Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
The Project Gutenberg eBook of William Pitt and the Great War
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of
the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it
away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
Title: William Pitt and the Great War
Author: J. Holland Rose
Release date: April 3, 2008 [eBook #24980]
Most recently updated: January 3, 2021
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24980
Credits: Produced by Paul Murray, Wolfgang Menges and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WILLIAM PITT AND THE
GREAT WAR ***
Transcriber's Notes:
The corrections listed in the "ERRATA" paragraph have been
made.
Further changes in the text are marked with a dashed blue
line; the original text is displayed when the mouse cursor
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of
the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it
away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
Title: William Pitt and the Great War
Author: J. Holland Rose
Release date: April 3, 2008 [eBook #24980]
Most recently updated: January 3, 2021
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/24980
Credits: Produced by Paul Murray, Wolfgang Menges and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WILLIAM PITT AND THE
GREAT WAR ***
Transcriber's Notes:
The corrections listed in the "ERRATA" paragraph have been
made.
Further changes in the text are marked with a dashed blue
line; the original text is displayed when the mouse cursor
Page 4
hovers over it.
Greek words are marked with a dashed gray line; a
transcription is displayed.
William Pitt, in later life. (From a
painting by Hoppner in the National
Portrait Gallery)
WILLIAM PITT
AND
Greek words are marked with a dashed gray line; a
transcription is displayed.
William Pitt, in later life. (From a
painting by Hoppner in the National
Portrait Gallery)
WILLIAM PITT
AND
Page 5
THE GREAT WAR
BY
J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.
England and France have held in their hands the fate
of the world, especially that of European civilization.
How much harm we have done one another: how
much good we might have done!—Napoleon to
Colonel Wilks, 20th April 1816.
LONDON
G. BELL AND SONS, LTD.
1911
CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
BY
J. HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D.
England and France have held in their hands the fate
of the world, especially that of European civilization.
How much harm we have done one another: how
much good we might have done!—Napoleon to
Colonel Wilks, 20th April 1816.
LONDON
G. BELL AND SONS, LTD.
1911
CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
Page 6
PREFACE
In the former volume, entitled "William Pitt and National Revival," I sought to trace the
career of Pitt the Younger up to the year 1791. Until then he was occupied almost entirely
with attempts to repair the evils arising out of the old order of things. Retrenchment and
Reform were his first watchwords; and though in the year 1785 he failed in his efforts to
renovate the life of Parliament and to improve the fiscal relations with Ireland, yet his
domestic policy in the main achieved a surprising success. Scarcely less eminent, though
far less known, were his services in the sphere of diplomacy. In the year 1783, when he
became First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, nearly half of the
British Empire was torn away, and the remainder seemed to be at the mercy of the allied
Houses of Bourbon. France, enjoying the alliance of Spain and Austria and the diplomatic
wooings of Catharine II and Frederick the Great, gave the law to Europe.
By the year 1790 all had changed. In 1787 Pitt supported Frederick William II of Prussia
in overthrowing French supremacy in the Dutch Netherlands; and a year later he framed
with those two States an alliance which not only dictated terms to Austria at the Congress
of Reichenbach but also compelled her to forego her far-reaching schemes on the lower
Danube, and to restore the status quo in Central Europe and in her Belgian provinces.
British policy triumphed over that of Spain in the Nootka Sound dispute of the year 1790,
thereby securing for the Empire the coast of what is now British Columbia; it also saved
Sweden from a position of acute danger; and Pitt cherished the hope of forming a league
of the smaller States, including the Dutch Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and, if
possible, Turkey, which, with support from Great Britain and Prussia, would withstand the
almost revolutionary schemes of the Russian and Austrian Courts.
These larger aims were unattainable. The duplicity of the Court of Berlin, the triumphs of
the Russian arms on the Danube, and changes in the general diplomatic situation, enabled
Catharine II to foil the efforts of Pitt in 1791. She worked her will on the Turks and not
long after on the Poles; Sweden came to an understanding with her; and Prussia, slighting
the British alliance, drew near to the new Hapsburg Sovereign, Leopold II. In fact, the
events of the French Revolution in the year 1791 served to focus attention more and more
upon Paris; and monarchs who had thought of little but the conquest or partition of
weaker States now talked of a crusade to restore order at Paris, with Gustavus III of
Sweden as the new Cœur de Lion. This occidentation of diplomacy became pronounced at
the time of the attempted escape of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette to the eastern frontier
at Midsummer 1791. Their capture at Varennes and their ignominious return to Paris are
In the former volume, entitled "William Pitt and National Revival," I sought to trace the
career of Pitt the Younger up to the year 1791. Until then he was occupied almost entirely
with attempts to repair the evils arising out of the old order of things. Retrenchment and
Reform were his first watchwords; and though in the year 1785 he failed in his efforts to
renovate the life of Parliament and to improve the fiscal relations with Ireland, yet his
domestic policy in the main achieved a surprising success. Scarcely less eminent, though
far less known, were his services in the sphere of diplomacy. In the year 1783, when he
became First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, nearly half of the
British Empire was torn away, and the remainder seemed to be at the mercy of the allied
Houses of Bourbon. France, enjoying the alliance of Spain and Austria and the diplomatic
wooings of Catharine II and Frederick the Great, gave the law to Europe.
By the year 1790 all had changed. In 1787 Pitt supported Frederick William II of Prussia
in overthrowing French supremacy in the Dutch Netherlands; and a year later he framed
with those two States an alliance which not only dictated terms to Austria at the Congress
of Reichenbach but also compelled her to forego her far-reaching schemes on the lower
Danube, and to restore the status quo in Central Europe and in her Belgian provinces.
British policy triumphed over that of Spain in the Nootka Sound dispute of the year 1790,
thereby securing for the Empire the coast of what is now British Columbia; it also saved
Sweden from a position of acute danger; and Pitt cherished the hope of forming a league
of the smaller States, including the Dutch Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, and, if
possible, Turkey, which, with support from Great Britain and Prussia, would withstand the
almost revolutionary schemes of the Russian and Austrian Courts.
These larger aims were unattainable. The duplicity of the Court of Berlin, the triumphs of
the Russian arms on the Danube, and changes in the general diplomatic situation, enabled
Catharine II to foil the efforts of Pitt in 1791. She worked her will on the Turks and not
long after on the Poles; Sweden came to an understanding with her; and Prussia, slighting
the British alliance, drew near to the new Hapsburg Sovereign, Leopold II. In fact, the
events of the French Revolution in the year 1791 served to focus attention more and more
upon Paris; and monarchs who had thought of little but the conquest or partition of
weaker States now talked of a crusade to restore order at Paris, with Gustavus III of
Sweden as the new Cœur de Lion. This occidentation of diplomacy became pronounced at
the time of the attempted escape of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette to the eastern frontier
at Midsummer 1791. Their capture at Varennes and their ignominious return to Paris are
Page 7
in several respects the central event of the French Revolution. The incident aroused both
democrats and royalists to a fury which foredoomed to failure all attempts at compromise
between the old order and the new. The fierceness of the strife in France incited
monarchists in all lands to importunate demands for the extirpation of "the French
plague"; and hence were set in motion forces which Pitt vainly strove to curb. War soon
broke out in Central Europe. His endeavours to localize it were fruitless; and thenceforth
his chief task was to bring to an honourable close a conflict which he had not sought. It is
therefore fitting that this study of the latter, less felicitous, but equally glorious part of his
career should begin with a survey of the situation in Great Britain and on the Continent at
the time of the incident at Varennes which opened a new chapter in the history of Europe.
In the present volume I have sought to narrate faithfully and as fully as is possible the
story of the dispute with France, the chief episodes of the war, and the varied influences
which it exerted upon political developments in these islands, including the early Radical
movement, the Irish Rebellion of 1798, and other events which brought about the Union
of the British and Irish Parliaments, the break up of the great national party at
Westminster in 1801, and the collapse of the strength of Pitt early in the course of the
struggle with the concentrated might of Napoleon.
That mighty drama dwarfs the actors. Even the French Emperor could not sustain the rôle
which he aspired to play, and, failing to discern the signs of the times, was whirled aside
by the forces which he claimed to control. Is it surprising that Pitt, more slightly endowed
by nature, and beset by the many limitations which hampered the advisers of George III,
should have sunk beneath burdens such as no other English statesman has been called
upon to bear? The success or failure of such a career is, however, to be measured by the
final success or failure of his policy; and in this respect, as I have shown, the victor in the
Great War was not Napoleon but Pitt.
To that high enterprise he consecrated all the powers of his being. His public life is
everything; his private life, unfortunately, counts for little. The materials for
reconstructing it are meagre. I have been able here and there to throw new light on his
friendships, difficulties, trials, and, in particular, on the love episode of the year 1797. But
in the main the story of the life of Pitt must soar high above the club and the salon to
... the toppling heights of Duty scaled.
democrats and royalists to a fury which foredoomed to failure all attempts at compromise
between the old order and the new. The fierceness of the strife in France incited
monarchists in all lands to importunate demands for the extirpation of "the French
plague"; and hence were set in motion forces which Pitt vainly strove to curb. War soon
broke out in Central Europe. His endeavours to localize it were fruitless; and thenceforth
his chief task was to bring to an honourable close a conflict which he had not sought. It is
therefore fitting that this study of the latter, less felicitous, but equally glorious part of his
career should begin with a survey of the situation in Great Britain and on the Continent at
the time of the incident at Varennes which opened a new chapter in the history of Europe.
In the present volume I have sought to narrate faithfully and as fully as is possible the
story of the dispute with France, the chief episodes of the war, and the varied influences
which it exerted upon political developments in these islands, including the early Radical
movement, the Irish Rebellion of 1798, and other events which brought about the Union
of the British and Irish Parliaments, the break up of the great national party at
Westminster in 1801, and the collapse of the strength of Pitt early in the course of the
struggle with the concentrated might of Napoleon.
That mighty drama dwarfs the actors. Even the French Emperor could not sustain the rôle
which he aspired to play, and, failing to discern the signs of the times, was whirled aside
by the forces which he claimed to control. Is it surprising that Pitt, more slightly endowed
by nature, and beset by the many limitations which hampered the advisers of George III,
should have sunk beneath burdens such as no other English statesman has been called
upon to bear? The success or failure of such a career is, however, to be measured by the
final success or failure of his policy; and in this respect, as I have shown, the victor in the
Great War was not Napoleon but Pitt.
To that high enterprise he consecrated all the powers of his being. His public life is
everything; his private life, unfortunately, counts for little. The materials for
reconstructing it are meagre. I have been able here and there to throw new light on his
friendships, difficulties, trials, and, in particular, on the love episode of the year 1797. But
in the main the story of the life of Pitt must soar high above the club and the salon to
... the toppling heights of Duty scaled.
Page 8
Again I must express my hearty thanks to those who have generously placed at my
disposal new materials of great value, especially to His Grace the Duke of Portland, the
Earl of Harrowby, Earl Stanhope, E. G. Pretyman, Esq., M.P., and A. M. Broadley, Esq.;
also to the Rev. William Hunt, D.Litt., and Colonel E. M. Lloyd, late R.E., for valuable
advice tendered during the correction of the proofs, and to Mr. Hubert Hall of H.M. Public
Record Office for assistance during my researches there. I am also indebted to Lord
Auckland and to Messrs. Longmans for permission to reproduce the miniature of the Hon.
Miss Eden which appeared in Lord Ashbourne's "Pitt, Some Chapters of his Life and
Times," and to Mr. and Mrs. Doulton for permission to my daughter to make the sketch of
Bowling Green House, the last residence of Pitt, which is reproduced near the end of this
volume. In the preface to the former volume I expressed my acknowledgements to recent
works bearing on this subject; and I need only add that numerous new letters of
George III, Pitt, Grenville, Burke, Canning, etc., which could only be referred to here,
will be published in a work entitled "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies," including also
essays and notes.
J. H. R.
March 1911.
CONTENTS
chapter pag
I . R o ya l i s t s a n d R a d i c a l s
II. Before the Storm 2
III. Peace or War? 5
I V. T h e R u p t u r e w i t h F r a n c e 8
V. T h e F l e m i s h C a m p a i g n ( 1 7 9 3 ) 11
VI. Toulon 14
VII. The British Jacobins 16
VIII. Pitt and the Allies (1794–5) 19
IX. The West Indies 21
X . S pa i n a n d H ay t i 23
X I . T h e C a p e o f G o o d H o p e : C o r s i c a : Q u i b e r o n 25
disposal new materials of great value, especially to His Grace the Duke of Portland, the
Earl of Harrowby, Earl Stanhope, E. G. Pretyman, Esq., M.P., and A. M. Broadley, Esq.;
also to the Rev. William Hunt, D.Litt., and Colonel E. M. Lloyd, late R.E., for valuable
advice tendered during the correction of the proofs, and to Mr. Hubert Hall of H.M. Public
Record Office for assistance during my researches there. I am also indebted to Lord
Auckland and to Messrs. Longmans for permission to reproduce the miniature of the Hon.
Miss Eden which appeared in Lord Ashbourne's "Pitt, Some Chapters of his Life and
Times," and to Mr. and Mrs. Doulton for permission to my daughter to make the sketch of
Bowling Green House, the last residence of Pitt, which is reproduced near the end of this
volume. In the preface to the former volume I expressed my acknowledgements to recent
works bearing on this subject; and I need only add that numerous new letters of
George III, Pitt, Grenville, Burke, Canning, etc., which could only be referred to here,
will be published in a work entitled "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies," including also
essays and notes.
J. H. R.
March 1911.
CONTENTS
chapter pag
I . R o ya l i s t s a n d R a d i c a l s
II. Before the Storm 2
III. Peace or War? 5
I V. T h e R u p t u r e w i t h F r a n c e 8
V. T h e F l e m i s h C a m p a i g n ( 1 7 9 3 ) 11
VI. Toulon 14
VII. The British Jacobins 16
VIII. Pitt and the Allies (1794–5) 19
IX. The West Indies 21
X . S pa i n a n d H ay t i 23
X I . T h e C a p e o f G o o d H o p e : C o r s i c a : Q u i b e r o n 25
Page 9
chapter pag
XII. Pitt as War Minister (1793–8) 26
XIII. Dearth and Discontent 28
X I V. T h e Y e a r s o f S t r a i n ( 1 7 9 6 – 7 ) 29
X V. N a t i o n a l R e v i v a l 32
XVI. The Irish Rebellion 33
XVII. The Second Coalition 36
XVIII. The Union 38
XIX. The Union (continued) 41
X X . R e s i g n at i o n 43
XXI. Pitt and his Friends (1794–1805) 45
XXII. Addington or Pitt? 48
XXIII. Pitt and Napoleon 50
X X I V. T h e L a s t S t r u g g l e 53
Epilogue 55
S tat i s t i c s o f t h e y e a r s 1 7 9 2 – 1 8 0 1 57
Index 57
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
William Pitt, in later life. (From a painting by Hoppner in the
National Portrait Gallery)
Seat of war in Flanders.
The Siege of Toulon. (By Emmanuel Toulougeon, Paris)
The House of Commons in 1793. (From a painting in the National
Portrait Gallery by K. A. Hickel)
The Hon. Eleanor Eden. (From a miniature)
Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville. (From a painting by Sir T.
Lawrence)
Bowling Green House, Putney Heath. (From a pencil sketch by Elsie
H. Rose)
XII. Pitt as War Minister (1793–8) 26
XIII. Dearth and Discontent 28
X I V. T h e Y e a r s o f S t r a i n ( 1 7 9 6 – 7 ) 29
X V. N a t i o n a l R e v i v a l 32
XVI. The Irish Rebellion 33
XVII. The Second Coalition 36
XVIII. The Union 38
XIX. The Union (continued) 41
X X . R e s i g n at i o n 43
XXI. Pitt and his Friends (1794–1805) 45
XXII. Addington or Pitt? 48
XXIII. Pitt and Napoleon 50
X X I V. T h e L a s t S t r u g g l e 53
Epilogue 55
S tat i s t i c s o f t h e y e a r s 1 7 9 2 – 1 8 0 1 57
Index 57
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
William Pitt, in later life. (From a painting by Hoppner in the
National Portrait Gallery)
Seat of war in Flanders.
The Siege of Toulon. (By Emmanuel Toulougeon, Paris)
The House of Commons in 1793. (From a painting in the National
Portrait Gallery by K. A. Hickel)
The Hon. Eleanor Eden. (From a miniature)
Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville. (From a painting by Sir T.
Lawrence)
Bowling Green House, Putney Heath. (From a pencil sketch by Elsie
H. Rose)
Page 10
ERRATA
Page 180,ad fin., for "Hamilton, Rowan" read "Hamilton Rowan."
311, line 1, for "formerly" read "brother of."
311, line 2, for "Lord Hood" read "Sir Alexander Hood."
551, line 11 from end, for "6th" read "4th."
ABBREVIATIONS OF THE TITLES OF THE CHIEF WORKS REFERRED TO
IN THIS VOLUME
Ann. Reg. "Annual Register."
"Pitt: some Chapters of his Life and Times," by the Rt. Hon.
Ashbourne
Lord Ashbourne. 1898.
"The Journal and Corresp. of William, Lord Auckland." 4 vols.
Auckland Journals
1861.
Beaufort P. MSS. of the Duke of Beaufort," etc. (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 1891.
B.M. Add. MSS. Additional Manuscripts of the British Museum.
"Mems. of the Court and Cabinets of George III," by the Duke
Buckingham P.
of Buckingham. 2 vols. 1853.
"Lives of the Lord Chancellors," by Lord Campbell. 8 vols.
Campbell
1845–69.
Castlereagh Corresp. "Mems. and Corresp. of Viscount Castlereagh." 8 vols. 1848–53.
Chevening MSS. Manuscripts of Earl Stanhope, preserved at Chevening.
"Growth of Eng. Industry and Commerce (Modern Times)," by
Cunningham
Dr. W. Cunningham. 1892.
"The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at
Dropmore P.
Dropmore" (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 7 vols. 1892–1910.
"The History of the British Army," by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue.
Fortescue
vol. iv.
"Deutsche Geschichte (1786–1804)," by L. Häusser. 4 vols.
Häusser
1861–3.
Holland "Memoirs of the Whig Party," by Lord Holland. 2 vols. 1852.
"Mems. of the Life and Reign of George III," by J. H. Jesse. 3
Jesse
vols. 1867.
"Hist. of England in the Eighteenth Century," by W. E. H.
Lecky
Lecky. 8 vols. Fifth edit. 1891–1904.
Page 180,ad fin., for "Hamilton, Rowan" read "Hamilton Rowan."
311, line 1, for "formerly" read "brother of."
311, line 2, for "Lord Hood" read "Sir Alexander Hood."
551, line 11 from end, for "6th" read "4th."
ABBREVIATIONS OF THE TITLES OF THE CHIEF WORKS REFERRED TO
IN THIS VOLUME
Ann. Reg. "Annual Register."
"Pitt: some Chapters of his Life and Times," by the Rt. Hon.
Ashbourne
Lord Ashbourne. 1898.
"The Journal and Corresp. of William, Lord Auckland." 4 vols.
Auckland Journals
1861.
Beaufort P. MSS. of the Duke of Beaufort," etc. (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 1891.
B.M. Add. MSS. Additional Manuscripts of the British Museum.
"Mems. of the Court and Cabinets of George III," by the Duke
Buckingham P.
of Buckingham. 2 vols. 1853.
"Lives of the Lord Chancellors," by Lord Campbell. 8 vols.
Campbell
1845–69.
Castlereagh Corresp. "Mems. and Corresp. of Viscount Castlereagh." 8 vols. 1848–53.
Chevening MSS. Manuscripts of Earl Stanhope, preserved at Chevening.
"Growth of Eng. Industry and Commerce (Modern Times)," by
Cunningham
Dr. W. Cunningham. 1892.
"The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at
Dropmore P.
Dropmore" (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 7 vols. 1892–1910.
"The History of the British Army," by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue.
Fortescue
vol. iv.
"Deutsche Geschichte (1786–1804)," by L. Häusser. 4 vols.
Häusser
1861–3.
Holland "Memoirs of the Whig Party," by Lord Holland. 2 vols. 1852.
"Mems. of the Life and Reign of George III," by J. H. Jesse. 3
Jesse
vols. 1867.
"Hist. of England in the Eighteenth Century," by W. E. H.
Lecky
Lecky. 8 vols. Fifth edit. 1891–1904.
Page 11
"Diaries and Corresp. of the First Earl of Malmesbury." 4 vols.
Malmesbury Diaries
1844.
"History of the Parliamentary Debates" (after 1804 continued in
Parl. Hist.
Hansard).
"Life and Corresp. of the first Viscount Sidmouth," by Rev. C.
Pellew
Pellew. 3 vols. 1847.
Pitt MSS. Pitt MSS., preserved at H.M. Public Record Office.
"The Unreformed House of Commons," by E. Porritt, 2 vols.
Porritt
1909.
Pretyman MSS. MSS. of E. G. Pretyman, Esq., M.P., preserved at Orwell Park.
Rose G., "Diaries" "Diaries and Corresp. of Rt. Hon. G. Rose." 2 vols. 1860.
Rose, "Napoleon" "Life of Napoleon," by J. H. Rose. 2 vols. 1909.
"Select Despatches ... relating to the Formation of the Third
Rose, "Third Coalition" Coalition (1804–5)," ed. by J. H. Rose (Royal Historical Soc.,
1904).
"MSS. of the Duke of Rutland" (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 3 vols.
Rutland P.
1894.
"William Pitt, Earl of Chatham," by A. von Ruville (Eng.
Ruville
transl.). 3 vols. 1907.
"L'Europe et la Révolution française," par A. Sorel. Pts. II, III.
Sorel
1889, 1897.
"Life of ... William Pitt," by Earl Stanhope. 4 vols. 3rd edition.
Stanhope
1867.
"Geschichte der Revolutionzeit (1789–1800)," von H. von
Sybel
Sybel. Eng. translation. 4 vols. 1867–9.
"Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik
Vivenot
Œsterreichs ..." von A. von Vivenot. 1873.
"Memoirs of Sir N. W. Wraxall" (1772–84), edited by H. B.
Wraxall
Wheatley. 5 vols. 1884.
W I L L I A M P I T T A N D T H E G R E A T WA R
Malmesbury Diaries
1844.
"History of the Parliamentary Debates" (after 1804 continued in
Parl. Hist.
Hansard).
"Life and Corresp. of the first Viscount Sidmouth," by Rev. C.
Pellew
Pellew. 3 vols. 1847.
Pitt MSS. Pitt MSS., preserved at H.M. Public Record Office.
"The Unreformed House of Commons," by E. Porritt, 2 vols.
Porritt
1909.
Pretyman MSS. MSS. of E. G. Pretyman, Esq., M.P., preserved at Orwell Park.
Rose G., "Diaries" "Diaries and Corresp. of Rt. Hon. G. Rose." 2 vols. 1860.
Rose, "Napoleon" "Life of Napoleon," by J. H. Rose. 2 vols. 1909.
"Select Despatches ... relating to the Formation of the Third
Rose, "Third Coalition" Coalition (1804–5)," ed. by J. H. Rose (Royal Historical Soc.,
1904).
"MSS. of the Duke of Rutland" (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 3 vols.
Rutland P.
1894.
"William Pitt, Earl of Chatham," by A. von Ruville (Eng.
Ruville
transl.). 3 vols. 1907.
"L'Europe et la Révolution française," par A. Sorel. Pts. II, III.
Sorel
1889, 1897.
"Life of ... William Pitt," by Earl Stanhope. 4 vols. 3rd edition.
Stanhope
1867.
"Geschichte der Revolutionzeit (1789–1800)," von H. von
Sybel
Sybel. Eng. translation. 4 vols. 1867–9.
"Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik
Vivenot
Œsterreichs ..." von A. von Vivenot. 1873.
"Memoirs of Sir N. W. Wraxall" (1772–84), edited by H. B.
Wraxall
Wheatley. 5 vols. 1884.
W I L L I A M P I T T A N D T H E G R E A T WA R
Page 12
CHAPTER I
R O Y A L I S T S A N D R A D I C A L S [1]
Détruire l'anarchie française, c'est se préparer une
gloire immortelle.—Catharine II, 1791.
The pretended Rights of Man, which have made this
havoc, cannot be the rights of the people. For to be a
people and to have these rights are incompatible. The
one supposes the presence, the other the absence, of a
state of civil society.—Burke, Appeal from the New
to the Old Whigs.
A constitution is the property of a nation and not of
those who exercise the Government.—T. Paine,
Rights of Man, part ii.
In the midst of a maze of events there may sometimes be found one which serves as a
clue, revealing hidden paths, connecting ways which seem far apart, and leading to a clear
issue. Such was the attempted flight of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette to the eastern
frontier of France at midsummer 1791, which may be termed the central event of the
French Revolution, at least in its first phases. The aim of joining the armed bands of
émigrés and the forces held in readiness by Austria was so obvious as to dispel the myth
of "a patriot King" misled for a time by evil counsellors. True, the moderates, from sheer
alarm, still sought to save the monarchy, and for a time with surprising success. But
bolder men, possessed both of insight and humour, perceived the futility of all such efforts
to hold down on the throne the father of his people lest he should again run away. In this
perception the young Republican party found its genesis and its inspiration. In truth, the
attempted flight of the King was a death-blow to the moderate party, into which the
lamented leader, Mirabeau, had sought to infuse some of his masterful energy.
Thenceforth, the future belonged either to the Jacobins or to the out and out royalists.
R O Y A L I S T S A N D R A D I C A L S [1]
Détruire l'anarchie française, c'est se préparer une
gloire immortelle.—Catharine II, 1791.
The pretended Rights of Man, which have made this
havoc, cannot be the rights of the people. For to be a
people and to have these rights are incompatible. The
one supposes the presence, the other the absence, of a
state of civil society.—Burke, Appeal from the New
to the Old Whigs.
A constitution is the property of a nation and not of
those who exercise the Government.—T. Paine,
Rights of Man, part ii.
In the midst of a maze of events there may sometimes be found one which serves as a
clue, revealing hidden paths, connecting ways which seem far apart, and leading to a clear
issue. Such was the attempted flight of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette to the eastern
frontier of France at midsummer 1791, which may be termed the central event of the
French Revolution, at least in its first phases. The aim of joining the armed bands of
émigrés and the forces held in readiness by Austria was so obvious as to dispel the myth
of "a patriot King" misled for a time by evil counsellors. True, the moderates, from sheer
alarm, still sought to save the monarchy, and for a time with surprising success. But
bolder men, possessed both of insight and humour, perceived the futility of all such efforts
to hold down on the throne the father of his people lest he should again run away. In this
perception the young Republican party found its genesis and its inspiration. In truth, the
attempted flight of the King was a death-blow to the moderate party, into which the
lamented leader, Mirabeau, had sought to infuse some of his masterful energy.
Thenceforth, the future belonged either to the Jacobins or to the out and out royalists.
Page 13
These last saw the horizon brighten in the East. Louis XVI being under constraint in
Paris, their leaders were the French Princes, the Comte de Provence (afterwards
Louis XVIII) and the Comte d'Artois (Charles X). Around them at Coblentz there
clustered angry swarms of French nobles, gentlemen, and orthodox priests, whose zeal
was reckoned by the earliness of the date at which they had "emigrated." For many
months the agents of these émigrés had vainly urged the Chanceries of the Continent to a
royalist crusade against the French rebels; and it seemed appropriate that Gustavus III of
Sweden should be their only convert. Now of a sudden their demands appeared, instinct
with statecraft; and courtiers everywhere exclaimed that "the French pest" must be
stamped out. In that thought lay in germ a quarter of a century of war.
Already the Prussian and Austrian Governments had vaguely discussed the need of a joint
intervention in France. In fact this subject formed one of the pretexts for the missions of
the Prussian envoy, Bischoffswerder, to the Emperor Leopold in February and June 1791.
[2] As was shown at the close of the former volume, "William Pitt and National Revival,"
neither Court took the matter seriously, the Eastern Question being then their chief
concern. But the flight to Varennes, which Leopold had helped to arrange, imposed on
him the duty of avenging the ensuing insults to his sister. He prepared to do so with a
degree of caution highly characteristic of him. He refused to move until he knew the
disposition of the Powers, especially of England. From Padua, where the news of the
capture of Louis at Varennes reached him, he wrote an autograph letter to George III,
dated 6th July, urging him to join in a general demand for the liberation of the King and
Queen of France. He also invited the monarchs of Europe to launch a Declaration, that
they regarded the cause of Louis as their own, and in the last resort to put down a
usurpation of power which it behoved all Governments to repress.[3]
The reply of George, dated St. James's, 23rd July, bears the imprint of the cool and
cautious personality of Pitt and Grenville, who in this matter may be counted as one. The
King avowed his sympathy with the French Royal Family and his interest in the present
proposals, but declared that his attitude must depend on his relations to other Powers. He
therefore cherished the hope that the Emperor would consult the welfare of the whole of
Europe by aiding in the work of pacification between Austria and Turkey now proceeding
at Sistova. So soon as those negotiations were completed, he would instruct his Ministers
to consider the best means of cementing a union between the Allies and the Emperor.[4]
Leopold must have gnashed his teeth on reading this reply, which beat him at his own
game of finesse. He had used the difficulties of England as a means of escaping from the
Paris, their leaders were the French Princes, the Comte de Provence (afterwards
Louis XVIII) and the Comte d'Artois (Charles X). Around them at Coblentz there
clustered angry swarms of French nobles, gentlemen, and orthodox priests, whose zeal
was reckoned by the earliness of the date at which they had "emigrated." For many
months the agents of these émigrés had vainly urged the Chanceries of the Continent to a
royalist crusade against the French rebels; and it seemed appropriate that Gustavus III of
Sweden should be their only convert. Now of a sudden their demands appeared, instinct
with statecraft; and courtiers everywhere exclaimed that "the French pest" must be
stamped out. In that thought lay in germ a quarter of a century of war.
Already the Prussian and Austrian Governments had vaguely discussed the need of a joint
intervention in France. In fact this subject formed one of the pretexts for the missions of
the Prussian envoy, Bischoffswerder, to the Emperor Leopold in February and June 1791.
[2] As was shown at the close of the former volume, "William Pitt and National Revival,"
neither Court took the matter seriously, the Eastern Question being then their chief
concern. But the flight to Varennes, which Leopold had helped to arrange, imposed on
him the duty of avenging the ensuing insults to his sister. He prepared to do so with a
degree of caution highly characteristic of him. He refused to move until he knew the
disposition of the Powers, especially of England. From Padua, where the news of the
capture of Louis at Varennes reached him, he wrote an autograph letter to George III,
dated 6th July, urging him to join in a general demand for the liberation of the King and
Queen of France. He also invited the monarchs of Europe to launch a Declaration, that
they regarded the cause of Louis as their own, and in the last resort to put down a
usurpation of power which it behoved all Governments to repress.[3]
The reply of George, dated St. James's, 23rd July, bears the imprint of the cool and
cautious personality of Pitt and Grenville, who in this matter may be counted as one. The
King avowed his sympathy with the French Royal Family and his interest in the present
proposals, but declared that his attitude must depend on his relations to other Powers. He
therefore cherished the hope that the Emperor would consult the welfare of the whole of
Europe by aiding in the work of pacification between Austria and Turkey now proceeding
at Sistova. So soon as those negotiations were completed, he would instruct his Ministers
to consider the best means of cementing a union between the Allies and the Emperor.[4]
Leopold must have gnashed his teeth on reading this reply, which beat him at his own
game of finesse. He had used the difficulties of England as a means of escaping from the
Page 14
pledges plighted at the Conference of Reichenbach in July 1790. Pitt and Grenville
retorted by ironically refusing all help until he fulfilled those pledges. As we have seen,
they succeeded; and the pacification in the East, as also in Belgium, was the result.
Equally chilling was the conduct of Pitt towards the émigrés. The French Princes at
Coblentz had sent over the former French Minister, Calonne, "to solicit from His Majesty
an assurance of his neutrality in the event ... of an attempt being made by the Emperor and
other Powers in support of the royal party in France." Pitt and Grenville refused to receive
Calonne, and sent to the Comte d'Artois a letter expressing sympathy with the situation of
the King and Queen of France, but declining to give any promise as to the line of conduct
which the British Government might pursue.[5]
No less vague were the terms in which George III replied to a letter of the King of
Sweden. Gustavus had for some little time been at Aix-la-Chapelle in the hope of leading
a royalist crusade into France as a sequel to the expected escape of Louis XVI and Marie
Antoinette. As readers of Carlyle will remember, the Swedish noble, Count Fersen,
chivalrously helped their flight towards Metz; and deep was the chagrin of Gustavus and
his squire on hearing the news from Varennes. They longed to strike at once. But how
could they strike while Leopold, Catharine, and Frederick William declared that
everything must depend on the action of England? The following significant sentence in
Fersen's diary shows the feeling prevalent at Brussels, as elsewhere, respecting England:
"We must know if that Power regards the continuation of anarchy in France as more
advantageous than order."[6] Fersen had imbibed this notion at Brussels from Count
Mercy d'Argenteau, the Austrian Minister, whose letters often harp on this string. Thus on
7th March 1791 he writes: "The worst obstacles for the King of France will always come
from England, which wishes to prolong the horrors in France and ruin her." A little later
he avers that the only way to save the French monarchy is by a civil war, "and England
(unless won over) will support the popular party."[7]
In order to win Pitt over to the cause of neutrality from which he never intended to
swerve, Gustavus and Fersen persuaded an Englishman named Crawford to proceed to
London with letters for George III and Pitt, dated 22nd July.[8] To the King he described
the danger to all Governments which must ensue if the French revolted with impunity. He
therefore begged to know speedily whether His Majesty would accord full liberty "to the
Princes of Germany and to those, who, owing to the long distance, can only arrive by
sea."[9] Evidently, then, Gustavus feared lest England might stop the fleet in which he
retorted by ironically refusing all help until he fulfilled those pledges. As we have seen,
they succeeded; and the pacification in the East, as also in Belgium, was the result.
Equally chilling was the conduct of Pitt towards the émigrés. The French Princes at
Coblentz had sent over the former French Minister, Calonne, "to solicit from His Majesty
an assurance of his neutrality in the event ... of an attempt being made by the Emperor and
other Powers in support of the royal party in France." Pitt and Grenville refused to receive
Calonne, and sent to the Comte d'Artois a letter expressing sympathy with the situation of
the King and Queen of France, but declining to give any promise as to the line of conduct
which the British Government might pursue.[5]
No less vague were the terms in which George III replied to a letter of the King of
Sweden. Gustavus had for some little time been at Aix-la-Chapelle in the hope of leading
a royalist crusade into France as a sequel to the expected escape of Louis XVI and Marie
Antoinette. As readers of Carlyle will remember, the Swedish noble, Count Fersen,
chivalrously helped their flight towards Metz; and deep was the chagrin of Gustavus and
his squire on hearing the news from Varennes. They longed to strike at once. But how
could they strike while Leopold, Catharine, and Frederick William declared that
everything must depend on the action of England? The following significant sentence in
Fersen's diary shows the feeling prevalent at Brussels, as elsewhere, respecting England:
"We must know if that Power regards the continuation of anarchy in France as more
advantageous than order."[6] Fersen had imbibed this notion at Brussels from Count
Mercy d'Argenteau, the Austrian Minister, whose letters often harp on this string. Thus on
7th March 1791 he writes: "The worst obstacles for the King of France will always come
from England, which wishes to prolong the horrors in France and ruin her." A little later
he avers that the only way to save the French monarchy is by a civil war, "and England
(unless won over) will support the popular party."[7]
In order to win Pitt over to the cause of neutrality from which he never intended to
swerve, Gustavus and Fersen persuaded an Englishman named Crawford to proceed to
London with letters for George III and Pitt, dated 22nd July.[8] To the King he described
the danger to all Governments which must ensue if the French revolted with impunity. He
therefore begged to know speedily whether His Majesty would accord full liberty "to the
Princes of Germany and to those, who, owing to the long distance, can only arrive by
sea."[9] Evidently, then, Gustavus feared lest England might stop the fleet in which he
Page 15
intended to convey Swedish and Russian troops to the coast of Normandy for a dash at
Paris. The answer of George soothed these fears, and that of Pitt, dated August 1791, was
a model of courtly complaisance.
Compared with the shrewd balancings of the Emperor Leopold and the cold neutrality of
Pitt, the policy of Frederick William II of Prussia seemed for a time to be instinct with
generosity. Despite the fears of his counsellors that a rapprochement to Austria would
involve Prussia in the ruin which the friendship of the Hapsburgs had brought on France,
the King turned eagerly towards Vienna; and on 25th July Kaunitz and Bischoffswerder
signed a preliminary treaty of alliance mutually guaranteeing their territories, and
agreeing to further the aims of the Emperor respecting France. Frederick William was on
fire for the royalist crusade. He even assured Baron Rolle, the agent of the French princes,
that something would be done in that season.[10] Pitt and Grenville disapproved the action
of Prussia in signing this compact, impairing as it did the validity of the Anglo-Prussian
alliance of the year 1788; but Frederick William peevishly asserted his right to make what
treaties he thought good, and remarked that he was now quits with England for the bad
turns she had played him.[11] On their side, the British Ministers, by way of marking their
disapproval of the warlike counsels of Berlin and Vienna, decided not to send an envoy to
Pilnitz, the summer abode of the Elector of Saxony, where a conference was arranged
between Leopold and Frederick William.
As is well known, the Comte d'Artois and Calonne now cherished lofty hopes of decisive
action by all the monarchs against the French rebels. But Leopold, with his usual caution,
repelled alike the solicitations of Artois and the warlike counsels of Frederick William,
the result of their deliberations being the famous Declaration of Pilnitz (27th August). In
it they expressed the hope that all the sovereigns of Europe
will not refuse to employ, in conjunction with their said Majesties, the most
efficient means in proportion to their resources, to place the King of France in a
position to establish with the most absolute freedom, the foundations of a
monarchical form of government, which shall at once be in harmony with the
rights of sovereigns and promote the welfare of the French nation. In that case
[alors et dans ce cas] their said Majesties, the Emperor and the King of Prussia,
are resolved to act promptly and in common accord with the forces necessary to
attain the desired common end.
Paris. The answer of George soothed these fears, and that of Pitt, dated August 1791, was
a model of courtly complaisance.
Compared with the shrewd balancings of the Emperor Leopold and the cold neutrality of
Pitt, the policy of Frederick William II of Prussia seemed for a time to be instinct with
generosity. Despite the fears of his counsellors that a rapprochement to Austria would
involve Prussia in the ruin which the friendship of the Hapsburgs had brought on France,
the King turned eagerly towards Vienna; and on 25th July Kaunitz and Bischoffswerder
signed a preliminary treaty of alliance mutually guaranteeing their territories, and
agreeing to further the aims of the Emperor respecting France. Frederick William was on
fire for the royalist crusade. He even assured Baron Rolle, the agent of the French princes,
that something would be done in that season.[10] Pitt and Grenville disapproved the action
of Prussia in signing this compact, impairing as it did the validity of the Anglo-Prussian
alliance of the year 1788; but Frederick William peevishly asserted his right to make what
treaties he thought good, and remarked that he was now quits with England for the bad
turns she had played him.[11] On their side, the British Ministers, by way of marking their
disapproval of the warlike counsels of Berlin and Vienna, decided not to send an envoy to
Pilnitz, the summer abode of the Elector of Saxony, where a conference was arranged
between Leopold and Frederick William.
As is well known, the Comte d'Artois and Calonne now cherished lofty hopes of decisive
action by all the monarchs against the French rebels. But Leopold, with his usual caution,
repelled alike the solicitations of Artois and the warlike counsels of Frederick William,
the result of their deliberations being the famous Declaration of Pilnitz (27th August). In
it they expressed the hope that all the sovereigns of Europe
will not refuse to employ, in conjunction with their said Majesties, the most
efficient means in proportion to their resources, to place the King of France in a
position to establish with the most absolute freedom, the foundations of a
monarchical form of government, which shall at once be in harmony with the
rights of sovereigns and promote the welfare of the French nation. In that case
[alors et dans ce cas] their said Majesties, the Emperor and the King of Prussia,
are resolved to act promptly and in common accord with the forces necessary to
attain the desired common end.
Page 16
Obviously, the gist of the whole Declaration lay in the words alors et dans ce cas. If they
be emphasized, they destroy the force of the document; for a union of all the monarchs
was an impossibility, it being well known that England would not, and Sardinia, and
Naples (probably also Spain) could not, take up arms. In fact, on that very evening
Leopold wrote to Kaunitz that he had not in the least committed himself.—"Alors et dans
ce cas is with me the law and the prophets. If England fails us, the case is non-existent."
Further, when the Comte d'Artois, two days later, urged the Emperor to give effect to the
Declaration by ordering his troops to march westwards, he sent a sharp retort, asserted
that he would not go beyond the Declaration, and forbade the French Princes to do so.[12]
To the good sense and insight of Grenville and Pitt, the Pilnitz Declaration was one of the
comédies augustes of history, as Mallet du Pan termed it. Grenville saw that Leopold
would stay his hand until England chose to act, meanwhile alleging her neutrality as an
excuse for doing nothing.[13] Thus, the resolve of Catharine to give nothing but fair words
being already surmised, the émigrés found to their annoyance that Pitt's passivity clogged
their efforts—the chief reason why they shrilly upbraided him for his insular egotism.
Certainly his attitude was far from romantic; but surely, after the sharp lesson which he
had received from the House of Commons in the spring of 1791 during the dispute with
Russia, caution was needful; and he probably discerned a truth hidden from the émigrés,
that an invasion of France for the rescue of the King and Queen would seal their doom
and increase the welter in that unhappy land.
Pitt and Grenville spent the middle of September at Weymouth in attendance on
George III; and we can imagine their satisfaction at the prospect of universal peace and
prosperity. Pitt consoled himself for the not very creditable end to the Russian negotiation
by reflecting that our revenue was steadily rising. "We are already £178,000 gainers in
this quarter," he wrote to George Rose on 10th August.[14] In fact, the cyclonic
disturbances of the past few years now gave place to a lull. The Russo-Turkish War had
virtually ended; Catharine and Gustavus were on friendly terms; the ferment in the
Hapsburg dominions had died down, except in Brabant; the Poles were working their new
constitution well; and, but for Jacobin propaganda in Italy and the Rhineland, the outlook
was serene.
At this time, too, there seemed a chance of a reconciliation between Louis XVI and his
people. On 14th September he accepted the new democratic constitution, a step which
filled France with rejoicing and furnished the desired excuse for Leopold to remain
passive. Kaunitz, who had consistently opposed intervention in France, now asserted that
be emphasized, they destroy the force of the document; for a union of all the monarchs
was an impossibility, it being well known that England would not, and Sardinia, and
Naples (probably also Spain) could not, take up arms. In fact, on that very evening
Leopold wrote to Kaunitz that he had not in the least committed himself.—"Alors et dans
ce cas is with me the law and the prophets. If England fails us, the case is non-existent."
Further, when the Comte d'Artois, two days later, urged the Emperor to give effect to the
Declaration by ordering his troops to march westwards, he sent a sharp retort, asserted
that he would not go beyond the Declaration, and forbade the French Princes to do so.[12]
To the good sense and insight of Grenville and Pitt, the Pilnitz Declaration was one of the
comédies augustes of history, as Mallet du Pan termed it. Grenville saw that Leopold
would stay his hand until England chose to act, meanwhile alleging her neutrality as an
excuse for doing nothing.[13] Thus, the resolve of Catharine to give nothing but fair words
being already surmised, the émigrés found to their annoyance that Pitt's passivity clogged
their efforts—the chief reason why they shrilly upbraided him for his insular egotism.
Certainly his attitude was far from romantic; but surely, after the sharp lesson which he
had received from the House of Commons in the spring of 1791 during the dispute with
Russia, caution was needful; and he probably discerned a truth hidden from the émigrés,
that an invasion of France for the rescue of the King and Queen would seal their doom
and increase the welter in that unhappy land.
Pitt and Grenville spent the middle of September at Weymouth in attendance on
George III; and we can imagine their satisfaction at the prospect of universal peace and
prosperity. Pitt consoled himself for the not very creditable end to the Russian negotiation
by reflecting that our revenue was steadily rising. "We are already £178,000 gainers in
this quarter," he wrote to George Rose on 10th August.[14] In fact, the cyclonic
disturbances of the past few years now gave place to a lull. The Russo-Turkish War had
virtually ended; Catharine and Gustavus were on friendly terms; the ferment in the
Hapsburg dominions had died down, except in Brabant; the Poles were working their new
constitution well; and, but for Jacobin propaganda in Italy and the Rhineland, the outlook
was serene.
At this time, too, there seemed a chance of a reconciliation between Louis XVI and his
people. On 14th September he accepted the new democratic constitution, a step which
filled France with rejoicing and furnished the desired excuse for Leopold to remain
passive. Kaunitz, who had consistently opposed intervention in France, now asserted that
Page 17
Louis had voluntarily accepted the constitution. The action of Louis and Marie Antoinette
was in reality forced. Amidst the Queen's expressions of contempt for the French Princes
at Coblentz, the suppressed fire of her fury against her captors flashes forth in this
sentence written to Mercy d'Argenteau (28th August)—"The only question for us is to lull
them to sleep and inspire them with confidence so as to trick them the better
afterwards."—And again (12th September)—"My God! Must I, with this blood in my
veins, pass my days among such beings as these, and in such an age as this?" Leopold
must have known her real feelings; but he chose to abide by the official language of
Louis, and to advise the Powers to accept the new situation.[15]
This peaceful turn of affairs sorely troubled the French Princes and Burke. In August and
September 1791 his son Richard was at Coblentz, and informed his father of the
consternation of the émigrés on hearing that the Emperor declined to draw the sword.
Burke himself was equally agitated, and on or about 24th September had a long interview
with Pitt and Grenville, at the house of the latter. We gather from Burke's "Letters on the
Conduct of our Domestic Parties," that it was the first time he had met Pitt in private; and
the meeting must have been somewhat awkward. After dining, with Grenville as host, the
three men conferred together till eleven o'clock, discussing the whole situation "very
calmly" (says Burke); but we can fancy the tumult of feelings in the breast of the old man
when he found both Ministers firm as adamant against intervention in France. "They are
certainly right as to their general inclinations," he wrote to his son, "perfectly so, I have
not a shadow of doubt; but at the same time they are cold and dead as to any attempt
whatsoever to give them effect." The heat of the Irish royalist failed to kindle a spark of
feeling in the two cousins. He found that their "deadness" proceeded from a rooted
distrust of the Emperor Leopold, and from a conviction that Britain had nothing to fear
from Jacobinical propaganda. Above all they believed that the present was not the time for
action, especially as the imminence of bankruptcy in France would discredit the new
Legislative Assembly, and render an invasion easier in the near future.
Are we to infer from this that Pitt and his cousin looked forward to a time when the
monarchs could invade France with safety? Such an inference would be rash. It is more
probable that they here found an excuse for postponing their decision and a means of
calming an insistent visitor. Certainly they impressed Burke with a belief in their sincere
but secret sympathy with the royalist cause. The three men also agreed in suspecting
Leopold, though Burke tried to prove that his treachery was not premeditated, but sprang
from "some complexional inconstancy." Pitt and Grenville, knowing the doggedness with
was in reality forced. Amidst the Queen's expressions of contempt for the French Princes
at Coblentz, the suppressed fire of her fury against her captors flashes forth in this
sentence written to Mercy d'Argenteau (28th August)—"The only question for us is to lull
them to sleep and inspire them with confidence so as to trick them the better
afterwards."—And again (12th September)—"My God! Must I, with this blood in my
veins, pass my days among such beings as these, and in such an age as this?" Leopold
must have known her real feelings; but he chose to abide by the official language of
Louis, and to advise the Powers to accept the new situation.[15]
This peaceful turn of affairs sorely troubled the French Princes and Burke. In August and
September 1791 his son Richard was at Coblentz, and informed his father of the
consternation of the émigrés on hearing that the Emperor declined to draw the sword.
Burke himself was equally agitated, and on or about 24th September had a long interview
with Pitt and Grenville, at the house of the latter. We gather from Burke's "Letters on the
Conduct of our Domestic Parties," that it was the first time he had met Pitt in private; and
the meeting must have been somewhat awkward. After dining, with Grenville as host, the
three men conferred together till eleven o'clock, discussing the whole situation "very
calmly" (says Burke); but we can fancy the tumult of feelings in the breast of the old man
when he found both Ministers firm as adamant against intervention in France. "They are
certainly right as to their general inclinations," he wrote to his son, "perfectly so, I have
not a shadow of doubt; but at the same time they are cold and dead as to any attempt
whatsoever to give them effect." The heat of the Irish royalist failed to kindle a spark of
feeling in the two cousins. He found that their "deadness" proceeded from a rooted
distrust of the Emperor Leopold, and from a conviction that Britain had nothing to fear
from Jacobinical propaganda. Above all they believed that the present was not the time for
action, especially as the imminence of bankruptcy in France would discredit the new
Legislative Assembly, and render an invasion easier in the near future.
Are we to infer from this that Pitt and his cousin looked forward to a time when the
monarchs could invade France with safety? Such an inference would be rash. It is more
probable that they here found an excuse for postponing their decision and a means of
calming an insistent visitor. Certainly they impressed Burke with a belief in their sincere
but secret sympathy with the royalist cause. The three men also agreed in suspecting
Leopold, though Burke tried to prove that his treachery was not premeditated, but sprang
from "some complexional inconstancy." Pitt and Grenville, knowing the doggedness with
Page 18
which the Emperor pushed towards his goal, amidst many a shift and turn, evidently were
not convinced.
At this time they had special reasons for distrusting Leopold and his advisers. The
Austrian Government had received a letter, dated Dresden, 27th August (the day of the
Declaration of Pilnitz), stating that England promised to remain neutral only on condition
that the Emperor would not withdraw any troops from his Belgic lands, as they were
needed to uphold the arrangements of which she was a guarantee. This extraordinary
statement grew out of a remark of Grenville to the Austrian Ambassador in London, that,
in view of the unrest in the Netherlands, it might be well not to leave them without troops.
[16] The mis-statement was not only accepted at Vienna, but was forwarded to various
Courts, the final version being that England might attack Austria if she withdrew her
troops from Flanders, and that therefore Leopold could not draw the sword against France
until his army on the Turkish borders arrived in Swabia. Some were found who believed
this odd farrago; but those who watched the calculating balance of Hapsburg policy saw
in it one more excuse for a masterly inactivity.
Still less were our Ministers inclined to unite with Catharine in the universal royalist
league then under discussion at St. Petersburg. The Czarina having charged her
ambassador, Vorontzoff, to find out the sentiments of Pitt and Grenville on this subject, he
replied that England would persevere in the strict neutrality which she had all along
observed, "and that, with respect to the measures of active intervention which other
Powers might have in contemplation, it was His Majesty's determination not to take any
part either in supporting or in opposing them." Now Russia, like Austria and Spain, had
decided not to act unless England joined the concert;[17] and this waiting on the action of a
Power which had already declared its resolve to do nothing enables us to test the sincerity
of the continental monarchs. As for the Czarina, her royalist fervour expended itself in
deposing the busts of democrats, in ordering the French Minister to remain away from
Court, and in condemning any Russian who had dealings with him to be publicly flogged.
Moreover, while thus drilling her own subjects, the quondam friend of Diderot kept her
eyes fixed upon Warsaw. The shrewdest diplomatist of the age had already divined her
aims, which he thus trenchantly summed up: "The Empress only waits to see Austria and
Prussia committed in France, to overturn everything in Poland."[18] Kaunitz lived on to
see his cynical prophecy fulfilled to the letter.
not convinced.
At this time they had special reasons for distrusting Leopold and his advisers. The
Austrian Government had received a letter, dated Dresden, 27th August (the day of the
Declaration of Pilnitz), stating that England promised to remain neutral only on condition
that the Emperor would not withdraw any troops from his Belgic lands, as they were
needed to uphold the arrangements of which she was a guarantee. This extraordinary
statement grew out of a remark of Grenville to the Austrian Ambassador in London, that,
in view of the unrest in the Netherlands, it might be well not to leave them without troops.
[16] The mis-statement was not only accepted at Vienna, but was forwarded to various
Courts, the final version being that England might attack Austria if she withdrew her
troops from Flanders, and that therefore Leopold could not draw the sword against France
until his army on the Turkish borders arrived in Swabia. Some were found who believed
this odd farrago; but those who watched the calculating balance of Hapsburg policy saw
in it one more excuse for a masterly inactivity.
Still less were our Ministers inclined to unite with Catharine in the universal royalist
league then under discussion at St. Petersburg. The Czarina having charged her
ambassador, Vorontzoff, to find out the sentiments of Pitt and Grenville on this subject, he
replied that England would persevere in the strict neutrality which she had all along
observed, "and that, with respect to the measures of active intervention which other
Powers might have in contemplation, it was His Majesty's determination not to take any
part either in supporting or in opposing them." Now Russia, like Austria and Spain, had
decided not to act unless England joined the concert;[17] and this waiting on the action of a
Power which had already declared its resolve to do nothing enables us to test the sincerity
of the continental monarchs. As for the Czarina, her royalist fervour expended itself in
deposing the busts of democrats, in ordering the French Minister to remain away from
Court, and in condemning any Russian who had dealings with him to be publicly flogged.
Moreover, while thus drilling her own subjects, the quondam friend of Diderot kept her
eyes fixed upon Warsaw. The shrewdest diplomatist of the age had already divined her
aims, which he thus trenchantly summed up: "The Empress only waits to see Austria and
Prussia committed in France, to overturn everything in Poland."[18] Kaunitz lived on to
see his cynical prophecy fulfilled to the letter.
Page 19
The reader will have noticed with some surprise the statement of Burke that Pitt and
Grenville had not the slightest fear of the spread of French principles in England. As we
know, Burke vehemently maintained the contrary, averring that the French plague, unless
crushed at Paris, would infect the world. In his survey of the European States he admitted
that we were less liable to infection than Germany, Holland, and Italy, owing to the
excellence of our constitution; but he feared that our nearness to France, and our zeal for
liberty, would expose us to some danger. Why he should have cherished these fears is
hard to say; for to him the French Revolution was "a wild attempt to methodize anarchy,"
"a foul, impious, monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral nature."[19] Surely if
British and French principles were so utterly different, we were in no more danger of
infection from the Jacobins than of catching swine fever.
This was virtually the view of Pitt and Grenville; for there were no premonitory
symptoms of infection, but much the reverse. Londoners showed the utmost joy at the
first news of the escape of the King and Queen from Paris, and were equally depressed by
the news from Varennes. As we shall presently see, it was with shouts of "Long live the
King," "Church and State," "Down with the Dissenters," "No Olivers," "Down with the
Rump," "No false Rights of Man," that the rabble of Birmingham wrecked and burnt the
houses of Dr. Priestley and other prominent Nonconformists of that town. Only by slow
degrees did this loyal enthusiasm give place to opinions which in course of time came to
be called Radical. It may be well to trace briefly the fluctuations of public opinion, to
which the career of Pitt stands in vital relation.
The growth of discontent in Great Britain may be ascribed to definite evils in the body
politic, and it seems to have arisen only secondarily from French propaganda. The first
question which kindled the fire of resentment was that of the civic and political
disabilities still imposed on Nonconformists by the Corporation and Test Acts of the reign
of Charles II. Pitt's decision in the session of 1787 to uphold those Acts ensured the
rejection of Beaufoy's motion for their repeal of 176 votes to 98; but undeterred by his
defeat, Beaufoy brought the matter before the House on 8th May 1789, and, despite the
opposition of Pitt, secured 102 votes against 122. The Prime Minister's chief argument
was that if Dissenters were admitted to civic rights they might use their power to
overthrow the Church Establishment.[20] Clearly the opinion of the House was drifting
away from him on that question; and it is a proof of his growing indifference to questions
of Reform that now, four days after the assembly of the States-General of France at
Versailles, he should have held to views so repugnant to the spirit of the age.
Grenville had not the slightest fear of the spread of French principles in England. As we
know, Burke vehemently maintained the contrary, averring that the French plague, unless
crushed at Paris, would infect the world. In his survey of the European States he admitted
that we were less liable to infection than Germany, Holland, and Italy, owing to the
excellence of our constitution; but he feared that our nearness to France, and our zeal for
liberty, would expose us to some danger. Why he should have cherished these fears is
hard to say; for to him the French Revolution was "a wild attempt to methodize anarchy,"
"a foul, impious, monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral nature."[19] Surely if
British and French principles were so utterly different, we were in no more danger of
infection from the Jacobins than of catching swine fever.
This was virtually the view of Pitt and Grenville; for there were no premonitory
symptoms of infection, but much the reverse. Londoners showed the utmost joy at the
first news of the escape of the King and Queen from Paris, and were equally depressed by
the news from Varennes. As we shall presently see, it was with shouts of "Long live the
King," "Church and State," "Down with the Dissenters," "No Olivers," "Down with the
Rump," "No false Rights of Man," that the rabble of Birmingham wrecked and burnt the
houses of Dr. Priestley and other prominent Nonconformists of that town. Only by slow
degrees did this loyal enthusiasm give place to opinions which in course of time came to
be called Radical. It may be well to trace briefly the fluctuations of public opinion, to
which the career of Pitt stands in vital relation.
The growth of discontent in Great Britain may be ascribed to definite evils in the body
politic, and it seems to have arisen only secondarily from French propaganda. The first
question which kindled the fire of resentment was that of the civic and political
disabilities still imposed on Nonconformists by the Corporation and Test Acts of the reign
of Charles II. Pitt's decision in the session of 1787 to uphold those Acts ensured the
rejection of Beaufoy's motion for their repeal of 176 votes to 98; but undeterred by his
defeat, Beaufoy brought the matter before the House on 8th May 1789, and, despite the
opposition of Pitt, secured 102 votes against 122. The Prime Minister's chief argument
was that if Dissenters were admitted to civic rights they might use their power to
overthrow the Church Establishment.[20] Clearly the opinion of the House was drifting
away from him on that question; and it is a proof of his growing indifference to questions
of Reform that now, four days after the assembly of the States-General of France at
Versailles, he should have held to views so repugnant to the spirit of the age.
Page 20
Thenceforth that question could not be debated solely on its own merits. The attacks made
by the French National Assembly on the Church of France, particularly the confiscation of
its tithes and landed property, soon aroused heated feelings in this country, though on a
subject of a wholly different kind. The result was that, while Dissenters peacefully
agitated for permission to act as citizens, they were represented as endeavouring to
despoil the Church, after the fashion of Talleyrand and Mirabeau. A work by a Manchester
merchant, Thomas Walker, reveals the influence of this question on the political activities
of the time. The Nonconformists of that town and county hoped to gain a majority in next
session or in the following Parliament, while the High Churchmen, to the cry of "The
Church in Danger," declared the two Acts of Charles II to be the bulwarks of the
constitution.[21] This cry was everywhere taken up, with the result that in the Parliament
elected in 1790 the Tories gained ground. Consequently, even the able advocacy of Fox on
behalf of religious liberty failed to save Beaufoy's motion from a crushing defeat. Pitt
spoke against the proposal and carried the House with him by 294 votes to 105. This vote
illustrates the baleful influence exerted by the French Revolution on the cause of Reform
in these islands.
A second example soon occurred. Only three days later Flood brought forward a motion
for Parliamentary Reform which the wildest of alarmists could not call revolutionary. He
proposed to add to the House of Commons one hundred members, elected by the resident
householders of the counties, those areas being far less corrupt than the towns; and he
suggested that, if the total number of members were deemed excessive, fifty seats in the
smallest boroughs might be declared vacant. This proposal differed but little from that of
Pitt in the session of 1785, which aimed at disfranchising thirty-six decayed boroughs and
apportioning their seventy-two members to the larger counties, as also to London and
Westminster. In a speech which might have been made by Pitt in pre-Revolution times
Flood declared that the events in France showed the need of a timely repair of outworn
institutions.
This was as a red rag to Windham, a prominent recruit from the Whigs, who now used all
the artifices of rhetoric to terrify his hearers. He besought them in turn not to repair their
house in the hurricane season, not to imitate the valetudinarian of the "Spectator," who
read medical books until he discovered he had every symptom of the gout except the pain.
These fallacious similes captivated the squires; and Pitt himself complimented the orator
on his ingenious arguments. For himself, he declared his desire of Reform to be as zealous
as ever; but he "could see no utility in any gentleman's bringing forward such a motion as
by the French National Assembly on the Church of France, particularly the confiscation of
its tithes and landed property, soon aroused heated feelings in this country, though on a
subject of a wholly different kind. The result was that, while Dissenters peacefully
agitated for permission to act as citizens, they were represented as endeavouring to
despoil the Church, after the fashion of Talleyrand and Mirabeau. A work by a Manchester
merchant, Thomas Walker, reveals the influence of this question on the political activities
of the time. The Nonconformists of that town and county hoped to gain a majority in next
session or in the following Parliament, while the High Churchmen, to the cry of "The
Church in Danger," declared the two Acts of Charles II to be the bulwarks of the
constitution.[21] This cry was everywhere taken up, with the result that in the Parliament
elected in 1790 the Tories gained ground. Consequently, even the able advocacy of Fox on
behalf of religious liberty failed to save Beaufoy's motion from a crushing defeat. Pitt
spoke against the proposal and carried the House with him by 294 votes to 105. This vote
illustrates the baleful influence exerted by the French Revolution on the cause of Reform
in these islands.
A second example soon occurred. Only three days later Flood brought forward a motion
for Parliamentary Reform which the wildest of alarmists could not call revolutionary. He
proposed to add to the House of Commons one hundred members, elected by the resident
householders of the counties, those areas being far less corrupt than the towns; and he
suggested that, if the total number of members were deemed excessive, fifty seats in the
smallest boroughs might be declared vacant. This proposal differed but little from that of
Pitt in the session of 1785, which aimed at disfranchising thirty-six decayed boroughs and
apportioning their seventy-two members to the larger counties, as also to London and
Westminster. In a speech which might have been made by Pitt in pre-Revolution times
Flood declared that the events in France showed the need of a timely repair of outworn
institutions.
This was as a red rag to Windham, a prominent recruit from the Whigs, who now used all
the artifices of rhetoric to terrify his hearers. He besought them in turn not to repair their
house in the hurricane season, not to imitate the valetudinarian of the "Spectator," who
read medical books until he discovered he had every symptom of the gout except the pain.
These fallacious similes captivated the squires; and Pitt himself complimented the orator
on his ingenious arguments. For himself, he declared his desire of Reform to be as zealous
as ever; but he "could see no utility in any gentleman's bringing forward such a motion as
Page 21
the present at that moment," and feared that the cause might thereby suffer disgrace and
lose ground. Fox, on the other hand, ridiculed all thought of panic on account of the
French Revolution, but he admitted that the majority both in Parliament and the nation did
not want Reform. Grenville, Wilberforce, and Burke opposed the motion, while even
Duncombe declined to vote for it at present. It was accordingly adjourned sine die.[22]
Disappointment at the course of these debates served to band Nonconformists and
reformers in a close alliance. Hitherto they had alike supported Pitt and the royal
prerogative, especially at the time of the Regency struggle. In May 1789, when Pitt
opposed the Nonconformist claims, Dr. Priestley wrote that Fox would regain his
popularity with Dissenters, while Pitt would lose ground.[23] Now, when the doors of the
franchise and of civic privilege were fast barred, resentment and indignation began to
arouse the groups of the unprivileged left outside. The news that Frenchmen had framed a
Departmental System, in which all privileges had vanished, and all men were citizens,
with equal rights in the making of laws and local regulations, worked potently in England,
furthering the growth of an institution little known in this country, the political club. As
the Jacobins had adapted the English idea of a club to political uses, so now the early
Radicals re-adapted it to English needs. "The Manchester Constitutional Society"[24] was
founded by Walker and others in October 1790, in order to oppose a "Church and King
Club," which High Churchmen had started in March, after the news of the triumph of
their principles in Parliament. The Manchester reformers struck the key-note of the
coming age by asserting in their programme that in every community the authority of the
governors must be derived from the consent of the governed, and that the welfare of the
people was the true aim of Government. They further declared that honours and rewards
were due only for services rendered to the State; that all officials, without exception, were
responsible to the people; that "actions only, not opinions, are the proper objects of civil
jurisdictions"; that no law is fairly made except by a majority of the people; and that the
people of Great Britain were not fully and fairly represented in Parliament.[25]
The Church and King Club, on the contrary, reprobated all change in "one of the most
beautiful systems of government that the combined efforts of human wisdom has [sic]
ever yet been able to accomplish." The issue between the two parties was thus sharply
outlined. The Tories of Manchester gloried in a state of things which shut out about half
of their fellow-citizens from civic rights and their whole community from any direct share
in the making of laws. In their eyes the Church and the monarchy were in danger if
lose ground. Fox, on the other hand, ridiculed all thought of panic on account of the
French Revolution, but he admitted that the majority both in Parliament and the nation did
not want Reform. Grenville, Wilberforce, and Burke opposed the motion, while even
Duncombe declined to vote for it at present. It was accordingly adjourned sine die.[22]
Disappointment at the course of these debates served to band Nonconformists and
reformers in a close alliance. Hitherto they had alike supported Pitt and the royal
prerogative, especially at the time of the Regency struggle. In May 1789, when Pitt
opposed the Nonconformist claims, Dr. Priestley wrote that Fox would regain his
popularity with Dissenters, while Pitt would lose ground.[23] Now, when the doors of the
franchise and of civic privilege were fast barred, resentment and indignation began to
arouse the groups of the unprivileged left outside. The news that Frenchmen had framed a
Departmental System, in which all privileges had vanished, and all men were citizens,
with equal rights in the making of laws and local regulations, worked potently in England,
furthering the growth of an institution little known in this country, the political club. As
the Jacobins had adapted the English idea of a club to political uses, so now the early
Radicals re-adapted it to English needs. "The Manchester Constitutional Society"[24] was
founded by Walker and others in October 1790, in order to oppose a "Church and King
Club," which High Churchmen had started in March, after the news of the triumph of
their principles in Parliament. The Manchester reformers struck the key-note of the
coming age by asserting in their programme that in every community the authority of the
governors must be derived from the consent of the governed, and that the welfare of the
people was the true aim of Government. They further declared that honours and rewards
were due only for services rendered to the State; that all officials, without exception, were
responsible to the people; that "actions only, not opinions, are the proper objects of civil
jurisdictions"; that no law is fairly made except by a majority of the people; and that the
people of Great Britain were not fully and fairly represented in Parliament.[25]
The Church and King Club, on the contrary, reprobated all change in "one of the most
beautiful systems of government that the combined efforts of human wisdom has [sic]
ever yet been able to accomplish." The issue between the two parties was thus sharply
outlined. The Tories of Manchester gloried in a state of things which shut out about half
of their fellow-citizens from civic rights and their whole community from any direct share
in the making of laws. In their eyes the Church and the monarchy were in danger if
Page 22
Nonconformists became citizens, and if a score of Cornish villages yielded up their
legislative powers to Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, and other hives of industry.
Scotland also began to awake. The torpor of that keen and intellectual people, under a
system of misrepresentation which assigned to them forty-five members and forty-four to
Cornwall, is incomprehensible, unless we may ascribe it to the waning of all enthusiasm
after the "forty-five" and to the supremacy of material interests so characteristic of the
age. In any case, this political apathy was now to end; and here, too, as in the case of
England, Government applied the spur.
On 10th May 1791 Sir Gilbert Elliot (afterwards Earl of Minto) brought forward a motion
in Parliament for the repeal of the Test Act, so far as it concerned Scotland. He voiced a
petition of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and declared that the
Presbyterians felt the grievance of being excluded from civic offices unless they
perverted. On wider grounds also he appealed against this petty form of persecution,
which might make men hypocrites but never sincere converts. Henry Dundas and his
nephew, Robert Dundas (Lord Advocate for Scotland), opposed the motion, mainly
because it would infringe the terms of the Act of Union; but Henry added the curious
argument that, if Scottish Presbyterians were relieved from the Test Act, then the English
Dissenters would have been "unjustly, harshly, and cruelly used." Pitt avowed himself
"not a violent friend, but a firm and steady friend" of the Test Act, as being essential to the
security of the Church and therefore of the civil establishment of the country.
Accordingly, Elliot's motion was defeated by 149 votes to 62.[26] It is curious that, a
month earlier, the House had agreed to a Bill granting slightly wider toleration to
"Catholic Dissenters."[27]
While Pitt was thus strengthening the old buttresses of Church and State, the son of a
Quaker had subjected the whole fabric to a battery of violent rhetoric. It is scarcely too
much to call Thomas Paine the Rousseau of English democracy. For, if his arguments
lacked the novelty of those of the Genevese thinker (and even they were far from
original), they equalled them in effectiveness, and excelled them in practicability. "The
Rights of Man" (Part I) may be termed an insular version of the "Contrat Social," with
this difference, that the English writer pointed the way to changes which were far from
visionary, while the Genevese seer outlined a polity fit only for a Swiss canton peopled by
philosophers. Paine had had the advantage of close contact with men and affairs in both
hemispheres. Not even Cobbett, his literary successor, passed through more varied
experiences. Born in 1737 at Thetford in Norfolk, Paine divided his early life between
legislative powers to Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, and other hives of industry.
Scotland also began to awake. The torpor of that keen and intellectual people, under a
system of misrepresentation which assigned to them forty-five members and forty-four to
Cornwall, is incomprehensible, unless we may ascribe it to the waning of all enthusiasm
after the "forty-five" and to the supremacy of material interests so characteristic of the
age. In any case, this political apathy was now to end; and here, too, as in the case of
England, Government applied the spur.
On 10th May 1791 Sir Gilbert Elliot (afterwards Earl of Minto) brought forward a motion
in Parliament for the repeal of the Test Act, so far as it concerned Scotland. He voiced a
petition of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and declared that the
Presbyterians felt the grievance of being excluded from civic offices unless they
perverted. On wider grounds also he appealed against this petty form of persecution,
which might make men hypocrites but never sincere converts. Henry Dundas and his
nephew, Robert Dundas (Lord Advocate for Scotland), opposed the motion, mainly
because it would infringe the terms of the Act of Union; but Henry added the curious
argument that, if Scottish Presbyterians were relieved from the Test Act, then the English
Dissenters would have been "unjustly, harshly, and cruelly used." Pitt avowed himself
"not a violent friend, but a firm and steady friend" of the Test Act, as being essential to the
security of the Church and therefore of the civil establishment of the country.
Accordingly, Elliot's motion was defeated by 149 votes to 62.[26] It is curious that, a
month earlier, the House had agreed to a Bill granting slightly wider toleration to
"Catholic Dissenters."[27]
While Pitt was thus strengthening the old buttresses of Church and State, the son of a
Quaker had subjected the whole fabric to a battery of violent rhetoric. It is scarcely too
much to call Thomas Paine the Rousseau of English democracy. For, if his arguments
lacked the novelty of those of the Genevese thinker (and even they were far from
original), they equalled them in effectiveness, and excelled them in practicability. "The
Rights of Man" (Part I) may be termed an insular version of the "Contrat Social," with
this difference, that the English writer pointed the way to changes which were far from
visionary, while the Genevese seer outlined a polity fit only for a Swiss canton peopled by
philosophers. Paine had had the advantage of close contact with men and affairs in both
hemispheres. Not even Cobbett, his literary successor, passed through more varied
experiences. Born in 1737 at Thetford in Norfolk, Paine divided his early life between
Page 23
stay-making, excise work, the vending of tobacco, and a seafaring life. His keen eyes,
lofty brow, prominent nose, proclaimed him a thinker and fighter, and therefore, in that
age, a rebel. What more natural than that he, a foe to authority and hater of oppression,
should go to America to help on the cause of Washington? There at last he discovered his
true vocation. His broadsides struck home. "Rebellious staymaker, unkempt," says
Carlyle, "who feels that he, a single needleman, did by his 'Common Sense' pamphlet,
free America; that he can, and will free all this world; perhaps even the other." Tom Paine,
indeed, had the rare gift of voicing tersely and stridently the dumb desires of the masses.
Further, a sojourn in France before and during the early part of the Revolution enabled
him to frame a crushing retort to Burke's "Reflections." The result was Part I of the
"Rights of Man," which he flung off at the "Angel" in Islington in February 1791.[28]
The general aims of the pamphlet are now as little open to question as the famous
Declaration which he sought to vindicate. Paine trenchantly attacked Burke's claim that
no people, not even our own, had an inherent right to choose its own ruler, and that the
Revolution Settlement of 1688 was binding for ever. Paine, on the contrary, asserted that
"every age and generation must be as free to act for itself in all cases as the ages and
generations that preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave
is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies." Further, on the general question at
issue, Paine remarked: "That men should take up arms, and spend their lives and fortunes,
not to maintain their rights, but to maintain they have not rights, is an entirely new species
of discovery and suited to the paradoxical genius of Mr. Burke." In reply to the noble
passage: "The age of chivalry is gone ...," Paine shrewdly says: "In the rhapsody of his
imagination he has discovered a world of windmills, and his sorrows are that there are no
Quixotes to attack them."
After thus exposing the weak points of the royalist case, Paine proceeded to defend the
mob, firstly, because the aristocratic plots against the French Revolution were really
formidable (a very disputable thesis), and secondly, because the mob in all old countries is
the outcome of their unfair and brutal system of government. "It is by distortedly exalting
some men," he says, "that others are distortedly debased, till the whole is out of nature. A
vast mass of mankind are degradedly thrown into the background of the human picture, to
bring forward with greater glare the puppet show of State and aristocracy." Here was
obviously the Junius of democracy, for whom the only effective answer was the gag and
gyve. Indeed, Burke in his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs" suggested that the
proper refutation was by means of "criminal justice."[29]
lofty brow, prominent nose, proclaimed him a thinker and fighter, and therefore, in that
age, a rebel. What more natural than that he, a foe to authority and hater of oppression,
should go to America to help on the cause of Washington? There at last he discovered his
true vocation. His broadsides struck home. "Rebellious staymaker, unkempt," says
Carlyle, "who feels that he, a single needleman, did by his 'Common Sense' pamphlet,
free America; that he can, and will free all this world; perhaps even the other." Tom Paine,
indeed, had the rare gift of voicing tersely and stridently the dumb desires of the masses.
Further, a sojourn in France before and during the early part of the Revolution enabled
him to frame a crushing retort to Burke's "Reflections." The result was Part I of the
"Rights of Man," which he flung off at the "Angel" in Islington in February 1791.[28]
The general aims of the pamphlet are now as little open to question as the famous
Declaration which he sought to vindicate. Paine trenchantly attacked Burke's claim that
no people, not even our own, had an inherent right to choose its own ruler, and that the
Revolution Settlement of 1688 was binding for ever. Paine, on the contrary, asserted that
"every age and generation must be as free to act for itself in all cases as the ages and
generations that preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave
is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies." Further, on the general question at
issue, Paine remarked: "That men should take up arms, and spend their lives and fortunes,
not to maintain their rights, but to maintain they have not rights, is an entirely new species
of discovery and suited to the paradoxical genius of Mr. Burke." In reply to the noble
passage: "The age of chivalry is gone ...," Paine shrewdly says: "In the rhapsody of his
imagination he has discovered a world of windmills, and his sorrows are that there are no
Quixotes to attack them."
After thus exposing the weak points of the royalist case, Paine proceeded to defend the
mob, firstly, because the aristocratic plots against the French Revolution were really
formidable (a very disputable thesis), and secondly, because the mob in all old countries is
the outcome of their unfair and brutal system of government. "It is by distortedly exalting
some men," he says, "that others are distortedly debased, till the whole is out of nature. A
vast mass of mankind are degradedly thrown into the background of the human picture, to
bring forward with greater glare the puppet show of State and aristocracy." Here was
obviously the Junius of democracy, for whom the only effective answer was the gag and
gyve. Indeed, Burke in his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs" suggested that the
proper refutation was by means of "criminal justice."[29]
Page 24
Pitt's opinions at this time on French and English democracy tend towards a moderate and
reforming royalism—witness his comment on Burke's "Reflections," that the writer would
have done well to extol the English constitution rather than to attack the French.[30] In this
remark we may detect his preference for construction over destruction, for the allaying,
rather than the exciting, of passion. Nevertheless the one-sidedness of the English
constitution made for unrest. So soon as one bold voice clearly contrasted those defects
with the inspiring precepts of the French Rights of Man, there was an end to political
apathy. A proof of this was furnished by the number of replies called forth by Burke's
"Reflections." They numbered thirty-eight.[31] Apart from that of Paine, the "Vindiciae
Gallicae" of Sir James Mackintosh made the most impression, especially the last chapter,
wherein he declared that the conspiracy of the monarchs to crush the liberties of France
would recoil on their own heads.
Fear of the alleged royalist league quickened the sympathy of Britons with the French
reformers; while the sympathy of friends of order with Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette
after the Varennes incident deepened their apprehension of all change. Thus were called
into play all the feelings which most deeply move mankind—love of our richly storied
past and its embodiment, the English constitution; while on the other hand no small part
of our people harboured resentment against the narrow franchise and class legislation at
home, and felt a growing fear that the nascent freedom of Frenchmen might expire under
the heel of the military Powers of Central Europe. Accordingly clubs and societies grew
apace, and many of them helped on the circulation of cheap editions of Paine's pamphlet.
The result of this clash of opinion was seen in the added keenness of party strife and in
the disturbances of 14th July 1791. The occasion of these last was the celebration by a
subscription dinner of the second anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. Both at
Manchester and Birmingham the announcement of this insular and inoffensive function
aroused strong feelings either of envy or of opposition. The Tories of Manchester resolved
that, if the local Constitutional Club chose to dine on that day it should be at their peril.
The populace was urged to pull down the hotel on their heads, "as the brains of every man
who dined there would be much improved by being mingled with bricks and mortar."
Thomas Walker's control of the local constables sufficed to thwart this pleasantry.
But on that day the forces of reaction broke loose at Birmingham. In the Midland capital
political feeling ran as high as at Manchester. The best known of the reformers was Dr.
Priestley, a Unitarian minister, whose researches in physical science had gained him a
world-wide reputation and a fellowship in the Royal Society. He and many other
reforming royalism—witness his comment on Burke's "Reflections," that the writer would
have done well to extol the English constitution rather than to attack the French.[30] In this
remark we may detect his preference for construction over destruction, for the allaying,
rather than the exciting, of passion. Nevertheless the one-sidedness of the English
constitution made for unrest. So soon as one bold voice clearly contrasted those defects
with the inspiring precepts of the French Rights of Man, there was an end to political
apathy. A proof of this was furnished by the number of replies called forth by Burke's
"Reflections." They numbered thirty-eight.[31] Apart from that of Paine, the "Vindiciae
Gallicae" of Sir James Mackintosh made the most impression, especially the last chapter,
wherein he declared that the conspiracy of the monarchs to crush the liberties of France
would recoil on their own heads.
Fear of the alleged royalist league quickened the sympathy of Britons with the French
reformers; while the sympathy of friends of order with Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette
after the Varennes incident deepened their apprehension of all change. Thus were called
into play all the feelings which most deeply move mankind—love of our richly storied
past and its embodiment, the English constitution; while on the other hand no small part
of our people harboured resentment against the narrow franchise and class legislation at
home, and felt a growing fear that the nascent freedom of Frenchmen might expire under
the heel of the military Powers of Central Europe. Accordingly clubs and societies grew
apace, and many of them helped on the circulation of cheap editions of Paine's pamphlet.
The result of this clash of opinion was seen in the added keenness of party strife and in
the disturbances of 14th July 1791. The occasion of these last was the celebration by a
subscription dinner of the second anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. Both at
Manchester and Birmingham the announcement of this insular and inoffensive function
aroused strong feelings either of envy or of opposition. The Tories of Manchester resolved
that, if the local Constitutional Club chose to dine on that day it should be at their peril.
The populace was urged to pull down the hotel on their heads, "as the brains of every man
who dined there would be much improved by being mingled with bricks and mortar."
Thomas Walker's control of the local constables sufficed to thwart this pleasantry.
But on that day the forces of reaction broke loose at Birmingham. In the Midland capital
political feeling ran as high as at Manchester. The best known of the reformers was Dr.
Priestley, a Unitarian minister, whose researches in physical science had gained him a
world-wide reputation and a fellowship in the Royal Society. He and many other
Page 25
reformers proposed to feast in public in honour of the French national festival.
Unfortunately, the annoyance of the loyalists at this proposal was inflamed by a recent
sermon of Priestley on the death of Dr. Price and by the circulation of a seditious handbill.
Dr. Keir, a Churchman who was to preside at the dinner, did not prove to the satisfaction
of all that this was a trick of the enemy. Public opinion was also excited by the discovery
of the words "This barn to let" chalked on some of the churches of the town; and charges
were bandied to and fro that this was the work of the Dissenters, or of the most virulent of
their opponents.
What is certain is that these hors d'œuvres endangered the rest of the menu. The dinner-
committee, however, struggled manfully with their difficulties. They had a Churchman in
the chair, and Priestley was not present. The loyalty of the diners also received due scenic
warrant in the work of a local artist. The dining-hall of the hotel was "decorated with three
emblematical pieces of sculpture, mixed with painting in a new style of composition. The
central was a finely executed medallion of His Majesty, surrounded with a Glory, on each
side of which was an alabaster obelisk, one exhibiting Gallic Liberty breaking the bonds
of Despotism, and the other representing British Liberty in its present enjoyment." The
terms in which the fourteen toasts were proposed breathed of the same flamboyant
loyalty, the only one open to criticism being the following: "The Prince of Wales! May he
have the wisdom to prefer the glory of being the chief of an entire [sic] free people to that
of being only the splendid fountain of corruption."[32]
The dinner passed with only occasional rounds of hissing from the loyalists outside. But,
as the evening wore on and the speeches inside still continued, the crowd became restive.
Stone-throwing began and was not discouraged by the two magistrates, the Rev. Dr.
Spencer and John Carles, who had now arrived. In fact, the clergyman with an oath
praised a lad who said that Priestley ought to be ducked; Carles also promised the rabble
drink; and when a local humourist asked for permission to knock the dust out of
Priestley's wig, the champions of order burst out laughing. A witness at the trial averred
that he saw an attorney, John Brook, go among the mob and point towards Priestley's
chapel. However that may be, the rabble moved off thither and speedily wrecked it. His
residence at Fair Hill was next demolished, his library and scientific instruments being
burnt or smashed. This was but the prelude to organized attacks on the houses of the
leading Nonconformists, whether they had been at the dinner or not. The resulting riots
soon involved in ruin a large part of the town. Prominent Churchmen who sought to end
these disgraceful scenes suffered both in person and property. A word of remonstrance
Unfortunately, the annoyance of the loyalists at this proposal was inflamed by a recent
sermon of Priestley on the death of Dr. Price and by the circulation of a seditious handbill.
Dr. Keir, a Churchman who was to preside at the dinner, did not prove to the satisfaction
of all that this was a trick of the enemy. Public opinion was also excited by the discovery
of the words "This barn to let" chalked on some of the churches of the town; and charges
were bandied to and fro that this was the work of the Dissenters, or of the most virulent of
their opponents.
What is certain is that these hors d'œuvres endangered the rest of the menu. The dinner-
committee, however, struggled manfully with their difficulties. They had a Churchman in
the chair, and Priestley was not present. The loyalty of the diners also received due scenic
warrant in the work of a local artist. The dining-hall of the hotel was "decorated with three
emblematical pieces of sculpture, mixed with painting in a new style of composition. The
central was a finely executed medallion of His Majesty, surrounded with a Glory, on each
side of which was an alabaster obelisk, one exhibiting Gallic Liberty breaking the bonds
of Despotism, and the other representing British Liberty in its present enjoyment." The
terms in which the fourteen toasts were proposed breathed of the same flamboyant
loyalty, the only one open to criticism being the following: "The Prince of Wales! May he
have the wisdom to prefer the glory of being the chief of an entire [sic] free people to that
of being only the splendid fountain of corruption."[32]
The dinner passed with only occasional rounds of hissing from the loyalists outside. But,
as the evening wore on and the speeches inside still continued, the crowd became restive.
Stone-throwing began and was not discouraged by the two magistrates, the Rev. Dr.
Spencer and John Carles, who had now arrived. In fact, the clergyman with an oath
praised a lad who said that Priestley ought to be ducked; Carles also promised the rabble
drink; and when a local humourist asked for permission to knock the dust out of
Priestley's wig, the champions of order burst out laughing. A witness at the trial averred
that he saw an attorney, John Brook, go among the mob and point towards Priestley's
chapel. However that may be, the rabble moved off thither and speedily wrecked it. His
residence at Fair Hill was next demolished, his library and scientific instruments being
burnt or smashed. This was but the prelude to organized attacks on the houses of the
leading Nonconformists, whether they had been at the dinner or not. The resulting riots
soon involved in ruin a large part of the town. Prominent Churchmen who sought to end
these disgraceful scenes suffered both in person and property. A word of remonstrance
Page 26
sufficed to turn into new channels the tide of hatred and greed; for, as happened in the
Gordon riots of 1780, rascality speedily rushed in to seize the spoils.
The usually dull archives of the Home Office yield proof of the terror that reigned in the
Midland capital. A Mr. Garbett wrote to Dundas on 17th July that the wrecking still went
on, that the Nonconformists were in the utmost dread and misery, and all people looked
for help from outside to stay the pillage. As for himself, though he was not a "marked
man," his hand trembled at the scenes he had witnessed. There can be little doubt that the
magistrates from the first acted with culpable weakness, as Whitbread proved in the
House of Commons, for they did not enrol special constables until the rioters had got the
upper hand. Dundas, as Home Secretary, seems to have done his duty. The news of the
riot of the 14th reached him at 10 a.m. on the 15th (Friday); and he at once sent post haste
to Nottingham, ordering the immediate despatch of the 15th Dragoons. By dint of a forced
march of fifty-six miles the horsemen reached Birmingham on the evening of that same
day (Sunday); but two days more elapsed before drunken blackmailers ceased to molest
Hagley, Halesowen, and other villages. Few persons lost their lives, except about a dozen
of the pillagers who lay helpless with drink in the cellars of houses which their more
zealous comrades had given over to the flames.[33]
The verdict of Grenville was as follows: "I do not admire riots in favour of Government
much more than riots against it." That of his less cautious brother, the Marquis of
Buckingham, is as follows: "I am not sorry for this excess, excessive as it has been." That
of Pitt is not recorded. He did not speak during the debate on this subject on 21st May
1792; but the rejection of Whitbread's motion for an inquiry by 189 votes to 46 implies
unanimity on the Ministerial side.[34]
In the winter of 1791–2 various incidents occurred which further excited public opinion.
On 17th February 1792 appeared the second part of Paine's "Rights of Man." He started
from the assumption that the birth of a democratic State in America would herald the
advent of Revolutions not only in France, but in all lands; and that British and Hessians
would live to bless the day when they were defeated by the soldiers of Washington. He
then proceeded to arraign all Governments of the old type, and asserted that constitutions
ought to be the natural outcome of the collective activities of the whole people. There was
nothing mysterious about Government, if Courts had not hidden away the patent fact that
it dealt primarily with the making and administering of laws. We are apt to be impressed
by these remarks until we contrast them with the majestic period wherein Burke depicts
human society as a venerable and mysterious whole bequeathed by the wisdom of our
Gordon riots of 1780, rascality speedily rushed in to seize the spoils.
The usually dull archives of the Home Office yield proof of the terror that reigned in the
Midland capital. A Mr. Garbett wrote to Dundas on 17th July that the wrecking still went
on, that the Nonconformists were in the utmost dread and misery, and all people looked
for help from outside to stay the pillage. As for himself, though he was not a "marked
man," his hand trembled at the scenes he had witnessed. There can be little doubt that the
magistrates from the first acted with culpable weakness, as Whitbread proved in the
House of Commons, for they did not enrol special constables until the rioters had got the
upper hand. Dundas, as Home Secretary, seems to have done his duty. The news of the
riot of the 14th reached him at 10 a.m. on the 15th (Friday); and he at once sent post haste
to Nottingham, ordering the immediate despatch of the 15th Dragoons. By dint of a forced
march of fifty-six miles the horsemen reached Birmingham on the evening of that same
day (Sunday); but two days more elapsed before drunken blackmailers ceased to molest
Hagley, Halesowen, and other villages. Few persons lost their lives, except about a dozen
of the pillagers who lay helpless with drink in the cellars of houses which their more
zealous comrades had given over to the flames.[33]
The verdict of Grenville was as follows: "I do not admire riots in favour of Government
much more than riots against it." That of his less cautious brother, the Marquis of
Buckingham, is as follows: "I am not sorry for this excess, excessive as it has been." That
of Pitt is not recorded. He did not speak during the debate on this subject on 21st May
1792; but the rejection of Whitbread's motion for an inquiry by 189 votes to 46 implies
unanimity on the Ministerial side.[34]
In the winter of 1791–2 various incidents occurred which further excited public opinion.
On 17th February 1792 appeared the second part of Paine's "Rights of Man." He started
from the assumption that the birth of a democratic State in America would herald the
advent of Revolutions not only in France, but in all lands; and that British and Hessians
would live to bless the day when they were defeated by the soldiers of Washington. He
then proceeded to arraign all Governments of the old type, and asserted that constitutions
ought to be the natural outcome of the collective activities of the whole people. There was
nothing mysterious about Government, if Courts had not hidden away the patent fact that
it dealt primarily with the making and administering of laws. We are apt to be impressed
by these remarks until we contrast them with the majestic period wherein Burke depicts
human society as a venerable and mysterious whole bequeathed by the wisdom of our
Page 27
forefathers. An admirer of Burke cannot but quote the passage in full: "Our political
system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and
with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts;
wherein by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great
mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or
middle-aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through
the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression. Thus, by preserving
the method of nature in the conduct of the State, in what we improve we are never wholly
new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete."[35]
This is a majestic conception. But, after all, the practical question at issue is—how much
of the old shall we retain and how much must be discarded? Unfortunately for himself and
his cause, Burke was now urging his countrymen to support two military Powers in their
effort to compel the French people to revert to institutions which were alike obsolete and
detested. Is it surprising that Paine, utterly lacking all sense of reverence for the past,
should brand this conduct as treasonable to the imperious needs of the present? Viewing
monarchy as represented by Versailles or Carlton House, and aristocracy by the intrigues
of Coblentz and the orgies of Brooks's Club, he gave short shrift to both forms of
Government. Monarchy he pronounced more or less despotic; and under aristocracy (he
says) the interests of the whole body necessarily suffer; democracy alone secures the rule
of the general will; and this can be thoroughly secured only in a democratic republic. He
then attacks the English constitution as unjust and extravagant, claiming that the
formation of a close alliance between England, France, and America would enable the
expenses of government (Army, Navy, and Civil List inclusive) to be reduced to a million
and a half a year.
With regard to the means of raising revenue, Paine sketched a plan of progressive taxation
on incomes, ranging from 3d. in the pound on incomes less than £500 to punitive
proportions after £10,000 was reached; while in his Spartan arithmetic great wealth
appeared so dire a misfortune that he rid the possessors of the whole of incomes of
£23,000 and upwards. As for Pitt's financial reforms, he laughed them to scorn. He also
accused him of throwing over the fair promises that marked his early career, of
advertising for enemies abroad, while at home he toadied to the Court. "The defect lies in
the system.... Prop it as you please, it continually sinks into Court government, and ever
will." Finally he urged a limitation of armaments, and prophesied that wars would cease
when nations had their freely elected Conventions. The cynic will remember with
system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and
with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts;
wherein by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great
mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or
middle-aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through
the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression. Thus, by preserving
the method of nature in the conduct of the State, in what we improve we are never wholly
new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete."[35]
This is a majestic conception. But, after all, the practical question at issue is—how much
of the old shall we retain and how much must be discarded? Unfortunately for himself and
his cause, Burke was now urging his countrymen to support two military Powers in their
effort to compel the French people to revert to institutions which were alike obsolete and
detested. Is it surprising that Paine, utterly lacking all sense of reverence for the past,
should brand this conduct as treasonable to the imperious needs of the present? Viewing
monarchy as represented by Versailles or Carlton House, and aristocracy by the intrigues
of Coblentz and the orgies of Brooks's Club, he gave short shrift to both forms of
Government. Monarchy he pronounced more or less despotic; and under aristocracy (he
says) the interests of the whole body necessarily suffer; democracy alone secures the rule
of the general will; and this can be thoroughly secured only in a democratic republic. He
then attacks the English constitution as unjust and extravagant, claiming that the
formation of a close alliance between England, France, and America would enable the
expenses of government (Army, Navy, and Civil List inclusive) to be reduced to a million
and a half a year.
With regard to the means of raising revenue, Paine sketched a plan of progressive taxation
on incomes, ranging from 3d. in the pound on incomes less than £500 to punitive
proportions after £10,000 was reached; while in his Spartan arithmetic great wealth
appeared so dire a misfortune that he rid the possessors of the whole of incomes of
£23,000 and upwards. As for Pitt's financial reforms, he laughed them to scorn. He also
accused him of throwing over the fair promises that marked his early career, of
advertising for enemies abroad, while at home he toadied to the Court. "The defect lies in
the system.... Prop it as you please, it continually sinks into Court government, and ever
will." Finally he urged a limitation of armaments, and prophesied that wars would cease
when nations had their freely elected Conventions. The cynic will remember with
Page 28
satisfaction that, two months later, began the war between France and Austria, which
developed into the most tremendous series of wars recorded in history.
The republican and levelling doctrines frankly advocated in Paine's second pamphlet
made a greater sensation than the first part had done; and Fox, who approved the former
production, sternly reprobated the latter. It is possible that Government sought to stop its
publication; for Chapman, the publisher, to whom Paine first applied, offered him £1,000
for the manuscript, and yet very soon afterwards declared it to be too dangerous for him to
print.[36] Certainly the work soon quickened the tone of political thought. Already the
London Society for promoting Constitutional Information, which had died of inanition in
1784, had come to life again before the close of the year 1791. And at the end of that year
a determined man, Thomas Hardy, a poor shoemaker of Westminster, set to work to
interest his comrades in politics. He assembled four men at an ale-house, and they agreed
to take action. At their second meeting, on 25th January 1792, they mustered eight strong,
and resolved to start "The London Corresponding Society for the Reform of
Parliamentary Representation." Its finances were scarcely on a par with its title: they
consisted of eightpence, the first weekly subscription. But the idea proved infectious; and
amidst the heat engendered by Paine's second pamphlet, the number of members rose to
forty-one.[37] The first manifesto of the Society, dated 2nd April, claimed political liberty
as the birthright of man, declared the British nation to be misrepresented by its
Parliament, and, while repudiating all disorderly methods, demanded a thorough reform
of that body.
So far as I have been able to discover, this was the first political club started by English
working-men at that time. But now the men of Sheffield also organized themselves. Their
"Association" began in an assembly of five or six mechanics, who discussed "the
enormous high price of provisions" and "the waste and lavish [sic] of the public property
by placemen, pensioners, luxury and debauchery,—sources of the grievous burthens under
which the nation groans." The practical character of their lamentations attracted many
working men, with the result that they resolved to reprint and circulate 1,600 copies of
Paine's "Rights of Man" (Part I), at sixpence a copy. On 15th January 1792 they wrote up
to the "London Society for Constitutional Information" to plan co-operation with them.
At first the ideas of the Sheffield Association were somewhat parochial. But the need of
common action all over the Kingdom was taking shape in several minds, and when
Scotland awoke to political activity (as will appear in Chapter VII) the idea of a General
Convention took firm root and led to remarkable developments. For the present, the chief
developed into the most tremendous series of wars recorded in history.
The republican and levelling doctrines frankly advocated in Paine's second pamphlet
made a greater sensation than the first part had done; and Fox, who approved the former
production, sternly reprobated the latter. It is possible that Government sought to stop its
publication; for Chapman, the publisher, to whom Paine first applied, offered him £1,000
for the manuscript, and yet very soon afterwards declared it to be too dangerous for him to
print.[36] Certainly the work soon quickened the tone of political thought. Already the
London Society for promoting Constitutional Information, which had died of inanition in
1784, had come to life again before the close of the year 1791. And at the end of that year
a determined man, Thomas Hardy, a poor shoemaker of Westminster, set to work to
interest his comrades in politics. He assembled four men at an ale-house, and they agreed
to take action. At their second meeting, on 25th January 1792, they mustered eight strong,
and resolved to start "The London Corresponding Society for the Reform of
Parliamentary Representation." Its finances were scarcely on a par with its title: they
consisted of eightpence, the first weekly subscription. But the idea proved infectious; and
amidst the heat engendered by Paine's second pamphlet, the number of members rose to
forty-one.[37] The first manifesto of the Society, dated 2nd April, claimed political liberty
as the birthright of man, declared the British nation to be misrepresented by its
Parliament, and, while repudiating all disorderly methods, demanded a thorough reform
of that body.
So far as I have been able to discover, this was the first political club started by English
working-men at that time. But now the men of Sheffield also organized themselves. Their
"Association" began in an assembly of five or six mechanics, who discussed "the
enormous high price of provisions" and "the waste and lavish [sic] of the public property
by placemen, pensioners, luxury and debauchery,—sources of the grievous burthens under
which the nation groans." The practical character of their lamentations attracted many
working men, with the result that they resolved to reprint and circulate 1,600 copies of
Paine's "Rights of Man" (Part I), at sixpence a copy. On 15th January 1792 they wrote up
to the "London Society for Constitutional Information" to plan co-operation with them.
At first the ideas of the Sheffield Association were somewhat parochial. But the need of
common action all over the Kingdom was taking shape in several minds, and when
Scotland awoke to political activity (as will appear in Chapter VII) the idea of a General
Convention took firm root and led to remarkable developments. For the present, the chief
Page 29
work of these clubs was the circulation of Paine's volumes (even in Welsh, Gaelic, and
Erse) at the price of sixpence or even less. They also distributed "The Catechism of the
French Constitution" (of 1791), drawn up by Christie, a Scot domiciled at Paris, which set
forth the beauties of that child of many hopes. Less objectionable was a pamphlet—"The
Rights of Men and the Duties of Men." For the most part, however, their literature was
acridly republican in tone and of a levelling tendency. Thus, for the first time since the
brief attempt of the Cromwellian Levellers, the rich and the poor began to group
themselves in hostile camps, at the strident tones of Paine's cry for a graduated Income
Tax. Is it surprising that the sight of the free institutions of France and of the forced
economy of the Court of the Tuileries should lead our workers to question the utility of
the State-paid debaucheries of Carlton House, and of the whole system of patronage and
pensions? Burke and Pitt had pruned away a few of the worst excrescences; but now they
saw with dismay the whole of the body politic subjected to remorseless criticism by those
whose duty was to toil and not to think or question.
This was a new departure in eighteenth-century England. Hitherto working men had taken
only a fleeting and fitful interest in politics. How should they do so in days when
newspapers were very dear, and their contents had only the remotest bearing on the life of
the masses? The London mob had bawled and rioted for "Wilkes and Liberty," but mainly
from personal motives and love of horse-play. Now, however, all was changed; and
artisans were willing to sacrifice their time and their pence to learn and teach a political
catechism, and spread the writings of Paine. Consequently the new Radical Clubs differed
widely from the short-lived County Associations of 1780 which charged a substantial fee
for membership. Moreover, these Associations expired in the years 1783–4, owing to the
disgust at Fox's Coalition with Lord North. We are therefore justified in declaring that
English democracy entered on a new lease of life, and did not, as has been asserted,[38]
merely continue the movement of 1780. The earlier efforts had been wholly insular in
character; they aimed at staying the tide of corruption; their methods were in the main
academic, and certainly never affected the great mass of the people. Now reformers were
moved by a wider enthusiasm for the rights of humanity, and sought not merely to abolish
pocket boroughs and sinecures, but to level up the poor and level down the wealthy. It
was this aspect of Paine's teaching that excited men to a frenzy of reprobation or of hope.
A certain continuity of tradition and method is observable in a club, called The Friends of
the People, which was founded at Freemasons' Tavern in April 1792, with a subscription
of five guineas a year. The members included Cartwright, Erskine, Lord Edward
Erse) at the price of sixpence or even less. They also distributed "The Catechism of the
French Constitution" (of 1791), drawn up by Christie, a Scot domiciled at Paris, which set
forth the beauties of that child of many hopes. Less objectionable was a pamphlet—"The
Rights of Men and the Duties of Men." For the most part, however, their literature was
acridly republican in tone and of a levelling tendency. Thus, for the first time since the
brief attempt of the Cromwellian Levellers, the rich and the poor began to group
themselves in hostile camps, at the strident tones of Paine's cry for a graduated Income
Tax. Is it surprising that the sight of the free institutions of France and of the forced
economy of the Court of the Tuileries should lead our workers to question the utility of
the State-paid debaucheries of Carlton House, and of the whole system of patronage and
pensions? Burke and Pitt had pruned away a few of the worst excrescences; but now they
saw with dismay the whole of the body politic subjected to remorseless criticism by those
whose duty was to toil and not to think or question.
This was a new departure in eighteenth-century England. Hitherto working men had taken
only a fleeting and fitful interest in politics. How should they do so in days when
newspapers were very dear, and their contents had only the remotest bearing on the life of
the masses? The London mob had bawled and rioted for "Wilkes and Liberty," but mainly
from personal motives and love of horse-play. Now, however, all was changed; and
artisans were willing to sacrifice their time and their pence to learn and teach a political
catechism, and spread the writings of Paine. Consequently the new Radical Clubs differed
widely from the short-lived County Associations of 1780 which charged a substantial fee
for membership. Moreover, these Associations expired in the years 1783–4, owing to the
disgust at Fox's Coalition with Lord North. We are therefore justified in declaring that
English democracy entered on a new lease of life, and did not, as has been asserted,[38]
merely continue the movement of 1780. The earlier efforts had been wholly insular in
character; they aimed at staying the tide of corruption; their methods were in the main
academic, and certainly never affected the great mass of the people. Now reformers were
moved by a wider enthusiasm for the rights of humanity, and sought not merely to abolish
pocket boroughs and sinecures, but to level up the poor and level down the wealthy. It
was this aspect of Paine's teaching that excited men to a frenzy of reprobation or of hope.
A certain continuity of tradition and method is observable in a club, called The Friends of
the People, which was founded at Freemasons' Tavern in April 1792, with a subscription
of five guineas a year. The members included Cartwright, Erskine, Lord Edward
Page 30
Fitzgerald, Philip Francis, Charles Grey, Lambton, the Earl of Lauderdale, Mackintosh,
Sheridan, Whitbread, and some sixty others; but Fox refused to join. Their profession of
faith was more moderate than that of Hardy's Club; it emphasized the need of avoiding
innovation and of restoring the constitution to its original purity.[39] This was in the spirit
of the Associations of 1780; but the new club was far less characteristic of the times than
the clubs of working men described above.
The appearance of Paine's "Rights of Man" (Part II), the founding of these societies, and
the outbreak of war between France and Austria in April 1792 made a deep impression on
Pitt. He opposed a notice of a motion of Reform for the following session, brought
forward by Grey on 30th April. While affirming his continued interest in that subject, Pitt
deprecated its introduction at that time as involving the risk of anarchy.
My object [he continued] always has been, and is now more particularly so, to
give permanence to that which we actually enjoy rather than remove subsisting
grievances.... I once thought, and still think, upon the point of the representation
of the Commons, that, if some mode could be adopted by which the people could
have any additional security for a continuance of the blessings which they now
enjoy, it would be an improvement in the constitution of this country. That was
the extent of my object. Further I never wished to go; and if this can be obtained
without the risk of losing what we have, I should think it wise to make the
experiment. When I say this, it is not because I believe there is any existing
grievance in this country that is felt at this hour.
At the end of the American War (he continued) when bankruptcy seemed imminent, he
believed Reform to be necessary in order to restore public confidence and remedy certain
notorious grievances. Even then very many moderate men opposed his efforts as
involving danger to the State. How much more would they deprecate sweeping proposals
which rightly aroused general apprehension? He then censured the action of certain
members of the House in joining an Association (the "Friends of the People") which was
supported by those who aimed at the overthrowing of hereditary monarchy, titles of
nobility, and all ideas of subordination. He would oppose all proposals for Reform rather
than run the risk of changes so sweeping.—"All, all may be lost by an indiscreet attempt
upon the subject." Clearly, Pitt was about to join the ranks of the alarmists. But members
generally were of his opinion. In vain did Fox, Erskine, Grey, and Sheridan deprecate the
attempt to confuse moderate Reform with reckless innovation. Burke illogically but
effectively dragged in the French spectre, and Windham declared that the public mind
Sheridan, Whitbread, and some sixty others; but Fox refused to join. Their profession of
faith was more moderate than that of Hardy's Club; it emphasized the need of avoiding
innovation and of restoring the constitution to its original purity.[39] This was in the spirit
of the Associations of 1780; but the new club was far less characteristic of the times than
the clubs of working men described above.
The appearance of Paine's "Rights of Man" (Part II), the founding of these societies, and
the outbreak of war between France and Austria in April 1792 made a deep impression on
Pitt. He opposed a notice of a motion of Reform for the following session, brought
forward by Grey on 30th April. While affirming his continued interest in that subject, Pitt
deprecated its introduction at that time as involving the risk of anarchy.
My object [he continued] always has been, and is now more particularly so, to
give permanence to that which we actually enjoy rather than remove subsisting
grievances.... I once thought, and still think, upon the point of the representation
of the Commons, that, if some mode could be adopted by which the people could
have any additional security for a continuance of the blessings which they now
enjoy, it would be an improvement in the constitution of this country. That was
the extent of my object. Further I never wished to go; and if this can be obtained
without the risk of losing what we have, I should think it wise to make the
experiment. When I say this, it is not because I believe there is any existing
grievance in this country that is felt at this hour.
At the end of the American War (he continued) when bankruptcy seemed imminent, he
believed Reform to be necessary in order to restore public confidence and remedy certain
notorious grievances. Even then very many moderate men opposed his efforts as
involving danger to the State. How much more would they deprecate sweeping proposals
which rightly aroused general apprehension? He then censured the action of certain
members of the House in joining an Association (the "Friends of the People") which was
supported by those who aimed at the overthrowing of hereditary monarchy, titles of
nobility, and all ideas of subordination. He would oppose all proposals for Reform rather
than run the risk of changes so sweeping.—"All, all may be lost by an indiscreet attempt
upon the subject." Clearly, Pitt was about to join the ranks of the alarmists. But members
generally were of his opinion. In vain did Fox, Erskine, Grey, and Sheridan deprecate the
attempt to confuse moderate Reform with reckless innovation. Burke illogically but
effectively dragged in the French spectre, and Windham declared that the public mind
Page 31
here, as in other lands, was in such a state that the slightest scratch might produce a mortal
wound.
The gulf between Pitt and the reformers now became impassable. His speech of 10th May
against any relaxation of the penal laws against Unitarians is a curious blend of bigotry
and panic. Eleven days later a stringent proclamation was issued against all who wrote,
printed, and dispersed "divers wicked and seditious writings." It ordered all magistrates to
search out the authors and abettors of them, and to take steps for preventing disorder. It
also inculcated "a due submission to the laws, and a just confidence in the integrity and
wisdom of Parliament." Anything less calculated to beget such a confidence than this
proclamation, threatening alike to reformers and levellers, can scarcely be conceived. On
25th May Grey opposed it in an acrid speech; he inveighed against Pitt as an apostate,
who never kept his word, and always intended to delude Parliament and people. The sting
of the speech lay, not in these reckless charges, but in the citing of Pitt's opinions as
expressed in a resolution passed at the Thatched House Tavern in May 1782, which
declared that without Parliamentary Reform neither the liberty of the nation nor the
permanence of a virtuous administration was secure. Pitt's reply, however, convinced all
those whose minds were open to conviction. He proved to demonstration that he had
never approved of universal suffrage; yet that was now the goal aimed at by Paine and the
Societies founded on the basis of the Rights of Man. The speech of Dundas also showed
that the writings of Paine, and the founding of clubs with those ends in view, had led to
the present action of the Cabinet.
Undoubtedly those clubs had behaved in a provocative manner. Apart from their
correspondence with the Jacobins Club (which will be described later), they advocated
aims which then seemed utterly subversive of order. Thus, early in May 1792, the
Sheffield Society declared their object to be "a radical Reform of the country, as soon as
prudence and discretion would permit, and established on that system which is consistent
with the Rights of Man." Further, the hope is expressed that not only the neighbouring
towns and villages, most of which were forming similar societies, but also the whole
country would be "united in the same cause, which cannot fail of being the case wherever
the most excellent works of Thomas Paine find reception."[40]
Now, this banding together of societies and clubs pointed the way to the forming of a
National Convention which would truly represent the whole nation. In judging the action
of Pitt and his colleagues at this crisis, we must remember that they had before them the
alarming example of the Jacobins Club of Paris, which had gained enormous power by its
wound.
The gulf between Pitt and the reformers now became impassable. His speech of 10th May
against any relaxation of the penal laws against Unitarians is a curious blend of bigotry
and panic. Eleven days later a stringent proclamation was issued against all who wrote,
printed, and dispersed "divers wicked and seditious writings." It ordered all magistrates to
search out the authors and abettors of them, and to take steps for preventing disorder. It
also inculcated "a due submission to the laws, and a just confidence in the integrity and
wisdom of Parliament." Anything less calculated to beget such a confidence than this
proclamation, threatening alike to reformers and levellers, can scarcely be conceived. On
25th May Grey opposed it in an acrid speech; he inveighed against Pitt as an apostate,
who never kept his word, and always intended to delude Parliament and people. The sting
of the speech lay, not in these reckless charges, but in the citing of Pitt's opinions as
expressed in a resolution passed at the Thatched House Tavern in May 1782, which
declared that without Parliamentary Reform neither the liberty of the nation nor the
permanence of a virtuous administration was secure. Pitt's reply, however, convinced all
those whose minds were open to conviction. He proved to demonstration that he had
never approved of universal suffrage; yet that was now the goal aimed at by Paine and the
Societies founded on the basis of the Rights of Man. The speech of Dundas also showed
that the writings of Paine, and the founding of clubs with those ends in view, had led to
the present action of the Cabinet.
Undoubtedly those clubs had behaved in a provocative manner. Apart from their
correspondence with the Jacobins Club (which will be described later), they advocated
aims which then seemed utterly subversive of order. Thus, early in May 1792, the
Sheffield Society declared their object to be "a radical Reform of the country, as soon as
prudence and discretion would permit, and established on that system which is consistent
with the Rights of Man." Further, the hope is expressed that not only the neighbouring
towns and villages, most of which were forming similar societies, but also the whole
country would be "united in the same cause, which cannot fail of being the case wherever
the most excellent works of Thomas Paine find reception."[40]
Now, this banding together of societies and clubs pointed the way to the forming of a
National Convention which would truly represent the whole nation. In judging the action
of Pitt and his colleagues at this crisis, we must remember that they had before them the
alarming example of the Jacobins Club of Paris, which had gained enormous power by its
Page 32
network of affiliated clubs. This body again was modelled on the various societies of the
Illuminati in Germany, whose organizer, Weishaupt, summed up his contention in the
words: "All their union shall be carried on by the correspondence and visits of the
brethren. If we can gain but that point, we shall have succeeded in all we want."[41] This is
why the name Corresponding Society stank in the nostrils of all rulers. It implied a
parasitic organization which, if allowed to grow, would strangle the established
Government. Signs were not wanting that this was the aim of the new Radical Clubs.
Thus the delegates of the United Constitutional Societies who met at Norwich drew up on
24th March 1792 resolutions expressing satisfaction at the rapid growth of those bodies,
already numbering some hundreds, "which by delegates preserve a mutual intercourse." ...
"To Mr. Thomas Paine our thanks are specially due for his first and second parts of the
'Rights of Man'; and we sincerely wish that he may live to see his labours crowned with
success in the general diffusion of liberty and happiness among mankind." ... "We ...
earnestly entreat our brethren to increase in their Associations in order to form one grand
and extensive Union of all the friends of liberty."[42] It is not surprising that this plan of a
National Convention of levellers produced something like a panic among the well-to-do;
and it is futile to assert that men who avowed their belief in the subversive teaching of
Part II of Paine's book were concerned merely with the Reform of Parliament. They put
that object in their public manifestoes; but, like many of the Chartists of a later date, their
ultimate aim was the redistribution of wealth; and this it was which brought on them the
unflinching opposition of Pitt.
Nevertheless even these considerations do not justify him in opposing the reformers root
and branch. The greatest statesman is he who distinguishes between the real grievances of
a suffering people and the visionary or dangerous schemes which they beget in ill-
balanced brains. To oppose moderate reformers as well as extremists is both unjust and
unwise. It confounds together the would-be healers and the enemies of the existing order.
Furthermore, an indiscriminate attack tends to close the ranks in a solid phalanx, and it
should be the aim of a tactician first to seek to loosen those ranks.
Finally, we cannot forget that Pitt had had it in his power to redress the most obvious of
the grievances which kept large masses of his countrymen outside the pale of political
rights and civic privilege. Those grievances were made known to him temperately in the
years 1787, 1789, and 1790; but he refused to amend them, and gradually drifted to the
side of the alarmists and reactionaries. Who is the wiser guide at such a time? He who sets
to work betimes to cure certain ills which are producing irritation in the body politic? Or
Illuminati in Germany, whose organizer, Weishaupt, summed up his contention in the
words: "All their union shall be carried on by the correspondence and visits of the
brethren. If we can gain but that point, we shall have succeeded in all we want."[41] This is
why the name Corresponding Society stank in the nostrils of all rulers. It implied a
parasitic organization which, if allowed to grow, would strangle the established
Government. Signs were not wanting that this was the aim of the new Radical Clubs.
Thus the delegates of the United Constitutional Societies who met at Norwich drew up on
24th March 1792 resolutions expressing satisfaction at the rapid growth of those bodies,
already numbering some hundreds, "which by delegates preserve a mutual intercourse." ...
"To Mr. Thomas Paine our thanks are specially due for his first and second parts of the
'Rights of Man'; and we sincerely wish that he may live to see his labours crowned with
success in the general diffusion of liberty and happiness among mankind." ... "We ...
earnestly entreat our brethren to increase in their Associations in order to form one grand
and extensive Union of all the friends of liberty."[42] It is not surprising that this plan of a
National Convention of levellers produced something like a panic among the well-to-do;
and it is futile to assert that men who avowed their belief in the subversive teaching of
Part II of Paine's book were concerned merely with the Reform of Parliament. They put
that object in their public manifestoes; but, like many of the Chartists of a later date, their
ultimate aim was the redistribution of wealth; and this it was which brought on them the
unflinching opposition of Pitt.
Nevertheless even these considerations do not justify him in opposing the reformers root
and branch. The greatest statesman is he who distinguishes between the real grievances of
a suffering people and the visionary or dangerous schemes which they beget in ill-
balanced brains. To oppose moderate reformers as well as extremists is both unjust and
unwise. It confounds together the would-be healers and the enemies of the existing order.
Furthermore, an indiscriminate attack tends to close the ranks in a solid phalanx, and it
should be the aim of a tactician first to seek to loosen those ranks.
Finally, we cannot forget that Pitt had had it in his power to redress the most obvious of
the grievances which kept large masses of his countrymen outside the pale of political
rights and civic privilege. Those grievances were made known to him temperately in the
years 1787, 1789, and 1790; but he refused to amend them, and gradually drifted to the
side of the alarmists and reactionaries. Who is the wiser guide at such a time? He who sets
to work betimes to cure certain ills which are producing irritation in the body politic? Or
Page 33
he who looks on the irritation as a sign that nothing should be done? The lessons of
history and the experience of everyday life plead for timely cure and warn against a
nervous postponement. Doubtless Pitt would have found it difficult to persuade some of
his followers to apply the knife in the session of 1791 or 1792. But in the Parliament
elected in 1790 his position was better assured, his temper more imperious, than in that of
1785, which needed much tactful management. The fact, then, must be faced that he
declined to run the risk of the curative operation, even at a time when there were no
serious symptoms in the patient and little or no risk for the surgeon.
The reason which he assigned for his refusal claims careful notice. It was that his earlier
proposals (those of 1782–5) had aimed at national security; while those of the present
would tend to insecurity. Possibly in the month of April 1792 this argument had some
validity; though up to that time all the violence had been on the Tory side. But the plea
does not excuse Pitt for not taking action in the year 1790. That was the period when the
earlier apathy of the nation to Reform was giving way to interest, and interest had not yet
grown into excitement. Still less had loyalty waned under the repressive measures
whereby he now proposed to give it vigour.
Thus, Pitt missed a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest of his career. What it means is
clear to us, who know that the cause of Reform passed under a cloud for the space of
thirty-eight years. It is of course unfair to censure him and his friends for lacking a
prophetic vision of the long woes that were to come. Most of the blame lavished upon
him arises from forgetfulness of the fact that he was not a seer mounted on some political
Pisgah, but a pioneer struggling through an unexplored jungle. Nevertheless, as the duty
of a pioneer is not merely to hew a path, but also to note the lie of the land and the signs
of the weather, we must admit that Pitt did not possess the highest instincts of his craft.
He cannot be ranked with Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Alfred the Great, Edward I, or
Burleigh, still less with those giants of his own age, Napoleon and Stein; for these men
boldly grappled with the elements of unrest or disloyalty, and by wise legislation wrought
them into the fabric of the State. Probably the lack of response to his reforming efforts in
the year 1785 ingrained in him the conviction that Britons would always be loyal if their
burdens were lessened and their comforts increased; and now in 1792 he looked on the
remissions of taxation (described in the following chapter) as a panacea against
discontent. Under normal conditions that would have been the case. It was not so now,
because new ideas were in the air, and these forbade a bovine acceptance of abundant
fodder. In truth, Pitt had not that gift without which the highest abilities and the most
strenuous endeavours will at novel crises be at fault—a sympathetic insight into the needs
history and the experience of everyday life plead for timely cure and warn against a
nervous postponement. Doubtless Pitt would have found it difficult to persuade some of
his followers to apply the knife in the session of 1791 or 1792. But in the Parliament
elected in 1790 his position was better assured, his temper more imperious, than in that of
1785, which needed much tactful management. The fact, then, must be faced that he
declined to run the risk of the curative operation, even at a time when there were no
serious symptoms in the patient and little or no risk for the surgeon.
The reason which he assigned for his refusal claims careful notice. It was that his earlier
proposals (those of 1782–5) had aimed at national security; while those of the present
would tend to insecurity. Possibly in the month of April 1792 this argument had some
validity; though up to that time all the violence had been on the Tory side. But the plea
does not excuse Pitt for not taking action in the year 1790. That was the period when the
earlier apathy of the nation to Reform was giving way to interest, and interest had not yet
grown into excitement. Still less had loyalty waned under the repressive measures
whereby he now proposed to give it vigour.
Thus, Pitt missed a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest of his career. What it means is
clear to us, who know that the cause of Reform passed under a cloud for the space of
thirty-eight years. It is of course unfair to censure him and his friends for lacking a
prophetic vision of the long woes that were to come. Most of the blame lavished upon
him arises from forgetfulness of the fact that he was not a seer mounted on some political
Pisgah, but a pioneer struggling through an unexplored jungle. Nevertheless, as the duty
of a pioneer is not merely to hew a path, but also to note the lie of the land and the signs
of the weather, we must admit that Pitt did not possess the highest instincts of his craft.
He cannot be ranked with Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Alfred the Great, Edward I, or
Burleigh, still less with those giants of his own age, Napoleon and Stein; for these men
boldly grappled with the elements of unrest or disloyalty, and by wise legislation wrought
them into the fabric of the State. Probably the lack of response to his reforming efforts in
the year 1785 ingrained in him the conviction that Britons would always be loyal if their
burdens were lessened and their comforts increased; and now in 1792 he looked on the
remissions of taxation (described in the following chapter) as a panacea against
discontent. Under normal conditions that would have been the case. It was not so now,
because new ideas were in the air, and these forbade a bovine acceptance of abundant
fodder. In truth, Pitt had not that gift without which the highest abilities and the most
strenuous endeavours will at novel crises be at fault—a sympathetic insight into the needs
Page 34
and aspirations of the people. His analytical powers enabled him to detect the follies of
the royalist crusaders; but he lacked those higher powers of synthesis which alone could
discern the nascent strength of Democracy.
the royalist crusaders; but he lacked those higher powers of synthesis which alone could
discern the nascent strength of Democracy.
Page 35
CHAPTER II
BEFORE THE STORM
I find it to be a very general notion, at least in the
Assembly, that if France can preserve a neutrality
with England, she will be able to cope with all the
rest of Europe united.—Gower to Grenville, 22nd
April 1792.
Indirect evidence as to the intentions of a statesman is often more convincing than his
official assertions. The world always suspects the latter; and many politicians have found
it expedient to adopt the ironical device practised frequently with success by Bismarck on
his Austrian colleagues at Frankfurt, that of telling the truth. Fortunately the English party
game has nearly always been kept up with sportsmanlike fair play; and Pitt himself was
so scrupulously truthful that we are rarely in doubt as to his opinions, save when he veiled
them by ministerial reserve. Nevertheless, on the all-important subject of his attitude
towards Revolutionary France, it is satisfactory to have indirect proofs of his desire to
maintain a strict, if not friendly, neutrality. This proof lies in his handling of the nation's
armaments and finances.
The debate on the Army Estimates on 15th February 1792 is of interest in more respects
than one. The news of the definitive signature of peace between Russia and Turkey by the
Treaty of Jassy, put an end to the last fears of a resumption of war in the East; and, as the
prospects were equally pacific in the West, the Ministry carried out slight reductions in
the land forces. These were fixed in the year 1785 at seventy-three regiments of 410 men
each, divided into eight companies, with two companies en second. In 1789 the number of
companies per regiment was fixed at ten, without any companies en second. Now the
Secretary at War, Sir Charles Yonge, proposed further reductions, which, with those of
1789, would lessen each regiment by seventy privates, and save the country the sum of
£51,000. No diminution was proposed in the number of officers; and this gave Fox a
BEFORE THE STORM
I find it to be a very general notion, at least in the
Assembly, that if France can preserve a neutrality
with England, she will be able to cope with all the
rest of Europe united.—Gower to Grenville, 22nd
April 1792.
Indirect evidence as to the intentions of a statesman is often more convincing than his
official assertions. The world always suspects the latter; and many politicians have found
it expedient to adopt the ironical device practised frequently with success by Bismarck on
his Austrian colleagues at Frankfurt, that of telling the truth. Fortunately the English party
game has nearly always been kept up with sportsmanlike fair play; and Pitt himself was
so scrupulously truthful that we are rarely in doubt as to his opinions, save when he veiled
them by ministerial reserve. Nevertheless, on the all-important subject of his attitude
towards Revolutionary France, it is satisfactory to have indirect proofs of his desire to
maintain a strict, if not friendly, neutrality. This proof lies in his handling of the nation's
armaments and finances.
The debate on the Army Estimates on 15th February 1792 is of interest in more respects
than one. The news of the definitive signature of peace between Russia and Turkey by the
Treaty of Jassy, put an end to the last fears of a resumption of war in the East; and, as the
prospects were equally pacific in the West, the Ministry carried out slight reductions in
the land forces. These were fixed in the year 1785 at seventy-three regiments of 410 men
each, divided into eight companies, with two companies en second. In 1789 the number of
companies per regiment was fixed at ten, without any companies en second. Now the
Secretary at War, Sir Charles Yonge, proposed further reductions, which, with those of
1789, would lessen each regiment by seventy privates, and save the country the sum of
£51,000. No diminution was proposed in the number of officers; and this gave Fox a
Page 36
handle for an attack. He said that the natural plan would be to reduce the number of
regiments to sixty-four. Instead of that, the number of seventy regiments was retained, and
new corps were now proposed for the East Indies, one for the West Indies, and one for
Canada, chiefly to be used for pioneer work and clearance of woods. General Burgoyne
and Fox protested against the keeping up of skeleton regiments, the latter adding the
caustic comment that the plan was "the least in point of saving and the greatest in point of
patronage."[43]
The practices prevalent in that age give colour to the charge. On the other hand,
professional men have defended a system which kept up the cadres of regiments in time
of peace, as providing a body of trained officers and privates, which in time of war could
be filled out by recruits. Of course it is far inferior to the plan of a reserve of trained men;
but that plan had not yet been hammered out by Scharnhorst, under the stress of the
Napoleonic domination in Prussia. As to the reduction of seven men per company, now
proposed, it may have been due partly to political reasons. Several reports in the Home
Office and War Office archives prove that discontent was rife among the troops,
especially in the northern districts, on account of insufficient pay and the progress of
Radical propaganda among them. The reduction may have afforded the means of sifting
out the ringleaders.
Retrenchment, if not Reform, was the order of the day. Pitt discerned the important fact
that a recovery in the finance and trade of the country must be encouraged through a
series of years to produce a marked effect. For then the application of capital to industry,
and the increase in production and revenue can proceed at the rate of compound interest.
Already his hopes, for which he was indebted to the "Wealth of Nations,"[44] had been
largely realized. The Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons presented
in May 1791 showed the following growth in the ordinary revenue (exclusive of the Land
and Malt Taxes):
1786 £11,867,055
1787 12,923,134
1788 13,007,642
1789 13,433,068
1790 14,072,978
regiments to sixty-four. Instead of that, the number of seventy regiments was retained, and
new corps were now proposed for the East Indies, one for the West Indies, and one for
Canada, chiefly to be used for pioneer work and clearance of woods. General Burgoyne
and Fox protested against the keeping up of skeleton regiments, the latter adding the
caustic comment that the plan was "the least in point of saving and the greatest in point of
patronage."[43]
The practices prevalent in that age give colour to the charge. On the other hand,
professional men have defended a system which kept up the cadres of regiments in time
of peace, as providing a body of trained officers and privates, which in time of war could
be filled out by recruits. Of course it is far inferior to the plan of a reserve of trained men;
but that plan had not yet been hammered out by Scharnhorst, under the stress of the
Napoleonic domination in Prussia. As to the reduction of seven men per company, now
proposed, it may have been due partly to political reasons. Several reports in the Home
Office and War Office archives prove that discontent was rife among the troops,
especially in the northern districts, on account of insufficient pay and the progress of
Radical propaganda among them. The reduction may have afforded the means of sifting
out the ringleaders.
Retrenchment, if not Reform, was the order of the day. Pitt discerned the important fact
that a recovery in the finance and trade of the country must be encouraged through a
series of years to produce a marked effect. For then the application of capital to industry,
and the increase in production and revenue can proceed at the rate of compound interest.
Already his hopes, for which he was indebted to the "Wealth of Nations,"[44] had been
largely realized. The Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons presented
in May 1791 showed the following growth in the ordinary revenue (exclusive of the Land
and Malt Taxes):
1786 £11,867,055
1787 12,923,134
1788 13,007,642
1789 13,433,068
1790 14,072,978
Page 37
During those five years the sum of £4,750,000 had been allotted to the Sinking Fund for
the payment of the National Debt; and a further sum of £674,592, accruing from the
interest of stock and expired annuities, had gone towards the same object—a crushing
retort to the taunts of Fox and Sheridan, that the Sinking Fund was a mere pretence. On
the whole the sum of £5,424,592 had been paid off from the National Debt in five years.
It is therefore not surprising that three per cent. Consols, which were down at fifty-four
when Pitt took office at the end of 1783, touched ninety in the year 1791. The hopes and
fears of the year 1792 find expression in the fact that in March they stood at ninety-seven,
and in December dropped to seventy-four.
For the present Pitt entertained the highest hopes. In his Budget Speech of 17th February
he declared the revenue to be in so flourishing a state that he could grant relief to the
taxpayers. In the year 1791 the permanent taxes had yielded £14,132,000; and those on
land and malt brought the total up to £16,690,000; but he proposed to take £16,212,000 as
the probable revenue for the following year. The expenditure would be lessened by
£104,000 on the navy (2,000 seamen being discharged), and about £50,000 on the army;
£36,000 would also be saved by the non-renewal of the subsidy for Hessian troops. There
were, however, additions, due to the establishment of the Government of Upper Canada,
and the portions allotted to the Duke of York (on the occasion of his marriage with a
Prussian princess) and the Duke of Clarence. The expenditure would, therefore, stand at
£15,811,000; but, taking the average of four years, he reckoned the probable surplus at no
more than £401,000. On the other hand, he anticipated no new expenses except for the
fortification of posts in the West Indies and the completion of forts for the further
protection of the home dockyards. On the whole, then, he reckoned that he had £600,000
to spare; and of this amount he proposed to allocate £400,000 to the reduction of the
National Debt and the repeal of the extra duty on malt, an impost much disliked by
farmers. He also announced a remission of permanent taxes to the extent of £200,000,
namely, on female servants, carts, and waggons, and that of three shillings on each house
having less than seven windows. These were burdens that had undoubtedly affected the
poor. Further, he hoped to add the sum of £200,000 every year to the Sinking Fund, and
he pointed out that, at this rate of payment, that fund would amount to £4,000,000 per
annum in the space of fifteen years, after which time the interest might be applied to the
relief of the nation's burdens.
Then, rising high above the level of facts and figures, he ventured on this remarkable
prophecy:
the payment of the National Debt; and a further sum of £674,592, accruing from the
interest of stock and expired annuities, had gone towards the same object—a crushing
retort to the taunts of Fox and Sheridan, that the Sinking Fund was a mere pretence. On
the whole the sum of £5,424,592 had been paid off from the National Debt in five years.
It is therefore not surprising that three per cent. Consols, which were down at fifty-four
when Pitt took office at the end of 1783, touched ninety in the year 1791. The hopes and
fears of the year 1792 find expression in the fact that in March they stood at ninety-seven,
and in December dropped to seventy-four.
For the present Pitt entertained the highest hopes. In his Budget Speech of 17th February
he declared the revenue to be in so flourishing a state that he could grant relief to the
taxpayers. In the year 1791 the permanent taxes had yielded £14,132,000; and those on
land and malt brought the total up to £16,690,000; but he proposed to take £16,212,000 as
the probable revenue for the following year. The expenditure would be lessened by
£104,000 on the navy (2,000 seamen being discharged), and about £50,000 on the army;
£36,000 would also be saved by the non-renewal of the subsidy for Hessian troops. There
were, however, additions, due to the establishment of the Government of Upper Canada,
and the portions allotted to the Duke of York (on the occasion of his marriage with a
Prussian princess) and the Duke of Clarence. The expenditure would, therefore, stand at
£15,811,000; but, taking the average of four years, he reckoned the probable surplus at no
more than £401,000. On the other hand, he anticipated no new expenses except for the
fortification of posts in the West Indies and the completion of forts for the further
protection of the home dockyards. On the whole, then, he reckoned that he had £600,000
to spare; and of this amount he proposed to allocate £400,000 to the reduction of the
National Debt and the repeal of the extra duty on malt, an impost much disliked by
farmers. He also announced a remission of permanent taxes to the extent of £200,000,
namely, on female servants, carts, and waggons, and that of three shillings on each house
having less than seven windows. These were burdens that had undoubtedly affected the
poor. Further, he hoped to add the sum of £200,000 every year to the Sinking Fund, and
he pointed out that, at this rate of payment, that fund would amount to £4,000,000 per
annum in the space of fifteen years, after which time the interest might be applied to the
relief of the nation's burdens.
Then, rising high above the level of facts and figures, he ventured on this remarkable
prophecy:
Page 38
I am not, indeed, presumptuous enough to suppose that, when I name fifteen
years, I am not naming a period in which events may arise which human
foresight cannot reach, and which may baffle all our conjectures. We must not
count with certainty on a continuance of our present prosperity during such an
interval; but unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country,
when, from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen
years of peace than at the present moment.
Imagination pictures what might possibly have been the outcome of events if Great
Britain and France had continued to exert on one another the peaceful and mutually
beneficent influence which Pitt had sought to bring about. In that case, we can imagine
the reformed French monarchy, or a Republic of the type longed for by Mme. Roland,
permeating the thought and action of neighbouring States, until the cause of Parliamentary
Reform in England, and the cognate efforts for civic and religious liberty on the Continent
achieved a lasting triumph. That Pitt cherished these hopes is seen not only in his eloquent
words, but in the efforts which he put forth to open up the world to commerce. The year
1792 ought to be remembered, not only for the outbreak of war and the horrors of the
September massacres at Paris, but also for the attempt to inaugurate friendly relations
with China. Pitt set great store by the embassy which he at this time sent out to Pekin
under the lead of Lord Macartney. In happier times this enterprise might have served to
link East and West in friendly intercourse; and Europe, weary of barren strifes, would
have known no other rivalries than those of peace.
Alas: this is but a mirage. As it fades away, we discern an arid waste. War broke out
between France and Austria within two months of this sanguine utterance. It soon
embroiled France and England in mortal strife. All hope of retrenchment and Reform was
crushed. The National Debt rose by leaps and bounds, and the Sinking Fund proved to be
a snare. Taxation became an ever-grinding evil, until the poor, whose lot Pitt hoped to
lighten, looked on him as the harshest of taskmasters, the puppet of kings, and the
paymaster of the Continental Coalition. The spring of the year 1807 found England
burdened beyond endurance, the Third Coalition stricken to death by the blows of
Napoleon, while Pitt had fourteen months previously succumbed to heart-breaking toils
and woes.
Before adverting to the complications with France which were thenceforth to absorb his
energies, I must refer to some incidents of the session and summer of the year 1792.
years, I am not naming a period in which events may arise which human
foresight cannot reach, and which may baffle all our conjectures. We must not
count with certainty on a continuance of our present prosperity during such an
interval; but unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country,
when, from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen
years of peace than at the present moment.
Imagination pictures what might possibly have been the outcome of events if Great
Britain and France had continued to exert on one another the peaceful and mutually
beneficent influence which Pitt had sought to bring about. In that case, we can imagine
the reformed French monarchy, or a Republic of the type longed for by Mme. Roland,
permeating the thought and action of neighbouring States, until the cause of Parliamentary
Reform in England, and the cognate efforts for civic and religious liberty on the Continent
achieved a lasting triumph. That Pitt cherished these hopes is seen not only in his eloquent
words, but in the efforts which he put forth to open up the world to commerce. The year
1792 ought to be remembered, not only for the outbreak of war and the horrors of the
September massacres at Paris, but also for the attempt to inaugurate friendly relations
with China. Pitt set great store by the embassy which he at this time sent out to Pekin
under the lead of Lord Macartney. In happier times this enterprise might have served to
link East and West in friendly intercourse; and Europe, weary of barren strifes, would
have known no other rivalries than those of peace.
Alas: this is but a mirage. As it fades away, we discern an arid waste. War broke out
between France and Austria within two months of this sanguine utterance. It soon
embroiled France and England in mortal strife. All hope of retrenchment and Reform was
crushed. The National Debt rose by leaps and bounds, and the Sinking Fund proved to be
a snare. Taxation became an ever-grinding evil, until the poor, whose lot Pitt hoped to
lighten, looked on him as the harshest of taskmasters, the puppet of kings, and the
paymaster of the Continental Coalition. The spring of the year 1807 found England
burdened beyond endurance, the Third Coalition stricken to death by the blows of
Napoleon, while Pitt had fourteen months previously succumbed to heart-breaking toils
and woes.
Before adverting to the complications with France which were thenceforth to absorb his
energies, I must refer to some incidents of the session and summer of the year 1792.
Page 39
One of the most noteworthy enactments was Fox's Libel Bill. In May 1791 that statesman
had proposed to the House of Commons to subject cases of libel to the award of juries,
not of judges. Pitt warmly approved the measure, maintaining that, far from protecting
libellers, it would have the contrary effect. The Bill passed the Commons on 31st May;
but owing to dilatory and factious procedure in the Lords, it was held over until the year
1792. Thanks to the noble plea for liberty urged by the venerable Earl Camden, it passed
on 21st May.[45] It is matter of congratulation that Great Britain gained this new safeguard
for freedom of speech before she encountered the storms of the revolutionary era.
There is little else to chronicle except two occurrences which displayed the power and the
foresight of Pitt. They were the fall of Thurlow and the endeavour of the Prime Minister
to form a working alliance with the Old Whigs. The former of these events greatly
impressed the contemporaries of Pitt, who likened the ejected Chancellor to Lucifer or to
a Titan blasted by Jove's thunderbolt. In this age we find it difficult to account for the
prestige of Thurlow. His legal learning was far from profound, his speeches were more
ponderous than powerful, and his attacks were bludgeon blows rather than home thrusts.
Of the lighter graces and social gifts he had scant store. Indeed, his private life displayed
no redeeming feature. Everyone disliked him, but very many feared him, mainly, perhaps,
because of his facility for intrigue, his power of bullying, and his great influence at Court.
As we have seen, the conciliatory efforts of the monarch had hitherto averted a rupture
between Pitt and Thurlow. But not even the favour of George III could render the crabbed
old Chancellor endurable. His spitefulness had increased since Pitt's nomination of Pepper
Arden to the Mastership of the Rolls; and he showed his spleen by obstructing
Government measures in the House of Lords. In April 1792 he flouted Pitt's efforts on
behalf of the abolition of the Slave Trade; and on 15th May he ridiculed his proposal that
to every new State loan a Sinking Fund should necessarily be appended. The Commons
had passed this measure; but in the Lords Thurlow spoke contemptuously of the proposal;
and his influence, if not his arguments, brought the Government majority down to six.
Pitt was furious. Despite a letter from Windsor urging the need of forbearance in the
interests of the public service, he resolved to end this intolerable situation. Respectfully
but firmly he begged the King to decide between him and Thurlow. The result was a
foregone conclusion. Having to choose between an overbearing Chancellor, and a Prime
Minister whose tact, firmness, and transcendent abilities formed the keystone of the
political fabric, the King instructed Dundas to request Thurlow to deliver up the Great
Seal.[46] For the convenience of public business, his resignation was deferred to the end of
had proposed to the House of Commons to subject cases of libel to the award of juries,
not of judges. Pitt warmly approved the measure, maintaining that, far from protecting
libellers, it would have the contrary effect. The Bill passed the Commons on 31st May;
but owing to dilatory and factious procedure in the Lords, it was held over until the year
1792. Thanks to the noble plea for liberty urged by the venerable Earl Camden, it passed
on 21st May.[45] It is matter of congratulation that Great Britain gained this new safeguard
for freedom of speech before she encountered the storms of the revolutionary era.
There is little else to chronicle except two occurrences which displayed the power and the
foresight of Pitt. They were the fall of Thurlow and the endeavour of the Prime Minister
to form a working alliance with the Old Whigs. The former of these events greatly
impressed the contemporaries of Pitt, who likened the ejected Chancellor to Lucifer or to
a Titan blasted by Jove's thunderbolt. In this age we find it difficult to account for the
prestige of Thurlow. His legal learning was far from profound, his speeches were more
ponderous than powerful, and his attacks were bludgeon blows rather than home thrusts.
Of the lighter graces and social gifts he had scant store. Indeed, his private life displayed
no redeeming feature. Everyone disliked him, but very many feared him, mainly, perhaps,
because of his facility for intrigue, his power of bullying, and his great influence at Court.
As we have seen, the conciliatory efforts of the monarch had hitherto averted a rupture
between Pitt and Thurlow. But not even the favour of George III could render the crabbed
old Chancellor endurable. His spitefulness had increased since Pitt's nomination of Pepper
Arden to the Mastership of the Rolls; and he showed his spleen by obstructing
Government measures in the House of Lords. In April 1792 he flouted Pitt's efforts on
behalf of the abolition of the Slave Trade; and on 15th May he ridiculed his proposal that
to every new State loan a Sinking Fund should necessarily be appended. The Commons
had passed this measure; but in the Lords Thurlow spoke contemptuously of the proposal;
and his influence, if not his arguments, brought the Government majority down to six.
Pitt was furious. Despite a letter from Windsor urging the need of forbearance in the
interests of the public service, he resolved to end this intolerable situation. Respectfully
but firmly he begged the King to decide between him and Thurlow. The result was a
foregone conclusion. Having to choose between an overbearing Chancellor, and a Prime
Minister whose tact, firmness, and transcendent abilities formed the keystone of the
political fabric, the King instructed Dundas to request Thurlow to deliver up the Great
Seal.[46] For the convenience of public business, his resignation was deferred to the end of
Page 40
the session, which came at the middle of June. The Great Seal was then placed in
commission until January 1793 when Lord Loughborough, formerly a follower of the
Prince of Wales and Fox, became Lord Chancellor.
The dismissal of Thurlow is interesting on general as well as constitutional grounds. It
marks an important step in the evolution of the Cabinet. Thenceforth the will of the Prime
Minister was held to be paramount whenever any one of his colleagues openly and
sharply differed from him. Thus the authority of the Prime Minister became more clearly
defined. Not even the favour of the Sovereign could thenceforth uphold a Minister who
openly opposed and scorned the head of the Cabinet. The recognition of this fact has
undoubtedly conduced to the amenity of parliamentary life; for etiquette has imposed on
Ministers the observance of outward signs of deference to their chief, and (save a few
times in the breezy careers of Canning and Palmerston) dissensions have been confined to
the council chamber.
As to Thurlow's feelings, they appear in his frank admission to Sir John Scott, the future
Chancellor, Lord Eldon: "I did not think that the King would have parted with me so
easily. As to that other man [Pitt], he has done to me just what I should have done to him
if I could."[47] It is not often that a plotter shows his hand so clearly; and we must admire
Pitt's discernment no less than his firmness at this crisis. Would that he had found a more
faithful successor. Possibly some suspicion as to Loughborough's powers of intrigue led
Pitt to make cautious advances to that promising lawyer, Sir John Scott. To his honour, be
it said, Scott at once declared that he must cease to be Solicitor-General, as he had
received much assistance from Thurlow. In vain did Pitt expostulate with him. At last he
persuaded him to consult Thurlow, who advised him to do nothing so foolish, seeing that
Pitt would be compelled at some future time to confer the Great Seal upon him. With this
parting gleam of insight and kindliness, the morose figure of Thurlow vanishes.
More than once in the session of 1792 rumours were afloat as to a reconstruction of the
Cabinet. Early in that year, when the debates on the Russian armament somewhat shook
Pitt's position, it was stated that the King desired to get rid of him. Gillray heard of the
story, and visualized it with his usual skill. He represented the Marquis of Lansdowne
("Malagrida") as driving at full speed to St. James's Palace, heralded by the dove of peace,
while Fox, Sheridan, etc., hang on behind and cry out, "Stop; stop; take us in." Pitt and
Dundas are seen leaving the palace. The rumour gains in credibility from a Memorandum
of the Marquis; but it is doubtful whether George ever thought seriously of giving up Pitt,
still less of seeking support from the discredited and unpopular Lansdowne, whose views
commission until January 1793 when Lord Loughborough, formerly a follower of the
Prince of Wales and Fox, became Lord Chancellor.
The dismissal of Thurlow is interesting on general as well as constitutional grounds. It
marks an important step in the evolution of the Cabinet. Thenceforth the will of the Prime
Minister was held to be paramount whenever any one of his colleagues openly and
sharply differed from him. Thus the authority of the Prime Minister became more clearly
defined. Not even the favour of the Sovereign could thenceforth uphold a Minister who
openly opposed and scorned the head of the Cabinet. The recognition of this fact has
undoubtedly conduced to the amenity of parliamentary life; for etiquette has imposed on
Ministers the observance of outward signs of deference to their chief, and (save a few
times in the breezy careers of Canning and Palmerston) dissensions have been confined to
the council chamber.
As to Thurlow's feelings, they appear in his frank admission to Sir John Scott, the future
Chancellor, Lord Eldon: "I did not think that the King would have parted with me so
easily. As to that other man [Pitt], he has done to me just what I should have done to him
if I could."[47] It is not often that a plotter shows his hand so clearly; and we must admire
Pitt's discernment no less than his firmness at this crisis. Would that he had found a more
faithful successor. Possibly some suspicion as to Loughborough's powers of intrigue led
Pitt to make cautious advances to that promising lawyer, Sir John Scott. To his honour, be
it said, Scott at once declared that he must cease to be Solicitor-General, as he had
received much assistance from Thurlow. In vain did Pitt expostulate with him. At last he
persuaded him to consult Thurlow, who advised him to do nothing so foolish, seeing that
Pitt would be compelled at some future time to confer the Great Seal upon him. With this
parting gleam of insight and kindliness, the morose figure of Thurlow vanishes.
More than once in the session of 1792 rumours were afloat as to a reconstruction of the
Cabinet. Early in that year, when the debates on the Russian armament somewhat shook
Pitt's position, it was stated that the King desired to get rid of him. Gillray heard of the
story, and visualized it with his usual skill. He represented the Marquis of Lansdowne
("Malagrida") as driving at full speed to St. James's Palace, heralded by the dove of peace,
while Fox, Sheridan, etc., hang on behind and cry out, "Stop; stop; take us in." Pitt and
Dundas are seen leaving the palace. The rumour gains in credibility from a Memorandum
of the Marquis; but it is doubtful whether George ever thought seriously of giving up Pitt,
still less of seeking support from the discredited and unpopular Lansdowne, whose views
Page 41
on the French Revolution were utterly opposed to those of the King. Probably the King
put questions to him merely with the view of gratifying his own curiosity and exciting
unreal hopes. Certainly Pitt scoffed at the idea of resignation. On 3rd March he referred to
the rumour, in a letter to the Earl of Westmorland, merely to dismiss it as ridiculous.[48]
Far more important were the negotiations that began in May–June 1792. Pitt paved the
way for a union with the Old Whigs by consulting the opinions of the Duke of Portland
and other leading Whigs, assembled at Burlington House, respecting the proclamation
against seditious writings. They suggested a few alterations in his draft and he adopted
them. Fox alone declared against the whole scheme, and afterwards hotly opposed it in
the House of Commons. This step having shown the cleavage in the Whig party, Dundas
and Loughborough sought to effect a union of the Portland Whigs with the Government.
The Duke of Portland strongly approved of it. Even Fox welcomed the proposal, but only
on the understanding that the Whigs joined the Ministry on fair and even terms, sharing
equally in the patronage. The Duke further suggested that Pitt should give up the Treasury
and allow a neutral man like the Duke of Leeds to take that office. We can picture the
upward tilt of the nose with which Pitt received this proposal.
Lord Malmesbury, who was present at this discussion of the Whig leaders on 13th June,
himself saw great difficulties in such a plan, as also from the opposition of the King and
the Prince of Wales. On the next day Loughborough met Pitt at Dundas's house, and
reported him to be favourable to the idea of a coalition. Pitt further said that the King and
the Queen would welcome it, except in so far as it concerned Fox, whose conduct in
Parliament during the last few months had given great offence. Pitt further declared that
he did not remember a single word in all the disputes with Fox which could prevent him
honourably and consistently acting with him. He added that it might be difficult to give
him the Foreign Office at once, but he could certainly have it in a few months' time. On
16th June Malmesbury saw Fox at Burlington House, and found him in an unusually acrid
and suspicious mood, from the notion that the whole affair was a plot of Pitt to break up
the Whig party. Beside which, Fox said that it was idle to expect Pitt to admit the Whig
leaders on an equal footing. Malmesbury, however, maintained that, if Fox and the Duke
were agreed, they would lead the whole of their party with them, at which remark Fox
became silent and embarrassed.
Pitt, on the other hand, was very open to Loughborough, and expressed a wish to form a
strong and united Ministry which could face the difficulties of the time. The chief obstacle
to a coalition, he said, was Fox's support of French principles, which must preclude his
put questions to him merely with the view of gratifying his own curiosity and exciting
unreal hopes. Certainly Pitt scoffed at the idea of resignation. On 3rd March he referred to
the rumour, in a letter to the Earl of Westmorland, merely to dismiss it as ridiculous.[48]
Far more important were the negotiations that began in May–June 1792. Pitt paved the
way for a union with the Old Whigs by consulting the opinions of the Duke of Portland
and other leading Whigs, assembled at Burlington House, respecting the proclamation
against seditious writings. They suggested a few alterations in his draft and he adopted
them. Fox alone declared against the whole scheme, and afterwards hotly opposed it in
the House of Commons. This step having shown the cleavage in the Whig party, Dundas
and Loughborough sought to effect a union of the Portland Whigs with the Government.
The Duke of Portland strongly approved of it. Even Fox welcomed the proposal, but only
on the understanding that the Whigs joined the Ministry on fair and even terms, sharing
equally in the patronage. The Duke further suggested that Pitt should give up the Treasury
and allow a neutral man like the Duke of Leeds to take that office. We can picture the
upward tilt of the nose with which Pitt received this proposal.
Lord Malmesbury, who was present at this discussion of the Whig leaders on 13th June,
himself saw great difficulties in such a plan, as also from the opposition of the King and
the Prince of Wales. On the next day Loughborough met Pitt at Dundas's house, and
reported him to be favourable to the idea of a coalition. Pitt further said that the King and
the Queen would welcome it, except in so far as it concerned Fox, whose conduct in
Parliament during the last few months had given great offence. Pitt further declared that
he did not remember a single word in all the disputes with Fox which could prevent him
honourably and consistently acting with him. He added that it might be difficult to give
him the Foreign Office at once, but he could certainly have it in a few months' time. On
16th June Malmesbury saw Fox at Burlington House, and found him in an unusually acrid
and suspicious mood, from the notion that the whole affair was a plot of Pitt to break up
the Whig party. Beside which, Fox said that it was idle to expect Pitt to admit the Whig
leaders on an equal footing. Malmesbury, however, maintained that, if Fox and the Duke
were agreed, they would lead the whole of their party with them, at which remark Fox
became silent and embarrassed.
Pitt, on the other hand, was very open to Loughborough, and expressed a wish to form a
strong and united Ministry which could face the difficulties of the time. The chief obstacle
to a coalition, he said, was Fox's support of French principles, which must preclude his
Page 42
taking the Foreign Office immediately. The remark is noteworthy as implying Pitt's
expectation that either Fox might tone down his opinions, or the Revolution might abate
its violence. Further, when Loughborough reminded him of the ardour of his advocacy of
the Abolitionist cause, he replied that some concession must be made on that head, as the
King strongly objected to the way in which it was pushed on by addresses and petitions, a
method which he himself disliked. Further, he freely admitted that the "national
Aristocracy" of the country must have its due weight and power.[49] These confessions
(assuming that Loughborough reported them correctly) prepare us for the half right turn
which now becomes the trend of Pitt's political career. In order to further the formation of
a truly national party, he was willing, if necessary, to postpone the cause of the slaves and
of Parliamentary Reform until the advent of calmer times.
At this stage of the discussions, then, Pitt was willing to meet the Whigs half way. But the
chief difficulty lay, not with Fox and his friends, but with the King. When Pitt mentioned
the proposal to him, there came the characteristic reply: "Anything complimentary to
them, but no power."[50] How was it possible to harmonize this resolve with that of Fox,
that the Whigs must have an equality of power? Grenville was a further obstacle. How
could that stiff and ambitious man give up the Foreign Office to Fox, whose principles he
detested? We hear little of Grenville in these days, probably because of his marriage to
Lady Ann Pitt, daughter of Lord Camelford. But certainly he would not have tolerated a
half Whig Cabinet.
It is therefore strange that the proposals were ever renewed. Renewed, however, they
were, in the second week of July. Loughborough having spread the impression that Pitt
desired their renewal, Leeds was again pushed to the front, it being suggested that he
might be First Lord of the Treasury. Finally, on 14th August, the King granted him a
private interview at Windsor, but stated that nothing had been said on the subject for a
long time, and that it had never been seriously considered, it being impossible for Pitt to
give up the Treasury and act as Commis to the Whig leaders. This statement should have
lessened the Duke's astonishment at hearing from Pitt on 22nd August that there had been
no thought of any change in the Government.[51] This assertion seems to belie Pitt's
reputation for truthfulness. But it is noteworthy that Grenville scarcely refers to the
discussions on this subject, deeply though it concerned him. Further, Rose, who was in
close touch with Ministers, wrote to Auckland on 13th July that he had heard only through
the newspapers of the "negotiations for a sort of Coalition," and that he knew there had
expectation that either Fox might tone down his opinions, or the Revolution might abate
its violence. Further, when Loughborough reminded him of the ardour of his advocacy of
the Abolitionist cause, he replied that some concession must be made on that head, as the
King strongly objected to the way in which it was pushed on by addresses and petitions, a
method which he himself disliked. Further, he freely admitted that the "national
Aristocracy" of the country must have its due weight and power.[49] These confessions
(assuming that Loughborough reported them correctly) prepare us for the half right turn
which now becomes the trend of Pitt's political career. In order to further the formation of
a truly national party, he was willing, if necessary, to postpone the cause of the slaves and
of Parliamentary Reform until the advent of calmer times.
At this stage of the discussions, then, Pitt was willing to meet the Whigs half way. But the
chief difficulty lay, not with Fox and his friends, but with the King. When Pitt mentioned
the proposal to him, there came the characteristic reply: "Anything complimentary to
them, but no power."[50] How was it possible to harmonize this resolve with that of Fox,
that the Whigs must have an equality of power? Grenville was a further obstacle. How
could that stiff and ambitious man give up the Foreign Office to Fox, whose principles he
detested? We hear little of Grenville in these days, probably because of his marriage to
Lady Ann Pitt, daughter of Lord Camelford. But certainly he would not have tolerated a
half Whig Cabinet.
It is therefore strange that the proposals were ever renewed. Renewed, however, they
were, in the second week of July. Loughborough having spread the impression that Pitt
desired their renewal, Leeds was again pushed to the front, it being suggested that he
might be First Lord of the Treasury. Finally, on 14th August, the King granted him a
private interview at Windsor, but stated that nothing had been said on the subject for a
long time, and that it had never been seriously considered, it being impossible for Pitt to
give up the Treasury and act as Commis to the Whig leaders. This statement should have
lessened the Duke's astonishment at hearing from Pitt on 22nd August that there had been
no thought of any change in the Government.[51] This assertion seems to belie Pitt's
reputation for truthfulness. But it is noteworthy that Grenville scarcely refers to the
discussions on this subject, deeply though it concerned him. Further, Rose, who was in
close touch with Ministers, wrote to Auckland on 13th July that he had heard only through
the newspapers of the "negotiations for a sort of Coalition," and that he knew there had
Page 43
been none; that Dundas had conferred with Loughborough, but there had been no
negotiation.[52]
Now the proneness of these two men to scheming and intrigue is well known; and it
seems probable that they so skilfully pulled the wires at Burlington House as to quicken
the appetites of the Whig leaders. Dundas may have acted with a view to breaking up the
Whig party, and Loughborough in order to bring about a general shuffle of the cards
favourable to himself. Malmesbury and others, whose desires or interests lay in a union of
the Portland Whigs with Pitt, furthered the scheme, and gave full credence to
Loughborough's reports. But we may doubt whether Pitt took the affair seriously after the
crushing declaration of the King: "Anything complimentary to them, but no power." The
last blow to the scheme was dealt by Pitt in an interview with Loughborough, so we may
infer from the following letter from George III to the former:
Weymouth, August 20, 1792.[53]
I cannot but think Mr. Pitt has judged right in seeing Lord Loughborough, as that
will convince him, however [whoever?] were parties to the proposal brought by
the Duke of Leeds, that the scheme can never succeed: that the Duke of Portland
was equally concerned with the former appeared clearly from his letters....
The King, then, looked on the whole affair as a Whig plot; and Pitt, whatever his feelings
were at first, finally frowned upon the proposal. Doubtless, in an official sense, there was
justification for his remark to the Duke of Leeds, that the coalition had never been in
contemplation; for the matter seems never to have come before the Cabinet. But as a
statement between man and man it leaves something to be desired on the score of
accuracy. Annoyance at the very exalted position marked out for the Duke, whose
capacity Pitt rated decidedly low, may have led him to belittle the whole affair; for signs
of constraint and annoyance are obvious in his other answers to his late colleague. There,
then, we must leave this question, involved in something of mystery.[54] We shall not be
far wrong in concluding that Pitt wished for the formation of a national Ministry, and that
the plan failed, partly from the resolve of Fox never to play second to Pitt; and still more
from the personal way in which the King regarded the suggestion.
The King meanwhile had marked his sense of the value of Pitt's services by pressing on
him the honourable position of Warden of the Cinque Ports, with a stipend of £3,000 a
negotiation.[52]
Now the proneness of these two men to scheming and intrigue is well known; and it
seems probable that they so skilfully pulled the wires at Burlington House as to quicken
the appetites of the Whig leaders. Dundas may have acted with a view to breaking up the
Whig party, and Loughborough in order to bring about a general shuffle of the cards
favourable to himself. Malmesbury and others, whose desires or interests lay in a union of
the Portland Whigs with Pitt, furthered the scheme, and gave full credence to
Loughborough's reports. But we may doubt whether Pitt took the affair seriously after the
crushing declaration of the King: "Anything complimentary to them, but no power." The
last blow to the scheme was dealt by Pitt in an interview with Loughborough, so we may
infer from the following letter from George III to the former:
Weymouth, August 20, 1792.[53]
I cannot but think Mr. Pitt has judged right in seeing Lord Loughborough, as that
will convince him, however [whoever?] were parties to the proposal brought by
the Duke of Leeds, that the scheme can never succeed: that the Duke of Portland
was equally concerned with the former appeared clearly from his letters....
The King, then, looked on the whole affair as a Whig plot; and Pitt, whatever his feelings
were at first, finally frowned upon the proposal. Doubtless, in an official sense, there was
justification for his remark to the Duke of Leeds, that the coalition had never been in
contemplation; for the matter seems never to have come before the Cabinet. But as a
statement between man and man it leaves something to be desired on the score of
accuracy. Annoyance at the very exalted position marked out for the Duke, whose
capacity Pitt rated decidedly low, may have led him to belittle the whole affair; for signs
of constraint and annoyance are obvious in his other answers to his late colleague. There,
then, we must leave this question, involved in something of mystery.[54] We shall not be
far wrong in concluding that Pitt wished for the formation of a national Ministry, and that
the plan failed, partly from the resolve of Fox never to play second to Pitt; and still more
from the personal way in which the King regarded the suggestion.
The King meanwhile had marked his sense of the value of Pitt's services by pressing on
him the honourable position of Warden of the Cinque Ports, with a stipend of £3,000 a
Page 44
year, intimating at the same time that he would not hear of his declining it (6th August).
[55] It is a proof of the spotless purity of Pitt's reputation that not a single libel or gibe
appeared in the Press on his acceptance of this almost honorary post.[56]
One brilliant recruit to the Whig ranks was now won over to the national cause, of which
Pitt was seen to be the incarnation. Already at Eton and Oxford George Canning had
shown the versatility of his genius and the precocious maturity of his eloquence. When his
Oxford friend, Jenkinson (the future Earl of Liverpool) made a sensational début in the
House on the Tory side, Sheridan remarked that the Whigs would soon provide an
antidote in the person of young Canning. Great, then, was their annoyance when the
prodigy showed signs of breaking away from the society of the Crewes and Sheridan, in
order to ally himself with Pitt. So little is known respecting the youth of Canning that the
motives which prompted his breach with Sheridan are involved in uncertainty. It is clear,
however, from his own confession that, after some discussion with Orde, he himself made
the first offer of allegiance to Pitt in a letter of 26th July 1792. He then informed the
Prime Minister that, though on terms of friendship with eminent members of the
Opposition, he was "in no way bound to them by any personal or political obligation," and
was therefore entirely free to choose his own party; that he was ambitious of being
connected with Pitt, but lacked the means to win an election, and yet refused to be
brought in by any individual—a reference, seemingly, to an offer made to him by the
Duke of Portland. In reply, Pitt proposed an interview at Downing Street on Wednesday,
15th August.[57]
At noon on that day the two men first met. We can picture them as they faced one another
in the formal surroundings of the Prime Minister's study. Pitt, at this time thirty-three
years of age, had lost some of the slimness of youth, but his figure was bony, angular, and
somewhat awkward. His face was as yet scarcely marked by the slight Bacchic blotches
which told of carouses with Dundas at Wimbledon. Months and years of triumph (apart
from the Russian defeat) had stiffened his confidence and pride; but the fateful shadow of
the French Revolution must have struck a chill to his being, especially then, on the arrival
of news of the pitiable surrender of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and the shooting
down of the Swiss Guards at the Tuileries. No royalist could look on the future without
inward shuddering; and both these men were ardent royalists. We know from Canning's
confession that it was the starting of the club, the Friends of the People, in April 1792,
which disgusted him with the forward section of the Whigs; and their subsequent action
completed the breach. Pitt's endeavour to form a national Administration must have
[55] It is a proof of the spotless purity of Pitt's reputation that not a single libel or gibe
appeared in the Press on his acceptance of this almost honorary post.[56]
One brilliant recruit to the Whig ranks was now won over to the national cause, of which
Pitt was seen to be the incarnation. Already at Eton and Oxford George Canning had
shown the versatility of his genius and the precocious maturity of his eloquence. When his
Oxford friend, Jenkinson (the future Earl of Liverpool) made a sensational début in the
House on the Tory side, Sheridan remarked that the Whigs would soon provide an
antidote in the person of young Canning. Great, then, was their annoyance when the
prodigy showed signs of breaking away from the society of the Crewes and Sheridan, in
order to ally himself with Pitt. So little is known respecting the youth of Canning that the
motives which prompted his breach with Sheridan are involved in uncertainty. It is clear,
however, from his own confession that, after some discussion with Orde, he himself made
the first offer of allegiance to Pitt in a letter of 26th July 1792. He then informed the
Prime Minister that, though on terms of friendship with eminent members of the
Opposition, he was "in no way bound to them by any personal or political obligation," and
was therefore entirely free to choose his own party; that he was ambitious of being
connected with Pitt, but lacked the means to win an election, and yet refused to be
brought in by any individual—a reference, seemingly, to an offer made to him by the
Duke of Portland. In reply, Pitt proposed an interview at Downing Street on Wednesday,
15th August.[57]
At noon on that day the two men first met. We can picture them as they faced one another
in the formal surroundings of the Prime Minister's study. Pitt, at this time thirty-three
years of age, had lost some of the slimness of youth, but his figure was bony, angular, and
somewhat awkward. His face was as yet scarcely marked by the slight Bacchic blotches
which told of carouses with Dundas at Wimbledon. Months and years of triumph (apart
from the Russian defeat) had stiffened his confidence and pride; but the fateful shadow of
the French Revolution must have struck a chill to his being, especially then, on the arrival
of news of the pitiable surrender of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and the shooting
down of the Swiss Guards at the Tuileries. No royalist could look on the future without
inward shuddering; and both these men were ardent royalists. We know from Canning's
confession that it was the starting of the club, the Friends of the People, in April 1792,
which disgusted him with the forward section of the Whigs; and their subsequent action
completed the breach. Pitt's endeavour to form a national Administration must have
Page 45
gained a new significance from the terrible news from Paris. We may be sure, then, that
the youth of twenty-two years gazed with eager interest on the stately form before him as
at the embodiment of political wisdom, purity, and patriotism.
They shook hands. Then for a time they ambled coyly around the subject at issue, and
talked of "France and Jenkinson, and other equally important concerns." Indeed Pitt
seems to have been as nervous and awkward as the novice. At length he plunged into
business. "It is your wish, I believe, Mr. Canning (and I am sure it is mine), to come in,
etc." On Canning bowing assent, Pitt remarked that it was not easy to find an inexpensive
seat, and commented on his expressed desire not to tie himself to any borough-owner.
Whereupon the young aspirant, with more pride than tact, threw in the remark that he
would not like to be personally beholden to such an one, for instance, as Lord Lonsdale
(who first brought Pitt into Parliament). The Prime Minister seemed not to notice the
gaucherie, and stated that the Treasury had only six seats at its disposal, but could arrange
matters with "proprietors of burgage-tenures." Thereupon Canning broke in more deftly.
In that case, he said, it must be made clear that he bound himself to follow, not the
borough-owner, but the Prime Minister. Here he more than recovered lost ground, if
indeed he had lost any. Pitt expressed his sense of the compliment, and said that this could
be managed, unless the young member came to differ absolutely from his patron. Canning
then frankly confessed his inability to follow Pitt in maintaining the Test Act. Equally
frank and cordial was the reply, that he (Pitt) did not claim exact agreement, especially on
"speculative subjects," but only "a general good disposition towards Government," which
might be strengthened by frequent contact.
Such was the course of this memorable interview. It sealed for ever the allegiance of the
youth to his self-chosen leader. He had prepared Sheridan, and through him Fox and
Bouverie, for this change of front. The openness, the charm, the self-effacing patriotism
of the Minister thenceforth drew him as by an irresistible magnet. The brilliance and
joviality of Fox and Sheridan counted as nothing against the national impulse which the
master now set in motion and the pupil was destined to carry to further lengths. There was
a natural sympathy between these men both in aim and temperament. It is a sign of the
greatness of Pitt that from the outset he laid the spell of his genius irrevocably upon
Canning.
the youth of twenty-two years gazed with eager interest on the stately form before him as
at the embodiment of political wisdom, purity, and patriotism.
They shook hands. Then for a time they ambled coyly around the subject at issue, and
talked of "France and Jenkinson, and other equally important concerns." Indeed Pitt
seems to have been as nervous and awkward as the novice. At length he plunged into
business. "It is your wish, I believe, Mr. Canning (and I am sure it is mine), to come in,
etc." On Canning bowing assent, Pitt remarked that it was not easy to find an inexpensive
seat, and commented on his expressed desire not to tie himself to any borough-owner.
Whereupon the young aspirant, with more pride than tact, threw in the remark that he
would not like to be personally beholden to such an one, for instance, as Lord Lonsdale
(who first brought Pitt into Parliament). The Prime Minister seemed not to notice the
gaucherie, and stated that the Treasury had only six seats at its disposal, but could arrange
matters with "proprietors of burgage-tenures." Thereupon Canning broke in more deftly.
In that case, he said, it must be made clear that he bound himself to follow, not the
borough-owner, but the Prime Minister. Here he more than recovered lost ground, if
indeed he had lost any. Pitt expressed his sense of the compliment, and said that this could
be managed, unless the young member came to differ absolutely from his patron. Canning
then frankly confessed his inability to follow Pitt in maintaining the Test Act. Equally
frank and cordial was the reply, that he (Pitt) did not claim exact agreement, especially on
"speculative subjects," but only "a general good disposition towards Government," which
might be strengthened by frequent contact.
Such was the course of this memorable interview. It sealed for ever the allegiance of the
youth to his self-chosen leader. He had prepared Sheridan, and through him Fox and
Bouverie, for this change of front. The openness, the charm, the self-effacing patriotism
of the Minister thenceforth drew him as by an irresistible magnet. The brilliance and
joviality of Fox and Sheridan counted as nothing against the national impulse which the
master now set in motion and the pupil was destined to carry to further lengths. There was
a natural sympathy between these men both in aim and temperament. It is a sign of the
greatness of Pitt that from the outset he laid the spell of his genius irrevocably upon
Canning.
Page 46
Deferring to the next chapter a study of the democratic movement in Great Britain, we
now turn our attention to the relations of Pitt to France, a topic which thenceforth
dominates his life story and the destinies of mankind.
In the month of January 1792, there arrived in London an envoy charged with important
proposals from the French Government. It was Talleyrand, ex-bishop of Autun. Pitt had
become acquainted with him during his residence at Rheims in the summer of 1783; but
the circumstances of the case now forbade anything more than passing intercourse with
that most charming of talkers and subtlest of diplomatists. Talleyrand, having been a
member of the first, or Constituent, Assembly, was prevented by the constitution of
September 1791 from holding any office for two years after that date. Therefore his visit
to London was ostensibly on private affairs. The Duc de Biron was the envoy, and
Talleyrand merely his adviser. He was instructed to seek "to maintain and strengthen the
good understanding which exists between the two Kingdoms."[58]
This was only the official pretext for the mission, the secret aim of which was to win the
friendship, if not the alliance, of England in case of a Franco-Austrian war. In the early
days of January 1792 the constitutional Ministry, holding office, though not power, at
Paris, seemed to be working for a rupture with the Hapsburgs, partly in order to please the
Jacobins, and partly to escape the ever increasing difficulties of its position. The earlier
causes of dispute do not concern us here. As we have seen, the Emperor Leopold was far
from desirous of war; but the provocative attitude of the Legislative Assembly at Paris
and the humiliations of his sister, Marie Antoinette, aroused his resentment; and, early in
January, he was heard to say "that if the French madmen were determined to force him
into a war, they should find that the pacific Leopold knew how to wage it with the greatest
vigour, and would oblige them to pay its expenses in something more solid than
assignats." Our ambassador, Sir Robert Keith, was, however, convinced that this outburst
and the westward march of troops were but "empty parade."[59]
On the other hand Earl Gower, British ambassador at Paris, reported that the Ministry, the
Assembly, and the Jacobins Club (with the exception of Robespierre and his clique)
desired war.[60] In truth, there seemed little risk in a struggle with the exhausted Hapsburg
States, provided that they had support neither from Prussia nor from England. De Ségur
therefore set out for Berlin, and Talleyrand for London, to secure the friendly neutrality or
support of those Governments. The latter envoy was specially suited for his mission, as he
carried on the traditions of Mirabeau, who in the closing months of his life urged the need
of an Anglo-French entente.[61]
now turn our attention to the relations of Pitt to France, a topic which thenceforth
dominates his life story and the destinies of mankind.
In the month of January 1792, there arrived in London an envoy charged with important
proposals from the French Government. It was Talleyrand, ex-bishop of Autun. Pitt had
become acquainted with him during his residence at Rheims in the summer of 1783; but
the circumstances of the case now forbade anything more than passing intercourse with
that most charming of talkers and subtlest of diplomatists. Talleyrand, having been a
member of the first, or Constituent, Assembly, was prevented by the constitution of
September 1791 from holding any office for two years after that date. Therefore his visit
to London was ostensibly on private affairs. The Duc de Biron was the envoy, and
Talleyrand merely his adviser. He was instructed to seek "to maintain and strengthen the
good understanding which exists between the two Kingdoms."[58]
This was only the official pretext for the mission, the secret aim of which was to win the
friendship, if not the alliance, of England in case of a Franco-Austrian war. In the early
days of January 1792 the constitutional Ministry, holding office, though not power, at
Paris, seemed to be working for a rupture with the Hapsburgs, partly in order to please the
Jacobins, and partly to escape the ever increasing difficulties of its position. The earlier
causes of dispute do not concern us here. As we have seen, the Emperor Leopold was far
from desirous of war; but the provocative attitude of the Legislative Assembly at Paris
and the humiliations of his sister, Marie Antoinette, aroused his resentment; and, early in
January, he was heard to say "that if the French madmen were determined to force him
into a war, they should find that the pacific Leopold knew how to wage it with the greatest
vigour, and would oblige them to pay its expenses in something more solid than
assignats." Our ambassador, Sir Robert Keith, was, however, convinced that this outburst
and the westward march of troops were but "empty parade."[59]
On the other hand Earl Gower, British ambassador at Paris, reported that the Ministry, the
Assembly, and the Jacobins Club (with the exception of Robespierre and his clique)
desired war.[60] In truth, there seemed little risk in a struggle with the exhausted Hapsburg
States, provided that they had support neither from Prussia nor from England. De Ségur
therefore set out for Berlin, and Talleyrand for London, to secure the friendly neutrality or
support of those Governments. The latter envoy was specially suited for his mission, as he
carried on the traditions of Mirabeau, who in the closing months of his life urged the need
of an Anglo-French entente.[61]
Page 47
Talleyrand and Biron reached London on 24th January 1792. Before reaching the capital
they read in the English papers that they had arrived there, and had been very coldly
received by Pitt—a specimen of the arts by which the French émigrés in London sought
to embitter the relations between the two lands. Talleyrand had the good fortune to occupy
a seat in the Strangers' Gallery at the opening of Parliament close to two ardent royalists,
Cazalès and Lally-Tollendal. What must have been their feelings on hearing in the King's
speech the statement of his friendly relations to the other Powers and his resolve to reduce
the army and navy?
Already Pitt had seen Talleyrand. He reminded him in a friendly way of their meeting at
Rheims, remarked on the unofficial character of the ex-bishop's "mission," but expressed
his willingness to discuss French affairs, about which he even showed "curiosity."
Grenville afterwards spoke to the envoy in the same courteous but non-committal manner.
Talleyrand was, however, charmed. He wrote to Delessart, the Foreign Minister at Paris:
"Your best ground is England; ... Believe me the rumours current in France about the
disposition of England towards us are false."[62] He urged the need of showing a bold
front; for "it is with a fleet that you must speak to England."
Talleyrand throughout showed the sagacity which earned him fame in diplomacy. He was
not depressed by the King's frigid reception of him at St. James's on 1st February, or by
the Queen refusing even to notice him. Even the escapades of Biron did not dash his
hopes. That envoy ran up debts and bargained about horses avec un nommé Tattersall, qui
tient dans sa main tous les chevaux d'Angleterre, until he was arrested for debt and
immured in a "sponging house," whence the appeals of the ex-bishop failed to rescue him.
As Biron had come with an official order to buy horses with a view to the impending war
with Austria, we may infer that his arrest was the work of some keen-witted émigré.
Even this, however, was better than the fortunes of Ségur, who found himself openly
flouted both by King and courtiers at Berlin. For Frederick William was still bent on a
vigorous policy. On 7th February his Ministers signed with Prince Reuss, the Austrian
envoy, a secret treaty of defensive alliance, mainly for the settlement of French affairs, but
also with a side glance at Poland. The Prussian Ministers probably hoped for a peaceful
but profitable settlement, which would leave them free for a decisive intervention in the
Polish troubles now coming to a crisis; but Frederick William was in a more warlike
mood, and longed to overthrow the "rebels" in France. Ségur's mission to Berlin was
therefore an utter failure. That of Talleyrand, on the other hand, achieved its purpose,
mainly because Pitt and Grenville never had any other desire than to remain strictly
they read in the English papers that they had arrived there, and had been very coldly
received by Pitt—a specimen of the arts by which the French émigrés in London sought
to embitter the relations between the two lands. Talleyrand had the good fortune to occupy
a seat in the Strangers' Gallery at the opening of Parliament close to two ardent royalists,
Cazalès and Lally-Tollendal. What must have been their feelings on hearing in the King's
speech the statement of his friendly relations to the other Powers and his resolve to reduce
the army and navy?
Already Pitt had seen Talleyrand. He reminded him in a friendly way of their meeting at
Rheims, remarked on the unofficial character of the ex-bishop's "mission," but expressed
his willingness to discuss French affairs, about which he even showed "curiosity."
Grenville afterwards spoke to the envoy in the same courteous but non-committal manner.
Talleyrand was, however, charmed. He wrote to Delessart, the Foreign Minister at Paris:
"Your best ground is England; ... Believe me the rumours current in France about the
disposition of England towards us are false."[62] He urged the need of showing a bold
front; for "it is with a fleet that you must speak to England."
Talleyrand throughout showed the sagacity which earned him fame in diplomacy. He was
not depressed by the King's frigid reception of him at St. James's on 1st February, or by
the Queen refusing even to notice him. Even the escapades of Biron did not dash his
hopes. That envoy ran up debts and bargained about horses avec un nommé Tattersall, qui
tient dans sa main tous les chevaux d'Angleterre, until he was arrested for debt and
immured in a "sponging house," whence the appeals of the ex-bishop failed to rescue him.
As Biron had come with an official order to buy horses with a view to the impending war
with Austria, we may infer that his arrest was the work of some keen-witted émigré.
Even this, however, was better than the fortunes of Ségur, who found himself openly
flouted both by King and courtiers at Berlin. For Frederick William was still bent on a
vigorous policy. On 7th February his Ministers signed with Prince Reuss, the Austrian
envoy, a secret treaty of defensive alliance, mainly for the settlement of French affairs, but
also with a side glance at Poland. The Prussian Ministers probably hoped for a peaceful
but profitable settlement, which would leave them free for a decisive intervention in the
Polish troubles now coming to a crisis; but Frederick William was in a more warlike
mood, and longed to overthrow the "rebels" in France. Ségur's mission to Berlin was
therefore an utter failure. That of Talleyrand, on the other hand, achieved its purpose,
mainly because Pitt and Grenville never had any other desire than to remain strictly
Page 48
neutral. It was therefore superfluous for Talleyrand to hint delicately at the desirability of
the friendship of France for England, in view of the war with Tippoo Sahib in India, and
the increasing ferment in Ireland.[63]
On 1st March Grenville again assured him of the earnest desire of the British Government
to see the end of the troubles in France, and declared that Pitt and he had been deeply
wounded by the oft-repeated insinuations that they had sought to foment them. All such
charges were absurd; for "a commercial people stands only to gain by the freedom of all
those who surround it." We may reasonably conclude that these were the words of Pitt; for
they recall that noble passage of the "Wealth of Nations": "A nation that would enrich
itself by trade is certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich,
industrious, and commercial nations."[64] For the rest, Grenville defied the calumniators
of England to adduce a single proof in support of their slanders, and requested Talleyrand
to remain some time in England for the purpose of observing public opinion. He warned
him, however, that the Cabinet could not give an answer to his main proposal.
More than this Talleyrand could scarcely expect. He had already divined the important
secret that the Cabinet was divided on this subject, the King, Thurlow, and Camden being
hostile to France, while Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas were friendly. When Talleyrand
ventured to ascribe those sentiments to Pitt and Grenville, the latter did not deny it, and he
at once echoed the desire expressed by the envoy for the conclusion of an Anglo-French
alliance. That the greater part of the British people would have welcomed such a compact
admits of no doubt. On the walls were often chalked the words: "No war with the
French." Talleyrand advised the Foreign Minister, Delessart, to send immediately to
London a fully accredited ambassador; for the talk often was: "We have an ambassador at
Paris. Why have not you one here?" Nevertheless, a despatch of Grenville to Gower, on
9th March, shows that Pitt and he keenly felt the need of caution. They therefore enjoined
complete silence on Gower. In truth, Grenville's expressions, quoted above, were merely
the outcome of the good will which he and Pitt felt towards France. But these words from
the two powerful Ministers meant safety for France on her coasts, whatever might betide
her on the Meuse and the Rhine.
On the day when Grenville spoke these words of peace, two events occurred which
portended war. Leopold II died; and an irritating despatch, which he and Kaunitz had
recently sent to Paris, was read out to the Legislative Assembly. Thereafter a rupture was
inevitable. Francis II, who now ascended the throne of his father, was a shy, proud,
delicate youth of twenty-four years, having only a superficial knowledge of public affairs,
the friendship of France for England, in view of the war with Tippoo Sahib in India, and
the increasing ferment in Ireland.[63]
On 1st March Grenville again assured him of the earnest desire of the British Government
to see the end of the troubles in France, and declared that Pitt and he had been deeply
wounded by the oft-repeated insinuations that they had sought to foment them. All such
charges were absurd; for "a commercial people stands only to gain by the freedom of all
those who surround it." We may reasonably conclude that these were the words of Pitt; for
they recall that noble passage of the "Wealth of Nations": "A nation that would enrich
itself by trade is certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich,
industrious, and commercial nations."[64] For the rest, Grenville defied the calumniators
of England to adduce a single proof in support of their slanders, and requested Talleyrand
to remain some time in England for the purpose of observing public opinion. He warned
him, however, that the Cabinet could not give an answer to his main proposal.
More than this Talleyrand could scarcely expect. He had already divined the important
secret that the Cabinet was divided on this subject, the King, Thurlow, and Camden being
hostile to France, while Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas were friendly. When Talleyrand
ventured to ascribe those sentiments to Pitt and Grenville, the latter did not deny it, and he
at once echoed the desire expressed by the envoy for the conclusion of an Anglo-French
alliance. That the greater part of the British people would have welcomed such a compact
admits of no doubt. On the walls were often chalked the words: "No war with the
French." Talleyrand advised the Foreign Minister, Delessart, to send immediately to
London a fully accredited ambassador; for the talk often was: "We have an ambassador at
Paris. Why have not you one here?" Nevertheless, a despatch of Grenville to Gower, on
9th March, shows that Pitt and he keenly felt the need of caution. They therefore enjoined
complete silence on Gower. In truth, Grenville's expressions, quoted above, were merely
the outcome of the good will which he and Pitt felt towards France. But these words from
the two powerful Ministers meant safety for France on her coasts, whatever might betide
her on the Meuse and the Rhine.
On the day when Grenville spoke these words of peace, two events occurred which
portended war. Leopold II died; and an irritating despatch, which he and Kaunitz had
recently sent to Paris, was read out to the Legislative Assembly. Thereafter a rupture was
inevitable. Francis II, who now ascended the throne of his father, was a shy, proud,
delicate youth of twenty-four years, having only a superficial knowledge of public affairs,
Page 49
scarcely known to the Ministers, and endowed with a narrow pedantic nature which was
to be the bane of his people. He lacked alike the sagacity, the foresight, and the suppleness
of Leopold. Further, though his inexperience should have inspired him with a dread of
war for his storm-tossed States, yet that same misfortune subjected him to the advice of
the veteran Chancellor, Kaunitz. That crabbed old man advised the maintenance of a stiff
attitude towards France; and this, in her present temper, entailed war.
The last despatch from Vienna to Paris contained strongly worded advice to the French
Government and Assembly to adopt a less provocative attitude, to withdraw its troops
from the northern frontier, and, above all, to rid itself of the factious minority which
controlled its counsels. If Leopold had hoped to intimidate France or to strengthen the
peace-party at Paris, he made the greatest mistake of his reign. The war party at once
gained the ascendancy, decreed the arrest of Delessart for his tame reply to Vienna, and
broke up the constitutional Ministry. Their successors were mainly Girondins. The most
noteworthy are Roland, who took the Home Office; Clavière, Finance; and Dumouriez,
Foreign Affairs. The last was a man of great energy and resource. A soldier by training,
and with a dash of the adventurer in his nature, he now leapt to the front, and astonished
France by his zeal and activity. He was not devoid of prudence; for, as appears from
Gower's despatch of 30th March, he persuaded the Assembly to postpone action until an
answer arrived to his last despatch to Vienna. Gower found from conversation with
Dumouriez that a rupture must ensue if a satisfactory reply did not arrive by 15th April.
[65] Four days later, as no answer came, the Council of Ministers decided on war; and on
the next day Louis formally proposed it to the Assembly, which assented with
acclamation.
Secondary causes helped on the rupture. Frederick William encouraged the young
Emperor to draw the sword, and led him to expect Alsace and Lorraine as his share of the
spoil, the duchies of Jülich and Berg falling to Prussia. Catharine also fanned the
crusading zeal at Berlin and Vienna in the hope of having "more elbow-room," obviously
in Poland.[66] Further, the news from Madrid and Stockholm indisposed the French
Assembly to endure any dictation from Vienna. At the end of February Floridablanca fell
from power at Madrid, and his successor, Aranda, showed a peaceful front. And, on 16th
March Gustavus of Sweden was assassinated by Anckarström, a tool of the revengeful
nobles. This loss was severely felt. The royalist crusade now had no Tancred, only an
uninspiring Duke of Brunswick.
to be the bane of his people. He lacked alike the sagacity, the foresight, and the suppleness
of Leopold. Further, though his inexperience should have inspired him with a dread of
war for his storm-tossed States, yet that same misfortune subjected him to the advice of
the veteran Chancellor, Kaunitz. That crabbed old man advised the maintenance of a stiff
attitude towards France; and this, in her present temper, entailed war.
The last despatch from Vienna to Paris contained strongly worded advice to the French
Government and Assembly to adopt a less provocative attitude, to withdraw its troops
from the northern frontier, and, above all, to rid itself of the factious minority which
controlled its counsels. If Leopold had hoped to intimidate France or to strengthen the
peace-party at Paris, he made the greatest mistake of his reign. The war party at once
gained the ascendancy, decreed the arrest of Delessart for his tame reply to Vienna, and
broke up the constitutional Ministry. Their successors were mainly Girondins. The most
noteworthy are Roland, who took the Home Office; Clavière, Finance; and Dumouriez,
Foreign Affairs. The last was a man of great energy and resource. A soldier by training,
and with a dash of the adventurer in his nature, he now leapt to the front, and astonished
France by his zeal and activity. He was not devoid of prudence; for, as appears from
Gower's despatch of 30th March, he persuaded the Assembly to postpone action until an
answer arrived to his last despatch to Vienna. Gower found from conversation with
Dumouriez that a rupture must ensue if a satisfactory reply did not arrive by 15th April.
[65] Four days later, as no answer came, the Council of Ministers decided on war; and on
the next day Louis formally proposed it to the Assembly, which assented with
acclamation.
Secondary causes helped on the rupture. Frederick William encouraged the young
Emperor to draw the sword, and led him to expect Alsace and Lorraine as his share of the
spoil, the duchies of Jülich and Berg falling to Prussia. Catharine also fanned the
crusading zeal at Berlin and Vienna in the hope of having "more elbow-room," obviously
in Poland.[66] Further, the news from Madrid and Stockholm indisposed the French
Assembly to endure any dictation from Vienna. At the end of February Floridablanca fell
from power at Madrid, and his successor, Aranda, showed a peaceful front. And, on 16th
March Gustavus of Sweden was assassinated by Anckarström, a tool of the revengeful
nobles. This loss was severely felt. The royalist crusade now had no Tancred, only an
uninspiring Duke of Brunswick.
Page 50
Though France took the final step of declaring war, it is now known that Austria had done
much to provoke it and nothing to prevent it. The young Emperor refused to withdraw a
word of the provocative despatch; and in his letter to Thugut at Brussels, he declared he
was weary of the state of things in France and had decided to act and put an end to it;
"that he should march his troops at once, and the French must be amused for two months
until the troops arrived; then, whether the French attacked him or not, he should attack
them."[67] Keith also wrote from Vienna to Grenville on 2nd May, that the French
declaration of war had come in the nick of time to furnish the Hapsburgs with the
opportunity of throwing the odium of the war upon France.[68] Other proofs might be
cited; and it seems certain that, if France had not thrown down the gauntlet, both the
German Powers would have attacked her in the early summer of 1792. Pitt and Grenville,
looking on at these conflicting schemes, formed the perfectly correct surmise that both
sides were bent on war, and that little or nothing could be done to avert it.
We must now trace the policy of Pitt somewhat closely. The question at issue is, whether
he favoured the royalist or the democratic cause, and was responsible for the ensuing
friction between England and France, which culminated in the long and disastrous strifes
of 1793–1801.
Dumouriez, as we have seen, threw down the gauntlet to Austria in the hope of securing
the neutrality of Prussia and the friendship of England. Accordingly he decided to send
Talleyrand on a second mission to London. That skilful diplomat had recently returned to
Paris; and the Foreign Minister drew up, perhaps in concert with him, a Memoir entitled
"Reflections on a Negotiation with England in case of War," which provided the text for
Talleyrand's discourse to Pitt and Grenville. The gist of it is that Talleyrand must convince
the British Government of the need of a French attack on the Belgic provinces of Austria
as the sole means of safety. For, while offensive in appearance, it is in reality defensive.
France does not intend to keep those provinces; and, even if her conquest of them brings
about the collapse of the Stadholder's power in Holland, England will do well not to
intervene in favour of the Orange régime. For what good can the Island Power gain by
war with France? She may take the French colonies; but that will mean a tiresome
struggle with the revolted negroes in the West Indies. France, meanwhile, with her new-
born strength, will conquer Central Europe and then throw her energy into her fleet. The
much to provoke it and nothing to prevent it. The young Emperor refused to withdraw a
word of the provocative despatch; and in his letter to Thugut at Brussels, he declared he
was weary of the state of things in France and had decided to act and put an end to it;
"that he should march his troops at once, and the French must be amused for two months
until the troops arrived; then, whether the French attacked him or not, he should attack
them."[67] Keith also wrote from Vienna to Grenville on 2nd May, that the French
declaration of war had come in the nick of time to furnish the Hapsburgs with the
opportunity of throwing the odium of the war upon France.[68] Other proofs might be
cited; and it seems certain that, if France had not thrown down the gauntlet, both the
German Powers would have attacked her in the early summer of 1792. Pitt and Grenville,
looking on at these conflicting schemes, formed the perfectly correct surmise that both
sides were bent on war, and that little or nothing could be done to avert it.
We must now trace the policy of Pitt somewhat closely. The question at issue is, whether
he favoured the royalist or the democratic cause, and was responsible for the ensuing
friction between England and France, which culminated in the long and disastrous strifes
of 1793–1801.
Dumouriez, as we have seen, threw down the gauntlet to Austria in the hope of securing
the neutrality of Prussia and the friendship of England. Accordingly he decided to send
Talleyrand on a second mission to London. That skilful diplomat had recently returned to
Paris; and the Foreign Minister drew up, perhaps in concert with him, a Memoir entitled
"Reflections on a Negotiation with England in case of War," which provided the text for
Talleyrand's discourse to Pitt and Grenville. The gist of it is that Talleyrand must convince
the British Government of the need of a French attack on the Belgic provinces of Austria
as the sole means of safety. For, while offensive in appearance, it is in reality defensive.
France does not intend to keep those provinces; and, even if her conquest of them brings
about the collapse of the Stadholder's power in Holland, England will do well not to
intervene in favour of the Orange régime. For what good can the Island Power gain by
war with France? She may take the French colonies; but that will mean a tiresome
struggle with the revolted negroes in the West Indies. France, meanwhile, with her new-
born strength, will conquer Central Europe and then throw her energy into her fleet. The
Page 51
better course, then, for England will be to remain neutral, even if Holland be
revolutionized, and the estuary of the Scheldt be thrown open to all nations. Or, still
better, England may help France to keep in check the King of Prussia and the Prince of
Orange. In that case the two free Powers will march hand in hand and "become the
arbiters of peace or war for the whole world."
This remarkable pronouncement claims attention for several reasons. Firstly, it proves that
Dumouriez and Talleyrand believed their sole chance of safety to lie in the conquest of
Austria's Belgic provinces, where a cognate people would receive them with open arms.
That is to say, they desired war with Austria, and they did not dread the prospect of war
with Prussia, provided that England remained neutral and friendly. Pitt and Grenville were
well aware of this from Gower's despatches. Our ambassador had warned them that
France recked little of a war with the whole of Europe, provided that England held aloof.
Secondly, this fact disposes of the subsequent charge of Fox against Pitt, that he ought to
have sided with France in 1792 and thereby to have prevented the attack of the German
Powers. For, as we have seen, it was she who took the irrevocable step of declaring war
on Austria; and further, the details given above prove that all that Frenchmen expected
from Pitt was neutrality. By remaining neutral, while the French overran Belgium, Pitt
was favouring the French plans more than any British statesman had done since the time
of James II. Thirdly, we notice in the closing sentences of these Reflections signs of that
extraordinary self-confidence which led Girondins and Jacobins to face without flinching
even the prospect of war with England.
What was Pitt's conduct at this crisis? He knew enough of the politics of Berlin and
Vienna to see that those Courts would almost certainly make war on France. He adopted
therefore the line of conduct which prudence and love of peace dictated, a strict neutrality.
But he refused to proclaim it to the world, as it would encourage France to attack Austria.
At the same time Grenville let it be known that Austria must not be deprived of her Belgic
lands, which England had assured to her, firstly by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), and quite
recently by the Reichenbach Convention. As Grenville phrased it—"The Pays Bas form
the chain which unites England to the Continent, and the central knot of our relations to
Austria and Russia. It would be broken if they belonged to France." Talleyrand and
Dumouriez knew this perfectly well, and prudently declared that France had no intention
of keeping those lands. Would that the Jacobins and Napoleon had shown the same wise
self-restraint! It was their resolve to dominate the Netherlands which brought them into
irreconcilable opposition to Pitt and his successors down to the year 1814.
revolutionized, and the estuary of the Scheldt be thrown open to all nations. Or, still
better, England may help France to keep in check the King of Prussia and the Prince of
Orange. In that case the two free Powers will march hand in hand and "become the
arbiters of peace or war for the whole world."
This remarkable pronouncement claims attention for several reasons. Firstly, it proves that
Dumouriez and Talleyrand believed their sole chance of safety to lie in the conquest of
Austria's Belgic provinces, where a cognate people would receive them with open arms.
That is to say, they desired war with Austria, and they did not dread the prospect of war
with Prussia, provided that England remained neutral and friendly. Pitt and Grenville were
well aware of this from Gower's despatches. Our ambassador had warned them that
France recked little of a war with the whole of Europe, provided that England held aloof.
Secondly, this fact disposes of the subsequent charge of Fox against Pitt, that he ought to
have sided with France in 1792 and thereby to have prevented the attack of the German
Powers. For, as we have seen, it was she who took the irrevocable step of declaring war
on Austria; and further, the details given above prove that all that Frenchmen expected
from Pitt was neutrality. By remaining neutral, while the French overran Belgium, Pitt
was favouring the French plans more than any British statesman had done since the time
of James II. Thirdly, we notice in the closing sentences of these Reflections signs of that
extraordinary self-confidence which led Girondins and Jacobins to face without flinching
even the prospect of war with England.
What was Pitt's conduct at this crisis? He knew enough of the politics of Berlin and
Vienna to see that those Courts would almost certainly make war on France. He adopted
therefore the line of conduct which prudence and love of peace dictated, a strict neutrality.
But he refused to proclaim it to the world, as it would encourage France to attack Austria.
At the same time Grenville let it be known that Austria must not be deprived of her Belgic
lands, which England had assured to her, firstly by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), and quite
recently by the Reichenbach Convention. As Grenville phrased it—"The Pays Bas form
the chain which unites England to the Continent, and the central knot of our relations to
Austria and Russia. It would be broken if they belonged to France." Talleyrand and
Dumouriez knew this perfectly well, and prudently declared that France had no intention
of keeping those lands. Would that the Jacobins and Napoleon had shown the same wise
self-restraint! It was their resolve to dominate the Netherlands which brought them into
irreconcilable opposition to Pitt and his successors down to the year 1814.
Page 52
Statesmanlike though the aims of Dumouriez were, they suffered not a little in their
exposition. Talleyrand, the brain of the policy, was not its mouthpiece. In the French
embassy at Portman Square he figured merely as adviser to the French ambassador, the ci-
devant Marquis de Chauvelin, a vain and showy young man, devoid of the qualities of
insight, tact, and patience in which the ex-bishop of Autun excelled his contemporaries.
Had this sage counsellor remained in London to the end of the year, things might have
gone very differently. The instructions issued to Chauvelin contain ideas similar to those
outlined above; but they lay stress on the utility of a French alliance for England, in order
to thwart the aims of a greedy Coalition and to ensure her own internal tranquillity, which,
it is hinted, France can easily ruffle. Talleyrand is also charged to offer to cede the small
but valuable island, Tobago, which we lost in 1783, provided that the British Government
guaranteed a French loan of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000, to be raised in London; and he is
to suggest that, if the two Powers acted together, they could revolutionize Spanish
America and control the world.[69]
Our curiosity is aroused as to the reception which Pitt and Grenville gave to these
schemes. It is not certain, however, that Chauvelin and Talleyrand showed their hand
completely; for events told against them from the outset. Chauvelin bore with him an
autograph letter from Louis XVI to George III, couched in the friendliest terms, and
expressing the hope of closer relations between the two peoples.[70] But before he could
present it to the King at St. James's, it appeared in the Paris papers. This breach of
etiquette created a bad impression; for it seemed that the letter was merely a bid for an
alliance between the two peoples. It is quite possible that Dumouriez, with his natural
impulsiveness, allowed it to gain currency in order to identify Louis XVI with French
democracy, and that in its turn with public opinion in England. Further, we now know that
Marie Antoinette, in her resolve to paralyse the policy and the defensive power of France,
wrote at once to Fersen at Brussels that her consort's letter was very far from speaking his
real sentiments.[71] This news, when passed on to London, must have made it clear that
the two envoys represented the Girondin Ministry, but not the King of France. Then again
tidings soon arrived of the disgraceful flight of the French troops on the Belgian frontier,
the new levies, at sight of the Austrian horse, rushing back to Lille in wild disorder and
there murdering their General, Theobald Dillon. George III and Grenville wrote of this
event in terms of disgust and contempt.[72] It is therefore not surprising that the reception
of Chauvelin was far from promising; and Talleyrand doubtless felt that the time was not
ripe for discussing an Anglo-French entente for the control of the world.
exposition. Talleyrand, the brain of the policy, was not its mouthpiece. In the French
embassy at Portman Square he figured merely as adviser to the French ambassador, the ci-
devant Marquis de Chauvelin, a vain and showy young man, devoid of the qualities of
insight, tact, and patience in which the ex-bishop of Autun excelled his contemporaries.
Had this sage counsellor remained in London to the end of the year, things might have
gone very differently. The instructions issued to Chauvelin contain ideas similar to those
outlined above; but they lay stress on the utility of a French alliance for England, in order
to thwart the aims of a greedy Coalition and to ensure her own internal tranquillity, which,
it is hinted, France can easily ruffle. Talleyrand is also charged to offer to cede the small
but valuable island, Tobago, which we lost in 1783, provided that the British Government
guaranteed a French loan of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000, to be raised in London; and he is
to suggest that, if the two Powers acted together, they could revolutionize Spanish
America and control the world.[69]
Our curiosity is aroused as to the reception which Pitt and Grenville gave to these
schemes. It is not certain, however, that Chauvelin and Talleyrand showed their hand
completely; for events told against them from the outset. Chauvelin bore with him an
autograph letter from Louis XVI to George III, couched in the friendliest terms, and
expressing the hope of closer relations between the two peoples.[70] But before he could
present it to the King at St. James's, it appeared in the Paris papers. This breach of
etiquette created a bad impression; for it seemed that the letter was merely a bid for an
alliance between the two peoples. It is quite possible that Dumouriez, with his natural
impulsiveness, allowed it to gain currency in order to identify Louis XVI with French
democracy, and that in its turn with public opinion in England. Further, we now know that
Marie Antoinette, in her resolve to paralyse the policy and the defensive power of France,
wrote at once to Fersen at Brussels that her consort's letter was very far from speaking his
real sentiments.[71] This news, when passed on to London, must have made it clear that
the two envoys represented the Girondin Ministry, but not the King of France. Then again
tidings soon arrived of the disgraceful flight of the French troops on the Belgian frontier,
the new levies, at sight of the Austrian horse, rushing back to Lille in wild disorder and
there murdering their General, Theobald Dillon. George III and Grenville wrote of this
event in terms of disgust and contempt.[72] It is therefore not surprising that the reception
of Chauvelin was far from promising; and Talleyrand doubtless felt that the time was not
ripe for discussing an Anglo-French entente for the control of the world.
Page 53
In fact, the envoys were received coolly from the outset. The outbreak of war on the
Continent had caused almost a panic in the City. The Funds dropped sharply, and Pitt
ordered an official denial to sinister reports of a forthcoming raid by the press-gang. A
little later he assured a deputation of merchants that England would hold strictly aloof
from the war. Chauvelin reported these facts to his Government along with the assurance
that the Cabinet had definitely resolved on neutrality. How he came to know of that
decision is a mystery; and it is scarcely less odd that a copy of his despatch reporting it
should be in the Pitt Papers.[73] On the whole, then, France had good reason to be satisfied
with Pitt. Austria, on the other hand, disliked his conduct. Kaunitz, with his usual acerbity,
gave out that England was secretly hostile to the House of Hapsburg; and Keith, finding
his position increasingly awkward, begged for his recall.
The first sign of friction between England and France arose out of the King's
proclamation against seditious writings, which we noticed in the last chapter. Chauvelin
complained of some of its phrases, and stated that France waged war for national safety,
not for aggrandizement. Grenville thereupon loftily remarked that Chauvelin had no right
to express an opinion on a question which concerned solely the King's Government and
Parliament. The British reply irritated by its curt correctness.
Equally unfortunate were some incidents in the ensuing debates on this topic. Some
members emphasized their loyalty by adverting tartly to the connections of Thomas Paine
and English reformers with the French Jacobins. On 31st May the Duke of Richmond
charged that writer with being an emissary from abroad, because he had advised the
destruction of the British navy.[74] There is no such passage in the "Rights of Man"; and
the Duke must have read with the distorting lens of fear or hatred the suggestion that, if
England, France, and the United States were allied, a very small navy would be needed,
costing not more than half a million a year.[75] But this incident is typical of the prejudice
that was growing against France. Grenville in the same debate declared that the
Corresponding Societies avowed their connection with foreign clubs and were engaged in
circulating pamphlets. The conclusion was obvious, that close relations with France must
be avoided. As to the feeling of the Royal Family, it was manifested in an effusively loyal
speech by the Prince of Wales, his first speech at Westminster. In it he marked his entire
severance from Fox on this question.
Grenville's complaisance to the French envoys was perhaps little more than a blind to
mask his contempt for them and their principles. On 19th June he wrote to Auckland
respecting the "ignorance and absurdity of the French mission," but suggested that the
Continent had caused almost a panic in the City. The Funds dropped sharply, and Pitt
ordered an official denial to sinister reports of a forthcoming raid by the press-gang. A
little later he assured a deputation of merchants that England would hold strictly aloof
from the war. Chauvelin reported these facts to his Government along with the assurance
that the Cabinet had definitely resolved on neutrality. How he came to know of that
decision is a mystery; and it is scarcely less odd that a copy of his despatch reporting it
should be in the Pitt Papers.[73] On the whole, then, France had good reason to be satisfied
with Pitt. Austria, on the other hand, disliked his conduct. Kaunitz, with his usual acerbity,
gave out that England was secretly hostile to the House of Hapsburg; and Keith, finding
his position increasingly awkward, begged for his recall.
The first sign of friction between England and France arose out of the King's
proclamation against seditious writings, which we noticed in the last chapter. Chauvelin
complained of some of its phrases, and stated that France waged war for national safety,
not for aggrandizement. Grenville thereupon loftily remarked that Chauvelin had no right
to express an opinion on a question which concerned solely the King's Government and
Parliament. The British reply irritated by its curt correctness.
Equally unfortunate were some incidents in the ensuing debates on this topic. Some
members emphasized their loyalty by adverting tartly to the connections of Thomas Paine
and English reformers with the French Jacobins. On 31st May the Duke of Richmond
charged that writer with being an emissary from abroad, because he had advised the
destruction of the British navy.[74] There is no such passage in the "Rights of Man"; and
the Duke must have read with the distorting lens of fear or hatred the suggestion that, if
England, France, and the United States were allied, a very small navy would be needed,
costing not more than half a million a year.[75] But this incident is typical of the prejudice
that was growing against France. Grenville in the same debate declared that the
Corresponding Societies avowed their connection with foreign clubs and were engaged in
circulating pamphlets. The conclusion was obvious, that close relations with France must
be avoided. As to the feeling of the Royal Family, it was manifested in an effusively loyal
speech by the Prince of Wales, his first speech at Westminster. In it he marked his entire
severance from Fox on this question.
Grenville's complaisance to the French envoys was perhaps little more than a blind to
mask his contempt for them and their principles. On 19th June he wrote to Auckland
respecting the "ignorance and absurdity of the French mission," but suggested that the
Page 54
picking a quarrel with France would only help the English Jacobins to introduce French
notions. Even if this mission were got rid of, some one else might come who might make
even more mischief. These expressions refer to the connections which Chauvelin and
Talleyrand had formed with the Opposition. As Bland Burges remarked: "Talleyrand is
intimate with Paine, Home Tooke, Lord Lansdowne, and a few more of that stamp, and is
generally scouted by every one else." George III's words were equally contemptuous and
marked his resolve to have as little as possible to do with France.[76] Pitt did not state his
opinions on this topic; but he probably held those of Grenville.
The prejudices of the King and the resolves of the two chief Ministers proved fatal to an
ardent appeal which came from Paris in the middle of June. As the attitude of the Court of
Berlin became more and more warlike, Dumouriez put forth one more effort to gain the
friendly mediation of England and thus assure peace with Prussia. Chauvelin, swallowing
his annoyance at Grenville's recent note, pointed out that Austria was making great efforts
to induce Prussia, Holland, and the lesser German States to join her in the war against
liberty. The designs of the monarchs against Poland were notorious; and it was clear that a
vast conspiracy was being hatched against the free States of the Continent. Would not
England, then, endeavour to stop the formation of this reactionary league?
The occasion was, indeed, highly important. It is conceivable that, if British influence had
been powerful at Berlin, a spirited declaration would have had some effect at that Court.
Unfortunately our influence had sunk to zero since the Oczakoff fiasco of 1791.
Moreover, the Prussian Government had by that time decided to break with France. Her
envoys were dismissed from Berlin in the first week of June, and it is probable that Pitt
and Grenville by 18th June knew of the warlike resolve of the Prussian Government. In
any case, after a delay of twenty days, they sent once more a reply to Chauvelin's request,
affirming the earnest desire of His Majesty to contribute to the restoration of peace, but
re-asserting his decision in favour of unswerving neutrality. On 24th July Prussia declared
war against France, and three days later the Duke of Brunswick issued the famous
manifesto to the French people which thrilled the French people with indignation against
the hapless sovereigns at the Tuileries whom it was designed to protect.[77]
notions. Even if this mission were got rid of, some one else might come who might make
even more mischief. These expressions refer to the connections which Chauvelin and
Talleyrand had formed with the Opposition. As Bland Burges remarked: "Talleyrand is
intimate with Paine, Home Tooke, Lord Lansdowne, and a few more of that stamp, and is
generally scouted by every one else." George III's words were equally contemptuous and
marked his resolve to have as little as possible to do with France.[76] Pitt did not state his
opinions on this topic; but he probably held those of Grenville.
The prejudices of the King and the resolves of the two chief Ministers proved fatal to an
ardent appeal which came from Paris in the middle of June. As the attitude of the Court of
Berlin became more and more warlike, Dumouriez put forth one more effort to gain the
friendly mediation of England and thus assure peace with Prussia. Chauvelin, swallowing
his annoyance at Grenville's recent note, pointed out that Austria was making great efforts
to induce Prussia, Holland, and the lesser German States to join her in the war against
liberty. The designs of the monarchs against Poland were notorious; and it was clear that a
vast conspiracy was being hatched against the free States of the Continent. Would not
England, then, endeavour to stop the formation of this reactionary league?
The occasion was, indeed, highly important. It is conceivable that, if British influence had
been powerful at Berlin, a spirited declaration would have had some effect at that Court.
Unfortunately our influence had sunk to zero since the Oczakoff fiasco of 1791.
Moreover, the Prussian Government had by that time decided to break with France. Her
envoys were dismissed from Berlin in the first week of June, and it is probable that Pitt
and Grenville by 18th June knew of the warlike resolve of the Prussian Government. In
any case, after a delay of twenty days, they sent once more a reply to Chauvelin's request,
affirming the earnest desire of His Majesty to contribute to the restoration of peace, but
re-asserting his decision in favour of unswerving neutrality. On 24th July Prussia declared
war against France, and three days later the Duke of Brunswick issued the famous
manifesto to the French people which thrilled the French people with indignation against
the hapless sovereigns at the Tuileries whom it was designed to protect.[77]
Page 55
The outbreak of war on the Rhine and Meuse was an event of incalculable importance. As
we have seen, Pitt discouraged the bellicose tendencies of the émigrés and of the Austrian
and Prussian Courts. But the passions of the time ran too high to admit of the continuance
of peace; and State after State was soon to be drawn into the devouring vortex of strife.
Strange to say the first to suffer from the outbreak of hostilities was Poland. That
Republic entered on a new lease of life in the spring of the year 1791. The constitution
adopted with enthusiasm on 3rd May substituted an hereditary for an elective monarchy,
and otherwise strengthened the fabric of that almost anarchic State. Social and civic
reforms promised also to call its burghers and serfs to a life of activity or comfort. But the
change at once aroused keen dislike at St. Petersburg and Berlin. Prussian statesmen
resented any improvement in the condition of their nominal ally, and declared that, if
Russia gained a strong position on the Euxine, Prussia and Austria must secure
indemnities at the expense of Poland.
The Czarina soon succeeded in heading them in that direction. After the signature of the
Peace of Jassy with the Turks early in January 1792, she began openly to encourage the
factious efforts of Polish malcontents. The troubles at Paris also enabled her to engage the
Courts of Vienna and Berlin in a western crusade on which she bestowed her richest
blessing, her own inmost desires meanwhile finding expression in the following
confidential utterance: "I am breaking my head to make the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin
intervene in the affairs of France. I wish to see them plunged into some very complicated
question in order to have my own hands free."[78] Though her old opponent, Kaunitz,
fathomed her intentions, she partly succeeded in persuading the Austrian and Prussian
Ministers that their mission clearly was to stamp out Jacobinism at Paris, while
Providence reserved for her the duty of extirpating its offshoots at Warsaw. In the
Viennese Court, where the value of a regenerated Poland as a buffer State was duly
appreciated, there were some qualms as to the spoliation of that unoffending State; but
Prussian politicians, in their eagerness for the Polish districts, Danzig and Thorn,
harboured few scruples as to betraying the cause of their allies at Warsaw.
Little by little the outlines of a scheme were sketched between Austria and Prussia for
securing indemnities for the expenses of the war against France; and it was arranged that
Prussia should acquire the coveted lands on the lower Vistula; also Anspach and Baireuth;
Austria was to effect the long-desired Belgic-Bavarian exchange, besides gaining parts of
Alsace; and it was understood that Russia would annex the Polish Ukraine and work her
will in the rest of Poland. The Polish part of the scheme was, however, stiffly opposed by
we have seen, Pitt discouraged the bellicose tendencies of the émigrés and of the Austrian
and Prussian Courts. But the passions of the time ran too high to admit of the continuance
of peace; and State after State was soon to be drawn into the devouring vortex of strife.
Strange to say the first to suffer from the outbreak of hostilities was Poland. That
Republic entered on a new lease of life in the spring of the year 1791. The constitution
adopted with enthusiasm on 3rd May substituted an hereditary for an elective monarchy,
and otherwise strengthened the fabric of that almost anarchic State. Social and civic
reforms promised also to call its burghers and serfs to a life of activity or comfort. But the
change at once aroused keen dislike at St. Petersburg and Berlin. Prussian statesmen
resented any improvement in the condition of their nominal ally, and declared that, if
Russia gained a strong position on the Euxine, Prussia and Austria must secure
indemnities at the expense of Poland.
The Czarina soon succeeded in heading them in that direction. After the signature of the
Peace of Jassy with the Turks early in January 1792, she began openly to encourage the
factious efforts of Polish malcontents. The troubles at Paris also enabled her to engage the
Courts of Vienna and Berlin in a western crusade on which she bestowed her richest
blessing, her own inmost desires meanwhile finding expression in the following
confidential utterance: "I am breaking my head to make the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin
intervene in the affairs of France. I wish to see them plunged into some very complicated
question in order to have my own hands free."[78] Though her old opponent, Kaunitz,
fathomed her intentions, she partly succeeded in persuading the Austrian and Prussian
Ministers that their mission clearly was to stamp out Jacobinism at Paris, while
Providence reserved for her the duty of extirpating its offshoots at Warsaw. In the
Viennese Court, where the value of a regenerated Poland as a buffer State was duly
appreciated, there were some qualms as to the spoliation of that unoffending State; but
Prussian politicians, in their eagerness for the Polish districts, Danzig and Thorn,
harboured few scruples as to betraying the cause of their allies at Warsaw.
Little by little the outlines of a scheme were sketched between Austria and Prussia for
securing indemnities for the expenses of the war against France; and it was arranged that
Prussia should acquire the coveted lands on the lower Vistula; also Anspach and Baireuth;
Austria was to effect the long-desired Belgic-Bavarian exchange, besides gaining parts of
Alsace; and it was understood that Russia would annex the Polish Ukraine and work her
will in the rest of Poland. The Polish part of the scheme was, however, stiffly opposed by
Page 56
Kaunitz; and in the sequel the old Chancellor ended his long and distinguished career by
way of protest against a change of front which he deemed unwise and disgraceful.[79]
Early in May everything was ready for the restoration of anarchy in Poland. Catharine
ordered her troops to enter its borders; and the factious Polish nobles whom she had
sheltered during the winter returned to their land and formed a "Confederation" at
Targowicz on 14th May for the purpose of undoing the reforms of 1791. Daniel Hailes,
our envoy at Warsaw, kept Grenville fully informed of this affair. On 16th June he
reported Austria's desertion of Poland, the brutal refusal of the Court of Berlin to accord
help to its ally, the heroic efforts of Kosciusko and the Polish levies to resist the Russian
armies, and the despair of the patriots of Warsaw, adding the cynical comment that at
Warsaw patriotism was only a cloak for private interest, and that the new constitution was
generally regarded as the death-blow to Polish independence.[80] Whether he added these
words to please Grenville, who had always discouraged the Polish cause,[81] is not easy to
say; but the statement cannot be reconciled with Hailes's earlier enthusiasm for that well-
meant effort.
On all sides the Polish patriots now found indifference or hostility. The Elector of Saxony
(their King-elect) gave them cold words; and Catharine demanded the restoration of the
old constitution of which she was a guarantor. King Stanislaus, a prey to deep
despondency, saw the defence collapse on all sides, and at the close of June the Russians
drew near to Warsaw. Many of the Polish reformers fled to Leipzig and there prepared to
appeal to Europe against this forcible suppression of a truly national constitution.
Amidst these scenes Hailes was replaced by Colonel Gardiner, who received from
Grenville the following instructions, dated 4th August 1792. He informed him that Hailes
had last year been charged "to confine himself to such assurances of His Majesty's good
wishes as could be given without committing H.M. to any particular line of conduct with
respect to any troubles that might arise on the subject [of the Polish Revolution]. The
event has unhappily but too well justified their reserve; and the present situation is such as
to leave little hope that the tranquillity of that unfortunate land can be restored without its
falling again into the most entire dependence on the power of Russia, even if no further
dismemberment of territory should take place." Grenville then stated that Prussia's
conduct was due to fear of a strong Government in Poland; but the present alternative (a
Russian occupation) would probably be worse for her. He added these sentences: "No
intervention of the Maritime Powers [England and Holland] could be serviceable to
Poland, at least not without a much greater exertion and expense than the importance to
way of protest against a change of front which he deemed unwise and disgraceful.[79]
Early in May everything was ready for the restoration of anarchy in Poland. Catharine
ordered her troops to enter its borders; and the factious Polish nobles whom she had
sheltered during the winter returned to their land and formed a "Confederation" at
Targowicz on 14th May for the purpose of undoing the reforms of 1791. Daniel Hailes,
our envoy at Warsaw, kept Grenville fully informed of this affair. On 16th June he
reported Austria's desertion of Poland, the brutal refusal of the Court of Berlin to accord
help to its ally, the heroic efforts of Kosciusko and the Polish levies to resist the Russian
armies, and the despair of the patriots of Warsaw, adding the cynical comment that at
Warsaw patriotism was only a cloak for private interest, and that the new constitution was
generally regarded as the death-blow to Polish independence.[80] Whether he added these
words to please Grenville, who had always discouraged the Polish cause,[81] is not easy to
say; but the statement cannot be reconciled with Hailes's earlier enthusiasm for that well-
meant effort.
On all sides the Polish patriots now found indifference or hostility. The Elector of Saxony
(their King-elect) gave them cold words; and Catharine demanded the restoration of the
old constitution of which she was a guarantor. King Stanislaus, a prey to deep
despondency, saw the defence collapse on all sides, and at the close of June the Russians
drew near to Warsaw. Many of the Polish reformers fled to Leipzig and there prepared to
appeal to Europe against this forcible suppression of a truly national constitution.
Amidst these scenes Hailes was replaced by Colonel Gardiner, who received from
Grenville the following instructions, dated 4th August 1792. He informed him that Hailes
had last year been charged "to confine himself to such assurances of His Majesty's good
wishes as could be given without committing H.M. to any particular line of conduct with
respect to any troubles that might arise on the subject [of the Polish Revolution]. The
event has unhappily but too well justified their reserve; and the present situation is such as
to leave little hope that the tranquillity of that unfortunate land can be restored without its
falling again into the most entire dependence on the power of Russia, even if no further
dismemberment of territory should take place." Grenville then stated that Prussia's
conduct was due to fear of a strong Government in Poland; but the present alternative (a
Russian occupation) would probably be worse for her. He added these sentences: "No
intervention of the Maritime Powers [England and Holland] could be serviceable to
Poland, at least not without a much greater exertion and expense than the importance to
Page 57
their separate interests could possibly justify.... You are to be very careful not to do
anything which could hold out ill-grounded expectations of support from this country."
In these words Grenville passed sentence of death upon Poland. On this important subject
he must have acted with the consent of Pitt; but the opinion of the latter is unknown. It
would seem that after the weak treatment of the Oczakoff crisis by Parliament, he gave up
all hope of saving either Turkey or Poland. If that was impracticable in the spring of 1791,
how much more so in August 1792, when French affairs claimed far closer attention? It is
worth noticing that several of the Foxites (not Fox himself, for he was still intent on a
Russian alliance),[82] now revised their opinion about Catharine II and inveighed against
her for trampling on the liberties of Poland. Did they now discover the folly of their
conduct in previously encouraging her?
In despair of help from England, some of the patriots of Warsaw turned towards France.
But this added to their misfortunes. It gave the schemers of Berlin the longed-for excuse
of intervening by force under the pretext that they must stamp out "the French evil" from
States bordering on their own. On hearing of the advance of three Prussian columns,
Catharine threw her whole weight into Polish affairs.
So closely did the fortunes of Poland intertwine themselves with those of France. The
outbreak of the Franco-Austrian war meant ruin for the reformers at Warsaw. Had Austria
held to her former resolve, to prevent the triumph of Russia or Prussia in Poland, it is
possible that Pitt and Grenville would have decided to support her. As it was, they
maintained their cautious and timid neutrality. The reports of Hailes were explicit enough
to show that another partition was at hand; but, so far as I can discover, they lifted not a
finger to prevent it. The excess of Pitt's caution at this crisis enables us to gauge the
magnitude of the disaster to the Polish cause involved by his surrender to the Czarina in
the spring and summer of 1791. By a wonderful display of skill and audacity she emerged
triumphant from all her difficulties, and now, while egging on the German Powers to war
with France, planted her heel on the liberties of Poland. Her conquest was easy and
profitable. The restoration of order at Paris proved to be fraught with unexpected dangers,
and the German sovereigns scarcely set their hands to the task before they discovered that
they were her dupes. If the French war worked disaster at Warsaw, the prospect of a
partition of Poland undoubtedly helped to lessen the pressure on France during the
campaign of Valmy. Hope of further spoils in 1794–5 distracted the aims of the Allies;
and Pitt was destined to see the efforts of the monarchical league in the West weaken and
die away under the magnetic influence of the eastern problem. Well would it have been
anything which could hold out ill-grounded expectations of support from this country."
In these words Grenville passed sentence of death upon Poland. On this important subject
he must have acted with the consent of Pitt; but the opinion of the latter is unknown. It
would seem that after the weak treatment of the Oczakoff crisis by Parliament, he gave up
all hope of saving either Turkey or Poland. If that was impracticable in the spring of 1791,
how much more so in August 1792, when French affairs claimed far closer attention? It is
worth noticing that several of the Foxites (not Fox himself, for he was still intent on a
Russian alliance),[82] now revised their opinion about Catharine II and inveighed against
her for trampling on the liberties of Poland. Did they now discover the folly of their
conduct in previously encouraging her?
In despair of help from England, some of the patriots of Warsaw turned towards France.
But this added to their misfortunes. It gave the schemers of Berlin the longed-for excuse
of intervening by force under the pretext that they must stamp out "the French evil" from
States bordering on their own. On hearing of the advance of three Prussian columns,
Catharine threw her whole weight into Polish affairs.
So closely did the fortunes of Poland intertwine themselves with those of France. The
outbreak of the Franco-Austrian war meant ruin for the reformers at Warsaw. Had Austria
held to her former resolve, to prevent the triumph of Russia or Prussia in Poland, it is
possible that Pitt and Grenville would have decided to support her. As it was, they
maintained their cautious and timid neutrality. The reports of Hailes were explicit enough
to show that another partition was at hand; but, so far as I can discover, they lifted not a
finger to prevent it. The excess of Pitt's caution at this crisis enables us to gauge the
magnitude of the disaster to the Polish cause involved by his surrender to the Czarina in
the spring and summer of 1791. By a wonderful display of skill and audacity she emerged
triumphant from all her difficulties, and now, while egging on the German Powers to war
with France, planted her heel on the liberties of Poland. Her conquest was easy and
profitable. The restoration of order at Paris proved to be fraught with unexpected dangers,
and the German sovereigns scarcely set their hands to the task before they discovered that
they were her dupes. If the French war worked disaster at Warsaw, the prospect of a
partition of Poland undoubtedly helped to lessen the pressure on France during the
campaign of Valmy. Hope of further spoils in 1794–5 distracted the aims of the Allies;
and Pitt was destined to see the efforts of the monarchical league in the West weaken and
die away under the magnetic influence of the eastern problem. Well would it have been
Page 58
for him if he could have upheld Poland in 1791. By so doing he would have removed the
cause of bitter dissensions between the Houses of Romanoff, Hapsburg, and
Hohenzollern. As will appear in due course, Revolutionary France achieved her
marvellous triumphs partly by the prowess of her sons, but still more owing to the
intrigues and feuds which clogged the efforts of the Allies and baffled the constructive
powers of Pitt.
cause of bitter dissensions between the Houses of Romanoff, Hapsburg, and
Hohenzollern. As will appear in due course, Revolutionary France achieved her
marvellous triumphs partly by the prowess of her sons, but still more owing to the
intrigues and feuds which clogged the efforts of the Allies and baffled the constructive
powers of Pitt.
Page 59
CHAPTER III
P E A C E O R WA R ?
It seems absolutely impossible to hesitate as to
supporting our Ally [Holland] in case of necessity,
and the explicit declaration of our sentiments is the
most likely way to prevent the case occurring.—Pitt
to Lord Stafford, 13th November 1792.
One of the first requisites for the study of a period whose outlines are well known, is to
bar out the insidious notion that the course of events was inevitable. Nine persons out of
ten have recourse to that easy but fallacious way of explaining events. The whole war,
they say, or think, was inevitable. It was fated that the Duke of Brunswick should issue his
threatening manifesto to the Parisians if violence were offered to Louis XVI; that they
should resent the threat, rise in revolt, and dethrone the King, and thereafter massacre
royalists in the prisons. The innate vigour of the democratic cause further required that the
French should stand their ground at Valmy and win a pitched battle at Jemappes, that
victory leading to an exaltation of soul in which the French Republicans pushed on their
claims in such a way as to bring England into the field. History, when written in this way,
is a symmetrical mosaic; and the human mind loves patterns.
But events are not neatly chiselled; they do not fall into geometrical groups, however
much the memory, for its own ease, seeks to arrange them thus. Their edges are jagged;
and the slightest jar might have sent them in different ways. To recur to the events in
question: the Duke of Brunswick objected to issuing the manifesto, and only owing to the
weariness or weakness of old age, yielded to the insistence of the émigrés at his
headquarters: the insurrection at Paris came about doubtfully and fitfully; the issue on
10th August hung mainly on the personal bearing of the King; the massacres were the
work of an insignificant minority, which the vast mass regarded with sheer stupefaction;
P E A C E O R WA R ?
It seems absolutely impossible to hesitate as to
supporting our Ally [Holland] in case of necessity,
and the explicit declaration of our sentiments is the
most likely way to prevent the case occurring.—Pitt
to Lord Stafford, 13th November 1792.
One of the first requisites for the study of a period whose outlines are well known, is to
bar out the insidious notion that the course of events was inevitable. Nine persons out of
ten have recourse to that easy but fallacious way of explaining events. The whole war,
they say, or think, was inevitable. It was fated that the Duke of Brunswick should issue his
threatening manifesto to the Parisians if violence were offered to Louis XVI; that they
should resent the threat, rise in revolt, and dethrone the King, and thereafter massacre
royalists in the prisons. The innate vigour of the democratic cause further required that the
French should stand their ground at Valmy and win a pitched battle at Jemappes, that
victory leading to an exaltation of soul in which the French Republicans pushed on their
claims in such a way as to bring England into the field. History, when written in this way,
is a symmetrical mosaic; and the human mind loves patterns.
But events are not neatly chiselled; they do not fall into geometrical groups, however
much the memory, for its own ease, seeks to arrange them thus. Their edges are jagged;
and the slightest jar might have sent them in different ways. To recur to the events in
question: the Duke of Brunswick objected to issuing the manifesto, and only owing to the
weariness or weakness of old age, yielded to the insistence of the émigrés at his
headquarters: the insurrection at Paris came about doubtfully and fitfully; the issue on
10th August hung mainly on the personal bearing of the King; the massacres were the
work of an insignificant minority, which the vast mass regarded with sheer stupefaction;
Page 60
and even the proclamation of the French Republic by the National Convention on 21st
September was not without many searchings of heart.[83]
Meanwhile Pitt and Grenville had not the slightest inkling as to the trend of events. The
latter on 13th July 1792 wrote thus to Earl Gower at Paris: "My speculations are that the
first entrance of the foreign troops [into France] will be followed by negotiations; but how
they are to end, or what possibility there is to establish any form of government, or any
order in France, is far beyond any conjectures I can form."[84] This uncertainty is
illuminating. It shows that Pitt and Grenville were not farseeing schemers bent on
undermining the liberties of France and Britain by a war on which they had long resolved,
but fallible mortals, unable to see a handbreadth through the turmoil, but cherishing the
hope that somehow all would soon become clear. As to British policy during the summer
of 1792, it may be classed as masterly inactivity or nervous passivity, according to the
standpoint of the critic. In one case alone did Pitt and Grenville take a step displeasing to
the French Government, namely, by recalling Gower from the embassy at Paris; and this
was due to the fall of the French monarchy on 10th August, and to the danger attending
the residence of a noble in Paris. Only by a display of firmness did Gower and his
secretary, Lindsay, succeed in obtaining passports from the new Foreign Minister, Lebrun.
[85]
That follower of Dumouriez had as colleagues the former Girondin Ministers, Clavière,
Roland, and Servan. Besides them were Monge (the physicist) for the Navy, and Danton
for Justice, the latter a far from reassuring choice, as he was known to be largely
responsible for the massacres in the prisons of Paris early in September. Little is known
about the publicist, Lebrun, on whom now rested the duty of negotiating with England,
Spain, Holland, etc. It is one of the astonishing facts of this time that unknown men
leaped to the front at Paris, directed affairs to momentous issues, and then sank into
obscurity or perished. The Genevese Clavière started assignats and managed
revolutionary finance; Servan controlled the War Office for some months with much
ability, and then fell; Pétion, Santerre, the popular Paris brewer, and an ex-hawker,
Hanriot, were successively rulers of Paris for a brief space.
But of all the puzzles of this time Lebrun is perhaps the chief. In his thirtieth year he was
Foreign Minister of France, when she broke with England, Holland, Spain, and the
Empire. He is believed by many (e.g., by W. A. Miles, who knew him well) to be largely
responsible for those wars. Yet who was this Lebrun? Before the Revolution he had to
leave France for his advanced opinions, and took refuge at Liége, where Miles found him
September was not without many searchings of heart.[83]
Meanwhile Pitt and Grenville had not the slightest inkling as to the trend of events. The
latter on 13th July 1792 wrote thus to Earl Gower at Paris: "My speculations are that the
first entrance of the foreign troops [into France] will be followed by negotiations; but how
they are to end, or what possibility there is to establish any form of government, or any
order in France, is far beyond any conjectures I can form."[84] This uncertainty is
illuminating. It shows that Pitt and Grenville were not farseeing schemers bent on
undermining the liberties of France and Britain by a war on which they had long resolved,
but fallible mortals, unable to see a handbreadth through the turmoil, but cherishing the
hope that somehow all would soon become clear. As to British policy during the summer
of 1792, it may be classed as masterly inactivity or nervous passivity, according to the
standpoint of the critic. In one case alone did Pitt and Grenville take a step displeasing to
the French Government, namely, by recalling Gower from the embassy at Paris; and this
was due to the fall of the French monarchy on 10th August, and to the danger attending
the residence of a noble in Paris. Only by a display of firmness did Gower and his
secretary, Lindsay, succeed in obtaining passports from the new Foreign Minister, Lebrun.
[85]
That follower of Dumouriez had as colleagues the former Girondin Ministers, Clavière,
Roland, and Servan. Besides them were Monge (the physicist) for the Navy, and Danton
for Justice, the latter a far from reassuring choice, as he was known to be largely
responsible for the massacres in the prisons of Paris early in September. Little is known
about the publicist, Lebrun, on whom now rested the duty of negotiating with England,
Spain, Holland, etc. It is one of the astonishing facts of this time that unknown men
leaped to the front at Paris, directed affairs to momentous issues, and then sank into
obscurity or perished. The Genevese Clavière started assignats and managed
revolutionary finance; Servan controlled the War Office for some months with much
ability, and then fell; Pétion, Santerre, the popular Paris brewer, and an ex-hawker,
Hanriot, were successively rulers of Paris for a brief space.
But of all the puzzles of this time Lebrun is perhaps the chief. In his thirtieth year he was
Foreign Minister of France, when she broke with England, Holland, Spain, and the
Empire. He is believed by many (e.g., by W. A. Miles, who knew him well) to be largely
responsible for those wars. Yet who was this Lebrun? Before the Revolution he had to
leave France for his advanced opinions, and took refuge at Liége, where Miles found him
Page 61
toiling for a scanty pittance at journalistic hack-work. Suffering much at the hands of the
Austrians in 1790, he fled back to Paris, joined the Girondins, wrote for them, made
himself useful to Dumouriez during his tenure of the Foreign Office, and, not long after
his resignation, stepped into his shoes and appropriated his policy. In order to finish with
him here, we may note that he voted for the death of Louis XVI, and, as President of the
Executive Council at that time, signed the order for the execution. He and other Girondins
were driven from power on 2nd June 1793 (when Hanriot's brazen voice decided the fate
of the Girondins) and he was guillotined on 23rd December of that year, for the alleged
crime of conspiring to place Philippe Egalité on the throne. Mme. Roland, who helped
Lebrun to rise to power, limns his portrait in these sharp outlines: "He passed for a wise
man, because he showed no kind of élan; and for a clever man, because he was a fairly
good clerk; but he possessed neither activity, intellect, nor force of character." The want of
élan seems to be a term relative merely to the characteristics of the Girondins, who,
whatever they lacked, had that Gallic quality in rich measure.
Chauvelin, the French ambassador in London, is another of these revolutionary rockets.
Only in fiction and the drama does he stand forth at all clearly to the eye. History knows
him not, except that he had been a marquis, then took up with the Girondins, finally shot
up among the Jacobins and made much noise by his intrigues and despatches. With all his
showiness and vanity he had enough shrewdness to suit his language at the French
embassy in Portman Square to the Jacobin jargon of the times. After the September
massacres the only hope for an aristocratic envoy was to figure as an irreproachable
patriot. Chauvelin's dealings with the English malcontents therefore became more and
more pronounced; for indeed they served both as a life insurance and as a means of
annoying Pitt and Grenville in return for their refusal to recognize him as the ambassador
of the new Republic. Londoners in general sided with the Ministry and snubbed the
French envoys. Dumont describes their annoyance, during a visit to Ranelagh, at being
received everywhere with the audible whisper, "Here comes the French embassy";
whereupon faces were turned away and a wide space was left around them.[86]
Such, then, were the men on whom largely rested the future of Europe. Lebrun mistook
fussiness for activity. At a time when tact and dignity prescribed a diminution of the staff
at Portman Square, he sent two almost untried men, Noël and, a little later, Benoît, to help
Chauvelin to mark time. Talleyrand also gained permission to return to London as adjoint
to Chauvelin, which, it appears, was the only safe means of escaping from Paris.
Chauvelin speedily quarrelled with him. But the doings of the French embassy concern us
Austrians in 1790, he fled back to Paris, joined the Girondins, wrote for them, made
himself useful to Dumouriez during his tenure of the Foreign Office, and, not long after
his resignation, stepped into his shoes and appropriated his policy. In order to finish with
him here, we may note that he voted for the death of Louis XVI, and, as President of the
Executive Council at that time, signed the order for the execution. He and other Girondins
were driven from power on 2nd June 1793 (when Hanriot's brazen voice decided the fate
of the Girondins) and he was guillotined on 23rd December of that year, for the alleged
crime of conspiring to place Philippe Egalité on the throne. Mme. Roland, who helped
Lebrun to rise to power, limns his portrait in these sharp outlines: "He passed for a wise
man, because he showed no kind of élan; and for a clever man, because he was a fairly
good clerk; but he possessed neither activity, intellect, nor force of character." The want of
élan seems to be a term relative merely to the characteristics of the Girondins, who,
whatever they lacked, had that Gallic quality in rich measure.
Chauvelin, the French ambassador in London, is another of these revolutionary rockets.
Only in fiction and the drama does he stand forth at all clearly to the eye. History knows
him not, except that he had been a marquis, then took up with the Girondins, finally shot
up among the Jacobins and made much noise by his intrigues and despatches. With all his
showiness and vanity he had enough shrewdness to suit his language at the French
embassy in Portman Square to the Jacobin jargon of the times. After the September
massacres the only hope for an aristocratic envoy was to figure as an irreproachable
patriot. Chauvelin's dealings with the English malcontents therefore became more and
more pronounced; for indeed they served both as a life insurance and as a means of
annoying Pitt and Grenville in return for their refusal to recognize him as the ambassador
of the new Republic. Londoners in general sided with the Ministry and snubbed the
French envoys. Dumont describes their annoyance, during a visit to Ranelagh, at being
received everywhere with the audible whisper, "Here comes the French embassy";
whereupon faces were turned away and a wide space was left around them.[86]
Such, then, were the men on whom largely rested the future of Europe. Lebrun mistook
fussiness for activity. At a time when tact and dignity prescribed a diminution of the staff
at Portman Square, he sent two almost untried men, Noël and, a little later, Benoît, to help
Chauvelin to mark time. Talleyrand also gained permission to return to London as adjoint
to Chauvelin, which, it appears, was the only safe means of escaping from Paris.
Chauvelin speedily quarrelled with him. But the doings of the French embassy concern us
Page 62
little for the present, as Pitt and Grenville paid no attention to the offers, similar to those
made in April, which Lebrun charged his envoys to make for an Anglo-French alliance. It
is not surprising, after the September massacres, that Ministers should hold sternly aloof
from the French envoys; but we may note that Miles considered their attitude most
unwise. He further remarked that the proud reserve of Grenville was almost offensive.[87]
We made the acquaintance of Miles as British agent at Paris in 1790 and noted his
consequential airs. In 1792 they were full blown.
The opinions of George III and Pitt on the events of that bloody harvest-time in Paris are
very little known. The King's letters from Weymouth to Pitt in August–September are few
and brief. On 16th September, after the arrival of news of the massacres, he writes to say
that his decision respecting the Prince of Wales's debts is irrevocable. After that there is a
long silence. Pitt's reserve is equally impenetrable. We know, however, from the letters of
Burke that the conduct of Ministers deeply disappointed him. Writing to Grenville on 19th
September he says that the crisis exceeds in gravity any that is recorded in history; and he
adds these curious words: "I know it is the opinion of His Majesty's Ministers that the
new [French] principles may be encouraged, and even triumph over every interior and
exterior resistance, and may even overturn other States as they have that of France,
without any sort of danger of their extending in their consequences to this Kingdom."[88]
Can we have a clearer testimony to the calm but rigid resolve with which Pitt and his
colleague clung to neutrality? On the following day (the day of the Battle of Valmy) Pitt
frigidly declined the request of the Austrian and Neapolitan ambassadors, that the British
Government would exclude from its territories all those who should be guilty of an attack
on the French royal family. On 21st September Grenville issued a guarded statement on
this subject to the corps diplomatique; but it was far from meeting the desires of the
royalists.[89]
Reticence is a virtue over-developed in an aristocracy—"that austere domination," as
Burke terms it. The virtue is slow in taking root among democracies. The early Radical
clubs of Great Britain regarded it as their cherished privilege to state their opinions on
foreign affairs with Athenian loquacity; and the months of October and November 1792,
when we vainly seek to know the inner feelings of Pitt, are enlivened by resolutions
expressing joy at the downfall of tyrants, and fervent beliefs in the advent of a fraternal
millennium, the first fruits of which were the election of Paine as deputy for Calais to the
National Convention.
made in April, which Lebrun charged his envoys to make for an Anglo-French alliance. It
is not surprising, after the September massacres, that Ministers should hold sternly aloof
from the French envoys; but we may note that Miles considered their attitude most
unwise. He further remarked that the proud reserve of Grenville was almost offensive.[87]
We made the acquaintance of Miles as British agent at Paris in 1790 and noted his
consequential airs. In 1792 they were full blown.
The opinions of George III and Pitt on the events of that bloody harvest-time in Paris are
very little known. The King's letters from Weymouth to Pitt in August–September are few
and brief. On 16th September, after the arrival of news of the massacres, he writes to say
that his decision respecting the Prince of Wales's debts is irrevocable. After that there is a
long silence. Pitt's reserve is equally impenetrable. We know, however, from the letters of
Burke that the conduct of Ministers deeply disappointed him. Writing to Grenville on 19th
September he says that the crisis exceeds in gravity any that is recorded in history; and he
adds these curious words: "I know it is the opinion of His Majesty's Ministers that the
new [French] principles may be encouraged, and even triumph over every interior and
exterior resistance, and may even overturn other States as they have that of France,
without any sort of danger of their extending in their consequences to this Kingdom."[88]
Can we have a clearer testimony to the calm but rigid resolve with which Pitt and his
colleague clung to neutrality? On the following day (the day of the Battle of Valmy) Pitt
frigidly declined the request of the Austrian and Neapolitan ambassadors, that the British
Government would exclude from its territories all those who should be guilty of an attack
on the French royal family. On 21st September Grenville issued a guarded statement on
this subject to the corps diplomatique; but it was far from meeting the desires of the
royalists.[89]
Reticence is a virtue over-developed in an aristocracy—"that austere domination," as
Burke terms it. The virtue is slow in taking root among democracies. The early Radical
clubs of Great Britain regarded it as their cherished privilege to state their opinions on
foreign affairs with Athenian loquacity; and the months of October and November 1792,
when we vainly seek to know the inner feelings of Pitt, are enlivened by resolutions
expressing joy at the downfall of tyrants, and fervent beliefs in the advent of a fraternal
millennium, the first fruits of which were the election of Paine as deputy for Calais to the
National Convention.
Page 63
In the dealings of nations, as of individuals, feelings often count for more than interests.
This was the case in the last four months of the year 1792, when the subjects in dispute
bulked small in comparison with the passions and prejudices which magnified and
distorted them. The psychology of the time therefore demands no less attention than its
diplomacy. Its first weeks were darkened by news of the September massacres. Even now
the details of that cowardly crime arouse horror: and surely no part of Carlyle's epic sinks
so low as that in which he seeks to compare that loathsome butchery with the bloodshed
of a battlefield.[90] No such special pleading was attempted by leaders of thought of that
period. On 10th September Romilly, a friend of human progress, wrote to Dumont: "How
could we ever be so deceived in the character of the French nation as to think them
capable of liberty?... One might as well think of establishing a republic of tigers in some
forest of Africa." To which the collaborator of Mirabeau replied: "Let us burn all our
books; let us cease to think and dream of the best system of legislation, since men make
so diabolical a use of every truth and every principle."[91] These feelings were general
among Frenchmen. Buzot stated that the loss of morality, with all its attendant evils, dated
from the September massacres.
It seems strange that the democratic cause made headway in England after this fell event.
Probably its details were but dimly known to the poor, who were at this time the victims
of a bad harvest and severe dearth. The months of September and October were marked
by heavy and persistent rains. The Marquis of Buckingham on 23rd September wrote at
Stowe to his brother, Lord Grenville, that he was living amidst a vortex of mud, clay, and
water such as was never known before—the result of six weeks of unsettled weather,
which must impair the harvest and increase the difficulty of maintaining order.[92]
Certainly the stars in their courses fought against the ancien régime. The rains which
made a receptive seed-bed for the writings of Paine also hampered the progress of
Brunswick towards the Argonne, crowded his hospitals with invalids, and in part induced
that inglorious retreat. As the storms lasted far into the autumn, disaffection increased
apace.
The results serve to enliven the dull tones of our Home Office archives. There one reads
of bread riots and meal riots so far back as May 1792, in which stalls are overturned and
despoiled; also of more persistent agitation in the factory towns of the North. Liverpool
leads off with a dock-strike that is with difficulty ended. Then the colliers of Wigan stop
work and seek to persuade all their comrades to follow their example. Most threatening of
all is the situation at Manchester and Sheffield. There, in addition to disorder among the
This was the case in the last four months of the year 1792, when the subjects in dispute
bulked small in comparison with the passions and prejudices which magnified and
distorted them. The psychology of the time therefore demands no less attention than its
diplomacy. Its first weeks were darkened by news of the September massacres. Even now
the details of that cowardly crime arouse horror: and surely no part of Carlyle's epic sinks
so low as that in which he seeks to compare that loathsome butchery with the bloodshed
of a battlefield.[90] No such special pleading was attempted by leaders of thought of that
period. On 10th September Romilly, a friend of human progress, wrote to Dumont: "How
could we ever be so deceived in the character of the French nation as to think them
capable of liberty?... One might as well think of establishing a republic of tigers in some
forest of Africa." To which the collaborator of Mirabeau replied: "Let us burn all our
books; let us cease to think and dream of the best system of legislation, since men make
so diabolical a use of every truth and every principle."[91] These feelings were general
among Frenchmen. Buzot stated that the loss of morality, with all its attendant evils, dated
from the September massacres.
It seems strange that the democratic cause made headway in England after this fell event.
Probably its details were but dimly known to the poor, who were at this time the victims
of a bad harvest and severe dearth. The months of September and October were marked
by heavy and persistent rains. The Marquis of Buckingham on 23rd September wrote at
Stowe to his brother, Lord Grenville, that he was living amidst a vortex of mud, clay, and
water such as was never known before—the result of six weeks of unsettled weather,
which must impair the harvest and increase the difficulty of maintaining order.[92]
Certainly the stars in their courses fought against the ancien régime. The rains which
made a receptive seed-bed for the writings of Paine also hampered the progress of
Brunswick towards the Argonne, crowded his hospitals with invalids, and in part induced
that inglorious retreat. As the storms lasted far into the autumn, disaffection increased
apace.
The results serve to enliven the dull tones of our Home Office archives. There one reads
of bread riots and meal riots so far back as May 1792, in which stalls are overturned and
despoiled; also of more persistent agitation in the factory towns of the North. Liverpool
leads off with a dock-strike that is with difficulty ended. Then the colliers of Wigan stop
work and seek to persuade all their comrades to follow their example. Most threatening of
all is the situation at Manchester and Sheffield. There, in addition to disorder among the
Page 64
townsfolk, disaffection gains ground among the troops sent to keep order. This again is
traceable to the dearness of food, for which the scanty pay of the trooper by no means
suffices. Here, then, is the opportunity for the apostle of discontent judiciously to offer a
cheap edition of the "Rights of Man," on which fare the troop becomes half-mutinous and
sends in a petition for higher pay. This the perplexed authorities do not grant, but build
barracks, a proceeding eyed askance by publicans and patriots as the beginning of military
rule.[93]
The South of England, too, is beset by fears of a novel kind. After the overthrow of the
French monarchy on 10th August fugitives from France come fast to the coasts of Kent
and Sussex. The flights become thicker day by day up to the end of that fell month of
September. Orthodox priests, always in disguise, form the bulk of the new arrivals. As
many as 700 of them land at Eastbourne, and strain the hospitality of that little town.
About as many reach Portsmouth and Gosport, to the perplexity of the authorities. When
assured that they are staunch royalists and not apostles of Revolution, the commander
allots shelter in the barracks at Forton, where for the present they exist on two pence a day
each. Plymouth, which receives fewer of them, frowns on the newcomers as politically
suspect and economically ruinous. The mayor assures Dundas that, if more priests arrive,
or are sent there, they will be driven away by the townsfolk for fear of dearth of corn. In
Jersey the food question eclipses all others; for 2,000 priests (so it is said) land there, until
all ideas of hospitality are cast to the winds and the refugees are threatened with
expulsion. Only in the vast obscurantism of London is there safety for these exiles. A
subscription list is started on their behalf; the King offers the royal house at Winchester
for the overplus at Portsmouth: and by degrees the scared throngs huddle down into the
dire poverty and uneasy rest that are to be their lot for many a year.[94]
Strange adventures befell many of the French nobles in their escape. The Duc de
Liancourt, commanding the troops at Rouen, was fain to flee to the coast, hire a deckless
craft, and conceal himself under faggots. In that manner he put to sea and finally made the
opposite coast at Hastings. There, still nervous, he made his way to the nearest inn, and, to
proclaim his insularity, called for porter. The beverage was too much for him, and he
retired to his room in a state of unconscious passivity. On his awaking, the strange
surroundings seemed those of a French lock-up; but as he crept down to make his escape,
the mugs caught his eye; and their brightness convinced him that he was in England. Such
was his story, told to the family at Bury, where Fanny Burney was staying. Several of the
wealthier French refugees settled at Richmond, and there found Horace Walpole as
traceable to the dearness of food, for which the scanty pay of the trooper by no means
suffices. Here, then, is the opportunity for the apostle of discontent judiciously to offer a
cheap edition of the "Rights of Man," on which fare the troop becomes half-mutinous and
sends in a petition for higher pay. This the perplexed authorities do not grant, but build
barracks, a proceeding eyed askance by publicans and patriots as the beginning of military
rule.[93]
The South of England, too, is beset by fears of a novel kind. After the overthrow of the
French monarchy on 10th August fugitives from France come fast to the coasts of Kent
and Sussex. The flights become thicker day by day up to the end of that fell month of
September. Orthodox priests, always in disguise, form the bulk of the new arrivals. As
many as 700 of them land at Eastbourne, and strain the hospitality of that little town.
About as many reach Portsmouth and Gosport, to the perplexity of the authorities. When
assured that they are staunch royalists and not apostles of Revolution, the commander
allots shelter in the barracks at Forton, where for the present they exist on two pence a day
each. Plymouth, which receives fewer of them, frowns on the newcomers as politically
suspect and economically ruinous. The mayor assures Dundas that, if more priests arrive,
or are sent there, they will be driven away by the townsfolk for fear of dearth of corn. In
Jersey the food question eclipses all others; for 2,000 priests (so it is said) land there, until
all ideas of hospitality are cast to the winds and the refugees are threatened with
expulsion. Only in the vast obscurantism of London is there safety for these exiles. A
subscription list is started on their behalf; the King offers the royal house at Winchester
for the overplus at Portsmouth: and by degrees the scared throngs huddle down into the
dire poverty and uneasy rest that are to be their lot for many a year.[94]
Strange adventures befell many of the French nobles in their escape. The Duc de
Liancourt, commanding the troops at Rouen, was fain to flee to the coast, hire a deckless
craft, and conceal himself under faggots. In that manner he put to sea and finally made the
opposite coast at Hastings. There, still nervous, he made his way to the nearest inn, and, to
proclaim his insularity, called for porter. The beverage was too much for him, and he
retired to his room in a state of unconscious passivity. On his awaking, the strange
surroundings seemed those of a French lock-up; but as he crept down to make his escape,
the mugs caught his eye; and their brightness convinced him that he was in England. Such
was his story, told to the family at Bury, where Fanny Burney was staying. Several of the
wealthier French refugees settled at Richmond, and there found Horace Walpole as
Page 65
charmer and friend. But the most distinguished group was that at Juniper Hall, near
Dorking where finally Mme. de Staël and Talleyrand enlivened the dull days and long
drives with unfailing stores of wit. We shall later on make the acquaintance of the French
émigrés in a more active and bellicose mood.
Such, then, was the mental condition of our folk. Depressed by rain and dear food, beset
by stories of plotters from Paris, or harrowed by the tales of misery of the French émigrés,
Britons came to look on France as a land peopled by demons, who sought to involve other
lands in the ruin to which they had reduced their own. In this state of nervousness and
excitement little was needed to bring about a furious reaction on behalf of Church and
King.
The follies of English democrats helped on this reaction. Whispers went about of strange
and threatening orders of arms at Birmingham. A correspondent at the midland capital
informed Dundas at the end of September that a Dr. Maxwell, of York, had ordered
20,000 daggers, which were to be 12 inches in the blade and 5 1/4 inches in the handle.
The informant convinced the manufacturer that he must apprise the Home Secretary of
this order and send him a specimen of the weapon. Probably it was the same which Burke
melodramatically cast down on the floor of the House of Commons during his speech of
28th December. The dimensions exactly tally with those named by the biographer of Lord
Eldon, who retained that dagger, though Bland Burges also put in a claim to have
possessed it. The scepticism which one feels about this prodigious order of daggers,
which others give as 3,000, is somewhat lessened by finding another letter, of 2nd
October 1792, addressed to Dundas by James Maxwell of York, who stated that he highly
disapproved of the "French" opinions of his younger brother (specimens of whose letters
he enclosed), and had just given him £500 so as to dissuade him from going to
Manchester to stir up discontent there.[95] This unbrotherly conduct condemns the elder
Maxwell, but his information to some extent corroborated that which came from
Birmingham. The whole affair may have been merely a device to frighten Ministers; but
report says that Pitt took it seriously and ascribed to him the singular statement that
Ministers soon might not have a hand to act with or a tongue to speak with.[96]
Certainly there was a good deal of discontent in the manufacturing towns, but it is not
easy to say whether it resulted more from dear food or from political reasons. At
Stockport a new club styled "The Friends of universal Peace and the Rights of Man,"
issued and circulated a manifesto asserting their right to inquire into political affairs:
Dorking where finally Mme. de Staël and Talleyrand enlivened the dull days and long
drives with unfailing stores of wit. We shall later on make the acquaintance of the French
émigrés in a more active and bellicose mood.
Such, then, was the mental condition of our folk. Depressed by rain and dear food, beset
by stories of plotters from Paris, or harrowed by the tales of misery of the French émigrés,
Britons came to look on France as a land peopled by demons, who sought to involve other
lands in the ruin to which they had reduced their own. In this state of nervousness and
excitement little was needed to bring about a furious reaction on behalf of Church and
King.
The follies of English democrats helped on this reaction. Whispers went about of strange
and threatening orders of arms at Birmingham. A correspondent at the midland capital
informed Dundas at the end of September that a Dr. Maxwell, of York, had ordered
20,000 daggers, which were to be 12 inches in the blade and 5 1/4 inches in the handle.
The informant convinced the manufacturer that he must apprise the Home Secretary of
this order and send him a specimen of the weapon. Probably it was the same which Burke
melodramatically cast down on the floor of the House of Commons during his speech of
28th December. The dimensions exactly tally with those named by the biographer of Lord
Eldon, who retained that dagger, though Bland Burges also put in a claim to have
possessed it. The scepticism which one feels about this prodigious order of daggers,
which others give as 3,000, is somewhat lessened by finding another letter, of 2nd
October 1792, addressed to Dundas by James Maxwell of York, who stated that he highly
disapproved of the "French" opinions of his younger brother (specimens of whose letters
he enclosed), and had just given him £500 so as to dissuade him from going to
Manchester to stir up discontent there.[95] This unbrotherly conduct condemns the elder
Maxwell, but his information to some extent corroborated that which came from
Birmingham. The whole affair may have been merely a device to frighten Ministers; but
report says that Pitt took it seriously and ascribed to him the singular statement that
Ministers soon might not have a hand to act with or a tongue to speak with.[96]
Certainly there was a good deal of discontent in the manufacturing towns, but it is not
easy to say whether it resulted more from dear food or from political reasons. At
Stockport a new club styled "The Friends of universal Peace and the Rights of Man,"
issued and circulated a manifesto asserting their right to inquire into political affairs:
Page 66
It is our labour that supports monarchy, aristocracy, and the
priesthood.... We are not the "swinish multitude" that Mr. Burke
speaks of. A majority of the House of Commons is returned by less
than 6,000 voters; whereas, if the representation were equal (and we
sincerely hope that it shortly will be), nearly that number will elect
every single member. Not one-twentieth part of the commoners of
Great Britain are electors.... We have a National Debt of more than
£270,000,000, and pay £17,000,000 a year in taxes. More than one
fourth of our incomes goes in taxes.[97]
The Radical clubs also showed a desire to pry into foreign affairs; witness
the following letter from Thomas Hardy to Dr. Adams, Secretary of the
London Society for Constitutional Information:
No. 9 Piccadilly (London), Sept. 21 1792.[98]
The London Corresponding Society having taken the resolution of
transmitting to the French National Convention an address ... to
assure that suffering nation that we sympathize with them in their
misfortunes; that we view their exertions with admiration; that we
wish to give them all such contenance [sic] and support as
individuals unsupported and oppressed themselves can afford; and
that, should those in power here dare (in violation of the nation's
pledged faith of neutrality and in opposition to the well-known
sentiments of the people at large) to join the German band of
despots united against Liberty, we disclaim all concurrence therein,
and will to a man exert every justifiable means for counteracting
their machinations against the freedom and happiness of mankind.
I am ordered by the Committee to acquaint the Society for
Constitutional Information therewith, in order to be favoured with
their opinions thereon, and in hopes that, if they approve the idea
priesthood.... We are not the "swinish multitude" that Mr. Burke
speaks of. A majority of the House of Commons is returned by less
than 6,000 voters; whereas, if the representation were equal (and we
sincerely hope that it shortly will be), nearly that number will elect
every single member. Not one-twentieth part of the commoners of
Great Britain are electors.... We have a National Debt of more than
£270,000,000, and pay £17,000,000 a year in taxes. More than one
fourth of our incomes goes in taxes.[97]
The Radical clubs also showed a desire to pry into foreign affairs; witness
the following letter from Thomas Hardy to Dr. Adams, Secretary of the
London Society for Constitutional Information:
No. 9 Piccadilly (London), Sept. 21 1792.[98]
The London Corresponding Society having taken the resolution of
transmitting to the French National Convention an address ... to
assure that suffering nation that we sympathize with them in their
misfortunes; that we view their exertions with admiration; that we
wish to give them all such contenance [sic] and support as
individuals unsupported and oppressed themselves can afford; and
that, should those in power here dare (in violation of the nation's
pledged faith of neutrality and in opposition to the well-known
sentiments of the people at large) to join the German band of
despots united against Liberty, we disclaim all concurrence therein,
and will to a man exert every justifiable means for counteracting
their machinations against the freedom and happiness of mankind.
I am ordered by the Committee to acquaint the Society for
Constitutional Information therewith, in order to be favoured with
their opinions thereon, and in hopes that, if they approve the idea
Page 67
and recommend its adoption to the different societies, the
publication of such a respectable number of real names will greatly
check the hostile measures which might otherwise be put in
execution.
On 5th October the Society for Constitutional Information agreed to the
plan, and ordered the drafting of a joint address to the French Convention.
By this time the news of the successful stand of the French troops against
the Allies at Valmy and the subsequent retreat of the latter greatly
encouraged the English democrats; and a more militant tone appears in their
addresses. Thus in that meeting of 5th October a letter was read from Joel
Barlow containing these sentences: "A great Revolution in the management
of the affairs of nations is doubtless soon to be expected through all Europe;
and in the progress of mankind towards this attainment it is greatly to be
desired that the convictions to be acquired from rational discussion should
precede and preclude those which must result from physical exertion."
Why "precede and preclude"? The two expressions are incompatible. It
seems that some more moderate member must have added the latter word as
a sop to the authorities. In any case the last words of the sentence were
clearly intended as a threat. On 26th October, John Frost being in the chair,
the same Society framed the following resolution:
That the Secretary do procure correct copies of the Manifesto
published by the late General Burgoyne while in America, of the
first Manifesto lately published by the Duke of Brunswick in
France, of the last Royal Proclamation against writings and
meetings in England, and of the Emperor's recent proclamation at
Brussels on the same subject; in order that these four pieces may be
printed fairly together on one sheet of paper, and be transmitted by
this Society to all the associated Societies in Great Britain.[99]
publication of such a respectable number of real names will greatly
check the hostile measures which might otherwise be put in
execution.
On 5th October the Society for Constitutional Information agreed to the
plan, and ordered the drafting of a joint address to the French Convention.
By this time the news of the successful stand of the French troops against
the Allies at Valmy and the subsequent retreat of the latter greatly
encouraged the English democrats; and a more militant tone appears in their
addresses. Thus in that meeting of 5th October a letter was read from Joel
Barlow containing these sentences: "A great Revolution in the management
of the affairs of nations is doubtless soon to be expected through all Europe;
and in the progress of mankind towards this attainment it is greatly to be
desired that the convictions to be acquired from rational discussion should
precede and preclude those which must result from physical exertion."
Why "precede and preclude"? The two expressions are incompatible. It
seems that some more moderate member must have added the latter word as
a sop to the authorities. In any case the last words of the sentence were
clearly intended as a threat. On 26th October, John Frost being in the chair,
the same Society framed the following resolution:
That the Secretary do procure correct copies of the Manifesto
published by the late General Burgoyne while in America, of the
first Manifesto lately published by the Duke of Brunswick in
France, of the last Royal Proclamation against writings and
meetings in England, and of the Emperor's recent proclamation at
Brussels on the same subject; in order that these four pieces may be
printed fairly together on one sheet of paper, and be transmitted by
this Society to all the associated Societies in Great Britain.[99]
Page 68
It was then resolved to publish this resolution in the "Argus," "Morning
Chronicle,"[100] "Star," "Morning Post," "English Chronicle," "World," and
"Courier." These papers supported the democratic cause. In order to
counteract their influence Pitt and his colleagues about this time helped to
start two newspapers, "The Sun" and "The True Briton," the advent of
which was much resented by Mr. Walter of "The Times," after his support
of the Government.[101] Apparently these papers were of a more popular
type, and heralded the advent of a cheap and sensational royalism. Sheridan
wittily advised that the motto of "The Sun" should be, not merely the
beginning, but the whole of the passage:
Solem quis dicere
falsum
Audeat? Ille etiam caecos instare tumultus
Saepe monet, fraudemque, et operta tumescere bella.
[102]
The combined address from several patriotic (i.e. reform) societies,
arranged for by Thomas Hardy, was not read at the bar of the French
Convention until 7th November. It set forth that the five thousand
signatories indignantly stepped forth to rescue their country from the
opprobrium thrown upon it by the base conduct of the Government. In vain
did Ministers seek to overawe the timid and mislead the credulous: for
Knowledge and Reason were making great strides in England, so that
Britons now looked on Frenchmen only as "citizens of the world, children
of the common Father," not as enemies to be assassinated "at the command
of weak or ambitious Kings, or of corrupt Ministers." Their real enemies
were the destructive aristocracy, "the bane of all the countries of the earth.
You have acted wisely in banishing it from France." They (the signatories)
could not take up arms to help France, because the Government had
pledged the national faith that it would remain neutral. The Elector of
Chronicle,"[100] "Star," "Morning Post," "English Chronicle," "World," and
"Courier." These papers supported the democratic cause. In order to
counteract their influence Pitt and his colleagues about this time helped to
start two newspapers, "The Sun" and "The True Briton," the advent of
which was much resented by Mr. Walter of "The Times," after his support
of the Government.[101] Apparently these papers were of a more popular
type, and heralded the advent of a cheap and sensational royalism. Sheridan
wittily advised that the motto of "The Sun" should be, not merely the
beginning, but the whole of the passage:
Solem quis dicere
falsum
Audeat? Ille etiam caecos instare tumultus
Saepe monet, fraudemque, et operta tumescere bella.
[102]
The combined address from several patriotic (i.e. reform) societies,
arranged for by Thomas Hardy, was not read at the bar of the French
Convention until 7th November. It set forth that the five thousand
signatories indignantly stepped forth to rescue their country from the
opprobrium thrown upon it by the base conduct of the Government. In vain
did Ministers seek to overawe the timid and mislead the credulous: for
Knowledge and Reason were making great strides in England, so that
Britons now looked on Frenchmen only as "citizens of the world, children
of the common Father," not as enemies to be assassinated "at the command
of weak or ambitious Kings, or of corrupt Ministers." Their real enemies
were the destructive aristocracy, "the bane of all the countries of the earth.
You have acted wisely in banishing it from France." They (the signatories)
could not take up arms to help France, because the Government had
pledged the national faith that it would remain neutral. The Elector of
Page 69
Hanover had joined his troops to those of traitors and robbers; "but the King
of England will do well to remember that England is not Hanover; should
he forget this, we will not forget it.... We ardently wish a Triple Alliance,
not of crowned heads, but of the people of America, France, and Great
Britain will give liberty to Europe and peace to the world." The address was
signed by Margarot and Hardy. It and other addresses were reported
verbatim by our chargé d'affaires, Munro, to the Foreign Office.[103]
The democratic ferment in England speedily aroused a decided opposition.
Macaulay probably does not much exaggerate when he says that out of
twenty well-to-do persons nineteen were ardently loyal and firmly anti-
Jacobin. The month of November saw the formation of an "Ante [sic]-
Levelling Society, for supporting the Civil Power in suppressing Tumults
and maintaining the constitutional Government of this Country in King,
Lords, and Commons." Its programme leaves much to be desired in the
matter of style, but nothing in respect to loyalty.[104] The club was founded
by Reeves and others. Hardy notes in his memoirs that it soon began to do
much harm to the Corresponding Society.
Far aloof from this turmoil stands the solitary and inscrutable figure of Pitt.
At this time he was leading, almost with ostentation, the life of a country
gentleman, dividing his time between Holwood and Walmer Castle. Very
few of his letters of this period survive. Writing from Walmer on 16th
October to Grenville, he makes merely a verbal alteration in an important
despatch on which the latter consulted him. Indeed he left the conduct of
foreign affairs to Grenville far more fully than he had done to the Duke of
Leeds. I have found no draft of a despatch written wholly by Pitt at the
time, or indeed at the crisis that followed. There is, however, a significant
phrase in his letter to Grenville, that, if the French retained Savoy, this
would bring about a new order of things.[105] For the most part Pitt at this
time gave himself up to rest and recreation at Walmer Castle. The charm of
of England will do well to remember that England is not Hanover; should
he forget this, we will not forget it.... We ardently wish a Triple Alliance,
not of crowned heads, but of the people of America, France, and Great
Britain will give liberty to Europe and peace to the world." The address was
signed by Margarot and Hardy. It and other addresses were reported
verbatim by our chargé d'affaires, Munro, to the Foreign Office.[103]
The democratic ferment in England speedily aroused a decided opposition.
Macaulay probably does not much exaggerate when he says that out of
twenty well-to-do persons nineteen were ardently loyal and firmly anti-
Jacobin. The month of November saw the formation of an "Ante [sic]-
Levelling Society, for supporting the Civil Power in suppressing Tumults
and maintaining the constitutional Government of this Country in King,
Lords, and Commons." Its programme leaves much to be desired in the
matter of style, but nothing in respect to loyalty.[104] The club was founded
by Reeves and others. Hardy notes in his memoirs that it soon began to do
much harm to the Corresponding Society.
Far aloof from this turmoil stands the solitary and inscrutable figure of Pitt.
At this time he was leading, almost with ostentation, the life of a country
gentleman, dividing his time between Holwood and Walmer Castle. Very
few of his letters of this period survive. Writing from Walmer on 16th
October to Grenville, he makes merely a verbal alteration in an important
despatch on which the latter consulted him. Indeed he left the conduct of
foreign affairs to Grenville far more fully than he had done to the Duke of
Leeds. I have found no draft of a despatch written wholly by Pitt at the
time, or indeed at the crisis that followed. There is, however, a significant
phrase in his letter to Grenville, that, if the French retained Savoy, this
would bring about a new order of things.[105] For the most part Pitt at this
time gave himself up to rest and recreation at Walmer Castle. The charm of
Page 70
the sea and of the Downs seems to have laid hold on him; for General
Smith, writing to Lord Auckland from Walmer, says that Pitt is soon in love
with the King's present and gladly spends there all the time he can spare.
Lord and Lady Chatham were with him and encouraged his passion for that
retired spot. A little later he had a flying visit from one who was to become
a devoted friend, the brilliant and versatile Earl of Mornington. Coming
over from Ramsgate and lunching at Walmer, he found that Pitt had so far
taken up with country sports as to follow the hounds in chase of "a
basketted hare."
Apart from the bad harvest and the spectre of want which crept over the
country, Pitt found little to alarm him at this time. In preparation for the
opening of Parliament, he distributed to each of his friends six printed
copies of his speech on the abatement of the Spanish armament taxes, for
the purpose of circulation in the country.[106] Clearly he thought that the
proposed economies in the public services would salve the prevailing
discontent. At the close of October the French agent, Noël, reported to
Lebrun that Pitt was not arming, and was still inclined to hold aloof from
French affairs.[107] In fact, so late as 6th November, Grenville wrote to
Auckland that on all grounds non-intervention in continental affairs is the
best policy for Great Britain.[108]
But now a time drew near when anger was to expel calculation; when the
impulses of the populace flung aside the counsels of statesmen, and the
friends of universal peace helped to loose the dogs of war. This new phase
in the life of Europe opened up when the dense columns of Dumouriez
drove the thin lines of Austria from a strong position at Jemappes (6th
Smith, writing to Lord Auckland from Walmer, says that Pitt is soon in love
with the King's present and gladly spends there all the time he can spare.
Lord and Lady Chatham were with him and encouraged his passion for that
retired spot. A little later he had a flying visit from one who was to become
a devoted friend, the brilliant and versatile Earl of Mornington. Coming
over from Ramsgate and lunching at Walmer, he found that Pitt had so far
taken up with country sports as to follow the hounds in chase of "a
basketted hare."
Apart from the bad harvest and the spectre of want which crept over the
country, Pitt found little to alarm him at this time. In preparation for the
opening of Parliament, he distributed to each of his friends six printed
copies of his speech on the abatement of the Spanish armament taxes, for
the purpose of circulation in the country.[106] Clearly he thought that the
proposed economies in the public services would salve the prevailing
discontent. At the close of October the French agent, Noël, reported to
Lebrun that Pitt was not arming, and was still inclined to hold aloof from
French affairs.[107] In fact, so late as 6th November, Grenville wrote to
Auckland that on all grounds non-intervention in continental affairs is the
best policy for Great Britain.[108]
But now a time drew near when anger was to expel calculation; when the
impulses of the populace flung aside the counsels of statesmen, and the
friends of universal peace helped to loose the dogs of war. This new phase
in the life of Europe opened up when the dense columns of Dumouriez
drove the thin lines of Austria from a strong position at Jemappes (6th
Page 71
November). Mons opened its gates on the following day; and the other
towns of Belgium speedily followed suit, the French receiving a hearty
welcome everywhere. The conquest of the Belgic Provinces puffed up the
French with boundless pride mingled with contempt for the old
Governments; and these feelings awakened a formidable response in these
islands. The news of the conquest of the Pays Bas by the sansculottes,
received with bewilderment and disgust in Piccadilly, aroused wild hopes
among the weavers of Spitalfields. "The activity and insolence of the
French emissaries and their allies in this country have certainly increased
much with Dumouriez's success," so wrote Grenville to Auckland on 26th
November.
In these days we smile at the notion of foreign agents influencing public
opinion; but it seems certain that Chauvelin and his staff made persistent
efforts to fan the embers of discontent into a flame.[109] Lord Sheffield
declared that even the neighbourhood of Sheffield Park, near Lewes, was
thoroughly worked by French emissaries; but it is not unlikely that landlord
nervousness transfigured some wretched refugees, on their way from the
coast, into Jacobinical envoys. Certainly the town which gave him his title
was in a dangerous state. An officer stationed there describes the joy of the
men of Sheffield in celebrating Dumouriez' victory. They roasted an ox
whole, devoured it, and then formed a procession, 10,000 strong, behind the
French tricolour and a picture which represented Dundas stabbing Liberty
and Burke treading down "the swinish multitude." He states that they were
enrolled in Corresponding Societies, had bought firearms, and were seeking
to corrupt the soldiery.[110]
Derby seems to have been equally fervid, if we may judge by the address
which on 20th November went from its branch of the Society for
Constitutional Information to the French National Convention, couched in
these terms. "It was reserved for the Gallic Republic to break the accursed
towns of Belgium speedily followed suit, the French receiving a hearty
welcome everywhere. The conquest of the Belgic Provinces puffed up the
French with boundless pride mingled with contempt for the old
Governments; and these feelings awakened a formidable response in these
islands. The news of the conquest of the Pays Bas by the sansculottes,
received with bewilderment and disgust in Piccadilly, aroused wild hopes
among the weavers of Spitalfields. "The activity and insolence of the
French emissaries and their allies in this country have certainly increased
much with Dumouriez's success," so wrote Grenville to Auckland on 26th
November.
In these days we smile at the notion of foreign agents influencing public
opinion; but it seems certain that Chauvelin and his staff made persistent
efforts to fan the embers of discontent into a flame.[109] Lord Sheffield
declared that even the neighbourhood of Sheffield Park, near Lewes, was
thoroughly worked by French emissaries; but it is not unlikely that landlord
nervousness transfigured some wretched refugees, on their way from the
coast, into Jacobinical envoys. Certainly the town which gave him his title
was in a dangerous state. An officer stationed there describes the joy of the
men of Sheffield in celebrating Dumouriez' victory. They roasted an ox
whole, devoured it, and then formed a procession, 10,000 strong, behind the
French tricolour and a picture which represented Dundas stabbing Liberty
and Burke treading down "the swinish multitude." He states that they were
enrolled in Corresponding Societies, had bought firearms, and were seeking
to corrupt the soldiery.[110]
Derby seems to have been equally fervid, if we may judge by the address
which on 20th November went from its branch of the Society for
Constitutional Information to the French National Convention, couched in
these terms. "It was reserved for the Gallic Republic to break the accursed
Page 72
knot which has leagued Kings for ages past against the rest of the world.
Reason and Philosophy are making great strides; and precedent and
hereditary notions go fast to decline. By teaching mankind that they are all
equal in rights, you have dedicated a glorious edifice to Liberty, which must
hereafter prove the dungeon of tyrants and the asylum of the oppressed."
[111]
Still more seditious was the action of the London Corresponding Society.
On 28th November Joel Barlow and John Frost, deputed by that body,
presented an address to the French Convention, congratulating it on the
triumphs of liberty, and assured Frenchmen that innumerable societies and
clubs were springing up in England. "After the example given by France,"
they said, "Revolutions will become easy. Reason is about to make rapid
progress; and it would not be extraordinary if in a much less space of time
than can be imagined, the French should send addresses of congratulation to
a National Convention of England." They then informed the French
deputies that 1,000 pairs of shoes had come from the Society as a gift to the
soldiers of liberty, and the gift would be repeated weekly for the next six
weeks. They also presented an address which ended thus: "Other nations
will soon follow your steps in this career of improvement, and, rising from
their lethargy, will arm themselves for the purpose of claiming the Rights of
Man with that all-powerful voice which man cannot resist." Next came a
deputation from the English and Irish residents in Paris, which assured the
French deputies that a majority of the British people desired to copy their
example, and that the old Governments would soon survive merely as a
memory. The three addresses aroused immense enthusiasm, and a decree
was passed for their printing and circulation.[112]
These ecstatic praises of the Convention sounded oddly, as that body had
just been discussing a petition from several Parisians who had lately been
imprisoned without knowing why or by whom. And the Belfast address of
Reason and Philosophy are making great strides; and precedent and
hereditary notions go fast to decline. By teaching mankind that they are all
equal in rights, you have dedicated a glorious edifice to Liberty, which must
hereafter prove the dungeon of tyrants and the asylum of the oppressed."
[111]
Still more seditious was the action of the London Corresponding Society.
On 28th November Joel Barlow and John Frost, deputed by that body,
presented an address to the French Convention, congratulating it on the
triumphs of liberty, and assured Frenchmen that innumerable societies and
clubs were springing up in England. "After the example given by France,"
they said, "Revolutions will become easy. Reason is about to make rapid
progress; and it would not be extraordinary if in a much less space of time
than can be imagined, the French should send addresses of congratulation to
a National Convention of England." They then informed the French
deputies that 1,000 pairs of shoes had come from the Society as a gift to the
soldiers of liberty, and the gift would be repeated weekly for the next six
weeks. They also presented an address which ended thus: "Other nations
will soon follow your steps in this career of improvement, and, rising from
their lethargy, will arm themselves for the purpose of claiming the Rights of
Man with that all-powerful voice which man cannot resist." Next came a
deputation from the English and Irish residents in Paris, which assured the
French deputies that a majority of the British people desired to copy their
example, and that the old Governments would soon survive merely as a
memory. The three addresses aroused immense enthusiasm, and a decree
was passed for their printing and circulation.[112]
These ecstatic praises of the Convention sounded oddly, as that body had
just been discussing a petition from several Parisians who had lately been
imprisoned without knowing why or by whom. And the Belfast address of
Page 73
congratulation on the progress of religious liberty was followed by the
complaints of two members of the Convention that they had been half
drowned at Chartres for a profession of atheism.[113] But undoubtedly these
addresses by British Radicals caused exultation on both sides of the
Channel. Frenchmen believed that our people were about to overthrow the
Cabinet;[114] while the visitors returned home to trumpet forth the triumphs
of Reason and the doom of Tyranny.
Certainly the action of the French Convention seemed to assume the speedy
advent of a Jacobinical millennium. To the eye of faith the headlong flight
of the Austrians from Belgium opened up boundless vistas of conquest, or
rather, of fraternization with liberated serfs. Consequently the month from
16th November to 15th December witnessed the issue of four defiantly
propagandist decrees. That of 16th November enjoined on French generals
the pursuit of the Austrians on to any territory where they might find refuge
—obviously a threat to the German and Dutch States near at hand. On the
same day the French deputies decreed freedom of navigation on the estuary
of the River Scheldt within the Dutch territory, which that people had
strictly controlled since the Treaty of Münster (1648). In this connection it
is well to remember that the right of the Dutch to exclude foreigners from
that estuary had been recognized by France in five treaties signed with
Great Britain since the Peace of Utrecht. Further, by the Anglo-Dutch
alliance of the year 1788, we had covenanted to uphold the rights of the
Dutch in this and other respects. Thus, the French Republic was taking upon
itself to rescind a well-established right of the Dutch Republic.
There is, however, another side to this question. The law of Nature, as
distinct from the law of nations, forbade the barring of a navigable river to
the commerce of aliens; and in this particular case the exclusive privileges
retained by the Dutch had almost strangled the trade of Antwerp. Visitors
describe the desolate aspect of the quays and streets in a city which was
complaints of two members of the Convention that they had been half
drowned at Chartres for a profession of atheism.[113] But undoubtedly these
addresses by British Radicals caused exultation on both sides of the
Channel. Frenchmen believed that our people were about to overthrow the
Cabinet;[114] while the visitors returned home to trumpet forth the triumphs
of Reason and the doom of Tyranny.
Certainly the action of the French Convention seemed to assume the speedy
advent of a Jacobinical millennium. To the eye of faith the headlong flight
of the Austrians from Belgium opened up boundless vistas of conquest, or
rather, of fraternization with liberated serfs. Consequently the month from
16th November to 15th December witnessed the issue of four defiantly
propagandist decrees. That of 16th November enjoined on French generals
the pursuit of the Austrians on to any territory where they might find refuge
—obviously a threat to the German and Dutch States near at hand. On the
same day the French deputies decreed freedom of navigation on the estuary
of the River Scheldt within the Dutch territory, which that people had
strictly controlled since the Treaty of Münster (1648). In this connection it
is well to remember that the right of the Dutch to exclude foreigners from
that estuary had been recognized by France in five treaties signed with
Great Britain since the Peace of Utrecht. Further, by the Anglo-Dutch
alliance of the year 1788, we had covenanted to uphold the rights of the
Dutch in this and other respects. Thus, the French Republic was taking upon
itself to rescind a well-established right of the Dutch Republic.
There is, however, another side to this question. The law of Nature, as
distinct from the law of nations, forbade the barring of a navigable river to
the commerce of aliens; and in this particular case the exclusive privileges
retained by the Dutch had almost strangled the trade of Antwerp. Visitors
describe the desolate aspect of the quays and streets in a city which was
Page 74
clearly designed to be one of the great marts of the world. Of this gospel of
Nature, as set forth by Rousseau, the French were the interpreters; but they
would have done well to appeal to Holland and Great Britain to abrogate
this odious privilege, adding also the assurance, formerly given by
Dumouriez, that Belgium would never become French.
Unfortunately the disinterested character of the crusade for liberty was now
belied by two additional decrees which created the worst possible
impression. On 19th November the French Convention declared its resolve
to "grant fraternity and assistance to all people who wish to recover their
liberty," and further ordered its generals to give effect to this decree. Eight
days later it rescinded the former resolution, that France would make no
conquests, by ordering the incorporation of Savoy in the French Republic.
The priest Grégoire was equal to the task of proving that this involved no
contradiction of the former principle, because the Savoyards wished to join
France and Nature herself had proclaimed the desirability of union. By the
same patriotic logic France could rightfully absorb all parts of the Continent
where Jacobins abounded and natural frontiers were lacking.
These decrees brought about an entirely new situation. The annexation of
Savoy furnished a practical commentary on the airy proposals announced
on 16th and 19th November; but these alone were sufficient to cause Pitt
and Grenville the deepest concern. On the 27th the latter wrote to Auckland
at The Hague in terms which show his conviction that France meant to
revolutionize the Dutch Republic, and also, if possible, Great Britain.
Respecting the decrees of the 16th and 19th he wrote: "The whole is a
concerted plan to drive us to extremities, with a view of producing an
impression in the interior of the country."[115] That is, he believed the
Convention to be set on forcing England either to declare war, or to give
way disgracefully; and in either case the result would be an increase of
seditious feeling in these islands. This continued to be his view. For on 4th
Nature, as set forth by Rousseau, the French were the interpreters; but they
would have done well to appeal to Holland and Great Britain to abrogate
this odious privilege, adding also the assurance, formerly given by
Dumouriez, that Belgium would never become French.
Unfortunately the disinterested character of the crusade for liberty was now
belied by two additional decrees which created the worst possible
impression. On 19th November the French Convention declared its resolve
to "grant fraternity and assistance to all people who wish to recover their
liberty," and further ordered its generals to give effect to this decree. Eight
days later it rescinded the former resolution, that France would make no
conquests, by ordering the incorporation of Savoy in the French Republic.
The priest Grégoire was equal to the task of proving that this involved no
contradiction of the former principle, because the Savoyards wished to join
France and Nature herself had proclaimed the desirability of union. By the
same patriotic logic France could rightfully absorb all parts of the Continent
where Jacobins abounded and natural frontiers were lacking.
These decrees brought about an entirely new situation. The annexation of
Savoy furnished a practical commentary on the airy proposals announced
on 16th and 19th November; but these alone were sufficient to cause Pitt
and Grenville the deepest concern. On the 27th the latter wrote to Auckland
at The Hague in terms which show his conviction that France meant to
revolutionize the Dutch Republic, and also, if possible, Great Britain.
Respecting the decrees of the 16th and 19th he wrote: "The whole is a
concerted plan to drive us to extremities, with a view of producing an
impression in the interior of the country."[115] That is, he believed the
Convention to be set on forcing England either to declare war, or to give
way disgracefully; and in either case the result would be an increase of
seditious feeling in these islands. This continued to be his view. For on 4th
Page 75
December, after reading the seditious addresses of the English societies to
the Convention, he wrote again to Auckland that the French evidently relied
on the malcontents both in England and Holland to paralyse the
Governments; and, he added, "This is above all others a reason for firmness
in the present moment, and for resisting, while the power of resistance is yet
in our hands. For the success of their unfounded claims would not only give
rise to new pretensions, but would give them additional influence."[116]
Pitt's views were the same, though he stated them more firmly and not as an
alarmist. On 9th December he wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland, that the gross disregard of treaties shown of late by
France, her encouragement of the spirit of revolt in all lands, and her public
reception of addresses from English societies, "full of treasonable
sentiments," compelled the Government, though very reluctantly, to add to
the armed forces. He added these words: "I am clear that the circumstances
require vigour and decision both at home and abroad. And the spirit of the
country seems within these last ten days to have taken so favourable a turn
that I think we may look with great confidence to the event."[117] Thus Pitt
and Grenville equally felt the need of firmness in resisting the French
decrees, partly because of their aggressive and illegal nature, but also
because surrender would inflate the spirits of British malcontents.
Current events served to strengthen this opinion. France had hitherto won
all the points of the game by sheer audacity. Everywhere she had attacked,
and everywhere she had found unexpected weakness. Custine's army had
extorted a forced loan from Frankfurt. Dumouriez was threatening Aix-la-
Chapelle on the east, and the Dutch on the north. The spirit which animated
the French Foreign Office appears in the letter which Lebrun, its chief,
wrote to Dumouriez on 22nd November: "To the glory of having freed the
Belgian Catholics, I hope you will join that of delivering their Batavian
brothers from the yoke of the Stadholder."[118] There can be no doubt that
the Convention, he wrote again to Auckland that the French evidently relied
on the malcontents both in England and Holland to paralyse the
Governments; and, he added, "This is above all others a reason for firmness
in the present moment, and for resisting, while the power of resistance is yet
in our hands. For the success of their unfounded claims would not only give
rise to new pretensions, but would give them additional influence."[116]
Pitt's views were the same, though he stated them more firmly and not as an
alarmist. On 9th December he wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland, that the gross disregard of treaties shown of late by
France, her encouragement of the spirit of revolt in all lands, and her public
reception of addresses from English societies, "full of treasonable
sentiments," compelled the Government, though very reluctantly, to add to
the armed forces. He added these words: "I am clear that the circumstances
require vigour and decision both at home and abroad. And the spirit of the
country seems within these last ten days to have taken so favourable a turn
that I think we may look with great confidence to the event."[117] Thus Pitt
and Grenville equally felt the need of firmness in resisting the French
decrees, partly because of their aggressive and illegal nature, but also
because surrender would inflate the spirits of British malcontents.
Current events served to strengthen this opinion. France had hitherto won
all the points of the game by sheer audacity. Everywhere she had attacked,
and everywhere she had found unexpected weakness. Custine's army had
extorted a forced loan from Frankfurt. Dumouriez was threatening Aix-la-
Chapelle on the east, and the Dutch on the north. The spirit which animated
the French Foreign Office appears in the letter which Lebrun, its chief,
wrote to Dumouriez on 22nd November: "To the glory of having freed the
Belgian Catholics, I hope you will join that of delivering their Batavian
brothers from the yoke of the Stadholder."[118] There can be no doubt that
Page 76
the general laid his plans for that purpose, though he also sent pacific
overtures to Auckland at The Hague.[119]
To crown the indignation of royalists, there came the tidings that on 3rd
December the French Convention decreed the trial of Louis XVI for high
treason against the nation. The news aroused furious resentment; but it is
noteworthy that Pitt and Grenville rarely, if ever, referred to this event; and
that, before it was known, they had declared the impossibility of avoiding a
rupture with the French Government if it persisted in adhering to the
November decrees. On this question the final court of appeal is the
despatches and letters of our Ministers. An examination of them discloses
the reasons for their firmness. On 13th November, when the evacuation of
Brussels by the Austrians was known, Ministers assured the Dutch
Government that they would oppose a French invasion of Holland. They
charged Auckland to declare that His Majesty had "no hesitation as to the
propriety of his assisting the Dutch Republic as circumstances might
require, against any attempt on the part of any other Power to invade its
dominions or to disturb its Government." This declaration was to be
published in order to discourage the plots of the Dutch "Patriots," and to
warn the French Government and its general of the danger of a hostile
advance. Auckland replied on 16th November: "It is impossible to convey
to Your Lordships an adequate sense of the impression made by this
voluntary declaration of His Majesty's sentiments and intentions respecting
the Republic on the occasion of the present crisis. The generosity of this
measure, which in a few hours was generally known, and which to-morrow
will be circulated on the Continent in the newspapers of the Republic, is
acknowledged by everyone." The Prince of Orange at once wrote to thank
the King for this proof of his friendship, and added the suggestion that the
anchoring of a British squadron in the Downs would, more than anything
else, tend to "hold in check our enemies."[120]
overtures to Auckland at The Hague.[119]
To crown the indignation of royalists, there came the tidings that on 3rd
December the French Convention decreed the trial of Louis XVI for high
treason against the nation. The news aroused furious resentment; but it is
noteworthy that Pitt and Grenville rarely, if ever, referred to this event; and
that, before it was known, they had declared the impossibility of avoiding a
rupture with the French Government if it persisted in adhering to the
November decrees. On this question the final court of appeal is the
despatches and letters of our Ministers. An examination of them discloses
the reasons for their firmness. On 13th November, when the evacuation of
Brussels by the Austrians was known, Ministers assured the Dutch
Government that they would oppose a French invasion of Holland. They
charged Auckland to declare that His Majesty had "no hesitation as to the
propriety of his assisting the Dutch Republic as circumstances might
require, against any attempt on the part of any other Power to invade its
dominions or to disturb its Government." This declaration was to be
published in order to discourage the plots of the Dutch "Patriots," and to
warn the French Government and its general of the danger of a hostile
advance. Auckland replied on 16th November: "It is impossible to convey
to Your Lordships an adequate sense of the impression made by this
voluntary declaration of His Majesty's sentiments and intentions respecting
the Republic on the occasion of the present crisis. The generosity of this
measure, which in a few hours was generally known, and which to-morrow
will be circulated on the Continent in the newspapers of the Republic, is
acknowledged by everyone." The Prince of Orange at once wrote to thank
the King for this proof of his friendship, and added the suggestion that the
anchoring of a British squadron in the Downs would, more than anything
else, tend to "hold in check our enemies."[120]
Page 77
Pitt and Grenville did not comply with this last request; and the British
declaration itself came just two days too late to give pause to the National
Convention, before it published the decree on the opening of the Scheldt.
Possibly in the days of telegraphs the warning would have been flashed
from The Hague to Paris in time. As it was, both Powers publicly
committed themselves on the same day to opposite courses of action from
which pride or conviction forbade them to recede. So narrow sometimes is
the space that at first divides the paths leading towards peace and war.
The concern of Pitt and Grenville at the French conquest of Belgium
appears in their instructions to Stratton, our chargé d'affaires at Vienna, to
confer with the Austrian Chancellor, Cobenzl, on the threatening situation,
setting forth the desire of George III to contribute to the tranquillity of all
the States of Europe. In his reply of 22nd December Cobenzl declared that
Austria and Prussia must have indemnities for their expenses in the war, the
restoration of monarchy at Paris being another essential to a settlement.[121]
These statements were most discouraging: the former pointed to a speedy
partition of Poland; and the forcible restoration of the Bourbons was at this
time wholly repugnant to the feelings of Pitt.
Meanwhile the prospect of war with France had become far more
threatening. The decree of 16th November on the Scheldt, and that of 19th
November on helping foreign malcontents, were a direct defiance to all
neighbouring States, and especially to Great Britain and Holland. In the
latter country the Patriots were, as in 1787, actively helped from Paris, and
threatened the existence of the Orange régime, of which we were the
guarantors. Moreover, the opening of the Scheldt was a serious blow to
Dutch commerce. Sir James Harris, writing from The Hague in December
1784, when this very question brought Joseph II to the brink of war with
Holland, quoted the declaration of the Grand Pensionary, that the Dutch
ought to spend their last florin "rather than submit to so destructive and
declaration itself came just two days too late to give pause to the National
Convention, before it published the decree on the opening of the Scheldt.
Possibly in the days of telegraphs the warning would have been flashed
from The Hague to Paris in time. As it was, both Powers publicly
committed themselves on the same day to opposite courses of action from
which pride or conviction forbade them to recede. So narrow sometimes is
the space that at first divides the paths leading towards peace and war.
The concern of Pitt and Grenville at the French conquest of Belgium
appears in their instructions to Stratton, our chargé d'affaires at Vienna, to
confer with the Austrian Chancellor, Cobenzl, on the threatening situation,
setting forth the desire of George III to contribute to the tranquillity of all
the States of Europe. In his reply of 22nd December Cobenzl declared that
Austria and Prussia must have indemnities for their expenses in the war, the
restoration of monarchy at Paris being another essential to a settlement.[121]
These statements were most discouraging: the former pointed to a speedy
partition of Poland; and the forcible restoration of the Bourbons was at this
time wholly repugnant to the feelings of Pitt.
Meanwhile the prospect of war with France had become far more
threatening. The decree of 16th November on the Scheldt, and that of 19th
November on helping foreign malcontents, were a direct defiance to all
neighbouring States, and especially to Great Britain and Holland. In the
latter country the Patriots were, as in 1787, actively helped from Paris, and
threatened the existence of the Orange régime, of which we were the
guarantors. Moreover, the opening of the Scheldt was a serious blow to
Dutch commerce. Sir James Harris, writing from The Hague in December
1784, when this very question brought Joseph II to the brink of war with
Holland, quoted the declaration of the Grand Pensionary, that the Dutch
ought to spend their last florin "rather than submit to so destructive and
Page 78
humiliating a measure as the opening of the Scheldt."[122] The effusive
thanks of the Dutch when the Court of Versailles opposed the demand of
Joseph II, shows that they looked on the control of that estuary as vital to
their interests. This question was brought to an issue on 23rd November,
when French gunboats entered the Scheldt, and, despite the fire of the
Dutch guardship, made their way up the river in order to assist in the
reduction of the citadel of Antwerp. The senior captain of the gunboats
announced that he did this by order of Dumouriez. On 8th December seven
French ships sailed up to that city, the first since the Treaty of Münster.
The affair of the Scheldt was not the only cause of alarm. The Dutch
authorities managed to get a copy of a secret letter (dated 20th November)
from Dumouriez to Maulde, French envoy at The Hague, in which he
assured him that he would do his best to keep him in that post (despite the
ill will of the Paris Government); for he had much need of him for certain
negotiations. He added these words: "I count on carrying liberty to the
Batavians (Dutch) as I have done to the Belgians; also that the Revolution
will take place in Holland so that things will return to the state they were in
1788." The Dutch Government gave a copy of this letter to Auckland, who
forwarded it to Grenville on 23rd November. It reached Whitehall three
days later. Curiously enough, Grenville did not hear of the French decree
for the opening of the Scheldt until 26th November. But on that day he
wrote to Auckland a despatch which shows his conviction that France
meant to force us into war, and that the chief question for Great Britain and
Holland now was—when should hostilities begin? Clearly, then, Grenville,
and probably Pitt, regarded a rupture with France as unavoidable, unless she
revoked the aggressive decrees. Nevertheless they decided to send a special
envoy to Paris, and drew up rough drafts undated and addressed to some
person unnamed, bidding him make careful inquiries into the state of affairs
at that capital.
thanks of the Dutch when the Court of Versailles opposed the demand of
Joseph II, shows that they looked on the control of that estuary as vital to
their interests. This question was brought to an issue on 23rd November,
when French gunboats entered the Scheldt, and, despite the fire of the
Dutch guardship, made their way up the river in order to assist in the
reduction of the citadel of Antwerp. The senior captain of the gunboats
announced that he did this by order of Dumouriez. On 8th December seven
French ships sailed up to that city, the first since the Treaty of Münster.
The affair of the Scheldt was not the only cause of alarm. The Dutch
authorities managed to get a copy of a secret letter (dated 20th November)
from Dumouriez to Maulde, French envoy at The Hague, in which he
assured him that he would do his best to keep him in that post (despite the
ill will of the Paris Government); for he had much need of him for certain
negotiations. He added these words: "I count on carrying liberty to the
Batavians (Dutch) as I have done to the Belgians; also that the Revolution
will take place in Holland so that things will return to the state they were in
1788." The Dutch Government gave a copy of this letter to Auckland, who
forwarded it to Grenville on 23rd November. It reached Whitehall three
days later. Curiously enough, Grenville did not hear of the French decree
for the opening of the Scheldt until 26th November. But on that day he
wrote to Auckland a despatch which shows his conviction that France
meant to force us into war, and that the chief question for Great Britain and
Holland now was—when should hostilities begin? Clearly, then, Grenville,
and probably Pitt, regarded a rupture with France as unavoidable, unless she
revoked the aggressive decrees. Nevertheless they decided to send a special
envoy to Paris, and drew up rough drafts undated and addressed to some
person unnamed, bidding him make careful inquiries into the state of affairs
at that capital.
Page 79
We cannot wonder that Pitt took a gloomy view of things; for on 24th
November a "moderate" member of the French Convention proposed an
addition to the decree of 19th November (offering help to malcontents in
other States), so as to limit it to nations with which France was at war. This
proposal—obviously designed to soothe the apprehensions of Pitt—
displeased the "patriotic" majority, which disposed of it by carrying the
"previous question." After this the decree of 19th November could no
longer be treated as a meaningless effervescence of Gallic enthusiasm; and,
when taken with the disloyal addresses presented by certain English clubs
on 28th November, its reaffirmation produced the worst possible
impression.
On the 29th, Nagel, the Dutch envoy in London, proffered a formal appeal
for help, in addition to requests which he had made to Grenville a few days
before. He further begged him to order the assembling of a squadron at the
Downs, or at Gravesend, so as to assist the Dutch speedily, if need arose.
[123] Meanwhile our allies (as usually happens with small States in presence
of danger) sought to temporize; and herein, as also in the caution of Pitt and
Grenville, lay the reason why war did not break out at once. No one can
peruse the despatches of our Ministers without seeing that they considered
war inevitable, unless the French retracted the obnoxious decrees. It is well
to notice that at this time the question of the trial of Louis XVI had not
come up for consideration. The dispute turned solely on the frontier rights
of the Dutch, which Pitt and his colleagues believed to be violated by
France, and which we were in honour bound to vindicate.
On 1st December, then, came the first of those precautionary measures
which not seldom precipitate the conflict they are designed to avert. The
Cabinet issued a royal proclamation, calling out part of the militia.
Ministers took this step partly as a retort to the seditious addresses of
English Radical clubs to the French Convention,[124] partly in order to
November a "moderate" member of the French Convention proposed an
addition to the decree of 19th November (offering help to malcontents in
other States), so as to limit it to nations with which France was at war. This
proposal—obviously designed to soothe the apprehensions of Pitt—
displeased the "patriotic" majority, which disposed of it by carrying the
"previous question." After this the decree of 19th November could no
longer be treated as a meaningless effervescence of Gallic enthusiasm; and,
when taken with the disloyal addresses presented by certain English clubs
on 28th November, its reaffirmation produced the worst possible
impression.
On the 29th, Nagel, the Dutch envoy in London, proffered a formal appeal
for help, in addition to requests which he had made to Grenville a few days
before. He further begged him to order the assembling of a squadron at the
Downs, or at Gravesend, so as to assist the Dutch speedily, if need arose.
[123] Meanwhile our allies (as usually happens with small States in presence
of danger) sought to temporize; and herein, as also in the caution of Pitt and
Grenville, lay the reason why war did not break out at once. No one can
peruse the despatches of our Ministers without seeing that they considered
war inevitable, unless the French retracted the obnoxious decrees. It is well
to notice that at this time the question of the trial of Louis XVI had not
come up for consideration. The dispute turned solely on the frontier rights
of the Dutch, which Pitt and his colleagues believed to be violated by
France, and which we were in honour bound to vindicate.
On 1st December, then, came the first of those precautionary measures
which not seldom precipitate the conflict they are designed to avert. The
Cabinet issued a royal proclamation, calling out part of the militia.
Ministers took this step partly as a retort to the seditious addresses of
English Radical clubs to the French Convention,[124] partly in order to
Page 80
repress tumults. There had been rioting in a few towns, and the reports from
Scotland were alarming. On 22nd November Dundas, writing to Pitt from
Melville Castle, N.B., stated that sedition had spread rapidly of late in
Scotland, and he estimated that five regiments would be needed to hold
down Dundee, Perth, and Montrose. He added that the clergy of the
Established Church and their following were loyal, the others far otherwise.
[125]
Still worse was the news from Ireland. Early in 1792 the Dublin Parliament
repealed one or two of the most odious statutes against Roman Catholics;
but later in the year contumeliously rejected their petition for the franchise.
Consequently the mass of Irishmen was ready to join the Society of United
Irishmen, a formidable association founded in Ulster in 1791 by Wolfe
Tone. This able young lawyer, fired with zeal for the French Revolution,
conceived the statesmanlike notion of banding together both Presbyterians
and Catholics in a national movement against the exclusive and dominant
English caste. The conduct of the Dublin Parliament made his dream a
reality. At once the ultra-Protestant traders of the North clasped hands with
the Catholic gentry and peasants of the Centre and South. This unheard-of
union was destined to lead Pitt on to a legislative experiment which will
concern us later. Here we may notice that the clubs of Irish malcontents
proceeded to act on a plan already mooted in the English societies, that of
sending delegates to form a National Convention in Dublin. The aim was to
constitute a body far more national than the corrupt Protestant clique that
sat in Parliament, and, after overawing that body, to sunder the connection
with England. The precedent set by the Ulster Volunteers in their meeting at
Dungannon in 1782 warranted the hope of an even completer triumph than
was then secured. The correspondence that passed between Pitt and the
Lord-Lieutenant, Westmorland, reveals the concern which they felt at the
news. Pitt advised the early meeting of the Dublin Parliament, the proposal
of concessions sufficient to allay discontent, and a determined resistance to
Scotland were alarming. On 22nd November Dundas, writing to Pitt from
Melville Castle, N.B., stated that sedition had spread rapidly of late in
Scotland, and he estimated that five regiments would be needed to hold
down Dundee, Perth, and Montrose. He added that the clergy of the
Established Church and their following were loyal, the others far otherwise.
[125]
Still worse was the news from Ireland. Early in 1792 the Dublin Parliament
repealed one or two of the most odious statutes against Roman Catholics;
but later in the year contumeliously rejected their petition for the franchise.
Consequently the mass of Irishmen was ready to join the Society of United
Irishmen, a formidable association founded in Ulster in 1791 by Wolfe
Tone. This able young lawyer, fired with zeal for the French Revolution,
conceived the statesmanlike notion of banding together both Presbyterians
and Catholics in a national movement against the exclusive and dominant
English caste. The conduct of the Dublin Parliament made his dream a
reality. At once the ultra-Protestant traders of the North clasped hands with
the Catholic gentry and peasants of the Centre and South. This unheard-of
union was destined to lead Pitt on to a legislative experiment which will
concern us later. Here we may notice that the clubs of Irish malcontents
proceeded to act on a plan already mooted in the English societies, that of
sending delegates to form a National Convention in Dublin. The aim was to
constitute a body far more national than the corrupt Protestant clique that
sat in Parliament, and, after overawing that body, to sunder the connection
with England. The precedent set by the Ulster Volunteers in their meeting at
Dungannon in 1782 warranted the hope of an even completer triumph than
was then secured. The correspondence that passed between Pitt and the
Lord-Lieutenant, Westmorland, reveals the concern which they felt at the
news. Pitt advised the early meeting of the Dublin Parliament, the proposal
of concessions sufficient to allay discontent, and a determined resistance to
Page 81
all attempts at intimidation. He also suggested the keeping a close watch on
the importation of arms, and levying a Militia if it were practicable.[126] In
reply Westmorland stated (1st December) that the manifesto of a meeting of
United Irishmen in Dublin was most threatening, and that the "French
mania" was spreading everywhere. He added: "Belfast is, as always, noisy
and republican; but not above 200 or 300 Volunteers are there."[127] It seems
probable that the embodying of the Militia in Great Britain was partly with
the view of enabling a few regular regiments to proceed to Ireland.
While taking these precautionary measures, Pitt and Grenville adopted a
tone far from unfriendly to the French envoy. Earlier in the autumn
Grenville refused to see Chauvelin on the ground that the French
Government which sent him no longer existed. But after some pourparlers
he consented to receive him on 29th November. With his usual hauteur he
prepared to teach the ex-Marquis his place from the outset. He placed for
him a stiff small chair; but the envoy quickly repelled the slight and
vindicated the honour of the Republic by occupying the largest arm-chair
available. After this preliminary skirmish things went more smoothly; but
only the briefest summary of their conversation can be given here.
Chauvelin assured Grenville of the desire of France to respect the neutrality
of the Dutch, though they had fired on two French vessels entering the
Scheldt. The opening of that river, he said, was a right decreed by Nature,
and confirmed to France by the conquest of Brabant—a point which he
pressed Grenville to concede. He then charged England with unfriendly
conduct in other respects. In reply Grenville said that he welcomed this
informal explanation, but he declined to give any assurance on the Scheldt
affair. If (said he) France and England were not on good terms, it was not
the fault of the latter Power, which had consistently remained neutral but
declined to allow the rights of its Allies to be violated.[128]
the importation of arms, and levying a Militia if it were practicable.[126] In
reply Westmorland stated (1st December) that the manifesto of a meeting of
United Irishmen in Dublin was most threatening, and that the "French
mania" was spreading everywhere. He added: "Belfast is, as always, noisy
and republican; but not above 200 or 300 Volunteers are there."[127] It seems
probable that the embodying of the Militia in Great Britain was partly with
the view of enabling a few regular regiments to proceed to Ireland.
While taking these precautionary measures, Pitt and Grenville adopted a
tone far from unfriendly to the French envoy. Earlier in the autumn
Grenville refused to see Chauvelin on the ground that the French
Government which sent him no longer existed. But after some pourparlers
he consented to receive him on 29th November. With his usual hauteur he
prepared to teach the ex-Marquis his place from the outset. He placed for
him a stiff small chair; but the envoy quickly repelled the slight and
vindicated the honour of the Republic by occupying the largest arm-chair
available. After this preliminary skirmish things went more smoothly; but
only the briefest summary of their conversation can be given here.
Chauvelin assured Grenville of the desire of France to respect the neutrality
of the Dutch, though they had fired on two French vessels entering the
Scheldt. The opening of that river, he said, was a right decreed by Nature,
and confirmed to France by the conquest of Brabant—a point which he
pressed Grenville to concede. He then charged England with unfriendly
conduct in other respects. In reply Grenville said that he welcomed this
informal explanation, but he declined to give any assurance on the Scheldt
affair. If (said he) France and England were not on good terms, it was not
the fault of the latter Power, which had consistently remained neutral but
declined to allow the rights of its Allies to be violated.[128]
Page 82
Equally firm, though more affable, was the behaviour of Pitt in an interview
of 2nd December with a Frenchman who was destined to become Foreign
Minister under Napoleon. Maret, the future Duc de Bassano, at this time
made a very informal début on the stage of diplomacy. Despite many
statements to the contrary it is certain that he had no official position in
England. He came here merely in order to look after the affairs of the Duke
of Orleans, especially to bring back his daughter, who had for some time
resided in Suffolk with Mme. de Genlis and "Pamela." Maret's own words
to Miles are decisive on this point: "I was not a secret agent; I had no
authority to treat, nor had I any mission; and in declaring this to Mr. Pitt and
to you I said nothing but the truth."[129] With characteristic mendacity
Lebrun afterwards informed the Convention that Maret was a secret agent
and that Pitt had requested an interview with him. The interview came
about owing to the exertions of William Smith, M.P., a well-intentioned
Whig, who hoped much from an informal conversation between Pitt and
one of the head clerks of the French Foreign Office. Chauvelin viewed it
with jealousy, it being his aim to represent Maret as an emissary to the
British and Irish malcontents.[130] Pitt, when he granted the interview,
cannot have known of this, or of the design of Lebrun ultimately to foist
Maret into the place of Morgues at the French Embassy. Accordingly he
welcomed Maret cordially. No tactical skirmish about chairs took place, and
Maret afterwards declared that the great Minister behaved affably
throughout, brightening his converse at times by a smile. As the personality
of the two statesmen and the gravity of the crisis invest this interview with
unique interest, Pitt's account of it, which is in the Pretyman MSS., must be
given almost in full.
He [Maret] expressed his regret at the distant and suspicious terms
on which England and France appeared to stand, his readiness to
give me any éclaircissement he could, and his belief that the present
of 2nd December with a Frenchman who was destined to become Foreign
Minister under Napoleon. Maret, the future Duc de Bassano, at this time
made a very informal début on the stage of diplomacy. Despite many
statements to the contrary it is certain that he had no official position in
England. He came here merely in order to look after the affairs of the Duke
of Orleans, especially to bring back his daughter, who had for some time
resided in Suffolk with Mme. de Genlis and "Pamela." Maret's own words
to Miles are decisive on this point: "I was not a secret agent; I had no
authority to treat, nor had I any mission; and in declaring this to Mr. Pitt and
to you I said nothing but the truth."[129] With characteristic mendacity
Lebrun afterwards informed the Convention that Maret was a secret agent
and that Pitt had requested an interview with him. The interview came
about owing to the exertions of William Smith, M.P., a well-intentioned
Whig, who hoped much from an informal conversation between Pitt and
one of the head clerks of the French Foreign Office. Chauvelin viewed it
with jealousy, it being his aim to represent Maret as an emissary to the
British and Irish malcontents.[130] Pitt, when he granted the interview,
cannot have known of this, or of the design of Lebrun ultimately to foist
Maret into the place of Morgues at the French Embassy. Accordingly he
welcomed Maret cordially. No tactical skirmish about chairs took place, and
Maret afterwards declared that the great Minister behaved affably
throughout, brightening his converse at times by a smile. As the personality
of the two statesmen and the gravity of the crisis invest this interview with
unique interest, Pitt's account of it, which is in the Pretyman MSS., must be
given almost in full.
He [Maret] expressed his regret at the distant and suspicious terms
on which England and France appeared to stand, his readiness to
give me any éclaircissement he could, and his belief that the present
Page 83
French Government would be very glad if means could be found by
private agents, with no official character, to set on foot a friendly
explanation.
I told him that, if they were desirous of such an explanation, it
seemed to me much to be wished under the critical circumstances;
as we might by conversing freely learn whether it was possible to
avoid those extremities which we should very much regret but
which seemed from what we saw of the conduct and designs of
France to be fast approaching; and I then mentioned to him
distinctly that the resolution announced respecting the Scheldt was
considered as proof of an intention to proceed to a rupture with
Holland; that a rupture with Holland on this ground or any other
injurious to their rights, must also lead to an immediate rupture with
this country; and that altho' we should deeply regret the event and
were really desirous of preserving, if possible, the neutrality to
which we had hitherto adhered, we were fully determined, if the
case arose, to give our utmost support to our ally.
His answer was that he hoped nothing of the sort would happen; that
he believed there was no design of proceeding to hostilities against
Holland; and that it was much the wish of the French Government
to be on good terms with this country; that they wished to ménager
l'Angleterre, and therefore to ménager l'Hollande; that these were
the sentiments of M. le Brun when he left Paris about 3 weeks ago;
that he believed them to be those of M. Dumouriez; and that, from
the despatches of M. Chauvelin, which he had seen while here, he
believed they continued to be those of the Conseil Exécutif; that he
thought a confidential explanation on this subject very desirable;
and would either go to Paris or write to M. le Brun, to state what
had passed in our conversation, and that he was persuaded they
would be disposed to [send?] some other person here to enter
privately into negotiations upon it. He afterwards dropped an idea
that some difficulty might perhaps arise from the Conseil Exécutif
feeling itself pressed by the weight of public opinion to propose to
us to receive some person here in a formal character. To this I
private agents, with no official character, to set on foot a friendly
explanation.
I told him that, if they were desirous of such an explanation, it
seemed to me much to be wished under the critical circumstances;
as we might by conversing freely learn whether it was possible to
avoid those extremities which we should very much regret but
which seemed from what we saw of the conduct and designs of
France to be fast approaching; and I then mentioned to him
distinctly that the resolution announced respecting the Scheldt was
considered as proof of an intention to proceed to a rupture with
Holland; that a rupture with Holland on this ground or any other
injurious to their rights, must also lead to an immediate rupture with
this country; and that altho' we should deeply regret the event and
were really desirous of preserving, if possible, the neutrality to
which we had hitherto adhered, we were fully determined, if the
case arose, to give our utmost support to our ally.
His answer was that he hoped nothing of the sort would happen; that
he believed there was no design of proceeding to hostilities against
Holland; and that it was much the wish of the French Government
to be on good terms with this country; that they wished to ménager
l'Angleterre, and therefore to ménager l'Hollande; that these were
the sentiments of M. le Brun when he left Paris about 3 weeks ago;
that he believed them to be those of M. Dumouriez; and that, from
the despatches of M. Chauvelin, which he had seen while here, he
believed they continued to be those of the Conseil Exécutif; that he
thought a confidential explanation on this subject very desirable;
and would either go to Paris or write to M. le Brun, to state what
had passed in our conversation, and that he was persuaded they
would be disposed to [send?] some other person here to enter
privately into negotiations upon it. He afterwards dropped an idea
that some difficulty might perhaps arise from the Conseil Exécutif
feeling itself pressed by the weight of public opinion to propose to
us to receive some person here in a formal character. To this I
Page 84
observed that the circumstances would by no means admit of any
formal communication, and that they would certainly see the
necessity of avoiding the difficulties which must arise from such a
proposal, if they were sincere in wishing an explanation with a view
to remove obstacles.
Towards the end of the conversation, on his repeating his belief that
it would be the wish of the French Government to have such an
explanation and to remove, if possible, the grounds of
misunderstanding, I remarked to him that, if this was really desired,
there was another point which must be attended to—that he must
have seen the impression made here by the decree in France
avowing a design of endeavouring to extend their principles of
government by raising disturbances in other countries; that, while
this was professed or attempted, and till we had full security on this
point, no explanation could answer its purpose, and that such a
conduct must be considered as an act of hostility to neutral nations.
He answered that he knew the impression which this circumstance
produced, and had seen the decree I mentioned with consternation;
that he believed it passed only in a moment of fermentation and
went beyond what was intended; that it could be meant only against
nations at war, and was considered as one way of carrying on war
against them; that he believed it was not conformable to the
sentiments of the Conseil Exécutif, and that they might possibly find
means to revise it. To this I said that, whatever were the sentiments
of the Conseil Exécutif, the decree, as it stood, might justly be
considered by any neutral nation as an act of hostility. He concluded
by saying that he would immediately send to M. le Brun an account
of what had passed, which he hoped might lead to happy
consequences.
Maret prefaced his report of this interview by assuring Lebrun that Pitt was
decidedly in favour of peace, and in fact dreaded war more than the Whig
aristocrats; but, he added, Lord Hawkesbury and the majority of Ministers
formal communication, and that they would certainly see the
necessity of avoiding the difficulties which must arise from such a
proposal, if they were sincere in wishing an explanation with a view
to remove obstacles.
Towards the end of the conversation, on his repeating his belief that
it would be the wish of the French Government to have such an
explanation and to remove, if possible, the grounds of
misunderstanding, I remarked to him that, if this was really desired,
there was another point which must be attended to—that he must
have seen the impression made here by the decree in France
avowing a design of endeavouring to extend their principles of
government by raising disturbances in other countries; that, while
this was professed or attempted, and till we had full security on this
point, no explanation could answer its purpose, and that such a
conduct must be considered as an act of hostility to neutral nations.
He answered that he knew the impression which this circumstance
produced, and had seen the decree I mentioned with consternation;
that he believed it passed only in a moment of fermentation and
went beyond what was intended; that it could be meant only against
nations at war, and was considered as one way of carrying on war
against them; that he believed it was not conformable to the
sentiments of the Conseil Exécutif, and that they might possibly find
means to revise it. To this I said that, whatever were the sentiments
of the Conseil Exécutif, the decree, as it stood, might justly be
considered by any neutral nation as an act of hostility. He concluded
by saying that he would immediately send to M. le Brun an account
of what had passed, which he hoped might lead to happy
consequences.
Maret prefaced his report of this interview by assuring Lebrun that Pitt was
decidedly in favour of peace, and in fact dreaded war more than the Whig
aristocrats; but, he added, Lord Hawkesbury and the majority of Ministers
Page 85
were for war—a somewhat doubtful statement. Maret's description of the
interview is graphic but far from complete. He reported Pitt's gracious effort
to minimize the difficulties of form arising from the lapse of official
relations between France and England. But (he wrote) the Minister's brow
darkened at the mention of the names of Noël and Chauvelin; and he finally
suggested that Maret should be the accredited French agent at London.[131]
Pitt's account does not name these personal details, and it lays more stress
on the difficulties caused by the French decrees opening the Scheldt and
offering help to malcontents. We must further remember that Maret's words
of warning to his compatriots on the latter subject were suppressed in the
version published at Paris, which therefore gave the impression that Pitt
was not deeply moved by recent events. This suppressio veri partly
accounts for the persistence of the French deputies in their resolves, which
prevented the friendly explanations undoubtedly desired by Pitt and Maret.
Bad news also came in from The Hague, to the effect that the French were
demanding a passage through the Dutch fortress of Maestricht. These
tidings caused the worst impression. Grenville wrote in reply to Auckland
on 4th December. "The conduct of the French in all their late proceedings
appears to His Majesty's servants to indicate a fixed and settled design of
hostility against this country and the [Dutch] Republic." Equally threatening
were "their almost undisguised attempts now making to excite insurrection
here and in Holland." Consequently His Majesty had decided to arm in self
defence, and he hoped that the Dutch would firmly repel all attempts
derogatory to their neutrality. The King (he added), while taking these
precautionary measures, would not omit such steps as might lead to friendly
explanations with France through the private agents of that Government;
but no ambassador would be received.[132] Pitt and Grenville set little store
by the soothing explanations of Dumouriez and his friend, Maulde, who had
made overtures to Auckland which met with a guarded but not unfavourable
interview is graphic but far from complete. He reported Pitt's gracious effort
to minimize the difficulties of form arising from the lapse of official
relations between France and England. But (he wrote) the Minister's brow
darkened at the mention of the names of Noël and Chauvelin; and he finally
suggested that Maret should be the accredited French agent at London.[131]
Pitt's account does not name these personal details, and it lays more stress
on the difficulties caused by the French decrees opening the Scheldt and
offering help to malcontents. We must further remember that Maret's words
of warning to his compatriots on the latter subject were suppressed in the
version published at Paris, which therefore gave the impression that Pitt
was not deeply moved by recent events. This suppressio veri partly
accounts for the persistence of the French deputies in their resolves, which
prevented the friendly explanations undoubtedly desired by Pitt and Maret.
Bad news also came in from The Hague, to the effect that the French were
demanding a passage through the Dutch fortress of Maestricht. These
tidings caused the worst impression. Grenville wrote in reply to Auckland
on 4th December. "The conduct of the French in all their late proceedings
appears to His Majesty's servants to indicate a fixed and settled design of
hostility against this country and the [Dutch] Republic." Equally threatening
were "their almost undisguised attempts now making to excite insurrection
here and in Holland." Consequently His Majesty had decided to arm in self
defence, and he hoped that the Dutch would firmly repel all attempts
derogatory to their neutrality. The King (he added), while taking these
precautionary measures, would not omit such steps as might lead to friendly
explanations with France through the private agents of that Government;
but no ambassador would be received.[132] Pitt and Grenville set little store
by the soothing explanations of Dumouriez and his friend, Maulde, who had
made overtures to Auckland which met with a guarded but not unfavourable
Page 86
response. On their renewal, Auckland received them coldly, remarking that
the whole situation was changed by the late violent decrees of the French
Convention. At that time, too, the friendly Maulde was recalled and
replaced by Tainville, "a professed Jacobin with brutal manners and evident
indiscretion,"[133] Thus faded away the last faint hopes in that quarter.
Equally sombre was the outlook at Paris. The pacific reports sent by Maret
and Maulde from London and The Hague were before the French Ministers
at their meeting on 5th December. They had also the benefit of a lucid and
suggestive Mémoire sent by Talleyrand from London a week earlier, setting
forth the desirability of a friendly understanding between the two free
peoples, who, advancing hand in hand, might give liberty to backward
peoples (especially Spanish America), and draw thence boundless benefits.
It was the plan which Dumouriez and he had drawn up in the spring of that
year. Probably the Executive Council took no notice of it; for certain papers
found in the iron chest at the Tuileries cast doubts on the purity of
Talleyrand's patriotism. Further, as Pache, Minister at War, hated
Dumouriez, personal bias told strongly against the moderate proposals
coming from London and The Hague. Nevertheless the Executive Council
now decided to defer for the present the invasion of Holland, meanwhile
chasing the Austrians beyond the Rhine, and fortifying Antwerp. The last
step was declared not to infringe the principles of the Republic, "which
oppose the spirit of conquest."
Obviously there was nothing to prevent the same liberal adaptation of these
principles to Belgium as Grégoire had proposed for the welfare of the
Savoyards. A few deputations of the liberated people, asking for union with
France, would enable some equally skilful dialectician to discover that
Belgium was naturally a part of the Republic. For the present, however, the
Belgians sent a deputation to demand unconditional independence; and it
taxed the ingenuity even of Barère, then President of the Convention, to
the whole situation was changed by the late violent decrees of the French
Convention. At that time, too, the friendly Maulde was recalled and
replaced by Tainville, "a professed Jacobin with brutal manners and evident
indiscretion,"[133] Thus faded away the last faint hopes in that quarter.
Equally sombre was the outlook at Paris. The pacific reports sent by Maret
and Maulde from London and The Hague were before the French Ministers
at their meeting on 5th December. They had also the benefit of a lucid and
suggestive Mémoire sent by Talleyrand from London a week earlier, setting
forth the desirability of a friendly understanding between the two free
peoples, who, advancing hand in hand, might give liberty to backward
peoples (especially Spanish America), and draw thence boundless benefits.
It was the plan which Dumouriez and he had drawn up in the spring of that
year. Probably the Executive Council took no notice of it; for certain papers
found in the iron chest at the Tuileries cast doubts on the purity of
Talleyrand's patriotism. Further, as Pache, Minister at War, hated
Dumouriez, personal bias told strongly against the moderate proposals
coming from London and The Hague. Nevertheless the Executive Council
now decided to defer for the present the invasion of Holland, meanwhile
chasing the Austrians beyond the Rhine, and fortifying Antwerp. The last
step was declared not to infringe the principles of the Republic, "which
oppose the spirit of conquest."
Obviously there was nothing to prevent the same liberal adaptation of these
principles to Belgium as Grégoire had proposed for the welfare of the
Savoyards. A few deputations of the liberated people, asking for union with
France, would enable some equally skilful dialectician to discover that
Belgium was naturally a part of the Republic. For the present, however, the
Belgians sent a deputation to demand unconditional independence; and it
taxed the ingenuity even of Barère, then President of the Convention, to
Page 87
waive aside that request, with airy phrases as to the alliance of the two
peoples emanating from the hands of Nature herself (4th December).[134]
Pitt cannot have heard of the French Cabinet's decision of 5th December,
but he must have read of the ambiguous treatment of the Belgians at the bar
of the Convention the day previously. It had long been a maxim at
Whitehall that the Pays Bas must never go to France. To prevent such a
disaster England had poured forth blood and treasure for more than a
century. Pitt's resolve two years before, to maintain Austrian authority in
those provinces, had deeply offended Prussia. Now he and Grenville turned
to the Court of Vienna, and on 7th December made friendly overtures to
Stadion, Austrian ambassador at London.[135] Thus, the French menace
ended the long period of estrangement between Great Britain and Austria,
though, as will duly appear, mutual confidence took root very slowly.
On 9th December Lebrun sent off an important despatch to Chauvelin. With
respect to the decree of 19th November, it stated that France would never
demean herself by assisting rioters, but would respond to the "general will"
of a people that desired to break its chains. Further, France could not
reverse her decision concerning the Scheldt. She would not revolutionize
Holland, but she expected Great Britain not to intervene in support of a
constitution which the Dutch considered "vicious and destructive of their
interests." Finally, the French Government could not recognize the
guarantees of the Dutch constitution undertaken by England and Prussia in
1788.[136] On the same day Lebrun sent a message to Maret, who was still
in London, adverting in ironical terms to the military preparations in
England, at which the French would feel no alarm, and insinuating that the
doctrines of liberty were making rapid progress there. As to negotiations,
the only bases on which they could proceed were the recognition of the
Republic, and the refusal of the French Cabinet to treat except by a fully
accredited envoy.
peoples emanating from the hands of Nature herself (4th December).[134]
Pitt cannot have heard of the French Cabinet's decision of 5th December,
but he must have read of the ambiguous treatment of the Belgians at the bar
of the Convention the day previously. It had long been a maxim at
Whitehall that the Pays Bas must never go to France. To prevent such a
disaster England had poured forth blood and treasure for more than a
century. Pitt's resolve two years before, to maintain Austrian authority in
those provinces, had deeply offended Prussia. Now he and Grenville turned
to the Court of Vienna, and on 7th December made friendly overtures to
Stadion, Austrian ambassador at London.[135] Thus, the French menace
ended the long period of estrangement between Great Britain and Austria,
though, as will duly appear, mutual confidence took root very slowly.
On 9th December Lebrun sent off an important despatch to Chauvelin. With
respect to the decree of 19th November, it stated that France would never
demean herself by assisting rioters, but would respond to the "general will"
of a people that desired to break its chains. Further, France could not
reverse her decision concerning the Scheldt. She would not revolutionize
Holland, but she expected Great Britain not to intervene in support of a
constitution which the Dutch considered "vicious and destructive of their
interests." Finally, the French Government could not recognize the
guarantees of the Dutch constitution undertaken by England and Prussia in
1788.[136] On the same day Lebrun sent a message to Maret, who was still
in London, adverting in ironical terms to the military preparations in
England, at which the French would feel no alarm, and insinuating that the
doctrines of liberty were making rapid progress there. As to negotiations,
the only bases on which they could proceed were the recognition of the
Republic, and the refusal of the French Cabinet to treat except by a fully
accredited envoy.
Page 88
On receipt of this letter on the 14th, Maret at once showed it to Miles, who
urged him to request an immediate interview with the Prime Minister. This
was accorded, and at 8 p.m. of that day, Maret met Pitt again. I have found
no account of this interview. All we know is that it was short and
depressing. Maret had to impart the unwelcome news that all the
communications to the French Government must pass through the hands of
Chauvelin—a personal triumph for that envoy. Pitt on his side declined to
give any answer on the subject of Maret's communication, or on that of
receiving Chauvelin.[137] We can imagine that under that stiff and cold
exterior the Prime Minister concealed deep agitation; for the determination
of the French rigidly to adhere to their decrees, to force Chauvelin upon the
British Government, and to require the recognition of the French Republic,
meant war.
urged him to request an immediate interview with the Prime Minister. This
was accorded, and at 8 p.m. of that day, Maret met Pitt again. I have found
no account of this interview. All we know is that it was short and
depressing. Maret had to impart the unwelcome news that all the
communications to the French Government must pass through the hands of
Chauvelin—a personal triumph for that envoy. Pitt on his side declined to
give any answer on the subject of Maret's communication, or on that of
receiving Chauvelin.[137] We can imagine that under that stiff and cold
exterior the Prime Minister concealed deep agitation; for the determination
of the French rigidly to adhere to their decrees, to force Chauvelin upon the
British Government, and to require the recognition of the French Republic,
meant war.
Page 89
CHAPTER IV
THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE
La guerre aux rois était la conséquence
naturelle du procès fait au roi de France; la
propagande conquérante devait être liée au
régicide.—Sorel.
The opening of Parliament on 13th December 1792 took place amidst
circumstances that were depressing to friends of peace. Affairs were
gyrating in a vicious circle. Diplomacy, as we have seen, had come to a
deadlock; but more threatening even than the dispute between Pitt and
Lebrun were the rising passions of the two peoples. The republican ferment
at Paris had worked all the more strongly since 20th November, the date of
the discovery of the iron chest containing proofs of the anti-national
intrigues of the King and Queen. Hence the decree (3rd December) for the
trial of Louis XVI at the bar of the Convention with its inevitable sequel,
the heating of royalist passion in all neighbouring lands. It is one of the
many mishaps of the revolutionary movement that its enthusiasm finally
aroused an opposite enthusiasm, its fury begot fury, and thus set in a series
of cyclones which scarcely spent their force even at Waterloo.
An essentially philosophic movement at the outset, the French Revolution
was now guided by demagogues and adventurers, whose only hope of
keeping erect lay in constant and convulsive efforts forwards. Worst
THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE
La guerre aux rois était la conséquence
naturelle du procès fait au roi de France; la
propagande conquérante devait être liée au
régicide.—Sorel.
The opening of Parliament on 13th December 1792 took place amidst
circumstances that were depressing to friends of peace. Affairs were
gyrating in a vicious circle. Diplomacy, as we have seen, had come to a
deadlock; but more threatening even than the dispute between Pitt and
Lebrun were the rising passions of the two peoples. The republican ferment
at Paris had worked all the more strongly since 20th November, the date of
the discovery of the iron chest containing proofs of the anti-national
intrigues of the King and Queen. Hence the decree (3rd December) for the
trial of Louis XVI at the bar of the Convention with its inevitable sequel,
the heating of royalist passion in all neighbouring lands. It is one of the
many mishaps of the revolutionary movement that its enthusiasm finally
aroused an opposite enthusiasm, its fury begot fury, and thus set in a series
of cyclones which scarcely spent their force even at Waterloo.
An essentially philosophic movement at the outset, the French Revolution
was now guided by demagogues and adventurers, whose only hope of
keeping erect lay in constant and convulsive efforts forwards. Worst
Page 90
symptom of all, its armies already bade fair to play the part of the
Praetorians of the later Roman Empire. Nothing is more singular at this
time than the fear of the troops. Amidst the distress prevalent at Paris, much
apprehension was felt at the return of the armies of Custine and Dumouriez.
In part, of course, this uneasiness arose from a suspicion that these men,
especially the latter, might take up the rôle of Monk and save Louis. But a
member of the French Convention assured Miles that the disbanding of
those tumultuary forces would bring on a social crisis.
War, [he wrote on 9th December] is to a certain extent inevitable,
not so much for the purpose of opening the Scheldt, for that is rather
a pretext in order to animate the people and preserve their
enthusiasm, but to get rid of 300,000 armed vagabonds, who can
never be allowed to return without evident risk to the Convention
and Executive Council.... It is her opinion [Madame Roland's] and
mine that we cannot make peace with the Emperor without danger
to the Republic, and that it would be hazardous to recall an army,
flushed with victory and impatient to gather fresh laurels, into the
heart of a country whose commerce and manufactures have lost
their activity, and which would leave the disbanded multitude
without resources or employment.[138]
These words are noteworthy; for they show that prudential or party motives
led some at least of the Girondins, formerly friends of England, to desire an
extension of the war.
In England, too, the war spirit was rising. The traditional loyalty of the land
had been strengthened by the tactful behaviour of George III since Pitt's
accession to power. These feelings warmed to a steady glow at the time of
the King's illness in 1788–9; and now the trial of Louis XVI, albeit on
grounds which Britons could not understand, seemed an act of contemptible
Praetorians of the later Roman Empire. Nothing is more singular at this
time than the fear of the troops. Amidst the distress prevalent at Paris, much
apprehension was felt at the return of the armies of Custine and Dumouriez.
In part, of course, this uneasiness arose from a suspicion that these men,
especially the latter, might take up the rôle of Monk and save Louis. But a
member of the French Convention assured Miles that the disbanding of
those tumultuary forces would bring on a social crisis.
War, [he wrote on 9th December] is to a certain extent inevitable,
not so much for the purpose of opening the Scheldt, for that is rather
a pretext in order to animate the people and preserve their
enthusiasm, but to get rid of 300,000 armed vagabonds, who can
never be allowed to return without evident risk to the Convention
and Executive Council.... It is her opinion [Madame Roland's] and
mine that we cannot make peace with the Emperor without danger
to the Republic, and that it would be hazardous to recall an army,
flushed with victory and impatient to gather fresh laurels, into the
heart of a country whose commerce and manufactures have lost
their activity, and which would leave the disbanded multitude
without resources or employment.[138]
These words are noteworthy; for they show that prudential or party motives
led some at least of the Girondins, formerly friends of England, to desire an
extension of the war.
In England, too, the war spirit was rising. The traditional loyalty of the land
had been strengthened by the tactful behaviour of George III since Pitt's
accession to power. These feelings warmed to a steady glow at the time of
the King's illness in 1788–9; and now the trial of Louis XVI, albeit on
grounds which Britons could not understand, seemed an act of contemptible
Page 91
cruelty. To bring Louis from Versailles to Paris, to load him with indignities
at the Tuileries, to stop his despairing bolt for freedom, to compass his
downfall, to attack him in his palace and massacre his defenders, to depose
him, and now to try him for his life for the crime of helping on his would-be
deliverers, appeared to a nation of sportsmen a series of odious outrages on
the laws of fair play. The action of certain Radical Clubs in sending
addresses of congratulation to the National Convention also aroused deep
disgust; and (as Bland Burges wrote to Auckland on 18th December) Loyal
Associations sprang up on all sides.[139] A typical address was sent by the
Dover Association to Pitt, as Lord Warden, on 19th December, asking for
permission to take arms in defence of King and Constitution against
invaders from without or levellers within.[140] The example was widely
followed; and thus, as usually happens in this land, the puny preparations of
Government were helped on by the eager exertions of the people.
The revulsion in public opinion early in December was so marked as to
impress even Chauvelin. He warned Lebrun that within a month the English
had so changed as scarcely to be recognizable; but he added: "Pitt seems to
have killed public opinion in England." A conversation which Sheridan had
with him on 7th December ought to have disproved this fable. The Whig
orator sternly reprobated the French decree of 19th November, offering aid
to malcontents, and stated that the Opposition desired peace with France,
but not if she attacked Holland. Nine-tenths of the people would resent any
attempt to interfere with England or her Allies.
This patriotic utterance of Sheridan expressed the feelings of a large part of
the Whig Opposition. Parliament on 13th December showed marked
approval of the King's Speech, which, while affirming his peaceful
intentions, asserted his resolve to strengthen the forces. Lansdowne and
Stanhope struck a few jarring notes; but in the Commons the Opposition
was almost paralysed by a split between the New and Old Whigs. At a
at the Tuileries, to stop his despairing bolt for freedom, to compass his
downfall, to attack him in his palace and massacre his defenders, to depose
him, and now to try him for his life for the crime of helping on his would-be
deliverers, appeared to a nation of sportsmen a series of odious outrages on
the laws of fair play. The action of certain Radical Clubs in sending
addresses of congratulation to the National Convention also aroused deep
disgust; and (as Bland Burges wrote to Auckland on 18th December) Loyal
Associations sprang up on all sides.[139] A typical address was sent by the
Dover Association to Pitt, as Lord Warden, on 19th December, asking for
permission to take arms in defence of King and Constitution against
invaders from without or levellers within.[140] The example was widely
followed; and thus, as usually happens in this land, the puny preparations of
Government were helped on by the eager exertions of the people.
The revulsion in public opinion early in December was so marked as to
impress even Chauvelin. He warned Lebrun that within a month the English
had so changed as scarcely to be recognizable; but he added: "Pitt seems to
have killed public opinion in England." A conversation which Sheridan had
with him on 7th December ought to have disproved this fable. The Whig
orator sternly reprobated the French decree of 19th November, offering aid
to malcontents, and stated that the Opposition desired peace with France,
but not if she attacked Holland. Nine-tenths of the people would resent any
attempt to interfere with England or her Allies.
This patriotic utterance of Sheridan expressed the feelings of a large part of
the Whig Opposition. Parliament on 13th December showed marked
approval of the King's Speech, which, while affirming his peaceful
intentions, asserted his resolve to strengthen the forces. Lansdowne and
Stanhope struck a few jarring notes; but in the Commons the Opposition
was almost paralysed by a split between the New and Old Whigs. At a
Page 92
meeting of the party, held on 11th December at Burlington House, the
majority decided to support the Government. Indeed Parliament would
probably have presented a united front but for the action of Lansdowne,
Stanhope, and Fox. Much depended on the conduct of the great orator at
this crisis. A warning uttered by him to French Republicans might have had
the most salutary effect. Unfortunately his conduct was such as to impair
the unity of English sentiment and thereby to encourage the delusions of the
men in power at Paris. In the meeting on 11th December he asserted that
there was no fear of a revolt (in which he was doubtless correct) and that
the calling out of the Militia was a mere trick, which he would strenuously
oppose. He admitted that we must support the Dutch if they were attacked,
and disapproved of the French decree respecting the Scheldt, but strongly
deprecated war on that account. On the 12th he threw caution to the winds,
and stated with an oath that there was no address that Pitt could frame on
which he would not propose an amendment and divide the House.[141] This
is party spirit run mad; but it was in that spirit that Fox went to the House
on the 13th.
There he made one of his finest flights of oratory. None of his speeches
excels it in beauty of diction and matchless energy of thought. Most forcible
was the passage in which he derided the ministerial maxim that the canon of
English laws and liberties was complete; that we might thenceforth stand
still, and call upon a wondering world to admire it as a model of human
perfection. Even more biting were his taunts at Ministers for seeking to
stamp out the discontent which their injustice and violence had created.
You have gone upon the principles of slavery in all your
proceedings; you neglect in your conduct the foundation of all
legitimate government, the rights of the people; and, setting up this
bugbear, you spread a panic for the very purpose of sanctifying this
infringement, while again the very infringement engenders the evil
majority decided to support the Government. Indeed Parliament would
probably have presented a united front but for the action of Lansdowne,
Stanhope, and Fox. Much depended on the conduct of the great orator at
this crisis. A warning uttered by him to French Republicans might have had
the most salutary effect. Unfortunately his conduct was such as to impair
the unity of English sentiment and thereby to encourage the delusions of the
men in power at Paris. In the meeting on 11th December he asserted that
there was no fear of a revolt (in which he was doubtless correct) and that
the calling out of the Militia was a mere trick, which he would strenuously
oppose. He admitted that we must support the Dutch if they were attacked,
and disapproved of the French decree respecting the Scheldt, but strongly
deprecated war on that account. On the 12th he threw caution to the winds,
and stated with an oath that there was no address that Pitt could frame on
which he would not propose an amendment and divide the House.[141] This
is party spirit run mad; but it was in that spirit that Fox went to the House
on the 13th.
There he made one of his finest flights of oratory. None of his speeches
excels it in beauty of diction and matchless energy of thought. Most forcible
was the passage in which he derided the ministerial maxim that the canon of
English laws and liberties was complete; that we might thenceforth stand
still, and call upon a wondering world to admire it as a model of human
perfection. Even more biting were his taunts at Ministers for seeking to
stamp out the discontent which their injustice and violence had created.
You have gone upon the principles of slavery in all your
proceedings; you neglect in your conduct the foundation of all
legitimate government, the rights of the people; and, setting up this
bugbear, you spread a panic for the very purpose of sanctifying this
infringement, while again the very infringement engenders the evil
Page 93
which you dread. One extreme naturally leads to another. Those
who dread republicanism fly for shelter to the Crown. Those who
desire Reform and are calumniated are driven by despair to
republicanism. And this is the evil that I dread. These are the
extremes into which these violent agitations hurry the people, to the
decrease of that middle order of men who shudder as much at
republicanism on the one hand as they do at despotism on the other.
[142]
He then taunted Ministers with abandoning Poland and not opposing the
coalition of Austria and Prussia, and asserted that the Cabinet refused to
negotiate with France because she was a Republic, and her Ministers had
not been anointed with the holy oil of Rheims. The weakest part of the
speech was that which dealt with the existing crisis. For of what use was it
to point out where Ministers had gone astray months and years before, if he
did not now mark out for them a practicable course? In truth, though the
prince of debaters, Fox lacked self-restraint, balance of judgement, and
practical sagacity. The sole important issue was the encouraging of the
peace party at Paris, with a view to the revocation of the aggressive decrees
of the Convention. In private, Fox had admitted that they were wholly
indefensible; and yet, in order to snatch an oratorical triumph, he fired off a
diatribe which could not but stiffen the necks of the French Jacobins. At
such a crisis the true statesman merges the partisan in the patriot and says
not a word to weaken his own Government and hearten its opponents. To
this height of self-denial Fox rarely rose; and the judgement alike of his
fellows and of posterity has pronounced this speech a masterpiece of
partisan invective and of political fatuity.
For how was it possible to recognize the French Republic until it had
withdrawn its threats to existing Governments? Pitt had reason to believe
that a firm protest against the aggressive decrees of November was the only
who dread republicanism fly for shelter to the Crown. Those who
desire Reform and are calumniated are driven by despair to
republicanism. And this is the evil that I dread. These are the
extremes into which these violent agitations hurry the people, to the
decrease of that middle order of men who shudder as much at
republicanism on the one hand as they do at despotism on the other.
[142]
He then taunted Ministers with abandoning Poland and not opposing the
coalition of Austria and Prussia, and asserted that the Cabinet refused to
negotiate with France because she was a Republic, and her Ministers had
not been anointed with the holy oil of Rheims. The weakest part of the
speech was that which dealt with the existing crisis. For of what use was it
to point out where Ministers had gone astray months and years before, if he
did not now mark out for them a practicable course? In truth, though the
prince of debaters, Fox lacked self-restraint, balance of judgement, and
practical sagacity. The sole important issue was the encouraging of the
peace party at Paris, with a view to the revocation of the aggressive decrees
of the Convention. In private, Fox had admitted that they were wholly
indefensible; and yet, in order to snatch an oratorical triumph, he fired off a
diatribe which could not but stiffen the necks of the French Jacobins. At
such a crisis the true statesman merges the partisan in the patriot and says
not a word to weaken his own Government and hearten its opponents. To
this height of self-denial Fox rarely rose; and the judgement alike of his
fellows and of posterity has pronounced this speech a masterpiece of
partisan invective and of political fatuity.
For how was it possible to recognize the French Republic until it had
withdrawn its threats to existing Governments? Pitt had reason to believe
that a firm protest against the aggressive decrees of November was the only
Page 94
means of averting an overturn of international law. He took the proper
means of protesting against them, and his protest was disregarded. In such a
case, to recognize a revolutionary Government which had just proclaimed
its sympathy with malcontents and its resolve to dictate terms to our Dutch
allies, would have been a sign of weakness. There was but one chance of
peace, namely, that Parliament should give so overwhelming a support to
Pitt and Grenville as to convince the tyros at Paris that they had to do, not
with a clique, but a nation. This unanimity the efforts of Fox impaired.
Some of his friends voted with him from a sense of personal regard; but the
greater number passed over to the Government or did not vote.
Consequently the Foxites mustered 50 votes against 290.
Equally inopportune was his motion of 15th December, for sending a
Minister to Paris to treat with that Government. His knowledge of all that
went on at the French Embassy in Portman Square was so exact (witness his
repetition publicly on the 13th of the very words of one of Lebrun's
despatches to Chauvelin),[143] that he must have known of the informal
communications between Pitt and Maret, and of the arrival on the 14th of
despatches from Paris, which negatived the requests of the Prime Minister.
Doubtless it was this last circumstance which curtailed and weakened Fox's
second speech. Grey, Erskine, and Whitbread vigorously supported the
motion; but there was a general feeling that the despatch of an ambassador
to Paris would be a weak acquiescence in the French claims. The motion
was therefore negatived. Pitt was not present at these first debates, not
having yet been re-elected by the University of Cambridge after his recent
acceptance of the Lord Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. The defence of the
Government therefore devolved chiefly upon Dundas, Windham, and Burke
—a significant conjunction of names. On 16th December Burke for the first
time took his seat on the Treasury Bench.
means of protesting against them, and his protest was disregarded. In such a
case, to recognize a revolutionary Government which had just proclaimed
its sympathy with malcontents and its resolve to dictate terms to our Dutch
allies, would have been a sign of weakness. There was but one chance of
peace, namely, that Parliament should give so overwhelming a support to
Pitt and Grenville as to convince the tyros at Paris that they had to do, not
with a clique, but a nation. This unanimity the efforts of Fox impaired.
Some of his friends voted with him from a sense of personal regard; but the
greater number passed over to the Government or did not vote.
Consequently the Foxites mustered 50 votes against 290.
Equally inopportune was his motion of 15th December, for sending a
Minister to Paris to treat with that Government. His knowledge of all that
went on at the French Embassy in Portman Square was so exact (witness his
repetition publicly on the 13th of the very words of one of Lebrun's
despatches to Chauvelin),[143] that he must have known of the informal
communications between Pitt and Maret, and of the arrival on the 14th of
despatches from Paris, which negatived the requests of the Prime Minister.
Doubtless it was this last circumstance which curtailed and weakened Fox's
second speech. Grey, Erskine, and Whitbread vigorously supported the
motion; but there was a general feeling that the despatch of an ambassador
to Paris would be a weak acquiescence in the French claims. The motion
was therefore negatived. Pitt was not present at these first debates, not
having yet been re-elected by the University of Cambridge after his recent
acceptance of the Lord Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. The defence of the
Government therefore devolved chiefly upon Dundas, Windham, and Burke
—a significant conjunction of names. On 16th December Burke for the first
time took his seat on the Treasury Bench.
Page 95
A national party might now have been formed but for the inaction of the
Duke of Portland. During the meetings at his mansion, Burlington House,
he evinced strong disapproval of the views of Fox; and, as official leader of
the Whigs, he had it in his power to bring nearly the whole of the party over
to the Government side. From this course, which would have placed
country above party, the Duke shrank; and his followers were left to sort
themselves at will. There was a general expectation that Portland would
publicly declare against Fox; but friendship or timidity held him tongue-
tied. Malmesbury sought to waken him from his "trance," but in vain.[144]
He lay under "the wand of the magician" (Pitt's phrase for the witchery that
Fox exerted), even when so staunch a Whig as Sir Gilbert Elliot saw that
the wizard's enchantments were working infinite mischief.[145]
Owing to the wrong-headedness of Fox and the timidity of Portland, Pitt's
triumph in the Commons was not decisive enough to tear the veil away
from the eyes of the French Jacobins. Nothing short of unanimity at
Westminster could have worked that miracle. Surely not even that novice in
diplomacy, Lebrun, would have threatened to appeal from the British
Government to the British nation, had he not believed the Government to be
without support.
This delusion appears in the memorable decree of 15th December. The
French Convention thereby asserts its resolve to revolutionize all countries
where its armies are or shall come. It will recognize no institutions alien to
the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. All feudal dues, customs,
and privileges are to be annulled, and the liberated people will meet in
primary assemblies to organize an Administration. Arrangements will be
made for defraying the expenses of the liberating army, and for maintaining
it while it remains.[146] Finally France declares that she will treat as an
enemy the people which refuses to accept Liberty and Equality, and
tolerates its prince and privileged castes. The decree is at once followed by
Duke of Portland. During the meetings at his mansion, Burlington House,
he evinced strong disapproval of the views of Fox; and, as official leader of
the Whigs, he had it in his power to bring nearly the whole of the party over
to the Government side. From this course, which would have placed
country above party, the Duke shrank; and his followers were left to sort
themselves at will. There was a general expectation that Portland would
publicly declare against Fox; but friendship or timidity held him tongue-
tied. Malmesbury sought to waken him from his "trance," but in vain.[144]
He lay under "the wand of the magician" (Pitt's phrase for the witchery that
Fox exerted), even when so staunch a Whig as Sir Gilbert Elliot saw that
the wizard's enchantments were working infinite mischief.[145]
Owing to the wrong-headedness of Fox and the timidity of Portland, Pitt's
triumph in the Commons was not decisive enough to tear the veil away
from the eyes of the French Jacobins. Nothing short of unanimity at
Westminster could have worked that miracle. Surely not even that novice in
diplomacy, Lebrun, would have threatened to appeal from the British
Government to the British nation, had he not believed the Government to be
without support.
This delusion appears in the memorable decree of 15th December. The
French Convention thereby asserts its resolve to revolutionize all countries
where its armies are or shall come. It will recognize no institutions alien to
the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. All feudal dues, customs,
and privileges are to be annulled, and the liberated people will meet in
primary assemblies to organize an Administration. Arrangements will be
made for defraying the expenses of the liberating army, and for maintaining
it while it remains.[146] Finally France declares that she will treat as an
enemy the people which refuses to accept Liberty and Equality, and
tolerates its prince and privileged castes. The decree is at once followed by
Page 96
a proclamation drawn up for the benefit of the subject peoples whom it may
concern. Finally, the Convention decides that the course of rivers must
everywhere be free, and directs its generals to enforce that principle with
respect to the Scheldt.
In view of this stern reiteration of the right to overturn all Governments that
conflict with revolutionary principles, it is impossible to consider the decree
of 19th November, offering assistance to malcontent peoples, as a
meaningless display of emotion. Subsequent events threw a sinister light on
it. The annexation of Savoy on 27th November was not a convincing proof
of altruism; and the refusal of the Executive Council, on 8th and 9th
December, to reconsider its decision on the Scheldt, marked a firm resolve
to carry out French policy in the Pays Bas, even if it led to war with
England. Now there came, as a damning corollary, the decree of 15th
December, which flung defiance at all Governments of the old type. Like
Mohammed, Lebrun stood forth with the "Contrat Social" in one hand, the
sword in the other, and bade the world take its choice.
For England there could be no doubt. Pitt and Grenville had decided that
the only chance of peace lay in offering a firm front to every act of
aggression. In this they had general support. Fox might choose to distort
facts by declaring that Ministers were about to plunge the country into war
on a matter of form[147] (the refusal to treat officially with the French
Republic); but everyone knew that the first aggressive action was that of
France, directed against the Anglo-Dutch alliance. The firmness of
Ministers gained them support in unexpected quarters. On 20th December,
when they asked for a vote for 25,000 seamen, including 5,000 marines,
Sheridan heartily declared that he would have supported a vote for 40,000
seamen if that number had been deemed necessary. He also made a
suggestion that the British Parliament or people should appeal to the
generous instincts of Frenchmen to spare the life of Louis XVI. The
concern. Finally, the Convention decides that the course of rivers must
everywhere be free, and directs its generals to enforce that principle with
respect to the Scheldt.
In view of this stern reiteration of the right to overturn all Governments that
conflict with revolutionary principles, it is impossible to consider the decree
of 19th November, offering assistance to malcontent peoples, as a
meaningless display of emotion. Subsequent events threw a sinister light on
it. The annexation of Savoy on 27th November was not a convincing proof
of altruism; and the refusal of the Executive Council, on 8th and 9th
December, to reconsider its decision on the Scheldt, marked a firm resolve
to carry out French policy in the Pays Bas, even if it led to war with
England. Now there came, as a damning corollary, the decree of 15th
December, which flung defiance at all Governments of the old type. Like
Mohammed, Lebrun stood forth with the "Contrat Social" in one hand, the
sword in the other, and bade the world take its choice.
For England there could be no doubt. Pitt and Grenville had decided that
the only chance of peace lay in offering a firm front to every act of
aggression. In this they had general support. Fox might choose to distort
facts by declaring that Ministers were about to plunge the country into war
on a matter of form[147] (the refusal to treat officially with the French
Republic); but everyone knew that the first aggressive action was that of
France, directed against the Anglo-Dutch alliance. The firmness of
Ministers gained them support in unexpected quarters. On 20th December,
when they asked for a vote for 25,000 seamen, including 5,000 marines,
Sheridan heartily declared that he would have supported a vote for 40,000
seamen if that number had been deemed necessary. He also made a
suggestion that the British Parliament or people should appeal to the
generous instincts of Frenchmen to spare the life of Louis XVI. The
Page 97
proposal came somewhat oddly in a debate for increasing our forces against
France; and it brought up Burke in one of his most acrid moods. Such an
appeal, he said, was futile, for Louis was in the custody of assassins who
were both accusers and judges: his death was inevitable. Sheridan and Fox
heartily reprobated this recklessly vindictive language.
Pitt then pointed out that on 17th August George III had expressed an
earnest desire for the safety of Louis and the Royal Family of France in
terms which were then read out. The same was the desire of every Briton;
and the sentiments now expressed in that House would be heard and noted
at Paris. If any more formal measure were to be adopted, he suggested the
entering a protest in the Journals of the House; but any public
representation, he said, must be couched in terms of indignation which must
tend to defeat its own object. With this method of procedure Fox and
Sheridan expressed their entire concurrence.[148] It is therefore a malicious
falsehood to say that Pitt opposed their suggestion.[149] Burke certainly did
so, and in the worst possible taste; but Pitt carried it out so far as was
deemed desirable. If Sheridan and Fox wished for a public appeal, it was for
them to set it on foot.
I must here notice the vague and misleading statements in Godoy's Memoirs
(written a generation later) that Spain made strenuous efforts to save the life
of Louis XVI and opened "an unlimited credit" at Paris with the view of
bribing members of the Convention to secure his acquittal. Further, that he,
Godoy, secretly approached Pitt in order to secure his financial aid, which
that statesman obstinately refused.[150] The story does not hang well
together; for if Spain had already opened an unlimited credit at Paris, why
did she want pecuniary help from Pitt? Further, the opening of unlimited
credit, presumably with a Parisian bank, did not consort well with the secret
methods which were essential to the success of the plan.
France; and it brought up Burke in one of his most acrid moods. Such an
appeal, he said, was futile, for Louis was in the custody of assassins who
were both accusers and judges: his death was inevitable. Sheridan and Fox
heartily reprobated this recklessly vindictive language.
Pitt then pointed out that on 17th August George III had expressed an
earnest desire for the safety of Louis and the Royal Family of France in
terms which were then read out. The same was the desire of every Briton;
and the sentiments now expressed in that House would be heard and noted
at Paris. If any more formal measure were to be adopted, he suggested the
entering a protest in the Journals of the House; but any public
representation, he said, must be couched in terms of indignation which must
tend to defeat its own object. With this method of procedure Fox and
Sheridan expressed their entire concurrence.[148] It is therefore a malicious
falsehood to say that Pitt opposed their suggestion.[149] Burke certainly did
so, and in the worst possible taste; but Pitt carried it out so far as was
deemed desirable. If Sheridan and Fox wished for a public appeal, it was for
them to set it on foot.
I must here notice the vague and misleading statements in Godoy's Memoirs
(written a generation later) that Spain made strenuous efforts to save the life
of Louis XVI and opened "an unlimited credit" at Paris with the view of
bribing members of the Convention to secure his acquittal. Further, that he,
Godoy, secretly approached Pitt in order to secure his financial aid, which
that statesman obstinately refused.[150] The story does not hang well
together; for if Spain had already opened an unlimited credit at Paris, why
did she want pecuniary help from Pitt? Further, the opening of unlimited
credit, presumably with a Parisian bank, did not consort well with the secret
methods which were essential to the success of the plan.
Page 98
In order to probe this matter to the bottom, I have examined the British
Foreign Office archives relating to Spain for the months of December and
January. They are detailed and apparently complete. F. J. Jackson, our
chargé d'affaires at Madrid, wrote to Lord Grenville every three or four
days, as the relations of the two States had been far from cordial owing to
friction caused by the cession of Nootka Sound, Captain Vancouver having
been employed to settle the boundaries and fix a neutral zone between the
two Empires. Grenville also wrote three times to Jackson to express his
apprehension that the timidity and poverty of Spain would cause her to
yield to the French Republic in the matter of some demonstrations on the
frontier. But there is no word implying that Spain requested help from
England, either pecuniary or diplomatic, in order to save Louis. Early in
January Charles IV made such an appeal to the French Convention, but it
was treated with contemptuous indifference. At that time the Courts of
London and Madrid were beginning to draw closer together in order to
withstand the demands of France; but nothing passed between them
officially respecting the saving of Louis. Now, where the life of a King was
at stake, any communication must have been official, and if it were made
through the Spanish ambassador in London, Grenville would certainly have
referred to it in his despatches to Madrid.[151] We may therefore dismiss
Godoy's story as a cruel and baseless slander, due to the spiteful desire of a
discredited politician to drag down a great name nearer to his own level.
It is also worth noting that Malouet, who was then in close touch with
Grenville on San Domingo affairs, does not mention in his Memoirs any
attempt to involve the Cabinet in a scheme for bribing the Convention—an
action which the French exiles in England and Holland were perfectly able
to carry out themselves had they been so minded. The only document
bearing on this question is a Memorial drawn up on 7th December by
Malouet, Lally-Tollendal, and Gillier, stating their horror at the King's trial,
and their belief that his life might be spared if George III and the British
Foreign Office archives relating to Spain for the months of December and
January. They are detailed and apparently complete. F. J. Jackson, our
chargé d'affaires at Madrid, wrote to Lord Grenville every three or four
days, as the relations of the two States had been far from cordial owing to
friction caused by the cession of Nootka Sound, Captain Vancouver having
been employed to settle the boundaries and fix a neutral zone between the
two Empires. Grenville also wrote three times to Jackson to express his
apprehension that the timidity and poverty of Spain would cause her to
yield to the French Republic in the matter of some demonstrations on the
frontier. But there is no word implying that Spain requested help from
England, either pecuniary or diplomatic, in order to save Louis. Early in
January Charles IV made such an appeal to the French Convention, but it
was treated with contemptuous indifference. At that time the Courts of
London and Madrid were beginning to draw closer together in order to
withstand the demands of France; but nothing passed between them
officially respecting the saving of Louis. Now, where the life of a King was
at stake, any communication must have been official, and if it were made
through the Spanish ambassador in London, Grenville would certainly have
referred to it in his despatches to Madrid.[151] We may therefore dismiss
Godoy's story as a cruel and baseless slander, due to the spiteful desire of a
discredited politician to drag down a great name nearer to his own level.
It is also worth noting that Malouet, who was then in close touch with
Grenville on San Domingo affairs, does not mention in his Memoirs any
attempt to involve the Cabinet in a scheme for bribing the Convention—an
action which the French exiles in England and Holland were perfectly able
to carry out themselves had they been so minded. The only document
bearing on this question is a Memorial drawn up on 7th December by
Malouet, Lally-Tollendal, and Gillier, stating their horror at the King's trial,
and their belief that his life might be spared if George III and the British
Page 99
Government issued a Declaration stating their lively interest in Louis XVI
and his family, their resolve for ever to refuse an asylum to all regicides,
and to cut off all supplies of food from France if the crime were committed.
[152] The Memorial was probably presented to Lord Grenville; but its
inutility, or danger, in the proud and exacting mood then prevalent at Paris,
is obvious. The confidential reports sent by "M. S." from Paris to Lord
Grenville do not refer to any such overture to the Cabinet.[153]
Lastly, there is the curious fact that the ex-abbé Noël, one of Chauvelin's
"advisers," came to Miles late on 18th December, and affected much
concern at the prospect of the execution of Louis. He then suggested that
Pitt should confer with a M. Talon, residing in Sloane Street, who had
immense resources and stood well with all parties in France, in order to
devise some means for saving the life of that monarch. When Miles asked
Noël how Pitt was to assist in this laudable project, no answer was
forthcoming. We must commend Noël's prudence; for he had already stated
that Talon was under impeachment in France. How a man accused of
treason could help his King, save by secretly using some of his immense
resources to bribe the deputies, is no more apparent to us than it was to
Miles. In fact he detected a snare in this effort to associate Pitt with a
wealthy French exile in what must evidently be merely an affair of bribery.
He therefore declined to bring the matter before Pitt, whereupon Noël
betrayed signs of satisfaction at finding that the Minister really was neutral
on French internal affairs.[154] This little episode should open the eyes of
detractors of Pitt to the extraordinary difficulty of his position. Of one thing
we may be certain. The readiest way of assuring the doom of the hapless
monarch was to take up some one of the silly or guileful schemes then
mooted for pressing the British Government to take sides in the trial. Pitt's
rigorous neutrality was the best means of helping the advocates of Louis in
their uphill fight with the hostile Convention.
and his family, their resolve for ever to refuse an asylum to all regicides,
and to cut off all supplies of food from France if the crime were committed.
[152] The Memorial was probably presented to Lord Grenville; but its
inutility, or danger, in the proud and exacting mood then prevalent at Paris,
is obvious. The confidential reports sent by "M. S." from Paris to Lord
Grenville do not refer to any such overture to the Cabinet.[153]
Lastly, there is the curious fact that the ex-abbé Noël, one of Chauvelin's
"advisers," came to Miles late on 18th December, and affected much
concern at the prospect of the execution of Louis. He then suggested that
Pitt should confer with a M. Talon, residing in Sloane Street, who had
immense resources and stood well with all parties in France, in order to
devise some means for saving the life of that monarch. When Miles asked
Noël how Pitt was to assist in this laudable project, no answer was
forthcoming. We must commend Noël's prudence; for he had already stated
that Talon was under impeachment in France. How a man accused of
treason could help his King, save by secretly using some of his immense
resources to bribe the deputies, is no more apparent to us than it was to
Miles. In fact he detected a snare in this effort to associate Pitt with a
wealthy French exile in what must evidently be merely an affair of bribery.
He therefore declined to bring the matter before Pitt, whereupon Noël
betrayed signs of satisfaction at finding that the Minister really was neutral
on French internal affairs.[154] This little episode should open the eyes of
detractors of Pitt to the extraordinary difficulty of his position. Of one thing
we may be certain. The readiest way of assuring the doom of the hapless
monarch was to take up some one of the silly or guileful schemes then
mooted for pressing the British Government to take sides in the trial. Pitt's
rigorous neutrality was the best means of helping the advocates of Louis in
their uphill fight with the hostile Convention.
Page 100
Reverting to events at Westminster, we note that Ministers, on 21st
December, introduced into the Upper House an Aliens Bill for subjecting to
supervision the many thousands of foreigners who had flocked to these
shores. The debates on this measure showed some approach to unanimity,
though Lansdowne and Lauderdale in the Lords, and Fox in the Commons
opposed it as a breach of the hospitable traditions of this land. On the 28th
Burke spoke in its support with his usual passion, flinging down a
Birmingham dagger as a sign of the French fraternity now introduced into
these happy islands.[155] After a few alterations in committee, the Bill
passed on the last day of the year.
Meanwhile, on 18th December, Lebrun had sent to the Convention a report
on the negotiations, which was not adapted to soften the passions of the
time, being merely a piece of parliamentary declamation; but, as
declamation rather than reason held sway at Paris, some of its phrases must
be quoted. After citing with approval passages from the recent speech of
Fox, Lebrun referred to the eager interest taken by the British nation in the
triumphs of the French arms. "But," he continued, "these glorious events
have a quite contrary effect upon the English Minister. In a moment, the
dread and jealousy of our victories, the entreaties of cowardly rebels [the
French émigrés], the vile intrigues of hostile Courts, and the secret
suspicions that the numerous addresses from all parts of England excited,
determined him to more decisive military preparations and to an immediate
assembling of Parliament." Lebrun then accused Pitt of seeking to stir up
public opinion against France, and of exciting, "by the most corrupt means,
distrusts, doubts, and disorders." A still more extraordinary charge followed,
namely, that Pitt and Grenville, while refusing to acknowledge the French
diplomatic agents, had "requested to see them confidentially, to hold
communications with them, and to grant them secret conferences."[156]
Lebrun then referred in contemptuous terms to the British naval
preparations, and stated that he had firmly maintained the decree respecting
December, introduced into the Upper House an Aliens Bill for subjecting to
supervision the many thousands of foreigners who had flocked to these
shores. The debates on this measure showed some approach to unanimity,
though Lansdowne and Lauderdale in the Lords, and Fox in the Commons
opposed it as a breach of the hospitable traditions of this land. On the 28th
Burke spoke in its support with his usual passion, flinging down a
Birmingham dagger as a sign of the French fraternity now introduced into
these happy islands.[155] After a few alterations in committee, the Bill
passed on the last day of the year.
Meanwhile, on 18th December, Lebrun had sent to the Convention a report
on the negotiations, which was not adapted to soften the passions of the
time, being merely a piece of parliamentary declamation; but, as
declamation rather than reason held sway at Paris, some of its phrases must
be quoted. After citing with approval passages from the recent speech of
Fox, Lebrun referred to the eager interest taken by the British nation in the
triumphs of the French arms. "But," he continued, "these glorious events
have a quite contrary effect upon the English Minister. In a moment, the
dread and jealousy of our victories, the entreaties of cowardly rebels [the
French émigrés], the vile intrigues of hostile Courts, and the secret
suspicions that the numerous addresses from all parts of England excited,
determined him to more decisive military preparations and to an immediate
assembling of Parliament." Lebrun then accused Pitt of seeking to stir up
public opinion against France, and of exciting, "by the most corrupt means,
distrusts, doubts, and disorders." A still more extraordinary charge followed,
namely, that Pitt and Grenville, while refusing to acknowledge the French
diplomatic agents, had "requested to see them confidentially, to hold
communications with them, and to grant them secret conferences."[156]
Lebrun then referred in contemptuous terms to the British naval
preparations, and stated that he had firmly maintained the decree respecting
Page 101
the Scheldt. He then affirmed the reasonableness of the decree of 19th
November; and scouted the notion that France harboured designs against
Holland. In answer to this last he had said in effect: "That it was much to be
wished that the British Ministry had never meddled more with the internal
government of that Republic than we ourselves wish to meddle." Finally, if
these disputes led to a rupture, "the war will be only the war of the British
Minister against us; and we will not fail to make a solemn appeal to the
English nation." ... "In short, we will leave it to the English nation to judge
between us, and the issue of this contest may lead to consequences which
he [Pitt] did not expect."
In the sordid annals of party strife this report of Lebrun holds a high place.
In order to furbish up the dulled prestige of the Gironde he sought to excite
national animosity, and to revive the former hatred of the name of Pitt.
What could be more criminal than to sneer at the smallness of England's
naval preparations? What more false than to charge Pitt and Grenville with
secretly begging for interviews with agents whom outwardly they scorned?
It is by acts like these that nations are set by the ears; and generally they are
at one another's throats before the lie can be exposed. Lebrun's report was
received with loud applause. No one questioned the accuracy of its details;
and these blind followers of a blind guide unanimously voted that it should
be printed and widely circulated. On 20th December Lebrun sent a copy of
it to Chauvelin, along with instructions which lost none of their emphasis in
the note drawn up at Portman Square. He forwarded another copy of the
report to Noël, with this significant explanation: "This document will keep
you in touch with the ideas of this country and will show you that I scarcely
have this affair in my hands any longer."[157]
This admission is illuminating. The trial of Louis XVI had, as the men of
the Mountain foresaw, placed the Girondin Ministry and its followers in a
most embarrassing position. Many of them inclined to mercy or to
November; and scouted the notion that France harboured designs against
Holland. In answer to this last he had said in effect: "That it was much to be
wished that the British Ministry had never meddled more with the internal
government of that Republic than we ourselves wish to meddle." Finally, if
these disputes led to a rupture, "the war will be only the war of the British
Minister against us; and we will not fail to make a solemn appeal to the
English nation." ... "In short, we will leave it to the English nation to judge
between us, and the issue of this contest may lead to consequences which
he [Pitt] did not expect."
In the sordid annals of party strife this report of Lebrun holds a high place.
In order to furbish up the dulled prestige of the Gironde he sought to excite
national animosity, and to revive the former hatred of the name of Pitt.
What could be more criminal than to sneer at the smallness of England's
naval preparations? What more false than to charge Pitt and Grenville with
secretly begging for interviews with agents whom outwardly they scorned?
It is by acts like these that nations are set by the ears; and generally they are
at one another's throats before the lie can be exposed. Lebrun's report was
received with loud applause. No one questioned the accuracy of its details;
and these blind followers of a blind guide unanimously voted that it should
be printed and widely circulated. On 20th December Lebrun sent a copy of
it to Chauvelin, along with instructions which lost none of their emphasis in
the note drawn up at Portman Square. He forwarded another copy of the
report to Noël, with this significant explanation: "This document will keep
you in touch with the ideas of this country and will show you that I scarcely
have this affair in my hands any longer."[157]
This admission is illuminating. The trial of Louis XVI had, as the men of
the Mountain foresaw, placed the Girondin Ministry and its followers in a
most embarrassing position. Many of them inclined to mercy or to
Page 102
compromises which found little favour with the populace. Accordingly, the
procedure at the trial, as also the final verdict, turned largely on the
desperate efforts of the Jacobins to discredit their rivals, who sought by all
means to keep their foothold in the revolutionary torrent. One of the most
obvious devices was to represent the Executive Council as the champion of
ultra-democratic ideas as against envious and reactionary England. If this
notion gained currency, Lebrun and his colleagues might hope still to ride
on the crest of the wave.
Historical students will remember another occasion when a tottering
Ministry sought to keep pace with public opinion at Paris. The Duc de
Gramont on 12th July 1870 instructed the French ambassador, Benedetti, to
insist on obtaining from King William of Prussia an immediate answer to a
demand that was certain to arouse angry feelings; and he sent to Benedetti
the explanation that public opinion was outflanking the Ministry, and that
"the effervescence of spirits is such that we do not know whether we shall
succeed in mastering it." Thus, twice within eighty years France was
hurried towards the brink of the precipice because her Foreign Minister
could not control an effervescence of spirits which he himself had helped to
excite.
Lebrun's missives of 20th December bore fruit seven days later in
Chauvelin's despatch to Grenville. As this document has often been printed,
only a brief summary need be given here. The French envoy insisted that
the conduct of France towards England had throughout been correct and
conciliatory; but the Executive Council had long observed with concern the
unfriendliness of the British Ministers, and now pressed its envoy to
demand definitely whether they held the position of a neutral or an enemy.
The only possible cause of enmity could be a misinterpretation of the
decree of 19th November, which obviously applied merely to peoples that
demanded the fraternal aid of Frenchmen. As France wished to respect the
procedure at the trial, as also the final verdict, turned largely on the
desperate efforts of the Jacobins to discredit their rivals, who sought by all
means to keep their foothold in the revolutionary torrent. One of the most
obvious devices was to represent the Executive Council as the champion of
ultra-democratic ideas as against envious and reactionary England. If this
notion gained currency, Lebrun and his colleagues might hope still to ride
on the crest of the wave.
Historical students will remember another occasion when a tottering
Ministry sought to keep pace with public opinion at Paris. The Duc de
Gramont on 12th July 1870 instructed the French ambassador, Benedetti, to
insist on obtaining from King William of Prussia an immediate answer to a
demand that was certain to arouse angry feelings; and he sent to Benedetti
the explanation that public opinion was outflanking the Ministry, and that
"the effervescence of spirits is such that we do not know whether we shall
succeed in mastering it." Thus, twice within eighty years France was
hurried towards the brink of the precipice because her Foreign Minister
could not control an effervescence of spirits which he himself had helped to
excite.
Lebrun's missives of 20th December bore fruit seven days later in
Chauvelin's despatch to Grenville. As this document has often been printed,
only a brief summary need be given here. The French envoy insisted that
the conduct of France towards England had throughout been correct and
conciliatory; but the Executive Council had long observed with concern the
unfriendliness of the British Ministers, and now pressed its envoy to
demand definitely whether they held the position of a neutral or an enemy.
The only possible cause of enmity could be a misinterpretation of the
decree of 19th November, which obviously applied merely to peoples that
demanded the fraternal aid of Frenchmen. As France wished to respect the
Page 103
independence of England and her allies, she would not attack the Dutch.
The opening of the Scheldt, however, was a question decided irrevocably by
reason and justice, besides being a matter of small moment; and the British
Ministers could not venture to make it a cause of war. If they did, they
would not be supported by the British people. Chauvelin then demanded an
official reply, and expressed the hope that the British Cabinet would not
engage in a war for which it alone would be responsible and to which the
people would not accord its support.[158]
What Pitt and Grenville thought of Chauvelin's last effort on behalf of
peace will best appear in Grenville's despatch of 28th December to
Auckland at The Hague:
The tone and language of Chauvelin's note of the 27th appear
calculated to accelerate a rupture, and the same conclusion seems to
follow from the circumstance of M. Maret's having informed Mr.
Pitt that it was not intended by the Conseil Exécutif to charge any
private agent with any commission of the nature which he had
himself suggested in his first conference. I have some reason to
believe that it is now intended to bring forward immediately in
Holland the same question of receiving formal and official
communication from the Conseil Exécutif. I trust that the answer
will be conformable to opinions entertained here; and, with the view
of avoiding as far as possible, any difference, however slight, in the
expression of our sentiments, I shall lose no time in sending to Your
Excellency the copy of the answer to M. Chauvelin when it is
settled.
I cannot conclude this dispatch without again urging Your
Excellency to press in the strongest manner possible upon the Dutch
Ministers the necessity of immediately bringing forward their whole
force. It is evident that the present intentions of France are those of
aggression. Whichever of the Allies is first attacked, there can be no
The opening of the Scheldt, however, was a question decided irrevocably by
reason and justice, besides being a matter of small moment; and the British
Ministers could not venture to make it a cause of war. If they did, they
would not be supported by the British people. Chauvelin then demanded an
official reply, and expressed the hope that the British Cabinet would not
engage in a war for which it alone would be responsible and to which the
people would not accord its support.[158]
What Pitt and Grenville thought of Chauvelin's last effort on behalf of
peace will best appear in Grenville's despatch of 28th December to
Auckland at The Hague:
The tone and language of Chauvelin's note of the 27th appear
calculated to accelerate a rupture, and the same conclusion seems to
follow from the circumstance of M. Maret's having informed Mr.
Pitt that it was not intended by the Conseil Exécutif to charge any
private agent with any commission of the nature which he had
himself suggested in his first conference. I have some reason to
believe that it is now intended to bring forward immediately in
Holland the same question of receiving formal and official
communication from the Conseil Exécutif. I trust that the answer
will be conformable to opinions entertained here; and, with the view
of avoiding as far as possible, any difference, however slight, in the
expression of our sentiments, I shall lose no time in sending to Your
Excellency the copy of the answer to M. Chauvelin when it is
settled.
I cannot conclude this dispatch without again urging Your
Excellency to press in the strongest manner possible upon the Dutch
Ministers the necessity of immediately bringing forward their whole
force. It is evident that the present intentions of France are those of
aggression. Whichever of the Allies is first attacked, there can be no
Page 104
doubt under the present circumstances, but that they must make
common cause in order to render the calamity of war short, if it is
unavoidable. And if the state of the preparations of the Republic is
found inadequate to the emergency, the attack will certainly be first
made there where least resistance is expected. Every circumstance
therefore, of interest and dignity require [sic] that no exertion of
which the Republic can be made capable, should be spared at such a
moment as the present.[159]
Evidently Grenville looked on Chauvelin's note as an ultimatum; and it is
noteworthy that Pitt on 28th December refused to see Chauvelin. Our Dutch
Allies, however, were by no means ready. The separate Admiralties of the
Dutch Provinces had not enough men to equip, still less to man, their ships;
and almost their only defence lay in a British squadron which set sail for
Flushing on or about 29th December.[160]
For the present, then, Pitt and Grenville contented themselves with sending
a stiff rejoinder to Chauvelin's note. Grenville reminded him that he had no
official character in this country since the fall of the French monarchy, and
that the sinister meaning of the decree of 19th November, as shown in the
public reception given at Paris to the promoters of sedition in this country,
was in no wise cleared away by his recent declaration, which still claimed
the right to encourage disloyalty. With regard to the Scheldt question,
Grenville declared again that it was of the highest importance both in point
of fact and of principle; of fact, because the action of France pre-supposed
her sovereignty of the Low Countries; of principle, because, if passed over,
it would give her the right to abrogate treaties at her will. The desire of
England to preserve strict neutrality in French affairs was universally
acknowledged, and he (Chauvelin) had not urged a single circumstance in
disproof of it. But, England (continued Grenville) "will never see with
indifference that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly,
common cause in order to render the calamity of war short, if it is
unavoidable. And if the state of the preparations of the Republic is
found inadequate to the emergency, the attack will certainly be first
made there where least resistance is expected. Every circumstance
therefore, of interest and dignity require [sic] that no exertion of
which the Republic can be made capable, should be spared at such a
moment as the present.[159]
Evidently Grenville looked on Chauvelin's note as an ultimatum; and it is
noteworthy that Pitt on 28th December refused to see Chauvelin. Our Dutch
Allies, however, were by no means ready. The separate Admiralties of the
Dutch Provinces had not enough men to equip, still less to man, their ships;
and almost their only defence lay in a British squadron which set sail for
Flushing on or about 29th December.[160]
For the present, then, Pitt and Grenville contented themselves with sending
a stiff rejoinder to Chauvelin's note. Grenville reminded him that he had no
official character in this country since the fall of the French monarchy, and
that the sinister meaning of the decree of 19th November, as shown in the
public reception given at Paris to the promoters of sedition in this country,
was in no wise cleared away by his recent declaration, which still claimed
the right to encourage disloyalty. With regard to the Scheldt question,
Grenville declared again that it was of the highest importance both in point
of fact and of principle; of fact, because the action of France pre-supposed
her sovereignty of the Low Countries; of principle, because, if passed over,
it would give her the right to abrogate treaties at her will. The desire of
England to preserve strict neutrality in French affairs was universally
acknowledged, and he (Chauvelin) had not urged a single circumstance in
disproof of it. But, England (continued Grenville) "will never see with
indifference that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly,
Page 105
sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and
liberties of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining friendship
and peace with England, she must show herself disposed to renounce her
views of aggression and aggrandisement, and to confine herself within her
own territory, without insulting other Governments, without disturbing their
tranquillity, without violating their rights."[161]
This stern rebuke to the flippant claim of the French Ministers to settle the
affairs of neighbouring States in accord with their own principles has often
been ascribed to Pitt himself. This is doubtful. I can find no proof that he
intervened directly in the affairs of the Foreign Office after the accession of
Grenville, as he had done in the days of the Duke of Leeds. Perhaps the
austere personality of Grenville forbade any intervention; or it may be that
the two cousins were in so complete an agreement on principles that Pitt left
all details to the Foreign Minister. Certain it is that he himself remained
almost passive at this time; and all the acts were the acts of Grenville. It
was well known that the two men were in close touch. "I consider his
lordship the same as Mr. Pitt," wrote Miles to Aust.[162]
More important is the question—What were the aims of the British
Government for the settlement of Europe? Fortunately, we are able to
answer this without a shadow of doubt. For on 29th December Grenville
sent off a despatch to Whitworth at St. Petersburg referring to an effusive
offer of alliance from Catharine II. Through Vorontzoff, her envoy at
London, she expressed her admiration of the generous conduct of
George III, and her earnest desire to help him in restoring order to Europe
by means of a concert of the Powers, which might be formed at London. At
the same time she found means to instruct her partisans in the British
Parliament to relax their efforts against the Ministry.[163] Pitt and Grenville
were not dazzled by these proposals. The latter generously declared to
Auckland that he did not believe the Opposition to be influenced by
liberties of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining friendship
and peace with England, she must show herself disposed to renounce her
views of aggression and aggrandisement, and to confine herself within her
own territory, without insulting other Governments, without disturbing their
tranquillity, without violating their rights."[161]
This stern rebuke to the flippant claim of the French Ministers to settle the
affairs of neighbouring States in accord with their own principles has often
been ascribed to Pitt himself. This is doubtful. I can find no proof that he
intervened directly in the affairs of the Foreign Office after the accession of
Grenville, as he had done in the days of the Duke of Leeds. Perhaps the
austere personality of Grenville forbade any intervention; or it may be that
the two cousins were in so complete an agreement on principles that Pitt left
all details to the Foreign Minister. Certain it is that he himself remained
almost passive at this time; and all the acts were the acts of Grenville. It
was well known that the two men were in close touch. "I consider his
lordship the same as Mr. Pitt," wrote Miles to Aust.[162]
More important is the question—What were the aims of the British
Government for the settlement of Europe? Fortunately, we are able to
answer this without a shadow of doubt. For on 29th December Grenville
sent off a despatch to Whitworth at St. Petersburg referring to an effusive
offer of alliance from Catharine II. Through Vorontzoff, her envoy at
London, she expressed her admiration of the generous conduct of
George III, and her earnest desire to help him in restoring order to Europe
by means of a concert of the Powers, which might be formed at London. At
the same time she found means to instruct her partisans in the British
Parliament to relax their efforts against the Ministry.[163] Pitt and Grenville
were not dazzled by these proposals. The latter generously declared to
Auckland that he did not believe the Opposition to be influenced by
Page 106
unpatriotic motives; and he doubted the sincerity of Catharine's offer.[164]
Nevertheless, in view of the imminence of a French attack on Holland,
Grenville decided to encourage the Czarina to form a league of the Powers;
but the instructions which he sent on 29th December to Whitworth set forth
aims very different from hers. He suggested that the Powers not yet at war
should invite the French people to accept the following terms:
The withdrawing of their arms within the limits of the French
territory: the abandoning their conquests; the rescinding any acts
injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nations; and the
giving, in some public and unequivocal manner, a pledge of their
intention no longer to foment troubles and to excite disturbances
against their own Governments. In return for these stipulations the
different Powers of Europe who should be parties to this measure
might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against
France or interference in their internal affairs, and to maintain a
correspondence or intercourse of amity with the existing powers in
that country with whom such a treaty may be concluded. [If,
however, France refuses to give these pledges, then the Powers will
take] active measures to obtain the ends in view, and it may be
considered whether, in such a case, they might not reasonably look
to some indemnity for the expenses and hazards to which they
would necessarily be exposed.[165]
From this remarkable pronouncement it appears that Pitt and Grenville
harboured no hostility to the French Republic as such, provided that it acted
on the principles which it professed up to the end of October 1792. The
ensuing acts of aggression and propagandism they unflinchingly opposed,
but in the hope that the combined remonstrances of all the Powers would
induce the French leaders to withdraw their untenable claims. Above all, the
British Cabinet did not refuse eventually to recognize the new state of
things at Paris, a point of view very far removed from the flaming royalism
Nevertheless, in view of the imminence of a French attack on Holland,
Grenville decided to encourage the Czarina to form a league of the Powers;
but the instructions which he sent on 29th December to Whitworth set forth
aims very different from hers. He suggested that the Powers not yet at war
should invite the French people to accept the following terms:
The withdrawing of their arms within the limits of the French
territory: the abandoning their conquests; the rescinding any acts
injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nations; and the
giving, in some public and unequivocal manner, a pledge of their
intention no longer to foment troubles and to excite disturbances
against their own Governments. In return for these stipulations the
different Powers of Europe who should be parties to this measure
might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against
France or interference in their internal affairs, and to maintain a
correspondence or intercourse of amity with the existing powers in
that country with whom such a treaty may be concluded. [If,
however, France refuses to give these pledges, then the Powers will
take] active measures to obtain the ends in view, and it may be
considered whether, in such a case, they might not reasonably look
to some indemnity for the expenses and hazards to which they
would necessarily be exposed.[165]
From this remarkable pronouncement it appears that Pitt and Grenville
harboured no hostility to the French Republic as such, provided that it acted
on the principles which it professed up to the end of October 1792. The
ensuing acts of aggression and propagandism they unflinchingly opposed,
but in the hope that the combined remonstrances of all the Powers would
induce the French leaders to withdraw their untenable claims. Above all, the
British Cabinet did not refuse eventually to recognize the new state of
things at Paris, a point of view very far removed from the flaming royalism
Page 107
of Catharine II and Burke. Whether a concert of the Powers could have
been formed on these moderate terms is very doubtful. What is certain is
that Pitt and Grenville saw in it the chief hope of peace, and that they did
not desire to force royalty on reluctant France. For them the war, if it came,
was not a war of opinion—Monarchy versus Republic. It was a struggle to
preserve the Balance of Power, which in all ages our statesmen had seen to
be incompatible with the sovereignty of France in the Low Countries. That
danger averted, they were content to let France settle her own affairs, if she
behaved with the like tolerance towards her neighbours.
Unhappily, these pacific and enlightened views were not accompanied by
conciliatory manners. It was the bane of Pitt, and still more of Grenville,
that their innate reserve often cooled their friends and heated their
opponents.[166] In the case of so vain and touchy a man as Chauvelin a little
affability would have gone a long way; and this was especially desirable, as
he had enough support at Paris to thwart the attempt to replace him by some
envoy less disliked at St. James's. Nevertheless, they persisted in their
resolve not to recognize him officially; and the Executive Council made it a
point of honour to force him on the British Court. Personal questions
therefore told against a peaceful settlement. Even at the end of the year
1792 it was not wholly impossible, provided that the questions in dispute
were treated with open-mindedness and a desire to understand the point of
view of the opponent.
Undoubtedly it was for the French Government to take the first steps
towards reconciliation by retracting or toning down the decrees of 16th and
19th November and 15th December, which had brought about the crisis.
Further, the Convention ought to have seen through and thwarted the
attempt of Lebrun to regain popularity by insulting Pitt in the report of 18th
December. Had that body been less intent on the party manœuvres centring
in the trial of Louis XVI, it would assuredly not have furthered the insidious
been formed on these moderate terms is very doubtful. What is certain is
that Pitt and Grenville saw in it the chief hope of peace, and that they did
not desire to force royalty on reluctant France. For them the war, if it came,
was not a war of opinion—Monarchy versus Republic. It was a struggle to
preserve the Balance of Power, which in all ages our statesmen had seen to
be incompatible with the sovereignty of France in the Low Countries. That
danger averted, they were content to let France settle her own affairs, if she
behaved with the like tolerance towards her neighbours.
Unhappily, these pacific and enlightened views were not accompanied by
conciliatory manners. It was the bane of Pitt, and still more of Grenville,
that their innate reserve often cooled their friends and heated their
opponents.[166] In the case of so vain and touchy a man as Chauvelin a little
affability would have gone a long way; and this was especially desirable, as
he had enough support at Paris to thwart the attempt to replace him by some
envoy less disliked at St. James's. Nevertheless, they persisted in their
resolve not to recognize him officially; and the Executive Council made it a
point of honour to force him on the British Court. Personal questions
therefore told against a peaceful settlement. Even at the end of the year
1792 it was not wholly impossible, provided that the questions in dispute
were treated with open-mindedness and a desire to understand the point of
view of the opponent.
Undoubtedly it was for the French Government to take the first steps
towards reconciliation by retracting or toning down the decrees of 16th and
19th November and 15th December, which had brought about the crisis.
Further, the Convention ought to have seen through and thwarted the
attempt of Lebrun to regain popularity by insulting Pitt in the report of 18th
December. Had that body been less intent on the party manœuvres centring
in the trial of Louis XVI, it would assuredly not have furthered the insidious
Page 108
designs of that Minister. It might have offered to recall Chauvelin, and to
substitute Maret, a man known to be a persona grata to Pitt. Finally, in
view of the large concourse of Frenchmen now in London, reckoned at
15,000, the Executive Council would have done well to say nothing about
the passing of the Aliens Bill, obviously a precautionary measure called for
by the emergency.[167]
The French Ministers took exactly the contrary course. On 30th December
they decided that Chauvelin should demand the withdrawal of that measure,
as contrary to the treaty of 1786; failing this, France would declare that
compact at an end. They also began to prepare for an invasion of England,
on a plan which came before them on 28th December; and on the last day of
the year, Monge, Minister for the Navy, issued a circular letter to Friends of
Liberty and Equality in the seaports. It contained passages to the following
effect:
The English Government is arming, and the King of Spain,
encouraged by this, is preparing to attack us. These two tyrannical
Powers, after persecuting the patriots on their own territories, think
no doubt that they will be able to influence the judgment to be
pronounced on the traitor, Louis. They hope to frighten us; but no! a
people which has made itself free, a people which has driven out of
the bosom of France, and as far as the distant borders of the Rhine,
the terrible army of the Prussians and Austrians—the people of
France will not suffer laws to be dictated to them by any tyrant. The
King and his Parliament mean to make war upon us. Will the
English republicans suffer it? Already these free men show their
discontent and the repugnance which they have to bear arms against
their brothers, the French. Well! We will fly to their succour. We
will make a descent in the island. We will lodge there 50,000 caps of
Liberty. We will plant there the sacred tree, and we will stretch out
our arms to our republican brethren. The tyranny of their
Government will soon be destroyed.
substitute Maret, a man known to be a persona grata to Pitt. Finally, in
view of the large concourse of Frenchmen now in London, reckoned at
15,000, the Executive Council would have done well to say nothing about
the passing of the Aliens Bill, obviously a precautionary measure called for
by the emergency.[167]
The French Ministers took exactly the contrary course. On 30th December
they decided that Chauvelin should demand the withdrawal of that measure,
as contrary to the treaty of 1786; failing this, France would declare that
compact at an end. They also began to prepare for an invasion of England,
on a plan which came before them on 28th December; and on the last day of
the year, Monge, Minister for the Navy, issued a circular letter to Friends of
Liberty and Equality in the seaports. It contained passages to the following
effect:
The English Government is arming, and the King of Spain,
encouraged by this, is preparing to attack us. These two tyrannical
Powers, after persecuting the patriots on their own territories, think
no doubt that they will be able to influence the judgment to be
pronounced on the traitor, Louis. They hope to frighten us; but no! a
people which has made itself free, a people which has driven out of
the bosom of France, and as far as the distant borders of the Rhine,
the terrible army of the Prussians and Austrians—the people of
France will not suffer laws to be dictated to them by any tyrant. The
King and his Parliament mean to make war upon us. Will the
English republicans suffer it? Already these free men show their
discontent and the repugnance which they have to bear arms against
their brothers, the French. Well! We will fly to their succour. We
will make a descent in the island. We will lodge there 50,000 caps of
Liberty. We will plant there the sacred tree, and we will stretch out
our arms to our republican brethren. The tyranny of their
Government will soon be destroyed.
Page 109
What did the famous mathematician think of this effusion in the heyday of
the Empire, when he became Count of Pelusium with a Westphalian estate
bringing in 200,000 francs a year? A collection of the frank confessions of
the ci-devant Jacobins would form an entertaining volume.
Not the least piquant of them would be the criticisms of a Breton captain,
Kersaint, on the bellicose speech which he launched at the Convention on
1st January 1793. Admitting that Pitt really wanted peace, while Fox only
desired to abase his rival, he averred that the Prime Minister would try to
arrest France in her rapid career of land conquest either by a naval war or
by an armed mediation. War, said Kersaint, must result, were it only from
the perplexities of Pitt and the hatred of George III for the French Republic.
France, then, must threaten to free the Scottish and Irish nations which
England had so long oppressed. The Republic could appeal with telling
effect to the English sailors not to fight against the champions of the Rights
of Man. Further, France need not fear the British Empire; for it is vulnerable
in every sea, on all the continental markets, while France stands four-
square, rooted in her fertile soil. Let them, then, attack the sources of British
wealth which are easily assailable. "The credit of England rests upon
fictitious wealth, the real riches of that people are scattered everywhere....
Asia, Portugal and Spain are the best markets for English products.... We
must attack Lisbon and the Brazils, and carry an auxiliary army to Tippoo
Sultan." As for Spain (continued Kersaint) she could be paralysed by the
revolutionizing of Spanish America—the suggestion of Miranda to
Dumouriez. In fact, Frenchmen need not fear war with all Governments.
Open enmity was better than neutrality. This war would "regulate the
destiny of nations and found the liberty of the world." Accordingly he
proposed to offer to England either war or an alliance; to equip thirty sail of
the line and twenty-four frigates; and to form a Committee of General
Defence. The Convention assented to this last and referred the other
questions to it.
the Empire, when he became Count of Pelusium with a Westphalian estate
bringing in 200,000 francs a year? A collection of the frank confessions of
the ci-devant Jacobins would form an entertaining volume.
Not the least piquant of them would be the criticisms of a Breton captain,
Kersaint, on the bellicose speech which he launched at the Convention on
1st January 1793. Admitting that Pitt really wanted peace, while Fox only
desired to abase his rival, he averred that the Prime Minister would try to
arrest France in her rapid career of land conquest either by a naval war or
by an armed mediation. War, said Kersaint, must result, were it only from
the perplexities of Pitt and the hatred of George III for the French Republic.
France, then, must threaten to free the Scottish and Irish nations which
England had so long oppressed. The Republic could appeal with telling
effect to the English sailors not to fight against the champions of the Rights
of Man. Further, France need not fear the British Empire; for it is vulnerable
in every sea, on all the continental markets, while France stands four-
square, rooted in her fertile soil. Let them, then, attack the sources of British
wealth which are easily assailable. "The credit of England rests upon
fictitious wealth, the real riches of that people are scattered everywhere....
Asia, Portugal and Spain are the best markets for English products.... We
must attack Lisbon and the Brazils, and carry an auxiliary army to Tippoo
Sultan." As for Spain (continued Kersaint) she could be paralysed by the
revolutionizing of Spanish America—the suggestion of Miranda to
Dumouriez. In fact, Frenchmen need not fear war with all Governments.
Open enmity was better than neutrality. This war would "regulate the
destiny of nations and found the liberty of the world." Accordingly he
proposed to offer to England either war or an alliance; to equip thirty sail of
the line and twenty-four frigates; and to form a Committee of General
Defence. The Convention assented to this last and referred the other
questions to it.
Page 110
Thus opened the terrible year, 1793. The circular letter of Monge and the
speech of Kersaint furnished the weather-gauge for the future. In them we
detect the mental exaltation, the boundless daring, the overwrought
conviction of their neighbours' weakness, which were to carry Frenchmen
up to bewildering heights of glory and overwhelm them in final disaster. We
behold in awful perspective the conquest of Holland, Italy, and Central
Europe, the Irish Rebellion, the Egyptian Expedition, the war on British
commerce, culminating in the Continental System, with its ensuing
campaigns in Spain and Russia, and the downfall of Napoleon. All this and
more can be seen dimly, as in a crystal globe, in that fateful phrase of
Kersaint—"The credit of England rests upon fictitious wealth."
Turning to the last details that preceded the declaration of war, we notice
that on 7th January Chauvelin, acting on the order of Lebrun, sent in a sharp
protest against the Aliens Bill as an infraction of Pitt's Treaty of Commerce
of 1786. On one count Chauvelin certainly had a right to complain; for,
strange to say, the Act was put in operation against Talleyrand, nominally
his adviser, and the champion of the Anglo-French entente. The ex-Bishop
of Autun penned an eloquent protest, which apparently had some effect, for
he was not expelled until March 1794.[168] Far more incisive was
Chauvelin's complaint. We can imagine his feelings when Grenville curtly
declined to receive it.[169] At the same time Grenville refused to discuss or
explain the stoppage of certain cargoes of grain destined for French ports.
His private correspondence with Auckland shows that this measure was due
to the fear that the French would store the corn for the use of the army that
was threatening Holland. That motive of course could not be disclosed to
speech of Kersaint furnished the weather-gauge for the future. In them we
detect the mental exaltation, the boundless daring, the overwrought
conviction of their neighbours' weakness, which were to carry Frenchmen
up to bewildering heights of glory and overwhelm them in final disaster. We
behold in awful perspective the conquest of Holland, Italy, and Central
Europe, the Irish Rebellion, the Egyptian Expedition, the war on British
commerce, culminating in the Continental System, with its ensuing
campaigns in Spain and Russia, and the downfall of Napoleon. All this and
more can be seen dimly, as in a crystal globe, in that fateful phrase of
Kersaint—"The credit of England rests upon fictitious wealth."
Turning to the last details that preceded the declaration of war, we notice
that on 7th January Chauvelin, acting on the order of Lebrun, sent in a sharp
protest against the Aliens Bill as an infraction of Pitt's Treaty of Commerce
of 1786. On one count Chauvelin certainly had a right to complain; for,
strange to say, the Act was put in operation against Talleyrand, nominally
his adviser, and the champion of the Anglo-French entente. The ex-Bishop
of Autun penned an eloquent protest, which apparently had some effect, for
he was not expelled until March 1794.[168] Far more incisive was
Chauvelin's complaint. We can imagine his feelings when Grenville curtly
declined to receive it.[169] At the same time Grenville refused to discuss or
explain the stoppage of certain cargoes of grain destined for French ports.
His private correspondence with Auckland shows that this measure was due
to the fear that the French would store the corn for the use of the army that
was threatening Holland. That motive of course could not be disclosed to
Page 111
Chauvelin; and Grenville declined to explain it at all until the resolutions
arrived at in Paris were clearly set forth.
On Sunday, 13th January, Chauvelin received from Lebrun a long despatch,
drawn up in less provoking terms than the last. He sought an informal
interview with Grenville, which was immediately granted. Grenville's
hitherto unpublished account of the interview may be quoted in full, as it
enables us to see the nuances of the situation:
Jan. 13, 1793.[170]
M. Chauvelin as soon as he came into my room began by stating
that he was desirous of explaining that all his steps subsequent to
the date of my letter of Dec. 31 had been taken in consequence of
positive instructions from the Conseil Exécutif, given before they
had received that letter. That they had seen in that letter one thing
which had been satisfactory to them, notwithstanding the other
things of which they might complain—this was the assurance which
enabled them to reject the idea entertained by some persons in
France of its being the intention of the Government here to declare
war at all events. Under this assurance they had authorized him to
give to their answer a form which was not liable to the exceptions
which had before been taken. He then gave me the despatch from
M. Le Brun. When I had read it I told him only that the
circumstances were too critical for me to say anything as to its
contents except to refer him to the answer which I should be [sic] to
give to it.
He then said that there was one other point which he was desirous of
mentioning. That one of the difficulties of the present situation of
the two Countries was the want of a proper channel of
communication. That he himself, from having no access to the
King's Ministers, was frequently unable to give accounts of their
real views and intentions. That he was therefore to desire the
arrived at in Paris were clearly set forth.
On Sunday, 13th January, Chauvelin received from Lebrun a long despatch,
drawn up in less provoking terms than the last. He sought an informal
interview with Grenville, which was immediately granted. Grenville's
hitherto unpublished account of the interview may be quoted in full, as it
enables us to see the nuances of the situation:
Jan. 13, 1793.[170]
M. Chauvelin as soon as he came into my room began by stating
that he was desirous of explaining that all his steps subsequent to
the date of my letter of Dec. 31 had been taken in consequence of
positive instructions from the Conseil Exécutif, given before they
had received that letter. That they had seen in that letter one thing
which had been satisfactory to them, notwithstanding the other
things of which they might complain—this was the assurance which
enabled them to reject the idea entertained by some persons in
France of its being the intention of the Government here to declare
war at all events. Under this assurance they had authorized him to
give to their answer a form which was not liable to the exceptions
which had before been taken. He then gave me the despatch from
M. Le Brun. When I had read it I told him only that the
circumstances were too critical for me to say anything as to its
contents except to refer him to the answer which I should be [sic] to
give to it.
He then said that there was one other point which he was desirous of
mentioning. That one of the difficulties of the present situation of
the two Countries was the want of a proper channel of
communication. That he himself, from having no access to the
King's Ministers, was frequently unable to give accounts of their
real views and intentions. That he was therefore to desire the
Page 112
permission to see me often sous la même forme that he had now
come [sic].
I told him that this was a point on which I was unwilling to take
upon myself personally to give him an answer; but that he should
have one; and in order to avoid mistakes I repeated to him the
phrase, that his request was to see me sous la même forme. He said
"yes," and that this was conceived to be a means of arriving sooner
at the object of his being allowed to present to the King the lettres
de créance with which he was charged. As he did not express this
quite distinctly, I asked him again whether I understood him right;
that his present request was only to communicate under the form in
which he now came. He again assented to this, but in doing it threw
out that he had almost had direct orders from the Conseil Exécutif to
apply for permission to present his letters. He however expressly
assented to my statement that the other was at present his only
request.
Nothing else material passed, except justifications of himself from
the imputation of treating on public business with some persons in
this country with whom he had connections of private friendship
and intercourse, and complaints of the manner in which he was
treated in the newspapers. To neither of these points I said anything.
[171]
It is not surprising that Grenville asked for time to consult his colleagues
(probably also the King) before returning an answer to Lebrun's missive;
for, though unobjectionable in form, it re-affirmed the French claims and
justified all the proceedings of that Government. Lebrun accused the Pitt
Cabinet of raising difficulties of form and of discovering hostile intentions
where none existed. While repudiating the notion of annexing Belgium, he
firmly adhered to the Scheldt decree. France, he declared, would respond to
all appeals which emanated from the general will of a nation, and he even
asserted that she could treat only with a Government which "is deemed the
come [sic].
I told him that this was a point on which I was unwilling to take
upon myself personally to give him an answer; but that he should
have one; and in order to avoid mistakes I repeated to him the
phrase, that his request was to see me sous la même forme. He said
"yes," and that this was conceived to be a means of arriving sooner
at the object of his being allowed to present to the King the lettres
de créance with which he was charged. As he did not express this
quite distinctly, I asked him again whether I understood him right;
that his present request was only to communicate under the form in
which he now came. He again assented to this, but in doing it threw
out that he had almost had direct orders from the Conseil Exécutif to
apply for permission to present his letters. He however expressly
assented to my statement that the other was at present his only
request.
Nothing else material passed, except justifications of himself from
the imputation of treating on public business with some persons in
this country with whom he had connections of private friendship
and intercourse, and complaints of the manner in which he was
treated in the newspapers. To neither of these points I said anything.
[171]
It is not surprising that Grenville asked for time to consult his colleagues
(probably also the King) before returning an answer to Lebrun's missive;
for, though unobjectionable in form, it re-affirmed the French claims and
justified all the proceedings of that Government. Lebrun accused the Pitt
Cabinet of raising difficulties of form and of discovering hostile intentions
where none existed. While repudiating the notion of annexing Belgium, he
firmly adhered to the Scheldt decree. France, he declared, would respond to
all appeals which emanated from the general will of a nation, and he even
asserted that she could treat only with a Government which "is deemed the
Page 113
organ of the general will of the nation governed." If her efforts for peace
failed, she would fight England with regret but without fear.[172]
In effect, then, this despatch held out no hope of a reconciliation. There
came with it, however, a long and rambling letter from Maret to Miles,
which was intended partly to threaten, partly to cajole the Ministry. In its
more dulcet passages the hope was set forth that the Scheldt affair could be
settled, and even that Chauvelin might be replaced by the estimable
Barthélemy. Miles, highly elated, hurried to the Foreign Office on that
momentous Sunday, 13th January, and found that a Cabinet meeting was
proceeding. Pitt came out and cordially received Maret's note. He returned
to the Cabinet meeting (at which, strange to say, Burke was present) but
came out again "furious, freighted with the bile of the whole Cabinet," and
forbade Miles to have any dealings with the French Executive Council.[173]
How are we to explain this change from affability to anger? The
impressionable Miles believed that in that hour Pitt capitulated to Burke and
became a man of war. The reader who takes the trouble to compare
Lebrun's note with that of Maret will probably come to another conclusion,
namely, that the latter seems very like a device to throw the British Ministry
off its guard. The terms of the two notes are widely divergent; and, in such a
case, Pitt naturally accepted that of Lebrun and scouted that of Maret, as of
a busybody or an intriguer. Grenville objected to this double-dealing;[174]
and probably the presence of Burke at the Cabinet meeting sharpened the
demand for its cessation.
Another explanation of Pitt's fury is possible. Grenville and he may have
received news of the warlike preparations going on in the French seaports
and on the Dutch borders. I have found no proof of this; but it is certain that
by this time they must have had before them the inflammatory appeal of
Monge to French and English Jacobins as well as the boastful tirade of
failed, she would fight England with regret but without fear.[172]
In effect, then, this despatch held out no hope of a reconciliation. There
came with it, however, a long and rambling letter from Maret to Miles,
which was intended partly to threaten, partly to cajole the Ministry. In its
more dulcet passages the hope was set forth that the Scheldt affair could be
settled, and even that Chauvelin might be replaced by the estimable
Barthélemy. Miles, highly elated, hurried to the Foreign Office on that
momentous Sunday, 13th January, and found that a Cabinet meeting was
proceeding. Pitt came out and cordially received Maret's note. He returned
to the Cabinet meeting (at which, strange to say, Burke was present) but
came out again "furious, freighted with the bile of the whole Cabinet," and
forbade Miles to have any dealings with the French Executive Council.[173]
How are we to explain this change from affability to anger? The
impressionable Miles believed that in that hour Pitt capitulated to Burke and
became a man of war. The reader who takes the trouble to compare
Lebrun's note with that of Maret will probably come to another conclusion,
namely, that the latter seems very like a device to throw the British Ministry
off its guard. The terms of the two notes are widely divergent; and, in such a
case, Pitt naturally accepted that of Lebrun and scouted that of Maret, as of
a busybody or an intriguer. Grenville objected to this double-dealing;[174]
and probably the presence of Burke at the Cabinet meeting sharpened the
demand for its cessation.
Another explanation of Pitt's fury is possible. Grenville and he may have
received news of the warlike preparations going on in the French seaports
and on the Dutch borders. I have found no proof of this; but it is certain that
by this time they must have had before them the inflammatory appeal of
Monge to French and English Jacobins as well as the boastful tirade of
Page 114
Kersaint to the Convention. Having these proofs of the warlike ardour of
the French and of their reliance on British reformers, how could Pitt and
Grenville look on the philanthropic professions of Maret as anything but a
snare, and Miles as his dupe? Miles had ever been officious. Clearly the
time had come to stop his fussy advances to an unofficial agent, which
Lebrun might once more ascribe to Pitt's secret fear of France.
It would be interesting to discover how far Pitt and Grenville were at this
time aware of the secret designs of the French Executive Council. On this
topic I have found no definite evidence. It is very unlikely that on 13th
January they knew of the aggressive plans which the Executive Council had
formed three days before. But it is certain that such plans were set on foot
on 10th January. On that day the Executive Council drew up secret orders
for Generals Dumouriez and Miranda. The former was then at Paris
concerting plans for the next campaign, not for the purpose of saving
Louis XVI, as he afterwards stated. Whether he fanned the warlike ardour
of the Executive Council will perhaps never be known. But undoubtedly on
10th January the Executive Council bade him order his lieutenant, Miranda,
to prepare for the invasion of Dutch Flanders and Walcheren within twelve
days. Furnaces were to be supplied to the French gun-vessels in the Scheldt
so as to beat off the frigates, whether English or Dutch is not stated.[175]
Why did not Miranda carry out this plan? Merely because he had neither
stores nor food[176]—a fact which justifies the British Government in
placing an embargo on the corn intended for France. Undoubtedly if he had
had supplies, Miranda would have seized the lands at the mouth of the
Scheldt, and cut off the retreat of the Stadholder to his place of refuge,
Walcheren. It will further be observed that these orders were given at Paris
three days after the despatch of Lebrun's and Maret's notes to London. The
design apparently was to amuse England until a deadly blow could be
struck at the Dutch. Auckland, writing on the 11th at The Hague, expressed
the French and of their reliance on British reformers, how could Pitt and
Grenville look on the philanthropic professions of Maret as anything but a
snare, and Miles as his dupe? Miles had ever been officious. Clearly the
time had come to stop his fussy advances to an unofficial agent, which
Lebrun might once more ascribe to Pitt's secret fear of France.
It would be interesting to discover how far Pitt and Grenville were at this
time aware of the secret designs of the French Executive Council. On this
topic I have found no definite evidence. It is very unlikely that on 13th
January they knew of the aggressive plans which the Executive Council had
formed three days before. But it is certain that such plans were set on foot
on 10th January. On that day the Executive Council drew up secret orders
for Generals Dumouriez and Miranda. The former was then at Paris
concerting plans for the next campaign, not for the purpose of saving
Louis XVI, as he afterwards stated. Whether he fanned the warlike ardour
of the Executive Council will perhaps never be known. But undoubtedly on
10th January the Executive Council bade him order his lieutenant, Miranda,
to prepare for the invasion of Dutch Flanders and Walcheren within twelve
days. Furnaces were to be supplied to the French gun-vessels in the Scheldt
so as to beat off the frigates, whether English or Dutch is not stated.[175]
Why did not Miranda carry out this plan? Merely because he had neither
stores nor food[176]—a fact which justifies the British Government in
placing an embargo on the corn intended for France. Undoubtedly if he had
had supplies, Miranda would have seized the lands at the mouth of the
Scheldt, and cut off the retreat of the Stadholder to his place of refuge,
Walcheren. It will further be observed that these orders were given at Paris
three days after the despatch of Lebrun's and Maret's notes to London. The
design apparently was to amuse England until a deadly blow could be
struck at the Dutch. Auckland, writing on the 11th at The Hague, expressed
Page 115
to Grenville the hope that war might be avoided, or, if that were impossible,
that the rupture should be postponed until the Austrians and Prussians had
re-crossed the Rhine. The preparations of the Dutch were going on with the
usual slowness.[177] Evidently the French Government counted on their
traditional inertia and on the malcontents in Great Britain and Ireland. The
private letters of Maret, that soi-disant friend of peace, breathe full
assurance of victory.[178]
Grenville of course sent no answer to the last missive of Maret; but to
Lebrun he replied, on 18th January, that his explanations were wholly
unsatisfactory, as they maintained the right of the Executive Council to
annul treaties at will. Until satisfaction were granted for the aggressions on
His Majesty's ally, he would continue to take all measures needful for their
common safety. The terms of this reply were doubtless due to the last news
received from Paris. On 12th January the arch-intriguer, Brissot, had fired
off at the Convention a warlike harangue in which he depicted the British
Ministry as helpless in the midst of a discontented populace and without a
friend in the world. France could therefore easily arouse Ireland and
Scotland to revolt, besides carrying liberty to India.[179] On the following
day the Convention ordered the equipment of 30 sail-of-the-line and 20
frigates, and the construction of 25 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates.
On his side Chauvelin saw the rupture to be imminent. In forwarding
Grenville's despatch to Lebrun on the 19th he described his situation in
London as intolerable, and added that no alternative but war was left. His
assistant, Reinhard, ended a letter of that day to Miles with the words "M.
Chauvelin leaves." That resolve must have been strengthened by Grenville's
haughty note of the 20th, stating that no special means could be taken to
protect his couriers and that he must rank "among the general mass of
foreigners resident in England." On the same day Grenville informed Sir
James Murray, who had gone on a special mission to the Prussian
that the rupture should be postponed until the Austrians and Prussians had
re-crossed the Rhine. The preparations of the Dutch were going on with the
usual slowness.[177] Evidently the French Government counted on their
traditional inertia and on the malcontents in Great Britain and Ireland. The
private letters of Maret, that soi-disant friend of peace, breathe full
assurance of victory.[178]
Grenville of course sent no answer to the last missive of Maret; but to
Lebrun he replied, on 18th January, that his explanations were wholly
unsatisfactory, as they maintained the right of the Executive Council to
annul treaties at will. Until satisfaction were granted for the aggressions on
His Majesty's ally, he would continue to take all measures needful for their
common safety. The terms of this reply were doubtless due to the last news
received from Paris. On 12th January the arch-intriguer, Brissot, had fired
off at the Convention a warlike harangue in which he depicted the British
Ministry as helpless in the midst of a discontented populace and without a
friend in the world. France could therefore easily arouse Ireland and
Scotland to revolt, besides carrying liberty to India.[179] On the following
day the Convention ordered the equipment of 30 sail-of-the-line and 20
frigates, and the construction of 25 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates.
On his side Chauvelin saw the rupture to be imminent. In forwarding
Grenville's despatch to Lebrun on the 19th he described his situation in
London as intolerable, and added that no alternative but war was left. His
assistant, Reinhard, ended a letter of that day to Miles with the words "M.
Chauvelin leaves." That resolve must have been strengthened by Grenville's
haughty note of the 20th, stating that no special means could be taken to
protect his couriers and that he must rank "among the general mass of
foreigners resident in England." On the same day Grenville informed Sir
James Murray, who had gone on a special mission to the Prussian
Page 116
headquarters, that war was likely to break out, as France "insists on terms
entirely inconsistent with the Government of this country and His Majesty's
dignity and honour." His Majesty is strenuously making preparations and
hopes to concert plans with Prussia and Austria.[180]
Such was the state of affairs on 21st January, when Louis XVI laid his head
on the block in the Place de la Révolution. The news of this tragedy reached
London late in the afternoon of the 23rd; and the horror which it aroused
led to a demand at the Haymarket that the farce should be put off. On the
advice of the Cabinet George III now intervened. At a Court held on the
morrow at the Queen's House (on the site of Buckingham Palace) an order
was issued that Chauvelin, as the envoy deputed by Louis XVI, should
leave the country on or before 1st February. But on or before 25th January,
that is, before the news of this mandate can have reached Paris, Lebrun had
decided to recall the French mission from London. On 25th January he
wrote to Monsieur Greenville [sic] stating that, as his plenipotentiary,
Chauvelin, had orders to return to Paris, Maret would proceed to London to
look after the papers at the French Embassy. This statement merits
attention; for it shows that Chauvelin's departure was hastened only a day or
two by the King's command;[181] and further it refutes the oft-repeated
assertion that Maret came charged with offers of peace to which Pitt and
Grenville paid no heed.
It will be well to examine this latter question somewhat closely. In order to
understand the situation at Paris, we must remember that Dumouriez was at
that time hesitating between an attack on Holland and a pacific mission to
England. On 23rd January, while at Paris, he wrote two very significant
letters, one to Miranda, the other to Auckland. In the former he states: "The
Executive Council ... has thought of sending me as special ambassador to
England to make that country decide definitely for peace or war.
Consequently an order has been given for our ambassador, Chauvelin, to
entirely inconsistent with the Government of this country and His Majesty's
dignity and honour." His Majesty is strenuously making preparations and
hopes to concert plans with Prussia and Austria.[180]
Such was the state of affairs on 21st January, when Louis XVI laid his head
on the block in the Place de la Révolution. The news of this tragedy reached
London late in the afternoon of the 23rd; and the horror which it aroused
led to a demand at the Haymarket that the farce should be put off. On the
advice of the Cabinet George III now intervened. At a Court held on the
morrow at the Queen's House (on the site of Buckingham Palace) an order
was issued that Chauvelin, as the envoy deputed by Louis XVI, should
leave the country on or before 1st February. But on or before 25th January,
that is, before the news of this mandate can have reached Paris, Lebrun had
decided to recall the French mission from London. On 25th January he
wrote to Monsieur Greenville [sic] stating that, as his plenipotentiary,
Chauvelin, had orders to return to Paris, Maret would proceed to London to
look after the papers at the French Embassy. This statement merits
attention; for it shows that Chauvelin's departure was hastened only a day or
two by the King's command;[181] and further it refutes the oft-repeated
assertion that Maret came charged with offers of peace to which Pitt and
Grenville paid no heed.
It will be well to examine this latter question somewhat closely. In order to
understand the situation at Paris, we must remember that Dumouriez was at
that time hesitating between an attack on Holland and a pacific mission to
England. On 23rd January, while at Paris, he wrote two very significant
letters, one to Miranda, the other to Auckland. In the former he states: "The
Executive Council ... has thought of sending me as special ambassador to
England to make that country decide definitely for peace or war.
Consequently an order has been given for our ambassador, Chauvelin, to
Page 117
return. To-morrow they will send a secret agent [Maret], very well known
to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, to ask the two parties (that is to say the whole
nation) for a safe-conduct for me and an assurance that I shall be welcome.
As I have to ask for yes or no, like Cato at Carthage, this mission will not
last more than eight days." Pending the reply to the first question (says
Dumouriez) he will set out for Dunkirk, Bruges, and Antwerp. His second
letter, of the same date, is to Auckland at The Hague, stating that he knows
him to be desirous of peace, as he himself is. Can they not have an
interview on the Dutch frontier, near Antwerp, where he will be on 30th
January?[182]
Now it is clear from Grenville's and Auckland's correspondence that
Ministers paid some heed to the offer of Dumouriez. Nothing came of it
owing to the arrival of news of the French declaration of war; but the
proposal was at least considered.[183] There is not a line to show that Pitt
and Grenville took Maret's so-called "mission" at all seriously. For, in the
first place, he had no powers, no authority to do anything more than collect
the papers of the embassy. He himself gave out to Miles that he came on a
"pacific mission," but he carefully refrained from telling even him what it
was.[184] His biographer, Ernouf, has invested his journey to London with
some importance by declaring that on 22nd January he (Maret) drew up and
sent off a "despatch" to Chauvelin, stating that the French Executive
Council desired peace, and that he was coming as chargé d'affaires to the
French Embassy in London. This missive (whether signed by Lebrun is not
stated) met Chauvelin on his way from London to Dover; but it produced no
change whatever in his plans. He proceeded on his way to Paris, passing
Maret in the night near Abbeville. To assign much importance to his
"despatch" is to overrate both his errand and his position at Paris. Maret was
only one of the head clerks at the French Foreign Office and had no right to
sign official despatches. If he really was charged by Lebrun to tender the
to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, to ask the two parties (that is to say the whole
nation) for a safe-conduct for me and an assurance that I shall be welcome.
As I have to ask for yes or no, like Cato at Carthage, this mission will not
last more than eight days." Pending the reply to the first question (says
Dumouriez) he will set out for Dunkirk, Bruges, and Antwerp. His second
letter, of the same date, is to Auckland at The Hague, stating that he knows
him to be desirous of peace, as he himself is. Can they not have an
interview on the Dutch frontier, near Antwerp, where he will be on 30th
January?[182]
Now it is clear from Grenville's and Auckland's correspondence that
Ministers paid some heed to the offer of Dumouriez. Nothing came of it
owing to the arrival of news of the French declaration of war; but the
proposal was at least considered.[183] There is not a line to show that Pitt
and Grenville took Maret's so-called "mission" at all seriously. For, in the
first place, he had no powers, no authority to do anything more than collect
the papers of the embassy. He himself gave out to Miles that he came on a
"pacific mission," but he carefully refrained from telling even him what it
was.[184] His biographer, Ernouf, has invested his journey to London with
some importance by declaring that on 22nd January he (Maret) drew up and
sent off a "despatch" to Chauvelin, stating that the French Executive
Council desired peace, and that he was coming as chargé d'affaires to the
French Embassy in London. This missive (whether signed by Lebrun is not
stated) met Chauvelin on his way from London to Dover; but it produced no
change whatever in his plans. He proceeded on his way to Paris, passing
Maret in the night near Abbeville. To assign much importance to his
"despatch" is to overrate both his errand and his position at Paris. Maret was
only one of the head clerks at the French Foreign Office and had no right to
sign official despatches. If he really was charged by Lebrun to tender the
Page 118
olive-branch, why was not that despatch sent to London in a form and
manner which would procure credence and have some effect? Again, if
Maret came to restore peace, why did he not at once produce his powers?
The question was infinitely important and undeniably urgent. Instead of
taking decisive action, as any well-wisher of mankind must have done at so
awful a crisis, he declined to enter into particulars, and, on the plea that
Chauvelin was ordered to Paris (which he himself knew before he left that
city) waited for further instructions—which never came. Finally he
confessed to Miles that he came to prepare the way for Dumouriez and to
discover whether that general would be assured of personal safety if he
came to England.
Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.
Such must have been the thought of Miles, when he heard this singular
admission. For what trust could be placed in Dumouriez, whose conquest of
Belgium—the source of the present difficulties—had by no means sated his
desire for its natural sequel, the conquest of Holland? That Maret had
credentials of some kind may be admitted; for he showed them to Miles and
claimed to be chargé d'affaires; but, as Miles found his powers to be
"extremely limited,"[185] we may doubt whether they extended beyond the
collection and transport of the archives of Portman Square. If he had any
authority to treat with our Government, it is curious that he refrained from
doing so merely on the ground of Chauvelin's departure. "Apprehensive that
this event might derange what had been agreed upon, he despatched a
messenger with a letter to Lebrun stating that under the present
circumstances, he should not think himself authorized to communicate with
the British Ministers without fresh instructions."[186]
Notwithstanding the urgency of the case, he received not a line, not even a
newspaper, from Paris during his stay in London. In fact, the soi-disant
manner which would procure credence and have some effect? Again, if
Maret came to restore peace, why did he not at once produce his powers?
The question was infinitely important and undeniably urgent. Instead of
taking decisive action, as any well-wisher of mankind must have done at so
awful a crisis, he declined to enter into particulars, and, on the plea that
Chauvelin was ordered to Paris (which he himself knew before he left that
city) waited for further instructions—which never came. Finally he
confessed to Miles that he came to prepare the way for Dumouriez and to
discover whether that general would be assured of personal safety if he
came to England.
Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.
Such must have been the thought of Miles, when he heard this singular
admission. For what trust could be placed in Dumouriez, whose conquest of
Belgium—the source of the present difficulties—had by no means sated his
desire for its natural sequel, the conquest of Holland? That Maret had
credentials of some kind may be admitted; for he showed them to Miles and
claimed to be chargé d'affaires; but, as Miles found his powers to be
"extremely limited,"[185] we may doubt whether they extended beyond the
collection and transport of the archives of Portman Square. If he had any
authority to treat with our Government, it is curious that he refrained from
doing so merely on the ground of Chauvelin's departure. "Apprehensive that
this event might derange what had been agreed upon, he despatched a
messenger with a letter to Lebrun stating that under the present
circumstances, he should not think himself authorized to communicate with
the British Ministers without fresh instructions."[186]
Notwithstanding the urgency of the case, he received not a line, not even a
newspaper, from Paris during his stay in London. In fact, the soi-disant
Page 119
"chargé d'affaires" of France knew so little of the real state of affairs that he
assured Miles of the desire of his countrymen to give up Nice, Mainz,
Worms, the Rhineland, the Scheldt, and the Low Countries[187]—at the very
time (31st January) when Danton carried unanimously a decree annexing
the Low Countries to the French Republic.
The explanation of the silence of Maret and the ambiguous conduct of
Dumouriez may be found in the Memoirs of the latter. He states that a
proposal came up in the French Executive Council at Paris on 22nd January
to send him to London; but it was negatived by three votes to two.
Nevertheless, he arranged with the minority (Lebrun and Garat) that he
should go to Antwerp and have pourparlers with Auckland preparatory to a
mission to England, while Maret returned to London to pave the way for
him.[188] The scheme was a private venture, proposed by Dumouriez, and
favoured only by the minority of the Council. In such a case neither
Dumouriez nor Maret could be invested with official functions; and it was
only a last despairing effort for peace that led Maret to pose as a chargé
d'affaires and write to Paris for "fresh instructions." This praiseworthy
device did not altogether impose even on Miles, who clearly was puzzled
by the air of mystery that his friend assumed.
In view of the facts now set forth, can we blame Pitt and Grenville for
declining to treat with Maret? He brought with him no proof that he had any
other function than that of taking over the archives of the French embassy.
Grenville stated to Auckland that Maret's presence caused much dabbling in
the funds, and that his presence was most undesirable if Dumouriez really
intended to treat for peace. Pitt afterwards assured the House of Commons
that Maret had not made the smallest communication to Ministers.[189]
Evidently they looked on him as an unofficial emissary, to which level
Chauvelin had persistently endeavoured to degrade him.
assured Miles of the desire of his countrymen to give up Nice, Mainz,
Worms, the Rhineland, the Scheldt, and the Low Countries[187]—at the very
time (31st January) when Danton carried unanimously a decree annexing
the Low Countries to the French Republic.
The explanation of the silence of Maret and the ambiguous conduct of
Dumouriez may be found in the Memoirs of the latter. He states that a
proposal came up in the French Executive Council at Paris on 22nd January
to send him to London; but it was negatived by three votes to two.
Nevertheless, he arranged with the minority (Lebrun and Garat) that he
should go to Antwerp and have pourparlers with Auckland preparatory to a
mission to England, while Maret returned to London to pave the way for
him.[188] The scheme was a private venture, proposed by Dumouriez, and
favoured only by the minority of the Council. In such a case neither
Dumouriez nor Maret could be invested with official functions; and it was
only a last despairing effort for peace that led Maret to pose as a chargé
d'affaires and write to Paris for "fresh instructions." This praiseworthy
device did not altogether impose even on Miles, who clearly was puzzled
by the air of mystery that his friend assumed.
In view of the facts now set forth, can we blame Pitt and Grenville for
declining to treat with Maret? He brought with him no proof that he had any
other function than that of taking over the archives of the French embassy.
Grenville stated to Auckland that Maret's presence caused much dabbling in
the funds, and that his presence was most undesirable if Dumouriez really
intended to treat for peace. Pitt afterwards assured the House of Commons
that Maret had not made the smallest communication to Ministers.[189]
Evidently they looked on him as an unofficial emissary, to which level
Chauvelin had persistently endeavoured to degrade him.
Page 120
Finally, on 4th February, Grenville ordered Maret to leave the country. By
this time news had arrived from Paris that France had laid an embargo on
British ships in her ports; and this portended more serious news. By that
time the die was cast. On 31st January Danton carried the Convention with
him in a fiery speech, crowned with that gigantic phrase—"Let us fling
down to the Kings the head of a King as gage of battle"; then, in defiance of
the well-known facts of the case, he urged the deputies to decree an act of
political union with the Belgians, who were already one at heart with them.
On the following day the Convention confirmed this aggressive action by
unanimously decreeing war against Great Britain and Holland. By so doing
the deputies of France merely endorsed the decision formed by the
Executive Council on 10th January.
The outbreak of war between France and England is an event so fraught
with momentous issues to Pitt, to the two Powers, and to the whole world,
that I have striven to set forth as fully as possible every incident, every
misunderstanding, every collision of interests or feelings, that brought it to
pass. No episode in the development of the nations of Europe is so tragic as
this. That two peoples should, within the space of nine months, abjure their
friendly relations and furiously grapple in a life and death struggle over
questions of secondary importance leads the dazed beholder at first to grope
after the old Greek idea of ἄτη or Nemesis. In reality the case does not call
for supernatural agency. The story is pitiably human, if the student will but
master its complex details. It may be well to close our study with a few
general observations, though they almost necessarily involve the risk of
over-statement.
this time news had arrived from Paris that France had laid an embargo on
British ships in her ports; and this portended more serious news. By that
time the die was cast. On 31st January Danton carried the Convention with
him in a fiery speech, crowned with that gigantic phrase—"Let us fling
down to the Kings the head of a King as gage of battle"; then, in defiance of
the well-known facts of the case, he urged the deputies to decree an act of
political union with the Belgians, who were already one at heart with them.
On the following day the Convention confirmed this aggressive action by
unanimously decreeing war against Great Britain and Holland. By so doing
the deputies of France merely endorsed the decision formed by the
Executive Council on 10th January.
The outbreak of war between France and England is an event so fraught
with momentous issues to Pitt, to the two Powers, and to the whole world,
that I have striven to set forth as fully as possible every incident, every
misunderstanding, every collision of interests or feelings, that brought it to
pass. No episode in the development of the nations of Europe is so tragic as
this. That two peoples should, within the space of nine months, abjure their
friendly relations and furiously grapple in a life and death struggle over
questions of secondary importance leads the dazed beholder at first to grope
after the old Greek idea of ἄτη or Nemesis. In reality the case does not call
for supernatural agency. The story is pitiably human, if the student will but
master its complex details. It may be well to close our study with a few
general observations, though they almost necessarily involve the risk of
over-statement.
Page 121
Firstly, the position of absolute neutrality which Pitt took up from the
beginning of the troubles in France was extremely difficult to maintain
amidst the rising passions of the year 1792. The Franco-Austrian war soon
led to a situation in which the future conduct of the neutral aroused far more
suspicion, and scarcely less hatred, than that of the enemy himself. When
brains reeled with rage against tyrants; when cheeks flushed at the thought
of the woes of Marie Antoinette, correct neutrality seemed inhuman. In an
age that vibrated to the appeals of Madame Roland and Burke, cold
passivity aroused doubt or contempt. Yet it is certain that Pitt and Grenville
clung to that position, even when its difficulties increased tenfold with the
fall of the monarchy and the September massacres. Lebrun, on coming into
office after the former of those events, was careful to inform his
countrymen that the withdrawal of the British ambassador was not an
unfriendly act, and that England was making no preparations for war. Later
on he chose to represent Pitt's conduct as persistently unfriendly; but his
earlier words prove the contrary.
Again, was it practicable (as Fox claimed) for Pitt to forbid Austria and
Prussia to coalesce against France? Probably it was not possible, without
bringing Russia and Sweden into the field on the royalist side. In the
excited state of men's minds, an act so annoying as that of armed mediation
would have widened the circle of war; and, as we have seen, it was the
belief of Pitt and Grenville, in August–September 1792, that the continental
war might probably end from the inability of the combatants to continue it.
No one at that time foresaw the easy conquest of Savoy and the Low
Countries by the French troops. In one of the few references to foreign
affairs in Pitt's letters of the month following, we find him stating that if
France conquers and keeps Savoy, a new situation will arise.[190] But he
remained passive while the French drove the Sardinian troops from Savoy;
and his whole conduct at this time moved Burke to indignation, if not
beginning of the troubles in France was extremely difficult to maintain
amidst the rising passions of the year 1792. The Franco-Austrian war soon
led to a situation in which the future conduct of the neutral aroused far more
suspicion, and scarcely less hatred, than that of the enemy himself. When
brains reeled with rage against tyrants; when cheeks flushed at the thought
of the woes of Marie Antoinette, correct neutrality seemed inhuman. In an
age that vibrated to the appeals of Madame Roland and Burke, cold
passivity aroused doubt or contempt. Yet it is certain that Pitt and Grenville
clung to that position, even when its difficulties increased tenfold with the
fall of the monarchy and the September massacres. Lebrun, on coming into
office after the former of those events, was careful to inform his
countrymen that the withdrawal of the British ambassador was not an
unfriendly act, and that England was making no preparations for war. Later
on he chose to represent Pitt's conduct as persistently unfriendly; but his
earlier words prove the contrary.
Again, was it practicable (as Fox claimed) for Pitt to forbid Austria and
Prussia to coalesce against France? Probably it was not possible, without
bringing Russia and Sweden into the field on the royalist side. In the
excited state of men's minds, an act so annoying as that of armed mediation
would have widened the circle of war; and, as we have seen, it was the
belief of Pitt and Grenville, in August–September 1792, that the continental
war might probably end from the inability of the combatants to continue it.
No one at that time foresaw the easy conquest of Savoy and the Low
Countries by the French troops. In one of the few references to foreign
affairs in Pitt's letters of the month following, we find him stating that if
France conquers and keeps Savoy, a new situation will arise.[190] But he
remained passive while the French drove the Sardinian troops from Savoy;
and his whole conduct at this time moved Burke to indignation, if not
Page 122
despair. So late as 6th November Grenville expressed to Auckland his firm
belief in the policy of strict neutrality.[191]
What was it, then, that blighted these hopes? The answer must be that the
French victory of Jemappes (6th November) and the phenomenally easy
conquest of the Austrian Netherlands speedily brought about a new and
most threatening situation. It has been usual to say, with Goethe, that Valmy
was the birth of a new age. Far more truly may we say so of Jemappes and
its immediate results. That decisive triumph and the welcome accorded by
the liberated Belgians opened up vistas of beneficent triumph that set the
brain of France in a whirl. Hence the decrees of 16th November–15th
December, which tear to pieces the old diplomacy, and apply to astonished
Europe the gospel of Rousseau. In place of musty treaties there will be
Social Contracts; instead of States there will be nations that will speak
straight to one another's heart. They do speak: English Radical Clubs speak
to the heart of France, the Convention; and Grégoire, President of that body,
makes answer that if the rulers of England threaten the delegates and their
comrades, Frenchmen will cross the Straits and fly to their help—"Come,
generous Britons," he cries, "let us all confederate for the welfare of
Humanity."[192] In the new age, then, political life will be a series of
tableaux from the gospel of Rousseau. To the true believer there can be no
compromise. Relics of old-world customs, such as the closing of the
Scheldt by the Dutch, must vanish. Here, as elsewhere, Nature will
infallibly guide men aright.
It was the application of these principles to our ally, the Dutch Republic,
which Pitt refused to accept, especially as their corollary made for the
aggrandisement of France. In his eyes international law imposed stringent
obligations, which no one State, or nation, had the right to revoke. Old
world theories of life, when rudely assailed at Paris, moved their champions
to an enthusiasm scarcely less keen than that of the Jacobins. Britons who
belief in the policy of strict neutrality.[191]
What was it, then, that blighted these hopes? The answer must be that the
French victory of Jemappes (6th November) and the phenomenally easy
conquest of the Austrian Netherlands speedily brought about a new and
most threatening situation. It has been usual to say, with Goethe, that Valmy
was the birth of a new age. Far more truly may we say so of Jemappes and
its immediate results. That decisive triumph and the welcome accorded by
the liberated Belgians opened up vistas of beneficent triumph that set the
brain of France in a whirl. Hence the decrees of 16th November–15th
December, which tear to pieces the old diplomacy, and apply to astonished
Europe the gospel of Rousseau. In place of musty treaties there will be
Social Contracts; instead of States there will be nations that will speak
straight to one another's heart. They do speak: English Radical Clubs speak
to the heart of France, the Convention; and Grégoire, President of that body,
makes answer that if the rulers of England threaten the delegates and their
comrades, Frenchmen will cross the Straits and fly to their help—"Come,
generous Britons," he cries, "let us all confederate for the welfare of
Humanity."[192] In the new age, then, political life will be a series of
tableaux from the gospel of Rousseau. To the true believer there can be no
compromise. Relics of old-world customs, such as the closing of the
Scheldt by the Dutch, must vanish. Here, as elsewhere, Nature will
infallibly guide men aright.
It was the application of these principles to our ally, the Dutch Republic,
which Pitt refused to accept, especially as their corollary made for the
aggrandisement of France. In his eyes international law imposed stringent
obligations, which no one State, or nation, had the right to revoke. Old
world theories of life, when rudely assailed at Paris, moved their champions
to an enthusiasm scarcely less keen than that of the Jacobins. Britons who
Page 123
fraternized with the new hierophants were counted traitors to their King.
Moreover, by a most unfortunate coincidence, the British Government
publicly announced its resolve to support the Dutch Republic on the very
day when the French Convention passed the first of its subversive decrees.
Thus, national pride came sharply into conflict. Neither side could give way
without seeming to betray alike its principles and its honour.
Personal questions played a baneful part in embittering the feud. Pitt and
Grenville shrouded themselves in their insular and innate austerity. They
judged the English Radical clubs too harshly; they ascribed to those who
congratulated the Convention on 28th November treasonable aims which
can scarcely have arisen in England when the addresses were drawn up.
Apart from frothy republican talk, which should have been treated with
quiet contempt, those congratulations contained no sign of consciousness
that France was about to challenge us to conflict. We may admit that Frost
and Barlow showed great tactlessness in presenting those addresses when
friction between the two nations had already begun; for the incident,
besides stiffening the necks of Frenchmen, gave the Reform movement an
appearance of disloyalty to England which worked infinite harm.
Nevertheless, on reviewing these questions, we see that Pitt treated the
foolish ebullitions of youth as though they implied malice.
Surely, too, he, and still more Grenville, were unwise in placing Chauvelin
under a political and social ban, which naturally led him to consort with the
bitterest enemies of Government in order to annoy Ministers here and
please his employers at Paris. A touchy and sensitive nature like Chauvelin's
is usually open to the soothing influences of flattery. Grenville, however,
drove him to open enmity, which finally wreaked its revenge;[193] for it was
Chauvelin's report on the readiness of Britons to revolt which finally
decided the Convention to declare war on 1st February. We may also
inquire why the Court of St. James's did not make clear the course of
Moreover, by a most unfortunate coincidence, the British Government
publicly announced its resolve to support the Dutch Republic on the very
day when the French Convention passed the first of its subversive decrees.
Thus, national pride came sharply into conflict. Neither side could give way
without seeming to betray alike its principles and its honour.
Personal questions played a baneful part in embittering the feud. Pitt and
Grenville shrouded themselves in their insular and innate austerity. They
judged the English Radical clubs too harshly; they ascribed to those who
congratulated the Convention on 28th November treasonable aims which
can scarcely have arisen in England when the addresses were drawn up.
Apart from frothy republican talk, which should have been treated with
quiet contempt, those congratulations contained no sign of consciousness
that France was about to challenge us to conflict. We may admit that Frost
and Barlow showed great tactlessness in presenting those addresses when
friction between the two nations had already begun; for the incident,
besides stiffening the necks of Frenchmen, gave the Reform movement an
appearance of disloyalty to England which worked infinite harm.
Nevertheless, on reviewing these questions, we see that Pitt treated the
foolish ebullitions of youth as though they implied malice.
Surely, too, he, and still more Grenville, were unwise in placing Chauvelin
under a political and social ban, which naturally led him to consort with the
bitterest enemies of Government in order to annoy Ministers here and
please his employers at Paris. A touchy and sensitive nature like Chauvelin's
is usually open to the soothing influences of flattery. Grenville, however,
drove him to open enmity, which finally wreaked its revenge;[193] for it was
Chauvelin's report on the readiness of Britons to revolt which finally
decided the Convention to declare war on 1st February. We may also
inquire why the Court of St. James's did not make clear the course of
Page 124
conduct which it proposed to take in the future respecting France.[194] As
outlined in the despatch of 29th December to Whitworth, it formed the basis
of a practicable compromise. If it could be stated confidentially to Russia,
Austria, and Prussia, why not to France? Probably the objections of
George III to the faintest sign of recognition of the French Republic[195]
account for the fact that these enlightened intentions remained, down to the
year 1800, secret except to those Powers. But statesmen err when they bury
their good intentions in the secrecy of archives and allow public opinion to
sympathize with the enemy. Here was Pitt's most serious blunder. At the
outset of the struggle, and throughout its course, he scorned those tactful
arts and melodramatic ways which win over waverers and inspire the
fainthearted. Here he showed himself not a son of Chatham, but a Grenville.
The results of this frigidity were disastrous. All Frenchmen and many
Britons believed that he went out of his way to assail a peaceful Republic in
order to crush liberty abroad and at home. History has exposed the falseness
of the slander; but a statesman ought not to owe his vindication to research
in archives. He needs whole-hearted support in the present more than
justification by students.
In this respect Pitt showed less of worldly wisdom than the journalists and
barristers who leaped to power at Paris. Their chief source of strength lay in
skilful appeals to popular passion. In reality their case was untenable before
any calm and judicial tribunal. But the France of that age was anything but
calm and judicial. It lived on enthusiasm and sensation; and the Girondins
and Jacobins fed it almost to repletion. Unfortunately Danton, the only man
who combined strength with some insight into statecraft, was away in
Belgium while the crisis developed; and the conduct of affairs rested mainly
with Lebrun and his envoy Chauvelin. It is only fair to remember that they
were thirty and twenty-seven years of age respectively, and had had just
four months and eight months of official experience. In such a case pity
must blend with censure. The frightful loss of experienced men and the
outlined in the despatch of 29th December to Whitworth, it formed the basis
of a practicable compromise. If it could be stated confidentially to Russia,
Austria, and Prussia, why not to France? Probably the objections of
George III to the faintest sign of recognition of the French Republic[195]
account for the fact that these enlightened intentions remained, down to the
year 1800, secret except to those Powers. But statesmen err when they bury
their good intentions in the secrecy of archives and allow public opinion to
sympathize with the enemy. Here was Pitt's most serious blunder. At the
outset of the struggle, and throughout its course, he scorned those tactful
arts and melodramatic ways which win over waverers and inspire the
fainthearted. Here he showed himself not a son of Chatham, but a Grenville.
The results of this frigidity were disastrous. All Frenchmen and many
Britons believed that he went out of his way to assail a peaceful Republic in
order to crush liberty abroad and at home. History has exposed the falseness
of the slander; but a statesman ought not to owe his vindication to research
in archives. He needs whole-hearted support in the present more than
justification by students.
In this respect Pitt showed less of worldly wisdom than the journalists and
barristers who leaped to power at Paris. Their chief source of strength lay in
skilful appeals to popular passion. In reality their case was untenable before
any calm and judicial tribunal. But the France of that age was anything but
calm and judicial. It lived on enthusiasm and sensation; and the Girondins
and Jacobins fed it almost to repletion. Unfortunately Danton, the only man
who combined strength with some insight into statecraft, was away in
Belgium while the crisis developed; and the conduct of affairs rested mainly
with Lebrun and his envoy Chauvelin. It is only fair to remember that they
were thirty and twenty-seven years of age respectively, and had had just
four months and eight months of official experience. In such a case pity
must blend with censure. The frightful loss of experienced men and the
Page 125
giddy preference for new-comers were among the most fatal characteristics
of the revolutionary movement. Needing natures that were able, yet self-
restrained, bold, but cautiously bold, it now found as leaders calculating
fanatics like Robespierre, headstrong orators and wire-pullers like the
Girondin leaders, or lucky journalists like Lebrun. To play to the gallery
was his first instinct; and the tottering fortunes of the Gironde made it
almost a necessity. Hence his refusal and that of his colleagues to draw back
a hair's breadth from the unjustifiable position which they had taken up.
Behind them loomed the September massacres, fatal to two Foreign
Ministers of France; before them shone the splendours of a liberating
crusade. We can scarcely blame men so ardent, so hard pressed.
But there are some rules of the game which even the most irresponsible of
Ministers must observe. Here both Chauvelin and Lebrun went fatally
astray. Chauvelin's pique at the interview which Pitt had with Maret on 2nd
December led him flagrantly to misrepresent that incident, and Lebrun, as
we have seen, reported it to the Convention in such a way as to impute to
Pitt a discreditable and cowardly intrigue. This is the climax of malice. An
envoy and a Minister who scatter such insinuations are the most reckless of
firebrands. By this conduct both Lebrun and Chauvelin inflamed the
passions of their countrymen. In truth, it was passion, not policy, that made
the war. The charges which they brought against England were of secondary
importance—her demand for the revocation of the decrees concerning the
Scheldt and the encouragement offered to malcontents, together with her
stoppage of corn ships lading for France, and her Aliens Bill. Such were the
pretexts for the recall of Chauvelin, which, as we have seen, was decided at
Paris before the Court of St. James's determined to dismiss him.
Another fact comes out clearly from a survey of the evidence given above,
namely, that the execution of Louis XVI was in no sense the cause of the
war. The question turned essentially on the conduct of France towards our
of the revolutionary movement. Needing natures that were able, yet self-
restrained, bold, but cautiously bold, it now found as leaders calculating
fanatics like Robespierre, headstrong orators and wire-pullers like the
Girondin leaders, or lucky journalists like Lebrun. To play to the gallery
was his first instinct; and the tottering fortunes of the Gironde made it
almost a necessity. Hence his refusal and that of his colleagues to draw back
a hair's breadth from the unjustifiable position which they had taken up.
Behind them loomed the September massacres, fatal to two Foreign
Ministers of France; before them shone the splendours of a liberating
crusade. We can scarcely blame men so ardent, so hard pressed.
But there are some rules of the game which even the most irresponsible of
Ministers must observe. Here both Chauvelin and Lebrun went fatally
astray. Chauvelin's pique at the interview which Pitt had with Maret on 2nd
December led him flagrantly to misrepresent that incident, and Lebrun, as
we have seen, reported it to the Convention in such a way as to impute to
Pitt a discreditable and cowardly intrigue. This is the climax of malice. An
envoy and a Minister who scatter such insinuations are the most reckless of
firebrands. By this conduct both Lebrun and Chauvelin inflamed the
passions of their countrymen. In truth, it was passion, not policy, that made
the war. The charges which they brought against England were of secondary
importance—her demand for the revocation of the decrees concerning the
Scheldt and the encouragement offered to malcontents, together with her
stoppage of corn ships lading for France, and her Aliens Bill. Such were the
pretexts for the recall of Chauvelin, which, as we have seen, was decided at
Paris before the Court of St. James's determined to dismiss him.
Another fact comes out clearly from a survey of the evidence given above,
namely, that the execution of Louis XVI was in no sense the cause of the
war. The question turned essentially on the conduct of France towards our
Page 126
Dutch Allies. Before Louis was put on his trial Pitt and Grenville had
decided that the French must retract their aggressive decree against
Holland, backed up as it was by a claim to support malcontents in any land.
Failing this, war would have ensued, even if Louis had not been condemned
to death. The tragedy of 21st January made no difference to the issue; for, as
we have seen, the French Government by 10th January decided to push on
its plans against the Dutch Republic. It is also impossible to attach any
importance to the vague offers of Dumouriez and Maret, at which Lebrun
connived probably so as to be able to say, without committing himself in
the least, that he had done all he could for peace.
We may therefore conclude that the wealth and defencelessness of the
Dutch Netherlands lured on the enthusiasts and intriguers of Paris to an
enterprise the terrible results of which were unsuspected by them. Nothing
is more remarkable than the full assurance of victory which breathes in the
letters of Dumouriez, the despatches of Lebrun, and the speeches of the
French deputies. Experienced statesmen were soon to stand aghast at the
triumph of the Republican arms; but it fell short of the hopes of the French
politicians. In this boundless self-confidence, sublime were it not so
disastrous, is to be found the chief cause of war in 1793.
decided that the French must retract their aggressive decree against
Holland, backed up as it was by a claim to support malcontents in any land.
Failing this, war would have ensued, even if Louis had not been condemned
to death. The tragedy of 21st January made no difference to the issue; for, as
we have seen, the French Government by 10th January decided to push on
its plans against the Dutch Republic. It is also impossible to attach any
importance to the vague offers of Dumouriez and Maret, at which Lebrun
connived probably so as to be able to say, without committing himself in
the least, that he had done all he could for peace.
We may therefore conclude that the wealth and defencelessness of the
Dutch Netherlands lured on the enthusiasts and intriguers of Paris to an
enterprise the terrible results of which were unsuspected by them. Nothing
is more remarkable than the full assurance of victory which breathes in the
letters of Dumouriez, the despatches of Lebrun, and the speeches of the
French deputies. Experienced statesmen were soon to stand aghast at the
triumph of the Republican arms; but it fell short of the hopes of the French
politicians. In this boundless self-confidence, sublime were it not so
disastrous, is to be found the chief cause of war in 1793.
Page 127
CHAPTER V
T H E F L E M I S H C A M PA I G N ( 1 7 9 3 )
The war is not only unavoidable, but, under
the circumstances of the case, absolutely
necessary to the existence of Great Britain
and Europe.—Pitt, Speech of 11th March,
1793.
In this chapter and the following, dealing with phases of the Great War, the
narrative may seem at times to diverge far from the life of Pitt. But, in truth,
his career now depended upon the issue of this gigantic strife. Therefore an
account merely of his domestic concerns, of the debates at Westminster, or
even of British and Irish affairs, would be a one-sided and superficial
sketch. For in reality his destiny, together with that of Great Britain and of
Europe at large, turned upon the events that unfolded themselves in
Flanders and the Rhineland, at Toulon and Quiberon, in Hayti, Corsica, and
Egypt. As these in their turn were potently influenced by the policy pursued
at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid, we must take a survey, wide but
minute, sometimes to all appearance diffuse, yet in reality vitally related to
the main theme. In order to simplify the narrative, I have sought to
disentangle the strands of war policy and to follow them severally,
connecting them, however, in the chapter entitled "Pitt as War Minister,"
which will sum up the results of these studies on the period 1793–8.
T H E F L E M I S H C A M PA I G N ( 1 7 9 3 )
The war is not only unavoidable, but, under
the circumstances of the case, absolutely
necessary to the existence of Great Britain
and Europe.—Pitt, Speech of 11th March,
1793.
In this chapter and the following, dealing with phases of the Great War, the
narrative may seem at times to diverge far from the life of Pitt. But, in truth,
his career now depended upon the issue of this gigantic strife. Therefore an
account merely of his domestic concerns, of the debates at Westminster, or
even of British and Irish affairs, would be a one-sided and superficial
sketch. For in reality his destiny, together with that of Great Britain and of
Europe at large, turned upon the events that unfolded themselves in
Flanders and the Rhineland, at Toulon and Quiberon, in Hayti, Corsica, and
Egypt. As these in their turn were potently influenced by the policy pursued
at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid, we must take a survey, wide but
minute, sometimes to all appearance diffuse, yet in reality vitally related to
the main theme. In order to simplify the narrative, I have sought to
disentangle the strands of war policy and to follow them severally,
connecting them, however, in the chapter entitled "Pitt as War Minister,"
which will sum up the results of these studies on the period 1793–8.
Page 128
If proof be needed that Pitt entered upon the French war with regret, it may
be found in the fact that on 5th February he and Grenville empowered
Auckland to discuss the pacific overtures of Dumouriez. Grenville, it is
true, saw in this move merely a device to gain time;[196] and we may detect
in the British reply the sanguine nature of the Prime Minister. But his hopes
ended on 8th February, when news arrived of the declaration of war by the
French Convention against Great Britain and Holland. Thereupon Pitt
entered into the struggle without a shadow of doubt.[197] For him it was
always a struggle to prevent the domination of the Netherlands by France;
and we may note, as a sign of the continuity of that policy, that on it largely
depended the rupture with Napoleon in 1803. Pitt summed up the object of
the war in the word "security." In his view, as in that of his successor,
Castlereagh, national security was wholly incompatible with the possession
of Holland, or even the Belgic Provinces, by France.
In taking this practical view of the crisis Pitt differed sharply from
George III and Burke. They looked on the struggle as one for the restoration
of monarchy. The King on 9th February wrote to Grenville that he hoped
the war would be the "means of restoring some degree of order to that
unprincipled country," and Burke flung into an unquotable phrase his anger
that the war should turn on the question of the Scheldt.[198] For the present
the aggressive conduct of France welded together these two wings of the
royalist party; but events were soon to reveal the fundamental difference of
view. Indeed, it coloured all their opinions about the struggle. Wilberforce
reports Pitt as saying that the war would be a short war, and certainly ended
in one or two campaigns. "No, Sir," retorted Burke, "it will be a long war
and a dangerous war, but it must be undertaken."[199] In his eyes the
struggle was one between two irreconcilable principles—democracy and
monarchy. Certainly the effort to force 25,000,000 Frenchmen back into the
well-worn grooves was stupendous. Further, the great Irishman, with the
be found in the fact that on 5th February he and Grenville empowered
Auckland to discuss the pacific overtures of Dumouriez. Grenville, it is
true, saw in this move merely a device to gain time;[196] and we may detect
in the British reply the sanguine nature of the Prime Minister. But his hopes
ended on 8th February, when news arrived of the declaration of war by the
French Convention against Great Britain and Holland. Thereupon Pitt
entered into the struggle without a shadow of doubt.[197] For him it was
always a struggle to prevent the domination of the Netherlands by France;
and we may note, as a sign of the continuity of that policy, that on it largely
depended the rupture with Napoleon in 1803. Pitt summed up the object of
the war in the word "security." In his view, as in that of his successor,
Castlereagh, national security was wholly incompatible with the possession
of Holland, or even the Belgic Provinces, by France.
In taking this practical view of the crisis Pitt differed sharply from
George III and Burke. They looked on the struggle as one for the restoration
of monarchy. The King on 9th February wrote to Grenville that he hoped
the war would be the "means of restoring some degree of order to that
unprincipled country," and Burke flung into an unquotable phrase his anger
that the war should turn on the question of the Scheldt.[198] For the present
the aggressive conduct of France welded together these two wings of the
royalist party; but events were soon to reveal the fundamental difference of
view. Indeed, it coloured all their opinions about the struggle. Wilberforce
reports Pitt as saying that the war would be a short war, and certainly ended
in one or two campaigns. "No, Sir," retorted Burke, "it will be a long war
and a dangerous war, but it must be undertaken."[199] In his eyes the
struggle was one between two irreconcilable principles—democracy and
monarchy. Certainly the effort to force 25,000,000 Frenchmen back into the
well-worn grooves was stupendous. Further, the great Irishman, with the
Page 129
idealism and chivalry which invest his nature with so much charm, urged
the Allies to abjure all thought of indemnifying themselves at the expense
of France, and to declare their sole aim to be the destruction of anarchy and
the restoration of monarchy, a course of action which would range on their
side a large number of Frenchmen and avert all risk of identifying that
nation with the regicide Republic. The new letters of Burke suggest the
advantages of such a declaration and most justly censure the Allies for
avowing their intention of taking land from France. The old man saw
clearly that by so doing they banded Frenchmen together for a national
effort. In the following pages the thoughtful reader will notice the disastrous
effects of this blunder. Here Burke stood on strong ground; and Pitt was far
from guiltless.
On the general question, however, whether the war should be for the
restoration of monarchy or the attainment of security, Pitt's position is
unassailable. For the mere suspicion that the Allies intended to impose
Louis XVII on France condemned monarchy in the eyes of patriotic
Frenchmen. Only amidst the exhaustion following on the Napoleonic wars
could an intensely patriotic people accept a king at the sword's point. In the
first glow of democratic ardour absolute destruction seemed preferable to so
craven a surrender. While, then, we join Burke in censuring the procedure
of the Allies, we must pronounce his advice fatal to the cause which he
wished to commend. Further, his was a counsel of perfection to Austria,
England, and the Dutch Republic. Deeming themselves attacked by France,
they were determined to gain security from the reckless schemes of
aggrandizing philanthropy now in favour at Paris; and, viewing the matter
impartially, we must admit that they were right. The French having been the
aggressors, the three States justly demanded security at that weak point in
the European system, the Flemish border. Further, as Pitt limited his aims to
the expulsion of the French from the Low Countries, he might reasonably
hope for a speedy peace, the task which he set before himself being far
the Allies to abjure all thought of indemnifying themselves at the expense
of France, and to declare their sole aim to be the destruction of anarchy and
the restoration of monarchy, a course of action which would range on their
side a large number of Frenchmen and avert all risk of identifying that
nation with the regicide Republic. The new letters of Burke suggest the
advantages of such a declaration and most justly censure the Allies for
avowing their intention of taking land from France. The old man saw
clearly that by so doing they banded Frenchmen together for a national
effort. In the following pages the thoughtful reader will notice the disastrous
effects of this blunder. Here Burke stood on strong ground; and Pitt was far
from guiltless.
On the general question, however, whether the war should be for the
restoration of monarchy or the attainment of security, Pitt's position is
unassailable. For the mere suspicion that the Allies intended to impose
Louis XVII on France condemned monarchy in the eyes of patriotic
Frenchmen. Only amidst the exhaustion following on the Napoleonic wars
could an intensely patriotic people accept a king at the sword's point. In the
first glow of democratic ardour absolute destruction seemed preferable to so
craven a surrender. While, then, we join Burke in censuring the procedure
of the Allies, we must pronounce his advice fatal to the cause which he
wished to commend. Further, his was a counsel of perfection to Austria,
England, and the Dutch Republic. Deeming themselves attacked by France,
they were determined to gain security from the reckless schemes of
aggrandizing philanthropy now in favour at Paris; and, viewing the matter
impartially, we must admit that they were right. The French having been the
aggressors, the three States justly demanded security at that weak point in
the European system, the Flemish border. Further, as Pitt limited his aims to
the expulsion of the French from the Low Countries, he might reasonably
hope for a speedy peace, the task which he set before himself being far
Page 130
smaller than that of forcing a king back on the French nation.[200]
Ultimately the stiffneckedness of Napoleon brought all the Powers to the
latter solution; but no one in 1793 could foresee the monstrous claim for
"the natural frontiers"—the Rhine, Alps, Pyrenees, and Ocean—which
prolonged the struggle to the year 1814.
Pitt's optimism will appear not unnatural, if we review the general situation
early in the year 1793. The political atmosphere was disturbed by two
cyclones, one in the west, the other in the east, of Europe. That which
centred in the French Revolution seemed to have reached its maximum
intensity; and skilled observers augured from the execution of Louis XVI a
relapse into savage but almost helpless anarchy. The recent successes of the
French in the Rhineland and Brabant were rightly ascribed to the supineness
of Prussia and Austria; and already the armies of Custine and Dumouriez
were in sore straits. The plunder of the liberated peoples by the troops and
by commissioners sent to carry out the decrees of fraternity had led to sharp
reprisals all along the straggling front from Mainz to Bruges; and now
Danton's decree of 31st January, annexing the Belgic provinces to France,
exasperated that people.
Further, the men in power at Paris had as yet shown no organizing capacity.
The administration of the War Department by "papa" Pache had been a
masterpiece of imbecile knavery which infuriated Dumouriez and his half-
starving troops. We have heard much of the blunders of British Ministers in
this war; but even at their worst they never sank to the depths revealed in
the correspondence of Dumouriez with Pache. In truth, both Powers began
the war very badly; but France repaired her faults far more quickly, chiefly
because the young democracy soon came to award the guillotine for
incompetent conduct over which the nepotism of Whitehall spread a decent
cloak. The discovery by the Jacobins of the law of the survival of the fittest
Ultimately the stiffneckedness of Napoleon brought all the Powers to the
latter solution; but no one in 1793 could foresee the monstrous claim for
"the natural frontiers"—the Rhine, Alps, Pyrenees, and Ocean—which
prolonged the struggle to the year 1814.
Pitt's optimism will appear not unnatural, if we review the general situation
early in the year 1793. The political atmosphere was disturbed by two
cyclones, one in the west, the other in the east, of Europe. That which
centred in the French Revolution seemed to have reached its maximum
intensity; and skilled observers augured from the execution of Louis XVI a
relapse into savage but almost helpless anarchy. The recent successes of the
French in the Rhineland and Brabant were rightly ascribed to the supineness
of Prussia and Austria; and already the armies of Custine and Dumouriez
were in sore straits. The plunder of the liberated peoples by the troops and
by commissioners sent to carry out the decrees of fraternity had led to sharp
reprisals all along the straggling front from Mainz to Bruges; and now
Danton's decree of 31st January, annexing the Belgic provinces to France,
exasperated that people.
Further, the men in power at Paris had as yet shown no organizing capacity.
The administration of the War Department by "papa" Pache had been a
masterpiece of imbecile knavery which infuriated Dumouriez and his half-
starving troops. We have heard much of the blunders of British Ministers in
this war; but even at their worst they never sank to the depths revealed in
the correspondence of Dumouriez with Pache. In truth, both Powers began
the war very badly; but France repaired her faults far more quickly, chiefly
because the young democracy soon came to award the guillotine for
incompetent conduct over which the nepotism of Whitehall spread a decent
cloak. The discovery by the Jacobins of the law of the survival of the fittest
Page 131
served to array the military genius of France against Court favourites or the
dull products of the system of seniority.
For the present, the misery of the French troops, the immense extent of their
lines, and the singular ingratitude of the liberated peoples, promised a
speedy reversal of the campaign of 1792. For the re-conquest of Belgium,
the Allies now had ready on or near the Rhine 55,000 Austrians under the
Duke of Coburg. On their right were 11,000 Prussians, under Frederick of
Brunswick-Oels, and 13,000 Hanoverians, destined for Guelderland. These
last were to be paid by the Maritime Powers. In reserve were 33,000
Prussians, under Hohenlohe-Kirchberg. For the invasion of Eastern France,
Frederick William of Prussia marshalled, near Frankfurt, a force of 42,000
of his own troops, together with 14,000 other Germans. Further south was
General Wurmser with 24,000 Austrians. And this was not all. The Holy
Roman Empire promised a force of 120,000, whenever its Translucencies,
Bishops, Abbesses, and Knights could muster them; and further east there
loomed the hosts of Russia. If these forces had been used straightforwardly,
France must have been overborne.[201]
But the half of them were not used at all. Before the campaign opened, the
eastern cyclone drew to itself the energies which ostensibly were directed
against France. Just one week before the execution of Louis XVI, five
Prussian columns crossed the borders of Poland. This act aroused a furious
outcry, especially as Frederick William preluded it by a manifesto
hypocritically dwelling upon the danger of allowing Jacobinism to take root
in Poland. Fears of Prussian and Muscovite rapacity had induced Pitt and
Grenville to seek disclaimers of partition at Berlin and St. Petersburg.
Assurances enough were forthcoming. On 29th January 1793 Markoff
sought to convince Whitworth that no partition was intended.[202] But in
view of the entire passivity of Pitt on the Polish Question since his
dull products of the system of seniority.
For the present, the misery of the French troops, the immense extent of their
lines, and the singular ingratitude of the liberated peoples, promised a
speedy reversal of the campaign of 1792. For the re-conquest of Belgium,
the Allies now had ready on or near the Rhine 55,000 Austrians under the
Duke of Coburg. On their right were 11,000 Prussians, under Frederick of
Brunswick-Oels, and 13,000 Hanoverians, destined for Guelderland. These
last were to be paid by the Maritime Powers. In reserve were 33,000
Prussians, under Hohenlohe-Kirchberg. For the invasion of Eastern France,
Frederick William of Prussia marshalled, near Frankfurt, a force of 42,000
of his own troops, together with 14,000 other Germans. Further south was
General Wurmser with 24,000 Austrians. And this was not all. The Holy
Roman Empire promised a force of 120,000, whenever its Translucencies,
Bishops, Abbesses, and Knights could muster them; and further east there
loomed the hosts of Russia. If these forces had been used straightforwardly,
France must have been overborne.[201]
But the half of them were not used at all. Before the campaign opened, the
eastern cyclone drew to itself the energies which ostensibly were directed
against France. Just one week before the execution of Louis XVI, five
Prussian columns crossed the borders of Poland. This act aroused a furious
outcry, especially as Frederick William preluded it by a manifesto
hypocritically dwelling upon the danger of allowing Jacobinism to take root
in Poland. Fears of Prussian and Muscovite rapacity had induced Pitt and
Grenville to seek disclaimers of partition at Berlin and St. Petersburg.
Assurances enough were forthcoming. On 29th January 1793 Markoff
sought to convince Whitworth that no partition was intended.[202] But in
view of the entire passivity of Pitt on the Polish Question since his
Page 132
surrender to Catharine in 1791 the two Powers laid their plans for the act of
robbery which took place a few months later.[203]
In this they had the rather doubtful acquiescence of Austria, provided that
they furthered the Belgic-Bavarian exchange so long favoured at Vienna
and resisted at Berlin. As we have seen, Pitt strongly opposed the exchange;
but, early in February 1793, Grenville and he heard that the Emperor
Francis II hoped to facilitate the transference of the Elector of Bavaria from
Munich to Brussels by adding Lille and Valenciennes to his new dominion.
[204] These tidings led them to adopt a decision which was largely to
influence the course of the war. They resolved to commit Austria deeply to
war with France by favouring the acquisition of Lille and Valenciennes by
the Hapsburgs provided that they retained Belgium. This, however, was far
from the wishes of that Court, which longed for parts of Alsace and
Lorraine, and viewed Belgium merely as a sop to be flung to the Elector of
Bavaria.[205]
Was there ever a more singular game of cross-purposes? Austria pursued
the war with France chiefly with the object of gaining Bavaria and parts of
Eastern France, Belgium (with Lille and Valenciennes) being allotted to the
Elector uprooted at Munich. Prussia and Russia promised to abet this
scheme as a set-off to their prospective plunder of Poland; but, obviously,
after securing their booty in the summer of 1793, they had no interest in
aggrandizing the House of Hapsburg. Further, England entered on the
Flemish campaign with motives widely different from those of Austria. Pitt
and Grenville sought to plant her more firmly at Brussels by girdling her
with the fortresses of French Flanders; but she sought to recover Belgium
only to fling it to the Elector. Finally neither Russia nor the German Powers
cared an iota about the security of Holland. Their eyes were fixed on
Warsaw or Munich. In truth, despite all their protestations as to the need of
re-establishing the French monarchy, they were mainly bent on continuing
robbery which took place a few months later.[203]
In this they had the rather doubtful acquiescence of Austria, provided that
they furthered the Belgic-Bavarian exchange so long favoured at Vienna
and resisted at Berlin. As we have seen, Pitt strongly opposed the exchange;
but, early in February 1793, Grenville and he heard that the Emperor
Francis II hoped to facilitate the transference of the Elector of Bavaria from
Munich to Brussels by adding Lille and Valenciennes to his new dominion.
[204] These tidings led them to adopt a decision which was largely to
influence the course of the war. They resolved to commit Austria deeply to
war with France by favouring the acquisition of Lille and Valenciennes by
the Hapsburgs provided that they retained Belgium. This, however, was far
from the wishes of that Court, which longed for parts of Alsace and
Lorraine, and viewed Belgium merely as a sop to be flung to the Elector of
Bavaria.[205]
Was there ever a more singular game of cross-purposes? Austria pursued
the war with France chiefly with the object of gaining Bavaria and parts of
Eastern France, Belgium (with Lille and Valenciennes) being allotted to the
Elector uprooted at Munich. Prussia and Russia promised to abet this
scheme as a set-off to their prospective plunder of Poland; but, obviously,
after securing their booty in the summer of 1793, they had no interest in
aggrandizing the House of Hapsburg. Further, England entered on the
Flemish campaign with motives widely different from those of Austria. Pitt
and Grenville sought to plant her more firmly at Brussels by girdling her
with the fortresses of French Flanders; but she sought to recover Belgium
only to fling it to the Elector. Finally neither Russia nor the German Powers
cared an iota about the security of Holland. Their eyes were fixed on
Warsaw or Munich. In truth, despite all their protestations as to the need of
re-establishing the French monarchy, they were mainly bent on continuing
Page 133
the territorial scrambles of former years. The two aims were utterly
incompatible.
In comparison with the motives prompting the actions of States, treaties are
of secondary importance. Nevertheless (to finish with these wearisome
details) we may note that on 25th March Grenville and Vorontzoff signed at
Downing Street a treaty of alliance whereby Russia promised, firstly, to use
her forces, along with those of England, against France; secondly, to
prevent neutrals from helping France indirectly (a clause which involved
the lapse of the principles of the Armed Neutrality), and thirdly, to grant to
England a favourable commercial treaty.[206] Agreement with Prussia and
Austria was more difficult, but at last, on 14th July and 30th August,
compacts were signed with them for military aid in return for subsidies; and
in the spring and summer of 1793 Grenville arranged similar conventions
with Sardinia, Hesse-Cassel, Spain, and Naples. In this haphazard manner
did these States agree to war against France. Their aims being as diverse as
their methods were disjointed, the term "First Coalition" applied to this
league is almost a misnomer.
Before describing the first campaign of the war it will be well briefly to
survey the armed forces of the Crown and the organization for war. Firstly,
we must remember that Pitt had devoted great attention to the navy and to
the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth. Despite the hostile vote of the
House of Commons in 1785, he had succeeded in finding money enough to
enable the Duke of Richmond to place those dockyard towns beyond reach
of a coup de main; and to Pitt may be ascribed the unquestioned superiority
of Britain at sea. Of the 113 sail-of-the-line then available, about 90 could
soon be placed in commission, that is, so soon as the press-gang provided
the larger part of the personnel.
incompatible.
In comparison with the motives prompting the actions of States, treaties are
of secondary importance. Nevertheless (to finish with these wearisome
details) we may note that on 25th March Grenville and Vorontzoff signed at
Downing Street a treaty of alliance whereby Russia promised, firstly, to use
her forces, along with those of England, against France; secondly, to
prevent neutrals from helping France indirectly (a clause which involved
the lapse of the principles of the Armed Neutrality), and thirdly, to grant to
England a favourable commercial treaty.[206] Agreement with Prussia and
Austria was more difficult, but at last, on 14th July and 30th August,
compacts were signed with them for military aid in return for subsidies; and
in the spring and summer of 1793 Grenville arranged similar conventions
with Sardinia, Hesse-Cassel, Spain, and Naples. In this haphazard manner
did these States agree to war against France. Their aims being as diverse as
their methods were disjointed, the term "First Coalition" applied to this
league is almost a misnomer.
Before describing the first campaign of the war it will be well briefly to
survey the armed forces of the Crown and the organization for war. Firstly,
we must remember that Pitt had devoted great attention to the navy and to
the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth. Despite the hostile vote of the
House of Commons in 1785, he had succeeded in finding money enough to
enable the Duke of Richmond to place those dockyard towns beyond reach
of a coup de main; and to Pitt may be ascribed the unquestioned superiority
of Britain at sea. Of the 113 sail-of-the-line then available, about 90 could
soon be placed in commission, that is, so soon as the press-gang provided
the larger part of the personnel.
Page 134
The state of the army was far less satisfactory. Never, in all probability,
since the ignominious times of Charles II, had it been in so weak a
condition relatively to the Continental Powers. In the Budget of 1792 Pitt
asked merely for 17,013 men as guards and garrisons in these islands; and
he reduced even that scanty force to 13,701 men for the next six months.
The regiments were in some cases little more than skeletons, but with a
fairly full complement of officers. Nominally the army consisted of eighty-
one battalions; but of these the West Indies claimed as many as nineteen.
India needed nine; and on the whole only twenty-eight line regiments,
together with the Guards and the cavalry, remained for the defence of Great
Britain and Ireland. Efforts were made in December 1792 to bring in
recruits, but with little effect. The defence of London, the dockyard towns,
and other important posts, depended of course partly on the militia; 19,000
of that useful force were embodied early in February. But as the authorities
forbore to compel men to serve in person, there was a rush for substitutes,
which naturally told against recruiting for the Line.[207] Volunteer
Associations were also relied on for local defence, and for overawing the
malcontent or disorderly elements in the populace. The safety of the coasts
and therefore of the capital rested primarily with the navy; and for England
the war promised to be almost entirely a naval war.
Equally chaotic was the administration for war. Some time in February
1793 Dundas sent to Pitt a Memorandum respecting a new arrangement of
offices which had been mooted in the Cabinet. The need of some change
may be judged by the fact that Dundas was Secretary for Home Affairs
(down to July 1794), First Commissioner for India (that is, virtually,
Secretary for India), and Treasurer of the Navy, besides drawing glory and
profit from his airy duties of Groom of the Stole. What changes had been
proposed does not appear; but Dundas expressed himself as follows: "First:
That I should remain precisely as I am while the war continues, provided
the arrangement takes place respecting the Groom of the Stole to Lord
since the ignominious times of Charles II, had it been in so weak a
condition relatively to the Continental Powers. In the Budget of 1792 Pitt
asked merely for 17,013 men as guards and garrisons in these islands; and
he reduced even that scanty force to 13,701 men for the next six months.
The regiments were in some cases little more than skeletons, but with a
fairly full complement of officers. Nominally the army consisted of eighty-
one battalions; but of these the West Indies claimed as many as nineteen.
India needed nine; and on the whole only twenty-eight line regiments,
together with the Guards and the cavalry, remained for the defence of Great
Britain and Ireland. Efforts were made in December 1792 to bring in
recruits, but with little effect. The defence of London, the dockyard towns,
and other important posts, depended of course partly on the militia; 19,000
of that useful force were embodied early in February. But as the authorities
forbore to compel men to serve in person, there was a rush for substitutes,
which naturally told against recruiting for the Line.[207] Volunteer
Associations were also relied on for local defence, and for overawing the
malcontent or disorderly elements in the populace. The safety of the coasts
and therefore of the capital rested primarily with the navy; and for England
the war promised to be almost entirely a naval war.
Equally chaotic was the administration for war. Some time in February
1793 Dundas sent to Pitt a Memorandum respecting a new arrangement of
offices which had been mooted in the Cabinet. The need of some change
may be judged by the fact that Dundas was Secretary for Home Affairs
(down to July 1794), First Commissioner for India (that is, virtually,
Secretary for India), and Treasurer of the Navy, besides drawing glory and
profit from his airy duties of Groom of the Stole. What changes had been
proposed does not appear; but Dundas expressed himself as follows: "First:
That I should remain precisely as I am while the war continues, provided
the arrangement takes place respecting the Groom of the Stole to Lord
Page 135
Chatham, together with all the consequent changes in other offices. This in
my judgment is by much the best for the public service, and ought to
supersede all other individual wishes." Failing this patriotic arrangement,
Dundas requested that he should have the first claim for the Privy Seal for
Scotland, provided that Lord Chatham did not take the Stole. He (Dundas)
would give up the latter but retain his office at the India Board and the
Navy. Or, thirdly, if he received the Privy Seal for Scotland, he would give
up his other offices except that at the India Board. This last plan would
involve a large reduction of income, but he preferred it to the others except
the two previously named.[208]
Nevertheless no change of any importance took place. Dundas continued to
be a portly pluralist, utterly unable to overtake the work of three important
offices, with the conduct of the war often superadded; and Chatham
remained at the Admiralty until the close of 1794, to the annoyance of all
champions of efficiency. In the course of that year Pitt urged the need of
strengthening both the Admiralty and War Departments; but, as we shall
see, Dundas strongly objected to the creation of a Secretary of State for
War, because his duties would overlap those of the other Departments, and
important decisions must be formed by the Cabinet as a whole.[209] I shall
touch on this question more fully in Chapter XII, but mention it here as a
sign of the mental cloudiness which led British Ministers for the first
eighteen months of the war to plod along with the most haphazard
arrangements known even to that age. The contrast between the boyish
irresponsibility of military management in England and the terrible
concentration of power in the hands of Carnot at Paris, after July 1793, goes
far to explain the disasters to the Union Jack after the first few months of
the war.
The triumph of the French Republic and its transformation into a military
Empire cannot be understood until we probe the inner weakness of the First
my judgment is by much the best for the public service, and ought to
supersede all other individual wishes." Failing this patriotic arrangement,
Dundas requested that he should have the first claim for the Privy Seal for
Scotland, provided that Lord Chatham did not take the Stole. He (Dundas)
would give up the latter but retain his office at the India Board and the
Navy. Or, thirdly, if he received the Privy Seal for Scotland, he would give
up his other offices except that at the India Board. This last plan would
involve a large reduction of income, but he preferred it to the others except
the two previously named.[208]
Nevertheless no change of any importance took place. Dundas continued to
be a portly pluralist, utterly unable to overtake the work of three important
offices, with the conduct of the war often superadded; and Chatham
remained at the Admiralty until the close of 1794, to the annoyance of all
champions of efficiency. In the course of that year Pitt urged the need of
strengthening both the Admiralty and War Departments; but, as we shall
see, Dundas strongly objected to the creation of a Secretary of State for
War, because his duties would overlap those of the other Departments, and
important decisions must be formed by the Cabinet as a whole.[209] I shall
touch on this question more fully in Chapter XII, but mention it here as a
sign of the mental cloudiness which led British Ministers for the first
eighteen months of the war to plod along with the most haphazard
arrangements known even to that age. The contrast between the boyish
irresponsibility of military management in England and the terrible
concentration of power in the hands of Carnot at Paris, after July 1793, goes
far to explain the disasters to the Union Jack after the first few months of
the war.
The triumph of the French Republic and its transformation into a military
Empire cannot be understood until we probe the inner weakness of the First
Page 136
Coalition and realize the unpreparedness of Great Britain. Moreover, as the
Allies believed that France would speedily succumb, the allocation of the
spoil claimed their attention more than preparations for the hunt. The
unexpected vigour of the French might have undeceived them. While
Coburg was leisurely preparing to drive the levies of Dumouriez from the
district between Verviers and Aix-la-Chapelle, the latter laid his plans for a
dash into the almost unprotected Dutch Netherlands, where he hoped to find
precious spoils and valuable munitions of war.[210] Breaking up therefore
from Antwerp on 16th February, the Republicans quickly advanced towards
the estuary known as the Hollandsdiep, while two other columns marched
on Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. As Dumouriez had foreseen, the torpor of
the Stadholder's forces was as marked as the eagerness of the Dutch Patriots
to welcome the invaders. Breda fell on 26th February; but he failed to cross
the Hollandsdiep, for there the Sea Power intervened.
On 15th February Auckland begged that the Duke of York might be sent
over with a few battalions. The Ministry at once answered the appeal. On
20th February seven battalions of the British Guards were paraded at
Whitehall; the Duke of York announced that the first three would go to
Holland, and asked for volunteers from the other four. The whole line
stepped forward. Huddled on to small transports, the little force reached the
Dutch estuaries in time to thwart the efforts of Dumouriez. Their arrival
heartened the defenders of the Hollandsdiep, and held the French at bay.
Meanwhile Coburg had bestirred himself, and, marching on Miranda's
vanguard on the River Roer, threw it back in utter rout. Dumouriez, falling
back hastily to succour his lieutenant, encountered the Austrian force at
Neerwinden, where the unsteadiness of the Republican levies enabled
Coburg and his brilliant lieutenant, the Archduke Charles, to win a decisive
triumph (18th March). A great part of the French levies melted away. The
Belgians rose against the retreating bands; and in a few days that land was
lost to France. The failure of Dumouriez to turn his army against the
Allies believed that France would speedily succumb, the allocation of the
spoil claimed their attention more than preparations for the hunt. The
unexpected vigour of the French might have undeceived them. While
Coburg was leisurely preparing to drive the levies of Dumouriez from the
district between Verviers and Aix-la-Chapelle, the latter laid his plans for a
dash into the almost unprotected Dutch Netherlands, where he hoped to find
precious spoils and valuable munitions of war.[210] Breaking up therefore
from Antwerp on 16th February, the Republicans quickly advanced towards
the estuary known as the Hollandsdiep, while two other columns marched
on Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. As Dumouriez had foreseen, the torpor of
the Stadholder's forces was as marked as the eagerness of the Dutch Patriots
to welcome the invaders. Breda fell on 26th February; but he failed to cross
the Hollandsdiep, for there the Sea Power intervened.
On 15th February Auckland begged that the Duke of York might be sent
over with a few battalions. The Ministry at once answered the appeal. On
20th February seven battalions of the British Guards were paraded at
Whitehall; the Duke of York announced that the first three would go to
Holland, and asked for volunteers from the other four. The whole line
stepped forward. Huddled on to small transports, the little force reached the
Dutch estuaries in time to thwart the efforts of Dumouriez. Their arrival
heartened the defenders of the Hollandsdiep, and held the French at bay.
Meanwhile Coburg had bestirred himself, and, marching on Miranda's
vanguard on the River Roer, threw it back in utter rout. Dumouriez, falling
back hastily to succour his lieutenant, encountered the Austrian force at
Neerwinden, where the unsteadiness of the Republican levies enabled
Coburg and his brilliant lieutenant, the Archduke Charles, to win a decisive
triumph (18th March). A great part of the French levies melted away. The
Belgians rose against the retreating bands; and in a few days that land was
lost to France. The failure of Dumouriez to turn his army against the
Page 137
Convention, and his flight to the Austrian outposts, need not be described
here.[211] Suffice it to say that the northern frontier of France lay open to
attack. An advance in force in the month of April or May might have ended
the war.
But, as we have seen, the Allies were too jealous and too distrustful to act
with the necessary vigour. Austria refused to recognize the Prussian scheme
for the Partition of Poland; and the North German Power retaliated by
withholding its contingent from the support of Coburg.[212] That
commander, finding himself duped by the Prussians, pressed the British and
Dutch Governments to send him succour. To this he had some claim; for it
was the Austrian victory at Neerwinden which saved Holland from the
French; and the best method of protecting that land was to capture the
northern fortresses of France. The Dutch army numbered on paper 50,000
men; 13,500 Hanoverians were marching towards Guelderland; 8,000
Hessians were entering the British service. In such a case it would have
been disgraceful not to assist Coburg in completing his triumph. Thus, as
often happens with British expeditions, the scope of the Duke of York's
operations now greatly widened. His original instructions of 23rd February
ordered him not to move more than twenty-four hours away from
Helvoetsluys. On 19th March, as the danger lessened, the War Office gave
him leave to advance, moving on the right of Coburg's army towards
Antwerp and Ghent.[213]
The news of Neerwinden led George III to adopt even more vigorous
measures. True, he disliked Coburg's pressing demand for help, seeing that
no treaty of alliance was formed; but he permitted the forward move on
Ghent, and formulated a still bolder scheme, that the British, Hanoverians,
and Dutch should advance to besiege Dunkirk; for the capture of that place
would enable a siege-train to be brought easily to the Austrians for the
here.[211] Suffice it to say that the northern frontier of France lay open to
attack. An advance in force in the month of April or May might have ended
the war.
But, as we have seen, the Allies were too jealous and too distrustful to act
with the necessary vigour. Austria refused to recognize the Prussian scheme
for the Partition of Poland; and the North German Power retaliated by
withholding its contingent from the support of Coburg.[212] That
commander, finding himself duped by the Prussians, pressed the British and
Dutch Governments to send him succour. To this he had some claim; for it
was the Austrian victory at Neerwinden which saved Holland from the
French; and the best method of protecting that land was to capture the
northern fortresses of France. The Dutch army numbered on paper 50,000
men; 13,500 Hanoverians were marching towards Guelderland; 8,000
Hessians were entering the British service. In such a case it would have
been disgraceful not to assist Coburg in completing his triumph. Thus, as
often happens with British expeditions, the scope of the Duke of York's
operations now greatly widened. His original instructions of 23rd February
ordered him not to move more than twenty-four hours away from
Helvoetsluys. On 19th March, as the danger lessened, the War Office gave
him leave to advance, moving on the right of Coburg's army towards
Antwerp and Ghent.[213]
The news of Neerwinden led George III to adopt even more vigorous
measures. True, he disliked Coburg's pressing demand for help, seeing that
no treaty of alliance was formed; but he permitted the forward move on
Ghent, and formulated a still bolder scheme, that the British, Hanoverians,
and Dutch should advance to besiege Dunkirk; for the capture of that place
would enable a siege-train to be brought easily to the Austrians for the
Page 138
leaguer of Lille and Valenciennes.[214] To Grenville he expressed the hope
that these measures would speedily end the war.[215]
The letter is important as showing the great influence of the King on
military affairs. It must be remembered that Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas (the
three leading members of the Cabinet) had no knowledge of these
questions, while that shadowy personage, Sir George Yonge, Secretary at
War, had no seat in the Cabinet. A more unsatisfactory state of things cannot
be conceived. It tended to subject questions of military policy to that
influential trio, which in its turn was swayed by the will of the King.
According to constitutional custom, the Cabinet was collectively
responsible for questions of war policy; but it is difficult to say how far
Ministers were individually responsible. Pitt and Grenville certainly
influenced the decisions arrived at; Dundas drew up and signed the chief
military despatches; but the wishes of George III had great weight.
that these measures would speedily end the war.[215]
The letter is important as showing the great influence of the King on
military affairs. It must be remembered that Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas (the
three leading members of the Cabinet) had no knowledge of these
questions, while that shadowy personage, Sir George Yonge, Secretary at
War, had no seat in the Cabinet. A more unsatisfactory state of things cannot
be conceived. It tended to subject questions of military policy to that
influential trio, which in its turn was swayed by the will of the King.
According to constitutional custom, the Cabinet was collectively
responsible for questions of war policy; but it is difficult to say how far
Ministers were individually responsible. Pitt and Grenville certainly
influenced the decisions arrived at; Dundas drew up and signed the chief
military despatches; but the wishes of George III had great weight.
Page 139
Seat of war in Flanders.
In fact, questions of war policy turned largely on motives other than military. The resolve of the
King and his Ministers to share in the invasion of France sprang not only from feelings of military
honour, but also from the exigencies of diplomacy. By the middle of March it was clear that Russia
and Prussia would acquire unexpectedly extensive tracts of Polish land. Francis II vented his
spleen at this rebuff on his Chancellor, Philip Cobenzl, who was virtually disgraced, while a clever
but unprincipled schemer, Thugut, took his place.[216] Another unwelcome surprise was in store.
The Emperor had hoped to find in the Belgic-Bavarian exchange "compensation" for the
presumedly moderate gains of his rivals in Poland. But to this plan, as we have seen, George III
and his Ministers stoutly demurred; and Grenville held out the prospect of the acquisition of Lille
and Valenciennes in order once more to lay that disquieting spectre. As it also alarmed some of the
In fact, questions of war policy turned largely on motives other than military. The resolve of the
King and his Ministers to share in the invasion of France sprang not only from feelings of military
honour, but also from the exigencies of diplomacy. By the middle of March it was clear that Russia
and Prussia would acquire unexpectedly extensive tracts of Polish land. Francis II vented his
spleen at this rebuff on his Chancellor, Philip Cobenzl, who was virtually disgraced, while a clever
but unprincipled schemer, Thugut, took his place.[216] Another unwelcome surprise was in store.
The Emperor had hoped to find in the Belgic-Bavarian exchange "compensation" for the
presumedly moderate gains of his rivals in Poland. But to this plan, as we have seen, George III
and his Ministers stoutly demurred; and Grenville held out the prospect of the acquisition of Lille
and Valenciennes in order once more to lay that disquieting spectre. As it also alarmed some of the
Page 140
German princes, whose help was needed against France, the Court of Vienna saw this vision fade
away until Thugut hit upon the design of conquering Alsace, and finding there the means of
effecting the longed-for exchange. Pitt and Grenville, however, clung to the policy of rooting
Austria firmly at Brussels, with Lille and Valenciennes as her outworks, and this involved the
effort of winning those two fortresses for the Hapsburgs. Thugut suggested that, if Austria could
not secure French Flanders, she must find compensation elsewhere; and he declined to satisfy
Eden's curiosity on this threatening word.[217] It therefore behoved us to strengthen Austria's stroke
at French Flanders, especially as she now acquiesced in the British contention, that the Allies
should neither interfere with the form of Government in France nor recognize the Comte de
Provence as Regent.[218]
The British Government, however, moved forward its troops into Flanders reluctantly, firstly,
because it wanted to use them in the West Indies,[219] and also discerned the preference of
Frederick William for a Polish to a Flemish campaign. That monarch and his generals left the
Austrians to bear the brunt of everything on the banks of the Rhine, and also in Brabant. His
manner of setting about the siege of Mainz was a masterpiece of politic delay, in which amorous
dalliance played its part.[220] When complaints came from his Allies, he hotly retorted that Coburg
had sent him only 5,000 troops from the northern army instead of the 15,000 that were promised.
The Austrians replied with no less warmth that Coburg needed those 10,000 men because he had
had no succour from the Prussian force supporting him. The result was that the Duke of York's
corps was thrust into the part which the Prussian contingent ought to have taken. Accordingly Pitt
and some of his colleagues deemed it preferable, now that Holland was safe, to withdraw the
British troops with a view to a series of expeditions against the coasts and colonies of France. This
problem called for a clear and decided solution. Nowhere do we so much lament the secrecy of
Cabinet discussions as on these questions—should the meagre forces of Britain be used on
maritime expeditions (their normal function in war), or form a petty division in the crusade of two
great Military Powers; or, worst of all, should they be parcelled out in both kinds of warfare?
All that we know is that George III, on 29th March, strongly advocated the siege of Dunkirk, in the
hope that the capture of that seaport would assist the Austrians in reducing the fortresses of French
Flanders, and thus put an end to the war. On the other hand, the Duke of Richmond counselled the
withdrawal of the British force for use against the coasts and colonies of France; and his two
letters to Pitt, dated Goodwood, 3rd and 5th April, show that Pitt inclined to that opinion. The
question was important in view of a forthcoming conference of the allied commanders and envoys
at Antwerp. The letters are too long for quotation. In that of 3rd April the duke declares that
Ministers must soon decide whether to persevere in Flanders or in maritime expeditions. "To
attempt both is to do neither well." For himself, he would much prefer to attack Cherbourg, Brest,
l'Orient, Rochefort, Nantes and Bordeaux; but he fears that the ardour of the Duke of York will
lead him into an extensive campaign in Flanders.
away until Thugut hit upon the design of conquering Alsace, and finding there the means of
effecting the longed-for exchange. Pitt and Grenville, however, clung to the policy of rooting
Austria firmly at Brussels, with Lille and Valenciennes as her outworks, and this involved the
effort of winning those two fortresses for the Hapsburgs. Thugut suggested that, if Austria could
not secure French Flanders, she must find compensation elsewhere; and he declined to satisfy
Eden's curiosity on this threatening word.[217] It therefore behoved us to strengthen Austria's stroke
at French Flanders, especially as she now acquiesced in the British contention, that the Allies
should neither interfere with the form of Government in France nor recognize the Comte de
Provence as Regent.[218]
The British Government, however, moved forward its troops into Flanders reluctantly, firstly,
because it wanted to use them in the West Indies,[219] and also discerned the preference of
Frederick William for a Polish to a Flemish campaign. That monarch and his generals left the
Austrians to bear the brunt of everything on the banks of the Rhine, and also in Brabant. His
manner of setting about the siege of Mainz was a masterpiece of politic delay, in which amorous
dalliance played its part.[220] When complaints came from his Allies, he hotly retorted that Coburg
had sent him only 5,000 troops from the northern army instead of the 15,000 that were promised.
The Austrians replied with no less warmth that Coburg needed those 10,000 men because he had
had no succour from the Prussian force supporting him. The result was that the Duke of York's
corps was thrust into the part which the Prussian contingent ought to have taken. Accordingly Pitt
and some of his colleagues deemed it preferable, now that Holland was safe, to withdraw the
British troops with a view to a series of expeditions against the coasts and colonies of France. This
problem called for a clear and decided solution. Nowhere do we so much lament the secrecy of
Cabinet discussions as on these questions—should the meagre forces of Britain be used on
maritime expeditions (their normal function in war), or form a petty division in the crusade of two
great Military Powers; or, worst of all, should they be parcelled out in both kinds of warfare?
All that we know is that George III, on 29th March, strongly advocated the siege of Dunkirk, in the
hope that the capture of that seaport would assist the Austrians in reducing the fortresses of French
Flanders, and thus put an end to the war. On the other hand, the Duke of Richmond counselled the
withdrawal of the British force for use against the coasts and colonies of France; and his two
letters to Pitt, dated Goodwood, 3rd and 5th April, show that Pitt inclined to that opinion. The
question was important in view of a forthcoming conference of the allied commanders and envoys
at Antwerp. The letters are too long for quotation. In that of 3rd April the duke declares that
Ministers must soon decide whether to persevere in Flanders or in maritime expeditions. "To
attempt both is to do neither well." For himself, he would much prefer to attack Cherbourg, Brest,
l'Orient, Rochefort, Nantes and Bordeaux; but he fears that the ardour of the Duke of York will
lead him into an extensive campaign in Flanders.
Page 141
In the second and longer letter, Richmond warns Pitt that, if he prefers to attack the ports and
colonies of France (especially the West Indies), he ought at once to warn the envoys of the Allies
at Antwerp (who were about to discuss the plan of campaign), that we could not long afford
succour to them, and trusted that after six weeks they could do without it, or, at least, would need it
only to a very slight extent. If, he continues, Coburg and the Prussians demur to this, we must
reply that England was at first no party to the war, and entered into it only for the defence of the
Dutch; that participation in a continental campaign is so unpopular and ruinous, that we may be
compelled to desist from it; that by means of naval expeditions we can help the common cause
steadily and effectively; and that we are in no position to act on the Continent because "our army,
cavalry and infantry, consists almost wholly of recruits, no part of which (men or horses) have
been raised two months, and the greater part of which are at this moment only raising." Further, if
we clearly warn the Allies of our resolve to withdraw our troops, they cannot complain of it. Pitt
should therefore instruct Lord Auckland to give clear expression to these ideas. Coburg will then
probably argue as to the extreme importance of clinching the successes already won, and will
therefore urge the Duke of York to besiege Dunkirk, Graveline, and St. Omer, with a view to
drawing him on finally towards Paris. But any such proceeding is to be resisted. The German
Powers will dismember France; but we, having little military weight, shall probably gain next to
nothing. Far more advantageous will be our action elsewhere, e.g., in the seizure of Cherbourg,
Toulon, etc. Richmond ends by requesting of Pitt the favour of an interview.[221]
Either the interview did not take place, or the duke's arguments failed to lower the sanguine spirits
of the Prime Minister to the level of prudence. All the letters of Pitt at that time exude confidence
from every line. He hopes that Dumouriez will succeed in overthrowing the regicides at Paris. The
backwardness of the Prussians in supporting Coburg does not deter him from ordering to Flanders
all the available British and mercenary troops, in order to besiege Dunkirk, and otherwise help the
Imperialists. As if this is not enough, on or just before 1st April he treats with Malouet, the French
envoy from Hayti, for the transfer of that colony to the British Crown; he writes hopefully of
finding a force large enough to make an attempt on the French coast; and a little later Grenville
mentions a Mediterranean campaign. The King, too, in referring to a recent offer of peace from
Paris, writes that the bounds of "that dangerous and faithless nation" must be greatly circumscribed
before such a proposal can be entertained.[222]
Thus France is to be attacked in Flanders, on the north or north-west coast, on the Mediterranean
coast and in Corsica, as well as the West Indies, by an army which musters scarcely 20,000
effectives. In this confidence, which wells forth into five distinct schemes, is to be found the cause
for the Jacobin triumphs which shattered the First Coalition.
Austria and Prussia were equally puffed up with unreal hopes. At the conference at Antwerp in the
second week of April occurred the first of the many blunders which helped to rally Frenchmen
around the tricolour. Coburg's promise, in a recent proclamation to Dumouriez and the French
colonies of France (especially the West Indies), he ought at once to warn the envoys of the Allies
at Antwerp (who were about to discuss the plan of campaign), that we could not long afford
succour to them, and trusted that after six weeks they could do without it, or, at least, would need it
only to a very slight extent. If, he continues, Coburg and the Prussians demur to this, we must
reply that England was at first no party to the war, and entered into it only for the defence of the
Dutch; that participation in a continental campaign is so unpopular and ruinous, that we may be
compelled to desist from it; that by means of naval expeditions we can help the common cause
steadily and effectively; and that we are in no position to act on the Continent because "our army,
cavalry and infantry, consists almost wholly of recruits, no part of which (men or horses) have
been raised two months, and the greater part of which are at this moment only raising." Further, if
we clearly warn the Allies of our resolve to withdraw our troops, they cannot complain of it. Pitt
should therefore instruct Lord Auckland to give clear expression to these ideas. Coburg will then
probably argue as to the extreme importance of clinching the successes already won, and will
therefore urge the Duke of York to besiege Dunkirk, Graveline, and St. Omer, with a view to
drawing him on finally towards Paris. But any such proceeding is to be resisted. The German
Powers will dismember France; but we, having little military weight, shall probably gain next to
nothing. Far more advantageous will be our action elsewhere, e.g., in the seizure of Cherbourg,
Toulon, etc. Richmond ends by requesting of Pitt the favour of an interview.[221]
Either the interview did not take place, or the duke's arguments failed to lower the sanguine spirits
of the Prime Minister to the level of prudence. All the letters of Pitt at that time exude confidence
from every line. He hopes that Dumouriez will succeed in overthrowing the regicides at Paris. The
backwardness of the Prussians in supporting Coburg does not deter him from ordering to Flanders
all the available British and mercenary troops, in order to besiege Dunkirk, and otherwise help the
Imperialists. As if this is not enough, on or just before 1st April he treats with Malouet, the French
envoy from Hayti, for the transfer of that colony to the British Crown; he writes hopefully of
finding a force large enough to make an attempt on the French coast; and a little later Grenville
mentions a Mediterranean campaign. The King, too, in referring to a recent offer of peace from
Paris, writes that the bounds of "that dangerous and faithless nation" must be greatly circumscribed
before such a proposal can be entertained.[222]
Thus France is to be attacked in Flanders, on the north or north-west coast, on the Mediterranean
coast and in Corsica, as well as the West Indies, by an army which musters scarcely 20,000
effectives. In this confidence, which wells forth into five distinct schemes, is to be found the cause
for the Jacobin triumphs which shattered the First Coalition.
Austria and Prussia were equally puffed up with unreal hopes. At the conference at Antwerp in the
second week of April occurred the first of the many blunders which helped to rally Frenchmen
around the tricolour. Coburg's promise, in a recent proclamation to Dumouriez and the French
Page 142
nation, that the Allies would not make conquests at the expense of France, was warmly disavowed
at the first sitting. Accordingly, a few days later, Coburg issued a second proclamation, announcing
the end of the armistice and omitting all reference to his disinterested views. The change of tone
speedily convinced the French people of the imminence of schemes of partition. This it was, quite
as much as Jacobin fanaticism, which banded Frenchmen enthusiastically in the defence of the
Republic. Patriotism strengthened the enthusiasm for liberty, and nerved twenty-five million
Frenchmen with a resolve to fling back the sacrilegious invaders.
About this time the French Government sent pacific proposals to London, which met with no very
encouraging reception, Pitt and Grenville probably regarding them as a means of sowing discord
among the Allies, of worming out their plans, or of gaining time for the French preparations. It is
indeed difficult to believe that they had any other object. After the defection of Dumouriez and his
Staff, France was in a desperate state, and her rulers naturally sought to gain a brief respite.
Grenville therefore replied that if France really desired to end the war which she had forced upon
England, definite proposals might be sent to the British headquarters in the Netherlands.[223] None
was sent.
Meanwhile, the jealousies of the German Powers, the delay of Austria in coming to terms with
England, and the refusal of Coburg to define his plan of campaign, paralysed the actions of the
Allies and saved France. As for the British force, it was too weak to act independently; and yet the
pride of George III forbade its fusion in Coburg's army.[224] By the third week of April the Duke of
York had with him 4,200 British infantry, 2,300 horsemen, besides 13,000 Hanoverians
(clamorous for more pay), and 15,000 Dutch troops of poor quality and doubtful fidelity; 8,000
hired Hessians had not yet arrived.[225] Yet the King and his Ministers persisted in hoping for the
conquest of French Flanders. The War Office despatch of 16th April specified as the chief aim of
the war the re-conquest of the Low Countries by Austria, "with such extended and safe frontier as
may secure the tranquillity and independence of Holland." But Pitt and his colleagues, far from
concentrating on Flanders, continued to toy with expeditions to Brittany, Provence, Corsica, and
the West Indies.
At first they pressed Coburg to consent to the deviation of the British force towards Dunkirk; and
only on his urgent protest was that ex-centric move given up until Valenciennes should have fallen.
The Austrian contention was undoubtedly right, as the British Government grudgingly admitted.
The Duke of York's force therefore moved along with that of Coburg towards that fortress and
showed great gallantry in compelling the French to evacuate the supporting camp of Famars (23rd
May). Early in June the siege of Valenciennes began in earnest. A British officer described the
defence of the French as "obstinate but not spirited." They made no sorties, and Custine's army of
40,000 men, which should have sought to raise the siege, did not attack, probably owing to the
unsteadiness and apathy of his troops.[226] This lack of energy cost him his life; for on 10th July he
was ordered back to Paris and soon went to the guillotine.
at the first sitting. Accordingly, a few days later, Coburg issued a second proclamation, announcing
the end of the armistice and omitting all reference to his disinterested views. The change of tone
speedily convinced the French people of the imminence of schemes of partition. This it was, quite
as much as Jacobin fanaticism, which banded Frenchmen enthusiastically in the defence of the
Republic. Patriotism strengthened the enthusiasm for liberty, and nerved twenty-five million
Frenchmen with a resolve to fling back the sacrilegious invaders.
About this time the French Government sent pacific proposals to London, which met with no very
encouraging reception, Pitt and Grenville probably regarding them as a means of sowing discord
among the Allies, of worming out their plans, or of gaining time for the French preparations. It is
indeed difficult to believe that they had any other object. After the defection of Dumouriez and his
Staff, France was in a desperate state, and her rulers naturally sought to gain a brief respite.
Grenville therefore replied that if France really desired to end the war which she had forced upon
England, definite proposals might be sent to the British headquarters in the Netherlands.[223] None
was sent.
Meanwhile, the jealousies of the German Powers, the delay of Austria in coming to terms with
England, and the refusal of Coburg to define his plan of campaign, paralysed the actions of the
Allies and saved France. As for the British force, it was too weak to act independently; and yet the
pride of George III forbade its fusion in Coburg's army.[224] By the third week of April the Duke of
York had with him 4,200 British infantry, 2,300 horsemen, besides 13,000 Hanoverians
(clamorous for more pay), and 15,000 Dutch troops of poor quality and doubtful fidelity; 8,000
hired Hessians had not yet arrived.[225] Yet the King and his Ministers persisted in hoping for the
conquest of French Flanders. The War Office despatch of 16th April specified as the chief aim of
the war the re-conquest of the Low Countries by Austria, "with such extended and safe frontier as
may secure the tranquillity and independence of Holland." But Pitt and his colleagues, far from
concentrating on Flanders, continued to toy with expeditions to Brittany, Provence, Corsica, and
the West Indies.
At first they pressed Coburg to consent to the deviation of the British force towards Dunkirk; and
only on his urgent protest was that ex-centric move given up until Valenciennes should have fallen.
The Austrian contention was undoubtedly right, as the British Government grudgingly admitted.
The Duke of York's force therefore moved along with that of Coburg towards that fortress and
showed great gallantry in compelling the French to evacuate the supporting camp of Famars (23rd
May). Early in June the siege of Valenciennes began in earnest. A British officer described the
defence of the French as "obstinate but not spirited." They made no sorties, and Custine's army of
40,000 men, which should have sought to raise the siege, did not attack, probably owing to the
unsteadiness and apathy of his troops.[226] This lack of energy cost him his life; for on 10th July he
was ordered back to Paris and soon went to the guillotine.
Page 143
At that time the Jacobins were in a state of mind in which fury and despair struggled for the
mastery. The outlook was as gloomy as before Valmy in September 1792. Bad news poured in
from all sides. The Girondins, after the collapse of their power on 2nd June, appealed to the
Departments, and two thirds of France seemed about to support them against the tyranny of the
capital. Had not the Jacobins developed an organizing power immeasurably superior to that of the
moderates, the royalists, and the Allies, the rule of that desperate minority must speedily have been
swept away. On 12th July the Parisian Government declared itself at war with the moderates, who
now had the upper hand at Lyons and in neighbouring districts. On that same day Condé (a small
fortress north of Valenciennes) opened its gates. On 22nd July Mainz surrendered to the King of
Prussia; and six days later the Austrian and British standards were hoisted on the ramparts of
Valenciennes.
This event raised to its climax the fury of the Jacobins; and on 9th August the Convention passed
with acclamation a decree declaring Pitt to be an enemy of the human race. This singular
manifestation of Gallic effervescence came about in the following way. The Committee of Public
Safety having presented a report on the scarcity of corn and bread, the Convention was electrified
by the doleful recital. In the ensuing debate stories are told of men disguised as women who
practise insidious devices among the queues at the bakers' shops. At once the Convention decrees
that men acting thus while in disguise shall be deemed worthy of death. A deputy named Garnier
then suggests that as this is clearly a device of the infamous Pitt to increase disorder, it shall be
declared lawful to murder him. Couthon, for once speaking the language of moderation, objects to
this proposal as unworthy of the Republic, and moves that Pitt be declared an enemy of the human
race. This is at once approved as worthy of the humanity and dignity of the Convention. The
decree, then, was obviously a device for shelving the stupid and bloodthirsty motion of Garnier.
The whole discussion may be compared with Pitt's declaration to the House of Commons on 12th
February 1793, that the war, though undoubtedly provoked by France, would never be waged by
England for motives of vengeance, but merely for the attainment of security.
Why at this time the name of Pitt should have driven the Parisian legislators half frantic is not easy
to see. Up to that time the exploits of the small British force at Famars and Valenciennes had been
no more than creditable; and it was not till the end of the month that the news of the entry of
Admiral Hood's fleet into Toulon threw Paris into a frenzy. The decree of 9th August therefore has
merely a psychological interest. When tyrants thundered at the gates of the Republic, France
needed some names the mere sound of which sufficed to drive her sons to arms. In 1792 it was
Brunswick or Condé. When they ceased to be effective, the populace found others first in Coburg
and finally in Pitt. Other names waxed and waned; but that of the son of Chatham stood fixed in a
dull haze of hatred. Thus, by a singular irony, the very man who in 1786 had branded with folly
those Englishmen who declared France to be our natural enemy, was now by her banned as the
enemy of the human race. And such he remains for the great majority of Frenchmen. The hasty and
mastery. The outlook was as gloomy as before Valmy in September 1792. Bad news poured in
from all sides. The Girondins, after the collapse of their power on 2nd June, appealed to the
Departments, and two thirds of France seemed about to support them against the tyranny of the
capital. Had not the Jacobins developed an organizing power immeasurably superior to that of the
moderates, the royalists, and the Allies, the rule of that desperate minority must speedily have been
swept away. On 12th July the Parisian Government declared itself at war with the moderates, who
now had the upper hand at Lyons and in neighbouring districts. On that same day Condé (a small
fortress north of Valenciennes) opened its gates. On 22nd July Mainz surrendered to the King of
Prussia; and six days later the Austrian and British standards were hoisted on the ramparts of
Valenciennes.
This event raised to its climax the fury of the Jacobins; and on 9th August the Convention passed
with acclamation a decree declaring Pitt to be an enemy of the human race. This singular
manifestation of Gallic effervescence came about in the following way. The Committee of Public
Safety having presented a report on the scarcity of corn and bread, the Convention was electrified
by the doleful recital. In the ensuing debate stories are told of men disguised as women who
practise insidious devices among the queues at the bakers' shops. At once the Convention decrees
that men acting thus while in disguise shall be deemed worthy of death. A deputy named Garnier
then suggests that as this is clearly a device of the infamous Pitt to increase disorder, it shall be
declared lawful to murder him. Couthon, for once speaking the language of moderation, objects to
this proposal as unworthy of the Republic, and moves that Pitt be declared an enemy of the human
race. This is at once approved as worthy of the humanity and dignity of the Convention. The
decree, then, was obviously a device for shelving the stupid and bloodthirsty motion of Garnier.
The whole discussion may be compared with Pitt's declaration to the House of Commons on 12th
February 1793, that the war, though undoubtedly provoked by France, would never be waged by
England for motives of vengeance, but merely for the attainment of security.
Why at this time the name of Pitt should have driven the Parisian legislators half frantic is not easy
to see. Up to that time the exploits of the small British force at Famars and Valenciennes had been
no more than creditable; and it was not till the end of the month that the news of the entry of
Admiral Hood's fleet into Toulon threw Paris into a frenzy. The decree of 9th August therefore has
merely a psychological interest. When tyrants thundered at the gates of the Republic, France
needed some names the mere sound of which sufficed to drive her sons to arms. In 1792 it was
Brunswick or Condé. When they ceased to be effective, the populace found others first in Coburg
and finally in Pitt. Other names waxed and waned; but that of the son of Chatham stood fixed in a
dull haze of hatred. Thus, by a singular irony, the very man who in 1786 had branded with folly
those Englishmen who declared France to be our natural enemy, was now by her banned as the
enemy of the human race. And such he remains for the great majority of Frenchmen. The hasty and
Page 144
fortuitous phrase of Couthon, which was designed to save him from the assassin's knife, will
doubtless be the permanent catchword, irremovable by research and explanation.
The ravings of the French Convention would soon have ended, had not a great organizer now
appeared. On 17th August 1793 Carnot entered the Committee of Public Safety, and thenceforth
wielded its limitless powers for purposes of national defence. He was an officer of engineers, and
had eagerly studied the principles of strategy. Throwing himself with ardour into the Revolution,
he became a member of the National Assembly, and now was charged with the supervision of the
War Department. At the War Committee he had the help of officers scarcely less able. Among them
Mallet du Pan, in an interesting survey of French administrators, names D'Arçon as largely
contributing to the French triumphs at Dunkirk and Maubeuge. He calls him a soul on fire and full
of resource.[227] But the brain and will of this Committee was Carnot. His application to work for
some twelve or fourteen hours a day, his hold on masses of details, and his burning patriotism,
enabled him to inflame, control, and energize Frenchmen until they became a nation in arms.
Moreover, Carnot had the invaluable gift of selecting the best commanders. True, the Frenchman
was not hampered by a monarch who regarded the army as his own, nor by clogging claims of
seniority. The "organizer of victory" had before him a clear field and no favour.
The most urgent danger for the Republic soon proved to be not in Flanders, but in Brittany and la
Vendée. There la petite noblesse and the peasantry still lived on friendly terms. They were alike
shocked by the expulsion of the orthodox priests and the murder of the King. Summoned by the
Republic to arms in the spring of 1793, they rushed to arms against her. In la Vendée, the densely
wooded district south of the lower Loire, everything favoured the defence. The hardy peasants
were ably led by that born leader of men, the chivalrous Marquis de Larochejaquelein, who had
inspired the men of his neighbourhood with the words: "If I advance, follow me; if I retreat, slay
me; if I fall, avenge me." With him was his cousin, Lescure, not less brave, but of a cooler and
more calculating temper. The ardently Catholic peasantry of the west furnished as leaders a carter,
Cathelineau, of rare ability and generosity of character, and Stofflet, a gamekeeper, of stern and
vindictive stamp. Nerved by fanatical hatred against the atheists and regicides of Paris, these levies
of the west proved more than a match for all the National Guards, whole columns of whom they
lured into the depths of the Bocage and cut down to the last man. As Victor Hugo has finely said:
"It was a war of the town against the forest." At first the forest-dwellers threatened to overrun the
towns. On 11th June they took Saumur, a town on the Loire, after a desperate fight, and sought to
open communication with the coast and the British fleet by seizing Nantes. This attempt, however,
failed; and it is generally admitted that they erred in not marching on Paris after their first
successes. After gaining a sure base of operations, they should have strained every nerve in order
to strike at the heart. And if distance and lack of supplies and equipment shortened their reach,
they might at least have carried the war into the rich central provinces, on which the capital
subsisted.
doubtless be the permanent catchword, irremovable by research and explanation.
The ravings of the French Convention would soon have ended, had not a great organizer now
appeared. On 17th August 1793 Carnot entered the Committee of Public Safety, and thenceforth
wielded its limitless powers for purposes of national defence. He was an officer of engineers, and
had eagerly studied the principles of strategy. Throwing himself with ardour into the Revolution,
he became a member of the National Assembly, and now was charged with the supervision of the
War Department. At the War Committee he had the help of officers scarcely less able. Among them
Mallet du Pan, in an interesting survey of French administrators, names D'Arçon as largely
contributing to the French triumphs at Dunkirk and Maubeuge. He calls him a soul on fire and full
of resource.[227] But the brain and will of this Committee was Carnot. His application to work for
some twelve or fourteen hours a day, his hold on masses of details, and his burning patriotism,
enabled him to inflame, control, and energize Frenchmen until they became a nation in arms.
Moreover, Carnot had the invaluable gift of selecting the best commanders. True, the Frenchman
was not hampered by a monarch who regarded the army as his own, nor by clogging claims of
seniority. The "organizer of victory" had before him a clear field and no favour.
The most urgent danger for the Republic soon proved to be not in Flanders, but in Brittany and la
Vendée. There la petite noblesse and the peasantry still lived on friendly terms. They were alike
shocked by the expulsion of the orthodox priests and the murder of the King. Summoned by the
Republic to arms in the spring of 1793, they rushed to arms against her. In la Vendée, the densely
wooded district south of the lower Loire, everything favoured the defence. The hardy peasants
were ably led by that born leader of men, the chivalrous Marquis de Larochejaquelein, who had
inspired the men of his neighbourhood with the words: "If I advance, follow me; if I retreat, slay
me; if I fall, avenge me." With him was his cousin, Lescure, not less brave, but of a cooler and
more calculating temper. The ardently Catholic peasantry of the west furnished as leaders a carter,
Cathelineau, of rare ability and generosity of character, and Stofflet, a gamekeeper, of stern and
vindictive stamp. Nerved by fanatical hatred against the atheists and regicides of Paris, these levies
of the west proved more than a match for all the National Guards, whole columns of whom they
lured into the depths of the Bocage and cut down to the last man. As Victor Hugo has finely said:
"It was a war of the town against the forest." At first the forest-dwellers threatened to overrun the
towns. On 11th June they took Saumur, a town on the Loire, after a desperate fight, and sought to
open communication with the coast and the British fleet by seizing Nantes. This attempt, however,
failed; and it is generally admitted that they erred in not marching on Paris after their first
successes. After gaining a sure base of operations, they should have strained every nerve in order
to strike at the heart. And if distance and lack of supplies and equipment shortened their reach,
they might at least have carried the war into the rich central provinces, on which the capital
subsisted.
Page 145
But the mistake of these poor peasants was venial when compared with those of the Allies. On the
capture of Mainz, Condé, and Valenciennes, the Prussian, Austrian, and British commanders did
not enforce an unconditional surrender, but offered to allow the garrisons to march out with the
honours of war on condition of not serving against them for a year. A better example of shirking
present problems at the cost of enhanced difficulties in the future cannot be imagined. By this
improvident lenity the Allies enabled the regicides to hurl fully 25,000 trained troops against the
royalists of the West and deal them terrible blows. In September and October the Republicans
gained considerable successes, especially at Cholet. Soon the Vendéan War became little more than
a guerilla strife, which Pitt fed by means of arms and stores, but not in the energetic manner
desired by Burke and Windham.
These ardent royalists constantly pressed him to help the men of Poitou and Brittany, but had to
deplore the wearisome delays which then clogged all military and naval operations. Most bitterly
did Burke write to Windham, early in November 1793, that Ministers were so eager in seeking to
win indemnities from France that they had hardened the national resistance of that nation, and
meanwhile had not sent a single shipload of stores to the brave men of Poitou. Of course it was
less easy than Burke imagined to get stores across a sea not yet fully commanded by the British
fleet, and through inlets and harbours closely watched by the enemy. But the inaction of a force
entrusted to the Earl of Moira for the support of the French royalists is certainly discreditable to
him and to Ministers. Among them the Duke of Richmond, Master of Ordnance, distinguished
himself by his incapacity and his ridiculous orders. Another obvious misfit was Lord Chatham at
the Admiralty. But how can we explain the inactivity of four regiments in the Channel Islands all
the summer? Surely they could have seized St. Malo or the Quiberon Peninsula.[228] Such a
diversion would have been highly effective. For the Bretons and Vendéans, when supplied with
arms, could have marched eastwards and roused the royalists of Normandy, Maine, and Touraine.
With so potent a foe near to Paris, must not the regicides have been overborne by Coburg in
Flanders? Everything tends to show that the Republicans feared the royalists of the West more than
the Austrians in the North. But, as will appear in a later chapter, Pitt and Dundas decided to throw
their strength into the West Indies. On 26th November 1793, Sir John Jervis sailed for that deadly
bourne with 7,000 troops.
Events were soon to reveal the seriousness of this mistake. It was far more important to strike at
Paris through Brittany than to occupy even the richest of the French West Indies. For a triumphant
advance of the Bretons and Vendéans must not only have lessened the material resources of the
Republic but also have deprived its defenders of one of their chief advantages. Hitherto the
Republicans had been better massed together, while their assailants were spread over wide spaces.
It is a well-known principle in war that an army operating on an inner arc, or what are termed
interior lines, has a great advantage over forces spread over the outer circumference. The Allies
then held the Pyrenees, the Maritime Alps, the Rhine, and most of Flanders, Brittany, and parts of
capture of Mainz, Condé, and Valenciennes, the Prussian, Austrian, and British commanders did
not enforce an unconditional surrender, but offered to allow the garrisons to march out with the
honours of war on condition of not serving against them for a year. A better example of shirking
present problems at the cost of enhanced difficulties in the future cannot be imagined. By this
improvident lenity the Allies enabled the regicides to hurl fully 25,000 trained troops against the
royalists of the West and deal them terrible blows. In September and October the Republicans
gained considerable successes, especially at Cholet. Soon the Vendéan War became little more than
a guerilla strife, which Pitt fed by means of arms and stores, but not in the energetic manner
desired by Burke and Windham.
These ardent royalists constantly pressed him to help the men of Poitou and Brittany, but had to
deplore the wearisome delays which then clogged all military and naval operations. Most bitterly
did Burke write to Windham, early in November 1793, that Ministers were so eager in seeking to
win indemnities from France that they had hardened the national resistance of that nation, and
meanwhile had not sent a single shipload of stores to the brave men of Poitou. Of course it was
less easy than Burke imagined to get stores across a sea not yet fully commanded by the British
fleet, and through inlets and harbours closely watched by the enemy. But the inaction of a force
entrusted to the Earl of Moira for the support of the French royalists is certainly discreditable to
him and to Ministers. Among them the Duke of Richmond, Master of Ordnance, distinguished
himself by his incapacity and his ridiculous orders. Another obvious misfit was Lord Chatham at
the Admiralty. But how can we explain the inactivity of four regiments in the Channel Islands all
the summer? Surely they could have seized St. Malo or the Quiberon Peninsula.[228] Such a
diversion would have been highly effective. For the Bretons and Vendéans, when supplied with
arms, could have marched eastwards and roused the royalists of Normandy, Maine, and Touraine.
With so potent a foe near to Paris, must not the regicides have been overborne by Coburg in
Flanders? Everything tends to show that the Republicans feared the royalists of the West more than
the Austrians in the North. But, as will appear in a later chapter, Pitt and Dundas decided to throw
their strength into the West Indies. On 26th November 1793, Sir John Jervis sailed for that deadly
bourne with 7,000 troops.
Events were soon to reveal the seriousness of this mistake. It was far more important to strike at
Paris through Brittany than to occupy even the richest of the French West Indies. For a triumphant
advance of the Bretons and Vendéans must not only have lessened the material resources of the
Republic but also have deprived its defenders of one of their chief advantages. Hitherto the
Republicans had been better massed together, while their assailants were spread over wide spaces.
It is a well-known principle in war that an army operating on an inner arc, or what are termed
interior lines, has a great advantage over forces spread over the outer circumference. The Allies
then held the Pyrenees, the Maritime Alps, the Rhine, and most of Flanders, Brittany, and parts of
Page 146
the South. The defenders, possessing the central provinces, could mass their units far more quickly
and choose the point on that outer curve against which they would aim their blow.
This principle was thoroughly understood by Carnot. Near the centre of the circle he massed the
levies that were to save the Republic, and, confiding them to zealots who were resolved to conquer
or die, he soon had on foot armies which, however contemptible as units, were formidable from
their weight and their enthusiasm. As in mechanics the mass multiplied by the speed gives the
effective force, so in the campaign of 1793 the levée en masse multiplied by enthusiasm and
impelled by the brain power of Carnot begot a momentum which, when brought to bear on light,
scattered, and almost stationary bodies, proved to be irresistible. For while Carnot trusted to
concentration, the Allies either sank into inertia, or made ex-centric movements which ultimately
played into their opponents' hands. The Prussians, after taking Mainz, did little more than rest on
their laurels, their only move being towards Luxemburg. Coburg was inclined to follow their
example on the ground that an advance to Paris would unite all the French parties against him,
while the siege of the remaining fortresses in the North would allow anarchy to run riot at the
centre.[229] The argument is a good example of political finesse applied to a military problem, with
disastrous results. Coburg therefore set about the siege of Quesnoy.
Certainly he could urge in excuse that the British Government now insisted on the resumption of
its favourite plan, the capture of that nest of privateers, Dunkirk. On receipt of the news of the
surrender of Valenciennes, an order was sent to the Duke of York to begin the siege of that once
important stronghold, and capture it for Great Britain, though it might be allowed finally to fall to
the Emperor as one of his new Barrier fortresses, provided that we gained indemnities in other
parts of the world. French and German historians, with their usual bias against Great Britain, have
assumed that she had resolved to keep Dunkirk. The contrary is proved by the despatches of
Dundas to Murray, and by a letter of Sir Gilbert Elliot whom Pitt appointed commissioner to
regulate affairs at Dunkirk. Writing to Lady Elliot on 10th September Sir Gilbert says: "No further
conquests are to be made in that quarter in the name of Great Britain, nor is it intended to retain
Dunkirk after the peace."[230] A speedy capture of Dunkirk was evidently expected, for the same
despatch ordered that the Hessian corps, some 8,000 strong, then with the Duke, must be held in
readiness to depart to some other destination.[231] This referred either to the expedition in the
Mediterranean (soon to be noticed) or to another, also in course of preparation, against Brittany.
The Duke of York disapproved of the divergence towards Dunkirk, and the withdrawal of troops
from his command.[232]
We here touch upon the weak side of Pitt's war policy. His aims at first had been merely to defend
England from invasion, and to use the fleet and as many troops as could well be spared, to threaten
various points along the coast of France and to capture her colonies. From these comparatively
simple aims he had been drawn aside into a continental campaign, owing to the desirability of re-
establishing Austria firmly in the Pays Bas. That is to say, a political aim drew him away from the
and choose the point on that outer curve against which they would aim their blow.
This principle was thoroughly understood by Carnot. Near the centre of the circle he massed the
levies that were to save the Republic, and, confiding them to zealots who were resolved to conquer
or die, he soon had on foot armies which, however contemptible as units, were formidable from
their weight and their enthusiasm. As in mechanics the mass multiplied by the speed gives the
effective force, so in the campaign of 1793 the levée en masse multiplied by enthusiasm and
impelled by the brain power of Carnot begot a momentum which, when brought to bear on light,
scattered, and almost stationary bodies, proved to be irresistible. For while Carnot trusted to
concentration, the Allies either sank into inertia, or made ex-centric movements which ultimately
played into their opponents' hands. The Prussians, after taking Mainz, did little more than rest on
their laurels, their only move being towards Luxemburg. Coburg was inclined to follow their
example on the ground that an advance to Paris would unite all the French parties against him,
while the siege of the remaining fortresses in the North would allow anarchy to run riot at the
centre.[229] The argument is a good example of political finesse applied to a military problem, with
disastrous results. Coburg therefore set about the siege of Quesnoy.
Certainly he could urge in excuse that the British Government now insisted on the resumption of
its favourite plan, the capture of that nest of privateers, Dunkirk. On receipt of the news of the
surrender of Valenciennes, an order was sent to the Duke of York to begin the siege of that once
important stronghold, and capture it for Great Britain, though it might be allowed finally to fall to
the Emperor as one of his new Barrier fortresses, provided that we gained indemnities in other
parts of the world. French and German historians, with their usual bias against Great Britain, have
assumed that she had resolved to keep Dunkirk. The contrary is proved by the despatches of
Dundas to Murray, and by a letter of Sir Gilbert Elliot whom Pitt appointed commissioner to
regulate affairs at Dunkirk. Writing to Lady Elliot on 10th September Sir Gilbert says: "No further
conquests are to be made in that quarter in the name of Great Britain, nor is it intended to retain
Dunkirk after the peace."[230] A speedy capture of Dunkirk was evidently expected, for the same
despatch ordered that the Hessian corps, some 8,000 strong, then with the Duke, must be held in
readiness to depart to some other destination.[231] This referred either to the expedition in the
Mediterranean (soon to be noticed) or to another, also in course of preparation, against Brittany.
The Duke of York disapproved of the divergence towards Dunkirk, and the withdrawal of troops
from his command.[232]
We here touch upon the weak side of Pitt's war policy. His aims at first had been merely to defend
England from invasion, and to use the fleet and as many troops as could well be spared, to threaten
various points along the coast of France and to capture her colonies. From these comparatively
simple aims he had been drawn aside into a continental campaign, owing to the desirability of re-
establishing Austria firmly in the Pays Bas. That is to say, a political aim drew him away from the
Page 147
simple and effective plan of a maritime and colonial war. Or rather it would be more correct to say
that he tried to carry on a limited continental campaign as well as the coast expeditions which
promised to paralyse the activities of large numbers of Frenchmen.
Accordingly, Pitt and his colleagues, instead of concentrating their activities on Flanders, prepared
also to harass the coasts and colonies of France, and to withdraw part of the Duke of York's force
for service in the Mediterranean or the West Indies. Instructions to this effect annoyed both the
duke and Coburg. Most reluctantly did the latter consent to the divergence of the British towards
Dunkirk; but, as he had already decided to spend the rest of the campaign in reducing the border
fortresses, the division of forces had none of those appalling results which Alison and others have
detected. The duke's corps, then, turned off to the right, and, after gaining some successes over
bodies of the French, set about the siege of Dunkirk. If his siege train had arrived in time, the town
would probably soon have surrendered. But now Carnot was able to utilize some of the forces
raised in the levée en masse. By the beginning of September the French relieving army amounted
to 45,000 men under General Houchard; while the Hessians and Hanoverians covering the siege
operations did not exceed 9,000 men. These made a most obstinate and skilful defence in the
village of Bambeke, and thereafter at Hondschoote; but the inequality of force was too great; and
they were outflanked and driven back towards Furnes and Nieuport with the loss of 2,600 men (6th
to 8th September). The garrison also attacked the besiegers and received much assistance from
French gunboats moored near the shore. It was an unfortunate circumstance that a storm on 1st
September had compelled a British frigate and a sloop to leave their moorings. Even so, the duke's
force beat back their assailants into the town. But the defeat of the covering army at Hondschoote
placed it between the French, the walls of Dunkirk, and the sea. Only by a speedy retreat could he
save his men; and at midnight he drew off, leaving behind 32 siege guns and large quantities of
stores.[233]
At once there arose an outcry against our naval and transport authorities for not sending a
squadron to cover the right flank of the Duke of York opposite Dunkirk. Elliot reports that the
duke violently censured Richmond, head of the Ordnance Department, and Chatham, First Lord of
the Admiralty, the latter of whom was universally allowed to be incompetent. Elliot adds: "I have
seen Dundas and Pitt since the bad news. Dundas seems much dismayed. Pitt tried to carry it off
better."[234] Certainly the delay in sending ships and stores was discreditable to all concerned. But
the decisive action was that of Hondschoote, six miles distant from the coast, and that reverse was
due to the inability of Coburg to spare the reinforcements which Murray pressed him to send. On
its side the French Government was ill satisfied with the success at Hondschoote. Censuring
Houchard for not pressing his advantage to the utmost and capturing the duke's whole army, it
replaced him by his young and energetic subaltern, an ex-draper named Jourdan, who was destined
to become one of Napoleon's marshals, while Houchard speedily went to the guillotine. By these
drastic methods France found leaders who could conquer. For them the inspiring thought was—
victory or the guillotine.
that he tried to carry on a limited continental campaign as well as the coast expeditions which
promised to paralyse the activities of large numbers of Frenchmen.
Accordingly, Pitt and his colleagues, instead of concentrating their activities on Flanders, prepared
also to harass the coasts and colonies of France, and to withdraw part of the Duke of York's force
for service in the Mediterranean or the West Indies. Instructions to this effect annoyed both the
duke and Coburg. Most reluctantly did the latter consent to the divergence of the British towards
Dunkirk; but, as he had already decided to spend the rest of the campaign in reducing the border
fortresses, the division of forces had none of those appalling results which Alison and others have
detected. The duke's corps, then, turned off to the right, and, after gaining some successes over
bodies of the French, set about the siege of Dunkirk. If his siege train had arrived in time, the town
would probably soon have surrendered. But now Carnot was able to utilize some of the forces
raised in the levée en masse. By the beginning of September the French relieving army amounted
to 45,000 men under General Houchard; while the Hessians and Hanoverians covering the siege
operations did not exceed 9,000 men. These made a most obstinate and skilful defence in the
village of Bambeke, and thereafter at Hondschoote; but the inequality of force was too great; and
they were outflanked and driven back towards Furnes and Nieuport with the loss of 2,600 men (6th
to 8th September). The garrison also attacked the besiegers and received much assistance from
French gunboats moored near the shore. It was an unfortunate circumstance that a storm on 1st
September had compelled a British frigate and a sloop to leave their moorings. Even so, the duke's
force beat back their assailants into the town. But the defeat of the covering army at Hondschoote
placed it between the French, the walls of Dunkirk, and the sea. Only by a speedy retreat could he
save his men; and at midnight he drew off, leaving behind 32 siege guns and large quantities of
stores.[233]
At once there arose an outcry against our naval and transport authorities for not sending a
squadron to cover the right flank of the Duke of York opposite Dunkirk. Elliot reports that the
duke violently censured Richmond, head of the Ordnance Department, and Chatham, First Lord of
the Admiralty, the latter of whom was universally allowed to be incompetent. Elliot adds: "I have
seen Dundas and Pitt since the bad news. Dundas seems much dismayed. Pitt tried to carry it off
better."[234] Certainly the delay in sending ships and stores was discreditable to all concerned. But
the decisive action was that of Hondschoote, six miles distant from the coast, and that reverse was
due to the inability of Coburg to spare the reinforcements which Murray pressed him to send. On
its side the French Government was ill satisfied with the success at Hondschoote. Censuring
Houchard for not pressing his advantage to the utmost and capturing the duke's whole army, it
replaced him by his young and energetic subaltern, an ex-draper named Jourdan, who was destined
to become one of Napoleon's marshals, while Houchard speedily went to the guillotine. By these
drastic methods France found leaders who could conquer. For them the inspiring thought was—
victory or the guillotine.
Page 148
The news of the failure at Dunkirk shattered Pitt's hope of a speedy end to the war. That he faced
the prospect of a second campaign with his usual buoyancy appears from some notes which bear
the date 16th September [1793] and are headed: "Force to be employed in Flanders, or on the coast
of France in the Channel and the Ocean." He proposes to increase 9 regiments at home to 800 men
apiece, to raise 8 new regiments; and these, along with Guards and troops from Ireland would
number at least 20,000. He also hoped that at least 20,000 more Austrians and about 25,000
Bavarians would be available for Flanders, raising the total force in that quarter to 175,000 men.
[235] These roseate views are apt to provoke derision; but we must remember that not until the
close of the year 1793 did the Republic put forth her full strength and beat back her enemies at all
points.
It would be tedious to follow in detail the rest of Coburg's operations in Flanders. Early in
September he took Quesnoy, and then drew together his forces for the capture of the intrenched
camp at Maubeuge. In this he seemed about to succeed, when Jourdan's relieving force of 60,000
men, handled by Carnot, drove the Austrians back at Wattignies with much loss, and thus saved the
garrison at Maubeuge, now in dire straits. On that day, 16th October, the head of Marie Antoinette
fell at Paris.
As for the Duke of York's army, after remaining in a sorry plight near Ostend, it moved forward to
Quesnoy to prolong Coburg's right; but the retreat of the main body involved his retirement
towards Ostend, near which town he routed some detachments of French. For a time the Allies
gained a few advantages and recovered lost ground. But the Republicans more than made up for
occasional losses by pouring troops into Flanders; and, moving under cover of their fortresses,
they often dealt heavy blows. In quality the Austrians and British far surpassed the raw levies of
France; but these, having the advantage in number and position, could take the offensive along a
wide ill-defended front. Wherever Coburg and the Duke of York attacked, they gained an
advantage, soon to be lost in face of the gathering masses of the enemy. As Coburg pointed out,
France sent forth another horde to take the place of one which perished or melted away; and the
Allies rarely had the chance of taking the offensive. By this last statement he passed sentence
against himself. An able commander, even with inferior forces, will mass them so as to strike with
effect. Pitt and Grenville continually pressed him to form some plan of action in conjunction with
the Duke of York; but to this he as persistently demurred.[236] Is it surprising that Pitt demanded
the removal of Coburg?
The Rhenish campaign, in which Austria took more interest, also languished owing to the
sluggishness of the Duke of Brunswick. This, in its turn, resulted from political reasons. Frederick
William, in spite of his treaty obligations to England, refused to move forward until she guaranteed
his late gains in Poland and made further advances of money. Then, too, he felt no interest in
Austria's proposed acquisition of parts of Alsace and Lorraine. Pitt and Grenville despatched Lord
Yarmouth to the King's headquarters to make a formal protest against the proposed withdrawal of
the prospect of a second campaign with his usual buoyancy appears from some notes which bear
the date 16th September [1793] and are headed: "Force to be employed in Flanders, or on the coast
of France in the Channel and the Ocean." He proposes to increase 9 regiments at home to 800 men
apiece, to raise 8 new regiments; and these, along with Guards and troops from Ireland would
number at least 20,000. He also hoped that at least 20,000 more Austrians and about 25,000
Bavarians would be available for Flanders, raising the total force in that quarter to 175,000 men.
[235] These roseate views are apt to provoke derision; but we must remember that not until the
close of the year 1793 did the Republic put forth her full strength and beat back her enemies at all
points.
It would be tedious to follow in detail the rest of Coburg's operations in Flanders. Early in
September he took Quesnoy, and then drew together his forces for the capture of the intrenched
camp at Maubeuge. In this he seemed about to succeed, when Jourdan's relieving force of 60,000
men, handled by Carnot, drove the Austrians back at Wattignies with much loss, and thus saved the
garrison at Maubeuge, now in dire straits. On that day, 16th October, the head of Marie Antoinette
fell at Paris.
As for the Duke of York's army, after remaining in a sorry plight near Ostend, it moved forward to
Quesnoy to prolong Coburg's right; but the retreat of the main body involved his retirement
towards Ostend, near which town he routed some detachments of French. For a time the Allies
gained a few advantages and recovered lost ground. But the Republicans more than made up for
occasional losses by pouring troops into Flanders; and, moving under cover of their fortresses,
they often dealt heavy blows. In quality the Austrians and British far surpassed the raw levies of
France; but these, having the advantage in number and position, could take the offensive along a
wide ill-defended front. Wherever Coburg and the Duke of York attacked, they gained an
advantage, soon to be lost in face of the gathering masses of the enemy. As Coburg pointed out,
France sent forth another horde to take the place of one which perished or melted away; and the
Allies rarely had the chance of taking the offensive. By this last statement he passed sentence
against himself. An able commander, even with inferior forces, will mass them so as to strike with
effect. Pitt and Grenville continually pressed him to form some plan of action in conjunction with
the Duke of York; but to this he as persistently demurred.[236] Is it surprising that Pitt demanded
the removal of Coburg?
The Rhenish campaign, in which Austria took more interest, also languished owing to the
sluggishness of the Duke of Brunswick. This, in its turn, resulted from political reasons. Frederick
William, in spite of his treaty obligations to England, refused to move forward until she guaranteed
his late gains in Poland and made further advances of money. Then, too, he felt no interest in
Austria's proposed acquisition of parts of Alsace and Lorraine. Pitt and Grenville despatched Lord
Yarmouth to the King's headquarters to make a formal protest against the proposed withdrawal of
Page 149
the Prussian army. Finally, Frederick William gave the order to advance, but too late to gain the
results which prompt and vigorous co-operation with the Austrians should have achieved.[237] In
short, the course of events in 1793 affords the classic example of the collapse of vast and imposing
efforts owing to division of interests and the intrusion of jealousies and intrigues. Pitt and
Grenville did their best to keep the Coalition united and active; but a Power which granted only
limited help could not impart that unity of design without which great enterprises come to naught.
results which prompt and vigorous co-operation with the Austrians should have achieved.[237] In
short, the course of events in 1793 affords the classic example of the collapse of vast and imposing
efforts owing to division of interests and the intrusion of jealousies and intrigues. Pitt and
Grenville did their best to keep the Coalition united and active; but a Power which granted only
limited help could not impart that unity of design without which great enterprises come to naught.
Page 150
CHAPTER VI
TOULON
Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary:
Then fiery expedition be my wing,
Jove's Mercury, and herald for a King.
—Shakespeare, King Richard III, act iv, sc. 3.
The enterprise destined to develop into the occupation of Toulon arose out of the negotiations for
alliance with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples. By the first of these England pledged herself to send a
considerable fleet into the Mediterranean, as an effective help to the military operations then going
on in the Maritime Alps and the Genoese Riviera. Indeed, the Court of Vienna made this almost a
sine quâ non of its alliance. On its side the British Government gained assurances of military aid
from Sardinia and Naples, the former of those States agreeing to furnish 20,000 troops in return for
the annual subsidy of £200,000.
Here, then, were the foundations of a Mediterranean policy on which Pitt and his colleagues began
to build in the years 1793–4, with the singular and unforeseen results at Toulon and in Corsica.
Everything favoured some such design. The French marine was enfeebled by mutiny, and, as the
spring of 1793 merged into summer, there came ominous signs of revolt in the South against the
Jacobin faction supreme at Paris. Accordingly Grenville urged the Hapsburg Court, in return for
British help in Flanders, to assist an expedition of the Allies to the coast of Provence. The conduct
of the Austrian Chancellor, Thugut, was characteristic. Far from strengthening the Imperial forces
in Italy, he prepared to withdraw some of them for the Rhenish campaign, now that a British fleet
spread its covering wings over the Kingdom of Sardinia.[238]
Nevertheless the British Ministers persevered with their scheme; but whether they at first aimed at
Corsica or Toulon is uncertain.[239] Certain it is that Pitt on 19th July proposed to detach three line
regiments from the Duke of York's force in Flanders and send them to the Mediterranean along
with one brigade of the Hessian corps and a body of Würtembergers. He pointed out that the naval
superiority of Hood and the Spanish fleet in that sea would enable us to strike a telling blow at
Provence if we were helped by Sardinians, Neapolitans, and Austrians from the Milanese. He
admitted the strength of the arguments in favour of our land forces acting together on one point;
but he added: "What I now mention seems to offer a fair chance of doing something material in the
TOULON
Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary:
Then fiery expedition be my wing,
Jove's Mercury, and herald for a King.
—Shakespeare, King Richard III, act iv, sc. 3.
The enterprise destined to develop into the occupation of Toulon arose out of the negotiations for
alliance with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples. By the first of these England pledged herself to send a
considerable fleet into the Mediterranean, as an effective help to the military operations then going
on in the Maritime Alps and the Genoese Riviera. Indeed, the Court of Vienna made this almost a
sine quâ non of its alliance. On its side the British Government gained assurances of military aid
from Sardinia and Naples, the former of those States agreeing to furnish 20,000 troops in return for
the annual subsidy of £200,000.
Here, then, were the foundations of a Mediterranean policy on which Pitt and his colleagues began
to build in the years 1793–4, with the singular and unforeseen results at Toulon and in Corsica.
Everything favoured some such design. The French marine was enfeebled by mutiny, and, as the
spring of 1793 merged into summer, there came ominous signs of revolt in the South against the
Jacobin faction supreme at Paris. Accordingly Grenville urged the Hapsburg Court, in return for
British help in Flanders, to assist an expedition of the Allies to the coast of Provence. The conduct
of the Austrian Chancellor, Thugut, was characteristic. Far from strengthening the Imperial forces
in Italy, he prepared to withdraw some of them for the Rhenish campaign, now that a British fleet
spread its covering wings over the Kingdom of Sardinia.[238]
Nevertheless the British Ministers persevered with their scheme; but whether they at first aimed at
Corsica or Toulon is uncertain.[239] Certain it is that Pitt on 19th July proposed to detach three line
regiments from the Duke of York's force in Flanders and send them to the Mediterranean along
with one brigade of the Hessian corps and a body of Würtembergers. He pointed out that the naval
superiority of Hood and the Spanish fleet in that sea would enable us to strike a telling blow at
Provence if we were helped by Sardinians, Neapolitans, and Austrians from the Milanese. He
admitted the strength of the arguments in favour of our land forces acting together on one point;
but he added: "What I now mention seems to offer a fair chance of doing something material in the
Page 151
South [of France], and, if we distress the enemy on more sides than one, while their internal
distraction continues, it seems hardly possible that they can long oppose any effectual resistance."
[240]
Pitt wrote thus at the time when Mainz and Valenciennes were on the point of surrender, and the
Bretons, together with nearly the whole of the South of France, were in open revolt against the
regicide Republic. Equally characteristic of his sanguine temperament is his Memorandum of 23rd
August 1793 as to the allied forces which ought to be available for service against France in June
1794, namely, 30,000 in Flanders, while 50,000 marched thence on Paris; 50,000 to attack Brest,
and as many more to attack Toulon.[241]
It so chanced that on that very day the ardour of the Provençaux brought about a very different
situation. The arrival of Hood's fleet encouraged the moderates to send two Commissioners,
representing the two coast Departments, to seek help from the British fleet. Thereupon on his
flagship, the "Victory," Hood drew up a public Declaration that, if the ships-of-war in Toulon and
Marseilles were unrigged and the French Royal standard hoisted, he would take those cities under
his protection, respect private property and, on the conclusion of peace, restore the warships to the
French monarchy. He then sent to a Spanish squadron, under Langara, cruising off the coast of
Roussillon, with a request for help. That officer soon had the promise of 2,000 Spanish troops, to
be detached from the army invading that province. The Jacobin forces under Carteaux having
crushed the moderates in Marseilles, Hood made for Toulon, though as yet the Spanish ships were
not in sight. He cast anchor in the outer roadstead on 27th August, and landed 1,500 men near Fort
Lamalgue, east of the town. In the afternoon fifteen Spanish ships arrived, and on the next day
landed 1,000 men. On the 28th Hood also issued a proclamation to the effect that he would hold
Toulon in trust only for Louis XVII until peace should be restored to France.[242] To this the
Toulonese assented; the opposition of some of their sailors and troops soon collapsed; and a
detachment of Carteaux' force was easily dislodged from a strong position near Ollioules, north-
west of the town (31st August). Toulon therefore seemed a sure gain for the royalist cause.
Yet Pitt and his colleagues were careful not to identify themselves with that cause. Hood, having
implied in his Toulon proclamation that one of the objects of Great Britain was the restoration of
the French monarchy, Ministers warned him that "the true ground of the war was to repel an unjust
and unprovoked aggression against His Majesty, and his Allies, and the rest of Europe, which had
been evidently threatened and endangered by the conduct of France." True, in the course of the
struggle England had supported the French Royalists, and might find it prudent, especially in view
of the events at Toulon, to assist in restoring monarchy. "But," adds Lord Chatham, "it is to be
considered as arising out of the circumstances and founded on the considerations which I have
stated, and not as making part of the object for which His Majesty originally took up arms."[243]
This gentle rebuke to Hood (an impetuous and opinionated officer), clearly shows the attitude of
the Cabinet towards that problem. For Great Britain the re-establishment of monarchy was not an
distraction continues, it seems hardly possible that they can long oppose any effectual resistance."
[240]
Pitt wrote thus at the time when Mainz and Valenciennes were on the point of surrender, and the
Bretons, together with nearly the whole of the South of France, were in open revolt against the
regicide Republic. Equally characteristic of his sanguine temperament is his Memorandum of 23rd
August 1793 as to the allied forces which ought to be available for service against France in June
1794, namely, 30,000 in Flanders, while 50,000 marched thence on Paris; 50,000 to attack Brest,
and as many more to attack Toulon.[241]
It so chanced that on that very day the ardour of the Provençaux brought about a very different
situation. The arrival of Hood's fleet encouraged the moderates to send two Commissioners,
representing the two coast Departments, to seek help from the British fleet. Thereupon on his
flagship, the "Victory," Hood drew up a public Declaration that, if the ships-of-war in Toulon and
Marseilles were unrigged and the French Royal standard hoisted, he would take those cities under
his protection, respect private property and, on the conclusion of peace, restore the warships to the
French monarchy. He then sent to a Spanish squadron, under Langara, cruising off the coast of
Roussillon, with a request for help. That officer soon had the promise of 2,000 Spanish troops, to
be detached from the army invading that province. The Jacobin forces under Carteaux having
crushed the moderates in Marseilles, Hood made for Toulon, though as yet the Spanish ships were
not in sight. He cast anchor in the outer roadstead on 27th August, and landed 1,500 men near Fort
Lamalgue, east of the town. In the afternoon fifteen Spanish ships arrived, and on the next day
landed 1,000 men. On the 28th Hood also issued a proclamation to the effect that he would hold
Toulon in trust only for Louis XVII until peace should be restored to France.[242] To this the
Toulonese assented; the opposition of some of their sailors and troops soon collapsed; and a
detachment of Carteaux' force was easily dislodged from a strong position near Ollioules, north-
west of the town (31st August). Toulon therefore seemed a sure gain for the royalist cause.
Yet Pitt and his colleagues were careful not to identify themselves with that cause. Hood, having
implied in his Toulon proclamation that one of the objects of Great Britain was the restoration of
the French monarchy, Ministers warned him that "the true ground of the war was to repel an unjust
and unprovoked aggression against His Majesty, and his Allies, and the rest of Europe, which had
been evidently threatened and endangered by the conduct of France." True, in the course of the
struggle England had supported the French Royalists, and might find it prudent, especially in view
of the events at Toulon, to assist in restoring monarchy. "But," adds Lord Chatham, "it is to be
considered as arising out of the circumstances and founded on the considerations which I have
stated, and not as making part of the object for which His Majesty originally took up arms."[243]
This gentle rebuke to Hood (an impetuous and opinionated officer), clearly shows the attitude of
the Cabinet towards that problem. For Great Britain the re-establishment of monarchy was not an
Page 152
affair of principle, but solely of expediency. It is also noteworthy that the inhabitants of Toulon
retained the tricolour flag, thus signifying their adhesion to constitutional royalism as established
in 1791.
The fortunes of the Republic now appeared desperate; and the Allies would certainly have
triumphed had they put forth a tithe of the energy developed by the Jacobins at Paris. With
ordinarily good management on the part of Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, Toulon might have
become the centre of a great royalist movement in the South. That was certainly the expectation of
Pitt; and Langara, the Spanish admiral at Toulon, expressed to his Government the hope that the
war would soon end with honour.[244]
No one at first realized the difficulties of the enterprise. The ramparts of Toulon were extensive;
and the outlying forts, from Lamalgue on the east to Mount Faron on the north, and the works on
the west and south-west, spread over a circumference of fully fifteen miles. Then again the French
royalist committee in Toulon was somewhat suspicious of the Allies. In truth a blight seemed to
settle on the royalist cause when it handed over to foreigners one of the cherished citadels of
France. Loyalty to Louis XVII now spelt treason to the nation. The crisis is interesting because it
set sharply against one another the principles of monarchy and nationality; and the sequel proved
that the national idea, though still far from mature even in France, had more potency than
royalism. A keen-sighted observer had very forcibly warned the Marseillais against delivering their
city into the hands of the Spaniards, a crime which must ruin their efforts. Such was the judgement
of Bonaparte in that curious pamphlet "Le Souper de Beaucaire."
Other invisible agencies, those of time and space, told against the Allies. Despatches sent by Hood
were at least eleven days in reaching their destination, and often far longer. Consequently, the
plans framed at home were always belated. The first tidings (received on 7th September) found the
Cabinet half committed to another enterprise, that in the West Indies, which Pitt very reluctantly
postponed owing to the drain of troops to Flanders and Toulon. A further disadvantage was that
disputes between the British and Spanish commanders at Toulon were known at Whitehall long
after they had come to a head; and the final reports of the sore straits of the garrison led to the
despatch to Cork of orders for the sailing of reinforcements five days after the evacuation began at
Toulon.
In these brisk and giddy-paced times it is difficult to realize the difficulties which then beset
British commanders warring in the Mediterranean against an enemy who could send news to Paris
in three days. Now the telegraph has annihilated space; but then, as in the campaigns of Francis I
against Charles V, the compactness of France and her central position told enormously in her
favour. The defence of Toulon was practicable, provided that adequate reinforcements arrived in
time. As will soon appear, Pitt urged the despatch of strong reinforcements from Ireland; and, but
for delays due to the want of transports, things might have gone very differently at Toulon. He also
retained the tricolour flag, thus signifying their adhesion to constitutional royalism as established
in 1791.
The fortunes of the Republic now appeared desperate; and the Allies would certainly have
triumphed had they put forth a tithe of the energy developed by the Jacobins at Paris. With
ordinarily good management on the part of Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, Toulon might have
become the centre of a great royalist movement in the South. That was certainly the expectation of
Pitt; and Langara, the Spanish admiral at Toulon, expressed to his Government the hope that the
war would soon end with honour.[244]
No one at first realized the difficulties of the enterprise. The ramparts of Toulon were extensive;
and the outlying forts, from Lamalgue on the east to Mount Faron on the north, and the works on
the west and south-west, spread over a circumference of fully fifteen miles. Then again the French
royalist committee in Toulon was somewhat suspicious of the Allies. In truth a blight seemed to
settle on the royalist cause when it handed over to foreigners one of the cherished citadels of
France. Loyalty to Louis XVII now spelt treason to the nation. The crisis is interesting because it
set sharply against one another the principles of monarchy and nationality; and the sequel proved
that the national idea, though still far from mature even in France, had more potency than
royalism. A keen-sighted observer had very forcibly warned the Marseillais against delivering their
city into the hands of the Spaniards, a crime which must ruin their efforts. Such was the judgement
of Bonaparte in that curious pamphlet "Le Souper de Beaucaire."
Other invisible agencies, those of time and space, told against the Allies. Despatches sent by Hood
were at least eleven days in reaching their destination, and often far longer. Consequently, the
plans framed at home were always belated. The first tidings (received on 7th September) found the
Cabinet half committed to another enterprise, that in the West Indies, which Pitt very reluctantly
postponed owing to the drain of troops to Flanders and Toulon. A further disadvantage was that
disputes between the British and Spanish commanders at Toulon were known at Whitehall long
after they had come to a head; and the final reports of the sore straits of the garrison led to the
despatch to Cork of orders for the sailing of reinforcements five days after the evacuation began at
Toulon.
In these brisk and giddy-paced times it is difficult to realize the difficulties which then beset
British commanders warring in the Mediterranean against an enemy who could send news to Paris
in three days. Now the telegraph has annihilated space; but then, as in the campaigns of Francis I
against Charles V, the compactness of France and her central position told enormously in her
favour. The defence of Toulon was practicable, provided that adequate reinforcements arrived in
time. As will soon appear, Pitt urged the despatch of strong reinforcements from Ireland; and, but
for delays due to the want of transports, things might have gone very differently at Toulon. He also
Page 153
expected Austria to send succours if only as a means of protecting her Italian possessions. In truth,
if the Hapsburgs had discerned the signs of the times, they would have taken steps to defend the
Milanese at Toulon. They were destined to rue their folly.
Further, on 14th September, despite bad news from Dunkirk, Dundas issued orders that 4,000
Hessians, serving under the Duke of York, must be withdrawn in order to strengthen the garrison at
Toulon, their place being taken by others hired at Cassel. On 28th September Dundas added that
the artillery sent for Dunkirk would be withdrawn from Flanders as it was urgently needed at
Toulon. Thus these two expeditions competed together, and produced a dislocation of plans and
ordering of troops to and fro, which told against success in either quarter. By 27th October
Ministers definitely decided that Toulon, or la Vendée, was a better fulcrum for their scanty forces
than Flanders.[245] Even so, with all these dislocations of the Flemish plans, Pitt and Dundas relied
too much upon Austria; and all too late found out that she was a broken reed. The Sardinians, also,
lacking due support from the Court of Vienna, were afraid to denude their borders and therefore
sent an inadequate contingent, despite the fact that they had promised to place 20,000 troops at the
disposal of England free from all expense.
Far different was the procedure of the French. Carnot determined to retake Lyons and Toulon, even
if the efforts against Spain and Sardinia had to be relaxed. Further, on the 16th of September there
arrived at the Republican army west of Toulon the incarnation of warlike energy and skill. At the
bidding of the Commissioners of the Convention, Napoleon Bonaparte had come from the arsenal
at Marseilles to assist the few artillerymen then before Toulon. On the 17th he was placed in
command of their insignificant siege artillery, and forthwith from the slopes two miles west of the
town he opened fire on the nearest ships. It is incorrect to claim for him the origination of the plan
of sinking the fleet by a fire from the height behind l'Eguilette; for three days earlier the
Commissioners of the Convention had written that they would secure a position whence the allied
fleet could be sunk by red-hot cannon-balls; and there was no point but the high ground behind
Fort l'Eguilette which dominated both the inner and the outer harbours.[246] But it may freely be
granted that Bonaparte clinched the arguments in favour of this course and brought to bear on it
that masterful energy which assures triumph. It was the first occasion on which he crossed the path
of Pitt; and here, as always, he had the advantage of a central position, and of wielding a compact
and homogeneous force against discordant Allies.
The worst difficulty confronting the defenders of Toulon remains to be noted. There the Sea Power
is at the mercy of the Land Power. To attempt to defend that city at the head of its land-locked
harbour, dominated by promontories, was to court disaster unless the fleet had an army to protect
it. In such a case a fleet is a source of danger rather than of safety. Its true function is to act where
it can, either directly or indirectly, command the land. It operates with most effect against low and
exposed coasts. St. Jean d'Acre affords, perhaps, the best example of a town at the mercy of a fleet.
Portsmouth, Sydney, Brest, and Toulon cannot be held by an enemy unless he brings forces
if the Hapsburgs had discerned the signs of the times, they would have taken steps to defend the
Milanese at Toulon. They were destined to rue their folly.
Further, on 14th September, despite bad news from Dunkirk, Dundas issued orders that 4,000
Hessians, serving under the Duke of York, must be withdrawn in order to strengthen the garrison at
Toulon, their place being taken by others hired at Cassel. On 28th September Dundas added that
the artillery sent for Dunkirk would be withdrawn from Flanders as it was urgently needed at
Toulon. Thus these two expeditions competed together, and produced a dislocation of plans and
ordering of troops to and fro, which told against success in either quarter. By 27th October
Ministers definitely decided that Toulon, or la Vendée, was a better fulcrum for their scanty forces
than Flanders.[245] Even so, with all these dislocations of the Flemish plans, Pitt and Dundas relied
too much upon Austria; and all too late found out that she was a broken reed. The Sardinians, also,
lacking due support from the Court of Vienna, were afraid to denude their borders and therefore
sent an inadequate contingent, despite the fact that they had promised to place 20,000 troops at the
disposal of England free from all expense.
Far different was the procedure of the French. Carnot determined to retake Lyons and Toulon, even
if the efforts against Spain and Sardinia had to be relaxed. Further, on the 16th of September there
arrived at the Republican army west of Toulon the incarnation of warlike energy and skill. At the
bidding of the Commissioners of the Convention, Napoleon Bonaparte had come from the arsenal
at Marseilles to assist the few artillerymen then before Toulon. On the 17th he was placed in
command of their insignificant siege artillery, and forthwith from the slopes two miles west of the
town he opened fire on the nearest ships. It is incorrect to claim for him the origination of the plan
of sinking the fleet by a fire from the height behind l'Eguilette; for three days earlier the
Commissioners of the Convention had written that they would secure a position whence the allied
fleet could be sunk by red-hot cannon-balls; and there was no point but the high ground behind
Fort l'Eguilette which dominated both the inner and the outer harbours.[246] But it may freely be
granted that Bonaparte clinched the arguments in favour of this course and brought to bear on it
that masterful energy which assures triumph. It was the first occasion on which he crossed the path
of Pitt; and here, as always, he had the advantage of a central position, and of wielding a compact
and homogeneous force against discordant Allies.
The worst difficulty confronting the defenders of Toulon remains to be noted. There the Sea Power
is at the mercy of the Land Power. To attempt to defend that city at the head of its land-locked
harbour, dominated by promontories, was to court disaster unless the fleet had an army to protect
it. In such a case a fleet is a source of danger rather than of safety. Its true function is to act where
it can, either directly or indirectly, command the land. It operates with most effect against low and
exposed coasts. St. Jean d'Acre affords, perhaps, the best example of a town at the mercy of a fleet.
Portsmouth, Sydney, Brest, and Toulon cannot be held by an enemy unless he brings forces
Page 154
sufficient to hold the neighbouring heights. In occupying Toulon, the Sea Power was virtually
putting its head into the lion's jaw. Only by degrees did the authorities at home understand this all-
important fact. For some time it was veiled from Pitt; and, as we shall see, the Austrian Chancellor,
Thugut, never did understand it. To those who were on the spot, the need of occupying the
promontory behind l'Eguilette was apparent; and on 21st September Lord Mulgrave and Rear-
Admiral Gravina led a force to seize the very height on which Bonaparte's will had already
fastened. The Allies crowned it with a temporary work dignified by the name of Fort Mulgrave.
The fortunes of Toulon turned on the possession of all the heights commanding the harbour, but
especially of this one.
The Siege of Toulon, 1793, from "L'Histoire de France depuis la Révolution de 1789," by
Emmanuel Toulougeon, Paris, An. XII. [1803].
A. Fort Mulgrave. A'. Promontory of L'Eguillette. 1 and 2. Batteries. 3. Battery "Hommes sans
Peur." The black and shaded rectangles are the Republican and Allied positions respectively.
Even before the arrival of Bonaparte the difficulties of defence were very great. A British naval
officer wrote on the 14th to Lord St. Helens, British ambassador at Madrid, that the situation of the
little garrison was very critical owing to daily attacks from the 5,000 French at Ollioules and the
same number on the eastern side. The Allies, he added, could not wholly trust the French royalists
serving with them, and they were glad to send away on four French sail-of-the-line some 6,000
putting its head into the lion's jaw. Only by degrees did the authorities at home understand this all-
important fact. For some time it was veiled from Pitt; and, as we shall see, the Austrian Chancellor,
Thugut, never did understand it. To those who were on the spot, the need of occupying the
promontory behind l'Eguilette was apparent; and on 21st September Lord Mulgrave and Rear-
Admiral Gravina led a force to seize the very height on which Bonaparte's will had already
fastened. The Allies crowned it with a temporary work dignified by the name of Fort Mulgrave.
The fortunes of Toulon turned on the possession of all the heights commanding the harbour, but
especially of this one.
The Siege of Toulon, 1793, from "L'Histoire de France depuis la Révolution de 1789," by
Emmanuel Toulougeon, Paris, An. XII. [1803].
A. Fort Mulgrave. A'. Promontory of L'Eguillette. 1 and 2. Batteries. 3. Battery "Hommes sans
Peur." The black and shaded rectangles are the Republican and Allied positions respectively.
Even before the arrival of Bonaparte the difficulties of defence were very great. A British naval
officer wrote on the 14th to Lord St. Helens, British ambassador at Madrid, that the situation of the
little garrison was very critical owing to daily attacks from the 5,000 French at Ollioules and the
same number on the eastern side. The Allies, he added, could not wholly trust the French royalists
serving with them, and they were glad to send away on four French sail-of-the-line some 6,000
Page 155
French sailors who had bargained to be landed on the Biscay coast. Having only 1,570 British and
3,460 Spaniards, they could scarcely man the ramparts and forts, several of which, especially those
on Mount Faron, were not nearly ready. The houses of the town were far too near to the ramparts;
but the Allies dared not demolish them until reinforcements arrived. Fortunately the Spanish
Admiral, Gravina, was alert, intelligent, and trustworthy; and Piedmontese were known to be
advancing over the Maritime Alps into the county of Nice. Part of Hood's fleet was engaged in
intercepting the supplies and stores destined for the Republicans.[247]
The letter brings out vividly the perils of the garrison, which must have evacuated Toulon had not
reinforcements speedily arrived. On 26th September Hood wrote that the Allies were kept in
perpetual alarm by the French batteries, which must be kept under at all risks, until more troops
arrived.[248] Fortunately the foresight of Pitt and Grenville had provided the means of backing up
operations in the Mediterranean. Apart from the treaty with Sardinia, there was a compact with
Naples, whereby that Court promised a force of 6,000 men and 12 warships, the naval expenses
being borne by England.[249] By 5th October 1,350 Sardinian and 4,000 Neapolitan troops arrived,
thus enabling the garrison to hold up against the ever increasing forces of the Republicans. On the
other hand, the fall of Lyons on 9th October set free large numbers who were available for service
at Toulon. Consequently the troops and seamen of the Allies were persistently overworked, so that
Hood was constrained to hire 1,500 Maltese seamen, to take the place of those serving the
batteries. At first only 750 British troops could be spared from Gibraltar; but by the end of
October, when further help was at hand, the allied forces (rank and file) stood as follows:
British 2,114
French Royalists 1,542
Spaniards 6,840
Neapolitans 4,832
Sardinians 1,584
———
16,912
So exacting was the service, and so unhealthy the season (it cost Bonaparte a sharp attack of
malarial fever), that the number fit for duty did not exceed 12,000.
It is interesting to compare these figures with the estimate of Pitt which is in the Pitt MSS. (No.
196).
September 16.
Force which it is supposed may be collected at Toulon by the end of October or early in
November:
3,460 Spaniards, they could scarcely man the ramparts and forts, several of which, especially those
on Mount Faron, were not nearly ready. The houses of the town were far too near to the ramparts;
but the Allies dared not demolish them until reinforcements arrived. Fortunately the Spanish
Admiral, Gravina, was alert, intelligent, and trustworthy; and Piedmontese were known to be
advancing over the Maritime Alps into the county of Nice. Part of Hood's fleet was engaged in
intercepting the supplies and stores destined for the Republicans.[247]
The letter brings out vividly the perils of the garrison, which must have evacuated Toulon had not
reinforcements speedily arrived. On 26th September Hood wrote that the Allies were kept in
perpetual alarm by the French batteries, which must be kept under at all risks, until more troops
arrived.[248] Fortunately the foresight of Pitt and Grenville had provided the means of backing up
operations in the Mediterranean. Apart from the treaty with Sardinia, there was a compact with
Naples, whereby that Court promised a force of 6,000 men and 12 warships, the naval expenses
being borne by England.[249] By 5th October 1,350 Sardinian and 4,000 Neapolitan troops arrived,
thus enabling the garrison to hold up against the ever increasing forces of the Republicans. On the
other hand, the fall of Lyons on 9th October set free large numbers who were available for service
at Toulon. Consequently the troops and seamen of the Allies were persistently overworked, so that
Hood was constrained to hire 1,500 Maltese seamen, to take the place of those serving the
batteries. At first only 750 British troops could be spared from Gibraltar; but by the end of
October, when further help was at hand, the allied forces (rank and file) stood as follows:
British 2,114
French Royalists 1,542
Spaniards 6,840
Neapolitans 4,832
Sardinians 1,584
———
16,912
So exacting was the service, and so unhealthy the season (it cost Bonaparte a sharp attack of
malarial fever), that the number fit for duty did not exceed 12,000.
It is interesting to compare these figures with the estimate of Pitt which is in the Pitt MSS. (No.
196).
September 16.
Force which it is supposed may be collected at Toulon by the end of October or early in
November:
Page 156
Rank and File.
British Marines 1,500
" flank companies from Gibraltar 600
" " " " Ireland 2,000[250]
" Two battalions from Flanders (to be replaced by detachments
1,200
from the Guards)
" Cavalry from Ireland 900
Hessians from Flanders (to be replaced by the additional corps
5,000
ordered)
Spanish (suppose) 3,000
Neapolitan 6,000
Sardinian 9,000
Austrian 5,000
———
Total 33,200
[sic—really
34,200.]
This Force may be estimated (allowing for some deduction) at 30,000 men. To this may
possibly be added some Force from Corsica, and probably early in the spring, an
additional body of 11,000 Sardinians, perhaps also of 10,000 Austrians, and some troops
of Baden from hence. Possibly also a body of Swiss, and in the course of the next
summer (if the expedition to the West Indies is successful) about 4,000 or 5,000 British
on their return from the Islands. If 10,000, or 12,000, Swiss can be secured, it seems not
unreasonable to expect that, by the beginning of next year, there may be an army in the
South of France of near 60,000 men.
Pitt, then, regarded Toulon as the base of operations in the South of France so extensive as to deal
a decisive blow at the Republic. The scheme was surely due to the influence of Bacchus rather
than of Mars. For how was it possible to spare 6,200 men from the Duke of York's force, then hard
pressed after its retreat from Dunkirk? The estimate of the Sardinian contingent was based on the
treaty obligations of that Power rather than on probable performance; while that for the Spaniards
is strangely beneath the mark. How boyishly hopeful also to suppose that the British forces
destined for the future conquest of Corsica could spare a contingent for service in Provence in the
spring of 1794, and that the nervous little Court of Turin would send an additional body of 11,000
men far into France. Thus early in Pitt's strategic combinations we can detect the vitiating flaw. He
did not know men, and therefore he did not know Cabinets. He believed them to be acting
according to his own high standard of public duty and magnanimous endeavour. Consequently he
never allowed for the calculating meanness which shifted the burdens on to other shoulders.
The one factor on which he had a right to count was the despatch of a respectable force of
Austrians from the Milanese by way of Genoa. The Austrian Governor of Milan promised to send
British Marines 1,500
" flank companies from Gibraltar 600
" " " " Ireland 2,000[250]
" Two battalions from Flanders (to be replaced by detachments
1,200
from the Guards)
" Cavalry from Ireland 900
Hessians from Flanders (to be replaced by the additional corps
5,000
ordered)
Spanish (suppose) 3,000
Neapolitan 6,000
Sardinian 9,000
Austrian 5,000
———
Total 33,200
[sic—really
34,200.]
This Force may be estimated (allowing for some deduction) at 30,000 men. To this may
possibly be added some Force from Corsica, and probably early in the spring, an
additional body of 11,000 Sardinians, perhaps also of 10,000 Austrians, and some troops
of Baden from hence. Possibly also a body of Swiss, and in the course of the next
summer (if the expedition to the West Indies is successful) about 4,000 or 5,000 British
on their return from the Islands. If 10,000, or 12,000, Swiss can be secured, it seems not
unreasonable to expect that, by the beginning of next year, there may be an army in the
South of France of near 60,000 men.
Pitt, then, regarded Toulon as the base of operations in the South of France so extensive as to deal
a decisive blow at the Republic. The scheme was surely due to the influence of Bacchus rather
than of Mars. For how was it possible to spare 6,200 men from the Duke of York's force, then hard
pressed after its retreat from Dunkirk? The estimate of the Sardinian contingent was based on the
treaty obligations of that Power rather than on probable performance; while that for the Spaniards
is strangely beneath the mark. How boyishly hopeful also to suppose that the British forces
destined for the future conquest of Corsica could spare a contingent for service in Provence in the
spring of 1794, and that the nervous little Court of Turin would send an additional body of 11,000
men far into France. Thus early in Pitt's strategic combinations we can detect the vitiating flaw. He
did not know men, and therefore he did not know Cabinets. He believed them to be acting
according to his own high standard of public duty and magnanimous endeavour. Consequently he
never allowed for the calculating meanness which shifted the burdens on to other shoulders.
The one factor on which he had a right to count was the despatch of a respectable force of
Austrians from the Milanese by way of Genoa. The Austrian Governor of Milan promised to send
Page 157
5,000 men; but not a man ever stirred.[251] Hood did not hear this disappointing news till 24th
November.[252] He at once sent off to London an urgent request for succour; and orders were given
on 23rd December (the day after the arrival of the news) for three regiments to sail from Cork for
his relief. Thus it came about that 12,000 Allies were left unsupported at Toulon to bear the brunt
of attacks of some 40,000 Frenchmen now directed by a genius. O'Hara, who took over the
command on his arrival on 27th October, at once gave a verdict consonant with his pessimistic
character. Hood wrote on the morrow to Dundas: "General O'Hara has just been with me and
alarmed me much. He says our posts are not tenable and that we are in a dangerous situation for
lack of troops that can be relied upon. And, what is very unpleasant, is the conduct of the
Spaniards, who are striving for power here." On 11th November O'Hara reported that, in the
absence of engineer officers, the forts had been injudiciously constructed; that their garrisons
began to suffer from exposure to the bleak weather; that the broken and wooded country greatly
favoured the advance of the enemy, and hampered all efforts to dislodge him; that the Spaniards
and Sardinians had no artillery, tools, or camp equipments; and that the only means of securing
Toulon was to have an army capable of taking the field.[253] Hood and he therefore counted the
hours for the arrival of 5,000 Austrians from Genoa, and of troops from England.
The difficulties of the Allies were enhanced by the disputes which soon arose between the British
and Spaniards as to the command of the garrison. The tactful Gravina having been badly wounded
in driving the French from Mount Faron, Langara put in a claim that his successor should be
commander-in-chief of the allied forces (23rd October). To this Hood stoutly demurred, on the
ground that he received Toulon in trust before the Spaniards appeared; and, though it was true that
the Spanish troops outnumbered the British, yet the command of the Neapolitan and Sardinian
contingents belonged of right to the subsidizing Power. He therefore claimed the supreme
command for General O'Hara. This matter caused much annoyance at Madrid, where that rankling
sore, Nootka Sound, was still kept open by the all-powerful Minister, Alcudia. Hood's testiness
increased the friction at Toulon. The Spaniards were justified in claiming equality at that fortress;
for only by their arrival did the position become tenable; and the joint proclamations of Hood and
Langara formed a tacit admission of that equality. But Pitt early resolved to take a firm stand on
this subject. On 17th October, in discussing the instructions for Sir Gilbert Elliot, the British
Commissioner designated for Toulon, he declared that we must appoint him governor of that town
in consequence of its surrender to us.[254]
Pitt kept up this stiff attitude, and on 30th November stated to St. Helens that, as Toulon
surrendered to Hood alone (Langara having declined to share in the original enterprise) England
must appoint the commander-in-chief, especially as she could not transfer to a Spaniard the
command of her subsidized Allies. The despatch concluded thus: "His Majesty has in no case any
view upon that place different from that which has been avowed in his name—that at the
conclusion of peace that port should be restored to the crown of France and that in the interval it
should serve in His Majesty's hands as a means of carrying on the war and as a pledge of
November.[252] He at once sent off to London an urgent request for succour; and orders were given
on 23rd December (the day after the arrival of the news) for three regiments to sail from Cork for
his relief. Thus it came about that 12,000 Allies were left unsupported at Toulon to bear the brunt
of attacks of some 40,000 Frenchmen now directed by a genius. O'Hara, who took over the
command on his arrival on 27th October, at once gave a verdict consonant with his pessimistic
character. Hood wrote on the morrow to Dundas: "General O'Hara has just been with me and
alarmed me much. He says our posts are not tenable and that we are in a dangerous situation for
lack of troops that can be relied upon. And, what is very unpleasant, is the conduct of the
Spaniards, who are striving for power here." On 11th November O'Hara reported that, in the
absence of engineer officers, the forts had been injudiciously constructed; that their garrisons
began to suffer from exposure to the bleak weather; that the broken and wooded country greatly
favoured the advance of the enemy, and hampered all efforts to dislodge him; that the Spaniards
and Sardinians had no artillery, tools, or camp equipments; and that the only means of securing
Toulon was to have an army capable of taking the field.[253] Hood and he therefore counted the
hours for the arrival of 5,000 Austrians from Genoa, and of troops from England.
The difficulties of the Allies were enhanced by the disputes which soon arose between the British
and Spaniards as to the command of the garrison. The tactful Gravina having been badly wounded
in driving the French from Mount Faron, Langara put in a claim that his successor should be
commander-in-chief of the allied forces (23rd October). To this Hood stoutly demurred, on the
ground that he received Toulon in trust before the Spaniards appeared; and, though it was true that
the Spanish troops outnumbered the British, yet the command of the Neapolitan and Sardinian
contingents belonged of right to the subsidizing Power. He therefore claimed the supreme
command for General O'Hara. This matter caused much annoyance at Madrid, where that rankling
sore, Nootka Sound, was still kept open by the all-powerful Minister, Alcudia. Hood's testiness
increased the friction at Toulon. The Spaniards were justified in claiming equality at that fortress;
for only by their arrival did the position become tenable; and the joint proclamations of Hood and
Langara formed a tacit admission of that equality. But Pitt early resolved to take a firm stand on
this subject. On 17th October, in discussing the instructions for Sir Gilbert Elliot, the British
Commissioner designated for Toulon, he declared that we must appoint him governor of that town
in consequence of its surrender to us.[254]
Pitt kept up this stiff attitude, and on 30th November stated to St. Helens that, as Toulon
surrendered to Hood alone (Langara having declined to share in the original enterprise) England
must appoint the commander-in-chief, especially as she could not transfer to a Spaniard the
command of her subsidized Allies. The despatch concluded thus: "His Majesty has in no case any
view upon that place different from that which has been avowed in his name—that at the
conclusion of peace that port should be restored to the crown of France and that in the interval it
should serve in His Majesty's hands as a means of carrying on the war and as a pledge of
Page 158
indemnity to him and his Allies, including the Crown of Spain, whose claim to indemnity His
Majesty has so distinctly avowed."[255]
These words were added because the French Royalists and the Spaniards asserted that England's
high-handed conduct at Toulon arose from her resolve to make of it a second Gibraltar. The
insinuation struck home then, and has been widely repeated.[256] But, on the first receipt of the
news of the gain of Toulon, Grenville declared explicitly to the Austrian Court "that whatever
indemnification is to be acquired by this country must be looked for in the foreign settlements and
colonies of France."[257] As we shall see in later chapters, Corsica and the French West Indies were
the acquisitions aimed at by the Pitt Ministry.
Some colour was given to this charge by the refusal of the British Government to allow the Comte
de Provence, the soi-disant Regent of France, to proceed to Toulon. Grenville even instructed
Francis Drake, our envoy at Genoa, to prevent him embarking at that port. At first sight this
conduct seems indefensible, especially as the Court of Madrid favoured the Prince's scheme. It
must be remembered, however, that the British Government had consistently refused to
acknowledge the Prince as Regent, and was now exceedingly annoyed with him for announcing
his resolve to go to Toulon, without first applying for permission to George III.[258] This violation
of etiquette prejudiced his case from the outset. Further, the Royalists of Toulon had declared for
Louis XVII, and a majority of them throughout France opposed the claim of "Monsieur" to the
Regency. The constitution of 1791 gave him no such right on his own initiative; and, as Toulon
stood for that constitution, not for the "pure" royalism which he now championed, his arrival
would place the garrison "at the discretion of wild and hot-headed emigrants and expose them to
the reproaches and discontents of the Regent's Court."[259] Besides, what could the Regent of
France do in Toulon, a town closely besieged and in danger of being taken? His dignity and
influence would be far better maintained by remaining at large than by proceeding thither.[260]
Finally, the two princes had given no assurance or promise that they would recognize the claims of
the Allies to indemnities from France for the expenses of the war.[261] On this last matter the
émigrés were beginning to raise shrill protests at London; and it was certainly wise to come to
some understanding with the princes on this point before they were put in possession of Provence.
Pitt and Grenville were not made of the same stuff as the Ministers in power in 1815, who
demanded no return for the sacrifices of blood and treasure in the Waterloo campaign. None the
less, it is certain that Pitt and his cousin had no thought of keeping either Dunkirk or Toulon, save
as a pledge for the acquisition of some of the French West Indies and Corsica.[262] This was hinted
at plainly in the British Declaration issued at Toulon on 20th November:
That altho' at the conclusion of peace, we shall think ourselves entitled to stipulate such
terms as may afford just security to ourselves and our Allies, and a reasonable
indemnification for the risks and expenses of a war in which, without any provocation on
Majesty has so distinctly avowed."[255]
These words were added because the French Royalists and the Spaniards asserted that England's
high-handed conduct at Toulon arose from her resolve to make of it a second Gibraltar. The
insinuation struck home then, and has been widely repeated.[256] But, on the first receipt of the
news of the gain of Toulon, Grenville declared explicitly to the Austrian Court "that whatever
indemnification is to be acquired by this country must be looked for in the foreign settlements and
colonies of France."[257] As we shall see in later chapters, Corsica and the French West Indies were
the acquisitions aimed at by the Pitt Ministry.
Some colour was given to this charge by the refusal of the British Government to allow the Comte
de Provence, the soi-disant Regent of France, to proceed to Toulon. Grenville even instructed
Francis Drake, our envoy at Genoa, to prevent him embarking at that port. At first sight this
conduct seems indefensible, especially as the Court of Madrid favoured the Prince's scheme. It
must be remembered, however, that the British Government had consistently refused to
acknowledge the Prince as Regent, and was now exceedingly annoyed with him for announcing
his resolve to go to Toulon, without first applying for permission to George III.[258] This violation
of etiquette prejudiced his case from the outset. Further, the Royalists of Toulon had declared for
Louis XVII, and a majority of them throughout France opposed the claim of "Monsieur" to the
Regency. The constitution of 1791 gave him no such right on his own initiative; and, as Toulon
stood for that constitution, not for the "pure" royalism which he now championed, his arrival
would place the garrison "at the discretion of wild and hot-headed emigrants and expose them to
the reproaches and discontents of the Regent's Court."[259] Besides, what could the Regent of
France do in Toulon, a town closely besieged and in danger of being taken? His dignity and
influence would be far better maintained by remaining at large than by proceeding thither.[260]
Finally, the two princes had given no assurance or promise that they would recognize the claims of
the Allies to indemnities from France for the expenses of the war.[261] On this last matter the
émigrés were beginning to raise shrill protests at London; and it was certainly wise to come to
some understanding with the princes on this point before they were put in possession of Provence.
Pitt and Grenville were not made of the same stuff as the Ministers in power in 1815, who
demanded no return for the sacrifices of blood and treasure in the Waterloo campaign. None the
less, it is certain that Pitt and his cousin had no thought of keeping either Dunkirk or Toulon, save
as a pledge for the acquisition of some of the French West Indies and Corsica.[262] This was hinted
at plainly in the British Declaration issued at Toulon on 20th November:
That altho' at the conclusion of peace, we shall think ourselves entitled to stipulate such
terms as may afford just security to ourselves and our Allies, and a reasonable
indemnification for the risks and expenses of a war in which, without any provocation on
Page 159
our part, we have been compelled to engage, yet that, for our part our views of
indemnification can only have relation to places not on the Continent of Europe.
After this explicit statement, there ought to have been no bickerings about British aggrandisement
at Toulon. Some of the hot-heads in that town (echoed by Fox later on at Westminster) chose to
consider the Declaration as an infraction of Hood's promise that he would hold Toulon merely in
trust for Louis XVII. The difference, however was not vital. Pitt and Grenville intended to hold
Toulon merely as a pledge that the British claims to an indemnity elsewhere would be satisfied.
Spain had most cause for annoyance with the Declaration, inasmuch as she, though having a
superior number of troops in that town, was neither allowed to consider it as a pledge for her future
indemnities, nor to share in its government. It was confided to three Commissioners—Sir Gilbert
Elliot, Hood, and O'Hara, Elliot being virtually Governor.
In one other matter the Courts of St. James and of Madrid were at variance. The latter urged the
need of speedily removing the French warships from Toulon to a Spanish port, or of making
preparations for burning them. Whereas Pitt, who regarded Toulon, not as a windfall, but as a base
of operations for a campaign in Provence, maintained that such conduct must blight their
prospects. With phenomenal stupidity, Langara allowed his secret instructions on this topic to leak
out, thereby rousing the rage of the Toulonese and the contempt of his British colleagues. The
Duke of Alcudia (better known as Godoy) expressed sincere regret for this bêtise. But the mischief
was done. The French royalists thenceforth figured as traitors who had let in a band of thieves
intent only on the seizure of the French warships.
As if this were not enough, Hood quarrelled with our military officers, with results highly
exasperating to our land forces.[263] These last did not shine during the siege. True, in the sortie of
29th November they captured a battery recently erected north of Malbosquet; but, their eagerness
exceeding their discipline, they rushed on, despite orders to remain in the battery, like a pack of
hounds after a fox (wrote Hood);[264] whereupon the French rushed upon them, driving them back
with heavy loss. O'Hara, while striving to retrieve the day, was wounded and captured. His mantle
of gloom devolved upon Major-General David Dundas, a desponding officer, who had recently
requested leave to return on furlough on the ground of ill health and inability to cope with the
work. This general's letters to his ever confident relative, Henry Dundas, at Whitehall, were always
in a minor key. In his eyes the Spanish troops were "everything that is bad"; half of the Toulonese
were hostile to the Allies; and the latter were heavily handicapped by having to defend their own
fleets. There was some truth in this; but the whining tone of the letters, due to ill health, drew from
the Minister a stinging retort, to the effect that the occupation of Toulon had taken Ministers
wholly by surprise; that they had done their best to comply with the new demands for troops, and
expected their general not to look at his own difficulties alone, but to remember those of the
enemy and endeavour to beat him.[265]
indemnification can only have relation to places not on the Continent of Europe.
After this explicit statement, there ought to have been no bickerings about British aggrandisement
at Toulon. Some of the hot-heads in that town (echoed by Fox later on at Westminster) chose to
consider the Declaration as an infraction of Hood's promise that he would hold Toulon merely in
trust for Louis XVII. The difference, however was not vital. Pitt and Grenville intended to hold
Toulon merely as a pledge that the British claims to an indemnity elsewhere would be satisfied.
Spain had most cause for annoyance with the Declaration, inasmuch as she, though having a
superior number of troops in that town, was neither allowed to consider it as a pledge for her future
indemnities, nor to share in its government. It was confided to three Commissioners—Sir Gilbert
Elliot, Hood, and O'Hara, Elliot being virtually Governor.
In one other matter the Courts of St. James and of Madrid were at variance. The latter urged the
need of speedily removing the French warships from Toulon to a Spanish port, or of making
preparations for burning them. Whereas Pitt, who regarded Toulon, not as a windfall, but as a base
of operations for a campaign in Provence, maintained that such conduct must blight their
prospects. With phenomenal stupidity, Langara allowed his secret instructions on this topic to leak
out, thereby rousing the rage of the Toulonese and the contempt of his British colleagues. The
Duke of Alcudia (better known as Godoy) expressed sincere regret for this bêtise. But the mischief
was done. The French royalists thenceforth figured as traitors who had let in a band of thieves
intent only on the seizure of the French warships.
As if this were not enough, Hood quarrelled with our military officers, with results highly
exasperating to our land forces.[263] These last did not shine during the siege. True, in the sortie of
29th November they captured a battery recently erected north of Malbosquet; but, their eagerness
exceeding their discipline, they rushed on, despite orders to remain in the battery, like a pack of
hounds after a fox (wrote Hood);[264] whereupon the French rushed upon them, driving them back
with heavy loss. O'Hara, while striving to retrieve the day, was wounded and captured. His mantle
of gloom devolved upon Major-General David Dundas, a desponding officer, who had recently
requested leave to return on furlough on the ground of ill health and inability to cope with the
work. This general's letters to his ever confident relative, Henry Dundas, at Whitehall, were always
in a minor key. In his eyes the Spanish troops were "everything that is bad"; half of the Toulonese
were hostile to the Allies; and the latter were heavily handicapped by having to defend their own
fleets. There was some truth in this; but the whining tone of the letters, due to ill health, drew from
the Minister a stinging retort, to the effect that the occupation of Toulon had taken Ministers
wholly by surprise; that they had done their best to comply with the new demands for troops, and
expected their general not to look at his own difficulties alone, but to remember those of the
enemy and endeavour to beat him.[265]
Page 160
This was the spirit in which Hood faced the problem. Even at the close of November, when all
hope of the arrival of the 5,000 Austrians was past, he refused to listen to David Dundas's advice
for the evacuation of Toulon; and surely this pertinacity was consonant with the traditions of the
British navy, and of the army in its better days; but out of this question arose a feud between army
and navy which developed in Corsica with disastrous results. Ministers strove to send all the
succour available. But they did not hear until 22nd December that the 5,000 Austrians were being
withheld. Henry Dundas's letter of the 28th also breathes deep concern at the news that Sir R.
Boyd had not forwarded from Gibraltar the reinforcements ordered thence. Further, it appears from
an official estimate drawn up at Whitehall on 18th December, that the troops already at or ordered
to Toulon were believed to be as follows: British, 2,828; Spanish, 4,147; Sardinians, 2,162;
Neapolitans, 8,600. Dundas also included the 1,100 British troops ordered from Gibraltar (where at
that time there was no chance of an attack), and 2,361 men under directions to sail from Cork, but
which could not stir owing to the non-arrival of the transports.[266] The resulting total of 21,198 is,
of course, merely a sign of Henry Dundas's optimism. But obviously Ministers were unaware of
the acute crisis at Toulon at the time of its surrender. In the age of telegraphy, that disaster would
have been averted. The delays of the Austrians, and the muddles at Gibraltar and Cork, would have
been known betimes.
Strange to say, there was at that time lying at anchor at Spithead a force under Lord Moira's
command, destined for Brittany, but held back for various causes, which would probably have
turned the balance at Toulon, had Ministers known of the dire need of reinforcements. It is
mortifying to read the letters of Pitt and the Marquis of Buckingham early in December,
complaining that Moira's force is strangely inactive.[267] Still more startling is it to read the hurried
order of 23rd December (six days after the loss of Toulon), that the 40th regiment, then
unexpectedly detained at Cork, though detached for service with Lord Moira, should set sail at
once for the French stronghold along with the other regiments also detained at Cork.[268] What
might not have happened, had those troops set sail for Toulon before the close of November?
Hero-worshippers will probably maintain that, even if Toulon had been held harmoniously by all
the troops which the imagination of Pitt and Dundas conjured up, nevertheless the genius and
daring of the little Corsican would have prevailed. This view is tenable; but the prosaic mind,
which notes the venturesome extension of Bonaparte's batteries in November–December, until
they presented their right flanks to the cliffs and their rear to the open sea, though at too high a
level to be cannonaded, will probably conclude that, if Hood and Langara had had a force of
20,000 men, they could have driven the French from those works. As it was, the Allies, not having
enough men, stood on the defensive all along their very extensive front, and were overpowered at
Fort Mulgrave, which was some miles away from the city. Its garrison of 700 men (British,
Spanish, and a few Neapolitans) was assailed in the stormy night of 16th–17th December by 7,000
of the best of the Republican troops. The ensuing conflict will best be understood from the hitherto
hope of the arrival of the 5,000 Austrians was past, he refused to listen to David Dundas's advice
for the evacuation of Toulon; and surely this pertinacity was consonant with the traditions of the
British navy, and of the army in its better days; but out of this question arose a feud between army
and navy which developed in Corsica with disastrous results. Ministers strove to send all the
succour available. But they did not hear until 22nd December that the 5,000 Austrians were being
withheld. Henry Dundas's letter of the 28th also breathes deep concern at the news that Sir R.
Boyd had not forwarded from Gibraltar the reinforcements ordered thence. Further, it appears from
an official estimate drawn up at Whitehall on 18th December, that the troops already at or ordered
to Toulon were believed to be as follows: British, 2,828; Spanish, 4,147; Sardinians, 2,162;
Neapolitans, 8,600. Dundas also included the 1,100 British troops ordered from Gibraltar (where at
that time there was no chance of an attack), and 2,361 men under directions to sail from Cork, but
which could not stir owing to the non-arrival of the transports.[266] The resulting total of 21,198 is,
of course, merely a sign of Henry Dundas's optimism. But obviously Ministers were unaware of
the acute crisis at Toulon at the time of its surrender. In the age of telegraphy, that disaster would
have been averted. The delays of the Austrians, and the muddles at Gibraltar and Cork, would have
been known betimes.
Strange to say, there was at that time lying at anchor at Spithead a force under Lord Moira's
command, destined for Brittany, but held back for various causes, which would probably have
turned the balance at Toulon, had Ministers known of the dire need of reinforcements. It is
mortifying to read the letters of Pitt and the Marquis of Buckingham early in December,
complaining that Moira's force is strangely inactive.[267] Still more startling is it to read the hurried
order of 23rd December (six days after the loss of Toulon), that the 40th regiment, then
unexpectedly detained at Cork, though detached for service with Lord Moira, should set sail at
once for the French stronghold along with the other regiments also detained at Cork.[268] What
might not have happened, had those troops set sail for Toulon before the close of November?
Hero-worshippers will probably maintain that, even if Toulon had been held harmoniously by all
the troops which the imagination of Pitt and Dundas conjured up, nevertheless the genius and
daring of the little Corsican would have prevailed. This view is tenable; but the prosaic mind,
which notes the venturesome extension of Bonaparte's batteries in November–December, until
they presented their right flanks to the cliffs and their rear to the open sea, though at too high a
level to be cannonaded, will probably conclude that, if Hood and Langara had had a force of
20,000 men, they could have driven the French from those works. As it was, the Allies, not having
enough men, stood on the defensive all along their very extensive front, and were overpowered at
Fort Mulgrave, which was some miles away from the city. Its garrison of 700 men (British,
Spanish, and a few Neapolitans) was assailed in the stormy night of 16th–17th December by 7,000
of the best of the Republican troops. The ensuing conflict will best be understood from the hitherto
Page 161
unpublished account given by the commander-in-chief. After describing the heavy cannonade from
three French batteries against Fort Mulgrave, he continues thus:
H.M.S. "Victory," Hières Bay, Dec. 21, 1793.[269]
... The works suffered much. The number of men killed and wounded was considerable.
The weather was rainy and the consequent fatigue great. At 2 a.m. of the 17th, the
enemy, who had every advantage in assembling and suddenly advancing, attacked the
fort in great force. Although no part of this temporary post was such as could well resist
determined troops, yet for a considerable time it was defended; but, on the enemy
entering on the Spanish side, the British quarter, commanded by Captain Conolly of the
18th regiment, could not be much longer maintained, notwithstanding several gallant
efforts were made for that purpose. It was therefore at last carried, and the remains of the
garrison of 700 men retired towards the shore of Balaguier, under the protection of the
other posts established on those heights, and which continued to be faintly attacked by
the enemy. As this position of Balaguier was a most essential one for the preservation of
the harbour, and as we had no communication with it but by water, 2,200 men had been
placed there for some time past. On the night preceding the attack, 300 more men had
been sent over, and on the morning of the 17th, 400 were embarked still further to
support it.
When the firing at Balaguier ceased, we remained in anxious suspense as to the event,
till a little before daylight, when a new scene opened by an attack on all our posts on Mt.
Pharon. The enemy were repulsed on the east side, where was our principal force of
about 700 men, commanded by a most distinguished officer, the Piedmontese Colonel,
de Jermagnan, whose loss we deeply lament; but on the back of the mountain—near
1,800 feet high, steep, rocky, deemed almost inaccessible, and which we had laboured
much to make so—they found means once more to penetrate between our posts, which
occupied an extent of above two miles, guarded by about 450 men; and in a very short
space of time we saw that with great numbers they crowned all that side of the mountain
which overlooks the town.
In this despatch David Dundas proclaimed his own incompetence. For some time it had been
obvious that the Republicans were about to attack Fort Mulgrave, which everybody knew to be
essential to the defence of the fleet. Yet he took no steps to strengthen this "temporary post" so that
it might resist a determined attack. He also entrusted one half of the battery to the Spaniards whom
he had declared to be "everything that is bad." On his own showing, as many as 2,500 allied troops
were near at hand on the Balaguier or Eguilette heights to act as supports, before Bonaparte's
attack began; and 400 more were sent thither soon afterwards. A spirited attack by those troops on
the victors at Fort Mulgrave on its blind side might have retrieved the day; but a panic seized part
of the supports, whom Sidney Smith describes as rushing like swine towards the sea though the
enemy was only in a condition to attack "faintly." Hood was furious at this spiritless acceptance of
defeat; and in his despatch to Whitehall censured the troops for not making a timely effort;[270] but
three French batteries against Fort Mulgrave, he continues thus:
H.M.S. "Victory," Hières Bay, Dec. 21, 1793.[269]
... The works suffered much. The number of men killed and wounded was considerable.
The weather was rainy and the consequent fatigue great. At 2 a.m. of the 17th, the
enemy, who had every advantage in assembling and suddenly advancing, attacked the
fort in great force. Although no part of this temporary post was such as could well resist
determined troops, yet for a considerable time it was defended; but, on the enemy
entering on the Spanish side, the British quarter, commanded by Captain Conolly of the
18th regiment, could not be much longer maintained, notwithstanding several gallant
efforts were made for that purpose. It was therefore at last carried, and the remains of the
garrison of 700 men retired towards the shore of Balaguier, under the protection of the
other posts established on those heights, and which continued to be faintly attacked by
the enemy. As this position of Balaguier was a most essential one for the preservation of
the harbour, and as we had no communication with it but by water, 2,200 men had been
placed there for some time past. On the night preceding the attack, 300 more men had
been sent over, and on the morning of the 17th, 400 were embarked still further to
support it.
When the firing at Balaguier ceased, we remained in anxious suspense as to the event,
till a little before daylight, when a new scene opened by an attack on all our posts on Mt.
Pharon. The enemy were repulsed on the east side, where was our principal force of
about 700 men, commanded by a most distinguished officer, the Piedmontese Colonel,
de Jermagnan, whose loss we deeply lament; but on the back of the mountain—near
1,800 feet high, steep, rocky, deemed almost inaccessible, and which we had laboured
much to make so—they found means once more to penetrate between our posts, which
occupied an extent of above two miles, guarded by about 450 men; and in a very short
space of time we saw that with great numbers they crowned all that side of the mountain
which overlooks the town.
In this despatch David Dundas proclaimed his own incompetence. For some time it had been
obvious that the Republicans were about to attack Fort Mulgrave, which everybody knew to be
essential to the defence of the fleet. Yet he took no steps to strengthen this "temporary post" so that
it might resist a determined attack. He also entrusted one half of the battery to the Spaniards whom
he had declared to be "everything that is bad." On his own showing, as many as 2,500 allied troops
were near at hand on the Balaguier or Eguilette heights to act as supports, before Bonaparte's
attack began; and 400 more were sent thither soon afterwards. A spirited attack by those troops on
the victors at Fort Mulgrave on its blind side might have retrieved the day; but a panic seized part
of the supports, whom Sidney Smith describes as rushing like swine towards the sea though the
enemy was only in a condition to attack "faintly." Hood was furious at this spiritless acceptance of
defeat; and in his despatch to Whitehall censured the troops for not making a timely effort;[270] but
Page 162
as David Dundas had all along opined that the place was untenable, he decided to hold a council of
war. It registered the wishes of the desponding chief. The officers decided that it was impossible
either to retake the two positions lost, or to establish a post on the outer, or Cepet, peninsula,
capable of protecting the roadstead from the cross fires which the French would pour in from the
Balaguier and Cape Brun promontories.
During the next three days the evacuation took place amidst scenes of misery for the royalist
refugees that baffle the imagination. As many as 14,877 were crowded on board the British ships,
together with some 8,000 troops. At the same time Captains Sidney Smith, Hare, and Edge, with a
picked body of men burnt or otherwise damaged 27 French warships left in the harbour, while 18
were brought away by the Allies. Eleven of the twenty-seven were not seriously injured by the fire,
and they afterwards flew the tricolour. But the loss of 34 warships and nearly all the masts and
other valuable stores was a blow from which the French navy did not recover until Bonaparte
before his Egyptian expedition breathed his own matchless vigour into the administration. In ships
and stores, then, France suffered far more heavily than the Allies. Their losses elude the inquiries
of the statistician. They consisted in the utter discredit of the royalist cause throughout France, the
resentment that ever follows on clumsy or disloyal co-operation, and the revelation of the
hollowness of the imposing fabric of the First Coalition. In the south of France four nations failed
to hold a single fortress which her own sons had placed in their power.
The Nemesis which waits upon weakness and vacillation has rarely appeared in more mocking
guise than at the close of the year 1793. About the time when Toulon surrendered, the Austrian
Government finally came to the determination to despatch thither the 5,000 men which it had
formerly promised to send. Grenville received this news from Eden in the first days of 1794,
shortly after the surrender of the fortress was known. Thereupon he penned these bitter words: "If
the first promise had been fulfilled agreeably to the expectation which His Majesty was justified in
forming, the assistance of such a body of disciplined troops would have sufficed to ensure the
defence of that important post; and the injury which the common cause has sustained on this
occasion can be ascribed only to the tardiness and indecision which so strongly characterize the
Austrian Government."[271] Most tactfully he bade Eden refrain from reproaches on this occasion
and to use it merely as an argument for throwing greater vigour into the next campaign.
Events pointed the moral far more strongly than Eden could do. As by a lightning flash, the
purblind politicians of Vienna could now discern the storm-wrack drifting upon them. The
weakness of the Piedmontese army, their own unpreparedness in the Milanese, the friendliness of
Genoa to France, and the Jacobinical ferment in all parts of Italy, portended a speedy irruption of
the Republicans into an almost defenceless land where they were sure of a welcome from the now
awakened populace. So long as Toulon held out, Piedmont and Milan were safe. Now, the
slackness of Austria enabled her future destroyer to place his foot on the first rung of the ladder of
war. It registered the wishes of the desponding chief. The officers decided that it was impossible
either to retake the two positions lost, or to establish a post on the outer, or Cepet, peninsula,
capable of protecting the roadstead from the cross fires which the French would pour in from the
Balaguier and Cape Brun promontories.
During the next three days the evacuation took place amidst scenes of misery for the royalist
refugees that baffle the imagination. As many as 14,877 were crowded on board the British ships,
together with some 8,000 troops. At the same time Captains Sidney Smith, Hare, and Edge, with a
picked body of men burnt or otherwise damaged 27 French warships left in the harbour, while 18
were brought away by the Allies. Eleven of the twenty-seven were not seriously injured by the fire,
and they afterwards flew the tricolour. But the loss of 34 warships and nearly all the masts and
other valuable stores was a blow from which the French navy did not recover until Bonaparte
before his Egyptian expedition breathed his own matchless vigour into the administration. In ships
and stores, then, France suffered far more heavily than the Allies. Their losses elude the inquiries
of the statistician. They consisted in the utter discredit of the royalist cause throughout France, the
resentment that ever follows on clumsy or disloyal co-operation, and the revelation of the
hollowness of the imposing fabric of the First Coalition. In the south of France four nations failed
to hold a single fortress which her own sons had placed in their power.
The Nemesis which waits upon weakness and vacillation has rarely appeared in more mocking
guise than at the close of the year 1793. About the time when Toulon surrendered, the Austrian
Government finally came to the determination to despatch thither the 5,000 men which it had
formerly promised to send. Grenville received this news from Eden in the first days of 1794,
shortly after the surrender of the fortress was known. Thereupon he penned these bitter words: "If
the first promise had been fulfilled agreeably to the expectation which His Majesty was justified in
forming, the assistance of such a body of disciplined troops would have sufficed to ensure the
defence of that important post; and the injury which the common cause has sustained on this
occasion can be ascribed only to the tardiness and indecision which so strongly characterize the
Austrian Government."[271] Most tactfully he bade Eden refrain from reproaches on this occasion
and to use it merely as an argument for throwing greater vigour into the next campaign.
Events pointed the moral far more strongly than Eden could do. As by a lightning flash, the
purblind politicians of Vienna could now discern the storm-wrack drifting upon them. The
weakness of the Piedmontese army, their own unpreparedness in the Milanese, the friendliness of
Genoa to France, and the Jacobinical ferment in all parts of Italy, portended a speedy irruption of
the Republicans into an almost defenceless land where they were sure of a welcome from the now
awakened populace. So long as Toulon held out, Piedmont and Milan were safe. Now, the
slackness of Austria enabled her future destroyer to place his foot on the first rung of the ladder of
Page 163
fame, and prompted those mighty plans for the conquest of the Italian States which were to ensure
her overthrow and his supremacy.
Well might Eden dwell on the consternation prevalent at Vienna early in 1794. For, along with
news of the loss of Toulon, tidings of defeat and retreat came from the Rhineland. Able and
vigorous young generals, Hoche and Pichegru, had beaten back Austrians and Prussians from the
hills around Wörth and Weissenburg; so that the Allies fell back with heavy losses towards the
Rhine. Thus, on the whole, the efforts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Holland, and some of the
smaller German States had availed merely to capture four fortresses, Mainz, Condé, Valenciennes,
and Quesnoy. It is not surprising that public opinion in England, even in loyal circles, became
clamorous against the conduct of the war.[272]
Not the least of the misfortunes attending the Toulon episode was that the logic of events, and also
the growing savagery of the Reign of Terror, edged Pitt away from his standpoint of complete
neutrality as to the future government of France. How could the ally of the Toulonese Royalists
profess indifference on that topic? On 5th October he wrote as follows to Grenville respecting the
powers to be granted to Sir Gilbert Elliot at Toulon:
I do not see that we can go on secure grounds if we treat with any separate districts or
bodies of men [in France] who stop short of some declaration in favour of monarchy: nor
do I see any way so likely to unite considerable numbers in one vigorous effort as by
specifying monarchy as the only system in the re-establishment of which we are
disposed to concur. This idea by no means precludes us from treating with any other
form of regular Government, if, in the end, any other should be solidly established; but it
holds out monarchy as the only one from which we expect any good, and in favour of
which we are disposed to enter into concert.[273]
These words are remarkable. Clearly, in Pitt's view of things, "security" for England and Holland
was the paramount aim; but he was beginning to feel that the Republican groups which scrambled
to power at Paris over the headless trunks of their enemies, could offer no adequate security. When
the Revolution began to solidify, as it seemed about to do in 1795–7, he was willing to treat with
its chiefs; but already he was feeling the horns of the dilemma, which may be described in words
adapted from Talleyrand's famous mot of the year 1814: "Either the Bourbons or the Republic:
everything else is an intrigue." The Toulon episode, more than anything else, bound France to the
regicide cause, and Pitt, albeit unwillingly, to the irreconcilable Royalists. Thus the event which
brought Bonaparte to the front, shattered the aim of the Prime Minister to effect merely the
restoration of the Balance of Power.
her overthrow and his supremacy.
Well might Eden dwell on the consternation prevalent at Vienna early in 1794. For, along with
news of the loss of Toulon, tidings of defeat and retreat came from the Rhineland. Able and
vigorous young generals, Hoche and Pichegru, had beaten back Austrians and Prussians from the
hills around Wörth and Weissenburg; so that the Allies fell back with heavy losses towards the
Rhine. Thus, on the whole, the efforts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Holland, and some of the
smaller German States had availed merely to capture four fortresses, Mainz, Condé, Valenciennes,
and Quesnoy. It is not surprising that public opinion in England, even in loyal circles, became
clamorous against the conduct of the war.[272]
Not the least of the misfortunes attending the Toulon episode was that the logic of events, and also
the growing savagery of the Reign of Terror, edged Pitt away from his standpoint of complete
neutrality as to the future government of France. How could the ally of the Toulonese Royalists
profess indifference on that topic? On 5th October he wrote as follows to Grenville respecting the
powers to be granted to Sir Gilbert Elliot at Toulon:
I do not see that we can go on secure grounds if we treat with any separate districts or
bodies of men [in France] who stop short of some declaration in favour of monarchy: nor
do I see any way so likely to unite considerable numbers in one vigorous effort as by
specifying monarchy as the only system in the re-establishment of which we are
disposed to concur. This idea by no means precludes us from treating with any other
form of regular Government, if, in the end, any other should be solidly established; but it
holds out monarchy as the only one from which we expect any good, and in favour of
which we are disposed to enter into concert.[273]
These words are remarkable. Clearly, in Pitt's view of things, "security" for England and Holland
was the paramount aim; but he was beginning to feel that the Republican groups which scrambled
to power at Paris over the headless trunks of their enemies, could offer no adequate security. When
the Revolution began to solidify, as it seemed about to do in 1795–7, he was willing to treat with
its chiefs; but already he was feeling the horns of the dilemma, which may be described in words
adapted from Talleyrand's famous mot of the year 1814: "Either the Bourbons or the Republic:
everything else is an intrigue." The Toulon episode, more than anything else, bound France to the
regicide cause, and Pitt, albeit unwillingly, to the irreconcilable Royalists. Thus the event which
brought Bonaparte to the front, shattered the aim of the Prime Minister to effect merely the
restoration of the Balance of Power.
Page 164
The House of Commons in 1793. (From a painting in the National Gallery by K. A. Hickel)
Page 165
CHAPTER VII
THE BRITISH JACOBINS
The much better way doubtless will be, in this wavering
condition of our affairs, to defer the changing or
circumscribing of our Senate more than may be done with
ease till the Commonwealth be thoroughly settled in peace
and safety.—Milton, A Free Commonwealth.
But cease, ye fleecing Senators
Your country to undo,
Or know, we British sans-culottes
Hereafter may fleece you.
Thelwall, A Shearing Song.
The outbreak of hostilities often tends to embitter the strife of parties. Those who oppose war find
abundant cause for criticism in the conduct of Ministers, who in their turn perforce adopt measures
alien to the traditions of Westminster. A system founded on compromise cannot suddenly take on
the ways of a military State; and efforts in this direction generally produce more friction than
activity. At such times John Bull, flurried and angry, short-sighted but opinionated, bewildered but
dogged as ever, is a sight to move the gods to laughter and his counsellors to despair.
The events of the session of 1793 illustrate my meaning. In view of the notorious sympathy of the
Radical Clubs with France, Pitt proposed a Bill against Traitorous Correspondence with the enemy.
Both he and Burke proved that the measure, far from being an insidious attack on the liberties of
the subject, merely aimed at enforcing "the police of war." Nevertheless, it passed only by a
majority of one—a warning to the Ministry not to proceed further in that doubtful course (9th
April 1793). Pitt had the full support of the House in opposing Grey's motion for Parliamentary
Reform, which was thrown out by 282 votes to 41. The war spirit also appeared in a sharp rebuff
given to Wilberforce and the Abolitionists on 14th May. The institution of a Board of Agriculture
(which Hussey, Sheridan, and Fox opposed as a piece of jobbery) and the renewal of the Charter of
the East India Company were the chief practical results of that session. But the barrenness of the
session, the passing of the Traitorous Correspondence Bill, and the hardships connected with the
balloting for the militia stirred the Radical Clubs to redoubled energy; so that home affairs for two
THE BRITISH JACOBINS
The much better way doubtless will be, in this wavering
condition of our affairs, to defer the changing or
circumscribing of our Senate more than may be done with
ease till the Commonwealth be thoroughly settled in peace
and safety.—Milton, A Free Commonwealth.
But cease, ye fleecing Senators
Your country to undo,
Or know, we British sans-culottes
Hereafter may fleece you.
Thelwall, A Shearing Song.
The outbreak of hostilities often tends to embitter the strife of parties. Those who oppose war find
abundant cause for criticism in the conduct of Ministers, who in their turn perforce adopt measures
alien to the traditions of Westminster. A system founded on compromise cannot suddenly take on
the ways of a military State; and efforts in this direction generally produce more friction than
activity. At such times John Bull, flurried and angry, short-sighted but opinionated, bewildered but
dogged as ever, is a sight to move the gods to laughter and his counsellors to despair.
The events of the session of 1793 illustrate my meaning. In view of the notorious sympathy of the
Radical Clubs with France, Pitt proposed a Bill against Traitorous Correspondence with the enemy.
Both he and Burke proved that the measure, far from being an insidious attack on the liberties of
the subject, merely aimed at enforcing "the police of war." Nevertheless, it passed only by a
majority of one—a warning to the Ministry not to proceed further in that doubtful course (9th
April 1793). Pitt had the full support of the House in opposing Grey's motion for Parliamentary
Reform, which was thrown out by 282 votes to 41. The war spirit also appeared in a sharp rebuff
given to Wilberforce and the Abolitionists on 14th May. The institution of a Board of Agriculture
(which Hussey, Sheridan, and Fox opposed as a piece of jobbery) and the renewal of the Charter of
the East India Company were the chief practical results of that session. But the barrenness of the
session, the passing of the Traitorous Correspondence Bill, and the hardships connected with the
balloting for the militia stirred the Radical Clubs to redoubled energy; so that home affairs for two
Page 166
or three years centred in their propaganda and in Pitt's repressive efforts. The development of a
keen political consciousness in the masses is a subject of so much interest that I may be pardoned
for dwelling on it somewhat fully, with the aid of new materials drawn from the Home Office
Archives.
There we see the causes of unrest. Hunger, hatred of the militia laws, chafing against restraints
entailed by the war, all conduce to discontent. The newly awakened Caliban is also a prey to
suspicion. He hates foreigners. Yet, either as refugees or prisoners, they swarm along the south
coast (there were for a time 5,000 prisoners in Winchester). Fishermen are tempted to help in their
escape, and a mariner of Emsworth is arraigned for treason on this count. Even so far west as
Bodmin the prisoners are numerous and threatening. They convince many of the townsfolk that
England would be better off as a Republic; and two patriotic ladies in fear and horror inform Lord
Mount Edgcumbe anonymously that Frenchmen cut a mark round the neck of King George on all
coins. The vicar of Ringmer, near Lewes, reports that the smugglers of the Sussex coast carry on a
regular intercourse with France. In the Isle of Wight even the French royalists, who are there
awaiting the despatch of Lord Moira's long-deferred expedition to Brittany, figure as murderous
Jacobins. In Bath, too, the mayor, Mr. Harington, is troubled by the influx of Gallic artists and
dancing-masters, especially as they mix in all the "routs," and dare even there to whisper treason
against King George. Another report comes that a French usher in a large school near London—
was it Harrow?—has converted several of the boys to republicanism. Clearly, these are cases for
the Aliens Act.
Even Britons, untainted by Gallic connections, are suspect. At Billingsgate a soldier swears that he
was set upon at night because he wore the uniform of "a d——d tyrant"; and other evidence proves
that the service was unpopular for political reasons as well as the poor pay. Farmers are plied by
emissaries of the clubs as they come in to market. Complaints come to Dundas that farmers and
shippers on the coasts of Lancashire and Cumberland sell corn to "the natural enemy."
The discontent takes colour from its surroundings. At Pocklington in Yorkshire the villagers
threaten to burn the magistrates in their houses in revenge for the conviction of poachers. The
rowdies of Olney in Bucks. (formerly a sore trial to Cowper and John Newton) terrorize the
neighbourhood. Everywhere the high price of corn produces irritation. The tinworkers of North
Cornwall march in force to Padstow to prevent the exportation of corn from that little harbour;
otherwise they are law-abiding, though a magistrate warns Dundas that local malcontents are
setting them against the Government. Multiply these typical cases a thousand fold, and it will be
seen that the old rural system is strained to breaking point. The amenities of the rule of the squires
are now paid back, and that, too, at a time when England needs one mind, one heart, one soul. At
and near Sheffield serious riots break out owing to the enclosures of common-fields and wastes,
the houses of the agricultural "reformers" being burnt or wrecked. On the whole, however, I have
found fewer references to enclosures than might be expected.[274]
keen political consciousness in the masses is a subject of so much interest that I may be pardoned
for dwelling on it somewhat fully, with the aid of new materials drawn from the Home Office
Archives.
There we see the causes of unrest. Hunger, hatred of the militia laws, chafing against restraints
entailed by the war, all conduce to discontent. The newly awakened Caliban is also a prey to
suspicion. He hates foreigners. Yet, either as refugees or prisoners, they swarm along the south
coast (there were for a time 5,000 prisoners in Winchester). Fishermen are tempted to help in their
escape, and a mariner of Emsworth is arraigned for treason on this count. Even so far west as
Bodmin the prisoners are numerous and threatening. They convince many of the townsfolk that
England would be better off as a Republic; and two patriotic ladies in fear and horror inform Lord
Mount Edgcumbe anonymously that Frenchmen cut a mark round the neck of King George on all
coins. The vicar of Ringmer, near Lewes, reports that the smugglers of the Sussex coast carry on a
regular intercourse with France. In the Isle of Wight even the French royalists, who are there
awaiting the despatch of Lord Moira's long-deferred expedition to Brittany, figure as murderous
Jacobins. In Bath, too, the mayor, Mr. Harington, is troubled by the influx of Gallic artists and
dancing-masters, especially as they mix in all the "routs," and dare even there to whisper treason
against King George. Another report comes that a French usher in a large school near London—
was it Harrow?—has converted several of the boys to republicanism. Clearly, these are cases for
the Aliens Act.
Even Britons, untainted by Gallic connections, are suspect. At Billingsgate a soldier swears that he
was set upon at night because he wore the uniform of "a d——d tyrant"; and other evidence proves
that the service was unpopular for political reasons as well as the poor pay. Farmers are plied by
emissaries of the clubs as they come in to market. Complaints come to Dundas that farmers and
shippers on the coasts of Lancashire and Cumberland sell corn to "the natural enemy."
The discontent takes colour from its surroundings. At Pocklington in Yorkshire the villagers
threaten to burn the magistrates in their houses in revenge for the conviction of poachers. The
rowdies of Olney in Bucks. (formerly a sore trial to Cowper and John Newton) terrorize the
neighbourhood. Everywhere the high price of corn produces irritation. The tinworkers of North
Cornwall march in force to Padstow to prevent the exportation of corn from that little harbour;
otherwise they are law-abiding, though a magistrate warns Dundas that local malcontents are
setting them against the Government. Multiply these typical cases a thousand fold, and it will be
seen that the old rural system is strained to breaking point. The amenities of the rule of the squires
are now paid back, and that, too, at a time when England needs one mind, one heart, one soul. At
and near Sheffield serious riots break out owing to the enclosures of common-fields and wastes,
the houses of the agricultural "reformers" being burnt or wrecked. On the whole, however, I have
found fewer references to enclosures than might be expected.[274]
Page 167
As generally happens in times of excitement, the towns are the first to voice the dumb or muttering
hatreds of the villages. Parisians led the Revolution in France, though its causes lay thickest and
deepest in the rural districts. Not until Paris "stormed" its castle did the villagers attack theirs. So,
too, in the muffled repetition of the revolutionary music which England sounds forth, the towns
buzz, while the country supplies but a dull ground-tone. Dearness of food and scarcity of work
were the chief causes of discontent. The spokesmen for the Spitalfields weavers, who number
14,000, sent up a temperate petition setting forth their distress; but, as is often the case in London,
their thoughts turned not to politics, but to practical means of cure. They stated that the trade in
velvets, brocades, and rich silks would be absolutely ruined unless steps were taken to revive the
fashion in these fabrics. In Liverpool there were far other grievances. There, as in all seaports, the
tyranny of the press-gang was sharply resented; and, early in November 1793, the populace
clamoured for the election of a "liberty-loving mayor," Mr. Tarleton, who promised to keep the
press-gang out of the town.[275]
In general the malcontents urged their case most pointedly in towns and villages, where branches
of the Radical Societies had taken root. These Societies or clubs continued to grow in number and
influence through the year 1793, the typical club being now concerned, not with faro, but with the
"Rights of Man." Some of the Reform Clubs sought to moderate the Gallicizing zeal of the
extreme wing. Thus, the "Friends of the People," whose subscription of two and a half guineas was
some guarantee for moderation, formally expressed their disapproval of Paine's works and all
Republican agencies—a futile declaration; for his "Rights of Man" was the very life-blood of the
new clubs. Working men had shown little or no interest in the earlier motions for Reform. The
Associations of the years 1780–5 had lapsed; and it was clearly the joint influence of the French
Revolution and Paine's productions which led to the remarkable awakening of the year 1792.
Besides the London Corresponding Society, started (as we saw in Chapter III) by Thomas Hardy
early in that year, there was another formidable organization, the Society for Constitutional
Information, founded in London at the close of 1791. It, too, was concerned with much more than
the Reform of Parliament; for on 18th May 1792 it recommended the publication in a cheap form
of Paine's "Rights of Man"; and on 21st November it appointed a Committee for Foreign
Correspondence. A little later were adopted some of the phrases used in the French Convention,
and St. André, Roland, and Barère were admitted to membership. It does not appear that either this
Society, or Hardy's, corresponded with France after the declaration of war; for the Parliamentary
Committee of Secrecy, charged in 1794 to report on seditious proceedings would, if it were
possible, have fastened on so compromising an act. Its members belonged to a higher class than
those of Hardy's Society; for they included Romney the painter, Holcroft the dramatist, Horne
Tooke, the humorous littérateur, and Thelwall, the ablest lecturer of the day.[276] That these men
had advanced far beyond the standpoint of the Whiggish "Friends of the People," appears from a
letter from one of the Norwich Radical Clubs to the London Corresponding Society:
hatreds of the villages. Parisians led the Revolution in France, though its causes lay thickest and
deepest in the rural districts. Not until Paris "stormed" its castle did the villagers attack theirs. So,
too, in the muffled repetition of the revolutionary music which England sounds forth, the towns
buzz, while the country supplies but a dull ground-tone. Dearness of food and scarcity of work
were the chief causes of discontent. The spokesmen for the Spitalfields weavers, who number
14,000, sent up a temperate petition setting forth their distress; but, as is often the case in London,
their thoughts turned not to politics, but to practical means of cure. They stated that the trade in
velvets, brocades, and rich silks would be absolutely ruined unless steps were taken to revive the
fashion in these fabrics. In Liverpool there were far other grievances. There, as in all seaports, the
tyranny of the press-gang was sharply resented; and, early in November 1793, the populace
clamoured for the election of a "liberty-loving mayor," Mr. Tarleton, who promised to keep the
press-gang out of the town.[275]
In general the malcontents urged their case most pointedly in towns and villages, where branches
of the Radical Societies had taken root. These Societies or clubs continued to grow in number and
influence through the year 1793, the typical club being now concerned, not with faro, but with the
"Rights of Man." Some of the Reform Clubs sought to moderate the Gallicizing zeal of the
extreme wing. Thus, the "Friends of the People," whose subscription of two and a half guineas was
some guarantee for moderation, formally expressed their disapproval of Paine's works and all
Republican agencies—a futile declaration; for his "Rights of Man" was the very life-blood of the
new clubs. Working men had shown little or no interest in the earlier motions for Reform. The
Associations of the years 1780–5 had lapsed; and it was clearly the joint influence of the French
Revolution and Paine's productions which led to the remarkable awakening of the year 1792.
Besides the London Corresponding Society, started (as we saw in Chapter III) by Thomas Hardy
early in that year, there was another formidable organization, the Society for Constitutional
Information, founded in London at the close of 1791. It, too, was concerned with much more than
the Reform of Parliament; for on 18th May 1792 it recommended the publication in a cheap form
of Paine's "Rights of Man"; and on 21st November it appointed a Committee for Foreign
Correspondence. A little later were adopted some of the phrases used in the French Convention,
and St. André, Roland, and Barère were admitted to membership. It does not appear that either this
Society, or Hardy's, corresponded with France after the declaration of war; for the Parliamentary
Committee of Secrecy, charged in 1794 to report on seditious proceedings would, if it were
possible, have fastened on so compromising an act. Its members belonged to a higher class than
those of Hardy's Society; for they included Romney the painter, Holcroft the dramatist, Horne
Tooke, the humorous littérateur, and Thelwall, the ablest lecturer of the day.[276] That these men
had advanced far beyond the standpoint of the Whiggish "Friends of the People," appears from a
letter from one of the Norwich Radical Clubs to the London Corresponding Society:
Page 168
The Friends of the People mean only a partial Reform, because they leave out words
expressing the Duke of Richmond's plan and talk only of a Reform; while the
Manchester people seem to intimate, by addressing Mr. Paine, as though they were intent
upon Republican principles only. Now, to come closer to the main question, it is only
desired to know whether the generality of the Societies mean to rest satisfied with the
Duke of Richmond's plan only, or whether it is their private design to rip up monarchy
by the roots and place democracy in its stead.[277]
These Societies seem to have put forth no definite programme. Their defenders claimed that they
adhered to the Westminster programme of 1780, championed by Fox and the Duke of Richmond.
But Fox strongly disapproved of their aims, and even refused to present their petition for annual
parliaments and universal suffrage.[278] In truth, the actions of these bodies belied their words.
They largely devoted their funds and their energies to the circulation in a cheap form of the works
of Paine, 200,000 copies being sold in 1793,[279] and still more in the following year. The Societies
also adopted methods of organization similar to those of the French Jacobins Club, and advocated
the assembly of a representative Convention. Every sixteen members of the London
Corresponding Society could form a division; and the divisions, by the process of swarming-off,
rapidly extended the organization. They also sent delegates who conferred on matters of
importance, either locally or at headquarters; and the head delegation finally claimed to represent
very large numbers in London and affiliated centres. In the conduct of details Spartan self-restraint
was everywhere manifest. Members were urged to be brief in their remarks and business-like in
their methods. Officials must give a solemn promise not to skulk, or make off, owing to
persecution; and members were warned that noisy declamation was not a proof of zeal but might
be a cloak for treachery. Above the chairman's seat was suspended a card with the words
—"Beware of Orators." One would like to have witnessed the proceedings of these dully earnest
men.
Both in the provinces and in London, reformers of the old type sought to curb the more dangerous
of these developments, especially correspondence with the Jacobins' Club at Paris. Thus, the
Manchester Constitutional Society having published its address of congratulation to that body,
together with the reply of Carras, a member, George Lloyd, entered a formal protest in these terms:
"We are not a Republican Society; but from such connection and correspondence we shall involve
ourselves in the imputation of Republicanism." He added that their aim was solely the Reform of
Parliament, and with that foreigners had no concern whatever.[280] Nevertheless the Society kept
up its foreign correspondence, and received addresses from Jacobin Clubs in France.
Another threatening symptom was the attempt to excite discontent among the soldiery. There being
then very few barracks, the men were quartered on the public houses; and several petitions were
sent to Whitehall by publicans (sometimes even by Corporations), pointing out the many
inconveniences of this custom. Thus in the autumn of 1793 the publicans of Winchester
expressing the Duke of Richmond's plan and talk only of a Reform; while the
Manchester people seem to intimate, by addressing Mr. Paine, as though they were intent
upon Republican principles only. Now, to come closer to the main question, it is only
desired to know whether the generality of the Societies mean to rest satisfied with the
Duke of Richmond's plan only, or whether it is their private design to rip up monarchy
by the roots and place democracy in its stead.[277]
These Societies seem to have put forth no definite programme. Their defenders claimed that they
adhered to the Westminster programme of 1780, championed by Fox and the Duke of Richmond.
But Fox strongly disapproved of their aims, and even refused to present their petition for annual
parliaments and universal suffrage.[278] In truth, the actions of these bodies belied their words.
They largely devoted their funds and their energies to the circulation in a cheap form of the works
of Paine, 200,000 copies being sold in 1793,[279] and still more in the following year. The Societies
also adopted methods of organization similar to those of the French Jacobins Club, and advocated
the assembly of a representative Convention. Every sixteen members of the London
Corresponding Society could form a division; and the divisions, by the process of swarming-off,
rapidly extended the organization. They also sent delegates who conferred on matters of
importance, either locally or at headquarters; and the head delegation finally claimed to represent
very large numbers in London and affiliated centres. In the conduct of details Spartan self-restraint
was everywhere manifest. Members were urged to be brief in their remarks and business-like in
their methods. Officials must give a solemn promise not to skulk, or make off, owing to
persecution; and members were warned that noisy declamation was not a proof of zeal but might
be a cloak for treachery. Above the chairman's seat was suspended a card with the words
—"Beware of Orators." One would like to have witnessed the proceedings of these dully earnest
men.
Both in the provinces and in London, reformers of the old type sought to curb the more dangerous
of these developments, especially correspondence with the Jacobins' Club at Paris. Thus, the
Manchester Constitutional Society having published its address of congratulation to that body,
together with the reply of Carras, a member, George Lloyd, entered a formal protest in these terms:
"We are not a Republican Society; but from such connection and correspondence we shall involve
ourselves in the imputation of Republicanism." He added that their aim was solely the Reform of
Parliament, and with that foreigners had no concern whatever.[280] Nevertheless the Society kept
up its foreign correspondence, and received addresses from Jacobin Clubs in France.
Another threatening symptom was the attempt to excite discontent among the soldiery. There being
then very few barracks, the men were quartered on the public houses; and several petitions were
sent to Whitehall by publicans (sometimes even by Corporations), pointing out the many
inconveniences of this custom. Thus in the autumn of 1793 the publicans of Winchester
Page 169
complained that they had had to lodge as many as 5,000 men during their passage through that
city, besides the Bucks. regiment stationed there, and they begged that barracks might be built. The
authorities paid the more heed to these petitions because local malcontents "got at" the soldiery in
the taverns, and brought home to them their grievances, namely, poor pay, insufficient allowance
for food at its enhanced prices, and the severities of discipline exercised by "effeminate puppies"
drawn from aristocratic circles. In particular they circulated a pamphlet—"The Soldiers' Friend: or
Considerations on the late pretended Augmentation of the Subsistence of the Private Soldiers"—
pointing out the close connection between the officers and "the ruling faction," which "ever must
exist while we suffer ourselves to be governed by a faction."
When the war with France unexpectedly lengthened out, the Ministry decided to erect new
barracks, accommodating 34,000 men, at a total expense of about £1,400,000. In the debate of 8th
April 1796, Fox and General Smith savagely assailed this proceeding as fatal to English liberty.
"Good God!" exclaimed Smith, "is every town to be made a citadel and every village converted
into a garrison?" Windham had little difficulty in showing that the old barracks were in general
badly situated, and not adapted for cavalry. Buildings for the use of 5,400 horsemen were now
erected; and on the whole question he asserted that the men would live more cheaply, and would
contract less vicious habits than when lodged in inns. Above all, they would be removed from the
sedition-mongers, who now plied them with doctrines destructive alike of loyalty and military
discipline. Windham then quoted a phrase from Molière's "Médecin malgré lui": "If I cannot make
him dumb, I will make you deaf."[281] The inference was that the inability of the Cabinet to silence
malcontents involved the expenditure of £1,400,000 partly in order to stop the ears of the soldiery.
Lord Bacon, in his pregnant aphorisms upon sedition, does not venture on a definition of that
indefinable term. Where, indeed, shall one draw the line between justifiable discontent and the
inciting of men to lawless and violent acts? We shall notice presently the claim of a Scottish judge
that an agitator may have good and upright intentions, and yet, if his words and acts lead to general
discontent, he is guilty of sedition and perhaps of high treason. At the other extreme of thought
stands the born malcontent. He is generally an idealist, having a keen sense of the miseries of
mankind and very imperfect notions as to the difficulty of peacefully and permanently ending
them. In times of political excitement the statesman has to deal with large bands of zealots nerved
by these irreconcilable principles. It was the misfortune of Pitt that he sought to hold together a
nation rent asunder by the doctrines of Burke and Paine. Compromise was out of the question; and
yet a British statesman cannot govern unless the majority of the people is ready for compromise.
His position becomes untenable if, while upholding the throne, he infuriates all friends of progress;
if, when he seeks to remove abuses, he is dubbed a traitor to King, Church, and Constitution. And
yet, to abandon his post because of these difficulties is not only cowardly, but also an act of
disloyalty alike to King and people.
city, besides the Bucks. regiment stationed there, and they begged that barracks might be built. The
authorities paid the more heed to these petitions because local malcontents "got at" the soldiery in
the taverns, and brought home to them their grievances, namely, poor pay, insufficient allowance
for food at its enhanced prices, and the severities of discipline exercised by "effeminate puppies"
drawn from aristocratic circles. In particular they circulated a pamphlet—"The Soldiers' Friend: or
Considerations on the late pretended Augmentation of the Subsistence of the Private Soldiers"—
pointing out the close connection between the officers and "the ruling faction," which "ever must
exist while we suffer ourselves to be governed by a faction."
When the war with France unexpectedly lengthened out, the Ministry decided to erect new
barracks, accommodating 34,000 men, at a total expense of about £1,400,000. In the debate of 8th
April 1796, Fox and General Smith savagely assailed this proceeding as fatal to English liberty.
"Good God!" exclaimed Smith, "is every town to be made a citadel and every village converted
into a garrison?" Windham had little difficulty in showing that the old barracks were in general
badly situated, and not adapted for cavalry. Buildings for the use of 5,400 horsemen were now
erected; and on the whole question he asserted that the men would live more cheaply, and would
contract less vicious habits than when lodged in inns. Above all, they would be removed from the
sedition-mongers, who now plied them with doctrines destructive alike of loyalty and military
discipline. Windham then quoted a phrase from Molière's "Médecin malgré lui": "If I cannot make
him dumb, I will make you deaf."[281] The inference was that the inability of the Cabinet to silence
malcontents involved the expenditure of £1,400,000 partly in order to stop the ears of the soldiery.
Lord Bacon, in his pregnant aphorisms upon sedition, does not venture on a definition of that
indefinable term. Where, indeed, shall one draw the line between justifiable discontent and the
inciting of men to lawless and violent acts? We shall notice presently the claim of a Scottish judge
that an agitator may have good and upright intentions, and yet, if his words and acts lead to general
discontent, he is guilty of sedition and perhaps of high treason. At the other extreme of thought
stands the born malcontent. He is generally an idealist, having a keen sense of the miseries of
mankind and very imperfect notions as to the difficulty of peacefully and permanently ending
them. In times of political excitement the statesman has to deal with large bands of zealots nerved
by these irreconcilable principles. It was the misfortune of Pitt that he sought to hold together a
nation rent asunder by the doctrines of Burke and Paine. Compromise was out of the question; and
yet a British statesman cannot govern unless the majority of the people is ready for compromise.
His position becomes untenable if, while upholding the throne, he infuriates all friends of progress;
if, when he seeks to remove abuses, he is dubbed a traitor to King, Church, and Constitution. And
yet, to abandon his post because of these difficulties is not only cowardly, but also an act of
disloyalty alike to King and people.
Page 170
As the political thermometer rose towards fever point through the years 1792–3, Government kept
closer watch upon the political Societies; but for a long time Pitt took no action against them. It
seems probable that, if they had confined themselves to their professed programme (that of the
Westminster Reformers of 1780) he would have remained passive. He did not prosecute those
which in November 1792 congratulated the French Convention on the triumph of its arms in
Belgium and the advent of a Gallic millennium. What, then, were the developments which met
with his stern opposition?
But, firstly, we must ask the question, Why did not Pitt, in view of the unswerving loyalty of the
great majority of Britons, rely on the good sense and weight of that mass to overbear the
Jacobinical minority? It is much to be regretted that he did not take that more intelligent and more
courageous course. But the events of the French Revolution seemed to show the need of early
taking decided measures against a resolute and desperate group. At half a dozen crises in the years
1789–92 firm action would have crushed the anarchic forces in Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles; but,
for lack of a strong guiding hand, those forces broke loose, with results which all genuine friends
of liberty have ever since deplored. It is perfectly certain that, if Mirabeau had had a free hand, he
would have used coercive measures by the side of which those of Pitt's so-called "Reign of Terror"
would have been but as a pop-gun to a cannon. Besides, to taunt Pitt with falseness to his
principles of the years 1782–5 is to ignore the patent facts that he advocated very moderate
changes in the representation. The Reform movement virtually collapsed in 1785. That which now
borrowed its watchwords was in the main a Republican and levelling agency. The creed of the
Radicals of 1793 was summed up, not in the academic programme of the Friends of the People, the
lineal heir to the earlier Associations, but in Part II of Paine's "Rights of Man."
Here, surely, are the reasons for Pitt's repressive policy. He entered on it regretfully, but he felt no
sense of inconsistency in his change of attitude towards Reform. The times had wholly changed;
and that movement changed with them. As Macaulay has well pointed out, Pitt never declared that,
under no circumstances, would he favour a moderate Reform of Parliament. But he did declare that
in his view Reform was at present highly perilous; and he resolutely set himself to the task of
coercing those men and those agencies who advocated it in dangerous forms and by lawless
methods.
The first prosecution that need be noticed here was directed against Paine for the seditious
utterances in the "Rights of Man," particularly in Part II. The Attorney-General made out a
formidable indictment, whereupon Paine, then a member of the French National Convention,
informed him that the prosecution might as well be directed against the man in the moon, and that
the liberties of the people of England were in reality on their trial. After this impertinence the
sentence went against Paine by default, and that, too, despite a skilful speech by Erskine
(December 1792). The aim of Government of course was to warn those who were circulating
Paine's works that their conduct was seditious and that they did so at their peril.
closer watch upon the political Societies; but for a long time Pitt took no action against them. It
seems probable that, if they had confined themselves to their professed programme (that of the
Westminster Reformers of 1780) he would have remained passive. He did not prosecute those
which in November 1792 congratulated the French Convention on the triumph of its arms in
Belgium and the advent of a Gallic millennium. What, then, were the developments which met
with his stern opposition?
But, firstly, we must ask the question, Why did not Pitt, in view of the unswerving loyalty of the
great majority of Britons, rely on the good sense and weight of that mass to overbear the
Jacobinical minority? It is much to be regretted that he did not take that more intelligent and more
courageous course. But the events of the French Revolution seemed to show the need of early
taking decided measures against a resolute and desperate group. At half a dozen crises in the years
1789–92 firm action would have crushed the anarchic forces in Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles; but,
for lack of a strong guiding hand, those forces broke loose, with results which all genuine friends
of liberty have ever since deplored. It is perfectly certain that, if Mirabeau had had a free hand, he
would have used coercive measures by the side of which those of Pitt's so-called "Reign of Terror"
would have been but as a pop-gun to a cannon. Besides, to taunt Pitt with falseness to his
principles of the years 1782–5 is to ignore the patent facts that he advocated very moderate
changes in the representation. The Reform movement virtually collapsed in 1785. That which now
borrowed its watchwords was in the main a Republican and levelling agency. The creed of the
Radicals of 1793 was summed up, not in the academic programme of the Friends of the People, the
lineal heir to the earlier Associations, but in Part II of Paine's "Rights of Man."
Here, surely, are the reasons for Pitt's repressive policy. He entered on it regretfully, but he felt no
sense of inconsistency in his change of attitude towards Reform. The times had wholly changed;
and that movement changed with them. As Macaulay has well pointed out, Pitt never declared that,
under no circumstances, would he favour a moderate Reform of Parliament. But he did declare that
in his view Reform was at present highly perilous; and he resolutely set himself to the task of
coercing those men and those agencies who advocated it in dangerous forms and by lawless
methods.
The first prosecution that need be noticed here was directed against Paine for the seditious
utterances in the "Rights of Man," particularly in Part II. The Attorney-General made out a
formidable indictment, whereupon Paine, then a member of the French National Convention,
informed him that the prosecution might as well be directed against the man in the moon, and that
the liberties of the people of England were in reality on their trial. After this impertinence the
sentence went against Paine by default, and that, too, despite a skilful speech by Erskine
(December 1792). The aim of Government of course was to warn those who were circulating
Paine's works that their conduct was seditious and that they did so at their peril.
Page 171
The Home Office Archives show that in very many cases the warning was disregarded, and several
prosecutions ensued, with varying results. Still more frequent were the cases of cursing the King,
sometimes in obscene terms. To these we need pay no heed. Frequently the offence was committed
in taverns by democrats in a state of mental exaltation. To this exciting cause we may probably
ascribe the folly of John Frost, the attorney with whom Pitt had some dealings during the Reform
agitation of 1782. He was now charged with exclaiming excitedly: "I am for equality"; and, when
challenged as to the meaning of his words, he added: "There ought to be no Kings." In this
connection it should be remembered that Frost and Barlow had on 28th November 1792 presented
to the French National Convention the most mischievous of all the addresses sent by Radical
Clubs to that body. It ended with the statement that other nations would soon imitate France (that
is by overthrowing the monarchy) and would "arm themselves for the purpose of claiming the
Rights of Man."[282] This piece of bravado must have told against Frost at the trial; for it proved
that amidst his potations at the tavern he spoke his real mind. Erskine did his best to defend Frost
by quoting Pitt's letters to him of May 1782, on the subject of Reform.[283] The device was clever;
but obviously Pitt's association with Frost for strictly constitutional purposes in 1782 could not
excuse the seditious language of the latter under wholly different conditions eleven years later.
Frost was condemned to six months' imprisonment in Newgate and was struck off the roll of
attorneys.[284] Other noteworthy trials ensued, notably that of the "Morning Chronicle" newspaper,
which ended in an acquittal; but it will be well now to turn to the important developments taking
place north of the Tweed.
Scotland had now thrown off the trance under which she had lain since 1745; and her chief towns
bade fair to outbid London, Leeds, Sheffield, and Norwich as centres of democratic activity. There
was every reason why she should awake. She had very little influence in Parliament. She returned
45 members as against Cornwall's 44; while the total number of persons entitled to vote for the
fifteen representatives of the Scottish burghs was 1,303,[285] a number smaller than that of the
electors of the city of Westminster. This singular system was defended chiefly on the ground of the
turbulence of the national character. Even in 1831 a Scottish member declared that Scots could
never assemble without drawing blood; and one of their champions, Lord Cockburn, made the
quaint admission: "The Scots are bad mobbers. They are too serious at it. They never joke, and
they throw stones." It did not occur to that generation that the cure for this bloodthirsty seriousness
was frequent public meetings, not no meetings at all. That a high-spirited people should so long
have remained in political childhood seems incredible, until we remember that a borough election
like that of Westminster was absolutely unknown in the whole course of Scottish history. Further,
it was notorious that the 45 Scottish members were the most obedient group of placemen in the
prosecutions ensued, with varying results. Still more frequent were the cases of cursing the King,
sometimes in obscene terms. To these we need pay no heed. Frequently the offence was committed
in taverns by democrats in a state of mental exaltation. To this exciting cause we may probably
ascribe the folly of John Frost, the attorney with whom Pitt had some dealings during the Reform
agitation of 1782. He was now charged with exclaiming excitedly: "I am for equality"; and, when
challenged as to the meaning of his words, he added: "There ought to be no Kings." In this
connection it should be remembered that Frost and Barlow had on 28th November 1792 presented
to the French National Convention the most mischievous of all the addresses sent by Radical
Clubs to that body. It ended with the statement that other nations would soon imitate France (that
is by overthrowing the monarchy) and would "arm themselves for the purpose of claiming the
Rights of Man."[282] This piece of bravado must have told against Frost at the trial; for it proved
that amidst his potations at the tavern he spoke his real mind. Erskine did his best to defend Frost
by quoting Pitt's letters to him of May 1782, on the subject of Reform.[283] The device was clever;
but obviously Pitt's association with Frost for strictly constitutional purposes in 1782 could not
excuse the seditious language of the latter under wholly different conditions eleven years later.
Frost was condemned to six months' imprisonment in Newgate and was struck off the roll of
attorneys.[284] Other noteworthy trials ensued, notably that of the "Morning Chronicle" newspaper,
which ended in an acquittal; but it will be well now to turn to the important developments taking
place north of the Tweed.
Scotland had now thrown off the trance under which she had lain since 1745; and her chief towns
bade fair to outbid London, Leeds, Sheffield, and Norwich as centres of democratic activity. There
was every reason why she should awake. She had very little influence in Parliament. She returned
45 members as against Cornwall's 44; while the total number of persons entitled to vote for the
fifteen representatives of the Scottish burghs was 1,303,[285] a number smaller than that of the
electors of the city of Westminster. This singular system was defended chiefly on the ground of the
turbulence of the national character. Even in 1831 a Scottish member declared that Scots could
never assemble without drawing blood; and one of their champions, Lord Cockburn, made the
quaint admission: "The Scots are bad mobbers. They are too serious at it. They never joke, and
they throw stones." It did not occur to that generation that the cure for this bloodthirsty seriousness
was frequent public meetings, not no meetings at all. That a high-spirited people should so long
have remained in political childhood seems incredible, until we remember that a borough election
like that of Westminster was absolutely unknown in the whole course of Scottish history. Further,
it was notorious that the 45 Scottish members were the most obedient group of placemen in the
Page 172
House of Commons; and their docility had increased under the bountiful sway of Henry Dundas,
whose control of patronage sufficed to keep the Caledonian squad close to heel.
This political apathy was now to end. The men of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Dundee began to
discuss the "Rights of Man," and to follow the lead given by the London Corresponding Society.
Thus, on 3rd October 1792, Lieutenant-Colonel William Dalrymple presided over the first meeting
of "The Associated Friends of the Constitution and of the People," held at Glasgow. Resolutions
were passed in favour of an equal representation of the people in Parliament, shorter Parliaments,
and co-operation with "the Friends of the People" in London. The entrance and annual
subscriptions were fixed at sixpence and one shilling. Thomas Muir of Huntershill, an able young
advocate, was appointed Vice-President. Other Societies were soon formed, and on 11th December
there assembled at Edinburgh a General Convention of Delegates from the Societies of the Friends
of the People throughout Scotland. Its proceedings were orderly, beginning and ending with
prayer. Resolutions were passed deprecating violence whether in language or action; and the
presence either of Lord Daer or Colonel Dalrymple in the chair showed that some, at least, of the
gentry were for Reform. This was exceptional. A little later the gentlemen of several towns and
counties asserted their loyalty in flamboyant petitions; and the farmers of Dalkeith district at their
meeting added to their loyal toasts the following: "May we have no fox in our fold or greys (wild
oats) in our corn."[286] Sir Kenneth Mackenzie on 3rd January 1793 informed William Pulteney
that in the North the towns were thoroughly loyal, with the exception of Perth and Dundee, where
certain ministers and writers led the people astray.[287]
Nevertheless, the authorities, notably the Lord Advocate, Robert Dundas, took alarm; and on 2nd
January 1793 Thomas Muir was brought before the deputy-sheriff of Midlothian. Muir was a man
of highly interesting personality. The son of a Glasgow tradesman, he had shown marked abilities
at school and at the University, whence, owing to his advanced opinions, he was forced to migrate
to Edinburgh. There, in his twenty-seventh year, he soon became a leader of the Scottish
Reformers, his sincerity, eloquence, and enthusiasm everywhere arousing keen interest. Had his
good sense been equal to his abilities, he might have gone far; but events soon showed him to be
tactless and headstrong. He went far beyond the rest of the delegates assembled at Edinburgh,
namely, in bringing forward, despite the reluctance of the Convention, an Address from the Society
of United Irishmen in Dublin. Their conduct much alarmed the authorities at Dublin Castle, who
adopted stringent precautions. Muir should therefore have seen, what his colleagues did see, that
any plan of co-operation was certain to irritate Government. Nevertheless he persisted in bringing
before the Convention the Irish Address, which strongly pointed out the need of common action in
the struggle for Reform and urged both peoples to persevere "until we have planted the flag of
freedom on the summit, and are at once victorious and secure." Further, the authorities accused
Muir of circulating Paine's writings and other pamphlets, including "A Dialogue between the
Governors and the Governed," which contained such sentences as these: "The law is the general
will—a new order." "Nations cannot revolt; tyrants are the only rebels." "We will live without
whose control of patronage sufficed to keep the Caledonian squad close to heel.
This political apathy was now to end. The men of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Dundee began to
discuss the "Rights of Man," and to follow the lead given by the London Corresponding Society.
Thus, on 3rd October 1792, Lieutenant-Colonel William Dalrymple presided over the first meeting
of "The Associated Friends of the Constitution and of the People," held at Glasgow. Resolutions
were passed in favour of an equal representation of the people in Parliament, shorter Parliaments,
and co-operation with "the Friends of the People" in London. The entrance and annual
subscriptions were fixed at sixpence and one shilling. Thomas Muir of Huntershill, an able young
advocate, was appointed Vice-President. Other Societies were soon formed, and on 11th December
there assembled at Edinburgh a General Convention of Delegates from the Societies of the Friends
of the People throughout Scotland. Its proceedings were orderly, beginning and ending with
prayer. Resolutions were passed deprecating violence whether in language or action; and the
presence either of Lord Daer or Colonel Dalrymple in the chair showed that some, at least, of the
gentry were for Reform. This was exceptional. A little later the gentlemen of several towns and
counties asserted their loyalty in flamboyant petitions; and the farmers of Dalkeith district at their
meeting added to their loyal toasts the following: "May we have no fox in our fold or greys (wild
oats) in our corn."[286] Sir Kenneth Mackenzie on 3rd January 1793 informed William Pulteney
that in the North the towns were thoroughly loyal, with the exception of Perth and Dundee, where
certain ministers and writers led the people astray.[287]
Nevertheless, the authorities, notably the Lord Advocate, Robert Dundas, took alarm; and on 2nd
January 1793 Thomas Muir was brought before the deputy-sheriff of Midlothian. Muir was a man
of highly interesting personality. The son of a Glasgow tradesman, he had shown marked abilities
at school and at the University, whence, owing to his advanced opinions, he was forced to migrate
to Edinburgh. There, in his twenty-seventh year, he soon became a leader of the Scottish
Reformers, his sincerity, eloquence, and enthusiasm everywhere arousing keen interest. Had his
good sense been equal to his abilities, he might have gone far; but events soon showed him to be
tactless and headstrong. He went far beyond the rest of the delegates assembled at Edinburgh,
namely, in bringing forward, despite the reluctance of the Convention, an Address from the Society
of United Irishmen in Dublin. Their conduct much alarmed the authorities at Dublin Castle, who
adopted stringent precautions. Muir should therefore have seen, what his colleagues did see, that
any plan of co-operation was certain to irritate Government. Nevertheless he persisted in bringing
before the Convention the Irish Address, which strongly pointed out the need of common action in
the struggle for Reform and urged both peoples to persevere "until we have planted the flag of
freedom on the summit, and are at once victorious and secure." Further, the authorities accused
Muir of circulating Paine's writings and other pamphlets, including "A Dialogue between the
Governors and the Governed," which contained such sentences as these: "The law is the general
will—a new order." "Nations cannot revolt; tyrants are the only rebels." "We will live without
Page 173
tyrants, without impostors (priests)."[288] The writings were probably seditious in their tendency;
[289] but the evidence that he circulated them was of the flimsiest character.[290]
Unfortunately, Muir left the country, though in no clandestine manner, while legal proceedings
were pending. After a short stay in London he proceeded to Paris, in order (as he said at his trial)
to try to persuade the French democrats to spare the life of Louis XVI. The credibility of this
statement is lessened by the fact that he arrived in Paris only the evening before the King's
execution and remained there long after that tragedy.[291] A letter from a Scot in Paris, James
Smith, to a friend in Glasgow, which the postal authorities opened, stated that the writer met Muir
in a café of the Palais Royal; that Muir did not hear of his indictment till the evening of 8th
February, and would return to face his trial, though he was loth to leave France, as he had made
"valuable and dear connections." "Mr. Christie advised me," adds the writer, "to make some little
proficiency in the language before I begin to think of beginning to do anything."[292] Now, as a
clique of Britons in Paris had not long before drunk the toast of "The coming Convention of Great
Britain and Ireland," Government naturally connected the efforts of Muir with this republican
propaganda. His next doings increased this suspicion. He left France on an American ship which
landed him at Belfast; he stayed there a few days, and landed at Stranraer on 31st July, only to be
arrested, along with his books and papers, and sent to Edinburgh.
The ensuing trial, held on 30th and 31st August, aroused intense interest, owing to the eloquence
of Muir and the unscrupulous zeal of the Scottish authorities in ensuring his conviction. They
packed the jury with men who belonged to a loyal Association; and it is said that the Lord Justice
Clerk, McQueen of Braxfield, welcomed one of them with the words: "Come awa', Maister
Horner, come awa', and help us to hang ane of thae daamed scoondrels." The trial itself bristled
with irregularities; and Muir, who rejected the proffered help of Erskine and conducted his own
defence, fastened on them so effectively, that at the conclusion of his final speech the Court
resounded with applause. All was in vain. The jury found him guilty, whereupon the Court of
Justiciary pronounced sentence of transportation for fourteen years.[293]
Admiration of the virtues and courage of Muir must not blind us to the fact that his conduct had
been most provocative. His visit to Paris, on the scarcely credible pretext that he went thither to
save the King's life, his connection with the United Irishmen, and his stay in Belfast, told against
him. Robert Dundas, in informing his uncle, Henry Dundas, of his arrest, added: "I have little
doubt that, tho' he avows his intention of coming home to have been a view to stand trial, [that] he
is an emissary from France or the disaffected in Ireland."[294] The Scot who first advocated
common action with the Irish malcontents should have paid good heed to his steps. Muir did not
do so. Accordingly, though the direct evidence at the trial told in his favour, the circumstantial
evidence weighed heavily against him.[295] At such a time men's actions count for more than their
words. It was the visit to Paris and the dealings with the United Irishmen, far more than biassed
witnesses and the bullying of Braxfield, which led to the condemnation of this talented youth. For
[289] but the evidence that he circulated them was of the flimsiest character.[290]
Unfortunately, Muir left the country, though in no clandestine manner, while legal proceedings
were pending. After a short stay in London he proceeded to Paris, in order (as he said at his trial)
to try to persuade the French democrats to spare the life of Louis XVI. The credibility of this
statement is lessened by the fact that he arrived in Paris only the evening before the King's
execution and remained there long after that tragedy.[291] A letter from a Scot in Paris, James
Smith, to a friend in Glasgow, which the postal authorities opened, stated that the writer met Muir
in a café of the Palais Royal; that Muir did not hear of his indictment till the evening of 8th
February, and would return to face his trial, though he was loth to leave France, as he had made
"valuable and dear connections." "Mr. Christie advised me," adds the writer, "to make some little
proficiency in the language before I begin to think of beginning to do anything."[292] Now, as a
clique of Britons in Paris had not long before drunk the toast of "The coming Convention of Great
Britain and Ireland," Government naturally connected the efforts of Muir with this republican
propaganda. His next doings increased this suspicion. He left France on an American ship which
landed him at Belfast; he stayed there a few days, and landed at Stranraer on 31st July, only to be
arrested, along with his books and papers, and sent to Edinburgh.
The ensuing trial, held on 30th and 31st August, aroused intense interest, owing to the eloquence
of Muir and the unscrupulous zeal of the Scottish authorities in ensuring his conviction. They
packed the jury with men who belonged to a loyal Association; and it is said that the Lord Justice
Clerk, McQueen of Braxfield, welcomed one of them with the words: "Come awa', Maister
Horner, come awa', and help us to hang ane of thae daamed scoondrels." The trial itself bristled
with irregularities; and Muir, who rejected the proffered help of Erskine and conducted his own
defence, fastened on them so effectively, that at the conclusion of his final speech the Court
resounded with applause. All was in vain. The jury found him guilty, whereupon the Court of
Justiciary pronounced sentence of transportation for fourteen years.[293]
Admiration of the virtues and courage of Muir must not blind us to the fact that his conduct had
been most provocative. His visit to Paris, on the scarcely credible pretext that he went thither to
save the King's life, his connection with the United Irishmen, and his stay in Belfast, told against
him. Robert Dundas, in informing his uncle, Henry Dundas, of his arrest, added: "I have little
doubt that, tho' he avows his intention of coming home to have been a view to stand trial, [that] he
is an emissary from France or the disaffected in Ireland."[294] The Scot who first advocated
common action with the Irish malcontents should have paid good heed to his steps. Muir did not
do so. Accordingly, though the direct evidence at the trial told in his favour, the circumstantial
evidence weighed heavily against him.[295] At such a time men's actions count for more than their
words. It was the visit to Paris and the dealings with the United Irishmen, far more than biassed
witnesses and the bullying of Braxfield, which led to the condemnation of this talented youth. For
Page 174
his arrest occurred at the time when terror was the order of the day at Paris, and when the issue of
an inflammatory address at Dundee spread panic in official circles.
Before adverting to this matter, we may note that Muir settled down by no means unhappily at
Sydney, and bought a farm which he named Huntershill, after his birthplace. It is now a suburb of
Sydney. A letter from the infant settlement, published in the "Gentleman's Magazine" of March
1797, describes him and the other Scottish "martyrs"—Skirving, Margarot, and Gerrald—as
treated indulgently by the authorities, who allotted to them convicts to till their lands. Shortly
afterwards Muir escaped, and, after exciting experiences, in which he was wounded, made his way
to France. In Paris, early in 1798, he published some articles on the United Irishmen, which Wolfe
Tone and other Irish patriots deemed most harmful to their cause. They therefore remonstrated
with him, but received the reply that he knew Ireland as well as they did, and had the confidence of
the United Irishmen as much as they had. Wolfe Tone says of him: "Of all the vain obstinate
blockheads that ever I met I never saw his equal."[296] Fortunately for his associates, Muir retired
into the provinces and died in the year 1799.
Dundee played a leading part in the democratic agitation. Its population, consisting largely of poor
weavers, suffered severely in the year 1793 from dearness of food and scarcity of fuel. On this
mass of needy operatives the doctrines of Paine fell like a spark on tinder. Dundee became the
chief focus of discontent in Scotland. A Tree of Liberty was planted in Belmont Grounds; bread
riots were of frequent occurrence; and Dundas was burnt in effigy. In the Home Office Archives is
a statement that a local tradesman named Wyllie generously supplied the waistcoat and breeches:
"they was of satin."[297] In July 1793 there appeared an "Address to the People," dated "Berean
Meeting House, Dundee," which painted the Government in the darkest colours, and contained
these assertions: "You are plunged into war by a wicked Ministry and a compliant Parliament, who
seem careless and unconcerned for your interest, the end and design of which is almost too horrid
to relate, the destruction of a whole people merely because they will be free.... Your treasure is
wasting fast: the blood of your brethren is pouring out, and all this to form chains for a free people
and eventually to rivet them on yourselves." On 1st August 1793 a Government agent found the
MS. from which this placard was printed in the house of a liquor-seller in Edinburgh. It was in the
writing of a minister, Palmer: so were two letters referring to it.[298] Robert Dundas therefore sent
to have Palmer arrested. In mentioning this fact to Henry Dundas, he added that Palmer was "the
most dangerous rebel in Scotland." It transpired in the course of the trial that the address was
originally written by a weaver named Mealmaker, and that Palmer re-wrote it, toning down some
expressions which he thought too strong. Mealmaker was a witness at the trial, but was not
allowed directly to incriminate himself. The authorities preferred to strike at Palmer, a man of
parts, educated at Eton and Cambridge, who latterly had officiated as Unitarian Minister at
Montrose and Dundee. Doubtless these facts as well as his association with the Scottish Friends of
Liberty brought on him a sentence of five years' transportation.[299]
an inflammatory address at Dundee spread panic in official circles.
Before adverting to this matter, we may note that Muir settled down by no means unhappily at
Sydney, and bought a farm which he named Huntershill, after his birthplace. It is now a suburb of
Sydney. A letter from the infant settlement, published in the "Gentleman's Magazine" of March
1797, describes him and the other Scottish "martyrs"—Skirving, Margarot, and Gerrald—as
treated indulgently by the authorities, who allotted to them convicts to till their lands. Shortly
afterwards Muir escaped, and, after exciting experiences, in which he was wounded, made his way
to France. In Paris, early in 1798, he published some articles on the United Irishmen, which Wolfe
Tone and other Irish patriots deemed most harmful to their cause. They therefore remonstrated
with him, but received the reply that he knew Ireland as well as they did, and had the confidence of
the United Irishmen as much as they had. Wolfe Tone says of him: "Of all the vain obstinate
blockheads that ever I met I never saw his equal."[296] Fortunately for his associates, Muir retired
into the provinces and died in the year 1799.
Dundee played a leading part in the democratic agitation. Its population, consisting largely of poor
weavers, suffered severely in the year 1793 from dearness of food and scarcity of fuel. On this
mass of needy operatives the doctrines of Paine fell like a spark on tinder. Dundee became the
chief focus of discontent in Scotland. A Tree of Liberty was planted in Belmont Grounds; bread
riots were of frequent occurrence; and Dundas was burnt in effigy. In the Home Office Archives is
a statement that a local tradesman named Wyllie generously supplied the waistcoat and breeches:
"they was of satin."[297] In July 1793 there appeared an "Address to the People," dated "Berean
Meeting House, Dundee," which painted the Government in the darkest colours, and contained
these assertions: "You are plunged into war by a wicked Ministry and a compliant Parliament, who
seem careless and unconcerned for your interest, the end and design of which is almost too horrid
to relate, the destruction of a whole people merely because they will be free.... Your treasure is
wasting fast: the blood of your brethren is pouring out, and all this to form chains for a free people
and eventually to rivet them on yourselves." On 1st August 1793 a Government agent found the
MS. from which this placard was printed in the house of a liquor-seller in Edinburgh. It was in the
writing of a minister, Palmer: so were two letters referring to it.[298] Robert Dundas therefore sent
to have Palmer arrested. In mentioning this fact to Henry Dundas, he added that Palmer was "the
most dangerous rebel in Scotland." It transpired in the course of the trial that the address was
originally written by a weaver named Mealmaker, and that Palmer re-wrote it, toning down some
expressions which he thought too strong. Mealmaker was a witness at the trial, but was not
allowed directly to incriminate himself. The authorities preferred to strike at Palmer, a man of
parts, educated at Eton and Cambridge, who latterly had officiated as Unitarian Minister at
Montrose and Dundee. Doubtless these facts as well as his association with the Scottish Friends of
Liberty brought on him a sentence of five years' transportation.[299]
Page 175
If the authorities hoped to crush the Scottish movement by these severities they were disappointed;
for it throve on them. A spy, "J. B.," who regularly supplied Robert Dundas with reports about the
Edinburgh club, wrote on 14th September 1793 that the sentence on Palmer had given new life to
the Association; for, after a time of decline in the early summer, more than 200 now attended its
meetings. On 28th October he stated that nearly all the Scottish clubs had revived. Dunlop, Lord
Provost of Glasgow, also declared that discontent made progress every day; that the soldiery were
corrupted, and that there was an urgent need of barracks.[300] Indignation also ran high at London.
Evan Nepean wrote to Robert Dundas: "There is a devil of a stir here about Muir and Palmer."
Braxfield's address to the jury was thus parodied in the "Morning Chronicle" of 4th March 1794:
I am bound by the law, while I sit in this place,
To say in plain terms what I think of this case.
My opinion is this, and you're bound to pursue it,
The defendants are guilty, and I'll make them rue it.
Nevertheless, as another Convention had met at Edinburgh, Robert Dundas wrote to his uncle on
2nd November 1793 strongly deprecating any mitigation of the sentences. It was therefore in vain
that the Earl of Lauderdale, Grey, and Sheridan interviewed the Home Secretary and pointed out
that the offence of "leasing-making," or verbal sedition, was punishable in Scots law only with
banishment, not with forcible detention at the Antipodes.[301] Henry Dundas informed his nephew
on 16th November that he would refer the whole question back to the Court of Justiciary, and if it
defended the verdict "scientifically" and in full detail, he would "carry the sentence into execution
and meet the clamour in Parliament without any kind of dismay."[302] Braxfield and his colleagues
defended their conduct in an exhaustive treatise on "leasing-making," which the curious may read
in the Home Office Archives.
What was the attitude of Pitt towards these events? Ultimately he was responsible for these unjust
and vindictive sentences; and it is a poor excuse to urge that he gave Dundas a free hand in
Scottish affairs. Still, it is unquestionable that the initiative lay with the two Dundases. If any
Englishman exerted influence on the sentences it was the Lord Chancellor, Loughborough.[303] He
treated with contempt the motion of Earl Stanhope on 31st January 1794 for an examination into
the case of Muir, when the Earl found himself in the position which he so much coveted—a
minority of one. On the cases of Muir and Palmer coming before the Commons (10th March), Pitt
upheld the Scottish Court of Justiciary in what was perhaps the worst speech of his whole career.
He defended even the careful selection of jurymen hostile to Muir on the curious plea that though
they were declared loyalists, yet they might be impartial as jurymen. He further denied that there
had been any miscarriage of justice, or that the sentence on the "daring delinquents" needed
revision. And these excuses for biassed and vindictive sentences were urged after Fox had uttered
a noble and manly plea for justice, not for mercy. Grey bitterly declared that Muir was to be sent
for fourteen years to Sydney for the offence of pleading for Reform, which Pitt and the Duke of
for it throve on them. A spy, "J. B.," who regularly supplied Robert Dundas with reports about the
Edinburgh club, wrote on 14th September 1793 that the sentence on Palmer had given new life to
the Association; for, after a time of decline in the early summer, more than 200 now attended its
meetings. On 28th October he stated that nearly all the Scottish clubs had revived. Dunlop, Lord
Provost of Glasgow, also declared that discontent made progress every day; that the soldiery were
corrupted, and that there was an urgent need of barracks.[300] Indignation also ran high at London.
Evan Nepean wrote to Robert Dundas: "There is a devil of a stir here about Muir and Palmer."
Braxfield's address to the jury was thus parodied in the "Morning Chronicle" of 4th March 1794:
I am bound by the law, while I sit in this place,
To say in plain terms what I think of this case.
My opinion is this, and you're bound to pursue it,
The defendants are guilty, and I'll make them rue it.
Nevertheless, as another Convention had met at Edinburgh, Robert Dundas wrote to his uncle on
2nd November 1793 strongly deprecating any mitigation of the sentences. It was therefore in vain
that the Earl of Lauderdale, Grey, and Sheridan interviewed the Home Secretary and pointed out
that the offence of "leasing-making," or verbal sedition, was punishable in Scots law only with
banishment, not with forcible detention at the Antipodes.[301] Henry Dundas informed his nephew
on 16th November that he would refer the whole question back to the Court of Justiciary, and if it
defended the verdict "scientifically" and in full detail, he would "carry the sentence into execution
and meet the clamour in Parliament without any kind of dismay."[302] Braxfield and his colleagues
defended their conduct in an exhaustive treatise on "leasing-making," which the curious may read
in the Home Office Archives.
What was the attitude of Pitt towards these events? Ultimately he was responsible for these unjust
and vindictive sentences; and it is a poor excuse to urge that he gave Dundas a free hand in
Scottish affairs. Still, it is unquestionable that the initiative lay with the two Dundases. If any
Englishman exerted influence on the sentences it was the Lord Chancellor, Loughborough.[303] He
treated with contempt the motion of Earl Stanhope on 31st January 1794 for an examination into
the case of Muir, when the Earl found himself in the position which he so much coveted—a
minority of one. On the cases of Muir and Palmer coming before the Commons (10th March), Pitt
upheld the Scottish Court of Justiciary in what was perhaps the worst speech of his whole career.
He defended even the careful selection of jurymen hostile to Muir on the curious plea that though
they were declared loyalists, yet they might be impartial as jurymen. He further denied that there
had been any miscarriage of justice, or that the sentence on the "daring delinquents" needed
revision. And these excuses for biassed and vindictive sentences were urged after Fox had uttered
a noble and manly plea for justice, not for mercy. Grey bitterly declared that Muir was to be sent
for fourteen years to Sydney for the offence of pleading for Reform, which Pitt and the Duke of
Page 176
Richmond advocated twelve years before. They sat in the King's Cabinet: Muir was sent to herd
with felons. This taunt flew wide of the mark. Pitt in his motions for Reform had always made it
clear that, while desirous of "a moderate and substantial Reform," he utterly repudiated universal
suffrage. If those were his views in 1782–5, how could he accept the Radical programme now that
it included the absurd demand for annual Parliaments? None the less Pitt was answerable for the
action of the Home Minister in referring the sentences back to the judges who inflicted them—a
course of conduct at once cowardly and farcical. Pitt's speech also proves him to have known of
the irregularities that disgraced the trials. But he, a lawyer, condoned them and applauded the
harsh and vindictive sentences. In short, he acted as an alarmist, not as a dispenser of justice.
It is easy for us now to descant on the virtues of moderation. But how many men would have held
on an even course when the guillotine worked its fell work in France, when the Goddess of Reason
was enthroned in Notre Dame, and when Jacobinism seemed about to sweep over the Continent?
Here, as at so many points, France proved to be the worst foe to ordered liberty. Robespierre and
Hébert were the men who assured the doom of Muir and Palmer. A trivial incident will suffice to
illustrate the alarm of Englishmen at the assembly of a British Convention. In December 1793
Drane, the mayor of Reading, reported to his neighbour Addington (Speaker of the House of
Commons) that the "infamous Tom Paine" and a member of the French Convention had been
overheard conversing in French in a public-house. Their talk turned on a proposed visit to the
British Convention then sitting in Edinburgh. At once Addington sent for a warrant from the Home
Office, while the mayor urged his informant to hunt the miscreants down. The machinery of the
law was set in motion. A search was instituted; the warrant came down from Whitehall; and not
until the sum of fourteen guineas had gone to the informant for his patriotic exertions did the
authorities discover that they had been hoaxed.[304]
The Edinburgh Convention, consisting of delegates of forty-five Reform Societies, seems to have
pursued dully decorous methods until 6th November, when citizens Hamilton Rowan and Simon
Butler came to represent Ireland; Joseph Gerrald and Maurice Margarot were the delegates from
the London Corresponding Society; and Sinclair and York from the Society for Constitutional
Information which met at the Crown and Anchor. A Convention of English Societies assembled at
London about the same time, and deputed the four delegates to join the Edinburgh body and form
a British Convention.[305] Accordingly, on 19th November, it took the title, "British Convention of
Delegates of the People, associated to obtain Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments." The
statement of Margarot, that the London police sought to prevent his journey to Edinburgh, should
have been a warning to members to measure their words well. Unfortunately, Margarot, a vain hot-
headed fellow, at once began to boast of the importance of the Radical Societies; though
fluctuating in number, they were numerous in London; there were thirty of them in Norwich; and
in the Sheffield district their members numbered 50,000. "If," he added, "we could get a
Convention of England and Scotland called, we might represent six or seven hundred thousand
males, which is a majority of all the adults of the Kingdom; and the Ministry would not dare to
with felons. This taunt flew wide of the mark. Pitt in his motions for Reform had always made it
clear that, while desirous of "a moderate and substantial Reform," he utterly repudiated universal
suffrage. If those were his views in 1782–5, how could he accept the Radical programme now that
it included the absurd demand for annual Parliaments? None the less Pitt was answerable for the
action of the Home Minister in referring the sentences back to the judges who inflicted them—a
course of conduct at once cowardly and farcical. Pitt's speech also proves him to have known of
the irregularities that disgraced the trials. But he, a lawyer, condoned them and applauded the
harsh and vindictive sentences. In short, he acted as an alarmist, not as a dispenser of justice.
It is easy for us now to descant on the virtues of moderation. But how many men would have held
on an even course when the guillotine worked its fell work in France, when the Goddess of Reason
was enthroned in Notre Dame, and when Jacobinism seemed about to sweep over the Continent?
Here, as at so many points, France proved to be the worst foe to ordered liberty. Robespierre and
Hébert were the men who assured the doom of Muir and Palmer. A trivial incident will suffice to
illustrate the alarm of Englishmen at the assembly of a British Convention. In December 1793
Drane, the mayor of Reading, reported to his neighbour Addington (Speaker of the House of
Commons) that the "infamous Tom Paine" and a member of the French Convention had been
overheard conversing in French in a public-house. Their talk turned on a proposed visit to the
British Convention then sitting in Edinburgh. At once Addington sent for a warrant from the Home
Office, while the mayor urged his informant to hunt the miscreants down. The machinery of the
law was set in motion. A search was instituted; the warrant came down from Whitehall; and not
until the sum of fourteen guineas had gone to the informant for his patriotic exertions did the
authorities discover that they had been hoaxed.[304]
The Edinburgh Convention, consisting of delegates of forty-five Reform Societies, seems to have
pursued dully decorous methods until 6th November, when citizens Hamilton Rowan and Simon
Butler came to represent Ireland; Joseph Gerrald and Maurice Margarot were the delegates from
the London Corresponding Society; and Sinclair and York from the Society for Constitutional
Information which met at the Crown and Anchor. A Convention of English Societies assembled at
London about the same time, and deputed the four delegates to join the Edinburgh body and form
a British Convention.[305] Accordingly, on 19th November, it took the title, "British Convention of
Delegates of the People, associated to obtain Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments." The
statement of Margarot, that the London police sought to prevent his journey to Edinburgh, should
have been a warning to members to measure their words well. Unfortunately, Margarot, a vain hot-
headed fellow, at once began to boast of the importance of the Radical Societies; though
fluctuating in number, they were numerous in London; there were thirty of them in Norwich; and
in the Sheffield district their members numbered 50,000. "If," he added, "we could get a
Convention of England and Scotland called, we might represent six or seven hundred thousand
males, which is a majority of all the adults of the Kingdom; and the Ministry would not dare to
Page 177
refuse our rights."[306] Butler then declared that Belfast was in a state of veiled rebellion; Gerrald,
the ablest and best educated of the delegates, also scoffed at the old party system, and said, "party
is ever a bird of prey, and the people their banquet." On 19th November a delegate from Sheffield,
M. C. Brown, moved that the next British Convention should meet near the borders of England
and Scotland. Thereupon Gerrald proposed that York should be chosen, despite its ecclesiastical
surroundings; for (said he), "as the Saviour of the world was often found in the company of
sinners, let us go there for the same gracious purpose, to convert to repentance."[307]
All this was but the prelude to more serious work. On 26th–28th November the Convention
declared it to be the duty of citizens to resist any law, similar to that lately passed in Dublin, for
preventing the assembly of a Convention in Great Britain; and the delegates resolved to prepare to
summon a Convention if the following emergencies should arise—an invasion, the landing of
Hanoverian troops, the passing of a Convention Act, or the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act.
These defiant resolutions were proposed by Sinclair; and, as he afterwards became a Government
informer, they were probably intended to lure the Convention away from its proper business into
seditious ways. However that may be, the delegates solemnly assented to these resolutions.
Scotsmen will notice alike with pride and indignation that the delegates of the Societies north of
the Tweed adhered to their main purpose, Parliamentary Reform, until, under the lead of the men
of London, Sheffield, and Dublin, debates became almost Parisian in vehemence. As reported in
the "Edinburgh Gazetteer" of 3rd December, they gave Robert Dundas the wished-for handle of
attack. Then and there he decided to disperse the Convention, so he informed Henry Dundas in the
following letter of 6th December: "Last Tuesday's '[Edinburgh] Gazetteer,' containing a further
account of the proceedings of the Convention appeared to the Solicitor and me so strong that we
agreed to take notice of them. The proper warrants were accordingly made, and early yesterday
morning put in execution against Margarot, Gerrald, Callender, Skirving, and one or two others,
and with such effect that we have secured all their Minutes and papers. Their conduct has excited
universal detestation."[308] The expulsion took place quite peaceably. The Lord Provost informed
the delegates that it was not their meeting, but their publications, that led him to intervene. The
Chairman, Paterson, thereupon "skulked off"; but Brown, the Sheffield delegate, took the chair,
and declared that he would not quit it save under compulsion. The Lord Provost and constables
then pulled him down; and the meeting was adjourned. Events ran the same course on the morrow,
save that the chairman, Gerrald, was allowed to wind up the proceedings with prayer before he
was pulled down. Thus ended the first British Convention.
The natural sequel was a trial of the leaders, Sinclair, Margarot, Gerrald, and Skirving. Sinclair
turned informer, whereupon his indictment was allowed to lapse. The others were charged with
attending the meetings of the Convention which, "under the pretence of procuring a Reform of
Parliament, were evidently of a dangerous and destructive tendency," modelled on those of the
French Convention and with the like aims in view. The charge was held to be proven, and they
the ablest and best educated of the delegates, also scoffed at the old party system, and said, "party
is ever a bird of prey, and the people their banquet." On 19th November a delegate from Sheffield,
M. C. Brown, moved that the next British Convention should meet near the borders of England
and Scotland. Thereupon Gerrald proposed that York should be chosen, despite its ecclesiastical
surroundings; for (said he), "as the Saviour of the world was often found in the company of
sinners, let us go there for the same gracious purpose, to convert to repentance."[307]
All this was but the prelude to more serious work. On 26th–28th November the Convention
declared it to be the duty of citizens to resist any law, similar to that lately passed in Dublin, for
preventing the assembly of a Convention in Great Britain; and the delegates resolved to prepare to
summon a Convention if the following emergencies should arise—an invasion, the landing of
Hanoverian troops, the passing of a Convention Act, or the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act.
These defiant resolutions were proposed by Sinclair; and, as he afterwards became a Government
informer, they were probably intended to lure the Convention away from its proper business into
seditious ways. However that may be, the delegates solemnly assented to these resolutions.
Scotsmen will notice alike with pride and indignation that the delegates of the Societies north of
the Tweed adhered to their main purpose, Parliamentary Reform, until, under the lead of the men
of London, Sheffield, and Dublin, debates became almost Parisian in vehemence. As reported in
the "Edinburgh Gazetteer" of 3rd December, they gave Robert Dundas the wished-for handle of
attack. Then and there he decided to disperse the Convention, so he informed Henry Dundas in the
following letter of 6th December: "Last Tuesday's '[Edinburgh] Gazetteer,' containing a further
account of the proceedings of the Convention appeared to the Solicitor and me so strong that we
agreed to take notice of them. The proper warrants were accordingly made, and early yesterday
morning put in execution against Margarot, Gerrald, Callender, Skirving, and one or two others,
and with such effect that we have secured all their Minutes and papers. Their conduct has excited
universal detestation."[308] The expulsion took place quite peaceably. The Lord Provost informed
the delegates that it was not their meeting, but their publications, that led him to intervene. The
Chairman, Paterson, thereupon "skulked off"; but Brown, the Sheffield delegate, took the chair,
and declared that he would not quit it save under compulsion. The Lord Provost and constables
then pulled him down; and the meeting was adjourned. Events ran the same course on the morrow,
save that the chairman, Gerrald, was allowed to wind up the proceedings with prayer before he
was pulled down. Thus ended the first British Convention.
The natural sequel was a trial of the leaders, Sinclair, Margarot, Gerrald, and Skirving. Sinclair
turned informer, whereupon his indictment was allowed to lapse. The others were charged with
attending the meetings of the Convention which, "under the pretence of procuring a Reform of
Parliament, were evidently of a dangerous and destructive tendency," modelled on those of the
French Convention and with the like aims in view. The charge was held to be proven, and they
Page 178
were severally sentenced to transportation for fourteen years. The cases aroused keen interest, in
part owing to the novel claims put forward by the prosecutor and endorsed by the Judges. The
Lord Advocate argued that these men, in claiming to represent a majority of the people, were in
reality planning a revolt; and Lord Justice Clerk finally declared that the crime of sedition
consisted "in endeavouring to create a dissatisfaction in the country, which nobody can tell where
it will end. It will very naturally end in overt rebellion; if it has that tendency, though not in the
mind of the parties at the time, yet, if they have been guilty of poisoning the minds of the lieges, I
apprehend that that will constitute the crime of sedition to all intents and purposes."[309]
To find a parallel to this monstrous claim, that sedition may be unintentional and may consist in
some action which the Government judges by its results, one would have to hark back to the days
of Judge Jeffreys, whom indeed McQueen of Braxfield resembled in ferocity, cunning, and
effrontery. The insolence of Margarot at the bar to some extent excused the chief judge for the
exhibition of the same conduct on the bench. But in the case of Gerrald, an English gentleman of
refined character and faultless demeanour, the brutalities of Braxfield aroused universal loathing.
In one respect Gerrald committed an imprudence. He appeared in the dock, not in a wig, but
displaying a shock of dishevelled hair, a sign of French and republican sympathies which seemed a
defiance to the Court. Nevertheless, his speech in his own defence moved to its depths the mind of
a young poet who had tramped all the way from Glasgow in the bleak March weather in order to
hear the trial. At the end of the speech young Campbell turned to his neighbour, a humble
tradesman, and said: "By heavens, Sir, that is a great man"; to which there came the reply: "Yes,
Sir, he is not only a great man himself, but he makes every other man feel great who listens to
him."
In truth, the Scottish trials were a moral defeat for Pitt and his colleagues. Sympathy with the
prisoners and detestation of the judges aroused a general outcry, which became furious when
Braxfield declared that he had no idea that his sentence of transportation involved servitude and
hard labour.[310] The assertion implies an incredible ignorance in the man who had packed the
juries and sought to get his victims hanged. It may be regarded as a cunning and cowardly attempt
to shift part of the odium on to the Government. Certainly the prestige of the Cabinet now fell to
zero. Ministers were held responsible for Braxfield's wanton vagaries, and were accused of luring
English democrats into the meshes of the Scottish law. This last charge is absurd. As we have seen,
the London police sought to stop Margarot, Sinclair, and Gerrald from going to Edinburgh. It was
their presence and that of the Irishmen which gave to the Convention almost a national character,
and placed it in rivalry to Parliament. Their speeches were by far the most provocative. Finally, as
the letter quoted above shows, the initiative in arresting the delegates was taken by Robert Dundas
and the Scottish Solicitor-General. On 11th December Henry Dundas wrote to his nephew: "You
get great credit here [London] for your attack on the Convention."[311]
part owing to the novel claims put forward by the prosecutor and endorsed by the Judges. The
Lord Advocate argued that these men, in claiming to represent a majority of the people, were in
reality planning a revolt; and Lord Justice Clerk finally declared that the crime of sedition
consisted "in endeavouring to create a dissatisfaction in the country, which nobody can tell where
it will end. It will very naturally end in overt rebellion; if it has that tendency, though not in the
mind of the parties at the time, yet, if they have been guilty of poisoning the minds of the lieges, I
apprehend that that will constitute the crime of sedition to all intents and purposes."[309]
To find a parallel to this monstrous claim, that sedition may be unintentional and may consist in
some action which the Government judges by its results, one would have to hark back to the days
of Judge Jeffreys, whom indeed McQueen of Braxfield resembled in ferocity, cunning, and
effrontery. The insolence of Margarot at the bar to some extent excused the chief judge for the
exhibition of the same conduct on the bench. But in the case of Gerrald, an English gentleman of
refined character and faultless demeanour, the brutalities of Braxfield aroused universal loathing.
In one respect Gerrald committed an imprudence. He appeared in the dock, not in a wig, but
displaying a shock of dishevelled hair, a sign of French and republican sympathies which seemed a
defiance to the Court. Nevertheless, his speech in his own defence moved to its depths the mind of
a young poet who had tramped all the way from Glasgow in the bleak March weather in order to
hear the trial. At the end of the speech young Campbell turned to his neighbour, a humble
tradesman, and said: "By heavens, Sir, that is a great man"; to which there came the reply: "Yes,
Sir, he is not only a great man himself, but he makes every other man feel great who listens to
him."
In truth, the Scottish trials were a moral defeat for Pitt and his colleagues. Sympathy with the
prisoners and detestation of the judges aroused a general outcry, which became furious when
Braxfield declared that he had no idea that his sentence of transportation involved servitude and
hard labour.[310] The assertion implies an incredible ignorance in the man who had packed the
juries and sought to get his victims hanged. It may be regarded as a cunning and cowardly attempt
to shift part of the odium on to the Government. Certainly the prestige of the Cabinet now fell to
zero. Ministers were held responsible for Braxfield's wanton vagaries, and were accused of luring
English democrats into the meshes of the Scottish law. This last charge is absurd. As we have seen,
the London police sought to stop Margarot, Sinclair, and Gerrald from going to Edinburgh. It was
their presence and that of the Irishmen which gave to the Convention almost a national character,
and placed it in rivalry to Parliament. Their speeches were by far the most provocative. Finally, as
the letter quoted above shows, the initiative in arresting the delegates was taken by Robert Dundas
and the Scottish Solicitor-General. On 11th December Henry Dundas wrote to his nephew: "You
get great credit here [London] for your attack on the Convention."[311]
Page 179
Far different was the comment of the London Corresponding Society. On 20th January 1794 that
body convened a great meeting which passed protests against the war, the expulsion of the British
Convention, and the arrest of delegates. It also resolved that the general committee should sit
permanently throughout the ensuing session. Further, that if the Government attacked the liberties
of the people in the ways described above, the committee should call "a General Convention of the
People for taking such measures under their consideration."[312] Equally threatening were the
resolutions of the Constitutional Society of London.[313] Pitt resolved to take up the gauntlet flung
down by these two powerful Societies. On 24th February 1794 Eaton, a publisher of Newgate
Street, was tried for publishing in his periodical pamphlet, "Politics for the People: or Hogs-wash,"
a little parable with which that witty lecturer, Thelwall, had delighted a debating society. He told
how a gamecock, resplendent with ermine-spotted breast, and crown or cockscomb, lorded it
greedily over all the fowls of the farmyard.[314] The parallel to George III was sufficiently close to
agitate the official mind; but the jury gave an open verdict, which implied that the King was not
hinted at.
The next prosecution, that of Thomas Walker, of Manchester, and six others broke down in a way
highly discreditable to the authorities. Walker's services to the cause of Reform had, as we have
seen, been conspicuous alike in energy and moderation, and his enemies in the Church and King
Club made great exertions in order to procure a conviction. The archives of the Home Office throw
a sinister light on their methods. A magistrate of Manchester, the Rev. John Griffith, informed the
Home Secretary that Booth, a man who was imprisoned in June 1793 for seditious practices, made
a declaration against Thomas Walker and McCullum, members of the local Constitutional Society.
According to Booth, McCullum had said: "Petitioning Parliament be d——d. You may as well
petition the devil to reform himself. The only way is for each Society to send a number of
delegates to a certain place, and there declare themselves the Representatives of the People and
support themselves as such." Thomas Walker had also said that each member must have a musket,
for they would soon want them.[315] But it transpired in the trial of Walker, McCullum, and others
that Griffith had let Booth see that he wanted to incriminate Walker. He not only offered Booth his
pardon for such evidence, but left him alone with Dunn, a malicious perjurer, the falsity of whose
charges against Walker was convincingly demonstrated.[316] The case proves how far an
unscrupulous magistrate could succeed in getting charges trumped up against an innocent man
who opposed him in politics. Doubtless in other cases personal spite, or the desire of a reward, led
to the offer of false charges; and the student who peruses the Home Office archives needs to
remember the Greek caution, μέμνησθ' ἀπιστεῖν, as much as if he were perusing French Memoirs.
It is therefore with much doubt that one reads the declaration of a Sheffield magistrate, in May
1794, that there was in that town "a most horrid conspiracy against State and Church under the
pretence of Reform." A vast number of pikes and spears had been made and "cats" to throw in the
road to lame the horses. 2nd July was fixed for the storming of the barracks and town. "It is a
mercy the plot is discovered. I am to be all night in the search." More detailed is the deposition of
body convened a great meeting which passed protests against the war, the expulsion of the British
Convention, and the arrest of delegates. It also resolved that the general committee should sit
permanently throughout the ensuing session. Further, that if the Government attacked the liberties
of the people in the ways described above, the committee should call "a General Convention of the
People for taking such measures under their consideration."[312] Equally threatening were the
resolutions of the Constitutional Society of London.[313] Pitt resolved to take up the gauntlet flung
down by these two powerful Societies. On 24th February 1794 Eaton, a publisher of Newgate
Street, was tried for publishing in his periodical pamphlet, "Politics for the People: or Hogs-wash,"
a little parable with which that witty lecturer, Thelwall, had delighted a debating society. He told
how a gamecock, resplendent with ermine-spotted breast, and crown or cockscomb, lorded it
greedily over all the fowls of the farmyard.[314] The parallel to George III was sufficiently close to
agitate the official mind; but the jury gave an open verdict, which implied that the King was not
hinted at.
The next prosecution, that of Thomas Walker, of Manchester, and six others broke down in a way
highly discreditable to the authorities. Walker's services to the cause of Reform had, as we have
seen, been conspicuous alike in energy and moderation, and his enemies in the Church and King
Club made great exertions in order to procure a conviction. The archives of the Home Office throw
a sinister light on their methods. A magistrate of Manchester, the Rev. John Griffith, informed the
Home Secretary that Booth, a man who was imprisoned in June 1793 for seditious practices, made
a declaration against Thomas Walker and McCullum, members of the local Constitutional Society.
According to Booth, McCullum had said: "Petitioning Parliament be d——d. You may as well
petition the devil to reform himself. The only way is for each Society to send a number of
delegates to a certain place, and there declare themselves the Representatives of the People and
support themselves as such." Thomas Walker had also said that each member must have a musket,
for they would soon want them.[315] But it transpired in the trial of Walker, McCullum, and others
that Griffith had let Booth see that he wanted to incriminate Walker. He not only offered Booth his
pardon for such evidence, but left him alone with Dunn, a malicious perjurer, the falsity of whose
charges against Walker was convincingly demonstrated.[316] The case proves how far an
unscrupulous magistrate could succeed in getting charges trumped up against an innocent man
who opposed him in politics. Doubtless in other cases personal spite, or the desire of a reward, led
to the offer of false charges; and the student who peruses the Home Office archives needs to
remember the Greek caution, μέμνησθ' ἀπιστεῖν, as much as if he were perusing French Memoirs.
It is therefore with much doubt that one reads the declaration of a Sheffield magistrate, in May
1794, that there was in that town "a most horrid conspiracy against State and Church under the
pretence of Reform." A vast number of pikes and spears had been made and "cats" to throw in the
road to lame the horses. 2nd July was fixed for the storming of the barracks and town. "It is a
mercy the plot is discovered. I am to be all night in the search." More detailed is the deposition of
Page 180
a magistrate of Sheffield, James Wilkinson, that a democrat named Widdison had made several
pikes and sold twelve to Gales, a well-known Jacobinical printer. Further, that a witness, William
Green, swore that a man named Jackson had employed him and others to make spear-heads; they
made twelve dozen or more in two days, and the heads were sent to the lodgings of Hill and
Jackson. Wilkinson wrote for instructions how to deal with these men; also for a warrant to arrest
Gales. On 20th May Dundas sent down warrants for the arrest of Gales, W. Carnage, H. Yorke
(alias Redhead), W. Broomhead, R. Moody, and T. Humphreys; he also issued a warrant against
Williams, a gun-engraver, of the Tower, in London.[317]
In Birmingham, as we have seen, the two magistrates, Carles and Spencer, were out and out
loyalists; and, as they wrote to Dundas on 23rd May 1794 that there was not enough evidence to
warrant a search for arms, we may infer that the Midland capital caused the authorities less
concern than rebellious Sheffield. But even at Birmingham, with its traditions of exuberant loyalty,
there were grounds for concern. John Brook, the mayor, informed Dundas that there were many
malcontents in the neighbourhood, especially at Dudley.
Turning to the East, we find signs that Norwich seethed with discontent. From that city had come
the first suggestion of a General Convention of the People. On 5th March 1793 one of the thirty
Societies of Norwich wrote up to the London Corresponding Society advocating that step, which
Hardy and his colleagues approved "so soon as the great body of the people shall be courageous
and virtuous enough to join us in the attempt." I have found no proof that either at Norwich or in
London these Societies used illegal methods. The seditious placards posted up at Norwich may
have been the work of some fanatic or of an agent provocateur. But it is very doubtful whether the
holding of a People's Convention in the manner proposed was not an act of defiance to Parliament,
and therefore seditious. Individual members certainly came within the ban of the law. Thus,
Dundas received tidings that two members of Hardy's Society, named Stone and Meakins, were
circulating seditious writings in Essex. When arrested they had with them one or two military
books, copies of the revolutionary song, Ça ira, and similar papers;[318] but this fact does not
incriminate the Society at large. In fact, the reports as to the purchase of arms and secret drillings
are not very convincing. To take a few instances: information was sent to the Home Office that a
man named Kitchen had sixty pikes in his house in George Street, near York Buildings; also that
men were drilled secretly at the house of Spence, a seller of seditious pamphlets in the Little
Turnstile, Holborn, and at that of Shelmerdine, a small tradesman of Southwark; the arms in the
last case were bought from Williams, of the Tower, with a sum of £10 contributed by "a desperate
tailor of China Walk, Lambeth."[319] Did patriotism or private spite or greed of money incite these
reports? Drawings of pikes and spear-heads also diversified the report of the Secret Committee of
the Lords appointed to investigate seditious proceedings, and probably convinced lovers of realism
that plots actually existed.
pikes and sold twelve to Gales, a well-known Jacobinical printer. Further, that a witness, William
Green, swore that a man named Jackson had employed him and others to make spear-heads; they
made twelve dozen or more in two days, and the heads were sent to the lodgings of Hill and
Jackson. Wilkinson wrote for instructions how to deal with these men; also for a warrant to arrest
Gales. On 20th May Dundas sent down warrants for the arrest of Gales, W. Carnage, H. Yorke
(alias Redhead), W. Broomhead, R. Moody, and T. Humphreys; he also issued a warrant against
Williams, a gun-engraver, of the Tower, in London.[317]
In Birmingham, as we have seen, the two magistrates, Carles and Spencer, were out and out
loyalists; and, as they wrote to Dundas on 23rd May 1794 that there was not enough evidence to
warrant a search for arms, we may infer that the Midland capital caused the authorities less
concern than rebellious Sheffield. But even at Birmingham, with its traditions of exuberant loyalty,
there were grounds for concern. John Brook, the mayor, informed Dundas that there were many
malcontents in the neighbourhood, especially at Dudley.
Turning to the East, we find signs that Norwich seethed with discontent. From that city had come
the first suggestion of a General Convention of the People. On 5th March 1793 one of the thirty
Societies of Norwich wrote up to the London Corresponding Society advocating that step, which
Hardy and his colleagues approved "so soon as the great body of the people shall be courageous
and virtuous enough to join us in the attempt." I have found no proof that either at Norwich or in
London these Societies used illegal methods. The seditious placards posted up at Norwich may
have been the work of some fanatic or of an agent provocateur. But it is very doubtful whether the
holding of a People's Convention in the manner proposed was not an act of defiance to Parliament,
and therefore seditious. Individual members certainly came within the ban of the law. Thus,
Dundas received tidings that two members of Hardy's Society, named Stone and Meakins, were
circulating seditious writings in Essex. When arrested they had with them one or two military
books, copies of the revolutionary song, Ça ira, and similar papers;[318] but this fact does not
incriminate the Society at large. In fact, the reports as to the purchase of arms and secret drillings
are not very convincing. To take a few instances: information was sent to the Home Office that a
man named Kitchen had sixty pikes in his house in George Street, near York Buildings; also that
men were drilled secretly at the house of Spence, a seller of seditious pamphlets in the Little
Turnstile, Holborn, and at that of Shelmerdine, a small tradesman of Southwark; the arms in the
last case were bought from Williams, of the Tower, with a sum of £10 contributed by "a desperate
tailor of China Walk, Lambeth."[319] Did patriotism or private spite or greed of money incite these
reports? Drawings of pikes and spear-heads also diversified the report of the Secret Committee of
the Lords appointed to investigate seditious proceedings, and probably convinced lovers of realism
that plots actually existed.
Page 181
More alarming in reality were the preparations for a General Convention of the People. The
authorities knew that plans were actually on foot for sending delegates to form such a body. On
27th March 1794 the London Corresponding Society consulted the sister club on this question; and
in due course delegates from the two Societies passed resolutions in favour of the scheme. Hardy
thereupon sent a printed letter round to similar bodies, probably early in the month of April 1794.
It ran thus:
authorities knew that plans were actually on foot for sending delegates to form such a body. On
27th March 1794 the London Corresponding Society consulted the sister club on this question; and
in due course delegates from the two Societies passed resolutions in favour of the scheme. Hardy
thereupon sent a printed letter round to similar bodies, probably early in the month of April 1794.
It ran thus:
Page 182
Notwithstanding the unparalleled audacity of a corrupt and
overbearing faction which at present tramples on the rights and
liberties of our people, our meetings cannot, in England, be
interrupted without the previous adoption of a Convention Bill[320]
—a measure it is our duty to anticipate.... Let us then form another
British Convention. We have a central situation in our view, which
we believe would be most convenient for the whole island, but
which we forbear to mention ... till we have the answers of the
Societies with which we are in correspondence. Let us have your
answer, then, by the 20th at farthest, earlier if possible, whether you
approve of the measure and how many delegates you can send, with
the number also, if possible, of your Societies.
PS. We have appointed a Secret Committee on this. Will you do the
same?[321]
In order to further the scheme, the London Corresponding Society held a
meeting on 14th April at Chalk Farm, when an ardent appeal was read from
Hardy to resist the encroachments on liberty recently made by "apostate
reformers"—a fling at Pitt. "Are they alone," he asked, "to judge of the fit
time for Reform?" The meeting then thanked Earl Stanhope for his manly
and successful opposition to the attempt to bring Hanoverian and Hessian
troops into England; it also condemned the late rapid advances of despotism
and the arming one part of the people against the other. Finally it declared
that in cases of necessity the safety of the people was the only law. We may
here note that a few Hanoverian and Hessian battalions had been landed in
Hampshire, as a temporary measure, previous to their transference to other
ships. This occasioned some clamour at Westminster, Grey, Fox, Sheridan
and others claiming that the liberties of England were in the direst danger.
Pitt refused to accept a Bill of Indemnity for his action, and the House
supported him by a great majority.[322]
overbearing faction which at present tramples on the rights and
liberties of our people, our meetings cannot, in England, be
interrupted without the previous adoption of a Convention Bill[320]
—a measure it is our duty to anticipate.... Let us then form another
British Convention. We have a central situation in our view, which
we believe would be most convenient for the whole island, but
which we forbear to mention ... till we have the answers of the
Societies with which we are in correspondence. Let us have your
answer, then, by the 20th at farthest, earlier if possible, whether you
approve of the measure and how many delegates you can send, with
the number also, if possible, of your Societies.
PS. We have appointed a Secret Committee on this. Will you do the
same?[321]
In order to further the scheme, the London Corresponding Society held a
meeting on 14th April at Chalk Farm, when an ardent appeal was read from
Hardy to resist the encroachments on liberty recently made by "apostate
reformers"—a fling at Pitt. "Are they alone," he asked, "to judge of the fit
time for Reform?" The meeting then thanked Earl Stanhope for his manly
and successful opposition to the attempt to bring Hanoverian and Hessian
troops into England; it also condemned the late rapid advances of despotism
and the arming one part of the people against the other. Finally it declared
that in cases of necessity the safety of the people was the only law. We may
here note that a few Hanoverian and Hessian battalions had been landed in
Hampshire, as a temporary measure, previous to their transference to other
ships. This occasioned some clamour at Westminster, Grey, Fox, Sheridan
and others claiming that the liberties of England were in the direst danger.
Pitt refused to accept a Bill of Indemnity for his action, and the House
supported him by a great majority.[322]
Page 183
The other reference at the Chalk Farm meeting was to the proposal to
sanction the subscriptions to the Volunteer forces now being raised in
various counties.[323] At the outset this noble movement had in view the
defence of the constitution no less than of the land; and this doubtless
accounts for the fact that Coke, Mingay, and other Norfolk Whigs struggled
desperately and successfully to break up a county meeting held at Norwich
for this purpose on 12th April, shouting down even so able a speaker as
Windham. In general, however, these meetings were an immense success.
That at Aylesbury realized £5,851 for a county corps; and one at Epsom, for
Surrey, brought in nearly double as much.[324] Most noteworthy of all these
meetings was one of 19th April 1794 at Birmingham, where loyal
sentiments crystalized in a rhetorical jewel of rare lustre. The "Loyal True
Blues" of Birmingham, in view of the threats of the French "to insult the
chalky cliffs of Albion and to plant in this island their accursed tree of
liberty, more baneful in its effects than the poisonous tree of Java which
desolates the country and corrupts the winds of heaven," resolved to quit
the field of argument and to take arms as a Military Association. For
nothing could be so effective as "the decided and awful plan of the whole
Nation rising in a mass of Volunteers, determined to dispute every inch of
ground with their daring aggressors and to spill the last drop of their blood
in defence of their religion and their laws." They beg Edward Carver to
command them; they will choose their uniform, will arrange themselves as
grenadiers and light infantry; and, "to preserve the coup d'œil, the whole
corps will be arranged with the strictest attention to the height of the
members."[325] Possibly the Royalists of Birmingham may have known of
the hint conveyed in Hardy's letter, that the National Convention should
assemble in some convenient centre, a phrase which seemed to point to
their town, which, indeed, the Chartists chose for that purpose in 1839.
sanction the subscriptions to the Volunteer forces now being raised in
various counties.[323] At the outset this noble movement had in view the
defence of the constitution no less than of the land; and this doubtless
accounts for the fact that Coke, Mingay, and other Norfolk Whigs struggled
desperately and successfully to break up a county meeting held at Norwich
for this purpose on 12th April, shouting down even so able a speaker as
Windham. In general, however, these meetings were an immense success.
That at Aylesbury realized £5,851 for a county corps; and one at Epsom, for
Surrey, brought in nearly double as much.[324] Most noteworthy of all these
meetings was one of 19th April 1794 at Birmingham, where loyal
sentiments crystalized in a rhetorical jewel of rare lustre. The "Loyal True
Blues" of Birmingham, in view of the threats of the French "to insult the
chalky cliffs of Albion and to plant in this island their accursed tree of
liberty, more baneful in its effects than the poisonous tree of Java which
desolates the country and corrupts the winds of heaven," resolved to quit
the field of argument and to take arms as a Military Association. For
nothing could be so effective as "the decided and awful plan of the whole
Nation rising in a mass of Volunteers, determined to dispute every inch of
ground with their daring aggressors and to spill the last drop of their blood
in defence of their religion and their laws." They beg Edward Carver to
command them; they will choose their uniform, will arrange themselves as
grenadiers and light infantry; and, "to preserve the coup d'œil, the whole
corps will be arranged with the strictest attention to the height of the
members."[325] Possibly the Royalists of Birmingham may have known of
the hint conveyed in Hardy's letter, that the National Convention should
assemble in some convenient centre, a phrase which seemed to point to
their town, which, indeed, the Chartists chose for that purpose in 1839.
Page 184
In view of the fervent loyalty manifested on all sides, Ministers might
surely have trusted to the majority to control the restless minority. Auckland
expressed the general opinion when he said that the country in the
proportion of ten to one was sound and loyal.[326] As the majority was
armed, while the malcontents had but small stores of pikes, there was little
cause for fear, though in the minority were some desperate men. In
particular, Richard Davison, a prominent member of the Sheffield
Constitutional Society, recommended the clubs of London and Norwich to
buy consignments of pikes in order to resist the "newly-armed minions of
the bare-faced aristocracy of the present Administration"; and it afterwards
appeared that he could sell them at twenty pence each.[327] This letter was
sent off on 24th April, 1794, seventeen days after the holding of a mass
meeting on Castle Hill, Sheffield, at which the chairman, Henry Yorke
(alias Redhead), declared that, when the sun of Reason shone in its fullest
meridian, the people would turn out the 558 gentlemen from Westminster.
The meeting resolved that, as the people ought to demand universal suffrage
as a right, and not petition for it as a favour, they would never again petition
the House of Commons on this subject.[328] Contemptuous epithets were
now constantly hurled at Parliament. On 2nd May, that genial toper, Horne
Tooke, of Wimbledon, declared at a dinner of the Constitutional Society in
London that Parliament was a scoundrel sink of corruption, and that the
scoundrel Opposition joined the scoundrel Government in order to destroy
the rights of Englishmen. In order to add weight to his epithets he called the
company to witness to his complete sobriety.[329]
Pitt and his colleagues now decided to strike at the leaders who were
planning a British Convention. Of these the most formidable was the
Secretary of the London Corresponding Society. Accordingly, early on 12th
May, some Bow Street officers made their way into Hardy's shop, No. 9,
Piccadilly, arrested him, seized his papers, ransacking the room where Mrs.
surely have trusted to the majority to control the restless minority. Auckland
expressed the general opinion when he said that the country in the
proportion of ten to one was sound and loyal.[326] As the majority was
armed, while the malcontents had but small stores of pikes, there was little
cause for fear, though in the minority were some desperate men. In
particular, Richard Davison, a prominent member of the Sheffield
Constitutional Society, recommended the clubs of London and Norwich to
buy consignments of pikes in order to resist the "newly-armed minions of
the bare-faced aristocracy of the present Administration"; and it afterwards
appeared that he could sell them at twenty pence each.[327] This letter was
sent off on 24th April, 1794, seventeen days after the holding of a mass
meeting on Castle Hill, Sheffield, at which the chairman, Henry Yorke
(alias Redhead), declared that, when the sun of Reason shone in its fullest
meridian, the people would turn out the 558 gentlemen from Westminster.
The meeting resolved that, as the people ought to demand universal suffrage
as a right, and not petition for it as a favour, they would never again petition
the House of Commons on this subject.[328] Contemptuous epithets were
now constantly hurled at Parliament. On 2nd May, that genial toper, Horne
Tooke, of Wimbledon, declared at a dinner of the Constitutional Society in
London that Parliament was a scoundrel sink of corruption, and that the
scoundrel Opposition joined the scoundrel Government in order to destroy
the rights of Englishmen. In order to add weight to his epithets he called the
company to witness to his complete sobriety.[329]
Pitt and his colleagues now decided to strike at the leaders who were
planning a British Convention. Of these the most formidable was the
Secretary of the London Corresponding Society. Accordingly, early on 12th
May, some Bow Street officers made their way into Hardy's shop, No. 9,
Piccadilly, arrested him, seized his papers, ransacking the room where Mrs.
Page 185
Hardy was in bed. The shock to her nerves was such as to bring on
premature child-birth with fatal results. On the same day a royal message
came to Parliament announcing that the efforts of certain Societies to
summon a Convention in defiance of Parliament had led him to order the
seizure of their books and papers. Those of the Corresponding and
Constitutional Societies were brought, sealed up, to the House of Commons
on the morrow, whereupon Pitt moved for the appointment of a secret
committee to examine them. He himself, Dundas, and nineteen other
members soon drew up the Report. When presented on 16th May, it
contained a statement of all the threatening symptoms of the time, and so
far ignored the legal efforts of those Societies as to form a very alarming
diagnosis.[330]
The fears of Ministers were further aroused by the contents of a letter from
the Rev. Jeremiah Joyce (tutor of Earl Stanhope's son) to Horne Tooke,
which the Post Office had seized. It announced the arrest of citizen Hardy,
and ended thus: "Query: is it possible to get ready by Thursday?"[331] Some
effort of the imagination was needed to figure the Silenus of the literary
world as a plotter against the lives of Ministers. But they now decided to
arrest him and the Reverend Jeremiah, as well as Bonney, Richter, and Kyd,
also members of the Constitutional Society, besides Camage and one or two
other democrats of Sheffield. Davison, the would-be seller of pikes, had
fled betimes.
These were the circumstances which induced Pitt to propose the suspension
of the Habeas Corpus Act (16th May). The Report of the Secret Committee
having been read, he proceeded to exaggerate the import of the more
threatening parts of the evidence, and to convince the House that these
Societies, which had congratulated the French Convention, and still aped its
methods, were plotting to set up an authority openly hostile to Parliament.
With all the force of his oratory he pictured the state of things that must
premature child-birth with fatal results. On the same day a royal message
came to Parliament announcing that the efforts of certain Societies to
summon a Convention in defiance of Parliament had led him to order the
seizure of their books and papers. Those of the Corresponding and
Constitutional Societies were brought, sealed up, to the House of Commons
on the morrow, whereupon Pitt moved for the appointment of a secret
committee to examine them. He himself, Dundas, and nineteen other
members soon drew up the Report. When presented on 16th May, it
contained a statement of all the threatening symptoms of the time, and so
far ignored the legal efforts of those Societies as to form a very alarming
diagnosis.[330]
The fears of Ministers were further aroused by the contents of a letter from
the Rev. Jeremiah Joyce (tutor of Earl Stanhope's son) to Horne Tooke,
which the Post Office had seized. It announced the arrest of citizen Hardy,
and ended thus: "Query: is it possible to get ready by Thursday?"[331] Some
effort of the imagination was needed to figure the Silenus of the literary
world as a plotter against the lives of Ministers. But they now decided to
arrest him and the Reverend Jeremiah, as well as Bonney, Richter, and Kyd,
also members of the Constitutional Society, besides Camage and one or two
other democrats of Sheffield. Davison, the would-be seller of pikes, had
fled betimes.
These were the circumstances which induced Pitt to propose the suspension
of the Habeas Corpus Act (16th May). The Report of the Secret Committee
having been read, he proceeded to exaggerate the import of the more
threatening parts of the evidence, and to convince the House that these
Societies, which had congratulated the French Convention, and still aped its
methods, were plotting to set up an authority openly hostile to Parliament.
With all the force of his oratory he pictured the state of things that must
Page 186
ensue—"an enormous torrent of insurrection, which would sweep away all
the barriers of government, law and religion, and leave our country a naked
waste for usurped authority to range in, uncontrolled and unresisted."
Despite the warning of Fox that the remedy now proposed was worse than
the evil which it sought to avert; despite the pleas of Grey and Sheridan
against indecent haste in hurrying on this arbitrary measure, it was forced
through every stage in the Commons at that single sitting; finally, at half-
past three in the morning, the numbers of the Whig protestors sank to 13,
while the Ministerialists still mustered 108 strong.[332]
This collapse of the Opposition was due to a sharp cleavage in its ranks on
the vital issues now at stake. As has already appeared, Pitt had consulted the
Duke of Portland and his immediate followers on subjects affecting public
order. Some of the Old Whigs, notably Windham, served on the Committee
of Secrecy; and the evidence there forthcoming led them to propose a
general support of Government both in its war policy and the maintenance
of order. Those eager Royalists, Burke and Windham, took the lead in
proposing an alliance with the Ministry. The question arose whether the Old
Whigs should support from outside or actually coalesce with the Ministry,
taking their fair share of power. Burke strongly advised the latter course as
the only means of assuring continued and strenuous support. This opened a
sluice gate of correspondence, resulting in important changes in the
Cabinet. I shall refer to this matter later, merely noting here that the Duke of
Portland took over from Dundas the Home Office, which was thenceforth
limited to British and Irish affairs, Dundas becoming Secretary of State for
War, and Windham Secretary at War. The changes were most opportune; for
they strengthened the administrative machine and served to build up a
national party strong enough to cope with the growing difficulties of the
time. Thenceforth there was no danger of the overthrow of the Ministry.
Further, the panic pervading all parts of England in May 1794 was soon
allayed by the news of Howe's victory, termed "the glorious First of June";
the barriers of government, law and religion, and leave our country a naked
waste for usurped authority to range in, uncontrolled and unresisted."
Despite the warning of Fox that the remedy now proposed was worse than
the evil which it sought to avert; despite the pleas of Grey and Sheridan
against indecent haste in hurrying on this arbitrary measure, it was forced
through every stage in the Commons at that single sitting; finally, at half-
past three in the morning, the numbers of the Whig protestors sank to 13,
while the Ministerialists still mustered 108 strong.[332]
This collapse of the Opposition was due to a sharp cleavage in its ranks on
the vital issues now at stake. As has already appeared, Pitt had consulted the
Duke of Portland and his immediate followers on subjects affecting public
order. Some of the Old Whigs, notably Windham, served on the Committee
of Secrecy; and the evidence there forthcoming led them to propose a
general support of Government both in its war policy and the maintenance
of order. Those eager Royalists, Burke and Windham, took the lead in
proposing an alliance with the Ministry. The question arose whether the Old
Whigs should support from outside or actually coalesce with the Ministry,
taking their fair share of power. Burke strongly advised the latter course as
the only means of assuring continued and strenuous support. This opened a
sluice gate of correspondence, resulting in important changes in the
Cabinet. I shall refer to this matter later, merely noting here that the Duke of
Portland took over from Dundas the Home Office, which was thenceforth
limited to British and Irish affairs, Dundas becoming Secretary of State for
War, and Windham Secretary at War. The changes were most opportune; for
they strengthened the administrative machine and served to build up a
national party strong enough to cope with the growing difficulties of the
time. Thenceforth there was no danger of the overthrow of the Ministry.
Further, the panic pervading all parts of England in May 1794 was soon
allayed by the news of Howe's victory, termed "the glorious First of June";
Page 187
while in July the fall of Robespierre caused a general sense of relief. In
view of these events, Pitt would have done well to relax his efforts against
the British Jacobins. He held on his way and encountered sharp rebuffs. The
trial of Hardy and others in October dragged on to a great length; and, after
hearing an enormous mass of evidence (some of which proved the
possession of arms by democrats) the jury returned a verdict of Not Guilty.
This result, due to the masterly defence by Erskine and Gibbs, aroused a
tumult of joy in the vast crowd outside such as London had rarely seen.
Hardy afterwards asserted that, in case of a conviction, Government had
decided to arrest about 800 more persons.[333] This is mere hearsay; but it
has been fastened upon by those who seek to father upon Pitt the design of
reviving the days of Strafford and "Thorough." A fortnight previously Watt,
once a government informer, was convicted at Edinburgh of a treasonable
plot to set the city on fire, sack the banks, and attack the castle. Before he
went to execution he confessed his guilt.[334]
This was the only conviction obtained by Government. The trial of Horne
Tooke ran a course unfavourable to Ministers, the evidence for the
prosecution being flimsy in the extreme. Pitt himself was called to the
witness-box, and when closely cross-questioned by Erskine as to his former
connection with the Reform cause, admitted that he was present at a
meeting at the Duke of Richmond's residence, at which delegates from
county Reform Associations were present. The admission exposed him to
the charge of inconsistency in the eyes of those who looked only at the
surface of things. In reality, those who met at the Duke of Richmond's
house had nothing in common with the democratic clubs which proposed to
override the will of Parliament by a National Convention. Yet, as the
superficial view gains a ready assent, the fame of Pitt now underwent an
eclipse. Never again did he hear the whole-hearted acclaim which greeted
him in the years 1784–90. The roar of delight which went up at the news of
view of these events, Pitt would have done well to relax his efforts against
the British Jacobins. He held on his way and encountered sharp rebuffs. The
trial of Hardy and others in October dragged on to a great length; and, after
hearing an enormous mass of evidence (some of which proved the
possession of arms by democrats) the jury returned a verdict of Not Guilty.
This result, due to the masterly defence by Erskine and Gibbs, aroused a
tumult of joy in the vast crowd outside such as London had rarely seen.
Hardy afterwards asserted that, in case of a conviction, Government had
decided to arrest about 800 more persons.[333] This is mere hearsay; but it
has been fastened upon by those who seek to father upon Pitt the design of
reviving the days of Strafford and "Thorough." A fortnight previously Watt,
once a government informer, was convicted at Edinburgh of a treasonable
plot to set the city on fire, sack the banks, and attack the castle. Before he
went to execution he confessed his guilt.[334]
This was the only conviction obtained by Government. The trial of Horne
Tooke ran a course unfavourable to Ministers, the evidence for the
prosecution being flimsy in the extreme. Pitt himself was called to the
witness-box, and when closely cross-questioned by Erskine as to his former
connection with the Reform cause, admitted that he was present at a
meeting at the Duke of Richmond's residence, at which delegates from
county Reform Associations were present. The admission exposed him to
the charge of inconsistency in the eyes of those who looked only at the
surface of things. In reality, those who met at the Duke of Richmond's
house had nothing in common with the democratic clubs which proposed to
override the will of Parliament by a National Convention. Yet, as the
superficial view gains a ready assent, the fame of Pitt now underwent an
eclipse. Never again did he hear the whole-hearted acclaim which greeted
him in the years 1784–90. The roar of delight which went up at the news of
Page 188
the acquittal of Horne Tooke was a sign of the advent of a new era, in
whose aspirations Pitt had no part.
The prosecutions against Bonney, Joyce, Kyd, and Holcroft were now
dropped. The charge against Thelwall was pressed home, but resulted in
another defeat for Government. Thus, except in the case of Watt, no proof
was forthcoming of treasonable designs, though the apprehension of
Davison of Sheffield might perhaps have led to discoveries of that nature.
In the main, then, Pitt and his colleagues failed to justify the harsh measure
of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act; and the failure of the State
prosecutions led to a marked increase of the membership and activity of the
London Corresponding Society, with results which will appear later.
Nevertheless, Pitt's conduct is far from indefensible with regard to the main
point at issue, the meeting of a National Convention. In view of the projects
of some of the wilder spirits at London, Sheffield, Norwich, and Edinburgh,
it is presumptuous to charge him with causelessly seeking to bring about a
"Reign of Terror." He was face to face with developments which might
easily have become dangerous; and, with the example of Paris before him,
he not unnaturally took what he thought to be the safer course, that of
stopping them at the outset. Indeed, we may question whether Fox, had he
been in power, would have allowed the assembling of a National
Convention, pledged to press upon Parliament measures which he
reprobated.
It is when we come to details that Pitt is open to the charge of acting with
undue severity. Considering the proved loyalty of the great mass of the
people, what need was there to inaugurate a system of arbitrary arrests?
After all, England was not France. Here no systematic assault had been
made on the institutions in Church and State. The constitution had suffered
dilapidation, but it was storm-proof, and the garrison was strongly
whose aspirations Pitt had no part.
The prosecutions against Bonney, Joyce, Kyd, and Holcroft were now
dropped. The charge against Thelwall was pressed home, but resulted in
another defeat for Government. Thus, except in the case of Watt, no proof
was forthcoming of treasonable designs, though the apprehension of
Davison of Sheffield might perhaps have led to discoveries of that nature.
In the main, then, Pitt and his colleagues failed to justify the harsh measure
of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act; and the failure of the State
prosecutions led to a marked increase of the membership and activity of the
London Corresponding Society, with results which will appear later.
Nevertheless, Pitt's conduct is far from indefensible with regard to the main
point at issue, the meeting of a National Convention. In view of the projects
of some of the wilder spirits at London, Sheffield, Norwich, and Edinburgh,
it is presumptuous to charge him with causelessly seeking to bring about a
"Reign of Terror." He was face to face with developments which might
easily have become dangerous; and, with the example of Paris before him,
he not unnaturally took what he thought to be the safer course, that of
stopping them at the outset. Indeed, we may question whether Fox, had he
been in power, would have allowed the assembling of a National
Convention, pledged to press upon Parliament measures which he
reprobated.
It is when we come to details that Pitt is open to the charge of acting with
undue severity. Considering the proved loyalty of the great mass of the
people, what need was there to inaugurate a system of arbitrary arrests?
After all, England was not France. Here no systematic assault had been
made on the institutions in Church and State. The constitution had suffered
dilapidation, but it was storm-proof, and the garrison was strongly
Page 189
entrenched. Moreover, the democrats for the most part urged their case
without any of the appeals to violence which wrought havoc in France.
There the mob delighted to hurry a suspect to la lanterne and to parade
heads on pikes. Here the mass meeting at Chalk Farm, or on Castle Hill,
Sheffield, ended with loss neither of life nor of property. So far as I have
found, not one life was taken by the people in the course of this agitation—
a fact which speaks volumes for their religious sense, their self-restraint
even amidst deep poverty, and, in general, their obedience to law even when
they deemed it oppressive. The hero of the year 1794 is not William Pitt,
but the British nation.
without any of the appeals to violence which wrought havoc in France.
There the mob delighted to hurry a suspect to la lanterne and to parade
heads on pikes. Here the mass meeting at Chalk Farm, or on Castle Hill,
Sheffield, ended with loss neither of life nor of property. So far as I have
found, not one life was taken by the people in the course of this agitation—
a fact which speaks volumes for their religious sense, their self-restraint
even amidst deep poverty, and, in general, their obedience to law even when
they deemed it oppressive. The hero of the year 1794 is not William Pitt,
but the British nation.
Page 190
CHAPTER VIII
PITT AND THE ALLIES (1794–5)
The main object of His Majesty is the
keeping together by influence and weight this
great Confederation by which alone the
designs of France can be resisted, and which,
if left to itself, would be too likely to fall to
pieces from the jarring interests of the
Powers engaged in it.—Grenville to
Malmesbury, 21st April 1794.
The disgraceful failure of every military
operation His Prussian Majesty has
undertaken since the year 1791 has destroyed
the reputation of the Prussian army; and the
duplicity and versatility of his Cabinet put an
end to all confidence and good faith.—
Malmesbury to Grenville, 20th September
1794.
As in parliamentary life, so too in the wider spheres of diplomacy and
warfare, a Coalition very rarely holds together under a succession of sharp
blows. This is inherent in the nature of things. A complex or heterogeneous
substance is easily split up by strokes which leave a homogeneous body
PITT AND THE ALLIES (1794–5)
The main object of His Majesty is the
keeping together by influence and weight this
great Confederation by which alone the
designs of France can be resisted, and which,
if left to itself, would be too likely to fall to
pieces from the jarring interests of the
Powers engaged in it.—Grenville to
Malmesbury, 21st April 1794.
The disgraceful failure of every military
operation His Prussian Majesty has
undertaken since the year 1791 has destroyed
the reputation of the Prussian army; and the
duplicity and versatility of his Cabinet put an
end to all confidence and good faith.—
Malmesbury to Grenville, 20th September
1794.
As in parliamentary life, so too in the wider spheres of diplomacy and
warfare, a Coalition very rarely holds together under a succession of sharp
blows. This is inherent in the nature of things. A complex or heterogeneous
substance is easily split up by strokes which leave a homogeneous body
Page 191
intact. Rocks of volcanic origin defy the hammer under which
conglomerates crumble away; and when these last are hurled against granite
or flint, they splinter at once. Well might Shakespeare speak through the
mouth of Ulysses these wise words on the divisions of the Greeks before
Troy:
Look how many Grecian tents do stand
Hollow upon this plain, so many hollow factions.
...
Troy in our weakness stands, not in her strength.[335]
Pitt and his colleagues were under no illusion as to the weakness of the first
Coalition against France. They well knew the incurable jealousies of the
Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, the utter weakness of the Holy
Roman Empire, the poverty or torpor of Spain, Sardinia, and Naples, the
potent distractions produced by the recent partition of Poland, and the
Machiavellian scheme of the Empress Catharine II to busy the Central
Powers in French affairs so that she might have a free hand at Warsaw. All
this and much more stood revealed to them. But they grounded their hopes
of success on two important considerations; first, that the finances of France
were exhausted; secondly, that the rule of the Jacobins, fertile in forced
loans, forced service, and guillotining, must speedily collapse. On the
subject of French finance there are many notes in the Pitt Papers, which
show that Pitt believed an utter breakdown to be imminent. Grenville, too,
at the close of October 1793, stated that France had lost at least 200,000
soldiers, while more than 50,000 were in hospital. The repugnance to
military service was universal, and the deficit for the month of August alone
was close on £17,000,000.[336]
Above all, Pitt and Grenville believed the French Government to be
incompetent as well as exasperatingly cruel. In their eyes Jacobins were
conglomerates crumble away; and when these last are hurled against granite
or flint, they splinter at once. Well might Shakespeare speak through the
mouth of Ulysses these wise words on the divisions of the Greeks before
Troy:
Look how many Grecian tents do stand
Hollow upon this plain, so many hollow factions.
...
Troy in our weakness stands, not in her strength.[335]
Pitt and his colleagues were under no illusion as to the weakness of the first
Coalition against France. They well knew the incurable jealousies of the
Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, the utter weakness of the Holy
Roman Empire, the poverty or torpor of Spain, Sardinia, and Naples, the
potent distractions produced by the recent partition of Poland, and the
Machiavellian scheme of the Empress Catharine II to busy the Central
Powers in French affairs so that she might have a free hand at Warsaw. All
this and much more stood revealed to them. But they grounded their hopes
of success on two important considerations; first, that the finances of France
were exhausted; secondly, that the rule of the Jacobins, fertile in forced
loans, forced service, and guillotining, must speedily collapse. On the
subject of French finance there are many notes in the Pitt Papers, which
show that Pitt believed an utter breakdown to be imminent. Grenville, too,
at the close of October 1793, stated that France had lost at least 200,000
soldiers, while more than 50,000 were in hospital. The repugnance to
military service was universal, and the deficit for the month of August alone
was close on £17,000,000.[336]
Above all, Pitt and Grenville believed the French Government to be
incompetent as well as exasperatingly cruel. In their eyes Jacobins were
Page 192
sworn foes to all that made government possible. The mistake was natural.
The English Ministers knew little of what was going on in France, and
therefore failed to understand that the desperadoes now in power at Paris
were wielding a centralized despotism, compared with which that of
Louis XIV was child's play. As to the Phœnix-like survival of French credit,
it is inexplicable even to those who have witnessed the wonders wrought by
Thiers in 1870–3. All that can be said is that the Jacobins killed the goose
that laid the golden egg, and yet the golden eggs were laid. Let him who
understands the miracle of revolutionary finance cast the first stone at Pitt.
The Prime Minister also erred when he believed the French social structure
to be breaking up. Here again the miscalculation was perfectly natural in an
age which regarded kings, nobles, and bishops as the fixed stars of a
universe otherwise diversified only by a dim Milky Way. The French were
the first to dispel these notions. In truth the strength of the young giant bore
witness to the potency of the new and as yet allied forces—Democracy and
Nationality. In 1792 Democracy girded itself eagerly against the semi-
feudal Powers, Austria and Prussia; but the strength latent in the French
people appeared only in the next year when, on the accession of England,
Spain, and the Empire to the Coalition, plans were discussed of detaching
Alsace, Lorraine, Roussillon, and Flanders.[337] To these sacrilegious
schemes the French patriots opposed the dogma of Rousseau—the
indivisibility of the general will. "Perish 25,000,000 Frenchmen rather than
the Republic one and indivisible." This perfervid, if illogical, exclamation
of a Commissioner of the Convention reveals something of that passion for
unity which now fused together the French nation. Some peoples merge
themselves slowly together under the shelter of kindred beliefs and
institutions. Others again, after feeling their way towards closer union,
finally achieve it in the explosion of war or revolution. The former case was
the happy lot of the British nation; the latter, that of the French. Pitt, with
his essentially English outlook, failed to perceive that the diverse peoples
The English Ministers knew little of what was going on in France, and
therefore failed to understand that the desperadoes now in power at Paris
were wielding a centralized despotism, compared with which that of
Louis XIV was child's play. As to the Phœnix-like survival of French credit,
it is inexplicable even to those who have witnessed the wonders wrought by
Thiers in 1870–3. All that can be said is that the Jacobins killed the goose
that laid the golden egg, and yet the golden eggs were laid. Let him who
understands the miracle of revolutionary finance cast the first stone at Pitt.
The Prime Minister also erred when he believed the French social structure
to be breaking up. Here again the miscalculation was perfectly natural in an
age which regarded kings, nobles, and bishops as the fixed stars of a
universe otherwise diversified only by a dim Milky Way. The French were
the first to dispel these notions. In truth the strength of the young giant bore
witness to the potency of the new and as yet allied forces—Democracy and
Nationality. In 1792 Democracy girded itself eagerly against the semi-
feudal Powers, Austria and Prussia; but the strength latent in the French
people appeared only in the next year when, on the accession of England,
Spain, and the Empire to the Coalition, plans were discussed of detaching
Alsace, Lorraine, Roussillon, and Flanders.[337] To these sacrilegious
schemes the French patriots opposed the dogma of Rousseau—the
indivisibility of the general will. "Perish 25,000,000 Frenchmen rather than
the Republic one and indivisible." This perfervid, if illogical, exclamation
of a Commissioner of the Convention reveals something of that passion for
unity which now fused together the French nation. Some peoples merge
themselves slowly together under the shelter of kindred beliefs and
institutions. Others again, after feeling their way towards closer union,
finally achieve it in the explosion of war or revolution. The former case was
the happy lot of the British nation; the latter, that of the French. Pitt, with
his essentially English outlook, failed to perceive that the diverse peoples
Page 193
grouped together under the French monarchy had now attained to an
indissoluble unity under the stress of the very blows which he and his Allies
dealt in Flanders, Alsace, and Provence.
For by this time the counter-strokes dealt by the Republicans were telling
with fatal effect on their adversaries. The failure of the Spanish campaign in
Roussillon and the irruption of a French force into Catalonia dashed the
spirits of that weak and wavering monarch, Charles IV; and already
whispers were heard that peace with France was necessary. The disputes
with England concerning Nootka Sound and affairs at Toulon predisposed
the King and his people to think with less horror of the regicides of Paris.
As for Sardinia, the childish obscurantism of the Court of Turin had nursed
to quick life a mushroom growth of Jacobinism. The army defending the
Alpine passes was honeycombed with discontent; and the suspicious
conduct of Austria towards her little ally foreshadowed the divisions and
disasters which quickly followed on the advent of Bonaparte at that theatre
of the war.
It was clear that only from London could come the impulse which would
invigorate this anaemic Coalition. Pitt sought to impart such an impulse in
the King's Speech at the opening of the Session of 1794. It had throughout a
defiant ring. The capture of three of the northern fortresses of France, the
gains in the East and West Indies (they amounted to Pondicherry,
Chandernagore, and Tobago, together with Miquelon and St. Pierre), the
blow dealt to her navy at Toulon, and the impossibility of her continuing the
recent prodigious exertions, were in turn duly emphasized. And on 21st
January 1794, when Fox moved an amendment in favour of peace, the
Prime Minister spoke even more strongly of the madness of coming to
terms with the present rulers of France. Could any statesman not gifted with
second sight have spoken otherwise? At that time the Reign of Terror was
approaching its climax. The Goddess of Reason had lately been enthroned
indissoluble unity under the stress of the very blows which he and his Allies
dealt in Flanders, Alsace, and Provence.
For by this time the counter-strokes dealt by the Republicans were telling
with fatal effect on their adversaries. The failure of the Spanish campaign in
Roussillon and the irruption of a French force into Catalonia dashed the
spirits of that weak and wavering monarch, Charles IV; and already
whispers were heard that peace with France was necessary. The disputes
with England concerning Nootka Sound and affairs at Toulon predisposed
the King and his people to think with less horror of the regicides of Paris.
As for Sardinia, the childish obscurantism of the Court of Turin had nursed
to quick life a mushroom growth of Jacobinism. The army defending the
Alpine passes was honeycombed with discontent; and the suspicious
conduct of Austria towards her little ally foreshadowed the divisions and
disasters which quickly followed on the advent of Bonaparte at that theatre
of the war.
It was clear that only from London could come the impulse which would
invigorate this anaemic Coalition. Pitt sought to impart such an impulse in
the King's Speech at the opening of the Session of 1794. It had throughout a
defiant ring. The capture of three of the northern fortresses of France, the
gains in the East and West Indies (they amounted to Pondicherry,
Chandernagore, and Tobago, together with Miquelon and St. Pierre), the
blow dealt to her navy at Toulon, and the impossibility of her continuing the
recent prodigious exertions, were in turn duly emphasized. And on 21st
January 1794, when Fox moved an amendment in favour of peace, the
Prime Minister spoke even more strongly of the madness of coming to
terms with the present rulers of France. Could any statesman not gifted with
second sight have spoken otherwise? At that time the Reign of Terror was
approaching its climax. The Goddess of Reason had lately been enthroned
Page 194
in Notre Dame amidst ribald songs and dances. The schism between
Robespierre and the atheistical party was beginning to appear; and few
persons believed that France would long bend the knee before the lords of
the guillotine, whose resources were largely derived from the plunder of
churches and banks, forced loans from the wealthy, and a graduated Income
Tax resembling the Spartan proposals of Thomas Paine.
In such a case Pitt naturally repeated his statement of the previous session,
that he altogether deprecated a peace with France, unless it possessed some
elements of permanence, and secured due indemnity to Great Britain. Nay,
he declared that he would rather persevere with war, even in the midst of
disasters, than come to terms with the present rulers of France, who were
alike enemies of order and rabid foes of England. They drove men into
battle by fear of the guillotine; they formed rapine and destruction into a
system, and perverted to their detestable purposes all the talents and
ingenuity derived from the civilization around them. He was careful,
however, to correct the mis-statement of Fox, that the Government was
struggling for the restoration of the French monarchy. While believing that
that nation would live most happily under a King, Pitt denied that a
restoration was the object of the present war. We have already seen that he
held this view in his correspondence with the Austrian Court. The House
supported Ministers by 277 votes to 59.
These declarations, backed by so large a majority, caused great satisfaction
at Vienna, and heartened that Government in the midst of its many
uncertainties. There was every need of encouragement. In that age, when
the great monarchs of the eighteenth century had passed, or were passing,
away, Francis II stood somewhat low among the mediocrities on whom fell
the strokes of destiny. He was a poor replica of Leopold II. Where the father
was supple and adroit, the son was perversely obstinate or weakly pliable.
In place of foresight and tenacity in the pursuit of essentials, Francis was
Robespierre and the atheistical party was beginning to appear; and few
persons believed that France would long bend the knee before the lords of
the guillotine, whose resources were largely derived from the plunder of
churches and banks, forced loans from the wealthy, and a graduated Income
Tax resembling the Spartan proposals of Thomas Paine.
In such a case Pitt naturally repeated his statement of the previous session,
that he altogether deprecated a peace with France, unless it possessed some
elements of permanence, and secured due indemnity to Great Britain. Nay,
he declared that he would rather persevere with war, even in the midst of
disasters, than come to terms with the present rulers of France, who were
alike enemies of order and rabid foes of England. They drove men into
battle by fear of the guillotine; they formed rapine and destruction into a
system, and perverted to their detestable purposes all the talents and
ingenuity derived from the civilization around them. He was careful,
however, to correct the mis-statement of Fox, that the Government was
struggling for the restoration of the French monarchy. While believing that
that nation would live most happily under a King, Pitt denied that a
restoration was the object of the present war. We have already seen that he
held this view in his correspondence with the Austrian Court. The House
supported Ministers by 277 votes to 59.
These declarations, backed by so large a majority, caused great satisfaction
at Vienna, and heartened that Government in the midst of its many
uncertainties. There was every need of encouragement. In that age, when
the great monarchs of the eighteenth century had passed, or were passing,
away, Francis II stood somewhat low among the mediocrities on whom fell
the strokes of destiny. He was a poor replica of Leopold II. Where the father
was supple and adroit, the son was perversely obstinate or weakly pliable.
In place of foresight and tenacity in the pursuit of essentials, Francis was
Page 195
remarkable for a more than Hapsburg narrowness of view, and he lacked the
toughness which had not seldom repaired the blunders of that House. Those
counsellors swayed him most who appealed to his family pride, or satisfied
his other dominant feelings, attachment to the old order of things and a
pedantic clinging to established usages. But the weakness of his character
soon became so patent as to excite general distrust, especially as he was
swayed by the wayward impulses of his consort, a daughter of Ferdinand IV
and Maria Carolina of Naples. From her mother she inherited a hatred of
French principles and the bent towards intrigue and extravagance which
wrecked the careers of that Queen and of her sister, Marie Antoinette.
Francis II and his consort longed to stamp out the French plague; but they
lacked the strength of mind and of will that commands success. Our special
envoy at Vienna, Thomas Grenville, questioned whether the Emperor "had
steadiness enough to influence the Government."
According to the same competent judge, the Chancellor Thugut was the
only efficient Minister, being very laborious in his work, and indeed "the
only man of business about the Court."[338] Yet Thugut was rather a clever
diplomat and ideal head-clerk than a statesman. In forethought he did not
much excel his master. Indeed, his personality and his position alike
condemned him to aim at cheap and easy gains. His features and figure
were mean. Worse still, he was of low birth, a crime in the eyes of nobles
and courtiers who for nearly half a century had seen the prestige of the
Chancery enhanced by the lordly airs and whims of Kaunitz. Fear of courtly
intrigues ever obsessed the mind of Thugut; and thus, whenever the horizon
darkened, this coast-hugging pilot at once made for the nearest haven. In
particular, as the recovery of Belgium in the year 1793 brought no financial
gain, but unending vistas of war, he sought other means of indemnity, and
discovered them in Alsace-Lorraine, South Poland, and Venice. The first
was a concession to the pride of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine; but
Thugut saw in Venetia and in the land south of Warsaw the readiest means
toughness which had not seldom repaired the blunders of that House. Those
counsellors swayed him most who appealed to his family pride, or satisfied
his other dominant feelings, attachment to the old order of things and a
pedantic clinging to established usages. But the weakness of his character
soon became so patent as to excite general distrust, especially as he was
swayed by the wayward impulses of his consort, a daughter of Ferdinand IV
and Maria Carolina of Naples. From her mother she inherited a hatred of
French principles and the bent towards intrigue and extravagance which
wrecked the careers of that Queen and of her sister, Marie Antoinette.
Francis II and his consort longed to stamp out the French plague; but they
lacked the strength of mind and of will that commands success. Our special
envoy at Vienna, Thomas Grenville, questioned whether the Emperor "had
steadiness enough to influence the Government."
According to the same competent judge, the Chancellor Thugut was the
only efficient Minister, being very laborious in his work, and indeed "the
only man of business about the Court."[338] Yet Thugut was rather a clever
diplomat and ideal head-clerk than a statesman. In forethought he did not
much excel his master. Indeed, his personality and his position alike
condemned him to aim at cheap and easy gains. His features and figure
were mean. Worse still, he was of low birth, a crime in the eyes of nobles
and courtiers who for nearly half a century had seen the prestige of the
Chancery enhanced by the lordly airs and whims of Kaunitz. Fear of courtly
intrigues ever obsessed the mind of Thugut; and thus, whenever the horizon
darkened, this coast-hugging pilot at once made for the nearest haven. In
particular, as the recovery of Belgium in the year 1793 brought no financial
gain, but unending vistas of war, he sought other means of indemnity, and
discovered them in Alsace-Lorraine, South Poland, and Venice. The first
was a concession to the pride of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine; but
Thugut saw in Venetia and in the land south of Warsaw the readiest means
Page 196
of indemnifying Austria for the loss of her Belgic Provinces, which after the
defeat of Wattignies (October 1793) he probably expected and welcomed.
In this orientation of Hapsburg policy Thugut did but follow the impulse
first imparted by Hertzberg at Berlin. As we have seen, Frederick William II
entered on the French war in one of his chivalrous moods, which passed
away amidst the smoke of Valmy. The miseries of the retreat Rhinewards,
and the incursion of the French into the valley of the Main taught him
prudence, while the ease of his conquest of Great Poland early in the year
1793 assured the victory of statecraft over chivalry. Morton Eden reported
from Berlin that, had the preparations for the Valmy campaign equalled in
thoroughness those for the invasion of Poland, events must have gone very
differently in Champagne. The circumspection with which the Prussians
conducted the siege of Mainz in the summer of 1793, and the long delays of
the autumn, have already been noticed. The result of it was that at
Christmastide of the year 1793 Pichegru and Hoche threw back Wurmser in
disastrous rout, and compelled Brunswick hurriedly to retire to the Rhine.
As always happens between discordant allies after defeats, Berlin and
Vienna indulged in a war of words, amidst which the Coalition would
probably have broken up but for the efforts of British diplomacy. The Pitt
Ministry had despatched to Berlin the ablest of British diplomatists, Lord
Malmesbury, with a view to strengthening the accord between the three
Powers; and the mingled charm and authority of his presence did much to
thwart the petty prejudices and intrigues prevalent at that capital. He took
Brussels and Frankfurt on his way to Berlin, and his diary shows the
listlessness or discontent which had infected the officers of the British army.
Many of them openly brought against the Duke of York the most outrageous
and unfounded charges, and it seems that about fifty of them went on
furlough to England, where they spread those slanders and played into the
hands of the Opposition.[339] Malmesbury's converse with the Duke and
defeat of Wattignies (October 1793) he probably expected and welcomed.
In this orientation of Hapsburg policy Thugut did but follow the impulse
first imparted by Hertzberg at Berlin. As we have seen, Frederick William II
entered on the French war in one of his chivalrous moods, which passed
away amidst the smoke of Valmy. The miseries of the retreat Rhinewards,
and the incursion of the French into the valley of the Main taught him
prudence, while the ease of his conquest of Great Poland early in the year
1793 assured the victory of statecraft over chivalry. Morton Eden reported
from Berlin that, had the preparations for the Valmy campaign equalled in
thoroughness those for the invasion of Poland, events must have gone very
differently in Champagne. The circumspection with which the Prussians
conducted the siege of Mainz in the summer of 1793, and the long delays of
the autumn, have already been noticed. The result of it was that at
Christmastide of the year 1793 Pichegru and Hoche threw back Wurmser in
disastrous rout, and compelled Brunswick hurriedly to retire to the Rhine.
As always happens between discordant allies after defeats, Berlin and
Vienna indulged in a war of words, amidst which the Coalition would
probably have broken up but for the efforts of British diplomacy. The Pitt
Ministry had despatched to Berlin the ablest of British diplomatists, Lord
Malmesbury, with a view to strengthening the accord between the three
Powers; and the mingled charm and authority of his presence did much to
thwart the petty prejudices and intrigues prevalent at that capital. He took
Brussels and Frankfurt on his way to Berlin, and his diary shows the
listlessness or discontent which had infected the officers of the British army.
Many of them openly brought against the Duke of York the most outrageous
and unfounded charges, and it seems that about fifty of them went on
furlough to England, where they spread those slanders and played into the
hands of the Opposition.[339] Malmesbury's converse with the Duke and
Page 197
others at Ath convinced him that the commander-in-chief was striving
manfully and generously against a situation full of difficulty.
At Frankfurt, and again at Berlin, Malmesbury found signs that Frederick
William was ashamed at the ignominious issue of the campaign, and
professed a desire to take up the duties which the Duke of Brunswick had
so haltingly fulfilled. The King seemed rather pleased than otherwise at the
Austrian reverses in the north of Alsace, but by no means indisposed to
renew the attack upon France, always provided that England paid him a
sufficient subsidy. He assured the envoy that his chef-d'œuvre, the Triple
Alliance of 1788, was still a reality, but he declared, on the faith of an
honest man, that the state of Prussia's finances would not enable him to face
a third campaign. In point of fact, out of the reserve fund of 80,000,000
crowns which Frederick the Great had handed on, only 20,000,000 or
perhaps only 14,000,000 remained in the early days of 1794.[340]
Other difficulties beset the Prussian monarch. Want of work had driven the
weavers of Silesia to a state of frenzy and tumult almost resembling a
Jacquerie; and there and elsewhere serfs and peasants talked openly of
casting off the restraints and burdens of Feudalism. In such a case the
veriest autocrat must pause before he commits his country to the risks of a
loan (that of 1792 had exhausted Prussia's credit), or to a campaign where
the losses were certain and the gains doubtful. On this last topic various
schemes had been bandied to and fro between Berlin and Vienna. The debt
of honour certainly bade Frederick William help to secure to his rival a
counterpart to Prussia's acquisitions in Poland; but, apart from this
consideration and the need of stamping out the French pest in the
Rhineland, the politicians of Berlin found few reasons for prolonging the
war. What wonder, then, that they set on foot intrigues with the regicides of
Paris? Marshal Möllendorf, the commander whom Frederick William
manfully and generously against a situation full of difficulty.
At Frankfurt, and again at Berlin, Malmesbury found signs that Frederick
William was ashamed at the ignominious issue of the campaign, and
professed a desire to take up the duties which the Duke of Brunswick had
so haltingly fulfilled. The King seemed rather pleased than otherwise at the
Austrian reverses in the north of Alsace, but by no means indisposed to
renew the attack upon France, always provided that England paid him a
sufficient subsidy. He assured the envoy that his chef-d'œuvre, the Triple
Alliance of 1788, was still a reality, but he declared, on the faith of an
honest man, that the state of Prussia's finances would not enable him to face
a third campaign. In point of fact, out of the reserve fund of 80,000,000
crowns which Frederick the Great had handed on, only 20,000,000 or
perhaps only 14,000,000 remained in the early days of 1794.[340]
Other difficulties beset the Prussian monarch. Want of work had driven the
weavers of Silesia to a state of frenzy and tumult almost resembling a
Jacquerie; and there and elsewhere serfs and peasants talked openly of
casting off the restraints and burdens of Feudalism. In such a case the
veriest autocrat must pause before he commits his country to the risks of a
loan (that of 1792 had exhausted Prussia's credit), or to a campaign where
the losses were certain and the gains doubtful. On this last topic various
schemes had been bandied to and fro between Berlin and Vienna. The debt
of honour certainly bade Frederick William help to secure to his rival a
counterpart to Prussia's acquisitions in Poland; but, apart from this
consideration and the need of stamping out the French pest in the
Rhineland, the politicians of Berlin found few reasons for prolonging the
war. What wonder, then, that they set on foot intrigues with the regicides of
Paris? Marshal Möllendorf, the commander whom Frederick William
Page 198
substituted for the weary and disgusted Duke of Brunswick, proved to be a
partisan of peace.[341]
Royalist at heart, but beset by advisers and mistresses who fanned his
jealousy of Austria and love of ease, Frederick William wavered under the
whims of the hour or the counsels of the last comer. Malmesbury thus
summed up the question now at issue in his letter to Pitt of 9th January
1794: "Can we do without the King of Prussia or can we not? If we can, he
is not worth the giving of a guinea for. If we cannot, I am afraid we cannot
give too many." Malmesbury saw no means of keeping Frederick William
steady up to the end of the war. Pitt and Grenville, however, devised the
following expedient. They offered the sum of £2,000,000 for bringing
100,000 Prussians into the field. Of this sum Great Britain would furnish
two fifths (or £800,000), and Austria and Holland each one fifth, the last
fifth being advanced by Prussia herself until she reimbursed herself from
France at the general peace. The device was suggestive of that of the rustic
who tempts his beast of burden onwards by dangling a choice vegetable
before his nose.
Frederick William alone might have been attracted by the offer; but his
advisers haggled long and obstinately over details. Chief among the
objectors was a Councillor of State, Haugwitz, an oily, plausible creature,
whose Gallophil leanings were destined finally to place his country under
the heel of Napoleon and deal a death-blow to Pitt. For the present, he
treated Malmesbury with a moderation and courtesy that deftly veiled a
determined opposition. The British envoy was fully his match. Finding that
Haugwitz ascribed all difficulties and delays to the Austrian embassy, he
advised him to propose the transfer of the negotiations to The Hague, where
these annoyances would cease. Vain and always prone to take the easiest
course, Haugwitz swallowed the bait and succeeded in carrying a point
which was all in Malmesbury's favour, especially as it saved time in
partisan of peace.[341]
Royalist at heart, but beset by advisers and mistresses who fanned his
jealousy of Austria and love of ease, Frederick William wavered under the
whims of the hour or the counsels of the last comer. Malmesbury thus
summed up the question now at issue in his letter to Pitt of 9th January
1794: "Can we do without the King of Prussia or can we not? If we can, he
is not worth the giving of a guinea for. If we cannot, I am afraid we cannot
give too many." Malmesbury saw no means of keeping Frederick William
steady up to the end of the war. Pitt and Grenville, however, devised the
following expedient. They offered the sum of £2,000,000 for bringing
100,000 Prussians into the field. Of this sum Great Britain would furnish
two fifths (or £800,000), and Austria and Holland each one fifth, the last
fifth being advanced by Prussia herself until she reimbursed herself from
France at the general peace. The device was suggestive of that of the rustic
who tempts his beast of burden onwards by dangling a choice vegetable
before his nose.
Frederick William alone might have been attracted by the offer; but his
advisers haggled long and obstinately over details. Chief among the
objectors was a Councillor of State, Haugwitz, an oily, plausible creature,
whose Gallophil leanings were destined finally to place his country under
the heel of Napoleon and deal a death-blow to Pitt. For the present, he
treated Malmesbury with a moderation and courtesy that deftly veiled a
determined opposition. The British envoy was fully his match. Finding that
Haugwitz ascribed all difficulties and delays to the Austrian embassy, he
advised him to propose the transfer of the negotiations to The Hague, where
these annoyances would cease. Vain and always prone to take the easiest
course, Haugwitz swallowed the bait and succeeded in carrying a point
which was all in Malmesbury's favour, especially as it saved time in
Page 199
communicating with Downing Street. After annoying delays they set out on
23rd March; and with the aid of twenty-two horses at each post traversed
the 326 (English) miles to The Hague in 120 hours during the days, 23rd–
30th March, when the campaign ought to have opened.
The prospects at Vienna were equally gloomy. Morton Eden's reports to
Grenville form an unrelieved jeremiad. Even amidst the alarms caused by
the disasters at Toulon and in the Palatinate, jealousy of Prussia was the
dominant feeling. The utmost efforts of our ambassador failed to convince
Francis II and Thugut of the need of humouring Prussia by meeting her
demand for an additional subsidy and by guaranteeing bread and forage for
the 20,000 men who formed her contingent in the Austrian service. Into
these wearisome quarrels we need not enter, further than to note that they
were envenomed by the acerbity of the Prussian ambassador at Vienna. The
Marquis Lucchesini, born at Lucca in 1752, early entered the service of
Frederick the Great, to whom he acted as reader. He advanced rapidly under
his successor. His commanding demeanour and vivacity of speech, added to
great powers of work, and acuteness in detecting the foibles of others, made
him a formidable opponent. Further, his marriage with the sister of
Bischoffswerder, until lately the King's favourite adviser, added to his
influence, which, as was natural with a foreigner, inclined towards the
attractive and gainful course. Long afterwards the saviour of Prussia, Baron
vom Stein, classed him among the narrow, selfish, insincere men who had
been the ruin of nations.[342] Certainly he helped to ruin Poland; and now
his conduct at Vienna clogged the efforts of Morton Eden and Malmesbury
to strengthen the Coalition against France. Eden complained that he
behaved as an intriguing subaltern rather than as an ambassador; and
rumour credibly ascribed his tortuous and exasperating conduct to French
gold.
23rd March; and with the aid of twenty-two horses at each post traversed
the 326 (English) miles to The Hague in 120 hours during the days, 23rd–
30th March, when the campaign ought to have opened.
The prospects at Vienna were equally gloomy. Morton Eden's reports to
Grenville form an unrelieved jeremiad. Even amidst the alarms caused by
the disasters at Toulon and in the Palatinate, jealousy of Prussia was the
dominant feeling. The utmost efforts of our ambassador failed to convince
Francis II and Thugut of the need of humouring Prussia by meeting her
demand for an additional subsidy and by guaranteeing bread and forage for
the 20,000 men who formed her contingent in the Austrian service. Into
these wearisome quarrels we need not enter, further than to note that they
were envenomed by the acerbity of the Prussian ambassador at Vienna. The
Marquis Lucchesini, born at Lucca in 1752, early entered the service of
Frederick the Great, to whom he acted as reader. He advanced rapidly under
his successor. His commanding demeanour and vivacity of speech, added to
great powers of work, and acuteness in detecting the foibles of others, made
him a formidable opponent. Further, his marriage with the sister of
Bischoffswerder, until lately the King's favourite adviser, added to his
influence, which, as was natural with a foreigner, inclined towards the
attractive and gainful course. Long afterwards the saviour of Prussia, Baron
vom Stein, classed him among the narrow, selfish, insincere men who had
been the ruin of nations.[342] Certainly he helped to ruin Poland; and now
his conduct at Vienna clogged the efforts of Morton Eden and Malmesbury
to strengthen the Coalition against France. Eden complained that he
behaved as an intriguing subaltern rather than as an ambassador; and
rumour credibly ascribed his tortuous and exasperating conduct to French
gold.
Page 200
In the midst of his irritation against Prussia and her envoy, Thugut heard
with astonishment the British proposals, presented at Berlin early in
February, to bring 100,000 Prussians into the field. Urgently he
remonstrated with Eden, pointing out that Prussia had played them false in
two campaigns, and would do so again, witness her late contention that
France must not be weakened. On no account, then, must Frederick William
head a compact mass of 100,000 men in the Palatinate. He would be the
arbiter of the situation. He would be between the Austrian army in Brabant
and the Hapsburg States. Nay, he might march into Swabia, reach the
Danube, take boats at Ulm, and, sailing down that stream, have Vienna at
his mercy![343] So pressing were these anxieties that, at the close of
February, Thugut sent a special request to Catharine II to guarantee the
security of Austria's possessions in case Frederick William withdrew from
the Coalition.
Despite the utmost efforts of the British Ministry and its envoys, no plan of
vigorous co-operation could be arranged between the two German rivals;
the sole link connecting them was the clause of the treaty of 1792, whereby
Austria, as having been attacked by France, claimed the help of 20,000
Prussians. Frederick William decided that this force must remain at Mainz,
in order to guard the Empire from a French raid. He promised 80,000 more
troops to Great Britain and Holland, provided that they were paid for. On
one point alone the four Allies came near to agreement, namely, that the
main Prussian army should operate in Flanders, so as effectively to defend
the Dutch territory, secure conquests in the North of France, and, above all,
preclude the quarrels which must ensue if it acted near the Austrians.[344]
Thugut of course assented, his great aim being to remove the Prussians as
far as possible from Swabia. Disputes on these subjects went on up to the
end of March 1794, the time when an advance into French Flanders
promised great results.
with astonishment the British proposals, presented at Berlin early in
February, to bring 100,000 Prussians into the field. Urgently he
remonstrated with Eden, pointing out that Prussia had played them false in
two campaigns, and would do so again, witness her late contention that
France must not be weakened. On no account, then, must Frederick William
head a compact mass of 100,000 men in the Palatinate. He would be the
arbiter of the situation. He would be between the Austrian army in Brabant
and the Hapsburg States. Nay, he might march into Swabia, reach the
Danube, take boats at Ulm, and, sailing down that stream, have Vienna at
his mercy![343] So pressing were these anxieties that, at the close of
February, Thugut sent a special request to Catharine II to guarantee the
security of Austria's possessions in case Frederick William withdrew from
the Coalition.
Despite the utmost efforts of the British Ministry and its envoys, no plan of
vigorous co-operation could be arranged between the two German rivals;
the sole link connecting them was the clause of the treaty of 1792, whereby
Austria, as having been attacked by France, claimed the help of 20,000
Prussians. Frederick William decided that this force must remain at Mainz,
in order to guard the Empire from a French raid. He promised 80,000 more
troops to Great Britain and Holland, provided that they were paid for. On
one point alone the four Allies came near to agreement, namely, that the
main Prussian army should operate in Flanders, so as effectively to defend
the Dutch territory, secure conquests in the North of France, and, above all,
preclude the quarrels which must ensue if it acted near the Austrians.[344]
Thugut of course assented, his great aim being to remove the Prussians as
far as possible from Swabia. Disputes on these subjects went on up to the
end of March 1794, the time when an advance into French Flanders
promised great results.
Page 201
The reader will naturally ask—Can this be called a Coalition? A Coalition
implies some power of coalescing. But among the four Powers there was far
more of disunion than union. In fact, England was the sole link between
these wrangling confederates, and that, too, solely by means of what
Carlyle called the cash nexus. Grenville, using a more homely metaphor,
averred that the German princes turned towards England as an inexhaustible
milch-cow. The animal in this case could dictate her terms; and thus the
relations of the three Powers resembled those of a rich but somewhat
exigent employer to grumbling and distrustful employees. Holland also, in
return for her sacrifices in men and money, demanded from Austria a better
frontier on the side of Dutch Flanders and Maestricht, to which the
Viennese Court opposed a quiet but firm resistance.
It speaks volumes for the confidence inspired by Pitt and Grenville, and for
the tactful zeal of Malmesbury and Eden, that they induced the German
rivals to make one more effort. The Duke of York also played an important
part in the formation of the plan of campaign; for he it was who persuaded
Colonel Mack to accompany him to London, and there discuss with
Ministers the alternative schemes. The mention of Mack will excite surprise
among those who know of him only by the futile Neapolitan campaign of
1799, and the frightful disaster of Ulm. In regard to strategy and the theory
of war he displayed much ability; and his administrative talents and energy
as Quarter-Master-General in 1793 should have screened him from the
criticism that he discoursed brilliantly on war in salons, and in the council
rhetorically developed specious and elegant plans.[345]
Mack's plan of operations was first submitted to the judgement of the
Archduke Charles, the Prince of Coburg, Count Mercy, the Prince of
Orange, and the Duke of York, at Brussels. Next, he proceeded, along with
Counts Stahremberg and Merveldt to London, and on 13th February
unfolded his plan to Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas. The Duke of York had
implies some power of coalescing. But among the four Powers there was far
more of disunion than union. In fact, England was the sole link between
these wrangling confederates, and that, too, solely by means of what
Carlyle called the cash nexus. Grenville, using a more homely metaphor,
averred that the German princes turned towards England as an inexhaustible
milch-cow. The animal in this case could dictate her terms; and thus the
relations of the three Powers resembled those of a rich but somewhat
exigent employer to grumbling and distrustful employees. Holland also, in
return for her sacrifices in men and money, demanded from Austria a better
frontier on the side of Dutch Flanders and Maestricht, to which the
Viennese Court opposed a quiet but firm resistance.
It speaks volumes for the confidence inspired by Pitt and Grenville, and for
the tactful zeal of Malmesbury and Eden, that they induced the German
rivals to make one more effort. The Duke of York also played an important
part in the formation of the plan of campaign; for he it was who persuaded
Colonel Mack to accompany him to London, and there discuss with
Ministers the alternative schemes. The mention of Mack will excite surprise
among those who know of him only by the futile Neapolitan campaign of
1799, and the frightful disaster of Ulm. In regard to strategy and the theory
of war he displayed much ability; and his administrative talents and energy
as Quarter-Master-General in 1793 should have screened him from the
criticism that he discoursed brilliantly on war in salons, and in the council
rhetorically developed specious and elegant plans.[345]
Mack's plan of operations was first submitted to the judgement of the
Archduke Charles, the Prince of Coburg, Count Mercy, the Prince of
Orange, and the Duke of York, at Brussels. Next, he proceeded, along with
Counts Stahremberg and Merveldt to London, and on 13th February
unfolded his plan to Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas. The Duke of York had
Page 202
preceded him by two days, but was absent from this conference. It became
piquant when Pitt "playfully" remarked to Mack that a great general had
recently arrived at London whose appointment to the command of the
British force in Flanders would doubtless meet with his warm approval.
After a little more fencing, Pitt gave the name of the Marquis Cornwallis,
who had just returned from his Viceroyalty in India. Mack by no means
welcomed the proposal, and made the irreverent remark that the best
General, after fighting elephants in India, would be puzzled by the French.
Pitt thereupon observed that the Duke of York had not the confidence of the
army, to which Mack and Merveldt replied by praising his character, and
decrying his critics as a set of influential but inexperienced youths.
The matter then dropped, and the Duke was present at the conference on the
morrow. Finally, Austria and England bound themselves to make great
efforts, the latter with at least 40,000 men, either British or German
auxiliaries. The Prussian and Dutch forces were to be increased so as to
bring the grand total to 340,000 men. Of this large number 170,000 were to
operate in Flanders with a view to a march on Paris; 35,000 held the
country along the right bank of the Meuse; 15,000 protected Luxemburg;
65,000 Prussians prolonged the line eastwards to the Rhine, which was
guarded by 55,000 Austrians. Certainly the plan called for a third of a
million of men, if all the frontier strongholds of Flanders were to be taken
before the march to Paris began. In regard to details, Pitt, Grenville, and
Dundas urged that Cornwallis should command the British and subsidiary
forces defending West Flanders—a suggestion which George III warmly
approved, on condition that the Duke of York, serving with the main body
nearer the centre of the long line, had a number of troops proportionate to
his rank and talents.
Thus the effort of Pitt and his colleagues to shelve the Duke of York was
foiled. On another and weightier matter he had his way. Coburg's conduct
piquant when Pitt "playfully" remarked to Mack that a great general had
recently arrived at London whose appointment to the command of the
British force in Flanders would doubtless meet with his warm approval.
After a little more fencing, Pitt gave the name of the Marquis Cornwallis,
who had just returned from his Viceroyalty in India. Mack by no means
welcomed the proposal, and made the irreverent remark that the best
General, after fighting elephants in India, would be puzzled by the French.
Pitt thereupon observed that the Duke of York had not the confidence of the
army, to which Mack and Merveldt replied by praising his character, and
decrying his critics as a set of influential but inexperienced youths.
The matter then dropped, and the Duke was present at the conference on the
morrow. Finally, Austria and England bound themselves to make great
efforts, the latter with at least 40,000 men, either British or German
auxiliaries. The Prussian and Dutch forces were to be increased so as to
bring the grand total to 340,000 men. Of this large number 170,000 were to
operate in Flanders with a view to a march on Paris; 35,000 held the
country along the right bank of the Meuse; 15,000 protected Luxemburg;
65,000 Prussians prolonged the line eastwards to the Rhine, which was
guarded by 55,000 Austrians. Certainly the plan called for a third of a
million of men, if all the frontier strongholds of Flanders were to be taken
before the march to Paris began. In regard to details, Pitt, Grenville, and
Dundas urged that Cornwallis should command the British and subsidiary
forces defending West Flanders—a suggestion which George III warmly
approved, on condition that the Duke of York, serving with the main body
nearer the centre of the long line, had a number of troops proportionate to
his rank and talents.
Thus the effort of Pitt and his colleagues to shelve the Duke of York was
foiled. On another and weightier matter he had his way. Coburg's conduct
Page 203
had been so languid and unenterprising as to lead to urgent demands for his
recall; and it was understood that the Emperor Francis would take the
command, with Mack as Chief-of-Staff and virtual director of the
campaign. Pitt expressed to Mack his marked preference of this
arrangement to the alternative scheme, the appointment of the Archduke
Charles; for the extreme youth of the Archduke might hinder a good
understanding between him and his subordinate and senior, the Duke of
York. Seeing, then, that Mack declined absolutely to serve under Coburg,
[346] nothing but the presence of the Emperor could end the friction in
Flanders.
But alas for the monarchical cause! At the very time when the Kaiser was to
set out for Brussels, alarming news came from Cracow. The temper of the
Poles, heated by the wrongs and insults of two years, burst forth in a rising
against the Russian and Prussian authorities. Kosciusko, the last hope of
Poland, issued an appeal which nerved his countrymen to dare the
impossible. Rushing to arms, they astonished the world by exhibiting in the
last throes of their long agony a strength which, if put forth in 1791, might
have saved their land from spoliation. Even now their despairing struggles
turned towards Warsaw much of the energy which should have trended
towards Paris; and thus, once again, and not for the last time, did the foul
crimes of 1772 and 1793 avenge themselves on their perpetrators. The last
struggles of Poland helped on the French Republic to its mighty
adolescence. Finally, on 2nd April, Francis II departed for Brussels. Thugut
set out nine days later; and in the interval, on the plausible pretext that
Prussia would seize more Polish land, he stopped the reinforcements
destined for Flanders. He also urged the Czarina on no account to allow a
partition of Poland.[347]
While the Continental States were thus pulling different ways, British
diplomacy won two notable triumphs at The Hague. By dint of threatening
recall; and it was understood that the Emperor Francis would take the
command, with Mack as Chief-of-Staff and virtual director of the
campaign. Pitt expressed to Mack his marked preference of this
arrangement to the alternative scheme, the appointment of the Archduke
Charles; for the extreme youth of the Archduke might hinder a good
understanding between him and his subordinate and senior, the Duke of
York. Seeing, then, that Mack declined absolutely to serve under Coburg,
[346] nothing but the presence of the Emperor could end the friction in
Flanders.
But alas for the monarchical cause! At the very time when the Kaiser was to
set out for Brussels, alarming news came from Cracow. The temper of the
Poles, heated by the wrongs and insults of two years, burst forth in a rising
against the Russian and Prussian authorities. Kosciusko, the last hope of
Poland, issued an appeal which nerved his countrymen to dare the
impossible. Rushing to arms, they astonished the world by exhibiting in the
last throes of their long agony a strength which, if put forth in 1791, might
have saved their land from spoliation. Even now their despairing struggles
turned towards Warsaw much of the energy which should have trended
towards Paris; and thus, once again, and not for the last time, did the foul
crimes of 1772 and 1793 avenge themselves on their perpetrators. The last
struggles of Poland helped on the French Republic to its mighty
adolescence. Finally, on 2nd April, Francis II departed for Brussels. Thugut
set out nine days later; and in the interval, on the plausible pretext that
Prussia would seize more Polish land, he stopped the reinforcements
destined for Flanders. He also urged the Czarina on no account to allow a
partition of Poland.[347]
While the Continental States were thus pulling different ways, British
diplomacy won two notable triumphs at The Hague. By dint of threatening
Page 204
Haugwitz with the rupture of the whole negotiation, Malmesbury induced
that Minister to countermand the order for the retirement of the Prussian
troops, which had already begun. He thereby saved the Allies in the
Palatinate and Flanders from very serious risks in view of the gathering
masses of the French.[348] Further, on 19th April, he induced Haugwitz to
sign a treaty which promised to revivify the monarchical cause. Prussia
agreed to furnish, by 24th May, 62,400 men, who were to act conjointly
with the British and Dutch forces in Flanders. For this powerful succour the
two Maritime States would pay a subsidy of £50,000 a month, besides the
cost of bread and forage, reckoned at £1 12s. per man per month, and
£300,000 for initial expenses. As Great Britain and Holland wholly
supported this army, they prescribed the sphere of its operations, and
retained any conquests that it might make. The treaty was for the year 1794;
but its renewal was stipulated in a separate article. Prussia of course still
supplied to Austria the 20,000 men due by the treaty of 1792.
If Malmesbury had not induced Haugwitz to sign the treaty then, it would
never have been signed at all. Almost alone in the Court of Berlin,
Frederick William desired to continue the struggle. His uncle, Prince Henry,
had always opposed war with France, and long before Valmy, had
prophesied that her untrained but enthusiastic levies would be a match for
any professional army. His influence and that of the Duke of Brunswick,
Lucchesini, and Möllendorf, were still cast against the western crusade, so
that Grenville believed Prussia to be dragging on the negotiation solely in
order to embarrass her Allies by throwing it up early in the campaign.[349]
Moreover, Malmesbury's treaty contained its own death warrant. A Great
Power can ill afford to hire out its troops to non-military States, unless they
lessen the humiliation of such a proceeding by according the utmost
possible freedom. But the Hague Convention specified that the subsidized
Prussian army must operate where the paymasters directed; and they now
decided on removing it from the Palatinate to the valley of the Meuse near
that Minister to countermand the order for the retirement of the Prussian
troops, which had already begun. He thereby saved the Allies in the
Palatinate and Flanders from very serious risks in view of the gathering
masses of the French.[348] Further, on 19th April, he induced Haugwitz to
sign a treaty which promised to revivify the monarchical cause. Prussia
agreed to furnish, by 24th May, 62,400 men, who were to act conjointly
with the British and Dutch forces in Flanders. For this powerful succour the
two Maritime States would pay a subsidy of £50,000 a month, besides the
cost of bread and forage, reckoned at £1 12s. per man per month, and
£300,000 for initial expenses. As Great Britain and Holland wholly
supported this army, they prescribed the sphere of its operations, and
retained any conquests that it might make. The treaty was for the year 1794;
but its renewal was stipulated in a separate article. Prussia of course still
supplied to Austria the 20,000 men due by the treaty of 1792.
If Malmesbury had not induced Haugwitz to sign the treaty then, it would
never have been signed at all. Almost alone in the Court of Berlin,
Frederick William desired to continue the struggle. His uncle, Prince Henry,
had always opposed war with France, and long before Valmy, had
prophesied that her untrained but enthusiastic levies would be a match for
any professional army. His influence and that of the Duke of Brunswick,
Lucchesini, and Möllendorf, were still cast against the western crusade, so
that Grenville believed Prussia to be dragging on the negotiation solely in
order to embarrass her Allies by throwing it up early in the campaign.[349]
Moreover, Malmesbury's treaty contained its own death warrant. A Great
Power can ill afford to hire out its troops to non-military States, unless they
lessen the humiliation of such a proceeding by according the utmost
possible freedom. But the Hague Convention specified that the subsidized
Prussian army must operate where the paymasters directed; and they now
decided on removing it from the Palatinate to the valley of the Meuse near
Page 205
Dinant, or even further west, provided that Austria could fill up the gap thus
left in the Palatinate.[350] In passing, I may note that this important decision
was due to George III, as appears in Grenville's final instruction to
Malmesbury: "The King's determination is finally taken not to agree to any
plan by which the Prussians would be employed more to the left than the
country of the Meuse."[351] No one who knows the rigour of the King's
resolves can doubt that he was responsible for a determination fraught with
unexpected issues.
It is alien to my purpose to recount the ensuing disputes. I can glance only
at the part played by Pitt. At one point his conduct was weak and dilatory.
Early in May, when Malmesbury proceeded to London for the purpose of
securing the ratification of the treaty and the payment of the first subsidy to
Prussia, he encountered most annoying delays. Pitt and Grenville left him
severely alone, probably because they were then so occupied with the
coercion of the English Jacobins as to have no time for the plans which
promised the overthrow of the French Jacobins. Another topic engaging
their attention was the hoped-for coalition with the Portland Whigs, which
shrouded from their gaze the needs of the European Coalition. However we
may explain the fact, it is certain that during sixteen days (6th to 22nd May)
Malmesbury, despite his urgent entreaties to Grenville, could procure
neither instructions as to his future conduct, nor a promise for the payment
of the first Prussian subsidy. News of a British disaster in Flanders at last
quickened the laggards of Whitehall. On the 23rd Malmesbury gained his
heart's desire, and set out for the Prussian headquarters on the following
day.[352] Meanwhile, owing to this long delay (one of the most discreditable
incidents in the careers of Pitt and Grenville), Prussia took no steps to carry
out the terms of the compact. It so happened that on 24th May her army in
the Palatinate, commanded by Möllendorf, gained a victory over the French
at Kaiserslautern in the Palatinate; but that event set them the more against
left in the Palatinate.[350] In passing, I may note that this important decision
was due to George III, as appears in Grenville's final instruction to
Malmesbury: "The King's determination is finally taken not to agree to any
plan by which the Prussians would be employed more to the left than the
country of the Meuse."[351] No one who knows the rigour of the King's
resolves can doubt that he was responsible for a determination fraught with
unexpected issues.
It is alien to my purpose to recount the ensuing disputes. I can glance only
at the part played by Pitt. At one point his conduct was weak and dilatory.
Early in May, when Malmesbury proceeded to London for the purpose of
securing the ratification of the treaty and the payment of the first subsidy to
Prussia, he encountered most annoying delays. Pitt and Grenville left him
severely alone, probably because they were then so occupied with the
coercion of the English Jacobins as to have no time for the plans which
promised the overthrow of the French Jacobins. Another topic engaging
their attention was the hoped-for coalition with the Portland Whigs, which
shrouded from their gaze the needs of the European Coalition. However we
may explain the fact, it is certain that during sixteen days (6th to 22nd May)
Malmesbury, despite his urgent entreaties to Grenville, could procure
neither instructions as to his future conduct, nor a promise for the payment
of the first Prussian subsidy. News of a British disaster in Flanders at last
quickened the laggards of Whitehall. On the 23rd Malmesbury gained his
heart's desire, and set out for the Prussian headquarters on the following
day.[352] Meanwhile, owing to this long delay (one of the most discreditable
incidents in the careers of Pitt and Grenville), Prussia took no steps to carry
out the terms of the compact. It so happened that on 24th May her army in
the Palatinate, commanded by Möllendorf, gained a victory over the French
at Kaiserslautern in the Palatinate; but that event set them the more against
Page 206
Malmesbury's treaty, which implied a march of some 120 miles through
difficult country, and across an enemy's front.
Moreover, as has been hinted, reverses had by this time overtaken the right
wing of the Allies, in West Flanders. At the centre, near the Sambre, the
campaign opened with promise, the British cavalry gaining a brilliant
success at Bethencourt. But Carnot, having drawn upon the French troops in
Lorraine and the Palatinate, threw his heaviest columns at points on the
extreme west of the French front, the result being that at Turcoing the
Republicans shattered the isolated corps of the Duke of York and General
Otto (18th May). The successes of the Prussians and of the Austrian army,
on the Sambre, saved the situation for a time. But the prospects even in that
quarter were overclouded by the resolve of the Emperor Francis to leave his
army and return to Vienna. News of the critical state of affairs in Poland
prompted this decision, the results of which soon appeared in quarrels at
headquarters and discouragement in the rank and file. The Austrian soldiery
saw in the withdrawal of the Kaiser the end of his rule in the Netherlands.
They were right. The counsels of Thugut had now prevailed. South Poland
was to be the prize of the Hapsburgs. The tiresome and distant Netherlands
were to be given up, the pecuniary support of England, however, being
assured as far as possible by a feint of defending them.
Here we have the explanation of the half-hearted effort made by the
Austrians at Fleurus. There was every reason why Coburg, now again the
commander of the main Austrian force, should strike vigorously at the
French force besieging Charleroi. A decisive victory in front of Charleroi
would not only save that place, but would give pause to the French forces
further west, now advancing rapidly towards Ghent. Accordingly Coburg,
advancing as far as Fleurus, hard by the village of Ligny, attacked the
Republicans. He had on the whole the best of the fight, when the arrival of
news of the surrender of Charleroi led him most tamely to call off his men
difficult country, and across an enemy's front.
Moreover, as has been hinted, reverses had by this time overtaken the right
wing of the Allies, in West Flanders. At the centre, near the Sambre, the
campaign opened with promise, the British cavalry gaining a brilliant
success at Bethencourt. But Carnot, having drawn upon the French troops in
Lorraine and the Palatinate, threw his heaviest columns at points on the
extreme west of the French front, the result being that at Turcoing the
Republicans shattered the isolated corps of the Duke of York and General
Otto (18th May). The successes of the Prussians and of the Austrian army,
on the Sambre, saved the situation for a time. But the prospects even in that
quarter were overclouded by the resolve of the Emperor Francis to leave his
army and return to Vienna. News of the critical state of affairs in Poland
prompted this decision, the results of which soon appeared in quarrels at
headquarters and discouragement in the rank and file. The Austrian soldiery
saw in the withdrawal of the Kaiser the end of his rule in the Netherlands.
They were right. The counsels of Thugut had now prevailed. South Poland
was to be the prize of the Hapsburgs. The tiresome and distant Netherlands
were to be given up, the pecuniary support of England, however, being
assured as far as possible by a feint of defending them.
Here we have the explanation of the half-hearted effort made by the
Austrians at Fleurus. There was every reason why Coburg, now again the
commander of the main Austrian force, should strike vigorously at the
French force besieging Charleroi. A decisive victory in front of Charleroi
would not only save that place, but would give pause to the French forces
further west, now advancing rapidly towards Ghent. Accordingly Coburg,
advancing as far as Fleurus, hard by the village of Ligny, attacked the
Republicans. He had on the whole the best of the fight, when the arrival of
news of the surrender of Charleroi led him most tamely to call off his men
Page 207
and fall back. The retirement took place in discreditably good order, not a
single gun being lost (25th June 1794). A bold leader would have beaten the
enemy and probably would have saved Charleroi. With the same excess of
prudence Coburg conducted his retreat, several positions and strongholds
being abandoned in craven fashion.
Meanwhile Pitt and Dundas made great efforts to save West Flanders. In
haste they despatched reinforcements to Ostend; and among the regiments
which landed there on 25th and 26th June was the 33rd, commanded by
Colonel Wellesley. The future Duke of Wellington found the small garrison
of Ostend in a state of panic; and his chief, the Earl of Moira, deemed it
best to meet the French in the open. By great good fortune Moira, with most
of the regiments, reached Bruges, and beyond that town came into touch
with Clerfait's force. Wellesley, taking ship, sailed round to Antwerp and
reached that column by a safer route and earlier than his chief. His action is
characteristic of a judgement that never erred, a will that never faltered. In
this campaign, as he afterwards said, he learnt how not to make war. But
success not seldom crowns the efforts of him who has the good sense to
probe the causes of failure. Certainly it rarely comes to British commanders
save after very chastening experiences; and Wellesley now took part in what
was, for the Austrians, a fore-ordained retreat. Despite the manly appeals of
the Duke of York, Coburg declined to make a stand on the fateful ridge of
Mount St. Jean; and the name of Waterloo appears in the tepid records of
1794 at the head of a plan for arranging the stages of the retreat (5th July)
which the nervousness of Coburg soon condemned to the limbo of
unfulfilled promises.[353] Is it surprising that, two days later, the Duke of
York declared to him that the British were "betrayed and sold to the
enemy"? Worse still, the garrisons of Valenciennes, Condé, Quesnoy, and
Landrecies, amounting to nearly 11,000 men, were now left to their fate.
single gun being lost (25th June 1794). A bold leader would have beaten the
enemy and probably would have saved Charleroi. With the same excess of
prudence Coburg conducted his retreat, several positions and strongholds
being abandoned in craven fashion.
Meanwhile Pitt and Dundas made great efforts to save West Flanders. In
haste they despatched reinforcements to Ostend; and among the regiments
which landed there on 25th and 26th June was the 33rd, commanded by
Colonel Wellesley. The future Duke of Wellington found the small garrison
of Ostend in a state of panic; and his chief, the Earl of Moira, deemed it
best to meet the French in the open. By great good fortune Moira, with most
of the regiments, reached Bruges, and beyond that town came into touch
with Clerfait's force. Wellesley, taking ship, sailed round to Antwerp and
reached that column by a safer route and earlier than his chief. His action is
characteristic of a judgement that never erred, a will that never faltered. In
this campaign, as he afterwards said, he learnt how not to make war. But
success not seldom crowns the efforts of him who has the good sense to
probe the causes of failure. Certainly it rarely comes to British commanders
save after very chastening experiences; and Wellesley now took part in what
was, for the Austrians, a fore-ordained retreat. Despite the manly appeals of
the Duke of York, Coburg declined to make a stand on the fateful ridge of
Mount St. Jean; and the name of Waterloo appears in the tepid records of
1794 at the head of a plan for arranging the stages of the retreat (5th July)
which the nervousness of Coburg soon condemned to the limbo of
unfulfilled promises.[353] Is it surprising that, two days later, the Duke of
York declared to him that the British were "betrayed and sold to the
enemy"? Worse still, the garrisons of Valenciennes, Condé, Quesnoy, and
Landrecies, amounting to nearly 11,000 men, were now left to their fate.
Page 208
Indirectly Pitt and Dundas were responsible for these disasters. They
weakened the British force in Flanders by sending large drafts to the West
Indies, as will in due course appear. They also allowed Corsica to be
occupied in the spring of 1794, and yet they made little or no use of that
island for expeditions against the Riviera, which the royalist natives would
readily have undertaken under an inspiring leader. They also relied too
much on the Austrians and Prussians, though the former were known to care
little for their Netherlands, apart from the prospect of gaining the Barrier
fortresses of French Flanders in order to further the Belgic-Bavarian
exchange. Above all, as we have seen, Pitt's conduct towards Prussia was
annoyingly halting. Malmesbury's treaty could have no effect unless it led
the Prussians to move at once. The delay of sixteen days at Whitehall must
rank as one of the causes of the failures just recounted; and though
Grenville was technically guilty, Pitt must be blamed for not ensuring the
needful despatch in an all-important decision. It is curious that he never
realized his responsibility. Speaking at a later date of the campaign of
Fleurus, he said that it turned upon as narrow a point as ever occurred: that
England was unfortunate, but the blame did not rest with her.[354] This
probably refers to the surrender of Charleroi and the retreat from Fleurus.
But Pitt did not understand that the timely advent of part of the Prussian
force on the Meuse, or even its advance into Lorraine, would have changed
the situation; and for their inactivity he was in some measure responsible.
At times Pitt lived in dreamland. On 15th July, while the Austrians were
quietly withdrawing from Central Belgium, he drew up a Memorandum as
to the course of events. By the close of the year Austria was to bring
100,000 men into Flanders, a close alliance being framed on the basis of her
acquisition of the French border districts (Valenciennes had not yet
surrendered). England was to retain all conquests in the two Indies. The
Prussians were to march towards Flanders, which they obstinately refused
to do. Dutch and other troops were to be engaged by England, the
weakened the British force in Flanders by sending large drafts to the West
Indies, as will in due course appear. They also allowed Corsica to be
occupied in the spring of 1794, and yet they made little or no use of that
island for expeditions against the Riviera, which the royalist natives would
readily have undertaken under an inspiring leader. They also relied too
much on the Austrians and Prussians, though the former were known to care
little for their Netherlands, apart from the prospect of gaining the Barrier
fortresses of French Flanders in order to further the Belgic-Bavarian
exchange. Above all, as we have seen, Pitt's conduct towards Prussia was
annoyingly halting. Malmesbury's treaty could have no effect unless it led
the Prussians to move at once. The delay of sixteen days at Whitehall must
rank as one of the causes of the failures just recounted; and though
Grenville was technically guilty, Pitt must be blamed for not ensuring the
needful despatch in an all-important decision. It is curious that he never
realized his responsibility. Speaking at a later date of the campaign of
Fleurus, he said that it turned upon as narrow a point as ever occurred: that
England was unfortunate, but the blame did not rest with her.[354] This
probably refers to the surrender of Charleroi and the retreat from Fleurus.
But Pitt did not understand that the timely advent of part of the Prussian
force on the Meuse, or even its advance into Lorraine, would have changed
the situation; and for their inactivity he was in some measure responsible.
At times Pitt lived in dreamland. On 15th July, while the Austrians were
quietly withdrawing from Central Belgium, he drew up a Memorandum as
to the course of events. By the close of the year Austria was to bring
100,000 men into Flanders, a close alliance being framed on the basis of her
acquisition of the French border districts (Valenciennes had not yet
surrendered). England was to retain all conquests in the two Indies. The
Prussians were to march towards Flanders, which they obstinately refused
to do. Dutch and other troops were to be engaged by England, the
Page 209
presumption being that the year 1795 would see the losses of 1794 more
than retrieved. The mistake of 10,000 in adding up the totals of the troops
(78,000 instead of 88,000) enables one to conjecture at what time of the day
this sketch was outlined.[355] One would not take it seriously had not the
Foreign Office soon despatched Earl Spencer and Mr. Thomas Grenville as
special envoys to Vienna to propose very similar plans, Austria being urged
on by the prospect of acquiring the French Barrier fortresses from Lille to
Sedan.[356]
They aroused in Thugut a spirit of greed, not of honourable emulation. In a
private letter to Pitt, dated Vienna 16th August, Spencer warned him that
that Government was "neither possessed of sufficient energy and vigour,
nor sufficiently actuated by the true principles on which the cause in which
we are engaged ought to be conducted" to justify the demands of Thugut.
They included British subsidies for Austria, though she could well support
the war, and the sacrifice of British maritime conquests at the general peace
as a means of ensuring the recovery of her losses on land. As to Belgium,
added Spencer, Thugut looked on it "as irrecoverably lost and not worth
regaining, unless with the addition of a very strong and extended barrier,
composed of fortresses which he to-day plainly told us he did not think
there was the least chance of taking in the course of the war, but that they
must be obtained as cessions from France at the peace."[357] Thus Thugut
expected that, while the Austrians were ignominiously evacuating the
Netherlands, the British fleet should win French colonies valuable enough
to induce France both to retire from Belgium, and to surrender to Austria
her northern fortresses from Lille to Sedan or Thionville.
The capture of Valenciennes and the slaughter of the émigrés in the Austrian
garrison was the retort of the French to these day-dreams (29th August).
The fall of Robespierre a month earlier, and the enhanced authority now
enjoyed by Carnot enabled the authorities at Paris to press on the conquest
than retrieved. The mistake of 10,000 in adding up the totals of the troops
(78,000 instead of 88,000) enables one to conjecture at what time of the day
this sketch was outlined.[355] One would not take it seriously had not the
Foreign Office soon despatched Earl Spencer and Mr. Thomas Grenville as
special envoys to Vienna to propose very similar plans, Austria being urged
on by the prospect of acquiring the French Barrier fortresses from Lille to
Sedan.[356]
They aroused in Thugut a spirit of greed, not of honourable emulation. In a
private letter to Pitt, dated Vienna 16th August, Spencer warned him that
that Government was "neither possessed of sufficient energy and vigour,
nor sufficiently actuated by the true principles on which the cause in which
we are engaged ought to be conducted" to justify the demands of Thugut.
They included British subsidies for Austria, though she could well support
the war, and the sacrifice of British maritime conquests at the general peace
as a means of ensuring the recovery of her losses on land. As to Belgium,
added Spencer, Thugut looked on it "as irrecoverably lost and not worth
regaining, unless with the addition of a very strong and extended barrier,
composed of fortresses which he to-day plainly told us he did not think
there was the least chance of taking in the course of the war, but that they
must be obtained as cessions from France at the peace."[357] Thus Thugut
expected that, while the Austrians were ignominiously evacuating the
Netherlands, the British fleet should win French colonies valuable enough
to induce France both to retire from Belgium, and to surrender to Austria
her northern fortresses from Lille to Sedan or Thionville.
The capture of Valenciennes and the slaughter of the émigrés in the Austrian
garrison was the retort of the French to these day-dreams (29th August).
The fall of Robespierre a month earlier, and the enhanced authority now
enjoyed by Carnot enabled the authorities at Paris to press on the conquest
Page 210
of Belgium with an energy which set at defiance the boyish miscalculations
of Pitt and the wavering plans of the Hapsburgs.
Towards the close of July Pitt and Grenville saw the need of abating the
rigour of their demands on Prussia. For of what use was it to move 60,000
Prussians more than 100 miles to defend West Flanders when that province
was lost? Malmesbury therefore was empowered to pay the monthly
subsidy of £50,000 on behalf of Great Britain and Holland, provided that
Möllendorf's army attacked the French about Trèves, thus lessening the
pressure on Coburg's left wing. On 27th July he framed such an agreement
with Hardenberg. This statesman was destined to be one of the saviours of
the Prussian State in its darkest days, 1810–12; but now, as always, his
conduct was shifty; and it is questionable whether he, any more than
Haugwitz, dealt honourably with England. It must suffice to say that
Möllendorf made not even a demonstration towards Trèves. His inactivity
was in part due to the withdrawal of several regiments towards Poland,
though Great Britain and Holland still paid for the maintenance of the full
quota on the Rhine.
So flagrant was the breach of faith as to elicit heated protests from
Malmesbury; and Pitt, justly indignant at the use of British money for what
was virtually a partition of Poland, decided to remonstrate with Jacobi, the
Prussian ambassador at London. Summoning him to Downing Street, at the
end of September, he upbraided him with this dishonourable conduct,
declaring that, unless the Prussians moved forward at once, the British and
Dutch subsidy for October would be withheld. Much as we may sympathize
with this indignant outburst, we must pronounce it unwise. For firstly, Pitt
was intruding upon the sphere of Grenville in making this declaration,
which was far more acrid than the despatches of the Foreign Secretary.
Secondly, it was made in the presence of Dundas, with whom Grenville was
already on bad terms. Is it surprising that the Foreign Secretary wrote
of Pitt and the wavering plans of the Hapsburgs.
Towards the close of July Pitt and Grenville saw the need of abating the
rigour of their demands on Prussia. For of what use was it to move 60,000
Prussians more than 100 miles to defend West Flanders when that province
was lost? Malmesbury therefore was empowered to pay the monthly
subsidy of £50,000 on behalf of Great Britain and Holland, provided that
Möllendorf's army attacked the French about Trèves, thus lessening the
pressure on Coburg's left wing. On 27th July he framed such an agreement
with Hardenberg. This statesman was destined to be one of the saviours of
the Prussian State in its darkest days, 1810–12; but now, as always, his
conduct was shifty; and it is questionable whether he, any more than
Haugwitz, dealt honourably with England. It must suffice to say that
Möllendorf made not even a demonstration towards Trèves. His inactivity
was in part due to the withdrawal of several regiments towards Poland,
though Great Britain and Holland still paid for the maintenance of the full
quota on the Rhine.
So flagrant was the breach of faith as to elicit heated protests from
Malmesbury; and Pitt, justly indignant at the use of British money for what
was virtually a partition of Poland, decided to remonstrate with Jacobi, the
Prussian ambassador at London. Summoning him to Downing Street, at the
end of September, he upbraided him with this dishonourable conduct,
declaring that, unless the Prussians moved forward at once, the British and
Dutch subsidy for October would be withheld. Much as we may sympathize
with this indignant outburst, we must pronounce it unwise. For firstly, Pitt
was intruding upon the sphere of Grenville in making this declaration,
which was far more acrid than the despatches of the Foreign Secretary.
Secondly, it was made in the presence of Dundas, with whom Grenville was
already on bad terms. Is it surprising that the Foreign Secretary wrote
Page 211
sharply to Pitt protesting against his acting on a line different from that
previously taken at Downing Street? In his despatch of 30th September to
Berlin, Grenville was careful to make the withdrawal of the subsidy strictly
conditional, and his protest was probably less sharp than that which Pitt
addressed to Jacobi.
So annoyed was Grenville at Pitt's interference during his own temporary
absence that he wrote to express his willingness to retire from the Foreign
Office if this would solve the difficulties caused by the appointment of Earl
Fitzwilliam to the Irish Viceroyalty. To that topic I shall recur in a later
chapter on the Irish troubles which now became acute. Here it must suffice
to say that Pitt declined to accept Grenville's offer, and affairs at Downing
Street righted themselves.[358] But at Berlin the mischief was irremediable.
Jacobi, a born intriguer, and ever hostile to England, represented the words
of Pitt in the worst possible light. Accordingly Frederick William affected
great indignation at the conduct of Pitt, accused him of ending the alliance,
and discovered in his own ruffled feelings the pretext for giving rein to the
dictates of self-interest. He gave orders to end the campaign on the Rhine;
and though Grenville sought to patch matters up, compromise was clearly
impossible between Allies who had lost that mutual confidence which is the
only lasting guarantee of treaties.
At the autumnal equinox of 1794 Pitt was confronted by a far more serious
crisis than at the beginning of the war in February 1793. The Republicans,
after throwing back Clerfait beyond the River Roer, towards Aix-la-
Chapelle, compelled the Duke of York to abandon the natural line of
defence of Holland, the River Waal; and in the early days of October the
British retired behind Bergen-op-zoom and other Dutch fortresses. These
were found to be totally unprepared to sustain a siege. The sluggishness of
the Orange party, dominant in Holland since 1787, stood in marked contrast
previously taken at Downing Street? In his despatch of 30th September to
Berlin, Grenville was careful to make the withdrawal of the subsidy strictly
conditional, and his protest was probably less sharp than that which Pitt
addressed to Jacobi.
So annoyed was Grenville at Pitt's interference during his own temporary
absence that he wrote to express his willingness to retire from the Foreign
Office if this would solve the difficulties caused by the appointment of Earl
Fitzwilliam to the Irish Viceroyalty. To that topic I shall recur in a later
chapter on the Irish troubles which now became acute. Here it must suffice
to say that Pitt declined to accept Grenville's offer, and affairs at Downing
Street righted themselves.[358] But at Berlin the mischief was irremediable.
Jacobi, a born intriguer, and ever hostile to England, represented the words
of Pitt in the worst possible light. Accordingly Frederick William affected
great indignation at the conduct of Pitt, accused him of ending the alliance,
and discovered in his own ruffled feelings the pretext for giving rein to the
dictates of self-interest. He gave orders to end the campaign on the Rhine;
and though Grenville sought to patch matters up, compromise was clearly
impossible between Allies who had lost that mutual confidence which is the
only lasting guarantee of treaties.
At the autumnal equinox of 1794 Pitt was confronted by a far more serious
crisis than at the beginning of the war in February 1793. The Republicans,
after throwing back Clerfait beyond the River Roer, towards Aix-la-
Chapelle, compelled the Duke of York to abandon the natural line of
defence of Holland, the River Waal; and in the early days of October the
British retired behind Bergen-op-zoom and other Dutch fortresses. These
were found to be totally unprepared to sustain a siege. The sluggishness of
the Orange party, dominant in Holland since 1787, stood in marked contrast
Page 212
to the eagerness of the Dutch Patriots to help the invaders. Consequently in
a few weeks the friends of the Stadholder saw their hopes fade away.
There was but one chance of rescue. The Duke of Brunswick, who so
skilfully led the Prussians to Amsterdam in 1787, might be expected to
impart some courage to the Dutch garrisons and some show of discipline to
the disordered relics of York's and Clerfait's forces now drifting slowly
northwards. His position as a Field-Marshal of the Prussian army also
promised to interest the Court of Berlin in recovering some part, at least, of
the supremacy of the Allies in the Dutch Netherlands. As the crisis in
Holland had served to unite the two great Protestant Powers, so now it
might prevent the dissolution of that salutary compact. Further, George III,
though greatly disliking the substitution of Cornwallis for the Duke of York,
favoured the appointment of the veteran Brunswick to the supreme
command. Family considerations, always very strong in the King, here
concurred with reasons of state. Not only had Brunswick married the sister
of George III; but their daughter, the Princess Caroline, was now the
reluctant choice of the Prince of Wales. The parents, both at Windsor and at
Brunswick welcomed the avowal by the royal prodigal of the claims of
lawful wedlock. The Duchess of Brunswick fell into raptures at the brilliant
prospects thus opened out for her daughter; and it seemed that both Hymen
and Mars, for once working in unison, conspired to bring from his
inglorious retreat at Brunswick the man whom that age still acclaimed as its
war-lord.
Malmesbury therefore proceeded to Brunswick for the double purpose of
arranging the marriage and urging the Duke to take the command of the
allied forces on the Lower Rhine. Overjoyed at leaving the atmosphere of
intrigue at Möllendorf's headquarters, the envoy journeyed into the northern
plain in hopes of assuring the safety of part of Holland. Early in November
Pitt and his colleagues received a refusal from the Duke, but now they sent
a few weeks the friends of the Stadholder saw their hopes fade away.
There was but one chance of rescue. The Duke of Brunswick, who so
skilfully led the Prussians to Amsterdam in 1787, might be expected to
impart some courage to the Dutch garrisons and some show of discipline to
the disordered relics of York's and Clerfait's forces now drifting slowly
northwards. His position as a Field-Marshal of the Prussian army also
promised to interest the Court of Berlin in recovering some part, at least, of
the supremacy of the Allies in the Dutch Netherlands. As the crisis in
Holland had served to unite the two great Protestant Powers, so now it
might prevent the dissolution of that salutary compact. Further, George III,
though greatly disliking the substitution of Cornwallis for the Duke of York,
favoured the appointment of the veteran Brunswick to the supreme
command. Family considerations, always very strong in the King, here
concurred with reasons of state. Not only had Brunswick married the sister
of George III; but their daughter, the Princess Caroline, was now the
reluctant choice of the Prince of Wales. The parents, both at Windsor and at
Brunswick welcomed the avowal by the royal prodigal of the claims of
lawful wedlock. The Duchess of Brunswick fell into raptures at the brilliant
prospects thus opened out for her daughter; and it seemed that both Hymen
and Mars, for once working in unison, conspired to bring from his
inglorious retreat at Brunswick the man whom that age still acclaimed as its
war-lord.
Malmesbury therefore proceeded to Brunswick for the double purpose of
arranging the marriage and urging the Duke to take the command of the
allied forces on the Lower Rhine. Overjoyed at leaving the atmosphere of
intrigue at Möllendorf's headquarters, the envoy journeyed into the northern
plain in hopes of assuring the safety of part of Holland. Early in November
Pitt and his colleagues received a refusal from the Duke, but now they sent
Page 213
through Malmesbury an offer to subsidize a corps of 20,000 or 30,000
Austrians in that quarter. These, along with the British, Hanoverian, and
Hessian troops, when marshalled by Brunswick, might surely be trusted to
stay the French advance. The crisis was momentous. Brunswick well
understood that in reality the fate of North Germany was at stake; for the
French, if masters of the Rhine and Ems valleys, could easily overrun the
northern plain, including his own duchy. Self-interest, pride in the German
name, hatred of French principles, and, finally, satisfaction at the marriage
alliance, bade the Duke draw his sword before it was too late.
But here again the malign influence of Berlin thwarted the plans of Pitt. In
vain did Malmesbury ply the Duke with arguments and the Duchess with
compliments. On 25th November the Duke informed him that, as a Prussian
Field-Marshal, he was bound to consult Frederick William: and "the answer
he had received was not of a nature which allowed him to accept of an offer
otherwise so highly honourable and flattering to him." He then handed to
the envoy his formal refusal.[359]
Whether the elderly Duke of Brunswick could have withstood the
impetuous onset of the ill-clad, half-starved, but unconquerable peasants
now following the French tricolour in its progress through Holland, who
shall say? The exploits of Pichegru and his levies border on the miraculous
until we remember that half of the Dutch laboured on their behalf, while the
troops of York and Clerfait distrusted or despised those leaders. This
consideration it was that led Pitt to take a step which he deemed most
necessary for the public service as well as for the reputation of the Duke of
York. On Sunday, 25th November, he wrote at Holwood a very lengthy
letter to the King, setting forth most deferentially the reasons which
impelled him and his colleagues to request the withdrawal of the Duke from
Holland.[360] He touched with equal skill and firmness on the unfortunate
feeling prevalent in the army respecting the Duke of York; and, while
Austrians in that quarter. These, along with the British, Hanoverian, and
Hessian troops, when marshalled by Brunswick, might surely be trusted to
stay the French advance. The crisis was momentous. Brunswick well
understood that in reality the fate of North Germany was at stake; for the
French, if masters of the Rhine and Ems valleys, could easily overrun the
northern plain, including his own duchy. Self-interest, pride in the German
name, hatred of French principles, and, finally, satisfaction at the marriage
alliance, bade the Duke draw his sword before it was too late.
But here again the malign influence of Berlin thwarted the plans of Pitt. In
vain did Malmesbury ply the Duke with arguments and the Duchess with
compliments. On 25th November the Duke informed him that, as a Prussian
Field-Marshal, he was bound to consult Frederick William: and "the answer
he had received was not of a nature which allowed him to accept of an offer
otherwise so highly honourable and flattering to him." He then handed to
the envoy his formal refusal.[359]
Whether the elderly Duke of Brunswick could have withstood the
impetuous onset of the ill-clad, half-starved, but unconquerable peasants
now following the French tricolour in its progress through Holland, who
shall say? The exploits of Pichegru and his levies border on the miraculous
until we remember that half of the Dutch laboured on their behalf, while the
troops of York and Clerfait distrusted or despised those leaders. This
consideration it was that led Pitt to take a step which he deemed most
necessary for the public service as well as for the reputation of the Duke of
York. On Sunday, 25th November, he wrote at Holwood a very lengthy
letter to the King, setting forth most deferentially the reasons which
impelled him and his colleagues to request the withdrawal of the Duke from
Holland.[360] He touched with equal skill and firmness on the unfortunate
feeling prevalent in the army respecting the Duke of York; and, while
Page 214
eulogizing His Royal Highness, expressed the conviction of the Cabinet
that, in his own interests as well as those of the country, he should be
recalled from a sphere of action where the difficulties were wellnigh
insuperable. Pitt also suggested to the King the advisability of transferring
the British forces to a more promising sphere, Brittany or la Vendée. The
King's answer evinced considerable irritation, a proof that he saw little but
the personal aspects of the case. Pitt, however, held to his point, and the
Duke was recalled in order to become a little later commander-in-chief, a
position for which he was far better suited than for a command in the field.
At the close of the year Pitt showed his regard for the public service by
requesting from the King leave to displace his brother, the Earl of Chatham,
from the Admiralty, where his lethargy had several times hindered the naval
operations. Lord Spencer became First Lord, the Earl of Chatham
succeeding to Spencer's position as Lord Privy Seal.
Pitt's magnanimous resolve to brave the royal displeasure rather than keep a
royal prince in a situation for which he was unfit met with general approval.
The times were too serious to admit of pedantic trifling or unmanly
shrinking. In quick succession there arrived news of the definite refusal of
the Duke of Brunswick to come forward, of the incredible apathy of the
Dutch, and of the demoralization of the Allies in their continued retreat. To
add to their misfortunes, nature gripped that land of waters in a severe frost,
so that the Dutch loyalists were unable, even if they had the hardihood, to
let loose the floods against the invaders. In endless swarms these pressed on
from the South, determined now to realize Dumouriez' dream of conquering
Holland in order to appropriate its resources, pecuniary, naval, and colonial.
Pichegru it was who won immortal fame by this conquest, which in truth
needs not the legendary addition of his cavalry seizing a Dutch squadron in
the Zuyder Zee. A singular incident attended the journey of Malmesbury
with the future Princess of Wales towards Helvoetsluys, on their way to
England. Unaware of the inroads of the French horse, they had to beat a
that, in his own interests as well as those of the country, he should be
recalled from a sphere of action where the difficulties were wellnigh
insuperable. Pitt also suggested to the King the advisability of transferring
the British forces to a more promising sphere, Brittany or la Vendée. The
King's answer evinced considerable irritation, a proof that he saw little but
the personal aspects of the case. Pitt, however, held to his point, and the
Duke was recalled in order to become a little later commander-in-chief, a
position for which he was far better suited than for a command in the field.
At the close of the year Pitt showed his regard for the public service by
requesting from the King leave to displace his brother, the Earl of Chatham,
from the Admiralty, where his lethargy had several times hindered the naval
operations. Lord Spencer became First Lord, the Earl of Chatham
succeeding to Spencer's position as Lord Privy Seal.
Pitt's magnanimous resolve to brave the royal displeasure rather than keep a
royal prince in a situation for which he was unfit met with general approval.
The times were too serious to admit of pedantic trifling or unmanly
shrinking. In quick succession there arrived news of the definite refusal of
the Duke of Brunswick to come forward, of the incredible apathy of the
Dutch, and of the demoralization of the Allies in their continued retreat. To
add to their misfortunes, nature gripped that land of waters in a severe frost,
so that the Dutch loyalists were unable, even if they had the hardihood, to
let loose the floods against the invaders. In endless swarms these pressed on
from the South, determined now to realize Dumouriez' dream of conquering
Holland in order to appropriate its resources, pecuniary, naval, and colonial.
Pichegru it was who won immortal fame by this conquest, which in truth
needs not the legendary addition of his cavalry seizing a Dutch squadron in
the Zuyder Zee. A singular incident attended the journey of Malmesbury
with the future Princess of Wales towards Helvoetsluys, on their way to
England. Unaware of the inroads of the French horse, they had to beat a
Page 215
speedy retirement, which, unfortunately for the Prince of Wales, placed
them out of reach of the raiders. A little later the Duke and Duchess of
Brunswick were fain to pack up their valuables and leave their capital in
haste.
Such was the French conquest of Holland and part of Hanover in the winter
of 1794–5. So speedy was it that Pitt and Dundas took no timely means to
ensure the carrying off the Dutch fleet. As no small part of it was loyal to
the Prince of Orange, who now fled to England, the oversight is to be
censured. Surely Flushing or the Brill could have been secured. The
Cabinet, however, as we shall see later, prepared to rescue from the general
ruin the most valuable of the Dutch colonies, the Cape of Good Hope, the
importance of which, for the safety of India, Pitt and Dundas rated most
highly. Meanwhile, under the command of Abercromby, Harcourt, Cathcart,
and Walmoden, the British and subsidized German forces fell back towards
the River Ems, and thence to the Weser. Pitt, as we have seen, desired to
recall the British regiments for service in the West of France. But various
considerations told against this plan; and, as will appear later, the King
obstinately opposed the withdrawal of the British cavalry from the confines
of his beloved Electorate until the autumn of 1795. In April of that year the
infantry, now reduced to some 6,000 effectives by the rigours of winter,
embarked at Bremen.
Thus ended an expedition unprecedentedly fatal to the British arms. The
causes of the disaster are not far to seek. The campaigns of 1793–4 were
undertaken heedlessly, in reliance upon the strength of a Coalition which
proved to have no strength, and upon the weakness of the French Republic
which proved to be unconquerably strong. The Allies were powerful enough
to goad France to fury, too weak to crush its transports. Their ill-concealed
threats of partition bound France to the cause of the Jacobins, which
otherwise she would have abjured in horror. Thus the would-be invaders
them out of reach of the raiders. A little later the Duke and Duchess of
Brunswick were fain to pack up their valuables and leave their capital in
haste.
Such was the French conquest of Holland and part of Hanover in the winter
of 1794–5. So speedy was it that Pitt and Dundas took no timely means to
ensure the carrying off the Dutch fleet. As no small part of it was loyal to
the Prince of Orange, who now fled to England, the oversight is to be
censured. Surely Flushing or the Brill could have been secured. The
Cabinet, however, as we shall see later, prepared to rescue from the general
ruin the most valuable of the Dutch colonies, the Cape of Good Hope, the
importance of which, for the safety of India, Pitt and Dundas rated most
highly. Meanwhile, under the command of Abercromby, Harcourt, Cathcart,
and Walmoden, the British and subsidized German forces fell back towards
the River Ems, and thence to the Weser. Pitt, as we have seen, desired to
recall the British regiments for service in the West of France. But various
considerations told against this plan; and, as will appear later, the King
obstinately opposed the withdrawal of the British cavalry from the confines
of his beloved Electorate until the autumn of 1795. In April of that year the
infantry, now reduced to some 6,000 effectives by the rigours of winter,
embarked at Bremen.
Thus ended an expedition unprecedentedly fatal to the British arms. The
causes of the disaster are not far to seek. The campaigns of 1793–4 were
undertaken heedlessly, in reliance upon the strength of a Coalition which
proved to have no strength, and upon the weakness of the French Republic
which proved to be unconquerably strong. The Allies were powerful enough
to goad France to fury, too weak to crush its transports. Their ill-concealed
threats of partition bound France to the cause of the Jacobins, which
otherwise she would have abjured in horror. Thus the would-be invaders
Page 216
drove France in upon herself, compelled her to organize her strength to the
utmost; and that strength, when marshalled by Carnot, was destined to
shatter the Coalition and overrun neighbouring lands. She then learnt the
fatal secret that she could conquer Europe.
In a later chapter I propose to survey Pitt's conduct as War Minister. Here I
need only point out that his mistakes resulted mainly from his unquenchable
hopefulness. A singular proof of this admirable but dangerous quality is
seen in his effort during the months of February and March 1795 to frame
one more plan of co-operation with the Court of Berlin, which had so
cynically deceived him. To this proposal Grenville offered unflinching
opposition, coupled with a conditional threat to resign. Pitt persuaded him
to defer action until the troubles in Ireland were less acute. But the King
finally agreed with Pitt, and Grenville was on the point of retiring when
news arrived of the defection of Prussia.[361] For some time she had been
deep in negotiations with France, which had the approval of Möllendorf and
the officers of her Rhenish army.[362] The upshot of it all was a treaty, which
Hardenberg signed with the French envoy at Basle on 5th April 1795. By
this discreditable bargain Frederick William of Prussia enabled France to
work her will on the lands west of the Rhine, on condition of his acquiring a
general ascendancy over North and Central Germany, which now became
neutral in the strife. Austria and the South German States remained at war
with France for two years longer, by which time the tottering Germanic
System fell beneath the sword of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Prussia's bargain with France marks a reversion to her traditional policy,
which viewed that Power as the friend and Austria as the enemy. It undid
the life-work of Prince Kaunitz, now nearing his end at Vienna, and left the
Hapsburg States enfeebled. True, they had a profitable share in the third and
last Partition of Poland, which soon ensued; but this scarcely made good the
loss in prestige due to the undisputed hegemony of Prussia in the greater
utmost; and that strength, when marshalled by Carnot, was destined to
shatter the Coalition and overrun neighbouring lands. She then learnt the
fatal secret that she could conquer Europe.
In a later chapter I propose to survey Pitt's conduct as War Minister. Here I
need only point out that his mistakes resulted mainly from his unquenchable
hopefulness. A singular proof of this admirable but dangerous quality is
seen in his effort during the months of February and March 1795 to frame
one more plan of co-operation with the Court of Berlin, which had so
cynically deceived him. To this proposal Grenville offered unflinching
opposition, coupled with a conditional threat to resign. Pitt persuaded him
to defer action until the troubles in Ireland were less acute. But the King
finally agreed with Pitt, and Grenville was on the point of retiring when
news arrived of the defection of Prussia.[361] For some time she had been
deep in negotiations with France, which had the approval of Möllendorf and
the officers of her Rhenish army.[362] The upshot of it all was a treaty, which
Hardenberg signed with the French envoy at Basle on 5th April 1795. By
this discreditable bargain Frederick William of Prussia enabled France to
work her will on the lands west of the Rhine, on condition of his acquiring a
general ascendancy over North and Central Germany, which now became
neutral in the strife. Austria and the South German States remained at war
with France for two years longer, by which time the tottering Germanic
System fell beneath the sword of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Prussia's bargain with France marks a reversion to her traditional policy,
which viewed that Power as the friend and Austria as the enemy. It undid
the life-work of Prince Kaunitz, now nearing his end at Vienna, and left the
Hapsburg States enfeebled. True, they had a profitable share in the third and
last Partition of Poland, which soon ensued; but this scarcely made good the
loss in prestige due to the undisputed hegemony of Prussia in the greater
Page 217
part of Germany. The House of Hohenzollern, impelled by men like
Lucchesini, Haugwitz, and Hardenberg, took the easy and profitable course
and plumed itself on over-reaching its secular rival at Vienna. In reality it
sealed the doom not only of the truly conservative policy of Pitt, but of the
European fabric. Prussia it was which enabled the Jacobins to triumph and
to extend their sway over neighbouring lands. The example of Berlin
tempted Spain three months later to sign degrading terms of peace with
France, and thus to rob England of her gains in Hayti and Corsica. Thanks
to Prussia and Spain, France could enter upon that career of conquest in
Italy which assured the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and the temporary ruin
of Austria. The mistakes of Pitt were great; but, after all, they might have
been retrieved were it not for the torpor of the Viennese Court and the
treachery of Prussia.
Lucchesini, Haugwitz, and Hardenberg, took the easy and profitable course
and plumed itself on over-reaching its secular rival at Vienna. In reality it
sealed the doom not only of the truly conservative policy of Pitt, but of the
European fabric. Prussia it was which enabled the Jacobins to triumph and
to extend their sway over neighbouring lands. The example of Berlin
tempted Spain three months later to sign degrading terms of peace with
France, and thus to rob England of her gains in Hayti and Corsica. Thanks
to Prussia and Spain, France could enter upon that career of conquest in
Italy which assured the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and the temporary ruin
of Austria. The mistakes of Pitt were great; but, after all, they might have
been retrieved were it not for the torpor of the Viennese Court and the
treachery of Prussia.
Page 218
CHAPTER IX
THE WEST INDIES
Unfortunately, the war was carried on on the
old principle of almost undivided attention to
what was termed British interests—that is,
looking to and preferring the protection of
trade and the capture of the enemy's colonial
establishments rather than to the objects
which had involved Great Britain in the
contest with France.—Colonel Thomas
Graham's Diary.
If we try to picture the course of the war as mapped out by Pitt, it would
probably have appeared somewhat as follows. Great Britain, after lending
to the Dutch a few regiments as a protection against the threatened raid of
Dumouriez, withdraws them, leaving the Dutch and the subsidized German
corps to guard the rear of the legions of Prussia and Austria during their
conquering march to Paris. England, in the meantime, harasses the coasts of
France, thereby compelling her to detain considerable forces at the
important points, and further cripples her by sweeping her fleets and
merchantmen from the sea and seizing her colonies.
In short, Pitt's conception of the true function of Great Britain in a
continental war was based on that of his father, who accorded
THE WEST INDIES
Unfortunately, the war was carried on on the
old principle of almost undivided attention to
what was termed British interests—that is,
looking to and preferring the protection of
trade and the capture of the enemy's colonial
establishments rather than to the objects
which had involved Great Britain in the
contest with France.—Colonel Thomas
Graham's Diary.
If we try to picture the course of the war as mapped out by Pitt, it would
probably have appeared somewhat as follows. Great Britain, after lending
to the Dutch a few regiments as a protection against the threatened raid of
Dumouriez, withdraws them, leaving the Dutch and the subsidized German
corps to guard the rear of the legions of Prussia and Austria during their
conquering march to Paris. England, in the meantime, harasses the coasts of
France, thereby compelling her to detain considerable forces at the
important points, and further cripples her by sweeping her fleets and
merchantmen from the sea and seizing her colonies.
In short, Pitt's conception of the true function of Great Britain in a
continental war was based on that of his father, who accorded
Page 219
comparatively little military aid to Frederick the Great even in his direst
need, but helped him indirectly by subsidies and by naval expeditions that
stalemated no small portion of the French army. If Chatham's tactics
succeeded when Prussia was striving against France, Austria, and Russia,
how much more might Pitt hope to win a speedy triumph over anarchic
France during her struggle with Austria, Prussia, Spain, Naples, Sardinia,
and Holland? He expected, and he had a right to expect, that these States
would need British money, not British troops, while the Sea Power
restricted its operations to a "minor offensive" along the seaboards of
France and her colonies. Pitt's efforts in this direction were constantly
thwarted by the drain of men to Flanders; but his letters to Murray, Chief of
Staff to the Duke of York, evince his anxiety to strike at Toulon and the
West Indies, and not merely to lighten the military duties of Austria and
Prussia on the French borders.[363] It would be tedious to recount his
various attempts to prepare an expedition for the West Indies.[364] Of more
interest are the requests for protection which he received from the French
colonists of Hayti, the western part of the great island of San Domingo.
As appeared in Chapter XX of the former volume, the decrees of the
National Assembly of Paris fired the negroes of the French West Indies with
the resolve to claim the liberty and equality now recklessly promised by the
mother-land. The white settlers, on the contrary, having recently acquired
autonomous rights, disputed the legality of that levelling legislation, and
rejected all authority but that of Louis XVI. Amidst the ensuing strifes, the
chief colonies, especially Hayti, were menaced by that most horrible of all
commotions, a servile revolt, when, most opportunely, help arrived from
Jamaica. The contrast between the timely succour of England and the
reckless iconoclasm of Paris struck the imagination of the French settlers,
and the Assembly of Hayti forthwith drew up a declaration, setting forth the
illegality of the French decrees, the miseries resulting from them, and the
resolve of the colonists to sever a connection absolutely fatal to their
need, but helped him indirectly by subsidies and by naval expeditions that
stalemated no small portion of the French army. If Chatham's tactics
succeeded when Prussia was striving against France, Austria, and Russia,
how much more might Pitt hope to win a speedy triumph over anarchic
France during her struggle with Austria, Prussia, Spain, Naples, Sardinia,
and Holland? He expected, and he had a right to expect, that these States
would need British money, not British troops, while the Sea Power
restricted its operations to a "minor offensive" along the seaboards of
France and her colonies. Pitt's efforts in this direction were constantly
thwarted by the drain of men to Flanders; but his letters to Murray, Chief of
Staff to the Duke of York, evince his anxiety to strike at Toulon and the
West Indies, and not merely to lighten the military duties of Austria and
Prussia on the French borders.[363] It would be tedious to recount his
various attempts to prepare an expedition for the West Indies.[364] Of more
interest are the requests for protection which he received from the French
colonists of Hayti, the western part of the great island of San Domingo.
As appeared in Chapter XX of the former volume, the decrees of the
National Assembly of Paris fired the negroes of the French West Indies with
the resolve to claim the liberty and equality now recklessly promised by the
mother-land. The white settlers, on the contrary, having recently acquired
autonomous rights, disputed the legality of that levelling legislation, and
rejected all authority but that of Louis XVI. Amidst the ensuing strifes, the
chief colonies, especially Hayti, were menaced by that most horrible of all
commotions, a servile revolt, when, most opportunely, help arrived from
Jamaica. The contrast between the timely succour of England and the
reckless iconoclasm of Paris struck the imagination of the French settlers,
and the Assembly of Hayti forthwith drew up a declaration, setting forth the
illegality of the French decrees, the miseries resulting from them, and the
resolve of the colonists to sever a connection absolutely fatal to their
Page 220
welfare. Citing the example of the United States fifteen years before, and
recounting the misdeeds of the mother country, they proclaimed to the
world the justice of the act of severance.
A copy of this declaration, signed by de Cadusey on 27th September 1791,
was sent forthwith to Pitt, with a request for the protection of Great Britain.
He received it at Burton Pynsent on 27th October.[365] One of the chief
delegates from Hayti was de Charmilly, who on 14th November sought an
interview with Pitt, and a fortnight later wrote to him, earnestly begging the
help of the only nation which could avert ruin from those islands. France,
he declared, had passed a decree of blood against her own colonies and was
powerless to stop its effects. The National Assembly, having by its
annexation of Avignon recognized the right of that papal district to belong
to whom it would, Hayti of equal right now voted for union with England.
He further advised that its ports should remain open to all nations, a course
of action which would herald the dawn of commercial and political freedom
among the Spanish colonies of the New World.[366] These alluring prospects
failed to entice Pitt from the strict neutrality to which he had pledged
himself. So far was he from desiring to profit by the misfortunes of France,
as the French princes first, and after them the Jacobins, maliciously
asserted.
Once more the deputies of France flung the torch of discord across the
Atlantic. By their decree of 4th April 1792 they declared absolute equality
of rights between whites, half-castes, and blacks, and sent out
commissioners to enforce this anarchic fiat. They forthwith took the side of
the rebels, who in Toussaint l'Ouverture found a leader of terrible force of
will. Martinique and Guadeloupe and the smaller islands were also a prey to
civil war. In sheer desperation the planters and merchants of Guadeloupe
sent over a delegate, Curt, to appeal to the British Government for
protection. Lord Hawkesbury accorded to him an informal interview in the
recounting the misdeeds of the mother country, they proclaimed to the
world the justice of the act of severance.
A copy of this declaration, signed by de Cadusey on 27th September 1791,
was sent forthwith to Pitt, with a request for the protection of Great Britain.
He received it at Burton Pynsent on 27th October.[365] One of the chief
delegates from Hayti was de Charmilly, who on 14th November sought an
interview with Pitt, and a fortnight later wrote to him, earnestly begging the
help of the only nation which could avert ruin from those islands. France,
he declared, had passed a decree of blood against her own colonies and was
powerless to stop its effects. The National Assembly, having by its
annexation of Avignon recognized the right of that papal district to belong
to whom it would, Hayti of equal right now voted for union with England.
He further advised that its ports should remain open to all nations, a course
of action which would herald the dawn of commercial and political freedom
among the Spanish colonies of the New World.[366] These alluring prospects
failed to entice Pitt from the strict neutrality to which he had pledged
himself. So far was he from desiring to profit by the misfortunes of France,
as the French princes first, and after them the Jacobins, maliciously
asserted.
Once more the deputies of France flung the torch of discord across the
Atlantic. By their decree of 4th April 1792 they declared absolute equality
of rights between whites, half-castes, and blacks, and sent out
commissioners to enforce this anarchic fiat. They forthwith took the side of
the rebels, who in Toussaint l'Ouverture found a leader of terrible force of
will. Martinique and Guadeloupe and the smaller islands were also a prey to
civil war. In sheer desperation the planters and merchants of Guadeloupe
sent over a delegate, Curt, to appeal to the British Government for
protection. Lord Hawkesbury accorded to him an informal interview in the
Page 221
closing days of 1792. Curt pressed him for official help, without which his
fellow colonists must lose their lives and property, and declared that he and
many others abjured the name of Frenchmen.[367] Malouet, once prominent
in the National Assembly and destined to become famous under Napoleon,
also approached our Ministers, but with more caution. He knew that in
some of the islands the Republic had many adherents; but after the outbreak
of war in February 1793 he too advocated the sovereignty of Great Britain
under certain conditions, and on behalf of the colonists of Hayti signed a
compact with Dundas to that effect.
Fear of a revolt of the slaves had induced Ministers to send out
reinforcements, so that, early in 1793, 19 battalions were in the British West
Indies. In the month of April a small British force easily captured Tobago
and restored that valuable little island to Great Britain. An attack on
Martinique at midsummer was, however, a failure. These attempts, it may
be noted, were made with forces already in the West Indies.[368] Pitt and
Dundas have been severely blamed for sending further reinforcements to
the West Indies.[369] But a letter which Pitt wrote to Grenville some time in
June or July 1793 shows that the news of a French expedition having set
sail to the West Indies, escorted by six or seven sail-of-the-line from Brest,
led him to urge the despatch of a force for the protection of that important
group of colonies.[370]
Besides, was a forward policy in the West Indies unwise? In these days it is
hard to realize the value of those islands. The mention of Hayti conjures up
a vision as of a ship manned by gorillas; for there and in Liberia is seen the
proneness of the negroes to aimless lounging varied by outbursts of passion.
But in the year 1789 Hayti far surpassed Jamaica in wealth and activity. The
French possessed only the western third of the island; but the Spanish
portion to the east was far less fertile, and far worse cultivated. The French
genius for colonization was seen in the excellent system of irrigation carried
fellow colonists must lose their lives and property, and declared that he and
many others abjured the name of Frenchmen.[367] Malouet, once prominent
in the National Assembly and destined to become famous under Napoleon,
also approached our Ministers, but with more caution. He knew that in
some of the islands the Republic had many adherents; but after the outbreak
of war in February 1793 he too advocated the sovereignty of Great Britain
under certain conditions, and on behalf of the colonists of Hayti signed a
compact with Dundas to that effect.
Fear of a revolt of the slaves had induced Ministers to send out
reinforcements, so that, early in 1793, 19 battalions were in the British West
Indies. In the month of April a small British force easily captured Tobago
and restored that valuable little island to Great Britain. An attack on
Martinique at midsummer was, however, a failure. These attempts, it may
be noted, were made with forces already in the West Indies.[368] Pitt and
Dundas have been severely blamed for sending further reinforcements to
the West Indies.[369] But a letter which Pitt wrote to Grenville some time in
June or July 1793 shows that the news of a French expedition having set
sail to the West Indies, escorted by six or seven sail-of-the-line from Brest,
led him to urge the despatch of a force for the protection of that important
group of colonies.[370]
Besides, was a forward policy in the West Indies unwise? In these days it is
hard to realize the value of those islands. The mention of Hayti conjures up
a vision as of a ship manned by gorillas; for there and in Liberia is seen the
proneness of the negroes to aimless lounging varied by outbursts of passion.
But in the year 1789 Hayti far surpassed Jamaica in wealth and activity. The
French possessed only the western third of the island; but the Spanish
portion to the east was far less fertile, and far worse cultivated. The French
genius for colonization was seen in the excellent system of irrigation carried
Page 222
on in the vast and fertile plain, the Cul-de-Sac, east of the capital, Port-au-
Prince. But other portions, notably the long peninsula to the south-west,
were also highly prosperous. The chief towns equalled in splendour and
activity the provincial cities of France. Port-au-Prince and Cap Français
were the pride of the West Indies; and the rocky fortress, Mole St. Nicholas,
dominated those waters as Gibraltar dominates the Eastern Mediterranean.
The population of Hayti was reckoned at 40,000 whites, 60,000 mulattoes
or half-castes, and some 500,000 negro slaves. Its exports (chiefly sugar,
coffee, and cotton) were assessed at upwards of £7,500,000, or more by one
third than that of all the British West Indies. To some extent Jamaica
flourished on its ruin. For in May 1796 an official report stated that two
coffee-planters, refugees from Hayti, who had settled in the mountains
behind Port Royal, were introducing so many improvements as to bring the
exports of coffee up to 6,000,000 lb.; and they would soon amount to
50,000,000 lb.[371]
The colonists of Hayti, who offered this valuable prize to Great Britain,
were far from being unprincipled adventurers. Malouet, on whom fell the
chief responsibility, was an upright and able man; and both he and his
comrades were deputed by representative Assemblies which sought to save
society from sinking into a gulf of unutterable horrors. His letters to Pitt[372]
are instinct with the conviction that the men of Hayti unanimously desired a
British protectorate, and recognized that the colonists must pay for the
support accorded to them. As we were framing an alliance with Spain, no
difficulties were to be anticipated from the Spanish part of that island.
When five or six valuable islands were to be had, to all appearance with
little risk except from the slaves, Ministers would have been craven in the
extreme not to push on an enterprise which promised to benefit British
commerce and cripple that of France.
Prince. But other portions, notably the long peninsula to the south-west,
were also highly prosperous. The chief towns equalled in splendour and
activity the provincial cities of France. Port-au-Prince and Cap Français
were the pride of the West Indies; and the rocky fortress, Mole St. Nicholas,
dominated those waters as Gibraltar dominates the Eastern Mediterranean.
The population of Hayti was reckoned at 40,000 whites, 60,000 mulattoes
or half-castes, and some 500,000 negro slaves. Its exports (chiefly sugar,
coffee, and cotton) were assessed at upwards of £7,500,000, or more by one
third than that of all the British West Indies. To some extent Jamaica
flourished on its ruin. For in May 1796 an official report stated that two
coffee-planters, refugees from Hayti, who had settled in the mountains
behind Port Royal, were introducing so many improvements as to bring the
exports of coffee up to 6,000,000 lb.; and they would soon amount to
50,000,000 lb.[371]
The colonists of Hayti, who offered this valuable prize to Great Britain,
were far from being unprincipled adventurers. Malouet, on whom fell the
chief responsibility, was an upright and able man; and both he and his
comrades were deputed by representative Assemblies which sought to save
society from sinking into a gulf of unutterable horrors. His letters to Pitt[372]
are instinct with the conviction that the men of Hayti unanimously desired a
British protectorate, and recognized that the colonists must pay for the
support accorded to them. As we were framing an alliance with Spain, no
difficulties were to be anticipated from the Spanish part of that island.
When five or six valuable islands were to be had, to all appearance with
little risk except from the slaves, Ministers would have been craven in the
extreme not to push on an enterprise which promised to benefit British
commerce and cripple that of France.
Page 223
Unfortunately, owing to the drain of the Flemish campaign, their action was
tardy. The schisms between Royalists and Republicans at the city of Cap
Français enabled the negroes to burst in at midsummer of 1793 with fire
and knife and glut their vengeance on some thousands of persons. Even
after these atrocities the Jacobin commissioners continued to make use of
the blacks in order to enforce their levelling decree; and the year ended
amid long drawn out scenes of murder, rape, and pillage. By these infamous
means did democracy win its triumph in the West Indies.
In their despair the French loyalists applied for further aid to Major-General
Williamson, the governor of Jamaica. He sent a force which received a
hearty welcome at the little fortress of Jérémie (19th September), and a few
days later at that important stronghold, Mole St. Nicholas, then blockaded
on land by the blacks. An attempt by the Republicans at the capital, Port-au-
Prince, to send an expedition for the recapture of Mole St. Nicholas was
thwarted; and late in the year 1793 five other towns accepted British
protection. The rapid recovery of prosperity in the district forming the lower
jaw of the griffin-like head of Hayti is seen in the official exports from the
port of Grand Anse at its tip. During the quarter 20th September to 31st
December 1793 it sent the following quantities to British ports, chiefly
Kingston in Jamaica: Coffee, 644,751 lb.; Sugar, 91,593 lb.; Cotton, 56,339
lb.; Cocoa, 66,944 lb. Even larger quantities of coffee were exported to
foreign ports.[373] In 1796 the produce of Hayti was valued at £1,500,000;
the colony employed more than 400 ships.[374] Was not this a land for which
some risks might be encountered?
Meanwhile the Spaniards from their part of the island had overrun certain
districts, especially those to the north of Port-au-Prince. In particular, they
for a time occupied the port of Gonaives, about midway between the capital
and Mole St. Nicholas, a step almost as threatening to the British forces as
to the French Republicans. It is hard to fathom the designs of the Spaniards
tardy. The schisms between Royalists and Republicans at the city of Cap
Français enabled the negroes to burst in at midsummer of 1793 with fire
and knife and glut their vengeance on some thousands of persons. Even
after these atrocities the Jacobin commissioners continued to make use of
the blacks in order to enforce their levelling decree; and the year ended
amid long drawn out scenes of murder, rape, and pillage. By these infamous
means did democracy win its triumph in the West Indies.
In their despair the French loyalists applied for further aid to Major-General
Williamson, the governor of Jamaica. He sent a force which received a
hearty welcome at the little fortress of Jérémie (19th September), and a few
days later at that important stronghold, Mole St. Nicholas, then blockaded
on land by the blacks. An attempt by the Republicans at the capital, Port-au-
Prince, to send an expedition for the recapture of Mole St. Nicholas was
thwarted; and late in the year 1793 five other towns accepted British
protection. The rapid recovery of prosperity in the district forming the lower
jaw of the griffin-like head of Hayti is seen in the official exports from the
port of Grand Anse at its tip. During the quarter 20th September to 31st
December 1793 it sent the following quantities to British ports, chiefly
Kingston in Jamaica: Coffee, 644,751 lb.; Sugar, 91,593 lb.; Cotton, 56,339
lb.; Cocoa, 66,944 lb. Even larger quantities of coffee were exported to
foreign ports.[373] In 1796 the produce of Hayti was valued at £1,500,000;
the colony employed more than 400 ships.[374] Was not this a land for which
some risks might be encountered?
Meanwhile the Spaniards from their part of the island had overrun certain
districts, especially those to the north of Port-au-Prince. In particular, they
for a time occupied the port of Gonaives, about midway between the capital
and Mole St. Nicholas, a step almost as threatening to the British forces as
to the French Republicans. It is hard to fathom the designs of the Spaniards
Page 224
at this time. Their pride, their hereditary claims to the whole of the Indies,
and their nearness to this splendid prize, all urged them on to an effort from
which lack of men, ships and money, and the hatred of the French and the
blacks to their sway should have warned them off. Seeing also that the
French colonists had officially handed over their possession to Great
Britain, Spain should have come to some understanding with her Ally
before invading what was now in effect British territory. She did not do so;
and subsequent events proved that her King and statesmen harboured deep
resentment against the transfer, and sought to thwart it by underhand means.
For the present, however, their inroad into the north-central districts dealt
one more blow to the power of the French Jacobins and their black friends.
These last were formidable only when the quest was plunder. Even the iron
will of their ablest leader, Toussaint l'Ouverture, could infuse no steadiness
into the swarthy levies, which, roving almost at will in the mountainous
interior, were wellnigh as dangerous to the Republicans as to the British.
[375]
It is not surprising, then, that Pitt and Dundas, despite the drain of ships and
men to Ostend and Toulon, did all in their power to secure this colony,
which had always been deemed essential to the prosperity of French
commerce. On 11th October 1793 Pitt reluctantly admitted the need of
further postponing the West India expedition owing to the uncertainty of the
fate of Ostend and the chance of a French raid on our shores. But when
these dangers passed away the original plan held the first place; and it
should be noted that, by the middle of November, when the expedition was
finally decided on, the position of the Royalists at Toulon was thought to be
satisfactory. Much, of course, can be urged against sending troops so far
away, when the loyal Bretons needed succour; but Pitt, Grenville, and, still
more, Dundas were bent on this colonial enterprise; and, viewing the
situation as it then was, not as we with our knowledge of later events see it,
their decision seems defensible.[376]
and their nearness to this splendid prize, all urged them on to an effort from
which lack of men, ships and money, and the hatred of the French and the
blacks to their sway should have warned them off. Seeing also that the
French colonists had officially handed over their possession to Great
Britain, Spain should have come to some understanding with her Ally
before invading what was now in effect British territory. She did not do so;
and subsequent events proved that her King and statesmen harboured deep
resentment against the transfer, and sought to thwart it by underhand means.
For the present, however, their inroad into the north-central districts dealt
one more blow to the power of the French Jacobins and their black friends.
These last were formidable only when the quest was plunder. Even the iron
will of their ablest leader, Toussaint l'Ouverture, could infuse no steadiness
into the swarthy levies, which, roving almost at will in the mountainous
interior, were wellnigh as dangerous to the Republicans as to the British.
[375]
It is not surprising, then, that Pitt and Dundas, despite the drain of ships and
men to Ostend and Toulon, did all in their power to secure this colony,
which had always been deemed essential to the prosperity of French
commerce. On 11th October 1793 Pitt reluctantly admitted the need of
further postponing the West India expedition owing to the uncertainty of the
fate of Ostend and the chance of a French raid on our shores. But when
these dangers passed away the original plan held the first place; and it
should be noted that, by the middle of November, when the expedition was
finally decided on, the position of the Royalists at Toulon was thought to be
satisfactory. Much, of course, can be urged against sending troops so far
away, when the loyal Bretons needed succour; but Pitt, Grenville, and, still
more, Dundas were bent on this colonial enterprise; and, viewing the
situation as it then was, not as we with our knowledge of later events see it,
their decision seems defensible.[376]
Page 225
On 26th November, then, Sir John Jervis (afterwards Earl of St. Vincent) set
sail with some 7,000 troops commanded by Sir Charles Grey. After
touching at Barbados he made for Martinique and succeeded in reducing
that island by 22nd March 1794. St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, Marie Galante, and
the Saintes surrendered in April, but after struggles which showed that the
Republicans, backed by mulattoes and blacks, were formidable foes. This
anarchic combination was already threatening the small and scattered
British garrisons in San Domingo. But, when further reinforcements from
England reached Mole St. Nicholas, a force detached thence under Major-
General Whyte made a dash upon Port-au-Prince. Vigorously handled, and
under cover of a violent thunderstorm, the landing parties carried an
important outwork in handsome style, and thus assured the surrender of the
whole place. The spoils were 101 cannon and 32 ships, with cargoes worth
about half a million sterling (4th June 1794). This brilliant success cost the
assailants very few lives; but the heats of the summer and probably also the
intemperance of the troops soon thinned their ranks. The French, too,
having received succours which slipped out from Rochefort, recovered
Guadeloupe in the month of September.[377] And from this point of vantage
they sought, often with success, to stir up the slaves in the British islands.
Thus by the autumn of 1794 the position was somewhat as follows. The
British had secured all the French colonies in the West Indies, excepting
Guadeloupe. In Hayti they held nearly all the coast towns, and maintained
an intermittent blockade over the others; but their position was precarious
owing to the thinness of their garrisons, the untrustworthiness of their
mulatto auxiliaries, and the ravages of disease. It seems probable that, with
ordinary precautions and some reinforcements, the garrisons might have
held out in the towns then occupied, provided that the fleet intercepted
French expeditions destined for the West Indies; and this ought to have been
possible after Howe's victory of 1st June 1794. The fact that the Republic
strenuously prepared to regain those islands at the very time when the
sail with some 7,000 troops commanded by Sir Charles Grey. After
touching at Barbados he made for Martinique and succeeded in reducing
that island by 22nd March 1794. St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, Marie Galante, and
the Saintes surrendered in April, but after struggles which showed that the
Republicans, backed by mulattoes and blacks, were formidable foes. This
anarchic combination was already threatening the small and scattered
British garrisons in San Domingo. But, when further reinforcements from
England reached Mole St. Nicholas, a force detached thence under Major-
General Whyte made a dash upon Port-au-Prince. Vigorously handled, and
under cover of a violent thunderstorm, the landing parties carried an
important outwork in handsome style, and thus assured the surrender of the
whole place. The spoils were 101 cannon and 32 ships, with cargoes worth
about half a million sterling (4th June 1794). This brilliant success cost the
assailants very few lives; but the heats of the summer and probably also the
intemperance of the troops soon thinned their ranks. The French, too,
having received succours which slipped out from Rochefort, recovered
Guadeloupe in the month of September.[377] And from this point of vantage
they sought, often with success, to stir up the slaves in the British islands.
Thus by the autumn of 1794 the position was somewhat as follows. The
British had secured all the French colonies in the West Indies, excepting
Guadeloupe. In Hayti they held nearly all the coast towns, and maintained
an intermittent blockade over the others; but their position was precarious
owing to the thinness of their garrisons, the untrustworthiness of their
mulatto auxiliaries, and the ravages of disease. It seems probable that, with
ordinary precautions and some reinforcements, the garrisons might have
held out in the towns then occupied, provided that the fleet intercepted
French expeditions destined for the West Indies; and this ought to have been
possible after Howe's victory of 1st June 1794. The fact that the Republic
strenuously prepared to regain those islands at the very time when the
Page 226
Coalition in Europe and the revolt in Brittany threatened its existence,
suffices to justify Pitt and his colleagues in attacking France in that quarter.
A colony which is worth regaining must be worth gaining. To the capture of
Louisburg, a weaker stronghold than Mole St. Nicholas, England devoted
several expeditions a generation earlier. Had Pitt and Dundas declined to
have as a gift this key to the Indies, what would not their critics have said of
their incapacity and cowardice? For the West Indies were then far more
highly prized than Canada.
Endless difficulties beset every expedition to the tropics, even when
forethought and care minimize the risks from disease. The story of
England's ventures in those seas is, in general, one of hasty action and long
repentance. No one had made a special study of the needs of white men in
that climate. In fact, the military martinets of those days made little
allowance for the altered conditions of service under a broiling sun; and,
until the advent of Abercromby, only slight changes took place either in the
uniform or the time of drills. Dr. Pinckard, in his account of this enterprise,
mentions cases of gross stupidity, slovenliness, and even of dishonesty on
the part of army officials in those colonies;[378] and it is clear that to this
cause the long death-roll was largely due. The following figures at the close
of 1794 are instructive:[379]
BRITISH. COLONIAL.
Effective. Sick. Effective. Sick.
Port-au-Prince 366 462 496 48
Mole St. Nicholas 209 166 209 38
Jérémie 95 59 — —
St. Marc 48 33 813 321
Tiburon 34 18 — —
suffices to justify Pitt and his colleagues in attacking France in that quarter.
A colony which is worth regaining must be worth gaining. To the capture of
Louisburg, a weaker stronghold than Mole St. Nicholas, England devoted
several expeditions a generation earlier. Had Pitt and Dundas declined to
have as a gift this key to the Indies, what would not their critics have said of
their incapacity and cowardice? For the West Indies were then far more
highly prized than Canada.
Endless difficulties beset every expedition to the tropics, even when
forethought and care minimize the risks from disease. The story of
England's ventures in those seas is, in general, one of hasty action and long
repentance. No one had made a special study of the needs of white men in
that climate. In fact, the military martinets of those days made little
allowance for the altered conditions of service under a broiling sun; and,
until the advent of Abercromby, only slight changes took place either in the
uniform or the time of drills. Dr. Pinckard, in his account of this enterprise,
mentions cases of gross stupidity, slovenliness, and even of dishonesty on
the part of army officials in those colonies;[378] and it is clear that to this
cause the long death-roll was largely due. The following figures at the close
of 1794 are instructive:[379]
BRITISH. COLONIAL.
Effective. Sick. Effective. Sick.
Port-au-Prince 366 462 496 48
Mole St. Nicholas 209 166 209 38
Jérémie 95 59 — —
St. Marc 48 33 813 321
Tiburon 34 18 — —
Page 227
—————— ——————
Total 1490 1925
It will be observed that the French and coloured troops were far more
immune from sickness. Indeed, the loyal French colonists felt much
annoyance at the comparative uselessness of the British force at this time.
Charmilly, after a long visit to Hayti, returned to London in September
1794, and laid stress on this in several letters to Pitt. On 11th October he
urges him to sanction a plan (already approved) for raising a force of
French émigrés in service in Hayti. A month later he complains that nothing
is being done, though the loyalists of Hayti are willing to pay their share of
the expenses. As it is, they are growing disheartened; for the British troops
remain in the strongholds, thus leaving the colonial troops in the country
too weak to cope with the roving bands of brigands. As for himself, he is
weary of soliciting help which is never vouchsafed; and he warns Pitt that
opinion is gaining ground in Hayti as to the uselessness of maintaining a
struggle in which the British people take no interest. The note of egotism
rarely absent from Charmilly's letters appears in his assurance that, if
something is not done soon, England will lose the splendid possession
which he has placed in her hand.[380]
There were good reasons why Pitt and his colleagues should not commit
themselves deeply to the Haytian embroglio. In that anxious time, the
autumn of 1794, the most urgent needs were to save Holland from the
Jacobins, to distract them by helping the Royalists of Brittany, and from our
new base in Corsica to clog their attempts at an invasion of Italy. Owing to
the slackness of our Allies, these enterprises proved unexpectedly difficult.
In truth any two of them would have strained the scanty resources of the
British army; and Pitt is open to censure for not ruling out all but the most
essential of them. But here a word of caution is needful. For us, with our
Total 1490 1925
It will be observed that the French and coloured troops were far more
immune from sickness. Indeed, the loyal French colonists felt much
annoyance at the comparative uselessness of the British force at this time.
Charmilly, after a long visit to Hayti, returned to London in September
1794, and laid stress on this in several letters to Pitt. On 11th October he
urges him to sanction a plan (already approved) for raising a force of
French émigrés in service in Hayti. A month later he complains that nothing
is being done, though the loyalists of Hayti are willing to pay their share of
the expenses. As it is, they are growing disheartened; for the British troops
remain in the strongholds, thus leaving the colonial troops in the country
too weak to cope with the roving bands of brigands. As for himself, he is
weary of soliciting help which is never vouchsafed; and he warns Pitt that
opinion is gaining ground in Hayti as to the uselessness of maintaining a
struggle in which the British people take no interest. The note of egotism
rarely absent from Charmilly's letters appears in his assurance that, if
something is not done soon, England will lose the splendid possession
which he has placed in her hand.[380]
There were good reasons why Pitt and his colleagues should not commit
themselves deeply to the Haytian embroglio. In that anxious time, the
autumn of 1794, the most urgent needs were to save Holland from the
Jacobins, to distract them by helping the Royalists of Brittany, and from our
new base in Corsica to clog their attempts at an invasion of Italy. Owing to
the slackness of our Allies, these enterprises proved unexpectedly difficult.
In truth any two of them would have strained the scanty resources of the
British army; and Pitt is open to censure for not ruling out all but the most
essential of them. But here a word of caution is needful. For us, with our
Page 228
knowledge of the sequel, it is a comparatively easy task to assess the gains
and losses of the war, and to blame perseverance in one course as wasteful
folly or backwardness in another as stupid slothfulness. If later critics
would seek to realize the amount of information possessed by fallible
mortals at the time of their decisions, the world would be spared floods of
censure. How was Pitt to know that the Dutch were about to hamper, rather
than assist, the defence of their land by the Allies; that Prussia would play
him false; that the schisms among the French Royalists would make
Quiberon a word of horror; that Paoli would stir up strife in Corsica; or that
Spain was preparing to ruin British rule in Hayti? With loyal cooperation on
the part of the Allies, all these enterprises might have proceeded
successfully side by side.
There were no solid reasons for distrusting Spain. The Court of Madrid had
eagerly taken up arms against the regicides of Paris; and Pitt, as we shall
see, early sought to avoid friction in the West Indies. Otherwise, he would
be highly blameable; for England's easy acquisition of Hayti could not but
ruffle the feelings of the Dons. No chord in the highly strung nature of the
Spaniard vibrates so readily and so powerfully as that of pride in the
retention or recovery of the conquests of his ancestors. The determination of
the Court of Madrid to win back Louisiana and the Floridas, not to speak of
Minorca, had potently influenced its policy in the recent past, and the
prospect of seeing the Union Jack wave over Hayti and Corsica now
envenomed the ever open wound of Gibraltar. True, the French colonists of
Hayti, acting through their local Assemblies, had the right to will away their
land to England. Spain, at least, could not say them nay; but none the less
she longed to see her flag float once more over the western districts which
had slipped from her grasp.
Pitt and Grenville had early foreseen trouble ahead with Spain on the
subject of the West Indies. When affairs at Toulon were causing friction,
and losses of the war, and to blame perseverance in one course as wasteful
folly or backwardness in another as stupid slothfulness. If later critics
would seek to realize the amount of information possessed by fallible
mortals at the time of their decisions, the world would be spared floods of
censure. How was Pitt to know that the Dutch were about to hamper, rather
than assist, the defence of their land by the Allies; that Prussia would play
him false; that the schisms among the French Royalists would make
Quiberon a word of horror; that Paoli would stir up strife in Corsica; or that
Spain was preparing to ruin British rule in Hayti? With loyal cooperation on
the part of the Allies, all these enterprises might have proceeded
successfully side by side.
There were no solid reasons for distrusting Spain. The Court of Madrid had
eagerly taken up arms against the regicides of Paris; and Pitt, as we shall
see, early sought to avoid friction in the West Indies. Otherwise, he would
be highly blameable; for England's easy acquisition of Hayti could not but
ruffle the feelings of the Dons. No chord in the highly strung nature of the
Spaniard vibrates so readily and so powerfully as that of pride in the
retention or recovery of the conquests of his ancestors. The determination of
the Court of Madrid to win back Louisiana and the Floridas, not to speak of
Minorca, had potently influenced its policy in the recent past, and the
prospect of seeing the Union Jack wave over Hayti and Corsica now
envenomed the ever open wound of Gibraltar. True, the French colonists of
Hayti, acting through their local Assemblies, had the right to will away their
land to England. Spain, at least, could not say them nay; but none the less
she longed to see her flag float once more over the western districts which
had slipped from her grasp.
Pitt and Grenville had early foreseen trouble ahead with Spain on the
subject of the West Indies. When affairs at Toulon were causing friction,
Page 229
Grenville instructed Lord St. Helens, British ambassador at Madrid, to urge
that Court to secure the hoped-for indemnities in the French districts north
of the Pyrenees. As for England, she had in view Hayti and certain of the
French Leeward Islands. This plan, continued Grenville, could not offend
Spain, seeing that the Haytian or western part of San Domingo fronted
Jamaica and fell naturally to the Power holding that island. But, as the
Court of Madrid was known to cherish desires for a part of Hayti, St.
Helens must endeavour to ascertain their extent so as to come to a friendly
compromise.[381] The Spanish Government, at that time incensed by the
quarrels at Toulon, vouchsafed no reply to these courteous overtures. They
were renewed during the year 1794, but with no better result.
Meanwhile, Don Garcia, the Spanish Governor of San Domingo sought to
pour oil on the flames of civil strife. He allowed the bands of negroes to
retire into the Spanish districts, and replenish their stores. In fact, his
conduct was so openly hostile to England, that on 11th November 1794
Grenville instructed Jackson, British chargé d'affaires at Madrid, to demand
the recall of that arrogant official.[382] Charmilly also averred that the
brigands often sallied forth from Spanish territory to ravage the western
districts.[383] Other facts point in the same direction. Whence could the
Republicans and their black allies have gained supplies of arms and
ammunition but from the Spaniards? The survey of the British over the
western coasts was close enough to bar those supplies, at least in the
quantities that the negroes demanded. In truth, the enigmas of the Hayti
affair can be solved only by delving in the Spanish archives. The whole
question is closely connected with the extraordinary change that came over
Anglo-Spanish relations in the years 1795–6, a topic which will be treated
in the following chapter.
that Court to secure the hoped-for indemnities in the French districts north
of the Pyrenees. As for England, she had in view Hayti and certain of the
French Leeward Islands. This plan, continued Grenville, could not offend
Spain, seeing that the Haytian or western part of San Domingo fronted
Jamaica and fell naturally to the Power holding that island. But, as the
Court of Madrid was known to cherish desires for a part of Hayti, St.
Helens must endeavour to ascertain their extent so as to come to a friendly
compromise.[381] The Spanish Government, at that time incensed by the
quarrels at Toulon, vouchsafed no reply to these courteous overtures. They
were renewed during the year 1794, but with no better result.
Meanwhile, Don Garcia, the Spanish Governor of San Domingo sought to
pour oil on the flames of civil strife. He allowed the bands of negroes to
retire into the Spanish districts, and replenish their stores. In fact, his
conduct was so openly hostile to England, that on 11th November 1794
Grenville instructed Jackson, British chargé d'affaires at Madrid, to demand
the recall of that arrogant official.[382] Charmilly also averred that the
brigands often sallied forth from Spanish territory to ravage the western
districts.[383] Other facts point in the same direction. Whence could the
Republicans and their black allies have gained supplies of arms and
ammunition but from the Spaniards? The survey of the British over the
western coasts was close enough to bar those supplies, at least in the
quantities that the negroes demanded. In truth, the enigmas of the Hayti
affair can be solved only by delving in the Spanish archives. The whole
question is closely connected with the extraordinary change that came over
Anglo-Spanish relations in the years 1795–6, a topic which will be treated
in the following chapter.
Page 230
Page 231
CHAPTER X
S PA I N A N D H AY T I
Are not Martinique, Mole St. Nicholas, and
the Cape of Good Hope most important
conquests?—Pitt, Speech of 9th December
1795.
More than once it has happened that, after a time of national revival, Spain
has fallen under the dominion of a ruler led by wrongheaded counsellors
and intriguing favourites. Such was the case in the year 1788. Charles III,
who then passed away, had restored the finances, the prosperity, the navy,
and the prestige of that land. But his successor, Charles IV, proved to be one
of the weakest and most indolent members of that dynasty. Fond of display,
and devoted to the pleasures of the chase and the table, he squandered the
resources of the State, and soon saw his finances fall into hopeless
confusion. Worse still, his consort, a princess of the ducal House of Parma,
and a woman of much energy, conceived a violent passion for Manuel
Godoy, a young private in the royal guards, on whom she heaped favours
and dignities, so that he forced his way into the highest circles with the title
Duke of Alcudia. He was endowed with a dignified mien, handsome
features, affable manners, and good abilities, so that the British ambassador,
Lord St. Helens, happily characterized him as a Birmingham Villiers. The
measure of his importance and of the degradation of the Sovereigns may be
gauged from the fact that the paramour of the Queen became the chief
S PA I N A N D H AY T I
Are not Martinique, Mole St. Nicholas, and
the Cape of Good Hope most important
conquests?—Pitt, Speech of 9th December
1795.
More than once it has happened that, after a time of national revival, Spain
has fallen under the dominion of a ruler led by wrongheaded counsellors
and intriguing favourites. Such was the case in the year 1788. Charles III,
who then passed away, had restored the finances, the prosperity, the navy,
and the prestige of that land. But his successor, Charles IV, proved to be one
of the weakest and most indolent members of that dynasty. Fond of display,
and devoted to the pleasures of the chase and the table, he squandered the
resources of the State, and soon saw his finances fall into hopeless
confusion. Worse still, his consort, a princess of the ducal House of Parma,
and a woman of much energy, conceived a violent passion for Manuel
Godoy, a young private in the royal guards, on whom she heaped favours
and dignities, so that he forced his way into the highest circles with the title
Duke of Alcudia. He was endowed with a dignified mien, handsome
features, affable manners, and good abilities, so that the British ambassador,
Lord St. Helens, happily characterized him as a Birmingham Villiers. The
measure of his importance and of the degradation of the Sovereigns may be
gauged from the fact that the paramour of the Queen became the chief
Page 232
Minister of the King. In truth, the Queen, her lover, and her two confessors
governed Spain.
The habits of the favourite were as follows. He rose early, drove or rode for
an hour, and after breakfast transacted business for a time. He then relieved
the tedium of that time by witnessing exhibitions of skill and daring by his
private matadors, after which he spent about three hours in the society of
the Queen. He then devoted the same length of time to the conduct of public
business with the King; and the day ended with dinner, fêtes, the opera, or
the consideration of requests for patronage. This function of State generally
occupied three evenings in the week; and on these occasions a crowd of
some 250 suitors filled his meanly lit ante-room with jealous expectancy
and long baffled hopes.[384]
Certainly the representatives of monarchy at this time of acute trial were
unequal to the strain. Catharine of Russia was supremely able, but no less
corrupt. Frederick William of Prussia equalled her in vice and in nothing
else. Francis of Austria had the brain of a master of ceremonies; George III
that of a model squire; Ferdinand of Naples was in his place in the kennel;
Victor Amadeus of Sardinia, in the confessional. It is difficult to say to what
place Charles IV of Spain and his consort can most fitly be assigned; for
they could not live apart from Godoy; and with Godoy they would have
been excluded from any residence but the royal palace of Spain. The policy
of that Court wavered under his whims and devices. Hated by the grandees,
loathed by honest people, and yet fawned on by all alike, he sought to
strengthen his power by jobbery, with results fatal to the public services.
Such a man evades difficulties instead of grappling with them. He lives for
the day. "After me the deluge" is the motto of all Godoys.
The favourite soon perceived that the war with France pleased neither the
Court, the merchants, nor the people. Charles IV had gone to war for the
governed Spain.
The habits of the favourite were as follows. He rose early, drove or rode for
an hour, and after breakfast transacted business for a time. He then relieved
the tedium of that time by witnessing exhibitions of skill and daring by his
private matadors, after which he spent about three hours in the society of
the Queen. He then devoted the same length of time to the conduct of public
business with the King; and the day ended with dinner, fêtes, the opera, or
the consideration of requests for patronage. This function of State generally
occupied three evenings in the week; and on these occasions a crowd of
some 250 suitors filled his meanly lit ante-room with jealous expectancy
and long baffled hopes.[384]
Certainly the representatives of monarchy at this time of acute trial were
unequal to the strain. Catharine of Russia was supremely able, but no less
corrupt. Frederick William of Prussia equalled her in vice and in nothing
else. Francis of Austria had the brain of a master of ceremonies; George III
that of a model squire; Ferdinand of Naples was in his place in the kennel;
Victor Amadeus of Sardinia, in the confessional. It is difficult to say to what
place Charles IV of Spain and his consort can most fitly be assigned; for
they could not live apart from Godoy; and with Godoy they would have
been excluded from any residence but the royal palace of Spain. The policy
of that Court wavered under his whims and devices. Hated by the grandees,
loathed by honest people, and yet fawned on by all alike, he sought to
strengthen his power by jobbery, with results fatal to the public services.
Such a man evades difficulties instead of grappling with them. He lives for
the day. "After me the deluge" is the motto of all Godoys.
The favourite soon perceived that the war with France pleased neither the
Court, the merchants, nor the people. Charles IV had gone to war for the
Page 233
restoration of royalty; but, thanks to the perfidy of Prussia and the
vacillations of Austria, that ideal had vanished; and in its place there
appeared the spectres of want and bankruptcy. By the end of 1794 the
Republicans had gained a firm foothold in Catalonia and Biscay; and the
prospect of further campaigns was highly distasteful to a Court which kept
up the traditional pomp of the Spanish monarchy. Even when the Spanish
forces in Catalonia and Biscay were wellnigh starving, the Court borrowed
£160,000 to defray the expenses of the usual migration to San Ildefonso;
and the British ambassador computed that the cost of a campaign could be
saved by a sojourn in Madrid for the whole year. But parsimony such as this
was out of the question. Accordingly the only possible alternatives were,
peace with France, an issue of paper money, or a bankruptcy. Godoy
inclined strongly to peace, and discovered in Anglophobia a means of
betraying the French House of Bourbon. England, so he averred, had
entered on the war solely for her own aggrandisement, with the view of
appropriating first Dunkirk, then Toulon, and, failing them, Corsica and
Hayti, to the manifest detriment of Spain. The argument was specious; for
Pitt's resolve to cripple France by colonial conquests necessarily tended to
re-awaken the old jealousies of the Spaniards; and herein, as in other
respects, the son had to confront difficulties unknown in the days of his
father. The task of the elder Pitt was simple compared with that of
humouring and spurring on five inert and yet jealous Allies.
Among them Spain was not the least slothful and exacting. After the
quarrels between Langara and Hood at Toulon, the despatches from Madrid
to London were full of complaints. Now it was the detention of Danish
vessels carrying naval stores, ostensibly for Cadiz, but in reality, as we
asserted, for Rochefort. Now it was the seizure and condemnation of a
Spanish merchantman, the "Sant' Iago," on a somewhat similar charge.
England had equal cause for annoyance. The embers of the quarrel of 1790
were once more fanned to a flame by Spanish officials. Captain Vancouver,
vacillations of Austria, that ideal had vanished; and in its place there
appeared the spectres of want and bankruptcy. By the end of 1794 the
Republicans had gained a firm foothold in Catalonia and Biscay; and the
prospect of further campaigns was highly distasteful to a Court which kept
up the traditional pomp of the Spanish monarchy. Even when the Spanish
forces in Catalonia and Biscay were wellnigh starving, the Court borrowed
£160,000 to defray the expenses of the usual migration to San Ildefonso;
and the British ambassador computed that the cost of a campaign could be
saved by a sojourn in Madrid for the whole year. But parsimony such as this
was out of the question. Accordingly the only possible alternatives were,
peace with France, an issue of paper money, or a bankruptcy. Godoy
inclined strongly to peace, and discovered in Anglophobia a means of
betraying the French House of Bourbon. England, so he averred, had
entered on the war solely for her own aggrandisement, with the view of
appropriating first Dunkirk, then Toulon, and, failing them, Corsica and
Hayti, to the manifest detriment of Spain. The argument was specious; for
Pitt's resolve to cripple France by colonial conquests necessarily tended to
re-awaken the old jealousies of the Spaniards; and herein, as in other
respects, the son had to confront difficulties unknown in the days of his
father. The task of the elder Pitt was simple compared with that of
humouring and spurring on five inert and yet jealous Allies.
Among them Spain was not the least slothful and exacting. After the
quarrels between Langara and Hood at Toulon, the despatches from Madrid
to London were full of complaints. Now it was the detention of Danish
vessels carrying naval stores, ostensibly for Cadiz, but in reality, as we
asserted, for Rochefort. Now it was the seizure and condemnation of a
Spanish merchantman, the "Sant' Iago," on a somewhat similar charge.
England had equal cause for annoyance. The embers of the quarrel of 1790
were once more fanned to a flame by Spanish officials. Captain Vancouver,
Page 234
of H.M.S. "Discovery," while on a voyage to survey the island which now
bears his name, had his ship and crew detained and ill-treated at Monterey
Bay by the Governor of California. The Court of St. James warmly
protested against this conduct as contrary to the Nootka Sound Convention
of 1790; and thereby inflamed that still open wound. Valdez, Minister of
Marine, the only rival of Godoy, now openly avowed his hostility to
England. Early in February 1795, in a conference with the King, he hotly
denounced British designs in Corsica and Hayti. Thenceforth there was no
hope of securing the co-operation of the Spanish fleet for the blockade of
Toulon and other duties too exacting for Admiral Hotham's squadron. On
11th February Godoy handed to Jackson, our chargé d'affaires, a state paper
containing the assurance that Spain desired to continue the struggle against
France; but "if His Christian Majesty finds another road less dangerous than
that which he follows, he will take it with the dignity becoming his rank; he
will exhaust the means he may have till he shall obtain the welfare of his
people; but he will not look on their annihilation with indifference, if those
who have a similar interest vary the mode of pursuing it." In plain language
this meant that, as Prussia was then treating with France, Spain would
follow her example when she thought fit.[385]
Thereafter the Spanish Ministers either manifested sullen reserve or
indulged in petulant complaints respecting the "Sant' Iago," Corsica, and
Hayti. The conduct of the Marquis del Campo at London was equally
sinister; his despatches represented the policy and conduct of England in the
darkest colours. In the hope of softening these asperities Pitt and Grenville
decided to send the Earl of Bute to Madrid in place of Jackson, who desired
to escape from the insolences of that capital. Thus by one of the subtle
ironies of history, the son of Chatham despatched to the Court of Madrid
the son of the man who thwarted Chatham's aims respecting that same
Power. Bute's instructions (dated 5th April) bade him humour that Court,
but none the less look out for any signs of a Franco-Spanish compact, and
bears his name, had his ship and crew detained and ill-treated at Monterey
Bay by the Governor of California. The Court of St. James warmly
protested against this conduct as contrary to the Nootka Sound Convention
of 1790; and thereby inflamed that still open wound. Valdez, Minister of
Marine, the only rival of Godoy, now openly avowed his hostility to
England. Early in February 1795, in a conference with the King, he hotly
denounced British designs in Corsica and Hayti. Thenceforth there was no
hope of securing the co-operation of the Spanish fleet for the blockade of
Toulon and other duties too exacting for Admiral Hotham's squadron. On
11th February Godoy handed to Jackson, our chargé d'affaires, a state paper
containing the assurance that Spain desired to continue the struggle against
France; but "if His Christian Majesty finds another road less dangerous than
that which he follows, he will take it with the dignity becoming his rank; he
will exhaust the means he may have till he shall obtain the welfare of his
people; but he will not look on their annihilation with indifference, if those
who have a similar interest vary the mode of pursuing it." In plain language
this meant that, as Prussia was then treating with France, Spain would
follow her example when she thought fit.[385]
Thereafter the Spanish Ministers either manifested sullen reserve or
indulged in petulant complaints respecting the "Sant' Iago," Corsica, and
Hayti. The conduct of the Marquis del Campo at London was equally
sinister; his despatches represented the policy and conduct of England in the
darkest colours. In the hope of softening these asperities Pitt and Grenville
decided to send the Earl of Bute to Madrid in place of Jackson, who desired
to escape from the insolences of that capital. Thus by one of the subtle
ironies of history, the son of Chatham despatched to the Court of Madrid
the son of the man who thwarted Chatham's aims respecting that same
Power. Bute's instructions (dated 5th April) bade him humour that Court,
but none the less look out for any signs of a Franco-Spanish compact, and
Page 235
discover at what place in the Spanish colonies a blow might be dealt with
most effect.
On 13th April, after receiving news of a Spanish success in Catalonia,
Grenville urged Bute to re-awaken Castilian pride by holding out the
prospect of gains beyond the Pyrenees, and expressed the hope that Spain
might renew her treaty with England, promising also to consider her claims
to parts of the north-west of Hayti. These hopes were futile. Early in that
year France and Spain began to draw close together. The more moderate
Republicans, Sieyès, Boissy d'Anglas, and Cambacérès, let it be known that
France would offer moderate terms. Barthélemy, the able French envoy in
Switzerland, furthered these plans, which came near to fulfilment when
Prussia signed with France the Treaty of Basle (5th April 1795). Charles IV
was only waiting for some excuse to follow suit. As a relative of
Louis XVI, he scrupled to take the lead; but he was ready to follow the lead
of Prussia. The sacrifices demanded of him in March 1795 were
considerable, viz., the province of Guipuzcoa and San Domingo. But
Bourgoing, the special envoy to Madrid, offered a prize which far
counterbalanced these losses. He held out to Godoy the bait which in the
more skilful hands of Napoleon was destined to catch both him and his
credulous master. Portugal was to be theirs if they made common cause
with France. Acting together, the two Latin nations would overwhelm this
"province of England," and together they would chase the British from the
Mediterranean. That Portugal had loyally supported Spain in the monarchist
cause mattered little. In place of the costly war of principle, Godoy sought
to substitute an effort with limited liability, effective partnership, and
enormous profits. He knew not that in entering on this broad and easy path,
he assured the ruin of Spain and the ultimate loss of her colonial empire.
In this secret chaffering Pitt and Grenville were worsted as inevitably as in
the similar case of the Partition of Poland. The Power that cries "hands off"
most effect.
On 13th April, after receiving news of a Spanish success in Catalonia,
Grenville urged Bute to re-awaken Castilian pride by holding out the
prospect of gains beyond the Pyrenees, and expressed the hope that Spain
might renew her treaty with England, promising also to consider her claims
to parts of the north-west of Hayti. These hopes were futile. Early in that
year France and Spain began to draw close together. The more moderate
Republicans, Sieyès, Boissy d'Anglas, and Cambacérès, let it be known that
France would offer moderate terms. Barthélemy, the able French envoy in
Switzerland, furthered these plans, which came near to fulfilment when
Prussia signed with France the Treaty of Basle (5th April 1795). Charles IV
was only waiting for some excuse to follow suit. As a relative of
Louis XVI, he scrupled to take the lead; but he was ready to follow the lead
of Prussia. The sacrifices demanded of him in March 1795 were
considerable, viz., the province of Guipuzcoa and San Domingo. But
Bourgoing, the special envoy to Madrid, offered a prize which far
counterbalanced these losses. He held out to Godoy the bait which in the
more skilful hands of Napoleon was destined to catch both him and his
credulous master. Portugal was to be theirs if they made common cause
with France. Acting together, the two Latin nations would overwhelm this
"province of England," and together they would chase the British from the
Mediterranean. That Portugal had loyally supported Spain in the monarchist
cause mattered little. In place of the costly war of principle, Godoy sought
to substitute an effort with limited liability, effective partnership, and
enormous profits. He knew not that in entering on this broad and easy path,
he assured the ruin of Spain and the ultimate loss of her colonial empire.
In this secret chaffering Pitt and Grenville were worsted as inevitably as in
the similar case of the Partition of Poland. The Power that cries "hands off"
Page 236
to abettors of robbery needs to have overwhelming force at its back; but
both here and on the banks of the Vistula England was helpless. There was
no Court of Appeal. Christendom had vanished amidst the schemes of the
monarchs in the East, and under the stabs of regicides in the West. Thus,
while the champions of monarchy were sharing the last spoils of Poland,
France succeeded in detaching Spain from the royalist league by inciting
her to the plunder of Portugal.
Few moves have been more mean and cowardly; though the conduct of the
Court of Madrid in this matter touches far deeper depths of infamy. For its
present position was far from hopeless. With the help of the British fleet the
progress of the French troops towards Bilbao might have been stayed.
Affairs in Catalonia wore a hopeful aspect. England offered to recognize the
Spanish conquests in Hayti and to press for further indemnities from France
at the general peace. But all representations were in vain. Godoy brushed
them aside in order to compass the ruin of the House of Braganza. On this
enterprise he concentrated all his faculties. He inveighed against the
invasion of Hayti by British troops. "His Britannic Majesty," he said, "ought
to have abstained from any interference with the island of San Domingo,
upon the whole of which His Christian Majesty had a well-founded claim;
or, if any enterprize was undertaken there by Great Britain, it should have
been in the way of auxiliary to Spain in order to restore to her her ancient
possessions in the West Indies." On other occasions he moaned over the
heavy expenses of the war, the misery of the people, and the impossibility
of resisting the superior power of France. But his chief theme was Hayti,
and he finally suggested that the British acquisitions in that island should be
held in trust for Louis XVII. He was not a little ruffled by the reply that
they belonged of right to George III, who would keep them as
compensation for the expenses of the war. Another significant fact was the
removal of a fine corps of French émigrés, some 3,300 strong, from the
northern provinces to Cadiz, on their way to the West Indies.
both here and on the banks of the Vistula England was helpless. There was
no Court of Appeal. Christendom had vanished amidst the schemes of the
monarchs in the East, and under the stabs of regicides in the West. Thus,
while the champions of monarchy were sharing the last spoils of Poland,
France succeeded in detaching Spain from the royalist league by inciting
her to the plunder of Portugal.
Few moves have been more mean and cowardly; though the conduct of the
Court of Madrid in this matter touches far deeper depths of infamy. For its
present position was far from hopeless. With the help of the British fleet the
progress of the French troops towards Bilbao might have been stayed.
Affairs in Catalonia wore a hopeful aspect. England offered to recognize the
Spanish conquests in Hayti and to press for further indemnities from France
at the general peace. But all representations were in vain. Godoy brushed
them aside in order to compass the ruin of the House of Braganza. On this
enterprise he concentrated all his faculties. He inveighed against the
invasion of Hayti by British troops. "His Britannic Majesty," he said, "ought
to have abstained from any interference with the island of San Domingo,
upon the whole of which His Christian Majesty had a well-founded claim;
or, if any enterprize was undertaken there by Great Britain, it should have
been in the way of auxiliary to Spain in order to restore to her her ancient
possessions in the West Indies." On other occasions he moaned over the
heavy expenses of the war, the misery of the people, and the impossibility
of resisting the superior power of France. But his chief theme was Hayti,
and he finally suggested that the British acquisitions in that island should be
held in trust for Louis XVII. He was not a little ruffled by the reply that
they belonged of right to George III, who would keep them as
compensation for the expenses of the war. Another significant fact was the
removal of a fine corps of French émigrés, some 3,300 strong, from the
northern provinces to Cadiz, on their way to the West Indies.
Page 237
At the time of the arrival of Bute at that port (25th May), Fortune
vouchsafed a few gleams of hope to the Allies. Spanish pride having kicked
against the French demands, especially that of the province of Guipuzcoa,
Bourgoing's mission proved fruitless. The diplomatic situation also
improved. In February 1795, as we have seen, Catharine II of Russia signed
a defensive treaty with Great Britain, to which Austria acceeded on 20th
May. Thus did Pitt replace the outworn Triple Alliance with Prussia and
Holland by a more powerful confederacy. With these bright prospects in
view, and animated by the hope of rousing Western France from Quiberon,
Pitt had a right to expect some measure of fortitude even in the Court of
Madrid.[386] But Godoy remained obdurate. On 11th June, in his first
interview with Bute, he said he had no faith in Russia; the vacillations of
Austria were notorious; and Pitt was said to be about to send Eden to Paris
to sue for peace. As for Spain, she was hard pressed; French and American
emissaries had stirred up strife in her colonies; and affairs were most
"ticklish" in San Domingo. His Government had therefore sought for a
composition (not a definite peace) with France. In fact, the war as a whole
had failed, for whereas the Allies had set themselves to crush French
principles, they had succeeded merely in uniting the French people in one
common cause. On 11th July he promised to recall the Anglophobe
Governor of San Domingo; but he declared the island to be in so distracted
a state that both Spaniards and British would probably be expelled. He then
complained that somehow England always got the better of Spain; witness
Nootka Sound, Hayti, and Corsica. In spite of Bute's assurance that he came
to end these jealousies, Godoy continued to drift on the tide of events. "No
plan is prepared," wrote Bute on 11th July, "no measures are taken. The
accident of the day seems to determine everything, and happy do the
Ministers feel when the day is passed." He therefore advised that Godoy
should be bribed.
vouchsafed a few gleams of hope to the Allies. Spanish pride having kicked
against the French demands, especially that of the province of Guipuzcoa,
Bourgoing's mission proved fruitless. The diplomatic situation also
improved. In February 1795, as we have seen, Catharine II of Russia signed
a defensive treaty with Great Britain, to which Austria acceeded on 20th
May. Thus did Pitt replace the outworn Triple Alliance with Prussia and
Holland by a more powerful confederacy. With these bright prospects in
view, and animated by the hope of rousing Western France from Quiberon,
Pitt had a right to expect some measure of fortitude even in the Court of
Madrid.[386] But Godoy remained obdurate. On 11th June, in his first
interview with Bute, he said he had no faith in Russia; the vacillations of
Austria were notorious; and Pitt was said to be about to send Eden to Paris
to sue for peace. As for Spain, she was hard pressed; French and American
emissaries had stirred up strife in her colonies; and affairs were most
"ticklish" in San Domingo. His Government had therefore sought for a
composition (not a definite peace) with France. In fact, the war as a whole
had failed, for whereas the Allies had set themselves to crush French
principles, they had succeeded merely in uniting the French people in one
common cause. On 11th July he promised to recall the Anglophobe
Governor of San Domingo; but he declared the island to be in so distracted
a state that both Spaniards and British would probably be expelled. He then
complained that somehow England always got the better of Spain; witness
Nootka Sound, Hayti, and Corsica. In spite of Bute's assurance that he came
to end these jealousies, Godoy continued to drift on the tide of events. "No
plan is prepared," wrote Bute on 11th July, "no measures are taken. The
accident of the day seems to determine everything, and happy do the
Ministers feel when the day is passed." He therefore advised that Godoy
should be bribed.
Page 238
The advice came too late. Already the favourite had instructed Don
Domingo d'Yriarte, his envoy to the now extinct Polish Republic, to confer
with Barthélemy, the French Ambassador at Basle. The actions of Yriarte,
of course, depended on the secret behests of Godoy. On 2nd July Godoy
informed him that peace was the only means of thwarting the efforts of the
bad counsellors of the Crown; and four days later he wrote:
Every day makes peace more necessary. There is no hope of
restoring affairs in Navarre. Cowardice has unnerved our army and
the French will dictate their terms to us.... I fear that their claims
will be excessive, and condescension is our only resource if we are
to succeed in saving ourselves even in part. Your Lordship need not
take alarm at the rigour of the terms of peace; listen to them, accept
them, and forward them to me, saying to yourself that perhaps they
will not be so fatal as the results of a delay in the negotiation might
be.[387]
Yriarte, a nervous valetudinarian, eagerly accepted this despicable advice.
Already one of his secretaries had allowed Barthélemy to see an almost
equally base effusion from Godoy; so that the French ambassador on 21st
July informed the Committee of Public Safety that the game was in their
hands. This was the case. Yriarte, after receiving two packets from Madrid,
hastily sought a nocturnal interview with Barthélemy by the help of a dark
lantern. The French ambassador received him with some surprise,
especially on hearing that he came to sign a treaty of peace on terms not yet
known at Paris. When the Spaniard insisted on signing at once, Barthélemy
examined the conditions, and finding them highly favourable to France,
consulted his secretaries, with the result that he finally decided to conclude
the affair.
Domingo d'Yriarte, his envoy to the now extinct Polish Republic, to confer
with Barthélemy, the French Ambassador at Basle. The actions of Yriarte,
of course, depended on the secret behests of Godoy. On 2nd July Godoy
informed him that peace was the only means of thwarting the efforts of the
bad counsellors of the Crown; and four days later he wrote:
Every day makes peace more necessary. There is no hope of
restoring affairs in Navarre. Cowardice has unnerved our army and
the French will dictate their terms to us.... I fear that their claims
will be excessive, and condescension is our only resource if we are
to succeed in saving ourselves even in part. Your Lordship need not
take alarm at the rigour of the terms of peace; listen to them, accept
them, and forward them to me, saying to yourself that perhaps they
will not be so fatal as the results of a delay in the negotiation might
be.[387]
Yriarte, a nervous valetudinarian, eagerly accepted this despicable advice.
Already one of his secretaries had allowed Barthélemy to see an almost
equally base effusion from Godoy; so that the French ambassador on 21st
July informed the Committee of Public Safety that the game was in their
hands. This was the case. Yriarte, after receiving two packets from Madrid,
hastily sought a nocturnal interview with Barthélemy by the help of a dark
lantern. The French ambassador received him with some surprise,
especially on hearing that he came to sign a treaty of peace on terms not yet
known at Paris. When the Spaniard insisted on signing at once, Barthélemy
examined the conditions, and finding them highly favourable to France,
consulted his secretaries, with the result that he finally decided to conclude
the affair.
Page 239
Thus came about the Peace of Basle (22nd July 1795). Spain now waived
her former demands, the restoration of religious worship in France, and
French aid in the recovery of Gibraltar. The French, however, now agreed to
restore all the districts held by their troops in the North of Spain, while the
Court of Madrid ceded San Domingo. Spain also made peace with the
Dutch or Batavian Republic, and offered to mediate between France and
Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, and Parma.[388] Such were the chief clauses of
this astonishing compact. It dealt a deadly blow to Pitt. For at the very time
when he was building up a formidable league and rousing Brittany against
the Republic, Spain seceded from the monarchist cause, and by
surrendering San Domingo to France, doomed to failure his costly efforts in
Hayti. Further, as will appear in Chapter XI, by setting free large numbers
of the French troops at the Pyrenees, she greatly enhanced the difficulties of
the expedition of General Doyle to the coast of la Vendée. Worst of all, it
soon appeared that Godoy was bent on reviving the policy of the Family
Compact, making common cause even with the murderers of Louis XVI in
order to thwart England's expansion oversea. Bute therefore warned our
Government to prepare to strike a blow at once, before the Spanish fleet
should be ready to help the French either in Corsica or Hayti. These
precautions proved, for the present at least, to be unnecessary. The
degradation of the Court and populace of Madrid may be measured by the
joy with which the news of that inglorious peace was received. The Queen,
fearful that the failures in the war would lead to the fall of her paramour,
procured the speedy ratification of the Treaty of Basle and decorated him
with the title Prince of the Peace.
On hearing of the defection of Spain, Pitt at once took steps to guard Hayti
against a treacherous attack by detaching the greater part of the British
force then preparing to help the French Royalists of la Vendée. The general
opinion both in London and Madrid was that war must ensue. Godoy kept a
close watch upon Bute, who took a mansion in Madrid on a long lease in
her former demands, the restoration of religious worship in France, and
French aid in the recovery of Gibraltar. The French, however, now agreed to
restore all the districts held by their troops in the North of Spain, while the
Court of Madrid ceded San Domingo. Spain also made peace with the
Dutch or Batavian Republic, and offered to mediate between France and
Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, and Parma.[388] Such were the chief clauses of
this astonishing compact. It dealt a deadly blow to Pitt. For at the very time
when he was building up a formidable league and rousing Brittany against
the Republic, Spain seceded from the monarchist cause, and by
surrendering San Domingo to France, doomed to failure his costly efforts in
Hayti. Further, as will appear in Chapter XI, by setting free large numbers
of the French troops at the Pyrenees, she greatly enhanced the difficulties of
the expedition of General Doyle to the coast of la Vendée. Worst of all, it
soon appeared that Godoy was bent on reviving the policy of the Family
Compact, making common cause even with the murderers of Louis XVI in
order to thwart England's expansion oversea. Bute therefore warned our
Government to prepare to strike a blow at once, before the Spanish fleet
should be ready to help the French either in Corsica or Hayti. These
precautions proved, for the present at least, to be unnecessary. The
degradation of the Court and populace of Madrid may be measured by the
joy with which the news of that inglorious peace was received. The Queen,
fearful that the failures in the war would lead to the fall of her paramour,
procured the speedy ratification of the Treaty of Basle and decorated him
with the title Prince of the Peace.
On hearing of the defection of Spain, Pitt at once took steps to guard Hayti
against a treacherous attack by detaching the greater part of the British
force then preparing to help the French Royalists of la Vendée. The general
opinion both in London and Madrid was that war must ensue. Godoy kept a
close watch upon Bute, who took a mansion in Madrid on a long lease in
Page 240
order to lull that Court into security. It was of the highest importance to
avert or delay a rupture with Spain; for the condition of the British West
Indies was most critical. The French, having recovered Guadeloupe and St.
Lucia, despatched thence emissaries to fire the slaves in the British islands
with the hope of gaining liberty and equality. The peril became acute in
Jamaica. There about 500 negroes had escaped to the mountains, especially
in Trelawny and Charlestown Counties, and by night carried out murderous
raids against the planters and their dependents. So fiendish were the
atrocities of these Maroons, that the authorities in that island applied to the
Spaniards in Cuba for one hundred bloodhounds and twenty huntsmen in
order to track the Maroons to their fastnesses. This device proved
successful; the murderers were by degrees hunted down, and were
transported to British North America, £25,000 being voted by the Jamaica
Assembly for settling them there.
Nevertheless the use of bloodhounds, which placed Britons on a level with
the Spanish crusaders, aroused general disgust. Attempts were made in the
House of Commons by General Macleod, Sheridan, and Courtenay to
represent the Maroons as men worthily struggling for liberty. Dundas, while
pruning these sprays of rhetoric, declared that Ministers would thereafter
prohibit the use of bloodhounds. These troubles with the slaves prejudiced
Parliament against any change in their condition. In vain did Francis, in one
of the last speeches of an acrid but not discreditable career, press for the
amelioration of their lot. At the outset he showed the bitterness of his
enmity to Pitt by charging him with the betrayal of the cause which, in his
oration of 2nd April 1792, he had irradiated with the beatific vision of a
regenerated and blissful Africa. Why, he asked, did not the Minister resign
office after his failure to realize his heart's desire? He then charged him
with insincerity on the whole question, and urged the House to be content
with alleviating the condition of the slaves by giving them the rudiments of
education and some rights of property, above all by securing the sanctity of
avert or delay a rupture with Spain; for the condition of the British West
Indies was most critical. The French, having recovered Guadeloupe and St.
Lucia, despatched thence emissaries to fire the slaves in the British islands
with the hope of gaining liberty and equality. The peril became acute in
Jamaica. There about 500 negroes had escaped to the mountains, especially
in Trelawny and Charlestown Counties, and by night carried out murderous
raids against the planters and their dependents. So fiendish were the
atrocities of these Maroons, that the authorities in that island applied to the
Spaniards in Cuba for one hundred bloodhounds and twenty huntsmen in
order to track the Maroons to their fastnesses. This device proved
successful; the murderers were by degrees hunted down, and were
transported to British North America, £25,000 being voted by the Jamaica
Assembly for settling them there.
Nevertheless the use of bloodhounds, which placed Britons on a level with
the Spanish crusaders, aroused general disgust. Attempts were made in the
House of Commons by General Macleod, Sheridan, and Courtenay to
represent the Maroons as men worthily struggling for liberty. Dundas, while
pruning these sprays of rhetoric, declared that Ministers would thereafter
prohibit the use of bloodhounds. These troubles with the slaves prejudiced
Parliament against any change in their condition. In vain did Francis, in one
of the last speeches of an acrid but not discreditable career, press for the
amelioration of their lot. At the outset he showed the bitterness of his
enmity to Pitt by charging him with the betrayal of the cause which, in his
oration of 2nd April 1792, he had irradiated with the beatific vision of a
regenerated and blissful Africa. Why, he asked, did not the Minister resign
office after his failure to realize his heart's desire? He then charged him
with insincerity on the whole question, and urged the House to be content
with alleviating the condition of the slaves by giving them the rudiments of
education and some rights of property, above all by securing the sanctity of
Page 241
their marriages. Fox followed with a speech aimed more against Pitt than
the slave-owners. The Prime Minister then replied. Ignoring the charges of
his opponents, he pointed out that the proposed improvements were utterly
inadequate to remedy the ills of the negroes so long as Parliament allowed
shiploads of these unhappy creatures to be cast into the West Indies every
year. What was needed, he said, was the abolition of that hateful traffic,
indeed of the whole system of slavery. For himself, he still hoped that
Parliament would adopt those measures, which alone could be effective.
Wilberforce was absent through illness. Francis, having elicited in the main
mere personalities, not declarations of principle, withdrew his motion.
The lapse of the question of Abolition in the years 1795–6 was a public
misfortune; for the slaves, despairing of justice from England, turned to
France. For the good of the cause they murdered men, women, or children,
with equal indifference; and, when hunted down, died with the cry Vive la
République. Here was our chief difficulty in the West Indies. Owing to the
refusal of Parliament to limit the supply of slaves or to alleviate their
condition, we had to deal with myriads of blacks, exasperated by their
former hardships, hoping everything from France, and able to support
climatic changes which dealt havoc to the raw English levies. In truth, the
success of the West India expeditions depended on other factors besides
military and medical skill. It turned on political and humanitarian motives
that were scouted at Westminster. The French Jacobins stole many a march
on the English governing classes; and in declaring the negro to be an equal
of the white man they nearly wrecked Britain's possessions in the West
Indies.
For a great negro leader had now appeared. Toussaint l'Ouverture, though
probably not of pure negro blood, was born at Breda in the north of Hayti in
1746. His mental gifts were formidable; and when sharpened by education
and by long contact with whites, they enabled him to play upon the
the slave-owners. The Prime Minister then replied. Ignoring the charges of
his opponents, he pointed out that the proposed improvements were utterly
inadequate to remedy the ills of the negroes so long as Parliament allowed
shiploads of these unhappy creatures to be cast into the West Indies every
year. What was needed, he said, was the abolition of that hateful traffic,
indeed of the whole system of slavery. For himself, he still hoped that
Parliament would adopt those measures, which alone could be effective.
Wilberforce was absent through illness. Francis, having elicited in the main
mere personalities, not declarations of principle, withdrew his motion.
The lapse of the question of Abolition in the years 1795–6 was a public
misfortune; for the slaves, despairing of justice from England, turned to
France. For the good of the cause they murdered men, women, or children,
with equal indifference; and, when hunted down, died with the cry Vive la
République. Here was our chief difficulty in the West Indies. Owing to the
refusal of Parliament to limit the supply of slaves or to alleviate their
condition, we had to deal with myriads of blacks, exasperated by their
former hardships, hoping everything from France, and able to support
climatic changes which dealt havoc to the raw English levies. In truth, the
success of the West India expeditions depended on other factors besides
military and medical skill. It turned on political and humanitarian motives
that were scouted at Westminster. The French Jacobins stole many a march
on the English governing classes; and in declaring the negro to be an equal
of the white man they nearly wrecked Britain's possessions in the West
Indies.
For a great negro leader had now appeared. Toussaint l'Ouverture, though
probably not of pure negro blood, was born at Breda in the north of Hayti in
1746. His mental gifts were formidable; and when sharpened by education
and by long contact with whites, they enabled him to play upon the
Page 242
elemental passions of his kindred, to organize them, to lead them to the
fight, to cure their wounds, and to overawe their discontent. A barbarian in
his outbursts of passion, and a European in organizing power, he became a
zealot in the Republican cause. A quarrel with another masterful negro, Jean
François, forced him for a time to retire into the Spanish part of San
Domingo; but he soon returned, and proved to be our most formidable
enemy.
The position in Hayti at the close of 1795 was somewhat as follows. The
Republicans and their coloured allies, often helped by the Spaniards, held or
ravaged the greater part of the territory which the French Royalists had
invited us to possess. Their hopeful forecasts had led Pitt and Dundas to
send far too few troops for what proved to be an increasingly difficult
enterprise; and at this time British authority extended scarcely beyond the
reach of the garrisons. The French Royalists had not given the help which
Malouet and Charmilly had led our Ministers to expect.[389] And on the
other hand, Victor Hugues, the Republican leader, managed to spread revolt
in St. Vincent, Grenada, and Dominica. In this critical state of things, the
Cabinet decided to accord to Major-General Williamson, Governor of
Hayti, a long furlough, and to place in supreme command a man of great
resourcefulness and power of character.
Sir Ralph Abercromby was at this time sixty-one years of age; but in zeal
and ardour he excelled nearly all the junior officers. His toughness and
energy had invested with dignity even the disastrous retreat from Holland
early in the year. He was not a great commander; for he lacked both
soundness and firmness of judgement, and he had no grasp of the principles
of strategy; but he restored the discipline and prestige of the British army;
and in him Moore and Wellesley hailed the dawn of a brighter era. "The
best man and the best soldier who has appeared amongst us this war," was
Moore's comment after Abercromby's glorious death near Alexandria.[390]
fight, to cure their wounds, and to overawe their discontent. A barbarian in
his outbursts of passion, and a European in organizing power, he became a
zealot in the Republican cause. A quarrel with another masterful negro, Jean
François, forced him for a time to retire into the Spanish part of San
Domingo; but he soon returned, and proved to be our most formidable
enemy.
The position in Hayti at the close of 1795 was somewhat as follows. The
Republicans and their coloured allies, often helped by the Spaniards, held or
ravaged the greater part of the territory which the French Royalists had
invited us to possess. Their hopeful forecasts had led Pitt and Dundas to
send far too few troops for what proved to be an increasingly difficult
enterprise; and at this time British authority extended scarcely beyond the
reach of the garrisons. The French Royalists had not given the help which
Malouet and Charmilly had led our Ministers to expect.[389] And on the
other hand, Victor Hugues, the Republican leader, managed to spread revolt
in St. Vincent, Grenada, and Dominica. In this critical state of things, the
Cabinet decided to accord to Major-General Williamson, Governor of
Hayti, a long furlough, and to place in supreme command a man of great
resourcefulness and power of character.
Sir Ralph Abercromby was at this time sixty-one years of age; but in zeal
and ardour he excelled nearly all the junior officers. His toughness and
energy had invested with dignity even the disastrous retreat from Holland
early in the year. He was not a great commander; for he lacked both
soundness and firmness of judgement, and he had no grasp of the principles
of strategy; but he restored the discipline and prestige of the British army;
and in him Moore and Wellesley hailed the dawn of a brighter era. "The
best man and the best soldier who has appeared amongst us this war," was
Moore's comment after Abercromby's glorious death near Alexandria.[390]
Page 243
Pitt has often been charged with lack of judgement in selecting
commanders. Let it be remembered, then, that he sent Abercromby to the
post of difficulty and danger.
Unfortunately, delays multiplied at Spithead. Though the Cabinet withdrew
the marrow of the Vendean expedition, yet not enough troops were available
to complete Abercromby's muster; and when the men were ready, the
ordnance and transports were not at hand. What Department and what
officials were answerable for this scandalous state of things it is hard to say.
Buckingham, who had several correspondents at Portsmouth, suspected
Abercromby of shiftlessness. However that may be, the autumn wore away
amidst recriminations and growing discontent. When the fleet at last put to
sea, it encountered a terrible storm off Portland; several transports were
dashed to pieces on that point; while others in the van were flung back on to
the Chesil Beach or the shore near Bridport (18th November). The horrors
of the scene were heightened by the brutality of the coast population, which
rushed on the spoil in utter disregard of the wretches struggling in the
waves. The rest of the convoy put back to Spithead; and not till the spring
of 1796 did Abercromby reach Jamaica. Dundas had instructed him first to
recover St. Lucia and Guadeloupe, whence Victor Hugues had flung forth
the brands of revolt. Ultimately the flames shrivelled up the colonies of
France; but, for the present, they were more formidable than her fleets and
armies. It was therefore sound policy to strike at those two islands. In a
"secret" despatch of 4th November, Dundas also warned Major-General
Forbes closely to watch the Spaniards in San Domingo, and, though not
attacking their posts, yet to support the French Royalists with arms and
money in case they desired to do so.
Among those who sailed from Portsmouth early in 1796 was Colonel
(afterwards Sir John) Moore.[391] He found the West India service most
unpopular. Yet the energy of Abercromby and Moore brought about the
commanders. Let it be remembered, then, that he sent Abercromby to the
post of difficulty and danger.
Unfortunately, delays multiplied at Spithead. Though the Cabinet withdrew
the marrow of the Vendean expedition, yet not enough troops were available
to complete Abercromby's muster; and when the men were ready, the
ordnance and transports were not at hand. What Department and what
officials were answerable for this scandalous state of things it is hard to say.
Buckingham, who had several correspondents at Portsmouth, suspected
Abercromby of shiftlessness. However that may be, the autumn wore away
amidst recriminations and growing discontent. When the fleet at last put to
sea, it encountered a terrible storm off Portland; several transports were
dashed to pieces on that point; while others in the van were flung back on to
the Chesil Beach or the shore near Bridport (18th November). The horrors
of the scene were heightened by the brutality of the coast population, which
rushed on the spoil in utter disregard of the wretches struggling in the
waves. The rest of the convoy put back to Spithead; and not till the spring
of 1796 did Abercromby reach Jamaica. Dundas had instructed him first to
recover St. Lucia and Guadeloupe, whence Victor Hugues had flung forth
the brands of revolt. Ultimately the flames shrivelled up the colonies of
France; but, for the present, they were more formidable than her fleets and
armies. It was therefore sound policy to strike at those two islands. In a
"secret" despatch of 4th November, Dundas also warned Major-General
Forbes closely to watch the Spaniards in San Domingo, and, though not
attacking their posts, yet to support the French Royalists with arms and
money in case they desired to do so.
Among those who sailed from Portsmouth early in 1796 was Colonel
(afterwards Sir John) Moore.[391] He found the West India service most
unpopular. Yet the energy of Abercromby and Moore brought about the
Page 244
surrender of that almost impregnable fortress, Morne Fortunée, in St. Lucia.
Moore was left as governor of the island, but with a garrison insufficient to
complete the subjection of the fanatical blacks. General Whyte found the
conquest of the Dutch settlement of Demerara a far easier task than its
retention. Abercromby then relieved St. Vincent and strengthened the
defences of Grenada, that island having been recaptured by General Nicols.
Abercromby and his comrades thus saved those possessions from the most
imminent danger. His services were almost as great in the quarters as on the
field. He adapted the cumbrous uniform to the needs of the tropics, and, by
abolishing parades and drills in the noontide heats, and improving the
sanitary conditions of the camps, sought to stay the ravages of disease, of
which the carelessness or stupidity of officials had been the most potent
ally. On 21st April 1796 Sheridan moved for a return of the troops who had
succumbed to disease in the West Indies. He asserted that several of them,
on landing, were without shoes and stockings, that hospitals crowded with
sick were without medicines or bandages, and that in one case a hundred
patients had to spend the night on the bare beach. Dundas's reply was
virtually an admission of the truth of these charges.
The declaration of war by Spain in the autumn of 1796 brought about a new
situation. The Republicans and their black allies regularly took refuge and
found their supplies in the central parts of San Domingo now ceded to
France; but when the British sought to follow and attack them there, they
were assured that it was neutral territory. The British Government warmly
protested against this duplicity. Either the island was Spanish, or it was
French. If the former, then Toussaint and his men had no right to retreat
thither. If the latter, the British could attack them. In point of fact, plans for
the transfer of San Domingo to France were at that time dragging slowly
along at Madrid: and when the French General, Rom, failed to bend that
Court to his terms, he departed for the island under the convoy of a Spanish
squadron. This incident was typical of the recent policy of Madrid. In every
Moore was left as governor of the island, but with a garrison insufficient to
complete the subjection of the fanatical blacks. General Whyte found the
conquest of the Dutch settlement of Demerara a far easier task than its
retention. Abercromby then relieved St. Vincent and strengthened the
defences of Grenada, that island having been recaptured by General Nicols.
Abercromby and his comrades thus saved those possessions from the most
imminent danger. His services were almost as great in the quarters as on the
field. He adapted the cumbrous uniform to the needs of the tropics, and, by
abolishing parades and drills in the noontide heats, and improving the
sanitary conditions of the camps, sought to stay the ravages of disease, of
which the carelessness or stupidity of officials had been the most potent
ally. On 21st April 1796 Sheridan moved for a return of the troops who had
succumbed to disease in the West Indies. He asserted that several of them,
on landing, were without shoes and stockings, that hospitals crowded with
sick were without medicines or bandages, and that in one case a hundred
patients had to spend the night on the bare beach. Dundas's reply was
virtually an admission of the truth of these charges.
The declaration of war by Spain in the autumn of 1796 brought about a new
situation. The Republicans and their black allies regularly took refuge and
found their supplies in the central parts of San Domingo now ceded to
France; but when the British sought to follow and attack them there, they
were assured that it was neutral territory. The British Government warmly
protested against this duplicity. Either the island was Spanish, or it was
French. If the former, then Toussaint and his men had no right to retreat
thither. If the latter, the British could attack them. In point of fact, plans for
the transfer of San Domingo to France were at that time dragging slowly
along at Madrid: and when the French General, Rom, failed to bend that
Court to his terms, he departed for the island under the convoy of a Spanish
squadron. This incident was typical of the recent policy of Madrid. In every
Page 245
possible way it favoured France. Early in 1796 seven French warships
underwent extensive repairs in the royal dockyard at Cadiz. Merry,
secretary of legation at Madrid, further reported numerous seizures of
British merchantmen by French privateers which brought them into Spanish
harbours. Twelve ships were thus brought into Alicante in the winter of
1795–6; and English merchants could get no redress for these seizures.
French privateers also fitted out at Trinidad to act against Grenada and
Tobago.[392]
Provocations were not all on one side. Early in 1796, three Spanish West
Indiamen were overhauled by two English frigates and taken to Bermuda,
in the belief that war had broken out. They were, however, at once released.
Godoy protested angrily against this indignity, and early in March hinted
that Spain's neutrality would cease on the establishment of a French
Government. Two months later Bute found that Spain was seeking to form a
Quadruple Alliance, namely, with France, Denmark, and Sweden, a scheme
which Ehrenthal, the Swedish envoy, warmly furthered. The news of
Bonaparte's victories in Italy and of the financial troubles in England
evidently puffed up Godoy with the hope of playing the part of an Alberoni
for the humiliation of England; and in 1796 Spain had better prospects of
worsting the islanders than in 1718 when they had the alliance of France,
Austria, and Holland. In truth, no period was more favourable for a revival
of the Latin races than the years 1796–7, when England was in dire straits,
when Austria succumbed under the blows of Bonaparte, and the Dutch,
Danes, and Swedes opposed the British Power. With singleness of purpose
and honesty in their administrations, France, Spain, and their Allies should
have wrecked the lifework of the two Pitts.
The British Ministers felt the gravity of the situation. In view of the
collapse of the Austrian Power in Lombardy, Pitt wrote to Grenville on 28th
June in unusually despondent terms, that it was hopeless to expect Austria
underwent extensive repairs in the royal dockyard at Cadiz. Merry,
secretary of legation at Madrid, further reported numerous seizures of
British merchantmen by French privateers which brought them into Spanish
harbours. Twelve ships were thus brought into Alicante in the winter of
1795–6; and English merchants could get no redress for these seizures.
French privateers also fitted out at Trinidad to act against Grenada and
Tobago.[392]
Provocations were not all on one side. Early in 1796, three Spanish West
Indiamen were overhauled by two English frigates and taken to Bermuda,
in the belief that war had broken out. They were, however, at once released.
Godoy protested angrily against this indignity, and early in March hinted
that Spain's neutrality would cease on the establishment of a French
Government. Two months later Bute found that Spain was seeking to form a
Quadruple Alliance, namely, with France, Denmark, and Sweden, a scheme
which Ehrenthal, the Swedish envoy, warmly furthered. The news of
Bonaparte's victories in Italy and of the financial troubles in England
evidently puffed up Godoy with the hope of playing the part of an Alberoni
for the humiliation of England; and in 1796 Spain had better prospects of
worsting the islanders than in 1718 when they had the alliance of France,
Austria, and Holland. In truth, no period was more favourable for a revival
of the Latin races than the years 1796–7, when England was in dire straits,
when Austria succumbed under the blows of Bonaparte, and the Dutch,
Danes, and Swedes opposed the British Power. With singleness of purpose
and honesty in their administrations, France, Spain, and their Allies should
have wrecked the lifework of the two Pitts.
The British Ministers felt the gravity of the situation. In view of the
collapse of the Austrian Power in Lombardy, Pitt wrote to Grenville on 28th
June in unusually despondent terms, that it was hopeless to expect Austria
Page 246
to prolong the war after the present campaign. We should be left alone to
confront France and Holland, "probably joined by Spain, and perhaps
favoured more or less openly by the Northern Powers."[393] Accordingly we
must see to our home defences, and also consider the possibility of a
general peace. Grenville therefore urged Bute to seek by all methods
compatible with his dignity "to preserve the good understanding of the two
countries." In fact, Pitt and his colleagues now decided to bring about a
general pacification; and, as will appear later, they held to that resolve, in
spite of the strong opposition of George III. But, on 5th August, while they
were discussing details, Bonaparte won a crushing victory over Wurmser at
Castiglione, and, eleven days later, Godoy definitely sided with France. Pitt
feared that the hostile league would include Denmark and Sweden; and, but
for his foresight in gaining over Catharine, this would have been the issue
of events. Even so, Godoy hoped to form a Quadruple Alliance with France,
Holland, and Prussia. He therefore took a high tone with Bute, declaring
that England would not be allowed to attack San Domingo, as it was still
Spanish, and there was a necessary connection between France and Spain;
but he would not hear of Bute accepting that statement as a declaration of
war.
Clearly, Spain was trying to gain time; for reports from Cadiz showed her
fleet to be far from ready, several of the ships being leaky. The repairs to the
French ships at that dockyard also went on in the most leisurely manner.
But on 4th August all was ready. Admiral Mann with a small blockading
force having been called by Jervis into the Mediterranean, the French ships
set sail, escorted by twenty Spanish sail-of-the-line. The French squadron
made for the Bank of Newfoundland and inflicted great damage. Why it did
not proceed along with the Spaniards to the West Indies is hard to say. The
impact of twenty-seven sail-of-the-line in that quarter would have been
decisive; but probably Godoy did not yet feel warranted in throwing down
the gauntlet. Pitt and Grenville decided to overlook the gross breach of
confront France and Holland, "probably joined by Spain, and perhaps
favoured more or less openly by the Northern Powers."[393] Accordingly we
must see to our home defences, and also consider the possibility of a
general peace. Grenville therefore urged Bute to seek by all methods
compatible with his dignity "to preserve the good understanding of the two
countries." In fact, Pitt and his colleagues now decided to bring about a
general pacification; and, as will appear later, they held to that resolve, in
spite of the strong opposition of George III. But, on 5th August, while they
were discussing details, Bonaparte won a crushing victory over Wurmser at
Castiglione, and, eleven days later, Godoy definitely sided with France. Pitt
feared that the hostile league would include Denmark and Sweden; and, but
for his foresight in gaining over Catharine, this would have been the issue
of events. Even so, Godoy hoped to form a Quadruple Alliance with France,
Holland, and Prussia. He therefore took a high tone with Bute, declaring
that England would not be allowed to attack San Domingo, as it was still
Spanish, and there was a necessary connection between France and Spain;
but he would not hear of Bute accepting that statement as a declaration of
war.
Clearly, Spain was trying to gain time; for reports from Cadiz showed her
fleet to be far from ready, several of the ships being leaky. The repairs to the
French ships at that dockyard also went on in the most leisurely manner.
But on 4th August all was ready. Admiral Mann with a small blockading
force having been called by Jervis into the Mediterranean, the French ships
set sail, escorted by twenty Spanish sail-of-the-line. The French squadron
made for the Bank of Newfoundland and inflicted great damage. Why it did
not proceed along with the Spaniards to the West Indies is hard to say. The
impact of twenty-seven sail-of-the-line in that quarter would have been
decisive; but probably Godoy did not yet feel warranted in throwing down
the gauntlet. Pitt and Grenville decided to overlook the gross breach of
Page 247
neutrality at Cadiz, and even now hoped for a change in Godoy's mood. On
26th August Grenville informed Bute that, though England had good cause
for declaring war, she would await the result of the recent proposals to
Spain. On or about that date Las Casas, the Spanish ambassador, pettishly
left London on a flimsy pretext; and two days later Dundas warned the
commander-in-chief in Hayti of the imminence of war. Nevertheless, while
taking every precaution, he was not to attack the Spaniards until definite
news of a rupture arrived. Further, on the 31st (as will appear in the
following chapter) Portland despatched orders to Sir Gilbert Elliot, Viceroy
of Corsica, to prepare for the immediate evacuation of that island.
It is therefore clear that Pitt and his colleagues used all possible means to
avert war with Spain. Bute, acting on orders from London, carried
complaisance to lengths derogatory, as he thought, to the honour of Great
Britain, and Godoy humoured him to the top of his bent. Thus, on 10th
September, in the course of a singular interview, Godoy assured him that,
even if war broke forth, it would be brief. If (he continued) England had not
annoyed Spain by her naval and colonial policy, the latter might have
arranged to find some indemnity, either at the expense of Holland, or else
"something on the coast of California. You English have a passion for
California, and the trade is in the most flourishing state." Half amused by
these dilatory tactics, Bute sought to find out the real state of the case; and
he discovered that the Franco-Spanish compact aimed at the joint conquest
of Portugal as well as of Naples, Sicily, and Gibraltar, while England was to
be compelled to surrender Honduras and Hayti. On the 5th of October he
received from Godoy the Spanish declaration of war. It laid stress on the
disputes at Toulon, England's seizure of Corsica, Hayti, and Dutch
Demerara, besides the founding of British mercantile posts on the River
Missouri, which evidently aimed at securing the routes to the Pacific.[394]
Of these schemes, the conquest of Portugal lay the nearest to the heart of
Godoy.
26th August Grenville informed Bute that, though England had good cause
for declaring war, she would await the result of the recent proposals to
Spain. On or about that date Las Casas, the Spanish ambassador, pettishly
left London on a flimsy pretext; and two days later Dundas warned the
commander-in-chief in Hayti of the imminence of war. Nevertheless, while
taking every precaution, he was not to attack the Spaniards until definite
news of a rupture arrived. Further, on the 31st (as will appear in the
following chapter) Portland despatched orders to Sir Gilbert Elliot, Viceroy
of Corsica, to prepare for the immediate evacuation of that island.
It is therefore clear that Pitt and his colleagues used all possible means to
avert war with Spain. Bute, acting on orders from London, carried
complaisance to lengths derogatory, as he thought, to the honour of Great
Britain, and Godoy humoured him to the top of his bent. Thus, on 10th
September, in the course of a singular interview, Godoy assured him that,
even if war broke forth, it would be brief. If (he continued) England had not
annoyed Spain by her naval and colonial policy, the latter might have
arranged to find some indemnity, either at the expense of Holland, or else
"something on the coast of California. You English have a passion for
California, and the trade is in the most flourishing state." Half amused by
these dilatory tactics, Bute sought to find out the real state of the case; and
he discovered that the Franco-Spanish compact aimed at the joint conquest
of Portugal as well as of Naples, Sicily, and Gibraltar, while England was to
be compelled to surrender Honduras and Hayti. On the 5th of October he
received from Godoy the Spanish declaration of war. It laid stress on the
disputes at Toulon, England's seizure of Corsica, Hayti, and Dutch
Demerara, besides the founding of British mercantile posts on the River
Missouri, which evidently aimed at securing the routes to the Pacific.[394]
Of these schemes, the conquest of Portugal lay the nearest to the heart of
Godoy.
Page 248
The rupture with Spain is an event of prime importance. Because her fleet
was disastrously beaten by Jervis off Cape St. Vincent in February 1797, it
has too often been assumed that she counted for little in the war. An
examination of the British Records reveals the error of that assumption. The
evacuation of Corsica and of the Mediterranean by the British forces
resulted solely from the Spanish offensive. Though weak in herself, Spain
held so strong a position in Europe and the West Indies as to endanger
British enterprises at many points, besides threatening the coasts of Ireland.
In truth, but for Spanish support in the Mediterranean, Bonaparte could
never have ventured upon his Eastern expedition. Thus the defection of the
Court of Madrid changed the character of the war. Thenceforth it revolved
more and more around colonial questions, to the weakening of the royalist
and republican motives which had worked so potently in its early stages.
The oriental adventure of the young Corsican was to emphasize the contrast
between the years 1793 and 1798; but the scene-shifting began with the
intrigues of Godoy. In a sense Pitt himself helped on the transformation. He
did not regard the struggle against France as one of political principle. He
aimed solely at curbing the aggression of the Jacobins upon Holland; and
the obvious device of weakening France by expeditions to the West Indies
further helped to bring events back into the arena of eighteenth-century
strife. Now that Spain, the protagonist of the French Bourbons, deserted
their cause and attacked the Power in which they most trusted, all pretence
of a war of principle vanished. The importance of the change was not
perceived at the time, though signs of it were not wanting. Both in France
and England democratic enthusiasm speedily died down, and the discontent,
which now and again flared forth in both lands, was but a feeble sputter
compared with the devouring flame of 1789.
In the West Indies the effects of the rupture with Spain were speedily felt.
On 9th September 1796 Dundas instructed Forbes, commander-in-chief in
Hayti, to help the Spanish settlers if they resisted the transfer of their part of
was disastrously beaten by Jervis off Cape St. Vincent in February 1797, it
has too often been assumed that she counted for little in the war. An
examination of the British Records reveals the error of that assumption. The
evacuation of Corsica and of the Mediterranean by the British forces
resulted solely from the Spanish offensive. Though weak in herself, Spain
held so strong a position in Europe and the West Indies as to endanger
British enterprises at many points, besides threatening the coasts of Ireland.
In truth, but for Spanish support in the Mediterranean, Bonaparte could
never have ventured upon his Eastern expedition. Thus the defection of the
Court of Madrid changed the character of the war. Thenceforth it revolved
more and more around colonial questions, to the weakening of the royalist
and republican motives which had worked so potently in its early stages.
The oriental adventure of the young Corsican was to emphasize the contrast
between the years 1793 and 1798; but the scene-shifting began with the
intrigues of Godoy. In a sense Pitt himself helped on the transformation. He
did not regard the struggle against France as one of political principle. He
aimed solely at curbing the aggression of the Jacobins upon Holland; and
the obvious device of weakening France by expeditions to the West Indies
further helped to bring events back into the arena of eighteenth-century
strife. Now that Spain, the protagonist of the French Bourbons, deserted
their cause and attacked the Power in which they most trusted, all pretence
of a war of principle vanished. The importance of the change was not
perceived at the time, though signs of it were not wanting. Both in France
and England democratic enthusiasm speedily died down, and the discontent,
which now and again flared forth in both lands, was but a feeble sputter
compared with the devouring flame of 1789.
In the West Indies the effects of the rupture with Spain were speedily felt.
On 9th September 1796 Dundas instructed Forbes, commander-in-chief in
Hayti, to help the Spanish settlers if they resisted the transfer of their part of
Page 249
the island to France. He also enjoined the utmost possible economy in
public expenditure, and urged that the French settlers should have a large
share in the conduct of local affairs. This zeal on behalf of local self-
government was markedly opportunist. It arose from a suggestion of
Colonel Wigglesworth, Commissary-General in Hayti, that the expenses of
that colony would not lessen until there was a regular Government. In the
midst of the financial strain at home Pitt and his colleagues desired that the
French settlers should bear their share of the expense of maintaining bands
of native auxiliaries. By one of the unaccountable impulses that sway the
negro mind, a considerable force was now available; but it could not be
utilized owing to the rigid economy enjoined by the Home Government. As
the financial outlook darkened, Portland and Dundas sent urgent warnings
to the new Governor of Hayti, Major-General Simcoe, bidding him
concentrate the whole of the British force at Cape Nicholas Mole, the
probable objective of the French and Spaniards. The military administration
must be withdrawn to that fortress, the British cavalry being sent home.
Further, as Great Britain could in no case bear a larger financial burden than
£300,000 a year for Hayti, expenses were to be reduced on all sides, the
residue falling to the share of the colonists. A larger naval force would,
however, be sent; and Simcoe was advised to seize the island of Tortuga and
to alarm the Spaniards by feints against Havannah.
This was the beginning of the end at Hayti. Ministers, in despair of
pacifying that racial cauldron, now looked on the Spanish colonies as an
easier prize. Dundas therefore ordered Abercromby to capture Porto Rico or
Trinidad; and he even dallied with a fantastic scheme for shipping the
Haytian colonists to Porto Rico. Abercromby, however, who again set sail
from Portsmouth in November 1796, decided to make for Trinidad, and by
a brilliant stroke captured its capital, Port of Spain. The attack on San Juan,
in Porto Rico, met with unexpected difficulties, and ended in failure
(February and April 1797). Matters now became desperate in Hayti. The
public expenditure, and urged that the French settlers should have a large
share in the conduct of local affairs. This zeal on behalf of local self-
government was markedly opportunist. It arose from a suggestion of
Colonel Wigglesworth, Commissary-General in Hayti, that the expenses of
that colony would not lessen until there was a regular Government. In the
midst of the financial strain at home Pitt and his colleagues desired that the
French settlers should bear their share of the expense of maintaining bands
of native auxiliaries. By one of the unaccountable impulses that sway the
negro mind, a considerable force was now available; but it could not be
utilized owing to the rigid economy enjoined by the Home Government. As
the financial outlook darkened, Portland and Dundas sent urgent warnings
to the new Governor of Hayti, Major-General Simcoe, bidding him
concentrate the whole of the British force at Cape Nicholas Mole, the
probable objective of the French and Spaniards. The military administration
must be withdrawn to that fortress, the British cavalry being sent home.
Further, as Great Britain could in no case bear a larger financial burden than
£300,000 a year for Hayti, expenses were to be reduced on all sides, the
residue falling to the share of the colonists. A larger naval force would,
however, be sent; and Simcoe was advised to seize the island of Tortuga and
to alarm the Spaniards by feints against Havannah.
This was the beginning of the end at Hayti. Ministers, in despair of
pacifying that racial cauldron, now looked on the Spanish colonies as an
easier prize. Dundas therefore ordered Abercromby to capture Porto Rico or
Trinidad; and he even dallied with a fantastic scheme for shipping the
Haytian colonists to Porto Rico. Abercromby, however, who again set sail
from Portsmouth in November 1796, decided to make for Trinidad, and by
a brilliant stroke captured its capital, Port of Spain. The attack on San Juan,
in Porto Rico, met with unexpected difficulties, and ended in failure
(February and April 1797). Matters now became desperate in Hayti. The
Page 250
rebels captured several posts near Port-au-Prince, largely owing to
dissensions among the defenders. Simcoe, despite a serious illness on his
way out, worked miracles with his skeleton regiments, but both he and his
subordinates failed to cut down expenses as the Cabinet demanded.
Accordingly, on 9th June 1797, Portland and Dundas reminded him that no
further reinforcements could be sent out, and added this ominous sentence:
"It is but too obvious that ... the immense sacrifices this country has made
for the protection of the French part of San Domingo have too frequently
been diverted from purposes of public utility to answer the worst ends of
private peculation and inordinate cupidity."
In a recent debate in the House of Commons St. John assessed the expenses
of Hayti for January 1797 at £700,000; and stated that, for the discharge of
judicial duties, a Frenchman was receiving £2,500 a year, which he was
now squandering in London. Pitt remained silent. Dundas did not deny
these allegations, but begged members to recollect the great difficulties of
our officials in Hayti.[395] This was undeniable. It is the curse of a policy of
retirement that waverers haste to leave betimes with all the spoils
obtainable. The signs of abandonment of Hayti caused a stampede,
demoralizing to all concerned. On 1st January 1798, Portland and Dundas
penned the order for the evacuation of Hayti, owing to the impossibility of
making good the loss of troops or of recruiting in the island. After dwelling
on the impossibility of reducing the expenditure to the requisite amount,
Ministers explained that they had deferred the evacuation of Hayti "as long
as the negotiation which His Majesty had opened with the enemy at Lille,
and the disposition of a majority in the two Councils of Legislature in
France, left a hope that some immediate arrangement might be made with
that country, which in its consequences might operate to relieve England
from the intolerable burdens by which the British part of St. Domingo is
retained, and to a certain degree to ensure to its inhabitants a continuance of
security and protection.... The rupture of the negotiation and the avowed
dissensions among the defenders. Simcoe, despite a serious illness on his
way out, worked miracles with his skeleton regiments, but both he and his
subordinates failed to cut down expenses as the Cabinet demanded.
Accordingly, on 9th June 1797, Portland and Dundas reminded him that no
further reinforcements could be sent out, and added this ominous sentence:
"It is but too obvious that ... the immense sacrifices this country has made
for the protection of the French part of San Domingo have too frequently
been diverted from purposes of public utility to answer the worst ends of
private peculation and inordinate cupidity."
In a recent debate in the House of Commons St. John assessed the expenses
of Hayti for January 1797 at £700,000; and stated that, for the discharge of
judicial duties, a Frenchman was receiving £2,500 a year, which he was
now squandering in London. Pitt remained silent. Dundas did not deny
these allegations, but begged members to recollect the great difficulties of
our officials in Hayti.[395] This was undeniable. It is the curse of a policy of
retirement that waverers haste to leave betimes with all the spoils
obtainable. The signs of abandonment of Hayti caused a stampede,
demoralizing to all concerned. On 1st January 1798, Portland and Dundas
penned the order for the evacuation of Hayti, owing to the impossibility of
making good the loss of troops or of recruiting in the island. After dwelling
on the impossibility of reducing the expenditure to the requisite amount,
Ministers explained that they had deferred the evacuation of Hayti "as long
as the negotiation which His Majesty had opened with the enemy at Lille,
and the disposition of a majority in the two Councils of Legislature in
France, left a hope that some immediate arrangement might be made with
that country, which in its consequences might operate to relieve England
from the intolerable burdens by which the British part of St. Domingo is
retained, and to a certain degree to ensure to its inhabitants a continuance of
security and protection.... The rupture of the negotiation and the avowed
Page 251
system of the present Government of France appear on the one hand to
render the attainment of this desirable end precarious, if not remote, whilst
on the other they impose on H.M.'s confidential servants an additional
obligation of reducing the heavy burdens of a war, the continuance of which
is unavoidable, within the narrowest limits, in order to be able to persevere
in it until adequate terms of peace can be obtained; and it is certainly their
first and essential duty to appropriate the resources of the country with such
management and economy as may ensure the preservation and defence of
the essential possessions of the Crown...."
The good faith of Pitt in the Lille negotiation appears clearly in this
interesting statement, which further proves that he held on to Hayti in the
hope of ceding it to France on terms satisfactory to Great Britain and the
colonists. Doubtless it was the perception of this truth which led many of
the settlers to decamp after spoiling the Egyptians. The thankless duty of
evacuation devolved on Brigadier-General Maitland, who carried it out with
skill and patience. Especially admirable is his secret bargain with Toussaint,
whereby that able chief agreed not to molest the British either in Hayti or in
Jamaica, while in return he was to receive provisions at certain ports under
his control. Ministers had not advised any such proceeding, but they
cordially approved of it, despite the clamour of the West India planters at a
compact with a negro.[396] Thus was laid the basis of that good
understanding which subsequently enabled Toussaint to defy Bonaparte.
The success attending this agreement shows what power England might
have wielded had not her King, her Princes, and her Parliament insisted on
maintaining intact the institution of slavery. They thereby aroused an enemy
more terrible than yellow fever, the negro. France profited by the blunder;
but she rushed blindly forward, using the black man with a recklessness
which gave him the mastery. On the other hand, if Pitt and Wilberforce had
succeeded in carrying out their programme in the years 1790–2, the
render the attainment of this desirable end precarious, if not remote, whilst
on the other they impose on H.M.'s confidential servants an additional
obligation of reducing the heavy burdens of a war, the continuance of which
is unavoidable, within the narrowest limits, in order to be able to persevere
in it until adequate terms of peace can be obtained; and it is certainly their
first and essential duty to appropriate the resources of the country with such
management and economy as may ensure the preservation and defence of
the essential possessions of the Crown...."
The good faith of Pitt in the Lille negotiation appears clearly in this
interesting statement, which further proves that he held on to Hayti in the
hope of ceding it to France on terms satisfactory to Great Britain and the
colonists. Doubtless it was the perception of this truth which led many of
the settlers to decamp after spoiling the Egyptians. The thankless duty of
evacuation devolved on Brigadier-General Maitland, who carried it out with
skill and patience. Especially admirable is his secret bargain with Toussaint,
whereby that able chief agreed not to molest the British either in Hayti or in
Jamaica, while in return he was to receive provisions at certain ports under
his control. Ministers had not advised any such proceeding, but they
cordially approved of it, despite the clamour of the West India planters at a
compact with a negro.[396] Thus was laid the basis of that good
understanding which subsequently enabled Toussaint to defy Bonaparte.
The success attending this agreement shows what power England might
have wielded had not her King, her Princes, and her Parliament insisted on
maintaining intact the institution of slavery. They thereby aroused an enemy
more terrible than yellow fever, the negro. France profited by the blunder;
but she rushed blindly forward, using the black man with a recklessness
which gave him the mastery. On the other hand, if Pitt and Wilberforce had
succeeded in carrying out their programme in the years 1790–2, the
Page 252
incendiary devices of Brissot and Victor Hugues would have come to
nought. In that case the transfer of Hayti to England would have placed at
her disposal myriads of devoted blacks, ready and able to plant the Union
Jack on every fortress in the West Indies, and to conquer the colonies of
Spain if she changed sides. It was not to be. Far from gaining an accession
of strength in that quarter, England lost heavily in men and treasure, and at
the Peace of Amiens retained only Trinidad in return for all her sacrifices.
In no part does Pitt's war policy appear to more disadvantage than in the
West Indies. He entered into those expeditions when the army at home was
unable to meet the demands of the service in Flanders, and on the coasts of
Brittany and Provence, not to speak of the needs of Ireland and the East
Indies. He allowed Dundas to send out levies which were far too raw to
withstand the strain of the tropics. This fact, together with the stupidity of
the regulations and the inexperience, or worse, of the medical staff,
accounts for the waste of life and the barrenness of these tedious
campaigns. At no time had England in the West Indies a force sufficient to
withstand the ravages of disease and to overcome the Republicans and their
black allies. Nevertheless, while the conduct of the West Indian campaigns
is open to censure, it is difficult to see what other course could have been
adopted towards those important colonies, in view of the resolve of the
French Jacobins to revolutionize them. The attempt was made and partly
succeeded. Could Pitt and his colleagues stand merely on the defensive,
while incendiaries sought to stir up a war of colour? Was it not the natural
and inevitable step to endeavour to extirpate those fire-brands? And when
so attractive an offer as that of Hayti was made by the royalist settlers,
could the British Government hold timidly aloof and allow that rich land to
breed revolt? Surely a servile war could be averted only by intervention at
the natural centre of influence. If from Guadeloupe, after its recapture by
the French, the seeds of rebellion were sown broadcast, would not Hayti
have become a volcano of insurrection? Finally, it is unquestionable that the
nought. In that case the transfer of Hayti to England would have placed at
her disposal myriads of devoted blacks, ready and able to plant the Union
Jack on every fortress in the West Indies, and to conquer the colonies of
Spain if she changed sides. It was not to be. Far from gaining an accession
of strength in that quarter, England lost heavily in men and treasure, and at
the Peace of Amiens retained only Trinidad in return for all her sacrifices.
In no part does Pitt's war policy appear to more disadvantage than in the
West Indies. He entered into those expeditions when the army at home was
unable to meet the demands of the service in Flanders, and on the coasts of
Brittany and Provence, not to speak of the needs of Ireland and the East
Indies. He allowed Dundas to send out levies which were far too raw to
withstand the strain of the tropics. This fact, together with the stupidity of
the regulations and the inexperience, or worse, of the medical staff,
accounts for the waste of life and the barrenness of these tedious
campaigns. At no time had England in the West Indies a force sufficient to
withstand the ravages of disease and to overcome the Republicans and their
black allies. Nevertheless, while the conduct of the West Indian campaigns
is open to censure, it is difficult to see what other course could have been
adopted towards those important colonies, in view of the resolve of the
French Jacobins to revolutionize them. The attempt was made and partly
succeeded. Could Pitt and his colleagues stand merely on the defensive,
while incendiaries sought to stir up a war of colour? Was it not the natural
and inevitable step to endeavour to extirpate those fire-brands? And when
so attractive an offer as that of Hayti was made by the royalist settlers,
could the British Government hold timidly aloof and allow that rich land to
breed revolt? Surely a servile war could be averted only by intervention at
the natural centre of influence. If from Guadeloupe, after its recapture by
the French, the seeds of rebellion were sown broadcast, would not Hayti
have become a volcano of insurrection? Finally, it is unquestionable that the
Page 253
change of front of the Court of Madrid in the years 1795–6 blighted the
whole enterprise at the very time when success seemed attainable. On
Godoy, then, not on Pitt, must rest the responsibility for the lamentable
waste of life in the West Indies and the ultimate lapse into barbarism of
their most fertile island.
whole enterprise at the very time when success seemed attainable. On
Godoy, then, not on Pitt, must rest the responsibility for the lamentable
waste of life in the West Indies and the ultimate lapse into barbarism of
their most fertile island.
Page 254
CHAPTER XI
THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE: CORSICA:
QUIBERON
The French Jacobins early laid stress on the weakness of the British Empire.
An official report issued in January 1793 at Paris advocated a close alliance
with Tippoo Sahib, the Raja of Mysore, and recommended that the French
force sent to assist him should threaten or secure the Dutch possessions at
the Cape of Good Hope, and in Java and Ceylon. "There," it continued,
"you would meet only with men enervated by luxury, soft beings that would
tremble before the soldiers of liberty." The French conquest of Holland and
the capture of the Dutch fleet in the winter of 1794–5 brought these
schemes within measurable distance of fulfilment. Failing to save a single
Dutch fortress or warship, Pitt and his colleagues became alarmed about the
Dutch colonies; and when the lethargic Stadholder and his consort
Wilhelmina landed in England, Ministers conferred with him on this topic.
On 7th February 1795, shortly after his arrival at Kew House, thenceforth
the scene of his debauches, he drew up an order for the Governor of the
Cape of Good Hope, bidding him welcome the arrival of a friendly British
force, which would save Cape Town from the French. That important post
belonged to the Dutch East India Company, then virtually bankrupt, and
altogether unable to maintain its neutrality amidst the struggles for a world-
empire now entering on a new phase. The officials of the Company at
Amsterdam on 3rd February issued warnings to all Dutch ships in British
THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE: CORSICA:
QUIBERON
The French Jacobins early laid stress on the weakness of the British Empire.
An official report issued in January 1793 at Paris advocated a close alliance
with Tippoo Sahib, the Raja of Mysore, and recommended that the French
force sent to assist him should threaten or secure the Dutch possessions at
the Cape of Good Hope, and in Java and Ceylon. "There," it continued,
"you would meet only with men enervated by luxury, soft beings that would
tremble before the soldiers of liberty." The French conquest of Holland and
the capture of the Dutch fleet in the winter of 1794–5 brought these
schemes within measurable distance of fulfilment. Failing to save a single
Dutch fortress or warship, Pitt and his colleagues became alarmed about the
Dutch colonies; and when the lethargic Stadholder and his consort
Wilhelmina landed in England, Ministers conferred with him on this topic.
On 7th February 1795, shortly after his arrival at Kew House, thenceforth
the scene of his debauches, he drew up an order for the Governor of the
Cape of Good Hope, bidding him welcome the arrival of a friendly British
force, which would save Cape Town from the French. That important post
belonged to the Dutch East India Company, then virtually bankrupt, and
altogether unable to maintain its neutrality amidst the struggles for a world-
empire now entering on a new phase. The officials of the Company at
Amsterdam on 3rd February issued warnings to all Dutch ships in British
Page 255
ports to set sail forthwith, and further requested the French Government to
secure Dutch vessels from attacks by its war vessels or privateers.[397] A
few days later the invaders of Holland laid hands on British ships and
detained even the packet-boats. In fact, though the Dutch did not frame an
alliance with France until 16th May, it existed in effect from the month of
February.[398] These facts explain the action of the Prince of Orange, which
is otherwise unjustifiable. It was a natural retort to the conduct of the Dutch
authorities. The British archives also show the alarm of our India Board and
of its president, Dundas. On 5th February he urged the British East India
Company to send in duplicate urgent messages to India. On 8th and 10th
February he inquired whether the extra troops needed for India could sail on
three of their ships now ready in the Thames; and he requested that some of
the Company's troops stationed at St. Helena should proceed to India, their
place being taken by drafts from home.[399]
Foremost among Dundas's plans for assuring British supremacy in India
was the acquisition of the Cape. Not that he valued the Cape and Egypt on
their own account. That generation regarded them merely as half-way-
houses to India, witness the curious statement of Sir Francis Barings,
Director of the East India Company, to Dundas, that the Cape was of no
advantage whatever to us, and might be a dangerous drain upon our
population; but in the hands of France it would most seriously menace our
interests.[400] Of how many prosperous British colonies has not this been
said? For similar reasons we took possession of large parts of India and
Canada, not to speak of Malta, portions of Australia, New Zealand, and the
Egyptian Soudan.
Early in March Commodore Blankett set sail from Spithead with four ships,
having on board part of the 78th regiment, besides marines. The "Sphinx"
was to join them at St. Helena. The land forces were commanded by Major-
General Sir James Craig. Early in April Rear-Admiral Sir Keith Elphinstone
secure Dutch vessels from attacks by its war vessels or privateers.[397] A
few days later the invaders of Holland laid hands on British ships and
detained even the packet-boats. In fact, though the Dutch did not frame an
alliance with France until 16th May, it existed in effect from the month of
February.[398] These facts explain the action of the Prince of Orange, which
is otherwise unjustifiable. It was a natural retort to the conduct of the Dutch
authorities. The British archives also show the alarm of our India Board and
of its president, Dundas. On 5th February he urged the British East India
Company to send in duplicate urgent messages to India. On 8th and 10th
February he inquired whether the extra troops needed for India could sail on
three of their ships now ready in the Thames; and he requested that some of
the Company's troops stationed at St. Helena should proceed to India, their
place being taken by drafts from home.[399]
Foremost among Dundas's plans for assuring British supremacy in India
was the acquisition of the Cape. Not that he valued the Cape and Egypt on
their own account. That generation regarded them merely as half-way-
houses to India, witness the curious statement of Sir Francis Barings,
Director of the East India Company, to Dundas, that the Cape was of no
advantage whatever to us, and might be a dangerous drain upon our
population; but in the hands of France it would most seriously menace our
interests.[400] Of how many prosperous British colonies has not this been
said? For similar reasons we took possession of large parts of India and
Canada, not to speak of Malta, portions of Australia, New Zealand, and the
Egyptian Soudan.
Early in March Commodore Blankett set sail from Spithead with four ships,
having on board part of the 78th regiment, besides marines. The "Sphinx"
was to join them at St. Helena. The land forces were commanded by Major-
General Sir James Craig. Early in April Rear-Admiral Sir Keith Elphinstone
Page 256
sailed with a larger force, and a further expedition was in preparation under
the command of Major-General Alured Clarke. The Cabinet expected little
or no resistance, and even referred to a friendly reception as the probable
issue. They had some grounds for hope. The Dutch force at the Cape
consisted of about 800 German mercenaries, whose pay was far in arrears.
It was suggested that we should take them into our pay, and quiet the people
by the promise of abolishing the abuses of the Dutch Company. These
hopes proved excessive. Craig, on making False Bay on 11th June, soon
found Governor Sluysken totally unaffected by the Stadholder's letter. He
was a man "of the most uncommon sangfroid" professing affection to
England and dislike of France, but resolved to keep a firm hold of Cape
Town. He offered to give the squadron all it wanted, and begged for time to
consider the British demand.
Meanwhile mounted burghers poured in from the eastern settlements, and
greatly strengthened the Dutch camp, situated in a pass half way between
the town and False Bay. These sturdy farmers hoped to win entire
independence; for indeed the Dutch East India Company cramped the life of
the settlers at every turn. Despite the wealth of that land in corn, cotton,
wine, and cattle, it made little progress. The fisheries might have been
productive but for the regulations which forbade the colonists even a
pleasure boat. The Company claimed one-tenth of the produce of all sales
and had the right of pre-emption and of fixing the prices of goods. Settlers
might not even kill their own cattle for food without the permission of
officials. Cape Town was the only market for foreign commerce, and all
products going in and out were subject to heavy dues.[401] Far from thriving
on these exclusive rights, that corporation found its funds crippled by the
very regulations which impoverished and irritated the burghers. In fact the
first aim of the Boers was to trek beyond reach of the arm of the law. Thus
came about the settlement of the remote townships, Swellendam and Graaf-
the command of Major-General Alured Clarke. The Cabinet expected little
or no resistance, and even referred to a friendly reception as the probable
issue. They had some grounds for hope. The Dutch force at the Cape
consisted of about 800 German mercenaries, whose pay was far in arrears.
It was suggested that we should take them into our pay, and quiet the people
by the promise of abolishing the abuses of the Dutch Company. These
hopes proved excessive. Craig, on making False Bay on 11th June, soon
found Governor Sluysken totally unaffected by the Stadholder's letter. He
was a man "of the most uncommon sangfroid" professing affection to
England and dislike of France, but resolved to keep a firm hold of Cape
Town. He offered to give the squadron all it wanted, and begged for time to
consider the British demand.
Meanwhile mounted burghers poured in from the eastern settlements, and
greatly strengthened the Dutch camp, situated in a pass half way between
the town and False Bay. These sturdy farmers hoped to win entire
independence; for indeed the Dutch East India Company cramped the life of
the settlers at every turn. Despite the wealth of that land in corn, cotton,
wine, and cattle, it made little progress. The fisheries might have been
productive but for the regulations which forbade the colonists even a
pleasure boat. The Company claimed one-tenth of the produce of all sales
and had the right of pre-emption and of fixing the prices of goods. Settlers
might not even kill their own cattle for food without the permission of
officials. Cape Town was the only market for foreign commerce, and all
products going in and out were subject to heavy dues.[401] Far from thriving
on these exclusive rights, that corporation found its funds crippled by the
very regulations which impoverished and irritated the burghers. In fact the
first aim of the Boers was to trek beyond reach of the arm of the law. Thus
came about the settlement of the remote townships, Swellendam and Graaf-
Page 257
Reinet, and thus was implanted in that virile race the resolve to secure
complete independence of the enfeebled motherland.
The time seemed to have come when the British force menaced Cape Town.
The Boers, no less than the Governor Sluysken, regarded the letter of the
Prince as a forgery and the whole affair a mere trick. In vain did
Elphinstone and Craig offer guarantees for good government. The officials
and soldiery were impressed by the offer of enrolment in the British service,
but the armed farmers proved intractable. Not having artillery or sufficient
troops, Craig awaited the arrival of reinforcements from St. Helena; but on
14th July he landed about 1,600 men at Simon's Town, and somewhat later
began the advance towards Cape Town. With little difficulty his men drove
the Dutch from a strong position in the Pass of Muysenberg. On the next
day the Dutch advanced from Cape Town with all their force and eight
guns, but failed to dislodge Craig, despite his lack of artillery.
A period of much anxiety ensued, owing to the delay in the arrival of the
reinforcements under Major-General Alured Clarke, without which an
advance on Cape Town was perilous. The Dutch meanwhile received
supplies from interlopers, concerning whom Elphinstone wrote with
nautical emphasis: "The seas are infested with Americans, Danes, Genoese,
Tuscans, etc., or in other terms smuggling ships, mostly belonging to
Britain and Bengal, entrenched with oaths and infamy, who trade to the
French islands [Bourbon, etc.] and all the ports in India, changing their
flags as is most convenient to them."[402] He therefore forbade any of them
to touch at the Cape. On the arrival of Clarke's force Craig took the
offensive. About 4,000 strong, the British pushed on towards Cape Town,
amidst a dropping fire from the mounted burghers, until they drew near to
Wynberg. There the Dutch prepared to offer a stout resistance; but the
diversion caused by three British ships entering Table Bay, and firing at
Cape Town, unsteadied them; and, after little fighting, they retired towards
complete independence of the enfeebled motherland.
The time seemed to have come when the British force menaced Cape Town.
The Boers, no less than the Governor Sluysken, regarded the letter of the
Prince as a forgery and the whole affair a mere trick. In vain did
Elphinstone and Craig offer guarantees for good government. The officials
and soldiery were impressed by the offer of enrolment in the British service,
but the armed farmers proved intractable. Not having artillery or sufficient
troops, Craig awaited the arrival of reinforcements from St. Helena; but on
14th July he landed about 1,600 men at Simon's Town, and somewhat later
began the advance towards Cape Town. With little difficulty his men drove
the Dutch from a strong position in the Pass of Muysenberg. On the next
day the Dutch advanced from Cape Town with all their force and eight
guns, but failed to dislodge Craig, despite his lack of artillery.
A period of much anxiety ensued, owing to the delay in the arrival of the
reinforcements under Major-General Alured Clarke, without which an
advance on Cape Town was perilous. The Dutch meanwhile received
supplies from interlopers, concerning whom Elphinstone wrote with
nautical emphasis: "The seas are infested with Americans, Danes, Genoese,
Tuscans, etc., or in other terms smuggling ships, mostly belonging to
Britain and Bengal, entrenched with oaths and infamy, who trade to the
French islands [Bourbon, etc.] and all the ports in India, changing their
flags as is most convenient to them."[402] He therefore forbade any of them
to touch at the Cape. On the arrival of Clarke's force Craig took the
offensive. About 4,000 strong, the British pushed on towards Cape Town,
amidst a dropping fire from the mounted burghers, until they drew near to
Wynberg. There the Dutch prepared to offer a stout resistance; but the
diversion caused by three British ships entering Table Bay, and firing at
Cape Town, unsteadied them; and, after little fighting, they retired towards
Page 258
the capital, crying out that Sluysken had betrayed them. Early on the
morrow he offered to surrender; and the Union Jack was hoisted on 16th
September.
The conquest was delusively easy. The mounted Boers, who were the heart
of the defence, rode off with their arms, vowing vengeance against the
invaders; and some hundred of the foreign mercenaries, who entered the
British service, soon deserted. On 22nd September Craig wrote that, except
the six principal merchants in Cape Town, all the population was hostile,
and would certainly join the French, if they appeared, Jacobin ideas being
rife alike in town and country. He hoped that the abolition of "the
abominable monopolies" would have some effect. After Clarke and most of
his troops sailed on to their destination, India, Craig viewed the future with
concern, as Cape Town and the neighbouring bays needed a considerable
force for adequate defence. The population of Cape Town and district then
amounted to 4,957 settlers and their children, 6,068 servants, and 9,049
slaves. In the whole colony there were 14,929 free settlers, 11,555 servants,
and 19,807 slaves. The oxen numbered 418,817.
The news of the capture of Cape Town caused great relief at Whitehall.
Dundas on 16th January 1796 assured Craig that His Majesty would have
preferred a peaceful acquisition. The remark does not evince much sagacity;
for in that case the Boers would have represented the occupation as an act
of trickery concocted with the Prince of Orange. As it was, the Cape was
conquered after a fair fight. Undoubtedly in the month of August the
burghers might have beaten Craig had they been either well led or
enterprising. Dundas also instructed Clarke to leave a strong garrison at
Cape Town, and forwarded news of the capture of Trincomalee, the Dutch
stronghold in Ceylon. The Dutch soon sent a force of 2,000 troops
convoyed by six warships, for the recapture of the Cape; but, while
sheltering in Saldanha Bay, some fifty miles north of Cape Town, it was
morrow he offered to surrender; and the Union Jack was hoisted on 16th
September.
The conquest was delusively easy. The mounted Boers, who were the heart
of the defence, rode off with their arms, vowing vengeance against the
invaders; and some hundred of the foreign mercenaries, who entered the
British service, soon deserted. On 22nd September Craig wrote that, except
the six principal merchants in Cape Town, all the population was hostile,
and would certainly join the French, if they appeared, Jacobin ideas being
rife alike in town and country. He hoped that the abolition of "the
abominable monopolies" would have some effect. After Clarke and most of
his troops sailed on to their destination, India, Craig viewed the future with
concern, as Cape Town and the neighbouring bays needed a considerable
force for adequate defence. The population of Cape Town and district then
amounted to 4,957 settlers and their children, 6,068 servants, and 9,049
slaves. In the whole colony there were 14,929 free settlers, 11,555 servants,
and 19,807 slaves. The oxen numbered 418,817.
The news of the capture of Cape Town caused great relief at Whitehall.
Dundas on 16th January 1796 assured Craig that His Majesty would have
preferred a peaceful acquisition. The remark does not evince much sagacity;
for in that case the Boers would have represented the occupation as an act
of trickery concocted with the Prince of Orange. As it was, the Cape was
conquered after a fair fight. Undoubtedly in the month of August the
burghers might have beaten Craig had they been either well led or
enterprising. Dundas also instructed Clarke to leave a strong garrison at
Cape Town, and forwarded news of the capture of Trincomalee, the Dutch
stronghold in Ceylon. The Dutch soon sent a force of 2,000 troops
convoyed by six warships, for the recapture of the Cape; but, while
sheltering in Saldanha Bay, some fifty miles north of Cape Town, it was
Page 259
surprised by Elphinstone's squadron and capitulated (17th August 1796).
The news of this disaster hastened the surrender of the burghers of Graaf
Reinet who had defied British authority.
In order to mark the permanence of British rule, Pitt decided to send out as
Governor Lord Macartney, who previously had undertaken a mission to
"Louis XVIII" at Verona. His arrival in May 1797 helped to check the
growth of discontent which was again becoming formidable. Macartney's
difficulties were great. The Dutch held sullenly aloof, in the belief that
England must give up her prize at the peace. Our military and naval officers
disliked Cape Town, owing to the lack of amusements, the dearness of
provisions, and the badness of the roadstead. Admiral Pringle declared to
Lady Anne Barnard that, as a naval station, it was the worst that the devil
could have contrived; that the people were objectionable, and the animals
vile, even the hens being unable to lay fresh eggs. The soldiers grumbled at
the high prices; for, though beef was only fourpence a pound, and good
wine sixpence a bottle, yet an egg cost threepence and a dish of
cauliflowers eighteenpence. Readers of Lady Anne's sprightly letters will
note in germ the problem that has beset the British in South Africa.[403]
They formed a restless minority among a people curiously unreceptive and
suspicious. They were bored by the surroundings, puzzled by Dutch
elusiveness, and doubtful as to the future. The war was going far from well;
and the alliance of Spain with France in the summer of 1796 facilitated
attacks from the Canaries and Monte Video. These difficulties were
enhanced by the cold and tactless behaviour of Macartney.
Nevertheless Pitt resolved at all costs to hold the Cape. Signs of disgust at
the state of affairs in Corsica and the West Indies early figure in his letters;
but as to the retention of Cape Town he never wavered. Bonaparte's capture
of Egypt in 1798 showed that India was about to be assailed by way of the
Red Sea. The greater, then, was the need to retain the stronghold which
The news of this disaster hastened the surrender of the burghers of Graaf
Reinet who had defied British authority.
In order to mark the permanence of British rule, Pitt decided to send out as
Governor Lord Macartney, who previously had undertaken a mission to
"Louis XVIII" at Verona. His arrival in May 1797 helped to check the
growth of discontent which was again becoming formidable. Macartney's
difficulties were great. The Dutch held sullenly aloof, in the belief that
England must give up her prize at the peace. Our military and naval officers
disliked Cape Town, owing to the lack of amusements, the dearness of
provisions, and the badness of the roadstead. Admiral Pringle declared to
Lady Anne Barnard that, as a naval station, it was the worst that the devil
could have contrived; that the people were objectionable, and the animals
vile, even the hens being unable to lay fresh eggs. The soldiers grumbled at
the high prices; for, though beef was only fourpence a pound, and good
wine sixpence a bottle, yet an egg cost threepence and a dish of
cauliflowers eighteenpence. Readers of Lady Anne's sprightly letters will
note in germ the problem that has beset the British in South Africa.[403]
They formed a restless minority among a people curiously unreceptive and
suspicious. They were bored by the surroundings, puzzled by Dutch
elusiveness, and doubtful as to the future. The war was going far from well;
and the alliance of Spain with France in the summer of 1796 facilitated
attacks from the Canaries and Monte Video. These difficulties were
enhanced by the cold and tactless behaviour of Macartney.
Nevertheless Pitt resolved at all costs to hold the Cape. Signs of disgust at
the state of affairs in Corsica and the West Indies early figure in his letters;
but as to the retention of Cape Town he never wavered. Bonaparte's capture
of Egypt in 1798 showed that India was about to be assailed by way of the
Red Sea. The greater, then, was the need to retain the stronghold which
Page 260
dominated the sea-route to the East Indies. The resolve of Pitt to assure the
communication with India by one or other of the two routes will concern us
later. But we may risk the assertion that he would certainly have avoided
the blunder of the Addington Ministry in 1802 in giving up the Cape and
neglecting to secure Malta against recapture by Napoleon. Early in the
course of the Napoleonic War, Pitt resolved at all costs to retain Malta and
to re-conquer the Cape. During the negotiations of 1805 with Russia he
refused to allow the discussion of our title to Malta; and in the parleys with
Prussia a little later he distinctly excepted the Cape from the list of the
conquered colonies which Britain might be willing to restore at the general
peace.[404] Six days before Pitt expressed this resolve, Nelson won his last
and greatest triumph, thus enabling the Prime Minister to deal with full
effect the blow which won Cape Colony for the British flag. It is clear, then,
that Pitt discerned the enormous importance of that station as an outwork of
India. In fact, after the expedition of Bonaparte to Egypt and the renewal of
his oriental schemes in 1803, no statesman worthy of the name could fail to
see that either Egypt and Malta, or the Cape of Good Hope, must belong to
the mistress of the East Indies. In the last resort, then, it was the world-
policy of Napoleon which planted the Union Jack for ever both at Malta and
the Cape of Good Hope.
Naval campaigns almost of necessity resolve themselves into a series of
experiments; and after the failure of the attempt to hold Toulon, a blow at
Corsica was the natural sequel. At a time when Great Britain had no post
within the Mediterranean, that island was a most desirable prize. Its
supplies of naval stores to the dockyard at Toulon were of the highest value
to the French; and Nelson declared the occupation of Corsica to be
communication with India by one or other of the two routes will concern us
later. But we may risk the assertion that he would certainly have avoided
the blunder of the Addington Ministry in 1802 in giving up the Cape and
neglecting to secure Malta against recapture by Napoleon. Early in the
course of the Napoleonic War, Pitt resolved at all costs to retain Malta and
to re-conquer the Cape. During the negotiations of 1805 with Russia he
refused to allow the discussion of our title to Malta; and in the parleys with
Prussia a little later he distinctly excepted the Cape from the list of the
conquered colonies which Britain might be willing to restore at the general
peace.[404] Six days before Pitt expressed this resolve, Nelson won his last
and greatest triumph, thus enabling the Prime Minister to deal with full
effect the blow which won Cape Colony for the British flag. It is clear, then,
that Pitt discerned the enormous importance of that station as an outwork of
India. In fact, after the expedition of Bonaparte to Egypt and the renewal of
his oriental schemes in 1803, no statesman worthy of the name could fail to
see that either Egypt and Malta, or the Cape of Good Hope, must belong to
the mistress of the East Indies. In the last resort, then, it was the world-
policy of Napoleon which planted the Union Jack for ever both at Malta and
the Cape of Good Hope.
Naval campaigns almost of necessity resolve themselves into a series of
experiments; and after the failure of the attempt to hold Toulon, a blow at
Corsica was the natural sequel. At a time when Great Britain had no post
within the Mediterranean, that island was a most desirable prize. Its
supplies of naval stores to the dockyard at Toulon were of the highest value
to the French; and Nelson declared the occupation of Corsica to be
Page 261
imperatively necessary, as it furnished that dockyard with the decks, sides,
and straight timbers for ships.[405] Accordingly, after the evacuation of
Toulon by the Allies in December 1793, Admiral Hood decided to effect the
reduction of the island for the royalist cause.
Already, while at Toulon, he had received an urgent invitation from Paoli,
the leader of the Royalist, or British, party in Corsica, to help the islanders
in driving out the French. Victor in the long feud against the Bonapartes,
whom he expelled at midsummer, Paoli now resolved to root out the
Jacobins, and his Anglophil leanings induced him to offer the crown of
Corsica to George III. Both the King and his Ministers received the offer
favourably, Pitt and Grenville regarding Corsica as one of the indemnities
to be exacted from France. Sir Gilbert Elliot, the King's Commissioner in
the Mediterranean, was therefore charged to administer Corsica. Disputes
between Admiral Hood and General Dundas, the commander of the British
troops, somewhat hampered the sieges of the three French garrisons still
holding out; but by August 1794 Calvi, the last hope of the French,
succumbed to the vigour of the attack of General Stuart, effectively helped
by Nelson, who there lost the sight of his right eye.
Subsequent events in Corsica, although of great interest, are not closely
connected with the life of Pitt; and I therefore propose to describe them and
the details of the Quiberon expedition in the volume entitled "Pitt and
Napoleon Miscellanies." In this chapter only the incidents which more
particularly concern Pitt will be noticed.
The attempt to rule that most clannish and suspicious of Mediterranean
peoples first called forth the administrative powers of Sir Gilbert Elliot, first
Earl of Minto. Acting as Viceroy of Corsica, he sought to promote
contentment by promulgating an excellent constitution and administrative
reforms. But, being hampered from the outset by the factious behaviour of
and straight timbers for ships.[405] Accordingly, after the evacuation of
Toulon by the Allies in December 1793, Admiral Hood decided to effect the
reduction of the island for the royalist cause.
Already, while at Toulon, he had received an urgent invitation from Paoli,
the leader of the Royalist, or British, party in Corsica, to help the islanders
in driving out the French. Victor in the long feud against the Bonapartes,
whom he expelled at midsummer, Paoli now resolved to root out the
Jacobins, and his Anglophil leanings induced him to offer the crown of
Corsica to George III. Both the King and his Ministers received the offer
favourably, Pitt and Grenville regarding Corsica as one of the indemnities
to be exacted from France. Sir Gilbert Elliot, the King's Commissioner in
the Mediterranean, was therefore charged to administer Corsica. Disputes
between Admiral Hood and General Dundas, the commander of the British
troops, somewhat hampered the sieges of the three French garrisons still
holding out; but by August 1794 Calvi, the last hope of the French,
succumbed to the vigour of the attack of General Stuart, effectively helped
by Nelson, who there lost the sight of his right eye.
Subsequent events in Corsica, although of great interest, are not closely
connected with the life of Pitt; and I therefore propose to describe them and
the details of the Quiberon expedition in the volume entitled "Pitt and
Napoleon Miscellanies." In this chapter only the incidents which more
particularly concern Pitt will be noticed.
The attempt to rule that most clannish and suspicious of Mediterranean
peoples first called forth the administrative powers of Sir Gilbert Elliot, first
Earl of Minto. Acting as Viceroy of Corsica, he sought to promote
contentment by promulgating an excellent constitution and administrative
reforms. But, being hampered from the outset by the factious behaviour of
Page 262
Paoli, he, with the consent of the Cabinet, deported him to England in the
autumn of 1795. An equally serious complication was the feud between the
British army and navy. These disputes, originating at Toulon, grew apace in
Corsica. Elliot sided with Hood, and was therefore detested by Dundas, his
successor, Sir Charles Stuart, and their coadjutor, Colonel Moore. This
brilliant young officer, by nature somewhat a frondeur, was finally guilty of
expressions so disrespectful as to lead to his removal shortly before that of
Paoli. He carried his complaints to Pitt, who bade him set forth his case
dispassionately. Indeed, so impressed was he with Moore's abilities, that he
decided to employ him in the West Indies, and afterwards advanced him to
posts of high importance.
Pitt took little interest in Corsica, leaving it to the intermittent attentions of
Portland. Consequently that interesting experiment had not a fair chance.
The possession of the island was also nearly useless in a military sense; for
the British garrison could spare no detachments, which, even with the help
of the loyal Corsicans, could effectively harass the French forces
campaigning in the Genoese Riviera. Elliot entered into relations with the
Knights of Malta, and in other ways sought to develop a Mediterranean
policy; but in this he met with scant support from London. In excuse of Pitt
it must be said that he had his hands more than full elsewhere. Moreover the
peace between France and Spain, framed in July 1795, caused him great
concern, especially as the Court of Madrid manifested deep resentment at
the British occupation of Corsica. In October 1795 Pitt inclined strongly
towards peace, and thenceforth carried on the war mainly with a view to
securing indemnities. Corsica apparently he now looked on as burdensome;
for in his speech of 9th December 1795 he did not include it among the
three valued acquisitions of the war—Martinique, Cape Nicholas Mole (in
Hayti), and the Cape of Good Hope. Dundas always looked on the
occupation of Corsica as prejudicial to the colonial efforts which held the
first place in his thoughts. Accordingly it was not utilized in the spring of
autumn of 1795. An equally serious complication was the feud between the
British army and navy. These disputes, originating at Toulon, grew apace in
Corsica. Elliot sided with Hood, and was therefore detested by Dundas, his
successor, Sir Charles Stuart, and their coadjutor, Colonel Moore. This
brilliant young officer, by nature somewhat a frondeur, was finally guilty of
expressions so disrespectful as to lead to his removal shortly before that of
Paoli. He carried his complaints to Pitt, who bade him set forth his case
dispassionately. Indeed, so impressed was he with Moore's abilities, that he
decided to employ him in the West Indies, and afterwards advanced him to
posts of high importance.
Pitt took little interest in Corsica, leaving it to the intermittent attentions of
Portland. Consequently that interesting experiment had not a fair chance.
The possession of the island was also nearly useless in a military sense; for
the British garrison could spare no detachments, which, even with the help
of the loyal Corsicans, could effectively harass the French forces
campaigning in the Genoese Riviera. Elliot entered into relations with the
Knights of Malta, and in other ways sought to develop a Mediterranean
policy; but in this he met with scant support from London. In excuse of Pitt
it must be said that he had his hands more than full elsewhere. Moreover the
peace between France and Spain, framed in July 1795, caused him great
concern, especially as the Court of Madrid manifested deep resentment at
the British occupation of Corsica. In October 1795 Pitt inclined strongly
towards peace, and thenceforth carried on the war mainly with a view to
securing indemnities. Corsica apparently he now looked on as burdensome;
for in his speech of 9th December 1795 he did not include it among the
three valued acquisitions of the war—Martinique, Cape Nicholas Mole (in
Hayti), and the Cape of Good Hope. Dundas always looked on the
occupation of Corsica as prejudicial to the colonial efforts which held the
first place in his thoughts. Accordingly it was not utilized in the spring of
Page 263
1796, when expeditions ought to have set forth to hamper the march of
Bonaparte's ill-equipped columns along the coast from Nice to Savona.
The opportunity then lost was never to return. Bonaparte's triumphs in Italy
enabled him to prepare at Leghorn to deal a blow for the recovery of his
native island. Checked for the time by the other claims of the war and the
presence of Nelson, he kept this aim in view; and the conquest of North and
Central Italy at the close of that campaign compromised the safety of the
small British and émigré force in Corsica. The final reason, however, for the
evacuation of the island was neither the menace from Italy nor the
discontent of the islanders, but the alliance of Spain with France. As Nelson
foresaw, that event endangered the communications with England.
Ministers also knew that a plan was on foot for a French invasion of
Ireland, which, as we shall see, was attempted at the end of the year. They
therefore determined to concentrate their forces for home defence and the
protection of the most important possessions, a decision which involved the
abandonment of the Mediterranean. Accordingly, on 31st August 1796,
Portland sent orders for the evacuation of Corsica and of Elba. For a few
days in the latter half of October Ministers revoked these orders, and bade
Elliot hold firm, their hope being to tempt the Empress Catharine to active
co-operation against France by the cession of Corsica to her. Whether that
wily potentate saw through this device is doubtful; for she died on 16th
November. Her death put an end to the fleeting hope of opposing France
with an equality of force; for the bent of her successor, Paul I, was at first
towards peace.
Despite the comparative neglect of Mediterranean affairs by Pitt at this
time, they exerted a profound influence upon his career. In view of the
many claims upon the British navy, it was perhaps impossible to exert upon
the coast of Nice and Genoa the pressure which Elliot desired; but the
failure to do so in the spring of 1796 enabled Bonaparte to win the triumphs
Bonaparte's ill-equipped columns along the coast from Nice to Savona.
The opportunity then lost was never to return. Bonaparte's triumphs in Italy
enabled him to prepare at Leghorn to deal a blow for the recovery of his
native island. Checked for the time by the other claims of the war and the
presence of Nelson, he kept this aim in view; and the conquest of North and
Central Italy at the close of that campaign compromised the safety of the
small British and émigré force in Corsica. The final reason, however, for the
evacuation of the island was neither the menace from Italy nor the
discontent of the islanders, but the alliance of Spain with France. As Nelson
foresaw, that event endangered the communications with England.
Ministers also knew that a plan was on foot for a French invasion of
Ireland, which, as we shall see, was attempted at the end of the year. They
therefore determined to concentrate their forces for home defence and the
protection of the most important possessions, a decision which involved the
abandonment of the Mediterranean. Accordingly, on 31st August 1796,
Portland sent orders for the evacuation of Corsica and of Elba. For a few
days in the latter half of October Ministers revoked these orders, and bade
Elliot hold firm, their hope being to tempt the Empress Catharine to active
co-operation against France by the cession of Corsica to her. Whether that
wily potentate saw through this device is doubtful; for she died on 16th
November. Her death put an end to the fleeting hope of opposing France
with an equality of force; for the bent of her successor, Paul I, was at first
towards peace.
Despite the comparative neglect of Mediterranean affairs by Pitt at this
time, they exerted a profound influence upon his career. In view of the
many claims upon the British navy, it was perhaps impossible to exert upon
the coast of Nice and Genoa the pressure which Elliot desired; but the
failure to do so in the spring of 1796 enabled Bonaparte to win the triumphs
Page 264
which changed the history of the world. Further, the British occupation of
Corsica, scarcely less than that of Hayti, aroused keen jealousy at Madrid,
and thus helped to set in motion forces which for the time checkmated
England in the Mediterranean. Not until the Spaniards were beaten by
Jervis and Nelson could she stretch forth her trident over that sea, first from
Minorca and finally from Malta. The loss of Corsica was keenly felt. For,
had England made full use of that island as a base of operations, Bonaparte
could not have carried out his Egyptian expedition in 1798. Austria also
ascribed her overthrow in Venetia and Styria to the withdrawal of the
British fleet from the Mediterranean. That step seemed a confession of
pitiable weakness, though in reality it enabled the Government to
concentrate the fleet at points more important than Bastia and Ajaccio.
Amidst the disasters at the end of the Flemish campaign of 1794 Pitt sought
to divert the energies of England to a more promising field. Thwarted on the
Lower Rhine by the vacillations of the German Powers and the torpor of the
Dutch, he hoped for success among the Royalists of Brittany and la Vendée.
He framed this decision reluctantly; for it involved co-operation with the
French princes, the Comte de Provence and the Comte d'Artois, and with
the swarms of fanatical émigrés who had long pestered him with mad
projects. Further, he had always been loath to declare for the restoration of
the Bourbons. To do so would be to flaunt the fleur-de-lis in the face of a
nation which hated all that pertained to the old régime. Besides, it implied a
surrender to the clique headed by Burke and Windham, which scoffed at the
compromise between monarchy and democracy embodied in the French
constitution of 1791. Pitt, with his innate moderation and good sense, saw
the folly of these reactionary views and the impossibility of forcing them
upon the French people. Nevertheless, as an experiment in the course of
that bewildering strife, he had recourse to the émigrés.
Corsica, scarcely less than that of Hayti, aroused keen jealousy at Madrid,
and thus helped to set in motion forces which for the time checkmated
England in the Mediterranean. Not until the Spaniards were beaten by
Jervis and Nelson could she stretch forth her trident over that sea, first from
Minorca and finally from Malta. The loss of Corsica was keenly felt. For,
had England made full use of that island as a base of operations, Bonaparte
could not have carried out his Egyptian expedition in 1798. Austria also
ascribed her overthrow in Venetia and Styria to the withdrawal of the
British fleet from the Mediterranean. That step seemed a confession of
pitiable weakness, though in reality it enabled the Government to
concentrate the fleet at points more important than Bastia and Ajaccio.
Amidst the disasters at the end of the Flemish campaign of 1794 Pitt sought
to divert the energies of England to a more promising field. Thwarted on the
Lower Rhine by the vacillations of the German Powers and the torpor of the
Dutch, he hoped for success among the Royalists of Brittany and la Vendée.
He framed this decision reluctantly; for it involved co-operation with the
French princes, the Comte de Provence and the Comte d'Artois, and with
the swarms of fanatical émigrés who had long pestered him with mad
projects. Further, he had always been loath to declare for the restoration of
the Bourbons. To do so would be to flaunt the fleur-de-lis in the face of a
nation which hated all that pertained to the old régime. Besides, it implied a
surrender to the clique headed by Burke and Windham, which scoffed at the
compromise between monarchy and democracy embodied in the French
constitution of 1791. Pitt, with his innate moderation and good sense, saw
the folly of these reactionary views and the impossibility of forcing them
upon the French people. Nevertheless, as an experiment in the course of
that bewildering strife, he had recourse to the émigrés.
Page 265
The accession of Windham to the Cabinet, in July 1794, had strengthened
their influence at Westminster; and incidents which occurred in France
during the winter of 1794–5 evinced a decline of Jacobinical enthusiasm.
The sentiment of loyalty, damped by the chilling personality of Louis XVI
and the follies of his brothers, revived now that the little Louis XVII was
being slowly done to death by his gaolers in the Temple. The rapacity and
vulgar ostentation of the Thermidorian party, then in power, provoked
general disgust; and despair of any satisfactory settlement began to range
friends of order on the side of the monarchy. The late American envoy at
Paris, Gouverneur Morris, informed Bland Burges at our Foreign Office, on
28th June 1795, that the state of France was so desperate as to admit of cure
only by the restoration of the old dynasty; that the recent death of
Louis XVII was a benefit to the cause inasmuch as his mind had been
completely brutalized; and finally the envoy heartily wished success to
every effort to overthrow the despicable Government at Paris.
Though the Royalist leaders in the west of France early in the year 1795
made a truce with the Republic, yet the resumption of the civil war in that
quarter was known to be only a question of time. Windham, therefore,
urged the despatch of an expedition to Brittany. His royalist zeal had now
developed his powers to their utmost. Early in the course of the French
Revolution the chivalry of his nature detached him from the Foxites. The
glow and beauty of his periods marked him out as the successor of Burke in
the House of Commons; yet in no respect did he attain complete success.
His speeches were too refined and subtle for that audience; and, worse still,
his diffidence or torpor led him often to miss opportunities of effective
intervention. The sensitiveness of his nature appeared in his falling in love
at first sight with a Highland girl whom Burke and he casually met during a
tour. His loss of her made a painful impression on him.[406] The butt of an
unkind fate, he seemed destined also to be the leader of lost causes; and the
proud and penniless émigrés found in him their most devoted friend.
their influence at Westminster; and incidents which occurred in France
during the winter of 1794–5 evinced a decline of Jacobinical enthusiasm.
The sentiment of loyalty, damped by the chilling personality of Louis XVI
and the follies of his brothers, revived now that the little Louis XVII was
being slowly done to death by his gaolers in the Temple. The rapacity and
vulgar ostentation of the Thermidorian party, then in power, provoked
general disgust; and despair of any satisfactory settlement began to range
friends of order on the side of the monarchy. The late American envoy at
Paris, Gouverneur Morris, informed Bland Burges at our Foreign Office, on
28th June 1795, that the state of France was so desperate as to admit of cure
only by the restoration of the old dynasty; that the recent death of
Louis XVII was a benefit to the cause inasmuch as his mind had been
completely brutalized; and finally the envoy heartily wished success to
every effort to overthrow the despicable Government at Paris.
Though the Royalist leaders in the west of France early in the year 1795
made a truce with the Republic, yet the resumption of the civil war in that
quarter was known to be only a question of time. Windham, therefore,
urged the despatch of an expedition to Brittany. His royalist zeal had now
developed his powers to their utmost. Early in the course of the French
Revolution the chivalry of his nature detached him from the Foxites. The
glow and beauty of his periods marked him out as the successor of Burke in
the House of Commons; yet in no respect did he attain complete success.
His speeches were too refined and subtle for that audience; and, worse still,
his diffidence or torpor led him often to miss opportunities of effective
intervention. The sensitiveness of his nature appeared in his falling in love
at first sight with a Highland girl whom Burke and he casually met during a
tour. His loss of her made a painful impression on him.[406] The butt of an
unkind fate, he seemed destined also to be the leader of lost causes; and the
proud and penniless émigrés found in him their most devoted friend.
Page 266
Despite the opposition of Dundas, and the doubts of Pitt, his views
prevailed; and preparations began for an Anglo-French expedition to the
coast of Brittany. During the winter there had arrived in London a Breton
leader of gigantic stature and considerable mental powers, the Comte de
Puisaye. He had fought devotedly for the constitutional monarchy in that
great province and had the confidence of its inhabitants, whether nobles or
peasants (Chouans). But French princes and the cliques of "pure" Royalists
looked on him, as Marie Antoinette looked on Mirabeau, merely as a rebel
who had partly seen the error of his ways. Secretly they resolved to make
use of him, as he had gained the confidence of Windham and Pitt, but to
throw him over at the first opportunity.
Meanwhile the Cabinet began to equip regiments of French Royalists
destined to form the spearhead of the "Royal and Catholic Army." Various
causes delayed the preparations, the chief being the absence in North
Germany of seasoned corps of émigrés whose presence in Brittany, was
essential. Puisaye therefore urged Ministers to allow him to enrol recruits
from among the French prisoners of war in England—a dangerous device
which, unfortunately, was adopted. Undoubtedly the initiative in this matter
rested with him; and it is noteworthy that other royalist leaders had tried the
plan, hitherto with no untoward results.[407] Prisoners were not forced into
the new corps; but it is clear that some of them enlisted in order to get back
to France. As for the finances of the enterprise, they were partly met by the
manufacture of royalist assignats. Whether they were like the forged
assignats manufactured, with the connivance of Government, near Hexham
and Durham, is not clear. It is alleged by royalist writers that they bore a
mark ensuring identification, so that, in case of a monarchist triumph, they
would be duly honoured. The chief aim, however, certainly was to discredit
the republican notes and to embarrass the Parisian Government. That Pitt
should in any way have countenanced these underhand devices is
discreditable.
prevailed; and preparations began for an Anglo-French expedition to the
coast of Brittany. During the winter there had arrived in London a Breton
leader of gigantic stature and considerable mental powers, the Comte de
Puisaye. He had fought devotedly for the constitutional monarchy in that
great province and had the confidence of its inhabitants, whether nobles or
peasants (Chouans). But French princes and the cliques of "pure" Royalists
looked on him, as Marie Antoinette looked on Mirabeau, merely as a rebel
who had partly seen the error of his ways. Secretly they resolved to make
use of him, as he had gained the confidence of Windham and Pitt, but to
throw him over at the first opportunity.
Meanwhile the Cabinet began to equip regiments of French Royalists
destined to form the spearhead of the "Royal and Catholic Army." Various
causes delayed the preparations, the chief being the absence in North
Germany of seasoned corps of émigrés whose presence in Brittany, was
essential. Puisaye therefore urged Ministers to allow him to enrol recruits
from among the French prisoners of war in England—a dangerous device
which, unfortunately, was adopted. Undoubtedly the initiative in this matter
rested with him; and it is noteworthy that other royalist leaders had tried the
plan, hitherto with no untoward results.[407] Prisoners were not forced into
the new corps; but it is clear that some of them enlisted in order to get back
to France. As for the finances of the enterprise, they were partly met by the
manufacture of royalist assignats. Whether they were like the forged
assignats manufactured, with the connivance of Government, near Hexham
and Durham, is not clear. It is alleged by royalist writers that they bore a
mark ensuring identification, so that, in case of a monarchist triumph, they
would be duly honoured. The chief aim, however, certainly was to discredit
the republican notes and to embarrass the Parisian Government. That Pitt
should in any way have countenanced these underhand devices is
discreditable.
Page 267
Owing to the declaration of war by Holland (May 1795), the vacillations of
Spain, and the determination of George III to keep troops in Hanover,[408]
very few British were available for the enterprise. It is worth noting that the
King disliked the émigrés and often shocked Windham by assertions at
Court that they would prove false. His influence was used steadily against
all attempts in their favour. There were, indeed, good grounds for suspicion
even at this time. Seeing that Charette and other Breton leaders still
observed the truce with the Republic, the risks of a landing were great; and
this explains the reluctance of the Cabinet to allow the Comte d'Artois to
proceed with the first contingent.[409] It was charged to occupy the
Quiberon Peninsula as a base for further exertions, to supply arms to the
Bretons, and thus prepare for a general rising, the effect of which would be
clinched by the arrival of a larger force. The vanguard set sail from
Spithead on 17th June 1795. It consisted of some 3,800 émigrés, under the
general command of Puisaye, though by some mistake in drafting the
orders, considerable power was given to Comte d'Hervilly, the senior officer
of the subsidized regiments. At first all went well. The convoying fleet
under Lord Bridport, after capturing three French sail-of-the-line off
l'Orient, made Quiberon Bay and assisted in the capture of Fort Penthièvre,
commanding the narrow isthmus (3rd July).
Disputes now began between Puisaye and Hervilly, the former desiring to
push on boldly, while the latter insisted on remaining in the peninsula. Time
was thus given for the republican general, Hoche, to collect his forces and
make spirited attacks upon the invaders, who soon fell a prey to schism and
discouragement. The doom of the expedition was decided by the
treacherous surrender of the fort to Hoche's men at the close of a night
attack (21st July). As day dawned the Republicans drove their foes into the
peninsula. Wild scenes of panic ensued. A storm having compelled the
larger British warships to keep in the offing, Puisaye went off in a boat to
beg succour from Admiral Warren. The defence speedily collapsed. De
Spain, and the determination of George III to keep troops in Hanover,[408]
very few British were available for the enterprise. It is worth noting that the
King disliked the émigrés and often shocked Windham by assertions at
Court that they would prove false. His influence was used steadily against
all attempts in their favour. There were, indeed, good grounds for suspicion
even at this time. Seeing that Charette and other Breton leaders still
observed the truce with the Republic, the risks of a landing were great; and
this explains the reluctance of the Cabinet to allow the Comte d'Artois to
proceed with the first contingent.[409] It was charged to occupy the
Quiberon Peninsula as a base for further exertions, to supply arms to the
Bretons, and thus prepare for a general rising, the effect of which would be
clinched by the arrival of a larger force. The vanguard set sail from
Spithead on 17th June 1795. It consisted of some 3,800 émigrés, under the
general command of Puisaye, though by some mistake in drafting the
orders, considerable power was given to Comte d'Hervilly, the senior officer
of the subsidized regiments. At first all went well. The convoying fleet
under Lord Bridport, after capturing three French sail-of-the-line off
l'Orient, made Quiberon Bay and assisted in the capture of Fort Penthièvre,
commanding the narrow isthmus (3rd July).
Disputes now began between Puisaye and Hervilly, the former desiring to
push on boldly, while the latter insisted on remaining in the peninsula. Time
was thus given for the republican general, Hoche, to collect his forces and
make spirited attacks upon the invaders, who soon fell a prey to schism and
discouragement. The doom of the expedition was decided by the
treacherous surrender of the fort to Hoche's men at the close of a night
attack (21st July). As day dawned the Republicans drove their foes into the
peninsula. Wild scenes of panic ensued. A storm having compelled the
larger British warships to keep in the offing, Puisaye went off in a boat to
beg succour from Admiral Warren. The defence speedily collapsed. De
Page 268
Sombreuil, who was left in command near the tip of the tongue of land,
unaccountably surrendered, though a British corvette, the "Lark," and
gunboats were effectively covering his flank. At the instigation of Tallien,
the French Convention disavowed the promise of its officers at Quiberon to
spare the lives of those who laid down their arms; and 712 Royalists were
shot down in cold blood at Auray and neighbouring places.
The evidence proves that the Pitt Ministry had done its best for this
expedition, which went to pieces owing to the quarrels of its leaders and the
refusal of Charette to stir a finger on behalf of Puisaye, whom he detested.
For the final massacre Tallien and the French Convention are wholly
responsible. Yet it suited the tactics of the English Opposition to accuse Pitt
of planning the death of the French Royalists. Fox, in one of his wildest
outbreaks, charged Ministers with deliberately sending noble gentlemen to a
massacre. Sheridan, too, declared that, though British blood had not flowed,
yet "British honour had bled at every pore." These reckless mis-statements
have been refuted by the testimony of La Jaille, Vauban, and Puisaye,
royalist officers who escaped.
Before these horrible events were known in England, Ministers prepared to
succour the vanguard at Quiberon. News that Spain had made peace with
France in a highly suspicious manner weakened this second effort, it being
necessary to safeguard the British West Indies from a probable attack by the
Spaniards. As no more than four newly raised British regiments could be
spared for the Biscay coast, the Earl of Moira threw up the command,
which General Doyle then accepted. It seems probable that by 3rd August
Pitt doubted the expediency of sending a second expedition to Brittany or la
Vendée. Nevertheless, the Comte d'Artois, who about that time arrived at
Spithead from North Germany with a force of émigrés, desired to make the
venture, relying on Charette, and other royalist chiefs who had once more
aroused the men of the West. The Count also cherished the hope that the
unaccountably surrendered, though a British corvette, the "Lark," and
gunboats were effectively covering his flank. At the instigation of Tallien,
the French Convention disavowed the promise of its officers at Quiberon to
spare the lives of those who laid down their arms; and 712 Royalists were
shot down in cold blood at Auray and neighbouring places.
The evidence proves that the Pitt Ministry had done its best for this
expedition, which went to pieces owing to the quarrels of its leaders and the
refusal of Charette to stir a finger on behalf of Puisaye, whom he detested.
For the final massacre Tallien and the French Convention are wholly
responsible. Yet it suited the tactics of the English Opposition to accuse Pitt
of planning the death of the French Royalists. Fox, in one of his wildest
outbreaks, charged Ministers with deliberately sending noble gentlemen to a
massacre. Sheridan, too, declared that, though British blood had not flowed,
yet "British honour had bled at every pore." These reckless mis-statements
have been refuted by the testimony of La Jaille, Vauban, and Puisaye,
royalist officers who escaped.
Before these horrible events were known in England, Ministers prepared to
succour the vanguard at Quiberon. News that Spain had made peace with
France in a highly suspicious manner weakened this second effort, it being
necessary to safeguard the British West Indies from a probable attack by the
Spaniards. As no more than four newly raised British regiments could be
spared for the Biscay coast, the Earl of Moira threw up the command,
which General Doyle then accepted. It seems probable that by 3rd August
Pitt doubted the expediency of sending a second expedition to Brittany or la
Vendée. Nevertheless, the Comte d'Artois, who about that time arrived at
Spithead from North Germany with a force of émigrés, desired to make the
venture, relying on Charette, and other royalist chiefs who had once more
aroused the men of the West. The Count also cherished the hope that the
Page 269
numerous bands of malcontents in Paris would overthrow that tottering
Government.
Events turned out otherwise. The first plan, that of occupying Noirmoutier,
an island close to the Vendéan coast, proving impracticable, Doyle sailed to
a smaller island, Yeu, farther out at sea. There the 5,500 troops, miserably
cramped and underfed, waited until the Comte d'Artois should make good
his boast of throwing himself into a boat, if need be, in order to join his
faithful Charette. It was soon apparent that he preferred to stay in Yeu with
his mistress, Mme. Polastron. In vain did the Bretons under Puisaye and
Vauban, and the Vendéans under Charette, beg him to join them.
Meanwhile, amid the early autumn rains the troops deteriorated, and the
royalist rising at Paris proved a miserable fiasco, some 30,000 National
Guards being scattered by a small force well handled by Bonaparte and
Barras (5th October). Finally, a deputation of Bretons proceeded to Yeu, and
begged Artois to place himself at the head of the numerous bands of
devoted gentlemen and peasants who still awaited his appearance. All was
in vain. Je ne veux pas aller Chouanner (play the Chouan) was his reply
(12th November). On the morrow he informed Vauban that he had received
orders from England to return at once. This assertion was at the time
generally believed to be false; the letters of Grenville to the Prince prove it
to be grossly exaggerated. To the despair and disgust of his soldiers he
departed, and finally sought refuge from his creditors in Holyrood Castle.
The British and French royalist regiments were withdrawn with much
difficulty during the storms of December 1795. Nearly all the horses had to
be destroyed.
Undoubtedly Pitt and Grenville had become disgusted with the torpor of
Artois and the follies of the French Royalists. In particular the absurd
failure at Paris seems to have prompted the resolve of the Cabinet to
withdraw the British troops from Yeu. Pitt's letters of the latter half of
Government.
Events turned out otherwise. The first plan, that of occupying Noirmoutier,
an island close to the Vendéan coast, proving impracticable, Doyle sailed to
a smaller island, Yeu, farther out at sea. There the 5,500 troops, miserably
cramped and underfed, waited until the Comte d'Artois should make good
his boast of throwing himself into a boat, if need be, in order to join his
faithful Charette. It was soon apparent that he preferred to stay in Yeu with
his mistress, Mme. Polastron. In vain did the Bretons under Puisaye and
Vauban, and the Vendéans under Charette, beg him to join them.
Meanwhile, amid the early autumn rains the troops deteriorated, and the
royalist rising at Paris proved a miserable fiasco, some 30,000 National
Guards being scattered by a small force well handled by Bonaparte and
Barras (5th October). Finally, a deputation of Bretons proceeded to Yeu, and
begged Artois to place himself at the head of the numerous bands of
devoted gentlemen and peasants who still awaited his appearance. All was
in vain. Je ne veux pas aller Chouanner (play the Chouan) was his reply
(12th November). On the morrow he informed Vauban that he had received
orders from England to return at once. This assertion was at the time
generally believed to be false; the letters of Grenville to the Prince prove it
to be grossly exaggerated. To the despair and disgust of his soldiers he
departed, and finally sought refuge from his creditors in Holyrood Castle.
The British and French royalist regiments were withdrawn with much
difficulty during the storms of December 1795. Nearly all the horses had to
be destroyed.
Undoubtedly Pitt and Grenville had become disgusted with the torpor of
Artois and the follies of the French Royalists. In particular the absurd
failure at Paris seems to have prompted the resolve of the Cabinet to
withdraw the British troops from Yeu. Pitt's letters of the latter half of
Page 270
October also evince a desire to pave the way for some understanding with
the French Directory. As that Government was firmly installed in power, an
opportunity presented itself, for the first time since the opening of the war,
of arranging a lasting peace. These hopes were to be blighted; but it is
certain that Pitt cherished them; and, doubtless, among the motives
operating in favour of peace the foremost was a feeling of disgust at the
poltroonery of the French Princes and the incurable factiousness of their
followers, in whom the faculties which command success were lost amidst
vices and perversities sufficient to ruin the best of causes. Pitt continued to
support the Chouans by money and arms; but, despite the frequent protests
of Windham, not a British soldier was landed on that coast.[410]
the French Directory. As that Government was firmly installed in power, an
opportunity presented itself, for the first time since the opening of the war,
of arranging a lasting peace. These hopes were to be blighted; but it is
certain that Pitt cherished them; and, doubtless, among the motives
operating in favour of peace the foremost was a feeling of disgust at the
poltroonery of the French Princes and the incurable factiousness of their
followers, in whom the faculties which command success were lost amidst
vices and perversities sufficient to ruin the best of causes. Pitt continued to
support the Chouans by money and arms; but, despite the frequent protests
of Windham, not a British soldier was landed on that coast.[410]
Page 271
CHAPTER XII
P I T T A S WA R M I N I S T E R ( 1 7 9 3 – 8 )
Si vous affaiblissez vos moyens en
partageant vos forces, si vous rompez en
Italie l'unité de la pensée militaire, je vous le
dis avec douleur, vous aurez perdu la plus
belle occasion d'imposer des lois à l'Italie....
La guerre est comme le gouvernement, c'est
une affaire de tact.—Napoleon, Letters of
14th May 1796.
In estimating the services of Pitt as War Minister during the first phases of
the conflict we must remember that the ambition of his life was to be a
Peace Minister. Amidst the exhaustion caused by the American War, he
deemed it essential to ensure the continuous growth of savings and
investments which, under favourable conditions, advance at the rate of
Compound Interest. His success in the time of peace 1783–93, may be
measured by the fact that, despite the waste of war, the rate of progress was
not seriously checked in the years 1793–6. A Scotsman, MacRitchie, who
travelled through England in 1795[411] was surprised to find the large towns
in a most flourishing state; and it is well known that the exports of cottons
largely increased in the last decade of the century. Seeing that the war
became "a contention of purse," the final triumph of England may be
P I T T A S WA R M I N I S T E R ( 1 7 9 3 – 8 )
Si vous affaiblissez vos moyens en
partageant vos forces, si vous rompez en
Italie l'unité de la pensée militaire, je vous le
dis avec douleur, vous aurez perdu la plus
belle occasion d'imposer des lois à l'Italie....
La guerre est comme le gouvernement, c'est
une affaire de tact.—Napoleon, Letters of
14th May 1796.
In estimating the services of Pitt as War Minister during the first phases of
the conflict we must remember that the ambition of his life was to be a
Peace Minister. Amidst the exhaustion caused by the American War, he
deemed it essential to ensure the continuous growth of savings and
investments which, under favourable conditions, advance at the rate of
Compound Interest. His success in the time of peace 1783–93, may be
measured by the fact that, despite the waste of war, the rate of progress was
not seriously checked in the years 1793–6. A Scotsman, MacRitchie, who
travelled through England in 1795[411] was surprised to find the large towns
in a most flourishing state; and it is well known that the exports of cottons
largely increased in the last decade of the century. Seeing that the war
became "a contention of purse," the final triumph of England may be
Page 272
ascribed to the reserve of strength which Pitt had helped to assure. He did
not live on to witness the issue of the economic struggle brought about by
the Continental System of Napoleon. But a study of the commercial war of
the years 1806–13 shows that Pitt's forethought enabled Britain to foil the
persistent efforts of her mightiest enemy.
Military critics will, however, reply that Pitt's economies in the earlier
period so far weakened her army as to lead to the failures of the
Revolutionary War. There is some force in this contention. A closer
examination, however, will reveal facts that necessarily weaken it. Firstly,
England had never kept up a large army in time of peace. Dislike of a
standing army was almost inconceivably strong; and it is certain that an
attempt by Pitt to maintain an army in excess of the ordinary peace
establishment would have aroused a powerful opposition. He therefore
concentrated his efforts on the navy; and the maritime triumphs of the war
were due in the last resort to his fostering care. As for the army, he kept it at
its normal strength until the spring of the year 1792, when he decided to
effect some reductions. In one sense this decision is creditable to him. It
proves that he neither desired nor expected a rupture with France. In his
view the risks of war were past. After his surrender to the Empress
Catharine in 1791 peace seemed assured. Further, his decision to reduce the
British Army was formed before the declaration of war by France against
Austria (20th April 1792). After the rupture of France with Sardinia and
Prussia it appeared the height of madness for a single disorganized State to
enlarge the circle of its enemies. Consequently, up to the second week of
November 1792, Pitt and Grenville were fully justified in expecting the
duration of peace for Great Britain. Here, as at many points in the ensuing
struggle, it was the impossible which happened.
Is Pitt to be blamed for effecting economies which led to a reduction of
taxes and an alleviation of the burdens of the poor? The chief danger of the
not live on to witness the issue of the economic struggle brought about by
the Continental System of Napoleon. But a study of the commercial war of
the years 1806–13 shows that Pitt's forethought enabled Britain to foil the
persistent efforts of her mightiest enemy.
Military critics will, however, reply that Pitt's economies in the earlier
period so far weakened her army as to lead to the failures of the
Revolutionary War. There is some force in this contention. A closer
examination, however, will reveal facts that necessarily weaken it. Firstly,
England had never kept up a large army in time of peace. Dislike of a
standing army was almost inconceivably strong; and it is certain that an
attempt by Pitt to maintain an army in excess of the ordinary peace
establishment would have aroused a powerful opposition. He therefore
concentrated his efforts on the navy; and the maritime triumphs of the war
were due in the last resort to his fostering care. As for the army, he kept it at
its normal strength until the spring of the year 1792, when he decided to
effect some reductions. In one sense this decision is creditable to him. It
proves that he neither desired nor expected a rupture with France. In his
view the risks of war were past. After his surrender to the Empress
Catharine in 1791 peace seemed assured. Further, his decision to reduce the
British Army was formed before the declaration of war by France against
Austria (20th April 1792). After the rupture of France with Sardinia and
Prussia it appeared the height of madness for a single disorganized State to
enlarge the circle of its enemies. Consequently, up to the second week of
November 1792, Pitt and Grenville were fully justified in expecting the
duration of peace for Great Britain. Here, as at many points in the ensuing
struggle, it was the impossible which happened.
Is Pitt to be blamed for effecting economies which led to a reduction of
taxes and an alleviation of the burdens of the poor? The chief danger of the
Page 273
years 1791, 1792 came not from the French Jacobins, but from their British
sympathizers; and experience warranted the belief that, with a lightening of
the financial load, the nation would manifest its former loyalty. On 23rd
August 1791 Grenville wrote: "Our only danger is at home, and for averting
that danger, peace and economy are our best resources."[412] These
considerations are political rather than military. But it is impossible to
separate the two spheres. The strength of the army depends ultimately on
the strength of the nation.
It is also well to remember that systematic preparation for war was an
outcome of that struggle. Conscription was a bequest of the French
Revolution. Planned first by Carnot, it was carried out by Dubois Crancé
and others in 1798. But in 1793 the days of large armies had not dawned. It
was usual to maintain small forces of professional soldiers, together with a
more or less inefficient militia. In England methods not unlike those of the
age of Falstaff still held good. War was an adventure, not a science. In
France first it became an intensely national effort. The Jacobins evoked the
popular enthusiasm; the Committee of Public Safety embodied it in citizen
armies; and the science of Carnot and Napoleon led them to victories which
shattered the old-world systems and baffled the forecasts of Pitt.
Let us briefly survey the conduct of the war by Pitt in its chief stages up to
the year 1798. The first period is from the declaration of war in February
1793, to the Battle of Fleurus, near the close of June 1794. At the outset he
is alarmed by the irruption of Dumouriez into Holland, and hastily sends a
small British force under the Duke of York, solely for the defence of
Helvoetsluys and its neighbourhood. It answers its purpose; the French are
held up at the Hollandsdiep, while the Austrians crush their main force at
Neerwinden. Thereupon Coburg claims the Duke's assistance in driving the
Republicans from the fortresses of French Flanders. Pitt and his colleagues
give their assent, because the enterprise seems easy after the defection of
sympathizers; and experience warranted the belief that, with a lightening of
the financial load, the nation would manifest its former loyalty. On 23rd
August 1791 Grenville wrote: "Our only danger is at home, and for averting
that danger, peace and economy are our best resources."[412] These
considerations are political rather than military. But it is impossible to
separate the two spheres. The strength of the army depends ultimately on
the strength of the nation.
It is also well to remember that systematic preparation for war was an
outcome of that struggle. Conscription was a bequest of the French
Revolution. Planned first by Carnot, it was carried out by Dubois Crancé
and others in 1798. But in 1793 the days of large armies had not dawned. It
was usual to maintain small forces of professional soldiers, together with a
more or less inefficient militia. In England methods not unlike those of the
age of Falstaff still held good. War was an adventure, not a science. In
France first it became an intensely national effort. The Jacobins evoked the
popular enthusiasm; the Committee of Public Safety embodied it in citizen
armies; and the science of Carnot and Napoleon led them to victories which
shattered the old-world systems and baffled the forecasts of Pitt.
Let us briefly survey the conduct of the war by Pitt in its chief stages up to
the year 1798. The first period is from the declaration of war in February
1793, to the Battle of Fleurus, near the close of June 1794. At the outset he
is alarmed by the irruption of Dumouriez into Holland, and hastily sends a
small British force under the Duke of York, solely for the defence of
Helvoetsluys and its neighbourhood. It answers its purpose; the French are
held up at the Hollandsdiep, while the Austrians crush their main force at
Neerwinden. Thereupon Coburg claims the Duke's assistance in driving the
Republicans from the fortresses of French Flanders. Pitt and his colleagues
give their assent, because the enterprise seems easy after the defection of
Page 274
Dumouriez, and Dunkirk is a tempting prize near to hand, but mainly owing
to their urgent desire that Austria shall find her indemnity not in Bavaria,
but in the French border fortresses. Thus, for reasons which are political,
rather than military, the Cabinet embarks an insufficient force on what
proves to be a lengthy and hazardous enterprise. Further, while the British
push on, Prussia holds back; so that the Duke of York virtually takes the
place of the Prussian contingent. Unaware of the duplicity of Berlin, and
trusting that the Allies will soon master the border strongholds, Pitt and
Dundas prepare to harry the coasts of France, and to secure her most
valuable colony, Hayti. These are their chief aims in the war. But, while
preparing maritime expeditions, they also drift into a continental campaign,
from which they find it hard to withdraw.
The efforts put forth at Toulon and in Corsica were the outcome of the
treaties with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, which required the appearance
of a British fleet off the coasts of France and Italy. While seeking to
strengthen both the Coalition and the Royalists of Provence, Admiral
Hood's force found an unexpected sphere of action at Toulon. In August
1793 that city admitted the British troops and a Spanish force a few days
later. Thereupon Pitt claimed the help which he had a right to expect from
his Allies. Naples and Sardinia sent contingents deficient in quality or
numbers; and the Court of Vienna, after promising to send 5,000 troops
from the Milanese, neglected to do so. Quarrels and suspicions hampered
the defence; but the arrival of the Austrian contingent would probably have
turned the scale. Owing to the length of time required for despatches from
Toulon to reach London, Pitt and his colleagues did not hear of the
remissness of Austria until 22nd December, that is, five days after the fall of
that stronghold. Had they known it a month earlier, they could have sent
thither the large force, then mustering in the Solent, which on 26th
November set sail for the West Indies.
to their urgent desire that Austria shall find her indemnity not in Bavaria,
but in the French border fortresses. Thus, for reasons which are political,
rather than military, the Cabinet embarks an insufficient force on what
proves to be a lengthy and hazardous enterprise. Further, while the British
push on, Prussia holds back; so that the Duke of York virtually takes the
place of the Prussian contingent. Unaware of the duplicity of Berlin, and
trusting that the Allies will soon master the border strongholds, Pitt and
Dundas prepare to harry the coasts of France, and to secure her most
valuable colony, Hayti. These are their chief aims in the war. But, while
preparing maritime expeditions, they also drift into a continental campaign,
from which they find it hard to withdraw.
The efforts put forth at Toulon and in Corsica were the outcome of the
treaties with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, which required the appearance
of a British fleet off the coasts of France and Italy. While seeking to
strengthen both the Coalition and the Royalists of Provence, Admiral
Hood's force found an unexpected sphere of action at Toulon. In August
1793 that city admitted the British troops and a Spanish force a few days
later. Thereupon Pitt claimed the help which he had a right to expect from
his Allies. Naples and Sardinia sent contingents deficient in quality or
numbers; and the Court of Vienna, after promising to send 5,000 troops
from the Milanese, neglected to do so. Quarrels and suspicions hampered
the defence; but the arrival of the Austrian contingent would probably have
turned the scale. Owing to the length of time required for despatches from
Toulon to reach London, Pitt and his colleagues did not hear of the
remissness of Austria until 22nd December, that is, five days after the fall of
that stronghold. Had they known it a month earlier, they could have sent
thither the large force, then mustering in the Solent, which on 26th
November set sail for the West Indies.
Page 275
This seems an unpardonable diffusion of efforts. But Ministers must already
have regretted their readiness to take up the duties incumbent on Prussia in
Flanders; and doubtless they resolved not to play the part of the willing
horse at Toulon. In the early days of every league there comes a time when
an active Power must protest against the shifty ways which are the curse of
Coalitions. Besides, Pitt had to keep in view the interests of Great Britain.
These were, firstly, to guard the Low Countries against French aggression,
and, secondly, to gain an indemnity for the expenses of the war either in the
French West Indies, or in Corsica. The independence of the Low Countries
was a European question. The maritime conquests concerned England
alone. Were Britons to shelve their own interests for a question of
international import? The statesman who does so will not long hold the
reins at Westminster. Besides, no device for weakening France was deemed
more effective than that of seizing her wealthiest group of colonies. On the
other hand, there was pressing need of armed help for the Royalists of
Brittany; and on this ground we must pronounce the West India enterprise
ill timed. A still worse blunder was the continued inactivity of Moira's force
in the Solent and the Channel Islands. The reports of an intended French
invasion form a wholly inadequate excuse for his inaction. His troops could
have rendered valuable service either in Brittany, Flanders, or at Toulon.
The riddle of their inaction has never been solved. Ultimately the blame
must rest with Pitt, Dundas, and Lord Chatham.[413]
In 1794 Pitt hoped to retrieve the failures of the first campaign and to wear
down the French defence. For this purpose he liberally subsidized Austria
and concluded with Prussia a treaty which, with better management, might
have brought a second highly efficient army into Flanders. The compacts of
that springtide warranted the hope that 340,000 allied troops would advance
on the north and north-east frontiers of France. They were not forthcoming;
but, even as it was, the Imperialists and the Duke of York routed the French
levies in Flanders and seemed about to open the way to Paris. Earl Howe's
have regretted their readiness to take up the duties incumbent on Prussia in
Flanders; and doubtless they resolved not to play the part of the willing
horse at Toulon. In the early days of every league there comes a time when
an active Power must protest against the shifty ways which are the curse of
Coalitions. Besides, Pitt had to keep in view the interests of Great Britain.
These were, firstly, to guard the Low Countries against French aggression,
and, secondly, to gain an indemnity for the expenses of the war either in the
French West Indies, or in Corsica. The independence of the Low Countries
was a European question. The maritime conquests concerned England
alone. Were Britons to shelve their own interests for a question of
international import? The statesman who does so will not long hold the
reins at Westminster. Besides, no device for weakening France was deemed
more effective than that of seizing her wealthiest group of colonies. On the
other hand, there was pressing need of armed help for the Royalists of
Brittany; and on this ground we must pronounce the West India enterprise
ill timed. A still worse blunder was the continued inactivity of Moira's force
in the Solent and the Channel Islands. The reports of an intended French
invasion form a wholly inadequate excuse for his inaction. His troops could
have rendered valuable service either in Brittany, Flanders, or at Toulon.
The riddle of their inaction has never been solved. Ultimately the blame
must rest with Pitt, Dundas, and Lord Chatham.[413]
In 1794 Pitt hoped to retrieve the failures of the first campaign and to wear
down the French defence. For this purpose he liberally subsidized Austria
and concluded with Prussia a treaty which, with better management, might
have brought a second highly efficient army into Flanders. The compacts of
that springtide warranted the hope that 340,000 allied troops would advance
on the north and north-east frontiers of France. They were not forthcoming;
but, even as it was, the Imperialists and the Duke of York routed the French
levies in Flanders and seemed about to open the way to Paris. Earl Howe's
Page 276
victory, named "the glorious first of June," ensured supremacy in the
Channel. Brittany and la Vendée were again aflame. The Union Jack
replaced the tricolour on the strongholds of Corsica and in the most fertile
parts of the West Indies. In April–May 1794 the collapse of the Jacobins
seemed imminent.
But these early triumphs of the Allies were almost as fatal as their later
disasters. Indeed they were largely the cause of them. Believing that they
had the game in their hands, Prussia and Austria relaxed their efforts at the
very time when France girded herself for a mightier struggle. Moreover, the
emergence of the Polish Question in an acute phase served once again to
distract the German rivals and to weaken their efforts in the West.
Moreover, the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of May 1794 prescribing the valley of
the Meuse as the sphere of action of the 62,400 Prussians subsidized by
England and Holland was so rigid as to furnish their generals with good
excuses for refusing to march from the Palatinate across the front of the
French columns now pressing forward. The upshot was that England and
the Dutch Republic got nothing in return for their subsidies, while the
Prussians on their side chafed at the insistent demands from London and
The Hague for the exact fulfilment of the bargain. The situation was
annoying for military men; and the British Government erred in tying them
down too stringently to a flank march, which was fraught with danger after
the long delay of Pitt in ratifying the compact (6th–23rd May); while the
postponement in the payment of the first subsidies gave the Prussians a
good excuse for inaction.[414] His remonstrance to the Prussian envoy in
London, at the close of September 1794, was also unwise. For it exceeded
the more measured protests of Grenville, and furnished the Berlin Court
with the desired excuse for recalling its troops from the Rhine. In short, the
campaign of 1794 failed, not so much because the French were in superior
force at the battles of Turcoing and Fleurus, as because the Allies at no
point worked cordially together. The intrusion of political motives
Channel. Brittany and la Vendée were again aflame. The Union Jack
replaced the tricolour on the strongholds of Corsica and in the most fertile
parts of the West Indies. In April–May 1794 the collapse of the Jacobins
seemed imminent.
But these early triumphs of the Allies were almost as fatal as their later
disasters. Indeed they were largely the cause of them. Believing that they
had the game in their hands, Prussia and Austria relaxed their efforts at the
very time when France girded herself for a mightier struggle. Moreover, the
emergence of the Polish Question in an acute phase served once again to
distract the German rivals and to weaken their efforts in the West.
Moreover, the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of May 1794 prescribing the valley of
the Meuse as the sphere of action of the 62,400 Prussians subsidized by
England and Holland was so rigid as to furnish their generals with good
excuses for refusing to march from the Palatinate across the front of the
French columns now pressing forward. The upshot was that England and
the Dutch Republic got nothing in return for their subsidies, while the
Prussians on their side chafed at the insistent demands from London and
The Hague for the exact fulfilment of the bargain. The situation was
annoying for military men; and the British Government erred in tying them
down too stringently to a flank march, which was fraught with danger after
the long delay of Pitt in ratifying the compact (6th–23rd May); while the
postponement in the payment of the first subsidies gave the Prussians a
good excuse for inaction.[414] His remonstrance to the Prussian envoy in
London, at the close of September 1794, was also unwise. For it exceeded
the more measured protests of Grenville, and furnished the Berlin Court
with the desired excuse for recalling its troops from the Rhine. In short, the
campaign of 1794 failed, not so much because the French were in superior
force at the battles of Turcoing and Fleurus, as because the Allies at no
point worked cordially together. The intrusion of political motives
Page 277
hampered their generals and turned what ought to have been an
overwhelming triumph into a disgracefully tame retreat.
The disasters at Turcoing and Fleurus open up the second stage of the war.
Realizing more and more the difficulty of defending Holland and Hanover,
Pitt seeks to end that campaign and to concentrate on colonial enterprises
and the war in Brittany and la Vendée. Experience of the utter weakness of
his Administration for purposes of war also leads him to strengthen it at the
time of the union with the Old Whigs. They demanded that their leader, the
Duke of Portland, should take the Home Office. On Dundas demurring to
this, Grenville generously assented to Pitt's suggestion that he should vacate
the Foreign Office (6th July). Fortunately the Duke declined to take it; and
Pitt resolved to make drastic changes, especially by curtailing the functions
of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, and creating a War Ministry of
Cabinet rank. Some change was clearly requisite; for of late Dundas had
supervised internal affairs, including those of Ireland, as well as the conduct
of the war; as Treasurer of the Navy he managed its finances, and, as
President of the India Board, he sought to control the affairs of that Empire.
As for the War Office, it was a petty office, controlled by a nonentity, Sir
Charles Yonge, who was soon to be transferred to the Mint.
In the haphazard allotment of military business to the Commander-in-Chief,
Amherst, to the head clerk of the War Office, Yonge, and to the overworked
pluralist, Dundas, we discern the causes of disaster. The war with France
being unforeseen, Pitt had to put up with these quaint arrangements; but the
reverses in Flanders and the incoming of the Portland Whigs now enabled
him to reduce chaos to order. He insisted that the Secretary of State for
Home Affairs should cease to direct the course of the war, but consented
that colonial business should fall to his lot. On the other hand he greatly
enlarged the functions of the War Office. His will prevailed. On 7th July
Portland agreed to become Home Secretary, while his supporter, Windham,
overwhelming triumph into a disgracefully tame retreat.
The disasters at Turcoing and Fleurus open up the second stage of the war.
Realizing more and more the difficulty of defending Holland and Hanover,
Pitt seeks to end that campaign and to concentrate on colonial enterprises
and the war in Brittany and la Vendée. Experience of the utter weakness of
his Administration for purposes of war also leads him to strengthen it at the
time of the union with the Old Whigs. They demanded that their leader, the
Duke of Portland, should take the Home Office. On Dundas demurring to
this, Grenville generously assented to Pitt's suggestion that he should vacate
the Foreign Office (6th July). Fortunately the Duke declined to take it; and
Pitt resolved to make drastic changes, especially by curtailing the functions
of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, and creating a War Ministry of
Cabinet rank. Some change was clearly requisite; for of late Dundas had
supervised internal affairs, including those of Ireland, as well as the conduct
of the war; as Treasurer of the Navy he managed its finances, and, as
President of the India Board, he sought to control the affairs of that Empire.
As for the War Office, it was a petty office, controlled by a nonentity, Sir
Charles Yonge, who was soon to be transferred to the Mint.
In the haphazard allotment of military business to the Commander-in-Chief,
Amherst, to the head clerk of the War Office, Yonge, and to the overworked
pluralist, Dundas, we discern the causes of disaster. The war with France
being unforeseen, Pitt had to put up with these quaint arrangements; but the
reverses in Flanders and the incoming of the Portland Whigs now enabled
him to reduce chaos to order. He insisted that the Secretary of State for
Home Affairs should cease to direct the course of the war, but consented
that colonial business should fall to his lot. On the other hand he greatly
enlarged the functions of the War Office. His will prevailed. On 7th July
Portland agreed to become Home Secretary, while his supporter, Windham,
Page 278
came into the re-organized War Office as Secretary at War, Dundas
becoming Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Despite the obvious
need of specializing and strengthening these Departments, the resistance of
Dundas was not easily overcome. His letter to Pitt on this subject betrays a
curious cloudiness of vision on a subject where clearness is essential:
becoming Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Despite the obvious
need of specializing and strengthening these Departments, the resistance of
Dundas was not easily overcome. His letter to Pitt on this subject betrays a
curious cloudiness of vision on a subject where clearness is essential:
Page 279
Wimbledon, July 9, 1794.[415]
... The idea of a War Minister as a separate Department you must on
recollection be sensible cannot exist in this country. The operations
of war are canvassed and adjusted in the Cabinet, and become the
joint act of His Majesty's servants; and the Secy of State who holds
the pen does no more than transmit their sentiments. I do not mean
to say that there is not at all times in H. M.'s Councils some
particular person who has, and ought to have, a leading and even an
overruling ascendency in the conduct of public affairs; and that
ascendency extends to war as it does to every other subject. Such
you are at present as the Minister of the King. Such your father was
as Secretary of State. Such you would be if you was Secretary of
State, and such Mr. Fox would be if he was Secretary of State and
the Duke of Bedford First Lord of the Treasury. In short it depends,
and must ever depend, on other circumstances than the particular
name by which a person is called; and if you was to have a
Secretary of State for the War Department tomorrow, not a person
living would ever look upon him, or any other person but you, as the
War Minister. All modern wars are a contention of purse, and unless
some very peculiar circumstance occurs to direct the lead into
another channel, the Minister of Finance must be the Minister of
War. Your father for obvious reasons was an exception to the rule.
It is impossible for any person to controvert the position I now state;
and therefore, when you talk of a War Minister, you must mean a
person to superintend the detail of the execution of the operations
which are determined upon. But do you think it possible to persuade
the public that such a separate Department can be necessary?
Yourself, so far as a general superintendence is necessary, must take
that into your own hands. If it was in the hands of any other, it
would lead to a constant wrangling between him and the various
Executive Boards.
... The idea of a War Minister as a separate Department you must on
recollection be sensible cannot exist in this country. The operations
of war are canvassed and adjusted in the Cabinet, and become the
joint act of His Majesty's servants; and the Secy of State who holds
the pen does no more than transmit their sentiments. I do not mean
to say that there is not at all times in H. M.'s Councils some
particular person who has, and ought to have, a leading and even an
overruling ascendency in the conduct of public affairs; and that
ascendency extends to war as it does to every other subject. Such
you are at present as the Minister of the King. Such your father was
as Secretary of State. Such you would be if you was Secretary of
State, and such Mr. Fox would be if he was Secretary of State and
the Duke of Bedford First Lord of the Treasury. In short it depends,
and must ever depend, on other circumstances than the particular
name by which a person is called; and if you was to have a
Secretary of State for the War Department tomorrow, not a person
living would ever look upon him, or any other person but you, as the
War Minister. All modern wars are a contention of purse, and unless
some very peculiar circumstance occurs to direct the lead into
another channel, the Minister of Finance must be the Minister of
War. Your father for obvious reasons was an exception to the rule.
It is impossible for any person to controvert the position I now state;
and therefore, when you talk of a War Minister, you must mean a
person to superintend the detail of the execution of the operations
which are determined upon. But do you think it possible to persuade
the public that such a separate Department can be necessary?
Yourself, so far as a general superintendence is necessary, must take
that into your own hands. If it was in the hands of any other, it
would lead to a constant wrangling between him and the various
Executive Boards.
Page 280
The illogicality of this letter would be amusing if it had not been so
disastrous. Because war depends ultimately on money, therefore (said
Dundas) the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to control its operations and
act virtually as Secretary of State for War. Then why not also as First Lord
of the Admiralty? No sooner is the question formulated than we see that
Dundas is confusing two very different things, namely, general financial
control and the administration of military affairs. In fact, Dundas still clung
to the old customs which allotted to the Secretaries of State wide and often
overlapping duties. He did not see the need of a specialized and
authoritative War Office, though the triumphs achieved by Carnot and the
Committee of Public Safety during the past twelvemonth might have
opened his eyes. Fortunately, Pitt discerned the necessity of strengthening
that Department; and, as we have seen, he made Dundas and Windham War
Ministers, with seats in the Cabinet. Thus from July 1794 military affairs
had a chance of adequate treatment in that body; and Pitt deserves great
credit for remodelling the Cabinet in a way suited to the exigencies of
modern warfare.
Why did he not appoint that experienced soldier, the Marquis Cornwallis,
Secretary of State for War? The answer is that he designed him as successor
to the Duke of York in Flanders. As has already appeared, Pitt framed this
resolve in February 1794, on the return of Cornwallis from India; and,
though rebuffed then, he continued to revolve the matter until the beginning
of the autumn, when the opposition of George III and of Francis II of
Austria prevented the appointment of that experienced soldier to the
supreme command of the Allies. As for the accession of Windham to the
War Department, it seems to have been merely a device to satisfy the Old
Whigs. Probably the question was not even discussed until 4th July, when
the Duke of Portland first named it to Windham. As it finds no place in the
Pitt-Grenville letters until 7th July, we may infer that Pitt and Dundas
accepted Windham with some reluctance as an ardent partisan of Burke and
disastrous. Because war depends ultimately on money, therefore (said
Dundas) the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to control its operations and
act virtually as Secretary of State for War. Then why not also as First Lord
of the Admiralty? No sooner is the question formulated than we see that
Dundas is confusing two very different things, namely, general financial
control and the administration of military affairs. In fact, Dundas still clung
to the old customs which allotted to the Secretaries of State wide and often
overlapping duties. He did not see the need of a specialized and
authoritative War Office, though the triumphs achieved by Carnot and the
Committee of Public Safety during the past twelvemonth might have
opened his eyes. Fortunately, Pitt discerned the necessity of strengthening
that Department; and, as we have seen, he made Dundas and Windham War
Ministers, with seats in the Cabinet. Thus from July 1794 military affairs
had a chance of adequate treatment in that body; and Pitt deserves great
credit for remodelling the Cabinet in a way suited to the exigencies of
modern warfare.
Why did he not appoint that experienced soldier, the Marquis Cornwallis,
Secretary of State for War? The answer is that he designed him as successor
to the Duke of York in Flanders. As has already appeared, Pitt framed this
resolve in February 1794, on the return of Cornwallis from India; and,
though rebuffed then, he continued to revolve the matter until the beginning
of the autumn, when the opposition of George III and of Francis II of
Austria prevented the appointment of that experienced soldier to the
supreme command of the Allies. As for the accession of Windham to the
War Department, it seems to have been merely a device to satisfy the Old
Whigs. Probably the question was not even discussed until 4th July, when
the Duke of Portland first named it to Windham. As it finds no place in the
Pitt-Grenville letters until 7th July, we may infer that Pitt and Dundas
accepted Windham with some reluctance as an ardent partisan of Burke and
Page 281
the émigrés. Windham now persistently urged an expedition to Brittany;
and the Quiberon and Yeu enterprises were largely due to him. Pitt and
Dundas, after their experience of the émigrés, had no great hope in these
efforts; and after the defection of Spain they discerned the increasing need
of concentrating their efforts on home defence and operations which
safeguarded British interests in the East and West Indies. To these causes
may be ascribed their decision to withdraw the British force from the island
of Yeu. The indignant letters of Windham to Pitt in 1796–8 show that, after
the Yeu fiasco and the beginning of the peace negotiations with France, his
advice was slighted. His moanings to Mrs. Crewe over the degeneracy of
the age also tell their tale. In October 1796 he merely "drags on" at the War
Office until he sees what turn things will take.
Pitt's determination to ensure efficiency in the services appears from two
incidents of the closing weeks of 1794. He deposed Lord Chatham from the
Admiralty in favour of the far more efficient Lord Spencer; and he removed
the Duke of York from the command in Holland. Another change remains to
be noted, namely, the retirement of the Master General of the Ordnance.
The Duke of Richmond had for some time ceased to attend the meetings of
the Cabinet. During six months Pitt put up with this peevishness; but on the
receipt of alarming news from Holland, he exerted his authority. On 27th
January 1795 he informed Richmond that his long absence from the Cabinet
and his general aloofness would make his return unpleasant and
"embarrassing to public business. This consideration," he added, "must
decide my opinion ... and at this critical time it seems indispensable to make
some such arrangement as shall substitute some other efficient military aid
in so important a Department."[416] This cutting note produced the desired
result. Richmond resigned and Cornwallis took his place at the Ordnance
and in the Cabinet. No change was more beneficial. During the next three
years the Ministry had the advice of the ablest soldier of the generation
preceding that of Wellington. Unfortunately the Cornwallis letters are so
and the Quiberon and Yeu enterprises were largely due to him. Pitt and
Dundas, after their experience of the émigrés, had no great hope in these
efforts; and after the defection of Spain they discerned the increasing need
of concentrating their efforts on home defence and operations which
safeguarded British interests in the East and West Indies. To these causes
may be ascribed their decision to withdraw the British force from the island
of Yeu. The indignant letters of Windham to Pitt in 1796–8 show that, after
the Yeu fiasco and the beginning of the peace negotiations with France, his
advice was slighted. His moanings to Mrs. Crewe over the degeneracy of
the age also tell their tale. In October 1796 he merely "drags on" at the War
Office until he sees what turn things will take.
Pitt's determination to ensure efficiency in the services appears from two
incidents of the closing weeks of 1794. He deposed Lord Chatham from the
Admiralty in favour of the far more efficient Lord Spencer; and he removed
the Duke of York from the command in Holland. Another change remains to
be noted, namely, the retirement of the Master General of the Ordnance.
The Duke of Richmond had for some time ceased to attend the meetings of
the Cabinet. During six months Pitt put up with this peevishness; but on the
receipt of alarming news from Holland, he exerted his authority. On 27th
January 1795 he informed Richmond that his long absence from the Cabinet
and his general aloofness would make his return unpleasant and
"embarrassing to public business. This consideration," he added, "must
decide my opinion ... and at this critical time it seems indispensable to make
some such arrangement as shall substitute some other efficient military aid
in so important a Department."[416] This cutting note produced the desired
result. Richmond resigned and Cornwallis took his place at the Ordnance
and in the Cabinet. No change was more beneficial. During the next three
years the Ministry had the advice of the ablest soldier of the generation
preceding that of Wellington. Unfortunately the Cornwallis letters are so
Page 282
few that his share in the shaping of war policy is unknown; but it is clear
that he helped Ministers finally to override the resolve of the King to keep
the relic of the British force for the defence of Hanover.[417]
To conclude the survey of these changes, we may note that the Duke of
York, after returning from Holland, became Commander-in-Chief of the
British army, a situation in which he earned general approbation. Thus,
when it is asserted that Pitt altogether lacked his father's power of
discerning military talents, the reply must be that he rendered an
incalculable service by organizing a competent War Ministry, that he put the
right men in the right place, though at the cost of offending the King, the
Duke of York, a powerful nobleman, and his own brother; and that he
quickly noted the transcendent abilities of Moore even when under censure
for acts of disobedience in Corsica. The results attained by the elder Pitt
were far more brilliant; for he came to the front at a time when the problems
were far less difficult and illusory than those of the Revolutionary Era; but,
if the very diverse conditions of their times be considered, the services of
Pitt will not suffer by comparison even with those of his father.
The torpor of the Dutch in defending their country and the refusal of the
Duke of Brunswick to organize the defence of North Germany virtually
ended the war on that side. In one respect the defection of Prussia in April
1795 proved beneficial; for she undertook to keep the States of North and
Central Germany entirely neutral. Had George III condescended at once to
place his Electorate under her covering wing, the whole British and
subsidized force might have been withdrawn in the spring of that year.
Pride, however, for some time held him back from that politic but
that he helped Ministers finally to override the resolve of the King to keep
the relic of the British force for the defence of Hanover.[417]
To conclude the survey of these changes, we may note that the Duke of
York, after returning from Holland, became Commander-in-Chief of the
British army, a situation in which he earned general approbation. Thus,
when it is asserted that Pitt altogether lacked his father's power of
discerning military talents, the reply must be that he rendered an
incalculable service by organizing a competent War Ministry, that he put the
right men in the right place, though at the cost of offending the King, the
Duke of York, a powerful nobleman, and his own brother; and that he
quickly noted the transcendent abilities of Moore even when under censure
for acts of disobedience in Corsica. The results attained by the elder Pitt
were far more brilliant; for he came to the front at a time when the problems
were far less difficult and illusory than those of the Revolutionary Era; but,
if the very diverse conditions of their times be considered, the services of
Pitt will not suffer by comparison even with those of his father.
The torpor of the Dutch in defending their country and the refusal of the
Duke of Brunswick to organize the defence of North Germany virtually
ended the war on that side. In one respect the defection of Prussia in April
1795 proved beneficial; for she undertook to keep the States of North and
Central Germany entirely neutral. Had George III condescended at once to
place his Electorate under her covering wing, the whole British and
subsidized force might have been withdrawn in the spring of that year.
Pride, however, for some time held him back from that politic but
Page 283
humiliating step. Consequently several battalions remained in Hanover for
so long a time as to weaken the blow dealt at Paris through Quiberon. This
was highly prejudicial to the Breton movement, which would have found in
the troops detained in Germany the firm nucleus that was so much needed.
Even after the ghastly failure at Quiberon, had the French émigré corps
arrived at Spithead at the end of July instead of August, the expedition to
the Vendéan coast might have ended differently. It is usual to blame Pitt or
Dundas for the delay in those preparations. But George must be held finally
responsible. As to the Quiberon disaster, it has been proved to result from
the hot-headedness of Puisaye, the criminal carelessness of Hervilly, and
the ceaseless schisms of the Royalists.
With the alliance of the Dutch and French Republics in May 1795, and the
almost open avowal of the French cause by the Court of Madrid in July, the
war entered upon a third phase. Thenceforth the colonial motive was
paramount at Westminster, for Pitt and his colleagues questioned the
wisdom of holding Corsica. On the other hand they sought to safeguard
India by seizing the Cape of Good Hope, and to preserve Hayti from the
inroads of the French, to whom Spain handed over her possession, San
Domingo. Unfortunately the greater the prominence accorded to colonial
affairs, the wider grew the breach with Spain, until in October 1796 the
Court of Madrid declared war. Is Pitt to be blamed for the rupture with
Spain? From the standpoint of Burke and Windham he is open to grave
censure. Surveying the course of events from their royalist minaret, these
prophets ceased not to proclaim the restoration of the Bourbons to be the
sole purpose of the war. Let there be no talk of indemnities. Be content with
crushing Jacobinism and restoring order. Such was their contention; and
much may be said for it.
On the other hand, we must remember that at first England was not a
principal in the contest. It was thrust upon her by the aggressions of the
so long a time as to weaken the blow dealt at Paris through Quiberon. This
was highly prejudicial to the Breton movement, which would have found in
the troops detained in Germany the firm nucleus that was so much needed.
Even after the ghastly failure at Quiberon, had the French émigré corps
arrived at Spithead at the end of July instead of August, the expedition to
the Vendéan coast might have ended differently. It is usual to blame Pitt or
Dundas for the delay in those preparations. But George must be held finally
responsible. As to the Quiberon disaster, it has been proved to result from
the hot-headedness of Puisaye, the criminal carelessness of Hervilly, and
the ceaseless schisms of the Royalists.
With the alliance of the Dutch and French Republics in May 1795, and the
almost open avowal of the French cause by the Court of Madrid in July, the
war entered upon a third phase. Thenceforth the colonial motive was
paramount at Westminster, for Pitt and his colleagues questioned the
wisdom of holding Corsica. On the other hand they sought to safeguard
India by seizing the Cape of Good Hope, and to preserve Hayti from the
inroads of the French, to whom Spain handed over her possession, San
Domingo. Unfortunately the greater the prominence accorded to colonial
affairs, the wider grew the breach with Spain, until in October 1796 the
Court of Madrid declared war. Is Pitt to be blamed for the rupture with
Spain? From the standpoint of Burke and Windham he is open to grave
censure. Surveying the course of events from their royalist minaret, these
prophets ceased not to proclaim the restoration of the Bourbons to be the
sole purpose of the war. Let there be no talk of indemnities. Be content with
crushing Jacobinism and restoring order. Such was their contention; and
much may be said for it.
On the other hand, we must remember that at first England was not a
principal in the contest. It was thrust upon her by the aggressions of the
Page 284
Jacobins, and perforce she played a subordinate part in continental
campaigns, the prizes of which Austria and Prussia had already marked out.
The reproaches hurled by Burke and Windham were the outcome of
ignorance as to the aims of the powerful Allies, whose co-operation,
illusory though it came to be, was at that time deemed essential to success.
Further, in striking at the French colonies, Pitt followed the course
successfully adopted by England in several wars. But here again his
difficulties were greater than those of Chatham. Indeed, they were enhanced
by the triumphs of Chatham. Where now could he deal the most telling
blow? Not against Canada; for his father had reft that prize. The French
settlements in the East Indies were of small account. It was in Hayti,
Martinique, and Guadeloupe that French commerce could be ruined. At
them, therefore, he struck. But in so doing he reopened the old disputes
with Spain. In vain did he seek to avert bickerings by suggesting a friendly
understanding about Hayti. Godoy was determined to bicker. And, as the
war changed its character, the old Latin affinities helped that adventurer to
undermine the monarchical league and to draw back Spain to the traditional
connection with France.
The Spanish declaration of war in October 1796 opens the fourth phase of
the struggle. Thenceforth England stood on the defensive in Europe in order
to guard and strengthen her Colonial Empire. She abandoned Corsica and
Elba; she withdrew her fleet from the Mediterranean so that Ireland might
be screened from attack. Pitt's views also underwent a change. Foreseeing
the collapse of Austria, he sought to assure peace with France and Spain by
conquering enough territory oversea to counterbalance the triumphs of
Bonaparte and Moreau in Italy and the Rhineland. If he could not restore
the Balance of Power on the Continent, he strove to safeguard British
interests at all essential points. Failing to save Holland from the Jacobins'
grip, he conquered and held the Cape. This was the bent of his policy during
the peace overtures of the year 1796. He struggled on reluctantly with the
campaigns, the prizes of which Austria and Prussia had already marked out.
The reproaches hurled by Burke and Windham were the outcome of
ignorance as to the aims of the powerful Allies, whose co-operation,
illusory though it came to be, was at that time deemed essential to success.
Further, in striking at the French colonies, Pitt followed the course
successfully adopted by England in several wars. But here again his
difficulties were greater than those of Chatham. Indeed, they were enhanced
by the triumphs of Chatham. Where now could he deal the most telling
blow? Not against Canada; for his father had reft that prize. The French
settlements in the East Indies were of small account. It was in Hayti,
Martinique, and Guadeloupe that French commerce could be ruined. At
them, therefore, he struck. But in so doing he reopened the old disputes
with Spain. In vain did he seek to avert bickerings by suggesting a friendly
understanding about Hayti. Godoy was determined to bicker. And, as the
war changed its character, the old Latin affinities helped that adventurer to
undermine the monarchical league and to draw back Spain to the traditional
connection with France.
The Spanish declaration of war in October 1796 opens the fourth phase of
the struggle. Thenceforth England stood on the defensive in Europe in order
to guard and strengthen her Colonial Empire. She abandoned Corsica and
Elba; she withdrew her fleet from the Mediterranean so that Ireland might
be screened from attack. Pitt's views also underwent a change. Foreseeing
the collapse of Austria, he sought to assure peace with France and Spain by
conquering enough territory oversea to counterbalance the triumphs of
Bonaparte and Moreau in Italy and the Rhineland. If he could not restore
the Balance of Power on the Continent, he strove to safeguard British
interests at all essential points. Failing to save Holland from the Jacobins'
grip, he conquered and held the Cape. This was the bent of his policy during
the peace overtures of the year 1796. He struggled on reluctantly with the
Page 285
war, opposing as inopportune the motions of Fox, Grey, or Wilberforce for
peace, but ever hoping that France would be compelled by the pressure of
bankruptcy to come to terms and surrender some of her continental
conquests on consideration of recovering her colonies. Wilberforce heard
him declare that he could almost calculate the time when her resources
would be exhausted. On the philanthropist repeating this at a dinner party,
one of his guests, de Lageard, wittily remarked: "I should like to know who
was Chancellor of the Exchequer to Attila."[418] This remark shore asunder
Pitt's financial arguments and reveals the weak point of his policy. He
conducted the war as if it were a Seven Years' War. It was a Revolutionary
War; and at this very time a greater than Attila was at hand. Bonaparte was
preparing to use the spoils of Italy for the extension of the arena of strife.
Nelson, then seeking to intercept the supplies of Bonaparte's army in the
Riviera, foresaw the danger and thus graphically summarized it: "Italy is the
gold mine; and if once entered, is without means of resistance." As by a
flash we see in this remark and in that of de Lageard the miscalculation
which was to ruin the life work of Pitt and almost ruin his country.
Despite the opposition of the King and Grenville to the negotiations for
peace, Pitt held firm; and early in 1796 advances were made through
Wickham, our enterprising envoy in Switzerland. They were foredoomed to
failure; on 26th March the Directory declared its resolve to listen to no
proposals involving the surrender of any of the lands incorporated in France
by the terms of the constitution of 1795. This implied that she would retain
the Rhine boundary, along with Savoy, Nice, and Avignon. Grenville
received the news with satisfaction, remarking to Wickham that the
Directory had acted clumsily and "in fact played our game better than we
could have hoped."[419] The effect on public opinion was even better when
it appeared that France expected England to surrender her colonial
conquests. That France should gain enormously on land while the British
acquisitions oversea were surrendered, was so monstrous a claim as to
peace, but ever hoping that France would be compelled by the pressure of
bankruptcy to come to terms and surrender some of her continental
conquests on consideration of recovering her colonies. Wilberforce heard
him declare that he could almost calculate the time when her resources
would be exhausted. On the philanthropist repeating this at a dinner party,
one of his guests, de Lageard, wittily remarked: "I should like to know who
was Chancellor of the Exchequer to Attila."[418] This remark shore asunder
Pitt's financial arguments and reveals the weak point of his policy. He
conducted the war as if it were a Seven Years' War. It was a Revolutionary
War; and at this very time a greater than Attila was at hand. Bonaparte was
preparing to use the spoils of Italy for the extension of the arena of strife.
Nelson, then seeking to intercept the supplies of Bonaparte's army in the
Riviera, foresaw the danger and thus graphically summarized it: "Italy is the
gold mine; and if once entered, is without means of resistance." As by a
flash we see in this remark and in that of de Lageard the miscalculation
which was to ruin the life work of Pitt and almost ruin his country.
Despite the opposition of the King and Grenville to the negotiations for
peace, Pitt held firm; and early in 1796 advances were made through
Wickham, our enterprising envoy in Switzerland. They were foredoomed to
failure; on 26th March the Directory declared its resolve to listen to no
proposals involving the surrender of any of the lands incorporated in France
by the terms of the constitution of 1795. This implied that she would retain
the Rhine boundary, along with Savoy, Nice, and Avignon. Grenville
received the news with satisfaction, remarking to Wickham that the
Directory had acted clumsily and "in fact played our game better than we
could have hoped."[419] The effect on public opinion was even better when
it appeared that France expected England to surrender her colonial
conquests. That France should gain enormously on land while the British
acquisitions oversea were surrendered, was so monstrous a claim as to
Page 286
arouse the temper of the nation. Even Fox admitted that if France retained
her conquests in Europe, England must keep those gained at sea. As Pitt
pointed out in his speech of 10th May 1796, the French demands blighted
all hope of peace; and we must struggle on, "waiting for the return of reason
in our deluded enemy."
Pitt regarded the French conquest of Italy as counterbalanced by the
triumph of Jervis and Nelson at Cape St. Vincent in February 1797; and he
therefore refused to consider the cession of Gibraltar to Spain.
Wholeheartedly he sought for peace in that year. But it was to be peace with
honour. In fact, Great Britain fared better after 1796 than before. As Allies
fell away or joined the enemy, her real strength began to appear. The
reasons for the paradox are not far to seek. Open enemies are less
dangerous than false friends. Further, the complexities of the war, resulting
from the conflicting aims of the Allies, vanished. England therefore could
act in the way in which Pitt would all along have preferred her to act,
namely, against the enemy's colonies. In Europe her attitude was defensive;
and for a time in the summer and autumn of 1796 fears of invasion were
rife. Accordingly the Quarter-Master-General, Sir David Dundas, drew up a
scheme of coast defence, especially for the district between Pegwell Bay
and Pevensey Bay; he also devised measures for "driving" the country in
front of the enemy. In November of that year he recommended the
construction of batteries or entrenchments at Shooter's Hill, Blackheath, on
the hills near Lee, Lewisham, Sydenham, Norwood, Streatham, Merton, and
Wandsworth. The failure of Hoche's attempt at Bantry Bay and the victory
off Cape St. Vincent somewhat assuaged these fears; but, owing to the
alarming state of Ireland, England remained on the defensive through the
years 1797–8, until Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition enabled her to strike a
crushing blow at the chief colonial enterprise of her antagonist. That
adventure, together with the aggressions of France at Rome and in
her conquests in Europe, England must keep those gained at sea. As Pitt
pointed out in his speech of 10th May 1796, the French demands blighted
all hope of peace; and we must struggle on, "waiting for the return of reason
in our deluded enemy."
Pitt regarded the French conquest of Italy as counterbalanced by the
triumph of Jervis and Nelson at Cape St. Vincent in February 1797; and he
therefore refused to consider the cession of Gibraltar to Spain.
Wholeheartedly he sought for peace in that year. But it was to be peace with
honour. In fact, Great Britain fared better after 1796 than before. As Allies
fell away or joined the enemy, her real strength began to appear. The
reasons for the paradox are not far to seek. Open enemies are less
dangerous than false friends. Further, the complexities of the war, resulting
from the conflicting aims of the Allies, vanished. England therefore could
act in the way in which Pitt would all along have preferred her to act,
namely, against the enemy's colonies. In Europe her attitude was defensive;
and for a time in the summer and autumn of 1796 fears of invasion were
rife. Accordingly the Quarter-Master-General, Sir David Dundas, drew up a
scheme of coast defence, especially for the district between Pegwell Bay
and Pevensey Bay; he also devised measures for "driving" the country in
front of the enemy. In November of that year he recommended the
construction of batteries or entrenchments at Shooter's Hill, Blackheath, on
the hills near Lee, Lewisham, Sydenham, Norwood, Streatham, Merton, and
Wandsworth. The failure of Hoche's attempt at Bantry Bay and the victory
off Cape St. Vincent somewhat assuaged these fears; but, owing to the
alarming state of Ireland, England remained on the defensive through the
years 1797–8, until Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition enabled her to strike a
crushing blow at the chief colonial enterprise of her antagonist. That
adventure, together with the aggressions of France at Rome and in
Page 287
Switzerland, aroused the anger or fear of Russia, Austria, and Naples, and
thereby led up to the war of the Second Coalition.
Amidst the conflict of aims which distracted the Allies in the First
Coalition, Pitt's foresight was not seldom at fault. But only those who have
weighed the importance of the diplomatic issues at stake, and have noted
their warping influence on military affairs, have the right to accuse him of
blindness and presumption. The problem before him was of unexampled
complexity, and its solution could be effected only by a succession of
experiments. That he put forth too many efforts at one time may be granted;
and yet in each case, if the details are fully known, the reasons for making
the attempt seem adequate. Did not Chatham fail in most of the expeditions
which he sent against the coasts of France? Even those who censure Pitt for
his blunders in the war will admit that the inspiring influence of his
personality and patriotism nerved the nation and Parliament for the struggle.
True, the Opposition indulged in petty nagging and in ingeniously
unpatriotic tactics; but they only served to throw up in bold relief the
consistent and courageous conduct of the Prime Minister. It was an easy
task to refute the peevish efforts of Fox to justify the French Jacobins alike
before the war, throughout its course, and in their rejection of the British
overtures for peace. But in every encounter Pitt won more than a personal
triumph. He proved that the war was forced upon us; that on our side it was
a defensive effort; and that despite the perverse conduct of Prussia and
Spain, England had won notable gains oversea and might expect an
advantageous peace, provided only that the nation persevered.
thereby led up to the war of the Second Coalition.
Amidst the conflict of aims which distracted the Allies in the First
Coalition, Pitt's foresight was not seldom at fault. But only those who have
weighed the importance of the diplomatic issues at stake, and have noted
their warping influence on military affairs, have the right to accuse him of
blindness and presumption. The problem before him was of unexampled
complexity, and its solution could be effected only by a succession of
experiments. That he put forth too many efforts at one time may be granted;
and yet in each case, if the details are fully known, the reasons for making
the attempt seem adequate. Did not Chatham fail in most of the expeditions
which he sent against the coasts of France? Even those who censure Pitt for
his blunders in the war will admit that the inspiring influence of his
personality and patriotism nerved the nation and Parliament for the struggle.
True, the Opposition indulged in petty nagging and in ingeniously
unpatriotic tactics; but they only served to throw up in bold relief the
consistent and courageous conduct of the Prime Minister. It was an easy
task to refute the peevish efforts of Fox to justify the French Jacobins alike
before the war, throughout its course, and in their rejection of the British
overtures for peace. But in every encounter Pitt won more than a personal
triumph. He proved that the war was forced upon us; that on our side it was
a defensive effort; and that despite the perverse conduct of Prussia and
Spain, England had won notable gains oversea and might expect an
advantageous peace, provided only that the nation persevered.
Page 288
One question remains. Why did not Pitt call the nation to arms? The reasons
for his caution are doubtless to be found in the ingrained conservatism of
the English character, and in the political ferment which marked the years
1794–5. The mere proposal to merge Line, Militia, and Volunteers in one
national array would have seemed mere madness. For the populace had
recently been protesting against the facilities given to the loyal to arm and
drill themselves. It was rumoured that, by way of retort, the men of
Sheffield, Southwark, and Norwich secretly mustered for practice with
pikes. In such circumstances, conscription might well spell Revolution.
Here was the weak place in Pitt's armour. By parting company with the
reformers, he had embittered no small section of his countrymen. In 1794,
as we have seen, he was considered a reactionary and an oppressor. He
therefore could not appeal to the nation, as Carnot did in France. Even his
Bill of March 1794 for increasing the Militia by an extension of the old
custom of the ballot or the drawing of lots produced some discontent. A
similar proposal, passed a year earlier by the Dublin Parliament for raising
16,000 additional Militiamen in Ireland, led to widespread rioting,
especially in Ulster. Not until 1797 did the Scottish Militia Act ensure the
adoption of similar methods by Scotland, though regiments of Fencibles
were raised in the meantime.
The preparations for national defence continued to proceed in these
parochial ways. Pitt's authority at Westminster was at no time more firmly
founded than at the time of the meeting of the new Parliament in the
autumn of 1796. Yet the piecemeal methods went on as before. He proposed
to raise by means of the ballot a levy of 15,000 men in order to recruit the
navy and the Line regiments; and he further asked for a levy of 60,000 men
as a Supplementary Militia, one tenth being embodied by turns so as not to
withdraw from work too many hands at one time. Nor was this all. For the
purpose of strengthening the irregular cavalry, he proposed that every
person who kept ten horses should be required to furnish one horseman and
for his caution are doubtless to be found in the ingrained conservatism of
the English character, and in the political ferment which marked the years
1794–5. The mere proposal to merge Line, Militia, and Volunteers in one
national array would have seemed mere madness. For the populace had
recently been protesting against the facilities given to the loyal to arm and
drill themselves. It was rumoured that, by way of retort, the men of
Sheffield, Southwark, and Norwich secretly mustered for practice with
pikes. In such circumstances, conscription might well spell Revolution.
Here was the weak place in Pitt's armour. By parting company with the
reformers, he had embittered no small section of his countrymen. In 1794,
as we have seen, he was considered a reactionary and an oppressor. He
therefore could not appeal to the nation, as Carnot did in France. Even his
Bill of March 1794 for increasing the Militia by an extension of the old
custom of the ballot or the drawing of lots produced some discontent. A
similar proposal, passed a year earlier by the Dublin Parliament for raising
16,000 additional Militiamen in Ireland, led to widespread rioting,
especially in Ulster. Not until 1797 did the Scottish Militia Act ensure the
adoption of similar methods by Scotland, though regiments of Fencibles
were raised in the meantime.
The preparations for national defence continued to proceed in these
parochial ways. Pitt's authority at Westminster was at no time more firmly
founded than at the time of the meeting of the new Parliament in the
autumn of 1796. Yet the piecemeal methods went on as before. He proposed
to raise by means of the ballot a levy of 15,000 men in order to recruit the
navy and the Line regiments; and he further asked for a levy of 60,000 men
as a Supplementary Militia, one tenth being embodied by turns so as not to
withdraw from work too many hands at one time. Nor was this all. For the
purpose of strengthening the irregular cavalry, he proposed that every
person who kept ten horses should be required to furnish one horseman and
Page 289
a horse for such a corps, and those who owned more than ten horses were to
subscribe a proportionate sum towards its maintenance. He also required
gamekeepers and those who took out licenses to shoot either to serve on
horseback or to find a substitute. In all he expected to raise 20,000
horsemen by these means.
The attitude of the House was on the whole highly favourable to these
proposals. Fox accused Ministers of raising an invasion scare in order to
compass their own nefarious designs; but Pitt's first proposals passed
without a division; that on the cavalry by 140 votes to 30. Nevertheless, Pitt
did nothing towards securing cohesion in these diverse forces, except by a
provision which obliged Volunteers to enrol in the Supplementary Militia,
to take the oath as such, and to train by turns for twenty days at a time in
any part of the country, instead of training once or twice a week in their
own towns. This must have been beneficial where it was carried out; but, as
the Militia was controlled by the Home Office, it is doubtful whether
enough energy was thrown into the scheme to ensure success.
These arrangements are miserably inadequate in comparison with the levée
en masse of Carnot, which baffled the calculations of foreign statesmen,
flung back the armies of the Coalition, and opened up the path of glory for
Bonaparte. Here the popular armament did not become in any sense
national until after the renewal of war in 1803. The possibilities open to
England, even in that trying year 1795, were set forth by Major Cartwright
in a suggestive pamphlet—"The Commonwealth in Danger." After pointing
out that, having been deserted by Prussia and Spain, we must now depend
on ourselves alone, he depicted the contrast between England and France.
The French Republic, relying on the populace, had more than a million of
men under arms. Great Britain was "a disarmed, defenceless, unprepared
people, scarcely more capable of resisting a torrent of French invaders than
the herds and flocks of Smithfield." How, then, could the danger be
subscribe a proportionate sum towards its maintenance. He also required
gamekeepers and those who took out licenses to shoot either to serve on
horseback or to find a substitute. In all he expected to raise 20,000
horsemen by these means.
The attitude of the House was on the whole highly favourable to these
proposals. Fox accused Ministers of raising an invasion scare in order to
compass their own nefarious designs; but Pitt's first proposals passed
without a division; that on the cavalry by 140 votes to 30. Nevertheless, Pitt
did nothing towards securing cohesion in these diverse forces, except by a
provision which obliged Volunteers to enrol in the Supplementary Militia,
to take the oath as such, and to train by turns for twenty days at a time in
any part of the country, instead of training once or twice a week in their
own towns. This must have been beneficial where it was carried out; but, as
the Militia was controlled by the Home Office, it is doubtful whether
enough energy was thrown into the scheme to ensure success.
These arrangements are miserably inadequate in comparison with the levée
en masse of Carnot, which baffled the calculations of foreign statesmen,
flung back the armies of the Coalition, and opened up the path of glory for
Bonaparte. Here the popular armament did not become in any sense
national until after the renewal of war in 1803. The possibilities open to
England, even in that trying year 1795, were set forth by Major Cartwright
in a suggestive pamphlet—"The Commonwealth in Danger." After pointing
out that, having been deserted by Prussia and Spain, we must now depend
on ourselves alone, he depicted the contrast between England and France.
The French Republic, relying on the populace, had more than a million of
men under arms. Great Britain was "a disarmed, defenceless, unprepared
people, scarcely more capable of resisting a torrent of French invaders than
the herds and flocks of Smithfield." How, then, could the danger be
Page 290
averted? Solely (he replied) by trusting the people and by reviving the
ancient laws which compelled householders to bear arms. But this implied
the concession of the franchise. Be bold, he said. Make the Kingdom a
Commonwealth and the nation will be saved. He continued in these
noteworthy words: "The enemy is at the gates, and we must be friends or
perish. Adversity is a school of the sublime virtues. Necessity is an eloquent
reconciler of differences.... By saying to Britain—Be an armed nation, she
secures her defence and seals her freedom. A million of armed men,
supporting the State with their purse, and defending it with their lives, will
know that none have so great a stake as themselves in the Government....
Arming the people and reforming Parliament are inseparable."
At first sight this seems mere rhetoric, but on reflection it will appear the
path of prudence. By the talisman of trust in the people France conjured up
those armed hosts which overthrew old Europe. At the stamp of Napoleon's
heel a new Europe arose, wherein the most potent defiance came from the
peoples which drew upon their inmost reserves of strength. That these
consist in men, not in money, is clear from the course of the struggle against
the great Emperor. Spain, Russia, and Prussia adopted truly national
systems of defence, and quickly forged to the front. Britain and Austria
clung to their old systems, and, thanks to Wellington's genius and
Metternich's diplomacy, they survived. But they did not play the decisive
part which they might have done if George III and Pitt, Francis II and
Thugut, had early determined to trust and arm their peoples. Unfortunately
for England, she underwent no military disaster; and therefore Pitt was fain
to plod along in the old paths and use the nation's wealth, not its manhood.
He organized it piecemeal, on a class basis, instead of embattling it as a
whole. In the main his failure to realize the possibilities of the situation
arose from his abandonment of those invigorating principles which nerved
him to the achievements of the earlier and better part of his career. It is
conceivable that, had he retained the idealism of his youth and discovered a
ancient laws which compelled householders to bear arms. But this implied
the concession of the franchise. Be bold, he said. Make the Kingdom a
Commonwealth and the nation will be saved. He continued in these
noteworthy words: "The enemy is at the gates, and we must be friends or
perish. Adversity is a school of the sublime virtues. Necessity is an eloquent
reconciler of differences.... By saying to Britain—Be an armed nation, she
secures her defence and seals her freedom. A million of armed men,
supporting the State with their purse, and defending it with their lives, will
know that none have so great a stake as themselves in the Government....
Arming the people and reforming Parliament are inseparable."
At first sight this seems mere rhetoric, but on reflection it will appear the
path of prudence. By the talisman of trust in the people France conjured up
those armed hosts which overthrew old Europe. At the stamp of Napoleon's
heel a new Europe arose, wherein the most potent defiance came from the
peoples which drew upon their inmost reserves of strength. That these
consist in men, not in money, is clear from the course of the struggle against
the great Emperor. Spain, Russia, and Prussia adopted truly national
systems of defence, and quickly forged to the front. Britain and Austria
clung to their old systems, and, thanks to Wellington's genius and
Metternich's diplomacy, they survived. But they did not play the decisive
part which they might have done if George III and Pitt, Francis II and
Thugut, had early determined to trust and arm their peoples. Unfortunately
for England, she underwent no military disaster; and therefore Pitt was fain
to plod along in the old paths and use the nation's wealth, not its manhood.
He organized it piecemeal, on a class basis, instead of embattling it as a
whole. In the main his failure to realize the possibilities of the situation
arose from his abandonment of those invigorating principles which nerved
him to the achievements of the earlier and better part of his career. It is
conceivable that, had he retained the idealism of his youth and discovered a
Page 291
British Scharnhorst, Waterloo might have been fought in 1796 and won
solely by British troops.
solely by British troops.
Page 292
CHAPTER XIII
DEARTH AND DISCONTENT
The Waste Land Bill will turn the tide of our
affairs and enable us to bear without
difficulty the increased burdens of the war.—
Sinclair to Pitt, 13th March 1796.
On 29th October 1795 occurred an event unparalleled within the memory of
Englishmen then living. An immense crowd, filling the Mall, broke into
loud hissing and hooting when George III left Buckingham House in the
state carriage to proceed to Westminster for the opening of Parliament. The
tumult reached its climax as the procession approached the Ordnance
Office, when a small pebble, or marble, or shot from an air-gun, pierced the
carriage window. The King immediately said to Westmorland, who sat
opposite, "That's a shot," and, with the courage of his family, coolly leaned
forward to examine the round hole in the glass. Similar scenes occurred on
his return to St. James's Palace. The mob pressed forward with an eagerness
which the Guards could scarcely restrain, calling out "Peace, Peace; Bread,
Bread; No Pitt; No Famine." With some difficulty the gates of the Horse
Guards were shut against them. Opposite Spring Gardens a stone struck the
woodwork of the carriage; and the intrepid monarch alighted at St. James's
amidst a commotion so wild that one of the horses took fright and flung
down a groom, breaking his thigh. Thereafter the rabble set upon the state
carriage, greatly damaging it; and when George later on proceeded in his
DEARTH AND DISCONTENT
The Waste Land Bill will turn the tide of our
affairs and enable us to bear without
difficulty the increased burdens of the war.—
Sinclair to Pitt, 13th March 1796.
On 29th October 1795 occurred an event unparalleled within the memory of
Englishmen then living. An immense crowd, filling the Mall, broke into
loud hissing and hooting when George III left Buckingham House in the
state carriage to proceed to Westminster for the opening of Parliament. The
tumult reached its climax as the procession approached the Ordnance
Office, when a small pebble, or marble, or shot from an air-gun, pierced the
carriage window. The King immediately said to Westmorland, who sat
opposite, "That's a shot," and, with the courage of his family, coolly leaned
forward to examine the round hole in the glass. Similar scenes occurred on
his return to St. James's Palace. The mob pressed forward with an eagerness
which the Guards could scarcely restrain, calling out "Peace, Peace; Bread,
Bread; No Pitt; No Famine." With some difficulty the gates of the Horse
Guards were shut against them. Opposite Spring Gardens a stone struck the
woodwork of the carriage; and the intrepid monarch alighted at St. James's
amidst a commotion so wild that one of the horses took fright and flung
down a groom, breaking his thigh. Thereafter the rabble set upon the state
carriage, greatly damaging it; and when George later on proceeded in his
Page 293
private carriage to Buckingham House, he again ploughed his way through
a din of curses. Pitt kept discreetly in the background, or he would have
been roughly handled.
A loyalist caricature of the period gives an imaginative version of the
incident. In it Pitt figures as the coachman whipping on the horses of the
royal carriage amidst a shower of stones, eggs, and cats. The King sits
inside absolutely passive, with large protruding eyes; Lansdowne, Bedford,
Whitbread, and others strive to stop the wheels; Fox and Sheridan, armed
with bludgeons, seek to force open the door; while Norfolk fires a
blunderbuss at the King. The sketch illustrates the fierce partisanship of the
time, which stooped to incredibly coarse charges. But scarcely less strange
was the insinuation of Lansdowne, immediately after the affair, that
Ministers had themselves planned it in order to alarm the public and
perpetuate their despotic rule. The same insinuation found favour with
Francis Place, a rabid tailor of Holborn, and a prominent member of the
London Corresponding Society, who charged Pitt with imperilling the life
of George III in order to keep office. "It is a curious circumstance," he
wrote, "that Pitt carried all his obnoxious measures, silenced or kept down
his opponents and raised vast sums of money by means of the alarms which
he and his coadjutors had created. The war was commenced after an alarm
had been created, and it was kept up by the same means."[420] Fox and his
followers often uttered similar taunts.
The insults to the King were but the climax of an agitation which had
previously gone to strange lengths. On 27th October 1795 the London
Corresponding Society convened a monster meeting in the fields near
Copenhagen House, Islington, in order to protest against the war and to
press for annual Parliaments and universal suffrage. A crowd said to number
nearly 150,000 persons assembled under the chairmanship of John Binns,
and passed an "Address to the Nation," which concluded as follows: "If
a din of curses. Pitt kept discreetly in the background, or he would have
been roughly handled.
A loyalist caricature of the period gives an imaginative version of the
incident. In it Pitt figures as the coachman whipping on the horses of the
royal carriage amidst a shower of stones, eggs, and cats. The King sits
inside absolutely passive, with large protruding eyes; Lansdowne, Bedford,
Whitbread, and others strive to stop the wheels; Fox and Sheridan, armed
with bludgeons, seek to force open the door; while Norfolk fires a
blunderbuss at the King. The sketch illustrates the fierce partisanship of the
time, which stooped to incredibly coarse charges. But scarcely less strange
was the insinuation of Lansdowne, immediately after the affair, that
Ministers had themselves planned it in order to alarm the public and
perpetuate their despotic rule. The same insinuation found favour with
Francis Place, a rabid tailor of Holborn, and a prominent member of the
London Corresponding Society, who charged Pitt with imperilling the life
of George III in order to keep office. "It is a curious circumstance," he
wrote, "that Pitt carried all his obnoxious measures, silenced or kept down
his opponents and raised vast sums of money by means of the alarms which
he and his coadjutors had created. The war was commenced after an alarm
had been created, and it was kept up by the same means."[420] Fox and his
followers often uttered similar taunts.
The insults to the King were but the climax of an agitation which had
previously gone to strange lengths. On 27th October 1795 the London
Corresponding Society convened a monster meeting in the fields near
Copenhagen House, Islington, in order to protest against the war and to
press for annual Parliaments and universal suffrage. A crowd said to number
nearly 150,000 persons assembled under the chairmanship of John Binns,
and passed an "Address to the Nation," which concluded as follows: "If
Page 294
ever the British nation should loudly demand strong and decisive measures,
we boldly answer, 'We have lives and are ready to devote them either
separately or collectively for the salvation of our country.'" Outwardly the
meeting was orderly, if that epithet can be applied to a monster meeting
which advocated civil war. But probably less than one tenth of the
assemblage heard the resolution. Equally threatening was a hand-bill
circulated in London on the practice of "King-killing." Place says nothing
about this, and ridicules the "Address to the Nation" as a foolish production,
which he had opposed no less strongly than the convocation of the meeting.
This was the usual attitude of Place. He sought to figure as the apostle of
reasonableness, deprecating all unwise acts and frothy talk on the part of his
associates, but minimizing the follies of British democrats, which he
usually ascribed to the insidious advice of the emissaries of Pitt.
Let us enlarge our survey. From the Home Office Records it is clear that
dear food and uncertain work had aggravated the political discontent of the
years 1792–4, until the autumn of 1795 witnessed almost an epidemic of
sedition. To take one significant episode. An inflammatory placard, dated
Norwich, 16th October 1795, was widely circulated. That city, as we have
seen, was a hotbed of Radicalism. There it was that the democratic clubs
sought to federate with the view of forming a National Convention. One of
their members, named Besey, now posted up the following placard. After
stating that the prevailing misery is due to the present unjust and
unnecessary war, the number of abuses and sinecures, and "the monopoly of
farms which disgraces this country," it continues thus: "The Minister would
gladly instigate you to riot and plunder that he might send against you those
valiant heroes who compose his devoted Volunteer corps.... This would
accelerate his darling object of governing us by a military aristocracy. The
countries which supplied us with quantities of corn now groan under the
iron yoke of the Tigress of the North or lie desolate from this infernal war.
We send immense stores to the emigrants and the Chouans. Those rebels,
we boldly answer, 'We have lives and are ready to devote them either
separately or collectively for the salvation of our country.'" Outwardly the
meeting was orderly, if that epithet can be applied to a monster meeting
which advocated civil war. But probably less than one tenth of the
assemblage heard the resolution. Equally threatening was a hand-bill
circulated in London on the practice of "King-killing." Place says nothing
about this, and ridicules the "Address to the Nation" as a foolish production,
which he had opposed no less strongly than the convocation of the meeting.
This was the usual attitude of Place. He sought to figure as the apostle of
reasonableness, deprecating all unwise acts and frothy talk on the part of his
associates, but minimizing the follies of British democrats, which he
usually ascribed to the insidious advice of the emissaries of Pitt.
Let us enlarge our survey. From the Home Office Records it is clear that
dear food and uncertain work had aggravated the political discontent of the
years 1792–4, until the autumn of 1795 witnessed almost an epidemic of
sedition. To take one significant episode. An inflammatory placard, dated
Norwich, 16th October 1795, was widely circulated. That city, as we have
seen, was a hotbed of Radicalism. There it was that the democratic clubs
sought to federate with the view of forming a National Convention. One of
their members, named Besey, now posted up the following placard. After
stating that the prevailing misery is due to the present unjust and
unnecessary war, the number of abuses and sinecures, and "the monopoly of
farms which disgraces this country," it continues thus: "The Minister would
gladly instigate you to riot and plunder that he might send against you those
valiant heroes who compose his devoted Volunteer corps.... This would
accelerate his darling object of governing us by a military aristocracy. The
countries which supplied us with quantities of corn now groan under the
iron yoke of the Tigress of the North or lie desolate from this infernal war.
We send immense stores to the emigrants and the Chouans. Those rebels,
Page 295
not satisfied with traitorously resisting the constituted authorities of their
country, have desolated the face of it. These honourable Allies must be fed,
as others of the kind are paid, by us." He then urges them to form popular
Societies and demand redress of grievances. He concludes thus: "You may
as well look for chastity and mercy in the Empress of Russia, honour and
consistency from the King of Prussia, wisdom and plain dealing from the
Emperor of Germany, as a single speck of virtue from our Hell-born
Minister."[421]
In view of these facts, is it surprising that Ministers decided to issue a royal
proclamation against seditious assemblies and the circulation of treasonable
papers? Sheriffs, magistrates, and all law-abiding men were charged to
apprehend those who distributed such papers and to help in the suppression
of seditious meetings (4th November). Six days later Grenville introduced
the Treasonable Practices Bill, while Pitt in the Commons moved the
Seditious Meetings Bill. The Prime Minister stated that, as soon as the
Habeas Corpus Act came again into operation, the political clubs renewed
their propaganda and brought about the present dangerous situation. In
order to suppress gatherings of a definitely seditious character, he proposed
that, before a meeting of more than fifty persons which was not convened
by the local authorities, notice must be given by seven householders and
sent to the magistrates. The Bill also required the presence of a magistrate,
and invested him with power to stop any speech, disperse the meeting, and
order the arrest of the speaker. But this was not all. The authorities had been
alarmed by the popularity of Thelwall's racy discourses, resumed early in
1795, which represented Government as the source of all the country's ills.
Whether his sprightly sallies were dangerous may be doubted; but Pitt, with
characteristic lack of humour, paid Thelwall the compliment of ordaining
that lecture-halls must be licensed by two magistrates; and a magistrate
might enter at any time. The Bill was passed for three years.
country, have desolated the face of it. These honourable Allies must be fed,
as others of the kind are paid, by us." He then urges them to form popular
Societies and demand redress of grievances. He concludes thus: "You may
as well look for chastity and mercy in the Empress of Russia, honour and
consistency from the King of Prussia, wisdom and plain dealing from the
Emperor of Germany, as a single speck of virtue from our Hell-born
Minister."[421]
In view of these facts, is it surprising that Ministers decided to issue a royal
proclamation against seditious assemblies and the circulation of treasonable
papers? Sheriffs, magistrates, and all law-abiding men were charged to
apprehend those who distributed such papers and to help in the suppression
of seditious meetings (4th November). Six days later Grenville introduced
the Treasonable Practices Bill, while Pitt in the Commons moved the
Seditious Meetings Bill. The Prime Minister stated that, as soon as the
Habeas Corpus Act came again into operation, the political clubs renewed
their propaganda and brought about the present dangerous situation. In
order to suppress gatherings of a definitely seditious character, he proposed
that, before a meeting of more than fifty persons which was not convened
by the local authorities, notice must be given by seven householders and
sent to the magistrates. The Bill also required the presence of a magistrate,
and invested him with power to stop any speech, disperse the meeting, and
order the arrest of the speaker. But this was not all. The authorities had been
alarmed by the popularity of Thelwall's racy discourses, resumed early in
1795, which represented Government as the source of all the country's ills.
Whether his sprightly sallies were dangerous may be doubted; but Pitt, with
characteristic lack of humour, paid Thelwall the compliment of ordaining
that lecture-halls must be licensed by two magistrates; and a magistrate
might enter at any time. The Bill was passed for three years.
Page 296
Equally drastic was the Treasonable Practices Bill. Declaring the planning
or levying war within the kingdom to be an act of substantive treason, it
imposed dire penalties on those who devised evil against the King, who
sought to coerce Parliament or help the invaders. Even those who spoke or
wrote against the constitution came under the penalties for treason and
might be transported for seven years. As Fox indignantly exclaimed, if he
criticized a system which allotted two members to Old Sarum and none to
Manchester, he might be sent to Botany Bay. The alarm of Pitt at the state
of affairs appears in a request which he and Portland sent to the Duke of
York, on 14th November, for reinforcements of cavalry. They asked him to
despatch three troops of the 1st Dragoon Guards from Romford to Hackney,
replacing the Pembroke Fencible Cavalry, which was utterly useless; to
order up two troops of the Cornish Fencible Cavalry from Barnet to
Hampstead and Highgate; to despatch the 11th Light Dragoons from
Guildford to Ewell or Kingston, and the 1st Fencibles from Reading to
Uxbridge. These, along with the Lancashire Militia at Lewisham and
Greenwich, and the Guards in London, would suffice for the crisis.[422]
Such were the conditions under which the debates on the two Bills
proceeded. They turned largely on the connection between the Islington
meeting and the outrage on the King. Canning stoutly affirmed that
connection, which Sheridan and Fox no less vehemently denied.
Wilberforce on this occasion supported the Government. Pitt showed little
zeal in defending his Bill, promising to safeguard the right of public
meeting when lawfully exercised. The debate in the Lords elicited from the
Bishop of Rochester the significant statement that he did not know what the
great mass of the people had to do with the laws except to obey them. The
Earl of Lauderdale pilloried this utterance, thereby consoling himself for
being in a minority of 5. In the Commons Fox mustered 22, as against 167
for the Government (6th November–14th December 1795). Meanwhile
monster meetings of protest were held on 12th November and 2nd and 7th
or levying war within the kingdom to be an act of substantive treason, it
imposed dire penalties on those who devised evil against the King, who
sought to coerce Parliament or help the invaders. Even those who spoke or
wrote against the constitution came under the penalties for treason and
might be transported for seven years. As Fox indignantly exclaimed, if he
criticized a system which allotted two members to Old Sarum and none to
Manchester, he might be sent to Botany Bay. The alarm of Pitt at the state
of affairs appears in a request which he and Portland sent to the Duke of
York, on 14th November, for reinforcements of cavalry. They asked him to
despatch three troops of the 1st Dragoon Guards from Romford to Hackney,
replacing the Pembroke Fencible Cavalry, which was utterly useless; to
order up two troops of the Cornish Fencible Cavalry from Barnet to
Hampstead and Highgate; to despatch the 11th Light Dragoons from
Guildford to Ewell or Kingston, and the 1st Fencibles from Reading to
Uxbridge. These, along with the Lancashire Militia at Lewisham and
Greenwich, and the Guards in London, would suffice for the crisis.[422]
Such were the conditions under which the debates on the two Bills
proceeded. They turned largely on the connection between the Islington
meeting and the outrage on the King. Canning stoutly affirmed that
connection, which Sheridan and Fox no less vehemently denied.
Wilberforce on this occasion supported the Government. Pitt showed little
zeal in defending his Bill, promising to safeguard the right of public
meeting when lawfully exercised. The debate in the Lords elicited from the
Bishop of Rochester the significant statement that he did not know what the
great mass of the people had to do with the laws except to obey them. The
Earl of Lauderdale pilloried this utterance, thereby consoling himself for
being in a minority of 5. In the Commons Fox mustered 22, as against 167
for the Government (6th November–14th December 1795). Meanwhile
monster meetings of protest were held on 12th November and 2nd and 7th
Page 297
December, the two last in Marylebone Fields, which now form the greater
portion of Regent's Park. The orderliness of these vast throngs, comprising
perhaps a quarter of a million of men, affords a strong argument against the
two Acts. Lord Malmesbury much regretted that there was no rioting, now
that all was ready for its repression. After the passing of those "barbarous
bloodthirsty" measures (as Place called them) the country settled down into
a sullen silence. Reformers limited their assemblies to forty-five members;
but even so they did not escape the close meshes of the law. Binns and
Jones, delegates of the London Corresponding Society who went to
Birmingham, were arrested there; and the Society soon gave up its
propaganda. All but the most resolute members fell away, and by the end of
1796 it was £185 in debt.[423]
Undoubtedly these measures mark the nadir of Pitt's political career.
Nevertheless, the coincidence between the London Corresponding Society's
meeting at Islington and the attempted outrage on George III was
suspiciously close in point of time; and a dangerous feeling prevailed
throughout the country. Pitt, as we shall see, took steps to alleviate the
distress which was its chief cause; but after the insult to the King he could
not but take precautionary measures against sedition. After such an incident,
a Minister who did nothing at all would be held responsible if the monarch
were assassinated. Some coercive measures were inevitable; and it is clear
that they cowed the more restive spirits. Among other persons who wrote to
Pitt on this topic, Wilson, formerly his tutor at Burton Pynsent and
Cambridge, sent him a letter from Binfield, in which occur these sentences:
"The Sedition Bills also have had so good an effect. Our farmers can now
go to market without being exposed to the danger of having republican
principles instilled into them while they are dining." Apparently, then, the
loyal efforts of Berkshire magistrates extended to the interiors of inns.
Whether the two Acts were not needlessly prolonged is open to grave
question. Certainly, while driving the discontent underground, they
portion of Regent's Park. The orderliness of these vast throngs, comprising
perhaps a quarter of a million of men, affords a strong argument against the
two Acts. Lord Malmesbury much regretted that there was no rioting, now
that all was ready for its repression. After the passing of those "barbarous
bloodthirsty" measures (as Place called them) the country settled down into
a sullen silence. Reformers limited their assemblies to forty-five members;
but even so they did not escape the close meshes of the law. Binns and
Jones, delegates of the London Corresponding Society who went to
Birmingham, were arrested there; and the Society soon gave up its
propaganda. All but the most resolute members fell away, and by the end of
1796 it was £185 in debt.[423]
Undoubtedly these measures mark the nadir of Pitt's political career.
Nevertheless, the coincidence between the London Corresponding Society's
meeting at Islington and the attempted outrage on George III was
suspiciously close in point of time; and a dangerous feeling prevailed
throughout the country. Pitt, as we shall see, took steps to alleviate the
distress which was its chief cause; but after the insult to the King he could
not but take precautionary measures against sedition. After such an incident,
a Minister who did nothing at all would be held responsible if the monarch
were assassinated. Some coercive measures were inevitable; and it is clear
that they cowed the more restive spirits. Among other persons who wrote to
Pitt on this topic, Wilson, formerly his tutor at Burton Pynsent and
Cambridge, sent him a letter from Binfield, in which occur these sentences:
"The Sedition Bills also have had so good an effect. Our farmers can now
go to market without being exposed to the danger of having republican
principles instilled into them while they are dining." Apparently, then, the
loyal efforts of Berkshire magistrates extended to the interiors of inns.
Whether the two Acts were not needlessly prolonged is open to grave
question. Certainly, while driving the discontent underground, they
Page 298
increased its explosive force. General David Dundas, in his Report on
National Defence of November 1796, states that at no time were there so
many people disposed to help the invaders. Perhaps we may sum up by
declaring the two Acts a disagreeable but necessary expedient during the
time of alarm, and mischievous when it passed away.[424]
The insult to the King was but one symptom of a distemper widely
prevalent. Its causes were manifold. Chief among them was a feeling of
disgust at the many failures of the war. The defection of Prussia and Spain,
the fruitless waste of British troops in the West Indies, the insane follies of
the French émigrés, the ghastly scenes at Quiberon, and the tragi-comedy of
Vendémiaire in the streets of Paris, sufficed to daunt the stoutest hearts. By
the middle of the month of October 1795, Pitt decided to come to terms
with France, if the Directory, newly installed in power, should found a
stable Government and exhibit peaceful tendencies. His position in this
autumn is pathetic. Reproached by the émigrés for recalling the Comte
d'Artois from Yeu, taunted by Fox for not having sought peace from the
Terrorists, and reviled by the populace as the cause of the dearth, he held
firmly on his way, shelving the émigrés, maintaining that this was the first
opportunity of gaining a lasting peace, and adjuring the people to behave
manfully in order the more speedily to win it.
This advice seemed but cold comfort to men and women whose hardships
were severe. Political discontent was greatly increased by dear food and
uncertainty of employment. The symptoms had long been threatening. At
midsummer of the year 1795 the men of Birmingham assembled in
hundreds opposite a mill and bakehouse on Snow Hill, crying out: "A large
loaf. Are we to be starved to death?" They were dispersed by armed force,
but not without bloodshed. At that time insubordination in the troops was
met by summary executions or repression at Horsham, Brighton, and
Dumfries. In July a drunken brawl at Charing Cross led to a riot, in the
National Defence of November 1796, states that at no time were there so
many people disposed to help the invaders. Perhaps we may sum up by
declaring the two Acts a disagreeable but necessary expedient during the
time of alarm, and mischievous when it passed away.[424]
The insult to the King was but one symptom of a distemper widely
prevalent. Its causes were manifold. Chief among them was a feeling of
disgust at the many failures of the war. The defection of Prussia and Spain,
the fruitless waste of British troops in the West Indies, the insane follies of
the French émigrés, the ghastly scenes at Quiberon, and the tragi-comedy of
Vendémiaire in the streets of Paris, sufficed to daunt the stoutest hearts. By
the middle of the month of October 1795, Pitt decided to come to terms
with France, if the Directory, newly installed in power, should found a
stable Government and exhibit peaceful tendencies. His position in this
autumn is pathetic. Reproached by the émigrés for recalling the Comte
d'Artois from Yeu, taunted by Fox for not having sought peace from the
Terrorists, and reviled by the populace as the cause of the dearth, he held
firmly on his way, shelving the émigrés, maintaining that this was the first
opportunity of gaining a lasting peace, and adjuring the people to behave
manfully in order the more speedily to win it.
This advice seemed but cold comfort to men and women whose hardships
were severe. Political discontent was greatly increased by dear food and
uncertainty of employment. The symptoms had long been threatening. At
midsummer of the year 1795 the men of Birmingham assembled in
hundreds opposite a mill and bakehouse on Snow Hill, crying out: "A large
loaf. Are we to be starved to death?" They were dispersed by armed force,
but not without bloodshed. At that time insubordination in the troops was
met by summary executions or repression at Horsham, Brighton, and
Dumfries. In July a drunken brawl at Charing Cross led to a riot, in the
Page 299
course of which the mob smashed Pitt's windows in Downing Street, and
demolished a recruiting station in St. George's Fields, Lambeth. The
country districts were deeply agitated by the shortage of corn resulting from
the bad harvest of 1794. A report from Beaminster in Dorset stated that for
six weeks before the harvest of 1795 no wheat remained; and the poor of
that county would have starved, had not a sum of money been raised
sufficient to buy cargoes of wheat which then reached Plymouth.
The suffering was increased by the extraordinary cold of that midsummer
which destroyed hundreds of newly-shorn sheep and blighted the corn.
Driving storms of rain in August laid the crops. On heavy land they were
utterly spoilt, so that even by October the poor felt the pinch. From all parts
there came the gloomiest reports. In Oxfordshire there was no old wheat
left, and the insatiable demands from the large towns of the north sent up
prices alarmingly. In November Lord Bateman wrote from Leominster that
the wheat crop was but two thirds of the average, and, if Government did
not import wheat directly, not through fraudulent contractors, riots must
ensue. Reports from Petworth, East Grinstead, and Battle told of the havoc
wrought by blight and rains. At Plymouth the price of wheat exceeded all
records. Lord Salisbury reported a shortage of one third in the wheat crop of
mid-Hertfordshire. Kensington sent a better estimate for its corn lands. But
the magistrates of Enfield and Edmonton deemed the outlook so threatening
that they urged Pitt and his colleagues (1) to encourage the free importation
of wheat, (2) to facilitate the enclosure of all common fields and the
conversion of common and waste lands into tillage; (3) to pass an Act
legalizing relief of the poor in every parish by the weekly distribution of
bread and meat at reduced prices in proportion to the size of the family and
of its earnings.[425]
The protests against the Corn Laws are significant. In 1773 the bounty
system of the reign of William III was revised, the average price of wheat
demolished a recruiting station in St. George's Fields, Lambeth. The
country districts were deeply agitated by the shortage of corn resulting from
the bad harvest of 1794. A report from Beaminster in Dorset stated that for
six weeks before the harvest of 1795 no wheat remained; and the poor of
that county would have starved, had not a sum of money been raised
sufficient to buy cargoes of wheat which then reached Plymouth.
The suffering was increased by the extraordinary cold of that midsummer
which destroyed hundreds of newly-shorn sheep and blighted the corn.
Driving storms of rain in August laid the crops. On heavy land they were
utterly spoilt, so that even by October the poor felt the pinch. From all parts
there came the gloomiest reports. In Oxfordshire there was no old wheat
left, and the insatiable demands from the large towns of the north sent up
prices alarmingly. In November Lord Bateman wrote from Leominster that
the wheat crop was but two thirds of the average, and, if Government did
not import wheat directly, not through fraudulent contractors, riots must
ensue. Reports from Petworth, East Grinstead, and Battle told of the havoc
wrought by blight and rains. At Plymouth the price of wheat exceeded all
records. Lord Salisbury reported a shortage of one third in the wheat crop of
mid-Hertfordshire. Kensington sent a better estimate for its corn lands. But
the magistrates of Enfield and Edmonton deemed the outlook so threatening
that they urged Pitt and his colleagues (1) to encourage the free importation
of wheat, (2) to facilitate the enclosure of all common fields and the
conversion of common and waste lands into tillage; (3) to pass an Act
legalizing relief of the poor in every parish by the weekly distribution of
bread and meat at reduced prices in proportion to the size of the family and
of its earnings.[425]
The protests against the Corn Laws are significant. In 1773 the bounty
system of the reign of William III was revised, the average price of wheat
Page 300
being reckoned at forty-four shillings the quarter. If it fell below that figure,
a bounty of five shillings a quarter was granted on export, so as to
encourage farmers to give a wide acreage to wheat, in the assurance that in
bountiful seasons they could profitably dispose of their surplus. But when
the price rose to forty-four shillings exportation was forbidden, and at forty-
eight shillings foreign corn was admitted on easy terms so as to safeguard
the consumer; for, as Burke said: "he who separates the interest of the
consumer from the interest of the grower starves the country."
Unfortunately, in 1791, Government raised the price at which importation
was allowed to fifty-four shillings the quarter. The upward trend of prices
may have called for some change; but it was too drastic. In view of the
increase of the manufacturing townships, Pitt should have favoured the
import of foreign corn, though not in such a way as unduly to discourage
agriculturists. England, in fact, was then reaching the stage at which she
needed foreign corn when nature withheld her bounties at home, and it is
well to remember that 1792 was the last year in which England exported
any appreciable amount of wheat. During the Great War she became an
importing country, and at no time was the crisis worse than in the winter of
1795–6. Early in the year 1796 the best wheat sold at six guineas the
quarter, or four times its present price; the inferior kinds were very dear,
and many poor people perished from want if not from actual starvation. So
grave was the crisis as to evoke a widespread demand for Free Trade in
corn. This feeling pervaded even the rural districts, a report by John
Shepherd of Faversham being specially significant. In the towns there was
an outcry against corn merchants, who were guilty of forestalling and
regrating. Possibly but for these tricks of trade the supply of home wheat
might almost have sufficed.
Pitt seems to have thought so; for he wrote to the Marquis of Stafford,
stating his desire to have powers for compelling exhaustive returns of the
wheat supply to be sent in. On the whole, however, he deemed such an
a bounty of five shillings a quarter was granted on export, so as to
encourage farmers to give a wide acreage to wheat, in the assurance that in
bountiful seasons they could profitably dispose of their surplus. But when
the price rose to forty-four shillings exportation was forbidden, and at forty-
eight shillings foreign corn was admitted on easy terms so as to safeguard
the consumer; for, as Burke said: "he who separates the interest of the
consumer from the interest of the grower starves the country."
Unfortunately, in 1791, Government raised the price at which importation
was allowed to fifty-four shillings the quarter. The upward trend of prices
may have called for some change; but it was too drastic. In view of the
increase of the manufacturing townships, Pitt should have favoured the
import of foreign corn, though not in such a way as unduly to discourage
agriculturists. England, in fact, was then reaching the stage at which she
needed foreign corn when nature withheld her bounties at home, and it is
well to remember that 1792 was the last year in which England exported
any appreciable amount of wheat. During the Great War she became an
importing country, and at no time was the crisis worse than in the winter of
1795–6. Early in the year 1796 the best wheat sold at six guineas the
quarter, or four times its present price; the inferior kinds were very dear,
and many poor people perished from want if not from actual starvation. So
grave was the crisis as to evoke a widespread demand for Free Trade in
corn. This feeling pervaded even the rural districts, a report by John
Shepherd of Faversham being specially significant. In the towns there was
an outcry against corn merchants, who were guilty of forestalling and
regrating. Possibly but for these tricks of trade the supply of home wheat
might almost have sufficed.
Pitt seems to have thought so; for he wrote to the Marquis of Stafford,
stating his desire to have powers for compelling exhaustive returns of the
wheat supply to be sent in. On the whole, however, he deemed such an
Page 301
expedient high-handed and likely to cause alarm. He therefore decided to
call for a special committee to inquire into the high price of corn, and
explained his reasons to the House of Commons on 3rd November 1795. He
urged the need of modifying the old and nearly obsolete law relating to the
assize of bread, and he suggested the advisability of mixing wheat with
barley, or other corn, which, while lessening the price of bread, would not
render it unpalatable. As to prohibiting the distillation of whiskey, he
proposed to discontinue that device after February 1796, so that the revenue
might not unduly suffer. The committee was equally cautious. In presenting
its report eight days later, Ryder moved that the members should pledge
themselves to lessen the consumption of wheat in their households by one
third. These proposals appeared wholly inadequate to Bankes and Sheridan,
who urged that all classes should be compelled to eat the same kind of
bread. Francis, however, asserted that the poor in his district now refused to
eat any but the best wheaten bread. There was therefore every need for a
law compelling bakers to make bread only two thirds of wheat.
Nevertheless, the House agreed to the proposals of the committee. Members
also bound themselves to forswear pastry, and by all possible means to
endeavour to lessen the consumption of fine wheaten flour. History does not
record how far these resolves held good, and with what hygienic results. An
external sign of the patriotic mania for economy in wheat was the disuse of
hair-powder, which resulted from the tax now imposed on that article. Thus
Rousseau, Pitt, and Nature are largely responsible for a change which in its
turn hastened the disappearance of wigs.
Pitt and his colleagues sought to check the practice of forestalling. But, as
usually happens in a struggle with human selfishness, success was doubtful.
More fruitful was the expedient of attracting foreign corn by granting large
bounties on imports. As if this were not enough, British warships sometimes
compelled neutral corn-vessels, bound for France, to put in at our harbours
and sell their cargoes at the high prices then prevailing, a high-handed
call for a special committee to inquire into the high price of corn, and
explained his reasons to the House of Commons on 3rd November 1795. He
urged the need of modifying the old and nearly obsolete law relating to the
assize of bread, and he suggested the advisability of mixing wheat with
barley, or other corn, which, while lessening the price of bread, would not
render it unpalatable. As to prohibiting the distillation of whiskey, he
proposed to discontinue that device after February 1796, so that the revenue
might not unduly suffer. The committee was equally cautious. In presenting
its report eight days later, Ryder moved that the members should pledge
themselves to lessen the consumption of wheat in their households by one
third. These proposals appeared wholly inadequate to Bankes and Sheridan,
who urged that all classes should be compelled to eat the same kind of
bread. Francis, however, asserted that the poor in his district now refused to
eat any but the best wheaten bread. There was therefore every need for a
law compelling bakers to make bread only two thirds of wheat.
Nevertheless, the House agreed to the proposals of the committee. Members
also bound themselves to forswear pastry, and by all possible means to
endeavour to lessen the consumption of fine wheaten flour. History does not
record how far these resolves held good, and with what hygienic results. An
external sign of the patriotic mania for economy in wheat was the disuse of
hair-powder, which resulted from the tax now imposed on that article. Thus
Rousseau, Pitt, and Nature are largely responsible for a change which in its
turn hastened the disappearance of wigs.
Pitt and his colleagues sought to check the practice of forestalling. But, as
usually happens in a struggle with human selfishness, success was doubtful.
More fruitful was the expedient of attracting foreign corn by granting large
bounties on imports. As if this were not enough, British warships sometimes
compelled neutral corn-vessels, bound for France, to put in at our harbours
and sell their cargoes at the high prices then prevailing, a high-handed
Page 302
practice which prepared the way for the Armed Neutrality League of 1800.
These exceptional expedients seem to have been due to what Sheffield
called "a sure little junto,"—Pitt, Ryder, and Jenkinson. He further accused
them of taking the corn trade out of the hands of the merchants and then
dropping State management prematurely. Over against this captious
comment may be placed the undoubted fact that, early in the year 1796,
wheat sold at six guineas the quarter, and by the month of May was down
nearly to normal prices. In that month Pitt deemed the crisis past; for the
King's Speech of 19th May, at the end of the last session of that Parliament,
congratulated members on the success of their efforts to afford relief to the
people. The harvest of 1796 was more abundant; but confidence was not
restored until late in the year. As Whitbread pointed out, the increase of
large farms at the expense of the little men led to the holding back of the
new corn. The small farmer perforce had to sell his corn at once. The
wealthy farmer could bide his time.[426]
In these years of dearth, when the troubles in Poland restricted the supply of
corn from that natural granary, the importance of the United States became
increasingly obvious. Pitt had consistently sought to improve the relations
with our kinsmen, and in 1791 sent out the first official envoy, George
Hammond. The disputes resulting from the War of Independence and those
arising out of the British Maritime Code during the Great War, brought
about acute friction; but the good sense of Pitt, Washington, and John Jay,
his special envoy to London, led to the conclusion of an Anglo-American
Treaty (7th October 1794). Though hotly opposed by the Gallophil party at
Washington, it was finally ratified in September 1796, and thus postponed
for sixteen years the hostilities which had at times seemed imminent. For
the present the United States sent us an increased quantity of cotton wool,
but mere driblets of corn except in seasons of scarcity. Lancashire benefited
from the enhanced trade, while the British farmer did not yet discern the
approach of times of ruinous competition.[427]
These exceptional expedients seem to have been due to what Sheffield
called "a sure little junto,"—Pitt, Ryder, and Jenkinson. He further accused
them of taking the corn trade out of the hands of the merchants and then
dropping State management prematurely. Over against this captious
comment may be placed the undoubted fact that, early in the year 1796,
wheat sold at six guineas the quarter, and by the month of May was down
nearly to normal prices. In that month Pitt deemed the crisis past; for the
King's Speech of 19th May, at the end of the last session of that Parliament,
congratulated members on the success of their efforts to afford relief to the
people. The harvest of 1796 was more abundant; but confidence was not
restored until late in the year. As Whitbread pointed out, the increase of
large farms at the expense of the little men led to the holding back of the
new corn. The small farmer perforce had to sell his corn at once. The
wealthy farmer could bide his time.[426]
In these years of dearth, when the troubles in Poland restricted the supply of
corn from that natural granary, the importance of the United States became
increasingly obvious. Pitt had consistently sought to improve the relations
with our kinsmen, and in 1791 sent out the first official envoy, George
Hammond. The disputes resulting from the War of Independence and those
arising out of the British Maritime Code during the Great War, brought
about acute friction; but the good sense of Pitt, Washington, and John Jay,
his special envoy to London, led to the conclusion of an Anglo-American
Treaty (7th October 1794). Though hotly opposed by the Gallophil party at
Washington, it was finally ratified in September 1796, and thus postponed
for sixteen years the hostilities which had at times seemed imminent. For
the present the United States sent us an increased quantity of cotton wool,
but mere driblets of corn except in seasons of scarcity. Lancashire benefited
from the enhanced trade, while the British farmer did not yet discern the
approach of times of ruinous competition.[427]
Page 303
Agriculture had long been an occupation equally fashionable and profitable.
No part of the career of George III deserves more commendation than his
patronage of high farming. That he felt keen interest in the subject appears
from the letters which he sent to "The Annals of Agriculture" over the
signature of "Ralph Robinson," one of his shepherds at Windsor. A present
of a ram from the King's fine flock of merinos was a sign of high favour.
Thanks to this encouragement and the efforts of that prince of agricultural
reformers, Arthur Young, the staple industry of the land was in a highly
flourishing condition. The rise in the price of wheat now stimulated the
demand for the enclosure of waste lands and of the open or common-fields
which then adjoined the great majority of English villages. The reclamation
of wastes and fens was an advantage to all but the very poor, who, as
graziers, wood-cutters, or fishermen, dragged along a life of poverty but
independence. Though they might suffer by the change to tillage, the parish
and the nation at large reaped golden harvests.
The enclosure of common fields was a different matter. Though on them the
traditional rotation of crops was stupid and the husbandry slipshod, yet the
semi-communal tillage of the three open strips enabled Hodge to jog along
in the easy ways dear to him. In such cases a change to more costly
methods involves hardship to the poor, who cannot, or will not, adopt the
requirements of a more scientific age. Recent research has also shown that
villagers depended mainly on their grazing rights. Now, a small grazier does
not readily become a corn-grower. Even if he can buy a plough and a team,
he lacks the experience needful for success in corn-growing. Accordingly,
the small yeomen could neither compete with the large farmers nor imitate
their methods. While the few who succeeded became prosperous, the many
sank into poverty. These results may also be ascribed to the expense and
No part of the career of George III deserves more commendation than his
patronage of high farming. That he felt keen interest in the subject appears
from the letters which he sent to "The Annals of Agriculture" over the
signature of "Ralph Robinson," one of his shepherds at Windsor. A present
of a ram from the King's fine flock of merinos was a sign of high favour.
Thanks to this encouragement and the efforts of that prince of agricultural
reformers, Arthur Young, the staple industry of the land was in a highly
flourishing condition. The rise in the price of wheat now stimulated the
demand for the enclosure of waste lands and of the open or common-fields
which then adjoined the great majority of English villages. The reclamation
of wastes and fens was an advantage to all but the very poor, who, as
graziers, wood-cutters, or fishermen, dragged along a life of poverty but
independence. Though they might suffer by the change to tillage, the parish
and the nation at large reaped golden harvests.
The enclosure of common fields was a different matter. Though on them the
traditional rotation of crops was stupid and the husbandry slipshod, yet the
semi-communal tillage of the three open strips enabled Hodge to jog along
in the easy ways dear to him. In such cases a change to more costly
methods involves hardship to the poor, who cannot, or will not, adopt the
requirements of a more scientific age. Recent research has also shown that
villagers depended mainly on their grazing rights. Now, a small grazier does
not readily become a corn-grower. Even if he can buy a plough and a team,
he lacks the experience needful for success in corn-growing. Accordingly,
the small yeomen could neither compete with the large farmers nor imitate
their methods. While the few who succeeded became prosperous, the many
sank into poverty. These results may also be ascribed to the expense and
Page 304
injustice too often attending the enclosures of this period. Far from striking
off at one blow the fetters of the old system, as happened in France in 1789,
English law required each parish to procure its own Enclosure Act. Thus,
when the parishioners at the village meeting had decided to enclose the
common fields and waste, there occurred a long and costly delay until the
parochial charter was gained.
Then again, the difficult task of re-allotting the wastes and open fields in
proportion to the rights of the lord of the manor, the tithe-owner, and the
parishioners, sometimes furnished an occasion for downright robbery of the
poor. That staunch champion of high-farming and enclosures, Arthur
Young, names many instances of shameful extortion on the part of landlord
and attorneys. Where the village carried out its enclosure fairly and cheaply,
the benefits were undoubtedly great. The wastes then became good pasture
or tolerable tillage; and the common fields, previously cut up into small
plots, and worked on a wasteful rotation, soon testified to the magic of
individual ownership. A case in point was Snettisham, near Sandringham,
where, as the result of the new wealth, the population increased by one
fifth, while the poor-rate diminished by one half. Young also declared that
large parts of Norfolk, owing to judicious enclosures, produced glorious
crops of grain and healthy flocks fed on turnips and mangolds, where
formerly there had been dreary wastes, miserable stock, and underfed
shepherds.
The dearth of the year 1795 brought to the front the question of a General
Enclosure Act, for enabling parishes to adopt this reform without the
expense of separately applying to Parliament. To devise a measure suitable
to the wide diversities of tenure prevalent in English villages was a difficult
task; but it had been carried out successfully in Scotland by the Act of 1695;
and now, a century later, a similar boon was proposed for England by one of
the most enterprising of Scotsmen. Sir John Sinclair was born in 1754 at
off at one blow the fetters of the old system, as happened in France in 1789,
English law required each parish to procure its own Enclosure Act. Thus,
when the parishioners at the village meeting had decided to enclose the
common fields and waste, there occurred a long and costly delay until the
parochial charter was gained.
Then again, the difficult task of re-allotting the wastes and open fields in
proportion to the rights of the lord of the manor, the tithe-owner, and the
parishioners, sometimes furnished an occasion for downright robbery of the
poor. That staunch champion of high-farming and enclosures, Arthur
Young, names many instances of shameful extortion on the part of landlord
and attorneys. Where the village carried out its enclosure fairly and cheaply,
the benefits were undoubtedly great. The wastes then became good pasture
or tolerable tillage; and the common fields, previously cut up into small
plots, and worked on a wasteful rotation, soon testified to the magic of
individual ownership. A case in point was Snettisham, near Sandringham,
where, as the result of the new wealth, the population increased by one
fifth, while the poor-rate diminished by one half. Young also declared that
large parts of Norfolk, owing to judicious enclosures, produced glorious
crops of grain and healthy flocks fed on turnips and mangolds, where
formerly there had been dreary wastes, miserable stock, and underfed
shepherds.
The dearth of the year 1795 brought to the front the question of a General
Enclosure Act, for enabling parishes to adopt this reform without the
expense of separately applying to Parliament. To devise a measure suitable
to the wide diversities of tenure prevalent in English villages was a difficult
task; but it had been carried out successfully in Scotland by the Act of 1695;
and now, a century later, a similar boon was proposed for England by one of
the most enterprising of Scotsmen. Sir John Sinclair was born in 1754 at
Page 305
Thurso Castle. Inheriting large estates in the county of Caithness, he
determined to enter political life, and became member for Lostwithiel, in
Cornwall. Differing sharply from Pitt over the Warren Hastings affair, he
adopted the independent line of conduct natural to his tastes, and during the
Regency dispute joined the intermediate party known as the Armed
Neutrality.
Above all he devoted himself to the development of Scottish agriculture,
and began in 1790 a work entitled "A Statistical Account of Scotland." He
also founded a society for improving the quality of British wool, and in
May 1793 he urged the Prime Minister to incorporate a Board of
Agriculture. Young bet that Pitt would refuse; for, while favouring
commerce and manufactures, he had hitherto done nothing for the plough.
He lost his bet. Pitt gave a conditional offer of support, provided that the
House of Commons approved. The proposal won general assent, despite the
insinuations of Fox and Sheridan that its purpose was merely to increase the
patronage at the disposal of the Cabinet. Sinclair became president, with
Young as secretary.[428] The Englishman complained that Sinclair's habit of
playing with large schemes wasted the scanty funds at their disposal. But
the Board did good work, for instance, in setting on foot experiments as to
the admixture of barley, beans, and rice in the partly wheaten bread
ordained by Parliament in 1795.
With the view of framing a General Enclosure Act, Sinclair sought to
extract from parochial Enclosure Acts a medicine suitable to the myriad
needs and ailments of English rural life. His survey of typical enactments is
of high interest. He summarizes the treatment accorded to the lord of the
manor, the rector or other tithe owner, and the parishioners. Thus, in the
case of three parishes near Hull, namely, Hessle, Anlaby, and Tranley, the
wastes and open fields, comprising 3,640 acres, were divided by an act of
the year 1792 in a way which seems to have given satisfaction.
determined to enter political life, and became member for Lostwithiel, in
Cornwall. Differing sharply from Pitt over the Warren Hastings affair, he
adopted the independent line of conduct natural to his tastes, and during the
Regency dispute joined the intermediate party known as the Armed
Neutrality.
Above all he devoted himself to the development of Scottish agriculture,
and began in 1790 a work entitled "A Statistical Account of Scotland." He
also founded a society for improving the quality of British wool, and in
May 1793 he urged the Prime Minister to incorporate a Board of
Agriculture. Young bet that Pitt would refuse; for, while favouring
commerce and manufactures, he had hitherto done nothing for the plough.
He lost his bet. Pitt gave a conditional offer of support, provided that the
House of Commons approved. The proposal won general assent, despite the
insinuations of Fox and Sheridan that its purpose was merely to increase the
patronage at the disposal of the Cabinet. Sinclair became president, with
Young as secretary.[428] The Englishman complained that Sinclair's habit of
playing with large schemes wasted the scanty funds at their disposal. But
the Board did good work, for instance, in setting on foot experiments as to
the admixture of barley, beans, and rice in the partly wheaten bread
ordained by Parliament in 1795.
With the view of framing a General Enclosure Act, Sinclair sought to
extract from parochial Enclosure Acts a medicine suitable to the myriad
needs and ailments of English rural life. His survey of typical enactments is
of high interest. He summarizes the treatment accorded to the lord of the
manor, the rector or other tithe owner, and the parishioners. Thus, in the
case of three parishes near Hull, namely, Hessle, Anlaby, and Tranley, the
wastes and open fields, comprising 3,640 acres, were divided by an act of
the year 1792 in a way which seems to have given satisfaction.
Page 306
Commissioners appointed by the local authorities divided the soil among
the lords of the manors, the tithe-owners, and the parishioners, the landlords
retaining half of their portions in trust for the poor. Other instances,
however, reveal the difficulty of the question of tithes. Young and Sinclair
felt bitterly on this subject, as their recent proposal to give a detailed
description of the lands of every parish in England was successfully
opposed by Dr. Moore, Archbishop of Canterbury.
Pointing out the need of a General Enclosure Act, Sinclair claimed that of
the 22,107,000 acres of waste in England and Wales, a large portion could
be afforested, while only one million acres were quite useless—a very
hopeful estimate.[429] In order to investigate this question, a Select
Committee was appointed, comprising among others Lord William Russell,
Ryder, Carew, Coke of Norfolk, Plumer, and Whitbread. The outcome of its
research was the General Enclosure Bill introduced early in the session of
1796, which elicited the sanguine prophecy of its author quoted at the head
of this chapter.
The measure aroused keen interest. On 15th March the London Court of
Aldermen urged its members to assist in passing some such measure with a
view to increasing the food supply, and providing work for the poor, as well
as for soldiers and sailors discharged at the peace. The proposals were as
follows: The present method of enclosure would be extended so as to enable
the parties concerned to frame an inexpensive and friendly agreement. In
case of disagreement the Bill would enable the majority of the parishioners,
voting, not by head, but according to the value of their rights, to decide on
the question of enclosure. But, in order to safeguard the rights of the poor,
the choice of commissioners charged with the duty of re-allotting the soil
would rest with the majority, reckoned both according to heads and value.
The lord of the manor could not veto enclosure; but his convenience was
specially to be consulted in the re-apportionment of the land. Sinclair also
the lords of the manors, the tithe-owners, and the parishioners, the landlords
retaining half of their portions in trust for the poor. Other instances,
however, reveal the difficulty of the question of tithes. Young and Sinclair
felt bitterly on this subject, as their recent proposal to give a detailed
description of the lands of every parish in England was successfully
opposed by Dr. Moore, Archbishop of Canterbury.
Pointing out the need of a General Enclosure Act, Sinclair claimed that of
the 22,107,000 acres of waste in England and Wales, a large portion could
be afforested, while only one million acres were quite useless—a very
hopeful estimate.[429] In order to investigate this question, a Select
Committee was appointed, comprising among others Lord William Russell,
Ryder, Carew, Coke of Norfolk, Plumer, and Whitbread. The outcome of its
research was the General Enclosure Bill introduced early in the session of
1796, which elicited the sanguine prophecy of its author quoted at the head
of this chapter.
The measure aroused keen interest. On 15th March the London Court of
Aldermen urged its members to assist in passing some such measure with a
view to increasing the food supply, and providing work for the poor, as well
as for soldiers and sailors discharged at the peace. The proposals were as
follows: The present method of enclosure would be extended so as to enable
the parties concerned to frame an inexpensive and friendly agreement. In
case of disagreement the Bill would enable the majority of the parishioners,
voting, not by head, but according to the value of their rights, to decide on
the question of enclosure. But, in order to safeguard the rights of the poor,
the choice of commissioners charged with the duty of re-allotting the soil
would rest with the majority, reckoned both according to heads and value.
The lord of the manor could not veto enclosure; but his convenience was
specially to be consulted in the re-apportionment of the land. Sinclair also
Page 307
pointed out to Pitt that, as tithe-owners were now "much run at," their
interests must be carefully guarded. As for the cottagers, they would find
compensation for the lapse of their fuel rights by the acquisition of small
allotments near to their cottages. The poor also would not be charged with
the expenses of enclosure, and might raise money on loan to fence the plots
awarded to them in lieu of their share in the waste and the open fields. To
insist, said Sinclair, on four acres being annexed to every cottage was really
harmful. Finally he expressed the hope that, under his plan, the legal
expenses of enclosure would on an average be £5 per parish as against the
present burden of £500.[430]
Pitt's treatment of the General Enclosure Bill is somewhat obscure. Again
and again Sinclair urged him to greater activity. In April 1796 he begged
him to consult with the judges so as to meet the objections of tithe-owners.
In May he warned him of the general disappointment that must ensue if no
measure of that kind passed in that session. He asked him whether the Bill,
as now amended by the committee, would not answer its purpose. Pitt gave
no encouraging sign. On the contrary, he gratified the country gentlemen by
opposing a Bill for the Reform of the Game Laws. The proposer, Curwen,
sought merely to legalize the killing of game started on ground farmed by
the occupier. But the squires took alarm, asserting that every small farmer
could then pursue hares and rabbits from his ground into their preserves,
and that country life, on those terms, would be intolerable. Pitt took their
side, averring that sport was a relaxation well suited to the higher Orders of
State, but likely to entice farmers away "from more serious and useful
occupations." Much may be forgiven to a Prime Minister shortly before a
General Election, which, in fact, gave to Pitt a new lease of power.
To Sinclair the election brought defeat and chagrin. He travelled northward
to the Orkneys to seek a seat there, and, writing from Edinburgh on 6th
July, tartly informed Pitt of his rejection after a journey of nearly a thousand
interests must be carefully guarded. As for the cottagers, they would find
compensation for the lapse of their fuel rights by the acquisition of small
allotments near to their cottages. The poor also would not be charged with
the expenses of enclosure, and might raise money on loan to fence the plots
awarded to them in lieu of their share in the waste and the open fields. To
insist, said Sinclair, on four acres being annexed to every cottage was really
harmful. Finally he expressed the hope that, under his plan, the legal
expenses of enclosure would on an average be £5 per parish as against the
present burden of £500.[430]
Pitt's treatment of the General Enclosure Bill is somewhat obscure. Again
and again Sinclair urged him to greater activity. In April 1796 he begged
him to consult with the judges so as to meet the objections of tithe-owners.
In May he warned him of the general disappointment that must ensue if no
measure of that kind passed in that session. He asked him whether the Bill,
as now amended by the committee, would not answer its purpose. Pitt gave
no encouraging sign. On the contrary, he gratified the country gentlemen by
opposing a Bill for the Reform of the Game Laws. The proposer, Curwen,
sought merely to legalize the killing of game started on ground farmed by
the occupier. But the squires took alarm, asserting that every small farmer
could then pursue hares and rabbits from his ground into their preserves,
and that country life, on those terms, would be intolerable. Pitt took their
side, averring that sport was a relaxation well suited to the higher Orders of
State, but likely to entice farmers away "from more serious and useful
occupations." Much may be forgiven to a Prime Minister shortly before a
General Election, which, in fact, gave to Pitt a new lease of power.
To Sinclair the election brought defeat and chagrin. He travelled northward
to the Orkneys to seek a seat there, and, writing from Edinburgh on 6th
July, tartly informed Pitt of his rejection after a journey of nearly a thousand
Page 308
miles. He must (he adds) either obtain a seat elsewhere, or take no further
interest in the Board of Agriculture. If Pitt approves of his labour at the
Board, will he show it in some way? "If, on the other hand," he continues,
"you feel the least hesitation about giving it support, your candour, I am
persuaded, will induce you to inform me at once, that I may no longer be
tempted to waste so much time and labour in such pursuits.... I still flatter
myself, however, that you will see the object in such a light that you will
give the President of the Board of Agriculture a seat either in the Upper or
the Lower House, that he may be encouraged to carry on the concerns of
that useful institution with redoubled energy." Pitt's comment on the back of
the letter is suggestive: "That he has lost his election, but flatters himself
that a seat will be given him either in the Lower or Upper House, or he must
decline taking further concern in the proceedings of the Board of
Agriculture." A little later Sinclair renewed his appeal for a seat either at
Midhurst, or in Scotland. Failing that, he hinted that the President of the
Board of Agriculture ought to be a Peer. Is it surprising that Pitt fulfilled the
suggestion by giving his influence in favour of Lord Somerville, who
displaced Sinclair at the Board in 1798? Loughborough it was who
suggested the change;[431] but Pitt must have approved it; and thereafter the
Board deteriorated.
In truth the thane of Thurso had become a bore. His letters to Pitt teem with
advice on foreign politics and the distillation of whisky, on new taxes and
high farming, on increasing the silver coinage and checking smuggling, on
manning the navy and raising corps of Fencibles. Wisdom flashing forth in
these diverse forms begets distrust. Sinclair the omniscient correspondent
injured Sinclair the agrarian reformer. Young treated the Prime Minister
with more tact. His letters were fewer, and his help was practical. A
pleasing instance of this was his presence at Holwood in April 1798, when
Pitt was draining the hillside near his house, so as to preserve it from damp
and provide water for the farm and garden below. Young drew up the
interest in the Board of Agriculture. If Pitt approves of his labour at the
Board, will he show it in some way? "If, on the other hand," he continues,
"you feel the least hesitation about giving it support, your candour, I am
persuaded, will induce you to inform me at once, that I may no longer be
tempted to waste so much time and labour in such pursuits.... I still flatter
myself, however, that you will see the object in such a light that you will
give the President of the Board of Agriculture a seat either in the Upper or
the Lower House, that he may be encouraged to carry on the concerns of
that useful institution with redoubled energy." Pitt's comment on the back of
the letter is suggestive: "That he has lost his election, but flatters himself
that a seat will be given him either in the Lower or Upper House, or he must
decline taking further concern in the proceedings of the Board of
Agriculture." A little later Sinclair renewed his appeal for a seat either at
Midhurst, or in Scotland. Failing that, he hinted that the President of the
Board of Agriculture ought to be a Peer. Is it surprising that Pitt fulfilled the
suggestion by giving his influence in favour of Lord Somerville, who
displaced Sinclair at the Board in 1798? Loughborough it was who
suggested the change;[431] but Pitt must have approved it; and thereafter the
Board deteriorated.
In truth the thane of Thurso had become a bore. His letters to Pitt teem with
advice on foreign politics and the distillation of whisky, on new taxes and
high farming, on increasing the silver coinage and checking smuggling, on
manning the navy and raising corps of Fencibles. Wisdom flashing forth in
these diverse forms begets distrust. Sinclair the omniscient correspondent
injured Sinclair the agrarian reformer. Young treated the Prime Minister
with more tact. His letters were fewer, and his help was practical. A
pleasing instance of this was his presence at Holwood in April 1798, when
Pitt was draining the hillside near his house, so as to preserve it from damp
and provide water for the farm and garden below. Young drew up the
Page 309
scheme, went down more than once to superintend the boring and
trenching, and then added these words: "I beg you will permit me to give
such attention merely and solely as a mark of gratitude for the goodness I
have already experienced at your hands."[432]
Sinclair, now member for Petersfield, brought his General Enclosure Bill
before Parliament in 1797. In order to meet the objections of tithe-owners
and lawyers, he divided it into two parts, the former applying to parishes
where all the persons concerned were unanimous, the latter where this was
not the case. Even so the measure met with opposition from the legal
profession; and on 13th May he wrote to Pitt expressing deep concern at the
opposition of the Solicitor-General. In July he besought Pitt to make the
Bill a Cabinet measure in order to "prevent either legal or ecclesiastical
prejudices operating against it." Nevertheless Pitt remained neutral, and the
Bill was lost in the Lords, mainly owing to the opposition of the Lord
Chancellor.[433] In December Sinclair announced his intention of bringing
in a Bill for the improvement of waste land; but, he added significantly, "I
should be glad previously to know whether it is your intention to support
that measure or not." Pitt gave no sign, and the proposal did not come
forward.
Pitt's treatment of one of the most important questions of that time deserves
censure. We may grant that the fussiness of Sinclair told against his
proposals. It is also true that the drafting of a Bill applicable to every
English parish was beset with difficulties, and that enclosures, while adding
greatly to the food supply of the nation, had for the most part told against
the independence of the poorer villagers. But this was largely due to the
expense and chicanery consequent on the passing of parochial Acts of
Parliament; and what objections were there to facilitating the enclosure of
wastes and open fields by parishes where everyone desired it? In such a
trenching, and then added these words: "I beg you will permit me to give
such attention merely and solely as a mark of gratitude for the goodness I
have already experienced at your hands."[432]
Sinclair, now member for Petersfield, brought his General Enclosure Bill
before Parliament in 1797. In order to meet the objections of tithe-owners
and lawyers, he divided it into two parts, the former applying to parishes
where all the persons concerned were unanimous, the latter where this was
not the case. Even so the measure met with opposition from the legal
profession; and on 13th May he wrote to Pitt expressing deep concern at the
opposition of the Solicitor-General. In July he besought Pitt to make the
Bill a Cabinet measure in order to "prevent either legal or ecclesiastical
prejudices operating against it." Nevertheless Pitt remained neutral, and the
Bill was lost in the Lords, mainly owing to the opposition of the Lord
Chancellor.[433] In December Sinclair announced his intention of bringing
in a Bill for the improvement of waste land; but, he added significantly, "I
should be glad previously to know whether it is your intention to support
that measure or not." Pitt gave no sign, and the proposal did not come
forward.
Pitt's treatment of one of the most important questions of that time deserves
censure. We may grant that the fussiness of Sinclair told against his
proposals. It is also true that the drafting of a Bill applicable to every
English parish was beset with difficulties, and that enclosures, while adding
greatly to the food supply of the nation, had for the most part told against
the independence of the poorer villagers. But this was largely due to the
expense and chicanery consequent on the passing of parochial Acts of
Parliament; and what objections were there to facilitating the enclosure of
wastes and open fields by parishes where everyone desired it? In such a
Page 310
case it was the bounden duty of Parliament to end the law's delays and
cheapen the procedure.
That Pitt did little or nothing to avert the hostility of bishops and lawyers in
the Upper House convicts him either of apathy or of covert opposition. He
is largely responsible for the continuance of the old customs, under which a
parish faced the expense of procuring a separate Act of Parliament only
under stress of severe dearth; and, as a rule, the crisis ended long before the
cumbrous machinery of the law enabled the new lands to come under the
plough. It is, however, possible that he hoped to inaugurate a system of
enclosures of waste lands by a clause which appeared in his abortive
proposals of the year 1797 for the relief of the poor. His Bill on that subject
comprised not only very generous plans of relief, but also the grant of cows
to the deserving poor, the erection of Schools of Industry in every parish or
group of parishes, and facilities for reclaiming waste land. His treatment of
the question of poor relief is too extensive a subject to admit of adequate
description here; but I propose to return to it and to notice somewhat fully
the criticisms of Bentham and others.[434] It must suffice to say that the
draft of that measure bespeaks a keen interest in the welfare of the poor, and
indeed errs on the side of generosity. Abbot, afterwards Lord Colchester,
was asked by Pitt to help in drafting the Poor Bill; and he pronounced it "as
bad in the mode as the principles were good in substance."[435]
After the withdrawal of Pitt's Poor Bill, nothing was done to facilitate
enclosures until the accession of Addington to power. His General
Enclosure Act of the year 1801 afforded timely relief in the matter of food-
supply, a fact which shows that the difficulties in the way of such a measure
were far from serious. The passing of that Bill, it is true, was helped on by
the terrible dearth of that year, when the average price of wheat was close
on 116 shillings the quarter. But Pitt was content to meet the almost equally
acute crisis of 1795–6 by temporary shifts, one of which exasperated the
cheapen the procedure.
That Pitt did little or nothing to avert the hostility of bishops and lawyers in
the Upper House convicts him either of apathy or of covert opposition. He
is largely responsible for the continuance of the old customs, under which a
parish faced the expense of procuring a separate Act of Parliament only
under stress of severe dearth; and, as a rule, the crisis ended long before the
cumbrous machinery of the law enabled the new lands to come under the
plough. It is, however, possible that he hoped to inaugurate a system of
enclosures of waste lands by a clause which appeared in his abortive
proposals of the year 1797 for the relief of the poor. His Bill on that subject
comprised not only very generous plans of relief, but also the grant of cows
to the deserving poor, the erection of Schools of Industry in every parish or
group of parishes, and facilities for reclaiming waste land. His treatment of
the question of poor relief is too extensive a subject to admit of adequate
description here; but I propose to return to it and to notice somewhat fully
the criticisms of Bentham and others.[434] It must suffice to say that the
draft of that measure bespeaks a keen interest in the welfare of the poor, and
indeed errs on the side of generosity. Abbot, afterwards Lord Colchester,
was asked by Pitt to help in drafting the Poor Bill; and he pronounced it "as
bad in the mode as the principles were good in substance."[435]
After the withdrawal of Pitt's Poor Bill, nothing was done to facilitate
enclosures until the accession of Addington to power. His General
Enclosure Act of the year 1801 afforded timely relief in the matter of food-
supply, a fact which shows that the difficulties in the way of such a measure
were far from serious. The passing of that Bill, it is true, was helped on by
the terrible dearth of that year, when the average price of wheat was close
on 116 shillings the quarter. But Pitt was content to meet the almost equally
acute crisis of 1795–6 by temporary shifts, one of which exasperated the
Page 311
neutral States of the North and prepared the way for the renewal of the
hostile League of the Baltic.
hostile League of the Baltic.
Page 312
CHAPTER XIV
THE YEARS OF STRAIN (1796–7)
Torn as we are by faction, without an army,
without money, trusting entirely to a navy
whom we may not be able to pay, and on
whose loyalty, even if we can, no firm
reliance is to be placed, how are we to get out
of this cursed war without a Revolution?—
Cornwallis to Ross, 15th December 1797.
The year 1797, which opened with events portending the overthrow of
Austria and the financial collapse of England, brought a passing gleam of
sunshine into the gray life of Pitt. For some time he had been a frequent
visitor at Eden Farm, Beckenham, the seat of Lord Auckland. It was on the
way to Holwood, and the cheerful society of that large family afforded a
relief from cares of state not to be found in his bachelor household. His
circle of friends, never large, had somewhat diminished with the wear and
tear of politics. His affection for Wilberforce, perhaps, had not quite
regained its former fervour. As for the vinous society of Dundas, a valuable
colleague but a far from ideal companion, Pitt must in his better moments
have held it cheap. He rarely saw his mother, far away in Somerset; and
probably his relations to his brother had cooled since he removed him from
the Admiralty. In truth, despite his loving disposition, Pitt was a lonely man.
THE YEARS OF STRAIN (1796–7)
Torn as we are by faction, without an army,
without money, trusting entirely to a navy
whom we may not be able to pay, and on
whose loyalty, even if we can, no firm
reliance is to be placed, how are we to get out
of this cursed war without a Revolution?—
Cornwallis to Ross, 15th December 1797.
The year 1797, which opened with events portending the overthrow of
Austria and the financial collapse of England, brought a passing gleam of
sunshine into the gray life of Pitt. For some time he had been a frequent
visitor at Eden Farm, Beckenham, the seat of Lord Auckland. It was on the
way to Holwood, and the cheerful society of that large family afforded a
relief from cares of state not to be found in his bachelor household. His
circle of friends, never large, had somewhat diminished with the wear and
tear of politics. His affection for Wilberforce, perhaps, had not quite
regained its former fervour. As for the vinous society of Dundas, a valuable
colleague but a far from ideal companion, Pitt must in his better moments
have held it cheap. He rarely saw his mother, far away in Somerset; and
probably his relations to his brother had cooled since he removed him from
the Admiralty. In truth, despite his loving disposition, Pitt was a lonely man.
Page 313
The voice of rumour, in his case always unfair, charged him with utter
indifference to feminine charms. His niece, Lady Hester Stanhope, who
later on had opportunities of observing him closely, vehemently denied the
charge, declaring that he was much impressed by beauty in women, and
noted the least defect, whether of feature, demeanour, or dress. She declared
that, on one occasion, while commending her preparations for the ball-
room, he suggested the looping up of one particular fold. At once she
recognized the voice of the expert and hailed the experiment as an artistic
triumph. Hester's recollections, it is true, belong to the lonely years spent in
the Lebanon, when she indulged in ecstatic or spiteful outbursts; and we
therefore question her statement that Pitt was once so enamoured of a
certain Miss W——, who became Mrs. B——s of Devonshire, as to drink
wine out of her shoe. But Hester's remarks are detailed enough to refute the
reports of his unnatural insensibility, which elicited coarse jests from
opponents; and we may fully trust that severe critic of all Pitt's friends,
when, recalling a special visit to Beckenham Church, she pronounced the
Honourable Eleanor Eden gloriously beautiful.[436]
indifference to feminine charms. His niece, Lady Hester Stanhope, who
later on had opportunities of observing him closely, vehemently denied the
charge, declaring that he was much impressed by beauty in women, and
noted the least defect, whether of feature, demeanour, or dress. She declared
that, on one occasion, while commending her preparations for the ball-
room, he suggested the looping up of one particular fold. At once she
recognized the voice of the expert and hailed the experiment as an artistic
triumph. Hester's recollections, it is true, belong to the lonely years spent in
the Lebanon, when she indulged in ecstatic or spiteful outbursts; and we
therefore question her statement that Pitt was once so enamoured of a
certain Miss W——, who became Mrs. B——s of Devonshire, as to drink
wine out of her shoe. But Hester's remarks are detailed enough to refute the
reports of his unnatural insensibility, which elicited coarse jests from
opponents; and we may fully trust that severe critic of all Pitt's friends,
when, recalling a special visit to Beckenham Church, she pronounced the
Honourable Eleanor Eden gloriously beautiful.[436]
Page 314
The Hon. Eleanor Eden. (From a
miniature)
To this bright vivacious girl of twenty years Pitt's affections went forth in
the winter of 1796–7;[437] and she reciprocated them. Every one agrees that
Eleanor combined beauty with good sense, sprightliness with tact. Having
had varied experiences during Auckland's missions to Paris, Madrid, and
The Hague, she had matured far beyond her years. In mental endowments
she would have been a fit companion even to Pitt; and she possessed a rich
store of the social graces in which he was somewhat deficient. In fact, here
was his weak point as a political leader. He and his colleagues had no salon
which could vie with those of the Whig grandees. The accession of Portland
had been a social boon; but Pitt and his intimate followers exerted little
influence on London Society. He and Grenville were too stiff. Neither
miniature)
To this bright vivacious girl of twenty years Pitt's affections went forth in
the winter of 1796–7;[437] and she reciprocated them. Every one agrees that
Eleanor combined beauty with good sense, sprightliness with tact. Having
had varied experiences during Auckland's missions to Paris, Madrid, and
The Hague, she had matured far beyond her years. In mental endowments
she would have been a fit companion even to Pitt; and she possessed a rich
store of the social graces in which he was somewhat deficient. In fact, here
was his weak point as a political leader. He and his colleagues had no salon
which could vie with those of the Whig grandees. The accession of Portland
had been a social boon; but Pitt and his intimate followers exerted little
influence on London Society. He and Grenville were too stiff. Neither
Page 315
Dundas nor Wilberforce moved in the highest circles. Portland, Spencer,
and Windham held somewhat aloof, and Leeds, Sydney, and others had
been alienated. Accordingly, the news that Pitt was paying marked
attentions to Auckland's eldest daughter caused a flutter of excitement. Her
charm and tact warranted the belief that in the near future the Prime
Minister would dominate the social sphere hardly less than the political.
Among his friends who knew how warm a heart beat under that cold
exterior, the news inspired the hope that here was the talisman which would
reveal the hidden treasures of his nature. The stiff form would now unbend;
the political leader would figure as a genial host; the martinet would
become a man. Assuredly their estimate was correct. Pitt's nature needed
more glow, wider sympathies, a freer expression. A happy marriage would
in any case have widened his outlook and matured his character. But a
union with Eleanor Eden would have supplied to him the amenities of life.
We picture her exerting upon him an influence not unlike that which
Wordsworth believed that his sister had exerted upon his being:
thou didst plant its crevices with flowers,
Hang it with shrubs that twinkle in the breeze,
And teach the little birds to build their nests
And warble in its chambers.[438]
It was not to be. After toying with this day-dream, Pitt suddenly broke away
to Downing Street. His letter to Auckland, written there on 20th January
1797, announced the decision of the Minister in chillingly correct terms. In
pathetically halting and laboured phraseology he implied that he had
throughout observed a correct aloofness. After five long sentences of
apology to the father he proceeded thus:
and Windham held somewhat aloof, and Leeds, Sydney, and others had
been alienated. Accordingly, the news that Pitt was paying marked
attentions to Auckland's eldest daughter caused a flutter of excitement. Her
charm and tact warranted the belief that in the near future the Prime
Minister would dominate the social sphere hardly less than the political.
Among his friends who knew how warm a heart beat under that cold
exterior, the news inspired the hope that here was the talisman which would
reveal the hidden treasures of his nature. The stiff form would now unbend;
the political leader would figure as a genial host; the martinet would
become a man. Assuredly their estimate was correct. Pitt's nature needed
more glow, wider sympathies, a freer expression. A happy marriage would
in any case have widened his outlook and matured his character. But a
union with Eleanor Eden would have supplied to him the amenities of life.
We picture her exerting upon him an influence not unlike that which
Wordsworth believed that his sister had exerted upon his being:
thou didst plant its crevices with flowers,
Hang it with shrubs that twinkle in the breeze,
And teach the little birds to build their nests
And warble in its chambers.[438]
It was not to be. After toying with this day-dream, Pitt suddenly broke away
to Downing Street. His letter to Auckland, written there on 20th January
1797, announced the decision of the Minister in chillingly correct terms. In
pathetically halting and laboured phraseology he implied that he had
throughout observed a correct aloofness. After five long sentences of
apology to the father he proceeded thus:
Page 316
Whoever may have the good fortune ever to be united to her is
destined to more than his share of human happiness. Whether, at any
rate, I could have had any ground to hope that such would have
been my lot, I am in no degree entitled to guess. I have to reproach
myself for ever having indulged the idea on my own part as far as I
have done, without asking myself carefully and early enough what
were the difficulties in the way of its being realised. I have suffered
myself to overlook them too long, but having now at length
reflected as fully and as calmly as I am able on every circumstance
that ought to come under my consideration (at least as much for her
sake as for my own) I am compelled to say that I find the obstacles
to it decisive and insurmountable.[439]
Auckland had a right to feel the deepest pain at this official missive. The
matter had been discussed in newspapers. Indeed, a caricaturist ventured to
publish a sketch showing Pitt as Adam conducting Eve to the nuptial bower
in the garden of Eden, while behind it squatted Satan as a toad, leering
hatred through the features of Fox. It is to be hoped that Auckland did not
know of this indelicate cartoon when he replied to Pitt. That letter has very
properly been destroyed. But we have Pitt's second letter to Auckland, in
which he again assures him how deeply he is affected by hearing of "the
sentiments of another person, unhappily too nearly interested in the subject
in question." He adds these moving words: "Believe me, I have not lightly
or easily sacrificed my best hopes and earnest wishes to my conviction and
judgment." Auckland's reply of 23rd January reveals the grief of his wife
and daughter. For two or three days they remained in absolute solitude, and
that, too, in a household remarkable for domestic affection. To Pitt also the
decision was a matter of deep pain and life-long regret. Thenceforth he trod
the path of duty alone. On 7th February the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote
to Auckland (his brother-in-law) that Pitt lived in seclusion and seemed
dreamy. At a recent Council meeting his face was swollen and unhealthy
destined to more than his share of human happiness. Whether, at any
rate, I could have had any ground to hope that such would have
been my lot, I am in no degree entitled to guess. I have to reproach
myself for ever having indulged the idea on my own part as far as I
have done, without asking myself carefully and early enough what
were the difficulties in the way of its being realised. I have suffered
myself to overlook them too long, but having now at length
reflected as fully and as calmly as I am able on every circumstance
that ought to come under my consideration (at least as much for her
sake as for my own) I am compelled to say that I find the obstacles
to it decisive and insurmountable.[439]
Auckland had a right to feel the deepest pain at this official missive. The
matter had been discussed in newspapers. Indeed, a caricaturist ventured to
publish a sketch showing Pitt as Adam conducting Eve to the nuptial bower
in the garden of Eden, while behind it squatted Satan as a toad, leering
hatred through the features of Fox. It is to be hoped that Auckland did not
know of this indelicate cartoon when he replied to Pitt. That letter has very
properly been destroyed. But we have Pitt's second letter to Auckland, in
which he again assures him how deeply he is affected by hearing of "the
sentiments of another person, unhappily too nearly interested in the subject
in question." He adds these moving words: "Believe me, I have not lightly
or easily sacrificed my best hopes and earnest wishes to my conviction and
judgment." Auckland's reply of 23rd January reveals the grief of his wife
and daughter. For two or three days they remained in absolute solitude, and
that, too, in a household remarkable for domestic affection. To Pitt also the
decision was a matter of deep pain and life-long regret. Thenceforth he trod
the path of duty alone. On 7th February the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote
to Auckland (his brother-in-law) that Pitt lived in seclusion and seemed
dreamy. At a recent Council meeting his face was swollen and unhealthy
Page 317
looking. Probably this was the time at which Pitt informed Addington that
he must take the helm of State.[440]
We can only conjecture as to the insuperable obstacles to the union; but it
seems highly probable that they were of a financial kind. In the Pitt MSS.
(No. 196) there is a brief Memorandum in Pitt's writing, of the year 1797,
which must refer to his yearly expenses, either at Downing Street or at
Holwood. It gives the liquor account of the steward's room as "£300 and
upwards," and states that the other expenses of that room might be reduced
from £600 to £300, those of his own wardrobe from £600 to £400, and
those of the stable from £400 to £300. These figures do not tally with those
of the Downing Street or Holwood accounts for the latter half of 1797,
which will be stated later; and the loose way in which Pitt estimates his
expenses is highly suggestive. We now know that he was heading straight
for bankruptcy throughout this period; and probably on looking into his
affairs he discovered the fact. It is also certain that he lent money to his
mother. She seems to have lost on farming experiments at Burton Pynsent;
for she charged her sons to defray her just debts incurred in this manner,
and the Bishop of Lincoln in July 1801 stated that she owed to Pitt the sum
of £5,800 on which she ought to pay interest but did not. Chatham also
borrowed £1,000 from Pitt in August 1791, and the fact that he paid not a
penny to help to discharge the debts of his brother in the year 1801 seems to
show that he himself was still in low water.[441]
Piecing together these fragments of evidence, we may infer that Pitt's near
relations were a source of considerable expense, and that his own
heedlessness had by this time further served to embarrass him. Therefore,
his conduct towards Miss Eden, which at first sight seems heartless, was
probably dictated by sheer financial need. We may also reject the spiteful
statement in which Lady Hester Stanhope represented Pitt as saying: "Oh,
there was her mother [Lady Auckland],—such a chatterer! and then the
he must take the helm of State.[440]
We can only conjecture as to the insuperable obstacles to the union; but it
seems highly probable that they were of a financial kind. In the Pitt MSS.
(No. 196) there is a brief Memorandum in Pitt's writing, of the year 1797,
which must refer to his yearly expenses, either at Downing Street or at
Holwood. It gives the liquor account of the steward's room as "£300 and
upwards," and states that the other expenses of that room might be reduced
from £600 to £300, those of his own wardrobe from £600 to £400, and
those of the stable from £400 to £300. These figures do not tally with those
of the Downing Street or Holwood accounts for the latter half of 1797,
which will be stated later; and the loose way in which Pitt estimates his
expenses is highly suggestive. We now know that he was heading straight
for bankruptcy throughout this period; and probably on looking into his
affairs he discovered the fact. It is also certain that he lent money to his
mother. She seems to have lost on farming experiments at Burton Pynsent;
for she charged her sons to defray her just debts incurred in this manner,
and the Bishop of Lincoln in July 1801 stated that she owed to Pitt the sum
of £5,800 on which she ought to pay interest but did not. Chatham also
borrowed £1,000 from Pitt in August 1791, and the fact that he paid not a
penny to help to discharge the debts of his brother in the year 1801 seems to
show that he himself was still in low water.[441]
Piecing together these fragments of evidence, we may infer that Pitt's near
relations were a source of considerable expense, and that his own
heedlessness had by this time further served to embarrass him. Therefore,
his conduct towards Miss Eden, which at first sight seems heartless, was
probably dictated by sheer financial need. We may also reject the spiteful
statement in which Lady Hester Stanhope represented Pitt as saying: "Oh,
there was her mother [Lady Auckland],—such a chatterer! and then the
Page 318
family intrigues! I can't keep them out of my house; and for my King's and
my country's sake I must remain a single man." This is mere romancing.
Pitt went to the Aucklands' house, not they to his. As for the remark about
Auckland's intrigues, it clearly refers to the painful days after 1801, when
Pitt broke with the household at Beckenham.
There was only one method whereby Pitt could have assured his marriage
with Eleanor Eden, namely, by condescending to political jobbery. It was
beyond the power of Auckland, a comparatively poor man, burdened with a
large family, to grant a dowry with her unless Pitt awarded to him a
lucrative post and sinecures. Of course any such step was wholly out of the
question for either of them. In fact, Pitt opposed Auckland's promotion,
opened up by the death of Lord Mansfield, President of the Council, though
the public voice acclaimed Auckland as the successor.[442] Equally
noteworthy is the fact that, early in the year 1798, Pitt appointed Auckland
Postmaster-General, with an annual stipend of £2,500, but required him to
give up his pension of £2,000 for diplomatic services.[443] It is pleasing to
record that their friendship was not overclouded, except for a brief period.
There, then, we must leave this painful incident, but with heightened
admiration for Pitt. Outwardly his conduct appears frigid in the extreme.
Those, however, who probe the secrets of that reserved soul see that his
renunciation of conjugal bliss resulted from a scrupulous sense of honour.
As to the tenderness of his feelings at this time, Addington, who knew him
well, gives striking testimony, averring that in his disposition there was
"very much of the softness and milkiness of human nature." That was the
real Pitt.
my country's sake I must remain a single man." This is mere romancing.
Pitt went to the Aucklands' house, not they to his. As for the remark about
Auckland's intrigues, it clearly refers to the painful days after 1801, when
Pitt broke with the household at Beckenham.
There was only one method whereby Pitt could have assured his marriage
with Eleanor Eden, namely, by condescending to political jobbery. It was
beyond the power of Auckland, a comparatively poor man, burdened with a
large family, to grant a dowry with her unless Pitt awarded to him a
lucrative post and sinecures. Of course any such step was wholly out of the
question for either of them. In fact, Pitt opposed Auckland's promotion,
opened up by the death of Lord Mansfield, President of the Council, though
the public voice acclaimed Auckland as the successor.[442] Equally
noteworthy is the fact that, early in the year 1798, Pitt appointed Auckland
Postmaster-General, with an annual stipend of £2,500, but required him to
give up his pension of £2,000 for diplomatic services.[443] It is pleasing to
record that their friendship was not overclouded, except for a brief period.
There, then, we must leave this painful incident, but with heightened
admiration for Pitt. Outwardly his conduct appears frigid in the extreme.
Those, however, who probe the secrets of that reserved soul see that his
renunciation of conjugal bliss resulted from a scrupulous sense of honour.
As to the tenderness of his feelings at this time, Addington, who knew him
well, gives striking testimony, averring that in his disposition there was
"very much of the softness and milkiness of human nature." That was the
real Pitt.
Page 319
Finance was the all-absorbing question in that gloomy winter of 1796–7.
The triumphs of Bonaparte in Italy and Hoche's attempt to invade Ireland
sank into insignificance in comparison with the oncoming shadow of
bankruptcy. The causes of this phenomenon are too technical to receive
adequate treatment here. Certainly the Bank Crisis of February of 1797 was
not due to the exhaustion of the nation; for the revenue testified to its
abounding vitality. The Permanent Taxes maintained nearly the high level
reached in the prosperous year of peace, 1792, and the figures for British
Imports and Exports told the same tale, but the sums of money borrowed in
the years 1796, 1797 undoubtedly strained the national credit.[444] Austria
also applied to England for loans to enable her to continue the war; and Pitt
helped her to borrow in London the sum of £4,600,000 in 1795, and
£4,620,000 in 1796.
In one particular Pitt's action was unprecedented. In July 1796, during the
interval between the seventeenth and eighteenth Parliaments of Great
Britain, Austria sent urgent requests for pecuniary help so as to stay the
triumphs of the French in Italy and Swabia. Pitt yielded and secretly
remitted the sum of £1,200,000 as a loan. Undoubtedly this opportune help
enabled Austria to make the surprising efforts which flung back the French
to the Rhine, and checked the triumphal progress of Bonaparte.
Nevertheless, Fox threatened his rival with impeachment for this
unconstitutional action. Pitt replied with irresistible cogency that the crisis
called for bold handling, and that England helped her ally to save the
Empire and to maintain the contest in Italy. The House condoned his action
by 285 votes to 81, a proof that he dominated the new Parliament as
completely as its predecessor. He has been accused of lavishing money on
the Allies; but, except in this instance, he did not by any means satisfy their
claims. Moreover, they were justified in expecting England to provide
money in lieu of the troops which her War Office failed to raise. Austria
also solemnly covenanted to repay the loans; and her neglect to do so
The triumphs of Bonaparte in Italy and Hoche's attempt to invade Ireland
sank into insignificance in comparison with the oncoming shadow of
bankruptcy. The causes of this phenomenon are too technical to receive
adequate treatment here. Certainly the Bank Crisis of February of 1797 was
not due to the exhaustion of the nation; for the revenue testified to its
abounding vitality. The Permanent Taxes maintained nearly the high level
reached in the prosperous year of peace, 1792, and the figures for British
Imports and Exports told the same tale, but the sums of money borrowed in
the years 1796, 1797 undoubtedly strained the national credit.[444] Austria
also applied to England for loans to enable her to continue the war; and Pitt
helped her to borrow in London the sum of £4,600,000 in 1795, and
£4,620,000 in 1796.
In one particular Pitt's action was unprecedented. In July 1796, during the
interval between the seventeenth and eighteenth Parliaments of Great
Britain, Austria sent urgent requests for pecuniary help so as to stay the
triumphs of the French in Italy and Swabia. Pitt yielded and secretly
remitted the sum of £1,200,000 as a loan. Undoubtedly this opportune help
enabled Austria to make the surprising efforts which flung back the French
to the Rhine, and checked the triumphal progress of Bonaparte.
Nevertheless, Fox threatened his rival with impeachment for this
unconstitutional action. Pitt replied with irresistible cogency that the crisis
called for bold handling, and that England helped her ally to save the
Empire and to maintain the contest in Italy. The House condoned his action
by 285 votes to 81, a proof that he dominated the new Parliament as
completely as its predecessor. He has been accused of lavishing money on
the Allies; but, except in this instance, he did not by any means satisfy their
claims. Moreover, they were justified in expecting England to provide
money in lieu of the troops which her War Office failed to raise. Austria
also solemnly covenanted to repay the loans; and her neglect to do so
Page 320
occasioned a bitter dispute which long held the two Powers apart. Pitt also
refused her request for a loan in the year 1797. As far as possible, he
discouraged the raising of war loans in London. Early in 1796 he did so in
the case of Portugal from a fear that the export of bullion would impair
credit.[445]
At that time a novel expedient was shaping itself in his mind. On New
Year's Day he drove Sir John Sinclair from Dundas's house at Wimbledon
up to town; and on the way the baronet suggested the raising a great loan on
easy terms by an appeal to the loyalty of Britons.[446] The need of some
such device became increasingly apparent; for sinister symptoms began to
appear amidst the alarms of the autumn of 1796. The threats of invasion led
the Ministry to propose a special levy of 15,000 men to reinforce the army,
of 20,000 irregular cavalry, and of 60,000 supplemental Militia (18th
October). These expenses, in addition to the ever growing demands for the
public services, involved a deficit of £18,000,000. It was most important to
raise this sum promptly in order to uphold the credit and display the loyalty
of the nation; for, as we shall see, Pitt had recently opened negotiations for
peace at Paris in the hope that the late successes of the Austrians both in
Italy and the Rhineland (which proved to be only temporary), would induce
the Directory to accord fair terms to enemies who thus evinced their energy
and vitality. After consultation with the officials of the Bank of England, he
decided to raise the required sums, not by means of "contractors," but by
appealing direct to the public. Accordingly, on 1st December, he adopted
the unusual course of appealing to the Lord Mayor and the Directors of the
Bank of England to encourage in every possible way the raising of an
extraordinary loan of £18,000,000. The rate of interest, 5 5/8 per cent.,
seems somewhat high in the case of a "Loyalty Loan," especially as
Consols rose from 53 3/4 in September to 57 in November; but competent
authorities agree that it was not too high.[447]
refused her request for a loan in the year 1797. As far as possible, he
discouraged the raising of war loans in London. Early in 1796 he did so in
the case of Portugal from a fear that the export of bullion would impair
credit.[445]
At that time a novel expedient was shaping itself in his mind. On New
Year's Day he drove Sir John Sinclair from Dundas's house at Wimbledon
up to town; and on the way the baronet suggested the raising a great loan on
easy terms by an appeal to the loyalty of Britons.[446] The need of some
such device became increasingly apparent; for sinister symptoms began to
appear amidst the alarms of the autumn of 1796. The threats of invasion led
the Ministry to propose a special levy of 15,000 men to reinforce the army,
of 20,000 irregular cavalry, and of 60,000 supplemental Militia (18th
October). These expenses, in addition to the ever growing demands for the
public services, involved a deficit of £18,000,000. It was most important to
raise this sum promptly in order to uphold the credit and display the loyalty
of the nation; for, as we shall see, Pitt had recently opened negotiations for
peace at Paris in the hope that the late successes of the Austrians both in
Italy and the Rhineland (which proved to be only temporary), would induce
the Directory to accord fair terms to enemies who thus evinced their energy
and vitality. After consultation with the officials of the Bank of England, he
decided to raise the required sums, not by means of "contractors," but by
appealing direct to the public. Accordingly, on 1st December, he adopted
the unusual course of appealing to the Lord Mayor and the Directors of the
Bank of England to encourage in every possible way the raising of an
extraordinary loan of £18,000,000. The rate of interest, 5 5/8 per cent.,
seems somewhat high in the case of a "Loyalty Loan," especially as
Consols rose from 53 3/4 in September to 57 in November; but competent
authorities agree that it was not too high.[447]
Page 321
The response was most gratifying. The Bank subscribed £1,000,000, the
Directors in their private capacity further contributing £400,000. Similar
feelings were displayed in the City and in the provinces. Before the hour of
10 a.m. on 5th December, when the subscription list was opened at the
Bank, the lobby of the hall and even the approaches were crowded with
eager patriots, who fought their way towards the books. Those in the rear
called to more fortunate friends in the front to inscribe their names. Within
an hour and twenty minutes the amount which could then be allotted was
made good, and hundreds retired disappointed. Similar scenes ensued on
the two following days, the whole sum of £18,000,000 being subscribed in
less than fifteen and a half hours.[448]
It was under these encouraging conditions that on 7th December 1796 Pitt
made his Budget Statement, which included the proposal of further
advances of £3,000,000 to our Allies. As a set-off to this, he pointed to the
yield of the taxes and the Imports and Exports for the quarter as affording
gratifying proof of the strength of the country. But, he added, "this
flourishing state of our affairs ought not to lessen our moderation or abate
our desire for peace." Those who blame him for continuing to pay £200,000
into the Sinking Fund, while he had to borrow large sums at a ruinous rate
of interest, should remember that he believed this costly device to be only
temporary in view of his efforts for peace.
The usually dull details of finance are at this point enlivened by the
ingenious suggestions poured in upon Pitt for opening up new sources of
revenue. The aim of financiers then being to press on the taxpayer at all
points with the imperceptible impartiality of air, the hints as to the taxation
of neighbours and rivals are of refreshing variety. Among the less obvious
are duties on barges, pawnbrokers' takings, toys, theatre and concert tickets,
buttons, corks, glass bottles, umbrellas, sheriffs and under-sheriffs, county
commissioners and attorneys who keep clerks. On behalf of the last
Directors in their private capacity further contributing £400,000. Similar
feelings were displayed in the City and in the provinces. Before the hour of
10 a.m. on 5th December, when the subscription list was opened at the
Bank, the lobby of the hall and even the approaches were crowded with
eager patriots, who fought their way towards the books. Those in the rear
called to more fortunate friends in the front to inscribe their names. Within
an hour and twenty minutes the amount which could then be allotted was
made good, and hundreds retired disappointed. Similar scenes ensued on
the two following days, the whole sum of £18,000,000 being subscribed in
less than fifteen and a half hours.[448]
It was under these encouraging conditions that on 7th December 1796 Pitt
made his Budget Statement, which included the proposal of further
advances of £3,000,000 to our Allies. As a set-off to this, he pointed to the
yield of the taxes and the Imports and Exports for the quarter as affording
gratifying proof of the strength of the country. But, he added, "this
flourishing state of our affairs ought not to lessen our moderation or abate
our desire for peace." Those who blame him for continuing to pay £200,000
into the Sinking Fund, while he had to borrow large sums at a ruinous rate
of interest, should remember that he believed this costly device to be only
temporary in view of his efforts for peace.
The usually dull details of finance are at this point enlivened by the
ingenious suggestions poured in upon Pitt for opening up new sources of
revenue. The aim of financiers then being to press on the taxpayer at all
points with the imperceptible impartiality of air, the hints as to the taxation
of neighbours and rivals are of refreshing variety. Among the less obvious
are duties on barges, pawnbrokers' takings, toys, theatre and concert tickets,
buttons, corks, glass bottles, umbrellas, sheriffs and under-sheriffs, county
commissioners and attorneys who keep clerks. On behalf of the last
Page 322
suggestion an anonymous writer points out that it would enhance the
dignity of the legal profession. Another correspondent suggests a similar
impost on physicians, surgeons, and chemists, ranging from ten guineas in
London to three guineas in the provinces, in order to discourage the entry of
illiterates. He also urges the need of stopping the increase of luxury and
amusements by taxing hot-houses, horses and carriages let out on Sundays,
organs, pianos, and all musical instruments, as well as the owners thereof,
on the ground that this step will lessen the alarming growth of bankruptcies
and divorces. A tax on armorial bearings is suggested as one which will not
be resented by the rich. A fourth correspondent advocates a graduated
Income Tax, ranging from 6d. in the pound on incomes under £400, up to
5s. in the pound on incomes of more than, £30,000 a year, and estimates the
total yield at £62,625,000. The same writer urges the need of a tax on
sinecures and pensions, and finally begs Pitt for a place for life, devolving
on his son.[449]
The Chancellor of the Exchequer therefore had the choice of the direct
attack on the purse or the increase of atmospheric pressure. For the present
he chose the latter method, enhancing the duties on tea, wines, sugar, spirits,
game licences, glass, tobacco, and snuff, besides raising the "Assessed
Taxes" by ten per cent. The produce of some of these imposts is curious.
Hair-powder yielded £197,000; the extra tea and wine duties £186,000 and
£923,000, severally; those on tobacco and snuff only £40,000. Pitt's
procedure in December 1796 was very cautious. He carefully watched the
yield of the new taxes, in order to see whether the increase of price checked
consumption. Finding that this did not happen in the case of tea and spirits,
he further raised the duties on those commodities; but, on behalf of the
poor, he exempted the cheaper kinds of tea. On the other hand he proposed
to check the consumption of spirits by imposing an extra duty of five pence
a gallon along with a surcharge on distillery licences. Further, as the duties
on bricks, auction sales, sugar, bar iron, oil, wines, and coal had not
dignity of the legal profession. Another correspondent suggests a similar
impost on physicians, surgeons, and chemists, ranging from ten guineas in
London to three guineas in the provinces, in order to discourage the entry of
illiterates. He also urges the need of stopping the increase of luxury and
amusements by taxing hot-houses, horses and carriages let out on Sundays,
organs, pianos, and all musical instruments, as well as the owners thereof,
on the ground that this step will lessen the alarming growth of bankruptcies
and divorces. A tax on armorial bearings is suggested as one which will not
be resented by the rich. A fourth correspondent advocates a graduated
Income Tax, ranging from 6d. in the pound on incomes under £400, up to
5s. in the pound on incomes of more than, £30,000 a year, and estimates the
total yield at £62,625,000. The same writer urges the need of a tax on
sinecures and pensions, and finally begs Pitt for a place for life, devolving
on his son.[449]
The Chancellor of the Exchequer therefore had the choice of the direct
attack on the purse or the increase of atmospheric pressure. For the present
he chose the latter method, enhancing the duties on tea, wines, sugar, spirits,
game licences, glass, tobacco, and snuff, besides raising the "Assessed
Taxes" by ten per cent. The produce of some of these imposts is curious.
Hair-powder yielded £197,000; the extra tea and wine duties £186,000 and
£923,000, severally; those on tobacco and snuff only £40,000. Pitt's
procedure in December 1796 was very cautious. He carefully watched the
yield of the new taxes, in order to see whether the increase of price checked
consumption. Finding that this did not happen in the case of tea and spirits,
he further raised the duties on those commodities; but, on behalf of the
poor, he exempted the cheaper kinds of tea. On the other hand he proposed
to check the consumption of spirits by imposing an extra duty of five pence
a gallon along with a surcharge on distillery licences. Further, as the duties
on bricks, auction sales, sugar, bar iron, oil, wines, and coal had not
Page 323
lessened consumption, he again increased them. A questionable experiment
was an increase in the postage of letters and parcels, and in the duties on
newspapers, stage coaches, and canal tolls. A new House Duty, levied in
proportion to the number of servants, is open to less objection. On the
whole he expected the new taxes to yield £2,138,000. The total supply
asked for was £27,640,000.
The financial outlook grew darker in the year 1797. At the close of January
came the news of Hoche's expedition to Bantry Bay, which revealed the
possibility of revolutionizing Ireland. On 4th February Pitt heard of the
triumph of Bonaparte at Rivoli. The tidings told disastrously on markets
already in a nervous state. A correspondent of Pitt attributed the decline to
the action of the Bank of England at the close of 1795, in reducing their
discounts. Fox and his friends ascribed it to the export of specie to Vienna;
while Ministers and their friends gave out that it resulted from the fears of
invasion, and the desire of depositors everywhere to withdraw their money
and place it in hiding. Privately, however, Pitt confessed to Auckland that
the export of gold brought matters to a climax.
The amount of specie in the Bank of England, which was nearly £8,000,000
in 1795, fell to £1,272,000 in February 1797. In reality the Bank was
solvent, but it could not have realized its securities; and on several
occasions the Directors warned Pitt that any further withdrawals of specie
would bring on a crisis.[450] The final cause of alarm was a loan of
£1,500,000 to the Irish Government, the first occasion on which any large
sum was raised for that Administration.[451] On 25th and 26th February,
then, crowds rushed to withdraw money from the Bank into which eleven
weeks before they thronged in order to procure shares in the Loyalty Loan.
So serious was the crisis that Ministers decided to intervene. On Sunday the
26th a meeting was held of the Privy Council, which issued an Order in
was an increase in the postage of letters and parcels, and in the duties on
newspapers, stage coaches, and canal tolls. A new House Duty, levied in
proportion to the number of servants, is open to less objection. On the
whole he expected the new taxes to yield £2,138,000. The total supply
asked for was £27,640,000.
The financial outlook grew darker in the year 1797. At the close of January
came the news of Hoche's expedition to Bantry Bay, which revealed the
possibility of revolutionizing Ireland. On 4th February Pitt heard of the
triumph of Bonaparte at Rivoli. The tidings told disastrously on markets
already in a nervous state. A correspondent of Pitt attributed the decline to
the action of the Bank of England at the close of 1795, in reducing their
discounts. Fox and his friends ascribed it to the export of specie to Vienna;
while Ministers and their friends gave out that it resulted from the fears of
invasion, and the desire of depositors everywhere to withdraw their money
and place it in hiding. Privately, however, Pitt confessed to Auckland that
the export of gold brought matters to a climax.
The amount of specie in the Bank of England, which was nearly £8,000,000
in 1795, fell to £1,272,000 in February 1797. In reality the Bank was
solvent, but it could not have realized its securities; and on several
occasions the Directors warned Pitt that any further withdrawals of specie
would bring on a crisis.[450] The final cause of alarm was a loan of
£1,500,000 to the Irish Government, the first occasion on which any large
sum was raised for that Administration.[451] On 25th and 26th February,
then, crowds rushed to withdraw money from the Bank into which eleven
weeks before they thronged in order to procure shares in the Loyalty Loan.
So serious was the crisis that Ministers decided to intervene. On Sunday the
26th a meeting was held of the Privy Council, which issued an Order in
Page 324
Council empowering the Directors to refuse payments in cash until
Parliament gave further orders on the subject.[452]
For a few hours there was the prospect of a general collapse; and as the
Bank issued no notes for less than £5, though Sinclair and others had
advised the issue of £3 and £2 notes, small traders were threatened with a
recurrence to barter. Fortunately on 27th February the Directors published a
reassuring statement, and the Lord Mayor presided at an influential meeting
on the same day, which decided to accept banknotes as legal tender for any
amount. Thus a crash was averted. But Fox, Sheridan, and the Opposition
ably accused Pitt of leading his own country to the brink of bankruptcy,
even while he proclaimed the imminent insolvency of France. They
thundered against the export of gold to the Emperor, and demanded a
searching inquiry into the high-handed dealings of the Minister with the
Bank and with national finance. "We have too long had a confiding House
of Commons," exclaimed Fox; "I want now an inquiring House of
Commons." Despite Pitt's poor defence of his loans to the Emperor, the
Government carried the day by 244 votes to 86 (28th February); but the
unwonted size of the minority was a sharp warning to curtail loans and
subsidies. Apart from a small loan to Portugal in 1798, nothing of note was
done to help Continental States until Russia demanded pecuniary aid for the
War of the Second Coalition. In order to provide a circulating medium, the
Bank was empowered to issue notes for £2 and £1, and to refuse cash
payments for sums exceeding £1 (March to May 1797).
Meanwhile, shortly after the Bank crisis, came news of the failure of an
American, Colonel Tate, with some 1,400 French gaol-birds, to make a raid
at Fishguard in Pembrokeshire. A later legend sought to embellish this very
tame affair by ascribing his failure to the apparition on the hills of Welsh
women in high hats and scarlet cloaks, whom the invaders took for regulars.
Unfortunately for lovers of the picturesque, the apparition occurs only in
Parliament gave further orders on the subject.[452]
For a few hours there was the prospect of a general collapse; and as the
Bank issued no notes for less than £5, though Sinclair and others had
advised the issue of £3 and £2 notes, small traders were threatened with a
recurrence to barter. Fortunately on 27th February the Directors published a
reassuring statement, and the Lord Mayor presided at an influential meeting
on the same day, which decided to accept banknotes as legal tender for any
amount. Thus a crash was averted. But Fox, Sheridan, and the Opposition
ably accused Pitt of leading his own country to the brink of bankruptcy,
even while he proclaimed the imminent insolvency of France. They
thundered against the export of gold to the Emperor, and demanded a
searching inquiry into the high-handed dealings of the Minister with the
Bank and with national finance. "We have too long had a confiding House
of Commons," exclaimed Fox; "I want now an inquiring House of
Commons." Despite Pitt's poor defence of his loans to the Emperor, the
Government carried the day by 244 votes to 86 (28th February); but the
unwonted size of the minority was a sharp warning to curtail loans and
subsidies. Apart from a small loan to Portugal in 1798, nothing of note was
done to help Continental States until Russia demanded pecuniary aid for the
War of the Second Coalition. In order to provide a circulating medium, the
Bank was empowered to issue notes for £2 and £1, and to refuse cash
payments for sums exceeding £1 (March to May 1797).
Meanwhile, shortly after the Bank crisis, came news of the failure of an
American, Colonel Tate, with some 1,400 French gaol-birds, to make a raid
at Fishguard in Pembrokeshire. A later legend sought to embellish this very
tame affair by ascribing his failure to the apparition on the hills of Welsh
women in high hats and scarlet cloaks, whom the invaders took for regulars.
Unfortunately for lovers of the picturesque, the apparition occurs only in
Page 325
much later accounts.[453] Far more important were the tidings from Cape St.
Vincent. There Jervis, with only fifteen ships, boldly attacked twenty-seven
Spaniards while still in confusion after a foggy night. As is well known, the
boldness of Nelson, in wearing out of the line so as to prevent the reunion
of the enemy's ships, crowned the day with glory (14th February). The
weakness of the Spanish navy stood glaringly revealed, and the fear of
invasion, which turned mainly on a junction of their fleet to that of France,
thenceforth subsided.
Jervis remarked before the fight that England never stood in more need of a
victory. The news reached London most opportunely on 3rd March; for,
along with the Bank crisis, came rumours of serious discontent among our
seamen. Even Jervis could scarcely stamp out disaffection in the fleet that
rode triumphantly before Cadiz; and in home waters mutiny soon ran riot. Is
it surprising that sailors mutinied? In large part they were pressed men.
Violence swept the crews together, and terror alone kept them together. The
rules of the service prescribed flogging for minor offences, hanging for
refusal to work. How men existed in the over-crowded decks is a mystery.
On paper the rations seem adequate, a pound of meat per day, a
proportionate amount of biscuit, and half a pint of rum. But these provisions
were issued by pursers who often eked out their scanty pay by defrauding
the crew. Weevilly biscuits and meat of briny antiquity were therefore the
rule, excess of salt and close packing being deemed adequate safeguards
against decay. Finally the indurated mass became so susceptible of polish as
in the last resort to provide the purser with a supply of snuff-boxes. One
little comfort was allowed, namely, cocoa for breakfast. But the chief solace
was rum, cheap, new, and fiery, from the West Indies. This and the rope-end
formed the nexus of the crew. As for the pay, from which alone the sailor
could make his lot bearable, it had not been increased since the reign of
Charles II. Thanks to the Duke of York, that of the army had been raised
from 8 1/4d. to 1s. a day, though not in proportion to the cost of living, the
Vincent. There Jervis, with only fifteen ships, boldly attacked twenty-seven
Spaniards while still in confusion after a foggy night. As is well known, the
boldness of Nelson, in wearing out of the line so as to prevent the reunion
of the enemy's ships, crowned the day with glory (14th February). The
weakness of the Spanish navy stood glaringly revealed, and the fear of
invasion, which turned mainly on a junction of their fleet to that of France,
thenceforth subsided.
Jervis remarked before the fight that England never stood in more need of a
victory. The news reached London most opportunely on 3rd March; for,
along with the Bank crisis, came rumours of serious discontent among our
seamen. Even Jervis could scarcely stamp out disaffection in the fleet that
rode triumphantly before Cadiz; and in home waters mutiny soon ran riot. Is
it surprising that sailors mutinied? In large part they were pressed men.
Violence swept the crews together, and terror alone kept them together. The
rules of the service prescribed flogging for minor offences, hanging for
refusal to work. How men existed in the over-crowded decks is a mystery.
On paper the rations seem adequate, a pound of meat per day, a
proportionate amount of biscuit, and half a pint of rum. But these provisions
were issued by pursers who often eked out their scanty pay by defrauding
the crew. Weevilly biscuits and meat of briny antiquity were therefore the
rule, excess of salt and close packing being deemed adequate safeguards
against decay. Finally the indurated mass became so susceptible of polish as
in the last resort to provide the purser with a supply of snuff-boxes. One
little comfort was allowed, namely, cocoa for breakfast. But the chief solace
was rum, cheap, new, and fiery, from the West Indies. This and the rope-end
formed the nexus of the crew. As for the pay, from which alone the sailor
could make his lot bearable, it had not been increased since the reign of
Charles II. Thanks to the Duke of York, that of the army had been raised
from 8 1/4d. to 1s. a day, though not in proportion to the cost of living, the
Page 326
net gain being only 2d. a day. The sailor alone was forgotten, and, lest he
should come into touch with Radical clubs, leave of absence was rarely if
ever accorded.
The men of the Channel Fleet were the first to resolve to end their chief
grievances, namely, insufficient pay, withdrawal of leave of absence, and
the unfair distribution of prize money. On putting back to Spithead in
March 1797, they sent to Admiral Howe several round-robins demanding an
increase of pay. He was then ill at Bath, and, deeming them the outcome of
a single knot of malcontents, ignored them. This angered the men. His
successor in command, Lord Bridport (brother of Sir Alexander Hood), was
less popular; and when it transpired that the fleet would soon set sail, the
men resolved to show their power. Accordingly, on 15th April, on the
hoisting of the signal to weigh anchor, the crew of the flag-ship, the "Queen
Charlotte," manned her shrouds and gave three cheers. The others followed
her example, and not an anchor was weighed. On the next day (Easter
Sunday) the men formed a central committee, sent ashore some hated
officers, and formulated the demands outlined above, promising to fight the
French if they put to sea, and afterwards to renew the same demands.
That Easter was a time of dismay in London. Ministers at once met in
Cabinet Council and agreed to despatch to Portsmouth Spencer, first Lord
of the Admiralty, along with Admiral Young, and others. Spencer's
reputation for sincerity, love of justice, and regard for the seamen inspired
general confidence; and when the Commissioners were joined by Bridport,
Parker, Colpoys, and Gardner, there was hope of a compromise. The men
allowed Bridport to retain his command, provided that he did not issue
orders for sea; they enforced respect to officers; they flogged one man who
became drunk, and ducked more venial offenders three times from a rope
tied at the main-yard. Their committee of thirty-two (two from each ship),
met every day on the "Queen Charlotte"; it demanded an increase of pay
should come into touch with Radical clubs, leave of absence was rarely if
ever accorded.
The men of the Channel Fleet were the first to resolve to end their chief
grievances, namely, insufficient pay, withdrawal of leave of absence, and
the unfair distribution of prize money. On putting back to Spithead in
March 1797, they sent to Admiral Howe several round-robins demanding an
increase of pay. He was then ill at Bath, and, deeming them the outcome of
a single knot of malcontents, ignored them. This angered the men. His
successor in command, Lord Bridport (brother of Sir Alexander Hood), was
less popular; and when it transpired that the fleet would soon set sail, the
men resolved to show their power. Accordingly, on 15th April, on the
hoisting of the signal to weigh anchor, the crew of the flag-ship, the "Queen
Charlotte," manned her shrouds and gave three cheers. The others followed
her example, and not an anchor was weighed. On the next day (Easter
Sunday) the men formed a central committee, sent ashore some hated
officers, and formulated the demands outlined above, promising to fight the
French if they put to sea, and afterwards to renew the same demands.
That Easter was a time of dismay in London. Ministers at once met in
Cabinet Council and agreed to despatch to Portsmouth Spencer, first Lord
of the Admiralty, along with Admiral Young, and others. Spencer's
reputation for sincerity, love of justice, and regard for the seamen inspired
general confidence; and when the Commissioners were joined by Bridport,
Parker, Colpoys, and Gardner, there was hope of a compromise. The men
allowed Bridport to retain his command, provided that he did not issue
orders for sea; they enforced respect to officers; they flogged one man who
became drunk, and ducked more venial offenders three times from a rope
tied at the main-yard. Their committee of thirty-two (two from each ship),
met every day on the "Queen Charlotte"; it demanded an increase of pay
Page 327
from 9 3/4d. to 1s. a day. But when Spencer promised to lay this request
before the King, on condition of immediate restoration of discipline, the
men demurred. Conscious of their power, they now claimed that rations
must be served out, not 12 ounces, but 16 ounces to the pound; that the
power of awarding heavy punishments for petty offences should be
curtailed, extended opportunities being also granted for going ashore. In
vain did Spencer and his colleagues protest against this dictation of terms. A
personal appeal to the crew of the "Royal George" had no effect; and when
Gardner vehemently reproached the men for skulking from the French, they
ran at him; and he would have fared badly had he not placed his neck in a
noose of a yard-rope and called on the men to hang him provided they
returned to duty. The men thereupon cheered him and retired.
On 18th April the men's committee formulated their demands in two
manifestoes. Further conferences took place, in one of which Gardner
shook a delegate by the collar and was himself nearly murdered. The whole
fleet then defiantly flew the red flag. Spencer and his colleagues returned to
London for an interview with Pitt; and along with him and the Lord
Chancellor they posted to Windsor to urge the need of compliance with the
men's demands. Grenville, journeying from Dropmore, joined them, and a
Privy Council was held. Pitt's and Spencer's views prevailed, and a Royal
Proclamation was drawn up on 22nd April, pardoning the crews if they
would return to duty. A horseman riding at full speed bore the document to
Portsmouth in seven hours, and the fleet, with the exception of the
"Marlborough," re-hoisted the white ensign and prepared for sea. The
discontent rife at Plymouth also subsided. On 26th April, during a Budget
debate, Pitt promised to provide for the extra pay to seamen and marines.
But on 3rd May an indiscreet opening of the whole question in the House of
Lords by the Duke of Bedford led to a revival of discontent at Spithead. He
upbraided Pitt with delay in introducing a Bill to give effect to the Royal
before the King, on condition of immediate restoration of discipline, the
men demurred. Conscious of their power, they now claimed that rations
must be served out, not 12 ounces, but 16 ounces to the pound; that the
power of awarding heavy punishments for petty offences should be
curtailed, extended opportunities being also granted for going ashore. In
vain did Spencer and his colleagues protest against this dictation of terms. A
personal appeal to the crew of the "Royal George" had no effect; and when
Gardner vehemently reproached the men for skulking from the French, they
ran at him; and he would have fared badly had he not placed his neck in a
noose of a yard-rope and called on the men to hang him provided they
returned to duty. The men thereupon cheered him and retired.
On 18th April the men's committee formulated their demands in two
manifestoes. Further conferences took place, in one of which Gardner
shook a delegate by the collar and was himself nearly murdered. The whole
fleet then defiantly flew the red flag. Spencer and his colleagues returned to
London for an interview with Pitt; and along with him and the Lord
Chancellor they posted to Windsor to urge the need of compliance with the
men's demands. Grenville, journeying from Dropmore, joined them, and a
Privy Council was held. Pitt's and Spencer's views prevailed, and a Royal
Proclamation was drawn up on 22nd April, pardoning the crews if they
would return to duty. A horseman riding at full speed bore the document to
Portsmouth in seven hours, and the fleet, with the exception of the
"Marlborough," re-hoisted the white ensign and prepared for sea. The
discontent rife at Plymouth also subsided. On 26th April, during a Budget
debate, Pitt promised to provide for the extra pay to seamen and marines.
But on 3rd May an indiscreet opening of the whole question in the House of
Lords by the Duke of Bedford led to a revival of discontent at Spithead. He
upbraided Pitt with delay in introducing a Bill to give effect to the Royal
Page 328
Proclamation. Howe thereupon proceeded to justify his former conduct; and
Spencer remarked that he did not expect to receive the King's commands to
bring down any communication on the affair to the House of Lords. By an
unscrupulous use of these remarks agitators inflamed the crews with the
suspicion of ministerial trickery; and on 7th May, every ship refused to
obey Bridport's orders to weigh anchor. The men arrested Colpoys and sent
fifteen officers on shore. Pitt thereupon, on 8th May, moved a resolution in
the terms of the decision framed at Windsor on 22nd April. He begged the
House for a silent vote on this question; but Fox and Sheridan could not
resist the temptation to accuse him of being the cause of this second mutiny.
Clearly it resulted from the remarks in the House of Lords on 3rd May,
which led the seamen to believe that Pitt was about to play them false.
The Commons passed the resolution; but Whitbread, on the morrow, moved
a vote of censure on Pitt for delay in dealing with this important question.
Again Pitt pointed out that the promise given during the Budget debate
sufficed for the time, but he admitted that preliminary forms and inquiries
had absorbed an undue amount of time. Fox and Sheridan pounced down on
this admission, the latter inveighing against the "criminal and murderous
delay" of Ministers, whose incapacity earned the contempt of the House.
Spying a party advantage in protracting these debates, Whitbread renewed
his attack on the next day (10th May). Pitt replied with admirable temper,
and showed that the delay in presenting a Bill arose partly from the action
of the Opposition itself. Will it be believed that Parliament wasted two
days, while the navy was in mutiny, in discussing whether Pitt had or had
not been guilty of delay? The results were deplorable. An anonymous
chronicler, hostile to Pitt, confessed that the men at Spithead were "better
pleased with reading Fox and Sheridan's speeches than with the long-
expected settlement of their claims."[454]
Spencer remarked that he did not expect to receive the King's commands to
bring down any communication on the affair to the House of Lords. By an
unscrupulous use of these remarks agitators inflamed the crews with the
suspicion of ministerial trickery; and on 7th May, every ship refused to
obey Bridport's orders to weigh anchor. The men arrested Colpoys and sent
fifteen officers on shore. Pitt thereupon, on 8th May, moved a resolution in
the terms of the decision framed at Windsor on 22nd April. He begged the
House for a silent vote on this question; but Fox and Sheridan could not
resist the temptation to accuse him of being the cause of this second mutiny.
Clearly it resulted from the remarks in the House of Lords on 3rd May,
which led the seamen to believe that Pitt was about to play them false.
The Commons passed the resolution; but Whitbread, on the morrow, moved
a vote of censure on Pitt for delay in dealing with this important question.
Again Pitt pointed out that the promise given during the Budget debate
sufficed for the time, but he admitted that preliminary forms and inquiries
had absorbed an undue amount of time. Fox and Sheridan pounced down on
this admission, the latter inveighing against the "criminal and murderous
delay" of Ministers, whose incapacity earned the contempt of the House.
Spying a party advantage in protracting these debates, Whitbread renewed
his attack on the next day (10th May). Pitt replied with admirable temper,
and showed that the delay in presenting a Bill arose partly from the action
of the Opposition itself. Will it be believed that Parliament wasted two
days, while the navy was in mutiny, in discussing whether Pitt had or had
not been guilty of delay? The results were deplorable. An anonymous
chronicler, hostile to Pitt, confessed that the men at Spithead were "better
pleased with reading Fox and Sheridan's speeches than with the long-
expected settlement of their claims."[454]
Page 329
In this state of things Pitt despatched Howe ("Black Dick"), the most
popular of the admirals, in order to convince the seamen of the sincerity of
Government. The following is the letter in which he apprised Bridport of
Howe's mission:
Downing Street, May 10, 1797.[455]
The account we have received this morning led to a great degree of
hope that the distressful embarrassments which you have
experienced may already in a great degree have subsided. You will,
however, have learnt that in the suspense in which we remained
yesterday, it had been determined to send Lord Howe with such
instructions under the sign manual as seemed to us best adapted to
the very difficult emergency. His presenting this commission seems
still [more] likely to confirm the good disposition which had begun
to show itself, and his not coming after the intention had once been
announced might lead to unpleasant consequence [sic]. It was
thought best to make this a civil commission in order not to interfere
with the military command of the fleet, and at the same time to give
the commission to a distinguished naval character, though not with
any naval authority or functions. It was also thought that making a
communication of this nature after all that had passed through some
other channel than the commander of the fleet was for other reasons
preferable and likely to be thought so by you.
I earnestly hope this measure will produce good effects and will
both in itself and in its consequences be satisfactory to you. At all
events I am sure you will continue to contribute your exertions with
the same zeal and public spirit which you have shewn under such
trying difficulties to bring this arduous work, if possible, to a happy
termination. I hope I need not say how sincerely and deeply, in
addition to the public difficulties, I have felt for the situation in
which you have been placed. If the favourable turn which has been
given to affairs should be happily confirmed, I look forward to the
popular of the admirals, in order to convince the seamen of the sincerity of
Government. The following is the letter in which he apprised Bridport of
Howe's mission:
Downing Street, May 10, 1797.[455]
The account we have received this morning led to a great degree of
hope that the distressful embarrassments which you have
experienced may already in a great degree have subsided. You will,
however, have learnt that in the suspense in which we remained
yesterday, it had been determined to send Lord Howe with such
instructions under the sign manual as seemed to us best adapted to
the very difficult emergency. His presenting this commission seems
still [more] likely to confirm the good disposition which had begun
to show itself, and his not coming after the intention had once been
announced might lead to unpleasant consequence [sic]. It was
thought best to make this a civil commission in order not to interfere
with the military command of the fleet, and at the same time to give
the commission to a distinguished naval character, though not with
any naval authority or functions. It was also thought that making a
communication of this nature after all that had passed through some
other channel than the commander of the fleet was for other reasons
preferable and likely to be thought so by you.
I earnestly hope this measure will produce good effects and will
both in itself and in its consequences be satisfactory to you. At all
events I am sure you will continue to contribute your exertions with
the same zeal and public spirit which you have shewn under such
trying difficulties to bring this arduous work, if possible, to a happy
termination. I hope I need not say how sincerely and deeply, in
addition to the public difficulties, I have felt for the situation in
which you have been placed. If the favourable turn which has been
given to affairs should be happily confirmed, I look forward to the
Page 330
hope that your command may still be attended with circumstances
which may repay you for the labour and anxiety with which you
have had to struggle.
Howe found it no easy task to vindicate the good faith of Ministers; but by
visiting each ship in turn, he prevailed on the men to submit to discipline.
The 14th of May was a day of great rejoicing at Spithead; the men's
delegates landed and carried the venerable admiral in triumph to
Government House, where he and his lady entertained them at dinner. Three
days later the whole fleet put to sea.
But already there had fallen on Pitt a still severer blow. On 10th May
appeared the first signs of discontent in the ships anchored off Sheerness. In
all probability they may be ascribed to the factious wrangling at
Westminster and the revival of the mutiny at Spithead on 7th May. Seeing
that the demands of the sailors had been conceded before this outbreak
occurred at the Nore, nothing can be said on behalf of the ringleaders,
except that amidst their worst excesses they professed unswerving loyalty,
firing salutes on 29th May in honour of the restoration of Charles II and on
4th June for King George's birthday. Apart from this their conduct was
grossly unpatriotic. On 12th May the crew of H.M.S. "Sandwich," headed
by a supernumerary named Parker, captured the ship, persuaded eleven
other crews to mutiny, and sent delegates to Portsmouth to concert action
with Bridport's fleet.
In this they failed; and, had Vice-Admiral Buckner, in command at the
Nore, acted with vigour, he might have profited by the discouragement
which this news produced. He acted weakly; and the men paid no heed to
the Royal Proclamation issued on 23rd May, offering the same terms as
those granted at Portsmouth and pardon to all who at once returned to duty.
Spencer and his colleagues came from London in the hope of persuading
which may repay you for the labour and anxiety with which you
have had to struggle.
Howe found it no easy task to vindicate the good faith of Ministers; but by
visiting each ship in turn, he prevailed on the men to submit to discipline.
The 14th of May was a day of great rejoicing at Spithead; the men's
delegates landed and carried the venerable admiral in triumph to
Government House, where he and his lady entertained them at dinner. Three
days later the whole fleet put to sea.
But already there had fallen on Pitt a still severer blow. On 10th May
appeared the first signs of discontent in the ships anchored off Sheerness. In
all probability they may be ascribed to the factious wrangling at
Westminster and the revival of the mutiny at Spithead on 7th May. Seeing
that the demands of the sailors had been conceded before this outbreak
occurred at the Nore, nothing can be said on behalf of the ringleaders,
except that amidst their worst excesses they professed unswerving loyalty,
firing salutes on 29th May in honour of the restoration of Charles II and on
4th June for King George's birthday. Apart from this their conduct was
grossly unpatriotic. On 12th May the crew of H.M.S. "Sandwich," headed
by a supernumerary named Parker, captured the ship, persuaded eleven
other crews to mutiny, and sent delegates to Portsmouth to concert action
with Bridport's fleet.
In this they failed; and, had Vice-Admiral Buckner, in command at the
Nore, acted with vigour, he might have profited by the discouragement
which this news produced. He acted weakly; and the men paid no heed to
the Royal Proclamation issued on 23rd May, offering the same terms as
those granted at Portsmouth and pardon to all who at once returned to duty.
Spencer and his colleagues came from London in the hope of persuading
Page 331
the men, but in vain. The men sought to tempt the one loyal ship, the
"Clyde," from its duty. Fortunately this Abdiel of a false company was able
to slip off by night and guard the entrance to Sheerness harbour.
Government then hurried up troops and had new batteries constructed to
overawe the fleet. Unfortunately, at the end of May, thirteen more ships,
deserters from the fleets of Duncan and Onslow, joined the mutineers at the
Nore. This event might have led to a double disaster. Stout old Duncan with
only two ships sailed on undaunted to the Texel, where lay a Dutch fleet of
fifteen sail preparing for sea. In order to impose on them he kept flying
signals as if to consorts in the offing, a stratagem which entirely succeeded.
The danger was, however, acute until, acting on Spencer's suggestion,
Vorontzoff ordered a Russian squadron, then in British waters, to sail to
Duncan's help.
Equally serious was the situation at the Nore. The mutineers, strong in
numbers but lacking beef and beer, stopped the navigation of the Thames
and captured provisions from merchantmen, thus causing a panic in
London. On 5th June, after firing the royal salute, the crews seized some
unpopular officers and boatswains, tarred and feathered them, and landed
them at Gravesend, a spectacle for gods and men. In these and other
reckless acts the fever expended its force. Food and water ran short; for the
banks were strictly guarded, and ships ceased to arrive. The desperate
suggestion of handing the ships over to the Dutch was frustrated, if it were
ever seriously considered, by the removal of the outer buoys. One by one
ships fell away and replaced the red flag by the white ensign. Enough force
was now at hand to quell the desperate minority; and on 15th June the
"Sandwich," renouncing the authority of Parker, sailed under the guns of
Sheerness. A fortnight later Parker swung from the yardarm of that ship. His
had been a strange career. The son of a tradesman of Exeter, he is said to
have entered the navy as a midshipman, but to have been thrice dismissed
from his ship for bad conduct. Settling down at Perth, he was imprisoned
"Clyde," from its duty. Fortunately this Abdiel of a false company was able
to slip off by night and guard the entrance to Sheerness harbour.
Government then hurried up troops and had new batteries constructed to
overawe the fleet. Unfortunately, at the end of May, thirteen more ships,
deserters from the fleets of Duncan and Onslow, joined the mutineers at the
Nore. This event might have led to a double disaster. Stout old Duncan with
only two ships sailed on undaunted to the Texel, where lay a Dutch fleet of
fifteen sail preparing for sea. In order to impose on them he kept flying
signals as if to consorts in the offing, a stratagem which entirely succeeded.
The danger was, however, acute until, acting on Spencer's suggestion,
Vorontzoff ordered a Russian squadron, then in British waters, to sail to
Duncan's help.
Equally serious was the situation at the Nore. The mutineers, strong in
numbers but lacking beef and beer, stopped the navigation of the Thames
and captured provisions from merchantmen, thus causing a panic in
London. On 5th June, after firing the royal salute, the crews seized some
unpopular officers and boatswains, tarred and feathered them, and landed
them at Gravesend, a spectacle for gods and men. In these and other
reckless acts the fever expended its force. Food and water ran short; for the
banks were strictly guarded, and ships ceased to arrive. The desperate
suggestion of handing the ships over to the Dutch was frustrated, if it were
ever seriously considered, by the removal of the outer buoys. One by one
ships fell away and replaced the red flag by the white ensign. Enough force
was now at hand to quell the desperate minority; and on 15th June the
"Sandwich," renouncing the authority of Parker, sailed under the guns of
Sheerness. A fortnight later Parker swung from the yardarm of that ship. His
had been a strange career. The son of a tradesman of Exeter, he is said to
have entered the navy as a midshipman, but to have been thrice dismissed
from his ship for bad conduct. Settling down at Perth, he was imprisoned
Page 332
for debt, but gained his freedom and also a bounty for enrolling in the navy
as a volunteer. His daring spirit and sturdy frame brought him to the front in
the way that we have seen, the moral perversity of his nature largely
determining the course of the mutiny at the Nore. After him twenty-two
other mutineers were hanged.
Few men have done more harm to England than Parker. So heavy a blow
did the Nore mutiny deal to credit that 3 per cent. Consols, which did not
fall below 50 at the Bank crisis, sank to 48 in June, the lowest level ever
touched in our history. After the collapse of the mutiny they rose to 55 1/2.
The serenity of Pitt never failed during this terrible time. A remarkable
proof of his self-possession was given by Spencer. Having to consult him
hastily one night, he repaired to Downing Street and found that he was
asleep. When awakened, he sat up in bed, heard the case, and gave his
instructions, whereupon Spencer withdrew. Remembering, however, one
topic which he had omitted, he returned, and found him buried in slumber
as profound as if he had not been disturbed. Fox and his friends were far
from showing the same equanimity. Because the House by 256 votes to 91
opposed a motion for Reform which Grey most inopportunely brought
forward in the midst of the mutiny, they decided to leave Parliament. But
the effect of this "secession" was marred by the occasional reappearance of
Sheridan, Tierney, and others who had loudly advocated it.[456] Unpatriotic
in conception, it speedily became ludicrous from its half-hearted execution.
The question has often been raised whether the mutineers were egged on by
malcontent clubs. There are some suspicious signs. A mutineer on board
H.M.S. "Champion" told his captain that they had received money from a
man in a black coat. This alone is not very convincing. But the malcontents
at the Nore certainly received money, though from what source is uncertain.
The evidence brought before the Committee of Secrecy as to the connection
of the United Irishmen with the mutineers, seems rather thin. As to French
as a volunteer. His daring spirit and sturdy frame brought him to the front in
the way that we have seen, the moral perversity of his nature largely
determining the course of the mutiny at the Nore. After him twenty-two
other mutineers were hanged.
Few men have done more harm to England than Parker. So heavy a blow
did the Nore mutiny deal to credit that 3 per cent. Consols, which did not
fall below 50 at the Bank crisis, sank to 48 in June, the lowest level ever
touched in our history. After the collapse of the mutiny they rose to 55 1/2.
The serenity of Pitt never failed during this terrible time. A remarkable
proof of his self-possession was given by Spencer. Having to consult him
hastily one night, he repaired to Downing Street and found that he was
asleep. When awakened, he sat up in bed, heard the case, and gave his
instructions, whereupon Spencer withdrew. Remembering, however, one
topic which he had omitted, he returned, and found him buried in slumber
as profound as if he had not been disturbed. Fox and his friends were far
from showing the same equanimity. Because the House by 256 votes to 91
opposed a motion for Reform which Grey most inopportunely brought
forward in the midst of the mutiny, they decided to leave Parliament. But
the effect of this "secession" was marred by the occasional reappearance of
Sheridan, Tierney, and others who had loudly advocated it.[456] Unpatriotic
in conception, it speedily became ludicrous from its half-hearted execution.
The question has often been raised whether the mutineers were egged on by
malcontent clubs. There are some suspicious signs. A mutineer on board
H.M.S. "Champion" told his captain that they had received money from a
man in a black coat. This alone is not very convincing. But the malcontents
at the Nore certainly received money, though from what source is uncertain.
The evidence brought before the Committee of Secrecy as to the connection
of the United Irishmen with the mutineers, seems rather thin. As to French
Page 333
bribery, the loyal sailors at Spithead in their address to the Nore mutineers
bade them not to be any longer misled by "French principles and their
agents, under whatsoever mask." It was also reported in August 1798 that
the French Government paid an Irishman, Duckett, to go and renew the
mutiny. The officials of the Home Office believed the London
Corresponding Society to be guilty; and on 16th June one of them, J.
K[ing], issued a secret order to two of his agents at Sheerness to discover
whether two members of that society, named Beck and Galloway, had had
dealings with the rebel crews. The agents, A. Graham and D. Williams, on
24th June sent to the Duke of Portland the following report, which merits
quotation almost in full:[457]
... Mr. Graham and Mr. Williams beg leave to assure his Grace that
they have unremittingly endeavoured to trace if there was any
connexion or correspondence carried on between the mutineers and
any private person or any society on shore, and they think they may
with the greatest safety pronounce that no such connexion or
correspondence ever did exist. They do not however mean to say
that wicked and designing men have not been among the mutineers;
on the contrary they have proof sufficient to found a belief upon that
several whose mischievous dispositions would lead them to the
farthest corner of the kingdom in hopes of continuing a disturbance
once begun have been in company with the delegates on shore, and
have also (some of them) visited the ships at the Nore, and by using
inflammatory language endeavoured to spirit on the sailors to a
continuance of the mutiny, without however daring to offer anything
like a plan for the disposal of the fleet or to do more than insinuate
that they were belonging to clubs or societies whose members
wished well to the cause, but from which societies Mr. Graham and
Mr. Williams are persuaded no such persons were ever regularly
deputed. Neither do they believe that any club or society in the
kingdom or any of those persons who may have found means of
introducing themselves to the delegates have in the smallest degree
bade them not to be any longer misled by "French principles and their
agents, under whatsoever mask." It was also reported in August 1798 that
the French Government paid an Irishman, Duckett, to go and renew the
mutiny. The officials of the Home Office believed the London
Corresponding Society to be guilty; and on 16th June one of them, J.
K[ing], issued a secret order to two of his agents at Sheerness to discover
whether two members of that society, named Beck and Galloway, had had
dealings with the rebel crews. The agents, A. Graham and D. Williams, on
24th June sent to the Duke of Portland the following report, which merits
quotation almost in full:[457]
... Mr. Graham and Mr. Williams beg leave to assure his Grace that
they have unremittingly endeavoured to trace if there was any
connexion or correspondence carried on between the mutineers and
any private person or any society on shore, and they think they may
with the greatest safety pronounce that no such connexion or
correspondence ever did exist. They do not however mean to say
that wicked and designing men have not been among the mutineers;
on the contrary they have proof sufficient to found a belief upon that
several whose mischievous dispositions would lead them to the
farthest corner of the kingdom in hopes of continuing a disturbance
once begun have been in company with the delegates on shore, and
have also (some of them) visited the ships at the Nore, and by using
inflammatory language endeavoured to spirit on the sailors to a
continuance of the mutiny, without however daring to offer anything
like a plan for the disposal of the fleet or to do more than insinuate
that they were belonging to clubs or societies whose members
wished well to the cause, but from which societies Mr. Graham and
Mr. Williams are persuaded no such persons were ever regularly
deputed. Neither do they believe that any club or society in the
kingdom or any of those persons who may have found means of
introducing themselves to the delegates have in the smallest degree
Page 334
been able to influence the proceedings of the mutineers, whose
conduct from the beginning seems to have been of a wild and
extravagant nature not reducible to any sort of form or order and
therefore capable of no other mischief than was to be apprehended
from a want of the fleet to serve against the enemy. In this state
however they were unfortunately suffered to go on without
interruption until they began to think themselves justifiable in what
they were doing, and by stopping up the mouth of the Thames they
were suspected of designs for which Mr. Graham and Mr. Williams
can by no means give them credit. The want of beer and fresh beef
prompted them to revenge, and that and nothing else induced them
to interrupt the trade of the river. It was done on the spur of the
occasion, and with a view of obtaining a supply of fresh provisions.
Another thing, namely the systematic appearance with which the
delegates and the sub-committees on board the different ships
conducted the business of the mutiny may be supposed a good
ground of suspecting that better informed men than sailors in
general are must have been employed in regulating it for them. This
Mr. Graham and Mr. Williams at first were inclined to believe too;
but in the course of their examinations of people belonging to the
fleet they were perfectly convinced that without such a combination
and with the assistance of the newspapers only (independent of the
many cheap publications to be had upon subjects relating to clubs
and societies of all descriptions) and the advantage of so many good
writers as must have been found among the quota-men, they were
capable of conducting it themselves.
Graham and Williams arrested at Sheerness three strangers, Hulm,
McLaurin, and McCan, who were making mischief. Nothing seems to have
come of these arrests; and, despite the opinion of Pitt, expressed in his
speech of 2nd June, we may dismiss the charge against the London
Corresponding Society. It is clear, however, that busybodies circulated
newspapers and pamphlets at Sheerness, Chatham, and Maidstone. The
reports of the parliamentary debates of 3rd, 8th, 9th, and 10th May would
conduct from the beginning seems to have been of a wild and
extravagant nature not reducible to any sort of form or order and
therefore capable of no other mischief than was to be apprehended
from a want of the fleet to serve against the enemy. In this state
however they were unfortunately suffered to go on without
interruption until they began to think themselves justifiable in what
they were doing, and by stopping up the mouth of the Thames they
were suspected of designs for which Mr. Graham and Mr. Williams
can by no means give them credit. The want of beer and fresh beef
prompted them to revenge, and that and nothing else induced them
to interrupt the trade of the river. It was done on the spur of the
occasion, and with a view of obtaining a supply of fresh provisions.
Another thing, namely the systematic appearance with which the
delegates and the sub-committees on board the different ships
conducted the business of the mutiny may be supposed a good
ground of suspecting that better informed men than sailors in
general are must have been employed in regulating it for them. This
Mr. Graham and Mr. Williams at first were inclined to believe too;
but in the course of their examinations of people belonging to the
fleet they were perfectly convinced that without such a combination
and with the assistance of the newspapers only (independent of the
many cheap publications to be had upon subjects relating to clubs
and societies of all descriptions) and the advantage of so many good
writers as must have been found among the quota-men, they were
capable of conducting it themselves.
Graham and Williams arrested at Sheerness three strangers, Hulm,
McLaurin, and McCan, who were making mischief. Nothing seems to have
come of these arrests; and, despite the opinion of Pitt, expressed in his
speech of 2nd June, we may dismiss the charge against the London
Corresponding Society. It is clear, however, that busybodies circulated
newspapers and pamphlets at Sheerness, Chatham, and Maidstone. The
reports of the parliamentary debates of 3rd, 8th, 9th, and 10th May would
Page 335
alone have encouraged the mutineers; and the chiefs of the Opposition must
bear no small share of responsibility for the disastrous events at Spithead
and the Nore. They were warned that their nagging tactics would cause
trouble in the navy. They persisted, in the hope of discrediting the Ministry.
They succeeded in paralysing the navy; and the only excuse for their
conduct is that their hatred of Pitt blinded them to the obvious
consequences. From this censure I must except Sheridan, whose speech of
2nd June was patriotic; and he further is said to have suggested the plan of
removing the buoys beyond the mutinous fleet.
For a brief space disquieting symptoms appeared in the army. An
inflammatory appeal to the troops was distributed at Maidstone by Henry
Fellows; and the same man addressed a letter to some person unnamed,
asking him to send on 100 copies of the Ulster Address, 50 of "Boniparte's
[sic] Address," 50 of "the Duke of Richmond's Letter," and 50 of Payne's
"Agrarian Justice." The last named was found among the papers of John
Bone, a member of the London Corresponding Society.[458] It is not
unlikely that this propaganda was connected with that at Chatham barracks,
where a seditious handbill was left on 21st May 1797, urging the men to
cast off the tyranny misnamed discipline, to demand better food, better
clothing, and freedom from restraint in barracks. "The power is all our
own," it concludes. "The regiments which send you this are willing to do
their part. They will show their countrymen they can be soldiers without
being slaves ... Be sober, be ready."[459] The paper was probably connected
with the mutiny at the Nore. There were also some suspicious doings in
London barracks. One of the incendiaries there was, "wicked Williams,"
who certainly had run through the whole gamut of evil. First as a
clergyman, he ruined himself by his excesses; then as a penitent he applied
to Wilberforce for relief, and, after disgusting even that saintly man, he in
revenge carried round to certain barracks the signature of his would-be
benefactor appended to a seditious appeal. Busybodies lacking all sense of
bear no small share of responsibility for the disastrous events at Spithead
and the Nore. They were warned that their nagging tactics would cause
trouble in the navy. They persisted, in the hope of discrediting the Ministry.
They succeeded in paralysing the navy; and the only excuse for their
conduct is that their hatred of Pitt blinded them to the obvious
consequences. From this censure I must except Sheridan, whose speech of
2nd June was patriotic; and he further is said to have suggested the plan of
removing the buoys beyond the mutinous fleet.
For a brief space disquieting symptoms appeared in the army. An
inflammatory appeal to the troops was distributed at Maidstone by Henry
Fellows; and the same man addressed a letter to some person unnamed,
asking him to send on 100 copies of the Ulster Address, 50 of "Boniparte's
[sic] Address," 50 of "the Duke of Richmond's Letter," and 50 of Payne's
"Agrarian Justice." The last named was found among the papers of John
Bone, a member of the London Corresponding Society.[458] It is not
unlikely that this propaganda was connected with that at Chatham barracks,
where a seditious handbill was left on 21st May 1797, urging the men to
cast off the tyranny misnamed discipline, to demand better food, better
clothing, and freedom from restraint in barracks. "The power is all our
own," it concludes. "The regiments which send you this are willing to do
their part. They will show their countrymen they can be soldiers without
being slaves ... Be sober, be ready."[459] The paper was probably connected
with the mutiny at the Nore. There were also some suspicious doings in
London barracks. One of the incendiaries there was, "wicked Williams,"
who certainly had run through the whole gamut of evil. First as a
clergyman, he ruined himself by his excesses; then as a penitent he applied
to Wilberforce for relief, and, after disgusting even that saintly man, he in
revenge carried round to certain barracks the signature of his would-be
benefactor appended to a seditious appeal. Busybodies lacking all sense of
Page 336
humour therefore buzzed it about that the abolitionist leader sought to stir
up a mutiny. On 13th May Pitt sent to him to sift any grains of truth that
there might be in this peck of lies. The following unpublished letter from
Wilberforce to Pitt shows that he advised him to use Williams so as to get at
the grains:
2.20 Saty mng. [May 1797?][460]
Williams has been with Windham and is to wait on him again. The
latter has been with me, and I have been guarding him about Wms's
character, telling him that we wish to enable some proper person to
watch Wms's motions by becoming acquainted with his person. Now,
if this watch should be at or near Windham's, this point could be
obtained. My other means of making the discovery have failed, and
I can devise no other. Williams avowed to Windham that he had
been employed in endeavouring to inflame the soldiery, but that his
mind was not prepared to go the lengths he found it would be
required to go. I am pretty sure the best way would be to give
Williams money, a little, to infuse a principle of hope. I dare say he
is hungry. You must place no dependence whatever on him, but if he
would act for you, he would be a useful agent, and I think a little
money in his case indispensable. I intreat you not to neglect this. I
suppose there will now be no use in my seeing Ford.
In a second letter, written an hour later, Wilberforce urges Pitt not to neglect
this note. Williams some years ago sought to make a mutiny; he was skilled
in intrigue, had "held Jacobinical language, and was going on in the most
profligate and abandoned way." This is all the information that the Pitt
MSS. yield upon this question. But in the private diary of Wilberforce there
is the significant entry: "Pitt awaked by Woolwich artillery riot and went
out to Cabinet." The cool bearing of Lord Harrington, commander of the
forces in London, helped to restore confidence. On 3rd June Government
up a mutiny. On 13th May Pitt sent to him to sift any grains of truth that
there might be in this peck of lies. The following unpublished letter from
Wilberforce to Pitt shows that he advised him to use Williams so as to get at
the grains:
2.20 Saty mng. [May 1797?][460]
Williams has been with Windham and is to wait on him again. The
latter has been with me, and I have been guarding him about Wms's
character, telling him that we wish to enable some proper person to
watch Wms's motions by becoming acquainted with his person. Now,
if this watch should be at or near Windham's, this point could be
obtained. My other means of making the discovery have failed, and
I can devise no other. Williams avowed to Windham that he had
been employed in endeavouring to inflame the soldiery, but that his
mind was not prepared to go the lengths he found it would be
required to go. I am pretty sure the best way would be to give
Williams money, a little, to infuse a principle of hope. I dare say he
is hungry. You must place no dependence whatever on him, but if he
would act for you, he would be a useful agent, and I think a little
money in his case indispensable. I intreat you not to neglect this. I
suppose there will now be no use in my seeing Ford.
In a second letter, written an hour later, Wilberforce urges Pitt not to neglect
this note. Williams some years ago sought to make a mutiny; he was skilled
in intrigue, had "held Jacobinical language, and was going on in the most
profligate and abandoned way." This is all the information that the Pitt
MSS. yield upon this question. But in the private diary of Wilberforce there
is the significant entry: "Pitt awaked by Woolwich artillery riot and went
out to Cabinet." The cool bearing of Lord Harrington, commander of the
forces in London, helped to restore confidence. On 3rd June Government
Page 337
introduced and speedily passed a Bill for preventing seduction of the
soldiery. There were rumours of an intended mutiny in the Guards; but
fortunately the troops remained true to duty, and some of them helped to
quell the mutiny at the Nore.
A survey of Pitt's conduct during these critical months reveals the
limitations of his nature. He was wanting in foresight. He seems to have
been taken unawares both by the Bank crisis and the mutinies. He met the
financial crisis promptly when it became acute, though by means which
caused incalculable inconvenience at a later time. The mutinies also ought
to have been averted by timely concessions to the sailors, who needed
increase of pay fully as much as the soldiery. For this neglect, however, the
Admiralty Board, not Pitt, is chiefly to blame. When the storm burst,
Ministers did not display the necessary initiative and resourcefulness; and
the officials of the Admiralty must be censured for the delay in bringing
forward the proposals on which Parliament could act. The Opposition, as
usual, blamed Pitt alone; and it must be confessed that he did not exert on
officials the almost terrifying influence whereby Chatham is said to have
expedited the preparation of a fleet of transports. The story to that effect is
of doubtful authenticity.[461] But there is no doubt that Chatham's
personality and behaviour surpassed those of his son in face of a national
crisis. The eagle eye of the father would have discerned the growth of
discontent in the navy, and his forceful will would have found means to
allay or crush it. Before the thunder of his eloquence the mewlings of
faction must have died away. The younger Pitt was too hopeful, too soft, for
the emergency. But it is only fair to remember the heartache and ill health
besetting him since the month of January, which doubtless dulled his
powers during the ensuing period of ceaseless strain and anxiety.
soldiery. There were rumours of an intended mutiny in the Guards; but
fortunately the troops remained true to duty, and some of them helped to
quell the mutiny at the Nore.
A survey of Pitt's conduct during these critical months reveals the
limitations of his nature. He was wanting in foresight. He seems to have
been taken unawares both by the Bank crisis and the mutinies. He met the
financial crisis promptly when it became acute, though by means which
caused incalculable inconvenience at a later time. The mutinies also ought
to have been averted by timely concessions to the sailors, who needed
increase of pay fully as much as the soldiery. For this neglect, however, the
Admiralty Board, not Pitt, is chiefly to blame. When the storm burst,
Ministers did not display the necessary initiative and resourcefulness; and
the officials of the Admiralty must be censured for the delay in bringing
forward the proposals on which Parliament could act. The Opposition, as
usual, blamed Pitt alone; and it must be confessed that he did not exert on
officials the almost terrifying influence whereby Chatham is said to have
expedited the preparation of a fleet of transports. The story to that effect is
of doubtful authenticity.[461] But there is no doubt that Chatham's
personality and behaviour surpassed those of his son in face of a national
crisis. The eagle eye of the father would have discerned the growth of
discontent in the navy, and his forceful will would have found means to
allay or crush it. Before the thunder of his eloquence the mewlings of
faction must have died away. The younger Pitt was too hopeful, too soft, for
the emergency. But it is only fair to remember the heartache and ill health
besetting him since the month of January, which doubtless dulled his
powers during the ensuing period of ceaseless strain and anxiety.
Page 338
Page 339
CHAPTER XV
N A T I O N A L R E V I VA L
A common feeling of danger has produced a
common spirit of exertion, and we have
cheerfully come forward with a surrender of
part of our property, not merely for
recovering ourselves, but for the general
recovery of mankind.—Pitt, Speech of 3rd
December 1798.
The desire of Pitt for peace with France led him in the autumn of 1796 to
renew more formally the overtures which he had instituted early in that
year. His first offer was repelled in so insolent a way that the King
expressed annoyance at its renewal being deemed necessary to call forth the
spirit of the British lion. Pitt, however, despatched Lord Malmesbury on a
special mission to Paris; and the slowness of his journey, due to the bad
roads, led Burke to remark: "No wonder it was slow; for he went all the
way on his knees." Pitt's terms were by no means undignified. He offered
that France should keep San Domingo and her conquests in Europe except
those made from Austria. The French reverses in Swabia and the check to
Bonaparte at Caldiero made the French Directory complaisant for a time;
but his victory at Arcola (17th November), the death of the Czarina
Catharine, and the hope of revolutionizing Ireland, led it to adopt an
imperious tone. Its irrevocable resolve to keep Belgium and the Rhine
N A T I O N A L R E V I VA L
A common feeling of danger has produced a
common spirit of exertion, and we have
cheerfully come forward with a surrender of
part of our property, not merely for
recovering ourselves, but for the general
recovery of mankind.—Pitt, Speech of 3rd
December 1798.
The desire of Pitt for peace with France led him in the autumn of 1796 to
renew more formally the overtures which he had instituted early in that
year. His first offer was repelled in so insolent a way that the King
expressed annoyance at its renewal being deemed necessary to call forth the
spirit of the British lion. Pitt, however, despatched Lord Malmesbury on a
special mission to Paris; and the slowness of his journey, due to the bad
roads, led Burke to remark: "No wonder it was slow; for he went all the
way on his knees." Pitt's terms were by no means undignified. He offered
that France should keep San Domingo and her conquests in Europe except
those made from Austria. The French reverses in Swabia and the check to
Bonaparte at Caldiero made the French Directory complaisant for a time;
but his victory at Arcola (17th November), the death of the Czarina
Catharine, and the hope of revolutionizing Ireland, led it to adopt an
imperious tone. Its irrevocable resolve to keep Belgium and the Rhine
Page 340
boundary appeared in a curt demand to Malmesbury, either to concede that
point or to quit Paris within forty-eight hours (19th December).[462]
It argued singular hopefulness in Pitt that, despite the opposition of the
King, he should make a third effort for peace in the summer of the year
1797, when the loyalty of the fleet was open to grave doubt, when rebellion
raised its head in Ireland, and Bonaparte had beaten down the last defences
of Austria; but so early as 9th April he urged on George the need of making
pacific overtures to Paris, seeing that Austria was at the end of her resources
and seemed on the point of accepting the French terms. The untoward
events of the next weeks deepened his convictions; and to a letter of the
Earl of Carlisle, pressing on him the urgent need of peace, he replied as
follows:
[Draft.] Private.
Downing St., 4 June 1797.[463]
I can also venture to assure you that I feel not less strongly than
yourself the expediency of taking every step towards peace that can
be likely to effect the object, consistent with the safety and honour
of the country; and I have no difficulty in adding (for your private
satisfaction) that steps are taken of the most direct sort, and of
which we must soon know the result, to ascertain whether the
disposition of the enemy will admit of negotiation. On this point the
last accounts from Paris seem to promise favourably. You will have
the goodness to consider the fact of a step having been actually
taken, as confidentially communicated to yourself.
Three days previously Pitt had sent to Paris suggestions for peace.
Delacroix, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose asperities were so
unbearable in 1796, now replied with courtesy. Pitt therefore persevered,
point or to quit Paris within forty-eight hours (19th December).[462]
It argued singular hopefulness in Pitt that, despite the opposition of the
King, he should make a third effort for peace in the summer of the year
1797, when the loyalty of the fleet was open to grave doubt, when rebellion
raised its head in Ireland, and Bonaparte had beaten down the last defences
of Austria; but so early as 9th April he urged on George the need of making
pacific overtures to Paris, seeing that Austria was at the end of her resources
and seemed on the point of accepting the French terms. The untoward
events of the next weeks deepened his convictions; and to a letter of the
Earl of Carlisle, pressing on him the urgent need of peace, he replied as
follows:
[Draft.] Private.
Downing St., 4 June 1797.[463]
I can also venture to assure you that I feel not less strongly than
yourself the expediency of taking every step towards peace that can
be likely to effect the object, consistent with the safety and honour
of the country; and I have no difficulty in adding (for your private
satisfaction) that steps are taken of the most direct sort, and of
which we must soon know the result, to ascertain whether the
disposition of the enemy will admit of negotiation. On this point the
last accounts from Paris seem to promise favourably. You will have
the goodness to consider the fact of a step having been actually
taken, as confidentially communicated to yourself.
Three days previously Pitt had sent to Paris suggestions for peace.
Delacroix, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose asperities were so
unbearable in 1796, now replied with courtesy. Pitt therefore persevered,
Page 341
declaring it to be his duty as a Christian and a patriot to end so terrible a
war. On the other hand Grenville pronounced the negotiation mischievous
at the present crisis, when the French Government would certainly proffer
intolerable demands. Much, it was true, could be said in favour of
concluding peace before Austria definitely came to terms with France; and
if Russia and Prussia had shown signs of mediating in our favour, the
negotiation might have had a favourable issue. But neither of those Courts
evinced good-will, and that of Berlin angered Grenville. He therefore
strongly opposed the overture to France, and herein had the support of the
three Whig Ministers, Portland, Spencer, and Windham. The others sided
with Pitt, Lord Liverpool after some hesitation. On 15th June there were
two long and stormy meetings of the Cabinet, the latter lasting until
midnight; but on the morrow, the day after the collapse of the Nore Mutiny,
the Cabinet endorsed the views of Pitt. Thereupon Grenville entered a
written protest, and wrote to the King, stating that he would offer his
resignation if the times were not so critical. George thanked him, and in a
highly significant phrase urged him to remain at his post so as "to stave off
many farther humiliations."[464]
Malmesbury proceeded to Lille and entered into negotiations with the
French plenipotentiaries, Letourneur, Pléville, and Maret. The last was he
who came on a fruitless errand to London in January 1793, and finally
became Duc de Bassano, and Foreign Minister under Napoleon. It soon
appeared that the only hope of peace lay in the triumph of the Moderates
over the Jacobins at Paris. The former, who desired peace, and had an
immense majority in the country, at first had the upper hand in the
Chambers. They were willing to give up some of the French conquests on
the Rhine and in the Belgic Provinces, if their distracted and nearly
bankrupt country gained the boon of peace. Their opponents, weak in
numbers, relied on the armies, and on the fierce fanaticism which clung
alike to the principles and the conquests of the Jacobins. Pitt was willing to
war. On the other hand Grenville pronounced the negotiation mischievous
at the present crisis, when the French Government would certainly proffer
intolerable demands. Much, it was true, could be said in favour of
concluding peace before Austria definitely came to terms with France; and
if Russia and Prussia had shown signs of mediating in our favour, the
negotiation might have had a favourable issue. But neither of those Courts
evinced good-will, and that of Berlin angered Grenville. He therefore
strongly opposed the overture to France, and herein had the support of the
three Whig Ministers, Portland, Spencer, and Windham. The others sided
with Pitt, Lord Liverpool after some hesitation. On 15th June there were
two long and stormy meetings of the Cabinet, the latter lasting until
midnight; but on the morrow, the day after the collapse of the Nore Mutiny,
the Cabinet endorsed the views of Pitt. Thereupon Grenville entered a
written protest, and wrote to the King, stating that he would offer his
resignation if the times were not so critical. George thanked him, and in a
highly significant phrase urged him to remain at his post so as "to stave off
many farther humiliations."[464]
Malmesbury proceeded to Lille and entered into negotiations with the
French plenipotentiaries, Letourneur, Pléville, and Maret. The last was he
who came on a fruitless errand to London in January 1793, and finally
became Duc de Bassano, and Foreign Minister under Napoleon. It soon
appeared that the only hope of peace lay in the triumph of the Moderates
over the Jacobins at Paris. The former, who desired peace, and had an
immense majority in the country, at first had the upper hand in the
Chambers. They were willing to give up some of the French conquests on
the Rhine and in the Belgic Provinces, if their distracted and nearly
bankrupt country gained the boon of peace. Their opponents, weak in
numbers, relied on the armies, and on the fierce fanaticism which clung
alike to the principles and the conquests of the Jacobins. Pitt was willing to
Page 342
meet France half-way. He consented to leave her in possession of her
"constitutional" frontiers, i.e., Belgium, Luxemburg, Avignon, Savoy, and
Nice, besides restoring to her and her allies all naval conquests, except the
Cape of Good Hope and Trinidad. Ceylon, a recent conquest, was to be
reserved for exchange. So far, but no farther, Pitt consented to go in his
desire for peace. Later on he assured Malmesbury that he would have given
way either on Ceylon or the Cape of Good Hope. But this latter concession
would have galled him deeply; for, as we shall see, he deemed the
possession of the Cape essential to British interests in the East. Spain's
demand for Gibraltar he waived aside as wholly inadmissible, thus
resuming on this question the attitude which he had taken up in the years
1782–3.[465]
Far though Pitt went on the path of conciliation, he did not satisfy the
haughty spirits dominant at Paris. It was soon evident that the only means
of satisfying them were subterranean; and a go-between now offered
himself. An American, Melvill, who claimed to be on intimate terms with
the most influential persons at Paris, assured Malmesbury that he could
guarantee the concession of the desired terms, on consideration of the
payment of £450,000 to the leading men at Paris. Malmesbury at first
believed in Melvill's sincerity and sent him over to see Pitt. They had some
interviews at Holwood at the close of August, apparently to the satisfaction
of the Prime Minister; for, after referring the proposal to Grenville, he laid it
before the King. His reply, dated Weymouth, 9th September, advised a wary
acceptance of the terms, provided that France also gave up her claim of
indemnity for the ships taken or burnt at Toulon in 1793.
The King did not then know of the coup d'état of Fructidor 18 (4th
September), whereby Augereau, the right hand of Bonaparte, coerced the
Moderates and installed the Jacobins in power. The work was done with
brutal thoroughness, prominent opponents being seized and forthwith
"constitutional" frontiers, i.e., Belgium, Luxemburg, Avignon, Savoy, and
Nice, besides restoring to her and her allies all naval conquests, except the
Cape of Good Hope and Trinidad. Ceylon, a recent conquest, was to be
reserved for exchange. So far, but no farther, Pitt consented to go in his
desire for peace. Later on he assured Malmesbury that he would have given
way either on Ceylon or the Cape of Good Hope. But this latter concession
would have galled him deeply; for, as we shall see, he deemed the
possession of the Cape essential to British interests in the East. Spain's
demand for Gibraltar he waived aside as wholly inadmissible, thus
resuming on this question the attitude which he had taken up in the years
1782–3.[465]
Far though Pitt went on the path of conciliation, he did not satisfy the
haughty spirits dominant at Paris. It was soon evident that the only means
of satisfying them were subterranean; and a go-between now offered
himself. An American, Melvill, who claimed to be on intimate terms with
the most influential persons at Paris, assured Malmesbury that he could
guarantee the concession of the desired terms, on consideration of the
payment of £450,000 to the leading men at Paris. Malmesbury at first
believed in Melvill's sincerity and sent him over to see Pitt. They had some
interviews at Holwood at the close of August, apparently to the satisfaction
of the Prime Minister; for, after referring the proposal to Grenville, he laid it
before the King. His reply, dated Weymouth, 9th September, advised a wary
acceptance of the terms, provided that France also gave up her claim of
indemnity for the ships taken or burnt at Toulon in 1793.
The King did not then know of the coup d'état of Fructidor 18 (4th
September), whereby Augereau, the right hand of Bonaparte, coerced the
Moderates and installed the Jacobins in power. The work was done with
brutal thoroughness, prominent opponents being seized and forthwith
Page 343
deported, while the triumphant minority annulled the elections in forty-nine
Departments, and by unscrupulous pressure compelled voters to endorse the
fiat of the army. Thus did France plunge once more into a Reign of Terror,
and without the golden hopes which had made the former experiment
bearable. Such was virtually the end of parliamentary government in
France. It is indeed curious that critics of Pitt, who label his repressive
measures a "Reign of Terror," bestow few words of regret on the despicable
acts of the "Fructidorians," whose policy of leaden repression at home and
filibustering raids abroad made the name of Liberty odious to her former
devotees.
The new tyrants at Paris withheld all news of the coup d'état until they
could override the policy of the French plenipotentiaries at Lille. There it
seemed probable that peace might ensue, when, on 9th September, the first
authentic news of Augereau's violence arrived. Even so, Pitt hoped that the
triumphant faction would be inclined to enjoy their success in peace. It was
not to be. A member of the French embassy at Lille discerned far more
clearly the motives now operating at Paris, that the new Directory, while
making peace with Austria, would continue the war with England in order
to have a pretext for keeping up its armies and acquiring compensations. In
any case the successors of the pacific trio with whom Malmesbury had
almost come to terms, demanded that England should restore every
possession conquered from the French or their allies. This implied the
surrender of the Cape, Ceylon, and Trinidad, besides minor places on which
Pitt and his colleagues held firm. Brief discussions took place, Malmesbury
continuing to show tact and good temper; but on Sunday, 17th September,
the French plenipotentiaries requested him, if he could not grant their
demands, to leave Lille within twenty-four hours. He departed early on
Monday, reached London by noon of Wednesday, and saw Grenville and
Canning immediately. Pitt, owing to news of the death of his brother-in-law,
Eliot, was too prostrate with grief to see him until the morrow. It then
Departments, and by unscrupulous pressure compelled voters to endorse the
fiat of the army. Thus did France plunge once more into a Reign of Terror,
and without the golden hopes which had made the former experiment
bearable. Such was virtually the end of parliamentary government in
France. It is indeed curious that critics of Pitt, who label his repressive
measures a "Reign of Terror," bestow few words of regret on the despicable
acts of the "Fructidorians," whose policy of leaden repression at home and
filibustering raids abroad made the name of Liberty odious to her former
devotees.
The new tyrants at Paris withheld all news of the coup d'état until they
could override the policy of the French plenipotentiaries at Lille. There it
seemed probable that peace might ensue, when, on 9th September, the first
authentic news of Augereau's violence arrived. Even so, Pitt hoped that the
triumphant faction would be inclined to enjoy their success in peace. It was
not to be. A member of the French embassy at Lille discerned far more
clearly the motives now operating at Paris, that the new Directory, while
making peace with Austria, would continue the war with England in order
to have a pretext for keeping up its armies and acquiring compensations. In
any case the successors of the pacific trio with whom Malmesbury had
almost come to terms, demanded that England should restore every
possession conquered from the French or their allies. This implied the
surrender of the Cape, Ceylon, and Trinidad, besides minor places on which
Pitt and his colleagues held firm. Brief discussions took place, Malmesbury
continuing to show tact and good temper; but on Sunday, 17th September,
the French plenipotentiaries requested him, if he could not grant their
demands, to leave Lille within twenty-four hours. He departed early on
Monday, reached London by noon of Wednesday, and saw Grenville and
Canning immediately. Pitt, owing to news of the death of his brother-in-law,
Eliot, was too prostrate with grief to see him until the morrow. It then
Page 344
appeared that the Directory on 11th September issued a secret order to its
plenipotentiaries to send off Malmesbury within twenty-four hours if he had
not full powers to surrender all Britain's conquests.[466]
Even now there was a glimmer of hope. By some secret channel, Melvill,
O'Drusse, or else Boyd the banker, Pitt received the startling offer, that
Talleyrand, if he remained in favour at Paris, could assure to England the
Dutch settlements in question if a large enough sum were paid over to
Barras, Rewbell, and their clique. Pitt clutched at this straw, and on 22nd
September wrote to the King, stating that for £1,200,000 we could retain
Ceylon, and for £800,000 the Cape of Good Hope. While withholding the
name of the intermediaries, known only to himself and Dundas, he strongly
urged that £2,000,000 be paid down when a treaty in this sense was signed
with France, provided that that sum could be presented to Parliament under
the head of secret service. George, now at Windsor, cannot have been
pleased that Pitt and Dundas had a state secret which was withheld for him;
but he replied on the morrow in terms, part of which Earl Stanhope did not
publish. "I am so thoroughly convinced of the venality of that nation
[France] and the strange methods used by its Directors in carrying on
negotiations that I agree with him [Pitt] in thinking, strange as the proposal
appears, that it may be not without foundation."
George, then, was more sceptical than Pitt; and Grenville and Malmesbury
soon had cause to believe the offer to be merely an effort of certain
Frenchmen to speculate in the English funds. Nothing came of the matter.
Melvill, O'Drusse, and Talleyrand on the French side, and Boyd in London,
seem to have been the wire-pullers in this affair, which was renewed early
in October; it may have been only a "bull" operation. The secret is hard to
fathom; but Pitt and Dundas were clearly too credulous. Such was the
conclusion of Malmesbury. It tallied with the pronouncement of Windham,
who in one of his captious moods remarked to Malmesbury that Pitt had no
plenipotentiaries to send off Malmesbury within twenty-four hours if he had
not full powers to surrender all Britain's conquests.[466]
Even now there was a glimmer of hope. By some secret channel, Melvill,
O'Drusse, or else Boyd the banker, Pitt received the startling offer, that
Talleyrand, if he remained in favour at Paris, could assure to England the
Dutch settlements in question if a large enough sum were paid over to
Barras, Rewbell, and their clique. Pitt clutched at this straw, and on 22nd
September wrote to the King, stating that for £1,200,000 we could retain
Ceylon, and for £800,000 the Cape of Good Hope. While withholding the
name of the intermediaries, known only to himself and Dundas, he strongly
urged that £2,000,000 be paid down when a treaty in this sense was signed
with France, provided that that sum could be presented to Parliament under
the head of secret service. George, now at Windsor, cannot have been
pleased that Pitt and Dundas had a state secret which was withheld for him;
but he replied on the morrow in terms, part of which Earl Stanhope did not
publish. "I am so thoroughly convinced of the venality of that nation
[France] and the strange methods used by its Directors in carrying on
negotiations that I agree with him [Pitt] in thinking, strange as the proposal
appears, that it may be not without foundation."
George, then, was more sceptical than Pitt; and Grenville and Malmesbury
soon had cause to believe the offer to be merely an effort of certain
Frenchmen to speculate in the English funds. Nothing came of the matter.
Melvill, O'Drusse, and Talleyrand on the French side, and Boyd in London,
seem to have been the wire-pullers in this affair, which was renewed early
in October; it may have been only a "bull" operation. The secret is hard to
fathom; but Pitt and Dundas were clearly too credulous. Such was the
conclusion of Malmesbury. It tallied with the pronouncement of Windham,
who in one of his captious moods remarked to Malmesbury that Pitt had no
Page 345
knowledge of the world, and kept in office by making concessions, and by
"tiding it over." Grenville (he said) thought more of the nation's dignity, but
was almost a recluse. In fact, the Cabinet was ruled by Dundas, whom
Grenville hated. Dundas it was who had sacrificed Corsica, which involved
the loss of Italy.[467] Windham of course detested the author of the colonial
expeditions, which had diverted help from the Bretons. In the Chouans
alone he saw hope; for how could England struggle on alone against France
if she could use all the advantages offered by Brest and Cherbourg?
Much can be said in support of these contentions; for now that the Directory
threw away the scabbard, England felt the need of the stout Bretons, whose
armies had become mere predatory bands. The last predictions of Burke
were therefore justified. That once mighty intellect expended its last
flickering powers in undignified gibes at the expense of Pitt and his regicide
peace. Fate denied to him the privilege of seeing Malmesbury again
expelled from France and whipped back "like a cur to his kennel." The great
Irishman passed away, amidst inconceivable gloom, in his 68th year, at
Beaconsfield (8th July 1797). In the view of Windham and other extreme
Royalists, Burke was wholly right, and Pitt's weakness was the cause of all
his country's ills.
We may grant that the summer of the year 1797 was one of the worst
possible times in which to open a negotiation with triumphant France; for
she was certain to exact hard terms from a power whose credit and whose
prestige at sea had grievously suffered. Nevertheless, the mistake, if
mistake it was, is venial when compared with the unstatesmanlike
arrogance of the French Directors, who, when an advantageous and brilliant
peace was within their reach, chose to open up a new cycle of war. Of late
France had made use of the pretext that she must gain her "natural
frontiers"—the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Ocean—for the sake
of security against the old dynasties. By rejecting Pitt's overtures, her
"tiding it over." Grenville (he said) thought more of the nation's dignity, but
was almost a recluse. In fact, the Cabinet was ruled by Dundas, whom
Grenville hated. Dundas it was who had sacrificed Corsica, which involved
the loss of Italy.[467] Windham of course detested the author of the colonial
expeditions, which had diverted help from the Bretons. In the Chouans
alone he saw hope; for how could England struggle on alone against France
if she could use all the advantages offered by Brest and Cherbourg?
Much can be said in support of these contentions; for now that the Directory
threw away the scabbard, England felt the need of the stout Bretons, whose
armies had become mere predatory bands. The last predictions of Burke
were therefore justified. That once mighty intellect expended its last
flickering powers in undignified gibes at the expense of Pitt and his regicide
peace. Fate denied to him the privilege of seeing Malmesbury again
expelled from France and whipped back "like a cur to his kennel." The great
Irishman passed away, amidst inconceivable gloom, in his 68th year, at
Beaconsfield (8th July 1797). In the view of Windham and other extreme
Royalists, Burke was wholly right, and Pitt's weakness was the cause of all
his country's ills.
We may grant that the summer of the year 1797 was one of the worst
possible times in which to open a negotiation with triumphant France; for
she was certain to exact hard terms from a power whose credit and whose
prestige at sea had grievously suffered. Nevertheless, the mistake, if
mistake it was, is venial when compared with the unstatesmanlike
arrogance of the French Directors, who, when an advantageous and brilliant
peace was within their reach, chose to open up a new cycle of war. Of late
France had made use of the pretext that she must gain her "natural
frontiers"—the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Ocean—for the sake
of security against the old dynasties. By rejecting Pitt's overtures, her
Page 346
leaders now proclaimed their resolve to dominate Italy and Germany and to
secure supremacy at sea. Their intrigues with British malcontents and the
United Irishmen also showed their determination to revolutionize our
institutions. Thus England was to be abased and insulted, while France
lorded it over all her neighbours and prepared to become mistress of the
seas. The war therefore ceased to be in any sense a war of principle, and
became for France a struggle for world-wide supremacy, for England a
struggle for national existence; and while democratic enthusiasm waned at
Paris, the old patriotic spirit revived everywhere in Great Britain. The
newspapers were full of appeals for unanimity; and on 20th November
appeared the first number of that bright and patriotic paper, the "Anti-
Jacobin," under the editorship of Canning and Hookham Frere, which
played no small part in arousing national ardour. On the next day the French
Directory issued an appeal to France to bestir herself to overthrow the
British power, and to dictate peace at London.
There was need of unanimity; for while France was stamping out revolt,
and Great Britain felt increasingly the drag of Ireland, Pitt encountered an
antagonist of unsuspected strength. Over against his diffuse and tentative
policy stood that of Bonaparte, clear-cut, and for the present everywhere
victorious. While Pitt pursued that will o' the wisp, a money-bought peace,
the Corsican was bullying the Austrian negotiators at Udine and Campo
Formio. Finally his gasconnades carried the day; and on 17th October
Austria signed away her Netherlands to France and her Milanese and
Mantuan territories to the newly created Cisalpine Republic. Bonaparte and
the Emperor, however, agreed to partition the unoffending Venetian State,
the western half of which went to the Cisalpines, the eastern half, along
with Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, to the Hapsburgs. The Court of Vienna
struggled hard to gain the Ionian Islands; but on these, and on Malta, the
young general had set his heart as the natural stepping-stones to Egypt. At
secure supremacy at sea. Their intrigues with British malcontents and the
United Irishmen also showed their determination to revolutionize our
institutions. Thus England was to be abased and insulted, while France
lorded it over all her neighbours and prepared to become mistress of the
seas. The war therefore ceased to be in any sense a war of principle, and
became for France a struggle for world-wide supremacy, for England a
struggle for national existence; and while democratic enthusiasm waned at
Paris, the old patriotic spirit revived everywhere in Great Britain. The
newspapers were full of appeals for unanimity; and on 20th November
appeared the first number of that bright and patriotic paper, the "Anti-
Jacobin," under the editorship of Canning and Hookham Frere, which
played no small part in arousing national ardour. On the next day the French
Directory issued an appeal to France to bestir herself to overthrow the
British power, and to dictate peace at London.
There was need of unanimity; for while France was stamping out revolt,
and Great Britain felt increasingly the drag of Ireland, Pitt encountered an
antagonist of unsuspected strength. Over against his diffuse and tentative
policy stood that of Bonaparte, clear-cut, and for the present everywhere
victorious. While Pitt pursued that will o' the wisp, a money-bought peace,
the Corsican was bullying the Austrian negotiators at Udine and Campo
Formio. Finally his gasconnades carried the day; and on 17th October
Austria signed away her Netherlands to France and her Milanese and
Mantuan territories to the newly created Cisalpine Republic. Bonaparte and
the Emperor, however, agreed to partition the unoffending Venetian State,
the western half of which went to the Cisalpines, the eastern half, along
with Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, to the Hapsburgs. The Court of Vienna
struggled hard to gain the Ionian Islands; but on these, and on Malta, the
young general had set his heart as the natural stepping-stones to Egypt. At
Page 347
the close of the year he returned to Paris in triumph, and was invited by the
Director, Barras, to go and conquer England.
Some such effort, either directly against London, or by a deadly ricochet
through Ireland, would have been made, had not Duncan, on 11th October,
crushed the Dutch off Camperdown, taking nine ships out of fifteen. The
consequences were far reaching. The Dutch navy was paralysed; and
without it the squadrons at Cherbourg and Brest were not yet strong enough
to attack our coasts, until the Toulon and Cadiz fleets sailed northwards.
Bonaparte, who was sent to survey the ports in Flanders and the north of
France, reported to the Directory on 23rd February 1798 that there were
fitting out at Brest only ten sail-of-the-line, which moreover had no crews,
and that the preparations were everywhere so backward as to compel
Government to postpone the invasion until 1799. The wish was father to
that thought. Already he had laid his plans to seize Egypt, and now strongly
advised the orientation of French policy. A third possible course was the
closing of all continental ports against England, an adumbration of the
Continental System of 1806–13 for assuring the ruin of British commerce.
The news of Camperdown and Campo Formio added vigour to Pitt's appeal
for national union in his great speech of 10th November, in which he gave
proofs of the domineering spirit of the party now triumphant at Paris. Very
telling, also, was his taunt at the Whig press, "which knows no other use of
English liberty but servilely to retail and transcribe French opinions."
Sinclair, who had moved a hostile amendment, was so impressed as to
withdraw it; and thus at last the violence of the French Jacobins conduced
to harmony at Westminster.
Already there were signs that the struggle was one of financial endurance.
At the close of November 1797 Pitt appealed to the patriotism of Britons to
raise £25,500,000 for the estimated expenses of the next year, in order to
Director, Barras, to go and conquer England.
Some such effort, either directly against London, or by a deadly ricochet
through Ireland, would have been made, had not Duncan, on 11th October,
crushed the Dutch off Camperdown, taking nine ships out of fifteen. The
consequences were far reaching. The Dutch navy was paralysed; and
without it the squadrons at Cherbourg and Brest were not yet strong enough
to attack our coasts, until the Toulon and Cadiz fleets sailed northwards.
Bonaparte, who was sent to survey the ports in Flanders and the north of
France, reported to the Directory on 23rd February 1798 that there were
fitting out at Brest only ten sail-of-the-line, which moreover had no crews,
and that the preparations were everywhere so backward as to compel
Government to postpone the invasion until 1799. The wish was father to
that thought. Already he had laid his plans to seize Egypt, and now strongly
advised the orientation of French policy. A third possible course was the
closing of all continental ports against England, an adumbration of the
Continental System of 1806–13 for assuring the ruin of British commerce.
The news of Camperdown and Campo Formio added vigour to Pitt's appeal
for national union in his great speech of 10th November, in which he gave
proofs of the domineering spirit of the party now triumphant at Paris. Very
telling, also, was his taunt at the Whig press, "which knows no other use of
English liberty but servilely to retail and transcribe French opinions."
Sinclair, who had moved a hostile amendment, was so impressed as to
withdraw it; and thus at last the violence of the French Jacobins conduced
to harmony at Westminster.
Already there were signs that the struggle was one of financial endurance.
At the close of November 1797 Pitt appealed to the patriotism of Britons to
raise £25,500,000 for the estimated expenses of the next year, in order to
Page 348
display the wealth and strength of the kingdom. He therefore proposed to
ask the Bank of England to advance £3,000,000 on Exchequer bills; and he
urged the propertied classes to submit to the trebling of the Assessed Taxes
on inhabited houses, windows, male servants, horses, carriages, etc. The
trebling of these imposts took the House by surprise, and drew from
Tierney, now, in the absence of Fox, the leader of Opposition, the taunt that
Pitt had to cringe to the Bank for help. A few days later Pitt explained that
the triple duty would fall only upon those who already paid £3 or more on
that score. If the sum paid were less than £1 it would be halved. Those who
paid £3 or more would be charged at an increasing rate, until, when the sum
paid exceeded £50, the amount would be quadrupled. Nor was this all. By a
third Resolution he outlined the scheme of what was in part a progressive
Income Tax. Incomes under £60 were exempt; those between £60 and £65
paid at the rate of 2d. in the pound; and the proportion rose until it reached
2s. in the pound for incomes of £200 or more.
Though Pitt pointed out the need of a patriotic rejoinder to the threats of the
French Government, the new Assessed Taxes aroused a furious opposition.
"The chief and almost only topic of conversation is the new taxes," wrote
Theresa Parker to Lady Stanley of Alderley. "How people are to live if the
Bill is passed I know not. I understand the Opposition are much elated with
the hope of the Bill's being passed, as they consider Mr. Pitt infallibly
ruined if it does, and that he must go out."[468] The patriotism of London
equalled that of the Foxites. City men, forgetting that the present proposals
were due to the shameless evasions of the Assessed Taxes, raised a
threatening din, some of them declaring that Pitt would be assaulted if he
came into the City. Several supporters of Pitt, among them the Duke of
Leeds, Sir William Pulteney and Henry Thornton, opposed the new imposts,
and the Opposition was jubilantly furious. Sheridan, who returned to the
fray, declared that though the poor escaped these taxes they would starve;
for the wealth which employed them would be dried up. Hobhouse dubbed
ask the Bank of England to advance £3,000,000 on Exchequer bills; and he
urged the propertied classes to submit to the trebling of the Assessed Taxes
on inhabited houses, windows, male servants, horses, carriages, etc. The
trebling of these imposts took the House by surprise, and drew from
Tierney, now, in the absence of Fox, the leader of Opposition, the taunt that
Pitt had to cringe to the Bank for help. A few days later Pitt explained that
the triple duty would fall only upon those who already paid £3 or more on
that score. If the sum paid were less than £1 it would be halved. Those who
paid £3 or more would be charged at an increasing rate, until, when the sum
paid exceeded £50, the amount would be quadrupled. Nor was this all. By a
third Resolution he outlined the scheme of what was in part a progressive
Income Tax. Incomes under £60 were exempt; those between £60 and £65
paid at the rate of 2d. in the pound; and the proportion rose until it reached
2s. in the pound for incomes of £200 or more.
Though Pitt pointed out the need of a patriotic rejoinder to the threats of the
French Government, the new Assessed Taxes aroused a furious opposition.
"The chief and almost only topic of conversation is the new taxes," wrote
Theresa Parker to Lady Stanley of Alderley. "How people are to live if the
Bill is passed I know not. I understand the Opposition are much elated with
the hope of the Bill's being passed, as they consider Mr. Pitt infallibly
ruined if it does, and that he must go out."[468] The patriotism of London
equalled that of the Foxites. City men, forgetting that the present proposals
were due to the shameless evasions of the Assessed Taxes, raised a
threatening din, some of them declaring that Pitt would be assaulted if he
came into the City. Several supporters of Pitt, among them the Duke of
Leeds, Sir William Pulteney and Henry Thornton, opposed the new imposts,
and the Opposition was jubilantly furious. Sheridan, who returned to the
fray, declared that though the poor escaped these taxes they would starve;
for the wealth which employed them would be dried up. Hobhouse dubbed
Page 349
the Finance Bill inquisitorial, degrading, and fatal to the virtues of
truthfulness and charity. Squires bemoaned the loss of horses and carriages
and the hard lot of their footmen. Arthur Young warned Pitt that if the taxes
could not be evaded, gentlemen must sell their estates and live in town.
Bath, he was assured, welcomed the new imposts because they would drive
very many families thither. He begged Pitt to reconsider his proposals, and,
instead of them, to tax "all places of public diversion, public dinners, clubs,
etc., not forgetting debating societies and Jacobin meetings"; for this would
restrain "that violent emigration to towns, which the measure dreadfully
threatens."[469]
A sign of the hopes of the Opposition was the re-appearance of Fox.
Resuming his long vacant seat, he declared Pitt to be the author of the
country's ruin. For himself, he upheld the funding system, that is, the plan
of shelving the debt upon the future. The palm for abusiveness was,
however, carried off by Nicholls and Jekyll. The former taunted Pitt with
losing all his Allies and raising France to undreamt-of heights of power,
with failing to gain peace, with exhausting the credit and the resources of
England until now he had to requisition men's incomes. As for Jekyll, he
called the present proposals "a detestable measure of extortion and
rapacity." The debates dragged on, until, after a powerful reply by Pitt in the
small hours of 5th January 1798 the Finance Bill passed the Commons by
196 to 71. The Lords showed a far better spirit. Carrington declared that
Pitt's proposals did not go far enough. Lord Holland in a maiden speech
pronounced them worse than the progressive taxes of Robespierre. But
Liverpool, Auckland, and Grenville supported the measure, which passed
on 9th January 1798 by 75 to 6.
For a time the Finance Bill injured Pitt's popularity in the City. During the
State procession on 19th December 1797, when the King, Queen, and
Ministers went to St. Paul's to render thanks for the naval triumphs of that
truthfulness and charity. Squires bemoaned the loss of horses and carriages
and the hard lot of their footmen. Arthur Young warned Pitt that if the taxes
could not be evaded, gentlemen must sell their estates and live in town.
Bath, he was assured, welcomed the new imposts because they would drive
very many families thither. He begged Pitt to reconsider his proposals, and,
instead of them, to tax "all places of public diversion, public dinners, clubs,
etc., not forgetting debating societies and Jacobin meetings"; for this would
restrain "that violent emigration to towns, which the measure dreadfully
threatens."[469]
A sign of the hopes of the Opposition was the re-appearance of Fox.
Resuming his long vacant seat, he declared Pitt to be the author of the
country's ruin. For himself, he upheld the funding system, that is, the plan
of shelving the debt upon the future. The palm for abusiveness was,
however, carried off by Nicholls and Jekyll. The former taunted Pitt with
losing all his Allies and raising France to undreamt-of heights of power,
with failing to gain peace, with exhausting the credit and the resources of
England until now he had to requisition men's incomes. As for Jekyll, he
called the present proposals "a detestable measure of extortion and
rapacity." The debates dragged on, until, after a powerful reply by Pitt in the
small hours of 5th January 1798 the Finance Bill passed the Commons by
196 to 71. The Lords showed a far better spirit. Carrington declared that
Pitt's proposals did not go far enough. Lord Holland in a maiden speech
pronounced them worse than the progressive taxes of Robespierre. But
Liverpool, Auckland, and Grenville supported the measure, which passed
on 9th January 1798 by 75 to 6.
For a time the Finance Bill injured Pitt's popularity in the City. During the
State procession on 19th December 1797, when the King, Queen, and
Ministers went to St. Paul's to render thanks for the naval triumphs of that
Page 350
year, he was hooted by the mob; and on the return his carriage had to be
guarded by a squadron of horse. Nevertheless, it is now clear that Pitt's
proposals were both necessary and salutary. The predictions of commercial
ruin were soon refuted by the trade returns. Imports in 1798 showed an
increase of £6,844,000 over those of 1797; exports, an increase of
£3,974,000. In part, doubtless, these gratifying results may be ascribed to
renewed security at sea, the bountiful harvest of 1798, and the recent
opening up of trade to Turkey and the Levant. But, under a vicious fiscal
system, trade would not have recovered from the severe depression of 1797.
Amidst all the troubles of the Irish Rebellion of 1798, Pitt derived comfort
from the signs of returning prosperity.
The confidence which he inspired was proved by the success of a
remarkable experiment, the Patriotic Contribution. In the midst of the acrid
debates on the Finance Bill, the Speaker, Addington, tactfully suggested the
insertion of a clause enabling the Bank of England to receive voluntary
gifts, amounting to one-fifth of the income. Pitt gratefully adopted the
proposal, and early in the year 1798 patriots began to send in large sums.
Pitt, Addington, Dundas, the Lord Chancellor, and Lords Kenyon and
Romney at once gave £2,000 each; the King graciously allotted from the
Privy Purse £20,000 a year during the war. The generous impulse speedily
prevailed, and the City once more showed its patriotism by subscribing
£10,000; the Bank gave £200,000. A platform was erected near the Royal
Exchange for the receipt of contributions. Among others, a wealthy calico
printer, Robert Peel, father of the statesman, felt the call of duty to give
£10,000. He went back to Bury (Lancashire) in some anxiety to inform his
partner, Yates, of this unbusinesslike conduct, whereupon the latter
remarked, "You might as well have made it £20,000 while you were about
it." If all Britons had acted in this spirit, the new taxes would have met the
needs of the war. But, as will subsequently appear, they failed to balance the
guarded by a squadron of horse. Nevertheless, it is now clear that Pitt's
proposals were both necessary and salutary. The predictions of commercial
ruin were soon refuted by the trade returns. Imports in 1798 showed an
increase of £6,844,000 over those of 1797; exports, an increase of
£3,974,000. In part, doubtless, these gratifying results may be ascribed to
renewed security at sea, the bountiful harvest of 1798, and the recent
opening up of trade to Turkey and the Levant. But, under a vicious fiscal
system, trade would not have recovered from the severe depression of 1797.
Amidst all the troubles of the Irish Rebellion of 1798, Pitt derived comfort
from the signs of returning prosperity.
The confidence which he inspired was proved by the success of a
remarkable experiment, the Patriotic Contribution. In the midst of the acrid
debates on the Finance Bill, the Speaker, Addington, tactfully suggested the
insertion of a clause enabling the Bank of England to receive voluntary
gifts, amounting to one-fifth of the income. Pitt gratefully adopted the
proposal, and early in the year 1798 patriots began to send in large sums.
Pitt, Addington, Dundas, the Lord Chancellor, and Lords Kenyon and
Romney at once gave £2,000 each; the King graciously allotted from the
Privy Purse £20,000 a year during the war. The generous impulse speedily
prevailed, and the City once more showed its patriotism by subscribing
£10,000; the Bank gave £200,000. A platform was erected near the Royal
Exchange for the receipt of contributions. Among others, a wealthy calico
printer, Robert Peel, father of the statesman, felt the call of duty to give
£10,000. He went back to Bury (Lancashire) in some anxiety to inform his
partner, Yates, of this unbusinesslike conduct, whereupon the latter
remarked, "You might as well have made it £20,000 while you were about
it." If all Britons had acted in this spirit, the new taxes would have met the
needs of the war. But, as will subsequently appear, they failed to balance the
Page 351
ever growing expenditure, and Pitt in 1799–1800 had to raise loans on the
security of the Income Tax to make up its deficiencies.
A pleasing proof of the restoration of friendship between Auckland and Pitt
appears in a letter in which the former asked advice as to the amount which
he should give to this fund. He was now Postmaster-General, and stated that
his total gross income was £3,600, out of which the new taxes took £320.
Should he give £1,000? And what should he give for his brother, Morton
Eden, ambassador at Vienna? Pitt answered that £700 should be the utmost
for him; the sum of £500 for Morton would also be generous.[470] On the
whole, £2,300,000 was subscribed—a sum which contrasts remarkably with
the driblets that came in as a response to Necker's appeal in the autumn of
1789 for a patriotic contribution of one fourth of the incomes of Frenchmen.
Even so, Pitt had to impose new taxes in his Budget of 1798, and to raise a
loan of £3,000,000. Further, on 2nd April, he proposed a commutation of
the Land Tax. Of late it had been voted annually at the rate of 4s. in the
pound, and produced about £2,000,000. Pitt now proposed to make it a
perpetual charge upon parishes, but to enable owners to redeem their land
from the tax at the existing valuation. The sums accruing from these sales
were to go to the reduction of the National Debt. His aim, that of enhancing
credit, was as praiseworthy as his procedure was defective. For there had
been no valuation of the land for many years, and the assessments varied in
the most surprising manner even in neighbouring districts. Doubtless it was
impossible during the Great War to carry out the expensive and lengthy
process of a national valuation; but, as manufactures and mining were
creating a new Industrial England, the time was most unsuited to the
imposition of a fixed quota of Land Tax.
Nevertheless, Pitt took as basis the assessment of 1797, and made it a
perpetual charge upon each parish. The results have in many cases been
security of the Income Tax to make up its deficiencies.
A pleasing proof of the restoration of friendship between Auckland and Pitt
appears in a letter in which the former asked advice as to the amount which
he should give to this fund. He was now Postmaster-General, and stated that
his total gross income was £3,600, out of which the new taxes took £320.
Should he give £1,000? And what should he give for his brother, Morton
Eden, ambassador at Vienna? Pitt answered that £700 should be the utmost
for him; the sum of £500 for Morton would also be generous.[470] On the
whole, £2,300,000 was subscribed—a sum which contrasts remarkably with
the driblets that came in as a response to Necker's appeal in the autumn of
1789 for a patriotic contribution of one fourth of the incomes of Frenchmen.
Even so, Pitt had to impose new taxes in his Budget of 1798, and to raise a
loan of £3,000,000. Further, on 2nd April, he proposed a commutation of
the Land Tax. Of late it had been voted annually at the rate of 4s. in the
pound, and produced about £2,000,000. Pitt now proposed to make it a
perpetual charge upon parishes, but to enable owners to redeem their land
from the tax at the existing valuation. The sums accruing from these sales
were to go to the reduction of the National Debt. His aim, that of enhancing
credit, was as praiseworthy as his procedure was defective. For there had
been no valuation of the land for many years, and the assessments varied in
the most surprising manner even in neighbouring districts. Doubtless it was
impossible during the Great War to carry out the expensive and lengthy
process of a national valuation; but, as manufactures and mining were
creating a new Industrial England, the time was most unsuited to the
imposition of a fixed quota of Land Tax.
Nevertheless, Pitt took as basis the assessment of 1797, and made it a
perpetual charge upon each parish. The results have in many cases been
Page 352
most incongruous. Agricultural land, which was generally rated high,
continued to pay at that level long after depreciation set in. On the other
hand, large tracts in the manufacturing districts, rapidly increasing in value,
paid far less than their due share. In some cases where a barren moor has
become a hive of industry, the parish now raises its quota by a rate of .001
in the pound. In a few cases, where the fall in value has been severe, the
rate is very heavy, in spite of remedial legislation. Pitt could not have
foreseen differences such as these; but, in view of the rapid growth of
manufactures in the Midlands and North, he should have ensured either a
re-valuation of the parochial quotas or a complete and methodical
redemption from the Land Tax. He took neither course, and that, too, in
spite of the warnings of Lord Sheffield and Sinclair as to the injustice and
impolicy of his proposals. They passed both Houses by large majorities,
perhaps because he offered to landlords the option of redeeming their land
at twenty years' purchase. Less than one fourth of the tax was redeemed
before the year 1800, a fact which seems to show that the landed interest
was too hard pressed to profit by the opportunity. As Sir Francis Burdett
said, country gentlemen had to bear a heavy burden of taxation, besides
poor-rates, tithes, and the expense of the mounted yeomanry. Thurlow
compared the country magnates to sheep who let themselves be shorn and
re-shorn, whereas merchants and traders were like hogs, grunting and
bolting as soon as one bristle was touched. In defence of Pitt's action, it may
be said that he hoped to secure a considerable gain by the investment of the
purchase money in Consols and to enhance their value; but it appears that
not more than £80,000 a year was thus realized.[471]
The prevalence of discontent early in 1798 and the threatened coalition of
Irish and British malcontents will be noticed in the following chapter. Pitt
was so impressed by the danger as to press for the suspension of the Habeas
Corpus Act and the renewal of the Aliens Act (April 1798). As happened in
1794, the revival of coercion produced vehement protests. Already the
continued to pay at that level long after depreciation set in. On the other
hand, large tracts in the manufacturing districts, rapidly increasing in value,
paid far less than their due share. In some cases where a barren moor has
become a hive of industry, the parish now raises its quota by a rate of .001
in the pound. In a few cases, where the fall in value has been severe, the
rate is very heavy, in spite of remedial legislation. Pitt could not have
foreseen differences such as these; but, in view of the rapid growth of
manufactures in the Midlands and North, he should have ensured either a
re-valuation of the parochial quotas or a complete and methodical
redemption from the Land Tax. He took neither course, and that, too, in
spite of the warnings of Lord Sheffield and Sinclair as to the injustice and
impolicy of his proposals. They passed both Houses by large majorities,
perhaps because he offered to landlords the option of redeeming their land
at twenty years' purchase. Less than one fourth of the tax was redeemed
before the year 1800, a fact which seems to show that the landed interest
was too hard pressed to profit by the opportunity. As Sir Francis Burdett
said, country gentlemen had to bear a heavy burden of taxation, besides
poor-rates, tithes, and the expense of the mounted yeomanry. Thurlow
compared the country magnates to sheep who let themselves be shorn and
re-shorn, whereas merchants and traders were like hogs, grunting and
bolting as soon as one bristle was touched. In defence of Pitt's action, it may
be said that he hoped to secure a considerable gain by the investment of the
purchase money in Consols and to enhance their value; but it appears that
not more than £80,000 a year was thus realized.[471]
The prevalence of discontent early in 1798 and the threatened coalition of
Irish and British malcontents will be noticed in the following chapter. Pitt
was so impressed by the danger as to press for the suspension of the Habeas
Corpus Act and the renewal of the Aliens Act (April 1798). As happened in
1794, the revival of coercion produced vehement protests. Already the
Page 353
Duke of Norfolk had flung defiance at Ministers. Presiding at a great
banquet held at the Crown and Anchor, on the occasion of Fox's birthday,
24th January, he not only compared the great orator to Washington, but
hinted that the 2,000 men present might do as much as Washington's
handful had done in America. Finally he proposed the distinctly Jacobinical
toast, "Our Sovereign, the Majesty of the People." For this he was
dismissed from the command of a militia regiment and from the Lord
Lieutenancy of the West Riding of Yorkshire.
Fox chose to repeat the toast early in May 1798, when large parts of Ireland
were on the brink of revolt. In so dire a crisis it behoved a leading man to
weigh his words. But the wilful strain in his nature set all prudence at
defiance. Thereupon several of Pitt's friends recommended a public
prosecution for sedition, or at least a reprimand at the bar of the House of
Commons. To the former course Pitt objected as giving Fox too much
consequence, besides running the risk of an acquittal; but he saw some
advantage in the latter course; for (as he wrote to Dundas) Fox, when
irritated by the reprimand, would probably offer a new insult and could then
be sent to the Tower for the rest of the Session. The suggestion is perhaps
the pettiest in the whole of Pitt's correspondence; but probably it was due to
the extremely grave situation in Ireland and the fear of a French invasion.
Further, Fox had ceased to attend the House of Commons; and a member
who shirks his duty is doubly guilty when he proposes a seditious toast. Pitt,
however, did not push matters to extremes, and the course actually adopted
was the removal of the name of Fox from the Privy Council by the hand of
George III on 9th May.
Sixteen days later, Pitt and Tierney had a passage of arms in the House.
That pugnacious Irishman had thrust himself to the fore during the
secession of Fox and other prominent Whigs from the House, and had to
bear many reproaches for his officiousness. He also nagged at Pitt at every
banquet held at the Crown and Anchor, on the occasion of Fox's birthday,
24th January, he not only compared the great orator to Washington, but
hinted that the 2,000 men present might do as much as Washington's
handful had done in America. Finally he proposed the distinctly Jacobinical
toast, "Our Sovereign, the Majesty of the People." For this he was
dismissed from the command of a militia regiment and from the Lord
Lieutenancy of the West Riding of Yorkshire.
Fox chose to repeat the toast early in May 1798, when large parts of Ireland
were on the brink of revolt. In so dire a crisis it behoved a leading man to
weigh his words. But the wilful strain in his nature set all prudence at
defiance. Thereupon several of Pitt's friends recommended a public
prosecution for sedition, or at least a reprimand at the bar of the House of
Commons. To the former course Pitt objected as giving Fox too much
consequence, besides running the risk of an acquittal; but he saw some
advantage in the latter course; for (as he wrote to Dundas) Fox, when
irritated by the reprimand, would probably offer a new insult and could then
be sent to the Tower for the rest of the Session. The suggestion is perhaps
the pettiest in the whole of Pitt's correspondence; but probably it was due to
the extremely grave situation in Ireland and the fear of a French invasion.
Further, Fox had ceased to attend the House of Commons; and a member
who shirks his duty is doubly guilty when he proposes a seditious toast. Pitt,
however, did not push matters to extremes, and the course actually adopted
was the removal of the name of Fox from the Privy Council by the hand of
George III on 9th May.
Sixteen days later, Pitt and Tierney had a passage of arms in the House.
That pugnacious Irishman had thrust himself to the fore during the
secession of Fox and other prominent Whigs from the House, and had to
bear many reproaches for his officiousness. He also nagged at Pitt at every
Page 354
opportunity, until, on his opposing a motion of urgency for a Bill for better
manning the Navy, Pitt's patience gave way. He accused the self-constituted
leader of seeking to obstruct the defence of the country. The charge was in
the main correct; for Tierney's opposition to a pressing measure of national
defence was highly unpatriotic. Nevertheless, Tierney had right on his side
when he called Pitt to order and appealed to the Speaker for protection.
Rarely has that personage been placed in a more difficult position. Pitt was
right in his facts; but etiquette required that he should withdraw or at least
attenuate his charge. Addington politely hinted that the words were
unparliamentary, but suggested that the Minister should give an
explanation. Pitt stiffly refused either to withdraw his words, or to explain
their meaning. There the incident closed. On the next day, Saturday, 26th
May, Tierney sent Pitt a challenge, which was at once accepted.
We find it difficult now to take seriously a duel between a slim man of near
forty who had rarely fired a shot in sport, never in anger, and a stoutly built
irascible Irishman, for whom a good shot meant lynching or lasting
opprobrium. Visions of Bob Acres and Sir Lucius O'Trigger flit before us.
We picture Tierney quoting "fighting Bob Acres" as to the advantage of a
sideways posture; and we wonder whether the seconds, if only in regard for
their own safety, did not omit to insert bullets. The ludicrous side of the
affair soon dawned on contemporaries, witness the suggestion that in all
fairness Pitt's figure ought to be chalked out on Tierney's, and that no shot
taking effect outside ought to count. But, on the whole, people took the
incident seriously. Certainly the principals did. Pitt made his will
beforehand, and requested Addington as a friend to come and see him,
thereby preventing his interposition as Speaker. He asked Steele to be his
second; but, he being away from town, Dudley Ryder took his place.
Leaving Downing Street about noon on Whitsunday, 27th May, the pair
walked along Birdcage Walk, mounted the steps leading into Queen Street,
and entered a chaise engaged for their excursion. After passing the villages
manning the Navy, Pitt's patience gave way. He accused the self-constituted
leader of seeking to obstruct the defence of the country. The charge was in
the main correct; for Tierney's opposition to a pressing measure of national
defence was highly unpatriotic. Nevertheless, Tierney had right on his side
when he called Pitt to order and appealed to the Speaker for protection.
Rarely has that personage been placed in a more difficult position. Pitt was
right in his facts; but etiquette required that he should withdraw or at least
attenuate his charge. Addington politely hinted that the words were
unparliamentary, but suggested that the Minister should give an
explanation. Pitt stiffly refused either to withdraw his words, or to explain
their meaning. There the incident closed. On the next day, Saturday, 26th
May, Tierney sent Pitt a challenge, which was at once accepted.
We find it difficult now to take seriously a duel between a slim man of near
forty who had rarely fired a shot in sport, never in anger, and a stoutly built
irascible Irishman, for whom a good shot meant lynching or lasting
opprobrium. Visions of Bob Acres and Sir Lucius O'Trigger flit before us.
We picture Tierney quoting "fighting Bob Acres" as to the advantage of a
sideways posture; and we wonder whether the seconds, if only in regard for
their own safety, did not omit to insert bullets. The ludicrous side of the
affair soon dawned on contemporaries, witness the suggestion that in all
fairness Pitt's figure ought to be chalked out on Tierney's, and that no shot
taking effect outside ought to count. But, on the whole, people took the
incident seriously. Certainly the principals did. Pitt made his will
beforehand, and requested Addington as a friend to come and see him,
thereby preventing his interposition as Speaker. He asked Steele to be his
second; but, he being away from town, Dudley Ryder took his place.
Leaving Downing Street about noon on Whitsunday, 27th May, the pair
walked along Birdcage Walk, mounted the steps leading into Queen Street,
and entered a chaise engaged for their excursion. After passing the villages
Page 355
of Chelsea and Putney, and, topping the rise beyond, they proceeded along
the old Portsmouth Road, which crosses the northern part of Putney Heath.
At the top of the steep hill leading down into Kingston Vale they alighted,
made their way past the gibbet where swung the corpse of a well-known
highwayman, Jerry Abershaw, long the terror of travellers on that road. Did
Pitt know that libellers likened him to the highwayman; for "Jerry took
purses with his pistols, and Pitt with his Parliaments"? Lower down Pitt and
Ryder found Tierney and his second, General Walpole, in a charming dell
radiant with golden gorse and silver birches.[472]
But they were not alone. That fine Whitsuntide had brought many chaises
along the road; and not a few curious persons skirted the rising ground
towards Putney and Wimbledon. To these inquisitive groups rode up a tall
bland-looking man, now more than usually sedate. It was Addington.
Probably he was the most anxious man alive. He knew that his weakness as
Speaker had freed Pitt from the necessity of apologizing to Tierney as the
occasion demanded. Now, too, as Speaker, he ought to intervene. As a
friend, pledged by Pitt to secrecy, he could do nothing but look on. Below,
in the dell, the seconds saw to the pistols and measured the distance—
twelve paces. Pitt and Tierney coolly took aim, and, at the signal, fired.
Addington's heart must have leaped with joy to see Pitt's figure still erect.
Again the seconds produced pistols, and again the pair fired: but this time
Pitt discharged his weapon into the air. Was it a sign of his contrition for his
insult to Tierney, or of his chivalrous sense of Tierney's disadvantage in the
matter of target-space? Certain it is that Walpole leaped over the furze
bushes for joy on seeing the duellists still erect.
Thus ended the duel, to the satisfaction of all present. Pitt had behaved with
spirit, and Tierney had achieved immortal fame. But that the duel was
fought at all caused deep concern. Hannah More was inexpressibly shocked
at the desecration of Whitsunday; Wilberforce also was deeply pained.
the old Portsmouth Road, which crosses the northern part of Putney Heath.
At the top of the steep hill leading down into Kingston Vale they alighted,
made their way past the gibbet where swung the corpse of a well-known
highwayman, Jerry Abershaw, long the terror of travellers on that road. Did
Pitt know that libellers likened him to the highwayman; for "Jerry took
purses with his pistols, and Pitt with his Parliaments"? Lower down Pitt and
Ryder found Tierney and his second, General Walpole, in a charming dell
radiant with golden gorse and silver birches.[472]
But they were not alone. That fine Whitsuntide had brought many chaises
along the road; and not a few curious persons skirted the rising ground
towards Putney and Wimbledon. To these inquisitive groups rode up a tall
bland-looking man, now more than usually sedate. It was Addington.
Probably he was the most anxious man alive. He knew that his weakness as
Speaker had freed Pitt from the necessity of apologizing to Tierney as the
occasion demanded. Now, too, as Speaker, he ought to intervene. As a
friend, pledged by Pitt to secrecy, he could do nothing but look on. Below,
in the dell, the seconds saw to the pistols and measured the distance—
twelve paces. Pitt and Tierney coolly took aim, and, at the signal, fired.
Addington's heart must have leaped with joy to see Pitt's figure still erect.
Again the seconds produced pistols, and again the pair fired: but this time
Pitt discharged his weapon into the air. Was it a sign of his contrition for his
insult to Tierney, or of his chivalrous sense of Tierney's disadvantage in the
matter of target-space? Certain it is that Walpole leaped over the furze
bushes for joy on seeing the duellists still erect.
Thus ended the duel, to the satisfaction of all present. Pitt had behaved with
spirit, and Tierney had achieved immortal fame. But that the duel was
fought at all caused deep concern. Hannah More was inexpressibly shocked
at the desecration of Whitsunday; Wilberforce also was deeply pained.
Page 356
Indeed, he deemed the matter so serious as to propose to give notice of a
motion for preventing duelling; but he dropped it on Pitt frankly assuring
him that, if carried, it would involve his resignation. George III signified to
Chatham his decided disapproval, and expressed to Pitt a desire that such an
incident should never occur again. "Public characters," he added, "have no
right to weigh alone what they owe to themselves; they must consider what
they owe to their country." Thomas Pitt strongly reprobated the conduct of
Tierney in challenging Pitt; for we find the latter replying to him on 30th
May: "I shall feel great concern if the feelings of my friends betray them
into any observations on Mr. Tierney's conduct reproachful or in the
smallest degree unfavourable to him, being convinced that he does not
merit them." This is the letter of a spirited gentleman. Buckingham
evidently sympathized with Thomas Pitt; for he expressed his surprise that
the Prime Minister should risk his life against such a man as Tierney. A
more jocular tone was taken by the Earl of Mornington, soon to become the
Marquis Wellesley. Writing to Pitt from Fort St. George on 8th August 1799
(three months after the capture of Seringapatam), he expressed strong
approval of his Irish policy and concluded as follows: "I send you by Henry
a pair of pistols found in the palace at Seringapatam. They are mounted in
gold and were given by the late King of France to the 'citizen Sultan'
(Tippoo). They will, I hope, answer better for your next Jacobin duel than
those you used under Abershaw's gibbet."[473]—What became of those
pistols?
The general opinion was adverse to Pitt's conduct. For at that time the
outlook in Ireland could scarcely have been gloomier, and Bonaparte's
armada at Toulon was believed to be destined for those shores. In such a
case, despite the nice punctilio of honour, neither ought Tierney to have sent
a challenge nor Pitt to have accepted it. The recklessness of Pitt in this
affair is, however, typical of the mood of the British people in the spring
and summer of that year. The victories of Jervis and Duncan, the rejection
motion for preventing duelling; but he dropped it on Pitt frankly assuring
him that, if carried, it would involve his resignation. George III signified to
Chatham his decided disapproval, and expressed to Pitt a desire that such an
incident should never occur again. "Public characters," he added, "have no
right to weigh alone what they owe to themselves; they must consider what
they owe to their country." Thomas Pitt strongly reprobated the conduct of
Tierney in challenging Pitt; for we find the latter replying to him on 30th
May: "I shall feel great concern if the feelings of my friends betray them
into any observations on Mr. Tierney's conduct reproachful or in the
smallest degree unfavourable to him, being convinced that he does not
merit them." This is the letter of a spirited gentleman. Buckingham
evidently sympathized with Thomas Pitt; for he expressed his surprise that
the Prime Minister should risk his life against such a man as Tierney. A
more jocular tone was taken by the Earl of Mornington, soon to become the
Marquis Wellesley. Writing to Pitt from Fort St. George on 8th August 1799
(three months after the capture of Seringapatam), he expressed strong
approval of his Irish policy and concluded as follows: "I send you by Henry
a pair of pistols found in the palace at Seringapatam. They are mounted in
gold and were given by the late King of France to the 'citizen Sultan'
(Tippoo). They will, I hope, answer better for your next Jacobin duel than
those you used under Abershaw's gibbet."[473]—What became of those
pistols?
The general opinion was adverse to Pitt's conduct. For at that time the
outlook in Ireland could scarcely have been gloomier, and Bonaparte's
armada at Toulon was believed to be destined for those shores. In such a
case, despite the nice punctilio of honour, neither ought Tierney to have sent
a challenge nor Pitt to have accepted it. The recklessness of Pitt in this
affair is, however, typical of the mood of the British people in the spring
and summer of that year. The victories of Jervis and Duncan, the rejection
Page 357
of Pitt's offers of peace by the French Directory, and its threats to invade
these shores, aroused the fighting spirit of the race. As the war became a
struggle for existence, all thoughts of surrender vanished. The prevalent
feeling was one of defiance. It was nurtured by Canning in the "Anti-
Jacobin," in which he lampooned the French democrats and their British
well-wishers. Under the thin disguise of "the Friend of Humanity" he
satirized Tierney in the poem, "The Knife-Grinder," a parody, in form, of
Southey's "Widow," and, in meaning, of Tierney's philanthropic appeals. In
a play, "The Rovers," he sportfully satirized the romantic drama of Schiller,
"The Robbers." In one of the incidental poems he represented the hero,
while in prison, recalling the bright days
at the U-
-niversity of Göttingen,
-niversity of Göttingen.
Pitt was so charmed with this jeu d'esprit that he is said to have added the
following verse in the same mock-heroic style:[474]
Sun, moon, and thou, vain world, adieu,
That Kings and priests are plotting in;
Here doomed to starve on water gru-
-el, never shall I see the U-
-niversity of Göttingen,
-niversity of Göttingen.
A Prime Minister who can throw off squibs, and a nation that can enjoy
them, will not succumb even in the worst crisis.
In truth, all patriots were now straining their utmost to repel an aggressive
and insolent enemy. The Volunteer Movement more than ever called forth
the manly exertions of the people; and one of the most popular caricatures
these shores, aroused the fighting spirit of the race. As the war became a
struggle for existence, all thoughts of surrender vanished. The prevalent
feeling was one of defiance. It was nurtured by Canning in the "Anti-
Jacobin," in which he lampooned the French democrats and their British
well-wishers. Under the thin disguise of "the Friend of Humanity" he
satirized Tierney in the poem, "The Knife-Grinder," a parody, in form, of
Southey's "Widow," and, in meaning, of Tierney's philanthropic appeals. In
a play, "The Rovers," he sportfully satirized the romantic drama of Schiller,
"The Robbers." In one of the incidental poems he represented the hero,
while in prison, recalling the bright days
at the U-
-niversity of Göttingen,
-niversity of Göttingen.
Pitt was so charmed with this jeu d'esprit that he is said to have added the
following verse in the same mock-heroic style:[474]
Sun, moon, and thou, vain world, adieu,
That Kings and priests are plotting in;
Here doomed to starve on water gru-
-el, never shall I see the U-
-niversity of Göttingen,
-niversity of Göttingen.
A Prime Minister who can throw off squibs, and a nation that can enjoy
them, will not succumb even in the worst crisis.
In truth, all patriots were now straining their utmost to repel an aggressive
and insolent enemy. The Volunteer Movement more than ever called forth
the manly exertions of the people; and one of the most popular caricatures
Page 358
of the time (May 1798) shows Pitt as a Volunteer standing rigidly at
attention. Sermons, caricatures, pamphlets, and songs, especially those of
Dibdin, served to stimulate martial ardour. Singular to relate, Hannah More
(now in her fifty-third year) figured among the patriotic pamphleteers, her
"Cheap Repository" of political tracts being an effective antidote to the
Jacobinical leaflets which once had a hold on the poorer classes. Space will
not admit of an account of all the agencies which heralded the dawn of a
more resolute patriotism. Though the methods were varied, the soul of them
all was Pitt.[475]
The tone of public opinion astonished that experienced writer, Mallet du
Pan, who, on coming from the Continent to England, described the change
of spirit as astounding. There the monarchical States, utterly devoid of
dignity and patriotism, were squabbling over the details of a shameful
peace. "Here," he writes in May 1798, "we are in the full tide of war,
crushed by taxation, and exposed to the fury of the most desperate of
enemies, but nevertheless security, abundance, and energy reign supreme,
alike in cottage and palace. I have not met with a single instance of
nervousness or apprehension. The spectacle presented by public opinion has
far surpassed my expectation. The nation had not yet learnt to know its own
strength or its resources. The Government has taught it the secret, and
inspired it with an unbounded confidence almost amounting to
presumption." No more striking tribute has been paid by a foreigner to the
dauntless spirit of Britons. Rarely have they begun a war well; for the
careless ways of the race tell against the methodical preparation to which
continental States must perforce submit. England, therefore, always loses in
the first rounds of a fight. But, if she finds a good leader, she slowly and
wastefully repairs the early losses. In September 1797 the French Directory
made the unpardonable mistake of compelling her to prepare for a war to
the knife. Thenceforth the hesitations of Pitt, which had weakened his war
policy in 1795–6, vanished; and he now stood forth as the inspirer of his
attention. Sermons, caricatures, pamphlets, and songs, especially those of
Dibdin, served to stimulate martial ardour. Singular to relate, Hannah More
(now in her fifty-third year) figured among the patriotic pamphleteers, her
"Cheap Repository" of political tracts being an effective antidote to the
Jacobinical leaflets which once had a hold on the poorer classes. Space will
not admit of an account of all the agencies which heralded the dawn of a
more resolute patriotism. Though the methods were varied, the soul of them
all was Pitt.[475]
The tone of public opinion astonished that experienced writer, Mallet du
Pan, who, on coming from the Continent to England, described the change
of spirit as astounding. There the monarchical States, utterly devoid of
dignity and patriotism, were squabbling over the details of a shameful
peace. "Here," he writes in May 1798, "we are in the full tide of war,
crushed by taxation, and exposed to the fury of the most desperate of
enemies, but nevertheless security, abundance, and energy reign supreme,
alike in cottage and palace. I have not met with a single instance of
nervousness or apprehension. The spectacle presented by public opinion has
far surpassed my expectation. The nation had not yet learnt to know its own
strength or its resources. The Government has taught it the secret, and
inspired it with an unbounded confidence almost amounting to
presumption." No more striking tribute has been paid by a foreigner to the
dauntless spirit of Britons. Rarely have they begun a war well; for the
careless ways of the race tell against the methodical preparation to which
continental States must perforce submit. England, therefore, always loses in
the first rounds of a fight. But, if she finds a good leader, she slowly and
wastefully repairs the early losses. In September 1797 the French Directory
made the unpardonable mistake of compelling her to prepare for a war to
the knife. Thenceforth the hesitations of Pitt, which had weakened his war
policy in 1795–6, vanished; and he now stood forth as the inspirer of his
Page 359
countrymen in a contest on behalf of their national existence and the future
independence of Europe.
independence of Europe.
Page 360
CHAPTER XVI
THE IRISH REBELLION
The dark destiny of Ireland, as usual,
triumphed.—T. Moore, Mems. of Lord
Edward Fitzgerald.
Various orders of minds ascribe the Irish Rebellion of 1798 to widely
different causes. The ethnologist sees in it the incompatibility of Celt and
Saxon. To the geographer it may yield proofs of Nature's design to make
Ireland a nation. If approached from the religious standpoint, it will be set
down either to Jesuits or to the great schism of Luther. The historian or
jurist may trace its origins back to the long series of wrongs inflicted by a
dominant on a subject race. Fanatical Irishmen see in it a natural result of
the rule of "the base and bloody Saxon"; and Whig historians ascribe it to
Pitt's unworthy treatment of that most enlightened of Lords-Lieutenant, Earl
Fitzwilliam. Passing by the remoter causes, I must very briefly notice the
last topic.
The appointment of the Whig magnate, Fitzwilliam, to the Irish Viceroyalty
in 1794 resulted from the recent accession of the "Old Whigs," led by the
Duke of Portland, to the ministerial ranks. That union, as we have seen, was
a fertile cause of friction. Fitzwilliam was at first President of the Council;
but that post did not satisfy the nephew and heir of the Marquis of
Rockingham. He aspired to the Viceroyalty at Dublin; and Portland, who, as
THE IRISH REBELLION
The dark destiny of Ireland, as usual,
triumphed.—T. Moore, Mems. of Lord
Edward Fitzgerald.
Various orders of minds ascribe the Irish Rebellion of 1798 to widely
different causes. The ethnologist sees in it the incompatibility of Celt and
Saxon. To the geographer it may yield proofs of Nature's design to make
Ireland a nation. If approached from the religious standpoint, it will be set
down either to Jesuits or to the great schism of Luther. The historian or
jurist may trace its origins back to the long series of wrongs inflicted by a
dominant on a subject race. Fanatical Irishmen see in it a natural result of
the rule of "the base and bloody Saxon"; and Whig historians ascribe it to
Pitt's unworthy treatment of that most enlightened of Lords-Lieutenant, Earl
Fitzwilliam. Passing by the remoter causes, I must very briefly notice the
last topic.
The appointment of the Whig magnate, Fitzwilliam, to the Irish Viceroyalty
in 1794 resulted from the recent accession of the "Old Whigs," led by the
Duke of Portland, to the ministerial ranks. That union, as we have seen, was
a fertile cause of friction. Fitzwilliam was at first President of the Council;
but that post did not satisfy the nephew and heir of the Marquis of
Rockingham. He aspired to the Viceroyalty at Dublin; and Portland, who, as
Page 361
Home Secretary, supervised Irish affairs, claimed it for him. Pitt consented,
provided that a suitable appointment could be arranged for the present
Viceroy, the Earl of Westmorland. This was far from easy. Ultimately the
position of Master of the Horse was found for him; but, long before this
decision was formed, Fitzwilliam wrote to the Irish patriot, Grattan, asking
him and his friends, the Ponsonbys, for their support during his Viceroyalty.
This move implied a complete change of system at Dublin, Grattan and the
Ponsonbys having declared for the admission of Roman Catholics to the
then exclusively Protestant Parliament. True, this reform seemed a natural
sequel to Pitt's action in according to British Catholics the right of public
worship and of the construction of schools (1791). Further, in 1792, he
urged Westmorland to favour the repeal of the remaining penal laws against
Irish Catholics; but the Dublin Parliament decisively rejected the proposal.
Nevertheless, in 1793 he induced Westmorland to support the extension of
the franchise to Romanists, a measure which seemed to foreshadow their
admission to Parliament itself. There is little doubt that Pitt, who then
expected the war to be short, intended to set the crown to this emancipating
policy; for even in the dark times that followed he uttered not a word which
implied permanent hostility to the claims of Catholics. His attitude was that
of one who awaited a fit opportunity for satisfying them.
Unfortunately, the overtures of Fitzwilliam to Grattan and the Ponsonbys
became known at Dublin, with results most humiliating for Westmorland.
The exultation of the Ponsonbys and the Opposition aroused the hopes of
Catholics and the resentment of the more extreme Protestants. Chief among
the champions of the existing order was the Irish Lord Chancellor, Baron
Fitzgibbon, afterwards Earl of Clare. A man of keen intellect and
indomitable will, he swayed the House of Lords, the Irish Bar, and the
Viceregal councils. It was he who had urged severe measures against the
new and powerful organization, the United Irishmen, started in Ulster by
Wolfe Tone, which aimed at banding together men of both religions in a
provided that a suitable appointment could be arranged for the present
Viceroy, the Earl of Westmorland. This was far from easy. Ultimately the
position of Master of the Horse was found for him; but, long before this
decision was formed, Fitzwilliam wrote to the Irish patriot, Grattan, asking
him and his friends, the Ponsonbys, for their support during his Viceroyalty.
This move implied a complete change of system at Dublin, Grattan and the
Ponsonbys having declared for the admission of Roman Catholics to the
then exclusively Protestant Parliament. True, this reform seemed a natural
sequel to Pitt's action in according to British Catholics the right of public
worship and of the construction of schools (1791). Further, in 1792, he
urged Westmorland to favour the repeal of the remaining penal laws against
Irish Catholics; but the Dublin Parliament decisively rejected the proposal.
Nevertheless, in 1793 he induced Westmorland to support the extension of
the franchise to Romanists, a measure which seemed to foreshadow their
admission to Parliament itself. There is little doubt that Pitt, who then
expected the war to be short, intended to set the crown to this emancipating
policy; for even in the dark times that followed he uttered not a word which
implied permanent hostility to the claims of Catholics. His attitude was that
of one who awaited a fit opportunity for satisfying them.
Unfortunately, the overtures of Fitzwilliam to Grattan and the Ponsonbys
became known at Dublin, with results most humiliating for Westmorland.
The exultation of the Ponsonbys and the Opposition aroused the hopes of
Catholics and the resentment of the more extreme Protestants. Chief among
the champions of the existing order was the Irish Lord Chancellor, Baron
Fitzgibbon, afterwards Earl of Clare. A man of keen intellect and
indomitable will, he swayed the House of Lords, the Irish Bar, and the
Viceregal councils. It was he who had urged severe measures against the
new and powerful organization, the United Irishmen, started in Ulster by
Wolfe Tone, which aimed at banding together men of both religions in a
Page 362
solid national phalanx. Scarcely less influential than Fitzgibbon was
Beresford, the chief of the Revenue Department, whose family connections
and control of patronage were so extensive as to earn him the name of the
King of Ireland. Like Fitzgibbon he bitterly opposed any further concession
to Catholics; and it was therefore believed that the dismissal of these two
men was a needful preliminary to the passing of that important measure.
Rumours of sweeping changes began to fly about, especially when Grattan
came to London, and had interviews with the Lord Chancellor. The frequent
shifts whereby the Scottish Presbyterian, Wedderburn, became the
reactionary Lord Loughborough were notorious; and it is one of the
suspicious features of the Fitzwilliam affair that he, now Lord Chancellor of
Great Britain, should urge Pitt to treat Fitzwilliam with the confidence due
to his prospective dignity. The Attorney-General, Sir Richard Pepper Arden,
sent to Pitt the following caution:
Beresford, the chief of the Revenue Department, whose family connections
and control of patronage were so extensive as to earn him the name of the
King of Ireland. Like Fitzgibbon he bitterly opposed any further concession
to Catholics; and it was therefore believed that the dismissal of these two
men was a needful preliminary to the passing of that important measure.
Rumours of sweeping changes began to fly about, especially when Grattan
came to London, and had interviews with the Lord Chancellor. The frequent
shifts whereby the Scottish Presbyterian, Wedderburn, became the
reactionary Lord Loughborough were notorious; and it is one of the
suspicious features of the Fitzwilliam affair that he, now Lord Chancellor of
Great Britain, should urge Pitt to treat Fitzwilliam with the confidence due
to his prospective dignity. The Attorney-General, Sir Richard Pepper Arden,
sent to Pitt the following caution:
Page 363
September 1794.[476]
... My wife says she dined the other day with Grattan at the
Chancellor's. I am sadly afraid that preferment in Ireland will run
too much in favour of those who have not been the most staunch
friends of Government; but, pray, for God's sake, take care that the
new Lord Lieutenant does not throw the Government back into the
hands of Lord Shannon and the Ponsonbys, nor turn out those who
behaved well during the King's illness to make way for those who
behaved directly the reverse. Excuse my anxiety on this head but I
fear there is good reason for it.
Arden was correctly informed. Now or a little later, Fitzwilliam formed the
resolve to dismiss Fitzgibbon and Beresford. On the other hand, the
lowering outlook in Holland in the autumn of 1794 induced in Pitt the
conviction that the time had not yet come for sweeping changes at Dublin.
Accordingly, late in October, or early in November, he and Grenville
thoroughly discussed this subject with the newly appointed Ministers,
Portland, Fitzwilliam, Spencer, and Windham. Grenville's account of this
conference, which has but recently seen the light, refutes the oft repeated
statement,[477] that Pitt accorded to Fitzwilliam a free hand at Dublin. On
the contrary, it was agreed, apparently with the full consent of the Viceroy-
elect, that he should make no change of system.[478] Fully consonant with
this decision was the reply of Pitt to Sir John Parnell, Grattan, and the two
Ponsonbys, who in the third week of November 1794 begged him to lower
the duties on inter-insular imports. While expressing his complete sympathy
with their request, he declared the present critical time to be inopportune for
a change which must arouse clamour and prejudice.[479] The conduct of
Fitzwilliam was far different. Landing near Dublin on 4th January 1795, he
on the 7th sent Daly to request Beresford to retire from office. Beresford
... My wife says she dined the other day with Grattan at the
Chancellor's. I am sadly afraid that preferment in Ireland will run
too much in favour of those who have not been the most staunch
friends of Government; but, pray, for God's sake, take care that the
new Lord Lieutenant does not throw the Government back into the
hands of Lord Shannon and the Ponsonbys, nor turn out those who
behaved well during the King's illness to make way for those who
behaved directly the reverse. Excuse my anxiety on this head but I
fear there is good reason for it.
Arden was correctly informed. Now or a little later, Fitzwilliam formed the
resolve to dismiss Fitzgibbon and Beresford. On the other hand, the
lowering outlook in Holland in the autumn of 1794 induced in Pitt the
conviction that the time had not yet come for sweeping changes at Dublin.
Accordingly, late in October, or early in November, he and Grenville
thoroughly discussed this subject with the newly appointed Ministers,
Portland, Fitzwilliam, Spencer, and Windham. Grenville's account of this
conference, which has but recently seen the light, refutes the oft repeated
statement,[477] that Pitt accorded to Fitzwilliam a free hand at Dublin. On
the contrary, it was agreed, apparently with the full consent of the Viceroy-
elect, that he should make no change of system.[478] Fully consonant with
this decision was the reply of Pitt to Sir John Parnell, Grattan, and the two
Ponsonbys, who in the third week of November 1794 begged him to lower
the duties on inter-insular imports. While expressing his complete sympathy
with their request, he declared the present critical time to be inopportune for
a change which must arouse clamour and prejudice.[479] The conduct of
Fitzwilliam was far different. Landing near Dublin on 4th January 1795, he
on the 7th sent Daly to request Beresford to retire from office. Beresford
Page 364
refused, and sent off an appeal to his old friend, Auckland, with the result
that the Cabinet soon met to consider the questions aroused by this and
other curt dismissals. It being clear that Fitzwilliam was working with the
Ponsonbys for a complete change of system, he was asked to modify his
conduct. He refused to do so.
The King now intervened in an unusually incisive manner. He informed Pitt
that it would be better to recall Fitzwilliam than to allow further
concessions to Catholics, a subject which was "beyond the decision of any
Cabinet of Ministers." Accordingly, Fitzwilliam was recalled, his departure
from Dublin arousing a storm of indignation which bade fair to overwhelm
the Administration of his successor, Earl Camden.
Such is a brief outline of the Fitzwilliam affair. No event could have been
more unfortunate. It led Irish patriots and the Whigs at Westminster to
inveigh against the perfidy and tyranny of Pitt. He was unable to publish
documents in his own defence, while Fitzwilliam crowned his indiscretions
by writing two lengthy letters charging the Cabinet with breach of faith and
Beresford with peculation. Nominally private, they were published at
Dublin, with the result that Pitt and Camden were held up to execration and
contempt. On reviewing this question, we may conclude that Pitt erred in
not procuring from Fitzwilliam a written statement that he would make no
sweeping changes at Dublin, either in regard to men or measures, without
the consent of the Cabinet. It is, however, clear that Ministers regarded the
verbal understanding with Fitzwilliam as binding; for Grenville, Portland,
Spencer, and Windham sided with Pitt in this painful dispute, Portland's
chilling behaviour to the Earl on his return marking his disapproval of his
conduct.
Never did a Lord-Lieutenant enter on his duties under auspices more
threatening than those besetting the arrival of Camden on 31st March 1795.
that the Cabinet soon met to consider the questions aroused by this and
other curt dismissals. It being clear that Fitzwilliam was working with the
Ponsonbys for a complete change of system, he was asked to modify his
conduct. He refused to do so.
The King now intervened in an unusually incisive manner. He informed Pitt
that it would be better to recall Fitzwilliam than to allow further
concessions to Catholics, a subject which was "beyond the decision of any
Cabinet of Ministers." Accordingly, Fitzwilliam was recalled, his departure
from Dublin arousing a storm of indignation which bade fair to overwhelm
the Administration of his successor, Earl Camden.
Such is a brief outline of the Fitzwilliam affair. No event could have been
more unfortunate. It led Irish patriots and the Whigs at Westminster to
inveigh against the perfidy and tyranny of Pitt. He was unable to publish
documents in his own defence, while Fitzwilliam crowned his indiscretions
by writing two lengthy letters charging the Cabinet with breach of faith and
Beresford with peculation. Nominally private, they were published at
Dublin, with the result that Pitt and Camden were held up to execration and
contempt. On reviewing this question, we may conclude that Pitt erred in
not procuring from Fitzwilliam a written statement that he would make no
sweeping changes at Dublin, either in regard to men or measures, without
the consent of the Cabinet. It is, however, clear that Ministers regarded the
verbal understanding with Fitzwilliam as binding; for Grenville, Portland,
Spencer, and Windham sided with Pitt in this painful dispute, Portland's
chilling behaviour to the Earl on his return marking his disapproval of his
conduct.
Never did a Lord-Lieutenant enter on his duties under auspices more
threatening than those besetting the arrival of Camden on 31st March 1795.
Page 365
After the swearing-in ceremony the passions of the Dublin mob broke
loose. Stones were flung at the carriages of the Primate and Fitzgibbon. The
rabble then attacked the Speaker's residence and the Custom House, and not
till two of their number fell dead under a volley of the soldiery did the
rioters disperse. The rebellion which Fitzwilliam predicted on his departure
seemed to be at hand.
Camden, on whom this storm was to burst three years later, was not a strong
man. He entered on his duties doubtfully and before long sent requests for
his recall on account of his family concerns. He might well quail at the
magnitude of his task. His instructions bade him by all available means
discourage the claims of the Catholics, and rally the discouraged
Protestants. Thereafter he might conciliate the Catholics by promising relief
for their parochial clergy, the foundation of a seminary for the training of
their priests, and some measure of education for the peasantry. The
instructions ended thus: "Moderate, soothe, conciliate these jarring spirits.
We have great confidence in your judgment, firmness, discretion."[480] The
despatch refutes the oft-repeated assertion that the Ministry sought to
inflame the animosities of Protestants and Catholics in order to force on the
Union. That was the outcome of the whole situation; but in the spring of
1795 Ministers hoped to calm the ferment, which they rightly ascribed to
the imprudence of Fitzwilliam. Their forecast for a time came true. In the
first debates at Dublin the lead given by Camden's able Secretary, Pelham,
served to close the schism in the Protestant ranks. Despite the vehement
efforts of Grattan, his Bill for the admission of Catholics was thrown out by
a majority of more than one hundred; and Ireland entered once more on the
dreary path of reaction.
In the hope of softening the asperities of Irish life, Pitt favoured the plan of
founding a seminary for the training of Catholic priests in Ireland. The
proposal was alike one of justice and expediency; of justice, because the
loose. Stones were flung at the carriages of the Primate and Fitzgibbon. The
rabble then attacked the Speaker's residence and the Custom House, and not
till two of their number fell dead under a volley of the soldiery did the
rioters disperse. The rebellion which Fitzwilliam predicted on his departure
seemed to be at hand.
Camden, on whom this storm was to burst three years later, was not a strong
man. He entered on his duties doubtfully and before long sent requests for
his recall on account of his family concerns. He might well quail at the
magnitude of his task. His instructions bade him by all available means
discourage the claims of the Catholics, and rally the discouraged
Protestants. Thereafter he might conciliate the Catholics by promising relief
for their parochial clergy, the foundation of a seminary for the training of
their priests, and some measure of education for the peasantry. The
instructions ended thus: "Moderate, soothe, conciliate these jarring spirits.
We have great confidence in your judgment, firmness, discretion."[480] The
despatch refutes the oft-repeated assertion that the Ministry sought to
inflame the animosities of Protestants and Catholics in order to force on the
Union. That was the outcome of the whole situation; but in the spring of
1795 Ministers hoped to calm the ferment, which they rightly ascribed to
the imprudence of Fitzwilliam. Their forecast for a time came true. In the
first debates at Dublin the lead given by Camden's able Secretary, Pelham,
served to close the schism in the Protestant ranks. Despite the vehement
efforts of Grattan, his Bill for the admission of Catholics was thrown out by
a majority of more than one hundred; and Ireland entered once more on the
dreary path of reaction.
In the hope of softening the asperities of Irish life, Pitt favoured the plan of
founding a seminary for the training of Catholic priests in Ireland. The
proposal was alike one of justice and expediency; of justice, because the
Page 366
expense of training Irish priests in foreign seminaries had been a sore
burden to their co-religionists; and of expediency, because the change
promised to assuage the anti-British prejudices of the priests. Moreover,
amidst the sweeping triumph of secularism in France and Belgium, most of
the seminaries frequented by Irish youths had disappeared. The chief
objections urged against the scheme were the narrowness of view certain to
result from the curriculum of a semi-monastic institution, and the
desirability of educating priests at Trinity College along with Protestants.
On these grounds we must regret Pitt's decision to found a separate training
college, albeit at first intended for the education of lay youths as well. The
considerations above set forth, however, prevailed; and the chief legislative
result of the year 1795 at Dublin was the charter establishing Maynooth
College. Undoubtedly it was the outcome of Pitt's desire to pacify Catholic
Ireland; but the unhappy conditions of the ensuing period told heavily
against success. Indeed, as Wolfe Tone predicted, that institution fostered
insular patriotism of a somewhat narrow type.
The trend of things in the years 1795–7 set steadily towards rebellion. The
discontent was most threatening among the sturdy Presbyterians of Ulster,
chafed as they were by the exaction of tithes by the Protestant Established
Church. The founders and the ablest leaders of the League of United
Irishmen were Protestants. For a time they aimed merely at a drastic
measure of Parliamentary Reform similar to that advocated by English
Radicals. But the disappointment of the hopes of Grattan and Irish Whigs in
the spring of 1795 exasperated all sections of reformers and impelled the
League towards revolutionary courses. Sops like Maynooth they rejected
with scorn; and at the close of that year, after the passing of certain
repressive measures, their organization became secret; they imposed an oath
on members and gradually devised means for organizing the whole of
Ireland in brotherhoods, which by means of district and county delegations,
carried out the behests of the central committee at Dublin.
burden to their co-religionists; and of expediency, because the change
promised to assuage the anti-British prejudices of the priests. Moreover,
amidst the sweeping triumph of secularism in France and Belgium, most of
the seminaries frequented by Irish youths had disappeared. The chief
objections urged against the scheme were the narrowness of view certain to
result from the curriculum of a semi-monastic institution, and the
desirability of educating priests at Trinity College along with Protestants.
On these grounds we must regret Pitt's decision to found a separate training
college, albeit at first intended for the education of lay youths as well. The
considerations above set forth, however, prevailed; and the chief legislative
result of the year 1795 at Dublin was the charter establishing Maynooth
College. Undoubtedly it was the outcome of Pitt's desire to pacify Catholic
Ireland; but the unhappy conditions of the ensuing period told heavily
against success. Indeed, as Wolfe Tone predicted, that institution fostered
insular patriotism of a somewhat narrow type.
The trend of things in the years 1795–7 set steadily towards rebellion. The
discontent was most threatening among the sturdy Presbyterians of Ulster,
chafed as they were by the exaction of tithes by the Protestant Established
Church. The founders and the ablest leaders of the League of United
Irishmen were Protestants. For a time they aimed merely at a drastic
measure of Parliamentary Reform similar to that advocated by English
Radicals. But the disappointment of the hopes of Grattan and Irish Whigs in
the spring of 1795 exasperated all sections of reformers and impelled the
League towards revolutionary courses. Sops like Maynooth they rejected
with scorn; and at the close of that year, after the passing of certain
repressive measures, their organization became secret; they imposed an oath
on members and gradually devised means for organizing the whole of
Ireland in brotherhoods, which by means of district and county delegations,
carried out the behests of the central committee at Dublin.
Page 367
Yet their system was far from absorbing the whole of the nation. The
vivacity of the Celt and the hardness of the Saxon tell against close union;
and where the two races dwell side by side, solidarity is a dream. Now, as
always, in times of excitement the old animosities burst forth. The Catholic
peasantry banded together in clubs, known as Defenders, to glut their hatred
upon Protestant landlords and tithe-reaping clergy. Their motives seem in
the main to have been agrarian rather than religious; but, as in Leinster,
Munster, and Connaught the dividing lines between landlords and peasants
were almost identical with those between Protestants and Catholics, the
land feud became a war of creed. The ensuing horrors, midnight attacks,
cattle-maiming, and retaliation by armed yeomanry, exerted a sinister
influence upon Ulster, where the masses were fiercely Protestant. Certain of
the Catholic villages were ravaged by Protestant Peep o' Day Boys, until the
Irishry fled in terror to the South or West, there wreaking their vengeance
upon squires and parsons. By degrees the Peep o' Day Boys became known
as Orangemen, whose defiant loyalty sometimes caused concern to Camden
and Pitt; while the Defenders joined the better drilled ranks of United
Ireland, which therefore became a preponderatingly Catholic body.
Thus affairs revolved in the old vicious circle. Feuds, racial, religious, and
agrarian, rent Ireland asunder. Disputes about land have ever sunk deep into
the brooding imagination of the Celt; and the memories of holdings
absorbed, or of tithes pitilessly exacted in lean years, now flashed forth in
many a deed of incendiarism or outrage. To Camden there appeared to be
only one means of cure, coercion. An Indemnity Act was therefore passed
to safeguard squires and yeomen who took the law into their own hands.
Then followed the Insurrection Act, for disarming the disaffected, and the
suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act for strengthening the arm of the law.
The outcome was that the United Irishmen turned towards France. Even in
the year 1793 the Republic sent agents into Ireland to stir up revolt. Nothing
vivacity of the Celt and the hardness of the Saxon tell against close union;
and where the two races dwell side by side, solidarity is a dream. Now, as
always, in times of excitement the old animosities burst forth. The Catholic
peasantry banded together in clubs, known as Defenders, to glut their hatred
upon Protestant landlords and tithe-reaping clergy. Their motives seem in
the main to have been agrarian rather than religious; but, as in Leinster,
Munster, and Connaught the dividing lines between landlords and peasants
were almost identical with those between Protestants and Catholics, the
land feud became a war of creed. The ensuing horrors, midnight attacks,
cattle-maiming, and retaliation by armed yeomanry, exerted a sinister
influence upon Ulster, where the masses were fiercely Protestant. Certain of
the Catholic villages were ravaged by Protestant Peep o' Day Boys, until the
Irishry fled in terror to the South or West, there wreaking their vengeance
upon squires and parsons. By degrees the Peep o' Day Boys became known
as Orangemen, whose defiant loyalty sometimes caused concern to Camden
and Pitt; while the Defenders joined the better drilled ranks of United
Ireland, which therefore became a preponderatingly Catholic body.
Thus affairs revolved in the old vicious circle. Feuds, racial, religious, and
agrarian, rent Ireland asunder. Disputes about land have ever sunk deep into
the brooding imagination of the Celt; and the memories of holdings
absorbed, or of tithes pitilessly exacted in lean years, now flashed forth in
many a deed of incendiarism or outrage. To Camden there appeared to be
only one means of cure, coercion. An Indemnity Act was therefore passed
to safeguard squires and yeomen who took the law into their own hands.
Then followed the Insurrection Act, for disarming the disaffected, and the
suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act for strengthening the arm of the law.
The outcome was that the United Irishmen turned towards France. Even in
the year 1793 the Republic sent agents into Ireland to stir up revolt. Nothing
Page 368
definite came of those efforts, except that a section of Irish patriots
thenceforth began to strive for separation from Great Britain. Early in 1796
Wolfe Tone proceeded to Paris to arrange for the despatch of a French
auxiliary corps. On 20th April General Clarke, head of the Topographical
Bureau at the War Office, agreed to send 10,000 men and 20,000 stand of
arms. The mercurial Irishman encountered endless delays, and was often a
prey to melancholy; but the news of Bonaparte's victories in Italy led him to
picture the triumph of the French Grenadiers in Ireland.[481]
Another interesting figure is that of Lord Edward Fitzgerald. Sprung from
the ancient line of the Geraldines, and son of the Duke of Leinster, he
plunged into life with the gaiety and bravery of a Celt. After serving with
distinction in the British army in America he returned, became a member of
the Irish Parliament, and in 1790 during the acute friction with Spain,
received from his uncle, the Duke of Richmond, an introduction to Pitt, who
offered him the command of an expedition against Cadiz. Nothing came of
the proposal; but the incident reveals the esteem in which the chivalrous
young officer was held. He soon married Pamela, the reputed daughter of
the Duke of Orleans and Mme. de Genlis, whence he himself was often
dubbed "Egalité." The repressive policy of Camden made him a rebel; and
in May 1796 he made his way to Hamburg, hoping to concert plans for a
French invasion. There he was joined by Arthur O'Connor, who impressed
Reinhard with a sense of ability and power. Together the two Irishmen
travelled to Basle, where they induced Barthélemy to favour their scheme.
Meanwhile the French Directory entered into the plan of Wolfe Tone; the
mission of Fitzgerald had no direct result, apart from the revelation of his
plan to a travelling companion, who had been the mistress of a British
Minister, and now forwarded a description of it to London.[482]
Meanwhile Wolfe Tone had sketched the outline of the enterprise to Clarke
and General Hoche, predicting to the latter, the commander-elect, that he
thenceforth began to strive for separation from Great Britain. Early in 1796
Wolfe Tone proceeded to Paris to arrange for the despatch of a French
auxiliary corps. On 20th April General Clarke, head of the Topographical
Bureau at the War Office, agreed to send 10,000 men and 20,000 stand of
arms. The mercurial Irishman encountered endless delays, and was often a
prey to melancholy; but the news of Bonaparte's victories in Italy led him to
picture the triumph of the French Grenadiers in Ireland.[481]
Another interesting figure is that of Lord Edward Fitzgerald. Sprung from
the ancient line of the Geraldines, and son of the Duke of Leinster, he
plunged into life with the gaiety and bravery of a Celt. After serving with
distinction in the British army in America he returned, became a member of
the Irish Parliament, and in 1790 during the acute friction with Spain,
received from his uncle, the Duke of Richmond, an introduction to Pitt, who
offered him the command of an expedition against Cadiz. Nothing came of
the proposal; but the incident reveals the esteem in which the chivalrous
young officer was held. He soon married Pamela, the reputed daughter of
the Duke of Orleans and Mme. de Genlis, whence he himself was often
dubbed "Egalité." The repressive policy of Camden made him a rebel; and
in May 1796 he made his way to Hamburg, hoping to concert plans for a
French invasion. There he was joined by Arthur O'Connor, who impressed
Reinhard with a sense of ability and power. Together the two Irishmen
travelled to Basle, where they induced Barthélemy to favour their scheme.
Meanwhile the French Directory entered into the plan of Wolfe Tone; the
mission of Fitzgerald had no direct result, apart from the revelation of his
plan to a travelling companion, who had been the mistress of a British
Minister, and now forwarded a description of it to London.[482]
Meanwhile Wolfe Tone had sketched the outline of the enterprise to Clarke
and General Hoche, predicting to the latter, the commander-elect, that he
Page 369
would "amputate the right hand of England for ever."[483] As is well known,
Hoche's expedition to Bantry Bay at the close of the year 1796 was an utter
failure; and the sterner spirits in Ulster believed that the French had
designed that it should end so. The malcontents therefore relaxed their
efforts for a time, until, in the spring following, the mutinies in the British
fleet aroused new hopes. It seems probable that their intrigues had some
effect on events at the Nore. In quick succession United Ireland despatched
to Paris two delegates, named Lewins and McNevin, to concert plans for
another landing. The Directory sent an agent to treat with the League.
Fitzgerald met him in London, and declared that the Irish Militia and
Yeomanry would join the French on their landing. The United Irishmen also
sought help from Spain.[484]
In Ireland the organisation went on apace until Camden struck sharp blows
through the military. In the middle of May 1797, when the malcontents
were excited by news of the second mutiny at Portsmouth, they rose in the
North, but in three or four engagements the loyal Militia and Yeomanry
broke up their bands. The South remained quiet, and the efforts to seduce
the army and Militia were fruitless; but Lord Clifden, writing to Abbot on
15th May, predicted a general rising when the French attempted a second
invasion, as they certainly would.[485] On 19th June Beresford wrote from
Dublin to Auckland, stating that, but for the repressive measures and
wholesale seizures of arms, not a loyalist's head would have been safe.[486]
The spring of 1797 was indeed a time of great risk. But for the weakness of
the Dutch and French navies, a landing in Ireland could have taken place
with every chance of success. As it was, Camden's vigorous measures so far
cowed the malcontents that the rebellion was deferred for a year. This
respite probably saved the British Empire. Amidst the financial and naval
difficulties of the first half of the year 1797, a telling blow struck at Ireland
could scarcely have failed of success. Rarely were the enemies of England
Hoche's expedition to Bantry Bay at the close of the year 1796 was an utter
failure; and the sterner spirits in Ulster believed that the French had
designed that it should end so. The malcontents therefore relaxed their
efforts for a time, until, in the spring following, the mutinies in the British
fleet aroused new hopes. It seems probable that their intrigues had some
effect on events at the Nore. In quick succession United Ireland despatched
to Paris two delegates, named Lewins and McNevin, to concert plans for
another landing. The Directory sent an agent to treat with the League.
Fitzgerald met him in London, and declared that the Irish Militia and
Yeomanry would join the French on their landing. The United Irishmen also
sought help from Spain.[484]
In Ireland the organisation went on apace until Camden struck sharp blows
through the military. In the middle of May 1797, when the malcontents
were excited by news of the second mutiny at Portsmouth, they rose in the
North, but in three or four engagements the loyal Militia and Yeomanry
broke up their bands. The South remained quiet, and the efforts to seduce
the army and Militia were fruitless; but Lord Clifden, writing to Abbot on
15th May, predicted a general rising when the French attempted a second
invasion, as they certainly would.[485] On 19th June Beresford wrote from
Dublin to Auckland, stating that, but for the repressive measures and
wholesale seizures of arms, not a loyalist's head would have been safe.[486]
The spring of 1797 was indeed a time of great risk. But for the weakness of
the Dutch and French navies, a landing in Ireland could have taken place
with every chance of success. As it was, Camden's vigorous measures so far
cowed the malcontents that the rebellion was deferred for a year. This
respite probably saved the British Empire. Amidst the financial and naval
difficulties of the first half of the year 1797, a telling blow struck at Ireland
could scarcely have failed of success. Rarely were the enemies of England
Page 370
so formidable; never were her means of defence so weak. Fortunately, no
blow was aimed at her until the month of October; and then, when the
Dutch fleet set out to convoy an expedition to Ireland, it was utterly crushed
by Duncan at Camperdown. There was therefore little risk of an invasion in
force after October 1797, the very month which saw Napoleon Bonaparte
set free from his lengthy negotiations with Austria. Verily, if Fortune
pressed hard on Pitt at Toulon and in Flanders and Hayti, she more than
redressed the balance by her boons at sea in the year 1797.
Camden's letters to Pitt reveal the imminence of bankruptcy in Ireland
throughout that year; and it is noteworthy that the loan raised for the Irish
Government in January and February was the final cause of the Bank crisis
in London. Even so, the Irish Exchequer was in dire need. On 25th April
Camden informed Pitt that only £8,000 remained in the Exchequer, and he
had no means for equipping the troops if the French should land. The sum
of £200,000 must be sent at once. Such a demand at that time was
impossible; and not until the end of May could Pitt forward the half of that
sum, Camden meanwhile borrowing money in Dublin at 8 3/8 per cent. On
1st June he wrote to Pitt a confidential letter, laying bare his real aims. He
urged him to do all in his power to procure peace from France. He had
recommended this step in April; but now his language was most insistent.
Assuming that it would be sheer madness to tempt fortune in another
campaign, he suggested that, if the French terms were too onerous, Pitt
should leave it to another Prime Minister to frame a peace. But whatever
happened, Pitt must not lower his dignity by conceding Reform and
Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain and Ireland. If those measures were
inevitable, others must carry them. The latter would only satisfy the Irish
Catholics for a time, their aim being to rule the country. The only way of
escaping these difficulties was a Union of the Parliaments; but he (Camden)
could not undertake to carry it, still less Catholic Emancipation. Finally he
declared the Presbyterians of Ulster to be Republicans who would rise en
blow was aimed at her until the month of October; and then, when the
Dutch fleet set out to convoy an expedition to Ireland, it was utterly crushed
by Duncan at Camperdown. There was therefore little risk of an invasion in
force after October 1797, the very month which saw Napoleon Bonaparte
set free from his lengthy negotiations with Austria. Verily, if Fortune
pressed hard on Pitt at Toulon and in Flanders and Hayti, she more than
redressed the balance by her boons at sea in the year 1797.
Camden's letters to Pitt reveal the imminence of bankruptcy in Ireland
throughout that year; and it is noteworthy that the loan raised for the Irish
Government in January and February was the final cause of the Bank crisis
in London. Even so, the Irish Exchequer was in dire need. On 25th April
Camden informed Pitt that only £8,000 remained in the Exchequer, and he
had no means for equipping the troops if the French should land. The sum
of £200,000 must be sent at once. Such a demand at that time was
impossible; and not until the end of May could Pitt forward the half of that
sum, Camden meanwhile borrowing money in Dublin at 8 3/8 per cent. On
1st June he wrote to Pitt a confidential letter, laying bare his real aims. He
urged him to do all in his power to procure peace from France. He had
recommended this step in April; but now his language was most insistent.
Assuming that it would be sheer madness to tempt fortune in another
campaign, he suggested that, if the French terms were too onerous, Pitt
should leave it to another Prime Minister to frame a peace. But whatever
happened, Pitt must not lower his dignity by conceding Reform and
Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain and Ireland. If those measures were
inevitable, others must carry them. The latter would only satisfy the Irish
Catholics for a time, their aim being to rule the country. The only way of
escaping these difficulties was a Union of the Parliaments; but he (Camden)
could not undertake to carry it, still less Catholic Emancipation. Finally he
declared the Presbyterians of Ulster to be Republicans who would rise en
Page 371
masse if the French landed; but if Cornwallis were sent over to lead the
troops, even that crisis might be overcome.[487]
Pitt received this letter at the height of the mutiny at the Nore. He seems to
have sent no answer to it: indeed, silence is the best reply to such an
effusion. Camden's letters to Pitt show that he longed for his recall. In that
of 16th November 1796 he concluded with the significant remark that he
looked forward to the time when they would once more live as country
gentlemen in Kent. Pitt had the same longing; but he never wrote a line
expressing a desire to leave the tiller at the height of the storm. Obviously
Camden was weary of his work. Fear seems to have been the motive which
prompted his proclamation of martial law in several counties and the offer
of an amnesty to all who would surrender their arms before Midsummer
1797. Those enactments, together with the brutal methods of General Lake
and the soldiery in Ulster and Leinster, crushed revolt for the present but
kindled a flame of resentment which burst forth a year later. As the danger
increased, so did the severities of the Protestant Yeomanry and Militia.
Thus, fear begot rage, and rage intensified fear and its offspring, violence.
The United Irishmen had their revenge. In the summer of 1797 their two
delegates, Lewins and McNevin, did their utmost to defeat the efforts of Pitt
to bring about peace with France; and the former had the promise of the
Director, Barras, that France would never sheathe the sword until Ireland
was free.[488]
Again Camden begged Pitt to seek the first opportunity of freeing him from
his duties in order to disentangle his private affairs which were in much
confusion, the excess of expenditure over income at Dublin being a further
cause of embarrassment. In fact nothing but a sense of public duty, in view
of a hostile invasion, kept him at his post. So far from the truth are those
who, without knowledge of the inner motives of statesmen, accuse them of
delight in cruelty and of intriguing to provoke a revolt.
troops, even that crisis might be overcome.[487]
Pitt received this letter at the height of the mutiny at the Nore. He seems to
have sent no answer to it: indeed, silence is the best reply to such an
effusion. Camden's letters to Pitt show that he longed for his recall. In that
of 16th November 1796 he concluded with the significant remark that he
looked forward to the time when they would once more live as country
gentlemen in Kent. Pitt had the same longing; but he never wrote a line
expressing a desire to leave the tiller at the height of the storm. Obviously
Camden was weary of his work. Fear seems to have been the motive which
prompted his proclamation of martial law in several counties and the offer
of an amnesty to all who would surrender their arms before Midsummer
1797. Those enactments, together with the brutal methods of General Lake
and the soldiery in Ulster and Leinster, crushed revolt for the present but
kindled a flame of resentment which burst forth a year later. As the danger
increased, so did the severities of the Protestant Yeomanry and Militia.
Thus, fear begot rage, and rage intensified fear and its offspring, violence.
The United Irishmen had their revenge. In the summer of 1797 their two
delegates, Lewins and McNevin, did their utmost to defeat the efforts of Pitt
to bring about peace with France; and the former had the promise of the
Director, Barras, that France would never sheathe the sword until Ireland
was free.[488]
Again Camden begged Pitt to seek the first opportunity of freeing him from
his duties in order to disentangle his private affairs which were in much
confusion, the excess of expenditure over income at Dublin being a further
cause of embarrassment. In fact nothing but a sense of public duty, in view
of a hostile invasion, kept him at his post. So far from the truth are those
who, without knowledge of the inner motives of statesmen, accuse them of
delight in cruelty and of intriguing to provoke a revolt.
Page 372
Early in the year 1798 the hopes of malcontents centred in the naval
preparations progressing at Brest and Toulon.[489] Bonaparte also seemed
about to deal a blow at London. In February he surveyed the flotilla at
Dunkirk and neighbouring ports; and the hearts of English Jacobins beat
high at the thought of his landing in Kent or Sussex. The London
Corresponding Society, after a time of suspended animation, had now
become a revolutionary body. On 30th January its new secretaries,
Crossfield and Thomas Evans, issued an encouraging address to the United
Irishmen. Somewhat later Evans and Binns formed a society, the United
Englishmen, which imposed on its members an oath to learn the use of
arms, its constitution in local, or baronial, committees being modelled on
that of the United Irishmen. A society of United Scotsmen was founded
about the same time; a society of United Britons also came to being, and
issued a fraternal address to the United Irishmen on 5th January.
Most significant of these effusions is one, dated 6 Pluviôse An VI [25th
January 1798], by "the Secret Committee of England" to the French
Directory, containing the assurance that Pitt had come to the end of his
borrowing powers and that the people were ready to throw off his yoke.
"United as we are," it concluded, "we now only await with impatience to
see the Hero of Italy and the brave veterans of the great Nation. Myriads
will hail their arrival with shouts of joy: they will soon finish the glorious
campaign." This address was drawn up fourteen days before Bonaparte set
out for Dunkirk. It is clear, then, that its compilers were not so ignorant as
that consequential tailor, Francis Place, represented them. Their chief
mistake lay in concluding that Bonaparte intended to "leap the ditch." As
we now know, his tour on the northern coast was intended merely to satisfy
the Directors and encourage the English and Irish malcontents to risk their
necks, while he made ready his armada at Toulon for the Levant.[490]
Meanwhile the United Britons and United Irishmen sought to undermine
Pitt's Government so that it might fall with a crash at the advent of the hero
preparations progressing at Brest and Toulon.[489] Bonaparte also seemed
about to deal a blow at London. In February he surveyed the flotilla at
Dunkirk and neighbouring ports; and the hearts of English Jacobins beat
high at the thought of his landing in Kent or Sussex. The London
Corresponding Society, after a time of suspended animation, had now
become a revolutionary body. On 30th January its new secretaries,
Crossfield and Thomas Evans, issued an encouraging address to the United
Irishmen. Somewhat later Evans and Binns formed a society, the United
Englishmen, which imposed on its members an oath to learn the use of
arms, its constitution in local, or baronial, committees being modelled on
that of the United Irishmen. A society of United Scotsmen was founded
about the same time; a society of United Britons also came to being, and
issued a fraternal address to the United Irishmen on 5th January.
Most significant of these effusions is one, dated 6 Pluviôse An VI [25th
January 1798], by "the Secret Committee of England" to the French
Directory, containing the assurance that Pitt had come to the end of his
borrowing powers and that the people were ready to throw off his yoke.
"United as we are," it concluded, "we now only await with impatience to
see the Hero of Italy and the brave veterans of the great Nation. Myriads
will hail their arrival with shouts of joy: they will soon finish the glorious
campaign." This address was drawn up fourteen days before Bonaparte set
out for Dunkirk. It is clear, then, that its compilers were not so ignorant as
that consequential tailor, Francis Place, represented them. Their chief
mistake lay in concluding that Bonaparte intended to "leap the ditch." As
we now know, his tour on the northern coast was intended merely to satisfy
the Directors and encourage the English and Irish malcontents to risk their
necks, while he made ready his armada at Toulon for the Levant.[490]
Meanwhile the United Britons and United Irishmen sought to undermine
Pitt's Government so that it might fall with a crash at the advent of the hero
Page 373
of Italy. They knew not that the chief efforts of the "soldiers of liberty" were
then being directed to the pillage of Rome and of the cantonal treasuries of
Switzerland in order to provide funds for Bonaparte's oriental adventure.
Already Irish, English, and French democrats had been fraternizing. In
January 1798 the United Englishmen sent over two delegates to Dublin to
concert action, and about the same time a priest of Dundalk, named
O'Coigly (Anglicé Quigley), came over from Ireland as a delegate from the
United Irishmen to Evans's Society. Place asserts that his plan of proceeding
to France was not known. But, as Place habitually toned down or ridiculed
the doings of that Society, this is doubtful. Owing to secret information
(probably from Turner, a British spy at Hamburg) the Government arrested
Quigley, Arthur O'Connor, and Binns, a leading member of the London
Corresponding Society, at Margate as they were about to board a hoy for
France (28th February). A little later Colonel Despard, Bonham, and Evans
were arrested. The evidence against all but Quigley was not conclusive, and
they were released. The case against Quigley depended on a paper found by
a police officer in his pocket, urging a French invasion of England. He was
therefore condemned for high treason and was hanged on 7th June 1798.
Probably Quigley had that paper from a London Society; but if so, why
were not its officials seized? In some respects the Quigley affair still
remains a mystery. Certainly it added fuel to the hatred felt for Pitt by
British and Irish Jacobins.[491]
The evidence against O'Connor was weighty. It was proved that he was the
leader of the party and that he knew Quigley well. He had a cipher in his
possession, which was surely superfluous if, as he stated, he was travelling
on private business. Probably his acquittal was due to his relationship to
Lord Longueville, an influential Irish peer. Fox, Sheridan, and the Duke of
Norfolk also proceeded to Maidstone to answer for the virtuous and
patriotic character of O'Connor, a fact which probably led the judge to give
then being directed to the pillage of Rome and of the cantonal treasuries of
Switzerland in order to provide funds for Bonaparte's oriental adventure.
Already Irish, English, and French democrats had been fraternizing. In
January 1798 the United Englishmen sent over two delegates to Dublin to
concert action, and about the same time a priest of Dundalk, named
O'Coigly (Anglicé Quigley), came over from Ireland as a delegate from the
United Irishmen to Evans's Society. Place asserts that his plan of proceeding
to France was not known. But, as Place habitually toned down or ridiculed
the doings of that Society, this is doubtful. Owing to secret information
(probably from Turner, a British spy at Hamburg) the Government arrested
Quigley, Arthur O'Connor, and Binns, a leading member of the London
Corresponding Society, at Margate as they were about to board a hoy for
France (28th February). A little later Colonel Despard, Bonham, and Evans
were arrested. The evidence against all but Quigley was not conclusive, and
they were released. The case against Quigley depended on a paper found by
a police officer in his pocket, urging a French invasion of England. He was
therefore condemned for high treason and was hanged on 7th June 1798.
Probably Quigley had that paper from a London Society; but if so, why
were not its officials seized? In some respects the Quigley affair still
remains a mystery. Certainly it added fuel to the hatred felt for Pitt by
British and Irish Jacobins.[491]
The evidence against O'Connor was weighty. It was proved that he was the
leader of the party and that he knew Quigley well. He had a cipher in his
possession, which was surely superfluous if, as he stated, he was travelling
on private business. Probably his acquittal was due to his relationship to
Lord Longueville, an influential Irish peer. Fox, Sheridan, and the Duke of
Norfolk also proceeded to Maidstone to answer for the virtuous and
patriotic character of O'Connor, a fact which probably led the judge to give
Page 374
a strangely favourable summing-up. The conduct of the Opposition leaders
in this matter led their former comrade, the Earl of Carlisle, to declare that
they had now sunk to a lower political hell than any yet reached. The
Government, however, had not done with O'Connor. He was at once
arrested at Maidstone on another charge (22nd May), and was in prison in
Dublin during the rebellion. He then confessed that he had done more than
any one to organize Leinster for revolt, also that he had had conferences
with French generals with a view to invasion so far back as 1793; and he
stated that he knew the member of the United Irishmen who in the winter of
1796 advised the French not to come until the spring of 1797.[492] There
certainly was some misunderstanding between the Irish rebels and their
would-be helpers; but the full details are not known. Finally O'Connor was
allowed to retire to France; he became a French general, and helped
Napoleon to concert plans for the invasion of Ireland, assuring him that,
after the work of liberation was done, 200,000 Irishmen would help him to
conquer England.
Meanwhile further news respecting the Franco-Irish plans reached Pitt
through a man named Parish at Hamburg. An American friend of his at
Brussels, while waiting at the municipal office for passports, saw those of
two young Irishmen, named O'Finn, delegates of the United Irishmen of
Cork. They had a large packet for the Directory at Paris, which contained
the plans of the United Irishmen, the numbers and positions of the British
troops and of the British warships between Dungeness and the North
Foreland. The O'Finns stated this to the commissary of the Brussels bureau,
who heard it with joy. The American secretly forwarded the news to Parish.
The fact that the O'Finns had a list of the forces on the Kentish coast
implied information from the English malcontents. Accordingly, on 19th
April, Government seized the papers of the London Corresponding Society.
They contained nothing of importance except the constitution of the
Society, the oath to learn the use of arms, and the address to the United
in this matter led their former comrade, the Earl of Carlisle, to declare that
they had now sunk to a lower political hell than any yet reached. The
Government, however, had not done with O'Connor. He was at once
arrested at Maidstone on another charge (22nd May), and was in prison in
Dublin during the rebellion. He then confessed that he had done more than
any one to organize Leinster for revolt, also that he had had conferences
with French generals with a view to invasion so far back as 1793; and he
stated that he knew the member of the United Irishmen who in the winter of
1796 advised the French not to come until the spring of 1797.[492] There
certainly was some misunderstanding between the Irish rebels and their
would-be helpers; but the full details are not known. Finally O'Connor was
allowed to retire to France; he became a French general, and helped
Napoleon to concert plans for the invasion of Ireland, assuring him that,
after the work of liberation was done, 200,000 Irishmen would help him to
conquer England.
Meanwhile further news respecting the Franco-Irish plans reached Pitt
through a man named Parish at Hamburg. An American friend of his at
Brussels, while waiting at the municipal office for passports, saw those of
two young Irishmen, named O'Finn, delegates of the United Irishmen of
Cork. They had a large packet for the Directory at Paris, which contained
the plans of the United Irishmen, the numbers and positions of the British
troops and of the British warships between Dungeness and the North
Foreland. The O'Finns stated this to the commissary of the Brussels bureau,
who heard it with joy. The American secretly forwarded the news to Parish.
The fact that the O'Finns had a list of the forces on the Kentish coast
implied information from the English malcontents. Accordingly, on 19th
April, Government seized the papers of the London Corresponding Society.
They contained nothing of importance except the constitution of the
Society, the oath to learn the use of arms, and the address to the United
Page 375
Irishmen. The Parliamentary Committee of Secrecy also believed that a
plan was afoot for bringing to London a band of Irish fanatics to strike a
blow which would paralyse Government while the French landed and
Ireland revolted. This inference seems far-fetched; but the evidence at hand
warranted the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, which Pitt procured
from Parliament on the following day. Place, with his usual perverse
ingenuity, argued that Pitt nursed the conspiracy in order to be able to create
alarm and govern despotically.[493]
Events were now moving fast in Ireland. Chief among the exciting causes
were the repressive measures of Camden and the licence of the Militia and
Yeomanry. So able and active a commander as General Abercromby failed
to keep discipline and prevent military outrages. Not long after his return
from the West Indies he reluctantly accepted these thankless duties
(November 1797). His dislike of the work appears in the following letter,
addressed probably to one of Pitt's colleagues:
Bantry, Jan. 28, 1798.[494]
Dear Sir,
... I have found the country everywhere quiet, but there exists
among the gentlemen the greatest despondency: they believe, or
affect to believe, that there is a plot in every family, and a
conspiracy in every parish, and they would abandon the country
unless the troops were dispersed over the face of it for their
protection. I believe the lower ranks heartily hate the gentlemen
because they oppress them, and the gentlemen hate the peasants
because they know they deserve to be hated. Hitherto rents have
been paid, tithes have not been refused or taxes withheld. No arms
or ammunition have anywhere been introduced, and there are no
tumultuous assemblings of the people. I have often heard of
disaffection among the militia; it may perhaps exist among a few
plan was afoot for bringing to London a band of Irish fanatics to strike a
blow which would paralyse Government while the French landed and
Ireland revolted. This inference seems far-fetched; but the evidence at hand
warranted the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, which Pitt procured
from Parliament on the following day. Place, with his usual perverse
ingenuity, argued that Pitt nursed the conspiracy in order to be able to create
alarm and govern despotically.[493]
Events were now moving fast in Ireland. Chief among the exciting causes
were the repressive measures of Camden and the licence of the Militia and
Yeomanry. So able and active a commander as General Abercromby failed
to keep discipline and prevent military outrages. Not long after his return
from the West Indies he reluctantly accepted these thankless duties
(November 1797). His dislike of the work appears in the following letter,
addressed probably to one of Pitt's colleagues:
Bantry, Jan. 28, 1798.[494]
Dear Sir,
... I have found the country everywhere quiet, but there exists
among the gentlemen the greatest despondency: they believe, or
affect to believe, that there is a plot in every family, and a
conspiracy in every parish, and they would abandon the country
unless the troops were dispersed over the face of it for their
protection. I believe the lower ranks heartily hate the gentlemen
because they oppress them, and the gentlemen hate the peasants
because they know they deserve to be hated. Hitherto rents have
been paid, tithes have not been refused or taxes withheld. No arms
or ammunition have anywhere been introduced, and there are no
tumultuous assemblings of the people. I have often heard of
disaffection among the militia; it may perhaps exist among a few
Page 376
individuals; but it cannot exist to any considerable amount. My
inquiries have been unremitted in this particular. Were, however, a
landing of the enemy to take place, I cannot say what might happen
to a people dissatisfied with their situation and naturally of great
levity; the new doctrines would give activity. We are preparing for
whatever may happen and no labour or exertion shall be wanting.
Abercromby soon proclaimed his disgust at the excesses of his troops in
unmeasured terms. True, he had much provocation. The militia officers
under him were a loose swaggering set, whose cruelties to the peasantry
during the prolonged search for arms were unpardonable. Further, their
powers had been enlarged by Camden's order of May 1797, allowing them
to use armed force without the requisition of magistrates, a step deemed
necessary to screen the civil authorities from outrage or murder. Seeing that
officers often put these powers to a brutal and arbitrary use, exasperating to
the peasants and demoralizing to the soldiery, Abercromby determined
publicly to rescind the viceregal mandate. The language in which he
announced his decision was no less remarkable than the decision itself. On
26th February 1798 he stated in a general order: "That the frequency of
courts-martial, and the many complaints of irregularities in the conduct of
the troops in this kingdom having too unfortunately proved the army to be
in a state of licentiousness which must render it formidable to everyone but
the enemy, the commander-in-chief" forbids officers ever to use military
force except at the requisition of magistrates.
That the army and militia did not assault their commander after this
outrageous insult shows that their discipline had not wholly vanished. In
face of the vehement outcries of the Irish loyalists against Abercromby,
Camden showed much forbearance. He issued a guarded statement that
Abercromby had been accustomed to command troops abroad, and did not
realize the impression which would be caused in Ireland by his censure of
inquiries have been unremitted in this particular. Were, however, a
landing of the enemy to take place, I cannot say what might happen
to a people dissatisfied with their situation and naturally of great
levity; the new doctrines would give activity. We are preparing for
whatever may happen and no labour or exertion shall be wanting.
Abercromby soon proclaimed his disgust at the excesses of his troops in
unmeasured terms. True, he had much provocation. The militia officers
under him were a loose swaggering set, whose cruelties to the peasantry
during the prolonged search for arms were unpardonable. Further, their
powers had been enlarged by Camden's order of May 1797, allowing them
to use armed force without the requisition of magistrates, a step deemed
necessary to screen the civil authorities from outrage or murder. Seeing that
officers often put these powers to a brutal and arbitrary use, exasperating to
the peasants and demoralizing to the soldiery, Abercromby determined
publicly to rescind the viceregal mandate. The language in which he
announced his decision was no less remarkable than the decision itself. On
26th February 1798 he stated in a general order: "That the frequency of
courts-martial, and the many complaints of irregularities in the conduct of
the troops in this kingdom having too unfortunately proved the army to be
in a state of licentiousness which must render it formidable to everyone but
the enemy, the commander-in-chief" forbids officers ever to use military
force except at the requisition of magistrates.
That the army and militia did not assault their commander after this
outrageous insult shows that their discipline had not wholly vanished. In
face of the vehement outcries of the Irish loyalists against Abercromby,
Camden showed much forbearance. He issued a guarded statement that
Abercromby had been accustomed to command troops abroad, and did not
realize the impression which would be caused in Ireland by his censure of
Page 377
the soldiery. Portland, however, openly blamed the commander-in-chief.
Pitt's letter of 13th March to Camden shows that, had he seen Portland's
censure before it went off, he would have toned down some of its
expressions; but on the whole he heartily disapproved of Abercromby's
indiscriminate rebuke to the army as not only unjust, but calculated to
depress its spirits and encourage those of the French and the Irish
malcontents. Portland's reprimand brought about Abercromby's resignation,
which Camden sought to avert. Thus again events took the worst possible
course. Abercromby was an able and energetic man; and his resignation, at
the time when the arrival of the French was expected, undoubtedly helped
to raise the hopes of malcontents. Well might Camden write to Pitt on 25th
April that Abercromby had done much harm. With that commander's desire
to repress the outrages of the soldiery everyone must sympathize. The
manner in which he sought to effect it was incredibly foolish.
Meanwhile, the work of the conspirators had been undermined by treachery.
One of the conspirators, named Reynolds, took fright and revealed the
secret of the plot to an official at Dublin Castle (26th February), adding the
information that the Dublin committee would hold a secret meeting on 12th
March. The police, bursting in, seized eighteen members, including
McNevin, along with their papers, amongst which were some incriminating
O'Coigly. Lord Edward Fitzgerald escaped for a time; but an informer
gained knowledge of his movements, and those of two brothers named
Sheares. On his warning the Castle that they were about to arouse Dublin to
revolt, Camden resolved to anticipate the blow. Two police officers, Swan
and Ryan, tracked Fitzgerald to his lair on the 19th of May. They found him
in bed. At once the fierce spirit of his race surged up. He sprang at them
with the small dagger ready by his side and struck at Swan. The blow went
home, while the pistols aimed by the officers missed fire. Turning on Ryan,
he dealt thrust upon thrust. The two wounded men clung to him while he
struggled and struck like a wild beast. He was dragging them towards the
Pitt's letter of 13th March to Camden shows that, had he seen Portland's
censure before it went off, he would have toned down some of its
expressions; but on the whole he heartily disapproved of Abercromby's
indiscriminate rebuke to the army as not only unjust, but calculated to
depress its spirits and encourage those of the French and the Irish
malcontents. Portland's reprimand brought about Abercromby's resignation,
which Camden sought to avert. Thus again events took the worst possible
course. Abercromby was an able and energetic man; and his resignation, at
the time when the arrival of the French was expected, undoubtedly helped
to raise the hopes of malcontents. Well might Camden write to Pitt on 25th
April that Abercromby had done much harm. With that commander's desire
to repress the outrages of the soldiery everyone must sympathize. The
manner in which he sought to effect it was incredibly foolish.
Meanwhile, the work of the conspirators had been undermined by treachery.
One of the conspirators, named Reynolds, took fright and revealed the
secret of the plot to an official at Dublin Castle (26th February), adding the
information that the Dublin committee would hold a secret meeting on 12th
March. The police, bursting in, seized eighteen members, including
McNevin, along with their papers, amongst which were some incriminating
O'Coigly. Lord Edward Fitzgerald escaped for a time; but an informer
gained knowledge of his movements, and those of two brothers named
Sheares. On his warning the Castle that they were about to arouse Dublin to
revolt, Camden resolved to anticipate the blow. Two police officers, Swan
and Ryan, tracked Fitzgerald to his lair on the 19th of May. They found him
in bed. At once the fierce spirit of his race surged up. He sprang at them
with the small dagger ready by his side and struck at Swan. The blow went
home, while the pistols aimed by the officers missed fire. Turning on Ryan,
he dealt thrust upon thrust. The two wounded men clung to him while he
struggled and struck like a wild beast. He was dragging them towards the
Page 378
door when Major Sirr rushed in and shot him in the shoulder. Even then his
convulsions were so violent that two or three soldiers, who ran upstairs,
scarcely overpowered him. Swan soon died. The wounds of Ryan were not
mortal. That of Fitzgerald was not deemed serious, but it mortified, and he
passed away on 4th June, mourned by all who knew his chivalrous daring
spirit.[495]
The fury of Fitzgerald is intelligible. He was the one necessary man in the
plot then coming to a head for the capture of Dublin on 23rd May. Among
his effects were found a green uniform, the seal of the Irish Union, the line
of route for the Kildare rebels in their advance, together with a plan for the
seizure of the chief officials. The triumph of the Castle was completed by
the capture of Neilson and the Sheares. Their papers showed that no quarter
was to be given. Irish historians (among them Plowden) maintained that Pitt
and Camden all along knew of the plot and allowed the conspirators to
drive on their mine in order at the right moment to blow them up. There is
no evidence to this effect, except during the few days preceding the blow.
Camden's efforts were uniformly directed towards disarmament and
coercion, so much so that he is reproached for his cruelty by the very men
who accuse him of playing with the conspiracy. It is clear that he sought to
prevent a rising, which was expected to coincide with a French invasion. In
fact the only prudent course was to repress and disarm at all possible points.
The severity of the crisis appears in the letters which Beresford, Cooke, and
Lees, officials at Dublin Castle, wrote to Auckland. In answer to Lord
Moira's reckless charge in the Irish Parliament, that they were pushing on
the country to rebel, Beresford on 10th April asks Auckland how can they,
who are daily exposed to murder, push on a nation to deeds of violence
which must fall on them? On 1st May he writes: "We think the Toulon
squadron will join the expedition against Ireland.... Pikes are making in
numbers, and the idea of a rising prevails. Kildare and Wicklow are armed,
convulsions were so violent that two or three soldiers, who ran upstairs,
scarcely overpowered him. Swan soon died. The wounds of Ryan were not
mortal. That of Fitzgerald was not deemed serious, but it mortified, and he
passed away on 4th June, mourned by all who knew his chivalrous daring
spirit.[495]
The fury of Fitzgerald is intelligible. He was the one necessary man in the
plot then coming to a head for the capture of Dublin on 23rd May. Among
his effects were found a green uniform, the seal of the Irish Union, the line
of route for the Kildare rebels in their advance, together with a plan for the
seizure of the chief officials. The triumph of the Castle was completed by
the capture of Neilson and the Sheares. Their papers showed that no quarter
was to be given. Irish historians (among them Plowden) maintained that Pitt
and Camden all along knew of the plot and allowed the conspirators to
drive on their mine in order at the right moment to blow them up. There is
no evidence to this effect, except during the few days preceding the blow.
Camden's efforts were uniformly directed towards disarmament and
coercion, so much so that he is reproached for his cruelty by the very men
who accuse him of playing with the conspiracy. It is clear that he sought to
prevent a rising, which was expected to coincide with a French invasion. In
fact the only prudent course was to repress and disarm at all possible points.
The severity of the crisis appears in the letters which Beresford, Cooke, and
Lees, officials at Dublin Castle, wrote to Auckland. In answer to Lord
Moira's reckless charge in the Irish Parliament, that they were pushing on
the country to rebel, Beresford on 10th April asks Auckland how can they,
who are daily exposed to murder, push on a nation to deeds of violence
which must fall on them? On 1st May he writes: "We think the Toulon
squadron will join the expedition against Ireland.... Pikes are making in
numbers, and the idea of a rising prevails. Kildare and Wicklow are armed,
Page 379
organized, and rebellious. Dublin and the county are very bad. The rebels
expect the French within a month. Such is their last Gazette." On 7th May
Lees writes to Auckland: "Lord Camden must steel his heart. Otherwise we
are in great jeopardy." On 9th May Beresford states that it would be a good
plan to seize a number of malcontents, threaten them with flogging and
induce them to turn informers. He adds: "At present the quiet which
prevails in some parts is deceptive. Where the country is organized, quiet
appears. Where the organization is going on there is disturbance. In Kildare
there are complete regiments, with large quantities of arms in their
possession." On 10th May Lees writes that Galway is arming for revolt,
and, nine days later, after the arrest of Fitzgerald, he states that they expect
a rising in Dublin on the morrow. On 21st May after the arrest of the
Sheares, Cooke writes: "A rising is not given up; but I think it will not take
place. Parts of Kildare will not give up arms.... A search for arms will
commence. We are in good spirits." On 20th May Beresford informs
Auckland of the receipt of news at the Castle from three different quarters
that there would be a rising on the 21st, owing to the vigorous measures
now taken by the Government.[496]
This is not the language of men who are nursing a plot. It evinces a resolve
to stamp out disaffection before the Brest and Toulon fleets arrive. As for
Pitt, his letters show a conviction of the need of continuing the repressive
measures whereby Camden had "saved the country." He approved the plan
of allowing officers to act without the orders of magistrates, seeing that the
latter were often murdered for doing their duty. The thinness of his
correspondence with Camden is somewhat surprising until we remember
that his energies mainly went towards strengthening the army and navy. His
letter to Grenville early in June shows that he expected news of the arrival
of the French off the Irish coast, since they had got out from Toulon on 19th
May.
expect the French within a month. Such is their last Gazette." On 7th May
Lees writes to Auckland: "Lord Camden must steel his heart. Otherwise we
are in great jeopardy." On 9th May Beresford states that it would be a good
plan to seize a number of malcontents, threaten them with flogging and
induce them to turn informers. He adds: "At present the quiet which
prevails in some parts is deceptive. Where the country is organized, quiet
appears. Where the organization is going on there is disturbance. In Kildare
there are complete regiments, with large quantities of arms in their
possession." On 10th May Lees writes that Galway is arming for revolt,
and, nine days later, after the arrest of Fitzgerald, he states that they expect
a rising in Dublin on the morrow. On 21st May after the arrest of the
Sheares, Cooke writes: "A rising is not given up; but I think it will not take
place. Parts of Kildare will not give up arms.... A search for arms will
commence. We are in good spirits." On 20th May Beresford informs
Auckland of the receipt of news at the Castle from three different quarters
that there would be a rising on the 21st, owing to the vigorous measures
now taken by the Government.[496]
This is not the language of men who are nursing a plot. It evinces a resolve
to stamp out disaffection before the Brest and Toulon fleets arrive. As for
Pitt, his letters show a conviction of the need of continuing the repressive
measures whereby Camden had "saved the country." He approved the plan
of allowing officers to act without the orders of magistrates, seeing that the
latter were often murdered for doing their duty. The thinness of his
correspondence with Camden is somewhat surprising until we remember
that his energies mainly went towards strengthening the army and navy. His
letter to Grenville early in June shows that he expected news of the arrival
of the French off the Irish coast, since they had got out from Toulon on 19th
May.
Page 380
It is not surprising that Ireland was thought to be their goal. Bonaparte and
the Directory had kept the secret of their Eastern Expedition with far more
care than Pitt displayed in worming it out. Certainly Pitt's spy system was
far less efficient than has been imagined.[497] With ordinary activity the
oriental scheme could have been found out from one of Barras' mistresses
or from some official at Toulon. The fact that Bonaparte had some time
previously engaged Arab interpreters might surely have enlightened an
agent of average intelligence. So far back as 20th April French engineers in
uniform, accompanied by interpreters, had arrived at Alexandria and Aleppo
in order to prepare for the reception of large forces. The interpreters, it is
said, "collect all possible information respecting Suez and the navigation of
the Red Sea, as also particularly whether the English have any ships in the
Persian Gulf. It is supposed that General Buonaparte will divide his army,
one corps to be embarked from the Red Sea and pass round to the Gulf of
Persia, the other part to proceed from Syria overland to the Euphrates, by
which river they are to advance and join the remainder near the mouth of
this river; from thence to make, united, the grand descent on the coast of
Malabar or Deccan."[498] In these days it is difficult to imagine that this
news did not reach Pitt until about 5th July.
The Irish malcontents were as ill informed as Pitt. Basing their hopes on the
arrival of the French fleet, they prepared to rise about the end of May. But
the arrests in Dublin hurried on their plans. The men of Kildare and
Westmeath received orders from the secret Directory in Dublin to take arms
on 23rd May, on the understanding that the whole of Ireland would revolt.
They were to seize the towns and villages on the roads to Dublin, while the
rebels in the city murdered the authorities and captured the chief positions.
But on the 22nd the Government seized quantities of arms, and the presence
of General Lake's garrison of 4,000 Yeomen daunted the United Irishmen;
on the night of the 23rd–24th only the more daring of them stole about the
environs, waiting for a signal which never came; and by dawn their bands
the Directory had kept the secret of their Eastern Expedition with far more
care than Pitt displayed in worming it out. Certainly Pitt's spy system was
far less efficient than has been imagined.[497] With ordinary activity the
oriental scheme could have been found out from one of Barras' mistresses
or from some official at Toulon. The fact that Bonaparte had some time
previously engaged Arab interpreters might surely have enlightened an
agent of average intelligence. So far back as 20th April French engineers in
uniform, accompanied by interpreters, had arrived at Alexandria and Aleppo
in order to prepare for the reception of large forces. The interpreters, it is
said, "collect all possible information respecting Suez and the navigation of
the Red Sea, as also particularly whether the English have any ships in the
Persian Gulf. It is supposed that General Buonaparte will divide his army,
one corps to be embarked from the Red Sea and pass round to the Gulf of
Persia, the other part to proceed from Syria overland to the Euphrates, by
which river they are to advance and join the remainder near the mouth of
this river; from thence to make, united, the grand descent on the coast of
Malabar or Deccan."[498] In these days it is difficult to imagine that this
news did not reach Pitt until about 5th July.
The Irish malcontents were as ill informed as Pitt. Basing their hopes on the
arrival of the French fleet, they prepared to rise about the end of May. But
the arrests in Dublin hurried on their plans. The men of Kildare and
Westmeath received orders from the secret Directory in Dublin to take arms
on 23rd May, on the understanding that the whole of Ireland would revolt.
They were to seize the towns and villages on the roads to Dublin, while the
rebels in the city murdered the authorities and captured the chief positions.
But on the 22nd the Government seized quantities of arms, and the presence
of General Lake's garrison of 4,000 Yeomen daunted the United Irishmen;
on the night of the 23rd–24th only the more daring of them stole about the
environs, waiting for a signal which never came; and by dawn their bands
Page 381
melted away. In Meath also the rising failed miserably. A large concourse
assembled on the historic slopes of Tara Hill, whence 400 Fencibles and
Yeomen drove them with ease (25th May).
In Kildare and the north of Wicklow, where the influence of the Fitzgeralds
made for revolt, large throngs of men assembled on the night of 23rd–24th
May, and made desperate attacks on Naas and Clane, important posts on the
roads leading to the capital. Their headlong rushes broke in vain against the
stubborn stand of the small garrisons. But at a village hard by, named
Prosperous, the rebel leaders fooled the chief of a small detachment by a
story of their intention to deliver up arms. Gaining access to the village,
they surprised the soldiers in the barracks, girdled them with fire, and
spitted them on their pikes as they jumped forth. That night of horror ended
with the murder of the Protestant manufacturer, whose enterprise had made
their village what it was. A few days later General Ralph Dundas somewhat
indiscreetly granted an armistice to a large body of Kildare rebels at
Kilcullen on the promise that they would give up their arms and go home.
Nevertheless a large body of them were found on the Curragh and barred
the way to General Duff, who courageously marched with 600 men to the
aid of Dundas. Duff was informed that these rebels would be willing to lay
down their arms. His men were advancing towards them when a shot or
shots were fired by the rebels, whether in bravado or in earnest is doubtful.
The troops, taking it as another act of treachery, charged with fury and
drove the mass from the plain with the loss of more than 200 killed. Thus,
here again, events made for animosity and bloodshed. Protestants
remembered the foul play at Prosperous; the rebels swore to avenge the
treachery at the Curragh.
assembled on the historic slopes of Tara Hill, whence 400 Fencibles and
Yeomen drove them with ease (25th May).
In Kildare and the north of Wicklow, where the influence of the Fitzgeralds
made for revolt, large throngs of men assembled on the night of 23rd–24th
May, and made desperate attacks on Naas and Clane, important posts on the
roads leading to the capital. Their headlong rushes broke in vain against the
stubborn stand of the small garrisons. But at a village hard by, named
Prosperous, the rebel leaders fooled the chief of a small detachment by a
story of their intention to deliver up arms. Gaining access to the village,
they surprised the soldiers in the barracks, girdled them with fire, and
spitted them on their pikes as they jumped forth. That night of horror ended
with the murder of the Protestant manufacturer, whose enterprise had made
their village what it was. A few days later General Ralph Dundas somewhat
indiscreetly granted an armistice to a large body of Kildare rebels at
Kilcullen on the promise that they would give up their arms and go home.
Nevertheless a large body of them were found on the Curragh and barred
the way to General Duff, who courageously marched with 600 men to the
aid of Dundas. Duff was informed that these rebels would be willing to lay
down their arms. His men were advancing towards them when a shot or
shots were fired by the rebels, whether in bravado or in earnest is doubtful.
The troops, taking it as another act of treachery, charged with fury and
drove the mass from the plain with the loss of more than 200 killed. Thus,
here again, events made for animosity and bloodshed. Protestants
remembered the foul play at Prosperous; the rebels swore to avenge the
treachery at the Curragh.
Page 382
News of the first of these events sped across the Irish Sea on 25th and 26th
May. They reached Pitt just before or after his Whitsunday duel on Putney
Heath. Thick and fast came the tales of slaughter. On 29th May Camden
wrote in almost despairing terms—The rebellion was most formidable and
extensive. It would certainly be followed by a French invasion. It must be
suppressed at once. The Protestants and the military were mad with fury,
and called aloud for a war of extermination. The strife would be marked by
unheard-of atrocities. For the sake of human nature, Pitt must at once send
5,000 regular troops. Camden added that cavalry were useless against lines
of pikemen, a phrase which tells of the dogged fury of the peasantry.
Nevertheless, his assertion that the rebellion was extensive proves his lack
of balance. The saving facts of the situation were that the Ulstermen had not
yet moved; that Connaught and Munster were quiet; and of Leinster, only
Kildare, Wexford, and parts of Carlow and Wicklow were in arms. In
Dublin murder was rife, but the pikemen did not muster.
Pitt's reply of 2nd June to Camden is singularly cool. In brief and
businesslike terms he stated that, despite the difficulties of the situation, he
had already prepared to despatch 5,000 men; but Camden must send them
back at the earliest possible moment in order not to disarrange the plans for
the war. Still more frigid was the letter of George III to Pitt. The King
lamented the need of sending troops to Ireland, as they would thereby be
cut off from "active service." Camden (he wrote) must really not press for
them unnecessarily. However, as the sword was drawn in Ireland, it must
not be sheathed until the rebels submitted unconditionally. Eleven days later
the King wrote to Pitt that the new Lord Lieutenant "must not lose the
present moment of terror for frightening the supporters of the Castle into an
Union with this country; and no further indulgences must be granted to
Roman Catholics, as no country can be governed where there is more than
one established religion."[499] The thinness of the King's thought is in part
May. They reached Pitt just before or after his Whitsunday duel on Putney
Heath. Thick and fast came the tales of slaughter. On 29th May Camden
wrote in almost despairing terms—The rebellion was most formidable and
extensive. It would certainly be followed by a French invasion. It must be
suppressed at once. The Protestants and the military were mad with fury,
and called aloud for a war of extermination. The strife would be marked by
unheard-of atrocities. For the sake of human nature, Pitt must at once send
5,000 regular troops. Camden added that cavalry were useless against lines
of pikemen, a phrase which tells of the dogged fury of the peasantry.
Nevertheless, his assertion that the rebellion was extensive proves his lack
of balance. The saving facts of the situation were that the Ulstermen had not
yet moved; that Connaught and Munster were quiet; and of Leinster, only
Kildare, Wexford, and parts of Carlow and Wicklow were in arms. In
Dublin murder was rife, but the pikemen did not muster.
Pitt's reply of 2nd June to Camden is singularly cool. In brief and
businesslike terms he stated that, despite the difficulties of the situation, he
had already prepared to despatch 5,000 men; but Camden must send them
back at the earliest possible moment in order not to disarrange the plans for
the war. Still more frigid was the letter of George III to Pitt. The King
lamented the need of sending troops to Ireland, as they would thereby be
cut off from "active service." Camden (he wrote) must really not press for
them unnecessarily. However, as the sword was drawn in Ireland, it must
not be sheathed until the rebels submitted unconditionally. Eleven days later
the King wrote to Pitt that the new Lord Lieutenant "must not lose the
present moment of terror for frightening the supporters of the Castle into an
Union with this country; and no further indulgences must be granted to
Roman Catholics, as no country can be governed where there is more than
one established religion."[499] The thinness of the King's thought is in part
Page 383
redeemed by its tenacity. His mind resembled an elemental two-stringed
instrument, which twanged forth two notes—Church and State.
In strange contrast to the calculations of the King and Pitt were the
effusions of Camden. On 7th June he referred plaintively to Portland's
despatch, stating that only 3,000 men could be sent. He warned Pitt that it
was a religious war; priests marched at the head of the rebels, who swept
together and drove at their head the reluctant. For the sake of humanity Pitt
must send larger reinforcements. He added that Lake was unequal to the
emergency. Fortunately, on that day Pitt received the consent of the Marquis
Cornwallis to act as Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief in Ireland.
As Camden had more than once pointed out the urgent need of that
appointment, it is surprising to find him on 16th June upbraiding Pitt with
the suddenness of the change. Surely it was no time for punctiliousness.
Already the Ulstermen were rising, and 30,000 rebels were afoot in
Wexford. But, as it happened, the worst of the trouble was over before
Cornwallis could take the field. Landing on 20th June near Dublin, he heard
news portending a speedy decision in Wexford.
It is not easy to account for the savagery of the revolt in that county. The
gentry resided among their tenants on friendly terms; and the search for
arms had been carried out less harshly than elsewhere. Gordon, the most
impartial historian of the rebellion, admits that the floggings and half-
hangings had been few in number, yet he adds that the people were
determined to revolt, probably from fear that their turn would come. Neither
is the religious bigotry of the rebels intelligible. The Protestants were
numerous in Wexford town, Enniscorthy, and New Ross; but there seems to
have been little religious animosity, except where tales were circulated as to
intended massacres of Catholics by Orangemen. The Celt is highly
susceptible to personal influence; and, just as that of the Fitzgeralds largely
accounts for the rising in Kildare, so does the personality of Father John
instrument, which twanged forth two notes—Church and State.
In strange contrast to the calculations of the King and Pitt were the
effusions of Camden. On 7th June he referred plaintively to Portland's
despatch, stating that only 3,000 men could be sent. He warned Pitt that it
was a religious war; priests marched at the head of the rebels, who swept
together and drove at their head the reluctant. For the sake of humanity Pitt
must send larger reinforcements. He added that Lake was unequal to the
emergency. Fortunately, on that day Pitt received the consent of the Marquis
Cornwallis to act as Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief in Ireland.
As Camden had more than once pointed out the urgent need of that
appointment, it is surprising to find him on 16th June upbraiding Pitt with
the suddenness of the change. Surely it was no time for punctiliousness.
Already the Ulstermen were rising, and 30,000 rebels were afoot in
Wexford. But, as it happened, the worst of the trouble was over before
Cornwallis could take the field. Landing on 20th June near Dublin, he heard
news portending a speedy decision in Wexford.
It is not easy to account for the savagery of the revolt in that county. The
gentry resided among their tenants on friendly terms; and the search for
arms had been carried out less harshly than elsewhere. Gordon, the most
impartial historian of the rebellion, admits that the floggings and half-
hangings had been few in number, yet he adds that the people were
determined to revolt, probably from fear that their turn would come. Neither
is the religious bigotry of the rebels intelligible. The Protestants were
numerous in Wexford town, Enniscorthy, and New Ross; but there seems to
have been little religious animosity, except where tales were circulated as to
intended massacres of Catholics by Orangemen. The Celt is highly
susceptible to personal influence; and, just as that of the Fitzgeralds largely
accounts for the rising in Kildare, so does the personality of Father John
Page 384
Murphy explain the riddle of Wexford. The son of a peasant of that county,
he was trained for the priesthood at Bordeaux, and ardently embraced the
principles of the French Revolution and the aims of United Ireland. His
huge frame, ready wit, and natural shrewdness brought him to the front in
Wexford; and he concerted the plan of establishing an Irish Republic on a
strictly Romanist basis, a programme incompatible with that of Wolfe Tone
and the United Irishmen.
Murphy, marching with his flock to the house of a neighbouring Protestant
clergyman, bade him and his terrified friends surrender. Meeting with a
refusal, they fired the outbuildings; and when the flames gained the house,
they granted the prayers of the occupants for mercy if they came out. On
coming out the adult males were forthwith butchered. Meeting with large
reinforcements from the hills, Father John's pikemen beat off a hasty attack
by 110 men of the North Cork Militia, only seven of whom escaped to
Wexford. Such were the doings on that Whitsunday in Wexford (27th May).
Next, the rebels swept down upon Enniscorthy; and though beaten back
from the very heart of the town by the steady valour of the defenders, these
last were yet fain to fall back on Wexford. But for the plundering habits of
the peasantry, not a man could have reached that town. The priest and his
followers now took post on Vinegar Hill, a height east of the River Slaney,
which overlooks Enniscorthy and the central plain of the county. There on
successive days he and his council dealt out pike-law to some four or five
hundred Protestants and landlords. Meanwhile, as no help drew nigh,
Maxwell, the commander at Wexford, deeming that town untenable, beat a
timely retreat westwards to Duncannon Fort on Waterford Harbour (30th
May).
Master of Wexford county, Murphy and his colleague, Father Michael,
proposed to raise Wicklow and Waterford. If these efforts succeeded, it was
probable that Dublin and Munster would rise. Ulster might then revolt; and
he was trained for the priesthood at Bordeaux, and ardently embraced the
principles of the French Revolution and the aims of United Ireland. His
huge frame, ready wit, and natural shrewdness brought him to the front in
Wexford; and he concerted the plan of establishing an Irish Republic on a
strictly Romanist basis, a programme incompatible with that of Wolfe Tone
and the United Irishmen.
Murphy, marching with his flock to the house of a neighbouring Protestant
clergyman, bade him and his terrified friends surrender. Meeting with a
refusal, they fired the outbuildings; and when the flames gained the house,
they granted the prayers of the occupants for mercy if they came out. On
coming out the adult males were forthwith butchered. Meeting with large
reinforcements from the hills, Father John's pikemen beat off a hasty attack
by 110 men of the North Cork Militia, only seven of whom escaped to
Wexford. Such were the doings on that Whitsunday in Wexford (27th May).
Next, the rebels swept down upon Enniscorthy; and though beaten back
from the very heart of the town by the steady valour of the defenders, these
last were yet fain to fall back on Wexford. But for the plundering habits of
the peasantry, not a man could have reached that town. The priest and his
followers now took post on Vinegar Hill, a height east of the River Slaney,
which overlooks Enniscorthy and the central plain of the county. There on
successive days he and his council dealt out pike-law to some four or five
hundred Protestants and landlords. Meanwhile, as no help drew nigh,
Maxwell, the commander at Wexford, deeming that town untenable, beat a
timely retreat westwards to Duncannon Fort on Waterford Harbour (30th
May).
Master of Wexford county, Murphy and his colleague, Father Michael,
proposed to raise Wicklow and Waterford. If these efforts succeeded, it was
probable that Dublin and Munster would rise. Ulster might then revolt; and
Page 385
the advent of the French would clinch the triumph. In full confidence, then,
the masses of pikemen moved against the loyalists at New Ross, an
important position on the River Barrow. Parish by parish, the priests at their
head, they marched, some 30,000 strong. At dawn of 5th June, when near
the town, they knelt during the celebration of Mass. Then they goaded on
herds of cattle to serve as an irresistible vanguard, and rushed at the old
walls. General Johnstone and the 1,400 defenders were at first overborne
and had to retreat over the bridge; but the plundering habits of the victors
were their ruin. The soldiery re-formed, regained their cannon, and planting
them skilfully, dealt such havoc among the disorderly mass, that finally it
surged out into the plain.[500] After their defeat the rebels deposed Harvey, a
Protestant, from his nominal command.
This success of the loyalists saved Waterford and Kilkenny from anything
more than local riots; and Moore, moving up from Fermoy and Clonmel,
soon threatened the rebel county from the west. The beaten peasants glutted
their revenge on Protestant prisoners near New Ross; and a general
massacre of prisoners at Wexford was averted only by the rapid advance of
Moore. Meanwhile, Father John, moving into County Wicklow with a force
some 30,000 strong, sought to break down the defence at Arklow. But that
important post on the River Avoca was stoutly held by General Needham
with some 1,500 men, mostly militia and yeomen. There, too, the priests led
on the peasants with a zeal that scorned death. One of the peasant leaders
rushed up to a gun, thrust his cap into it, and shouted, "Come along, boys;
her mouth is stopped." The next moment he and his men were blown to
pieces. Disciplined valour gained the day (9th June), and John and his
crusaders retired to Vinegar Hill. His colleague, Father Michael Murphy,
who had claimed to be able to catch Protestant bullets, was killed by a
cannon-shot; and this may have decided the rebels to retreat.
the masses of pikemen moved against the loyalists at New Ross, an
important position on the River Barrow. Parish by parish, the priests at their
head, they marched, some 30,000 strong. At dawn of 5th June, when near
the town, they knelt during the celebration of Mass. Then they goaded on
herds of cattle to serve as an irresistible vanguard, and rushed at the old
walls. General Johnstone and the 1,400 defenders were at first overborne
and had to retreat over the bridge; but the plundering habits of the victors
were their ruin. The soldiery re-formed, regained their cannon, and planting
them skilfully, dealt such havoc among the disorderly mass, that finally it
surged out into the plain.[500] After their defeat the rebels deposed Harvey, a
Protestant, from his nominal command.
This success of the loyalists saved Waterford and Kilkenny from anything
more than local riots; and Moore, moving up from Fermoy and Clonmel,
soon threatened the rebel county from the west. The beaten peasants glutted
their revenge on Protestant prisoners near New Ross; and a general
massacre of prisoners at Wexford was averted only by the rapid advance of
Moore. Meanwhile, Father John, moving into County Wicklow with a force
some 30,000 strong, sought to break down the defence at Arklow. But that
important post on the River Avoca was stoutly held by General Needham
with some 1,500 men, mostly militia and yeomen. There, too, the priests led
on the peasants with a zeal that scorned death. One of the peasant leaders
rushed up to a gun, thrust his cap into it, and shouted, "Come along, boys;
her mouth is stopped." The next moment he and his men were blown to
pieces. Disciplined valour gained the day (9th June), and John and his
crusaders retired to Vinegar Hill. His colleague, Father Michael Murphy,
who had claimed to be able to catch Protestant bullets, was killed by a
cannon-shot; and this may have decided the rebels to retreat.
Page 386
The British Guards had now arrived, to the inexpressible relief of Camden
and his advisers. Beset by reports of a general rising in Ulster and by the
furious protests of loyalists against the inaction of Pitt, the Lord Lieutenant
had held on his way, acting with energy but curbing the policy of
vengeance, so that, as he informed Pitt, he was now the most unpopular
man in Ireland. Nevertheless, before he left her shores, he had the
satisfaction to see his measures crowned with success. The converging
moves of Lake, Needham, Dundas, and Johnstone upon Vinegar Hill
cooped up the rebels on that height; and on 21st June the royal troops
stormed the slopes with little loss. The dupes of Father John no longer
believed in his miraculous powers. The survivors broke away southwards,
but then doubled back into the mountains of Wicklow. The war now became
a hunt, varied by savage reprisals. Father John was hanged on 26th June. By
his barbarities he had ended the dream of United Ireland. Few of the
malcontents of Antrim and Down obeyed the call to arms of the United
Irishmen early in June; and the risings in those counties soon flickered out.
Religious bigotry enabled Dublin Castle once more to triumph.
Pitt was vehemently blamed by Irish loyalists for his apathy at the crisis.
The accusation, quite natural among men whose families were in hourly
danger, was unjust. As we have seen, even before the arrival of Camden's
request, he took steps to send off 5,000 men. As the Duke of York and
Dundas cut down that number to 3,000, and endeavoured to prevent any
more being sent, they were responsible for the despatch of an inadequate
force. If the French detachments intended for Ireland had arrived early in
June, they must have carried all before them. But it was not until 22nd
August that General Humbert, with 1,100 men, landed at Killala. Even so
his little force was believed to be the vanguard of a large army, a fact which
explains the revival of rebellion at the end of the summer.
and his advisers. Beset by reports of a general rising in Ulster and by the
furious protests of loyalists against the inaction of Pitt, the Lord Lieutenant
had held on his way, acting with energy but curbing the policy of
vengeance, so that, as he informed Pitt, he was now the most unpopular
man in Ireland. Nevertheless, before he left her shores, he had the
satisfaction to see his measures crowned with success. The converging
moves of Lake, Needham, Dundas, and Johnstone upon Vinegar Hill
cooped up the rebels on that height; and on 21st June the royal troops
stormed the slopes with little loss. The dupes of Father John no longer
believed in his miraculous powers. The survivors broke away southwards,
but then doubled back into the mountains of Wicklow. The war now became
a hunt, varied by savage reprisals. Father John was hanged on 26th June. By
his barbarities he had ended the dream of United Ireland. Few of the
malcontents of Antrim and Down obeyed the call to arms of the United
Irishmen early in June; and the risings in those counties soon flickered out.
Religious bigotry enabled Dublin Castle once more to triumph.
Pitt was vehemently blamed by Irish loyalists for his apathy at the crisis.
The accusation, quite natural among men whose families were in hourly
danger, was unjust. As we have seen, even before the arrival of Camden's
request, he took steps to send off 5,000 men. As the Duke of York and
Dundas cut down that number to 3,000, and endeavoured to prevent any
more being sent, they were responsible for the despatch of an inadequate
force. If the French detachments intended for Ireland had arrived early in
June, they must have carried all before them. But it was not until 22nd
August that General Humbert, with 1,100 men, landed at Killala. Even so
his little force was believed to be the vanguard of a large army, a fact which
explains the revival of rebellion at the end of the summer.
Page 387
Not until 1st September did Pitt hear this alarming news. At once he
ordered all possible reinforcements to proceed to Ireland. There was need of
them. The Irish militiamen under Lake and Hutchinson who opposed the
French at Castlebar rushed away in wild panic from one-fourth of their
numbers (27th August). Such were "the Castlebar Races." Probably the
Irishmen were disaffected; for many of them joined the enemy. Cornwallis
proceeded to the front, and with 11,000 men made head against the rebels
and the French. The latter were now but 800 strong, and after a most
creditable stand finally surrendered with the honours of war (8th
September). Cornwallis issued a tactful bulletin,[501] commending his
troops for their meritorious exertions and trusting to their honour not to
commit acts of cruelty against their deluded fellow subjects. In point of fact
11,000 men with difficulty brought 800 to surrender and then gave
themselves up to retaliation on the rebels. Fortunately the French Directory
sent only small parties of raiders. A month later, Wolfe Tone, with a
squadron, appeared off Lough Swilly; but the French ships being
overpowered by Sir John Warren, Tone was captured, taken to Dublin, and
cut his throat in order to escape the ignominy of a public hanging. Another
small French squadron entered Killala Bay late in October, but had to make
for the open. Thus flickered out a flame which threatened to shrivel up
British rule in Ireland.
What causes contributed to this result? Certainly not the activity and
resourcefulness of Pitt and his colleagues; for their conduct at the crisis was
weak and tardy. The Duke of York and Dundas must primarily be blamed
for the despatch of inadequate reinforcements; but Pitt ought to have
overruled their decision. Perhaps the Cabinet believed England to be the
objective of Bonaparte and the fleet at Brest; but, thanks to the rapid growth
of the Volunteer Movement, England was well prepared to meet an invading
force and to quell the efforts of the malcontent Societies. In Ireland the
outlook was far more gloomy. After the resignation of Abercromby,
ordered all possible reinforcements to proceed to Ireland. There was need of
them. The Irish militiamen under Lake and Hutchinson who opposed the
French at Castlebar rushed away in wild panic from one-fourth of their
numbers (27th August). Such were "the Castlebar Races." Probably the
Irishmen were disaffected; for many of them joined the enemy. Cornwallis
proceeded to the front, and with 11,000 men made head against the rebels
and the French. The latter were now but 800 strong, and after a most
creditable stand finally surrendered with the honours of war (8th
September). Cornwallis issued a tactful bulletin,[501] commending his
troops for their meritorious exertions and trusting to their honour not to
commit acts of cruelty against their deluded fellow subjects. In point of fact
11,000 men with difficulty brought 800 to surrender and then gave
themselves up to retaliation on the rebels. Fortunately the French Directory
sent only small parties of raiders. A month later, Wolfe Tone, with a
squadron, appeared off Lough Swilly; but the French ships being
overpowered by Sir John Warren, Tone was captured, taken to Dublin, and
cut his throat in order to escape the ignominy of a public hanging. Another
small French squadron entered Killala Bay late in October, but had to make
for the open. Thus flickered out a flame which threatened to shrivel up
British rule in Ireland.
What causes contributed to this result? Certainly not the activity and
resourcefulness of Pitt and his colleagues; for their conduct at the crisis was
weak and tardy. The Duke of York and Dundas must primarily be blamed
for the despatch of inadequate reinforcements; but Pitt ought to have
overruled their decision. Perhaps the Cabinet believed England to be the
objective of Bonaparte and the fleet at Brest; but, thanks to the rapid growth
of the Volunteer Movement, England was well prepared to meet an invading
force and to quell the efforts of the malcontent Societies. In Ireland the
outlook was far more gloomy. After the resignation of Abercromby,
Page 388
Camden and the officials of Dublin Castle were in a state of panic. Pitt did
well finally to send over Cornwallis; but that step came too late to influence
the struggle in Leinster. In truth the saving facts of the situation were the
treachery of informers at Dublin and the diversion of the efforts of
Bonaparte towards the East. The former event enabled Camden to crush the
rising in Dublin; the latter left thousands of brave Irishmen a prey to the
false hopes which the French leaders had designedly fostered, Barras
having led Wolfe Tone to believe that France would fight on for the
freedom of Ireland. The influence of Bonaparte told more and more against
an expedition to her shores; but the Irish patriots were left in the dark, for
their rising would serve to distract the energies of England, while Bonaparte
won glory in the East. To save appearances, the French Government sent
three small expeditions in August to October; but they merely prolonged the
agony of a dying cause, and led that deeply wronged people to ask what
might not have happened if the promises showered on Wolfe Tone had been
made good.
It is recorded of William of Orange, shortly before his intended landing in
England, that, on hearing of the march of Louis XIV's formidable army into
the Palatinate, he serenely smiled at his rival's miscalculation. Louis sated
his troops with plunder and lost a crown for James II. Similarly we may
imagine the mental exultation of Pitt on hearing that Bonaparte had gone
the way of Alexander the Great and Mark Antony. Camden and he knew
full well that Ireland was the danger spot of the British Empire, and that the
half of the Toulon force could overthrow the Protestant ascendancy. Some
sense of the magnitude of the blunder haunted Napoleon at St. Helena; for
he confessed to Las Casas: "If, instead of the expedition to Egypt, I had
undertaken that against Ireland, what could England have done now?" In a
career, illumined by flashes of genius, but wrecked by strange errors, the
miscalculation of the spring of 1798 was not the least fatal. For of all parts
well finally to send over Cornwallis; but that step came too late to influence
the struggle in Leinster. In truth the saving facts of the situation were the
treachery of informers at Dublin and the diversion of the efforts of
Bonaparte towards the East. The former event enabled Camden to crush the
rising in Dublin; the latter left thousands of brave Irishmen a prey to the
false hopes which the French leaders had designedly fostered, Barras
having led Wolfe Tone to believe that France would fight on for the
freedom of Ireland. The influence of Bonaparte told more and more against
an expedition to her shores; but the Irish patriots were left in the dark, for
their rising would serve to distract the energies of England, while Bonaparte
won glory in the East. To save appearances, the French Government sent
three small expeditions in August to October; but they merely prolonged the
agony of a dying cause, and led that deeply wronged people to ask what
might not have happened if the promises showered on Wolfe Tone had been
made good.
It is recorded of William of Orange, shortly before his intended landing in
England, that, on hearing of the march of Louis XIV's formidable army into
the Palatinate, he serenely smiled at his rival's miscalculation. Louis sated
his troops with plunder and lost a crown for James II. Similarly we may
imagine the mental exultation of Pitt on hearing that Bonaparte had gone
the way of Alexander the Great and Mark Antony. Camden and he knew
full well that Ireland was the danger spot of the British Empire, and that the
half of the Toulon force could overthrow the Protestant ascendancy. Some
sense of the magnitude of the blunder haunted Napoleon at St. Helena; for
he confessed to Las Casas: "If, instead of the expedition to Egypt, I had
undertaken that against Ireland, what could England have done now?" In a
career, illumined by flashes of genius, but wrecked by strange errors, the
miscalculation of the spring of 1798 was not the least fatal. For of all parts
Page 389
of the British Empire Ireland was that in which the Sea Power was most
helpless when once a French corps d'armée had landed.
helpless when once a French corps d'armée had landed.
Page 390
CHAPTER XVII
THE SECOND COALITION
To reduce France within her ancient limits is
an object of evident and pressing interest to
the future tranquillity and independence of
Europe.—Foreign Office Despatch of 16th
November 1798.
It is difficult to realize that the independence of Europe was endangered by
the French Republic. We associate the ascendancy of France in Spain, Italy,
Germany, Switzerland, and Holland with the personality of Napoleon; and
by contrasting him with the pygmies who strutted on the stage after the
death of Pitt we find the collapse of Europe intelligible. But a backward
glance of one decade more shows France dominating the Continent. True, it
was Bonaparte's genius which brought Austria to the humiliating Peace of
Campo Formio (October 1797); but his triumphs in Italy merely crowned
the efforts of France in 1793–5. After the close of his Italian campaigns a
touch of her little finger unseated the Pope. At the Congress of Rastatt her
envoys disposed of German duchies and bishoprics in the lordliest way.
Switzerland she overran, plundered, and unified. Ferdinand IV of Naples
and his consort, Maria Carolina, quaked and fumed at her threats. Prussia
was her henchman. And in the first months of his reign Paul I of Russia
courted her favour. French policy controlled Europe from the Niemen to the
Tagus, from the Zuyder Zee to the Campagna.
THE SECOND COALITION
To reduce France within her ancient limits is
an object of evident and pressing interest to
the future tranquillity and independence of
Europe.—Foreign Office Despatch of 16th
November 1798.
It is difficult to realize that the independence of Europe was endangered by
the French Republic. We associate the ascendancy of France in Spain, Italy,
Germany, Switzerland, and Holland with the personality of Napoleon; and
by contrasting him with the pygmies who strutted on the stage after the
death of Pitt we find the collapse of Europe intelligible. But a backward
glance of one decade more shows France dominating the Continent. True, it
was Bonaparte's genius which brought Austria to the humiliating Peace of
Campo Formio (October 1797); but his triumphs in Italy merely crowned
the efforts of France in 1793–5. After the close of his Italian campaigns a
touch of her little finger unseated the Pope. At the Congress of Rastatt her
envoys disposed of German duchies and bishoprics in the lordliest way.
Switzerland she overran, plundered, and unified. Ferdinand IV of Naples
and his consort, Maria Carolina, quaked and fumed at her threats. Prussia
was her henchman. And in the first months of his reign Paul I of Russia
courted her favour. French policy controlled Europe from the Niemen to the
Tagus, from the Zuyder Zee to the Campagna.
Page 391
Yet this supremacy was in reality unsound. So fitful a ruler as the Czar Paul
was certain to weary of his peaceful mood. He had good ground for
intervention. By the Treaty of Teschen (1779) Russia became one of the
guarantors of the Germanic System which the French now set at naught.
Moreover his chivalrous instincts, inherited from his mother, Catharine,
were chafed by the news of French depredations in Rome and Switzerland.
The growth of indignation at St. Petersburg begot new hopes at Vienna. In
truth Francis II, despite his timidity, could not acquiesce in French
ascendancy. How could his motley States cohere, if from Swabia,
Switzerland, and Italy there dropped on them the corrosive acid of
democracy? The appeals from his father-in-law, Ferdinand of Naples, also
had some weight. In fine the Court of Vienna decided to make overtures to
London. On 17th March 1798 the Chancellor, Thugut, urged his
ambassador, Stahremberg, to find out whether England would help Austria
against "a fierce nation irrevocably determined on the total subversion of
Europe, and rapidly marching to that end"; also whether Pitt would send a
fleet to the Mediterranean, and, if necessary, prolong the struggle into the
year 1799.[502] The entreaties from Naples were still more urgent.
Pitt resolved to stretch out a helping hand. Early in April he sought to
induce Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, to send to that sea a strong
squadron detached from Earl St. Vincent's force blockading Cadiz. His
letter asking for information on several topics is missing; but Spencer's
letter to Grenville throws so much light on the situation that I quote parts of
it, summarizing the remainder:[503]
Admiralty, April 6, 1798.
"I send you by Mr. Pitt's desire a sketch I have made out of answers
to the queries he put down upon paper yesterday in Downing Street.
The result is to my mind a decision which I fear will not tally very
was certain to weary of his peaceful mood. He had good ground for
intervention. By the Treaty of Teschen (1779) Russia became one of the
guarantors of the Germanic System which the French now set at naught.
Moreover his chivalrous instincts, inherited from his mother, Catharine,
were chafed by the news of French depredations in Rome and Switzerland.
The growth of indignation at St. Petersburg begot new hopes at Vienna. In
truth Francis II, despite his timidity, could not acquiesce in French
ascendancy. How could his motley States cohere, if from Swabia,
Switzerland, and Italy there dropped on them the corrosive acid of
democracy? The appeals from his father-in-law, Ferdinand of Naples, also
had some weight. In fine the Court of Vienna decided to make overtures to
London. On 17th March 1798 the Chancellor, Thugut, urged his
ambassador, Stahremberg, to find out whether England would help Austria
against "a fierce nation irrevocably determined on the total subversion of
Europe, and rapidly marching to that end"; also whether Pitt would send a
fleet to the Mediterranean, and, if necessary, prolong the struggle into the
year 1799.[502] The entreaties from Naples were still more urgent.
Pitt resolved to stretch out a helping hand. Early in April he sought to
induce Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, to send to that sea a strong
squadron detached from Earl St. Vincent's force blockading Cadiz. His
letter asking for information on several topics is missing; but Spencer's
letter to Grenville throws so much light on the situation that I quote parts of
it, summarizing the remainder:[503]
Admiralty, April 6, 1798.
"I send you by Mr. Pitt's desire a sketch I have made out of answers
to the queries he put down upon paper yesterday in Downing Street.
The result is to my mind a decision which I fear will not tally very
Page 392
well with our wishes and the views you have formed as the
groundwork of the communication at present proposed with
Vienna." He then states that, even if a Russian squadron appears in
the North Sea, yet we cannot keep a permanent squadron in the
Mediterranean. "For that purpose we should at least have 70 sail, as
the Channel cannot be trusted with safety with less than 35,
including the coast of Ireland, and the remaining 35 would be but
barely enough to watch Cadiz and command the Mediterranean. Our
best plan appears to me to be to maintain as long as we can a
position between Lisbon and Cadiz, and when we are excluded
(which I conclude we soon shall be) from the Tagus, to send Lord
St. Vincent with the fleet he now has to take a sweep round the
Mediterranean and do all the mischief he can to the French navy."
If, he adds, the Spaniards come northward, our home fleet can deal
with them: if they go to the Mediterranean and join the French there
will not be much danger from so ill-combined a force when opposed
to St. Vincent's fleet, "which I consider as being the best formed to
act together that perhaps ever existed." If Austria would be satisfied
with our sweeping round the Mediterranean, Spencer advocates that
plan, but not that of keeping a fleet there, "because, exclusive of the
great expense, it would leave the Spaniards too much at liberty."
In answer to Pitt's questions Spencer states the force disposable for
the Channel and the coast of Ireland as 34, for the Mediterranean
24; 3 more were fitting for sea, and 8 others were nearing
completion; but the chief deficiency was in men, 8,000 more being
needed. He adds that the Neapolitans have 4 sail-of-the-line and 7
frigates: the French have 6 sail at Corfu; but he thinks not more than
10 sail can be equipped at Toulon. He regards the Venetian fleet as
valueless.
Clearly Spencer underrated the force at Toulon and in the ports of North
Italy. But, even so, the position was critical. To send an undermanned fleet
into the Mediterranean, while France was preparing a blow at Ireland,
groundwork of the communication at present proposed with
Vienna." He then states that, even if a Russian squadron appears in
the North Sea, yet we cannot keep a permanent squadron in the
Mediterranean. "For that purpose we should at least have 70 sail, as
the Channel cannot be trusted with safety with less than 35,
including the coast of Ireland, and the remaining 35 would be but
barely enough to watch Cadiz and command the Mediterranean. Our
best plan appears to me to be to maintain as long as we can a
position between Lisbon and Cadiz, and when we are excluded
(which I conclude we soon shall be) from the Tagus, to send Lord
St. Vincent with the fleet he now has to take a sweep round the
Mediterranean and do all the mischief he can to the French navy."
If, he adds, the Spaniards come northward, our home fleet can deal
with them: if they go to the Mediterranean and join the French there
will not be much danger from so ill-combined a force when opposed
to St. Vincent's fleet, "which I consider as being the best formed to
act together that perhaps ever existed." If Austria would be satisfied
with our sweeping round the Mediterranean, Spencer advocates that
plan, but not that of keeping a fleet there, "because, exclusive of the
great expense, it would leave the Spaniards too much at liberty."
In answer to Pitt's questions Spencer states the force disposable for
the Channel and the coast of Ireland as 34, for the Mediterranean
24; 3 more were fitting for sea, and 8 others were nearing
completion; but the chief deficiency was in men, 8,000 more being
needed. He adds that the Neapolitans have 4 sail-of-the-line and 7
frigates: the French have 6 sail at Corfu; but he thinks not more than
10 sail can be equipped at Toulon. He regards the Venetian fleet as
valueless.
Clearly Spencer underrated the force at Toulon and in the ports of North
Italy. But, even so, the position was critical. To send an undermanned fleet
into the Mediterranean, while France was preparing a blow at Ireland,
Page 393
seemed almost foolhardy. Nevertheless, Pitt resolved to do so. For, as he
stated to Grenville on 7th April, they must encourage Austria to play a
decisive part in resisting French aggression; and, in view of the revival of
the old English spirit, he was prepared to brave the risks of invasion,
deeming even that event preferable to a lingering and indecisive war. As
usual, Pitt's view prevailed; and a few days later orders went forth to St.
Vincent to despatch a squadron under Nelson to the Mediterranean, Austria
being also apprised of this decision, in terms which implied the formation
of a league against France. While Russia and, if possible, Prussia defended
Germany, Austria was to expel the French from Italy.[504] Here again Pitt's
hopeful nature led him to antedate the course of events. The new Coalition
came about very slowly. England and Austria were held apart by disputes
respecting the repayment of the last loan, on which Pitt and Grenville
insisted, perhaps with undue rigour. Distrust of Prussia paralysed the Court
of Vienna, and some time elapsed before it came to terms with Russia. But
in the midst of the haggling came news which brought new vigour to the
old monarchies.
On 1st August 1798 Nelson destroyed the French fleet in Aboukir Bay; and
thus, at one blow, naval supremacy in the Mediterranean passed from the
tricolour to the Union Jack. This momentous change resulted primarily
from the bold resolve of Pitt to encounter even a French descent on our
coasts, provided that he could strike at France in the Mediterranean. Thus
he exchanged the defensive for the offensive in a way no less bewildering
to the French than reassuring to friendly Powers; and it is noteworthy that
he adopted the same course in 1805, in sending Craig's expedition into that
sea, thereby replacing Addington's tame acceptance of events by a vigorous
policy which heartened Austria and Naples for the struggle against
Napoleon. On both occasions he ran great risks, but his audacity proved to
be the highest prudence. The results of the Battle of the Nile were
immeasurably great. Bonaparte and his 30,000 veterans were cooped up in
stated to Grenville on 7th April, they must encourage Austria to play a
decisive part in resisting French aggression; and, in view of the revival of
the old English spirit, he was prepared to brave the risks of invasion,
deeming even that event preferable to a lingering and indecisive war. As
usual, Pitt's view prevailed; and a few days later orders went forth to St.
Vincent to despatch a squadron under Nelson to the Mediterranean, Austria
being also apprised of this decision, in terms which implied the formation
of a league against France. While Russia and, if possible, Prussia defended
Germany, Austria was to expel the French from Italy.[504] Here again Pitt's
hopeful nature led him to antedate the course of events. The new Coalition
came about very slowly. England and Austria were held apart by disputes
respecting the repayment of the last loan, on which Pitt and Grenville
insisted, perhaps with undue rigour. Distrust of Prussia paralysed the Court
of Vienna, and some time elapsed before it came to terms with Russia. But
in the midst of the haggling came news which brought new vigour to the
old monarchies.
On 1st August 1798 Nelson destroyed the French fleet in Aboukir Bay; and
thus, at one blow, naval supremacy in the Mediterranean passed from the
tricolour to the Union Jack. This momentous change resulted primarily
from the bold resolve of Pitt to encounter even a French descent on our
coasts, provided that he could strike at France in the Mediterranean. Thus
he exchanged the defensive for the offensive in a way no less bewildering
to the French than reassuring to friendly Powers; and it is noteworthy that
he adopted the same course in 1805, in sending Craig's expedition into that
sea, thereby replacing Addington's tame acceptance of events by a vigorous
policy which heartened Austria and Naples for the struggle against
Napoleon. On both occasions he ran great risks, but his audacity proved to
be the highest prudence. The results of the Battle of the Nile were
immeasurably great. Bonaparte and his 30,000 veterans were cooped up in
Page 394
Egypt. The Maltese rose against the French garrison of Valetta two days
after the arrival of the glad tidings from the Nile. At Naples the news
aroused a delirium of joy, and filled Queen Maria Carolina with a resolve to
drive the French force from the Roman States.
To Pitt also the news of Nelson's triumph brought intense relief. The
disappearance of Bonaparte's armada after the capture of Malta had caused
much concern. True, Naples, which was thought to be his objective, was
safe; but Ireland and Portugal were deemed in jeopardy. No one at
Whitehall anticipated the seizure of Malta and Egypt, still less the
emergence of plans for a French conquest of India. A tone of anxiety
pervades Pitt's letter of 22nd August to his mother: "The account of
Bonaparte's arrival at Alexandria is, I am afraid, true; but it gives us no
particulars, and leaves us in entire suspense as to Nelson."[505] All the
greater, then, was the relief on 2nd October, when tidings of Aboukir at last
arrived.
Further, there were signs of a Russo-French war. The romantic nature of the
Czar was fired by the hope of acquiring Malta. At Ancona, early in 1797,
Bonaparte had intercepted a Russian envoy bearing offers of alliance to the
Knights of the Order of St. John; and their expulsion by the French at
Midsummer 1798 seemed to Paul a personal affront. Some of the Knights
proceeded to St. Petersburg and claimed his protection. The affairs of the
Order became his most cherished concern; and on 24th July Sir Charles
Whitworth, British ambassador at that Court, reported that Russia would
now become a principal in the war against France, her aim being the re-
establishment of peace on safe and honourable terms, but not the restoration
of the French monarchy, on which Catharine had insisted. With this
declaration the British and Austrian Cabinets were in full accord; and thus
at last there was a hope of framing a compact Coalition. Fortunate was it
that Bonaparte's seizure of Malta incensed Paul against France; for, early in
after the arrival of the glad tidings from the Nile. At Naples the news
aroused a delirium of joy, and filled Queen Maria Carolina with a resolve to
drive the French force from the Roman States.
To Pitt also the news of Nelson's triumph brought intense relief. The
disappearance of Bonaparte's armada after the capture of Malta had caused
much concern. True, Naples, which was thought to be his objective, was
safe; but Ireland and Portugal were deemed in jeopardy. No one at
Whitehall anticipated the seizure of Malta and Egypt, still less the
emergence of plans for a French conquest of India. A tone of anxiety
pervades Pitt's letter of 22nd August to his mother: "The account of
Bonaparte's arrival at Alexandria is, I am afraid, true; but it gives us no
particulars, and leaves us in entire suspense as to Nelson."[505] All the
greater, then, was the relief on 2nd October, when tidings of Aboukir at last
arrived.
Further, there were signs of a Russo-French war. The romantic nature of the
Czar was fired by the hope of acquiring Malta. At Ancona, early in 1797,
Bonaparte had intercepted a Russian envoy bearing offers of alliance to the
Knights of the Order of St. John; and their expulsion by the French at
Midsummer 1798 seemed to Paul a personal affront. Some of the Knights
proceeded to St. Petersburg and claimed his protection. The affairs of the
Order became his most cherished concern; and on 24th July Sir Charles
Whitworth, British ambassador at that Court, reported that Russia would
now become a principal in the war against France, her aim being the re-
establishment of peace on safe and honourable terms, but not the restoration
of the French monarchy, on which Catharine had insisted. With this
declaration the British and Austrian Cabinets were in full accord; and thus
at last there was a hope of framing a compact Coalition. Fortunate was it
that Bonaparte's seizure of Malta incensed Paul against France; for, early in
Page 395
August, the Swiss thinker, Laharpe, tutor of the future Czar Alexander I,
brought tempting offers from Paris, with a view to the partition of the
Turkish Empire.[506] That glittering prize was finally to captivate the fancy
of Paul; but for the present he spurned the offer as degrading.
Nevertheless, the news of Aboukir did not wholly please him. For, while
rejoicing at the discomfiture of the French atheists, he saw in Nelson's
victory a sign of England's appropriation of Malta. In truth, that island now
became the central knot of far-reaching complications. Formerly the
bulwark of Christendom against the infidels, it now sundered European
States.[507] So doubtful was the attitude of Paul and Francis that Pitt, in
October 1798, twice wrote despondingly as to any definite decision on their
part. All that was clear was their inordinate appetite for subsidies. These he
of course withheld, knowing full well that neither would Paul tolerate for
long the presence of the French at Malta, nor Francis their occupation of
Switzerland. In any case he resolved not to give more than £2,000,000 to
the two Empires for the year 1799.[508] For the time his hope lay only in the
exertions of England, Europe being meantime "left to its fate." In order to
humour the Czar, who was about to become Grand Master of the Knights of
St. John, Grenville, on 23rd November, wrote to assure his Government that
England renounced all aims of conquest in the Adriatic, or of the possession
of Malta.
At the close of the year Pitt proudly displayed the inexhaustible resources
of Great Britain. His Budget speech of 3rd December 1798 marks an epoch
in economic history, alike for the boldness of the underlying conception and
the statesmanlike assessment of the national resources. Well might Mallet
du Pan declare that the speech surpassed all previous efforts in its
illuminating exposition of a nation's finance. As appeared in our survey of
the Budget of 1797, Pitt then sought to meet the year's expenses within the
year. To a generation accustomed to shift present burdens on to its
brought tempting offers from Paris, with a view to the partition of the
Turkish Empire.[506] That glittering prize was finally to captivate the fancy
of Paul; but for the present he spurned the offer as degrading.
Nevertheless, the news of Aboukir did not wholly please him. For, while
rejoicing at the discomfiture of the French atheists, he saw in Nelson's
victory a sign of England's appropriation of Malta. In truth, that island now
became the central knot of far-reaching complications. Formerly the
bulwark of Christendom against the infidels, it now sundered European
States.[507] So doubtful was the attitude of Paul and Francis that Pitt, in
October 1798, twice wrote despondingly as to any definite decision on their
part. All that was clear was their inordinate appetite for subsidies. These he
of course withheld, knowing full well that neither would Paul tolerate for
long the presence of the French at Malta, nor Francis their occupation of
Switzerland. In any case he resolved not to give more than £2,000,000 to
the two Empires for the year 1799.[508] For the time his hope lay only in the
exertions of England, Europe being meantime "left to its fate." In order to
humour the Czar, who was about to become Grand Master of the Knights of
St. John, Grenville, on 23rd November, wrote to assure his Government that
England renounced all aims of conquest in the Adriatic, or of the possession
of Malta.
At the close of the year Pitt proudly displayed the inexhaustible resources
of Great Britain. His Budget speech of 3rd December 1798 marks an epoch
in economic history, alike for the boldness of the underlying conception and
the statesmanlike assessment of the national resources. Well might Mallet
du Pan declare that the speech surpassed all previous efforts in its
illuminating exposition of a nation's finance. As appeared in our survey of
the Budget of 1797, Pitt then sought to meet the year's expenses within the
year. To a generation accustomed to shift present burdens on to its
Page 396
successors the proposal seemed Quixotic; and Fox blamed him for not
adopting this device. Pitt held to his plan, and outlined a ten per cent. tax
upon income. Having failed to gain the requisite tenth by means of the
Assessed Taxes, he proposed to raise it by methods which even the shirkers
could with difficulty circumvent.
In order to lay a first rough actuarial basis for his Income Tax, he made a
careful study of the nation's resources in the autumn of 1798. The results he
summarized in an interesting statement. There were available at that time
only rough estimates, even as to the area of cultivated land and its average
rental. Relying upon Davenant, King, Adam Smith, Arthur Young, and
Middleton, he estimated the area at 40,000,000 acres, and the average rental
at 15s. an acre. He prudently fixed the taxable value at 12s. 6d. an acre. The
yearly produce of mines, timber, and canal shares he assessed at
£3,000,000. He reckoned house rent at double that sum, and the earnings of
the legal profession at one half of it. Half a million he deemed well within
the total of doctors' fees. He assessed the incomes derived from the British
West Indies at £4,000,000, and those from the rest of the world at
£1,000,000, a highly suggestive estimate. Tithes were reckoned at
£4,000,000; annuities from the public funds at £12,000,000; the same sum
for profits derived from foreign commerce; and £28,000,000 for the profits
of internal trade, whether wholesale or retail. Fixing the rental of land at
£6,000,000, he computed the total national income as £102,000,000, which
should therefore yield not less than £10,000,000 a year. He proposed to
safeguard the collection by imposing an oath at the declaration of income,
and enjoining absolute secrecy on the Crown commissioners. The new tax,
beginning from April 1799, would take the place of the Assessed Taxes. As
will appear in a later chapter, the new impost did not yield the amount
which Pitt expected; but the failure was probably due to defects in the
methods of collection. Pitt further proposed to set aside £1,200,000 for the
Sinking Fund.
adopting this device. Pitt held to his plan, and outlined a ten per cent. tax
upon income. Having failed to gain the requisite tenth by means of the
Assessed Taxes, he proposed to raise it by methods which even the shirkers
could with difficulty circumvent.
In order to lay a first rough actuarial basis for his Income Tax, he made a
careful study of the nation's resources in the autumn of 1798. The results he
summarized in an interesting statement. There were available at that time
only rough estimates, even as to the area of cultivated land and its average
rental. Relying upon Davenant, King, Adam Smith, Arthur Young, and
Middleton, he estimated the area at 40,000,000 acres, and the average rental
at 15s. an acre. He prudently fixed the taxable value at 12s. 6d. an acre. The
yearly produce of mines, timber, and canal shares he assessed at
£3,000,000. He reckoned house rent at double that sum, and the earnings of
the legal profession at one half of it. Half a million he deemed well within
the total of doctors' fees. He assessed the incomes derived from the British
West Indies at £4,000,000, and those from the rest of the world at
£1,000,000, a highly suggestive estimate. Tithes were reckoned at
£4,000,000; annuities from the public funds at £12,000,000; the same sum
for profits derived from foreign commerce; and £28,000,000 for the profits
of internal trade, whether wholesale or retail. Fixing the rental of land at
£6,000,000, he computed the total national income as £102,000,000, which
should therefore yield not less than £10,000,000 a year. He proposed to
safeguard the collection by imposing an oath at the declaration of income,
and enjoining absolute secrecy on the Crown commissioners. The new tax,
beginning from April 1799, would take the place of the Assessed Taxes. As
will appear in a later chapter, the new impost did not yield the amount
which Pitt expected; but the failure was probably due to defects in the
methods of collection. Pitt further proposed to set aside £1,200,000 for the
Sinking Fund.
Page 397
His purpose in making this prodigious effort was to inspirit other nations to
similar patriotic exertions. He pointed out with pride that after nearly six
years of war British exports and imports exceeded those of any year of
peace. Thus, far from declining in strength and prowess, as croakers
averred, England had never shone so transcendently in the arts of peace and
the exploits of war, a prodigality of power which presaged the vindication
of her own rights and of the liberties of Europe.
What was the new Europe which Pitt sought to call to being? The question
is of deep interest, not only as a psychological study, but as revealing
glimpses of British policy in the years 1814–15. The old order having been
rudely shaken in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy, Pitt
sought to effect a compromise between the claims of tradition and those of
expediency. It being of paramount importance to safeguard Europe against
France, Pitt and Grenville insisted on the limitation of that Power within its
old boundaries, and the complete independence of Switzerland and Holland.
That of the Kingdom of Sardinia afterwards figured in their stipulations.
But one significant change now appears. The restoration of Austrian rule at
Brussels being impracticable, it was suggested that the Belgic Provinces
should go to the Prince of Orange when restored to his rights at The Hague.
In the desperate crisis of 1805, as we shall see, Pitt sought to allure Prussia
by offering Belgium to her; but that was a passing thought soon given up.
The other solution of the Netherlands Question finally prevailed, thanks to
the efforts of Pitt's pupil, Castlereagh, in 1814. The Foreign Office did not
as yet aim at the retention of the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon as a set off
to British efforts for the Dutch and their acquisition of Belgium; but this
thought was already taking shape. The barrier against French aggressions in
the south-east was to be found in the reconstituted Kingdom of Sardinia, the
House of Savoy rendering in that quarter services similar to the House of
Orange in Flanders and Brabant. In other respects the British Cabinet
favoured Austria's plans of aggrandisement in Italy as enhancing her power
similar patriotic exertions. He pointed out with pride that after nearly six
years of war British exports and imports exceeded those of any year of
peace. Thus, far from declining in strength and prowess, as croakers
averred, England had never shone so transcendently in the arts of peace and
the exploits of war, a prodigality of power which presaged the vindication
of her own rights and of the liberties of Europe.
What was the new Europe which Pitt sought to call to being? The question
is of deep interest, not only as a psychological study, but as revealing
glimpses of British policy in the years 1814–15. The old order having been
rudely shaken in Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy, Pitt
sought to effect a compromise between the claims of tradition and those of
expediency. It being of paramount importance to safeguard Europe against
France, Pitt and Grenville insisted on the limitation of that Power within its
old boundaries, and the complete independence of Switzerland and Holland.
That of the Kingdom of Sardinia afterwards figured in their stipulations.
But one significant change now appears. The restoration of Austrian rule at
Brussels being impracticable, it was suggested that the Belgic Provinces
should go to the Prince of Orange when restored to his rights at The Hague.
In the desperate crisis of 1805, as we shall see, Pitt sought to allure Prussia
by offering Belgium to her; but that was a passing thought soon given up.
The other solution of the Netherlands Question finally prevailed, thanks to
the efforts of Pitt's pupil, Castlereagh, in 1814. The Foreign Office did not
as yet aim at the retention of the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon as a set off
to British efforts for the Dutch and their acquisition of Belgium; but this
thought was already taking shape. The barrier against French aggressions in
the south-east was to be found in the reconstituted Kingdom of Sardinia, the
House of Savoy rendering in that quarter services similar to the House of
Orange in Flanders and Brabant. In other respects the British Cabinet
favoured Austria's plans of aggrandisement in Italy as enhancing her power
Page 398
in a sphere which could not arouse the jealousy of Prussia. The aims of
Berlin not being known, except that the restoration of the House of Orange
was desired, Pitt and Grenville remained silent on that topic.[509]
The question whether the peoples concerned would submit to this under-
girding of the European fabric did not trouble them. They saw only the
statics of territories; they had no conception of the dynamics of nations. A
future in which Nationality, triumphant in Italy and Germany, would bring
about a Balance of Power far more solid than any which their flying
buttresses could assure, was of course entirely hidden from them. But they
failed to read the signs of the times. The last despairing efforts of the Poles,
and the levée en masse of the French people, now systematized in the
Conscription Law of 5th September 1798, did not open their eyes to the
future. For they were essentially men of the Eighteenth Century; and herein
lay the chief cause of their failure against Revolutionary France. They dealt
with lands as with blocks. She infused new energy into peoples.
Meanwhile the return of Nelson to the Neapolitan coast intoxicated that
Court with joy. Queen Maria Carolina, ever the moving spirit at Naples,
now laid her plans for the expulsion of the French from Italy. Trusting to
her influence over her son-in-law, Francis II, and to a defensive compact
which the Courts of Vienna and Naples had framed on 20th May 1798, she
sought to incite him to take the offensive. Her close friendship with Lady
Hamilton, wife of the British ambassador at Naples, also enabled her to
gain complete ascendancy over Nelson, who, with his usual hatred of "the
French villains," counselled open and immediate war. For abetting this
design, Sir William Hamilton received a sharp rebuke from Downing Street.
Berlin not being known, except that the restoration of the House of Orange
was desired, Pitt and Grenville remained silent on that topic.[509]
The question whether the peoples concerned would submit to this under-
girding of the European fabric did not trouble them. They saw only the
statics of territories; they had no conception of the dynamics of nations. A
future in which Nationality, triumphant in Italy and Germany, would bring
about a Balance of Power far more solid than any which their flying
buttresses could assure, was of course entirely hidden from them. But they
failed to read the signs of the times. The last despairing efforts of the Poles,
and the levée en masse of the French people, now systematized in the
Conscription Law of 5th September 1798, did not open their eyes to the
future. For they were essentially men of the Eighteenth Century; and herein
lay the chief cause of their failure against Revolutionary France. They dealt
with lands as with blocks. She infused new energy into peoples.
Meanwhile the return of Nelson to the Neapolitan coast intoxicated that
Court with joy. Queen Maria Carolina, ever the moving spirit at Naples,
now laid her plans for the expulsion of the French from Italy. Trusting to
her influence over her son-in-law, Francis II, and to a defensive compact
which the Courts of Vienna and Naples had framed on 20th May 1798, she
sought to incite him to take the offensive. Her close friendship with Lady
Hamilton, wife of the British ambassador at Naples, also enabled her to
gain complete ascendancy over Nelson, who, with his usual hatred of "the
French villains," counselled open and immediate war. For abetting this
design, Sir William Hamilton received a sharp rebuke from Downing Street.
Page 399
Francis II and Thugut were even more annoyed. They repulsed the
Neapolitan emissary who begged for help, and roundly accused the Pitt
Ministry of inciting Naples to war in order to drag in Austria. Their anger
was not appeased by the successes of the Neapolitans near Rome, which the
French evacuated on 29th November. The counter-stroke soon fell. The
French, rallying in force, pushed the Bourbon columns southwards; and the
early days of 1799 witnessed in swift succession the surrender of Naples,
the flight of its Court and the Hamiltons to Palermo on Nelson's fleet, the
foundation of the Parthenopean Republic, and the liquefaction of the blood
of St. Januarius in sign of divine benediction on the new régime.[510]
Nevertheless, Nelson and the royal fugitives had set in motion forces which
elsewhere made for triumph. Paul, re-assured as to England's desire to re-
establish the Order of St. John at Malta, entered into an alliance with her on
29th December 1798, whereby the two Powers agreed to reduce France
within her old boundaries, Russia furnishing to England an army of 45,000
men, mainly with a view to the support of Prussia, on condition of receiving
£75,000 per month and three months' subsidies in advance. She also
promised to send 3,000 men to help in the siege of the French garrison at
Malta and others to assist England in the defence of the Neapolitan lands.
Austria, resentful towards Pitt and fearful of Prussia's designs, still held
back, though the events in Italy, especially the dethronement of Charles
Emmanuel IV of the House of Savoy by the French should have spurred her
to action. Probably she waited until the needs of England and Russia should
enable her to dictate her terms. The cupidity of Thugut had been whetted by
Pitt's speech as to the wealth of England; and the efforts of Cobenzl at St.
Petersburg led Whitworth to sign a compact on terms so onerous to the
British Treasury as to draw on him a sharp disclaimer and reprimand from
London.[511] So matters dragged on far into the year 1799, when plans for
the ensuing campaign ought to have been matured.
Neapolitan emissary who begged for help, and roundly accused the Pitt
Ministry of inciting Naples to war in order to drag in Austria. Their anger
was not appeased by the successes of the Neapolitans near Rome, which the
French evacuated on 29th November. The counter-stroke soon fell. The
French, rallying in force, pushed the Bourbon columns southwards; and the
early days of 1799 witnessed in swift succession the surrender of Naples,
the flight of its Court and the Hamiltons to Palermo on Nelson's fleet, the
foundation of the Parthenopean Republic, and the liquefaction of the blood
of St. Januarius in sign of divine benediction on the new régime.[510]
Nevertheless, Nelson and the royal fugitives had set in motion forces which
elsewhere made for triumph. Paul, re-assured as to England's desire to re-
establish the Order of St. John at Malta, entered into an alliance with her on
29th December 1798, whereby the two Powers agreed to reduce France
within her old boundaries, Russia furnishing to England an army of 45,000
men, mainly with a view to the support of Prussia, on condition of receiving
£75,000 per month and three months' subsidies in advance. She also
promised to send 3,000 men to help in the siege of the French garrison at
Malta and others to assist England in the defence of the Neapolitan lands.
Austria, resentful towards Pitt and fearful of Prussia's designs, still held
back, though the events in Italy, especially the dethronement of Charles
Emmanuel IV of the House of Savoy by the French should have spurred her
to action. Probably she waited until the needs of England and Russia should
enable her to dictate her terms. The cupidity of Thugut had been whetted by
Pitt's speech as to the wealth of England; and the efforts of Cobenzl at St.
Petersburg led Whitworth to sign a compact on terms so onerous to the
British Treasury as to draw on him a sharp disclaimer and reprimand from
London.[511] So matters dragged on far into the year 1799, when plans for
the ensuing campaign ought to have been matured.
Page 400
Still more luckless were the dealings of the British Cabinet with Prussia. In
the hope of winning over Frederick William III, Grenville in November
1798 despatched his brother Thomas on a mission to Berlin. His journey
thither was one of the longest and most eventful on record. At Yarmouth he
was detained by easterly gales; and when at last the packet boat made the
mouth of the Elbe it was wrecked. The passengers and crew succeeded in
making their way to shore over the pack-ice, Grenville saving his papers,
except the "full-power" needful for signing a treaty. He reached Cuxhaven
in great exhaustion; and arrived at Berlin on 17th March, only to find that
the French by daring and intrigue had cowed the North German States into
subservience. The terrible winter of 1798–9 largely accounts for the delays
which ruined the subsequent campaign. Whitworth remained long without
news from Downing Street; and at last, on 12th February, announced that he
had received nine posts at once. Meanwhile France, controlling all the
coasts from Bremen to Genoa, not only excluded British messengers, but
carried on her diplomatic bargaining in Germany without let or hindrance.
For all his trouble, Thomas Grenville could get no firm footing amidst the
shifting sands of Prussian diplomacy. So nervous were the Austrian
Ministers as to Prussia's future conduct that they seemed about to come to
terms with France and join in the plunder of the smaller German States.
This might have been the upshot had not French armies crossed the Rhine
(1st March 1799), and shortly afterwards invaded the Grisons Canton.[512]
Goaded to action, Francis II declared war eleven days later. On 28th April
Austrian hussars seized the French envoys withdrawing from Rastatt,
murdering two of the four and seizing the papers of all.
Thus began the war of the Second Coalition. Bonaparte's seizure of Malta
and Egypt without a declaration of war, and the unbearable aggressions of
the French in Switzerland, Italy, and on the Rhine, stirred to action States
which the diplomatic efforts of Pitt and Grenville had left unmoved. For
none of the wars of that period was France so largely responsible. Even
the hope of winning over Frederick William III, Grenville in November
1798 despatched his brother Thomas on a mission to Berlin. His journey
thither was one of the longest and most eventful on record. At Yarmouth he
was detained by easterly gales; and when at last the packet boat made the
mouth of the Elbe it was wrecked. The passengers and crew succeeded in
making their way to shore over the pack-ice, Grenville saving his papers,
except the "full-power" needful for signing a treaty. He reached Cuxhaven
in great exhaustion; and arrived at Berlin on 17th March, only to find that
the French by daring and intrigue had cowed the North German States into
subservience. The terrible winter of 1798–9 largely accounts for the delays
which ruined the subsequent campaign. Whitworth remained long without
news from Downing Street; and at last, on 12th February, announced that he
had received nine posts at once. Meanwhile France, controlling all the
coasts from Bremen to Genoa, not only excluded British messengers, but
carried on her diplomatic bargaining in Germany without let or hindrance.
For all his trouble, Thomas Grenville could get no firm footing amidst the
shifting sands of Prussian diplomacy. So nervous were the Austrian
Ministers as to Prussia's future conduct that they seemed about to come to
terms with France and join in the plunder of the smaller German States.
This might have been the upshot had not French armies crossed the Rhine
(1st March 1799), and shortly afterwards invaded the Grisons Canton.[512]
Goaded to action, Francis II declared war eleven days later. On 28th April
Austrian hussars seized the French envoys withdrawing from Rastatt,
murdering two of the four and seizing the papers of all.
Thus began the war of the Second Coalition. Bonaparte's seizure of Malta
and Egypt without a declaration of war, and the unbearable aggressions of
the French in Switzerland, Italy, and on the Rhine, stirred to action States
which the diplomatic efforts of Pitt and Grenville had left unmoved. For
none of the wars of that period was France so largely responsible. Even
Page 401
now, when the inroad of the French into Germany threatened the
ascendancy of Prussia, Frederick William declined to join the Allies; and
his unstatesmanlike refusal thwarted the plans of Pitt for the march of the
subsidized Muscovite force through Prussia for the recovery of Holland.
Another essential point was Switzerland. Like a bastion frowning over
converging valleys, that Alpine tract dominates the basins of the Po, the Inn,
the Upper Rhine, and the Upper Rhone. He who holds it, if strong and
resolute, can determine the fortunes of North Italy, Eastern France, South
Germany, and the West of the Hapsburg domains. Further, by closing the
passes over the Alps he can derange the commerce of Europe; and the
sturdy mountaineers will either overbear the plain-dwellers, or will serve as
mercenaries in their forces. Accordingly Switzerland, like her Asiatic
counterpart, Afghanistan, has either controlled her neighbours, or has been
fought for by them. As commerce-controller, provider of troops, and warden
of the passes, she holds a most important position. Fortunate it is that the
Swiss have loved freedom, or money, more than dominion. For so soon as a
great State possesses their land, the Balance of Power becomes a fiction.
Pitt evinced sure insight in his resolve to free the Switzers from the Jacobin
yoke. To it the men of the Forest Cantons succumbed only after desperate
struggles, which inspired Wordsworth with one of the noblest of his
sonnets. There is no sign that Pitt set much store on winning over the public
opinion of Europe by siding with the oppressed against the oppressor, as his
disciple, Canning, did during the Spanish National Rising; but help from the
Swiss was certainly hoped for. So early as August 1798 Pitt proposed to
allot £500,000 for assistance to them, and, but for the delays at St.
Petersburg and Vienna, the Allies might have rescued that brave people
before it fell beneath the weight of numbers. Even in March 1799, when the
rising against the French had scarcely begun, he set apart £31,000 per
month for the purpose of equipping a corps of 20,000 Swiss. On 15th
ascendancy of Prussia, Frederick William declined to join the Allies; and
his unstatesmanlike refusal thwarted the plans of Pitt for the march of the
subsidized Muscovite force through Prussia for the recovery of Holland.
Another essential point was Switzerland. Like a bastion frowning over
converging valleys, that Alpine tract dominates the basins of the Po, the Inn,
the Upper Rhine, and the Upper Rhone. He who holds it, if strong and
resolute, can determine the fortunes of North Italy, Eastern France, South
Germany, and the West of the Hapsburg domains. Further, by closing the
passes over the Alps he can derange the commerce of Europe; and the
sturdy mountaineers will either overbear the plain-dwellers, or will serve as
mercenaries in their forces. Accordingly Switzerland, like her Asiatic
counterpart, Afghanistan, has either controlled her neighbours, or has been
fought for by them. As commerce-controller, provider of troops, and warden
of the passes, she holds a most important position. Fortunate it is that the
Swiss have loved freedom, or money, more than dominion. For so soon as a
great State possesses their land, the Balance of Power becomes a fiction.
Pitt evinced sure insight in his resolve to free the Switzers from the Jacobin
yoke. To it the men of the Forest Cantons succumbed only after desperate
struggles, which inspired Wordsworth with one of the noblest of his
sonnets. There is no sign that Pitt set much store on winning over the public
opinion of Europe by siding with the oppressed against the oppressor, as his
disciple, Canning, did during the Spanish National Rising; but help from the
Swiss was certainly hoped for. So early as August 1798 Pitt proposed to
allot £500,000 for assistance to them, and, but for the delays at St.
Petersburg and Vienna, the Allies might have rescued that brave people
before it fell beneath the weight of numbers. Even in March 1799, when the
rising against the French had scarcely begun, he set apart £31,000 per
month for the purpose of equipping a corps of 20,000 Swiss. On 15th
Page 402
March, after hearing of the outbreak of war on the Rhine, Grenville urged
that the Russian force subsidized by England should march towards
Switzerland, now that Prussia's doubtful behaviour prevented a conquest of
Holland by land. He also insisted that this addition to the allied forces
destined for Switzerland must not be allowed to lessen the number of
Austrians operating there.[513]
The Court of Vienna at once saw in the subsidized Russian army a tool
useful for its own plans, and requested that it should serve with the
Austrians in Swabia. The answer to this singular request can be imagined.
For a day or two Whitworth was also disturbed by a belated effort of the
French Directory to restore peace. It offered Poland to the Elector of
Saxony, and Saxony to Prussia for her friendly services, Austria being led to
expect Bavaria, if she would keep Russia "within her ancient limits."
Whitworth mentioned this overture to Cobenzl, and saw him blush for the
first time on record.[514] Probably, then, the scheme had some powerful
backing; but now Austria had crossed the Rubicon.
At first all went well. The French had played a game of bluff which they
could not sustain. On all sides they were worsted in a way which suggests
how decisive the campaign might have been had the Allies heartily
seconded the salutary plans of Pitt. Unfortunately, despite his efforts, no
compact came about between Great Britain and Austria. Russia and the
Hapsburg State were but loosely connected; and, owing to a long delay in
the arrival of the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Treaty, Paul did not until
the beginning of May send forward the subsidized army under the
command of Korsakoff.
On the other hand, the auxiliary Russian force sent forward to the help of
Austria had by that time helped the white-coats to win notable triumphs in
North Italy. In the months of April and May, Melas and the Imperialists,
that the Russian force subsidized by England should march towards
Switzerland, now that Prussia's doubtful behaviour prevented a conquest of
Holland by land. He also insisted that this addition to the allied forces
destined for Switzerland must not be allowed to lessen the number of
Austrians operating there.[513]
The Court of Vienna at once saw in the subsidized Russian army a tool
useful for its own plans, and requested that it should serve with the
Austrians in Swabia. The answer to this singular request can be imagined.
For a day or two Whitworth was also disturbed by a belated effort of the
French Directory to restore peace. It offered Poland to the Elector of
Saxony, and Saxony to Prussia for her friendly services, Austria being led to
expect Bavaria, if she would keep Russia "within her ancient limits."
Whitworth mentioned this overture to Cobenzl, and saw him blush for the
first time on record.[514] Probably, then, the scheme had some powerful
backing; but now Austria had crossed the Rubicon.
At first all went well. The French had played a game of bluff which they
could not sustain. On all sides they were worsted in a way which suggests
how decisive the campaign might have been had the Allies heartily
seconded the salutary plans of Pitt. Unfortunately, despite his efforts, no
compact came about between Great Britain and Austria. Russia and the
Hapsburg State were but loosely connected; and, owing to a long delay in
the arrival of the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Treaty, Paul did not until
the beginning of May send forward the subsidized army under the
command of Korsakoff.
On the other hand, the auxiliary Russian force sent forward to the help of
Austria had by that time helped the white-coats to win notable triumphs in
North Italy. In the months of April and May, Melas and the Imperialists,
Page 403
powerfully backed by Suvóroff's Muscovites, carried all before them, and
drove the enemy from Milan. Soon afterwards the Allies entered Turin; and
only by hard fighting and heavy losses did Moreau with the chief French
army cut his way through to the Genoese coast. Meanwhile General
Macdonald, retiring with a French corps from Naples, left that city to the
vengeance of Nelson and Maria Carolina with results that are notorious.
The French general made a brave stand in North Italy, only to fall before the
onsets of the Allies at the Trebbia (17th–19th June). He, too, barely escaped
to Genoa, where the relics of the two French armies faced about. These
successes aroused the highest hopes at Westminster. Canning, who resigned
his Under-Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs in March 1799, wrote that he
cared not whether the Austrians were beaten; for their failure would serve
as a good example to Europe. But in June, after their brilliant successes, he
expressed a confident hope of the collapse of "the monstrous fabrick of
crimes and cruelties and abominations" known as French policy; he added
that Prussia could not be so stupid as to hold aloof from the Coalition; and
that Pitt, again vigorous in mind and body, would carry through the war to
the end.
But now in the train of victory there appeared its parasite, discord. The re-
conquest of Italy was so brilliant and easy as to arouse disputes about the
spoils; and when the Imperialists began to treat Suvóroff and his heroes
cavalierly, the feud became acute. His complaints to his Sovereign that the
Austrians thwarted him at every turn threw the irascible Czar into a rage,
and he inveighed against the insolence of the Court of Vienna and its
minions. Finally, in order to end these disputes, the British Ministry
proposed the departure of Suvóroff to Switzerland in order to take
command of Korsakoff's subsidized force. In the third week of June
Grenville urged this plan on the Russian Court as securing concentration of
force and unity of command, the result in all probability being the liberation
of Switzerland, whereupon the Allies could prepare for an invasion of
drove the enemy from Milan. Soon afterwards the Allies entered Turin; and
only by hard fighting and heavy losses did Moreau with the chief French
army cut his way through to the Genoese coast. Meanwhile General
Macdonald, retiring with a French corps from Naples, left that city to the
vengeance of Nelson and Maria Carolina with results that are notorious.
The French general made a brave stand in North Italy, only to fall before the
onsets of the Allies at the Trebbia (17th–19th June). He, too, barely escaped
to Genoa, where the relics of the two French armies faced about. These
successes aroused the highest hopes at Westminster. Canning, who resigned
his Under-Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs in March 1799, wrote that he
cared not whether the Austrians were beaten; for their failure would serve
as a good example to Europe. But in June, after their brilliant successes, he
expressed a confident hope of the collapse of "the monstrous fabrick of
crimes and cruelties and abominations" known as French policy; he added
that Prussia could not be so stupid as to hold aloof from the Coalition; and
that Pitt, again vigorous in mind and body, would carry through the war to
the end.
But now in the train of victory there appeared its parasite, discord. The re-
conquest of Italy was so brilliant and easy as to arouse disputes about the
spoils; and when the Imperialists began to treat Suvóroff and his heroes
cavalierly, the feud became acute. His complaints to his Sovereign that the
Austrians thwarted him at every turn threw the irascible Czar into a rage,
and he inveighed against the insolence of the Court of Vienna and its
minions. Finally, in order to end these disputes, the British Ministry
proposed the departure of Suvóroff to Switzerland in order to take
command of Korsakoff's subsidized force. In the third week of June
Grenville urged this plan on the Russian Court as securing concentration of
force and unity of command, the result in all probability being the liberation
of Switzerland, whereupon the Allies could prepare for an invasion of
Page 404
France on her undefended flank, Franche Comté. England (added Grenville)
disapproved of the presence of "Louis XVIII" at the Russian headquarters;
and if Monsieur, his brother, issued a declaration, it must be drafted with
care. The need of caution appears in Monsieur's offer of pardon and
clemency to the misguided French, provided that they joined his standard.
[515]
The Allies, it will be seen, built their hopes on a revolt of the royalists of the
East of France. In fact, widespread risings were expected. Bordeaux had
been the centre of a conspiracy for leaguing together the malcontents of la
Vendée with those of the South, these again being in touch with the
royalists of the Lyonnais and Franche Comté. Wickham, who was sent as
British agent to Switzerland in June 1799, opened up an extensive
correspondence which promised to lead to a formidable revolt whenever the
Allies invaded Franche Comté and Nice. The malcontents had as leaders
Generals Précy, Pichegru, and Willot. In due course the Comte d'Artois
("Monsieur") was to appear and put himself at their head. Accordingly, in
August 1799, he left Holyrood, came to London, and dined at Grenville's
house with him and Pitt. The Prime Minister afterwards paid him a private
visit: but the details of their conference are not known. It is certain,
however, that the Cabinet accorded large sums of money to Wickham for
use in the East of France. Even after the failure in Switzerland, he pressed
for the payment of £365,000 in order to maintain the royalist movement.
[516]
Pitt, then, was bent on using all possible means for humbling France; and,
in view of her disasters in the field, the discontent at home, and the absence
of Bonaparte's army in Egypt, the triumph of the Allies seemed to depend
solely on their unanimity. Much can be said in favour of the British plan of
uniting the two Russian armies in Switzerland to act with that of the
Archduke Charles, in order to strike at Franche Comté in overwhelming
disapproved of the presence of "Louis XVIII" at the Russian headquarters;
and if Monsieur, his brother, issued a declaration, it must be drafted with
care. The need of caution appears in Monsieur's offer of pardon and
clemency to the misguided French, provided that they joined his standard.
[515]
The Allies, it will be seen, built their hopes on a revolt of the royalists of the
East of France. In fact, widespread risings were expected. Bordeaux had
been the centre of a conspiracy for leaguing together the malcontents of la
Vendée with those of the South, these again being in touch with the
royalists of the Lyonnais and Franche Comté. Wickham, who was sent as
British agent to Switzerland in June 1799, opened up an extensive
correspondence which promised to lead to a formidable revolt whenever the
Allies invaded Franche Comté and Nice. The malcontents had as leaders
Generals Précy, Pichegru, and Willot. In due course the Comte d'Artois
("Monsieur") was to appear and put himself at their head. Accordingly, in
August 1799, he left Holyrood, came to London, and dined at Grenville's
house with him and Pitt. The Prime Minister afterwards paid him a private
visit: but the details of their conference are not known. It is certain,
however, that the Cabinet accorded large sums of money to Wickham for
use in the East of France. Even after the failure in Switzerland, he pressed
for the payment of £365,000 in order to maintain the royalist movement.
[516]
Pitt, then, was bent on using all possible means for humbling France; and,
in view of her disasters in the field, the discontent at home, and the absence
of Bonaparte's army in Egypt, the triumph of the Allies seemed to depend
solely on their unanimity. Much can be said in favour of the British plan of
uniting the two Russian armies in Switzerland to act with that of the
Archduke Charles, in order to strike at Franche Comté in overwhelming
Page 405
force, while the Austrians in Italy invaded Nice. If all the moves had taken
place betimes, formidable forces would have been massed for an attack
upon the weakest parts of the French frontier. The Czar agreed to the plan
on 9th July; but the Emperor Francis withheld his sanction for a
suspiciously long time. Here again, as in 1794–6, the men of the pen
interfered with the men of the sword. Immersed in plans for a vast
extension of Austria's domains in Italy, Thugut turned a deaf ear to the
demands of Russia and England for the restoration of the House of Savoy to
the throne of Turin. He declared that, as Austria had recovered the
continental domains of that dynasty, she could therefore dispose of them. It
soon appeared that she sought to appropriate Piedmont, as well as Venetia,
Lombardy, Parma, Modena, and the northern part of the Papal States in
place of her troublesome Belgic domains, thus liberally fulfilling Pitt's
suggestion that her chief gains should be on the side of Italy.
On this question Pitt and Grenville differed. The latter, sympathizing with
Russia, strongly objected to Austria annexing Piedmont. Pitt, however,
maintained that such an acquisition would not resemble the partition of
Poland or of Venetia; for Charles Emmanuel had lost his lands through his
own weakness, and now did nothing towards recovering them. Further, it
was to the advantage of Europe that the rescuing Power, Austria, should
hold them as a barrier against France. If the Czar Paul could not be induced
to take this view we might leave the two Empires to settle the matter; but, at
present this solution offered the best chance of arriving at a compact with
Austria so much to be desired. Thus, in order to strengthen the Barrier
System against France, Pitt was prepared to sacrifice legal rights to
expediency, while Grenville upheld the claims of justice.
place betimes, formidable forces would have been massed for an attack
upon the weakest parts of the French frontier. The Czar agreed to the plan
on 9th July; but the Emperor Francis withheld his sanction for a
suspiciously long time. Here again, as in 1794–6, the men of the pen
interfered with the men of the sword. Immersed in plans for a vast
extension of Austria's domains in Italy, Thugut turned a deaf ear to the
demands of Russia and England for the restoration of the House of Savoy to
the throne of Turin. He declared that, as Austria had recovered the
continental domains of that dynasty, she could therefore dispose of them. It
soon appeared that she sought to appropriate Piedmont, as well as Venetia,
Lombardy, Parma, Modena, and the northern part of the Papal States in
place of her troublesome Belgic domains, thus liberally fulfilling Pitt's
suggestion that her chief gains should be on the side of Italy.
On this question Pitt and Grenville differed. The latter, sympathizing with
Russia, strongly objected to Austria annexing Piedmont. Pitt, however,
maintained that such an acquisition would not resemble the partition of
Poland or of Venetia; for Charles Emmanuel had lost his lands through his
own weakness, and now did nothing towards recovering them. Further, it
was to the advantage of Europe that the rescuing Power, Austria, should
hold them as a barrier against France. If the Czar Paul could not be induced
to take this view we might leave the two Empires to settle the matter; but, at
present this solution offered the best chance of arriving at a compact with
Austria so much to be desired. Thus, in order to strengthen the Barrier
System against France, Pitt was prepared to sacrifice legal rights to
expediency, while Grenville upheld the claims of justice.
Page 406
Limits of space preclude an investigation of the causes of the humiliating
failure of the campaign in Switzerland. Suffice it to say that, when
Korsakoff's army finally entered the north-east of Switzerland, the
Archduke Charles was compelled by imperious mandates from Vienna to
withdraw into Swabia. He foresaw disaster; and it soon came. While
Suvóroff's army was toiling down the northern defiles of the St. Gotthard,
Masséna, after receiving strong reinforcements, overwhelmed Korsakoff at
Zurich (25th–26th September). That Pitt expected defeat after the
withdrawal of the Archduke Charles appears from his letter to Windham:
Downing Street, 30th August 1799.[517]
I should gladly accept your proposal to join the water-party today,
but I came to town to meet Lord Grenville; and, having seen him, I
am preparing to return part of the way to Walmer in the course of
the evening. I was brought to town by the vexatious accounts from
Vienna, which give too great a chance of our being disappointed in
our best hopes by the blind and perverse selfishness of Austria's
counsels.
Grenville was equally indignant and accused Austria of treachery.[518] Much
can be said in support of that charge. Whatever may have been her motive,
her conduct ruined the campaign. South-east of Zurich, Soult routed Hotze's
Austrian corps, which might have linked the movements of Suvóroff with
those of Korsakoff, and Suvóroff on arriving at Altorff found no other
course practicable than to strike away eastwards over the Panixer Pass to
Coire in the Grisons. There he arrived after severe hardships on 8th
October, and swore never again to act with the Austrians. Paul, on hearing
these dire tidings, registered the same vow, and informed the Viennese
Court that thenceforth he separated his interests entirely from hers. Thus
failure of the campaign in Switzerland. Suffice it to say that, when
Korsakoff's army finally entered the north-east of Switzerland, the
Archduke Charles was compelled by imperious mandates from Vienna to
withdraw into Swabia. He foresaw disaster; and it soon came. While
Suvóroff's army was toiling down the northern defiles of the St. Gotthard,
Masséna, after receiving strong reinforcements, overwhelmed Korsakoff at
Zurich (25th–26th September). That Pitt expected defeat after the
withdrawal of the Archduke Charles appears from his letter to Windham:
Downing Street, 30th August 1799.[517]
I should gladly accept your proposal to join the water-party today,
but I came to town to meet Lord Grenville; and, having seen him, I
am preparing to return part of the way to Walmer in the course of
the evening. I was brought to town by the vexatious accounts from
Vienna, which give too great a chance of our being disappointed in
our best hopes by the blind and perverse selfishness of Austria's
counsels.
Grenville was equally indignant and accused Austria of treachery.[518] Much
can be said in support of that charge. Whatever may have been her motive,
her conduct ruined the campaign. South-east of Zurich, Soult routed Hotze's
Austrian corps, which might have linked the movements of Suvóroff with
those of Korsakoff, and Suvóroff on arriving at Altorff found no other
course practicable than to strike away eastwards over the Panixer Pass to
Coire in the Grisons. There he arrived after severe hardships on 8th
October, and swore never again to act with the Austrians. Paul, on hearing
these dire tidings, registered the same vow, and informed the Viennese
Court that thenceforth he separated his interests entirely from hers. Thus
Page 407
was it that Pitt's plans miscarried. Thus was it that British subsidies were
flung away into the limbo strewn with tokens of Hapsburg fatuity.
The Anglo-Russian effort against the Batavian Republic is often referred to
as if it were the principal event of the year 1799. On the contrary, it was
little more than a diversion intended to help the chief enterprise in
Switzerland and Franche Comté. The Czar Paul and Pitt probably did not
intend to hold the Dutch Provinces unless the Allies pressed France hard on
the Swiss frontier and the Orange party rose in force. If these contingencies
held good, then Holland might be held as far as the River Waal. If not, then
the effort must be temporary. Even so, its advantages were great. The
seizure of the Dutch fleet at the Texel and Helder would end all chance of
invasion from that quarter. Fears of such an attempt had prompted a
counter-stroke dealt by General Coote's force in the spring of 1798 at the
sluice-gates near Ostend. Its surrender under untoward circumstances was,
perhaps, nearly counterbalanced by the destruction of canal works
necessary for the assembly of the flat-bottomed boats at Ostend.
For a brief space the doubtful attitude of Prussia led Pitt and Grenville to
concert a larger scheme. They hoped to form a great array of Prussians,
Russians, Britons, and Hanoverians which would sweep the French out of
Holland; but obviously such a plan depended on the support of the Berlin
Cabinet. If it were hostile, or even unfriendly, no force could advance
through Hanover for the delivery of Holland; for it would be at the mercy of
Prussia. In order to bring her into the league, Pitt and Grenville held out the
promise of gains near the Dutch frontier; but she held coyly aloof, doubtless
from a conviction that Austria would oppose her aggrandisement. So at
flung away into the limbo strewn with tokens of Hapsburg fatuity.
The Anglo-Russian effort against the Batavian Republic is often referred to
as if it were the principal event of the year 1799. On the contrary, it was
little more than a diversion intended to help the chief enterprise in
Switzerland and Franche Comté. The Czar Paul and Pitt probably did not
intend to hold the Dutch Provinces unless the Allies pressed France hard on
the Swiss frontier and the Orange party rose in force. If these contingencies
held good, then Holland might be held as far as the River Waal. If not, then
the effort must be temporary. Even so, its advantages were great. The
seizure of the Dutch fleet at the Texel and Helder would end all chance of
invasion from that quarter. Fears of such an attempt had prompted a
counter-stroke dealt by General Coote's force in the spring of 1798 at the
sluice-gates near Ostend. Its surrender under untoward circumstances was,
perhaps, nearly counterbalanced by the destruction of canal works
necessary for the assembly of the flat-bottomed boats at Ostend.
For a brief space the doubtful attitude of Prussia led Pitt and Grenville to
concert a larger scheme. They hoped to form a great array of Prussians,
Russians, Britons, and Hanoverians which would sweep the French out of
Holland; but obviously such a plan depended on the support of the Berlin
Cabinet. If it were hostile, or even unfriendly, no force could advance
through Hanover for the delivery of Holland; for it would be at the mercy of
Prussia. In order to bring her into the league, Pitt and Grenville held out the
promise of gains near the Dutch frontier; but she held coyly aloof, doubtless
from a conviction that Austria would oppose her aggrandisement. So at
Page 408
least Thugut declared to Eden on his departure from Vienna. Well might his
successor, Lord Minto, remark that the Allies spent as much time in
watching each other's moves as those of the enemy.
Prussia being immovable, England and Russia laid their plans for a naval
expedition to Holland. By a Convention signed at midsummer 1799 at St
Petersburg, Russia agreed to send a squadron of 11 ships, convoying an
expeditionary force of 17,500 men to the Dutch coast, England paying
£44,000 per month for their services after embarkation. The Czar hoped that
England would send some 6,000 men. The help of 8,000 Swedes was also
expected; but the King of Sweden, annoyed at England's seizure of Swedish
merchantmen, refused all assistance. For a time Pitt desired both to attack
the Island of Voorn below Rotterdam, and to effect a landing in the estuary
of the Ems, provided that 25,000 British, 18,000 Russians, and 8,000
Swedes were available. Here, as so often, Pitt's hopes outran the actuality.
Windham believed that he wished to conquer Flanders. But Windham's
moods were so various and perverse that he can scarcely be trusted. In his
view every effort not directed towards Brittany was wasted; and certainly
feints against the coasts of Brittany and Spain promised to further the Dutch
expedition.[519]
Early in August Pitt and his colleagues finally resolved to send the
expedition to the Dutch coast; but they had not decided as to the length or
extent of the occupation. So, at least, it appears from a letter of Pitt to Sir
Charles Grey:
Downing Street, Aug. 23, 1799.[520]
You will not wonder that the circumstances of the present moment
have strongly recalled to Mr. Dundas's mind and mine the
conversations which we have at different times had with you
successor, Lord Minto, remark that the Allies spent as much time in
watching each other's moves as those of the enemy.
Prussia being immovable, England and Russia laid their plans for a naval
expedition to Holland. By a Convention signed at midsummer 1799 at St
Petersburg, Russia agreed to send a squadron of 11 ships, convoying an
expeditionary force of 17,500 men to the Dutch coast, England paying
£44,000 per month for their services after embarkation. The Czar hoped that
England would send some 6,000 men. The help of 8,000 Swedes was also
expected; but the King of Sweden, annoyed at England's seizure of Swedish
merchantmen, refused all assistance. For a time Pitt desired both to attack
the Island of Voorn below Rotterdam, and to effect a landing in the estuary
of the Ems, provided that 25,000 British, 18,000 Russians, and 8,000
Swedes were available. Here, as so often, Pitt's hopes outran the actuality.
Windham believed that he wished to conquer Flanders. But Windham's
moods were so various and perverse that he can scarcely be trusted. In his
view every effort not directed towards Brittany was wasted; and certainly
feints against the coasts of Brittany and Spain promised to further the Dutch
expedition.[519]
Early in August Pitt and his colleagues finally resolved to send the
expedition to the Dutch coast; but they had not decided as to the length or
extent of the occupation. So, at least, it appears from a letter of Pitt to Sir
Charles Grey:
Downing Street, Aug. 23, 1799.[520]
You will not wonder that the circumstances of the present moment
have strongly recalled to Mr. Dundas's mind and mine the
conversations which we have at different times had with you
Page 409
respecting the possibility of a successful stroke against Brest. The
assemblage of the combined fleets[521] in that port renders such an
object more tempting than ever. We have a prospect, if the
expedition in Holland should terminate speedily, of having a large
army of 30,000 men at least, and a large body of marines, with any
number of sail-of-the-line that may be thought necessary, applicable
to such a service by the month of October; and if the Allies continue
to push their operations on the other side of France, the bulk of the
French force will find sufficient occupation at a distance from their
coast. In all these respects the time seems as favourable as it can
ever be expected to be to such an enterprise; and if it is to be
undertaken, we shall derive the greatest confidence of success from
seeing the execution of it placed in your hands. Many circumstances
may undoubtedly arise in the course of the next six weeks which
may oblige us to abandon the idea....
This letter proves that Pitt did not expect a prolonged occupation of
Holland, at least by British troops; but the notions of Ministers on this topic
were singularly hazy. All things considered, the expedition at first fared
well. Sir Ralph Abercromby, the leader of the first detachment of some
12,000 British troops, effected a landing near the forts at the Helder, and on
27th August speedily captured them. Three days later Admiral Mitchell
captured a squadron of 10 sail-of-the-line and several frigates anchored
behind the Texel. Pitt was elated by these successes, and wrote from
Walmer Castle on 5th September: "We are impatiently waiting till this east
wind brings our transports in sight to carry the remainder of our troops, in
order to compleat speedily what has been so gloriously begun." He adds
that in a short autumn session he hopes speedily to pass by acclamation a
Bill ensuring the doubling of the regular army by another levy from the
militia.[522] Other letters bespeak his anxiety as to the safety of his brother,
the Earl of Chatham, who served on the Council of War directing the
operations of the Duke of York.
assemblage of the combined fleets[521] in that port renders such an
object more tempting than ever. We have a prospect, if the
expedition in Holland should terminate speedily, of having a large
army of 30,000 men at least, and a large body of marines, with any
number of sail-of-the-line that may be thought necessary, applicable
to such a service by the month of October; and if the Allies continue
to push their operations on the other side of France, the bulk of the
French force will find sufficient occupation at a distance from their
coast. In all these respects the time seems as favourable as it can
ever be expected to be to such an enterprise; and if it is to be
undertaken, we shall derive the greatest confidence of success from
seeing the execution of it placed in your hands. Many circumstances
may undoubtedly arise in the course of the next six weeks which
may oblige us to abandon the idea....
This letter proves that Pitt did not expect a prolonged occupation of
Holland, at least by British troops; but the notions of Ministers on this topic
were singularly hazy. All things considered, the expedition at first fared
well. Sir Ralph Abercromby, the leader of the first detachment of some
12,000 British troops, effected a landing near the forts at the Helder, and on
27th August speedily captured them. Three days later Admiral Mitchell
captured a squadron of 10 sail-of-the-line and several frigates anchored
behind the Texel. Pitt was elated by these successes, and wrote from
Walmer Castle on 5th September: "We are impatiently waiting till this east
wind brings our transports in sight to carry the remainder of our troops, in
order to compleat speedily what has been so gloriously begun." He adds
that in a short autumn session he hopes speedily to pass by acclamation a
Bill ensuring the doubling of the regular army by another levy from the
militia.[522] Other letters bespeak his anxiety as to the safety of his brother,
the Earl of Chatham, who served on the Council of War directing the
operations of the Duke of York.
Page 410
Abercromby's first successes were for a time maintained. At dawn of 10th
September the British force beat off a sharp attack by Vandamme at the
Zuype Canal on the way southwards to Alkmaar. Three days later the Duke
of York arrived and took the command, including that of a Russian corps
under General Hermann. Moving forwards with some 30,000 men, the
Duke attacked a Franco-Dutch force somewhat inferior in numbers but very
strongly posted at and around the village of Bergen. The onset failed,
mainly owing to the fierce but premature and disorderly onset of the
Russians on the right wing, which ended in a rout. Abercromby's flanking
movement came too late to restore the fight, which cost the British 1,000
men and the Russians more than double as many (19th September).
Hermann was taken prisoner.[523]
On 2nd October the Allies compelled the enemy to retreat from Bergen; but
the success was of little service. The defenders, now strongly reinforced,
held several good positions between Alkmaar and Amsterdam. Meanwhile
the Orange party did not stir. Torrents of rain day after day impaired the
health of the troops and filled the dykes. An advance being impossible in
these circumstances, the Duke of York retreated to the line of the Zuype
(8th to 9th October). There he could have held his own; but, in view of the
disasters in Switzerland, Ministers decided to evacuate Holland (15th
October). Accordingly, by the Convention of Alkmaar, on the 18th, the
Duke of York agreed to evacuate the Dutch Netherlands by the end of
November, 8,000 of the prisoners of war then in England being restored.
Most questionable was the decision of Ministers to evacuate the Helder and
the Texel. Grenville desired to hold those posts as bases for a second
attempt in 1800; but this was not done. The only result, then, was the
capture of the Dutch fleet, a prize gained without loss by the end of
September.
September the British force beat off a sharp attack by Vandamme at the
Zuype Canal on the way southwards to Alkmaar. Three days later the Duke
of York arrived and took the command, including that of a Russian corps
under General Hermann. Moving forwards with some 30,000 men, the
Duke attacked a Franco-Dutch force somewhat inferior in numbers but very
strongly posted at and around the village of Bergen. The onset failed,
mainly owing to the fierce but premature and disorderly onset of the
Russians on the right wing, which ended in a rout. Abercromby's flanking
movement came too late to restore the fight, which cost the British 1,000
men and the Russians more than double as many (19th September).
Hermann was taken prisoner.[523]
On 2nd October the Allies compelled the enemy to retreat from Bergen; but
the success was of little service. The defenders, now strongly reinforced,
held several good positions between Alkmaar and Amsterdam. Meanwhile
the Orange party did not stir. Torrents of rain day after day impaired the
health of the troops and filled the dykes. An advance being impossible in
these circumstances, the Duke of York retreated to the line of the Zuype
(8th to 9th October). There he could have held his own; but, in view of the
disasters in Switzerland, Ministers decided to evacuate Holland (15th
October). Accordingly, by the Convention of Alkmaar, on the 18th, the
Duke of York agreed to evacuate the Dutch Netherlands by the end of
November, 8,000 of the prisoners of war then in England being restored.
Most questionable was the decision of Ministers to evacuate the Helder and
the Texel. Grenville desired to hold those posts as bases for a second
attempt in 1800; but this was not done. The only result, then, was the
capture of the Dutch fleet, a prize gained without loss by the end of
September.
Page 411
The censures bestowed on this undertaking are very natural. Success was
scarcely possible in the narrow, marshy strip of land north of Amsterdam. In
such a district victory must be costly, while defeat spelt disaster. The whole
enterprise was unwarrantable, unless the Orange party was about to rise; but
on this subject Ministers were deceived. The Prince of Orange and his son
assured them that it was necessary even to hold back the loyalists until
armed help appeared, so eager were they to expel the French.[524] Not a sign
of this eagerness appeared.
Undaunted by this failure, which Sheridan wittily called nibbling at the
French rind, Pitt sought to utilize the Russian force withdrawn from
Holland for the projected blow at Brest. It was therefore taken to the
Channel Islands, greatly to the hurt of the inhabitants. Pitt and Grenville
also concerted plans with the Austrian Court, which, chastened by the
disasters in Switzerland, now displayed less truculence. It agreed to repay
the loan of May 1797, to restore Piedmont to the House of Savoy, and to
give back to France any provinces conquered in the war, on condition of the
re-establishment of monarchy. Thus, a friendly understanding was at last
arrived at; and on 24th December 1799 Grenville empowered Minto to
prepare a treaty, adding that on the first opportunity the French Government
should be informed of this engagement.
The occasion occurred at once. Bonaparte, having become master of France
by the coup d'état of Brumaire (10th November), wrote on Christmas Day
to Francis II and George III proposing terms of peace. The statesmanlike
tone of that offer has been deservedly admired; but his motives in making it
do not concern us here.[525] Suffice it to say that Pitt and Thugut saw in it a
clever device for sundering the Anglo-Austrian compact. As appears from a
letter of Canning, Pitt looked on the new Consular Government as a make-
shift. Writing early in December to Canning, Pitt stated that the new French
constitution might prove to be of a moderate American kind. To this
scarcely possible in the narrow, marshy strip of land north of Amsterdam. In
such a district victory must be costly, while defeat spelt disaster. The whole
enterprise was unwarrantable, unless the Orange party was about to rise; but
on this subject Ministers were deceived. The Prince of Orange and his son
assured them that it was necessary even to hold back the loyalists until
armed help appeared, so eager were they to expel the French.[524] Not a sign
of this eagerness appeared.
Undaunted by this failure, which Sheridan wittily called nibbling at the
French rind, Pitt sought to utilize the Russian force withdrawn from
Holland for the projected blow at Brest. It was therefore taken to the
Channel Islands, greatly to the hurt of the inhabitants. Pitt and Grenville
also concerted plans with the Austrian Court, which, chastened by the
disasters in Switzerland, now displayed less truculence. It agreed to repay
the loan of May 1797, to restore Piedmont to the House of Savoy, and to
give back to France any provinces conquered in the war, on condition of the
re-establishment of monarchy. Thus, a friendly understanding was at last
arrived at; and on 24th December 1799 Grenville empowered Minto to
prepare a treaty, adding that on the first opportunity the French Government
should be informed of this engagement.
The occasion occurred at once. Bonaparte, having become master of France
by the coup d'état of Brumaire (10th November), wrote on Christmas Day
to Francis II and George III proposing terms of peace. The statesmanlike
tone of that offer has been deservedly admired; but his motives in making it
do not concern us here.[525] Suffice it to say that Pitt and Thugut saw in it a
clever device for sundering the Anglo-Austrian compact. As appears from a
letter of Canning, Pitt looked on the new Consular Government as a make-
shift. Writing early in December to Canning, Pitt stated that the new French
constitution might prove to be of a moderate American kind. To this
Page 412
Canning answered on the 7th that it might perhaps last long enough to
admit of Bonaparte sending off a courier to London and receiving the reply
if he were kicked back. Or more probably, France would fall under a
military despotism, "of the actual and manifest instability of which you
seem to entertain no doubt." In answer to Pitt's statement "that we ought not
to commit ourselves by any declaration that the restoration of royalty is the
sine qua non condition of peace," Canning advised him to issue a
declaration "that you would treat with a monarchy; that to the monarchy
restored to its rightful owner you would give not only peace, but peace on
the most liberal terms."
Clearly, then, Pitt was less royalist than Canning; but he decided to repel all
overtures from Paris (so he wrote to Dundas on 31st December), because
the condition of France did not provide a solid security for a peace. He
added that he desired "to express strongly the eagerness with which we
should embrace any opening for general peace whenever such solid security
should be attainable. This may, I think, be so expressed as to convey to the
people of France that the shortest road to peace is by effecting the
restoration of Royalty, and thereby to increase the chance of that most
desirable of all issues to the war." As Grenville and Dundas concurred in
this view, the Foreign Office sent off a reply stating that the usual
diplomatic forms would be observed; that His Majesty sought only to
maintain the rights of his subjects against a war of aggression; and that the
present time was unsuitable for negotiations with persons recently placed in
power by a Revolution, until they should disclaim the restless and
subversive schemes which threatened the framework of society. His
Majesty, however, would welcome peace when it could be attained with
security, the best pledge of which would be the restoration of Royalty.
This reply ranks among the greatest mistakes of the time. It made the name
of the Bourbons odious and that of Bonaparte popular throughout France;
admit of Bonaparte sending off a courier to London and receiving the reply
if he were kicked back. Or more probably, France would fall under a
military despotism, "of the actual and manifest instability of which you
seem to entertain no doubt." In answer to Pitt's statement "that we ought not
to commit ourselves by any declaration that the restoration of royalty is the
sine qua non condition of peace," Canning advised him to issue a
declaration "that you would treat with a monarchy; that to the monarchy
restored to its rightful owner you would give not only peace, but peace on
the most liberal terms."
Clearly, then, Pitt was less royalist than Canning; but he decided to repel all
overtures from Paris (so he wrote to Dundas on 31st December), because
the condition of France did not provide a solid security for a peace. He
added that he desired "to express strongly the eagerness with which we
should embrace any opening for general peace whenever such solid security
should be attainable. This may, I think, be so expressed as to convey to the
people of France that the shortest road to peace is by effecting the
restoration of Royalty, and thereby to increase the chance of that most
desirable of all issues to the war." As Grenville and Dundas concurred in
this view, the Foreign Office sent off a reply stating that the usual
diplomatic forms would be observed; that His Majesty sought only to
maintain the rights of his subjects against a war of aggression; and that the
present time was unsuitable for negotiations with persons recently placed in
power by a Revolution, until they should disclaim the restless and
subversive schemes which threatened the framework of society. His
Majesty, however, would welcome peace when it could be attained with
security, the best pledge of which would be the restoration of Royalty.
This reply ranks among the greatest mistakes of the time. It made the name
of the Bourbons odious and that of Bonaparte popular throughout France;
Page 413
and the scornful references to the First Consul's insecurity must have re-
doubled the zeal of Frenchmen for the erection of a truly national and
monarchical system under his auspices. In truth, it is difficult to see why
Pitt, who held out the olive-branch to the newly-established Directory in the
autumn of 1795, should have repelled the proffered hand of Bonaparte. The
probable explanation is that he thought more of the effect of the reply at
Vienna than at Paris. On 6th January Grenville forwarded a copy to Minto,
expressing also the hope that it would be regarded as a sign of the fidelity of
England to the Emperor. Further, Pitt's oration on 3rd February 1800 on this
topic was marked by extreme acerbity against Bonaparte. He descanted on
his perfidy and rapacity at the expense of Venice and the Sultan's
dominions, and deprecated a compact with "this last adventurer in the
lottery of Revolutions.... As a sincere lover of peace," he added, "I will not
sacrifice it by grasping at the shadow, when the reality is not substantially
within my reach. Cur igitur pacem nolo? Quia infida est, quia periculosa,
quia esse non potest."[526] In reply to a verbal challenge from Tierney a
fortnight later, he fired off an harangue which ranks among the ablest and
most fervid of improvisations. The Whig leader having defied him to state
in one sentence without ifs and buts the object of the war, Pitt flung back
the retort:
... I know not whether I can do it in one sentence, but in one word I
can tell him that it is security; security against a danger the greatest
that ever threatened the world; ... against a danger which has been
resisted by all the nations of Europe, and resisted by none with so
much success as by this nation, because by none has it been resisted
so uniformly and with so much energy.... How or where did the
honourable gentleman discover that the Jacobinism of Robespierre,
of Barère, of the Triumvirate, of the Five Directors, which he
acknowledged to be real, has vanished and disappeared because it
has all been centred and condensed into one man, who was reared
doubled the zeal of Frenchmen for the erection of a truly national and
monarchical system under his auspices. In truth, it is difficult to see why
Pitt, who held out the olive-branch to the newly-established Directory in the
autumn of 1795, should have repelled the proffered hand of Bonaparte. The
probable explanation is that he thought more of the effect of the reply at
Vienna than at Paris. On 6th January Grenville forwarded a copy to Minto,
expressing also the hope that it would be regarded as a sign of the fidelity of
England to the Emperor. Further, Pitt's oration on 3rd February 1800 on this
topic was marked by extreme acerbity against Bonaparte. He descanted on
his perfidy and rapacity at the expense of Venice and the Sultan's
dominions, and deprecated a compact with "this last adventurer in the
lottery of Revolutions.... As a sincere lover of peace," he added, "I will not
sacrifice it by grasping at the shadow, when the reality is not substantially
within my reach. Cur igitur pacem nolo? Quia infida est, quia periculosa,
quia esse non potest."[526] In reply to a verbal challenge from Tierney a
fortnight later, he fired off an harangue which ranks among the ablest and
most fervid of improvisations. The Whig leader having defied him to state
in one sentence without ifs and buts the object of the war, Pitt flung back
the retort:
... I know not whether I can do it in one sentence, but in one word I
can tell him that it is security; security against a danger the greatest
that ever threatened the world; ... against a danger which has been
resisted by all the nations of Europe, and resisted by none with so
much success as by this nation, because by none has it been resisted
so uniformly and with so much energy.... How or where did the
honourable gentleman discover that the Jacobinism of Robespierre,
of Barère, of the Triumvirate, of the Five Directors, which he
acknowledged to be real, has vanished and disappeared because it
has all been centred and condensed into one man, who was reared
Page 414
and nursed in its bosom, whose celebrity was gained under its
auspices, who was at once the child and champion of all its
atrocities and horrors? Our security in negotiation is to be this
Buonaparte, who is now the sole organ of all that was formerly
dangerous and pestiferous in the Revolution.... If peace afford no
prospect of security; if it threaten all the evils which we have been
struggling to avert; if the prosecution of the war afford the prospect
of attaining complete security; and if it may be prosecuted with
increasing commerce, with increasing means, and with increasing
prosperity, except what may result from the visitations of the
seasons; then I say it is prudent in us not to negotiate at the present
moment. These are my buts and my ifs. This is my plea, and on no
other do I wish to be tried by God and my country.
One who heard that spirited retort left on record the profound impression
which it produced on the House.[527]
Seeing that Bonaparte was then known merely as an able condottiere, not as
the re-organizer of French society, Pitt's haughty attitude, though
deplorable, is intelligible. The prospects of the war were not unfavourable.
He hoped that Austria, now about to invade Nice and Savoy, would be able
by her own efforts to reduce France within her old limits, England's duty
being to offer help on the Riviera, to make a dash at Brest, and to seize
Belleisle as a base of supplies for the Breton royalists, now once more in
revolt. It is significant that Dundas wrote to Pitt on 4th January expressing
his belief that Bonaparte must be serious in his desire for peace because he
had no other game to play.[528]
Many influences conspired to mar these hopes. The enterprises against
Brest and Belleisle proved to be impracticable, and a landing at Quiberon
failed because the Breton rising occurred too soon. The royalists of
Provence did not rise at all. An attempt by Sir James Pulteney and a small
auspices, who was at once the child and champion of all its
atrocities and horrors? Our security in negotiation is to be this
Buonaparte, who is now the sole organ of all that was formerly
dangerous and pestiferous in the Revolution.... If peace afford no
prospect of security; if it threaten all the evils which we have been
struggling to avert; if the prosecution of the war afford the prospect
of attaining complete security; and if it may be prosecuted with
increasing commerce, with increasing means, and with increasing
prosperity, except what may result from the visitations of the
seasons; then I say it is prudent in us not to negotiate at the present
moment. These are my buts and my ifs. This is my plea, and on no
other do I wish to be tried by God and my country.
One who heard that spirited retort left on record the profound impression
which it produced on the House.[527]
Seeing that Bonaparte was then known merely as an able condottiere, not as
the re-organizer of French society, Pitt's haughty attitude, though
deplorable, is intelligible. The prospects of the war were not unfavourable.
He hoped that Austria, now about to invade Nice and Savoy, would be able
by her own efforts to reduce France within her old limits, England's duty
being to offer help on the Riviera, to make a dash at Brest, and to seize
Belleisle as a base of supplies for the Breton royalists, now once more in
revolt. It is significant that Dundas wrote to Pitt on 4th January expressing
his belief that Bonaparte must be serious in his desire for peace because he
had no other game to play.[528]
Many influences conspired to mar these hopes. The enterprises against
Brest and Belleisle proved to be impracticable, and a landing at Quiberon
failed because the Breton rising occurred too soon. The royalists of
Provence did not rise at all. An attempt by Sir James Pulteney and a small
Page 415
force upon Ferrol was an utter failure. All the operations were paralysed by
uncertainty as to the future conduct of Russia. The indignation of the Czar
against Austria extended to England after the failure of the joint expedition
to Holland; and his testiness increased owing to maritime disputes and the
friction caused by the outrages of his troops in the Channel Islands. In the
Riviera the Austrians continued their successes, and finally shut up Masséna
in Genoa, where the British fleet rendered valuable service. But it is not
surprising to find Grenville writing on 10th April to Dundas: "For God's
sake, for your own honour, and for the cause in which we are engaged, do
not let us, after having by immense exertions collected a fine army, leave it
unemployed, gaping after messengers from Genoa, Augsburg, and Vienna
till the moment for acting is irrecoverably passed by."
This, however, was the outcome of events. The French, acting on interior
lines, and propelled by the will of Bonaparte, utterly crushed these sporadic
efforts. The Royalists were quelled or pacified, the coasts were well
guarded, while the First Consul, crossing the Great St. Bernard, overthrew
the Austrians at Marengo (14th June). Before long Naples made peace with
the conqueror. Meanwhile the Sea Power, operating on diverse coasts,
delayed, but did not reverse, the progress of the French arms. British forces
for a time defended Portugal and held Minorca and the citadel of Messina,
but without any appreciable effect on Spain or Italy. The fleet played an
important part in starving out the French garrisons of Genoa and Valetta.
But elsewhere the action, or inaction, of the British forces was
discreditable. True, the conditions were adverse, but an army numbering
more than 80,000 men, and costing nearly £10,000,000 sterling, should
have accomplished something in Europe.
Only at one point did the British arms win a decisive success. The French
occupation of Egypt had aroused the apprehensions of Dundas for India;
and throughout the year 1800 he continued to urge an expedition to Egypt,
uncertainty as to the future conduct of Russia. The indignation of the Czar
against Austria extended to England after the failure of the joint expedition
to Holland; and his testiness increased owing to maritime disputes and the
friction caused by the outrages of his troops in the Channel Islands. In the
Riviera the Austrians continued their successes, and finally shut up Masséna
in Genoa, where the British fleet rendered valuable service. But it is not
surprising to find Grenville writing on 10th April to Dundas: "For God's
sake, for your own honour, and for the cause in which we are engaged, do
not let us, after having by immense exertions collected a fine army, leave it
unemployed, gaping after messengers from Genoa, Augsburg, and Vienna
till the moment for acting is irrecoverably passed by."
This, however, was the outcome of events. The French, acting on interior
lines, and propelled by the will of Bonaparte, utterly crushed these sporadic
efforts. The Royalists were quelled or pacified, the coasts were well
guarded, while the First Consul, crossing the Great St. Bernard, overthrew
the Austrians at Marengo (14th June). Before long Naples made peace with
the conqueror. Meanwhile the Sea Power, operating on diverse coasts,
delayed, but did not reverse, the progress of the French arms. British forces
for a time defended Portugal and held Minorca and the citadel of Messina,
but without any appreciable effect on Spain or Italy. The fleet played an
important part in starving out the French garrisons of Genoa and Valetta.
But elsewhere the action, or inaction, of the British forces was
discreditable. True, the conditions were adverse, but an army numbering
more than 80,000 men, and costing nearly £10,000,000 sterling, should
have accomplished something in Europe.
Only at one point did the British arms win a decisive success. The French
occupation of Egypt had aroused the apprehensions of Dundas for India;
and throughout the year 1800 he continued to urge an expedition to Egypt,
Page 416
though other Ministers inclined to put it off. Finally, when Bonaparte's
triumph at Marengo shattered all hopes of an Austrian invasion of
Provence, and the surrender of Valetta, early in September, set free the
British squadron long blockading that port, Dundas pressed the Egyptian
project in a letter to Pitt, dated Wimbledon, 19th September 1800. The gist
of it is as follows:[529]
On reconsidering the discussion on Egypt at the Cabinet meeting of
yesterday, I am impressed by the danger of delaying action. The
importance of expelling the French from Egypt is obvious; for it is
clear that Bonaparte will subordinate every object to the retention of
that colony. The danger to India may not be immediate, but it must
be faced. Besides, our sacrifice of Turkish interests to those of
Austria [that is, by refusing to ratify the Franco-Turkish Convention
of El Arish] may induce the Sultan to bargain with France on terms
very unfavourable to us. Or, again, France and Russia may plan a
partition of the Ottoman Empire. The objections, that we are
pledged to do what we can for Portugal and Austria, are not vital.
For Portugal is safe while the Viennese Court opposes France; and
by our subsidies and naval help we have borne our fair share in the
Coalition. Further efforts in that direction will be fruitless. We must
now see to our own interests. By occupying all the posts of Egypt,
we can coop up the French and force them to capitulate. Action
must not be postponed for any consideration whatever.
The opinion of Dundas soon prevailed; for, on 6th October, Grenville wrote
that the Egyptian Expedition was decided on. As is well known, the joint
efforts of forces from England, India, and the Cape of Good Hope brought
about the surrender of the French garrisons, and the acquisition for the
British Museum of the treasures designed for the Louvre. This brilliant
result was in the last instance due to Abercromby, Hutchinson, Popham, and
their coadjutors. But the enterprise resulted from the untiring championship
triumph at Marengo shattered all hopes of an Austrian invasion of
Provence, and the surrender of Valetta, early in September, set free the
British squadron long blockading that port, Dundas pressed the Egyptian
project in a letter to Pitt, dated Wimbledon, 19th September 1800. The gist
of it is as follows:[529]
On reconsidering the discussion on Egypt at the Cabinet meeting of
yesterday, I am impressed by the danger of delaying action. The
importance of expelling the French from Egypt is obvious; for it is
clear that Bonaparte will subordinate every object to the retention of
that colony. The danger to India may not be immediate, but it must
be faced. Besides, our sacrifice of Turkish interests to those of
Austria [that is, by refusing to ratify the Franco-Turkish Convention
of El Arish] may induce the Sultan to bargain with France on terms
very unfavourable to us. Or, again, France and Russia may plan a
partition of the Ottoman Empire. The objections, that we are
pledged to do what we can for Portugal and Austria, are not vital.
For Portugal is safe while the Viennese Court opposes France; and
by our subsidies and naval help we have borne our fair share in the
Coalition. Further efforts in that direction will be fruitless. We must
now see to our own interests. By occupying all the posts of Egypt,
we can coop up the French and force them to capitulate. Action
must not be postponed for any consideration whatever.
The opinion of Dundas soon prevailed; for, on 6th October, Grenville wrote
that the Egyptian Expedition was decided on. As is well known, the joint
efforts of forces from England, India, and the Cape of Good Hope brought
about the surrender of the French garrisons, and the acquisition for the
British Museum of the treasures designed for the Louvre. This brilliant
result was in the last instance due to Abercromby, Hutchinson, Popham, and
their coadjutors. But the enterprise resulted from the untiring championship
Page 417
of the interests of India by Dundas. Long afterwards at Perthshire dinner-
tables he used to tell with pride how George III once proposed a toast to the
Minister who planned the expedition to Egypt and in doing so had the
courage to oppose not only his colleagues but his King.
As the year 1800 drew to its close, the opposition of the Baltic Powers to
the British maritime code became most threatening. The questions at issue
are too technical to be discussed here. Pitt and his colleagues believed the
maintenance of the rights of search and of the seizure of an enemy's goods
on neutral ships to be essential to the existence of England. For this view of
the case much was to be said. In every war France used neutral ships in
order to get supplies; and the neutrals themselves sought to filch trade from
British merchants. Now, to hinder or destroy the commerce of the enemy,
and to prevent neutrals from bringing naval stores to his ports, were the
only means of bringing pressure from the sea upon the dominant Land
Power. In a strife for life or death Pitt and his colleagues perforce made use
of every weapon, even to the detriment of non-combatants. This stiff
attitude, however, contrasted with that of Bonaparte, who, in July 1800
flattered the Czar by sending back Russian prisoners and by offering to cede
Malta to him. Paul, not knowing that the fall of Valetta was imminent, was
duped by this device; and, a few weeks later, occurred the rupture between
Russia and England.
Thus, within a year, the Second Coalition against France went to pieces, and
was succeeded by a league against England. Thanks to the victory of
Nelson at Copenhagen and the murder of the Czar Paul in the spring of
1801, that unnatural alliance speedily collapsed. These events, however,
belong to a time subsequent to Pitt's resignation of office, after the
completion of the union with Ireland, to which we must now return. Enough
has been said to show the statesmanlike nature of his plans for the
vindication of European independence. The intrigues of Thugut, the selfish
tables he used to tell with pride how George III once proposed a toast to the
Minister who planned the expedition to Egypt and in doing so had the
courage to oppose not only his colleagues but his King.
As the year 1800 drew to its close, the opposition of the Baltic Powers to
the British maritime code became most threatening. The questions at issue
are too technical to be discussed here. Pitt and his colleagues believed the
maintenance of the rights of search and of the seizure of an enemy's goods
on neutral ships to be essential to the existence of England. For this view of
the case much was to be said. In every war France used neutral ships in
order to get supplies; and the neutrals themselves sought to filch trade from
British merchants. Now, to hinder or destroy the commerce of the enemy,
and to prevent neutrals from bringing naval stores to his ports, were the
only means of bringing pressure from the sea upon the dominant Land
Power. In a strife for life or death Pitt and his colleagues perforce made use
of every weapon, even to the detriment of non-combatants. This stiff
attitude, however, contrasted with that of Bonaparte, who, in July 1800
flattered the Czar by sending back Russian prisoners and by offering to cede
Malta to him. Paul, not knowing that the fall of Valetta was imminent, was
duped by this device; and, a few weeks later, occurred the rupture between
Russia and England.
Thus, within a year, the Second Coalition against France went to pieces, and
was succeeded by a league against England. Thanks to the victory of
Nelson at Copenhagen and the murder of the Czar Paul in the spring of
1801, that unnatural alliance speedily collapsed. These events, however,
belong to a time subsequent to Pitt's resignation of office, after the
completion of the union with Ireland, to which we must now return. Enough
has been said to show the statesmanlike nature of his plans for the
vindication of European independence. The intrigues of Thugut, the selfish
Page 418
isolation of Prussia, and the mad oscillations of Paul marred those plans and
left the Continent a prey to the unbridled ambition of Bonaparte, from
which it was to be saved only after a decade of exhausting wars.
left the Continent a prey to the unbridled ambition of Bonaparte, from
which it was to be saved only after a decade of exhausting wars.
Page 419
CHAPTER XVIII
THE UNION
I am determined not to submit to the
insertion of any clause that shall make the
exclusion of the Catholics a fundamental part
of the Union, as I am fully convinced that,
until the Catholics are admitted into a general
participation of rights (which, when
incorporated with the British Government,
they cannot abuse) there will be no peace or
safety in Ireland.—Cornwallis to Ross, 30th
September 1798.
The fairest method of dealing with the Act of Union of the British and Irish
Parliaments seems to be, firstly, to trace the development of Pitt's thoughts
on that subject; secondly, to survey the state of affairs in Ireland after the
Rebellion of 1798; and thirdly, to trace the course of the negotiations
whereby the new Lord Lieutenant, Cornwallis, succeeded in carrying
through the measure itself.
Firstly, it is clear that Pitt had long felt the need of closer commercial ties
between the two islands. As was shown in Chapter XI of the former part of
this work, he sought to prepare the way for such a measure in the session of
1785. The importance which he attached to the freeing of inter-insular trade
THE UNION
I am determined not to submit to the
insertion of any clause that shall make the
exclusion of the Catholics a fundamental part
of the Union, as I am fully convinced that,
until the Catholics are admitted into a general
participation of rights (which, when
incorporated with the British Government,
they cannot abuse) there will be no peace or
safety in Ireland.—Cornwallis to Ross, 30th
September 1798.
The fairest method of dealing with the Act of Union of the British and Irish
Parliaments seems to be, firstly, to trace the development of Pitt's thoughts
on that subject; secondly, to survey the state of affairs in Ireland after the
Rebellion of 1798; and thirdly, to trace the course of the negotiations
whereby the new Lord Lieutenant, Cornwallis, succeeded in carrying
through the measure itself.
Firstly, it is clear that Pitt had long felt the need of closer commercial ties
between the two islands. As was shown in Chapter XI of the former part of
this work, he sought to prepare the way for such a measure in the session of
1785. The importance which he attached to the freeing of inter-insular trade
Page 420
appears in a phrase of his letter of 6th January 1785 to the Duke of Rutland
as to Great Britain and Ireland becoming "one country in effect, though for
local concerns under distinct legislatures," This represents his first thoughts
on the subject. Obviously they were then limited to a commercial union. If
the two Parliaments and the two nations could have shaken off their
commercial jealousies, Pitt would probably have been satisfied with
fostering the prosperity of both islands, while leaving their legislative
machinery intact. But, being thwarted by the stupidity of British traders and
the nagging tactics adopted at Dublin, he wrote to Rutland that his plan was
not discredited by failure and they must "await times and seasons for
carrying it into effect."
Times and seasons brought, not peace and quiet, but the French Revolution.
With it there came an increase of racial and religious feuds, which,
however, did but strengthen his conviction of the need of a closer
connection between the two islands; witness his letter of 18th November
1792 to the Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Westmorland:
The idea of the present fermentation gradually bringing both parties
to think of an Union with this country has long been in my mind. I
hardly dare flatter myself with the hope of its taking place; but I
believe it, tho' itself not easy to be accomplished, to be the only
solution for other and greater difficulties. The admission of
Catholics to a share of suffrage could not then be dangerous. The
Protestant interest, in point of power, property and Church
Establishment, would be secure because the decided majority of the
supreme Legislature would necessarily be Protestant; and the great
ground of argument on the part of the Catholics would be done
away, as, compared with the rest of the Empire, they would become
a minority. You will judge when and to whom this idea can be
confided. It must certainly require great delicacy and management;
but I am heartily glad that it is at least in your thoughts.[530]
as to Great Britain and Ireland becoming "one country in effect, though for
local concerns under distinct legislatures," This represents his first thoughts
on the subject. Obviously they were then limited to a commercial union. If
the two Parliaments and the two nations could have shaken off their
commercial jealousies, Pitt would probably have been satisfied with
fostering the prosperity of both islands, while leaving their legislative
machinery intact. But, being thwarted by the stupidity of British traders and
the nagging tactics adopted at Dublin, he wrote to Rutland that his plan was
not discredited by failure and they must "await times and seasons for
carrying it into effect."
Times and seasons brought, not peace and quiet, but the French Revolution.
With it there came an increase of racial and religious feuds, which,
however, did but strengthen his conviction of the need of a closer
connection between the two islands; witness his letter of 18th November
1792 to the Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Westmorland:
The idea of the present fermentation gradually bringing both parties
to think of an Union with this country has long been in my mind. I
hardly dare flatter myself with the hope of its taking place; but I
believe it, tho' itself not easy to be accomplished, to be the only
solution for other and greater difficulties. The admission of
Catholics to a share of suffrage could not then be dangerous. The
Protestant interest, in point of power, property and Church
Establishment, would be secure because the decided majority of the
supreme Legislature would necessarily be Protestant; and the great
ground of argument on the part of the Catholics would be done
away, as, compared with the rest of the Empire, they would become
a minority. You will judge when and to whom this idea can be
confided. It must certainly require great delicacy and management;
but I am heartily glad that it is at least in your thoughts.[530]
Page 421
These words show why Pitt allowed proposals so imperfect as the Franchise
Bill of 1793 to become law. It enfranchised most of the Irish peasantry, the
great majority of whom were Catholics, though men of their creed were
excluded from Parliament. But he hoped in the future to supplement it by a
far greater measure which would render the admission of Catholics to
Parliament innocuous, namely, by the formation of a united Parliament in
which they would command only a small minority of votes. Pitt's words
open up a vista which receded far away amidst the smoke of war and the
mirage of bigotry, and did not come into sight until the second decade of the
period of peace, when Canning, Pitt's disciple, was the chief champion of
the measure here first clearly outlined. Pitt, then, desired a Union as the sole
means of ending commercial disputes, otherwise as insoluble as those
between England and Scotland previous to the year 1707; but also for an
even weightier reason, because only so could the religious discords of
Irishmen be ended; only so could the chafing of the majority against the
rule of a cramping caste cease. By the formation of an Imperial Parliament,
the Irish Protestants would have solid guarantees against the subversion of
all that they held most dear.
The full realization of these aims was impossible. Early in 1793 came war
with France, with its sequel, the heating of nationalist and religious feeling
in Ireland; and while the officials of Dublin Castle embarked on a policy of
repression, the United Irishmen looked for help to Paris. The results
appeared in the Rebellion of 1798. The oft-repeated assertion that Pitt and
Camden brought about the revolt in order to force on the Union is at
variance with all the available evidence. They sought by all possible means
to prevent a rising, which, with a reasonable amount of help from France,
must have shaken the British Empire to its base. When the rebellion came
and developed into a bloody religious feud, they saw that the time for a
Union had come.
Bill of 1793 to become law. It enfranchised most of the Irish peasantry, the
great majority of whom were Catholics, though men of their creed were
excluded from Parliament. But he hoped in the future to supplement it by a
far greater measure which would render the admission of Catholics to
Parliament innocuous, namely, by the formation of a united Parliament in
which they would command only a small minority of votes. Pitt's words
open up a vista which receded far away amidst the smoke of war and the
mirage of bigotry, and did not come into sight until the second decade of the
period of peace, when Canning, Pitt's disciple, was the chief champion of
the measure here first clearly outlined. Pitt, then, desired a Union as the sole
means of ending commercial disputes, otherwise as insoluble as those
between England and Scotland previous to the year 1707; but also for an
even weightier reason, because only so could the religious discords of
Irishmen be ended; only so could the chafing of the majority against the
rule of a cramping caste cease. By the formation of an Imperial Parliament,
the Irish Protestants would have solid guarantees against the subversion of
all that they held most dear.
The full realization of these aims was impossible. Early in 1793 came war
with France, with its sequel, the heating of nationalist and religious feeling
in Ireland; and while the officials of Dublin Castle embarked on a policy of
repression, the United Irishmen looked for help to Paris. The results
appeared in the Rebellion of 1798. The oft-repeated assertion that Pitt and
Camden brought about the revolt in order to force on the Union is at
variance with all the available evidence. They sought by all possible means
to prevent a rising, which, with a reasonable amount of help from France,
must have shaken the British Empire to its base. When the rebellion came
and developed into a bloody religious feud, they saw that the time for a
Union had come.
Page 422
The best means of checking hasty generalizations is to peruse letters written
at the time, before ingenious theories could be spun. Now, the definite
proposal of a Union very rarely occurs before the month of June 1798. One
of the first references is in a letter of the Lord Chancellor, Loughborough, to
Pitt, dated 13th June 1798. After approving the appointment of Cornwallis
as the best means of quelling the revolt in Ireland, he adds: "Every
reasonable man in that country must feel that their preservation depends on
their connection with England, and it ought [to] be their first wish to make
it more entire. It would be very rash to make any such suggestion from
hence: but we should be prepared to receive it and to impose the idea
whenever it begins to appear in Ireland."[531]
More important, as showing the impossibility of continuing the present
chaotic administration at Dublin, is the following letter from the Earl of
Carlisle, formerly Lord Lieutenant, to Pitt. It is undated, but probably
belongs to 2nd June 1798:[532]
... It may perhaps be but a weak apology for this interruption to own
I cannot help looking at that country [Ireland] with a sort of
affection, like an old house which one has once inhabited, not
disliking the antient arrangement of its interior, and perhaps
unreasonably prejudiced against many of its modern innovations.
The innovation that has long given me uneasiness, and which now
seems most seriously to perplex the Irish Government, was the fatal
institution of an Irish Cabinet, which has worked itself into being,
considered almost as a component part of that deputed authority. A
Government composed of Lords Justices, natives of that country, as
a permanent establishment, absurd as such an expedient might be,
would not have at least that radical defect of authority disjoined
from responsibility. We now feel all the bad effects of a power
which should never have been confer'd, and which is strengthen'd
at the time, before ingenious theories could be spun. Now, the definite
proposal of a Union very rarely occurs before the month of June 1798. One
of the first references is in a letter of the Lord Chancellor, Loughborough, to
Pitt, dated 13th June 1798. After approving the appointment of Cornwallis
as the best means of quelling the revolt in Ireland, he adds: "Every
reasonable man in that country must feel that their preservation depends on
their connection with England, and it ought [to] be their first wish to make
it more entire. It would be very rash to make any such suggestion from
hence: but we should be prepared to receive it and to impose the idea
whenever it begins to appear in Ireland."[531]
More important, as showing the impossibility of continuing the present
chaotic administration at Dublin, is the following letter from the Earl of
Carlisle, formerly Lord Lieutenant, to Pitt. It is undated, but probably
belongs to 2nd June 1798:[532]
... It may perhaps be but a weak apology for this interruption to own
I cannot help looking at that country [Ireland] with a sort of
affection, like an old house which one has once inhabited, not
disliking the antient arrangement of its interior, and perhaps
unreasonably prejudiced against many of its modern innovations.
The innovation that has long given me uneasiness, and which now
seems most seriously to perplex the Irish Government, was the fatal
institution of an Irish Cabinet, which has worked itself into being,
considered almost as a component part of that deputed authority. A
Government composed of Lords Justices, natives of that country, as
a permanent establishment, absurd as such an expedient might be,
would not have at least that radical defect of authority disjoined
from responsibility. We now feel all the bad effects of a power
which should never have been confer'd, and which is strengthen'd
Page 423
from hence by many acting with you, so as to make it impossible for
the Lord Lieutenant to manage with it or without it.
You have, in my poor judgment, an opportunity offer'd to crush at
one blow this defective system. Ireland, I scruple not to say, cannot
be saved if you permit an hour longer almost the military defence of
that country to depend upon the tactical dictates of Chancellors,
Speaker of the House of Commons, etc. I mean to speak with no
disrespect of Lord Camden; I never heard anything but to his
honour; but I maintain under the present circumstances the best
soldier would make the best Lord-Lieutenant; one on whom no
Junto there would presume to fling their shackles, and one who
would cut them short if they presumed to talk of what they did not
understand. With this idea, I confess, Ld Cornwallis naturally occurs
to me. Next to this, but not so efficacious, would be sending some
one equal to the military duties, freed from all control, saving that,
for form's sake, good sense would acquiesce under to [sic] the
King's Deputy. But I cannot doubt but a deeper change would be
most advisable. The disaffected to our Government (and I fear it is
too general) may perhaps have their degrees and divisions of
animosity against it, and some possibly may be changed by a
change of men more than by a professed change of measures, which
perhaps they think little about. I know they are taught to believe a
particular set of men are their enemies; in truth I question if, in
tyrannising over and thwarting the Castle, and talking so
injudiciously, they ought to be considered as our friends....
Thus the man to whom in 1795 Earl Fitzwilliam poured forth his grievances
against Pitt, now advised him to end the mischievous dualism at Dublin,
which enabled Lords Justices and the Speaker of the Irish House of
Commons to paralyse the Executive. There, as at Berlin, advisers who had
great influence but no official responsibility, often intervened with
disastrous results; and not until Stein took the tiller after Tilsit did the
Prussian ship of State pursue a straight course. At Dublin the crisis of 1798
the Lord Lieutenant to manage with it or without it.
You have, in my poor judgment, an opportunity offer'd to crush at
one blow this defective system. Ireland, I scruple not to say, cannot
be saved if you permit an hour longer almost the military defence of
that country to depend upon the tactical dictates of Chancellors,
Speaker of the House of Commons, etc. I mean to speak with no
disrespect of Lord Camden; I never heard anything but to his
honour; but I maintain under the present circumstances the best
soldier would make the best Lord-Lieutenant; one on whom no
Junto there would presume to fling their shackles, and one who
would cut them short if they presumed to talk of what they did not
understand. With this idea, I confess, Ld Cornwallis naturally occurs
to me. Next to this, but not so efficacious, would be sending some
one equal to the military duties, freed from all control, saving that,
for form's sake, good sense would acquiesce under to [sic] the
King's Deputy. But I cannot doubt but a deeper change would be
most advisable. The disaffected to our Government (and I fear it is
too general) may perhaps have their degrees and divisions of
animosity against it, and some possibly may be changed by a
change of men more than by a professed change of measures, which
perhaps they think little about. I know they are taught to believe a
particular set of men are their enemies; in truth I question if, in
tyrannising over and thwarting the Castle, and talking so
injudiciously, they ought to be considered as our friends....
Thus the man to whom in 1795 Earl Fitzwilliam poured forth his grievances
against Pitt, now advised him to end the mischievous dualism at Dublin,
which enabled Lords Justices and the Speaker of the Irish House of
Commons to paralyse the Executive. There, as at Berlin, advisers who had
great influence but no official responsibility, often intervened with
disastrous results; and not until Stein took the tiller after Tilsit did the
Prussian ship of State pursue a straight course. At Dublin the crisis of 1798
Page 424
revealed the weakness of the Irish Executive, and naturally led to a
complete break with the past.[533]
Amidst the mass of Pitt's papers relating to Ireland there is no sign of his
intention to press on an Act of Union before the middle of the month of
June 1798, that is, in the midst of the Rebellion. The first reference to it
occurs in a memorandum endorsed by Pitt "received June 19, 1798," and
obviously drawn up by Camden a few days before he resigned the
Viceroyalty in favour of Cornwallis. Pitt's letter of inquiry is missing.
Camden's reply is too long for quotation, but may be thus summarized:
The plan of a Union should be detailed as far as possible before it is
attempted. The King's Cabinet should be at once consulted, also
leading persons in both islands. If their opinion is favourable, the
measure should then be brought forward. If the Catholic claims are
to be met, the advice of their leading men, as for instance Lords
Fingal and Kenmare, should be sought. The legal attainments of the
Irish Chancellor, the Earl of Clare, and the parliamentary and
commercial connections of the Speaker, Foster, entitle their opinions
to great weight. Foster may perhaps be won over by the offer of an
English peerage. The Irish Bar, as also Lords Shannon and Ely, will
probably oppose a Union. Some persons will object to the admission
of Catholics even to the United Parliament, though that measure
cannot do harm. The Scottish Catholics should have the same
privileges accorded to them, and a provision should be made for the
Dissenting clergy. Parliamentary Reform must be considered, but it
will not be dangerous now. The French will never make peace until
Great Britain is weakened. The religious difficulty of a Union will
not be great, for the Protestants will always form the majority in the
complete break with the past.[533]
Amidst the mass of Pitt's papers relating to Ireland there is no sign of his
intention to press on an Act of Union before the middle of the month of
June 1798, that is, in the midst of the Rebellion. The first reference to it
occurs in a memorandum endorsed by Pitt "received June 19, 1798," and
obviously drawn up by Camden a few days before he resigned the
Viceroyalty in favour of Cornwallis. Pitt's letter of inquiry is missing.
Camden's reply is too long for quotation, but may be thus summarized:
The plan of a Union should be detailed as far as possible before it is
attempted. The King's Cabinet should be at once consulted, also
leading persons in both islands. If their opinion is favourable, the
measure should then be brought forward. If the Catholic claims are
to be met, the advice of their leading men, as for instance Lords
Fingal and Kenmare, should be sought. The legal attainments of the
Irish Chancellor, the Earl of Clare, and the parliamentary and
commercial connections of the Speaker, Foster, entitle their opinions
to great weight. Foster may perhaps be won over by the offer of an
English peerage. The Irish Bar, as also Lords Shannon and Ely, will
probably oppose a Union. Some persons will object to the admission
of Catholics even to the United Parliament, though that measure
cannot do harm. The Scottish Catholics should have the same
privileges accorded to them, and a provision should be made for the
Dissenting clergy. Parliamentary Reform must be considered, but it
will not be dangerous now. The French will never make peace until
Great Britain is weakened. The religious difficulty of a Union will
not be great, for the Protestants will always form the majority in the
Page 425
United Parliament. Legal expenses in the case of Irish suits will be
little more than in Scottish suits. As Dublin will suffer from the
removal of the Parliament, the Lord Lieutenant's Court must be kept
up in great splendour, the residence of influential persons in Ireland
being encouraged in every possible way. The communications
between the two islands must be improved, free packet-boats being
provided. In a postscript Camden adds that he hopes Cornwallis will
continue the present repressive policy, which otherwise must appear
unduly harsh by contrast.[534]
The most significant passages are those in which Camden refers to the plan
of a Union as so unformed as to require preliminary inquiries, and in which
he presumes that after the Union Dissenters and Catholics will have "the
same advantages as are bestowed upon the rest of the inhabitants of the
three kingdoms." Clearly, then, Pitt and Camden had come to no decision
on the Union; but Camden, from what he knew of Pitt's views, believed that
he favoured a broad and inclusive policy, not a Union framed on a narrowly
Protestant basis. Neither of them seems to have anticipated serious
resistance on the religious question, even though the King, at the time of the
Fitzwilliam crisis of 1795, had declared the admission of Catholics to the
Irish Parliament to be a matter which concerned his conscience, not his
Cabinet.
It is also obvious that the question of the Union was forced to the front by
the cumbrous dualism of the Irish Executive, which proved to be utterly
unable to cope with the crisis of the Rebellion. The King, as we have seen,
shrewdly suggested that Cornwallis ought to make use of the fears of Irish
loyalists in order to frighten the Dublin Parliament into acquiescence in an
Act of Union. The same opinion was gaining ground; but several of Pitt's
supporters doubted the advisability of so far-reaching a measure. Thus, on
4th July 1798, Hatsell, Clerk of the House of Commons, wrote to Auckland
little more than in Scottish suits. As Dublin will suffer from the
removal of the Parliament, the Lord Lieutenant's Court must be kept
up in great splendour, the residence of influential persons in Ireland
being encouraged in every possible way. The communications
between the two islands must be improved, free packet-boats being
provided. In a postscript Camden adds that he hopes Cornwallis will
continue the present repressive policy, which otherwise must appear
unduly harsh by contrast.[534]
The most significant passages are those in which Camden refers to the plan
of a Union as so unformed as to require preliminary inquiries, and in which
he presumes that after the Union Dissenters and Catholics will have "the
same advantages as are bestowed upon the rest of the inhabitants of the
three kingdoms." Clearly, then, Pitt and Camden had come to no decision
on the Union; but Camden, from what he knew of Pitt's views, believed that
he favoured a broad and inclusive policy, not a Union framed on a narrowly
Protestant basis. Neither of them seems to have anticipated serious
resistance on the religious question, even though the King, at the time of the
Fitzwilliam crisis of 1795, had declared the admission of Catholics to the
Irish Parliament to be a matter which concerned his conscience, not his
Cabinet.
It is also obvious that the question of the Union was forced to the front by
the cumbrous dualism of the Irish Executive, which proved to be utterly
unable to cope with the crisis of the Rebellion. The King, as we have seen,
shrewdly suggested that Cornwallis ought to make use of the fears of Irish
loyalists in order to frighten the Dublin Parliament into acquiescence in an
Act of Union. The same opinion was gaining ground; but several of Pitt's
supporters doubted the advisability of so far-reaching a measure. Thus, on
4th July 1798, Hatsell, Clerk of the House of Commons, wrote to Auckland
Page 426
that of all possible plans a Union was the worst, "full of difficulties, to be
brought about by errant jobs; and, when done, not answering the purpose.
You must take out the teeth, or give the Catholics sops to eat. One or other;
but the half-measure won't do." Better balanced was the judgement of the
Earl of Carlisle, as stated to Auckland some time in September. After asking
whether the recurrence of local risings in Ireland did not prove the
unwisdom of the policy of lenience pursued by Cornwallis, he added these
significant words: "In this distress it is not strange that we should turn to the
expedient of Union; but this is running in a dark night for a port we are little
acquainted with.... If you did not satisfy Ireland by the measure and take off
some part of those ill-disposed to England, you would only make matters
worse. But in truth something must be done, or we must fight for Ireland
once a week."[535]
That the activity of the rebels varied according to the prospects of aid from
France was manifest. Thus, on 25th July Beresford wrote to Auckland that
the people seemed tired of rebellion, which would die out unless the French
landed. But on 22nd August, after the arrival of Humbert's little force in
Killala Bay, he described the whole country as in revolt. The State
prisoners, O'Connor, McNevin, and Addis Emmett, sent to the papers a
denial of their former pacific assurances;[536] and even after the surrender of
Humbert's force, Beresford wrote to Auckland on 15th September: "...
Should the French or the Dutch get out an armament and land, there will be
a very general rising. I have it from a man on whose veracity I can depend,
and who was on the spot in Mayo, during the French invasion, that the
Catholics of the country ran to join them with eagerness, and that they had
more than they could arm; that, as they moved on, they were constantly
joined; but he says the Irish behaved so ill that the French made use of
discipline, which thinned their ranks; however, they had 4,000 of them
when they were attacked by Colonel Vereker, and about 200 of the Limerick
militia. By our late accounts there are said to be in Mayo and Roscommon
brought about by errant jobs; and, when done, not answering the purpose.
You must take out the teeth, or give the Catholics sops to eat. One or other;
but the half-measure won't do." Better balanced was the judgement of the
Earl of Carlisle, as stated to Auckland some time in September. After asking
whether the recurrence of local risings in Ireland did not prove the
unwisdom of the policy of lenience pursued by Cornwallis, he added these
significant words: "In this distress it is not strange that we should turn to the
expedient of Union; but this is running in a dark night for a port we are little
acquainted with.... If you did not satisfy Ireland by the measure and take off
some part of those ill-disposed to England, you would only make matters
worse. But in truth something must be done, or we must fight for Ireland
once a week."[535]
That the activity of the rebels varied according to the prospects of aid from
France was manifest. Thus, on 25th July Beresford wrote to Auckland that
the people seemed tired of rebellion, which would die out unless the French
landed. But on 22nd August, after the arrival of Humbert's little force in
Killala Bay, he described the whole country as in revolt. The State
prisoners, O'Connor, McNevin, and Addis Emmett, sent to the papers a
denial of their former pacific assurances;[536] and even after the surrender of
Humbert's force, Beresford wrote to Auckland on 15th September: "...
Should the French or the Dutch get out an armament and land, there will be
a very general rising. I have it from a man on whose veracity I can depend,
and who was on the spot in Mayo, during the French invasion, that the
Catholics of the country ran to join them with eagerness, and that they had
more than they could arm; that, as they moved on, they were constantly
joined; but he says the Irish behaved so ill that the French made use of
discipline, which thinned their ranks; however, they had 4,000 of them
when they were attacked by Colonel Vereker, and about 200 of the Limerick
militia. By our late accounts there are said to be in Mayo and Roscommon
Page 427
10,000 rebels up: they are destroying the country."[537] Beresford then
blames the Viceroy's proclamation, offering pardon to rebels who come in
within a month, and he says their leaders tell them that 20,000 French will
soon land. Equally significant is the statement of George Rose in a letter of
23rd September. Referring to the fact that two French warships had got
away from Brest towards the Irish coast, he writes: "If they land, the
struggle may be more serious. The truth is that it will be nearly impossible
to keep Ireland as a conquered country. Union is become more urgent than
ever." This was also the opinion of Lord Sheffield. Writing on 29th
September from Rottingdean to Auckland, he remarks on the disquieting
ease with which the French squadrons reach Ireland. He has had a long
argument with the Irish Judge, Sir William Downes, and proved to him the
necessity of a Union with Ireland. But (he proceeds) it will never take place,
if it is set about publicly.
Irish loyalists united in decrying the comparatively lenient methods of
Cornwallis; but, despite the urgent advice of Camden to Pitt, the change of
system met with approval at Downing Street. This is the more remarkable
as letters from Dublin were full of invectives against Cornwallis.
Buckingham wrote almost daily to his brother, Grenville, foretelling ruin
from the weakness and vacillation of the Lord Lieutenant. Still more furious
were Beresford, Cooke, and Lees. Their correspondence with Auckland,
Postmaster-General at London, was so systematic as to imply design.
Probably they sought to procure the dismissal of Cornwallis and the
nomination of Auckland in his place. There can be little doubt that
Auckland lent himself to the scheme with a view to maintaining the
Protestant ascendancy unimpaired; for he wrote to Beresford that public
opinion in England favoured the maintenance of the existing order of things
in Church and State in both kingdoms. The following extracts from the
letters which he received from Cooke and Lees are typical. On 4th October
Lees writes: "I am afraid Lord Cornwallis is not devil enough to deal with
blames the Viceroy's proclamation, offering pardon to rebels who come in
within a month, and he says their leaders tell them that 20,000 French will
soon land. Equally significant is the statement of George Rose in a letter of
23rd September. Referring to the fact that two French warships had got
away from Brest towards the Irish coast, he writes: "If they land, the
struggle may be more serious. The truth is that it will be nearly impossible
to keep Ireland as a conquered country. Union is become more urgent than
ever." This was also the opinion of Lord Sheffield. Writing on 29th
September from Rottingdean to Auckland, he remarks on the disquieting
ease with which the French squadrons reach Ireland. He has had a long
argument with the Irish Judge, Sir William Downes, and proved to him the
necessity of a Union with Ireland. But (he proceeds) it will never take place,
if it is set about publicly.
Irish loyalists united in decrying the comparatively lenient methods of
Cornwallis; but, despite the urgent advice of Camden to Pitt, the change of
system met with approval at Downing Street. This is the more remarkable
as letters from Dublin were full of invectives against Cornwallis.
Buckingham wrote almost daily to his brother, Grenville, foretelling ruin
from the weakness and vacillation of the Lord Lieutenant. Still more furious
were Beresford, Cooke, and Lees. Their correspondence with Auckland,
Postmaster-General at London, was so systematic as to imply design.
Probably they sought to procure the dismissal of Cornwallis and the
nomination of Auckland in his place. There can be little doubt that
Auckland lent himself to the scheme with a view to maintaining the
Protestant ascendancy unimpaired; for he wrote to Beresford that public
opinion in England favoured the maintenance of the existing order of things
in Church and State in both kingdoms. The following extracts from the
letters which he received from Cooke and Lees are typical. On 4th October
Lees writes: "I am afraid Lord Cornwallis is not devil enough to deal with
Page 428
the devils he has to contend with in this country.... The profligacy of the
murderous malignant disposition of Paddy soars too high for his humane
and merciful principles at this crisis." Cooke was less flowery but equally
emphatic: "If," he wrote on 22nd October, "your Union is to be Protestant,
we have 100,000 Protestants who are connected by Orange Lodges, and
they might be made a great instrument.... Our robberies and murders
continue; and the depredations of the mountain rebels increase."[538]
Nevertheless Cornwallis held on his way. In the period 22nd August 1798 to
the end of February 1799, he reprieved as many as 41 rebels out of 131 on
whom sentence of death had been passed, and he commuted to banishment
heavy sentences passed on 78 others. It is clear, then, that, despite the
efforts of Buckingham and the officials of Dublin Castle, Pitt continued to
uphold a policy of clemency. But it is equally clear that the reliance of Irish
malcontents on French aid, the persistent efforts of the Brest squadron to
send that aid, and the savage reprisals demanded, and when possible
enforced, by the loyal minority of Irishmen, brought about a situation in
which Ireland could not stand alone.[539]
Preliminary inquiries respecting the Act of Union were set on foot, and the
results were summarized in Memoranda of the summer and autumn of
1798. One of them, comprised among the Pelham manuscripts, is annotated
by Pitt. The compiler thus referred to the question of Catholic
Emancipation: "Catholics to be eligible to all offices, civil and military,
taking the present oath. Such as shall take the Oath of Supremacy in the Bill
of Rights may sit in Parliament without subscribing the Abjuration.
Corporation offices to be Protestant." On this Pitt wrote the following note:
"The first part seems unexceptionable, and is exactly what I wish ... but if
this oath is sufficient for office, why require a different one for Parliament?
And why are Corporation offices to be exclusively Protestant, when those
of the State may be Catholic?"[540] Well might Pitt ask these questions, for
murderous malignant disposition of Paddy soars too high for his humane
and merciful principles at this crisis." Cooke was less flowery but equally
emphatic: "If," he wrote on 22nd October, "your Union is to be Protestant,
we have 100,000 Protestants who are connected by Orange Lodges, and
they might be made a great instrument.... Our robberies and murders
continue; and the depredations of the mountain rebels increase."[538]
Nevertheless Cornwallis held on his way. In the period 22nd August 1798 to
the end of February 1799, he reprieved as many as 41 rebels out of 131 on
whom sentence of death had been passed, and he commuted to banishment
heavy sentences passed on 78 others. It is clear, then, that, despite the
efforts of Buckingham and the officials of Dublin Castle, Pitt continued to
uphold a policy of clemency. But it is equally clear that the reliance of Irish
malcontents on French aid, the persistent efforts of the Brest squadron to
send that aid, and the savage reprisals demanded, and when possible
enforced, by the loyal minority of Irishmen, brought about a situation in
which Ireland could not stand alone.[539]
Preliminary inquiries respecting the Act of Union were set on foot, and the
results were summarized in Memoranda of the summer and autumn of
1798. One of them, comprised among the Pelham manuscripts, is annotated
by Pitt. The compiler thus referred to the question of Catholic
Emancipation: "Catholics to be eligible to all offices, civil and military,
taking the present oath. Such as shall take the Oath of Supremacy in the Bill
of Rights may sit in Parliament without subscribing the Abjuration.
Corporation offices to be Protestant." On this Pitt wrote the following note:
"The first part seems unexceptionable, and is exactly what I wish ... but if
this oath is sufficient for office, why require a different one for Parliament?
And why are Corporation offices to be exclusively Protestant, when those
of the State may be Catholic?"[540] Well might Pitt ask these questions, for
Page 429
the whole system of exclusion by religious tests was condemned so soon as
admission to Parliament ceased to depend on them. Other Memoranda dealt
mainly with the difficult question of compensation to the borough-holders
and placemen who would suffer by the proposed change. But for the present
it will be well to deal with the question of the abolition of religious tests.
The procedure of Pitt in regard to this difficult subject was eminently
cautious. As was the case before dealing with the fiscal problem in 1785, so
now he invited over certain leading Irishmen in order to discuss details.
About the middle of October he had two interviews with the Earl of Clare,
Lord Chancellor of Ireland. These important conferences took place at
Holwood, where he was then occupied in marking out a new road; for his
pastime every autumn was to indulge his favourite pursuit of planting trees
and otherwise improving his grounds. The two ablest men in the sister
kingdoms must have regarded one another with interest. They were not
unlike in figure except that Clare was short. His frame was as slight as
Pitt's; his features were thin and finely chiselled. Neither frame nor features
bespoke the haughty spirit and dauntless will that enabled him at times to
turn the current of events and overbear the decisions of Lords Lieutenant. In
forcefulness and narrowness, in bravery and bigotry, he was a fit spokesman
of the British garrison, which was resolved to hold every outwork of the
citadel.
The particulars of their converse are unknown. Probably Clare had the
advantage which a man of narrow views but expert knowledge enjoys over
an antagonist who trusts in lofty principles and cherishes generous hopes.
Clare, knowing his ground thoroughly, must have triumphed. Pitt did not
confess his defeat. Indeed, on 16th October, he wrote reassuringly to
Grenville: "I have had two very full conversations with Lord Clare. What he
says is very encouraging to the great question of the Union, in which I do
not think we shall have much difficulty; I mean, in proportion to the
admission to Parliament ceased to depend on them. Other Memoranda dealt
mainly with the difficult question of compensation to the borough-holders
and placemen who would suffer by the proposed change. But for the present
it will be well to deal with the question of the abolition of religious tests.
The procedure of Pitt in regard to this difficult subject was eminently
cautious. As was the case before dealing with the fiscal problem in 1785, so
now he invited over certain leading Irishmen in order to discuss details.
About the middle of October he had two interviews with the Earl of Clare,
Lord Chancellor of Ireland. These important conferences took place at
Holwood, where he was then occupied in marking out a new road; for his
pastime every autumn was to indulge his favourite pursuit of planting trees
and otherwise improving his grounds. The two ablest men in the sister
kingdoms must have regarded one another with interest. They were not
unlike in figure except that Clare was short. His frame was as slight as
Pitt's; his features were thin and finely chiselled. Neither frame nor features
bespoke the haughty spirit and dauntless will that enabled him at times to
turn the current of events and overbear the decisions of Lords Lieutenant. In
forcefulness and narrowness, in bravery and bigotry, he was a fit spokesman
of the British garrison, which was resolved to hold every outwork of the
citadel.
The particulars of their converse are unknown. Probably Clare had the
advantage which a man of narrow views but expert knowledge enjoys over
an antagonist who trusts in lofty principles and cherishes generous hopes.
Clare, knowing his ground thoroughly, must have triumphed. Pitt did not
confess his defeat. Indeed, on 16th October, he wrote reassuringly to
Grenville: "I have had two very full conversations with Lord Clare. What he
says is very encouraging to the great question of the Union, in which I do
not think we shall have much difficulty; I mean, in proportion to the
Page 430
magnitude of the subject. At his desire I have written to press the Speaker
[Foster] to come over, which he seems to think may be of great
importance." Here is Clare's version of the interviews in a letter of the same
day to his fellow countryman, Castlereagh: "I have seen Mr. Pitt, the
Chancellor, and the Duke of Portland, who seem to feel very sensibly the
critical situation of our damnable country, and that the Union alone can save
it. I should have hoped that what has passed would have opened the eyes of
every man in England to the insanity of their past conduct with respect to
the Papists of Ireland; but I can very plainly perceive that they were as full
of their popish projects as ever. I trust, and I hope I am not deceived, that
they are fairly inclined to give them up, and to bring the measure forward
unencumbered with the doctrine of Emancipation. Lord Cornwallis has
intimated his acquiescence in this point; Mr. Pitt is decided upon it, and I
think he will keep his colleagues steady."[541]
The mention of Castlereagh seems to call for a short account of one who,
after assisting in carrying the Act of Union, was destined to win a European
reputation as a disciple of Pitt. Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, and
second Marquis of Londonderry (1769–1822), was the son of Robert
Stewart of Ballylawn in County Londonderry by his first marriage, that
with the daughter of the Earl of Hertford. Educated at Armagh and at St.
John's College, Cambridge, he soon returned to contest the seat of County
Down with Lord Downshire, and succeeded by dint of hard work and the
expenditure of £60,000. He entered the Irish Parliament as a representative
of the freeholders as against the aristocracy; but the second marriage of his
father (now Marquis of Londonderry) with the eldest daughter of the late
Earl Camden brought the family into close connection with the second Earl,
who, on becoming Lord Lieutenant in 1795, soon succeeded in detaching
young Stewart from the popular party, already, from its many indiscretions,
distasteful to his cool and cautious nature. Stewart had recently married
Lady Emily Hobart, the daughter of the late Earl of Buckinghamshire, and
[Foster] to come over, which he seems to think may be of great
importance." Here is Clare's version of the interviews in a letter of the same
day to his fellow countryman, Castlereagh: "I have seen Mr. Pitt, the
Chancellor, and the Duke of Portland, who seem to feel very sensibly the
critical situation of our damnable country, and that the Union alone can save
it. I should have hoped that what has passed would have opened the eyes of
every man in England to the insanity of their past conduct with respect to
the Papists of Ireland; but I can very plainly perceive that they were as full
of their popish projects as ever. I trust, and I hope I am not deceived, that
they are fairly inclined to give them up, and to bring the measure forward
unencumbered with the doctrine of Emancipation. Lord Cornwallis has
intimated his acquiescence in this point; Mr. Pitt is decided upon it, and I
think he will keep his colleagues steady."[541]
The mention of Castlereagh seems to call for a short account of one who,
after assisting in carrying the Act of Union, was destined to win a European
reputation as a disciple of Pitt. Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, and
second Marquis of Londonderry (1769–1822), was the son of Robert
Stewart of Ballylawn in County Londonderry by his first marriage, that
with the daughter of the Earl of Hertford. Educated at Armagh and at St.
John's College, Cambridge, he soon returned to contest the seat of County
Down with Lord Downshire, and succeeded by dint of hard work and the
expenditure of £60,000. He entered the Irish Parliament as a representative
of the freeholders as against the aristocracy; but the second marriage of his
father (now Marquis of Londonderry) with the eldest daughter of the late
Earl Camden brought the family into close connection with the second Earl,
who, on becoming Lord Lieutenant in 1795, soon succeeded in detaching
young Stewart from the popular party, already, from its many indiscretions,
distasteful to his cool and cautious nature. Stewart had recently married
Lady Emily Hobart, the daughter of the late Earl of Buckinghamshire, and
Page 431
became Viscount Castlereagh in October 1795. Though continuing to
support the claims of the Catholics, he upheld Camden's policy of coercion;
and his firm and resolute character made his support valuable in Parliament.
The sagacity of his advice in committee, and the straightforward boldness
of his action as an administrator, are in marked contrast to his rambling and
laboured speeches, in whose incongruous phrases alone there lurked signs
of Hibernian humour. "The features of the clause"; "sets of circumstances
coming up and circumstances going down"; "men turning their backs upon
themselves"; "the constitutional principle wound up in the bowels of the
monarchy"; "the Herculean labour of the honourable member, who will find
himself quite disappointed when he has at last brought forth his
Hercules"—such are a few of the rhetorical gems which occasionally
sparkled in the dull quartz of his plentiful output. Nevertheless, so manly
was his bearing, so dogged his defence, that he always gained a respectful
hearing; and supporters of the Government plucked up heart when, after a
display of dazzling rhetoric by Grattan or Plunket, the young aristocrat
drew up his tall figure, squared his chest, flung open his coat, and plunged
into the unequal contest. Courage and tenacity win their reward; and in
these qualities Castlereagh had no superior. It is said that on one occasion
he determined to end a fight between two mastiffs, and, though badly bitten,
he effected his purpose. These virile powers marked him out for promotion;
and during the illness of Pelham, Chief Secretary at Dublin, Castlereagh
discharged his duties. Cornwallis urged that he should have the
appointment; and to the King's initial objection that a Briton ought to hold
it, Cornwallis successfully replied that Castlereagh was "so very unlike an
Irishman" that the office would be safe in his hands. Castlereagh received
the appointment early in November 1798. He, the first Irishman to hold it,
was destined to overthrow the Irish Parliament.[542]
support the claims of the Catholics, he upheld Camden's policy of coercion;
and his firm and resolute character made his support valuable in Parliament.
The sagacity of his advice in committee, and the straightforward boldness
of his action as an administrator, are in marked contrast to his rambling and
laboured speeches, in whose incongruous phrases alone there lurked signs
of Hibernian humour. "The features of the clause"; "sets of circumstances
coming up and circumstances going down"; "men turning their backs upon
themselves"; "the constitutional principle wound up in the bowels of the
monarchy"; "the Herculean labour of the honourable member, who will find
himself quite disappointed when he has at last brought forth his
Hercules"—such are a few of the rhetorical gems which occasionally
sparkled in the dull quartz of his plentiful output. Nevertheless, so manly
was his bearing, so dogged his defence, that he always gained a respectful
hearing; and supporters of the Government plucked up heart when, after a
display of dazzling rhetoric by Grattan or Plunket, the young aristocrat
drew up his tall figure, squared his chest, flung open his coat, and plunged
into the unequal contest. Courage and tenacity win their reward; and in
these qualities Castlereagh had no superior. It is said that on one occasion
he determined to end a fight between two mastiffs, and, though badly bitten,
he effected his purpose. These virile powers marked him out for promotion;
and during the illness of Pelham, Chief Secretary at Dublin, Castlereagh
discharged his duties. Cornwallis urged that he should have the
appointment; and to the King's initial objection that a Briton ought to hold
it, Cornwallis successfully replied that Castlereagh was "so very unlike an
Irishman" that the office would be safe in his hands. Castlereagh received
the appointment early in November 1798. He, the first Irishman to hold it,
was destined to overthrow the Irish Parliament.[542]
Page 432
We must now revert to the negotiations between Pitt and Clare. It is
surprising to find Clare convinced that the Prime Minister would keep
faithful to the Protestant cause its unfaithful champion, Loughborough, also
that Cornwallis had acquiesced in the shelving of Catholic Emancipation.
Probably Clare had the faculty, not uncommon in strong-willed men, of
reading his thoughts into the words of others. For Cornwallis, writing to Pitt
on 8th October, just after saying farewell to Clare at Dublin, describes him
as a well-intentioned man, but blind to the absolute dependence of Irish
Protestants on British support and resolutely opposed to the admission of
Romanists to the united Parliament. As to himself, Cornwallis pens these
noble words: "I certainly wish that England could now make a Union with
the Irish nation, instead of making it with a party in Ireland"; and he
expresses the hope that with fair treatment the Roman Catholics will soon
become loyal subjects. Writing to the Duke of Portland in the same sense,
Cornwallis shows a slight diffidence in his ability to judge of the chief
question at issue.
Probably the solution of the riddle is here to be found. It seems that the
Lord Lieutenant was politely deferential to Clare; that at Holwood Clare
represented him as a convert to the ultra-Protestant tenets; and that Pitt
accepted the statements of the Irish Chancellor. William Elliot, Under-
Secretary at War at Dublin, who saw Pitt a week later, found him
disinclined to further the Catholic claims at the present juncture, though
equally resolved not to bar the way for the future. Possibly the King now
intervened. It is a significant fact that Clare expected to have an interview
with him before returning to Ireland. If so, he must have strengthened his
earlier resolve. Pitt, then, gave way on the question of the admission of
Dissenters and Catholics to the Irish Parliament. But he kept open the more
important question of the admission of Catholics to the United Parliament.
Obviously, the latter comprised the former; and it was likely to arouse the
fears of the Irish Protestants far less. On tactical grounds alone the change
surprising to find Clare convinced that the Prime Minister would keep
faithful to the Protestant cause its unfaithful champion, Loughborough, also
that Cornwallis had acquiesced in the shelving of Catholic Emancipation.
Probably Clare had the faculty, not uncommon in strong-willed men, of
reading his thoughts into the words of others. For Cornwallis, writing to Pitt
on 8th October, just after saying farewell to Clare at Dublin, describes him
as a well-intentioned man, but blind to the absolute dependence of Irish
Protestants on British support and resolutely opposed to the admission of
Romanists to the united Parliament. As to himself, Cornwallis pens these
noble words: "I certainly wish that England could now make a Union with
the Irish nation, instead of making it with a party in Ireland"; and he
expresses the hope that with fair treatment the Roman Catholics will soon
become loyal subjects. Writing to the Duke of Portland in the same sense,
Cornwallis shows a slight diffidence in his ability to judge of the chief
question at issue.
Probably the solution of the riddle is here to be found. It seems that the
Lord Lieutenant was politely deferential to Clare; that at Holwood Clare
represented him as a convert to the ultra-Protestant tenets; and that Pitt
accepted the statements of the Irish Chancellor. William Elliot, Under-
Secretary at War at Dublin, who saw Pitt a week later, found him
disinclined to further the Catholic claims at the present juncture, though
equally resolved not to bar the way for the future. Possibly the King now
intervened. It is a significant fact that Clare expected to have an interview
with him before returning to Ireland. If so, he must have strengthened his
earlier resolve. Pitt, then, gave way on the question of the admission of
Dissenters and Catholics to the Irish Parliament. But he kept open the more
important question of the admission of Catholics to the United Parliament.
Obviously, the latter comprised the former; and it was likely to arouse the
fears of the Irish Protestants far less. On tactical grounds alone the change
Page 433
of procedure was desirable. It is therefore difficult to see why Elliot so
deeply deplored his surrender to the ultra-Protestants. Pitt had the approval
of Grenville, who, owing to the religious feuds embittered by the Rebellion,
deprecated the imposition of the Catholic claims on the fiercely Protestant
Assembly at Dublin.[543] Yet he warmly supported them in the United
Parliament, both in 1801 and 1807.
The next of the Protestant champions whom Pitt saw was Foster, Speaker of
the Irish House of Commons, whose forceful will, narrow but resolute
religious beliefs, and mercantile connections gave him an influence second
only to that of Clare. In the course of a long conversation with him about
15th November, Pitt found him frank in his opinions, decidedly opposed to
the Union, but not so fixedly as to preclude all hope of arrangement. On this
topic Pitt dilated in a "private" letter of 17th November, to Cornwallis:
deeply deplored his surrender to the ultra-Protestants. Pitt had the approval
of Grenville, who, owing to the religious feuds embittered by the Rebellion,
deprecated the imposition of the Catholic claims on the fiercely Protestant
Assembly at Dublin.[543] Yet he warmly supported them in the United
Parliament, both in 1801 and 1807.
The next of the Protestant champions whom Pitt saw was Foster, Speaker of
the Irish House of Commons, whose forceful will, narrow but resolute
religious beliefs, and mercantile connections gave him an influence second
only to that of Clare. In the course of a long conversation with him about
15th November, Pitt found him frank in his opinions, decidedly opposed to
the Union, but not so fixedly as to preclude all hope of arrangement. On this
topic Pitt dilated in a "private" letter of 17th November, to Cornwallis:
Page 434
... I think I may venture to say that he [Foster] will not obstruct the
measure; and I rather hope if it can be made palatable to him
personally (which I believe it may) that he will give it fair support.
It would, as it seems to me, be worth while for this purpose, to hold
out to him the prospect of a British peerage, with (if possible) some
ostensible situation, and a provision for life to which he would be
naturally entitled on quitting the Chair. Beresford and Parnell do not
say much on the general measure, but I think both, or at least the
former against trying it, but both disposed to concur when they
understand it is finally resolved on. They all seem clearly (and I
believe sincerely) of opinion that it will not be wise to announce it
as a decided measure from authority, till time has been given for
communication to all leading individuals and for disposing the
public mind. On this account we have omitted all reference to the
subject in the King's Speech; and the communication may in all
respects be more conveniently made by a separate message when
the Irish Parliament is sitting, and it can be announced to them at the
same time. In the interval previous to your Session there will, I trust,
be full opportunity for communication and arrangement with
individuals, on which I am inclined to believe the success of the
measure will wholly depend. You will observe that in what relates to
the oaths to be taken by members of the United Parliament, the plan
which we have sent copies the precedent I mentioned in a former
letter of the Scotch Union; and on the grounds I before mentioned, I
own I think this leaves the Catholic Question on the only footing on
which it can safely be placed. Mr. Elliott when he brought me your
letter, stated very strongly all the arguments which he thought ought
to induce us to admit the Catholics to Parliament, and office; but I
confess he did not satisfy me of the practicability of such a measure
at this time, or of the propriety of attempting it. With respect to a
provision for the Catholic clergy, and some arrangement respecting
tithes, I am happy to find an uniform opinion in favor of the
proposal, among all the Irish I have seen; and I am more and more
convinced that those measures, with some effectual mode to enforce
measure; and I rather hope if it can be made palatable to him
personally (which I believe it may) that he will give it fair support.
It would, as it seems to me, be worth while for this purpose, to hold
out to him the prospect of a British peerage, with (if possible) some
ostensible situation, and a provision for life to which he would be
naturally entitled on quitting the Chair. Beresford and Parnell do not
say much on the general measure, but I think both, or at least the
former against trying it, but both disposed to concur when they
understand it is finally resolved on. They all seem clearly (and I
believe sincerely) of opinion that it will not be wise to announce it
as a decided measure from authority, till time has been given for
communication to all leading individuals and for disposing the
public mind. On this account we have omitted all reference to the
subject in the King's Speech; and the communication may in all
respects be more conveniently made by a separate message when
the Irish Parliament is sitting, and it can be announced to them at the
same time. In the interval previous to your Session there will, I trust,
be full opportunity for communication and arrangement with
individuals, on which I am inclined to believe the success of the
measure will wholly depend. You will observe that in what relates to
the oaths to be taken by members of the United Parliament, the plan
which we have sent copies the precedent I mentioned in a former
letter of the Scotch Union; and on the grounds I before mentioned, I
own I think this leaves the Catholic Question on the only footing on
which it can safely be placed. Mr. Elliott when he brought me your
letter, stated very strongly all the arguments which he thought ought
to induce us to admit the Catholics to Parliament, and office; but I
confess he did not satisfy me of the practicability of such a measure
at this time, or of the propriety of attempting it. With respect to a
provision for the Catholic clergy, and some arrangement respecting
tithes, I am happy to find an uniform opinion in favor of the
proposal, among all the Irish I have seen; and I am more and more
convinced that those measures, with some effectual mode to enforce
Page 435
the residence of all ranks of the Protestant clergy, offer the best
chance of gradually putting an end to the evils most felt in Ireland.
[544]
The suggestion that Foster's opposition might be obviated by the promise of
a peerage emanated first from Camden. Its adoption by Pitt marks the first
step in the by-paths of bribery on which he now entered. In this case his
action is not indefensible; for the abolition of the Speakership at Dublin
naturally involved some indemnity. Besides, in that Parliament no important
measure passed without bribery. That eager democrat, Hamilton Rowan,
foresaw in the Union "the downfall of one of the most corrupt assemblies I
believe ever existed." The proprietors of the pocket-boroughs were needy
and grasping, some of them living by the sale of presentation of seats.
Government generally managed to control them, but only on condition of
dispensing favours proportionate to the importance of the suitor and the
corruptness of the occasion. As Beresford remarked with unconscious
humour, the borough-mongers "cannot be expected to give up their interest
for nothing; and those who bought their seats cannot be expected to give up
their term for nothing." Here he expressed the general conviction of that
age, which Pitt recognized in his Reform Bill of 1785 by seeking to
indemnify the borough-holders of Great Britain.
A typical specimen of the borough-owner was that "ill-tempered, violent
fellow," Lord Downshire, who controlled the Crown patronage in the North
by virtue of his seven borough seats. Lord Ely had six seats; and the Duke
of Devonshire, and Lords Abercorn, Belmore, Clifden, Granard, and
Shannon, four apiece. In the counties, Downshire, the Ponsonbys, and the
Beresfords controlled about twenty seats. Camden, writing to Pitt on 11th
August 1799, thus described Downshire: "He is not personally corrupt; but
the larger the compensation for the boroughs is to be, the more readily will
he listen to you or Lord Castlereagh."[545] Lord Longueville, a borough-
chance of gradually putting an end to the evils most felt in Ireland.
[544]
The suggestion that Foster's opposition might be obviated by the promise of
a peerage emanated first from Camden. Its adoption by Pitt marks the first
step in the by-paths of bribery on which he now entered. In this case his
action is not indefensible; for the abolition of the Speakership at Dublin
naturally involved some indemnity. Besides, in that Parliament no important
measure passed without bribery. That eager democrat, Hamilton Rowan,
foresaw in the Union "the downfall of one of the most corrupt assemblies I
believe ever existed." The proprietors of the pocket-boroughs were needy
and grasping, some of them living by the sale of presentation of seats.
Government generally managed to control them, but only on condition of
dispensing favours proportionate to the importance of the suitor and the
corruptness of the occasion. As Beresford remarked with unconscious
humour, the borough-mongers "cannot be expected to give up their interest
for nothing; and those who bought their seats cannot be expected to give up
their term for nothing." Here he expressed the general conviction of that
age, which Pitt recognized in his Reform Bill of 1785 by seeking to
indemnify the borough-holders of Great Britain.
A typical specimen of the borough-owner was that "ill-tempered, violent
fellow," Lord Downshire, who controlled the Crown patronage in the North
by virtue of his seven borough seats. Lord Ely had six seats; and the Duke
of Devonshire, and Lords Abercorn, Belmore, Clifden, Granard, and
Shannon, four apiece. In the counties, Downshire, the Ponsonbys, and the
Beresfords controlled about twenty seats. Camden, writing to Pitt on 11th
August 1799, thus described Downshire: "He is not personally corrupt; but
the larger the compensation for the boroughs is to be, the more readily will
he listen to you or Lord Castlereagh."[545] Lord Longueville, a borough-
Page 436
owner of great influence in County Cork, wrote as follows to Pitt on 3rd
December, 1798:
... Long attached to you, and confirmed in that attachment for life by
the direction and advice of Lord Westmorland, I have now no object
to look up to, to prevent my falling a sacrifice to my political
enemies, but to you. When Lord Shannon opposed your measures, I
spent £30,000 of my own money to frustrate his intentions and
support your measures. I shall now act by your advice and opinion
on this great business of a Union with Great Britain. My friends are
numerous and firm; they look up to you for decision on every
occasion. My interest in Ireland is extensive. I wish to be a British
peer before the measure of a Union takes place, or after. I wish the
city of Cork to have two members, Bantry one and Mallow one.
Longueville gained his desire and the patronage of the Revenue offices in
Cork City.[546] From Pitt's letter to Cornwallis it is clear that he believed
that the promise of Government stipends for the Catholic clergy, and a
reform in tithes would induce them to support the Union. But it seems
impossible to reconcile his statement as to Beresford's opposition to the
Union with the assertion of the latter, that, in an interview of 12th
November, he pressed Pitt to take immediate steps to ensure the success of
the measure, which otherwise would have to struggle against unfair odds at
Dublin. The curious tendency of Hibernian affairs towards confusion also
appears in Cornwallis's statement, on 15th November, that he had urged Pitt
not to close the door to the Catholics in the United Parliament. Whereas Pitt
was resolved to admit them at an early opportunity.[547]
On the various interests at stake there is in the Pretyman archives a long but
undated Memorandum, with notes at the side by Pitt, or perhaps by
Grenville; for their writing, when cramped, was similar. It recommends that
December, 1798:
... Long attached to you, and confirmed in that attachment for life by
the direction and advice of Lord Westmorland, I have now no object
to look up to, to prevent my falling a sacrifice to my political
enemies, but to you. When Lord Shannon opposed your measures, I
spent £30,000 of my own money to frustrate his intentions and
support your measures. I shall now act by your advice and opinion
on this great business of a Union with Great Britain. My friends are
numerous and firm; they look up to you for decision on every
occasion. My interest in Ireland is extensive. I wish to be a British
peer before the measure of a Union takes place, or after. I wish the
city of Cork to have two members, Bantry one and Mallow one.
Longueville gained his desire and the patronage of the Revenue offices in
Cork City.[546] From Pitt's letter to Cornwallis it is clear that he believed
that the promise of Government stipends for the Catholic clergy, and a
reform in tithes would induce them to support the Union. But it seems
impossible to reconcile his statement as to Beresford's opposition to the
Union with the assertion of the latter, that, in an interview of 12th
November, he pressed Pitt to take immediate steps to ensure the success of
the measure, which otherwise would have to struggle against unfair odds at
Dublin. The curious tendency of Hibernian affairs towards confusion also
appears in Cornwallis's statement, on 15th November, that he had urged Pitt
not to close the door to the Catholics in the United Parliament. Whereas Pitt
was resolved to admit them at an early opportunity.[547]
On the various interests at stake there is in the Pretyman archives a long but
undated Memorandum, with notes at the side by Pitt, or perhaps by
Grenville; for their writing, when cramped, was similar. It recommends that
Page 437
the precedent of the Union with the Scottish Parliament shall be followed
where possible; that few changes shall be made in the Irish legal system,
appeals being allowed to the Irish Lord Chancellor and three chief judges,
who may also deal with evidence for parliamentary and private Bills
affecting Ireland. The general aim should be to lessen the expense of resort
to the United Parliament for private business. Pitt here added at the side
—"Particularly in divorces and exchange of lands in settlement," also in
certain "private" Bills. The compiler then refers to the difficulty of
assessing or equalizing the Revenues, National Debts, and the fiscal
systems of the two islands, but suggests that on the last topic Pitt's Irish
proposals of 1785 shall be followed. To this Pitt assents, suggesting also
that the proportions of Revenue and Debt may soon be arranged
provisionally, Commissioners being appointed to discuss the future and
definitive quotas. Further, Pitt expresses the desire to model the election of
Irish peers on that of Scottish peers. The compiler of the plan advises a
delegation of 40 Irish peers, and not less than 120 Commoners to
Westminster; but, as electoral changes are highly dangerous to both
countries, he drafts a scheme by which either 125 or 138 Irish Commoners
will sit in the United Parliament.[548]
Here Pitt and his colleagues differed from their adviser. Probably they heard
rumours of the fears aroused by the advent of Irish members. The repose of
Lord Sheffield was troubled by thoughts of the irruption of "100 wild
Irishmen"; and he deemed the arrival of 75 quite sufficient, if staid country
gentlemen were not to be scared away from St. Stephen's. By way of
compromise the Cabinet fixed the number at 100 on or before 25th
November 1798.[549] At that date Portland also informed Cornwallis that the
number of Irish Peers at Westminster must not exceed 32.
Meanwhile, the tangle at Dublin was becoming hopeless. There, as
Beresford warned Pitt, the report of the proposed Union was the letting out
where possible; that few changes shall be made in the Irish legal system,
appeals being allowed to the Irish Lord Chancellor and three chief judges,
who may also deal with evidence for parliamentary and private Bills
affecting Ireland. The general aim should be to lessen the expense of resort
to the United Parliament for private business. Pitt here added at the side
—"Particularly in divorces and exchange of lands in settlement," also in
certain "private" Bills. The compiler then refers to the difficulty of
assessing or equalizing the Revenues, National Debts, and the fiscal
systems of the two islands, but suggests that on the last topic Pitt's Irish
proposals of 1785 shall be followed. To this Pitt assents, suggesting also
that the proportions of Revenue and Debt may soon be arranged
provisionally, Commissioners being appointed to discuss the future and
definitive quotas. Further, Pitt expresses the desire to model the election of
Irish peers on that of Scottish peers. The compiler of the plan advises a
delegation of 40 Irish peers, and not less than 120 Commoners to
Westminster; but, as electoral changes are highly dangerous to both
countries, he drafts a scheme by which either 125 or 138 Irish Commoners
will sit in the United Parliament.[548]
Here Pitt and his colleagues differed from their adviser. Probably they heard
rumours of the fears aroused by the advent of Irish members. The repose of
Lord Sheffield was troubled by thoughts of the irruption of "100 wild
Irishmen"; and he deemed the arrival of 75 quite sufficient, if staid country
gentlemen were not to be scared away from St. Stephen's. By way of
compromise the Cabinet fixed the number at 100 on or before 25th
November 1798.[549] At that date Portland also informed Cornwallis that the
number of Irish Peers at Westminster must not exceed 32.
Meanwhile, the tangle at Dublin was becoming hopeless. There, as
Beresford warned Pitt, the report of the proposed Union was the letting out
Page 438
of water. Captain Saurin, an eminent counsel who was commander of a
corps of lawyers nick-named the Devil's Own, insisted on parading his
battalion in order to harangue them on the insult to Ireland and the injury to
their profession. His example was widely followed. On 9th December the
Dublin Bar, by 168 votes to 32, protested strongly against the proposal to
extinguish the Irish Parliament. Eloquent speakers like Plunket warned that
body that suicide was the supreme act of cowardice, besides being ultra
vires. The neighbouring towns and counties joined in the clamour. The
somnolence of Cornwallis, his neglect to win over opponents by tact or
material inducements, and the absence of any Ministerial declaration on the
subject, left all initiative to the Opposition. On 24th December Cooke wrote
to Auckland in these doleful terms:[550]
... Our Union politics are not at present very thriving. Pamphlets are
in shoals, in general against a Union; a few for it; but I do not yet
see anything of superior talent and effect. The tide in Dublin is
difficult to stem. In the country hitherto, indifference. We have no
account from the North, and that is the quarter I apprehend. The
South will not be very hostile. The Bar is most impetuous and
active, and I cannot be surprized at it. The Corporation have not
sense to see that by an Union alone the Corporation can be
preserved. Most of the best merchants are, I know, not averse. The
proprietors of Dublin and the county are violent, and shopkeepers,
etc. The Catholics hold back. They are on the watch to make the
most of the game, and will intrigue with both parties.... In the North
they expect the Dutch fleet. If we had a more able active
conciliating Chief, we might do; but the vis inertiae is incredible.
There is an amazing disgust among the friends of Government. The
tone of loyalty is declining, for want of being cherished. Do not be
surprized at a dreadful parliamentary opposition and a personal
opposition.
corps of lawyers nick-named the Devil's Own, insisted on parading his
battalion in order to harangue them on the insult to Ireland and the injury to
their profession. His example was widely followed. On 9th December the
Dublin Bar, by 168 votes to 32, protested strongly against the proposal to
extinguish the Irish Parliament. Eloquent speakers like Plunket warned that
body that suicide was the supreme act of cowardice, besides being ultra
vires. The neighbouring towns and counties joined in the clamour. The
somnolence of Cornwallis, his neglect to win over opponents by tact or
material inducements, and the absence of any Ministerial declaration on the
subject, left all initiative to the Opposition. On 24th December Cooke wrote
to Auckland in these doleful terms:[550]
... Our Union politics are not at present very thriving. Pamphlets are
in shoals, in general against a Union; a few for it; but I do not yet
see anything of superior talent and effect. The tide in Dublin is
difficult to stem. In the country hitherto, indifference. We have no
account from the North, and that is the quarter I apprehend. The
South will not be very hostile. The Bar is most impetuous and
active, and I cannot be surprized at it. The Corporation have not
sense to see that by an Union alone the Corporation can be
preserved. Most of the best merchants are, I know, not averse. The
proprietors of Dublin and the county are violent, and shopkeepers,
etc. The Catholics hold back. They are on the watch to make the
most of the game, and will intrigue with both parties.... In the North
they expect the Dutch fleet. If we had a more able active
conciliating Chief, we might do; but the vis inertiae is incredible.
There is an amazing disgust among the friends of Government. The
tone of loyalty is declining, for want of being cherished. Do not be
surprized at a dreadful parliamentary opposition and a personal
opposition.
Page 439
Cooke's reference to the mediocrity of the pamphlets for the Union is a
curious piece of finesse; for he was known to be the author of an able
pamphlet, "Arguments for and against an Union between Great Britain and
Ireland." In it he dilated on the benefits gained by Wales and Scotland from
a Union with England. He dwelt on the recent increase of strength in France
consequent on the concentration of political power at Paris, and
demonstrated the unreality of the boasted independence of the Dublin
Parliament, seeing that Irish enactments must be sealed by the Seal of Great
Britain. After touching on the dangerous divergence of policy at
Westminster and Dublin during the Regency crisis of 1789, he showed that
peace and prosperity must increase under a more comprehensive system,
which would both guarantee the existence of the Established Church, and
accord civic recognition to Catholics. At present, said he, it would be
dangerous to admit Catholics to the Irish Parliament; but in the United
Parliament such a step would be practicable. This semi-official
pronouncement caused a sensation, and before the end of the year twenty-
four replies appeared. In one of the counterblasts the anonymous author
offers "the reflections of a plain and humble mind," by stating forthwith that
the policy of the British Government had been to foment discontent, to
excite jealousies, to connive at insurrections, and finally to "amnestize"
those rebellions, for the purpose of promoting its favourite and now avowed
object of a Union.[551]
Far abler is the "Reply" to Cooke by Richard Jebb, who afterwards became
a Justice of the King's Bench in Ireland. He showed that only in regard to
the Regency had any serious difference arisen between the two Parliaments;
he scoffed at the notion of Ireland's needs finding satisfaction at
Westminster. Would Pitt, he asked, who whirled out of the Cabinet the
gigantic Thurlow, ever attend to Irish affairs? Jebb then quoted with effect
Clare's assertion that the Irish Parliament alone was competent to deal with
the business of the island. He admitted the directing power of the British
curious piece of finesse; for he was known to be the author of an able
pamphlet, "Arguments for and against an Union between Great Britain and
Ireland." In it he dilated on the benefits gained by Wales and Scotland from
a Union with England. He dwelt on the recent increase of strength in France
consequent on the concentration of political power at Paris, and
demonstrated the unreality of the boasted independence of the Dublin
Parliament, seeing that Irish enactments must be sealed by the Seal of Great
Britain. After touching on the dangerous divergence of policy at
Westminster and Dublin during the Regency crisis of 1789, he showed that
peace and prosperity must increase under a more comprehensive system,
which would both guarantee the existence of the Established Church, and
accord civic recognition to Catholics. At present, said he, it would be
dangerous to admit Catholics to the Irish Parliament; but in the United
Parliament such a step would be practicable. This semi-official
pronouncement caused a sensation, and before the end of the year twenty-
four replies appeared. In one of the counterblasts the anonymous author
offers "the reflections of a plain and humble mind," by stating forthwith that
the policy of the British Government had been to foment discontent, to
excite jealousies, to connive at insurrections, and finally to "amnestize"
those rebellions, for the purpose of promoting its favourite and now avowed
object of a Union.[551]
Far abler is the "Reply" to Cooke by Richard Jebb, who afterwards became
a Justice of the King's Bench in Ireland. He showed that only in regard to
the Regency had any serious difference arisen between the two Parliaments;
he scoffed at the notion of Ireland's needs finding satisfaction at
Westminster. Would Pitt, he asked, who whirled out of the Cabinet the
gigantic Thurlow, ever attend to Irish affairs? Jebb then quoted with effect
Clare's assertion that the Irish Parliament alone was competent to deal with
the business of the island. He admitted the directing power of the British
Page 440
Cabinet over Ireland's concerns; but he averred that under the new system
the Lord Lieutenant would be little more than a Great Contractor. As to the
satisfaction to be granted to Catholics, the Under-Secretary had done well
not to be too explicit, lest he should offend jealous Protestants. But, asked
Jebb, would the Catholics have much influence in the United Kingdom,
where they would be, not three to one as in Ireland, but three to fourteen?
Nature herself had intended England and Scotland to be one country; she
had proclaimed the need of some degree of independence in Ireland.
Finally, he deprecated in the mouth of an official a reference to the success
attending the policy of annexation pursued by France, which Pitt had
always reprobated. The effect produced by these replies appears in a letter
of Lees to Auckland on 29th December. Dublin, he writes, is in a frenzy
against the Union. As for Cornwallis, he was as apathetic as usual: "We are
asleep, while the disaffected are working amain."[552]
Not until 21st December did Pitt and his colleagues come to a final decision
to press on the Act of Union at all costs. On that day he held a Cabinet
meeting in Downing Street, all being present, as well as the Earl of
Liverpool and Earl Camden. The following Minute of their resolution was
taken by Lord Grenville.
That the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland should be instructed to state
without delay to all persons with whom he may have
communication on this subject, that His Majesty's Government is
decided to press the measure of an Union as essential to the well-
being of both countries and particularly to the security and peace of
Ireland as dependent on its connection with Great Britain: that this
object will now be urged to the utmost, and will even in the case (if
it should happen) of any present failure, be renewed on every
occasion till it succeed; and that the conduct of individuals on this
subject will be considered as the test of their disposition to support
the King's Government.[553]
the Lord Lieutenant would be little more than a Great Contractor. As to the
satisfaction to be granted to Catholics, the Under-Secretary had done well
not to be too explicit, lest he should offend jealous Protestants. But, asked
Jebb, would the Catholics have much influence in the United Kingdom,
where they would be, not three to one as in Ireland, but three to fourteen?
Nature herself had intended England and Scotland to be one country; she
had proclaimed the need of some degree of independence in Ireland.
Finally, he deprecated in the mouth of an official a reference to the success
attending the policy of annexation pursued by France, which Pitt had
always reprobated. The effect produced by these replies appears in a letter
of Lees to Auckland on 29th December. Dublin, he writes, is in a frenzy
against the Union. As for Cornwallis, he was as apathetic as usual: "We are
asleep, while the disaffected are working amain."[552]
Not until 21st December did Pitt and his colleagues come to a final decision
to press on the Act of Union at all costs. On that day he held a Cabinet
meeting in Downing Street, all being present, as well as the Earl of
Liverpool and Earl Camden. The following Minute of their resolution was
taken by Lord Grenville.
That the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland should be instructed to state
without delay to all persons with whom he may have
communication on this subject, that His Majesty's Government is
decided to press the measure of an Union as essential to the well-
being of both countries and particularly to the security and peace of
Ireland as dependent on its connection with Great Britain: that this
object will now be urged to the utmost, and will even in the case (if
it should happen) of any present failure, be renewed on every
occasion till it succeed; and that the conduct of individuals on this
subject will be considered as the test of their disposition to support
the King's Government.[553]
Page 441
Portland forthwith informed the Lord-Lieutenant, Cornwallis, of the purport
of this resolution. Drastic proceedings were now inevitable; for
mischievous rumours were rife at Dublin that nobody would suffer for his
vote against the Union.
A brief Declaration as to the essentials of the Government plan was issued
at Dublin on 5th January 1799. It stated that twenty-eight temporal peers
elected for life would be delegated to Westminster, and four Protestant
bishops, taken in rotation. Irish peers not elected might sit for British
counties and boroughs, as before. The Crown retained the right of creating
Irish peers. As to the delegation of the Commons of Ireland, each county or
large town now returning two members could send only one to Westminster,
except Dublin and Cork, each of which would return two members. Of the
108 small boroughs, one half would return members for one Parliament, the
other half for the next Parliament. In the sphere of commerce Ireland would
enjoy the same advantages as Great Britain, the duties between the two
islands being equalized, the linen manufacturers retaining their special
privileges. The Exchequer and National Debt of each island were to
continue separate, the quota paid by Ireland into the Imperial Exchequer
being reserved for future consideration, it being understood that when the
Irish Revenue exceeded its expenses, the excess must be applied to local
purposes, the taxes producing the excess being duly modified.
Apart from the inevitable vagueness as to the proportion of Ireland's quota,
the Declaration was calculated to reassure Irishmen. The borough-mongers
lost only one half of their lucrative patronage. True, the change bore hard
upon the 180 Irish peers, of whom only one in six would enter the House of
Lords at Westminster. But commerce was certain to thrive now that the
British Empire unreservedly threw open its markets to Irish products; and in
the political sphere the Act of Union, by shattering the Irish pocket-borough
system, assigned an influence to the larger towns such as those of Great
of this resolution. Drastic proceedings were now inevitable; for
mischievous rumours were rife at Dublin that nobody would suffer for his
vote against the Union.
A brief Declaration as to the essentials of the Government plan was issued
at Dublin on 5th January 1799. It stated that twenty-eight temporal peers
elected for life would be delegated to Westminster, and four Protestant
bishops, taken in rotation. Irish peers not elected might sit for British
counties and boroughs, as before. The Crown retained the right of creating
Irish peers. As to the delegation of the Commons of Ireland, each county or
large town now returning two members could send only one to Westminster,
except Dublin and Cork, each of which would return two members. Of the
108 small boroughs, one half would return members for one Parliament, the
other half for the next Parliament. In the sphere of commerce Ireland would
enjoy the same advantages as Great Britain, the duties between the two
islands being equalized, the linen manufacturers retaining their special
privileges. The Exchequer and National Debt of each island were to
continue separate, the quota paid by Ireland into the Imperial Exchequer
being reserved for future consideration, it being understood that when the
Irish Revenue exceeded its expenses, the excess must be applied to local
purposes, the taxes producing the excess being duly modified.
Apart from the inevitable vagueness as to the proportion of Ireland's quota,
the Declaration was calculated to reassure Irishmen. The borough-mongers
lost only one half of their lucrative patronage. True, the change bore hard
upon the 180 Irish peers, of whom only one in six would enter the House of
Lords at Westminster. But commerce was certain to thrive now that the
British Empire unreservedly threw open its markets to Irish products; and in
the political sphere the Act of Union, by shattering the Irish pocket-borough
system, assigned an influence to the larger towns such as those of Great
Page 442
Britain did not enjoy until the time of the Reform Bill. Nothing, it is true,
was said to encourage the Catholics; but in Cooke's semi-official pamphlet
they had been led to hope for justice in the United Parliament.
The following letter of Cooke to Castlereagh (6th January) is interesting:
We shall have difficult work; but there is no need to despair. I do not
hear of anything formidable from the country. Armagh is stirred by
Lord Charlemont; Louth, I suppose, by the Speaker; Lord
Enniskillen will move Fermanagh; Queen's County will be against
[us]. I hear Waterford, Cork, Kerry, Limerick is [sic] with us. Sir
Edward O'Brien in Clare is against and is stirring. Derry will be
quiet, if not favourable. The North is so in general at present. The
sketch of terms thrown out is much relished. I cannot tell you how
our numbers will stand on the 22nd. The Catholics will wait upon
the question, and will not declare till they think they can act with
effect. Many persons are anxious to make them part of the measure.
Grattan is come. I know not yet what he is doing. I hope all friends
in London will be sent over. The first burst is everything. It would
be decisive if the Prince of Wales would declare publicly in favour
and hoist his banner for the Union.[554]
Apart from this enigmatical reference, there were few grounds for hope.
The landlords and traders of Dublin naturally opposed a measure certain to
lessen the importance of that city. Trinity College, the Corporation of
Dublin, and the gentry and freeholders of County Dublin all protested
against Union. Equally hostile were most Irish Protestants. In their pride as
a dominant Order, they scorned the thought of subordination to Great
Britain. Sixteen years of almost complete legislative independence had
quickened their national feelings; and many of them undoubtedly set love of
country before the promptings of caste. How was it possible, they asked,
was said to encourage the Catholics; but in Cooke's semi-official pamphlet
they had been led to hope for justice in the United Parliament.
The following letter of Cooke to Castlereagh (6th January) is interesting:
We shall have difficult work; but there is no need to despair. I do not
hear of anything formidable from the country. Armagh is stirred by
Lord Charlemont; Louth, I suppose, by the Speaker; Lord
Enniskillen will move Fermanagh; Queen's County will be against
[us]. I hear Waterford, Cork, Kerry, Limerick is [sic] with us. Sir
Edward O'Brien in Clare is against and is stirring. Derry will be
quiet, if not favourable. The North is so in general at present. The
sketch of terms thrown out is much relished. I cannot tell you how
our numbers will stand on the 22nd. The Catholics will wait upon
the question, and will not declare till they think they can act with
effect. Many persons are anxious to make them part of the measure.
Grattan is come. I know not yet what he is doing. I hope all friends
in London will be sent over. The first burst is everything. It would
be decisive if the Prince of Wales would declare publicly in favour
and hoist his banner for the Union.[554]
Apart from this enigmatical reference, there were few grounds for hope.
The landlords and traders of Dublin naturally opposed a measure certain to
lessen the importance of that city. Trinity College, the Corporation of
Dublin, and the gentry and freeholders of County Dublin all protested
against Union. Equally hostile were most Irish Protestants. In their pride as
a dominant Order, they scorned the thought of subordination to Great
Britain. Sixteen years of almost complete legislative independence had
quickened their national feelings; and many of them undoubtedly set love of
country before the promptings of caste. How was it possible, they asked,
Page 443
that the claims of Ireland should receive due attention amidst the clash of
worldwide interests at Westminster?
Doubts like these should have been set at rest. Surely Pitt missed a great
opportunity in not promising the appointment of a perpetual committee at
Westminster, elected by the Irish members for the consideration of their
local affairs. A similar committee for Scottish business would also have
been a statesmanlike proposal, in view of the increase of work certain to
result from the Union. Doubtless those committees would have interfered
with the functions of the Lord Lieutenant at Dublin, and the Scottish
patronage controlled by Henry Dundas. But some such measure would have
appeased the discontent rife in both kingdoms, and, while easing the strain
on the Imperial Parliament, would have nurtured the growth of that wider
patriotism which has its roots in local affections.
A survey of the facts passed under review must, I think, lead to the
conclusion that the conduct of Pitt in preparing for the Act of Union was
halting and ineffective. It is true that Camden had advised him to make
careful preliminary inquiries; but they were not instituted until October
1798, and they dragged on to the end of the year, by which time the fear of
a French invasion had subsided. There were but two satisfactory ways of
carrying the Act of Union through the hostile Parliament at Dublin. In June–
October, during the panic caused by the Rebellion and the French raids, Pitt
might have intimated secretly though officially to the leading loyalists that
Great Britain could not again pour forth her blood and treasure for an
unworkable system, and that the acceptance of that help must imply
acquiescence in a Union. Such a compact would of course be termed
unchivalrous by the rhetoricians at St. Stephen's Green; but it would have
prevented the unchivalrous conduct of many so-called loyalists, who, after
triumphing by England's aid, then, relying upon that aid for the future,
thwarted Pitt's remedial policy. Prudence should have enjoined the adoption
worldwide interests at Westminster?
Doubts like these should have been set at rest. Surely Pitt missed a great
opportunity in not promising the appointment of a perpetual committee at
Westminster, elected by the Irish members for the consideration of their
local affairs. A similar committee for Scottish business would also have
been a statesmanlike proposal, in view of the increase of work certain to
result from the Union. Doubtless those committees would have interfered
with the functions of the Lord Lieutenant at Dublin, and the Scottish
patronage controlled by Henry Dundas. But some such measure would have
appeased the discontent rife in both kingdoms, and, while easing the strain
on the Imperial Parliament, would have nurtured the growth of that wider
patriotism which has its roots in local affections.
A survey of the facts passed under review must, I think, lead to the
conclusion that the conduct of Pitt in preparing for the Act of Union was
halting and ineffective. It is true that Camden had advised him to make
careful preliminary inquiries; but they were not instituted until October
1798, and they dragged on to the end of the year, by which time the fear of
a French invasion had subsided. There were but two satisfactory ways of
carrying the Act of Union through the hostile Parliament at Dublin. In June–
October, during the panic caused by the Rebellion and the French raids, Pitt
might have intimated secretly though officially to the leading loyalists that
Great Britain could not again pour forth her blood and treasure for an
unworkable system, and that the acceptance of that help must imply
acquiescence in a Union. Such a compact would of course be termed
unchivalrous by the rhetoricians at St. Stephen's Green; but it would have
prevented the unchivalrous conduct of many so-called loyalists, who, after
triumphing by England's aid, then, relying upon that aid for the future,
thwarted Pitt's remedial policy. Prudence should have enjoined the adoption
Page 444
of some such precaution in the case of men whose behaviour was exacting
towards England and exasperating towards the majority of Irishmen. In
neglecting to take it, Pitt evinced a strange lack of foresight. At this point
George III showed himself the shrewder tactician; for he urged that
Cornwallis must take steps to frighten the loyal minority into accepting an
Act of Union.
But there was an alternative course of action. Failing to come to an
understanding with the ultra-Protestant zealots of Dublin, Pitt might have
elicited a strong declaration from the many Irishmen who were in favour of
Union. He seems to have taken no such step. Though aware that Cornwallis
was in civil affairs a figure-head, he neglected to send over a spokesman
capable of giving a decided lead. In the ensuing debates at Dublin,
Castlereagh showed the toughness, energy, and resourcefulness which,
despite his halting cumbrous style, made him a power in Parliament; but his
youth and his stiff un-Hibernian ways told against him. Beresford was
detained by illness in London; and Clare, after his return to Dublin, did
strangely little for the cause. Thus, at this critical time the Unionists were
without a lead and without a leader. The autumn of 1798 was frittered away
in interviews in London, the purport of which ought to have clearly
appeared two or three months earlier. The passive attitude and tardy action
of Pitt and Portland in these critical weeks offer a strange contrast to the
habits of clear thinking and forceful action characteristic of Napoleon. It is
painful to compare their procedure with the action of the First Consul in
speedily bringing ecclesiastical bigots and fanatical atheists to the working
compromise summed up in the Concordat. In the case of the Union, the
initiative, energy, and zeal, which count for much among a Celtic people,
passed to the side of Pitt's opponents. Thenceforth that measure could be
carried through the Irish Parliament only by coercion or bribery.
towards England and exasperating towards the majority of Irishmen. In
neglecting to take it, Pitt evinced a strange lack of foresight. At this point
George III showed himself the shrewder tactician; for he urged that
Cornwallis must take steps to frighten the loyal minority into accepting an
Act of Union.
But there was an alternative course of action. Failing to come to an
understanding with the ultra-Protestant zealots of Dublin, Pitt might have
elicited a strong declaration from the many Irishmen who were in favour of
Union. He seems to have taken no such step. Though aware that Cornwallis
was in civil affairs a figure-head, he neglected to send over a spokesman
capable of giving a decided lead. In the ensuing debates at Dublin,
Castlereagh showed the toughness, energy, and resourcefulness which,
despite his halting cumbrous style, made him a power in Parliament; but his
youth and his stiff un-Hibernian ways told against him. Beresford was
detained by illness in London; and Clare, after his return to Dublin, did
strangely little for the cause. Thus, at this critical time the Unionists were
without a lead and without a leader. The autumn of 1798 was frittered away
in interviews in London, the purport of which ought to have clearly
appeared two or three months earlier. The passive attitude and tardy action
of Pitt and Portland in these critical weeks offer a strange contrast to the
habits of clear thinking and forceful action characteristic of Napoleon. It is
painful to compare their procedure with the action of the First Consul in
speedily bringing ecclesiastical bigots and fanatical atheists to the working
compromise summed up in the Concordat. In the case of the Union, the
initiative, energy, and zeal, which count for much among a Celtic people,
passed to the side of Pitt's opponents. Thenceforth that measure could be
carried through the Irish Parliament only by coercion or bribery.
Page 445
Page 446
CHAPTER XIX
THE UNION (continued)
"We must consider it as a measure of great
national policy, the object of which is
effectually to counteract the restless
machinations of an inveterate enemy, who
has uniformly and anxiously endeavoured to
effect a separation between the two
countries."—Pitt, Speech on the Union, 21st
April, 1800.
On 22nd January 1799 the long talked-of Act of Union was pointedly
referred to in the King's Speech read out to the Irish Parliament. The Speech
was adopted by the House of Lords, amendments hostile to the proposed
measure being rejected by large majorities. But in the House of Commons
nationalist zeal raged with ever-increasing fury from dusk until the dawn of
the following day. In vain had Castlereagh made liberal use of the sum of
£5,000 which he begged Pitt to send over to serve as a primum mobile at
Dublin. In vain had he "worked like a horse." The feeling against the
measure was too strong to be allayed by bribery of a retail kind.
Owing to ill health Grattan was not present. Sir John Parnell, Chancellor of
the Exchequer, was among the less violent opponents; but the most telling
appeal was that of Plunket, an Ulsterman. With an eloquence which even
THE UNION (continued)
"We must consider it as a measure of great
national policy, the object of which is
effectually to counteract the restless
machinations of an inveterate enemy, who
has uniformly and anxiously endeavoured to
effect a separation between the two
countries."—Pitt, Speech on the Union, 21st
April, 1800.
On 22nd January 1799 the long talked-of Act of Union was pointedly
referred to in the King's Speech read out to the Irish Parliament. The Speech
was adopted by the House of Lords, amendments hostile to the proposed
measure being rejected by large majorities. But in the House of Commons
nationalist zeal raged with ever-increasing fury from dusk until the dawn of
the following day. In vain had Castlereagh made liberal use of the sum of
£5,000 which he begged Pitt to send over to serve as a primum mobile at
Dublin. In vain had he "worked like a horse." The feeling against the
measure was too strong to be allayed by bribery of a retail kind.
Owing to ill health Grattan was not present. Sir John Parnell, Chancellor of
the Exchequer, was among the less violent opponents; but the most telling
appeal was that of Plunket, an Ulsterman. With an eloquence which even
Page 447
won votes he denied either the right of the Government to propose such a
measure or the competence of that Assembly to commit political suicide. If
the Act of Union were passed, he said, no one in Ireland would obey it.
Then, turning to the Speaker, he exclaimed: "You are appointed to make
laws and not Legislatures. You are appointed to exercise the functions of
legislators, and not to transfer them; and if you do so, your act is a
dissolution of the Government." On behalf of Government Castlereagh
made a well-reasoned reply; but his speech was too laboured to commend a
cause which offended both the sentiments and interests of members; and the
Opposition was beaten by only one vote—106 to 105. The debate was
marked by curious incidents. Sir Jonah Barrington, a chronicler of these
events, declared that Cooke, perturbed by the threatened defection of a
member named French, whispered to Castlereagh, and then, sidling up to
the erring placeman, spoke long and earnestly until smiles spread over the
features of both. A little later French rose to state his regret at the opinions
which he had previously expressed. The story is not convincing in the case
of a building provided with committee-rooms; but there can be no doubt
that bribery went on before the debate. The final voting showed that there
were limits to that form of influence. Even the canvassing of Castlereagh
failed to persuade members to pass sentence of political death on half of
their number and of transportation on the remainder. The joy of the men of
Dublin found expression in a spontaneous illumination, and the mob broke
all windows which were not lit up.
On all sides the procedure of the Government met with severe censure. As
usual, blame was lavished upon Cornwallis, Lord Carysfort warning
Grenville that the defeat was due to the disgust of "Orangemen and
exterminators" at his clemency. Buckingham, writing to Pitt on 29th
January, reported that on the estimate of Archbishop Troy, nine-tenths of the
Irish Catholics were for the Union: "Remember, however," he added, "that
this can only be done by the removal of Lord Cornwallis and Lord
measure or the competence of that Assembly to commit political suicide. If
the Act of Union were passed, he said, no one in Ireland would obey it.
Then, turning to the Speaker, he exclaimed: "You are appointed to make
laws and not Legislatures. You are appointed to exercise the functions of
legislators, and not to transfer them; and if you do so, your act is a
dissolution of the Government." On behalf of Government Castlereagh
made a well-reasoned reply; but his speech was too laboured to commend a
cause which offended both the sentiments and interests of members; and the
Opposition was beaten by only one vote—106 to 105. The debate was
marked by curious incidents. Sir Jonah Barrington, a chronicler of these
events, declared that Cooke, perturbed by the threatened defection of a
member named French, whispered to Castlereagh, and then, sidling up to
the erring placeman, spoke long and earnestly until smiles spread over the
features of both. A little later French rose to state his regret at the opinions
which he had previously expressed. The story is not convincing in the case
of a building provided with committee-rooms; but there can be no doubt
that bribery went on before the debate. The final voting showed that there
were limits to that form of influence. Even the canvassing of Castlereagh
failed to persuade members to pass sentence of political death on half of
their number and of transportation on the remainder. The joy of the men of
Dublin found expression in a spontaneous illumination, and the mob broke
all windows which were not lit up.
On all sides the procedure of the Government met with severe censure. As
usual, blame was lavished upon Cornwallis, Lord Carysfort warning
Grenville that the defeat was due to the disgust of "Orangemen and
exterminators" at his clemency. Buckingham, writing to Pitt on 29th
January, reported that on the estimate of Archbishop Troy, nine-tenths of the
Irish Catholics were for the Union: "Remember, however," he added, "that
this can only be done by the removal of Lord Cornwallis and Lord
Page 448
Castlereagh.... I protest I see no salvation but in the immediate change.
Send us Lord Winchilsea, or rather Lord Euston, or in short send us any
one. But send us Steele as his Secretary, and with firmness the Question
(and with it Ireland) will be saved. Excuse this earnestness."[555] Pitt took
no notice of this advice, but continued to support Cornwallis. As for the
Irish Executive, it proceeded now to the policy of official coercion
recommended from Downing Street. Parnell was dismissed from the
Exchequer; the Prime Serjeant was deposed, and four opponents of Union
were removed from subordinate posts, among them being Foster, son of the
Speaker.
So confident was Pitt of victory at Dublin that he introduced the Bill of
Union at Westminster on 23rd January. The King's Speech referred to the
designs of enemies and traitors to separate Ireland from Great Britain, and
counselled the adoption of means for perpetuating the connection.
Forthwith Sheridan moved a hostile amendment. With his wonted zeal and
eloquence, he urged the inopportuneness of such a measure when 40,000
British troops were holding down Ireland, and he denied the competence
either of the British or Irish Parliament to decide on it. Pitt promptly refuted
Sheridan's plea by referring to the action of the English and Scottish
Parliaments at the time of their Union, and he twitted him with seeking to
perpetuate at Dublin a system whose injustice and cruelty he had always
reprobated. Allowing that British rule in Ireland had been narrow and
intolerant, Pitt foretold the advent of a far different state of things after the
Union. Then, pointing to the divergence of British and Irish policy at the
time of the Regency crisis he pronounced it a dangerous omen, and declared
the Union to be necessary to the peace and stability of the Empire. The
House agreed with him and negatived the amendment without a division.
It is worth noting that of Sheridan's hypothetical colleagues in office under
the Prince Regent in the Cabinet outlined in February 1789, not one now
Send us Lord Winchilsea, or rather Lord Euston, or in short send us any
one. But send us Steele as his Secretary, and with firmness the Question
(and with it Ireland) will be saved. Excuse this earnestness."[555] Pitt took
no notice of this advice, but continued to support Cornwallis. As for the
Irish Executive, it proceeded now to the policy of official coercion
recommended from Downing Street. Parnell was dismissed from the
Exchequer; the Prime Serjeant was deposed, and four opponents of Union
were removed from subordinate posts, among them being Foster, son of the
Speaker.
So confident was Pitt of victory at Dublin that he introduced the Bill of
Union at Westminster on 23rd January. The King's Speech referred to the
designs of enemies and traitors to separate Ireland from Great Britain, and
counselled the adoption of means for perpetuating the connection.
Forthwith Sheridan moved a hostile amendment. With his wonted zeal and
eloquence, he urged the inopportuneness of such a measure when 40,000
British troops were holding down Ireland, and he denied the competence
either of the British or Irish Parliament to decide on it. Pitt promptly refuted
Sheridan's plea by referring to the action of the English and Scottish
Parliaments at the time of their Union, and he twitted him with seeking to
perpetuate at Dublin a system whose injustice and cruelty he had always
reprobated. Allowing that British rule in Ireland had been narrow and
intolerant, Pitt foretold the advent of a far different state of things after the
Union. Then, pointing to the divergence of British and Irish policy at the
time of the Regency crisis he pronounced it a dangerous omen, and declared
the Union to be necessary to the peace and stability of the Empire. The
House agreed with him and negatived the amendment without a division.
It is worth noting that of Sheridan's hypothetical colleagues in office under
the Prince Regent in the Cabinet outlined in February 1789, not one now
Page 449
supported him. Fox was not present, being engrossed in Lucretius and the
"Poetics" of Aristotle. He, however, informed Lord Holland that he detested
the Union and all centralized Governments, his predilection being for
Federalism.[556] The remark merits notice in view of the concentration of
power in France, and in her vassal Republics at Rome, Milan, Genoa, and
Amsterdam. That eager student of the Classics wished to dissolve the
British Isles into their component parts at a time when the highly organized
energy of the French race was threatening every neighbouring State. While
the tricolour waved at Amsterdam, Mainz, Berne, Rome, Valetta, and Cairo,
Fox thought it opportune to federalize British institutions. The means
whereby Pitt sought to solidify them are open to question. But which of the
two statesmen had the sounder sense?
On 31st January, after the receipt of the disappointing news from Dublin,
Pitt returned to the charge. Expressing deep regret that the Irish House of
Commons should have rejected the plan of a Union before it knew the
details, he proceeded to describe the proposals of the Government. Firstly,
he insisted that it was the concerted action of invaders from without and
traitors within that made the measure necessary. He then argued that the
settlement of 1782, according legislative independence to the Irish
Parliament, was far from final, as appeared in the ministerial declarations of
that time. Moreover, Irish Bills did not become law unless sanctioned by the
King and sealed by the Great Seal of Great Britain on the advice of British
Ministers, facts which implied the dependence of the Irish Parliament.
Turning to the commercial issues at stake, he effectively quoted the
statement of Foster to the Irish House of Commons in 1785, that they would
be mad to reject the commercial proposals then offered, which, if thrown
out, would not be renewed. But now, said Pitt, they are renewed in the
projected Union; and Foster has used his influence to reject a measure
which breaks down the fiscal barriers between the two kingdoms. After
referring to the Regency Question, he pointed out the danger of France
"Poetics" of Aristotle. He, however, informed Lord Holland that he detested
the Union and all centralized Governments, his predilection being for
Federalism.[556] The remark merits notice in view of the concentration of
power in France, and in her vassal Republics at Rome, Milan, Genoa, and
Amsterdam. That eager student of the Classics wished to dissolve the
British Isles into their component parts at a time when the highly organized
energy of the French race was threatening every neighbouring State. While
the tricolour waved at Amsterdam, Mainz, Berne, Rome, Valetta, and Cairo,
Fox thought it opportune to federalize British institutions. The means
whereby Pitt sought to solidify them are open to question. But which of the
two statesmen had the sounder sense?
On 31st January, after the receipt of the disappointing news from Dublin,
Pitt returned to the charge. Expressing deep regret that the Irish House of
Commons should have rejected the plan of a Union before it knew the
details, he proceeded to describe the proposals of the Government. Firstly,
he insisted that it was the concerted action of invaders from without and
traitors within that made the measure necessary. He then argued that the
settlement of 1782, according legislative independence to the Irish
Parliament, was far from final, as appeared in the ministerial declarations of
that time. Moreover, Irish Bills did not become law unless sanctioned by the
King and sealed by the Great Seal of Great Britain on the advice of British
Ministers, facts which implied the dependence of the Irish Parliament.
Turning to the commercial issues at stake, he effectively quoted the
statement of Foster to the Irish House of Commons in 1785, that they would
be mad to reject the commercial proposals then offered, which, if thrown
out, would not be renewed. But now, said Pitt, they are renewed in the
projected Union; and Foster has used his influence to reject a measure
which breaks down the fiscal barriers between the two kingdoms. After
referring to the Regency Question, he pointed out the danger of France
Page 450
attacking the British race at its weakest point. Never would she cease to
assail it until the Union was indissoluble. Commerce, he said, was the
source of wealth; and the wealth needed to withstand the predatory designs
of France would be enhanced by a free interchange of British and Irish
products. The Union would encourage the flow into the poorer island of
British capital which it so much needed. Next, adverting to the religious
feuds in Ireland, he remarked on the danger of granting concessions to the
Irish Catholics while Ireland remained a distinct kingdom. He then uttered
these momentous words:
On the other hand, without anticipating the discussion, or the
propriety of agitating the question, or saying how soon or how late it
may be fit to discuss it, two propositions are indisputable; first,
when the conduct of the Catholics shall be such as to make it safe
for the Government to admit them to the participation of the
privileges granted to those of the established religion, and when the
temper of the times shall be favourable to such a measure—when
these events take place, it is obvious that such a question may be
agitated in an United Imperial Parliament with much greater safety,
than it could be in a separate Legislature. In the second place, I
think it certain that, even for whatever period it may be thought
necessary after the Union to withhold from the Catholics the
enjoyment of those advantages, many of the objections which at
present arise out of their situation would be removed, if the
Protestant Legislature were no longer separate and local, but general
and Imperial: and the Catholics themselves would at once feel a
mitigation of the most goading and irritating of their present causes
of complaint.
Pitt then deprecated the effort to inflame the insular pride of Irishmen.
Could Irishmen really object to unite with Britons? For it was no
subordinate place that they were asked to take, but one of equality and
assail it until the Union was indissoluble. Commerce, he said, was the
source of wealth; and the wealth needed to withstand the predatory designs
of France would be enhanced by a free interchange of British and Irish
products. The Union would encourage the flow into the poorer island of
British capital which it so much needed. Next, adverting to the religious
feuds in Ireland, he remarked on the danger of granting concessions to the
Irish Catholics while Ireland remained a distinct kingdom. He then uttered
these momentous words:
On the other hand, without anticipating the discussion, or the
propriety of agitating the question, or saying how soon or how late it
may be fit to discuss it, two propositions are indisputable; first,
when the conduct of the Catholics shall be such as to make it safe
for the Government to admit them to the participation of the
privileges granted to those of the established religion, and when the
temper of the times shall be favourable to such a measure—when
these events take place, it is obvious that such a question may be
agitated in an United Imperial Parliament with much greater safety,
than it could be in a separate Legislature. In the second place, I
think it certain that, even for whatever period it may be thought
necessary after the Union to withhold from the Catholics the
enjoyment of those advantages, many of the objections which at
present arise out of their situation would be removed, if the
Protestant Legislature were no longer separate and local, but general
and Imperial: and the Catholics themselves would at once feel a
mitigation of the most goading and irritating of their present causes
of complaint.
Pitt then deprecated the effort to inflame the insular pride of Irishmen.
Could Irishmen really object to unite with Britons? For it was no
subordinate place that they were asked to take, but one of equality and
Page 451
honour. Most happily then did he quote the vow of Aeneas for an equal and
lasting compact between his Trojans and the Italians:
Non ego nec Teucris Italos parere jubebo,
Nec nova regna peto: paribus se legibus ambae
Invictae gentes aeterna in foedera mittant.[557]
He ended his speech by moving eight Resolutions on the question; and the
House approved their introduction by 140 votes to 15. This statesmanlike
survey lacked the fire and imaginative elevation of his speech on the Slave
Trade in 1792. But there was little need of rhetoric and invective. Pitt's aim
was to convince Ireland of the justice of his proposals. And his plea, though
weak at one point, must rank among the ablest expositions of a great and
complex question. How different the course of events might have been if
the Commons of Ireland had first heard Pitt's proposals of Union, clearly
and authoritatively set forth, not in the distorted form which rumour or
malice depicted. In this respect Gladstone proved himself an abler tactician
than Pitt. His Home Rule Bill of 1886 remained a secret until it was
described in that masterly statement which formed a worthy retort to Pitt's
oration of 31st January 1799. Pitt prepared it with great care, so Auckland
avers; and, as he and Long had secured the presence of the best reporters,
the text of the speech is among the most accurate that we possess for that
period. He now resolved to bring forward specific Resolutions, instead of,
as before, proposing merely to appoint Commissioners to consider the
details of the Bill of Union. It is unfortunate that he did not take this step at
first. The mistake probably resulted from his besetting sin—excess of
confidence. On 26th January he expressed to Cornwallis his deep
disappointment and grief at the action of the Dublin Parliament, which he
ascribed to prejudice and cabal. Clearly he had underrated the force of the
nationalist opposition.
lasting compact between his Trojans and the Italians:
Non ego nec Teucris Italos parere jubebo,
Nec nova regna peto: paribus se legibus ambae
Invictae gentes aeterna in foedera mittant.[557]
He ended his speech by moving eight Resolutions on the question; and the
House approved their introduction by 140 votes to 15. This statesmanlike
survey lacked the fire and imaginative elevation of his speech on the Slave
Trade in 1792. But there was little need of rhetoric and invective. Pitt's aim
was to convince Ireland of the justice of his proposals. And his plea, though
weak at one point, must rank among the ablest expositions of a great and
complex question. How different the course of events might have been if
the Commons of Ireland had first heard Pitt's proposals of Union, clearly
and authoritatively set forth, not in the distorted form which rumour or
malice depicted. In this respect Gladstone proved himself an abler tactician
than Pitt. His Home Rule Bill of 1886 remained a secret until it was
described in that masterly statement which formed a worthy retort to Pitt's
oration of 31st January 1799. Pitt prepared it with great care, so Auckland
avers; and, as he and Long had secured the presence of the best reporters,
the text of the speech is among the most accurate that we possess for that
period. He now resolved to bring forward specific Resolutions, instead of,
as before, proposing merely to appoint Commissioners to consider the
details of the Bill of Union. It is unfortunate that he did not take this step at
first. The mistake probably resulted from his besetting sin—excess of
confidence. On 26th January he expressed to Cornwallis his deep
disappointment and grief at the action of the Dublin Parliament, which he
ascribed to prejudice and cabal. Clearly he had underrated the force of the
nationalist opposition.
Page 452
Meanwhile Castlereagh endeavoured to reckon the value of the pecuniary
interests in Ireland opposed to the Union. In a characteristically narrow
spirit he assessed the losses to borough-holders at £756,000; to controllers
of counties at £224,000; to barristers at £200,000; to purchasers of
parliamentary seats at £75,000; and he estimated the probable depreciation
of property in Dublin at £200,000. Thus, moneyed interests worth
£1,433,000 were arrayed against the Union. He proposed to whittle down
these claims by raising the number of Irish members in the United
Parliament either to 127 or 141. Both at Dublin and Westminster Ministers
were intent on appeasing hostile interests on the easiest terms. Among Pitt's
papers is a curious estimate of the opinion of the propertied classes in the
counties and chief towns of Ireland. "Property" is declared to favour the
Union in Antrim, Clare, Cork, Donegal, Galway, Kerry, Leitrim,
Londonderry, Mayo, Waterford, and Wexford. It was hostile in Carlow,
Cavan, Dublin, Fermanagh, Kildare, and Louth. In the other counties it was
divided on the subject. Among the towns, Cork, Galway, Lisburne,
Londonderry, Waterford, and Wexford supported Union. Clonmell,
Drogheda, and Dublin opposed it; while Belfast, Kilkenny, and Limerick
were doubtful. Most of the Grand Juries petitioned for Union, only those of
Dublin, Louth, Queen's County, and Wicklow pronouncing against it.[558] In
view of the expected attempt of the Brest fleet, the Grand Jury of Cork burst
into a patriotic rhapsody which must be placed on record:
March 26, 1799.[559]
... At the present awful moment whilst we await the threatened
attempt of the enemies of religion and of man to crush us in their
sacrilegious embrace; whilst their diabolical influence cherishes
rebellion and promotes assassination in the land, we look back with
gratitude to the timely interposition of Great Britain, which has
more than once rescued us from that infidel yoke under which so
interests in Ireland opposed to the Union. In a characteristically narrow
spirit he assessed the losses to borough-holders at £756,000; to controllers
of counties at £224,000; to barristers at £200,000; to purchasers of
parliamentary seats at £75,000; and he estimated the probable depreciation
of property in Dublin at £200,000. Thus, moneyed interests worth
£1,433,000 were arrayed against the Union. He proposed to whittle down
these claims by raising the number of Irish members in the United
Parliament either to 127 or 141. Both at Dublin and Westminster Ministers
were intent on appeasing hostile interests on the easiest terms. Among Pitt's
papers is a curious estimate of the opinion of the propertied classes in the
counties and chief towns of Ireland. "Property" is declared to favour the
Union in Antrim, Clare, Cork, Donegal, Galway, Kerry, Leitrim,
Londonderry, Mayo, Waterford, and Wexford. It was hostile in Carlow,
Cavan, Dublin, Fermanagh, Kildare, and Louth. In the other counties it was
divided on the subject. Among the towns, Cork, Galway, Lisburne,
Londonderry, Waterford, and Wexford supported Union. Clonmell,
Drogheda, and Dublin opposed it; while Belfast, Kilkenny, and Limerick
were doubtful. Most of the Grand Juries petitioned for Union, only those of
Dublin, Louth, Queen's County, and Wicklow pronouncing against it.[558] In
view of the expected attempt of the Brest fleet, the Grand Jury of Cork burst
into a patriotic rhapsody which must be placed on record:
March 26, 1799.[559]
... At the present awful moment whilst we await the threatened
attempt of the enemies of religion and of man to crush us in their
sacrilegious embrace; whilst their diabolical influence cherishes
rebellion and promotes assassination in the land, we look back with
gratitude to the timely interposition of Great Britain, which has
more than once rescued us from that infidel yoke under which so
Page 453
great a portion of distracted Europe at this moment groans. We have
still to acknowledge how necessary that interposition is to protect us
from the further attempts of an unprincipled foe, ... and to her
assistance we are ... indebted for keeping down an unnatural but
wide extended rebellion within the bosom of this country. To
become a constituent part of that Empire to whose protection we
owe our political existence and whose constitution is the admiration
of the civilized world; to participate in those resources which are
inexhaustible; to become joint proprietors of that navy which is
irresistible; and to share in that commerce which knows no bounds,
are objects beyond which our most sanguine wishes for the wealth
and prosperity of Ireland cannot possibly extend, whilst the prospect
which they hold forth of terminating the jarring interests of party
and reconciling the jealous distinctions of religion, promises a
restoration of that tranquillity to which the country has too long
been a stranger.
This exuberant loyalty may have been heightened by the hope that Cork
would reap from the Union a commercial harvest equal to that which raised
Glasgow from a city of 12,700 souls before the Anglo-Scottish Union, to
one of nearly 70,000 in the year 1800. But the men of Cork forgot that that
marvellous increase was due to the coal, iron, and manufactures of
Lanarkshire, no less than to free participation in the trade of the Empire.
The fact that Cork was then far more Unionist than Belfast is apt to perplex
the reader until he realizes that Roman Catholics for the most part favoured
Union, not so much from loyalty to George III, as from the conviction that
only in the Imperial Parliament could they gain full religious equality. On
the other hand the Presbyterians of Ulster had fewer grievances to be
redressed, and were not without hope of gaining satisfaction from the
Protestant Legislature at Dublin. It is certain that the Catholic Archbishops
of Dublin and Tuam, besides Bishop Moylan of Cork and other prelates,
used their influence on behalf of the Union. Cornwallis was known to
still to acknowledge how necessary that interposition is to protect us
from the further attempts of an unprincipled foe, ... and to her
assistance we are ... indebted for keeping down an unnatural but
wide extended rebellion within the bosom of this country. To
become a constituent part of that Empire to whose protection we
owe our political existence and whose constitution is the admiration
of the civilized world; to participate in those resources which are
inexhaustible; to become joint proprietors of that navy which is
irresistible; and to share in that commerce which knows no bounds,
are objects beyond which our most sanguine wishes for the wealth
and prosperity of Ireland cannot possibly extend, whilst the prospect
which they hold forth of terminating the jarring interests of party
and reconciling the jealous distinctions of religion, promises a
restoration of that tranquillity to which the country has too long
been a stranger.
This exuberant loyalty may have been heightened by the hope that Cork
would reap from the Union a commercial harvest equal to that which raised
Glasgow from a city of 12,700 souls before the Anglo-Scottish Union, to
one of nearly 70,000 in the year 1800. But the men of Cork forgot that that
marvellous increase was due to the coal, iron, and manufactures of
Lanarkshire, no less than to free participation in the trade of the Empire.
The fact that Cork was then far more Unionist than Belfast is apt to perplex
the reader until he realizes that Roman Catholics for the most part favoured
Union, not so much from loyalty to George III, as from the conviction that
only in the Imperial Parliament could they gain full religious equality. On
the other hand the Presbyterians of Ulster had fewer grievances to be
redressed, and were not without hope of gaining satisfaction from the
Protestant Legislature at Dublin. It is certain that the Catholic Archbishops
of Dublin and Tuam, besides Bishop Moylan of Cork and other prelates,
used their influence on behalf of the Union. Cornwallis was known to
Page 454
favour the Catholic claims; and Wilberforce, writing to Pitt, says: "I have
long wished to converse with you a little concerning the part proper for you
to take when the Catholic Question should come before the House. I feel it
due to the long friendship which has subsisted between us to state to you
unreservedly my sentiments on this very important occasion, especially as I
fear they are different from your own."[560] Pitt does not seem to have
welcomed the suggestion couched in these magisterial terms, and, as the
sequel will show, he had good grounds for concealing his hand. Only at one
point did the Cabinet declare its intentions. There being some fear that the
Opposition at Dublin would seek to win over the Catholics by the offer of
Emancipation, the Government declared its resolve to oppose any step in
this direction so long as that Parliament existed.[561]
It is well also to remember that the concession of the franchise to the bulk
of the Irish peasantry in 1793, with the full approval of Pitt, enabled the
Catholics to control the elections in the counties and "open" boroughs
except in Ulster. Therefore, though they could not send to Parliament men
of their creed, they could in many instances keep out Protestants who were
inimical to their interests. In the present case, then, Catholic influence was
certain to tell powerfully, though indirectly, in favour of Union. These facts
explain the progress of the cause early in the year 1799. Opponents of the
measure began to tremble for their seats owing to the action either of
Government or of the Catholic vote. Accordingly, despite the frantic efforts
of Lord Downshire and Foster, Government carried the day by 123 to 103
(15th February). Fear worked on behalf of Union. A great fleet was fitting
out at Brest, the Dutch ports were alive with work, and again Ireland was
believed to be the aim of the Republicans. As was the case in 1798, they
encouraged numbers of Irishmen to make pikes, to muster on the hills of
Cork and Wicklow, dealing murder and havoc in the plains by night.
Cornwallis therefore proclaimed martial law, armed the yeomen, and sought
to crush the malcontents, a proceeding which led critics to charge
long wished to converse with you a little concerning the part proper for you
to take when the Catholic Question should come before the House. I feel it
due to the long friendship which has subsisted between us to state to you
unreservedly my sentiments on this very important occasion, especially as I
fear they are different from your own."[560] Pitt does not seem to have
welcomed the suggestion couched in these magisterial terms, and, as the
sequel will show, he had good grounds for concealing his hand. Only at one
point did the Cabinet declare its intentions. There being some fear that the
Opposition at Dublin would seek to win over the Catholics by the offer of
Emancipation, the Government declared its resolve to oppose any step in
this direction so long as that Parliament existed.[561]
It is well also to remember that the concession of the franchise to the bulk
of the Irish peasantry in 1793, with the full approval of Pitt, enabled the
Catholics to control the elections in the counties and "open" boroughs
except in Ulster. Therefore, though they could not send to Parliament men
of their creed, they could in many instances keep out Protestants who were
inimical to their interests. In the present case, then, Catholic influence was
certain to tell powerfully, though indirectly, in favour of Union. These facts
explain the progress of the cause early in the year 1799. Opponents of the
measure began to tremble for their seats owing to the action either of
Government or of the Catholic vote. Accordingly, despite the frantic efforts
of Lord Downshire and Foster, Government carried the day by 123 to 103
(15th February). Fear worked on behalf of Union. A great fleet was fitting
out at Brest, the Dutch ports were alive with work, and again Ireland was
believed to be the aim of the Republicans. As was the case in 1798, they
encouraged numbers of Irishmen to make pikes, to muster on the hills of
Cork and Wicklow, dealing murder and havoc in the plains by night.
Cornwallis therefore proclaimed martial law, armed the yeomen, and sought
to crush the malcontents, a proceeding which led critics to charge
Page 455
Government with inciting the people to outrage in order to coerce them.
Those who flung out the sneer should also have proved that the naval
preparations at Brest and the Texel were instigated from Downing Street in
order to carry the Union.
The real feelings of Dublin officials appear in the letters of Beresford,
Cooke, and Lees to Auckland. On 15th March 1799 Beresford writes: "Our
business is going on smoothly in Parliament; from the day that Government
took the courage [sic] of dividing with the Opposition, they have grown
weaker and weaker every day as I foretold to you they would. The Speaker
[Foster], as I hear, appears to be much softened. I am sure he sees that he
has pledged himself too far, and that he cannot depend upon those who
heretofore supported him: and both he and Ponsonby are conscious that the
point will be carried and they, of course, left in the lurch.... The country is
in a wretched way, organization going on everywhere; and if the French
should land, I much fear that there will be very universal risings." On the
subject of inter-insular trade Beresford informs Auckland on 29th March
that Ireland depends almost entirely upon Great Britain and her colonies,
having a balance in her favour in that trade but an adverse balance in her
dealings with foreign lands. She exports 41,670,000 yards of linen to Great
Britain and only 4,762,000 yards to other lands. Besides, the British trade is
increasing fast, as England uses less and less foreign linen. On the morrow,
Cooke declares that, if the French do not land, the Irish malcontents will
settle down. Commending the policy of going slowly with the Union, he
says: "By letting the subject cool, by opening its nature, tendencies, and
advantages, and seeming not to press it, and by insinuating that no other
course of safety to property remains, the mind begins to think seriously and
faints. I think during the Vacation pains may be taken with the House of
Commons so as to give us a fair majority, and if the Catholics act steadily
we should be able to carry the point. I could wish that Mr. Pitt would suffer
some person of ability to prepare all the necessary Bills, and to fill up every
Those who flung out the sneer should also have proved that the naval
preparations at Brest and the Texel were instigated from Downing Street in
order to carry the Union.
The real feelings of Dublin officials appear in the letters of Beresford,
Cooke, and Lees to Auckland. On 15th March 1799 Beresford writes: "Our
business is going on smoothly in Parliament; from the day that Government
took the courage [sic] of dividing with the Opposition, they have grown
weaker and weaker every day as I foretold to you they would. The Speaker
[Foster], as I hear, appears to be much softened. I am sure he sees that he
has pledged himself too far, and that he cannot depend upon those who
heretofore supported him: and both he and Ponsonby are conscious that the
point will be carried and they, of course, left in the lurch.... The country is
in a wretched way, organization going on everywhere; and if the French
should land, I much fear that there will be very universal risings." On the
subject of inter-insular trade Beresford informs Auckland on 29th March
that Ireland depends almost entirely upon Great Britain and her colonies,
having a balance in her favour in that trade but an adverse balance in her
dealings with foreign lands. She exports 41,670,000 yards of linen to Great
Britain and only 4,762,000 yards to other lands. Besides, the British trade is
increasing fast, as England uses less and less foreign linen. On the morrow,
Cooke declares that, if the French do not land, the Irish malcontents will
settle down. Commending the policy of going slowly with the Union, he
says: "By letting the subject cool, by opening its nature, tendencies, and
advantages, and seeming not to press it, and by insinuating that no other
course of safety to property remains, the mind begins to think seriously and
faints. I think during the Vacation pains may be taken with the House of
Commons so as to give us a fair majority, and if the Catholics act steadily
we should be able to carry the point. I could wish that Mr. Pitt would suffer
some person of ability to prepare all the necessary Bills, and to fill up every
Page 456
detail; so that the measure might be seen in its complete stage. I despair of
this being done, tho' obviously right; for Ministers never will act till they
are forced, and I do not wonder at it."[562]
Again, all the energy was on the side of the Opposition. On 11th April
Foster passed the whole subject in review in a speech of four hours'
duration. In order to weaken one of the strongest of Pitt's arguments, he
proposed that in case of a Regency, the Regent, who was chosen at
Westminster, should necessarily be Regent at Dublin. This proposal of
course implied the dependence of the Irish Parliament on that of Great
Britain; but, as invalidating one of the chief pleas for Union, Foster pressed
it home. He also charged Pitt with endeavouring to wring a large sum of
money every year from Ireland. The speech made a deep impression. The
only way of deadening its influence and stopping the Regency Bill was to
postpone it until August and summarily to close the session on 1st June.
The meanness of this device is a tribute to the power of Foster and the
mediocrity of the officials of Dublin Castle.
Meanwhile the naval situation had cleared up, so far as concerns Ireland.
On 25th April Admiral Bruix, with a powerful fleet, slipped out from Brest
by night past Lord Bridport's blockading force. For some days panic
reigned in London, and it is significant that Bridport took especial measures
to guard the coasts of Ireland, thus enabling the French to get clear away to
the Mediterranean. With bolder tactics they should have been able to reduce
the new British possession, Minorca, or annihilate the small force
blockading Malta. The relief felt at Dublin Castle, on hearing of Bruix'
southward voyage, appears in Beresford's letter of 15th May, in which he
refers to the revival of loyalty and the terrible number of hangings by courts
martial: "We consider ourselves as safe from the French for this year; but I
am in great anxiety for my friend St. Vincent. What steps will be taken
against those damned dogs in the Mediterranean?... I expect that the French
this being done, tho' obviously right; for Ministers never will act till they
are forced, and I do not wonder at it."[562]
Again, all the energy was on the side of the Opposition. On 11th April
Foster passed the whole subject in review in a speech of four hours'
duration. In order to weaken one of the strongest of Pitt's arguments, he
proposed that in case of a Regency, the Regent, who was chosen at
Westminster, should necessarily be Regent at Dublin. This proposal of
course implied the dependence of the Irish Parliament on that of Great
Britain; but, as invalidating one of the chief pleas for Union, Foster pressed
it home. He also charged Pitt with endeavouring to wring a large sum of
money every year from Ireland. The speech made a deep impression. The
only way of deadening its influence and stopping the Regency Bill was to
postpone it until August and summarily to close the session on 1st June.
The meanness of this device is a tribute to the power of Foster and the
mediocrity of the officials of Dublin Castle.
Meanwhile the naval situation had cleared up, so far as concerns Ireland.
On 25th April Admiral Bruix, with a powerful fleet, slipped out from Brest
by night past Lord Bridport's blockading force. For some days panic
reigned in London, and it is significant that Bridport took especial measures
to guard the coasts of Ireland, thus enabling the French to get clear away to
the Mediterranean. With bolder tactics they should have been able to reduce
the new British possession, Minorca, or annihilate the small force
blockading Malta. The relief felt at Dublin Castle, on hearing of Bruix'
southward voyage, appears in Beresford's letter of 15th May, in which he
refers to the revival of loyalty and the terrible number of hangings by courts
martial: "We consider ourselves as safe from the French for this year; but I
am in great anxiety for my friend St. Vincent. What steps will be taken
against those damned dogs in the Mediterranean?... I expect that the French
Page 457
going to the Mediterranean, instead of coming to the assistance of their
friends here, will have a very great effect upon the people of this country,
who, as soon as they find that they have been made fools of will endeavour
to get out of the scrape they are in." On 1st June Cooke writes "secretly" to
Auckland, expressing regret that Pitt ever attacked Foster, whose opposition
is most weighty. The Cabinet lost the measure by want of good
management in 1798: and the same is now the case. Nothing has been done
to win over Lord Downshire with his eight votes, or Lords Donegal and De
Clifford, who had half as many. He even asks whether Pitt will think it
worth while to spend three months' work on the Union now that the French
had gone to the Mediterranean.[563] The question reveals the prevalence of
the belief that Pitt paid little attention to Irish affairs. Probably it arose from
his stiffness of manner and his execrable habit of leaving letters
unanswered. This defect had become incurable, witness the complaint of
Wilberforce to Addington—"You know how difficult, I may say next to
impossible, it is to extort a line from Pitt."[564]
In July the return of Bruix with the Cadiz fleet into the Atlantic renewed the
fears of Irish loyalists and the hopes of the malcontents. The combined fleet
managed to enter Brest on 13th August 1799; and its presence there was a
continual source of unsettlement to Ireland, preparations for revolt being
kept up in several parts. A large British force was therefore kept in Ireland,
not for the purpose of forcing through the Union, as Pitt's enemies averred,
but in order to guard against invasion and rebellion. Though reinforcements
arrived, Cornwallis complained that he had not enough troops. On 24th July
1799 he informed the Duke of Portland that he had only 45,000 regular
infantry, a number sufficient to preserve order but totally inadequate to
repel an invasion in force. Thus the facts of the case are, that French threats
to tear Ireland from Great Britain kept up the threatening ferment and
necessitated the presence of a considerable military force; but they also led
Pitt to insist on the Union as a means of thwarting all separatist efforts
friends here, will have a very great effect upon the people of this country,
who, as soon as they find that they have been made fools of will endeavour
to get out of the scrape they are in." On 1st June Cooke writes "secretly" to
Auckland, expressing regret that Pitt ever attacked Foster, whose opposition
is most weighty. The Cabinet lost the measure by want of good
management in 1798: and the same is now the case. Nothing has been done
to win over Lord Downshire with his eight votes, or Lords Donegal and De
Clifford, who had half as many. He even asks whether Pitt will think it
worth while to spend three months' work on the Union now that the French
had gone to the Mediterranean.[563] The question reveals the prevalence of
the belief that Pitt paid little attention to Irish affairs. Probably it arose from
his stiffness of manner and his execrable habit of leaving letters
unanswered. This defect had become incurable, witness the complaint of
Wilberforce to Addington—"You know how difficult, I may say next to
impossible, it is to extort a line from Pitt."[564]
In July the return of Bruix with the Cadiz fleet into the Atlantic renewed the
fears of Irish loyalists and the hopes of the malcontents. The combined fleet
managed to enter Brest on 13th August 1799; and its presence there was a
continual source of unsettlement to Ireland, preparations for revolt being
kept up in several parts. A large British force was therefore kept in Ireland,
not for the purpose of forcing through the Union, as Pitt's enemies averred,
but in order to guard against invasion and rebellion. Though reinforcements
arrived, Cornwallis complained that he had not enough troops. On 24th July
1799 he informed the Duke of Portland that he had only 45,000 regular
infantry, a number sufficient to preserve order but totally inadequate to
repel an invasion in force. Thus the facts of the case are, that French threats
to tear Ireland from Great Britain kept up the threatening ferment and
necessitated the presence of a considerable military force; but they also led
Pitt to insist on the Union as a means of thwarting all separatist efforts
Page 458
whether from without or from within. It is clear, however, that Pitt and Earl
Spencer trusted to Bridport's powerful squadron to intercept any large
expedition of the enemy. The blow then preparing against the Dutch was in
part intended to ensure the safety of the British Isles.
Meanwhile at Westminster the cause of the Union met with almost universal
approval. The debate in the Lords on 11th April elicited admirable speeches,
from Dr. Watson, the learned Bishop of Llandaff, and from Lords Auckland
and Minto. Only Lords Holland, King, and Thanet protested against the
measure. In the Commons, Lord Sheffield, while supporting the Union,
reproved Ministers for allowing their aim to become known in Ireland
several weeks before the details of their proposals were made public. The
measure received warm support from Canning, who a month earlier had
resigned the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, and was now for the
time merely on the India Board of Control, with a sinecure superadded. The
sensitive young Irishman had found it impossible to work with the cold and
austere Grenville; and his place was taken for a time by his coadjutor on the
"Anti-Jacobin," Hookham Frere, to whom the Grenville yoke proved
scarcely less irksome.
Canning flung himself with ardour into the struggle for the Union, and
proved a match for his brilliant fellow countryman, Sheridan. He combated
the notion that the Irish Parliament was unalterably opposed to the measure,
and, arguing from the contemptuous manner in which the French had met
our overtures for peace, he inferred their resolve to sever Ireland from the
Empire. In animated style he declared that Ireland would not lose but gain
in dignity by the Union, which would confer on her what she most needed,
stronger and steadier government. On this occasion Sheridan did not speak,
and Fox was absent. After a protest by Lord William Russell against
infringing the final settlement of 1782, Pitt arose merely in order to
challenge this statement and to read the letters of the Duke of Portland to
Spencer trusted to Bridport's powerful squadron to intercept any large
expedition of the enemy. The blow then preparing against the Dutch was in
part intended to ensure the safety of the British Isles.
Meanwhile at Westminster the cause of the Union met with almost universal
approval. The debate in the Lords on 11th April elicited admirable speeches,
from Dr. Watson, the learned Bishop of Llandaff, and from Lords Auckland
and Minto. Only Lords Holland, King, and Thanet protested against the
measure. In the Commons, Lord Sheffield, while supporting the Union,
reproved Ministers for allowing their aim to become known in Ireland
several weeks before the details of their proposals were made public. The
measure received warm support from Canning, who a month earlier had
resigned the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, and was now for the
time merely on the India Board of Control, with a sinecure superadded. The
sensitive young Irishman had found it impossible to work with the cold and
austere Grenville; and his place was taken for a time by his coadjutor on the
"Anti-Jacobin," Hookham Frere, to whom the Grenville yoke proved
scarcely less irksome.
Canning flung himself with ardour into the struggle for the Union, and
proved a match for his brilliant fellow countryman, Sheridan. He combated
the notion that the Irish Parliament was unalterably opposed to the measure,
and, arguing from the contemptuous manner in which the French had met
our overtures for peace, he inferred their resolve to sever Ireland from the
Empire. In animated style he declared that Ireland would not lose but gain
in dignity by the Union, which would confer on her what she most needed,
stronger and steadier government. On this occasion Sheridan did not speak,
and Fox was absent. After a protest by Lord William Russell against
infringing the final settlement of 1782, Pitt arose merely in order to
challenge this statement and to read the letters of the Duke of Portland to
Page 459
Lord Shelburne of May–June 1782; they refuted Russell's contention only
in so far as to show that Ministers then designed to legislate further on the
subject. The Irish Parliament certainly regarded the legislative
independence then granted as complete and final. The House of Commons
supported Pitt by a unanimous vote.
During the summer the outlook at Dublin became somewhat brighter, as
appears from the following "secret" letter of Cooke to Lord Camden. After
congratulating him on receiving the Garter, he continues:
Dublin, 14 Aug., 1799.
... I think Union gains ground. Lord Cornwallis is in earnest on the
subject and feels himself committed. The Catholics have been
chiefly courted by him, and he has always been of opinion that, if
they would act heartily in support, the Protestants would not resist
the efforts of the British Government, assisted by the population of
the kingdom. I believe this position to be true. It cannot, however,
be fully acted upon, in my mind, unless there be a determination to
make further concessions to that body. To such concessions I
confess I do not see insuperable, tho' I do strong, objections. I think
they vanish in the superior importance of the question of Union.
From the present state of the country I conceive the question may be
brought forward with safety. If the Catholics were steady, Dublin
might be preserved quiet, tho' the Opposition would be clamorous.
Our difficulties will be in Parliament. I think the Speaker will not
relax. Lord Downshire, I am sorry to say, seems very hostile. Lord
de Clifford is also unfriendly. Lord Donegal I hear is coming round.
Could Lord Downshire and Lord de Clifford be made cordial, the
Parliament would be secure. I see not any great difficulty in settling
the terms except as to the representation of the Commons and
compensation to the boroughs. Allowing two members for each
county—which makes 64—there is no principle which can be
exactly applied for classing the boroughs and selecting the great
in so far as to show that Ministers then designed to legislate further on the
subject. The Irish Parliament certainly regarded the legislative
independence then granted as complete and final. The House of Commons
supported Pitt by a unanimous vote.
During the summer the outlook at Dublin became somewhat brighter, as
appears from the following "secret" letter of Cooke to Lord Camden. After
congratulating him on receiving the Garter, he continues:
Dublin, 14 Aug., 1799.
... I think Union gains ground. Lord Cornwallis is in earnest on the
subject and feels himself committed. The Catholics have been
chiefly courted by him, and he has always been of opinion that, if
they would act heartily in support, the Protestants would not resist
the efforts of the British Government, assisted by the population of
the kingdom. I believe this position to be true. It cannot, however,
be fully acted upon, in my mind, unless there be a determination to
make further concessions to that body. To such concessions I
confess I do not see insuperable, tho' I do strong, objections. I think
they vanish in the superior importance of the question of Union.
From the present state of the country I conceive the question may be
brought forward with safety. If the Catholics were steady, Dublin
might be preserved quiet, tho' the Opposition would be clamorous.
Our difficulties will be in Parliament. I think the Speaker will not
relax. Lord Downshire, I am sorry to say, seems very hostile. Lord
de Clifford is also unfriendly. Lord Donegal I hear is coming round.
Could Lord Downshire and Lord de Clifford be made cordial, the
Parliament would be secure. I see not any great difficulty in settling
the terms except as to the representation of the Commons and
compensation to the boroughs. Allowing two members for each
county—which makes 64—there is no principle which can be
exactly applied for classing the boroughs and selecting the great
Page 460
towns, and tho' it would be easy to compensate the close boroughs,
it is almost impossible to compensate pot-walloping boroughs.[565]
The difficulties here are enhanced by the consideration that in this
case private not public interests are concerned. When I thus
represent the probability of success, I am aware of the strange
volatility of the Irish mind; and I should not be surprised at any
sudden turn of the present appearances....
Very interesting is the statement as to the courting of the Catholics by
Cornwallis. Pitt certainly knew of these advances; for on New Year's Day
1801 Castlereagh reminded him by letter that Cornwallis did not venture to
make them until the Cabinet had discussed the matter sometime in the
autumn of 1799, and had come to a conclusion entirely favourable to the
Catholic claims, finally assuring him that he "need not hesitate in calling
forth the Catholic support in whatever degree he found it practicable to
obtain it." This and other passages in Castlereagh's letter prove conclusively
that not only Pitt, but the Cabinet as a whole was responsible for the
procedure of Cornwallis, which ensured the more or less declared support
of the Irish Catholics.[566]
The chief difficulty was with the Protestant clique which largely controlled
State patronage. In the autumn Pitt had another interview with Downshire,
but found him full of complaints, demanding among other things that
Ireland should send at least 300 Commoners to Westminster. He departed
for Dublin declaring that he would do his duty. In October the
Government's cause was furthered by a state progress of Cornwallis through
the North of Ireland, during which he received numerous addresses in
favour of Union. At Belfast 150 of the chief citizens attended a banquet in
his honour; Londonderry was enthusiastic in the cause; and it was clear that
the opposition of the Protestants of the North was slackening. But, as often
happened in Ireland, many Catholics now began to doubt the utility of a
it is almost impossible to compensate pot-walloping boroughs.[565]
The difficulties here are enhanced by the consideration that in this
case private not public interests are concerned. When I thus
represent the probability of success, I am aware of the strange
volatility of the Irish mind; and I should not be surprised at any
sudden turn of the present appearances....
Very interesting is the statement as to the courting of the Catholics by
Cornwallis. Pitt certainly knew of these advances; for on New Year's Day
1801 Castlereagh reminded him by letter that Cornwallis did not venture to
make them until the Cabinet had discussed the matter sometime in the
autumn of 1799, and had come to a conclusion entirely favourable to the
Catholic claims, finally assuring him that he "need not hesitate in calling
forth the Catholic support in whatever degree he found it practicable to
obtain it." This and other passages in Castlereagh's letter prove conclusively
that not only Pitt, but the Cabinet as a whole was responsible for the
procedure of Cornwallis, which ensured the more or less declared support
of the Irish Catholics.[566]
The chief difficulty was with the Protestant clique which largely controlled
State patronage. In the autumn Pitt had another interview with Downshire,
but found him full of complaints, demanding among other things that
Ireland should send at least 300 Commoners to Westminster. He departed
for Dublin declaring that he would do his duty. In October the
Government's cause was furthered by a state progress of Cornwallis through
the North of Ireland, during which he received numerous addresses in
favour of Union. At Belfast 150 of the chief citizens attended a banquet in
his honour; Londonderry was enthusiastic in the cause; and it was clear that
the opposition of the Protestants of the North was slackening. But, as often
happened in Ireland, many Catholics now began to doubt the utility of a
Page 461
measure commended by their opponents. The interest which Pitt felt in this
complex problem and in Cornwallis's tour appears in the following
Memorandum which he wrote probably at the end of October 1799:
The number of placemen in Ireland is 71. Of these such as hold
office for life or during good behaviour, 11, and 2 holding places for
pleasure, vote against. It is said 63 seats have been vacated by
Government by a misuse of the Place Bill. This number is
exaggerated; but at least 10 were vacated to serve Opposition. A
charge is made against Lord Cornwallis for canvassing for
declarations in favour of Union. The fact is that Lord Cornwallis,
being commander-in-chief, thought it his duty to make a progress of
inspection thro' the kingdom in order to examine the state of the
army and to be a judge of the means of defence he could rely on. In
this progress he received numerous addresses in favour of Union. A
charge is made against Government of intimidation and the exertion
of martial law. There was only one attempt to substantiate such a
charge which was by Sir L. Parsons, which, instead of terminating
in censure, produced a vote of unanimous approbation in favour of
Government. There have been general charges of corruption
adduced, but no proof attempted. The charge retorted by
Government on Opposition for forming the most extensive
subscriptions for the purpose of corruption has not been denied by
them.
The last sentence refers to a curious incident. Downshire, the most
influential opponent of the Union, had opened a fund for influencing
members of Parliament. It reached a large amount, probably £100,000.
Beresford in a letter to Auckland states that £4,000 was paid to win over a
supporter of Government. Pitt, as we have seen, believed that Downshire's
fund necessitated the extensive use of bribery by Government. But it is on
the whole more likely that Dublin Castle opened the game by its request
complex problem and in Cornwallis's tour appears in the following
Memorandum which he wrote probably at the end of October 1799:
The number of placemen in Ireland is 71. Of these such as hold
office for life or during good behaviour, 11, and 2 holding places for
pleasure, vote against. It is said 63 seats have been vacated by
Government by a misuse of the Place Bill. This number is
exaggerated; but at least 10 were vacated to serve Opposition. A
charge is made against Lord Cornwallis for canvassing for
declarations in favour of Union. The fact is that Lord Cornwallis,
being commander-in-chief, thought it his duty to make a progress of
inspection thro' the kingdom in order to examine the state of the
army and to be a judge of the means of defence he could rely on. In
this progress he received numerous addresses in favour of Union. A
charge is made against Government of intimidation and the exertion
of martial law. There was only one attempt to substantiate such a
charge which was by Sir L. Parsons, which, instead of terminating
in censure, produced a vote of unanimous approbation in favour of
Government. There have been general charges of corruption
adduced, but no proof attempted. The charge retorted by
Government on Opposition for forming the most extensive
subscriptions for the purpose of corruption has not been denied by
them.
The last sentence refers to a curious incident. Downshire, the most
influential opponent of the Union, had opened a fund for influencing
members of Parliament. It reached a large amount, probably £100,000.
Beresford in a letter to Auckland states that £4,000 was paid to win over a
supporter of Government. Pitt, as we have seen, believed that Downshire's
fund necessitated the extensive use of bribery by Government. But it is on
the whole more likely that Dublin Castle opened the game by its request
Page 462
early in 1799, for £5,000 immediately from London. Further sums were
forwarded, for on 5th April, Cooke, after interviews with Pitt and Portland,
assured Castlereagh that Portland would send "the needful" to Dublin. He
adds: "Pitt will contrive to let you have from £8,000 to £10,000 for five
years," though this was less than Castlereagh required. After this, it is
absurd to deny that Pitt used corrupt means to carry the Union. He used
them because only so could he carry through that corrupt Parliament a
measure entailing pecuniary loss on most of its members. Probably he
disliked the work as much as Cornwallis, who longed to kick the men
whom he had to conciliate.—"I despise and hate myself every hour," so
Cornwallis wrote to Ross, "for engaging in such dirty work, and am
supported only by the reflection that without an Union, the British Empire
must be dissolved."[567]
The winter of 1799–1800 was marked by fierce discontent; and again, after
the rise of Bonaparte to power, there were rumours of invasion which
excited the peasants of South Ireland. The men of Dublin on some
occasions assaulted Unionist Members of Parliament. Cornwallis, however,
believed that the country as a whole favoured the cause; and Castlereagh
received favourable assurances as to the attitude of the great majority of
Catholics except in County Dublin.[568] Some leading Episcopalians were
appeased by the insertion of a clause uniting the Protestant Churches of
England and Ireland in one body. This concession did not satisfy the
Orangemen, who, despite the prohibition of their Grand Lodge, clamoured
against the Union, and threatened to oppose it by force.
So doubtful were the omens when Cornwallis opened the Irish Parliament
on 5th February 1800, in a speech commending the present plan of
unification. Castlereagh then defended the proposals and declared them to
have the support of three fourths of the property there represented. After
showing the need of keeping the debts of the two islands distinct, he
forwarded, for on 5th April, Cooke, after interviews with Pitt and Portland,
assured Castlereagh that Portland would send "the needful" to Dublin. He
adds: "Pitt will contrive to let you have from £8,000 to £10,000 for five
years," though this was less than Castlereagh required. After this, it is
absurd to deny that Pitt used corrupt means to carry the Union. He used
them because only so could he carry through that corrupt Parliament a
measure entailing pecuniary loss on most of its members. Probably he
disliked the work as much as Cornwallis, who longed to kick the men
whom he had to conciliate.—"I despise and hate myself every hour," so
Cornwallis wrote to Ross, "for engaging in such dirty work, and am
supported only by the reflection that without an Union, the British Empire
must be dissolved."[567]
The winter of 1799–1800 was marked by fierce discontent; and again, after
the rise of Bonaparte to power, there were rumours of invasion which
excited the peasants of South Ireland. The men of Dublin on some
occasions assaulted Unionist Members of Parliament. Cornwallis, however,
believed that the country as a whole favoured the cause; and Castlereagh
received favourable assurances as to the attitude of the great majority of
Catholics except in County Dublin.[568] Some leading Episcopalians were
appeased by the insertion of a clause uniting the Protestant Churches of
England and Ireland in one body. This concession did not satisfy the
Orangemen, who, despite the prohibition of their Grand Lodge, clamoured
against the Union, and threatened to oppose it by force.
So doubtful were the omens when Cornwallis opened the Irish Parliament
on 5th February 1800, in a speech commending the present plan of
unification. Castlereagh then defended the proposals and declared them to
have the support of three fourths of the property there represented. After
showing the need of keeping the debts of the two islands distinct, he
Page 463
explained that an examination of the Customs and Excise duties warranted
the inference that the contribution of Ireland towards Imperial expenses
should be two fifteenths of that of Great Britain. He claimed that this plan
would press less heavily on Ireland than the present duty of contributing
£1,000,000 to the British armaments in time of war and half that amount in
peace. Further, the Union would tend to assuage religious jealousies and to
consolidate the strength of the Empire. Early on the next morning the House
divided—158 for and 115 against Government. This result did not wholly
please Dublin Castle. Cooke wrote on the morrow to Auckland: "The
activity and intimidation of Opposition, together with their subscription
purse, does sad mischief. They scruple not to give from 3,000 to 4,000
guineas for a vote." Government therefore had to mourn over seven
deserters.[569] Nevertheless, this division was decisive. Castlereagh rounded
up his flock, and by the display of fat pasture called in some of the
wanderers. Is it possible that the Opposition purse was merely the device of
a skilful auctioneer, who sends in a friend to raise the bids?
The triumph of Government at Dublin had its effects at Westminster. On
21st April 1800 Pitt explained the Resolutions as recently accepted by the
Irish Parliament. He spoke very briefly, probably owing to ill health, which
beset him through many weeks of that year.[570] He soon met a challenger.
Thomas Jones dared him to combat by accusing Ministers of seeking to
disfranchise Ireland by corrupt means. Foiled in argument, they now acted
on the principle
Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.
After a further display of classical knowledge, Jones declared that the
introduction of 100 Irish members into that House must destroy the British
constitution, which, like Damocles, would for ever be threatened with the
sword of Dionysius suspended over it by a single hair.
the inference that the contribution of Ireland towards Imperial expenses
should be two fifteenths of that of Great Britain. He claimed that this plan
would press less heavily on Ireland than the present duty of contributing
£1,000,000 to the British armaments in time of war and half that amount in
peace. Further, the Union would tend to assuage religious jealousies and to
consolidate the strength of the Empire. Early on the next morning the House
divided—158 for and 115 against Government. This result did not wholly
please Dublin Castle. Cooke wrote on the morrow to Auckland: "The
activity and intimidation of Opposition, together with their subscription
purse, does sad mischief. They scruple not to give from 3,000 to 4,000
guineas for a vote." Government therefore had to mourn over seven
deserters.[569] Nevertheless, this division was decisive. Castlereagh rounded
up his flock, and by the display of fat pasture called in some of the
wanderers. Is it possible that the Opposition purse was merely the device of
a skilful auctioneer, who sends in a friend to raise the bids?
The triumph of Government at Dublin had its effects at Westminster. On
21st April 1800 Pitt explained the Resolutions as recently accepted by the
Irish Parliament. He spoke very briefly, probably owing to ill health, which
beset him through many weeks of that year.[570] He soon met a challenger.
Thomas Jones dared him to combat by accusing Ministers of seeking to
disfranchise Ireland by corrupt means. Foiled in argument, they now acted
on the principle
Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.
After a further display of classical knowledge, Jones declared that the
introduction of 100 Irish members into that House must destroy the British
constitution, which, like Damocles, would for ever be threatened with the
sword of Dionysius suspended over it by a single hair.
Page 464
Disregarding rhetoric and classical allusions, Pitt plunged into business. In
none of his speeches is there a simpler statement of a case. He declared the
Union to be absolutely necessary as a means of thwarting the machinations
of an enemy ever intent on separating the two kingdoms. It would further
allay the religious animosities rife in Ireland, and would conduce to her
freedom and happiness. He then uttered these words: "It may be proper to
leave to Parliament an opportunity of considering what may be fit to be
done for His Majesty's Catholic subjects, without seeking at present any
rule to govern the Protestant Establishment or to make any provision upon
that subject." This statement is not wholly clear; but it and its context
undoubtedly opened up a prospect of Catholic Emancipation such as
Cornwallis had far more clearly outlined. The significance of Pitt's
declaration will appear in the sequel.
On the subject of commerce Pitt laid down the guiding principle that after
the Union all Customs barriers between the two islands ought to be swept
away as completely as between England and Scotland. If at present they
swerved from this grand object, it was for the sake of reaching it the more
surely. In compliance with the demand of Ireland, they would allow her to
maintain a protective duty of 10 per cent. on cottons and woollens, in the
latter case for not more than twenty years. He then added these words: "The
manufacturers of this country do not, I believe, wish for any protecting
duties; all they desire is a free intercourse with all the world; and, though
the want of protecting duties may occasion partial loss, they think that
amply compensated by general advantage." No more statesmanlike
utterance had been heard in the House of Commons. Only by degrees had
Pitt worked his way to this conviction. In his early Budgets, as we saw, he
clung to the system of numerous duties; but, despite the cramping influence
of war, he now relied on the effects of a two-shilling Income Tax and aimed
at the abolition of protective Customs dues. He was fated never to reach this
none of his speeches is there a simpler statement of a case. He declared the
Union to be absolutely necessary as a means of thwarting the machinations
of an enemy ever intent on separating the two kingdoms. It would further
allay the religious animosities rife in Ireland, and would conduce to her
freedom and happiness. He then uttered these words: "It may be proper to
leave to Parliament an opportunity of considering what may be fit to be
done for His Majesty's Catholic subjects, without seeking at present any
rule to govern the Protestant Establishment or to make any provision upon
that subject." This statement is not wholly clear; but it and its context
undoubtedly opened up a prospect of Catholic Emancipation such as
Cornwallis had far more clearly outlined. The significance of Pitt's
declaration will appear in the sequel.
On the subject of commerce Pitt laid down the guiding principle that after
the Union all Customs barriers between the two islands ought to be swept
away as completely as between England and Scotland. If at present they
swerved from this grand object, it was for the sake of reaching it the more
surely. In compliance with the demand of Ireland, they would allow her to
maintain a protective duty of 10 per cent. on cottons and woollens, in the
latter case for not more than twenty years. He then added these words: "The
manufacturers of this country do not, I believe, wish for any protecting
duties; all they desire is a free intercourse with all the world; and, though
the want of protecting duties may occasion partial loss, they think that
amply compensated by general advantage." No more statesmanlike
utterance had been heard in the House of Commons. Only by degrees had
Pitt worked his way to this conviction. In his early Budgets, as we saw, he
clung to the system of numerous duties; but, despite the cramping influence
of war, he now relied on the effects of a two-shilling Income Tax and aimed
at the abolition of protective Customs dues. He was fated never to reach this
Page 465
ideal; but there can be no doubt that he cherished it as one of the hopes of
his life.
Turning next to the question of Ireland's contribution to the Imperial
Exchequer, Pitt set forth his reasons for fixing it at two fifteenths of the
revenue of Great Britain; but, as this decision might in the future unduly
burden the smaller island, it would not be final; and he suggested that at the
end of twenty years the resources of each would so far have developed as to
admit of a more authoritative assessment. If, however, in the meantime the
amount paid by Ireland should be in excess of what ought to be paid, the
surplus should be applied either to the extinction of her Debt or to local
improvements. He further expressed the hope that in course of time the
Debts and the produce of taxation would be so far assimilated in the two
kingdoms as to admit of the formation of one National Debt and one system
of taxation. Despite the favourable nature of these proposals, Pitt
encountered a spirited opposition. Grey declared the measure to be a gross
violation of the rights of the Irish people. Sheridan, Dr. Laurence (the friend
of Burke), and Tierney continued in the same strain; and Grey finally dared
the Minister to dissolve the Irish Parliament and appeal to the people.
Throwing off all signs of bodily weakness, Pitt took up the challenge. Last
year, he said, when the Commons of Ireland rejected the Union, certain
members applauded them. Now, when they passed it, the same members
said "appeal to the people." He refused to do so, knowing well the scenes of
violence and intimidation that would result from consulting primary
assemblies of Irishmen. The reference to those bodies, so notorious during
the French Revolution, clinched his reply; and the House expressed
approval of the Union by 236 votes to 30 (21st April 1800).
The further debates on the Bill are of little interest. In the absence of Fox,
Grey was the protagonist of Opposition. Bankes, once a firm supporter of
Pitt, opposed the measure. Wilberforce confessed to tremulous uncertainty
his life.
Turning next to the question of Ireland's contribution to the Imperial
Exchequer, Pitt set forth his reasons for fixing it at two fifteenths of the
revenue of Great Britain; but, as this decision might in the future unduly
burden the smaller island, it would not be final; and he suggested that at the
end of twenty years the resources of each would so far have developed as to
admit of a more authoritative assessment. If, however, in the meantime the
amount paid by Ireland should be in excess of what ought to be paid, the
surplus should be applied either to the extinction of her Debt or to local
improvements. He further expressed the hope that in course of time the
Debts and the produce of taxation would be so far assimilated in the two
kingdoms as to admit of the formation of one National Debt and one system
of taxation. Despite the favourable nature of these proposals, Pitt
encountered a spirited opposition. Grey declared the measure to be a gross
violation of the rights of the Irish people. Sheridan, Dr. Laurence (the friend
of Burke), and Tierney continued in the same strain; and Grey finally dared
the Minister to dissolve the Irish Parliament and appeal to the people.
Throwing off all signs of bodily weakness, Pitt took up the challenge. Last
year, he said, when the Commons of Ireland rejected the Union, certain
members applauded them. Now, when they passed it, the same members
said "appeal to the people." He refused to do so, knowing well the scenes of
violence and intimidation that would result from consulting primary
assemblies of Irishmen. The reference to those bodies, so notorious during
the French Revolution, clinched his reply; and the House expressed
approval of the Union by 236 votes to 30 (21st April 1800).
The further debates on the Bill are of little interest. In the absence of Fox,
Grey was the protagonist of Opposition. Bankes, once a firm supporter of
Pitt, opposed the measure. Wilberforce confessed to tremulous uncertainty
Page 466
about it, ostensibly because the addition of 100 Irish members to the House
would add to the influence of the Crown, but more probably because he
foresaw Catholic Emancipation. Peel, already known as one of the most
successful and patriotic of Lancashire manufacturers, spoke up manfully for
the Union, though he deeply regretted that Ireland would retain certain
protective duties against Great Britain. Very noteworthy, in view of the
son's championship of Free Trade in 1845, was the contention of the father
that a weak country (Ireland) had no need of "protection" against a stronger
one. In reality it would be as if a poor family shut its doors against
assistance from a wealthy one. On the trading proposals Pitt's following was
thinned down to 133; but the main question went through in May by
overwhelming majorities in both Houses. In the following month it passed
through the Irish Parliament.
Castlereagh thereupon introduced a Bill to indemnify the holders of pocket
boroughs who would lose patronage by the proposed changes. The
Government, having now revised its previous resolve, proposed to
disfranchise as many as 84 small Irish boroughs, and allotted £15,000 for
each, or £1,260,000 in all. In explanation of this payment it must be
remembered that the owning of such boroughs was a recognized form of
property, as appeared in Pitt's proposal of 1785 to compensate British
owners whom he sought to dispossess. Nothing but the near approach of
revolution in 1832 availed to shatter the system of pocket boroughs in Great
Britain; and then their owners were sent empty away. The difference in
treatment marks the infiltration of new ideas. In England and Ireland a vote
and a seat had been a form of property. According to the Rights of Man the
franchise was an inalienable right of citizenship.
The list of Union honours and preferments having been published, we need
not dwell on that unsavoury topic, except to remark that the promotions in
the peerage conferred for services in connection with the Union numbered
would add to the influence of the Crown, but more probably because he
foresaw Catholic Emancipation. Peel, already known as one of the most
successful and patriotic of Lancashire manufacturers, spoke up manfully for
the Union, though he deeply regretted that Ireland would retain certain
protective duties against Great Britain. Very noteworthy, in view of the
son's championship of Free Trade in 1845, was the contention of the father
that a weak country (Ireland) had no need of "protection" against a stronger
one. In reality it would be as if a poor family shut its doors against
assistance from a wealthy one. On the trading proposals Pitt's following was
thinned down to 133; but the main question went through in May by
overwhelming majorities in both Houses. In the following month it passed
through the Irish Parliament.
Castlereagh thereupon introduced a Bill to indemnify the holders of pocket
boroughs who would lose patronage by the proposed changes. The
Government, having now revised its previous resolve, proposed to
disfranchise as many as 84 small Irish boroughs, and allotted £15,000 for
each, or £1,260,000 in all. In explanation of this payment it must be
remembered that the owning of such boroughs was a recognized form of
property, as appeared in Pitt's proposal of 1785 to compensate British
owners whom he sought to dispossess. Nothing but the near approach of
revolution in 1832 availed to shatter the system of pocket boroughs in Great
Britain; and then their owners were sent empty away. The difference in
treatment marks the infiltration of new ideas. In England and Ireland a vote
and a seat had been a form of property. According to the Rights of Man the
franchise was an inalienable right of citizenship.
The list of Union honours and preferments having been published, we need
not dwell on that unsavoury topic, except to remark that the promotions in
the peerage conferred for services in connection with the Union numbered
Page 467
forty-six; that the opposition of the Protestant Archbishop of Cashel was
bought off by the promise of the Archbishopric of Dublin; and that the
number of ecclesiastical jobs consequent on the Union was nearly twenty.
The promotions in the legal profession numbered twelve. Twelve pensions
and four titular honours were also granted. Five aspirants refused the posts
offered to them because they expected "snug sinecures" which "require no
attendance at all." In March 1805 Lord Hardwicke, successor to Cornwallis,
complained that his funds were so embarrassed by the various claims that
the Irish Civil List had only £150 in hand.[571] These sordid bargainings
cannot be said to amount to wholesale corruption, and did not much exceed
those which usually were needed to carry an important Bill through that
Parliament. On the whole Pitt and his colleagues might reflect with
satisfaction that the use of bribes served to cleanse the political life of
Ireland in the future.
The Union of the British and Irish Parliaments is generally considered from
the insular point of view. This is quite natural; for primarily it concerned the
British Isles. Nevertheless the influences which brought it about were more
than insular. The formation of the United Kingdom, by the Act which came
into effect on 1st January 1801, was but one among many processes of
consolidation then proceeding. France was the first State which succeeded
in concentrating political power at the capital; and the new polity endued
her with a strength sufficient to break in pieces the chaotic systems of her
neighbours. The mania of the French for centralization was seen in their
dealings with the Batavian Republic, and with the Swiss Confederation,
which they crushed into the mould of an indivisible Republic. Everywhere
the new unifying impulse undermined or swept away local Parliaments or
bought off by the promise of the Archbishopric of Dublin; and that the
number of ecclesiastical jobs consequent on the Union was nearly twenty.
The promotions in the legal profession numbered twelve. Twelve pensions
and four titular honours were also granted. Five aspirants refused the posts
offered to them because they expected "snug sinecures" which "require no
attendance at all." In March 1805 Lord Hardwicke, successor to Cornwallis,
complained that his funds were so embarrassed by the various claims that
the Irish Civil List had only £150 in hand.[571] These sordid bargainings
cannot be said to amount to wholesale corruption, and did not much exceed
those which usually were needed to carry an important Bill through that
Parliament. On the whole Pitt and his colleagues might reflect with
satisfaction that the use of bribes served to cleanse the political life of
Ireland in the future.
The Union of the British and Irish Parliaments is generally considered from
the insular point of view. This is quite natural; for primarily it concerned the
British Isles. Nevertheless the influences which brought it about were more
than insular. The formation of the United Kingdom, by the Act which came
into effect on 1st January 1801, was but one among many processes of
consolidation then proceeding. France was the first State which succeeded
in concentrating political power at the capital; and the new polity endued
her with a strength sufficient to break in pieces the chaotic systems of her
neighbours. The mania of the French for centralization was seen in their
dealings with the Batavian Republic, and with the Swiss Confederation,
which they crushed into the mould of an indivisible Republic. Everywhere
the new unifying impulse undermined or swept away local Parliaments or
Page 468
provincial Estates. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity in practice meant a
single, democratic, and centralized Government. In self defence the Powers
threatened by France borrowed her political weapons. In succession Great
Britain, Prussia, and for a time even Austria, pulled themselves together for
the struggle. As the binding powers of commerce also tended towards
union, the Nineteenth Century witnessed the absorption of little States,
except where they represented a distinct nationality.
Confronted by the new and threatening forces in France, Pitt was virtually
compelled to abrogate a system under which the Speaker of the Irish House
of Commons, and Ministers who had no definite responsibility, could
meddle in military affairs. Under the sway of Mars dualism cannot exist. In
the crises of a great war Cabals and Juntos go by the board. The Irish
Ministry was little more than a Junto; and Ireland need not mourn its loss.
The loss of her Parliament was far more serious; and if that body had
represented the Irish people, Pitt's action would be indefensible. But
Grattan's Parliament represented only a small minority of the Irish people;
and that minority was resolved not to admit Catholics to full civic rights. It
would have fought to maintain Protestant Episcopalian ascendancy; and
under the conditions then existing England must have drawn the sword on
behalf of her exacting "garrison."
Even in ordinary times such a state of things was unbearable; and the
French saw it. Their aim was to strike at England through Ireland; and, but
for Bonaparte's dreams of conquest in the East, this blow would have been
dealt. Fortunately for Great Britain, his oriental ambitions served to divert
to the sands of Egypt a thunderbolt which would have been fatal at Dublin.
Even as it was, the mere presence of Bruix' great fleet at Brest prolonged
the ferment in Ireland, thus emphasizing the force of the arguments in
favour of Union. As we have seen, Pitt placed them in the forefront of his
single, democratic, and centralized Government. In self defence the Powers
threatened by France borrowed her political weapons. In succession Great
Britain, Prussia, and for a time even Austria, pulled themselves together for
the struggle. As the binding powers of commerce also tended towards
union, the Nineteenth Century witnessed the absorption of little States,
except where they represented a distinct nationality.
Confronted by the new and threatening forces in France, Pitt was virtually
compelled to abrogate a system under which the Speaker of the Irish House
of Commons, and Ministers who had no definite responsibility, could
meddle in military affairs. Under the sway of Mars dualism cannot exist. In
the crises of a great war Cabals and Juntos go by the board. The Irish
Ministry was little more than a Junto; and Ireland need not mourn its loss.
The loss of her Parliament was far more serious; and if that body had
represented the Irish people, Pitt's action would be indefensible. But
Grattan's Parliament represented only a small minority of the Irish people;
and that minority was resolved not to admit Catholics to full civic rights. It
would have fought to maintain Protestant Episcopalian ascendancy; and
under the conditions then existing England must have drawn the sword on
behalf of her exacting "garrison."
Even in ordinary times such a state of things was unbearable; and the
French saw it. Their aim was to strike at England through Ireland; and, but
for Bonaparte's dreams of conquest in the East, this blow would have been
dealt. Fortunately for Great Britain, his oriental ambitions served to divert
to the sands of Egypt a thunderbolt which would have been fatal at Dublin.
Even as it was, the mere presence of Bruix' great fleet at Brest prolonged
the ferment in Ireland, thus emphasizing the force of the arguments in
favour of Union. As we have seen, Pitt placed them in the forefront of his
Page 469
speeches; and those who charge him with hypocrisy, because France did not
strike vigorously at Ireland during or after the Rebellion of 1798, only
expose their ignorance of the facts and sentiments of that time. Throughout
the years 1799 and 1800 the thought of invasion filled the minds of loyalists
with dread, of malcontents with eager hope.
Nevertheless Pitt saw in the Union, not merely an expedient necessitated by
war, but a permanent uplift for the whole nation. From the not dissimilar
case of the Union with Scotland he augured hopefully for Ireland, believing
that her commerce would thrive not less than that of North Britain. Still
more did he found his hopes upon the religious settlement whereby he
sought to crown his work. Ever since the days of Queen Elizabeth the strife
between the Protestants and Catholics had marred the fortunes of that land.
Pitt believed that it could be stilled in the larger political unity for which he
now prepared.
strike vigorously at Ireland during or after the Rebellion of 1798, only
expose their ignorance of the facts and sentiments of that time. Throughout
the years 1799 and 1800 the thought of invasion filled the minds of loyalists
with dread, of malcontents with eager hope.
Nevertheless Pitt saw in the Union, not merely an expedient necessitated by
war, but a permanent uplift for the whole nation. From the not dissimilar
case of the Union with Scotland he augured hopefully for Ireland, believing
that her commerce would thrive not less than that of North Britain. Still
more did he found his hopes upon the religious settlement whereby he
sought to crown his work. Ever since the days of Queen Elizabeth the strife
between the Protestants and Catholics had marred the fortunes of that land.
Pitt believed that it could be stilled in the larger political unity for which he
now prepared.
Page 470
CHAPTER XX
R E S I G N AT I O N
It is well known that no quiet could subsist in
a country where there is not a Church
Establishment.—George III to Addington,
29th January 1801.
On 25th September 1800 Pitt wrote to the Lord Chancellor, Loughborough,
then in attendance on the King at Weymouth, requesting his presence at a
Cabinet meeting in order to discuss the Catholic Question and proposals
respecting tithes and a provision for the Catholic and Dissenting clergy.
Five days later he explained to his colleagues the main proposal. In place of
the Oaths of Supremacy and Abjuration he desired to impose on members
of Parliament and officials merely the Oath of Allegiance, which would be
no bar to Romanists. The change won the approval of all the Ministers
present except Loughborough. He strongly objected to the proposal, upheld
the present exclusive system, and demurred to any change affecting Roman
Catholics except a commutation of tithes, a measure which he had in
preparation. His colleagues, astonished at this firm opposition from the
erstwhile Presbyterian of East Lothian, begged him to elaborate his Tithe
Bill, and indulged the hope that further inquiry would weaken his resistance
to the larger Reform. They did not know Loughborough.
R E S I G N AT I O N
It is well known that no quiet could subsist in
a country where there is not a Church
Establishment.—George III to Addington,
29th January 1801.
On 25th September 1800 Pitt wrote to the Lord Chancellor, Loughborough,
then in attendance on the King at Weymouth, requesting his presence at a
Cabinet meeting in order to discuss the Catholic Question and proposals
respecting tithes and a provision for the Catholic and Dissenting clergy.
Five days later he explained to his colleagues the main proposal. In place of
the Oaths of Supremacy and Abjuration he desired to impose on members
of Parliament and officials merely the Oath of Allegiance, which would be
no bar to Romanists. The change won the approval of all the Ministers
present except Loughborough. He strongly objected to the proposal, upheld
the present exclusive system, and demurred to any change affecting Roman
Catholics except a commutation of tithes, a measure which he had in
preparation. His colleagues, astonished at this firm opposition from the
erstwhile Presbyterian of East Lothian, begged him to elaborate his Tithe
Bill, and indulged the hope that further inquiry would weaken his resistance
to the larger Reform. They did not know Loughborough.
Page 471
There is a curious reference in one of Pitt's letters, of October 1798, to
Loughborough as the Keeper of the King's conscience.[572] The phrase has
an ironical ring well suited to the character of him who called it forth. Now,
in his sixty-seventh year, he had run through the gamut of political
professions. An adept in the art of changing sides, he, as Alexander
Wedderburn, had earned the contempt or envy of all rivals. Yet such was the
grace of his curves and the skill of his explanations that a new turn caused
less surprise than admiration. Unlike his rival, Thurlow, who stormed
ahead, Wedderburn trimmed his sails for every breeze and showed up best
in light airs. Making few friends, he had few inveterate enemies; but one of
them, Churchill, limned him as
Adopting arts by which gay villains rise
And reach the heights which honest men despise;
Mute at the Bar and in the Senate loud,
Dull 'mong the dullest, proudest of the proud,
A pert prim prater of the northern race,
Guilt in his heart, and famine in his face.
This was before Wedderburn had wormed himself into favour with Lord
North and won the office of Solicitor-General (1778). Two years later he
became Lord Loughborough, a title which Fox ascribed to his rancorous
abuse of the American colonists. Figuring next as a member of the Fox–
North Administration, he did not long share the misfortunes of his
colleagues, for he alone of his colleagues contrived not to offend either the
King or Pitt. This sleekness had its reward. The perversities of Thurlow
having led to his fall in 1792, Loughborough became Lord Chancellor. His
sage counsels heightened his reputation; and in October 1794 Pitt assigned
to him the delicate task of seeing Earl Fitzwilliam and Grattan in order to
smooth over the difficulties attending the union with the Old Whigs. At his
house in Bedford Square, Bloomsbury, occurred some of the conferences
Loughborough as the Keeper of the King's conscience.[572] The phrase has
an ironical ring well suited to the character of him who called it forth. Now,
in his sixty-seventh year, he had run through the gamut of political
professions. An adept in the art of changing sides, he, as Alexander
Wedderburn, had earned the contempt or envy of all rivals. Yet such was the
grace of his curves and the skill of his explanations that a new turn caused
less surprise than admiration. Unlike his rival, Thurlow, who stormed
ahead, Wedderburn trimmed his sails for every breeze and showed up best
in light airs. Making few friends, he had few inveterate enemies; but one of
them, Churchill, limned him as
Adopting arts by which gay villains rise
And reach the heights which honest men despise;
Mute at the Bar and in the Senate loud,
Dull 'mong the dullest, proudest of the proud,
A pert prim prater of the northern race,
Guilt in his heart, and famine in his face.
This was before Wedderburn had wormed himself into favour with Lord
North and won the office of Solicitor-General (1778). Two years later he
became Lord Loughborough, a title which Fox ascribed to his rancorous
abuse of the American colonists. Figuring next as a member of the Fox–
North Administration, he did not long share the misfortunes of his
colleagues, for he alone of his colleagues contrived not to offend either the
King or Pitt. This sleekness had its reward. The perversities of Thurlow
having led to his fall in 1792, Loughborough became Lord Chancellor. His
sage counsels heightened his reputation; and in October 1794 Pitt assigned
to him the delicate task of seeing Earl Fitzwilliam and Grattan in order to
smooth over the difficulties attending the union with the Old Whigs. At his
house in Bedford Square, Bloomsbury, occurred some of the conferences
Page 472
which ensured Fitzwilliam's acceptance of the Irish Viceroyalty.
Loughborough urged Pitt to do all in his power to prevent a rupture with the
Portland Whigs or the Irish people. Counsels of conciliation then flowed
from his lips and were treasured up. In fact, Pitt seems to have felt no
suspicion of him despite his courtier-like ways and his constant attendance
on the King. For Loughborough, like Dundas, had outlived the evil
reputation of an earlier time. The Marquis of Buckingham, writing to
Grenville on an awkward episode affecting Lord Berkeley, advised him to
consult Loughborough as a man of discretion and undoubted private
honour.[573]
Neither Pitt nor Grenville knew that Loughborough had played them false
in 1795. The man who urged them to send Fitzwilliam to Dublin with the
olive-branch soon tendered to George III official advice of an exactly
opposite tenour, namely, that assent to Catholic Emancipation would
involve a violation of the Coronation Oath. A day or two later he stated to
Rose that he had given to the King wholly different counsels, to the effect
that the Coronation Oath did not apply to the question at issue, which
referred to a legislative enactment, not to an act of the King in his executive
capacity.[574] Two other legal authorities unequivocally declared for this
view of the case.
Whether in the autumn and winter of 1800 Loughborough's secret counsels
had much effect on the King may be doubted; for George, in his letter of 6th
February 1795 to Pitt, declared Catholic Emancipation to be "beyond the
decision of any Cabinet of Ministers." As for the Church Establishment, it
was essential to every State, and must be maintained intact. When George
had once framed a resolve, it was hopeless to try to change it. Moreover,
during the debates on the Union, early in 1799, he remarked to Dundas at
Court that he hoped the Cabinet was not pledged to anything in favour of
the Romanists. "No," was the wary reply, "that will be a matter for future
Loughborough urged Pitt to do all in his power to prevent a rupture with the
Portland Whigs or the Irish people. Counsels of conciliation then flowed
from his lips and were treasured up. In fact, Pitt seems to have felt no
suspicion of him despite his courtier-like ways and his constant attendance
on the King. For Loughborough, like Dundas, had outlived the evil
reputation of an earlier time. The Marquis of Buckingham, writing to
Grenville on an awkward episode affecting Lord Berkeley, advised him to
consult Loughborough as a man of discretion and undoubted private
honour.[573]
Neither Pitt nor Grenville knew that Loughborough had played them false
in 1795. The man who urged them to send Fitzwilliam to Dublin with the
olive-branch soon tendered to George III official advice of an exactly
opposite tenour, namely, that assent to Catholic Emancipation would
involve a violation of the Coronation Oath. A day or two later he stated to
Rose that he had given to the King wholly different counsels, to the effect
that the Coronation Oath did not apply to the question at issue, which
referred to a legislative enactment, not to an act of the King in his executive
capacity.[574] Two other legal authorities unequivocally declared for this
view of the case.
Whether in the autumn and winter of 1800 Loughborough's secret counsels
had much effect on the King may be doubted; for George, in his letter of 6th
February 1795 to Pitt, declared Catholic Emancipation to be "beyond the
decision of any Cabinet of Ministers." As for the Church Establishment, it
was essential to every State, and must be maintained intact. When George
had once framed a resolve, it was hopeless to try to change it. Moreover,
during the debates on the Union, early in 1799, he remarked to Dundas at
Court that he hoped the Cabinet was not pledged to anything in favour of
the Romanists. "No," was the wary reply, "that will be a matter for future
Page 473
consideration." Thereupon he set forth his scruples respecting the
Coronation Oath. Dundas sought to allay them by observing that the Oath
referred, not to his executive actions, but only to his assent to an act of the
Legislature, a matter even then taken for granted. The remark, far from
soothing the King, elicited the shrewd retort, "None of your Scotch
metaphysics, Mr. Dundas! None of your Scotch metaphysics!"
The action of Loughborough, then, can only have put an edge on the King's
resolve; and all speculation as to the exact nature of his "intrigues" at
Weymouth or at Windsor is futile. In truth a collision between the King and
Pitt on this topic was inevitable. The marvel is that there had been no
serious friction during the past eighteen years. Probably the knowledge that
a Fox Cabinet, dominated by the Prince of Wales, was the only alternative
to Pitt had exerted a chastening influence on the once headstrong monarch;
but now even that spectre faded away before the more potent wraith of
mangled Protestantism. The King was a sincerely religious man in his own
narrow way; and arguments about the Coronation Oath were as useless with
him as discussions on Modernism are with Pius X.
Pitt therefore kept his plans secret. But we must here digress to notice an
assertion to the contrary. Malmesbury avers that Loughborough, while at
Weymouth in the autumn of 1800, informed his cousin, Auckland, and the
Archbishop of Canterbury of the danger to the Established Church; that the
latter wrote to the King, who thereupon upbraided Pitt. Now, it is highly
probable that Auckland knew nothing of the matter until the end of January
1801,[575] and the secret almost certainly did not come to light until then,
when the Archbishop, Auckland's brother-in-law, was a prey to nervous
anxieties resulting from recent and agitating news. Further, no such letter
from the King to Pitt is extant either at the Public Record Office, Orwell
Park, or Chevening; and if the proposals were known to George why did he
fume at Pitt and Castlereagh on 28th January for springing the mine upon
Coronation Oath. Dundas sought to allay them by observing that the Oath
referred, not to his executive actions, but only to his assent to an act of the
Legislature, a matter even then taken for granted. The remark, far from
soothing the King, elicited the shrewd retort, "None of your Scotch
metaphysics, Mr. Dundas! None of your Scotch metaphysics!"
The action of Loughborough, then, can only have put an edge on the King's
resolve; and all speculation as to the exact nature of his "intrigues" at
Weymouth or at Windsor is futile. In truth a collision between the King and
Pitt on this topic was inevitable. The marvel is that there had been no
serious friction during the past eighteen years. Probably the knowledge that
a Fox Cabinet, dominated by the Prince of Wales, was the only alternative
to Pitt had exerted a chastening influence on the once headstrong monarch;
but now even that spectre faded away before the more potent wraith of
mangled Protestantism. The King was a sincerely religious man in his own
narrow way; and arguments about the Coronation Oath were as useless with
him as discussions on Modernism are with Pius X.
Pitt therefore kept his plans secret. But we must here digress to notice an
assertion to the contrary. Malmesbury avers that Loughborough, while at
Weymouth in the autumn of 1800, informed his cousin, Auckland, and the
Archbishop of Canterbury of the danger to the Established Church; that the
latter wrote to the King, who thereupon upbraided Pitt. Now, it is highly
probable that Auckland knew nothing of the matter until the end of January
1801,[575] and the secret almost certainly did not come to light until then,
when the Archbishop, Auckland's brother-in-law, was a prey to nervous
anxieties resulting from recent and agitating news. Further, no such letter
from the King to Pitt is extant either at the Public Record Office, Orwell
Park, or Chevening; and if the proposals were known to George why did he
fume at Pitt and Castlereagh on 28th January for springing the mine upon
Page 474
him? Finally, if the King, while at Weymouth, blamed Pitt for bringing the
matter forward, why did Malmesbury censure him for keeping it secret? It
is well to probe these absurdities, for they reveal the untrustworthiness of
the Earl on this question.
To revert to Pitt's procedure; there were two arguments on which he must
have relied for convincing the King of the need of granting Catholic
Emancipation. Firstly, the Irish Catholics had, on the whole, behaved with
marked loyalty and moderation during the wearisome debates on the Union
at Dublin, a course of conduct markedly different from the acrid and
factious tactics of the privileged Protestant Episcopalians. Secondly, as the
summer of 1800 waned to autumn, the position of Great Britain became
almost desperate. Her ally, Austria, had lost Lombardy and was fighting a
losing game in Swabia. Russia had not only left the Second Coalition, but
was threatening England with a renewal of the Armed Neutrality League. At
home a bad harvest was sending up corn to famine prices; and sedition
again raised its head. In such a case would not a patriotic ruler waive his
objections to a measure essential not only to peace and quiet in Ireland, but
to the stability of the United Kingdom? The latter consideration derived
added force from the fact that Bonaparte, fresh from his triumphs in Italy,
was inaugurating a policy of conciliation which promised to end the long
ferment in the west of France and to make of her a really united nation.
While he was allaying Jacobinical zeal and royalist bigotry, could Britons
afford to keep up internal causes of friction, and, disunited among
themselves, face a hostile world in arms? In such an emergency would not
the King waive even his conscientious scruples, and at the cost of some
qualms pacify and consolidate his nominally united realms?
For it was certain that the Irish Catholics would not rest now that the boon
of Emancipation was well within reach. Pitt and Cornwallis had aroused
their hopes. While not openly promising that the portals at Westminster
matter forward, why did Malmesbury censure him for keeping it secret? It
is well to probe these absurdities, for they reveal the untrustworthiness of
the Earl on this question.
To revert to Pitt's procedure; there were two arguments on which he must
have relied for convincing the King of the need of granting Catholic
Emancipation. Firstly, the Irish Catholics had, on the whole, behaved with
marked loyalty and moderation during the wearisome debates on the Union
at Dublin, a course of conduct markedly different from the acrid and
factious tactics of the privileged Protestant Episcopalians. Secondly, as the
summer of 1800 waned to autumn, the position of Great Britain became
almost desperate. Her ally, Austria, had lost Lombardy and was fighting a
losing game in Swabia. Russia had not only left the Second Coalition, but
was threatening England with a renewal of the Armed Neutrality League. At
home a bad harvest was sending up corn to famine prices; and sedition
again raised its head. In such a case would not a patriotic ruler waive his
objections to a measure essential not only to peace and quiet in Ireland, but
to the stability of the United Kingdom? The latter consideration derived
added force from the fact that Bonaparte, fresh from his triumphs in Italy,
was inaugurating a policy of conciliation which promised to end the long
ferment in the west of France and to make of her a really united nation.
While he was allaying Jacobinical zeal and royalist bigotry, could Britons
afford to keep up internal causes of friction, and, disunited among
themselves, face a hostile world in arms? In such an emergency would not
the King waive even his conscientious scruples, and at the cost of some
qualms pacify and consolidate his nominally united realms?
For it was certain that the Irish Catholics would not rest now that the boon
of Emancipation was well within reach. Pitt and Cornwallis had aroused
their hopes. While not openly promising that the portals at Westminster
Page 475
should be thrown open to Roman Catholics, Ministers had allowed hints to
go forth definite enough to influence opinion, especially in Cork, Tipperary,
and Galway. In fact, Castlereagh assured Pitt that the help of Catholics had
turned the wavering scales in favour of Union.[576] The claims of honour
therefore required that Pitt should do all in his power to requite the services
of a great body of men, long depressed and maligned, who, when tempted
by the foreigner to revolt, had on the whole shown remarkable patience and
fidelity. The pressure of this problem was too much for the scanty strength
of Pitt. Worried by private financial needs, and distressed at the bewildering
change in European affairs, he broke down in health in September–October;
and a period of rest and change at Addington's seat at Woodley, near
Reading, was all too short for a complete recovery (18th October to 5th
November). Addington, describing this visit, remarked that Pitt had become
one of his family. Neither of them knew that a time of feud was at hand.
At the close of the year Castlereagh came from Dublin to London to confer
with Ministers on legal and other details connected with the proposal of
Catholic Emancipation. By that time Loughborough's sharp opposition to
the measure was known at Dublin Castle, where Cornwallis declared all
resistance to the measure to be mere madness. The Catholics, he reported,
were quiet merely because they were confident of success. Cooke, though
once opposed to Catholic Emancipation, now accepted it as a necessity.[577]
Nevertheless in the King's view Catholic Emancipation was wholly
incompatible with his Coronation Oath and with the Church Establishment
in England. In the middle of December the Chancellor drew up an able and
very detailed Memorandum on the legal aspects of the case. He even
discoursed on the proselytizing zeal of Romanists and the material causes of
discontent in Ireland which the Union would probably dispel. As Cooke
remarked, the paper seemed designed to close the question for ever.[578]
go forth definite enough to influence opinion, especially in Cork, Tipperary,
and Galway. In fact, Castlereagh assured Pitt that the help of Catholics had
turned the wavering scales in favour of Union.[576] The claims of honour
therefore required that Pitt should do all in his power to requite the services
of a great body of men, long depressed and maligned, who, when tempted
by the foreigner to revolt, had on the whole shown remarkable patience and
fidelity. The pressure of this problem was too much for the scanty strength
of Pitt. Worried by private financial needs, and distressed at the bewildering
change in European affairs, he broke down in health in September–October;
and a period of rest and change at Addington's seat at Woodley, near
Reading, was all too short for a complete recovery (18th October to 5th
November). Addington, describing this visit, remarked that Pitt had become
one of his family. Neither of them knew that a time of feud was at hand.
At the close of the year Castlereagh came from Dublin to London to confer
with Ministers on legal and other details connected with the proposal of
Catholic Emancipation. By that time Loughborough's sharp opposition to
the measure was known at Dublin Castle, where Cornwallis declared all
resistance to the measure to be mere madness. The Catholics, he reported,
were quiet merely because they were confident of success. Cooke, though
once opposed to Catholic Emancipation, now accepted it as a necessity.[577]
Nevertheless in the King's view Catholic Emancipation was wholly
incompatible with his Coronation Oath and with the Church Establishment
in England. In the middle of December the Chancellor drew up an able and
very detailed Memorandum on the legal aspects of the case. He even
discoursed on the proselytizing zeal of Romanists and the material causes of
discontent in Ireland which the Union would probably dispel. As Cooke
remarked, the paper seemed designed to close the question for ever.[578]
Page 476
Pitt was equally determined to set the question at rest. He and Castlereagh
had confidence in the issue; and Cornwallis declared that if Pitt were firm
he would meet with no difficulty. Accordingly Pitt inserted in the King's
Speech for the ensuing session a passage expressing confidence that
Parliament would seek to improve the benefits already secured by the Act
of Union. The phrase was smooth enough to leave the King's conscience
unruffled, and on 23rd January he assented to the Speech, requesting that no
change be made.[579] But while Pitt sapped the approaches to the citadel,
Loughborough countermined him. On what day and in what manner he
informed the King of the proposed measure of Catholic Emancipation is not
clear. Possibly George scented mischief in a short conversation with
Spencer and Grenville about the middle of January. But his brain was set on
fire by something which he heard on 27th or 28th January. On the latter day
(Wednesday), during the levée at St. James's Palace, his behaviour betrayed
unusual excitement, and he said warmly to Windham, a friend of the
measure, that he regarded all supporters of it as "personally indisposed" to
him. Waxing hotter in the course of the function, he declared in a loud voice
to Dundas: "What is this that the young Lord [Castlereagh] has brought
over, which they are going to throw at my head? Lord C. came over with
the plan in September.... I shall reckon any man my personal enemy who
proposes any such measure. The most Jacobinical thing I ever heard of."
This extraordinary outburst naturally led Ministers to confer together on the
morrow; and they requested Grenville to prepare a paper explaining the
proposed changes in the form of oath for members of Parliament and
officials. Grenville declined this task, which Pitt himself then undertook.
This question, I may note, was far more difficult than outsiders could
understand. Castlereagh's interviews with Pitt in September, and now again
in January, had only recently brought Ministers near to an agreement, a fact
which fully accounts for the delay in drafting the proposals in a form
suitable for the King's inspection.[580] On that day George took another step
had confidence in the issue; and Cornwallis declared that if Pitt were firm
he would meet with no difficulty. Accordingly Pitt inserted in the King's
Speech for the ensuing session a passage expressing confidence that
Parliament would seek to improve the benefits already secured by the Act
of Union. The phrase was smooth enough to leave the King's conscience
unruffled, and on 23rd January he assented to the Speech, requesting that no
change be made.[579] But while Pitt sapped the approaches to the citadel,
Loughborough countermined him. On what day and in what manner he
informed the King of the proposed measure of Catholic Emancipation is not
clear. Possibly George scented mischief in a short conversation with
Spencer and Grenville about the middle of January. But his brain was set on
fire by something which he heard on 27th or 28th January. On the latter day
(Wednesday), during the levée at St. James's Palace, his behaviour betrayed
unusual excitement, and he said warmly to Windham, a friend of the
measure, that he regarded all supporters of it as "personally indisposed" to
him. Waxing hotter in the course of the function, he declared in a loud voice
to Dundas: "What is this that the young Lord [Castlereagh] has brought
over, which they are going to throw at my head? Lord C. came over with
the plan in September.... I shall reckon any man my personal enemy who
proposes any such measure. The most Jacobinical thing I ever heard of."
This extraordinary outburst naturally led Ministers to confer together on the
morrow; and they requested Grenville to prepare a paper explaining the
proposed changes in the form of oath for members of Parliament and
officials. Grenville declined this task, which Pitt himself then undertook.
This question, I may note, was far more difficult than outsiders could
understand. Castlereagh's interviews with Pitt in September, and now again
in January, had only recently brought Ministers near to an agreement, a fact
which fully accounts for the delay in drafting the proposals in a form
suitable for the King's inspection.[580] On that day George took another step
Page 477
betokening irrevocable opposition. He begged Addington to see Pitt and
convince him of the danger of the measure. The King confessed that he
could scarcely keep his temper in speaking about it; for it portended the
destruction of the Established Church and the end of all order in civil life.
Addington therefore paid a visit to Pitt, who cannot have been well pleased
to see him acting as a tool of the King. The interview, however, seems to
have been friendly, and it inspired Addington with the complacent hope that
he had dissuaded Pitt. Possibly he or Auckland alarmed Dr. Moore,
Archbishop of Canterbury, and set the bishops in motion. Other persons
working to this end were the Earl of Clare and the Irish Primate. The latter
took a prominent part in arousing the fears of the King. Cooke wrote: "The
Primate was a great card, was much consulted by the King, for ever with
him, or in correspondence with him.... The Archbishop of Canterbury was at
first so nervous that for ten or twelve nights he could not sleep, and our
Primate was daily with him, encouraging him."[581]
It is uncertain how far Pitt was aware of the many adverse influences
playing upon the King; for his papers on this topic are unusually scanty. On
the 30th he sent a draft of his proposals to Loughborough, a sign that he
would persevere with them. On the morrow George again summoned
Addington to the palace, and adjured him to form a Ministry. This offer
preceded the arrival of any intimation from Pitt of his desire to resign if his
advice were rejected. Addington for his part begged to be excused;
whereupon the King exclaimed: "Lay your hand upon your heart and ask
yourself where I am to turn for support if you do not stand by me."[582]
Meanwhile Pitt was inditing his famous letter of 31st January, to the King,
of which this summary must suffice:
Pitt has heard with deep regret of the opposition displayed by His
Majesty to the proposals of Catholic Emancipation, which are
approved by the majority of the Cabinet and regarded as a natural
convince him of the danger of the measure. The King confessed that he
could scarcely keep his temper in speaking about it; for it portended the
destruction of the Established Church and the end of all order in civil life.
Addington therefore paid a visit to Pitt, who cannot have been well pleased
to see him acting as a tool of the King. The interview, however, seems to
have been friendly, and it inspired Addington with the complacent hope that
he had dissuaded Pitt. Possibly he or Auckland alarmed Dr. Moore,
Archbishop of Canterbury, and set the bishops in motion. Other persons
working to this end were the Earl of Clare and the Irish Primate. The latter
took a prominent part in arousing the fears of the King. Cooke wrote: "The
Primate was a great card, was much consulted by the King, for ever with
him, or in correspondence with him.... The Archbishop of Canterbury was at
first so nervous that for ten or twelve nights he could not sleep, and our
Primate was daily with him, encouraging him."[581]
It is uncertain how far Pitt was aware of the many adverse influences
playing upon the King; for his papers on this topic are unusually scanty. On
the 30th he sent a draft of his proposals to Loughborough, a sign that he
would persevere with them. On the morrow George again summoned
Addington to the palace, and adjured him to form a Ministry. This offer
preceded the arrival of any intimation from Pitt of his desire to resign if his
advice were rejected. Addington for his part begged to be excused;
whereupon the King exclaimed: "Lay your hand upon your heart and ask
yourself where I am to turn for support if you do not stand by me."[582]
Meanwhile Pitt was inditing his famous letter of 31st January, to the King,
of which this summary must suffice:
Pitt has heard with deep regret of the opposition displayed by His
Majesty to the proposals of Catholic Emancipation, which are
approved by the majority of the Cabinet and regarded as a natural
Page 478
sequel to the Act of Union. The admission of Catholics and
Dissenters to certain offices, and of Catholics to Parliament, now
involves little or no danger to the Established Church or to the
Protestant interest, as the Catholics disclaim the obnoxious tenets
once held by them. A form of oath can be devised to exclude those
Dissenters who may have designs against the constitution either in
Church or State. The Irish Catholic clergy may be attached to the
Government by making their maintenance partly dependent on the
State. These changes would adapt the constitution to present needs.
Pitt therefore earnestly commends the measure to the consideration
of His Majesty. Meanwhile no steps will be taken in the matter; but,
if on examination the measure should not be approved, Pitt will beg
to be allowed to resign, though in such a way as to occasion the
least possible difficulty. Finally he takes the liberty "of most
respectfully, but explicitly, submitting to Your Majesty the
indispensable necessity of effectually discountenancing, in the
whole of the interval, all attempts to make use of Your Majesty's
name, or to influence the opinion of any individual on any part of
the subject."
In the last sentence Pitt administered a telling and dignified rebuke for the
outrageous behaviour of the King at the levée. A reply came on the morrow,
couched in pompously ungrammatical terms, which sufficiently refute the
rumour that it was composed by that polished talker, Loughborough.
George declared that his Oath bound him to support the Established
Church; that State officials must be in active communion with that Church.
He therefore refused to discuss the present proposals, which tended to
destroy the groundwork of the Constitution. Respecting the suggested truce
of silence he wrote as follows: "Mr. Pitt once acquainted with my
sentiments, his assuring me that he will stave off the only question whereon
I fear from his letter we can never agree—for the advantage and comfort of
continuing to have his advice and exertions in public affairs I will certainly
abstain from talking on this subject which is the one nearest my heart." The
Dissenters to certain offices, and of Catholics to Parliament, now
involves little or no danger to the Established Church or to the
Protestant interest, as the Catholics disclaim the obnoxious tenets
once held by them. A form of oath can be devised to exclude those
Dissenters who may have designs against the constitution either in
Church or State. The Irish Catholic clergy may be attached to the
Government by making their maintenance partly dependent on the
State. These changes would adapt the constitution to present needs.
Pitt therefore earnestly commends the measure to the consideration
of His Majesty. Meanwhile no steps will be taken in the matter; but,
if on examination the measure should not be approved, Pitt will beg
to be allowed to resign, though in such a way as to occasion the
least possible difficulty. Finally he takes the liberty "of most
respectfully, but explicitly, submitting to Your Majesty the
indispensable necessity of effectually discountenancing, in the
whole of the interval, all attempts to make use of Your Majesty's
name, or to influence the opinion of any individual on any part of
the subject."
In the last sentence Pitt administered a telling and dignified rebuke for the
outrageous behaviour of the King at the levée. A reply came on the morrow,
couched in pompously ungrammatical terms, which sufficiently refute the
rumour that it was composed by that polished talker, Loughborough.
George declared that his Oath bound him to support the Established
Church; that State officials must be in active communion with that Church.
He therefore refused to discuss the present proposals, which tended to
destroy the groundwork of the Constitution. Respecting the suggested truce
of silence he wrote as follows: "Mr. Pitt once acquainted with my
sentiments, his assuring me that he will stave off the only question whereon
I fear from his letter we can never agree—for the advantage and comfort of
continuing to have his advice and exertions in public affairs I will certainly
abstain from talking on this subject which is the one nearest my heart." The
Page 479
meaning of these words is not easy to fix; but apparently the King meant to
say that his silence on the subject was conditional on Pitt promising never
to bring it forward again. Now, Pitt had made no such promise. He required
that, while the King was examining the proposals of his Cabinet, he would
abstain from setting his counsellors against it. George III evaded this
request, thereby leaving himself free to talk at large against Catholic
Emancipation while he was supposed to be examining its details. We may
be sure that this sentence clinched Pitt's resolve to resign at the earliest
possible moment.[583]
He said so in his reply of 3rd February to the King. He expressed both
regret at the King's resolve on this question, and a desire to consult his
convenience, though continuance in office even for a short time became
very difficult in view of the King's refusal to undertake to discountenance
the use of his name during the interval. In every respect the accession of
another Minister was to be desired. Pitt closed this painful correspondence
with a letter, also of 3rd February, requesting a pension of £1,500 a year for
Long, one of the secretaries of the Treasury, whose private means were so
slender as to leave him in discomfort if he should resign. The King briefly
assented to Pitt's retirement and to Long's pension. To Long's services the
King accorded a few words of thanks: to those of Pitt not a word. This is the
more remarkable as Pitt was then suffering from an attack of gout which
depressed him greatly; but, as we shall see, the King in private expressed
his deep obligations, and requested him to keep in office until all the new
appointments were settled.[584] This involved a delay of nearly six weeks,
which were among the most trying of his career.
On 5th February the King succeeded in persuading Addington to form a
Ministry. Accordingly on the 10th he resigned the office of Speaker, being
succeeded by Sir John Mitford, afterwards Lord Redesdale. There is no
ground for the insinuation that Addington snatched at office. He took it
say that his silence on the subject was conditional on Pitt promising never
to bring it forward again. Now, Pitt had made no such promise. He required
that, while the King was examining the proposals of his Cabinet, he would
abstain from setting his counsellors against it. George III evaded this
request, thereby leaving himself free to talk at large against Catholic
Emancipation while he was supposed to be examining its details. We may
be sure that this sentence clinched Pitt's resolve to resign at the earliest
possible moment.[583]
He said so in his reply of 3rd February to the King. He expressed both
regret at the King's resolve on this question, and a desire to consult his
convenience, though continuance in office even for a short time became
very difficult in view of the King's refusal to undertake to discountenance
the use of his name during the interval. In every respect the accession of
another Minister was to be desired. Pitt closed this painful correspondence
with a letter, also of 3rd February, requesting a pension of £1,500 a year for
Long, one of the secretaries of the Treasury, whose private means were so
slender as to leave him in discomfort if he should resign. The King briefly
assented to Pitt's retirement and to Long's pension. To Long's services the
King accorded a few words of thanks: to those of Pitt not a word. This is the
more remarkable as Pitt was then suffering from an attack of gout which
depressed him greatly; but, as we shall see, the King in private expressed
his deep obligations, and requested him to keep in office until all the new
appointments were settled.[584] This involved a delay of nearly six weeks,
which were among the most trying of his career.
On 5th February the King succeeded in persuading Addington to form a
Ministry. Accordingly on the 10th he resigned the office of Speaker, being
succeeded by Sir John Mitford, afterwards Lord Redesdale. There is no
ground for the insinuation that Addington snatched at office. He took it
Page 480
without eagerness but from conscientious conviction; and Pitt, with the
usual generosity of his nature, assured him of his support as a private
member. Of Pitt's colleagues Grenville, Dundas, Spencer, and Windham
offered their resignations; so also did Cornwallis and Castlereagh at Dublin.
Portland retained the Home Secretaryship. Of late he had wavered on the
subject of Catholic Emancipation, perhaps owing to the arguments of
Loughborough. Westmorland and Chatham also kept their positions of Lord
Privy Seal and Lord President. The retention of office by the latter aroused
some comment; but as the earnest desire of Pitt was to disarrange the
Ministry as little as possible, he probably approved conduct which outsiders
condemned as unbrotherly.
The following letter from Chatham, dated Winchester, 6th February, is of
interest. After expressing his regret at Pitt's resignation, he continues:
"Upon the measure itself of granting further indulgence to the Catholics I
have neither time, nor indeed would it be of any use, to say anything at
present. I will only observe that if, by being on the spot, I could in any
degree have contributed even to put off the extremity to which the agitation
of it has led, I should think I had done much, and I should be most unhappy
in having been absent; otherwise I consider myself as fortunate in having
avoided a discussion which could only have been painful to me in many
respects. As things stand, I shall certainly think it my duty to come to town
in a few days, and I will defer, till we meet, any further remarks; I will only
add that if your part is irrevocably taken, the King could not have acted
more wisely than in having recourse to the Speaker.... I see all the difficulty
and delicacy of your situation."[585]
Far less charitable were the sentiments of Dundas in the following letter:
Wimbledon, 7 Feb., 1801.[586]
usual generosity of his nature, assured him of his support as a private
member. Of Pitt's colleagues Grenville, Dundas, Spencer, and Windham
offered their resignations; so also did Cornwallis and Castlereagh at Dublin.
Portland retained the Home Secretaryship. Of late he had wavered on the
subject of Catholic Emancipation, perhaps owing to the arguments of
Loughborough. Westmorland and Chatham also kept their positions of Lord
Privy Seal and Lord President. The retention of office by the latter aroused
some comment; but as the earnest desire of Pitt was to disarrange the
Ministry as little as possible, he probably approved conduct which outsiders
condemned as unbrotherly.
The following letter from Chatham, dated Winchester, 6th February, is of
interest. After expressing his regret at Pitt's resignation, he continues:
"Upon the measure itself of granting further indulgence to the Catholics I
have neither time, nor indeed would it be of any use, to say anything at
present. I will only observe that if, by being on the spot, I could in any
degree have contributed even to put off the extremity to which the agitation
of it has led, I should think I had done much, and I should be most unhappy
in having been absent; otherwise I consider myself as fortunate in having
avoided a discussion which could only have been painful to me in many
respects. As things stand, I shall certainly think it my duty to come to town
in a few days, and I will defer, till we meet, any further remarks; I will only
add that if your part is irrevocably taken, the King could not have acted
more wisely than in having recourse to the Speaker.... I see all the difficulty
and delicacy of your situation."[585]
Far less charitable were the sentiments of Dundas in the following letter:
Wimbledon, 7 Feb., 1801.[586]
Page 481
I know not to what stage the Speaker's endeavours to form an
Arrangement have proceeded; but it is impossible for me not to
whisper into your ear my conviction that no Arrangement can be
formed under him as its head that will not crumble to pieces almost
as soon as formed. Our friends who, as an act of friendship and
attachment to you agree to remain in office, do it with the utmost
chagrin and unwillingness; and among the other considerations
which operate upon them the feeling that they are embarking in an
Administration under a head totally incapable to carry it on and
which must of course soon be an object of ridicule is uppermost in
their minds. Add to this that, though they will not certainly enter
into faction and opposition, all the aristocracy of the country at
present cordially connected with Government, and part of it under
you, feel a degradation in the first Minister of the Country being
selected from [sic] a Person of the description of Mr. Addington
without the slightest pretensions to justify it, and destitute of
abilities to carry it on. Depend upon it I am not exaggerating the
state of the case; and a very short experience will prove that I am
right; and the Speaker will ere long feel that he has fallen from a
most exalted situation and character into one of a very opposite
description. Save him from it if not too late. Yourself excluded from
it, I am afraid nothing permanent can be formed; but if the Speaker
was to advise the King to call upon the Duke of Portland to form an
Administration, I am persuaded His Grace at the head of it, with
either Steele, Ryder, Lord Hawkesbury, or even Mr. Abbott as his
Chancellor of the Exchequer, would fill the public eye infinitely
more than anything that can be found upon the plan now in
agitation. By the answer I have received from the King to my
resignation I must entreat you without delay to send for my
correspondence with Lord Westmorland in order that I may be sure
of what my recollection suggests, that I refused to give the promise
of the Government at home that what was then proposed was the
ultimatum of concession.
Arrangement have proceeded; but it is impossible for me not to
whisper into your ear my conviction that no Arrangement can be
formed under him as its head that will not crumble to pieces almost
as soon as formed. Our friends who, as an act of friendship and
attachment to you agree to remain in office, do it with the utmost
chagrin and unwillingness; and among the other considerations
which operate upon them the feeling that they are embarking in an
Administration under a head totally incapable to carry it on and
which must of course soon be an object of ridicule is uppermost in
their minds. Add to this that, though they will not certainly enter
into faction and opposition, all the aristocracy of the country at
present cordially connected with Government, and part of it under
you, feel a degradation in the first Minister of the Country being
selected from [sic] a Person of the description of Mr. Addington
without the slightest pretensions to justify it, and destitute of
abilities to carry it on. Depend upon it I am not exaggerating the
state of the case; and a very short experience will prove that I am
right; and the Speaker will ere long feel that he has fallen from a
most exalted situation and character into one of a very opposite
description. Save him from it if not too late. Yourself excluded from
it, I am afraid nothing permanent can be formed; but if the Speaker
was to advise the King to call upon the Duke of Portland to form an
Administration, I am persuaded His Grace at the head of it, with
either Steele, Ryder, Lord Hawkesbury, or even Mr. Abbott as his
Chancellor of the Exchequer, would fill the public eye infinitely
more than anything that can be found upon the plan now in
agitation. By the answer I have received from the King to my
resignation I must entreat you without delay to send for my
correspondence with Lord Westmorland in order that I may be sure
of what my recollection suggests, that I refused to give the promise
of the Government at home that what was then proposed was the
ultimatum of concession.
Page 482
The last sentence of Chatham's letter refers to the difficulties of Pitt's
position. These have nearly always been overlooked. Yet his decision turned
finally on a question of honour. It is true that neither Pitt nor Cornwallis
gave a distinct pledge to the Irish Catholics that the Cabinet would press
their claims if they would support the Union. But no such pledge could
have been given without exasperating the King and the privileged phalanx
at St. Stephen's Green. Therefore, when the critics of Pitt demand to see the
proof that he made a promise, they ask for what, in the nature of the case,
could not be forthcoming. Cornwallis and Castlereagh were aware of the
need of extreme caution in making overtures to the leading Catholics; and
they afterwards denied that they gave a distinct pledge. Nevertheless, some
of their agents induced the Catholics of the south and west of Ireland, to act
in a "highly useful" manner, which averted an otherwise dangerous
opposition. Castlereagh explained this to Pitt early in January;[587] and the
scrupulous Minister must have considered these promises as a debt of
honour. That some of the leading Irish Catholics viewed them in the same
light appears in an account of a representative meeting held at Ryan's house
in Marlborough Street, Dublin, on 27th October 1804. Ryan then set forth
the condition of his co-religionists at the time of the Union, and referred to
the stipulations made to them by Government. Others, including Lord
Fingall and a barrister, Scully, followed; and after two more meetings, they
resolved to petition Pitt, who had by that time returned to office, it being
known that he was at heart favourable to their claims.[588] But in his speech
of 14th May 1805 on this topic, he said, "I did not make a distinct pledge.
On the contrary, I believe the line of argument I took was, that if it should
be thought right to give what the Catholics required, it might be given with
more safety to the Empire."[589]
What the stipulations were is not clear; for with this exception the Irish
Records are disappointingly silent. But it is clear that Canning finally came
position. These have nearly always been overlooked. Yet his decision turned
finally on a question of honour. It is true that neither Pitt nor Cornwallis
gave a distinct pledge to the Irish Catholics that the Cabinet would press
their claims if they would support the Union. But no such pledge could
have been given without exasperating the King and the privileged phalanx
at St. Stephen's Green. Therefore, when the critics of Pitt demand to see the
proof that he made a promise, they ask for what, in the nature of the case,
could not be forthcoming. Cornwallis and Castlereagh were aware of the
need of extreme caution in making overtures to the leading Catholics; and
they afterwards denied that they gave a distinct pledge. Nevertheless, some
of their agents induced the Catholics of the south and west of Ireland, to act
in a "highly useful" manner, which averted an otherwise dangerous
opposition. Castlereagh explained this to Pitt early in January;[587] and the
scrupulous Minister must have considered these promises as a debt of
honour. That some of the leading Irish Catholics viewed them in the same
light appears in an account of a representative meeting held at Ryan's house
in Marlborough Street, Dublin, on 27th October 1804. Ryan then set forth
the condition of his co-religionists at the time of the Union, and referred to
the stipulations made to them by Government. Others, including Lord
Fingall and a barrister, Scully, followed; and after two more meetings, they
resolved to petition Pitt, who had by that time returned to office, it being
known that he was at heart favourable to their claims.[588] But in his speech
of 14th May 1805 on this topic, he said, "I did not make a distinct pledge.
On the contrary, I believe the line of argument I took was, that if it should
be thought right to give what the Catholics required, it might be given with
more safety to the Empire."[589]
What the stipulations were is not clear; for with this exception the Irish
Records are disappointingly silent. But it is clear that Canning finally came
Page 483
to consider them binding on an honourable man. In his great speech on
Catholic Emancipation in March 1827, while admitting that Pitt in 1800
made no definite promise to the Catholics, he added these notable words:
"The Catholics were made to believe, and that belief was a powerful
inducement to them to lend their aid towards the accomplishment of the
measure [the Union] that in the Imperial Parliament the question which so
nearly concerned them would be more favourably entertained.... There is no
tribunal, however solemn, before which I am not prepared to depose to my
firm belief in the sincerity of Mr. Pitt's wishes and intentions to carry it."
This passage once for all refutes the charges of insincerity which certain of
Canning's biographers have brought against Pitt.
Light is thrown on this topic by notes of Bishop Tomline. Pitt consulted his
former tutor at this crisis; for on 6th February he wrote warning him of his
approaching resignation on grounds which he desired to explain. He added:
"I am in the firm persuasion that an Arrangement can be formed to which I
can give a cordial general support, and which may keep everything safe."
[590] The bishop thereupon came to town and saw much of Pitt, whose
conduct he thus describes: "I never saw Mr. Pitt in more uniformly cheerful
spirits, although everyone about him was dejected and melancholy. He
talked of his quitting office with the utmost composure, gave the King the
highest credit for the notions on which he acted, and also fully acquitted
those who were supposed to have influenced his sentiments and conduct.
He felt some dissatisfaction at the conduct of one who was not a Cabinet
Minister, and was under great obligations to Mr. Pitt, who had by intrigues
and misrepresentations and every unfair means in his power endeavoured to
influence people's opinion on the question and to excite alarm and prejudice
against him." The reference here is to Lord Auckland, but nothing definite
is known as to his conduct. The bishop then states that Pitt's equanimity was
surprising, inasmuch as his resignation would reduce his income to less
than that of a country gentleman and necessitate the sale of Holwood.
Catholic Emancipation in March 1827, while admitting that Pitt in 1800
made no definite promise to the Catholics, he added these notable words:
"The Catholics were made to believe, and that belief was a powerful
inducement to them to lend their aid towards the accomplishment of the
measure [the Union] that in the Imperial Parliament the question which so
nearly concerned them would be more favourably entertained.... There is no
tribunal, however solemn, before which I am not prepared to depose to my
firm belief in the sincerity of Mr. Pitt's wishes and intentions to carry it."
This passage once for all refutes the charges of insincerity which certain of
Canning's biographers have brought against Pitt.
Light is thrown on this topic by notes of Bishop Tomline. Pitt consulted his
former tutor at this crisis; for on 6th February he wrote warning him of his
approaching resignation on grounds which he desired to explain. He added:
"I am in the firm persuasion that an Arrangement can be formed to which I
can give a cordial general support, and which may keep everything safe."
[590] The bishop thereupon came to town and saw much of Pitt, whose
conduct he thus describes: "I never saw Mr. Pitt in more uniformly cheerful
spirits, although everyone about him was dejected and melancholy. He
talked of his quitting office with the utmost composure, gave the King the
highest credit for the notions on which he acted, and also fully acquitted
those who were supposed to have influenced his sentiments and conduct.
He felt some dissatisfaction at the conduct of one who was not a Cabinet
Minister, and was under great obligations to Mr. Pitt, who had by intrigues
and misrepresentations and every unfair means in his power endeavoured to
influence people's opinion on the question and to excite alarm and prejudice
against him." The reference here is to Lord Auckland, but nothing definite
is known as to his conduct. The bishop then states that Pitt's equanimity was
surprising, inasmuch as his resignation would reduce his income to less
than that of a country gentleman and necessitate the sale of Holwood.
Page 484
Nevertheless, no hasty word fell from him even in the most confidential
conversation; but he talked cheerfully of living in privacy for the rest of his
life, and expressed satisfaction that men who were attached to the
constitution would carry on affairs of State. The safety of the country
seemed to be his only concern. Tomline then describes the cause and the
circumstances of Pitt's resignation:[591]
While the business of the Union was going on, Lord Cornwallis had
informed the Ministers in England that the support of the Catholics
to the measure would in a great degree depend upon the intention of
Ministers to remove those disabilities under which they at present
laboured. This produced in the Cabinet a discussion of the question
of Catholic Emancipation, as it is called, and Lord Cornwallis was
authorized to declare that it was intended by Government, after the
Union should have taken place, to grant to the Catholics some
further indulgences; but he was not authorized to pledge the
Government to any particular measure, nor was any plan of this
kind settled by the Cabinet. When the King's Speech was to be
drawn up for the opening of the Imperial Parliament, the Catholic
Question naturally occurred and gave rise to a good deal of
discussion in the Cabinet. Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Lord Spencer,
Mr. Dundas, and Mr. Wyndham declared themselves in favour of
Catholic Emancipation; and the Lord Chancellor, the Duke of
Portland and Lord Westmorland against it. Lord Chatham and Lord
Liverpool did not attend the Council, the former being at Winchester
as military commander of that district and the latter was confined to
his house by illness.
The King was of course informed of this division in the Cabinet and
took a decided part by talking against the question freely and openly
to everyone he saw. On Wednesday, the 28th of January, the King
said to Mr. D[undas] at the levée in such a voice that those who
were near might hear him—"So here is an Irish Secretary come over
to propose in Parliament the Emancipation of the Irish Catholics, as
conversation; but he talked cheerfully of living in privacy for the rest of his
life, and expressed satisfaction that men who were attached to the
constitution would carry on affairs of State. The safety of the country
seemed to be his only concern. Tomline then describes the cause and the
circumstances of Pitt's resignation:[591]
While the business of the Union was going on, Lord Cornwallis had
informed the Ministers in England that the support of the Catholics
to the measure would in a great degree depend upon the intention of
Ministers to remove those disabilities under which they at present
laboured. This produced in the Cabinet a discussion of the question
of Catholic Emancipation, as it is called, and Lord Cornwallis was
authorized to declare that it was intended by Government, after the
Union should have taken place, to grant to the Catholics some
further indulgences; but he was not authorized to pledge the
Government to any particular measure, nor was any plan of this
kind settled by the Cabinet. When the King's Speech was to be
drawn up for the opening of the Imperial Parliament, the Catholic
Question naturally occurred and gave rise to a good deal of
discussion in the Cabinet. Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Lord Spencer,
Mr. Dundas, and Mr. Wyndham declared themselves in favour of
Catholic Emancipation; and the Lord Chancellor, the Duke of
Portland and Lord Westmorland against it. Lord Chatham and Lord
Liverpool did not attend the Council, the former being at Winchester
as military commander of that district and the latter was confined to
his house by illness.
The King was of course informed of this division in the Cabinet and
took a decided part by talking against the question freely and openly
to everyone he saw. On Wednesday, the 28th of January, the King
said to Mr. D[undas] at the levée in such a voice that those who
were near might hear him—"So here is an Irish Secretary come over
to propose in Parliament the Emancipation of the Irish Catholics, as
Page 485
they call it"—and then he declared himself in the strongest degree
hostile to the question. This was of course reported to Mr. Pitt. On
the Friday (the 30th) the King sent for the Speaker to the Queen's
House and conversed with him a long time. Upon my mentioning
this circumstance to Mr. Pitt, he said he knew what happened at that
interview and seemed perfectly satisfied with it. He had before told
me (namely, the first night he saw me, Saturday, Feb. 7th) that he
knew nine days before that he should be under the necessity of
resigning. On the 31st Mr. Pitt wrote his first letter to the King. Two
letters only passed on each side, which see. Mr. Pitt did not see the
King till at the levée on Wednesday the 11th [February]. The King
spoke to him in the most gracious manner—"You have behaved like
yourself throughout this business. Nothing could possibly be more
honourable. I have a great deal more to say to you."—"Your
Majesty has already said much more than the occasion calls
for."—"Oh no, I have not; and I do not care who hears me: it was
impossible for anyone to behave more honourably." After more
conversation of the same kind the King desired to see Mr. Pitt in the
closet. The levée continued, and, some little time after, Mr. Pitt said
to the King: "Your Majesty will pardon me if I take the liberty of
saying that I fear I shall not be able to attend Your Majesty in the
closet."—"Oh yes: you must; I have just done." The King went to
the closet and Mr. Pitt attended him. Nothing could exceed the
kindness of the King towards Mr. Pitt: he was affected very much
and more than once. The conversation lasted more than half an hour;
and in the course of it the King said that, tho' he could no longer
retain Mr. Pitt in his service, he hoped to have him as his friend. Mr.
Pitt, with strong expressions both of duty and attachment and love
to His Majesty, submitted that any intercourse of that kind might be
injurious to His Majesty's Government; for that it was very
important that his new Ministers should appear to act by themselves
and for themselves, and that if he was frequently with His Majesty,
unfavourable conclusions might be drawn concerning his
interference or influence. This seemed to satisfy the King, and they
parted. At the levée the King spoke in the highest terms of Mr. Pitt's
hostile to the question. This was of course reported to Mr. Pitt. On
the Friday (the 30th) the King sent for the Speaker to the Queen's
House and conversed with him a long time. Upon my mentioning
this circumstance to Mr. Pitt, he said he knew what happened at that
interview and seemed perfectly satisfied with it. He had before told
me (namely, the first night he saw me, Saturday, Feb. 7th) that he
knew nine days before that he should be under the necessity of
resigning. On the 31st Mr. Pitt wrote his first letter to the King. Two
letters only passed on each side, which see. Mr. Pitt did not see the
King till at the levée on Wednesday the 11th [February]. The King
spoke to him in the most gracious manner—"You have behaved like
yourself throughout this business. Nothing could possibly be more
honourable. I have a great deal more to say to you."—"Your
Majesty has already said much more than the occasion calls
for."—"Oh no, I have not; and I do not care who hears me: it was
impossible for anyone to behave more honourably." After more
conversation of the same kind the King desired to see Mr. Pitt in the
closet. The levée continued, and, some little time after, Mr. Pitt said
to the King: "Your Majesty will pardon me if I take the liberty of
saying that I fear I shall not be able to attend Your Majesty in the
closet."—"Oh yes: you must; I have just done." The King went to
the closet and Mr. Pitt attended him. Nothing could exceed the
kindness of the King towards Mr. Pitt: he was affected very much
and more than once. The conversation lasted more than half an hour;
and in the course of it the King said that, tho' he could no longer
retain Mr. Pitt in his service, he hoped to have him as his friend. Mr.
Pitt, with strong expressions both of duty and attachment and love
to His Majesty, submitted that any intercourse of that kind might be
injurious to His Majesty's Government; for that it was very
important that his new Ministers should appear to act by themselves
and for themselves, and that if he was frequently with His Majesty,
unfavourable conclusions might be drawn concerning his
interference or influence. This seemed to satisfy the King, and they
parted. At the levée the King spoke in the highest terms of Mr. Pitt's
Page 486
conduct throughout the business of his resignation, and said that it
was very different from that of his predecessors.
This narrative needs little comment, except on the phrase that the Cabinet
had promised to grant the Catholics "some further indulgences." Probably
the schism occurred on the extent of those concessions, Pitt and the
majority desiring the admission of Catholics to Parliament and to offices of
trust, while Loughborough and the minority refused to do more than grant
some measure of support to the Irish priests.[592] The King probably
opposed both concessions; and Pitt seems to have ascribed his strenuous
opposition more to the intrigues of Auckland than to those of
Loughborough. In this he was probably mistaken. The best judge on this
question, the monarch himself, certainly looked on the Chancellor as a
traitor. But in truth the crisis could not be avoided. The King acknowledged
as much in his effusive comments on the extremely honourable conduct of
Pitt, but he also most firmly declared that he could no longer retain him in
his service. This was in effect a dismissal. On 18th February, George wrote
a brief letter expressing his sorrow at the close of Pitt's political career and
his satisfaction that Parliament had passed the Ways and Means without
debate. Thus did he close his correspondence with a Minister who had
devotedly served him for more than seventeen years.
There is little need to notice the hasty and spiteful comments of Lord
Malmesbury, that Pitt was playing a selfishly criminal game by resigning,
with the evident aim of showing his own strength and being called back to
office on his own terms.[593] The Malmesbury Diaries at this point consist
chiefly of hearsays, which can readily be refuted. But this calumny spread
was very different from that of his predecessors.
This narrative needs little comment, except on the phrase that the Cabinet
had promised to grant the Catholics "some further indulgences." Probably
the schism occurred on the extent of those concessions, Pitt and the
majority desiring the admission of Catholics to Parliament and to offices of
trust, while Loughborough and the minority refused to do more than grant
some measure of support to the Irish priests.[592] The King probably
opposed both concessions; and Pitt seems to have ascribed his strenuous
opposition more to the intrigues of Auckland than to those of
Loughborough. In this he was probably mistaken. The best judge on this
question, the monarch himself, certainly looked on the Chancellor as a
traitor. But in truth the crisis could not be avoided. The King acknowledged
as much in his effusive comments on the extremely honourable conduct of
Pitt, but he also most firmly declared that he could no longer retain him in
his service. This was in effect a dismissal. On 18th February, George wrote
a brief letter expressing his sorrow at the close of Pitt's political career and
his satisfaction that Parliament had passed the Ways and Means without
debate. Thus did he close his correspondence with a Minister who had
devotedly served him for more than seventeen years.
There is little need to notice the hasty and spiteful comments of Lord
Malmesbury, that Pitt was playing a selfishly criminal game by resigning,
with the evident aim of showing his own strength and being called back to
office on his own terms.[593] The Malmesbury Diaries at this point consist
chiefly of hearsays, which can readily be refuted. But this calumny spread
Page 487
widely, and Fox finally barbed it with the hint that the substitution of
Addington for Pitt was "a notorious juggle," the former being obviously a
dummy to be knocked down when it suited Pitt to come back fancy-free
about the Catholics. Fortunately, the correspondence of statesmen often
supplies antidotes to the venomous gibes of bystanders; and a case in point
is a phrase in Grenville's letter of 13th February to Minto: "There was no
alternative except that of taking this step [resignation] or of agreeing to the
disguise or dereliction of one's opinion on one of the most important
questions in the whole range of our domestic policy."[594]
Pitt has been sharply censured for his excessive scrupulousness in resigning
at so serious a crisis. But the verdict must depend on three main issues, the
importance of the question at stake, that of the services rendered by the
Irish Catholics, and the nature of the promises made to them. Now, no one
will deny that in the days when France was striving to effect the
independence of Ireland—for Bonaparte was thought to be pressing on the
war with that aim in view[595]—the question of the Union stood paramount.
It was the most important problem confronting Parliament since the Union
with Scotland in 1707; and the difficulties encountered were greater than
those raised by the Scots. The services of the Irish Catholics to the cause of
the Union are not easy to assess; but Castlereagh, a cool judge, rated them
high. In such a case a man of sensitive conscience will deem himself bound
to those who, in reliance on his sense of honour, acted in a way that ensured
the success of his measure. Above all, in so tangled a situation the final
decision will depend on the character of the statesman. Walpole would have
waived aside the debt of honour. Pitt resolved to discharge it.
It is scarcely necessary to notice another slander, that Pitt resigned because,
in his inability to procure peace from France, he intended to put Addington
in office merely for that purpose, to be ousted when it was fulfilled. No
evidence is forthcoming in support of this version, which found no small
Addington for Pitt was "a notorious juggle," the former being obviously a
dummy to be knocked down when it suited Pitt to come back fancy-free
about the Catholics. Fortunately, the correspondence of statesmen often
supplies antidotes to the venomous gibes of bystanders; and a case in point
is a phrase in Grenville's letter of 13th February to Minto: "There was no
alternative except that of taking this step [resignation] or of agreeing to the
disguise or dereliction of one's opinion on one of the most important
questions in the whole range of our domestic policy."[594]
Pitt has been sharply censured for his excessive scrupulousness in resigning
at so serious a crisis. But the verdict must depend on three main issues, the
importance of the question at stake, that of the services rendered by the
Irish Catholics, and the nature of the promises made to them. Now, no one
will deny that in the days when France was striving to effect the
independence of Ireland—for Bonaparte was thought to be pressing on the
war with that aim in view[595]—the question of the Union stood paramount.
It was the most important problem confronting Parliament since the Union
with Scotland in 1707; and the difficulties encountered were greater than
those raised by the Scots. The services of the Irish Catholics to the cause of
the Union are not easy to assess; but Castlereagh, a cool judge, rated them
high. In such a case a man of sensitive conscience will deem himself bound
to those who, in reliance on his sense of honour, acted in a way that ensured
the success of his measure. Above all, in so tangled a situation the final
decision will depend on the character of the statesman. Walpole would have
waived aside the debt of honour. Pitt resolved to discharge it.
It is scarcely necessary to notice another slander, that Pitt resigned because,
in his inability to procure peace from France, he intended to put Addington
in office merely for that purpose, to be ousted when it was fulfilled. No
evidence is forthcoming in support of this version, which found no small
Page 488
favour with Continental historians of a former generation; but it is now
clear that the split occurred solely on Catholic Emancipation. Those
Ministers who approved it resigned; while its opponents remained in office,
namely, Portland, Chatham, and Westmorland. The same is true of the
subordinate offices. The new Cabinet decided to grant only occasional relief
and a "compassionate allowance" to the Irish priests.[596] In several other
matters its policy differed from that of Pitt; and Addington soon made it
apparent that he was no stop-gap.
But now this clear issue was to be blurred in the blinding glare of the King's
lunacy. The causes of the malady of February 1801 were partly physical,
partly mental. While still agitated by the dismissal of his trusted Minister,
the King, two days later, went to church on the day appointed for the
National Fast. That day of supplication for delivery from the perils of the
time was shrouded in gloom and snow. He remained a long time in church
and took a chill. Nevertheless, with his wonted energy he persisted in
transacting business with Addington, until the stress told on the brain. On
the 16th slight feverish symptoms began to develop. Yet Addington saw him
often about new appointments, until on Sunday the 22nd the symptoms
caused some concern. Willis, son of the man who had so much control over
him during the illness of 1788–9, now came to the Queen's House, and
resumed the old regimen. Dr. Gisborne was also in attendance. From the
notes of Tomline we glean curious details about the illness. The bilious
symptoms were very pronounced, and after the 23rd the King became
worse. His manner became nervous and "hurried." He went up to Willis and
shook him eagerly by the hand. When the Queen and princesses rose to
leave, he jocosely extended his arms so as to stop them; whereupon Willis
stepped forward, and, looking at him earnestly, told him he was very ill.
The King at once said with a deep sigh: "I see, I cannot deceive you. I have
deceived all the rest. They think me well; but I cannot deceive you." He
then burst into an agony of weeping, threw himself into Willis's arms, and
clear that the split occurred solely on Catholic Emancipation. Those
Ministers who approved it resigned; while its opponents remained in office,
namely, Portland, Chatham, and Westmorland. The same is true of the
subordinate offices. The new Cabinet decided to grant only occasional relief
and a "compassionate allowance" to the Irish priests.[596] In several other
matters its policy differed from that of Pitt; and Addington soon made it
apparent that he was no stop-gap.
But now this clear issue was to be blurred in the blinding glare of the King's
lunacy. The causes of the malady of February 1801 were partly physical,
partly mental. While still agitated by the dismissal of his trusted Minister,
the King, two days later, went to church on the day appointed for the
National Fast. That day of supplication for delivery from the perils of the
time was shrouded in gloom and snow. He remained a long time in church
and took a chill. Nevertheless, with his wonted energy he persisted in
transacting business with Addington, until the stress told on the brain. On
the 16th slight feverish symptoms began to develop. Yet Addington saw him
often about new appointments, until on Sunday the 22nd the symptoms
caused some concern. Willis, son of the man who had so much control over
him during the illness of 1788–9, now came to the Queen's House, and
resumed the old regimen. Dr. Gisborne was also in attendance. From the
notes of Tomline we glean curious details about the illness. The bilious
symptoms were very pronounced, and after the 23rd the King became
worse. His manner became nervous and "hurried." He went up to Willis and
shook him eagerly by the hand. When the Queen and princesses rose to
leave, he jocosely extended his arms so as to stop them; whereupon Willis
stepped forward, and, looking at him earnestly, told him he was very ill.
The King at once said with a deep sigh: "I see, I cannot deceive you. I have
deceived all the rest. They think me well; but I cannot deceive you." He
then burst into an agony of weeping, threw himself into Willis's arms, and
Page 489
said: "You are right. I am ill indeed. But oh! for God's sake, keep your
father from me, and keep off a Regency."
After weeping for a quarter of an hour, he walked about the room with
Willis for an hour and a half. In the evening he grew worse. At 2.30 a.m. he
went to bed, while the Duke of Kent and Willis watched by the door. As in
the previous seizure, intervals of calm and reasonableness alternated
strangely with fits of delirium or even of violence. Now and again he spoke
collectedly, and at such times those about him rejoiced to hear the familiar
"What, what," wherewith he prefaced his remarks.[597]
Frequently he declared that he would uphold the Church of England; or
again his thoughts started away from the loathed spectre of a Regency. On
2nd March the illness took so violent a turn that his life seemed in danger;
but, as was the case twelve years before, long spells of sleep supervened
and brought his pulse down from 136 to 84. His powers of recovery
surprised every one about him. By 6th March he was so far well as to be
allowed to see the Dukes of York, Kent, and Cumberland. Not until 9th
March did he undergo the more trying ordeal of seeing the Prince of Wales.
On that same day he requested to see Pitt, who very properly declined,
suggesting, with all deference, that Addington was the proper person for an
interview.[598]
Meanwhile, at or just after the crisis of the illness, Pitt gave a very
important pledge. If we may trust the far from convincing statements of
Lord Malmesbury, who had the story from Pelham, the King on 7th March
charged Willis to inform Pitt of the improvement in his health, and to add
the biting words: "But what has not he to answer for who is the cause of my
having been ill at all?" Pelham further asserted that Pitt, in a "most dutiful,
humble and contrite answer," wrote down his resolve to give up Catholic
Emancipation.[599] Now it is almost certain that Pitt sent no such letter, for
father from me, and keep off a Regency."
After weeping for a quarter of an hour, he walked about the room with
Willis for an hour and a half. In the evening he grew worse. At 2.30 a.m. he
went to bed, while the Duke of Kent and Willis watched by the door. As in
the previous seizure, intervals of calm and reasonableness alternated
strangely with fits of delirium or even of violence. Now and again he spoke
collectedly, and at such times those about him rejoiced to hear the familiar
"What, what," wherewith he prefaced his remarks.[597]
Frequently he declared that he would uphold the Church of England; or
again his thoughts started away from the loathed spectre of a Regency. On
2nd March the illness took so violent a turn that his life seemed in danger;
but, as was the case twelve years before, long spells of sleep supervened
and brought his pulse down from 136 to 84. His powers of recovery
surprised every one about him. By 6th March he was so far well as to be
allowed to see the Dukes of York, Kent, and Cumberland. Not until 9th
March did he undergo the more trying ordeal of seeing the Prince of Wales.
On that same day he requested to see Pitt, who very properly declined,
suggesting, with all deference, that Addington was the proper person for an
interview.[598]
Meanwhile, at or just after the crisis of the illness, Pitt gave a very
important pledge. If we may trust the far from convincing statements of
Lord Malmesbury, who had the story from Pelham, the King on 7th March
charged Willis to inform Pitt of the improvement in his health, and to add
the biting words: "But what has not he to answer for who is the cause of my
having been ill at all?" Pelham further asserted that Pitt, in a "most dutiful,
humble and contrite answer," wrote down his resolve to give up Catholic
Emancipation.[599] Now it is almost certain that Pitt sent no such letter, for
Page 490
none exists either at the Public Record Office, Orwell Park, or Chevening.
Tomline asserts that Pitt sent by Willis a verbal assurance that he would not
agitate Catholic Emancipation again during the King's reign; whereupon
George III exclaimed: "Now my mind will be at ease." The bishop,
however, believed that Pitt's assurance was reported in a more emphatic
form than was warranted; and the statesman does not seem to have
considered himself absolutely bound by it. Yet the written assurance sent by
Rose to the King on behalf of Pitt seems binding during that reign.[600]
Thus had the King conquered—by madness. No incident in the life of Pitt is
more unfortunate than this surrender. The King had made an ungenerous
use of the privileges of an invalid, and the pressure which he put on Pitt
passes the bounds even of the immorality of a sick-room. The illness began
with a chill due to his own imprudence; but he used its later developments
to extort a promise which otherwise would never have been forthcoming.
Nothing but the crisis in the King's illness led Pitt to waver. For at the end
of February he authorized Castlereagh to send to Cornwallis at Dublin a
declaration intended to reassure the Irish Catholics. It pointed out that the
majority of the Cabinet had resigned owing to the impossibility of carrying
Catholic Emancipation at the present juncture. He (Pitt) still resolved to do
his utmost for the success of that cause; and therefore begged them to
refrain from any conduct which would prejudice it in the future. Cornwallis
delivered this and another paper to the titular Archbishop of Dublin and
Lord Fingall for circulation among their friends and found that it produced
good results.[601] Far different, of course, was the effect produced on those
few who knew of Pitt's private promise to the King. They contrasted it with
the contrary promise to the Irish Catholics and drew the most unfavourable
inferences, forgetting that between 27th February and 2nd March the King's
illness had taken so dangerous a turn as perhaps to justify the use of that
political sedative.
Tomline asserts that Pitt sent by Willis a verbal assurance that he would not
agitate Catholic Emancipation again during the King's reign; whereupon
George III exclaimed: "Now my mind will be at ease." The bishop,
however, believed that Pitt's assurance was reported in a more emphatic
form than was warranted; and the statesman does not seem to have
considered himself absolutely bound by it. Yet the written assurance sent by
Rose to the King on behalf of Pitt seems binding during that reign.[600]
Thus had the King conquered—by madness. No incident in the life of Pitt is
more unfortunate than this surrender. The King had made an ungenerous
use of the privileges of an invalid, and the pressure which he put on Pitt
passes the bounds even of the immorality of a sick-room. The illness began
with a chill due to his own imprudence; but he used its later developments
to extort a promise which otherwise would never have been forthcoming.
Nothing but the crisis in the King's illness led Pitt to waver. For at the end
of February he authorized Castlereagh to send to Cornwallis at Dublin a
declaration intended to reassure the Irish Catholics. It pointed out that the
majority of the Cabinet had resigned owing to the impossibility of carrying
Catholic Emancipation at the present juncture. He (Pitt) still resolved to do
his utmost for the success of that cause; and therefore begged them to
refrain from any conduct which would prejudice it in the future. Cornwallis
delivered this and another paper to the titular Archbishop of Dublin and
Lord Fingall for circulation among their friends and found that it produced
good results.[601] Far different, of course, was the effect produced on those
few who knew of Pitt's private promise to the King. They contrasted it with
the contrary promise to the Irish Catholics and drew the most unfavourable
inferences, forgetting that between 27th February and 2nd March the King's
illness had taken so dangerous a turn as perhaps to justify the use of that
political sedative.
Page 491
While blaming Pitt for weakness in giving this pledge to the King, we must
remember that the prolongation of the reign of George III was the first
desire of all responsible statesmen. The intrigues of the Prince of Wales and
Fox for a Regency were again beginning; and thus there loomed ahead an
appalling vista of waste and demoralization. In these circumstances Dundas
and Cornwallis came to the conclusion that the King's conscience must not
again be troubled. Grenville seems to have held firm on the Catholic
Question.[602] But his colleagues now took an opportunist view. Pitt had two
or three interviews with the Prince of Wales, late in February and early in
March, and made it clear that the Prince would be well advised to accept the
Regency Bill drafted in 1789. On the Prince asking whether this was the
opinion of certain of Pitt's colleagues, who then opposed that Bill as
derogatory to his interests, Pitt at once replied in the affirmative; and when
the Prince further objected to certain restrictions on the power of the
Regent, Pitt declared that no change would be acceptable. They parted
courteously but coolly; and we may be sure that the Prince never forgave
Pitt for his uncompromising assertion of the rights of Parliament.
So dark was the outlook at home and abroad that Pitt was persuaded,
probably by Dundas, Tomline, Rose, and Canning, to re-consider the whole
question with a view to continuance in office, provided that some suitable
position were found for Addington. The bishop penned some notes of sharp
criticism on the conduct of Addington, affirming that, if he had been
patriotic and sincere, he would have pressed Pitt to remain in office. The
following words are remarkable: "Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas and myself had a
long conversation upon this point at Wimbledon; and I am satisfied that, if
Mr. Addington had entered into the idea cordially, Mr. Pitt's resignation
might have been prevented." He adds that they drew up a tentative scheme
of a Cabinet, Pitt remaining as chief, while Addington was to be a Secretary
of State; but the latter rejected this indignantly.[603] Pitt also finally deemed
the plan "utterly improper," and threatened to hold aloof from those who
remember that the prolongation of the reign of George III was the first
desire of all responsible statesmen. The intrigues of the Prince of Wales and
Fox for a Regency were again beginning; and thus there loomed ahead an
appalling vista of waste and demoralization. In these circumstances Dundas
and Cornwallis came to the conclusion that the King's conscience must not
again be troubled. Grenville seems to have held firm on the Catholic
Question.[602] But his colleagues now took an opportunist view. Pitt had two
or three interviews with the Prince of Wales, late in February and early in
March, and made it clear that the Prince would be well advised to accept the
Regency Bill drafted in 1789. On the Prince asking whether this was the
opinion of certain of Pitt's colleagues, who then opposed that Bill as
derogatory to his interests, Pitt at once replied in the affirmative; and when
the Prince further objected to certain restrictions on the power of the
Regent, Pitt declared that no change would be acceptable. They parted
courteously but coolly; and we may be sure that the Prince never forgave
Pitt for his uncompromising assertion of the rights of Parliament.
So dark was the outlook at home and abroad that Pitt was persuaded,
probably by Dundas, Tomline, Rose, and Canning, to re-consider the whole
question with a view to continuance in office, provided that some suitable
position were found for Addington. The bishop penned some notes of sharp
criticism on the conduct of Addington, affirming that, if he had been
patriotic and sincere, he would have pressed Pitt to remain in office. The
following words are remarkable: "Mr. Pitt, Mr. Dundas and myself had a
long conversation upon this point at Wimbledon; and I am satisfied that, if
Mr. Addington had entered into the idea cordially, Mr. Pitt's resignation
might have been prevented." He adds that they drew up a tentative scheme
of a Cabinet, Pitt remaining as chief, while Addington was to be a Secretary
of State; but the latter rejected this indignantly.[603] Pitt also finally deemed
the plan "utterly improper," and threatened to hold aloof from those who
Page 492
would not support the new Administration or croaked about its instability.
The action of Dundas and the bishop was unfortunate; for it gave rise to the
report that Pitt was intriguing with them for a shuffling of offices in which
he would again come out at the top; and, as usually happens, the meanest
version overshadowed the truth.
Fortune willed that the new Ministry, by far the weakest Ministry of recent
times, should win two brilliant successes and secure a not inglorious peace.
So bewildering a change seemed impossible in the dark days of February–
March 1801, when it was the bounden duty of every strong man to remain
at his post, and of under-studies to stand aside. The fates and Addington
willed otherwise. Pitt resigned on 14th March, nineteen days before Nelson
triumphed at Copenhagen.
Meanwhile Pitt had endeavoured to place the nation's finance on a sound
footing. His Budget speech of 18th February has a ring of confidence and
pride. True, the expenses were unprecedentedly heavy. Great Britain had to
provide £12,117,000, and Ireland £3,785,000, for the army alone. The navy
cost £15,800,000; the Ordnance £1,938,000. The bad seasons or other
causes having lessened the yield of the Income Tax and the Malt Tax, he
proposed further imposts upon sugar, raisins, tea, paper, timber, lead, and all
exports without exception. He increased the Excise duty on horses, even
those used for agriculture, on stamp duties, and on the postage of letters. He
also urged that not less than £200,000 (the normal amount) should be set
apart for the reduction of the British National Debt. Over against these
depressing proposals he set the notable fact that British commerce
prospered more than ever, and that the revenue showed remarkable
buoyancy. From these extraordinary symptoms he augured that the strength
and spirit of the people were equal to all the demands of the crisis; and he
declared that the attachment of the nation to its revered monarch and
The action of Dundas and the bishop was unfortunate; for it gave rise to the
report that Pitt was intriguing with them for a shuffling of offices in which
he would again come out at the top; and, as usually happens, the meanest
version overshadowed the truth.
Fortune willed that the new Ministry, by far the weakest Ministry of recent
times, should win two brilliant successes and secure a not inglorious peace.
So bewildering a change seemed impossible in the dark days of February–
March 1801, when it was the bounden duty of every strong man to remain
at his post, and of under-studies to stand aside. The fates and Addington
willed otherwise. Pitt resigned on 14th March, nineteen days before Nelson
triumphed at Copenhagen.
Meanwhile Pitt had endeavoured to place the nation's finance on a sound
footing. His Budget speech of 18th February has a ring of confidence and
pride. True, the expenses were unprecedentedly heavy. Great Britain had to
provide £12,117,000, and Ireland £3,785,000, for the army alone. The navy
cost £15,800,000; the Ordnance £1,938,000. The bad seasons or other
causes having lessened the yield of the Income Tax and the Malt Tax, he
proposed further imposts upon sugar, raisins, tea, paper, timber, lead, and all
exports without exception. He increased the Excise duty on horses, even
those used for agriculture, on stamp duties, and on the postage of letters. He
also urged that not less than £200,000 (the normal amount) should be set
apart for the reduction of the British National Debt. Over against these
depressing proposals he set the notable fact that British commerce
prospered more than ever, and that the revenue showed remarkable
buoyancy. From these extraordinary symptoms he augured that the strength
and spirit of the people were equal to all the demands of the crisis; and he
declared that the attachment of the nation to its revered monarch and
Page 493
beloved constitution furnished a moving spectacle to Europe. The House
accepted these crushing imposts without demur.
He found it more difficult to reconcile his followers to the sway of
Addington. As we have seen, Dundas had already expressed to Pitt his
scorn of him and his desire for a Portland Ministry. Rose also refused to
serve under a man whom he accused (unjustly, as we now know) of
worming his way to office; and the high-spirited Canning declined to give
to Pitt any pledge except that he would not laugh at the new Prime Minister.
It is clear that Canning, like his chief, disliked resignation. As the gifted
young Irishman wrote, it was not at all good fun to move out of the best
house in London (Downing Street) and hunt about for a little dwelling.[604]
Ryder and Steele kept their posts.
Singular to relate, the Mr. Pliable of so many Ministries was soon to be
turned out. Loughborough, on whose back Addington climbed to power,
forthwith received a direct intimation to withdraw. The Lord Chancellor
therefore closed his career, the King bestowing on him for his services to
religion the title Earl of Rosslyn. To finish with him, we may note that his
settlement near Windsor and his assiduous courting of the royal favour
finally secured an epitaph quite as piquant as any which George bestowed.
On hearing of Rosslyn's sudden death early in 1805, the King earnestly
asked the messenger whether the news was trustworthy; and, on receiving a
reassuring reply, he said: "Then, he has not left a greater knave behind him
in my dominions." The comment of Thurlow on this gracious remark is
equally notable: "Then I presume that His Majesty is quite sane at present."
One of Pitt's friendships was severed by the crisis. As we have seen, he
deeply resented the part played by Auckland. To his letter of remonstrance
he replied very briefly that, widely as they differed on the topic at issue,
they differed quite as much as to the question on which side there had been
accepted these crushing imposts without demur.
He found it more difficult to reconcile his followers to the sway of
Addington. As we have seen, Dundas had already expressed to Pitt his
scorn of him and his desire for a Portland Ministry. Rose also refused to
serve under a man whom he accused (unjustly, as we now know) of
worming his way to office; and the high-spirited Canning declined to give
to Pitt any pledge except that he would not laugh at the new Prime Minister.
It is clear that Canning, like his chief, disliked resignation. As the gifted
young Irishman wrote, it was not at all good fun to move out of the best
house in London (Downing Street) and hunt about for a little dwelling.[604]
Ryder and Steele kept their posts.
Singular to relate, the Mr. Pliable of so many Ministries was soon to be
turned out. Loughborough, on whose back Addington climbed to power,
forthwith received a direct intimation to withdraw. The Lord Chancellor
therefore closed his career, the King bestowing on him for his services to
religion the title Earl of Rosslyn. To finish with him, we may note that his
settlement near Windsor and his assiduous courting of the royal favour
finally secured an epitaph quite as piquant as any which George bestowed.
On hearing of Rosslyn's sudden death early in 1805, the King earnestly
asked the messenger whether the news was trustworthy; and, on receiving a
reassuring reply, he said: "Then, he has not left a greater knave behind him
in my dominions." The comment of Thurlow on this gracious remark is
equally notable: "Then I presume that His Majesty is quite sane at present."
One of Pitt's friendships was severed by the crisis. As we have seen, he
deeply resented the part played by Auckland. To his letter of remonstrance
he replied very briefly that, widely as they differed on the topic at issue,
they differed quite as much as to the question on which side there had been
Page 494
a failure of friendship, confidence, or attention. The rupture became
complete on 20th March, when Auckland declared in the Lords that Pitt's
resignation was involved in mystery which the eye could not penetrate. The
insinuation wounded Pitt deeply; and his intercourse with Auckland entirely
ceased. Pitt was not exacting in his social intercourse; but no man of high
feeling can endure secret opposition, followed by a veiled insinuation that
what he has done from high principle resulted from motives that cannot
bear the light. This is an unpardonable sin that ends friendship.
With all his outward composure, Pitt must have felt deep distress at his
failure to complete the Union by the act of grace which he had in
contemplation. The time was ripe, indeed overripe, for a generous
experiment, whereby seven tenths of the Irish people would have gained
religious equality. If the populace of Dublin hailed with joy the St. Patrick's
cross on the new Union Jack,[605] we may be sure that Irishmen,
irrespective of creed, would have joined heart and soul in the larger national
unity which it typified. It is probable that Pitt, when granting the franchise
to Irish Catholics in 1793, resolved to make the other concessions at an
early date. But the cause of Catholic Emancipation having been prejudiced
by the unwise haste of Fitzwilliam in 1795, and by raids and revolts soon
after, the time of the Union was the first which he could seize with any
chance of success; and he hoped to vitalize that Union by an act which
would then have been hailed as a boon. Such acts of grace are all too rare in
the frigid annals of British Parliaments. The Anglo-Saxon race builds its
political fabric too exclusively on material interests; and the whole structure
is the uglier and weaker for this calculating hardness. At the time of the
Union with Scotland, the counsellors of Queen Anne utterly failed to touch
complete on 20th March, when Auckland declared in the Lords that Pitt's
resignation was involved in mystery which the eye could not penetrate. The
insinuation wounded Pitt deeply; and his intercourse with Auckland entirely
ceased. Pitt was not exacting in his social intercourse; but no man of high
feeling can endure secret opposition, followed by a veiled insinuation that
what he has done from high principle resulted from motives that cannot
bear the light. This is an unpardonable sin that ends friendship.
With all his outward composure, Pitt must have felt deep distress at his
failure to complete the Union by the act of grace which he had in
contemplation. The time was ripe, indeed overripe, for a generous
experiment, whereby seven tenths of the Irish people would have gained
religious equality. If the populace of Dublin hailed with joy the St. Patrick's
cross on the new Union Jack,[605] we may be sure that Irishmen,
irrespective of creed, would have joined heart and soul in the larger national
unity which it typified. It is probable that Pitt, when granting the franchise
to Irish Catholics in 1793, resolved to make the other concessions at an
early date. But the cause of Catholic Emancipation having been prejudiced
by the unwise haste of Fitzwilliam in 1795, and by raids and revolts soon
after, the time of the Union was the first which he could seize with any
chance of success; and he hoped to vitalize that Union by an act which
would then have been hailed as a boon. Such acts of grace are all too rare in
the frigid annals of British Parliaments. The Anglo-Saxon race builds its
political fabric too exclusively on material interests; and the whole structure
is the uglier and weaker for this calculating hardness. At the time of the
Union with Scotland, the counsellors of Queen Anne utterly failed to touch
Page 495
the hearts of the Scots; and it was left to commerce sluggishly and partially
to mingle the two peoples. In contrast with this dullness, how inspiring are
the annals of France in the early and best days of the Revolution. Then the
separatist Provincial System vanished as a miasma; and amidst the eager
hopes and class renunciations of that golden day the French people found a
unity such as legislators alone can neither make nor unmake. With the
insight of a statesman Pitt now sought to clinch legislation by sentiment. He
desired to vivify the Union with Ireland by a concession which would come
with all the more graciousness because he had not introduced it into the
legal contract of marriage. But the outcome of it all was, for himself
resignation, for the two peoples the continuance of their age-long feud.
to mingle the two peoples. In contrast with this dullness, how inspiring are
the annals of France in the early and best days of the Revolution. Then the
separatist Provincial System vanished as a miasma; and amidst the eager
hopes and class renunciations of that golden day the French people found a
unity such as legislators alone can neither make nor unmake. With the
insight of a statesman Pitt now sought to clinch legislation by sentiment. He
desired to vivify the Union with Ireland by a concession which would come
with all the more graciousness because he had not introduced it into the
legal contract of marriage. But the outcome of it all was, for himself
resignation, for the two peoples the continuance of their age-long feud.
Page 496
CHAPTER XXI
PITT AND HIS FRIENDS (1794–1805)
Nothing could be more playful, and at the
same time more instructive, than Pitt's
conversation on a variety of topics while
sitting in the library at Cirencester. You never
would have guessed that the man before you
was Prime Minister of the country, and one
of the greatest that ever filled that situation.
His style and manner were quite those of an
accomplished idler.—"Malmesbury Diaries,"
iv, 34.
The conflict of parties and interests is apt to thin the circle of a statesman's
friends; and in that age of relentless strife the denuding forces worked
havoc. Only he who possesses truly lovable qualities can pass through such
a time with comparatively little loss; and such was the lot of Pitt. True, his
circle was somewhat diminished. The opposition of Bankes had been at
times so sharp as to lessen their intimacy; and the reputation of Steele had
suffered seriously from financial irregularities.[606] Pitt's affection for
Dundas and Grenville had also cooled; but on the whole his friendships
stood the test of time better, perhaps, than those of any statesman of the
eighteenth century. Certainly in this respect he compares favourably with
PITT AND HIS FRIENDS (1794–1805)
Nothing could be more playful, and at the
same time more instructive, than Pitt's
conversation on a variety of topics while
sitting in the library at Cirencester. You never
would have guessed that the man before you
was Prime Minister of the country, and one
of the greatest that ever filled that situation.
His style and manner were quite those of an
accomplished idler.—"Malmesbury Diaries,"
iv, 34.
The conflict of parties and interests is apt to thin the circle of a statesman's
friends; and in that age of relentless strife the denuding forces worked
havoc. Only he who possesses truly lovable qualities can pass through such
a time with comparatively little loss; and such was the lot of Pitt. True, his
circle was somewhat diminished. The opposition of Bankes had been at
times so sharp as to lessen their intimacy; and the reputation of Steele had
suffered seriously from financial irregularities.[606] Pitt's affection for
Dundas and Grenville had also cooled; but on the whole his friendships
stood the test of time better, perhaps, than those of any statesman of the
eighteenth century. Certainly in this respect he compares favourably with
Page 497
his awe-inspiring father. Not that Pitt possessed the charm of affability. On
most persons his austere self-concentration produced a repellent effect; and
it must be confessed that the Grenville strain in his nature dowered him
with a fund of more than ordinary English coldness. Such was the opinion
not only of the French émigrés, whom he designedly kept at arm's length,
but even of his followers, to whom his aloofness seemed a violation of the
rules of the parliamentary game. But it was not in his nature to expand
except in the heat of debate or in congenial society. In general his stiffness
was insular, his pre-occupation profound. Lady Hester Stanhope, who saw
much of him in the closing years, pictures his thin, tall, rather ungainly
figure, stalking through Hyde Park, oblivious of all surroundings, with head
uptilted, "as if his ideas were en air, so that you would have taken him for a
poet."[607]
The comparison is as flighty as Lady Hester's remarks usually were, though
the passage may depict with truth the air that Pitt assumed when walking
with her. No one else accused him of having affinities to poets. In truth, so
angular was his nature, so restricted his sympathies, that he never came in
touch with literary men, artists, or original thinkers. His life was the poorer
for it. A statesman should know more than a part of human life; and Pitt
never realized the full extent of his powers because he spent his time almost
entirely amongst politicians of the same school. His mind, though by no
means closed against new ideas, lacked the eager inquisitiveness of that of
Napoleon, who, before the process of imperial fossilization set in,
welcomed discussions with men of all shades of opinion, and encouraged in
them that frankness of utterance which at once widens and clarifies the
views of the disputants. It is true that Pitt's private conversations are almost
unknown. They appear to have ranged within political grooves, with
frequent excursions into the loved domains of classical and English
literature; but he seems never to have explored the new realms of
speculation and poetry then opened up by Bentham and the Lake Poets. A
most persons his austere self-concentration produced a repellent effect; and
it must be confessed that the Grenville strain in his nature dowered him
with a fund of more than ordinary English coldness. Such was the opinion
not only of the French émigrés, whom he designedly kept at arm's length,
but even of his followers, to whom his aloofness seemed a violation of the
rules of the parliamentary game. But it was not in his nature to expand
except in the heat of debate or in congenial society. In general his stiffness
was insular, his pre-occupation profound. Lady Hester Stanhope, who saw
much of him in the closing years, pictures his thin, tall, rather ungainly
figure, stalking through Hyde Park, oblivious of all surroundings, with head
uptilted, "as if his ideas were en air, so that you would have taken him for a
poet."[607]
The comparison is as flighty as Lady Hester's remarks usually were, though
the passage may depict with truth the air that Pitt assumed when walking
with her. No one else accused him of having affinities to poets. In truth, so
angular was his nature, so restricted his sympathies, that he never came in
touch with literary men, artists, or original thinkers. His life was the poorer
for it. A statesman should know more than a part of human life; and Pitt
never realized the full extent of his powers because he spent his time almost
entirely amongst politicians of the same school. His mind, though by no
means closed against new ideas, lacked the eager inquisitiveness of that of
Napoleon, who, before the process of imperial fossilization set in,
welcomed discussions with men of all shades of opinion, and encouraged in
them that frankness of utterance which at once widens and clarifies the
views of the disputants. It is true that Pitt's private conversations are almost
unknown. They appear to have ranged within political grooves, with
frequent excursions into the loved domains of classical and English
literature; but he seems never to have explored the new realms of
speculation and poetry then opened up by Bentham and the Lake Poets. A
Page 498
letter of the poet Hayley to him will serve to suggest the extent of his loss in
limiting his intercourse to a comparatively small coterie:
Felpham, near Chichester, Sept. 9[?].[608]
Dear Pitt,
Why are you slow in doing the little good in your power? Yes: great
as you are, the real good you can do must be little; but that little I
once believed you would ever haste to do with a generous eagerness
and enthusiasm, and therefore I used to contemplate your character
with an enthusiastic affection. That character, high as it was, sunk in
my estimation from the calamitous delay concerning the promised
pension of Cowper, a delay which allowed that dear and now
released sufferer to sink into utter and useless distraction before the
neglected promise was fulfilled. Will you make me some amends
for the affectionate concern I suffered for the diminution of your
glory in that business by expediting now a pension eagerly but
ineffectively solicited by many great people, as I am told, for a most
deserving woman, the widow of Mr. Green, the consul at Nice?...
Deserve and receive a kind and constant remembrance in the
benedictions of a recluse who has still the ambition to live in your
regard by the good which he would excite you to perform. At all
events forgive this very unexpected intrusion and importunity from
the old and long sequestered admirer of your youth,
W. Hayley.
Hayley's letter is a trifle too presumptuous in tone even for an old friend;
but it affords one more proof of Pitt's neglect of literary men, though it is
but fair to remember that in 1793–4 he was hard pressed by the outbreak of
war with France and the struggle to keep the Allies together. Still, the
greatest of statesmen is he who, in the midst of world politics, neither
limiting his intercourse to a comparatively small coterie:
Felpham, near Chichester, Sept. 9[?].[608]
Dear Pitt,
Why are you slow in doing the little good in your power? Yes: great
as you are, the real good you can do must be little; but that little I
once believed you would ever haste to do with a generous eagerness
and enthusiasm, and therefore I used to contemplate your character
with an enthusiastic affection. That character, high as it was, sunk in
my estimation from the calamitous delay concerning the promised
pension of Cowper, a delay which allowed that dear and now
released sufferer to sink into utter and useless distraction before the
neglected promise was fulfilled. Will you make me some amends
for the affectionate concern I suffered for the diminution of your
glory in that business by expediting now a pension eagerly but
ineffectively solicited by many great people, as I am told, for a most
deserving woman, the widow of Mr. Green, the consul at Nice?...
Deserve and receive a kind and constant remembrance in the
benedictions of a recluse who has still the ambition to live in your
regard by the good which he would excite you to perform. At all
events forgive this very unexpected intrusion and importunity from
the old and long sequestered admirer of your youth,
W. Hayley.
Hayley's letter is a trifle too presumptuous in tone even for an old friend;
but it affords one more proof of Pitt's neglect of literary men, though it is
but fair to remember that in 1793–4 he was hard pressed by the outbreak of
war with France and the struggle to keep the Allies together. Still, the
greatest of statesmen is he who, in the midst of world politics, neither
Page 499
neglects old friends, nor forgets the claims of literature and art. In this
connection it is painful to add that he allowed the yearly stipend of the
King's Painter, Sir Joshua Reynolds, to be reduced from £200 to £50. On
Reynolds soliciting the secretaryship to the Order of the Bath, he was told
that it had been promised to an official of the Treasury. Another request,
proffered through his patron, the Duke of Rutland, also proved fruitless, and
he had reason to write with some bitterness—"Mr. Pitt, I fear, has not much
attention to the arts."[609] His neglect of literature and the arts was the more
unfortunate because George III and his sons did not raise the tone of the
Court in this respect, witness the remark of the King to Gibbon at a State
function. "Well, Mr. Gibbon, it's always scribble, scribble, I suppose."[610]
Apart from these obvious limitations in Pitt's nature, there was a wealth of
noble qualities, which ensured life-long devotion from those who
penetrated the protective crust and came to know, not the statesman, but the
man. In him the qualities that command respect and excite affection were
happily balanced. To a manly courage which never quailed in the hour of
disaster, and a good sense that provided sage counsels alike in private and
public affairs, he added the tenderer gifts. His affection once given was not
lightly withdrawn. He looked always on the best side of men, and to that
noble failing, if failing it be, most of his blunders may be ascribed. Even
when his confidence was abused, he was loth to take revenge, so that
Canning expressed regret at his reluctance to punish those who betrayed
him.[611] Such a man will often make mistakes, but he will also inspire the
devotion that serves to repair them. Moreover, even his opponents were
forced to admit the conscientiousness of his conduct. On this topic the
testimony of his friend Wilberforce is of value; for they had differed sharply
as to the rupture with France in 1793; and, somewhat later, Wilberforce
lamented the relaxation of Pitt's efforts against the Slave Trade. Yet their
differences did not end their friendship; on 30th November 1797 the
connection it is painful to add that he allowed the yearly stipend of the
King's Painter, Sir Joshua Reynolds, to be reduced from £200 to £50. On
Reynolds soliciting the secretaryship to the Order of the Bath, he was told
that it had been promised to an official of the Treasury. Another request,
proffered through his patron, the Duke of Rutland, also proved fruitless, and
he had reason to write with some bitterness—"Mr. Pitt, I fear, has not much
attention to the arts."[609] His neglect of literature and the arts was the more
unfortunate because George III and his sons did not raise the tone of the
Court in this respect, witness the remark of the King to Gibbon at a State
function. "Well, Mr. Gibbon, it's always scribble, scribble, I suppose."[610]
Apart from these obvious limitations in Pitt's nature, there was a wealth of
noble qualities, which ensured life-long devotion from those who
penetrated the protective crust and came to know, not the statesman, but the
man. In him the qualities that command respect and excite affection were
happily balanced. To a manly courage which never quailed in the hour of
disaster, and a good sense that provided sage counsels alike in private and
public affairs, he added the tenderer gifts. His affection once given was not
lightly withdrawn. He looked always on the best side of men, and to that
noble failing, if failing it be, most of his blunders may be ascribed. Even
when his confidence was abused, he was loth to take revenge, so that
Canning expressed regret at his reluctance to punish those who betrayed
him.[611] Such a man will often make mistakes, but he will also inspire the
devotion that serves to repair them. Moreover, even his opponents were
forced to admit the conscientiousness of his conduct. On this topic the
testimony of his friend Wilberforce is of value; for they had differed sharply
as to the rupture with France in 1793; and, somewhat later, Wilberforce
lamented the relaxation of Pitt's efforts against the Slave Trade. Yet their
differences did not end their friendship; on 30th November 1797 the
Page 500
philanthropist wrote as follows to Sir Richard Aclom on the subject of the
reformation of morals:
... There is one point only on which I will now declare we perfectly
coincide, I mean, that of a general moral reform being the only real
restorative of the health of our body politic. But I hesitate not to say
that, tho' the Government is in its system and principle too much
(indeed ever so little is, as I think, too much) tainted with
corruption, yet it is more sound than the people at large. You appear
to feel the disposition of the public to yield an implicit assent to
Ministers without stopping to investigate the causes of that
disposition (which are chiefly to be found in the violence of the
Opposition and the established predominance of party). I will
frankly avow no man has lamented this more than myself; I may
indeed say more than this. I have endeavoured both in public and in
private to fight against it. But selfishness has diffused itself thro' the
whole mass of our people, and hinc illae lacrymae. You mistakenly
conceive, as do many others, that I am biassed by personal affection
for Mr. Pitt. When we meet, I will rectify your error on that head....
[612]
Again, on 20th February 1798, Wilberforce wrote to William Smith, an
active Abolitionist and now prominent in the Opposition, deploring the
dilatoriness of Pitt, but maintaining that his patriotism was purer and more
disinterested than that of anyone not under the direct influence of Christian
principles. He adds these words:
reformation of morals:
... There is one point only on which I will now declare we perfectly
coincide, I mean, that of a general moral reform being the only real
restorative of the health of our body politic. But I hesitate not to say
that, tho' the Government is in its system and principle too much
(indeed ever so little is, as I think, too much) tainted with
corruption, yet it is more sound than the people at large. You appear
to feel the disposition of the public to yield an implicit assent to
Ministers without stopping to investigate the causes of that
disposition (which are chiefly to be found in the violence of the
Opposition and the established predominance of party). I will
frankly avow no man has lamented this more than myself; I may
indeed say more than this. I have endeavoured both in public and in
private to fight against it. But selfishness has diffused itself thro' the
whole mass of our people, and hinc illae lacrymae. You mistakenly
conceive, as do many others, that I am biassed by personal affection
for Mr. Pitt. When we meet, I will rectify your error on that head....
[612]
Again, on 20th February 1798, Wilberforce wrote to William Smith, an
active Abolitionist and now prominent in the Opposition, deploring the
dilatoriness of Pitt, but maintaining that his patriotism was purer and more
disinterested than that of anyone not under the direct influence of Christian
principles. He adds these words:
Page 501
I speak not this from the partiality of personal affection. In fact for
several years past there has been so little of the eadem velle et
eadem nolle that our friendship has starved for want of nutriment. I
really love him for his public qualities and his private ones, though
there too he is much misunderstood. But how can I expect that he
should love me much, who have been so long rendering myself in
various ways vexatious to him, and, above all, when, poor fellow, he
never schools his mind by a cessation from political ruminations,
the most blinding, hardening, and souring of all others?[613]
These passages explain why the personality of Pitt attracted all that was
purest and most patriotic in the public life of England. Men might disagree
with particular actions, but they saw in him the saving genius of the State;
and this was the dominant feeling until the year 1801 when events scattered
his following and reduced public life almost to a state of chaos.
His character, then, was strong in the virtues of steadfastness and loyalty, on
which the social gifts can root deeply and bear perennial fruit. Of these he
had rich store. His conversations possessed singular charm; for his
melodious voice, facile fancy, and retentive memory enabled him to adorn
all topics. His favourite themes were the Greek and Latin Classics. The
rooms at Holwood or Walmer were strewn with volumes of his favourite
authors, on whom he delighted to converse at length. Grenville declared to
Wellesley that Pitt was the best classical scholar he had ever met. Yet, with
the delicate tact which bade him enliven, not dominate, the social circle, he
refrained from obtruding those subjects on occasions when they would be
neither known nor appreciated. Equally good was his knowledge of English
literature; so that in the company of kindred spirits, the flow of wit and
learning, imagination and experience, must have rivalled that of the Literary
Club over which Dr. Johnson held sway.
several years past there has been so little of the eadem velle et
eadem nolle that our friendship has starved for want of nutriment. I
really love him for his public qualities and his private ones, though
there too he is much misunderstood. But how can I expect that he
should love me much, who have been so long rendering myself in
various ways vexatious to him, and, above all, when, poor fellow, he
never schools his mind by a cessation from political ruminations,
the most blinding, hardening, and souring of all others?[613]
These passages explain why the personality of Pitt attracted all that was
purest and most patriotic in the public life of England. Men might disagree
with particular actions, but they saw in him the saving genius of the State;
and this was the dominant feeling until the year 1801 when events scattered
his following and reduced public life almost to a state of chaos.
His character, then, was strong in the virtues of steadfastness and loyalty, on
which the social gifts can root deeply and bear perennial fruit. Of these he
had rich store. His conversations possessed singular charm; for his
melodious voice, facile fancy, and retentive memory enabled him to adorn
all topics. His favourite themes were the Greek and Latin Classics. The
rooms at Holwood or Walmer were strewn with volumes of his favourite
authors, on whom he delighted to converse at length. Grenville declared to
Wellesley that Pitt was the best classical scholar he had ever met. Yet, with
the delicate tact which bade him enliven, not dominate, the social circle, he
refrained from obtruding those subjects on occasions when they would be
neither known nor appreciated. Equally good was his knowledge of English
literature; so that in the company of kindred spirits, the flow of wit and
learning, imagination and experience, must have rivalled that of the Literary
Club over which Dr. Johnson held sway.
Page 502
Unfortunately, only the merest scraps survive; but the testimony of Pitt's
friends suffices to refute the Whig legend as to his cold and calculating
selfishness, which filled even the hours of leisure with schemes for making
himself necessary to the King and country.[614] On the contrary, he was fond
of society, throwing himself so heartily into the conversation that the savant
was merged in the wit, the Prime Minister in the genial companion. His
jests were of that Attic flavour which seasons without stinging; and this was
the outcome, not of calculation, but of a kindly disposition, which delighted
to throw off political cares amidst the tide of mirth which he helped to carry
to the full. He also felt increasingly the charms of country life, and at
Holwood was never more happy than when labouring along with his
gardeners in the effort to enhance the beauty of his grounds. This strenuous
work, together with horse exercise and occasional bursts with the West Kent
or Dover hunt, provided the recreation which enabled his naturally weak
and gout-ridden frame to withstand the wear and tear of official life up to
his forty-seventh year.
In town he delighted to visit friends in an informal manner, and was never
more pleased than when he could have games with children. His romp with
young Napier and the two Stanhopes when they succeeded in corking his
face, has been already described; but it appears that even in 1805, when
beset by manifold cares, he often dropped in at Broom House, Parson's
Green, the residence of Sir Evan Nepean, and would "take a chair in a
corner, and, laying aside state and gravity, would gambol and play with the
boys."[615] At times his repartees were piquant. When his friend and
admirer, the Duchess of Gordon, who had not seen him for some time, met
him at the levée and asked whether he talked as much nonsense as of yore,
he laughingly replied: "I do not know whether I talk so much nonsense:
certainly I do not hear so much."[616]
friends suffices to refute the Whig legend as to his cold and calculating
selfishness, which filled even the hours of leisure with schemes for making
himself necessary to the King and country.[614] On the contrary, he was fond
of society, throwing himself so heartily into the conversation that the savant
was merged in the wit, the Prime Minister in the genial companion. His
jests were of that Attic flavour which seasons without stinging; and this was
the outcome, not of calculation, but of a kindly disposition, which delighted
to throw off political cares amidst the tide of mirth which he helped to carry
to the full. He also felt increasingly the charms of country life, and at
Holwood was never more happy than when labouring along with his
gardeners in the effort to enhance the beauty of his grounds. This strenuous
work, together with horse exercise and occasional bursts with the West Kent
or Dover hunt, provided the recreation which enabled his naturally weak
and gout-ridden frame to withstand the wear and tear of official life up to
his forty-seventh year.
In town he delighted to visit friends in an informal manner, and was never
more pleased than when he could have games with children. His romp with
young Napier and the two Stanhopes when they succeeded in corking his
face, has been already described; but it appears that even in 1805, when
beset by manifold cares, he often dropped in at Broom House, Parson's
Green, the residence of Sir Evan Nepean, and would "take a chair in a
corner, and, laying aside state and gravity, would gambol and play with the
boys."[615] At times his repartees were piquant. When his friend and
admirer, the Duchess of Gordon, who had not seen him for some time, met
him at the levée and asked whether he talked as much nonsense as of yore,
he laughingly replied: "I do not know whether I talk so much nonsense:
certainly I do not hear so much."[616]
Page 503
Is it surprising that a character so benevolent, and social gifts of so much
charm, should attract men about him? Of those who came forward to fill the
gaps of the circle, only two, Wellesley and Canning, were men of powers so
exceptional as to claim more than passing notice. Though descended from
families domiciled in Ireland, they differed widely, except in versatility and
devotion to Pitt. Wellesley's nature was Saxon in its inner hardness. Like his
younger brother, the future Duke of Wellington, he rarely displayed signs of
emotion; but his temperament, though cold at the heart, thrilled at the
approach of great and perilous enterprises, amidst which he rivalled his
brother in activity and resourcefulness. Accordingly, his Viceroyalty of
India moved Bonaparte to envy, patriotic Britons to rapturous applause, and
the parsimonious Directors of the Company to carping criticisms. Those
who deny to Pitt the gift of choosing able and inspiring men, forget that he
made Wellesley Governor-General of India, and supported him in his
quarrels with the India House. As Earl of Mornington, Wellesley had helped
the Irish Administration in various ways, and became closely acquainted
with the Grenvilles. His first letter to Pitt, dated Dublin, January 1785,
expresses thanks for assistance and for the offer of support in case the
annoyances of his situation drove him to England. Thus, Mornington was
first attracted to Pitt by his loyalty to subordinates; and, later, after his
return to England, respect for the Minister ripened into admiration and love
of the man.
They had much in common. Manly in bearing, persistent of purpose, and
prompt in decision, they were also richly dowered with social gifts. Like
Pitt, Mornington had classical attainments and literary gifts of no mean
order; and his high spirits and powers of repartee must have brought new
energy to the jaded statesman. Entering Parliament as member for Windsor,
he found his duties far from congenial. On some occasions nervousness
marred the effect of his speeches; and his constituents involved him in so
much expense and worry as to prompt a request, in the autumn of 1794, for
charm, should attract men about him? Of those who came forward to fill the
gaps of the circle, only two, Wellesley and Canning, were men of powers so
exceptional as to claim more than passing notice. Though descended from
families domiciled in Ireland, they differed widely, except in versatility and
devotion to Pitt. Wellesley's nature was Saxon in its inner hardness. Like his
younger brother, the future Duke of Wellington, he rarely displayed signs of
emotion; but his temperament, though cold at the heart, thrilled at the
approach of great and perilous enterprises, amidst which he rivalled his
brother in activity and resourcefulness. Accordingly, his Viceroyalty of
India moved Bonaparte to envy, patriotic Britons to rapturous applause, and
the parsimonious Directors of the Company to carping criticisms. Those
who deny to Pitt the gift of choosing able and inspiring men, forget that he
made Wellesley Governor-General of India, and supported him in his
quarrels with the India House. As Earl of Mornington, Wellesley had helped
the Irish Administration in various ways, and became closely acquainted
with the Grenvilles. His first letter to Pitt, dated Dublin, January 1785,
expresses thanks for assistance and for the offer of support in case the
annoyances of his situation drove him to England. Thus, Mornington was
first attracted to Pitt by his loyalty to subordinates; and, later, after his
return to England, respect for the Minister ripened into admiration and love
of the man.
They had much in common. Manly in bearing, persistent of purpose, and
prompt in decision, they were also richly dowered with social gifts. Like
Pitt, Mornington had classical attainments and literary gifts of no mean
order; and his high spirits and powers of repartee must have brought new
energy to the jaded statesman. Entering Parliament as member for Windsor,
he found his duties far from congenial. On some occasions nervousness
marred the effect of his speeches; and his constituents involved him in so
much expense and worry as to prompt a request, in the autumn of 1794, for
Page 504
the intervention of Pitt, seeing that his rival, Isherwood, had "the means of
supplying the rapacity even of the electors of Windsor." On 4th October he
thanked Pitt for relieving him from further obligations to "the worthy
electors of that loyal borough"; but he continued for a time to sit in
Parliament. Meanwhile his fine presence and lively converse brought him
into favour with the Prince of Wales. On 4th August 1793, writing at
Brighthelmstone, he heartily congratulated Pitt on the surrender of
Valenciennes, which sanguine persons hoped might hasten the end of the
war. But, he added, "I own my most sanguine expectations cannot reach the
notion of our being able to bring down the power of France in one
campaign to the level to which I think it must be reduced for our safety and
for that of the rest of the world. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales has been
pleased to be most gracious to me.... I suppose you have heard of his dinner
on the capture of Valenciennes. We sat from five till half-past ten, and many
were very drunk, particularly H.R.H. He really did the honours most
admirably...." In the next letter, of the early part of August 1796,
Mornington sends a quatrain of Latin Elegiacs which he had composed at
Dundas's house, on the exploits of Wurmser in relieving Mantua, of
Davidovitch at Roveredo, and Quosdanovitch at Brescia (not Verona),
which seemed to presage the ruin of Bonaparte.
Mantua Vurmisero gaudet, Rovereda Davido,
Et Verona tibi, Quosdanovice, patet.
Vae mihi (raptor ait Gallus) ne forte per Alpes
Heu! Bona pars in rem cogar abire malam.[617]
For some time Mornington had felt the charm of Indian history; and the
blend of energy with romance in his being may have prompted Pitt's
selection of him as Viceroy in 1797. After a most tedious voyage he reached
the Hooghly in time to foil the blow which Tippoo Sahib, Bonaparte's
prospective ally, aimed at Madras. In his letter to Pitt, written there on 20th
supplying the rapacity even of the electors of Windsor." On 4th October he
thanked Pitt for relieving him from further obligations to "the worthy
electors of that loyal borough"; but he continued for a time to sit in
Parliament. Meanwhile his fine presence and lively converse brought him
into favour with the Prince of Wales. On 4th August 1793, writing at
Brighthelmstone, he heartily congratulated Pitt on the surrender of
Valenciennes, which sanguine persons hoped might hasten the end of the
war. But, he added, "I own my most sanguine expectations cannot reach the
notion of our being able to bring down the power of France in one
campaign to the level to which I think it must be reduced for our safety and
for that of the rest of the world. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales has been
pleased to be most gracious to me.... I suppose you have heard of his dinner
on the capture of Valenciennes. We sat from five till half-past ten, and many
were very drunk, particularly H.R.H. He really did the honours most
admirably...." In the next letter, of the early part of August 1796,
Mornington sends a quatrain of Latin Elegiacs which he had composed at
Dundas's house, on the exploits of Wurmser in relieving Mantua, of
Davidovitch at Roveredo, and Quosdanovitch at Brescia (not Verona),
which seemed to presage the ruin of Bonaparte.
Mantua Vurmisero gaudet, Rovereda Davido,
Et Verona tibi, Quosdanovice, patet.
Vae mihi (raptor ait Gallus) ne forte per Alpes
Heu! Bona pars in rem cogar abire malam.[617]
For some time Mornington had felt the charm of Indian history; and the
blend of energy with romance in his being may have prompted Pitt's
selection of him as Viceroy in 1797. After a most tedious voyage he reached
the Hooghly in time to foil the blow which Tippoo Sahib, Bonaparte's
prospective ally, aimed at Madras. In his letter to Pitt, written there on 20th
Page 505
April 1799, he expressed a hope of the capture of Seringapatam, and
continues thus: "I assure you that my nerves are much strengthened by all
the exertions which I have been obliged to make, and in this land of
indolence I pass for rather an active, stout, hardy fellow and can now fast
till four o'clock (save only a bit of biscuit and a glass of port). I am happy to
hear that you are better than you have ever been in your life. There is no
comfort in mine but the distant hope of seeing you all again safe, well, and
quizzing in England. I have only one request to make to you if you do not
mean to abridge either my doleful days or the period of my Government—
do not suffer that cantancerous [sic] fellow, Sir J[ames] Craig, to be made
commander-in-chief in Bengal. Send me a sober discreet decent man, but
do not allow the etiquette of throwing inkstands to be revived at the Council
Board."[618]
On 12th May, after announcing to Pitt the capture of Seringapatam,
Mornington adds: "If Buonaparte should now chuse to visit Malabar, I think
he will find supper prepared for him before he has reached Calcutta."
Reviewing the events of his Viceroyalty he writes on 8th August: "I suppose
you will either hang me or magnificently honour me for my deeds (mine
they are, be they good or bad). In either case I shall be gratified; for an
English gallows is better than an Indian throne; but these words must be
buried in your own breast; for here I pretend to be very happy and humble;
although I am as proud as the D. and as wretched as his dam. I think you
will enjoy 'Le Citoïen Tipou' and 'Citoïen Sultan' in the papers found at
Seringapatam. I admire your conduct with respect to the Union [with
Ireland]. I hope you will persevere, but I trust you will not trust Ireland to
my old friend Hobart. He used to be a good humoured fellow; but from
what I have heard of his reign here, he is utterly unfit to govern anywhere."
[619]
continues thus: "I assure you that my nerves are much strengthened by all
the exertions which I have been obliged to make, and in this land of
indolence I pass for rather an active, stout, hardy fellow and can now fast
till four o'clock (save only a bit of biscuit and a glass of port). I am happy to
hear that you are better than you have ever been in your life. There is no
comfort in mine but the distant hope of seeing you all again safe, well, and
quizzing in England. I have only one request to make to you if you do not
mean to abridge either my doleful days or the period of my Government—
do not suffer that cantancerous [sic] fellow, Sir J[ames] Craig, to be made
commander-in-chief in Bengal. Send me a sober discreet decent man, but
do not allow the etiquette of throwing inkstands to be revived at the Council
Board."[618]
On 12th May, after announcing to Pitt the capture of Seringapatam,
Mornington adds: "If Buonaparte should now chuse to visit Malabar, I think
he will find supper prepared for him before he has reached Calcutta."
Reviewing the events of his Viceroyalty he writes on 8th August: "I suppose
you will either hang me or magnificently honour me for my deeds (mine
they are, be they good or bad). In either case I shall be gratified; for an
English gallows is better than an Indian throne; but these words must be
buried in your own breast; for here I pretend to be very happy and humble;
although I am as proud as the D. and as wretched as his dam. I think you
will enjoy 'Le Citoïen Tipou' and 'Citoïen Sultan' in the papers found at
Seringapatam. I admire your conduct with respect to the Union [with
Ireland]. I hope you will persevere, but I trust you will not trust Ireland to
my old friend Hobart. He used to be a good humoured fellow; but from
what I have heard of his reign here, he is utterly unfit to govern anywhere."
[619]
Page 506
Pitt did not receive this letter by 6th November, when he informed
Wellesley that the King, as a mark of high approbation, conferred on him
the title the Marquis Wellesley, suitable arrangements being also in
contemplation for his family. An Irish marquisate was far from the
magnificent reward which the Viceroy desired; and on 28th April 1800 he
expressed his anguish of mind at receiving only an Irish and pinchbeck
reward for exploits neither Irish nor pinchbeck. Nevertheless, while
requesting a speedy recall so that he might hide his chagrin in retirement, he
uttered no vindictive word against Pitt. Despite its morbid expressions, the
letter is that of a friend to a friend. On 27th September Pitt wrote in reply
one of the longest of his private letters. With equal tact and frankness he
reviewed the whole question, proving that Wellesley's services were not
undervalued, that the bestowal of an English marquisate would have been
an advance of four steps in the peerage for what was after all a short
Viceroyalty; and that the present honour equalled that conferred on
Cornwallis at the end of his term. The question was whether Wellesley
should receive an English earldom or an Irish marquisate; and the latter was
deemed preferable. Further, if the notion prevailed at Calcutta that
Wellesley had been slighted, it might be due to a suspicion that he himself
harboured it. Pitt then begged Wellesley to regard this frankness as the best
proof of real friendship.[620]
Wellesley showed his good sense by acquiescing, and their letters though
rare, became thoroughly cordial. Writing at Patna on 6th October 1801, he
gently reproached Pitt for his long silence, especially for not explaining the
reason of his resignation; he also expressed the hope that he approved his
remaining at Calcutta until a successor was appointed. He added that his
state progress up the Ganges to Patna had been favoured by an easterly gale
of unusual strength which the natives ascribed either to his happy star or to
an Order in Council. As for his health, it was better than in "the reeking
House of Commons." Again at the beginning of 1804 he expressed regret
Wellesley that the King, as a mark of high approbation, conferred on him
the title the Marquis Wellesley, suitable arrangements being also in
contemplation for his family. An Irish marquisate was far from the
magnificent reward which the Viceroy desired; and on 28th April 1800 he
expressed his anguish of mind at receiving only an Irish and pinchbeck
reward for exploits neither Irish nor pinchbeck. Nevertheless, while
requesting a speedy recall so that he might hide his chagrin in retirement, he
uttered no vindictive word against Pitt. Despite its morbid expressions, the
letter is that of a friend to a friend. On 27th September Pitt wrote in reply
one of the longest of his private letters. With equal tact and frankness he
reviewed the whole question, proving that Wellesley's services were not
undervalued, that the bestowal of an English marquisate would have been
an advance of four steps in the peerage for what was after all a short
Viceroyalty; and that the present honour equalled that conferred on
Cornwallis at the end of his term. The question was whether Wellesley
should receive an English earldom or an Irish marquisate; and the latter was
deemed preferable. Further, if the notion prevailed at Calcutta that
Wellesley had been slighted, it might be due to a suspicion that he himself
harboured it. Pitt then begged Wellesley to regard this frankness as the best
proof of real friendship.[620]
Wellesley showed his good sense by acquiescing, and their letters though
rare, became thoroughly cordial. Writing at Patna on 6th October 1801, he
gently reproached Pitt for his long silence, especially for not explaining the
reason of his resignation; he also expressed the hope that he approved his
remaining at Calcutta until a successor was appointed. He added that his
state progress up the Ganges to Patna had been favoured by an easterly gale
of unusual strength which the natives ascribed either to his happy star or to
an Order in Council. As for his health, it was better than in "the reeking
House of Commons." Again at the beginning of 1804 he expressed regret
Page 507
that Pitt had neither written nor vouchsafed any sign of approbation at
recent events, including the victory of Assaye, which assured British
ascendancy in the East.
At last, on 30th August 1804, three months after resuming office, Pitt
apologized for his neglect on the ground of excess of work in preparing to
meet a French invasion, in which he had so far succeeded as to hope that
the attempt might be made. At that time he expected Wellesley to come
home in order to escape the petty cabals of the Company's Directors; but he
left the decision entirely to him. Pitt's next letter, at Christmastide, breathes
a profound hope for Wellesley's speedy arrival as a means of lightening the
then heavy burden of political life. Wellesley, however, on 25th March
1805, announced his chivalrous resolve to remain in India another season
owing to financial troubles and disputes with the Company. To Dundas, in
May 1805, he wrote: "I imagined myself to be one of the best friends of the
Company, but I hear that I am a traitor, and a conspirator, and an interloper.
Time discovers truth, and I must leave the Honourable Courts' opinions to
that test."[621] In August, after transferring his duties to Cornwallis, he set
sail for England, and landed in time to have a few last words with Pitt. The
interview must have been deeply affecting. At its conclusion Pitt fainted
away. Of all the estimates of Pitt none breathes deeper devotion than that of
Wellesley. Was it not because he at last saw the pettiness of his own pride
and petulance when contrasted with the self-abnegation of him who was
truly the Great Commoner? And did not even his meteoric career in the East
pale before the full-orbed splendour of the quarter of a century of
achievement which made up the public life of Pitt?
The other enthusiastic friend was typically Irish in temperament. Celtic in
vivacity and charm, feminine in sensitiveness, Canning was dowered with
virile persistence and pugnacity. In histrionic and versifying power he
rivalled his countryman, Sheridan, who never forgave him for deserting the
recent events, including the victory of Assaye, which assured British
ascendancy in the East.
At last, on 30th August 1804, three months after resuming office, Pitt
apologized for his neglect on the ground of excess of work in preparing to
meet a French invasion, in which he had so far succeeded as to hope that
the attempt might be made. At that time he expected Wellesley to come
home in order to escape the petty cabals of the Company's Directors; but he
left the decision entirely to him. Pitt's next letter, at Christmastide, breathes
a profound hope for Wellesley's speedy arrival as a means of lightening the
then heavy burden of political life. Wellesley, however, on 25th March
1805, announced his chivalrous resolve to remain in India another season
owing to financial troubles and disputes with the Company. To Dundas, in
May 1805, he wrote: "I imagined myself to be one of the best friends of the
Company, but I hear that I am a traitor, and a conspirator, and an interloper.
Time discovers truth, and I must leave the Honourable Courts' opinions to
that test."[621] In August, after transferring his duties to Cornwallis, he set
sail for England, and landed in time to have a few last words with Pitt. The
interview must have been deeply affecting. At its conclusion Pitt fainted
away. Of all the estimates of Pitt none breathes deeper devotion than that of
Wellesley. Was it not because he at last saw the pettiness of his own pride
and petulance when contrasted with the self-abnegation of him who was
truly the Great Commoner? And did not even his meteoric career in the East
pale before the full-orbed splendour of the quarter of a century of
achievement which made up the public life of Pitt?
The other enthusiastic friend was typically Irish in temperament. Celtic in
vivacity and charm, feminine in sensitiveness, Canning was dowered with
virile persistence and pugnacity. In histrionic and versifying power he
rivalled his countryman, Sheridan, who never forgave him for deserting the
Page 508
Whigs and going over to Pitt. The loss was indeed serious; for the young
orator was far more than a frondeur. As editor of the "Anti-Jacobin,"
conjointly with Hookham Frere, he covered with ridicule the detractors of
their country, and helped on the revival of national spirit which began in
1798. But he also possessed great administrative talents, displaying as
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs an insight into character in which his
chief, Grenville, was signally lacking. Canning's letters to Pitt on the
negotiation at Lille in 1797 show signs of those inductive powers which
appear at their zenith in his brilliantly correct inference ten years later that
the Danish fleet must be snatched from the clutch of Napoleon.
The statuesque calm of Pitt's personality charmed and overawed this
impressionable Irishman from the time of their first interview in the
summer of 1792. Always versatile and sometimes shifty, he seems
instinctively to have felt in him the needed counterpart. As the Czar
Alexander leaned on the rock-like Stein in the crisis of 1812, so Canning
gained strength and confidence from reliance on Pitt. He on his side took a
keen interest in his disciple, discerning in him the propagator of the Pitt
doctrine and tradition. At times the fostering care became fatherly. A case in
point was Canning's marriage with a wealthy Scottish heiress (July 1800).
Pitt regarded this event as essential to his success as the future leader of the
party. Indeed, so absorbed was he in his own thoughts during the ride to the
church as not to notice a pert remark of Canning's friend, Hookham Frere.
The clergyman, Frere, and he were in a coach driving along Swallow Street
towards Brook Street when a carter who saw them called out: "What! Billy
Pitt! and with a parson too!" Thereupon Frere burst out with the daring jest,
"He thinks you are going to Tyburn to be hanged privately!" But Pitt was
too pre-occupied to notice the gibe. Again, after the ceremony, in the vestry
Pitt was so nervous as to be unable to sign as a witness, and Canning had to
whisper to Frere to sign without waiting for him.[622] They ascribed his
strange inaction to extreme regard for Canning. But surely another
orator was far more than a frondeur. As editor of the "Anti-Jacobin,"
conjointly with Hookham Frere, he covered with ridicule the detractors of
their country, and helped on the revival of national spirit which began in
1798. But he also possessed great administrative talents, displaying as
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs an insight into character in which his
chief, Grenville, was signally lacking. Canning's letters to Pitt on the
negotiation at Lille in 1797 show signs of those inductive powers which
appear at their zenith in his brilliantly correct inference ten years later that
the Danish fleet must be snatched from the clutch of Napoleon.
The statuesque calm of Pitt's personality charmed and overawed this
impressionable Irishman from the time of their first interview in the
summer of 1792. Always versatile and sometimes shifty, he seems
instinctively to have felt in him the needed counterpart. As the Czar
Alexander leaned on the rock-like Stein in the crisis of 1812, so Canning
gained strength and confidence from reliance on Pitt. He on his side took a
keen interest in his disciple, discerning in him the propagator of the Pitt
doctrine and tradition. At times the fostering care became fatherly. A case in
point was Canning's marriage with a wealthy Scottish heiress (July 1800).
Pitt regarded this event as essential to his success as the future leader of the
party. Indeed, so absorbed was he in his own thoughts during the ride to the
church as not to notice a pert remark of Canning's friend, Hookham Frere.
The clergyman, Frere, and he were in a coach driving along Swallow Street
towards Brook Street when a carter who saw them called out: "What! Billy
Pitt! and with a parson too!" Thereupon Frere burst out with the daring jest,
"He thinks you are going to Tyburn to be hanged privately!" But Pitt was
too pre-occupied to notice the gibe. Again, after the ceremony, in the vestry
Pitt was so nervous as to be unable to sign as a witness, and Canning had to
whisper to Frere to sign without waiting for him.[622] They ascribed his
strange inaction to extreme regard for Canning. But surely another
Page 509
explanation is more natural. How could a man of keenly affectionate nature
share in that ceremony without feeling deeply his own lonely lot? Three and
a half years ago poverty and debt had stepped in to part him and Eleanor
Eden. Was it not the wraith of his buried love which now hovered before
him, blotting out the sight of the carter, deafening his ears to the jest, and
palsying his hand?
Pitt's resignation of office sorely tried his friends; for, without informing
them of the inmost reasons that prompted that step, he pressed them to
remain in office under his successor, Addington. As we have seen, some of
them refused. Of those not holding Cabinet appointments, Rose and Long,
joint Secretaries of the Treasury, Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, a Lord of
the Treasury, and Canning, joint Paymaster of the Forces, decided to resign.
Pitt's silence and his urgent requests to his friends to remain in office were
of course open to misconstruction; and several of his supporters echoed the
malicious assertion of Frere, that his aim was for Addington to take office
as a locum tenens, and sign a discreditable peace, whereupon he (Pitt)
would come back to power and find his former supporters in their old
places. Malmesbury gave colour to the story by stating that Addington
described himself as locum tenens, a remark utterly inconsistent with all
that is known of his complacent pride. Nevertheless the slander gained
general currency, and, even now, despite convincing refutation, dies hard.
That Canning and others resented Pitt's silence and his pressure to remain in
office is undeniable; but, while saying nothing as to the cause of his own
conduct, he explained clearly to Canning that, as a friend, he was gratified
by his conduct in resigning, however much he deplored his action on public
share in that ceremony without feeling deeply his own lonely lot? Three and
a half years ago poverty and debt had stepped in to part him and Eleanor
Eden. Was it not the wraith of his buried love which now hovered before
him, blotting out the sight of the carter, deafening his ears to the jest, and
palsying his hand?
Pitt's resignation of office sorely tried his friends; for, without informing
them of the inmost reasons that prompted that step, he pressed them to
remain in office under his successor, Addington. As we have seen, some of
them refused. Of those not holding Cabinet appointments, Rose and Long,
joint Secretaries of the Treasury, Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, a Lord of
the Treasury, and Canning, joint Paymaster of the Forces, decided to resign.
Pitt's silence and his urgent requests to his friends to remain in office were
of course open to misconstruction; and several of his supporters echoed the
malicious assertion of Frere, that his aim was for Addington to take office
as a locum tenens, and sign a discreditable peace, whereupon he (Pitt)
would come back to power and find his former supporters in their old
places. Malmesbury gave colour to the story by stating that Addington
described himself as locum tenens, a remark utterly inconsistent with all
that is known of his complacent pride. Nevertheless the slander gained
general currency, and, even now, despite convincing refutation, dies hard.
That Canning and others resented Pitt's silence and his pressure to remain in
office is undeniable; but, while saying nothing as to the cause of his own
conduct, he explained clearly to Canning that, as a friend, he was gratified
by his conduct in resigning, however much he deplored his action on public
Page 510
grounds. Of course the tu quoque retort was inevitable; but Canning's
curiosity was not gratified.[623]
For a time he talked of breaking with Pitt, and sent him a copy of a letter to
Frere couched in those terms. Pitt replied calmly on 26th April 1801 that on
reviewing his conduct he found it neither unkind nor unfair. While
lamenting that Canning should thus have misunderstood his conduct, he
expressed a resolve to forget the incident and a hope that their friendship
might endure. Serenity such as this is the best cure to Celtic susceptibility.
But other grievances were discovered, and on 12th July Canning dashed off
to Frere a furious missive full of dashes and underlinings, charging Pitt with
showing to him "confidence just enough to mislead and not enough to
guide"; on which promising theme he fired off clause upon clause of an
incoherent sentence which fills thirty-five lines of print and then expires in
a dash. What it was all about is far from clear, except that Canning believed
Pitt to have done "scrupulously and magnanimously right by everybody but
me."[624] Before long the sensitive youth was moving heaven and earth to
bring back Pitt to power. But, even in December 1803, when his whole soul
was bound up in him, he reproached him with lover-like vehemence for
having inspired a derogatory article in the "Accurate Observer." Apparently
the wounded friend had no proof whatever that Pitt had sped or barbed the
shaft.
Among those who won Pitt's confidence in his closing years was Spencer
Perceval, an able young barrister, who entered Parliament in 1796 as
member for Northampton, and showed considerable skill in finance and
debating powers of no mean order. "He spoke (says Sinclair) without the
disagreeable cant of the Bar, was never tedious, was peculiarly distinct in
matters of business, and explained his financial measures with clearness and
ability. His style was singularly acute, bold, sarcastic, and personal." The
same authority avers that Pitt, on being asked—"If we lose you, where
curiosity was not gratified.[623]
For a time he talked of breaking with Pitt, and sent him a copy of a letter to
Frere couched in those terms. Pitt replied calmly on 26th April 1801 that on
reviewing his conduct he found it neither unkind nor unfair. While
lamenting that Canning should thus have misunderstood his conduct, he
expressed a resolve to forget the incident and a hope that their friendship
might endure. Serenity such as this is the best cure to Celtic susceptibility.
But other grievances were discovered, and on 12th July Canning dashed off
to Frere a furious missive full of dashes and underlinings, charging Pitt with
showing to him "confidence just enough to mislead and not enough to
guide"; on which promising theme he fired off clause upon clause of an
incoherent sentence which fills thirty-five lines of print and then expires in
a dash. What it was all about is far from clear, except that Canning believed
Pitt to have done "scrupulously and magnanimously right by everybody but
me."[624] Before long the sensitive youth was moving heaven and earth to
bring back Pitt to power. But, even in December 1803, when his whole soul
was bound up in him, he reproached him with lover-like vehemence for
having inspired a derogatory article in the "Accurate Observer." Apparently
the wounded friend had no proof whatever that Pitt had sped or barbed the
shaft.
Among those who won Pitt's confidence in his closing years was Spencer
Perceval, an able young barrister, who entered Parliament in 1796 as
member for Northampton, and showed considerable skill in finance and
debating powers of no mean order. "He spoke (says Sinclair) without the
disagreeable cant of the Bar, was never tedious, was peculiarly distinct in
matters of business, and explained his financial measures with clearness and
ability. His style was singularly acute, bold, sarcastic, and personal." The
same authority avers that Pitt, on being asked—"If we lose you, where
Page 511
could we find a successor?"—answered at once, "Perceval." The reply is
remarkable; for Perceval, besides opposing Catholic Emancipation,
displayed little tact in dealing with men and a strangely narrow outlook.
Probably it was his power of hard work, his grasp of finance, and his
resolute disposition which led Pitt to prefer him to Canning, who in other
respects was far better qualified to act as leader.
I must here notice charges which have been brought against Pitt, that his
creations of peers, or promotions in the peerage, which by the year 1801
exceeded 140, were fraught with evil to the Upper House, lowering the
intellectual level of its debates, and impairing the balance of parties, with
results damaging to the constitution.[625] It has even been suggested that the
friction between the two Houses in the years 1830–1911 resulted in no
small degree from the reckless conduct of Pitt in this respect. Vague and
sweeping assertions like these can neither be substantiated nor refuted. But
the only definite part of them, namely, that Pitt's creations degraded the
House of Lords, is obviously overstrained. At no period was the tone of its
debates higher than in that of Pitt's supremacy, witness those on Warren
Hastings, the disputes with Spain and Russia, and the Great War. They have
not the brilliance of those of the Commons in the days of Burke, Fox, Pitt
and Sheridan; but they often excel them in statesmanlike qualities; and a
perusal of them reveals the fact that the ablest of the Lords were, not those
of the old governing families, which at that period showed signs of
decadence, but those for whose creation Pitt was mainly responsible.
Malmesbury, Buckingham, Grenville, Auckland, Carrington, Minto, and at
a later period, Sidmouth and Castlereagh, excelled in ability and weight the
representatives of the older nobility. Far from degrading and weakening the
peerage, Pitt strengthened it by an infusion of new blood which was sorely
needed at that time of strain and stress. Further, it must be remembered that
Burke's Economy Bill had abolished many of the sinecures which were
considered due for steady support in Parliament; and, while at Bath in the
remarkable; for Perceval, besides opposing Catholic Emancipation,
displayed little tact in dealing with men and a strangely narrow outlook.
Probably it was his power of hard work, his grasp of finance, and his
resolute disposition which led Pitt to prefer him to Canning, who in other
respects was far better qualified to act as leader.
I must here notice charges which have been brought against Pitt, that his
creations of peers, or promotions in the peerage, which by the year 1801
exceeded 140, were fraught with evil to the Upper House, lowering the
intellectual level of its debates, and impairing the balance of parties, with
results damaging to the constitution.[625] It has even been suggested that the
friction between the two Houses in the years 1830–1911 resulted in no
small degree from the reckless conduct of Pitt in this respect. Vague and
sweeping assertions like these can neither be substantiated nor refuted. But
the only definite part of them, namely, that Pitt's creations degraded the
House of Lords, is obviously overstrained. At no period was the tone of its
debates higher than in that of Pitt's supremacy, witness those on Warren
Hastings, the disputes with Spain and Russia, and the Great War. They have
not the brilliance of those of the Commons in the days of Burke, Fox, Pitt
and Sheridan; but they often excel them in statesmanlike qualities; and a
perusal of them reveals the fact that the ablest of the Lords were, not those
of the old governing families, which at that period showed signs of
decadence, but those for whose creation Pitt was mainly responsible.
Malmesbury, Buckingham, Grenville, Auckland, Carrington, Minto, and at
a later period, Sidmouth and Castlereagh, excelled in ability and weight the
representatives of the older nobility. Far from degrading and weakening the
peerage, Pitt strengthened it by an infusion of new blood which was sorely
needed at that time of strain and stress. Further, it must be remembered that
Burke's Economy Bill had abolished many of the sinecures which were
considered due for steady support in Parliament; and, while at Bath in the
Page 512
year 1797, he admitted that his reform was accountable for the large
increase of peerages, thenceforth the chief hope of the faithful.[626] Pitt's
correspondence also shows that he frequently repulsed the insistent claims
of his supporters for titles, a theme on which piquant letters might be
adduced.
Surely, too, it is unjust to say that Pitt entirely altered the political
complexion of the Upper House. During the greater part of his career the
so-called political differences were based mainly on personal
considerations; and throughout the struggle against France, Whigs and
Tories, with the exception of a small coterie, were merged in the national
party which recognized in Pitt the saviour of British institutions. The charge
that he was largely responsible for the friction between the two Houses after
1830 needs little notice; for that friction was clearly due to the progress of
democratic principles and the growth of an enormous industrial community
in these islands. Both of those developments told strongly against the parity
of political influence of the two Houses of Parliament. Amidst the torpor of
the previous age the prerogatives of the Peers had gone unchallenged. After
the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution a challenge was certain
to come; and in this, as in many other respects, the conduct of Pitt was such
as to strengthen our institutions. By adding to the House of Lords a
considerable number of commoners he enabled it to withstand the storms of
the Revolutionary age and the inevitable conflicts of the future.
To revert to the year 1801, there occurred early in the autumn an event of
high import. The struggle of eight years between Great Britain and France
ended in stalemate. The collapse of the Armed Neutrality League together
increase of peerages, thenceforth the chief hope of the faithful.[626] Pitt's
correspondence also shows that he frequently repulsed the insistent claims
of his supporters for titles, a theme on which piquant letters might be
adduced.
Surely, too, it is unjust to say that Pitt entirely altered the political
complexion of the Upper House. During the greater part of his career the
so-called political differences were based mainly on personal
considerations; and throughout the struggle against France, Whigs and
Tories, with the exception of a small coterie, were merged in the national
party which recognized in Pitt the saviour of British institutions. The charge
that he was largely responsible for the friction between the two Houses after
1830 needs little notice; for that friction was clearly due to the progress of
democratic principles and the growth of an enormous industrial community
in these islands. Both of those developments told strongly against the parity
of political influence of the two Houses of Parliament. Amidst the torpor of
the previous age the prerogatives of the Peers had gone unchallenged. After
the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution a challenge was certain
to come; and in this, as in many other respects, the conduct of Pitt was such
as to strengthen our institutions. By adding to the House of Lords a
considerable number of commoners he enabled it to withstand the storms of
the Revolutionary age and the inevitable conflicts of the future.
To revert to the year 1801, there occurred early in the autumn an event of
high import. The struggle of eight years between Great Britain and France
ended in stalemate. The collapse of the Armed Neutrality League together
Page 513
with the capture of Malta and the surrender of the French garrisons in Egypt
left the Union Jack triumphant at sea and the tricolour on the Continent.
Each State had need of rest to restore its finances and consolidate its
conquests. Therefore, though Bonaparte had at the end of March 1801
sharply repelled the pacific overtures of the Addington Cabinet, yet
negotiations were resumed at the close of summer, a fact which proves that
the First Consul was influenced, not by spite to Pitt and goodwill to his
successor, but by the constricting grip of the Sea Power. Hawkesbury,
Grenville's successor at the Foreign Office, asserted that shortly before the
end of the negotiation Pitt sat up with him through part of a night discussing
finance, and finally advising the cessation of hostilities.
Not that Pitt directed the negotiations; for both Addington and Hawkesbury
were proud and sensitive men, and Pitt at some points criticized the
conditions of the Preliminaries of London (1st October 1801). They were as
follows: Great Britain agreed to restore to France, Spain, and the Batavian,
or Dutch, Republic all their possessions recently conquered by her, with the
exception of Trinidad and Ceylon, ceded to her by Spain and the Dutch
respectively. She also retired from Elba and restored Malta to the Knights of
St. John, under conditions to be further specified. The French restored
Egypt to the Sultan, and evacuated Naples and the Papal States. Portugal
was also saved from danger of partition. Nothing was said respecting the
resumption of trade between England and France; and no assurance was
forthcoming as to the independence of the Republics bordering on France.
By his recent compact with Austria the First Consul agreed to respect their
independence; but England had no definite ground for complaint if it were
violated.
While the London rabble shouted itself hoarse with joy at the advent of
peace, Grenville, Windham, and Canning saw disgrace and disaster ahead.
Pitt thought otherwise. At the small house in Park Place which he had
left the Union Jack triumphant at sea and the tricolour on the Continent.
Each State had need of rest to restore its finances and consolidate its
conquests. Therefore, though Bonaparte had at the end of March 1801
sharply repelled the pacific overtures of the Addington Cabinet, yet
negotiations were resumed at the close of summer, a fact which proves that
the First Consul was influenced, not by spite to Pitt and goodwill to his
successor, but by the constricting grip of the Sea Power. Hawkesbury,
Grenville's successor at the Foreign Office, asserted that shortly before the
end of the negotiation Pitt sat up with him through part of a night discussing
finance, and finally advising the cessation of hostilities.
Not that Pitt directed the negotiations; for both Addington and Hawkesbury
were proud and sensitive men, and Pitt at some points criticized the
conditions of the Preliminaries of London (1st October 1801). They were as
follows: Great Britain agreed to restore to France, Spain, and the Batavian,
or Dutch, Republic all their possessions recently conquered by her, with the
exception of Trinidad and Ceylon, ceded to her by Spain and the Dutch
respectively. She also retired from Elba and restored Malta to the Knights of
St. John, under conditions to be further specified. The French restored
Egypt to the Sultan, and evacuated Naples and the Papal States. Portugal
was also saved from danger of partition. Nothing was said respecting the
resumption of trade between England and France; and no assurance was
forthcoming as to the independence of the Republics bordering on France.
By his recent compact with Austria the First Consul agreed to respect their
independence; but England had no definite ground for complaint if it were
violated.
While the London rabble shouted itself hoarse with joy at the advent of
peace, Grenville, Windham, and Canning saw disgrace and disaster ahead.
Pitt thought otherwise. At the small house in Park Place which he had
Page 514
leased for his visits to London, he wrote to Long on 1st October, describing
the terms as not all that could be wished but "highly creditable, and on the
whole very advantageous." Finding that Grenville considered them
disastrous, he on the 5th expressed concern at their disagreement. Though
regretting the surrender of the Cape, and the uncertainty of the fate of
Malta, he considered the acquisition of Ceylon and Trinidad most
beneficial; and he hailed with satisfaction a peace which saved Turkey and
Portugal from spoliation. He therefore suggested an interview for the sake
of reconciling their differences. To this Grenville somewhat coolly assented,
remarking that the differences were fundamental and could not be
concealed, and that his confidence in the Addington Cabinet was
irretrievably destroyed by a treaty which ceded to France Martinique,
Malta, Minorca, the Cape, Cochin China, and all the Dutch settlements.
Clearly, then, Grenville looked on the Dutch Republic and Spain as
dominated by Bonaparte, who would seize Minorca, Malta, and the Cape
whenever it suited him. He also wrote to the King expressing regret that he
could no longer support Addington, whose conduct towards France and
Russia was "marked throughout by a tone of unnecessary and degrading
concession."[627]
Here, then, the two cousins began sharply to differ. On 3rd November,
during the debates on the Peace, Pitt rose to rebut the censures of Thomas
Grenville on a policy which implied the surrender of the Mediterranean to
France. He deprecated these sweeping criticisms; for he had ever been
ready to frame a treaty which, though falling short of our just pretensions,
was not inconsistent with honour and security. The present terms did not
fulfil all his wishes; but the difference between them and the best possible
terms was not worth the continuance of war. If both Trinidad and Malta
could not be retained, he commended Ministers for choosing Trinidad; for
the sight of the Union Jack at Malta would have hurt the pride of France.
With regard to the Cape of Good Hope he deemed it a far more important
the terms as not all that could be wished but "highly creditable, and on the
whole very advantageous." Finding that Grenville considered them
disastrous, he on the 5th expressed concern at their disagreement. Though
regretting the surrender of the Cape, and the uncertainty of the fate of
Malta, he considered the acquisition of Ceylon and Trinidad most
beneficial; and he hailed with satisfaction a peace which saved Turkey and
Portugal from spoliation. He therefore suggested an interview for the sake
of reconciling their differences. To this Grenville somewhat coolly assented,
remarking that the differences were fundamental and could not be
concealed, and that his confidence in the Addington Cabinet was
irretrievably destroyed by a treaty which ceded to France Martinique,
Malta, Minorca, the Cape, Cochin China, and all the Dutch settlements.
Clearly, then, Grenville looked on the Dutch Republic and Spain as
dominated by Bonaparte, who would seize Minorca, Malta, and the Cape
whenever it suited him. He also wrote to the King expressing regret that he
could no longer support Addington, whose conduct towards France and
Russia was "marked throughout by a tone of unnecessary and degrading
concession."[627]
Here, then, the two cousins began sharply to differ. On 3rd November,
during the debates on the Peace, Pitt rose to rebut the censures of Thomas
Grenville on a policy which implied the surrender of the Mediterranean to
France. He deprecated these sweeping criticisms; for he had ever been
ready to frame a treaty which, though falling short of our just pretensions,
was not inconsistent with honour and security. The present terms did not
fulfil all his wishes; but the difference between them and the best possible
terms was not worth the continuance of war. If both Trinidad and Malta
could not be retained, he commended Ministers for choosing Trinidad; for
the sight of the Union Jack at Malta would have hurt the pride of France.
With regard to the Cape of Good Hope he deemed it a far more important
Page 515
possession than Hawkesbury had represented, though inferior to Ceylon. He
deplored our failure to restore the House of Savoy to its capital, Turin; but
the chief object of the war, the security of Great Britain, had been attained.
True, the restoration of the French monarchy would have furnished a better
safeguard for peace; but we had never insisted on it as essential, though it
might have been assured if the Allies had fulfilled their duties. As to the
future, if the First Consul aimed at founding a military despotism, he
probably would not select England as the first object of his attack; and we
had every prospect of enjoying a long peace. Remembering, perhaps, that
he made the same prophecy early in 1792, he uttered this warning: "I am
inclined to hope everything that is good; but I am bound to act as if I feared
otherwise." In none of his speeches did Pitt display less foresight. The
preference of Trinidad to Malta and of Ceylon to the Cape is curious
enough; but the prophecy as to a long period of peace and the probable
immunity of England from Bonaparte's attack argues singular blindness to
the colonial trend of French policy since the year 1798. Despite acrid
comments by Fox and Windham, the speech carried the day and firmly
established Addington in power.
The sequel is well known. In the interval of six months, during which the
aged and gouty Cornwallis sought to reduce the Preliminaries of London to
the Treaty of Amiens (27th March 1802), Bonaparte remodelled the
Batavian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics in a way wholly at variance
with the Treaty of Lunéville. Against these breaches of faith the Addington
Cabinet made no protest; and the treaty in its final form provided a complex
and unsatisfactory compromise on the Maltese question.[628] Canning and
Windham strove to elicit from Pitt a public expression of his disapproval of
the treaty; but their efforts were in vain. On 20th April 1802 Canning, while
at his country seat, South Hill, Bracknell (Berks), wrote thus to Windham:
[629]
deplored our failure to restore the House of Savoy to its capital, Turin; but
the chief object of the war, the security of Great Britain, had been attained.
True, the restoration of the French monarchy would have furnished a better
safeguard for peace; but we had never insisted on it as essential, though it
might have been assured if the Allies had fulfilled their duties. As to the
future, if the First Consul aimed at founding a military despotism, he
probably would not select England as the first object of his attack; and we
had every prospect of enjoying a long peace. Remembering, perhaps, that
he made the same prophecy early in 1792, he uttered this warning: "I am
inclined to hope everything that is good; but I am bound to act as if I feared
otherwise." In none of his speeches did Pitt display less foresight. The
preference of Trinidad to Malta and of Ceylon to the Cape is curious
enough; but the prophecy as to a long period of peace and the probable
immunity of England from Bonaparte's attack argues singular blindness to
the colonial trend of French policy since the year 1798. Despite acrid
comments by Fox and Windham, the speech carried the day and firmly
established Addington in power.
The sequel is well known. In the interval of six months, during which the
aged and gouty Cornwallis sought to reduce the Preliminaries of London to
the Treaty of Amiens (27th March 1802), Bonaparte remodelled the
Batavian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics in a way wholly at variance
with the Treaty of Lunéville. Against these breaches of faith the Addington
Cabinet made no protest; and the treaty in its final form provided a complex
and unsatisfactory compromise on the Maltese question.[628] Canning and
Windham strove to elicit from Pitt a public expression of his disapproval of
the treaty; but their efforts were in vain. On 20th April 1802 Canning, while
at his country seat, South Hill, Bracknell (Berks), wrote thus to Windham:
[629]
Page 516
... Do not suppose that this is because I have the slightest doubt as to
the impression which may be made by pointing out the gross faults
and omissions, the weakness, and baseness, and shuffling, and
stupidity, that mark this Treaty even beyond the Preliminaries that
led to it. But I think people do not want to be convinced of this; that
they will not take it kindly, but rather otherwise, to have it forced
upon their observation; that, if parted to a division, they will vote
for the Treaty with all its imperfections upon its head.... Now as to
Pitt himself. He cannot and does not think of this as he did of the
Preliminary Treaty. But debate it; and he will, he must, debate as
warmly for it. He can take no distinction without seeming to
abandon Addington; and that he will not do. He cannot object to any
part of the Peace in public, without weakening the grounds upon
which he contends peace upon the whole to be preferable to war,
and that he will not do. ... Leave it possible for Pitt to say six or
eight months hence that the Preliminaries promised well, but that
the Treaty did not come up to them. I do not promise you that he
ever will say this. But I am fairly persuaded that, if you force from
him a public approbation of the Treaty, you defer for at least as
many months as have passed since the debates of October, the
chance of his coming to see things almost as you and I see them....
April 27 1802.
Since I wrote to you, I have seen Lord Grenville, and I think the
plan of action, which he tells me had been concerted between you
and him, so perfect, that I retract everything in what I wrote to you
(if anything there were) which could be construed as making against
it. To debate "about it and about it," as much as you will, to move
for papers, to move for taking the Treaty into consideration—all this
may be done with great and good effect, but a condemnation of the
Treaty, such as would force P[itt] into a defence of it, and identify
the impression which may be made by pointing out the gross faults
and omissions, the weakness, and baseness, and shuffling, and
stupidity, that mark this Treaty even beyond the Preliminaries that
led to it. But I think people do not want to be convinced of this; that
they will not take it kindly, but rather otherwise, to have it forced
upon their observation; that, if parted to a division, they will vote
for the Treaty with all its imperfections upon its head.... Now as to
Pitt himself. He cannot and does not think of this as he did of the
Preliminary Treaty. But debate it; and he will, he must, debate as
warmly for it. He can take no distinction without seeming to
abandon Addington; and that he will not do. He cannot object to any
part of the Peace in public, without weakening the grounds upon
which he contends peace upon the whole to be preferable to war,
and that he will not do. ... Leave it possible for Pitt to say six or
eight months hence that the Preliminaries promised well, but that
the Treaty did not come up to them. I do not promise you that he
ever will say this. But I am fairly persuaded that, if you force from
him a public approbation of the Treaty, you defer for at least as
many months as have passed since the debates of October, the
chance of his coming to see things almost as you and I see them....
April 27 1802.
Since I wrote to you, I have seen Lord Grenville, and I think the
plan of action, which he tells me had been concerted between you
and him, so perfect, that I retract everything in what I wrote to you
(if anything there were) which could be construed as making against
it. To debate "about it and about it," as much as you will, to move
for papers, to move for taking the Treaty into consideration—all this
may be done with great and good effect, but a condemnation of the
Treaty, such as would force P[itt] into a defence of it, and identify
Page 517
him with the makers of it, is what of all things is to be avoided. I
hope you think so.—Whether P[itt] will save us I do not know. But
surely he is the only man that can.
All was in vain. Pitt, having promised to support Addington, deemed
himself in honour bound to fulfil that pledge. But, as the events of the year
1802 showed more and more the imbecility of the Addington Cabinet,
torturing doubts preyed upon his mind. His friends, especially Canning,
now began to discern the pathos of his position, but sought to draw him
from his seclusion at Walmer. An opportunity occurred in the month of
May. Pitt's birthday was on the 28th. Would not all who foresaw ruin for
England in the supremacy of "the Doctor" welcome a demonstration on
behalf of his predecessor? For more than a year Pitt's friends had been
puzzled and abashed by his unexplained retirement, witness the
uncharitable surmise of the usually benevolent Dr. Burgh—"Can I see
Addington climb upon the stooping neck of Mr. Pitt, and not believe that it
is done in hostility or in a masked confederacy? If the former, how am I to
estimate the man who comes in? If the latter, what judgement can I form of
the man who goes out?"[630] Slander also was busy in the guise of that
gadfly, Nicholls, who proposed to thank the King for dismissing him. By
way of retort Pitt's friends triumphantly carried a motion of thanks to Pitt
for his great services, against a carping minority of fifty-two; but members
were heard to mutter their preference for Addington over all "the d—d men
of genius."
Was it not time to arouse the country from sloth? The England of 1802
seemed to Wordsworth
a fen of stagnant waters.
hope you think so.—Whether P[itt] will save us I do not know. But
surely he is the only man that can.
All was in vain. Pitt, having promised to support Addington, deemed
himself in honour bound to fulfil that pledge. But, as the events of the year
1802 showed more and more the imbecility of the Addington Cabinet,
torturing doubts preyed upon his mind. His friends, especially Canning,
now began to discern the pathos of his position, but sought to draw him
from his seclusion at Walmer. An opportunity occurred in the month of
May. Pitt's birthday was on the 28th. Would not all who foresaw ruin for
England in the supremacy of "the Doctor" welcome a demonstration on
behalf of his predecessor? For more than a year Pitt's friends had been
puzzled and abashed by his unexplained retirement, witness the
uncharitable surmise of the usually benevolent Dr. Burgh—"Can I see
Addington climb upon the stooping neck of Mr. Pitt, and not believe that it
is done in hostility or in a masked confederacy? If the former, how am I to
estimate the man who comes in? If the latter, what judgement can I form of
the man who goes out?"[630] Slander also was busy in the guise of that
gadfly, Nicholls, who proposed to thank the King for dismissing him. By
way of retort Pitt's friends triumphantly carried a motion of thanks to Pitt
for his great services, against a carping minority of fifty-two; but members
were heard to mutter their preference for Addington over all "the d—d men
of genius."
Was it not time to arouse the country from sloth? The England of 1802
seemed to Wordsworth
a fen of stagnant waters.
Page 518
While he invoked the memory of Milton, Canning resolved to appeal to
Pitt. In a day or two he threw off a poem which, though slighted by him,
gained a wider vogue than any of his effusions, "The Pilot that weathered
the Storm." The last and best stanza is as follows:
And O! if again the rude whirlwind should rise,
The dawning of peace should fresh darkness
deform,
The regrets of the good and the fears of the wise
Shall turn to the pilot that weathered the storm.
The song was enthusiastically received by the company assembled at the
Merchant Taylors' Hall; and the reference to the recall of Pitt roused the
company to a high pitch of excitement. The song, as a whole, is laboured
and strained. The only stanza which happily weds phrase and thought is the
last. The others form a lumbering prelude to this almost Sibylline cadence.
Despite these efforts to sow discord between Pitt and Addington, they
remained on excellent terms;[631] and the support given by the former to the
Peace of Amiens ensured to the Minister an overwhelming victory at the
polls in the General Election of the summer of 1802. Pitt was of course
returned by the University of Cambridge, "with every mark of zeal and
cordiality"—so he wrote to Rose on 10th July. The rest of the summer he
passed either near London or at Walmer. It is unfortunate that he did not
visit France, as Fox, Romilly, and many others now did. Probably his sharp
rebuff to Bonaparte's overture at the end of 1799, and his subsequent
diatribes against him precluded such a step. But he also needed rest and
quiet. On 8th June he wrote to Windham: "The sea air and the contrast of
the scene to that which I left behind me in London have, as usual, done me
a great deal of good."[632] He set to work to improve the grounds adjoining
the castle, and invited Addington, who was then spending some weeks at
Pitt. In a day or two he threw off a poem which, though slighted by him,
gained a wider vogue than any of his effusions, "The Pilot that weathered
the Storm." The last and best stanza is as follows:
And O! if again the rude whirlwind should rise,
The dawning of peace should fresh darkness
deform,
The regrets of the good and the fears of the wise
Shall turn to the pilot that weathered the storm.
The song was enthusiastically received by the company assembled at the
Merchant Taylors' Hall; and the reference to the recall of Pitt roused the
company to a high pitch of excitement. The song, as a whole, is laboured
and strained. The only stanza which happily weds phrase and thought is the
last. The others form a lumbering prelude to this almost Sibylline cadence.
Despite these efforts to sow discord between Pitt and Addington, they
remained on excellent terms;[631] and the support given by the former to the
Peace of Amiens ensured to the Minister an overwhelming victory at the
polls in the General Election of the summer of 1802. Pitt was of course
returned by the University of Cambridge, "with every mark of zeal and
cordiality"—so he wrote to Rose on 10th July. The rest of the summer he
passed either near London or at Walmer. It is unfortunate that he did not
visit France, as Fox, Romilly, and many others now did. Probably his sharp
rebuff to Bonaparte's overture at the end of 1799, and his subsequent
diatribes against him precluded such a step. But he also needed rest and
quiet. On 8th June he wrote to Windham: "The sea air and the contrast of
the scene to that which I left behind me in London have, as usual, done me
a great deal of good."[632] He set to work to improve the grounds adjoining
the castle, and invited Addington, who was then spending some weeks at
Page 519
Eastbourne, to come over and see the changes. Further, he leased a large
farm near Walmer, and expressed a hope that he might spend the rest of the
year in farming. The splendour of that summer and the bounteous crops of
corn evidently captivated Pitt. The supreme need of England was more
corn. A man who could not serve her at Westminster could serve her by high
farming. This was Pitt's forecast, unless "the pacificator of Europe takes it
into his head to send an army from the opposite coast to revenge himself for
some newspaper paragraph."[633]
At this time, too, he finally succeeded in disposing of Holwood. The sale
was inevitable; for Pitt's finance had long been a source of deep anxiety. So
far back as 18th October 1800 Rose informed the Bishop of Lincoln that
bailiffs threatened the seizure of Pitt's furniture in Downing Street for debts
of £600 and £400. Then, referring to Pitt's ill health, he wrote: "I conceived
till this morning [it] was owing to the state of public matters; but I am now
strongly inclined to think he is agitated by the state of his own affairs.
Bullock came to me this morning and forced upon me such a history of
debts and distresses as actually sickened me.... Something must be done
before Pitt returns to town. His expenses in the last years were nearly
£26,000. I am quite certain Holwood must be parted with."[634]
Pitt's private finance is involved in mystery. His official stipend was £6,000
a year; and as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports he drew £3,000 more. Yet
he was now insolvent. Among his papers systematic accounts are extant
only for the latter half of the years 1794 and 1799. Even these are not
complete, especially for the household at Walmer Castle. Those for the
house in Downing Street are the fullest; but, for the last six months of 1799,
they amount to £3,789 at Downing Street, and £2,382 at Holwood, the latter
sum including a charge of £1,163 for farm expenses which cannot much
have exceeded the income.[635] The Walmer accounts vary according to the
duration of Pitt's residence. Those for the summer and autumn of 1794
farm near Walmer, and expressed a hope that he might spend the rest of the
year in farming. The splendour of that summer and the bounteous crops of
corn evidently captivated Pitt. The supreme need of England was more
corn. A man who could not serve her at Westminster could serve her by high
farming. This was Pitt's forecast, unless "the pacificator of Europe takes it
into his head to send an army from the opposite coast to revenge himself for
some newspaper paragraph."[633]
At this time, too, he finally succeeded in disposing of Holwood. The sale
was inevitable; for Pitt's finance had long been a source of deep anxiety. So
far back as 18th October 1800 Rose informed the Bishop of Lincoln that
bailiffs threatened the seizure of Pitt's furniture in Downing Street for debts
of £600 and £400. Then, referring to Pitt's ill health, he wrote: "I conceived
till this morning [it] was owing to the state of public matters; but I am now
strongly inclined to think he is agitated by the state of his own affairs.
Bullock came to me this morning and forced upon me such a history of
debts and distresses as actually sickened me.... Something must be done
before Pitt returns to town. His expenses in the last years were nearly
£26,000. I am quite certain Holwood must be parted with."[634]
Pitt's private finance is involved in mystery. His official stipend was £6,000
a year; and as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports he drew £3,000 more. Yet
he was now insolvent. Among his papers systematic accounts are extant
only for the latter half of the years 1794 and 1799. Even these are not
complete, especially for the household at Walmer Castle. Those for the
house in Downing Street are the fullest; but, for the last six months of 1799,
they amount to £3,789 at Downing Street, and £2,382 at Holwood, the latter
sum including a charge of £1,163 for farm expenses which cannot much
have exceeded the income.[635] The Walmer accounts vary according to the
duration of Pitt's residence. Those for the summer and autumn of 1794
Page 520
amount only to £458. Evidently, then, Pitt benefited by the King's gift of the
Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But he gave £1,000 in 1793 to start the
Dover Volunteer corps and doubtless other sums towards the Fencibles of
the other Cinque Ports.
At all times the servants at Downing Street and the farm at Holwood were a
heavy drain. The amount of the servants' private bills charged to Pitt at
Downing Street is disgraceful. Pitt kept a good table and a good cellar, as
the customs of the age required; but neither these expenses nor his heavy
outlay on his tailor would have brought about a crisis, had not his town
servants and tradesmen plundered him. Morse, the tailor, charged at the rate
of £130 to £140 a quarter for Pitt's clothes. Now Pitt was neat and
punctilious in his attire, but he was no dandy. As for the farm at Holwood,
accounts for straw and manure were charged twice over, as some friendly
accountant pointed out. Probably, too, his experiments in landscape-
gardening were as costly as they had been to Chatham; for lavishness was
in the nature both of father and son. Pitt once confessed to his niece, Hester
Stanhope, that he never saw a house and grounds without at once planning
improvements. In this phrase as in the suggestive item on farm expenses we
can see why the sale of Holwood was necessary; but for various reasons it
did not take place until the autumn of 1802.
Meanwhile his friends bestirred themselves to prevent the scandal of an
execution. They succeeded in staving off a crisis until schemes of relief
were concerted, but here again there was much difficulty; for, on hearing of
the proposed private subscription on his behalf, he declared that he would
rather return to practice at the Bar than submit to such a humiliation. Fox
might allow friends to pay his gambling debts; but the pride of Pitt scorned
to accept help on behalf of liabilities even if due to pre-occupation in public
affairs. Rose deemed a sum of £25,000 necessary to his peace and
quietness, seeing that the total liabilities were £45,064. The letters which
Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But he gave £1,000 in 1793 to start the
Dover Volunteer corps and doubtless other sums towards the Fencibles of
the other Cinque Ports.
At all times the servants at Downing Street and the farm at Holwood were a
heavy drain. The amount of the servants' private bills charged to Pitt at
Downing Street is disgraceful. Pitt kept a good table and a good cellar, as
the customs of the age required; but neither these expenses nor his heavy
outlay on his tailor would have brought about a crisis, had not his town
servants and tradesmen plundered him. Morse, the tailor, charged at the rate
of £130 to £140 a quarter for Pitt's clothes. Now Pitt was neat and
punctilious in his attire, but he was no dandy. As for the farm at Holwood,
accounts for straw and manure were charged twice over, as some friendly
accountant pointed out. Probably, too, his experiments in landscape-
gardening were as costly as they had been to Chatham; for lavishness was
in the nature both of father and son. Pitt once confessed to his niece, Hester
Stanhope, that he never saw a house and grounds without at once planning
improvements. In this phrase as in the suggestive item on farm expenses we
can see why the sale of Holwood was necessary; but for various reasons it
did not take place until the autumn of 1802.
Meanwhile his friends bestirred themselves to prevent the scandal of an
execution. They succeeded in staving off a crisis until schemes of relief
were concerted, but here again there was much difficulty; for, on hearing of
the proposed private subscription on his behalf, he declared that he would
rather return to practice at the Bar than submit to such a humiliation. Fox
might allow friends to pay his gambling debts; but the pride of Pitt scorned
to accept help on behalf of liabilities even if due to pre-occupation in public
affairs. Rose deemed a sum of £25,000 necessary to his peace and
quietness, seeing that the total liabilities were £45,064. The letters which
Page 521
passed between Camden, the Bishop of Lincoln, and Rose, evince deep
affection for the shy, proud man. The following is a précis of a letter of
Rose to Tomline which is among the Pretyman MSS.:
Christchurch, July 21, 1801.
I am in great perplexity about Pitt's affairs. Joe Smith has been
strangely misled respecting them.[636] The unforeseen demands have
been very large. If Holwood fetches a good price, the sum of
£24,000 will set the matter at rest. Pitt's diamonds have been sold
for £680 to pay pressing claims. The unpaid bills now amount to
£9,618. Old debts come to £9,600 more. Mr. Soane and Mr. Coutts
might be asked to wait, as neither would suffer from it. The debt due
to Banker (£5,800) cannot surely be a separate one of Pitt's; for I
think he could give no security on it. Probably it is a debt contracted
jointly with Lord Chatham, the whole of which Pitt may have to
pay. Of the last sum which in his own deep distress he borrowed on
the security of Holwood, he gave (I know) £1,000 to Lord Chatham.
These are trifling considerations compared with that of getting him
to accept the means of relief. They are as follows: (1) a vote from
Parliament; (2) a free gift from the King; (3) a private subscription;
(4) an additional office for life. The first and second of these Pitt has
peremptorily declined. The third he refused in 1787 when the
London merchants offered £100,000. The fourth course would not
be wholly creditable, but Pitt thinks it the least objectionable. He
dislikes the second and third alternatives because the second (as he
thinks) would give the King a hold over him and the third would
entitle the subscribers to his favour. The notion of an execution by
bailiffs in his house is too painful to contemplate. I consider the first
or second alternatives the best.
The reference here to a gift, or loan, from Pitt to his brother prompts the
inquiry whether similar acts of benevolence may not explain his difficulties.
affection for the shy, proud man. The following is a précis of a letter of
Rose to Tomline which is among the Pretyman MSS.:
Christchurch, July 21, 1801.
I am in great perplexity about Pitt's affairs. Joe Smith has been
strangely misled respecting them.[636] The unforeseen demands have
been very large. If Holwood fetches a good price, the sum of
£24,000 will set the matter at rest. Pitt's diamonds have been sold
for £680 to pay pressing claims. The unpaid bills now amount to
£9,618. Old debts come to £9,600 more. Mr. Soane and Mr. Coutts
might be asked to wait, as neither would suffer from it. The debt due
to Banker (£5,800) cannot surely be a separate one of Pitt's; for I
think he could give no security on it. Probably it is a debt contracted
jointly with Lord Chatham, the whole of which Pitt may have to
pay. Of the last sum which in his own deep distress he borrowed on
the security of Holwood, he gave (I know) £1,000 to Lord Chatham.
These are trifling considerations compared with that of getting him
to accept the means of relief. They are as follows: (1) a vote from
Parliament; (2) a free gift from the King; (3) a private subscription;
(4) an additional office for life. The first and second of these Pitt has
peremptorily declined. The third he refused in 1787 when the
London merchants offered £100,000. The fourth course would not
be wholly creditable, but Pitt thinks it the least objectionable. He
dislikes the second and third alternatives because the second (as he
thinks) would give the King a hold over him and the third would
entitle the subscribers to his favour. The notion of an execution by
bailiffs in his house is too painful to contemplate. I consider the first
or second alternatives the best.
The reference here to a gift, or loan, from Pitt to his brother prompts the
inquiry whether similar acts of benevolence may not explain his difficulties.
Page 522
We find the second Earl of Chatham in August 1797 acknowledging a loan
of £1,000 from Pitt. The bishop, replying to Rose on 24th July 1801, states
that the debt of £5,800 was to the best of his knowledge a sum advanced
through Thomas Coutts, the banker, to Lady Chatham upon the Burton
Pynsent estate. He adds that she ought to pay interest to Pitt upon it, but did
not. It seems that Pitt advanced £11,750 in all on behalf of the Burton
Pynsent estate. Here, then, was a grievous family burden. Probably the debt
was left by his father, and may have been increased by his mother. So far
back as November 1793 he wrote to her stating his desire to help her at any
time of need; and in August of the following year, when she believed her
end to be near, she begged her sons to pay her "just debts," which were due,
not to vain expenses, but to outlays upon the farm which she at the time
believed to be for the best.[637] The eldest son could not help her, for he
required succour from Pitt. If, then, the farming experiments at Burton
Pynsent failed, the loss fell upon Pitt. We may infer, then, that his debts
were occasioned partly by rapacious servants and tradesmen in London,
partly by farming and gardening at Holwood, but also by the needs of his
mother and brother. The fact that Chatham paid not a shilling towards the
discharge of Pitt's liabilities proves that he was in low water; and as no one,
not even Tomline, knew of the source of Pitt's embarrassments, they must
have been of a peculiarly delicate character.
Tomline's decision, that Pitt could never accept a sinecure from Addington,
is indisputable. The words in which Pitt declared that he could not accept
the sum of £30,000 graciously offered by the King breathe more
independence than those in which he first expressed his gratitude for the
offer. There remained, then, the plan of a private subscription. The Bishop
of Lincoln mentioned it to him with admirable delicacy on 6th August 1801,
and gained his consent. The following were the subscribers: Lords Bathurst,
Camden, and Carrington, together with Tomline, Rose, and Steele, £1,000
each. From Scotland came £4,000, probably in equal parts from the Dukes
of £1,000 from Pitt. The bishop, replying to Rose on 24th July 1801, states
that the debt of £5,800 was to the best of his knowledge a sum advanced
through Thomas Coutts, the banker, to Lady Chatham upon the Burton
Pynsent estate. He adds that she ought to pay interest to Pitt upon it, but did
not. It seems that Pitt advanced £11,750 in all on behalf of the Burton
Pynsent estate. Here, then, was a grievous family burden. Probably the debt
was left by his father, and may have been increased by his mother. So far
back as November 1793 he wrote to her stating his desire to help her at any
time of need; and in August of the following year, when she believed her
end to be near, she begged her sons to pay her "just debts," which were due,
not to vain expenses, but to outlays upon the farm which she at the time
believed to be for the best.[637] The eldest son could not help her, for he
required succour from Pitt. If, then, the farming experiments at Burton
Pynsent failed, the loss fell upon Pitt. We may infer, then, that his debts
were occasioned partly by rapacious servants and tradesmen in London,
partly by farming and gardening at Holwood, but also by the needs of his
mother and brother. The fact that Chatham paid not a shilling towards the
discharge of Pitt's liabilities proves that he was in low water; and as no one,
not even Tomline, knew of the source of Pitt's embarrassments, they must
have been of a peculiarly delicate character.
Tomline's decision, that Pitt could never accept a sinecure from Addington,
is indisputable. The words in which Pitt declared that he could not accept
the sum of £30,000 graciously offered by the King breathe more
independence than those in which he first expressed his gratitude for the
offer. There remained, then, the plan of a private subscription. The Bishop
of Lincoln mentioned it to him with admirable delicacy on 6th August 1801,
and gained his consent. The following were the subscribers: Lords Bathurst,
Camden, and Carrington, together with Tomline, Rose, and Steele, £1,000
each. From Scotland came £4,000, probably in equal parts from the Dukes
Page 523
of Buccleugh and Gordon, Dundas, and the Chief Baron. Wilberforce,
Long, and Joseph Smith each gave £500, and another (Lord Alvanley?)
£200. Bishop Tomline and Rose showed equal activity and tact in raising
this sum of £11,700, so that the details remained unknown to Pitt.[638] Later
on he felt pecuniary embarrassments, partly owing to his share in
maintaining the Cinque Ports Volunteers, and at his death his debts
amounted to £40,000.
His relations to his bankers, Messrs. Coutts, continued cordial, though on
24th April 1805 Thomas Coutts ventured to state that there was an overdraft
against him of £1,511, which, however, was redressed by the arrival of his
quarterly official stipends.[639] Pitt's loyalty to his friends appears in his
effort during his second Ministry to procure the royal assent to his
nomination of Bishop Tomline to the Archbishopric of Canterbury shortly
after the death of Dr. Moore early in 1805. The King, however, who did not
admire Tomline, and believed the Bishop of Norwich to have prior claims,
refused his reiterated requests. Pitt's second letter to the King on this subject
is couched in terms almost of remonstrance.[640]
Reverting to Pitt's life at Walmer, we find that in the summer of 1802 he fell
a prey to nausea and lassitude; so that Lady Hester Stanhope, who visited
him in September, found him very weak. Probably his indisposition was
due less to the exceptional heat of that season than to suppressed gout
aggravated by anxiety. As we saw, he invited Addington to come over from
Eastbourne and discuss public affairs. The conference seems to have caused
him much concern; for Tomline in July 1802 jotted down notes of a
conversation with Pitt, in which Addington is described as "without
exception the vainest man he (Pitt) had ever met with." Pitt's advice had
often been asked before the Preliminaries of Peace were signed, but
afterwards he was neglected. Cornwallis, too, had evidently believed that by
the Treaty of Amiens all former treaties with France were revived without
Long, and Joseph Smith each gave £500, and another (Lord Alvanley?)
£200. Bishop Tomline and Rose showed equal activity and tact in raising
this sum of £11,700, so that the details remained unknown to Pitt.[638] Later
on he felt pecuniary embarrassments, partly owing to his share in
maintaining the Cinque Ports Volunteers, and at his death his debts
amounted to £40,000.
His relations to his bankers, Messrs. Coutts, continued cordial, though on
24th April 1805 Thomas Coutts ventured to state that there was an overdraft
against him of £1,511, which, however, was redressed by the arrival of his
quarterly official stipends.[639] Pitt's loyalty to his friends appears in his
effort during his second Ministry to procure the royal assent to his
nomination of Bishop Tomline to the Archbishopric of Canterbury shortly
after the death of Dr. Moore early in 1805. The King, however, who did not
admire Tomline, and believed the Bishop of Norwich to have prior claims,
refused his reiterated requests. Pitt's second letter to the King on this subject
is couched in terms almost of remonstrance.[640]
Reverting to Pitt's life at Walmer, we find that in the summer of 1802 he fell
a prey to nausea and lassitude; so that Lady Hester Stanhope, who visited
him in September, found him very weak. Probably his indisposition was
due less to the exceptional heat of that season than to suppressed gout
aggravated by anxiety. As we saw, he invited Addington to come over from
Eastbourne and discuss public affairs. The conference seems to have caused
him much concern; for Tomline in July 1802 jotted down notes of a
conversation with Pitt, in which Addington is described as "without
exception the vainest man he (Pitt) had ever met with." Pitt's advice had
often been asked before the Preliminaries of Peace were signed, but
afterwards he was neglected. Cornwallis, too, had evidently believed that by
the Treaty of Amiens all former treaties with France were revived without
Page 524
being named; and probably Ministers were under the same delusion. The
last King's Speech was also annoying to Pitt, who characterized Addington
as "a man of little mind, of consummate vanity and of very slender
abilities." As to resumption of office Pitt thought it impossible during the
life of the King, except in case of some great emergency.[641]
Equally frank were Pitt's confessions to Canning, who stayed at Walmer in
September–October 1802. He admitted that his resignation was due partly
to the manner in which the King opposed him on Catholic Emancipation.
But he quitted office with a clear conscience, leaving full means for
attacking Egypt and the Armed Neutrals, so that the reproaches of desertion
of duty were unjust. He pledged himself to support Addington; and from
this only Addington could release him. He admitted that this was a mistake,
now that current events showed Bonaparte's ambition to be insatiable; but
none the less he waved aside Canning's reiterated appeals that he would
apply to Addington for release from the pledge, on the ground that such a
step would seem an intrigue for a return to power. "My ambition (he
proudly said) is character, not office."
Was a statesman ever placed in a more embarrassing situation? Pitt had
resigned office on a point of honour, and yet felt constrained to humour the
royal invalid by abandoning the very measure which caused his resignation.
Incautiously he pledged himself to support Addington, thereby alienating
some of his own supporters. He defended his pacific policy until it led to a
bad treaty followed by a series of humiliations. By October 1802 Bonaparte
was master of four Republics bordering on France, and had annexed
Piedmont and Elba, besides securing Parma and Louisiana by profitable
exchanges. Such a peace was worse than a disastrous war. Yet Addington
made no protest except against the virtual subjugation of Switzerland. True,
the Cabinet now clung to the Cape and Malta as for dear life; but elsewhere
the eye could see French influence creeping resistlessly over Europe, while
last King's Speech was also annoying to Pitt, who characterized Addington
as "a man of little mind, of consummate vanity and of very slender
abilities." As to resumption of office Pitt thought it impossible during the
life of the King, except in case of some great emergency.[641]
Equally frank were Pitt's confessions to Canning, who stayed at Walmer in
September–October 1802. He admitted that his resignation was due partly
to the manner in which the King opposed him on Catholic Emancipation.
But he quitted office with a clear conscience, leaving full means for
attacking Egypt and the Armed Neutrals, so that the reproaches of desertion
of duty were unjust. He pledged himself to support Addington; and from
this only Addington could release him. He admitted that this was a mistake,
now that current events showed Bonaparte's ambition to be insatiable; but
none the less he waved aside Canning's reiterated appeals that he would
apply to Addington for release from the pledge, on the ground that such a
step would seem an intrigue for a return to power. "My ambition (he
proudly said) is character, not office."
Was a statesman ever placed in a more embarrassing situation? Pitt had
resigned office on a point of honour, and yet felt constrained to humour the
royal invalid by abandoning the very measure which caused his resignation.
Incautiously he pledged himself to support Addington, thereby alienating
some of his own supporters. He defended his pacific policy until it led to a
bad treaty followed by a series of humiliations. By October 1802 Bonaparte
was master of four Republics bordering on France, and had annexed
Piedmont and Elba, besides securing Parma and Louisiana by profitable
exchanges. Such a peace was worse than a disastrous war. Yet Addington
made no protest except against the virtual subjugation of Switzerland. True,
the Cabinet now clung to the Cape and Malta as for dear life; but elsewhere
the eye could see French influence creeping resistlessly over Europe, while
Page 525
the German Powers were intent only on securing the spoils of the
Ecclesiastical States. Well might Pitt write to Wilberforce on 31st October:
"You know how much under all the circumstances I wished for peace, and
my wishes remain the same, if Bonaparte can be made to feel that he is not
to trample in succession on every nation in Europe. But of this I fear there
is little chance, and without it I see no prospect but war." Worst of all, there
were sure signs that France and the other Powers distrusted and despised
Addington. Vorontzoff, the Russian ambassador, declared that he would
work hard to form an alliance with Pitt, but despaired of effecting anything
with his successor.[642] In truth, Pitt's excessive scrupulousness at the time
of his resignation had enclosed himself and his country in a vicious circle
from which the only means of escape was war.
A prey to these harassing thoughts, Pitt left Walmer near the close of
October 1802 to take the waters at Bath. On the way he visited Sir Charles
Middleton at Teston in Kent, and sought distraction by inquiries on farming.
Middleton wrote to Wilberforce on 26th October: "His inquiries were very
minute and judicious; and it is incredible how quickly he comprehended
things, and how much further he reasons on them than I can follow him.... I
believe Mr. Pitt has it in his power to become the first farmer in England if
he thinks the pursuit worth his time and attention."[643] The treatment at
Bath suited Pitt so well that he prolonged his stay. Rose, whom he invited to
Bath in the second week of November, thus describes to Bishop Tomline his
manner of life:
Bath, Nov. 21, 1802.[644]
Mr. Pitt's health mends every day: it is really better than it has been
ever since I knew him. I am quite sure this place agrees with him
entirely, he eats a small [illegible] and a half for breakfast, and more
at dinner than I ever saw him at 1/2 past 4: no luncheon: two very
Ecclesiastical States. Well might Pitt write to Wilberforce on 31st October:
"You know how much under all the circumstances I wished for peace, and
my wishes remain the same, if Bonaparte can be made to feel that he is not
to trample in succession on every nation in Europe. But of this I fear there
is little chance, and without it I see no prospect but war." Worst of all, there
were sure signs that France and the other Powers distrusted and despised
Addington. Vorontzoff, the Russian ambassador, declared that he would
work hard to form an alliance with Pitt, but despaired of effecting anything
with his successor.[642] In truth, Pitt's excessive scrupulousness at the time
of his resignation had enclosed himself and his country in a vicious circle
from which the only means of escape was war.
A prey to these harassing thoughts, Pitt left Walmer near the close of
October 1802 to take the waters at Bath. On the way he visited Sir Charles
Middleton at Teston in Kent, and sought distraction by inquiries on farming.
Middleton wrote to Wilberforce on 26th October: "His inquiries were very
minute and judicious; and it is incredible how quickly he comprehended
things, and how much further he reasons on them than I can follow him.... I
believe Mr. Pitt has it in his power to become the first farmer in England if
he thinks the pursuit worth his time and attention."[643] The treatment at
Bath suited Pitt so well that he prolonged his stay. Rose, whom he invited to
Bath in the second week of November, thus describes to Bishop Tomline his
manner of life:
Bath, Nov. 21, 1802.[644]
Mr. Pitt's health mends every day: it is really better than it has been
ever since I knew him. I am quite sure this place agrees with him
entirely, he eats a small [illegible] and a half for breakfast, and more
at dinner than I ever saw him at 1/2 past 4: no luncheon: two very
Page 526
small glasses of Madeira at dinner and less than a pint of port after
dinner: at night, nothing but a bason of arrowroot: he is positively in
the best possible train of management for his health.... He is
positively decided to have no responsibility whatever respecting
what has been done or is doing on the subject of foreign politics; he
not only adheres to his resolution of not going up for the opening [of
Parliament]; but will not attend even on the estimates unless a
necessity should arise: he writes to day both to Mr. Addington and
Lord Hawkesbury in a style that will not only manifest the above,
but will prevent all further attempts to draw him into confidential
communication. He has also made up his mind to take office again
whenever the occasion shall arise, when he can come in properly,
and has now no reluctance on the subject. I dare not say more by the
Post. If my letter is opened, the Ministers will know the first part is
true, and I don't care about their learning the latter. Lord Grenville
will positively not take a line to render it difficult for Mr. Pitt and
him to act together; he will move no amendment to the Address....
Rose, as we have seen, disliked Lord Auckland, who was joint Postmaster-
General; and if Pitt's letters were opened at the Post Office, we can
understand the thinness of his correspondence.[645] Recently he had advised
Addington not to retain Alexandria, Malta, Goree, and Cape Town, but to
trust rather to defensive preparations, which might include a friendly
understanding with other aggrieved Powers. This surely was the dignified
course. Even Malta was not worth the risk of immediate war unless we
were ready both with armaments and alliances. The foregoing letter,
however, shows that Pitt believed his advice to be useless. Possibly he
heard that the Cabinet had decided to retain those posts; and finally, as we
shall see, Pitt approved their action in the case of Malta. Meanwhile matters
went from bad to worse. Ministers complained of Pitt's aloofness; but his
friends agreed that he must do nothing to avert from Addington the
consequences of his own incompetence. Even the cold Grenville declared
dinner: at night, nothing but a bason of arrowroot: he is positively in
the best possible train of management for his health.... He is
positively decided to have no responsibility whatever respecting
what has been done or is doing on the subject of foreign politics; he
not only adheres to his resolution of not going up for the opening [of
Parliament]; but will not attend even on the estimates unless a
necessity should arise: he writes to day both to Mr. Addington and
Lord Hawkesbury in a style that will not only manifest the above,
but will prevent all further attempts to draw him into confidential
communication. He has also made up his mind to take office again
whenever the occasion shall arise, when he can come in properly,
and has now no reluctance on the subject. I dare not say more by the
Post. If my letter is opened, the Ministers will know the first part is
true, and I don't care about their learning the latter. Lord Grenville
will positively not take a line to render it difficult for Mr. Pitt and
him to act together; he will move no amendment to the Address....
Rose, as we have seen, disliked Lord Auckland, who was joint Postmaster-
General; and if Pitt's letters were opened at the Post Office, we can
understand the thinness of his correspondence.[645] Recently he had advised
Addington not to retain Alexandria, Malta, Goree, and Cape Town, but to
trust rather to defensive preparations, which might include a friendly
understanding with other aggrieved Powers. This surely was the dignified
course. Even Malta was not worth the risk of immediate war unless we
were ready both with armaments and alliances. The foregoing letter,
however, shows that Pitt believed his advice to be useless. Possibly he
heard that the Cabinet had decided to retain those posts; and finally, as we
shall see, Pitt approved their action in the case of Malta. Meanwhile matters
went from bad to worse. Ministers complained of Pitt's aloofness; but his
friends agreed that he must do nothing to avert from Addington the
consequences of his own incompetence. Even the cold Grenville declared
Page 527
Pitt to be the only man who could save England. But could even he, when
under an incompetent chief, achieve that feat?
For by this time Addington had hopelessly deranged the nation's finance.
While giving up Pitt's drastic Income Tax, which had not brought in the
expected £10,000,000 but a net sum of £6,000,000, he raised the Assessed
Taxes by one third, increased Import and Export duties with impartial
rigour, and yet proposed to raise £5,000,000 by Exchequer Bills, which
were to be funded at the end of the Session or paid off by a loan. This signal
failure to meet the year's expenses within the year exasperated Pitt. At
Christmas, which he spent with Rose at his seat in the New Forest, he often
conversed on this topic; and his host thus summed up his own conclusions
in a letter to Bishop Tomline:
Cuffnells, December 24, 1802.[646]
... There is hardly a part of the Budget that is not too stupidly wrong
even for the doctor's dullness and ignorance. I am sure Mr. Pitt must
concur with me; and I have all the materials for him.—Wrong about
the increase of the revenue; wrong as to the produce of the
Consolidated Fund; scandalously wrong as to what is to be expected
from it in future by at least £2,800,000 a year; wrong as to the
money he will want this year by millions....
During his stay at Cuffnells Pitt received a letter from Addington urging the
need of an interview. Viewing the request as a sign of distress with which
he must in honour comply, Pitt agreed to stay a few days early in January
1803 at the White Lodge in Richmond Park, which the King had for the
time assigned to his favoured Minister. Addington described him as looking
far from well, though his strength had improved and his spirits and appetite
were good.[647] Apparently Pitt found the instruction of his host in finance a
under an incompetent chief, achieve that feat?
For by this time Addington had hopelessly deranged the nation's finance.
While giving up Pitt's drastic Income Tax, which had not brought in the
expected £10,000,000 but a net sum of £6,000,000, he raised the Assessed
Taxes by one third, increased Import and Export duties with impartial
rigour, and yet proposed to raise £5,000,000 by Exchequer Bills, which
were to be funded at the end of the Session or paid off by a loan. This signal
failure to meet the year's expenses within the year exasperated Pitt. At
Christmas, which he spent with Rose at his seat in the New Forest, he often
conversed on this topic; and his host thus summed up his own conclusions
in a letter to Bishop Tomline:
Cuffnells, December 24, 1802.[646]
... There is hardly a part of the Budget that is not too stupidly wrong
even for the doctor's dullness and ignorance. I am sure Mr. Pitt must
concur with me; and I have all the materials for him.—Wrong about
the increase of the revenue; wrong as to the produce of the
Consolidated Fund; scandalously wrong as to what is to be expected
from it in future by at least £2,800,000 a year; wrong as to the
money he will want this year by millions....
During his stay at Cuffnells Pitt received a letter from Addington urging the
need of an interview. Viewing the request as a sign of distress with which
he must in honour comply, Pitt agreed to stay a few days early in January
1803 at the White Lodge in Richmond Park, which the King had for the
time assigned to his favoured Minister. Addington described him as looking
far from well, though his strength had improved and his spirits and appetite
were good.[647] Apparently Pitt found the instruction of his host in finance a
Page 528
subject as dreary as the winter landscape. He afterwards told Rose that
Addington mooted his entrance to the Cabinet awkwardly during their
farewell drive to town. But this does not tally with another account, which
is that Pitt, on the plea of winding up the transfer of Holwood, suddenly left
the White Lodge on 6th January. On the 11th he wrote from Camden's seat,
The Wilderness, in Kent, that his views on foreign affairs were nearly in
accord with those of the Cabinet, but that he failed to convince Addington
of his financial error.
This, then, was still the rock of offence. Nevertheless, Pitt begged Rose not
to attack the Cabinet on that topic, as it would embarrass him. If it were
necessary on public grounds to set right the error, he (Pitt) would do so
himself on some fit occasion. Malmesbury and Canning did their utmost to
spur him on to a more decided opposition; and the latter wrote him a letter
of eight pages "too admonitory and too fault-finding for even Pitt's very
good humoured mind to bear."[648] Pitt replied by silence. In vain did
friends tell him that Ministers had assured the King of his intention to bring
forward Catholic Emancipation if he returned to office. In vain did
Malmesbury declare that Pitt must take the helm of State, otherwise Fox
would do so. In vain did Rose predict the country's ruin from Addington's
appalling ignorance of finance. Pitt still considered himself in honour bound
to support Addington. At the close of January he held friendly converse
with him, before setting out for Walmer for a time of rest and seclusion.
Canning's only consolation was that Bonaparte would come to their help,
and by some new act of violence end Pitt's scrupulous balancing between
the claims of national duty and of private obligations. The First Consul
dealt blow upon blow. Yet even so, Canning's hopes were long to remain
unfulfilled. As we saw in the former volume, the relations of Pitt to
Addington had for many years been of an intimate nature; but occasions
arise when a statesman ought promptly to act upon the maxim of Mirabeau
—"La petite morale est ennemie de la grande." In subordinating the
Addington mooted his entrance to the Cabinet awkwardly during their
farewell drive to town. But this does not tally with another account, which
is that Pitt, on the plea of winding up the transfer of Holwood, suddenly left
the White Lodge on 6th January. On the 11th he wrote from Camden's seat,
The Wilderness, in Kent, that his views on foreign affairs were nearly in
accord with those of the Cabinet, but that he failed to convince Addington
of his financial error.
This, then, was still the rock of offence. Nevertheless, Pitt begged Rose not
to attack the Cabinet on that topic, as it would embarrass him. If it were
necessary on public grounds to set right the error, he (Pitt) would do so
himself on some fit occasion. Malmesbury and Canning did their utmost to
spur him on to a more decided opposition; and the latter wrote him a letter
of eight pages "too admonitory and too fault-finding for even Pitt's very
good humoured mind to bear."[648] Pitt replied by silence. In vain did
friends tell him that Ministers had assured the King of his intention to bring
forward Catholic Emancipation if he returned to office. In vain did
Malmesbury declare that Pitt must take the helm of State, otherwise Fox
would do so. In vain did Rose predict the country's ruin from Addington's
appalling ignorance of finance. Pitt still considered himself in honour bound
to support Addington. At the close of January he held friendly converse
with him, before setting out for Walmer for a time of rest and seclusion.
Canning's only consolation was that Bonaparte would come to their help,
and by some new act of violence end Pitt's scrupulous balancing between
the claims of national duty and of private obligations. The First Consul
dealt blow upon blow. Yet even so, Canning's hopes were long to remain
unfulfilled. As we saw in the former volume, the relations of Pitt to
Addington had for many years been of an intimate nature; but occasions
arise when a statesman ought promptly to act upon the maxim of Mirabeau
—"La petite morale est ennemie de la grande." In subordinating the
Page 529
interests of England to the dictates of a deep-rooted but too exacting
friendship, Pitt was guilty of one of the most fatal blunders of that time.
friendship, Pitt was guilty of one of the most fatal blunders of that time.
Page 530
CHAPTER XXII
ADDINGTON OR PITT?
Once more doth Pitt deem the land crying loud to
him—
Frail though and spent, and an hungered for
restfulness
Once more responds he, dead fervours to energize
Aims to concentre, slack efforts to bind.
Thomas Hardy, The Dynasts,
Act i, sc. 3.
On 30th January 1803 there appeared in the "Moniteur" the official Report
of Colonel Sebastiani, Napoleon's envoy to the Levant. So threatening were
its terms respecting the situation in Egypt and Corfu, that the Addington
Ministry at once adopted a stiffer tone, and applied to Parliament for 10,000
additional seamen and the embodying of the militia. But the House, while
readily acceding on 9th March, evidently wanted not only more men but a
man. The return of Pitt to power was anxiously discussed in the lobbies.
The Duke of Portland and Lord Pelham strongly expressed their desire for
it. Yet Pitt remained at Walmer, feeling that he could not support financial
plans fraught with danger to the State. Addington therefore resolved to
sound him again with a view to his entering the Cabinet as a coadjutor. The
envoy whom he chose for this delicate mission was Henry Dundas, now
Lord Melville. He could count on his devotion; for, besides nominating him
ADDINGTON OR PITT?
Once more doth Pitt deem the land crying loud to
him—
Frail though and spent, and an hungered for
restfulness
Once more responds he, dead fervours to energize
Aims to concentre, slack efforts to bind.
Thomas Hardy, The Dynasts,
Act i, sc. 3.
On 30th January 1803 there appeared in the "Moniteur" the official Report
of Colonel Sebastiani, Napoleon's envoy to the Levant. So threatening were
its terms respecting the situation in Egypt and Corfu, that the Addington
Ministry at once adopted a stiffer tone, and applied to Parliament for 10,000
additional seamen and the embodying of the militia. But the House, while
readily acceding on 9th March, evidently wanted not only more men but a
man. The return of Pitt to power was anxiously discussed in the lobbies.
The Duke of Portland and Lord Pelham strongly expressed their desire for
it. Yet Pitt remained at Walmer, feeling that he could not support financial
plans fraught with danger to the State. Addington therefore resolved to
sound him again with a view to his entering the Cabinet as a coadjutor. The
envoy whom he chose for this delicate mission was Henry Dundas, now
Lord Melville. He could count on his devotion; for, besides nominating him
Page 531
for the peerage, he is said to have opened to his gaze a life of official
activity and patronage as First Lord of the Admiralty in place of the
parsimonious and unmannerly St. Vincent.[649] Pitt received his old friend at
Walmer with a shade of coolness in view of his declaration, on quitting
office, that he could accept no boon whatever from Addington. To come
now as his Cabinet-maker argued either overwhelming patriotism or
phenomenal restlessness.
Henry Dundas, First Viscount
Melville. (From a painting by Sir
T. Lawrence)
Nevertheless, the two friends resumed at Walmer the festive intercourse of
the Wimbledon days; and in due course, after dinner and wine, Melville
broached the subject of his visit. It was that Addington, who was First Lord
activity and patronage as First Lord of the Admiralty in place of the
parsimonious and unmannerly St. Vincent.[649] Pitt received his old friend at
Walmer with a shade of coolness in view of his declaration, on quitting
office, that he could accept no boon whatever from Addington. To come
now as his Cabinet-maker argued either overwhelming patriotism or
phenomenal restlessness.
Henry Dundas, First Viscount
Melville. (From a painting by Sir
T. Lawrence)
Nevertheless, the two friends resumed at Walmer the festive intercourse of
the Wimbledon days; and in due course, after dinner and wine, Melville
broached the subject of his visit. It was that Addington, who was First Lord
Page 532
of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, should resign the latter
office to Pitt, and take Lord Pelham's place as Secretary of State for Home
Affairs. We can picture the astonishment and wrath of Pitt as this singular
proposal came to light. At once he cut short the conversation, probably not
without expletives. But Melville was pertinacious where patriotism and
office were at stake; and their converse spread over the two days, 21st–22nd
March, Melville thereupon sending a summary of it to Addington, couched
in terms which Pitt deemed too favourable. The upshot was that on personal
grounds Pitt desired not to return to office; and, if affairs were efficiently
conducted, would prefer to continue his present independent support. If,
however, the misleading statements of the Treasury were persisted in, he
must criticize them. Above all, if he returned to office it must be as First
Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer.
But Addington, foreseeing that Pitt would claim his two former offices, had
concocted a sovereign remedy for all these personal sores. Pitt was to take
office as Chancellor of the Exchequer, serving under his brother, the Earl of
Chatham, as Prime Minister. Is it surprising that he negatived this singular
proposal "without reserve or affectation"? By way of retort to this family
prescription he charged Melville to point out the absolute need of the
Cabinet being under the control of "the First Minister," who must not only
have the confidence of the King and administer the finances, but also in the
last resort impose his will on his colleagues. For himself he declared he
would never come forward unless bound by public duty and with the
enjoyment of the fullest confidence of the King.[650] There is a discrepancy
between Melville's letter to Addington and a short account given by Pitt to
Wilberforce two years later, to the effect that Melville, on cautiously
opening his proposals at Walmer, saw that it would not do and stopped
abruptly. "Really," said Pitt with a sly severity, "I had not the curiosity to
ask what I was to be."
office to Pitt, and take Lord Pelham's place as Secretary of State for Home
Affairs. We can picture the astonishment and wrath of Pitt as this singular
proposal came to light. At once he cut short the conversation, probably not
without expletives. But Melville was pertinacious where patriotism and
office were at stake; and their converse spread over the two days, 21st–22nd
March, Melville thereupon sending a summary of it to Addington, couched
in terms which Pitt deemed too favourable. The upshot was that on personal
grounds Pitt desired not to return to office; and, if affairs were efficiently
conducted, would prefer to continue his present independent support. If,
however, the misleading statements of the Treasury were persisted in, he
must criticize them. Above all, if he returned to office it must be as First
Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer.
But Addington, foreseeing that Pitt would claim his two former offices, had
concocted a sovereign remedy for all these personal sores. Pitt was to take
office as Chancellor of the Exchequer, serving under his brother, the Earl of
Chatham, as Prime Minister. Is it surprising that he negatived this singular
proposal "without reserve or affectation"? By way of retort to this family
prescription he charged Melville to point out the absolute need of the
Cabinet being under the control of "the First Minister," who must not only
have the confidence of the King and administer the finances, but also in the
last resort impose his will on his colleagues. For himself he declared he
would never come forward unless bound by public duty and with the
enjoyment of the fullest confidence of the King.[650] There is a discrepancy
between Melville's letter to Addington and a short account given by Pitt to
Wilberforce two years later, to the effect that Melville, on cautiously
opening his proposals at Walmer, saw that it would not do and stopped
abruptly. "Really," said Pitt with a sly severity, "I had not the curiosity to
ask what I was to be."
Page 533
Such was the bomb-shell exploded on Addington's bureau on 23rd March. It
must have cost him no less concern than Bonaparte's outrageous behaviour
to our ambassador, Lord Whitworth, ten days before. That scene before the
diplomatic circle at the Tuileries portended war. How would Addington and
his colleagues behave in this crisis? Would they sink all personal feelings,
and, admitting that they could not weather the storm, accept the help and
guidance of long tried navigators? Or would they stand on their dignity and
order the pilot-boat to sheer off? Clearly it was a case where half measures
were useless. The old captain and his chosen subalterns must command the
ship. Pitt made this clear during conversations with Addington at Long's
house at Bromley Hill (10th April). While declaring that he would not urge
any point inconsistent with His Majesty's intentions, he demanded that
Grenville, Melville, Spencer, and Windham should enter the Cabinet with
him on the clearly expressed desire of the King, and at the request of the
present Ministry. The last conditions seem severe. But Pitt's pledge to
Addington made it essential that the Prime Minister should take the first
step. To these terms two days later Addington made demur, but promised to
communicate them to his colleagues; whereupon Pitt declared that he had
said the last word on the matter; and when Ministers objected to Grenville
and Windham, he was inexorable.[651] That their anger waxed hot against
him appears from the following letter sent to Pitt by Lord Redesdale,
formerly Sir John Mitford, and now Lord Chancellor of Ireland, who had
been with Pitt and Addington at their conferences at Bromley:
Albemarle St., April 16, 1803.[652]
What passed yesterday and the day before at Bromley Hill, has
made so strong an impression on my mind that I have been unable
to relieve myself from the anxiety which it has occasioned.
However you may flatter yourself to the contrary, it seems to me
most clear that your return into office, with the impression under
must have cost him no less concern than Bonaparte's outrageous behaviour
to our ambassador, Lord Whitworth, ten days before. That scene before the
diplomatic circle at the Tuileries portended war. How would Addington and
his colleagues behave in this crisis? Would they sink all personal feelings,
and, admitting that they could not weather the storm, accept the help and
guidance of long tried navigators? Or would they stand on their dignity and
order the pilot-boat to sheer off? Clearly it was a case where half measures
were useless. The old captain and his chosen subalterns must command the
ship. Pitt made this clear during conversations with Addington at Long's
house at Bromley Hill (10th April). While declaring that he would not urge
any point inconsistent with His Majesty's intentions, he demanded that
Grenville, Melville, Spencer, and Windham should enter the Cabinet with
him on the clearly expressed desire of the King, and at the request of the
present Ministry. The last conditions seem severe. But Pitt's pledge to
Addington made it essential that the Prime Minister should take the first
step. To these terms two days later Addington made demur, but promised to
communicate them to his colleagues; whereupon Pitt declared that he had
said the last word on the matter; and when Ministers objected to Grenville
and Windham, he was inexorable.[651] That their anger waxed hot against
him appears from the following letter sent to Pitt by Lord Redesdale,
formerly Sir John Mitford, and now Lord Chancellor of Ireland, who had
been with Pitt and Addington at their conferences at Bromley:
Albemarle St., April 16, 1803.[652]
What passed yesterday and the day before at Bromley Hill, has
made so strong an impression on my mind that I have been unable
to relieve myself from the anxiety which it has occasioned.
However you may flatter yourself to the contrary, it seems to me
most clear that your return into office, with the impression under
Page 534
which you have appeared to act, must have the effect of driving
from their situations every man now in office, and making a greater
change than has ever been made on any similar occasion. I think
myself as one of those persons individually intitled to call upon your
honour not to pursue the line of conduct which you seem
determined to adopt. The present Administration, so far from having
been formed in hostility to you, was avowedly formed of your
friends. When you quitted office, you repeatedly declared that you
should consider yourself as obliged to those friends who would
continue in office or would accept office under Mr. Addington. You
must recollect that I expressed to you my disapprobation of the
change and my wish to retire to my situation at the Bar, quitting the
office of Attorney-General; and that you used to me these words
—"That you must not do, for my sake." The words were too
strongly impressed upon my mind at the moment to have escaped
my memory. You encouraged me to take the office of Speaker much
against my will. If I had not taken that office, nothing should have
induced me to take that in which I am now placed, and by which I
have been brought into a position of much anxiety, separated from
all my old friends. Many many others are in similar situations, and
all are to be sacrificed to those men who were said by yourself at the
time to be acting in contradiction to your wishes in quitting their
offices or those who dragged you out of office with them. You will
probably tell me that you have no such intentions, particularly with
respect to myself. But, whatever may be your intentions, such must
be the unavoidable consequence of the changes which you have
determined upon. I thought, when I took a situation under the
Administration at the head of which you placed Mr. Addington, that
I was doing you service. It was of no small importance to you,
whether you looked to a return to office, or to retirement from
public life, that the Government should not fall into the hands of
those who had been engaged in violent opposition to you; and you
yourself stated to me that you apprehended that must be the
consequence if Mr. Addington should not be able to form an
Administration.... Some of your last words to me induce me to think
that you have not yourself abandoned the plan formed for giving to
from their situations every man now in office, and making a greater
change than has ever been made on any similar occasion. I think
myself as one of those persons individually intitled to call upon your
honour not to pursue the line of conduct which you seem
determined to adopt. The present Administration, so far from having
been formed in hostility to you, was avowedly formed of your
friends. When you quitted office, you repeatedly declared that you
should consider yourself as obliged to those friends who would
continue in office or would accept office under Mr. Addington. You
must recollect that I expressed to you my disapprobation of the
change and my wish to retire to my situation at the Bar, quitting the
office of Attorney-General; and that you used to me these words
—"That you must not do, for my sake." The words were too
strongly impressed upon my mind at the moment to have escaped
my memory. You encouraged me to take the office of Speaker much
against my will. If I had not taken that office, nothing should have
induced me to take that in which I am now placed, and by which I
have been brought into a position of much anxiety, separated from
all my old friends. Many many others are in similar situations, and
all are to be sacrificed to those men who were said by yourself at the
time to be acting in contradiction to your wishes in quitting their
offices or those who dragged you out of office with them. You will
probably tell me that you have no such intentions, particularly with
respect to myself. But, whatever may be your intentions, such must
be the unavoidable consequence of the changes which you have
determined upon. I thought, when I took a situation under the
Administration at the head of which you placed Mr. Addington, that
I was doing you service. It was of no small importance to you,
whether you looked to a return to office, or to retirement from
public life, that the Government should not fall into the hands of
those who had been engaged in violent opposition to you; and you
yourself stated to me that you apprehended that must be the
consequence if Mr. Addington should not be able to form an
Administration.... Some of your last words to me induce me to think
that you have not yourself abandoned the plan formed for giving to
Page 535
the Roman Catholic Church full establishment in Ireland—for such
I consider the plan suggested by Lord Castlereagh, with any
modification of which it is capable. Indeed, if all those who went
out of office because that measure was not approved then (such
being the ostensible cause of their quitting their stations) are to
come into office again, there can be no doubt in the mind of the
public that it is determined to carry that measure....
That at so critical a juncture a supporter of Addington, not of Cabinet rank,
should rake up personal reasons why Pitt should let things drift to ruin is
inconceivable. And did Redesdale really believe Protestantism to be
endangered by Pitt's return to office, after his assurance at Bromley that he
would not press any point at variance with the royal resolves? The King,
who knew Pitt far better than Redesdale did, had no fear that he would belie
his word by bringing forward Catholic Emancipation. But the phrases in the
letter quoted above show that some of the Ministers were preparing to beat
the drum ecclesiastic, and, in the teeth of the evidence, to charge Pitt with
ingratitude and duplicity if he became Prime Minister. Ignoring the national
crisis, they concentrated attention solely on the personal questions at issue;
and it is humiliating to have to add that their petty scheming won the day. A
compromise between Pitt and Addington was exceedingly difficult, but their
reproaches and innuendoes made it impossible.[653]
The outcome was disastrous. The failure to form a strong and truly national
Administration ended all hope of peace. Over against Addington set
Bonaparte; with Hawkesbury compare Talleyrand; with Hobart, Berthier.
[654] The weighing need go no further. The British Ministry kicks the beam;
and in that signal inequality is one of the chief causes of the war of 1803.
The first Consul, like the Czar Alexander I, despised the Addington
Cabinet. He could not believe that men who were laughed at by their own
supporters would dare to face him in arms. Twice he made the mistake of
I consider the plan suggested by Lord Castlereagh, with any
modification of which it is capable. Indeed, if all those who went
out of office because that measure was not approved then (such
being the ostensible cause of their quitting their stations) are to
come into office again, there can be no doubt in the mind of the
public that it is determined to carry that measure....
That at so critical a juncture a supporter of Addington, not of Cabinet rank,
should rake up personal reasons why Pitt should let things drift to ruin is
inconceivable. And did Redesdale really believe Protestantism to be
endangered by Pitt's return to office, after his assurance at Bromley that he
would not press any point at variance with the royal resolves? The King,
who knew Pitt far better than Redesdale did, had no fear that he would belie
his word by bringing forward Catholic Emancipation. But the phrases in the
letter quoted above show that some of the Ministers were preparing to beat
the drum ecclesiastic, and, in the teeth of the evidence, to charge Pitt with
ingratitude and duplicity if he became Prime Minister. Ignoring the national
crisis, they concentrated attention solely on the personal questions at issue;
and it is humiliating to have to add that their petty scheming won the day. A
compromise between Pitt and Addington was exceedingly difficult, but their
reproaches and innuendoes made it impossible.[653]
The outcome was disastrous. The failure to form a strong and truly national
Administration ended all hope of peace. Over against Addington set
Bonaparte; with Hawkesbury compare Talleyrand; with Hobart, Berthier.
[654] The weighing need go no further. The British Ministry kicks the beam;
and in that signal inequality is one of the chief causes of the war of 1803.
The first Consul, like the Czar Alexander I, despised the Addington
Cabinet. He could not believe that men who were laughed at by their own
supporters would dare to face him in arms. Twice he made the mistake of
Page 536
judging a nation by its Ministers—England by Addington in 1803, Spain by
Godoy in 1808. Both blunders were natural, and both were irreparable; but
those peoples had to pour forth their life blood to recover the position from
which weakness and folly allowed them to slide. Politics, like meteorology,
teaches that any sharp difference of pressure, whether mental or
atmospheric, draws in a strong current to redress the balance. Never were
the conditions more cyclonic than in 1803. A decade of strife scarcely made
good the inequality between the organized might of France and the
administrative chaos of her neighbours; between the Titanic Corsican and
the mediocrities or knaves who held the reins at London, Vienna, Berlin,
and Madrid.
War having been declared on 18th May 1803, Pitt sought the first
opportunity of inspiriting Parliament and the nation. On the 23rd a great
concourse crowded the House in the hope of hearing him speak; and cries
of "Pitt, Pitt" arose as he strode to his seat on the third row behind
Ministers, beside one of the pillars. The position gave point to a remark of
Canning to Lord Malmesbury, that Pitt would fire over the heads of
Ministers, neither praising nor blaming them, but merely supporting the
policy of the war. Such was the case. Replying to a few criticisms of
Erskine, he defended the Cabinet and powerfully described the unbearable
aggressions of the First Consul.
The speech aroused a patriotic fervour which cannot be fully realized from
the meagre and dreary summary of it which survives. Romilly pronounced
it among the finest, if not the very finest, which he had ever made;[655] and
Sheridan, in a vinous effusion to Lady Bessborough, called it "one of the
most magnificent pieces of declamation that ever fell from that rascal Pitt's
lips. Detesting the dog, as I do, I cannot withhold this just tribute to the
scoundrel's talents." There follows a lament over Pitt's want of honesty,
which betokens the maudlin mood preceding complete intoxication.[656] On
Godoy in 1808. Both blunders were natural, and both were irreparable; but
those peoples had to pour forth their life blood to recover the position from
which weakness and folly allowed them to slide. Politics, like meteorology,
teaches that any sharp difference of pressure, whether mental or
atmospheric, draws in a strong current to redress the balance. Never were
the conditions more cyclonic than in 1803. A decade of strife scarcely made
good the inequality between the organized might of France and the
administrative chaos of her neighbours; between the Titanic Corsican and
the mediocrities or knaves who held the reins at London, Vienna, Berlin,
and Madrid.
War having been declared on 18th May 1803, Pitt sought the first
opportunity of inspiriting Parliament and the nation. On the 23rd a great
concourse crowded the House in the hope of hearing him speak; and cries
of "Pitt, Pitt" arose as he strode to his seat on the third row behind
Ministers, beside one of the pillars. The position gave point to a remark of
Canning to Lord Malmesbury, that Pitt would fire over the heads of
Ministers, neither praising nor blaming them, but merely supporting the
policy of the war. Such was the case. Replying to a few criticisms of
Erskine, he defended the Cabinet and powerfully described the unbearable
aggressions of the First Consul.
The speech aroused a patriotic fervour which cannot be fully realized from
the meagre and dreary summary of it which survives. Romilly pronounced
it among the finest, if not the very finest, which he had ever made;[655] and
Sheridan, in a vinous effusion to Lady Bessborough, called it "one of the
most magnificent pieces of declamation that ever fell from that rascal Pitt's
lips. Detesting the dog, as I do, I cannot withhold this just tribute to the
scoundrel's talents." There follows a lament over Pitt's want of honesty,
which betokens the maudlin mood preceding complete intoxication.[656] On
Page 537
the morrow Fox vehemently blamed the Cabinet in a speech which, for
width of survey, acuteness of dialectic, wealth of illustration and abhorrence
of war, stands unrivalled. Addington's reply exhibited his hopeless
mediocrity; but, thanks to Pitt, Ministers triumphed by 398 votes to 67. As
they resented the absence of definite praise in his speech, he withdrew to
Walmer, there to serve his country and embarrass his finances by raising the
Cinque Ports Volunteers.
Before recounting Pitt's services in East Kent, I must mention a
bereavement which he had sustained. His mother died, after a very short
seizure, at Burton Pynsent on 3rd April 1803. Thus was snapped a link
connecting England with a mighty past. A quarter of a century had elapsed
since her consort was laid to rest in the family vault in Westminster Abbey;
she followed him while the storm-fiends were shrouding in strife the two
hereditary foes; and the Napoleonic War was destined to bring her gifted
son thither in less than three years. The father had linked the name of Pitt
with military triumphs; the son, with futile efforts for peace and goodwill;
but the lives both of the war-lord and of the would-be peacemaker were to
be ended by tidings of national disaster.
No parleying now. In Britain is one breath;
We all are with you now from shore to shore;
Ye men of Kent, 'tis victory or death!
We all know these lines of Wordsworth. Do we know equally well that on
Pitt, as Lord Warden, fell the chief burden of organization on the most
easily accessible coast, that which stretches from Ramsgate to Rye?[657] It
was defenceless but for the antiquated works at Sandown, Deal, Walmer,
Dover, and a few small redoubts further west. Evidently men must be the
ramparts, and Pitt sought to stimulate the Volunteer Movement, which now
again made headway. He strove to make it a National Movement. At the
width of survey, acuteness of dialectic, wealth of illustration and abhorrence
of war, stands unrivalled. Addington's reply exhibited his hopeless
mediocrity; but, thanks to Pitt, Ministers triumphed by 398 votes to 67. As
they resented the absence of definite praise in his speech, he withdrew to
Walmer, there to serve his country and embarrass his finances by raising the
Cinque Ports Volunteers.
Before recounting Pitt's services in East Kent, I must mention a
bereavement which he had sustained. His mother died, after a very short
seizure, at Burton Pynsent on 3rd April 1803. Thus was snapped a link
connecting England with a mighty past. A quarter of a century had elapsed
since her consort was laid to rest in the family vault in Westminster Abbey;
she followed him while the storm-fiends were shrouding in strife the two
hereditary foes; and the Napoleonic War was destined to bring her gifted
son thither in less than three years. The father had linked the name of Pitt
with military triumphs; the son, with futile efforts for peace and goodwill;
but the lives both of the war-lord and of the would-be peacemaker were to
be ended by tidings of national disaster.
No parleying now. In Britain is one breath;
We all are with you now from shore to shore;
Ye men of Kent, 'tis victory or death!
We all know these lines of Wordsworth. Do we know equally well that on
Pitt, as Lord Warden, fell the chief burden of organization on the most
easily accessible coast, that which stretches from Ramsgate to Rye?[657] It
was defenceless but for the antiquated works at Sandown, Deal, Walmer,
Dover, and a few small redoubts further west. Evidently men must be the
ramparts, and Pitt sought to stimulate the Volunteer Movement, which now
again made headway. He strove to make it a National Movement. At the
Page 538
close of July he sent an official offer to raise 3,000 Volunteers in Walmer
and its neighbourhood; and he urged Ministers to have recourse to a levée
en masse, whereupon Yorke, Under Secretary at War, proposed a scheme
somewhat on those lines. Probably the encouragement offered to Volunteers
was too great; for, while they were required to do less than was necessary to
ensure efficiency, they were freed from all risk of compulsory enrolment in
the Militia. This force and the Army consequently suffered, while the
Volunteer Associations grew apace. On 27th October 1803 the King
reviewed in Hyde Park as many as 27,000 of the London Volunteers and
showed his caustic wit by giving the nickname of "the Devil's Own" to the
Inns of Court Volunteers.
Pitt was not present on this occasion, he and his neighbour, Lord
Carrington, on whom in 1802 he bestowed the command of Deal Castle,
being busy in organizing the local Volunteers. As Constable of Dover
Castle, Pitt summoned the delegates of the Cinque Ports to meet him there
to discuss the raising of local corps; and he gave the sum of £1,000 towards
their expenses. Dover contributed £885; Sandwich, £887; Margate, £538,
and so on. As Lord Warden, he also took steps to secure a large number of
recruits for the new Army of Reserve, and he further instructed local
authorities to send in returns of all men of military age, besides carts,
horses, and stock, with a view to the "driving" of the district in case of a
landing.[658] At Walmer he kept open house for officers and guests who
visited that coast. By the end of the year 1803 more than 10,000
Kentishmen had enrolled as Volunteers, and 1,040 in the Army of Reserve,
exclusive of Sea Fencibles serving on gunboats. For the whole of Great
Britain the totals were 379,000 and 31,000 respectively.[659] Pitt's joke at
the expense of a battalion which laid more stress on privileges than drills,
has become historic. Its organizers sent up a plan containing several
stipulations as to their duties, with exceptions "in case of actual invasion."
Pitt lost patience at this Falstaff-like conduct, and opposite the clause that
and its neighbourhood; and he urged Ministers to have recourse to a levée
en masse, whereupon Yorke, Under Secretary at War, proposed a scheme
somewhat on those lines. Probably the encouragement offered to Volunteers
was too great; for, while they were required to do less than was necessary to
ensure efficiency, they were freed from all risk of compulsory enrolment in
the Militia. This force and the Army consequently suffered, while the
Volunteer Associations grew apace. On 27th October 1803 the King
reviewed in Hyde Park as many as 27,000 of the London Volunteers and
showed his caustic wit by giving the nickname of "the Devil's Own" to the
Inns of Court Volunteers.
Pitt was not present on this occasion, he and his neighbour, Lord
Carrington, on whom in 1802 he bestowed the command of Deal Castle,
being busy in organizing the local Volunteers. As Constable of Dover
Castle, Pitt summoned the delegates of the Cinque Ports to meet him there
to discuss the raising of local corps; and he gave the sum of £1,000 towards
their expenses. Dover contributed £885; Sandwich, £887; Margate, £538,
and so on. As Lord Warden, he also took steps to secure a large number of
recruits for the new Army of Reserve, and he further instructed local
authorities to send in returns of all men of military age, besides carts,
horses, and stock, with a view to the "driving" of the district in case of a
landing.[658] At Walmer he kept open house for officers and guests who
visited that coast. By the end of the year 1803 more than 10,000
Kentishmen had enrolled as Volunteers, and 1,040 in the Army of Reserve,
exclusive of Sea Fencibles serving on gunboats. For the whole of Great
Britain the totals were 379,000 and 31,000 respectively.[659] Pitt's joke at
the expense of a battalion which laid more stress on privileges than drills,
has become historic. Its organizers sent up a plan containing several
stipulations as to their duties, with exceptions "in case of actual invasion."
Pitt lost patience at this Falstaff-like conduct, and opposite the clause that
Page 539
they were on no account to be sent out of the country he wrote the stinging
comment—"except in case of invasion."
The pen of Lady Hester Stanhope gives life-like glimpses of him during the
endless drills between Deal and Dover. She had fled from the levelling
vagaries of Earl Stanhope at Chevening to Lady Chatham at Burton
Pynsent; but that home being now broken up, Pitt offered to install her at
Walmer Castle. He did so with some misgiving; for her queenly airs and
sprightly sallies, however pleasing as a tonic, promised little for comfort
and repose. But the experiment succeeded beyond all hope. She soon learnt
to admire his serenity, while his home was the livelier for the coming of this
meteoric being. Her complexion was dazzlingly bright. Her eyes, usually
blue, would flash black, as did those of Chatham in moments of excitement.
Her features, too, had a magical play of expression, lighting up at a pleasing
fancy, or again darting forth scorn, with the April-like alternations that
irradiated and overclouded the brow of her grandsire. Kinglake, who saw
her half a century later in her Syrian fastness, was struck by the likeness to
the Chatham of Copley's famous picture.
Certainly she had more in common with him than with the younger Pitt.
During the time when she brought storm and sunshine to Walmer, Park
Place, and Bowling Green House, she often rallied her uncle on showing
undue complaisance to the King or to stupid colleagues whom the Great
Commoner would have overawed. Pitt laughingly took the second place,
and at times vowed that when her voice rang with excitement, he caught an
echo of the tones of his father.[660] Perhaps it was this which reconciled him
to her vagaries. For her whims and moods even then showed the
extravagance which made her the dreaded Sultana of that lonely Syrian
castle where she ended her days amidst thirty quarrelsome but awe-struck
servants, and an equal number of cats, over whom an apprehensive doctor
held doubtful sway.
comment—"except in case of invasion."
The pen of Lady Hester Stanhope gives life-like glimpses of him during the
endless drills between Deal and Dover. She had fled from the levelling
vagaries of Earl Stanhope at Chevening to Lady Chatham at Burton
Pynsent; but that home being now broken up, Pitt offered to install her at
Walmer Castle. He did so with some misgiving; for her queenly airs and
sprightly sallies, however pleasing as a tonic, promised little for comfort
and repose. But the experiment succeeded beyond all hope. She soon learnt
to admire his serenity, while his home was the livelier for the coming of this
meteoric being. Her complexion was dazzlingly bright. Her eyes, usually
blue, would flash black, as did those of Chatham in moments of excitement.
Her features, too, had a magical play of expression, lighting up at a pleasing
fancy, or again darting forth scorn, with the April-like alternations that
irradiated and overclouded the brow of her grandsire. Kinglake, who saw
her half a century later in her Syrian fastness, was struck by the likeness to
the Chatham of Copley's famous picture.
Certainly she had more in common with him than with the younger Pitt.
During the time when she brought storm and sunshine to Walmer, Park
Place, and Bowling Green House, she often rallied her uncle on showing
undue complaisance to the King or to stupid colleagues whom the Great
Commoner would have overawed. Pitt laughingly took the second place,
and at times vowed that when her voice rang with excitement, he caught an
echo of the tones of his father.[660] Perhaps it was this which reconciled him
to her vagaries. For her whims and moods even then showed the
extravagance which made her the dreaded Sultana of that lonely Syrian
castle where she ended her days amidst thirty quarrelsome but awe-struck
servants, and an equal number of cats, over whom an apprehensive doctor
held doubtful sway.
Page 540
But that bitter, repining, spirit-haunted exile was far different from the
joyous creature who shed light on Pitt. Her spasmodic nature needed his
strength; her waywardness, his affectionate control. As for her tart retorts,
terrifying to bores and toadies, they only amused him. In truth she brought
into his life a beam of the sunshine which might have flooded it had he
married Eleanor Eden. Hester soon found that, far from being indifferent to
the charms of women, he was an exacting judge of beauty, even of dress. In
fact, she pronounced him to be perfect in household life. His abilities in
gardening astonished her; and we may doubt the correctness of the local
legend which ascribes to her the landscape-gardening undertaken in the
grounds of Walmer Castle in 1803. The dell at the top of the grounds was
Hester's favourite haunt.
The varied excitements of the time are mirrored in her sprightly letters.
Thus, on 15th November 1803, she wrote at Walmer:
We took one of their gunboats the other day: and, as soon as she
came in, Mr. Pitt, Charles,[661] Lord Camden and myself took a Deal
boat and rowed alongside of her. She had two large guns on board,
30 soldiers and 4 sailors. She is about 30 feet long, and only draws
about 4 feet of water; an ill-contrived thing, and so little above the
water that, had she as many men on board as she could really carry,
a moderate storm would wash them overboard.... Mr. Pitt's 1st
battalion of his newly-raised regiment was reviewed the other day
by General Dundas, who expressed himself equally surprised and
pleased by the state of discipline he found them in.... I like all this
sort of thing, and I admire my uncle most particularly when
surrounded with a tribe of military attendants. But what is all this
pageantry compared with the unaffected simplicity of real greatness!
joyous creature who shed light on Pitt. Her spasmodic nature needed his
strength; her waywardness, his affectionate control. As for her tart retorts,
terrifying to bores and toadies, they only amused him. In truth she brought
into his life a beam of the sunshine which might have flooded it had he
married Eleanor Eden. Hester soon found that, far from being indifferent to
the charms of women, he was an exacting judge of beauty, even of dress. In
fact, she pronounced him to be perfect in household life. His abilities in
gardening astonished her; and we may doubt the correctness of the local
legend which ascribes to her the landscape-gardening undertaken in the
grounds of Walmer Castle in 1803. The dell at the top of the grounds was
Hester's favourite haunt.
The varied excitements of the time are mirrored in her sprightly letters.
Thus, on 15th November 1803, she wrote at Walmer:
We took one of their gunboats the other day: and, as soon as she
came in, Mr. Pitt, Charles,[661] Lord Camden and myself took a Deal
boat and rowed alongside of her. She had two large guns on board,
30 soldiers and 4 sailors. She is about 30 feet long, and only draws
about 4 feet of water; an ill-contrived thing, and so little above the
water that, had she as many men on board as she could really carry,
a moderate storm would wash them overboard.... Mr. Pitt's 1st
battalion of his newly-raised regiment was reviewed the other day
by General Dundas, who expressed himself equally surprised and
pleased by the state of discipline he found them in.... I like all this
sort of thing, and I admire my uncle most particularly when
surrounded with a tribe of military attendants. But what is all this
pageantry compared with the unaffected simplicity of real greatness!
Page 541
Walmer Castle, Nov. 19, 1803.
To F. R. Jackson, Esq.
To express the kindness with which Mr. Pitt welcomed my return
and proposed my living with him would be impossible; one would
really suppose that all obligation was on his side. Here then am I,
happy to a degree; exactly in the sort of society I most like. There
are generally three or four men staying in the house, and we dine
eight or ten almost every other day. Military and naval characters
are constantly welcome here; women are not, I suppose, because
they do not form any part of our society. You may guess, then, what
a pretty fuss they make with me. Pitt absolutely goes through the
fatigue of a drill sergeant. It is parade after parade at 15 or 20
minutes' distance from each other. I often attend him; and it is quite
as much as I am equal to, although I am remarkably well just now.
The hard riding I do not mind, but to remain almost still so many
hours on horseback is an incomprehensible bore, and requires more
patience than you can easily imagine. However, I suppose few
regiments for the time were ever so forward; therefore the trouble is
nothing. If Mr. Pitt does not overdo and injure his health every other
consideration becomes trifling. [She then states her anxiety on this
score. She rarely speaks to him on it, as he particularly dislikes it.
She adds:] I am happy to tell you, sincerely, I see nothing at all
alarming about him. He had a cough when I first came to England,
but it has nearly or quite left him. He is thin, but certainly strong,
and his spirits are excellent.... Mr. Pitt is determined to remain
acting colonel when his regiment is called into the field.
On this topic Pitt met with a rebuff from General (afterwards Sir John)
Moore, commander of the newly formed camp at Shorncliffe, near
Folkestone. Pitt rode over from Walmer to ask his advice, and his question
as to the position he and his Volunteers should take brought the following
reply: "Do you see that hill? You and yours shall be drawn up on it, where
To F. R. Jackson, Esq.
To express the kindness with which Mr. Pitt welcomed my return
and proposed my living with him would be impossible; one would
really suppose that all obligation was on his side. Here then am I,
happy to a degree; exactly in the sort of society I most like. There
are generally three or four men staying in the house, and we dine
eight or ten almost every other day. Military and naval characters
are constantly welcome here; women are not, I suppose, because
they do not form any part of our society. You may guess, then, what
a pretty fuss they make with me. Pitt absolutely goes through the
fatigue of a drill sergeant. It is parade after parade at 15 or 20
minutes' distance from each other. I often attend him; and it is quite
as much as I am equal to, although I am remarkably well just now.
The hard riding I do not mind, but to remain almost still so many
hours on horseback is an incomprehensible bore, and requires more
patience than you can easily imagine. However, I suppose few
regiments for the time were ever so forward; therefore the trouble is
nothing. If Mr. Pitt does not overdo and injure his health every other
consideration becomes trifling. [She then states her anxiety on this
score. She rarely speaks to him on it, as he particularly dislikes it.
She adds:] I am happy to tell you, sincerely, I see nothing at all
alarming about him. He had a cough when I first came to England,
but it has nearly or quite left him. He is thin, but certainly strong,
and his spirits are excellent.... Mr. Pitt is determined to remain
acting colonel when his regiment is called into the field.
On this topic Pitt met with a rebuff from General (afterwards Sir John)
Moore, commander of the newly formed camp at Shorncliffe, near
Folkestone. Pitt rode over from Walmer to ask his advice, and his question
as to the position he and his Volunteers should take brought the following
reply: "Do you see that hill? You and yours shall be drawn up on it, where
Page 542
you will make a most formidable appearance to the enemy, while I with the
soldiers will be fighting on the beach." Pitt was highly amused at this
professional retort; but at the close of 1804 his regiment was pronounced by
General David Dundas fit to take the field with regulars. Life in the open
and regular exercise on horseback served to strengthen Pitt's frame; for
Hester, writing in the middle of January 1804, when her uncle was away in
London for a few days, says: "His most intimate friends say they do not
remember him so well since the year '97.... Oh! such miserable things as
these French gunboats. We took a vessel the other day, laden with gin—to
keep their spirits up, I suppose." Bonaparte was believed to be at Boulogne;
and there was much alarm about a landing; but she was resolved "not to be
driven up country like a sheep."
This phrase refers to the arrangements for "driving" the country, that is,
sweeping it bare of everything in front of the invaders. The plans for
"driving" were thorough, but were finally pronounced unworkable. His
efforts to meet the Boulogne flotilla were also most vigorous. On 18th
October 1803 he informs Rose that he had 170 gunboats ready between
Hastings and Margate to give the enemy a good reception whenever they
appeared. He adds: "Our Volunteers are, I think, likely to be called upon to
undertake permanent duty, which, I hope, they will readily consent to. I
suppose the same measure will be recommended in your part of the coast
[West Hants]. I wish the arrangements for defence were as forward
everywhere else as they are in Hythe Bay under General Moore. We begin
now to have no other fear in that quarter than that the enemy will not give
us an opportunity of putting our preparations to the proof, and will select
some other point which we should not be in reach of in the first instance."
On 10th November he expresses a hope of repelling any force that
attempted to land in East Kent, but fears that elsewhere the French cannot
be stopped until they arrive disagreeably near to London.[662]
soldiers will be fighting on the beach." Pitt was highly amused at this
professional retort; but at the close of 1804 his regiment was pronounced by
General David Dundas fit to take the field with regulars. Life in the open
and regular exercise on horseback served to strengthen Pitt's frame; for
Hester, writing in the middle of January 1804, when her uncle was away in
London for a few days, says: "His most intimate friends say they do not
remember him so well since the year '97.... Oh! such miserable things as
these French gunboats. We took a vessel the other day, laden with gin—to
keep their spirits up, I suppose." Bonaparte was believed to be at Boulogne;
and there was much alarm about a landing; but she was resolved "not to be
driven up country like a sheep."
This phrase refers to the arrangements for "driving" the country, that is,
sweeping it bare of everything in front of the invaders. The plans for
"driving" were thorough, but were finally pronounced unworkable. His
efforts to meet the Boulogne flotilla were also most vigorous. On 18th
October 1803 he informs Rose that he had 170 gunboats ready between
Hastings and Margate to give the enemy a good reception whenever they
appeared. He adds: "Our Volunteers are, I think, likely to be called upon to
undertake permanent duty, which, I hope, they will readily consent to. I
suppose the same measure will be recommended in your part of the coast
[West Hants]. I wish the arrangements for defence were as forward
everywhere else as they are in Hythe Bay under General Moore. We begin
now to have no other fear in that quarter than that the enemy will not give
us an opportunity of putting our preparations to the proof, and will select
some other point which we should not be in reach of in the first instance."
On 10th November he expresses a hope of repelling any force that
attempted to land in East Kent, but fears that elsewhere the French cannot
be stopped until they arrive disagreeably near to London.[662]
Page 543
It is clear, then, that Pitt was not dismayed by the startling disparity of
forces. On the coast of Flanders and Picardy were ranged regular troops
amounting to 114,554 men seemingly ready for embarkation on an
immense flotilla of small craft, part of which was heavily armed. It is now
known that these imposing forces were rarely, if ever, up to their nominal
strength; that part of the flotilla was unseaworthy; that the difficulties of
getting under way were never overcome; and that the unwieldy mass would
probably have been routed, if not destroyed, by the cruisers and gunboats
stationed on the Kentish coast. Still, even if part of it made land, the crisis
would be serious in view of the paucity and want of organization of the
British forces. As bearing on this subject, a letter of Lord Melville to a
relative deserves quotation:
"Dunira, 16 Dec., 1803.[663]
"Dear Alexander,
"I received your letter from Walmer and was extreamly happy to
learn from it that Mr. Pitt was in such excellent health. Long, I pray,
may it continue. He has been very usefully and creditably
employed, but not exactly in the way his country could have
wished; but that is a subject on which I never now allow myself to
think.... If Mr. Pitt, from what he feels within himself or from the
enthusiasm he may have inspired in those he commands, conceives
that the defence of the country could at any time be safely entrusted
with the Volunteers alone, as the newspapers seem to convey as his
sentiments, he is by much too sanguine. On the other hand it is
talking wildly, or like old women, to contend, as Mr. Windham and
Mr. Fox do, that great bodies of Britains [sic], with arms in their
hands and trained to the use of them, are not a most important
bulwark of security to the Empire. My opinion, however, lays
perhaps in the middle, and I would have greatly preferred a much
smaller number to have secured more effectually their uniform
forces. On the coast of Flanders and Picardy were ranged regular troops
amounting to 114,554 men seemingly ready for embarkation on an
immense flotilla of small craft, part of which was heavily armed. It is now
known that these imposing forces were rarely, if ever, up to their nominal
strength; that part of the flotilla was unseaworthy; that the difficulties of
getting under way were never overcome; and that the unwieldy mass would
probably have been routed, if not destroyed, by the cruisers and gunboats
stationed on the Kentish coast. Still, even if part of it made land, the crisis
would be serious in view of the paucity and want of organization of the
British forces. As bearing on this subject, a letter of Lord Melville to a
relative deserves quotation:
"Dunira, 16 Dec., 1803.[663]
"Dear Alexander,
"I received your letter from Walmer and was extreamly happy to
learn from it that Mr. Pitt was in such excellent health. Long, I pray,
may it continue. He has been very usefully and creditably
employed, but not exactly in the way his country could have
wished; but that is a subject on which I never now allow myself to
think.... If Mr. Pitt, from what he feels within himself or from the
enthusiasm he may have inspired in those he commands, conceives
that the defence of the country could at any time be safely entrusted
with the Volunteers alone, as the newspapers seem to convey as his
sentiments, he is by much too sanguine. On the other hand it is
talking wildly, or like old women, to contend, as Mr. Windham and
Mr. Fox do, that great bodies of Britains [sic], with arms in their
hands and trained to the use of them, are not a most important
bulwark of security to the Empire. My opinion, however, lays
perhaps in the middle, and I would have greatly preferred a much
smaller number to have secured more effectually their uniform
Page 544
efficiency. I would much rather have had 200,000 on the footing of
Lord Hobart's first letter in June than double that number selected
and formed in the loose and desultory manner they have more
recently been under the variety of contradictory orders they have
since received and by which Government have annoyed every
corner of the country." Melville adds that they would be useful if
thoroughly trained and not allowed to leave their corps; but
exemptions from the Militia and Army of Reserve ballots granted to
the recent Volunteer Corps are mischievous, and interfere with the
recruiting. The Militia is unnecessarily large and interferes with
recruiting for the regular army. He would have enough trained
troops at home to be able to send abroad "50,000 infantry for
offensive operations either by ourselves or in co-operation with such
European Powers as may recover their senses, as sooner or later
they must and will do."
Pitt did not leave his post for long, except when high winds made an
invasion impossible. At such times he would make a trip to London. A short
sojourn in town in the early spring elicits from Lady Hester the words: "I
cannot but be happy anywhere in Mr. Pitt's society"; and she hoped that she
helped to amuse and entertain him. Certainly Pitt did his utmost to enliven
her stay at the little residence at Park Place. In the Memoirs of the Comtesse
de Boigne, who claims to have known her well, we catch a glimpse of Pitt
acting as chaperon at balls which obviously bored him. Yet he would
patiently wait there until, perhaps, four a.m., when Lady Hester returned to
end his ennui. Is it surprising that after his death she called him that adored
angel?
Lord Hobart's first letter in June than double that number selected
and formed in the loose and desultory manner they have more
recently been under the variety of contradictory orders they have
since received and by which Government have annoyed every
corner of the country." Melville adds that they would be useful if
thoroughly trained and not allowed to leave their corps; but
exemptions from the Militia and Army of Reserve ballots granted to
the recent Volunteer Corps are mischievous, and interfere with the
recruiting. The Militia is unnecessarily large and interferes with
recruiting for the regular army. He would have enough trained
troops at home to be able to send abroad "50,000 infantry for
offensive operations either by ourselves or in co-operation with such
European Powers as may recover their senses, as sooner or later
they must and will do."
Pitt did not leave his post for long, except when high winds made an
invasion impossible. At such times he would make a trip to London. A short
sojourn in town in the early spring elicits from Lady Hester the words: "I
cannot but be happy anywhere in Mr. Pitt's society"; and she hoped that she
helped to amuse and entertain him. Certainly Pitt did his utmost to enliven
her stay at the little residence at Park Place. In the Memoirs of the Comtesse
de Boigne, who claims to have known her well, we catch a glimpse of Pitt
acting as chaperon at balls which obviously bored him. Yet he would
patiently wait there until, perhaps, four a.m., when Lady Hester returned to
end his ennui. Is it surprising that after his death she called him that adored
angel?
Page 545
Early in the year 1804 a ministerial crisis seemed at hand. The personal
insignificance of Ministers, the hatred felt for St. Vincent at the Admiralty,
the distrust of Hobart at the War Office, and the deep depression caused by
the laboured infelicities of Addington's speeches presaged a breakdown. So
threatening was the outlook that Grenville urged Pitt to combine with him
for the overthrow of an Administration which palsied national energy. For
reasons which are far from clear, Pitt refused to take decisive action. During
his stay in London in mid-January he saw Grenville, but declined to pledge
himself to a definite opposition. Grenville and his coadjutors, among them
Lord Carysfort, were puzzled by this wavering conduct, which they
ascribed to finesse, pettiness, or even to insincerity.[664] But it is clear that
Pitt objected only to their proposed methods, which he termed a teasing,
harassing opposition. In vain did the Bishop of Lincoln, who came to town
at Pitt's request, seek to reconcile their differences. The most to be hoped
for was that Pitt would be compelled by force of circumstances to concert a
plan with the Grenvilles for Addington's overthrow. The following letter of
Carysfort to the bishop is of interest:
Jany. 18, 1804.[665]
Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt being agreed upon so material a point as
the necessity of removing Mr. A[ddington] from his present
situation, it must be a matter not only of regret but of surprise, that
they should not be able to reconcile any difference of opinion
between them as to the sort of opposition to be carried on in
Parliament; and I cannot help thinking that Mr. Pitt's avowal that he
intends opposition would in itself be sufficient to incline (not merely
Lord Grenville and his friends, who have made it a principal object
to be united with Mr. Pitt and place him again at the head of affairs)
but all the parties who may mean to oppose, to leave the mode
pretty much at his option!... [Your letter] leads me to think that Mr.
Pitt and he may not have understood each other. Lord Grenville's
insignificance of Ministers, the hatred felt for St. Vincent at the Admiralty,
the distrust of Hobart at the War Office, and the deep depression caused by
the laboured infelicities of Addington's speeches presaged a breakdown. So
threatening was the outlook that Grenville urged Pitt to combine with him
for the overthrow of an Administration which palsied national energy. For
reasons which are far from clear, Pitt refused to take decisive action. During
his stay in London in mid-January he saw Grenville, but declined to pledge
himself to a definite opposition. Grenville and his coadjutors, among them
Lord Carysfort, were puzzled by this wavering conduct, which they
ascribed to finesse, pettiness, or even to insincerity.[664] But it is clear that
Pitt objected only to their proposed methods, which he termed a teasing,
harassing opposition. In vain did the Bishop of Lincoln, who came to town
at Pitt's request, seek to reconcile their differences. The most to be hoped
for was that Pitt would be compelled by force of circumstances to concert a
plan with the Grenvilles for Addington's overthrow. The following letter of
Carysfort to the bishop is of interest:
Jany. 18, 1804.[665]
Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt being agreed upon so material a point as
the necessity of removing Mr. A[ddington] from his present
situation, it must be a matter not only of regret but of surprise, that
they should not be able to reconcile any difference of opinion
between them as to the sort of opposition to be carried on in
Parliament; and I cannot help thinking that Mr. Pitt's avowal that he
intends opposition would in itself be sufficient to incline (not merely
Lord Grenville and his friends, who have made it a principal object
to be united with Mr. Pitt and place him again at the head of affairs)
but all the parties who may mean to oppose, to leave the mode
pretty much at his option!... [Your letter] leads me to think that Mr.
Pitt and he may not have understood each other. Lord Grenville's
Page 546
attachment to Mr. Pitt has been so conspicuous, and I am persuaded
his communications have been so frank and so explicit, that I cannot
account for Mr. Pitt using any reserve with him, and must be of
opinion that greater openness, where there is such solid ground of
confidence, would lead to more satisfactory results. [Lord Carysfort
then says that Pitt should not keep public opinion so long in
suspense; for] the public danger from a Ministry confessedly
incapable is already great and urgent and will be continually
increasing.
Failing to get help from Pitt, Grenville, at the end of January, sought the
help of Fox! Through his brother, Thomas Grenville, as go-between he
offered the Whig leader his alliance for the overthrow of Addington and the
formation of a Ministry of the talented men of all parties. Here, then, is the
origin of the broad-bottomed or All the Talents Administrations which
produced so singular a muddle after the death of Pitt. The Fox–Grenville
bargain cannot be styled immoral like that of Fox and North in 1782; for it
expressly excluded all compromise on matters of conviction. Nevertheless
it was a tactical mistake, for which Pitt's exasperating aloofness was largely
responsible. Few occurrences in this time of folly and blundering were
more untoward. Pitt's letter of 4th February to Grenville shows that he
discerned the magnitude of the error, little though he saw his own share in
it. The result of the union of Fox and Grenville was likely to be the fall of
Addington, an appeal of the King to him (Pitt) to form a Cabinet, which
would be narrowed and weakened by the present effort of Grenville to form
a strong and comprehensive Administration.[666]
Presumably the national crisis was not yet acute enough to satisfy Pitt that
he might conscientiously oppose Addington. But that he was drifting to this
conviction appears in the following letter from Rose to the Bishop of
Lincoln.
his communications have been so frank and so explicit, that I cannot
account for Mr. Pitt using any reserve with him, and must be of
opinion that greater openness, where there is such solid ground of
confidence, would lead to more satisfactory results. [Lord Carysfort
then says that Pitt should not keep public opinion so long in
suspense; for] the public danger from a Ministry confessedly
incapable is already great and urgent and will be continually
increasing.
Failing to get help from Pitt, Grenville, at the end of January, sought the
help of Fox! Through his brother, Thomas Grenville, as go-between he
offered the Whig leader his alliance for the overthrow of Addington and the
formation of a Ministry of the talented men of all parties. Here, then, is the
origin of the broad-bottomed or All the Talents Administrations which
produced so singular a muddle after the death of Pitt. The Fox–Grenville
bargain cannot be styled immoral like that of Fox and North in 1782; for it
expressly excluded all compromise on matters of conviction. Nevertheless
it was a tactical mistake, for which Pitt's exasperating aloofness was largely
responsible. Few occurrences in this time of folly and blundering were
more untoward. Pitt's letter of 4th February to Grenville shows that he
discerned the magnitude of the error, little though he saw his own share in
it. The result of the union of Fox and Grenville was likely to be the fall of
Addington, an appeal of the King to him (Pitt) to form a Cabinet, which
would be narrowed and weakened by the present effort of Grenville to form
a strong and comprehensive Administration.[666]
Presumably the national crisis was not yet acute enough to satisfy Pitt that
he might conscientiously oppose Addington. But that he was drifting to this
conviction appears in the following letter from Rose to the Bishop of
Lincoln.
Page 547
Feb. 11, 1804.[667]
I showed Mr. Pitt your letter because it expressed so entirely my
own view of the interesting subject: he appeared at first against
anything like hostility, but I think is now disposed to point out pretty
strongly the neglect of proper measures of defence in the naval and
military departments and to suggest the necessary ones; so [as] to
throw on the Government the just responsibility and odium of
rejecting them if they shall determine to do so.
Rose then states that the Bishop of St. Asaph calls the new Volunteer Bill
"the most wishy-washy thing that ever was produced." He also adds that the
King is ill, probably of dropsy. The fact was even worse. A chill caught in
drenching rain developed into the former mental malady. Thus the nation
was for a time kingless, leaderless, and open to a deadly thrust from
Boulogne. For a short time his life was in danger, and all the troubles of a
Regency loomed ahead. The Prince of Wales having ventured on the
compromising prophecy that the illness "must last several months," Pitt
quoted to his informant, Malmesbury, the damning line
Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought.
In truth, there now began a series of intrigues, in which the Prince, Fox, and
the Duke and Duchess of Devonshire played the leading parts, for assuring
a Regency and the formation of a Fox Administration. While England
needed to keep her gaze on Boulogne, the intriguers thought only of the
death or lunacy of the King, the accession of the Prince and the
apportionment of the spoils of office. Sheridan on this occasion played his
own game and for this was heartily cursed by the expectant Creevey.[668]
In view of these last complications and the prospect of an invasion, Pitt
revised his former judgement, and informed Malmesbury that, while
I showed Mr. Pitt your letter because it expressed so entirely my
own view of the interesting subject: he appeared at first against
anything like hostility, but I think is now disposed to point out pretty
strongly the neglect of proper measures of defence in the naval and
military departments and to suggest the necessary ones; so [as] to
throw on the Government the just responsibility and odium of
rejecting them if they shall determine to do so.
Rose then states that the Bishop of St. Asaph calls the new Volunteer Bill
"the most wishy-washy thing that ever was produced." He also adds that the
King is ill, probably of dropsy. The fact was even worse. A chill caught in
drenching rain developed into the former mental malady. Thus the nation
was for a time kingless, leaderless, and open to a deadly thrust from
Boulogne. For a short time his life was in danger, and all the troubles of a
Regency loomed ahead. The Prince of Wales having ventured on the
compromising prophecy that the illness "must last several months," Pitt
quoted to his informant, Malmesbury, the damning line
Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought.
In truth, there now began a series of intrigues, in which the Prince, Fox, and
the Duke and Duchess of Devonshire played the leading parts, for assuring
a Regency and the formation of a Fox Administration. While England
needed to keep her gaze on Boulogne, the intriguers thought only of the
death or lunacy of the King, the accession of the Prince and the
apportionment of the spoils of office. Sheridan on this occasion played his
own game and for this was heartily cursed by the expectant Creevey.[668]
In view of these last complications and the prospect of an invasion, Pitt
revised his former judgement, and informed Malmesbury that, while
Page 548
declining the offers of the Grenvilles to help to overthrow Addington, he
would not refuse to take office if for any reason Ministers resigned. On that
day (19th February) Melville wrote to him from Melville Castle that the
outlook was full of horror, and everything depended on the formation of a
steady and permanent Government with which foreign nations could treat.
For this reason he (Melville) urged that the King should be relieved of his
executive duties, which it was sheer cruelty to exact from him.[669] Pitt's
answer to this daring proposal is not known; but later, on 29th March, in
answer to further overtures from Melville, he stated that the King's illness
was less serious than was reported by the Earl of Moira, the confidante of
the Prince of Wales; and that while it lasted he doubted the propriety of
taking any steps to overturn the Ministry.[670] To this scrupulousness
Melville was a stranger, and on 4th April again urged him to form a
compact opposition for the overthrow of Addington, and promised him the
votes of at least twenty-six Scottish members (out of forty-five) for any
such effort.[671]
Meanwhile the King recovered but slowly. The nervous, excited, irritable
symptoms showed little abatement; and in the third week in March he fell
into a fit of anger of such violence that he had to be strapped to his bed.
Even more threatening was the military situation. Yorke, early in March,
proposed a Volunteer Consolidation Bill, which met with general derision.
As the state of the Navy was also unsatisfactory, Pitt freely criticized
Ministers, especially St. Vincent; and, on one occasion, when Addington
showed boyish petulance, he met with a serene and courteous answer.
Tierney, Treasurer of the Navy, attacked Pitt coarsely; Sheridan, with his
usual wit and brilliance; but neither coarseness nor eloquence could
rehabilitate that Ministry. The urgency of the crisis appears in the following
letter written by Pitt at Walmer Castle to some person unknown:
would not refuse to take office if for any reason Ministers resigned. On that
day (19th February) Melville wrote to him from Melville Castle that the
outlook was full of horror, and everything depended on the formation of a
steady and permanent Government with which foreign nations could treat.
For this reason he (Melville) urged that the King should be relieved of his
executive duties, which it was sheer cruelty to exact from him.[669] Pitt's
answer to this daring proposal is not known; but later, on 29th March, in
answer to further overtures from Melville, he stated that the King's illness
was less serious than was reported by the Earl of Moira, the confidante of
the Prince of Wales; and that while it lasted he doubted the propriety of
taking any steps to overturn the Ministry.[670] To this scrupulousness
Melville was a stranger, and on 4th April again urged him to form a
compact opposition for the overthrow of Addington, and promised him the
votes of at least twenty-six Scottish members (out of forty-five) for any
such effort.[671]
Meanwhile the King recovered but slowly. The nervous, excited, irritable
symptoms showed little abatement; and in the third week in March he fell
into a fit of anger of such violence that he had to be strapped to his bed.
Even more threatening was the military situation. Yorke, early in March,
proposed a Volunteer Consolidation Bill, which met with general derision.
As the state of the Navy was also unsatisfactory, Pitt freely criticized
Ministers, especially St. Vincent; and, on one occasion, when Addington
showed boyish petulance, he met with a serene and courteous answer.
Tierney, Treasurer of the Navy, attacked Pitt coarsely; Sheridan, with his
usual wit and brilliance; but neither coarseness nor eloquence could
rehabilitate that Ministry. The urgency of the crisis appears in the following
letter written by Pitt at Walmer Castle to some person unknown:
Page 549
April 11, 1804.
... The experience of the last summer and the discussions of this
session confirm me in the opinion that while the Government
remains in its present shape and under its present leader, nothing
efficient can be expected either to originate with them or to be fairly
adopted and effectually executed. With this persuasion, and thinking
that a system of more energy and decision is indispensable with a
view to the immediate crisis and the many difficulties he may have
to encounter in the course of the present contest, I mean to take an
early opportunity of avowing and acting on these sentiments more
explicitly and decidedly than I have hitherto done; and I shall
endeavour to give effect to my opinion by the support of all the
friends whom I can collect. My object will be to press to the utmost
those points which I think essential to the public defence, and at the
same time in doing so to make it, if I can, impossible for the present
Government to maintain itself. In this object I have every reason to
believe that I shall have the fullest concurrence of all those with
whom I have the most differed on former occasions and with whom
possibly I may as little agree in future. With their number added to
my own more immediate friends, and to the few who have acted
with Ld Grenville and Windham, I am persuaded that our division
on any favourable question will probably be such as would be
sufficient to shake a much stronger Government than the present....
[672]
On the same day he promised Melville to return to town in the middle of
April, and to make the "principal push" against Addington on 23rd April, on
the subject of Yorke's Bill for suspending the completion of the Army
Reserve. If they failed, he would return to Walmer for another kind of
contest. The joint assault by Fox and Pitt against the Ministry on 23rd April
produced a great sensation, the speech of Pitt being remarkable for its
suppressed sarcasm and thinly veiled charges of inefficiency. As a call to
arms, it stands without a rival. Ministers were utterly beaten in argument,
... The experience of the last summer and the discussions of this
session confirm me in the opinion that while the Government
remains in its present shape and under its present leader, nothing
efficient can be expected either to originate with them or to be fairly
adopted and effectually executed. With this persuasion, and thinking
that a system of more energy and decision is indispensable with a
view to the immediate crisis and the many difficulties he may have
to encounter in the course of the present contest, I mean to take an
early opportunity of avowing and acting on these sentiments more
explicitly and decidedly than I have hitherto done; and I shall
endeavour to give effect to my opinion by the support of all the
friends whom I can collect. My object will be to press to the utmost
those points which I think essential to the public defence, and at the
same time in doing so to make it, if I can, impossible for the present
Government to maintain itself. In this object I have every reason to
believe that I shall have the fullest concurrence of all those with
whom I have the most differed on former occasions and with whom
possibly I may as little agree in future. With their number added to
my own more immediate friends, and to the few who have acted
with Ld Grenville and Windham, I am persuaded that our division
on any favourable question will probably be such as would be
sufficient to shake a much stronger Government than the present....
[672]
On the same day he promised Melville to return to town in the middle of
April, and to make the "principal push" against Addington on 23rd April, on
the subject of Yorke's Bill for suspending the completion of the Army
Reserve. If they failed, he would return to Walmer for another kind of
contest. The joint assault by Fox and Pitt against the Ministry on 23rd April
produced a great sensation, the speech of Pitt being remarkable for its
suppressed sarcasm and thinly veiled charges of inefficiency. As a call to
arms, it stands without a rival. Ministers were utterly beaten in argument,
Page 550
and escaped defeat only by thirty-seven votes. Addington became alarmed,
and advised the King, who was now convalescent, to instruct the Lord
Chancellor, Eldon, to confer with Pitt, a fact which refutes the charges of
Brougham and Dean Pellew against Eldon.
Finally the King allowed Pitt to make proposals concerning a new Ministry.
Pitt did so fully and courteously in a paper which George III forthwith
described to Eldon as containing "many empty words and little
information." To Pitt himself the King, on 5th May, expressed his deep
regret that he had taken such a dislike to Mr. Addington, after the
praiseworthy services of the latter to our glorious Constitution in Church
and State. He could never forget the wound which Pitt proposed to deal it,
and "the indelicacy (not to call it worse) of wanting His Majesty to forego
his solemn Coronation Oath." He therefore required Pitt to give a solemn
pledge not to propose the least alteration in the Test Act. As to a proposal to
admit Fox to the Cabinet, the King expressed "his astonishment that Mr. Pitt
should one moment harbour the thought of bringing such a man before his
Royal notice." References to the "wild ideas" of Burke, and to Grenville
being guided by obstinacy, "his usual director," filled up the interstices of
this strange composition.[673] Evidently the enfeebled brain of George could
form no notion of the national danger. While Pitt thought only of the safety
of England, the King's thoughts continued to gyrate angrily around the Test
Act, the Coronation Oath, and the iniquities of Fox.
It was therefore with grave apprehension that on 7th May Pitt went to
Buckingham House for attendance upon the King, the first for nearly three
and a quarter years. He expected an outburst of rage when he mentioned the
chief subject at issue, namely the inclusion of Fox and the Grenvilles in the
future Administration. The King, however, kept surprising control over his
feelings, behaved graciously to Pitt, tactfully waived aside smaller
questions that he disliked, even consented to admit the Grenvilles, but for
and advised the King, who was now convalescent, to instruct the Lord
Chancellor, Eldon, to confer with Pitt, a fact which refutes the charges of
Brougham and Dean Pellew against Eldon.
Finally the King allowed Pitt to make proposals concerning a new Ministry.
Pitt did so fully and courteously in a paper which George III forthwith
described to Eldon as containing "many empty words and little
information." To Pitt himself the King, on 5th May, expressed his deep
regret that he had taken such a dislike to Mr. Addington, after the
praiseworthy services of the latter to our glorious Constitution in Church
and State. He could never forget the wound which Pitt proposed to deal it,
and "the indelicacy (not to call it worse) of wanting His Majesty to forego
his solemn Coronation Oath." He therefore required Pitt to give a solemn
pledge not to propose the least alteration in the Test Act. As to a proposal to
admit Fox to the Cabinet, the King expressed "his astonishment that Mr. Pitt
should one moment harbour the thought of bringing such a man before his
Royal notice." References to the "wild ideas" of Burke, and to Grenville
being guided by obstinacy, "his usual director," filled up the interstices of
this strange composition.[673] Evidently the enfeebled brain of George could
form no notion of the national danger. While Pitt thought only of the safety
of England, the King's thoughts continued to gyrate angrily around the Test
Act, the Coronation Oath, and the iniquities of Fox.
It was therefore with grave apprehension that on 7th May Pitt went to
Buckingham House for attendance upon the King, the first for nearly three
and a quarter years. He expected an outburst of rage when he mentioned the
chief subject at issue, namely the inclusion of Fox and the Grenvilles in the
future Administration. The King, however, kept surprising control over his
feelings, behaved graciously to Pitt, tactfully waived aside smaller
questions that he disliked, even consented to admit the Grenvilles, but for
Page 551
ever barred the way to the return of Fox. The utmost that he would hear was
the employment of Fox as an ambassador. Once again, then, the royal
convalescent outwitted Pitt. "Never," said Pitt to Eldon, "in any
conversation I have had with him in my life has he so baffled me." Fox
being excluded by the King, there was scant hope of bringing in his new
allies, the Grenvilles and Windham. Pitt broached the matter to Lord
Grenville on 7th May, and received on the morrow a friendly but firm
refusal. The following sentences are noteworthy: "We rest our
determination solely on our strong sense of the impropriety of our
becoming parties to a system of Government which is to be formed at such
a moment as the present on a principle of exclusion.... We see no hope of
any effectual remedy for those mischiefs but by uniting in the public service
as large a proportion as possible of the weight, talents, and character to be
found in public men of all descriptions and without any exception."
The refusal of Grenville to join Pitt has often been ascribed to jealousy of
Pitt, and the latter is reported to have said that he would teach that proud
man that he could do without him. The sentiment is alien to the tolerant
nature of Pitt,[674] who must have respected his cousin's decision, based as it
was on a determination to break down the bigoted resolve of the King. But
Grenville's conduct punished Pitt far more severely than the King. For
while George in his feeble, irritable condition thought only about the Test
Act and Fox, Pitt was intent on forming a truly national Administration,
including Fox, Fitzwilliam, and Melville as Secretaries of State, with
Spencer at the Admiralty, Grenville as Lord President, and Windham as
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.[675]
The actual result was far inferior. Fox, Fitzwilliam, Spencer, Grenville, and
Windham being ruled out by the King's action and Grenville's resolve, the
Cabinet was formed as follows: Pitt, First Lord of the Treasury and
Chancellor of the Exchequer; Harrowby, Foreign Secretary; Hawkesbury,
the employment of Fox as an ambassador. Once again, then, the royal
convalescent outwitted Pitt. "Never," said Pitt to Eldon, "in any
conversation I have had with him in my life has he so baffled me." Fox
being excluded by the King, there was scant hope of bringing in his new
allies, the Grenvilles and Windham. Pitt broached the matter to Lord
Grenville on 7th May, and received on the morrow a friendly but firm
refusal. The following sentences are noteworthy: "We rest our
determination solely on our strong sense of the impropriety of our
becoming parties to a system of Government which is to be formed at such
a moment as the present on a principle of exclusion.... We see no hope of
any effectual remedy for those mischiefs but by uniting in the public service
as large a proportion as possible of the weight, talents, and character to be
found in public men of all descriptions and without any exception."
The refusal of Grenville to join Pitt has often been ascribed to jealousy of
Pitt, and the latter is reported to have said that he would teach that proud
man that he could do without him. The sentiment is alien to the tolerant
nature of Pitt,[674] who must have respected his cousin's decision, based as it
was on a determination to break down the bigoted resolve of the King. But
Grenville's conduct punished Pitt far more severely than the King. For
while George in his feeble, irritable condition thought only about the Test
Act and Fox, Pitt was intent on forming a truly national Administration,
including Fox, Fitzwilliam, and Melville as Secretaries of State, with
Spencer at the Admiralty, Grenville as Lord President, and Windham as
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.[675]
The actual result was far inferior. Fox, Fitzwilliam, Spencer, Grenville, and
Windham being ruled out by the King's action and Grenville's resolve, the
Cabinet was formed as follows: Pitt, First Lord of the Treasury and
Chancellor of the Exchequer; Harrowby, Foreign Secretary; Hawkesbury,
Page 552
Home Secretary; Camden, Secretary at War and for the Colonies; Portland,
Lord President; Eldon, Lord Chancellor; Westmorland, Privy Seal; Melville,
Admiralty; Chatham, Master of Ordnance; Mulgrave, Duchy of Lancaster;
Castlereagh, President of the India Board; the Duke of Montrose, President
of the Board of Trade. Of these twelve Ministers, six had been with
Addington, namely, Hawkesbury (though at the Foreign Office, which he
unwillingly vacated), Portland, Eldon, Westmorland, Chatham, and
Castlereagh.[676] Pitt dispensed with the services of Addington, St. Vincent,
and Pelham. Of non-Cabinet appointments, the chief were those of the Earl
of Hardwicke as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; Sir Evan Nepean, Irish
Secretary; William Dundas, War Office; Canning, Treasury of the Navy, in
place of Tierney, who declined to serve with Pitt; Lord Charles Somerset
and George Rose, Joint Paymasters of the Forces; and Perceval, Attorney-
General. Canning and Rose were dissatisfied with their appointments, the
latter writing to Bishop Tomline in deep chagrin at Pitt's neglect of his
faithful services.
The new Cabinet, besides being too large, was half Addingtonian and half
Pittite, a source of weakness which soon led to further changes. It was also
weighted with inefficient members—Chatham, Hawkesbury, and Portland.
The King disliked Hawkesbury, and said he had no head for business, no
method, and no punctuality. Harrowby, though a man of brilliant parts in
private life, and an excellent speaker, was oppressed by a delicate frame,
precarious health, and a peevish temper. During no small part of his tenure
of office he had to take the waters at Bath, and was therefore a poor
substitute for the experienced and hard-working Grenville. Pitt, for some
unexplained reason, disliked placing Melville at the Admiralty, a strangely
prophetic instinct. Camden and Mulgrave were also misfits. Hawkesbury
did better work at the Home Office than the Foreign Office; but on the
whole, the new arrangement aroused widespread grumbling and distrust.
The result of it all was the dissolution of the great national party formed in
Lord President; Eldon, Lord Chancellor; Westmorland, Privy Seal; Melville,
Admiralty; Chatham, Master of Ordnance; Mulgrave, Duchy of Lancaster;
Castlereagh, President of the India Board; the Duke of Montrose, President
of the Board of Trade. Of these twelve Ministers, six had been with
Addington, namely, Hawkesbury (though at the Foreign Office, which he
unwillingly vacated), Portland, Eldon, Westmorland, Chatham, and
Castlereagh.[676] Pitt dispensed with the services of Addington, St. Vincent,
and Pelham. Of non-Cabinet appointments, the chief were those of the Earl
of Hardwicke as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; Sir Evan Nepean, Irish
Secretary; William Dundas, War Office; Canning, Treasury of the Navy, in
place of Tierney, who declined to serve with Pitt; Lord Charles Somerset
and George Rose, Joint Paymasters of the Forces; and Perceval, Attorney-
General. Canning and Rose were dissatisfied with their appointments, the
latter writing to Bishop Tomline in deep chagrin at Pitt's neglect of his
faithful services.
The new Cabinet, besides being too large, was half Addingtonian and half
Pittite, a source of weakness which soon led to further changes. It was also
weighted with inefficient members—Chatham, Hawkesbury, and Portland.
The King disliked Hawkesbury, and said he had no head for business, no
method, and no punctuality. Harrowby, though a man of brilliant parts in
private life, and an excellent speaker, was oppressed by a delicate frame,
precarious health, and a peevish temper. During no small part of his tenure
of office he had to take the waters at Bath, and was therefore a poor
substitute for the experienced and hard-working Grenville. Pitt, for some
unexplained reason, disliked placing Melville at the Admiralty, a strangely
prophetic instinct. Camden and Mulgrave were also misfits. Hawkesbury
did better work at the Home Office than the Foreign Office; but on the
whole, the new arrangement aroused widespread grumbling and distrust.
The result of it all was the dissolution of the great national party formed in
Page 553
the year 1794 and the formation of three groups, following Pitt, Addington,
and Grenville, the Addingtonians showing much bitterness at the treatment
of their chief, while the Grenvilles and Windham inveighed against the new
Ministry, as formed on the principle of excluding Fox.[677] The charge was
unfair; for at that crisis Pitt could not stand by and see the national
resources frittered away by Addington. The King's Government had to be
carried on; and, like Wellington a generation later, Pitt consented to do so in
the only way which was practicable.
The limitations of his power were soon obvious. The two unfriendly groups
eagerly criticized him at all times and accorded grudging and doubtful
support even on measures which they approved. This was especially the
case with regard to the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Thanks to the untiring
exertions of Wilberforce, Clarkson, and others, that movement had made
considerable progress during the interval of peace. The outbreak of war in
May 1803 darkened the outlook; for once again the cry was raised that
England must not cut off a trade which was essential to the welfare of the
West Indies, highly lucrative to British shipowners, and a necessary adjunct
to the mercantile marine. Nevertheless, the accession of Pitt to power and
the goodwill of the majority of the Irish members inspired Wilberforce with
hope. True, Addington always strenuously opposed him; and among the
younger members of the Cabinet Castlereagh had declared his hostility; but
at first all went well. At the close of May 1804 Pitt and Fox united in
expressing approval of Wilberforce's proposals. Addington, in remarks
which lasted exactly forty seconds, scouted the measure, but carried with
him only 49 members as against 124. The majorities were nearly as great at
the second and third readings.
In the Lords the omens were inauspicious. Some bishops were away in their
dioceses: the supporters of the West India and shipping interests were at
hand, using their utmost endeavours to delay, if not to defeat, the measure.
and Grenville, the Addingtonians showing much bitterness at the treatment
of their chief, while the Grenvilles and Windham inveighed against the new
Ministry, as formed on the principle of excluding Fox.[677] The charge was
unfair; for at that crisis Pitt could not stand by and see the national
resources frittered away by Addington. The King's Government had to be
carried on; and, like Wellington a generation later, Pitt consented to do so in
the only way which was practicable.
The limitations of his power were soon obvious. The two unfriendly groups
eagerly criticized him at all times and accorded grudging and doubtful
support even on measures which they approved. This was especially the
case with regard to the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Thanks to the untiring
exertions of Wilberforce, Clarkson, and others, that movement had made
considerable progress during the interval of peace. The outbreak of war in
May 1803 darkened the outlook; for once again the cry was raised that
England must not cut off a trade which was essential to the welfare of the
West Indies, highly lucrative to British shipowners, and a necessary adjunct
to the mercantile marine. Nevertheless, the accession of Pitt to power and
the goodwill of the majority of the Irish members inspired Wilberforce with
hope. True, Addington always strenuously opposed him; and among the
younger members of the Cabinet Castlereagh had declared his hostility; but
at first all went well. At the close of May 1804 Pitt and Fox united in
expressing approval of Wilberforce's proposals. Addington, in remarks
which lasted exactly forty seconds, scouted the measure, but carried with
him only 49 members as against 124. The majorities were nearly as great at
the second and third readings.
In the Lords the omens were inauspicious. Some bishops were away in their
dioceses: the supporters of the West India and shipping interests were at
hand, using their utmost endeavours to delay, if not to defeat, the measure.
Page 554
Pitt despaired of thwarting these dilatory tactics, backed by wealth and
influence from all quarters. Wilberforce wrote indignantly to Lord
Muncaster: "It was truly humiliating to see four of the Royal Family come
down to vote against the poor, helpless, friendless slaves." A wild speech by
Stanhope told against the cause which he meant to further, and the motion
was adjourned to avoid defeat.
Pitt's subsequent conduct in 1805 disappointed Wilberforce. Certainly it
was half-hearted and procrastinating. But, seeing that he had to rely more
on Addington and finally to bring him into the Cabinet, his difficulties were
great. The Irish members also showed signs of defection; and it was certain
that the Bill would fail in the Lords. Accordingly, Pitt begged Wilberforce
to wait for a more propitious time. A sense of religious duty impelled him to
persevere, with the inevitable result, a crushing defeat (19th February
1805).[678] On a smaller question, connected with the prohibition of the
supply of slaves to Guiana, then recently conquered from the Dutch, he
finally brought Pitt to acquiesce. But here again the conduct of the Minister
was tardy. Wilberforce urged Pitt to abolish the Guiana Slave Trade by an
Order in Council, and early in May wrote: "One very powerful and
important reason for your abolishing the Guiana Slave Trade by an act of
Government, not by, or in consequence of a vote of Parliament, is that it
would tend to confirm the disposition so strongly manifested by the Dutch
to abolish the Slave Trade, and give them the sort of compensation they
demand." The British Order in Council did not appear until 13th September
1805.[679]
Nevertheless, their friendship remained firm to the end. "Had much talk
with him [Pitt] on political topics, finding him very open and kind." Such is
Wilberforce's account of his last interviews with Pitt; and he certainly could
not have remained on friendly terms with one who was deliberately untrue
to the cause. He knew better than recent critics the difficulties resulting
influence from all quarters. Wilberforce wrote indignantly to Lord
Muncaster: "It was truly humiliating to see four of the Royal Family come
down to vote against the poor, helpless, friendless slaves." A wild speech by
Stanhope told against the cause which he meant to further, and the motion
was adjourned to avoid defeat.
Pitt's subsequent conduct in 1805 disappointed Wilberforce. Certainly it
was half-hearted and procrastinating. But, seeing that he had to rely more
on Addington and finally to bring him into the Cabinet, his difficulties were
great. The Irish members also showed signs of defection; and it was certain
that the Bill would fail in the Lords. Accordingly, Pitt begged Wilberforce
to wait for a more propitious time. A sense of religious duty impelled him to
persevere, with the inevitable result, a crushing defeat (19th February
1805).[678] On a smaller question, connected with the prohibition of the
supply of slaves to Guiana, then recently conquered from the Dutch, he
finally brought Pitt to acquiesce. But here again the conduct of the Minister
was tardy. Wilberforce urged Pitt to abolish the Guiana Slave Trade by an
Order in Council, and early in May wrote: "One very powerful and
important reason for your abolishing the Guiana Slave Trade by an act of
Government, not by, or in consequence of a vote of Parliament, is that it
would tend to confirm the disposition so strongly manifested by the Dutch
to abolish the Slave Trade, and give them the sort of compensation they
demand." The British Order in Council did not appear until 13th September
1805.[679]
Nevertheless, their friendship remained firm to the end. "Had much talk
with him [Pitt] on political topics, finding him very open and kind." Such is
Wilberforce's account of his last interviews with Pitt; and he certainly could
not have remained on friendly terms with one who was deliberately untrue
to the cause. He knew better than recent critics the difficulties resulting
Page 555
from the compromise with Addington and from the ceaseless friction with
the followers of Fox and Grenville.
The case of the Slave Trade serves to illustrate the peculiar difficulties of
Pitt's position, which were to appear on even more important questions. The
King, Addington, Grenville, and Pitt had all contributed to the tangle.
Limiting our survey to the conduct of Addington and Pitt, we must
pronounce both of them culpable. Addington should have seen that Pitt's
promise of support, given at the time of the King's lunacy in February–
March 1801, was not morally binding three years later when the existence
of the nation was at stake in the Napoleonic War. At such a time an
enlightened patriot does not stand upon punctilio, but gladly takes a second
place if he can thereby place in authority an abler man. Addington alone
could release Pitt from the debt of honour incurred in February 1801, and
faithfully discharged for three weary years, at the cost of the alienation of
friends and the derision of opponents. He never spoke or wrote that word of
release, but held Pitt to the bargain with an insistence which would be
contemptible were it not in large measure the outcome of a narrow
complacent nature blind to its own shortcomings.
Pitt, also, behaved weakly. The original promise, to support an untried man,
was a piece of astounding trustfulness; and when the weakness of
Addington's Administration involved the nation in war and brought it to the
brink of disaster, he should openly have claimed release from a pledge too
hastily given, leaving the world to judge between them. As it was, for
nearly a year he wavered to and fro between the claims of national duty and
private honour, thereby exasperating his friends and finally driving the
Grenvilles, Windham, and Spencer to a union with Fox which in its turn
blighted the hope of forming a national Administration. Finally, he made
only one effort to induce the King to accept Fox. True, the situation was a
delicate one; for pressure brought to bear on George on that topic would
the followers of Fox and Grenville.
The case of the Slave Trade serves to illustrate the peculiar difficulties of
Pitt's position, which were to appear on even more important questions. The
King, Addington, Grenville, and Pitt had all contributed to the tangle.
Limiting our survey to the conduct of Addington and Pitt, we must
pronounce both of them culpable. Addington should have seen that Pitt's
promise of support, given at the time of the King's lunacy in February–
March 1801, was not morally binding three years later when the existence
of the nation was at stake in the Napoleonic War. At such a time an
enlightened patriot does not stand upon punctilio, but gladly takes a second
place if he can thereby place in authority an abler man. Addington alone
could release Pitt from the debt of honour incurred in February 1801, and
faithfully discharged for three weary years, at the cost of the alienation of
friends and the derision of opponents. He never spoke or wrote that word of
release, but held Pitt to the bargain with an insistence which would be
contemptible were it not in large measure the outcome of a narrow
complacent nature blind to its own shortcomings.
Pitt, also, behaved weakly. The original promise, to support an untried man,
was a piece of astounding trustfulness; and when the weakness of
Addington's Administration involved the nation in war and brought it to the
brink of disaster, he should openly have claimed release from a pledge too
hastily given, leaving the world to judge between them. As it was, for
nearly a year he wavered to and fro between the claims of national duty and
private honour, thereby exasperating his friends and finally driving the
Grenvilles, Windham, and Spencer to a union with Fox which in its turn
blighted the hope of forming a national Administration. Finally, he made
only one effort to induce the King to accept Fox. True, the situation was a
delicate one; for pressure brought to bear on George on that topic would
Page 556
have brought back the mental malady. But the Grenvilles, viewing the
situation with pedantic narrowness, considered the attempt so half-hearted
as to warrant their opposition to the new Cabinet. On the whole, then, Pitt's
punctiliousness must be pronounced a secondary but vital cause of the
lamentable dénouement, which left him exposed at forty five years of age,
enfeebled by worry and gout, to a contest with Napoleon at the climax of
his powers.
situation with pedantic narrowness, considered the attempt so half-hearted
as to warrant their opposition to the new Cabinet. On the whole, then, Pitt's
punctiliousness must be pronounced a secondary but vital cause of the
lamentable dénouement, which left him exposed at forty five years of age,
enfeebled by worry and gout, to a contest with Napoleon at the climax of
his powers.
Page 557
CHAPTER XXIII
PITT AND NAPOLEON
I made a mistake about England, in trying to
conquer it. The English are a brave nation. I
have always said that there are only two
nations, the English and the French; and I
made the French.—Napoleon to Macnamara
(1814), Lord Broughton's Recollections, i,
180.
The two protagonists now stood face to face—Napoleon, Emperor of the
French, President of the Italian Republic, Mediator of the Swiss Republic,
controller of Holland, absolute ruler of a great military Empire; Pitt, the
Prime Minister of an obstinate and at times half-crazy King, dependent on a
weak Cabinet, a disordered Exchequer, a Navy weakened by ill-timed
economies, and land forces whose martial ardour ill made up for lack of
organization, equipment, and training. Before the outbreak of war in May
1803, Napoleon had summed up the situation in the words—"Forty-five
millions of people must prevail over sixteen millions." And now after a year
of hostilities his position was far stronger. In Hanover the French troops
were profitably installed on the Elector's domains. Soult's corps occupied
the Neapolitan realm, thus threatening Malta, the Ionian Isles, the Morea,
and Egypt. The recent restitution of several colonial conquests by England
not only damaged her trade, but enabled her enemy to stir up trouble in
PITT AND NAPOLEON
I made a mistake about England, in trying to
conquer it. The English are a brave nation. I
have always said that there are only two
nations, the English and the French; and I
made the French.—Napoleon to Macnamara
(1814), Lord Broughton's Recollections, i,
180.
The two protagonists now stood face to face—Napoleon, Emperor of the
French, President of the Italian Republic, Mediator of the Swiss Republic,
controller of Holland, absolute ruler of a great military Empire; Pitt, the
Prime Minister of an obstinate and at times half-crazy King, dependent on a
weak Cabinet, a disordered Exchequer, a Navy weakened by ill-timed
economies, and land forces whose martial ardour ill made up for lack of
organization, equipment, and training. Before the outbreak of war in May
1803, Napoleon had summed up the situation in the words—"Forty-five
millions of people must prevail over sixteen millions." And now after a year
of hostilities his position was far stronger. In Hanover the French troops
were profitably installed on the Elector's domains. Soult's corps occupied
the Neapolitan realm, thus threatening Malta, the Ionian Isles, the Morea,
and Egypt. The recent restitution of several colonial conquests by England
not only damaged her trade, but enabled her enemy to stir up trouble in
Page 558
India. There, thanks to Wellesley's dramatic victory at Assaye, the Union
Jack waved in triumph; but at other points Napoleon might hope to gain the
long contested race for Empire.
So convinced was Pitt of the need of fighting out the quarrel thrust upon us
by Napoleon's aggressions, that he waved aside an offer of Livingston,
American envoy at Paris, to effect a reconciliation. During a brief visit to
London, Livingston sent proposals to this effect through Whitworth, who
declined to meet a man hitherto remarkable for a strong anti-British bias;
and Pitt approved this repulse.[680] Nevertheless, on 5th June Livingston,
accompanied by Fox and Grey, called on Pitt at Downing Street; but his
proposals proved to be merely the outcome of informal conversations with
Joseph Bonaparte, who was known to be far more peacefully inclined than
his brother. Joseph's notions were that Malta should perhaps be garrisoned
by Russians, and must in any case be relinquished by England; that France
should withdraw her troops from the Dutch and Swiss Republics, the status
of which was not defined.[681] Pitt set little store by these shadowy
proposals, doubtless seeing in them a way of discovering whether England
was concerting a league against France.
Already, in spite of many obstacles, he was taking the first steps in that
direction. An initial difficulty lay in the mental aberrations of the King,
whose conduct still caused intense anxiety or annoyance.[682] Scarcely a day
passed without a lapse into incoherence or violence. Moreover, his
conversation often showed a lack of discrimination, being the same to the
Queen, the physicians, or the servants. He made the most capricious
changes, turning off the Queen's favourite coachman, and making grooms
footmen, and footmen grooms, to the distraction of the household. On
assuming office, Pitt consulted the royal physicians and received a reply,
dated Queen's Palace, 16th May 1804, stating that the King was equal to the
discharge of important business, but must avoid long conferences or any
Jack waved in triumph; but at other points Napoleon might hope to gain the
long contested race for Empire.
So convinced was Pitt of the need of fighting out the quarrel thrust upon us
by Napoleon's aggressions, that he waved aside an offer of Livingston,
American envoy at Paris, to effect a reconciliation. During a brief visit to
London, Livingston sent proposals to this effect through Whitworth, who
declined to meet a man hitherto remarkable for a strong anti-British bias;
and Pitt approved this repulse.[680] Nevertheless, on 5th June Livingston,
accompanied by Fox and Grey, called on Pitt at Downing Street; but his
proposals proved to be merely the outcome of informal conversations with
Joseph Bonaparte, who was known to be far more peacefully inclined than
his brother. Joseph's notions were that Malta should perhaps be garrisoned
by Russians, and must in any case be relinquished by England; that France
should withdraw her troops from the Dutch and Swiss Republics, the status
of which was not defined.[681] Pitt set little store by these shadowy
proposals, doubtless seeing in them a way of discovering whether England
was concerting a league against France.
Already, in spite of many obstacles, he was taking the first steps in that
direction. An initial difficulty lay in the mental aberrations of the King,
whose conduct still caused intense anxiety or annoyance.[682] Scarcely a day
passed without a lapse into incoherence or violence. Moreover, his
conversation often showed a lack of discrimination, being the same to the
Queen, the physicians, or the servants. He made the most capricious
changes, turning off the Queen's favourite coachman, and making grooms
footmen, and footmen grooms, to the distraction of the household. On
assuming office, Pitt consulted the royal physicians and received a reply,
dated Queen's Palace, 16th May 1804, stating that the King was equal to the
discharge of important business, but must avoid long conferences or any
Page 559
deviation from his usual habits, quiet being essential. Thereupon Pitt and
Lord Eldon wrote to the King urging this prudent course. They frequently
visited Buckingham House, where five physicians were in almost constant
attendance, a state of things viewed with alarm by patriots and with eager
hope by the Foxites and their hangers on.[683]
Unfortunately George could not compose himself to rest. Such is the tenor
of hasty notes sent to Pitt by Villiers, now high in favour at Kew and
Windsor. They describe the King's fussy intervention in household affairs,
his orders for sudden and expensive changes in the palaces, his substitution
of German for English servants, his frequent visits to the stables
unaccompanied by the equerry, his irritability on the most trifling
occasions, and, alternating with this undignified bustle, fits of somnolence
which at times overtook him even on horseback. Then, too, there were
quarrels with the Queen, whose conduct, said Villiers, was such as to
aggravate these troubles and check the course of recovery. Indeed, the
King's violent headaches seemed to Dr. Milman to presage an attack of
apoplexy. At all times he showed a marked preference for the company of
servants and workmen, declaring the higher officials to be "Court
nuisances." Villiers therefore begged Pitt to request an interview with the
King, now at Kew, for he took no notice of letters. On Midsummer day
Villiers suggested means for assuring the veto of the physicians on the
projected visit to Weymouth, in view of the extravagance and
inconvenience of the plans to which it gave rise.
Among them was the collection of a large military force in Dorset, George
being convinced that the French would land there rather than in Kent or
Essex. Fortunately, the Duke of York dissuaded him from a step so
eminently favourable to Napoleon; for about this time the King wrote to the
Duke: "As I am no friend to obstinacy, I will agree to lessen the demand
from other districts" (i.e., for an "Army of Reserve" in Dorset). The visit to
Lord Eldon wrote to the King urging this prudent course. They frequently
visited Buckingham House, where five physicians were in almost constant
attendance, a state of things viewed with alarm by patriots and with eager
hope by the Foxites and their hangers on.[683]
Unfortunately George could not compose himself to rest. Such is the tenor
of hasty notes sent to Pitt by Villiers, now high in favour at Kew and
Windsor. They describe the King's fussy intervention in household affairs,
his orders for sudden and expensive changes in the palaces, his substitution
of German for English servants, his frequent visits to the stables
unaccompanied by the equerry, his irritability on the most trifling
occasions, and, alternating with this undignified bustle, fits of somnolence
which at times overtook him even on horseback. Then, too, there were
quarrels with the Queen, whose conduct, said Villiers, was such as to
aggravate these troubles and check the course of recovery. Indeed, the
King's violent headaches seemed to Dr. Milman to presage an attack of
apoplexy. At all times he showed a marked preference for the company of
servants and workmen, declaring the higher officials to be "Court
nuisances." Villiers therefore begged Pitt to request an interview with the
King, now at Kew, for he took no notice of letters. On Midsummer day
Villiers suggested means for assuring the veto of the physicians on the
projected visit to Weymouth, in view of the extravagance and
inconvenience of the plans to which it gave rise.
Among them was the collection of a large military force in Dorset, George
being convinced that the French would land there rather than in Kent or
Essex. Fortunately, the Duke of York dissuaded him from a step so
eminently favourable to Napoleon; for about this time the King wrote to the
Duke: "As I am no friend to obstinacy, I will agree to lessen the demand
from other districts" (i.e., for an "Army of Reserve" in Dorset). The visit to
Page 560
Weymouth was also postponed; and Camden, Secretary at War,
countermanded the construction of huge barracks at that town, which the
King had ordered without consulting the Cabinet or the Duke of York. On
1st August Villiers reported the refusal of the King to see the Prince of
Wales, with whom no complete reconciliation was possible. George wished
Villiers to come and reside near Windsor and manage all his private affairs,
and would take no refusal. But how, asked Villiers, was he to do this on
£330 a year? He therefore requested the advice and help of Pitt.[684]
At Weymouth, late in the summer, the quarrels between the King and Queen
again became acute, as appears from confidential letters which Lord
Hawkesbury wrote to Pitt. The latter sided with the Queen and Princes on
some points; and indeed through these months the conduct of George seems
to have been so exasperating that the Princesses almost sank under the
ceaseless strain, for Queen Charlotte, too, was "ill and cross." In vain did
Pitt seek to effect a reconciliation between the King and the Prince of
Wales. The only result of his efforts was a formal and fruitless interview.
Last but not least of Pitt's Court worries was the conduct of the Princess of
Wales. Her wayward and extravagant habits increased the aversion of the
Prince, and produced scandals so serious that Pitt urgently but ineffectually
remonstrated with her at her residence in Blackheath. Such were the
diversions of a Minister on whom almost singly rested the burden of
defending his country at this crisis.
The eccentricities of the King seriously hampered British diplomacy. For
how could Russia and Austria bind themselves to an Administration which
might at any time be succeeded by one which was under the domination of
the Prince of Wales, Fox, and Sheridan? True, offers of a defensive alliance
were mooted at St. Petersburg to our ambassador, Admiral Warren. But it
was obvious even to that misplaced sailor, whom Pitt soon recalled, that
Russia merely aimed at securing English subsidies and help for her garrison
countermanded the construction of huge barracks at that town, which the
King had ordered without consulting the Cabinet or the Duke of York. On
1st August Villiers reported the refusal of the King to see the Prince of
Wales, with whom no complete reconciliation was possible. George wished
Villiers to come and reside near Windsor and manage all his private affairs,
and would take no refusal. But how, asked Villiers, was he to do this on
£330 a year? He therefore requested the advice and help of Pitt.[684]
At Weymouth, late in the summer, the quarrels between the King and Queen
again became acute, as appears from confidential letters which Lord
Hawkesbury wrote to Pitt. The latter sided with the Queen and Princes on
some points; and indeed through these months the conduct of George seems
to have been so exasperating that the Princesses almost sank under the
ceaseless strain, for Queen Charlotte, too, was "ill and cross." In vain did
Pitt seek to effect a reconciliation between the King and the Prince of
Wales. The only result of his efforts was a formal and fruitless interview.
Last but not least of Pitt's Court worries was the conduct of the Princess of
Wales. Her wayward and extravagant habits increased the aversion of the
Prince, and produced scandals so serious that Pitt urgently but ineffectually
remonstrated with her at her residence in Blackheath. Such were the
diversions of a Minister on whom almost singly rested the burden of
defending his country at this crisis.
The eccentricities of the King seriously hampered British diplomacy. For
how could Russia and Austria bind themselves to an Administration which
might at any time be succeeded by one which was under the domination of
the Prince of Wales, Fox, and Sheridan? True, offers of a defensive alliance
were mooted at St. Petersburg to our ambassador, Admiral Warren. But it
was obvious even to that misplaced sailor, whom Pitt soon recalled, that
Russia merely aimed at securing English subsidies and help for her garrison
Page 561
at Corfu, now threatened by Soult. The timid conduct of Francis II, who, as
if in imitation of Napoleon, assumed the title of Hereditary Emperor of the
Austrian Empire, further prescribed caution; and only by slow degrees did
the Czar Alexander feel his way towards an understanding with England.
His jealousy respecting Malta, and the uncertainties at London and
Windsor, held these natural allies apart for many months. Pitt did not hurry
matters, doubtless from a conviction that the conduct of Napoleon must
before long bring both Russia and Austria into the field. Meanwhile, he
withheld subsidies which would have helped them to arm for an almost
inevitable struggle.[685] We need not therefore trace the course of these coy
advances until they led to definite overtures. Here as always Pitt showed a
dignified reserve and a cautious regard for British finances, which refute the
stories officially circulated at Paris as to his lavishly bribing the Continental
States to attack France. As usually happens, the prosaic truth long remained
hidden in British despatches, while the piquant slander gained all but
universal acceptance.
Pitt's first thought was to enhance the value of England's friendship by
strengthening her navy and enabling her to take the offensive if an occasion
offered. The French royalist refugee, General Dumouriez, in a long Memoir
which he drew up for the Cabinet, pointed out that nothing was more
perilous than a perpetual defensive, as it allowed the enemy quietly to
perfect his plans for attack at any point over the whole field.[686] Pitt was
well aware of this danger. In fact, his policy of military pinpricks, while
apparently wasteful and inconclusive, had prevented that concentration of
the enemy's force which alone could ensure the capture of London. Once
more, then, he aimed at strengthening the regular army, reducing the Militia
to its usual quota, and raising a large force of Volunteers. On 5th June 1804
he brought forward his proposal for repairing the defects of Yorke's Army of
Reserve Act. They arose from the following provisions. A man, when drawn
to serve in that force, must either come forward, find a substitute, or pay a
if in imitation of Napoleon, assumed the title of Hereditary Emperor of the
Austrian Empire, further prescribed caution; and only by slow degrees did
the Czar Alexander feel his way towards an understanding with England.
His jealousy respecting Malta, and the uncertainties at London and
Windsor, held these natural allies apart for many months. Pitt did not hurry
matters, doubtless from a conviction that the conduct of Napoleon must
before long bring both Russia and Austria into the field. Meanwhile, he
withheld subsidies which would have helped them to arm for an almost
inevitable struggle.[685] We need not therefore trace the course of these coy
advances until they led to definite overtures. Here as always Pitt showed a
dignified reserve and a cautious regard for British finances, which refute the
stories officially circulated at Paris as to his lavishly bribing the Continental
States to attack France. As usually happens, the prosaic truth long remained
hidden in British despatches, while the piquant slander gained all but
universal acceptance.
Pitt's first thought was to enhance the value of England's friendship by
strengthening her navy and enabling her to take the offensive if an occasion
offered. The French royalist refugee, General Dumouriez, in a long Memoir
which he drew up for the Cabinet, pointed out that nothing was more
perilous than a perpetual defensive, as it allowed the enemy quietly to
perfect his plans for attack at any point over the whole field.[686] Pitt was
well aware of this danger. In fact, his policy of military pinpricks, while
apparently wasteful and inconclusive, had prevented that concentration of
the enemy's force which alone could ensure the capture of London. Once
more, then, he aimed at strengthening the regular army, reducing the Militia
to its usual quota, and raising a large force of Volunteers. On 5th June 1804
he brought forward his proposal for repairing the defects of Yorke's Army of
Reserve Act. They arose from the following provisions. A man, when drawn
to serve in that force, must either come forward, find a substitute, or pay a
Page 562
fine of £20 for each year of default. A penalty also fell on every parish
failing to supply its quota. The consequence was that parishes and
individuals offered high bounties in order to escape the fine—sometimes as
much as £40 or £60 per man.[687] These bounties naturally drew the best
recruits to the Army of Reserve, to the detriment both of the army and navy.
Another source of loss to the line regiments was the addition to the strength
of the Militia, the net result being that 9,000 more recruits were required
annually for the regular forces. These therefore suffered from the
competition of the second and third lines of defence; and in this competition
(then unusually severe) has always lain the crux of the British military
problem.
Pitt sought to solve the problem by reducing the Militia (now 74,000
strong) to the old standard of 52,000 men, transferring the surplus to the
Army of Reserve. He also suggested various inducements to men in the
latter force to enter the line regiments. Further, he proposed to lessen the
penalties levied on defaulters. While maintaining the principle of
compulsory service, at least for a considerable part of the population, he
lessened the inducements which told in favour of the Army of Reserve and
against the Line. Further, in place of the irritating plan of recruiting by the
compulsion of the ballot, Pitt made the parish authorities responsible for the
supply of their quota. If, even so, the parishes could not find the men, the
commander of the district was empowered to raise them by the ordinary
means of recruiting. He further proposed to associate in each district the
battalions of the Army of Reserve with those of the Line, in the well-
grounded hope of increasing esprit de corps and stimulating the flow of
men into the first line of defence.
The chief critic of these proposals was Sheridan who, on 18th June
brilliantly declaimed against the formation of a great Regular Army, as alien
to the spirit of our people, and by all the arts of rhetorical necromancy
failing to supply its quota. The consequence was that parishes and
individuals offered high bounties in order to escape the fine—sometimes as
much as £40 or £60 per man.[687] These bounties naturally drew the best
recruits to the Army of Reserve, to the detriment both of the army and navy.
Another source of loss to the line regiments was the addition to the strength
of the Militia, the net result being that 9,000 more recruits were required
annually for the regular forces. These therefore suffered from the
competition of the second and third lines of defence; and in this competition
(then unusually severe) has always lain the crux of the British military
problem.
Pitt sought to solve the problem by reducing the Militia (now 74,000
strong) to the old standard of 52,000 men, transferring the surplus to the
Army of Reserve. He also suggested various inducements to men in the
latter force to enter the line regiments. Further, he proposed to lessen the
penalties levied on defaulters. While maintaining the principle of
compulsory service, at least for a considerable part of the population, he
lessened the inducements which told in favour of the Army of Reserve and
against the Line. Further, in place of the irritating plan of recruiting by the
compulsion of the ballot, Pitt made the parish authorities responsible for the
supply of their quota. If, even so, the parishes could not find the men, the
commander of the district was empowered to raise them by the ordinary
means of recruiting. He further proposed to associate in each district the
battalions of the Army of Reserve with those of the Line, in the well-
grounded hope of increasing esprit de corps and stimulating the flow of
men into the first line of defence.
The chief critic of these proposals was Sheridan who, on 18th June
brilliantly declaimed against the formation of a great Regular Army, as alien
to the spirit of our people, and by all the arts of rhetorical necromancy
Page 563
sought to raise the spectre of a Standing Army. When others bemoaned the
threatened increase of taxation and Windham and Craufurd ("Craufurd of
the Light Division") criticized the measure severely, the Opposition
cherished the hope of defeating the Ministry. The debate dragged on till 4
a.m. when 265 members supported Pitt against 223 Noes. The Bill became
law on 29th June. Undoubtedly it failed to answer his hopes. Recruits did
not come in, probably because most parishes were thenceforth content to
pay the smaller fines now imposed. Grenville even ventured to assert that
the Regular Army was smaller at the beginning of 1805 than a year earlier.
Certainly the numbers were deficient; and Pitt accordingly on 31st March
1805 brought in a Bill to attract men from the Supplementary Militia into
the Regular Army by a bounty of ten guineas per man. This brought forward
11,000 men, but at the expense of the Militia.[688] Thus Pitt did not solve
the military problem. Who indeed has solved it?
Most fortunately for England, the Emperor had made serious
miscalculations respecting the flotilla now preparing at the ports between
Ostend and Etaples. First he armed his gun-boats heavily so that they might
fight their way across against a fleet. On finding this to be impossible, he
had to face the delay and expense of reconstruction. Next the harbours at
and near Boulogne proved to be too shallow and too small for the enlarged
flotilla. The strengthening of the French fleet was also a work of time.
England therefore gained a year's respite. Indeed not a few experienced
naval officers scouted an invasion by the flotilla as impossible. General
Moore also believed that Napoleon would never be so mad as to make the
attempt, which must end in our glory and his disgrace. Only by continuing
to threaten us could he do harm.[689] Another sceptic was Lord Melville,
First Lord of the Admiralty, who, in a letter of 14th October, urged Pitt
during his stay at Weymouth to represent to the King the importance of
attacking the flotilla at Boulogne, if only in order to show the
impracticability of Napoleon's scheme. Experienced officers, said Melville,
threatened increase of taxation and Windham and Craufurd ("Craufurd of
the Light Division") criticized the measure severely, the Opposition
cherished the hope of defeating the Ministry. The debate dragged on till 4
a.m. when 265 members supported Pitt against 223 Noes. The Bill became
law on 29th June. Undoubtedly it failed to answer his hopes. Recruits did
not come in, probably because most parishes were thenceforth content to
pay the smaller fines now imposed. Grenville even ventured to assert that
the Regular Army was smaller at the beginning of 1805 than a year earlier.
Certainly the numbers were deficient; and Pitt accordingly on 31st March
1805 brought in a Bill to attract men from the Supplementary Militia into
the Regular Army by a bounty of ten guineas per man. This brought forward
11,000 men, but at the expense of the Militia.[688] Thus Pitt did not solve
the military problem. Who indeed has solved it?
Most fortunately for England, the Emperor had made serious
miscalculations respecting the flotilla now preparing at the ports between
Ostend and Etaples. First he armed his gun-boats heavily so that they might
fight their way across against a fleet. On finding this to be impossible, he
had to face the delay and expense of reconstruction. Next the harbours at
and near Boulogne proved to be too shallow and too small for the enlarged
flotilla. The strengthening of the French fleet was also a work of time.
England therefore gained a year's respite. Indeed not a few experienced
naval officers scouted an invasion by the flotilla as impossible. General
Moore also believed that Napoleon would never be so mad as to make the
attempt, which must end in our glory and his disgrace. Only by continuing
to threaten us could he do harm.[689] Another sceptic was Lord Melville,
First Lord of the Admiralty, who, in a letter of 14th October, urged Pitt
during his stay at Weymouth to represent to the King the importance of
attacking the flotilla at Boulogne, if only in order to show the
impracticability of Napoleon's scheme. Experienced officers, said Melville,
Page 564
reported that the flotilla must embark the troops in the outer road; yet the
work of getting that vast concourse of boats out of the inner harbour could
not be accomplished in less than four, five, or perhaps even six tides. We
must therefore attack them during this tedious operation. "Our officers and
seamen," he continues, "have a perfect confidence that they can attack them
under their own batteries, and put them into immediate confusion.... Their
confidence is founded on the experiment they have already made of
entering in the night the Bay of Boulogne and sustaining for many hours the
whole fire of the enemy's batteries without a single man being hurt."
Moreover, the British fire-ships, being like ordinary ships, will take the
enemy by surprise and cause irremediable confusion.[690] Apparently the
King and Pitt thought an attack not only too risky, in view of the failures at
Boulogne in 1801 and on 3rd October 1804, but also needless, if the flotilla
were no more formidable than Melville pronounced. While inspecting the
"Royal Sovereign" at Portsmouth on 6th October the King wrote to Pitt
enjoining great caution, as a failure would be very discreditable.[691]
I do not propose to discuss here the much debated question whether
Napoleon intended to invade England, or to wear us out by threats of
invasion.[692] Suffice it to say that no responsible Minister could ignore
those formidable preparations. Pitt therefore strove might and main to raise
martial enthusiasm by attending drills and reviews of Volunteers. A cynical
phrase in Grenville's letter of 25th August 1804 dwells on the ridiculous
figure which he cut, riding from Downing Street to Wimbledon Common
and thence to Cox Heath in Kent "to inspect military carriages, impregnable
batteries, and Lord Chatham's reviews. Can he possibly be serious in
expecting Bonaparte now?" The sneer is a sign of the strained relations
between the cousins. Assuredly, if Bonaparte had come, Grenville and his
Foxite allies would have impeached a Minister who left his country
defenceless. Pitt showed a good example to country gentlemen by drilling
work of getting that vast concourse of boats out of the inner harbour could
not be accomplished in less than four, five, or perhaps even six tides. We
must therefore attack them during this tedious operation. "Our officers and
seamen," he continues, "have a perfect confidence that they can attack them
under their own batteries, and put them into immediate confusion.... Their
confidence is founded on the experiment they have already made of
entering in the night the Bay of Boulogne and sustaining for many hours the
whole fire of the enemy's batteries without a single man being hurt."
Moreover, the British fire-ships, being like ordinary ships, will take the
enemy by surprise and cause irremediable confusion.[690] Apparently the
King and Pitt thought an attack not only too risky, in view of the failures at
Boulogne in 1801 and on 3rd October 1804, but also needless, if the flotilla
were no more formidable than Melville pronounced. While inspecting the
"Royal Sovereign" at Portsmouth on 6th October the King wrote to Pitt
enjoining great caution, as a failure would be very discreditable.[691]
I do not propose to discuss here the much debated question whether
Napoleon intended to invade England, or to wear us out by threats of
invasion.[692] Suffice it to say that no responsible Minister could ignore
those formidable preparations. Pitt therefore strove might and main to raise
martial enthusiasm by attending drills and reviews of Volunteers. A cynical
phrase in Grenville's letter of 25th August 1804 dwells on the ridiculous
figure which he cut, riding from Downing Street to Wimbledon Common
and thence to Cox Heath in Kent "to inspect military carriages, impregnable
batteries, and Lord Chatham's reviews. Can he possibly be serious in
expecting Bonaparte now?" The sneer is a sign of the strained relations
between the cousins. Assuredly, if Bonaparte had come, Grenville and his
Foxite allies would have impeached a Minister who left his country
defenceless. Pitt showed a good example to country gentlemen by drilling
Page 565
his corps of Volunteers at Walmer, so that it became a model of efficiency.
There was the greatest need at that point, for the coast between Ramsgate
and Dungeness presented exceptional facilities for a landing except under
the guns of Sandown, Deal, Walmer, and Dover. Pitt's attention was
specially directed to the open shelving beach between Folkestone and
Dungeness.
In truth, the district of Romney Marsh, which is not normally marshy,
offered the maximum of attractions to an invader, who, after beaching his
boats and entrenching himself behind a fosse, would find few, if any,
physical obstacles to his advance into the level tract between Ashford and
Tonbridge. As this route was undefended, Pitt and Camden, by the month of
October 1804, decided on the construction of the Hythe Military Canal. On
24th October Pitt attended a meeting of the "surveyors, lords, bailiffs and
jurats" of Romney Marsh held at Dymchurch, Generals Sir David Dundas
and Moore, and Colonel Brown being also present. It was agreed that the
proposed canal from Sandgate to Rye would be beneficial to Romney
Marsh, and landlords were urged forthwith to put their property at the
disposal of Government, trusting to receive compensation assessed by a
duly qualified local jury. On Pitt's recommendation the matter was passed at
once, and he returned to Walmer Castle.[693] By the end of 1804 the work
was well in hand, the expense of cutting the fosse of ten feet deep being
estimated at £150,000. Batteries and martello towers were designed for its
protection especially around Hythe and Dymchurch. At the latter place were
sluices for flooding the marsh. Criticisms have fallen freely upon Pitt's
canal, the report gaining currency that it was intended for the conveyance of
military stores. Its true purpose was to isolate the most vulnerable part of
the coast and to form a barrier which would at least delay an invader until
reinforcements arrived. In its original condition it was an excellent first line
of defence of South Kent; and, unless the French flotilla brought over
There was the greatest need at that point, for the coast between Ramsgate
and Dungeness presented exceptional facilities for a landing except under
the guns of Sandown, Deal, Walmer, and Dover. Pitt's attention was
specially directed to the open shelving beach between Folkestone and
Dungeness.
In truth, the district of Romney Marsh, which is not normally marshy,
offered the maximum of attractions to an invader, who, after beaching his
boats and entrenching himself behind a fosse, would find few, if any,
physical obstacles to his advance into the level tract between Ashford and
Tonbridge. As this route was undefended, Pitt and Camden, by the month of
October 1804, decided on the construction of the Hythe Military Canal. On
24th October Pitt attended a meeting of the "surveyors, lords, bailiffs and
jurats" of Romney Marsh held at Dymchurch, Generals Sir David Dundas
and Moore, and Colonel Brown being also present. It was agreed that the
proposed canal from Sandgate to Rye would be beneficial to Romney
Marsh, and landlords were urged forthwith to put their property at the
disposal of Government, trusting to receive compensation assessed by a
duly qualified local jury. On Pitt's recommendation the matter was passed at
once, and he returned to Walmer Castle.[693] By the end of 1804 the work
was well in hand, the expense of cutting the fosse of ten feet deep being
estimated at £150,000. Batteries and martello towers were designed for its
protection especially around Hythe and Dymchurch. At the latter place were
sluices for flooding the marsh. Criticisms have fallen freely upon Pitt's
canal, the report gaining currency that it was intended for the conveyance of
military stores. Its true purpose was to isolate the most vulnerable part of
the coast and to form a barrier which would at least delay an invader until
reinforcements arrived. In its original condition it was an excellent first line
of defence of South Kent; and, unless the French flotilla brought over
Page 566
pontoons, it formed a barrier not easily penetrable, which fully justified its
comparatively small cost.
The same remarks apply to the martello towers. The responsibility for them
rests mainly with Colonel Twiss and Captain Ford, who in the summer of
1803 recommended their construction at exposed points of the shore, at a
cost of about £3,000 apiece. The experience of our troops in Corsica
showed that such towers, even when held by small garrisons, could hold at
bay a greatly superior force.[694] The towers were begun soon afterwards;
but those in Pevensey Bay were not undertaken till 1805–6. The first points
to be defended were those nearest to France.
In the winter of 1804–5 there was need to strengthen the coast defences; for
the declaration of war by Spain placed the whole of the coast line from the
Texel to Toulon at Napoleon's disposal for shipbuilding. There seemed
therefore every prospect of our being finally overwhelmed at sea, a
consummation which the French Emperor might have ensured had he
refrained from irritating the monarchs of Russia and Austria. Fortunately for
England, his nature was too restless and domineering to admit of the
necessary concentration of effort on the naval problem; and that besetting
sin, megalomania, marred prospects which then seemed easily realizable.
Playing with coolness and patience, he had the game in his hands in 1804,
when as yet there was little prospect of an Anglo-Russian alliance.
An offensive alliance of Spain with France was the natural result of the
treaty of 1796 between the two Powers. In vain did the luxurious
Charles IV and his pampered minion, Godoy, Prince of the Peace, seek to
evade their obligations. Under threat of a French invasion they gave way
and agreed to pay 72,000,000 francs a year into the French exchequer, and
to force the hand of Portugal. That little Power purchased immunity for a
time by paying an annual subsidy of 12,000,000 francs to France. Spain
comparatively small cost.
The same remarks apply to the martello towers. The responsibility for them
rests mainly with Colonel Twiss and Captain Ford, who in the summer of
1803 recommended their construction at exposed points of the shore, at a
cost of about £3,000 apiece. The experience of our troops in Corsica
showed that such towers, even when held by small garrisons, could hold at
bay a greatly superior force.[694] The towers were begun soon afterwards;
but those in Pevensey Bay were not undertaken till 1805–6. The first points
to be defended were those nearest to France.
In the winter of 1804–5 there was need to strengthen the coast defences; for
the declaration of war by Spain placed the whole of the coast line from the
Texel to Toulon at Napoleon's disposal for shipbuilding. There seemed
therefore every prospect of our being finally overwhelmed at sea, a
consummation which the French Emperor might have ensured had he
refrained from irritating the monarchs of Russia and Austria. Fortunately for
England, his nature was too restless and domineering to admit of the
necessary concentration of effort on the naval problem; and that besetting
sin, megalomania, marred prospects which then seemed easily realizable.
Playing with coolness and patience, he had the game in his hands in 1804,
when as yet there was little prospect of an Anglo-Russian alliance.
An offensive alliance of Spain with France was the natural result of the
treaty of 1796 between the two Powers. In vain did the luxurious
Charles IV and his pampered minion, Godoy, Prince of the Peace, seek to
evade their obligations. Under threat of a French invasion they gave way
and agreed to pay 72,000,000 francs a year into the French exchequer, and
to force the hand of Portugal. That little Power purchased immunity for a
time by paying an annual subsidy of 12,000,000 francs to France. Spain
Page 567
also repaired French warships which took refuge at Ferrol in July 1804, and
allowed reinforcements to their crews to travel thither overland. When Pitt
and Harrowby remonstrated on this conduct, Spain armed as if for war; and
in answer to inquiries from London, Godoy alleged certain disputes with
the United States as the cause of his alarm. The arrival in London of Frere,
our ambassador at Madrid, on 17th September 1804 revealed the unreality
of this excuse; for he reported that Spain had previously decided to yield on
that question. As the Spanish fleet was evidently preparing to cooperate
with that of Napoleon, Pitt resolved to deal the blow which Chatham was
not allowed to deliver in 1761. The weak point of Spain was her treasure
fleet; there was an inner fitness in wrenching from her the gold which was
soon to go into Napoleon's coffers.
On Tuesday, 18th September, the Cabinet assembled, Eldon, Camden,
Hawkesbury, Melville, Mulgrave, and Pitt being present. In view of the
news brought by Frere, and other tidings from Rear-Admiral Cochrane off
Ferrol, Ministers decided to order Cochrane closely to blockade that port,
preventing both French and Spanish ships from sailing out. Admiral
Cornwallis, then blockading Brest, was to reinforce Cochrane, thereby
assuring the capture of the Spanish treasure ships bound from South
America to Cadiz.[695] Pitt at once reported this decision to Harrowby, then
in attendance on the King at Weymouth, and urged a speedy ratification of
it.[696] Hence without delay the order went forth which enlarged the area of
strife. The four frigates despatched for the seizure of the treasure-ships were
not so superior in force to the convoying corvettes as to avert a conflict.
One of the Spanish ships blew up: the others surrendered (5th October
1804). Resenting this outrage, Spain declared war on 12th December.[697]
Pitt did not consider the capture of the treasure-ships as necessarily
involving war, but rather as a sharp warning, called for by the hostile
conduct of Spain; for on 23rd September he wrote to Harrowby stating that
allowed reinforcements to their crews to travel thither overland. When Pitt
and Harrowby remonstrated on this conduct, Spain armed as if for war; and
in answer to inquiries from London, Godoy alleged certain disputes with
the United States as the cause of his alarm. The arrival in London of Frere,
our ambassador at Madrid, on 17th September 1804 revealed the unreality
of this excuse; for he reported that Spain had previously decided to yield on
that question. As the Spanish fleet was evidently preparing to cooperate
with that of Napoleon, Pitt resolved to deal the blow which Chatham was
not allowed to deliver in 1761. The weak point of Spain was her treasure
fleet; there was an inner fitness in wrenching from her the gold which was
soon to go into Napoleon's coffers.
On Tuesday, 18th September, the Cabinet assembled, Eldon, Camden,
Hawkesbury, Melville, Mulgrave, and Pitt being present. In view of the
news brought by Frere, and other tidings from Rear-Admiral Cochrane off
Ferrol, Ministers decided to order Cochrane closely to blockade that port,
preventing both French and Spanish ships from sailing out. Admiral
Cornwallis, then blockading Brest, was to reinforce Cochrane, thereby
assuring the capture of the Spanish treasure ships bound from South
America to Cadiz.[695] Pitt at once reported this decision to Harrowby, then
in attendance on the King at Weymouth, and urged a speedy ratification of
it.[696] Hence without delay the order went forth which enlarged the area of
strife. The four frigates despatched for the seizure of the treasure-ships were
not so superior in force to the convoying corvettes as to avert a conflict.
One of the Spanish ships blew up: the others surrendered (5th October
1804). Resenting this outrage, Spain declared war on 12th December.[697]
Pitt did not consider the capture of the treasure-ships as necessarily
involving war, but rather as a sharp warning, called for by the hostile
conduct of Spain; for on 23rd September he wrote to Harrowby stating that
Page 568
they must wait for the Spanish answer to our ultimatum, and in the
meantime Spanish merchantmen might leave British ports unmolested.[698]
The seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships caused resentment at St.
Petersburg until the causes of Britain's action were more fully known. But
the event did not long delay a good understanding. The prospect of Sicily
falling a prey to the French army of occupation in South Italy alarmed both
the Czar Alexander and Pitt. The former was bound by a Convention signed
in 1798 to befriend the Neapolitan Court; and it was also to his interest to
prevent France dominating the Mediterranean and expelling the Russians
from Corfu. He therefore demanded from Napoleon the evacuation of Italy
and North Germany, a suitable compensation for the King of Sardinia for
the loss of his mainland possessions, and the recognition of the complete
neutrality of the Germanic Empire. Far from complying with these
demands, Napoleon kept his troops in South Italy and Hanover, and early in
November seized Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador at Hamburg. At
once Pitt and Harrowby made effective use of this incident to prove the
impossibility of peace with Napoleon. The Russian and Prussian Courts
sent sharp remonstrances to Paris; and, to humour Frederick William,
Napoleon ordered the release of the envoy, though in the most grudging
way possible. This violation of international law served to counterbalance
our irregular action against Spain.
In short, Napoleon's evident resolve everywhere to carry matters with a
high hand convinced the Czar that war was inevitable; and he prepared to
espouse the cause of Britain, not so much from sympathy with her as from
detestation of her restless adversary.[699] On 20th November Pitt wrote from
Downing Street to Harrowby, who was then taking the waters at Bath,
expressing joy that the views of Russia coincided entirely with ours,
especially as to the reduction of the French Power within its ancient limits.
He added these noteworthy words: "The restoration of the [French]
meantime Spanish merchantmen might leave British ports unmolested.[698]
The seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships caused resentment at St.
Petersburg until the causes of Britain's action were more fully known. But
the event did not long delay a good understanding. The prospect of Sicily
falling a prey to the French army of occupation in South Italy alarmed both
the Czar Alexander and Pitt. The former was bound by a Convention signed
in 1798 to befriend the Neapolitan Court; and it was also to his interest to
prevent France dominating the Mediterranean and expelling the Russians
from Corfu. He therefore demanded from Napoleon the evacuation of Italy
and North Germany, a suitable compensation for the King of Sardinia for
the loss of his mainland possessions, and the recognition of the complete
neutrality of the Germanic Empire. Far from complying with these
demands, Napoleon kept his troops in South Italy and Hanover, and early in
November seized Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador at Hamburg. At
once Pitt and Harrowby made effective use of this incident to prove the
impossibility of peace with Napoleon. The Russian and Prussian Courts
sent sharp remonstrances to Paris; and, to humour Frederick William,
Napoleon ordered the release of the envoy, though in the most grudging
way possible. This violation of international law served to counterbalance
our irregular action against Spain.
In short, Napoleon's evident resolve everywhere to carry matters with a
high hand convinced the Czar that war was inevitable; and he prepared to
espouse the cause of Britain, not so much from sympathy with her as from
detestation of her restless adversary.[699] On 20th November Pitt wrote from
Downing Street to Harrowby, who was then taking the waters at Bath,
expressing joy that the views of Russia coincided entirely with ours,
especially as to the reduction of the French Power within its ancient limits.
He added these noteworthy words: "The restoration of the [French]
Page 569
monarchy may become in the course of events an object to be distinctly
aimed at, but it certainly cannot be made a substantive object in the first
instance; and it is very satisfactory to see that in this important point there is
no apparent difference in our sentiments."[700] The hope of ending Prussia's
subservience to Napoleon, and of inspiring Francis of Austria with a manly
resolve, proved futile. Frederick William and Haugwitz hoped to creep into
Hanover, under the French Emperor's cloak, and Austria had not yet
suffered enough humiliation to lead her to fling down the gauntlet. True, she
signed a compact with Russia on 6th November 1804; but it was timidly
defensive in tone. Alexander therefore held back in the hope that events
would compel her to take sides against Napoleon.
Far less calculating was Gustavus IV of Sweden. With the chivalrous zeal
of his race he stood forth the first among the European monarchs as the
declared ally of England. After the execution of the Duc d'Enghien by the
French Emperor, he informed "Monsieur" Napoleon Bonaparte of the
rupture of all relations between them; and now, on 3rd December 1804, an
Anglo-Swedish Convention was signed, placing at our disposal the Isle of
Rügen and the fortress of Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania, in return for a
subsidy of £80,000. This sum served but to whet his appetite for subsidies,
his demands almost equalling in extravagance his Quixotic summons to a
royalist crusade.
Pitt therefore based his hopes on the statesmanlike policy of the Czar, who
in that month despatched to London one of his confidants, a clever but
viewy young man, of frank and engaging manners, Count Novossiltzoff.
Ostensibly the mission was for scientific purposes; but French agents
discovered that he took with him a plan of a Coalition against Napoleon.
[701] This seems to have led the Emperor to take a step similar to that of
Christmastide 1799. On 2nd January 1805 he wrote a letter direct to
George III, proposing terms of peace. The King at once expressed to Pitt his
aimed at, but it certainly cannot be made a substantive object in the first
instance; and it is very satisfactory to see that in this important point there is
no apparent difference in our sentiments."[700] The hope of ending Prussia's
subservience to Napoleon, and of inspiring Francis of Austria with a manly
resolve, proved futile. Frederick William and Haugwitz hoped to creep into
Hanover, under the French Emperor's cloak, and Austria had not yet
suffered enough humiliation to lead her to fling down the gauntlet. True, she
signed a compact with Russia on 6th November 1804; but it was timidly
defensive in tone. Alexander therefore held back in the hope that events
would compel her to take sides against Napoleon.
Far less calculating was Gustavus IV of Sweden. With the chivalrous zeal
of his race he stood forth the first among the European monarchs as the
declared ally of England. After the execution of the Duc d'Enghien by the
French Emperor, he informed "Monsieur" Napoleon Bonaparte of the
rupture of all relations between them; and now, on 3rd December 1804, an
Anglo-Swedish Convention was signed, placing at our disposal the Isle of
Rügen and the fortress of Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania, in return for a
subsidy of £80,000. This sum served but to whet his appetite for subsidies,
his demands almost equalling in extravagance his Quixotic summons to a
royalist crusade.
Pitt therefore based his hopes on the statesmanlike policy of the Czar, who
in that month despatched to London one of his confidants, a clever but
viewy young man, of frank and engaging manners, Count Novossiltzoff.
Ostensibly the mission was for scientific purposes; but French agents
discovered that he took with him a plan of a Coalition against Napoleon.
[701] This seems to have led the Emperor to take a step similar to that of
Christmastide 1799. On 2nd January 1805 he wrote a letter direct to
George III, proposing terms of peace. The King at once expressed to Pitt his
Page 570
astonishment that "the French usurper" had addressed him in this
objectionable manner, and highly approved the draft of an answer which
Pitt had thoughtfully forwarded to Windsor. In it Pitt declared that His
Majesty could not enter upon the proposed overtures for peace until he had
communicated them to the Powers with which he had confidential ties,
especially to the Emperor of Russia. At the King's command, he sent a copy
of this answer to St. Petersburg. At London, then, as also at Paris,
Napoleon's offer was deemed a diplomatic device for getting news, though
it also enabled him to represent himself as the friend of peace and Pitt as its
worst enemy.
While the French Emperor played his game with the advantages conferred
by a daring initiative, superior force, and unquestioned authority at home,
Pitt had to employ all possible means to conciliate allies abroad and half-
hearted friends at Westminster. His position was far from secure. True, the
King had now recovered almost his usual health; but in Parliament the
Ministry with difficulty repelled the bitter attacks of Fox, Sheridan,
Grenville, and Windham. The speech of Grenville on the seizure of the
Spanish treasure ships was of singular bitterness. Though aware of the
provocations of the Spanish Court, he chose to represent that affair as a
cowardly, and almost piratical attack on an unprepared Power. Pitt had
expected some such misrepresentations. He knew that the Opposition would
strain every nerve to overthrow him; and in the Christmas Vacation he made
timely overtures through Hawkesbury for the support of Addington. The
two old friends met on 23rd December 1804, at Hawkesbury's residence,
Coombe Wood, near Richmond Park. The host contrived to be absent when
Pitt entered the room, and he advanced with the cordial greeting: "I rejoice
to take you by the hand again."
Converse of three hours ensued between them alone. Addington demurred
to Pitt's request that he should retire to the Upper House. Finally, however,
objectionable manner, and highly approved the draft of an answer which
Pitt had thoughtfully forwarded to Windsor. In it Pitt declared that His
Majesty could not enter upon the proposed overtures for peace until he had
communicated them to the Powers with which he had confidential ties,
especially to the Emperor of Russia. At the King's command, he sent a copy
of this answer to St. Petersburg. At London, then, as also at Paris,
Napoleon's offer was deemed a diplomatic device for getting news, though
it also enabled him to represent himself as the friend of peace and Pitt as its
worst enemy.
While the French Emperor played his game with the advantages conferred
by a daring initiative, superior force, and unquestioned authority at home,
Pitt had to employ all possible means to conciliate allies abroad and half-
hearted friends at Westminster. His position was far from secure. True, the
King had now recovered almost his usual health; but in Parliament the
Ministry with difficulty repelled the bitter attacks of Fox, Sheridan,
Grenville, and Windham. The speech of Grenville on the seizure of the
Spanish treasure ships was of singular bitterness. Though aware of the
provocations of the Spanish Court, he chose to represent that affair as a
cowardly, and almost piratical attack on an unprepared Power. Pitt had
expected some such misrepresentations. He knew that the Opposition would
strain every nerve to overthrow him; and in the Christmas Vacation he made
timely overtures through Hawkesbury for the support of Addington. The
two old friends met on 23rd December 1804, at Hawkesbury's residence,
Coombe Wood, near Richmond Park. The host contrived to be absent when
Pitt entered the room, and he advanced with the cordial greeting: "I rejoice
to take you by the hand again."
Converse of three hours ensued between them alone. Addington demurred
to Pitt's request that he should retire to the Upper House. Finally, however,
Page 571
he agreed to do so, accepting the title of Viscount Sidmouth, taking also the
Presidency of the Council, which the Duke of Portland, for reasons of
health, wished to relinquish, though he finally agreed to remain in the
Cabinet without office. Lord Hobart, now Earl of Buckinghamshire, also
entered the Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in place of
Lord Mulgrave, who now succeeded Lord Harrowby at the Foreign Office.
Pitt further promised to promote some of Addington's supporters, including
his brother-in-law, Bragge Bathurst.
These changes were resented by several of Pitt's supporters, especially by
Rose. We have already noticed his contempt for Addington's financial
shifts; and he now, on 8th January 1805, wrote to Bishop Tomline deploring
Pitt's junction with "a man whose imbecility and falsehood, under Mr. Pitt's
own sanction," had weakened the country. Pitt would now gain a few votes,
no additional talents, and an increase of rancour in the Opposition. "We
shall," adds Rose, "drag on a wretched existence and expire not creditably.
What next will happen God only knows."[702] Canning was equally annoyed
at the new Coalition.[703] His sharp tongue and still sharper pen had deeply
annoyed Addington. Who, indeed, would not have resented this reference in
the "Apothecary's Hall (First of April)":
When his speeches hobble vilely
How "Hear him" bursts from brother Hiley!
When his faltering periods lag
Hark to the cheers of brother Bragge!
Sarcasms on Hawkesbury had also annoyed that susceptible Minister; so
that in June 1804 Canning offered to resign his Treasurership of the Navy.
The matter was patched up, only to be opened once more in the winter. Pitt
sought to mediate between the bard and his victim, but failed to elicit from
Canning an apology as complete as Hawkesbury demanded. Finally, on
Presidency of the Council, which the Duke of Portland, for reasons of
health, wished to relinquish, though he finally agreed to remain in the
Cabinet without office. Lord Hobart, now Earl of Buckinghamshire, also
entered the Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in place of
Lord Mulgrave, who now succeeded Lord Harrowby at the Foreign Office.
Pitt further promised to promote some of Addington's supporters, including
his brother-in-law, Bragge Bathurst.
These changes were resented by several of Pitt's supporters, especially by
Rose. We have already noticed his contempt for Addington's financial
shifts; and he now, on 8th January 1805, wrote to Bishop Tomline deploring
Pitt's junction with "a man whose imbecility and falsehood, under Mr. Pitt's
own sanction," had weakened the country. Pitt would now gain a few votes,
no additional talents, and an increase of rancour in the Opposition. "We
shall," adds Rose, "drag on a wretched existence and expire not creditably.
What next will happen God only knows."[702] Canning was equally annoyed
at the new Coalition.[703] His sharp tongue and still sharper pen had deeply
annoyed Addington. Who, indeed, would not have resented this reference in
the "Apothecary's Hall (First of April)":
When his speeches hobble vilely
How "Hear him" bursts from brother Hiley!
When his faltering periods lag
Hark to the cheers of brother Bragge!
Sarcasms on Hawkesbury had also annoyed that susceptible Minister; so
that in June 1804 Canning offered to resign his Treasurership of the Navy.
The matter was patched up, only to be opened once more in the winter. Pitt
sought to mediate between the bard and his victim, but failed to elicit from
Canning an apology as complete as Hawkesbury demanded. Finally, on
Page 572
18th January, Canning informed Pitt that, as Hawkesbury had left his letter
unanswered for three days, he declined to take the further steps which Pitt
recommended.[704] Is it surprising that the health of the Prime Minister
began to suffer? Friends noted with concern his thinness and a hacking
cough. Nevertheless, he rode out successfully the squalls of the session of
1805, beating off the onset of Sheridan against his Defence Bill, and
defeating an inopportune motion of Fox for Catholic Emancipation.
On this subject Pitt secretly sympathized with Fox, but his hands were tied
both by his promise of March 1801 to the King not to bring up the subject
during his reign, and recently by his union with Addington. The Irish
Catholics knew of these difficulties; and at meetings held by their leading
men at the house of James Ryan, a wealthy Dublin merchant, in the autumn
of 1804, both Lord Fingall and Counsellor Scully deprecated a petition to
Parliament as alike useless and embarrassing. Scully urged that they must
conciliate one whose "opinions had literally proved of great weight in the
Catholic cause.... The Catholics owe him [Pitt] respect for his enlarged and
manly conceptions of the necessity of relieving them, and the dignified
energy with which he publicly expressed those conceptions." A Committee
was chosen to consider the matter and communicate with Pitt. It included
Fingall, Sir Thomas French, Scully, and others. At the third meeting at
Ryan's house, on 17th November, Keogh sharply blamed Fingall for
opposing the petition, and commented adversely on the silence of Pitt.
Scully inferred from it "that he is favourably disposed, but in some way, to
them unknown, not in a situation in which he can freely act," or even
explain his reticence; but no Catholic wished to embarrass him.[705]
Nevertheless, the petition was resolved on; and it is clear that Fox
encouraged the petitioners rather from the hope of embarrassing Pitt than of
carrying Catholic Emancipation.[706]
unanswered for three days, he declined to take the further steps which Pitt
recommended.[704] Is it surprising that the health of the Prime Minister
began to suffer? Friends noted with concern his thinness and a hacking
cough. Nevertheless, he rode out successfully the squalls of the session of
1805, beating off the onset of Sheridan against his Defence Bill, and
defeating an inopportune motion of Fox for Catholic Emancipation.
On this subject Pitt secretly sympathized with Fox, but his hands were tied
both by his promise of March 1801 to the King not to bring up the subject
during his reign, and recently by his union with Addington. The Irish
Catholics knew of these difficulties; and at meetings held by their leading
men at the house of James Ryan, a wealthy Dublin merchant, in the autumn
of 1804, both Lord Fingall and Counsellor Scully deprecated a petition to
Parliament as alike useless and embarrassing. Scully urged that they must
conciliate one whose "opinions had literally proved of great weight in the
Catholic cause.... The Catholics owe him [Pitt] respect for his enlarged and
manly conceptions of the necessity of relieving them, and the dignified
energy with which he publicly expressed those conceptions." A Committee
was chosen to consider the matter and communicate with Pitt. It included
Fingall, Sir Thomas French, Scully, and others. At the third meeting at
Ryan's house, on 17th November, Keogh sharply blamed Fingall for
opposing the petition, and commented adversely on the silence of Pitt.
Scully inferred from it "that he is favourably disposed, but in some way, to
them unknown, not in a situation in which he can freely act," or even
explain his reticence; but no Catholic wished to embarrass him.[705]
Nevertheless, the petition was resolved on; and it is clear that Fox
encouraged the petitioners rather from the hope of embarrassing Pitt than of
carrying Catholic Emancipation.[706]
Page 573
In March 1805 Scully came to London, and saw Fox, Nepean, and Grey.
Pitt received him and others of the Irish deputation at Downing Street on
the 12th. Scully noted in his diary: "He [Pitt] wore dirty boots and odd-
fashioned, lank leather breeches, but otherwise well dressed and cleanly, his
hair powdered, etc. He was very courteous and cordial in words and looks,
but his carriage was stiff and strait, perhaps naturally so. His face cold and
harsh, rather selfish, but acute and sensible. We took our seats after much
reciprocal ceremony." Pitt declined Fingall's request that he should present
the Catholic petition, though he admitted that the measure would be most
salutary whenever the proper time would arrive; but he added with a smile
that he could not tell when that would be. The deputation failed to move
him from this position, and thereafter committed its cause to the
Opposition.[707] Despite excellent speeches by Fox and Grey, and by
Grenville and Holland in the Lords, the motions for Catholic Emancipation
were rejected by large majorities. The speech of Pitt on 14th May, to which
reference has already been made, naturally lacked energy and fire; he
opposed Fox's motion solely on the ground of present expediency.[708]
The worst trial of the session was the impeachment of his old friend, Lord
Melville. As Treasurer of the Navy in Pitt's former Administration, he had
been guilty of a serious irregularity in not preventing Deputy Treasurer
Trotter from using the sum of £10,000 for private speculation. Suspicions
having been aroused on this and other grounds, a Commission was
appointed to sift the matter to the bottom. The tenth Report dealing with
these charges came out on 17th or 18th March; and Wilberforce, who then
chanced to be with Pitt, noted how eagerly, without waiting to cut open the
pages, he sought to tear out the secret. It proved to be highly unfavourable
to Melville. In vain did Wilberforce and Bankes seek to persuade Pitt to
adopt a judicial attitude on this question. Though his friendship with
Melville had cooled, yet it was still strong, and he finally agreed with Lord
Sidmouth to press for a committee of inquiry. Only so could he count on the
Pitt received him and others of the Irish deputation at Downing Street on
the 12th. Scully noted in his diary: "He [Pitt] wore dirty boots and odd-
fashioned, lank leather breeches, but otherwise well dressed and cleanly, his
hair powdered, etc. He was very courteous and cordial in words and looks,
but his carriage was stiff and strait, perhaps naturally so. His face cold and
harsh, rather selfish, but acute and sensible. We took our seats after much
reciprocal ceremony." Pitt declined Fingall's request that he should present
the Catholic petition, though he admitted that the measure would be most
salutary whenever the proper time would arrive; but he added with a smile
that he could not tell when that would be. The deputation failed to move
him from this position, and thereafter committed its cause to the
Opposition.[707] Despite excellent speeches by Fox and Grey, and by
Grenville and Holland in the Lords, the motions for Catholic Emancipation
were rejected by large majorities. The speech of Pitt on 14th May, to which
reference has already been made, naturally lacked energy and fire; he
opposed Fox's motion solely on the ground of present expediency.[708]
The worst trial of the session was the impeachment of his old friend, Lord
Melville. As Treasurer of the Navy in Pitt's former Administration, he had
been guilty of a serious irregularity in not preventing Deputy Treasurer
Trotter from using the sum of £10,000 for private speculation. Suspicions
having been aroused on this and other grounds, a Commission was
appointed to sift the matter to the bottom. The tenth Report dealing with
these charges came out on 17th or 18th March; and Wilberforce, who then
chanced to be with Pitt, noted how eagerly, without waiting to cut open the
pages, he sought to tear out the secret. It proved to be highly unfavourable
to Melville. In vain did Wilberforce and Bankes seek to persuade Pitt to
adopt a judicial attitude on this question. Though his friendship with
Melville had cooled, yet it was still strong, and he finally agreed with Lord
Sidmouth to press for a committee of inquiry. Only so could he count on the
Page 574
support of the Addingtonians. On 8th April, then, he resolutely defended
Melville against the aspersions of Whitbread, maintaining that the evidence
before the Commission was far from conclusive, and moving that a select
Committee of the House should make further investigations.
The debate was long and stormy. Petty, Tierney, George Ponsonby, and Fox
censured Melville severely. Canning with his wonted brilliance, Castlereagh
with the usual laboured infelicity, sought to strengthen the defence; but it
had almost collapsed when, about 4 a.m. of 9th April, Wilberforce arose. At
once Pitt bent forward and sent an eager glance down the Treasury bench at
his old friend; for the verdict of a conscientious and independent member at
such a time is decisive. Speaking with the calm of deep conviction, the
member for Yorkshire declared against Melville, whereupon Pitt sank back
with signs of deep pain. The division showed 216 for and 216 against the
motion of censure. The Speaker, Abbott, turned deathly white, and after a
long and trying pause gave the casting vote against the Government. Then
the pent up feelings burst forth. The groups of the Opposition united in yells
of triumph; one member gave the "view holloa," and others shouted to Pitt
to resign. He meanwhile pressed forward his hat to hide the tears which
stole down his cheeks. Fitzharris, son of Lord Malmesbury, and a few
devoted friends formed a phalanx to screen him from the insolent stare of
Colonel Wardle and others who were crowding round the exit to see "how
Billy Pitt looked after it"; and he was helped out of the House in a half
unconscious state. The blow told severely on a frame already enfeebled by
overwork and worry.[709]
Whitbread's further motion for impeachment was rejected (11th June), but a
similar motion succeeded a fortnight later. Public opinion, however, soon
began to veer round and pronounce the conduct of the Opposition
rancorous. Melville's relative, Sir Charles Middleton, in a letter to
Wilberforce, denounced it as sheer persecution, seeing that the nation had
Melville against the aspersions of Whitbread, maintaining that the evidence
before the Commission was far from conclusive, and moving that a select
Committee of the House should make further investigations.
The debate was long and stormy. Petty, Tierney, George Ponsonby, and Fox
censured Melville severely. Canning with his wonted brilliance, Castlereagh
with the usual laboured infelicity, sought to strengthen the defence; but it
had almost collapsed when, about 4 a.m. of 9th April, Wilberforce arose. At
once Pitt bent forward and sent an eager glance down the Treasury bench at
his old friend; for the verdict of a conscientious and independent member at
such a time is decisive. Speaking with the calm of deep conviction, the
member for Yorkshire declared against Melville, whereupon Pitt sank back
with signs of deep pain. The division showed 216 for and 216 against the
motion of censure. The Speaker, Abbott, turned deathly white, and after a
long and trying pause gave the casting vote against the Government. Then
the pent up feelings burst forth. The groups of the Opposition united in yells
of triumph; one member gave the "view holloa," and others shouted to Pitt
to resign. He meanwhile pressed forward his hat to hide the tears which
stole down his cheeks. Fitzharris, son of Lord Malmesbury, and a few
devoted friends formed a phalanx to screen him from the insolent stare of
Colonel Wardle and others who were crowding round the exit to see "how
Billy Pitt looked after it"; and he was helped out of the House in a half
unconscious state. The blow told severely on a frame already enfeebled by
overwork and worry.[709]
Whitbread's further motion for impeachment was rejected (11th June), but a
similar motion succeeded a fortnight later. Public opinion, however, soon
began to veer round and pronounce the conduct of the Opposition
rancorous. Melville's relative, Sir Charles Middleton, in a letter to
Wilberforce, denounced it as sheer persecution, seeing that the nation had
Page 575
suffered no loss, and Melville had served it many years with indefatigable
zeal. As for Melville, he retired to his Highland seat, "Dunira," and in the
last letter which he wrote to Pitt, dated 11th November 1805, expressed
gratitude for Pitt's recent message that his energy at the Admiralty had
largely contributed to the triumph at Trafalgar. Melville's feelings further
appeared in the postscript, that Nelson's death was "enviable beyond
expression," as placing "his fair fame beyond the reach of caprice, envy, or
malevolence."[710] Pitt did not live on to see the vindication of his old
friend. On 12th June 1806, after a trial of twelve days in Westminster Hall,
the Peers acquitted Melville on all the ten counts, the prosecution failing to
prove that he had benefited by Trotter's irregular use of the sum of £10,000.
It is worth noting that Whitbread in his final attack declared his belief that
Pitt in similar circumstances would have died rather than connive at such an
irregularity.[711] This statement may be set against the Bacchic outburst of
Creevey, after the hostile vote in Parliament, that Pitt had betrayed Melville
in order to save himself from ruin.[712]
Pitt, seconded in this by Grenville, urged the appointment of Middleton,
whose sagacity and long experience at the Admiralty had of late furnished
the First Lord with invaluable counsel. True, he was eighty years of age, but
neither had his frame lost vigour nor his mind alertness. Seeing that his
reputation as a naval expert was unequalled, Pitt little expected to encounter
the stiff opposition of Lords Sidmouth and Buckinghamshire to the
appointment, which they designed for Buckinghamshire, Hawkesbury, or
Charles Yorke. The King, too, probably influenced by Sidmouth, expressed
his disapproval of Middleton, preferring those just named, or Castlereagh,
or even Chatham. In a matter which concerned the safety of the nation Pitt
was inexorable, facing for several days the threats of resignation of his two
colleagues and the disapproval of the King. Finally he carried his point, the
two lords being pacified by the assurance that Middleton's appointment
zeal. As for Melville, he retired to his Highland seat, "Dunira," and in the
last letter which he wrote to Pitt, dated 11th November 1805, expressed
gratitude for Pitt's recent message that his energy at the Admiralty had
largely contributed to the triumph at Trafalgar. Melville's feelings further
appeared in the postscript, that Nelson's death was "enviable beyond
expression," as placing "his fair fame beyond the reach of caprice, envy, or
malevolence."[710] Pitt did not live on to see the vindication of his old
friend. On 12th June 1806, after a trial of twelve days in Westminster Hall,
the Peers acquitted Melville on all the ten counts, the prosecution failing to
prove that he had benefited by Trotter's irregular use of the sum of £10,000.
It is worth noting that Whitbread in his final attack declared his belief that
Pitt in similar circumstances would have died rather than connive at such an
irregularity.[711] This statement may be set against the Bacchic outburst of
Creevey, after the hostile vote in Parliament, that Pitt had betrayed Melville
in order to save himself from ruin.[712]
Pitt, seconded in this by Grenville, urged the appointment of Middleton,
whose sagacity and long experience at the Admiralty had of late furnished
the First Lord with invaluable counsel. True, he was eighty years of age, but
neither had his frame lost vigour nor his mind alertness. Seeing that his
reputation as a naval expert was unequalled, Pitt little expected to encounter
the stiff opposition of Lords Sidmouth and Buckinghamshire to the
appointment, which they designed for Buckinghamshire, Hawkesbury, or
Charles Yorke. The King, too, probably influenced by Sidmouth, expressed
his disapproval of Middleton, preferring those just named, or Castlereagh,
or even Chatham. In a matter which concerned the safety of the nation Pitt
was inexorable, facing for several days the threats of resignation of his two
colleagues and the disapproval of the King. Finally he carried his point, the
two lords being pacified by the assurance that Middleton's appointment
Page 576
would be temporary. The King also consented to raise him to the peerage as
Lord Barham, adding, however, the proviso that he should attend the
Cabinet only during the discussion of naval affairs. In this grudging way did
the Monarch and Sidmouth permit Middleton to reap the reward of life-long
service and the nation to benefit by his unique experience. Only of late has
the work done by Barham during the Trafalgar campaign been duly set
forth; and it is therefore possible now to estimate the service rendered by
Pitt in insisting on his appointment even at the risk of the secession of the
Addingtonian group.[713]
Before referring to naval affairs, we must glance at the efforts of Pitt to
frame a Coalition of the Powers against France. In the middle of January
1805 he had important interviews with Novossiltzoff, the envoy whom the
Czar Alexander had despatched to London on an important mission. For
this ardent young reformer Alexander had drawn up secret instructions
which the curious may read in the Memoirs of his Minister, Czartoryski.
[714] They illustrate the mingling of sentimentality and statecraft, of
viewiness and ambition, which accounts for the strange oscillations of
Muscovite policy between altruistic philosophy and brutal self-seeking. At
present the Russian Janus turned his modern face westwards. Alexander
insisted on the need of tearing from France the mask of liberty which she
had so long and so profitably worn. Against the naturalism of Rousseau,
which supplied Napoleon with excellent reasons for every annexation,
Alexander resolved to appeal to historical rights and the Balance of Power.
Yet he also resolved to uphold the rights of all the peoples concerned. They
must be reconciled to their rulers so as to harmonize the claims of
legitimacy and liberty. Thus, the King of Sardinia, when restored to his
throne at Turin, was to be induced to grant a Constitution. The Germanic
System was to be rescued from chaos by the grant of free federal
institutions. The independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Dutch Republics
was a matter of urgency, those States being also strengthened against
Lord Barham, adding, however, the proviso that he should attend the
Cabinet only during the discussion of naval affairs. In this grudging way did
the Monarch and Sidmouth permit Middleton to reap the reward of life-long
service and the nation to benefit by his unique experience. Only of late has
the work done by Barham during the Trafalgar campaign been duly set
forth; and it is therefore possible now to estimate the service rendered by
Pitt in insisting on his appointment even at the risk of the secession of the
Addingtonian group.[713]
Before referring to naval affairs, we must glance at the efforts of Pitt to
frame a Coalition of the Powers against France. In the middle of January
1805 he had important interviews with Novossiltzoff, the envoy whom the
Czar Alexander had despatched to London on an important mission. For
this ardent young reformer Alexander had drawn up secret instructions
which the curious may read in the Memoirs of his Minister, Czartoryski.
[714] They illustrate the mingling of sentimentality and statecraft, of
viewiness and ambition, which accounts for the strange oscillations of
Muscovite policy between altruistic philosophy and brutal self-seeking. At
present the Russian Janus turned his modern face westwards. Alexander
insisted on the need of tearing from France the mask of liberty which she
had so long and so profitably worn. Against the naturalism of Rousseau,
which supplied Napoleon with excellent reasons for every annexation,
Alexander resolved to appeal to historical rights and the Balance of Power.
Yet he also resolved to uphold the rights of all the peoples concerned. They
must be reconciled to their rulers so as to harmonize the claims of
legitimacy and liberty. Thus, the King of Sardinia, when restored to his
throne at Turin, was to be induced to grant a Constitution. The Germanic
System was to be rescued from chaos by the grant of free federal
institutions. The independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Dutch Republics
was a matter of urgency, those States being also strengthened against
Page 577
French aggressions. Finally, Russia and England were, if possible, to secure
the friendship of Turkey.
With these aims Pitt declared his entire concurrence, a just and lasting peace
being the first of British interests. He developed these notions in a
remarkable document of date 19th January 1805. We may be sure that it is
his; for, an accident having befallen the Earl of Harrowby at the close of
1804, Lord Mulgrave took his place at the Foreign Office, and a new comer
would not have ventured to impose his own views as to the future of
Europe. Pitt now recurred to his plans of the year 1798 for assuring the
repose of the Continent. In brief, they were the aggrandisement of Austria
in Northern Italy and of Prussia in the Low Countries so as to form barriers
against France. The Italian Republic must therefore be divided between the
Hapsburgs and the King of Sardinia, the latter also absorbing the Genoese
Republic, which had forfeited all claim to consideration. Pitt did not enter
into details respecting Belgium; but probably he intended to offer it to
Prussia, in order to still her cravings for Hanover. Such was his proposal to
the Court of Berlin in October 1805.[715] Conscious, perhaps, that the
present plans were not consonant with the benevolent idealism of Russian
policy, which, however, stole sidelong glances at Constantinople, Pitt
declared that only by these arrangements could the peace of Europe be
secured. They were therefore "not repugnant to the most sacred principles
of justice and public morality." In order further to curb the aggressions of
Napoleon, the Great Powers were mutually to guarantee their possessions,
thus laying the foundation of a system of public right.[716]
This scheme clearly foreshadows the system of alliances and compromises
carried out by Castlereagh in the Treaty of Chaumont nine years later. Pitt
also assented to the Czar's proposal that the final settlement should be
guaranteed by international agreements forming a basis for the new
European polity, a suggestion in which lies the germ of the Holy Alliance. It
the friendship of Turkey.
With these aims Pitt declared his entire concurrence, a just and lasting peace
being the first of British interests. He developed these notions in a
remarkable document of date 19th January 1805. We may be sure that it is
his; for, an accident having befallen the Earl of Harrowby at the close of
1804, Lord Mulgrave took his place at the Foreign Office, and a new comer
would not have ventured to impose his own views as to the future of
Europe. Pitt now recurred to his plans of the year 1798 for assuring the
repose of the Continent. In brief, they were the aggrandisement of Austria
in Northern Italy and of Prussia in the Low Countries so as to form barriers
against France. The Italian Republic must therefore be divided between the
Hapsburgs and the King of Sardinia, the latter also absorbing the Genoese
Republic, which had forfeited all claim to consideration. Pitt did not enter
into details respecting Belgium; but probably he intended to offer it to
Prussia, in order to still her cravings for Hanover. Such was his proposal to
the Court of Berlin in October 1805.[715] Conscious, perhaps, that the
present plans were not consonant with the benevolent idealism of Russian
policy, which, however, stole sidelong glances at Constantinople, Pitt
declared that only by these arrangements could the peace of Europe be
secured. They were therefore "not repugnant to the most sacred principles
of justice and public morality." In order further to curb the aggressions of
Napoleon, the Great Powers were mutually to guarantee their possessions,
thus laying the foundation of a system of public right.[716]
This scheme clearly foreshadows the system of alliances and compromises
carried out by Castlereagh in the Treaty of Chaumont nine years later. Pitt
also assented to the Czar's proposal that the final settlement should be
guaranteed by international agreements forming a basis for the new
European polity, a suggestion in which lies the germ of the Holy Alliance. It
Page 578
would be absurd to hold Pitt responsible for the strange and unforeseen
developments of the years 1815–25. But it is to be regretted that fear of
Napoleon should have obliterated his earlier aim of forming a defensive
league of the weaker States. His cure for the evils of French domination
was scarcely better than the evils themselves. The installation of the
Hapsburgs at Venice and Milan, of Victor Emmanuel I at Genoa, of
Frederick William of Prussia at Brussels, could not permanently improve
the lot of the Italian and Belgian peoples. So soon as we formulate the
question we see that, as in 1798, Pitt left their welfare out of count. He
aimed merely at piling up barriers against France, and trusted to some
vague arrangement with the Czar for safeguarding the political rights of the
bartered peoples.
Pitt's reliance on the statics of statecraft rather than on the dynamics of
nationality tells against the credibility of the oft-repeated story that he
prophesied the liberation of Europe by the enthusiasm and efforts of the
Spaniards. Wellington afterwards told the Spanish general, Alava, that Pitt,
on hearing of the disaster of Ulm, made this prophecy at a dinner party at
which he (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) was present. Difficulties of time and
place militate against the anecdote, which, moreover, is out of harmony
with the sentiments expressed in Pitt's speeches, letters, and despatches.[717]
Further, his experience of Spain was such as to inspire him with deep
distrust; and, finally, the cast of his mind was so far objective as to forbid
the indulgence of speculations on the little-known topic of nationality.
Distrusting novel theories, he sought to utilize forces of tried potency. He
worked by diplomatic methods through Governments, not through the
tumultuary efforts of peoples. Dependence on a nation so backward as the
Spaniards would have seemed to him madness. Even if he could have seen
the surprising events of May–June 1808, he would probably have distrusted
the spirit which prompted them. In truth, he lacked the sympathetic instinct
developments of the years 1815–25. But it is to be regretted that fear of
Napoleon should have obliterated his earlier aim of forming a defensive
league of the weaker States. His cure for the evils of French domination
was scarcely better than the evils themselves. The installation of the
Hapsburgs at Venice and Milan, of Victor Emmanuel I at Genoa, of
Frederick William of Prussia at Brussels, could not permanently improve
the lot of the Italian and Belgian peoples. So soon as we formulate the
question we see that, as in 1798, Pitt left their welfare out of count. He
aimed merely at piling up barriers against France, and trusted to some
vague arrangement with the Czar for safeguarding the political rights of the
bartered peoples.
Pitt's reliance on the statics of statecraft rather than on the dynamics of
nationality tells against the credibility of the oft-repeated story that he
prophesied the liberation of Europe by the enthusiasm and efforts of the
Spaniards. Wellington afterwards told the Spanish general, Alava, that Pitt,
on hearing of the disaster of Ulm, made this prophecy at a dinner party at
which he (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) was present. Difficulties of time and
place militate against the anecdote, which, moreover, is out of harmony
with the sentiments expressed in Pitt's speeches, letters, and despatches.[717]
Further, his experience of Spain was such as to inspire him with deep
distrust; and, finally, the cast of his mind was so far objective as to forbid
the indulgence of speculations on the little-known topic of nationality.
Distrusting novel theories, he sought to utilize forces of tried potency. He
worked by diplomatic methods through Governments, not through the
tumultuary efforts of peoples. Dependence on a nation so backward as the
Spaniards would have seemed to him madness. Even if he could have seen
the surprising events of May–June 1808, he would probably have distrusted
the spirit which prompted them. In truth, he lacked the sympathetic instinct
Page 579
which led Canning at that crisis to side with the Spanish patriots and thus
open a new chapter in the history of Europe.
Yet it is but just to remember that Pitt the diplomatic bargainer of 1805
differed from Pitt the upholder of weak States in 1790, only because the
times had completely changed. Against the destructive schemes of
Joseph II, Catharine II, and Hertzberg he worked on the whole successfully.
But now Poland was gone; Sweden and Turkey were safe; the German
tangle had been cut by the Secularizations of Church domains in 1803. Now
the danger was from the West. France had swallowed up her weaker
neighbours. Napoleon dominated Spain, Italy, Switzerland, the Rhenish
States, and the Netherlands. Russian policy, subversive under Catharine,
was in a European sense conservative under Alexander. Then the most
damaging thrusts to the European fabric came from Vienna and St.
Petersburg. Now they came from Paris. Pitt therefore sought to construct a
rampart out of the weak States bordering on France. As the Barrier Treaties
of a century earlier were directed against Louis XIV, so now Pitt sought to
inaugurate an enlarged Barrier policy as a safeguard against Napoleon. The
efforts of at least half a million of trained troops being available, the time
had apparently come for a final effort to preserve the Balance of Power
before it was irretrievably impaired.
For a time the Russian and British Governments seemed in complete
accord. Novossiltzoff, on his return to St. Petersburg, wrote to Pitt on 20th
March 1805 (N.S.), describing the entire concurrence of his master with the
principles on which they had agreed at London. In about eight days he
would leave for Berlin to put forth his utmost endeavours to gain the
alliance of that Court. He would then proceed to Paris to present the Czar's
ultimatum. A refusal was expected; but his master believed it more
dignified to take all reasonable means of ensuring peace. The orders for
mobilizing the Russian troops would go forth at the time of his departure
open a new chapter in the history of Europe.
Yet it is but just to remember that Pitt the diplomatic bargainer of 1805
differed from Pitt the upholder of weak States in 1790, only because the
times had completely changed. Against the destructive schemes of
Joseph II, Catharine II, and Hertzberg he worked on the whole successfully.
But now Poland was gone; Sweden and Turkey were safe; the German
tangle had been cut by the Secularizations of Church domains in 1803. Now
the danger was from the West. France had swallowed up her weaker
neighbours. Napoleon dominated Spain, Italy, Switzerland, the Rhenish
States, and the Netherlands. Russian policy, subversive under Catharine,
was in a European sense conservative under Alexander. Then the most
damaging thrusts to the European fabric came from Vienna and St.
Petersburg. Now they came from Paris. Pitt therefore sought to construct a
rampart out of the weak States bordering on France. As the Barrier Treaties
of a century earlier were directed against Louis XIV, so now Pitt sought to
inaugurate an enlarged Barrier policy as a safeguard against Napoleon. The
efforts of at least half a million of trained troops being available, the time
had apparently come for a final effort to preserve the Balance of Power
before it was irretrievably impaired.
For a time the Russian and British Governments seemed in complete
accord. Novossiltzoff, on his return to St. Petersburg, wrote to Pitt on 20th
March 1805 (N.S.), describing the entire concurrence of his master with the
principles on which they had agreed at London. In about eight days he
would leave for Berlin to put forth his utmost endeavours to gain the
alliance of that Court. He would then proceed to Paris to present the Czar's
ultimatum. A refusal was expected; but his master believed it more
dignified to take all reasonable means of ensuring peace. The orders for
mobilizing the Russian troops would go forth at the time of his departure
Page 580
for Berlin. Before his arrival at Paris, he hoped to receive from London full
powers authorizing him to speak for Great Britain as well as for Russia.[718]
All this implied the closest union and sympathy. But now Alexander
showed the other side of his nature. He sought to drive a hard bargain with
Pitt. Firstly, he strove to obtain the promise of a larger British force to form
an integral part of a Russian expedition for the deliverance of the Kingdom
of Naples. In view of the paucity of our disposable forces, Pitt had sought to
limit the sphere of action to Sicily and the neighbouring parts of Calabria,
the defence of Sicily, the key of the Mediterranean and the outwork of
Egypt, being now and throughout the war one of the cardinal aims of
British policy. An expedition under General Sir James Craig was about to
set sail for Malta and Messina; and the Czar required that, when
strengthened, it should act in any part of South Italy, under a Russian
general. After wearisome correspondence, a compromise was arrived at;
and on 19th April 1805 Craig set sail from Portsmouth on his perilous
voyage over seas now and again swept by French and Spanish warships. By
good fortune he escaped these many dangers, and reached Malta, there
setting free seasoned troops for operations in South Italy. The hardihood of
Pitt in sending forth this expedition has often provoked criticism. But it was
worth while to run serious risks to save Sicily from the grip of Napoleon,
and to wrest from him the initiative which he had hitherto enjoyed
unchallenged. Besides, the Czar insisted on that effort, and made it almost a
sine quâ non of his alliance. In a military sense the results were
contemptible; in the diplomatic sphere they were very great.[719]
Twelve days before Craig set sail, Czartoryski worried or coaxed the British
ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, into signing
a provisional treaty of alliance. The Czar now promised to set in motion
half a million of men (half of them being Austrians, and only 115,000
Russians) so as to drive the French from Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and
powers authorizing him to speak for Great Britain as well as for Russia.[718]
All this implied the closest union and sympathy. But now Alexander
showed the other side of his nature. He sought to drive a hard bargain with
Pitt. Firstly, he strove to obtain the promise of a larger British force to form
an integral part of a Russian expedition for the deliverance of the Kingdom
of Naples. In view of the paucity of our disposable forces, Pitt had sought to
limit the sphere of action to Sicily and the neighbouring parts of Calabria,
the defence of Sicily, the key of the Mediterranean and the outwork of
Egypt, being now and throughout the war one of the cardinal aims of
British policy. An expedition under General Sir James Craig was about to
set sail for Malta and Messina; and the Czar required that, when
strengthened, it should act in any part of South Italy, under a Russian
general. After wearisome correspondence, a compromise was arrived at;
and on 19th April 1805 Craig set sail from Portsmouth on his perilous
voyage over seas now and again swept by French and Spanish warships. By
good fortune he escaped these many dangers, and reached Malta, there
setting free seasoned troops for operations in South Italy. The hardihood of
Pitt in sending forth this expedition has often provoked criticism. But it was
worth while to run serious risks to save Sicily from the grip of Napoleon,
and to wrest from him the initiative which he had hitherto enjoyed
unchallenged. Besides, the Czar insisted on that effort, and made it almost a
sine quâ non of his alliance. In a military sense the results were
contemptible; in the diplomatic sphere they were very great.[719]
Twelve days before Craig set sail, Czartoryski worried or coaxed the British
ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, into signing
a provisional treaty of alliance. The Czar now promised to set in motion
half a million of men (half of them being Austrians, and only 115,000
Russians) so as to drive the French from Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and
Page 581
the Low Countries, England subsidizing the allied forces at the rate of
£1,250,000 a year for every 100,000 men actually employed. The liberated
lands were to have the right of building their own fortresses and choosing
their own constitutions. But firstly, Alexander would seek to restore peace
to Europe; and to this end he would consent to Napoleon placing his brother
Joseph on the throne of North Italy, either in Piedmont or in the Italian
Republic, shadowy realms being outlined in the Peninsula for the
consolation of the dispossessed King of Sardinia. But the sting of the
proposal was in its tail. Alexander suggested that, to secure the boon of
peace, England should restore her maritime conquests in the war, and also
Malta if Napoleon insisted on this last, the island being then garrisoned by
Russians. In its blend of hazy theorizings on general topics with astute
egotism in Russian affairs, the scheme is highly characteristic, peace being
assured by means which would substitute Muscovite for British rule at
Malta; while in the event of war, Great Britain was to pay at the rate of
£6,250,000 a year for campaigns that would aggrandise the continental
States at the expense of France.[720]
What must have been the feelings of Pitt when he perused this Byzantine
offer? While prepared to give way on some parts of the January proposals,
he was determined to hold fast to Malta. The island had not been named by
him and Novossiltzoff, its present destiny being assumed as irrevocably
fixed. But now Alexander swung back to the aims of his father, the
domination of the Central Mediterranean from the impregnable fortress of
Valetta. Probably some of the Knights of the Order of St. John who had
sought refuge in Russia gained the ear of Alexander in the spring of 1805,
and produced the startling change in his policy just described. Whatever the
cause, Pitt's answer could be none other than a firm refusal. In Count Simon
Vorontzoff, Russian ambassador at London, he found a secret sympathizer,
who entered heartily into his plans for the salvation of Europe, foreseeing
that only by the retention of Malta for the Union Jack could the
£1,250,000 a year for every 100,000 men actually employed. The liberated
lands were to have the right of building their own fortresses and choosing
their own constitutions. But firstly, Alexander would seek to restore peace
to Europe; and to this end he would consent to Napoleon placing his brother
Joseph on the throne of North Italy, either in Piedmont or in the Italian
Republic, shadowy realms being outlined in the Peninsula for the
consolation of the dispossessed King of Sardinia. But the sting of the
proposal was in its tail. Alexander suggested that, to secure the boon of
peace, England should restore her maritime conquests in the war, and also
Malta if Napoleon insisted on this last, the island being then garrisoned by
Russians. In its blend of hazy theorizings on general topics with astute
egotism in Russian affairs, the scheme is highly characteristic, peace being
assured by means which would substitute Muscovite for British rule at
Malta; while in the event of war, Great Britain was to pay at the rate of
£6,250,000 a year for campaigns that would aggrandise the continental
States at the expense of France.[720]
What must have been the feelings of Pitt when he perused this Byzantine
offer? While prepared to give way on some parts of the January proposals,
he was determined to hold fast to Malta. The island had not been named by
him and Novossiltzoff, its present destiny being assumed as irrevocably
fixed. But now Alexander swung back to the aims of his father, the
domination of the Central Mediterranean from the impregnable fortress of
Valetta. Probably some of the Knights of the Order of St. John who had
sought refuge in Russia gained the ear of Alexander in the spring of 1805,
and produced the startling change in his policy just described. Whatever the
cause, Pitt's answer could be none other than a firm refusal. In Count Simon
Vorontzoff, Russian ambassador at London, he found a secret sympathizer,
who entered heartily into his plans for the salvation of Europe, foreseeing
that only by the retention of Malta for the Union Jack could the
Page 582
Mediterranean be saved from becoming a French lake; and that if either
Gower or Pitt wavered on this question, the country would disown them.
[721] Official etiquette, of course, compelled him to proffer Alexander's
demand, and to declare that, unless Pitt gave way about Malta, there was an
end of all hope of the alliance. Here Pitt intervened with the statesmanlike
remark: "It will not save Europe. The Mediterranean, the Levant and Egypt,
will be in the power of France the moment a British squadron ceases to
have for base a good port protected by formidable fortifications.... So,
whatever pain it causes us (and it is indeed great) we must give up the hope
of seeing the alliance ratified, since its express condition is our renunciation
of Malta. We will continue the war alone. It will be maritime."
Thus Malta, the final cause of the Great War, now promised to limit that
war. Vorontzoff prevailed on Pitt to defer reporting his refusal to St.
Petersburg. But on 27th May he stated that the last ray of hope had
disappeared, as neither Court would give way. On 5th June, then, Mulgrave
penned for Gower a despatch summarizing Pitt's reasons why England must
retain Malta. She was ready to restore her valuable conquests in the East
and West Indies, but the key of the Mediterranean she must not and would
not surrender. Neither would she relax her maritime code as the Emperor of
Russia now insisted; for experience had shown it to be necessary for the
equipment of the British fleets and the crippling of the enemy's naval
construction. In the maintenance of these fleets lay the only hope of
assuring the salvation of Europe. A more convincing exposition of the
importance of Sea Power has never gone forth from a Government office.
[722]
The deadlock was therefore complete. But now, as happened more than
once in the development of the Coalitions, Napoleon himself came to the
rescue. Whether he was aware of the breakdown of the Anglo-Russian
negotiation is uncertain; but his remark to Fouché—"I shall be able to strike
Gower or Pitt wavered on this question, the country would disown them.
[721] Official etiquette, of course, compelled him to proffer Alexander's
demand, and to declare that, unless Pitt gave way about Malta, there was an
end of all hope of the alliance. Here Pitt intervened with the statesmanlike
remark: "It will not save Europe. The Mediterranean, the Levant and Egypt,
will be in the power of France the moment a British squadron ceases to
have for base a good port protected by formidable fortifications.... So,
whatever pain it causes us (and it is indeed great) we must give up the hope
of seeing the alliance ratified, since its express condition is our renunciation
of Malta. We will continue the war alone. It will be maritime."
Thus Malta, the final cause of the Great War, now promised to limit that
war. Vorontzoff prevailed on Pitt to defer reporting his refusal to St.
Petersburg. But on 27th May he stated that the last ray of hope had
disappeared, as neither Court would give way. On 5th June, then, Mulgrave
penned for Gower a despatch summarizing Pitt's reasons why England must
retain Malta. She was ready to restore her valuable conquests in the East
and West Indies, but the key of the Mediterranean she must not and would
not surrender. Neither would she relax her maritime code as the Emperor of
Russia now insisted; for experience had shown it to be necessary for the
equipment of the British fleets and the crippling of the enemy's naval
construction. In the maintenance of these fleets lay the only hope of
assuring the salvation of Europe. A more convincing exposition of the
importance of Sea Power has never gone forth from a Government office.
[722]
The deadlock was therefore complete. But now, as happened more than
once in the development of the Coalitions, Napoleon himself came to the
rescue. Whether he was aware of the breakdown of the Anglo-Russian
negotiation is uncertain; but his remark to Fouché—"I shall be able to strike
Page 583
the blow before the old Coalition machines are ready"—and his conduct in
Italy in the months of May and June 1805 bear the imprint of a boundless
confidence, which, on any other supposition, savours of madness. He well
knew that no continental ruler but Gustavus of Sweden desired war with
him. Austria maintained her timid reserve. Alexander was ready to negotiate
with him through the medium of Novossiltzoff, who was now at Berlin
awaiting permission to proceed to Paris. The predilections of Frederick
William of Prussia for France were notorious; for Hanover was his goal;
and he and his counsellors saw far more hope of securing it from Napoleon
than from King George.[723]
Prudence and patience were therefore peculiarly necessary for Napoleon at
this juncture. He had the game in his hands if he would but concentrate all
his energies against England and leave severely alone the land which then
most interested Russia and Austria, namely, Italy. But, either from the
ingrained restlessness of his nature, which chafed at the stalemate at
Boulogne, or from contempt of "the old Coalition machines," or from an
innate conviction that Italy was his own political preserve, he now took two
steps which aroused the anger of the Russian and Austrian Emperors. On
26th May 1805 he crowned himself King of Italy in the cathedral of Milan,
thereby welding that populous realm indissolubly to his Empire. On 4th
June he annexed outright the Genoese or Ligurian Republic. Both acts were
flagrant infractions of his Treaty of Lunéville with Austria of four years
before; and they contemptuously overturned the Balance of Power which
Alexander was striving to re-establish. The results were soon apparent.
"This man is insatiable," exclaimed Alexander; "his ambition knows no
bounds; he is a scourge of the world: he wants war; well, he shall have it,
and the sooner the better."
Novossiltzoff left Berlin for St. Petersburg; and his despatches of 10th July
to Vorontzoff and to Hardenberg, Foreign Minister at Berlin, prove
Italy in the months of May and June 1805 bear the imprint of a boundless
confidence, which, on any other supposition, savours of madness. He well
knew that no continental ruler but Gustavus of Sweden desired war with
him. Austria maintained her timid reserve. Alexander was ready to negotiate
with him through the medium of Novossiltzoff, who was now at Berlin
awaiting permission to proceed to Paris. The predilections of Frederick
William of Prussia for France were notorious; for Hanover was his goal;
and he and his counsellors saw far more hope of securing it from Napoleon
than from King George.[723]
Prudence and patience were therefore peculiarly necessary for Napoleon at
this juncture. He had the game in his hands if he would but concentrate all
his energies against England and leave severely alone the land which then
most interested Russia and Austria, namely, Italy. But, either from the
ingrained restlessness of his nature, which chafed at the stalemate at
Boulogne, or from contempt of "the old Coalition machines," or from an
innate conviction that Italy was his own political preserve, he now took two
steps which aroused the anger of the Russian and Austrian Emperors. On
26th May 1805 he crowned himself King of Italy in the cathedral of Milan,
thereby welding that populous realm indissolubly to his Empire. On 4th
June he annexed outright the Genoese or Ligurian Republic. Both acts were
flagrant infractions of his Treaty of Lunéville with Austria of four years
before; and they contemptuously overturned the Balance of Power which
Alexander was striving to re-establish. The results were soon apparent.
"This man is insatiable," exclaimed Alexander; "his ambition knows no
bounds; he is a scourge of the world: he wants war; well, he shall have it,
and the sooner the better."
Novossiltzoff left Berlin for St. Petersburg; and his despatches of 10th July
to Vorontzoff and to Hardenberg, Foreign Minister at Berlin, prove
Page 584
conclusively that it was Napoleon's annexation of Genoa which ended all
hope of peace on the Continent.[724] The French Emperor himself admitted
as much a few years later when he visited Genoa. Looking down on that
beautiful city, he exclaimed: "Ah! It was worth a war." In order to work
French patriotism up to the necessary pitch he on 30th May 1805 ordered
Fouché to have caricatures made at Paris depicting John Bull, purse in
hand, entreating the Powers to take his money and fight France. Insults to
Russia and England make up the rest of that angry and almost illegible
scrawl.[725] In his heart he knew that the war sprang from his resolve to
make the Mediterranean a French lake and Italy an annexe of his imperial
fabric.
The sequel may be told very briefly. On 28th July the Court of St.
Petersburg agreed to Pitt's version of the Anglo-Russian compact; and on
9th August the British ambassador at St. Petersburg pledged his country to
join the two Empires if Napoleon rejected the conditions of peace still left
open to him. In that case Gower promised to assure the advance of five
months' subsidy at the rate mentioned above.[726] It is needless to say that
Napoleon rejected all thought of compromise; and Austria began to hurry
her troops up the banks of the Danube for the Bavarian campaign.[727] Thus
Pitt won the diplomatic game. Or rather, his opponent gave it to him by the
last reckless move at Genoa. The wrath of Alexander at this affront
obliterated his annoyance at the retention of Malta by Great Britain; and
both he and the Emperor Francis now prepared to enter the lists against
Napoleon.
hope of peace on the Continent.[724] The French Emperor himself admitted
as much a few years later when he visited Genoa. Looking down on that
beautiful city, he exclaimed: "Ah! It was worth a war." In order to work
French patriotism up to the necessary pitch he on 30th May 1805 ordered
Fouché to have caricatures made at Paris depicting John Bull, purse in
hand, entreating the Powers to take his money and fight France. Insults to
Russia and England make up the rest of that angry and almost illegible
scrawl.[725] In his heart he knew that the war sprang from his resolve to
make the Mediterranean a French lake and Italy an annexe of his imperial
fabric.
The sequel may be told very briefly. On 28th July the Court of St.
Petersburg agreed to Pitt's version of the Anglo-Russian compact; and on
9th August the British ambassador at St. Petersburg pledged his country to
join the two Empires if Napoleon rejected the conditions of peace still left
open to him. In that case Gower promised to assure the advance of five
months' subsidy at the rate mentioned above.[726] It is needless to say that
Napoleon rejected all thought of compromise; and Austria began to hurry
her troops up the banks of the Danube for the Bavarian campaign.[727] Thus
Pitt won the diplomatic game. Or rather, his opponent gave it to him by the
last reckless move at Genoa. The wrath of Alexander at this affront
obliterated his annoyance at the retention of Malta by Great Britain; and
both he and the Emperor Francis now prepared to enter the lists against
Napoleon.
Page 585
Meanwhile, Pitt sought to strengthen his Ministry in view of the desertion
of the Addingtonians. Two of them, Hiley Addington and Bond, spoke
bitterly against Melville during the debates of June, which led Gillray to
represent them as jackasses about to kick a wounded lion. So annoyed was
Pitt as to refuse them promotions which they expected, whereupon
Sidmouth and Buckinghamshire tendered their resignations. The old friends
parted sorrowfully after a final interview at Pitt's house on Putney Heath
(7th July). Camden now became President of the Council, and Castlereagh
Minister at War, Harrowby re-entering the Cabinet as Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster.
As the prospect of further taxation was calculated to depress Pitt's
supporters and inspirit the Opposition, he proceeded to Weymouth in the
middle of September to lay before the King an important proposal. The
formation of a truly national Administration being more than ever essential,
he besought George to admit certain members of the parties of Fox and
Grenville, especially in order to facilitate the passing of the next Budget.
The Monarch, however, was obdurate, asserting that Pitt had done well in
the past session and would probably fare better still in the next. On 22nd
September he repeated these statements to Rose, whom he called to him on
the esplanade, and was quite unconvinced by his arguments that in the
present state of parties the Budget could scarcely be passed, and that, if Pitt
chanced to be laid up with a fit of gout for two or three weeks, there would
be an end of the Administration. The King would not hear of any change,
and proved more intractable on this topic than in the year before, during his
stay at Cuffnells.[728] In fact, in Rose's manuscript is a statement, prudently
omitted from the published Diaries, that George, on returning to his
residence at Weymouth, declared his resolve rather to risk a civil war than
to admit Fox into his councils.[729] Thus ended Pitt's last effort to form a
national Administration fitted to cope with the gigantic power of Napoleon.
of the Addingtonians. Two of them, Hiley Addington and Bond, spoke
bitterly against Melville during the debates of June, which led Gillray to
represent them as jackasses about to kick a wounded lion. So annoyed was
Pitt as to refuse them promotions which they expected, whereupon
Sidmouth and Buckinghamshire tendered their resignations. The old friends
parted sorrowfully after a final interview at Pitt's house on Putney Heath
(7th July). Camden now became President of the Council, and Castlereagh
Minister at War, Harrowby re-entering the Cabinet as Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster.
As the prospect of further taxation was calculated to depress Pitt's
supporters and inspirit the Opposition, he proceeded to Weymouth in the
middle of September to lay before the King an important proposal. The
formation of a truly national Administration being more than ever essential,
he besought George to admit certain members of the parties of Fox and
Grenville, especially in order to facilitate the passing of the next Budget.
The Monarch, however, was obdurate, asserting that Pitt had done well in
the past session and would probably fare better still in the next. On 22nd
September he repeated these statements to Rose, whom he called to him on
the esplanade, and was quite unconvinced by his arguments that in the
present state of parties the Budget could scarcely be passed, and that, if Pitt
chanced to be laid up with a fit of gout for two or three weeks, there would
be an end of the Administration. The King would not hear of any change,
and proved more intractable on this topic than in the year before, during his
stay at Cuffnells.[728] In fact, in Rose's manuscript is a statement, prudently
omitted from the published Diaries, that George, on returning to his
residence at Weymouth, declared his resolve rather to risk a civil war than
to admit Fox into his councils.[729] Thus ended Pitt's last effort to form a
national Administration fitted to cope with the gigantic power of Napoleon.
Page 586
It is difficult to realize the multiplicity of the cares which pressed upon Pitt.
Rose feared that he would soon succumb to the burden; for, apart from the
defence of a weak Government against a strong Opposition, Pitt transacted
very much of the business of the War Office and Foreign Office, besides
assisting the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief. No one in Europe,
with the exception of Napoleon, worked so hard; and Pitt, besides being ten
years older than the Emperor, had far less physical strength. We may judge,
then, of the effect produced by a life such as Lady Hester Stanhope
described in a passage of more than usual credibility: "Ah doctor," she said
in her Lebanon days, "what a life was his! Roused from sleep (for he was a
good sleeper) with a despatch from Lord Melville; then down to Windsor;
then, if he had half an hour to spare, trying to swallow something; Mr.
Adams with a paper, Mr. Long with another; then Mr. Rose: then, with a
little bottle of cordial confection in his pocket, off to the House until three
or four in the morning; then home to a hot supper for two or three hours
more, to talk over what was to be done next day:—and wine, and wine.
Scarcely up next morning, when 'tat-tat-tat,' twenty or thirty people one
after another, and the horses walking before the door from two till sunset,
waiting for him. It was enough to kill a man—it was murder."[730]
One who knew Pitt well gave wise advice to his secretary, William Dacre
Adams. "Attend to your meals regularly even if you sit up or rise the earlier
for it to get through the business. I have often been told that half Mr. Pitt's
complaints were originally brought on by fasting too long and indeed only
eating when he found it convenient, which ruined the tone of his stomach."
[731] These statements explain the reason for the collapse of Pitt's strength
late in the year. Hester's concluding remark is somewhat hysterical, but it is
nearer the truth than the charge that Pitt was greedy of power. He killed
himself by persistent overwork on behalf of a nation which did not
understand him, and in the service of a Monarch who refused to allow him
to strengthen his Administration.
Rose feared that he would soon succumb to the burden; for, apart from the
defence of a weak Government against a strong Opposition, Pitt transacted
very much of the business of the War Office and Foreign Office, besides
assisting the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief. No one in Europe,
with the exception of Napoleon, worked so hard; and Pitt, besides being ten
years older than the Emperor, had far less physical strength. We may judge,
then, of the effect produced by a life such as Lady Hester Stanhope
described in a passage of more than usual credibility: "Ah doctor," she said
in her Lebanon days, "what a life was his! Roused from sleep (for he was a
good sleeper) with a despatch from Lord Melville; then down to Windsor;
then, if he had half an hour to spare, trying to swallow something; Mr.
Adams with a paper, Mr. Long with another; then Mr. Rose: then, with a
little bottle of cordial confection in his pocket, off to the House until three
or four in the morning; then home to a hot supper for two or three hours
more, to talk over what was to be done next day:—and wine, and wine.
Scarcely up next morning, when 'tat-tat-tat,' twenty or thirty people one
after another, and the horses walking before the door from two till sunset,
waiting for him. It was enough to kill a man—it was murder."[730]
One who knew Pitt well gave wise advice to his secretary, William Dacre
Adams. "Attend to your meals regularly even if you sit up or rise the earlier
for it to get through the business. I have often been told that half Mr. Pitt's
complaints were originally brought on by fasting too long and indeed only
eating when he found it convenient, which ruined the tone of his stomach."
[731] These statements explain the reason for the collapse of Pitt's strength
late in the year. Hester's concluding remark is somewhat hysterical, but it is
nearer the truth than the charge that Pitt was greedy of power. He killed
himself by persistent overwork on behalf of a nation which did not
understand him, and in the service of a Monarch who refused to allow him
to strengthen his Administration.
Page 587
It is impossible now to feel one's way along all the threads which Pitt held
in his hands. But occasionally a chance reference reveals his connection
with designs of vast moment. The following is a case in point. Castlereagh
wrote to him, probably on 20th August 1805, in terms which show that Pitt
took a leading part in one of the decisions bearing on the fate of the naval
campaign which culminated at Trafalgar. The daring and wisdom of his
naval policy in 1805 has lately been fully vindicated.[732] But the following
letter throws new light on the complex problem which arose after the
indecisive success gained by Admiral Calder over Villeneuve's French and
Spanish fleets off Cape Finisterre on 22nd July, and while the subsequent
movements of those fleets were not yet definitely known. Baird's expedition
at Cork was destined for the reduction of the Cape (ever Pitt's pre-
occupation) so soon as the way was fairly safe.
in his hands. But occasionally a chance reference reveals his connection
with designs of vast moment. The following is a case in point. Castlereagh
wrote to him, probably on 20th August 1805, in terms which show that Pitt
took a leading part in one of the decisions bearing on the fate of the naval
campaign which culminated at Trafalgar. The daring and wisdom of his
naval policy in 1805 has lately been fully vindicated.[732] But the following
letter throws new light on the complex problem which arose after the
indecisive success gained by Admiral Calder over Villeneuve's French and
Spanish fleets off Cape Finisterre on 22nd July, and while the subsequent
movements of those fleets were not yet definitely known. Baird's expedition
at Cork was destined for the reduction of the Cape (ever Pitt's pre-
occupation) so soon as the way was fairly safe.
Page 588
Downing St Tuesday 3 P.M.[733]
My dear Sir,
I have just seen Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Barham, Adml Cornwallis having
anticipated your intentions by detaching 20 sail of the line off Ferrol, and the wind being
now favourable, it appears to us that no time should be lost in ordering Sir D. Baird to
sail. As Ld H. and Ld B. seem to entertain no doubt of your approving of this step, I shall
send the orders without delay. I shall remain in town tonight and be at your disposal as
best suits your engagements.
Ever yours,
Castlereagh.
The most interesting words in this letter are "your intentions." They seem to imply that the plan of
detaching part of Admiral Cornwallis's fleet off Brest to the assistance of Calder off the North
West of Spain was originally Pitt's own, not Lord Barham's, as has been hitherto supposed. They
must not be pressed too much; for the advice of Barham, First Lord of the Admiralty, must have
been paramount. Nevertheless the proposal was evidently Pitt's as well as Barham's. The fact that
Cornwallis anticipated it bespeaks the resolve alike of Ministers and the admiral at all costs to stop
Villeneuve off Finisterre and prevent the naval concentration in French waters on which Napoleon
laid so much stress. The success of the British counter-stroke is well known. Villeneuve, having
been roughly handled by Calder, put into Ferrol, and finally, a prey to discouragement, made off
for Cadiz, thus upsetting Napoleon's scheme for the invasion of England. In due course Nelson
returned to England for a brief time of rest at "dear, dear Merton," and then set off on his last
cruise. Before his departure he had an interview with Pitt at Downing Street—the only occasion, I
believe, on which they met—and found in the ante-room Sir Arthur Wellesley, just returned from
India. At the end of the interview Pitt flattered the great seaman by an act of attention which he
thus described: "Mr. Pitt paid me a compliment, which, I believe, he would not have paid to a
Prince of the Blood. When I rose to go, he left the room with me and attended me to the carriage."
By attentions such as these Chatham was wont to stimulate the patriotism of our warriors; and on
this occasion his son played an equally inspiriting part. Imagination strives to picture the scene,
especially when England's greatest statesman and greatest seaman passed through the ante-room
where stood the future victor of Waterloo.[734]
Never again were those three heroes to meet. Nelson departed for Trafalgar. Pitt resumed the work
which was wearing him to death, nerved, however, by the consciousness that the despatch of
Nelson to the Mediterranean would foil Napoleon's project of making that sea a French lake, "the
principal aim of my policy" as he declared it to be. In that quarter, then, Pitt won a decisive victory
My dear Sir,
I have just seen Lord Hawkesbury and Lord Barham, Adml Cornwallis having
anticipated your intentions by detaching 20 sail of the line off Ferrol, and the wind being
now favourable, it appears to us that no time should be lost in ordering Sir D. Baird to
sail. As Ld H. and Ld B. seem to entertain no doubt of your approving of this step, I shall
send the orders without delay. I shall remain in town tonight and be at your disposal as
best suits your engagements.
Ever yours,
Castlereagh.
The most interesting words in this letter are "your intentions." They seem to imply that the plan of
detaching part of Admiral Cornwallis's fleet off Brest to the assistance of Calder off the North
West of Spain was originally Pitt's own, not Lord Barham's, as has been hitherto supposed. They
must not be pressed too much; for the advice of Barham, First Lord of the Admiralty, must have
been paramount. Nevertheless the proposal was evidently Pitt's as well as Barham's. The fact that
Cornwallis anticipated it bespeaks the resolve alike of Ministers and the admiral at all costs to stop
Villeneuve off Finisterre and prevent the naval concentration in French waters on which Napoleon
laid so much stress. The success of the British counter-stroke is well known. Villeneuve, having
been roughly handled by Calder, put into Ferrol, and finally, a prey to discouragement, made off
for Cadiz, thus upsetting Napoleon's scheme for the invasion of England. In due course Nelson
returned to England for a brief time of rest at "dear, dear Merton," and then set off on his last
cruise. Before his departure he had an interview with Pitt at Downing Street—the only occasion, I
believe, on which they met—and found in the ante-room Sir Arthur Wellesley, just returned from
India. At the end of the interview Pitt flattered the great seaman by an act of attention which he
thus described: "Mr. Pitt paid me a compliment, which, I believe, he would not have paid to a
Prince of the Blood. When I rose to go, he left the room with me and attended me to the carriage."
By attentions such as these Chatham was wont to stimulate the patriotism of our warriors; and on
this occasion his son played an equally inspiriting part. Imagination strives to picture the scene,
especially when England's greatest statesman and greatest seaman passed through the ante-room
where stood the future victor of Waterloo.[734]
Never again were those three heroes to meet. Nelson departed for Trafalgar. Pitt resumed the work
which was wearing him to death, nerved, however, by the consciousness that the despatch of
Nelson to the Mediterranean would foil Napoleon's project of making that sea a French lake, "the
principal aim of my policy" as he declared it to be. In that quarter, then, Pitt won a decisive victory
Page 589
which was destined to save not only that sea, but the Continent from the domination of France.
Whether a glimpse of the future course of events opened out to the wearied gaze of the statesman
we know not. All we know is that in mid-December, when the "Victory" lay jury-masted and wind-
bound for three days off Walmer Castle, the Lord Warden was at Bath, in hope of gaining health
and strength for a struggle which concerned him even more nearly than that in the Mediterranean,
namely, the liberation of North Germany and the Dutch Netherlands from the Napoleonic yoke.
Whether a glimpse of the future course of events opened out to the wearied gaze of the statesman
we know not. All we know is that in mid-December, when the "Victory" lay jury-masted and wind-
bound for three days off Walmer Castle, the Lord Warden was at Bath, in hope of gaining health
and strength for a struggle which concerned him even more nearly than that in the Mediterranean,
namely, the liberation of North Germany and the Dutch Netherlands from the Napoleonic yoke.
Page 590
CHAPTER XXIV
THE LAST STRUGGLE
Heavens! What has Prussia to answer for! For nothing less,
in my mind, than every calamity which has befallen
Europe for more than ten years.—General Paget to Sir
Arthur Paget, 24th January 1806.
The opening moves in the great game between Pitt and Napoleon were divided with a curious
evenness. As we have seen, the French Emperor's defiant annexation of Genoa obliterated the
anger of the Czar at Pitt's insistence on the retention of Malta; and if Pitt's high-handed conduct
forced Spain to declare against England, yet, on the other hand, Napoleon wantonly challenged
Austria and Russia to a conflict. The first events of the war showed a similar balance. On 20th
October the French Emperor compelled the Austrian commander, General Mack, to surrender at or
near Ulm in Swabia with almost the whole of an army of some 70,000 men. On the next day
Nelson destroyed the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar. So quickly did the forcefulness or
ineptitude of four commanders determine the course of events. By the end of October the tricolour
waved triumphant over Central Europe; but the Union Jack was thenceforth scarcely challenged by
sea; and Britain began to exert that unseen but resistless pressure upon her enemy which gradually
edged him to his ruin. Consequently the appalling failures of the Third Coalition on land only
delayed the final triumph on which the serene genius of Pitt surely counted.
At first everything seemed to favour his designs. Part of Napoleon's army in its hurried march
from North Germany towards Ulm violated the neutrality of the Prussian principality of Anspach,
apparently by command of the Emperor. This short cut to success nearly entailed disaster; for it
earned the sharp resentment of Prussia at a time when he especially valued her friendship. Indeed,
so soon as he resolved to turn the "Army of England" against Austria, he despatched his most
trusted aide-de-camp, Duroc, to Berlin, to tempt that Court with that alluring bait, Hanover. Russia
and England were, however, making equal efforts in the hope of gaining the help of the
magnificent army of Frederick William III. For a time Pitt also hoped to add the South German
States, and in all to set in motion a mass of 650,000 men against France, Austria contributing
250,000, Russia 180,000, Prussia 100,000 (later on he bargained for 180,000), Sardinia 25,000,
Naples 20,000, Sweden 16,000, and the small German States the remainder. Napoleon, on the
other hand, strove to paralyse the efforts of the Coalition by securing the alliance or the friendly
THE LAST STRUGGLE
Heavens! What has Prussia to answer for! For nothing less,
in my mind, than every calamity which has befallen
Europe for more than ten years.—General Paget to Sir
Arthur Paget, 24th January 1806.
The opening moves in the great game between Pitt and Napoleon were divided with a curious
evenness. As we have seen, the French Emperor's defiant annexation of Genoa obliterated the
anger of the Czar at Pitt's insistence on the retention of Malta; and if Pitt's high-handed conduct
forced Spain to declare against England, yet, on the other hand, Napoleon wantonly challenged
Austria and Russia to a conflict. The first events of the war showed a similar balance. On 20th
October the French Emperor compelled the Austrian commander, General Mack, to surrender at or
near Ulm in Swabia with almost the whole of an army of some 70,000 men. On the next day
Nelson destroyed the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar. So quickly did the forcefulness or
ineptitude of four commanders determine the course of events. By the end of October the tricolour
waved triumphant over Central Europe; but the Union Jack was thenceforth scarcely challenged by
sea; and Britain began to exert that unseen but resistless pressure upon her enemy which gradually
edged him to his ruin. Consequently the appalling failures of the Third Coalition on land only
delayed the final triumph on which the serene genius of Pitt surely counted.
At first everything seemed to favour his designs. Part of Napoleon's army in its hurried march
from North Germany towards Ulm violated the neutrality of the Prussian principality of Anspach,
apparently by command of the Emperor. This short cut to success nearly entailed disaster; for it
earned the sharp resentment of Prussia at a time when he especially valued her friendship. Indeed,
so soon as he resolved to turn the "Army of England" against Austria, he despatched his most
trusted aide-de-camp, Duroc, to Berlin, to tempt that Court with that alluring bait, Hanover. Russia
and England were, however, making equal efforts in the hope of gaining the help of the
magnificent army of Frederick William III. For a time Pitt also hoped to add the South German
States, and in all to set in motion a mass of 650,000 men against France, Austria contributing
250,000, Russia 180,000, Prussia 100,000 (later on he bargained for 180,000), Sardinia 25,000,
Naples 20,000, Sweden 16,000, and the small German States the remainder. Napoleon, on the
other hand, strove to paralyse the efforts of the Coalition by securing the alliance or the friendly
Page 591
neutrality of Prussia. With 200,000 hostile or doubtful troops on her frontier, Austria could do
little, and Russia still less. Further, as he still had French troops in one or two fortresses of
Hanover, he could utter the words so often on the lips of Bismarck—Beati possidentes. Hanover
belonged of right to George III; but Napoleon could will it away to Prussia.
Thus the fortunes of Europe depended largely on Frederick William. Unfortunately he was
incapable of rising to the height of the situation; for he utterly lacked the virile qualities which
raised the House of Hohenzollern above petty compeers in Swabia to fame and prosperity.
Essentially mediocre, and conscious of his slender endowments, he, like Louis XVI, nearly always
hesitated, and therefore generally lost. His character was a dull compound of negations. Prone
neither to vice nor to passion, he was equally devoid of charm and graciousness. Freezing men by
his coldness, he failed to overawe them by superiority; and, with a weak man's dislike of genius
and strength, he avoided great men, preferring trimmers like Haugwitz and Lombard, who played
upon his foibles, and saved him from disagreeable decisions. The commanding personality of Stein
inspired in him nervous dislike which deepened into peevish dread. Only in the depths of disaster,
into which his own weakness was to plunge him, did he have recourse to that saviour of Prussia.
By the side of Frederick William was that radiant figure, Queen Louisa, who recalls the contrast
between Marie Antoinette and her uninteresting, hapless spouse. For Louisa, too, had ambition and
the power of inspiring devotion, though etiquette and jealousy forbade her intervention in affairs of
State;[735] otherwise the Prussian Government would have shaken off that paralysing indecision
which left its people friendless and spiritless on the bursting of the storm a year later. For the
present, the King's chief adviser, Hardenberg, sought to impart to Prussian policy a trend more
favourable to England and Russia. Conscious of the need of a better frontier on the west and of the
longing of his master for the greater part of Hanover, he sought to attain this end by means not
wholly opposed to the feelings of George III and the policy of Pitt. Above all, he strove to end the
humiliating subservience of his Court to France, which galled the spirit of all patriotic Prussians.
Their great desire was to join the new Coalition even though such a step entailed war with
Napoleon. They rejoiced at the news of Admiral Calder's victory off Finisterre, and hailed every
sign of war at St. Petersburg and Vienna.[736] On the other hand, the French party was strong at
Court. Haugwitz, its head, was still nominally Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, though often
absent for long periods on his Silesian domain, resumed the control of them when he returned to
Berlin. This singular arrangement enabled the King to keep up the game of political see-saw which
brought relief to him, disgust to his would-be allies, and ruin to his country.
To tilt the balance in favour of the Coalition was now the chief aim of Pitt. And who shall say that,
if Prussia, with strength still unimpaired, had played the part which her enfeebled people insisted
on taking up in 1813, the doom of Napoleon might not have been assured in the autumn and winter
which we associate with the names of Ulm and Austerlitz? All this was possible, nay, probable,
had Frederick William surveyed the situation with the sound judgement of Pitt. But the British
little, and Russia still less. Further, as he still had French troops in one or two fortresses of
Hanover, he could utter the words so often on the lips of Bismarck—Beati possidentes. Hanover
belonged of right to George III; but Napoleon could will it away to Prussia.
Thus the fortunes of Europe depended largely on Frederick William. Unfortunately he was
incapable of rising to the height of the situation; for he utterly lacked the virile qualities which
raised the House of Hohenzollern above petty compeers in Swabia to fame and prosperity.
Essentially mediocre, and conscious of his slender endowments, he, like Louis XVI, nearly always
hesitated, and therefore generally lost. His character was a dull compound of negations. Prone
neither to vice nor to passion, he was equally devoid of charm and graciousness. Freezing men by
his coldness, he failed to overawe them by superiority; and, with a weak man's dislike of genius
and strength, he avoided great men, preferring trimmers like Haugwitz and Lombard, who played
upon his foibles, and saved him from disagreeable decisions. The commanding personality of Stein
inspired in him nervous dislike which deepened into peevish dread. Only in the depths of disaster,
into which his own weakness was to plunge him, did he have recourse to that saviour of Prussia.
By the side of Frederick William was that radiant figure, Queen Louisa, who recalls the contrast
between Marie Antoinette and her uninteresting, hapless spouse. For Louisa, too, had ambition and
the power of inspiring devotion, though etiquette and jealousy forbade her intervention in affairs of
State;[735] otherwise the Prussian Government would have shaken off that paralysing indecision
which left its people friendless and spiritless on the bursting of the storm a year later. For the
present, the King's chief adviser, Hardenberg, sought to impart to Prussian policy a trend more
favourable to England and Russia. Conscious of the need of a better frontier on the west and of the
longing of his master for the greater part of Hanover, he sought to attain this end by means not
wholly opposed to the feelings of George III and the policy of Pitt. Above all, he strove to end the
humiliating subservience of his Court to France, which galled the spirit of all patriotic Prussians.
Their great desire was to join the new Coalition even though such a step entailed war with
Napoleon. They rejoiced at the news of Admiral Calder's victory off Finisterre, and hailed every
sign of war at St. Petersburg and Vienna.[736] On the other hand, the French party was strong at
Court. Haugwitz, its head, was still nominally Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, though often
absent for long periods on his Silesian domain, resumed the control of them when he returned to
Berlin. This singular arrangement enabled the King to keep up the game of political see-saw which
brought relief to him, disgust to his would-be allies, and ruin to his country.
To tilt the balance in favour of the Coalition was now the chief aim of Pitt. And who shall say that,
if Prussia, with strength still unimpaired, had played the part which her enfeebled people insisted
on taking up in 1813, the doom of Napoleon might not have been assured in the autumn and winter
which we associate with the names of Ulm and Austerlitz? All this was possible, nay, probable,
had Frederick William surveyed the situation with the sound judgement of Pitt. But the British
Page 592
statesman laboured under one great disadvantage. He could not offer to Prussia what she most
wanted. He could do no more than promise to extend her western confines to Antwerp and Ostend;
and she far preferred Hanover, as solidifying her straggling western lands, without bringing her
near to France. Here was an almost insuperable obstacle; and we can imagine that, like his father,
he cursed Britain's connection with Hanover. His chief hope was, that Prussia would discern her
true interest in acquiring less by honourable means than very much from Napoleon, whose gifts
were often perilous. Russia, too, at that time seemed to adopt the British view of the Hanoverian
question; and in the early autumn that Power mustered her second army on the borders of Prussia
in a highly threatening manner. Finally, the Czar declared that if his troops were refused a passage
through Silesia, he would make his way by force, the Pitt Cabinet informing him that, in that case,
the liberal subsidies intended for Prussia, would be added to those already on their way to St.
Petersburg. But even threats failed to bring Frederick William to a decision; and Hardenberg
announced that a forcible entry of the Russians would involve war with Prussia.[737]
While Frederick William fumed at the Muscovite threats, came news of the violation of his
Anspach domain on 3rd October. At once he declared his intention to avenge the insult and to
expel Duroc from Prussian territory. He also raised high the hopes of the Allies by allowing the
Russians to enter Silesia, and by favouring Pitt's plan of a joint expedition of the Allies to Hanover
with a view to the liberation of Holland; and when he ordered the mobilization of the whole
Prussian army, there appeared good grounds for expecting the speedy accession of at least 150,000
troops trained in the school of Frederick the Great. Even Haugwitz now suggested that if war came
England must give Prussia a subsidy.[738] The Anglophil party at Berlin raised its head in triumph
at the approach of the Russian Emperor; and when on 28th October he entered Berlin with
enthusiastic greetings from the populace, Europe seemed about to be leagued against Napoleon.
Chivalry and prudence alike counselled such a union, for on the morrow arrived news of the
annihilation of Mack's army. Nothing but prompt action could save Germany from the Napoleonic
deluge.
The first rumours of the disaster at Ulm did not reach London until 2nd November. Lord
Malmesbury was dining with Pitt and mentioned the report to him, whereupon the Prime Minister
exclaimed in loud and angry tones, "Don't believe a word of it: it is all a fiction."[739] But on the
morrow a Dutch newspaper was brought, and Malmesbury translated the account, which was so
clear and detailed as to leave little room for doubt. Pitt's countenance changed. There came over
him that look which his friends saw imprinted more deeply with every week of deepening gloom.
For a brief space it passed away. On 6th November London heard the joyful yet painful news of
Trafalgar. It reached Downing Street at 3 a.m. Pitt was so moved by conflicting emotions that he,
the soundest of sleepers, could not find repose, but roused himself for work. The Stock Exchange
registered the swift oscillations from confidence to doubt, for though all fear of the French and
Spanish fleet was at an end, yet, as Nelson perished, national security seemed imperilled, and
Consols sank.
wanted. He could do no more than promise to extend her western confines to Antwerp and Ostend;
and she far preferred Hanover, as solidifying her straggling western lands, without bringing her
near to France. Here was an almost insuperable obstacle; and we can imagine that, like his father,
he cursed Britain's connection with Hanover. His chief hope was, that Prussia would discern her
true interest in acquiring less by honourable means than very much from Napoleon, whose gifts
were often perilous. Russia, too, at that time seemed to adopt the British view of the Hanoverian
question; and in the early autumn that Power mustered her second army on the borders of Prussia
in a highly threatening manner. Finally, the Czar declared that if his troops were refused a passage
through Silesia, he would make his way by force, the Pitt Cabinet informing him that, in that case,
the liberal subsidies intended for Prussia, would be added to those already on their way to St.
Petersburg. But even threats failed to bring Frederick William to a decision; and Hardenberg
announced that a forcible entry of the Russians would involve war with Prussia.[737]
While Frederick William fumed at the Muscovite threats, came news of the violation of his
Anspach domain on 3rd October. At once he declared his intention to avenge the insult and to
expel Duroc from Prussian territory. He also raised high the hopes of the Allies by allowing the
Russians to enter Silesia, and by favouring Pitt's plan of a joint expedition of the Allies to Hanover
with a view to the liberation of Holland; and when he ordered the mobilization of the whole
Prussian army, there appeared good grounds for expecting the speedy accession of at least 150,000
troops trained in the school of Frederick the Great. Even Haugwitz now suggested that if war came
England must give Prussia a subsidy.[738] The Anglophil party at Berlin raised its head in triumph
at the approach of the Russian Emperor; and when on 28th October he entered Berlin with
enthusiastic greetings from the populace, Europe seemed about to be leagued against Napoleon.
Chivalry and prudence alike counselled such a union, for on the morrow arrived news of the
annihilation of Mack's army. Nothing but prompt action could save Germany from the Napoleonic
deluge.
The first rumours of the disaster at Ulm did not reach London until 2nd November. Lord
Malmesbury was dining with Pitt and mentioned the report to him, whereupon the Prime Minister
exclaimed in loud and angry tones, "Don't believe a word of it: it is all a fiction."[739] But on the
morrow a Dutch newspaper was brought, and Malmesbury translated the account, which was so
clear and detailed as to leave little room for doubt. Pitt's countenance changed. There came over
him that look which his friends saw imprinted more deeply with every week of deepening gloom.
For a brief space it passed away. On 6th November London heard the joyful yet painful news of
Trafalgar. It reached Downing Street at 3 a.m. Pitt was so moved by conflicting emotions that he,
the soundest of sleepers, could not find repose, but roused himself for work. The Stock Exchange
registered the swift oscillations from confidence to doubt, for though all fear of the French and
Spanish fleet was at an end, yet, as Nelson perished, national security seemed imperilled, and
Consols sank.
Page 593
The contrast between the victorious constancy of Britain and the wavering and hapless counsels of
the Germanic States inspired Pitt with one of the most magnanimous utterances of that age. At the
Lord Mayor's banquet on 9th November, that dignitary proposed his health as the Saviour of
Europe. Pitt concentrated his reply into these two memorable sentences: "I return you many thanks
for the honour you have done me; but Europe is not to be saved by any single man. England has
saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example." In its terseness
and strength, its truth and modesty, its patriotism and hopefulness, this utterance stands unrivalled.
The effect must have been all the greater because Pitt then bore on his countenance signs of that
anxious forethought in which now lay the chief hope of European independence.
Six days before the arrival of news of the Austrian disaster, Pitt had sought to expedite a union
with Prussia. In view of the urgency of the case, he decided to send his trusted friend, the Earl of
Harrowby, the Dudley Ryder of former days. Harrowby's great abilities have never met with due
recognition, probably owing to the persistent ill health which impaired alike his equanimity and
his power of work; but Wilberforce had good cause for commending Pitt's choice; and he added in
a letter of 25th October that the capacity of Harrowby was rated far higher by foreigners than by
Englishmen.[740] The instructions to the Earl, drafted by Lord Mulgrave on 27th October, reveal
Pitt's resolve to go very far in order to buy the support of Prussia. They empowered Harrowby to
offer her the Belgic provinces and such German lands as would connect them with the Westphalian
domains of Prussia. The need of money for the immediate equipment of her army being also
urgent, Harrowby was to offer a yearly subsidy of £12 10s. for each Prussian soldier actually
serving against France, the hope being expressed that from 150,000 to 200,000 men would be
forthcoming. At the same time Pitt explained that at the general peace Great Britain would restore
all her acquisitions oversea, Malta and the Cape of Good Hope alone excepted. Harrowby was also
charged to do all in his power to effect the liberation of North Germany and Holland by the Russo-
Swedish force then mustering at Stralsund. Such were the plans of Pitt. Even in this brief outline,
their magnanimity is apparent. In order to assure the freedom of the Continent, he was ready to
pour forth the wealth of Britain, and to sacrifice all her conquests, except those two bulwarks of
Empire, Malta and the Cape.[741] Already even before Nelson gained the mastery of the seas at
Trafalgar, Baird's force had set sail for the reduction of the Cape. It achieved its purpose in the
month in which Pitt died. It is not generally known that the foundation of our South African
Empire was due primarily to his foresight. The war having originated in Napoleon's aggressions
and his threats respecting Egypt and the Orient generally, Pitt resolved that England should
thenceforth dominate both the sea route and the overland route to the East Indies.
Unfortunately, owing to the fogs on the River Elbe and other delays at Hamburg, Harrowby did
not reach Berlin until the middle of November;[742] and a fortnight earlier (3rd November) the
sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had framed the Treaty of Potsdam. Ostensibly, it bound Prussia to
side with the Allies unless within four weeks Napoleon accepted her armed mediation, which she
proposed to offer forthwith. She required from the French Emperor a full recognition of the
the Germanic States inspired Pitt with one of the most magnanimous utterances of that age. At the
Lord Mayor's banquet on 9th November, that dignitary proposed his health as the Saviour of
Europe. Pitt concentrated his reply into these two memorable sentences: "I return you many thanks
for the honour you have done me; but Europe is not to be saved by any single man. England has
saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example." In its terseness
and strength, its truth and modesty, its patriotism and hopefulness, this utterance stands unrivalled.
The effect must have been all the greater because Pitt then bore on his countenance signs of that
anxious forethought in which now lay the chief hope of European independence.
Six days before the arrival of news of the Austrian disaster, Pitt had sought to expedite a union
with Prussia. In view of the urgency of the case, he decided to send his trusted friend, the Earl of
Harrowby, the Dudley Ryder of former days. Harrowby's great abilities have never met with due
recognition, probably owing to the persistent ill health which impaired alike his equanimity and
his power of work; but Wilberforce had good cause for commending Pitt's choice; and he added in
a letter of 25th October that the capacity of Harrowby was rated far higher by foreigners than by
Englishmen.[740] The instructions to the Earl, drafted by Lord Mulgrave on 27th October, reveal
Pitt's resolve to go very far in order to buy the support of Prussia. They empowered Harrowby to
offer her the Belgic provinces and such German lands as would connect them with the Westphalian
domains of Prussia. The need of money for the immediate equipment of her army being also
urgent, Harrowby was to offer a yearly subsidy of £12 10s. for each Prussian soldier actually
serving against France, the hope being expressed that from 150,000 to 200,000 men would be
forthcoming. At the same time Pitt explained that at the general peace Great Britain would restore
all her acquisitions oversea, Malta and the Cape of Good Hope alone excepted. Harrowby was also
charged to do all in his power to effect the liberation of North Germany and Holland by the Russo-
Swedish force then mustering at Stralsund. Such were the plans of Pitt. Even in this brief outline,
their magnanimity is apparent. In order to assure the freedom of the Continent, he was ready to
pour forth the wealth of Britain, and to sacrifice all her conquests, except those two bulwarks of
Empire, Malta and the Cape.[741] Already even before Nelson gained the mastery of the seas at
Trafalgar, Baird's force had set sail for the reduction of the Cape. It achieved its purpose in the
month in which Pitt died. It is not generally known that the foundation of our South African
Empire was due primarily to his foresight. The war having originated in Napoleon's aggressions
and his threats respecting Egypt and the Orient generally, Pitt resolved that England should
thenceforth dominate both the sea route and the overland route to the East Indies.
Unfortunately, owing to the fogs on the River Elbe and other delays at Hamburg, Harrowby did
not reach Berlin until the middle of November;[742] and a fortnight earlier (3rd November) the
sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had framed the Treaty of Potsdam. Ostensibly, it bound Prussia to
side with the Allies unless within four weeks Napoleon accepted her armed mediation, which she
proposed to offer forthwith. She required from the French Emperor a full recognition of the
Page 594
independence of Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Naples, which of course implied the
withdrawal of French troops from those lands. Napoleon was also to grant to the dispossessed
King of Sardinia the following indemnities—Genoa, Parma, and Piacenza; while Austria was to
recover Central Venetia as far as the River Mincio. The Allies flattered themselves that Napoleon
would at once reject these terms and throw Prussia into their arms. Such, too, was the conviction
of Pitt. While regretting that France should keep Piedmont and find no barrier opposed to her in
Holland,[743] he felt so convinced of Napoleon's refusal and of Prussia's good faith that he prepared
to satisfy her demand for a British subsidy. Prussian troops were marching into Hanover, as if with
the aim of ousting the French and restoring the authority of George III; and Hardenberg assured
Harrowby in their first interview, on 16th November, that that force would protect the flank of the
Anglo-Russian expedition then about to enter the Electorate.
On the surface, then, everything seemed to augur a brilliant success for Pitt's policy. As had
happened before, the recklessness of Napoleon favoured the British cause; and it is probable that,
if Frederick William had sent to the French headquarters any one but Count Haugwitz, Prussia
would have drawn the sword. Napoleon was in great danger. True, he met with little opposition in
his advance to Vienna and thence into Moravia. But the deeper he plunged into that province, the
worse would be his position if 180,000 Prussians were launched at his flank and rear. The Court of
Berlin was well aware that the destinies of Europe lay in its hands; and for once a fatal confidence
possessed Frederick William. He and his advisers used the crisis, not in the magnanimous spirit
which impelled Pitt to sacrifice nearly the whole of Britain's naval conquests, but in order to assure
Prussia's gain even at the expense of the solidarity of the European League. The Coalition's
extremity was Prussia's opportunity. Hanover was her price for joining it. Such was the purport of
a secret article of the Treaty of Potsdam, to which the Czar had most reluctantly given his consent.
In order to bring the utmost possible pressure to bear upon the British Government, a special
Russian envoy, Count d'Oubril, set out from Berlin to London, crossing Harrowby on the way.
Oubril arrived in London on or about 16th November; and after a short delay Vorontzoff and he
communicated to Pitt the document containing the ominous demand. The Russian ambassador
noted that Pitt, despite long training in the concealment of his feelings, displayed some emotion on
reading the fateful words. In truth, they dealt the second of the strokes which struck him to the
heart. But, collecting himself with an effort, he informed Vorontzoff that, so great was the King's
attachment to Hanover, the patrimony of his family for upwards of a thousand years, that no
Minister would venture ever to name the proposal, as it might either kill him or drive him mad. All
the arguments of Vorontzoff and Oubril on behalf of the Prusso-Russian demand utterly failed. Pitt
expressed a desire to meet Prussia's wishes for a better western frontier, but never at the expense of
Hanover.[744] Thus he deliberately faced a terrible diplomatic reverse rather than expose the King
to a recurrence of his mental malady. A little later he recovered his equanimity; for on 19th
November he informed Harrowby that, though Hanover was out of the question, yet he hoped to
find an equivalent which would satisfy Prussia. The two Emperors could not in their present plight
withdrawal of French troops from those lands. Napoleon was also to grant to the dispossessed
King of Sardinia the following indemnities—Genoa, Parma, and Piacenza; while Austria was to
recover Central Venetia as far as the River Mincio. The Allies flattered themselves that Napoleon
would at once reject these terms and throw Prussia into their arms. Such, too, was the conviction
of Pitt. While regretting that France should keep Piedmont and find no barrier opposed to her in
Holland,[743] he felt so convinced of Napoleon's refusal and of Prussia's good faith that he prepared
to satisfy her demand for a British subsidy. Prussian troops were marching into Hanover, as if with
the aim of ousting the French and restoring the authority of George III; and Hardenberg assured
Harrowby in their first interview, on 16th November, that that force would protect the flank of the
Anglo-Russian expedition then about to enter the Electorate.
On the surface, then, everything seemed to augur a brilliant success for Pitt's policy. As had
happened before, the recklessness of Napoleon favoured the British cause; and it is probable that,
if Frederick William had sent to the French headquarters any one but Count Haugwitz, Prussia
would have drawn the sword. Napoleon was in great danger. True, he met with little opposition in
his advance to Vienna and thence into Moravia. But the deeper he plunged into that province, the
worse would be his position if 180,000 Prussians were launched at his flank and rear. The Court of
Berlin was well aware that the destinies of Europe lay in its hands; and for once a fatal confidence
possessed Frederick William. He and his advisers used the crisis, not in the magnanimous spirit
which impelled Pitt to sacrifice nearly the whole of Britain's naval conquests, but in order to assure
Prussia's gain even at the expense of the solidarity of the European League. The Coalition's
extremity was Prussia's opportunity. Hanover was her price for joining it. Such was the purport of
a secret article of the Treaty of Potsdam, to which the Czar had most reluctantly given his consent.
In order to bring the utmost possible pressure to bear upon the British Government, a special
Russian envoy, Count d'Oubril, set out from Berlin to London, crossing Harrowby on the way.
Oubril arrived in London on or about 16th November; and after a short delay Vorontzoff and he
communicated to Pitt the document containing the ominous demand. The Russian ambassador
noted that Pitt, despite long training in the concealment of his feelings, displayed some emotion on
reading the fateful words. In truth, they dealt the second of the strokes which struck him to the
heart. But, collecting himself with an effort, he informed Vorontzoff that, so great was the King's
attachment to Hanover, the patrimony of his family for upwards of a thousand years, that no
Minister would venture ever to name the proposal, as it might either kill him or drive him mad. All
the arguments of Vorontzoff and Oubril on behalf of the Prusso-Russian demand utterly failed. Pitt
expressed a desire to meet Prussia's wishes for a better western frontier, but never at the expense of
Hanover.[744] Thus he deliberately faced a terrible diplomatic reverse rather than expose the King
to a recurrence of his mental malady. A little later he recovered his equanimity; for on 19th
November he informed Harrowby that, though Hanover was out of the question, yet he hoped to
find an equivalent which would satisfy Prussia. The two Emperors could not in their present plight
Page 595
object to her gaining a large accession of territory. Moreover it would be an infinite disgrace to
them now to make a separate peace with Napoleon.
Still [he added] even if this should happen, we have a strong interest that a separate
peace should provide all the security that can be obtained for the Continent. If decent
terms are obtained, particularly if France is obliged really to evacuate Holland and leave
it in a state of independence, and if the three great Continental Powers after extorting
concessions from France in the moment of victory, unite cordially in an obligation to
resist all future encroachments, not only Europe will have gained much, but we shall
have gained for the separate objects of this country more than enough to compensate for
all the expense of subsidies in this year; and we may return to a state of separate war
with little to guard against but the single point of Boulogne and with increased means of
concentrating both our naval and land defence. The first object therefore of my wishes is,
the immediate rejection of the mediation[745] and the embarking Prussia at any rate in
active and decisive operations towards Germany and Holland, leaving it to be
considered afterwards what territorial arrangements can be agreed upon to secure her
permanent co-operation. The next would be, in the event of negotiation, our being
included in it, on the terms of restoring all our conquests except Malta and the Cape—
and the third (and tho' the worst not a bad one) as good a separate peace as possible for
our perfidious Allies, leaving us to fight our battle for ourselves....[746]
Pitt's indignation against Prussia did not lead him to fling a refusal at her. On the contrary, he
sought to postpone that announcement until the expiration of the four weeks, within which she
must make her decision to side with or against Napoleon. Such was the purport of his letter of 23rd
November to Harrowby. He also announced an increase in the numbers of the British force
destined to serve in Hanover. This expedition under General Don was now being pushed on with
great zeal. It met with disapproval from Canning, who with much sagacity pointed out, on 29th
November, that if the war were continued the gain of a month or two was a trifling object;
whereas, if the Allies ended the war, France would certainly offer Hanover to Prussia.[747] The
dash of pessimism in Canning's nature enabled him to discern difficulties and dangers which were
hidden from Pitt's ever hopeful vision. Mulgrave seems to have shared Pitt's view; for he signed all
the despatches relating to the Hanoverian expedition. On 23rd November he informed Harrowby
that, early in the year 1806, as many as 70,000 British and Hanoverian troops would be ready for
service, either in Hanover or wherever they could be employed to most effect. He therefore
expected that by that time the Allies would have nearly 300,000 men in North Germany; and, as
the resources of Austria were not depleted by the disaster at Ulm, she and Russia ought then to
have nearly half a million of men on foot.[748]
them now to make a separate peace with Napoleon.
Still [he added] even if this should happen, we have a strong interest that a separate
peace should provide all the security that can be obtained for the Continent. If decent
terms are obtained, particularly if France is obliged really to evacuate Holland and leave
it in a state of independence, and if the three great Continental Powers after extorting
concessions from France in the moment of victory, unite cordially in an obligation to
resist all future encroachments, not only Europe will have gained much, but we shall
have gained for the separate objects of this country more than enough to compensate for
all the expense of subsidies in this year; and we may return to a state of separate war
with little to guard against but the single point of Boulogne and with increased means of
concentrating both our naval and land defence. The first object therefore of my wishes is,
the immediate rejection of the mediation[745] and the embarking Prussia at any rate in
active and decisive operations towards Germany and Holland, leaving it to be
considered afterwards what territorial arrangements can be agreed upon to secure her
permanent co-operation. The next would be, in the event of negotiation, our being
included in it, on the terms of restoring all our conquests except Malta and the Cape—
and the third (and tho' the worst not a bad one) as good a separate peace as possible for
our perfidious Allies, leaving us to fight our battle for ourselves....[746]
Pitt's indignation against Prussia did not lead him to fling a refusal at her. On the contrary, he
sought to postpone that announcement until the expiration of the four weeks, within which she
must make her decision to side with or against Napoleon. Such was the purport of his letter of 23rd
November to Harrowby. He also announced an increase in the numbers of the British force
destined to serve in Hanover. This expedition under General Don was now being pushed on with
great zeal. It met with disapproval from Canning, who with much sagacity pointed out, on 29th
November, that if the war were continued the gain of a month or two was a trifling object;
whereas, if the Allies ended the war, France would certainly offer Hanover to Prussia.[747] The
dash of pessimism in Canning's nature enabled him to discern difficulties and dangers which were
hidden from Pitt's ever hopeful vision. Mulgrave seems to have shared Pitt's view; for he signed all
the despatches relating to the Hanoverian expedition. On 23rd November he informed Harrowby
that, early in the year 1806, as many as 70,000 British and Hanoverian troops would be ready for
service, either in Hanover or wherever they could be employed to most effect. He therefore
expected that by that time the Allies would have nearly 300,000 men in North Germany; and, as
the resources of Austria were not depleted by the disaster at Ulm, she and Russia ought then to
have nearly half a million of men on foot.[748]
Page 596
Pitt's eagerness to receive news from Harrowby appears in the closing phrases of his letter of 29th
November to that envoy: "We are counting moments till we hear in what state you found things on
your arrival [at Berlin], and what has been Haugwitz's reception at the French headquarters."
Again, on 5th December, he sent off to him a letter, which as being the last of any importance
written by him at Downing Street, must be given in full:
Downing St. Dec. 5th, 1805.
Dear Harrowby,
I am grieved to hear by your letter of the 24th that you had been so much persecuted by
headaches, and that you had allowed the secret article of Potsdam [sic] to give you so
much uneasiness. You must I am sure be satisfied that the way in which you have treated
it is the best possible, because it gives no hopes of the thing being consented to, and at
the same time avoids the necessity of any formal and official negative. The great object I
think is that Prussia should if possible, decide on the result of Ct Haugwitz's mission,
without giving to the evil councillors of the King of Prussia the advantage of stating to
him that this object is precluded for ever. At the same time we cannot in good faith give
the least assurance that it is likely to be ever attainable. Woronzow [Vorontzoff] who has
been in town for ten days but is gone again, writes to Alopeus that he has received from
him the mémoire raisonné on the exchange of Hanover, but cannot present it to us till he
has orders to do so from his own Court. We are therefore supposed to know nothing
more of the matter.
On the whole state of things, you will perhaps be angry with me for saying that my
hopes are still sanguine. I think I see great chance of Prussia agreeing to co-operate
either for a definite object or a limited time, in return for subsidies and for our assurance
(which you know to be a very sincere one) of wishing to procure for them important
acquisitions. The question of Hanover may I think be left aloof. As to plans of
operations, it is almost idle to say anything. But you will have seen that we think the first
and essential point is to act (as Prussia seems to intend) with a force sure of success in
the rear of the French Army in Germany. Still I cannot conceive what can be the military
reasons why an attack on Holland should not take place at the same time, or at least
should not be prepared so as to be put into execution whenever the effect of any great
success of the Allies, or a frost, or an appearance of good disposition in the country,
should afford a favourable opening for such an enterprise, the advantages of which in its
impression and consequences I need not state to you. We have finally decided with a
view to this chance and for the sake of shewing at any rate our readiness to co-operate, to
send the 12,000 men which have been prepared, to Embden [sic], and if this wind
continues, I hope they will sail within three days. Endeavour to make Prussia send under
General Kalkreuth (or whoever may be the general they destine for that quarter) not
merely 10,000 men, but enough to make such an army as can scarce be resisted. Our
force with the Russians (exclusive of the Swedes and after allowing for something to
watch Hameln[749]) will be near 40,000 men. It surely cannot be difficult for Prussia to
add 30,000 to that number within a very few weeks on increased subsidies beyond the
November to that envoy: "We are counting moments till we hear in what state you found things on
your arrival [at Berlin], and what has been Haugwitz's reception at the French headquarters."
Again, on 5th December, he sent off to him a letter, which as being the last of any importance
written by him at Downing Street, must be given in full:
Downing St. Dec. 5th, 1805.
Dear Harrowby,
I am grieved to hear by your letter of the 24th that you had been so much persecuted by
headaches, and that you had allowed the secret article of Potsdam [sic] to give you so
much uneasiness. You must I am sure be satisfied that the way in which you have treated
it is the best possible, because it gives no hopes of the thing being consented to, and at
the same time avoids the necessity of any formal and official negative. The great object I
think is that Prussia should if possible, decide on the result of Ct Haugwitz's mission,
without giving to the evil councillors of the King of Prussia the advantage of stating to
him that this object is precluded for ever. At the same time we cannot in good faith give
the least assurance that it is likely to be ever attainable. Woronzow [Vorontzoff] who has
been in town for ten days but is gone again, writes to Alopeus that he has received from
him the mémoire raisonné on the exchange of Hanover, but cannot present it to us till he
has orders to do so from his own Court. We are therefore supposed to know nothing
more of the matter.
On the whole state of things, you will perhaps be angry with me for saying that my
hopes are still sanguine. I think I see great chance of Prussia agreeing to co-operate
either for a definite object or a limited time, in return for subsidies and for our assurance
(which you know to be a very sincere one) of wishing to procure for them important
acquisitions. The question of Hanover may I think be left aloof. As to plans of
operations, it is almost idle to say anything. But you will have seen that we think the first
and essential point is to act (as Prussia seems to intend) with a force sure of success in
the rear of the French Army in Germany. Still I cannot conceive what can be the military
reasons why an attack on Holland should not take place at the same time, or at least
should not be prepared so as to be put into execution whenever the effect of any great
success of the Allies, or a frost, or an appearance of good disposition in the country,
should afford a favourable opening for such an enterprise, the advantages of which in its
impression and consequences I need not state to you. We have finally decided with a
view to this chance and for the sake of shewing at any rate our readiness to co-operate, to
send the 12,000 men which have been prepared, to Embden [sic], and if this wind
continues, I hope they will sail within three days. Endeavour to make Prussia send under
General Kalkreuth (or whoever may be the general they destine for that quarter) not
merely 10,000 men, but enough to make such an army as can scarce be resisted. Our
force with the Russians (exclusive of the Swedes and after allowing for something to
watch Hameln[749]) will be near 40,000 men. It surely cannot be difficult for Prussia to
add 30,000 to that number within a very few weeks on increased subsidies beyond the
Page 597
number they now propose, and that without at all impairing the effort against Bonaparte's
army. As to your stay at Berlin I can only say that if your health will permit, everything
that we value most may depend on your remaining till you have seen the leading points
of the negociation fairly through. As to details with Saxony and Hesse, they cannot be
worth your waiting for, if they require any time, which, however, supposing you once to
settle with Prussia, they cannot. The important moment seems to be that when the issue
of Haugwitz's negociation shall have been known in Berlin and time given to
communicate with Austria and Russia on the result. Under these circumstances it will I
am afraid hardly be as pleasant to you as it is to me to know that Parliament will not
meet till the 21st of Jany [1806] and that you have not on that account any reason for
your immediate return. If, however, (as I most earnestly hope will not be the case) you
should really find the fatigue and anxiety too much for you, it is certainly among the
things that we value most, that you should return, having suffered as little as possible. A
frigate will be sent to wait your orders at the Elbe, but I hope you will have no occasion
to use it, till after you have signed a provisional treaty, and seen the Prussians on their
march against the enemy.
Ever most sincerely yours
W. P.
Three days before Pitt poured forth this sanguine forecast, Napoleon struck the Coalition to the
heart. As "the sun of Austerlitz" set, the two Emperors were in flight eastwards, while their armies
streamed after them in hopeless rout, or struggled through the funnel of death between the two
lakes (2nd December). Marbot's story of thousands of Russians sinking majestically under the ice
is a piece of melodrama. But the reality was such as to stun the survivors. In his dazed condition
the Emperor Francis forthwith sent proposals for a truce. It proved to be the precursor of the
armistice of 6th December, which involved the departure of the Russian army and the exclusion of
that of Prussia from Austrian territories. In the calculating balance maintained at Berlin, this
diplomatic surrender proved to be a greater calamity than the military disaster. True, the news of
the battle caused consternation; but for the present Frederick William held firm and on 8th
December ordered part of the Prussian army (now 192,000 strong) to enter Bohemia for the
succour of the Allies.[750] Not until after the 13th, after the arrival of news of the armistice, did he
seek to evade his obligations to Russia; and, obviously, a new situation arose when Alexander gave
up the campaign, and Francis promised to bar out the Prussians. Hardenberg sought to hide from
Harrowby this change of front, hinting, however, that Prussia might have to consult her own
interests. In the light of the events of 1795, that phrase was clear enough; and Harrowby forthwith
sent orders to General Don to countermand the advance of his troops towards Hanover.[751]
To complete this chapter of misfortunes, Harrowby's health broke down. On discovering the truth
about Prussia's secret demand for Hanover, he fell into the depths of despair and nervous
prostration, as appears from the postscript of his letter of 24th November to Pitt:
army. As to your stay at Berlin I can only say that if your health will permit, everything
that we value most may depend on your remaining till you have seen the leading points
of the negociation fairly through. As to details with Saxony and Hesse, they cannot be
worth your waiting for, if they require any time, which, however, supposing you once to
settle with Prussia, they cannot. The important moment seems to be that when the issue
of Haugwitz's negociation shall have been known in Berlin and time given to
communicate with Austria and Russia on the result. Under these circumstances it will I
am afraid hardly be as pleasant to you as it is to me to know that Parliament will not
meet till the 21st of Jany [1806] and that you have not on that account any reason for
your immediate return. If, however, (as I most earnestly hope will not be the case) you
should really find the fatigue and anxiety too much for you, it is certainly among the
things that we value most, that you should return, having suffered as little as possible. A
frigate will be sent to wait your orders at the Elbe, but I hope you will have no occasion
to use it, till after you have signed a provisional treaty, and seen the Prussians on their
march against the enemy.
Ever most sincerely yours
W. P.
Three days before Pitt poured forth this sanguine forecast, Napoleon struck the Coalition to the
heart. As "the sun of Austerlitz" set, the two Emperors were in flight eastwards, while their armies
streamed after them in hopeless rout, or struggled through the funnel of death between the two
lakes (2nd December). Marbot's story of thousands of Russians sinking majestically under the ice
is a piece of melodrama. But the reality was such as to stun the survivors. In his dazed condition
the Emperor Francis forthwith sent proposals for a truce. It proved to be the precursor of the
armistice of 6th December, which involved the departure of the Russian army and the exclusion of
that of Prussia from Austrian territories. In the calculating balance maintained at Berlin, this
diplomatic surrender proved to be a greater calamity than the military disaster. True, the news of
the battle caused consternation; but for the present Frederick William held firm and on 8th
December ordered part of the Prussian army (now 192,000 strong) to enter Bohemia for the
succour of the Allies.[750] Not until after the 13th, after the arrival of news of the armistice, did he
seek to evade his obligations to Russia; and, obviously, a new situation arose when Alexander gave
up the campaign, and Francis promised to bar out the Prussians. Hardenberg sought to hide from
Harrowby this change of front, hinting, however, that Prussia might have to consult her own
interests. In the light of the events of 1795, that phrase was clear enough; and Harrowby forthwith
sent orders to General Don to countermand the advance of his troops towards Hanover.[751]
To complete this chapter of misfortunes, Harrowby's health broke down. On discovering the truth
about Prussia's secret demand for Hanover, he fell into the depths of despair and nervous
prostration, as appears from the postscript of his letter of 24th November to Pitt:
Page 598
This horrible secret article has finished me. It stood with its mouth open, and from mere
cowardice I have run into it, and it will devour me. I am persuaded, however, that it
would equally have caught me if I had run away. There is something, however, in every
view of it which agonises me. I am anxious beyond imagination to know what passes in
England upon it and conclude I shall by the next newspaper. Would it be impossible to
prevail upon the King to listen to the idea of a sort of Barrier-treaty for Hanover, which
would give Prussia a military frontier but not the territorial possession?[752]
On 8th December, after hearing the first news of Austerlitz, he writes in equally dolorous strains,
concluding with a request that Pitt would send a frigate to the mouth of the Elbe to bring away his
coffin. Again he writes in these pathetic terms:
Most secret.
Berlin, 12 Dec. 1805.[753]
Dear Pitt,
The current of events has been so rapid, and the embarrassments they produce from
every quarter is [sic] so intolerable, that, weakened as my brain has been by nervous
spasms of giddiness, I hardly keep my senses. Cool judgment is required; and I can only
take steps in a state of agitation—repent; and there is something more to be repented of.
I shall not long stand it; but, in the meantime, what mischief may not have happened!
The sacrifice of myself is nothing. All is over with me even if I survive. I am tolerably at
intervals, but every fresh occurrence brings with it distraction. I tremble at the
consequences. You can conceive no state of mind, or rather of mind and body operating
upon each other; you cannot even pity it; you can only despise it. Good God. If it be
possible, do not betray me. I may recover. I try to disguise my feelings. I write to my
wife with affected cheerfulness. She would not survive. For heaven's sake, keep this to
yourself.
Yours ever,
Harrowby.
To what mistake Harrowby here alludes is a mystery. But George Jackson states that he had three
fits at Berlin, besides spasms every day. Indeed his state was so pitiable that his selection for this
difficult post was matter of general comment. The physicians strongly urged him to return to
England at once.[754] Pitt cannot have received Harrowby's pathetic confession when he replied as
follows, probably to the letter of the 8th:
Bath, Dec. 21st, 1805.[755]
cowardice I have run into it, and it will devour me. I am persuaded, however, that it
would equally have caught me if I had run away. There is something, however, in every
view of it which agonises me. I am anxious beyond imagination to know what passes in
England upon it and conclude I shall by the next newspaper. Would it be impossible to
prevail upon the King to listen to the idea of a sort of Barrier-treaty for Hanover, which
would give Prussia a military frontier but not the territorial possession?[752]
On 8th December, after hearing the first news of Austerlitz, he writes in equally dolorous strains,
concluding with a request that Pitt would send a frigate to the mouth of the Elbe to bring away his
coffin. Again he writes in these pathetic terms:
Most secret.
Berlin, 12 Dec. 1805.[753]
Dear Pitt,
The current of events has been so rapid, and the embarrassments they produce from
every quarter is [sic] so intolerable, that, weakened as my brain has been by nervous
spasms of giddiness, I hardly keep my senses. Cool judgment is required; and I can only
take steps in a state of agitation—repent; and there is something more to be repented of.
I shall not long stand it; but, in the meantime, what mischief may not have happened!
The sacrifice of myself is nothing. All is over with me even if I survive. I am tolerably at
intervals, but every fresh occurrence brings with it distraction. I tremble at the
consequences. You can conceive no state of mind, or rather of mind and body operating
upon each other; you cannot even pity it; you can only despise it. Good God. If it be
possible, do not betray me. I may recover. I try to disguise my feelings. I write to my
wife with affected cheerfulness. She would not survive. For heaven's sake, keep this to
yourself.
Yours ever,
Harrowby.
To what mistake Harrowby here alludes is a mystery. But George Jackson states that he had three
fits at Berlin, besides spasms every day. Indeed his state was so pitiable that his selection for this
difficult post was matter of general comment. The physicians strongly urged him to return to
England at once.[754] Pitt cannot have received Harrowby's pathetic confession when he replied as
follows, probably to the letter of the 8th:
Bath, Dec. 21st, 1805.[755]
Page 599
Dear Harrowby,
I was prevented from writing a few lines as I intended by the messenger we sent from
hence yesterday. We are sending orders for another today to pass through Berlin on his
way to the Emperor's head-quarters, to remind them of sending the ratification which we
have never yet received. We have nothing very authentic from the armies later than your
despatch of the 9th by estafette, but there are accounts thro' Hamburg from Berlin of the
10th, corroborated by reports from various quarters, which lead us to hope that the
sequel of the battle at length terminated in great success on the part of Russia. If this
proves true, I flatter myself your subsidiary treaty will have been soon brought to a
prosperous issue, and you will be delivered from all your fatigue and anxiety. I am quite
grieved to think how much you have suffered, tho' I trust your complaint is only
temporary, and that a good battle and a good treaty will send you back to us in better
health than you went. I see no danger of your exceeding our limit in the amount of
subsidy, as we looked if necessary to an actual annual payment of £3,000,000, and the
number proposed in the treaty, of 180,000 Prussians and 40,000 Allies, will not require
more than £2,750,000, which still leaves room for 25,000 men more if they are wanted
and can be had. I have been here for ten days and have already felt the effect of the
waters in a pretty smart fit of the gout from which I am just recovering, and of which I
expect soon to perceive the benefit.
Ever yours,
W. Pitt.
I need hardly tell you that every step you have taken has been exactly what we should
have desired.
He who wrote these cheering words was in worse health than Harrowby. The latter lived on till the
year 1847; Pitt had now taken his last journey but one. Sharp attacks of gout had reduced him to so
weak and tremulous a state that he could scarcely lift a glass to his lips. So wrote Mrs. Jackson on
9th December, long before the news of Austerlitz reached these shores.[756] So far back as 27th
November, Canning, in prophetic strains, begged him not to defer a projected visit to Bath until it
was too late for the waters to do him good. But "the pilot that weathered the storm" refused to
leave the tiller in case decisive news came from Harrowby. He also prepared to strengthen his
Cabinet against the attacks certain to be made in the ensuing session, by including in it two
excellent speakers, Canning and Charles Yorke, the latter taking the Board of Control. Why he did
not complete these changes, as Canning begged him to do, is far from clear. Possibly the sharp
though friendly criticism which Canning levelled against the Anglo-Russian expedition to Hanover
made him apprehensive of divisions in the Cabinet on a question which was very near his heart.
Certainly much could be said in favour of an expedition to Walcheren, which Canning urged
should be entrusted to General M[oore?]. Pitt preferred the Hanoverian enterprise, doubtless
I was prevented from writing a few lines as I intended by the messenger we sent from
hence yesterday. We are sending orders for another today to pass through Berlin on his
way to the Emperor's head-quarters, to remind them of sending the ratification which we
have never yet received. We have nothing very authentic from the armies later than your
despatch of the 9th by estafette, but there are accounts thro' Hamburg from Berlin of the
10th, corroborated by reports from various quarters, which lead us to hope that the
sequel of the battle at length terminated in great success on the part of Russia. If this
proves true, I flatter myself your subsidiary treaty will have been soon brought to a
prosperous issue, and you will be delivered from all your fatigue and anxiety. I am quite
grieved to think how much you have suffered, tho' I trust your complaint is only
temporary, and that a good battle and a good treaty will send you back to us in better
health than you went. I see no danger of your exceeding our limit in the amount of
subsidy, as we looked if necessary to an actual annual payment of £3,000,000, and the
number proposed in the treaty, of 180,000 Prussians and 40,000 Allies, will not require
more than £2,750,000, which still leaves room for 25,000 men more if they are wanted
and can be had. I have been here for ten days and have already felt the effect of the
waters in a pretty smart fit of the gout from which I am just recovering, and of which I
expect soon to perceive the benefit.
Ever yours,
W. Pitt.
I need hardly tell you that every step you have taken has been exactly what we should
have desired.
He who wrote these cheering words was in worse health than Harrowby. The latter lived on till the
year 1847; Pitt had now taken his last journey but one. Sharp attacks of gout had reduced him to so
weak and tremulous a state that he could scarcely lift a glass to his lips. So wrote Mrs. Jackson on
9th December, long before the news of Austerlitz reached these shores.[756] So far back as 27th
November, Canning, in prophetic strains, begged him not to defer a projected visit to Bath until it
was too late for the waters to do him good. But "the pilot that weathered the storm" refused to
leave the tiller in case decisive news came from Harrowby. He also prepared to strengthen his
Cabinet against the attacks certain to be made in the ensuing session, by including in it two
excellent speakers, Canning and Charles Yorke, the latter taking the Board of Control. Why he did
not complete these changes, as Canning begged him to do, is far from clear. Possibly the sharp
though friendly criticism which Canning levelled against the Anglo-Russian expedition to Hanover
made him apprehensive of divisions in the Cabinet on a question which was very near his heart.
Certainly much could be said in favour of an expedition to Walcheren, which Canning urged
should be entrusted to General M[oore?]. Pitt preferred the Hanoverian enterprise, doubtless
Page 600
because it would lay Russia and Prussia under a debt of honour to co-operate to the utmost of their
power.
At last the strain became too great, and on 7th December Pitt set out for Bath, arriving there on the
11th. He resided at Harrowby's house, 11, Laura Place. His stay in Bath aroused interest so intense
that he found it necessary to vary the time of his visits to the Pump Room in order to escape the
crowd which would otherwise have incommoded him.[757] As has just appeared, he expected a
speedy recovery; for, as was the case with his father, if the attack of gout ran a normal course, the
system felt relief. Freedom from worry was the first condition of amendment. After his retirement
from office in 1768 Chatham recovered so quickly that his opponents gibed at the illness as a
political device.[758] Ten years later he succumbed to excitement and strain.
During the first part of his stay at Bath, Pitt was in good spirits and wrote cheerfully about his
health. The following letter to his London physician, Sir Walter Farquhar, is not that of a man who
feels death approaching:
Bath, Dec. 15. 1805.[759]
The gout continues pretty smartly in my foot; and I find from Mr. Crooks that it is
attended with a feverish pulse and some other symptoms of the same nature. I have
communicated to Mr. Crooks your directions, and he is to send me the saline draughts
with some little addition, which he will explain to you. I thought he would detail
symptoms more precisely than I could, and have therefore desired him to write to you.
On the whole, I have no doubt the plan you have laid down will answer, and I do not at
present see the smallest occasion to accept your kind and friendly offer of coming here.
P.S. 4.30 P.M. I enclose Mr. Crooks' letter to you. His account to me of the pulse was that
it was not strong, but quick and beating near an hundred. One of the saline draughts
which I have taken since I wrote the foregoing letter, seems, as far as I can judge from
feeling, already to have had a very good effect.
Not until ten days later do we find signs of alarm in the letters of his friends; for it is characteristic
of his buoyant nature that he never wrote despondingly about himself. There is a well-known story
to the effect that, on hearing the news of Austerlitz, he called for a map of Europe, to see where the
place was, and then said with a sigh: "Roll up that map: it will not be wanted these ten years." One
version assigns the incident to Shockerwick House, near Bath. Pitt is looking over the picture
gallery, and is gazing at Gainsborough's portrait of the actor Quin. His retentive memory calls up
the lines in Churchill's "Characters":
Nature, in spite of all his skill, crept in—
Horatio, Dorax, Falstaff—still 'twas Quin.
power.
At last the strain became too great, and on 7th December Pitt set out for Bath, arriving there on the
11th. He resided at Harrowby's house, 11, Laura Place. His stay in Bath aroused interest so intense
that he found it necessary to vary the time of his visits to the Pump Room in order to escape the
crowd which would otherwise have incommoded him.[757] As has just appeared, he expected a
speedy recovery; for, as was the case with his father, if the attack of gout ran a normal course, the
system felt relief. Freedom from worry was the first condition of amendment. After his retirement
from office in 1768 Chatham recovered so quickly that his opponents gibed at the illness as a
political device.[758] Ten years later he succumbed to excitement and strain.
During the first part of his stay at Bath, Pitt was in good spirits and wrote cheerfully about his
health. The following letter to his London physician, Sir Walter Farquhar, is not that of a man who
feels death approaching:
Bath, Dec. 15. 1805.[759]
The gout continues pretty smartly in my foot; and I find from Mr. Crooks that it is
attended with a feverish pulse and some other symptoms of the same nature. I have
communicated to Mr. Crooks your directions, and he is to send me the saline draughts
with some little addition, which he will explain to you. I thought he would detail
symptoms more precisely than I could, and have therefore desired him to write to you.
On the whole, I have no doubt the plan you have laid down will answer, and I do not at
present see the smallest occasion to accept your kind and friendly offer of coming here.
P.S. 4.30 P.M. I enclose Mr. Crooks' letter to you. His account to me of the pulse was that
it was not strong, but quick and beating near an hundred. One of the saline draughts
which I have taken since I wrote the foregoing letter, seems, as far as I can judge from
feeling, already to have had a very good effect.
Not until ten days later do we find signs of alarm in the letters of his friends; for it is characteristic
of his buoyant nature that he never wrote despondingly about himself. There is a well-known story
to the effect that, on hearing the news of Austerlitz, he called for a map of Europe, to see where the
place was, and then said with a sigh: "Roll up that map: it will not be wanted these ten years." One
version assigns the incident to Shockerwick House, near Bath. Pitt is looking over the picture
gallery, and is gazing at Gainsborough's portrait of the actor Quin. His retentive memory calls up
the lines in Churchill's "Characters":
Nature, in spite of all his skill, crept in—
Horatio, Dorax, Falstaff—still 'twas Quin.
Page 601
At that moment he hears the beat of a horse's hoofs. A courier dashes up. He comes in, splashed
with mud, hands the despatches. Pitt tears them open and hurriedly reads them. His countenance
changes, he calls for brandy, then for a map, and is finally helped to his carriage, uttering the
historic phrase.[760] In another version he mournfully rolls out the words to Lady Hester Stanhope,
as she welcomes him in the hall of Bowling Green House, after his last journey to his home on
Putney Heath.[761] The words probably fell from him on some occasion. But at the risk of incurring
the charge of pedantry, I must point out that the news of Austerlitz did not come on him as one
overwhelming shock: it filtered through by degrees. As we have seen, he wrote to Harrowby on
21st December, stating that reports from Berlin and other quarters represented the sequel to the
battle as a great success for the Russians. It appears that Thornton, our envoy at Hamburg, wrote as
follows on 13th December to Mulgrave: "From everything I can learn (for the details are even yet
far from being circumstantial and decisive) the tide of success had completely turned in favour of
the Russian and Austrian armies, tho', as the conflict still continued to the 4th and perhaps to the
5th, it could not be positively said on which side the victory had been declared. The certain
intelligence cannot now be long delayed."[762]
Castlereagh also, writing to Pitt on 19th December, assured him that he had heard similar news
through various channels, and therefore cherished high hopes that something good had happened.
[763] Mulgrave, who was then also at Bath along with Bathurst, Hawkesbury, and Canning, shared
these hopes. Despite the first reports of Austerlitz, which were promptly contradicted, the
Ministerial circle at Bath had no want of diversion. On 12th December Mulgrave sent to Pitt a
short poem on Trafalgar for his correction, and Pitt touched up a few lines. On 21st December
Mulgrave wrote to him: "I send you Woronzow [Vorontzoff] and Ward, faute de mieux. I was
rejoiced to find you were gone out in your carriage when I called at your home after church. As
Bathurst, Canning, and the gout have left you, I hope you will be able to return to the mess to-
morrow." This does not imply that Pitt was living the life of an invalid, or was kept to so strict a
diet as during his sojourn at Bath three years before.
Equally hopeful was the estimate of Canning. He spent a week with Pitt at Bath, and, after leaving
him shortly before Christmas, informed a friend that Pitt was "recovering from a fit of the gout,
which has done him abundance of good, and puts off the time of his driving after old Frere—I trust
to an incalculable distance.... There wants only an official confirmation of all the good news (that
has reached us through every possible channel except those of Office) to complete it."[764]
Canning, we may note here, had discussed with Pitt his projected poem—"Ulm and Trafalgar"
(which bore the motto "Look here, upon this picture, and on that"). It began:
While Austria's yielded armies, vainly brave,
Moved, in sad pomp, by Danube's blood-stained wave
with mud, hands the despatches. Pitt tears them open and hurriedly reads them. His countenance
changes, he calls for brandy, then for a map, and is finally helped to his carriage, uttering the
historic phrase.[760] In another version he mournfully rolls out the words to Lady Hester Stanhope,
as she welcomes him in the hall of Bowling Green House, after his last journey to his home on
Putney Heath.[761] The words probably fell from him on some occasion. But at the risk of incurring
the charge of pedantry, I must point out that the news of Austerlitz did not come on him as one
overwhelming shock: it filtered through by degrees. As we have seen, he wrote to Harrowby on
21st December, stating that reports from Berlin and other quarters represented the sequel to the
battle as a great success for the Russians. It appears that Thornton, our envoy at Hamburg, wrote as
follows on 13th December to Mulgrave: "From everything I can learn (for the details are even yet
far from being circumstantial and decisive) the tide of success had completely turned in favour of
the Russian and Austrian armies, tho', as the conflict still continued to the 4th and perhaps to the
5th, it could not be positively said on which side the victory had been declared. The certain
intelligence cannot now be long delayed."[762]
Castlereagh also, writing to Pitt on 19th December, assured him that he had heard similar news
through various channels, and therefore cherished high hopes that something good had happened.
[763] Mulgrave, who was then also at Bath along with Bathurst, Hawkesbury, and Canning, shared
these hopes. Despite the first reports of Austerlitz, which were promptly contradicted, the
Ministerial circle at Bath had no want of diversion. On 12th December Mulgrave sent to Pitt a
short poem on Trafalgar for his correction, and Pitt touched up a few lines. On 21st December
Mulgrave wrote to him: "I send you Woronzow [Vorontzoff] and Ward, faute de mieux. I was
rejoiced to find you were gone out in your carriage when I called at your home after church. As
Bathurst, Canning, and the gout have left you, I hope you will be able to return to the mess to-
morrow." This does not imply that Pitt was living the life of an invalid, or was kept to so strict a
diet as during his sojourn at Bath three years before.
Equally hopeful was the estimate of Canning. He spent a week with Pitt at Bath, and, after leaving
him shortly before Christmas, informed a friend that Pitt was "recovering from a fit of the gout,
which has done him abundance of good, and puts off the time of his driving after old Frere—I trust
to an incalculable distance.... There wants only an official confirmation of all the good news (that
has reached us through every possible channel except those of Office) to complete it."[764]
Canning, we may note here, had discussed with Pitt his projected poem—"Ulm and Trafalgar"
(which bore the motto "Look here, upon this picture, and on that"). It began:
While Austria's yielded armies, vainly brave,
Moved, in sad pomp, by Danube's blood-stained wave
Page 602
and ended with a noble acclaim to Nelson:
Thou, bravest, gentlest Spirit, fare thee well.
On the first line Canning plumed himself until he remembered the warning of an old tutor at
Magdalen, that when anything in your verses pleased you very much, it was best to strike it out.
Canning referred the phrase "yielded armies" to Pitt, who probably found relief from his cares in
touching up the poem.[765] That Christmastide, then, was a time of anxiety, but not of settled
gloom. There is no sign that Pitt or his colleagues felt the position to be desperate until the end of
the year. On Christmas Day Castlereagh wrote from Downing Street to Pitt: "I am sorry to add to
your materials for criticism and speculation. I send you Cooke's 'Courant,' There is intelligence in
the City from Amsterdam of the 21st. Nothing official known here of an armistice. You have
received from Lord B[arham?] every information from that quarter."[766]
Indeed, the hopefulness of Ministers now involved them in greater difficulties. Building on
Prussia's promises, they decided early in December to order the despatch of strong reinforcements
to the British corps then on the point of entering Hanover.[767] In all, as many as 65,000 British and
King's Germans were to be sent—the largest force that had ever set sail from these shores, a fact
which testifies to the ardour of Pitt's desires for the liberation of Hanover and Holland. Even the
immediate results of this decision were disastrous. Sixty-seven transports, forthwith setting sail,
encountered a terrible storm, which flung three of them on the enemy's coast, while one sank with
all hands on the Goodwins. Such was the purport of the news sent by Castlereagh to Pitt at Bath on
19th December. He added that, in spite of these losses, "the little Cabinet of five" (with Lord
Barham in attendance) decided to order all the remaining transports to sail, so that Prussia might
be encouraged to "throw her strength to the southward. We have acted for the best, and I hope you
and your companions will approve."[768] Pitt, of course, did approve, not knowing that while
England was encountering heavy risks in order to effect the liberation of North Germany, her
Allies had come to terms with Napoleon.
At last, on 29th December, definite news concerning the armistice of 4th December reached
London. It must have chilled the hearts of the boldest. For, trusting in the continued exertions of
the Allies, England had sent to North Germany as many as 257 transports, and of these 8 were now
known to be lost, involving the death of 664 men, and the capture of about 1,000 on the enemies'
coasts. All this effort and loss of life now appeared to be useless, in view of the vacillating conduct
of Prussia. Only with her good will could the British troops, with the Russian and Swedish
contingents, hope to conquer Holland. If she declared against us, the whole force would be in
jeopardy. Such were the tidings which Castlereagh bore with him to Pitt at the end of the year.[769]
Not a line survives respecting that mournful interview; but we can picture the deathly look coming
over Pitt's emaciated features as he now for the first time faced the prospect of the dissolution of
the mighty league which he had toiled to construct. Probably it was this shock to the system which
Thou, bravest, gentlest Spirit, fare thee well.
On the first line Canning plumed himself until he remembered the warning of an old tutor at
Magdalen, that when anything in your verses pleased you very much, it was best to strike it out.
Canning referred the phrase "yielded armies" to Pitt, who probably found relief from his cares in
touching up the poem.[765] That Christmastide, then, was a time of anxiety, but not of settled
gloom. There is no sign that Pitt or his colleagues felt the position to be desperate until the end of
the year. On Christmas Day Castlereagh wrote from Downing Street to Pitt: "I am sorry to add to
your materials for criticism and speculation. I send you Cooke's 'Courant,' There is intelligence in
the City from Amsterdam of the 21st. Nothing official known here of an armistice. You have
received from Lord B[arham?] every information from that quarter."[766]
Indeed, the hopefulness of Ministers now involved them in greater difficulties. Building on
Prussia's promises, they decided early in December to order the despatch of strong reinforcements
to the British corps then on the point of entering Hanover.[767] In all, as many as 65,000 British and
King's Germans were to be sent—the largest force that had ever set sail from these shores, a fact
which testifies to the ardour of Pitt's desires for the liberation of Hanover and Holland. Even the
immediate results of this decision were disastrous. Sixty-seven transports, forthwith setting sail,
encountered a terrible storm, which flung three of them on the enemy's coast, while one sank with
all hands on the Goodwins. Such was the purport of the news sent by Castlereagh to Pitt at Bath on
19th December. He added that, in spite of these losses, "the little Cabinet of five" (with Lord
Barham in attendance) decided to order all the remaining transports to sail, so that Prussia might
be encouraged to "throw her strength to the southward. We have acted for the best, and I hope you
and your companions will approve."[768] Pitt, of course, did approve, not knowing that while
England was encountering heavy risks in order to effect the liberation of North Germany, her
Allies had come to terms with Napoleon.
At last, on 29th December, definite news concerning the armistice of 4th December reached
London. It must have chilled the hearts of the boldest. For, trusting in the continued exertions of
the Allies, England had sent to North Germany as many as 257 transports, and of these 8 were now
known to be lost, involving the death of 664 men, and the capture of about 1,000 on the enemies'
coasts. All this effort and loss of life now appeared to be useless, in view of the vacillating conduct
of Prussia. Only with her good will could the British troops, with the Russian and Swedish
contingents, hope to conquer Holland. If she declared against us, the whole force would be in
jeopardy. Such were the tidings which Castlereagh bore with him to Pitt at the end of the year.[769]
Not a line survives respecting that mournful interview; but we can picture the deathly look coming
over Pitt's emaciated features as he now for the first time faced the prospect of the dissolution of
the mighty league which he had toiled to construct. Probably it was this shock to the system which
Page 603
brought on a second attack of the gout, accompanied with great weakness and distaste for food.
[770]
Nevertheless he clung to the hope that Prussia would stand firm. On 3rd January 1806 further
news reached him from the Austrian and Prussian Governments. The Austrian despatches
represented Austerlitz as a repulse, but not a disaster, and the armistice as a device for enabling
Prussia to prepare her blow at Napoleon's flank or rear. On 5th January Mulgrave found in the
despatches from Berlin grounds for believing that that Court might under certain conditions assist
the two Emperors in Moravia and the British force in Hanover. On the morrow he wrote to Pitt in
emphatic terms, urging him to offer to Prussia the Dutch Republic. That little State (he urged)
could not again be independent, save in circumstances now scarcely imaginable, much less
realizable. Further, the Stadholder having very tamely accepted the domain of Fulda as an
indemnity, we need feel no qualms for the House of Nassau; and, as Prussia was influenced solely
by territorial greed, and Hanover was out of the question, she might well acquire the Dutch
Netherlands, which would link her to British interests.[771] Again we have to admit ignorance of
Pitt's opinion on this degrading proposal. Certainly it never took definite shape.[772] Though
willing to assign to Prussia the Belgic Netherlands, he laid great stress on the independence of the
Dutch Netherlands, which indeed was the corner-stone of his foreign policy. Moreover, to barter
away an unoffending little State was to repeat the international crimes of the partitions of Poland
and Venetia. We may be sure that that proud and just spirit would rather have perished than stoop
to such ignominy.
In effect, he fell a victim to his resolve never to barter away the patrimony of George III. We now
know that Prussia's policy at this crisis turned mainly on the acquisition of Hanover. Her envoy,
Haugwitz, whom she sent to Napoleon's headquarters charged with the offer of Prussia's armed
mediation on behalf of Europe, had on 15th December signed with him the humiliating
Convention of Schönbrunn, whereby Prussia agreed to make certain cessions of territory on
condition of acquiring Hanover. About Christmastide Frederick William decided to close with this
offer, which involved the expulsion of the Anglo-Russian force from the Electorate. Premonitory
signs of this change of front were soon visible at Berlin. Indeed, the trend of Prussian policy
during the last decade prepared the British Ministry for the ruin of their hopes. Pitt must have been
racked with anxiety lest Prussia should doff the lion's skin and don that of the jackal; for he alone
knew of the nervous breakdown of Harrowby.
Perhaps it was the hope of helping on that negotiation from Downing Street, added to the verdict
of Sir Walter Farquhar that the Bath waters were now of no avail, which induced him on 9th
January to set out on his homeward journey. He was believed to be in better health than at the time
of his arrival; such at least was the announcement of the "Bath Herald" on the 11th; and his
hopeful outlook appears in a curious detail which afterwards came to light. In order to beguile the
tedium of the journey he had taken out from a circulating library in Bath the following works, each
[770]
Nevertheless he clung to the hope that Prussia would stand firm. On 3rd January 1806 further
news reached him from the Austrian and Prussian Governments. The Austrian despatches
represented Austerlitz as a repulse, but not a disaster, and the armistice as a device for enabling
Prussia to prepare her blow at Napoleon's flank or rear. On 5th January Mulgrave found in the
despatches from Berlin grounds for believing that that Court might under certain conditions assist
the two Emperors in Moravia and the British force in Hanover. On the morrow he wrote to Pitt in
emphatic terms, urging him to offer to Prussia the Dutch Republic. That little State (he urged)
could not again be independent, save in circumstances now scarcely imaginable, much less
realizable. Further, the Stadholder having very tamely accepted the domain of Fulda as an
indemnity, we need feel no qualms for the House of Nassau; and, as Prussia was influenced solely
by territorial greed, and Hanover was out of the question, she might well acquire the Dutch
Netherlands, which would link her to British interests.[771] Again we have to admit ignorance of
Pitt's opinion on this degrading proposal. Certainly it never took definite shape.[772] Though
willing to assign to Prussia the Belgic Netherlands, he laid great stress on the independence of the
Dutch Netherlands, which indeed was the corner-stone of his foreign policy. Moreover, to barter
away an unoffending little State was to repeat the international crimes of the partitions of Poland
and Venetia. We may be sure that that proud and just spirit would rather have perished than stoop
to such ignominy.
In effect, he fell a victim to his resolve never to barter away the patrimony of George III. We now
know that Prussia's policy at this crisis turned mainly on the acquisition of Hanover. Her envoy,
Haugwitz, whom she sent to Napoleon's headquarters charged with the offer of Prussia's armed
mediation on behalf of Europe, had on 15th December signed with him the humiliating
Convention of Schönbrunn, whereby Prussia agreed to make certain cessions of territory on
condition of acquiring Hanover. About Christmastide Frederick William decided to close with this
offer, which involved the expulsion of the Anglo-Russian force from the Electorate. Premonitory
signs of this change of front were soon visible at Berlin. Indeed, the trend of Prussian policy
during the last decade prepared the British Ministry for the ruin of their hopes. Pitt must have been
racked with anxiety lest Prussia should doff the lion's skin and don that of the jackal; for he alone
knew of the nervous breakdown of Harrowby.
Perhaps it was the hope of helping on that negotiation from Downing Street, added to the verdict
of Sir Walter Farquhar that the Bath waters were now of no avail, which induced him on 9th
January to set out on his homeward journey. He was believed to be in better health than at the time
of his arrival; such at least was the announcement of the "Bath Herald" on the 11th; and his
hopeful outlook appears in a curious detail which afterwards came to light. In order to beguile the
tedium of the journey he had taken out from a circulating library in Bath the following works, each
Page 604
in two volumes, "The Secret History of the Court of Petersburg," and Schiller's "History of the
Thirty Years' War."[773] A man who believes death to be near does not undertake a study of the
manifold intrigues of Catharine II, or of the Thirty Years' War. He also had the prospect of seeing
the liveliest and most devoted of friends, Canning, at his country home, South Hill, Bracknell, in
Windsor Forest. Canning sent the invitation on the 5th, and it was accepted on the 8th in terms
which implied a sojourn of some days. He offered to accompany him from Bath, if he felt strong
enough to converse on the way; but Pitt declined this offer, and it is doubtful whether he stayed at
South Hill; for Malmesbury declares that he had to remain a long time in bed at Reading. On the
other hand the Bishop of Lincoln declared that the journey took only two days, and that at its close
Pitt showed no very marked signs of fatigue. Lady Hester Stanhope, however, was shocked by his
wasted appearance on reaching his home, Bowling Green House, on Putney Heath.
Some eighteen months earlier he had leased that residence. It stands on the (old) Portsmouth Road,
and had earlier been an inn frequented by lovers of that game and patrons of cockfighting. After
enlargement it had been converted into a gentleman's abode which well suited the modest
requirements of Pitt and of his niece, Lady Hester Stanhope.[774] There, not far from the scenes of
his youthful frolics with Wilberforce, and only a quarter of a mile from the dell where he fought
the duel with Tierney, he found solace from the ever-increasing cares of state. In those last months
Hester felt for him feelings akin to adoration.
Thirty Years' War."[773] A man who believes death to be near does not undertake a study of the
manifold intrigues of Catharine II, or of the Thirty Years' War. He also had the prospect of seeing
the liveliest and most devoted of friends, Canning, at his country home, South Hill, Bracknell, in
Windsor Forest. Canning sent the invitation on the 5th, and it was accepted on the 8th in terms
which implied a sojourn of some days. He offered to accompany him from Bath, if he felt strong
enough to converse on the way; but Pitt declined this offer, and it is doubtful whether he stayed at
South Hill; for Malmesbury declares that he had to remain a long time in bed at Reading. On the
other hand the Bishop of Lincoln declared that the journey took only two days, and that at its close
Pitt showed no very marked signs of fatigue. Lady Hester Stanhope, however, was shocked by his
wasted appearance on reaching his home, Bowling Green House, on Putney Heath.
Some eighteen months earlier he had leased that residence. It stands on the (old) Portsmouth Road,
and had earlier been an inn frequented by lovers of that game and patrons of cockfighting. After
enlargement it had been converted into a gentleman's abode which well suited the modest
requirements of Pitt and of his niece, Lady Hester Stanhope.[774] There, not far from the scenes of
his youthful frolics with Wilberforce, and only a quarter of a mile from the dell where he fought
the duel with Tierney, he found solace from the ever-increasing cares of state. In those last months
Hester felt for him feelings akin to adoration.
Page 605
Bowling Green House, Putney Heath. (From a pencil sketch by Elsie H. Rose)
On the morrow, Sunday, their circle was enlarged by the arrival of his old friend and counsellor,
Bishop Tomline, who was shocked at the change which had taken place in him since he left for
Bath. The physicians, Farquhar, Reynolds, and Baillie, however, saw no cause for alarm, the only
disquieting symptoms being intense weakness and dislike of animal food. There is a forcibly
significant phrase in a recent letter of George Rose to Tomline, that he dreaded the effect on the
invalid of an excessive use of medicines.[775] Evidently Rose believed the digestive organs to be
impaired by this habit. Pitt's daily potations of port wine for many years past must further have
told against recovery. Whether Farquhar and his colleagues cut off medicine and sought to build up
that emaciated frame is uncertain. All that we know is that they prescribed complete quiet, and
therefore requested the bishop to open all Pitt's letters so as to preclude all chance of excitement.
On 12th January, Pitt wrote an affectionate letter to the Marquis Wellesley, welcoming him on his
return from his memorable Vice-royalty in India. He begged him to come to Bowling Green House
at the earliest opportunity. The letter closes with these remarkable words: "I am recovering rather
slowly from a series of stomach complaints, followed by severe attacks of gout, but I believe I am
now in the way of real amendment."[776] The Bishop also describes him as gaining ground until
Monday the 13th. On that day he went out in his coach in the morning, but in the evening Lords
On the morrow, Sunday, their circle was enlarged by the arrival of his old friend and counsellor,
Bishop Tomline, who was shocked at the change which had taken place in him since he left for
Bath. The physicians, Farquhar, Reynolds, and Baillie, however, saw no cause for alarm, the only
disquieting symptoms being intense weakness and dislike of animal food. There is a forcibly
significant phrase in a recent letter of George Rose to Tomline, that he dreaded the effect on the
invalid of an excessive use of medicines.[775] Evidently Rose believed the digestive organs to be
impaired by this habit. Pitt's daily potations of port wine for many years past must further have
told against recovery. Whether Farquhar and his colleagues cut off medicine and sought to build up
that emaciated frame is uncertain. All that we know is that they prescribed complete quiet, and
therefore requested the bishop to open all Pitt's letters so as to preclude all chance of excitement.
On 12th January, Pitt wrote an affectionate letter to the Marquis Wellesley, welcoming him on his
return from his memorable Vice-royalty in India. He begged him to come to Bowling Green House
at the earliest opportunity. The letter closes with these remarkable words: "I am recovering rather
slowly from a series of stomach complaints, followed by severe attacks of gout, but I believe I am
now in the way of real amendment."[776] The Bishop also describes him as gaining ground until
Monday the 13th. On that day he went out in his coach in the morning, but in the evening Lords
Page 606
Castlereagh and Hawkesbury, having obtained permission from the physicians to interview their
chief, communicated news which had a most agitating effect. Pitt afterwards assured the Bishop
"that he felt during that conversation some sensation in his stomach which he feared it might be
difficult to remove."[777] It is surprising that the physicians allowed an interview of an agitating
nature; but the ministerial pressure brought to bear on them may have overborne their better
judgement. In matters of Cabinet discipline Pitt was an autocrat, insisting that no important action
should be taken without his cognizance. Probably, then, it was his own sense of responsibility
which exposed him to the death blow.
Certainly the question at issue was of the gravest kind. Should Ministers order the return of the
British reinforcements last sent to Hanover? That expedition was the work of Pitt. He it was who
had reared the fabric of a European Coalition; and, even after the withdrawal of Austria, he clung
to the hope that Prussia would take her place, and, with the help of British, Prussian, Russian, and
Swedish troops, drive the French from North Germany and the Dutch Republic. How could his
colleagues order back a large part of the British force, thereby justifying the vacillations of Prussia
and ensuring a parliamentary triumph to Fox and Grenville? And yet Ministers knew, better than
Pitt could know, the danger of relying on the Court of Berlin. Though not yet fully aware of its
resolve to take Napoleon's side, they had strong reasons for expecting this course of action; and in
that case the British expedition would be in grave danger between the Prussians on the east, the
Franco-Dutch forces on the south-west and the ice-floes which were forming on the River Weser.
Prudence counselled the timely return of our troops who were yet on board ship at or near Bremen.
[778] Patriotic pride prompted a bold offensive. But the King and Pitt alone could utter the decisive
words. The King approved the return of the last reinforcements, and Pitt, it seems, must have
conceded the point. But the concession struck him to the heart. It was the last of the deadly stabs
which fate dealt him thick and fast in his time of weakness.
Nevertheless, on the morrow he drove out in his carriage, but was visibly weaker than before the
interview. For a few minutes he saw his brother and then Lord Wellesley. The latter found his mind
as clear as ever; and he uttered these remarkable words about Sir Arthur Wellesley: "He states
every difficulty before he undertakes any service, but none after he has undertaken it." What a
prophecy of Vittoria and Waterloo there is in these words—the swan-song of Pitt. It was too much
for him. He fainted before Wellesley left the room. On the 18th he rallied for a time, and the
doctors saw a gleam of hope.[779]
In reality there was only one faint chance of recovery, that good news might arrive. The chief
cause of physical collapse was the torture of the brain; and it was possible that the whole system
might even now rally under the vitalizing thrills of hope. But as day by day passed by and brought
nearer that dreaded occasion, the opening of Parliament on 22nd January, this last chance
vanished. The news which reached the Foreign Office became more and more gloomy. On 10th
January Mulgrave decided, when recalling Harrowby, to entrust his mission at Berlin to the Earl of
chief, communicated news which had a most agitating effect. Pitt afterwards assured the Bishop
"that he felt during that conversation some sensation in his stomach which he feared it might be
difficult to remove."[777] It is surprising that the physicians allowed an interview of an agitating
nature; but the ministerial pressure brought to bear on them may have overborne their better
judgement. In matters of Cabinet discipline Pitt was an autocrat, insisting that no important action
should be taken without his cognizance. Probably, then, it was his own sense of responsibility
which exposed him to the death blow.
Certainly the question at issue was of the gravest kind. Should Ministers order the return of the
British reinforcements last sent to Hanover? That expedition was the work of Pitt. He it was who
had reared the fabric of a European Coalition; and, even after the withdrawal of Austria, he clung
to the hope that Prussia would take her place, and, with the help of British, Prussian, Russian, and
Swedish troops, drive the French from North Germany and the Dutch Republic. How could his
colleagues order back a large part of the British force, thereby justifying the vacillations of Prussia
and ensuring a parliamentary triumph to Fox and Grenville? And yet Ministers knew, better than
Pitt could know, the danger of relying on the Court of Berlin. Though not yet fully aware of its
resolve to take Napoleon's side, they had strong reasons for expecting this course of action; and in
that case the British expedition would be in grave danger between the Prussians on the east, the
Franco-Dutch forces on the south-west and the ice-floes which were forming on the River Weser.
Prudence counselled the timely return of our troops who were yet on board ship at or near Bremen.
[778] Patriotic pride prompted a bold offensive. But the King and Pitt alone could utter the decisive
words. The King approved the return of the last reinforcements, and Pitt, it seems, must have
conceded the point. But the concession struck him to the heart. It was the last of the deadly stabs
which fate dealt him thick and fast in his time of weakness.
Nevertheless, on the morrow he drove out in his carriage, but was visibly weaker than before the
interview. For a few minutes he saw his brother and then Lord Wellesley. The latter found his mind
as clear as ever; and he uttered these remarkable words about Sir Arthur Wellesley: "He states
every difficulty before he undertakes any service, but none after he has undertaken it." What a
prophecy of Vittoria and Waterloo there is in these words—the swan-song of Pitt. It was too much
for him. He fainted before Wellesley left the room. On the 18th he rallied for a time, and the
doctors saw a gleam of hope.[779]
In reality there was only one faint chance of recovery, that good news might arrive. The chief
cause of physical collapse was the torture of the brain; and it was possible that the whole system
might even now rally under the vitalizing thrills of hope. But as day by day passed by and brought
nearer that dreaded occasion, the opening of Parliament on 22nd January, this last chance
vanished. The news which reached the Foreign Office became more and more gloomy. On 10th
January Mulgrave decided, when recalling Harrowby, to entrust his mission at Berlin to the Earl of
Page 607
Harrington, in the hope that that Court would keep troth.[780] But all negotiation was useless. By
the 19th the conduct of Prussia respecting Hanover appeared so threatening that Ministers ordered
the immediate recall of the whole British force.[781] Thus, England had sent forth some 60,000
troops in order to bring them back again. She had paid a million sterling to Austria, and the results
were Ulm and Austerlitz. Nearly as much had gone to Russia, and the outcome was the armistice.
A British subsidy had been claimed by Prussia, and in return she was about to take Hanover as a
gift from Napoleon. It is to be hoped that Ministers kept the last bitter truth from Pitt; but from
their silence he must have augured the worst. Surely death itself was better than to be driven from
power by the combined attacks of Fox, Grenville, and Windham, the success of which was now
assured.
A touching instance of Pitt's thoughtfulness during these days of waning strength is recorded by
Robert Plumer Ward. He had accepted office as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs; but, in the
event of the overthrow of the Ministry, he would be in a far worse position than before. Pitt
remembered this fact, and whispered to Farquhar the words "Robert Ward." He also made signs for
paper and ink and sought to pen a request for a pension; but he succeeded only in tracing strokes
which could not be deciphered.[782] His thoughts were also with his nieces, especially Lady Hester
Stanhope. Farquhar sought to prevent a parting interview with her; but during his temporary
absence she slipped into the bedroom, there to receive the blessing of her uncle and an affectionate
farewell. To her brother James, who then came in, he said; "Dear soul, I know she loves me.
Where is Hester? Is Hester gone?" Early on the 22nd he dictated these words to the bishop: "I wish
£1,000 or £1,500 a year to be given to my nieces if the public should think my long services
deserving it; but I do not presume to think I have earned it."[783] He then named those to whom
since 1801 he owed sums of money: Long, Steele, Lords Camden and Carrington, the Bishop of
Lincoln and Joseph Smith; he also entrusted his papers to the bishop and to Lord Chatham.
Already Bishop Tomline had warned him of his approaching change and besought him to prepare
his mind for the Sacrament. This he declined, alleging his unworthiness to receive it. Thereupon
the bishop prayed with him. He calmly murmured the responses and humbly confessed that he had
too much neglected prayer. Nevertheless, he affirmed the steadiness of his religious faith and
principles, and declared that he had ever sought to fulfil his duty to God and to mankind, though
with many errors and failures. While the bishop was overcome with emotion, the dying man
thanked him earnestly for all his kindness throughout life. Once his thoughts recurred to his own
conduct; he expressed heartfelt satisfaction at the innocency of his life, and declared that he died in
perfect charity with all mankind.[784]
He lingered on to the early hours of 23rd January, the twenty-fifth anniversary of his entry into
Parliament. During that night the cares of state once more pressed upon him. He spoke often about
a private letter from Lord Harrowby, probably the pathetic effusion quoted above. At times he
asked his nephew the direction of the wind, and on hearing it was in the east he murmured: "East
the 19th the conduct of Prussia respecting Hanover appeared so threatening that Ministers ordered
the immediate recall of the whole British force.[781] Thus, England had sent forth some 60,000
troops in order to bring them back again. She had paid a million sterling to Austria, and the results
were Ulm and Austerlitz. Nearly as much had gone to Russia, and the outcome was the armistice.
A British subsidy had been claimed by Prussia, and in return she was about to take Hanover as a
gift from Napoleon. It is to be hoped that Ministers kept the last bitter truth from Pitt; but from
their silence he must have augured the worst. Surely death itself was better than to be driven from
power by the combined attacks of Fox, Grenville, and Windham, the success of which was now
assured.
A touching instance of Pitt's thoughtfulness during these days of waning strength is recorded by
Robert Plumer Ward. He had accepted office as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs; but, in the
event of the overthrow of the Ministry, he would be in a far worse position than before. Pitt
remembered this fact, and whispered to Farquhar the words "Robert Ward." He also made signs for
paper and ink and sought to pen a request for a pension; but he succeeded only in tracing strokes
which could not be deciphered.[782] His thoughts were also with his nieces, especially Lady Hester
Stanhope. Farquhar sought to prevent a parting interview with her; but during his temporary
absence she slipped into the bedroom, there to receive the blessing of her uncle and an affectionate
farewell. To her brother James, who then came in, he said; "Dear soul, I know she loves me.
Where is Hester? Is Hester gone?" Early on the 22nd he dictated these words to the bishop: "I wish
£1,000 or £1,500 a year to be given to my nieces if the public should think my long services
deserving it; but I do not presume to think I have earned it."[783] He then named those to whom
since 1801 he owed sums of money: Long, Steele, Lords Camden and Carrington, the Bishop of
Lincoln and Joseph Smith; he also entrusted his papers to the bishop and to Lord Chatham.
Already Bishop Tomline had warned him of his approaching change and besought him to prepare
his mind for the Sacrament. This he declined, alleging his unworthiness to receive it. Thereupon
the bishop prayed with him. He calmly murmured the responses and humbly confessed that he had
too much neglected prayer. Nevertheless, he affirmed the steadiness of his religious faith and
principles, and declared that he had ever sought to fulfil his duty to God and to mankind, though
with many errors and failures. While the bishop was overcome with emotion, the dying man
thanked him earnestly for all his kindness throughout life. Once his thoughts recurred to his own
conduct; he expressed heartfelt satisfaction at the innocency of his life, and declared that he died in
perfect charity with all mankind.[784]
He lingered on to the early hours of 23rd January, the twenty-fifth anniversary of his entry into
Parliament. During that night the cares of state once more pressed upon him. He spoke often about
a private letter from Lord Harrowby, probably the pathetic effusion quoted above. At times he
asked his nephew the direction of the wind, and on hearing it was in the east he murmured: "East
Page 608
—ah that will do: that will bring him quick."[785] Then he fell into conversation with a messenger,
or, again, he murmured "Hear, hear," until sleep enfolded him. The last thoughts of Napoleon are
said to have centred in his early love and his army—"Joséphine:—Tête d'armée" he gasped as he
neared his end. In Pitt's being there was but one master passion; and to it his wandering fancies
returned during a last brief spell of consciousness. As James Stanhope listened to the breathing,
there fell on his ears with a strange clearness the words: "My country! How I leave my country!"
Then the sufferer fell once more into a deep sleep; and so he lay, until, some three hours before the
dawn, his spirit passed away in a long-drawn sigh.
or, again, he murmured "Hear, hear," until sleep enfolded him. The last thoughts of Napoleon are
said to have centred in his early love and his army—"Joséphine:—Tête d'armée" he gasped as he
neared his end. In Pitt's being there was but one master passion; and to it his wandering fancies
returned during a last brief spell of consciousness. As James Stanhope listened to the breathing,
there fell on his ears with a strange clearness the words: "My country! How I leave my country!"
Then the sufferer fell once more into a deep sleep; and so he lay, until, some three hours before the
dawn, his spirit passed away in a long-drawn sigh.
Page 609
EPILOGUE
Now is the stately column broke
The beacon-light is quench'd in smoke,
The trumpet's silver sound is still
The warder silent on the hill.
Scott, Marmion.
This noble epitaph to the memory of Pitt conveys an impression alike of heroic endeavour and of
irretrievable failure. It is the Funeral March of Chopin, not of Handel, and it echoes the feeling of
the time. An impenetrable darkness hung over England. Ulm, Austerlitz, the armistice, and the
desertion of the Allies by Prussia were successive waves of calamity, which obliterated all
landmarks and all means of safety. The dying words of Pitt found response in every breast, with
this difference, that, while he was proudly conscious of the correctness of his aims, the many, who
judge solely by tangible results, imputed to him the disasters of the war and the collapse of the
Coalition. Even Auckland exclaimed that the continental alliances had been wretchedly
mismanaged, a remark which Malmesbury treated with quiet contempt. Grenville, who was about
to move a vote of censure on the Ministry, burst into an agony of tears on hearing that Pitt was at
death's door. His distress of mind probably arose from a belated perception of the factiousness of
his own conduct and from grief at the unrelieved gloom of the end of a career whose meridian
splendour had shed lustre upon him.
The House of Commons did not whole-heartedly accord to the deceased statesman a burial in
Westminster Abbey in the tomb of Chatham. A motion to that effect, moved by Lascelles and
seconded by the Marquis of Titchfield, was strongly opposed by Fox, George Ponsonby, Windham,
and three other speakers. It passed by 258 votes to 59. Still more painful was the discussion in the
Common Council of the City of London, where a proposal to erect a monument to Pitt was carried
only by 77 votes to 71. It is safe to say that, if the fortune of war had gone against France at Ulm
and Austerlitz, Pitt would have been ecstatically hailed as the saviour of Europe, as indeed he was
at the Guildhall after Trafalgar. How long was it before it dawned on Auckland, Windham, and the
seventy-one councillors of the City of London, that the censures cast on the memory of Pitt ought
to have been levelled at the defender of Ulm, the Czar Alexander and his equally presumptuous
advisers at Austerlitz, and most of all at the cringing politicians of Berlin?
Now is the stately column broke
The beacon-light is quench'd in smoke,
The trumpet's silver sound is still
The warder silent on the hill.
Scott, Marmion.
This noble epitaph to the memory of Pitt conveys an impression alike of heroic endeavour and of
irretrievable failure. It is the Funeral March of Chopin, not of Handel, and it echoes the feeling of
the time. An impenetrable darkness hung over England. Ulm, Austerlitz, the armistice, and the
desertion of the Allies by Prussia were successive waves of calamity, which obliterated all
landmarks and all means of safety. The dying words of Pitt found response in every breast, with
this difference, that, while he was proudly conscious of the correctness of his aims, the many, who
judge solely by tangible results, imputed to him the disasters of the war and the collapse of the
Coalition. Even Auckland exclaimed that the continental alliances had been wretchedly
mismanaged, a remark which Malmesbury treated with quiet contempt. Grenville, who was about
to move a vote of censure on the Ministry, burst into an agony of tears on hearing that Pitt was at
death's door. His distress of mind probably arose from a belated perception of the factiousness of
his own conduct and from grief at the unrelieved gloom of the end of a career whose meridian
splendour had shed lustre upon him.
The House of Commons did not whole-heartedly accord to the deceased statesman a burial in
Westminster Abbey in the tomb of Chatham. A motion to that effect, moved by Lascelles and
seconded by the Marquis of Titchfield, was strongly opposed by Fox, George Ponsonby, Windham,
and three other speakers. It passed by 258 votes to 59. Still more painful was the discussion in the
Common Council of the City of London, where a proposal to erect a monument to Pitt was carried
only by 77 votes to 71. It is safe to say that, if the fortune of war had gone against France at Ulm
and Austerlitz, Pitt would have been ecstatically hailed as the saviour of Europe, as indeed he was
at the Guildhall after Trafalgar. How long was it before it dawned on Auckland, Windham, and the
seventy-one councillors of the City of London, that the censures cast on the memory of Pitt ought
to have been levelled at the defender of Ulm, the Czar Alexander and his equally presumptuous
advisers at Austerlitz, and most of all at the cringing politicians of Berlin?
Page 610
It is now abundantly clear that Pitt fell a victim to his confidence in the rulers of three great
monarchies, whose means were vast, whose promises were lofty, and whose surrender after the
first reverses baffled all forecasts. The descendants of Maria Theresa and Catharine tamely retired
from the fray after a single adverse blow; and the successor of the great Frederick sheathed his
sword after the unpardonable insult at Anspach.
In truth, the career of Pitt came to a climax at a time of unexampled decadence of the ancient
dynasties. The destinies of the allied Houses of Bourbon rested upon Louis XVI of France and
Charles IV of Spain. To the ineptitude of the former the French Revolution was in large measure
due. To the weakness and falsity of the latter we may ascribe the desertion of the royalist cause by
Spain in 1795–6, with the train of disastrous results in the Mediterranean and the West Indies. In
Central Europe Francis of Austria was scarcely more than a tool in the hands of those subtle
schemers, Thugut and Cobenzl. The boundless resources of Russia were at the disposal of Paul and
Alexander, who, with all their generous impulses, were incapable of steadily applying them to one
definite end. Only after weary years of subservience to Napoleon did Alexander develop that
firmness of character which finally brought salvation to the Continent. From Frederick William
even deeper humiliations failed to evoke any heroic resolve. Among the statesmen of those three
monarchies at the time of Pitt there is but one who was a fit compeer to him; and the fates willed
that Stein should not control affairs until the year 1807. The age of Pitt was the age of Godoy,
Thugut, and Haugwitz—weavers of old-world schemes of partition or barter, and blind to the
storm gathering in the West.
The importance of his achievements in curbing their ambitions and saving the smaller States has
not received due recognition. He did much to rescue the Dutch Netherlands from anarchy, and
Sweden and Turkey from the clutches of powerful neighbours. He failed, indeed, in his diplomatic
contest with Catharine; but the duplicity of the Court of Berlin, and the factious opposition of the
Whigs, made success impossible; and he had thereafter to look on helplessly at the final Partitions
of Poland. Only those who have probed the policy of Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the years
1787–92 can fully realize the difficulties which attended his efforts to frame a solid league against
Revolutionary France. As well might one attempt out of rubble to build a cannon-proof rampart.
At home Pitt had to deal with George III. Now, even under a limited monarchy the fortunes of a
statesman depend largely on the character of his Sovereign. While possessing the initiative which
proffers timely advice, it should be under the control of unfailing tact. Dowered with insight into
character and foresight as to the trend of events, the Monarch must, for the most part, subordinate
energy to self-repression and the prophetic instinct to the warnings of courtly sagacity. Yet the
ideal British ruler must at times assert his will, albeit indirectly, and with the personal charm which
ensures the smooth working of this delicately poised machine. He should therefore be the
embodiment of all the political virtues. Will even the admirers of George claim that he realized
monarchies, whose means were vast, whose promises were lofty, and whose surrender after the
first reverses baffled all forecasts. The descendants of Maria Theresa and Catharine tamely retired
from the fray after a single adverse blow; and the successor of the great Frederick sheathed his
sword after the unpardonable insult at Anspach.
In truth, the career of Pitt came to a climax at a time of unexampled decadence of the ancient
dynasties. The destinies of the allied Houses of Bourbon rested upon Louis XVI of France and
Charles IV of Spain. To the ineptitude of the former the French Revolution was in large measure
due. To the weakness and falsity of the latter we may ascribe the desertion of the royalist cause by
Spain in 1795–6, with the train of disastrous results in the Mediterranean and the West Indies. In
Central Europe Francis of Austria was scarcely more than a tool in the hands of those subtle
schemers, Thugut and Cobenzl. The boundless resources of Russia were at the disposal of Paul and
Alexander, who, with all their generous impulses, were incapable of steadily applying them to one
definite end. Only after weary years of subservience to Napoleon did Alexander develop that
firmness of character which finally brought salvation to the Continent. From Frederick William
even deeper humiliations failed to evoke any heroic resolve. Among the statesmen of those three
monarchies at the time of Pitt there is but one who was a fit compeer to him; and the fates willed
that Stein should not control affairs until the year 1807. The age of Pitt was the age of Godoy,
Thugut, and Haugwitz—weavers of old-world schemes of partition or barter, and blind to the
storm gathering in the West.
The importance of his achievements in curbing their ambitions and saving the smaller States has
not received due recognition. He did much to rescue the Dutch Netherlands from anarchy, and
Sweden and Turkey from the clutches of powerful neighbours. He failed, indeed, in his diplomatic
contest with Catharine; but the duplicity of the Court of Berlin, and the factious opposition of the
Whigs, made success impossible; and he had thereafter to look on helplessly at the final Partitions
of Poland. Only those who have probed the policy of Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the years
1787–92 can fully realize the difficulties which attended his efforts to frame a solid league against
Revolutionary France. As well might one attempt out of rubble to build a cannon-proof rampart.
At home Pitt had to deal with George III. Now, even under a limited monarchy the fortunes of a
statesman depend largely on the character of his Sovereign. While possessing the initiative which
proffers timely advice, it should be under the control of unfailing tact. Dowered with insight into
character and foresight as to the trend of events, the Monarch must, for the most part, subordinate
energy to self-repression and the prophetic instinct to the warnings of courtly sagacity. Yet the
ideal British ruler must at times assert his will, albeit indirectly, and with the personal charm which
ensures the smooth working of this delicately poised machine. He should therefore be the
embodiment of all the political virtues. Will even the admirers of George claim that he realized
Page 611
that ideal? However excellent as Elector of Hanover, he was a doubtful blessing as King of Great
Britain and Ireland.
In truth, the Hanoverian strain in his nature had not been toned to the degree of fineness needful
for the kingly office in these islands. In a time of peculiar difficulty he sought to govern almost
absolutely by means which ensured the temporary subservience of Parliament, and in a spirit
which brought disruption upon the Empire. The former half of Pitt's career was largely occupied in
repairing the financial waste consequent on the American War, or in making good long arrears of
legislation. Here, indeed, is his most abiding contribution to the national welfare. But his
indebtedness to the King on questions of foreign and domestic policy is rarely apparent. Reform,
whether Economical or Parliamentary, encountered the more or less declared opposition of the
Sovereign. On the other hand, George showed marked ability in the support of corporate interests
and the management of men; so that his relations to Pitt were not unlike those of the Duke of
Newcastle to Chatham. The Pitts supplied the brain power while the Monarch or the Duke by the
award of favours ensured the needful degree of subservience at the polls or in the lobbies of St.
Stephens.
After the "surrender" at the close of the American War, the attitude of George towards his British
subjects was one of scarcely concealed scorn. Now and again his feelings burst forth
uncontrollably. Shortly before his second attack of lunacy, which occurred near the end of the
fortieth year of his reign, he astonished the congregation in church by repeating in loud and
emphatic tones the response: "Forty years long was I grieved with this generation and said: 'It is a
people that do err in their hearts, for they have not known My ways.'" The tones of the voice
betokened the approach of lunacy, but the conviction of the mind was always the same. For the
most part, however, scorn was tempered by calculation. His letters to Pitt are full of commendation
of the House of Commons when it unquestioningly passed Government Bills or the Supplies;
whereas he looked on Fox and Burke as baneful and wearisome talkers, consumers of time, and
foes to healthful slumber. Similarly, in his political catechism, the whole duty of Parliament was to
help Ministers to govern; while their proper function was to raise the maximum of revenue with
the minimum of fuss and change. In short, to maintain the existing social order; to allow no change
in a constitution which aroused the wonder or envy of other nations; to use peerages and
bishoprics, pocket boroughs and sinecures, as a means of buttressing that fabric, such were the
aims of the third George.
Failing materially to weaken the force of this mighty engine of patronage, Pitt was fain to make
the best of things as they were. The defeat of his Reform Bill in 1785 was the chief crisis in his
early career; for it involved the failure of the Abolition Bill, perhaps also of the schemes for the
relief of the poor which he outlined in 1797. In fact, after the year 1785, and still more so after
1790, he had to govern mainly as King's Minister, not as the people's Minister. Worst of all, the
centre of political gravity remained dangerously high throughout the storms of the Revolutionary
Britain and Ireland.
In truth, the Hanoverian strain in his nature had not been toned to the degree of fineness needful
for the kingly office in these islands. In a time of peculiar difficulty he sought to govern almost
absolutely by means which ensured the temporary subservience of Parliament, and in a spirit
which brought disruption upon the Empire. The former half of Pitt's career was largely occupied in
repairing the financial waste consequent on the American War, or in making good long arrears of
legislation. Here, indeed, is his most abiding contribution to the national welfare. But his
indebtedness to the King on questions of foreign and domestic policy is rarely apparent. Reform,
whether Economical or Parliamentary, encountered the more or less declared opposition of the
Sovereign. On the other hand, George showed marked ability in the support of corporate interests
and the management of men; so that his relations to Pitt were not unlike those of the Duke of
Newcastle to Chatham. The Pitts supplied the brain power while the Monarch or the Duke by the
award of favours ensured the needful degree of subservience at the polls or in the lobbies of St.
Stephens.
After the "surrender" at the close of the American War, the attitude of George towards his British
subjects was one of scarcely concealed scorn. Now and again his feelings burst forth
uncontrollably. Shortly before his second attack of lunacy, which occurred near the end of the
fortieth year of his reign, he astonished the congregation in church by repeating in loud and
emphatic tones the response: "Forty years long was I grieved with this generation and said: 'It is a
people that do err in their hearts, for they have not known My ways.'" The tones of the voice
betokened the approach of lunacy, but the conviction of the mind was always the same. For the
most part, however, scorn was tempered by calculation. His letters to Pitt are full of commendation
of the House of Commons when it unquestioningly passed Government Bills or the Supplies;
whereas he looked on Fox and Burke as baneful and wearisome talkers, consumers of time, and
foes to healthful slumber. Similarly, in his political catechism, the whole duty of Parliament was to
help Ministers to govern; while their proper function was to raise the maximum of revenue with
the minimum of fuss and change. In short, to maintain the existing social order; to allow no change
in a constitution which aroused the wonder or envy of other nations; to use peerages and
bishoprics, pocket boroughs and sinecures, as a means of buttressing that fabric, such were the
aims of the third George.
Failing materially to weaken the force of this mighty engine of patronage, Pitt was fain to make
the best of things as they were. The defeat of his Reform Bill in 1785 was the chief crisis in his
early career; for it involved the failure of the Abolition Bill, perhaps also of the schemes for the
relief of the poor which he outlined in 1797. In fact, after the year 1785, and still more so after
1790, he had to govern mainly as King's Minister, not as the people's Minister. Worst of all, the
centre of political gravity remained dangerously high throughout the storms of the Revolutionary
Page 612
Era. How much of the nation's energy then went forth in justifiable discontent and futile efforts at
repression has already appeared. Up to the year 1798 the struggle against France was largely one
of the governing class against a nation; and for this the King and the British oligarchy, not Pitt,
were responsible. Personal charm and the magnetic gift of evoking enthusiasm have in some
monarchs counterbalanced defects of narrowness and intolerance. George was not deficient in
courtly grace and tact—witness his remark to Pitt at their first interview after the long separation
of the years 1801–1804. When Pitt ventured to compliment the King on his looking better than
after the illness of 1801, the latter at once replied: "That is not to be wondered at: I was then on the
point of parting with an old friend. Now I am about to regain one." But these gracious remarks
came rarely in his closing years, which were marked by increasing harshness to his family,
petulance on the most trivial affairs, and an outlook more narrowly personal than ever.
Such a nature chafes its surroundings. It arouses no enthusiasm; it merely begets heat by friction.
Pitt has been blamed for spending too much time and energy in speeches about the war. But there
was no other way of kindling the nation's zeal. The Princes very rarely spoke in the House of
Lords, except under an overmastering fear of the abolition of the Slave Trade. None of the
Ministers, except Windham, had the gift of oratory. On Pitt alone devolved the task of arousing a
national spirit; and a cruel destiny cut short his life at the very time when his inspiring presence
was most needed. How much England then lost can never be known. Vorontzoff, Russian
ambassador at London, who had earlier been a bitter enemy of Pitt, now expressed the fervent
desire that death had carried off his weary old frame, rather than that of the potential Saviour of
Europe. The words are instinct with prescience. The personality and the actions of Pitt were alike a
summons to a life of dignity and manly independence. His successors had perforce to take a course
not unlike that which they were about to censure in him; and the distrust which the Czar Alexander
felt for them in part accounts for the collapse at Tilsit and the ensuing years of bondage to
Napoleon.
The disintegrating effects of the party system, or rather of its factious use by the Whig leaders,
have been explained in these pages. Its first result was seen in the divergence of the careers of Pitt
and Fox. The cause of Reform ought to have received their undivided support; but little by little
they were edged apart, and their hostility was perhaps the most lasting of the many evils wrought
by the unnatural Coalition of Fox and North. For a time Pitt gathered around him a national party,
which became avowedly so on the junction of the Old Whigs in 1794. But in the last years of his
life the denuding influences of partisan and personal feuds disastrously thinned his following.
From the refusal of George to grant Catholic Emancipation, and the consequent resignation of Pitt
in the spring of 1801, we may trace three sinister results. The Union with Ireland was bereft of its
natural sequel, Catholic Emancipation; the Ministerial ranks were cleft in twain; and the crisis
brought to the front Addington, a man utterly incapable of confronting Napoleon. Had Pitt
remained in power, the Peace of Amiens would have been less one-sided, its maintenance more
dignified; and the First Consul, who respected the strong but bullied the weak, would probably
repression has already appeared. Up to the year 1798 the struggle against France was largely one
of the governing class against a nation; and for this the King and the British oligarchy, not Pitt,
were responsible. Personal charm and the magnetic gift of evoking enthusiasm have in some
monarchs counterbalanced defects of narrowness and intolerance. George was not deficient in
courtly grace and tact—witness his remark to Pitt at their first interview after the long separation
of the years 1801–1804. When Pitt ventured to compliment the King on his looking better than
after the illness of 1801, the latter at once replied: "That is not to be wondered at: I was then on the
point of parting with an old friend. Now I am about to regain one." But these gracious remarks
came rarely in his closing years, which were marked by increasing harshness to his family,
petulance on the most trivial affairs, and an outlook more narrowly personal than ever.
Such a nature chafes its surroundings. It arouses no enthusiasm; it merely begets heat by friction.
Pitt has been blamed for spending too much time and energy in speeches about the war. But there
was no other way of kindling the nation's zeal. The Princes very rarely spoke in the House of
Lords, except under an overmastering fear of the abolition of the Slave Trade. None of the
Ministers, except Windham, had the gift of oratory. On Pitt alone devolved the task of arousing a
national spirit; and a cruel destiny cut short his life at the very time when his inspiring presence
was most needed. How much England then lost can never be known. Vorontzoff, Russian
ambassador at London, who had earlier been a bitter enemy of Pitt, now expressed the fervent
desire that death had carried off his weary old frame, rather than that of the potential Saviour of
Europe. The words are instinct with prescience. The personality and the actions of Pitt were alike a
summons to a life of dignity and manly independence. His successors had perforce to take a course
not unlike that which they were about to censure in him; and the distrust which the Czar Alexander
felt for them in part accounts for the collapse at Tilsit and the ensuing years of bondage to
Napoleon.
The disintegrating effects of the party system, or rather of its factious use by the Whig leaders,
have been explained in these pages. Its first result was seen in the divergence of the careers of Pitt
and Fox. The cause of Reform ought to have received their undivided support; but little by little
they were edged apart, and their hostility was perhaps the most lasting of the many evils wrought
by the unnatural Coalition of Fox and North. For a time Pitt gathered around him a national party,
which became avowedly so on the junction of the Old Whigs in 1794. But in the last years of his
life the denuding influences of partisan and personal feuds disastrously thinned his following.
From the refusal of George to grant Catholic Emancipation, and the consequent resignation of Pitt
in the spring of 1801, we may trace three sinister results. The Union with Ireland was bereft of its
natural sequel, Catholic Emancipation; the Ministerial ranks were cleft in twain; and the crisis
brought to the front Addington, a man utterly incapable of confronting Napoleon. Had Pitt
remained in power, the Peace of Amiens would have been less one-sided, its maintenance more
dignified; and the First Consul, who respected the strong but bullied the weak, would probably
Page 613
have acquiesced in a settlement consonant with the reviving prestige of England. But though the
Union Jack won notable triumphs in the spring of 1801, yet at London everything went awry.
Moved by consideration for the King, then recovering from lunacy, Pitt weakly promised not to
bring forward Catholic Emancipation during his life, an act which annoyed the Grenville–
Windham group. His rash promise to support Addington tied his hands in the following years; and
even after the renewal of war he too scrupulously refrained from overthrowing a Ministry whose
weakness had invited foreign aggressions and was powerless to avenge them. Finally, the
Grenvilles joined Fox; and thus the King's perversity nullified the efforts of Pitt to form an
Administration worthy to cope with Napoleon.
Nevertheless, the challenge flung down to England by the French regicides in 1793 was such as to
enhance the person of the Monarch in these islands; and the Revolutionary War, which was fatal to
several dynasties on the Continent, served to consolidate the power of the House of Brunswick.
For, though Pitt sought to keep the war from becoming a royalist crusade, it almost inevitably
assumed that character. During hostilities there can be but two sharply defined parties.
Accordingly, Pitt, who opened his career with a bold attack upon the prerogatives of George III,
ended it as his champion, even consenting to surrender a cherished conviction in order that the
Monarch's peace of mind might not be troubled. Was ever a Minister beset by more baffling
problems, by more hampering restrictions? Peace might have solved and shattered them. But peace
he could not secure in the years 1796, 1797; and when finally it came it proved to be no peace,
merely a pause before a still greater cycle of war.
The grandeur of Pitt's efforts for ensuring the independence of Europe has somewhat obscured his
services as Empire builder. Yet, with the possible exception of Chatham, no statesman has
exercised a greater influence on the destinies of the British race. On two occasions he sternly set
his face against the cession of Gibraltar; he took keen interest in the settlement of New South
Wales; his arrangements for the government of Canada deserve far higher praise than they have
usually secured; and his firmness in repelling the archaic claims of Spain to the shores of the
Northern Pacific gained for his people the future colony of British Columbia. Cherishing a belief
in the pacific nature of Bonaparte's policy at the time of the Treaty of Amiens, he condoned the
retrocession of the Cape of Good Hope and of Malta, on condition of the gain of Ceylon and
Trinidad; but after the revival of French schemes of aggression in the East he saw the imperative
need of planting or maintaining the Union Jack at those commanding points. He, who has been
accused of excessive trust in allies, prepared to forego the alliance of Russia rather than give up
Malta; and, even before Nelson gained the mastery at sea, Pitt sent forth an expedition to conquer
the Cape. In his magnanimous desire of securing to Europe the blessings of a lasting peace he was
ready to surrender maritime conquests of greater pecuniary value so long as England held the keys
of the overland and sea routes to India. To that empire his just and statesmanlike policy brought a
new sense of confidence and therefore a time of comparative rest, until the threatening orientation
of Bonaparte's plans once more placed everything at hazard. Thanks to the exertions of Dundas
Union Jack won notable triumphs in the spring of 1801, yet at London everything went awry.
Moved by consideration for the King, then recovering from lunacy, Pitt weakly promised not to
bring forward Catholic Emancipation during his life, an act which annoyed the Grenville–
Windham group. His rash promise to support Addington tied his hands in the following years; and
even after the renewal of war he too scrupulously refrained from overthrowing a Ministry whose
weakness had invited foreign aggressions and was powerless to avenge them. Finally, the
Grenvilles joined Fox; and thus the King's perversity nullified the efforts of Pitt to form an
Administration worthy to cope with Napoleon.
Nevertheless, the challenge flung down to England by the French regicides in 1793 was such as to
enhance the person of the Monarch in these islands; and the Revolutionary War, which was fatal to
several dynasties on the Continent, served to consolidate the power of the House of Brunswick.
For, though Pitt sought to keep the war from becoming a royalist crusade, it almost inevitably
assumed that character. During hostilities there can be but two sharply defined parties.
Accordingly, Pitt, who opened his career with a bold attack upon the prerogatives of George III,
ended it as his champion, even consenting to surrender a cherished conviction in order that the
Monarch's peace of mind might not be troubled. Was ever a Minister beset by more baffling
problems, by more hampering restrictions? Peace might have solved and shattered them. But peace
he could not secure in the years 1796, 1797; and when finally it came it proved to be no peace,
merely a pause before a still greater cycle of war.
The grandeur of Pitt's efforts for ensuring the independence of Europe has somewhat obscured his
services as Empire builder. Yet, with the possible exception of Chatham, no statesman has
exercised a greater influence on the destinies of the British race. On two occasions he sternly set
his face against the cession of Gibraltar; he took keen interest in the settlement of New South
Wales; his arrangements for the government of Canada deserve far higher praise than they have
usually secured; and his firmness in repelling the archaic claims of Spain to the shores of the
Northern Pacific gained for his people the future colony of British Columbia. Cherishing a belief
in the pacific nature of Bonaparte's policy at the time of the Treaty of Amiens, he condoned the
retrocession of the Cape of Good Hope and of Malta, on condition of the gain of Ceylon and
Trinidad; but after the revival of French schemes of aggression in the East he saw the imperative
need of planting or maintaining the Union Jack at those commanding points. He, who has been
accused of excessive trust in allies, prepared to forego the alliance of Russia rather than give up
Malta; and, even before Nelson gained the mastery at sea, Pitt sent forth an expedition to conquer
the Cape. In his magnanimous desire of securing to Europe the blessings of a lasting peace he was
ready to surrender maritime conquests of greater pecuniary value so long as England held the keys
of the overland and sea routes to India. To that empire his just and statesmanlike policy brought a
new sense of confidence and therefore a time of comparative rest, until the threatening orientation
of Bonaparte's plans once more placed everything at hazard. Thanks to the exertions of Dundas
Page 614
and the Wellesleys, the crisis was averted; but the policy which assured British supremacy in the
East was essentially that of Pitt.
It is far easier to assess the importance of the life work of Pitt than to set forth his character in
living traits. Those who knew him well agree as the charm of his personality; but they supply few
illuminating details, perhaps out of respect for the reserve which was his usual panoply. Like
Chatham he rarely revealed his inmost self. The beauties of his conversation, informed with
learning, sparkling with wit, always vivacious yet never spiteful, never appeared in their full glow
except in the circle of his dearest friends; but by singular ill fortune they who could have handed
on those treasures, were satisfied with entries such as: "Pitt talked a great deal among his friends";
or, "In society he was remarkably cheerful and pleasant, full of wit and playfulness";[786] or again,
"His great delight was society. There he shone with a degree of calm and steady lustre which often
astonished me more than his most splendid efforts in Parliament; ... he seemed utterly unconscious
of his own superiority and much more disposed to listen than to talk; ... his appearance dispelled
all care, his brow was never clouded even in the severest public trials."[787] These are only the hors
d'œuvres of what must have been a feast of delight; but even they suffice to refute the Whig
slanders as to Pitt's austerity and selfishness. Under happier auspices he would have been known
as the most lovable of English statesmen; and his exceptional fondness for children would alone
suffice to expose the falsity of his alleged reply to a manufacturer who complained that he could
not get enough men—"Then you must take the children."[788] Cynicism at the expense of the weak
was a trait utterly alien to him. It is also incorrect to assert, with Macaulay, that "pride pervaded
the whole man, was written in the harsh rigid lines of his face, was marked by the way in which he
walked, in which he sat, in which he stood, and, above all, in which he bowed." The Whig
historian, here following the Whig tradition, formed his estimate of the whole man from what was
merely a parliamentary mannerism. Pitt, as we have seen, was a prey to shyness and gaucherie;
and the rigid attitude which he adopted for the House was not so much the outcome of a sense of
superiority (though he had an able man's consciousness of worth) as a screen to hide those defects.
A curiously stilted manner has been the bane of many gifted orators and actors; but the real test is
whether they could throw it off in private. That Pitt threw it off in the circle of his friends they all
agree. The only defects which Wilberforce saw in him were an inadequate knowledge of human
nature, a too sanguine estimate of men and of the course of events, and, in later years, occasional
displays of petulance in face of opposition.[789] The first are the defects of a noble nature, the last
those of a man whose strength has long been overtaxed.
In fact, Pitt's constitution was unequal to the prolonged strain. In childhood his astonishingly
precocious powers needed judicious repression. Instead, they were unduly forced by the paternal
East was essentially that of Pitt.
It is far easier to assess the importance of the life work of Pitt than to set forth his character in
living traits. Those who knew him well agree as the charm of his personality; but they supply few
illuminating details, perhaps out of respect for the reserve which was his usual panoply. Like
Chatham he rarely revealed his inmost self. The beauties of his conversation, informed with
learning, sparkling with wit, always vivacious yet never spiteful, never appeared in their full glow
except in the circle of his dearest friends; but by singular ill fortune they who could have handed
on those treasures, were satisfied with entries such as: "Pitt talked a great deal among his friends";
or, "In society he was remarkably cheerful and pleasant, full of wit and playfulness";[786] or again,
"His great delight was society. There he shone with a degree of calm and steady lustre which often
astonished me more than his most splendid efforts in Parliament; ... he seemed utterly unconscious
of his own superiority and much more disposed to listen than to talk; ... his appearance dispelled
all care, his brow was never clouded even in the severest public trials."[787] These are only the hors
d'œuvres of what must have been a feast of delight; but even they suffice to refute the Whig
slanders as to Pitt's austerity and selfishness. Under happier auspices he would have been known
as the most lovable of English statesmen; and his exceptional fondness for children would alone
suffice to expose the falsity of his alleged reply to a manufacturer who complained that he could
not get enough men—"Then you must take the children."[788] Cynicism at the expense of the weak
was a trait utterly alien to him. It is also incorrect to assert, with Macaulay, that "pride pervaded
the whole man, was written in the harsh rigid lines of his face, was marked by the way in which he
walked, in which he sat, in which he stood, and, above all, in which he bowed." The Whig
historian, here following the Whig tradition, formed his estimate of the whole man from what was
merely a parliamentary mannerism. Pitt, as we have seen, was a prey to shyness and gaucherie;
and the rigid attitude which he adopted for the House was not so much the outcome of a sense of
superiority (though he had an able man's consciousness of worth) as a screen to hide those defects.
A curiously stilted manner has been the bane of many gifted orators and actors; but the real test is
whether they could throw it off in private. That Pitt threw it off in the circle of his friends they all
agree. The only defects which Wilberforce saw in him were an inadequate knowledge of human
nature, a too sanguine estimate of men and of the course of events, and, in later years, occasional
displays of petulance in face of opposition.[789] The first are the defects of a noble nature, the last
those of a man whose strength has long been overtaxed.
In fact, Pitt's constitution was unequal to the prolonged strain. In childhood his astonishingly
precocious powers needed judicious repression. Instead, they were unduly forced by the paternal
Page 615
pride of Chatham. At Cambridge, at Lincoln's Inn, and in Parliament the intellectual pressure was
maintained, with the result that his weakly frame was constantly overwrought and attenuated by a
too active mind. Further, the pressure at Westminster was so continuous as to preclude all chance
of widening his nature by foreign travel. He caught but a glimpse of the life of France in 1783; and
his knowledge of other peoples and politics was therefore perforce derived from books. It is
therefore surprising that the young Prime Minister displayed the sagacity and tolerance which
marked his career.
But his faculties, though not transcendently great, were singularly well balanced, besides being
controlled by an indomitable will and tact that rarely was at fault. In oratory he did not equal
Sheridan in wit and brilliance, Burke in richness of thought and majesty of diction, or Fox in
massive strength and debating facility; but, while falling little short of Fox in debate, he excelled
him in elegance and conciseness, Burke in point and common sense, Sheridan in dignity and
argumentative power, and all of them in the felicitous wedding of elevated thought or vigorous
argument to noble diction. By the side of his serried yet persuasive periods the efforts of Fox
seemed ragged, those of Burke philosophic essays, those of Sheridan rhetorical tinsel. And this
harmony was not the effect of long and painful training. His maiden speech of 26th February 1781
displayed the grace and forcefulness which marked his classic utterance at the Lord Mayor's
banquet ten weeks before his death.
Precocious maturity also characterized his financial plans, which displayed alike the shrewd
common sense of those of Walpole and the wider aims of Adam Smith. Before his twenty-sixth
year Pitt laid the basis of a system which, whatever its defects, ensured the speedy recovery of
national credit and belied the spiteful croakings of foreign rivals. Four days after his death, Fox
freely admitted that the establishment of the Sinking Fund had been most beneficial; and this
belief, though we now see it to be ill-founded, certainly endowed the nation with courage to
continue the struggle against the overgrown power of France. Scarcely less remarkable is his
record of legislative achievement. His India Bill of 1784, his attempt to free Anglo-Irish trade from
antiquated shackles, his effort to present to Parliament a palatable yet not ineffective scheme of
Reform, raise him above the other law-givers of the eighteenth century in the grandeur of his aims
if not in his actual achievements. By the India Bill of 1784 he reconciled the almost incompatible
claims of eastern autocracy and western democracy. If he failed to carry fiscal and Parliamentary
Reform, it was due less to tactical defects on his part than to prejudice and selfishness among those
whom he sought to benefit.
On the other hand, his intense hopefulness often led him to overlook obstacles and to credit all
men with his own high standard of intelligence and probity, a noble defect which not seldom
marred his diplomatic and military arrangements during the Great War. At no point have I slurred
over his mistakes, his diffusion of effort over too large an area of conflict, and his perhaps undue
trust in doubtful allies. But, even so, as I have shown, a careful examination of all the available
maintained, with the result that his weakly frame was constantly overwrought and attenuated by a
too active mind. Further, the pressure at Westminster was so continuous as to preclude all chance
of widening his nature by foreign travel. He caught but a glimpse of the life of France in 1783; and
his knowledge of other peoples and politics was therefore perforce derived from books. It is
therefore surprising that the young Prime Minister displayed the sagacity and tolerance which
marked his career.
But his faculties, though not transcendently great, were singularly well balanced, besides being
controlled by an indomitable will and tact that rarely was at fault. In oratory he did not equal
Sheridan in wit and brilliance, Burke in richness of thought and majesty of diction, or Fox in
massive strength and debating facility; but, while falling little short of Fox in debate, he excelled
him in elegance and conciseness, Burke in point and common sense, Sheridan in dignity and
argumentative power, and all of them in the felicitous wedding of elevated thought or vigorous
argument to noble diction. By the side of his serried yet persuasive periods the efforts of Fox
seemed ragged, those of Burke philosophic essays, those of Sheridan rhetorical tinsel. And this
harmony was not the effect of long and painful training. His maiden speech of 26th February 1781
displayed the grace and forcefulness which marked his classic utterance at the Lord Mayor's
banquet ten weeks before his death.
Precocious maturity also characterized his financial plans, which displayed alike the shrewd
common sense of those of Walpole and the wider aims of Adam Smith. Before his twenty-sixth
year Pitt laid the basis of a system which, whatever its defects, ensured the speedy recovery of
national credit and belied the spiteful croakings of foreign rivals. Four days after his death, Fox
freely admitted that the establishment of the Sinking Fund had been most beneficial; and this
belief, though we now see it to be ill-founded, certainly endowed the nation with courage to
continue the struggle against the overgrown power of France. Scarcely less remarkable is his
record of legislative achievement. His India Bill of 1784, his attempt to free Anglo-Irish trade from
antiquated shackles, his effort to present to Parliament a palatable yet not ineffective scheme of
Reform, raise him above the other law-givers of the eighteenth century in the grandeur of his aims
if not in his actual achievements. By the India Bill of 1784 he reconciled the almost incompatible
claims of eastern autocracy and western democracy. If he failed to carry fiscal and Parliamentary
Reform, it was due less to tactical defects on his part than to prejudice and selfishness among those
whom he sought to benefit.
On the other hand, his intense hopefulness often led him to overlook obstacles and to credit all
men with his own high standard of intelligence and probity, a noble defect which not seldom
marred his diplomatic and military arrangements during the Great War. At no point have I slurred
over his mistakes, his diffusion of effort over too large an area of conflict, and his perhaps undue
trust in doubtful allies. But, even so, as I have shown, a careful examination of all the available
Page 616
evidence generally reveals the reasons for his confidence; and failures due to this cause are far less
disastrous, because less dispiriting to the nation, than those which are the outcome of sluggishness
or cowardice. Of those unpardonable sins Pitt has never been accused even by his severest critics.
After the repulse of his pacific overtures by the French Directory in September 1797 his attitude
was one almost of defiance, witness his curt rejection of similar offers by Bonaparte early in 1800,
which may be pronounced the gravest defect of his diplomatic career.
In that age the action of statesmen was often dilatory; and we must admit that in regard to the Act
of Union with Ireland Pitt's procedure was halting and ineffective, so that finally he was driven to
use corrupt means to force through the corrupt Irish Parliament a measure which in the autumn of
1798 would have been accepted thankfully by the dominant caste. His Bill of 1797 for the relief of
the poor and his Land Tax Commutation Act of 1798 are examples of improvident legislation. But
from a leader overburdened with the details of war and diplomacy we should not expect the keen
foresight, the minute care as to details, which distinguished Gladstone. To compare the
achievements of a statesman hard pressed by the problems of the Revolutionary Era with those of
a peaceful age when the standard of legislative effort had been greatly raised is unfair; and the
criticism of Pitt by a distinguished historian evinces partiality towards the Victorian statesman
rather than an adequate appreciation of the difficulties besetting a Minister of George III in those
times of turmoil.[790] It is true that Pitt did not inaugurate Factory legislation; that was the work of
the Addington Cabinet in 1802; he did not link his name with the efforts of Romilly and others for
the reform of the brutal Penal Code; and he did little for art and literature; but neither the
personality of George nor the state of the national finances favoured the rise of a Maecenas.
Concentration of effort on political and diplomatic questions was the alpha and omega of Pitt's
creed. The terrible pressure of events forbade his looking far ahead or far afield; he marched
straight onward, hoping by his untiring efforts first to restore national prosperity and thereafter to
secure a peace which would inaugurate a brighter future. His overtaxed strength collapsed when
the strain was most tense; and his life therefore figures as a torso, which should not be criticized as
if it were the perfect statue. Yet, as moral grandeur is always inspiring, Pitt's efforts were finally to
be crowned with success by the statesmen who had found wisdom in his teaching, inspiration in
his quenchless hope, enthusiasm in his all-absorbing love of country. An egoist never founds a
school of the prophets. But Pitt, who
Spurn'd at the sordid lust of pelf
And served his Albion for herself,
trained and inspired a band of devoted disciples such as no other leader of the eighteenth century
left behind him. Some were unimaginative plodders, as Perceval; others were capable
administrators and shrewd diplomatists, as Castlereagh; to one alone was vouchsafed the fire of
genius, the sympathetic insight, the soaring ambition held in check by overmastering patriotism,
disastrous, because less dispiriting to the nation, than those which are the outcome of sluggishness
or cowardice. Of those unpardonable sins Pitt has never been accused even by his severest critics.
After the repulse of his pacific overtures by the French Directory in September 1797 his attitude
was one almost of defiance, witness his curt rejection of similar offers by Bonaparte early in 1800,
which may be pronounced the gravest defect of his diplomatic career.
In that age the action of statesmen was often dilatory; and we must admit that in regard to the Act
of Union with Ireland Pitt's procedure was halting and ineffective, so that finally he was driven to
use corrupt means to force through the corrupt Irish Parliament a measure which in the autumn of
1798 would have been accepted thankfully by the dominant caste. His Bill of 1797 for the relief of
the poor and his Land Tax Commutation Act of 1798 are examples of improvident legislation. But
from a leader overburdened with the details of war and diplomacy we should not expect the keen
foresight, the minute care as to details, which distinguished Gladstone. To compare the
achievements of a statesman hard pressed by the problems of the Revolutionary Era with those of
a peaceful age when the standard of legislative effort had been greatly raised is unfair; and the
criticism of Pitt by a distinguished historian evinces partiality towards the Victorian statesman
rather than an adequate appreciation of the difficulties besetting a Minister of George III in those
times of turmoil.[790] It is true that Pitt did not inaugurate Factory legislation; that was the work of
the Addington Cabinet in 1802; he did not link his name with the efforts of Romilly and others for
the reform of the brutal Penal Code; and he did little for art and literature; but neither the
personality of George nor the state of the national finances favoured the rise of a Maecenas.
Concentration of effort on political and diplomatic questions was the alpha and omega of Pitt's
creed. The terrible pressure of events forbade his looking far ahead or far afield; he marched
straight onward, hoping by his untiring efforts first to restore national prosperity and thereafter to
secure a peace which would inaugurate a brighter future. His overtaxed strength collapsed when
the strain was most tense; and his life therefore figures as a torso, which should not be criticized as
if it were the perfect statue. Yet, as moral grandeur is always inspiring, Pitt's efforts were finally to
be crowned with success by the statesmen who had found wisdom in his teaching, inspiration in
his quenchless hope, enthusiasm in his all-absorbing love of country. An egoist never founds a
school of the prophets. But Pitt, who
Spurn'd at the sordid lust of pelf
And served his Albion for herself,
trained and inspired a band of devoted disciples such as no other leader of the eighteenth century
left behind him. Some were unimaginative plodders, as Perceval; others were capable
administrators and shrewd diplomatists, as Castlereagh; to one alone was vouchsafed the fire of
genius, the sympathetic insight, the soaring ambition held in check by overmastering patriotism,
Page 617
which were commingled in the personality of the master; and Canning afterwards declared that he
buried his political allegiance in the grave of Pitt. It was granted to these men to labour on in the
cause for which he gave his life, and finally, in the years 1814–15, to bring back France to her old
frontiers by arrangements which he clearly outlined in the years 1798 and 1805. Of the numerous
annexations and changes of boundaries effected by Napoleon, only one, the Valtelline, was
destined to survive. But Europe after Waterloo testified alike to the sagacity and the limitations of
the mind of William Pitt.
buried his political allegiance in the grave of Pitt. It was granted to these men to labour on in the
cause for which he gave his life, and finally, in the years 1814–15, to bring back France to her old
frontiers by arrangements which he clearly outlined in the years 1798 and 1805. Of the numerous
annexations and changes of boundaries effected by Napoleon, only one, the Valtelline, was
destined to survive. But Europe after Waterloo testified alike to the sagacity and the limitations of
the mind of William Pitt.
Page 618
STATISTICS OF THE YEARS 1792–1801
N.B.—The figures under the heading "money borrowed" are taken from the official statistics
presented by the Rt. Hon. George Rose, "Brief Examination into the Increase of the Revenue,
Commerce and Navigation of Great Britain" (London, 1806), p. 16. The total statistics are given in
round numbers.
PERMANENT MONEY
YEAR. IMPORTS. EXPORTS. NAVY. ARMY.
TAXES. BORROWED.
1792 14,284,000 19,659,000 24,465,000 1,985,000 1,819,000 ——
1793 13,941,000 19,256,000 19,676,000 3,971,000 3,993,000 4,500,000
1794 13,858,000 22,288,000 25,111,000 5,525,000 6,641,000 12,907,000
1795 13,557,000 22,736,000 25,036,000 6,315,000 11,610,000 19,490,000
1796 14,292,000 23,187,000 28,025,000 11,883,000 14,911,000 29,726,000
1797 13,332,000 21,013,000 26,315,000 13,033,000 15,488,000 44,029,000
1798 14,275,000 27,857,000 30,289,000 13,449,000 12,852,000 15,000,000
1799 15,727,000 26,837,000 33,640,000 13,642,000 11,840,000 15,500,000
1800 14,238,000 30,570,000 38,119,000 13,619,000 11,941,000 18,500,000
1801 14,641,000 32,795,000 37,786,000 15,857,000 12,117,000 25,500,000
N.B.—The figures under the heading "money borrowed" are taken from the official statistics
presented by the Rt. Hon. George Rose, "Brief Examination into the Increase of the Revenue,
Commerce and Navigation of Great Britain" (London, 1806), p. 16. The total statistics are given in
round numbers.
PERMANENT MONEY
YEAR. IMPORTS. EXPORTS. NAVY. ARMY.
TAXES. BORROWED.
1792 14,284,000 19,659,000 24,465,000 1,985,000 1,819,000 ——
1793 13,941,000 19,256,000 19,676,000 3,971,000 3,993,000 4,500,000
1794 13,858,000 22,288,000 25,111,000 5,525,000 6,641,000 12,907,000
1795 13,557,000 22,736,000 25,036,000 6,315,000 11,610,000 19,490,000
1796 14,292,000 23,187,000 28,025,000 11,883,000 14,911,000 29,726,000
1797 13,332,000 21,013,000 26,315,000 13,033,000 15,488,000 44,029,000
1798 14,275,000 27,857,000 30,289,000 13,449,000 12,852,000 15,000,000
1799 15,727,000 26,837,000 33,640,000 13,642,000 11,840,000 15,500,000
1800 14,238,000 30,570,000 38,119,000 13,619,000 11,941,000 18,500,000
1801 14,641,000 32,795,000 37,786,000 15,857,000 12,117,000 25,500,000
Page 619
INDEX
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Abbot, Charles (afterwards Lord Colchester), 298, 306 n., 330 n., 346;
Speaker, 520.
Abercorn, Lord, 402.
Abercromby, Sir Ralph, 216;
Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies, 226, 239, 240, 241, 246;
in Ireland, 352–354;
resigns, 354, 363;
campaign in Holland, 381, 382;
in Egypt, 387;
his death, 240.
Aboukir Bay, 367–369.
"Accurate Observer," the, 466.
Acton, General, 150 n.
Acton, Lord, on Pitt and the execution of Louis XVI, refuted, 94 n., 569.
Adair, Robert, 337 n.
Adams, W. D., Pitt's secretary, 531.
Addington, Henry (afterwards Viscount Sidmouth), Speaker, 180, 255, 302, 368, 436 n.;
suggests the Patriotic Contribution, 331;
at the duel between Pitt and Tierney, 334, 335;
Pitt at his house, 435;
tries to dissuade Pitt from Catholic Emancipation, 437;
urged by the King to form a Ministry, 437;
Prime Minister, 439, 445–448, 450, 451, 468, 469, 487, 488;
Pitt supports him, 471, 472, 478, 479, 488, 496, 503, 504;
visits Pitt at Walmer, 473, 477;
his finance, 480–482;
failure of his negotiations with Pitt, 483–487;
plans for his overthrow, 495–499;
resigns, 499;
opposes abolition of the Slave Trade, 502;
union with Pitt, 517;
created Viscount Sidmouth, 517;
Lord President, 517, 520–522;
resigns, 530.
Addington, Hiley, 530.
Agriculture, Board of, instituted, 165, 293.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Abbot, Charles (afterwards Lord Colchester), 298, 306 n., 330 n., 346;
Speaker, 520.
Abercorn, Lord, 402.
Abercromby, Sir Ralph, 216;
Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies, 226, 239, 240, 241, 246;
in Ireland, 352–354;
resigns, 354, 363;
campaign in Holland, 381, 382;
in Egypt, 387;
his death, 240.
Aboukir Bay, 367–369.
"Accurate Observer," the, 466.
Acton, General, 150 n.
Acton, Lord, on Pitt and the execution of Louis XVI, refuted, 94 n., 569.
Adair, Robert, 337 n.
Adams, W. D., Pitt's secretary, 531.
Addington, Henry (afterwards Viscount Sidmouth), Speaker, 180, 255, 302, 368, 436 n.;
suggests the Patriotic Contribution, 331;
at the duel between Pitt and Tierney, 334, 335;
Pitt at his house, 435;
tries to dissuade Pitt from Catholic Emancipation, 437;
urged by the King to form a Ministry, 437;
Prime Minister, 439, 445–448, 450, 451, 468, 469, 487, 488;
Pitt supports him, 471, 472, 478, 479, 488, 496, 503, 504;
visits Pitt at Walmer, 473, 477;
his finance, 480–482;
failure of his negotiations with Pitt, 483–487;
plans for his overthrow, 495–499;
resigns, 499;
opposes abolition of the Slave Trade, 502;
union with Pitt, 517;
created Viscount Sidmouth, 517;
Lord President, 517, 520–522;
resigns, 530.
Addington, Hiley, 530.
Agriculture, Board of, instituted, 165, 293.
Page 620
Agriculture, flourishing state of, 291;
influence of enclosures on, 291, 292.
Alava, General, 524.
Alcudia, Duke of. See Godoy.
Alexander I, Czar, 487, 508, 515;
his instructions to Novossiltzoff, 522, 525;
his terms of alliance, 525–527;
his designs on Malta, 527;
at Berlin, 537;
treaty of Potsdam, 539;
battle of Austerlitz, 544, 560.
Aliens' Bill (1792), 94;
its withdrawal demanded by France, 101, 103;
renewal of (1798), 333.
Alkmaar, Convention of, 382.
All the Talents, Administration of, 496.
Alsace, 46, 53, 122, 129, 142, 197, 199, 200.
Alvanley, Lord. See Arden, Richard Pepper.
Amherst, Lord, Commander-in-Chief, 270.
Amiens, Treaty of, 248, 470, 472, 477, 564, 565.
Anckarström, Johann Jakob, assassinates Gustavus III, 46.
Anspach, Principality of, overrun by Napoleon, 534, 537, 560.
"Anti-Jacobin," the, 327, 336, 337, 464.
"Anti-Levelling Society," the, 68.
Antwerp, trade of, strangled by the Dutch, 72;
reduction of the citadel, 76;
proposed fortification of, 83;
conference at (1793), 132.
Aranda, Count of, Spanish Minister, 46.
Arcola, battle of, 321.
Arden, Sir Richard Pepper (Lord Alvanley), Master of the Rolls, 34, 476;
on Irish affairs, 341.
"Argus," the, 66;
in the pay of the French Embassy, 66 n.
Armed Neutrality League, 290;
collapse of, 468, 478.
Army, the, debate on the Estimates, 29, 30;
state of 1793, 124, 266, 267;
Pitt's measures for increasing, 278–280, 305;
disaffection in, 318, 319.
Army of Reserve Act, 499, 509, 510.
Artois, Comte d' (afterwards Charles X), 2, 3, 5, 6;
and the Quiberon Expedition, 259, 261–263, 287;
retires to Holyrood, 263;
dines with Pitt and Grenville, 377.
Assaye, battle of, 463, 505.
Assignats, royalist, manufacture of, 261.
"Associated Friends of the Constitution," the, at Glasgow, 173, 174.
influence of enclosures on, 291, 292.
Alava, General, 524.
Alcudia, Duke of. See Godoy.
Alexander I, Czar, 487, 508, 515;
his instructions to Novossiltzoff, 522, 525;
his terms of alliance, 525–527;
his designs on Malta, 527;
at Berlin, 537;
treaty of Potsdam, 539;
battle of Austerlitz, 544, 560.
Aliens' Bill (1792), 94;
its withdrawal demanded by France, 101, 103;
renewal of (1798), 333.
Alkmaar, Convention of, 382.
All the Talents, Administration of, 496.
Alsace, 46, 53, 122, 129, 142, 197, 199, 200.
Alvanley, Lord. See Arden, Richard Pepper.
Amherst, Lord, Commander-in-Chief, 270.
Amiens, Treaty of, 248, 470, 472, 477, 564, 565.
Anckarström, Johann Jakob, assassinates Gustavus III, 46.
Anspach, Principality of, overrun by Napoleon, 534, 537, 560.
"Anti-Jacobin," the, 327, 336, 337, 464.
"Anti-Levelling Society," the, 68.
Antwerp, trade of, strangled by the Dutch, 72;
reduction of the citadel, 76;
proposed fortification of, 83;
conference at (1793), 132.
Aranda, Count of, Spanish Minister, 46.
Arcola, battle of, 321.
Arden, Sir Richard Pepper (Lord Alvanley), Master of the Rolls, 34, 476;
on Irish affairs, 341.
"Argus," the, 66;
in the pay of the French Embassy, 66 n.
Armed Neutrality League, 290;
collapse of, 468, 478.
Army, the, debate on the Estimates, 29, 30;
state of 1793, 124, 266, 267;
Pitt's measures for increasing, 278–280, 305;
disaffection in, 318, 319.
Army of Reserve Act, 499, 509, 510.
Artois, Comte d' (afterwards Charles X), 2, 3, 5, 6;
and the Quiberon Expedition, 259, 261–263, 287;
retires to Holyrood, 263;
dines with Pitt and Grenville, 377.
Assaye, battle of, 463, 505.
Assignats, royalist, manufacture of, 261.
"Associated Friends of the Constitution," the, at Glasgow, 173, 174.
Page 621
Auckland, Lord (William Eden), Ambassador at The Hague, 38, 51, 68, 69, 71 n., 72–74, 76,
82, 97, 99, 107, 109, 111, 126, 189;
Pitt's intimacy with his daughter, 299–303;
Postmaster-General, 303, 330, 331, 342, 355, 356, 394–396, 415, 421, 434;
his reported intrigues, 443, 445;
rupture with Pitt, 452;
his "inquisitiveness," 479, 480 n.;
559, 560.
Augereau, P. F. C., Duc de Castiglione, 324.
Austerlitz, battle of, 536, 544, 560;
reception of the news of in England, 548, 549.
Austria, alliance with Prussia (1791), 5, 43;
war with France, 23, 46;
her share in the partition of Poland, 53, 122;
evacuates Brussels, 74;
end of estrangement with England, 84;
her aims in the war, 122, 123, 129;
alliance with England (1793), 123, 143, 147;
fails to send reinforcements to Toulon, 152, 153, 157, 158, 161, 268;
disputes with Prussia, 200–202;
evacuation of the Netherlands, 209, 211, 212;
treaty with Russia and England (1795), 235;
receives financial aid from England, 304;
her struggle with Napoleon, 304, 321, 322;
treaty of Campo Formio (1797), 327, 365;
appeals to England, 366;
schemes for expansion in Italy, 371, 378;
declares War against France (1799), 374;
negotiations with England (1799), 383;
her defeats at Marengo, 386, 387,
Ulm, 534, 542,
and Austerlitz, 544, 552, 560.
See Francis II.
Avignon, annexed by France, 220, 276.
Aylesbury, county meeting at, 188.
Baillie, Dr., 554.
Baird, Sir David, his expedition to the Cape, 532, 539.
Bank of England, crisis in 1797, 304, 308, 309.
Bankes, Sir Henry, 290, 428, 454, 520.
Bantry Bay, expedition to, 277, 308, 346.
Barère de Vieuzac, Bertrand, 83, 167.
Barham, Lord (Sir Charles Middleton), Pitt visits him at Teston, 479;
appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, 521, 522, 532, 550, 551;
created Lord Barham, 522.
Baring, Sir Francis, on the Cape, 251.
Barlow, Joel, 66, 70, 115, 172.
Barnard, Lady Anne, her "South Africa a Century Ago," 254.
82, 97, 99, 107, 109, 111, 126, 189;
Pitt's intimacy with his daughter, 299–303;
Postmaster-General, 303, 330, 331, 342, 355, 356, 394–396, 415, 421, 434;
his reported intrigues, 443, 445;
rupture with Pitt, 452;
his "inquisitiveness," 479, 480 n.;
559, 560.
Augereau, P. F. C., Duc de Castiglione, 324.
Austerlitz, battle of, 536, 544, 560;
reception of the news of in England, 548, 549.
Austria, alliance with Prussia (1791), 5, 43;
war with France, 23, 46;
her share in the partition of Poland, 53, 122;
evacuates Brussels, 74;
end of estrangement with England, 84;
her aims in the war, 122, 123, 129;
alliance with England (1793), 123, 143, 147;
fails to send reinforcements to Toulon, 152, 153, 157, 158, 161, 268;
disputes with Prussia, 200–202;
evacuation of the Netherlands, 209, 211, 212;
treaty with Russia and England (1795), 235;
receives financial aid from England, 304;
her struggle with Napoleon, 304, 321, 322;
treaty of Campo Formio (1797), 327, 365;
appeals to England, 366;
schemes for expansion in Italy, 371, 378;
declares War against France (1799), 374;
negotiations with England (1799), 383;
her defeats at Marengo, 386, 387,
Ulm, 534, 542,
and Austerlitz, 544, 552, 560.
See Francis II.
Avignon, annexed by France, 220, 276.
Aylesbury, county meeting at, 188.
Baillie, Dr., 554.
Baird, Sir David, his expedition to the Cape, 532, 539.
Bank of England, crisis in 1797, 304, 308, 309.
Bankes, Sir Henry, 290, 428, 454, 520.
Bantry Bay, expedition to, 277, 308, 346.
Barère de Vieuzac, Bertrand, 83, 167.
Barham, Lord (Sir Charles Middleton), Pitt visits him at Teston, 479;
appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, 521, 522, 532, 550, 551;
created Lord Barham, 522.
Baring, Sir Francis, on the Cape, 251.
Barlow, Joel, 66, 70, 115, 172.
Barnard, Lady Anne, her "South Africa a Century Ago," 254.
Page 622
Barras, Paul François Nicolas, Comte de, 263, 325, 328;
promises help to Ireland, 348, 363.
Barrington, Sir Jonah, 411, 412.
Barthélemy, François, Marquis de, French envoy in Switzerland, 105, 217, 233, 236, 346.
Basle, Treaties of (1795), 217, 233, 236, 237.
Bassano, Duc de. See Maret.
Bath, French refugees in, 165;
Pitt's stay at, 479, 547–553.
Bathurst, Bragge, 517, 518.
Bathurst, Lord, 476, 549, 550.
Bavaria, Electorate of, proposal for exchange, 122, 123, 129, 210.
Beaufoy, Henry, M.P., 10, 11.
Bedford, Duke of, 312.
Belfast, French sympathies in, 71, 78;
sedition in, 181.
Belgic Provinces, French designs on, 47, 48;
French conquest of, 69, 79;
demand independence, 83;
annexed by France, 111, 121;
Austrian proposal for exchange, 122, 129, 210;
reconquered, 126;
Austrian evacuation of, 208–212;
plans for, 371.
Belmore, Lord, 402.
Benoît, Pierre Victor, 60.
Beresford, John, Irish Chief Commissioner of the Revenue, 340, 346, 355, 356, 418, 419,
420, 424;
Lord Fitzwilliam and, 341, 342;
on the Irish Rebellion, 394, 395;
on the Union, 401–404, 410.
Berg, Duchy of, 46.
Bergen-op-Zoom, 126, 213;
failure of attack on, 382.
Bethencourt, battle of, 208.
Binns, John, 283, 286, 349, 350.
Birmingham, riots in (1791), 10, 17–19;
malcontents in, 186;
the "Loyal True Blues," 188, 189;
riots in (1795), 287, 288.
Biron, Duc de, his mission to London, 42, 43;
arrested for debt, 43.
Bischoffswerder, Baron von, Prussian Minister, 2, 5, 203.
Blankett, Commodore, expedition to the Cape, 251.
Boissy d'Anglas, François Antoine de, 233.
Bolton, Lord. See Orde, Thomas.
Bonaparte, Joseph, 506, 526.
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon.
Bond, 530.
promises help to Ireland, 348, 363.
Barrington, Sir Jonah, 411, 412.
Barthélemy, François, Marquis de, French envoy in Switzerland, 105, 217, 233, 236, 346.
Basle, Treaties of (1795), 217, 233, 236, 237.
Bassano, Duc de. See Maret.
Bath, French refugees in, 165;
Pitt's stay at, 479, 547–553.
Bathurst, Bragge, 517, 518.
Bathurst, Lord, 476, 549, 550.
Bavaria, Electorate of, proposal for exchange, 122, 123, 129, 210.
Beaufoy, Henry, M.P., 10, 11.
Bedford, Duke of, 312.
Belfast, French sympathies in, 71, 78;
sedition in, 181.
Belgic Provinces, French designs on, 47, 48;
French conquest of, 69, 79;
demand independence, 83;
annexed by France, 111, 121;
Austrian proposal for exchange, 122, 129, 210;
reconquered, 126;
Austrian evacuation of, 208–212;
plans for, 371.
Belmore, Lord, 402.
Benoît, Pierre Victor, 60.
Beresford, John, Irish Chief Commissioner of the Revenue, 340, 346, 355, 356, 418, 419,
420, 424;
Lord Fitzwilliam and, 341, 342;
on the Irish Rebellion, 394, 395;
on the Union, 401–404, 410.
Berg, Duchy of, 46.
Bergen-op-Zoom, 126, 213;
failure of attack on, 382.
Bethencourt, battle of, 208.
Binns, John, 283, 286, 349, 350.
Birmingham, riots in (1791), 10, 17–19;
malcontents in, 186;
the "Loyal True Blues," 188, 189;
riots in (1795), 287, 288.
Biron, Duc de, his mission to London, 42, 43;
arrested for debt, 43.
Bischoffswerder, Baron von, Prussian Minister, 2, 5, 203.
Blankett, Commodore, expedition to the Cape, 251.
Boissy d'Anglas, François Antoine de, 233.
Bolton, Lord. See Orde, Thomas.
Bonaparte, Joseph, 506, 526.
Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon.
Bond, 530.
Page 623
Bone, John, 318.
Bonham, arrested, 350.
Bonney, arrested, 190;
discharged, 193.
Booth, his evidence against Thomas Walker, 185.
Boyd, Sir R., 158.
Boyd, Walter, 325, 326.
Brabant. See Belgic Provinces.
Breda, captured by Dumouriez, 126.
Brest, naval preparations at, 349, 418, 420, 421;
proposed attack on, 383, 386.
Bridport, Lord (Alexander Hood), 261;
and the mutiny at the Nore, 311–313;
blockades Brest, 420, 421.
Brissot, Jacques Pierre, 107, 223 n., 248.
British Columbia, 565.
British Convention, meets at Edinburgh, 181, 182, 184.
Brook, John, attorney and Mayor of Birmingham, 18, 186.
Brooks's Club, 20.
Brown, Matthew C., of Sheffield, 181, 182.
Brown, Colonel, 512.
Bruix, Admiral, 381 n., 420, 430.
Brunswick, Charles, Duke of, 46;
his manifesto, 52, 57;
his retreat through the Argonne, 62;
campaign on the Rhine, 142, 200, 201;
superseded, 201;
opposed to continuation of the war, 207;
refuses to take command in Holland, 214–216, 274.
Brunswick, Duchess of, 214, 215, 216.
Brunswick-Oels, Frederick, Duke of, 121.
Brussels, evacuated by the Austrians, 74.
Buccleugh, Duke of, 476.
Buckingham, Marquis of (George Grenville, Earl Temple), 19, 62, 158, 240, 336;
on the state of Ireland, 395, 396, 412;
on Lord Loughborough, 432.
Buckinghamshire, Earl of (Lord Hobart), 462, 487, 494, 495;
Chancellor of the Duchy, 517, 521;
resigns, 530.
Buckner, Vice-Admiral, 314.
Burdett, Sir Francis, 332.
Burges, Bland, 51, 64, 86, 259.
Burgh, Dr., 472.
Burgoing, special envoy to Madrid, 233, 235.
Burgoyne, General, 30.
Burke, Edmund, interview with Pitt and Grenville, 7, 8;
fears the spread of French principles, 9, 10, 61;
on Reform, 12, 24;
Bonham, arrested, 350.
Bonney, arrested, 190;
discharged, 193.
Booth, his evidence against Thomas Walker, 185.
Boyd, Sir R., 158.
Boyd, Walter, 325, 326.
Brabant. See Belgic Provinces.
Breda, captured by Dumouriez, 126.
Brest, naval preparations at, 349, 418, 420, 421;
proposed attack on, 383, 386.
Bridport, Lord (Alexander Hood), 261;
and the mutiny at the Nore, 311–313;
blockades Brest, 420, 421.
Brissot, Jacques Pierre, 107, 223 n., 248.
British Columbia, 565.
British Convention, meets at Edinburgh, 181, 182, 184.
Brook, John, attorney and Mayor of Birmingham, 18, 186.
Brooks's Club, 20.
Brown, Matthew C., of Sheffield, 181, 182.
Brown, Colonel, 512.
Bruix, Admiral, 381 n., 420, 430.
Brunswick, Charles, Duke of, 46;
his manifesto, 52, 57;
his retreat through the Argonne, 62;
campaign on the Rhine, 142, 200, 201;
superseded, 201;
opposed to continuation of the war, 207;
refuses to take command in Holland, 214–216, 274.
Brunswick, Duchess of, 214, 215, 216.
Brunswick-Oels, Frederick, Duke of, 121.
Brussels, evacuated by the Austrians, 74.
Buccleugh, Duke of, 476.
Buckingham, Marquis of (George Grenville, Earl Temple), 19, 62, 158, 240, 336;
on the state of Ireland, 395, 396, 412;
on Lord Loughborough, 432.
Buckinghamshire, Earl of (Lord Hobart), 462, 487, 494, 495;
Chancellor of the Duchy, 517, 521;
resigns, 530.
Buckner, Vice-Admiral, 314.
Burdett, Sir Francis, 332.
Burges, Bland, 51, 64, 86, 259.
Burgh, Dr., 472.
Burgoing, special envoy to Madrid, 233, 235.
Burgoyne, General, 30.
Burke, Edmund, interview with Pitt and Grenville, 7, 8;
fears the spread of French principles, 9, 10, 61;
on Reform, 12, 24;
Page 624
Paine's reply to his "Reflections," 15, 16;
other replies, 16;
his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," 16;
his "Reflections," 19, 20, 70 n.;
letter to Grenville after the September massacres, 60, 61;
on the Treasury Bench, 89;
declares the death of Louis inevitable, 91, 92;
his speech on the Aliens Bill, 64, 94;
his view of the war, 119, 120, 136, 137, 259, 275, 321;
on the Traitorous Correspondence Bill, 164;
proposes Coalition Ministry (1794), 191;
his Economy Bill, 467;
as an orator, compared with Pitt, 567;
his death, 326.
Burke, Richard, at Coblentz, 7.
Burney, Fanny, 64.
Burton Pynsent, expenses of, 476.
Butler, Simon, 180, 181.
Bute, Earl of, sent to Madrid, 233, 235–237, 242–244.
Buzot, F. L. Nicolas, 62.
Cadusey, de, 220.
Calder, Admiral, 532, 536.
Caldiero, battle of, 321.
Calonne, Charles Alexandre de, his mission to England, 3, 5.
Calvi, capture of, 256.
Camage, W., of Sheffield, arrested, 186, 191.
Cambacérès, J. J. Régis de, 233.
Camden, Charles Pratt, 1st Earl, 33, 44.
Camden, John Jeffreys Pratt, 2nd Earl (afterwards Marquis), Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 342–
348, 352–364, 391, 392, 393, 395, 402, 406, 409, 422;
his friendship with Pitt, 475, 476, 481, 491;
Secretary at War, etc., 501, 507, 514;
President of the Council, 530, 557.
Camelford, Lord (Thomas Pitt), 37;
on Pitt's duel with Tierney, 336.
Campbell, Thomas, at the trial of Gerrald, 183.
Camperdown, battle of, 328, 347.
Campo Formio, Treaty of, 327, 328, 365.
Canada, Upper, establishment of Government of, 31.
Canning, George, 39;
his interview with Pitt, 40, 41;
the "Anti-Jacobin," 327, 336, 337, 464;
on conditions of peace with France, 383, 384;
resigns the Under-Secretaryship, 376, 421;
strongly supports the Union, 421, 422;
on Catholic Emancipation, 442;
resigns office (1801), 451, 465;
other replies, 16;
his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," 16;
his "Reflections," 19, 20, 70 n.;
letter to Grenville after the September massacres, 60, 61;
on the Treasury Bench, 89;
declares the death of Louis inevitable, 91, 92;
his speech on the Aliens Bill, 64, 94;
his view of the war, 119, 120, 136, 137, 259, 275, 321;
on the Traitorous Correspondence Bill, 164;
proposes Coalition Ministry (1794), 191;
his Economy Bill, 467;
as an orator, compared with Pitt, 567;
his death, 326.
Burke, Richard, at Coblentz, 7.
Burney, Fanny, 64.
Burton Pynsent, expenses of, 476.
Butler, Simon, 180, 181.
Bute, Earl of, sent to Madrid, 233, 235–237, 242–244.
Buzot, F. L. Nicolas, 62.
Cadusey, de, 220.
Calder, Admiral, 532, 536.
Caldiero, battle of, 321.
Calonne, Charles Alexandre de, his mission to England, 3, 5.
Calvi, capture of, 256.
Camage, W., of Sheffield, arrested, 186, 191.
Cambacérès, J. J. Régis de, 233.
Camden, Charles Pratt, 1st Earl, 33, 44.
Camden, John Jeffreys Pratt, 2nd Earl (afterwards Marquis), Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 342–
348, 352–364, 391, 392, 393, 395, 402, 406, 409, 422;
his friendship with Pitt, 475, 476, 481, 491;
Secretary at War, etc., 501, 507, 514;
President of the Council, 530, 557.
Camelford, Lord (Thomas Pitt), 37;
on Pitt's duel with Tierney, 336.
Campbell, Thomas, at the trial of Gerrald, 183.
Camperdown, battle of, 328, 347.
Campo Formio, Treaty of, 327, 328, 365.
Canada, Upper, establishment of Government of, 31.
Canning, George, 39;
his interview with Pitt, 40, 41;
the "Anti-Jacobin," 327, 336, 337, 464;
on conditions of peace with France, 383, 384;
resigns the Under-Secretaryship, 376, 421;
strongly supports the Union, 421, 422;
on Catholic Emancipation, 442;
resigns office (1801), 451, 465;
Page 625
on Pitt's generosity, 457;
his relations with Pitt, 459, 464–466, 567;
his marriage, 464;
opposed to peace (1801), 469, 470;
on Pitt's position, 471;
his poems, 474, 518;
urges Pitt to action, 481, 482;
Treasurer of the Navy, 501;
falls out with Hawkesbury, 518;
defends Melville, 520;
his sympathy with Spanish patriots, 524;
disapproves of the expedition to Hanover, 542, 547;
anxious for Pitt's health, 547;
with Pitt at Bath, 549, 550, 553;
mentioned, 286, 325, 375, 390, 450, 488.
Canterbury, Archbishop of. See Moore, John, and Sutton, Charles Manners.
Cape of Good Hope, the, 216, 250;
British conquest of, 251–255, 274, 276, 323, 325, 371, 469, 470, 478, 480, 565;
Baird's expedition to, 532, 539.
Cape Town, capture of, 252–254;
population of, 253.
Carew, 294.
Carles, John, of Birmingham, 18, 186.
Carlisle, Earl of, 322, 350;
on Irish affairs, 391, 392, 394.
Carlyle, Thomas, on the September massacres, 61.
Carmarthen, Marquis of. See Leeds, Duke of.
Carnot, L. N. M., French general and Minister of War, 125, 135, 138, 141, 208, 212, 217, 266,
272, 279, 280.
Caroline, Princess, of Brunswick, 214, 216;
as Princess of Wales, 508.
Carrington, Lord, 330, 476, 489, 557.
Carteaux, Jean François, 145.
Cartwright, Major John, 23;
his "Commonwealth in Danger," 280.
Carver, Edward, of Birmingham, 189.
Carysfort, Lord, 412, 495.
Castiglione, battle of, 243.
"Castlebar Races," the, 362.
Castlereagh, Viscount, 370, 569;
account of, 398, 399;
Irish Chief Secretary, 399, 402, 408, 410–412, 416, 423–425, 435–437, 441, 446, 449,
486;
resigns, 440;
President of the India Board, 501;
defends Melville, 520;
Minister at War, 530;
letters to Pitt, 531, 532, 549–551;
his relations with Pitt, 459, 464–466, 567;
his marriage, 464;
opposed to peace (1801), 469, 470;
on Pitt's position, 471;
his poems, 474, 518;
urges Pitt to action, 481, 482;
Treasurer of the Navy, 501;
falls out with Hawkesbury, 518;
defends Melville, 520;
his sympathy with Spanish patriots, 524;
disapproves of the expedition to Hanover, 542, 547;
anxious for Pitt's health, 547;
with Pitt at Bath, 549, 550, 553;
mentioned, 286, 325, 375, 390, 450, 488.
Canterbury, Archbishop of. See Moore, John, and Sutton, Charles Manners.
Cape of Good Hope, the, 216, 250;
British conquest of, 251–255, 274, 276, 323, 325, 371, 469, 470, 478, 480, 565;
Baird's expedition to, 532, 539.
Cape Town, capture of, 252–254;
population of, 253.
Carew, 294.
Carles, John, of Birmingham, 18, 186.
Carlisle, Earl of, 322, 350;
on Irish affairs, 391, 392, 394.
Carlyle, Thomas, on the September massacres, 61.
Carmarthen, Marquis of. See Leeds, Duke of.
Carnot, L. N. M., French general and Minister of War, 125, 135, 138, 141, 208, 212, 217, 266,
272, 279, 280.
Caroline, Princess, of Brunswick, 214, 216;
as Princess of Wales, 508.
Carrington, Lord, 330, 476, 489, 557.
Carteaux, Jean François, 145.
Cartwright, Major John, 23;
his "Commonwealth in Danger," 280.
Carver, Edward, of Birmingham, 189.
Carysfort, Lord, 412, 495.
Castiglione, battle of, 243.
"Castlebar Races," the, 362.
Castlereagh, Viscount, 370, 569;
account of, 398, 399;
Irish Chief Secretary, 399, 402, 408, 410–412, 416, 423–425, 435–437, 441, 446, 449,
486;
resigns, 440;
President of the India Board, 501;
defends Melville, 520;
Minister at War, 530;
letters to Pitt, 531, 532, 549–551;
Page 626
interview with Pitt at Bath, 551, 552;
at Putney, 555.
Catalonia, French invasion of, 197;
Republican rising in, 231, 233, 234.
Catharine II, Czarina, 4, 6, 7, 231;
her designs on Poland, 9, 46, 122;
encourages Polish malcontents, 52;
invades Poland, 53, 54;
her success, 55;
offers alliance to England, 99;
treaty with England and Austria (1795), 235;
her death, 258, 321.
Cathelineau, Jacques, 136.
Catholic Emancipation, question of, 396–401, 414, 418, 426, 428, 431, 433, 452, 486, 487;
opposed by the King, 433–439, 564;
division in the Cabinet on, 443–445;
motion for, rejected, 518, 519.
Catholics, the, in Ireland, 390, 395–401;
in favour of the Union, 412, 417–419;
courted by Cornwallis, 422, 423;
question of promises made to them, 441–446.
Cazalès, Jacques Antoine Marie de, 43.
Ceylon, 323, 325, 371, 468–470, 565.
Chalk Farm, mass meeting at, 188, 193.
Chandermagore, 198.
Charette, François, 261–263.
Charlemont, Lord, 408.
Charleroi, surrender of, 209, 210.
Charles, Archduke of Austria, 126, 205, 206, 377, 378.
Charles IV, of Spain, appeals to France on behalf of Louis, 93;
his weakness and extravagance, 197, 230, 231, 513, 560;
his policy, 231, 233.
Charles X, 2.
Charles Emmanuel IV, King of Sardinia (1796–8), his abdication, 373, 378.
Charles Theodore, Elector of Bavaria, 122, 123.
Charlotte, Queen, her relations with the King, 506, 507.
Charmilly, de, delegate from Hayti, 220, 227, 229, 239.
Chatham, John Pitt, Earl of, First Lord of the Admiralty, 68, 125, 145, 268;
his incompetence, 137, 140, 215;
made Lord Privy Seal, 216, 273, 299;
borrows money of Pitt, 302, 303, 476;
engaged in Holland, 382;
Lord President, 440, 446;
letter to Pitt on his resignation, 440;
Master of the Ordnance, 501, 557.
Chatham, William Pitt, 1st Lord, and Pitt compared, 320, 474, 490, 562, 565.
Chatham, Lady, 68.
Chatham, Dowager Lady, Pitt's mother, 299, 302, 476;
at Putney, 555.
Catalonia, French invasion of, 197;
Republican rising in, 231, 233, 234.
Catharine II, Czarina, 4, 6, 7, 231;
her designs on Poland, 9, 46, 122;
encourages Polish malcontents, 52;
invades Poland, 53, 54;
her success, 55;
offers alliance to England, 99;
treaty with England and Austria (1795), 235;
her death, 258, 321.
Cathelineau, Jacques, 136.
Catholic Emancipation, question of, 396–401, 414, 418, 426, 428, 431, 433, 452, 486, 487;
opposed by the King, 433–439, 564;
division in the Cabinet on, 443–445;
motion for, rejected, 518, 519.
Catholics, the, in Ireland, 390, 395–401;
in favour of the Union, 412, 417–419;
courted by Cornwallis, 422, 423;
question of promises made to them, 441–446.
Cazalès, Jacques Antoine Marie de, 43.
Ceylon, 323, 325, 371, 468–470, 565.
Chalk Farm, mass meeting at, 188, 193.
Chandermagore, 198.
Charette, François, 261–263.
Charlemont, Lord, 408.
Charleroi, surrender of, 209, 210.
Charles, Archduke of Austria, 126, 205, 206, 377, 378.
Charles IV, of Spain, appeals to France on behalf of Louis, 93;
his weakness and extravagance, 197, 230, 231, 513, 560;
his policy, 231, 233.
Charles X, 2.
Charles Emmanuel IV, King of Sardinia (1796–8), his abdication, 373, 378.
Charles Theodore, Elector of Bavaria, 122, 123.
Charlotte, Queen, her relations with the King, 506, 507.
Charmilly, de, delegate from Hayti, 220, 227, 229, 239.
Chatham, John Pitt, Earl of, First Lord of the Admiralty, 68, 125, 145, 268;
his incompetence, 137, 140, 215;
made Lord Privy Seal, 216, 273, 299;
borrows money of Pitt, 302, 303, 476;
engaged in Holland, 382;
Lord President, 440, 446;
letter to Pitt on his resignation, 440;
Master of the Ordnance, 501, 557.
Chatham, William Pitt, 1st Lord, and Pitt compared, 320, 474, 490, 562, 565.
Chatham, Lady, 68.
Chatham, Dowager Lady, Pitt's mother, 299, 302, 476;
Page 627
her death, 488, 490.
Chaumont, Treaty of (1814), 523.
Chauvelin, Marquis de, French Ambassador in London, 48, 84;
his cold reception, 49, 50;
account of, 59, 60;
tries to stir up discontent, 69;
interview with Grenville, 78, 79;
piqued at Pitt's interview with Maret, 80, 82, 116, 117;
refused official recognition, 84, 98, 101, 115;
conversation with Sheridan, 87;
Lebrun's instructions to, 96;
note to Grenville, 97, 98;
protests against the Aliens Bill, 101, 103;
interview with Grenville, 104, 105;
ordered to leave England, 108–111, 117;
his responsibility for the war, 115–117.
China, British embassy to, 32.
Chouans, the, 260–264, 284, 326.
Christie, William, his "Catechism of the French Constitution," 22;
175.
"Church and King Club," 13, 185.
Churchill, Charles, on Lord Loughborough, 432.
Cinque Ports Volunteers, Pitt and the, 474, 477, 488–490.
Cisalpine Republic, the, 470.
Clare, Earl of (Baron Fitzgibbon), Lord Chancellor of Ireland, 340, 342, 393, 406, 410;
interviews with Pitt, 397–400;
opposes Catholic Emancipation, 437.
Clarence, Duke of, 31.
Clarke, Major-General Alured, his expedition to the Cape, 251, 253.
Clarke, General, agrees to send a French expedition to Ireland, 345, 346.
Clarkson, Thomas, 502.
Clavière, Etienne, French Minister of Finance, 45, 58.
Clerfait, Field Marshal, 209, 213–215.
Clifden, Lord, 346, 402.
Clubs, political, growth of, 12, 13, 16, 21–23;
their aims, 25, 26;
accused of foreign connections, 51;
their rejoicings at the Revolution, 61;
addresses to French National Convention, 65–67, 70, 71, 73, 76, 77, 86, 114, 115, 164,
172;
growth of, in 1793, 167;
their organization, 168, 169.
See Chap. VII.
Coalition, the First, 123, 125, 132;
weakness of, 195, 196, 278;
the Second, see Chap. XVII;
the Third, 529, 534 et seq.
Cobenzl, Count Ludwig, 373, 375.
Chaumont, Treaty of (1814), 523.
Chauvelin, Marquis de, French Ambassador in London, 48, 84;
his cold reception, 49, 50;
account of, 59, 60;
tries to stir up discontent, 69;
interview with Grenville, 78, 79;
piqued at Pitt's interview with Maret, 80, 82, 116, 117;
refused official recognition, 84, 98, 101, 115;
conversation with Sheridan, 87;
Lebrun's instructions to, 96;
note to Grenville, 97, 98;
protests against the Aliens Bill, 101, 103;
interview with Grenville, 104, 105;
ordered to leave England, 108–111, 117;
his responsibility for the war, 115–117.
China, British embassy to, 32.
Chouans, the, 260–264, 284, 326.
Christie, William, his "Catechism of the French Constitution," 22;
175.
"Church and King Club," 13, 185.
Churchill, Charles, on Lord Loughborough, 432.
Cinque Ports Volunteers, Pitt and the, 474, 477, 488–490.
Cisalpine Republic, the, 470.
Clare, Earl of (Baron Fitzgibbon), Lord Chancellor of Ireland, 340, 342, 393, 406, 410;
interviews with Pitt, 397–400;
opposes Catholic Emancipation, 437.
Clarence, Duke of, 31.
Clarke, Major-General Alured, his expedition to the Cape, 251, 253.
Clarke, General, agrees to send a French expedition to Ireland, 345, 346.
Clarkson, Thomas, 502.
Clavière, Etienne, French Minister of Finance, 45, 58.
Clerfait, Field Marshal, 209, 213–215.
Clifden, Lord, 346, 402.
Clubs, political, growth of, 12, 13, 16, 21–23;
their aims, 25, 26;
accused of foreign connections, 51;
their rejoicings at the Revolution, 61;
addresses to French National Convention, 65–67, 70, 71, 73, 76, 77, 86, 114, 115, 164,
172;
growth of, in 1793, 167;
their organization, 168, 169.
See Chap. VII.
Coalition, the First, 123, 125, 132;
weakness of, 195, 196, 278;
the Second, see Chap. XVII;
the Third, 529, 534 et seq.
Cobenzl, Count Ludwig, 373, 375.
Page 628
Cobenzl, Count Philip, Austrian Chancellor, 75, 120 n., 560;
his fall, 129.
Coblentz, Royalist leaders at, 2, 3, 20.
Coburg, Duke of, his campaign in Flanders, 121, 126, 127, 130–133, 138–141, 205, 206, 209,
210, 267.
Cochrane, Admiral, 514.
Cockburn, Lord, on the Scots, 173.
Coke of Norfolk, 188, 294.
Colchester, Lord. See Abbot, Charles.
Colpoys, Vice-Admiral, 311, 312.
Condé, captured by the Allies, 134, 136;
surrendered, 210.
Conolly, Captain, 159.
Conscription, in France, 266.
Consols, great rise in (1783–1792), 31;
rise in (1796), 305;
fall after the Nore mutiny, 315.
Constitutional Information, London Society for, 12 n., 21, 22, 65, 66, 70, 167, 181, 184, 190.
Cooke, Edward, his letters to Auckland and Castlereagh on the Irish question, 355, 356,
362 n., 395, 396, 404, 405, 418–420, 422, 424, 425, 435–437;
his pamphlet on the Union, 405, 408;
his conduct during the debate on the Union, 412.
Coote, General, 379.
Copenhagen, battle of, 388, 450.
Cork, despatch of troops from, 146, 152 n., 153;
sentiments of the Grand Jury on the Union, 416, 417.
Corn Laws, 288, 289.
Cornwall, representation of, 173.
Cornwallis, Admiral, 514, 532.
Cornwallis, Marquis, suggested as Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, 205, 214, 272;
Master-General of the Ordnance, 273;
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 359, 362, 363, 389, 391–412, 417, 418, 421–426, 435, 436,
441, 443, 449;
resigns, 440;
Viceroy of India, 463;
negotiates the Treaty of Amiens, 470, 477.
Corporation Act, the, efforts to repeal, 10, 11.
Corresponding Society for Reform of Parliamentary Representation, 21, 26, 65, 66, 167, 168,
184, 186–190, 193;
monster meeting at Islington, 283, 286;
supposed connection with the mutiny at the Nore, 316–318;
becomes a revolutionary body, 349, 350;
its papers seized, 351.
Corsica, 143, 144, 150 n., 155, 156, 158, 210, 228, 232, 233, 235, 244, 267;
British occupation of, 255–257, 269;
evacuated, 258, 275.
County Reform Associations, the, 23.
"Courier," the, 67.
his fall, 129.
Coblentz, Royalist leaders at, 2, 3, 20.
Coburg, Duke of, his campaign in Flanders, 121, 126, 127, 130–133, 138–141, 205, 206, 209,
210, 267.
Cochrane, Admiral, 514.
Cockburn, Lord, on the Scots, 173.
Coke of Norfolk, 188, 294.
Colchester, Lord. See Abbot, Charles.
Colpoys, Vice-Admiral, 311, 312.
Condé, captured by the Allies, 134, 136;
surrendered, 210.
Conolly, Captain, 159.
Conscription, in France, 266.
Consols, great rise in (1783–1792), 31;
rise in (1796), 305;
fall after the Nore mutiny, 315.
Constitutional Information, London Society for, 12 n., 21, 22, 65, 66, 70, 167, 181, 184, 190.
Cooke, Edward, his letters to Auckland and Castlereagh on the Irish question, 355, 356,
362 n., 395, 396, 404, 405, 418–420, 422, 424, 425, 435–437;
his pamphlet on the Union, 405, 408;
his conduct during the debate on the Union, 412.
Coote, General, 379.
Copenhagen, battle of, 388, 450.
Cork, despatch of troops from, 146, 152 n., 153;
sentiments of the Grand Jury on the Union, 416, 417.
Corn Laws, 288, 289.
Cornwall, representation of, 173.
Cornwallis, Admiral, 514, 532.
Cornwallis, Marquis, suggested as Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, 205, 214, 272;
Master-General of the Ordnance, 273;
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 359, 362, 363, 389, 391–412, 417, 418, 421–426, 435, 436,
441, 443, 449;
resigns, 440;
Viceroy of India, 463;
negotiates the Treaty of Amiens, 470, 477.
Corporation Act, the, efforts to repeal, 10, 11.
Corresponding Society for Reform of Parliamentary Representation, 21, 26, 65, 66, 167, 168,
184, 186–190, 193;
monster meeting at Islington, 283, 286;
supposed connection with the mutiny at the Nore, 316–318;
becomes a revolutionary body, 349, 350;
its papers seized, 351.
Corsica, 143, 144, 150 n., 155, 156, 158, 210, 228, 232, 233, 235, 244, 267;
British occupation of, 255–257, 269;
evacuated, 258, 275.
County Reform Associations, the, 23.
"Courier," the, 67.
Page 629
Courtenay, John, M.P., 238.
Couthon, Georges, 134, 135.
Coutts, Thomas, 306 n., 308 n., 475–477.
Cowper, W., his pension, 455 n., 456.
Craig, Major-General Sir James, in command at the Cape, 251–254;
his expedition to Malta, 368, 524, 525;
Mornington's opinion of, 461.
Crancé, Dubois, 266.
Craufurd, Major-General Robert, 510.
Creevey, Thomas, 497, 521.
Crossfield, Secretary of the London Corresponding Society, 349.
Cumberland, Duke of, 448.
Curragh, affair on the, 357, 358.
Curt, delegate from Guadeloupe, 221.
Custine, General, Comte de, 73, 85, 121, 133.
Czartoryski, Prince, 522, 526.
Daer, Lord, 174.
Dalrymple, Colonel William, 173, 174.
Daly, Denis, 341.
Danton, George Jacques, Minister of Justice, 58;
his alleged offer to save Louis, 94 n.;
his decree annexing Belgium, 111, 112, 116, 121.
D'Arçon, 135.
Davison, Richard, of Sheffield, 189, 191, 193.
De Clifford, Lord, 420, 422.
Delacroix, Jacques Vincent, French Foreign Minister, 322.
Del Campo, Marquis, 233.
Delessart, A. de Valdec, French Foreign Minister, 43, 44;
arrested, 45.
Demerara, Dutch, 241.
Democracy, new birth of, 23;
progress of, 62–68;
opposition to, 68.
Derby, Society for Constitutional Information at, 70.
Despard, Colonel, arrested, 350.
"Devil's Own," the, 489.
Devonshire, Duke of, 402, 497.
Devonshire, Duchess of, 497.
Dibdin, Charles, 337.
Dillon, General Theobald, murdered by his troops, 49.
Dissenters. See Nonconformists.
Dominica, revolt in, 239.
Don, General, 542, 545.
Donegal, Lord, 420, 422.
Dover Loyal Association, address to Pitt, 86.
Downes, Sir William, 395.
Downshire, Lord, 398;
Couthon, Georges, 134, 135.
Coutts, Thomas, 306 n., 308 n., 475–477.
Cowper, W., his pension, 455 n., 456.
Craig, Major-General Sir James, in command at the Cape, 251–254;
his expedition to Malta, 368, 524, 525;
Mornington's opinion of, 461.
Crancé, Dubois, 266.
Craufurd, Major-General Robert, 510.
Creevey, Thomas, 497, 521.
Crossfield, Secretary of the London Corresponding Society, 349.
Cumberland, Duke of, 448.
Curragh, affair on the, 357, 358.
Curt, delegate from Guadeloupe, 221.
Custine, General, Comte de, 73, 85, 121, 133.
Czartoryski, Prince, 522, 526.
Daer, Lord, 174.
Dalrymple, Colonel William, 173, 174.
Daly, Denis, 341.
Danton, George Jacques, Minister of Justice, 58;
his alleged offer to save Louis, 94 n.;
his decree annexing Belgium, 111, 112, 116, 121.
D'Arçon, 135.
Davison, Richard, of Sheffield, 189, 191, 193.
De Clifford, Lord, 420, 422.
Delacroix, Jacques Vincent, French Foreign Minister, 322.
Del Campo, Marquis, 233.
Delessart, A. de Valdec, French Foreign Minister, 43, 44;
arrested, 45.
Demerara, Dutch, 241.
Democracy, new birth of, 23;
progress of, 62–68;
opposition to, 68.
Derby, Society for Constitutional Information at, 70.
Despard, Colonel, arrested, 350.
"Devil's Own," the, 489.
Devonshire, Duke of, 402, 497.
Devonshire, Duchess of, 497.
Dibdin, Charles, 337.
Dillon, General Theobald, murdered by his troops, 49.
Dissenters. See Nonconformists.
Dominica, revolt in, 239.
Don, General, 542, 545.
Donegal, Lord, 420, 422.
Dover Loyal Association, address to Pitt, 86.
Downes, Sir William, 395.
Downshire, Lord, 398;
Page 630
his opposition to the Union, 402, 418, 420, 422–424.
Doyle, General, expedition to la Vendée, 237, 262, 263.
Drake, Francis, British agent at Genoa, 155.
Drane, Mr., Mayor of Reading, 180.
Duckworth, Sir James, 532 n.
Duff, General, 357, 358.
Dumouriez, General, French Foreign Minister, 45, 46, 72;
his "Reflections on Negotiations with England," 47, 48;
appeals to England to prevent war with Prussia, 51;
his resignation, 59;
Campaign in the Low Countries, 69, 73, 74, 76, 80, 82, 83, 85, 106, 107, 267;
his proposed mission to London, 109–111, 118;
his self-confidence, 117;
correspondence with Pache, 121;
failure of his campaign in Belgium, 121, 126;
his treason, 126, 131–132;
Memoir on the defence of England, 509.
Duncan, Admiral Lord, 315, 328, 336, 347.
Duncombe, C. S., M.P., 12.
Dundas, Major-General Sir David, at Toulon, 157, 159, 160;
in Corsica, 256, 257;
his scheme of coast defence, 277, 287;
and the Volunteers, 491, 492, 512.
Dundas, Henry (afterwards Lord Melville), Home Secretary, 34, 35, 63, 64, 89, 186, 190;
opposes repeal of the Test Act in Scotland, 14;
puts down the Birmingham riots, 18, 79;
on the proclamation against seditious writings, 25;
anxious for union with the Old Whigs, 36, 38;
friendly to France, 44;
on sedition in Scotland, 77;
his scheme for rearranging the Cabinet, 124, 125;
his many offices, 124, 125, 270, 271;
his conduct of the war, 125, 137, 140, 147, 157, 158;
ignorant of military affairs, 128;
his influence in Scotland, 173, 409;
and the Scottish prosecutions, 176, 178–180, 182, 184;
burnt in effigy at Dundee, 177;
Secretary of State for War, 191, 205, 210, 213, 216, 221, 224, 225, 238–240, 241, 243,
245–248, 257, 260, 267, 268, 325, 326, 331, 362, 363, 381, 384, 386;
President of the India Board, 251, 254;
letter to Pitt on the idea of a War Minister, 271, 272;
his friendship with Pitt, 299, 454, 476;
urges the Egyptian expedition, 387, 388;
his conversations with the King on Catholic Emancipation, 433, 436, 444, 449;
resigns, 440;
on Pitt's resignation, 440, 441, 450;
created Lord Melville, 483;
his mission to Pitt at Walmer, 483, 484;
Doyle, General, expedition to la Vendée, 237, 262, 263.
Drake, Francis, British agent at Genoa, 155.
Drane, Mr., Mayor of Reading, 180.
Duckworth, Sir James, 532 n.
Duff, General, 357, 358.
Dumouriez, General, French Foreign Minister, 45, 46, 72;
his "Reflections on Negotiations with England," 47, 48;
appeals to England to prevent war with Prussia, 51;
his resignation, 59;
Campaign in the Low Countries, 69, 73, 74, 76, 80, 82, 83, 85, 106, 107, 267;
his proposed mission to London, 109–111, 118;
his self-confidence, 117;
correspondence with Pache, 121;
failure of his campaign in Belgium, 121, 126;
his treason, 126, 131–132;
Memoir on the defence of England, 509.
Duncan, Admiral Lord, 315, 328, 336, 347.
Duncombe, C. S., M.P., 12.
Dundas, Major-General Sir David, at Toulon, 157, 159, 160;
in Corsica, 256, 257;
his scheme of coast defence, 277, 287;
and the Volunteers, 491, 492, 512.
Dundas, Henry (afterwards Lord Melville), Home Secretary, 34, 35, 63, 64, 89, 186, 190;
opposes repeal of the Test Act in Scotland, 14;
puts down the Birmingham riots, 18, 79;
on the proclamation against seditious writings, 25;
anxious for union with the Old Whigs, 36, 38;
friendly to France, 44;
on sedition in Scotland, 77;
his scheme for rearranging the Cabinet, 124, 125;
his many offices, 124, 125, 270, 271;
his conduct of the war, 125, 137, 140, 147, 157, 158;
ignorant of military affairs, 128;
his influence in Scotland, 173, 409;
and the Scottish prosecutions, 176, 178–180, 182, 184;
burnt in effigy at Dundee, 177;
Secretary of State for War, 191, 205, 210, 213, 216, 221, 224, 225, 238–240, 241, 243,
245–248, 257, 260, 267, 268, 325, 326, 331, 362, 363, 381, 384, 386;
President of the India Board, 251, 254;
letter to Pitt on the idea of a War Minister, 271, 272;
his friendship with Pitt, 299, 454, 476;
urges the Egyptian expedition, 387, 388;
his conversations with the King on Catholic Emancipation, 433, 436, 444, 449;
resigns, 440;
on Pitt's resignation, 440, 441, 450;
created Lord Melville, 483;
his mission to Pitt at Walmer, 483, 484;
Page 631
on the Volunteers, 494;
on the King's illness, 497;
First Lord of the Admiralty, 501, 511, 514;
his impeachment, 519–521;
acquitted, 521;
on India, 565.
Dundas, General Ralph, 357, 358, 361.
Dundas, Robert, Lord Advocate for Scotland, 14, 174, 176, 178, 179, 182–184.
Dundas, William, Secretary at War, 501.
Dundee, political agitation in, 77, 173, 174, 177, 178.
Dungannon, Ulster Volunteers in, 78.
Dunkirk, siege of, 127, 130, 131, 138–141, 147, 267;
Napoleon at, 349.
Dunlop, John, Lord Provost of Glasgow, 175 n., 178.
Duroc, General, Duc de Frioul, his mission to Berlin, 535, 537.
Dutch, the, their rights over the Scheldt, 71, 72;
their apathy, 213, 216, 274;
at the Cape, 250–255;
defeated at battle of Camperdown, 328, 347.
Dutch East India Company, 250, 252.
Dutch Republic, the, 47;
treaty with England (1788), 72;
threatened by France, 73–76, 80, 82, 84, 107;
English assurances to, 74, 114;
plots of the "Patriots," 74, 75;
appeals to England for help, 77;
unprepared for war, 98, 107;
France declares war on, 112;
French conquest of, 213–216, 250;
peace with Spain, 236;
alliance with France (1795), 251, 261, 274;
Anglo-Russian expedition to, 379–383;
remodelled by Bonaparte, 470;
proposal to offer it to Prussia, 552.
East India Company, renewal of Charter, 165.
Eaton, Daniel Isaac, prosecution of, 184.
Eden, Eleanor, Pitt's relations with, 300–303, 465, 491;
her marriage, 462 n.
Eden, Morton, Ambassador at Vienna, 129, 161, 199, 200, 202–204, 235, 331, 380.
Edge, Captain, 160.
Edinburgh, Conventions of Friends of the People at, 174, 179, 180;
Radical club at, 178;
British Convention at, 181, 182.
Egypt, Napoleon's expedition to, 255, 277 n., 278, 327, 328, 368, 377;
English expedition to, 387, 388;
surrender of French garrisons in, 468;
to be restored to the Sultan, 468.
on the King's illness, 497;
First Lord of the Admiralty, 501, 511, 514;
his impeachment, 519–521;
acquitted, 521;
on India, 565.
Dundas, General Ralph, 357, 358, 361.
Dundas, Robert, Lord Advocate for Scotland, 14, 174, 176, 178, 179, 182–184.
Dundas, William, Secretary at War, 501.
Dundee, political agitation in, 77, 173, 174, 177, 178.
Dungannon, Ulster Volunteers in, 78.
Dunkirk, siege of, 127, 130, 131, 138–141, 147, 267;
Napoleon at, 349.
Dunlop, John, Lord Provost of Glasgow, 175 n., 178.
Duroc, General, Duc de Frioul, his mission to Berlin, 535, 537.
Dutch, the, their rights over the Scheldt, 71, 72;
their apathy, 213, 216, 274;
at the Cape, 250–255;
defeated at battle of Camperdown, 328, 347.
Dutch East India Company, 250, 252.
Dutch Republic, the, 47;
treaty with England (1788), 72;
threatened by France, 73–76, 80, 82, 84, 107;
English assurances to, 74, 114;
plots of the "Patriots," 74, 75;
appeals to England for help, 77;
unprepared for war, 98, 107;
France declares war on, 112;
French conquest of, 213–216, 250;
peace with Spain, 236;
alliance with France (1795), 251, 261, 274;
Anglo-Russian expedition to, 379–383;
remodelled by Bonaparte, 470;
proposal to offer it to Prussia, 552.
East India Company, renewal of Charter, 165.
Eaton, Daniel Isaac, prosecution of, 184.
Eden, Eleanor, Pitt's relations with, 300–303, 465, 491;
her marriage, 462 n.
Eden, Morton, Ambassador at Vienna, 129, 161, 199, 200, 202–204, 235, 331, 380.
Edge, Captain, 160.
Edinburgh, Conventions of Friends of the People at, 174, 179, 180;
Radical club at, 178;
British Convention at, 181, 182.
Egypt, Napoleon's expedition to, 255, 277 n., 278, 327, 328, 368, 377;
English expedition to, 387, 388;
surrender of French garrisons in, 468;
to be restored to the Sultan, 468.
Page 632
Ehrenthal, Swedish envoy at Madrid, 242.
El Arish, Convention of, 387.
Elba, evacuation of, 258, 275.
Eldon, Lord (Sir John Scott), 34, 35, 499, 501, 506, 514.
Eliot, Edward J., his death, 325.
Elliot, Sir Gilbert. See Minto, Earl of.
Elliot, William, Irish Under-Secretary at War, 400.
Elphinstone, Rear-Admiral Sir Keith, his expedition to the Cape, 251, 252, 254.
Ely, Lord, 393, 402.
Emmett, Addis, 394.
Enclosures, 166, 288, 291–298.
Enghien, Duc d', execution of, 516.
England, discontent in (1793), 165–167;
(1795), see Chap. XIII;
(1798), 333;
fears of invasion, 277;
national defence, 278–281;
shortage of corn, 288–291;
state of agriculture, 291;
policy of enclosures, 291–298;
financial crisis (1797), 304, 308, 309;
increasing prosperity, 330;
public opinion in (1798), 338.
"English Chronicle," the, 66, 67.
Enniskillen, Lord, 408.
Epsom, county meeting at, 188.
Erskine, Thomas, Baron, 23, 24, 89, 172, 176, 192, 488.
Euston, Lord, 412.
Evans, Thomas, Secretary of the London Corresponding Society, 349, 350;
arrested, 350.
Famars, evacuated by the French, 133, 134.
Farquhar, Sir Walter, 548, 553, 554, 557.
Federalism, advocated by Fox, 413.
Fellows, Henry, 318.
Ferdinand IV, King of Naples, 199, 231, 365, 366.
Ferrol, expedition to (1800), 386.
Fersen, Count, 4, 49.
Fingall, Lord, 393, 442, 449, 518, 519.
Finisterre, Cape, battle off, 532, 536.
Fitzgerald, Lord Edward, 23, 345, 346;
his capture and death, 354, 355.
Fitzgerald, Pamela, 79, 345.
Fitzgibbon, Baron. See Clare, Earl of.
Fitzharris, Lord, 520.
Fitzwilliam, Earl, Viceroy of Ireland, 213, 339–342, 392, 432, 433, 452, 500.
Fleurus, battle of, 209, 210, 267, 270.
Flood, Henry, M.P., his motion for Reform, 11, 12.
El Arish, Convention of, 387.
Elba, evacuation of, 258, 275.
Eldon, Lord (Sir John Scott), 34, 35, 499, 501, 506, 514.
Eliot, Edward J., his death, 325.
Elliot, Sir Gilbert. See Minto, Earl of.
Elliot, William, Irish Under-Secretary at War, 400.
Elphinstone, Rear-Admiral Sir Keith, his expedition to the Cape, 251, 252, 254.
Ely, Lord, 393, 402.
Emmett, Addis, 394.
Enclosures, 166, 288, 291–298.
Enghien, Duc d', execution of, 516.
England, discontent in (1793), 165–167;
(1795), see Chap. XIII;
(1798), 333;
fears of invasion, 277;
national defence, 278–281;
shortage of corn, 288–291;
state of agriculture, 291;
policy of enclosures, 291–298;
financial crisis (1797), 304, 308, 309;
increasing prosperity, 330;
public opinion in (1798), 338.
"English Chronicle," the, 66, 67.
Enniskillen, Lord, 408.
Epsom, county meeting at, 188.
Erskine, Thomas, Baron, 23, 24, 89, 172, 176, 192, 488.
Euston, Lord, 412.
Evans, Thomas, Secretary of the London Corresponding Society, 349, 350;
arrested, 350.
Famars, evacuated by the French, 133, 134.
Farquhar, Sir Walter, 548, 553, 554, 557.
Federalism, advocated by Fox, 413.
Fellows, Henry, 318.
Ferdinand IV, King of Naples, 199, 231, 365, 366.
Ferrol, expedition to (1800), 386.
Fersen, Count, 4, 49.
Fingall, Lord, 393, 442, 449, 518, 519.
Finisterre, Cape, battle off, 532, 536.
Fitzgerald, Lord Edward, 23, 345, 346;
his capture and death, 354, 355.
Fitzgerald, Pamela, 79, 345.
Fitzgibbon, Baron. See Clare, Earl of.
Fitzharris, Lord, 520.
Fitzwilliam, Earl, Viceroy of Ireland, 213, 339–342, 392, 432, 433, 452, 500.
Fleurus, battle of, 209, 210, 267, 270.
Flood, Henry, M.P., his motion for Reform, 11, 12.
Page 633
Floridablanca, Count, his fall, 46.
Forbes, Major-General, Commander-in-Chief in Hayti, 240, 245.
Ford, Captain, 513.
Fortiquerri, Marshal, 150 n.
Foster, John (afterwards Baron Oriel), Irish Speaker, 393, 398;
interview with Pitt, 400, 401;
his opposition to the Union, 414, 418–420.
Foster, son of the Speaker, 412.
Fouché, Joseph, Duke of Otranto, 528, 529.
Fox, Charles James, gains ground with Nonconformists, 11, 12;
on the Army Estimates (1792), 30;
his Libel Bill, 33;
opposes proclamations against seditious writings, 36;
suggested coalition with Pitt, 36, 37;
unpatriotic speeches, 87–89, 91, 278, 333;
intimate with the French embassy, 89;
opposes the Aliens Bill, 94;
disapproves of the Radical Clubs, 168;
opposes erection of barracks, 169;
on the Scottish prosecutions, 179;
in favour of peace, 198, 276, 277;
on slaves in Jamaica, 238;
on the massacre of royalists at Quiberon, 262;
on the Treasonable Practices Bill, 285, 286;
on the Bank crisis (1797), 308, 309;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 312, 313, 316;
his "secession," 316, 330;
on the Finance Bills of 1797–8, 330, 370;
his name removed from the Privy Council, 333;
and Arthur O'Connor, 350;
his views on the Union and Federalism, 413;
on Pitt's resignation, 445;
intrigues with the Prince of Wales, 449, 497;
on the peace proposals, 470;
on the war (1803), 488;
on the Volunteers, 494;
alliance with Grenville, 496;
attack on Addington, 499;
the King objects to his inclusion in Pitt's ministry, 499, 500;
supports abolition of the Slave Trade, 502;
his motion of Catholic Emancipation, 518, 519;
opposes Pitt's burial in the Abbey, 559;
as an orator, compared with Pitt, 567;
mentioned, 24, 156, 165, 188, 191, 283, 293, 506, 517, 518, 555, 557, 562, 563.
France, the flight to Varennes, 1, 2, 4, 40;
change of ministry, 45;
declares war against Austria, 23, 46;
first signs of friction with England, 50;
Forbes, Major-General, Commander-in-Chief in Hayti, 240, 245.
Ford, Captain, 513.
Fortiquerri, Marshal, 150 n.
Foster, John (afterwards Baron Oriel), Irish Speaker, 393, 398;
interview with Pitt, 400, 401;
his opposition to the Union, 414, 418–420.
Foster, son of the Speaker, 412.
Fouché, Joseph, Duke of Otranto, 528, 529.
Fox, Charles James, gains ground with Nonconformists, 11, 12;
on the Army Estimates (1792), 30;
his Libel Bill, 33;
opposes proclamations against seditious writings, 36;
suggested coalition with Pitt, 36, 37;
unpatriotic speeches, 87–89, 91, 278, 333;
intimate with the French embassy, 89;
opposes the Aliens Bill, 94;
disapproves of the Radical Clubs, 168;
opposes erection of barracks, 169;
on the Scottish prosecutions, 179;
in favour of peace, 198, 276, 277;
on slaves in Jamaica, 238;
on the massacre of royalists at Quiberon, 262;
on the Treasonable Practices Bill, 285, 286;
on the Bank crisis (1797), 308, 309;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 312, 313, 316;
his "secession," 316, 330;
on the Finance Bills of 1797–8, 330, 370;
his name removed from the Privy Council, 333;
and Arthur O'Connor, 350;
his views on the Union and Federalism, 413;
on Pitt's resignation, 445;
intrigues with the Prince of Wales, 449, 497;
on the peace proposals, 470;
on the war (1803), 488;
on the Volunteers, 494;
alliance with Grenville, 496;
attack on Addington, 499;
the King objects to his inclusion in Pitt's ministry, 499, 500;
supports abolition of the Slave Trade, 502;
his motion of Catholic Emancipation, 518, 519;
opposes Pitt's burial in the Abbey, 559;
as an orator, compared with Pitt, 567;
mentioned, 24, 156, 165, 188, 191, 283, 293, 506, 517, 518, 555, 557, 562, 563.
France, the flight to Varennes, 1, 2, 4, 40;
change of ministry, 45;
declares war against Austria, 23, 46;
first signs of friction with England, 50;
Page 634
the September massacres, 57, 59–62;
addresses of English clubs to the Convention, 65, et seq.;
trial of the King decreed, 74, 85;
conquest of Belgium, 66, 69, 75, 83;
the November decrees, 71, 72, 75, 76, 114;
annexes Savoy, 72;
her designs on Holland, 73–76, 80, 82;
negotiations with England, 84, 95–99, 103–107;
decree of 15th December, 90, 91;
annexes Belgium, 111, 121;
declares war on England and Holland, 112;
evacuates the Netherlands, 126;
the Convention declares Pitt the enemy of the human race, 134;
revolts in the South and in Brittany, 143, 144;
destruction of her navy at Toulon, 160, 161;
the miracle of revolutionary finance, 196;
passion for unity in, 197;
successes in Belgium, 208–212;
conquest of Holland, 213–216;
treaty of Basle, 217, 223;
action in the West Indies, see Chaps. IX and X;
peace with Spain, 236, 237, 244, 257;
alliance with Holland, 251, 274;
supposed connection with the mutiny at the Nore, 316;
negotiations at Lille, 323–325;
coup d'état of Fructidor 18, 1797, 324;
the Directory rejects Pitt's overtures for peace, 324–327, 336, 338;
intrigues with Irish rebels, 345–351, 391;
preparations for the eastern expedition, 356, 357;
makes offers of peace to Russia, 375;
expeditions to Ireland, 362–364, 394–396;
her supremacy in Europe, 365;
destruction of her fleet at Aboukir, 367, 368;
conquest of Naples, 372;
Austria declares war on (1799), 374;
her responsibility for the war, 374;
defeats in Italy, 376;
Peace of Amiens, 470;
declares war on England (1803), 487;
alliance with Spain, 513, 514.
Francis II, Emperor, his accession, 45;
war with France, 46;
his French policy, 120 n.;
dismisses Cobenzl, 129;
his character, 189–199, 231, 560;
takes command of the army in Flanders, 206;
returns to Vienna, 209;
appeals to England, 366;
addresses of English clubs to the Convention, 65, et seq.;
trial of the King decreed, 74, 85;
conquest of Belgium, 66, 69, 75, 83;
the November decrees, 71, 72, 75, 76, 114;
annexes Savoy, 72;
her designs on Holland, 73–76, 80, 82;
negotiations with England, 84, 95–99, 103–107;
decree of 15th December, 90, 91;
annexes Belgium, 111, 121;
declares war on England and Holland, 112;
evacuates the Netherlands, 126;
the Convention declares Pitt the enemy of the human race, 134;
revolts in the South and in Brittany, 143, 144;
destruction of her navy at Toulon, 160, 161;
the miracle of revolutionary finance, 196;
passion for unity in, 197;
successes in Belgium, 208–212;
conquest of Holland, 213–216;
treaty of Basle, 217, 223;
action in the West Indies, see Chaps. IX and X;
peace with Spain, 236, 237, 244, 257;
alliance with Holland, 251, 274;
supposed connection with the mutiny at the Nore, 316;
negotiations at Lille, 323–325;
coup d'état of Fructidor 18, 1797, 324;
the Directory rejects Pitt's overtures for peace, 324–327, 336, 338;
intrigues with Irish rebels, 345–351, 391;
preparations for the eastern expedition, 356, 357;
makes offers of peace to Russia, 375;
expeditions to Ireland, 362–364, 394–396;
her supremacy in Europe, 365;
destruction of her fleet at Aboukir, 367, 368;
conquest of Naples, 372;
Austria declares war on (1799), 374;
her responsibility for the war, 374;
defeats in Italy, 376;
Peace of Amiens, 470;
declares war on England (1803), 487;
alliance with Spain, 513, 514.
Francis II, Emperor, his accession, 45;
war with France, 46;
his French policy, 120 n.;
dismisses Cobenzl, 129;
his character, 189–199, 231, 560;
takes command of the army in Flanders, 206;
returns to Vienna, 209;
appeals to England, 366;
Page 635
refuses to interfere in Naples, 372;
declares war against France, 374;
his timid conduct, 508, 515;
his truce proposals after Austerlitz, 544, 545.
Francis, Sir Philip, 23, 238, 290.
Free Trade, demand for (in corn), 289;
Pitt's ideal, 427, 428.
Frederick William II, of Prussia, alliance with Austria, 5, 43;
signs the Declaration of Pilnitz, 5;
encourages Francis II to war, 46;
his conduct of the war, 121, 129, 142, 200–204, 207, 215;
difficulties of his position, 201;
affects indignation with Pitt, 213;
makes treaty of Basle with France, 217;
his character, 231.
Frederick William III, of Prussia, refuses to join the Allies, 373, 374;
his policy, 515, 523, 528, 535–537;
his character, 535, 560;
signs the Treaty of Potsdam, 539;
his demand for Hanover, 540, 541, 552;
agrees to the Convention of Schönbrunn, 553;
deserts the Allies, 553, 556.
French émigrés, 1–3, 6, 7, 155;
Pitt and, 3, 6, 259, 287, 454;
in England, 63, 64, 165;
and the Quiberon expedition, 259–261;
hated by George III, 261.
French, Sir Thomas, 518.
Frere, Hookham, 327;
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 421;
at Canning's wedding, 464, 465;
Ambassador at Madrid, 514.
"Friends of the People," the, 23, 24, 40, 167, 168, 171.
Frost, John, 66, 70, 115, 172;
his conviction, 172, 173.
Gales, of Sheffield, arrested, 186.
Game Laws, Bill for Reform of, 295.
Garat, Dominique Joseph, 111.
Garcia, Don, Spanish Governor of San Domingo, 228, 229, 235.
Gardiner, Colonel, British envoy at Warsaw, 54.
Gardner, Vice-Admiral Sir Allan, 311.
Garnier, moves that it shall be lawful to murder Pitt, 134.
General Convention of the People, proposal for, 186–189, 192, 193, 284.
Genlis, Mme. de, 79.
Genoa (the Ligurian Republic), 150 n., 386, 470;
annexed by Napoleon, 528, 529.
George III, his replies to Leopold II and Gustavus III on intervention in France, 3, 4;
declares war against France, 374;
his timid conduct, 508, 515;
his truce proposals after Austerlitz, 544, 545.
Francis, Sir Philip, 23, 238, 290.
Free Trade, demand for (in corn), 289;
Pitt's ideal, 427, 428.
Frederick William II, of Prussia, alliance with Austria, 5, 43;
signs the Declaration of Pilnitz, 5;
encourages Francis II to war, 46;
his conduct of the war, 121, 129, 142, 200–204, 207, 215;
difficulties of his position, 201;
affects indignation with Pitt, 213;
makes treaty of Basle with France, 217;
his character, 231.
Frederick William III, of Prussia, refuses to join the Allies, 373, 374;
his policy, 515, 523, 528, 535–537;
his character, 535, 560;
signs the Treaty of Potsdam, 539;
his demand for Hanover, 540, 541, 552;
agrees to the Convention of Schönbrunn, 553;
deserts the Allies, 553, 556.
French émigrés, 1–3, 6, 7, 155;
Pitt and, 3, 6, 259, 287, 454;
in England, 63, 64, 165;
and the Quiberon expedition, 259–261;
hated by George III, 261.
French, Sir Thomas, 518.
Frere, Hookham, 327;
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 421;
at Canning's wedding, 464, 465;
Ambassador at Madrid, 514.
"Friends of the People," the, 23, 24, 40, 167, 168, 171.
Frost, John, 66, 70, 115, 172;
his conviction, 172, 173.
Gales, of Sheffield, arrested, 186.
Game Laws, Bill for Reform of, 295.
Garat, Dominique Joseph, 111.
Garcia, Don, Spanish Governor of San Domingo, 228, 229, 235.
Gardiner, Colonel, British envoy at Warsaw, 54.
Gardner, Vice-Admiral Sir Allan, 311.
Garnier, moves that it shall be lawful to murder Pitt, 134.
General Convention of the People, proposal for, 186–189, 192, 193, 284.
Genlis, Mme. de, 79.
Genoa (the Ligurian Republic), 150 n., 386, 470;
annexed by Napoleon, 528, 529.
George III, his replies to Leopold II and Gustavus III on intervention in France, 3, 4;
Page 636
dismisses Thurlow, 34;
his attitude to proposed coalition of Pitt and the Old Whigs, 36–38;
his reception of Talleyrand, 43;
his hostility to France, 44, 51, 115;
increasing loyalty to, 86;
sympathy with Louis XVI, 91;
orders Chauvelin to leave the country, 108, 109 n.;
his view of the war, 119;
advocates the siege of Dunkirk, 127, 130;
his influence in military affairs, 128, 205, 207, 208, 214, 215, 217;
opposed to peace, 243, 276, 321–323;
offered the crown of Corsica, 256;
insists on keeping troops in Hanover, 261, 273, 274;
his dislike of the émigrés, 261;
outrage on, in the Mall, 277 n., 282, 283, 286;
his patronage of agriculture, 291;
on the peace negotiations, 324, 325;
disapproves of Pitt's duel with Tierney, 336;
Irish policy, 342, 358, 359, 394, 409;
story of Dundas and, 388;
his opposition to Catholic Emancipation, 433–439;
accepts Pitt's resignation, 439, 444, 445;
his madness, 447, 448, 497–499, 506, 507;
extracts a pledge from Pitt, 448, 449;
his neglect of literature and art, 456;
objects to Fox's inclusion in the Ministry, 499, 500, 530;
rejects Napoleon's peace overtures, 516;
his character and relations with Pitt, 561–564.
Gerrald, Joseph, 177, 180, 181;
his trial and transportation, 182, 183.
Gibbon, Edward, remark of George III to, 456.
Gibraltar, proposed cession to Spain, 277;
demanded by Spain, 323, 565.
Gillray, James, 530.
Gisborne, Dr., 447.
Gladstone, W. E., his Home Rule Bill (1886), 415.
Glasgow, political agitation in, 173, 178.
Godoy, Manuel de (afterwards Duke of Alcudia and Prince of the Peace), Spanish Minister,
154, 157;
his story concerning Pitt refuted, 92, 93;
his relations with the Queen, 230;
his character, 230, 231;
Anti-British intrigues, 232, 235, 237, 242, 243, 275;
makes peace with France, 233, 234, 236;
protests against British action in Hayti, 234, 235;
made Prince of the Peace, 237;
declares war against England, 244;
gives aid to France, 513, 514, 560.
his attitude to proposed coalition of Pitt and the Old Whigs, 36–38;
his reception of Talleyrand, 43;
his hostility to France, 44, 51, 115;
increasing loyalty to, 86;
sympathy with Louis XVI, 91;
orders Chauvelin to leave the country, 108, 109 n.;
his view of the war, 119;
advocates the siege of Dunkirk, 127, 130;
his influence in military affairs, 128, 205, 207, 208, 214, 215, 217;
opposed to peace, 243, 276, 321–323;
offered the crown of Corsica, 256;
insists on keeping troops in Hanover, 261, 273, 274;
his dislike of the émigrés, 261;
outrage on, in the Mall, 277 n., 282, 283, 286;
his patronage of agriculture, 291;
on the peace negotiations, 324, 325;
disapproves of Pitt's duel with Tierney, 336;
Irish policy, 342, 358, 359, 394, 409;
story of Dundas and, 388;
his opposition to Catholic Emancipation, 433–439;
accepts Pitt's resignation, 439, 444, 445;
his madness, 447, 448, 497–499, 506, 507;
extracts a pledge from Pitt, 448, 449;
his neglect of literature and art, 456;
objects to Fox's inclusion in the Ministry, 499, 500, 530;
rejects Napoleon's peace overtures, 516;
his character and relations with Pitt, 561–564.
Gerrald, Joseph, 177, 180, 181;
his trial and transportation, 182, 183.
Gibbon, Edward, remark of George III to, 456.
Gibraltar, proposed cession to Spain, 277;
demanded by Spain, 323, 565.
Gillray, James, 530.
Gisborne, Dr., 447.
Gladstone, W. E., his Home Rule Bill (1886), 415.
Glasgow, political agitation in, 173, 178.
Godoy, Manuel de (afterwards Duke of Alcudia and Prince of the Peace), Spanish Minister,
154, 157;
his story concerning Pitt refuted, 92, 93;
his relations with the Queen, 230;
his character, 230, 231;
Anti-British intrigues, 232, 235, 237, 242, 243, 275;
makes peace with France, 233, 234, 236;
protests against British action in Hayti, 234, 235;
made Prince of the Peace, 237;
declares war against England, 244;
gives aid to France, 513, 514, 560.
Page 637
Gordon, Duke of, 476.
Gordon, Duchess of, 300 n.;
Pitt and, 459.
Gower, Earl, Ambassador at Paris, 42, 45, 47, 58;
recalled, 58.
Gower, Lord Granville Leveson-, 465;
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 526, 527, 529.
Graaf-Reinet, settlement of, 252, 254.
Graham, A., and D. Williams, their report on the mutiny at the Nore, 316–318.
Granard, Lord, 402.
Grattan, Henry, 339–341, 343, 344, 398, 408, 411.
Gravina, Rear-Admiral, 148, 150, 153.
Grégoire, Henri, 72, 83, 114.
Grenada, revolt in, 239;
capture of, 241.
Grenville, Thomas, special envoy at Vienna, 199, 211;
his mission to Berlin (1798), 373, 374;
on the peace proposals (1801), 469;
negotiates the Grenville–Fox alliance, 496.
Grenville, William Wyndham, Lord, Foreign Secretary, 3, 6–9, 37, 68, 312, 421;
opposes Flood's motion for Reform, 12;
on the Birmingham riots, 19;
his marriage, 37;
his assurances to Talleyrand, 43–45;
his policy regarding the Belgic Provinces, 47, 48;
his treatment of Chauvelin, 50, 79, 98, 99, 104, 105, 115;
assertion of neutrality, 51, 52, 61, 69, 98;
policy towards Poland, 54;
ignorant of events in France, 58;
his concern at the November decrees, 72–74;
regards war as unavoidable, 76, 77, 82;
makes overtures to Austria, 84;
his fears of Spanish weakness, 92;
negotiations with France, 97–101, 103–108;
his despatch to Whitworth on British aims, 99, 100;
declines to treat with Maret, 109–112;
his belief in neutrality, 113;
forms the first coalition, 123;
ignorant of military affairs, 128;
his war policy, 129, 132, 142, 143, 150, 153 n., 154–156, 161, 196, 202, 204–213, 256,
263, 266, 369, 371, 375, 377–380, 382–384;
offers to resign, 213, 217, 323;
West Indian policy, 224, 225, 228;
negotiations with Spain, 233, 234, 243;
opposed to negotiations for peace, 276, 322–326;
introduces the Treasonable Practices Bill, 285;
supports the Finance Bill (1797), 330;
on Irish policy, 341, 342, 400, 403, 406;
Gordon, Duchess of, 300 n.;
Pitt and, 459.
Gower, Earl, Ambassador at Paris, 42, 45, 47, 58;
recalled, 58.
Gower, Lord Granville Leveson-, 465;
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 526, 527, 529.
Graaf-Reinet, settlement of, 252, 254.
Graham, A., and D. Williams, their report on the mutiny at the Nore, 316–318.
Granard, Lord, 402.
Grattan, Henry, 339–341, 343, 344, 398, 408, 411.
Gravina, Rear-Admiral, 148, 150, 153.
Grégoire, Henri, 72, 83, 114.
Grenada, revolt in, 239;
capture of, 241.
Grenville, Thomas, special envoy at Vienna, 199, 211;
his mission to Berlin (1798), 373, 374;
on the peace proposals (1801), 469;
negotiates the Grenville–Fox alliance, 496.
Grenville, William Wyndham, Lord, Foreign Secretary, 3, 6–9, 37, 68, 312, 421;
opposes Flood's motion for Reform, 12;
on the Birmingham riots, 19;
his marriage, 37;
his assurances to Talleyrand, 43–45;
his policy regarding the Belgic Provinces, 47, 48;
his treatment of Chauvelin, 50, 79, 98, 99, 104, 105, 115;
assertion of neutrality, 51, 52, 61, 69, 98;
policy towards Poland, 54;
ignorant of events in France, 58;
his concern at the November decrees, 72–74;
regards war as unavoidable, 76, 77, 82;
makes overtures to Austria, 84;
his fears of Spanish weakness, 92;
negotiations with France, 97–101, 103–108;
his despatch to Whitworth on British aims, 99, 100;
declines to treat with Maret, 109–112;
his belief in neutrality, 113;
forms the first coalition, 123;
ignorant of military affairs, 128;
his war policy, 129, 132, 142, 143, 150, 153 n., 154–156, 161, 196, 202, 204–213, 256,
263, 266, 369, 371, 375, 377–380, 382–384;
offers to resign, 213, 217, 323;
West Indian policy, 224, 225, 228;
negotiations with Spain, 233, 234, 243;
opposed to negotiations for peace, 276, 322–326;
introduces the Treasonable Practices Bill, 285;
supports the Finance Bill (1797), 330;
on Irish policy, 341, 342, 400, 403, 406;
Page 638
and the Catholic question, 432, 436, 437, 439 n., 449, 519;
resigns, 440;
on Pitt's resignation, 445, 446;
his relations with Pitt, 454, 469, 479, 480, 510, 511;
on Pitt's scholarship, 458;
opposed to peace (1801), 469;
his plans for overthrowing Addington, 495, 496;
alliance with Fox, 496;
refuses to join Pitt's new ministry, 500–502;
opposes Pitt, 502–504, 510, 517, 55, 557, 559.
Grey, General Sir Charles (afterwards 1st Earl Grey), 225;
letter from Pitt to, 381.
Grey, Charles (afterwards 2nd Earl Grey), 23, 188, 191, 276, 516, 519;
motions for Reform, 24, 316;
opposes proclamation against seditious writings, 25;
supports Fox, 89;
on the Scottish prosecutions, 179;
opposes the Act of Union, 427, 428.
Griffith, Rev. John, of Manchester, 185.
Guadeloupe, planters appeal to England for protection, 221;
captured and again recovered, 225, 237, 240, 249.
Guiana, abolition of Slave Trade in, 503.
Guipuzcoa, province of, 233, 235.
Gustavus III of Sweden, 2–4, 7;
assassinated, 46.
Gustavus IV of Sweden, refuses aid against Holland, 380;
makes a convention with England, 516;
his hostility to Napoleon, 528.
Habeas Corpus Act, suspension of (1794), 191, 193, 285;
(1798), 333, 351;
in Ireland, 345.
Hague Convention (1794), 207.
Hailes, Daniel, British envoy at Warsaw, 53–55.
Hair-powder, disuse of, 290;
tax on, 307.
Hameln, held by the French, 544.
Hamilton, Sir William, 150 n., 372.
Hamilton, Lady, 372.
Hammond, George, envoy to the United States, 291.
Hanover, British troops kept in, 261, 273, 274;
coveted by Prussia, 535–537, 540, 541, 552;
British expedition to, 542, 551, 555, 556.
Hanoverian troops, landed in England, 181, 188.
Hanriot, François, 59.
Hardenberg, Karl August, Prince von, 212;
signs the Treaty of Basle, 217;
Prussian Foreign Minister, 529, 536, 540, 545.
resigns, 440;
on Pitt's resignation, 445, 446;
his relations with Pitt, 454, 469, 479, 480, 510, 511;
on Pitt's scholarship, 458;
opposed to peace (1801), 469;
his plans for overthrowing Addington, 495, 496;
alliance with Fox, 496;
refuses to join Pitt's new ministry, 500–502;
opposes Pitt, 502–504, 510, 517, 55, 557, 559.
Grey, General Sir Charles (afterwards 1st Earl Grey), 225;
letter from Pitt to, 381.
Grey, Charles (afterwards 2nd Earl Grey), 23, 188, 191, 276, 516, 519;
motions for Reform, 24, 316;
opposes proclamation against seditious writings, 25;
supports Fox, 89;
on the Scottish prosecutions, 179;
opposes the Act of Union, 427, 428.
Griffith, Rev. John, of Manchester, 185.
Guadeloupe, planters appeal to England for protection, 221;
captured and again recovered, 225, 237, 240, 249.
Guiana, abolition of Slave Trade in, 503.
Guipuzcoa, province of, 233, 235.
Gustavus III of Sweden, 2–4, 7;
assassinated, 46.
Gustavus IV of Sweden, refuses aid against Holland, 380;
makes a convention with England, 516;
his hostility to Napoleon, 528.
Habeas Corpus Act, suspension of (1794), 191, 193, 285;
(1798), 333, 351;
in Ireland, 345.
Hague Convention (1794), 207.
Hailes, Daniel, British envoy at Warsaw, 53–55.
Hair-powder, disuse of, 290;
tax on, 307.
Hameln, held by the French, 544.
Hamilton, Sir William, 150 n., 372.
Hamilton, Lady, 372.
Hammond, George, envoy to the United States, 291.
Hanover, British troops kept in, 261, 273, 274;
coveted by Prussia, 535–537, 540, 541, 552;
British expedition to, 542, 551, 555, 556.
Hanoverian troops, landed in England, 181, 188.
Hanriot, François, 59.
Hardenberg, Karl August, Prince von, 212;
signs the Treaty of Basle, 217;
Prussian Foreign Minister, 529, 536, 540, 545.
Page 639
Hardwicke, Earl of, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 429, 501.
Hardy, Thomas, his "Corresponding Society," 21, 23, 68, 167;
letter to Dr. Adams, 65, 66;
sends address from combined patriotic societies to French Convention, 67, 68;
circular on a General Convention, 187, 188;
arrested, 190;
acquitted, 192;
letter from Thelwall to, 352 n.
Hare, Captain, 160.
Harington, Mr., Mayor of Bath, 165.
Harrington, Earl of, commander of the forces in London, 319;
his mission to Berlin, 556.
Harris, Sir James. See Malmesbury, Lord.
Harrowby, Earl of (Dudley Ryder), 290, 294, 451;
acts as Pitt's second, 334, 335;
Foreign Secretary, 501, 514, 515, 517, 523;
Chancellor of the Duchy, 530;
his mission to Berlin, 538–547, 552 n.;
breakdown of his health, 545, 546, 553, 558;
recalled, 556.
Haugwitz, Count von, Prussian Foreign Minister, 202, 206, 207, 212, 515, 536, 537, 540, 543,
553, 560.
Hawkesbury, Lord, 81, 221;
Foreign Secretary, 468, 479, 487;
Home Secretary, 501, 507, 514, 517, 518, 521, 532, 549, 555.
Hayley, W., letter to Pitt, 455, 456.
Hayti, proposed transfer to England, 131;
rising of negroes in, 220, 223;
requests British protection, 220;
its wealth and prosperity, 222, 223;
British successes in, 223, 225–227, 232, 233;
Spanish action in, 224, 227–229, 239;
increasing difficulties in, 245, 246;
English evacuation of, 247;
267, 274, 275.
Hébert, Jacques René, 180.
Helvoetsluys, 127, 216, 267.
Henry, Prince, of Prussia, 207.
Hermann, General, 382.
Hervilly, Comte d', 261, 274.
Hesse-Cassel, compact with England, 123.
Hessian troops, landed in England, 188.
Hobhouse, Sir Benjamin, on the Finance Bill of 1797, 329.
Hoche, General Lazare, 162, 200, 261, 262, 277, 304, 308, 346.
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, Prince of, 121.
Holcroft, Thomas, 167, 193,
Holwood House, sale of, 473.
Holland. See Dutch Republic.
Hardy, Thomas, his "Corresponding Society," 21, 23, 68, 167;
letter to Dr. Adams, 65, 66;
sends address from combined patriotic societies to French Convention, 67, 68;
circular on a General Convention, 187, 188;
arrested, 190;
acquitted, 192;
letter from Thelwall to, 352 n.
Hare, Captain, 160.
Harington, Mr., Mayor of Bath, 165.
Harrington, Earl of, commander of the forces in London, 319;
his mission to Berlin, 556.
Harris, Sir James. See Malmesbury, Lord.
Harrowby, Earl of (Dudley Ryder), 290, 294, 451;
acts as Pitt's second, 334, 335;
Foreign Secretary, 501, 514, 515, 517, 523;
Chancellor of the Duchy, 530;
his mission to Berlin, 538–547, 552 n.;
breakdown of his health, 545, 546, 553, 558;
recalled, 556.
Haugwitz, Count von, Prussian Foreign Minister, 202, 206, 207, 212, 515, 536, 537, 540, 543,
553, 560.
Hawkesbury, Lord, 81, 221;
Foreign Secretary, 468, 479, 487;
Home Secretary, 501, 507, 514, 517, 518, 521, 532, 549, 555.
Hayley, W., letter to Pitt, 455, 456.
Hayti, proposed transfer to England, 131;
rising of negroes in, 220, 223;
requests British protection, 220;
its wealth and prosperity, 222, 223;
British successes in, 223, 225–227, 232, 233;
Spanish action in, 224, 227–229, 239;
increasing difficulties in, 245, 246;
English evacuation of, 247;
267, 274, 275.
Hébert, Jacques René, 180.
Helvoetsluys, 127, 216, 267.
Henry, Prince, of Prussia, 207.
Hermann, General, 382.
Hervilly, Comte d', 261, 274.
Hesse-Cassel, compact with England, 123.
Hessian troops, landed in England, 188.
Hobhouse, Sir Benjamin, on the Finance Bill of 1797, 329.
Hoche, General Lazare, 162, 200, 261, 262, 277, 304, 308, 346.
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, Prince of, 121.
Holcroft, Thomas, 167, 193,
Holwood House, sale of, 473.
Holland. See Dutch Republic.
Page 640
Holland, Lord, 330, 413, 481 n., 519;
opposes the Act of Union, 421.
Hondschoote, battle of, 140.
Hood, Alexander. See Bridport, Lord.
Hood, Samuel Lord, occupies Toulon, 134, 144, 145;
his difficulties and quarrels, 150–160, 232, 267;
occupies Corsica, 256, 257.
Hotham, Admiral (afterwards Lord), 232.
Horsley, Samuel, Bishop of Rochester, and afterwards of St. Asaph, 286, 497.
Houchard, General, 140.
Howe, Admiral Lord, his victory of the 1st of June, 192, 225, 269;
quells the mutiny at Spithead, 310–314.
Hugues, Victor, Republican leader in the West Indies, 239, 240, 248.
Humbert, General, his expedition to Ireland, 362, 394, 395.
Hutchinson, John Hely, General (afterwards Earl of Donoughmore), at the "Castlebar Races,"
362;
in Egypt, 387.
Hythe military canal, 512.
Illuminati, the, 26.
Income Tax, graduated, suggested, 20, 22, 307;
imposed by Pitt, 329, 370, 427, 450;
abandoned by Addington, 480.
India, 387, 388, 460–464, 565.
India Bill, Pitt's (1784), 568.
Ireland, Parliament refuses franchise to Catholics, 77;
grave situation in, 278, 321, 333, 336;
Hoche's expedition to, 304, 308;
English loan to, 308, 347;
the Rebellion of 1798, 330, and see Chaps. XVI, XVIII;
Earl Fitzwilliam's Viceroyalty, 339–342;
Maynooth founded, 343;
feuds and disturbances, 344, 345;
Camden's policy of coercion, 345–348, 352, 355, 391;
financial straits, 347;
Franco-Irish plots, 349–351, 354;
resignation of Abercromby, 354;
progress of the Rebellion, 355–364;
French invasions, 362–364, 394, 395;
the Union, see Chaps. XVIII, XIX;
policy of Cornwallis, 395, 396;
corruption in Parliament, 402, 424, 425;
debates on the Act of Union, 411–415, 425–428;
continued danger from France, 420, 421, 425, 430;
financial relations with England, 425, 427, 568;
Act of Union passed, 428;
pocket boroughs disfranchised, 428;
Union honours, 428, 429.
opposes the Act of Union, 421.
Hondschoote, battle of, 140.
Hood, Alexander. See Bridport, Lord.
Hood, Samuel Lord, occupies Toulon, 134, 144, 145;
his difficulties and quarrels, 150–160, 232, 267;
occupies Corsica, 256, 257.
Hotham, Admiral (afterwards Lord), 232.
Horsley, Samuel, Bishop of Rochester, and afterwards of St. Asaph, 286, 497.
Houchard, General, 140.
Howe, Admiral Lord, his victory of the 1st of June, 192, 225, 269;
quells the mutiny at Spithead, 310–314.
Hugues, Victor, Republican leader in the West Indies, 239, 240, 248.
Humbert, General, his expedition to Ireland, 362, 394, 395.
Hutchinson, John Hely, General (afterwards Earl of Donoughmore), at the "Castlebar Races,"
362;
in Egypt, 387.
Hythe military canal, 512.
Illuminati, the, 26.
Income Tax, graduated, suggested, 20, 22, 307;
imposed by Pitt, 329, 370, 427, 450;
abandoned by Addington, 480.
India, 387, 388, 460–464, 565.
India Bill, Pitt's (1784), 568.
Ireland, Parliament refuses franchise to Catholics, 77;
grave situation in, 278, 321, 333, 336;
Hoche's expedition to, 304, 308;
English loan to, 308, 347;
the Rebellion of 1798, 330, and see Chaps. XVI, XVIII;
Earl Fitzwilliam's Viceroyalty, 339–342;
Maynooth founded, 343;
feuds and disturbances, 344, 345;
Camden's policy of coercion, 345–348, 352, 355, 391;
financial straits, 347;
Franco-Irish plots, 349–351, 354;
resignation of Abercromby, 354;
progress of the Rebellion, 355–364;
French invasions, 362–364, 394, 395;
the Union, see Chaps. XVIII, XIX;
policy of Cornwallis, 395, 396;
corruption in Parliament, 402, 424, 425;
debates on the Act of Union, 411–415, 425–428;
continued danger from France, 420, 421, 425, 430;
financial relations with England, 425, 427, 568;
Act of Union passed, 428;
pocket boroughs disfranchised, 428;
Union honours, 428, 429.
Page 641
Isherwood, Mr., 460.
Jackson, George, his "Diaries," 546.
Jackson, Mrs., 547.
Jackson, F. L., chargé-d'affaires at Madrid, 92, 229;
recalled, 230.
Jacobi, Baron, Prussian Ambassador in London, 212, 213.
Jacobins Club, the, in Paris, 25, 26, 42, 168, 169.
Jamaica, sends help to Hayti, 220, 223;
coffee-planting in, 222;
atrocities of Maroons in, 237, 238.
Jassy, Treaty of, 29, 52.
Jay, John, American envoy to London, 291.
Jean François, negro leader, 239.
Jebb, Richard, his pamphlet against Union, 406.
Jekyll, Joseph, M.P., on the new taxes (1797), 330.
Jemappes, battle of, 57, 69, 113, 114.
Jenkinson, Charles. See Liverpool, Earl of.
Jermagnan, Colonel de, 160.
Jervis, Sir John. See St. Vincent, Earl of.
Johnstone, General, 361.
Jones, Thomas, M.P., 426.
Jourdan, Marshal, 140, 141.
Joyce, Rev. Jeremiah, letter to Horne Tooke, 190;
arrested, 190;
discharged, 193.
Jülich, Duchy of, 46.
June 1st, 1794, battle of, 192, 225, 269.
Kaiserslautern, battle of, 208.
Kalkreuth, General, 543.
Kaunitz, Prince, Austrian Chancellor, 5–9, 45, 50, 53, 199, 218.
Keir, Dr., of Birmingham, 17.
Keith, Sir Robert Murray, Ambassador at Vienna, 42, 46;
begs for recall, 50.
Kenmare, Lord, 393.
Kent, Duke of, 447, 448.
Kenyon, Lord, 331.
Kersaint, Captain, his speech against England, 102, 103, 106.
Killala, French landing at, 362, 363.
King, Lord, opposes the Act of Union, 421.
Kinglake, A. W., 490.
Korsakoff, General, 375, 378, 379.
Kosciusko, Thaddeus, 53, 206.
Kyd, Stewart, arrested, 190;
discharged, 193.
Lageard, de, witty remark of, 276.
Jackson, George, his "Diaries," 546.
Jackson, Mrs., 547.
Jackson, F. L., chargé-d'affaires at Madrid, 92, 229;
recalled, 230.
Jacobi, Baron, Prussian Ambassador in London, 212, 213.
Jacobins Club, the, in Paris, 25, 26, 42, 168, 169.
Jamaica, sends help to Hayti, 220, 223;
coffee-planting in, 222;
atrocities of Maroons in, 237, 238.
Jassy, Treaty of, 29, 52.
Jay, John, American envoy to London, 291.
Jean François, negro leader, 239.
Jebb, Richard, his pamphlet against Union, 406.
Jekyll, Joseph, M.P., on the new taxes (1797), 330.
Jemappes, battle of, 57, 69, 113, 114.
Jenkinson, Charles. See Liverpool, Earl of.
Jermagnan, Colonel de, 160.
Jervis, Sir John. See St. Vincent, Earl of.
Johnstone, General, 361.
Jones, Thomas, M.P., 426.
Jourdan, Marshal, 140, 141.
Joyce, Rev. Jeremiah, letter to Horne Tooke, 190;
arrested, 190;
discharged, 193.
Jülich, Duchy of, 46.
June 1st, 1794, battle of, 192, 225, 269.
Kaiserslautern, battle of, 208.
Kalkreuth, General, 543.
Kaunitz, Prince, Austrian Chancellor, 5–9, 45, 50, 53, 199, 218.
Keir, Dr., of Birmingham, 17.
Keith, Sir Robert Murray, Ambassador at Vienna, 42, 46;
begs for recall, 50.
Kenmare, Lord, 393.
Kent, Duke of, 447, 448.
Kenyon, Lord, 331.
Kersaint, Captain, his speech against England, 102, 103, 106.
Killala, French landing at, 362, 363.
King, Lord, opposes the Act of Union, 421.
Kinglake, A. W., 490.
Korsakoff, General, 375, 378, 379.
Kosciusko, Thaddeus, 53, 206.
Kyd, Stewart, arrested, 190;
discharged, 193.
Lageard, de, witty remark of, 276.
Page 642
Laharpe, F. C. de, 369.
Lake, General, 348, 357, 361, 362.
Lally-Tollendal, Comte de, 43, 93.
Lambton, John, 23.
Landrecies, surrendered, 210.
Land Tax, 30, 31;
Pitt's Commutation Act, 331–333, 568.
Langara, Admiral, 144, 146, 153, 154, 157, 159, 232.
Lansdowne, Marquis of, Gillray's cartoon of, 35;
intimate with Talleyrand, 51, 77 n.;
opposes Government policy, 87;
opposes the Aliens Bill, 94;
on the insult to the King, 283.
Larochejaquelein, Marquis de, 136.
Las Casas, Spanish Ambassador in London, 243.
Lascelles, Mr., M.P., 559.
Lauderdale, Earl of, 23, 179, 286;
opposes the Aliens Bill, 94.
Laurence, Dr. French, 427.
Lebrun, P. M. Henri, French Foreign Minister, 58, 60, 69;
account of his career, 59;
his instructions to Dumouriez, 73, 74;
and Maret, 79–81;
negotiations with England, 84, 87, 89–91, 97, 104–108, 116;
his report on the negotiations, 95, 96, 101, 113, 117.
Leeds, Duke of (Marquis of Carmarthen), 35 n.;
suggested as First Lord of the Treasury in Coalition Ministry, 36–38;
interview with the King, 37;
opposes the taxes of 1797, 329.
Lees, John, 355, 395, 396, 406, 418.
Leopold II, correspondence with George III on intervention in France, 2, 3;
signs the Declaration of Pilnitz, 5, 6;
distrusted by Pitt and Grenville, 8;
anxious to avoid war with France, 42;
his death, 45.
Lescure, Marquis de, 136.
Letourneur, C. L. F. Honoré, 323.
Lewins, Edward John, delegate of the United Irishmen in Paris, 346, 348.
Liancourt, Duc de, story of his flight, 63, 64.
Ligurian Republic. See Genoa.
Lille, 122, 123, 127, 129;
peace negotiations at (1797), 247, 323–325.
Lincoln, Bishop of. See Tomline, George Pretyman.
Liverpool, Earl of (Charles Jenkinson), 39, 290, 322, 330, 406.
Liverpool, dock strike at, 62;
press-gang at, 166, 167.
Livingston, Mr., American Envoy at Paris, 505, 506.
Lloyd, George, 169.
Lake, General, 348, 357, 361, 362.
Lally-Tollendal, Comte de, 43, 93.
Lambton, John, 23.
Landrecies, surrendered, 210.
Land Tax, 30, 31;
Pitt's Commutation Act, 331–333, 568.
Langara, Admiral, 144, 146, 153, 154, 157, 159, 232.
Lansdowne, Marquis of, Gillray's cartoon of, 35;
intimate with Talleyrand, 51, 77 n.;
opposes Government policy, 87;
opposes the Aliens Bill, 94;
on the insult to the King, 283.
Larochejaquelein, Marquis de, 136.
Las Casas, Spanish Ambassador in London, 243.
Lascelles, Mr., M.P., 559.
Lauderdale, Earl of, 23, 179, 286;
opposes the Aliens Bill, 94.
Laurence, Dr. French, 427.
Lebrun, P. M. Henri, French Foreign Minister, 58, 60, 69;
account of his career, 59;
his instructions to Dumouriez, 73, 74;
and Maret, 79–81;
negotiations with England, 84, 87, 89–91, 97, 104–108, 116;
his report on the negotiations, 95, 96, 101, 113, 117.
Leeds, Duke of (Marquis of Carmarthen), 35 n.;
suggested as First Lord of the Treasury in Coalition Ministry, 36–38;
interview with the King, 37;
opposes the taxes of 1797, 329.
Lees, John, 355, 395, 396, 406, 418.
Leopold II, correspondence with George III on intervention in France, 2, 3;
signs the Declaration of Pilnitz, 5, 6;
distrusted by Pitt and Grenville, 8;
anxious to avoid war with France, 42;
his death, 45.
Lescure, Marquis de, 136.
Letourneur, C. L. F. Honoré, 323.
Lewins, Edward John, delegate of the United Irishmen in Paris, 346, 348.
Liancourt, Duc de, story of his flight, 63, 64.
Ligurian Republic. See Genoa.
Lille, 122, 123, 127, 129;
peace negotiations at (1797), 247, 323–325.
Lincoln, Bishop of. See Tomline, George Pretyman.
Liverpool, Earl of (Charles Jenkinson), 39, 290, 322, 330, 406.
Liverpool, dock strike at, 62;
press-gang at, 166, 167.
Livingston, Mr., American Envoy at Paris, 505, 506.
Lloyd, George, 169.
Page 643
London, Preliminaries of, 468–470.
Long, Charles (afterwards Lord Farnborough), 415, 439, 465, 476, 557.
Longueville, Lord, letter to Pitt on the Union, 402, 403.
Lorraine, 46, 122, 142, 197, 199, 200.
Loughborough, Lord (Alexander Wedderburn), Lord Chancellor, 34, 35, 296, 297, 312, 331;
his efforts to bring about a union between Pitt and the Old Whigs, 36–38, 39 n.;
on the Scottish prosecutions, 179;
interviews with Grattan, 340;
on union with Ireland, 391, 399;
opposes Catholic Emancipation, 431–437, 440, 443, 445;
his record, 431, 432;
dismissed and created Earl of Rosslyn, 451;
the King's comment on his death, 451.
Louis XVI, the flight to Varennes, 1, 4, 10;
accepts new constitution, 7;
letter to George III, 49;
his trial decreed, 74, 85, 96;
English sympathy for, 86;
proposed appeal from England for his life, 91, 92;
stories of Spanish and other efforts on his behalf, 92–94;
his execution, 108, 117;
his responsibility for the Revolution, 560.
Louis, Dauphin (Louis XVII), 145, 146, 156;
his death, 259.
Louis XVIII. See Provence, Comte de.
Louisa, Queen, of Prussia, 535, 536.
Loyal Associations, growth of, 86.
Loyalty Loan, 305, 306.
Lucchesini, Marquis di, Prussian Ambassador at Vienna, 203, 207.
Lunéville, Treaty of, 470, 529.
Lyons, fall of, 147, 151.
Macartney, Earl, his embassy to Pekin, 32;
Governor of the Cape, 254, 255.
MacBride, Admiral, 269 n.
McCullum, of Manchester, trial of, 185.
Macdonald, General, 376.
Macdonald, Sir Archibald, Attorney-General, 172.
Mack, General, 204;
his plan of campaign (1794), 205;
declines to serve under Coburg, 206;
surrenders at Ulm, 534, 537.
Mackenzie, Sir Kenneth, 174.
Mackintosh, Sir James, his "Vindiciae Gallicae," 16, 23.
Macleod, General, M.P., 238.
McNevin, William James, delegate of the United Irishmen in Paris, 346, 348;
arrested, 354, 394.
Macqueen of Braxfield, Lord Justice Clerk, his trial of Muir, 176, 178, 179;
Long, Charles (afterwards Lord Farnborough), 415, 439, 465, 476, 557.
Longueville, Lord, letter to Pitt on the Union, 402, 403.
Lorraine, 46, 122, 142, 197, 199, 200.
Loughborough, Lord (Alexander Wedderburn), Lord Chancellor, 34, 35, 296, 297, 312, 331;
his efforts to bring about a union between Pitt and the Old Whigs, 36–38, 39 n.;
on the Scottish prosecutions, 179;
interviews with Grattan, 340;
on union with Ireland, 391, 399;
opposes Catholic Emancipation, 431–437, 440, 443, 445;
his record, 431, 432;
dismissed and created Earl of Rosslyn, 451;
the King's comment on his death, 451.
Louis XVI, the flight to Varennes, 1, 4, 10;
accepts new constitution, 7;
letter to George III, 49;
his trial decreed, 74, 85, 96;
English sympathy for, 86;
proposed appeal from England for his life, 91, 92;
stories of Spanish and other efforts on his behalf, 92–94;
his execution, 108, 117;
his responsibility for the Revolution, 560.
Louis, Dauphin (Louis XVII), 145, 146, 156;
his death, 259.
Louis XVIII. See Provence, Comte de.
Louisa, Queen, of Prussia, 535, 536.
Loyal Associations, growth of, 86.
Loyalty Loan, 305, 306.
Lucchesini, Marquis di, Prussian Ambassador at Vienna, 203, 207.
Lunéville, Treaty of, 470, 529.
Lyons, fall of, 147, 151.
Macartney, Earl, his embassy to Pekin, 32;
Governor of the Cape, 254, 255.
MacBride, Admiral, 269 n.
McCullum, of Manchester, trial of, 185.
Macdonald, General, 376.
Macdonald, Sir Archibald, Attorney-General, 172.
Mack, General, 204;
his plan of campaign (1794), 205;
declines to serve under Coburg, 206;
surrenders at Ulm, 534, 537.
Mackenzie, Sir Kenneth, 174.
Mackintosh, Sir James, his "Vindiciae Gallicae," 16, 23.
Macleod, General, M.P., 238.
McNevin, William James, delegate of the United Irishmen in Paris, 346, 348;
arrested, 354, 394.
Macqueen of Braxfield, Lord Justice Clerk, his trial of Muir, 176, 178, 179;
Page 644
trial of Margarot and Gerrald, 183, 184.
MacRitchie, W., his "Diary of a Tour through Great Britain in 1795," 265.
Maestricht, the French demand a passage through, 82.
Mainz, siege of, 130, 134, 136, 138, 200.
Maitland, General, evacuates Hayti, 247, 248.
Mallet du Pan, 6, 135, 338, 370.
Malmesbury, Lord (Sir James Harris), furthers proposed union between Pitt and the Old
Whigs, 36, 38;
on the opening of the Scheldt, 75;
his mission to Berlin, 200–202, 204;
makes treaty with Prussia, 206–208;
agreement with Hardenberg, 212;
goes to Brunswick, 214, 215;
his mission to Paris, 321;
negotiations at Lille, 323–326;
his statements controverted, 434, 445, 448, 465, 550 n.;
urges Pitt to action, 481;
mentioned, 90, 286, 497, 524 n., 537, 553, 559.
Malouet, Baron Pierre Victor, his "Mémoires," 92, 93;
envoy from Hayti to England, 131, 221, 222, 239, 247 n.
Malt, tax on, 30, 31, 450.
Malta, Pitt's policy with regard to, 255, 277 n., 327, 468–470, 478, 480, 565;
the French in, 368, 369, 373, 387, 388;
Craig's expedition to, 525, 526;
Russian aims in, 526–527;
its value to England, 539.
Manchester, Nonconformists in, 11;
political clubs founded, 12, 13, 17;
disorder in, 62.
"Manchester Constitutional Society," 12, 168, 169, 185.
Mann, Admiral, 243.
Mansfield, Lord, death of, 303.
Marengo, battle of, 386, 387.
Maret, Hugues Bernard (afterwards Duc de Bassano), in London, 79, 83, 94 n., 101;
interviews with Pitt, 79–82, 84;
his letter to Miles, 105–107;
his alleged mission to London, 108–112, 117;
ordered to leave, 112;
on Chauvelin, 115 n.;
one of the plenipotentiaries at Lille, 323.
Margarot, Maurice, 177, 181;
his trial and transportation, 182–184.
Maria Carolina, Queen of Naples, 365, 368, 372, 376.
Maria Luisa, of Parma, Queen of Spain, 230, 231, 237.
Maria Theresa, 2nd wife of the Emperor Francis II, 199.
Marie Antoinette, the flight to Varennes, 1, 4, 10;
her anger, 7;
her schemes, 7, 49, 85;
MacRitchie, W., his "Diary of a Tour through Great Britain in 1795," 265.
Maestricht, the French demand a passage through, 82.
Mainz, siege of, 130, 134, 136, 138, 200.
Maitland, General, evacuates Hayti, 247, 248.
Mallet du Pan, 6, 135, 338, 370.
Malmesbury, Lord (Sir James Harris), furthers proposed union between Pitt and the Old
Whigs, 36, 38;
on the opening of the Scheldt, 75;
his mission to Berlin, 200–202, 204;
makes treaty with Prussia, 206–208;
agreement with Hardenberg, 212;
goes to Brunswick, 214, 215;
his mission to Paris, 321;
negotiations at Lille, 323–326;
his statements controverted, 434, 445, 448, 465, 550 n.;
urges Pitt to action, 481;
mentioned, 90, 286, 497, 524 n., 537, 553, 559.
Malouet, Baron Pierre Victor, his "Mémoires," 92, 93;
envoy from Hayti to England, 131, 221, 222, 239, 247 n.
Malt, tax on, 30, 31, 450.
Malta, Pitt's policy with regard to, 255, 277 n., 327, 468–470, 478, 480, 565;
the French in, 368, 369, 373, 387, 388;
Craig's expedition to, 525, 526;
Russian aims in, 526–527;
its value to England, 539.
Manchester, Nonconformists in, 11;
political clubs founded, 12, 13, 17;
disorder in, 62.
"Manchester Constitutional Society," 12, 168, 169, 185.
Mann, Admiral, 243.
Mansfield, Lord, death of, 303.
Marengo, battle of, 386, 387.
Maret, Hugues Bernard (afterwards Duc de Bassano), in London, 79, 83, 94 n., 101;
interviews with Pitt, 79–82, 84;
his letter to Miles, 105–107;
his alleged mission to London, 108–112, 117;
ordered to leave, 112;
on Chauvelin, 115 n.;
one of the plenipotentiaries at Lille, 323.
Margarot, Maurice, 177, 181;
his trial and transportation, 182–184.
Maria Carolina, Queen of Naples, 365, 368, 372, 376.
Maria Luisa, of Parma, Queen of Spain, 230, 231, 237.
Maria Theresa, 2nd wife of the Emperor Francis II, 199.
Marie Antoinette, the flight to Varennes, 1, 4, 10;
her anger, 7;
her schemes, 7, 49, 85;
Page 645
her execution, 141.
Maritime Code, British, opposed by the Baltic powers, 388.
Markoff, Russian minister, 122.
Maroons, their atrocities in Jamaica, 237, 238.
Marseilles, the Royalists in, 144–146.
Martello towers, 512, 513.
Martinique, failure of English attack on, 221;
capture of, 225;
to be ceded to France, 469.
Masséna, André (Duc de Rivoli), 378, 386.
Maubeuge, siege of, 141.
Maulde, French envoy at The Hague, 76, 82, 83.
Maxwell, Colonel, 360.
Maxwell, Dr., of York, his order for daggers, 64, 65.
Maxwell, James, of York, 64, 65.
Maynooth College, founded, 343, 344.
Mealmaker, author of "An address to the People," 178.
Melas, Field-Marshal, 376.
Melvill, 324–326.
Melville, Lord. See Dundas, Henry.
Mercy d'Argenteau, Count, 4, 7, 8 n., 205.
Merry, Antony, Secretary of legation at Madrid, 242.
Merveldt, General Count, 205.
Middleton, Sir Charles. See Barham, Lord.
Miles, William Augustus, British agent at Paris, 59, 60, 79, 84, 85, 93, 94, 99, 105, 106, 109–
111.
Militia, the, 509, 510.
Militia Acts, 279.
Milman, Dr., the King's physician, 506.
Mingay of Norfolk, 188.
Minto, Earl of (Sir Gilbert Elliot), his motion to repeal the Test Act in Scotland, 13, 14;
on Fox's conduct, 90;
commissioner at Dunkirk, 138–140;
commissioner at Toulon, 154, 156, 162;
Viceroy of Corsica, 244, 256–258;
Ambassador at Vienna, 380, 383, 384;
speech on the Union, 421.
Mirabeau, Count, 2, 11, 42, 171.
Miranda, General Francesco, 103, 106, 109;
ordered to prepare for invasion of Holland, 107;
defeated by Coburg, 126.
Missouri River, British mercantile ports on, 244.
Mitchell, Admiral, his successes against the Dutch, 381.
Mitford, Sir John (afterwards Lord Redesdale), made Speaker, 439;
letter to Pitt, 485, 486.
Moira, Earl of, 137, 158, 165, 209, 262, 268, 355, 497.
Möllendorf, Marshal, 201, 207, 208, 212, 217.
Monge, Gaspard, French Minister for the Navy, 58;
Maritime Code, British, opposed by the Baltic powers, 388.
Markoff, Russian minister, 122.
Maroons, their atrocities in Jamaica, 237, 238.
Marseilles, the Royalists in, 144–146.
Martello towers, 512, 513.
Martinique, failure of English attack on, 221;
capture of, 225;
to be ceded to France, 469.
Masséna, André (Duc de Rivoli), 378, 386.
Maubeuge, siege of, 141.
Maulde, French envoy at The Hague, 76, 82, 83.
Maxwell, Colonel, 360.
Maxwell, Dr., of York, his order for daggers, 64, 65.
Maxwell, James, of York, 64, 65.
Maynooth College, founded, 343, 344.
Mealmaker, author of "An address to the People," 178.
Melas, Field-Marshal, 376.
Melvill, 324–326.
Melville, Lord. See Dundas, Henry.
Mercy d'Argenteau, Count, 4, 7, 8 n., 205.
Merry, Antony, Secretary of legation at Madrid, 242.
Merveldt, General Count, 205.
Middleton, Sir Charles. See Barham, Lord.
Miles, William Augustus, British agent at Paris, 59, 60, 79, 84, 85, 93, 94, 99, 105, 106, 109–
111.
Militia, the, 509, 510.
Militia Acts, 279.
Milman, Dr., the King's physician, 506.
Mingay of Norfolk, 188.
Minto, Earl of (Sir Gilbert Elliot), his motion to repeal the Test Act in Scotland, 13, 14;
on Fox's conduct, 90;
commissioner at Dunkirk, 138–140;
commissioner at Toulon, 154, 156, 162;
Viceroy of Corsica, 244, 256–258;
Ambassador at Vienna, 380, 383, 384;
speech on the Union, 421.
Mirabeau, Count, 2, 11, 42, 171.
Miranda, General Francesco, 103, 106, 109;
ordered to prepare for invasion of Holland, 107;
defeated by Coburg, 126.
Missouri River, British mercantile ports on, 244.
Mitchell, Admiral, his successes against the Dutch, 381.
Mitford, Sir John (afterwards Lord Redesdale), made Speaker, 439;
letter to Pitt, 485, 486.
Moira, Earl of, 137, 158, 165, 209, 262, 268, 355, 497.
Möllendorf, Marshal, 201, 207, 208, 212, 217.
Monge, Gaspard, French Minister for the Navy, 58;
Page 646
his circular letter, 101–103, 106.
Montrose, Duke of, President of the Board of Trade, 501.
Moore, John, Archbishop of Canterbury, 294, 302;
and Catholic Emancipation, 434, 437;
death of, 477.
Moore, Sir John, on Abercromby, 240;
in the West Indies, 241;
in Corsica, 257, 274;
in Ireland, 361;
and the Volunteers, 492, 493, 510, 512, 547.
More, Hannah, 335, 337.
Moreau, General, 276, 376.
"Morning Chronicle," the, 66, 178;
in the pay of the French Embassy, 66 n.;
prosecution of, 173.
"Morning Post," the, 66.
Mornington, Earl of. See Wellesley, Marquis.
Morris, Gouverneur, 96 n.;
on the state of France in 1795, 259.
Moylan, Bishop, 417, 425 n.
Muir, Thomas, 174, 175;
goes to Paris, 175;
his trial and sentence, 176, 179, 180;
at Sydney, 177;
his death, 177.
Mulgrave, 1st Lord, 148.
Mulgrave, Henry, 2nd Lord (afterwards Earl of Mulgrave), Chancellor of the Duchy, 501,
514;
Foreign Secretary, 517, 523, 527, 538, 542, 549, 550, 552, 556.
Munro, British chargé-d'affaires in Paris, 64 n., 68.
Münster, Treaty of (1648), 71, 76.
Murphy, Father John, his barbarities in Wexford, 360–362;
hanged, 362.
Murphy, Father Michael, 360;
killed, 361.
Murray, Sir James, envoy at Frankfurt, 108, 122 n., 126 n.;
Chief of Staff to the Duke of York, 140, 220.
Nagel, Dutch envoy in London, appeals for help, 77.
Nantes, assault of, 136.
Naples, compact with England, 123, 143, 150, 267, 268;
French conquest of, 372;
Nelson's vengeance on, 376;
makes peace with Bonaparte, 386;
468.
Napoleon Bonaparte, 119, 120, 570;
his "Souper de Beaucaire," 146;
at Toulon, 147, 148, 151, 159;
Montrose, Duke of, President of the Board of Trade, 501.
Moore, John, Archbishop of Canterbury, 294, 302;
and Catholic Emancipation, 434, 437;
death of, 477.
Moore, Sir John, on Abercromby, 240;
in the West Indies, 241;
in Corsica, 257, 274;
in Ireland, 361;
and the Volunteers, 492, 493, 510, 512, 547.
More, Hannah, 335, 337.
Moreau, General, 276, 376.
"Morning Chronicle," the, 66, 178;
in the pay of the French Embassy, 66 n.;
prosecution of, 173.
"Morning Post," the, 66.
Mornington, Earl of. See Wellesley, Marquis.
Morris, Gouverneur, 96 n.;
on the state of France in 1795, 259.
Moylan, Bishop, 417, 425 n.
Muir, Thomas, 174, 175;
goes to Paris, 175;
his trial and sentence, 176, 179, 180;
at Sydney, 177;
his death, 177.
Mulgrave, 1st Lord, 148.
Mulgrave, Henry, 2nd Lord (afterwards Earl of Mulgrave), Chancellor of the Duchy, 501,
514;
Foreign Secretary, 517, 523, 527, 538, 542, 549, 550, 552, 556.
Munro, British chargé-d'affaires in Paris, 64 n., 68.
Münster, Treaty of (1648), 71, 76.
Murphy, Father John, his barbarities in Wexford, 360–362;
hanged, 362.
Murphy, Father Michael, 360;
killed, 361.
Murray, Sir James, envoy at Frankfurt, 108, 122 n., 126 n.;
Chief of Staff to the Duke of York, 140, 220.
Nagel, Dutch envoy in London, appeals for help, 77.
Nantes, assault of, 136.
Naples, compact with England, 123, 143, 150, 267, 268;
French conquest of, 372;
Nelson's vengeance on, 376;
makes peace with Bonaparte, 386;
468.
Napoleon Bonaparte, 119, 120, 570;
his "Souper de Beaucaire," 146;
at Toulon, 147, 148, 151, 159;
Page 647
his Italian campaign, 243, 257, 258, 276, 304, 308, 321, 365;
his Eastern expedition, 244, 245, 255, 258, 276, 278, 328, 350, 356, 357, 363, 364, 430;
disperses the royalist rising in Paris (1795), 263;
peace of Campo Formio, 327;
at Dunkirk, 349;
First Consul, 383, 468–470, 478;
proposes terms of peace to Austria and England, 383, 568;
battle of Marengo, 386, 387;
dupes the Czar, 388;
renews peace negotiations, 468;
his conquests (1802), 478;
his behaviour to Whitworth, 485;
declares war on England, 487;
threatened invasion of England, 493, 510, 511;
his position in 1804, 505;
seizes Sir H. Rumbold, 515;
again proposes terms of peace, 516;
crowned King of Italy, 528;
annexes Genoa, 528, 529;
battle of Austerlitz, 544.
National Debt, the (1792), 31;
(1801), 451.
National Defence, 278–281.
Navy, state of the (1793), 124;
causes of discontent in, 310;
mutinies at Spithead and the Nore, 310–320.
Needham, General, 361.
Neerwinden, battle of, 126, 127, 267.
Nelson, Lord, in Corsica, 256;
on the position of Italy, 277;
at Cape St. Vincent, 276, 309;
battle of the Nile, 367–369;
at Naples, 372, 376;
battle of Copenhagen, 388, 450;
interview with Pitt, 533;
battle of Trafalgar, 534, 538, 565;
death of, 521, 538.
Nepean, Sir Evan, on the Scottish prosecutions, 178;
Pitt at his house, 459;
Irish Secretary, 501, 519.
Netherlands, Austrian, ceded to France, 327.
Netherlands, Dutch. See Dutch Republic.
New Ross, fight at, 360, 361.
New South Wales, 565.
Nicholls, Mr., 330, 472.
Nicols, General, 241.
Nile, battle of the, 368, 369.
Noël, French agent in London, 60, 69, 82, 89 n., 93, 94, 96.
his Eastern expedition, 244, 245, 255, 258, 276, 278, 328, 350, 356, 357, 363, 364, 430;
disperses the royalist rising in Paris (1795), 263;
peace of Campo Formio, 327;
at Dunkirk, 349;
First Consul, 383, 468–470, 478;
proposes terms of peace to Austria and England, 383, 568;
battle of Marengo, 386, 387;
dupes the Czar, 388;
renews peace negotiations, 468;
his conquests (1802), 478;
his behaviour to Whitworth, 485;
declares war on England, 487;
threatened invasion of England, 493, 510, 511;
his position in 1804, 505;
seizes Sir H. Rumbold, 515;
again proposes terms of peace, 516;
crowned King of Italy, 528;
annexes Genoa, 528, 529;
battle of Austerlitz, 544.
National Debt, the (1792), 31;
(1801), 451.
National Defence, 278–281.
Navy, state of the (1793), 124;
causes of discontent in, 310;
mutinies at Spithead and the Nore, 310–320.
Needham, General, 361.
Neerwinden, battle of, 126, 127, 267.
Nelson, Lord, in Corsica, 256;
on the position of Italy, 277;
at Cape St. Vincent, 276, 309;
battle of the Nile, 367–369;
at Naples, 372, 376;
battle of Copenhagen, 388, 450;
interview with Pitt, 533;
battle of Trafalgar, 534, 538, 565;
death of, 521, 538.
Nepean, Sir Evan, on the Scottish prosecutions, 178;
Pitt at his house, 459;
Irish Secretary, 501, 519.
Netherlands, Austrian, ceded to France, 327.
Netherlands, Dutch. See Dutch Republic.
New Ross, fight at, 360, 361.
New South Wales, 565.
Nicholls, Mr., 330, 472.
Nicols, General, 241.
Nile, battle of the, 368, 369.
Noël, French agent in London, 60, 69, 82, 89 n., 93, 94, 96.
Page 648
Nonconformists, position of, 10, 11;
no longer support Pitt, 12;
riots in Birmingham, 18.
Nootka Sound dispute, the, 92, 154, 197, 235;
Convention, 232.
Nore, the, mutiny at, 314–320.
Norfolk, Duke of, his seditious speech, 333;
and Arthur O'Connor, 350.
Norwich, Bishop of. See Sutton, Charles Manners, 477.
Norwich, Radical Clubs at, 168, 181, 186, 284.
Novossiltzoff, Count, his mission to London, 516, 522, 525;
in Berlin, 528, 529.
O'Brien, Sir Edward, 408.
O'Coigly. See Quigley.
O'Connor, Arthur, 346, 350, 351, 394.
O'Drusse, 325, 326.
O'Finn, the brothers, 351.
O'Hara, General, at Toulon, 153, 154, 156;
captured, 157.
Orange, Prince of. See William V.
Orange, Wilhelmina, Princess of, 250.
Orangemen, 344, 359;
oppose the Union, 425.
Orde, Thomas (afterwards Lord Bolton), 39.
Orleans, Duke of (Philippe Egalité), 59, 79.
Otto, General, 208.
Oubril, Count d', 540, 541.
Pache, Jean Nicolas, French Minister of War, 83, 121.
Paine, Thomas, his "Rights of Man," 14–16, 19–23, 25, 26, 50, 167;
intimate with Talleyrand, 51;
elected as deputy for Calais, 61;
circulation of his works, 167, 168, 175;
prosecution of, 172;
story of, 180.
Palmer, T. F., transported for sedition, 178, 179.
Paoli, Pascal, 150 n., 227, 256, 257.
Paris, deputation of British residents to the National Convention, 71;
activity of Britons in, 175;
royalist rising in, 263.
Parker, Vice-Admiral, 311.
Parker, Richard, and the Mutiny at the Nore, 314, 315.
Parker, Theresa, on the taxes of 1797, 329.
Parliament, movement for Reform, 11, 12, 21, 23–28, 164, 171, 180, 181;
evolution of the Cabinet, 34;
growing power of the Prime Minister, 34;
election of 1796, 295.
no longer support Pitt, 12;
riots in Birmingham, 18.
Nootka Sound dispute, the, 92, 154, 197, 235;
Convention, 232.
Nore, the, mutiny at, 314–320.
Norfolk, Duke of, his seditious speech, 333;
and Arthur O'Connor, 350.
Norwich, Bishop of. See Sutton, Charles Manners, 477.
Norwich, Radical Clubs at, 168, 181, 186, 284.
Novossiltzoff, Count, his mission to London, 516, 522, 525;
in Berlin, 528, 529.
O'Brien, Sir Edward, 408.
O'Coigly. See Quigley.
O'Connor, Arthur, 346, 350, 351, 394.
O'Drusse, 325, 326.
O'Finn, the brothers, 351.
O'Hara, General, at Toulon, 153, 154, 156;
captured, 157.
Orange, Prince of. See William V.
Orange, Wilhelmina, Princess of, 250.
Orangemen, 344, 359;
oppose the Union, 425.
Orde, Thomas (afterwards Lord Bolton), 39.
Orleans, Duke of (Philippe Egalité), 59, 79.
Otto, General, 208.
Oubril, Count d', 540, 541.
Pache, Jean Nicolas, French Minister of War, 83, 121.
Paine, Thomas, his "Rights of Man," 14–16, 19–23, 25, 26, 50, 167;
intimate with Talleyrand, 51;
elected as deputy for Calais, 61;
circulation of his works, 167, 168, 175;
prosecution of, 172;
story of, 180.
Palmer, T. F., transported for sedition, 178, 179.
Paoli, Pascal, 150 n., 227, 256, 257.
Paris, deputation of British residents to the National Convention, 71;
activity of Britons in, 175;
royalist rising in, 263.
Parker, Vice-Admiral, 311.
Parker, Richard, and the Mutiny at the Nore, 314, 315.
Parker, Theresa, on the taxes of 1797, 329.
Parliament, movement for Reform, 11, 12, 21, 23–28, 164, 171, 180, 181;
evolution of the Cabinet, 34;
growing power of the Prime Minister, 34;
election of 1796, 295.
Page 649
Parnell, Sir John, Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, 341, 401, 411.
Parsons, Sir L., 424.
Parthenopean Republic, the, 372.
Paterson, Chairman of the British Convention, 182.
Patriotic Contribution, the (1797), 330, 331.
Paul I, Czar, 258;
his indignation with France, 365, 366, 368, 369;
alliance with England, 373, 376;
breaks with Austria, 379;
joins England in the expedition against Holland, 380;
duped by Bonaparte, 388;
murdered, 388.
Pays Bas. See Belgic Provinces.
Peel, Robert (senior), and the Patriotic Contribution, 331;
on the Union, 428.
Peep o' Day Boys, 344.
Pelham, Thomas (afterwards Earl of Chichester), Secretary to Earl Camden, 343;
Irish Chief Secretary, 359 n., 399;
on Pitt's pledge to the King, 448;
Home Secretary, 483, 484;
omitted from Pitt's ministry, 501.
Perceval, Spencer, 466;
Attorney-General 501, 569.
Perth, sedition in, 77, 174.
Pétion, Jérôme, 58.
Petty, Lord Henry, 520.
Pichegru, General Charles, 162, 200, 215, 216, 377.
Pilnitz, Declaration of, 5, 6.
Pinckard, Dr., his account of the West India expedition, 226.
Pitt, Lady Ann, marries Lord Grenville, 37.
Pitt, Thomas, of Boccanoc. See Camelford, Lord.
Pitt, William, his neutrality towards the French Revolution, 3–5, 6, 8;
first private meeting with Burke, 7, 8;
distrusts Leopold II, 8;
opposes Nonconformist claims, 10–12, 24;
his opposition to Reform, 12, 23, 24, 26–28;
his finance, 30–32, 265, 304–309, 328–333, 369–371, 427, 450, 451;
sends Lord Macartney to China, 32;
insists on dismissal of Thurlow, 34;
rumour of his impending fall, 35;
negotiates for union with the Old Whigs, 35–39, 270;
made Warden of the Cinque Ports, 39, 89;
interview with Canning, 39–41;
his reception of Talleyrand, 43;
discussion of his policy, 46–48;
assertion of neutrality, 48, 50, 52, 61, 98;
cautious Polish policy, 55;
ignorant of events in France, 58;
Parsons, Sir L., 424.
Parthenopean Republic, the, 372.
Paterson, Chairman of the British Convention, 182.
Patriotic Contribution, the (1797), 330, 331.
Paul I, Czar, 258;
his indignation with France, 365, 366, 368, 369;
alliance with England, 373, 376;
breaks with Austria, 379;
joins England in the expedition against Holland, 380;
duped by Bonaparte, 388;
murdered, 388.
Pays Bas. See Belgic Provinces.
Peel, Robert (senior), and the Patriotic Contribution, 331;
on the Union, 428.
Peep o' Day Boys, 344.
Pelham, Thomas (afterwards Earl of Chichester), Secretary to Earl Camden, 343;
Irish Chief Secretary, 359 n., 399;
on Pitt's pledge to the King, 448;
Home Secretary, 483, 484;
omitted from Pitt's ministry, 501.
Perceval, Spencer, 466;
Attorney-General 501, 569.
Perth, sedition in, 77, 174.
Pétion, Jérôme, 58.
Petty, Lord Henry, 520.
Pichegru, General Charles, 162, 200, 215, 216, 377.
Pilnitz, Declaration of, 5, 6.
Pinckard, Dr., his account of the West India expedition, 226.
Pitt, Lady Ann, marries Lord Grenville, 37.
Pitt, Thomas, of Boccanoc. See Camelford, Lord.
Pitt, William, his neutrality towards the French Revolution, 3–5, 6, 8;
first private meeting with Burke, 7, 8;
distrusts Leopold II, 8;
opposes Nonconformist claims, 10–12, 24;
his opposition to Reform, 12, 23, 24, 26–28;
his finance, 30–32, 265, 304–309, 328–333, 369–371, 427, 450, 451;
sends Lord Macartney to China, 32;
insists on dismissal of Thurlow, 34;
rumour of his impending fall, 35;
negotiates for union with the Old Whigs, 35–39, 270;
made Warden of the Cinque Ports, 39, 89;
interview with Canning, 39–41;
his reception of Talleyrand, 43;
discussion of his policy, 46–48;
assertion of neutrality, 48, 50, 52, 61, 98;
cautious Polish policy, 55;
ignorant of events in France, 58;
Page 650
life at Holwood and Walmer, 68;
foresees no danger, 69;
his concern at the November decrees, 72–74, 76;
his assurances to Holland, 74, 114;
considers war unavoidable, 76, 77;
interviews with Maret, 79–80, 84;
support of his policy not unanimous, 89, 90;
his firm attitude, 91;
Godoy's story of, 92, 93;
Lebrun's charges against, 95, 113, 117;
stiff reply to Chauvelin, 98, 99;
declaration of policy, 100;
his anger with Miles, 106;
difficulties of neutrality, 112–113;
faults of his policy, 114–116;
harsh treatment of Radical Clubs, 114–115;
his view of the war, 118–120, 219, 220;
his war policy (1793), 123, 129, 131, 132, 137, 139, 144, 145, 147;
his care for the navy, 124, 266;
ignorant of military affairs, 128;
his optimism, 131, 144, 151, 152;
demands removal of Coburg, 142;
Mediterranean policy, 143, 258;
his intentions at Toulon, 152, 154–156;
effect of Toulon on his policy, 162, 163;
his Traitorous Correspondence Bill, 164, 165;
altered attitude to Reform, 164, 171, 180;
policy of repression, 171, 183, 184, 190–194, 333;
speech on the Scottish prosecutions, 179, 180;
suspends the Habeas Corpus Act, 191;
mistaken as to affairs in France, 196, 197;
deprecates peace, 198;
war policy in 1794, 202, 204–217;
dilatoriness in ratifying Prussian Alliance, 208, 210, 269;
remonstrance to Prussian Ambassador, 212, 270;
insists on recall of the Duke of York, 215;
policy in the West Indies, 220 et seq.;
negotiations with Spain, 233;
makes treaty with Russia and Austria, 235;
speech on abolition of slavery, 238;
inclines towards peace, 242, 243, 257, 276, 287;
tries to avert war with Spain, 243, 244;
policy at the Cape, 254, 255;
attitude towards Corsica, 256–258;
relations with the émigrés, 259, 287;
the Quiberon expedition, 259–262;
policy as War Minister, see Chap. XII;
changes in the Cabinet, 270–272;
foresees no danger, 69;
his concern at the November decrees, 72–74, 76;
his assurances to Holland, 74, 114;
considers war unavoidable, 76, 77;
interviews with Maret, 79–80, 84;
support of his policy not unanimous, 89, 90;
his firm attitude, 91;
Godoy's story of, 92, 93;
Lebrun's charges against, 95, 113, 117;
stiff reply to Chauvelin, 98, 99;
declaration of policy, 100;
his anger with Miles, 106;
difficulties of neutrality, 112–113;
faults of his policy, 114–116;
harsh treatment of Radical Clubs, 114–115;
his view of the war, 118–120, 219, 220;
his war policy (1793), 123, 129, 131, 132, 137, 139, 144, 145, 147;
his care for the navy, 124, 266;
ignorant of military affairs, 128;
his optimism, 131, 144, 151, 152;
demands removal of Coburg, 142;
Mediterranean policy, 143, 258;
his intentions at Toulon, 152, 154–156;
effect of Toulon on his policy, 162, 163;
his Traitorous Correspondence Bill, 164, 165;
altered attitude to Reform, 164, 171, 180;
policy of repression, 171, 183, 184, 190–194, 333;
speech on the Scottish prosecutions, 179, 180;
suspends the Habeas Corpus Act, 191;
mistaken as to affairs in France, 196, 197;
deprecates peace, 198;
war policy in 1794, 202, 204–217;
dilatoriness in ratifying Prussian Alliance, 208, 210, 269;
remonstrance to Prussian Ambassador, 212, 270;
insists on recall of the Duke of York, 215;
policy in the West Indies, 220 et seq.;
negotiations with Spain, 233;
makes treaty with Russia and Austria, 235;
speech on abolition of slavery, 238;
inclines towards peace, 242, 243, 257, 276, 287;
tries to avert war with Spain, 243, 244;
policy at the Cape, 254, 255;
attitude towards Corsica, 256–258;
relations with the émigrés, 259, 287;
the Quiberon expedition, 259–262;
policy as War Minister, see Chap. XII;
changes in the Cabinet, 270–272;
Page 651
national defence policy, 278–281;
agitation against him, 282–284, 288;
caricatures of, 282, 301, 335 n., 337;
his Sedition Bills, 285–287;
action with regard to shortage of corn, 289, 290;
institutes a Board of Agriculture, 293;
treatment of the Enclosures question, 295–297;
his Poor Bill (1797), 297, 298;
his relations with Miss Eden, 300–303;
his financial embarrassments, 302, 303, 473–477;
issues a "Loyalty Loan," 305, 306;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 312–320;
compared with Chatham, 320;
further efforts for peace, 321–326;
hostility to his new taxes (1797), 329, 330;
the "Patriotic Contribution," 330, 331;
his Land Tax proposals, 331–333;
his duel with Tierney, 334–336;
verses in the "Anti-Jacobin," 337;
Irish policy, see Chaps. XVI, XVIII, XIX, 566;
sends a squadron to the Mediterranean, 366, 367;
his Income Tax, 370, 427;
his aims in Europe (1798), 371;
his policy towards Switzerland, 375;
the expedition to Holland, 379–383;
rejects Bonaparte's offers of peace, 383–385, 473;
on commercial union with Ireland, 389, 390;
his first reference to the Union, 393;
preparations for the Union, 396–410;
speeches on the Act of Union, 413–415, 426, 427;
his use of bribery in Ireland, 424, 429;
his proposal for Catholic Emancipation, 431;
opposition of the King, 433–439;
breaks down in health, 435;
his resignation, 439–446, 450;
his promises to the Catholics, 441, 442, 446;
gives a pledge to the King during his illness, 448, 449, 518;
breach with Auckland, 452;
personal characteristics, 454–459, 491;
his neglect of literature and art, 456;
his scholarship, 458;
his friendship with Wellesley and Canning, 459–466;
his creations of peers, 466–468;
supports Addington and the peace proposals (1801), 468–472, 478;
vote of thanks to him carried, 472;
at Walmer, 471, 473, 474, 477;
his interest in farming and gardening, 473, 474, 479, 491;
his private expenses, 474;
agitation against him, 282–284, 288;
caricatures of, 282, 301, 335 n., 337;
his Sedition Bills, 285–287;
action with regard to shortage of corn, 289, 290;
institutes a Board of Agriculture, 293;
treatment of the Enclosures question, 295–297;
his Poor Bill (1797), 297, 298;
his relations with Miss Eden, 300–303;
his financial embarrassments, 302, 303, 473–477;
issues a "Loyalty Loan," 305, 306;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 312–320;
compared with Chatham, 320;
further efforts for peace, 321–326;
hostility to his new taxes (1797), 329, 330;
the "Patriotic Contribution," 330, 331;
his Land Tax proposals, 331–333;
his duel with Tierney, 334–336;
verses in the "Anti-Jacobin," 337;
Irish policy, see Chaps. XVI, XVIII, XIX, 566;
sends a squadron to the Mediterranean, 366, 367;
his Income Tax, 370, 427;
his aims in Europe (1798), 371;
his policy towards Switzerland, 375;
the expedition to Holland, 379–383;
rejects Bonaparte's offers of peace, 383–385, 473;
on commercial union with Ireland, 389, 390;
his first reference to the Union, 393;
preparations for the Union, 396–410;
speeches on the Act of Union, 413–415, 426, 427;
his use of bribery in Ireland, 424, 429;
his proposal for Catholic Emancipation, 431;
opposition of the King, 433–439;
breaks down in health, 435;
his resignation, 439–446, 450;
his promises to the Catholics, 441, 442, 446;
gives a pledge to the King during his illness, 448, 449, 518;
breach with Auckland, 452;
personal characteristics, 454–459, 491;
his neglect of literature and art, 456;
his scholarship, 458;
his friendship with Wellesley and Canning, 459–466;
his creations of peers, 466–468;
supports Addington and the peace proposals (1801), 468–472, 478;
vote of thanks to him carried, 472;
at Walmer, 471, 473, 474, 477;
his interest in farming and gardening, 473, 474, 479, 491;
his private expenses, 474;
Page 652
subscription for, 476, 477;
relations with Addington, 473, 477, 478, 480–482, 503, 504;
at Bath, 479;
negotiations with Dundas, 483, 484;
his terms for return to office, 485;
speech on the war with France (1803), 487, 488;
death of his mother, 488;
organizes the East Kent Volunteers, 489–494, 511, 512;
Lady Hester Stanhope at Walmer, 490–493;
refuses to join Grenville, 495, 496;
agrees to accept office, 497;
attack on Addington, 499;
forms a ministry, 500–502;
and the Slave Trade, 502, 503;
difficulties of his position, 503, 504;
declines Livingston's peace proposals, 505, 506;
remonstrates with the Princess of Wales, 508;
his measures for strengthening the army, 509, 511;
constructs the Hythe Military Canal, 512;
seizes Spanish treasure-ships, 514;
on the restoration of the French monarchy, 515;
rejects Napoleon's overtures, 516, 566;
forms a junction with Addington, 517;
opposes Fox's motion for Catholic Emancipation, 518, 519;
on the impeachment of Lord Melville, 519–521;
his foreign policy (1805), 523–525;
negotiations with Russia, 525–529;
final parting with Addington, 530;
fails to form a national administration, 530;
multiplicity of his cares, 530, 531;
interview with Nelson, 533;
receives the news of Ulm, 537, 538;
his speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet (1805), 538;
his magnanimous offers to Prussia, 538, 539;
his foresight in South Africa, 539;
rejects Prussia's demand for Hanover, 541, 542;
correspondence with Harrowby, 541–547;
goes back to Bath, 547;
story of his reception of the news of Austerlitz, 548, 549;
returns home, 553, 554;
last days and death, 554–558;
opposition to his burial in the Abbey, 559;
summary of his career and character, 560–570.
Place, Francis, 283, 284, 286, 349, 350.
Pléville, Admiral, 323.
Plunket, William C. (afterwards Baron), 399, 404, 411.
Plymouth, fortification of, 124.
Pocket Boroughs, in Ireland, disfranchised, 428.
relations with Addington, 473, 477, 478, 480–482, 503, 504;
at Bath, 479;
negotiations with Dundas, 483, 484;
his terms for return to office, 485;
speech on the war with France (1803), 487, 488;
death of his mother, 488;
organizes the East Kent Volunteers, 489–494, 511, 512;
Lady Hester Stanhope at Walmer, 490–493;
refuses to join Grenville, 495, 496;
agrees to accept office, 497;
attack on Addington, 499;
forms a ministry, 500–502;
and the Slave Trade, 502, 503;
difficulties of his position, 503, 504;
declines Livingston's peace proposals, 505, 506;
remonstrates with the Princess of Wales, 508;
his measures for strengthening the army, 509, 511;
constructs the Hythe Military Canal, 512;
seizes Spanish treasure-ships, 514;
on the restoration of the French monarchy, 515;
rejects Napoleon's overtures, 516, 566;
forms a junction with Addington, 517;
opposes Fox's motion for Catholic Emancipation, 518, 519;
on the impeachment of Lord Melville, 519–521;
his foreign policy (1805), 523–525;
negotiations with Russia, 525–529;
final parting with Addington, 530;
fails to form a national administration, 530;
multiplicity of his cares, 530, 531;
interview with Nelson, 533;
receives the news of Ulm, 537, 538;
his speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet (1805), 538;
his magnanimous offers to Prussia, 538, 539;
his foresight in South Africa, 539;
rejects Prussia's demand for Hanover, 541, 542;
correspondence with Harrowby, 541–547;
goes back to Bath, 547;
story of his reception of the news of Austerlitz, 548, 549;
returns home, 553, 554;
last days and death, 554–558;
opposition to his burial in the Abbey, 559;
summary of his career and character, 560–570.
Place, Francis, 283, 284, 286, 349, 350.
Pléville, Admiral, 323.
Plunket, William C. (afterwards Baron), 399, 404, 411.
Plymouth, fortification of, 124.
Pocket Boroughs, in Ireland, disfranchised, 428.
Page 653
Poland, new Constitution in, 7, 52;
Russian designs on, 9, 46, 52;
scheme of partition of, 53, 129;
Russian invasion of, 53–56;
Prussian invasion of, 122;
rising in, 206;
third Partition of, 218.
Polastron, Mme., 263.
Pondicherry, 198.
Ponsonby, George, 521, 559.
Ponsonby, George, and William (afterwards Baron), Fitzwilliam's overtures to, 339–342;
402.
Poor Bill, Pitt's (1797), withdrawn, 298, 568.
Portland, Duke of, proposed coalitions with Pitt, 35–38, 191, 208, 270;
Canning and, 39;
refuses to break with Fox, 89, 90;
Home Secretary, 191, 244–247, 257, 258, 271, 285, 316, 322, 339, 341, 342, 359, 398,
404, 407, 421, 440, 446, 483;
censures Abercromby, 353, 354;
his letters to Shelburne on the Irish settlement of 1782, 422;
Lord President, 501.
Porto Rico, failure of attack on, 246.
Portsmouth, fortification of, 124.
Portugal, Spanish designs on, 233, 234, 244;
loan to, 309;
defended by England, 386, 387, 468, 469;
pays an annual subsidy to France, 513.
Potsdam, Treaty of (1805), 539, 540.
Press-gang, the, 166.
Pretyman, Dr. See Tomline, Bishop.
Price, Dr., his sermon in the Old Jewry, 12 n.;
his death, 17.
Priestley, Dr., 10, 12, 16 n.;
his sermon on the death of Dr. Price, 17;
his chapel and house wrecked, 18.
Pringle, Admiral, his opinion of Cape Town, 254.
Prosperous, affair at, 357, 358.
Protestants, the, in Ireland, 394, 396, 397, 400, 430;
their hostility to the Union, 408, 417, 423.
Provence, Comte de (afterwards Louis XVIII), 2, 129, 259;
refused permission to go to Toulon, 155;
at the Russian headquarters, 377.
Prussia, alliance with Austria, 5;
renounces alliance with Turkey, 5 n.;
declares war against France, 52;
her betrayal of Poland, 52, 53, 129;
invades Poland, 122, 123;
compact with England (1793), 123;
Russian designs on, 9, 46, 52;
scheme of partition of, 53, 129;
Russian invasion of, 53–56;
Prussian invasion of, 122;
rising in, 206;
third Partition of, 218.
Polastron, Mme., 263.
Pondicherry, 198.
Ponsonby, George, 521, 559.
Ponsonby, George, and William (afterwards Baron), Fitzwilliam's overtures to, 339–342;
402.
Poor Bill, Pitt's (1797), withdrawn, 298, 568.
Portland, Duke of, proposed coalitions with Pitt, 35–38, 191, 208, 270;
Canning and, 39;
refuses to break with Fox, 89, 90;
Home Secretary, 191, 244–247, 257, 258, 271, 285, 316, 322, 339, 341, 342, 359, 398,
404, 407, 421, 440, 446, 483;
censures Abercromby, 353, 354;
his letters to Shelburne on the Irish settlement of 1782, 422;
Lord President, 501.
Porto Rico, failure of attack on, 246.
Portsmouth, fortification of, 124.
Portugal, Spanish designs on, 233, 234, 244;
loan to, 309;
defended by England, 386, 387, 468, 469;
pays an annual subsidy to France, 513.
Potsdam, Treaty of (1805), 539, 540.
Press-gang, the, 166.
Pretyman, Dr. See Tomline, Bishop.
Price, Dr., his sermon in the Old Jewry, 12 n.;
his death, 17.
Priestley, Dr., 10, 12, 16 n.;
his sermon on the death of Dr. Price, 17;
his chapel and house wrecked, 18.
Pringle, Admiral, his opinion of Cape Town, 254.
Prosperous, affair at, 357, 358.
Protestants, the, in Ireland, 394, 396, 397, 400, 430;
their hostility to the Union, 408, 417, 423.
Provence, Comte de (afterwards Louis XVIII), 2, 129, 259;
refused permission to go to Toulon, 155;
at the Russian headquarters, 377.
Prussia, alliance with Austria, 5;
renounces alliance with Turkey, 5 n.;
declares war against France, 52;
her betrayal of Poland, 52, 53, 129;
invades Poland, 122, 123;
compact with England (1793), 123;
Page 654
her disputes with Austria, 200–202;
state of her finances, 201;
English proposals to, 202, 203;
treaty with England (1794), 207, 269;
her breach of faith, 212;
treaty with France (1795), 217, 218, 233;
attitude of, in 1799, 374, 380;
her conduct with regard to Hanover, 535–537, 540, 541, 552, 553, 556, 560.
See Frederick William II and Frederick William III.
Puisaye, Comte de, Breton leader, 260–263, 274.
Pulteney, Sir James, failure of his attack on Ferrol, 386.
Pulteney, Sir William, 174;
opposes the taxes of 1797, 329.
Putney, Bowling Green House, 554–557.
Quesnoy, siege of, 138, 141;
surrendered, 210.
Quiberon Expedition, the, 227, 239, 259–262, 274;
failure of landing at (1800), 385.
Quigley (O'Coigly), hanged for treason, 350, 354.
Radical, use of the term, 1 n., 10, 23.
Rastatt, Congress of, 365, 374.
Redesdale, Lord. See Mitford, Sir John.
Reeves, John, founder of the "Anti-Levelling Society," 68.
Reform, influence of the French Revolution on, in England, 11;
Flood's motion for, 11, 12;
Hardy's efforts for, 21;
Pitt's opposition to, 23–28, 164, 171, 180;
change of aims, 171, 180.
Regency, threatened, 497.
Reichenbach, Conference of, 3;
Convention of, 48.
Reinhard, 108, 346.
Reuss, Prince, Austrian envoy at Berlin, 43.
Rewbell, Jean François, 325.
Reynolds, Dr., 554.
Reynolds, Sir Joshua, Pitt's neglect of, 456.
Richmond, Duke of, his charge against Paine, 50;
Master-General of the Ordnance, 124, 130, 131;
his incompetence, 137, 140;
his Reform plan, 168, 179, 192;
resigns, 273.
Richter, arrested, 190.
Rivoli, battle of, 308.
Robespierre, François Maximilien Joseph Isidore, 42, 116, 180;
his fall, 192, 212.
Rochester, Bishop of. See Horsley, Samuel.
state of her finances, 201;
English proposals to, 202, 203;
treaty with England (1794), 207, 269;
her breach of faith, 212;
treaty with France (1795), 217, 218, 233;
attitude of, in 1799, 374, 380;
her conduct with regard to Hanover, 535–537, 540, 541, 552, 553, 556, 560.
See Frederick William II and Frederick William III.
Puisaye, Comte de, Breton leader, 260–263, 274.
Pulteney, Sir James, failure of his attack on Ferrol, 386.
Pulteney, Sir William, 174;
opposes the taxes of 1797, 329.
Putney, Bowling Green House, 554–557.
Quesnoy, siege of, 138, 141;
surrendered, 210.
Quiberon Expedition, the, 227, 239, 259–262, 274;
failure of landing at (1800), 385.
Quigley (O'Coigly), hanged for treason, 350, 354.
Radical, use of the term, 1 n., 10, 23.
Rastatt, Congress of, 365, 374.
Redesdale, Lord. See Mitford, Sir John.
Reeves, John, founder of the "Anti-Levelling Society," 68.
Reform, influence of the French Revolution on, in England, 11;
Flood's motion for, 11, 12;
Hardy's efforts for, 21;
Pitt's opposition to, 23–28, 164, 171, 180;
change of aims, 171, 180.
Regency, threatened, 497.
Reichenbach, Conference of, 3;
Convention of, 48.
Reinhard, 108, 346.
Reuss, Prince, Austrian envoy at Berlin, 43.
Rewbell, Jean François, 325.
Reynolds, Dr., 554.
Reynolds, Sir Joshua, Pitt's neglect of, 456.
Richmond, Duke of, his charge against Paine, 50;
Master-General of the Ordnance, 124, 130, 131;
his incompetence, 137, 140;
his Reform plan, 168, 179, 192;
resigns, 273.
Richter, arrested, 190.
Rivoli, battle of, 308.
Robespierre, François Maximilien Joseph Isidore, 42, 116, 180;
his fall, 192, 212.
Rochester, Bishop of. See Horsley, Samuel.
Page 655
Roer, River, 126, 213.
Roland, J. Marie, French Minister of Home Affairs, 45, 58, 167.
Roland, Mme., 59, 86.
Rolle, Baron, French royalist agent, 5.
Rom, General, goes to San Domingo, 241.
Romilly, Sir Samuel, 61, 487 n., 488, 569.
Romney, Lord, 331.
Romney, George, 167.
Rose, George, Secretary to the Treasury, 6, 38, 119 n., 395, 448, 450;
resigns, 451, 465;
473, 475, 476, 479–482, 496, 530, 554;
Paymaster of the Forces, 501, 517.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 72, 114, 197.
Roussillon, Spanish campaign in, 197.
Rowan, Hamilton, 180, 402.
Rumbold, Sir Horace, Ambassador at Hamburg, seized by Napoleon, 515.
Russell, Lord William, 294, 422.
Russia, her designs on Poland, 9, 46, 122, 123, 129;
peace with Turkey, 29, 52;
treaties with England, 123, 235, 373, 376, 529;
successes in Italy, 376;
failure of campaign in Switzerland, 378, 379;
Dutch campaign, 379–383;
rupture with England, 388;
understanding with England, 508, 515;
compact with Austria (1804), 516;
treaty of Potsdam, 539.
See Catharine II, Paul I, and Alexander I.
Rutland, Duke of, 456.
Ryan, James, 442, 518, 519.
Ryder, Dudley. See Harrowby, Earl of.
St. André, André Jeanbon, 167.
St. Asaph, Bishop of. See Horsley, Samuel.
St. Helen's, Lord, Ambassador at Madrid, 150, 154, 156, 228, 230.
St. Januarius, 372.
St. John, Lord, 246.
St. John, Order of, 368, 369, 373, 468, 527.
St. Lucia, 225, 237, 240, 241.
St. Vincent, Sir John Jervis, Earl of, expedition to the West Indies, 137, 225, 243;
battle of St. Vincent, 244, 277, 309, 310, 336;
in the Mediterranean, 366, 367, 420;
First Lord of the Admiralty, 483, 495, 498, 501.
St. Vincent, revolt in, 239;
relief of, 241.
St. Vincent, Cape, battle of, 244, 277, 309, 310.
Saldanha Bay, defeat of the Dutch in, 254.
San Domingo, 220, 223 n., 225, 233, 235;
Roland, J. Marie, French Minister of Home Affairs, 45, 58, 167.
Roland, Mme., 59, 86.
Rolle, Baron, French royalist agent, 5.
Rom, General, goes to San Domingo, 241.
Romilly, Sir Samuel, 61, 487 n., 488, 569.
Romney, Lord, 331.
Romney, George, 167.
Rose, George, Secretary to the Treasury, 6, 38, 119 n., 395, 448, 450;
resigns, 451, 465;
473, 475, 476, 479–482, 496, 530, 554;
Paymaster of the Forces, 501, 517.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 72, 114, 197.
Roussillon, Spanish campaign in, 197.
Rowan, Hamilton, 180, 402.
Rumbold, Sir Horace, Ambassador at Hamburg, seized by Napoleon, 515.
Russell, Lord William, 294, 422.
Russia, her designs on Poland, 9, 46, 122, 123, 129;
peace with Turkey, 29, 52;
treaties with England, 123, 235, 373, 376, 529;
successes in Italy, 376;
failure of campaign in Switzerland, 378, 379;
Dutch campaign, 379–383;
rupture with England, 388;
understanding with England, 508, 515;
compact with Austria (1804), 516;
treaty of Potsdam, 539.
See Catharine II, Paul I, and Alexander I.
Rutland, Duke of, 456.
Ryan, James, 442, 518, 519.
Ryder, Dudley. See Harrowby, Earl of.
St. André, André Jeanbon, 167.
St. Asaph, Bishop of. See Horsley, Samuel.
St. Helen's, Lord, Ambassador at Madrid, 150, 154, 156, 228, 230.
St. Januarius, 372.
St. John, Lord, 246.
St. John, Order of, 368, 369, 373, 468, 527.
St. Lucia, 225, 237, 240, 241.
St. Vincent, Sir John Jervis, Earl of, expedition to the West Indies, 137, 225, 243;
battle of St. Vincent, 244, 277, 309, 310, 336;
in the Mediterranean, 366, 367, 420;
First Lord of the Admiralty, 483, 495, 498, 501.
St. Vincent, revolt in, 239;
relief of, 241.
St. Vincent, Cape, battle of, 244, 277, 309, 310.
Saldanha Bay, defeat of the Dutch in, 254.
San Domingo, 220, 223 n., 225, 233, 235;
Page 656
ceded to France, 236, 237, 241, 275, 321.
See also Hayti.
Santerre, Claude, 58.
"Sant' Iago," the, seizure of, 232, 233.
Sardinia, compact with England, 123, 143, 147, 150, 151, 267, 268;
growth of Jacobinism in, 197;
independence of, stipulated by Pitt, 371.
Saumur, capture of, 136.
Saurin, Capt. William, 404, 405 n.
Savoy, annexed by France, 68, 72, 113, 276.
Saxony, Elector of, King-elect of Poland, 54.
Scheldt, the, opening of, 47, 71, 72, 75, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86, 91, 97, 105, 114, 117, 119;
French gunboats in, 76, 107.
Schönbrunn, Convention of, 553.
Scotland, waking of political life in, 13, 22, 173;
failure of motion to repeal the Test Act in, 13, 14;
Radical movement in, 77, 173 et seq.
Scott, Sir John. See Eldon, Lord.
Scully, Denys, 442, 518, 519.
Sebastiani, Colonel, 483.
Secrecy, Parliamentary committee of, 167, 191, 316, 351.
"Secret Committee of England," the, 349.
Seditious Meetings Bill, 285–287.
Seditious writings, proclamation against, 24, 25, 50.
Ségur, Comte de, his mission to Berlin, 42–44.
September Massacres, the, 57, 59–62.
Seringapatam, capture of, 461, 462.
Servan, Joseph, 58.
Shannon, Lord, 341, 393, 402.
Sheares, Henry and John, United Irishmen, 354;
arrested, 355, 356.
Sheffield, disorder in, 62;
victory of Jermappes celebrated in, 70;
riots at, 166;
arrests at, 185, 186;
mass meeting at, 189, 193.
Sheffield Association, the, 21, 22, 25, 181.
Sheffield, Earl of, on French emissaries, 69, 70;
on the Corn Trade, 290;
on Pitt's redemption of Land Tax, 290, 332;
on Irish affairs, 395, 404, 421.
Shepherd, John, of Faversham, his report on shortage of corn, 289.
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, his breach with Canning, 39, 41;
warns Chauvelin of Whig patriotism, 87;
suggests an appeal to France to spare Louis, 91, 92, 94 n.;
on the massacre of royalists at Quiberon, 262;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 312, 313, 316, 318;
on the new taxes (1797), 329;
See also Hayti.
Santerre, Claude, 58.
"Sant' Iago," the, seizure of, 232, 233.
Sardinia, compact with England, 123, 143, 147, 150, 151, 267, 268;
growth of Jacobinism in, 197;
independence of, stipulated by Pitt, 371.
Saumur, capture of, 136.
Saurin, Capt. William, 404, 405 n.
Savoy, annexed by France, 68, 72, 113, 276.
Saxony, Elector of, King-elect of Poland, 54.
Scheldt, the, opening of, 47, 71, 72, 75, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86, 91, 97, 105, 114, 117, 119;
French gunboats in, 76, 107.
Schönbrunn, Convention of, 553.
Scotland, waking of political life in, 13, 22, 173;
failure of motion to repeal the Test Act in, 13, 14;
Radical movement in, 77, 173 et seq.
Scott, Sir John. See Eldon, Lord.
Scully, Denys, 442, 518, 519.
Sebastiani, Colonel, 483.
Secrecy, Parliamentary committee of, 167, 191, 316, 351.
"Secret Committee of England," the, 349.
Seditious Meetings Bill, 285–287.
Seditious writings, proclamation against, 24, 25, 50.
Ségur, Comte de, his mission to Berlin, 42–44.
September Massacres, the, 57, 59–62.
Seringapatam, capture of, 461, 462.
Servan, Joseph, 58.
Shannon, Lord, 341, 393, 402.
Sheares, Henry and John, United Irishmen, 354;
arrested, 355, 356.
Sheffield, disorder in, 62;
victory of Jermappes celebrated in, 70;
riots at, 166;
arrests at, 185, 186;
mass meeting at, 189, 193.
Sheffield Association, the, 21, 22, 25, 181.
Sheffield, Earl of, on French emissaries, 69, 70;
on the Corn Trade, 290;
on Pitt's redemption of Land Tax, 290, 332;
on Irish affairs, 395, 404, 421.
Shepherd, John, of Faversham, his report on shortage of corn, 289.
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, his breach with Canning, 39, 41;
warns Chauvelin of Whig patriotism, 87;
suggests an appeal to France to spare Louis, 91, 92, 94 n.;
on the massacre of royalists at Quiberon, 262;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 312, 313, 316, 318;
on the new taxes (1797), 329;
Page 657
and Arthur O'Connor, 350;
opposes the Act of Union, 412, 413, 421, 422, 427;
on Pitt's speech on the war (1803), 488;
on the danger of a standing army, 510;
as an orator, compared with Pitt, 567;
mentioned, 23, 24, 165, 179, 188, 191, 238, 241, 286, 290, 293, 309, 352 n., 383, 497,
498, 517, 518.
Sicily, policy of defence of, 525, 526.
Sidmouth, Viscount. See Addington, Henry.
Sieyès, Abbé, 233.
Silesia, rising of the weavers in, 201.
Simcoe, Major-General, Governor of Hayti, 245, 246.
Sinclair, Charles, delegate to the British Convention, 181, 182;
turns informer, 182.
Sinclair, Sir John, President of the Board of Agriculture, 293–295;
loses his seat, 295;
his correspondence with Pitt, 296;
his General Enclosure Bill, 297;
his financial suggestions, 305, 308 n., 309, 332;
withdraws amendment hostile to Pitt, 328;
on Spencer Perceval, 466.
Sinking Fund, the, 31, 32, 568.
Sistova, Congress of, 3.
Skirving, William, 177;
his trial and transportation, 182–184.
Slavery question, in the West Indies, 238, 239.
Slave Trade, Wilberforce's proposals for abolition of, defeated, 502–503;
abolished in Guiana, 503.
Sluysken, Governor of the Cape, 251–253.
Smith, Adam, his "Wealth of Nations," 30, 567.
Smith, James, 175.
Smith, Joseph, Pitt's private secretary, 475, 476, 557.
Smith, Captain (afterwards Sir Sidney), at Toulon, 160.
Smith, General, M.P., 68;
opposes erection of barracks, 169, 170.
Smith, William, M.P., 79, 457.
Smugglers, their intercourse with France, 165.
Snettisham, result of enclosures at, 292.
"Soldiers' Friend," the, 169.
Sombreuil, de, surrenders at Quiberon, 262.
Somerset, Lord Charles, Paymaster of the Forces, 501.
Somerville, Lord, President of the Board of Agriculture, 296.
Sorel, Albert, mis-statements by, refuted, 277 n.
Soult, Marshal, 379, 505, 508.
Spain, compact with England, 123;
her co-operation at Toulon, 144, 145, 150, 151, 153, 160;
disputes with the English, 153, 154, 156, 157, 197;
her action in Hayti, 224, 227–229, 239, 241, 245;
opposes the Act of Union, 412, 413, 421, 422, 427;
on Pitt's speech on the war (1803), 488;
on the danger of a standing army, 510;
as an orator, compared with Pitt, 567;
mentioned, 23, 24, 165, 179, 188, 191, 238, 241, 286, 290, 293, 309, 352 n., 383, 497,
498, 517, 518.
Sicily, policy of defence of, 525, 526.
Sidmouth, Viscount. See Addington, Henry.
Sieyès, Abbé, 233.
Silesia, rising of the weavers in, 201.
Simcoe, Major-General, Governor of Hayti, 245, 246.
Sinclair, Charles, delegate to the British Convention, 181, 182;
turns informer, 182.
Sinclair, Sir John, President of the Board of Agriculture, 293–295;
loses his seat, 295;
his correspondence with Pitt, 296;
his General Enclosure Bill, 297;
his financial suggestions, 305, 308 n., 309, 332;
withdraws amendment hostile to Pitt, 328;
on Spencer Perceval, 466.
Sinking Fund, the, 31, 32, 568.
Sistova, Congress of, 3.
Skirving, William, 177;
his trial and transportation, 182–184.
Slavery question, in the West Indies, 238, 239.
Slave Trade, Wilberforce's proposals for abolition of, defeated, 502–503;
abolished in Guiana, 503.
Sluysken, Governor of the Cape, 251–253.
Smith, Adam, his "Wealth of Nations," 30, 567.
Smith, James, 175.
Smith, Joseph, Pitt's private secretary, 475, 476, 557.
Smith, Captain (afterwards Sir Sidney), at Toulon, 160.
Smith, General, M.P., 68;
opposes erection of barracks, 169, 170.
Smith, William, M.P., 79, 457.
Smugglers, their intercourse with France, 165.
Snettisham, result of enclosures at, 292.
"Soldiers' Friend," the, 169.
Sombreuil, de, surrenders at Quiberon, 262.
Somerset, Lord Charles, Paymaster of the Forces, 501.
Somerville, Lord, President of the Board of Agriculture, 296.
Sorel, Albert, mis-statements by, refuted, 277 n.
Soult, Marshal, 379, 505, 508.
Spain, compact with England, 123;
her co-operation at Toulon, 144, 145, 150, 151, 153, 160;
disputes with the English, 153, 154, 156, 157, 197;
her action in Hayti, 224, 227–229, 239, 241, 245;
Page 658
state of under Charles IV, 230, 231;
hostility to England, 232, 233;
peace with France, 236, 237, 244, 257;
declares war against England, 241, 244, 275 (1804), 513, 514;
Pitt and, 524, 560.
Spanish treasure-ships, seizure of, 514.
Spencer, Rev. Dr., of Birmingham, 18, 186.
Spencer, Earl, special envoy to Vienna, 211;
First Lord of the Admiralty, 273, 341, 342, 366, 367, 421, 436;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 311, 312, 314, 316;
opposes negotiations for peace, 322;
resigns, 440, 500.
Spitalfields weavers, their grievances, 166.
Spithead, mutiny at, 310–314.
Stadion, Johann Philipp Karl Joseph, Austrian Ambassador in London, 84.
Staël, Mme. de, at Juniper Hall, 64.
Stahremberg, Count, 205;
Austrian Ambassador in London, 366.
Stanhope, Earl, 87, 179, 188, 490, 502.
Stanhope, Lady Hester, on Pitt and women, 299, 300, 303, 454, 455, 477, 531;
at Walmer, 490–495;
at Putney, 549, 554;
her parting with Pitt, 557.
Stanhope, Lord Charles, 491.
Stanhope, Lord James, 557, 558.
Stanislaus, King, of Poland, 54.
"Star," the, 66.
Steele, Robert, Secretary to the Treasury, 412, 451, 454, 476, 557.
Stein, Baron vom, 392, 535, 560.
Stockport, "Friends of Universal Peace" at, 65.
Stofflet, Nicolas, 136.
Stralsund, Russians and Swedes at, 539.
Stratton, Mr., British chargé d'affaires at Vienna, 75.
Stuart, General Sir Charles, in Corsica, 256, 257.
Sutton, Charles Manners, Bishop of Norwich, made Archbishop of Canterbury, 477.
Sweden, refuses to aid the expedition to Holland, 380;
convention with England (1804), 516.
Swellendam, settlement of, 252.
Switzerland, 371;
importance of her position, 374;
Pitt's policy with regard to, 375, 377;
failure of campaign in, 378, 379.
"Sun," the, 67.
Suvóroff, Prince, 376, 378, 379.
Sydney, Muir at, 177.
Tainville, French envoy at The Hague, 82.
Talleyrand, Périgord Charles Maurice de, 11;
hostility to England, 232, 233;
peace with France, 236, 237, 244, 257;
declares war against England, 241, 244, 275 (1804), 513, 514;
Pitt and, 524, 560.
Spanish treasure-ships, seizure of, 514.
Spencer, Rev. Dr., of Birmingham, 18, 186.
Spencer, Earl, special envoy to Vienna, 211;
First Lord of the Admiralty, 273, 341, 342, 366, 367, 421, 436;
and the mutinies in the fleet, 311, 312, 314, 316;
opposes negotiations for peace, 322;
resigns, 440, 500.
Spitalfields weavers, their grievances, 166.
Spithead, mutiny at, 310–314.
Stadion, Johann Philipp Karl Joseph, Austrian Ambassador in London, 84.
Staël, Mme. de, at Juniper Hall, 64.
Stahremberg, Count, 205;
Austrian Ambassador in London, 366.
Stanhope, Earl, 87, 179, 188, 490, 502.
Stanhope, Lady Hester, on Pitt and women, 299, 300, 303, 454, 455, 477, 531;
at Walmer, 490–495;
at Putney, 549, 554;
her parting with Pitt, 557.
Stanhope, Lord Charles, 491.
Stanhope, Lord James, 557, 558.
Stanislaus, King, of Poland, 54.
"Star," the, 66.
Steele, Robert, Secretary to the Treasury, 412, 451, 454, 476, 557.
Stein, Baron vom, 392, 535, 560.
Stockport, "Friends of Universal Peace" at, 65.
Stofflet, Nicolas, 136.
Stralsund, Russians and Swedes at, 539.
Stratton, Mr., British chargé d'affaires at Vienna, 75.
Stuart, General Sir Charles, in Corsica, 256, 257.
Sutton, Charles Manners, Bishop of Norwich, made Archbishop of Canterbury, 477.
Sweden, refuses to aid the expedition to Holland, 380;
convention with England (1804), 516.
Swellendam, settlement of, 252.
Switzerland, 371;
importance of her position, 374;
Pitt's policy with regard to, 375, 377;
failure of campaign in, 378, 379.
"Sun," the, 67.
Suvóroff, Prince, 376, 378, 379.
Sydney, Muir at, 177.
Tainville, French envoy at The Hague, 82.
Talleyrand, Périgord Charles Maurice de, 11;
Page 659
his mission to London, 41–44;
second mission, 47–51;
intimacy with the Opposition, 51;
again in London, 60;
at Juniper Hall, 64;
his "Mémoire" on a Franco-British understanding, 83;
doubts of his loyalty, 83;
expelled from England, 103;
and the peace negotiations, 325, 326.
Tallien, Jean Lambert, 262.
Talon, M., 93, 94.
Tara Hill, fight at, 357.
Targowicz, Confederation of, 53.
Tarleton, Mr., Mayor of Liverpool, 167.
Tate, Colonel, 309.
Teschen, Treaty of (1779), 365.
Test Act, the, efforts to repeal, 10, 11;
in Scotland, 13, 14.
Thanet, Lord, opposes the Act of Union, 421.
Thatched House Tavern, 25.
Thelwall, John, 167, 184, 285;
his trial, 193;
letter to Hardy, 352 n.
Thornton, Edward, British envoy at Hamburg, 549.
Thornton, Henry, opposes the taxes of 1797, 329.
Thugut, Baron Franz von, Austrian diplomatic agent at Brussels, 46;
Chancellor, 129, 143, 148, 153 n., 197 n., 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 212, 366, 372, 373,
378, 380, 383, 560;
his character and aims, 199, 200.
Thurlow, Lord, Lord Chancellor, his character, 33;
dismissed, 34, 35;
hostile to France, 44;
on Lord Loughborough's death, 451, 452.
Tierney, George, 316, 328, 352 n., 385, 427, 520;
his duel with Pitt, 334–336;
satirized by Canning, 337;
Treasurer of the Navy, 498;
refuses to serve under Pitt, 501.
"Times," the, 67.
Tippoo Sahib, 44, 250, 336, 461.
Titchfield, Marquis of, 559.
Tobago, 49;
captured by Great Britain, 198, 221.
Tomline, George Pretyman, Bishop of Lincoln, 300, 456 n., 473, 475–477, 495, 496;
on Pitt's resignation, 442–444, 450, 480;
on the King's illness, 447, 448;
at Putney, 554–557.
Tone, Wolfe, 78, 177, 340, 344;
second mission, 47–51;
intimacy with the Opposition, 51;
again in London, 60;
at Juniper Hall, 64;
his "Mémoire" on a Franco-British understanding, 83;
doubts of his loyalty, 83;
expelled from England, 103;
and the peace negotiations, 325, 326.
Tallien, Jean Lambert, 262.
Talon, M., 93, 94.
Tara Hill, fight at, 357.
Targowicz, Confederation of, 53.
Tarleton, Mr., Mayor of Liverpool, 167.
Tate, Colonel, 309.
Teschen, Treaty of (1779), 365.
Test Act, the, efforts to repeal, 10, 11;
in Scotland, 13, 14.
Thanet, Lord, opposes the Act of Union, 421.
Thatched House Tavern, 25.
Thelwall, John, 167, 184, 285;
his trial, 193;
letter to Hardy, 352 n.
Thornton, Edward, British envoy at Hamburg, 549.
Thornton, Henry, opposes the taxes of 1797, 329.
Thugut, Baron Franz von, Austrian diplomatic agent at Brussels, 46;
Chancellor, 129, 143, 148, 153 n., 197 n., 203, 204, 206, 209, 211, 212, 366, 372, 373,
378, 380, 383, 560;
his character and aims, 199, 200.
Thurlow, Lord, Lord Chancellor, his character, 33;
dismissed, 34, 35;
hostile to France, 44;
on Lord Loughborough's death, 451, 452.
Tierney, George, 316, 328, 352 n., 385, 427, 520;
his duel with Pitt, 334–336;
satirized by Canning, 337;
Treasurer of the Navy, 498;
refuses to serve under Pitt, 501.
"Times," the, 67.
Tippoo Sahib, 44, 250, 336, 461.
Titchfield, Marquis of, 559.
Tobago, 49;
captured by Great Britain, 198, 221.
Tomline, George Pretyman, Bishop of Lincoln, 300, 456 n., 473, 475–477, 495, 496;
on Pitt's resignation, 442–444, 450, 480;
on the King's illness, 447, 448;
at Putney, 554–557.
Tone, Wolfe, 78, 177, 340, 344;
Page 660
goes to Paris, 345, 346;
his capture and death, 363.
Tooke, Horne, intimate with Talleyrand, 51, 167;
his speech, 190;
arrested, 190;
acquitted, 192, 193.
Tortuga, island of, 246.
Toulon, see Chap. VI;
occupied by Hood, 134, 145, 267;
British aims at, 154–156;
evacuated, 160;
destruction of French navy at, 160, 161, 198;
Napoleon's preparations at, 336, 349.
Toussaint l'Ouverture, 221, 224, 239, 241, 247, 248.
Trafalgar, battle of, 521, 533, 534.
Traitorous Correspondence Bill, 164, 165.
Treasonable Practices Bill, 285–287.
Trevor, J. H. (afterwards Viscount Hampden), British Minister at Turin, 153 n.
Trincomalee, capture of, 254.
Trinidad, capture of, 246, 248;
valued highly by Pitt, 323, 325, 468–470.
Trotter, Deputy-Treasurer of the Navy, 519, 521.
Troy, Archbishop, 412, 417, 425 n.
"True Briton," the, 67.
Turcoing, battle of, 208, 270.
Turin, captured by the allies, 376;
470.
Turkey, makes peace with Russia, 29, 52.
Tuscany, attitude of, 150 n.
Twiss, Colonel, 513.
Ulm, battle of, 524, 534, 536, 537, 556.
Union, the, with Ireland, see Chs. XVIII, XIX;
568.
Unitarians, Pitt opposes removal of disabilities of, 24.
United Britons, 349.
United Constitutional Societies, meeting at Norwich (1792), 26.
United Englishmen, 349, 350.
United Irishmen, Society of, 78, 174, 175, 316, 327, 340, 344;
turn to France, 345, 346, 349, 351, 357, 391.
United Provinces. See Dutch Republic.
United Scotsmen, 349.
United States, treaty with England (1794), 291.
Utrecht, Treaty of (1713), 48, 72.
Valdez, Don, Spanish Minister of Marine, 232.
Valenciennes, 122, 123, 127, 129;
siege and fall of, 133, 134, 136;
his capture and death, 363.
Tooke, Horne, intimate with Talleyrand, 51, 167;
his speech, 190;
arrested, 190;
acquitted, 192, 193.
Tortuga, island of, 246.
Toulon, see Chap. VI;
occupied by Hood, 134, 145, 267;
British aims at, 154–156;
evacuated, 160;
destruction of French navy at, 160, 161, 198;
Napoleon's preparations at, 336, 349.
Toussaint l'Ouverture, 221, 224, 239, 241, 247, 248.
Trafalgar, battle of, 521, 533, 534.
Traitorous Correspondence Bill, 164, 165.
Treasonable Practices Bill, 285–287.
Trevor, J. H. (afterwards Viscount Hampden), British Minister at Turin, 153 n.
Trincomalee, capture of, 254.
Trinidad, capture of, 246, 248;
valued highly by Pitt, 323, 325, 468–470.
Trotter, Deputy-Treasurer of the Navy, 519, 521.
Troy, Archbishop, 412, 417, 425 n.
"True Briton," the, 67.
Turcoing, battle of, 208, 270.
Turin, captured by the allies, 376;
470.
Turkey, makes peace with Russia, 29, 52.
Tuscany, attitude of, 150 n.
Twiss, Colonel, 513.
Ulm, battle of, 524, 534, 536, 537, 556.
Union, the, with Ireland, see Chs. XVIII, XIX;
568.
Unitarians, Pitt opposes removal of disabilities of, 24.
United Britons, 349.
United Constitutional Societies, meeting at Norwich (1792), 26.
United Englishmen, 349, 350.
United Irishmen, Society of, 78, 174, 175, 316, 327, 340, 344;
turn to France, 345, 346, 349, 351, 357, 391.
United Provinces. See Dutch Republic.
United Scotsmen, 349.
United States, treaty with England (1794), 291.
Utrecht, Treaty of (1713), 48, 72.
Valdez, Don, Spanish Minister of Marine, 232.
Valenciennes, 122, 123, 127, 129;
siege and fall of, 133, 134, 136;
Page 661
surrendered, 210, 212, 460, 461.
Valmy, battle of, 56, 57, 61, 66, 114, 200.
Vancouver, Captain, 92;
ill-treated in California, 232.
Vandamme, General, 382.
Varennes, the flight to, 1, 2, 4;
receipt of the news in London, 10.
Vauban, Count, 262, 263.
Vendée, la, insurrection in, 135, 136;
expedition to, 237, 240, 262, 263.
Venice, suggested partition of, 129 n., 200.
Vereker, Colonel, 395.
Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia, 231.
Victor Emmanuel I, King of Sardinia, 522, 523, 539.
Villeneuve, Admiral, 532, 533.
Villiers, George, 506, 507.
Vinegar Hill, fight at, 360, 361.
Volunteer Bill (1804), 497, 498.
Volunteers, the, 124, 188, 278, 279, 337, 363;
Pitt's encouragement of, 474, 477, 488–494.
Volunteers, the Ulster, 78.
Vorontzoff, Count, Russian Ambassador in London, 9, 99, 123, 315, 478, 487 n., 527, 529,
541, 543, 550, 563.
Walcheren, Isle of, 547.
Wales, George, Prince of (afterwards George IV), his first speech at Westminster, 51;
and the Princess Caroline, 214;
and the King's illness, 448, 449, 497;
interviews with Pitt, 449;
Lord Mornington and, 460, 461;
his relations with the King, 507, 508;
and with the Princess, 508.
Wales, Princess of, her extravagant conduct, 508.
Walker, Thomas, his "Review of Political Events in Manchester," 11;
founds the Manchester Constitutional Society, 11, 12, 17;
prosecution of, 185.
Walpole, General, acts as Tierney's second, 335.
Walpole, Horace, and the French refugees, 64.
Walter, John, of "The Times," 67.
Ward, Robert Plumer, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 550;
Pitt's care for, 557.
Wardle, Colonel, 520.
Warren, Admiral Sir John, 262, 363, 532 n.;
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 508.
Washington, George, 291.
Watson, Dr., Bishop of Llandaff, his speech on the Union, 421.
Watt, convicted at Edinburgh, 192, 193.
Wattignies, battle of, 141, 200.
Valmy, battle of, 56, 57, 61, 66, 114, 200.
Vancouver, Captain, 92;
ill-treated in California, 232.
Vandamme, General, 382.
Varennes, the flight to, 1, 2, 4;
receipt of the news in London, 10.
Vauban, Count, 262, 263.
Vendée, la, insurrection in, 135, 136;
expedition to, 237, 240, 262, 263.
Venice, suggested partition of, 129 n., 200.
Vereker, Colonel, 395.
Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia, 231.
Victor Emmanuel I, King of Sardinia, 522, 523, 539.
Villeneuve, Admiral, 532, 533.
Villiers, George, 506, 507.
Vinegar Hill, fight at, 360, 361.
Volunteer Bill (1804), 497, 498.
Volunteers, the, 124, 188, 278, 279, 337, 363;
Pitt's encouragement of, 474, 477, 488–494.
Volunteers, the Ulster, 78.
Vorontzoff, Count, Russian Ambassador in London, 9, 99, 123, 315, 478, 487 n., 527, 529,
541, 543, 550, 563.
Walcheren, Isle of, 547.
Wales, George, Prince of (afterwards George IV), his first speech at Westminster, 51;
and the Princess Caroline, 214;
and the King's illness, 448, 449, 497;
interviews with Pitt, 449;
Lord Mornington and, 460, 461;
his relations with the King, 507, 508;
and with the Princess, 508.
Wales, Princess of, her extravagant conduct, 508.
Walker, Thomas, his "Review of Political Events in Manchester," 11;
founds the Manchester Constitutional Society, 11, 12, 17;
prosecution of, 185.
Walpole, General, acts as Tierney's second, 335.
Walpole, Horace, and the French refugees, 64.
Walter, John, of "The Times," 67.
Ward, Robert Plumer, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 550;
Pitt's care for, 557.
Wardle, Colonel, 520.
Warren, Admiral Sir John, 262, 363, 532 n.;
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 508.
Washington, George, 291.
Watson, Dr., Bishop of Llandaff, his speech on the Union, 421.
Watt, convicted at Edinburgh, 192, 193.
Wattignies, battle of, 141, 200.
Page 662
Weishaupt, Adam, 26.
Wellesley, Marquis (Earl of Mornington), 68, 313 n.;
on Pitt's duel with Tierney, 336;
his friendship with Pitt, 459–464, 554, 556, 566.
Wellesley, Sir Arthur (afterwards Duke of Wellington), in Flanders, 209, 210;
battle of Assaye, 463, 505;
anecdote of Pitt told by, refuted, 524;
meeting with Nelson, 533;
Pitt's last words on, 556.
West Indies, see Chaps. IX, X;
British designs on, 129, 137, 155, 156, 268, 275;
risings of negroes, 220, 237, 238;
slavery in, 238, 239;
incomes derived from, 370.
Westminster programme of 1780, 168, 171.
Westmorland, Earl of, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 35, 73, 78, 151 n., 152 n., 282, 389, 402;
Master of the Horse, 339;
Lord Privy Seal, 440, 446, 501.
Wheat, shortage of (1795–6), 288–291;
regulation of export and import of, 289.
Whitbread, Samuel, 18, 19, 23, 89, 291, 294;
moves a vote of censure on Pitt, 312, 313;
his attack on Lord Melville, 518, 519.
Whitworth, Lord, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 99, 100, 115, 122, 369, 373;
ambassador in Paris, 485, 505.
Whyte, Major-General, in the West Indies, 225, 241.
Wickham, William, envoy in Switzerland, 276, 377.
Wigan, strike of colliers at, 62.
Wigglesworth, Colonel, Commissary-General in Hayti, 245.
Wilberforce, William, opposes Flood's motion for reform, 12;
his relations with Pitt, 299, 457, 458, 503;
and "wicked" Williams, 318, 319;
pained by Pitt's duel with Tierney, 335, 336;
on the Catholic question, 417, 428;
and the Slave Trade, 502, 503;
and the impeachment of Melville, 520;
on Lord Harrowby, 538;
mentioned, 119, 238, 248, 276, 286, 420, 476, 566.
Wilkinson, James, of Sheffield, 186.
William V, Prince of Orange, 47, 74, 77 n., 107, 205, 216, 250, 383;
his letter to the Governor of the Cape, 250–252.
Williams, "wicked," stirs up disaffection in the army, 318, 319.
Williamson, Major-General, Governor of Jamaica, 223;
Governor of Hayti, 239;
recalled, 239.
Willis, Dr. (jun.), 447, 448.
Wilson, Rev. Edward, 287.
Winchester, French prisoners at, 165;
Wellesley, Marquis (Earl of Mornington), 68, 313 n.;
on Pitt's duel with Tierney, 336;
his friendship with Pitt, 459–464, 554, 556, 566.
Wellesley, Sir Arthur (afterwards Duke of Wellington), in Flanders, 209, 210;
battle of Assaye, 463, 505;
anecdote of Pitt told by, refuted, 524;
meeting with Nelson, 533;
Pitt's last words on, 556.
West Indies, see Chaps. IX, X;
British designs on, 129, 137, 155, 156, 268, 275;
risings of negroes, 220, 237, 238;
slavery in, 238, 239;
incomes derived from, 370.
Westminster programme of 1780, 168, 171.
Westmorland, Earl of, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 35, 73, 78, 151 n., 152 n., 282, 389, 402;
Master of the Horse, 339;
Lord Privy Seal, 440, 446, 501.
Wheat, shortage of (1795–6), 288–291;
regulation of export and import of, 289.
Whitbread, Samuel, 18, 19, 23, 89, 291, 294;
moves a vote of censure on Pitt, 312, 313;
his attack on Lord Melville, 518, 519.
Whitworth, Lord, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 99, 100, 115, 122, 369, 373;
ambassador in Paris, 485, 505.
Whyte, Major-General, in the West Indies, 225, 241.
Wickham, William, envoy in Switzerland, 276, 377.
Wigan, strike of colliers at, 62.
Wigglesworth, Colonel, Commissary-General in Hayti, 245.
Wilberforce, William, opposes Flood's motion for reform, 12;
his relations with Pitt, 299, 457, 458, 503;
and "wicked" Williams, 318, 319;
pained by Pitt's duel with Tierney, 335, 336;
on the Catholic question, 417, 428;
and the Slave Trade, 502, 503;
and the impeachment of Melville, 520;
on Lord Harrowby, 538;
mentioned, 119, 238, 248, 276, 286, 420, 476, 566.
Wilkinson, James, of Sheffield, 186.
William V, Prince of Orange, 47, 74, 77 n., 107, 205, 216, 250, 383;
his letter to the Governor of the Cape, 250–252.
Williams, "wicked," stirs up disaffection in the army, 318, 319.
Williamson, Major-General, Governor of Jamaica, 223;
Governor of Hayti, 239;
recalled, 239.
Willis, Dr. (jun.), 447, 448.
Wilson, Rev. Edward, 287.
Winchester, French prisoners at, 165;
Page 663
soldiers quartered at, 169.
Winchilsea, Lord, 412.
Windham, William, on reform, 11, 12, 24;
on the war in la Vendée, 136, 137;
on the erection of barracks, 170;
Secretary at War, 192, 259–261, 271–273, 275, 341, 342, 379, 380, 436;
opposes negotiations for peace, 322, 326;
resigns, 440;
opposed to peace (1801), 469, 470;
on the Volunteers, 494;
joins Fox and Grenville, 500, 502, 504, 510, 517, 557;
opposes motion to bury Pitt in the Abbey, 559, 560;
mentioned, 89, 188, 191, 498.
"World," the, 67.
Wurmser, General, 121, 142 n., 200, 243, 461.
Yarmouth, Lord, 142.
Yeu, expedition to, 263, 272, 273.
Yonge, Sir Charles, Secretary at War, 29, 128, 270.
York, Duke of, his marriage, 31;
Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, 126, 127, 130, 133, 138–142, 147, 200, 201, 204, 208,
210, 213–215, 267, 269;
effort to shelve him foiled, 205, 206;
recalled, 215, 273;
Commander-in-Chief, 273, 285, 310, 362–363, 382, 448, 507.
York, delegate to the British Convention, 181.
Yorke, Charles, Under-Secretary at War, 489, 498, 499, 509, 521, 547.
Yorke, Henry (alias Redhead), of Sheffield, 186, 189.
Young, Arthur, 291, 292;
Secretary of the Board of Agriculture, 293;
superintends draining works at Holwood, 296;
on the new taxes (1797), 329.
Young, Admiral, 311.
Yriarte, Don Domingo d', signs the peace of Basle, 236.
Zurich, battle of, 378.
Zuype Canal, the, 382.
Winchilsea, Lord, 412.
Windham, William, on reform, 11, 12, 24;
on the war in la Vendée, 136, 137;
on the erection of barracks, 170;
Secretary at War, 192, 259–261, 271–273, 275, 341, 342, 379, 380, 436;
opposes negotiations for peace, 322, 326;
resigns, 440;
opposed to peace (1801), 469, 470;
on the Volunteers, 494;
joins Fox and Grenville, 500, 502, 504, 510, 517, 557;
opposes motion to bury Pitt in the Abbey, 559, 560;
mentioned, 89, 188, 191, 498.
"World," the, 67.
Wurmser, General, 121, 142 n., 200, 243, 461.
Yarmouth, Lord, 142.
Yeu, expedition to, 263, 272, 273.
Yonge, Sir Charles, Secretary at War, 29, 128, 270.
York, Duke of, his marriage, 31;
Commander-in-Chief in Flanders, 126, 127, 130, 133, 138–142, 147, 200, 201, 204, 208,
210, 213–215, 267, 269;
effort to shelve him foiled, 205, 206;
recalled, 215, 273;
Commander-in-Chief, 273, 285, 310, 362–363, 382, 448, 507.
York, delegate to the British Convention, 181.
Yorke, Charles, Under-Secretary at War, 489, 498, 499, 509, 521, 547.
Yorke, Henry (alias Redhead), of Sheffield, 186, 189.
Young, Arthur, 291, 292;
Secretary of the Board of Agriculture, 293;
superintends draining works at Holwood, 296;
on the new taxes (1797), 329.
Young, Admiral, 311.
Yriarte, Don Domingo d', signs the peace of Basle, 236.
Zurich, battle of, 378.
Zuype Canal, the, 382.
Page 664
CHISWICK PRESS: PRINTED BY CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO. TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I am perfectly aware that the term "Radical" (in its first form, "Radical
Reformer") does not appear until a few years later; but I use it here and in the
following chapters because there is no other word which expresses the same
meaning.
[2] See Vivenot, i, 176–81; Beer, "Leopold II, Franz II, und Catharina," 140 et
seq.; Clapham, "Causes of the War of 1792," ch. iv.
[3] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438; Vivenot, i, 185, 186. "He [the Emperor] was
extremely agitated when he gave me the letter for the King" (Elgin to Grenville,
7th July, in "Dropmore P.," ii, 126).
[4] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438.
[5] Ibid. Grenville to Ewart, 26th July. Calonne for some little time resided at
Wimbledon House. His letters to Pitt show that he met with frequent rebuffs; but
he had one interview with him early in June 1790. I have found no details of it.
[6] "Diary and Corresp. of Fersen," 121.
[7] Arneth, "Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, und Leopold II," 148, 152.
[8] Mr. Nisbet Bain (op. cit., ii, 129) accuses Pitt and his colleagues of waiving
aside a proposed visit of Gustavus III to London, because "they had no desire to
meet face to face a monarch they had already twice deceived." Mr. Bain must
refer to the charges (invented at St Petersburg) that Pitt had egged Gustavus on
to war against Russia, and then deserted him. In the former volume (chapters
xxi-iii) I proved the falsity of those charges. It would be more correct to say that
Gustavus deserted England.
[9] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438.
[10] Martens, v, 236–9; "F.O.," Prussia, 22. Ewart to Grenville, 4th August.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I am perfectly aware that the term "Radical" (in its first form, "Radical
Reformer") does not appear until a few years later; but I use it here and in the
following chapters because there is no other word which expresses the same
meaning.
[2] See Vivenot, i, 176–81; Beer, "Leopold II, Franz II, und Catharina," 140 et
seq.; Clapham, "Causes of the War of 1792," ch. iv.
[3] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438; Vivenot, i, 185, 186. "He [the Emperor] was
extremely agitated when he gave me the letter for the King" (Elgin to Grenville,
7th July, in "Dropmore P.," ii, 126).
[4] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438.
[5] Ibid. Grenville to Ewart, 26th July. Calonne for some little time resided at
Wimbledon House. His letters to Pitt show that he met with frequent rebuffs; but
he had one interview with him early in June 1790. I have found no details of it.
[6] "Diary and Corresp. of Fersen," 121.
[7] Arneth, "Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, und Leopold II," 148, 152.
[8] Mr. Nisbet Bain (op. cit., ii, 129) accuses Pitt and his colleagues of waiving
aside a proposed visit of Gustavus III to London, because "they had no desire to
meet face to face a monarch they had already twice deceived." Mr. Bain must
refer to the charges (invented at St Petersburg) that Pitt had egged Gustavus on
to war against Russia, and then deserted him. In the former volume (chapters
xxi-iii) I proved the falsity of those charges. It would be more correct to say that
Gustavus deserted England.
[9] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438.
[10] Martens, v, 236–9; "F.O.," Prussia, 22. Ewart to Grenville, 4th August.
Page 665
[11] On 15th August Prussia renounced her alliance with Turkey (Vivenot, i,
225).
[12] Sybel, bk. ii, ch. vi; Vivenot, i, 235, 243.
[13] "Dropmore P.," ii, 192.
[14] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 111.
[15] Arneth, 206, 210; Vivenot, i, 270.
[16] Burke ("Corresp.," iii, 308, 342, 346) shows that Mercy d'Argenteau, after
his brief mission to London, spread the slander. Pitt and Grenville said nothing
decisive to him on this or any other topic. Kaunitz partly adopted the charge.
(See Vivenot, i, 272.)
[17] "F.O.," Russia, 22. Grenville to Whitworth, 27th October, and W. to G.,
14th October 1791.
[18] Larivière, "Cath. II et la Rév. franç.," 88–90, 110–17.
[19] Burke's "Works," iii, 8, 369 (Bohn edit.).
[20] "Parl. Hist.," xxviii, 1–41.
[21] T. Walker, "Review of ... political events in Manchester (1789–1794)."
[22] T. Walker, "Review of ... political events in Manchester (1789–1794)," 452–
79. I cannot agree with Mr. J. R. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 76) that Pitt now spoke
as the avowed enemy of parliamentary reform. Indeed, he never spoke in that
sense, but opposed it as inopportune.
[23] Rutt, "Mems. of Priestly," ii, 25. As is well known, Burke's "Reflections on
the Fr. Rev.," was in part an answer to Dr. Price's sermon of 4th November 1789
in the Old Jewry chapel, to the Society for celebrating the Revolution of 1688.
[24] It was more of a club than the branches of the "Society for Constitutional
Information," which did good work in 1780–4, but expired in 1784 owing to the
disgust of reformers at the Fox–North Coalition—so Place asserts (B.M. Add.
MSS., 27808).
[25] T. Walker, op. cit., 18, 19.
[26] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 488–510.
225).
[12] Sybel, bk. ii, ch. vi; Vivenot, i, 235, 243.
[13] "Dropmore P.," ii, 192.
[14] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 111.
[15] Arneth, 206, 210; Vivenot, i, 270.
[16] Burke ("Corresp.," iii, 308, 342, 346) shows that Mercy d'Argenteau, after
his brief mission to London, spread the slander. Pitt and Grenville said nothing
decisive to him on this or any other topic. Kaunitz partly adopted the charge.
(See Vivenot, i, 272.)
[17] "F.O.," Russia, 22. Grenville to Whitworth, 27th October, and W. to G.,
14th October 1791.
[18] Larivière, "Cath. II et la Rév. franç.," 88–90, 110–17.
[19] Burke's "Works," iii, 8, 369 (Bohn edit.).
[20] "Parl. Hist.," xxviii, 1–41.
[21] T. Walker, "Review of ... political events in Manchester (1789–1794)."
[22] T. Walker, "Review of ... political events in Manchester (1789–1794)," 452–
79. I cannot agree with Mr. J. R. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 76) that Pitt now spoke
as the avowed enemy of parliamentary reform. Indeed, he never spoke in that
sense, but opposed it as inopportune.
[23] Rutt, "Mems. of Priestly," ii, 25. As is well known, Burke's "Reflections on
the Fr. Rev.," was in part an answer to Dr. Price's sermon of 4th November 1789
in the Old Jewry chapel, to the Society for celebrating the Revolution of 1688.
[24] It was more of a club than the branches of the "Society for Constitutional
Information," which did good work in 1780–4, but expired in 1784 owing to the
disgust of reformers at the Fox–North Coalition—so Place asserts (B.M. Add.
MSS., 27808).
[25] T. Walker, op. cit., 18, 19.
[26] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 488–510.
Page 666
[27] Ibid., 113–9.
[28] M. D. Conway, "Life of T. Paine," i, 284.
[29] Burke's Works, iii, 76 (Bohn edit.).
[30] Ibid., iii, 12. So, too, on 30th August 1791 Priestley wrote that Pitt had
shown himself unfavourable to their cause (Rutt, "Life of Priestley," ii, 145).
[31] Prior, "Life of Burke," 322, who states very incorrectly that not one of them
has survived.
[32] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 19.
[33] Ibid. As late as 9th August a proclamation was posted about Birmingham:
"The friends of the good cause are requested to meet us at Revolution Place to-
morrow night at 11 o'clock in order to fix upon those persons who are to be the
future objects of our malice." Of course this was but an incitation to plunder. See
Massey, iii, 462–6, on the Birmingham riots.
[34] "Dropmore P.," ii, 133, 136; "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1464.
[35] Burke "Reflections on the Fr. Rev.," 39 (Mr. Payne's edit.).
[36] Conway, op. cit., ii, 330. The printer and publisher were prosecuted later on,
as well as Paine, who fled to France.
[37] "Mem. of T. Hardy," by himself (Lond., 1832).
[38] Leslie Stephen, "The Eng. Utilitarians," i, 121. I fully admit that the
Chartist leaders in 1838 went back to the Westminster programme of 1780. See
"The Life and Struggles of William Lovett"; but the spirit and methods of the
new agitation were wholly different. On this topic I feel compelled to differ from
Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," ch. v, ad init.). Mr. C. B. R. Kent ("The
English Radicals," 156) states the case correctly.
[39] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1303–9.
[40] "Application of Barruel's 'Memoirs of Jacobinism' to the Secret Societies of
Ireland and Great Britain," 32–3.
[41] "Application of Barruel's 'Memoirs of Jacobinism' to the Secret Societies of
Ireland and Great Britain," Introduction, p. x.
[42] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 20.
[28] M. D. Conway, "Life of T. Paine," i, 284.
[29] Burke's Works, iii, 76 (Bohn edit.).
[30] Ibid., iii, 12. So, too, on 30th August 1791 Priestley wrote that Pitt had
shown himself unfavourable to their cause (Rutt, "Life of Priestley," ii, 145).
[31] Prior, "Life of Burke," 322, who states very incorrectly that not one of them
has survived.
[32] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 19.
[33] Ibid. As late as 9th August a proclamation was posted about Birmingham:
"The friends of the good cause are requested to meet us at Revolution Place to-
morrow night at 11 o'clock in order to fix upon those persons who are to be the
future objects of our malice." Of course this was but an incitation to plunder. See
Massey, iii, 462–6, on the Birmingham riots.
[34] "Dropmore P.," ii, 133, 136; "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1464.
[35] Burke "Reflections on the Fr. Rev.," 39 (Mr. Payne's edit.).
[36] Conway, op. cit., ii, 330. The printer and publisher were prosecuted later on,
as well as Paine, who fled to France.
[37] "Mem. of T. Hardy," by himself (Lond., 1832).
[38] Leslie Stephen, "The Eng. Utilitarians," i, 121. I fully admit that the
Chartist leaders in 1838 went back to the Westminster programme of 1780. See
"The Life and Struggles of William Lovett"; but the spirit and methods of the
new agitation were wholly different. On this topic I feel compelled to differ from
Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," ch. v, ad init.). Mr. C. B. R. Kent ("The
English Radicals," 156) states the case correctly.
[39] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1303–9.
[40] "Application of Barruel's 'Memoirs of Jacobinism' to the Secret Societies of
Ireland and Great Britain," 32–3.
[41] "Application of Barruel's 'Memoirs of Jacobinism' to the Secret Societies of
Ireland and Great Britain," Introduction, p. x.
[42] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 20.
Page 667
[43] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 810–15.
[44] Ibid., 834.
[45] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 551–602, 1404–31.
[46] Stanhope, ii, 148–50, and App., xv.
[47] Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," ch. x.
[48] Fitzmaurice, "Shelburne," iii, 500–4; Salomon, "Pitt," 596. The King later
on teased the Duke of Leeds by a more compromising overture.
[49] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 454–64.
[50] "Leeds Mem.," 188.
[51] Ibid., 194.
[52] "Auckland Journals," ii, 417, 418.
[53] Pitt MSS., 103.
[54] I accept, with some qualification, Mr. Oscar Browning's explanation, that
Lord Loughborough had exaggerated the accounts of his interviews with Pitt and
the Whig leaders. (see "Leeds Mem.," 197, note).
[55] Stanhope, ii, 160.
[56] "Bland Burges P.," 208.
[57] Stanhope, "Miscellanies," ii, 57–63. Letter of Canning to W. Sturges
Bourne, 3rd September 1792. This interview is not referred to by Mr. H. W. V.
Temperley ("Canning," ch. ii), Mr. Sichel ("Sheridan"), Captain Bagot ("Canning
and his Friends"), or E. Festing ("Frere and his Friends"). In "Pitt and Napoleon
Miscellanies" I shall publish new letters of Canning. One, dated 15th March
1793, declines an offer of Portland to bring him into Parliament.
[58] Pallain, "La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres," 41.
[59] Keith's "Mems.," ii, 494. Keith to Grenville, 14th January 1792.
[60] "Gower's Despatches," 142, 143, 145, 149.
[61] Pallain, pp. xv-xviii.
[44] Ibid., 834.
[45] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 551–602, 1404–31.
[46] Stanhope, ii, 148–50, and App., xv.
[47] Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," ch. x.
[48] Fitzmaurice, "Shelburne," iii, 500–4; Salomon, "Pitt," 596. The King later
on teased the Duke of Leeds by a more compromising overture.
[49] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 454–64.
[50] "Leeds Mem.," 188.
[51] Ibid., 194.
[52] "Auckland Journals," ii, 417, 418.
[53] Pitt MSS., 103.
[54] I accept, with some qualification, Mr. Oscar Browning's explanation, that
Lord Loughborough had exaggerated the accounts of his interviews with Pitt and
the Whig leaders. (see "Leeds Mem.," 197, note).
[55] Stanhope, ii, 160.
[56] "Bland Burges P.," 208.
[57] Stanhope, "Miscellanies," ii, 57–63. Letter of Canning to W. Sturges
Bourne, 3rd September 1792. This interview is not referred to by Mr. H. W. V.
Temperley ("Canning," ch. ii), Mr. Sichel ("Sheridan"), Captain Bagot ("Canning
and his Friends"), or E. Festing ("Frere and his Friends"). In "Pitt and Napoleon
Miscellanies" I shall publish new letters of Canning. One, dated 15th March
1793, declines an offer of Portland to bring him into Parliament.
[58] Pallain, "La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres," 41.
[59] Keith's "Mems.," ii, 494. Keith to Grenville, 14th January 1792.
[60] "Gower's Despatches," 142, 143, 145, 149.
[61] Pallain, pp. xv-xviii.
Page 668
[62] Pallain, 56, 57.
[63] Pallain, 106, 107.
[64] "Wealth of Nations," bk. iv, ch. iii.
[65] "Gower's Despatches," 165, 171.
[66] Sorel, ii, 216.
[67] Fersen, "Diary" (Eng. edit.), 255.
[68] Clapham, "Causes of the War of 1792," 231.
[69] On the Tobago proposal see "Dropmore P.," ii, 260.
[70] Pallain, 215–9. The original is in Pitt MSS., 333.
[71] Fersen, "Diary" (Eng. edit.), 316, 319.
[72] "Dropmore P.," ii, 267. See, too, further details in "Dumouriez and the
Defence of England against Napoleon," by J. H. Rose and A. M. Broadley.
[73] Pitt MSS., 333. Chauvelin to Dumouriez, 28th April.
[74] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1522.
[75] "Rights of Man," pt. ii, ch. v.
[76] "Dropmore P.," ii, 282; "Auckland Journals," ii, 410.
[77] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 178–82, 225–32; Sorel, ii, 445–54; Heidrich, pt. ii, ch.
ii. I fully agree with Dr. Salomon ("Pitt," 537) as to the sincerity of Pitt's desire
for neutrality.
[78] Sybel, ii, 142.
[79] For the discussions between the three Powers on Poland see Heidrich, 165–
219; and Salomon, "Das Politische System des jüngeren Pitt und die zweite
Teilung Polens" (Berlin, 1895).
[80] "F. O.," Poland, 6. Hailes to Grenville, 16th and 27th June 1792.
[81] "Dropmore P.," ii, 142; see, too, ii, 279.
[82] "Mems. of Fox," iii, 18.
[63] Pallain, 106, 107.
[64] "Wealth of Nations," bk. iv, ch. iii.
[65] "Gower's Despatches," 165, 171.
[66] Sorel, ii, 216.
[67] Fersen, "Diary" (Eng. edit.), 255.
[68] Clapham, "Causes of the War of 1792," 231.
[69] On the Tobago proposal see "Dropmore P.," ii, 260.
[70] Pallain, 215–9. The original is in Pitt MSS., 333.
[71] Fersen, "Diary" (Eng. edit.), 316, 319.
[72] "Dropmore P.," ii, 267. See, too, further details in "Dumouriez and the
Defence of England against Napoleon," by J. H. Rose and A. M. Broadley.
[73] Pitt MSS., 333. Chauvelin to Dumouriez, 28th April.
[74] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1522.
[75] "Rights of Man," pt. ii, ch. v.
[76] "Dropmore P.," ii, 282; "Auckland Journals," ii, 410.
[77] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 178–82, 225–32; Sorel, ii, 445–54; Heidrich, pt. ii, ch.
ii. I fully agree with Dr. Salomon ("Pitt," 537) as to the sincerity of Pitt's desire
for neutrality.
[78] Sybel, ii, 142.
[79] For the discussions between the three Powers on Poland see Heidrich, 165–
219; and Salomon, "Das Politische System des jüngeren Pitt und die zweite
Teilung Polens" (Berlin, 1895).
[80] "F. O.," Poland, 6. Hailes to Grenville, 16th and 27th June 1792.
[81] "Dropmore P.," ii, 142; see, too, ii, 279.
[82] "Mems. of Fox," iii, 18.
Page 669
[83] Aulard, "La Rév. Franç.," 270–2.
[84] "Dropmore P.," ii, 291.
[85] "Bland Burges P.," 207, 211.
[86] Dumont, "Souvenirs"; Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters" (Talleyrand).
[87] W. A. Miles, "Corresp.," i, 349–51; Sorel, iii, 18–20.
[88] Burke, "Corresp.," iv, 7.
[89] Sorel, iii, 139.
[90] Carlyle, "Fr. Rev.," iii, bk. i, ch. vi.
[91] "Mems. of Romilly," i, 351, 352.
[92] "Dropmore P.," ii, 318.
[93] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 19, 20.
[94] Ibid. In all, 3,772 French refugees landed in September 1792 ("Ann. Reg."
39). The first subscription for them realized £1,468. Burke gave £20.
[95] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21; Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," i, 218;
"Bland Burges P.," 203. Our agent, Munro, on 17th December 1792 reported
from Paris: "Dr. Maxwell has at last obtained a company in the French service,
and I understand is soon to leave this to join the army" (Gower's "Despatches,"
260). Mr. Elgar has not been able to trace him afterwards.
[96] Massey, iv, 45. This was said to be spoken to Bland Burges; but the papers
of the latter (p. 204) contain no reference to it.
[97] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.
[98] Ibid.
[99] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.
[100] Miles ("Corresp.," 333) states that the editors of the "Argus" and "Morning
Chronicle" were regularly paid by the French Embassy and were often there.
[101] "Bland Burges P.," 227–9.
[84] "Dropmore P.," ii, 291.
[85] "Bland Burges P.," 207, 211.
[86] Dumont, "Souvenirs"; Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters" (Talleyrand).
[87] W. A. Miles, "Corresp.," i, 349–51; Sorel, iii, 18–20.
[88] Burke, "Corresp.," iv, 7.
[89] Sorel, iii, 139.
[90] Carlyle, "Fr. Rev.," iii, bk. i, ch. vi.
[91] "Mems. of Romilly," i, 351, 352.
[92] "Dropmore P.," ii, 318.
[93] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 19, 20.
[94] Ibid. In all, 3,772 French refugees landed in September 1792 ("Ann. Reg."
39). The first subscription for them realized £1,468. Burke gave £20.
[95] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21; Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," i, 218;
"Bland Burges P.," 203. Our agent, Munro, on 17th December 1792 reported
from Paris: "Dr. Maxwell has at last obtained a company in the French service,
and I understand is soon to leave this to join the army" (Gower's "Despatches,"
260). Mr. Elgar has not been able to trace him afterwards.
[96] Massey, iv, 45. This was said to be spoken to Bland Burges; but the papers
of the latter (p. 204) contain no reference to it.
[97] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.
[98] Ibid.
[99] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.
[100] Miles ("Corresp.," 333) states that the editors of the "Argus" and "Morning
Chronicle" were regularly paid by the French Embassy and were often there.
[101] "Bland Burges P.," 227–9.
Page 670
[102] Virgil, "Georgics," i, 463–5. "Who would dare call the sun a liar? In truth,
he often warns of the approach of hidden seditions and of the swellings of
treachery and strifes yet unseen."
[103] "F. O.," France, 40.
[104] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 22.
[105] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.
[106] "Auckland Journals," ii, 449, 455; "Dropmore P.," ii, 324.
[107] Sorel, iii, 143.
[108] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.
[109] On 24th November Noël wrote from London to Lebrun: "Tous les
symptômes annoncent que les mouvements révolutionnaires ne peuvent être
éloignés." Quoted by Sorel, iii, 214. See, too, Ernouf's "Maret," p. 84.
[110] "Auckland Journals," ii, 481. Tomline, iii, 458, 459. Burke's unfortunate
phrase in the "Reflections": "Learning will be cast into the mire and trodden
down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude."
[111] B.M. Place MSS., vol. entitled "Libel, Sedition, Treason, Persecution."
[112] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.
[113] "Residence in France in 1792–5," by an English Lady, i, 190–2.
[114] Auckland says ("Journals," ii, 473) he has seen Paris bulletins and letters
which counted absolutely on a revolt in England.
[115] "Dropmore P.," ii, 344. Grenville to Auckland, 27th November.
[116] Ibid., 351–2.
[117] Salomon, "Pitt," 599.
[118] Rojas, "Miranda dans la Rév. Franç.," 3–4.
[119] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 341, 343; "Auckland Journals," ii, 471; Lecky, vi,
70–4.
[120] "F. O.," Holland, 20.
he often warns of the approach of hidden seditions and of the swellings of
treachery and strifes yet unseen."
[103] "F. O.," France, 40.
[104] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 22.
[105] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.
[106] "Auckland Journals," ii, 449, 455; "Dropmore P.," ii, 324.
[107] Sorel, iii, 143.
[108] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.
[109] On 24th November Noël wrote from London to Lebrun: "Tous les
symptômes annoncent que les mouvements révolutionnaires ne peuvent être
éloignés." Quoted by Sorel, iii, 214. See, too, Ernouf's "Maret," p. 84.
[110] "Auckland Journals," ii, 481. Tomline, iii, 458, 459. Burke's unfortunate
phrase in the "Reflections": "Learning will be cast into the mire and trodden
down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude."
[111] B.M. Place MSS., vol. entitled "Libel, Sedition, Treason, Persecution."
[112] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.
[113] "Residence in France in 1792–5," by an English Lady, i, 190–2.
[114] Auckland says ("Journals," ii, 473) he has seen Paris bulletins and letters
which counted absolutely on a revolt in England.
[115] "Dropmore P.," ii, 344. Grenville to Auckland, 27th November.
[116] Ibid., 351–2.
[117] Salomon, "Pitt," 599.
[118] Rojas, "Miranda dans la Rév. Franç.," 3–4.
[119] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 341, 343; "Auckland Journals," ii, 471; Lecky, vi,
70–4.
[120] "F. O.," Holland, 20.
Page 671
[121] "F. O.," Austria, 31, 32. See, too, Vivenot, ii, 446, 447.
[122] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90.
[123] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90. This despatch, and the letter of the
Prince of Orange referred to above, correct the statement of Mr. Browning
("Varennes," etc., 191) and Mr. Hammond ("Fox," 257), that the Dutch did not
call upon us for help. This was asserted by Lord Lansdowne on 21st December,
but his information was unofficial and is refuted by that given above.
[124] Marsh, "Politics of Great Britain and France," i, 260–2. The militia were
not called out in Surrey, Herts, Berks, and Bucks ("Dropmore P.," ii, 348).
[125] Pretyman MSS.
[126] Pitt to Westmorland, 14th October and 18th November 1792, in Salomon,
"Pitt" (App.); "Dropmore P.," ii, 318, 320–3, 328, 330, 333, 336; "Mems. of
Lord Ed. Fitzgerald," 155–60.
[127] Pretyman MSS.
[128] "F. O.," France, 40. For Grenville's account of the interview, see "Pitt and
Napoleon Miscellanies."
[129] Miles, "Correspondence," ii, 46; see, too, Ernouf, "Maret," 89, 95. This
corrects the mis-statement of Lecky (vi, 94) on this topic.
[130] Ernouf, "Maret," 90.
[131] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 190–3; Ernouf, "Maret," 94–8.
[132] "F. O.," Holland, 41; B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Auckland, 4th
December.
[133] "F. O.," Holland, 42. Auckland to Grenville, 7th and 8th December 1792.
See, too, Miles, "Correspondence," i, 382; Sorel, iii, 224.
[134] Sorel, iii, 204, 224.
[135] Vivenot, ii, 393.
[136] Sorel, iii, 225, 226.
[137] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 388, 389.
[138] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 385–7.
[122] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90.
[123] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90. This despatch, and the letter of the
Prince of Orange referred to above, correct the statement of Mr. Browning
("Varennes," etc., 191) and Mr. Hammond ("Fox," 257), that the Dutch did not
call upon us for help. This was asserted by Lord Lansdowne on 21st December,
but his information was unofficial and is refuted by that given above.
[124] Marsh, "Politics of Great Britain and France," i, 260–2. The militia were
not called out in Surrey, Herts, Berks, and Bucks ("Dropmore P.," ii, 348).
[125] Pretyman MSS.
[126] Pitt to Westmorland, 14th October and 18th November 1792, in Salomon,
"Pitt" (App.); "Dropmore P.," ii, 318, 320–3, 328, 330, 333, 336; "Mems. of
Lord Ed. Fitzgerald," 155–60.
[127] Pretyman MSS.
[128] "F. O.," France, 40. For Grenville's account of the interview, see "Pitt and
Napoleon Miscellanies."
[129] Miles, "Correspondence," ii, 46; see, too, Ernouf, "Maret," 89, 95. This
corrects the mis-statement of Lecky (vi, 94) on this topic.
[130] Ernouf, "Maret," 90.
[131] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 190–3; Ernouf, "Maret," 94–8.
[132] "F. O.," Holland, 41; B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Auckland, 4th
December.
[133] "F. O.," Holland, 42. Auckland to Grenville, 7th and 8th December 1792.
See, too, Miles, "Correspondence," i, 382; Sorel, iii, 224.
[134] Sorel, iii, 204, 224.
[135] Vivenot, ii, 393.
[136] Sorel, iii, 225, 226.
[137] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 388, 389.
[138] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 385–7.
Page 672
[139] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[140] Pitt MSS., 245. Published in "Napoleon and the Invasion of England," by
H. E. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, ii, App.
[141] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 475.
[142] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 19–21.
[143] Miles ("Corresp.," i, 391), who also asserts that Sheridan echoed words
used by the French agent, Noël.
[144] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 478–81.
[145] "Life and Letters of Earl Minto," ii, 82.
[146] Chuquet, "Jemappes," 196–7, shows that the urgent needs of the army in
Belgium were the raison d'être of the decree.
[147] "Dropmore P.," ii, 359–62; "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 126.
[148] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 137–46.
[149] "Méms. tirés des Papiers d'un homme d'Etat," ii, 100. This false assertion
was adopted by Malouet ("Méms.," ii, 201), whence it has been copied largely,
without examination of the debate itself.
[150] Godoy, "Mems.," i, ch. vi.
[151] "F. O.," Spain, 25, 26.
[152] "F. O.," France, 40.
[153] "F. O.," France, 40, 41.
[154] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 398–400. Unfortunately, Lord Acton ("Lects. on the
French Rev.," 253) accepted the stories against Pitt. He states that Danton
secretly offered to save Louis for £40,000; that Lansdowne, Sheridan, and Fox
urged Pitt to interpose; and that Pitt informed Maret that he did not do so
because the execution of Louis would ruin the Whigs. I must reply that Lord
Fitzmaurice assures me there is no sign that the first Lord Lansdowne urged Pitt
to bribe the Convention, though in the debate of 21st December 1792 he
suggested the sending an ambassador to Paris to improve the relations of the two
lands, and assuage the hostility to Louis. Further, Danton could scarcely have
made that offer; for he left Paris for Belgium on 1st December, and did not
[140] Pitt MSS., 245. Published in "Napoleon and the Invasion of England," by
H. E. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, ii, App.
[141] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 475.
[142] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 19–21.
[143] Miles ("Corresp.," i, 391), who also asserts that Sheridan echoed words
used by the French agent, Noël.
[144] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 478–81.
[145] "Life and Letters of Earl Minto," ii, 82.
[146] Chuquet, "Jemappes," 196–7, shows that the urgent needs of the army in
Belgium were the raison d'être of the decree.
[147] "Dropmore P.," ii, 359–62; "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 126.
[148] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 137–46.
[149] "Méms. tirés des Papiers d'un homme d'Etat," ii, 100. This false assertion
was adopted by Malouet ("Méms.," ii, 201), whence it has been copied largely,
without examination of the debate itself.
[150] Godoy, "Mems.," i, ch. vi.
[151] "F. O.," Spain, 25, 26.
[152] "F. O.," France, 40.
[153] "F. O.," France, 40, 41.
[154] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 398–400. Unfortunately, Lord Acton ("Lects. on the
French Rev.," 253) accepted the stories against Pitt. He states that Danton
secretly offered to save Louis for £40,000; that Lansdowne, Sheridan, and Fox
urged Pitt to interpose; and that Pitt informed Maret that he did not do so
because the execution of Louis would ruin the Whigs. I must reply that Lord
Fitzmaurice assures me there is no sign that the first Lord Lansdowne urged Pitt
to bribe the Convention, though in the debate of 21st December 1792 he
suggested the sending an ambassador to Paris to improve the relations of the two
lands, and assuage the hostility to Louis. Further, Danton could scarcely have
made that offer; for he left Paris for Belgium on 1st December, and did not
Page 673
return till 14th January, after which he was engrossed in the last illness of his
wife. Danton's name was dragged into the affair probably by mistake for Dannon
(see Belloc, "Danton," 200). Lastly, as Maret left London on 19th December, and
did not return until 30th January, he did not see Pitt at the crucial time of the
trial. And would Pitt have made so damaging a remark to a Frenchman? Is it not
obviously a Whig slander?
[155] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 189. See ch. iii of this work.
[156] See ch. iii for a refutation of this.
[157] Sorel, iii, 241. So, too, Gouverneur Morris, then in Paris, thought the
French Ministers, despite their bluster, wished to avoid war "if the people will let
them." (Quoted by Lecky, vi, 114.)
[158] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 250–3; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 114–16.
[159] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[160] Ibid., and "Dropmore P.," ii, 361.
[161] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 253–6; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 116–9.
[162] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 351.
[163] "Dropmore P.," ii, 363.
[164] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[165] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Whitworth, 29th December.
[166] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 441.
[167] Ibid., i, 439.
[168] I published it in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1906; see, too, Fitzmaurice,
"Shelburne," iii, 515. Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters" (Talleyrand), wrongly
states that he was at once expelled.
[169] "Ann. Reg.," 122–5; "Parl Hist.," xxx, 259–61; Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 4.
[170] "F. O.," France, 41.
[171] Whether Chauvelin was guilty of any worse offence than entertaining at
his house the editors of Opposition newspapers (Miles, "Corresp.," i, 440) is not
proven. Maret admitted to Miles that some scoundrels were sowing sedition in
wife. Danton's name was dragged into the affair probably by mistake for Dannon
(see Belloc, "Danton," 200). Lastly, as Maret left London on 19th December, and
did not return until 30th January, he did not see Pitt at the crucial time of the
trial. And would Pitt have made so damaging a remark to a Frenchman? Is it not
obviously a Whig slander?
[155] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 189. See ch. iii of this work.
[156] See ch. iii for a refutation of this.
[157] Sorel, iii, 241. So, too, Gouverneur Morris, then in Paris, thought the
French Ministers, despite their bluster, wished to avoid war "if the people will let
them." (Quoted by Lecky, vi, 114.)
[158] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 250–3; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 114–16.
[159] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[160] Ibid., and "Dropmore P.," ii, 361.
[161] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 253–6; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 116–9.
[162] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 351.
[163] "Dropmore P.," ii, 363.
[164] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[165] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Whitworth, 29th December.
[166] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 441.
[167] Ibid., i, 439.
[168] I published it in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1906; see, too, Fitzmaurice,
"Shelburne," iii, 515. Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters" (Talleyrand), wrongly
states that he was at once expelled.
[169] "Ann. Reg.," 122–5; "Parl Hist.," xxx, 259–61; Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 4.
[170] "F. O.," France, 41.
[171] Whether Chauvelin was guilty of any worse offence than entertaining at
his house the editors of Opposition newspapers (Miles, "Corresp.," i, 440) is not
proven. Maret admitted to Miles that some scoundrels were sowing sedition in
Page 674
England; but he added the not very comforting assurance that, in that case, they
would cease to be Frenchmen. Miles evidently believed those intrigues to be the
work of French emissaries, (Ibid., 450, 451).
[172] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 262–6; "Ann. Reg.," 119–22.
[173] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 28–36, 42. See, too, Sorel, iii, 258, on Maret's letter.
[174] "Dropmore P.," ii, 366; but see Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 43, 44.
[175] "Corresp. du Gén. Miranda avec le Gén. Dumouriez ... depuis janvier
1793," 3–8. See "Dropmore P.," ii, 371, on Dumouriez' plan.
[176] Ibid., 8.
[177] "Dropmore P.," ii, 365.
[178] Miles, ii, 36.
[179] "Gower's Despatches," 278.
[180] B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.
[181] "F. O.," France, 41. The order to Chauvelin must have been given earlier,
probably on 22nd January, as will be seen by Dumouriez' letter to Miranda soon
to be quoted. George III's order of 24th January (endorsed by Pitt) for
Chauvelin's expulsion cannot have the importance which Mr. J. L. le B.
Hammond ("Fox," 262–3) assigns to it. See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for
Lebrun's letter to Grenville.
[182] Published in "Dumouriez, etc.," 159, 160, by J. H. Rose and A. M.
Broadley, from B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.
[183] Lecky, vi, 119–22.
[184] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 55.
[185] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108; "Corresp.," ii, 62.
[186] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108.
[187] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 62.
[188] Dumouriez, "Méms.," ii, 128–31 (edit. of 1794).
would cease to be Frenchmen. Miles evidently believed those intrigues to be the
work of French emissaries, (Ibid., 450, 451).
[172] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 262–6; "Ann. Reg.," 119–22.
[173] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 28–36, 42. See, too, Sorel, iii, 258, on Maret's letter.
[174] "Dropmore P.," ii, 366; but see Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 43, 44.
[175] "Corresp. du Gén. Miranda avec le Gén. Dumouriez ... depuis janvier
1793," 3–8. See "Dropmore P.," ii, 371, on Dumouriez' plan.
[176] Ibid., 8.
[177] "Dropmore P.," ii, 365.
[178] Miles, ii, 36.
[179] "Gower's Despatches," 278.
[180] B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.
[181] "F. O.," France, 41. The order to Chauvelin must have been given earlier,
probably on 22nd January, as will be seen by Dumouriez' letter to Miranda soon
to be quoted. George III's order of 24th January (endorsed by Pitt) for
Chauvelin's expulsion cannot have the importance which Mr. J. L. le B.
Hammond ("Fox," 262–3) assigns to it. See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for
Lebrun's letter to Grenville.
[182] Published in "Dumouriez, etc.," 159, 160, by J. H. Rose and A. M.
Broadley, from B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.
[183] Lecky, vi, 119–22.
[184] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 55.
[185] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108; "Corresp.," ii, 62.
[186] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108.
[187] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 62.
[188] Dumouriez, "Méms.," ii, 128–31 (edit. of 1794).
Page 675
[189] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 350. Fox admitted (p. 371) that Maret did not think
himself authorized to negotiate. See, too, Bland Burges in "Auckland Journals,"
ii, 493. I cannot agree with Mr. Oscar Browning ("Varennes, etc.," 198), and Mr.
J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 258) as to the importance of Maret's "mission."
Lecky (vi, 126) also overrates it, in my judgement.
[190] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.
[191] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.
[192] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.
[193] Maret stated that "M. Chauvelin had shamefully deceived the Executive
Council, and that nothing but misrepresentations and falsehoods had marked his
despatches since he lost all hope of remaining in this country" (Miles,
"Corresp.," ii, 62).
[194] Wilberforce urged this ("Life," ii, 13).
[195] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 351, 378.
[196] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377.
[197] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 565.
[198] "Dropmore P.," ii, 378; Prior, "Burke," 368.
[199] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 11. Note the statement of George Rose to
Auckland (8th February, 1793): "Our revenue goes on gloriously. The year
ending 5th January shows £300,000 more than the year preceding.... We may
suffer in some respects; but we must crush the miscreants"(B.M. Add. MSS.,
34448).
[200] "F. O.," Austria, 32 (Stratton to Grenville, 22nd December, 1792).
Cobenzl, Austrian Chancellor, assured Stratton that Francis II would require
from France "l'établissement d'une constitution quelconque fondée sur les bases
les plus essentiels du gouvernement monarchique."
In view of these considerations I cannot endorse Lecky's censure (vi, 134) on
Pitt's "blindness" as to the character of the war.
[201] Sir James Murray, our envoy at Frankfurt, was assured on 1st February
that 138,419 Austrians were ready for the campaign.
[202] B.M. Add. MSS., 34448.
himself authorized to negotiate. See, too, Bland Burges in "Auckland Journals,"
ii, 493. I cannot agree with Mr. Oscar Browning ("Varennes, etc.," 198), and Mr.
J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 258) as to the importance of Maret's "mission."
Lecky (vi, 126) also overrates it, in my judgement.
[190] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.
[191] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.
[192] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.
[193] Maret stated that "M. Chauvelin had shamefully deceived the Executive
Council, and that nothing but misrepresentations and falsehoods had marked his
despatches since he lost all hope of remaining in this country" (Miles,
"Corresp.," ii, 62).
[194] Wilberforce urged this ("Life," ii, 13).
[195] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 351, 378.
[196] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377.
[197] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 565.
[198] "Dropmore P.," ii, 378; Prior, "Burke," 368.
[199] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 11. Note the statement of George Rose to
Auckland (8th February, 1793): "Our revenue goes on gloriously. The year
ending 5th January shows £300,000 more than the year preceding.... We may
suffer in some respects; but we must crush the miscreants"(B.M. Add. MSS.,
34448).
[200] "F. O.," Austria, 32 (Stratton to Grenville, 22nd December, 1792).
Cobenzl, Austrian Chancellor, assured Stratton that Francis II would require
from France "l'établissement d'une constitution quelconque fondée sur les bases
les plus essentiels du gouvernement monarchique."
In view of these considerations I cannot endorse Lecky's censure (vi, 134) on
Pitt's "blindness" as to the character of the war.
[201] Sir James Murray, our envoy at Frankfurt, was assured on 1st February
that 138,419 Austrians were ready for the campaign.
[202] B.M. Add. MSS., 34448.
Page 676
[203] See Martens, v, 530–5, for the Russo-Prussian treaty of 13th July 1793.
[204] Murray to Grenville, 19th January 1793; see "Pitt and Napoleon
Miscellanies," which also contain the new letters of Burke referred to above.
[205] Vivenot, ii, 498–506.
[206] Martens, v, 438–42.
[207] Hon. J. W. Fortescue, "Hist. of the British Army," iv, 77–83.
[208] Pretyman MSS.
[209] Chevening MSS.
[210] Murray reported to Grenville on 10th and 18th February that the Allies at
Frankfurt were disturbed by news of the negotiation with Dumouriez. See too,
Vivenot, ii, 489.
[211] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377–81; "Dumouriez," by J. H. Rose and A. M.
Broadley, 162–75.
[212] "F. O.," Austria, 32, Morton Eden to Grenville, 30th March.
[213] "War Office" 6, (7); 23rd February, to Duke of York; B.M. Add. MSS
34448, Grenville to Auckland, 23rd February; Calvert, "Campaigns in Flanders
and Holland," chs. i, ii.
[214] This letter (for which see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies") corrects Mr.
Fortescue's statement (iv, 125) that Ministers alone were responsible for the
Dunkirk scheme. George III was morally responsible for it.
[215] "Dropmore P.," ii, 387.
[216] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Eden to Grenville, 27th and 28th March, 10th April;
Vivenot, ii, 541; Häusser, i, 483.
[217] Ibid., Eden to Grenville, 15th April. This probably refers to Alsace; but it
may possibly hint at a partition of Venice which had been mooted at Vienna
before. A slice of Piedmont was also desired (Eden to Grenville, 8th June).
[218] Ibid., Eden to Grenville, 30th March.
[219] The West India expedition was again and again deferred in favour of that
to la Vendée or Toulon (Vivenot, iii, 383).
[204] Murray to Grenville, 19th January 1793; see "Pitt and Napoleon
Miscellanies," which also contain the new letters of Burke referred to above.
[205] Vivenot, ii, 498–506.
[206] Martens, v, 438–42.
[207] Hon. J. W. Fortescue, "Hist. of the British Army," iv, 77–83.
[208] Pretyman MSS.
[209] Chevening MSS.
[210] Murray reported to Grenville on 10th and 18th February that the Allies at
Frankfurt were disturbed by news of the negotiation with Dumouriez. See too,
Vivenot, ii, 489.
[211] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377–81; "Dumouriez," by J. H. Rose and A. M.
Broadley, 162–75.
[212] "F. O.," Austria, 32, Morton Eden to Grenville, 30th March.
[213] "War Office" 6, (7); 23rd February, to Duke of York; B.M. Add. MSS
34448, Grenville to Auckland, 23rd February; Calvert, "Campaigns in Flanders
and Holland," chs. i, ii.
[214] This letter (for which see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies") corrects Mr.
Fortescue's statement (iv, 125) that Ministers alone were responsible for the
Dunkirk scheme. George III was morally responsible for it.
[215] "Dropmore P.," ii, 387.
[216] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Eden to Grenville, 27th and 28th March, 10th April;
Vivenot, ii, 541; Häusser, i, 483.
[217] Ibid., Eden to Grenville, 15th April. This probably refers to Alsace; but it
may possibly hint at a partition of Venice which had been mooted at Vienna
before. A slice of Piedmont was also desired (Eden to Grenville, 8th June).
[218] Ibid., Eden to Grenville, 30th March.
[219] The West India expedition was again and again deferred in favour of that
to la Vendée or Toulon (Vivenot, iii, 383).
Page 677
[220] Sybel, iii, 38–40; Häusser, i, 488, 489.
[221] Pretyman MSS. I have published the letter of 5th April 1793 almost in full
in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1910.
[222] "Dropmore P.," ii, 388–93, 399.
[223] "F. O.," France, 42. I cannot agree with Sorel (iii, 405) in taking the
French overtures seriously.
[224] "W. O.," 6 (10), Dundas to Murray (now secretary to the Duke of York).
[225] Calvert, 80.
[226] Calvert, ch. iii; Fortescue, iv, 111.
[227] "Dropmore P.," iii, 493.
[228] "Dropmore P.," ii, 436.
[229] Sybel, iii, 136, 137.
[230] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot (Earl of Minto)," ii, 159.
[231] "W. O.," 6 (10), 1st August, to Sir J. Murray, which corrects the statement
in Sybel (iii, 140), that England meant to keep Dunkirk.
[232] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 18.
[233] Calvert, 119–21.
[234] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 160.
[235] Pitt MSS., 196.
[236] Vivenot, iii, 352, 353.
[237] Ibid., 320, 321, 339, 379, 380; "Dropmore P.," ii, 470, 536. In the last
passage Yarmouth accuses the King of Prussia of deliberately thwarting the
action of the Austrian army under Wurmser.
[238] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Grenville to Eden, 11th June; Eden to Grenville, 26th
June.
[239] "Dropmore P.," ii, 392, 399, 407, 412. Spain hoped to find her "indemnity"
in Corsica. See too Fortescue, iv, 116, 117.
[221] Pretyman MSS. I have published the letter of 5th April 1793 almost in full
in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1910.
[222] "Dropmore P.," ii, 388–93, 399.
[223] "F. O.," France, 42. I cannot agree with Sorel (iii, 405) in taking the
French overtures seriously.
[224] "W. O.," 6 (10), Dundas to Murray (now secretary to the Duke of York).
[225] Calvert, 80.
[226] Calvert, ch. iii; Fortescue, iv, 111.
[227] "Dropmore P.," iii, 493.
[228] "Dropmore P.," ii, 436.
[229] Sybel, iii, 136, 137.
[230] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot (Earl of Minto)," ii, 159.
[231] "W. O.," 6 (10), 1st August, to Sir J. Murray, which corrects the statement
in Sybel (iii, 140), that England meant to keep Dunkirk.
[232] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 18.
[233] Calvert, 119–21.
[234] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 160.
[235] Pitt MSS., 196.
[236] Vivenot, iii, 352, 353.
[237] Ibid., 320, 321, 339, 379, 380; "Dropmore P.," ii, 470, 536. In the last
passage Yarmouth accuses the King of Prussia of deliberately thwarting the
action of the Austrian army under Wurmser.
[238] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Grenville to Eden, 11th June; Eden to Grenville, 26th
June.
[239] "Dropmore P.," ii, 392, 399, 407, 412. Spain hoped to find her "indemnity"
in Corsica. See too Fortescue, iv, 116, 117.
Page 678
[240] See "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October 1909, p. 748.
[241] Pitt MSS., 196.
[242] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[243] Ibid.
[244] "F. O.," Spain, 28. St. Helens to Grenville, 4th and 11th September.
[245] "W. O.," 6 (10). See Fortescue (iv, pt. i, chs. vi, vii) for criticisms of these
measures.
[246] The arguments of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in "Owens College Essays," do
not convince me that Napoleon alone devised that plan. Chuquet's conclusion
("Toulon," 176), "Bonaparte partageait l'avis des représentants," seems to me
thoroughly sound. So, too, Cottin, "Toulon et les Anglais," ch. xi.
[247] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[248] "H. O." (Adm. Medit., 1793). Nevertheless Hood sent off a small squadron
to offer help to Paoli in Corsica, but with very disappointing results. On 7th
October he writes: "Paoli is a composition of art and deceipt [sic]." He also
dwells on the hostile conduct of Genoa and Tuscany.
[249] Martens, v, 473–83. In "H. O.," Secrs. of State, 4, is a despatch of General
Acton of 30th October 1793 to Sir W. Hamilton, stating that when transports
reach Naples, they will take off 1,200 more troops for Toulon, making a total of
6,300. But ships and supplies of food were wanting. The troops must be
commanded by a Neapolitan, Marshal Fortiquerri, whom Hood had censured for
incompetence!
[250] On 15th September Pitt wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Viceroy of
Ireland, asking him to send the flank companies (the best men) of the regiments
then in Ireland. Westmorland agreed on 18th September, but said they could not
sail in less than three weeks. As the crisis at Toulon deepened, Pitt, about the
middle of November, begged the Lord Lieutenant to send the 35th, 41st, and
42nd regiments from Ireland to Toulon. On 20th November Westmorland agreed
(though pointing out the danger of an Irish rising). On the 30th he said the two
latter regiments were ready to sail from Cork whenever the transports should
arrive; but the delays in the arrival and sailing of transports had always been
serious—a prophetic remark (Pitt MSS., 331).
[241] Pitt MSS., 196.
[242] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[243] Ibid.
[244] "F. O.," Spain, 28. St. Helens to Grenville, 4th and 11th September.
[245] "W. O.," 6 (10). See Fortescue (iv, pt. i, chs. vi, vii) for criticisms of these
measures.
[246] The arguments of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in "Owens College Essays," do
not convince me that Napoleon alone devised that plan. Chuquet's conclusion
("Toulon," 176), "Bonaparte partageait l'avis des représentants," seems to me
thoroughly sound. So, too, Cottin, "Toulon et les Anglais," ch. xi.
[247] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[248] "H. O." (Adm. Medit., 1793). Nevertheless Hood sent off a small squadron
to offer help to Paoli in Corsica, but with very disappointing results. On 7th
October he writes: "Paoli is a composition of art and deceipt [sic]." He also
dwells on the hostile conduct of Genoa and Tuscany.
[249] Martens, v, 473–83. In "H. O.," Secrs. of State, 4, is a despatch of General
Acton of 30th October 1793 to Sir W. Hamilton, stating that when transports
reach Naples, they will take off 1,200 more troops for Toulon, making a total of
6,300. But ships and supplies of food were wanting. The troops must be
commanded by a Neapolitan, Marshal Fortiquerri, whom Hood had censured for
incompetence!
[250] On 15th September Pitt wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Viceroy of
Ireland, asking him to send the flank companies (the best men) of the regiments
then in Ireland. Westmorland agreed on 18th September, but said they could not
sail in less than three weeks. As the crisis at Toulon deepened, Pitt, about the
middle of November, begged the Lord Lieutenant to send the 35th, 41st, and
42nd regiments from Ireland to Toulon. On 20th November Westmorland agreed
(though pointing out the danger of an Irish rising). On the 30th he said the two
latter regiments were ready to sail from Cork whenever the transports should
arrive; but the delays in the arrival and sailing of transports had always been
serious—a prophetic remark (Pitt MSS., 331).
Page 679
[251] "Dropmore P.," ii, 471. Thugut took no interest whatever in Toulon (see
Vivenot, iii, 324, 327, 362, 363). Other proofs follow (pp. 381, 384) of the
pressing demands which Grenville, also Mr. Trevor at Turin, made for the
fulfilment of the Emperor's promise. Some difficulties supervened as to the
provisioning of the 5,000 Austrian troops on the march and the place of
embarkation; but these were far from insuperable. Clearly the operating cause
was Thugut's conviction that there was at Toulon a number of troops "excédant
ce que toute place quelconque peut exiger pour sa défense" (ibid., 385).
[252] "H. O." (Adm. Medit, 1793), Hood to Dundas, 24th November.
[253] Ibid. O'Hara to Hood. This reached London on 8th December; but, as we
have seen, Ministers up to 22nd December continued to rely on the arrival of the
Austrians as providing a sufficient reinforcement.
[254] "Dropmore P.," ii, 447; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 190, et seq.
[255] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[256] Even by M. Cottin in his works, "Toulon et les Anglais," "L'Angleterre et
les Princes."
[257] "F. O.," Austria, 34. Grenville to Eden, 7th September. So in his letter of
4th October to Pitt he refers to "such other towns or districts [in S. France] as
may become objects of indemnity." See, too, "Dropmore P.," ii, 412, 438;
Vivenot, iii, 326.
[258] "Dropmore P.," iii, 487.
[259] "H. O.," 455, ad fin.
[260] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 33.
[261] "F. O.," Spain, 28. Grenville to St. Helens, 22nd October 1793. Cottin
omits this despatch, which is essential to the understanding of British policy. See
for further details C. J. Fox, "Bonaparte at the Siege of Toulon," bk. ii, ch. ii.
[262] "F. O.," Spain, 28. On 30th November Grenville instructed St. Helens to
express regret that Spain seemed to retract her wish, previously expressed, that
Corsica should go to England; and also to advise that Spain should take her
indemnity from France on the Pyrenean frontier.
[263] Fortescue, iv, 172.
Vivenot, iii, 324, 327, 362, 363). Other proofs follow (pp. 381, 384) of the
pressing demands which Grenville, also Mr. Trevor at Turin, made for the
fulfilment of the Emperor's promise. Some difficulties supervened as to the
provisioning of the 5,000 Austrian troops on the march and the place of
embarkation; but these were far from insuperable. Clearly the operating cause
was Thugut's conviction that there was at Toulon a number of troops "excédant
ce que toute place quelconque peut exiger pour sa défense" (ibid., 385).
[252] "H. O." (Adm. Medit, 1793), Hood to Dundas, 24th November.
[253] Ibid. O'Hara to Hood. This reached London on 8th December; but, as we
have seen, Ministers up to 22nd December continued to rely on the arrival of the
Austrians as providing a sufficient reinforcement.
[254] "Dropmore P.," ii, 447; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 190, et seq.
[255] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[256] Even by M. Cottin in his works, "Toulon et les Anglais," "L'Angleterre et
les Princes."
[257] "F. O.," Austria, 34. Grenville to Eden, 7th September. So in his letter of
4th October to Pitt he refers to "such other towns or districts [in S. France] as
may become objects of indemnity." See, too, "Dropmore P.," ii, 412, 438;
Vivenot, iii, 326.
[258] "Dropmore P.," iii, 487.
[259] "H. O.," 455, ad fin.
[260] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 33.
[261] "F. O.," Spain, 28. Grenville to St. Helens, 22nd October 1793. Cottin
omits this despatch, which is essential to the understanding of British policy. See
for further details C. J. Fox, "Bonaparte at the Siege of Toulon," bk. ii, ch. ii.
[262] "F. O.," Spain, 28. On 30th November Grenville instructed St. Helens to
express regret that Spain seemed to retract her wish, previously expressed, that
Corsica should go to England; and also to advise that Spain should take her
indemnity from France on the Pyrenean frontier.
[263] Fortescue, iv, 172.
Page 680
[264] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[265] "H. O.," Mil., 455. Fortescue (iv, 175) vehemently censures Henry
Dundas, but I think without sufficient ground. The letters of David Dundas
called for reproof. See Mr. Oscar Browning's "Youth of Napoleon" (App. iv).
[266] Pitt MSS., 331; "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[267] "Dropmore P.," ii, 476, 477; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 198.
[268] Admiralty. Out Letters, xiii.
[269] "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[270] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1794.
[271] "F. O.," Austria, 36. Grenville to Eden, 3rd January 1794.
[272] Pellew, "Sidmouth," i, 112.
[273] "Dropmore P.," ii, 438.
[274] See "The Complaints of the Poor People of England," by G. Dyer, B.A.
(late of Emmanuel College, Camb., 1793).
[275] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27, 28.
[276] E. Smith, "The English Jacobins," 111–3; C. Cestre, "John Thelwall," ch.
ii.
[277] "Report of the Committee of Secrecy," May 1794. The Duke of
Richmond's plan was the Westminster programme of 1780, which became the
"six points" of the Charter of 1838.
[278] See Fox's letter of 2nd May 1793 to Hardy in "State Trials," xxiv, 791.
[279] M. Conway, "Life of T. Paine," i, 346.
[280] In the Place MSS. (Brit. Mus.), vol. entitled "Libel, Sedition, Treason,
Persecution"—a valuable collection.
[281] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 929–44.
[282] "Collection of Addresses ... to the National Convention of France"
(Debrett, 1793), 14.
[265] "H. O.," Mil., 455. Fortescue (iv, 175) vehemently censures Henry
Dundas, but I think without sufficient ground. The letters of David Dundas
called for reproof. See Mr. Oscar Browning's "Youth of Napoleon" (App. iv).
[266] Pitt MSS., 331; "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[267] "Dropmore P.," ii, 476, 477; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 198.
[268] Admiralty. Out Letters, xiii.
[269] "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[270] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1794.
[271] "F. O.," Austria, 36. Grenville to Eden, 3rd January 1794.
[272] Pellew, "Sidmouth," i, 112.
[273] "Dropmore P.," ii, 438.
[274] See "The Complaints of the Poor People of England," by G. Dyer, B.A.
(late of Emmanuel College, Camb., 1793).
[275] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27, 28.
[276] E. Smith, "The English Jacobins," 111–3; C. Cestre, "John Thelwall," ch.
ii.
[277] "Report of the Committee of Secrecy," May 1794. The Duke of
Richmond's plan was the Westminster programme of 1780, which became the
"six points" of the Charter of 1838.
[278] See Fox's letter of 2nd May 1793 to Hardy in "State Trials," xxiv, 791.
[279] M. Conway, "Life of T. Paine," i, 346.
[280] In the Place MSS. (Brit. Mus.), vol. entitled "Libel, Sedition, Treason,
Persecution"—a valuable collection.
[281] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 929–44.
[282] "Collection of Addresses ... to the National Convention of France"
(Debrett, 1793), 14.
Page 681
[283] "Speeches of Lord Erskine," 293.
[284] "State Trials," xxii, 471–522.
[285] Porritt, ii, 128.
[286] "H. O.," Scotland, 7.
[287] Ibid.
[288] "State Trials," xxiii, 118–26.
[289] I differ here from Lord Cockburn, "Examination of the Trials for Sedition
in Scotland," i, 147.
[290] Ibid., i, 162–5; "State Trials," xxiii, 146–8, 160.
[291] P. Mackenzie, "Life of Muir," does not state the reason for Muir's visit to
Paris.
[292] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. Dunlop, Lord Provost of Glasgow, sent it to Robert
Dundas on 12th March 1793. For this William Christie, who translated the
French Constitution of 1791 into English, see Alger, "Englishmen in the French
Revolution," 78, 98.
[293] See Campbell, "Lives of the Lord Chancellors," vii, 273, note, and viii,
143–5, for criticisms on the judges: also Cockburn, op. cit., i, 147–80; "Life of
Romilly," i, 23.
[294] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. Letter of 2nd August 1793. Dundas further stated that
Muir had several Irish handbills on him.
[295] Curiously enough, Lord Cockburn paid no heed to this in his otherwise
able examination of the case.
[296] T. Wolfe Tone, "Autobiography," ii, 285.
[297] "H. O.," Scotland, 7.
[298] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. W. Scot to R. Dundas, 1st August.
[299] See the "Narrative of the Sufferings of T. F. Palmer and W. Skirving"
(1794), and "Monthly Mag.," xvii, 83–5, for Palmer's adventures. He died of
dysentery in 1799.
[300] "H. O.," Scotland, 9.
[284] "State Trials," xxii, 471–522.
[285] Porritt, ii, 128.
[286] "H. O.," Scotland, 7.
[287] Ibid.
[288] "State Trials," xxiii, 118–26.
[289] I differ here from Lord Cockburn, "Examination of the Trials for Sedition
in Scotland," i, 147.
[290] Ibid., i, 162–5; "State Trials," xxiii, 146–8, 160.
[291] P. Mackenzie, "Life of Muir," does not state the reason for Muir's visit to
Paris.
[292] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. Dunlop, Lord Provost of Glasgow, sent it to Robert
Dundas on 12th March 1793. For this William Christie, who translated the
French Constitution of 1791 into English, see Alger, "Englishmen in the French
Revolution," 78, 98.
[293] See Campbell, "Lives of the Lord Chancellors," vii, 273, note, and viii,
143–5, for criticisms on the judges: also Cockburn, op. cit., i, 147–80; "Life of
Romilly," i, 23.
[294] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. Letter of 2nd August 1793. Dundas further stated that
Muir had several Irish handbills on him.
[295] Curiously enough, Lord Cockburn paid no heed to this in his otherwise
able examination of the case.
[296] T. Wolfe Tone, "Autobiography," ii, 285.
[297] "H. O.," Scotland, 7.
[298] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. W. Scot to R. Dundas, 1st August.
[299] See the "Narrative of the Sufferings of T. F. Palmer and W. Skirving"
(1794), and "Monthly Mag.," xvii, 83–5, for Palmer's adventures. He died of
dysentery in 1799.
[300] "H. O.," Scotland, 9.
Page 682
[301] Their Memorial to Henry Dundas is in "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27.
They did not claim that he was innocent, merely that the punishment was
excessive and unjust.
[302] "Arniston Mems.," 240.
[303] Campbell, op. cit., viii, 145, 147.
[304] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27.
[305] For the instructions see E. Smith, "The Story of the English Jacobins," 87.
[306] "State Trials," xxiii, 414.
[307] J. Gerrald had published a pamphlet, "A Convention the only Means of
saving us from Ruin" (1793). It is in the British Museum.
[308] "H. O.," Scotland, 9.
[309] "State Trials," xxiii, 766.
[310] "Auckland Journals," iii, 205.
[311] "Arniston Mems.," 242.
[312] E. Smith, "The Eng. Jacobins," 93–7.
[313] See "Report of the Committee of Secrecy" (17th May 1794).
[314] C. Cestre, "John Thelwall," 77.
[315] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 30.
[316] "State Trials," xxiii, 1055–1166. For technical reasons this statement of
Booth could not be given at Walker's trial. Besides Walker's Constitutional
Society, there were two others, the Reformation and Patriotic Societies, founded
in March and April 1792.
[317] See E. Smith, "The Eng. Jacobins," ch. vi, for the meetings at Sheffield
and the part played by Yorke.
[318] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 31.
[319] Ibid., 27, 29. Spence purveyed "Pigs' Meat," while Eaton sold "Hogs'
Wash." The titles are a take-off of Burke's phrase "the swinish multitude."
They did not claim that he was innocent, merely that the punishment was
excessive and unjust.
[302] "Arniston Mems.," 240.
[303] Campbell, op. cit., viii, 145, 147.
[304] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27.
[305] For the instructions see E. Smith, "The Story of the English Jacobins," 87.
[306] "State Trials," xxiii, 414.
[307] J. Gerrald had published a pamphlet, "A Convention the only Means of
saving us from Ruin" (1793). It is in the British Museum.
[308] "H. O.," Scotland, 9.
[309] "State Trials," xxiii, 766.
[310] "Auckland Journals," iii, 205.
[311] "Arniston Mems.," 242.
[312] E. Smith, "The Eng. Jacobins," 93–7.
[313] See "Report of the Committee of Secrecy" (17th May 1794).
[314] C. Cestre, "John Thelwall," 77.
[315] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 30.
[316] "State Trials," xxiii, 1055–1166. For technical reasons this statement of
Booth could not be given at Walker's trial. Besides Walker's Constitutional
Society, there were two others, the Reformation and Patriotic Societies, founded
in March and April 1792.
[317] See E. Smith, "The Eng. Jacobins," ch. vi, for the meetings at Sheffield
and the part played by Yorke.
[318] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 31.
[319] Ibid., 27, 29. Spence purveyed "Pigs' Meat," while Eaton sold "Hogs'
Wash." The titles are a take-off of Burke's phrase "the swinish multitude."
Page 683
[320] I.e., similar to the one passed in Dublin against a People's Convention.
[321] "Report of the Parl. Comm. of Secrecy" (17th May 1794).
[322] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 1363–91; xxxi, 1–27.
[323] Ibid., xxxi, 97–121.
[324] "Morning Chronicle" for April 1794.
[325] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 30.
[326] "Auckland Journals," iii, 213.
[327] "State Trials," xxiv, 588, 600, 601.
[328] "State Trials," xxiv, 626.
[329] E. Smith, "Eng. Jacobins," 116.
[330] "Parl. Hist.," xxxi, 475–97.
[331] "Life of Horne Tooke," ii, 119. It was afterwards absurdly said that
Dundas, Horne Tooke's neighbour at Wimbledon, had had the letter filched from
his house. Both of them lived on the west side of the "green."
[332] "Parl. Hist.," xxxi, 497–505.
[333] "Life of T. Hardy," 42; "State Trials," xxiv, 717, 729, 762, etc. The
evidence fills 1,207 pages.
[334] Ibid., 1–200.
[335] "Troilus and Cressida," act i, sc. 3.
[336] "Dropmore P.," ii, 452.
[337] Thugut in the autumn of 1793 sketched a scheme for annexing the north of
France from the Somme to Sedan.
[338] "Dropmore P.," ii, 628. So, too, Morton Eden wrote to Grenville on 1st
January 1793: "The steadfastness of the Emperor does not equal his moral
rectitude" ("F. O.," Austria, 32).
[339] "Dropmore P.," ii, 491; "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 17–19, 69.
[321] "Report of the Parl. Comm. of Secrecy" (17th May 1794).
[322] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 1363–91; xxxi, 1–27.
[323] Ibid., xxxi, 97–121.
[324] "Morning Chronicle" for April 1794.
[325] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 30.
[326] "Auckland Journals," iii, 213.
[327] "State Trials," xxiv, 588, 600, 601.
[328] "State Trials," xxiv, 626.
[329] E. Smith, "Eng. Jacobins," 116.
[330] "Parl. Hist.," xxxi, 475–97.
[331] "Life of Horne Tooke," ii, 119. It was afterwards absurdly said that
Dundas, Horne Tooke's neighbour at Wimbledon, had had the letter filched from
his house. Both of them lived on the west side of the "green."
[332] "Parl. Hist.," xxxi, 497–505.
[333] "Life of T. Hardy," 42; "State Trials," xxiv, 717, 729, 762, etc. The
evidence fills 1,207 pages.
[334] Ibid., 1–200.
[335] "Troilus and Cressida," act i, sc. 3.
[336] "Dropmore P.," ii, 452.
[337] Thugut in the autumn of 1793 sketched a scheme for annexing the north of
France from the Somme to Sedan.
[338] "Dropmore P.," ii, 628. So, too, Morton Eden wrote to Grenville on 1st
January 1793: "The steadfastness of the Emperor does not equal his moral
rectitude" ("F. O.," Austria, 32).
[339] "Dropmore P.," ii, 491; "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 17–19, 69.
Page 684
[340] "Dropmore P.," ii, 494; "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 31, et seq.
[341] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 50; Sorel, iv, 17.
[342] Seeley, "Stein," i, 65.
[343] "F. O.," Austria, 36. Eden to Grenville, 15th and 27th February.
[344] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 81, 82.
[345] Sorel, iv, 13.
[346] Vivenot, iii, 89–96; "Dropmore P.," ii, 505–7.
[347] "F. O.," Austria, 36, Eden to Grenville, 31st March, 9th April. See, too,
Vivenot, iii, 172, for proofs that Kosciusko sought to delay the rising, and looked
to Vienna for help against Russia and Prussia.
[348] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 85, 89.
[349] "Dropmore P.," ii, 516.
[350] "F. O.," Prussia, 33. Grenville to Malmesbury, 21st April.
[351] Ibid., Same to same, 23rd May.
[352] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 96.
[353] "W. O.," I, 169. See an admirable article in the "United Service Mag."
(Aug. 1897), by Colonel E. M. Lloyd, founded on the papers of General Sir
James Craig, Adjutant-General of the Duke of York.
[354] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1132.
[355] "Dropmore P.," ii, 599.
[356] "F. O.," Austria, 38. Despatch of 19th July.
[357] Pitt MSS., 180. See, too, "Dropmore P.," ii, 617–20, 626.
[358] See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for Grenville's letters. Pitt was the
guest of Grenville at Dropmore at the end of November 1794 ("Buckingham P.,"
ii, 319).
[359] "F. O.," Prussia, 35. Malmesbury to Grenville, 25th November 1794.
[341] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 50; Sorel, iv, 17.
[342] Seeley, "Stein," i, 65.
[343] "F. O.," Austria, 36. Eden to Grenville, 15th and 27th February.
[344] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 81, 82.
[345] Sorel, iv, 13.
[346] Vivenot, iii, 89–96; "Dropmore P.," ii, 505–7.
[347] "F. O.," Austria, 36, Eden to Grenville, 31st March, 9th April. See, too,
Vivenot, iii, 172, for proofs that Kosciusko sought to delay the rising, and looked
to Vienna for help against Russia and Prussia.
[348] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 85, 89.
[349] "Dropmore P.," ii, 516.
[350] "F. O.," Prussia, 33. Grenville to Malmesbury, 21st April.
[351] Ibid., Same to same, 23rd May.
[352] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 96.
[353] "W. O.," I, 169. See an admirable article in the "United Service Mag."
(Aug. 1897), by Colonel E. M. Lloyd, founded on the papers of General Sir
James Craig, Adjutant-General of the Duke of York.
[354] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1132.
[355] "Dropmore P.," ii, 599.
[356] "F. O.," Austria, 38. Despatch of 19th July.
[357] Pitt MSS., 180. See, too, "Dropmore P.," ii, 617–20, 626.
[358] See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for Grenville's letters. Pitt was the
guest of Grenville at Dropmore at the end of November 1794 ("Buckingham P.,"
ii, 319).
[359] "F. O.," Prussia, 35. Malmesbury to Grenville, 25th November 1794.
Page 685
[360] See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for this letter.
[361] "Dropmore P.," iii, 26–30, 50, 57.
[362] Ranke, "Hardenberg," i, 258; "Paget P.," i, 95, et seq.
[363] See "Eng. Hist. Rev.," October 1909.
[364] "Dropmore P.," ii, 395, 438, 443, 444, 464.
[365] Pitt MSS., 349.
[366] Pitt MSS., 121.
[367] "F. O.," France, 40.
[368] Malouet, "Méms.," ii, 209–11; Morse Stephens, "French Rev.," ii, 481–4;
"Dropmore P.," ii, 388.
[369] Fortescue, iv, pt. i, 77, 78.
[370] "Dropmore P.," ii, 402, 403.
[371] Pitt MSS., 349.
[372] Pitt MSS., 155, 349. In the latter packet is Malouet's letter of 10th March
1793 from Kingston, Jamaica, to M. Franklyn at London, dwelling on the woes
of San Domingo and Martinique—all due to the folly and wickedness of one
man, probably Brissot. He despairs of the French West Indies. See, too,
"Dropmore P.," ii, 388.
[373] Pitt MSS., 349.
[374] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 586.
[375] The facts stated above suffice to refute the strange statement of Mr. Morse
Stephens ("Fr. Rev.," ii, 476) that the English invasion of San Domingo was
"absurd." It was not an invasion, but an occupation of the coast towns after
scarcely any resistance.
[376] "Dropmore P.," ii, 443, 454, 464.
[377] Fortescue, iv, pt. i, chs. xiii, xiv; James, i, 250–2.
[378] Pinckard, "Notes on the Expedition to the West Indies," ii, especially
Letter 15.
[361] "Dropmore P.," iii, 26–30, 50, 57.
[362] Ranke, "Hardenberg," i, 258; "Paget P.," i, 95, et seq.
[363] See "Eng. Hist. Rev.," October 1909.
[364] "Dropmore P.," ii, 395, 438, 443, 444, 464.
[365] Pitt MSS., 349.
[366] Pitt MSS., 121.
[367] "F. O.," France, 40.
[368] Malouet, "Méms.," ii, 209–11; Morse Stephens, "French Rev.," ii, 481–4;
"Dropmore P.," ii, 388.
[369] Fortescue, iv, pt. i, 77, 78.
[370] "Dropmore P.," ii, 402, 403.
[371] Pitt MSS., 349.
[372] Pitt MSS., 155, 349. In the latter packet is Malouet's letter of 10th March
1793 from Kingston, Jamaica, to M. Franklyn at London, dwelling on the woes
of San Domingo and Martinique—all due to the folly and wickedness of one
man, probably Brissot. He despairs of the French West Indies. See, too,
"Dropmore P.," ii, 388.
[373] Pitt MSS., 349.
[374] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 586.
[375] The facts stated above suffice to refute the strange statement of Mr. Morse
Stephens ("Fr. Rev.," ii, 476) that the English invasion of San Domingo was
"absurd." It was not an invasion, but an occupation of the coast towns after
scarcely any resistance.
[376] "Dropmore P.," ii, 443, 454, 464.
[377] Fortescue, iv, pt. i, chs. xiii, xiv; James, i, 250–2.
[378] Pinckard, "Notes on the Expedition to the West Indies," ii, especially
Letter 15.
Page 686
[379] Bryan Edwards, "Hist. Survey of S. Domingo" (1801), 204. Fortescue (iv,
385) assesses the British losses in the West Indies in 1794 at 12,000 men, apart
from deaths in battle.
[380] Pitt MSS., 121.
[381] "F. O.," Spain, 28. Grenville to St. Helens, 30th November 1793. On 1st
October Pitt pressed Grenville to open this question to the Spanish Court
("Dropmore P.," ii, 433, 438).
[382] "H. O." (Secretaries of State), 5.
[383] Pitt MSS., 349. He added that in 1788, 584 European and 699 American
ships set sail from Hayti: 37,447 negroes were imported.
[384] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Bute to Grenville, 26th June 1795.
[385] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Jackson to Grenville, 2nd January and 11th February
1795.
[386] "F. O.," Spain, 37. Grenville to Bute, 5th, 12th, and 19th June.
[387] Del Cantillo, "Tratados," 660.
[388] "Papiers de Barthélemy," vi, Introd., xv, 71, 77–85.
[389] "W. O.," vi, 6, which contains other despatches of Dundas cited later.
[390] "Diary of Sir John Moore," i, 208, 221, 233, 243; ii, 18, 19.
[391] "Diary of Sir John Moore," 2 vols. Edited by General Maurice.
[392] "F. O.," Spain, 39, 40. Merry to Grenville, 20th and 25th December and
19th January, 10th February, 6th and 29th March.
[393] "Dropmore P.," iii, 214.
[394] "F. O.," Spain, 44. Bute to Grenville, 10th September and 21st October.
[395] For the disgust of Pitt and Dundas, see "Dropmore P.," iii, 390.
[396] Malouet wrote to Pitt on 24th June 1798: "The wisdom of General
Maitland's measures, the perfect order in which he has conducted the operations
have lessened the disasters attending it, and by means of a truce and convention
agreed on with the Republican chiefs, not an inconsiderable number of
inhabitants has been induced to remain on their plantations" (Pitt MSS., 146).
385) assesses the British losses in the West Indies in 1794 at 12,000 men, apart
from deaths in battle.
[380] Pitt MSS., 121.
[381] "F. O.," Spain, 28. Grenville to St. Helens, 30th November 1793. On 1st
October Pitt pressed Grenville to open this question to the Spanish Court
("Dropmore P.," ii, 433, 438).
[382] "H. O." (Secretaries of State), 5.
[383] Pitt MSS., 349. He added that in 1788, 584 European and 699 American
ships set sail from Hayti: 37,447 negroes were imported.
[384] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Bute to Grenville, 26th June 1795.
[385] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Jackson to Grenville, 2nd January and 11th February
1795.
[386] "F. O.," Spain, 37. Grenville to Bute, 5th, 12th, and 19th June.
[387] Del Cantillo, "Tratados," 660.
[388] "Papiers de Barthélemy," vi, Introd., xv, 71, 77–85.
[389] "W. O.," vi, 6, which contains other despatches of Dundas cited later.
[390] "Diary of Sir John Moore," i, 208, 221, 233, 243; ii, 18, 19.
[391] "Diary of Sir John Moore," 2 vols. Edited by General Maurice.
[392] "F. O.," Spain, 39, 40. Merry to Grenville, 20th and 25th December and
19th January, 10th February, 6th and 29th March.
[393] "Dropmore P.," iii, 214.
[394] "F. O.," Spain, 44. Bute to Grenville, 10th September and 21st October.
[395] For the disgust of Pitt and Dundas, see "Dropmore P.," iii, 390.
[396] Malouet wrote to Pitt on 24th June 1798: "The wisdom of General
Maitland's measures, the perfect order in which he has conducted the operations
have lessened the disasters attending it, and by means of a truce and convention
agreed on with the Republican chiefs, not an inconsiderable number of
inhabitants has been induced to remain on their plantations" (Pitt MSS., 146).
Page 687
[397] "F. O.," Holland, 57.
[398] "Cape Records," i, 98.
[399] "W. O.," vi, 67.
[400] "Cape Records," i, 17, 22.
[401] "Cape Records," i, 23–6, 138–40; Cory, "Rise of South Africa," i, ch. ii.
[402] "W. O.," i, 323. In "F. O.," Holland, 57, is a memorial of Elphinstone and
Craig to Grenville, stating why they had detained at the Cape the U. S. ship
"Argonaut," whose owners now prosecuted them for £100,000.
[403] "South Africa a Century ago." By Lady Anne Barnard.
[404] "F. O.," Prussia, 70. Pitt to Harrowby, 27th October 1805.
[405] "Nelson Despatches," ii, 5.
[406] "Corresp. of Sir John Sinclair," i, 141–3.
[407] Puisaye, "Mems.," ii, 594–603; Forneron, "Hist. des Emigrés," ii, 13, 14.
[408] Cornwallis, "Corresp.," iii, 289.
[409] "F. O.," France, 44. Grenville to d'Harcourt, 19th June 1795.
[410] On 19th January 1798 Pitt, Windham, and Canning agreed to give £9,082
and £9,400 for the discharge of debts due for services of the Royalists in France,
incurred in England and France respectively, leaving a balance of £8,000 for
future payment. The following sums were paid to the Duc d'Harcourt for the
support of "Monsieur": in 1796, £3,000; in 1797, £9,000; and after May 1798 at
the rate of £500 per month (B.M. Add. MSS., 37844). I have not found the sums
allowed to the Comte d'Artois.
[411] "Diary of a Tour through Great Britain in 1795," by W. MacRitchie (1897).
[412] "Dropmore P.," ii, 172.
[413] In "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27, are Dundas's instructions to Moira,
dated 20th November 1793, appointing him Major-General in an expedition to
Guernsey, with Admiral MacBride, taking with him a Hessian corps as soon as it
arrives. He is to seize St. Malo or any place near it suitable for helping the
Royalists and harassing the enemy. If he deems success doubtful, he is to await
[398] "Cape Records," i, 98.
[399] "W. O.," vi, 67.
[400] "Cape Records," i, 17, 22.
[401] "Cape Records," i, 23–6, 138–40; Cory, "Rise of South Africa," i, ch. ii.
[402] "W. O.," i, 323. In "F. O.," Holland, 57, is a memorial of Elphinstone and
Craig to Grenville, stating why they had detained at the Cape the U. S. ship
"Argonaut," whose owners now prosecuted them for £100,000.
[403] "South Africa a Century ago." By Lady Anne Barnard.
[404] "F. O.," Prussia, 70. Pitt to Harrowby, 27th October 1805.
[405] "Nelson Despatches," ii, 5.
[406] "Corresp. of Sir John Sinclair," i, 141–3.
[407] Puisaye, "Mems.," ii, 594–603; Forneron, "Hist. des Emigrés," ii, 13, 14.
[408] Cornwallis, "Corresp.," iii, 289.
[409] "F. O.," France, 44. Grenville to d'Harcourt, 19th June 1795.
[410] On 19th January 1798 Pitt, Windham, and Canning agreed to give £9,082
and £9,400 for the discharge of debts due for services of the Royalists in France,
incurred in England and France respectively, leaving a balance of £8,000 for
future payment. The following sums were paid to the Duc d'Harcourt for the
support of "Monsieur": in 1796, £3,000; in 1797, £9,000; and after May 1798 at
the rate of £500 per month (B.M. Add. MSS., 37844). I have not found the sums
allowed to the Comte d'Artois.
[411] "Diary of a Tour through Great Britain in 1795," by W. MacRitchie (1897).
[412] "Dropmore P.," ii, 172.
[413] In "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27, are Dundas's instructions to Moira,
dated 20th November 1793, appointing him Major-General in an expedition to
Guernsey, with Admiral MacBride, taking with him a Hessian corps as soon as it
arrives. He is to seize St. Malo or any place near it suitable for helping the
Royalists and harassing the enemy. If he deems success doubtful, he is to await
Page 688
reinforcements. The aim is to help the cause of Louis XVII and lead to a general
pacification.
[414] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 96–8.
[415] Chevening MSS.
[416] Pretyman MSS.
[417] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 289.
[418] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 92.
[419] Sorel, v, 41; "Wickham Corresp.," i, 269–74, 343. Some mis-statements of
Sorel may be noted here. On pp. 39, 40 of vol. v he states that Pitt was intent on
acquiring Malta and Egypt (though he was then in doubt whether to retain
Corsica): also that, after the insult to George III in London on 29th October
1795, Pitt proposed a loan of £18,000,000 and new taxes, which Parliament
refused. The facts are that Pitt asked for that loan on 7th December 1796, and it
was subscribed in twenty-two hours. On the same day Parliament voted the new
taxes.
[420] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808.
[421] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 36.
[422] "H. O.," (Departmental), Secs. of State.
[423] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Hist. of the Two Acts," 330 et seq.
[424] Pitt MSS., 190; "W. O.," 113.
[425] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 36.
[426] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 235–42, 687–700, 1156; Tooke, "Hist. of Prices," i,
185 et seq.; Porter, "Progress of the Nation," 147, 452.
[427] "Dropmore P.," iii, 87, 243, 526–30; "Report of the American Hist. Assoc."
(1903), ii, 67–9, 354, 375, 440 et seq., 552–8; E. Channing, "United States,"
148–50; Cunningham, 512, 694.
[428] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," i, ch. iv; ii, ch. i.
[429] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," ii, 60–4, 104; Sinclair, "Address ... on the
Cultivation of Waste Lands (1795)"; "Observations on ... a Bill for facilitating
pacification.
[414] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 96–8.
[415] Chevening MSS.
[416] Pretyman MSS.
[417] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 289.
[418] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 92.
[419] Sorel, v, 41; "Wickham Corresp.," i, 269–74, 343. Some mis-statements of
Sorel may be noted here. On pp. 39, 40 of vol. v he states that Pitt was intent on
acquiring Malta and Egypt (though he was then in doubt whether to retain
Corsica): also that, after the insult to George III in London on 29th October
1795, Pitt proposed a loan of £18,000,000 and new taxes, which Parliament
refused. The facts are that Pitt asked for that loan on 7th December 1796, and it
was subscribed in twenty-two hours. On the same day Parliament voted the new
taxes.
[420] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808.
[421] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 36.
[422] "H. O.," (Departmental), Secs. of State.
[423] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Hist. of the Two Acts," 330 et seq.
[424] Pitt MSS., 190; "W. O.," 113.
[425] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 36.
[426] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 235–42, 687–700, 1156; Tooke, "Hist. of Prices," i,
185 et seq.; Porter, "Progress of the Nation," 147, 452.
[427] "Dropmore P.," iii, 87, 243, 526–30; "Report of the American Hist. Assoc."
(1903), ii, 67–9, 354, 375, 440 et seq., 552–8; E. Channing, "United States,"
148–50; Cunningham, 512, 694.
[428] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," i, ch. iv; ii, ch. i.
[429] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," ii, 60–4, 104; Sinclair, "Address ... on the
Cultivation of Waste Lands (1795)"; "Observations on ... a Bill for facilitating
Page 689
the Division of Commons." He first urged this on Pitt on 10th January 1795 (Pitt
MSS., 175).
[430] Pitt MSS., 178.
[431] "Corresp. of Sir John Sinclair," i, 124.
[432] Pitt MSS., 193. Sinclair raised two corps of Fencibles. The list of his
works, pamphlets, etc., fills thirty-two pages at the end of his Memoirs.
[433] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," ii, 106–9.
[434] "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[435] "Lord Colchester's Diary," i, 82.
[436] "Mems. of Lady Hester Stanhope," i, 177–81. Tomline asserted that a lady
of the highest rank desired to marry Pitt. Various conjectures have been made on
this topic. Lord Rosebery suggests that the Duchess of Gordon was hinted at.
[437] "Auckland Journals," iii, 356, 363, 369, 373–4.
[438] Wordsworth, "Prelude," bk. xiv.
[439] Pretyman MSS. Quoted in full, with Pitt's second letter and one of
Auckland, by Lord Ashbourne ("Pitt," 241–4).
[440] Pellew, i, 183.
[441] Ashbourne, 162, 179; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 410, 429.
[442] "Auckland Journals," iii, 359. George III, who disliked Auckland, ordered
the appointment of Chatham.
[443] Ibid., iii, 387.
[444] See Appendix for the sums borrowed, expended on the army and navy, and
raised by the Permanent Taxes in 1792–1801.
[445] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1297–1347; Pitt MSS., 102. Pitt to Boyd, 4th January
1796.
[446] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," ii, 276.
[447] W. Newmarch, "Loans raised by Pitt (1793–1801)," pp. 16, 25–33.
MSS., 175).
[430] Pitt MSS., 178.
[431] "Corresp. of Sir John Sinclair," i, 124.
[432] Pitt MSS., 193. Sinclair raised two corps of Fencibles. The list of his
works, pamphlets, etc., fills thirty-two pages at the end of his Memoirs.
[433] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," ii, 106–9.
[434] "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[435] "Lord Colchester's Diary," i, 82.
[436] "Mems. of Lady Hester Stanhope," i, 177–81. Tomline asserted that a lady
of the highest rank desired to marry Pitt. Various conjectures have been made on
this topic. Lord Rosebery suggests that the Duchess of Gordon was hinted at.
[437] "Auckland Journals," iii, 356, 363, 369, 373–4.
[438] Wordsworth, "Prelude," bk. xiv.
[439] Pretyman MSS. Quoted in full, with Pitt's second letter and one of
Auckland, by Lord Ashbourne ("Pitt," 241–4).
[440] Pellew, i, 183.
[441] Ashbourne, 162, 179; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 410, 429.
[442] "Auckland Journals," iii, 359. George III, who disliked Auckland, ordered
the appointment of Chatham.
[443] Ibid., iii, 387.
[444] See Appendix for the sums borrowed, expended on the army and navy, and
raised by the Permanent Taxes in 1792–1801.
[445] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1297–1347; Pitt MSS., 102. Pitt to Boyd, 4th January
1796.
[446] "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," ii, 276.
[447] W. Newmarch, "Loans raised by Pitt (1793–1801)," pp. 16, 25–33.
Page 690
[448] On 2nd December 1796, Thomas Coutts, Pitt's banker, wrote to him: "Mr.
Dent, Mr. Hoare, Mr. Snow, Mr. Gosling, Mr. Drummond, and myself met today,
and have each subscribed £50,000.... I shall leave town tomorrow, having staid
solely to do any service in my power in forwarding this business, which I
sincerely wish and hope may be the means of procuring peace on fair and
honourable terms. P.S.—We have subscribed £10,000 in your name, and shall
take care to make the payments" (Pitt MSS., 126). Mr. Abbot ("Lord Colchester's
Diary," 76) states that fear of a compulsory contribution helped on the Loyalty
Loan.
[449] Pitt MSS., 272.
[450] Ann. Reg. (1797), 130–42.
[451] Sir J. Sinclair, "Hist. of the Public Revenue," ii, 143.
[452] Pitt MSS., 272; "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1517; Gilbart, "History ... of Banking"
(ed. by E. Sykes), i, 46. On 25th February 1797 Pitt wrote a memorandum (Pitt
MSS., 102), stating that the crisis was due to the too great circulation of paper
notes by banks having limited resources. Their stoppage affected larger Houses
and paralysed trade. He had wanted to meet the City men, who met on the 22nd
to discuss the situation, but failed to agree on any remedy. Finally they agreed to
meet at the Mansion House to discuss the issue of Exchequer Bills. Coutts, on
19th March 1797, informed Pitt that gambling in the Prince of Wales'
Debentures, which exceeded £432,000, ruined the market for ordinary securities
(Pitt MSS., 126). Sinclair had vainly urged Pitt to compel bankers to find and
exhibit securities for the paper notes which they issued ("Corresp. of Sir J.
Sinclair," i, 87).
[453] H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, "Napoleon and the Invasion of
England," ch. ii, have proved this.
[454] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 473–516; "Hist. of the Mutiny at Spithead and the
Nore" (Lond. 1842), 61–2; "Dropmore P.," iii, 323.
[455] Pitt MSS., 102. Lord Mornington deemed the surrender to the seamen
destructive of all discipline in the future ("Buckingham P.," i, 373).
[456] Holland, i, 84–91.
[457] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 137.
[458] "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), 23; App., v, vi.
Dent, Mr. Hoare, Mr. Snow, Mr. Gosling, Mr. Drummond, and myself met today,
and have each subscribed £50,000.... I shall leave town tomorrow, having staid
solely to do any service in my power in forwarding this business, which I
sincerely wish and hope may be the means of procuring peace on fair and
honourable terms. P.S.—We have subscribed £10,000 in your name, and shall
take care to make the payments" (Pitt MSS., 126). Mr. Abbot ("Lord Colchester's
Diary," 76) states that fear of a compulsory contribution helped on the Loyalty
Loan.
[449] Pitt MSS., 272.
[450] Ann. Reg. (1797), 130–42.
[451] Sir J. Sinclair, "Hist. of the Public Revenue," ii, 143.
[452] Pitt MSS., 272; "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1517; Gilbart, "History ... of Banking"
(ed. by E. Sykes), i, 46. On 25th February 1797 Pitt wrote a memorandum (Pitt
MSS., 102), stating that the crisis was due to the too great circulation of paper
notes by banks having limited resources. Their stoppage affected larger Houses
and paralysed trade. He had wanted to meet the City men, who met on the 22nd
to discuss the situation, but failed to agree on any remedy. Finally they agreed to
meet at the Mansion House to discuss the issue of Exchequer Bills. Coutts, on
19th March 1797, informed Pitt that gambling in the Prince of Wales'
Debentures, which exceeded £432,000, ruined the market for ordinary securities
(Pitt MSS., 126). Sinclair had vainly urged Pitt to compel bankers to find and
exhibit securities for the paper notes which they issued ("Corresp. of Sir J.
Sinclair," i, 87).
[453] H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, "Napoleon and the Invasion of
England," ch. ii, have proved this.
[454] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 473–516; "Hist. of the Mutiny at Spithead and the
Nore" (Lond. 1842), 61–2; "Dropmore P.," iii, 323.
[455] Pitt MSS., 102. Lord Mornington deemed the surrender to the seamen
destructive of all discipline in the future ("Buckingham P.," i, 373).
[456] Holland, i, 84–91.
[457] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 137.
[458] "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), 23; App., v, vi.
Page 691
[459] From Mr. Broadley's MSS.
[460] Pitt MSS., 189. See, too, "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 217; Windham ("Diary,"
363) saw Williams on and after 13th May.
[461] J. Corbett, "England in the Seven Years' War," i, 191.
[462] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 259–368; "Dropmore P.," iii, 239–42, 256, 287,
290.
[463] Pitt MSS., 102. See Stanhope, iii, App., for the letters of the King and Pitt;
"Dropmore P.," iii, 310 et seq.; also C. Ballot, "Les Négociations de Lille," for
an excellent account of these overtures and the European situation.
[464] See Pitt's letter of 16th June to the King and new letters of Grenville in
"Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies"; "Windham's Diary," 368; C. Ballot, op. cit.,
ch. v and App.; Luckwaldt (vice Huffer) "Quellen," pt ii, 153, 161, 176, 183.
[465] On 1st August 1797 Wilberforce wrote to Pitt a letter (the last part of
which is quoted in Chapter XX of my former volume) urging him, even if the
negotiation failed, to declare on what terms he would resume it. In Mr.
Broadley's library is a letter of Lord Shelburne to Vergennes, dated 13th
November 1782, which makes it clear that Pitt in 1782–3 was wholly against the
surrender or the exchange of Gibraltar.
[466] Ballot, op. cit., 302, who corrects Thiers, Sorel, and Sciout on several
points.
[467] "Dropmore P.," iii, 377, 380–2; "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 590.
[468] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 1076; "The Early Married Life of Lady Stanley," 149.
[469] Pitt MSS., 193. Mr. Abbott, afterwards Lord Colchester, differed from his
patron, the Duke of Leeds, on this question. See "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i,
124–31.
[470] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[471] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 1434–54, 1481; "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," i, 310,
311.
[472] Addington's description (Pellew, "Sidmouth," i, 206) fixes the spot. Mr. A.
Hawkes, in an article in the "Wimbledon Annual" for 1904, places it in front of
the house called "Scio," but it must be the deeper hollow towards Kingston Vale.
[460] Pitt MSS., 189. See, too, "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 217; Windham ("Diary,"
363) saw Williams on and after 13th May.
[461] J. Corbett, "England in the Seven Years' War," i, 191.
[462] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 259–368; "Dropmore P.," iii, 239–42, 256, 287,
290.
[463] Pitt MSS., 102. See Stanhope, iii, App., for the letters of the King and Pitt;
"Dropmore P.," iii, 310 et seq.; also C. Ballot, "Les Négociations de Lille," for
an excellent account of these overtures and the European situation.
[464] See Pitt's letter of 16th June to the King and new letters of Grenville in
"Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies"; "Windham's Diary," 368; C. Ballot, op. cit.,
ch. v and App.; Luckwaldt (vice Huffer) "Quellen," pt ii, 153, 161, 176, 183.
[465] On 1st August 1797 Wilberforce wrote to Pitt a letter (the last part of
which is quoted in Chapter XX of my former volume) urging him, even if the
negotiation failed, to declare on what terms he would resume it. In Mr.
Broadley's library is a letter of Lord Shelburne to Vergennes, dated 13th
November 1782, which makes it clear that Pitt in 1782–3 was wholly against the
surrender or the exchange of Gibraltar.
[466] Ballot, op. cit., 302, who corrects Thiers, Sorel, and Sciout on several
points.
[467] "Dropmore P.," iii, 377, 380–2; "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 590.
[468] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 1076; "The Early Married Life of Lady Stanley," 149.
[469] Pitt MSS., 193. Mr. Abbott, afterwards Lord Colchester, differed from his
patron, the Duke of Leeds, on this question. See "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i,
124–31.
[470] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[471] "Parl. Hist.," xxxiii, 1434–54, 1481; "Mems. of Sir John Sinclair," i, 310,
311.
[472] Addington's description (Pellew, "Sidmouth," i, 206) fixes the spot. Mr. A.
Hawkes, in an article in the "Wimbledon Annual" for 1904, places it in front of
the house called "Scio," but it must be the deeper hollow towards Kingston Vale.
Page 692
Caricatures of the time wrongly place the duel on the high ground near the
windmill. A wag chalked on Abershaw's gibbet a figure of the two duellers,
Tierney saying: "As well fire at the devil's darning-needle."
[473] Pretyman MSS.; "Dropmore P.," iv, 222.
[474] The hero is probably Robert Adair, the Whig "envoy" to St. Petersburg in
1791,
"the youth whose daring soul
With half a mission sought the frozen pole."
Pitt's authorship of the lines quoted above is denied by Mr. Lloyd Sanders in his
Introduction to the "Anti-Jacobin" (Methuen, 1904); but his arguments are not
conclusive. Lines 370–80 of "New Morality" are also said to be by Pitt.
[475] In "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" I shall describe Pitt's work in the
national defence. See an excellent account of the popular literature of the time in
"Napoleon and the Invasion of England," by H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M.
Broadley, i, ch. vii.
[476] Pitt MSS., 108. See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies," for a fuller
investigation of the Fitzwilliam affair in the light of new evidence.
[477] Lecky, vii, 41–4.
[478] "Dropmore P.," iii, 35–8.
[479] Pitt MSS., 331.
[480] Quoted by Froude, "The English in Ireland," iii, 158–61.
[481] "Autobiography of Wolfe Tone," ii, chs. iv-vi; Guillon, "La France et
l'Irlande."
[482] "Mems. of Ld. E. Fitzgerald," ch. xx.
[483] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 99.
[484] "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), 22, 25; W. J. Fitzpatrick,
"Secret Service under Pitt," ch. x; C. L. Falkiner, "Studies in Irish History," ch.
iv; "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 270–88.
[485] "Lord Colchester's Diary," i, 103.
windmill. A wag chalked on Abershaw's gibbet a figure of the two duellers,
Tierney saying: "As well fire at the devil's darning-needle."
[473] Pretyman MSS.; "Dropmore P.," iv, 222.
[474] The hero is probably Robert Adair, the Whig "envoy" to St. Petersburg in
1791,
"the youth whose daring soul
With half a mission sought the frozen pole."
Pitt's authorship of the lines quoted above is denied by Mr. Lloyd Sanders in his
Introduction to the "Anti-Jacobin" (Methuen, 1904); but his arguments are not
conclusive. Lines 370–80 of "New Morality" are also said to be by Pitt.
[475] In "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" I shall describe Pitt's work in the
national defence. See an excellent account of the popular literature of the time in
"Napoleon and the Invasion of England," by H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M.
Broadley, i, ch. vii.
[476] Pitt MSS., 108. See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies," for a fuller
investigation of the Fitzwilliam affair in the light of new evidence.
[477] Lecky, vii, 41–4.
[478] "Dropmore P.," iii, 35–8.
[479] Pitt MSS., 331.
[480] Quoted by Froude, "The English in Ireland," iii, 158–61.
[481] "Autobiography of Wolfe Tone," ii, chs. iv-vi; Guillon, "La France et
l'Irlande."
[482] "Mems. of Ld. E. Fitzgerald," ch. xx.
[483] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 99.
[484] "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), 22, 25; W. J. Fitzpatrick,
"Secret Service under Pitt," ch. x; C. L. Falkiner, "Studies in Irish History," ch.
iv; "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 270–88.
[485] "Lord Colchester's Diary," i, 103.
Page 693
[486] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[487] Pitt MSS., 326. Quoted with other extracts from Camden's letters, in "Pitt
and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[488] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 272.
[489] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 165–8.
[490] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), App.
x; "Nap. Corresp.," iii, 486–92. For Place see ante, ch. vii.
[491] W. J. Fitzpatrick, "Secret Service under Pitt," ch. iii; "Report of the Comm.
of Secrecy" (1799), App. xxvi. For Despard, the plotter of 1802, see
"Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 306, 326; ii, 4.
[492] "Auckland Journals," iv, 52. I have published the statements of O'Connor,
etc., and the news sent by a British agent at Hamburg, in the "Eng. Hist. Rev."
for October 1910.
[493] Pitt MSS., 324; B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Dropmore P.," iv, 167. On 24th
May 1798 Thelwall wrote to Thos. Hardy from Llyswen, near Brecknock,
describing his rustic retreat, and requesting a new pair of farmer's boots for
"Stella." He hopes that O'Connor has returned in triumph to his friends. Tierney's
vote in favour of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act does not surprise him, for
he is vulgar and a sycophant. Hardy is too angry with Sheridan, whose chief
offence is in going at all to the House of Commons. Sheridan surely does well in
encouraging the people to resist an invasion. "I remain steady to my point—'no
nation can be free but by its own efforts.' As for the French Directory and its
faction, nothing appears to me to be further from their design than to leave one
atom of liberty either to their own or to any nation. If, however, Mr. Sheridan
supposes that all his talents can produce even a temporary unanimity while the
present crew are in power, even for repelling the most inveterate enemy, he will
find himself miserably mistaken. No such unanimity ever can exist: I am
convinced, nay, the Ministers themselves seem determined, that it shall not. The
only way to produce the unanimity desired is to stand aloof, and let these
ruffians go blundering on till our most blessed and gracious sovereign shall see
that either Pitt and Co. must bow down to the will of the people or his British
crown bow down to five French shillings.... But what have we to do with
Directories or politics? Peaceful shades of Llyswen! shelter me beneath your
luxuriant foliage: lull me to forgetfulness, ye murmuring waters of the Wye. Let
me be part farmer and fisherman. But no more politics—no more politics in this
bad world!" (From Mr. A. M. Broadley's MSS.)
[487] Pitt MSS., 326. Quoted with other extracts from Camden's letters, in "Pitt
and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[488] Tone, "Autob.," ii, 272.
[489] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 165–8.
[490] B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Report of the Comm. of Secrecy" (1799), App.
x; "Nap. Corresp.," iii, 486–92. For Place see ante, ch. vii.
[491] W. J. Fitzpatrick, "Secret Service under Pitt," ch. iii; "Report of the Comm.
of Secrecy" (1799), App. xxvi. For Despard, the plotter of 1802, see
"Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 306, 326; ii, 4.
[492] "Auckland Journals," iv, 52. I have published the statements of O'Connor,
etc., and the news sent by a British agent at Hamburg, in the "Eng. Hist. Rev."
for October 1910.
[493] Pitt MSS., 324; B.M. Add. MSS., 27808; "Dropmore P.," iv, 167. On 24th
May 1798 Thelwall wrote to Thos. Hardy from Llyswen, near Brecknock,
describing his rustic retreat, and requesting a new pair of farmer's boots for
"Stella." He hopes that O'Connor has returned in triumph to his friends. Tierney's
vote in favour of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act does not surprise him, for
he is vulgar and a sycophant. Hardy is too angry with Sheridan, whose chief
offence is in going at all to the House of Commons. Sheridan surely does well in
encouraging the people to resist an invasion. "I remain steady to my point—'no
nation can be free but by its own efforts.' As for the French Directory and its
faction, nothing appears to me to be further from their design than to leave one
atom of liberty either to their own or to any nation. If, however, Mr. Sheridan
supposes that all his talents can produce even a temporary unanimity while the
present crew are in power, even for repelling the most inveterate enemy, he will
find himself miserably mistaken. No such unanimity ever can exist: I am
convinced, nay, the Ministers themselves seem determined, that it shall not. The
only way to produce the unanimity desired is to stand aloof, and let these
ruffians go blundering on till our most blessed and gracious sovereign shall see
that either Pitt and Co. must bow down to the will of the people or his British
crown bow down to five French shillings.... But what have we to do with
Directories or politics? Peaceful shades of Llyswen! shelter me beneath your
luxuriant foliage: lull me to forgetfulness, ye murmuring waters of the Wye. Let
me be part farmer and fisherman. But no more politics—no more politics in this
bad world!" (From Mr. A. M. Broadley's MSS.)
Page 694
[494] Pretyman MSS. See, too, "Diary of Sir J. Moore," i, ch. xi.
[495] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 458–67; "Life and Letters of Lady Sarah
Lennox," ii, 299–302; "Mems. of Lord E. Fitzgerald," chs. 27–30.
[496] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[497] "Dropmore P.," iv, 230, 239.
[498] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454. News received through Sir F. d'Ivernois.
[499] Pretyman MSS. The King also stated that Pitt had "saved Ireland" by
persuading Pelham to return and act as Chief Secretary. Pelham was a clever
man, but often disabled by ill health.
[500] J. Alexander, "... Rebellion in Wexford" (Dublin, 1800).
[501] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 395–404. For the panic in Dublin see
"Dropmore P.," iv, 289 et seq. Cooke wrote to Castlereagh on 28th September
that the Bishop of Killala and his family were saved from slaughter by a few
French officers, "who execrate our savages more than they whom they have
plundered." He adds that though the United Irishmen began the plot the
Catholics are turning it solely to their own interests (Pitt MSS., 327). See, too,
H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, "The War in Wexford" (1910).
[502] "F. O.," Austria, 51; "Dropmore P.," iv, 170. The French took nearly
33,000,000 francs from the Swiss cantonal treasuries.
[503] Pitt MSS., 108.
[504] "Dropmore P.," iv, 166, 172; "F. O.," Austria, 51. Grenville to Eden, 20th
April.
[505] The Earl of Crawford's MSS.
[506] "F. O.," Russia, 40. Whitworth to Grenville, 6th August 1798.
[507] See my Introduction to "The History of Malta, 1798–1815," by the late W.
Hardman.
[508] "Dropmore P.," iv, 344, 355.
[509] See Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 54–8, for this despatch of 16th November
1798.
[495] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 458–67; "Life and Letters of Lady Sarah
Lennox," ii, 299–302; "Mems. of Lord E. Fitzgerald," chs. 27–30.
[496] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[497] "Dropmore P.," iv, 230, 239.
[498] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454. News received through Sir F. d'Ivernois.
[499] Pretyman MSS. The King also stated that Pitt had "saved Ireland" by
persuading Pelham to return and act as Chief Secretary. Pelham was a clever
man, but often disabled by ill health.
[500] J. Alexander, "... Rebellion in Wexford" (Dublin, 1800).
[501] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 395–404. For the panic in Dublin see
"Dropmore P.," iv, 289 et seq. Cooke wrote to Castlereagh on 28th September
that the Bishop of Killala and his family were saved from slaughter by a few
French officers, "who execrate our savages more than they whom they have
plundered." He adds that though the United Irishmen began the plot the
Catholics are turning it solely to their own interests (Pitt MSS., 327). See, too,
H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, "The War in Wexford" (1910).
[502] "F. O.," Austria, 51; "Dropmore P.," iv, 170. The French took nearly
33,000,000 francs from the Swiss cantonal treasuries.
[503] Pitt MSS., 108.
[504] "Dropmore P.," iv, 166, 172; "F. O.," Austria, 51. Grenville to Eden, 20th
April.
[505] The Earl of Crawford's MSS.
[506] "F. O.," Russia, 40. Whitworth to Grenville, 6th August 1798.
[507] See my Introduction to "The History of Malta, 1798–1815," by the late W.
Hardman.
[508] "Dropmore P.," iv, 344, 355.
[509] See Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 54–8, for this despatch of 16th November
1798.
Page 695
[510] For a fuller account see "Camb. Mod. Hist.," viii, ch. xxi, by the present
writer.
[511] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Despatches of 2nd, 8th and 25th January 1799.
[512] Huffer, "Quellen," i, 23–9.
[513] "Dropmore P.," iv, 297, 338, 505; "F. O.," Russia, 42.
[514] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Whitworth to Grenville, 29th March.
[515] "F. O.," Russia, 43. Grenville to Whitworth, 23rd June.
[516] G. Caudrillier, "L'Association royaliste ... et la Conspiration anglaise en
France" (Paris, 1908); Wickham, "Corresp.," ii, passim.
[517] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.
[518] "Dropmore P.," v, 400. I propose to examine this campaign in "Pitt and
Napoleon Miscellanies."
[519] "F. O.," Russia, 43. Whitworth to Grenville, 23rd June 1799; "Dropmore
P.," v, 133, 259; Windham, "Diary," 411. On 22nd July Windham urged Pitt to
send a force to help the Bretons rather than to Holland. "If we succeed in France,
Holland falls of course, but not vice versa" (Pitt MSS., 190).
[520] Pretyman MSS.
[521] That of Bruix, which after entering the Mediterranean, returned to Brest on
13th August along with the Spanish fleet.
[522] The Earl of Crawford's MSS.
[523] Fortescue, iv, 662, 673–6; Bunbury, "Narrative of the War (1799–1810),"
50. Hermann wrote to the Emperor blaming the British for not supporting his
advance ("Dropmore P.," v, 425); but on 10th October Paul dismissed him from
the Russian service ("F. O.," Russia, 44).
[524] "Dropmore P.," v, 446.
[525] See Rose, "Napoleon I," 240–2.
[526] Cicero, Seventh Philippic, ch. iii.
[527] The father of the present Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. See his
work, "Ten Great and Good Men," 49.
writer.
[511] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Despatches of 2nd, 8th and 25th January 1799.
[512] Huffer, "Quellen," i, 23–9.
[513] "Dropmore P.," iv, 297, 338, 505; "F. O.," Russia, 42.
[514] "F. O.," Russia, 42. Whitworth to Grenville, 29th March.
[515] "F. O.," Russia, 43. Grenville to Whitworth, 23rd June.
[516] G. Caudrillier, "L'Association royaliste ... et la Conspiration anglaise en
France" (Paris, 1908); Wickham, "Corresp.," ii, passim.
[517] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.
[518] "Dropmore P.," v, 400. I propose to examine this campaign in "Pitt and
Napoleon Miscellanies."
[519] "F. O.," Russia, 43. Whitworth to Grenville, 23rd June 1799; "Dropmore
P.," v, 133, 259; Windham, "Diary," 411. On 22nd July Windham urged Pitt to
send a force to help the Bretons rather than to Holland. "If we succeed in France,
Holland falls of course, but not vice versa" (Pitt MSS., 190).
[520] Pretyman MSS.
[521] That of Bruix, which after entering the Mediterranean, returned to Brest on
13th August along with the Spanish fleet.
[522] The Earl of Crawford's MSS.
[523] Fortescue, iv, 662, 673–6; Bunbury, "Narrative of the War (1799–1810),"
50. Hermann wrote to the Emperor blaming the British for not supporting his
advance ("Dropmore P.," v, 425); but on 10th October Paul dismissed him from
the Russian service ("F. O.," Russia, 44).
[524] "Dropmore P.," v, 446.
[525] See Rose, "Napoleon I," 240–2.
[526] Cicero, Seventh Philippic, ch. iii.
[527] The father of the present Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. See his
work, "Ten Great and Good Men," 49.
Page 696
[528] Pretyman MSS.
[529] Pretyman MSS.
[530] Salomon, "Pitt," 599. See, too, the similar letter of Richmond to his sister,
Lady Conolly, in June 1795 (Lecky, vii, 134).
[531] Pitt MSS., 328.
[532] Ibid., 169.
[533] Porritt, ii, ch. iii; Seeley, "Stein," i, 267–82.
[534] Pitt MSS., 326. For the text in full see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[535] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[536] See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October 1910.
[537] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[538] B.M. Add. MSS., 34455.
[539] Ibid.; "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 13.
[540] Lecky, viii, 328 note.
[541] "Dropmore P.," iv, 344; "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 393.
[542] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 424 et seq.; "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 439–441;
Brougham, "Statesmen of George III"; Lecky, viii, 311; Wilberforce ("Life," iii,
178) calls Castlereagh "a cold-blooded creature."
[543] "Castlereagh Corresp.," ii, 29; "Buckingham P.," ii, 411, 412.
[544] Pitt MSS., 325; "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 441–3.
[545] Pretyman MSS.
[546] Pretyman MSS. "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 3; Macdonagh, "The Viceroy's
Post Bag," 19.
[547] "Beresford Corresp.," ii, 189; "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 436; "Castlereagh
Corresp.," i, 404.
[548] For the plan and notes, see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[529] Pretyman MSS.
[530] Salomon, "Pitt," 599. See, too, the similar letter of Richmond to his sister,
Lady Conolly, in June 1795 (Lecky, vii, 134).
[531] Pitt MSS., 328.
[532] Ibid., 169.
[533] Porritt, ii, ch. iii; Seeley, "Stein," i, 267–82.
[534] Pitt MSS., 326. For the text in full see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[535] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[536] See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October 1910.
[537] B.M. Add. MSS., 34454.
[538] B.M. Add. MSS., 34455.
[539] Ibid.; "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 13.
[540] Lecky, viii, 328 note.
[541] "Dropmore P.," iv, 344; "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 393.
[542] "Castlereagh Corresp.," i, 424 et seq.; "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 439–441;
Brougham, "Statesmen of George III"; Lecky, viii, 311; Wilberforce ("Life," iii,
178) calls Castlereagh "a cold-blooded creature."
[543] "Castlereagh Corresp.," ii, 29; "Buckingham P.," ii, 411, 412.
[544] Pitt MSS., 325; "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 441–3.
[545] Pretyman MSS.
[546] Pretyman MSS. "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 3; Macdonagh, "The Viceroy's
Post Bag," 19.
[547] "Beresford Corresp.," ii, 189; "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 436; "Castlereagh
Corresp.," i, 404.
[548] For the plan and notes, see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
Page 697
[549] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 456, 457.
[550] B.M. Add. MSS., 34455. William C. Plunket (1764–1854), born in co.
Fermanagh, was called to the Irish Bar in 1787, and entered Parliament in 1798.
He speedily made his mark, and in 1803 was State Prosecutor of Emmett. In
Pitt's second Administration (1804) he was Solicitor-General: he was created
Baron Plunket in 1827 and was Lord Chancellor of Ireland in 1830–41. William
Saurin sat in the Irish Parliament as a nominee of Lord Downshire ("Cornwallis
Corresp.," iii, 212).
[551] "Strictures on a Pamphlet, etc.," 5 (Dublin, 1798).
[552] B.M. Add. MSS., 34455. The term "Contractor" used above is equivalent
to "Undertaker," i.e., one who undertook to get business through the Irish
Parliament for certain rewards (Lecky, iv, 353).
[553] Pretyman MSS.
[554] Pretyman MSS.; also in Pitt MSS., 327.
[555] Pretyman MSS.
[556] "Mems. of Fox," iii, 150; "Grattan Mems.," iv, 435.
[557] Virgil, "Aen.," xii, 189–91. "As for me, I will neither bid the Italians obey
the Trojans, nor do I seek a new sovereignty. Let both peoples, unsubdued,
submit to an eternal compact with equal laws." The correct reading is "Nec mihi
regna peto," which Pitt altered to "nova."
[558] Pitt MSS., 196, 320.
[559] Pretyman MSS. See "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 125, 210, for Unionist
sentiment in Cork.
[560] Pitt MSS., 189.
[561] "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 52, 54; Hunt, "Pol. Hist. of England," x, 447.
[562] B.M. Add. MSS., 35455.
[563] B.M. Add. MSS., 35455.
[564] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 227.
[550] B.M. Add. MSS., 34455. William C. Plunket (1764–1854), born in co.
Fermanagh, was called to the Irish Bar in 1787, and entered Parliament in 1798.
He speedily made his mark, and in 1803 was State Prosecutor of Emmett. In
Pitt's second Administration (1804) he was Solicitor-General: he was created
Baron Plunket in 1827 and was Lord Chancellor of Ireland in 1830–41. William
Saurin sat in the Irish Parliament as a nominee of Lord Downshire ("Cornwallis
Corresp.," iii, 212).
[551] "Strictures on a Pamphlet, etc.," 5 (Dublin, 1798).
[552] B.M. Add. MSS., 34455. The term "Contractor" used above is equivalent
to "Undertaker," i.e., one who undertook to get business through the Irish
Parliament for certain rewards (Lecky, iv, 353).
[553] Pretyman MSS.
[554] Pretyman MSS.; also in Pitt MSS., 327.
[555] Pretyman MSS.
[556] "Mems. of Fox," iii, 150; "Grattan Mems.," iv, 435.
[557] Virgil, "Aen.," xii, 189–91. "As for me, I will neither bid the Italians obey
the Trojans, nor do I seek a new sovereignty. Let both peoples, unsubdued,
submit to an eternal compact with equal laws." The correct reading is "Nec mihi
regna peto," which Pitt altered to "nova."
[558] Pitt MSS., 196, 320.
[559] Pretyman MSS. See "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 125, 210, for Unionist
sentiment in Cork.
[560] Pitt MSS., 189.
[561] "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 52, 54; Hunt, "Pol. Hist. of England," x, 447.
[562] B.M. Add. MSS., 35455.
[563] B.M. Add. MSS., 35455.
[564] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 227.
Page 698
[565] These were boroughs in which all holders of tenements where a pot could
be boiled had votes. See Porritt, ii, 186, 350.
[566] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 8–10.
[567] "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 101, 102, 226; "Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 260;
Plowden (ii, 550), without proof, denies the existence of Downshire's fund.
[568] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 135, 226. On the proposed changes in the
Catechism there is a long précis in the Pretyman MSS., being a summary of the
correspondence of Lords Castlereagh and Hobart with Archbishop Troy and
Bishop Moylan.
[569] B.M. Add. MSS., 35455; "Dropmore P.," vi, 121.
[570] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 263, 278.
[571] M. Mac Donagh, "The Viceroy's Post-Bag," 43–53; "Cornwallis Corresp.,"
iii, 245, 251–6, 267, 318–21.
[572] "Dropmore P.," iv, 337.
[573] "Dropmore P.," v, 82; "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 507. Sir John Macpherson
called Loughborough by far the cleverest man in the country ("Glenbervie
Journals," 54).
[574] Campbell, viii, 172; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 300.
[575] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 21; "Auckland Journals," iv, 114–25.
[576] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv 8–12.
[577] Ibid., iii, 418; iv, 13, 17–20.
[578] Pellew, i, ad fin. The original is in "H. O.," Ireland (Corresp.), 99, together
with nine others for or against Catholic Emancipation, some with notes by
Castlereagh.
[579] The first Imperial Parliament met on 22nd January; but time was taken up
in swearing in members and choosing a Speaker. Addington was chosen. The
King's Speech was fixed for 2nd February.
[580] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 17–20; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 303.
[581] Ibid., iv, 81.
be boiled had votes. See Porritt, ii, 186, 350.
[566] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 8–10.
[567] "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 101, 102, 226; "Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 260;
Plowden (ii, 550), without proof, denies the existence of Downshire's fund.
[568] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 135, 226. On the proposed changes in the
Catechism there is a long précis in the Pretyman MSS., being a summary of the
correspondence of Lords Castlereagh and Hobart with Archbishop Troy and
Bishop Moylan.
[569] B.M. Add. MSS., 35455; "Dropmore P.," vi, 121.
[570] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 263, 278.
[571] M. Mac Donagh, "The Viceroy's Post-Bag," 43–53; "Cornwallis Corresp.,"
iii, 245, 251–6, 267, 318–21.
[572] "Dropmore P.," iv, 337.
[573] "Dropmore P.," v, 82; "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 507. Sir John Macpherson
called Loughborough by far the cleverest man in the country ("Glenbervie
Journals," 54).
[574] Campbell, viii, 172; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 300.
[575] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 21; "Auckland Journals," iv, 114–25.
[576] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv 8–12.
[577] Ibid., iii, 418; iv, 13, 17–20.
[578] Pellew, i, ad fin. The original is in "H. O.," Ireland (Corresp.), 99, together
with nine others for or against Catholic Emancipation, some with notes by
Castlereagh.
[579] The first Imperial Parliament met on 22nd January; but time was taken up
in swearing in members and choosing a Speaker. Addington was chosen. The
King's Speech was fixed for 2nd February.
[580] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 17–20; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 303.
[581] Ibid., iv, 81.
Page 699
[582] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 309; Pellew, i, 287. Addington afterwards destroyed
those letters of the King to him which he considered unsuitable for publication.
[583] Grenville agreed with Pitt's letter to the King, but doubted the possibility
of precluding discussion on the question, as it was already in the papers. He
assured Pitt that he would act closely with him (Grenville to Pitt, 1st February
1801; Pretyman MSS.). Pitt afterwards declared that his resignation was largely
due to the manner in which the King opposed him.
[584] "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 224.
[585] Pitt MSS., 122.
[586] Pretyman MSS.
[587] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 8–12. Both Grenville and Windham declared in
Parliament in May 1805 that hopes were held out to the Irish Catholics, and that
their support of the Union was the result (Hansard, iv, 659, 1022).
[588] "H. O.," Ireland (Corresp.), 99.
[589] Hansard, iv, 1015.
[590] Pretyman MSS.
[591] Pretyman MSS.
[592] In "H. O.," Ireland (Corresp.), 99, are long reports of the Irish Catholic
bishops, dated November 1800, on the state of their dioceses. The bishops'
incomes did not average more than £300 a year. The Archbishops of Dublin and
Tuam reckoned the total number of parish priests and curates at 1,800, of whom
1,400 were seculars and 400 regulars. The benefices numbered 1,200; each
required the services of two priests. The destruction of the seminaries in France
and the poverty of the Irish made it impossible to supply or support 2,400 clergy.
Other papers follow for and against Catholic Emancipation. See also
"Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, ad fin.
[593] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 3, 8, 9, 14.
[594] "Dropmore P.," vi, 445. Mulgrave, who knew Pitt well, was convinced of
his sincerity in resigning. His letter of 9th February 1801 (quoted by R. Plumer
Ward, "Memoirs," i, 44) refutes the insinuations of Sorel (vi, 101) that Pitt
resigned because he could not make peace with France.
those letters of the King to him which he considered unsuitable for publication.
[583] Grenville agreed with Pitt's letter to the King, but doubted the possibility
of precluding discussion on the question, as it was already in the papers. He
assured Pitt that he would act closely with him (Grenville to Pitt, 1st February
1801; Pretyman MSS.). Pitt afterwards declared that his resignation was largely
due to the manner in which the King opposed him.
[584] "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 224.
[585] Pitt MSS., 122.
[586] Pretyman MSS.
[587] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 8–12. Both Grenville and Windham declared in
Parliament in May 1805 that hopes were held out to the Irish Catholics, and that
their support of the Union was the result (Hansard, iv, 659, 1022).
[588] "H. O.," Ireland (Corresp.), 99.
[589] Hansard, iv, 1015.
[590] Pretyman MSS.
[591] Pretyman MSS.
[592] In "H. O.," Ireland (Corresp.), 99, are long reports of the Irish Catholic
bishops, dated November 1800, on the state of their dioceses. The bishops'
incomes did not average more than £300 a year. The Archbishops of Dublin and
Tuam reckoned the total number of parish priests and curates at 1,800, of whom
1,400 were seculars and 400 regulars. The benefices numbered 1,200; each
required the services of two priests. The destruction of the seminaries in France
and the poverty of the Irish made it impossible to supply or support 2,400 clergy.
Other papers follow for and against Catholic Emancipation. See also
"Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, ad fin.
[593] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 3, 8, 9, 14.
[594] "Dropmore P.," vi, 445. Mulgrave, who knew Pitt well, was convinced of
his sincerity in resigning. His letter of 9th February 1801 (quoted by R. Plumer
Ward, "Memoirs," i, 44) refutes the insinuations of Sorel (vi, 101) that Pitt
resigned because he could not make peace with France.
Page 700
[595] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iii, 285.
[596] "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 286.
[597] Pretyman MSS.
[598] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 313, 330; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 244.
[599] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 31, 32.
[600] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 360; Stanhope, iii, 304, 305.
[601] "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 343–9.
[602] Ibid., iii, 346; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 243. The writer in the
"Edinburgh Review" for 1858, who censured Pitt, failed to notice the entire
change in the political situation brought about by the King's acute malady.
[603] Pretyman MSS.
[604] Bagot, "Canning and his Friends," i, 180.
[605] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 14.
[606] Wraxall, iii, 458. For Pitt's earlier friendships see my former volume.
[607] "Mems. of Lady Hester Stanhope," iii, 187.
[608] From Mr. Broadley's MSS. Hayley's efforts on behalf of Cowper have
been described by Professor E. Dowden, "Essays: Modern and Elizabethan"
(1910). Ultimately a pension of £300 a year was assigned to Cowper: the
authorization, signed by the King and Pitt, and dated 23rd April 1794, is now in
the Cowper Museum, Olney, Bucks, so the secretary, Mr. Thomas Wright (editor
of Cowper's Letters), kindly informs me.
[609] "Rutland Papers," iii, 229, 241 (Hist. MSS. Comm.). So, too, Tomline said
that Pitt had no ear for music, and little taste for drawing or painting, though he
was fond of architecture, and once drew from memory the plan of a mansion in
Norfolk, with a view to improving it (Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of
Pitt," 34).
[610] "Glenbervie Journals," 195.
[611] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 26; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 4.
[612] Pitt MSS., 189.
[596] "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 286.
[597] Pretyman MSS.
[598] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 313, 330; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 244.
[599] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 31, 32.
[600] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 360; Stanhope, iii, 304, 305.
[601] "Cornwallis Corresp.," iii, 343–9.
[602] Ibid., iii, 346; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 243. The writer in the
"Edinburgh Review" for 1858, who censured Pitt, failed to notice the entire
change in the political situation brought about by the King's acute malady.
[603] Pretyman MSS.
[604] Bagot, "Canning and his Friends," i, 180.
[605] "Castlereagh Corresp.," iv, 14.
[606] Wraxall, iii, 458. For Pitt's earlier friendships see my former volume.
[607] "Mems. of Lady Hester Stanhope," iii, 187.
[608] From Mr. Broadley's MSS. Hayley's efforts on behalf of Cowper have
been described by Professor E. Dowden, "Essays: Modern and Elizabethan"
(1910). Ultimately a pension of £300 a year was assigned to Cowper: the
authorization, signed by the King and Pitt, and dated 23rd April 1794, is now in
the Cowper Museum, Olney, Bucks, so the secretary, Mr. Thomas Wright (editor
of Cowper's Letters), kindly informs me.
[609] "Rutland Papers," iii, 229, 241 (Hist. MSS. Comm.). So, too, Tomline said
that Pitt had no ear for music, and little taste for drawing or painting, though he
was fond of architecture, and once drew from memory the plan of a mansion in
Norfolk, with a view to improving it (Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of
Pitt," 34).
[610] "Glenbervie Journals," 195.
[611] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 26; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 4.
[612] Pitt MSS., 189.
Page 701
[613] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 270.
[614] The estimate of Pitt by Wellesley, summarized above, refutes the
ungenerous remark of Lecky (v, 72) that he took little delight in books and "was
a politician, and nothing more." Lecky was perhaps misled by the ignorant libel
on Pitt in Wraxall, iii, 223.
[615] "Diary of D. Scully," quoted by Dr. Hunt, "Transactions of Royal Hist.
Soc." (1908), p. 12.
[616] Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of Pitt," 33.
[617] I.e., Mantua rejoices in Wurmser, Rovereda in Davidovitch, Verona is
open to Quosdanovitch. "Woe is me," says the greedy Gaul, Bonaparte, "I shall
have to be off through the Alps and go to the dogs."
[618] Pitt MSS., 188.
[619] Pitt MSS., 188. Hobart married Pitt's early love, Eleanor Eden, and
became Minister at War under Addington. For Mornington's comments on his
factious conduct at Madras, see "Dropmore P.," iv, 384, 476; v, 268; vi, 338.
[620] Stanhope, iii, 232; Rosebery, "Pitt," 213–7.
[621] Pitt MSS., 188.
[622] Gabrielle Festing, "J. H. Frere and his Friends," 31.
[623] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 8; Pellew, i, ch. xi; G. Festing, "Hookham
Frere," 42–4; R. Bell, "Canning," 176; H. W. V. Temperley, "Canning," 62–3.
[624] Stanhope, iii, 315; Festing, 47–51.
[625] May, "Constit. Hist.," i, 232–8; Lecky, v, 27.
[626] Wraxall, ii, 286.
[627] Stanhope, iii, 352; "Dropmore P.," vii, 49–51. For new letters of Canning
and Grenville, see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[628] See Rose, "Life of Napoleon," i, ch. xiv, for details.
[629] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.
[630] "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 110.
[614] The estimate of Pitt by Wellesley, summarized above, refutes the
ungenerous remark of Lecky (v, 72) that he took little delight in books and "was
a politician, and nothing more." Lecky was perhaps misled by the ignorant libel
on Pitt in Wraxall, iii, 223.
[615] "Diary of D. Scully," quoted by Dr. Hunt, "Transactions of Royal Hist.
Soc." (1908), p. 12.
[616] Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of Pitt," 33.
[617] I.e., Mantua rejoices in Wurmser, Rovereda in Davidovitch, Verona is
open to Quosdanovitch. "Woe is me," says the greedy Gaul, Bonaparte, "I shall
have to be off through the Alps and go to the dogs."
[618] Pitt MSS., 188.
[619] Pitt MSS., 188. Hobart married Pitt's early love, Eleanor Eden, and
became Minister at War under Addington. For Mornington's comments on his
factious conduct at Madras, see "Dropmore P.," iv, 384, 476; v, 268; vi, 338.
[620] Stanhope, iii, 232; Rosebery, "Pitt," 213–7.
[621] Pitt MSS., 188.
[622] Gabrielle Festing, "J. H. Frere and his Friends," 31.
[623] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 8; Pellew, i, ch. xi; G. Festing, "Hookham
Frere," 42–4; R. Bell, "Canning," 176; H. W. V. Temperley, "Canning," 62–3.
[624] Stanhope, iii, 315; Festing, 47–51.
[625] May, "Constit. Hist.," i, 232–8; Lecky, v, 27.
[626] Wraxall, ii, 286.
[627] Stanhope, iii, 352; "Dropmore P.," vii, 49–51. For new letters of Canning
and Grenville, see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[628] See Rose, "Life of Napoleon," i, ch. xiv, for details.
[629] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.
[630] "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 110.
Page 702
[631] For the passing misunderstanding of February 1802, see Pellew, ii, 489–
92, with Pitt's letters.
[632] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.
[633] Pellew, ii, 75, 76.
[634] Pretyman MSS. Bullock paid the servants and supervised the accounts at
Downing Street. Pitt was then staying with Addington near Reading.
[635] Omitting shillings, the details for Downing Street and Holwood for July–
December 1799 are respectively: Table, £344, £231; Cellar, £169, £126;
Housekeeping, £531, £156; Private Account, £357, £—; Servants' Wages, £251,
£69; Servants' Board Wages, £329, £80; Servants' Bills, £353, £15; Liveries,
£41, £—; Taxes, etc., £747, £77; Farm, £—, £784; Farm Labourers, £—, £379;
Garden, £—, £125; Stable, £155, £—; Job Horses, £165, £—; Incidentals, £347,
£340. (Pitt MSS., 201.)
[636] Joseph Smith (no relative of "Bob Smith," Lord Carrington) became Pitt's
private secretary in 1787. His letters, published along with "The Beaufort
Papers" in 1897, throw no light on Pitt's debts.
[637] Ashbourne, 162. See, too, ch. xv of this work.
[638] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 429; ii, 215.
[639] Pitt MSS., 126. Coutts and five other bankers each subscribed £50,000 to
the "Loyalty Loan" in 1797 and invested £10,000 on behalf of Pitt.
[640] Stanhope, iv, 233, 252; Ashbourne, 351–4.
[641] Pretyman MSS.
[642] "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 34; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 508.
[643] "Letters of Wilberforce," i, 256.
[644] Pretyman MSS.
[645] Auckland, while ambassador at The Hague, was suspected of too great
inquisitiveness as to the British despatches which passed through that place. On
20th July 1790, Aust, of the Foreign Office, wrote to Sir R. M. Keith at Vienna
that Keith's new cipher puzzles "our friends at the Hague," and that Auckland's
curiosity is "insatiable" (B.M. Add. MSS., 35543). See, too, a note by Miss Rose
in G. Rose "Diaries," ii, 75.
92, with Pitt's letters.
[632] B.M. Add. MSS., 37844.
[633] Pellew, ii, 75, 76.
[634] Pretyman MSS. Bullock paid the servants and supervised the accounts at
Downing Street. Pitt was then staying with Addington near Reading.
[635] Omitting shillings, the details for Downing Street and Holwood for July–
December 1799 are respectively: Table, £344, £231; Cellar, £169, £126;
Housekeeping, £531, £156; Private Account, £357, £—; Servants' Wages, £251,
£69; Servants' Board Wages, £329, £80; Servants' Bills, £353, £15; Liveries,
£41, £—; Taxes, etc., £747, £77; Farm, £—, £784; Farm Labourers, £—, £379;
Garden, £—, £125; Stable, £155, £—; Job Horses, £165, £—; Incidentals, £347,
£340. (Pitt MSS., 201.)
[636] Joseph Smith (no relative of "Bob Smith," Lord Carrington) became Pitt's
private secretary in 1787. His letters, published along with "The Beaufort
Papers" in 1897, throw no light on Pitt's debts.
[637] Ashbourne, 162. See, too, ch. xv of this work.
[638] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 429; ii, 215.
[639] Pitt MSS., 126. Coutts and five other bankers each subscribed £50,000 to
the "Loyalty Loan" in 1797 and invested £10,000 on behalf of Pitt.
[640] Stanhope, iv, 233, 252; Ashbourne, 351–4.
[641] Pretyman MSS.
[642] "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 34; G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 508.
[643] "Letters of Wilberforce," i, 256.
[644] Pretyman MSS.
[645] Auckland, while ambassador at The Hague, was suspected of too great
inquisitiveness as to the British despatches which passed through that place. On
20th July 1790, Aust, of the Foreign Office, wrote to Sir R. M. Keith at Vienna
that Keith's new cipher puzzles "our friends at the Hague," and that Auckland's
curiosity is "insatiable" (B.M. Add. MSS., 35543). See, too, a note by Miss Rose
in G. Rose "Diaries," ii, 75.
Page 703
[646] Pretyman MSS.
[647] Pellew, ii, 113. Lord Holland, writing early in 1803 to his uncle, General
Fox, then at Malta, says that there are three parties in Parliament, besides many
subdivisions, "Grenville and Windham against peace and nearly avowed enemies
of the present Government; the old Opposition; and Addington [sic]. Pitt, as you
know, supports Addington, but the degree of intimacy and the nature of his
connection with Ministers are riddles to every one." (From Mr. Broadley's
MSS.)
[648] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 168; G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 6–9; Pellew, ii, 113.
[649] Addington desired the retirement of St. Vincent. See "Dropmore P.," vii,
121; Stanhope, iv, 21.
[650] Pellew, ii, 114–6.
[651] "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 415; Pellew, ii, 121–4.
[652] Pretyman MSS.
[653] G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 156; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 416, 417;
Pellew, ii, 119–28.
[654] Hawkesbury's remissness (so Vorontzoff told Rose) then lost an
opportunity of gaining the friendly mediation of the Czar (G. Rose, "Diaries," ii,
43, 157). Romilly ("Mems.," i, 427) calls the Ministry a thing of no account in
comparison with Pitt, and says it was universally despised.
[655] Romilly Memoirs, i, 427.
[656] Sichel, "Sheridan," i, 440. Spencer Stanhope declared Pitt's speech the
finest he ever heard. His wife wrote to their son: "He (Pitt) spoke for two hours,
but unless he can be prevailed upon to give it himself, as the shorthand-writers
were excluded, the speech will be lost for ever. Your father thinks it will be made
out by some of his friends and submitted to his inspection; therefore, tho' we
may lose much, we shall not lose the whole" (A. M. W. Stirling, "Annals of a
Yorkshire House," ii, 282).
[657] "Dumouriez and the Defence of England against Napoleon," by J. H. Rose
and A. M. Broadley.
[658] Lyon, "Hist. of Dover," p. xxxiii.
[647] Pellew, ii, 113. Lord Holland, writing early in 1803 to his uncle, General
Fox, then at Malta, says that there are three parties in Parliament, besides many
subdivisions, "Grenville and Windham against peace and nearly avowed enemies
of the present Government; the old Opposition; and Addington [sic]. Pitt, as you
know, supports Addington, but the degree of intimacy and the nature of his
connection with Ministers are riddles to every one." (From Mr. Broadley's
MSS.)
[648] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 168; G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 6–9; Pellew, ii, 113.
[649] Addington desired the retirement of St. Vincent. See "Dropmore P.," vii,
121; Stanhope, iv, 21.
[650] Pellew, ii, 114–6.
[651] "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 415; Pellew, ii, 121–4.
[652] Pretyman MSS.
[653] G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 156; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 416, 417;
Pellew, ii, 119–28.
[654] Hawkesbury's remissness (so Vorontzoff told Rose) then lost an
opportunity of gaining the friendly mediation of the Czar (G. Rose, "Diaries," ii,
43, 157). Romilly ("Mems.," i, 427) calls the Ministry a thing of no account in
comparison with Pitt, and says it was universally despised.
[655] Romilly Memoirs, i, 427.
[656] Sichel, "Sheridan," i, 440. Spencer Stanhope declared Pitt's speech the
finest he ever heard. His wife wrote to their son: "He (Pitt) spoke for two hours,
but unless he can be prevailed upon to give it himself, as the shorthand-writers
were excluded, the speech will be lost for ever. Your father thinks it will be made
out by some of his friends and submitted to his inspection; therefore, tho' we
may lose much, we shall not lose the whole" (A. M. W. Stirling, "Annals of a
Yorkshire House," ii, 282).
[657] "Dumouriez and the Defence of England against Napoleon," by J. H. Rose
and A. M. Broadley.
[658] Lyon, "Hist. of Dover," p. xxxiii.
Page 704
[659] Hansard, i, 1899–1902.
[660] "Mems. of Lady Hester Stanhope," i, 174.
[661] Lady Hester's second brother.
[662] G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 70–2; Desbrière, "Projets de Débarquement," iii,
98–105; Wheeler and Broadley, "Napoleon and the Invasion of England," ii, ch.
14; Cornwallis ("Corresp.," iii, 500) thought ill of our chances if the French
landed, but he doubted if they could. (Ibid., iii, 503.)
[663] Pitt MSS., 157.
[664] "Dropmore P.," vii, 193, 196.
[665] Pretyman MSS. It is in answer to the one referred to in "Dropmore P.," vii,
209.
[666] "Dropmore P.," vii, 211–14.
[667] Pretyman MSS.
[668] "Creevey Papers," i, 25–7.
[669] Pretyman MSS.
[670] Stanhope, iv, 139–44.
[671] Pretyman MSS.
[672] From Mr. A. M. Broadley's MSS.
[673] Stanhope, iv, App. viii-ix.
[674] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 4.
[675] Stanhope, iv, 177.
[676] Pitt thoroughly approved of Castlereagh taking the India Board under
Addington in July 1802; in October he entered the Cabinet ("Private Papers of
Wilberforce," 131).
[677] Wraxall (iii, 281) with his usual bias says that Pitt "affected" to desire the
inclusion of Fox.
[678] "Life of Wilberforce," iii, 168, 182, 184, 211, 212.
[660] "Mems. of Lady Hester Stanhope," i, 174.
[661] Lady Hester's second brother.
[662] G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 70–2; Desbrière, "Projets de Débarquement," iii,
98–105; Wheeler and Broadley, "Napoleon and the Invasion of England," ii, ch.
14; Cornwallis ("Corresp.," iii, 500) thought ill of our chances if the French
landed, but he doubted if they could. (Ibid., iii, 503.)
[663] Pitt MSS., 157.
[664] "Dropmore P.," vii, 193, 196.
[665] Pretyman MSS. It is in answer to the one referred to in "Dropmore P.," vii,
209.
[666] "Dropmore P.," vii, 211–14.
[667] Pretyman MSS.
[668] "Creevey Papers," i, 25–7.
[669] Pretyman MSS.
[670] Stanhope, iv, 139–44.
[671] Pretyman MSS.
[672] From Mr. A. M. Broadley's MSS.
[673] Stanhope, iv, App. viii-ix.
[674] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 4.
[675] Stanhope, iv, 177.
[676] Pitt thoroughly approved of Castlereagh taking the India Board under
Addington in July 1802; in October he entered the Cabinet ("Private Papers of
Wilberforce," 131).
[677] Wraxall (iii, 281) with his usual bias says that Pitt "affected" to desire the
inclusion of Fox.
[678] "Life of Wilberforce," iii, 168, 182, 184, 211, 212.
Page 705
[679] Ibid., iii, 230–4; Pitt MSS., 189.
[680] Pitt MSS., 102. Pitt to Whitworth, 28th May 1804; G. Rose, "Diaries," ii,
136. See, too, Rose, "Despatches relating to the ... Third Coalition," 27.
[681] Stanhope, iv, 199–201.
[682] Czartoryski, "Memoirs," ii, 35.
[683] "Creevey Papers," i, 28.
[684] Pretyman MSS.
[685] Rose, "Despatches relating to the ... Third Coalition" (Royal Hist. Soc.,
1904), 14–19; also Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 364–6, for the tentative Russian
overture of November 1803.
[686] Rose and Broadley, "Dumouriez and the Defence of England against
Napoleon," 260.
[687] Fortescue, v, 204–13. Half of the fine went to the overseers of the parish,
who were bound under penalties to provide a parochial substitute.
[688] Fortescue, v, 239, 240.
[689] "Creevey Papers," i, 29.
[690] Pitt MSS., 157.
[691] Pretyman MSS. See "Ann. Reg." (1805) for the failure at Boulogne on 3rd
October 1804.
[692] See Desbrière, "Projets ... de Débarquement, etc.," vol. v; J. Corbett, "The
Campaign of Trafalgar," chs. ii, iii, ix.
[693] "Kentish Gazette," 26th October 1804. Apparently Moore agreed to the
scheme, despite his opinion quoted above. For information on this topic I am
indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Fynmore of Sandgate. In the manœuvres of 1910
regiments were told off to extemporize means of crossing the canal in the
quickest and most effective way.
[694] "W. O.," 76; "Diary of Sir J. Moore," ii, 71–4.
[695] Pretyman MSS.
[696] Harrowby MSS.
[680] Pitt MSS., 102. Pitt to Whitworth, 28th May 1804; G. Rose, "Diaries," ii,
136. See, too, Rose, "Despatches relating to the ... Third Coalition," 27.
[681] Stanhope, iv, 199–201.
[682] Czartoryski, "Memoirs," ii, 35.
[683] "Creevey Papers," i, 28.
[684] Pretyman MSS.
[685] Rose, "Despatches relating to the ... Third Coalition" (Royal Hist. Soc.,
1904), 14–19; also Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 364–6, for the tentative Russian
overture of November 1803.
[686] Rose and Broadley, "Dumouriez and the Defence of England against
Napoleon," 260.
[687] Fortescue, v, 204–13. Half of the fine went to the overseers of the parish,
who were bound under penalties to provide a parochial substitute.
[688] Fortescue, v, 239, 240.
[689] "Creevey Papers," i, 29.
[690] Pitt MSS., 157.
[691] Pretyman MSS. See "Ann. Reg." (1805) for the failure at Boulogne on 3rd
October 1804.
[692] See Desbrière, "Projets ... de Débarquement, etc.," vol. v; J. Corbett, "The
Campaign of Trafalgar," chs. ii, iii, ix.
[693] "Kentish Gazette," 26th October 1804. Apparently Moore agreed to the
scheme, despite his opinion quoted above. For information on this topic I am
indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Fynmore of Sandgate. In the manœuvres of 1910
regiments were told off to extemporize means of crossing the canal in the
quickest and most effective way.
[694] "W. O.," 76; "Diary of Sir J. Moore," ii, 71–4.
[695] Pretyman MSS.
[696] Harrowby MSS.
Page 706
[697] Mahan, ii, ch. xv, ad fin.; "Ann. Reg." (1804), 555; "Mems. of R. P. Ward,"
i, ch. vii. For the subsequent plan of Ministers to attack Ferrol, from which
Moore dissuaded them, see "Diary of Sir J. Moore," ii, ch. xxi.
[698] Harrowby MSS.
[699] Rose, "Third Coalition," 32, 53, 61, 65, 67, 71, 75.
[700] Harrowby MSS.
[701] Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ii, 33.
[702] Pretyman MSS.
[703] Stanhope, iv, 244–8.
[704] See the letter in "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[705] "H. O." Ireland (Corresp.), 99.
[706] "Mems. of Fox," iv, 45, 68, 72, 75.
[707] See an interesting account by Dr. Hunt, "Transactions of the Royal Hist.
Soc." (1908), pp. 7–16.
[708] Hansard, iv, 1013–22, 1060.
[709] Hansard, iv, 255–325; "Life of Wilberforce," iii, 219–23; "Malmesbury
Diaries," iv, 338, 347; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 544–9.
[710] Chevening MSS.
[711] "Trial of Lord Melville" (1806), 256–9, 370, 378.
[712] "Creevey Papers," i, 34.
[713] "Barham Papers" (Navy Records Society), iii; Corbett, "Trafalgar
Campaign," 70–2; Stanhope, iv, 287; Pellew, ii 356–64.
[714] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, ch. vii.
[715] "F. O.," Prussia, 70; Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 54–8; Rose, "Napoleon,"
ii, 54.
[716] Garden, "Traités," viii, 317–23; Alison, App. to ch. xxxix.
i, ch. vii. For the subsequent plan of Ministers to attack Ferrol, from which
Moore dissuaded them, see "Diary of Sir J. Moore," ii, ch. xxi.
[698] Harrowby MSS.
[699] Rose, "Third Coalition," 32, 53, 61, 65, 67, 71, 75.
[700] Harrowby MSS.
[701] Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ii, 33.
[702] Pretyman MSS.
[703] Stanhope, iv, 244–8.
[704] See the letter in "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[705] "H. O." Ireland (Corresp.), 99.
[706] "Mems. of Fox," iv, 45, 68, 72, 75.
[707] See an interesting account by Dr. Hunt, "Transactions of the Royal Hist.
Soc." (1908), pp. 7–16.
[708] Hansard, iv, 1013–22, 1060.
[709] Hansard, iv, 255–325; "Life of Wilberforce," iii, 219–23; "Malmesbury
Diaries," iv, 338, 347; "Lord Colchester's Diaries," i, 544–9.
[710] Chevening MSS.
[711] "Trial of Lord Melville" (1806), 256–9, 370, 378.
[712] "Creevey Papers," i, 34.
[713] "Barham Papers" (Navy Records Society), iii; Corbett, "Trafalgar
Campaign," 70–2; Stanhope, iv, 287; Pellew, ii 356–64.
[714] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, ch. vii.
[715] "F. O.," Prussia, 70; Rose, "Napoleonic Studies," 54–8; Rose, "Napoleon,"
ii, 54.
[716] Garden, "Traités," viii, 317–23; Alison, App. to ch. xxxix.
Page 707
[717] Toreno ("War of Independence in Spain," vol. i, ad fin.) had the story from
Alava, who connected it with the arrival of the news of Ulm, on 2nd November.
Pitt said: "All is not lost if I can succeed in raising up a national war in Europe,
and this must have its commencement in Spain." But Malmesbury ("Diaries," iv,
340), who was present, does not name the incident, and states that Pitt
disbelieved the news (see ch. xxiv).
[718] Pretyman MSS.
[719] Rose, "Third Coalition," 25, 32, 44, 61, 66, 73, 76, 87, 97, etc.; Mr. Julian
Corbett, "The Trafalgar Campaign," chs. i, ii. For a critique on Pitt's
Mediterranean plans, see Bunbury's "Great War with France," 183–95.
[720] Rose, "Third Coalition," 127–30.
[721] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, 74–6.
[722] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, 78; Rose, "Third Coalition," 155–64.
[723] Ibid., 232; Ulmann, "Russisch-preussische Politik"; Hansing, "Hardenberg
und die dritte Coalition."
[724] "Paget Papers," ii, 186; Sir G. Jackson, "Diaries," i, 304, 458–60; Rose,
"Third Coalition," 180.
[725] "Lettres inédites de Napoléon," i, 50.
[726] Rose, "Third Coalition," 279–82. On 9th August Austria allied herself to
Russia.
[727] For a time her action was unknown at London; and Pitt and Mulgrave
outlined a plan of campaign turning largely on the liberation of South and
Central Italy. See Mr. Corbett, "Trafalgar Campaign," App. B.
[728] G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 198–200.
[729] Pretyman MSS.
[730] "Lady Hester Stanhope's Mems.," ii, 63.
[731] Chevening MSS. See, too, G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 235, as to Pitt's reliance
on "cordial medicines."
[732] By Mr. Julian Corbett, "The Campaign of Trafalgar." Mr. Corbett has
kindly helped me to fix the probable date of Castlereagh's letter.
Alava, who connected it with the arrival of the news of Ulm, on 2nd November.
Pitt said: "All is not lost if I can succeed in raising up a national war in Europe,
and this must have its commencement in Spain." But Malmesbury ("Diaries," iv,
340), who was present, does not name the incident, and states that Pitt
disbelieved the news (see ch. xxiv).
[718] Pretyman MSS.
[719] Rose, "Third Coalition," 25, 32, 44, 61, 66, 73, 76, 87, 97, etc.; Mr. Julian
Corbett, "The Trafalgar Campaign," chs. i, ii. For a critique on Pitt's
Mediterranean plans, see Bunbury's "Great War with France," 183–95.
[720] Rose, "Third Coalition," 127–30.
[721] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, 74–6.
[722] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, 78; Rose, "Third Coalition," 155–64.
[723] Ibid., 232; Ulmann, "Russisch-preussische Politik"; Hansing, "Hardenberg
und die dritte Coalition."
[724] "Paget Papers," ii, 186; Sir G. Jackson, "Diaries," i, 304, 458–60; Rose,
"Third Coalition," 180.
[725] "Lettres inédites de Napoléon," i, 50.
[726] Rose, "Third Coalition," 279–82. On 9th August Austria allied herself to
Russia.
[727] For a time her action was unknown at London; and Pitt and Mulgrave
outlined a plan of campaign turning largely on the liberation of South and
Central Italy. See Mr. Corbett, "Trafalgar Campaign," App. B.
[728] G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 198–200.
[729] Pretyman MSS.
[730] "Lady Hester Stanhope's Mems.," ii, 63.
[731] Chevening MSS. See, too, G. Rose, "Diaries," ii, 235, as to Pitt's reliance
on "cordial medicines."
[732] By Mr. Julian Corbett, "The Campaign of Trafalgar." Mr. Corbett has
kindly helped me to fix the probable date of Castlereagh's letter.
Page 708
[733] Pitt MSS., 121. In Pitt MSS., 111, is a hasty and undated note of Pitt to
Middleton (probably of February 1805) asking him to consider "whether it might
not be expedient to direct Sir John Warren to proceed to Cape de Verde, and if he
there found that Sir James Duckworth was gone to the West Indies, but not upon
certain information of the enemy having preceded him, that Sir J. Warren should
be ordered on to the Cape, unless he received intelligence that the enemy had
taken another course." He adds that this suggestion arises out of the news
received from the Cape, where French troops were expected. In that case the
operations would be protracted. Pitt hoped that Warren would be back in five
months, that is by 1st June, before which time the French preparations for the
invasion of England would not be far advanced. Evidently, then, Pitt sought
Middleton's advice direct on the complex problem of defending England and
guarding the overland and the sea routes to India at the same time. On this see
Corbett, "Trafalgar Campaign," 236–8.
[734] Wellington in 1834 told Croker that they met in the anteroom of the
Secretary of State, Castlereagh (Croker, "Diaries," ii, 234).
[735] G. Jackson ("Diaries," i, 270) gives a supposed instance of her interference
in favour of Haugwitz.
[736] Ibid., i, 301, 305, 314–9.
[737] Metternich, "Mems.," i, 57 (Eng. ed.); Hardenberg, "Mems.," ii, 220–4.
[738] Hardenberg, "Mems.," ii, 292–300.
[739] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 340.
[740] Pretyman MSS.; "Life of Wilberforce," iii, 412.
[741] Rose, "Third Coalition," 208–20. In "F. O.," Russia, 59, is a ciphered
despatch of 25th October 1805 that, if circumstances favoured, a second British
expedition (i.e., besides that destined for Hanover) would be made ready to seize
Walcheren.
[742] Pitt MSS., 142.
[743] See Hansing, "Hardenberg und die dritte Coalition" (Appendix), for a
comparison of these terms with those of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 11th April
1805.
[744] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, ch. ix. The editor wrongly gives the date of
Vorontzoff's letter as 17/29 September 1805, though it contains references to
Middleton (probably of February 1805) asking him to consider "whether it might
not be expedient to direct Sir John Warren to proceed to Cape de Verde, and if he
there found that Sir James Duckworth was gone to the West Indies, but not upon
certain information of the enemy having preceded him, that Sir J. Warren should
be ordered on to the Cape, unless he received intelligence that the enemy had
taken another course." He adds that this suggestion arises out of the news
received from the Cape, where French troops were expected. In that case the
operations would be protracted. Pitt hoped that Warren would be back in five
months, that is by 1st June, before which time the French preparations for the
invasion of England would not be far advanced. Evidently, then, Pitt sought
Middleton's advice direct on the complex problem of defending England and
guarding the overland and the sea routes to India at the same time. On this see
Corbett, "Trafalgar Campaign," 236–8.
[734] Wellington in 1834 told Croker that they met in the anteroom of the
Secretary of State, Castlereagh (Croker, "Diaries," ii, 234).
[735] G. Jackson ("Diaries," i, 270) gives a supposed instance of her interference
in favour of Haugwitz.
[736] Ibid., i, 301, 305, 314–9.
[737] Metternich, "Mems.," i, 57 (Eng. ed.); Hardenberg, "Mems.," ii, 220–4.
[738] Hardenberg, "Mems.," ii, 292–300.
[739] "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 340.
[740] Pretyman MSS.; "Life of Wilberforce," iii, 412.
[741] Rose, "Third Coalition," 208–20. In "F. O.," Russia, 59, is a ciphered
despatch of 25th October 1805 that, if circumstances favoured, a second British
expedition (i.e., besides that destined for Hanover) would be made ready to seize
Walcheren.
[742] Pitt MSS., 142.
[743] See Hansing, "Hardenberg und die dritte Coalition" (Appendix), for a
comparison of these terms with those of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 11th April
1805.
[744] Czartoryski, "Mems.," ii, ch. ix. The editor wrongly gives the date of
Vorontzoff's letter as 17/29 September 1805, though it contains references to
Page 709
Ulm and Trafalgar. It is of 18th–21st November. "F. O.," Prussia, 70. Mulgrave
to Harrowby, 23rd November.
[745] I.e., the Prussian mediation by Napoleon.
[746] Harrowby MSS.
[747] See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for the letter in full.
[748] Rose, "Third Coalition," 230–5.
[749] The French held the fortress of Hameln.
[750] Rose, "Third Coalition," 259.
[751] Ibid., 260, 261.
[752] Pitt MSS., 142.
[753] Pretyman MSS.
[754] G. Jackson, "Diaries," i, 377, 381, 384. Harrowby left Berlin on 7th or 8th
January 1806 (ibid., 390).
[755] Harrowby MSS.
[756] G. Jackson, "Diaries," i, 381.
[757] Peach, "Historic Houses of Bath." The "Bath Herald" of 11th January 1806
has an ode containing the lines:
Oh prepare, prepare
The renovating draught! He comes by stealth
(For so unconscious worth is ever seen)
With thoughts uplifted but retiring mien.
[758] Ruville, "Chatham," iii, 246.
[759] Chevening MSS.
[760] Thomas Hardy ("The Dynasts," i, Act vi, sc. 7) places the incident in the
week after Austerlitz. The date is impossible.
[761] Stanhope, iv, 369.
[762] Pitt MSS., 337.
to Harrowby, 23rd November.
[745] I.e., the Prussian mediation by Napoleon.
[746] Harrowby MSS.
[747] See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for the letter in full.
[748] Rose, "Third Coalition," 230–5.
[749] The French held the fortress of Hameln.
[750] Rose, "Third Coalition," 259.
[751] Ibid., 260, 261.
[752] Pitt MSS., 142.
[753] Pretyman MSS.
[754] G. Jackson, "Diaries," i, 377, 381, 384. Harrowby left Berlin on 7th or 8th
January 1806 (ibid., 390).
[755] Harrowby MSS.
[756] G. Jackson, "Diaries," i, 381.
[757] Peach, "Historic Houses of Bath." The "Bath Herald" of 11th January 1806
has an ode containing the lines:
Oh prepare, prepare
The renovating draught! He comes by stealth
(For so unconscious worth is ever seen)
With thoughts uplifted but retiring mien.
[758] Ruville, "Chatham," iii, 246.
[759] Chevening MSS.
[760] Thomas Hardy ("The Dynasts," i, Act vi, sc. 7) places the incident in the
week after Austerlitz. The date is impossible.
[761] Stanhope, iv, 369.
[762] Pitt MSS., 337.
Page 710
[763] Ibid., 121. See, too, in his letter of 23rd December ("Castlereagh
Corresp.," vi, 92).
[764] J. Bagot, "Canning and his Friends," i, 227. The statement about the gout
corrects Malmesbury ("Diaries," iv, 343) that the attack of gout left Pitt far
weaker and with digestion impaired. Malmesbury was not at Bath. Frere's father
had lately died.
[765] Bagot, "Canning, etc.," 415–9; H. Newbolt, "Year of Trafalgar," 190–3.
[766] Pitt MSS., 121.
[767] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 70–85.
[768] Pitt MSS., 121.
[769] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 100; "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 344.
[770] Gifford, "Life of Pitt," vi, 802; Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of
Pitt" (1903), p. 16.
[771] Pitt MSS., 142.
[772] In the "Hardenberg Memoirs" (ii, 353) it is stated that Harrowby offered
Holland to Prussia. Every despatch that I have read runs counter to this assertion.
If Harrowby made the offer, it was in sheer desperation and on his own
authority; but he nowhere mentions it.
[773] Chevening MSS.; "Notes and Queries," 12th November 1864. Mr. John
Upham of Bath on 10th March 1806 sent these particulars to Lord Chatham.
Gifford ("Life of Pitt," vi, 803) wrongly states that the journey took four days.
[774] The house has been very little altered since 1806, and not at all on the side
shown in the accompanying sketch, which, by kind permission of Mr. and Mrs.
Doulton, was done by my daughter. The room over the veranda is that in which
Pitt died.
[775] Pretyman MSS.
[776] Stanhope, iv, 374.
[777] Pretyman MSS.
[778] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 103–112, 119.
Corresp.," vi, 92).
[764] J. Bagot, "Canning and his Friends," i, 227. The statement about the gout
corrects Malmesbury ("Diaries," iv, 343) that the attack of gout left Pitt far
weaker and with digestion impaired. Malmesbury was not at Bath. Frere's father
had lately died.
[765] Bagot, "Canning, etc.," 415–9; H. Newbolt, "Year of Trafalgar," 190–3.
[766] Pitt MSS., 121.
[767] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 70–85.
[768] Pitt MSS., 121.
[769] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 100; "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 344.
[770] Gifford, "Life of Pitt," vi, 802; Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of
Pitt" (1903), p. 16.
[771] Pitt MSS., 142.
[772] In the "Hardenberg Memoirs" (ii, 353) it is stated that Harrowby offered
Holland to Prussia. Every despatch that I have read runs counter to this assertion.
If Harrowby made the offer, it was in sheer desperation and on his own
authority; but he nowhere mentions it.
[773] Chevening MSS.; "Notes and Queries," 12th November 1864. Mr. John
Upham of Bath on 10th March 1806 sent these particulars to Lord Chatham.
Gifford ("Life of Pitt," vi, 803) wrongly states that the journey took four days.
[774] The house has been very little altered since 1806, and not at all on the side
shown in the accompanying sketch, which, by kind permission of Mr. and Mrs.
Doulton, was done by my daughter. The room over the veranda is that in which
Pitt died.
[775] Pretyman MSS.
[776] Stanhope, iv, 374.
[777] Pretyman MSS.
[778] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 103–112, 119.
Page 711
[779] Stanhope, iv, 375; "Malmesbury Diaries," iv, 346; "Dropmore P.," vii, 327
[780] "F. O.," Austria, 77. Mulgrave to Harrington, 10th January 1806.
[781] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 126.
[782] R. P. Ward, "Memoirs," i, 176.
[783] Pretyman MSS.
[784] Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of Pitt," 18; "Dropmore P.," vii, 330.
[785] Stanhope, iv, 381.
[786] "Life of Wilberforce," v, 260; "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 68.
[787] Marquis Wellesley, "Quarterly Rev." (1836).
[788] Michelet, "La Femme," Introd., ch. ii, quoted by Stanhope, iv, 405.
[789] "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 67–72.
[790] Lord Acton, "Letters to Mary Gladstone," 45, 46, 56.
[780] "F. O.," Austria, 77. Mulgrave to Harrington, 10th January 1806.
[781] "Castlereagh Corresp.," vi, 126.
[782] R. P. Ward, "Memoirs," i, 176.
[783] Pretyman MSS.
[784] Lord Rosebery, "Tomline's Estimate of Pitt," 18; "Dropmore P.," vii, 330.
[785] Stanhope, iv, 381.
[786] "Life of Wilberforce," v, 260; "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 68.
[787] Marquis Wellesley, "Quarterly Rev." (1836).
[788] Michelet, "La Femme," Introd., ch. ii, quoted by Stanhope, iv, 405.
[789] "Private Papers of Wilberforce," 67–72.
[790] Lord Acton, "Letters to Mary Gladstone," 45, 46, 56.
Page 712
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WILLIAM PITT
AND THE GREAT WAR ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be
renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law
means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the
Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States
without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules,
set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying
and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the
PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a
registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook,
except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying
royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge
anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is
very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg
eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do
practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by
U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license,
especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
AND THE GREAT WAR ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be
renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law
means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the
Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States
without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules,
set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying
and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the
PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a
registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook,
except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying
royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge
anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is
very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg
eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do
practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by
U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license,
especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
Page 713
THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or any
other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project Gutenberg”), you
agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project Gutenberg License
available with this file or online at www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing
Project Gutenberg electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg electronic work,
you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to and accept all the
terms of this license and intellectual property (trademark/copyright)
agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all the terms of this agreement,
you must cease using and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg
electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy
of or access to a Project Gutenberg electronic work and you do not agree to
be bound by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the
person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be used on
or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who agree to be
bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few things that you can
do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works even without complying
with the full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There are a
lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg electronic works if you
follow the terms of this agreement and help preserve free future access to
Project Gutenberg electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the Foundation”
or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the
collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an individual
work is unprotected by copyright law in the United States and you are
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or any
other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project Gutenberg”), you
agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project Gutenberg License
available with this file or online at www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing
Project Gutenberg electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg electronic work,
you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to and accept all the
terms of this license and intellectual property (trademark/copyright)
agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all the terms of this agreement,
you must cease using and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg
electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy
of or access to a Project Gutenberg electronic work and you do not agree to
be bound by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the
person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be used on
or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who agree to be
bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few things that you can
do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works even without complying
with the full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There are a
lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg electronic works if you
follow the terms of this agreement and help preserve free future access to
Project Gutenberg electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the Foundation”
or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the
collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an individual
work is unprotected by copyright law in the United States and you are
Page 714
located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works
based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg are
removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project Gutenberg
mission of promoting free access to electronic works by freely sharing
Project Gutenberg works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for
keeping the Project Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can
easily comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when you
share it without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in a
constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check the
laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement before
downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or creating
derivative works based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg work.
The Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright status
of any work in any country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear prominently
whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work on which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, copied
or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with
this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in
the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country
where you are located before using this eBook.
copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works
based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg are
removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project Gutenberg
mission of promoting free access to electronic works by freely sharing
Project Gutenberg works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for
keeping the Project Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can
easily comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when you
share it without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in a
constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check the
laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement before
downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or creating
derivative works based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg work.
The Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright status
of any work in any country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear prominently
whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work on which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, copied
or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with
this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in
the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country
where you are located before using this eBook.
Page 715
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is derived from
texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a notice
indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright holder), the
work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the United States without
paying any fees or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a
work with the phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on
the work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs
1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
Project Gutenberg trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted with the
permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution must comply
with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed
by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked to the Project
Gutenberg License for all works posted with the permission of the
copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg License
terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this work or any
other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without prominently
displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with active links or
immediate access to the full terms of the Project Gutenberg License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or
distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format other than “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official version posted on the
official Project Gutenberg website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no
additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a means of
exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work
in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format
must include the full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph
1.E.1.
texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a notice
indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright holder), the
work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the United States without
paying any fees or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a
work with the phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on
the work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs
1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
Project Gutenberg trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted with the
permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution must comply
with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed
by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked to the Project
Gutenberg License for all works posted with the permission of the
copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg License
terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this work or any
other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without prominently
displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with active links or
immediate access to the full terms of the Project Gutenberg License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or
distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format other than “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official version posted on the
official Project Gutenberg website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no
additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a means of
exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work
in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format
must include the full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph
1.E.1.
Page 716
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, performing,
copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works unless you comply
with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing access to
or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from the
use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method you
already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed to the
owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has agreed to donate
royalties under this paragraph to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid within 60 days
following each date on which you prepare (or are legally required to
prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly
marked as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information about
donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he does
not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ License. You
must require such a user to return or destroy all copies of the works
possessed in a physical medium and discontinue all use of and all
access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free distribution
of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set forth in
this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project
copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works unless you comply
with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing access to
or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from the
use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method you
already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed to the
owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has agreed to donate
royalties under this paragraph to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid within 60 days
following each date on which you prepare (or are legally required to
prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly
marked as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information about
donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he does
not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ License. You
must require such a user to return or destroy all copies of the works
possessed in a physical medium and discontinue all use of and all
access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free distribution
of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set forth in
this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project
Page 717
Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3
below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread works
not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project Gutenberg™
collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and
the medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,” such as,
but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription
errors, a copyright or other intellectual property infringement, a defective or
damaged disk or other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that
damage or cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except
for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to
you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE
THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT
EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE
THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY
DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE
TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL,
PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE
NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you
discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you
can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the
defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a refund.
If you received the work electronically, the person or entity providing it to
below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread works
not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project Gutenberg™
collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and
the medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,” such as,
but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription
errors, a copyright or other intellectual property infringement, a defective or
damaged disk or other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that
damage or cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except
for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to
you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE
THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT
EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE
THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY
DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE
TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL,
PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE
NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you
discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you
can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the
defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a refund.
If you received the work electronically, the person or entity providing it to
Page 718
you may choose to give you a second opportunity to receive the work
electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you
may demand a refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the
problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in
paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO OTHER
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied warranties or
the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. If any disclaimer or
limitation set forth in this agreement violates the law of the state applicable
to this agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum
disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity
or unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in accordance
with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works,
harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that
arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do or cause
to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg work, (b)
alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg
work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project
Gutenberg
Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of electronic
works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers including
obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists because of the
electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you
may demand a refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the
problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in
paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO OTHER
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied warranties or
the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. If any disclaimer or
limitation set forth in this agreement violates the law of the state applicable
to this agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum
disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity
or unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in accordance
with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works,
harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that
arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do or cause
to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg work, (b)
alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg
work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project
Gutenberg
Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of electronic
works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers including
obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists because of the
Page 719
efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from people in all walks of
life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the assistance
they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s goals and ensuring
that the Project Gutenberg collection will remain freely available for
generations to come. In 2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation was created to provide a secure and permanent future for
Project Gutenberg and future generations. To learn more about the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations
can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at
www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)
(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the state of
Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service.
The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification number is 64-6221541.
Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax
deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state’s
laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza #516,
Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website and
official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of increasing the
number of public domain and licensed works that can be freely distributed
in machine-readable form accessible by the widest array of equipment
life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the assistance
they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s goals and ensuring
that the Project Gutenberg collection will remain freely available for
generations to come. In 2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation was created to provide a secure and permanent future for
Project Gutenberg and future generations. To learn more about the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations
can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at
www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)
(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the state of
Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service.
The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification number is 64-6221541.
Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax
deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state’s
laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza #516,
Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website and
official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of increasing the
number of public domain and licensed works that can be freely distributed
in machine-readable form accessible by the widest array of equipment
Page 720
including outdated equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are
particularly important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United States.
Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a considerable effort,
much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up with these
requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations where we have not
received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or
determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we have
not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition against
accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who approach us
with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make any
statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from outside the
United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation methods
and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other ways including
checks, online payments and credit card donations. To donate, please visit:
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg
electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg
concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared with
anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project Gutenberg
eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed editions,
all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in the U.S. unless a
particularly important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United States.
Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a considerable effort,
much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up with these
requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations where we have not
received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or
determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we have
not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition against
accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who approach us
with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make any
statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from outside the
United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation methods
and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other ways including
checks, online payments and credit card donations. To donate, please visit:
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg
electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg
concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared with
anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project Gutenberg
eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed editions,
all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in the U.S. unless a
Page 721
copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily keep eBooks in
compliance with any particular paper edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search facility:
www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg, including how
to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation,
how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email
newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
compliance with any particular paper edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search facility:
www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg, including how
to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation,
how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email
newsletter to hear about new eBooks.