belief that the safety of the colony could only
be fully secured by decisive strokes at the enemy's columns as they
emerged from the mountain passes and, in pursuance of this policy, General
White impressed on his staff the necessity for making such preparations as
would set free the maximum number of troops for active operations in the
field. Under these circumstances Sir W. Penn Symons started for Dundee on
October 10th and on October 11th Sir George White went by train from
Maritzburg to Ladysmith. The distribution of the forces in Natal on the
outbreak of war will be found in Appendix 3.

plans. The exertions of ten special service officers despatched to South
Africa three months earlier had ensured the acquisition of accurate
information as to the enemy's mobilisation, strength, and points of
concentration. Sir George White's appreciation of the situation was,
therefore, in conformity with the actual facts. The main strength of the
enemy had been concentrated for an invasion of Natal. The President hoped

that it would sweep that colony clear of British troops down to the sea, and
would hoist the Vierkleur over the port of Durban. Small detachments had
been told off to guard the Colesberg, Bethulie, and Aliwal North bridges
and to watch Basutoland. On the western frontiers of the Transvaal and the
Free State strong commandos were assembling for the destruction of
Baden-Powell's retaining force at Mafeking and for the capture of
Kimberley. Both Kruger and Steyn aimed at results other than those
achieved by the initiatory victories of 1880-1. They cherished the hope that
the time had come for the establishment of a Boer Republic reaching from
the Zambesi to Table Mountain; but, for the accomplishment of so great an
enterprise, external assistance was necessary, the aid of their kinsmen in the
south, and ultimately, as they hoped, an alliance with other Powers across
the seas. The authorities at Pretoria and Bloemfontein realised fully that,
though they might expect to have sympathisers in the colonies, active co-
operation on any large scale was not to be counted on until successes in the
field should persuade the waverers that, in casting in their lot definitely with
the republican forces, they would be supporting the winning side. The
conquest of Natal and the capture of Kimberley would, it was thought,
suffice to convince the most doubtful and timid. As soon, therefore, as the
British troops in Natal had been overwhelmed and Kimberley occupied, the
Boer commandos in the western theatre of war were to move south across
the Cape frontier to excite a rising in that colony. A situation would thus be
created which, as they calculated, would lead to the intervention of one or
more European Powers, and terminate in the permanent expulsion of all
British authority from South Africa.

It was with these designs and based on this far-reaching plan of
bution campaign that the mobilisation of the burghers in both the republics
1th, /99.
was ordered during the last week of September, and by the 11th of
October the following was approximately the constitution, strength and
distribution of the field forces.[58] The army for the invasion of Natal was
made up of three distinct bodies; the principal and most important of these
remained under the personal orders of General P. Joubert, the Commandant-
General of the Boer forces, and was concentrated at Zandspruit and
Wakkerstroom Nek, in immediate proximity to the northern apex of Natal.
It included the Krugersdorp, Bethel, Heidelberg, Johannesburg, Boksburg
and Germiston, Standerton, Pretoria, Middelburg, and Ermelo commandos,

the Transvaal Staats Artillerie, and small Irish, Hollander and German corps
of adventurers; the total strength of this force was about 11,300 men. Its
atal. armament included 16 field guns and three 6-inch Creusots. On the
eastern border of Natal, facing the British force at Dundee, lay the
Utrecht, Vryheid, Piet Retief and Wakkerstroom commandos, under the
leadership of General Lukas Meyer; this detachment numbered about 2,870
men. Westward, a Free State contingent, amounting to some 9,500 burghers,
and consisting of the Vrede, Heilbron, Kroonstad, Winburg, Bethlehem and
Harrismith commandos, occupied Botha's, Bezuidenhout, Tintwa, Van
Reenen's, and Olivier's Hoek passes. The republican forces, to whom the
task of conquering Natal had been assigned, amounted therefore at the
outset of war to about 23,500 men.[59]

Mafeking. For the attack on Colonel Baden-Powell's small garrison at
Mafeking, a body, in strength about 7,000, consisting of the
Potchefstroom, Lichtenburg, Marico, Wolmaranstad and Rustenburg
commandos, with a company of Scandinavian adventurers, had been
concentrated close to the western border. General Piet Cronje was in
supreme command on this side, his two principal subordinates being
Generals Snyman and J. H. De la Rey.

imberley. The capture of Kimberley and the duty of holding in check the
British troops at the Orange River station were assigned to Free
State levies composed of the Fauresmith, Jacobsdal, Bloemfontein,
Ladybrand, Boshof and Hoopstad commandos, the first two of these corps
being assembled at Boshof and the remainder at Jacobsdal. Their total
strength was probably about 7,500; a Transvaal detachment, about 1,700
strong, composed of the Fordsburg and Bloemhof commandos, was
concentrated at Fourteen Streams, ready to join hands with the Free Staters.

her The Philippolis, Bethulie, Rouxville, and Caledon commandos,
. under the orders of Commandants Grobelaar, Olivier and
Swanepoel, were assembling at Donkerpoort, Bethulie, and a little to the
north of Aliwal North for the protection, or possibly destruction, of the
Norval's Pont, Bethulie, and Aliwal bridges. These four commandos had an
approximate strength of 2,500 burghers. Detachments, amounting in all to
about 1,000 men, were watching the Basuto border; on the extreme north of

the Transvaal about 2,000 Waterberg and Zoutpansberg burghers were
piqueting the drifts across the Limpopo river. A small guard had been
placed at Komati Poort to protect the vulnerable portion of the railway to
Delagoa Bay, while the Lydenburg and Carolina commandos, about 1,600
strong, under Schalk Burger, watched the native population of Swaziland.
Thus, including the police and a few other detachments left to guard
Johannesburg, about 48,000 burghers were under arms at the outbreak of
war.

The most remarkable feature of the Boer dispositions is the
nce of influence on them of Baden-Powell's contingent. His two little
n-Powell
m. corps, each numbering barely 500 men, had drawn away nearly
8,000 of the best burghers. Mafeking was in itself a place of no
strategic value, and, had the enemy been content to watch, and hold with
equal numbers, Lt.-Cols. H.C.O. Plumer's and C.O. Hore's regiments and
the police and volunteers assisting them, a contingent of 5,000 Transvaalers
might have been added to the army invading Natal, thus adding greatly to
the difficulties of Sir George White's defence. Alternatively it might have
ensured the capture of Kimberley, or might have marched as a recruiting
column from the Orange river through the disaffected districts and have
gradually occupied the whole of the British lines of communication down to
the coast.

ty of The general distribution, therefore, of the Queen's troops in
h South Africa at the outbreak of war appears, with the exception of
ion.
the division of the field force in Natal, to have been the best that
could have been devised, having due regard to the advantage of the
initiative possessed by the enemy, and to the supreme importance of
preventing, or at any rate retarding, any rising of the disloyal in Cape
Colony. Nevertheless, the situation was one of grave anxiety. The
reinforcements which would form the field army were not due for some
weeks. Meanwhile, in the eastern theatre of operations, the Boers would
have made their supreme effort with all the advantages of superior numbers,
greater mobility, and a terrain admirably suited to their methods of fighting.
A considerable portion of the British troops under Sir G. White were,
moreover, mere units, lacking war organisation except on paper, unknown
to their leaders and staff, unacquainted with the country, and with both

horses and men out of condition after their sea voyage. In the western
theatre, the safety of Kimberley and Mafeking mainly depended on the
untried fighting qualities of recently enlisted colonial corps, volunteers, and
hastily organised town-guards; detachments of regular troops dotted along
the northern frontier of Cape Colony were without hope of support either
from the coast or each other, and would be cut off and crushed in detail in
the case of serious attack or of a rising in their rear. Thus, the initiative lay
absolutely with the enemy, and, so far as could be foreseen, must remain in
his hands until the British army corps and cavalry division should be ready
to take the field about the middle of December.

l According to the terms of the ultimatum of October 9th, a state
ment of of war ensued at 5 p.m. on the 11th. The advance of the Boer forces
begins.
destined for the attack of Mafeking and Kimberley began on the
following day, and by the 14th both places were cut off from Cape Colony.
On the 17th the enemy occupied Belmont railway station. To meet these
movements the 9th Lancers, the squadrons of which disembarked at Cape
Town from India on the 14th, 15th, and 18th, were sent up to Orange River
station immediately on their arrival. The 1st battalion Northumberland
Fusiliers were also moved by train on the 15th from De Aar to Orange
River, being replaced at the former station by a half-battalion of the 2nd
battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, which reached Cape Town
on the 14th, having been brought with extraordinary swiftness from
Mauritius by H.M.S. Powerful. The Orange River bridge garrison was
further strengthened by two 12-pr. B.L. guns manned by Prince Alfred's
Own Cape artillery. The first field artillery to land in Cape Colony, the 62nd
and half 75th batteries, were, on the evening of their disembarkation, the
25th, entrained at once for Orange River. The 1st Border regiment, which
arrived from Malta on the 22nd, was despatched immediately to De Aar, but
subsequently, at the urgent request of Sir George White, was sent by train to
East London and re-embarked for Natal. Steps were taken to make the
Orange River railway bridge passable by artillery and cavalry, by planking
the space between the rails. Meanwhile, on the advice of the local
magistrate, Colonel Money, who was in command at Orange River,
destroyed Hopetown road bridge, eleven miles to the westward, as it was
feared the enemy's guns might cross the river at that point. Raiding parties
of the Boers had overrun Bechuanaland and Griqualand West and spread

proclamations annexing the former district to the Transvaal and the latter to
the Free State. On the eastern side of the colony the enemy made no move,
but still hung back on the north bank of the Orange River. The British
garrison of Stormberg was reinforced by two naval 12-pr. 8-cwt. guns,
accompanied by 357 officers and men of the Royal Navy and Marines, lent
from Simon's Town by the Naval commander-in-chief. In the opinion of
General Forestier-Walker, this reinforcement made this important railway
junction, for the moment, reasonably secure. Three months' supplies had
been stored at all the advanced posts.

Two thousand of the Cape volunteer forces[60] were called out by
teers the Governor on the 16th October and placed at the disposal of the
out.
General Officer Commanding the regular troops, on the
understanding that they were to be paid and rationed from Imperial funds.
These corps were at first employed as garrisons for Cape Town, Port
Elizabeth, East London, Queenstown, and King William's Town;
detachments of the Kaffrarian Rifles being also stationed at Barkly East,
Cathcart, Molteno, and Indwe; but by the end of October the Colonial
volunteers were drawn upon to furnish military posts on the three lines of
railway from the coast, viz.: Touw's River, Fraserburg Road, and Beaufort
West, on the western system; at Cookhouse and Witmoss on the central, and
at Molteno and Sterkstroom, on the eastern. Arrangements were made for
patrolling the line between these posts by railway employés. Having regard,
however, to the great length of these lines, it was obvious that protection of
this description, although useful in checking individual attempts to obstruct
trains, or destroy bridges and culverts, would be of no value against any
armed bodies of the enemy or of rebels.

al Thus, in the western theatre of war, although the investment of
ss of Kimberley, and, in a lesser degree, the attack on Mafeking, were
y of bluff.
causes of grave alarm to the loyalists of Cape Colony, yet, from a
larger point of view, the forward policy of frontier defence successfully
tided over the dangerous weeks previous to the arrival of the first units of
the army corps from home.

CHAPTER III.

THE THEATRE OF WAR.[61]

chapters When the challenge to war, recorded in the first chapter, startled
g with the British people, it met with an immediate response alike in the
ound and
wo armies home islands, and in the Colonies, in India, or elsewhere, wherever
ed. they happened to be. In order to understand the problems of no
small complexity confronting the statesmen at home and the
generals who in the field had to carry out the will of the nation by taking up
the gauntlet so thrown down, it is necessary, first, that the characteristics of
the vast area which was about to become the scene of operations should be
realised; secondly, that the strength of the forces on which the challenger
relied for making good his words should be estimated; and, thirdly, that
certain peculiarities in the constitution of our own army, which materially
affected the nature of the task which lay before both Ministers and soldiers,
whether in London or in South Africa, should be recognised. The next three
chapters will deal in succession with each of these subjects. The attempt
which is here made to portray in a few pages the mountains, the rolling
prairies, and the rivers of the sub-continent must be aided by an
examination of the map which has been specially prepared in order to make
the description intelligible.

al aspect The tableland of South Africa is some 1,360,000 square miles in
a. extent, and of a mean altitude of 3,000 to 5,000 feet above sea
level. To the Indian Ocean on the east it shows a face of scarped mountains.
Following the coast-line at a distance inland of from 70 to 100 miles, these
sweep round from north to south: then stretch straight across the extreme
south-west of the continent through Cape Colony, dwindling as they once
more turn northward into the sand-hills of Namaqualand, and rising again to
the eminences above Mossamedes in Portuguese territory. The rampart,
however, though continuous for a distance of more than 1,200 miles,
scarcely anywhere presents an abrupt wall to the seaboard, but on the
contrary descends to it in some parts in one gigantic step, in others in a
series of steps, or terraces.

Colony: Of the States within it, Cape Colony first claims consideration.
arroos. In the central section the step or terrace formation is so marked,
and the flats, which intervene between the rises, are of such extent, and of a
nature so curious, that they form one of the most remarkable features of
South Africa. They are known as "the Karroos," vast plains stretching
northward, firstly as the Little Karroo from the lower coast ranges to the
more elevated Zwarte Bergen, thence as the Great Karroo to the still loftier
Nieuwveld Mountains. In the rainless season they present an aspect
indescribably desolate, and at the same time a formidable military obstacle
to any invasion of Cape Colony on a large scale from the north. They are
then mere wastes of sand and dead scrub, lifeless and waterless. The first
fall of rain produces a transformation as rapid as any effected by nature.
The vegetable life of the Karroos, which has only been suspended, not
extinguished, is then released; the arid watercourses are filled in a few
hours, and the great desert tract becomes within that brief time a garden of
flowers. Even then, from the scarcity of buildings and inhabitants, and
hence of supplies, the Karroos still form a barrier not to be lightly
attempted, unless by an army fully equipped, and carrying its own
magazines; or, on the other hand, by a band of partisans so insignificant as
to be able to subsist on the scanty resources available, and to disappear
when these are exhausted, or the enemy approaches in strength.

above The first noticeable feature of the hill systems which bind these
os. steppes is their regularity of disposition, and the second, their
steadily increasing altitude northwards to that mountain group which,
running roughly along the 32nd parallel of latitude, culminates in the
Sneeuw Bergen, where the Compass Peak (8,500 feet) stands above the
plains of Graaf Reinet. North of these heights, only the low Karree Bergen,
about 150 miles distant, and the slightly higher Hartzogsrand, occur to
break the monotonous fall of the ground towards the bed of the Orange. All
the geographical and strategical interest lies to the north and east of the
Compass Peak, where with the Zuurbergen commences the great range,
known to the natives as Quathlamba,[62] but to the Voortrekkers, peopling
its mysterious fastnesses with monsters of their imagination, as the
Drakensberg.[63] Throwing out spurs over the length and breadth of
Basutoland, this granite series, here rising to lofty mountains, there
dwindling to rounded downs, runs northward to the Limpopo river, still

clinging to the coast, that is to say, for a distance of over 1,250 miles. The
Zuurbergen, the western extremity, are of no great elevation. They form a
downward step from the Compass and the Great Winterberg to the Orange
river, whose waters they part from those of the Great Fish and Great Kei
rivers. The Stormbergen, on the other hand, which sweep in a bold curve
round to the north-east until, on the borders of Basutoland, they merge into
the central mass, are high, rugged, and pierced by exceedingly few roads,
forming a strong line of defence.

s. It may be said generally of the Cape highlands that the only
passes really practicable for armies are those through which, in
1899, the railways wound upwards to the greater altitudes. These lines of
approach to the Free State frontier were as follows:—

1.—The Cape Colony—De Aar line.
2.—The Port Elizabeth—Norval's Pont line.
3.—The East London—Bethulie and Aliwal North lines.

These were connected by two transverse branches; elsewhere throughout
their length they were not only almost completely isolated, but divided by
great tracts of pathless mountains and barren plains, rendering, except at the
points mentioned, or by way of the sea, the transfer of troops from one to
the other a difficult process. Therefore the branch lines (I. De Aar—
Naauwpoort; 2. Stormberg—Rosmead) had a significance hardly inferior to
that of the three ports, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London. These
varied greatly in the facilities they afforded. Table Bay, with its docks,
wharves and store-houses, took rank among the great commercial harbours
of the world. Port Elizabeth, 430 miles eastward, had no true harbour. Its
open roadstead, although frequented by the mercantile marine, was exposed
to the dangerous south-east gales prevalent on that coast. At East London,
140 miles yet further eastwards, there was a small although excellent
harbour. Its deep basin allowed ocean steamers to moor alongside the
railway wharf, but the water area was limited and a sandbank at the mouth
of the river Buffalo, which flows in here, barred the approach of vessels
exceeding 4,000 tons in burden. On the east coast, Durban, at a distance of
300 miles from East London and 830 miles from Cape Town, formed a
satisfactory base. The difficulties of a bar at the entrance to the harbour,

similar to that at East London, had been overcome by the energy and
enterprise of the colonial authorities. There was no direct communication
by land between these four ports, but this was of little consequence to a
power holding command at sea.

orthern North of the Stormbergen the Drakensberg range maintains its
nsberg. north-easterly trend continuously until it breaks up in the valley of
the Limpopo. Along the eastern Basuto border, from the Natal to the Free
State frontiers, its characteristics, which have been always grand, become
magnificent. Here it is joined by the Maluti Mountains, a range which,
bisecting the domains of the Basuto, and traversing them with its great
spurs, has earned for the little state the title of the South African
Switzerland. At the junction of the Basutoland, Free State, and Natal
frontiers stands Potong, an imposing table-shaped mass, called by the
French missionaries Mont Aux Sources, from the fact that it forms the chief
water parting between the numerous streams flowing west and east. Further
south tower Cathkin (or Champagne Castle), Giants Castle, and Mount
Hamilton, the latter within the Basuto border. All these and many lesser
peaks are joined by ridge after ridge of rugged grandeur.

nsberg Between the Basuto border and Laing's Nek lies the chief
s. strategic interest of the Drakensberg. Of less elevation than the
lofty giants which lie behind it to the southward, this portion still preserves,
with a mean altitude of 8,000 feet, the peculiar scenic beauty of the system.
From the Basuto border northwards the mountains formed the frontier
between Natal and the Orange Free State. They are pierced by a number of
passes of which none are easy, with the exception of Laing's Nek, leading
into the Transvaal. The best known, starting from the southern extremity of
this frontier section, are Olivier's Hoek, Bezuidenhout, and Tintwa Passes at
the head-stream of the Tugela river; Van Reenen's, a steep tortuous gap over
which the railway from Ladysmith to Harrismith, and a broad highway,
wind upwards through a strange profusion of sudden peaks and flat-topped
heights; De Beers, Cundycleugh, and Sunday's River Passes giving access
by rough bridle paths from the Free State into Natal, abreast of the Dundee
coalfields; Müller's and Botha's Passes debouching on Newcastle and
Ingogo; and finally Laing's Nek, the widest and most important of all, by
which a fair road over a rounded saddle crosses the Drakensberg, the

Transvaal frontier lying four miles to the north of its summit. Some of the
eastern spurs thrown off from this section of the Drakensberg completely
traverse, and form formidable barriers across, Natal. Such are the
Biggarsberg, a range of lofty downs running from Cundycleugh Pass across
the apex of Natal to Dundee, and pierced by the railway from Waschbank to
Glencoe. Further to the south, Mount Tintwa throws south-eastward down
to the river Tugela a long, irregular spur, of which the chief features are the
eminences of Tabanyama and Spion Kop. This spur, indeed, after a brief
subsidence below the last-named Kop, continues to flank the whole of the
northern bank of the Tugela as far as the railway, culminating there in the
heights of Pieters, and the lofty downs of Grobelaars Kloof, both of which
overhang the river. East of the railway another series of heights prolongs the
barrier, and joins hands with the lower slopes of the Biggarsberg, which
descends to the Tugela between Sunday's and Buffalo rivers. Further south
still, broad spurs from Cathkin and Giants Castle strike out through Estcourt
and Highlands, and connect the Drakensberg with Zululand.

of North of Basutoland, the western spurs of the Drakensberg,
nsberg. jutting out on to the Orange Free State uplands, are far less
numerous and pronounced than those in Natal, where the mountains dip
steeply down towards the sea; but the Versamelberg, the Witteberg, and the
Koranaberg further south, although of no great height, are strategical
features of importance.

nsberg Beyond Laing's Nek, the Drakensberg, no longer a watershed,
obombo and losing much both of its continuity and splendour, still preserves
s.
its north-easterly trend, dropping still further to a mean altitude of
between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, and passing under many local appellations,
through the eastern Transvaal, until near Lydenburg, it again rises in the
Mauch Berg. Along its eastern edge the Drakensberg here descends in the
ruggedest slopes and precipices to the plains which divide it from the
Lobombo Mountains, a range which, commencing at the Pongola river
opposite Lake St. Lucia, runs parallel to the Drakensberg, the two systems
inclining inward to coalesce at the Limpopo. South of that river the
Lobombo formed throughout its length the eastern frontier of the Transvaal
State.

ands.

North of the Oliphant river, which pierces both the Drakensberg and
Lobombo, the character of the Drakensberg becomes still more
fragmentary. Here its most important features are the transverse ridges, or
rands, thrown off from it in a direction generally south-westerly. Chief
amongst these are the Murchison and Zoutpansberg Mountains, which,
covering more than 350 miles of the country, unite in the Witfontein Berg in
the Rustenburg district. These ridges, though of an elevation of over 4,000
feet above the sea level, rise nowhere more than, and seldom as much as,
1,500 feet above the terrain, and do little to relieve the monotony of the
great prairies they traverse and surround. The same type is preserved by the
various low ridges running parallel to and south of them towards the
Orange Free State border. One of these is the famous Witwaters Rand,
extending from Krugersdorp to Springs, and another the Magaliesberg, a
chain of more imposing character, connecting Pretoria and Rustenburg to
the north-east, and disappearing in the fertile Marico valley. North of the
Limpopo the Drakensberg, though becoming more broken and complicated,
still presents a bold front where the great sub-continental plateau descends
suddenly northwards to the Zambesi, and eastwards to Portuguese territory,
i.e., on the northern and eastern frontiers of Mashonaland. Almost at the
junction of these boundaries it is joined by the Matoppo Hills, which rise
from the north-eastern limits of Khama's Country, bisect obliquely the
region between the Zambesi and the Limpopo, and culminate in Mount
Hampden (5,000 feet), near Salisbury.

s Passing from the mountains to the great plateau they enclose, the
opo and first point to be noted is that its surface is set at two opposite "tilts,"
ge.
the portion north of the Witwaters Rand inclining downward to the
water- east, the other, south of that ridge, to the west. The drainage,
g.
therefore, runs respectively east and west, and it is effected by the
two great streams of the Limpopo and the Orange, with their many
affluents. The general river system of the central plains is thus of the
simplest; the Indian Ocean receives their northern waters, the Atlantic their
southern; the remarkable factor of the arrangement being that a physical
feature so insignificant as the Witwaters Rand should perform the function
of water-parting for a region so gigantic.[64]

e of
opo.

The Limpopo, or Crocodile river, rises as a paltry stream in the Witwaters
Rand between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and flows into the Indian Ocean,
80 miles north of Delagoa Bay, covering in its course fully 1,350 miles.

e of The Orange has three distinct sets of headstreams from the
ge. western flank of the Drakensberg, and a total length of 1,300 miles.
From the Basuto border to Ramah, on the Kimberley railway, about 220
miles, it divided the Orange Free State from Cape Colony. The Orange
receives on its right bank its greatest affluent, the Vaal, which is between
500 and 600 miles in length. Commercially, both the Orange and the Vaal
are as useless as their smallest tributary, being entirely unnavigable at all
times of the year. Raging floods in the wet season, and mere driblets in the
dry, they are at present denied to the most powerful or shallowest of river
steamboats. The prospects of the Orange river as a potential waterway are
in any case practically destroyed by a great bar which blocks approach to
the estuary from the sea.

ry The streams of the South African plateau, whether river, spruit,
cter of sluit, or donga, have, in addition to their extreme variability,
ms of
another marked and almost universal peculiarity. Running in deep
beds, of which the banks are usually level with the surrounding
country, and the sides terraced from the highest to the lowest water-mark,
they constitute natural entrenchments which are generally invisible, except
where rarely defined by a line of bushes, and, owing to the dead uniformity
of the surrounding country, are almost impossible to reconnoitre. Nor, in
1899, were their defensive capabilities lessened by the dearth of bridges, by
the dangers of the drifts, and by the absence of defined approaches to all
crossing-places away from the main roads. The "drifts," or fords, especially
rendered the laying out of a line of operations in South Africa a complex
problem. Their depth varied with the weather of the day; they were known
by many names even to local residents, and were of many types; but all
alike were so liable to sudden change or even destruction, that any
information concerning them, except the most recent, was practically
useless.

of To comprehend broadly the salient physiological features of a
on region so enormous as South Africa, the causes of the climatic
te.

influences which affect them must be understood. These causes on are
simplicity itself. The warm winds blow from the east, and the cold from the
west; the former, from the warm Mozambique current, skirting the eastern
seaboard, the latter, from the frigid Antarctic stream, setting from south to
north, and striking the western coast about Cape St. Martin. It follows,
therefore, that the climate and country become more genial and fertile the
further they are removed from the desiccating influence emanating from the
western seaboard. The dreariness of the solitudes between Little
Namaqualand and Griqualand West, the latter slightly more smiling than the
former, attests this fact. But the comparative inhospitality of the Boer States
—comparative, that is, to what might be expected from their proximity to
the warm Indian Ocean—demands further explanation. From the Atlantic to
the eastern frontiers of these States no mountain ranges of any elevation
intervene to break the progress of the dry, cold breezes; from the mouth of
the Orange river to the Drakensberg the country is subject almost
uninterruptedly to their influence. But it is not so with the milder winds
from the east. The great screen of the Drakensberg meets and turns them
from end to end of South Africa; no country west of this range profits by
their moisture, whereas the regions east of it receive it to the full. Hence the
almost tropical fertility of Natal and eastern Cape Colony, with their high
rainfall, their luxuriance of vegetation, indigo, figs, and coffee, and the
jungles of cactus and mimosa which choke their torrid kloofs. Hence,
equally, the more austere veld of the central tableland, the great grass
wildernesses, which are as characteristic of South Africa as the prairies and
the pampas of America, and, like them, became the home and hunting-
elds. ground of a race of martial horsemen. Agriculture, following
nature, divides the veld into three parts, the "High," "Bush," and
"Low" Velds; but it is the first and greatest of these which stamps the
central tableland with its peculiar military characteristics. Almost the whole
of the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal east of the Natal railway, are
High Veld, which may be taken to mean any grassland lying at an elevation
of about 4,000 feet, upon which all vegetation withers in the dry season,
while in spring and summer it is covered with nutritious herbage. The Low
Veld lies properly between longitude 31° and the tropical eastern coast;
while the Bush Veld is usually understood to mean the country lying
between the Pretoria-Delagoa railway and the Limpopo river. The terms,
however, are very loosely used. The Low Veld differs widely from the High

Veld. Upon the former is rich—almost rank—vegetation and pasture
flourishing throughout the year. But the climate is hot, moist, and
unhealthy; and the Boer farmers, forced by the course of the seasons to
drive their flocks from the sparkling, invigorating air of the uplands to the
steamy lowlands, were wont to take the task in turn amongst themselves, as
an unpleasant one to be performed as seldom as possible.

vaal The High Veld of the Transvaal differs slightly from that of the
Veld. Free State in appearance. It is more broken and undulating; the
range of vision, at times apparently boundless in the southern state, is rarely
extensive, except from the summit of a kopje, being usually bounded by the
low ridge-lines of one of those great, gentle, almost imperceptible, rolls of
the ground which are a feature of the Transvaal veld, and with its hidden
watercourses, its peculiar tactical danger. A mountain range is seldom out of
sight; and, speaking generally, the Transvaal may be said to be less sombre
than the southern or western districts of the great plateau.

opjes. If the veld can only be compared with the sea, the kopjes which
accentuate, rather than relieve, its monotony resemble in as marked
a degree the isolated islands which rise abruptly from the waters of some
tropic archipelago. Sometimes, indeed, the kopjes form a rough series of
broken knolls, extending over a space of several miles, as, for instance, the
ridges of Magersfontein and Spytfontein, between Kimberley and the
Modder; sometimes a group of three or four, disposed irregularly in all
directions, become a conspicuous landmark, as at the positions of Belmont
and Graspan; and it is not uncommon to find larger masses, not less
irregular, enclosing the river reaches which their drainage has created,
among which may be enumerated the heights south-east of Jacobsdal, and
by the river Riet, and those about Koffyfontein and Jagersfontein on the
same stream.

for view But, as a rule, the kopje of the veld is a lonely hill, a mass of
defence. igneous rock—flat-topped or sharp-pointed. From 200 to 800 feet
in height, without spur or underfeature, accessible only by winding paths
among gigantic boulders, sheer of face and narrow of crest, it is more useful
as a post of observation than as a natural fortress; for it can almost always

be surrounded, and the line of retreat, as a general rule, is naked to view and
fire.

States as So far as tactical positions are concerned, any force on the
sive defensive upon the veld of the Boer States must be mainly
n.
dependent on the rivers. Yet the spurs of the Drakensberg, blending
in a range of ridges, form a mountain stronghold admirably adapted for
guerilla warfare; and all along the Basuto border, at a distance of from 10 to
20 miles west of the Caledon, stands out a series of high, detached hills,
which form a covered way along the eastern boundary of the Free State,
crossing the Orange, and leading into the recesses of the Stormberg
Mountains.

features. For every wavelet of land upon the surface of the Boer States, a
hundred great billows stand up in Natal. Kopje succeeds kopje, all
steep, and many precipitous, yet not the bare, stony cairns of the
transmontane regions, but moist green masses of verdure, seldom parched
even in the dry season, and in the wet, glistening with a thousand cascades;
not severely conical or rectangular, like the bizarre eminences which cover
Cape Colony with the models of a school of geometry, but nobly outlined.
Many of the foothills, it is true, are mere heaps of rock and stone; but even
these are rarely such naked and uncompromising piles as are found on the
higher levels. Even where northern Natal occasionally widens and subsides
to a savannah, as it does below the Biggarsberg, and again south of
Colenso, the expanse, compared with the tremendous stretches of the Boer
veld, is but a meadow.

hy As a theatre of war South Africa had one advantage, that it was
e sole for the most part eminently healthy. Enteric fever, the scourge of
r for
er. armies, was bound to be prevalent amongst thousands exposed to
hardships in a country where the water supply was indifferent,
where sanitation was usually primitive amongst the inhabitants, and
impossible to improvise hurriedly. But the purity of the air, the geniality of
the temperature, the cool nights, the brilliant sunshine, and the hard dry soil
were palliatives of evils inseparable from all campaigning. Otherwise, for
regular armies of invasion, South Africa was unfavourable. The railways
were so few that the business of supply and movement was always arduous;

spaces so vast that large forces were swallowed up; the enormous distances
from one strategical point to another, intensified, in difficulty by the almost
entire absence of good roads, the scarcity of substantial bridges, of well-
built towns, of commodious harbours, and of even such ordinary
necessaries as flour or fuel, all these complicated every military problem to
a degree not readily intelligible to the student of European warfare alone.

entral It is not easy to sum up briefly the typical qualities as a fighting
u. area of a region so vast and diversified as South Africa; but its
dominant feature is undoubtedly the great central plateau comprising
southern Rhodesia, all the Transvaal, except a narrow fringe on the
eastward, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the Orange Free State, and the
northern and central portions of Cape Colony. Westward this tableland
slopes gradually and imperceptibly to sea level; to the south it reaches the
Atlantic in the series of terraces and escarpments already described.
Eastward it is shut in by the Drakensberg, whose spurs, projecting to the
Indian Ocean, traverse at right angles Natal, Zululand, Swaziland, and
Portuguese East Africa.

on Upon the central South African plateau tactical and strategical
tions of success is dependent upon rapid manœuvring. Positions are so
u.
readily turned that they can seldom be resolutely held. It is
difficult, therefore, to bring an evasive enemy to decisive action, and the
fruits of victory must chiefly be plucked by pursuit. The horse is as
important as the man, and the infantry arm is reduced to the position of a
first reserve, or to the rôle of piquets on the lines of communication, which
remain always open to attack. Superior numbers and, above all, superior
speed, are irresistible. There are no first-class physical obstacles; the rivers,
excepting only the Orange and the Vaal, are, as a rule, fordable; the hill
features for the most part insignificant or easy to mask. Mobility is thus at
once the chief enemy and aid to military success.

f lower But on the stairway descending from the south of this plateau,
and on the spurs reaching up from the coast on the east, all this is
reversed. The approach of an army acting on the offensive, uphill or across
the series of ridges, is commanded by so many points, that a small number
of defenders can readily arrest its advance. Position leads but to position,

and these, prolonged almost indefinitely on either flank, are not readily
turned, or, if turned, still offer locally a strong frontal defence, should the
enemy be sufficiently mobile to reach them in time. Streamlets, which
would be negligible on the plateau, become formidable obstacles in their
deep beds. The horseman's occupation is greatly limited, for he can neither
reconnoitre nor gallop. Marches must, therefore, be made painfully in battle
formation, for every advance may entail an action. Thus strategy is
grievously cramped by the constant necessity for caution, and still more by
the tedious movements of the mass of transport, without which no army can
continue to operate in a country sparsely inhabited, and as sparsely
cultivated.

y of In South Africa even the rainfall militates against concurrent
ll. operations on a wide scale, for, at the same season of the year, the
conditions prevalent upon one side of the sub-continent are exactly the
opposite to those obtaining on the other. In the western provinces, the rainy
season occurs in the winter months (May—October), in the eastern,
including the Boer States, the rain falls chiefly in the summer (October—
March). Yet so capricious are these phenomena that a commander, who
counted absolutely upon them for his schemes, might easily find them in
abeyance, or even for a period reversed.

y of S.A. Beyond the broad facts stated above, the extent of South Africa
te. renders it as impossible to specify any typical climatic or scenic
peculiarities common to the whole of it, as to fix upon any strategical or
tactical character that is universal. Cape Colony alone exhibits such
antitheses of landscape as the moist verdure of the Stormberg and the
parched dreariness of Bushman and Little Namaqua Lands, and a rainfall
ranging from two to seventy-two inches per annum. The variations in other
parts are little less striking. The temperature of the High Veld, for instance,
is wont to rise or fall no less than sixty degrees in twelve hours, or less.
Thus, whilst one portion of an army on a wide front might be operating in
the tropics, another might be in the snows, whilst a third was sheltering
from the sun by day, from the frost by night, conditions which actually
obtained during the contest about to be described. What effect such
divergencies must exercise on plans of campaign, on supplies of clothing,

shelter, food, forage, and on military animals themselves, may be readily
imagined.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BOER ARMY.

previous Any force of irregulars which offers a prolonged resistance, not
compare unmarked by tactical successes, to a regular army of superior
Boer
ance. strength is apt to be regarded as a phenomenon. Yet, from the
earliest times, history has shown how seasoned troops may be
checked by an enemy who is inferior in numbers, discipline and armament,
but possessed of certain counterbalancing resources, due either to the nature
of his country, to his own natural characteristics, or to a combination of
both.[65] Of such resources the Boers at the close of the nineteenth century
ted possessed, largely by inheritance, a full share. With their
ies. forefathers, the early Afrikanders, loneliness had been a passion to
which their very presence north of the Orange river was due. Flying from
society, from burdens and responsibilities which they considered
intolerable, from pleasures which seemed to them godless, from a stir which
bewildered them, and from regularity which wearied them, they had
penetrated the wilds northward in bands as small as possible, each man of
which was wrapped in a dream of solitude, careless whither he went so long
as he went unseen. It troubled these pioneers little that they were plunging
into a sea of enemies. Society, with its conventions and trammels, and most
of all, perhaps, with its taxes, was the only enemy whom they feared, the
only one they could never escape. But before it caught them up, their
combats with corporeal foes were incessant and deadly. Wild beasts
prowled round their herds; savages swooped upon their homesteads; all
animated nature was in arms against them; every farmhouse was a fortress,
usually in a state of siege. In the great spaces of the wilderness the cry for
help was but seldom heard, or if heard, only by one who had his own safety
to look to. The Boer farmer of the forties, therefore, had to work out his

rescue, as he worked out every other problem of his existence, for himself,
acquiring thereby, a supreme individuality and self-reliance in the presence
of danger. He acquired also other characteristics. The fighting men of his
nation were few in number; every mature life was little less valuable to the
State than it was to the homestead whose existence depended upon it. The
burgher's hope of injuring his enemy was therefore subordinated to
solicitude for his own preservation, and he studied only safe methods of
being dangerous. Even when in later days the Boer expeditionary bands,
reclaiming to the full from the blacks the toll of blood and cruelty which
had been levied on themselves, were more often the attackers than the
attacked, their aggression was always tempered by the caution of the
individual Boers, who would still forego a chance of striking a blow should
it contain an undue element of hazard. The republican warriors relied,
indeed, less on attack than on defence. They trusted yet more to that
weapon, perfected by many small races which have been compelled to work
out their own methods of warfare, the weapon of evasion. Nearly always
outnumbered, never sure of victory, the burghers always provided, then kept
their eyes continually upon, a loophole of escape, for if that were closed
they felt themselves to be lost. These characteristics, with many more which
will be noted, the early Boer bequeathed to his sons and grandsons; a legacy
so strangely composed that many of the very qualities which brought
temporary victory to the campaigners of 1899 foredoomed them to ultimate
defeat.

of these Self-reliance and individuality are factors of extraordinary
sent military importance under any conditions, but especially under
re.
circumstances involving such dispersion of combatants, such
distances between commanders and commanded, as were brought about by
the conjunction of long-range arms, an open terrain and the clearest
atmosphere in the world. South Africa was a country which gave the freest
play to the deadly properties of small-bore rifles. The new weapons fitted
into the Boer's inherited conceptions of warfare as if they were a part for
which his military organisers had long been hoping and waiting. He had an
antipathy to fighting at close quarters, but he knew the value and necessity
of striking; the Mauser enabled him to strike at the extreme limit of vision,
multiplying tenfold the losses and difficulties of the enemy who attempted
to close with him. The portability of the ammunition, the accuracy of the

sighting, the absence of betraying smoke, all these increased the Boer's
already great trust in himself, and he took the field against the British
regular infantryman with more confidence than his sires had felt when they
held their laagers against the Zulu and the Matabele. The modern rifle,
moreover, still further increased his self-reliance by rendering avoidance of
close combat, which alone he feared, a much simpler matter than hitherto.
His father had escaped the bayonets of the British at Boomplaats; he
himself was no more willing or likely to be caught by the steel fifty years
later, when he could kill at two thousand yards instead of two hundred, or
failing to kill, had hours instead of minutes in which to gain his pony and
disappear. Yet the long-range rifle had improved his weapon of retreat until
it had become a danger instead of an aid to his cause. Failing so completely
to understand the military value of self-sacrifice, that he actually pitied, and
slightly despised it, when he saw it resorted to by his enemies, his refusal to
risk his life often proved disastrous to his side at times when more
resolution might have turned the scale of battle in his favour.

There was much to be admired in the Boer defensive; up to a certain
point it was stubborn and dangerous. The musketry from a position, poured
upon zones of ground over which the British troops must pass rather than
upon the troops themselves, was heavy and effective, and not easily quelled
by bombardment. In battle, artillery may do its work without causing a
casualty; but so long as he had cover for his body, the soul of the Boer
rifleman was little shaken by the bursting of projectiles; fierce firing came
often from portions of a position which appeared to be smothered by
shrapnel, and invisible in the reek of exploding lyddite.

al habits Nor did the Boer armies, as regular armies have done, cling to
hting. strong positions simply because they were strong. They considered
a position as a means to an end, and if it ceased to be the best, they
discarded it without hesitation, no matter with what toil it had been
prepared. Nevertheless, on ground of their own choosing, the abandonment
without a shot of strong, laboriously entrenched, positions by no means
always meant retirement. Much as they dreaded being enveloped, their
flanks, or what would have been the flanks of an European army, might be
threatened again and again only to be converted each time into new and
formidable fronts. The nature of the country, and the comparative mobility

of the opposing forces rendered these rapid changes of front easy of
execution, but they demanded promptness, and a genius for the appreciation
of the value of ground, not only on the part of the Boer leaders, but also on
that of the rank and file. In the ranks of the commandos persuasion had to
take the place of word of command; the Boer soldier, before he quitted one
position for another, had to be convinced of the necessity for a repetition of
the severe toil of entrenching which had apparently been wasted. But his
eye was as quick, his tactical and topographical instinct as keen as those of
his commander, and if the new dispositions were not selected for him, he
often selected them himself.

Once on the ground the burghers' first care was to conceal
ces: themselves quickly and cunningly, cutting deep and narrow
g points.
entrenchments, if possible upon the rearward crest, leaving the
forward crest, of which they carefully took the range, to the outposts. Upon
the naked slope between, which was often obstructed with barbed wire, they
relied to deny approach to their schanzes. A not uncommon device was the
placing of the main trench, not at the top, but along the base of the position.
Here the riflemen, secure and invisible, lay while the hostile artillery
bombarded the untenanted ridge lines behind them. Such traps presented an
enhanced danger from the fact that the Boers would rarely open fire from
them until the front of the attack was well committed, though, on the other
hand, they seldom had nerve or patience to withhold their musketry until
the moment when it might be completely decisive. As regards the Boer
artillery, its concealment was usually perfect, its location original and
independent, its service accurate and intelligent. Dotted thinly over a wide
front, the few guns were nevertheless often turned upon a common target,
and were as difficult to detect from their invisibility, as to silence from the
strength of the defences, in the case of the heavy ordnance, and in the case
of the lighter pieces, from their instant change of position when discovered.

akness in Nevertheless, with all these virtues, the Boer defensive, by
ce. reason of the above-mentioned characteristics of the individual
soldiers, was no insurmountable barrier, but only an obstacle to a
determined attack. Many of the positions occupied by the Republicans
during the campaigns seemed impregnable. Prepared as skilfully as they
had been selected, in them some troops would have been unconquerable.

But at the moment when they must be lost without a serried front, the
reverse slopes would be covered with flying horsemen, whilst but a handful
of the defenders remained in the trenches. Nor, except on the feeblest and
most local scale, would the defenders at any time venture anything in the
nature of a counter stroke, though the attack staggered, or even recoiled,
upon the bullet-swept glacis, and victory trembled in the balance.

akness in If the Boer defensive was force passive, their general attack
. became force dissipated as soon as it entered the medium rifle
zone. Excessive individuality marked its every stage, the thought of victory
seldom held the first place. In the old days, when an assault had to be
attempted, as at Thaba Bosigo and Amajuba, it had been the custom to call
for volunteers. But when President Kruger pitted his burghers against large
armies, this expedient was no longer available; instead of a few score such
affairs required thousands, and they were not forthcoming. The desire to
close, the only spirit which can compel decisive victory, entered into the
Boer fighting philosophy even less than the desire to be closed with; the
non-provision of bayonets was no careless omission on the part of their War
department. During an assault the Commandants might set, as they often
did, a splendid example of courage, but they could never rely on being
followed to the end by more than a fraction of their men. The attack,
therefore, of the Boers differed from that of a force of regulars in that it was
never made in full strength, and was never pushed home; and from that of
the Afghans, Afridis or Soudanese in that there was no strong body of
spectators to rush forward and assure the victory half won by the bolder
spirits in front. Their attack was, in consequence, little to be feared, so long
as the defence was well covered from the incessant rifle fire which
supported and accompanied it; for none but a few gallant individuals would
ever venture to close upon a trench or sangar whose defenders yet remained
alive behind it. Both in attack and defence, therefore, the Boer army lacked
the last essentials to victory.

rtisans. It was in the warfare of the partisan that the Boer excelled, in the
raid on a post or convoy, the surprise and surrounding of a
detachment, the harassing of the flanks and the rear of a column, and the
dash upon a railway. Their scouting has not often been excelled; their
adversaries seldom pitched or struck a camp unwatched, or marched

undogged by distant horsemen. How little the Boer generals and
Intelligence department knew how to utilise the fruits of this constant
watchfulness will be fully shown elsewhere, but the lack of deductive
power on the part of the leaders detracts nothing from the unwearied
cunning of their men.

f ground. The combinations of scattered bands at a given rendezvous for a
common purpose were not seldom marvellous, effected as they
often were by rides of extraordinary speed and directness by night, when
the men had to feel with their hands for the goat and Kaffir tracks if astray,
but rarely astray, even in the most tangled maze of kopjes, or, still more
wonderful, on the broadest savannah of featureless grass. With the Boer,
direction had become a sense; not only were topographical features, once
seen, engraved indelibly on his memory, but many which would be utterly
invisible to untrained eyes were often detected at once by inference so
unconscious as to verge on instinct. He knew "ground" and its secrets as
intimately as the seaman knows the sea, and his memory for locality was
that of the Red Indian scout.

d Thus the Boer riflemen possessed many of the characteristics of
ies. the same formidable type of irregular soldier as the backwoodsmen
of America or the picked warriors of the Hindustan border. Yet an exact
prototype of qualities so contradictory as those which composed this
military temperament is not to be recalled. No fighting men have been more
ready for war, yet so indifferent to military glory, more imbued with
patriotism, yet so prone to fight for themselves alone, more courageous, yet
so careful of their lives, more lethargic, or even languid by nature, and yet
so capable of the most strenuous activity. Such were the Boers of the veld.
In one particular they had never been surpassed by any troops. No Boer but
was a bold horseman and a skilled horsemaster, who kept his mount ready
at any moment for the longest march or the swiftest gallop, in darkness, or
over the roughest ground. In camp the ponies grazed each one within reach
of its master; in action every burgher took care that his perfectly trained
animal stood, saddled and bridled, under cover within a short run to the
rear. In remote valleys great herds of ponies, some fresh, some recouping
their strength after the fatigues of a campaign, roamed at pasture until they
should be driven to the front as remounts.

ity. The unrivalled mobility of the Boer armies, therefore, and the
vastness of its theatre of action, gave to them strength out of all
proportion to their numbers. A muster roll is little indication of the fighting
power of a force which can march three or four times as fast as its
opponent, can anticipate him at every point, dictating the hour and place of
the conflict, can keep him under constant surveillance, can leave its
communications without misgivings, and finally, which can dispense with
reserves in action, so quickly can it reinforce from the furthest portions of
its line of battle. Yet in this particular again, the Boers' constitutional
antipathy to the offensive robbed them of half their power. They employed
their mobility, their peculiar strength, chiefly on the defensive and on tactics
of evasion, often, indeed, resigning it altogether, to undertake a prolonged
and half-hearted investment of some place of arms. Amongst their leaders
there appeared some who did all that was possible, and much more than had
seemed possible, with a few hundreds of devoted followers. But the
Republics possessed no Sheridan. Men who foresaw that in this mobility
might lie the making of a successful campaign, that the feats of the raider
might be achieved tenfold by large well-mounted armies, were missing
from their councils.

nisation. The Boer forces which took the field in 1899 were composed of
two divisions:—

(I.) The Burgher Commandos.
(II.) The Regular Forces.

Of the former the whole male population, black and white, between the
ages of sixteen and sixty, formed the material,[66] the "Wyk" or Ward, the
lowest electoral unit, the recruiting basis. Upon the Field Cornet, the chief
officer of a Ward, elected by its votes for a term of three years, devolved
many responsibilities besides the civil duties of collecting the taxes,
administering the law, and maintaining order in his small satrapy. He was
also the sole representative of Army Headquarters. One of the most
important of his functions was that of compiling the registers of burghers
liable to war service.[67]

cornet.

It was his business, moreover, to see that each man of his levy took the
field with clothing, rifle, horse and ammunition in good and serviceable
order; and if, as was rarely the case, means of transport were insufficiently
contributed by the burghers themselves, to provide them by commandeering
from the most convenient source. The whole military responsibility, in
short, of his Ward fell on him; and though the men he inspected annually
were rather his neighbours than his subordinates, their habitual readiness for
emergencies smoothed what, in most other communities, would have been
the thorniest of official paths, and rendered seldom necessary even the mild
law he could invoke.

levy. The first acts of the Ward levy at the rendezvous were to elect an
Assistant Field Cornet and two or more Corporals, the former to
serve their commander during the campaign, the latter to serve themselves
by distributing rations and ammunition, and supervising generally their
comfort in laager, by performing, in fact, all the duties performed by a
section commander in the British infantry except that of command.

The Field Cornet then rode with his burghers to the meeting-
mando place of the commando, usually the market town of the District.
mandant. There a Commandant, elected by the votes of the District, as the
Field Cornet had been by those of the Ward, assumed command of
the levies of all the Wards, and forthwith led them out to war, a Boer
commando.

on in Thus, at the order to mobilise, the manhood of the Boer
Republics sprang to arms as quickly, as well prepared, and with
incomparably more zeal than the best trained conscripts of Europe. Not
urged to the front like slaves by the whips of innumerable penalties, their
needs not considered to the provision of a button, or a ration of salt, shabby
even to squalor in their appointments, they gathered in response to a call
which it was easy for the laggard to disobey, and almost uncared for by the
forethought of anyone but themselves.

ts of In so far, therefore, as it applied to the actual enrolment and
m. mobilisation of the commandos, the military system of the Boer
Republics appeared well-nigh perfect. Yet it had radical and grievous
defects, and these, being in its most vital parts, robbed it of half its

efficiency. The election of military officers by the votes of the men they
were destined to command would be a hazardous expedient in the most
er army Utopian of communities; it was doubly dangerous with a people
y trained in habits formed by the accustomed life of the Boers in the
rous.
nineteenth century. Its evil effects were felt throughout their
armies. Officers of all grades had been selected for any other qualities than
those purely military. Property, family interest, and politics had often
weighed more heavily in the balance than aptitude for command. In the
field the results were disastrous. Few of the officers had sufficient strength
of character to let it be seen that they did not intend to remain subject to the
favour which had created them. The burghers were not slow to profit by the
humility of their superiors. Jealous of their democratic rights, conscious of
their own individual value in a community so small, the rank and file were
too ignorant of war to perceive the necessity of subordination. Especially
were these failings of leaders and led harmful in the Krijgsraads, or
Councils of War, which, attended by every officer from corporal upwards,
preceded any military movement of importance. Since most of the members
owed their presence to social and civic popularity, sound military decisions
were in any case not to be expected. Moreover, as the majority of the
officers truckled to the electorate which had conferred upon them their rank,
it followed that the decisions of a Krijgsraad were often purely those of the
Boer soldiers, who hung on its outskirts, and did not scruple, when their
predilections were in danger of being disregarded, to buttonhole their
representatives and dictate their votes. Finally, there were not wanting
instances of unauthorised Krijgsraads being assembled at critical junctures,
avowedly in mutinous opposition to a lawful assembly, and actually
overriding the latter's decision.

s of There was, however, discipline of a theoretical kind in the
line. commandos. Two authorised forms of Courts-Martial existed to
deal with offences committed on active service. But Courts-Martial were an
empty terror to evil-doers. They were rarely convened, and when they were,
the burgher of the close of the nineteenth century knew as many methods of
evading the stroke of justice as did his father of escaping the stalk of a lion
or the rush of a Zulu spearman.

tain
er in

A serious defect inherent in this military system was the inequality of the
strength of the units created by it. A commando was a commando, of
whatever numbers it consisted; and these, contributed by districts greatly
varying in population, ranged from 300 to 3,000 men. Thus the generals,
placed in command of forces composed of many commandos of which they
knew nothing but the names, were ever in doubt as to the numbers of men
at their disposal, a difficulty increased tenfold by the constantly shifting
strength of the commandos themselves. Straggling and absenteeism are
evils incident to all irregular or hastily enrolled armies, however drastic
their codes of discipline, or however fervent their enthusiasm; with the
Boers these maladies were prevalent to an incredible degree. Many and
stringent circulars were promulgated by the Boer Presidents to cope with
this disastrous source of weakness. But one and all failed in their object,
from the impotence of the officers whose duty it was to enforce them, and
at every stage of the campaign many more than the authorised 10 per cent.
of the fighting line were absent from their posts.

ined If such were the faults of the machine, those of the motive power
were not less glaring. No provision had been made in peace for the
training of men for the duties of the Staff. At Pretoria, the Commandant-
General, forced to reign alone over the twin kingdoms of administration and
command, had not unnaturally failed to govern either. The chain of
authority between Commander-in-Chief and private soldier, a chain whose
every link must be tempered and tested in time of peace, was with the Boers
not forged until war was upon them, and then so hurriedly that it could not
bear the strain. When prompt orders were most needed, there was often no
one to issue them, no one to carry them, or, even if issued and delivered, no
one present who could enforce them. Nor were the ramifications of
departmental duty, which, like arteries, should carry vitality to every portion
of the army, of any more tried material. In most existing departments there
was chaos; many that are indispensable did not exist at all.

The service arms of the burgher forces were the Mauser ·276
rifle and carbine.

The exact number of Mauser rifles brought into the Boer States is, and
will probably be always, uncertain. At least 53,375 can be accounted for, of

which 43,000 were imported by the Transvaal and the remainder by the
Orange Free State, the latter drawing a further 5,000 from the stores of the
sister Republic. These, with approximately 50,000 Martini-Henry and other
rifles known to have been in the arsenals and in possession of the burghers
before the commencement of hostilities, made up over 100,000 serviceable
weapons at the disposal of the two countries.[68] Ammunition was ample,
though, again, it is idle to discuss actual figures. Neither the stock in the
magazines, nor that in the possession of the farmers, was for certain known
to any man. The most moderate of the Republican officials in a position to
form a credible estimate placed it at seventy millions of rounds; it was more
probably nearer one hundred millions. The Boer farmer, still uncertain of
security in the outlying solitudes of the veld, still unaccustomed to it in the
more frequented districts, never wasted ammunition even though a use for it
seemed remote. He hoarded it as other men hoard gold; for deeply rooted in
him was the thought, sown in the perilous days of the past, that cartridges,
with which to preserve the lives of himself and his family, might at any
moment become of more value than gold pieces, which could only give to
life the comfort he somewhat despised. Thus the arsenals of the larger
towns were not the only, or even the chief, repositories of small-arm
ammunition. Every farm was a magazine; lonely caves hid packets and
boxes of cartridges; they lay covered beneath the roots of many a solitary
tree, beneath conspicuous stones, often beneath the surface of the bare veld
itself. Whatever were the actual amounts of arms and ammunition at the
disposal of the Republican riflemen, it was plain they were not only
adequate but extravagant. There was significance in the excess. The Boers
possessed sufficient munitions of war to arm and equip 30,000 or 40,000
men over and above their own greatest available strength. It will be seen in
due course for whose hands this over-plus was designed.

practice. The Republican Governments had not been satisfied with the
mere issue of arms. As early as 1892 in the Transvaal, and 1895 in
the Orange Free State, rifle practice, at the periodical inspections of arms
and equipment, called Wapenschouws, had been made compulsory for the
burghers. For these exercises ammunition was provided free, and money
appropriated from the State funds for prizes. Every effort, in short, was
made to preserve the old skill and interest in rifle-shooting, which it was
feared would vanish with the vanishing elands and gemsbok. If the skill had

diminished, the interest had not. A rifle had at all times an irresistible
fascination for a Boer. The Bedouin Arab did not expend more care upon
his steed of pure Kehailan blood, nor the medieval British archer upon his
bow, than did the veld farmer upon his weapon. Even he who kept clean no
other possession, allowed no speck of dirt on barrel or stock. On the
introduction of the new rifles, not only had shooting clubs sprung up in all
quarters, but, in aiding them with funds, ammunition, and prizes, the
Republican authorities, before they disappeared, had given at least one
lesson to Governments, that of fostering to the utmost any national
predilection which may be of service to the State.

THE REGULAR FORCE.

Regular forces of similar, if not identical, composition were authorised
by the constitutions of both Republics, consisting in the Transvaal of
artillery and police, and in the Free State of artillery only. These differed in
no respects from similar units of any European organisation, being raised,
equipped, officered, instructed, and paid in the ordinary manner, and
quartered in barracks or forts.

ars. The regular forces of the Transvaal consisted of:—

(a) The State Artillery.
(b) The South African Republic Police.
(c) The Swaziland Police.

ery. The State Artillery of the South African Republic was as
complete and efficient a unit as any of its kind in existence.
Originally incorporated with the Police at the inception of both in 1881, it
was reorganised on a separate footing in 1894, in which year it also first
saw active service against Malaboch in the Blue Mountains. At this time the
strength of the Corps was but 100 gunners, 12 non-commissioned officers
and 7 officers. After the Jameson Raid, however, the force was quadrupled
and reorganised; the field and fortress departments were differentiated,
larger barracks built, and steps taken generally to ensure the greatest
possible efficiency and readiness for instant service, the avowed object of

the Government being to make the Corps "the nucleus of the military forces
of the Republic."[69] The only qualifications necessary for the 300
additional men required by the scheme were citizenship, either by birth or
naturalisation, age not to be less than 16, and the possession of a certificate
of good conduct from the Field Cornet. Service was for three years, with the
option of prolongation to six years, after which followed a period of service
in the reserve until the age of 35 was reached.[70]

ry For the maintenance of discipline the Corps had three Military
. Courts of its own, whose powers extended from detention to death.
They differed in no way from similar tribunals in the British army save in
one respect, that convicted prisoners had a right of appeal from a lower
Court to that above it. Drill was on the German model, but the language
was Dutch. The Boer gunners were ready pupils, having much the same
natural aptitude for the handling of ordnance as is observable in British
recruits. Only 20 rounds per gun were allowed for the yearly target practice.

ery The State Artillery was divided into the following principal
ons. departments:—[71]

(a) Field Artillery.
(b) Fortress Artillery.
(c) Field Telegraph.

ery At the date of the outbreak of hostilities the modern armament of
ons. the field artillery was as follows:—

6 Creusot Q.F. 75 m/m (about 3 inches), supplied with
11,009[72] rounds.
4 Krupp Howitzers 120 m/m (4·7-in.), supplied with 3,978
rounds.
8 Krupp Guns Q.F. 75 m/m, supplied with 5,600 rounds.
21 Vickers-Maxim (pom-pom) 37·5 m/m (about 1-½ inches),
supplied with 72,000 rounds (14,000 pointed steel, 58,000

common).
4 Vickers Mountain Guns 75 m/m. Ammunition not known.
4 Nordenfeldts 75 m/m, supplied with 2,483 rounds,
1 Armstrong 15-pr. Ammunition not known,
1 Armstrong 12-pr. Ammunition not known.

In addition to this the field artillery possessed 12 Maxims for ·303 rifle
ammunition, and 10 for the ·450 Martini-Henry. For the latter 1,871,176
rounds of nickel-covered ammunition were in store. The total modern
armament of the field artillery, therefore, capable of service in the field, was
—excluding the 22 Maxims—49 pieces. The following more or less
obsolete weapons were also in charge of the Corps:—

4 Krupp Mountain Guns, 65 m/m.
6 7-pr. Mountain Guns.
3 5-pr. Armstrong Guns.

ing of The personnel of the field artillery was, on a peace footing, 12
ry. officers and 394 N.C.O.s and men, but in the field this was found
to be very inadequate, and was eked out by the incorporation of volunteers
from the commandos.[73]

The fortress artillery had 9 officers and 151 N.C.O.s and men, but, like
the field artillery, drew many willing helpers from the burgher ranks. Its
armament consisted of:—

4 Creusot 155 m/m (about 6 inches),[74] supplied with
8,745 rounds.
6 Hotchkiss 37 m/m on parapet mounting, supplied with
3,663 rounds.
1 Mortar 150 m/m. Ammunition not known.
1 Howitzer 64-pr. Ammunition not known.

Besides these, a few guns of odd and mostly obsolete patterns, including
three Krupp, were on the books of the Fortress department.

The third division of the State Artillery, the field telegraph section,
comprised 2 officers and 65 N.C.O.s and men.

The State Artillery of the Transvaal, to sum up, was (excluding Maxims)
armed with 61 effective and about 20 semi-effective weapons, manned by a
personnel of about 800 men (including reservists).

THE POLICE.

olice, The Transvaal Police consisted of two bodies:—
vaal.
(a) The South African Republic Police.
(b) The Swaziland Police.

The former, whose sobriquet of "Zarps" war made more famous with the
British than peace had rendered it infamous, numbered some 1,200 whites
and 200 blacks under 13 officers and 64 non-commissioned officers. In
peace time they were stationed chiefly in Johannesburg, with detachments
at Pretoria, Krugersdorp, and a few outlying stations. Qualifications for
service were an age of 21 years, with burgher rights by birth, and the term
for three years, with subsequent yearly renewals.

The S.A.R. Police, who were a purely regular force, were divided into
foot and mounted organisations of about 800 and 500 respectively. They
were thoroughly drilled, their fire discipline being on the most approved
German model. Their rigid training, however, had apparently robbed them
of much of the individual initiative which safeguarded the persons and lost
the battles of their less educated compatriots in the ranks of the
commandos.

e, The Swaziland Police were a small body of some 300 white and
land. black men, commanded by eight officers and 27 of non-
commissioned rank. Their formation was much more that of an ordinary

commando than that of the Europeanised "Zarps," and, in fact, from the
commencement of the war, they operated as a wing of the local commando.

REGULAR FORCES OF THE FREE STATE.

State These consisted of artillery only, numbering some 375 men
ars. (including 200 reservists), and possessed of the following
armament:—[75]

14 Krupp Guns 75 m/m, with 9,008 rounds.
5 Armstrong Guns 9-pr., with 1,300 rounds,
1 Krupp Q.F. 37 m/m. Ammunition not known.
3 Armstrong Mountain Guns 3-pr., with 786 rounds.
3 Maxim Guns.

With all furniture and wagons complete.

or The Corps was by no means so thoroughly organised as the
isation. artillery of the Transvaal. There was no division into batteries, the
guns being entrusted to the care of any commando which "liked to have a
gun with it."[76] Yet there was considerable esprit de corps amongst the
gunners, who maintained their material, as well as their discipline, in
surprisingly good order considering the lack of officers, and the general
slovenliness of their surroundings. The conditions of service for the men
were the same as those which obtained in the Transvaal Corps.

The Corps also possessed a small but efficient telegraph section. The
barracks, at Bloemfontein, compared most unfavourably with the fine
buildings which housed the Transvaal artillery at Pretoria.

NUMBERS OF THE BOER FORCES.

tainty of Figures of exact accuracy are, and must be for ever,
figures. unobtainable, for none of the data from which they could be
compiled were either precisely recorded, or can be remembered. The Field

Cornets' books, and consequently the State lists, of those liable to service
were all alike full of errors and discrepancies. The statistical machinery of
the Republics, too primitively, and it may be added too loosely, managed to
be equal to the work of even a complete census in time of peace, made no
attempt to cope with the levy which crowded around the Field Cornets in
every market place at the issue of the Ultimatum in October, 1899. Muster
rolls of even those actually and officially present in the field do not exist.
Only one leader in either Republican army ventured to call a roll of his
command, and the loud discontent of the burghers, scandalised at the
militarism of the proceeding, did not encourage other officers to follow his
example.

engaged. The estimate, however, of 87,365, has been arrived at after the
collation of so much independent testimony, that it may be taken as
fairly accurate.[77]

The grand total does not, of course, represent the number of men in the
field at any one time. It is an estimate of the numbers of all who bore arms
against the British troops at any time whatever during the campaign. The
Boer army numerically was the most unstable known to history,[78] varying
in strength as it varied in fortune in the field, varying even with the weather,
or with that mercurial mental condition of which, in irregular forces, the
numbers present at the front best mark the barometer. Those numbers, even
in the heroic stages of the campaign, ranged from about 55,000 men to
15,000, with every intermediate graduation. It is impossible to trace the
vicissitudes of an army which lost, regained, then lost again fifty per cent.
of its strength within a week. Nor is a periodic enumeration of vital military
interest. With the Boers the numbers actually present in the fighting line
were not, as with European troops, the measure of their effective force. For
the Boer, whether as absentee at his farm, or wandering demoralised over
the veld, was often little less a portion of the strength of his side than his
comrade who happened to be lying alert in a shelter trench at the same
moment. He intended to fight again; and instances were not wanting of
parties of burghers, thus deserting their proper front, being attracted by the
sound or the news of fighting in a totally different direction, and riding
thither to form a reinforcement, as little expected upon the new battle
ground by their friends as by their enemies.

CHAPTER V.

THE BRITISH ARMY.

us Every army necessarily grows up according to the traditions of
oyments its past history. Those of the Continent having only to cross a
tish
. frontier, marked by Royal, Imperial or Republican stones, have, in
their rare but terrible campaigns, to pursue definite objects that can
be anticipated in nearly all their details years beforehand. The British army,
on the contrary, throughout the nineteenth century, since the great war came
to an end in 1815, has had to carry out a series of expeditions in every
variety of climate, in all quarters of the globe, amidst the deserts of North
Africa, the hills, plains and tropical forests of South Africa, the mountains
of India, the swamps of Burma, or the vast regions of Canada. Such
expeditions have been more numerous than the years of the century; each of
them has differed from the other in almost all its conditions. Amongst its
employments this army has had to face, also, the forces of a great Empire
and troops armed and trained by Britain herself. Accordingly, it has
happened that the experience of one campaign has almost invariably been
reversed in the next. To take only recent illustrations, the fighting which
was suitable for dealing with Zulu warriors, moving in compact formations,
heroic savages armed with spears or assegais, was not the best for meeting a
great body of skilled riflemen, mounted on well-managed horses. Moreover,
the necessary accessories of an army, without which it cannot make war,
such as its transport and its equipment, have had to be changed with the
circumstances of each incident. Just as it has been impossible to preserve
throughout all its parts one uniform pattern, such as is established
everywhere by the nations of the Continent, so it has not been possible to
have ready either the suitable clothing, the most convenient equipment, or
the transport best adapted for the particular campaign which it happened to
be at the moment necessary to undertake. More serious than this, and more
vital in its effect on the contest about to be described, was the fact that the
services thus required continually of British troops prevented the formation
of larger bodies of definite organisation in which the whole staff, needed to
give vitality and unity to anything more than a battalion or a brigade, was
trained together. For such wars as those in Egypt, or for the earlier wars in

South Africa, in Canada, or in many other countries, it was much more
practical to select for each enterprise the men whose experience suited them
for the particular circumstances, and form staffs as well as corps of the kind
that were needed, both in strength and composition, for that especial work.
This was a very serious disadvantage, when it came to be necessary to make
up a great host, in which not a certain number of battalions, batteries, and
cavalry regiments had to be employed, but in which ultimately a vast
organisation of 300,000 men, many of whom were entirely new to army
life, had to be brought into the field. It is one thing for the army corps of a
great Continental State, in which everyone has been practising his own
special part precisely as he will be engaged in war, to march straight upon
its enemy in its then existing formation, and it is quite another to draw
together a staff formed of men, each of them experienced both in war and
peace, none of whom have worked together, while few have fulfilled the
identical functions which they have to discharge for the first time when
bullets are flying and shells are bursting. It will so often appear in the
course of this history that the operations seriously suffered, because the
necessary links between a general in command and the units which he has
to direct were inadequate, that it is only fair to the many officers of
excellent quality who were employed on the staff that the nature of this
comparison should be clearly appreciated. It was no fault of theirs, but a
consequence of that past history which had built up the British Empire, that
they had neither previously worked together, nor practised in peace time
their special part in an organisation which had, in fact, to be created anew
for the immediate task in hand.

otal When the war began, and when there were in South Africa, as
of already narrated, 27,054 troops,[79] there nominally stood behind
re.
them, if all those who were armed and equipped throughout the
British Empire be included, more than a million men. These were of every
religion, of many colours, types and classes. On the 28th July, 1899, the
Prime Minister had made for the kingdom a self-denying declaration by
which one vast body of these forces was eliminated from the campaign. He
announced that none but white soldiers would be employed by us. Of white
men, 67,921 were in India, 3,699 in Egypt, 7,496 in Malta, 5,104 in
Gibraltar, 738 in Barbados, 570 in Jamaica, 1,599 in Canada, 1,896 in
Bermuda, 962 in Mauritius, 1,689 in China and Hong Kong, and 1,407 in

the Straits Settlements. Even these are only examples of the nature of the
duties on which the great mass of the British army was employed. They are
chiefly interesting, because the proportion between the 67,921 men and the
millions of the subject races of India, between the 3,699 men and the vast
regions throughout which they maintained order under the sway of the
Khedive, suggests to how fine a point had been carried the doing of much
with mere representatives bearing the flag and little more. The extent of
territory, the numbers of possible enemies, the vastness of the interests
which the 1,689 men in China and the 1,407 men in the Straits Settlements
had to watch, are perhaps, to those who realise the geography, almost as
significant. Always it had been assumed that, if at any time some addition
was necessary to reinforce these far extended outposts of Empire, it was to
be provided from the regular army stationed at home. Up to the year 1888
no official declaration had ever been made of the purposes for which the
home army was to be used. In that year Mr. Stanhope issued the necessarily
often mentioned memorandum, which declared that, though it was highly
improbable that so large a force would ever be required, yet two army
corps, with a cavalry division, or a total of 81,952 men, were to be available
for the purposes of action beyond the seas. As will be seen from the chapter
on the work of the Navy, it was only in the year 1899 that the Admiralty,
who necessarily would have to transport whatever strength was thus
employed, became aware for the first time that the War Office would need
shipping for more than one army corps. The British army has had more, and
more varied, service during the nineteenth century than any other in the
world. It undoubtedly included more officers and men, who had
experienced what it meant to be under fire, than any other. But these
experiences had all been gained in comparatively small detachments, and
each was so unlike that of any other, that it was practically impossible that
those trainings by service, which are much more efficient in their influence
on the practical action of an army than any prescriptions, should be uniform
throughout it. At the same time, this had given both to officers and men a
habit of adapting themselves to unexpected incidents which may perhaps,
service. without national immodesty, be said to be unique. In the year 1870
what is known as the short service system had been introduced.
Under that system there were, in 1899, in the British Islands, 81,134
reservists available to be called up when required for war, retained only by
a small fee. The principle on which the scheme was worked at the time was

this: that as soon as the army was ordered to be mobilised all those men
who had not completed their training in the ranks, or had not yet reached
the age for service abroad, were relegated to depôts; their places were taken
by the trained men from the reserve, and out of the excess numbers of the
reservists and the men who gradually each month in succession completed
their training, a supplementary reserve to maintain the cadres of the army in
the field was created. Inevitably, as the numbers ultimately employed in this
case far exceeded the two army corps for which alone provision had been
made, these supplies of men only lasted for the first twelve months; but as
long as they did so, the waste of war was compensated to an extent such as
never has been known in our campaigns before, and hardly in those of any
other Power except Japan, who appears to have borrowed our methods
exactly for her great struggle with Russia.

ar White At the time of Kruger's ultimatum of October 9, 1899, the British
s. regular army was composed as follows:—

Warrant,
Non-
Officers. Commissione
d Officers,
and men.

Cavalry 780 18,853
Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery 660 18,855
Royal Garrison Artillery[80] 775 20,103
Royal Engineers 962 7,323
Infantry 4,362 144,103
Army Service Corps 240 3,858
Army Ordnance Department and Corps 227 1,433
Royal Army Medical Corps 831 2,876
Army Pay Department and Corps 205 582
Army Veterinary Department 131 —

9,173 217,986

Total, all ranks 227,159.

These were all white troops; but it is essential that their
sion. distribution over the surface of the globe should be realised. The
remarks which have been made as to the special cases quoted could easily,
with slight modification, be shown to apply in practically every instance.

There were, including troops on the seas, on 1st October, 1899:—

Aden (Naval base) 1,092
South Africa (Naval base at Simon's Bay) 22,179
West Africa (Naval base at Sierra Leone) 38
Barbados 738
Bermuda (Naval base) 1,896
Canada (Naval bases at Esquimault and Halifax) 1,599
Ceylon (Naval base at Trincomalee) 1,402
China (Naval base at Hong Kong) 1,689
Crete 1,628
Cyprus 116
Egypt 3,699
Gibraltar (Naval base) 5,104
Jamaica 570
Malta[81] (Naval base) 7,496
Mauritius (Naval base) 962
St. Helena (Coaling station) 211
Straits Settlements (Naval base at Singapore). 1,407
Particular Service 47
India (less garrison of Aden) 67,921
United Kingdom (exclusive of Reserves) 108,098
—————
227,992

Officers This total does not include the white officers employed with
natives. native troops, who numbered in all 1,814. The functions of these,
however, will be best understood when the figures which follow have been
considered, and the yet greater area of the earth's surface covered by those

who served under the British flag has been taken into account. They are not
matters for an appendix, but for the close study with a map of every adult
and every child in the realm.

strength The effective strength of the armed land forces of the British
ispersion.
Empire (exclusive of the Royal Marines, but inclusive of local
colonial naval contingents for harbour defence), in September-October,
1899, was:—

Other
Officers. All ranks.
ranks.
Regular Army (European) on Oct. 1st, 1899.
With Colours 9,173 217,986 227,159
Reserves 1,803 81,134 82,937
Royal Malta
31 802 833
Artillery
Regular Army
(Colonial Corps,
European Officers, 233 7,798 8,031
Native Troops)
———— 318,960

Regular Army of India.
With Colours
(European Officers, 1,460 171,216 172,676
Native Troops)
Reserves — 18,644 18,644
———— 191,320

Hyderabad Contingent.
(Officered by
121 7,386 7,507 7,507
Europeans)

Imperial Service Troops.
(A few European
— 18,289 18,289 18,289
Officers)

Auxiliary Troops of the United Kingdom.
Militia 3,036 106,515 109,551
Yeomanry 654 9,460 10,114
Volunteers 8,020 215,901 223,921
Honourable Artillery
39 497 536
Company
———— 344,122

Indian Volunteers — — 29,219 29,219
Indian Military Police — — 30,284 30,284
Channel Isles Militia 150 3,278 3,428 3,428
Malta Militia 60 1,755 1,815 1,815
Cyprus Police 26 731 757 757

Canada:
Local regular troops 91 936 1,027
Militia 2,398 28,463 30,861
Police (including 92
105 1,191 1,296
Newfoundland)
Naval Forces 50 472 522
———— 33,706

Australasia:
New South Wales.
Local regular troops 49 876 925
Militia 228 3,815 4,043
Volunteers 97 2,724 2,821
Reserves 111 1,535 1,646
Police — — 1,977
Naval Forces 39 576 615
———— 12,027

Queensland.

Local regular troops 22 265 287
Militia 198 2,801 2,999
Volunteers 50 758 808
Cadets — — 875
Police — — 869
Rifle Clubs — — 2,520
Naval Forces — — 584
———— 8,942

South Australia.
Local regular troops 3 31 34
Militia 72 625 697
Reserves 40 529 569
Police — — 349
Rifle Clubs — — 1,003
Naval Forces — — 120
———— 2,772

Tasmania.
Local regular troops 2 20 22
Volunteers 88 1,696 1,784
Cadets 8 250 258
Police — — 60
———— 2,124

Victoria.
Local regular troops 24 349 373
Militia 158 2,867 3,025
Volunteers 110 1,598 1,708
Naval Forces — — 286
———— 5,392

West Australia.
Local regular troops 15 261 276

Volunteers 46 883 929
———— 1,205

New Zealand.
Local regular troops 11 277 288
Volunteers 330 6,368 6,698
Naval Forces 30 682 712
———— 7,698

Fiji.
Volunteers 19 189 208
Police 16 143 159
———— 367

Cape Colony.
Local regular troops 38 1,028 1,066
Volunteers 186 3,486 3,672
Cadets — — 2,000
Police — — 1,401
Mounted Rifle Clubs 64 997 1,061
———— 9,200

Natal.
Volunteers 112 1,489 1,601
Cadets — — 1,062
Police — — 659
Naval Forces 6 116 122
———— 3,444

Rhodesia.
Protectorate raise 92 2,387 2,479 2,479
Regt. d by
Col.
Rhodesian
Bad
Regt.

British South en-
Africa Police Pow
ell
Zululand.
Police — — 500 500

Basutoland.
Police — — 260 260

Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Police 14 190 204 204

West Indies.
Militia 23 574 597
Volunteers 122 1,845 1,967
Police 54 2,924 2,978
———— 5,542

Falkland Isles.
Volunteers 3 78 81 81

Colonies in Asia.
Local regular troops
9 623 632
(Malay State Guides)
Volunteers 93 1,556 1,649
Police 47 2,881 2,928
———— 5,209

St. Helena.
Volunteers 4 51 55 55

West Africa.
Local regular troops 219 4,196 4,415
Volunteers 11 187 198

Police 40 2,202 2,242
Naval Forces 15 87 102
———— 6,957

Grand Total 1,053,865

EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA.

The local troops serving in Uganda, British East Africa, British Central
Africa, and Somaliland, are not given. The aggregate area of these
Protectorates is nearly four times that of Great Britain. The majority of their
inhabitants were, and still are, but semi-civilised or wholly savage, and
internal order has often to be maintained by serious fighting. In 1899 the
force included three and a half battalions, but as it was then in process of
reorganisation into one corps, the "King's African Rifles," its precise
strength at that time cannot now be ascertained.

CHAPTER VI.

THE NAVY IN THE BOER WAR.[82]

SECTION I. THE GENERAL WORK OF THE NAVY.

The duty of the Navy in this, as in all war was:—

(1) To acquire and keep the command of the sea.
(2) To undertake, by full use of our great mercantile
marine, all sea transport.
(3) To carry out the instructions of Government for
stopping the enemy's supplies by sea.

(4) To render any local or temporary assistance to the Army
that circumstances might require.

mand of During the Boer War the command of the sea was never
disputed, so that it gave rise to no anxiety after the first few
port. months. The second duty, that of transport, at once assumed
extreme importance owing to the 6,000 miles distance of the base
of operations (Cape Town) from England, the large number of men and
ing animals, and the great quantity of stores to be dealt with. The third
es. duty, involving the much disputed matter of contraband, etc., was,
and is always likely to be, a difficult one, owing to the rather nebulous state
of International Law on questions which were likely to, and did arise, and to
the many interests, belligerent and neutral, which might be involved. It was
further complicated by the fact that the enemy possessed no seaport and no
carrying trade of his own, so that all goods for him from over sea had to be
landed either at a neutral port or in a British colonial port. The fourth duty,
that of local assistance, was a simpler matter. Owing to causes recorded
elsewhere, the armed forces of Great Britain in South Africa were not
anything like adequate for the task before them when the war broke out on
October 9th, 1899. The grave differences that existed between England and
the Dutch Republics, and the absolutely vital British interests involved, had,
as the year 1899 wore on, been realised not only by the Government, but by
all the world. It was inevitable that the delay in strengthening the garrison,
due to extreme unwillingness to present even the appearance of forcing on
the quarrel, should throw an exceptional responsibility on the Navy. It
became necessary to develop to the utmost limit the strength that could be
spared for work on shore in order to gain time for the arrival of
reinforcements. Happily our public services, both civil and military, have
grown up in the traditions that each branch and department, while it has
special grooves in which its own particular duty runs, is at all times on the
look-out to help any other department. The Navy and Army are no strangers
to this practice of mutual aid. Their special duties have in times past so
often led to each helping the other in some way, that perhaps there exists
between them in a rather special degree that feeling of comradeship which
is engendered by sharing the same duties and the same perils and hardships;
just as boys who have gone through the same mill at school, and got into

and out of the same scrapes together, are undoubtedly imbued with an esprit
de corps which is often a valuable possession in after-life.

SECTION II. SEA TRANSPORT.

The Army Sea Transport work was carried out by the Admiralty through
its Transport department, with the following exceptions. Arrangements for
the Indian contingent, the Remounts, and all else sent from India, were
made by the Director of Indian Marine, for the outward voyage; by the
Admiralty for the return voyage. For the Colonial contingents, passage was
provided partly in freight ships locally engaged by the Colonial
Governments and partly in Admiralty transports sent from the Cape. The
return voyage in all cases was regulated by the Admiralty. Remounts
(horses) from ports abroad were conveyed in freight ships hired by the
Remount department up to February, 1901; after that date they were
conveyed by the Admiralty. Stores from ports abroad were delivered in
South Africa by the contractors, from whom the War Office obtained them
at "C.I.F." rates; that is to say, that the price which was paid for the stores
included delivery. All other sea transport for men, animals, and stores was
organised by the Admiralty. The services of the Admiralty shipping agents
(Messrs. Hogg and Robinson) were utilised as regards stores, but these
agents worked under the supervision of the Admiralty Transport
department.

ght" and As the terms used above, "freight ships" and "transports," will
port" frequently recur in this chapter, it is necessary to give an
explanation of their meaning and of the distinction between them.
Troops are carried either in a transport or a freight ship. A transport is a
vessel wholly taken up by the Government on a time charter. A freight ship
is one in which the whole or a portion of the accommodation is engaged at a
rate per head, or for a lump sum for a definite voyage. For a single voyage,
freight, when obtainable, is generally cheaper. But owners will not always
divert their ships under other than a time charter, and it is necessary that the
bulk of the engagements for the conveyance of troops should be on time
charter in order to secure control over the ships. Transports, when
continuously employed and utilised both ways, are cheaper than freight
ships. Under the transport charter the vessel, though engaged for a named

period certain, is at the disposal of the Admiralty so long as the Government
choose to retain her, except when it is expressly stipulated otherwise.

sea The method by which the Government carries out the sea
ort. transport of the Army is as follows:

The Board of Admiralty, as agents for, and on the requisition of, the
Secretary of State for War, undertakes all this work, except coastwise
conveyance in the United Kingdom.

e method. Since 1st April, 1888, Army Sea Transport has been always
charged to Army instead of to Navy Votes; but the control of the
Admiralty over the Transport service remains unimpaired. The Admiralty
has always held that the work can be efficiently and satisfactorily carried
out only by an Admiralty department, in connection with similar work for
the Navy. For convenience sake the Director of Transports is placed in
direct communication with the War Office as to all ordinary matters. An
officer of the Quartermaster-General's department visits the Transport
department frequently in peace time, and in war time he is placed at the
Admiralty to assist the Director of Transports in military questions. All
claims chargeable to Army Votes, after examination in the Transport
department, receive, before they are passed to the War Office for payment,
the concurrence of Army examiners, who visit the Admiralty daily. The
Director of Transports is responsible for the whole work; administration,
claims and accounts, custody of Army Transport stores, such as troop-
bedding, horse-gear, etc., etc. The system by which one department does the
work, while another provides for the cost, seems somewhat anomalous. But
the experience of the Boer War, in which it was put to a test of some
magnitude, has conclusively proved that it works well. That experience has,
moreover, fully shown the necessity of the Sea Transport service remaining
as it always has been, under the control of the Admiralty.

port Ever since 1876 the Transport department has been organised in
tment at such a manner as to be ready to ship a considerable force overseas
at short notice. The office establishment, both clerical and
professional, was intended to be a sufficient nucleus to admit of rapid
expansion in time of war. Full particulars of all ships suitable for the
conveyance of men and animals were kept recorded in special books. A

stock of troop-bedding, horse fittings, etc., etc., was kept in the Government
depôts, and standing contracts for putting these fittings in place, etc., were
in existence. Arrangements had been made with the Director of Victualling
and the War Office respectively for the food supply of the troops to be
embarked, and for the forage of the horses. Stocks of printed forms ready
for issue to the transports were also kept in hand. All calculations were
based on the understanding that the Admiralty would not be called upon to
convey much more than an army corps without due warning. Bedding and
horse fittings (of the old kind) for 55,000 men and 10,000 horses were
immediately available. Moreover, a committee had recently met to provide
for an increase of the stocks in hand in consequence of information from the
War Office that two army corps could be ready to go abroad if required.

needed. In August, 1899, the Director of Transports was asked how long
it would take to despatch 49,000 men and 8,000 horses. His reply
was that in the then state of the labour market, four to five weeks would be
required. Tentative enquiries of this kind, and the evidently critical state of
affairs in South Africa, had led the Transport department, as early as July, to
make for eventualities every preparation that was possible within the
department—such as conferring with contractors, marine shipping
superintendents, etc., and having all troop-bedding and hammocks washed
and overhauled, so that on receipt of any definite instructions work might
be commenced within an hour.

Sept./99 On the 23rd September, 1899, the Secretary of State for War
grant. authorised the expenditure of £25,000. This included money for a
new pattern of horse fittings which had been approved. On the same date
came a requisition for the conveyance of 7,000 mules from various foreign
ports. On 20th September the Quartermaster-General had sent to the
department a list giving details of the force proposed to be embarked if it
should become necessary. This list showed ports of embarkation, and on
receipt of it the Admiralty, without waiting for formal requisition, and on
their own responsibility, decided to engage two large vessels of the Union-
Castle Steamship Company, and to hold them in readiness, and this was
done.[83] Also on their own initiative the Admiralty issued that same
evening confidential circulars to thirty-five leading ship owners, asking
what ships now ready, or to be ready shortly, they were prepared to place at
Government disposal for use as troop-transports, etc., for two months
certain, asking for a reply the following day.

engaged On 30th September there was a conference at the War Office, at
30/99. which the Admiralty was represented, and verbal authority was
then given to the Director of Transports to engage vessels for the
conveyance of the force. It was there stated by the Commander-in-Chief
(Lord Wolseley) that the troops would not be ready to begin embarking
before the 21st October. That same night, 30th September, twenty vessels
were engaged from those of which particulars were given in the replies
already received; and from that time the work of engaging and preparing
the vessels proceeded continuously. Immediately, additions were made to

the professional and clerical staff, and more office accommodation was
provided at the Admiralty. On the 9th October, 1899, an official requisition
was received for the conveyance of 46,000 men and 8,600 horses, and a
notice that 24,000 of the men and 4,000 horses would be ready to embark
between the 21st October and the 25th October. By the middle of November
this whole force was embarked.

for A certain amount of time (ten to twelve days) and money
up. (£2,000 to £5,000, according to the kind of ship) is required to fit a
vessel for carrying either troops or animals after she is empty of cargo. The
vessel having been selected (sometimes even while she is still at sea), has to
be surveyed in order to decide details of the work necessary, and also in
order to obtain the Board of Trade's passenger certificate if she is to carry
men. Troops and horses cannot be carried in ready-fitted accommodation.
The space ordinarily devoted to cargo or cattle is appropriated, and the
requisite accommodation built up. In the best cavalry ships, which are
generally cattle ships adapted, saloon and cabin accommodation has to be
increased. This is done at the owner's expense as part of the bargain. Height
between decks is an important factor. Even more height is required for
horses than for men. Ships otherwise good often have to be rejected for
failure in this respect. Mounted troops always travel men and horses
together. The men are for sanitary reasons placed on a deck below the
horses. In such cases the horses are not, as a rule, carried on exposed decks.
This is both for the sake of the horses and because the deck space is
required for exercising the men. For remount and mule freight-ships the
exposed decks are utilised, unless the nature of the voyage renders it
undesirable.

sion for Horses must be carried either on wooden or wood-sheathed
s. decks, or on cemented decks, or on platforms over metal decks
with the gangways cemented. For men, in all cases, the decks must be wood
or wood-sheathed. As modern vessels, other than passenger ships, usually
have steel decks, this becomes a considerable item in the time and cost of
fitting. It is also frequently necessary to cut such extra side-lights as are
essential for carrying men or horses. Extra lighting, ventilation and
distilling apparatus, mess tables, stools, and provision for men's hammocks
must all be obtained. Latrines have to be built, as well as a prison, a

hospital, and the numerous store-rooms and issue-rooms that are required.
Horse stalls have to be fitted, and sometimes even an extra deck has to be
laid. A considerable number of horse stalls are kept at the Government
depôts, and the contractors who work for the Government are bound to be
ready to fit up a certain number of transports at short notice. For this war
the stock of horse fittings in hand was only utilised to a small extent, as it
had been decided, a short time before the war broke out, to adopt a longer
stall (eight feet) without horse hammocks, instead of the existing six feet six
inches stall with hammock. There is no doubt that the new fitting was a
great improvement.

sports." Transports are always fitted at the expense of Government. The
of work is done either by (a) contractors who hold a standing contract,
up.
(b) special supplementary contractors, or (c) the owners on behalf
ght" of the Government. Freight ships, on the contrary, are fitted by the
shipowners, the cost being covered by the rate per head, whether
ent
od. they take troops or animals. Horses in freight ships were provided
with the long stall under a modified specification. The fittings on
these ships were often required for one voyage only, whereas in the
transports they were used again and again. Mules were in all cases placed in
pens. These held, as a rule, five mules, and no detailed specifications were
necessary. Trade fittings were accepted if satisfactory to the shipping
officer. In all ships carrying animals, whether transports or freight ships,
spare stalls to the extent of five per cent, were allowed to provide for sick
animals and for shifting the animals for cleaning purposes.

Hospital Ships.—Eight transports in all were fitted up as hospital ships.
Two, the Spartan and Trojan, each of about 3,500 tons gross, were prepared
in England for local service at the Cape. The other six, ranging from 4,000
to 6,000 tons gross, were infantry transports converted at Durban, as they
were required, for bringing sick and wounded from the Cape to England.
All were equipped in concert with the Army Medical Officers, in
accordance with plans which had been found suitable on previous
expeditions. All ordinary fittings were cleared out, and the ship was
arranged in "wards," with special cots; operating rooms, laundries, ice
room, special cooking appliances, radiators for warming, punkahs and

electric fans, cot lifts, and everything else that medical science suggested,
were added.

al gifts to These ships were not officially declared under the Geneva
n. Convention and did not fly the Red Cross flag, as they were
occasionally employed during the return voyage for the conveyance of
combatants. Besides these eight vessels there were available the Maine, lent
by the Atlantic Transport Company, and most generously and at great cost
fitted out and maintained by the American Ladies' Committee, who spared
no time, trouble, or expense in making her most efficient and comfortable.
Their kindly action will not soon be forgotten by the officers and men who
benefited by her, by their immediate friends, or by the British nation. There
was also the Princess of Wales, similarly sent out by the Central Red Cross
Society, to whom much gratitude was naturally felt. H.M. Queen Alexandra,
then H.R.H. the Princess of Wales, took special interest in the equipment of
this vessel.

ship It will be seen, therefore, that no ships exist which can be
ble at utilised for sea transport without extensive adaptation and
alteration. It is perhaps hardly realised generally how much work
has to be done both by Government and the shipowner before a transport
can be ready for sea. In addition to all that has been described the ship must
be docked and her bottom coated with anti-fouling composition, and she
must be ballasted as needed. Boats, awnings and crews, efficient services of
fresh and salt water, and provision against fire, have to be secured, and
before any of the work can be started the ship herself must be definitely
engaged.

Animals.—The units to be employed in the war were not carried by sea
complete with their transport animals. The cavalry and artillery were
accompanied by their horses, but nearly all the transport animals were taken
direct to South Africa from ports abroad. Remounts and mules from abroad
were conveyed by freight ships at rates per animal, which included forage,
attendance, horse-gear and fittings, and all expenses.

Stores.—It was decided from the first not to utilise the spare space in the
transports for conveying stores, because on arrival it might well be that the
stores were urgently required at the first port, while the troops were wanted
elsewhere with equal urgency. This would have led to delay and confusion.
Moreover, if the cargo could not be at once received, the transport would be
hampered in her movements and inconvenience and expense would follow.
Stores from England were therefore carried in freight ships, either in full
cargo ships engaged at a lump sum, with special terms for varying ports and
demurrage, or in the regular liners at rates per ton.

ry and For infantry, passenger ships or large fast cargo boats are
ted selected. The latter are preferred as the former require more
s.
extensive alterations. Mounted troops are usually carried in ships
specially designed for the conveyance of live stock; remounts and mules in
similar vessels, or in specially roomy cargo ships. The vessels employed for
infantry and mounted troops were, in fact, running ships belonging to good
lines, and they had to possess, or take out, a Board of Trade passenger
certificate. The owners naturally do not keep such ships waiting on the off-
chance of Government employment. They are in full work and have to
sacrifice their own lucrative business to accept an Admiralty contract.

Coaling Arrangements.—Whenever possible, space was appropriated in
the holds of the transports for additional coal bunkers, so that the quantity
of coal taken from England might be as great as possible. The contractors at
St. Vincent, Las Palmas and Teneriffe were also given special instructions,
and a constant stream of colliers was kept going to the Cape. The transports
were made to call at the three first-named places in such rotation as should
ensure there being no block at any of them. A man-of-war was stationed at
St. Vincent, one at Las Palmas, and one at Teneriffe to supervise the
arrangements and to make such preparation and give such help as should
preclude delay in dealing with each of the ships as they arrived. This system
proved to be a good one. There was plenty of coal and no delay, but it was
found that the high-speed vessels, owing to their enormous coal
consumption, were not so suitable as others of more moderate speed.
Eminently suited as they were for the short run across the Atlantic, it was
really hardly worth while using them for the long voyage to the Cape.

Victualling.—The first batch of troops sent out was victualled from the
Navy Yards, and this practice was partially continued till early in 1900. But,
owing to considerations of the reserve of stores, and to the fact that the
Navy salt meat ration was new to the troops and not liked by them, this was
then changed. The owners contracted to victual the men at a rate per head
per day, and this, though more expensive, worked well. Moreover, it gave
greater satisfaction to the men, as it was more like what they were
accustomed to on shore; and it was an important point to land them in the
best possible condition. Volunteers and yeomanry when carried separate
from the regulars were fed on a slightly better scale than the latter. If carried
in the same ship all were fed alike on the better scale.

Forage in transports was in all cases supplied from the Government
stores. In freight ships it was supplied by the owners, and was included in
the rate per animal.

Troop-bedding and horse-gear are supplied by Government in all
transports. Though a large stock is always kept on hand, special purchases
of both had also to be made from time to time as the war went on to meet
unexpectedly great demands.

Staff of the Transport Department.—To meet the requirements of this
sudden expansion of work, Naval staffs were sent out to Cape Town,
Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London, under Captain Sir Edward
Chichester, R.N., and at home—to assist the normal peace establishment
(which consisted of the Director of Transports, Rear-Admiral Bouverie F.
Clark, Captain F. J. Pitt, R.N., the Naval Assistant, and Mr. Stephen J.
Graff, the Civil Assistant, with their respective staffs)—the clerical
establishment was enlarged and two captains, four lieutenants, engineers,
and paymasters, and the requisite staff were appointed—some to each of the
three districts, the Thames, Liverpool, and Southampton. These three places
are, by reason of local considerations such as dock and repair
accommodation, railway service and tidal conditions, the most suitable for
such work, and with few exceptions the embarking was done in those
districts.

General Remarks and Statistics.—Tables are given on pages 108-9,
showing the number of vessels employed and of the troops, etc., carried.
The total number of voyages out and home with troops, animals or stores
was about 1,500, representing over 9,000,000 miles steaming, exclusive of
coast movements at the Cape, and in addition to about 1,000,000 miles of
cross voyages by the transports to India, Australia, Bermuda, etc. The ships
selected for the conveyance of troops were chosen as the best adapted for
the special work they had to perform, viz.: to deliver them at their
destination with the least risk and in healthy condition, fit to take the field at
once. That the choice was not unsuccessful is evidenced by the fact that
throughout these vast operations not a single life was lost at sea from causes
due to the ship, and the only serious casualties were the loss of one cavalry
transport, the Ismore, with guns and 315 horses; one mule freight ship, the
Carinthea, with 400 mules; and two store freight ships, the Denton Grange
and the Madura, the latter by fire. Looking to the mileage run, this is a
wonderful record, and one which reflects the highest credit on the
mercantile marine in general, and on the management of the shipping lines
concerned in particular.

oyage to There was no delay in getting the troops off. From 20th October,
o. 1899, when the first units of the army corps were ready to embark,
to the 30th November, 1899, no less than 58,000 men and 9,000 horses left
England, and a steady stream continued month after month, the largest
shipment in one month being February, 1900, when 33,500 men and 5,500
horses left this country. The removal from South Africa was even more
speedy. From 1st June, 1902, to 31st July, 53,800 men embarked. By the
end of August the number was 94,000 men, and by the end of September,
133,000 men had left South Africa. The homeward move was simplified by
there being no horses, and by the Government being able to utilise to their
full extent the resources of the Union-Castle Company, whose large fleet of
vessels, specially suitable for carrying troops, had an important share in the
work.

tism of The shipowners, as a body, showed every desire throughout the
wners. war to meet the wishes of the Admiralty, often (in the early days)
placing their ships at the disposal of the Government at great inconvenience
to their own trade, and making great personal exertions to expedite the

despatch of the troops and to ensure their comfort. In no case was any
vessel engaged, either for troops, animals, or stores, which was not a
registered British ship, and as far as possible the crews were British
subjects; practically the crews of all troop transports were then exclusively
so.

bers The following figures will convey an idea of the extent of the
yed. Sea Transport work in connection with the war, from its
commencement up to the 31st December, 1902.

The numbers conveyed were:

To South Africa. Personnel. Horses. Mules.

From Home and Mediterranean:
Troops, &c. 338,547 84,213 249
South African Constabulary 8,482 — —
British South Africa Police 353 — —
Imperial Military Railways 320 — —
Colonial Office Details 59 — —
Various 89 — —

From India:
Troops, &c. 19,438 8,611 1,117
Natives 10,528 — —

From Ceylon, Mauritius, &c.:
Troops, &c. 690 — —
Natives 26 — —
Various 8 — —

From Colonies:
Contingents 29,793 27,465 19
South African Constabulary 1,249 — —
Remounts — 36,660 —

From other countries:
Remounts, &c. — 195,915 102,627
Prisoners of War and Escorts 22,790 — —

Totals 432,372 352,864 104,012

From South Africa:
To United Kingdom, Colonies,
India, &c., including Boer 372,320 2,460 —
prisoners

804,692
Grand Total 459,336 animals.
persons.

The tonnage of stores carried to South Africa was as follows, exclusive of
wagons, guns, baggage, and equipment accompanying the troops, and of the
vast quantities of supplies delivered by contractors from abroad at rates
inclusive of freight:

In the Transports 4,990tons.
Otherwise 1,369,080tons.
————
—
Total 1,374,070tons.

bers of The number of specially engaged ships employed on the work
was as follows:

No.
Transports engaged by the
117
Admiralty
Transports engaged in
41
India
——158

Troop freight ships:

Engaged by Admiralty 115
Outwards.
Engaged by Colonial Governments 13

Engaged by Admiralty 104
Homewards.
Engaged by P.T.O., South Africa 21

—— 253

Remount freight ships:

Engaged by Remount Department 107
Engaged by Admiralty 201
—— 308
Mule Freight Ships engaged by Admiralty 98
Full Cargo Freight Ships engaged by Admiralty 210
———
1,027

Nearly all the transports made several voyages, and some of them were in
continuous employment for over three years, and went to the Cape and back
as many as ten times besides coastal and colonial voyages.

age, The 210 full cargo ships carried 974,000 tons of the stores,
orts and besides 3,745 oxen. The remainder was conveyed in running ships
rs.
at current rates. The transports engaged by the Admiralty were the
property of thirty-six owners, mostly Liverpool or London firms; their
average size was 6,400 tons gross, ranging from 12,600 to 3,500 tons, the
range of speed from nineteen to eleven knots. The proportion of tonnage per
man and per horse turns out, over the whole, four tons per man, twelve and
a half tons per horse. This estimate is made by calculating the tonnage per
man on the infantry ships alone, and allowing for the men at that rate by
casting out the tonnage per horse over the transports which conveyed both
t of men and horses. The following is an extract from the report of His
Majesty's Commissioners appointed to enquire into matters in
mission.

connection with the war in South Africa, dated 9th July, 1903, pp. 125, 126.

"TRANSPORT BY SEA.

"The transport by sea to South Africa from the United Kingdom and the
Colonies of a force much larger than any which had ever crossed the seas
before in the service of this or any other country affords a remarkable
illustration not only of the greatness of British maritime resources, but also
of what can be done when careful forethought and preparation is applied to
the object of utilising rapidly in war instruments which are in peace solely
engaged in the purposes of civil life. If the same forethought had been
applied throughout, there would have been little criticism to make with
regard to the South African War. A full account of the Sea Transport
organisation will be found in the evidence of Mr. Stephen Graff, Assistant
Director of Transports at the Admiralty, and of Captain F. J. Pitt, R.N.,
Naval Assistant Director of Transports.

"It had been represented by the Admiralty in a letter of the 4th April,
1898 (in continuation of earlier representations), that the stock of horse
fittings and water tanks was inadequate even for one Army Corps, inasmuch
as one Army Corps, with a Cavalry Brigade and Line of Communication
troops, requires over 15,000 horses, and it was represented that an
expenditure of £25,000 to provide complete fittings would be necessary. In
April, 1899, there was a conference between the Admiralty and War Office
officials, who came to the conclusion that 'the present stock of fittings,
horse-gear, etc., is dangerously insufficient and inadequate to ensure the
rapid despatch of even one Army Corps, one Cavalry Brigade and Line of
Communication troops.' At this time it had been intimated by the War
Office that transport for two Army Corps might be needed. On the 19th
July, 1899, the Committee recommended the purchase of 6,000 new pattern
stalls, and on the 23rd September the Secretary of State for War authorised
the expenditure of £25,000. The engagement and preparation of ships began
on the 30th September. It does not appear that the absence of a sufficient
stock of horse fittings caused any appreciable delay. To a large extent the
difficulty was met by fitting up with lighter fittings the Liverpool cattle
ships, which are in many ways so constructed as to be admirable

conveyances for horses. The plan of using these ships, and the kind of
fittings to be used on them, had been worked out some time before the war
by Captain Pitt, R.N.

"The adjustment of ships to transport purposes involves much labour, but
the ships appear to have been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as the troops
were ready to start. The arrangements between the War Office and the
Admiralty for the embarkation of troops worked with great success. Sir
Charles M. Clarke, then Quartermaster-General, stated that the demands of
the War Office were 'most admirably met.' The accommodation on the ships
appears to have been well calculated. The timing of the departures and
arrivals, so as to regulate the pressure on intermediate coaling stations and
terminal ports, also seems to have been satisfactory. The delays in
disembarkation of men and stores were slight, and, when they occurred,
were due to insufficient berthing accommodation at Cape Town. The
accidents on voyage were few, and only one ship, the Ismore, was entirely
lost, together with a battery of artillery."

NOTE BY THE OFFICIAL HISTORIAN.

on The record above given of the splendid triumph of the Admiralty
. administration of Sea Transport during the war has been compiled
by Capt. A. H. Limpus, R.N., with the cordial assistance of the Transport
department of the Admiralty. The conclusion that the work of carrying the
Army by sea could not have been in more competent hands is one which
admits of no doubt in the mind of any reader who studies it. There are,
ions of nevertheless, certain deductions to be made in regard to the
record. passengers carried—the greatest army ever delivered by any
country over 6,000 miles of sea-way—which closely concern the efficiency
of the instrument with which the blow of Britain has to be struck, at points
so distant from her shores. It is essential that the management of railways
shall be in the hands of the officials of the particular company which
conveys an excursion; but in order that the undertaking may be a great
success many things are needed besides the perfect management of the
trains. No one who has seen the amount of labour and the kind of
organisation required by those who yearly send to the country the holiday-

children, for instance, will fail to know that the passengers also need to be
prepared beforehand for their part in the day. Moreover, some knowledge
on the part of the most admirable railway officials of the special needs of
those they carry is required; and, further, if any sudden change is made in
the carriages themselves, in the sequence of trains, or in other matters
strictly belonging to the functions of the company, this, if not
communicated to the managers of the excursion, may introduce dire
confusion.

w An army has over the holiday travellers the advantage of its
ience long-established unity, its discipline, and its training, but
special
ng. embarkation and disembarkation are entirely outside its ordinary
experience. It needs, therefore, being much accustomed to work by
habit, to be prepared both for getting on board ship, and, still more, for
getting off it, in the manner that will best enable it to fulfil its duties, and, as
time is very precious, to do this with the least possible delay, both in order
to play completely into the hands of the officers in charge of the ships and
in order to be itself at its best when it lands. This is the more easily
accomplished because a ship in dock is virtually a part of the mainland.
Everything that has to be done by troops in embarking can be imitated
perfectly on shore, if the ordinary fittings of a ship are placed in a hut or
other building outside which such a gangway is erected as that over which
men and horses have to be passed in entering a ship. Now, by the willing
assistance of the Admiralty in furnishing the exact fittings used in
transports, this practice had been carried out by all arms—cavalry, horse
and field artillery, army service corps and infantry—at least in some
instances. Practical adaptations in the training of each corps had been made
by the experiments conducted on shore by each. Printed regulations
embodying these had been framed.

sity for Unfortunately, the sudden improvement in the ship fittings
al mentioned above, coming as it did at the very moment of war,
standing
n by completely, for the Army, upset the conditions on which the drill
nt. had been framed. It had been devised to make the passage of horses
on board as rapid as it could be when the horses had to be placed in
slings. Men, specially trained in slinging, were in each corps detailed to do
the work. To find, when the embarkation began, that there were no slings,

naturally involved at the last moment a change in method. Moreover, horses
always obey more kindly, especially in strange circumstances, the men to
whom they are accustomed, those by whom they are groomed and fed. It
was, nevertheless, not surprising that the shipping authorities, unaware that
the soldiers were dealing with conditions already familiar to them, should
have detailed men of the ship to place the horses in their stalls. The horses
did not like the unfamiliar hands; the soldiers were puzzled by their horses
being taken from them. In some cases much delay and confusion occurred,
and, indeed, it needed all the tact and good-fellowship of the navy and army
officers to adjust things satisfactorily. Relatively to other matters the
incident was a small one, but it illustrates the importance of a thorough
understanding between the two services such as can only be gained by
continued practice during peace-time for war.

tance of In the matter of stores a difficulty, which had been very strongly
ght stores commented upon in the case of the Egyptian expedition of 1882,
on top.
again presented itself. In 1882, in the disembarkation at Ismailia in
the Suez Canal, where the facilities were much less than they were in the
several harbours of South Africa, it became a very serious point that the
stores required by the Army at once on landing were at the bottom of the
holds. The ample landing capacities of Cape Town, of Durban, and almost,
relatively to Ismailia, of East London and Port Elizabeth, made this in the
present war less serious; but even in this case it drew a strongly-worded
telegram of remonstrance. It would be impossible to reckon upon our
having always at our disposal conveniences so great as these for
disembarking an army. It becomes, therefore, for future expeditions,
important to note that the trouble which became so grave in 1882 was not
removed at the ports of embarkation when this war began. To say the least,
it was not the universally established practice to give to the naval officer in
charge or to any one else a list showing the order in which the material
embarked would be required on landing; and to ask that those things which
would be first needed should be put in last, so that they might be on the top.

peration The army in South Africa had not to land against an opposing
cing a enemy. It is obviously important that in conjoint practice of the two
ng.
services the possibility of an opposed landing should be taken into
account. It was unfortunate, therefore, that as a consequence of the limited

time at disposal, the other duties of the fleet, and the cost of demurrage, it
became necessary for the Admiralty, when it was wisely decided to have
combined manœuvres of navy and army in the autumn of 1904, in order to
practise embarkation and disembarkation, to direct that the landing should
be carried out under peace conditions. As a consequence of this the first
party landed on a shore, supposed to be hostile, was one of unarmed sailors;
and orders, at least in one instance, filled the foremost boats with the clerks
and clerkly paraphernalia of a divisional Headquarters. That may have been
the routine rightly followed in many cases at Cape Town, but the true
application of the lessons of history does not consist in blind imitation of
precedent from the past in those respects in which the conditions have
changed. Joint action in manœuvre will be valueless unless it is used to
familiarise each service with the work of the other as it will be in the actual
fighting of the time. During the great war at the end of the eighteenth and
beginning of the nineteenth century failure followed failure because the
services had not practised together. At last they did so and the result was a
brilliant success. The Japanese have undoubtedly owed many of their
triumphs to their having profited by our historical records. Their
disembarkations have been models of combined action.

s of On one other point the Naval triumph is of great importance to
real and the Army. The passage quoted above (page 111) from the report of
nary.
the Commission on the War marks well the facts. "The ships appear
to have been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as the troops were ready to
start." It follows that the shipping was just ready and no more for the Army,
after mobilisation, when the reserves had been called in and incorporated.
Moreover, it is to be noticed (page 100) that this result was only secured by
a splendid audacity in expenditure by the Naval authorities, supplementing
an admirable organisation. Now, as in every war we carry out abroad, the
of earliest time at which any armed force can move towards its object
ng force. is the hour when the ships are ready to convey it, it follows that no
delay whatever was caused by the necessity for summoning to the colours
trained men retained for service by a small fee. On the other hand very great
delay was caused by the impossibility of preparing for the particular
campaign without threatening those whom we desired to conciliate. It,
therefore, further follows that if there were ready at all times a force which
did not need to be ostentatiously prepared, we should avoid the crux of not

being able to make war without preparing for it and of not being able to
prepare lest we should provoke war. On the other hand, this instance
admirably illustrates the invariable law that the strength that can be so used
is strictly limited by the number of properly fitted ships that the Admiralty
can have ready at any given moment. An examination of Captain Limpus'
careful statement will show how very small this inevitably is, and how
much time is needed to fit those that are not available. Moreover, there is,
on the Army side, as has been shown in Chapter V., this further restriction,
that the equipment and transport, without which a campaign cannot be
carried on, must be of the kind suited to the particular case.

SECTION III. THE WORK OF THE NAVY.
THE STOPPAGE OF CONTRABAND.

The task of the Navy in this matter lay so entirely outside the sphere of
the military operations on land that it will be sufficient to say here that,
despite the extreme delicacy of the situation created by the fact that it was
only through neutral ports that the Boers could obtain supplies after the war
had begun, the vigilance exercised was remarkably effective. The amount of
contraband which reached the enemy was insignificant, yet very few claims
for compensation were successfully sustained by neutrals. Ordinary trade,
through Lourenço Marques, including, unfortunately, British trade, was
uninterrupted till, towards the end of 1900, in consequence of the progress
of the war, it died a natural death. In their careful watching of the coast and
river-mouths the sailors, under Captain W. B. Fisher, of the Magicienne,
had some trying experiences. Lieut. Massy Dawson, of the Forte, and Lieut.
H. S. Leckie, of H.M.S. Widgeon, who received the Albert medal, did most
gallant service.

SECTION IV. THE ASSISTANCE OF THE NAVY ON SHORE.

Navy on This is incorporated in the accounts of the several campaigns
and battles, but there were certain preparations made beforehand
on board-ship which must here be recorded. During a cruise up the east
coast in the month of July, 1899, Admiral Harris, the Naval Commander-in-
Chief, was convinced that there would be war and that the Boers were only

waiting till the grass was in fit condition for their cattle, to invade the
colonies. He therefore took steps to have all the ships ready for service. He
concentrated the fleet within easy reach of call. Early in October he sent to
the G.O.C. at the Cape a list of small guns, etc., which he could furnish if
needful. He was then told that it was not anticipated that such assistance
would be necessary. Nevertheless, a Naval brigade of 500 men was
exercised and prepared for landing. When the ultimatum was delivered it
was clear enough that the troops were not in adequate strength to resist the
forces the Boers could place against them, and that the enemy were
bringing into the field guns of unusual calibre and range. The utmost
numbers which it was possible to land were about 2,500, but heavy guns
were the very weapons with which the sailors were most familiar. It seemed
likely that these might prove to be of great value. On September 19th, the
Admiral was informed that the Terrible, which was to have relieved the
Powerful, viâ the Canal, would, instead, meet her on her voyage home at
the Cape. On the 14th October the Terrible reached Simon's Bay. By
October 21st, Captain Scott, her commanding officer, had devised a field
mounting for a long-range 12-pr. and, having put it through a satisfactory
firing trial, was authorised by the Commander-in-Chief to make several
more. When, on October 24th, the Admiralty telegraphed that the War
Office would be glad of all the assistance that the Navy could render, and
that all was to be given that would not cripple the ships, the order had been
so far anticipated that the upper decks of the Terrible, Powerful, Monarch
and Doris, as well as the dockyard itself, had already assumed the
appearance of a gun-carriage factory.

ration of On October 24th, the day when this message was received from
guns for home, the Admiral arranged with Sir A. Milner that the Powerful
ng.
should go to Durban on the 26th. On October 25th the Governor of
Natal telegraphed to the Admiral that "Sir George White suggests that, in
view of the heavy guns with Joubert, the Navy should be consulted with the
view of sending a detachment of bluejackets with long-range guns firing
heavy projectiles." He also revealed to the Admiral the gravity of the
situation, and the scanty means available for defending Maritzburg and
even Durban itself. The Admiral replied at once, saying, "Powerful arrives
Durban 29th. She can on emergency land four 12-prs. and 9 Maxims." He
then saw Captain Scott of the Terrible, and enquired if he could design a

mounting to take a 4·7-in. and have two ready for the following afternoon,
26th. This Captain Scott did. By the next evening two such mountings had
been put on board the Powerful, and before midnight she sailed for Durban.
These 4·7-in. mountings were meant for use as guns of position, and not as
field guns. They consisted—briefly described—of four 12-in. baulks of
timber 14 feet long, bolted together in the form of a double cross. This
made a rough platform to which was secured the plate and spindle which
was used to carry the ordinary ship mounting of the 4·7-in. guns. They were
intended to be placed in a hole in the ground 15 feet square and 2 feet deep,
and the ends of the timber baulks were to be secured with chains to weights
sunk in the ground. But this securing of the timbers was found to be quite
unnecessary when a mounting of this kind was put through a firing trial
near Simon's Town, and so it was not subsequently employed with these
"platform" mountings, as they came to be called. Sir George White, in
Ladysmith, to which place the first two "platform" mountings had been
promptly taken by the Powerful's Naval brigade, was, on October 30th,
informed by telegram of the result of the firing trial, also that no moorings
had been found necessary.

s Captain Scott now obtained permission to make a travelling
ling carriage for a 4·7-in. gun. It consisted of a double trail of 14-inch
ge.
timber fitted with plates and bearings to carry the cradle of the
ordinary ship mounting. A pair of steel wheels and a heavy axle were
required, and all the work was done in the dockyard under Captain Scott's
supervision. This mounting was satisfactorily tried and embarked on the
Terrible for Durban on November 3rd.

In giving this brief description of the mountings which enabled long-
range guns to be put at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding-in-
Chief, the events which led to their use have been anticipated. The
foregoing explanation is necessary, because, though the warships were
already supplied with field mountings for the 12-pr. 8-cwt. and some
smaller guns, and these were therefore available, and to a certain extent
were used during the war, yet when more powerful guns were required it
became necessary to extemporise a carriage for them.

bers
oyed.

The first long 12-pr. was tried on October 21st, and by November 3rd
there were already prepared for use, or actually in use:—

21 field mountings for 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns.
3 platform mountings for 4·7-in.
1 travelling carriage for 4·7-in.

This number was, soon afterwards, largely increased, and a 6-in.
opments. Q.F. 7-ton gun was also mounted on a travelling carriage at the
Durban Locomotive Works under Captain Scott's supervision. As more
mountings were made and other people's ideas were enlisted, modifications
were introduced; some mountings, entirely of steel, were indeed used for
4.7-in. guns; but in the main these mountings resembled those which were
so hurriedly prepared in the last ten days of October.

To resume the sequence of Naval events at the Cape.

ulties of The Commander-in-Chief found himself, when war broke out,
C.-in-C. with his small squadron of ships ready for any service, and a Naval
brigade of 500 of their crews ready whenever called for. He had informed
the military Commander-in-Chief to what extent he could give help on
shore, and his squadron was shortly increased as told above. He was none
too strong for the purely Naval duties which war would involve, though a
sufficient staff of officers was sent out to relieve him to a large extent of the
Sea Transport duty. Still he found himself with the considerable
responsibility of keeping the seaports—Table Bay, Simon's Bay, Port
Elizabeth, East London and Durban, secure and available for our troops,
and in the case of Durban, as the situation developed, this promised to be no
light matter. The timely distribution of the coal supply, both for his own
reinforced squadron and for the transports, had to be arranged. At one time
the unfortunate grounding of a transport, the Ismore, caused extra work and
anxiety. The enemy's supplies by sea had also to be stopped. There were
precautions to be taken for the safety of H.M. ships while lying in harbour,
for the arriving transports, and the Naval establishments. Later on there was
the care of a considerable number of Boer prisoners until regular camps
could be formed for them. Altogether, therefore, if the squadron was to be

kept always fit for sea, some circumspection was required when
determining to land men and guns for service on shore.

Naval Although in detail the record of the services of the men actually
des. landed falls into its place in the course of the campaigns, it should
here be noticed that these contingents resolved themselves eventually into
three Naval brigades.

rn First, the Western brigade, a force of 357 of all ranks and two
de. short 12-pounders under Commander Ethelston of the Powerful.
This was originally employed to garrison Stormberg, was then withdrawn to
Queenstown, and finally recalled to Simon's Bay viâ East London, to be
reorganised, strengthened, and sent up under Captain Prothero with four
long 12-prs., and about 400 men, to join Lord Methuen's force for the relief
of Kimberley. It left behind two short 12-pr. field guns at Queenstown for
the use of the Army. After Graspan, where it suffered considerably, Captain
J. E. Bearcroft was sent to replace Captain Prothero, who was wounded,
and the brigade was much augmented. It then accompanied Lord Roberts'
main advance; parties with guns being sent on various detached services—
until by 17th October, 1900, the men of this brigade had all been recalled to
their ships.

mith Second, the Ladysmith brigade. The Powerful having been sent
de. to Durban to comply with Sir George White's request for guns,
there were landed on arrival on October 29th, and taken at once to
Ladysmith, two 4·7-in. guns on platform mountings, three long 12-
pounders, one short 12-pounder, and four Maxims, with 283 of all ranks
under Captain the Hon. Hedworth Lambton. They arrived on the 30th
October, 9.30 a.m., in time to take part in the action of Lombards Kop, and
remained in Ladysmith during the siege.

brigade. The third, or Natal brigade, had its origin in the Terrible being
sent to Durban, where she arrived on November 6th. Her Captain,
Percy Scott, at once became Commandant and organised—from the
Terrible, Thetis, Forte, Philomel, and Tartar, the defence of that town. Over
thirty guns were placed in position and put under the command of
Commander Limpus, of the Terrible, while a pair of 12-pounders, drawn
from the Powerful, had been pushed on to Maritzburg and placed under

Lieutenant James, of the Tartar, with the men of that ship already up there.
It was from this force that, as troops arrived, Sir Redvers Buller drew the
Naval brigade which accompanied the Ladysmith relief column. Captain E.
P. Jones, of the Forte, commanded this brigade, with Commander A. H.
Limpus, of the Terrible, second in command. After the relief of Ladysmith,
Captain Jones reorganised the Naval brigade with ranks and ratings from
the Forte, Philomel, and Tartar. The Terribles and Powerfuls rejoined their
ships by March 13th. So reconstituted, the brigade served on with the Natal
Field Force until June 24th, 1900, when all but the Philomel's and Tartar's
men, under Lieutenant Halsey, were recalled to their ships. Lieutenant
Halsey, with four officers and thirty-eight men of the Philomel, one officer
and eighteen men of the Tartar, remained until October, 1900, when they
also returned.

aval Essential as were the services rendered on shore[84] it was
des always arranged that, if it had become advisable at any time to
n recall.
recall officers and men to their ships, they should be able to rejoin
them long before their presence was needed on board. Also as soon as any
article, including guns and ammunition, was landed from the fleet it was
replaced from England. When it became clear that the safety of Durban was
assured, its naval defence force was re-embarked; but Captain Percy Scott
remained on shore with his staff as Commandant until 14th March, 1900.
His work there, in preparing and sending additional guns to General Buller
—among them a 6-in. gun on a wheeled carriage—and also as an able
Commandant of Durban under martial law, was highly appreciated.[85]

Naval A welcome addition was made to the strength of the Natal
teers. brigade by a party of Natal Naval Volunteers, under Lieutenants T.
Anderton and Nicholas Chiazzari, who with forty-eight men of all ratings,
joined Captain Jones' force at Frere on 10th December, and reinforced the
crews of the 4·7-in. guns. Lieut. Barrett, N.N.V., also joined the Naval
brigade with the Natal Field Force after the relief of Ladysmith. The Natal
Naval Volunteers proved to be a most valuable addition to the brigade,
composed as they were of intelligent, resourceful men, who were familiar
with the ways of the country, and many of whom spoke both the Taal and
native languages. They were part of a corps which had its origin in the

previous scheme for the defence of Durban, and possessed muzzle-loading
9-prs.

they They had been stationed at Colenso when the southward advance
d. of the Boers compelled the evacuation of that position on 3rd
November, 1899. Although told to abandon their guns they had carried
them bodily away with them in the retirement. Forced to recognise that such
guns were quite useless in the field, and unable to obtain better weapons
locally, they had eagerly volunteered to join the Naval brigade under
Captain Jones. Fortunately they obtained their wish, and the Naval brigade
gained the services of a body of men who soon proved their sterling worth,
and whose traditions will henceforth always be closely associated with
those of the Royal Navy.

CHAPTER VII.

TALANA HILL.[86]

ection The last four chapters have dealt with subjects affecting the
Chap. II. whole course of the war, the theatre of operations, the two opposed
armies, and the British navy. The present one, which describes the first
action in the campaign, connects immediately with the second, that on the
outbreak of the war, taking up the narrative from the time when, as a
consequence of the conference at Maritzburg between the Governor (Sir W.
Hely-Hutchinson), Sir George White, Sir A. Hunter and Maj.-Genl. Sir W.
Penn Symons, the latter officer had been despatched to take over the
command at Dundee while Sir George White had gone to Ladysmith.

al, Oct. On October 12th, the day when the British agent quitted
99 of Pretoria, Major-General Sir W. Penn Symons arrived at Dundee,
ns at
ee. and took over command of 3,280 infantry, 497 cavalry and
eighteen guns from Brigadier-General J. H. Yule.[87] He had gained
his point. Dundee was to be held, and held by him. As early as the 13th

news came that a strong commando was concentrating at the Doornberg
east of De Jager's Drift, and that small parties of the enemy had been
sighted four miles north of Newcastle, whilst to his left rear the Free Staters
were reported so close to Ladysmith, and in such strength, as to cause Sir
George White to recall one of Symons' own battalions, the 2nd Royal
Dublin Fusiliers, to strengthen a column which was pushed out on October
13th towards Tintwa Pass to get touch with the enemy. This column[88]
failed, however, to observe even patrols of the enemy, and the Dublin
Fusiliers returned to Dundee by train the same night. On this day the enemy
fell upon a piquet of Natal Policemen posted at De Jager's Drift, and made
them prisoners. A patrol of the 18th Hussars proceeding to reconnoitre the
spot next day, the 14th, came upon a scouting party of forty of the enemy a
mile on the British side of the Buffalo. On the 16th a fugitive from
Newcastle announced the arrival of a commando, 3,000 strong, before
Newcastle, another in Botha's Pass, whilst across Wools Drift, on the
Buffalo, six miles of wagons had been seen trekking slowly southwards. If
the left, then, was for the moment clear, it was plain that strong bodies were
coming down on Symons' front and right, a front whose key was Impati, a
right whose only bulwark was the hill of Talana.

2th Joubert quitted Zandspruit on the 12th October, and was at
rt also Volksrust in the evening, with the forces of Generals Kock and
Lukas Meyer thrown widely forward on his right and left flanks
respectively. Kock, coming through Botha's Pass with his motley foreign
levies,[89] halted for the night at the mouth of the defile, whilst the units of
the left horn of the invading crescent, reinforced this day by the commandos
of Middelburg and Wakkerstroom, lay under Meyer some forty miles
eastward, some in Utrecht, some in Vryheid, and some already at the
concentration point, the Doornberg. On the 13th, whilst the wings remained
quiescent, Joubert, with the main column, occupied Laing's Nek, having
first, either by an excess of precaution, or from a fear lest the gap between
him and Meyer were too great, made good that formidable obstacle by a
turning movement around the left and over the Buffalo at Wools Drift; this
was executed by his advance guard (Pretoria, Boksburg, part of Heidelberg,
Standerton, Ermelo) under Erasmus. But though a coal-truck drawn by
cables through the long tunnel, which penetrated the Nek, proved it to be
neither blocked nor mined, this stroke of fortune rather increased than

allayed the caution of the Boer General, to whom, grown old in Native
wars, nothing appeared more suspicious than an unimpeded advance against
an enemy. On the 14th he was still on the Nek, whilst Erasmus moved
timidly on Newcastle, and Kock, who remained on the Ingagane,
despatched a reconnoitring party of the German Corps along the
Drakensberg, to gain touch with Trüter's Free Staters at Müller's Pass. This
patrol, riding back next day, found Newcastle occupied by the commandos
of Erasmus. The little town was almost empty of inhabitants, and the
burghers wrought havoc amongst the deserted shops and houses. Not all the
remonstrances of their officers, nor the general order from Headquarters,
nor even the heavy wrath of their Commandant-General, who arrived in the
town on the 18th, could stop their ruthless plundering, and by nightfall the
township was a scene of sordid devastation.

rt's net. On the afternoon of the 16th Joubert called a council of war. So
far he had been without any settled scheme, and, owing to the
straggling and indiscipline of his burghers, the march was rapidly becoming
unmanageable. The commander, whose plans and army require
consolidation after but four days, may well look with foreboding upon the
campaign he has taken in hand, and Joubert was as little hopeful as any
invader in history. Nevertheless, at Newcastle he devised a net which, had it
been cast as he designed, might by entangling one British force beyond
salvation, have weakened another beyond repair and perhaps have laid
Natal at his feet. Whilst Erasmus with his 5,000 men moved straight down
upon Dundee, Kock with 800 riflemen, composed of Schiel's Germans,
Lombard's Hollanders, and 200 men of Johannesburg under Viljoen, with
two guns, was to reconnoitre towards Ladysmith, gaining touch with the
Free Staters at Van Reenen's and the other passes of the Drakensberg. He
was then to take up a position in the Biggarsberg range, cutting the railway
between Dundee and Ladysmith. Thus isolated, the garrison of Dundee
appeared to be at the mercy of a combined attack by Erasmus from the
north, and Lukas Meyer from the east.

Kock and Erasmus had left the neighbourhood of Newcastle on
ment of the 17th, and on the afternoon of the 18th the latter's advance guard
.
came into collision with a squadron of the 18th Hussars, from
Dundee, north of Hatting Spruit. Meanwhile Meyer, who was much

behindhand with his concentration, lay so close in his camp at the
Doornberg, that the British patrols scouted up to De Jager's Drift again
without opposition. Meyer still lacked two commandos (Krugersdorp and
Bethel) and four guns, and as his transport animals were in a deplorable
condition, it was with relief rather than with impatience that he watched the
tardiness of his coadjutors. His missing units arrived in the evening,
however; Erasmus' advanced guard was close behind Impati on the morning
of the 19th, and Meyer then issued orders for a march.

eorge Meanwhile, on the 15th October, an officer of the Headquarter
recalls staff visited Dundee, and on his return to Ladysmith was
ee
hment. questioned by Sir G. White as to the state of the defences existing
at the post. To his surprise he learnt that, properly speaking, no
defences existed at all—no position, no entrenchments, and, most important
of all, no assured and defended supply of water. His instructions, in short,
conditional upon which alone he had consented to the retention of Dundee,
had not been carried out. Not until three days had elapsed, however, did he
telegraph to Sir W. Penn Symons that, failing an assurance of compliance,
Dundee must be evacuated at once. In answer, Symons admitted that he
could not give the required assurance, and must therefore carry out the
order to retire. At the same time he stated his requirements in the matter of
rolling-stock for the withdrawal of military stores and the non-combatant
inhabitants of Dundee. This reply raised a new point. To send the whole of
the rolling-stock—and nothing less would suffice—would be to expose it to
the gravest danger, for the railway line was in hourly insecurity. Two hours
after the despatch of his first telegram, therefore, Sir George White sent a
second, which became the determining factor of subsequent events.

"With regard to water, are you confident you can supply your camp for
an indefinite period? The difficulties and risk of withdrawing of civil
population and military stores are great. The railway may be cut any day.
Do you yourself, after considering these difficulties, think it better to
remain at Dundee, and prefer it?"

els recall. Sir W. Penn Symons replied as follows: "We can and must stay
here. I have no doubt whatever that this is the proper course. I have
cancelled all orders for moving."

The question thus finally decided for good or ill, Sir George White sent a
third telegram:

"I fully support you. Make particulars referred to by me as safe as
possible. Difficulties and disadvantages of other course have decided me to
support your views."

ns faces Sir W. Penn Symons, his only fear about Dundee—that of being
wn withdrawn from it—thus finally removed, turned to the front again
on.
to face the converging enemy with equanimity. His information
continued to be full and accurate. Erasmus' advance, Meyer's concentration
at the Doornberg, Kock's circuitous passage over the Biggarsberg, were all
known to him. On October 19th he received detailed warning that an attack
was to be made on him that very night by Erasmus from the north, Meyer
from the east, and Viljoen from the west. By midday, communication by rail
with Ladysmith was cut off—not, however, until a party of fifty of the 1st
King's Royal Rifles had returned in safety from a visit to Waschbank, where
they had rescued some derelict trucks left by a train, which, having been
fired on at Elandslaagte, had dropped them for greater speed. Three
companies 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, which had been railed to the
Navigation Collieries, north-east of Hatting Spruit, at 3 a.m., to bring back
eight tons of mealies which the General was unwilling to leave for the
enemy, also returned in safety.

r Oct. At sundown on October 19th, Lukas Meyer left his bivouac with
moves about 3,500 men and seven guns. De Jager's Drift was crossed
rd.
about 9 p.m.; then, pressing through the Sunday's[90] river south-
west of Maybole farm, Meyer's force emerged on to the bleak expanse of
veld stretching east of Dundee. The Boer scouts, moving parallel to and
north of the Landman's Drift road, drew with great caution towards Talana.
0th, 2.30 At 2.30 a.m. a party of burghers came upon a British piquet of the
seizes Dublin Fusiliers mounted infantry, commanded by Lieut. C. T. W.
a.
Grimshaw, at the junction of the road with the track to Vant's Drift.
Shots were exchanged, the piquet disappeared, and the Boer advance guard
was upon the flat summit of Talana an hour before dawn, with Dundee
sleeping five hundred feet below. Close on the heels of the scouts pressed
the Utrecht and Wakkerstroom commandos, under Commandants Hatting

and Joshua Joubert, of about 900 and 600 men respectively, with some 300
Krugersdorpers under Potgieter in addition, and a few men of the Ermelo
commando. The rest of the main body, consisting of the Vryheid commando
(600 men, under Van Staaden), the Middelburg commando (some 900 men,
under Trichardt), portion of the Swazi Police, portion of the Piet Retief
commando (170 men, under Englebrecht), and odd men of the Bethel and
other absent commandos, made their way rapidly across the Dundee road,
and took up position on the heights south of it. Of the artillery, two field-
pieces (Creusot 75 m/m) were hauled into a depression nearly at the rear
edge of the top of Talana, a "pom-pom" (37·5 m/m Vickers-Maxim) pushed
forward to the advanced crest of the same eminence, and the remainder,
consisting of two Krupps (75 m/m) and two more pom-poms, sent across
under charge of the Vryheid men to their position to the south.

round of Talana Hill, situated about 5,000 yards east of the British camp,
a. from which it was separated by the wire-intersected environs of
Dundee and by the sunken bed of the Sand Spruit, was peculiarly adapted
for defence. From the summit a precipitous rocky face dropped on the
Dundee side to a nearly flat terrace, 160 feet below it, whose fifty to eighty
yards of width were commanded throughout by the boulder-strewn brow of
the mountain. A low stone wall bounded this terrace at its outer edge,
immediately below which the hillside again fell suddenly, affording from
ten to fifteen yards of ground dead to the crest directly above it, but
vulnerable to fire, both from Lennox Hill, a slightly higher eminence on the
other side of a Nek to the south-east, and from a salient protruding from the
northern extremity of the hill. From the wall bounding the upper terrace,
however, other walls, running downhill, intersected this face of the
mountain at right angles, and served as low traverses affording some
protection from flanking fire. These formed the enclosures of Smith's farm,
a group of tree-encircled buildings around an open space at the base of the
mountain, near its centre, and some 400 feet below its summit. Below, and
on either side of the homestead stood copses of eucalyptus trees, which,
roughly in all some 500 yards square, occupied the top of the glacis whose
base was the Sand Spruit, which 800 yards of bare and open grassland
separated from the edge of the wood.[91]

ns
es the

Such was the position crowned by the Boer commandos in the first light
of October 20th. Swift as had been its captors, news of their success was at
once in the hands of the British commander. At 3 a.m. a sergeant from
Grimshaw's piquet, which had been surprised at the cross roads, hurried into
camp and reported the approach of the enemy in force across the veld. Sir
W. Penn Symons thereupon ordered two companies of the Dublin Fusiliers
to turn out in support. The rest of the camp slept undisturbed, and the two
companies, stumbling through the dark and obstructed suburbs of Dundee,
gained the shelter of the Sand Spruit, where they found Grimshaw already
arrived. The first shots had stampeded his horses, which had galloped back
to Smith's Nek, the col between Talana and Lennox Hills. Retiring on foot,
the piquet had gained the Nek, recovered its horses, and making its way
first to Smith's farm, and thence to the cover of the Sand Spruit, had turned
and faced the enemy as he appeared over the crest of Talana Hill.

morning At 5 a.m. the British troops stood to arms as usual. It was a wet
e and misty morning. As the men, few of whom knew of the
ssed.
occurrences of the night, waited in quarter-column, to a few keen
ears came the fitful sound of musketry from the east. It was the fire of
Grimshaw's piquet just then at bay below Talana. The parade having been
dismissed, at 5.20 a message from Headquarters assured commanding
officers that all was clear. A few companies moved directly from their lines
for skirmishing drill around the camp, the men of others hung about in
groups expecting the word to fall in for a similar purpose; the horses of two
of the three batteries, and all the transport animals, filed out to water a mile
and a half away. Suddenly at 5.30 a.m., the mist upon Talana, wasting
before the rising sun, lifted and revealed the summit alive with figures.

oers Ten minutes later the report of a gun sounded from the top, and a
their projectile fell into the western enclosures of the town. Others,
nce
n. better aimed, followed in quick succession; the camp came under a
rapid bombardment, accurate but harmless, for the small common
shell from the enemy's field-pieces failed to explode on impact with the
sodden ground. The cavalry and the mounted infantry, whose horses had
remained in camp, moved out of sight behind a stony kopje in front of it;
the infantry, already equipped, fell rapidly into their places, each company
before its own line of tents, and were immediately marched at the "double"

into the shelter of a ravine some 200 yards to the south of the camp, where
fighting formations were organised.

ns The General had already decided upon an assault. Before the
res to infantry were clear of camp he called out the artillery. Whilst the
Talana.
67th battery, whose horses were now hurrying back from water,
replied to the Boer shells from the gun-park itself, the 69th battery, already
horsed, waiting neither for its wagons nor an escort, galloped out along the
road to the railway station, swept through the town, and swinging sharply to
the right at the south-eastern extremity, came into action on a roll of the
veld immediately west of the colliery extension railway line. As it advanced
the Boers turned their guns upon it, but within twenty minutes of the falling
of the first shell in camp, the 69th commenced a rapid and effective fire at
3,750 yards upon the crest. Ten minutes later the 13th battery wheeled into
line alongside the 69th. In five minutes more the practice of the Boer
ordnance dropped to spasmodic bursts; in five more it was temporarily
silenced. Meanwhile the General, who had ridden out soon after the
batteries, had set his infantry in motion, and so fast did they go forward that
before the 69th had ended its first round they were already almost beyond
Dundee.

ards To the 67th battery and the 1st Leicestershire regiment, with one
st company from each of the other battalions, was now entrusted the
mus and
orders defence of the camp from the expected attack of Erasmus from
ack. Impati. An officer of the King's Royal Rifles carried the orders to
the cavalry from the General: "Colonel Möller is to wait under
cover, it may be for one or two hours, and I will send him word when to
advance. But he may advance if he sees a good opportunity. The M.I. are to
go with the 18th Hussars." The Royal Dublin Fusiliers were first in the bed
of the spruit at about 6.30 a.m., picking up the two companies which had
lain there since 4.30 a.m. in support of Grimshaw's piquet. By 7 a.m. the
whole of the infantry were in security in the same shelter, 1,600 to 2,000
yards from the crest of the position. General Penn Symons himself then
rode down thither, and sending for commanding officers, detailed orders for
the assault. The Dublin Fusiliers were to form the first line, with the King's
Royal Rifles in support, the Royal Irish Fusiliers in reserve. Brigadier-
General Yule would command the attack.

ry push At 7.20 a.m. the right-hand company of the Dublin emerged
hill. from the Sand Spruit, the men extended to ten paces interval, and
steadily in quick-time moved towards the boundary of the wood. The other
companies, advancing in order from the right, soon followed. Before the
last of them was fairly clear, the King's Royal Rifles were released and
pressed forward. On the appearance of the first lines, a hot fire, direct from
Talana itself and crosswise from Lennox Hill on the right, quickly caused
casualties. Eager to be at closer quarters, the men increased their pace,
breaking from quick-time into the double, and from that to a swift run upon
the edge of the wood. A low stone wall, topped by a broken-down fence of
wire which ringed the copse on this side, was tumbled flat, and the foremost
soldiers of the Dublin, pouring through the thicket, penetrated to the wall
and hedge on the farther side. Here their line was prolonged by the King's
Royal Rifles, who had come through the wood on the right. In front of this
line the crest of Talana was 550 yards distant. With the Dublin Fusiliers, the
general trend had been towards the left; now after a short pause at the edge
cherous of the plantation they attempted to push on in that direction.
. Enticed by a donga, which, quitting the wood at its northern angle,
looked like a covered way towards the crest of the hill, the three leading
companies ("A." "F." and "G.") worked steadily along it in hopes of arriving
within striking distance of the enemy under comparative shelter. But the
watercourse not only faded to nothing before it reached the terrace wall, but
was open to the enemy's view and enfiladed by his musketry throughout its
length. A storm of bullets descending into it when it teemed with men,
brought down many and checked further progress.

R. and Of the King's Royal Rifles, four companies, under Colonel R. H.
n reach Gunning, advancing through the right-hand half of the plantation,
of wood.
found themselves amongst the Dublin Fusiliers at its forward edge,
and became in part intermingled with them. The three remaining companies
R. hold moved upon the buildings of Smith's farm, and gained the front and
's farm. right edges. Somewhat ahead of the general line, this portion of the
force was enfiladed from the crest of Talana on its left, and from Lennox
Hill on its right, and received so hot a cross-fire that it was ordered to fall
back to the cover of the farm walls. This it did with the loss of three officers
and many men; but from their more secure location the Rifles here began a

telling reply, both upon the crest in front and upon the clouds of
sharpshooters which hung upon the summit and slopes of Lennox Hill.

nd "H." Lieut.-Colonel F. R. C. Carleton, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers,
.F. on immediately on entering the plantation, had detached two of his
wood.
companies ("B." and "H.") to line the left face of the wood, whence
they could watch the open ground beyond that flank. These sent volleys
against the enemy's right upon Talana. The remainder were held in reserve,
ms at as ordered, amongst the small dongas and depressions in the wood.
ngle. The Maxim guns of all three battalions moved to the south-eastern
angle of the wood, and opened at 1,700 yards upon Smith's Nek and Lennox
Hill to their right front and right, doing much to alleviate the musketry
which came incessantly from these flanking and partially invisible
eminences.

and 13th Such was the situation at eight o'clock. At that hour the 69th and
ies 13th batteries, quitting the position from which they had silenced
e their
d. the Boer artillery, moved through the town, and unlimbered on
rising ground between the eastern boundary of Dundee and the
Sand Spruit. Thence they opened again, the 69th upon Talana at 2,300
yards, the 13th upon Lennox Hill at 2,500. Though they and their escort of
King's Royal Riflemen were targets for both hills, their practice was
admirable, and had it been more rapid, must speedily have smothered the
ced fire. enemy's fire. But the artillery commander, fearing to run short, and
knowing his inability to replenish, was obliged continually to
check expenditure.[92] For a time the fight remained stationary. The
momentum of the attack had died away, and Yule found it impossible to get
it in motion again at once, in spite of numerous messages he received from
ns gives Sir W. Penn Symons urging immediate advance. At 9 a.m. the
se. infantry being still inert, the patience of the General was exhausted.
Despite the remonstrances of his staff, he, with three staff officers and
orderlies, rode into the wood, and, dismounting, hurried into the foremost
lines of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, at its northern angle. Calling to these to
"push on!" he then pressed along inside the boundary, animating by word
and gesture all the troops he passed, and halted for a moment to face the hill
a little beyond where the afore-mentioned donga disappeared into the wood.
Here Major F. Hammersley, of his staff, was wounded, and, immediately

ceives after, the General himself was shot in the stomach. Directing
ortal Brigadier-General Yule to proceed with the attack, he turned and
d.
walked calmly to the rear. Then, meeting his horse, he mounted,
and not until he had passed entirely through the troops was any sign of
suffering allowed to escape him. At the station of the Bearer company he
dismounted, and was carried to the dressing station in a dhoolie. Five
minutes later, at 9.35 a.m., the surgeon pronounced his wound to be fatal,
and the news was telegraphed to Ladysmith.

mpulse The life of the General was not thrown away; his action had
immediate effect. Before he had quitted the wood a dying man,
parties of soldiers were already pushing forward from its front wall across
the 100 yards of bullet-swept flat intervening between them and the first
slopes of Talana proper. On the right, the first to break cover, four and a half
companies of the King's Royal Rifles emerged in small parties from Smith's
farm. Leaving there two companies in support, they pushed up along the
right side of the transverse wall, in full view of Lennox Hill, and suffering
from its fire. So rapid were their movements that the Boer shooting was
hasty and ill-aimed, and the losses were but few. Some distance forward
they leapt across to the left of the transverse wall, and reconnoitring that
bounding the upper terrace, found it, to their surprise, unoccupied by the
R. seize enemy.[93] Other groups, in response to signals, then worked their
f upper way upward, until soon a considerable number of Riflemen were
e.
under the wall. On their left the Royal Irish Fusiliers supported the
attack. Two and a half companies ("E.," "F." and half of "C.") of this
battalion had, when General Symons came to the front, been sent to the
edge of the wood, and these, seeing what the Rifles had done, streamed
straight up to the wall. "A." and half of "D." companies, which had been
boldly and independently handled wide on the left, avoiding the dongas,
pushed on gradually to well within five hundred yards of the enemy's
join and extreme right, on which they brought their rifles to bear. The other
hreaten half of "C." company, with men of other battalions, amounting to
right.
about one hundred in all, had lain with the three companies of
King's Royal Rifles in the enclosure of Smith's farm, and advanced with
them. One company ("B.") Royal Irish Fusiliers had been ordered forward
on the left by General Symons himself immediately he arrived in the wood.
This company, perceiving the fallacious donga winding apparently to the

front, had dropped into it, and following it up with the same expectations as
had encouraged the Dublin Fusiliers, was speedily in the same predicament
at its open extremity. Another company ("H."), taking this route with many
losses, was similarly blocked at the same point. But with the exception of
these two companies, which could not move for a time, the advance of the
King's Royal Rifles to the wall was strongly backed by the Royal Irish
Fusiliers, whose men appeared from all the near parts of the hill to join in
with the rest. With them ran many of the Dublin Fusiliers. This regiment,
much entangled in the watercourse already mentioned and in others equally
exposed and useless more to the right, could not progress, and, though a
few men managed to reach the upper wall direct, it was only possible to do
so by first going back to the edge of the wood, an attempt of great hazard.

hours The battle came to a standstill once more. The upper wall was
. won, but the heavy and incessant fusilade directed upon it and
upon the ground below it, rendered its occupation precarious, and
reinforcement a matter of extreme difficulty. Not until two hours had passed
were sufficient men collected under it to render the last stage possible, and
the long delay cost many casualties. At 11 a.m. the officer commanding the
artillery received a request by flag-signal to cease firing, as the assault was
about to be delivered. He did so; but time to acquire strength was still
needed, and the artillery, itself harassed by musketry, re-opened. At 11.30
a.m. the order was repeated, and once more Colonel E. H. Pickwoad
gallop stopped his guns. Immediately after, the batteries galloped forward,
rd. awaking against themselves the full energy of all parts of the Boer
line. They crossed a wide donga and came into action again on the flat plain
between the Sand Spruit and Talana, sending their shells clear over and past
the left edge of the wood at a range of 1,400 yards from the crest of the
enemy's stronghold. Under the rapid bombardment the Mausers slackened
and at last were silent. For the third time the order was signalled to cease
firing. It was duly obeyed. Colonel Gunning, of the King's Royal Rifles,
who had called up his two supporting companies from Smith's farm, passed
the word, "Get ready to go over!" The men rose to their knees; then, at the
nfantry command "Advance!" scrambled and fell over the obstacle. A blaze
n. burst from the crest as the first figures wavered on the wall, and
many fell backward dead or wounded. Some could not surmount the
obstruction, which in parts was over-high for vaulting; some, falling on the

far side, picked themselves up and were struck down in the first leap of
their charge. A few, more fortunate, held on. But the onset had not much
weight, and losses quickly lightened it still further. Many of the Boers had
fled at the first sight of the soldiers rushing forward, but of those who
remained, not a few actually came towards them, and shot rapidly point-
blank at the assailants, who were clawing their way up the last precipitous
nslaught rampart of the natural fortress. The artillery, therefore, knowing
g only that the onslaught had been checked, about 12.30 p.m. re-
ened, the
ery opens opened with quick and devastating rounds. But during the charge,
gain. the light had been bad, and the gunners had not all observed the
foremost groups of their comrades lying amongst the rocks close to
the crest. Soon shell after shell burst amongst the latter.

cks both A signaller of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, standing up near the top
of the hill, attracted the attention of the artillerymen, but was
unable to make them understand his message. Another of the same regiment
failed similarly from the wall. As the discharges, destroying both
combatants alike, became more overwhelming, both drew back. On the
extreme right a few of the Rifles still clung on. At first the Boers melted
from the front alone, but the shrapnel beat all over the hill, and the retreat
became a run before the rear edge was reached.

nal Behind the wall the regimental commanders, taking the cessation
e. of Boer fire as signal for a last successful attack, met in hasty
conference, and agreed to lead their men forward simultaneously. Soon after
1 p.m. the whole British line surged over the wall, and clambering up the
hill, flooded its flat summit from end to end.

oers From Lennox Hill this final charge was marked, and in a few
on moments it, too, was empty of Boers. Before 2 p.m. the entire
ox Hill.
position was won, and Brigadier-General Yule, to whom the loss of
General Symons had given the command, at once ordered the artillery to the
summit of Smith's Nek, from whence they might shell the now flying foe.
The cavalry, looked for amongst the defeated Boers, who covered the plain
for miles in the direction of the Buffalo river, were nowhere to be seen. On
the guns then rested the last hope of confirming the victory, but they, having
gained the Nek, were, to the wonderment of all, pointed silently at the

ry and receding commandos. Doubt had at this critical moment assailed
both fail the artillery commander. Just before the final stroke, about 1.30
ke defeat
ng. p.m., a message, purporting to come from Lukas Meyer, proposing
an armistice to look for the wounded, had passed through his hands
on its way to the General. No authoritative information as to its having been
accorded or not having reached him, he, with other officers, became
uncertain as to the propriety of continuing the battle. At this time a
bystander exclaimed that the Boer hospital was retreating before him, and
believing that he himself saw red-crossed flags waving over the Boer
column moving slowly away within shrapnel range, his hesitation
l error. deepened. He refrained from opening fire, and the Boer army,
defeated, but not crushed, made despondently, but without further
losses, for the laager under the Doornberg, from which it had marched the
night before.

eturn to Brigadier-General Yule, beset with anxiety concerning the Boer
army, which had menaced his flank all day from Impati, had no
thought but to secure his men in quarters before night and the still expected
attack fell upon them together. The infantry, therefore, after searching the
hill for wounded, were sent from the field. By 6 p.m., as evening fell amid a
storm of rain, all were back in camp. The mounted troops alone, unseen
since the early morning, did not return to their lines, nor was there any sign
of them until, at 7 p.m., two squadrons of the 18th Hussars, under Major
Knox, reported themselves. No more came in that night, nor next morning,
nor at any time.

r's The brief orders given to Colonel Möller at the commencement
rous day. of the action have already been detailed, and even before the
enemy's guns were silenced that officer began to put them into execution
with promise of brilliant results. As early as 5.45 a.m. he despatched a
squadron of the 18th Hussars, with instructions to move round the northern
extremity of Talana, and report if it were possible to take ground on the
flank from which the enemy's retreat or, at least, his loose ponies might be
threatened. The reconnaissance was perfectly successful. Moving
northwards a mile down an arm of the Sand Spruit, under the harmless fire
of two guns, Major E. C. Knox guided his squadron across the watercourse,
and hidden, by the mist from Impati, by a spur from Talana, turned north-

east. Then crossing the main spruit, above the point where its northerly
trend is deflected by the spurs of the two mountains, he swung boldly
south-east and, unperceived by the enemy, seized a kopje from which he
could actually look into the right rear of their position upon Talana, only
1,200 yards distant to the south-west. Behind the mountain stood herds of
saddled ponies, whose masters lay out of sight in action along the western
crest. A message despatched to Colonel Möller informing him of this
achievement, and asking for reinforcements, brought to the spot another
squadron of the 18th and the regimental machine gun, with the section of
the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry. These made their way at first
through a sharp fire from the pom-pom near the northern end of Talana, but,
like their predecessors, were neglected as soon as they moved out of sight
around the spur swelling up from the Sand Spruit to the right flank of the
Boer fastness. Shortly afterwards, in response to a message from the
General, who thought that the enemy's guns, now suddenly silent, were
being withdrawn, and that a general retreat would shortly follow, Colonel
Möller himself hurried after with the remaining squadron of the 18th and
the mounted infantry company of the Dublin Fusiliers. The cavalry were
now in rear of the flank of an enemy already wavering, and certain to fly
shortly, whose lines of retreat would be at their mercy, whose means of
retreat, the ponies, they could already partially destroy. But here, Möller,
refusing the requests of his subordinates to be allowed to open fire on the
closely-packed ponies on Talana, first despatched a squadron under Major
Knox towards the rear of Talana, then himself quitted his vantage ground
and lined up his force in some plough land towards Schultz' farm, and later
in the open veld astride of the Landman's Drift road, two and a half miles in
rear of the centre of the Boer position. Whilst moving in accordance with
these dispositions, a section of the Dublin Fusiliers mounted infantry,
turning aside to assail a party of Boers in a small farmhouse on the flank,
captured seven of them.

s happy Meanwhile the squadron under Knox, reconnoitring towards the
e. rear of Smith's Nek, had been harassed by hostile patrols on its left
flank. These were speedily dispersed with a loss of ten prisoners by the
charge of a troop. But other and stronger patrols coming up from the
direction of Landman's Drift hung so persistently on the flank that a charge
by the whole squadron was necessary. It was completely successful, two of

the enemy being killed and about twenty-five captured. The other patrols
then drew off, and the squadron, finding nothing more to do, returned to
hand over the prisoners. But Möller, seeing the enemy swarming about the
rear of Lennox Hill, at once ordered Knox out again in that direction, this
time with two squadrons and a troop, directing him to get behind the hill,
which, in prolongation of Lennox Hill to the south, overlooks the coalfields
on one side and on the other abuts on the heights of Halifax.

r's He himself remained out in the open with his diminished force
nder. of mounted infantry and two troops of cavalry. Now the enemy
were quitting Talana and Lennox Hills in numbers which increased
momentarily, and when the mounted infantry opened fire upon them, they
began to converge on the insignificant party which barred the road to safety.
Möller at length perceived his danger, and commencing a series of rapid
retirements towards the northern spur of Impati, fixed his only hope on the
possibility of riding completely around that mountain, outwork though it
was of the main Boer army in its descent from the frontier. In a spruit, a
branch of the Sand river, which runs through Schultz' farm, the Maxim,
outpaced and overdriven, stuck fast, and it was promptly attacked and
captured by a party of twenty-five of the enemy who had descried its plight
from Talana, its detachment holding out until all were killed or wounded. In
this affair nine Boer prisoners were also released. About 1.15 p.m., a party
of two hundred Boers was seen descending Impati through the collieries at
its northern extremity. The mountain already held the enemy's van; Möller's
retreat was cut off. Adelaide farm lay close ahead, and here for the first time
he faced about for a stand. The men of the 18th Hussars, with the section of
the King's Royal Rifles mounted infantry, and one of the Dublin mounted
infantry, lined the farm walls; the remaining two sections of the mounted
infantry of the Dublin Fusiliers held a small kopje, two hundred yards from
the building. The Boers closed around in force and poured a bitter fusilade
upon the troopers. A gun, which had opened ineffectively from the colliery,
was then brought forward to 1,400 yards, and its projectiles shattered the
buildings, and scattered the horses. In a few moments another gun opened
more to the left and 1,100 yards distant. At 4 p.m. the white flag was by
Möller's order waved in the farmyard, and he capitulated to Commandant
Trichardt. Nine officers and 205 men laid down their arms after a loss of 8

men killed, 3 officers and 20 men wounded. This affair all but doubled the
day's casualties, which now numbered 500.[94]

wins his Meanwhile Knox's two squadrons were in little less danger in
ome. the opposite direction. Attempting to intercept with dismounted fire
parties of the enemy, who were retiring towards Halifax, the little force
became the focus of every wandering party of the enemy, not only of those
evacuating the positions of Talana and Lennox Hill, but also of many riding
in from the Buffalo. For the hills and plain were full of Boers who had
taken no part in the battle. But Knox was not to be trapped. Moving swiftly
towards Malungeni, and favoured by a slight mist, he slipped away, though
nearly surrounded, and halted for half an hour under cover. Then, whilst the
Boers were puzzled by his circuitous track, he dashed westwards through
their intervals and escaped.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE RETREAT FROM DUNDEE, AND THE ACTION OF
RIETFONTEIN.[95]

decides At 5, on the morning of October 21st, the troops again stood to
retreat, arms. There was no sign of life upon Talana; the cavalry scouted
ifts his
d. out unmolested on that side. The mounted patrols, however,
supported by "F." company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers,
reconnoitring northward, discovered the enemy on the Dannhauser road,
and the foremost scouts were driven in. At the same time information came
of a hostile movement to the westward. Whatever illusions may have
existed previously about the strategical situation, none now remained.
General Yule himself had at no time shared them; yet he was disinclined to
retreat. He re-created a staff,[96] examined a fresh defensive position, and
determined to stand his ground. Sending for his commanding officers
shortly after midday, he pointed out the new site he had selected below the
sloping shoulder of one of the foremost spurs of Indumeni, about a mile

south of their present camp, and desired them to rendezvous upon it with
their commands at 2.30 p.m., less, however, with any intention of
occupying it definitely than of seeing how the troops "fitted into the
ground." In view of the expected bombardment from Impati, the whole of
the tents except those of the hospital had previously been lowered, and in
them the men's kits had been left ready packed for a move. The cavalry and
artillery started at once. Before the hour appointed for the march of the rest
of the troops the enemy made his presence on Impati felt. At 1.35 p.m. a
squadron of the 18th Hussars, reconnoitring near the Dannhauser road,
came suddenly under the fire of four guns and many rifles from the north-
western slopes of the mountain.

asks for The Royal Irish Fusiliers led off towards the rendezvous at 2
rcements p.m. By 3 p.m. all were in their places, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Royal
Dublin Fusiliers, Leicestershire regiment and King's Royal Rifles,
in the order named from right to left. It was cold and dull, and the slight
rain turned to a heavy downpour, which filled the shallow trenches as soon
as they were made. At 3.30 p.m. Yule, receiving reports from his patrols that
the enemy was mounting guns upon Impati, and realising more fully his
peril, despatched a telegram to Ladysmith reporting his arrangements,
declaring his expectation of being attacked from both sides, and asking for
reinforcements. Before the message had reached its destination, a shell from
a heavy piece upon the western shoulder of Impati burst in front of the new
line. Others followed quickly, some into the deserted camp where the
hospital tents stood up as a target, some into the entrenchments, others into
the cavalry, who had taken ground in the rear of the line of defence, and
further up the slopes of Indumeni. One falling into a tin house, which lay
behind the left, killed Lieut. W. M. J. Hannah, of the Leicestershire M.I.,
who was sheltering from the storm, and wounded two of his men; elsewhere
a gunner was killed and another wounded. Another and a smaller gun then
opened from a point below the western crest of Impati. The accuracy of the
piece and the smallness of its calibre challenged the British batteries to
reply. But the first shrapnel burst at the foot of the mountain, far below the
Boer artillery, and when sinking the trails failed to give the necessary
elevation by some two thousand yards, the gunners desisted.

orcement
not be

Shortly before 4 p.m. Brigadier-General Yule received the compliments
of Sir George White upon his appointment to the rank of Major-General. An
hour later, a second telegram from Ladysmith informed him that the
reinforcements, which at this juncture he desired more than promotion,
could not be sent. The troops at Ladysmith,—telegraphed the Chief Staff
Officer,—were engaged at Elandslaagte and the Commander-in-Chief was
in the field with them. General Yule's request would be submitted to him on
his return, but little hopes could be held out of its being complied with.

will wait. Still the General was unwilling to retreat. Accompanied by his
staff officer, he was on his way to find new ground, out of range of
Impati, before that mountain had become indistinct in the twilight. He was
long in the saddle, examining the northern slopes of Indumeni for a suitable
spot. Night drew on, the rain increasing with the dying light; the regular fire
of the enemy's guns became intermittent, then ceased, and darkness closed
round the British force on the spur.

oves At midnight Yule gave instructions for a move at 3 a.m. to the
spot he had selected, a flat-topped foothill of Indumeni, on its
northern side, and some two miles south of the bivouac. Before that hour
the transport, escorted by the cavalry and mounted infantry, was quietly
withdrawn, and made its way safely to the place appointed, where it found
cover behind the reverse slopes. The remainder, marching punctually,
covered by a rearguard of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, reached the new
position at 5 a.m., and took up an open line along the crest, facing generally
north in the following order of units from left to right: Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, Leicestershire regiment, Royal Irish Fusiliers and King's Royal
Rifles.

ves news At 8 a.m., October 22nd, two despatch riders arriving from
Helpmakaar delivered a message from the Prime Minister of Natal,
slaagte.
announcing a victory on the previous day at Elandslaagte. "The
British force from Ladysmith,"—telegraphed Sir Albert Hime,
—"completely defeated Boer force over a thousand strong at Elandslaagte,
capturing guns, tents and equipment. Cavalry in full pursuit."

marches It was at once apparent to General Yule that he was directly on
ercept the line of retreat of the Boers flying from Sir George White's
ves

ves.
cavalry, and he determined to attempt to intercept them. Glencoe Junction,
at the mouth of the Biggarsberg, appeared to be the point most likely to
promise success; he immediately issued orders for a general march in that
direction.

es a At 10 a.m. an advance guard of the 69th battery, the mounted
and infantry, and the 18th Hussars moved off at the trot for Glencoe. A
s.
wounded Boer, who had been pushed up along the railway from
Elandslaagte on a trolly, was their only capture, and less than a dozen
rounds of shrapnel at 3,800 yards dispersed the few scattered parties of the
enemy visible along the kopjes. The remainder of the column wended their
way across the lower spurs of Indumeni. Soon a portion of the baggage,
seeking an easier road too near the camp, was descried from Impati by the
Boer gunners, who turned their pieces on both camp and troops, and opened
a rapid fire. The 67th battery, which had previously been directed upon the
Glencoe kopjes, now endeavoured in vain to silence the Impati battery from
near the left of the Dublin Fusiliers. The enemy's shooting was as accurate
as it was impartial, though it was singularly ineffective. Shells of 96 lbs.
weight burst between the guns of the 67th battery, amongst the troops and
baggage, and all over the camp, doing no other damage than to add to the
sufferings of the wounded lying, with the apprehension of helpless men, in
the field hospital.[97] The descent of mist, however, soon put an end to the
bombardment, and the mounted arms, pushing forward towards Glencoe,
endeavoured to carry out the original intention. But instead of fugitives,
they found the Boers showing a firm front on the high land north and west
of the station, and some slight interchange of shots took place, during which
a troop of the 18th Hussars, reconnoitring too boldly, was cut off, and was
seen no more that day.[98] With the enemy in this attitude upon strong
ground, General Yule saw the inutility of further efforts of this kind, and
gave the order for retirement. At 1 p.m. the force was again below
Indumeni, as it had been in the morning, having effected nothing. As the
men climbed the last few yards of the precipitous ascent, the fog, rolling for
a short time from the summit of Impati, once more gave the Boer
artillerymen on their lofty platform a view of the plain below, and again the
sufferers in the hospital endured the explosion of the heavy projectiles of
the Creusot cannon close outside their shelter.

ordered Yule, whose health, previously bad, had given way under the
mpt toil, anxiety and exposure, now unwillingly decided to retire on
t,
res for it.Ladysmith whilst the road still remained open, and at 5.45 p.m. he
dictated a message acquainting Sir G. White with his
determination. Before it could be despatched, at 6.30 p.m. a telegram from
Ladysmith was placed in his hands. It was Sir G. White's reply to his
request for reinforcements, and it banished the last cause for hesitation. "I
cannot reinforce you without sacrificing Ladysmith and the Colony behind.
You must try and fall back on Ladysmith. I will do what I may to help you
when nearer." Acknowledging its contents, Yule prepared for retreat.

at begins. No sooner had darkness fallen than Major Wickham, of the
Indian Commissariat, taking with him thirty-three wagons guarded
by two companies of the Leicestershire regiment, left the hill and moved
with great precaution into the deserted camp. The convoy performed its
short but dangerous journey without attracting the attention of the enemy,
and the wagons, after being quickly loaded with as many stores as the
darkness, the confusion of the levelled tents, and limited time made
possible, were drawn up on the outskirts to await the passing of the column.
At 9 p.m. the whole force fell in. The night was fine but intensely dark, and
the units had some difficulty in reaching their stations in the carefully
arranged order of march. At 9.30 p.m. all being ready, the column, guided
by Colonel Dartnell, went quietly down the mountain side towards Dundee,
the southern boundary of which it was necessary to skirt to gain the
Helpmakaar road. By 11.15 p.m. the last company was clear of the
mountain, and, striking the track to Dundee at the foot of Indumeni, the
troops passed close to the bivouac ground of the 21st October. Outside the
town Major Wickham's convoy stood waiting, and when, at the right
moment, the signal was given, the above-mentioned wagons fell into their
place in the line of march. The pace was rapid, despite the impenetrable
gloom. Skirting Dundee, the route turned sharply south-east around the
corner of the Helpmakaar road. On the edge of the town the precaution was
taken to cut the telegraph wire to Greytown.[99] By 4.30 a.m. October 23rd,
the leading files having traversed safely the defile of Blesboklaagte[100], had
made good twelve miles of the road to Helpmakaar, fourteen miles from the
starting-point. Near Dewaas, Yule, sending a message to Ladysmith to
announce his progress, halted on open ground, over which piquets were at

once thrown out on every side, and the batteries formed up for action. Ten
a.m. was the hour of starting again, the Royal Irish Fusiliers relieving the
King's Royal Rifles as advance guard. A blazing sun beating upon the
treeless downs, and a rumour of the enemy having been seen ahead, now
made marching toilsome and slow. By 12.30 p.m., less than five miles
having been covered, Yule decided to halt again, until darkness should
arrive to lessen both the fatigue and the risk of discovery by the enemy. His
situation was hazardous in the extreme. Behind him the Boers would be
soon on his heels, if they were not so already; before him lay a defile
known as Van Tonders Pass, deep and difficult, some six miles in length.
But at the slow rate of movement, necessitated by the nature of the route
through it, the passage of this dangerous ground would take so much time
and cause such disorder, that, balancing the evils, Yule, after reconnoitring
the obstacle, bivouacked at 2 p.m. on a high and open spur of the
Biggarsberg, overlooking the valley of the Waschbank river, two miles east-
south-east of Beith, and one mile west of the junction of the Helpmakaar
and Ladysmith roads. Here he waited anxiously for the night.

oers Late on the morning of the 23rd the Boers, after reconnoitring
y the camp and its vicinity as closely as they dared, opened once
ee.
more from Impati with their heavy gun. The first shell burst in the
hospital lines, and Major J. F. Donegan, the chief medical officer, who,
fearing to prejudice General Yule's operations, had done nothing to inform
the enemy that his marquees were the only inhabited tents, now determined
to spare the wounded the horrors of further bombardment. Captain A. E.
Milner was therefore sent with a white flag to ask that the fire should be
stopped. Thereupon Erasmus' men, to whom news of Yule's evacuation was
a complete surprise, filed down the mountain, and approached, not without
caution. There was soon no room for doubt; Dundee had fallen, and
Erasmus' prize was large in inverse proportion to the share he had taken in
capturing it. No sooner was the absence of the British soldiers established
beyond a doubt, than the burghers made haste to sack the camp and town. In
a short time every tent, except those of the hospitals, which were
scrupulously respected, was ransacked, and every shop turned inside out.
Commandant-General Joubert now sent orders to Lukas Meyer to pursue
Yule with a thousand men. Meyer did so, but marching late and slowly,
failed to come up with the British.

march At 11 p.m. Yule roused his men for a fresh effort. A hot day had
3rd Oct. given place to a bleak and bitter night. But though the road was
steep and obstructed, and Van Tenders Pass plunged in profound
gloom, the column, headed by the Dublin Fusiliers, marched punctually and
well. By dawn the dangerous defile was safely threaded and the force
debouched on to the broad veld which rolls about the southern buttresses of
the Biggarsberg. At 6 a.m., October 24th, the vanguard was at the
Waschbank river, some thirteen miles from Beith, and on its southern bank
the troops were allowed to bivouac, the rearguard closing up at 10 a.m.,
after ten weary hours' marching.

Oct. As they halted, heavy and prolonged reports of artillery sounded
moves to from the westward. It was evident that Sir G. White was fighting an
of guns.
action upon the flank near Elandslaagte or Modder Spruit, and, in
response to the urgent request of his senior officers, Yule determined to
despatch at once a portion of his command to co-operate. Yule himself,
though now almost prostrate with illness and fatigue, rode out westward at
the head of the 67th and 69th field batteries, two squadrons 18th Hussars,
and two companies M.I. The remainder of the troops were left by the
Waschbank under command of Lieut.-Col. Carleton, Royal Irish Fusiliers,
who took up a defensive position on the northern bank.

ecrosses Yule moved rapidly westwards over the shadeless tract lying
hbank between the Sunday's and Waschbank rivers. Nine miles his
4th.
mounted men pressed towards the sound of the guns, but still the
most advanced scouts saw nothing, and when, about 2 p.m., the noise of the
firing, still far ahead, began to die away, he gave the order to retire to the
Waschbank. His men were back in bivouac at 4 p.m. No sooner had the
infantry from the height above filed over the muddy pools than a storm,
which had been gathering all day in the terrible heat, burst, and cooled the
sun-baked ground with a waterspout of rain. The Waschbank, which had all
but perished in the drought, in less than an hour rose from three inches to a
height of twelve feet of roaring water, thirty-five yards in breadth. The
rearmost infantry plunged hurriedly across before it had attained its
strength. A piquet of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and a patrol of the 18th
Hussars, who had covered the passage, found themselves cut off, and
remained long on the enemy's side of the river.

5 Yule At 4 a.m. on the 25th the march was resumed along the southern
ouch and least direct[101] of the two routes, which bifurcate at the
White.
Waschbank. At 8.30 a.m. the advance guard was at and over
Sunday's river, seven miles further on, the rearguard crossing by the steep
drift at noon, and here the column rested. At 1 p.m. it was on the move
again, breasting the gentler ascent which swells upwards from the southern
bank of the stream, and after covering some four and a half miles, was
again halted at 3.45 p.m. upon the summit of a high ridge due north of
Kankana Mountain. Here preparations were made to pass the night; the
piquets went out, rations were distributed and cooked. At 5 p.m., however, a
patrol of the 5th Lancers from Ladysmith rode up with orders from Sir G.
White. Behind them a column under Lt.-Col. J. A. Coxhead, R.A., was on
the way from Ladysmith to assist the Dundee detachment over the last
stage. There were reports that the enemy was about to close in from every
side. General Yule was to effect a junction with Coxhead at once, and to
proceed without another check into Ladysmith.

march At 6 p.m. began a night march of great distress and trouble. Soon
5th-26th. after the advance guard moved off, a heavy downpour converted
the road into a sea of semi-liquid mire, which the transport ploughed into
waves and furrows. These, invisible in the black darkness, almost held
down the soldiers plunging knee-deep into them. The teams of mules,
exhausted by prolonged labour and insufficient food, impatient by nature of
wet and darkness, strove with much suffering to drag the rocking wagons
through the mud, and, as is their habit when overmastered by their load,
threw themselves often in confusion athwart the track and enforced a halt.
At 9 p.m. the whole of the transport stuck fast for more than two hours. The
rearguard closed up, but the troops in front of the baggage, knowing nothing
of its misfortunes, and travelling on a road not destroyed by its struggles,
pushed on and left it. With great efforts it was set in motion again, but some
half-dozen of the wagons, being imbedded hopelessly, had to be abandoned.
[102] Half a mile further the convoy was again in difficulties. From this point
all cohesion was lost. Some of the wagons passed on, some remained; it
was impossible for their escorts to tell which were derelict and which they
must still consider as in their charge.

ead's
column.

Throughout the night Lieut.-Col. Coxhead, R.A., who had left Ladysmith
at 9 a.m. on October 25th, lay waiting about a mile east of the Nek between
Bulwana[103] and Lombards Kop for the Dundee column to join hands with
his own. With him were the 5th Lancers, half a battalion 2nd Gordon
Highlanders, half a battalion 1st Manchester regiment, the 21st battery
R.F.A., and a convoy containing two days' supplies, which General Yule
had asked for, in a message despatched from the bivouac at the Waschbank
river on the 24th. Coxhead immediately gained touch with Yule by means
of his mounted troops, and learning that the food would not be required,
sent the wagons back. All day the troops from Ladysmith remained on the
Helpmakaar road. But night and torrents of rain fell together, and Coxhead's
men bivouacked in discomfort only less than that of their comrades toiling
towards them, still nine miles distant.

etreat At 3.30 a.m. on the 26th, just as the Ladysmith garrison was
Oct 26th. getting under arms, in case a sally to bring in Yule might after all
be necessary, the foremost of the mounted men from Dundee rode up to
Modder Spruit. An hour later the Leicestershire regiment and the King's
Royal Rifles arrived, much exhausted, but in good order. After a brief halt
they went on into the town, which they entered at 6 a.m. The other
regiments, with the transport which had delayed them, coming up to
Coxhead between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m., halted for two hours, and had breakfast
before pushing on.

of It is necessary now to revert to the action which had, on October
ontein 24th, been heard in the bivouac by the Waschbank, that action of
, Oct.
which a ride of nine miles westward had failed to disclose either
the purport or the scene. The arrival on the 23rd of Free State
commandos upon the heights north and west of the railway had redoubled
Sir G. White's already great anxiety for the safety of the retreat from
Dundee. In reality, the presence of the Free State forces on the commanding
ranges to the west of Elandslaagte was less dangerous than it appeared, for
Yule was marching in greater obscurity than either he, or Sir G. White,
imagined. When, indeed, on the morning of the 24th, the Free Staters saw
troops issuing from Ladysmith, they believed them to be the combined
forces of Generals White and Yule,[104] though the latter was at the moment
still actually upon the wrong side of the Waschbank. At still greater cross-

purposes was Erasmus, who set off on the morning of the 24th, with so little
hope of overtaking the retreat that he chose the only route by which it was
impossible for him to do so, the main road west of the railway.
Nevertheless, on the evening of the 25th, Erasmus' bivouac was near
Elandslaagte, and the wisdom of Sir G. White's order for the instant
continuance of the march of the column on that afternoon was manifested.
Had that march not been executed, Yule, the action of Rietfontein
notwithstanding, would have had the vanguard of Joubert's army upon his
flank next day, when only operations from Ladysmith on the largest scale
could have extricated him.

Some seven miles north-east of Ladysmith, Rietfontein[105]
ontein farmhouse lay by a branch of the Modder Spruit, south-west of a
on.
long, low ridge, which descended to the railway line in smooth and
easy slopes dotted with ant-heaps, with on its forehead a sparse eyebrow of
stones. Beyond the crest line, to the northward, the ground sank with a
gentle sweep, broken only by two rough under-features jutting from the
western extremity of the ridge, to rear itself again eight hundred yards
beyond into a line of abrupt heights. The southernmost of these, called
Intintanyoni,[106] leaped up steeply from the hollow, and beyond and behind
it stretched many leagues of rolling ground, with scarce a subsidence until
they merged in the tumultuous billows of the Drakensberg. Two grassy
pinnacles, nearly equal in height, flanked Intintanyoni. Of these the western
looked across a deep and narrow gorge over to Nodashwana or Swaatbouys
Kop, of a somewhat greater elevation, whilst below the eastern, deep re-
entrants, both on the north and south, divided Intintanyoni from the
magnificent curve of highlands, which terminated west of Elandslaagte in
the wooded mass of Jonono's Kop.[107]

oer East of the twin peaks of Intintanyoni various lesser eminences
ation of and hollow Neks completed the tempestuous irregularity of this
singular feature, along whose crest six Free State commandos lay
waiting for their first battle on the morning of October 24th. To the east,
with patrols upon Jonono's Kop, lay the men of Bethlehem, Vrede, and
Heilbron; about the eastern peak of Intintanyoni the Winburg commando
held the ground, in charge of two pieces of artillery; on their right,
occupying the rest of the mountain, the burghers of Kroonstad made ready;

whilst those of Harrismith disposed themselves partly upon a supporting
position in rear, and partly as piquets and observation posts on outlying
kopjes, amongst others the lofty Nodashwana. Some 6,000 riflemen in all
filled the six-mile line of heights. They were commanded by General A. P.
Cronje, who had arrived only on this morning, the 24th, to replace de
Villiers, who had been in temporary charge.

eorge Sir G. White moved out from Ladysmith at 5 a.m. with the 5th
hes out, Lancers, 19th Hussars, Imperial Light Horse, Natal Mounted
4th.
Rifles, 42nd and 53rd batteries R.F.A., No. 10 Mountain battery
R.G.A., 1st Liverpool, 1st Devon, 1st Gloucestershire regiments, and 2nd
King's Royal Rifle Corps, in all, some 5,300 officers and men, assuming
himself the direction of an operation certain to be delicate, likely to be
extremely dangerous. Moving up the Newcastle road from its rendezvous
near the junction of the Free State railway, the force had proceeded six
miles when the advanced screen of cavalry came under a dropping rifle fire
at 7 a.m. from the heights on their left. Their action was prompt. Pushing
rapidly across the Modder Spruit, a squadron of 5th Lancers, supported by
two others, drove back at the gallop the small parties of Boers hovering in
that neighbourhood, and themselves seized and held this advanced position.
The remainder of the cavalry, stringing out along high ground dominating
the western bank of the spruit, and facing more to the eastward, formed a
strong flank guard towards Jonono's Kop. At 8 a.m., whilst fitful discharges
of musketry rose and fell along the widely-extended line of troopers, the
infantry had come up to Rietfontein. No sooner had they arrived at a point
on the road some five hundred yards east of the Modder Spruit, than a loud
report broke from the eastern peak of Intintanyoni, and a shell, bursting on
impact, fell into the head of the column. Thereupon the British artillery
wheeled out from the route, and in line of batteries trotted towards a level
crossing over the railway, some six hundred yards west of the road. Arrived
at this defile, and forming column inwards to traverse it, the first gun had
scarcely passed the rails, when both the Boer guns on the high green
rampart ahead opened upon the point, which had been taken as one of their
range marks. Five hundred yards beyond it the artillery deployed behind a
rise. The second round from the 53rd battery, fused at 3,600 yards, burst full
upon one of the Boer pieces, and the gunners of both weapons fled. After a
few more rounds the 53rd limbered up and prepared to advance.

nfantry The infantry were already over the railway, and moving forward
ridge —Gloucester regiment on the left, Liverpool regiment on the right
g hill.
—up the gentle but protected slope, swelling to the summit of the
low ridge of Rietfontein. The 1st Devonshire regiment, in support, lay at the
base, whilst the 2nd King's Royal Rifles remained in rear in charge of the
baggage. On the appearance of the leading companies upon the crest, firing
broke out from the whole length of the crest of Intintanyoni, to which the
British infantry, lying prone, soon replied as vigorously. Of the artillery, the
42nd battery was quickly in action near the centre of the front, whilst the
53rd unlimbered some six hundred yards to the left, and began shelling a
rocky underfeature of Intintanyoni, at a range of 1,500 yards. Sharp
musketry assailed them. Then the 42nd battery, being ordered further to the
left, passed behind the 53rd and the 10th Mountain battery, which had come
into line on the left of the 53rd, and opened 1,900 yards from the summit of
Intintanyoni. Thus began a severe fire fight at ranges varying from one to
two thousand yards. Especially was it hotly contested where the Gloucester
on the left of the British opposed the 1,400 Kroonstad men, who, under Nel,
maintained the Boer right. Heavy exchanges of rifle fire swept across the
valley in this part, and in spite of the steady practice of the artillery, it
became necessary to reinforce the attackers. For this purpose the
Devonshire regiment was pushed up on the left of the Gloucester, half the
King's Royal Rifles coming from the baggage train to fill its place in
support.

ntoward Sir G. White had all but accomplished his purpose, that of
nt. intervening between the Free State commandos and Yule's line of
march, when one of those accidents of war, inexplicable because of the
death of those who alone could explain them, largely increased his hitherto
insignificant losses. Shortly before midday Colonel E. P. Wilford,
commanding the 1st Gloucestershire, taking a company of his battalion and
the regimental Maxim gun, dashed out of cover down the open slope as if to
assault. Another half company of the battalion moved on ahead to cut a wire
fence which obstructed the front. The Boers, who for a time had lain quiet
under the shrapnel, which searched their position from end to end, at once
opened a fierce fusilade. Colonel Wilford was shot dead, and his men fell
rapidly, the detachment finally halting upon a low ridge beneath
Intintanyoni. Further advance was impossible. Only with difficulty could
both the Gloucestershire and "D." squadron I.L.H., which had joined in the
attack, be withdrawn. Fortunately, as the attempt was promptly ordered to
cease, though many had been wounded, only six were killed in the
adventure. Meanwhile the shooting over their heads had been continuous.
The enemy, encouraged by this event, and by the immobility of Sir G.
White's line of battle, which they imagined to be awed from its purpose by
their resistance, still clung to their fastness, and maintained a heavy though
spasmodic fire. More than once the gunners of the still uninjured piece
beneath the eastern peak made efforts to drag it forward into action, but the
British artillerymen watched the spot narrowly, and each attempt was blown
back by shrapnel, under which Intintanyoni burst into flames. Many of the
Boer ponies herded in rear, terrified by the blaze, stampeded. Then, up on
Nodashwana, amongst the Harrismith men, a stir was descried which
seemed to threaten an outflanking manœuvre against the British left. Sir G.
White, anxious for his communications with Ladysmith, promptly
countered the movement by calling the Natal Mounted Rifles across from
his right, and sending them on in front of his left flank.[108] The Colonial
riflemen went with such skill into the maze of broken ground below the
mountain, that they not only succeeded in outflanking the outflankers, but
actually drove by enfilade fire all of the Kroonstad commando, who were
upon the right of Intintanyoni, far back across the hill to where the
Winburgers lay at the eastern extremity. All danger ceased definitely on this
side when two guns of the 42nd battery, turning towards the ridges of

Nodashwana, in a few moments cleared it of the enemy, and converted it
also into a huge bonfire of blazing grass. At 1.30 p.m. the Boer fire had
dwindled all along the main ridge, and an hour later it ceased altogether.
Only from the far right came the sound of musketry from the cavalry still
fencing with scattered detachments of the Heilbron, Vrede and Bethlehem
burghers, who clung to them pertinaciously.

n to At 3 p.m. Sir G. White gave the order for a general retirement.
mith. His object was accomplished, with the not undue loss of 114
casualties. Yule was now safe for that day, and he believed the Free State
army to have suffered severely enough to keep it inactive on the next, when
he intended to assist the Dundee column by other means. But the Boers
watched the withdrawal of the British troops with very little despondency.
Unaware of the true situation of the Dundee column, they misunderstood
operations designed to keep them from it. The demonstration against
Intintanyoni seemed to them nothing less than a serious attempt to drive
them from their hold, and the retreat of the British to be that of a baffled
army. Thus, ignorant of their strategical defeat, they rejoiced at what
seemed a tactical victory. Moreover, their losses[109] had been small. The
cavalry alone, now called upon to protect the rear—as all day they had
covered the right—had difficulty in returning. For some distance they had
to maintain a running fire fight, and it was nearly 7 p.m. before the rearmost
troopers entered Ladysmith, which the head of the infantry column had
reached two hours and a half earlier.[110]

CHAPTER IX.

ELANDSLAAGTE.[111]

days in During the time (Oct. 12th-Oct. 26th, 1899) occupied by the
mith, episode of the Dundee detachment, including the action of
1th to
Rietfontein fought to assist it in retreat, much had happened
elsewhere.

Sir G. White arrived in Ladysmith on the 11th October. On the 12th
telegraphic communication by Harrismith entirely ceased, and the mail train
from that town failed to arrive. Early on the 12th a telegram from a post of
observation of Natal Carbineers at Acton Homes gave information that a
strong column of Boers, with four miles of train, was on the march through
Tintwa Pass, the head of it being already across the border; furthermore,
that there seemed to be an advance guard concealed in Van Reenen's Pass.
Sir G. White prepared to strike instantly; but a British detachment which
reached Dewdrop next day saw the Boer vanguard, halted in the mouth of
Tintwa Pass, and as previously described (p. 123) returned to Ladysmith. A
cavalry reconnaissance[112] in the same direction on the 16th found that the
commandos had not stirred and, though Olivier's Hoek, Bezuidenhout's,
Tintwa and Van Reenen's Passes were all occupied,[113] the country east of
them was as clear of the enemy as heretofore. There appeared an
unaccountable hesitation amongst the Free Staters. Rumours of
disagreement, and even of actual hostilities between the commandos,
reached the British camp. They were not altogether groundless, and Sir G.
White, utilising the respite, set himself to consider how his field force might
be turned into a garrison, and his place of rest into a fortress, should it be
necessary, as now seemed likely, to stand a siege in Ladysmith. A complete
6th. scheme of defence was drawn up on the 16th, and a mobile column
organised for instant service in any quarter. But, whilst the real
enemy lay idle on the west, rumour, working in his favour far to the
southward, troubled the British general and robbed him of troops he could
7th. ill spare. On the 17th a telegram from the Governor of Natal
announced that there was evidence of a contemplated Boer raid viâ
Zululand upon Pietermaritzburg and Durban,[114] and asked for
reinforcements for the defenceless capital. They were promptly sent,[115]
and quitted Ladysmith just as the Free Staters in the mountains received
with much discussion the order to cross the frontier. Before dawn of the
8th. 18th all the commandos were on the move down the defiles, the
men of Bethlehem in Olivier's Hoek Pass, of Heilbron in
Bezuidenhout's, of Kroonstad in Tintwa, of Winburg in Van Reenen's, of
Harrismith in De Beer's, of Vrede in Müller's. By 8 a.m. Acton Homes was
in the hands of 3,000 Boers, and shortly after, west of Bester's station, a
piquet of the Natal Carbineers was sharply attacked by the Harrismith
commando, and forced to retire with loss. The Boers then occupied Bester's

station, where they halted for the night. The news of this rapid development
caused a great stir in Ladysmith. As early as the 15th Sir George White had
decided upon the evacuation of the camp, which lay outside the town, but
hitherto no orders had been issued to this effect. All the 18th the work of
removing the troops and stores from the camp to the town defences
previously selected was pushed on with such despatch, that by 10 p.m. these
were well manned. The Pietermaritzburg column, which had reached
9th. Colenso, was ordered back to Onderbrook. Next day the General
rode around Ladysmith, re-adjusting with great care the line of
defence selected on the 16th. Instructions were then sent to Wolseley-
Jenkins to resume his march to Pietermaritzburg, the Imperial Light Horse
alone being taken from the column and brought back into Ladysmith.[116]

Oct. Meanwhile, the Boer General, Kock, having arrived on the
and night summit of the Biggarsberg on the 19th, promptly pushed patrols
t. 19th-
eizes down the southern slopes. Field Cornet Potgieter, the leader of one
slaagte of these, pressing on in company with a party of Viljoen's men,
n. under Field Cornet Pienaar, dashed into Elandslaagte station, some
twenty miles southward, and attacked and captured a supply train which
was steaming through the station on its way to Glencoe. Potgieter at once
sent back word to Kock, who, replying with the order: "Hold on to the
trains at any cost, I am following with the whole detachment," marched all
night, and joined his lieutenant near the looted train at break of day on the
20th.

h moves News of the event was quickly received at Headquarters. At 11
ct. 20th, a.m. on the 20th Major-General J. D. P. French, who had only
recalled.
arrived at 5 a.m. that morning, left Ladysmith with the 5th Lancers,
the Natal Mounted Rifles and Natal Carbineers, and a battery Royal Field
artillery, to ascertain the situation at Elandslaagte. An infantry brigade,
under Colonel Ian Hamilton, moved out in support. But whilst they were on
the march, the Free Staters at Bester's became so active that Sir George
White, fearing an attack whilst part of his force was absent, sent orders to
check the reconnaissance before it was half completed, and by sunset
French was back in Ladysmith, having seen nothing but the German
commando, Kock's screen.

uraged by By this time news of the victory at Talana[117] had come in. Its
of partial extent not fully understood at first, it not only lifted a load
a.
from the General's mind, but showed him where he too could strike
a blow. The commandos at Elandslaagte, yesterday dangerous from their
position on Symons' line of retreat, were to-day in peril themselves, and he
determined to give them no time to remove into safety. At 4 a.m. on the 21st
, Oct. French was again on the move towards Elandslaagte[118] with five
sends squadrons (338 men) Imperial Light Horse and the Natal Field
h out
to artillery. At 6 a.m. a half battalion (330 men) of the 1st Manchester
slaagte. regiment, with Railway and Royal engineer detachments, followed
by rail, preceded by the armoured train manned by one company of
the same battalion. Moving along the Newcastle road, French made straight
for the high ground south-west of Elandslaagte station, and at 7 a.m. his
advance and right flank guards (Imperial Light Horse) came in touch with
the enemy, the former south of the collieries, the latter on the open veld
some four miles south of the railway. As the mist lifted, parties of Boers
were seen all about the station and colliery buildings, and over the
undulating veld, and it was observed that most of these, on sighting the
British scouts, drew back upon a group of kopjes situated about a mile
h retakes south-east of the station. French immediately ordered up the Natal
n. battery on to a flat hillock which rose between the railway and the
Newcastle road, south-east of Woodcote farm, and at 8 a.m. a shot from the
7-pounders, sighted at 1,900 yards, crashed into the tin out-buildings of the
station. A crowd of Boers swarmed out at the explosion and with them some
of the British captured in the train the day before, the former galloping for
the kopjes, the latter making for the protection of their countrymen at the
battery. At the same time a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse galloped
for the station in extended files, captured the Boer guard, and released the
station and colliery officials who were there in durance. But in a few
moments shells from the group of kopjes beyond the station began to fall
into the battery, one smashing an ammunition wagon. The gunners
attempted in vain to reply; their pieces were outranged by over 500 yards,
and at 8.15, on the arrival of the infantry near at hand, they fell back leaving
lls back. the wagon derelict. At 8.30 a.m. French withdrew to a point four
miles south of Woodcote farm, and from here sent a report to Sir
George White, informing him that about 400 Boers with three guns were
before him on a prepared position, and asking for support. The enemy's

artillery continued to shell the troops, and French, after questioning the
prisoners and the released Britons, and examining more closely, came to the
conclusion that there were from 800 to 1,000 Boers in front of him. When
parties of the enemy began to appear also upon Jonono's Kop to the north-
west he judged it prudent to withdraw his weak detachment still further, and
by 11.30 a.m. was back nearly at the Modder Spruit. On the way he fell in
with a reinforcement from Ladysmith consisting of one squadron 5th
Lancers,[119] one squadron 5th Dragoon Guards, and the 42nd battery Field
artillery, all under Colonel Coxhead, R.A., and with these he retraced his
steps to the Modder Spruit siding, where a halt was called.

ks for It was now evident to General French that an action of great
rcements importance could be fought or avoided before nightfall. At noon,
rders.
therefore, he communicated with Sir George White, and, after
informing him of his own and the enemy's situations, and the best line of
attack, stated that in his opinion the numbers required would be three
battalions of infantry, two batteries, and more cavalry than he had at the
moment. He would await instructions. They came with promptitude; for Sir
G. White had determined to ruin this commando, and sweep it from Yule's
communications, before it could separate. "The enemy must be beaten, and
driven off," he wrote to French. "Time of great importance." Within a
quarter of an hour of the receipt of the above message, French had
promulgated his orders; within half an hour, at 1.30 p.m., before the arrival
of the reinforcements, the advance upon the kopjes had begun.

round Running south-east, with its northern extremity about a mile
y Boers. from the station, the ground held by the enemy covered some 4,000
yards from flank to flank, and consisted of four boulder-strewn kopjes. That
nearest the station was steep and rocky, its top 200 yards broad and sloping
rearwards; next and somewhat retired from the general line, 700 yards
distant, on the far side of a deep cup scored with dongas, arose one of those
singular isosceles triangular eminences of which South Africa almost alone
possesses the mould. A Nek, carrying the roadway to a farm behind,
separated this from the main feature 500 yards away. This was a bluff and
precipitous hill, thatched here and there with long grasses on its northern
face, on its eastern sloping easily down to the veld which rolled in rounded
waves towards Ladysmith. Its summit was almost flat, a bouldered plateau,

400 yards long by 200 wide, falling in rocky spurs to the river a mile and a
half in rear, and slanting at its southern extremity into a broad and broken
Nek. This climbed again 2,000 yards away up to the last kopje of the
position, whose top, also flat, swung first south, then sharply west, to merge
finally into the grassy rises which approached almost to Modder Spruit.
Though the general elevation was no more than some 300 feet from the
ground level, so bare was the terrain about its base, that the insignificant
hills presented a formidable face to the south-west. Across the railway,
some six miles to the north-west, Jonono's Kop looked over these low
ridges, and threw great spurs, dotted with Kaffir villages, down into the
undulating prairie which rolled between them. On one of these spurs, which
came down to the Newcastle road, 100 men of the German commando,
under Schiel, had, on the retirement of the British, taken post, supported on
an underfeature close to the eastward by Field Cornet Joubert's
Johannesburgers, and Vrede men (100) under De Jager. The rest of the
commandos occupied the main feature above described, the remainder of
the Germans the kopje nearest the station, strong skirmishing parties being
thrown out, under Field Cornet Pienaar, along the uplands which ran out
southward in front of their left flank. Slightly retired from the forward crest
of the main hill were posted the two guns, below and behind the right of
which, beside the roadway creeping between the bluff and the tall triangular
kopje, the laager had been pitched on a flat of sun-baked mud.

h attacks Major-General French moved forward quickly without waiting
e. for the reinforcements from Ladysmith. A squadron 5th Dragoon
Guards under Major St. J. C. Gore on the west of the railway, and one of the
5th Lancers on the east, each covering two miles, scouted in front of the
batteries and Imperial Light Horse, the 1st Manchester following slowly in
the train. The Lancers were first in touch with the enemy, their progress
being checked at 2 p.m. by Pienaar's piquets posted, as already described,
on the low ridge running parallel to the railway, the ridge, indeed, which
General French had selected as the springboard for his attack. A gun,
opening from the hills behind, supported the skirmishers: the Lancer
squadron had to retire. But Colonel Scott Chisholme quickly brought up
four squadrons Imperial Light Horse, which, pressing forward in squadron-
column with extended files, with the 5th Lancer squadron on the right,
stormed the ridge and cleared it. The crest thus secured, the Manchester

detrained under its cover at 2.30 p.m. about three miles south-west of
nfantry Elandslaagte. Ten minutes later they were joined by a half-battalion
rcements 2nd Gordon Highlanders and seven companies of the 1st
.
Devonshire regiment, who formed up on the veld in brigade-line of
quarter-columns, facing north-east, Devonshire on the right, Manchester on
the left. Before starting, the 7th brigade was addressed in inspiriting terms
by its commander, Colonel Ian Hamilton. The Manchester led the way,
heading for the ridge occupied by the Imperial Light Horse, with two
companies covering 500 yards in front line; the Devonshire supported, and
the Highlanders marched in reserve. As the brigade began to move, a burst
of musketry from across the railway to the north told that the squadron of
the 5th Dragoon Guards had run into the enemy on the lower spurs of
Jonono's Kop. So strong did the opposition there appear that the 42nd and
21st batteries, with a squadron 5th Lancers which had just escorted the guns
from Ladysmith, were despatched to the spot in support. A few shrapnel
from the 42nd battery sufficed to silence the Mausers, and the artillery
recrossed the railway, the 5th Dragoon Guards also receiving an order to
come in. The artillery were then ordered to go on at once and open against
the main position. On their way to the front they passed the marching
infantry, whose directions were now somewhat altered; for whilst the
Manchester in the van still pushed eastwards for Scott Chisholme's captured
ridge, the Devonshire, diverging half left from this line, now led upon the
enemy's right flank, and behind, in the ever increasing interval thus created
between the two battalions, the Gordon Highlanders were extending in
reserve.

eorge Whilst the advance was in progress Sir G. White, who had
s and ridden fast from Ladysmith, arrived upon the field, escorted by a
ves.
troop of Natal Mounted Rifles. Recognising the excellence of
General French's plans and arrangements, he remained only as a spectator,
leaving to his subordinate complete control of the battle. A few moments
later, at 4 p.m., the British guns came into action in front of the infantry at a
range of 4,400 yards. The enemy replied, shells bursting in the 21st battery.
So rapid a bombardment was at once delivered against the hill that, after
firing twenty rounds, all of which fell among the guns, the Boer gunners
oer guns fled from their pieces. Then the artillery, changing their target
enced. continually, searched all the top with shrapnel. The 1st Devonshire

regiment, pushing west of the rise to a point 800 yards north of the
batteries, lay down on a front of 500 yards. At 3.30 p.m. this battalion had
received an order to move, when the artillery preparation should cease, right
across the open grass plain which separated them from the enemy, and to
hold him to his defences.

hester A thousand yards south-east of the Devonshire, beyond the
Gordons batteries, the Manchester had halted near the crest at the point of its
left.
curve northward, and this curve they were ordered to follow until it
brought them upon the opposed left flank. A mile in rear, still, therefore, in
the plain below, the Gordon Highlanders halted, and orders came to them to
support the Manchester at the next stage. At 4.30 p.m. the infantry rose and
moved forward. On the left the Devonshire, with three companies covering
some 600 yards in front, and four companies in reserve, in column, with 50
paces distance between the single ranks, steered upon the tall cone which
marked the right-centre of the Boers. Their march led them at first downhill
into the broad bowl which lay below the foot of the kopjes, a hollow as
smooth as a meadow but for the infrequent ant-hills. Shrapnel began from
the first to burst over the battalion, but the soldiers pressed steadily onward
until, at a point some 1,200 yards from the enemy, severe rifle-fire began to
play upon them, and they were halted to reply to it. Their section volleys
soon beat heavily about the Boer right, and pinned the burghers to their
nshire sangars. A little later, the Devonshire firing line, now stiffened by
ght. the supports, advanced again down the bullet-swept slope and
gained a shallow donga about 850 yards from the crest. Here Major C. W.
Park disposed his battalion for a musketry fight. He had carried out the first
part of his orders, and it was necessary now to await the development of the
attack in progress against the other flank. With some loss, therefore, the
Devonshire lay within close range of the hostile lines. So briskly, however,
did they engage them, that the attention of a great part of the Boer force was
drawn to that direction, and for a time the simultaneous movement against
the other flank proceeded almost unnoticed. The Manchester, indeed, during
the early portion of their advance, were not easily to be seen from the Boers'
left. Skilfully led, they made their way with two companies extended in the
firing line, over broken ground under the crest of the ridge, and only some
shells, aimed at the artillery, dropped amongst them. Out of sight on the
right the Imperial Light Horse and the squadron 5th Lancers worked ahead

on a parallel route, having drawn towards the outer flank on the infantry
coming up to them. In rear the Gordon Highlanders, inclining to the right,
followed in support of the Manchester, in echelon of companies at 60 paces
interval, the companies marching in column of sections. A brisk shell fire
assailed this battalion as it crossed the rear of the batteries, but, like the
Manchester, the Highlanders for a time escaped the notice of the Boer
riflemen, and they pushed on with trifling loss.

silence Thus by 4.30 p.m. the whole British force, 3,500 men in all, was
artillery. in motion, and Coxhead, during the temporary silence of the
enemy's artillery, ordered his command to support more closely. As the
batteries limbered up, the Boers re-opened and followed them with shells.
Only one horse fell, however, and the British guns, moving swiftly between
the Devonshire and Manchester regiments, were shortly in action again
three quarters of a mile nearer to the front. Under their rapid rounds at
3,200 yards the hostile gunners relapsed immediately and finally into
silence.

ulties of In approaching the occupied zone the cavalry on the right were
ach to first closely engaged. A screen of skirmishers still lay out before
left.
the Boer left, and these, as they fell back slowly, had an easy target
in the mounted men, who were working over ground of great difficulty.
Then the Manchester, emerging from their covered way, found themselves
upon the crest of a smooth and open plateau, which, sloping downwards for
200 yards from them almost imperceptibly, was traversed by a wire fence,
beyond which stony outcrops again gave promise of shelter. As the
foremost soldiers showed above the fringe of stones at the crest line, a
sudden rush of bullets drummed upon the sun-dried level in front of them,
and the men, in obedience to an order, dropped again behind the protecting
stones to reply. As they did so, some of the officers of the Manchester,
leaving their men in the security of the rocks, ran through the storm of lead
and severed the wires obstructing advance. But the line was as yet too weak
for a forward dash.

ttack on For a quarter of an hour the Manchester lay where they were,
left. with frequent casualties, but using their weapons so vigorously that
soon the Boers on their front, an advanced party of Lombard's commando,

gave back in spite of their leader's efforts to hold them, and at 5.20 p.m. the
Manchester poured from the stones after them. They were closely followed
by the Gordon, who, though under cover below them, had suffered
somewhat from the shots grazing the edge of the plateau. At their
appearance heavy musketry burst from the kopjes 1,200 yards ahead. The
soldiers were in a moment at the wire fence. This obstacle, only partially
destroyed, had been taken as a known range by the Boer marksmen, and so
accurate therefore was their shooting that soon there was scarce a strand
unrent by the bullets. In the crowding which ensued many men fell amongst
the now dangling wires, some pushed through, and some could find no gap.
Though the front of the brigade thus became broken and confused, the
advance continued uninterruptedly. Now Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Dick-
Cunyngham sent the Gordon Highlanders forward into the gaps opening in
the lines of the Manchester, some to the left, some to the right, some
wherever they could find room. The Imperial Light Horse, who had been
contending every foot of their progress with the cloud of skirmishers
retiring slowly before them, here joined on to the right of the Gordon. Once
at the edge of the ridge, from which, as the troops rushed forward, a
detached party of Boers fell back, still shooting bitterly, the brigade found
itself facing due north, and the Boer left flank lay exposed.

dashing Meanwhile Gore, reinforced by a squadron 5th Lancers, had
lts on moved out yet further to the left, cutting in between the Boer main
right rear.
body and Schiel's Germans, so that the latter only saved themselves
by a circuitous gallop behind Woodcote farm, not drawing rein until they
arrived in rear of the left of the main position. Gore then gained a secure
foothold near the colliery 1,700 yards from the enemy's right rear. Here he
concealed his squadrons, and awaiting the development of the infantry
attack, watched the rear face of the enemy's kopjes for signs of a break
away.

osition is Strengthened by the arrival of Schiel, the Boer left poured their
red. bullets chiefly upon that portion of the line occupied by the right
companies of the Gordon Highlanders and the Imperial Light Horse. Below
the fence the ground sloped gently downward to the foot of the kopjes,
where it again rose more steeply to the summit, some 350 yards distant.
Down the incline the firing line went rapidly, for the most part by rushes of

sections, carried out independently, yet with great dash and unanimity. But
the slope was exposed throughout, and there were many casualties. About
5.30 p.m. the line of battle had arrived at the foot of the kopjes; then,
swinging slightly towards the left, so as to envelop still more the flank of
the enemy above, all supports and reserves being now absorbed, it began to
make head upwards, still by short rushes. It was now nearly dark; rain burst
down on them in a torrent: the men, breathless from their eager pace, began
to slacken somewhat in their difficult progress up the hill-sides. At this
moment Colonel Hamilton, who had previously ridden to where the
Devonshire still held fast the Boer right with their volleys, hurried back to
the main attack. He at once ordered the "charge" to be sounded, and running
to the front, himself led the last onset. The Devonshire simultaneously
leaped from the donga where they had lain more than an hour, and,
advancing by companies from the right, reached the base of the final kopje.
For an instant they halted to gain breath and fix bayonets, then, coming to
the charge, assaulted the portion before them, and carried it without a
check, four companies swinging to the left against the northernmost kopje,
and three moving straight upon the main hill whereon stood the enemy's
artillery. Here, as occurred all along the Boer line, though many fled at the
sound of the charge, many stood and continued shooting at the troops until
the latter were within twenty yards of them. Below the main crest a bitter
contest was also maintained, for as at Talana, many Boers, seeing the
soldiers determined to win the summit, pressed forward to oppose them,
and lay firing behind the rocks until their assailants were almost upon them.
Some acting thus were made prisoners; some escaped to the rear at the last
moment; many were shot down as they ran. The assault poured on
unchecked, the two guns falling to the converging Devonshire. At 5.55 p.m.
the infantry held all the upper part of the hill.

attacks By that time the cavalry, lying in wait at Elandslaagte, had
ying already dealt their blow. A quarter of an hour before the infantry
.
gained the crest the majority of the defenders had begun to vacate
the summit, and, descending to the open ground behind, streamed raggedly
across the front, many within five hundred yards, of the concealed troopers.
The light was failing rapidly, and with it the chance of action. Though the
crowd in the loose disorder of retreat seemed to offer an indefinite object
for a charge, there was no likelihood of a better whilst sufficient light

remained. At 5.30 p.m. Gore gave the word and pushed out eastwards with
a squadron of the 5th Lancers on the right of his line, and one of the 5th
Dragoon Guards on the left, both in extended files. The ground was
difficult, boulders strewed the surface, and a series of dongas, intersecting it
at all angles, seriously impeded progress. These obstacles once cleared, the
cavalry moved on rapidly and, topping a slight rise, came suddenly into full
view of the foremost Boers, some 300 in number, who were riding slowly
northward away from the ridges all but captured behind them. The charge
was instantly delivered, and the Boer retirement was dashed to pieces in all
directions. Then, having traversed completely the zone of retreat, the
cavalry were rallied and reformed into line. The gallop had carried the
squadrons more than a mile and a half from their starting-place, and the
intervening space was again covered by the enemy, now in full flight from
the kopjes. Once more, therefore, the troopers charged, and, scouring in
loose order back over the same ground, cleared it of the enemy, and drew
rein with many prisoners near Elandslaagte, just as the last gleam of light
died and gave place to darkness.

er rally Meanwhile there had occurred an anxious moment for the
cease infantry, victorious along the summit of the kopjes. Pressing
forward from the captured crest in pursuit, and firing fast, the
soldiers were some distance down the gentle reverse slope when a white
flag was seen to be waving from the conical kopje above the laager, and
Colonel Hamilton, believing it to signify a general capitulation, ordered the
"cease fire" to be sounded. Suddenly a body of some fifty Boers charged
boldly uphill against that section in which were the right company of the
Gordon Highlanders and the Imperial Light Horse, and, seizing a small spur
within twenty yards of the crest, turned their rifles upon the surprised
troops. For a moment there was some confusion. The soldiers were
scattered; some were continuing the pursuit, some were seeking their units;
many were resting; the cross fire which thus assailed them was severe and
accurate.

nemy is But the effect of this counter-attack was but momentary. Once
off. more the "advance" was sounded, and that part of the line, rallied
by the voice and example of Colonel Hamilton himself, surged forward
again,[120] and tumbled the last remnant of the enemy down the reverse

slopes. During this incident some of the Imperial Light Horse on the
extreme right, swinging round the enemy's left, surrounded a farmhouse
which had been the rallying point of the above counter-attack, and, after a
sharp encounter, stormed it, capturing twenty-one prisoners.

of the Thus terminated an action of which there can be no greater
. praise than that it was swiftly planned, carried out with
determination, and that its complete success was gained exactly as
designed. That success, moreover, was of more than local importance.
Kock's hold upon the communications of Dundee had been of the briefest.
He himself was a prisoner, mortally wounded, in British hands, and his
force, rushing headlong back to Newcastle from the battlefield, upon which
it had left over two hundred killed and wounded, nearly two hundred
prisoners, two guns and a complete laager, carried despondency into the
Boer Headquarters, so recently alarmed at the rebuff of Talana. Moreover,
the battle did more than clear Yule's rear; it also safeguarded his front, by
persuading Erasmus, already timorous upon Impati, to cling to his
mountain, at a time when Yule's exhausted battalions were in no condition
to resist the attack of 5,000 fresh enemies.

h is It formed no part of Sir G. White's plan to keep the ground that
ed to had been won. The position of Elandslaagte was useless alike for
mith.
observation, defence, or offence. Even had it been of value, the
presence of the Free State army upon its flank rendered the occupation of it
too hazardous in the view of a General already impressed by the dangers of
detachments. Throughout the day, indeed, the Free Staters themselves had
been reminding him of these dangers. As early as 11 a.m. the piquets to the
west of Ladysmith had reported significant developments about Van
Reenen's Pass, and these, as the day wore on, became so threatening that at
5.30 p.m. General Hunter despatched a message to Sir G. White, who was
at that time still at Elandslaagte, informing him that there was a hostile
advance upon Ladysmith from Bester's station. It was necessary, therefore,
to recall French at once, and at 9 p.m. he was so instructed by telephone.

acs on At 11 p.m. General French issued orders for the return to
d night Ladysmith on the morrow, and the troops bivouacked on the field,
2nd.

the infantry upon the kopjes, the cavalry about the station. The day's losses
amounted to 263 officers and men killed and wounded.[121]

ack in At 3 a.m. on the 22nd the three batteries, the 5th Lancers and the
mith, Natal Mounted Rifles[122] left by road for Ladysmith, the loaded
2/99.
ambulance train quitting the station at the same time. From that
hour onwards the trains, bearing the soldiers, steamed away from the
battlefield, the last to leave by rail being a portion of the Manchester
escorting forty prisoners. They were detained until 3.20 p.m. The 5th
Dragoon Guards, who had reconnoitred northward, followed last of all by
road, and by evening the position was empty.

CHAPTER X.

LOMBARDS KOP.[123]

forces On the very day of Yule's junction with Coxhead[124], Erasmus
Oct. was in touch with A. P. Cronje, next day with Lukas Meyer, who,
French
noitres, still feeling the blow of Talana, had moved timidly, wide on the
7th. left. At 4 a.m. on the morning of the 27th a brigade of cavalry left
Ladysmith under Major-General French, and, proceeding to scout
along the Newcastle and Helpmakaar roads, was sighted at dawn by Meyer,
who was then in laager about seven miles south of Elandslaagte. The Boer
leader, anticipating a general attack, at once signalled to Erasmus, upon
which a strong contingent of the Ermelo burghers, accompanied by guns,
made their way across to him from their camp. French reconnoitred boldly,
and at 10.35 a.m. he was able to send in to Sir George White his estimate of
the numbers confronting him. On Intintanyoni were 4,000-5,000 men. Other
strong bodies hovered between Rietfontein and Pepworth Hill, whilst the
enemy to his immediate front appeared to separate themselves into two
laagers, whose sites could be clearly distinguished. One, sheltering about
2,000 men, lay at the junction of the Beith and Glencoe roads, some five
miles south-east of Modder Spruit station, whilst the other, a much larger

encampment, was situated four miles nearer to the railway, that is to say,
one mile south-east of it.

lton with Meanwhile Colonel Ian Hamilton had at 10 a.m. marched out of
ry and Ladysmith to the Neks between Gun Hill, Lombards Kop and
ery
rts him. Umbulwana, with a brigade consisting of the 1st Devonshire and
1st Manchester regiments, the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 2nd
Gordon Highlanders, with a brigade division of the 21st, 42nd and 53rd
batteries R.F.A., joined later by the 1st Liverpool regiment and the 13th
battery R.F.A. This brigade, lying out all day in support of the cavalry
reconnaissance, caused continual apprehension to the enemy, who covered
all his positions with men and cannon in momentary expectation of an
attack. Altogether some 10,000 men with fifteen guns were observed, and
for the purpose intended by Sir George White, who was only anxious to
gain information, the object of the reconnaissance was accomplished. The
attack of the laagers was considered by Sir George White, who rode out
beyond Lombards Nek in the afternoon to confer with General French and
s return Colonel Hamilton; but after careful examination it was ultimately
mp. decided to await a more suitable opportunity, and the troops were
withdrawn.

On October 28th Lukas Meyer with 2,000 men and three guns
vaalers pushed forward to Modder Spruit, where he went into laager
ree
s behind a long flat kopje, now called Long Hill, situated some four
ach thousand yards south-east of Pepworth Hill, the summit of which
mith, the Ermelo commando had already piqueted. The Free Staters,
8th.
coming down from Intintanyoni, rode westward and lay in the
evening upon the farm Kleinfontein, joining hands with their allies of the
Transvaal across Surprise Hill and the heights above the Bell Spruit.
Through their main laager on Kleinfontein ran the railway line to Van
Reenen's Pass.

ry On the 29th the cavalry made a reconnaissance eastwards, and
s Boer reported as follows. The laager which had been close to the
sitions.
9th. Modder Spruit station on the 27th had disappeared, but there were
now two encampments to the east and south-east of Lombards
Kop, of which the lower appeared to command the road to Pieters, thus

threatening the line of communication. Pepworth Hill was strongly
occupied, and artillery were now upon it; a large camp lay close to the
north-west of the height. The enemy was numerous upon Long Hill. Upon
its flat top two or three guns were already emplaced, and an epaulment for
another was in course of construction. Behind the hill was a laager.

decides This reconnaissance seemed to Sir G. White to furnish the
ack. reasons he desired for assuming the offensive. The capture of Long
Hill would at least throw back the investing line of Transvaalers. It might
do more—break through it altogether, when a sweep north against Pepworth
would bid fair to drive together the Transvaal commandos in upon their
centre, and roll up the whole. The Free Staters, strung out as they now are,
thinly north-west and west, would then be cut off from the rest.

arranged, At 4 p.m. on the afternoon of the 29th his plans were formulated.
9th. Long Hill was to be the primary, Pepworth Hill the secondary
object, and to secure them the whole of the troops were to be employed. His
main army he divided into two bodies, with separate missions. One,
consisting of No. 10 Mountain battery, the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers and the
1st Gloucester regiment, all commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. C.
on to Carleton, of the first-named battalion, was to move at 10 p.m. that
ach night northward along the Bell Spruit. The duties of this force were
lson's
hat night. twofold: first, to cover the left flank of the main operation;
secondly, to gain and hold such a position towards Nicholson's Nek
(if possible, the Nek itself) as would enable the cavalry to debouch safely
upon the open ground beyond, should opportunity arise for a pursuit, or,
better still, an interception of the Transvaalers as they fell back on the
Drakensberg passes. The left flank thus provided for, a cavalry brigade,
consisting of the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, and Colonel Royston's
regiment of Colonials, under Major-General French, were to reach the
ry by ridges north-east of Gun Hill before dawn, from which, by
of 30th demonstrating against the enemy's left, they would cover the
on ridges
f Gun British right. Between these wings, the main infantry attack was to
be carried out by the 8th brigade, which, in the absence of its
proper commander, Colonel F. Howard, was under Colonel G. G.
Grimwood, 2nd King's Royal Rifles, whose five battalions would include
the 1st and 2nd King's Royal Rifles, the 1st Leicestershire, and 1st King's

(Liverpool) regiments and the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The 1st brigade
division Royal Field artillery and the Natal Field battery were to be attached
to Grimwood's command. A general reserve of the 7th brigade, consisting of
the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 1st Manchester and 1st Devonshire regiments,
and, should it arrive from Maritzburg in time, the 2nd Rifle Brigade, were
to be under the command of Colonel Ian Hamilton, who, besides his
infantry, would have with him the 5th Dragoon Guards, the 18th Hussars,
the Imperial Light Horse, two companies mounted infantry, and the 2nd
wood to brigade division of artillery. Grimwood was to take Long Hill, and
Long his path thereto was to be cleared by the shrapnel of both brigade
divisions. That position carried, he was to hold it, whilst Colonel
lton then Hamilton, supported in turn by the fire of the united artillery, was
ture to throw his fresh infantry against Pepworth Hill, and complete the
orth.
victory.

on's At 10 p.m. Carleton left his parade ground with six companies
mn (16 officers, 518 other ranks) and 46 mules, and at 11 p.m. arrived
es 11
Oct. 29th.at the rendezvous, the level crossing of the Newcastle road close to
the Orange Free State railway junction, where the rest of his
command had been awaiting him for an hour. It consisted of five and a half
companies (some 450 men) of the Gloucester regiment, with 57 mules and a
Maxim gun; the 10th Mountain battery, comprising 137 N.C.O.s and men, 6
guns, with 100 rounds for each, 133 mules, with 52 Cape Boys as
muleteers, and 10 horses. The total strength of the column was thus about
1,140 men and 250 animals.

wood Half an hour after midnight Grimwood's brigade (8th) set out
same eastward in the following order: 1st and 2nd battalions King's
at 12.30.
Royal Rifles, 1st Leicestershire regiment, 1st brigade division
R.F.A., 1st King's (Liverpool) regiment, and the Natal Field battery, with a
rearguard of the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.[125] Another brigade division,
the 2nd, joining the line of march soon after it was put in motion, marched
in front of the 1st Liverpool regiment. The whole pressed on for a time
quietly and in order. Soon, however, the last arrival, the 2nd brigade
division of artillery, in pursuance of orders, when between Flag and Limit
hills, drew away from out of the column to the left and passed under the
wood's shelter of Flag Hill. The two battalions behind, not being aware of
mn broken

or. any special instructions given to the artillery, followed it, whilst
those in front still pursued their proper route, so that Grimwood's force was
cut in two and separated whilst yet but half his march was over. An hour
before dawn, Grimwood, unconscious of the mishap to his rear, gained
some low kopjes 1,800 yards from the south-eastern flank of Long Hill, and
extended his troops across them, the two battalions King's Royal Rifles in
firing line, Leicester in support, facing north-west. Here he waited for light.
One company, "F." of the 1st King's Royal Rifles, moved cautiously
forward to a small kopje, slightly in advance, to cover the front.

h starting At 3 a.m. Major-General French rode out of Ladysmith with his
two regiments and pushed for Lombards Kop, dismounting his
unts
yards in command in a hollow basin between Gun Hill and Lombards Kop,
f some 4,000 yards in rear, and out of sight, of Grimwood's infantry.
wood. The Natal Volunteers, who had been on the ground since the
previous night, went on, and, dividing right and left, secured the summits of
lton at 4 Lombards Kop and Umbulwana Mountain. Colonel Hamilton,
moves on quitting his rendezvous between Tunnel and Junction Hills at 4
Hill.
a.m., moved, as directed, on Limit Hill, which had been piqueted
throughout the night by "G." and "H." companies Gordon Highlanders. As
Hamilton rode at the head of his brigade, a man was brought to him who
news of proved to be a muleteer of the 10th Mountain battery. He reported
er to that a sudden disturbance had occurred in the midst of Carleton's
on.
night march; all the mules of the battery had broken away, and, so
far as he knew, had never been seen again. A little further on an officer of
the Scottish Rifles, who had been attached to the Gloucester regiment a few
hours previously, appeared amongst the Gordon Highlanders. He, too, told
of a stampede amongst the battery mules, and, in addition, of resulting
disturbance of some of the infantry companies, amongst others that which
he accompanied. Yet a third warning of misadventure on the left was
received before dawn. In the early morning the sentries of the piquet of the
Leicester regiment at Cove Redoubt, one of the northerly outposts of
Ladysmith, became aware of the sound of hoofs and the rattle of harness
coming towards them from the north, and the soldiers, running down,
captured several mules bearing the equipment of mountain guns. A patrol of
the 5th Dragoon Guards,[126] which had been despatched by Sir G. White to
try to get news of Carleton's column, was checked at the Bell Spruit, but

met on the road a gunner of the 10th Mountain battery, who related the
same tale as had already reached that General. This man said that the
battery had been suddenly fired on at 2 a.m.; the mules had stampeded and
disappeared. Both its ammunition and portions of most of its guns had been
carried off. Finally, a brief note from Carleton himself to the Commander-
in-Chief announced what had then happened.

woad At dawn Pickwoad's brigade division, which was now deployed
Long 1-½ miles south-eastward of Limit Hill, opened at Long Hill at
3,700 yards. But Long Hill was silent. The three gun emplacements
visible upon the crest were empty. Instead, at 5.15 a.m., a heavy piece fired
orth from Pepworth Hill, and a 96-pound shell fell near the town, its
s. explosion greeting the 2nd Rifle Brigade, which, having detrained
at 2.30 a.m., was marching out to join Hamilton's force at Limit Hill. The
next, following quickly, burst in Pickwoad's line of guns, and Coxhead's
artillery, which attempted to reply, found itself far outranged, whilst
Pickwoad's three batteries maintained for a time their bombardment of
Long Hill. In a few moments four long-range Creusots of smaller calibre
(75 m/m) joined in from either side of the 96-pounder, two others from
lower ground about the railway below the height. Both Coxhead's and
ing Pickwoad's batteries were covered with missiles. Colonel C. M. H.
s the two Downing, commanding all the artillery, quickly assumed the
de Divs.
st offensive. Dissatisfied with his position, the left of which, lying to
orth. the east of Limit Hill, was so encumbered with rocks that of the
53rd battery only two guns could fire at all, and those of the other
batteries of the 2nd brigade division only by indirect laying, he drew that
part of his line clear, and moved Coxhead's three batteries, the 21st, 42nd,
and 53rd, out into the open, facing north-west, to within 4,000 yards of
Pepworth.[127] Troubled, while the change was in course of taking place, by
the accurate shooting from that hill, Downing then ordered Pickwoad to
change front to the left and come into action against Pepworth on the right
of, but some distance from, the 2nd brigade division. The guns on the low
lences ground under the shadow of Pepworth were soon mastered. The
oer guns. battery upon its summit, at distant range for shrapnel, withstood yet
awhile; but ere long the gunners there, too, temporarily abandoned their
weapons, and only returned when a slackening of Pickwoad's fire gave
opportunity for a hasty round. At 6.30 a.m., therefore, and for some half

hour more, the trend of battle seemed to the artillery to be in favour of the
British. After that, however, fresh hostile guns opened, and the rattle of
rifles arose in ever-increasing volume, not only from the broken ground to
the right, where Grimwood's infantry lay lost to view amongst the low,
rolling kopjes by the Modder Spruit, but also far to the rear, towards
Lombards Kop. Yet no British were seen advancing. It was evident that the
infantry and cavalry were not delivering but withstanding an onslaught.

wood The attack which Grimwood found to be developing rapidly
ting against him was less surprising from its suddenness than from the
rt from
ght, direction from which it assailed him. Those with him, as described
s from above, lay in the precise position designed for them. He had taken
uarter. the precaution of covering his right rear, until it should be protected
by the cavalry, at first with a half company ("A.") of the Leicestershire
regiment, then with two more ("F." and "H.") of the same battalion and the
Maxim gun. Furthermore, a kopje to the right front, seen in the growing
light to command from the eastward that already occupied by "F." company
1st King's Royal Rifles, was now crowned by "H." company of the same
battalion, and all had seemed safe on that side. But now a raking fire from
the right assailed all his lines, and Grimwood, instead of outflanking, was
outflanked.

Every moment this fire grew more severe; beyond the Modder, Boer
reinforcements were streaming in full view up to the line of riflemen
shooting along the Modder Spruit. Two guns, which began to shoot from a
well-concealed spot near the Elandslaagte road, now took the British line in
enfilade, and partially in reverse. The Boer gunners upon Pepworth and the
low ground east of it again fired, the smaller pieces into the batteries and
infantry, the great Creusot frequently into the town.

wood Instead of the anticipated change of front to the left for the
the new destruction of the enemy Grimwood had now, therefore, to prepare
r.
a new frontage most speedily, almost to his present rear, for the
safety of his brigade. "H." company 1st King's Royal Rifles, on the
advanced kopje, first turned towards the east, and coming under heavy fire
from three directions, was later reinforced by "A." company of the same
battalion. "B." company, which had lain in support of "F.," moved to the

new right of "H." and "A.," and, with "E." company, lined up along the
rocks facing the Modder Spruit. Meanwhile the officer commanding "F.,"
the other advanced company, who had turned east, now found his left
assailed, and threw back half his command in that direction. The tripod
Maxim gun of the 2nd King's Royal Rifles was placed in the centre of this
company.[128]

K.R.R. The 2nd King's Royal Rifles, which had lain in support whilst
ap the front circled round, were now sent to reinforce. Leaving two
en 1st
R. and companies still in support, the battalion changed front to the right,
ster and, extending from right to left, filled the gap between the right of
hment. the 1st King's Royal Rifles and the detached 2-½ companies of the
Leicester regiment. These, with a Maxim, somewhat isolated on the kopje
on what was now the right flank, were beginning to be hotly engaged.

rrival of Thus under incessant and increasing fire the 8th brigade swung
ompanies round, pivoting on the left company 1st King's Royal Rifles, with
.
cts the detachment of the Leicester as "marker," so to speak, to its
wood outer flank. Two companies of the missing Royal Dublin
Cavalry. Fusiliers[129] now arrived to assist the Leicester, and were
immediately assailed by some sharpshooters who had worked around the
right flank. They therefore prolonged the line to the right, towards the
northern spurs of Lombards Kop, and here about 7 a.m. they joined hands
with the cavalry, whose movements must now be related.

h's Waiting until the artillery duel seemed to be going in favour of
tions. Downing's batteries, French gave the word for advance about 5.30
a.m. The 5th Lancers and 19th Hussars, who had been lying in mass in the
hollow, quickly extended in a north-easterly direction, with orders to work
round the Boer left. The route taken by the brigade lay for some distance
within rifle range of the western flank of a line of low kopjes, which,
running down north-east as an irregular spur of Lombards Kop, and parallel
to the Modder Spruit, pointed in the direction of Long Hill. At the
termination of this ridge, the high ground, dropping sharply to the plain,
offered an outlet to the eastward. For this gateway French's two regiments
were making. They had all but reached it when a sharp blaze of rifles broke
from the kopjes to their right. The squadrons thereupon wheeled to the

right, the troopers dismounted, and running a short way to the new front,
they soon reinforced a ridge, already thinly held by the right of Grimwood's
infantry, from whence they replied to the sharpshooters on the kopjes
beyond. It was soon evident that the Mausers were becoming the masters of
the carbines, and French, seeing the impossibility of breaking through, at
any rate at this period, ordered his brigade to retire. As the men took to their
horses, a gun, opening from the enemy's left, threw shell rapidly amongst
them, and made the inequality of the combat yet more apparent. The two
squadrons of the 5th Lancers, who were on the left, drew back over the
plain, whilst the 19th Hussars retraced their path under the ridges, both
rejoining General French under the lee of Lombards Kop, north of Gun Hill
and of their original point of departure. French immediately threw his
command forward again, and his two regiments, with some of the Natal
Carbineers, all dismounted, crowned the high ridges running northward and
downward from the summit of Lombards Kop, and were soon deep in
action with superior numbers all along the line. About 8 a.m. Major-General
J. F. Brocklehurst, who had only reached Ladysmith at 3 a.m., arrived at
Lombards Kop with two squadrons ("B." and "D.") of the 5th Dragoon
Guards, followed by the 18th Hussars; and Downing, withdrawing the 69th
battery from the line of guns still shelling Pepworth, despatched it with all
haste in the same direction. Of Brocklehurst's reinforcement, the two
squadrons 5th Dragoon Guards came up on the right of the 19th Hussars on
the crest, and found themselves at once under fire from the front and right
flank. Of the three weak squadrons of the 18th Hussars—all that remained
after the catastrophe of Adelaide Farm[130]—one was directed to reinforce
the 19th Hussars on the eastern slope of Lombards, the other two climbed to
the right of the 5th Dragoon Guards to the south. Sharp fire from a pom-
pom and many rifles met them on the shoulder of the ridge, and it seemed
as if the British right was to be overmatched. But the 69th battery, which
had moved up the Helpmakaar road, escorted by a squadron of the 5th
Lancers, now arrived, and, boldly handled, quickly relieved the pressure in
this portion of the field by drawing the enemy's attention to itself. Pushing
on through the Nek which joins Lombards Kop to Umbulwana this battery
came into action on an underfeature south of the road one mile beyond it,
and enfiladed the Boer left. Soon, however, it found itself the focus of an
increasing fusilade, and its commander, Major F. D. V. Wing, saw that to
continue to work the guns would entail a grave loss of men. He therefore

determined to withdraw from his dangerously advanced position. It was
impossible to bring up the teams, but the gunners ran the guns back by
hand. The battery withdrew almost intact, and, coming into action again,
kept the balance level by steady practice carried on from the Nek itself.[131]

wood Meanwhile, Grimwood was being hard pressed on the low
es kopjes to the northward, and his line became thinner every moment
ery
rt. as he endeavoured to meet the continual attempts upon his flanks.
Two Boer guns shelled steadily the much exposed 8th brigade from
various points, and when about 8 a.m. a pom-pom, joining in the
bombardment, killed with its first discharges some of the ammunition mules
and scattered the rest far and wide, Grimwood sent urgent messages to the
artillery for support. Sir G. White was at that moment himself with the
batteries, which were being enfiladed again, this time by some guns on the
low ground below and south of Pepworth. He promptly despatched the 21st
and 53rd batteries to positions from which, facing eastwards, they could
support both the cavalry and Grimwood. The 21st moved far southward,
and from a gap in the hills between the infantry and cavalry soon rendered
for the left of the latter the same service as the 69th was performing for the
right. The 53rd battery, coming into action near the Elandslaagte road,
engaged the Boer guns on Grimwood's front, and though kept at extreme
range by Sir G. White's orders, succeeded in much reducing their effect. At
the same time the 13th battery also left the line facing Pepworth, and,
wheeling eastward, shelled the hostile artillery on the left front of the
infantry with good results.

1 a.m. a For two hours, from about 9 a.m. to 11 a.m., the engagement
nary continued with little movement of either army. The Boers, being
now within 800 yards of the British, could advance no further, but
sent a steady stream of bullets against the ridges, pinning the cavalry to
Lombards Kop and the infantry to their line of hillocks along the Modder.
By 9.30 a.m. Grimwood's last available reserve was put into the firing line,
and he could prolong his front no more, though the enemy still threatened
his flanks. The artillery was strangely dispersed. Far on the right the 69th
battery stood in action upon Umbulwana Nek; the 21st battery on the
northern side of Lombards Kop covered French's left and Grimwood's right;
out in the open to their left rear the 53rd battery shot above the heads of the

right wing of the infantry, whilst farther northward the 13th sent shrapnel
over the left wing. Only the 42nd and 67th batteries remained on the site
first held by the artillery facing north-west, where the former suffered
considerable losses from the heavy enfilade and frontal fire which
recommenced. For the Boer artillerymen, encouraged by the diminution of
the British gun-power at this point, had not only returned to the pieces upon
Pepworth, but placed fresh ones upon the northernmost spurs of Long Hill
itself.

ve The reserve on Limit Hill, under Colonel Ian Hamilton's
bed by command, had been reduced considerably by the successive
.
demands of the battle. He had been early deprived of most of his
cavalry and all his artillery, and shortly after 8 a.m., on a report coming of a
hostile advance against the left flank, two squadrons ("E." and "F.") of his
remaining mounted troops, the Imperial Light Horse, had left him to occupy
some kopjes on either side of the railway close to Aller Park, from which
they could see the enemy moving in strength about the heights of Bell
Spruit. At 10 a.m. the 1st Manchester regiment was also withdrawn from
Hamilton's brigade, the right half-battalion proceeding towards Lombards
Kop, the left half passing into the open as escort to the artillery. The former
portion eventually became incorporated with French's firing line, whilst the
latter lay out upon the shelterless ground between the original artillery
position and the new one taken up by the 13th battery, where they suffered
somewhat severely from the intermittent shells.

mith Meanwhile Colonel W. G. Knox, who, in the absence of the
ened. army, had been placed in charge of the defences of Ladysmith, was
by no means secure. Left with a garrison of a few companies of infantry, he
detailed two of these, with the 23rd of the Royal engineers, and the two
Boer guns captured at Elandslaagte, to cover the north of the town, posting
them upon a ridge north-west of Observation Hill. Here he found himself
confronted immediately by strong bodies and two guns of the enemy, who
manœuvred about Bell's and the adjacent kopjes. He was soon strengthened
by two guns and 88 men of the 10th Mountain battery, hastily collected and
reorganised after their stampede from Carleton's party. But at no time could
Knox do more than hold his own, and the strength and boldness of the

Boers, who at one time threatened the town, seemed the last confirmation of
Carleton's fate.

eorge About 11 a.m. Sir G. White, having first despatched his Chief of
raws the the Staff, Major-General A. Hunter, to investigate the situation,
s.
decided to withdraw. To cover the movement he sent out three
squadrons ("B.," "C." and "D.") of the Imperial Light Horse which
remained in reserve at Limit Hill. The 13th battery, receiving an order to
support them as closely as possible, galloped in and unlimbered 800 yards
battery behind Grimwood's line. So screened, the infantry began to retreat
s retreat. at 11.30 a.m. As the men rose from their shelters, a storm of fire
broke from the enemy's ridges. But the gunners of the 13th battery, turning
the hail of bullets from the infantry, faced it themselves. Almost the whole
volume of the enemy's fire soon centred on this battery. From the right, four
Boer guns concealed in the scrub raked the line; those upon Long Hill
bombarded from the left, whilst from the left rear the heavy shells from
Pepworth also struck in, hitting direct four of the six guns. When twenty
minutes had passed thus, and Grimwood's brigade had almost removed
itself into safety, the battery which had shielded it looked as if it must itself
be lost.

battery From their rear Major A. J. Abdy, commanding the 53rd battery,
es 13th. had marked the perilous situation of the 13th and, obtaining
permission from Colonel Coxhead, advanced to succour it. Galloping to the
front, across a deep donga, the 53rd wheeled to the right of the 13th and
ranged upon some Boer artillery 2,350 yards to the eastward. By the orders
of Major-General Hunter, who was on the spot, the 13th retired first, some
800 yards. But before it could come into action again, the 53rd, left alone
on the plain, drew in its turn the fire of all the Boer guns. A shell exploded
beneath a limber, blowing the wheels to fragments, so that the gun could
not be removed, and had to be temporarily abandoned. As soon as the 13th
re-opened the 53rd was able to draw back. In re-crossing the donga a gun
upset, and the enemy's shells burst over it, but whilst the battery fell back to
a new site to support the 13th, Lieutenant J. F. A. Higgins, having been left
with the team in the donga, succeeded in righting the gun, and restored it to
its place in the line. A few minutes previously, Captain W. Thwaites, with
six men, had ridden forward, and now returned, bringing with him on a new

limber the gun which had been disabled in the open. Only the old limber
and a wagon of stores remained derelict.

nfantry, So covered, the infantry had been getting away with unimpaired
the discipline, but in great confusion, owing to the intermixture of
ction of
uns, get units and the extreme exhaustion of the men. Two Maxims were
abandoned, but useless, on the kopjes—those of the Leicestershire
regiment and 2nd King's Royal Rifles—the mules of both having
been shot or stampeded by the last outburst from the Boer lines. The enemy
made no serious attempt to follow up the retirement. Some Boers did indeed
speed forward to the now empty kopjes, and began shooting rapidly from
thence, but under the fine practice of the 13th battery the musketry soon
dwindled. The Creusot on Pepworth Hill sounded on the right, and every
part of the route to be traversed by the troops lay within range of its
projectiles. About noon, a report, as loud as that of the great French cannon
itself, came from the direction of the town, and the batteries on Pepworth
sank immediately to silence under the repeated strokes of shells from
Naval British Naval guns. Captain the Honourable Hedworth Lambton,
appear R.N., had detrained his command of two 4.7-in., three 12-pr. 12-
lence the
. cwt. quick-firing guns, with some smaller pieces, 16 officers and
267 men at 10 a.m., the very time when the enemy's 6-in. shells
were bursting over the railway station.[132] After conferring with Colonel
Knox, he was in two hours on his way towards the fight with the 12-
pounders, reaching the place held by Hamilton's brigade. But in view of the
imminent retirement, this was too far forward, and Lambton was ordered
back. Whilst he was in the act of Withdrawing, the gunners on Pepworth,
descrying the strings of moving bullocks, launched a shell which pitched
exactly upon one of the guns, and tumbled it over. Lambton, however,
coming into action nearer the town, opened heavily and accurately on his
antagonist, and reduced him to immediate silence.

arrison At 1 p.m. the cavalry on the right gave up the crests which they
es had maintained so long, covered up to the last by the 21st battery
mith by
p.m. on the left, and on the right by the 69th battery, whose escort had
been strengthened by "C" squadron 5th Dragoon Guards taken
from Limit Hill. At 2.30 p.m. French's command was in Ladysmith,
following the 1st Manchester regiment, which had retired on the right of the

cavalry. With the exception of four companies of the 1st Devonshire
regiment, left upon Limit Hill, the rest of the troops engaged had reached
their camps a short time previously. Only the tents of Carleton's two
battalions were seen to be empty when evening fell.

on's Carleton's detachment had moved from the rendezvous at 11.15
march p.m. in the following order: first, under Major C. S. Kincaid, a
s 11.15
29th small party of 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, who marched with fixed
9. bayonets; then Colonel Carleton himself, with Major W. Adye,
D.A.A.G. for Intelligence, and the guides; behind them the 1st
Royal Irish Fusiliers, followed by their 46 mules; then the 10th Mountain
battery, with 133 mules; then the 57 mules of the 1st Gloucester regiment;
next five and a half companies of that battalion, and finally a small
rearguard, under Captain B. O. Fyffe, of the Gloucester. The valley of the
Bell Spruit was wrapped in profound darkness, yet the force pushed on at a
rapid pace, and, in spite of the noise of its progress, was undetected by the
Boer piquets on the hills on either side. Shortly after 1 a.m. the van was
opposite the southern spur of the height called Kainguba, at the other
extremity of which, some two miles due north, lay the object of the
expedition, Nicholson's Nek. The column was here in perfect order, the road
to the Nek was good, and there was promise of about two hours of darkness
to conceal the remainder of the march. But Colonel Carleton, thinking more
of the lateness of his start than of the excellence of his progress, and
remembering that his orders had not bound him absolutely to Nicholson's
Nek, came to the conclusion at this point that, if, as seemed possible, he
could not reach the Nek before dawn, it would be extremely rash to be
surprised by daylight in a narrow defile. He decided, therefore, at least to
make good the dangerous high ground on his left by occupying the nearest
crest of Kainguba above him, intending, if time allowed, to continue his
march to the Nek from this vantage ground. He therefore wheeled the
leading files to the left, and at their head began the boulder-obstructed and
finally almost precipitous ascent of the mountain, ordering guides to be left
to indicate the point of the change of direction to the units following the
Royal Irish Fusiliers. When the head of that battalion had climbed two-
isaster. thirds of the steep a mysterious and fatal incident occurred.
Suddenly from the darkness encircling the clambering soldiers
broke out a roar "like that of an approaching train,"[133] there was a rush of

hoofs and the clatter of scattering stones. In a moment a group of loose
animals, whether horses, mules or cattle, it was impossible to discern,
bounding down the rocky precipice, tore past the last companies of the
Royal Irish Fusiliers and disappeared as quickly as they had come into the
gloom of the valley. The rear of the Irish Fusiliers checked and staggered
back upon the long line of ammunition mules. The natural timidity of these
animals, many of them almost untrained, had been increased by their long
wait at the rendezvous, and by the fact that they were led by strange and
unskilled men. Now it became an uncontrollable panic. Leaping round,
dragging their muleteers with them, they plunged backwards in terror,
wrenched themselves loose, and thundered over the steep slope upon all
below them. The battery mules and those of the Gloucester regiment were
dashed downwards and joined the riot, and the whole mass poured upon the
Gloucester regiment, which had just begun to breast the hill. A shout arose;
the men of the front companies were buffeted and swept from the track in
every direction. A few shots rang sharply from behind, and a few more
faintly from a startled Boer piquet on Surprise Hill. Then the uproar died
away in the valley of the Bell Spruit, leaving the column disordered and
amazed at its own wreck. It was a disaster complete, sudden, and incurred
by no fault of officers or men. Up to this point the night march, conducted
in deep darkness and between the enemy's piquets, had been a conspicuous
success, and now in one swift moment the hand of fate had changed order
into chaos, and success into destruction. But the troops quickly recovered,
and indeed but few had yielded to the shock. Many had gathered about their
officers with fixed bayonets; many, hurled to the ground, had nevertheless
gripped their weapons and looked not for safety, but the enemy. Only fifty
of the infantry, and these included many who had been actually stunned by
the onset of the frenzied mules, failed to fall into the ranks at the summons
of the officers, who, even before the tumult had ceased, were strenuously
working to re-organise their commands.

the About 2 a.m. the leading files pressed over the crest on to the top
mn of the mountain. An hour of uncertainty and, had the enemy been
es
it near, of extreme danger followed. Most of the Irish Fusiliers were
ut guns now upon the summit, disposed, as best could be, for defence. But
erve the Gloucester at the bottom were not yet formed, and when, about
unition.
3 a.m., they came up in such order as they had been able to

contrive, they brought only nine of their fifty-nine mules with them. The
Irish Fusiliers had recovered but eight. The reserve of ammunition was thus
practically swept away. The Mountain battery did not appear at all. Only
two of the gun mules eventually arrived, carrying portions of two pieces.
Eighty-eight gunners and one hundred and thirty mules had dropped out,
and not a complete gun of all the six was available.

acks on When at last both regiments reached the top they were formed in
ern edge line of quarter-columns—Gloucester on the right. Guided by Adye,
waits
they moved towards the southern extremity of the ridge, where
they halted, lay down around the crest, and waited for light. Dawn
revealed the nature of the position which the diminished detachment
occupied. Behind, the southern end of the mountain dropped almost sheer to
the valley. In front, to the northward, the hill-top first sloped downward
somewhat to a point, where, like Talana, it was narrowed by a deep re-
entrant on one side, then rose to a new sky line, which hid from the British
troops the remainder of the ridge some 1,200 or more yards from the
southern crest. Over it the hill-top narrowed, and ran on for a mile and a
round. half towards Nicholson's Nek. A jungle of tall grass, hiding
innumerable boulders, clothed the mountain up to and a little
beyond the sky line, ceasing some 700 yards from the southern crest, and
between this thicket and the British line were dotted a few ruined stone
kraals, of a circular shape and some two feet high. Across the valley of the
Bell Spruit, to the east, a group of kopjes stood within long rifle range of,
but lower than, Kainguba. In the midst of the British position itself, a small
knoll, crowned by two trees, and nearly as high as the grass-grown sky line
in front, arose at the end of the mountain before it plunged into the depth
on behind. Carleton, now decided to stand on the defensive where he
es a was, despatched a message at 3.55 a.m. by a native, acquainting Sir
sive
on. G. White with his mishap, his position, and his plan, and issued
orders for the disposition and entrenchment of the troops. The left
bution of or western crest of the hill was assigned to the Gloucester
anies. regiment, the right to the Irish Fusiliers, a reserve, consisting of
two companies ("G." and "H.") of the latter battalion, taking post in front of
the knoll at the southern extremity of the summit. The men began at once to
build sangars. The position of the Gloucester, which it is necessary to
describe in detail, was as follows: Along half of the southern and south-

western crest lay "A." company, its right being prolonged by "B." company,
and at first by "C." This last-named unit, however, was soon extended
across the north of the hill, at right angles to the crest and "B." company,
and had half completed a defensive wall when it was again pushed forward
about 100 yards to the front, "B." company increasing its extension along
the crest to maintain junction with the left of "C." The right flank of "C."
company was marked by a round kraal, behind which stood up a small tree,
and beyond this the line across the mountain-top was taken up by a
company ("E.") of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, which, in its turn, linked on to
the defenders ("A.," "B.," "F." companies Royal Irish Fusiliers) of the
eastern crest. The formation thus took the shape of a semicircle, behind a
diameter, composed of one company Gloucester and one Royal Irish
Fusiliers, facing the rise to the northward. Some 700 yards back from these
the arc followed the contour of the mountain in rear. Thus back from the
fighting line the ground sloped upwards, hiding from it the reserves, and
exposing reinforcements from them, or men retreating back to them, to the
full view and fire of anyone upon the shoulder which arose in front. Over
the brow of this rise "D." company Gloucester entrenched itself in a
position to support both "C." company Gloucester and "E." company Royal
Irish Fusiliers. Though less than 150 yards in rear, "D." company was,
owing to the bulging ground, invisible to "C." company, and the officers of
the latter knew nothing of the proximity of its support. The movements
necessary to these dispositions had scarcely begun when a slow rifle-fire,
commencing from Surprise Hill to the south-west, showed that the presence
of the British on the mountain was discovered, and from the very first the
toiling soldiers thus found themselves taken in flank and reverse. Stones of
manageable size were scarce, tools were lacking with which to move the
large ones, and, with the smaller, defences of but the most paltry
dimensions could be erected. At this time the danger of the dead ground
ahead, and below the left front, became apparent to Carleton, and "E."
company of the Gloucester, moving out beyond the front line, took post
upon the densely-grown summit of the rise, 400 yards in front of "C."
turning its left section to face west. Here it was shortly joined by the half of
"H." company, some twenty men in all, sent forward by the O.C. Gloucester
in response to Carleton's order (which did not name any precise strength) to
reinforce.

Boers At 7 a.m. bands of mounted men came down from Intintanyoni
r. to the heights east of Bell Spruit, whence they opened fire upon the
right rear of the British position. An hour later a hostile battery of
apparently four guns suddenly appeared upon the northern end of these
heights, and, unlimbering for action, threatened Kainguba in silence for
some time, only to disappear northwards without firing a shot. A number of
horsemen were seen to ride away with it, and these, bearing to the left,
vanished behind Nicholson's Nek.

they At 9 a.m. a movement still more threatening was descried from
en rear. the lines of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. Groups of horsemen, breaking
away from the main laager visible at Pepworth, came riding up the valleys
and behind the crests towards the northern end of Kainguba. On the right,
amongst the Irish Fusiliers, the Maxim of the Gloucester regiment stood
ready for action, and the officer in charge commenced a slow fire upon the
stream of Boers. Opening at 1,200 yards, he gradually increased the range
to 2,000 yards, and the trotting horsemen had just broken into a gallop as
the bullets began to lash amongst them, when an order was received not to
fire unless the enemy showed in masses at closer distances, ammunition
being scarce.

At 2 a.m. Commandant Van Dam, lying in bivouac with his
ments. Johannesburg Police[134] beneath Pepworth, received orders from
Joubert in person to proceed at once to the northern summit of Kainguba
and hold the ridge above Nicholson's Nek. The Boer officer thereupon
galloped for that spot with 400 men, being warned of the proximity of
British troops by a Field Cornet of the Pretoria commando, who lay with
thirty men on the northern slope of the high ground east of Bell Spruit.
Gaining the Nek, the Police found it occupied by 150 Free Staters, who
moved away further west on their approach. Van Dam's plan was quickly
made. Sending a message to the Free Staters that if they would ride round to
the flank and rear of the British, he would attack straight over the top of the
mountain, he left fifty burghers in the Nek in charge of the horses, and led
the remainder on foot in straggling order up the hill. The crest was gained
and half the summit traversed before shots rang out from the shelters of the
advanced companies of the Gloucester. But the Boers fired no round until,
at 800 yards, the foremost British sangar was visible through the long grass.

Meanwhile the Free Staters, under Christian De Wet and Steenkamp, crept
around the foot of the steep ground under Van Dam's right, swinging
northward. Then they, too, began to climb, and by 10 a.m. Carleton's
column was entrapped.

opment The weak company and a half in front of the Gloucester, badly
ack. sheltered from the converging fire, could do little more than check
the foremost burghers. This, however, they did so effectually for a time that
Van Dam, fearing for the issue of a merely frontal attack, and hearing
nothing of the Free Staters, who had not yet reached their goal, ordered one
of his officers, Lieutenant Pohlmann, to take fifty men out of sight under
the hill to the right, and not to fire a shot until he arrived within decisive
range of the British. Pohlmann moved boldly and skilfully, and, appearing
suddenly upon the left of "E." company Gloucester, poured a destructive
shower over the defences. The captain of "E." company perceived at once
the hopelessness of his situation, asked and received permission to retire,
and took his men and those of "H." company back under a heavy fusilade
and with severe loss, passing the left flank of "C." company, into whose
sangars many dropped for shelter. The section detached to the left, not
receiving the order—unable to retire, if it had received it—was shot down
to a man. The commander was taken prisoner. Carleton, who had not
authorised this retirement, and placed as he was, knew nothing of the
necessity for it, then ordered Major S. Humphery to reinforce the
diminished companies, and send them back to the abandoned sangars. This
Humphery found to be impossible, and thus the front of the position
receded to the line of "C." company Gloucester and of "E." company Royal
Irish Fusiliers, slightly to their right rear. Nor was this to remain long
unbroken; for most of the men of this company of Royal Irish Fusiliers,
finding their feeble defences crumbling to nothing under the tremendous
fire, drew off gradually towards their comrades on the right, and soon the
officers of "C." company Gloucester saw that the prolongation of their line
had vanished, and that their right was now completely exposed.

a.m. A About this time (11.30 a.m.) a heliograph from Sir G. White's
graph main body was seen. Carleton called for signallers to read the
t be
ered. message; but so deadly was the fire that three men were wounded
in succession, and one man thrice, as they stood by Carleton

spelling out the signal. This ran:—"Retire on Ladysmith as opportunity
offers." The only heliograph with the column had vanished in the stampede,
and Carleton, encircled by musketry, knew that he was as powerless to obey
the order as to acknowledge it.

l The Boers, who had turned "E." company, Gloucester, crawled
derstand on to within forty yards of the right of "B." company, threatening to
roll it up, and Lieutenant C. S. Knox, its commander, surrounded
by dead, found it necessary to go back to fetch up more men. Near him, in
the sangar of "C." company, lay Captain S. Willcock of "H." company, and
Knox, before starting back, waved his arms to attract his attention, shouting
to him that the Boers were coming up from behind, that he, Knox, had to go
back, and that Willcock must look to his left. But Knox, with a gesture of
his arms, had unwittingly imitated the military signal to retire, and the
musketry, which was now one sustained roar upon the mountain, drowned
all of his shouting, except the words "from behind." Willcock, therefore,
imagining that he was receiving an order to retire, which might have been
sent forward from the commanding officer, passed it on to Captain Fyffe,
who, in turn, communicated it to Captain Duncan, the senior officer in the
sangar. In the short retirement which followed nearly forty-five percent fell.

an Following their retreating companies, Captains Duncan and
ies a Fyffe (the latter wounded) halted by a small ruined kraal some fifty
and then
nders. yards back, leaped into it with six or eight men, and determined to
make a stand. Behind the kraal, the ground sloping upwards, hid
the rest of the British lines entirely from a man lying prone in the sorry
shelter. So close now were the Boers that the uproar of their rapid and
incessant shots overwhelmed all else. To the occupants of the kraal it
seemed as though silence had fallen over the British part of the position,
and this, though "D." company was shooting steadily, unshaken in the
sangar not fifty yards to their right rear. They thought that Colonel Carleton
had taken his column from the hill, and that they were alone. For a few
moments they lay, the helpless focus of hundreds of rifles, and then, after a
brief conversation with his wounded junior, Duncan decided to surrender.
Two handkerchiefs tied to the muzzle of an uplifted rifle were apparently
invisible to the Boers, whose fire continued unabated. But the white rags,
fluttering just clear of the brow of the rise, were marked in an instant from

the sangar of "D." company, of whose proximity Duncan and his party were
absolutely unaware, and Captain R. Conner, who lay there with the
commanding officer of the Gloucester, rushed out towards them over some
fifty yards of bullet-swept ground shouting an enquiry. Meanwhile, as the
storm of lead still beat upon the shelter, Duncan, taking a towel from a
soldier near him, tied it to his sword and held it aloft. For a minute or two
the enemy did not desist, and in this interval Conner, running by order of
his commanding officer, across to Colonel Carleton, acquainted him with
the fact that the flag had been upraised in Duncan's sangar. At the same time
a bugle, whether British or Boer will never be known, sounded the "cease
fire" somewhere on the British left. There was a hasty consultation between
Carleton and Adye as to the possibility of repudiating the surrender
altogether, or of applying it solely to the small party which had yielded. But
the former officer, raising his eyes towards the spot, saw that the enemy had
practically decided the question for him. Having passed by Duncan's kraal
they were close in front of his main line, moving quickly forward with
shouts and waving of hats, with rifles held confidently at the "trail." Many
were already on the flank of the right portion of the British line, which,
surrender or not as it would, was thus placed in an utterly untenable
position. This right, consisting of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, absorbed in
action to the front, knew nothing of the events on the left.

on There was yet time to disown the flag. The Boers had so far
ts for all.possessed themselves only of Duncan's sangar; but Carleton shrank
from doing what he knew would be construed into the blackest treachery by
his opponents, which he knew, moreover, could but prolong the resistance
of his trapped and exhausted battalions some half an hour or less. Calling a
bugler to him he bade him sound the "cease fire," set a match to his maps
and papers, and, with Adye, walked out towards the enemy. Some of the
Irish Fusiliers still fought on whilst Carleton, meeting Commandant
Steenkamp, handed over to him his sword and revolver; it was some time
before the bursts of firing ceased altogether on the right. At about 1.30 p.m.
37 officers and 917 men became prisoners of war.[135]

CHAPTER XI.

THE ARRIVAL OF SIR REDVERS BULLER.

s of Sir Reports of the concentration of large commandos of Transvaal
ge and Free State burghers on the Natal border had been telegraphed
's
th felt athome by the High Commissioner and the Governor of Natal on the
28th of September, and reached the Colonial Office during the
night of the 28th-29th. The plan, therefore, of an advance through
the Orange Free State, which was adopted by the Cabinet on the following
day, by implication assumed that the force assigned to Sir George White for
the defence of Natal would be sufficient to check the threatened invasion
until a forward movement of the army corps in the western theatre of war
should draw away from the republican host the Free State men for the
protection of their own territory.

ion when The events of the first three weeks of the war showed that Sir
Buller George White, without assistance, would not be able to protect
d.
Natal, and the situation which met General Buller on his
disembarkation in South Africa on the morning of the 31st October could
not but cause him grave anxiety. The Natal Field Force, after three
strenuous efforts at Talana, Elandslaagte and Lombards Kop to repel the
enemy's columns of invasion, lay concentrated at Ladysmith, and to the
north, east, and west was already closely watched by the enemy in superior
strength. General Buller was convinced that the troops needed rest, and
could for a time only act on the defensive. He therefore telegraphed to
General White, on 1st November, suggesting that he should entrench and
await events either at Ladysmith or at Colenso. Sir George's reply showed
that he had already entrenched himself at Ladysmith, and could not now
withdraw. South of Ladysmith there were only very weak posts at Colenso
and Estcourt, and one regular battalion at Maritzburg. For the moment, the
safety of the capital of Natal appeared to be precarious, and Sir Redvers
even deemed it necessary to request the Naval Commander-in-Chief to take
steps for the protection of Durban from land attack. In Cape Colony the
Boer forces close to the Orange river had been strengthened by
reinforcements from the commandos originally assigned to watch the

Basuto border. Moreover, there was some reason to believe that another
commando from the north was moving down upon Kimberley, and this
report, coupled with the lack of news from Mafeking, rendered it for the
moment doubtful whether Baden-Powell might not have been
overwhelmed.[136] The first units of the expeditionary force were not due at
Cape Town for some ten days. The complete disembarkation at Cape Town,
Port Elizabeth, and East London would not be finished until early in
December.[137] The British Commander-in-Chief could not hope, therefore,
for at least a month, that his field army would be complete in organisation,
equipment, and transport, and ready to commence an advance into the Free
State. Notwithstanding these anxieties, General Buller was at first inclined
to adhere to the scheme originally designed, and to wait until he could
remove the pressure on Ladysmith and Kimberley by striking straight at
Bloemfontein. He so informed Lord Wolseley in a telegram despatched
from Cape Town on 1st November. Yet a few hours later it became evident
that the whole case was graver than Sir Redvers had at first conceived. Both
from the telegrams of Sir George White and from those of Sir Archibald
Hunter, from whom, as his own chief-of-staff, Buller had called for a
personal report on affairs in Natal, it was manifest that Ladysmith was
certain to be cut off from the outer world. General White telegraphed: "I
have the greatest confidence in holding the Boers for as long as necessary,"
but he added that "reinforcements should be sent to Natal at once.
Ladysmith strongly entrenched, but lines not continuous and perimeter so
large that Boers can exercise their usual tactics." General Hunter reported
that "Ladysmith lies in a hollow, commanded by heights too distant for us
to hold, and now possessed by the enemy"; and that "the Boers are superior
in numbers, mobility, and long-range artillery." In Cape Colony the
Intelligence officers at Naauwpoort and Stormberg telegraphed that a
commando, 800 strong, had crossed the Orange river at Norval's Pont, and
that another Boer force, stated to be 3,000 strong, with two guns and a
Maxim, was crossing the Bethulie bridge. The enemy's successes in Natal
were, in fact, encouraging the Free State commandos to establish
connection with the disaffected in the eastern and midland districts of Cape
Colony. As regards the general attitude of those in the Colonies who
sympathised with the Boers, General Buller was aware that for the most
part they possessed arms and ammunition, and that if their districts were
invaded the young men would join the enemy. The information in his

possession led to a belief that the greater number were for the moment still
very undecided, wondering which side would win, and that their whole
attention was fixed on Ladysmith and Kimberley. If the relief of those
places could be effected, the hostile elements, it was held, would not stir;
but if the two towns should fall, a dangerous rising was thought probable.
Meanwhile at Kimberley, although the reports of the officer in command of
the garrison did not appear to Sir Redvers to show any immediate anxiety,
yet the successful defence of that place depended on other than the regular
troops,[138] and there were indications that the strain of the situation was
being already felt. Urgent appeals were addressed by the civil community to
the High Commissioner, drawing his attention to the large number of
women and children within the town, the possibility of the cattle, on which
the meat supplies of the invested population mainly depended, being
captured by the enemy, and the difficulty of maintaining order amongst the
10,000 "raw savages" employed in the mine compounds.

ulties to The consideration of these reports and representations made it
alt with. evident that the whole situation had changed from that
contemplated when the original plan of campaign had been drawn up. For
an aggressive advance on Bloemfontein there was as yet no adequate army.
The component parts of it were on the high seas. Even after they should
have arrived, much time and labour would be required, before they could be
welded together, and supplied with all that was needed for an offensive
march into a country so distant from the coast. On the other hand, if
Ladysmith should meanwhile fall, the Boer commandos at present
surrounding that town would be set free to seize not only Maritzburg but
probably also the seaport of Durban, the possession of which would give to
the republics direct access to the outer world, and would, as was believed
by both Boer and British, be a signal to all the disaffected in Cape Colony
to take up arms. In the western theatre of war, the early relief of Kimberley
was an object dear to the hearts of all loyalists, and its loss would
undoubtedly give an immediate impetus to the wave of rebellion. The
necessity for immediate action was urgent, both in Natal and Cape Colony,
but the former appeared for the moment to present the more critical
situation. Sir Redvers, therefore, on the 2nd November, telegraphed to the
War Office:

"I consider that I must reinforce Natal, hang on to Orange River
bridge, and give myself to organise troops expected from England. I am,
therefore, withdrawing the garrisons at Naauwpoort and Stormberg. I
shall send Gatacre's division on arrival to Natal, and with Methuen's and
Clery's try to keep the main line open, and to relieve Kimberley. I do not
wish to be pessimistic, but it seems to me I shall have to wait until
March to commence active operations."

ages from On receipt of this report Lord Lansdowne telegraphed an enquiry
home. whether the division sent to Natal should be replaced by a fresh
eme
y." division from England. On the 3rd November, in consequence of
further reports from Natal, Sir Redvers telegraphed to the Secretary
of State:

"Telegraphic connection with Ladysmith was interrupted yesterday,
and White's force is isolated. He is well supplied with everything,
except ammunition for his naval 12-pounders, which are the only guns
that can compete with hostile artillery. I regard the situation as one of
extreme gravity. Colenso bridge and Maritzburg are held by one
battalion each; we are protecting Durban from the fleet. I shall despatch
the first reinforcements I receive to Durban, but I cannot conceal from
myself that if the enemy previously occupy, even with a small force, the
country south of Mooi River, the relief of White by troops just landed
will be an almost impossible operation, unless he can hold out six
weeks at least from now."

4/99. Sir By the following day, 4th November, General Buller had been
ers able to work out his plans more in detail. It had become more and
es to go
tal. more apparent that Natal, where now the bulk of the enemy's
strength lay, was for the moment the scene of most difficulty and
danger, and that the relief of Ladysmith was all-important. For these reasons
Sir Redvers decided to proceed himself to Natal for a time to supervise
personally that critical operation. He telegraphed, therefore, to the Secretary
of State:

"My intentions are as follows: I propose to send Clery and
Headquarters 2nd division to Natal to command. With him will go the
first three brigade Headquarters except Guards that arrive. These three

brigades will be composed of the first line battalions that arrive.
Headquarters 1st division will land at Cape Town, and Lord Methuen
will command advance on Kimberley with Guards' brigade and one
other. Headquarters 3rd division will land at Cape Town or East
London, as circumstances require, and will be completed with a new
brigade, under Fetherstonhaugh, formed of three extra regiments and
one from line of communications, or else colonial regiment.

"I propose to take charge of advance on Ladysmith. If under
Providence we are successful there and at Kimberley, I think collapse of
opposition possible. These proposals are subject to High
Commissioner's views of state of Cape Colony, and to what may happen
meantime anywhere else.

"Preparation of extra division seems desirable, but I do not yet see
need for its despatch from England. I shall speak with more confidence
when I see French, who is, I hope, en route here from Ladysmith."
hopeful
. On the 5th November Sir Redvers telegraphed further to the War
Office that 40 days' supplies for the force under orders for Natal
should be shipped direct from England to Durban. The more hopeful view
the General Commanding-in-Chief was already taking may be judged from
the fact that on the following day, the 6th of November, he requested the
War Office to read "January" instead of "March" in the last sentence of his
above quoted cypher of November 2nd. Five days later, in reply to a
telegram from Lord Lansdowne, stating that another infantry division was
being mobilised, and asking by what date it would be required, General
Buller reported:

"The defence of Ladysmith seems to have so thoroughly checked
advance of enemy, that I have some grounds for hoping the successful
relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith may end opposition. On the other
hand, reliable Dutch here predict guerilla warfare as a certainty. I think,
therefore, that I ought to have another division as soon as possible. My
great want at present is mounted men. I am raising as many as I can,
and should like, as soon as possible, a few good special service
officers."

To this despatch the War Office answered on 14th November that a fifth
infantry division would be sent out at an early date, under command of Sir
C. Warren.

riginal In arriving at the decisions recorded in the above official
me of telegrams, Sir Redvers Buller had not abandoned the intention of
h through
State to carrying out ultimately the original plan of campaign. On the
ried out contrary, with a view to its resumption, after the relief of
elief of Ladysmith had been effected, he determined to instruct the General
mith.
Officer Commanding the 1st division, Lieut.-General Lord
Methuen, as soon as he had thrust aside the Boer commandos between the
Orange river and Kimberley, to throw into that town supplies and a
reinforcement of one and a half battalions of infantry and some naval long-
range guns, and then move back to the Orange river, withdrawing with him
the women and children and natives. Meantime, while the cavalry division,
as its units arrived from England, was being prepared for the front at a camp
near Cape Town, its commander, Lieut.-General French, who had been
recalled from Ladysmith, was to form a flying column at Naauwpoort, with
instructions to risk no engagement, but to manœuvre and worry the enemy,
and thus check any invasion of the central districts of the Cape. On the
eastern side of that colony, the Commander-in-Chief decided to assemble at
Queenstown a force, under Lieut.-General Sir W. Gatacre, the commander
of the 3rd infantry division, whose duty it would be to operate northwards,
and endeavour to stop recruiting by the enemy and protect the loyal. On
Lord Methuen's return to Orange River, it was Sir Redvers' intention that he
should march eastwards in conjunction with French, occupy the bridges of
Colesberg, Norval's Pont and Bethulie, and thus prepare for the advance on
Bloemfontein, which would be undertaken as soon as the relief of
Ladysmith set him (Sir Redvers) free from Natal.

lution of The decision to despatch to Natal the bulk of the earliest
reinforcements arriving from home has been often referred to as
isation.
"the break-up of the army corps." In a sense it was much more than
that. From the point of view of organisation, the transfer of one or more
intact divisions of the original army corps to Natal would have been
immaterial, since they would have remained still under the supreme control
of the General himself. But the urgency of the situation compelled the

British Commander not only to detach portions of the army corps, but to
improvise hastily, from the general officers and regimental units as they
arrived in transports at Cape Town, special forces with hardly any regard to
the composition of the divisions as originally fixed by the War Office. Thus
to the commander of the 2nd division, Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, who
was selected by Sir Redvers Buller to make preparation for the relief of
Ladysmith, and to act as his second in command in that enterprise, two
cavalry regiments, four brigades of infantry,[139] two brigade divisions of
field artillery, a company of Royal engineers, and a pontoon troop were
assigned. But of these units, only the 4th brigade, commanded by Major-
General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, and Lt.-Colonel L. W. Parsons' brigade
division, R.F.A. (63rd, 64th, and 73rd batteries), belonged to Clery's
division. The 2nd infantry brigade, under Major-General H. J. T. Hildyard,
and Lt.-Colonel H. V. Hunt's brigade division (7th, 14th, and 66th batteries),
being the first units of infantry and artillery to arrive from England, were
removed from Methuen's division, and sent on at once to Natal. To these
were subsequently added both the infantry brigades of the 3rd division (the
5th, under command of Major-General A. FitzRoy Hart, and the 6th, under
Major-General G. Barton), the 13th Hussars, originally designated as corps
troops, the Royal Dragoons, drawn from the 2nd cavalry brigade, and the
pontoon troop of the army corps.

us new The 3rd, or Highland brigade, under Major-General A. G.
butions. Wauchope, was at first assigned by the Commander-in-Chief to
Lord Methuen, to replace the 2nd brigade, transferred to Natal; but, as it
was found later that Wauchope's battalions would at the outset be needed to
guard the railway line in rear of Methuen's column, a 9th brigade, under
Major-General R.S.R. Fetherstonhaugh, was formed out of the infantry
units already at Orange River station, viz.: the half-battalion 1st Loyal
North Lancashire, 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1st
Northumberland Fusiliers, and 2nd Northamptonshire. Lt.-Colonel F. H.
Hall's brigade division (18th, 62nd, and 75th batteries[140]) and the 9th
Lancers were also allotted to the 1st division.

h's For Naauwpoort, General French, in addition to the original
mand. garrison of that place, was at first given the assistance of the 12th
Lancers, a battery of R.H.A., and a half-battalion of the Black Watch,

besides two companies of M.I. To these other units were to be gradually
added, as soon as they became available.

re's. Sir W. Gatacre was instructed to develop a force on the eastern
railway line from the original Stormberg garrison,[141] the 1st
Royal Scots (originally allotted as corps troops), the 2nd Northumberland
Fusiliers (a lines of communication battalion), the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles
(detached from the 5th brigade[142]), and the brigade division (74th, 77th
and 79th batteries), of the 3rd division, supplemented by such colonial
corps as he could gather together locally.

The dates of the arrival of the various expeditionary units at Cape Town
and their disposal are shown in Appendix No. 7.

erious The dislocation of the infantry divisions, which was caused by
of the the necessity for these sweeping changes, would have been even
ing of
because more seriously detrimental had those divisions actually existed
inary prior to the embarkation of the troops from England; but, as has
h habit. been shown in an earlier chapter, one of the weak points of the
British army in 1899 was the imperfect development in peace time of the
higher organisation of the troops. Except, therefore, in Major-General
Hildyard's brigade, which came direct from Aldershot,[143] and had been
trained there by its brigadier under the immediate eye of Sir R. Buller, that
confidence, which is established between troops and their superior leaders
by intimate mutual knowledge, did not exist, and could not be affected by
that reorganisation, which the strategical situation necessitated.

rious Nevertheless, as regards staff arrangements, serious
h. Sir inconvenience was for the moment inevitable. Sir F. Forestier-
ers goes
tal Walker, although appointed officially to the post of General Officer
ut a staff.Commanding the lines of communication, had, through some
oversight in London, not been given the full staff, as prescribed by
the regulations, for an officer performing those onerous duties, and had
been forced to improvise assistants from such special service officers as he
could lay hands on. There was from the outset, therefore, a shortage of staff.
Officers were, moreover, urgently required for the development of local
troops and for censorship duties. The original Headquarter staff had been
calculated on the hypothesis that the whole of the expeditionary corps

would operate in the western theatre of war, Sir George White being
responsible for the Natal command. The rearrangement carried out by Sir R.
Buller created in Natal a second field army. For this no Headquarter staff
was available, without robbing the Cape of needed men. He therefore kept
with him only his personal staff during his temporary absence in Natal, and
issued orders there through the divisional staff of General Clery. He decided
to leave the rest of the Headquarter staff at Cape Town to supervise the
disembarkation of the reinforcements from England and their formation into
a field army.

from the The reports of the fighting during the opening phases of the war
had shown that our difficulties were mainly due to three causes—
the superior numbers of the enemy, their greater mobility, and the longer
range of their guns. In the operations he was now about to undertake, Sir
Redvers hoped partially to make good these deficiencies by borrowing
ships' guns from the Navy and by locally raising mounted men. The Naval
Commander-in-Chief had already lent one contingent, under Commander A.
P. Ethelston, R.N., to garrison Stormberg. Another such contingent, under
Captain the Hon. H. Lambton, R.N., was in Ladysmith, and, at the request
of Sir R. Buller, Captain Percy Scott, R.N., in H.M.S. Terrible, had been
despatched to Durban to arrange the land defences of that port. Rear-
Admiral Harris, with the approval of the Admiralty, now consented to the
Stormberg party being brought back to Cape Town, with a view to its
marching under the command of Capt. R. C. Prothero, R.N., with Lord
Methuen's column, to Kimberley and there remaining as a reinforcement of
the garrison. The Naval Commander-in-Chief further agreed to organise yet
a third detachment to assist in the relief of Ladysmith. The cheerfulness
with which the Naval authorities rendered assistance to the army in this
time of stress and strain was only in conformity with the traditions of both
services; yet the readiness shown by the officers and men of the Royal
Navy and Marines in adapting themselves and their weapons to the
circumstances of a land campaign won the profound admiration even of
those who were best acquainted with the practical nature of the normal
training of the personnel of the fleet.

ng The calling out of colonial mounted corps, both in Cape Colony
ial corps, and Natal, is mentioned in Chapter I. and Chapter II. Mounted men
atal.

were urgently needed by all the columns in process of preparation, but,
adhering to his opinion that success in the relief of Ladysmith was the most
crucial matter, Sir Redvers decided to despatch to Natal the first unit
enlisted at Cape Town—the South African Light Horse. The first party of
"Light Horse" embarked at Cape Town for Natal on the 22nd November. In
Natal itself two mounted corps, under the command of Major (local Lieut.-
Colonel) A. W. Thorneycroft, Royal Scots Fusiliers, and Major (local
Lieut.-Colonel) E. C. Bethune, 16th Lancers, were already being formed.

nt in Mr. Schreiner, the Prime Minister of Cape Colony, had, at the
n suggestion of General Buller, endeavoured to raise in the districts
cts.
of Middleburg, Cradock, and Somerset East, a burgher force to
maintain internal order and repel invasion, but the local civil authorities
were unanimous in advising that an application of the Cape Burgher law
would furnish some recruits for the enemy. Captain Brabant (now Major-
General Sir E. Brabant), an ex-Imperial officer, was, with the concurrence
of the Cape Government, instructed to raise a mounted corps from the
loyalists in the eastern districts.

now It will readily be conceived from the brief summary of the facts
which have been above recorded that the tasks which the
Commander-in-Chief, assisted by the Headquarter and lines of
communication staffs, had to carry out during the first three weeks of
November were of an overwhelming nature. These included the
reorganisation of the various bodies of troops which, from the 9th
November onwards, arrived daily in Table Bay from England; the
disembarkation of the units; their equipment for the field and despatch to
the front; the issue of operation orders to the troops in Natal and Cape
Colony already in touch with the enemy; the establishment of supply depôts
for the field forces, the defence of Maritzburg and Durban from the Boer
raid, which threatened those very important towns; the protection of the
lines of railway through Cape Colony, with the mere handful of troops at
first available; and the checking of the invasion of the Free Staters across
the Orange river. To these must be added the anxious watching of the signs
in disaffected districts of smouldering rebellion, which a single success of
the enemy might fan into a burst of flame; these and other cares formed an
accumulation of pressing duties and heavy responsibilities, which fully

justify the frank statement of Sir R. Buller to Lt.-Gen. Forestier-Walker on
20th November that "Ever since I have been here we have been like the
man who, with a long day's work before him, overslept himself and so was
late for everything all day."[144] The position of affairs in South Africa
throughout these anxious weeks, in fact, forcibly proved the truth of Lord
Wolseley's warning, addressed on 3rd September, 1899, to the Secretary of
State that: "We have committed one of the greatest blunders in war, namely,
we have given the enemy the initiative. He is in a position to take the
offensive, and by striking the first blow to ensure the great advantage of
winning the first round."

ved Yet by the 22nd November the labours of the Headquarter staff
ects. of the army in South Africa, assisted by the fullest co-operation of
the two Governors, Sir Alfred Milner and Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, and
aided by the strenuous exertions of the lines of communication staff in Cape
Colony and Natal, had sensibly improved the general situation in both the
western and eastern theatres of war. In Cape Colony, no part of
Bechuanaland and Griqualand West, it is true, except the areas defended by
the garrisons of Mafeking, Kuruman and Kimberley, remained under British
authority. But cheery reports from Colonel Baden-Powell gave promise of a
prolonged stand at the little northern town, while Lord Methuen's column
had on the previous day (the 21st November) crossed the Orange river and
made good the first eleven miles of its march on Kimberley. Southward,
Major-General Wauchope's brigade was holding the section of the railway
line from Orange River station, viâ De Aar, to Naauwpoort, the latter station
having been re-occupied, and the formation of a column, to harass and
menace the enemy in the direction of Colesberg, had commenced under the
direction of Lieut.-General French. On the eastern side of the Colony only
had the Boers made any substantial advance; a strong Free State commando
had seized Burghersdorp and detached parties to Aliwal North and Lady
Grey. Sir W. Gatacre, on the other hand, had assumed command of colonial
corps and one and a half battalions of regular troops at Queenstown, and
was preparing to move northward, to check the commandeering of British
subjects, which Commandant Olivier had instituted in the territory occupied
by his burghers. The Basuto chiefs remained true to their allegiance to the
"Great White Queen," and by tacit consent their territory was treated by
both sides as neutral. In Griqualand East and the native territories east of

Cape Colony, the Pondo, Tembu and Fingo tribes continued loyal, and
arrangements for the defence of these great masses of native population
against Boer raids were being made by Major Sir H. Elliott, who as
Commandant-General, under the sanction of the Governor, was defending
the passes leading from Barkly East with the Cape Mounted Rifles and
some Volunteers.

Sir G. In Natal Sir George White was holding his own at Ladysmith,
detains and, as he had anticipated, detaining north of the Tugela the main
of Boers.
thus strength of the enemy's army. After some hesitation on the part of
d. the Boer leaders, a raid in force had been made to the south, and
had for the moment caused much alarm. But the delay in the
movement had greatly diminished its chances of reaching Maritzburg,
although the local condition was still one of some anxiety. Reinforcements
as they arrived at Durban had been pushed rapidly up by rail north of
Maritzburg, and the British troops were now echeloned along the railway up
to Estcourt. The vanguard of the enemy's raiding column had reached Mooi
River, and his scouts had even penetrated as far as Nottingham Road, but a
day's ride from Maritzburg. The Boers were, therefore, well in rear of the
British advanced posts, and Lieut.-General Clery felt some doubt whether a
temporary retirement from Estcourt might not prove necessary. The chief
difficulty was the lack of mounted troops to bring the enemy to action and
put a stop to his pillaging the outlying farms of the Natal colonists.

edvers, Such were throughout South Africa the facts known to him when
Nov./99, Sir Redvers Buller, having issued instructions for the guidance of
for
the senior officer in Cape Colony, Sir F. Forestier-Walker, and for
the three commanders in the field, Lieut.-Generals Lord Methuen,
French, and Sir W. Gatacre, embarked at 7 p.m., the 22nd November, in the
S.S. Mohawk for Natal. His military secretary, Col. the Hon. F. Stopford,
and aides-de-camp accompanied him. The rest of the Headquarter staff
remained at Cape Town.

ews at The appreciation of the situation written by the General
me. commanding-in-chief forty-eight hours earlier will place the reader
in possession of his views on the eve of his embarkation for Durban. The
memorandum ran as follows:—

Cape Town,
November 20th, 1899.

General Walker,

Before starting for Natal I think I should leave you my appreciation
of the situation.

1. Ever since I have been here we have been like the man, who, with
a long day's work before him, overslept himself and so was late for
everything all day.

2. In disposing the troops which arrived from England I have
considered that it was of the first importance to keep Cape Colony from
rebellion, even if by so doing I temporarily lost Maritzburg.

3. I consequently have formed a strong column under Lord Methuen
which is in a position to take the field and I am forming a force of
mounted men and horse artillery under General French, which will, I
hope, be able to meet any commandos which may invade the Colony. I
have also done all I can to safeguard the western and eastern lines of
railway.

4. The state of Kimberley necessitated the first employment of Lord
Methuen's force in that direction. He starts to-day. General French is at
Naauwpoort, organising a column to attack Colesberg at the earliest
possible date.

5. My hope is that the Boers at Colesberg will have been defeated
before Lord Methuen returns from Kimberley.

On his return he should send a force to attack the Boers at
Burghersdorp. There should then be 1,000,000 rations at Orange River
and 1,000,000 at De Aar, and I have directed that supply should be
accumulated at Port Elizabeth and East London. He can then open new
lines of supply as he moves eastward.

6. As soon as they can be occupied General Gatacre's force should be
advanced to Molteno or Stormberg, and any force at Burghersdorp
should be attacked.

If the Burghersdorp force has meanwhile advanced south it would be
attacked by Lord Methuen, aided by part of General French's force, the
two being based on Naauwpoort or Middleburg.

7. The exact nature of this operation must depend on the actual
circumstances at the time. The main point is, there will be rations at De
Aar and near it to enable a force under Lord Methuen to move along the
line eastward, repairing it as he goes, and strong enough to clear the
northern districts.

8. As soon as ever circumstances admit the bridges at Norval's Pont
and Bethulie will, of course, be seized; in short, the plan is, clear the
northern districts by working from west to east, seize the bridges, and,
as occasion admits, bring the shorter lines of supply into use. Then
concentrate for an advance on Bloemfontein.

9. I think there are enough troops in the Colony to work this
programme, except that:

(1) There should be a battalion at Port Elizabeth.
(2) General Gatacre wants another battalion and a battery of
field artillery.
(3) General French should have the second battery Royal
Horse artillery, and eventually three cavalry regiments,
and, if possible, one more battalion.

10. With regard to Natal, I propose to send the 6th Dragoon Guards
and 10th Hussars, the 63rd, 64th, and 73rd batteries Royal Field
artillery, the remainder of General Hart's Brigade, i.e., three battalions,
as soon as they come in. We must do with them the best we can.

11. I think the Colonial contingents had better go to Natal.

12. In my opinion, so long as General White holds Ladysmith the
force able to attack you from the Orange Free State is not likely to be
serious, but if Natal goes you will have to concentrate for defence, and
you should make up your mind what positions to hold. Probably the
best military positions about Queenstown, Middleburg, and Beaufort
West will be found most convenient.

Redvers Buller,
General.

CHAPTER XII.

ADVANCE FROM THE ORANGE RIVER.
uen's
ctions.
10/99.
On the 10th of November Lord Methuen, with his staff, left
Cape Town for Orange River station, where he arrived two days later. The
orders which he had received from Sir Redvers Buller ran as follows:—

November 10th, 1899.

1. You will take command of the troops at De Aar and Orange River
stations,[145] with the object of marching on Kimberley as rapidly as
possible.

2. In addition to the troops now at De Aar, the infantry of which are
being formed into the 9th brigade under Colonel Fetherstonhaugh, you
will have under your command:—

i. The 1st Infantry Brigade.—Major-Gen. Colvile.
ii. The Highland Brigade.—Major-Gen. Wauchope.
iii. The 9th Lancers.
iv. The Brigade Division, Royal Field Artillery, under
Colonel Hall.
v. The Divisional Troops except Cavalry of the Division.
vi. Certain Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps and
Medical Details which have been collected at the two
stations.

I wish you to march from the Orange river to the Modder river,
communicate with Kimberley, and to hold the line De Aar, Modder

river, so that we shall be able to bring up stores and heavy guns and
pass them into Kimberley.

3. The half-battalion Loyal North Lancashire regiment, which will
form part of the 9th brigade, is to be left in Kimberley.

4. You will afford help to Kimberley to remove such of the natives as
they wish to get rid of, and, generally, you will give such advice and
assistance in perfecting the defences as you may be able to afford.

5. You will make the people of Kimberley understand that you have
not come to remain charged with its defence, but to afford it better
means of maintaining its defence, which will at the same time be
assisted by an advance on Bloemfontein.

Redvers Buller, General.

Four days later, the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa addressed the
following letter to General Methuen:—

Cape Town,
November 14th, 1899.

Lord Methuen,—

nal I do not want to tie your hands in any way, but I send this letter
e from for such use as you choose to make of it.
dvers,
14th.
1. I think that you will find that the Guards and the 9th Brigade
and two batteries Royal Field Artillery will be as large a portion of your
force as you can take with advantage.

2. As to mounted men, you will of course take what you require. I
think it will be advisable to leave one-half of Rimington's Guides, the
party at Hanover Road, and sufficient others to scout 20 to 25 miles on
all sides of the line held by General Wauchope.

3. On your departure General Wauchope will have, including the two
half-battalions of Berkshire and Munster, four battalions; and if you

leave him one battery, six guns Royal Field Artillery, with them he
should be able to hold the line to Belmont with perfect safety. Orange
River bridge must of course be held at all costs. I hope you will not
remain a day longer at Kimberley than you can help.

5. I have already told you that I am sending with you a Naval brigade
with four 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns; these guns range 6,000 yards. You will
not start without them, will leave them at Kimberley, and such
reinforcements not exceeding one-and-a-half battalions as the
commandant may require.

6. I have said in my instructions that you will proceed to Modder
river. If you can from there get a clear road to Kimberley, so much the
better, but you will act according to circumstances. The main object is
to save time.[146]

* * * * *

R. Buller.
mation
red Before Lord Methuen's arrival at Orange River station, the
e the
h, up to
mounted troops had been engaged in reconnoitring and sketching
21st. the country in the neighbourhood of the railway bridge. On the 6th
of November a party of the 9th Lancers and mounted infantry,
accompanied by guns, had scouted up the railway to within five miles of
Belmont. On the 9th another reconnaissance was made up the line, past
Belmont, to Honey Nest Kloof, 37 miles from Orange River station. No
Boers were seen about Belmont, though they had left traces of their
presence in broken culverts and other damage to the railway. After falling
back for the night to Witteputs, the patrol marched north-eastward on the
morning of the 10th, and encountered several hundred Boers, with field
guns, a few miles to the east of Belmont. A skirmish ensued in which Lt.-
Col. C. E. Keith-Falconer was killed, Lt. C. C. Wood mortally wounded,
and Lts. F. Bevan and H. C. Hall and four men wounded. To the westward
of the railway line a detachment of thirty of Rimington's Guides
successfully reconnoitred as far as Prieska. Though the information brought
back by these reconnaissances was mainly negative, on the 18th November
Major R. N. R. Reade, Lord Methuen's Intelligence officer, was able from

various sources of information to report that a force, estimated at from 700
to 1,200 men, with four guns, was at or near Belmont; and that a small
commando under Jourdaan had been successfully recruiting from the
disloyal farmers in the districts of Barkly West, Campbell, Douglas, and
Griquatown, which lay to the west and north-west of the line of advance to
Kimberley.

itution of Thanks to the strenuous efforts of the staff and the departmental
vision. corps, the reconstituted first division[147] was by the 20th of
November ready to take the field. Equipped with mule transport, and
marching with a minimum of baggage, Lord Methuen's column consisted of
about 7,726 infantry, 850 cavalry and mounted infantry, two batteries of
Royal Field artillery, four companies of Royal engineers and a Naval
brigade.

It was thus composed:—

Naval brigade—Captain R. C. Prothero, R.N.:—

Four naval 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns, with 363 officers and men
of the Royal Navy, sailors, Royal Marine artillery and Royal
Marine Light Infantry.[148]

Mounted troops:—

9th Lancers.

One company mounted infantry Northumberland
Fusiliers.

One company mounted infantry Loyal North Lancashire.

Half company mounted infantry King's Own Yorkshire
Light Infantry.

New South Wales Lancers (30 of all ranks).

Rimington's Guides.

Royal Field Artillery:—

Brigade division R.F.A.—Lt.-Colonel F. H. Hall.

18th and 75th Field batteries (15-pr. guns).[149]

Royal Engineers—Lt.-Colonel J. B. Sharpe:—

7th Field company.

8th Railway company.

11th Field company.

30th Fortress company.

Telegraph section.

1st (Guards) brigade—Major-General Sir H. E. Colvile:—

3rd battalion Grenadier Guards.

1st battalion Coldstream Guards.[150]

2nd battalion Coldstream Guards.

1st battalion Scots Guards.

9th Infantry brigade—Maj.-Gen. R. S. R. Fetherstonhaugh:—[151]

1st battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.

Half-battalion 1st Loyal North Lancashire.[152]

2nd battalion Northamptonshire.

2nd battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

The medical services for the 9th infantry brigade were furnished by the
divisional Field Hospital of the 1st division, and the 3rd brigade Field

Hospital formed the new divisional Field Hospital. Subsequently, when the
3rd (Highland) brigade joined Lord Methuen's force at Modder river, its
Field Hospital was provided by the 2nd division Field Hospital and the
Bearer company by "A." company Cape Medical Staff Corps, under Lieut.-
Col. Hartley, V.C.

orting Behind the 1st division, the Highland brigade, under Maj.-Gen.
. A. G. Wauchope, guarded the railway up to the Orange river, and
hope.
h. overawed the disaffected element among the inhabitants along the
line of communication. In the neighbourhood of Colesberg, Lieut.-
General French, with a mixed force of all arms, was engaged in stemming
the tide of invasion from the Free State, and by incessantly occupying the
attention of the commandos opposed to him, prevented their massing
against Lord Methuen's right flank as he advanced towards Kimberley.

h fully The Boers were not taken by surprise by Lord Methuen's
n by preparations for an advance. Their spies and sympathisers kept
. They
re to them fully informed of all the steps taken. In anticipation of a dash
it. upon Kimberley they had carefully prepared defensive positions
along the railway at Belmont and at Rooilaagte, or, as we term it,
Graspan. To some 2,500 burghers, under Commandant Jacobus Prinsloo,
was entrusted the duty of thrusting the British back towards the Orange;
and, if the task should prove beyond their strength, De la Rey, who, with his
commando was then investing the southern defences of Kimberley, could
easily reinforce them. A large supply of stores had been collected at
Jacobsdal, while subsidiary depôts had been formed at Graspan and in the
neighbourhood of Koffyfontein.

, Nov. At 4 a.m., on the 21st of November, the 1st division marched
march from their bivouac on the northern bank of the Orange river. The
s.
General followed the course of the railway in order to facilitate the
carriage of supplies, not only for his own column, but also for the
inhabitants of the town into which he was to throw stores and
reinforcements. The troops halted about 8 a.m. at Fincham's farm, near
Witteputs, twelve miles north of the Orange River bridge. The 9th Lancers
and mounted infantry were at once thrown forward with orders to
reconnoitre northwards on a front of about twelve miles. They found the

enemy in some strength among the hills which lie to the east of Belmont
station, and drew fire, fortunately with very slight loss. Lieut.-Colonel
Willoughby Verner, D.A.A.G., for topography to the army corps, sketched
the Boer position from the low hills east of Thomas' farm, about a mile and
a half south-east of Belmont station.[153] These sketches were subsequently
reproduced and distributed among the officers of the column before the
action of the 23rd. Later in the day Lord Methuen himself studied the
ground from the hills near Thomas' farm, and then returned to Witteputs,
followed by the mounted troops, many of whom had covered forty miles
during the day.

oach to In the grey of the morning of the 22nd of November, the
ont. mounted infantry swooped from Witteputs upon Thomas' farm,
occupied it, and threw out a chain of posts facing the station of Belmont and
the hills to the east. Lord Methuen, with his staff, the brigadiers
commanding the infantry brigades, Lt.-Col. Hall, C.R.A., and Lt.-Col.
Sharpe, C.R.E., arrived shortly afterwards, and again reconnoitred the Boer
position from the high ground above Thomas' farm. When the General had
completed his reconnaissance, he dictated the orders for the attack which he
proposed to deliver on the morrow. Then, leaving the mounted infantry to
hold the ground they occupied, and to protect the companies of Royal
engineers who were on their way from Witteputs to repair the railway, Lord
Methuen returned with his staff to the column, to prepare for a further
advance that afternoon. During the morning there was intermittent firing
between the mounted infantry outposts and parties of the enemy, who
occasionally showed themselves for a short time, and then disappeared
without affording any clue as to the strength of the force concealed among
the kopjes. In the afternoon the Boers brought two guns into action, chiefly
directed against the 7th Field company R.E., then employed in improving
the supply of water at the site selected for that night's bivouac near Thomas'
farm. To silence this artillery fire the 18th and 75th batteries were hurriedly
despatched from Witteputs, and in order to save the troops at Belmont as
quickly as possible from this annoyance, the Officer Commanding trotted
nearly the whole distance. The horses, still weak from the effects of the
long sea voyage, suffered severely from the strain. Five indeed actually died
of exhaustion, and all were so weary that during the engagement of the
23rd, the artillery was unable to move with any degree of rapidity.