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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Literary and Philosophical
Essays: French, German and Italian
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Title: Literary and Philosophical Essays: French, German and Italian
Author: Michel de Montaigne
Immanuel Kant
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing
Giuseppe Mazzini
Ernest Renan
Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve
Friedrich Schiller
Release date: May 1, 2004 [eBook #5637]
Most recently updated: December 29, 2020
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5637
Essays: French, German and Italian
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will
have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using
this eBook.
Title: Literary and Philosophical Essays: French, German and Italian
Author: Michel de Montaigne
Immanuel Kant
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing
Giuseppe Mazzini
Ernest Renan
Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve
Friedrich Schiller
Release date: May 1, 2004 [eBook #5637]
Most recently updated: December 29, 2020
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5637
Page 4
Credits: David Turner, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LITERARY AND
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: FRENCH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN ***
David Turner, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading
Team.
LITERARY AND
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
HARVARD CLASSICS V32
Proofreading Team
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LITERARY AND
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: FRENCH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN ***
David Turner, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading
Team.
LITERARY AND
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
HARVARD CLASSICS V32
Page 5
CONTENTS
THAT WE SHOULD NOT JUDGE OF OUR HAPPINESS UNTIL AFTER
OUR DEATH THAT
TO PHILOSOPHISE IS TO LEARNE How TO DIE OF THE
INSTITUTION AND
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN OF FRIENDSHIP OF BOOKES BY
MONTAIGNE
MONTAIGNE
WHAT IS A CLASSIC? BY CHASLES-AUGUSTIN SAINTE-BEUVE
THE POETRY OF THE CELTIC RACES BY ERNEST RENAN
THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE BY GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING
LETTERS UPON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN BY J. C. FRIEDRICH VON
SCHILLER
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS
IMMANUEL KANT
BYRON AND GOETHE BY GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
THAT WE SHOULD NOT JUDGE OF OUR HAPPINESS UNTIL AFTER
OUR DEATH THAT
TO PHILOSOPHISE IS TO LEARNE How TO DIE OF THE
INSTITUTION AND
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN OF FRIENDSHIP OF BOOKES BY
MONTAIGNE
MONTAIGNE
WHAT IS A CLASSIC? BY CHASLES-AUGUSTIN SAINTE-BEUVE
THE POETRY OF THE CELTIC RACES BY ERNEST RENAN
THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE BY GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING
LETTERS UPON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN BY J. C. FRIEDRICH VON
SCHILLER
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS
IMMANUEL KANT
BYRON AND GOETHE BY GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
Page 6
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Michel Eyquem De Montaigne, the founder of the modern Essay, was born
February 28, 1533, at the chateau of Montaigne in Pirigord. He came of a
family of wealthy merchants of Bordeaux, and was educated at the College
de Guyenne, where he had among his teachers the great Scottish Latinist,
George Buchanan. Later he studied law, and held various public offices; but
at the age of thirty-eight he retired to his estates, where he lived apart from
the civil wars of the time, and devoted himself to study and thought. While
he was traveling in Germany and Italy, in 1580-81, he was elected mayor of
Bordeaux, and this office he filled for four years. He married in 1565, and
had six daughters, only one of whom grew up. The first two books of his
"Essays" appeared in 1580; the third in 1588; and four years later he died.
These are the main external facts of Montaigne's life: of the man himself
the portrait is to be found in his book. "It is myself I portray," he declares;
and there is nowhere in literature a volume of self-revelation surpassing his
in charm and candor. He is frankly egotistical, yet modest and
unpretentious; profoundly wise, yet constantly protesting his ignorance;
learned, yet careless, forgetful, and inconsistent. His themes are as wide and
varied as his observation of human life, and he has written the finest eulogy
of friendship the world has known. Bacon, who knew his book and
borrowed from it, wrote on the same subject; and the contrast of the essays
is the true reflection of the contrast between the personalities of their
authors.
Shortly after Montaigne's death the "Essays" were translated into English
by John Florio, with less than exact accuracy, but in a style so full of the
flavor of the age that we still read Montaigne in the version which
Shakespeare knew. The group of examples here printed exhibits the author
Michel Eyquem De Montaigne, the founder of the modern Essay, was born
February 28, 1533, at the chateau of Montaigne in Pirigord. He came of a
family of wealthy merchants of Bordeaux, and was educated at the College
de Guyenne, where he had among his teachers the great Scottish Latinist,
George Buchanan. Later he studied law, and held various public offices; but
at the age of thirty-eight he retired to his estates, where he lived apart from
the civil wars of the time, and devoted himself to study and thought. While
he was traveling in Germany and Italy, in 1580-81, he was elected mayor of
Bordeaux, and this office he filled for four years. He married in 1565, and
had six daughters, only one of whom grew up. The first two books of his
"Essays" appeared in 1580; the third in 1588; and four years later he died.
These are the main external facts of Montaigne's life: of the man himself
the portrait is to be found in his book. "It is myself I portray," he declares;
and there is nowhere in literature a volume of self-revelation surpassing his
in charm and candor. He is frankly egotistical, yet modest and
unpretentious; profoundly wise, yet constantly protesting his ignorance;
learned, yet careless, forgetful, and inconsistent. His themes are as wide and
varied as his observation of human life, and he has written the finest eulogy
of friendship the world has known. Bacon, who knew his book and
borrowed from it, wrote on the same subject; and the contrast of the essays
is the true reflection of the contrast between the personalities of their
authors.
Shortly after Montaigne's death the "Essays" were translated into English
by John Florio, with less than exact accuracy, but in a style so full of the
flavor of the age that we still read Montaigne in the version which
Shakespeare knew. The group of examples here printed exhibits the author
Page 7
in a variety of moods, easy, serious, and, in the essay on "Friendship," as
nearly impassioned as his philosophy ever allowed him to become.
Reader, be here a well-meaning Booke. It doth at the firth entrance
forewarne thee, that in contriving the same I have proposed unto my selfe
no other than a familiar and private end: I have no respect or consideration
at all, either to thy service, or to my glory: my forces are not capable of any
such desseigne. I have vowed the same to the particular commodity of my
kinsfolks and friends: to the end, that losing me (which they are likely to
doe ere long), they may therein find some lineaments of my conditions and
humours, and by that meanes reserve more whole, and more lively foster
the knowledge and acquaintance they have had of me. Had my intention
beene to forestal and purchase the world's opinion and favour, I would
surely have adorned myselfe more quaintly, or kept a more grave and
solemne march. I desire therein to be delineated in mine owne genuine,
simple and ordinarie fashion, without contention, art or study; for it is
myself e I pourtray. My imperfections shall therein be read to the life, and
my naturall forme discerned, so farre-forth as publike reverence hath
permitted me. For if my fortune had beene to have lived among those
nations which yet are said to live under the sweet liberty of Nature's first
and uncorrupted lawes, I assure thee, I would most willingly have
pourtrayed my selfe fully and naked. Thus, gentle Reader, myself I am the
groundworke of my booke: it is then no reason thou shouldest employ thy
time about so frivolous and vaine a subject.
Therefore farewell.
From MONTAIGNE,
The First of March, 1580.
nearly impassioned as his philosophy ever allowed him to become.
Reader, be here a well-meaning Booke. It doth at the firth entrance
forewarne thee, that in contriving the same I have proposed unto my selfe
no other than a familiar and private end: I have no respect or consideration
at all, either to thy service, or to my glory: my forces are not capable of any
such desseigne. I have vowed the same to the particular commodity of my
kinsfolks and friends: to the end, that losing me (which they are likely to
doe ere long), they may therein find some lineaments of my conditions and
humours, and by that meanes reserve more whole, and more lively foster
the knowledge and acquaintance they have had of me. Had my intention
beene to forestal and purchase the world's opinion and favour, I would
surely have adorned myselfe more quaintly, or kept a more grave and
solemne march. I desire therein to be delineated in mine owne genuine,
simple and ordinarie fashion, without contention, art or study; for it is
myself e I pourtray. My imperfections shall therein be read to the life, and
my naturall forme discerned, so farre-forth as publike reverence hath
permitted me. For if my fortune had beene to have lived among those
nations which yet are said to live under the sweet liberty of Nature's first
and uncorrupted lawes, I assure thee, I would most willingly have
pourtrayed my selfe fully and naked. Thus, gentle Reader, myself I am the
groundworke of my booke: it is then no reason thou shouldest employ thy
time about so frivolous and vaine a subject.
Therefore farewell.
From MONTAIGNE,
The First of March, 1580.
Page 8
THAT WE SHOULD NOT JUDGE OF OUR
HAPPINESSE UNTILL AFTER OUR DEATH
scilicet ultima semper
Expectanda dies homini est, dicique beatus
Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera debat.
[Footnote: Ovid. Met. 1, iii. 135.]
We must expect of man the latest day,
Nor ere he die, he's happie, can we say.
The very children are acquainted with the storie of Croesus to this
purpose: who being taken by Cyrus, and by him condemned to die, upon the
point of his execution, cried out aloud: "Oh Solon, Solon!" which words of
his, being reported to Cyrus, who inquiring what he meant by them, told
him, hee now at his owne cost verified the advertisement Solon had before
times given him; which was, that no man, what cheerefull and blandishing
countenance soever fortune shewed them, may rightly deeme himselfe
happie, till such time as he have passed the last day of his life, by reason of
the uncertaintie and vicissitude of humane things, which by a very light
motive, and slight occasion, are often changed from one to another cleane
contrary state and degree. And therefore Agesilaus answered one that
counted the King of Persia happy, because being very young, he had gotten
the garland of so mightie and great a dominion: "yea but said he, Priam at
HAPPINESSE UNTILL AFTER OUR DEATH
scilicet ultima semper
Expectanda dies homini est, dicique beatus
Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera debat.
[Footnote: Ovid. Met. 1, iii. 135.]
We must expect of man the latest day,
Nor ere he die, he's happie, can we say.
The very children are acquainted with the storie of Croesus to this
purpose: who being taken by Cyrus, and by him condemned to die, upon the
point of his execution, cried out aloud: "Oh Solon, Solon!" which words of
his, being reported to Cyrus, who inquiring what he meant by them, told
him, hee now at his owne cost verified the advertisement Solon had before
times given him; which was, that no man, what cheerefull and blandishing
countenance soever fortune shewed them, may rightly deeme himselfe
happie, till such time as he have passed the last day of his life, by reason of
the uncertaintie and vicissitude of humane things, which by a very light
motive, and slight occasion, are often changed from one to another cleane
contrary state and degree. And therefore Agesilaus answered one that
counted the King of Persia happy, because being very young, he had gotten
the garland of so mightie and great a dominion: "yea but said he, Priam at
Page 9
the same age was not unhappy." Of the Kings of Macedon that succeeded
Alexander the Great, some were afterward seene to become Joyners and
Scriveners at Rome: and of Tyrants of Sicilie, Schoolemasters at Corinth.
One that had conquered halfe the world, and been Emperour over so many,
Armies, became an humble and miserable suter to the raskally officers of a
king of AEgypte: At so high a rate did that great Pompey purchase the
irkesome prolonging of his life but for five or six moneths. And in our
fathers daies, Lodowicke Sforze, tenth Duke of Millane, under whom the
State of Italic had so long beene turmoiled and shaken, was seene to die a
wretched prisoner at Loches in France, but not till he had lived and lingered
ten yeares in thraldom, which was the worst of his bargaine. The fairest
Queene, wife to the greatest King of Christendome, was she not lately scene
to die by the hands of an executioner? Oh unworthie and barbarous cruelties
And a thousand such examples. For, it seemeth that as the sea-billowes and
surging waves, rage and storme against the surly pride and stubborne height
of our buildings, so are there above, certaine spirits that envie the rising
prosperities and greatnesse heere below.
Vsque adeb res humanas vis abdita quadam
Obterit, et pulchros fasces sav&sque secures
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.
[Footnote: LUCRET. I. v. 1243.]
A hidden power so mens states hath out-worne
Faire swords, fierce scepters, signes of honours borne,
It seemes to trample and deride in scorne.
And it seemeth Fortune doth sometimes narrowly watch the last day of
our life, thereby to shew her power, and in one moment to overthrow what
for many yeares together she had been erecting, and makes us cry after
Laberius, Nimirum hoc die una plus vixi, mihi quam vivendum fuit.
Alexander the Great, some were afterward seene to become Joyners and
Scriveners at Rome: and of Tyrants of Sicilie, Schoolemasters at Corinth.
One that had conquered halfe the world, and been Emperour over so many,
Armies, became an humble and miserable suter to the raskally officers of a
king of AEgypte: At so high a rate did that great Pompey purchase the
irkesome prolonging of his life but for five or six moneths. And in our
fathers daies, Lodowicke Sforze, tenth Duke of Millane, under whom the
State of Italic had so long beene turmoiled and shaken, was seene to die a
wretched prisoner at Loches in France, but not till he had lived and lingered
ten yeares in thraldom, which was the worst of his bargaine. The fairest
Queene, wife to the greatest King of Christendome, was she not lately scene
to die by the hands of an executioner? Oh unworthie and barbarous cruelties
And a thousand such examples. For, it seemeth that as the sea-billowes and
surging waves, rage and storme against the surly pride and stubborne height
of our buildings, so are there above, certaine spirits that envie the rising
prosperities and greatnesse heere below.
Vsque adeb res humanas vis abdita quadam
Obterit, et pulchros fasces sav&sque secures
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.
[Footnote: LUCRET. I. v. 1243.]
A hidden power so mens states hath out-worne
Faire swords, fierce scepters, signes of honours borne,
It seemes to trample and deride in scorne.
And it seemeth Fortune doth sometimes narrowly watch the last day of
our life, thereby to shew her power, and in one moment to overthrow what
for many yeares together she had been erecting, and makes us cry after
Laberius, Nimirum hoc die una plus vixi, mihi quam vivendum fuit.
Page 10
[Footnote: MACHOB, 1, ii. 7.] Thus it is, "I have lived longer by this one
day than I should." So may that good advice of Solon be taken with reason.
But forsomuch as he is a Philosopher, with whom the favours or disfavours
of fortune, and good or ill lucke have no place, and are not regarded by him;
and puissances and greatnesses, and accidents of qualitie, are well-nigh
indifferent: I deeme it very likely he had a further reach, and meant that the
same good fortune of our life, which dependeth of the tranquillitie and
contentment of a welborne minde, and of the resolution and assurance of a
well ordered soule, should never be ascribed unto man, untill he have beene
scene play the last act of his comedie, and without doubt the hardest. In all
the rest there may be some maske: either these sophisticall discourses of
Philosophie are not in us but by countenance, or accidents that never touch
us to the quick, give us alwaies leasure to keep our countenance setled. But
when that last part of death, and of our selves comes to be acted, then no
dissembling will availe, then is it high time to speake plaine English, and
put off all vizards: then whatsoever the pot containeth must be shewne, be it
good or bad, foule or cleane, wine or water.
Nam vera voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Ejiciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet res.
[Footnote: LUCEET. 1. iii. 57.]
For then are sent true speeches from the heart,
We are ourselves, we leave to play a part.
Loe heere, why at this last cast, all our lives other actions must be tride
and touched. It is the master-day, the day that judgeth all others: it is the
day, saith an auncient Writer, that must judge of all my forepassed yeares.
To death doe I referre the essay [Footnote: Assay, exact weighing.] of my
studies fruit. There shall wee see whether my discourse proceed from my
heart, or from my mouth. I have scene divers, by their death, either in good
day than I should." So may that good advice of Solon be taken with reason.
But forsomuch as he is a Philosopher, with whom the favours or disfavours
of fortune, and good or ill lucke have no place, and are not regarded by him;
and puissances and greatnesses, and accidents of qualitie, are well-nigh
indifferent: I deeme it very likely he had a further reach, and meant that the
same good fortune of our life, which dependeth of the tranquillitie and
contentment of a welborne minde, and of the resolution and assurance of a
well ordered soule, should never be ascribed unto man, untill he have beene
scene play the last act of his comedie, and without doubt the hardest. In all
the rest there may be some maske: either these sophisticall discourses of
Philosophie are not in us but by countenance, or accidents that never touch
us to the quick, give us alwaies leasure to keep our countenance setled. But
when that last part of death, and of our selves comes to be acted, then no
dissembling will availe, then is it high time to speake plaine English, and
put off all vizards: then whatsoever the pot containeth must be shewne, be it
good or bad, foule or cleane, wine or water.
Nam vera voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Ejiciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet res.
[Footnote: LUCEET. 1. iii. 57.]
For then are sent true speeches from the heart,
We are ourselves, we leave to play a part.
Loe heere, why at this last cast, all our lives other actions must be tride
and touched. It is the master-day, the day that judgeth all others: it is the
day, saith an auncient Writer, that must judge of all my forepassed yeares.
To death doe I referre the essay [Footnote: Assay, exact weighing.] of my
studies fruit. There shall wee see whether my discourse proceed from my
heart, or from my mouth. I have scene divers, by their death, either in good
Page 11
or evill, give reputation to all their forepassed life. Scipio, father-in-law to
Pompey, in well dying, repaired the ill opinion which untill that houre men
had ever held of him. Epaminondas being demanded which of the three he
esteemed most, either Chabrias, or Iphicrates, or himselfe: "It is necessary,"
said he, "that we be scene to die, before your question may well be
resolved." [Footnote: Answered.] Verily, we should steale much from him,
if he should be weighed without the honour and greatnesse of his end. God
hath willed it, as he pleased: but in my time three of the most execrable
persons that ever I knew in all abomination of life, and the most infamous,
have beene seen to die very orderly and quietly, and in every circumstance
composed even unto perfection. There are some brave and fortunate deaths.
I have seene her cut the twine of some man's life, with a progresse of
wonderful advancement, and with so worthie an end, even in the flowre of
his growth and spring of his youth, that in mine opinion, his ambitious and
haughtie couragious signes, thought nothing so high as might interrupt them
who without going to the place where he pretended, arived there more
gloriously and worthily than either his desire or hope aimed at, and by his
fall fore-went the power and name, whither by his course he aspired. When
I judge of other men's lives, I ever respect how they have behaved
themselves in their end; and my chiefest study is, I may well demeane my
selfe at my last gaspe, that is to say, quietly and constantly.
Pompey, in well dying, repaired the ill opinion which untill that houre men
had ever held of him. Epaminondas being demanded which of the three he
esteemed most, either Chabrias, or Iphicrates, or himselfe: "It is necessary,"
said he, "that we be scene to die, before your question may well be
resolved." [Footnote: Answered.] Verily, we should steale much from him,
if he should be weighed without the honour and greatnesse of his end. God
hath willed it, as he pleased: but in my time three of the most execrable
persons that ever I knew in all abomination of life, and the most infamous,
have beene seen to die very orderly and quietly, and in every circumstance
composed even unto perfection. There are some brave and fortunate deaths.
I have seene her cut the twine of some man's life, with a progresse of
wonderful advancement, and with so worthie an end, even in the flowre of
his growth and spring of his youth, that in mine opinion, his ambitious and
haughtie couragious signes, thought nothing so high as might interrupt them
who without going to the place where he pretended, arived there more
gloriously and worthily than either his desire or hope aimed at, and by his
fall fore-went the power and name, whither by his course he aspired. When
I judge of other men's lives, I ever respect how they have behaved
themselves in their end; and my chiefest study is, I may well demeane my
selfe at my last gaspe, that is to say, quietly and constantly.
Page 12
THAT TO PHILOSOPHISE IS TO LEARNE
HOW TO DIE
Cicero saith, that to Philosophise is no other thing than for a man to prepare
himselfe to death: which is the reason that studie and contemplation doth in
some sort withdraw our soule from us, and severally employ it from the
body, which is a kind of apprentisage and resemblance of death; or else it is,
that all the wisdome and discourse of the world, doth in the end resolve
upon this point, to teach us not to feare to die. Truly either reason mockes
us, or it only aimeth at our contentment, and in fine, bends all her travell to
make us live well, and as the holy Scripture saith, "at our ease." All the
opinions of the world conclude, that pleasure is our end, howbeit they take
divers meanes unto and for it, else would men reject them at their first
comming. For, who would give eare unto him, that for it's end would
establish our paine and disturbance? The dissentions of philosophicall sects
in this case are verbal: Transcurramus solertissimas Hugos [Footnote:
Travails, labours.] "Let us run over such over-fine fooleries and subtill
trifles." There is more wilfulnesse and wrangling among them, than pertains
to a sacred profession. But what person a man undertakes to act, he doth
ever therewithal! personate his owne. Allthough they say, that in vertue it
selfe, the last scope of our aime is voluptuousnes. It pleaseth me to
importune their eares still with this word, which so much offends their
hearing. And if it imply any chief pleasure or exceeding contentments, it is
rather due to the assistance of vertue, than to any other supply,
HOW TO DIE
Cicero saith, that to Philosophise is no other thing than for a man to prepare
himselfe to death: which is the reason that studie and contemplation doth in
some sort withdraw our soule from us, and severally employ it from the
body, which is a kind of apprentisage and resemblance of death; or else it is,
that all the wisdome and discourse of the world, doth in the end resolve
upon this point, to teach us not to feare to die. Truly either reason mockes
us, or it only aimeth at our contentment, and in fine, bends all her travell to
make us live well, and as the holy Scripture saith, "at our ease." All the
opinions of the world conclude, that pleasure is our end, howbeit they take
divers meanes unto and for it, else would men reject them at their first
comming. For, who would give eare unto him, that for it's end would
establish our paine and disturbance? The dissentions of philosophicall sects
in this case are verbal: Transcurramus solertissimas Hugos [Footnote:
Travails, labours.] "Let us run over such over-fine fooleries and subtill
trifles." There is more wilfulnesse and wrangling among them, than pertains
to a sacred profession. But what person a man undertakes to act, he doth
ever therewithal! personate his owne. Allthough they say, that in vertue it
selfe, the last scope of our aime is voluptuousnes. It pleaseth me to
importune their eares still with this word, which so much offends their
hearing. And if it imply any chief pleasure or exceeding contentments, it is
rather due to the assistance of vertue, than to any other supply,
Page 13
voluptuousnes being more strong, sinnowie, sturdie, and manly, is but more
seriously voluptuous. And we should give it the name of pleasure, more
favorable, sweeter, and more naturall; and not terme it vigor, from which it
hath his denomination. Should this baser sensuality deserve this faire name,
it should be by competencie, and not by privilege. I finde it lesse void of
incommodities and crosses than vertue. And besides that> her taste is more
fleeting, momentarie, and fading, she hath her fasts, her eyes, and her
travels, and both sweat and blood. Furthermore she hath particularly so
many wounding passions, and of so severall sorts, and so filthie and
loathsome a societie waiting upon her, that shee is equivalent to penitencie.
Wee are in the wrong, to thinke her incommodities serve her as a
provocation and seasoning to her sweetnes, as in nature one contrarie is
vivified by another contrarie: and to say, when we come to vertue, that like
successes and difficulties overwhelme it, and yeeld it austere and
inaccessible. Whereas much more properly then unto voluptuousnes, they
ennobled, sharpen, animate, and raise that divine and perfect pleasure,
which it meditates and procureth us. Truly he is verie unworthie her
acquaintance, that counter-ballanceth her cost to his fruit, and knowes
neither the graces nor use of it. Those who go about to instruct us, how her
pursuit is very hard and laborious, and her jovisance [Footnote: Enjoyment]
well-pleasing and delightfull: what else tell they us, but that shee is ever
unpleasant and irksome? For what humane meane [Footnote: Human
meana. man's life is subject, it is not with an equall care: as well because
accidents are not of such a necessitie, for most men passe their whole life
without feeling any want or povertie, and othersome without feeling any
griefe or sicknes, as Xenophilus the Musitian, who lived an hundred and six
yeares in perfect and continuall health: as also if the worst happen, death
may at all times, and whensoever it shall please us, cut off all other
inconveniences and crosses. But as for death, it is inevitable.] did ever
attaine unto an absolute enjoying of it? The perfectest have beene content
seriously voluptuous. And we should give it the name of pleasure, more
favorable, sweeter, and more naturall; and not terme it vigor, from which it
hath his denomination. Should this baser sensuality deserve this faire name,
it should be by competencie, and not by privilege. I finde it lesse void of
incommodities and crosses than vertue. And besides that> her taste is more
fleeting, momentarie, and fading, she hath her fasts, her eyes, and her
travels, and both sweat and blood. Furthermore she hath particularly so
many wounding passions, and of so severall sorts, and so filthie and
loathsome a societie waiting upon her, that shee is equivalent to penitencie.
Wee are in the wrong, to thinke her incommodities serve her as a
provocation and seasoning to her sweetnes, as in nature one contrarie is
vivified by another contrarie: and to say, when we come to vertue, that like
successes and difficulties overwhelme it, and yeeld it austere and
inaccessible. Whereas much more properly then unto voluptuousnes, they
ennobled, sharpen, animate, and raise that divine and perfect pleasure,
which it meditates and procureth us. Truly he is verie unworthie her
acquaintance, that counter-ballanceth her cost to his fruit, and knowes
neither the graces nor use of it. Those who go about to instruct us, how her
pursuit is very hard and laborious, and her jovisance [Footnote: Enjoyment]
well-pleasing and delightfull: what else tell they us, but that shee is ever
unpleasant and irksome? For what humane meane [Footnote: Human
meana. man's life is subject, it is not with an equall care: as well because
accidents are not of such a necessitie, for most men passe their whole life
without feeling any want or povertie, and othersome without feeling any
griefe or sicknes, as Xenophilus the Musitian, who lived an hundred and six
yeares in perfect and continuall health: as also if the worst happen, death
may at all times, and whensoever it shall please us, cut off all other
inconveniences and crosses. But as for death, it is inevitable.] did ever
attaine unto an absolute enjoying of it? The perfectest have beene content
Page 14
but to aspire and approach her, without ever possessing her. But they are
deceived; seeing that of all the pleasures we know, the pursute of them is
pleasant. The enterprise is perceived by the qualitie of the thing, which it
hath regard unto: for it is a good portion of the effect, and consubstantiall.
That happines and felicitie, which shineth in vertue, replenisheth her
approaches and appurtenances, even unto, the first entrance and utmost
barre. Now of all the benefits of vertue, the contempt of death is the
chiefest, a meane that furnisheth our life with an ease-full tranquillitie, and
gives us a pure and amiable taste of it: without which every other
voluptuousnes is extinguished. Loe, here the reasons why all rules
encounter and agree with this article. And albeit they all leade us with a
common accord to despise povertie, and other accidental! crosses, to which
Omnes eodem cogimur, omnium
Versatur urna, serius, ocius
Sors exitura, et nos in aeternum
Exilium impositura cymbae,
[Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. iii. 25.]
All to one place are driv'n, of all
Shak't is the lot-pot, where-hence shall
Sooner or later drawne lots fall,
And to deaths boat for aye enthrall.
And by consequence, if she makes us affeard, it is a continual subject of
torment, and which can no way be eased. There is no starting-hole will hide
us from her, she will finde us wheresoever we are, we may as in a suspected
countrie start and turne here and there: quae quasi saxum Tantalo semper
impendet.[Footnote: Cic. De Fin. I. i.] "Which evermore hangs like the
stone over the head of Tantalus:" Our lawes doe often condemne and send
malefactors to be executed in the same place where the crime was
deceived; seeing that of all the pleasures we know, the pursute of them is
pleasant. The enterprise is perceived by the qualitie of the thing, which it
hath regard unto: for it is a good portion of the effect, and consubstantiall.
That happines and felicitie, which shineth in vertue, replenisheth her
approaches and appurtenances, even unto, the first entrance and utmost
barre. Now of all the benefits of vertue, the contempt of death is the
chiefest, a meane that furnisheth our life with an ease-full tranquillitie, and
gives us a pure and amiable taste of it: without which every other
voluptuousnes is extinguished. Loe, here the reasons why all rules
encounter and agree with this article. And albeit they all leade us with a
common accord to despise povertie, and other accidental! crosses, to which
Omnes eodem cogimur, omnium
Versatur urna, serius, ocius
Sors exitura, et nos in aeternum
Exilium impositura cymbae,
[Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. iii. 25.]
All to one place are driv'n, of all
Shak't is the lot-pot, where-hence shall
Sooner or later drawne lots fall,
And to deaths boat for aye enthrall.
And by consequence, if she makes us affeard, it is a continual subject of
torment, and which can no way be eased. There is no starting-hole will hide
us from her, she will finde us wheresoever we are, we may as in a suspected
countrie start and turne here and there: quae quasi saxum Tantalo semper
impendet.[Footnote: Cic. De Fin. I. i.] "Which evermore hangs like the
stone over the head of Tantalus:" Our lawes doe often condemne and send
malefactors to be executed in the same place where the crime was
Page 15
committed: to which whilest they are going, leade them along the fairest
houses, or entertaine them with the best cheere you can,
non Siculae dapes Dulcem elaborabunt saporem:
Non avium, citharaeque cantus
Somnum reducent.
[Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. i, 12.]
Not all King Denys daintie fare,
Can pleasing taste for them prepare:
No song of birds, no musikes sound
Can lullabie to sleepe profound.
Doe you thinke they can take any pleasure in it? or be any thing
delighted? and that the finall intent of their voiage being still before their
eies, hath not altered and altogether distracted their taste from all these
commodities and allurements?
Audit iter, numeratque dies, spatioque viarum
Metitur vitam, torquetur peste futura.
[Footnote: Claud, in Ruff. 1. ii. 137]
He heares his journey, counts his daies, so measures he
His life by his waies length, vext with the ill shall be.
The end of our cariere is death, it is the necessarie object of our aime: if it
affright us, how is it possible we should step one foot further without an
ague? The remedie of the vulgar sort is, not to think on it. But from what
brutall stupiditie may so grosse a blindnesse come upon him? he must be
made to bridle his Asse by the taile,
houses, or entertaine them with the best cheere you can,
non Siculae dapes Dulcem elaborabunt saporem:
Non avium, citharaeque cantus
Somnum reducent.
[Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. i, 12.]
Not all King Denys daintie fare,
Can pleasing taste for them prepare:
No song of birds, no musikes sound
Can lullabie to sleepe profound.
Doe you thinke they can take any pleasure in it? or be any thing
delighted? and that the finall intent of their voiage being still before their
eies, hath not altered and altogether distracted their taste from all these
commodities and allurements?
Audit iter, numeratque dies, spatioque viarum
Metitur vitam, torquetur peste futura.
[Footnote: Claud, in Ruff. 1. ii. 137]
He heares his journey, counts his daies, so measures he
His life by his waies length, vext with the ill shall be.
The end of our cariere is death, it is the necessarie object of our aime: if it
affright us, how is it possible we should step one foot further without an
ague? The remedie of the vulgar sort is, not to think on it. But from what
brutall stupiditie may so grosse a blindnesse come upon him? he must be
made to bridle his Asse by the taile,
Page 16
Qiti capite ipse suo instituit vestigia retro.
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. iv. 474]
Who doth a course contrarie runne
With his head to his course begunne.
It is no marvell if he be so often taken tripping; some doe no sooner heare
the name of death spoken of, but they are afraid, yea the most part will
crosse themselves, as if they heard the Devill named. And because mention
is made of it in mens wils and testaments, I warrant you there is none will
set his hand to them, til the physitian hath given his last doome, and utterly
forsaken him. And God knowes, being then betweene such paine and feare,
with what sound judgment they endure him. For so much as this syllable
sounded so unpleasantly in their eares, and this voice seemed so ill boding
and unluckie, the Romans had learned to allay and dilate the same by a
Periphrasis. In liew of saying, he is dead, or he hath ended his daies, they
would say, he hath lived. So it be life, be it past or no, they are comforted:
from whom we have borrowed our phrases quondam, alias, or late such a
one. It may haply be, as the common saying is, the time we live is worth the
mony we pay for it. I was borne betweene eleven of the clocke and noone,
the last of Februarie 1533, according to our computation, the yeare
beginning the first of Januarie. It is but a fortnight since I was 39 yeares old.
I want at least as much more. If in the meane time I should trouble my
thoughts with a matter so farre from me, it were but folly. But what? we see
both young and old to leave their life after one selfe-same condition. No
man departs otherwise from it, than if he but now came to it, seeing there is
no man so crazed,[Footnote: Infirm] bedrell, [Footnote: Bedridden.] or
decrepit, so long as he remembers Methusalem, but thinkes he may yet live
twentie yeares. Moreover, seely [Footnote: Simple, weak.] creature as thou
art, who hath limited the end of thy daies? Happily thou presumest upon
physitians reports. Rather consider the effect and experience. By the
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. iv. 474]
Who doth a course contrarie runne
With his head to his course begunne.
It is no marvell if he be so often taken tripping; some doe no sooner heare
the name of death spoken of, but they are afraid, yea the most part will
crosse themselves, as if they heard the Devill named. And because mention
is made of it in mens wils and testaments, I warrant you there is none will
set his hand to them, til the physitian hath given his last doome, and utterly
forsaken him. And God knowes, being then betweene such paine and feare,
with what sound judgment they endure him. For so much as this syllable
sounded so unpleasantly in their eares, and this voice seemed so ill boding
and unluckie, the Romans had learned to allay and dilate the same by a
Periphrasis. In liew of saying, he is dead, or he hath ended his daies, they
would say, he hath lived. So it be life, be it past or no, they are comforted:
from whom we have borrowed our phrases quondam, alias, or late such a
one. It may haply be, as the common saying is, the time we live is worth the
mony we pay for it. I was borne betweene eleven of the clocke and noone,
the last of Februarie 1533, according to our computation, the yeare
beginning the first of Januarie. It is but a fortnight since I was 39 yeares old.
I want at least as much more. If in the meane time I should trouble my
thoughts with a matter so farre from me, it were but folly. But what? we see
both young and old to leave their life after one selfe-same condition. No
man departs otherwise from it, than if he but now came to it, seeing there is
no man so crazed,[Footnote: Infirm] bedrell, [Footnote: Bedridden.] or
decrepit, so long as he remembers Methusalem, but thinkes he may yet live
twentie yeares. Moreover, seely [Footnote: Simple, weak.] creature as thou
art, who hath limited the end of thy daies? Happily thou presumest upon
physitians reports. Rather consider the effect and experience. By the
Page 17
common course of things long since thou livest by extraordinarie favour.
Thou hast alreadie over-past the ordinarie tearmes of common life: And to
prove it, remember but thy acquaintances, and tell me how many more of
them have died before they came to thy age, than have either attained or
outgone the same: yea, and of those that through renoune have ennobled
their life, if thou but register them, I will lay a wager, I will finde more that
have died before they came to five and thirty years, than after. It is
consonant with reason and pietie, to take example by the humanity of Jesus
Christ, who ended his humane life at three and thirtie yeares. The greatest
man that ever was, being no more than a man, I meane Alexander the Great,
ended his dayes, and died also of that age. How many severall meanes and
waies hath death to surprise us!
Quid quisque vitet, nunquam homini satis
Cautum est in horas
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Od. xiii. 13.]
A man can never take good heed,
Hourely what he may shun and speed.
I omit to speak of agues and pleurisies; who would ever have imagined
that a Duke of Brittanie should have beene stifled to death in a throng of
people, as whilome was a neighbour of mine at Lyons, when Pope Clement
made his entrance there? Hast thou not seene one of our late Kings slaine in
the middest of his sports? and one of his ancestors die miserably by the
chocke [Footnote: Shock.] of an hog? Eschilus fore threatned by the fall of
an house, when he stood most upon his guard, strucken dead by the fall of a
tortoise shell, which fell out of the tallants of an eagle flying in the air? and
another choaked with the kernell of a grape? And an Emperour die by the
scratch of a combe, whilest he was combing his head? And Aemylius
Lepidus with hitting his foot against a doore-seele? And Aufidius with
Thou hast alreadie over-past the ordinarie tearmes of common life: And to
prove it, remember but thy acquaintances, and tell me how many more of
them have died before they came to thy age, than have either attained or
outgone the same: yea, and of those that through renoune have ennobled
their life, if thou but register them, I will lay a wager, I will finde more that
have died before they came to five and thirty years, than after. It is
consonant with reason and pietie, to take example by the humanity of Jesus
Christ, who ended his humane life at three and thirtie yeares. The greatest
man that ever was, being no more than a man, I meane Alexander the Great,
ended his dayes, and died also of that age. How many severall meanes and
waies hath death to surprise us!
Quid quisque vitet, nunquam homini satis
Cautum est in horas
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Od. xiii. 13.]
A man can never take good heed,
Hourely what he may shun and speed.
I omit to speak of agues and pleurisies; who would ever have imagined
that a Duke of Brittanie should have beene stifled to death in a throng of
people, as whilome was a neighbour of mine at Lyons, when Pope Clement
made his entrance there? Hast thou not seene one of our late Kings slaine in
the middest of his sports? and one of his ancestors die miserably by the
chocke [Footnote: Shock.] of an hog? Eschilus fore threatned by the fall of
an house, when he stood most upon his guard, strucken dead by the fall of a
tortoise shell, which fell out of the tallants of an eagle flying in the air? and
another choaked with the kernell of a grape? And an Emperour die by the
scratch of a combe, whilest he was combing his head? And Aemylius
Lepidus with hitting his foot against a doore-seele? And Aufidius with
Page 18
stumbling against the Consull-chamber doore as he was going in thereat?
And Cornelius Gallus, the Praetor, Tigillinus, Captaine of the Romane
watch, Lodowike, sonne of Guido Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua, end their
daies betweene womens thighs? And of a farre worse example Speusippus,
the Platonian philosopher, and one of our Popes? Poore Bebius a Judge,
whilest he demurreth the sute of a plaintife but for eight daies, be hold, his
last expired: And Caius Iulius a Physitian, whilest he was annointing the
eies of one of his patients, to have his owne sight closed for ever by death.
And if amongst these examples, I may adde one of a brother of mine, called
Captain Saint Martin, a man of three and twentie yeares of age, who had
alreadie given good testimonie of his worth and forward valour, playing at
tennis, received a blow with a ball, that hit him a little above the right eare,
without apparance of any contusion, bruse, or hurt, and never sitting or
resting upon it, died within six houres after of an apoplexie, which the blow
of the ball caused in him. These so frequent and ordinary examples,
hapning, and being still before our eies, how is it possible for man to forgo
or for get the remembrance of death? and why should it not continually
seeme unto us, that shee is still ready at hand to take us by the throat? What
matter is it, will you say unto me, how and in what manner it is, so long as a
man doe not trouble and vex himselfe therewith? I am of this opinion, that
howsoever a man may shrowd or hide himselfe from her dart, yea, were it
under an oxe-hide, I am not the man would shrinke backe: it sufficeth me to
live at my ease; and the best recreation I can have, that doe I ever take; in
other matters, as little vain glorious, and exemplare as you list.
—praetulerim delirus inersque videri,
Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant,
Quam sapere et ringi
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Episi. ii 126]
And Cornelius Gallus, the Praetor, Tigillinus, Captaine of the Romane
watch, Lodowike, sonne of Guido Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua, end their
daies betweene womens thighs? And of a farre worse example Speusippus,
the Platonian philosopher, and one of our Popes? Poore Bebius a Judge,
whilest he demurreth the sute of a plaintife but for eight daies, be hold, his
last expired: And Caius Iulius a Physitian, whilest he was annointing the
eies of one of his patients, to have his owne sight closed for ever by death.
And if amongst these examples, I may adde one of a brother of mine, called
Captain Saint Martin, a man of three and twentie yeares of age, who had
alreadie given good testimonie of his worth and forward valour, playing at
tennis, received a blow with a ball, that hit him a little above the right eare,
without apparance of any contusion, bruse, or hurt, and never sitting or
resting upon it, died within six houres after of an apoplexie, which the blow
of the ball caused in him. These so frequent and ordinary examples,
hapning, and being still before our eies, how is it possible for man to forgo
or for get the remembrance of death? and why should it not continually
seeme unto us, that shee is still ready at hand to take us by the throat? What
matter is it, will you say unto me, how and in what manner it is, so long as a
man doe not trouble and vex himselfe therewith? I am of this opinion, that
howsoever a man may shrowd or hide himselfe from her dart, yea, were it
under an oxe-hide, I am not the man would shrinke backe: it sufficeth me to
live at my ease; and the best recreation I can have, that doe I ever take; in
other matters, as little vain glorious, and exemplare as you list.
—praetulerim delirus inersque videri,
Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant,
Quam sapere et ringi
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Episi. ii 126]
Page 19
A dotard I had rather seeme, and dull,
Sooner my faults may please make me a gull,
Than to be wise, and beat my vexed scull.
But it is folly to thinke that way to come unto it. They come, they goe,
they trot, they daunce: but no speech of death. All that is good sport. But if
she be once come, and on a sudden and openly surprise, either them, their
wives, their children, or their friends, what torments, what out cries, what
rage, and what despaire doth then overwhelme them? saw you ever
anything so drooping, so changed, and so distracted? A man must looke to
it, and in better times fore-see it. And might that brutish carelessenesse
lodge in the minde of a man of understanding (which I find altogether
impossible) she sels us her ware at an overdeere rate: were she an enemie
by mans wit to be avoided, I would advise men to borrow the weapons of
cowardlinesse: but since it may not be, and that be you either a coward or a
runaway, an honest or valiant man, she overtakes you,
Nempe et fugacem persequitur virum,
Nec parcit imbellis juventae
Poplitibus, timidoque tergo.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. iii. Od. ii. 14.]
Shee persecutes the man that flies,
Shee spares not weake youth to surprise,
But on their hammes and backe turn'd plies.
And that no temper of cuirace [Footnote: Cuirass.] may shield or defend
you,
Ille licet ferro cauius se condat et aere,
Mors tamen inclusum protraket inde caput.
[Footnote: Propert. 1. iii. et xvii. 5]
Sooner my faults may please make me a gull,
Than to be wise, and beat my vexed scull.
But it is folly to thinke that way to come unto it. They come, they goe,
they trot, they daunce: but no speech of death. All that is good sport. But if
she be once come, and on a sudden and openly surprise, either them, their
wives, their children, or their friends, what torments, what out cries, what
rage, and what despaire doth then overwhelme them? saw you ever
anything so drooping, so changed, and so distracted? A man must looke to
it, and in better times fore-see it. And might that brutish carelessenesse
lodge in the minde of a man of understanding (which I find altogether
impossible) she sels us her ware at an overdeere rate: were she an enemie
by mans wit to be avoided, I would advise men to borrow the weapons of
cowardlinesse: but since it may not be, and that be you either a coward or a
runaway, an honest or valiant man, she overtakes you,
Nempe et fugacem persequitur virum,
Nec parcit imbellis juventae
Poplitibus, timidoque tergo.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. iii. Od. ii. 14.]
Shee persecutes the man that flies,
Shee spares not weake youth to surprise,
But on their hammes and backe turn'd plies.
And that no temper of cuirace [Footnote: Cuirass.] may shield or defend
you,
Ille licet ferro cauius se condat et aere,
Mors tamen inclusum protraket inde caput.
[Footnote: Propert. 1. iii. et xvii. 5]
Page 20
Though he with yron and brasse his head empale,
Yet death his head enclosed thence will hale.
Let us learne to stand, and combat her with a resolute minde. And being
to take the greatest advantage she hath upon us from her, let us take a cleane
contrary way from the common, let us remove her strangenesse from her,
let us converse, frequent, and acquaint our selves with her, let us have
nothing so much in minde as death, let us at all times and seasons, and in
the ugliest manner that may be, yea with all faces shapen and represent the
same unto our imagination. At the stumbling of a horse, at the fall of a
stone, at the least prick with a pinne, let us presently ruminate and say with
our selves, what if it were death it selfe? and thereupon let us take heart of
grace, and call our wits together to confront her. Amiddest our bankets,
feasts, and pleasures, let us ever have this restraint or object before us, that
is, the remembrance of our condition, and let not pleasure so much mislead
or transport us, that we altogether neglect or forget, how many waies, our
joyes, or our feastings, be subject unto death, and by how many hold-fasts
shee threatens us and them. So did the AEgyptians, who in the middest of
their banquetings, and in the full of their greatest cheere, caused the
anatomie [Footnote: Skeleton] of a dead man to be brought before them, as
a memorandum and warning to their guests.
Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum,
Grata superveniet; quae non sperabitur, hora?
[Footnote: Hor. 1. i. Epist. iv. 13.]
Thinke every day shines on thee as thy last,
Welcome it will come, whereof hope was past.
It is uncertaine where death looks for us; let us expect her everie where:
the premeditation of death, is a forethinking of libertie. He who hath
learned to die, hath unlearned to serve. There is no evill in life, for him that
Yet death his head enclosed thence will hale.
Let us learne to stand, and combat her with a resolute minde. And being
to take the greatest advantage she hath upon us from her, let us take a cleane
contrary way from the common, let us remove her strangenesse from her,
let us converse, frequent, and acquaint our selves with her, let us have
nothing so much in minde as death, let us at all times and seasons, and in
the ugliest manner that may be, yea with all faces shapen and represent the
same unto our imagination. At the stumbling of a horse, at the fall of a
stone, at the least prick with a pinne, let us presently ruminate and say with
our selves, what if it were death it selfe? and thereupon let us take heart of
grace, and call our wits together to confront her. Amiddest our bankets,
feasts, and pleasures, let us ever have this restraint or object before us, that
is, the remembrance of our condition, and let not pleasure so much mislead
or transport us, that we altogether neglect or forget, how many waies, our
joyes, or our feastings, be subject unto death, and by how many hold-fasts
shee threatens us and them. So did the AEgyptians, who in the middest of
their banquetings, and in the full of their greatest cheere, caused the
anatomie [Footnote: Skeleton] of a dead man to be brought before them, as
a memorandum and warning to their guests.
Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum,
Grata superveniet; quae non sperabitur, hora?
[Footnote: Hor. 1. i. Epist. iv. 13.]
Thinke every day shines on thee as thy last,
Welcome it will come, whereof hope was past.
It is uncertaine where death looks for us; let us expect her everie where:
the premeditation of death, is a forethinking of libertie. He who hath
learned to die, hath unlearned to serve. There is no evill in life, for him that
Page 21
hath well conceived, how the privation of life is no evill. To know how to
die, doth free us from all subjection and constraint. Paulus AEmilius
answered one, whom that miserable king of Macedon his prisoner sent to
entreat him he would not lead him in triumph, "Let him make that request
unto himselfe." Verily, if Nature afford not some helpe in all things, it is
very hard that art and industrie should goe farre before. Of my selfe, I am
not much given to melancholy, but rather to dreaming and sluggishness.
There is nothing wherewith I have ever more entertained my selfe, than
with the imaginations of death, yea in the most licentious times of my age.
Iucundum, cum atas florida ver ageret
[Footnote: Catul. Eleg. iv. 16.]
When my age flourishing
Did spend its pleasant spring.
Being amongst faire Ladies, and in earnest play, some have thought me
busied, or musing with my selfe, how to digest some jealousie, or
meditating on the uncertaintie of some conceived hope, when God he
knowes, I was entertaining my selfe with the remembrance of some one or
other, that but few daies before was taken with a burning fever, and of his
sodaine end, comming from such a feast or meeting where I was my selfe,
and with his head full of idle conceits, of lore, and merry glee; supposing
the same, either sickness or end, to be as neere me as him.
Iam fuerit, nec post, unquam revocare licebit.
[Footnote: Lucr. I. iii. 947.]
Now time would be, no more You can this time restore.
I did no more trouble my selfe or frowne at such conceit, [Idea.] than at
any other. It is impossible we should not apprehend or feele some motions
die, doth free us from all subjection and constraint. Paulus AEmilius
answered one, whom that miserable king of Macedon his prisoner sent to
entreat him he would not lead him in triumph, "Let him make that request
unto himselfe." Verily, if Nature afford not some helpe in all things, it is
very hard that art and industrie should goe farre before. Of my selfe, I am
not much given to melancholy, but rather to dreaming and sluggishness.
There is nothing wherewith I have ever more entertained my selfe, than
with the imaginations of death, yea in the most licentious times of my age.
Iucundum, cum atas florida ver ageret
[Footnote: Catul. Eleg. iv. 16.]
When my age flourishing
Did spend its pleasant spring.
Being amongst faire Ladies, and in earnest play, some have thought me
busied, or musing with my selfe, how to digest some jealousie, or
meditating on the uncertaintie of some conceived hope, when God he
knowes, I was entertaining my selfe with the remembrance of some one or
other, that but few daies before was taken with a burning fever, and of his
sodaine end, comming from such a feast or meeting where I was my selfe,
and with his head full of idle conceits, of lore, and merry glee; supposing
the same, either sickness or end, to be as neere me as him.
Iam fuerit, nec post, unquam revocare licebit.
[Footnote: Lucr. I. iii. 947.]
Now time would be, no more You can this time restore.
I did no more trouble my selfe or frowne at such conceit, [Idea.] than at
any other. It is impossible we should not apprehend or feele some motions
Page 22
or startings at such imaginations at the first, and comming sodainely upon
us; but doubtlesse, he that shall manage and meditate upon them with an
impartiall eye, they will assuredly, in tract [Course.] of time, become
familiar to him: Otherwise, for my part, I should be in continuall feare and
agonie; for no man did ever more distrust his life, nor make lesse account of
his continuance: Neither can health, which hitherto I have so long enjoied,
and which so seldome hath beene crazed, [Enfeebled.] lengthen my hopes,
nor any sicknesse shorten them of it. At every minute me thinkes I make an
escape. And I uncessantly record unto my selfe, that whatsoever may be
done another day, may be effected this day. Truly hazards and dangers doe
little or nothing approach us at our end: And if we consider, how many
more there remaine, besides this accident, which in number more than
millions seeme to threaten us, and hang over us; we shall find, that be we
sound or sicke, lustie or weake, at sea or at land, abroad or at home, fighting
or at rest, in the middest of a battell or, in our beds, she is ever alike neere
unto us. Nemo altero fragilior est, nemo in crastinum sui certior: "No man
is weaker then other; none surer of himselfe (to live) till to morrow."
Whatsoever I have to doe before death, all leasure to end the same seemeth
short unto me, yea were it but of one houre. Some body, not long since
turning over my writing tables, found by chance a memoriall of something I
would have done after my death: I told him (as indeed it was true), that
being but a mile from my house, and in perfect health and lustie, I had made
haste to write it, because I could not assure my self I should ever come
home in safety: As one that am ever hatching of mine owne thoughts, and
place them in my selfe: I am ever prepared about that which I may be: nor
can death (come when she please) put me in mind of any new thing. A man
should ever, as much as in him lieth, be ready booted to take his journey,
and above all things, looke he have then nothing to doe but with himselfe.
Quid brevi fortes jaculamur aevo
Multa:
us; but doubtlesse, he that shall manage and meditate upon them with an
impartiall eye, they will assuredly, in tract [Course.] of time, become
familiar to him: Otherwise, for my part, I should be in continuall feare and
agonie; for no man did ever more distrust his life, nor make lesse account of
his continuance: Neither can health, which hitherto I have so long enjoied,
and which so seldome hath beene crazed, [Enfeebled.] lengthen my hopes,
nor any sicknesse shorten them of it. At every minute me thinkes I make an
escape. And I uncessantly record unto my selfe, that whatsoever may be
done another day, may be effected this day. Truly hazards and dangers doe
little or nothing approach us at our end: And if we consider, how many
more there remaine, besides this accident, which in number more than
millions seeme to threaten us, and hang over us; we shall find, that be we
sound or sicke, lustie or weake, at sea or at land, abroad or at home, fighting
or at rest, in the middest of a battell or, in our beds, she is ever alike neere
unto us. Nemo altero fragilior est, nemo in crastinum sui certior: "No man
is weaker then other; none surer of himselfe (to live) till to morrow."
Whatsoever I have to doe before death, all leasure to end the same seemeth
short unto me, yea were it but of one houre. Some body, not long since
turning over my writing tables, found by chance a memoriall of something I
would have done after my death: I told him (as indeed it was true), that
being but a mile from my house, and in perfect health and lustie, I had made
haste to write it, because I could not assure my self I should ever come
home in safety: As one that am ever hatching of mine owne thoughts, and
place them in my selfe: I am ever prepared about that which I may be: nor
can death (come when she please) put me in mind of any new thing. A man
should ever, as much as in him lieth, be ready booted to take his journey,
and above all things, looke he have then nothing to doe but with himselfe.
Quid brevi fortes jaculamur aevo
Multa:
Page 23
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Od. Xiv]
To aime why are we ever bold,
At many things in so short hold?
For then we shall have worke sufficient, without any more accrease.
Some man complaineth more that death doth hinder him from the assured
course of an hoped for victorie, than of death it selfe; another cries out, he
should give place to her, before he have married his daughter, or directed
the course of his childrens bringing up; another bewaileth he must forgoe
his wives company; another moaneth the losse of his children, the chiefest
commodities of his being. I am now by meanes of the mercy of God in such
a taking, that without regret or grieving at any worldly matter, I am
prepared to dislodge, whensoever he shall please to call me: I am every
where free: my farewell is soone taken of all my friends, except of my selfe.
No man did ever pre pare himselfe to quit the world more simply and fully,
or more generally spake of all thoughts of it, than I am assured I shall doe.
The deadest deaths are the best.
—Miser, de miser (aiunt) omnia ademit.
Vna dies infesta mihi tot praemia vitae:
[Footnote: Luce. 1. iii. 941.]
O wretch, O wretch (friends cry), one day,
All joyes of life hath tane away:
And the builder,
—manent (saith he) opera interrupta, minaeque Murorum ingentes.
[Footnote: Virg. Aen. 1. iv. 88.]
To aime why are we ever bold,
At many things in so short hold?
For then we shall have worke sufficient, without any more accrease.
Some man complaineth more that death doth hinder him from the assured
course of an hoped for victorie, than of death it selfe; another cries out, he
should give place to her, before he have married his daughter, or directed
the course of his childrens bringing up; another bewaileth he must forgoe
his wives company; another moaneth the losse of his children, the chiefest
commodities of his being. I am now by meanes of the mercy of God in such
a taking, that without regret or grieving at any worldly matter, I am
prepared to dislodge, whensoever he shall please to call me: I am every
where free: my farewell is soone taken of all my friends, except of my selfe.
No man did ever pre pare himselfe to quit the world more simply and fully,
or more generally spake of all thoughts of it, than I am assured I shall doe.
The deadest deaths are the best.
—Miser, de miser (aiunt) omnia ademit.
Vna dies infesta mihi tot praemia vitae:
[Footnote: Luce. 1. iii. 941.]
O wretch, O wretch (friends cry), one day,
All joyes of life hath tane away:
And the builder,
—manent (saith he) opera interrupta, minaeque Murorum ingentes.
[Footnote: Virg. Aen. 1. iv. 88.]
Page 24
The workes unfinisht lie,
And walls that threatned hie.
A man should designe nothing so long afore-hand, or at least with such
an intent, as to passionate[Footnote: Long passionately.] himselfe to see the
end of it; we are all borne to be doing.
Cum moriar, medium solvar et inter opus
[Footnote: Ovid. Am. 1. ii. El. x. 36]
When dying I my selfe shall spend,
Ere halfe my businesse come to end.
I would have a man to be doing, and to prolong his lives offices as much
as lieth in him, and let death seize upon me whilest I am setting my cabiges,
carelesse of her dart, but more of my unperfect garden. I saw one die, who
being at his last gaspe, uncessantly complained against his destinie, and that
death should so unkindly cut him off in the middest of an historie which he
had in hand, and was now come to the fifteenth or sixteenth of our Kings.
Illud in his rebus non addunt, nec tibi earum,
Iam desiderium rerum super insidet uno.
[Footnote: Luce. 1. iii. 44.]
Friends adde not that in this case, now no more
Shalt thou desire, or want things wisht before.
A man should rid himselfe of these vulgar and hurtful humours. Even as
Churchyards were first place adjoyning unto churches, and in the most
frequented places of the City, to enure (as Lycurgus said) the common
people, women and children, not to be skared at the sight of a dead man,
And walls that threatned hie.
A man should designe nothing so long afore-hand, or at least with such
an intent, as to passionate[Footnote: Long passionately.] himselfe to see the
end of it; we are all borne to be doing.
Cum moriar, medium solvar et inter opus
[Footnote: Ovid. Am. 1. ii. El. x. 36]
When dying I my selfe shall spend,
Ere halfe my businesse come to end.
I would have a man to be doing, and to prolong his lives offices as much
as lieth in him, and let death seize upon me whilest I am setting my cabiges,
carelesse of her dart, but more of my unperfect garden. I saw one die, who
being at his last gaspe, uncessantly complained against his destinie, and that
death should so unkindly cut him off in the middest of an historie which he
had in hand, and was now come to the fifteenth or sixteenth of our Kings.
Illud in his rebus non addunt, nec tibi earum,
Iam desiderium rerum super insidet uno.
[Footnote: Luce. 1. iii. 44.]
Friends adde not that in this case, now no more
Shalt thou desire, or want things wisht before.
A man should rid himselfe of these vulgar and hurtful humours. Even as
Churchyards were first place adjoyning unto churches, and in the most
frequented places of the City, to enure (as Lycurgus said) the common
people, women and children, not to be skared at the sight of a dead man,
Page 25
and to the end that continuall spectacle of bones, sculs, tombes, graves and
burials, should forewarne us of our condition, and fatall end.
Quin etiam exhilarare viris convivia caede
Mos olim, et miscere epulis spectacula dira
Certantum ferro, saepe et super ipsa cadentum
Pocula, respersis non parco sanguine mensis.
[Footnote: Syl. 1. xi. 51]
Nay more, the manner was to welcome guests,
And with dire shewes of slaughter to mix feasts.
Of them that fought at sharpe, and with bords tainted
Of them with much bloud, who o'er full cups fainted.
And even as the AEgyptians after their feastings and carousings caused a
great image of death to be brought in and shewed to the guests and
bytanders, by one that cried aloud, "Drinke and be merry, for such shalt
thou be when thou art dead: "So have I learned this custome or lesson, to
have alwaies death, not only in my imagination, but continually in my
mouth. And there is nothing I desire more to be informed of than of the
death of men; that is to say, what words, what countenance, and what face
they shew at their death; and in reading of histories, which I so attentively
observe. It appeareth by the shuffling and hudling up[Footnote: Collecting]
of my examples, I affect[Footnote: Like] no subject so particularly as this.
Were I a composer of books, I would keepe a register, commented of the
divers deaths, which in teaching men to die, should after teach them to live.
Dicearcus made one of that title, but of another and lesse profitable end.
Some man will say to mee, the effect exceeds the thought so farre, that there
is no fence so sure, or cunning so certaine, but a man shall either lose or
forget if he come once to that point; let them say what they list: to
premeditate on it, giveth no doubt a great advantage: and it is nothing, at the
burials, should forewarne us of our condition, and fatall end.
Quin etiam exhilarare viris convivia caede
Mos olim, et miscere epulis spectacula dira
Certantum ferro, saepe et super ipsa cadentum
Pocula, respersis non parco sanguine mensis.
[Footnote: Syl. 1. xi. 51]
Nay more, the manner was to welcome guests,
And with dire shewes of slaughter to mix feasts.
Of them that fought at sharpe, and with bords tainted
Of them with much bloud, who o'er full cups fainted.
And even as the AEgyptians after their feastings and carousings caused a
great image of death to be brought in and shewed to the guests and
bytanders, by one that cried aloud, "Drinke and be merry, for such shalt
thou be when thou art dead: "So have I learned this custome or lesson, to
have alwaies death, not only in my imagination, but continually in my
mouth. And there is nothing I desire more to be informed of than of the
death of men; that is to say, what words, what countenance, and what face
they shew at their death; and in reading of histories, which I so attentively
observe. It appeareth by the shuffling and hudling up[Footnote: Collecting]
of my examples, I affect[Footnote: Like] no subject so particularly as this.
Were I a composer of books, I would keepe a register, commented of the
divers deaths, which in teaching men to die, should after teach them to live.
Dicearcus made one of that title, but of another and lesse profitable end.
Some man will say to mee, the effect exceeds the thought so farre, that there
is no fence so sure, or cunning so certaine, but a man shall either lose or
forget if he come once to that point; let them say what they list: to
premeditate on it, giveth no doubt a great advantage: and it is nothing, at the
Page 26
least, to goe so farre without dismay or alteration, or without an ague?
There belongs more to it: Nature her selfe lends her hand, and gives us
courage. If it be a short and violent death, wee have no leisure to feare it; if
otherwise, I perceive that according as I engage my selfe in sicknesse, I doe
naturally fall into some disdaine and contempt of life. I finde that I have
more adoe to digest this resolution, that I shall die when I am in health, than
I have when I am troubled with a fever: forsomuch as I have no more such
fast hold on the commodities of life, whereof I begin to lose the use and
pleasure, and view death in the face with a lesse undanted looke, which
makes me hope, that the further I goe from that, and the nearer I approach
to this, so much more easily doe I enter in composition for their exchange.
Even as I have tried in many other occurrences, which Caesar affirmed, that
often some things seeme greater, being farre from us, than if they bee neere
at hand: I have found that being in perfect health, I have much more beene
frighted with sicknesse, than when I have felt it. The jollitie wherein I live,
the pleasure and the strength make the other seeme so disproportionable
from that, that by imagination I amplifie these commodities by one moitie,
and apprehended them much more heavie and burthensome, than I feele
them when I have them upon my shoulders. The same I hope will happen to
me of death. Consider we by the ordinary mutations, and daily declinations
which we suffer, how Nature deprives us of the sight of our losse and
empairing; what hath an aged man left him of his youths vigor, and of his
forepast life?
Heu senibus vita portio quanta manet
[Footnote: Com. Gal. 1. i. 16.]
Alas to men in yeares how small
A part of life is left in all?
There belongs more to it: Nature her selfe lends her hand, and gives us
courage. If it be a short and violent death, wee have no leisure to feare it; if
otherwise, I perceive that according as I engage my selfe in sicknesse, I doe
naturally fall into some disdaine and contempt of life. I finde that I have
more adoe to digest this resolution, that I shall die when I am in health, than
I have when I am troubled with a fever: forsomuch as I have no more such
fast hold on the commodities of life, whereof I begin to lose the use and
pleasure, and view death in the face with a lesse undanted looke, which
makes me hope, that the further I goe from that, and the nearer I approach
to this, so much more easily doe I enter in composition for their exchange.
Even as I have tried in many other occurrences, which Caesar affirmed, that
often some things seeme greater, being farre from us, than if they bee neere
at hand: I have found that being in perfect health, I have much more beene
frighted with sicknesse, than when I have felt it. The jollitie wherein I live,
the pleasure and the strength make the other seeme so disproportionable
from that, that by imagination I amplifie these commodities by one moitie,
and apprehended them much more heavie and burthensome, than I feele
them when I have them upon my shoulders. The same I hope will happen to
me of death. Consider we by the ordinary mutations, and daily declinations
which we suffer, how Nature deprives us of the sight of our losse and
empairing; what hath an aged man left him of his youths vigor, and of his
forepast life?
Heu senibus vita portio quanta manet
[Footnote: Com. Gal. 1. i. 16.]
Alas to men in yeares how small
A part of life is left in all?
Page 27
Caesar, to a tired and crazed [Footnote: diseased] Souldier of his guard,
who in the open street came to him, to beg leave he might cause himselfe to
be put to death; viewing his decrepit behaviour, answered pleasantly:
"Doest thou thinke to be alive then?" Were man all at once to fall into it, I
doe not thinke we should be able to beare such a change, but being faire and
gently led on by her hand, in a slow, and as it were unperceived descent, by
little and little, and step by step, she roules us into that miserable state, and
day by day seekes to acquaint us with it. So that when youth failes in us, we
feele, nay we perceive no shaking or transchange at all in our selves: which
in essence and veritie is a harder death, than that of a languishing and
irkesome life, or that of age. Forsomuch as the leape from an ill being unto
a not being, is not so dangerous or steepie; as it is from a delightfull and
flourishing being unto a painfull and sorrowfull condition. A weake
bending, and faint stopping bodie hath lesse strength to beare and under goe
a heavie burden: So hath our soule. She must bee rouzed and raised against
the violence and force of this adversarie. For as it is impossible she should
take any rest whilest she feareth: whereof if she be assured (which is a thing
exceeding humane [Footnote: human] condition) she may boast that it is
impossible unquietnesse, torment, and feare, much lesse the least
displeasure should lodge in her.
Non vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida, neque Auster,
Dux inquieti turbidus Adria,
Nec fulminantis magna Jovis manus.
[Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. iii.]
No urging tyrants threatning face,
Where minde is found can it displace,
No troublous wind the rough seas Master,
Nor Joves great hand, the thunder-caster.
who in the open street came to him, to beg leave he might cause himselfe to
be put to death; viewing his decrepit behaviour, answered pleasantly:
"Doest thou thinke to be alive then?" Were man all at once to fall into it, I
doe not thinke we should be able to beare such a change, but being faire and
gently led on by her hand, in a slow, and as it were unperceived descent, by
little and little, and step by step, she roules us into that miserable state, and
day by day seekes to acquaint us with it. So that when youth failes in us, we
feele, nay we perceive no shaking or transchange at all in our selves: which
in essence and veritie is a harder death, than that of a languishing and
irkesome life, or that of age. Forsomuch as the leape from an ill being unto
a not being, is not so dangerous or steepie; as it is from a delightfull and
flourishing being unto a painfull and sorrowfull condition. A weake
bending, and faint stopping bodie hath lesse strength to beare and under goe
a heavie burden: So hath our soule. She must bee rouzed and raised against
the violence and force of this adversarie. For as it is impossible she should
take any rest whilest she feareth: whereof if she be assured (which is a thing
exceeding humane [Footnote: human] condition) she may boast that it is
impossible unquietnesse, torment, and feare, much lesse the least
displeasure should lodge in her.
Non vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida, neque Auster,
Dux inquieti turbidus Adria,
Nec fulminantis magna Jovis manus.
[Footnote: Hor. I. iii. Od. iii.]
No urging tyrants threatning face,
Where minde is found can it displace,
No troublous wind the rough seas Master,
Nor Joves great hand, the thunder-caster.
Page 28
She is made Mistris of her passions and concupiscence, Lady of
indulgence, of shame, of povertie, and of all for tunes injuries. Let him that
can, attaine to this advantage: Herein consists the true and soveraigne
liberty, that affords us meanes wherewith to jeast and make a scorne of
force and injustice, and to deride imprisonment, gives [Footnote: Gyves,
shackles] or fetters.
—in manicis, et
Compedibus, savo te sub custode tenebo.
Ipse Deus simui atque volam, me solvet: opinor
Hoc sentit, moriar. Mors ultima linea rerum est.
[Footnote: Hor. I. i. Ep. xvi. 76.]
In gyves and fetters I will hamper thee,
Under a Jayler that shall cruell be:
Yet, when I will, God me deliver shall,
He thinkes, I shall die: death is end of all.
Our religion hath had no surer humane foundation than the contempt of
life. Discourse of reason doth not only call and summon us unto it. For why
should we feare to lose a thing, which being lost, cannot be moaned? but
also, since we are threatened by so many kinds of death, there is no more
inconvenience to feare them all, than to endure one: what matter is it when
it commeth, since it is unavoidable? Socrates answered one that told him,
"The thirty tyrants have condemned thee to death." "And Nature them," said
he. What fondnesse is it to carke and care so much, at that instant and
passage from all exemption of paine and care? As our birth brought us the
birth of all things, so shall our death the end of all things. Therefore is it as
great follie to weepe, we shall not live a hundred yeeres hence, as to waile
we lived not a hundred yeeres agoe. "Death is the beginning of another
life." So wept we, and so much did it cost us to enter into this life; and so
indulgence, of shame, of povertie, and of all for tunes injuries. Let him that
can, attaine to this advantage: Herein consists the true and soveraigne
liberty, that affords us meanes wherewith to jeast and make a scorne of
force and injustice, and to deride imprisonment, gives [Footnote: Gyves,
shackles] or fetters.
—in manicis, et
Compedibus, savo te sub custode tenebo.
Ipse Deus simui atque volam, me solvet: opinor
Hoc sentit, moriar. Mors ultima linea rerum est.
[Footnote: Hor. I. i. Ep. xvi. 76.]
In gyves and fetters I will hamper thee,
Under a Jayler that shall cruell be:
Yet, when I will, God me deliver shall,
He thinkes, I shall die: death is end of all.
Our religion hath had no surer humane foundation than the contempt of
life. Discourse of reason doth not only call and summon us unto it. For why
should we feare to lose a thing, which being lost, cannot be moaned? but
also, since we are threatened by so many kinds of death, there is no more
inconvenience to feare them all, than to endure one: what matter is it when
it commeth, since it is unavoidable? Socrates answered one that told him,
"The thirty tyrants have condemned thee to death." "And Nature them," said
he. What fondnesse is it to carke and care so much, at that instant and
passage from all exemption of paine and care? As our birth brought us the
birth of all things, so shall our death the end of all things. Therefore is it as
great follie to weepe, we shall not live a hundred yeeres hence, as to waile
we lived not a hundred yeeres agoe. "Death is the beginning of another
life." So wept we, and so much did it cost us to enter into this life; and so
Page 29
did we spoile us of our ancient vaile in entring into it. Nothing can be
grievous that is but once. Is it reason so long to fear a thing of so short
time? Long life or short life is made all one by death. For long or short is
not in things that are no more. Aristotle saith, there are certaine little beasts
alongst the river Hyspanis, that live but one day; she which dies at 8
o'clocke in the morning, dies in her youth, and she that dies at 5 in the
afternoon, dies in her decrepitude, who of us doth not laugh, when we shall
see this short moment of continuance to be had in consideration of good or
ill fortune? The most and the least is ours, if we compare it with eternitie, or
equall it to the lasting of mountains, rivers, stars, and trees, or any other
living creature, is not lesse ridiculous. But nature compels us to it. Depart
(saith she) out of this world, even as you came into it. The same way you
came from death to life, returne without passion or amazement, from life to
death: your death is but a peece of the worlds order, and but a parcell of the
worlds life.
—inter se mortales mutua vivunt,
Et quasi cursores vitae lampada tradunt.
[Footnote: Lucret. ii. 74. 77.]
Mortall men live by mutuall entercourse:
And yeeld their life-torch, as men in a course.
Shal I not change this goodly contexture of things for you? It is the
condition of your creation: death is a part of yourselves: you flie from
yourselves. The being you enjoy is equally shared betweene life and death.
The first day of your birth doth as wel addresse you to die, as to live.
Prima quae vitam dedit, hora, carpsit.
[Footnote: Sen. Her. Sw. ckor. Iii.]
grievous that is but once. Is it reason so long to fear a thing of so short
time? Long life or short life is made all one by death. For long or short is
not in things that are no more. Aristotle saith, there are certaine little beasts
alongst the river Hyspanis, that live but one day; she which dies at 8
o'clocke in the morning, dies in her youth, and she that dies at 5 in the
afternoon, dies in her decrepitude, who of us doth not laugh, when we shall
see this short moment of continuance to be had in consideration of good or
ill fortune? The most and the least is ours, if we compare it with eternitie, or
equall it to the lasting of mountains, rivers, stars, and trees, or any other
living creature, is not lesse ridiculous. But nature compels us to it. Depart
(saith she) out of this world, even as you came into it. The same way you
came from death to life, returne without passion or amazement, from life to
death: your death is but a peece of the worlds order, and but a parcell of the
worlds life.
—inter se mortales mutua vivunt,
Et quasi cursores vitae lampada tradunt.
[Footnote: Lucret. ii. 74. 77.]
Mortall men live by mutuall entercourse:
And yeeld their life-torch, as men in a course.
Shal I not change this goodly contexture of things for you? It is the
condition of your creation: death is a part of yourselves: you flie from
yourselves. The being you enjoy is equally shared betweene life and death.
The first day of your birth doth as wel addresse you to die, as to live.
Prima quae vitam dedit, hora, carpsit.
[Footnote: Sen. Her. Sw. ckor. Iii.]
Page 30
The first houre, that to men
Gave life, strait, cropt it then.
Nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet:
[Footnote: Manil. At. l. iv]
As we are borne we die; the end
Doth of th' originall depend.
All the time you live, you steale it from death: it is at her charge. The
continuall worke of your life, is to contrive death: you are in death, during
the time you continue in life: for, you are after death, when you are no
longer living. Or if you had rather have it so, you are dead after life: but
during life, you are still dying: and death doth more rudely touch the dying
than the dead, and more lively and essentially. If you have profited by life,
you have also beene fed thereby, depart then satisfied.
Cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis?
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. iii. 982.]
Why like a full-fed guest,
Depart you not to rest?
If you have not knowne how to make use of it: if it were unprofitable to
you, what need you care to have lost it to what end would you enjoy it
longer?
—cur amplius addere quaeris Rursum quod pereat male, et
ingratum occidat omne? [Footnote: Lucret. 1. iii. 989.]
Why seeke you more to gaine, what must againe
All perish ill, and passe with griefe or paine?
Gave life, strait, cropt it then.
Nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet:
[Footnote: Manil. At. l. iv]
As we are borne we die; the end
Doth of th' originall depend.
All the time you live, you steale it from death: it is at her charge. The
continuall worke of your life, is to contrive death: you are in death, during
the time you continue in life: for, you are after death, when you are no
longer living. Or if you had rather have it so, you are dead after life: but
during life, you are still dying: and death doth more rudely touch the dying
than the dead, and more lively and essentially. If you have profited by life,
you have also beene fed thereby, depart then satisfied.
Cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis?
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. iii. 982.]
Why like a full-fed guest,
Depart you not to rest?
If you have not knowne how to make use of it: if it were unprofitable to
you, what need you care to have lost it to what end would you enjoy it
longer?
—cur amplius addere quaeris Rursum quod pereat male, et
ingratum occidat omne? [Footnote: Lucret. 1. iii. 989.]
Why seeke you more to gaine, what must againe
All perish ill, and passe with griefe or paine?
Page 31
Life in itselfe is neither good nor evill: it is the place of good or evill,
according as you prepare it for them. And if you have lived one day, you
have seene all: one day is equal to all other daies. There is no other light,
there is no other night. This Sunne, this Moone, these Starres, and this
disposition, is the very same which your forefathers enjoyed, and which
shall also entertaine your posteritie.
Non alium videre patres, aliumve nepotes
Aspicient.
[Footnote: Manil. i. 523.]
No other saw our Sires of old,
No other shall their sonnes behold.
And if the worst happen, the distribution and varietie of all the acts of my
comedie, is performed in one yeare. If you have observed the course of my
foure seasons; they containe the infancie, the youth, the viriltie, and the old
age of the world. He hath plaied his part: he knowes no other wilinesse
belonging to it, but to begin againe, it will ever be the same, and no other.
Versamur ibidem, atque insumus usque,
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. iii. 123.]
We still in one place turne about,
Still there we are, now in, now out.
Atque in se sua per vestigia volvitur annus.
[Footnote: Virg. Georg. 1. ii. 403.]
The yeare into it selfe is cast
By those same steps, that it hath past.
I am not purposed to devise you other new sports.
according as you prepare it for them. And if you have lived one day, you
have seene all: one day is equal to all other daies. There is no other light,
there is no other night. This Sunne, this Moone, these Starres, and this
disposition, is the very same which your forefathers enjoyed, and which
shall also entertaine your posteritie.
Non alium videre patres, aliumve nepotes
Aspicient.
[Footnote: Manil. i. 523.]
No other saw our Sires of old,
No other shall their sonnes behold.
And if the worst happen, the distribution and varietie of all the acts of my
comedie, is performed in one yeare. If you have observed the course of my
foure seasons; they containe the infancie, the youth, the viriltie, and the old
age of the world. He hath plaied his part: he knowes no other wilinesse
belonging to it, but to begin againe, it will ever be the same, and no other.
Versamur ibidem, atque insumus usque,
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. iii. 123.]
We still in one place turne about,
Still there we are, now in, now out.
Atque in se sua per vestigia volvitur annus.
[Footnote: Virg. Georg. 1. ii. 403.]
The yeare into it selfe is cast
By those same steps, that it hath past.
I am not purposed to devise you other new sports.
Page 32
Nam tibi praterea quod machiner, inveniamque
Quod placeat nihil est; eadem suni omnia semper.
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. ii. 978.]
Else nothing, that I can devise or frame,
Can please thee, for all things are still the same.
Make roome for others, as others have done for you. Equalitie is the
chiefe ground-worke of equitie, who can complaine to be comprehended
where all are contained? So may you live long enough, you shall never
diminish anything from the time you have to die: it is bootlesse; so long
shall you continue in that state which you feare, as if you had died, being in
your swathing-clothes, and when you were sucking.
—licet, quot vis, vivendo vincere secla.
Mors sterna tamen, nihilominus ilia manebit.
[Footnote: Ib. 1126.]
Though yeares you live, as many as you will,
Death is eternall, death remaineth still.
And I will so please you, that you shall have no discontent.
In vera nescis nullum fore morte alium te,
Qui possit vivus tibi te lugere peremptum,
Stansque jacentem.
[Footnote: Idt. 1. Iii. 9.]
Thou know'st not there shall be not other thou,
When thou art dead indeed, that can tell how
Alive to waile thee dying, Standing to waile thee lying.
Nor shall you wish for life, which you so much desire
Quod placeat nihil est; eadem suni omnia semper.
[Footnote: Lucret. 1. ii. 978.]
Else nothing, that I can devise or frame,
Can please thee, for all things are still the same.
Make roome for others, as others have done for you. Equalitie is the
chiefe ground-worke of equitie, who can complaine to be comprehended
where all are contained? So may you live long enough, you shall never
diminish anything from the time you have to die: it is bootlesse; so long
shall you continue in that state which you feare, as if you had died, being in
your swathing-clothes, and when you were sucking.
—licet, quot vis, vivendo vincere secla.
Mors sterna tamen, nihilominus ilia manebit.
[Footnote: Ib. 1126.]
Though yeares you live, as many as you will,
Death is eternall, death remaineth still.
And I will so please you, that you shall have no discontent.
In vera nescis nullum fore morte alium te,
Qui possit vivus tibi te lugere peremptum,
Stansque jacentem.
[Footnote: Idt. 1. Iii. 9.]
Thou know'st not there shall be not other thou,
When thou art dead indeed, that can tell how
Alive to waile thee dying, Standing to waile thee lying.
Nor shall you wish for life, which you so much desire
Page 33
Nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requirit,
[Footnote: ib. 963.]
Nec desiderium nostri nos afficit ullum.
[Footnote: Ib. 966.]
For then none for himselfe or life requires:
Nor are we of our selves affected with desires.
Death is lesse to be feared than nothing, if there were anything lesse than
nothing.
—multo mortem minus ad nos esse putandum,
Si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus.
[Footnote: Ib. 970.]
Death is much less to us, we ought esteeme,
If lesse may be, than what doth nothing seeme.
Nor alive, nor dead, it doth concern you nothing. Alive because you are:
Dead, because you are no more. Moreover, no man dies before his houre.
The time you leave behinde was no more yours than that which was before
your birth, and concerneth you no more.
Respice enim quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas
Temporis aeterni fuerit.
[Footnote: Ib. 1016.]
For marke, how all antiquitie foregone
Of all time ere we were, to us was none.
Wheresoever your life ended, there is it all. The profit of life consists not
in the space, but rather in the use. Some man hath lived long, that hath a
short life, Follow it whilst you have time. It consists not in number of
[Footnote: ib. 963.]
Nec desiderium nostri nos afficit ullum.
[Footnote: Ib. 966.]
For then none for himselfe or life requires:
Nor are we of our selves affected with desires.
Death is lesse to be feared than nothing, if there were anything lesse than
nothing.
—multo mortem minus ad nos esse putandum,
Si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus.
[Footnote: Ib. 970.]
Death is much less to us, we ought esteeme,
If lesse may be, than what doth nothing seeme.
Nor alive, nor dead, it doth concern you nothing. Alive because you are:
Dead, because you are no more. Moreover, no man dies before his houre.
The time you leave behinde was no more yours than that which was before
your birth, and concerneth you no more.
Respice enim quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas
Temporis aeterni fuerit.
[Footnote: Ib. 1016.]
For marke, how all antiquitie foregone
Of all time ere we were, to us was none.
Wheresoever your life ended, there is it all. The profit of life consists not
in the space, but rather in the use. Some man hath lived long, that hath a
short life, Follow it whilst you have time. It consists not in number of
Page 34
yeeres, but in your will, that you have lived long enough. Did you thinke
you should never come to the place, where you were still going? There is no
way but hath an end. And if company may solace you, doth not the whole
world walke the same path?
—Omnia te, vita perfuncta, sequentur.
[Footnote: Ib. 1012.]
Life past, all things at last
Shall follow thee as thou hast past.
Doe not all things move as you doe, or keepe your course? Is there any
thing grows not old together with yourselfe? A thousand men, a thousand
beasts, and a thousand other creatures die in the very instant that you die.
Nam nox nulla diem, neque noctem aurora sequuta est,
Que non audierit mistus vagitibus aegris
Ploratus, mortis comites et funeris atri.
[Footnote: Id. i. ii. 587.]
No night ensued day light; no morning followed night,
Which heard not moaning mixt with sick-mens groaning,
With deaths and funerals joyned was that moaning.
To what end recoile you from it, if you cannot goe backe. You have seene
many who have found good in death, ending thereby many many miseries.
But have you seene any that hath received hurt thereby? Therefore it is
meere simplicitie to condemne a thing you never approve, neither by
yourselfe nor any other. Why doest thou complaine of me and of destinie?
Doe we offer thee any wrong? is it for thee to direct us, or for us to governe
thee? Although thy age be not come to her period, thy life is. A little man is
a whole man as well as a great man. Neither men nor their lives are
you should never come to the place, where you were still going? There is no
way but hath an end. And if company may solace you, doth not the whole
world walke the same path?
—Omnia te, vita perfuncta, sequentur.
[Footnote: Ib. 1012.]
Life past, all things at last
Shall follow thee as thou hast past.
Doe not all things move as you doe, or keepe your course? Is there any
thing grows not old together with yourselfe? A thousand men, a thousand
beasts, and a thousand other creatures die in the very instant that you die.
Nam nox nulla diem, neque noctem aurora sequuta est,
Que non audierit mistus vagitibus aegris
Ploratus, mortis comites et funeris atri.
[Footnote: Id. i. ii. 587.]
No night ensued day light; no morning followed night,
Which heard not moaning mixt with sick-mens groaning,
With deaths and funerals joyned was that moaning.
To what end recoile you from it, if you cannot goe backe. You have seene
many who have found good in death, ending thereby many many miseries.
But have you seene any that hath received hurt thereby? Therefore it is
meere simplicitie to condemne a thing you never approve, neither by
yourselfe nor any other. Why doest thou complaine of me and of destinie?
Doe we offer thee any wrong? is it for thee to direct us, or for us to governe
thee? Although thy age be not come to her period, thy life is. A little man is
a whole man as well as a great man. Neither men nor their lives are
Page 35
measured by the Ell. Chiron refused immortalitie, being informed of the
conditions thereof, even by the God of time and of continuance, Saturne his
father. Imagine truly how much an ever-during life would be lesse tolerable
and more painfull to a man, than is the life which I have given him. Had
you not death you would then uncessantly curse, and cry out against me,
that I had deprived you of it. I have of purpose and unwittingly blended
some bitternesse amongst it, that so seeing the commoditie of its use, I
might hinder you from over- greedily embracing, or indiscreetly calling for
it. To continue in this moderation that is, neither to fly from life nor to run
to death (which I require of you) I have tempered both the one and other
betweene sweetnes and sowrenes. I first taught Thales, the chiefest of your
Sages and Wisemen, that to live and die were indifferent, which made him
answer one very wisely, who asked him wherefore he died not: "Because,"
said he, "it is indifferent. The water, the earth, the aire, the fire, and other
members of this my universe, are no more the instruments of thy life than of
thy death. Why fearest thou thy last day? He is no more guiltie, and
conferreth no more to thy death, than any of the others. It is not the last step
that causeth weariness: it only declares it. All daies march towards death,
only the last comes to it." Behold heere the good precepts of our universall
mother Nature. I have oftentimes bethought my self whence it proceedeth,
that in times of warre, the visage of death (whether wee see it in us or in
others) seemeth without all comparison much lesse dreadful and terrible
unto us, than in our houses, or in our beds, otherwise it should be an armie
of Physitians and whiners, and she ever being one, there must needs bee
much more assurance amongst countrie-people and of base condition, than
in others. I verily believe, these fearefull lookes, and astonishing
countenances wherewith we encompass it, are those that more amaze and
terrifie us than death: a new forme of life; the out cries of mothers; the
wailing of women and children; the visitation of dismaid and swouning
friends; the assistance of a number of pale-looking, distracted, and whining
conditions thereof, even by the God of time and of continuance, Saturne his
father. Imagine truly how much an ever-during life would be lesse tolerable
and more painfull to a man, than is the life which I have given him. Had
you not death you would then uncessantly curse, and cry out against me,
that I had deprived you of it. I have of purpose and unwittingly blended
some bitternesse amongst it, that so seeing the commoditie of its use, I
might hinder you from over- greedily embracing, or indiscreetly calling for
it. To continue in this moderation that is, neither to fly from life nor to run
to death (which I require of you) I have tempered both the one and other
betweene sweetnes and sowrenes. I first taught Thales, the chiefest of your
Sages and Wisemen, that to live and die were indifferent, which made him
answer one very wisely, who asked him wherefore he died not: "Because,"
said he, "it is indifferent. The water, the earth, the aire, the fire, and other
members of this my universe, are no more the instruments of thy life than of
thy death. Why fearest thou thy last day? He is no more guiltie, and
conferreth no more to thy death, than any of the others. It is not the last step
that causeth weariness: it only declares it. All daies march towards death,
only the last comes to it." Behold heere the good precepts of our universall
mother Nature. I have oftentimes bethought my self whence it proceedeth,
that in times of warre, the visage of death (whether wee see it in us or in
others) seemeth without all comparison much lesse dreadful and terrible
unto us, than in our houses, or in our beds, otherwise it should be an armie
of Physitians and whiners, and she ever being one, there must needs bee
much more assurance amongst countrie-people and of base condition, than
in others. I verily believe, these fearefull lookes, and astonishing
countenances wherewith we encompass it, are those that more amaze and
terrifie us than death: a new forme of life; the out cries of mothers; the
wailing of women and children; the visitation of dismaid and swouning
friends; the assistance of a number of pale-looking, distracted, and whining
Page 36
servants; a darke chamber; tapers burning round about; our couch beset
round with Physitians and Preachers; and to conclude, nothing but horror
and astonishment on every side of us: are wee not already dead and buried?
The very children are afraid of their friends, when they see them masked;
and so are we. The maske must as well be taken from things as from men,
which being removed, we shall find nothing hid under it, but the very same
death, that a seely[Footnote: weak, simple] varlet, or a simple maid-servant,
did latterly suffer without amazement or feare. Happie is that death which
takes all leasure from the preparations of such an equipage.
round with Physitians and Preachers; and to conclude, nothing but horror
and astonishment on every side of us: are wee not already dead and buried?
The very children are afraid of their friends, when they see them masked;
and so are we. The maske must as well be taken from things as from men,
which being removed, we shall find nothing hid under it, but the very same
death, that a seely[Footnote: weak, simple] varlet, or a simple maid-servant,
did latterly suffer without amazement or feare. Happie is that death which
takes all leasure from the preparations of such an equipage.
Page 37
OF THE INSTITUTION AND EDUCATION OF
CHILDREN; TO THE LADIE DIANA OF FOIX,
COUNTESSE OF GURSON
I never knew father, how crooked and deformed soever his sonne were, that
would either altogether cast him off, or not acknowledge him for his owne:
and yet (unlesse he be meerely besotted or blinded in his affection) it may
not be said, but he plainly perceiveth his defects, and hath a feeling of his
imperfections. But so it is, he is his owne. So it is in my selfe. I see better
than any man else, that what I have set downe is nought but the fond
imaginations of him who in his youth hath tasted nothing but the paring,
and seen but the superficies of true learning: whereof he hath retained but a
generall and shapelesse forme: a smacke of every thing in generall, but
nothing to the purpose in particular: After the French manner. To be short, I
know there is an art of Phisicke; a course of lawes; foure parts of the
Mathematikes; and I am not altogether ignorant what they tend unto. And
perhaps I also know the scope and drift of Sciences in generall to be for the
service of our life. But to wade further, or that ever I tired my selfe with
plodding upon Aristotle (the Monarch of our moderne doctrine 1) or
obstinately continued in search of any one science: I confesse I never did it.
Nor is there any one art whereof I am able so much as to draw the first
lineaments. And there is no scholler (be he of the lowest forme) that may
not repute himselfe wiser than I, who am not able to oppose him in his first
lesson: and if I be forced to it, I am constrained verie impertinently to draw
CHILDREN; TO THE LADIE DIANA OF FOIX,
COUNTESSE OF GURSON
I never knew father, how crooked and deformed soever his sonne were, that
would either altogether cast him off, or not acknowledge him for his owne:
and yet (unlesse he be meerely besotted or blinded in his affection) it may
not be said, but he plainly perceiveth his defects, and hath a feeling of his
imperfections. But so it is, he is his owne. So it is in my selfe. I see better
than any man else, that what I have set downe is nought but the fond
imaginations of him who in his youth hath tasted nothing but the paring,
and seen but the superficies of true learning: whereof he hath retained but a
generall and shapelesse forme: a smacke of every thing in generall, but
nothing to the purpose in particular: After the French manner. To be short, I
know there is an art of Phisicke; a course of lawes; foure parts of the
Mathematikes; and I am not altogether ignorant what they tend unto. And
perhaps I also know the scope and drift of Sciences in generall to be for the
service of our life. But to wade further, or that ever I tired my selfe with
plodding upon Aristotle (the Monarch of our moderne doctrine 1) or
obstinately continued in search of any one science: I confesse I never did it.
Nor is there any one art whereof I am able so much as to draw the first
lineaments. And there is no scholler (be he of the lowest forme) that may
not repute himselfe wiser than I, who am not able to oppose him in his first
lesson: and if I be forced to it, I am constrained verie impertinently to draw
Page 38
in matter from some generall discourse, whereby I examine, and give a
guesse at his naturall judgement: a lesson as much unknowne to them as
theirs is to me. I have not dealt or had commerce with any excellent booke,
except Plutarke or Seneca, from whom (as the Danaides) I draw my water,
uncessantly filling, and as fast emptying: some thing whereof I fasten to this
paper, but to my selfe nothing at all. And touching bookes: Historie is my
chiefe studie, Poesie my only delight, to which I am particularly affected:
for as Cleanthes said, that as the voice being forciblie pent in the narrow
gullet of a trumpet, at last issueth forth more strong and shriller, so me
seemes, that a sentence cunningly and closely couched in measure keeping
Posie, darts it selfe forth more furiously, and wounds me even to the quicke.
And concerning the naturall faculties that are in me (whereof behold here
an essay), I perceive them to faint under their owne burthen; my conceits,
[Footnote: Ideas.] and my judgement march but uncertaine, and as it were
groping, staggering, and stumbling at every rush: And when I have gone as
far as I can, I have no whit pleased my selfe: for the further I saile the more
land I descrie, and that so dimmed with fogges, and overcast with clouds,
that my sight is so weakned, I cannot distinguish the same. And then
undertaking to speake indifferently of all that presents it selfe unto my
fantasie, and having nothing but mine owne naturall meanes to imploy
therein, if it be my hap (as commonly it is) among good Authors, to light
upon those verie places which I have undertaken to treat off, as even now I
did in Plutarke reading his discourse of the power of imagination, wherein
in regard of those wise men, I acknowledge my selfe so weake and so
poore, so dull and grose-headed, as I am forced both to pittie and disdaine
my selfe, yet am I pleased with this, that my opinions have often the grace
to jump with theirs, and that I follow them a loofe-off, [Footnote: At a
distance.] and thereby possesse at least, that which all other men have not;
which is, that I know the utmost difference betweene them and my selfe: all
which notwithstanding, I suffer my inventions to run abroad, as weake and
guesse at his naturall judgement: a lesson as much unknowne to them as
theirs is to me. I have not dealt or had commerce with any excellent booke,
except Plutarke or Seneca, from whom (as the Danaides) I draw my water,
uncessantly filling, and as fast emptying: some thing whereof I fasten to this
paper, but to my selfe nothing at all. And touching bookes: Historie is my
chiefe studie, Poesie my only delight, to which I am particularly affected:
for as Cleanthes said, that as the voice being forciblie pent in the narrow
gullet of a trumpet, at last issueth forth more strong and shriller, so me
seemes, that a sentence cunningly and closely couched in measure keeping
Posie, darts it selfe forth more furiously, and wounds me even to the quicke.
And concerning the naturall faculties that are in me (whereof behold here
an essay), I perceive them to faint under their owne burthen; my conceits,
[Footnote: Ideas.] and my judgement march but uncertaine, and as it were
groping, staggering, and stumbling at every rush: And when I have gone as
far as I can, I have no whit pleased my selfe: for the further I saile the more
land I descrie, and that so dimmed with fogges, and overcast with clouds,
that my sight is so weakned, I cannot distinguish the same. And then
undertaking to speake indifferently of all that presents it selfe unto my
fantasie, and having nothing but mine owne naturall meanes to imploy
therein, if it be my hap (as commonly it is) among good Authors, to light
upon those verie places which I have undertaken to treat off, as even now I
did in Plutarke reading his discourse of the power of imagination, wherein
in regard of those wise men, I acknowledge my selfe so weake and so
poore, so dull and grose-headed, as I am forced both to pittie and disdaine
my selfe, yet am I pleased with this, that my opinions have often the grace
to jump with theirs, and that I follow them a loofe-off, [Footnote: At a
distance.] and thereby possesse at least, that which all other men have not;
which is, that I know the utmost difference betweene them and my selfe: all
which notwithstanding, I suffer my inventions to run abroad, as weake and
Page 39
faint as I have produced them, without bungling and botching the faults
which this comparison hath discovered to me in them. A man had need have
a strong backe, to undertake to march foot to foot with these kind of men.
The indiscreet writers of our age, amidst their triviall [Footnote:
Commonplace.] compositions, intermingle and wrest in whole sentences
taken from ancient Authors, supposing by such filching-theft to purchase
honour and reputation to themselves, doe cleane contrarie. For, this infinite
varietie and dissemblance of lustres, makes a face so wan, so il-favored, and
so uglie, in respect of theirs, that they lose much more than gaine thereby.
These were two contrarie humours: The Philosopher Chrisippus was wont
to foist-in amongst his bookes, not only whole sentences and other long-
long discourses, but whole bookes of other Authors, as in one, he brought in
Euripides his Medea. And Apollodorus was wont to say of him, that if one
should draw from out his bookes what he had stolne from others, his paper
would remaine blanke. Whereas Epicurus cleane contrarie to him in three
hundred volumes he left behind him, had not made use of one allegation.
[Footnote: Citation.] It was my fortune not long since to light upon such a
place: I had languishingly traced after some French words, so naked and
shallow, and so void either of sense or matter, that at last I found them to be
nought but meere French words; and after a tedious and wearisome travell, I
chanced to stumble upon an high, rich, and even to the clouds-raised piece,
the descent whereof had it been somewhat more pleasant or easie, or the
ascent reaching a little further, it had been excusable, and to be borne with-
all; but it was such a steepie downe-fall, and by meere strength hewen out
of the maine rocke, that by reading of the first six words, me thought I was
carried into another world: whereby I perceive the bottome whence I came
to be so low and deep, as I durst never more adventure to go through it; for,
if I did stuffe any one of my discourses with those rich spoiles, it would
manifestly cause the sottishnesse [Footnote: Foolishness.] of others to
appeare. To reprove mine owne faults in others, seemes to me no more
which this comparison hath discovered to me in them. A man had need have
a strong backe, to undertake to march foot to foot with these kind of men.
The indiscreet writers of our age, amidst their triviall [Footnote:
Commonplace.] compositions, intermingle and wrest in whole sentences
taken from ancient Authors, supposing by such filching-theft to purchase
honour and reputation to themselves, doe cleane contrarie. For, this infinite
varietie and dissemblance of lustres, makes a face so wan, so il-favored, and
so uglie, in respect of theirs, that they lose much more than gaine thereby.
These were two contrarie humours: The Philosopher Chrisippus was wont
to foist-in amongst his bookes, not only whole sentences and other long-
long discourses, but whole bookes of other Authors, as in one, he brought in
Euripides his Medea. And Apollodorus was wont to say of him, that if one
should draw from out his bookes what he had stolne from others, his paper
would remaine blanke. Whereas Epicurus cleane contrarie to him in three
hundred volumes he left behind him, had not made use of one allegation.
[Footnote: Citation.] It was my fortune not long since to light upon such a
place: I had languishingly traced after some French words, so naked and
shallow, and so void either of sense or matter, that at last I found them to be
nought but meere French words; and after a tedious and wearisome travell, I
chanced to stumble upon an high, rich, and even to the clouds-raised piece,
the descent whereof had it been somewhat more pleasant or easie, or the
ascent reaching a little further, it had been excusable, and to be borne with-
all; but it was such a steepie downe-fall, and by meere strength hewen out
of the maine rocke, that by reading of the first six words, me thought I was
carried into another world: whereby I perceive the bottome whence I came
to be so low and deep, as I durst never more adventure to go through it; for,
if I did stuffe any one of my discourses with those rich spoiles, it would
manifestly cause the sottishnesse [Footnote: Foolishness.] of others to
appeare. To reprove mine owne faults in others, seemes to me no more
Page 40
unsufferable than to reprehend (as I doe often) those of others in my selfe.
They ought to be accused every where, and have all places of Sanctuarie
taken from them: yet do I know how over boldly, at all times I adventure to
equall my selfe unto my filchings, and to march hand in hand with them;
not without a fond hardie hope, that I may perhaps be able to bleare the
eyes of the Judges from discerning them. But it is as much for the benefit of
my application, as for the good of mine invention and force. And I doe not
furiously front, and bodie to bodie wrestle with those old champions: it is
but by flights, advantages, and false offers I seek to come within them, and
if I can, to give them a fall. I do not rashly take them about the necke, I doe
but touch them, nor doe I go so far as by my bargaine I would seeme to doe;
could I but keepe even with them, I should then be an honest man; for I
seeke not to venture on them, but where they are strongest. To doe as I have
seen some, that is, to shroud themselves under other armes, not daring so
much as to show their fingers ends unarmed, and to botch up all their works
(as it is an easie matter in a common subject, namely for the wiser sort)
with ancient inventions, here and there hudled up together. And in those
who endeavoured to hide what they have filched from others, and make it
their owne, it is first a manifest note of injustice, then a plaine argument of
cowardlinesse; who having nothing of any worth in themselves to make
show of, will yet under the countenance of others sufficiencie goe about to
make a faire offer: Moreover (oh great foolishnesse) to seek by such
cosening [Footnote: Cheating.] tricks to forestall the ignorant approbation
of the common sort, nothing fearing to discover their ignorance to men of
understanding (whose praise only is of value) who will soone trace out such
borrowed ware. As for me, there is nothing I will doe lesse. I never speake
of others, but that I may the more speake of my selfe. This concerneth not
those mingle-mangles of many kinds of stuffe, or as the Grecians call them
Rapsodies, that for such are published, of which kind I have (since I came
to yeares of discretion) seen divers most ingenious and wittie; amongst
They ought to be accused every where, and have all places of Sanctuarie
taken from them: yet do I know how over boldly, at all times I adventure to
equall my selfe unto my filchings, and to march hand in hand with them;
not without a fond hardie hope, that I may perhaps be able to bleare the
eyes of the Judges from discerning them. But it is as much for the benefit of
my application, as for the good of mine invention and force. And I doe not
furiously front, and bodie to bodie wrestle with those old champions: it is
but by flights, advantages, and false offers I seek to come within them, and
if I can, to give them a fall. I do not rashly take them about the necke, I doe
but touch them, nor doe I go so far as by my bargaine I would seeme to doe;
could I but keepe even with them, I should then be an honest man; for I
seeke not to venture on them, but where they are strongest. To doe as I have
seen some, that is, to shroud themselves under other armes, not daring so
much as to show their fingers ends unarmed, and to botch up all their works
(as it is an easie matter in a common subject, namely for the wiser sort)
with ancient inventions, here and there hudled up together. And in those
who endeavoured to hide what they have filched from others, and make it
their owne, it is first a manifest note of injustice, then a plaine argument of
cowardlinesse; who having nothing of any worth in themselves to make
show of, will yet under the countenance of others sufficiencie goe about to
make a faire offer: Moreover (oh great foolishnesse) to seek by such
cosening [Footnote: Cheating.] tricks to forestall the ignorant approbation
of the common sort, nothing fearing to discover their ignorance to men of
understanding (whose praise only is of value) who will soone trace out such
borrowed ware. As for me, there is nothing I will doe lesse. I never speake
of others, but that I may the more speake of my selfe. This concerneth not
those mingle-mangles of many kinds of stuffe, or as the Grecians call them
Rapsodies, that for such are published, of which kind I have (since I came
to yeares of discretion) seen divers most ingenious and wittie; amongst
Page 41
others, one under the name of Capilupus; besides many of the ancient
stampe. These are wits of such excellence, as both here and elsewhere they
will soone be perceived, as our late famous writer Lipsius, in his learned
and laborious work of the Politikes: yet whatsoever come of it, for so much
as they are but follies, my intent is not to smother them, no more than a bald
and hoarie picture of mine, where a Painter hath drawne not a perfect
visage, but mine owne. For, howsoever, these are but my humors and
opinions, and I deliver them but to show what my conceit [Footnote:
notion] is, and not what ought to be beleeved. Wherein I ayme at nothing
but to display my selfe, who peradventure (if a new prentiship change me)
shall be another to morrow. I have no authoritie to purchase beliefe, neither
do I desire it; knowing well that I am not sufficiently taught to instruct
others. Some having read my precedent Chapter [Footnote: "Of
Pedantism"], told me not long since in mine owne house, I should
somewhat more have extended my selfe in the discourse concerning the
institution of children. Now (Madam) if there were any sufficiencie in me
touching that subject, I could not better employ the same than to bestow it
as a present upon that little lad, which ere long threatneth to make a happie
issue from out your honorable woombe; for (Madame) you are too generous
to begin with other than a man childe. And having had so great a part in the
conduct of your successeful marriage, I may challenge some right and
interest in the greatnesse and prosperitie of all that shall proceed from it:
moreover, the ancient and rightfull possession, which you from time to time
have ever had, and still have over my service, urgeth me with more than
ordinarie respects, to wish all honour, well-fare and advantage to
whatsoever may in any sort concerne you and yours. And truly, my meaning
is but to show that the greatest difficultie, and importing all humane
knowledge, seemeth to be in this point, where the nurture and institution of
young children is in question. For, as in matters of husbandrie, the labor that
must be used before sowing, setting, and planting, yea in planting itselfe, is
stampe. These are wits of such excellence, as both here and elsewhere they
will soone be perceived, as our late famous writer Lipsius, in his learned
and laborious work of the Politikes: yet whatsoever come of it, for so much
as they are but follies, my intent is not to smother them, no more than a bald
and hoarie picture of mine, where a Painter hath drawne not a perfect
visage, but mine owne. For, howsoever, these are but my humors and
opinions, and I deliver them but to show what my conceit [Footnote:
notion] is, and not what ought to be beleeved. Wherein I ayme at nothing
but to display my selfe, who peradventure (if a new prentiship change me)
shall be another to morrow. I have no authoritie to purchase beliefe, neither
do I desire it; knowing well that I am not sufficiently taught to instruct
others. Some having read my precedent Chapter [Footnote: "Of
Pedantism"], told me not long since in mine owne house, I should
somewhat more have extended my selfe in the discourse concerning the
institution of children. Now (Madam) if there were any sufficiencie in me
touching that subject, I could not better employ the same than to bestow it
as a present upon that little lad, which ere long threatneth to make a happie
issue from out your honorable woombe; for (Madame) you are too generous
to begin with other than a man childe. And having had so great a part in the
conduct of your successeful marriage, I may challenge some right and
interest in the greatnesse and prosperitie of all that shall proceed from it:
moreover, the ancient and rightfull possession, which you from time to time
have ever had, and still have over my service, urgeth me with more than
ordinarie respects, to wish all honour, well-fare and advantage to
whatsoever may in any sort concerne you and yours. And truly, my meaning
is but to show that the greatest difficultie, and importing all humane
knowledge, seemeth to be in this point, where the nurture and institution of
young children is in question. For, as in matters of husbandrie, the labor that
must be used before sowing, setting, and planting, yea in planting itselfe, is
Page 42
most certaine and easie. But when that which was sowen, set and planted,
commeth to take life; before it come to ripenesse, much adoe, and great
varietie of proceeding belongeth to it. So in men, it is no great matter to get
them, but being borne, what continuall cares, what diligent attendance, what
doubts and feares, doe daily wait to their parents and tutors, before they can
be nurtured and brought to any good? The fore-shew of their inclination
whilest they are young is so uncertaine, their humours so variable, their
promises so changing, their hopes so false, and their proceedings so
doubtful, that it is very hard (yea for the wisest) to ground any certaine
judgment, or assured successe upon them. Behold Cymon, view
Themistocles, and a thousand others, how they have differed, and fallen to
better from themselves, and deceive the expectation of such as knowe them.
The young whelps both of Dogges and Beares at first sight shew their
naturall disposition, but men headlong embracing this custome or fashion,
following that humor or opinion, admitting this or that passion, allowing of
that or this law, are easily changed, and soone disguised; yet it is hard to
force the naturall propension or readinesse of the mind, whereby it
followeth, that for want of heedie fore-sight in those that could not guide
their course well, they often employ much time in vaine, to addresse young
children in those matters whereunto they are not naturally addicted. All
which difficulties notwithstanding, mine opinion is, to bring them up in the
best and profitablest studies, and that a man should slightly passe over those
fond presages, and deceiving prognostikes, which we over precisely gather
in their infancie. And (without offence be it said) me thinks that Plato in his
"Commonwealth" allowed them too- too much authoritie.
Madame, Learning joyned with true knowledge is an especiall and
gracefull ornament, and an implement of wonderful use and consequence,
namely, in persons raised to that degree of fortune wherein you are. And in
good truth, learning hath not her owne true forme, nor can she make shew
of her beauteous lineaments, if she fall into the hands of base and vile
commeth to take life; before it come to ripenesse, much adoe, and great
varietie of proceeding belongeth to it. So in men, it is no great matter to get
them, but being borne, what continuall cares, what diligent attendance, what
doubts and feares, doe daily wait to their parents and tutors, before they can
be nurtured and brought to any good? The fore-shew of their inclination
whilest they are young is so uncertaine, their humours so variable, their
promises so changing, their hopes so false, and their proceedings so
doubtful, that it is very hard (yea for the wisest) to ground any certaine
judgment, or assured successe upon them. Behold Cymon, view
Themistocles, and a thousand others, how they have differed, and fallen to
better from themselves, and deceive the expectation of such as knowe them.
The young whelps both of Dogges and Beares at first sight shew their
naturall disposition, but men headlong embracing this custome or fashion,
following that humor or opinion, admitting this or that passion, allowing of
that or this law, are easily changed, and soone disguised; yet it is hard to
force the naturall propension or readinesse of the mind, whereby it
followeth, that for want of heedie fore-sight in those that could not guide
their course well, they often employ much time in vaine, to addresse young
children in those matters whereunto they are not naturally addicted. All
which difficulties notwithstanding, mine opinion is, to bring them up in the
best and profitablest studies, and that a man should slightly passe over those
fond presages, and deceiving prognostikes, which we over precisely gather
in their infancie. And (without offence be it said) me thinks that Plato in his
"Commonwealth" allowed them too- too much authoritie.
Madame, Learning joyned with true knowledge is an especiall and
gracefull ornament, and an implement of wonderful use and consequence,
namely, in persons raised to that degree of fortune wherein you are. And in
good truth, learning hath not her owne true forme, nor can she make shew
of her beauteous lineaments, if she fall into the hands of base and vile
Page 43
persons. [For, as famous Torquato Tasso saith: "Philosophie being a rich
and noble Queene, and knowing her owne worth, graciously smileth upon
and lovingly embraceth Princes and noble men, if they become suiters to
her, admitting them as her minions, and gently affoording them all the
favours she can; whereas upon the contrarie, if she be wooed, and sued unto
by clownes, mechanicall fellowes, and such base kind of people, she holds
herselfe disparaged and disgraced, as holding no proportion with them. And
therefore see we by experience, that if a true Gentleman or nobleman follow
her with any attention, and woo her with importunitie, he shall learne and
know more of her, and prove a better scholler in one yeare, than an ungentle
or base fellow shall in seven, though he pursue her never so attentively."]
She is much more readie and fierce to lend her furtherance and direction in
the conduct of a warre, to attempt honourable actions, to command a
people, to treat a peace with a prince of forraine nation, than she is to forme
an argument in Logick, to devise a Syllogisme, to canvase a case at the
barre, or to prescribe a receit of pills. So (noble Ladie) forsomuch as I
cannot perswade myselfe, that you will either forget or neglect this point,
concerning the institution of yours, especially having tasted the sweetnesse
thereof, and being descended of so noble and learned a race. For we yet
possesse the learned compositions of the ancient and noble Earles of Foix,
from out whose heroicke loynes your husband and you take your of-spring.
And Francis Lord of Candale, your worthie uncle, doth daily bring forth
such fruits thereof, as the knowledge of the matchlesse qualitie of your
house shall hereafter extend itselfe to many ages; I will therefore make you
acquainted with one conceit of mine, which contrarie to the common use I
hold, and that is all I am able to affoord you concerning that matter. The
charge of the Tutor, which you shall appoint your sonne, in the choice of
whom consisteth the whole substance of his education and bringing up; on
which are many branches depending, which (forasmuch as I can adde
nothing of any moment to it) I will not touch at all. And for that point,
and noble Queene, and knowing her owne worth, graciously smileth upon
and lovingly embraceth Princes and noble men, if they become suiters to
her, admitting them as her minions, and gently affoording them all the
favours she can; whereas upon the contrarie, if she be wooed, and sued unto
by clownes, mechanicall fellowes, and such base kind of people, she holds
herselfe disparaged and disgraced, as holding no proportion with them. And
therefore see we by experience, that if a true Gentleman or nobleman follow
her with any attention, and woo her with importunitie, he shall learne and
know more of her, and prove a better scholler in one yeare, than an ungentle
or base fellow shall in seven, though he pursue her never so attentively."]
She is much more readie and fierce to lend her furtherance and direction in
the conduct of a warre, to attempt honourable actions, to command a
people, to treat a peace with a prince of forraine nation, than she is to forme
an argument in Logick, to devise a Syllogisme, to canvase a case at the
barre, or to prescribe a receit of pills. So (noble Ladie) forsomuch as I
cannot perswade myselfe, that you will either forget or neglect this point,
concerning the institution of yours, especially having tasted the sweetnesse
thereof, and being descended of so noble and learned a race. For we yet
possesse the learned compositions of the ancient and noble Earles of Foix,
from out whose heroicke loynes your husband and you take your of-spring.
And Francis Lord of Candale, your worthie uncle, doth daily bring forth
such fruits thereof, as the knowledge of the matchlesse qualitie of your
house shall hereafter extend itselfe to many ages; I will therefore make you
acquainted with one conceit of mine, which contrarie to the common use I
hold, and that is all I am able to affoord you concerning that matter. The
charge of the Tutor, which you shall appoint your sonne, in the choice of
whom consisteth the whole substance of his education and bringing up; on
which are many branches depending, which (forasmuch as I can adde
nothing of any moment to it) I will not touch at all. And for that point,
Page 44
wherein I presume to advise him, he may so far forth give credit unto it, as
he shall see just cause. To a gentleman borne of noble parentage, and heire
of a house that aymeth at true learning, and in it would be disciplined, not
so much for gane or commoditie to himselfe (because so abject an end is far
unworthie the grace and favour of the Muses, and besides, hath a regard or
dependencie of others) nor for externall shew and ornament, but to adorne
and enrich his inward minde, desiring rather to shape and institute an able
and sufficient man, than a bare learned man; my desire is therefore, that the
parents or overseers of such a gentleman be very circumspect, and careful
in chusing his director, whom I would rather commend for having a well
composed and temperate braine, than a full stuft head, yet both will doe
well. And I would rather prefer wisdome, judgement, civill customes, and
modest behaviour, than bare and meere literall learning; and that in his
charge he hold a new course. Some never cease brawling in their schollers
eares (as if they were still pouring in a tonell) to follow their booke, yet is
their charge nothing else but to repeat what hath beene told them before. I
would have a tutor to correct this part, and that at first entrance, according
to the capacitie of the wit he hath in hand, he should begin to make shew of
it, making him to have a smacke of all things, and how to choose and
distinguish them, without helpe of others, sometimes opening him the way,
other times leaving him to open it by himselfe. I would not have him to
invent and speake alone, but suffer his disciple to speake when his turne
commeth. Socrates, and after him Arcesilaus, made their schollers to speake
first, and then would speake themselves. Obest plerumque iis qui discere
volunt, auctoritas eorum qui docent: [Footnote: CIC. De Nat. 1. i] "Most
commonly the authoritie of them that teach, hinders them that would
learne."
It is therefore meet that he make him first trot-on before him, whereby he
may the better judge of his pace, and so guesse how long he will hold out,
that accordingly he may fit his strength; for want of which proportion we
he shall see just cause. To a gentleman borne of noble parentage, and heire
of a house that aymeth at true learning, and in it would be disciplined, not
so much for gane or commoditie to himselfe (because so abject an end is far
unworthie the grace and favour of the Muses, and besides, hath a regard or
dependencie of others) nor for externall shew and ornament, but to adorne
and enrich his inward minde, desiring rather to shape and institute an able
and sufficient man, than a bare learned man; my desire is therefore, that the
parents or overseers of such a gentleman be very circumspect, and careful
in chusing his director, whom I would rather commend for having a well
composed and temperate braine, than a full stuft head, yet both will doe
well. And I would rather prefer wisdome, judgement, civill customes, and
modest behaviour, than bare and meere literall learning; and that in his
charge he hold a new course. Some never cease brawling in their schollers
eares (as if they were still pouring in a tonell) to follow their booke, yet is
their charge nothing else but to repeat what hath beene told them before. I
would have a tutor to correct this part, and that at first entrance, according
to the capacitie of the wit he hath in hand, he should begin to make shew of
it, making him to have a smacke of all things, and how to choose and
distinguish them, without helpe of others, sometimes opening him the way,
other times leaving him to open it by himselfe. I would not have him to
invent and speake alone, but suffer his disciple to speake when his turne
commeth. Socrates, and after him Arcesilaus, made their schollers to speake
first, and then would speake themselves. Obest plerumque iis qui discere
volunt, auctoritas eorum qui docent: [Footnote: CIC. De Nat. 1. i] "Most
commonly the authoritie of them that teach, hinders them that would
learne."
It is therefore meet that he make him first trot-on before him, whereby he
may the better judge of his pace, and so guesse how long he will hold out,
that accordingly he may fit his strength; for want of which proportion we
Page 45
often marre all. And to know how to make a good choice, and how far forth
one may proceed (still keeping a due measure), is one of the hardest labours
I know. It is a signe of a noble, and effect of an undanted spirit, to know
how to second, and how far forth he shall condescend to his childish
proceedings, and how to guide them. As for myselfe, I can better and with
more strength walke up than downe a hill. Those which, according to our
common fashion, undertake with one selfe-same lesson, and like maner of
education, to direct many spirits of divers formes and different humours, it
is no marvell if among a multitude of children, they scarce meet with two or
three that reap any good fruit by their discipline, or that come to any
perfection. I would not only have him to demand an accompt of the words
contained in his lesson, but of the sense and substance thereof, and judge of
the profit he hath made of it, not by the testimonie of his memorie, but by
the witnesse of his life. That what he lately learned, he cause him to set
forth and pourtray the same into sundrie shapes, and then to accommodate it
to as many different and severall subjects, whereby he shal perceive,
whether he have yet apprehended the same, and therein enfeoffed himselfe,
[Footnote: Taken possession.] at due times taking his instruction from the
institution given by Plato. It is a signe of cruditie and indigestion for a man
to yeeld up his meat, even as he swallowed the same; the stomacke hath not
wrought his full operation, unlesse it have changed forme, and altered
fashion of that which was given him to boyle and concoct.
[Wee see men gape after no reputation but learning, and when they say,
such a one is a learned man, they thinke they have said enough;] Our minde
doth move at others pleasure, and tyed and forced to serve the fantasies of
others, being brought under by authoritie, and forced to stoope to the lure of
their bare lesson; wee have beene so subjected to harpe upon one string,
that we have no way left us to descant upon voluntarie; our vigor and
libertie is cleane extinct. Nunquam tutelae suae fiunt: "They never come to
their owne tuition." It was my hap to bee familiarlie acquainted with an
one may proceed (still keeping a due measure), is one of the hardest labours
I know. It is a signe of a noble, and effect of an undanted spirit, to know
how to second, and how far forth he shall condescend to his childish
proceedings, and how to guide them. As for myselfe, I can better and with
more strength walke up than downe a hill. Those which, according to our
common fashion, undertake with one selfe-same lesson, and like maner of
education, to direct many spirits of divers formes and different humours, it
is no marvell if among a multitude of children, they scarce meet with two or
three that reap any good fruit by their discipline, or that come to any
perfection. I would not only have him to demand an accompt of the words
contained in his lesson, but of the sense and substance thereof, and judge of
the profit he hath made of it, not by the testimonie of his memorie, but by
the witnesse of his life. That what he lately learned, he cause him to set
forth and pourtray the same into sundrie shapes, and then to accommodate it
to as many different and severall subjects, whereby he shal perceive,
whether he have yet apprehended the same, and therein enfeoffed himselfe,
[Footnote: Taken possession.] at due times taking his instruction from the
institution given by Plato. It is a signe of cruditie and indigestion for a man
to yeeld up his meat, even as he swallowed the same; the stomacke hath not
wrought his full operation, unlesse it have changed forme, and altered
fashion of that which was given him to boyle and concoct.
[Wee see men gape after no reputation but learning, and when they say,
such a one is a learned man, they thinke they have said enough;] Our minde
doth move at others pleasure, and tyed and forced to serve the fantasies of
others, being brought under by authoritie, and forced to stoope to the lure of
their bare lesson; wee have beene so subjected to harpe upon one string,
that we have no way left us to descant upon voluntarie; our vigor and
libertie is cleane extinct. Nunquam tutelae suae fiunt: "They never come to
their owne tuition." It was my hap to bee familiarlie acquainted with an
Page 46
honest man at Pisa, but such an Aristotelian, as he held this infallible
position; that a conformitie to Aristotles doctrine was the true touchstone
and squire [Footnote: Square.] of all solid imaginations and perfect veritie;
for, whatsoever had no coherencie with it, was but fond Chimeraes and idle
humors; inasmuch as he had knowne all, seene all, and said all. This
proposition of his being somewhat over amply and injuriously interpreted
by some, made him a long time after to be troubled in the inquisition of
Rome. I would have him make his scholler narrowly to sift all things with
discretion, and harbour nothing in his head by mere authoritie, or upon
trust. Aristotles principles shall be no more axiomes unto him, than the
Stoikes or Epicurians. Let this diversitie of judgements be proposed unto
him, if he can, he shall be able to distinguish the truth from falsehood, if
not, he will remaine doubtful.
Che non men che saper dubbiar m'aggrata.
[Footnote: DANTE, Inferno, cant. xi. 93.]
No lesse it pleaseth me,
To doubt, than wise to be.
For if by his owne discourse he embrace the opinions of Xenophon or of
Plato, they shall be no longer theirs, but his. He that meerely followeth
another, traceth nothing, and seeketh nothing: Non sumus sub Rege, sibi
quisque se vindicet: [Footnote: SEN. Epist. xxxiii.] "We are not under a
Kings command, every one may challenge himselfe, for let him at least
know that he knoweth." It is requisite he endevour as much to feed himselfe
with their conceits, as labour to learne their precepts; which, so he know
how to applie, let him hardily forget, where or whence he had them. Truth
and reason are common to all, and are no more proper unto him that spake
them heretofore, then unto him that shall speake them hereafter. And it is no
more according to Platoes opinion than to mine, since both he and I
position; that a conformitie to Aristotles doctrine was the true touchstone
and squire [Footnote: Square.] of all solid imaginations and perfect veritie;
for, whatsoever had no coherencie with it, was but fond Chimeraes and idle
humors; inasmuch as he had knowne all, seene all, and said all. This
proposition of his being somewhat over amply and injuriously interpreted
by some, made him a long time after to be troubled in the inquisition of
Rome. I would have him make his scholler narrowly to sift all things with
discretion, and harbour nothing in his head by mere authoritie, or upon
trust. Aristotles principles shall be no more axiomes unto him, than the
Stoikes or Epicurians. Let this diversitie of judgements be proposed unto
him, if he can, he shall be able to distinguish the truth from falsehood, if
not, he will remaine doubtful.
Che non men che saper dubbiar m'aggrata.
[Footnote: DANTE, Inferno, cant. xi. 93.]
No lesse it pleaseth me,
To doubt, than wise to be.
For if by his owne discourse he embrace the opinions of Xenophon or of
Plato, they shall be no longer theirs, but his. He that meerely followeth
another, traceth nothing, and seeketh nothing: Non sumus sub Rege, sibi
quisque se vindicet: [Footnote: SEN. Epist. xxxiii.] "We are not under a
Kings command, every one may challenge himselfe, for let him at least
know that he knoweth." It is requisite he endevour as much to feed himselfe
with their conceits, as labour to learne their precepts; which, so he know
how to applie, let him hardily forget, where or whence he had them. Truth
and reason are common to all, and are no more proper unto him that spake
them heretofore, then unto him that shall speake them hereafter. And it is no
more according to Platoes opinion than to mine, since both he and I
Page 47
understand and see alike. The Bees do here and there sucke this and cull
that flower, but afterward they produce the hony, which is peculiarly their
owne, then is it no more Thyme or Majoram. So of peeces borrowed of
others, he may lawfully alter, transforme, and confound them, to shape out
of them a perfect peece of worke, altogether his owne; alwaies provided his
judgement, his travell, [Footnote: Travail, labor.] studie, and institution tend
to nothing, but to frame the same perfect. Let him hardily conceale where or
whence he hath had any helpe, and make no shew of anything, but of that
which he hath made himselfe. Pirates, pilchers, and borrowers, make a shew
of their purchases and buildings, but not of that which they have taken from
others: you see not the secret fees or bribes Lawyers take of their Clients,
but you shall manifestly discover the alliances they make, the honours they
get for their children, and the goodly houses they build. No man makes
open shew of his receits, but every one of his gettings. The good that comes
of studie (or at least should come) is to prove better, wiser and honester. It
is the understanding power (said Epicharmus) that seeth and heareth, it is it
that profiteth all and disposeth all, that moveth, swayeth, and ruleth all: all
things else are but blind, senselesse, and without spirit. And truly in barring
him of libertie to doe any thing of himselfe, we make him thereby more
servile and more coward. Who would ever enquire of his scholler what he
thinketh of Rhetorike, of Grammar, of this or of that sentence of Cicero?
Which things thoroughly fethered (as if they were oracles) are let flie into
our memorie; in which both letters and syllables are substantiall parts of the
subject. To know by roat is no perfect knowledge, but to keep what one hath
committed to his memories charge, is commendable: what a man directly
knoweth, that will he dispose of, without turning still to his booke or
looking to his pattern. A meere bookish sufficiencie is unpleasant. All I
expect of it is an imbellishing of my actions, and not a foundation of them,
according to Platoes mind, who saith, constancie, faith, and sinceritie are
true Philosophie; as for other Sciences, and tending elsewhere, they are but
that flower, but afterward they produce the hony, which is peculiarly their
owne, then is it no more Thyme or Majoram. So of peeces borrowed of
others, he may lawfully alter, transforme, and confound them, to shape out
of them a perfect peece of worke, altogether his owne; alwaies provided his
judgement, his travell, [Footnote: Travail, labor.] studie, and institution tend
to nothing, but to frame the same perfect. Let him hardily conceale where or
whence he hath had any helpe, and make no shew of anything, but of that
which he hath made himselfe. Pirates, pilchers, and borrowers, make a shew
of their purchases and buildings, but not of that which they have taken from
others: you see not the secret fees or bribes Lawyers take of their Clients,
but you shall manifestly discover the alliances they make, the honours they
get for their children, and the goodly houses they build. No man makes
open shew of his receits, but every one of his gettings. The good that comes
of studie (or at least should come) is to prove better, wiser and honester. It
is the understanding power (said Epicharmus) that seeth and heareth, it is it
that profiteth all and disposeth all, that moveth, swayeth, and ruleth all: all
things else are but blind, senselesse, and without spirit. And truly in barring
him of libertie to doe any thing of himselfe, we make him thereby more
servile and more coward. Who would ever enquire of his scholler what he
thinketh of Rhetorike, of Grammar, of this or of that sentence of Cicero?
Which things thoroughly fethered (as if they were oracles) are let flie into
our memorie; in which both letters and syllables are substantiall parts of the
subject. To know by roat is no perfect knowledge, but to keep what one hath
committed to his memories charge, is commendable: what a man directly
knoweth, that will he dispose of, without turning still to his booke or
looking to his pattern. A meere bookish sufficiencie is unpleasant. All I
expect of it is an imbellishing of my actions, and not a foundation of them,
according to Platoes mind, who saith, constancie, faith, and sinceritie are
true Philosophie; as for other Sciences, and tending elsewhere, they are but
Page 48
garish paintings. I would faine have Paluel or Pompey, those two excellent
dauncers of our time, with all their nimblenesse, teach any man to doe their
loftie tricks and high capers, only with seeing them done, and without
stirring out of his place, as some Pedanticall fellowes would instruct our
minds without moving or putting it in practice. And glad would I be to find
one that would teach us how to manage a horse, to tosse a pike, to shoot-off
a peece, to play upon the lute, or to warble with the voice, without any
exercise, as these kind of men would teach us to judge, and how to speake
well, without any exercise of speaking or judging. In which kind of life, or
as I may terme it, Prentiship, what action or object soever presents itselfe
into our eies, may serve us in stead of a sufficient booke. A prettie pranke of
a boy, a knavish tricke of a page, a foolish part of a lackey, an idle tale or
any discourse else, spoken either in jest or earnest, at the table or in
companie, are even as new subjects for us to worke upon: for furtherance
whereof, commerce or common societie among men, visiting of forraine
countries, and observing of strange fashions, are verie necessary, not only to
be able (after the manner of our yong gallants of France) to report how
many paces the Church of Santa Rotonda is in length or breadth, or what
rich garments the curtezan Signora Livia weareth, and the worth of her
hosen; or as some do, nicely to dispute how much longer or broader the face
of Nero is, which they have seene in some old ruines of Italie, than that
which is made for him in other old monuments else-where. But they should
principally observe, and be able to make certaine relation of the humours
and fashions of those countries they have seene, that they may the better
know how to correct and prepare their wits by those of others. I would
therefore have him begin even from his infancie to travell abroad; and first,
that at one shoot he may hit two markes he should see neighbour- countries,
namely where languages are most different from ours; for, unlesse a mans
tongue be fashioned unto them in his youth, he shall never attaine to the
true pronunciation of them if he once grow in yeares. Moreover, we see it
dauncers of our time, with all their nimblenesse, teach any man to doe their
loftie tricks and high capers, only with seeing them done, and without
stirring out of his place, as some Pedanticall fellowes would instruct our
minds without moving or putting it in practice. And glad would I be to find
one that would teach us how to manage a horse, to tosse a pike, to shoot-off
a peece, to play upon the lute, or to warble with the voice, without any
exercise, as these kind of men would teach us to judge, and how to speake
well, without any exercise of speaking or judging. In which kind of life, or
as I may terme it, Prentiship, what action or object soever presents itselfe
into our eies, may serve us in stead of a sufficient booke. A prettie pranke of
a boy, a knavish tricke of a page, a foolish part of a lackey, an idle tale or
any discourse else, spoken either in jest or earnest, at the table or in
companie, are even as new subjects for us to worke upon: for furtherance
whereof, commerce or common societie among men, visiting of forraine
countries, and observing of strange fashions, are verie necessary, not only to
be able (after the manner of our yong gallants of France) to report how
many paces the Church of Santa Rotonda is in length or breadth, or what
rich garments the curtezan Signora Livia weareth, and the worth of her
hosen; or as some do, nicely to dispute how much longer or broader the face
of Nero is, which they have seene in some old ruines of Italie, than that
which is made for him in other old monuments else-where. But they should
principally observe, and be able to make certaine relation of the humours
and fashions of those countries they have seene, that they may the better
know how to correct and prepare their wits by those of others. I would
therefore have him begin even from his infancie to travell abroad; and first,
that at one shoot he may hit two markes he should see neighbour- countries,
namely where languages are most different from ours; for, unlesse a mans
tongue be fashioned unto them in his youth, he shall never attaine to the
true pronunciation of them if he once grow in yeares. Moreover, we see it
Page 49
received as a common opinion of the wiser sort, that it agreeth not with
reason, that a childe be alwaies nuzzled, cockered, dandled, and brought up
in his parents lap or sight; forsomuch as their naturall kindnesse, or (as I
may call it) tender fondnesse, causeth often, even the wisest to prove so
idle, so over-nice, and so base-minded. For parents are not capable, neither
can they find in their hearts to see them checkt, corrected, or chastised, nor
indure to see them brought up so meanly, and so far from daintinesse, and
many times so dangerously, as they must needs be. And it would grieve
them to see their children come home from those exercises, that a
Gentleman must necessarily acquaint himselfe with, sometimes all wet and
bemyred, other times sweatie and full of dust, and to drinke being either
extreme hot or exceeding cold; and it would trouble them to see him ride a
rough-untamed horse, or with his weapon furiously incounter a skilful
Fencer, or to handle or shoot-off a musket; against which there is no
remedy, if he will make him prove a sufficient, compleat, or honest man: he
must not be spared in his youth; and it will come to passe, that he shall
many times have occasion and be forced to shocke the rules of Physicke.
Vitamque sub dio et trepidis agat
In rebus.
[Footnote: Hor. I. i. Od. ii. 4.]
Leade he his life in open aire,
And in affaires full of despaire.
It is not sufficient to make his minde strong, his muskles must also be
strengthened: the mind is over-borne if it be not seconded: and it is too
much for her alone to discharge two offices. I have a feeling how mine
panteth, being joyned to so tender and sensible [Footnote: Sensitive.] a
bodie, and that lieth so heavie upon it And in my lecture, I often perceive
how my Authors in their writings sometimes commend examples for
reason, that a childe be alwaies nuzzled, cockered, dandled, and brought up
in his parents lap or sight; forsomuch as their naturall kindnesse, or (as I
may call it) tender fondnesse, causeth often, even the wisest to prove so
idle, so over-nice, and so base-minded. For parents are not capable, neither
can they find in their hearts to see them checkt, corrected, or chastised, nor
indure to see them brought up so meanly, and so far from daintinesse, and
many times so dangerously, as they must needs be. And it would grieve
them to see their children come home from those exercises, that a
Gentleman must necessarily acquaint himselfe with, sometimes all wet and
bemyred, other times sweatie and full of dust, and to drinke being either
extreme hot or exceeding cold; and it would trouble them to see him ride a
rough-untamed horse, or with his weapon furiously incounter a skilful
Fencer, or to handle or shoot-off a musket; against which there is no
remedy, if he will make him prove a sufficient, compleat, or honest man: he
must not be spared in his youth; and it will come to passe, that he shall
many times have occasion and be forced to shocke the rules of Physicke.
Vitamque sub dio et trepidis agat
In rebus.
[Footnote: Hor. I. i. Od. ii. 4.]
Leade he his life in open aire,
And in affaires full of despaire.
It is not sufficient to make his minde strong, his muskles must also be
strengthened: the mind is over-borne if it be not seconded: and it is too
much for her alone to discharge two offices. I have a feeling how mine
panteth, being joyned to so tender and sensible [Footnote: Sensitive.] a
bodie, and that lieth so heavie upon it And in my lecture, I often perceive
how my Authors in their writings sometimes commend examples for
Page 50
magnanimitie and force, that rather proceed from a thicke skin and hardnes
of the bones. I have knowne men, women and children borne of so hard a
constitution, that a blow with a cudgell would lesse hurt them, than a filip
would doe me, and so dull and blockish, that they will neither stir tongue
nor eyebrowes, beat them never so much. When wrestlers goe about to
counterfeit the Philosophers patience, they rather shew the vigor of their
sinnewes than of their heart. For the custome to beare travell, is to tolerate
griefe: Labor callum obducit dolori. [Footnote: Cic. Tusc. Qu. I. ii.]
"Labour worketh a hardnesse upon sorrow." Hee must be enured to suffer
the paine and hardnesse of exercises, that so he may be induced to endure
the paine of the colicke, of cauterie, of fals, of sprains, and other diseases
incident to mans bodie: yea, if need require, patiently to beare
imprisonment and other tortures, by which sufferance he shall come to be
had in more esteeme and accompt: for according to time and place, the
good as well as the bad man may haply fall into them; we have seen it by
experience. Whosoever striveth against the lawes, threats good men with
mischiefe and extortion. Moreover, the authoritie of the Tutor (who should
be soveraigne over him) is by the cockering and presence of the parents,
hindred and interrupted: besides the awe and respect which the houshold
beares him, and the knowledge of the meane, possibilities, and greatnesse
of his house, are in my judgement no small lets [Footnote: Hindrances.]in a
young Gentleman. In this schoole of commerce, and societie among men, I
have often noted this vice, that in lieu of taking acquaintance of others, we
only endevour to make our selves knowne to them: and we are more ready
to utter such merchandize as we have, than to ingrosse and purchase new
commodities. Silence and modestie are qualities very convenient to civil
conversation. It is also necessary that a young man be rather taught to be
discreetly-sparing and close-handed, than prodigally-wastfull and lavish in
his expences, and moderate in husbanding his wealth when he shall come to
possesse it. And not to take pepper in the nose for every foolish tale that
of the bones. I have knowne men, women and children borne of so hard a
constitution, that a blow with a cudgell would lesse hurt them, than a filip
would doe me, and so dull and blockish, that they will neither stir tongue
nor eyebrowes, beat them never so much. When wrestlers goe about to
counterfeit the Philosophers patience, they rather shew the vigor of their
sinnewes than of their heart. For the custome to beare travell, is to tolerate
griefe: Labor callum obducit dolori. [Footnote: Cic. Tusc. Qu. I. ii.]
"Labour worketh a hardnesse upon sorrow." Hee must be enured to suffer
the paine and hardnesse of exercises, that so he may be induced to endure
the paine of the colicke, of cauterie, of fals, of sprains, and other diseases
incident to mans bodie: yea, if need require, patiently to beare
imprisonment and other tortures, by which sufferance he shall come to be
had in more esteeme and accompt: for according to time and place, the
good as well as the bad man may haply fall into them; we have seen it by
experience. Whosoever striveth against the lawes, threats good men with
mischiefe and extortion. Moreover, the authoritie of the Tutor (who should
be soveraigne over him) is by the cockering and presence of the parents,
hindred and interrupted: besides the awe and respect which the houshold
beares him, and the knowledge of the meane, possibilities, and greatnesse
of his house, are in my judgement no small lets [Footnote: Hindrances.]in a
young Gentleman. In this schoole of commerce, and societie among men, I
have often noted this vice, that in lieu of taking acquaintance of others, we
only endevour to make our selves knowne to them: and we are more ready
to utter such merchandize as we have, than to ingrosse and purchase new
commodities. Silence and modestie are qualities very convenient to civil
conversation. It is also necessary that a young man be rather taught to be
discreetly-sparing and close-handed, than prodigally-wastfull and lavish in
his expences, and moderate in husbanding his wealth when he shall come to
possesse it. And not to take pepper in the nose for every foolish tale that
Page 51
shall be spoken in his presence, because it is an uncivil importunity to
contradict whatsoever is not agreeing to our humour: let him be pleased to
correct himselfe. And let him not seeme to blame that in others which he
refuseth to doe himselfe, nor goe about to withstand common fashions,
Licet sapere sine pompa, sine invidia: [Footnote: SEN. Epist. ciii. f.] "A
man may bee wise without ostentation, without envie." Let him avoid those
imperious images of the world, those uncivil behaviours and childish
ambition wherewith, God wot, too-too many are possest: that is, to make a
faire shew of that which is not in him: endevouring to be reputed other than
indeed he is; and as if reprehension and new devices were hard to come by,
he would by that meane acquire into himselfe the name of some peculiar
vertue. As it pertaineth but to great Poets to use the libertie of arts; so is it
tolerable but in noble minds and great spirits to have a preheminence above
ordinarie fashions. Si quid Socrates et Aristippus contra morem et
consuetudinem fecerunt, idem sibi ne arbitretur licere: Magis enim illi et
divinis bonis hanc licentiam assequebantur: [Footnote: CIC. Off. 1. i.] "If
Socrates and Aristippus have done ought against custome or good manner,
let not a man thinke he may doe the same: for they obtained this licence by
their great and excellent good parts:" He shall be taught not to enter rashly
into discourse or contesting, but when he shall encounter with a Champion
worthie his strength; And then would I not have him imploy all the tricks
that may fit his turne, but only such as may stand him in most stead. That he
be taught to be curious in making choice of his reasons, loving pertinency,
and by consequence brevitie. That above all, he be instructed to yeeld, yea
to quit his weapons unto truth, as soone as he shall discerne the same,
whether it proceed from his adversarie, or upon better advice from
himselfe; for he shall not be preferred to any place of eminencie above
others, for repeating of a prescript [Footnote: Fixed beforehand.] part; and
he is not engaged to defend any cause, further than he may approove it; nor
shall he bee of that trade where the libertie for a man to repent and re-advise
contradict whatsoever is not agreeing to our humour: let him be pleased to
correct himselfe. And let him not seeme to blame that in others which he
refuseth to doe himselfe, nor goe about to withstand common fashions,
Licet sapere sine pompa, sine invidia: [Footnote: SEN. Epist. ciii. f.] "A
man may bee wise without ostentation, without envie." Let him avoid those
imperious images of the world, those uncivil behaviours and childish
ambition wherewith, God wot, too-too many are possest: that is, to make a
faire shew of that which is not in him: endevouring to be reputed other than
indeed he is; and as if reprehension and new devices were hard to come by,
he would by that meane acquire into himselfe the name of some peculiar
vertue. As it pertaineth but to great Poets to use the libertie of arts; so is it
tolerable but in noble minds and great spirits to have a preheminence above
ordinarie fashions. Si quid Socrates et Aristippus contra morem et
consuetudinem fecerunt, idem sibi ne arbitretur licere: Magis enim illi et
divinis bonis hanc licentiam assequebantur: [Footnote: CIC. Off. 1. i.] "If
Socrates and Aristippus have done ought against custome or good manner,
let not a man thinke he may doe the same: for they obtained this licence by
their great and excellent good parts:" He shall be taught not to enter rashly
into discourse or contesting, but when he shall encounter with a Champion
worthie his strength; And then would I not have him imploy all the tricks
that may fit his turne, but only such as may stand him in most stead. That he
be taught to be curious in making choice of his reasons, loving pertinency,
and by consequence brevitie. That above all, he be instructed to yeeld, yea
to quit his weapons unto truth, as soone as he shall discerne the same,
whether it proceed from his adversarie, or upon better advice from
himselfe; for he shall not be preferred to any place of eminencie above
others, for repeating of a prescript [Footnote: Fixed beforehand.] part; and
he is not engaged to defend any cause, further than he may approove it; nor
shall he bee of that trade where the libertie for a man to repent and re-advise
Page 52
himselfe is sold for readie money, Neque, ut omnia, que praescripta et
imperata sint, defendat, necessitate ulla cogitur: [Footnote: CIC. Acad. Qu.
I. iv.] "Nor is he inforced by any necessitie to defend and make good all that
is prescribed and commanded him." If his tutor agree with my humour, he
shall frame his affection to be a most loyall and true subject to his Prince,
and a most affectionate and couragious Gentleman in al that may concerne
the honor of his Soveraigne or the good of his countrie, and endevour to
suppresse in him all manner of affection to undertake any action Otherwise
than for a publike good and dutie. Besides many inconveniences, which
greatly prejudice our libertie by reason of these particular bonds, the
judgment of a man that is waged and bought, either it is lesse free and
honest, or else it is blemisht with oversight and ingratitude. A meere and
precise Courtier can neither have law nor will to speake or thinke otherwise
than favourablie of his Master, who among so many thousands of his
subjects hath made choice of him alone, to institute and bring him up with
his owne hand. These favours, with the commodities that follow minion
[Footnote: Favorite.] Courtiers, corrupt (not without some colour of reason)
his libertie, and dazle his judgement. It is therefore commonly scene that
the Courtiers- language differs from other mens, in the same state, and to be
of no great credit in such matters. Let therefore his conscience and vertue
shine in his speech, and reason be his chiefe direction, Let him be taught to
confesse such faults as he shall discover in his owne discourses, albeit none
other perceive them but himselfe; for it is an evident shew of judgement,
and effect of sinceritie, which are the chiefest qualities he aymeth at. That
wilfully to strive, and obstinately to contest in words, are common qualities,
most apparent in basest mindes: That to readvise and correct himselfe, and
when one is most earnest, to leave an ill opinion, are rare, noble, and
Philosophicall conditions. Being in companie, he shall be put in minde, to
cast his eyes round about, and every where: For I note, that the chiefe
places are usually seezed upon by the most unworthie and lesse capable;
imperata sint, defendat, necessitate ulla cogitur: [Footnote: CIC. Acad. Qu.
I. iv.] "Nor is he inforced by any necessitie to defend and make good all that
is prescribed and commanded him." If his tutor agree with my humour, he
shall frame his affection to be a most loyall and true subject to his Prince,
and a most affectionate and couragious Gentleman in al that may concerne
the honor of his Soveraigne or the good of his countrie, and endevour to
suppresse in him all manner of affection to undertake any action Otherwise
than for a publike good and dutie. Besides many inconveniences, which
greatly prejudice our libertie by reason of these particular bonds, the
judgment of a man that is waged and bought, either it is lesse free and
honest, or else it is blemisht with oversight and ingratitude. A meere and
precise Courtier can neither have law nor will to speake or thinke otherwise
than favourablie of his Master, who among so many thousands of his
subjects hath made choice of him alone, to institute and bring him up with
his owne hand. These favours, with the commodities that follow minion
[Footnote: Favorite.] Courtiers, corrupt (not without some colour of reason)
his libertie, and dazle his judgement. It is therefore commonly scene that
the Courtiers- language differs from other mens, in the same state, and to be
of no great credit in such matters. Let therefore his conscience and vertue
shine in his speech, and reason be his chiefe direction, Let him be taught to
confesse such faults as he shall discover in his owne discourses, albeit none
other perceive them but himselfe; for it is an evident shew of judgement,
and effect of sinceritie, which are the chiefest qualities he aymeth at. That
wilfully to strive, and obstinately to contest in words, are common qualities,
most apparent in basest mindes: That to readvise and correct himselfe, and
when one is most earnest, to leave an ill opinion, are rare, noble, and
Philosophicall conditions. Being in companie, he shall be put in minde, to
cast his eyes round about, and every where: For I note, that the chiefe
places are usually seezed upon by the most unworthie and lesse capable;
Page 53
and that height of fortune is seldome joyned with sufficiencie. I have scene
that whilst they at the upper end of a board were busie entertaining
themselves with talking of the beautie of the hangings about a chamber, or
of the taste of some good cup of wine, many good discourses at the lower
end have utterly been lost. He shall weigh the carriage of every man in his
calling, a Heardsman, a Mason, a Stranger, or a Traveller; all must be
imployed; every one according to his worth; for all helps to make up
houshold; yea, the follie and the simplicitie of others shall be as instructions
to him. By controlling the graces and manners of others, he shall acquire
unto himselfe envie of the good and contempt of the bad. Let him hardly be
possest with an honest curiositie to search out the nature and causes of all
things: let him survay whatsoever is rare and singular about him; a building,
a fountaine, a man, a place where any battell hath been fought, or the
passages of Caesar or Charlemaine.
Quae tellus sit lenta gelu, qua putris ab aestu,
Ventus in Italiam quis bene vela ferat.
[Footnote: Prop. 1. iv. El. iii. 39.]
What land is parcht with heat, what clog'd with frost.
What wind drives kindly to th' Italian coast.
He shall endevour to be familiarly acquainted with the customes, with the
meanes, with the state, with the dependances and alliances of all Princes;
they are things soone and pleasant to be learned, and most profitable to be
knowne. In this acquaintance of men, my intending is, that hee chiefely
comprehend them, that live but by the memorie of bookes. He shall, by the
help of Histories, in forme himselfe of the worthiest minds that were in the
best ages. It is a frivolous studie, if a man list, but of unvaluable worth to
such as can make use of it, and as Plato saith, the only studie the
Lacedemonians reserved for themselves. What profit shall he not reap,
that whilst they at the upper end of a board were busie entertaining
themselves with talking of the beautie of the hangings about a chamber, or
of the taste of some good cup of wine, many good discourses at the lower
end have utterly been lost. He shall weigh the carriage of every man in his
calling, a Heardsman, a Mason, a Stranger, or a Traveller; all must be
imployed; every one according to his worth; for all helps to make up
houshold; yea, the follie and the simplicitie of others shall be as instructions
to him. By controlling the graces and manners of others, he shall acquire
unto himselfe envie of the good and contempt of the bad. Let him hardly be
possest with an honest curiositie to search out the nature and causes of all
things: let him survay whatsoever is rare and singular about him; a building,
a fountaine, a man, a place where any battell hath been fought, or the
passages of Caesar or Charlemaine.
Quae tellus sit lenta gelu, qua putris ab aestu,
Ventus in Italiam quis bene vela ferat.
[Footnote: Prop. 1. iv. El. iii. 39.]
What land is parcht with heat, what clog'd with frost.
What wind drives kindly to th' Italian coast.
He shall endevour to be familiarly acquainted with the customes, with the
meanes, with the state, with the dependances and alliances of all Princes;
they are things soone and pleasant to be learned, and most profitable to be
knowne. In this acquaintance of men, my intending is, that hee chiefely
comprehend them, that live but by the memorie of bookes. He shall, by the
help of Histories, in forme himselfe of the worthiest minds that were in the
best ages. It is a frivolous studie, if a man list, but of unvaluable worth to
such as can make use of it, and as Plato saith, the only studie the
Lacedemonians reserved for themselves. What profit shall he not reap,
Page 54
touching this point, reading the lives of our Plutark? Alwayes conditioned,
the master bethinke himselfe whereto his charge tendeth, and that he
imprint not so much in his schollers mind the date of the ruine of Carthage,
as the manners of Hanniball and Scipio, nor so much where Marcellus died,
as because he was unworthy of his devoire [Footnote: Task.] he died there:
that he teach him not so much to know Histories as to judge of them. It is
amongst things that best agree with my humour, the subject to which our
spirits doe most diversly applie themselves. I have read in Titus Livius a
number of things, which peradventure others never read, in whom Plutarke
haply read a hundred more than ever I could read, and which perhaps the
author himselfe did never intend to set downe. To some kind of men it is a
meere gramaticali studie, but to others a perfect anatomie [Footnote:
Dissection, analytical exposition.] of Philosophie; by meanes whereof the
secretest part of our nature is searched into. There are in Plutarke many
ample discourses most worthy to be knowne: for in my judgement, he is the
chiefe work- master of such works, whereof there are a thousand, whereat
he hath but slightly glanced; for with his finger he doth but point us out a
way to walke in, if we list; and is sometimes pleased to give but a touch at
the quickest and maine point of a discourse, from whence they are by
diligent studie to be drawne, and so brought into open market. As that
saying of his, That the inhabitants of Asia served but one alone, because
they could not pronounce one onely syllable, which is Non, gave perhaps
both subject and occasion to my friend Boetie to compose his booke of
voluntarie servitude. If it were no more but to see Plutarke wrest a slight
action to mans life, or a word that seemeth to beare no such sence, it will
serve for a whole discourse. It is pittie men of understanding should so
much love brevitie; without doubt their reputation is thereby better, but we
the worse. Plutarke had rather we should commend him for his judgement
than for his knowledge, he loveth better to leave a kind of longing-desire in
us of him, than a satietie. He knew verie well that even in good things too
the master bethinke himselfe whereto his charge tendeth, and that he
imprint not so much in his schollers mind the date of the ruine of Carthage,
as the manners of Hanniball and Scipio, nor so much where Marcellus died,
as because he was unworthy of his devoire [Footnote: Task.] he died there:
that he teach him not so much to know Histories as to judge of them. It is
amongst things that best agree with my humour, the subject to which our
spirits doe most diversly applie themselves. I have read in Titus Livius a
number of things, which peradventure others never read, in whom Plutarke
haply read a hundred more than ever I could read, and which perhaps the
author himselfe did never intend to set downe. To some kind of men it is a
meere gramaticali studie, but to others a perfect anatomie [Footnote:
Dissection, analytical exposition.] of Philosophie; by meanes whereof the
secretest part of our nature is searched into. There are in Plutarke many
ample discourses most worthy to be knowne: for in my judgement, he is the
chiefe work- master of such works, whereof there are a thousand, whereat
he hath but slightly glanced; for with his finger he doth but point us out a
way to walke in, if we list; and is sometimes pleased to give but a touch at
the quickest and maine point of a discourse, from whence they are by
diligent studie to be drawne, and so brought into open market. As that
saying of his, That the inhabitants of Asia served but one alone, because
they could not pronounce one onely syllable, which is Non, gave perhaps
both subject and occasion to my friend Boetie to compose his booke of
voluntarie servitude. If it were no more but to see Plutarke wrest a slight
action to mans life, or a word that seemeth to beare no such sence, it will
serve for a whole discourse. It is pittie men of understanding should so
much love brevitie; without doubt their reputation is thereby better, but we
the worse. Plutarke had rather we should commend him for his judgement
than for his knowledge, he loveth better to leave a kind of longing-desire in
us of him, than a satietie. He knew verie well that even in good things too
Page 55
much may be said: and that Alexandridas did justly reprove him who spake
verie good sentences to the Ephores, but they were over tedious. Oh
stranger, quoth he, thou speakest what thou oughtest, otherwise then
[Footnote: Than.] thou shouldest. Those that have leane and thin bodies
stuffe them up with bumbasting. [Footnote: Padding.] And such as have but
poore matter, will puffe it up with loftie words. There is a marvelous
cleerenesse, or as I may terme it an enlightning of mans judgement drawne
from the commerce of men, and by frequenting abroad in the world; we are
all so contrived and compact in our selves, that our sight is made shorter by
the length of our nose. When Socrates was demaunded whence he was, he
answered, not of Athens, but of the world; for he, who had his imagination
more full and farther stretching, embraced all the world for his native Citie,
and extended his acquaintance, his societie, and affections to all man- kind:
and not as we do, that looke no further than our feet. If the frost chance to
nip the vines about my village, my Priest doth presently argue that the wrath
of God hangs over our head, and threatneth all mankind: and judgeth that
the Pippe [Footnote: A disease.] is alreadie falne upon the Canibals.
In viewing these intestine and civill broiles of ours, who doth not
exclaime, that this worlds vast frame is neere unto a dissolution, and that
the day of judgement is readie to fall on us? never remembering that many
worse revolutions have been seene, and that whilest we are plunged in
griefe, and overwhelmed in sorrow, a thousand other parts of the world
besides are blessed with happinesse, and wallow in pleasures, and never
thinke on us? whereas, when I behold our lives, our licence, and impunitie,
I wonder to see them so milde and easie. He on whose head it haileth,
thinks all the Hemispheare besides to be in a storme and tempest. And as
that dull-pated Savoyard said, that if the seelie [Footnote 31: Simple.] King
of France could cunningly have managed his fortune, he might verie well
have made himselfe chiefe Steward of his Lords household, whose
imagination conceived no other greatnesse than his Masters; we are all
verie good sentences to the Ephores, but they were over tedious. Oh
stranger, quoth he, thou speakest what thou oughtest, otherwise then
[Footnote: Than.] thou shouldest. Those that have leane and thin bodies
stuffe them up with bumbasting. [Footnote: Padding.] And such as have but
poore matter, will puffe it up with loftie words. There is a marvelous
cleerenesse, or as I may terme it an enlightning of mans judgement drawne
from the commerce of men, and by frequenting abroad in the world; we are
all so contrived and compact in our selves, that our sight is made shorter by
the length of our nose. When Socrates was demaunded whence he was, he
answered, not of Athens, but of the world; for he, who had his imagination
more full and farther stretching, embraced all the world for his native Citie,
and extended his acquaintance, his societie, and affections to all man- kind:
and not as we do, that looke no further than our feet. If the frost chance to
nip the vines about my village, my Priest doth presently argue that the wrath
of God hangs over our head, and threatneth all mankind: and judgeth that
the Pippe [Footnote: A disease.] is alreadie falne upon the Canibals.
In viewing these intestine and civill broiles of ours, who doth not
exclaime, that this worlds vast frame is neere unto a dissolution, and that
the day of judgement is readie to fall on us? never remembering that many
worse revolutions have been seene, and that whilest we are plunged in
griefe, and overwhelmed in sorrow, a thousand other parts of the world
besides are blessed with happinesse, and wallow in pleasures, and never
thinke on us? whereas, when I behold our lives, our licence, and impunitie,
I wonder to see them so milde and easie. He on whose head it haileth,
thinks all the Hemispheare besides to be in a storme and tempest. And as
that dull-pated Savoyard said, that if the seelie [Footnote 31: Simple.] King
of France could cunningly have managed his fortune, he might verie well
have made himselfe chiefe Steward of his Lords household, whose
imagination conceived no other greatnesse than his Masters; we are all
Page 56
insensible of this kind of errour: an errour of great consequence and
prejudice. But whosoever shall present unto his inward eyes, as it were in a
Table, the Idea of the great image of our universall mother Nature, attired in
her richest robes, sitting in the throne of her Majestic, and in her visage
shall read so generall and so constant a varietie; he that therein shall view
himselfe, not himselfe alone, but a whole Kingdome, to be in respect of a
great circle but the smallest point that can be imagined, he onely can value
things according to their essentiall greatnesse and proportion. This great
universe (which some multiplie as Species under one Genus) is the true
looking-glasse wherein we must looke, if we will know whether we be of a
good stamp or in the right byase. To conclude, I would have this worlds-
frame to be my Schollers choise-booke. [Footnote: Book of examples] So
many strange humours, sundrie sects, varying judgements, diverse opinions,
different lawes, and fantasticall customes teach us to judge rightly of ours,
and instruct our judgement to acknowledge his imperfections and naturall
weaknesse, which is no easie an apprentiship: So many innovations of
estates, so many fals of Princes, and changes of publike fortune, may and
ought to teach us, not to make so great accompt of ours: So many names, so
many victories, and so many conquests buried in darke oblivion, makes the
hope to perpetuate our names but ridiculous, by the surprising of ten Argo-
lettiers, [Footnote: Mounted Bowmen.] or of a small cottage, which is
knowne but by his fall. The pride and fiercenesse of so many strange and
gorgeous shewes: the pride-puft majestie of so many courts, and of their
greatnesse, ought to confirme and assure our sight, undauntedly to beare the
affronts and thunder-claps of ours, without feeling our eyes: So many
thousands of men, lowlaide in their graves afore us, may encourage us not
to feare, or be dismaied to go meet so good companie in the other world,
and so of all things else. Our life (said Pithagoras) drawes neare unto the
great and populous assemblies of the Olympike games, wherein some, to
get the glorie and to win the goale of the games, exercise their bodies with
prejudice. But whosoever shall present unto his inward eyes, as it were in a
Table, the Idea of the great image of our universall mother Nature, attired in
her richest robes, sitting in the throne of her Majestic, and in her visage
shall read so generall and so constant a varietie; he that therein shall view
himselfe, not himselfe alone, but a whole Kingdome, to be in respect of a
great circle but the smallest point that can be imagined, he onely can value
things according to their essentiall greatnesse and proportion. This great
universe (which some multiplie as Species under one Genus) is the true
looking-glasse wherein we must looke, if we will know whether we be of a
good stamp or in the right byase. To conclude, I would have this worlds-
frame to be my Schollers choise-booke. [Footnote: Book of examples] So
many strange humours, sundrie sects, varying judgements, diverse opinions,
different lawes, and fantasticall customes teach us to judge rightly of ours,
and instruct our judgement to acknowledge his imperfections and naturall
weaknesse, which is no easie an apprentiship: So many innovations of
estates, so many fals of Princes, and changes of publike fortune, may and
ought to teach us, not to make so great accompt of ours: So many names, so
many victories, and so many conquests buried in darke oblivion, makes the
hope to perpetuate our names but ridiculous, by the surprising of ten Argo-
lettiers, [Footnote: Mounted Bowmen.] or of a small cottage, which is
knowne but by his fall. The pride and fiercenesse of so many strange and
gorgeous shewes: the pride-puft majestie of so many courts, and of their
greatnesse, ought to confirme and assure our sight, undauntedly to beare the
affronts and thunder-claps of ours, without feeling our eyes: So many
thousands of men, lowlaide in their graves afore us, may encourage us not
to feare, or be dismaied to go meet so good companie in the other world,
and so of all things else. Our life (said Pithagoras) drawes neare unto the
great and populous assemblies of the Olympike games, wherein some, to
get the glorie and to win the goale of the games, exercise their bodies with
Page 57
all industrie; others, for greedinesse of gaine, bring thither marchandise to
sell: others there are (and those be not the worst) that seek after no other
good, but to marke how wherefore, and to what end, all things are done: and
to be spectators or observers of other mens lives and actions, that so they
may the better judge and direct their owne. Unto examples may all the most
profitable Discourses of Philosophic be sorted, which ought to be the touch-
stone of human actions, and a rule to square them by, to whom may be said,
—-quid fas optare, quid asper Vtile nummus habet, patriae
charisque propinquis Quantum elargiri deceat, quem te Deus esse
lussit, et humana qua parte locaius es in re. [Footnote: Pers. Sat. iii.
69.] Quid sumus, aut quidnam victuri gignimur. [Footnote: Ib. 67.]
What thou maiest wish, what profit may come cleare,
From new-stampt coyne, to friends and countrie deare
What thou ought'st give: whom God would have thee bee,
And in what part mongst men he placed thee.
What we are, and wherefore,
To live heer we were bore.
What it is to know, and not to know (which ought to be the scope of
studie), what valour, what temperance, and what justice is: what difference
there is betweene ambition and avarice, bondage and freedome, subjection
and libertie, by which markes a man may distinguish true and perfect
contentment, and how far-forth one ought to feare or apprehend death,
griefe, or shame.
Et quo quemque modo fugiatque. feratque laborem.
[Footnote: Virg. Aen. 1. iii. 853.]
How ev'ry labour he may plie,
And beare, or ev'ry labour flie.
sell: others there are (and those be not the worst) that seek after no other
good, but to marke how wherefore, and to what end, all things are done: and
to be spectators or observers of other mens lives and actions, that so they
may the better judge and direct their owne. Unto examples may all the most
profitable Discourses of Philosophic be sorted, which ought to be the touch-
stone of human actions, and a rule to square them by, to whom may be said,
—-quid fas optare, quid asper Vtile nummus habet, patriae
charisque propinquis Quantum elargiri deceat, quem te Deus esse
lussit, et humana qua parte locaius es in re. [Footnote: Pers. Sat. iii.
69.] Quid sumus, aut quidnam victuri gignimur. [Footnote: Ib. 67.]
What thou maiest wish, what profit may come cleare,
From new-stampt coyne, to friends and countrie deare
What thou ought'st give: whom God would have thee bee,
And in what part mongst men he placed thee.
What we are, and wherefore,
To live heer we were bore.
What it is to know, and not to know (which ought to be the scope of
studie), what valour, what temperance, and what justice is: what difference
there is betweene ambition and avarice, bondage and freedome, subjection
and libertie, by which markes a man may distinguish true and perfect
contentment, and how far-forth one ought to feare or apprehend death,
griefe, or shame.
Et quo quemque modo fugiatque. feratque laborem.
[Footnote: Virg. Aen. 1. iii. 853.]
How ev'ry labour he may plie,
And beare, or ev'ry labour flie.
Page 58
What wards or springs move us, and the causes of so many motions in us:
For me seemeth, that the first discourses, wherewith his conceit should be
sprinkled, ought to be those that rule his manners and direct his sense;
which will both teach him to know himselfe, and how to live and how to die
well. Among the liberall Sciences, let us begin with that which makes us
free: Indeed, they may all, in some sort stead us, as an instruction to our
life, and use of it, as all other things else serve the same to some purpose or
other. But let us make especiall choice of that which may directly and
pertinently serve the same. If we could restraine and adapt the
appurtenances of our life to their right byase and naturall limits, we should
find the best part of the Sciences that now are in use, cleane out of fashion
with us: yea, and in those that are most in use, there are certaine by-wayes
and deep-flows most profitable, which we should do well to leave, and
according to the institution of Socrates, limit the course of our studies in
those where profit is wanting.
——sapere aude,
Incipe: vivendi qui recte prorogat horam,
Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis avum.
[Footnote: Hor. I. i. Epist. ii. 40.]
Be bold to be wise: to begin, be strong,
He that to live well doth the time prolong,
Clowne-like expects, till downe the streame be run,
That runs, and will run, till the world be done.
It is mere simplicitie to teach our children,
Quid moveant Pisces, animosaque signa Leonis,
Lotus et Hesperia quid Capricornus aqua.
[Footnote: Prop. I. El. i. 85.]
For me seemeth, that the first discourses, wherewith his conceit should be
sprinkled, ought to be those that rule his manners and direct his sense;
which will both teach him to know himselfe, and how to live and how to die
well. Among the liberall Sciences, let us begin with that which makes us
free: Indeed, they may all, in some sort stead us, as an instruction to our
life, and use of it, as all other things else serve the same to some purpose or
other. But let us make especiall choice of that which may directly and
pertinently serve the same. If we could restraine and adapt the
appurtenances of our life to their right byase and naturall limits, we should
find the best part of the Sciences that now are in use, cleane out of fashion
with us: yea, and in those that are most in use, there are certaine by-wayes
and deep-flows most profitable, which we should do well to leave, and
according to the institution of Socrates, limit the course of our studies in
those where profit is wanting.
——sapere aude,
Incipe: vivendi qui recte prorogat horam,
Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis avum.
[Footnote: Hor. I. i. Epist. ii. 40.]
Be bold to be wise: to begin, be strong,
He that to live well doth the time prolong,
Clowne-like expects, till downe the streame be run,
That runs, and will run, till the world be done.
It is mere simplicitie to teach our children,
Quid moveant Pisces, animosaque signa Leonis,
Lotus et Hesperia quid Capricornus aqua.
[Footnote: Prop. I. El. i. 85.]
Page 59
What Pisces move, or hot breath'd Leos beames,
Or Capricornus bath'd in western streames,
the knowledge of the starres, and the motion of the eighth spheare,
before their owne;
[Greek text quote omited]
[Footnote: Anacr. Od. xvii. 10, 12.]
What longs it to the seaven stars, and me,
Or those about Bootes be.
Anaximenes writing to Pythagoras, saith, "With what sense can I amuse
my selfe in the secrets of the Starres, having continually death or bondage
before mine eyes?" For at that time the Kings of Persia were making
preparations to war against his Countrie. All men ought to say so: Being
beaten with ambition, with avarice, with rashnesse, and with superstition,
and having such other enemies unto life within him. Wherefore shall I study
and take care about the mobility and variation of the world? When hee is
once taught what is fit to make him better and wiser, he shall be entertained
with Logicke, naturall Philosophy, Geometry, and Rhetoricke, then having
setled his judgement, looke what science he doth most addict himselfe unto,
he shall in short time attaine to the perfection of it. His lecture shall be
somtimes by way of talke and sometimes by booke: his tutor may now and
then supply him with the same Author, as an end and motive of his
institution: sometimes giving him the pith and substance of it ready chewed.
And if of himselfe he be not so throughly acquainted with bookes, that hee
may readily find so many notable discourses as are in them to effect his
purpose, it shall not be amisse that some learned man bee appointed to
keepe him, company, who at any time of need may furnish him with such
munition as hee shall stand in need of; that hee may afterward distribute and
dispense them to his best use. And that this kind of lesson be more easie and
Or Capricornus bath'd in western streames,
the knowledge of the starres, and the motion of the eighth spheare,
before their owne;
[Greek text quote omited]
[Footnote: Anacr. Od. xvii. 10, 12.]
What longs it to the seaven stars, and me,
Or those about Bootes be.
Anaximenes writing to Pythagoras, saith, "With what sense can I amuse
my selfe in the secrets of the Starres, having continually death or bondage
before mine eyes?" For at that time the Kings of Persia were making
preparations to war against his Countrie. All men ought to say so: Being
beaten with ambition, with avarice, with rashnesse, and with superstition,
and having such other enemies unto life within him. Wherefore shall I study
and take care about the mobility and variation of the world? When hee is
once taught what is fit to make him better and wiser, he shall be entertained
with Logicke, naturall Philosophy, Geometry, and Rhetoricke, then having
setled his judgement, looke what science he doth most addict himselfe unto,
he shall in short time attaine to the perfection of it. His lecture shall be
somtimes by way of talke and sometimes by booke: his tutor may now and
then supply him with the same Author, as an end and motive of his
institution: sometimes giving him the pith and substance of it ready chewed.
And if of himselfe he be not so throughly acquainted with bookes, that hee
may readily find so many notable discourses as are in them to effect his
purpose, it shall not be amisse that some learned man bee appointed to
keepe him, company, who at any time of need may furnish him with such
munition as hee shall stand in need of; that hee may afterward distribute and
dispense them to his best use. And that this kind of lesson be more easie and
Page 60
naturall than that of Gaza, who will make question? Those are but harsh,
thornie, and unpleasant precepts; vaine, idle and immaterial words, on
which small hold may be taken; wherein is nothing to quicken the minde. In
this the spirit findeth substance to bide and feed upon. A fruit without all
comparison much better, and that will soone be ripe. It is a thing worthy
consideration, to see what state things are brought unto in this our age; and
how Philosophie, even to the wisest, and men of best understanding, is but
an idle, vaine and fantasticall name, of small use and lesse worth, both in
opinion and effect. I thinke these Sophistries are the cause of it, which have
forestalled the wayes to come unto it: They doe very ill that goe about to
make it seeme as it were inaccessible for children to come unto, setting it
foorth with a wrimpled [Footnote: wrinkled.] gastlie, and frowning visage;
who hath masked her with so counterfet, pale, and hideous a countenance?
There is nothing more beauteous, nothing more delightful, nothing more
gamesome; and as I may say, nothing more fondly wanton: for she
presenteth nothing to our eyes, and preacheth nothing to our eares, but sport
and pastime. A sad and lowring looke plainly declareth that that is not her
haunt. Demetrius the Gramarian, finding a companie of Philosophers sitting
close together in the Temple of Delphos, said unto them, "Either I am
deceived, or by your plausible and pleasant lookes, you are not in any
serious and earnest discourse amongst your selves;" to whom one of them,
named Heracleon the Megarian, answered, "That belongeth to them, who
busie themselves in seeking whether the future tense of the verbe ___, hath
a double, or that labour to find the derivation of the comparatives, [omitted]
and of the superlatives [omitted], it is they that must chafe in intertaining
themselves with their science: as for discourses of Philosophie they are
wont to glad, rejoyce, and not to vex and molest those that use them."
Deprendas animi tormenta latentis in agro
Corpore, deprendas et gaudia; sumit utrumque
thornie, and unpleasant precepts; vaine, idle and immaterial words, on
which small hold may be taken; wherein is nothing to quicken the minde. In
this the spirit findeth substance to bide and feed upon. A fruit without all
comparison much better, and that will soone be ripe. It is a thing worthy
consideration, to see what state things are brought unto in this our age; and
how Philosophie, even to the wisest, and men of best understanding, is but
an idle, vaine and fantasticall name, of small use and lesse worth, both in
opinion and effect. I thinke these Sophistries are the cause of it, which have
forestalled the wayes to come unto it: They doe very ill that goe about to
make it seeme as it were inaccessible for children to come unto, setting it
foorth with a wrimpled [Footnote: wrinkled.] gastlie, and frowning visage;
who hath masked her with so counterfet, pale, and hideous a countenance?
There is nothing more beauteous, nothing more delightful, nothing more
gamesome; and as I may say, nothing more fondly wanton: for she
presenteth nothing to our eyes, and preacheth nothing to our eares, but sport
and pastime. A sad and lowring looke plainly declareth that that is not her
haunt. Demetrius the Gramarian, finding a companie of Philosophers sitting
close together in the Temple of Delphos, said unto them, "Either I am
deceived, or by your plausible and pleasant lookes, you are not in any
serious and earnest discourse amongst your selves;" to whom one of them,
named Heracleon the Megarian, answered, "That belongeth to them, who
busie themselves in seeking whether the future tense of the verbe ___, hath
a double, or that labour to find the derivation of the comparatives, [omitted]
and of the superlatives [omitted], it is they that must chafe in intertaining
themselves with their science: as for discourses of Philosophie they are
wont to glad, rejoyce, and not to vex and molest those that use them."
Deprendas animi tormenta latentis in agro
Corpore, deprendas et gaudia; sumit utrumque
Page 61
Inde habitum facies.
[Footnote: Juven, SAT. ix, 18]
You may perceive the torments of the mind,
Hid in sicke bodie, you the joyes may find;
The face such habit takes in either kind.
That mind which harboureth Philosophie, ought by reason of her sound
health, make that bodie also sound and healthie: it ought to make her
contentment to through-shine in all exteriour parts: it ought to shapen and
modell all outward demeanours to the modell of it: and by consequence
arme him that doth possesse it, with a gracious stoutnesse and lively
audacite, with an active and pleasing gesture, and with a setled and
cheerefull countenance. The most evident token and apparant signe of true
wisdome is a constant and unconstrained rejoycing, whose estate is like
unto all things above the Moone, that is ever cleare, alwaies bright. It is
Baroco [Footnote: Mnemonic words invented by the scholastic logicians]
and Baralipton [Footnote: Mnemonic words invented by the scholastic
logicians], that makes their followers prove so base and idle, and not
Philosophie; they know her not but by heare-say; what? Is it not shee that
cleereth all stormes of the mind? And teacheth miserie, famine, and
sicknesse to laugh? Not by reason of some imaginarie Epicicles [Footnote:
A term of the old astronomy.], but by naturall and palpable reasons. Shee
aymeth at nothing but vertue; it is vertue shee seekes after; which as the
schoole saith, is not pitcht on the top of an high, steepie, or inaccessible hill;
for they that have come unto her, affirme that cleane-contrarie shee keeps
her stand, and holds her mansion in a faire, flourishing, and pleasant plaine,
whence as from an high watch tower, she survaieth all things, to be subject
unto her, to whom any man may with great facilitie come, if he but know
the way or entrance to her palace: for, the pathes that lead unto her are
certaine fresh and shadie greene allies, sweet and flowrie waies, whose
[Footnote: Juven, SAT. ix, 18]
You may perceive the torments of the mind,
Hid in sicke bodie, you the joyes may find;
The face such habit takes in either kind.
That mind which harboureth Philosophie, ought by reason of her sound
health, make that bodie also sound and healthie: it ought to make her
contentment to through-shine in all exteriour parts: it ought to shapen and
modell all outward demeanours to the modell of it: and by consequence
arme him that doth possesse it, with a gracious stoutnesse and lively
audacite, with an active and pleasing gesture, and with a setled and
cheerefull countenance. The most evident token and apparant signe of true
wisdome is a constant and unconstrained rejoycing, whose estate is like
unto all things above the Moone, that is ever cleare, alwaies bright. It is
Baroco [Footnote: Mnemonic words invented by the scholastic logicians]
and Baralipton [Footnote: Mnemonic words invented by the scholastic
logicians], that makes their followers prove so base and idle, and not
Philosophie; they know her not but by heare-say; what? Is it not shee that
cleereth all stormes of the mind? And teacheth miserie, famine, and
sicknesse to laugh? Not by reason of some imaginarie Epicicles [Footnote:
A term of the old astronomy.], but by naturall and palpable reasons. Shee
aymeth at nothing but vertue; it is vertue shee seekes after; which as the
schoole saith, is not pitcht on the top of an high, steepie, or inaccessible hill;
for they that have come unto her, affirme that cleane-contrarie shee keeps
her stand, and holds her mansion in a faire, flourishing, and pleasant plaine,
whence as from an high watch tower, she survaieth all things, to be subject
unto her, to whom any man may with great facilitie come, if he but know
the way or entrance to her palace: for, the pathes that lead unto her are
certaine fresh and shadie greene allies, sweet and flowrie waies, whose
Page 62
ascent is even, easie, and nothing wearisome, like unto that of heavens
vaults. Forsomuch as they have not frequented this vertue, who gloriously,
as in a throne of Majestie sits soveraigne, goodly, triumphant, lovely,
equally delicious, and couragious, protesting her selfe to be a professed and
irreconcileable enemie to all sharpnesse, austeritie, feare, and compulsion;
having nature for her guide, fortune and voluptuousnesse for her
companions; they according to their weaknesse have imaginarily fained her,
to have a foolish, sad, grim, quarelous, spitefull, threatning, and disdainfull
visage, with an horride and unpleasant looke; and have placed her upon a
craggie, sharpe, and unfrequented rocke, amidst desert cliffes and uncouth
crags, as a scar-crow, or bugbeare, to affright the common people with.
Now the tutour, which ought to know that he should rather seek to fill the
mind and store the will of his disciple, as much, or rather more, with love
and affection, than with awe, and reverence unto vertue, may shew and tell
him, that Poets follow common humours, making him plainly to perceive,
and as it were palpably to feele, that the Gods have rather placed labour and
sweat at the entrances which lead to Venus chambers, than at the doores that
direct to Pallas cabinets.
And when he shall perceive his scholler to have a sensible feeling of
himselfe, presenting Bradamant [Footnote: A warlike heroine in Boiardo's
"Orlando Innamorato" and Ariosto's "Orlando Furioso."] or Angelica
[Footnote: The faithless princess, on account of whom Orlando goes mad,
in the same poems.] before him, as a Mistresse to enjoy, embelished with a
naturall, active, generous, and unspotted beautie not uglie or Giant-like, but
blithe and livelie, in respect of a wanton, soft, affected, and artificiall-
flaring beautie; the one attired like unto a young man, coyfed with a bright-
shining helmet, the other disguised and drest about the head like unto an
impudent harlot, with embroyderies, frizelings, and carcanets of pearles: he
will no doubt deeme his owne love to be a man and no woman, if in his
choice he differ from that effeminate shepheard of Phrygia. In this new kind
vaults. Forsomuch as they have not frequented this vertue, who gloriously,
as in a throne of Majestie sits soveraigne, goodly, triumphant, lovely,
equally delicious, and couragious, protesting her selfe to be a professed and
irreconcileable enemie to all sharpnesse, austeritie, feare, and compulsion;
having nature for her guide, fortune and voluptuousnesse for her
companions; they according to their weaknesse have imaginarily fained her,
to have a foolish, sad, grim, quarelous, spitefull, threatning, and disdainfull
visage, with an horride and unpleasant looke; and have placed her upon a
craggie, sharpe, and unfrequented rocke, amidst desert cliffes and uncouth
crags, as a scar-crow, or bugbeare, to affright the common people with.
Now the tutour, which ought to know that he should rather seek to fill the
mind and store the will of his disciple, as much, or rather more, with love
and affection, than with awe, and reverence unto vertue, may shew and tell
him, that Poets follow common humours, making him plainly to perceive,
and as it were palpably to feele, that the Gods have rather placed labour and
sweat at the entrances which lead to Venus chambers, than at the doores that
direct to Pallas cabinets.
And when he shall perceive his scholler to have a sensible feeling of
himselfe, presenting Bradamant [Footnote: A warlike heroine in Boiardo's
"Orlando Innamorato" and Ariosto's "Orlando Furioso."] or Angelica
[Footnote: The faithless princess, on account of whom Orlando goes mad,
in the same poems.] before him, as a Mistresse to enjoy, embelished with a
naturall, active, generous, and unspotted beautie not uglie or Giant-like, but
blithe and livelie, in respect of a wanton, soft, affected, and artificiall-
flaring beautie; the one attired like unto a young man, coyfed with a bright-
shining helmet, the other disguised and drest about the head like unto an
impudent harlot, with embroyderies, frizelings, and carcanets of pearles: he
will no doubt deeme his owne love to be a man and no woman, if in his
choice he differ from that effeminate shepheard of Phrygia. In this new kind
Page 63
of lesson he shall declare unto him, that the prize, the glorie, and height of
true vertue, consisted in the facilitie, profit, and pleasure of his exercises: so
far from difficultie and incumbrances, that children as well as men, the
simple as soone as the wise, may come unto her. Discretion and
temperance, not force or way-wardnesse are the instruments to bring him
unto her. Socrates (vertues chiefe favorite) that he might the better walke in
the pleasant, naturall, and open path of her progresses, doth voluntarily and
in good, earnest, quit all compulsion. Shee is the nurse and foster-mother of
all humane [Footnote: Human.] pleasures, who in making them just and
upright, she also makes them sure and sincere. By moderating them, she
keepeth them in ure [Footnote: Practice.] and breath. In limiting and cutting
them off, whom she refuseth; she whets us on toward those she leaveth unto
us; and plenteously leaves us them, which Nature pleaseth, and like a kind
mother giveth us over unto satietie, if not unto wearisomnesse, unlesse we
will peradventure say that the rule and bridle, which stayeth the drunkard
before drunkennesse, the glutton before surfetting, and the letcher before
the losing of his haire, be the enemies of our pleasures. If common fortune
faile her, it cleerely scapes her; or she cares not for her, or she frames
another unto herselfe, altogether her owne, not so fleeting nor so rowling.
She knoweth the way how to be rich, mightie and wise, and how to lie in
sweet-perfumed beds. She loveth life; she delights in beautie, in glorie, and
in health. But her proper and particular office is, first to know how to use
such goods temperately, and how to lose them constantly. An office much
more noble than severe, without which all course of life is unnaturall,
turbulent, and deformed, to which one may lawfully joyne those rocks,
those incumbrances, and those hideous monsters. If so it happen, that his
Disciple prove of so different a condition, that he rather love to give eare to
an idle fable than to the report of some noble voiage, or other notable and
wise discourse, when he shall heare it; that at the sound of a Drum or clang
of a Trumpet, which are wont to rowse and arme the youthly heat of his
true vertue, consisted in the facilitie, profit, and pleasure of his exercises: so
far from difficultie and incumbrances, that children as well as men, the
simple as soone as the wise, may come unto her. Discretion and
temperance, not force or way-wardnesse are the instruments to bring him
unto her. Socrates (vertues chiefe favorite) that he might the better walke in
the pleasant, naturall, and open path of her progresses, doth voluntarily and
in good, earnest, quit all compulsion. Shee is the nurse and foster-mother of
all humane [Footnote: Human.] pleasures, who in making them just and
upright, she also makes them sure and sincere. By moderating them, she
keepeth them in ure [Footnote: Practice.] and breath. In limiting and cutting
them off, whom she refuseth; she whets us on toward those she leaveth unto
us; and plenteously leaves us them, which Nature pleaseth, and like a kind
mother giveth us over unto satietie, if not unto wearisomnesse, unlesse we
will peradventure say that the rule and bridle, which stayeth the drunkard
before drunkennesse, the glutton before surfetting, and the letcher before
the losing of his haire, be the enemies of our pleasures. If common fortune
faile her, it cleerely scapes her; or she cares not for her, or she frames
another unto herselfe, altogether her owne, not so fleeting nor so rowling.
She knoweth the way how to be rich, mightie and wise, and how to lie in
sweet-perfumed beds. She loveth life; she delights in beautie, in glorie, and
in health. But her proper and particular office is, first to know how to use
such goods temperately, and how to lose them constantly. An office much
more noble than severe, without which all course of life is unnaturall,
turbulent, and deformed, to which one may lawfully joyne those rocks,
those incumbrances, and those hideous monsters. If so it happen, that his
Disciple prove of so different a condition, that he rather love to give eare to
an idle fable than to the report of some noble voiage, or other notable and
wise discourse, when he shall heare it; that at the sound of a Drum or clang
of a Trumpet, which are wont to rowse and arme the youthly heat of his
Page 64
companions, turneth to another that calleth him to see a play, tumbling,
jugling tricks, or other idle lose-time sports; and who for pleasures sake
doth not deeme it more delightsome to returne all sweatie and wearie from a
victorious combat, from wrestling, or riding of a horse, than from a Tennis-
court or dancing schoole, with the prize or honour of such exercises; The
best remedy I know for such a one is, to put him prentice to some base
occupation, in some good towne or other, yea, were he the sonne of a Duke;
according to Platoes rule, who saith "That children must be placed, not
according to their fathers conditions, but the faculties of their mind." Since
it is Philosophie that teacheth us to live, and that infancie as well as other
ages, may plainly read her lessons in the same, why should it not be
imparted unto young Schollers?
Vdum et molle lutum est, nunc nunc properandus, et acri
Fingendus sine fine rota.
[Footnote: PES. Sat. iii. 23.]
He's moist and soft mould, and must by and by
Be cast, made up, while wheele whirls readily.
We are taught to live when our life is well-nigh spent. Many schollers
have been infected with that loathsome and marrow-wasting disease before
ever they came to read Aristotles treatise of Temperance. Cicero was wont
to say, "That could he out-live the lives of two men, he should never find
leasure to study the Lyrike Poets." And I find these Sophisters both worse
and more unprofitable. Our childe is engaged in greater matters; And but
the first fifteene or sixteene yeares of his life are due unto Pedantisme, the
rest unto action: let us therefore imploy so short time as we have to live in
more necessarie instructions. It is an abuse; remove these thornie quiddities
of Logike, whereby our life can no whit be amended, and betake our selves
to the simple discourses of Philosophy; know how to chuse and fitly to
jugling tricks, or other idle lose-time sports; and who for pleasures sake
doth not deeme it more delightsome to returne all sweatie and wearie from a
victorious combat, from wrestling, or riding of a horse, than from a Tennis-
court or dancing schoole, with the prize or honour of such exercises; The
best remedy I know for such a one is, to put him prentice to some base
occupation, in some good towne or other, yea, were he the sonne of a Duke;
according to Platoes rule, who saith "That children must be placed, not
according to their fathers conditions, but the faculties of their mind." Since
it is Philosophie that teacheth us to live, and that infancie as well as other
ages, may plainly read her lessons in the same, why should it not be
imparted unto young Schollers?
Vdum et molle lutum est, nunc nunc properandus, et acri
Fingendus sine fine rota.
[Footnote: PES. Sat. iii. 23.]
He's moist and soft mould, and must by and by
Be cast, made up, while wheele whirls readily.
We are taught to live when our life is well-nigh spent. Many schollers
have been infected with that loathsome and marrow-wasting disease before
ever they came to read Aristotles treatise of Temperance. Cicero was wont
to say, "That could he out-live the lives of two men, he should never find
leasure to study the Lyrike Poets." And I find these Sophisters both worse
and more unprofitable. Our childe is engaged in greater matters; And but
the first fifteene or sixteene yeares of his life are due unto Pedantisme, the
rest unto action: let us therefore imploy so short time as we have to live in
more necessarie instructions. It is an abuse; remove these thornie quiddities
of Logike, whereby our life can no whit be amended, and betake our selves
to the simple discourses of Philosophy; know how to chuse and fitly to
Page 65
make use of them: they are much more easie to be conceived than one of
Bocace his tales. A childe comming from nurse is more capable of them,
than he is to learne to read or write. Philosophy hath discourses, whereof
infancie as well as decaying old-age may make good use. I am of Plutarkes
mind, which is, that Aristotle did not so much ammuse his great Disciple
about the arts how to frame Syllogismes, or the principles of Geometric, as
he endevoured to instruct him with good precepts concerning valour,
prowesse, magnanimitie, and temperance, and an undanted assurance not to
feare any thing; and with such munition he sent him, being yet verie young,
to subdue the Empire of the world, only with 30000 footmen, 4000
horsemen, and 42000 Crownes in monie. As for other arts and sciences; he
saith Alexander honoured them, and commended their excellencie and
comlinesse; but for any pleasure he tooke in them, his affection could not
easily be drawne to exercise them.
—petite hinc juvenesque senesque
Finem animo certum, miserisque viatica canis.
[Footnote: Sat. v. 64]
Young men and old, draw hence (in your affaires)
Your minds set marke, provision for gray haires.
It is that which Epicurus said in the beginning of his letter to Memiceus:
"Neither let the youngest shun nor the oldest wearie himselfe in
philosophying, for who doth otherwise seemeth to say, that either the season
to live happily is not yet come, or is already past." Yet would I not have this
young gentleman pent-up, nor carelesly cast-off to the heedlesse choler, or
melancholy humour of the hasty Schoole-master. I would not have his
budding spirit corrupted with keeping him fast-tied, and as it were
labouring fourteene or fifteene houres a day poaring on his booke, as some
doe, as if he were a day-labouring man; neither doe I thinke it fit, if at any
Bocace his tales. A childe comming from nurse is more capable of them,
than he is to learne to read or write. Philosophy hath discourses, whereof
infancie as well as decaying old-age may make good use. I am of Plutarkes
mind, which is, that Aristotle did not so much ammuse his great Disciple
about the arts how to frame Syllogismes, or the principles of Geometric, as
he endevoured to instruct him with good precepts concerning valour,
prowesse, magnanimitie, and temperance, and an undanted assurance not to
feare any thing; and with such munition he sent him, being yet verie young,
to subdue the Empire of the world, only with 30000 footmen, 4000
horsemen, and 42000 Crownes in monie. As for other arts and sciences; he
saith Alexander honoured them, and commended their excellencie and
comlinesse; but for any pleasure he tooke in them, his affection could not
easily be drawne to exercise them.
—petite hinc juvenesque senesque
Finem animo certum, miserisque viatica canis.
[Footnote: Sat. v. 64]
Young men and old, draw hence (in your affaires)
Your minds set marke, provision for gray haires.
It is that which Epicurus said in the beginning of his letter to Memiceus:
"Neither let the youngest shun nor the oldest wearie himselfe in
philosophying, for who doth otherwise seemeth to say, that either the season
to live happily is not yet come, or is already past." Yet would I not have this
young gentleman pent-up, nor carelesly cast-off to the heedlesse choler, or
melancholy humour of the hasty Schoole-master. I would not have his
budding spirit corrupted with keeping him fast-tied, and as it were
labouring fourteene or fifteene houres a day poaring on his booke, as some
doe, as if he were a day-labouring man; neither doe I thinke it fit, if at any
Page 66
time, by reason of some solitairie or melancholy complexion, he should be
scene with an over-indiscreet application given to his booke, it should be
cherished in him; for, that doth often make him both unapt for civill
conversation and distracts him from better imployments: How many have I
scene in my daies, by an over-greedy desire of knowledge, become as it
were foolish? Carneades was so deeply plunged, and as I may say besotted
in it, that he could never have leasure to cut his haire, or pare his nailes: nor
would I have his noble manners obscured by the incivilitie and barbarisme
of others. The French wisdome hath long since proverbially been spoken of
as verie apt to conceive study in her youth, but most unapt to keepe it long.
In good truth, we see at this day that there is nothing lovelier to behold than
the young children of France; but for the most part, they deceive the hope
which was fore-apprehended of them: for when they once become men,
there is no excellencie at all in them. I have heard men of understanding
hold this opinion, that the Colleges to which they are sent (of which there
are store) doe thus besot them: whereas to our scholler, a cabinet, a gardin,
the table, the bed, a solitarinesse, a companie, morning and evening, and all
houres shall be alike unto him, all places shall be a study for him: for
Philosophy (as a former of judgements, and modeler of customes) shall be
his principall lesson, having the privilege to entermeddle her selfe with all
things, and in all places. Isocrates the Orator, being once requested at a
great banket to speake of his art, when all thought he had reason to answer,
said, "It is not now time to doe what I can, and what should now be done, I
cannot doe it; For, to present orations, or to enter into disputation of
Rhetorike, before a companie assembled together to be merrie, and make
good cheere, would be but a medley of harsh and jarring musicke." The like
may be said of all other Sciences. But touching Philosophy, namely, in that
point where it treateth of man, and of his duties and offices, it hath been the
common judgement of the wisest, that in regard of the pleasantnesse of her
conversatione, she ought not to be rejected, neither at banquets nor at
scene with an over-indiscreet application given to his booke, it should be
cherished in him; for, that doth often make him both unapt for civill
conversation and distracts him from better imployments: How many have I
scene in my daies, by an over-greedy desire of knowledge, become as it
were foolish? Carneades was so deeply plunged, and as I may say besotted
in it, that he could never have leasure to cut his haire, or pare his nailes: nor
would I have his noble manners obscured by the incivilitie and barbarisme
of others. The French wisdome hath long since proverbially been spoken of
as verie apt to conceive study in her youth, but most unapt to keepe it long.
In good truth, we see at this day that there is nothing lovelier to behold than
the young children of France; but for the most part, they deceive the hope
which was fore-apprehended of them: for when they once become men,
there is no excellencie at all in them. I have heard men of understanding
hold this opinion, that the Colleges to which they are sent (of which there
are store) doe thus besot them: whereas to our scholler, a cabinet, a gardin,
the table, the bed, a solitarinesse, a companie, morning and evening, and all
houres shall be alike unto him, all places shall be a study for him: for
Philosophy (as a former of judgements, and modeler of customes) shall be
his principall lesson, having the privilege to entermeddle her selfe with all
things, and in all places. Isocrates the Orator, being once requested at a
great banket to speake of his art, when all thought he had reason to answer,
said, "It is not now time to doe what I can, and what should now be done, I
cannot doe it; For, to present orations, or to enter into disputation of
Rhetorike, before a companie assembled together to be merrie, and make
good cheere, would be but a medley of harsh and jarring musicke." The like
may be said of all other Sciences. But touching Philosophy, namely, in that
point where it treateth of man, and of his duties and offices, it hath been the
common judgement of the wisest, that in regard of the pleasantnesse of her
conversatione, she ought not to be rejected, neither at banquets nor at
Page 67
sports. And Plato having invited her to his solemne feast, we see how kindly
she entertaineth the companie with a milde behaviour, fitly suting her selfe
to time and place, notwithstanding it be one of his learned'st and profitable
discourses.
AEque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus aque,
Et neglecta aeque pueris senibusque nocebit.
[Footnote: HOR. 1. i. Epist. 125.]
Poore men alike, alike rich men it easeth,
Alike it, scorned, old and young displeaseth.
So doubtlesse he shall lesse be idle than others; for even as the paces we
bestow walking in a gallerie, although they be twice as many more, wearie
us not so much as those we spend in going a set journey: So our lesson
being past over, as it were, by chance, or way of encounter, without strict
observance of time or place, being applied to all our actions, shall be
digested, and never felt. All sports and exercises shall be a part of his study;
running, wrestling, musicke, dancing, hunting, and managing of armes and
horses. I would have the exterior demeanor or decencie, and the disposition
of his person to be fashioned together with his mind: for, it is not a mind, it
is not a body that we erect, but it is a man, and we must not make two parts
of him. And as Plato saith, They must not be erected one without another,
but equally be directed, no otherwise than a couple of horses matched to
draw in one selfe-same teeme. And to heare him, doth he not seeme to
imploy more time and care in the exercises of his bodie: and to thinke that
the minde is together with the same exercised, and not the contrarie? As for
other matters, this institution ought to be directed by a sweet- severe
mildnesse; Not as some do, who in liew of gently-bidding children to the
banquet of letters, present them with nothing but horror and crueltie. Let me
have this violence and compulsion removed, there is nothing that, in my
she entertaineth the companie with a milde behaviour, fitly suting her selfe
to time and place, notwithstanding it be one of his learned'st and profitable
discourses.
AEque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus aque,
Et neglecta aeque pueris senibusque nocebit.
[Footnote: HOR. 1. i. Epist. 125.]
Poore men alike, alike rich men it easeth,
Alike it, scorned, old and young displeaseth.
So doubtlesse he shall lesse be idle than others; for even as the paces we
bestow walking in a gallerie, although they be twice as many more, wearie
us not so much as those we spend in going a set journey: So our lesson
being past over, as it were, by chance, or way of encounter, without strict
observance of time or place, being applied to all our actions, shall be
digested, and never felt. All sports and exercises shall be a part of his study;
running, wrestling, musicke, dancing, hunting, and managing of armes and
horses. I would have the exterior demeanor or decencie, and the disposition
of his person to be fashioned together with his mind: for, it is not a mind, it
is not a body that we erect, but it is a man, and we must not make two parts
of him. And as Plato saith, They must not be erected one without another,
but equally be directed, no otherwise than a couple of horses matched to
draw in one selfe-same teeme. And to heare him, doth he not seeme to
imploy more time and care in the exercises of his bodie: and to thinke that
the minde is together with the same exercised, and not the contrarie? As for
other matters, this institution ought to be directed by a sweet- severe
mildnesse; Not as some do, who in liew of gently-bidding children to the
banquet of letters, present them with nothing but horror and crueltie. Let me
have this violence and compulsion removed, there is nothing that, in my
Page 68
seeming, doth more bastardise and dizzie a welborne and gentle nature: If
you would have him stand in awe of shame and punishment, doe not so
much enure him to it: accustome him patiently to endure sweat and cold,
the sharpnesse of the wind, the heat of the sunne, and how to despise all
hazards. Remove from him all nicenesse and quaintnesse in clothing, in
lying, in eating, and in drinking: fashion him to all things, that he prove not
a faire and wanton-puling boy, but a lustie and vigorous boy: When I was a
child, being a man, and now am old, I have ever judged and believed the
same. But amongst other things, I could never away with this kind of
discipline used in most of our Colleges. It had peradventure been lesse
hurtfull, if they had somewhat inclined to mildnesse, or gentle entreatie. It
is a verie prison of captivated youth, and proves dissolute in punishing it
before it be so. Come upon them when they are going to their lesson, and
you heare nothing but whipping and brawling, both of children tormented,
and masters besotted with anger and chafing. How wide are they, which go
about to allure a childs mind to go to its booke, being yet but tender and
fearefull, with a stearne-frowning countenance, and with hands full of rods?
Oh wicked and pernicious manner of teaching! which Quintillian hath very
wel noted, that this imperious kind of authoritie, namely, this way of
punishing of children, drawes many dangerous inconveniences within. How
much more decent were it to see their school-houses and formes strewed
with greene boughs and flowers, than with bloudy burchen-twigs? If it lay
in me, I would doe as the Philosopher Speusippus did, who caused the
pictures of Gladness and Joy, of Flora and of the Graces, to be set up round
about his school-house. Where their profit lieth, there should also be their
recreation. Those meats ought to be sugred over, that are healthful for
childrens stomakes, and those made bitter that are hurtfull for them. It is
strange to see how carefull Plato sheweth him selfe in framing of his lawes
about the recreation and pastime of the youth of his Citie, and how far he
extends him selfe about their exercises, sports, songs, leaping, and dancing,
you would have him stand in awe of shame and punishment, doe not so
much enure him to it: accustome him patiently to endure sweat and cold,
the sharpnesse of the wind, the heat of the sunne, and how to despise all
hazards. Remove from him all nicenesse and quaintnesse in clothing, in
lying, in eating, and in drinking: fashion him to all things, that he prove not
a faire and wanton-puling boy, but a lustie and vigorous boy: When I was a
child, being a man, and now am old, I have ever judged and believed the
same. But amongst other things, I could never away with this kind of
discipline used in most of our Colleges. It had peradventure been lesse
hurtfull, if they had somewhat inclined to mildnesse, or gentle entreatie. It
is a verie prison of captivated youth, and proves dissolute in punishing it
before it be so. Come upon them when they are going to their lesson, and
you heare nothing but whipping and brawling, both of children tormented,
and masters besotted with anger and chafing. How wide are they, which go
about to allure a childs mind to go to its booke, being yet but tender and
fearefull, with a stearne-frowning countenance, and with hands full of rods?
Oh wicked and pernicious manner of teaching! which Quintillian hath very
wel noted, that this imperious kind of authoritie, namely, this way of
punishing of children, drawes many dangerous inconveniences within. How
much more decent were it to see their school-houses and formes strewed
with greene boughs and flowers, than with bloudy burchen-twigs? If it lay
in me, I would doe as the Philosopher Speusippus did, who caused the
pictures of Gladness and Joy, of Flora and of the Graces, to be set up round
about his school-house. Where their profit lieth, there should also be their
recreation. Those meats ought to be sugred over, that are healthful for
childrens stomakes, and those made bitter that are hurtfull for them. It is
strange to see how carefull Plato sheweth him selfe in framing of his lawes
about the recreation and pastime of the youth of his Citie, and how far he
extends him selfe about their exercises, sports, songs, leaping, and dancing,
Page 69
whereof he saith, that severe antiquitie gave the conduct and patronage unto
the Gods themselves, namely, to Apollo, to the Muses, and to Minerva.
Marke but how far-forth he endevoreth to give a thousand precepts to be
kept in his places of exercises both of bodie and mind. As for learned
Sciences, he stands not much upon them, and seemeth in particular to
commend Poesie, but for Musickes sake. All strangenesse and selfe-
particularitie in our manners and conditions, is to be shunned, as an enemie
to societie and civill conversation. Who would not be astonished at
Demophons complexion, chiefe steward of Alexanders household, who was
wont to sweat in the shadow, and quiver for cold in the sunne? I have seene
some to startle at the smell of an apple more than at the shot of a peece;
some to be frighted with a mouse, some readie to cast their gorge [Footnote:
Vomit.] at the sight of a messe of creame, and others to be scared with
seeing a fether bed shaken: as Germanicus, who could not abide to see a
cock, or heare his crowing. There may haply be some hidden propertie of
nature, which in my judgement might easilie be removed, if it were taken in
time. Institution hath gotten this upon me (I must confesse with much adoe)
for, except beere, all things else that are mans food agree indifferently with
my taste. The bodie being yet souple, ought to be accommodated to all
fashions and customes; and (alwaies provided, his appetites and desires be
kept under) let a yong man boldly be made fit for al Nations and
companies; yea, if need be, for al disorders and surfetings; let him acquaint
him selfe with al fashions; That he may be able to do al things, and love to
do none but those that are commendable. Some strict Philosophers
commend not, but rather blame Calisthenes, for losing the good favour of
his Master Alexander, only because he would not pledge him as much as he
had drunke to him. He shall laugh, jest, dally, and debauch himselfe with
his Prince. And in his debauching, I would have him out-go al his fellowes
in vigor and constancie, and that he omit not to doe evill, neither for want of
strength or knowledge, but for lacke of will. Multum interest utrum peccare
the Gods themselves, namely, to Apollo, to the Muses, and to Minerva.
Marke but how far-forth he endevoreth to give a thousand precepts to be
kept in his places of exercises both of bodie and mind. As for learned
Sciences, he stands not much upon them, and seemeth in particular to
commend Poesie, but for Musickes sake. All strangenesse and selfe-
particularitie in our manners and conditions, is to be shunned, as an enemie
to societie and civill conversation. Who would not be astonished at
Demophons complexion, chiefe steward of Alexanders household, who was
wont to sweat in the shadow, and quiver for cold in the sunne? I have seene
some to startle at the smell of an apple more than at the shot of a peece;
some to be frighted with a mouse, some readie to cast their gorge [Footnote:
Vomit.] at the sight of a messe of creame, and others to be scared with
seeing a fether bed shaken: as Germanicus, who could not abide to see a
cock, or heare his crowing. There may haply be some hidden propertie of
nature, which in my judgement might easilie be removed, if it were taken in
time. Institution hath gotten this upon me (I must confesse with much adoe)
for, except beere, all things else that are mans food agree indifferently with
my taste. The bodie being yet souple, ought to be accommodated to all
fashions and customes; and (alwaies provided, his appetites and desires be
kept under) let a yong man boldly be made fit for al Nations and
companies; yea, if need be, for al disorders and surfetings; let him acquaint
him selfe with al fashions; That he may be able to do al things, and love to
do none but those that are commendable. Some strict Philosophers
commend not, but rather blame Calisthenes, for losing the good favour of
his Master Alexander, only because he would not pledge him as much as he
had drunke to him. He shall laugh, jest, dally, and debauch himselfe with
his Prince. And in his debauching, I would have him out-go al his fellowes
in vigor and constancie, and that he omit not to doe evill, neither for want of
strength or knowledge, but for lacke of will. Multum interest utrum peccare
Page 70
quis nolit, aut nesciat: [Footnote: HOR. Epist. xvii. 23.] "There is a great
difference, whether one have no will, or no wit to doe amisse." I thought to
have honoured a gentleman (as great a stranger, and as far from such riotous
disorders as any is in France) by enquiring of him in verie good companie,
how many times in all his life he had bin drunke in Germanie during the
time of his abode there, about the necessarie affaires of our King; who
tooke it even as I meant it, and answered three times, telling the time and
manner how. I know some, who for want of that qualitie, have been much
perplexed when they have had occasion to converse with that nation. I have
often noted with great admiration, that wonderfull nature of Alcibiades, to
see how easilie he could sute himselfe to so divers fashions and different
humors, without prejudice unto his health; sometimes exceeding the
sumptuousnesse and pompe of the Persians, and now and then surpassing.
the austeritie and frugalitie of the Lacedemonians; as reformed in Sparta, as
voluptuous in Ionia.
Omnis Atistippum decuit color, et status, et res.
[Footnote: HOR. Epist. xvii. 25.]
All colours, states, and things are fit
For courtly Aristippus wit.
Such a one would I frame my Disciple,
—quem duplici panno patientia velat,
Mirabor, vita via si conversa decebit.
Whom patience clothes with sutes of double kind,
I muse, if he another way will find.
Personavnque feret non inconcinnus utramque.
[Footnote: CIC. Tusc. Qu. 1. iv.]
difference, whether one have no will, or no wit to doe amisse." I thought to
have honoured a gentleman (as great a stranger, and as far from such riotous
disorders as any is in France) by enquiring of him in verie good companie,
how many times in all his life he had bin drunke in Germanie during the
time of his abode there, about the necessarie affaires of our King; who
tooke it even as I meant it, and answered three times, telling the time and
manner how. I know some, who for want of that qualitie, have been much
perplexed when they have had occasion to converse with that nation. I have
often noted with great admiration, that wonderfull nature of Alcibiades, to
see how easilie he could sute himselfe to so divers fashions and different
humors, without prejudice unto his health; sometimes exceeding the
sumptuousnesse and pompe of the Persians, and now and then surpassing.
the austeritie and frugalitie of the Lacedemonians; as reformed in Sparta, as
voluptuous in Ionia.
Omnis Atistippum decuit color, et status, et res.
[Footnote: HOR. Epist. xvii. 25.]
All colours, states, and things are fit
For courtly Aristippus wit.
Such a one would I frame my Disciple,
—quem duplici panno patientia velat,
Mirabor, vita via si conversa decebit.
Whom patience clothes with sutes of double kind,
I muse, if he another way will find.
Personavnque feret non inconcinnus utramque.
[Footnote: CIC. Tusc. Qu. 1. iv.]
Page 71
He not unfitly may,
Both parts and persons play.
Loe here my lessons, wherein he that acteth them, profiteth more than he
that but knoweth them, whom if you see, you heare, and if you heare him,
you see him. God forbid, saith some bodie in Plato, that to Philosophize, be
to learne many things, and to exercise the arts. Hanc amplissimam omnium
artium bene vivendi disciplinam, vita magis quant litteris persequntd sunt
[Footnote: Ib. 29.] "This discipline of living well, which is the amplest of
all other arts, they followed rather in their lives than in their learning or
writing." Leo Prince of the Phliasians, enquiring of Heraclides Ponticus,
what art he professed, he answered, "Sir, I professe neither art nor science;
but I am a Philosopher." Some reproved Diogenes, that being an ignorant
man, he did neverthelesse meddle with Philosophie, to whom he replied,
"So much the more reason have I and to greater purpose doe I meddle with
it." Hegesias praid him upon a time to reade some booke unto him: "You are
a merry man," said he: "As you chuse naturall and not painted, right and not
counterfeit figges to eat, why doe you not likewise chuse, not the painted
and written, but the true and naturall exercises?" He shall not so much
repeat, as act his lesson. In his actions shall he make repetition of the same.
We must observe, whether there bee wisdome in his enterprises, integritie in
his demeanor, modestie in his jestures, justice in his actions, judgement and
grace in his speech, courage in his sicknesse, moderation in his sports,
temperance in his pleasures, order in the government of his house, and
indifference in his taste, whether it be flesh, fish, wine, or water, or
whatsoever he feedeth upon. Qui disciplinam suam non ostentationem
scientiae sed legem vitae putet: quique obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis
pareat [Footnote: Ib. I. ii.] "Who thinks his learning not an ostentation of
knowledge, but a law of life, and himselfe obayes himselfe, and doth what
is decreed."
Both parts and persons play.
Loe here my lessons, wherein he that acteth them, profiteth more than he
that but knoweth them, whom if you see, you heare, and if you heare him,
you see him. God forbid, saith some bodie in Plato, that to Philosophize, be
to learne many things, and to exercise the arts. Hanc amplissimam omnium
artium bene vivendi disciplinam, vita magis quant litteris persequntd sunt
[Footnote: Ib. 29.] "This discipline of living well, which is the amplest of
all other arts, they followed rather in their lives than in their learning or
writing." Leo Prince of the Phliasians, enquiring of Heraclides Ponticus,
what art he professed, he answered, "Sir, I professe neither art nor science;
but I am a Philosopher." Some reproved Diogenes, that being an ignorant
man, he did neverthelesse meddle with Philosophie, to whom he replied,
"So much the more reason have I and to greater purpose doe I meddle with
it." Hegesias praid him upon a time to reade some booke unto him: "You are
a merry man," said he: "As you chuse naturall and not painted, right and not
counterfeit figges to eat, why doe you not likewise chuse, not the painted
and written, but the true and naturall exercises?" He shall not so much
repeat, as act his lesson. In his actions shall he make repetition of the same.
We must observe, whether there bee wisdome in his enterprises, integritie in
his demeanor, modestie in his jestures, justice in his actions, judgement and
grace in his speech, courage in his sicknesse, moderation in his sports,
temperance in his pleasures, order in the government of his house, and
indifference in his taste, whether it be flesh, fish, wine, or water, or
whatsoever he feedeth upon. Qui disciplinam suam non ostentationem
scientiae sed legem vitae putet: quique obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis
pareat [Footnote: Ib. I. ii.] "Who thinks his learning not an ostentation of
knowledge, but a law of life, and himselfe obayes himselfe, and doth what
is decreed."
Page 72
The true mirror of our discourses is the course of our lives. Zeuxidamus
answered one that demanded of him, why the Lacedemonians did not draw
into a booke, the ordinances of prowesse, that so their yong men might read
them; "it is," saith he, "because they would rather accustome them to deeds
and actions, than to bookes and writings." Compare at the end of fifteene or
sixteene yeares one of these collegiall Latinizers, who hath imployed all
that while onely in learning how to speake, to such a one as I meane. The
world is nothing but babling and words, and I never saw man that doth not
rather speake more than he ought, than lesse. Notwithstanding halfe our age
is consumed that way. We are kept foure or five yeares learning to
understand bare words, and to joine them into clauses, then as long in
proportioning a great bodie extended into foure or five parts; and five more
at least ere we can succinctly know how to mingle, joine, and interlace them
handsomly into a subtil fashion, and into one coherent orbe. Let us leave it
to those whose profession is to doe nothing else. Being once on my journey
to Orleans, it was my chance to meet upon that plaine that lieth on this side
Clery, with two Masters of Arts, traveling toward Bordeaux, about fiftie
paces one from another; far off behind them, I descride a troupe of
horsemen, their Master riding formost, who was the Earle of Rochefocault;
one of my servants enquiring of the first of those Masters of Arts, what
Gentleman he was that followed him; supposing my servant had meant his
fellow-scholler, for he had not yet seen the Earles traine, answered
pleasantly, "He is no gentleman, Sir, but a Gramarian, and I am a Logitian."
Now, we that contrariwise seek not to frame a Gramarian, nor a Logitian,
but a compleat gentleman, let us give them leave to mispend their time; we
have else-where, and somewhat else of more import to doe. So that our
Disciple be well and sufficiently stored with matter; words will follow
apace, and if they will hot follow gently, he shall hale them on perforce. I
heare some excuse themselves, that they cannot expresse their meaning, and
make a semblance that their heads are so full stuft with many goodly things,
answered one that demanded of him, why the Lacedemonians did not draw
into a booke, the ordinances of prowesse, that so their yong men might read
them; "it is," saith he, "because they would rather accustome them to deeds
and actions, than to bookes and writings." Compare at the end of fifteene or
sixteene yeares one of these collegiall Latinizers, who hath imployed all
that while onely in learning how to speake, to such a one as I meane. The
world is nothing but babling and words, and I never saw man that doth not
rather speake more than he ought, than lesse. Notwithstanding halfe our age
is consumed that way. We are kept foure or five yeares learning to
understand bare words, and to joine them into clauses, then as long in
proportioning a great bodie extended into foure or five parts; and five more
at least ere we can succinctly know how to mingle, joine, and interlace them
handsomly into a subtil fashion, and into one coherent orbe. Let us leave it
to those whose profession is to doe nothing else. Being once on my journey
to Orleans, it was my chance to meet upon that plaine that lieth on this side
Clery, with two Masters of Arts, traveling toward Bordeaux, about fiftie
paces one from another; far off behind them, I descride a troupe of
horsemen, their Master riding formost, who was the Earle of Rochefocault;
one of my servants enquiring of the first of those Masters of Arts, what
Gentleman he was that followed him; supposing my servant had meant his
fellow-scholler, for he had not yet seen the Earles traine, answered
pleasantly, "He is no gentleman, Sir, but a Gramarian, and I am a Logitian."
Now, we that contrariwise seek not to frame a Gramarian, nor a Logitian,
but a compleat gentleman, let us give them leave to mispend their time; we
have else-where, and somewhat else of more import to doe. So that our
Disciple be well and sufficiently stored with matter; words will follow
apace, and if they will hot follow gently, he shall hale them on perforce. I
heare some excuse themselves, that they cannot expresse their meaning, and
make a semblance that their heads are so full stuft with many goodly things,
Page 73
but for want of eloquence they can neither titter nor make show of them. It
is a meere fopperie. And will you know what, in my seeming, the cause is?
They are shadows and Chimeraes, proceeding of some formelesse
conceptions, which they cannot distinguish or resolve within, and by
consequence are not able to produce them in as-much as they understand
not themselves: And if you but marke their earnestnesse, and how they
stammer and labour at the point of their deliverle, you would deeme that
what they go withall, is but a conceiving, and therefore nothing neere
downelying; and that they doe but licke that imperfect and shapelesse lump
of matter. As for me, I am of opinion, and Socrates would have it so, that he
who had a cleare and lively imagination in his mind, may easilie produce
and utter the same, although it be in Bergamaske [Footnote: A rustic dialect
of the north of Italy.] or Welsh, and if he be dumbe, by signes and tokens.
Verbaque praevisam rem non invita sequentur.
[Footnote: HOR. Art. Poet. 311.]
When matter we fore-know,
Words voluntarie flow.
As one said, as poetically in his prose, Cum res animum occupavere,
verba ambiunt; [Footnote: SED. Controv. 1. vii. prae.] "When matter hath
possest their minds, they hunt after words:" and another: Ipsa res verba
rapiunt: [Footnote: CIC. de Fin. I. iii. c. 5.] "Things themselves will catch
and carry words:" He knowes neither Ablative, Conjunctive, Substantive,
nor Gramar, no more doth his Lackey, nor any Oyster-wife about the streets,
and yet if you have a mind to it he will intertaine you, your fill, and
peradventure stumble as little and as seldome against the rules of his
tongue, as the best Master of arts in France. He hath no skill in Rhetoricke,
nor can he with a preface fore-stall and captivate the Gentle Readers good
will: nor careth he greatly to know it. In good sooth, all this garish painting
is a meere fopperie. And will you know what, in my seeming, the cause is?
They are shadows and Chimeraes, proceeding of some formelesse
conceptions, which they cannot distinguish or resolve within, and by
consequence are not able to produce them in as-much as they understand
not themselves: And if you but marke their earnestnesse, and how they
stammer and labour at the point of their deliverle, you would deeme that
what they go withall, is but a conceiving, and therefore nothing neere
downelying; and that they doe but licke that imperfect and shapelesse lump
of matter. As for me, I am of opinion, and Socrates would have it so, that he
who had a cleare and lively imagination in his mind, may easilie produce
and utter the same, although it be in Bergamaske [Footnote: A rustic dialect
of the north of Italy.] or Welsh, and if he be dumbe, by signes and tokens.
Verbaque praevisam rem non invita sequentur.
[Footnote: HOR. Art. Poet. 311.]
When matter we fore-know,
Words voluntarie flow.
As one said, as poetically in his prose, Cum res animum occupavere,
verba ambiunt; [Footnote: SED. Controv. 1. vii. prae.] "When matter hath
possest their minds, they hunt after words:" and another: Ipsa res verba
rapiunt: [Footnote: CIC. de Fin. I. iii. c. 5.] "Things themselves will catch
and carry words:" He knowes neither Ablative, Conjunctive, Substantive,
nor Gramar, no more doth his Lackey, nor any Oyster-wife about the streets,
and yet if you have a mind to it he will intertaine you, your fill, and
peradventure stumble as little and as seldome against the rules of his
tongue, as the best Master of arts in France. He hath no skill in Rhetoricke,
nor can he with a preface fore-stall and captivate the Gentle Readers good
will: nor careth he greatly to know it. In good sooth, all this garish painting
Page 74
is easilie defaced, by the lustre of an in-bred and simple truth; for these
dainties and quaint devices serve but to ammuse the vulgar sort; unapt and
incapable to taste the most solid and firme meat: as Afer verie plainly
declareth in Cornelius Tacitus. The Ambassadours of Samos being come to
Cleomenes King of Sparta, prepared with a long prolix Oration, to stir him
up to war against the tyrant Policrates, after he had listned a good while
unto them, his answer was: "Touching your Exordium or beginning I have
forgotten it; the middle I remember not; and for your conclusion I will do
nothing in it." A fit, and (to my thinking) a verie good answer; and the
Orators were put to such a shift; as they knew not what to replie. And what
said another? the Athenians from out two of their cunning Architects, were
to chuse one to erect a notable great frame; the one of them more affected
and selfe presuming, presented himselfe before them, with a smooth fore-
premeditated discourse, about the subject of that piece of worke, and
thereby drew the judgements of the common people unto his liking; but the
other in few words spake thus: "Lords of Athens, what this man hath said I
will performe." In the greatest earnestnesse of Ciceroes eloquence many
were drawn into a kind of admiration; But Cato jesting at it, said, "Have we
not a pleasant Consull?" A quicke cunning Argument, and a wittie saying,
whether it go before or come after, it is never out of season. If it have no
coherence with that which goeth before, nor with what commeth after; it is
good and commendable in it selfe. I am none of those that think a good
Ryme, to make a good Poeme; let him hardly (if so he please) make a short
syllable long, it is no great matter; if the invention be rare and good, and his
wit and judgement have cunningly played their part. I will say to such a
one; he is a good Poet, but an ill Versifier.
Emunciae naris, durus componere versus.
[Footnote: HOR. 1. i. Sat. iv.]
dainties and quaint devices serve but to ammuse the vulgar sort; unapt and
incapable to taste the most solid and firme meat: as Afer verie plainly
declareth in Cornelius Tacitus. The Ambassadours of Samos being come to
Cleomenes King of Sparta, prepared with a long prolix Oration, to stir him
up to war against the tyrant Policrates, after he had listned a good while
unto them, his answer was: "Touching your Exordium or beginning I have
forgotten it; the middle I remember not; and for your conclusion I will do
nothing in it." A fit, and (to my thinking) a verie good answer; and the
Orators were put to such a shift; as they knew not what to replie. And what
said another? the Athenians from out two of their cunning Architects, were
to chuse one to erect a notable great frame; the one of them more affected
and selfe presuming, presented himselfe before them, with a smooth fore-
premeditated discourse, about the subject of that piece of worke, and
thereby drew the judgements of the common people unto his liking; but the
other in few words spake thus: "Lords of Athens, what this man hath said I
will performe." In the greatest earnestnesse of Ciceroes eloquence many
were drawn into a kind of admiration; But Cato jesting at it, said, "Have we
not a pleasant Consull?" A quicke cunning Argument, and a wittie saying,
whether it go before or come after, it is never out of season. If it have no
coherence with that which goeth before, nor with what commeth after; it is
good and commendable in it selfe. I am none of those that think a good
Ryme, to make a good Poeme; let him hardly (if so he please) make a short
syllable long, it is no great matter; if the invention be rare and good, and his
wit and judgement have cunningly played their part. I will say to such a
one; he is a good Poet, but an ill Versifier.
Emunciae naris, durus componere versus.
[Footnote: HOR. 1. i. Sat. iv.]
Page 75
A man whose sense could finely pierce,
But harsh and hard to make a verse.
Let a man (saith Horace) make his worke loose all seames, measures, and
joynts.
Tempora certa moddsque, et quod prius ordine verbum est,
[Footnote: Ib. 58.]
Posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis:
Invenias etiam disjecti membra Poetae.
[Footnote: Ib. 62.]
Set times and moods, make you the first word last,
The last word first, as if they were new cast:
Yet find th' unjoynted Poets joints stand fast.
He shall for all that, nothing gain-say himselfe, every piece will make a
good shew. To this purpose answered Menander those that chid him, the day
being at hand, in which he had promised a Comedy, and had not begun the
same, "Tut-tut," said he, "it is alreadie finished, there wanteth nothing but to
adde the verse unto it;" for, having ranged and cast the plot in his mind, he
made small accompt of feet, of measures, or cadences of verses, which
indeed are but of small import in regard of the rest. Since great Ronsarde
and learned Bellay have raised our French Poesie unto that height of honour
where it now is: I see not one of these petty ballad-makers, or prentise
dogrell rymers, that doth not bombast his labours with high-swelling and
heaven-disimbowelling words, and that doth not marshall his cadences
verie neere as they doe. Plus sonat quam valet. [Footnote: Sen, Epist. xl.]
"The sound is more than the weight or worth." And for the vulgar sort there
were never so many Poets, and so few good: but as it hath been easie for
them to represent their rymes, so come they far short in imitating the rich
descriptions of the one, and rare inventions of the other. But what shall he
But harsh and hard to make a verse.
Let a man (saith Horace) make his worke loose all seames, measures, and
joynts.
Tempora certa moddsque, et quod prius ordine verbum est,
[Footnote: Ib. 58.]
Posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis:
Invenias etiam disjecti membra Poetae.
[Footnote: Ib. 62.]
Set times and moods, make you the first word last,
The last word first, as if they were new cast:
Yet find th' unjoynted Poets joints stand fast.
He shall for all that, nothing gain-say himselfe, every piece will make a
good shew. To this purpose answered Menander those that chid him, the day
being at hand, in which he had promised a Comedy, and had not begun the
same, "Tut-tut," said he, "it is alreadie finished, there wanteth nothing but to
adde the verse unto it;" for, having ranged and cast the plot in his mind, he
made small accompt of feet, of measures, or cadences of verses, which
indeed are but of small import in regard of the rest. Since great Ronsarde
and learned Bellay have raised our French Poesie unto that height of honour
where it now is: I see not one of these petty ballad-makers, or prentise
dogrell rymers, that doth not bombast his labours with high-swelling and
heaven-disimbowelling words, and that doth not marshall his cadences
verie neere as they doe. Plus sonat quam valet. [Footnote: Sen, Epist. xl.]
"The sound is more than the weight or worth." And for the vulgar sort there
were never so many Poets, and so few good: but as it hath been easie for
them to represent their rymes, so come they far short in imitating the rich
descriptions of the one, and rare inventions of the other. But what shall he
Page 76
doe, if he be urged with sophisticall subtilties about a Sillogisme? A
gammon of Bacon makes a man drink, drinking quencheth a mans thirst;
Ergo, a gammon of bacon quencheth a mans thirst. Let him mock at it, it is
more wittie to be mockt at than to be answered. Let him borrow this
pleasant counter-craft of Aristippus; "Why shall I unbind that, which being
bound doth so much trouble me?" Some one proposed certaine Logicall
quiddities against Cleanthes, to whom Chrisippus said; use such jugling
tricks to play with children, and divert not the serious thoughts of an aged
man to such idle matters. If such foolish wiles, Contorta et aculeata
sophismata, [Footnote: Cic. Acad. Qu. 1. iv.] "Intricate and stinged
sophismes," must perswade a lie, it is dangerous: but if they proove void of
any effect, and move him but to laughter, I see not why he shall beware of
them. Some there are so foolish that will go a quarter of a mile out of the
way to hunt after a quaint new word, if they once get in chace; Aut qui non
verba rebus aptant, sed res extrinsecus arcessunt, quibus verba conveniant:
"Or such as fit not words to matter, but fetch matter from abroad, whereto
words be fitted." And another, Qui alicujus verbi decore placentis, vocentur
ad id quod non proposuerant scribere: [Footnote: Sen. Epist. liii.] "Who are
allured by the grace of some pleasing word, to write what they intended not
to write." I doe more willingly winde up a wittie notable sentence, that so I
may sew it upon me, than unwinde my thread to go fetch it. Contrariwise, it
is for words to serve and wait upon the matter, and not for matter to attend
upon words, and if the French tongue cannot reach unto it, let the Gaskonie,
or any other. I would have the matters to surmount, and so fill the
imagination of him that harkeneth, that he have no remembrance at all of
the words. It is a naturall, simple, and unaffected speech that I love, so
written as it is spoken, and such upon the paper, as it is in the mouth, a
pithie, sinnowie, full, strong, compendious and materiall speech, not so
delicate and affected as vehement and piercing.
gammon of Bacon makes a man drink, drinking quencheth a mans thirst;
Ergo, a gammon of bacon quencheth a mans thirst. Let him mock at it, it is
more wittie to be mockt at than to be answered. Let him borrow this
pleasant counter-craft of Aristippus; "Why shall I unbind that, which being
bound doth so much trouble me?" Some one proposed certaine Logicall
quiddities against Cleanthes, to whom Chrisippus said; use such jugling
tricks to play with children, and divert not the serious thoughts of an aged
man to such idle matters. If such foolish wiles, Contorta et aculeata
sophismata, [Footnote: Cic. Acad. Qu. 1. iv.] "Intricate and stinged
sophismes," must perswade a lie, it is dangerous: but if they proove void of
any effect, and move him but to laughter, I see not why he shall beware of
them. Some there are so foolish that will go a quarter of a mile out of the
way to hunt after a quaint new word, if they once get in chace; Aut qui non
verba rebus aptant, sed res extrinsecus arcessunt, quibus verba conveniant:
"Or such as fit not words to matter, but fetch matter from abroad, whereto
words be fitted." And another, Qui alicujus verbi decore placentis, vocentur
ad id quod non proposuerant scribere: [Footnote: Sen. Epist. liii.] "Who are
allured by the grace of some pleasing word, to write what they intended not
to write." I doe more willingly winde up a wittie notable sentence, that so I
may sew it upon me, than unwinde my thread to go fetch it. Contrariwise, it
is for words to serve and wait upon the matter, and not for matter to attend
upon words, and if the French tongue cannot reach unto it, let the Gaskonie,
or any other. I would have the matters to surmount, and so fill the
imagination of him that harkeneth, that he have no remembrance at all of
the words. It is a naturall, simple, and unaffected speech that I love, so
written as it is spoken, and such upon the paper, as it is in the mouth, a
pithie, sinnowie, full, strong, compendious and materiall speech, not so
delicate and affected as vehement and piercing.
Page 77
Hac demum sapiet dictio qua feriet.
[Footnote: Epitaph on Lucan, 6.]
In fine, that word is wisely fit,
Which strikes the fence, the marke doth hit.
Rather difficult than tedious, void of affection, free, loose and bold, that
every member of it seeme to make a bodie; not Pedanticall, nor Frier-like,
nor Lawyer-like, but rather downe right, Souldier-like. As Suetonius calleth
that of Julius Caesar, which I see no reason wherefore he calleth it. I have
sometimes pleased myselfe in imitating that licenciousnesse or wanton
humour of our youths, in wearing of their garments; as carelessly to let their
cloaks hang downe over one shoulder; to weare their cloakes scarfe or
bawdrikewise, and their stockings loose hanging about their legs. It
represents a kind of disdainful fiercenesse of these forraine embellishings,
and neglect carelesnesse of art: But I commend it more being imployed in
the course and forme of speech. All manner of affectation, namely
[Footnote: Especially,] in the livelinesse and libertie of France, is
unseemely in a Courtier. And in a Monarchie every Gentleman ought to
addresse himselfe unto [Footnote: Aim at] a Courtiers carriage. Therefore
do we well somewhat to incline to a native and carelesse behaviour. I like
not a contexture, where the seames and pieces may be seen: As in a well
compact bodie, what need a man distinguish and number all the bones and
veines severally? Quae veritati operam dat oratio, incomposita sit et
simplex [Footnote: Sen. Epist. xl] Quis accurate loquitur nisi qui vult putide
loqui [Footnote: Ib. Epist. ixxr.] "The speach that intendeth truth must be
plaine and unpollisht: Who speaketh elaborately, but he that meanes to
speake unfavourably?" That eloquence offereth injurie unto things, which
altogether drawes us to observe it. As in apparell, it is a signe of
pusillanimitie for one to marke himselfe, in some particular and unusuall
fashion: so likewise in common speech, for one to hunt after new phrases,
[Footnote: Epitaph on Lucan, 6.]
In fine, that word is wisely fit,
Which strikes the fence, the marke doth hit.
Rather difficult than tedious, void of affection, free, loose and bold, that
every member of it seeme to make a bodie; not Pedanticall, nor Frier-like,
nor Lawyer-like, but rather downe right, Souldier-like. As Suetonius calleth
that of Julius Caesar, which I see no reason wherefore he calleth it. I have
sometimes pleased myselfe in imitating that licenciousnesse or wanton
humour of our youths, in wearing of their garments; as carelessly to let their
cloaks hang downe over one shoulder; to weare their cloakes scarfe or
bawdrikewise, and their stockings loose hanging about their legs. It
represents a kind of disdainful fiercenesse of these forraine embellishings,
and neglect carelesnesse of art: But I commend it more being imployed in
the course and forme of speech. All manner of affectation, namely
[Footnote: Especially,] in the livelinesse and libertie of France, is
unseemely in a Courtier. And in a Monarchie every Gentleman ought to
addresse himselfe unto [Footnote: Aim at] a Courtiers carriage. Therefore
do we well somewhat to incline to a native and carelesse behaviour. I like
not a contexture, where the seames and pieces may be seen: As in a well
compact bodie, what need a man distinguish and number all the bones and
veines severally? Quae veritati operam dat oratio, incomposita sit et
simplex [Footnote: Sen. Epist. xl] Quis accurate loquitur nisi qui vult putide
loqui [Footnote: Ib. Epist. ixxr.] "The speach that intendeth truth must be
plaine and unpollisht: Who speaketh elaborately, but he that meanes to
speake unfavourably?" That eloquence offereth injurie unto things, which
altogether drawes us to observe it. As in apparell, it is a signe of
pusillanimitie for one to marke himselfe, in some particular and unusuall
fashion: so likewise in common speech, for one to hunt after new phrases,
Page 78
and unaccustomed quaint words, proceedeth of a scholasticall and childish
ambition. Let me use none other than are spoken in the hals of Paris.
Aristophanes the Gramarian was somewhat out of the way, when he
reproved Epicurus, for the simplicitie of his words, and the end of his art
oratorie, which was onely perspicuitie in speech. The imitation of speech,
by reason of the facilitie of it, followeth presently a whole nation. The
imitation of judging and inventing comes more slow. The greater number of
Readers, because they have found one self-same kind of gowne, suppose
most falsely to holde one like bodie. Outward garments and cloakes may be
borrowed, but never the sinews and strength of the bodie. Most of those that
converse with me, speake like unto these Essayes; but I know not whether
they think alike. The Athenians (as Plato averreth) have for their part great
care to be fluent and eloquent in their speech; The Lacedemonians endevour
to be short and compendious; and those of Creet labour more to bee
plentifull in conceits than in language. And these are the best. Zeno was
wont to say, "That he had two sorts of disciples; the one he called [Greek
word omitted], curious to learne things, and those were his darlings, the
other he termed [Greek word omitted], who respected nothing more than
the language." Yet can no man say, but that to speake well, is most gracious
and commendable, but not so excellent as some make it: and I am grieved
to see how we imploy most part of our time about that onely. I would first
know mine owne tongue perfectly, then my neighbours with whom I have
most commerce. I must needs acknowledge, that the Greeke and Latine
tongues are great ornaments in a gentleman, but they are purchased at over-
high a rate. Use it who list, I will tell you how they may be gotten better,
cheaper, and much sooner than is ordinarily used, which was tried in
myselfe. My late father, having, by all the meanes and industrie that is
possible for a man, sought amongst the wisest, and men of best
understanding, to find a most exquisite and readie way of teaching, being
advised of the inconveniences then in use; was given to understand that the
ambition. Let me use none other than are spoken in the hals of Paris.
Aristophanes the Gramarian was somewhat out of the way, when he
reproved Epicurus, for the simplicitie of his words, and the end of his art
oratorie, which was onely perspicuitie in speech. The imitation of speech,
by reason of the facilitie of it, followeth presently a whole nation. The
imitation of judging and inventing comes more slow. The greater number of
Readers, because they have found one self-same kind of gowne, suppose
most falsely to holde one like bodie. Outward garments and cloakes may be
borrowed, but never the sinews and strength of the bodie. Most of those that
converse with me, speake like unto these Essayes; but I know not whether
they think alike. The Athenians (as Plato averreth) have for their part great
care to be fluent and eloquent in their speech; The Lacedemonians endevour
to be short and compendious; and those of Creet labour more to bee
plentifull in conceits than in language. And these are the best. Zeno was
wont to say, "That he had two sorts of disciples; the one he called [Greek
word omitted], curious to learne things, and those were his darlings, the
other he termed [Greek word omitted], who respected nothing more than
the language." Yet can no man say, but that to speake well, is most gracious
and commendable, but not so excellent as some make it: and I am grieved
to see how we imploy most part of our time about that onely. I would first
know mine owne tongue perfectly, then my neighbours with whom I have
most commerce. I must needs acknowledge, that the Greeke and Latine
tongues are great ornaments in a gentleman, but they are purchased at over-
high a rate. Use it who list, I will tell you how they may be gotten better,
cheaper, and much sooner than is ordinarily used, which was tried in
myselfe. My late father, having, by all the meanes and industrie that is
possible for a man, sought amongst the wisest, and men of best
understanding, to find a most exquisite and readie way of teaching, being
advised of the inconveniences then in use; was given to understand that the
Page 79
lingring while, and best part of our youth, that we imploy in learning the
tongues, which cost them nothing, is the onely cause we can never attaine to
that absolute perfection of skill and knowledge of the Greekes and
Romanes. I doe not beleeve that to be the onely cause. But so it is, the
expedient my father found out was this; that being yet at nurse, and before
the first loosing of my tongue, I was delivered to a Germane (who died
since, a most excellent Physitian in France) he being then altogether
ignorant of the French tongue, but exquisitely readie and skilfull in the
Latine. This man, whom my father had sent for of purpose, and to whom he
gave verie great entertainment, had me continually in his armes, and was
mine onely overseer. There were also joyned unto him two of his
countrimen, but not so learned; whose charge was to attend, and now and
then to play with me; and all these together did never entertaine me with
other than the Latine tongue. As for others of his household, it was an
inviolable rule, that neither himselfe, nor my mother, nor man, nor maid-
servant, were suffered to speake one word in my companie, except such
Latine words as every one had learned to chat and prattle with me. It were
strange to tell how every one in the house profited therein. My Father and
my Mother learned so much Latine, that for a need they could understand it,
when they heard it spoken, even so did all the household servants, namely
such as were neerest and most about me. To be short, we were all so
Latinized, that the townes round about us had their share of it; insomuch as
even at this day, many Latine names both of workmen and of their tooles
are yet in use amongst them. And as for myselfe, I was about six years old,
and could understand no more French or Perigordine than Arabike; and that
without art, without bookes, rules, or grammer, without whipping or
whining, I had gotten as pure a Latin tongue as my Master could speake; the
rather because I could neither mingle or confound the same with other
tongues. If for an Essay they would give me a Theme, whereas the fashion
in Colleges is, to give it in French, I had it in bad Latine, to reduce the same
tongues, which cost them nothing, is the onely cause we can never attaine to
that absolute perfection of skill and knowledge of the Greekes and
Romanes. I doe not beleeve that to be the onely cause. But so it is, the
expedient my father found out was this; that being yet at nurse, and before
the first loosing of my tongue, I was delivered to a Germane (who died
since, a most excellent Physitian in France) he being then altogether
ignorant of the French tongue, but exquisitely readie and skilfull in the
Latine. This man, whom my father had sent for of purpose, and to whom he
gave verie great entertainment, had me continually in his armes, and was
mine onely overseer. There were also joyned unto him two of his
countrimen, but not so learned; whose charge was to attend, and now and
then to play with me; and all these together did never entertaine me with
other than the Latine tongue. As for others of his household, it was an
inviolable rule, that neither himselfe, nor my mother, nor man, nor maid-
servant, were suffered to speake one word in my companie, except such
Latine words as every one had learned to chat and prattle with me. It were
strange to tell how every one in the house profited therein. My Father and
my Mother learned so much Latine, that for a need they could understand it,
when they heard it spoken, even so did all the household servants, namely
such as were neerest and most about me. To be short, we were all so
Latinized, that the townes round about us had their share of it; insomuch as
even at this day, many Latine names both of workmen and of their tooles
are yet in use amongst them. And as for myselfe, I was about six years old,
and could understand no more French or Perigordine than Arabike; and that
without art, without bookes, rules, or grammer, without whipping or
whining, I had gotten as pure a Latin tongue as my Master could speake; the
rather because I could neither mingle or confound the same with other
tongues. If for an Essay they would give me a Theme, whereas the fashion
in Colleges is, to give it in French, I had it in bad Latine, to reduce the same
Page 80
into good. And Nicholas Grouchy, who hath written De comitiis
Romanorum, William Guerente, who hath commented Aristotele: George
Buchanan, that famous Scottish Poet, and Marke Antonie Muret, whom
(while he lived) both France and Italie to this day, acknowledge to have
been the best orator: all which have beene my familiar tutors, have often
told me, that in mine infancie I had the Latine tongue so readie and so
perfect, that themselves feared to take me in hand. And Buchanan, who
afterward I saw attending on the Marshall of Brissacke, told me, he was
about to write a treatise of the institution of children, and that he tooke the
model and patterne from mine: for at that time he had the charge and
bringing up of the young Earle of Brissack, whom since we have scene
prove so worthy and so valiant a Captaine. As for the Greeke, wherein I
have but small understanding, my father purposed to make me learne it by
art; But by new and uncustomed meanes, that is, by way of recreation and
exercise. We did tosse our declinations and conjugations to and fro, as they
doe, who by way of a certaine game at tables learne both Arithmetike and
Geometrie. For, amongst other things he had especially beene persuaded to
make me taste and apprehend the fruits of dutie and science by an unforced
kinde of will, and of mine owne choice; and without any compulsion or
rigor to bring me up in all mildnesse and libertie: yea with such kinde of
superstition, that, whereas some are of opinion that suddenly to awaken
young children, and as it were by violence to startle and fright them out of
their dead sleepe in a morning (wherein they are more heavie and deeper
plunged than we) doth greatly trouble and distemper their braines, he would
every morning cause me to be awakened by the sound of some instrument;
and I was never without a servant who to that purpose attended upon me.
This example may serve to judge of the rest; as also to commend the
judgement and tender affection of so carefull and loving a father: who is not
to be blamed, though hee reaped not the fruits answerable to his exquisite
toyle and painefull manuring. [Footnote: Cultivation.] Two things hindered
Romanorum, William Guerente, who hath commented Aristotele: George
Buchanan, that famous Scottish Poet, and Marke Antonie Muret, whom
(while he lived) both France and Italie to this day, acknowledge to have
been the best orator: all which have beene my familiar tutors, have often
told me, that in mine infancie I had the Latine tongue so readie and so
perfect, that themselves feared to take me in hand. And Buchanan, who
afterward I saw attending on the Marshall of Brissacke, told me, he was
about to write a treatise of the institution of children, and that he tooke the
model and patterne from mine: for at that time he had the charge and
bringing up of the young Earle of Brissack, whom since we have scene
prove so worthy and so valiant a Captaine. As for the Greeke, wherein I
have but small understanding, my father purposed to make me learne it by
art; But by new and uncustomed meanes, that is, by way of recreation and
exercise. We did tosse our declinations and conjugations to and fro, as they
doe, who by way of a certaine game at tables learne both Arithmetike and
Geometrie. For, amongst other things he had especially beene persuaded to
make me taste and apprehend the fruits of dutie and science by an unforced
kinde of will, and of mine owne choice; and without any compulsion or
rigor to bring me up in all mildnesse and libertie: yea with such kinde of
superstition, that, whereas some are of opinion that suddenly to awaken
young children, and as it were by violence to startle and fright them out of
their dead sleepe in a morning (wherein they are more heavie and deeper
plunged than we) doth greatly trouble and distemper their braines, he would
every morning cause me to be awakened by the sound of some instrument;
and I was never without a servant who to that purpose attended upon me.
This example may serve to judge of the rest; as also to commend the
judgement and tender affection of so carefull and loving a father: who is not
to be blamed, though hee reaped not the fruits answerable to his exquisite
toyle and painefull manuring. [Footnote: Cultivation.] Two things hindered
Page 81
the same; first the barrennesse and unfit soyle: for howbeit I were of a
sound and strong constitution, and of a tractable and yeelding condition, yet
was I so heavie, so sluggish, and so dull, that I could not be rouzed (yea
were it to goe to play) from out mine idle drowzinesse. What I saw, I saw it
perfectly; and under this heavy, and as it were Lethe-complexion did I breed
hardie imaginations, and opinions farre above my yeares. My spirit was
very slow, and would goe no further than it was led by others; my
apprehension blockish, my invention poore; and besides, I had a marvelous
defect in my weake memorie: it is therefore no wonder, if my father could
never bring me to any perfection. Secondly, as those that in some dangerous
sicknesse, moved with a kind of hope-full and greedie desire of perfect
health againe, give eare to every Leach or Emperike, [Footnote: Doctor or
quack.] and follow all counsels, the good man being exceedingly fearefull
to commit any oversight, in a matter he tooke so to heart, suffered himselfe
at last to be led away by the common opinion, which like unto the Cranes,
followeth ever those that go before, and yeelded to customer having those
no longer about him, that had given him his first directions, and which they
had brought out of Italie. Being but six yeares old I was sent to the College
of Guienne, then most flourishing and reputed the best in France, where it is
impossible to adde any thing to the great care he had, both to chuse the best
and most sufficient masters that could be found, to reade unto me, as also
for all other circumstances partaining to my education; wherein contrary to
usuall customes of Colleges, he observed many particular rules. But so it is,
it was ever a College. My Latin tongue was forthwith corrupted, whereof by
reason of discontinuance, I afterward lost all manner of use: which new
kind of institution stood me in no other stead, but that at my first admittance
it made me to overskip some of the lower formes, and to be placed in the
highest. For at thirteene yeares of age, that I left the College, I had read
over the whole course of Philosophie (as they call it) but with so small
profit, that I can now make no account of it. The first taste or feeling I had
sound and strong constitution, and of a tractable and yeelding condition, yet
was I so heavie, so sluggish, and so dull, that I could not be rouzed (yea
were it to goe to play) from out mine idle drowzinesse. What I saw, I saw it
perfectly; and under this heavy, and as it were Lethe-complexion did I breed
hardie imaginations, and opinions farre above my yeares. My spirit was
very slow, and would goe no further than it was led by others; my
apprehension blockish, my invention poore; and besides, I had a marvelous
defect in my weake memorie: it is therefore no wonder, if my father could
never bring me to any perfection. Secondly, as those that in some dangerous
sicknesse, moved with a kind of hope-full and greedie desire of perfect
health againe, give eare to every Leach or Emperike, [Footnote: Doctor or
quack.] and follow all counsels, the good man being exceedingly fearefull
to commit any oversight, in a matter he tooke so to heart, suffered himselfe
at last to be led away by the common opinion, which like unto the Cranes,
followeth ever those that go before, and yeelded to customer having those
no longer about him, that had given him his first directions, and which they
had brought out of Italie. Being but six yeares old I was sent to the College
of Guienne, then most flourishing and reputed the best in France, where it is
impossible to adde any thing to the great care he had, both to chuse the best
and most sufficient masters that could be found, to reade unto me, as also
for all other circumstances partaining to my education; wherein contrary to
usuall customes of Colleges, he observed many particular rules. But so it is,
it was ever a College. My Latin tongue was forthwith corrupted, whereof by
reason of discontinuance, I afterward lost all manner of use: which new
kind of institution stood me in no other stead, but that at my first admittance
it made me to overskip some of the lower formes, and to be placed in the
highest. For at thirteene yeares of age, that I left the College, I had read
over the whole course of Philosophie (as they call it) but with so small
profit, that I can now make no account of it. The first taste or feeling I had
Page 82
of bookes, was of the pleasure I tooke in reading the fables of Ovids
Metamorphosies; for, being but seven or eight yeares old, I would steale
and sequester my selfe from all other delights, only to reade them:
Forsomuch as the tongue wherein they were written was to me naturall; and
it was the easiest booke I knew, and by reason of the matter therein
contained most agreeing with my young age. For of King Arthur, of
Lancelot du Lake, of Amadis, of Huon of Burdeaux, and such idle time
consuming and wit-besotting trash of bookes wherein youth doth commonly
ammuse it selfe, I was not so much as acquainted with their names, and to
this day know not their bodies, nor what they containe: So exact was my
discipline. Whereby I became more carelesse to studie my other prescript
lessons. And well did it fall out for my purpose, that I had to deale with a
very discreet Master, who out of his judgement could with such dexterite
winke at and second my untowardlinesse, and such other faults that were in
me. For by that meanes I read over Virgils AEneados, Terence, Plautus, and
other Italian Comedies, allured thereunto by the pleasantnesse of their
severall subjects: Had he beene so foolishly- severe, or so severely froward
as to crosse this course of mine, I thinke verily I had never brought any
thing from the College, but the hate and contempt of Bookes, as doth the
greatest part of our Nobilitie. Such was his discretion, and so warily did he
behave himselfe, that he saw and would not see: hee would foster and
increase my longing: suffering me but by stealth and by snatches to glut my
selfe with those Bookes, holding ever a gentle hand over me, concerning
other regular studies. For, the chiefest thing my father required at their
hands (unto whose charge he had committed me) was a kinde of well
conditioned mildnesse and facilitie of complexion. [Footnote: Easiness of
disposition.] And, to say truth, mine had no other fault, but a certaine dull
languishing and heavie slothfullnesse. The danger was not, I should doe ill,
but that I should doe nothing.
Metamorphosies; for, being but seven or eight yeares old, I would steale
and sequester my selfe from all other delights, only to reade them:
Forsomuch as the tongue wherein they were written was to me naturall; and
it was the easiest booke I knew, and by reason of the matter therein
contained most agreeing with my young age. For of King Arthur, of
Lancelot du Lake, of Amadis, of Huon of Burdeaux, and such idle time
consuming and wit-besotting trash of bookes wherein youth doth commonly
ammuse it selfe, I was not so much as acquainted with their names, and to
this day know not their bodies, nor what they containe: So exact was my
discipline. Whereby I became more carelesse to studie my other prescript
lessons. And well did it fall out for my purpose, that I had to deale with a
very discreet Master, who out of his judgement could with such dexterite
winke at and second my untowardlinesse, and such other faults that were in
me. For by that meanes I read over Virgils AEneados, Terence, Plautus, and
other Italian Comedies, allured thereunto by the pleasantnesse of their
severall subjects: Had he beene so foolishly- severe, or so severely froward
as to crosse this course of mine, I thinke verily I had never brought any
thing from the College, but the hate and contempt of Bookes, as doth the
greatest part of our Nobilitie. Such was his discretion, and so warily did he
behave himselfe, that he saw and would not see: hee would foster and
increase my longing: suffering me but by stealth and by snatches to glut my
selfe with those Bookes, holding ever a gentle hand over me, concerning
other regular studies. For, the chiefest thing my father required at their
hands (unto whose charge he had committed me) was a kinde of well
conditioned mildnesse and facilitie of complexion. [Footnote: Easiness of
disposition.] And, to say truth, mine had no other fault, but a certaine dull
languishing and heavie slothfullnesse. The danger was not, I should doe ill,
but that I should doe nothing.
Page 83
No man did ever suspect I would prove a bad, but an unprofitable man:
foreseeing in me rather a kind of idlenesse than a voluntary craftinesse. I
am not so selfe-conceited but I perceive what hath followed. The
complaints that are daily buzzed in mine eares are these; that I am idle,
cold, and negligent in offices of friendship, and dutie to my parents and
kinsfolkes; and touching publike offices, that I am over singular and
disdainfull. And those that are most injurious cannot aske, wherefore I have
taken, and why I have not paied? but may rather demand, why I doe not
quit, and wherefore I doe not give? I would take it as a favour, they should
wish such effects of supererogation in me. But they are unjust and over
partiall, that will goe about to exact that from me which I owe not, with
more vigour than they will exact from themselves that which they owe;
wherein if they condemne me, they utterly cancell both the gratifying of the
action, and the gratitude, which thereby would be due to me. Whereas the
active well doing should be of more consequence, proceeding from my
hand, in regard I have no passive at all. Wherefore I may so much the more
freely dispose of my fortune, by how much more it is mine, and of my selfe
that am most mine owne. Notwithstanding, if I were a great blazoner of
mine owne actions, I might peradventure barre such reproches, and justly
upraid some, that they are not so much offended, because I doe not enough,
as for that I may, and it lies in my power to doe much more than I doe. Yet
my minde ceased not at the same time to have peculiar unto it selfe well
setled motions, true and open judgements concerning the objects which it
knew; which alone, and without any helpe or communication it would
digest. And amongst other things, I verily beleeve it would have proved
altogether incapable and unfit to yeeld unto force, or stoope unto violence.
Shall I account or relate this qualitie of my infancie, which was, a kinde of
boldnesse in my lookes, and gentle softnesse in my voice, and affabilitie in
my gestures, and a dexterite in conforming my selfe to the parts I
undertooke? for before the age of the
foreseeing in me rather a kind of idlenesse than a voluntary craftinesse. I
am not so selfe-conceited but I perceive what hath followed. The
complaints that are daily buzzed in mine eares are these; that I am idle,
cold, and negligent in offices of friendship, and dutie to my parents and
kinsfolkes; and touching publike offices, that I am over singular and
disdainfull. And those that are most injurious cannot aske, wherefore I have
taken, and why I have not paied? but may rather demand, why I doe not
quit, and wherefore I doe not give? I would take it as a favour, they should
wish such effects of supererogation in me. But they are unjust and over
partiall, that will goe about to exact that from me which I owe not, with
more vigour than they will exact from themselves that which they owe;
wherein if they condemne me, they utterly cancell both the gratifying of the
action, and the gratitude, which thereby would be due to me. Whereas the
active well doing should be of more consequence, proceeding from my
hand, in regard I have no passive at all. Wherefore I may so much the more
freely dispose of my fortune, by how much more it is mine, and of my selfe
that am most mine owne. Notwithstanding, if I were a great blazoner of
mine owne actions, I might peradventure barre such reproches, and justly
upraid some, that they are not so much offended, because I doe not enough,
as for that I may, and it lies in my power to doe much more than I doe. Yet
my minde ceased not at the same time to have peculiar unto it selfe well
setled motions, true and open judgements concerning the objects which it
knew; which alone, and without any helpe or communication it would
digest. And amongst other things, I verily beleeve it would have proved
altogether incapable and unfit to yeeld unto force, or stoope unto violence.
Shall I account or relate this qualitie of my infancie, which was, a kinde of
boldnesse in my lookes, and gentle softnesse in my voice, and affabilitie in
my gestures, and a dexterite in conforming my selfe to the parts I
undertooke? for before the age of the
Page 84
Alter ab undecimo turn me vix ceperat annus.
[Footnote: Virg. Buc. Ecl. viii. 39.]
Yeares had I (to make even)
Scarce two above eleven.
I have under-gone and represented the chiefest part in the Latin Tragedies
of Buchanan, Guerente, and of Muret; which in great state were acted and
plaid in our College of Guienne: wherein Andreas Goveanus our Rector
principall; who as in all other parts belonging to his charge, was without
comparison the chiefest Rector of France, and my selfe (without ostentation
be it spoken) was reputed, if not a chiefe-master, yet a principall Actor in
them. It is an exercise I rather commend than disalow in young Gentlemen:
and have seene some of our Princes (in imitation of some of former ages)
both commendably and honestly, in their proper persons act and play some
parts in Tragedies. It hath heretofore been esteemed a lawfull exercise, and
a tolerable profession in men of honor, namely in Greece. Aristoni tragico
actori rem aperit: huic et genus et fortuna honesta erant: nec ars, quia nihil
tale apud Graecos pudori est, ea deformabat. [Footnote: Liv. Deo. iii. 1. iv.]
"He imparts the matter to Ariston a Player of tragedies, whose progenie and
fortune were both honest; nor did his profession disgrace them, because no
such matter is a disparagement amongst the Grecians."
And I have ever accused them of impertinencie, that condemne and
disalow such kindes of recreations, and blame those of injustice, that refuse
good and honest Comedians, or (as we call them) Players, to enter our good
townes, and grudge the common people such publike sports. Politike and
wel ordered commonwealths endevour rather carefully to unite and
assemble their Citizens together; as in serious offices of devotion, so in
honest exercises of recreation. Common societie and loving friendship is
thereby cherished and increased. And besides, they cannot have more
[Footnote: Virg. Buc. Ecl. viii. 39.]
Yeares had I (to make even)
Scarce two above eleven.
I have under-gone and represented the chiefest part in the Latin Tragedies
of Buchanan, Guerente, and of Muret; which in great state were acted and
plaid in our College of Guienne: wherein Andreas Goveanus our Rector
principall; who as in all other parts belonging to his charge, was without
comparison the chiefest Rector of France, and my selfe (without ostentation
be it spoken) was reputed, if not a chiefe-master, yet a principall Actor in
them. It is an exercise I rather commend than disalow in young Gentlemen:
and have seene some of our Princes (in imitation of some of former ages)
both commendably and honestly, in their proper persons act and play some
parts in Tragedies. It hath heretofore been esteemed a lawfull exercise, and
a tolerable profession in men of honor, namely in Greece. Aristoni tragico
actori rem aperit: huic et genus et fortuna honesta erant: nec ars, quia nihil
tale apud Graecos pudori est, ea deformabat. [Footnote: Liv. Deo. iii. 1. iv.]
"He imparts the matter to Ariston a Player of tragedies, whose progenie and
fortune were both honest; nor did his profession disgrace them, because no
such matter is a disparagement amongst the Grecians."
And I have ever accused them of impertinencie, that condemne and
disalow such kindes of recreations, and blame those of injustice, that refuse
good and honest Comedians, or (as we call them) Players, to enter our good
townes, and grudge the common people such publike sports. Politike and
wel ordered commonwealths endevour rather carefully to unite and
assemble their Citizens together; as in serious offices of devotion, so in
honest exercises of recreation. Common societie and loving friendship is
thereby cherished and increased. And besides, they cannot have more
Page 85
formal and regular pastimes allowed them, than such as are acted and
represented in open view of all, and in the presence of the magistrates
themselves; And if I might beare sway, I would thinke it reasonable, that
Princes should sometimes, at their proper charges, gratifie the common
people with them, as an argument of a fatherly affection, and loving
goodnesse towards them: and that in populous and frequented cities, there
should be Theatres and places appointed for such spectacles; as a diverting
of worse inconveniences, and secret actions. But to come to my intended
purpose there is no better way to allure the affection, and to entice the
appetite: otherwise a man shall breed but asses laden with Bookes. With
jerks of rods they have their satchels full of learning given them to keepe.
Which to doe well, one must not only harbor in himselfe, but wed and
marry the same with his minde.
represented in open view of all, and in the presence of the magistrates
themselves; And if I might beare sway, I would thinke it reasonable, that
Princes should sometimes, at their proper charges, gratifie the common
people with them, as an argument of a fatherly affection, and loving
goodnesse towards them: and that in populous and frequented cities, there
should be Theatres and places appointed for such spectacles; as a diverting
of worse inconveniences, and secret actions. But to come to my intended
purpose there is no better way to allure the affection, and to entice the
appetite: otherwise a man shall breed but asses laden with Bookes. With
jerks of rods they have their satchels full of learning given them to keepe.
Which to doe well, one must not only harbor in himselfe, but wed and
marry the same with his minde.
Page 86
OF FRIENDSHIP
Considering the proceeding of a Painters worke I have, a desire hath
possessed mee to imitate him: He maketh choice of the most convenient
place and middle of everie wall, there to place a picture, laboured with all
his skill and sufficiencie; and all void places about it he filleth up with
antike Boscage [Footnote: Foliated ornament] or Crotesko [Footnote:
Grotesque] works; which are fantasticall pictures, having no grace, but in
the variety and strangenesse of them. And what are these my compositions
in truth, other than antike workes, and monstrous bodies, patched and
hudled up together of divers members, without any certaine or well ordered
figure, having neither order, dependencie, or proportion, but casuall and
framed by chance?
Definit in piscem mulier formosa superne.
[Footnote: Hon. Art. Poet. 4.]
A woman faire for parts superior,
Ends in a fish for parts inferior.
Touching this second point I goe as farre as my Painter, but for the other
and better part I am farre behinde: for my sufficiency reacheth not so farre
as that I dare undertake a rich, a polished, and, according to true skill, an
art-like table. I have advised myselfe to borrow one of Steven de la Boetie,
who with this kinde of worke shall honour all the world. It is a discourse he
Considering the proceeding of a Painters worke I have, a desire hath
possessed mee to imitate him: He maketh choice of the most convenient
place and middle of everie wall, there to place a picture, laboured with all
his skill and sufficiencie; and all void places about it he filleth up with
antike Boscage [Footnote: Foliated ornament] or Crotesko [Footnote:
Grotesque] works; which are fantasticall pictures, having no grace, but in
the variety and strangenesse of them. And what are these my compositions
in truth, other than antike workes, and monstrous bodies, patched and
hudled up together of divers members, without any certaine or well ordered
figure, having neither order, dependencie, or proportion, but casuall and
framed by chance?
Definit in piscem mulier formosa superne.
[Footnote: Hon. Art. Poet. 4.]
A woman faire for parts superior,
Ends in a fish for parts inferior.
Touching this second point I goe as farre as my Painter, but for the other
and better part I am farre behinde: for my sufficiency reacheth not so farre
as that I dare undertake a rich, a polished, and, according to true skill, an
art-like table. I have advised myselfe to borrow one of Steven de la Boetie,
who with this kinde of worke shall honour all the world. It is a discourse he
Page 87
entitled Voluntary Servitude, but those who have not knowne him, have
since very properly rebaptized the same, The Against-one. In his first youth
he writ, by way of Essaie, in honour of libertie against Tyrants. It hath long
since beene dispersed amongst men of understanding, not without great and
well deserved commendations: for it is full of wit, and containeth as much
learning as may be: yet doth it differ much from the best he can do. And if
in the age I knew him in, he would have undergone my dessigne to set his
fantasies downe in writing, we should doubtlesse see many rare things, and
which would very neerely approch the honour of antiquity: for especially
touching that part of natures gifts, I know none may be compared to him.
But it was not long of him, that ever this Treatise came to mans view, and I
beleeve he never saw it since it first escaped his hands: with certaine other
notes concerning the edict of Januarie, famous by reason of our intestine
warre, which haply may in other places finde their deserved praise. It is all I
could ever recover of his reliques (whom when death seized, he by his last
will and testament, left with so kinde remembrance, heire and executor of
his librarie and writings) besides the little booke, I since caused to be
published: To which his pamphlet I am particularly most bounden, for so
much as it was the instrumentall meane of our first acquaintance. For it was
shewed me long time before I saw him; and gave me the first knowledge of
his name, addressing, and thus nourishing that unspotted friendship which
we (so long as it pleased God) have so sincerely, so entire and inviolably
maintained betweene us, that truly a man shall not commonly heare of the
like; and amongst our moderne men no signe of any such is scene. So many
parts are required to the erecting of such a one, that it may be counted a
wonder if fortune once in three ages contract the like. There is nothing to
which Nature hath more addressed us than to societie. And Aristotle saith
that perfect Law- givers have had more regardfull care of friendship than of
justice. And the utmost drift of its perfection is this. For generally, all those
amities which are forged and nourished by voluptuousnesse or profit,
since very properly rebaptized the same, The Against-one. In his first youth
he writ, by way of Essaie, in honour of libertie against Tyrants. It hath long
since beene dispersed amongst men of understanding, not without great and
well deserved commendations: for it is full of wit, and containeth as much
learning as may be: yet doth it differ much from the best he can do. And if
in the age I knew him in, he would have undergone my dessigne to set his
fantasies downe in writing, we should doubtlesse see many rare things, and
which would very neerely approch the honour of antiquity: for especially
touching that part of natures gifts, I know none may be compared to him.
But it was not long of him, that ever this Treatise came to mans view, and I
beleeve he never saw it since it first escaped his hands: with certaine other
notes concerning the edict of Januarie, famous by reason of our intestine
warre, which haply may in other places finde their deserved praise. It is all I
could ever recover of his reliques (whom when death seized, he by his last
will and testament, left with so kinde remembrance, heire and executor of
his librarie and writings) besides the little booke, I since caused to be
published: To which his pamphlet I am particularly most bounden, for so
much as it was the instrumentall meane of our first acquaintance. For it was
shewed me long time before I saw him; and gave me the first knowledge of
his name, addressing, and thus nourishing that unspotted friendship which
we (so long as it pleased God) have so sincerely, so entire and inviolably
maintained betweene us, that truly a man shall not commonly heare of the
like; and amongst our moderne men no signe of any such is scene. So many
parts are required to the erecting of such a one, that it may be counted a
wonder if fortune once in three ages contract the like. There is nothing to
which Nature hath more addressed us than to societie. And Aristotle saith
that perfect Law- givers have had more regardfull care of friendship than of
justice. And the utmost drift of its perfection is this. For generally, all those
amities which are forged and nourished by voluptuousnesse or profit,
Page 88
publike or private need, are thereby so much the lesse faire and generous,
and so much the lesse true amities, in that they intermeddle other causes,
scope, and fruit with friendship, than it selfe alone: Nor doe those foure
ancient kindes of friendships, Naturall, sociall, hospitable, and venerian,
either particularly or conjointly beseeme the same. That from children to
parents may rather be termed respect: Friendship is nourished by
communication, which by reason of the over-great disparitie cannot bee
found in them, and would happly offend the duties of nature: for neither all
the secret thoughts of parents can be communicated unto children, lest it
might engender an unbeseeming familiaritie betweene them, nor the
admonitions and corrections (which are the chiefest offices of friendship)
could be exercised from children to parents. There have nations beene
found, where, by custome, children killed their parents, and others where
parents slew their children, thereby to avoid the hindrance of enterbearing
[Footnote: Mutually supporting.] one another in after-times: for naturally
one dependeth from the ruine of another. There have Philosophers beene
found disdaining this naturall conjunction: witnesse Aristippus, who being
urged with the affection he ought [Footnote: Owed.] his children, as
proceeding from his loyns, began to spit, saying, That also that excrement
proceeded from him, and that also we engendred wormes and lice. And that
other man, whom Plutarke would have perswaded to agree with his brother,
answered, "I care not a straw the more for him, though he came out of the
same wombe I did." Verily the name of Brother is a glorious name, and full
of loving kindnesse, and therefore did he and I terme one another sworne
brother: but this commixture, dividence, and sharing of goods, this joyning
wealth to wealth, and that the riches of one shall be the povertie of another,
doth exceedingly distemper and distract all brotherly alliance, and lovely
conjunction: If brothers should conduct the progresse of their advancement
and thrift in one same path and course, they must necessarily oftentimes
hinder and crosse one another. Moreover, the correspondencie and relation
and so much the lesse true amities, in that they intermeddle other causes,
scope, and fruit with friendship, than it selfe alone: Nor doe those foure
ancient kindes of friendships, Naturall, sociall, hospitable, and venerian,
either particularly or conjointly beseeme the same. That from children to
parents may rather be termed respect: Friendship is nourished by
communication, which by reason of the over-great disparitie cannot bee
found in them, and would happly offend the duties of nature: for neither all
the secret thoughts of parents can be communicated unto children, lest it
might engender an unbeseeming familiaritie betweene them, nor the
admonitions and corrections (which are the chiefest offices of friendship)
could be exercised from children to parents. There have nations beene
found, where, by custome, children killed their parents, and others where
parents slew their children, thereby to avoid the hindrance of enterbearing
[Footnote: Mutually supporting.] one another in after-times: for naturally
one dependeth from the ruine of another. There have Philosophers beene
found disdaining this naturall conjunction: witnesse Aristippus, who being
urged with the affection he ought [Footnote: Owed.] his children, as
proceeding from his loyns, began to spit, saying, That also that excrement
proceeded from him, and that also we engendred wormes and lice. And that
other man, whom Plutarke would have perswaded to agree with his brother,
answered, "I care not a straw the more for him, though he came out of the
same wombe I did." Verily the name of Brother is a glorious name, and full
of loving kindnesse, and therefore did he and I terme one another sworne
brother: but this commixture, dividence, and sharing of goods, this joyning
wealth to wealth, and that the riches of one shall be the povertie of another,
doth exceedingly distemper and distract all brotherly alliance, and lovely
conjunction: If brothers should conduct the progresse of their advancement
and thrift in one same path and course, they must necessarily oftentimes
hinder and crosse one another. Moreover, the correspondencie and relation
Page 89
that begetteth these true and mutually perfect amities, why shall it be found
in these? The father and the sonne may very well be of a farre differing
complexion, and so many brothers: He is my sonne, he is my kinsman; but
he may be a foole, a bad, or a peevish-minded man. And then according as
they are friendships which the law and dutie of nature doth command us, so
much the lesse of our owne voluntarie choice and libertie is there required
unto it: And our genuine libertie hath no production more properly her
owne, than that of affection and amitie. Sure I am, that concerning the same
I have assaied all that might be, having had the best and most indulgent
father that ever was, even to his extremest age, and who from father to
sonne was descended of a famous house, and touching this rare-seene
vertue of brotherly concord very exemplare:
——et ipse
Notus in fratres animi paterni.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Qd. li. 6.]
To his brothers knowne so kinde.
As to beare a fathers minde.
To compare the affection toward women unto it, although it proceed from
our owne free choice, a man cannot, nor may it be placed in this ranke: Her
fire, I confesse it to be more
(—-neque enim est dea nescia nostri
Quae dulcem curis miscet amaritiem.)
[Footnote: Catul. Epig. lxvi.]
(Nor is that Goddesse ignorant of me,
Whose bitter-sweets with my cares mixed be.)
in these? The father and the sonne may very well be of a farre differing
complexion, and so many brothers: He is my sonne, he is my kinsman; but
he may be a foole, a bad, or a peevish-minded man. And then according as
they are friendships which the law and dutie of nature doth command us, so
much the lesse of our owne voluntarie choice and libertie is there required
unto it: And our genuine libertie hath no production more properly her
owne, than that of affection and amitie. Sure I am, that concerning the same
I have assaied all that might be, having had the best and most indulgent
father that ever was, even to his extremest age, and who from father to
sonne was descended of a famous house, and touching this rare-seene
vertue of brotherly concord very exemplare:
——et ipse
Notus in fratres animi paterni.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Qd. li. 6.]
To his brothers knowne so kinde.
As to beare a fathers minde.
To compare the affection toward women unto it, although it proceed from
our owne free choice, a man cannot, nor may it be placed in this ranke: Her
fire, I confesse it to be more
(—-neque enim est dea nescia nostri
Quae dulcem curis miscet amaritiem.)
[Footnote: Catul. Epig. lxvi.]
(Nor is that Goddesse ignorant of me,
Whose bitter-sweets with my cares mixed be.)
Page 90
active, more fervent, and more sharpe. But it is a rash and wavering fire,
waving and divers: the fire of an ague subject to fits and stints, and that hath
but slender hold-fast of us. In true friendship, it is a generall and universall
heat, and equally tempered, a constant and setled heat, all pleasure and
smoothnes, that hath no pricking or stinging in it, which the more it is in
lustfull love, the more is it but a raging and mad desire in following that
which flies us,
Come segue la lepre il cacciatore
Alfreddo, al caldo, alia montagna, a lito,
Ne pin l'estima poi che presa vede,
E sol dietro a chi fugge affretta il piede.
[Footnote: Ariost. can. x. st. 7.]
Ev'n as the huntsman doth the hare pursue,
In cold, in heat, on mountaines, on the shore,
But cares no more, when he her ta'en espies
Speeding his pace only at that which flies.
As soone as it creepeth into the termes of friendship, that is to say, in the
agreement of wits, it languisheth and vanisheth away: enjoying doth lose it,
as having a corporall end, and subject to satietie. On the other side,
friendship is enjoyed according as it is desired, it is neither bred, nourished,
nor increaseth but in jovissance, as being spirituall, and the minde being
refined by use custome. Under this chiefe amitie, these fading affections
have sometimes found place in me, lest I should speake of him, who in his
verses speakes but too much of it. So are these two passions entered into me
in knowledge one of another, but in comparison never: the first flying a
high, and keeping a proud pitch, disdainfully beholding the other to passe
her points farre under it. Concerning marriage, besides that it is a covenant
which hath nothing free but the entrance, the continuance being forced and
waving and divers: the fire of an ague subject to fits and stints, and that hath
but slender hold-fast of us. In true friendship, it is a generall and universall
heat, and equally tempered, a constant and setled heat, all pleasure and
smoothnes, that hath no pricking or stinging in it, which the more it is in
lustfull love, the more is it but a raging and mad desire in following that
which flies us,
Come segue la lepre il cacciatore
Alfreddo, al caldo, alia montagna, a lito,
Ne pin l'estima poi che presa vede,
E sol dietro a chi fugge affretta il piede.
[Footnote: Ariost. can. x. st. 7.]
Ev'n as the huntsman doth the hare pursue,
In cold, in heat, on mountaines, on the shore,
But cares no more, when he her ta'en espies
Speeding his pace only at that which flies.
As soone as it creepeth into the termes of friendship, that is to say, in the
agreement of wits, it languisheth and vanisheth away: enjoying doth lose it,
as having a corporall end, and subject to satietie. On the other side,
friendship is enjoyed according as it is desired, it is neither bred, nourished,
nor increaseth but in jovissance, as being spirituall, and the minde being
refined by use custome. Under this chiefe amitie, these fading affections
have sometimes found place in me, lest I should speake of him, who in his
verses speakes but too much of it. So are these two passions entered into me
in knowledge one of another, but in comparison never: the first flying a
high, and keeping a proud pitch, disdainfully beholding the other to passe
her points farre under it. Concerning marriage, besides that it is a covenant
which hath nothing free but the entrance, the continuance being forced and
Page 91
constrained, depending else-where than from our will, and a match
ordinarily concluded to other ends: A thousand strange knots are therein
commonly to be unknit, able to break the web, and trouble the whole course
of a lively affection; whereas in friendship there is no commerce or busines
depending on the same, but it selfe. Seeing (to speake truly) that the
ordinary sufficiency of women cannot answer this conference and
communication, the nurse of this sacred bond: nor seeme their mindes
strong enough to endure the pulling of a knot so hard, so fast, and durable.
And truly, if without that, such a genuine and voluntarie acquaintance might
be contracted, where not only mindes had this entire jovissance, [Footnote:
Enjoyment.] but also bodies, a share of the alliance, and where a man might
wholly be engaged: It is certaine, that friendship would thereby be more
compleat and full: But this sex could never yet by any example attaine unto
it, and is by ancient schooles rejected thence. And this other Greeke licence
is justly abhorred by our customes, which notwithstanding, because
according to use it had so necessarie a disparitie of ages, and difference of
offices betweene lovers, did no more sufficiently answer the perfect union
and agreement, which here we require: Quis est enim iste amor amicitiae?
cur neque deformem adolescentem quisquam amat, neque formosum
senem? [Footnote: Cic. Tusc. Qu. lv. c. 33.] "For, what love is this of
friendship? why doth no man love either a deformed young man, or a
beautifull old man?" For even the picture the Academic makes of it, will not
(as I suppose) disavowe mee, to say thus in her behalfe: That the first furie,
enspired by the son of Venus in the lovers hart, upon the object of tender
youths-flower, to which they allow all insolent and passionate violences, an
immoderate heat may produce, was simply grounded upon an externall
beauty; a false image of corporall generation: for in the spirit it had no
power, the sight whereof was yet concealed, which was but in his infancie,
and before the age of budding. For, if this furie did seize upon a base
minded courage, the meanes of its pursuit were riches, gifts, favour to the
ordinarily concluded to other ends: A thousand strange knots are therein
commonly to be unknit, able to break the web, and trouble the whole course
of a lively affection; whereas in friendship there is no commerce or busines
depending on the same, but it selfe. Seeing (to speake truly) that the
ordinary sufficiency of women cannot answer this conference and
communication, the nurse of this sacred bond: nor seeme their mindes
strong enough to endure the pulling of a knot so hard, so fast, and durable.
And truly, if without that, such a genuine and voluntarie acquaintance might
be contracted, where not only mindes had this entire jovissance, [Footnote:
Enjoyment.] but also bodies, a share of the alliance, and where a man might
wholly be engaged: It is certaine, that friendship would thereby be more
compleat and full: But this sex could never yet by any example attaine unto
it, and is by ancient schooles rejected thence. And this other Greeke licence
is justly abhorred by our customes, which notwithstanding, because
according to use it had so necessarie a disparitie of ages, and difference of
offices betweene lovers, did no more sufficiently answer the perfect union
and agreement, which here we require: Quis est enim iste amor amicitiae?
cur neque deformem adolescentem quisquam amat, neque formosum
senem? [Footnote: Cic. Tusc. Qu. lv. c. 33.] "For, what love is this of
friendship? why doth no man love either a deformed young man, or a
beautifull old man?" For even the picture the Academic makes of it, will not
(as I suppose) disavowe mee, to say thus in her behalfe: That the first furie,
enspired by the son of Venus in the lovers hart, upon the object of tender
youths-flower, to which they allow all insolent and passionate violences, an
immoderate heat may produce, was simply grounded upon an externall
beauty; a false image of corporall generation: for in the spirit it had no
power, the sight whereof was yet concealed, which was but in his infancie,
and before the age of budding. For, if this furie did seize upon a base
minded courage, the meanes of its pursuit were riches, gifts, favour to the
Page 92
advancement of dignities, and such like vile merchandice, which they
reprove. If it fell into a more generous minde, the interpositions [Footnote:
Means of approach.] were likewise generous: Philosophicall instructions,
documents [Footnote: Teachings.] to reverence religion, to obey the lawes,
to die for the good of his countrie: examples of valor, wisdome and justice;
the lover endevoring and studying to make himselfe acceptable by the good
grace and beauty of his minde (that of his body being long since decayed)
hoping by this mentall society to establish a more firme and permanent
bargaine. When this pursuit attained the effect in due season (for by not
requiring in a lover, he should bring leasure and discretion in his enterprise,
they require it exactly in the beloved; forasmuch as he was to judge of an
internall beauty, of difficile knowledge, and abstruse discovery) then by the
interposition of a spiritual beauty was the desire of a spiritual conception
engendred in the beloved. The latter was here chiefest; the corporall,
accidentall and second, altogether contrarie to the lover. And therefore doe
they preferre the beloved, and verifie that the gods likewise preferre the
same: and greatly blame the Poet AEschylus, who in the love betweene
Achilles and Patroclus ascribeth the lovers part unto Achilles, who was in
the first and beardlesse youth of his adolescency, and the fairest of the
Graecians. After this general communitie, the mistris and worthiest part of
it, predominant and exercising her offices (they say the most availefull
commodity did thereby redound both to the private and publike). That it
was the force of countries received the use of it, and the principall defence
of equitie and libertie: witnesse the comfortable loves of Hermodius and
Aristogiton. Therefore name they it sacred and divine, and it concerns not
them whether the violence of tyrants, or the demisnesse of the people be
against them: To conclude, all that can be alleged in favour of the Academy,
is to say, that it was a love ending in friendship, a thing which hath no bad
reference unto the Stoical definition of love: Amorem conatum esse
amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie: [Footnote: Cic. Tusc. Qu. ir. c.
reprove. If it fell into a more generous minde, the interpositions [Footnote:
Means of approach.] were likewise generous: Philosophicall instructions,
documents [Footnote: Teachings.] to reverence religion, to obey the lawes,
to die for the good of his countrie: examples of valor, wisdome and justice;
the lover endevoring and studying to make himselfe acceptable by the good
grace and beauty of his minde (that of his body being long since decayed)
hoping by this mentall society to establish a more firme and permanent
bargaine. When this pursuit attained the effect in due season (for by not
requiring in a lover, he should bring leasure and discretion in his enterprise,
they require it exactly in the beloved; forasmuch as he was to judge of an
internall beauty, of difficile knowledge, and abstruse discovery) then by the
interposition of a spiritual beauty was the desire of a spiritual conception
engendred in the beloved. The latter was here chiefest; the corporall,
accidentall and second, altogether contrarie to the lover. And therefore doe
they preferre the beloved, and verifie that the gods likewise preferre the
same: and greatly blame the Poet AEschylus, who in the love betweene
Achilles and Patroclus ascribeth the lovers part unto Achilles, who was in
the first and beardlesse youth of his adolescency, and the fairest of the
Graecians. After this general communitie, the mistris and worthiest part of
it, predominant and exercising her offices (they say the most availefull
commodity did thereby redound both to the private and publike). That it
was the force of countries received the use of it, and the principall defence
of equitie and libertie: witnesse the comfortable loves of Hermodius and
Aristogiton. Therefore name they it sacred and divine, and it concerns not
them whether the violence of tyrants, or the demisnesse of the people be
against them: To conclude, all that can be alleged in favour of the Academy,
is to say, that it was a love ending in friendship, a thing which hath no bad
reference unto the Stoical definition of love: Amorem conatum esse
amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie: [Footnote: Cic. Tusc. Qu. ir. c.
Page 93
34. ] "That love is an endevour of making friendship, by the shew of
beautie." I returne to my description in a more equitable and equall manner.
Omnino amicitiae, corroboratis jam confirmatisque ingeniis et aetatibus,
judicandae sunt. [Footnote: Cic. Amic.] "Clearely friendships are to be
judged by wits, and ages already strengthened and confirmed." As for the
rest, those we ordinarily call friendes and amities, are but acquaintances and
familiarities, tied together by some occasion or commodities, by meanes
whereof our mindes are entertained. In the amitie I speake of, they
entermixe and confound themselves one in the other, with so universall a
commixture, that they weare out and can no more finde the seame that hath
conjoined them together. If a man urge me to tell wherefore I loved him, I
feele it cannot be expressed, but by answering; Because it was he, because
it was my selfe. There is beyond all my discourse, and besides what I can
particularly report of it, I know not what inexplicable and fatall power, a
meane and Mediatrix of this indissoluble union. We sought one another
before we had scene one another, and by the reports we heard one of
another; which wrought a greater violence in us, than the reason of reports
may well beare; I thinke by some secret ordinance of the heavens, we
embraced one another by our names. And at our first meeting, which was by
chance at a great feast, and solemne meeting of a whole towneship, we
found our selves so surprized, so knowne, so acquainted, and so
combinedly bound together, that from thence forward, nothing was so neer
unto us as one unto anothers. He writ an excellent Latyne Satyre since
published; by which he excuseth and expoundeth the precipitation of our
acquaintance, so suddenly come to her perfection; Sithence it must continue
so short a time, and begun so late (for we were both growne men, and he
some yeares older than my selfe) there was no time to be lost. And it was
not to bee modelled or directed by the paterne of regular and remisse
[Footnote: Slight, languid.] friendship, wherein so many precautions of a
long and preallable conversation [Footnote: Preceding intercourse.] are
beautie." I returne to my description in a more equitable and equall manner.
Omnino amicitiae, corroboratis jam confirmatisque ingeniis et aetatibus,
judicandae sunt. [Footnote: Cic. Amic.] "Clearely friendships are to be
judged by wits, and ages already strengthened and confirmed." As for the
rest, those we ordinarily call friendes and amities, are but acquaintances and
familiarities, tied together by some occasion or commodities, by meanes
whereof our mindes are entertained. In the amitie I speake of, they
entermixe and confound themselves one in the other, with so universall a
commixture, that they weare out and can no more finde the seame that hath
conjoined them together. If a man urge me to tell wherefore I loved him, I
feele it cannot be expressed, but by answering; Because it was he, because
it was my selfe. There is beyond all my discourse, and besides what I can
particularly report of it, I know not what inexplicable and fatall power, a
meane and Mediatrix of this indissoluble union. We sought one another
before we had scene one another, and by the reports we heard one of
another; which wrought a greater violence in us, than the reason of reports
may well beare; I thinke by some secret ordinance of the heavens, we
embraced one another by our names. And at our first meeting, which was by
chance at a great feast, and solemne meeting of a whole towneship, we
found our selves so surprized, so knowne, so acquainted, and so
combinedly bound together, that from thence forward, nothing was so neer
unto us as one unto anothers. He writ an excellent Latyne Satyre since
published; by which he excuseth and expoundeth the precipitation of our
acquaintance, so suddenly come to her perfection; Sithence it must continue
so short a time, and begun so late (for we were both growne men, and he
some yeares older than my selfe) there was no time to be lost. And it was
not to bee modelled or directed by the paterne of regular and remisse
[Footnote: Slight, languid.] friendship, wherein so many precautions of a
long and preallable conversation [Footnote: Preceding intercourse.] are
Page 94
required. This hath no other Idea than of it selfe, and can have no reference
but to itselfe. It is not one especiall consideration, nor two, nor three, nor
foure, nor a thousand: It is I wot not what kinde of quintessence, of all this
commixture, which having seized all my will, induced the same to plunge
and lose it selfe in his, which likewise having seized all his will, brought it
to lose and plunge it selfe in mine, with a mutuall greedinesse, and with a
semblable concurrance. I may truly say, lose, reserving nothing unto us, that
might properly be called our owne, nor that was either his or mine. When
Lelius in the presence of the Romane Consuls, who after the condemnation
of Tiberius Gracchus, pursued all those that had beene of his acquaintance,
came to enquire of Caius Blosius (who was one of his chiefest friends) what
he would have done for him, and that he answered, "All things." "What, all
things?" replied he. "And what if he had willed thee to burne our Temples?"
Blosius answered, "He would never have commanded such a thing." "But
what if he had done it?" replied Lelius. The other answered, "I would have
obeyed him." If hee were so perfect a friend to Gracchus as Histories report,
he needed not offend the Consuls with this last and bold confession, and
should not have departed from the assurance hee had of Gracchus his
minde. But yet those who accuse this answer as seditious, understand not
well this mysterie: and doe not presuppose in what termes he stood, and that
he held Gracchus his will in his sleeve, both by power and knowledge. They
were rather friends than Citizens, rather friends than enemies of their
countrey, or friends of ambition and trouble. Having absolutely committed
themselves one to another, they perfectly held the reines of one anothers
inclination: and let this yoke be guided by vertue and conduct of reason
(because without them it is altogether impossible to combine and proportion
the same). The answer of Blosius was such as it should be. If their
affections miscarried, according to my meaning, they were neither friends
one to other, nor friends to themselves. As for the rest, this answer sounds
no more than mine would doe, to him that would in such sort enquire of me;
but to itselfe. It is not one especiall consideration, nor two, nor three, nor
foure, nor a thousand: It is I wot not what kinde of quintessence, of all this
commixture, which having seized all my will, induced the same to plunge
and lose it selfe in his, which likewise having seized all his will, brought it
to lose and plunge it selfe in mine, with a mutuall greedinesse, and with a
semblable concurrance. I may truly say, lose, reserving nothing unto us, that
might properly be called our owne, nor that was either his or mine. When
Lelius in the presence of the Romane Consuls, who after the condemnation
of Tiberius Gracchus, pursued all those that had beene of his acquaintance,
came to enquire of Caius Blosius (who was one of his chiefest friends) what
he would have done for him, and that he answered, "All things." "What, all
things?" replied he. "And what if he had willed thee to burne our Temples?"
Blosius answered, "He would never have commanded such a thing." "But
what if he had done it?" replied Lelius. The other answered, "I would have
obeyed him." If hee were so perfect a friend to Gracchus as Histories report,
he needed not offend the Consuls with this last and bold confession, and
should not have departed from the assurance hee had of Gracchus his
minde. But yet those who accuse this answer as seditious, understand not
well this mysterie: and doe not presuppose in what termes he stood, and that
he held Gracchus his will in his sleeve, both by power and knowledge. They
were rather friends than Citizens, rather friends than enemies of their
countrey, or friends of ambition and trouble. Having absolutely committed
themselves one to another, they perfectly held the reines of one anothers
inclination: and let this yoke be guided by vertue and conduct of reason
(because without them it is altogether impossible to combine and proportion
the same). The answer of Blosius was such as it should be. If their
affections miscarried, according to my meaning, they were neither friends
one to other, nor friends to themselves. As for the rest, this answer sounds
no more than mine would doe, to him that would in such sort enquire of me;
Page 95
if your will should command you to kill your daughter, would you doe it?
and that I should consent unto it: for, that beareth no witnesse of consent to
doe it: because I am not in doubt of my will, and as little of such a friends
will. It is not in the power of the worlds discourse to remove me from the
certaintie I have of his intentions and judgments of mine: no one of its
actions might be presented unto me, under what shape soever, but I would
presently finde the spring and motion of it. Our mindes have jumped
[Footnote: Agreed.] so unitedly together, they have with so fervent an
affection considered of each other, and with like affection so discovered and
sounded, even to the very bottome of each others heart and entrails, that I
did not only know his, as well as mine owne, but I would (verily) rather
have trusted him concerning any matter of mine, than my selfe. Let no man
compare any of the other common friendships to this. I have as much
knowledge of them as another, yea of the perfectest of their kinde: yet wil I
not perswade any man to confound their rules, for so a man might be
deceived. In these other strict friendships a man must march with the bridle
of wisdome and precaution in his hand: the bond is not so strictly tied but a
man may in some sort distrust the same. Love him (said Chilon) as if you
should one day hate him againe. Hate him as if you should love him againe.
This precept, so abhominable in this soveraigne and mistris Amitie, is
necessarie and wholesome in the use of vulgar and customarie friendships:
toward which a man must employ the saying Aristotle was wont so often
repeat, "Oh you my friends, there is no perfect friend."
In this noble commerce, offices and benefits (nurses of other amities)
deserve not so much as to bee accounted of: this confusion so full of our
wills is cause of it: for even as the friendship I beare unto my selfe, admits
no accrease, [Footnote: Increase.] by any succour I give my selfe in any
time of need, whatsoever the Stoickes allege; and as I acknowledge no
thanks unto my selfe for any service I doe unto myselfe, so the union of
such friends, being truly perfect, makes them lose the feeling of such duties,
and that I should consent unto it: for, that beareth no witnesse of consent to
doe it: because I am not in doubt of my will, and as little of such a friends
will. It is not in the power of the worlds discourse to remove me from the
certaintie I have of his intentions and judgments of mine: no one of its
actions might be presented unto me, under what shape soever, but I would
presently finde the spring and motion of it. Our mindes have jumped
[Footnote: Agreed.] so unitedly together, they have with so fervent an
affection considered of each other, and with like affection so discovered and
sounded, even to the very bottome of each others heart and entrails, that I
did not only know his, as well as mine owne, but I would (verily) rather
have trusted him concerning any matter of mine, than my selfe. Let no man
compare any of the other common friendships to this. I have as much
knowledge of them as another, yea of the perfectest of their kinde: yet wil I
not perswade any man to confound their rules, for so a man might be
deceived. In these other strict friendships a man must march with the bridle
of wisdome and precaution in his hand: the bond is not so strictly tied but a
man may in some sort distrust the same. Love him (said Chilon) as if you
should one day hate him againe. Hate him as if you should love him againe.
This precept, so abhominable in this soveraigne and mistris Amitie, is
necessarie and wholesome in the use of vulgar and customarie friendships:
toward which a man must employ the saying Aristotle was wont so often
repeat, "Oh you my friends, there is no perfect friend."
In this noble commerce, offices and benefits (nurses of other amities)
deserve not so much as to bee accounted of: this confusion so full of our
wills is cause of it: for even as the friendship I beare unto my selfe, admits
no accrease, [Footnote: Increase.] by any succour I give my selfe in any
time of need, whatsoever the Stoickes allege; and as I acknowledge no
thanks unto my selfe for any service I doe unto myselfe, so the union of
such friends, being truly perfect, makes them lose the feeling of such duties,
Page 96
and hate, and expell from one another these words of division, and
difference: benefit, good deed, dutie, obligation, acknowledgement, prayer,
thanks, and such their like. All things being by effect common betweene
them; wils, thoughts, judgements, goods, wives, children, honour, and life;
and their mutual agreement, being no other than one soule in two bodies,
according to the fit definition of Aristotle, they can neither lend or give
ought to each other. See here the reason why Lawmakers, to honour
marriage with some imaginary resemblance of this divine bond, inhibite
donations between husband and wife; meaning thereby to inferre, that all
things should peculiarly bee proper to each of them, and that they have
nothing to divide and share together. If in the friendship whereof I speake,
one might give unto another, the receiver of the benefit should binde his
fellow. For, each seeking more than any other thing to doe each other good,
he who yeelds both matter and occasion, is the man sheweth himselfe
liberall, giving his friend that contentment, to effect towards him what he
desireth most. When the Philosopher Diogenes wanted money, he was wont
to say that he redemanded the same of his friends, and not that he demanded
it: And to show how that is practised by effect, I will relate an ancient
singular example. Eudamidas the Corinthiam had two friends: Charixenus a
Sycionian, and Aretheus a Corinthian; being upon his death-bed, and very
poore, and his two friends very rich, thus made his last will and testament:
"To Aretheus, I bequeath the keeping of my mother, and to maintaine her
when she shall be old: To Charixenus the marrying of my daughter, and to
give her as great a dowry as he may: and in case one of them shall chance to
die before, I appoint the survivor to substitute his charge, and supply his
place." Those that first saw this testament laughed and mocked at the same;
but his heires being advertised thereof, were very well pleased, and received
it with singular contentment. And Charixenus, one of them, dying five daies
after Eudamidas, the substitution being declared in favour of Aretheus, he
carefully and very kindly kept and maintained his mother, and of five
difference: benefit, good deed, dutie, obligation, acknowledgement, prayer,
thanks, and such their like. All things being by effect common betweene
them; wils, thoughts, judgements, goods, wives, children, honour, and life;
and their mutual agreement, being no other than one soule in two bodies,
according to the fit definition of Aristotle, they can neither lend or give
ought to each other. See here the reason why Lawmakers, to honour
marriage with some imaginary resemblance of this divine bond, inhibite
donations between husband and wife; meaning thereby to inferre, that all
things should peculiarly bee proper to each of them, and that they have
nothing to divide and share together. If in the friendship whereof I speake,
one might give unto another, the receiver of the benefit should binde his
fellow. For, each seeking more than any other thing to doe each other good,
he who yeelds both matter and occasion, is the man sheweth himselfe
liberall, giving his friend that contentment, to effect towards him what he
desireth most. When the Philosopher Diogenes wanted money, he was wont
to say that he redemanded the same of his friends, and not that he demanded
it: And to show how that is practised by effect, I will relate an ancient
singular example. Eudamidas the Corinthiam had two friends: Charixenus a
Sycionian, and Aretheus a Corinthian; being upon his death-bed, and very
poore, and his two friends very rich, thus made his last will and testament:
"To Aretheus, I bequeath the keeping of my mother, and to maintaine her
when she shall be old: To Charixenus the marrying of my daughter, and to
give her as great a dowry as he may: and in case one of them shall chance to
die before, I appoint the survivor to substitute his charge, and supply his
place." Those that first saw this testament laughed and mocked at the same;
but his heires being advertised thereof, were very well pleased, and received
it with singular contentment. And Charixenus, one of them, dying five daies
after Eudamidas, the substitution being declared in favour of Aretheus, he
carefully and very kindly kept and maintained his mother, and of five
Page 97
talents that he was worth he gave two and a halfe in marriage to one only
daughter he had, and the other two and a halfe to the daughter of
Eudamidas, whom he married both in one day. This example is very ample,
if one thing were not, which is the multitude of friends: For, this perfect
amity I speake of, is indivisible; each man doth so wholly give himselfe
unto his friend, that he hath nothing left him to divide else-where: moreover
he is grieved that he is not double, triple, or quadruple, and hath not many
soules, or sundry wils, that he might conferre them all upon this subject.
Common friendships may bee divided; a man may love beauty in one,
facility of behaviour in another, liberality in one, and wisdome in another,
paternity in this, fraternity in that man, and so forth: but this amitie which
possesseth the soule, and swaies it in all sovereigntie, it is impossible it
should be double. If two at one instant should require helpe, to which would
you run? Should they crave contrary offices of you, what order would you
follow? Should one commit a matter to your silence, which if the other
knew would greatly profit him, what course would you take? Or how would
you discharge your selfe? A singular and principall friendship dissolveth all
other duties, and freeth all other obligations. The secret I have sworne not to
reveale to another, I may without perjurie impart it unto him, who is no
other but my selfe. It is a great and strange wonder for a man to double
himselfe; and those that talke of tripling know not, nor cannot reach into the
height of it. "Nothing is extreme that hath his like." And he who shal
presuppose that of two I love the one as wel as the other, and that they
enter-love [Footnote: Love mutually.] one another, and love me as much as
I love them: he multiplied! in brotherhood, a thing most singular, and a
lonely one, and than which one alone is also the rarest to be found in the
world. The remainder of this history agreeth very wel with what I said; for,
Eudamidas giveth us a grace and favor to his friends to employ them in his
need: he leaveth them as his heires of his liberality, which consisteth in
putting the meanes into their hands to doe him good. And doubtlesse the
daughter he had, and the other two and a halfe to the daughter of
Eudamidas, whom he married both in one day. This example is very ample,
if one thing were not, which is the multitude of friends: For, this perfect
amity I speake of, is indivisible; each man doth so wholly give himselfe
unto his friend, that he hath nothing left him to divide else-where: moreover
he is grieved that he is not double, triple, or quadruple, and hath not many
soules, or sundry wils, that he might conferre them all upon this subject.
Common friendships may bee divided; a man may love beauty in one,
facility of behaviour in another, liberality in one, and wisdome in another,
paternity in this, fraternity in that man, and so forth: but this amitie which
possesseth the soule, and swaies it in all sovereigntie, it is impossible it
should be double. If two at one instant should require helpe, to which would
you run? Should they crave contrary offices of you, what order would you
follow? Should one commit a matter to your silence, which if the other
knew would greatly profit him, what course would you take? Or how would
you discharge your selfe? A singular and principall friendship dissolveth all
other duties, and freeth all other obligations. The secret I have sworne not to
reveale to another, I may without perjurie impart it unto him, who is no
other but my selfe. It is a great and strange wonder for a man to double
himselfe; and those that talke of tripling know not, nor cannot reach into the
height of it. "Nothing is extreme that hath his like." And he who shal
presuppose that of two I love the one as wel as the other, and that they
enter-love [Footnote: Love mutually.] one another, and love me as much as
I love them: he multiplied! in brotherhood, a thing most singular, and a
lonely one, and than which one alone is also the rarest to be found in the
world. The remainder of this history agreeth very wel with what I said; for,
Eudamidas giveth us a grace and favor to his friends to employ them in his
need: he leaveth them as his heires of his liberality, which consisteth in
putting the meanes into their hands to doe him good. And doubtlesse the
Page 98
force of friendship is much more richly shewen in his deed than in
Aretheus. To conclude, they are imaginable effects to him that hath not
tasted them; and which makes me wonderfully to honor the answer of that
young Souldier to Cyrus, who enquiring of him what he would take for a
horse with which he had lately gained the prize of a race, and whether he
would change him for a Kingdome? "No surely, my Liege (said he), yet
would I willingly forgot him to game a true friend, could I but finde a man
worthy of so precious an alliance." He said not ill, in saying "could I but
finde." For, a man shall easily finde men fit for a superficiall acquaintance;
but in this, wherein men negotiate from the very centre of their harts, and
make no spare of any thing, it is most requisite all the wards and springs be
sincerely wrought and perfectly true. In confederacies, which hold but by
one end, men have nothing to provide for, but for the imperfections, which
particularly doe interest and concerne that end and respect. It is no great
matter what religion my Physician or Lawyer is of: this consideration hath
nothing common with the offices of that friendship they owe mee. So doe I
in the familiar acquaintances that those who serve me contract with me. I
am nothing inquisitive whether a Lackey be chaste or no, but whether he be
diligent: I feare not a gaming Muletier, so much as if he be weake: nor a hot
swearing Cooke, as one that is ignorant and unskilfull; I never meddle with
saying what a man should doe in the world; there are over many others that
doe it; but what my selfe doe in the world.
Mihi sic usus est: Tibi, ut opus est facto, face
[Footnote: Ter. Heau. act. i. sc. i, 28.]
So is it requisite for me:
Doe thou as needfull is for thee.
Concerning familiar table-talke, I rather acquaint my selfe with and
follow a merry conceited [Footnote: Fanciful] humour, than a wise man:
Aretheus. To conclude, they are imaginable effects to him that hath not
tasted them; and which makes me wonderfully to honor the answer of that
young Souldier to Cyrus, who enquiring of him what he would take for a
horse with which he had lately gained the prize of a race, and whether he
would change him for a Kingdome? "No surely, my Liege (said he), yet
would I willingly forgot him to game a true friend, could I but finde a man
worthy of so precious an alliance." He said not ill, in saying "could I but
finde." For, a man shall easily finde men fit for a superficiall acquaintance;
but in this, wherein men negotiate from the very centre of their harts, and
make no spare of any thing, it is most requisite all the wards and springs be
sincerely wrought and perfectly true. In confederacies, which hold but by
one end, men have nothing to provide for, but for the imperfections, which
particularly doe interest and concerne that end and respect. It is no great
matter what religion my Physician or Lawyer is of: this consideration hath
nothing common with the offices of that friendship they owe mee. So doe I
in the familiar acquaintances that those who serve me contract with me. I
am nothing inquisitive whether a Lackey be chaste or no, but whether he be
diligent: I feare not a gaming Muletier, so much as if he be weake: nor a hot
swearing Cooke, as one that is ignorant and unskilfull; I never meddle with
saying what a man should doe in the world; there are over many others that
doe it; but what my selfe doe in the world.
Mihi sic usus est: Tibi, ut opus est facto, face
[Footnote: Ter. Heau. act. i. sc. i, 28.]
So is it requisite for me:
Doe thou as needfull is for thee.
Concerning familiar table-talke, I rather acquaint my selfe with and
follow a merry conceited [Footnote: Fanciful] humour, than a wise man:
Page 99
And in bed I rather prefer beauty than goodnesse; and in society or
conversation of familiar discourse, I respect rather sufficiency, though
without Preud'hommie, [Footnote: Probity.] and so of all things else. Even
as he that was found riding upon an hobby-horse, playing with his children
besought him who thus surprized him not to speake of it untill he were a
father himselfe, supposing the tender fondnesse and fatherly passion which
then would posesse his minde should make him an impartiall judge of such
an action; so would I wish to speake to such as had tried what I speake of:
but knowing how far such an amitie is from the common use, and how seld
scene and rarely found, I looke not to finde a competent judge. For, even the
discourses, which sterne antiquitie hath left us concerning this subject,
seeme to me but faint and forcelesse in respect of the feeling I have of it;
And in that point the effects exceed the very precepts of Philosophie.
Nil ego contulerim jucundo sanus amico.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. i. Sat. vii. 44]
For me, be I well in my wit,
Nought, as a merry friend, so fit.
Ancient Menander accounted him happy that had but met the shadow of
a true friend: verily he had reason to say so, especially if he had tasted of
any: for truly, if I compare all the rest of my forepassed life, which although
I have, by the meere mercy of God, past at rest and ease, and except the
losse of so deare a friend, free from all grievous affliction, with an ever-
quietnesse of minde, as one that have taken my naturall and originall
commodities in good payment, without searching any others: if, as I say, I
compare it all unto the foure yeares I so happily enjoied the sweet company
and deare- deare society of that worthy man, it is nought but a vapour,
nought but a darke and yrkesome light. Since the time I lost him,
conversation of familiar discourse, I respect rather sufficiency, though
without Preud'hommie, [Footnote: Probity.] and so of all things else. Even
as he that was found riding upon an hobby-horse, playing with his children
besought him who thus surprized him not to speake of it untill he were a
father himselfe, supposing the tender fondnesse and fatherly passion which
then would posesse his minde should make him an impartiall judge of such
an action; so would I wish to speake to such as had tried what I speake of:
but knowing how far such an amitie is from the common use, and how seld
scene and rarely found, I looke not to finde a competent judge. For, even the
discourses, which sterne antiquitie hath left us concerning this subject,
seeme to me but faint and forcelesse in respect of the feeling I have of it;
And in that point the effects exceed the very precepts of Philosophie.
Nil ego contulerim jucundo sanus amico.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. i. Sat. vii. 44]
For me, be I well in my wit,
Nought, as a merry friend, so fit.
Ancient Menander accounted him happy that had but met the shadow of
a true friend: verily he had reason to say so, especially if he had tasted of
any: for truly, if I compare all the rest of my forepassed life, which although
I have, by the meere mercy of God, past at rest and ease, and except the
losse of so deare a friend, free from all grievous affliction, with an ever-
quietnesse of minde, as one that have taken my naturall and originall
commodities in good payment, without searching any others: if, as I say, I
compare it all unto the foure yeares I so happily enjoied the sweet company
and deare- deare society of that worthy man, it is nought but a vapour,
nought but a darke and yrkesome light. Since the time I lost him,
Page 100
quem semper acerbum,
Semper honoratum (sic Dii voluistis) habebo,
[Footnote: Virg. AEn. iii. 49.]
Which I shall ever hold a bitter day,
Yet ever honour'd (so my God t' obey),
I doe but languish, I doe but sorrow: and even those pleasures, all things
present me with, in stead of yeelding me comfort, doe but redouble the
griefe of his losse. We were copartners in all things. All things were with us
at halfe; me thinkes I have stolne his part from him.
—Nee fas esse iilla me voluptate hic frui
Decrevi, tantisper dum ille abest meus particeps.
[Footnote: Ter. Heau. act. i. sc. i, 97.]
I have set downe, no joy enjoy I may,
As long as he my partner is away.
I was so accustomed to be ever two, and so enured [Footnote:
Accustomed] to be never single, that me thinks I am but halfe my selfe.
Illam mea si partem animce tulit,
Maturior vis, quid moror altera.
Nec charus aeque nec superstes,
Integer? Ille dies utramque
Duxit ruinam.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Od. xvii.]
Since that part of my soule riper fate reft me,
Why stay I heere the other part he left me?
Semper honoratum (sic Dii voluistis) habebo,
[Footnote: Virg. AEn. iii. 49.]
Which I shall ever hold a bitter day,
Yet ever honour'd (so my God t' obey),
I doe but languish, I doe but sorrow: and even those pleasures, all things
present me with, in stead of yeelding me comfort, doe but redouble the
griefe of his losse. We were copartners in all things. All things were with us
at halfe; me thinkes I have stolne his part from him.
—Nee fas esse iilla me voluptate hic frui
Decrevi, tantisper dum ille abest meus particeps.
[Footnote: Ter. Heau. act. i. sc. i, 97.]
I have set downe, no joy enjoy I may,
As long as he my partner is away.
I was so accustomed to be ever two, and so enured [Footnote:
Accustomed] to be never single, that me thinks I am but halfe my selfe.
Illam mea si partem animce tulit,
Maturior vis, quid moror altera.
Nec charus aeque nec superstes,
Integer? Ille dies utramque
Duxit ruinam.
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Od. xvii.]
Since that part of my soule riper fate reft me,
Why stay I heere the other part he left me?
Page 101
Nor so deere, nor entire, while heere I rest:
That day hath in one mine both opprest.
There is no action can betide me, or imagination possesse me, but I heare
him saying, as indeed he would have done to me: for even as he did excell
me by an infinite distance in all other sufficiencies and vertues, so did he in
all offices and duties of friendship.
Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus,
Tam chari capitis?
[Footnote: Id. 1. i. Od. xxiv.]
What modesty or measure may I beare,
In want and wish of him that was so deare?
O misero frater adempte mihi!
Omnia tecum una perieruni gaudia nostra.
Qua tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor.
[Footnote: CATUL. Eleg. iv. 20, 92, 26, 95.]
Tu mea, tu moriens fregisti commoda frater.
[Footnote: Ib. 21.]
Tecum una tota est nostra sepulta anima,
Cujus ego interitu tota de mente fugavi
Hac studia, atque omnes delicias animi
[Footnote: CATUL. Bl. iv. 94.]
Alloquar? audiero nunquam tua verba loquentem?
[Footnote: Ib. 25.]
Nunquam ego te vita frater amabilior,
Aspiciam posthac? at certe semper amabo.
[Footnote: El. i. 9.]
That day hath in one mine both opprest.
There is no action can betide me, or imagination possesse me, but I heare
him saying, as indeed he would have done to me: for even as he did excell
me by an infinite distance in all other sufficiencies and vertues, so did he in
all offices and duties of friendship.
Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus,
Tam chari capitis?
[Footnote: Id. 1. i. Od. xxiv.]
What modesty or measure may I beare,
In want and wish of him that was so deare?
O misero frater adempte mihi!
Omnia tecum una perieruni gaudia nostra.
Qua tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor.
[Footnote: CATUL. Eleg. iv. 20, 92, 26, 95.]
Tu mea, tu moriens fregisti commoda frater.
[Footnote: Ib. 21.]
Tecum una tota est nostra sepulta anima,
Cujus ego interitu tota de mente fugavi
Hac studia, atque omnes delicias animi
[Footnote: CATUL. Bl. iv. 94.]
Alloquar? audiero nunquam tua verba loquentem?
[Footnote: Ib. 25.]
Nunquam ego te vita frater amabilior,
Aspiciam posthac? at certe semper amabo.
[Footnote: El. i. 9.]
Page 102
O brother rest from miserable me,
All our delights are perished with thee,
Which thy sweet love did nourish in my breath.
Thou all my good hast spoiled in thy death:
With thee my soule is all and whole enshrinde,
At whose death I have cast out of my minde
All my mindes sweet-meats, studies of this kinde;
Never shall I, heare thee speake, speake with thee?
Thee brother, than life dearer, never see?
Yet shalt them ever be belov'd of mee.
But let us a little feare this yong man speake, being but sixteene yeares of
age.
Because I have found this worke to have since beene published (and to an
ill end) by such as seeke to trouble and subvert the state of our common-
wealth, nor caring whether they shall reforme it or no; which they have
fondly inserted among other writings of their invention, I have revoked my
intent, which was to place it here. And lest the Authors memory should any
way be interessed with those that could not thoroughly know his opinions
and actions, they shall understand that this subject was by him treated of in
his infancie, only by way of exercise, as a subject, common, bareworne, and
wyer- drawne in a thousand bookes. I will never doubt but he beleeved what
he writ, and writ as he thought: for hee was so conscientious that no lie did
ever passe his lips, yea were it but in matters of sport or play: and I know,
that had it beene in his choyce, he would rather have beene borne at Venice
than at Sarlac; and good, reason why: But he had another maxime deepely
imprinted in his minde, which was, carefully to obey, and religiously to
submit himselfe to the lawes, under which he was borne. There was never a
better citizen, nor more affected to the welfare and quietnesse of his
countrie, nor a sharper enemie of the changes, innovations, newfangles, and
All our delights are perished with thee,
Which thy sweet love did nourish in my breath.
Thou all my good hast spoiled in thy death:
With thee my soule is all and whole enshrinde,
At whose death I have cast out of my minde
All my mindes sweet-meats, studies of this kinde;
Never shall I, heare thee speake, speake with thee?
Thee brother, than life dearer, never see?
Yet shalt them ever be belov'd of mee.
But let us a little feare this yong man speake, being but sixteene yeares of
age.
Because I have found this worke to have since beene published (and to an
ill end) by such as seeke to trouble and subvert the state of our common-
wealth, nor caring whether they shall reforme it or no; which they have
fondly inserted among other writings of their invention, I have revoked my
intent, which was to place it here. And lest the Authors memory should any
way be interessed with those that could not thoroughly know his opinions
and actions, they shall understand that this subject was by him treated of in
his infancie, only by way of exercise, as a subject, common, bareworne, and
wyer- drawne in a thousand bookes. I will never doubt but he beleeved what
he writ, and writ as he thought: for hee was so conscientious that no lie did
ever passe his lips, yea were it but in matters of sport or play: and I know,
that had it beene in his choyce, he would rather have beene borne at Venice
than at Sarlac; and good, reason why: But he had another maxime deepely
imprinted in his minde, which was, carefully to obey, and religiously to
submit himselfe to the lawes, under which he was borne. There was never a
better citizen, nor more affected to the welfare and quietnesse of his
countrie, nor a sharper enemie of the changes, innovations, newfangles, and
Page 103
hurly- burlies of his time: He would more willingly have imployed the
utmost of his endevours to extinguish and suppresse, than to favour or
further them: His minde was modelled to the patterne of other best ages.
But yet in exchange of his serious treatise, I will here set you downe
another, more pithie, materiall, and of more consequence, by him likewise
produced at that tender age.
utmost of his endevours to extinguish and suppresse, than to favour or
further them: His minde was modelled to the patterne of other best ages.
But yet in exchange of his serious treatise, I will here set you downe
another, more pithie, materiall, and of more consequence, by him likewise
produced at that tender age.
Page 104
OF BOOKS
I make no doubt but it shall often befall me to speake of things which are
better, and with more truth, handled by such as are their crafts-masters.
Here is simply an essay of my natural faculties, and no whit of those I have
acquired. And he that shall tax me with ignorance shall have no great
victory at my hands; for hardly could I give others reasons for my
discourses that give none unto my selfe, and am not well satisfied with
them. He that shall make search after knowledge, let him seek it where it is
there is nothing I professe lesse. These are but my fantasies by which I
endevour not to make things known, but my selfe. They may haply one day
be knowne unto me, or have bin at other times, according as fortune hath
brought me where they were declared or manifested. But I remember them
no more. And if I be a man of some reading, yet I am a man of no
remembering, I conceive no certainty, except it bee to give notice how farre
the knowledge I have of it doth now reach. Let no man busie himselfe about
the matters, but on the fashion I give them. Let that which I borrow be
survaied, and then tell me whether I have made good choice of ornaments
to beautifie and set foorth the invention which ever comes from mee. For I
make others to relate (not after mine owne fantasie but as it best falleth out)
what I cannot so well expresse, either through unskill of language or want
of judgement. I number not my borrowings, but I weigh them. And if I
would have made their number to prevail, I would have had twice as many.
They are all, or almost all, of so famous and ancient names, that me thinks
I make no doubt but it shall often befall me to speake of things which are
better, and with more truth, handled by such as are their crafts-masters.
Here is simply an essay of my natural faculties, and no whit of those I have
acquired. And he that shall tax me with ignorance shall have no great
victory at my hands; for hardly could I give others reasons for my
discourses that give none unto my selfe, and am not well satisfied with
them. He that shall make search after knowledge, let him seek it where it is
there is nothing I professe lesse. These are but my fantasies by which I
endevour not to make things known, but my selfe. They may haply one day
be knowne unto me, or have bin at other times, according as fortune hath
brought me where they were declared or manifested. But I remember them
no more. And if I be a man of some reading, yet I am a man of no
remembering, I conceive no certainty, except it bee to give notice how farre
the knowledge I have of it doth now reach. Let no man busie himselfe about
the matters, but on the fashion I give them. Let that which I borrow be
survaied, and then tell me whether I have made good choice of ornaments
to beautifie and set foorth the invention which ever comes from mee. For I
make others to relate (not after mine owne fantasie but as it best falleth out)
what I cannot so well expresse, either through unskill of language or want
of judgement. I number not my borrowings, but I weigh them. And if I
would have made their number to prevail, I would have had twice as many.
They are all, or almost all, of so famous and ancient names, that me thinks
Page 105
they sufficiently name themselves without mee. If in reasons, comparisons,
and arguments, I transplant any into my soile, or confound them with mine
owne, I purposely conceale the author, thereby to bridle the rashnesse of
these hastie censures that are so headlong cast upon all manner of
compositions, namely young writings of men yet living; and in vulgare that
admit all the world to talke of them, and which seemeth to convince the
conception and publike designe alike. I will have them to give Plutarch a
barb [Footnote: Thrust, taunt] upon mine own lips, and vex themselves in
wronging Seneca in mee. My weaknesse must be hidden under such great
credits. I will love him that shal trace or unfeather me; I meane through
clearenesse of judgement, and by the onely distinction of the force and
beautie of my discourses. For my selfe, who for want of memorie am ever
to seeke how to trie and refine them by the knowledge of their country,
knowe perfectly, by measuring mine owne strength, that my soyle is no way
capable of some over-pretious flowers that therein I find set, and that all the
fruits of my increase could not make it amends. This am I bound to answer
for if I hinder my selfe, if there be either vanitie or fault in my discourses
that I perceive not or am not able to discerne if they be showed me. For
many faults do often escape our eyes; but the infirmitie of judgement
consisteth in not being able to perceive them when another discovereth
them unto us. Knowledge and truth may be in us without judgement, and
we may have judgment without them: yea, the acknowledgement of
ignorance is one of the best and surest testimonies of judgement that I can
finde. I have no other sergeant of band to marshall my rapsodies than
fortune. And looke how my humours or conceites present themselves, so I
shuffle them up. Sometimes they prease out thicke and three fold, and other
times they come out languishing one by one. I will have my naturall and
ordinarie pace scene as loose and as shuffling as it is. As I am, so I goe on
plodding. And besides, these are matters that a man may not be ignorant of,
and rashly and casually to speake of them. I would wish to have a more
and arguments, I transplant any into my soile, or confound them with mine
owne, I purposely conceale the author, thereby to bridle the rashnesse of
these hastie censures that are so headlong cast upon all manner of
compositions, namely young writings of men yet living; and in vulgare that
admit all the world to talke of them, and which seemeth to convince the
conception and publike designe alike. I will have them to give Plutarch a
barb [Footnote: Thrust, taunt] upon mine own lips, and vex themselves in
wronging Seneca in mee. My weaknesse must be hidden under such great
credits. I will love him that shal trace or unfeather me; I meane through
clearenesse of judgement, and by the onely distinction of the force and
beautie of my discourses. For my selfe, who for want of memorie am ever
to seeke how to trie and refine them by the knowledge of their country,
knowe perfectly, by measuring mine owne strength, that my soyle is no way
capable of some over-pretious flowers that therein I find set, and that all the
fruits of my increase could not make it amends. This am I bound to answer
for if I hinder my selfe, if there be either vanitie or fault in my discourses
that I perceive not or am not able to discerne if they be showed me. For
many faults do often escape our eyes; but the infirmitie of judgement
consisteth in not being able to perceive them when another discovereth
them unto us. Knowledge and truth may be in us without judgement, and
we may have judgment without them: yea, the acknowledgement of
ignorance is one of the best and surest testimonies of judgement that I can
finde. I have no other sergeant of band to marshall my rapsodies than
fortune. And looke how my humours or conceites present themselves, so I
shuffle them up. Sometimes they prease out thicke and three fold, and other
times they come out languishing one by one. I will have my naturall and
ordinarie pace scene as loose and as shuffling as it is. As I am, so I goe on
plodding. And besides, these are matters that a man may not be ignorant of,
and rashly and casually to speake of them. I would wish to have a more
Page 106
perfect understanding of things, but I will not purchase it so deare as it cost.
My intention is to passe the remainder of my life quietly and not
laboriously, in rest and not in care. There is nothing I will trouble or vex
myselfe about, no not for science it selfe, what esteeme soever it be of. I
doe not search and tosse over books but for an honester recreation to please,
and pastime to delight my selfe: or if I studie, I only endevour to find out
the knowledge that teacheth or handleth the knowledge of my selfe, and
which may instruct me how to die well and how to live well.
Has meus ad metas sudet oportet equus.
[Footnote: Propeet. 1. iv. El. i. 70]
My horse must sweating runne,
That this goale may be wonne.
If in reading I fortune to meet with any difficult points, I fret not my selfe
about them, but after I have given them a charge or two, I leave them as I
found them. Should I earnestly plod upon them, I should loose both time
and my selfe, for I have a skipping wit. What I see not at the first view, I
shall lesse see it if I opinionate my selfe upon it. I doe nothing without
blithnesse; and an over obstinate continuation and plodding contention doth
dazle, dul, and wearie the same: my sight is thereby confounded and
diminished. I must therefore withdraw it, and at fittes goe to it againe. Even
as to judge well of the lustre of scarlet we are taught to cast our eyes over it,
in running over by divers glances, sodaine glimpses and reiterated
reprisings. [Footnote: Repeated observations.] If one booke seeme tedious
unto me I take another, which I follow not with any earnestnesse, except it
be at such houres as I am idle, or that I am weary with doing nothing. I am
not greatly affected to new books, because ancient Authors are, in my
judgement, more full and pithy: nor am I much addicted to Greeke books,
forasmuch as my understanding cannot well rid [Footnote: Accomplish.] his
My intention is to passe the remainder of my life quietly and not
laboriously, in rest and not in care. There is nothing I will trouble or vex
myselfe about, no not for science it selfe, what esteeme soever it be of. I
doe not search and tosse over books but for an honester recreation to please,
and pastime to delight my selfe: or if I studie, I only endevour to find out
the knowledge that teacheth or handleth the knowledge of my selfe, and
which may instruct me how to die well and how to live well.
Has meus ad metas sudet oportet equus.
[Footnote: Propeet. 1. iv. El. i. 70]
My horse must sweating runne,
That this goale may be wonne.
If in reading I fortune to meet with any difficult points, I fret not my selfe
about them, but after I have given them a charge or two, I leave them as I
found them. Should I earnestly plod upon them, I should loose both time
and my selfe, for I have a skipping wit. What I see not at the first view, I
shall lesse see it if I opinionate my selfe upon it. I doe nothing without
blithnesse; and an over obstinate continuation and plodding contention doth
dazle, dul, and wearie the same: my sight is thereby confounded and
diminished. I must therefore withdraw it, and at fittes goe to it againe. Even
as to judge well of the lustre of scarlet we are taught to cast our eyes over it,
in running over by divers glances, sodaine glimpses and reiterated
reprisings. [Footnote: Repeated observations.] If one booke seeme tedious
unto me I take another, which I follow not with any earnestnesse, except it
be at such houres as I am idle, or that I am weary with doing nothing. I am
not greatly affected to new books, because ancient Authors are, in my
judgement, more full and pithy: nor am I much addicted to Greeke books,
forasmuch as my understanding cannot well rid [Footnote: Accomplish.] his
Page 107
worke with a childish and apprentise intelligence. Amongst moderne
bookes meerly pleasant, I esteeme Bocace his Decameron, Rabelais, and the
kisses of John the second (if they may be placed under this title), worth the
paines-taking to reade them. As for Amadis and such like trash of writings,
they had never the credit so much as to allure my youth to delight in them.
This I will say more, either boldly or rashly, that this old and heavie-pased
minde of mine will no more be pleased with Aristotle, or tickled with good
Ovid: his facility and quaint inventions, which heretofore have so ravished
me, they can now a days scarcely entertaine me. I speake my minde freely
of all things, yea, of such as peradventure exceed my sufficiencie, and that
no way I hold to be of my jurisdiction. What my conceit is of them is told
also to manifest the proportion of my insight, and not the measure of things.
If at any time I finde my selfe distasted of Platoes Axiochus, as of a forceles
worke, due regard had to such an Author, my judgement doth nothing
beleeve it selfe: It is not so fond-hardy, or selfe-conceited, as it durst dare to
oppose it selfe against the authority of so many other famous ancient
judgements, which he reputeth his regents and masters, and with whom hee
had rather erre. He chafeth with, and condemneth himselfe, either to rely on
the superficiall sense, being unable to pierce into the centre, or to view the
thing by some false lustre. He is pleased only to warrant himselfe from
trouble and unrulinesse: As for weaknesse, he acknowledgeth and
ingeniously avoweth the same. He thinks to give a just interpretation to the
apparences which his conception presents unto him, but they are shallow
and imperfect. Most of AEsopes fables have divers senses, and severall
interpretations: Those which Mythologize them, chuse some kinde of colour
well suting with the fable; but for the most part, it is no other than the first
and superficiall glosse: There are others more quicke, more sinnowie, more
essentiall, and more internall, into which they could never penetrate; and
thus thinke I with them. But to follow my course, I have ever deemed that
in Poesie, Virgil, Lucretius, Catullus, and Horace, doe doubtles by far hold
bookes meerly pleasant, I esteeme Bocace his Decameron, Rabelais, and the
kisses of John the second (if they may be placed under this title), worth the
paines-taking to reade them. As for Amadis and such like trash of writings,
they had never the credit so much as to allure my youth to delight in them.
This I will say more, either boldly or rashly, that this old and heavie-pased
minde of mine will no more be pleased with Aristotle, or tickled with good
Ovid: his facility and quaint inventions, which heretofore have so ravished
me, they can now a days scarcely entertaine me. I speake my minde freely
of all things, yea, of such as peradventure exceed my sufficiencie, and that
no way I hold to be of my jurisdiction. What my conceit is of them is told
also to manifest the proportion of my insight, and not the measure of things.
If at any time I finde my selfe distasted of Platoes Axiochus, as of a forceles
worke, due regard had to such an Author, my judgement doth nothing
beleeve it selfe: It is not so fond-hardy, or selfe-conceited, as it durst dare to
oppose it selfe against the authority of so many other famous ancient
judgements, which he reputeth his regents and masters, and with whom hee
had rather erre. He chafeth with, and condemneth himselfe, either to rely on
the superficiall sense, being unable to pierce into the centre, or to view the
thing by some false lustre. He is pleased only to warrant himselfe from
trouble and unrulinesse: As for weaknesse, he acknowledgeth and
ingeniously avoweth the same. He thinks to give a just interpretation to the
apparences which his conception presents unto him, but they are shallow
and imperfect. Most of AEsopes fables have divers senses, and severall
interpretations: Those which Mythologize them, chuse some kinde of colour
well suting with the fable; but for the most part, it is no other than the first
and superficiall glosse: There are others more quicke, more sinnowie, more
essentiall, and more internall, into which they could never penetrate; and
thus thinke I with them. But to follow my course, I have ever deemed that
in Poesie, Virgil, Lucretius, Catullus, and Horace, doe doubtles by far hold
Page 108
the first ranke: and especially Virgil in his Georgiks, which I esteeme to be
the most accomplished peece of worke of Poesie: In comparison of which
one may easily discerne, that there are some passages in the AEneidos to
which the Author (had he lived) would no doubt have given some review or
correction: The fifth booke whereof is (in my mind) the most absolutely
perfect. I also love Lucan, and willingly read him, not so much for his stile,
as for his owne worth and truth of his opinion and judgement. As for good
Terence, I allow the quaintnesse and grace of his Latine tongue, and judge
him wonderfull conceited and apt, lively to represent the motions and
passions of the minde, and the condition of our manners: our actions make
me often remember him. I can never reade him so often but still I discover
some new grace and beautie in him. Those that lived about Virgil's time,
complained that some would compare Lucretius unto him. I am of opinion
that verily it is an unequall comparison; yet can I hardly assure my selfe in
this opinion whensoever I finde my selfe entangled in some notable passage
of Lucretius. If they were moved at this comparison, what would they say
now of the fond, hardy and barbarous stupiditie of those which now adayes
compare Ariosto unto him? Nay, what would Ariosto say of it himselfe?
O seclum insipiens et infacetutn.
[Footnote: Catul. Epig, xl. 8.]
O age that hath no wit,
And small conceit in it.
I thinke our ancestors had also more reason to cry out against those that
blushed not to equall Plautus unto Terence (who makes more show to be a
Gentleman) than Lucretius unto Virgil. This one thing doth greatly
advantage the estimation and preferring of Terence, that the father of the
Roman eloquence, of men of his quality doth so often make mention of
him; and the censure [Footnote: Opinion.] which the chiefe Judge of the
the most accomplished peece of worke of Poesie: In comparison of which
one may easily discerne, that there are some passages in the AEneidos to
which the Author (had he lived) would no doubt have given some review or
correction: The fifth booke whereof is (in my mind) the most absolutely
perfect. I also love Lucan, and willingly read him, not so much for his stile,
as for his owne worth and truth of his opinion and judgement. As for good
Terence, I allow the quaintnesse and grace of his Latine tongue, and judge
him wonderfull conceited and apt, lively to represent the motions and
passions of the minde, and the condition of our manners: our actions make
me often remember him. I can never reade him so often but still I discover
some new grace and beautie in him. Those that lived about Virgil's time,
complained that some would compare Lucretius unto him. I am of opinion
that verily it is an unequall comparison; yet can I hardly assure my selfe in
this opinion whensoever I finde my selfe entangled in some notable passage
of Lucretius. If they were moved at this comparison, what would they say
now of the fond, hardy and barbarous stupiditie of those which now adayes
compare Ariosto unto him? Nay, what would Ariosto say of it himselfe?
O seclum insipiens et infacetutn.
[Footnote: Catul. Epig, xl. 8.]
O age that hath no wit,
And small conceit in it.
I thinke our ancestors had also more reason to cry out against those that
blushed not to equall Plautus unto Terence (who makes more show to be a
Gentleman) than Lucretius unto Virgil. This one thing doth greatly
advantage the estimation and preferring of Terence, that the father of the
Roman eloquence, of men of his quality doth so often make mention of
him; and the censure [Footnote: Opinion.] which the chiefe Judge of the
Page 109
Roman Poets giveth of his companion. It hath often come unto my minde,
how such as in our dayes give themselves to composing of comedies (as the
Italians who are very happy in them) employ three or foure arguments of
Terence and Plautus to make up one of theirs. In one onely comedy they
will huddle up five or six of Bocaces tales. That which makes them so to
charge themselves with matter, is the distrust they have of their owne
sufficiency, and that they are not able to undergoe so heavie a burthen with
their owne strength. They are forced to finde a body on which they may rely
and leane themselves: and wanting matter of their owne wherewith to
please us, they will have the story or tale to busie and ammuse us: where as
in my Authors it is cleane contrary: The elegancies, the perfections and
ornaments of his manner of speech, make us neglect and lose the longing
for his subject. His quaintnesse and grace doe still retaine us to him. He is
every where pleasantly conceited, [Footnote: Full of pleasant notions.]
Liquidus puroque simillimus amni
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Epist. II. 120.]
So clearely-neate, so neately-cleare,
As he a fine-pure River were,
and doth so replenish our minde with his graces that we forget those of
the fable. The same consideration drawes me somewhat further. I perceive
that good and ancient Poets have shunned the affectation and enquest, not
only of fantasticall, new fangled, Spagniolized, and Petrarchisticall
elevations, but also of more sweet and sparing inventions, which are the
ornament of all the Poeticall workes of succeeding ages. Yet is there no
competent Judge that findeth them wanting in those Ancient ones, and that
doth not much more admire that smoothly equall neatnesse, continued
sweetnesse, and flourishing comelinesse of Catullus his Epigrams, than all
the sharpe quips and witty girds wherewith Martiall doth whet and
how such as in our dayes give themselves to composing of comedies (as the
Italians who are very happy in them) employ three or foure arguments of
Terence and Plautus to make up one of theirs. In one onely comedy they
will huddle up five or six of Bocaces tales. That which makes them so to
charge themselves with matter, is the distrust they have of their owne
sufficiency, and that they are not able to undergoe so heavie a burthen with
their owne strength. They are forced to finde a body on which they may rely
and leane themselves: and wanting matter of their owne wherewith to
please us, they will have the story or tale to busie and ammuse us: where as
in my Authors it is cleane contrary: The elegancies, the perfections and
ornaments of his manner of speech, make us neglect and lose the longing
for his subject. His quaintnesse and grace doe still retaine us to him. He is
every where pleasantly conceited, [Footnote: Full of pleasant notions.]
Liquidus puroque simillimus amni
[Footnote: Hor. 1. ii. Epist. II. 120.]
So clearely-neate, so neately-cleare,
As he a fine-pure River were,
and doth so replenish our minde with his graces that we forget those of
the fable. The same consideration drawes me somewhat further. I perceive
that good and ancient Poets have shunned the affectation and enquest, not
only of fantasticall, new fangled, Spagniolized, and Petrarchisticall
elevations, but also of more sweet and sparing inventions, which are the
ornament of all the Poeticall workes of succeeding ages. Yet is there no
competent Judge that findeth them wanting in those Ancient ones, and that
doth not much more admire that smoothly equall neatnesse, continued
sweetnesse, and flourishing comelinesse of Catullus his Epigrams, than all
the sharpe quips and witty girds wherewith Martiall doth whet and
Page 110
embellish the conclusions of his. It is the same reason I spake of erewhile,
as Martiall of himselfe. Minus illi ingenio laborandum fuit, in cuius locum
materia successerat. [Footnote: Mart. Praf. 1. viii.] "He needed the lesse
worke with his wit, in place whereof matter came in supply." The former
without being moved or pricked cause themselves to be heard lowd enough:
they have matter to laugh at every where, and need not tickle themselves;
where as these must have foraine helpe: according as they have lesse spirit,
they must have more body. They leape on horsebacke, because they are not
sufficiently strong in their legs to march on foot. Even as in our dances,
those base conditioned men that keepe dancing-schooles, because they are
unfit to represent the port and decencie of our nobilitie, endevour to get
commendation by dangerous lofty trickes, and other strange tumbler-like
friskes and motions. And some Ladies make a better shew of their
countenances in those dances, wherein are divers changes, cuttings,
turnings, and agitations of the body, than in some dances of state and
gravity, where they need but simply to tread a naturall measure, represent an
unaffected cariage, and their ordinary grace; And as I have also seene some
excellent Lourdans, or Clownes, attired in their ordinary worky-day clothes,
and with a common homely countenance, affoord us all the pleasure that
may be had from their art: but prentises and learners that are not of so high
a forme, besmeare their faces, to disguise themselves, and in motions
counterfeit strange visages and antickes, to enduce us to laughter. This my
conception is no where better discerned than in the comparison betweene
Virgils AEneidos and Orlando Furioso. The first is seene to soare aloft with
full-spread wings, and with so high and strong a pitch, ever following his
point; the other faintly to hover and flutter from tale to tale, and as it were
skipping from bough to bough, always distrusting his owne wings, except it
be for some short flight, and for feare his strength and breath should faile
him, to sit downe at every fields- end;
as Martiall of himselfe. Minus illi ingenio laborandum fuit, in cuius locum
materia successerat. [Footnote: Mart. Praf. 1. viii.] "He needed the lesse
worke with his wit, in place whereof matter came in supply." The former
without being moved or pricked cause themselves to be heard lowd enough:
they have matter to laugh at every where, and need not tickle themselves;
where as these must have foraine helpe: according as they have lesse spirit,
they must have more body. They leape on horsebacke, because they are not
sufficiently strong in their legs to march on foot. Even as in our dances,
those base conditioned men that keepe dancing-schooles, because they are
unfit to represent the port and decencie of our nobilitie, endevour to get
commendation by dangerous lofty trickes, and other strange tumbler-like
friskes and motions. And some Ladies make a better shew of their
countenances in those dances, wherein are divers changes, cuttings,
turnings, and agitations of the body, than in some dances of state and
gravity, where they need but simply to tread a naturall measure, represent an
unaffected cariage, and their ordinary grace; And as I have also seene some
excellent Lourdans, or Clownes, attired in their ordinary worky-day clothes,
and with a common homely countenance, affoord us all the pleasure that
may be had from their art: but prentises and learners that are not of so high
a forme, besmeare their faces, to disguise themselves, and in motions
counterfeit strange visages and antickes, to enduce us to laughter. This my
conception is no where better discerned than in the comparison betweene
Virgils AEneidos and Orlando Furioso. The first is seene to soare aloft with
full-spread wings, and with so high and strong a pitch, ever following his
point; the other faintly to hover and flutter from tale to tale, and as it were
skipping from bough to bough, always distrusting his owne wings, except it
be for some short flight, and for feare his strength and breath should faile
him, to sit downe at every fields- end;
Page 111
Excursusque breves tentat.
[Footnote: Virg. AEn. 1. iv. 194.]
Out-lopes [Footnote: Wanderings out.] sometimes he doth assay,
But very short, and as he may.
Loe here then, concerning this kinde of subjects, what Authors please me
best: As for my other lesson, which somewhat more mixeth profit with
pleasure, whereby I learne to range my opinions and addresse my
conditions, the Bookes that serve me thereunto are Plutarke (since he spake
[Footnote: Was translated by Angot] French) and Seneca; both have this
excellent commodity for my humour, that the knowledge I seeke in them is
there so scatteringly and loosely handled, that whosoever readeth them is
not tied to plod long upon them, whereof I am uncapable. And so are
Plutarkes little workes and Senecas Epistles, which are the best and most
profitable parts of their writings. It is no great matter to draw mee to them,
and I leave them where I list. For they succeed not and depend not one of
another. Both jumpe [Footnote: Agree] and suit together, in most true and
profitable opinions: And fortune brought them both into the world in one
age. Both were Tutors unto two Roman Emperours: Both were strangers,
and came from farre Countries; both rich and mighty in the common-
wealth, and in credit with their masters. Their instruction is the prime and
creame of Philosophy, and presented with a plaine, unaffected, and
pertinent fashion. Plutarke is more uniforme and constant; Seneca more
waving and diverse. This doth labour, force, and extend himselfe, to arme
and strengthen vertue against weaknesse, feare, and vitious desires; the
other seemeth nothing so much to feare their force or attempt, and in a
manner scorneth to hasten or change his pace about them, and to put
himselfe upon his guard. Plutarkes opinions are Platonicall, gentle and
accommodable unto civill societie: Senecaes Stoicall and Epicurian, further
from common use, but in my conceit [Footnote: Opinion.] more proper,
[Footnote: Virg. AEn. 1. iv. 194.]
Out-lopes [Footnote: Wanderings out.] sometimes he doth assay,
But very short, and as he may.
Loe here then, concerning this kinde of subjects, what Authors please me
best: As for my other lesson, which somewhat more mixeth profit with
pleasure, whereby I learne to range my opinions and addresse my
conditions, the Bookes that serve me thereunto are Plutarke (since he spake
[Footnote: Was translated by Angot] French) and Seneca; both have this
excellent commodity for my humour, that the knowledge I seeke in them is
there so scatteringly and loosely handled, that whosoever readeth them is
not tied to plod long upon them, whereof I am uncapable. And so are
Plutarkes little workes and Senecas Epistles, which are the best and most
profitable parts of their writings. It is no great matter to draw mee to them,
and I leave them where I list. For they succeed not and depend not one of
another. Both jumpe [Footnote: Agree] and suit together, in most true and
profitable opinions: And fortune brought them both into the world in one
age. Both were Tutors unto two Roman Emperours: Both were strangers,
and came from farre Countries; both rich and mighty in the common-
wealth, and in credit with their masters. Their instruction is the prime and
creame of Philosophy, and presented with a plaine, unaffected, and
pertinent fashion. Plutarke is more uniforme and constant; Seneca more
waving and diverse. This doth labour, force, and extend himselfe, to arme
and strengthen vertue against weaknesse, feare, and vitious desires; the
other seemeth nothing so much to feare their force or attempt, and in a
manner scorneth to hasten or change his pace about them, and to put
himselfe upon his guard. Plutarkes opinions are Platonicall, gentle and
accommodable unto civill societie: Senecaes Stoicall and Epicurian, further
from common use, but in my conceit [Footnote: Opinion.] more proper,
Page 112
particular, and more solid. It appeareth in Seneca that he somewhat
inclineth and yeeldeth to the tyrannic of the Emperors which were in his
daies; for I verily believe, it is with a forced judgement he condemneth the
cause of those noblie- minded murtherers of Caesar; Plutarke is every
where free and open hearted; Seneca full-fraught with points and sallies;
Plutarke stuft with matters. The former doth move and enflame you more;
the latter content, please, and pay you better: This doth guide you, the other
drive you on. As for Cicero, of all his works, those that treat of Philosophie
(namely morall) are they which best serve my turne, and square with my
intent. But boldly to confess the truth (for, since the bars of impudencie
were broken downe, all curbing is taken away), his manner of writing
seemeth verie tedious unto me, as doth all such like stuffe. For his prefaces,
definitions, divisions, and Etymologies consume the greatest part of his
works; whatsoever quick, wittie, and pithie conceit is in him is surcharged
and confounded by those his long and far-fetcht preambles. If I bestow but
one hour in reading them, which is much for me, and let me call to minde
what substance or juice I have drawne from him, for the most part I find
nothing but wind and ostentation in him; for he is not yet come to the
arguments which make for his purpose, and reasons that properly concerne
the knot or pith I seek after. These Logicall and Aristotelian ordinances are
not avail full for me, who onely endeavour to become more wise and
sufficient, and not more wittie or eloquent. I would have one begin with the
last point: I understand sufficiently what death and voluptuousnesse are: let
not a man busie himselfe to anatomize them. At the first reading of a booke
I seeke for good and solid reasons that may instruct me how to sustaine
their assaults. It is neither grammaticall subtilties nor logicall quiddities, nor
the wittie contexture of choice words or arguments and syllogismes, that
will serve my turne. I like those discourses that give the first charge to the
strongest part of the doubt; his are but flourishes, and languish everywhere.
They are good for schooles, at the barre, or for Orators and Preachers,
inclineth and yeeldeth to the tyrannic of the Emperors which were in his
daies; for I verily believe, it is with a forced judgement he condemneth the
cause of those noblie- minded murtherers of Caesar; Plutarke is every
where free and open hearted; Seneca full-fraught with points and sallies;
Plutarke stuft with matters. The former doth move and enflame you more;
the latter content, please, and pay you better: This doth guide you, the other
drive you on. As for Cicero, of all his works, those that treat of Philosophie
(namely morall) are they which best serve my turne, and square with my
intent. But boldly to confess the truth (for, since the bars of impudencie
were broken downe, all curbing is taken away), his manner of writing
seemeth verie tedious unto me, as doth all such like stuffe. For his prefaces,
definitions, divisions, and Etymologies consume the greatest part of his
works; whatsoever quick, wittie, and pithie conceit is in him is surcharged
and confounded by those his long and far-fetcht preambles. If I bestow but
one hour in reading them, which is much for me, and let me call to minde
what substance or juice I have drawne from him, for the most part I find
nothing but wind and ostentation in him; for he is not yet come to the
arguments which make for his purpose, and reasons that properly concerne
the knot or pith I seek after. These Logicall and Aristotelian ordinances are
not avail full for me, who onely endeavour to become more wise and
sufficient, and not more wittie or eloquent. I would have one begin with the
last point: I understand sufficiently what death and voluptuousnesse are: let
not a man busie himselfe to anatomize them. At the first reading of a booke
I seeke for good and solid reasons that may instruct me how to sustaine
their assaults. It is neither grammaticall subtilties nor logicall quiddities, nor
the wittie contexture of choice words or arguments and syllogismes, that
will serve my turne. I like those discourses that give the first charge to the
strongest part of the doubt; his are but flourishes, and languish everywhere.
They are good for schooles, at the barre, or for Orators and Preachers,
Page 113
where we may slumber: and though we wake a quarter of an houre after, we
may finde and trace him soone enough. Such a manner of speech is fit for
those judges that a man would corrupt by hooke or crooke, by right or
wrong, or for children and the common people, unto whom a man must tell
all, and see what the event would be. I would not have a man go about and
labour by circumlocutions to induce and winne me to attention, and that (as
our Heralds or Criers do) they shall ring out their words: Now heare me,
now listen, or ho-yes. [Footnote: Oyez, hear.] The Romanes in their religion
were wont to say, "Hoc age; [Footnote: Do this.] "which in ours we say,
"Sursum corda. [Footnote: Lift up your hearts.] There are so many lost
words for me. I come readie prepared from my house. I neede no allurement
nor sawce, my stomacke is good enough to digest raw meat: And whereas
with these preparatives and flourishes, or preambles, they thinke to sharpen
my taste or stir my stomacke, they cloy and make it wallowish. [Footnote:
Mawkish.] Shall the privilege of times excuse me from this sacrilegious
boldnesse, to deem Platoes Dialogismes to be as languishing, by over-filling
and stuffing his matter? And to bewaile the time that a man who had so
many thousands of things to utter, spends about so many, so long, so vaine,
and idle interloqutions, and preparatives? My ignorance shall better excuse
me, in that I see nothing in the beautie of his language. I generally enquire
after bookes that use sciences, and not after such as institute them. The two
first, and Plinie, with others of their ranke, have no Hoc age in them, they
will have to doe with men that have forewarned themselves; or if they have,
it is a materiall and substantial! Hoc age, and that hath his bodie apart I
likewise love to read the Epistles and ad Atticum, not onely because they
containe a most ample instruction of the historic and affaires of his times,
but much more because in them I descrie his private humours. For (as I
have said elsewhere) I am wonderfull curious to discover and know the
minde, the soul, the genuine disposition and naturall judgement of my
authors. A man ought to judge their sufficiencie and not their customes, nor
may finde and trace him soone enough. Such a manner of speech is fit for
those judges that a man would corrupt by hooke or crooke, by right or
wrong, or for children and the common people, unto whom a man must tell
all, and see what the event would be. I would not have a man go about and
labour by circumlocutions to induce and winne me to attention, and that (as
our Heralds or Criers do) they shall ring out their words: Now heare me,
now listen, or ho-yes. [Footnote: Oyez, hear.] The Romanes in their religion
were wont to say, "Hoc age; [Footnote: Do this.] "which in ours we say,
"Sursum corda. [Footnote: Lift up your hearts.] There are so many lost
words for me. I come readie prepared from my house. I neede no allurement
nor sawce, my stomacke is good enough to digest raw meat: And whereas
with these preparatives and flourishes, or preambles, they thinke to sharpen
my taste or stir my stomacke, they cloy and make it wallowish. [Footnote:
Mawkish.] Shall the privilege of times excuse me from this sacrilegious
boldnesse, to deem Platoes Dialogismes to be as languishing, by over-filling
and stuffing his matter? And to bewaile the time that a man who had so
many thousands of things to utter, spends about so many, so long, so vaine,
and idle interloqutions, and preparatives? My ignorance shall better excuse
me, in that I see nothing in the beautie of his language. I generally enquire
after bookes that use sciences, and not after such as institute them. The two
first, and Plinie, with others of their ranke, have no Hoc age in them, they
will have to doe with men that have forewarned themselves; or if they have,
it is a materiall and substantial! Hoc age, and that hath his bodie apart I
likewise love to read the Epistles and ad Atticum, not onely because they
containe a most ample instruction of the historic and affaires of his times,
but much more because in them I descrie his private humours. For (as I
have said elsewhere) I am wonderfull curious to discover and know the
minde, the soul, the genuine disposition and naturall judgement of my
authors. A man ought to judge their sufficiencie and not their customes, nor
Page 114
them by the shew of their writings, which they set forth on this world's
theatre. I have sorrowed a thousand times that ever we lost the booke that
Brutus writ of Vertue. Oh it is a goodly thing to learne the Theorike of such
as understand the practice well. But forsomuch as the Sermon is one thing
and the Preacher an other, I love as much to see Brutus in Plutarke as in
himself: I would rather make choice to know certainly what talk he had in
his tent with some of his familiar friends, the night fore-going the battell,
than the speech he made the morrow after to his Armie; and what he did in
his chamber or closet, than what in the senate or market place. As for
Cicero, I am of the common judgement, that besides learning there was no
exquisite [Footnote: Overelaborate.] eloquence in him: He was a good
citizen, of an honest, gentle nature, as are commonly fat and burly men: for
so was he: But to speake truly of thim? full of ambitious vanity and remisse
niceness. [Footnote: Ineffectual fastidiousness.] And I know not well how to
excuse him, in that he deemed his Poesie worthy to be published. It is no
great imperfection to make bad verses, but it is an imperfection in him that
he never perceived how unworthy they were of the glorie of his name.
Concerning his eloquence, it is beyond all comparison, and I verily beleeve
that none shall ever equall it. Cicero the younger, who resembled his father
in nothing but in name, commanding in Asia, chanced one day to have
many strangers at his board, and amongst others, one Caestius sitting at the
lower end, as the manner is to thrust in at great mens tables: Cicero inquired
of one of his men what he was, who told him his name, but he dreaming on
other matters, and having forgotten what answere his man made him, asked
him his name twice or thrice more: the servant, because he would not be
troubled to tell him one thing so often, and by some circumstance to make
him to know him better, "It is," said he, "the same Caestius of whom some
have told you that, in respect of his owne, maketh no accompt of your
fathers eloquence:" Cicero being suddainly mooved, commanded the said
poore Caestius to be presently taken from the table, and well whipt in his
theatre. I have sorrowed a thousand times that ever we lost the booke that
Brutus writ of Vertue. Oh it is a goodly thing to learne the Theorike of such
as understand the practice well. But forsomuch as the Sermon is one thing
and the Preacher an other, I love as much to see Brutus in Plutarke as in
himself: I would rather make choice to know certainly what talk he had in
his tent with some of his familiar friends, the night fore-going the battell,
than the speech he made the morrow after to his Armie; and what he did in
his chamber or closet, than what in the senate or market place. As for
Cicero, I am of the common judgement, that besides learning there was no
exquisite [Footnote: Overelaborate.] eloquence in him: He was a good
citizen, of an honest, gentle nature, as are commonly fat and burly men: for
so was he: But to speake truly of thim? full of ambitious vanity and remisse
niceness. [Footnote: Ineffectual fastidiousness.] And I know not well how to
excuse him, in that he deemed his Poesie worthy to be published. It is no
great imperfection to make bad verses, but it is an imperfection in him that
he never perceived how unworthy they were of the glorie of his name.
Concerning his eloquence, it is beyond all comparison, and I verily beleeve
that none shall ever equall it. Cicero the younger, who resembled his father
in nothing but in name, commanding in Asia, chanced one day to have
many strangers at his board, and amongst others, one Caestius sitting at the
lower end, as the manner is to thrust in at great mens tables: Cicero inquired
of one of his men what he was, who told him his name, but he dreaming on
other matters, and having forgotten what answere his man made him, asked
him his name twice or thrice more: the servant, because he would not be
troubled to tell him one thing so often, and by some circumstance to make
him to know him better, "It is," said he, "the same Caestius of whom some
have told you that, in respect of his owne, maketh no accompt of your
fathers eloquence:" Cicero being suddainly mooved, commanded the said
poore Caestius to be presently taken from the table, and well whipt in his
Page 115
presence: Lo heere an uncivill and barbarous host. Even amongst those
which (all things considered) have deemed his eloquence matchlesse and
incomparable, others there have been who have not spared to note some
faults in it. As great Brutus said, that it was an eloquence broken, halting,
and disjoynted, fractam et elumbem: "Incoherent and sinnowlesse." Those
Orators that lived about his age, reproved also in him the curious care he
had of a certaine long cadence at the end of his clauses, and noted these
words, esse videatur, which he so often useth. As for me, I rather like a
cadence that falleth shorter, cut like Iambikes: yet doth he sometimes
confounde his numbers, [Footnote: Confuse his rhythm.] but it is seldome: I
have especially observed this one place: "Ego vero me minus diu senem
esse mallem, quam esse senem, antequam essem? [Footnote: Cic. De
Senect.] "But I had rather not be an old man, so long as I might be, than to
be old before I should be." Historians are my right hand, for they are
pleasant and easie; and therewithall the man with whom I desire generally
to be acquainted may more lively and perfectly be discovered in them than
in any other composition: the varictic and truth of his inward conditions, in
grosse and by retale: the diversitie of the meanes of his collection and
composing, and of the accidents that threaten him. Now those that write of
mens lives, forasmuch as they ammuse and busie themselves more about
counsels than events, more about that which commeth from within than that
which appeareth outward; they are fittest for me: And that's the reason why
Plutarke above all in that kind doth best please me. Indeed I am not a little
grieved that we have not a dozen of Laertius, or that he is not more knowne,
or better understood; for I am no lesse curious to know the fortunes and
lives of these great masters of the world than to understand the diversitie of
their decrees and conceits. In this kind of studie of historie a man must,
without distinction, tosse and turne over all sorts of Authors, both old and
new, both French and others, if he will learne the things they so diversly
treat of. But me thinkes that Caesar above all doth singularly deserve to be
which (all things considered) have deemed his eloquence matchlesse and
incomparable, others there have been who have not spared to note some
faults in it. As great Brutus said, that it was an eloquence broken, halting,
and disjoynted, fractam et elumbem: "Incoherent and sinnowlesse." Those
Orators that lived about his age, reproved also in him the curious care he
had of a certaine long cadence at the end of his clauses, and noted these
words, esse videatur, which he so often useth. As for me, I rather like a
cadence that falleth shorter, cut like Iambikes: yet doth he sometimes
confounde his numbers, [Footnote: Confuse his rhythm.] but it is seldome: I
have especially observed this one place: "Ego vero me minus diu senem
esse mallem, quam esse senem, antequam essem? [Footnote: Cic. De
Senect.] "But I had rather not be an old man, so long as I might be, than to
be old before I should be." Historians are my right hand, for they are
pleasant and easie; and therewithall the man with whom I desire generally
to be acquainted may more lively and perfectly be discovered in them than
in any other composition: the varictic and truth of his inward conditions, in
grosse and by retale: the diversitie of the meanes of his collection and
composing, and of the accidents that threaten him. Now those that write of
mens lives, forasmuch as they ammuse and busie themselves more about
counsels than events, more about that which commeth from within than that
which appeareth outward; they are fittest for me: And that's the reason why
Plutarke above all in that kind doth best please me. Indeed I am not a little
grieved that we have not a dozen of Laertius, or that he is not more knowne,
or better understood; for I am no lesse curious to know the fortunes and
lives of these great masters of the world than to understand the diversitie of
their decrees and conceits. In this kind of studie of historie a man must,
without distinction, tosse and turne over all sorts of Authors, both old and
new, both French and others, if he will learne the things they so diversly
treat of. But me thinkes that Caesar above all doth singularly deserve to be
Page 116
studied, not onely for the understanding of the historie as of himselfe; so
much perfection and excellencie is there in him more than in others,
although Salust be reckoned one of the number. Verily I read that author
with a little more reverence and respects than commonly men reade profane
and humane Workes: sometimes considering him by his actions and
wonders of his greatnesse, and other times waighing the puritie and
inimitable polishing and elegancie of his tongue, which (as Cicero saith)
hath not onely exceeded all historians, but haply Cicero himselfe: with such
sinceritie in his judgement, speaking of his enemies, that except the false
colours wherewith he goeth about to cloake his bad cause, and the
corruption and filthinesse of his pestilent ambition, I am perswaded there is
nothing in him to be found fault with: and that he hath been over-sparing to
speake of himselfe; for so many notable and great things could never be
executed by him, unlesse he had put more of his owne into them than he
setteth downe. I love those Historians that are either very simple or most
excellent. The simple who have nothing of their owne to adde unto the
storie and have but the care and diligence to collect whatsoever come to
their knowledge, and sincerely and faithfully to register all things, without
choice or culling, by the naked truth leave our judgment more entire and
better satisfied.
Such amongst others (for examples sake) plaine and well-meaning
Froissard, who in his enterprise hath marched with so free and genuine a
puritie, that having committed some oversight, he is neither ashamed to
acknowledge nor afraid to correct the same, wheresoever he hath either
notice or warning of it; and who representeth unto us the diversitie of the
newes then current and the different reports that were made unto him. The
subject of an historie should be naked, bare, and formelesse; each man
according to his capacitie or understanding may reap commoditie out of it.
The curious and most excellent have the sufficiencie to cull and chuse that
which is worthie to be knowne and may select of two relations that which is
much perfection and excellencie is there in him more than in others,
although Salust be reckoned one of the number. Verily I read that author
with a little more reverence and respects than commonly men reade profane
and humane Workes: sometimes considering him by his actions and
wonders of his greatnesse, and other times waighing the puritie and
inimitable polishing and elegancie of his tongue, which (as Cicero saith)
hath not onely exceeded all historians, but haply Cicero himselfe: with such
sinceritie in his judgement, speaking of his enemies, that except the false
colours wherewith he goeth about to cloake his bad cause, and the
corruption and filthinesse of his pestilent ambition, I am perswaded there is
nothing in him to be found fault with: and that he hath been over-sparing to
speake of himselfe; for so many notable and great things could never be
executed by him, unlesse he had put more of his owne into them than he
setteth downe. I love those Historians that are either very simple or most
excellent. The simple who have nothing of their owne to adde unto the
storie and have but the care and diligence to collect whatsoever come to
their knowledge, and sincerely and faithfully to register all things, without
choice or culling, by the naked truth leave our judgment more entire and
better satisfied.
Such amongst others (for examples sake) plaine and well-meaning
Froissard, who in his enterprise hath marched with so free and genuine a
puritie, that having committed some oversight, he is neither ashamed to
acknowledge nor afraid to correct the same, wheresoever he hath either
notice or warning of it; and who representeth unto us the diversitie of the
newes then current and the different reports that were made unto him. The
subject of an historie should be naked, bare, and formelesse; each man
according to his capacitie or understanding may reap commoditie out of it.
The curious and most excellent have the sufficiencie to cull and chuse that
which is worthie to be knowne and may select of two relations that which is
Page 117
most likely: from the condition of Princes and of their humours, they
conclude their counsels and attribute fit words to them: they assume a just
authoritie and bind our faith to theirs. But truly that belongs not to many.
Such as are betweene both (which is the most common fashion), it is they
that spoil all; they will needs chew our meat for us and take upon them a
law to judge, and by consequence to square and encline the storie according
to their fantasie; for, where the judgement bendeth one way, a man cannot
chuse but wrest and turne his narration that way. They undertake to chuse
things worthy to bee knowne, and now and then conceal either a word or a
secret action from us, which would much better instruct us: omitting such
things as they understand not as incredible: and haply such matters as they
know not how to declare, either in good Latin or tolerable French. Let them
boldly enstall their eloquence and discourse: Let them censure at their
pleasure, but let them also give us leave to judge after them: And let them
neither alter nor dispense by their abridgements and choice anything
belonging to the substance of the matter; but let them rather send it pure and
entire with all her dimensions unto us. Most commonly (as chiefly in our
age) this charge of writing histories is committed unto base, ignorant, and
mechanicall kind of people, only for this consideration that they can speake
well; as if we sought to learne the Grammer of them; and they have some
reason, being only hired to that end, and publishing nothing but their tittle-
tattle to aime at nothing else so much. Thus with store of choice and quaint
words, and wyre drawne phrases, they huddle up and make a hodge-pot of a
laboured contexture of the reports which they gather in the market places or
such other assemblies. The only good histories are those that are written by
such as commanded or were imploied themselves in weighty affaires or that
were partners in the conduct of them, or that at least have had the fortune to
manage others of like qualitie. Such in a manner are all the Graecians and
Romans. For many eye-witnesses having written of one same subject (as it
hapned in those times when Greatnesse and Knowledge did commonly
conclude their counsels and attribute fit words to them: they assume a just
authoritie and bind our faith to theirs. But truly that belongs not to many.
Such as are betweene both (which is the most common fashion), it is they
that spoil all; they will needs chew our meat for us and take upon them a
law to judge, and by consequence to square and encline the storie according
to their fantasie; for, where the judgement bendeth one way, a man cannot
chuse but wrest and turne his narration that way. They undertake to chuse
things worthy to bee knowne, and now and then conceal either a word or a
secret action from us, which would much better instruct us: omitting such
things as they understand not as incredible: and haply such matters as they
know not how to declare, either in good Latin or tolerable French. Let them
boldly enstall their eloquence and discourse: Let them censure at their
pleasure, but let them also give us leave to judge after them: And let them
neither alter nor dispense by their abridgements and choice anything
belonging to the substance of the matter; but let them rather send it pure and
entire with all her dimensions unto us. Most commonly (as chiefly in our
age) this charge of writing histories is committed unto base, ignorant, and
mechanicall kind of people, only for this consideration that they can speake
well; as if we sought to learne the Grammer of them; and they have some
reason, being only hired to that end, and publishing nothing but their tittle-
tattle to aime at nothing else so much. Thus with store of choice and quaint
words, and wyre drawne phrases, they huddle up and make a hodge-pot of a
laboured contexture of the reports which they gather in the market places or
such other assemblies. The only good histories are those that are written by
such as commanded or were imploied themselves in weighty affaires or that
were partners in the conduct of them, or that at least have had the fortune to
manage others of like qualitie. Such in a manner are all the Graecians and
Romans. For many eye-witnesses having written of one same subject (as it
hapned in those times when Greatnesse and Knowledge did commonly
Page 118
meet) if any fault or over-sight have past them, it must be deemed
exceeding light and upon some doubtful accident. What may a man expect
at a Phisitians hand that discourseth of warre, or of a bare Scholler treating
of Princes secret designes? If we shall but note the religion which the
Romans had in that, wee need no other example: Asinius Pollio found some
mistaking or oversight in Caesars Commentaries, whereinto he was falne,
only because he could not possiblie oversee all things with his owne eyes
that hapned in his Armie, but was faine to rely on the reports of particular
men, who often related untruths unto him: or else because he had not been
curiously advertized [Footnote: Minutely informed.] and distinctly
enformed by his Lieutenants and Captaines of such matters as they in his
absence had managed or effected. Whereby may be seen that nothing is so
hard or so uncertaine to be found out as the certaintie of the truth, sithence
[Footnote: Since.] no man can put any assured confidence concerning the
truth of a battel, neither in the knowledge of him that was Generall or
commanded over it, nor in the soldiers that fought, of anything that hath
hapned amongst them; except after the manner of a strict point of law, the
severall witnesses are brought and examined face to face, and that all
matters be nicely and thorowly sifted by the objects and trials of the
successe of every accident. Verily the knowledge we have of our owne
affaires is much more barren and feeble. But this hath sufficiently been
handled by Bodin, and agreeing with my conception. Somewhat to aid the
weaknesse of my memorie and to assist her great defects; for it hath often
been my chance to light upon bookes which I supposed to be new and never
to have read, which I had not understanding diligently read and run over
many years before, and all bescribled with my notes; I have a while since
accustomed my selfe to note at the end of my booke (I meane such as I
purpose to read but once) the time I made an end to read it, and to set
downe what censure or judgement I gave of it; that so it may at least at
another time represent unto my mind the aire and generall idea I had
exceeding light and upon some doubtful accident. What may a man expect
at a Phisitians hand that discourseth of warre, or of a bare Scholler treating
of Princes secret designes? If we shall but note the religion which the
Romans had in that, wee need no other example: Asinius Pollio found some
mistaking or oversight in Caesars Commentaries, whereinto he was falne,
only because he could not possiblie oversee all things with his owne eyes
that hapned in his Armie, but was faine to rely on the reports of particular
men, who often related untruths unto him: or else because he had not been
curiously advertized [Footnote: Minutely informed.] and distinctly
enformed by his Lieutenants and Captaines of such matters as they in his
absence had managed or effected. Whereby may be seen that nothing is so
hard or so uncertaine to be found out as the certaintie of the truth, sithence
[Footnote: Since.] no man can put any assured confidence concerning the
truth of a battel, neither in the knowledge of him that was Generall or
commanded over it, nor in the soldiers that fought, of anything that hath
hapned amongst them; except after the manner of a strict point of law, the
severall witnesses are brought and examined face to face, and that all
matters be nicely and thorowly sifted by the objects and trials of the
successe of every accident. Verily the knowledge we have of our owne
affaires is much more barren and feeble. But this hath sufficiently been
handled by Bodin, and agreeing with my conception. Somewhat to aid the
weaknesse of my memorie and to assist her great defects; for it hath often
been my chance to light upon bookes which I supposed to be new and never
to have read, which I had not understanding diligently read and run over
many years before, and all bescribled with my notes; I have a while since
accustomed my selfe to note at the end of my booke (I meane such as I
purpose to read but once) the time I made an end to read it, and to set
downe what censure or judgement I gave of it; that so it may at least at
another time represent unto my mind the aire and generall idea I had
Page 119
conceived of the Author in reading him. I will here set downe the Copie of
some of my annotations, and especially what I noted upon my Guicciardine
about ten yeares since: (For what language soever my books speake unto
me I speake unto them in mine owne.) He is a diligent Historiographer and
from whom in my conceit a man may as exactly learne the truth of such
affaires as passed in his time, as of any other writer whatsoever: and the
rather because himselfe hath been an Actor of most part of them and in
verie honourable place. There is no signe or apparance that ever he
disguised or coloured any matter, either through hatred, malice, favour, or
vanitie; whereof the free and impartiall judgements he giveth of great men,
and namely of those by whom he had been advanced or imployed in his
important charges, as of Pope Clement the seaventh, beareth undoubted
testimony. Concerning the parts wherein he most goeth about to prevaile,
which are his digressions and discourses, many of them are verie excellent
and enriched with faire ornaments, but he hath too much pleased himselfe
in them: for endeavouring to omit nothing that might be spoken, having so
full and large a subject, and almost infinite, he proveth somewhat
languishing, and giveth a taste of a kind of scholasticall tedious babling.
Moreover, I have noted this, that of so severall and divers armes, successes,
and effects he judgeth of; of so many and variable motives, alterations, and
counsels, that he relateth, he never referreth any one unto vertue, religion or
conscience: as if they were all extinguished and banished the world. And of
all actions how glorious soever in apparance they be of themselves, he doth
ever impute the cause of them to some vicious and blame-worthie occasion,
or to some commoditie and profit. It is impossible to imagine that amongst
so infinite a number of actions whereof he judgeth, some one have not been
produced and compassed by way of reason. No corruption could ever
possesse men so universally but that some one must of necessity escape the
contagion; which makes me to feare he hath had some distaste or blame in
his passion, and it hath haply fortuned that he hath judged or esteemed of
some of my annotations, and especially what I noted upon my Guicciardine
about ten yeares since: (For what language soever my books speake unto
me I speake unto them in mine owne.) He is a diligent Historiographer and
from whom in my conceit a man may as exactly learne the truth of such
affaires as passed in his time, as of any other writer whatsoever: and the
rather because himselfe hath been an Actor of most part of them and in
verie honourable place. There is no signe or apparance that ever he
disguised or coloured any matter, either through hatred, malice, favour, or
vanitie; whereof the free and impartiall judgements he giveth of great men,
and namely of those by whom he had been advanced or imployed in his
important charges, as of Pope Clement the seaventh, beareth undoubted
testimony. Concerning the parts wherein he most goeth about to prevaile,
which are his digressions and discourses, many of them are verie excellent
and enriched with faire ornaments, but he hath too much pleased himselfe
in them: for endeavouring to omit nothing that might be spoken, having so
full and large a subject, and almost infinite, he proveth somewhat
languishing, and giveth a taste of a kind of scholasticall tedious babling.
Moreover, I have noted this, that of so severall and divers armes, successes,
and effects he judgeth of; of so many and variable motives, alterations, and
counsels, that he relateth, he never referreth any one unto vertue, religion or
conscience: as if they were all extinguished and banished the world. And of
all actions how glorious soever in apparance they be of themselves, he doth
ever impute the cause of them to some vicious and blame-worthie occasion,
or to some commoditie and profit. It is impossible to imagine that amongst
so infinite a number of actions whereof he judgeth, some one have not been
produced and compassed by way of reason. No corruption could ever
possesse men so universally but that some one must of necessity escape the
contagion; which makes me to feare he hath had some distaste or blame in
his passion, and it hath haply fortuned that he hath judged or esteemed of
Page 120
others according to himselfe. In my Philip de Comines there is this: In him
you shall find a pleasing- sweet and gently-gliding speech, fraught with a
purely sincere simplicitie, his narration pure and unaffected, and wherein
the Authours unspotted good meaning doth evidently appeare, void of all
manner of vanitie or ostentation speaking of himselfe, and free from all
affection or envie-speaking of others; his discourses and perswasions
accompanied more with a well-meaning zeale and meere [Footnote: Pure.]
veritie than with any laboured and exquisite sufficiencie, and allthrough
with gravitie and authoritie, representing a man well-borne and brought up
in high negotiations. Upon the Memoires and historic of Monsieur du
Bellay: It is ever a well-pleasing thing to see matters written by those that
have as said how and in what manner they ought to be directed and
managed: yet can it not be denied but that in both these Lords there will
manifestly appeare a great declination from a free libertie of writing, which
clearely shineth in ancient writers of their kind: as in the Lord of louinille,
familiar unto Saint Lewis; Eginard, Chancellor unto Charlemaine; and of
more fresh memorie in Philip de Comines. This is rather a declamation or
pleading for King Francis against the Emperour Charles the fifth, than an
Historic. I will not beleeve they have altered or changed any thing
concerning the generalitie of matters, but rather to wrest and turne the
judgement of the events many times against reason, to our advantage, and
to omit whatsoever they supposed to be doubtful or ticklish in their masters
life: they have made a business of it: witnesse the recoylings of the Lords of
Momorancy and Byron, which therein are forgotten; and which is more,
you shall not so much as find the name of the Ladie of Estampes mentioned
at all. A man may sometimes colour and haply hide secret actions, but
absolutely to conceal that which all the world knoweth, and especially such
things as have drawne-on publike effects, and of such consequence, it is an
inexcusable defect, or as I may say unpardonable oversight. To conclude,
whosoever desireth to have perfect information and knowledge of king
you shall find a pleasing- sweet and gently-gliding speech, fraught with a
purely sincere simplicitie, his narration pure and unaffected, and wherein
the Authours unspotted good meaning doth evidently appeare, void of all
manner of vanitie or ostentation speaking of himselfe, and free from all
affection or envie-speaking of others; his discourses and perswasions
accompanied more with a well-meaning zeale and meere [Footnote: Pure.]
veritie than with any laboured and exquisite sufficiencie, and allthrough
with gravitie and authoritie, representing a man well-borne and brought up
in high negotiations. Upon the Memoires and historic of Monsieur du
Bellay: It is ever a well-pleasing thing to see matters written by those that
have as said how and in what manner they ought to be directed and
managed: yet can it not be denied but that in both these Lords there will
manifestly appeare a great declination from a free libertie of writing, which
clearely shineth in ancient writers of their kind: as in the Lord of louinille,
familiar unto Saint Lewis; Eginard, Chancellor unto Charlemaine; and of
more fresh memorie in Philip de Comines. This is rather a declamation or
pleading for King Francis against the Emperour Charles the fifth, than an
Historic. I will not beleeve they have altered or changed any thing
concerning the generalitie of matters, but rather to wrest and turne the
judgement of the events many times against reason, to our advantage, and
to omit whatsoever they supposed to be doubtful or ticklish in their masters
life: they have made a business of it: witnesse the recoylings of the Lords of
Momorancy and Byron, which therein are forgotten; and which is more,
you shall not so much as find the name of the Ladie of Estampes mentioned
at all. A man may sometimes colour and haply hide secret actions, but
absolutely to conceal that which all the world knoweth, and especially such
things as have drawne-on publike effects, and of such consequence, it is an
inexcusable defect, or as I may say unpardonable oversight. To conclude,
whosoever desireth to have perfect information and knowledge of king
Page 121
Francis the first, and of the things hapned in his time, let him addresse
himselfe elsewhere if he will give any credit unto me. The profit he may
reap here is by the particular description of the battels and exploits of warre
wherein these gentlemen were present; some privie conferences, speeches,
or secret actions of some princes that then lived, and the practices managed,
or negotiations directed by the Lord of Langeay, in which doubtless are
verie many things well worthy to be knowne, and diverse discourses not
vulgare.
himselfe elsewhere if he will give any credit unto me. The profit he may
reap here is by the particular description of the battels and exploits of warre
wherein these gentlemen were present; some privie conferences, speeches,
or secret actions of some princes that then lived, and the practices managed,
or negotiations directed by the Lord of Langeay, in which doubtless are
verie many things well worthy to be knowne, and diverse discourses not
vulgare.
Page 122
MONTAIGNE
WHAT IS A CLASSIC?
BY
CHARLES-AUGUSTIN SAINTE-BEUVE
TRANSLATED BY
E. LEE
WHAT IS A CLASSIC?
BY
CHARLES-AUGUSTIN SAINTE-BEUVE
TRANSLATED BY
E. LEE
Page 123
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve, the foremost French critic of the nineteenth
century, and, in the view of many, the greatest literary critic of the world,
was born at Boulogne-sur-Mer, December 23, 1804. He studied medicine,
but soon abandoned it for literature; and before he gave himself up to
criticism he made some mediocre attempts in poetry and fiction. He became
professor at the College de France and the Ecole Normale and was
appointed Senator in 1865. A course of lectures given at Lausanne in 1837
resulted in his great "Histoire de Port-Royal" and another given at Liege in
his "Chateaubriand et son groupe litteraire." But his most famous
productions were his critical essays published periodically in the
"Constitutionnel" the "Moniteur" and the "Temps" later collected in sets
under the names of "Critiques et Portraits Litteraires" "Portraits
Contemporains" "Causeries du Lundi" and "Nouveaux Lundis." At the
height of his vogue, these Monday essays were events of European
importance. He died in 1869.
Sainte-Beuve's work was much more than literary criticism as that type
of writing had been generally conceived before his time. In place of the
mere classification of books and the passing of a judgment upon them as
good or bad, he sought to illuminate and explain by throwing light on a
literary work from a study of the life, circumstances, and aim of the writer,
and by a comparison with the literature of other times and countries. Thus
Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve, the foremost French critic of the nineteenth
century, and, in the view of many, the greatest literary critic of the world,
was born at Boulogne-sur-Mer, December 23, 1804. He studied medicine,
but soon abandoned it for literature; and before he gave himself up to
criticism he made some mediocre attempts in poetry and fiction. He became
professor at the College de France and the Ecole Normale and was
appointed Senator in 1865. A course of lectures given at Lausanne in 1837
resulted in his great "Histoire de Port-Royal" and another given at Liege in
his "Chateaubriand et son groupe litteraire." But his most famous
productions were his critical essays published periodically in the
"Constitutionnel" the "Moniteur" and the "Temps" later collected in sets
under the names of "Critiques et Portraits Litteraires" "Portraits
Contemporains" "Causeries du Lundi" and "Nouveaux Lundis." At the
height of his vogue, these Monday essays were events of European
importance. He died in 1869.
Sainte-Beuve's work was much more than literary criticism as that type
of writing had been generally conceived before his time. In place of the
mere classification of books and the passing of a judgment upon them as
good or bad, he sought to illuminate and explain by throwing light on a
literary work from a study of the life, circumstances, and aim of the writer,
and by a comparison with the literature of other times and countries. Thus
Page 124
his work was historical, psychological, and ethical, as well as esthetic, and
demanded vast learning and a literary outlook of unparalleled breadth. In
addition to this equipment he had fine taste and an admirable style; and by
his universality, penetration, and balance he raised to a new level the
profession of critic.
demanded vast learning and a literary outlook of unparalleled breadth. In
addition to this equipment he had fine taste and an admirable style; and by
his universality, penetration, and balance he raised to a new level the
profession of critic.
Page 125
MONTAIGNE
While the good ship France is taking a somewhat haphazard course, getting
into unknown seas, and preparing to double what the pilots (if there is a
pilot) call the Stormy Cape, while the look-out at the mast-head thinks he
sees the spectre of the giant Adamastor rising on the horizon, many
honourable and peaceable men continue their work and studies all the same,
and follow out to the end, or as far as they can, their favourite hobbies. I
know, at the present time, a learned man who is collating more carefully
than has ever yet been done the different early editions of Rabelais—
editions, mark you, of which only one copy remains, of which a second is
not to be found: from the careful collation of the texts some literary and
maybe philosophical result will be derived with regard to the genius of the
French Lucian-Aristophanes. I know another scholar whose devotion and
worship is given to a very different man—to Bossuet: he is preparing a
complete, exact, detailed history of the life and works of the great bishop.
And as tastes differ, and "human fancy is cut into a thousand shapes"
(Montaigne said that), Montaigne also has his devotees, he who, himself,
was so little of one: a sect is formed round him. In his lifetime he had
Mademoiselle de Gournay, his daughter of alliance, who was solemnly
devoted to him; and his disciple, Charron, followed him closely, step by
step, only striving to arrange his thoughts with more order and method. In
our time amateurs, intelligent men, practice the religion under another form:
they devote themselves to collecting the smallest traces of the author of the
While the good ship France is taking a somewhat haphazard course, getting
into unknown seas, and preparing to double what the pilots (if there is a
pilot) call the Stormy Cape, while the look-out at the mast-head thinks he
sees the spectre of the giant Adamastor rising on the horizon, many
honourable and peaceable men continue their work and studies all the same,
and follow out to the end, or as far as they can, their favourite hobbies. I
know, at the present time, a learned man who is collating more carefully
than has ever yet been done the different early editions of Rabelais—
editions, mark you, of which only one copy remains, of which a second is
not to be found: from the careful collation of the texts some literary and
maybe philosophical result will be derived with regard to the genius of the
French Lucian-Aristophanes. I know another scholar whose devotion and
worship is given to a very different man—to Bossuet: he is preparing a
complete, exact, detailed history of the life and works of the great bishop.
And as tastes differ, and "human fancy is cut into a thousand shapes"
(Montaigne said that), Montaigne also has his devotees, he who, himself,
was so little of one: a sect is formed round him. In his lifetime he had
Mademoiselle de Gournay, his daughter of alliance, who was solemnly
devoted to him; and his disciple, Charron, followed him closely, step by
step, only striving to arrange his thoughts with more order and method. In
our time amateurs, intelligent men, practice the religion under another form:
they devote themselves to collecting the smallest traces of the author of the
Page 126
Essays, to gathering up the slightest relics, and Dr. Payen may be justly
placed at the head of the group. For years he has been preparing a book on
Montaigne, of which the title will be—"Michel de Montaigne, a collection
of unedited or little known facts about the author of the Essays, his book,
and his other writings, about his family, his friends, his admirers, his
detractors."
While awaiting the conclusion of the book, the occupation and
amusement of a lifetime, Dr. Payen keeps us informed in short pamphlets of
the various works and discoveries made about Montaigne.
If we separate the discoveries made during the last five or six years from
the jumble of quarrels, disputes, cavilling, quackery, and law-suits (for there
have been all those), they consist in this- -
In 1846 M. Mace found in the (then) Royal Library, amongst the
"Collection Du Puys," a letter of Montaigne, addressed to the king,
Henri IV., September 2, 1590.
In 1847 M. Payen printed a letter, or a fragment of a letter of Montaigne
of February 16, 1588, a letter corrupt and incomplete, coming from the
collection of the Comtesse Boni de Castellane.
But, most important of all, in 1848, M. Horace de Viel-Castel found in
London, at the British Museum, a remarkable letter of Montaigne, May 22,
1585, when Mayor of Bordeaux, addressed to M. de Matignon, the king's
lieutenant in the town. The great interest of the letter is that it shows
Montaigne for the first time in the full discharge of his office with all the
energy and vigilance of which he was capable. The pretended idler was at
need much more active than he was ready to own.
placed at the head of the group. For years he has been preparing a book on
Montaigne, of which the title will be—"Michel de Montaigne, a collection
of unedited or little known facts about the author of the Essays, his book,
and his other writings, about his family, his friends, his admirers, his
detractors."
While awaiting the conclusion of the book, the occupation and
amusement of a lifetime, Dr. Payen keeps us informed in short pamphlets of
the various works and discoveries made about Montaigne.
If we separate the discoveries made during the last five or six years from
the jumble of quarrels, disputes, cavilling, quackery, and law-suits (for there
have been all those), they consist in this- -
In 1846 M. Mace found in the (then) Royal Library, amongst the
"Collection Du Puys," a letter of Montaigne, addressed to the king,
Henri IV., September 2, 1590.
In 1847 M. Payen printed a letter, or a fragment of a letter of Montaigne
of February 16, 1588, a letter corrupt and incomplete, coming from the
collection of the Comtesse Boni de Castellane.
But, most important of all, in 1848, M. Horace de Viel-Castel found in
London, at the British Museum, a remarkable letter of Montaigne, May 22,
1585, when Mayor of Bordeaux, addressed to M. de Matignon, the king's
lieutenant in the town. The great interest of the letter is that it shows
Montaigne for the first time in the full discharge of his office with all the
energy and vigilance of which he was capable. The pretended idler was at
need much more active than he was ready to own.
Page 127
M. Detcheverry, keeper of the records to the mayoralty of Bordeaux,
found and published (1850) a letter of Montaigne, while mayor, to the
Jurats, or aldermen of the town, July 30, 1585.
M. Achille Jubinal found among the manuscripts of the National
Library, and published (1850), a long, remarkable letter from
Montaigne to the king, Henri IV., January 18, 1590, which happily
coincides with that already found by M. Mace.
Lastly, to omit nothing and do justice to all, in a "Visit to Montaigne's
Chateau in Perigord," of which the account appeared in 1850, M. Bertrand
de Saint-Germain described the place and pointed out the various Greek and
Latin inscriptions that may still be read in Montaigne's tower in the third-
storey chamber (the ground floor counting as the first), which the
philosopher made his library and study.
M. Payen, collecting together and criticising in his last pamphlet the
various notices and discoveries, not all of equal importance, allowed
himself to be drawn into some little exaggeration of praise; but we cannot
blame him. Admiration, when applied to such noble, perfectly innocent, and
disinterested subjects, is truly a spark of the sacred fire: it produces research
that a less ardent zeal would quickly leave aside, and sometimes leads to
valuable results. However, it would be well for those who, following M.
Payen's example, intelligently understand and greatly admire Montaigne, to
remember, even in their ardour, the advice of the wise man and the master.
"There is more to do," said he, speaking of the commentators of his time,
"in interpreting the interpretations than in interpreting the things
themselves; and more bdoks about books than on any other subject. We do
nothing, but everything swarms with commentators; of authors there is a
great rarity." Authors are of great price and very scared at all times—that is
to say, authors who really increase the sum of human knowledge. I should
found and published (1850) a letter of Montaigne, while mayor, to the
Jurats, or aldermen of the town, July 30, 1585.
M. Achille Jubinal found among the manuscripts of the National
Library, and published (1850), a long, remarkable letter from
Montaigne to the king, Henri IV., January 18, 1590, which happily
coincides with that already found by M. Mace.
Lastly, to omit nothing and do justice to all, in a "Visit to Montaigne's
Chateau in Perigord," of which the account appeared in 1850, M. Bertrand
de Saint-Germain described the place and pointed out the various Greek and
Latin inscriptions that may still be read in Montaigne's tower in the third-
storey chamber (the ground floor counting as the first), which the
philosopher made his library and study.
M. Payen, collecting together and criticising in his last pamphlet the
various notices and discoveries, not all of equal importance, allowed
himself to be drawn into some little exaggeration of praise; but we cannot
blame him. Admiration, when applied to such noble, perfectly innocent, and
disinterested subjects, is truly a spark of the sacred fire: it produces research
that a less ardent zeal would quickly leave aside, and sometimes leads to
valuable results. However, it would be well for those who, following M.
Payen's example, intelligently understand and greatly admire Montaigne, to
remember, even in their ardour, the advice of the wise man and the master.
"There is more to do," said he, speaking of the commentators of his time,
"in interpreting the interpretations than in interpreting the things
themselves; and more bdoks about books than on any other subject. We do
nothing, but everything swarms with commentators; of authors there is a
great rarity." Authors are of great price and very scared at all times—that is
to say, authors who really increase the sum of human knowledge. I should
Page 128
like all who write on Montaigne, and give us the details of their researches
and discoveries, to imagine one thing,—Montaigne himself reading and
criticising them. "What would he think of me and the manner in which I am
going to speak of him to the public?" If such a question was put, how
greatly it would suppress useless phrases and shorten idle discussions! M.
Payen's last pamphlet was dedicated to a man who deserves equally well of
Montaigne—M. Gustave Brunet, of Bordeaux. He, speaking of M. Payen,
in a work in which he pointed out interesting and various corrections of
Montaigne's text, said: "May he soon decide to publish the fruits of his
researches: he will have left nothing for future Montaignologues"
Montaignologues! Great Heaven! what would Montaigne say of such a
word coined in his honour? You who occupy yourselves so meritoriously
with him, but who have, I think, no claim to appropriate him to yourselves,
in the name of him whom you love, and whom we all love by a greater or
lesser title, never, I beg of you, use such words; they smack of the
brotherhood and the sect, of pedantry and of the chatter of the schools—
things utterly repugnant to Montaigne.
Montaigne had a simple, natural, affable mind, and a very happy
disposition. Sprung from an excellent father, who, though of no great
education, entered with real enthusiasm into the movement of the
Renaissance and all the liberal novelties of his time, the son corrected the
excessive enthusiasm, vivacity, and tenderness he inherited by a great
refinement and justness of reflection; but he did not abjure the original
groundwork. It is scarcely more than thirty years ago that whenever the
sixteenth century was mentioned it was spoken of as a barbarous epoch,
Montaigne only excepted: therein lay error and ignorance. The sixteenth
century was a great century, fertile, powerful, learned, refined in parts,
although in some aspects it was rough, violent, and seemingly coarse. What
it particularly lacked was taste, if by taste is meant the faculty of clear and
perfect selection, the extrication of the elements of the beautiful. But in the
and discoveries, to imagine one thing,—Montaigne himself reading and
criticising them. "What would he think of me and the manner in which I am
going to speak of him to the public?" If such a question was put, how
greatly it would suppress useless phrases and shorten idle discussions! M.
Payen's last pamphlet was dedicated to a man who deserves equally well of
Montaigne—M. Gustave Brunet, of Bordeaux. He, speaking of M. Payen,
in a work in which he pointed out interesting and various corrections of
Montaigne's text, said: "May he soon decide to publish the fruits of his
researches: he will have left nothing for future Montaignologues"
Montaignologues! Great Heaven! what would Montaigne say of such a
word coined in his honour? You who occupy yourselves so meritoriously
with him, but who have, I think, no claim to appropriate him to yourselves,
in the name of him whom you love, and whom we all love by a greater or
lesser title, never, I beg of you, use such words; they smack of the
brotherhood and the sect, of pedantry and of the chatter of the schools—
things utterly repugnant to Montaigne.
Montaigne had a simple, natural, affable mind, and a very happy
disposition. Sprung from an excellent father, who, though of no great
education, entered with real enthusiasm into the movement of the
Renaissance and all the liberal novelties of his time, the son corrected the
excessive enthusiasm, vivacity, and tenderness he inherited by a great
refinement and justness of reflection; but he did not abjure the original
groundwork. It is scarcely more than thirty years ago that whenever the
sixteenth century was mentioned it was spoken of as a barbarous epoch,
Montaigne only excepted: therein lay error and ignorance. The sixteenth
century was a great century, fertile, powerful, learned, refined in parts,
although in some aspects it was rough, violent, and seemingly coarse. What
it particularly lacked was taste, if by taste is meant the faculty of clear and
perfect selection, the extrication of the elements of the beautiful. But in the
Page 129
succeeding centuries taste quickly became distaste. If, however, in literature
it was crude, in the arts properly so-called, in those of the hand and the
chisel, the sixteenth century, even in France, is, in the quality of taste, far
greater than the two succeeding centuries: it is neither meagre nor massive,
heavy nor distorted. In art its taste is rich and of fine quality,—at once
unrestrained and complex, ancient and modern, special to itself and
original. In the region of morals it is unequal and mixed. It was an age of
contrasts, of contrasts in all their crudity, an age of philosophy and
fanaticism, of scepticism and strong faith. Everything was at strife and in
collision; nothing was blended and united. Everything was in ferment; it
was a period of chaos; every ray of light caused a storm. It was not a gentle
age, or one we can call an age of light, but an age of struggle and combat.
What distinguished Montaigne and made a phenomenon of him was, that in
such an age he should have possessed moderation, caution, and order.
Born on the last day of February, 1533, taught the ancient languages as a
game while still a child, waked even in his cradle by the sound of musical
instruments, he seemed less fitted for a rude and violent epoch than for the
commerce and sanctuary of the muses. His rare good sense corrected what
was too ideal and poetical in his early education; but he preserved the happy
faculty of saying everything with freshness and wit. Married, when past
thirty, to an estimable woman who was his companion for twenty-eight
years, he seems to have put passion only into friendship. He immortalised
his love for Etienne de la Boetie, whom he lost after four years of the
sweetest and closest intimacy. For some time counsellor in the Parliament
of Bordeaux, Montaigne, before he was forty, retired from public life, and
flung away ambition to live in his tower of Montaigne, enjoying his own
society and his own intellect, entirely given up to his own observations and
thoughts, and to the busy idleness of which we know all the sports and
fancies. The first edition of the Essays appeared in 1580, consisting of only
two books, and in a form representing only the first rough draft of what we
it was crude, in the arts properly so-called, in those of the hand and the
chisel, the sixteenth century, even in France, is, in the quality of taste, far
greater than the two succeeding centuries: it is neither meagre nor massive,
heavy nor distorted. In art its taste is rich and of fine quality,—at once
unrestrained and complex, ancient and modern, special to itself and
original. In the region of morals it is unequal and mixed. It was an age of
contrasts, of contrasts in all their crudity, an age of philosophy and
fanaticism, of scepticism and strong faith. Everything was at strife and in
collision; nothing was blended and united. Everything was in ferment; it
was a period of chaos; every ray of light caused a storm. It was not a gentle
age, or one we can call an age of light, but an age of struggle and combat.
What distinguished Montaigne and made a phenomenon of him was, that in
such an age he should have possessed moderation, caution, and order.
Born on the last day of February, 1533, taught the ancient languages as a
game while still a child, waked even in his cradle by the sound of musical
instruments, he seemed less fitted for a rude and violent epoch than for the
commerce and sanctuary of the muses. His rare good sense corrected what
was too ideal and poetical in his early education; but he preserved the happy
faculty of saying everything with freshness and wit. Married, when past
thirty, to an estimable woman who was his companion for twenty-eight
years, he seems to have put passion only into friendship. He immortalised
his love for Etienne de la Boetie, whom he lost after four years of the
sweetest and closest intimacy. For some time counsellor in the Parliament
of Bordeaux, Montaigne, before he was forty, retired from public life, and
flung away ambition to live in his tower of Montaigne, enjoying his own
society and his own intellect, entirely given up to his own observations and
thoughts, and to the busy idleness of which we know all the sports and
fancies. The first edition of the Essays appeared in 1580, consisting of only
two books, and in a form representing only the first rough draft of what we
Page 130
have in the later editions. The same year Montaigne set out on a voyage to
Switzerland and Italy. It was during that voyage that the aldermen of
Bordeaux elected him mayor of their town. At first he refused and excused
himself, but warned that it would be well to accept, and enjoined by the
king, he took the office, "the more beautiful," he said, "that there was
neither renunciation nor gain other than the honour of its performance." He
filled the office for four years, from July 1582 to July 1586, being re-
elected after the first two years. Thus Montaigne, at the age of fifty, and a
little against his will, re- entered public life when the country was on the
eve of civil disturbances which, quieted and lulled to sleep for a while,
broke out more violently at the cry of the League. Although, as a rule,
lessons serve for nothing, since the art of wisdom and happiness cannot be
taught, let us not deny ourselves the pleasure of listening to Montaigne; let
us look on his wisdom and happiness; let him speak of public affairs, of
revolutions and disturbances, and of his way of conducting himself with
regard to them. We do not put forward a model, but we offer our readers an
agreeable recreation.
Although Montaigne lived in so agitated and stormy a time, a period that
a man who had lived through the Terror (M. Daunou) called the most tragic
century in all history, he by no means regarded his age as the worst of ages.
He was not of those prejudiced and afflicted persons, who, measuring
everything by their visual horizon, valuing everything according to their
present sensations, alway declare that the disease they suffer from is worse
than any ever before experienced by a human being. He was like Socrates,
who did not consider himself a citizen of one city but of the world; with his
broad and full imagination he embraced the universality of countries and of
ages; he even judged more equitably the very evils of which he was witness
and victim. "Who is it," he said, "that, seeing the bloody havoc of these
civil wars of ours, does not cry out that the machine of the world is near
dissolution, and that the day of judgment is at hand, without considering
Switzerland and Italy. It was during that voyage that the aldermen of
Bordeaux elected him mayor of their town. At first he refused and excused
himself, but warned that it would be well to accept, and enjoined by the
king, he took the office, "the more beautiful," he said, "that there was
neither renunciation nor gain other than the honour of its performance." He
filled the office for four years, from July 1582 to July 1586, being re-
elected after the first two years. Thus Montaigne, at the age of fifty, and a
little against his will, re- entered public life when the country was on the
eve of civil disturbances which, quieted and lulled to sleep for a while,
broke out more violently at the cry of the League. Although, as a rule,
lessons serve for nothing, since the art of wisdom and happiness cannot be
taught, let us not deny ourselves the pleasure of listening to Montaigne; let
us look on his wisdom and happiness; let him speak of public affairs, of
revolutions and disturbances, and of his way of conducting himself with
regard to them. We do not put forward a model, but we offer our readers an
agreeable recreation.
Although Montaigne lived in so agitated and stormy a time, a period that
a man who had lived through the Terror (M. Daunou) called the most tragic
century in all history, he by no means regarded his age as the worst of ages.
He was not of those prejudiced and afflicted persons, who, measuring
everything by their visual horizon, valuing everything according to their
present sensations, alway declare that the disease they suffer from is worse
than any ever before experienced by a human being. He was like Socrates,
who did not consider himself a citizen of one city but of the world; with his
broad and full imagination he embraced the universality of countries and of
ages; he even judged more equitably the very evils of which he was witness
and victim. "Who is it," he said, "that, seeing the bloody havoc of these
civil wars of ours, does not cry out that the machine of the world is near
dissolution, and that the day of judgment is at hand, without considering
Page 131
that many worse revolutions have been seen, and that, in the mean time,
people are being merry in a thousand other parts of the earth for all this?
For my part, considering the license and impunity that always attend such
commotions, I admire they are so moderate, and that there is not more
mischief done. To him who feels the hailstones patter about his ears, the
whole hemisphere appears to be in storm and tempest." And raising his
thoughts higher and higher, reducing his own suffering to what it was in the
immensity of nature, seeing there not only himself but whole kingdoms as
mere specks in the infinite, he added in words which foreshadowed Pascal,
in words whose outline and salient points Pascal did not disdain to borrow:
"But whoever shall represent to his fancy, as in a picture, that great image
of our mother nature, portrayed in her full majesty and lustre, whoever in
her face shall read so general and so constant a variety, whoever shall
observe himself in that figure, and not himself but a whole kingdom, no
bigger than the least touch or prick of a pencil in comparison of the whole,
that man alone is able to value things according to their true estimate and
grandeur."
Thus Montaigne gives us a lesson, a useless lesson, but I state it all the
same, because among the many unprofitable ones that have been written
down, it is perhaps of greater worth than most. I do not mean to underrate
the gravity of the circumstances in which France is just now involved, for I
believe there is pressing need to bring together all the energy, prudence, and
courage she possesses in order that the country may come out with honour
[Footnote: This essay appeared April 28, 1851]. However, let us reflect, and
remember that, leaving aside the Empire, which as regards internal affairs
was a period of calm, and before 1812 of prosperity, we who utter such loud
complaints, lived in peace from 1815 to 1830, fifteen long years; that the
three days of July only inaugurated another order of things that for eighteen
years guaranteed peace and in dustrial prosperity; in all, thirty-two years of
repose. Stormy days came; tempests burst, and will doubtless burst again.
people are being merry in a thousand other parts of the earth for all this?
For my part, considering the license and impunity that always attend such
commotions, I admire they are so moderate, and that there is not more
mischief done. To him who feels the hailstones patter about his ears, the
whole hemisphere appears to be in storm and tempest." And raising his
thoughts higher and higher, reducing his own suffering to what it was in the
immensity of nature, seeing there not only himself but whole kingdoms as
mere specks in the infinite, he added in words which foreshadowed Pascal,
in words whose outline and salient points Pascal did not disdain to borrow:
"But whoever shall represent to his fancy, as in a picture, that great image
of our mother nature, portrayed in her full majesty and lustre, whoever in
her face shall read so general and so constant a variety, whoever shall
observe himself in that figure, and not himself but a whole kingdom, no
bigger than the least touch or prick of a pencil in comparison of the whole,
that man alone is able to value things according to their true estimate and
grandeur."
Thus Montaigne gives us a lesson, a useless lesson, but I state it all the
same, because among the many unprofitable ones that have been written
down, it is perhaps of greater worth than most. I do not mean to underrate
the gravity of the circumstances in which France is just now involved, for I
believe there is pressing need to bring together all the energy, prudence, and
courage she possesses in order that the country may come out with honour
[Footnote: This essay appeared April 28, 1851]. However, let us reflect, and
remember that, leaving aside the Empire, which as regards internal affairs
was a period of calm, and before 1812 of prosperity, we who utter such loud
complaints, lived in peace from 1815 to 1830, fifteen long years; that the
three days of July only inaugurated another order of things that for eighteen
years guaranteed peace and in dustrial prosperity; in all, thirty-two years of
repose. Stormy days came; tempests burst, and will doubtless burst again.
Page 132
Let us learn how to live through them, but do not let us cry out every day, as
we are disposed to do, that never under the sun were such storms known as
we are enduring. To get away from the present state of feeling, to restore
lucidity and proportion to our judgments, let us read every evening a page
of Montaigne.
A criticism of Montaigne on the men of his day struck me, and it bears
equally well on those of ours. Our philosopher says somewhere that he
knows a fair number of men possessing various good qualities—one,
intelligence; another, heart; another, address, conscience or knowledge, or
skill in languages, each has his share: "but of a great man as a whole,
having so many good qualities together, or one with such a degree of
excellence that we ought to admire him, or compare him with those we
honour in the past, my fortune has never shown me one." He afterwards
made an exception in favour of his friend Etienne de la Boetie, but he
belonged to the company of great men dead before attaining maturity, and
showing promise without having time to fulfil it. Montaigne's criticism
called up a smile. He did not see a true and wholly great man in his time,
the age of L'Hopital, Coligny, and the Guises. Well! how does ours seem to
you? We have as many great men as in Montaigne's time, one distinguished
for his intellect, another for his heart, a third for skill, some (a rare thing)
for conscience, many for knowledge and language. But we too lack the
perfect man, and he is greatly to be desired. One of the most intelligent
observers of our day recognised and proclaimed it some years ago: "Our
age," said M. de Remusat, "is wanting in great men." [Footnote: Essais de
Philosophie, vol. i, p. 22]
How did Montaigne conduct himself in his duties as first magistrate of a
great city? If we take him literally and on a hasty first glance we should
believe he discharged them slackly and languidly. Did not Horace, doing
the honours to himself, say that in war he one day let his shield fall (relicta
we are disposed to do, that never under the sun were such storms known as
we are enduring. To get away from the present state of feeling, to restore
lucidity and proportion to our judgments, let us read every evening a page
of Montaigne.
A criticism of Montaigne on the men of his day struck me, and it bears
equally well on those of ours. Our philosopher says somewhere that he
knows a fair number of men possessing various good qualities—one,
intelligence; another, heart; another, address, conscience or knowledge, or
skill in languages, each has his share: "but of a great man as a whole,
having so many good qualities together, or one with such a degree of
excellence that we ought to admire him, or compare him with those we
honour in the past, my fortune has never shown me one." He afterwards
made an exception in favour of his friend Etienne de la Boetie, but he
belonged to the company of great men dead before attaining maturity, and
showing promise without having time to fulfil it. Montaigne's criticism
called up a smile. He did not see a true and wholly great man in his time,
the age of L'Hopital, Coligny, and the Guises. Well! how does ours seem to
you? We have as many great men as in Montaigne's time, one distinguished
for his intellect, another for his heart, a third for skill, some (a rare thing)
for conscience, many for knowledge and language. But we too lack the
perfect man, and he is greatly to be desired. One of the most intelligent
observers of our day recognised and proclaimed it some years ago: "Our
age," said M. de Remusat, "is wanting in great men." [Footnote: Essais de
Philosophie, vol. i, p. 22]
How did Montaigne conduct himself in his duties as first magistrate of a
great city? If we take him literally and on a hasty first glance we should
believe he discharged them slackly and languidly. Did not Horace, doing
the honours to himself, say that in war he one day let his shield fall (relicta
Page 133
non bene parmula)? We must not be in too great a hurry to take too literally
the men of taste who have a horror of over-estimating themselves. Minds of
a fine quality are more given to vigilance and to action than they are apt to
confess. The man who boasts and makes a great noise, will, I am almost
sure, be less brave in the combat than Horace, and less vigilant at the
council board than Montaigne.
On entering office Montaigne was careful to warn the aldermen of
Bordeaux not to expect to find in him more than there really was; he
presented himself to them without affectation. "I represented to them
faithfully and conscientiously all that I felt myself to be,—a man without
memory, without vigilance, without experience, and without energy; but
also, without hate, without ambition, without avarice, and without
violence." He should be sorry, while taking the affairs of the town in hand,
that his feelings should be so strongly affected as those of his worthy father
had been, who in the end had lost his place and health. The eager and ardent
pledge to satisfy an impetuous desire was not his method. His opinion was
"that you must lend yourself to others, and only give yourself to yourself."
And repeating his thought, according to his custom in all kinds of
metaphors and picturesque forms, he said again that if he some times
allowed himself to be urged to the management of other men's affairs, he
promised to take them in hand, not "into my lungs and liver." We are thus
forewarned, we know what to expect. The mayor and Montaigne were two
distinct persons; under his role and office he reserved to himself a certain
freedom and secret security. He continued to judge things in his own
fashion and impartially, although acting loyally for the cause confided to
him. He was far from approving or even excusing all he saw in his party,
and he could judge his adversaries and say of them: "He did that thing
wickedly, and this virtuously." "I would have," he added, "matters go well
on our side; but if they do not, I shall not run mad. I am heartily for the
right party; but I do not affect to be taken notice of for an especial enemy to
the men of taste who have a horror of over-estimating themselves. Minds of
a fine quality are more given to vigilance and to action than they are apt to
confess. The man who boasts and makes a great noise, will, I am almost
sure, be less brave in the combat than Horace, and less vigilant at the
council board than Montaigne.
On entering office Montaigne was careful to warn the aldermen of
Bordeaux not to expect to find in him more than there really was; he
presented himself to them without affectation. "I represented to them
faithfully and conscientiously all that I felt myself to be,—a man without
memory, without vigilance, without experience, and without energy; but
also, without hate, without ambition, without avarice, and without
violence." He should be sorry, while taking the affairs of the town in hand,
that his feelings should be so strongly affected as those of his worthy father
had been, who in the end had lost his place and health. The eager and ardent
pledge to satisfy an impetuous desire was not his method. His opinion was
"that you must lend yourself to others, and only give yourself to yourself."
And repeating his thought, according to his custom in all kinds of
metaphors and picturesque forms, he said again that if he some times
allowed himself to be urged to the management of other men's affairs, he
promised to take them in hand, not "into my lungs and liver." We are thus
forewarned, we know what to expect. The mayor and Montaigne were two
distinct persons; under his role and office he reserved to himself a certain
freedom and secret security. He continued to judge things in his own
fashion and impartially, although acting loyally for the cause confided to
him. He was far from approving or even excusing all he saw in his party,
and he could judge his adversaries and say of them: "He did that thing
wickedly, and this virtuously." "I would have," he added, "matters go well
on our side; but if they do not, I shall not run mad. I am heartily for the
right party; but I do not affect to be taken notice of for an especial enemy to
Page 134
others." And he entered into some details and applications which at that
time were piquant. Let us remark, however, in order to explain and justify
his somewhat extensive profession of impartiality, that the chiefs of the
party then in evidence, the three Henris, were famous and considerable men
on several counts: Henri, Duke of Guise, head of the League; Henri, King
of Navarre, leader of the Opposition; and the King Henri III. in whose name
Montaigne was mayor, who wavered between the two. When parties have
neither chief nor head, when they are known by the body only, that is to say,
in their hideous and brutal reality, it is more difficult and also more
hazardous to be just towards them and to assign to each its share of action.
The principle which guided him in his administration was to look only at
the fact, at the result, and to grant nothing to noise and outward show:
"How much more a good effect makes a noise, so much I abate of the
goodness of it." For it is always to be feared that it was more performed for
the sake of the noise than upon the account of goodness: "Being exposed
upon the stall, 'tis half sold." That was not Montaigne's way: he made no
show; he managed men and affairs as quietly as he could; he employed in a
manner useful to all alike the gifts of sincerity and conciliation; the personal
attraction with which nature endowed him was a quality of the highest
value in the management of men. He preferred to warn men of evil rather
than to take on himself the honour of repressing it: "Is there any one who
desires to be sick that he may see his physician's practice? And would not
that physician deserve to be whipped who should wish the plague amongst
us that he might put his art into practice?" Far from desiring that trouble and
disorder in the affairs of the city should rouse and honour his govern ment,
he had ever willingly, he said, contributed all he could to their tranquillity
and ease. He is not of those whom municipal honours intoxicate and elate,
those "dignities of office" as he called them, and of which all the noise
"goes from one cross-road to another." If he was a man desirous of fame, he
recognised that it was of a kind greater than that. I do not know, however, if
time were piquant. Let us remark, however, in order to explain and justify
his somewhat extensive profession of impartiality, that the chiefs of the
party then in evidence, the three Henris, were famous and considerable men
on several counts: Henri, Duke of Guise, head of the League; Henri, King
of Navarre, leader of the Opposition; and the King Henri III. in whose name
Montaigne was mayor, who wavered between the two. When parties have
neither chief nor head, when they are known by the body only, that is to say,
in their hideous and brutal reality, it is more difficult and also more
hazardous to be just towards them and to assign to each its share of action.
The principle which guided him in his administration was to look only at
the fact, at the result, and to grant nothing to noise and outward show:
"How much more a good effect makes a noise, so much I abate of the
goodness of it." For it is always to be feared that it was more performed for
the sake of the noise than upon the account of goodness: "Being exposed
upon the stall, 'tis half sold." That was not Montaigne's way: he made no
show; he managed men and affairs as quietly as he could; he employed in a
manner useful to all alike the gifts of sincerity and conciliation; the personal
attraction with which nature endowed him was a quality of the highest
value in the management of men. He preferred to warn men of evil rather
than to take on himself the honour of repressing it: "Is there any one who
desires to be sick that he may see his physician's practice? And would not
that physician deserve to be whipped who should wish the plague amongst
us that he might put his art into practice?" Far from desiring that trouble and
disorder in the affairs of the city should rouse and honour his govern ment,
he had ever willingly, he said, contributed all he could to their tranquillity
and ease. He is not of those whom municipal honours intoxicate and elate,
those "dignities of office" as he called them, and of which all the noise
"goes from one cross-road to another." If he was a man desirous of fame, he
recognised that it was of a kind greater than that. I do not know, however, if
Page 135
even in a vaster field he would have changed his method and manner of
proceed ing. To do good for the public imperceptibly would always seem to
him the ideal of skill and the culminating point of happiness. "He who will
not thank me," he said, "for the order and quiet calm that has accompanied
my administration, cannot, however, deprive me of the share that belongs to
me by the title of my good fortune." And he is inexhaustible in describing in
lively and graceful expressions the kinds of effective and imperceptible
services he believed he had rendered—services greatly superior to noisy
and glorious deeds: "Actions which come from the workman's hand
carelessly and noiselessly have most charm, that some honest man chooses
later and brings from their obscurity to thrust them into the light for their
own sake." Thus fortune served Montaigne to perfection, and even in his
administration of affairs, in difficult conjunctures, he never had to belie his
maxim, nor to step very far out of the way of life he had planned: "For my
part I commend a gliding, solitary, and silent life." He reached the end of
his magistracy almost satisfied with himself, having accomplished what he
had promised himself, and much more than he had promised others.
The letter lately discovered by M. Horace de Viel-Castel corroborates the
chapter in which Montaigne exhibits and criticises himself in the period of
his public life. "That letter," says M. Payen, "is entirely on affairs.
Montaigne is mayor; Bordeaux, lately disturbed, seems threatened by fresh
agitations; the king's lieutenant is away. It is Wednesday, May 22, 1585; it is
night, Montaigne is wakeful, and writes to the governor of the province."
The letter, which is of too special and local an interest to be inserted here,
may be summed up in these words:—Montaigne regretted the absence of
Marshal de Matignon, and feared the consequences of its prolongation; he
was keeping, and would continue to keep, him acquainted with all that was
going on, and begged him to return as soon as his circumstances would
permit. "We are looking after our gates and guards, and a little more
carefully in your absence. . . . If anything important and fresh occurs, I shall
proceed ing. To do good for the public imperceptibly would always seem to
him the ideal of skill and the culminating point of happiness. "He who will
not thank me," he said, "for the order and quiet calm that has accompanied
my administration, cannot, however, deprive me of the share that belongs to
me by the title of my good fortune." And he is inexhaustible in describing in
lively and graceful expressions the kinds of effective and imperceptible
services he believed he had rendered—services greatly superior to noisy
and glorious deeds: "Actions which come from the workman's hand
carelessly and noiselessly have most charm, that some honest man chooses
later and brings from their obscurity to thrust them into the light for their
own sake." Thus fortune served Montaigne to perfection, and even in his
administration of affairs, in difficult conjunctures, he never had to belie his
maxim, nor to step very far out of the way of life he had planned: "For my
part I commend a gliding, solitary, and silent life." He reached the end of
his magistracy almost satisfied with himself, having accomplished what he
had promised himself, and much more than he had promised others.
The letter lately discovered by M. Horace de Viel-Castel corroborates the
chapter in which Montaigne exhibits and criticises himself in the period of
his public life. "That letter," says M. Payen, "is entirely on affairs.
Montaigne is mayor; Bordeaux, lately disturbed, seems threatened by fresh
agitations; the king's lieutenant is away. It is Wednesday, May 22, 1585; it is
night, Montaigne is wakeful, and writes to the governor of the province."
The letter, which is of too special and local an interest to be inserted here,
may be summed up in these words:—Montaigne regretted the absence of
Marshal de Matignon, and feared the consequences of its prolongation; he
was keeping, and would continue to keep, him acquainted with all that was
going on, and begged him to return as soon as his circumstances would
permit. "We are looking after our gates and guards, and a little more
carefully in your absence. . . . If anything important and fresh occurs, I shall
Page 136
send you a messenger immediately, so that if you hear no news from me,
you may consider that nothing has happened." He begs M. de Matignon to
remember, however, that he might not have time to warn him, "entreating
you to consider that such movements are usually so sudden, that if they do
occur they will take me by the throat without any warning." Besides, he will
do everything to ascertain the march of events beforehand. "I will do what I
can to hear news from all parts, and to that end shall visit and observe the
inclinations of all sorts of men." Lastly, after keeping the marshal informed
of everything, of the least rumours abroad in the city, he pressed him to
return, assuring him "that we spare neither our care, nor, if need be, our
lives to preserve everything in obedience to the king." Montaigne was never
prodigal of protestations and praises, and what with others was a mere form
of speech, was with him a real undertaking and the truth.
Things, however, became worse and worse: civil war broke out; friendly
or hostile parties (the difference was not great) infested the country.
Montaigne, who went to his country house as often as he could, whenever
the duties of his office, which was drawing near its term, did not oblige him
to be in Bordeaux, was exposed to every sort of insult and outrage. "I
underwent," he said, "the inconveniences that moderation brings along with
it in such a disease. I was pitied on all hands; to the Ghibelline I was a
Guelph, and to the Guelph a Ghibelline." In the midst of his personal
grievances he could disengage and raise his thoughts to reflections on the
public misfortunes and on the degradation of men's characters. Considering
closely the disorder of parties, and all the abject and wretched things which
developed so quickly, he was ashamed to see leaders of renown stoop and
debase themselves by cowardly complacency; for in those circumstances
we know, like him, "that in the word of command to march, draw up, wheel,
and the like, we obey him indeed; but all the rest is dissolute and free." "It
pleases me," said Montaigne ironically, "to observe how much pusillanimity
and cowardice there is in ambition; by how abject and servile ways it must
you may consider that nothing has happened." He begs M. de Matignon to
remember, however, that he might not have time to warn him, "entreating
you to consider that such movements are usually so sudden, that if they do
occur they will take me by the throat without any warning." Besides, he will
do everything to ascertain the march of events beforehand. "I will do what I
can to hear news from all parts, and to that end shall visit and observe the
inclinations of all sorts of men." Lastly, after keeping the marshal informed
of everything, of the least rumours abroad in the city, he pressed him to
return, assuring him "that we spare neither our care, nor, if need be, our
lives to preserve everything in obedience to the king." Montaigne was never
prodigal of protestations and praises, and what with others was a mere form
of speech, was with him a real undertaking and the truth.
Things, however, became worse and worse: civil war broke out; friendly
or hostile parties (the difference was not great) infested the country.
Montaigne, who went to his country house as often as he could, whenever
the duties of his office, which was drawing near its term, did not oblige him
to be in Bordeaux, was exposed to every sort of insult and outrage. "I
underwent," he said, "the inconveniences that moderation brings along with
it in such a disease. I was pitied on all hands; to the Ghibelline I was a
Guelph, and to the Guelph a Ghibelline." In the midst of his personal
grievances he could disengage and raise his thoughts to reflections on the
public misfortunes and on the degradation of men's characters. Considering
closely the disorder of parties, and all the abject and wretched things which
developed so quickly, he was ashamed to see leaders of renown stoop and
debase themselves by cowardly complacency; for in those circumstances
we know, like him, "that in the word of command to march, draw up, wheel,
and the like, we obey him indeed; but all the rest is dissolute and free." "It
pleases me," said Montaigne ironically, "to observe how much pusillanimity
and cowardice there is in ambition; by how abject and servile ways it must
Page 137
arrive at its end." Despising ambition as he did, he was not sorry to see it
unmasked by such practices and degraded in his sight. However, his
goodness of heart overcoming his pride and contempt, he adds sadly, "it
displeases me to see good and generous natures, and that are capable of
justice, every day corrupted in the management and command of this
confusion. . . . We had ill-contrived souls enough without spoiling those that
were generous and good." He rather sought in that misfortune an
opportunity and motive for fortifying and strengthening himself. Attacked
one by one by many disagreeables and evils, which he would have endured
more cheerfully in a heap—that is to say, all at once- -pursued by war,
disease, by all the plagues (July 1585), in the course things were taking, he
already asked himself to whom he and his could have recourse, of whom he
could ask shelter and subsistence for his old age; and having looked and
searched thoroughly all around, he found himself actually destitute and
RUINED. For, "to let a man's self fall plumb down, and from so great a
height, it ought to be in the arms of a solid, vigorous, and fortunate
friendship. They are very rare, if there be any." Speaking in such a manner,
we perceive that La Boetie had been some time dead. Then he felt that he
must after all rely on himself in his distress, and must gain strength; now or
never was the time to put into practice the lofty lessons he spent his life in
collecting from the books of the philosophers. He took heart again, and
attained all the height of his virtue: "In an ordinary and quiet time, a man
prepares himself for moderate and common accidents; but in the confusion
wherein we have been for these thirty years, every Frenchman, whether in
particular or in general, sees himself every hour upon the point of the total
ruin and overthrow of his fortune." And far from being discouraged and
cursing fate for causing him to be born in so stormy an age, he suddenly
congratulated himself: "Let us thank fortune that has not made us live in an
effeminate, idle and languishing age." Since the curiosity of wise men seeks
the past for disturbances in states in order to learn the secrets of history,
unmasked by such practices and degraded in his sight. However, his
goodness of heart overcoming his pride and contempt, he adds sadly, "it
displeases me to see good and generous natures, and that are capable of
justice, every day corrupted in the management and command of this
confusion. . . . We had ill-contrived souls enough without spoiling those that
were generous and good." He rather sought in that misfortune an
opportunity and motive for fortifying and strengthening himself. Attacked
one by one by many disagreeables and evils, which he would have endured
more cheerfully in a heap—that is to say, all at once- -pursued by war,
disease, by all the plagues (July 1585), in the course things were taking, he
already asked himself to whom he and his could have recourse, of whom he
could ask shelter and subsistence for his old age; and having looked and
searched thoroughly all around, he found himself actually destitute and
RUINED. For, "to let a man's self fall plumb down, and from so great a
height, it ought to be in the arms of a solid, vigorous, and fortunate
friendship. They are very rare, if there be any." Speaking in such a manner,
we perceive that La Boetie had been some time dead. Then he felt that he
must after all rely on himself in his distress, and must gain strength; now or
never was the time to put into practice the lofty lessons he spent his life in
collecting from the books of the philosophers. He took heart again, and
attained all the height of his virtue: "In an ordinary and quiet time, a man
prepares himself for moderate and common accidents; but in the confusion
wherein we have been for these thirty years, every Frenchman, whether in
particular or in general, sees himself every hour upon the point of the total
ruin and overthrow of his fortune." And far from being discouraged and
cursing fate for causing him to be born in so stormy an age, he suddenly
congratulated himself: "Let us thank fortune that has not made us live in an
effeminate, idle and languishing age." Since the curiosity of wise men seeks
the past for disturbances in states in order to learn the secrets of history,
Page 138
and, as we should say, the whole physiology of the body social, "so does my
curiosity," he declares, "make me in some sort please myself with seeing
with my own eyes this notable spectacle of our public death, its forms and
symptoms; and, seeing I could not hinder it, am content to be destined to
assist in it, and thereby to instruct myself." I shall not suggest a consolation
of that sort to most people; the greater part of mankind does not possess the
heroic and eager curiosity of Empedocles and the elder Pliny, the two
intrepid men who went straight to the volcanoes and the disturbances of
nature to examine them at close quarters, at the risk of destruction and
death. But to a man of Montaigne's nature, the thought of that stoical
observation gave him consolation even amid real evils. Considering the
condition of false peace and doubtful truce, the regime of dull and profound
corruption which had preceded the last disturbances, he almost
congratulated himself on seeing their cessation; for "it was," he said of the
regime of Henri III., "an universal juncture of particular members, rotten to
emulation of one another, and the most of them with inveterate ulcers, that
neither required nor admitted of any cure. This conclusion therefore did
really more animate than depress me." Note that his health, usually delicate,
is here raised to the level of his morality, although what it had suffered
through the various disturbances might have been enough to undermine it.
He had the satisfaction of feeling that he had some hold against fortune, and
that it would take a greater shock still to crush him.
Another consideration, humbler and more humane, upheld him in his
troubles, the consolation arising from a common misfortune, a misfortune
shared by all, and the sight of the courage of others. The people, especially
the real people, they who are victims and not robbers, the peasants of his
district, moved him by the manner in which they endured the same, or even
worse, troubles than his. The disease or plague which raged at that time in
the country pressed chiefly on the poor; Montaigne learned from them
resignation and the practice of philosophy. "Let us look down upon the poor
curiosity," he declares, "make me in some sort please myself with seeing
with my own eyes this notable spectacle of our public death, its forms and
symptoms; and, seeing I could not hinder it, am content to be destined to
assist in it, and thereby to instruct myself." I shall not suggest a consolation
of that sort to most people; the greater part of mankind does not possess the
heroic and eager curiosity of Empedocles and the elder Pliny, the two
intrepid men who went straight to the volcanoes and the disturbances of
nature to examine them at close quarters, at the risk of destruction and
death. But to a man of Montaigne's nature, the thought of that stoical
observation gave him consolation even amid real evils. Considering the
condition of false peace and doubtful truce, the regime of dull and profound
corruption which had preceded the last disturbances, he almost
congratulated himself on seeing their cessation; for "it was," he said of the
regime of Henri III., "an universal juncture of particular members, rotten to
emulation of one another, and the most of them with inveterate ulcers, that
neither required nor admitted of any cure. This conclusion therefore did
really more animate than depress me." Note that his health, usually delicate,
is here raised to the level of his morality, although what it had suffered
through the various disturbances might have been enough to undermine it.
He had the satisfaction of feeling that he had some hold against fortune, and
that it would take a greater shock still to crush him.
Another consideration, humbler and more humane, upheld him in his
troubles, the consolation arising from a common misfortune, a misfortune
shared by all, and the sight of the courage of others. The people, especially
the real people, they who are victims and not robbers, the peasants of his
district, moved him by the manner in which they endured the same, or even
worse, troubles than his. The disease or plague which raged at that time in
the country pressed chiefly on the poor; Montaigne learned from them
resignation and the practice of philosophy. "Let us look down upon the poor
Page 139
people that we see scattered upon the face of the earth, prone and intent
upon their business, that neither know Aristotle nor Cato, example nor
precept. Even from these does nature every day extract effects of constancy
and patience, more pure and manly than those we so inquisitively study in
the schools." And he goes on to describe them working to the bitter end,
even in their grief, even in disease, until their strength failed them. "He that
is now digging in my garden has this morning buried his father, or his son. .
. . They never keep their beds but to die." The whole chapter is fine,
pathetic, to the point, evincing noble, stoical elevation of mind, and also the
cheerful and affable disposition which Montaigne said, with truth, was his
by inheritance, and in which he had been nourished. There could be nothing
better as regards "consolation in public calamities," except a chapter of
some not more human, but of some truly divine book, in which the hand of
God should be everywhere visible, not perfunctorily, as with Montaigne,
but actually and lovingly present. In fact, the consolation Montaigne gives
himself and others is perhaps as lofty and beautiful as human consolation
without prayer can be.
He wrote the chapter, the twelfth of the third book, in the midst of the
evils described, and before they were ended. He concluded it in his graceful
and poetical way with a collection of examples, "a heap of foreign flowers,"
to which he furnished only the thread for fastening them together.
There is Montaigne to the life; no matter how seriously he spoke, it was
always with the utmost charm. To form an opinion on his style you have
only to open him indifferently at any page and listen to his talk on any
subject; there is none that he did not enliven and make suggestive. In the
chapter "Of Liars," for instance, after enlarging on his lack of memory and
giving a list of reasons by which he might console himself, he suddenly
added this fresh and delightful reason, that, thanks to his faculty for
forgetting, "the places I revisit, and the books I read over again, always
upon their business, that neither know Aristotle nor Cato, example nor
precept. Even from these does nature every day extract effects of constancy
and patience, more pure and manly than those we so inquisitively study in
the schools." And he goes on to describe them working to the bitter end,
even in their grief, even in disease, until their strength failed them. "He that
is now digging in my garden has this morning buried his father, or his son. .
. . They never keep their beds but to die." The whole chapter is fine,
pathetic, to the point, evincing noble, stoical elevation of mind, and also the
cheerful and affable disposition which Montaigne said, with truth, was his
by inheritance, and in which he had been nourished. There could be nothing
better as regards "consolation in public calamities," except a chapter of
some not more human, but of some truly divine book, in which the hand of
God should be everywhere visible, not perfunctorily, as with Montaigne,
but actually and lovingly present. In fact, the consolation Montaigne gives
himself and others is perhaps as lofty and beautiful as human consolation
without prayer can be.
He wrote the chapter, the twelfth of the third book, in the midst of the
evils described, and before they were ended. He concluded it in his graceful
and poetical way with a collection of examples, "a heap of foreign flowers,"
to which he furnished only the thread for fastening them together.
There is Montaigne to the life; no matter how seriously he spoke, it was
always with the utmost charm. To form an opinion on his style you have
only to open him indifferently at any page and listen to his talk on any
subject; there is none that he did not enliven and make suggestive. In the
chapter "Of Liars," for instance, after enlarging on his lack of memory and
giving a list of reasons by which he might console himself, he suddenly
added this fresh and delightful reason, that, thanks to his faculty for
forgetting, "the places I revisit, and the books I read over again, always
Page 140
smile upon me with a fresh novelty." It is thus that on every subject he
touched he was continually new, and created sources of freshness.
Montesquieu, in a memorable exclamation, said: "The four great poets,
Plato, Malebranche, Shaftesbury, Montaigne!" How true it is of Montaigne!
No French writer, including the poets proper, had so lofty an idea of poetry
as he had. "From my earliest childhood," he said, "poetry had power over
me to transport and transpierce me." He considered, and therein shows
penetration, that "we have more poets than judges and interpreters of poetry.
It is easier to write than to understand." In itself and its pure beauty his
poetry defies definition; whoever desired to recognise it at a glance and
discern of what it actually consisted would see no more than "the brilliance
of a flash of lightning." In the constitution and continuity of his style,
Montaigne is a writer very rich in animated, bold similes, naturally fertile in
metaphors that are never detached from the thought, but that seize it in its
very centre, in its interior, that join and bind it. In that respect, fully obeying
his own genius, he has gone beyond and some times exceeded the genius of
language. His concise, vigorous and always forcible style, by its poignancy,
emphasises and repeats the meaning. It may be said of his style that it is a
continual epigram, or an ever-renewed metaphor, a style that has only been
successfully employed by the French once, by Montaigne himself. If we
wanted to imitate him, supposing we had the power and were naturally
fitted for it—if we desired to write with his severity, exact proportion, and
diverse continuity of figures and turns—it would be necessary to force our
language to be more powerful, and poetically more complete, than is
usually our custom. Style a la Montaigne, consistent, varied in the series
and assortment of the metaphors, exacts the creation of a portion of the
tissue itself to hold them. It is absolutely necessary that in places the woof
should be enlarged and extended, in order to weave into it the metaphor; but
in defining him I come almost to write like him. The French language,
French prose, which in fact always savours more or less of conversation,
touched he was continually new, and created sources of freshness.
Montesquieu, in a memorable exclamation, said: "The four great poets,
Plato, Malebranche, Shaftesbury, Montaigne!" How true it is of Montaigne!
No French writer, including the poets proper, had so lofty an idea of poetry
as he had. "From my earliest childhood," he said, "poetry had power over
me to transport and transpierce me." He considered, and therein shows
penetration, that "we have more poets than judges and interpreters of poetry.
It is easier to write than to understand." In itself and its pure beauty his
poetry defies definition; whoever desired to recognise it at a glance and
discern of what it actually consisted would see no more than "the brilliance
of a flash of lightning." In the constitution and continuity of his style,
Montaigne is a writer very rich in animated, bold similes, naturally fertile in
metaphors that are never detached from the thought, but that seize it in its
very centre, in its interior, that join and bind it. In that respect, fully obeying
his own genius, he has gone beyond and some times exceeded the genius of
language. His concise, vigorous and always forcible style, by its poignancy,
emphasises and repeats the meaning. It may be said of his style that it is a
continual epigram, or an ever-renewed metaphor, a style that has only been
successfully employed by the French once, by Montaigne himself. If we
wanted to imitate him, supposing we had the power and were naturally
fitted for it—if we desired to write with his severity, exact proportion, and
diverse continuity of figures and turns—it would be necessary to force our
language to be more powerful, and poetically more complete, than is
usually our custom. Style a la Montaigne, consistent, varied in the series
and assortment of the metaphors, exacts the creation of a portion of the
tissue itself to hold them. It is absolutely necessary that in places the woof
should be enlarged and extended, in order to weave into it the metaphor; but
in defining him I come almost to write like him. The French language,
French prose, which in fact always savours more or less of conversation,
Page 141
does not, naturally, possess the resources and the extent of canvas necessary
for a continued picture: by the side of an animated metaphor it will often
exhibit a sudden lacuna and some weak places. In filling this by boldness
and invention as Montaigne did, in creating, in imagining the expression
and locution that is wanting, our prose should appear equally finished. Style
a la Montaigne would, in many respects, be openly at war with that of
Voltaire. It could only come into being and flourish in the full freedom of
the sixteenth century, in a frank, ingenious, jovial, keen, brave, and refined
mind, of an unique stamp, that even for that time, seemed free and
somewhat licentious, and that was inspired and emboldened, but not
intoxicated by the pure and direct spirit of ancient sources.
Such as he is, Montaigne is the French Horace; he is Horatian in the
groundwork, often in the form and expression, although in that he
sometimes approaches Seneca. His book is a treasure-house of moral
observations and of experience; at whatever page it is opened, and in what
ever condition of mind, some wise thought expressed in a striking and
enduring fashion is certain to be found. It will at once detach itself and
engrave itself on the mind, a beautiful meaning in full and forcible words,
in one vigorous line, familiar or great. The whole of his book, said Etienne
Pasquier, is a real seminary of beautiful and remarkable sentences, and they
come in so much the better that they run and hasten on without thrusting
them selves into notice. There is something for every age, for every hour of
life: you cannot read in it for any time without having the mind filled and
lined as it were, or, to put it better, fully armed and clothed. We have just
seen how much useful counsel and actual consolation it contains for an
honourable man, born for private life, and fallen on times of disturbance
and revolution. To this I shall add the counsel he gave those who, like
myself and many men of my acquaintance, suffer from political
disturbances without in any way provoking them, or believing ourselves
capable of averting them. Montaigne, as Horace would have done, counsels
for a continued picture: by the side of an animated metaphor it will often
exhibit a sudden lacuna and some weak places. In filling this by boldness
and invention as Montaigne did, in creating, in imagining the expression
and locution that is wanting, our prose should appear equally finished. Style
a la Montaigne would, in many respects, be openly at war with that of
Voltaire. It could only come into being and flourish in the full freedom of
the sixteenth century, in a frank, ingenious, jovial, keen, brave, and refined
mind, of an unique stamp, that even for that time, seemed free and
somewhat licentious, and that was inspired and emboldened, but not
intoxicated by the pure and direct spirit of ancient sources.
Such as he is, Montaigne is the French Horace; he is Horatian in the
groundwork, often in the form and expression, although in that he
sometimes approaches Seneca. His book is a treasure-house of moral
observations and of experience; at whatever page it is opened, and in what
ever condition of mind, some wise thought expressed in a striking and
enduring fashion is certain to be found. It will at once detach itself and
engrave itself on the mind, a beautiful meaning in full and forcible words,
in one vigorous line, familiar or great. The whole of his book, said Etienne
Pasquier, is a real seminary of beautiful and remarkable sentences, and they
come in so much the better that they run and hasten on without thrusting
them selves into notice. There is something for every age, for every hour of
life: you cannot read in it for any time without having the mind filled and
lined as it were, or, to put it better, fully armed and clothed. We have just
seen how much useful counsel and actual consolation it contains for an
honourable man, born for private life, and fallen on times of disturbance
and revolution. To this I shall add the counsel he gave those who, like
myself and many men of my acquaintance, suffer from political
disturbances without in any way provoking them, or believing ourselves
capable of averting them. Montaigne, as Horace would have done, counsels
Page 142
them, while apprehending everything from afar off, not to be too much
preoccupied with such matters in advance; to take advantage to the end of
pleasant moments and bright intervals. Stroke on stroke come his piquant
and wise similes, and he concludes, to my thinking, with the most delightful
one of all, and one, besides, entirely appropriate and seasonable: it is folly
and fret, he said, "to take out your furred gown at Saint John because you
will want it at Christmas."
preoccupied with such matters in advance; to take advantage to the end of
pleasant moments and bright intervals. Stroke on stroke come his piquant
and wise similes, and he concludes, to my thinking, with the most delightful
one of all, and one, besides, entirely appropriate and seasonable: it is folly
and fret, he said, "to take out your furred gown at Saint John because you
will want it at Christmas."
Page 143
WHAT IS A CLASSIC?
A delicate question, to which somewhat diverse solutions might be given
according to times and seasons. An intelligent man suggests it to me, and I
intend to try, if not to solve it, at least to examine and discuss it face to face
with my readers, were it only to persuade them to answer it for themselves,
and, if I can, to make their opinion and mine on the point clear. And why, in
criticism, should we not, from time to time, venture to treat some of those
subjects which are not personal, in which we no longer speak of some one
but of some thing? Our neighbours, the English, have well succeeded in
making of it a special division of literature under the modest title of
"Essays." It is true that in writing of such subjects, always slightly abstract
and moral, it is advisable to speak of them in a season of quiet, to make sure
of our own attention and of that of others, to seize one of those moments of
calm moderation and leisure seldom granted our amiable France; even
when she is desirous of being wise and is not making revolutions, her
brilliant genius can scarcely tolerate them.
A classic, according to the usual definition, is an old author canonised by
admiration, and an authority in his particular style. The word classic was
first used in this sense by the Romans. With them not all the citizens of the
different classes were properly called classici, but only those of the chief
class, those who possessed an income of a certain fixed sum. Those who
possessed a smaller income were described by the term infra classem,
A delicate question, to which somewhat diverse solutions might be given
according to times and seasons. An intelligent man suggests it to me, and I
intend to try, if not to solve it, at least to examine and discuss it face to face
with my readers, were it only to persuade them to answer it for themselves,
and, if I can, to make their opinion and mine on the point clear. And why, in
criticism, should we not, from time to time, venture to treat some of those
subjects which are not personal, in which we no longer speak of some one
but of some thing? Our neighbours, the English, have well succeeded in
making of it a special division of literature under the modest title of
"Essays." It is true that in writing of such subjects, always slightly abstract
and moral, it is advisable to speak of them in a season of quiet, to make sure
of our own attention and of that of others, to seize one of those moments of
calm moderation and leisure seldom granted our amiable France; even
when she is desirous of being wise and is not making revolutions, her
brilliant genius can scarcely tolerate them.
A classic, according to the usual definition, is an old author canonised by
admiration, and an authority in his particular style. The word classic was
first used in this sense by the Romans. With them not all the citizens of the
different classes were properly called classici, but only those of the chief
class, those who possessed an income of a certain fixed sum. Those who
possessed a smaller income were described by the term infra classem,
Page 144
below the preeminent class. The word classicus was used in a figurative
sense by Aulus Gellius, and applied to writers: a writer of worth and
distinction, classicus assiduusque scriptor, a writer who is of account, has
real property, and is not lost in the proletariate crowd. Such an expression
implies an age sufficiently advanced to have already made some sort of
valuation and classification of literature.
At first the only true classics for the moderns were the ancients. The
Greeks, by peculiar good fortune and natural enlightenment of mind, had no
classics but themselves. They were at first the only classical authors for the
Romans, who strove and contrived to imitate them. After the great periods
of Roman literature, after Cicero and Virgil, the Romans in their turn had
their classics, who became almost exclusively the classical authors of the
centuries which followed. The middle ages, which were less ignorant of
Latin antiquity than is believed, but which lacked proportion and taste,
confused the ranks and orders. Ovid was placed above Homer, and Boetius
seemed a classic equal to Plato. The revival of learning in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries helped to bring this long chaos to order, and then only
was admiration rightly proportioned. Thenceforth the true classical authors
of Greek and Latin antiquity stood out in a luminous background, and were
harmoniously grouped on their two heights.
Meanwhile modern literatures were born, and some of the more
precocious, like the Italian, already possessed the style of antiquity. Dante
appeared, and, from the very first, posterity greeted him as a classic. Italian
poetry has since shrunk into far narrower bounds; but, whenever it desired
to do so, it always found again and preserved the impulse and echo of its
lofty origin. It is no indifferent matter for a poetry to derive its point of
departure and classical source in high places; for example, to spring from
Dante rather than to issue laboriously from Malherbe.
sense by Aulus Gellius, and applied to writers: a writer of worth and
distinction, classicus assiduusque scriptor, a writer who is of account, has
real property, and is not lost in the proletariate crowd. Such an expression
implies an age sufficiently advanced to have already made some sort of
valuation and classification of literature.
At first the only true classics for the moderns were the ancients. The
Greeks, by peculiar good fortune and natural enlightenment of mind, had no
classics but themselves. They were at first the only classical authors for the
Romans, who strove and contrived to imitate them. After the great periods
of Roman literature, after Cicero and Virgil, the Romans in their turn had
their classics, who became almost exclusively the classical authors of the
centuries which followed. The middle ages, which were less ignorant of
Latin antiquity than is believed, but which lacked proportion and taste,
confused the ranks and orders. Ovid was placed above Homer, and Boetius
seemed a classic equal to Plato. The revival of learning in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries helped to bring this long chaos to order, and then only
was admiration rightly proportioned. Thenceforth the true classical authors
of Greek and Latin antiquity stood out in a luminous background, and were
harmoniously grouped on their two heights.
Meanwhile modern literatures were born, and some of the more
precocious, like the Italian, already possessed the style of antiquity. Dante
appeared, and, from the very first, posterity greeted him as a classic. Italian
poetry has since shrunk into far narrower bounds; but, whenever it desired
to do so, it always found again and preserved the impulse and echo of its
lofty origin. It is no indifferent matter for a poetry to derive its point of
departure and classical source in high places; for example, to spring from
Dante rather than to issue laboriously from Malherbe.
Page 145
Modern Italy had her classical authors, and Spain had every right to
believe that she also had hers at a time when France was yet seeking hers. A
few talented writers en dowed with originality and exceptional animation, a
few brilliant efforts, isolated, without following, interrupted and
recommenced, did not suffice to endow a nation with a solid and imposing
basis of literary wealth. The idea of a classic implies something that has
continuance and consistence, and which produces unity and tradition
fashions and transmits itself, and endures. It was only after the glorious
years of Louis XIV. that the nation felt with tremor and pride that such good
fortune had happened to her. Every voice in formed Louis XIV. of it with
flattery, exaggeration, and emphasis, yet with a certain sentiment of truth.
Then arose a singular and striking contradiction: those men of whom
Perrauit was the chief, the men who were most smitten with the marvels of
the age of Louis the Great, who even went the length of sacrificing the
ancients to the moderns, aimed at exalting and canonising even those whom
they regarded as inveterate opponents and adversaries. Boileau avenged and
angrily upheld the ancients against Perrault, who extolled the moderns—
that is to say, Corneille, Moliere, Pascal, and the eminent men of his age,
Boileau, one of the first, included. Kindly La Fontaine, taking part in the
dispute in behalf of the learned Huet, did not perceive that, in spite of his
defects, he was in his turn on the point of being held as a classic himself.
Example is the best definition. From the time France possessed her age of
Louis XIV. and could contemplate it at a little distance, she knew, better
than by any arguments, what to be classical meant. The eighteenth century,
even in its medley of things, strengthened this idea through some fine
works, due to its four great men. Read Voltaire's Age of Louis XIV.,
Montesquieu's Greatness and Fall of the Romans, Buffon's Epochs of
Nature, the beautiful pages of reverie and natural description of Rousseau's
Savoyard Vicar, and say if the eighteenth century, in these memorable
works, did not understand how to reconcile tradition with freedom of
believe that she also had hers at a time when France was yet seeking hers. A
few talented writers en dowed with originality and exceptional animation, a
few brilliant efforts, isolated, without following, interrupted and
recommenced, did not suffice to endow a nation with a solid and imposing
basis of literary wealth. The idea of a classic implies something that has
continuance and consistence, and which produces unity and tradition
fashions and transmits itself, and endures. It was only after the glorious
years of Louis XIV. that the nation felt with tremor and pride that such good
fortune had happened to her. Every voice in formed Louis XIV. of it with
flattery, exaggeration, and emphasis, yet with a certain sentiment of truth.
Then arose a singular and striking contradiction: those men of whom
Perrauit was the chief, the men who were most smitten with the marvels of
the age of Louis the Great, who even went the length of sacrificing the
ancients to the moderns, aimed at exalting and canonising even those whom
they regarded as inveterate opponents and adversaries. Boileau avenged and
angrily upheld the ancients against Perrault, who extolled the moderns—
that is to say, Corneille, Moliere, Pascal, and the eminent men of his age,
Boileau, one of the first, included. Kindly La Fontaine, taking part in the
dispute in behalf of the learned Huet, did not perceive that, in spite of his
defects, he was in his turn on the point of being held as a classic himself.
Example is the best definition. From the time France possessed her age of
Louis XIV. and could contemplate it at a little distance, she knew, better
than by any arguments, what to be classical meant. The eighteenth century,
even in its medley of things, strengthened this idea through some fine
works, due to its four great men. Read Voltaire's Age of Louis XIV.,
Montesquieu's Greatness and Fall of the Romans, Buffon's Epochs of
Nature, the beautiful pages of reverie and natural description of Rousseau's
Savoyard Vicar, and say if the eighteenth century, in these memorable
works, did not understand how to reconcile tradition with freedom of
Page 146
development and independence. But at the be ginning of the present century
and under the Empire, in sight of the first attempts of a decidedly new and
somewhat adventurous literature, the idea of a classic in a few resist ing
minds, more sorrowful than severe, was strangely nar rowed and contracted.
The first Dictionary of the Academy (1694) merely defined a classical
author as "a much-approved ancient writer, who is an authority as regards
the subject he treats." The Dictionary of the Academy of 1835 narrows that
definition still more, and gives precision and even limit to its rather vague
form. It describes classical authors as those "who have become models in
any language whatever," and in all the articles which follow, the
expressions, models, fixed rules for composition and style, strict rules of art
to which men must conform, continually recur. That definition of classic
was evidently made by the respectable Academicians, our predecessors, in
face and sight of what was then called romantic—that is to say, in sight of
the enemy. It seems to me time to renounce those timid and restrictive
definitions and to free our mind of them. A true classic, as I should like to
hear it defined, is an author who has enriched the human mind, increased its
treasure, and caused it to advance a step; who has discovered some moral
and not equivocal truth, or revealed some eternal passion in that heart where
all seemed known and discovered; who has expressed his thought,
observation, or invention, in no matter what form, only provided it be broad
and great, refined and sensible, sane and beautiful in itself; who has spoken
to all in his own peculiar style, a style which is found to be also that of the
whole world, a style new without neologism, new and old, easily
contemporary with all time.
Such a classic may for a moment have been revolutionary; it may at least
have seemed so, but it is not; it only lashed and subverted whatever
prevented the restoration of the balance of order and beauty.
and under the Empire, in sight of the first attempts of a decidedly new and
somewhat adventurous literature, the idea of a classic in a few resist ing
minds, more sorrowful than severe, was strangely nar rowed and contracted.
The first Dictionary of the Academy (1694) merely defined a classical
author as "a much-approved ancient writer, who is an authority as regards
the subject he treats." The Dictionary of the Academy of 1835 narrows that
definition still more, and gives precision and even limit to its rather vague
form. It describes classical authors as those "who have become models in
any language whatever," and in all the articles which follow, the
expressions, models, fixed rules for composition and style, strict rules of art
to which men must conform, continually recur. That definition of classic
was evidently made by the respectable Academicians, our predecessors, in
face and sight of what was then called romantic—that is to say, in sight of
the enemy. It seems to me time to renounce those timid and restrictive
definitions and to free our mind of them. A true classic, as I should like to
hear it defined, is an author who has enriched the human mind, increased its
treasure, and caused it to advance a step; who has discovered some moral
and not equivocal truth, or revealed some eternal passion in that heart where
all seemed known and discovered; who has expressed his thought,
observation, or invention, in no matter what form, only provided it be broad
and great, refined and sensible, sane and beautiful in itself; who has spoken
to all in his own peculiar style, a style which is found to be also that of the
whole world, a style new without neologism, new and old, easily
contemporary with all time.
Such a classic may for a moment have been revolutionary; it may at least
have seemed so, but it is not; it only lashed and subverted whatever
prevented the restoration of the balance of order and beauty.
Page 147
If it is desired, names may be applied to this definition which I wish to
make purposely majestic and fluctuating, or in a word, all- embracing. I
should first put there Corneille of the Polyeucte, Cinna, and Horaces. I
should put Moliere there, the fullest and most complete poetic genius we
have ever had in France. Goethe, the king of critics, said:—
"Moliere is so great that he astonishes us afresh every time we read him.
He is a man apart; his plays border on the tragic, and no one has the courage
to try and imitate him. His Avare, where vice destroys all affection between
father and son, is one of the most sublime works, and dramatic in the
highest degree. In a drama every action ought to be important in itself, and
to lead to an action greater still. In this respect Tartuffe is a model. What a
piece of exposition the first scene is! From the beginning everything has an
important meaning, and causes something much more important to be
foreseen. The exposition in a certain play of Lessing that might be
mentioned is very fine, but the world only sees that of Tartuffe once. It is
the finest of the kind we possess. Every year I read a play of Moliere, just
as from time to time I contemplate some engraving after the great Italian
masters."
I do not conceal from myself that the definition of the classic I have just
given somewhat exceeds the notion usually ascribed to the term. It should,
above all, include conditions of uniformity, wisdom, moderation, and
reason, which dominate and contain all the others. Having to praise M.
Royer-Collard, M. de Remusat said—"If he derives purity of taste,
propriety of terms, variety of expression, attentive care in suiting the diction
to the thought, from our classics, he owes to himself alone the distinctive
character he gives it all." It is here evident that the part allotted to classical
qualities seems mostly to depend on harmony and nuances of expression,
on graceful and temperate style: such is also the most general opinion. In
this sense the pre-eminent classics would be writers of a middling order,
make purposely majestic and fluctuating, or in a word, all- embracing. I
should first put there Corneille of the Polyeucte, Cinna, and Horaces. I
should put Moliere there, the fullest and most complete poetic genius we
have ever had in France. Goethe, the king of critics, said:—
"Moliere is so great that he astonishes us afresh every time we read him.
He is a man apart; his plays border on the tragic, and no one has the courage
to try and imitate him. His Avare, where vice destroys all affection between
father and son, is one of the most sublime works, and dramatic in the
highest degree. In a drama every action ought to be important in itself, and
to lead to an action greater still. In this respect Tartuffe is a model. What a
piece of exposition the first scene is! From the beginning everything has an
important meaning, and causes something much more important to be
foreseen. The exposition in a certain play of Lessing that might be
mentioned is very fine, but the world only sees that of Tartuffe once. It is
the finest of the kind we possess. Every year I read a play of Moliere, just
as from time to time I contemplate some engraving after the great Italian
masters."
I do not conceal from myself that the definition of the classic I have just
given somewhat exceeds the notion usually ascribed to the term. It should,
above all, include conditions of uniformity, wisdom, moderation, and
reason, which dominate and contain all the others. Having to praise M.
Royer-Collard, M. de Remusat said—"If he derives purity of taste,
propriety of terms, variety of expression, attentive care in suiting the diction
to the thought, from our classics, he owes to himself alone the distinctive
character he gives it all." It is here evident that the part allotted to classical
qualities seems mostly to depend on harmony and nuances of expression,
on graceful and temperate style: such is also the most general opinion. In
this sense the pre-eminent classics would be writers of a middling order,
Page 148
exact, sensible, elegant, always clear, yet of noble feeling and airily veiled
strength. Marie-Joseph Chenier has described the poetics of those temperate
and accomplished writers in lines where he shows himself their happy
disciple:—
"It is good sense, reason which does all,—virtue, genius, soul, talent, and
taste.—What is virtue? reason put in practice;—talent? reason expressed
with brilliance;—soul? reason delicately put forth;—and genius is sublime
reason."
While writing those lines he was evidently thinking of Pope, Boileau, and
Horace, the master of them all. The peculiar characteristic of the theory
which subordinated imagination and feeling itself to reason, of which
Scaliger perhaps gave the first sign among the moderns, is, properly
speaking, the Latin theory, and for a long time it was also by preference the
French theory. If it is used appositely, if the term reason is not abused, that
theory possesses some truth; but it is evident that it is abused, and that if,
for instance, reason can be confounded with poetic genius and make one
with it in a moral epistle, it cannot be the same thing as the genius, so
varied and so diversely creative in its expression of the passions, of the
drama or the epic. Where will you find reason in the fourth book of the
AEneid and the transports of Dido? Be that as it may, the spirit which
prompted the theory, caused writers who ruled their inspiration, rather than
those who abandoned themselves to it, to be placed in the first rank of
classics; to put Virgil there more surely than Homer, Racine in preference to
Corneille. The masterpiece to which the theory likes to point, which in fact
brings together all conditions of prudence, strength, tempered boldness,
moral elevation, and grandeur, is Athalie. Turenne in his two last campaigns
and Racine in Athalie are the great examples of what wise and prudent men
are capable of when they reach the maturity of their genius and attain their
supremest boldness.
strength. Marie-Joseph Chenier has described the poetics of those temperate
and accomplished writers in lines where he shows himself their happy
disciple:—
"It is good sense, reason which does all,—virtue, genius, soul, talent, and
taste.—What is virtue? reason put in practice;—talent? reason expressed
with brilliance;—soul? reason delicately put forth;—and genius is sublime
reason."
While writing those lines he was evidently thinking of Pope, Boileau, and
Horace, the master of them all. The peculiar characteristic of the theory
which subordinated imagination and feeling itself to reason, of which
Scaliger perhaps gave the first sign among the moderns, is, properly
speaking, the Latin theory, and for a long time it was also by preference the
French theory. If it is used appositely, if the term reason is not abused, that
theory possesses some truth; but it is evident that it is abused, and that if,
for instance, reason can be confounded with poetic genius and make one
with it in a moral epistle, it cannot be the same thing as the genius, so
varied and so diversely creative in its expression of the passions, of the
drama or the epic. Where will you find reason in the fourth book of the
AEneid and the transports of Dido? Be that as it may, the spirit which
prompted the theory, caused writers who ruled their inspiration, rather than
those who abandoned themselves to it, to be placed in the first rank of
classics; to put Virgil there more surely than Homer, Racine in preference to
Corneille. The masterpiece to which the theory likes to point, which in fact
brings together all conditions of prudence, strength, tempered boldness,
moral elevation, and grandeur, is Athalie. Turenne in his two last campaigns
and Racine in Athalie are the great examples of what wise and prudent men
are capable of when they reach the maturity of their genius and attain their
supremest boldness.
Page 149
Buffon, in his Discourse on Style, insisting on the unity of design,
arrangement, and execution, which are the stamps of true classical works,
said:—"Every subject is one, and however vast it is, it can be comprised in
a single treatise. Interruptions, pauses, sub- divisions should only be used
when many subjects are treated, when, having to speak of great, intricate,
and dissimilar things, the march of genius is interrupted by the multiplicity
of obstacles, and contracted by the necessity of circumstances: otherwise,
far from making a work more solid, a great number of divisions destroys
the unity of its parts; the book appears clearer to the view, but the author's
design remains obscure." And he continues his criticism, having in view
Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, an excellent book at bottom, but sub-divided:
the famous author, worn out before the end, was unable to infuse inspiration
into all his ideas, and to arrange all his matter. However, I can scarcely
believe that Buffon was not also thinking, by way of contrast, of Bossuet's
Discourse on Universal History, a subject vast indeed, and yet of such an
unity that the great orator was able to comprise it in a single treatise. When
we open the first edition, that of 1681, before the division into chapters,
which was introduced later, passed from the margin into the text, very thing
is developed in a single series, almost in one breath. It might be said that the
orator has here acted like the nature of which Buffon speaks, that "he has
worked on an eternal plan from which he has nowhere departed," so deeply
does he seem to have entered into the familiar counsels and designs of
providence.
Are Athalie and the Discourse on Universal History the greatest
masterpieces that the strict classical theory can present to its friends as well
as to its enemies? In spite of the admirable simplicity and dignity in the
achievement of such unique productions, we should like, nevertheless, in
the interests of art, to expand that theory a little, and to show that it is
possible to enlarge it without relaxing the tension. Goethe, whom I like to
quote on such a subject, said:—
arrangement, and execution, which are the stamps of true classical works,
said:—"Every subject is one, and however vast it is, it can be comprised in
a single treatise. Interruptions, pauses, sub- divisions should only be used
when many subjects are treated, when, having to speak of great, intricate,
and dissimilar things, the march of genius is interrupted by the multiplicity
of obstacles, and contracted by the necessity of circumstances: otherwise,
far from making a work more solid, a great number of divisions destroys
the unity of its parts; the book appears clearer to the view, but the author's
design remains obscure." And he continues his criticism, having in view
Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, an excellent book at bottom, but sub-divided:
the famous author, worn out before the end, was unable to infuse inspiration
into all his ideas, and to arrange all his matter. However, I can scarcely
believe that Buffon was not also thinking, by way of contrast, of Bossuet's
Discourse on Universal History, a subject vast indeed, and yet of such an
unity that the great orator was able to comprise it in a single treatise. When
we open the first edition, that of 1681, before the division into chapters,
which was introduced later, passed from the margin into the text, very thing
is developed in a single series, almost in one breath. It might be said that the
orator has here acted like the nature of which Buffon speaks, that "he has
worked on an eternal plan from which he has nowhere departed," so deeply
does he seem to have entered into the familiar counsels and designs of
providence.
Are Athalie and the Discourse on Universal History the greatest
masterpieces that the strict classical theory can present to its friends as well
as to its enemies? In spite of the admirable simplicity and dignity in the
achievement of such unique productions, we should like, nevertheless, in
the interests of art, to expand that theory a little, and to show that it is
possible to enlarge it without relaxing the tension. Goethe, whom I like to
quote on such a subject, said:—
Page 150
"I call the classical healthy, and the romantic sickly. In my opinion the
Nibelungen song is as much a classic as Homer. Both are healthy and
vigorous. The works of the day are romantic, not because they are new, but
because they are weak, ailing, or sickly. Ancient works are classical not
because they are old, but because they are powerful, fresh, and healthy. If
we regarded romantic and classical from those two points of view we
should soon all agree."
Indeed, before determining and fixing the opinions on that matter, I
should like every unbiassed mind to take a voyage round the world and
devote itself to a survey of different literatures in their primitive vigour and
infinite variety. What would be seen? Chief of all a Homer, the father of the
classical world, less a single distinct individual than the vast living
expression of a whole epoch and a semi-barbarous civilisation. In order to
make him a true classic, it was necessary to attribute to him later a design, a
plan, literary invention, qualities of atticism and urbanity of which he had
certainly never dreamed in the luxuriant development of his natural
inspirations. And who appear by his side? August, venerable ancients, the
AEschyluses and the Sophocles, mutilated, it is true, and only there to
present us with a debris of themselves, the survivors of many others as
worthy, doubtless, as they to survive, but who have succumbed to the
injuries of time. This thought alone would teach a man of impartial mind
not to look upon the whole of even classical literatures with a too narrow
and restricted view; he would learn that the exact and well-proportioned
order which has since so largely prevailed in our admiration of the past was
only the outcome of artificial circumstances.
And in reaching the modern world, how would it be? The greatest names
to be seen at the beginning of literatures are those which disturb and run
counter to certain fixed ideas of what is beautiful and appropriate in poetry.
For example, is Shakespeare a classic? Yes, now, for England and the
Nibelungen song is as much a classic as Homer. Both are healthy and
vigorous. The works of the day are romantic, not because they are new, but
because they are weak, ailing, or sickly. Ancient works are classical not
because they are old, but because they are powerful, fresh, and healthy. If
we regarded romantic and classical from those two points of view we
should soon all agree."
Indeed, before determining and fixing the opinions on that matter, I
should like every unbiassed mind to take a voyage round the world and
devote itself to a survey of different literatures in their primitive vigour and
infinite variety. What would be seen? Chief of all a Homer, the father of the
classical world, less a single distinct individual than the vast living
expression of a whole epoch and a semi-barbarous civilisation. In order to
make him a true classic, it was necessary to attribute to him later a design, a
plan, literary invention, qualities of atticism and urbanity of which he had
certainly never dreamed in the luxuriant development of his natural
inspirations. And who appear by his side? August, venerable ancients, the
AEschyluses and the Sophocles, mutilated, it is true, and only there to
present us with a debris of themselves, the survivors of many others as
worthy, doubtless, as they to survive, but who have succumbed to the
injuries of time. This thought alone would teach a man of impartial mind
not to look upon the whole of even classical literatures with a too narrow
and restricted view; he would learn that the exact and well-proportioned
order which has since so largely prevailed in our admiration of the past was
only the outcome of artificial circumstances.
And in reaching the modern world, how would it be? The greatest names
to be seen at the beginning of literatures are those which disturb and run
counter to certain fixed ideas of what is beautiful and appropriate in poetry.
For example, is Shakespeare a classic? Yes, now, for England and the
Page 151
world; but in the time of Pope he was not considered so. Pope and his
friends were the only pre-eminent classics; directly after their death they
seemed so for ever. At the present time they are still classics, as they
deserve to be, but they are only of the second order, and are for ever
subordinated and relegated to their rightful place by him who has again
come to his own on the height of the horizon.
It is not, however, for me to speak ill of Pope or his great disciples, above
all, when they possess pathos and naturalness like Goldsmith: after the
greatest they are perhaps the most agreeable writers and the poets best fitted
to add charm to life. Once when Lord Bolingbroke was writing to Swift,
Pope added a postscript, in which he said—"I think some advantage would
result to our age, if we three spent three years together." Men who, without
boasting, have the right to say such things must never be spoken of lightly:
the fortunate ages, when men of talent could propose such things, then no
chimera, are rather to be envied. The ages called by the name of Louis XIV.
or of Queen Anne are, in the dispassionate sense of the word, the only true
classical ages, those which offer protection and a favourable climate to real
talent. We know only to well how in our untrammelled times, through the
instability and storminess of the age, talents are lost and dissipated.
Nevertheless, let us acknowledge our age's part and superiority in greatness.
True and sovereign genius triumphs over the very difficulties that cause
others to fail: Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton were able to attain their
height and produce their imperishable works in spite of obstacles, hardships
and tempests. Byron's opinion of Pope has been much discussed, and the
explanation of it sought in the kind of contradiction by which the singer of
Don Juan and Childe Harold extolled the purely classical school and
pronounced it the only good one, while himself acting so differently.
Goethe spoke the truth on that point when he remarked that Byron, great by
the flow and source of poetry, feared that Shakespeare was more powerful
than himself in the creation and realisation of his characters. "He would
friends were the only pre-eminent classics; directly after their death they
seemed so for ever. At the present time they are still classics, as they
deserve to be, but they are only of the second order, and are for ever
subordinated and relegated to their rightful place by him who has again
come to his own on the height of the horizon.
It is not, however, for me to speak ill of Pope or his great disciples, above
all, when they possess pathos and naturalness like Goldsmith: after the
greatest they are perhaps the most agreeable writers and the poets best fitted
to add charm to life. Once when Lord Bolingbroke was writing to Swift,
Pope added a postscript, in which he said—"I think some advantage would
result to our age, if we three spent three years together." Men who, without
boasting, have the right to say such things must never be spoken of lightly:
the fortunate ages, when men of talent could propose such things, then no
chimera, are rather to be envied. The ages called by the name of Louis XIV.
or of Queen Anne are, in the dispassionate sense of the word, the only true
classical ages, those which offer protection and a favourable climate to real
talent. We know only to well how in our untrammelled times, through the
instability and storminess of the age, talents are lost and dissipated.
Nevertheless, let us acknowledge our age's part and superiority in greatness.
True and sovereign genius triumphs over the very difficulties that cause
others to fail: Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton were able to attain their
height and produce their imperishable works in spite of obstacles, hardships
and tempests. Byron's opinion of Pope has been much discussed, and the
explanation of it sought in the kind of contradiction by which the singer of
Don Juan and Childe Harold extolled the purely classical school and
pronounced it the only good one, while himself acting so differently.
Goethe spoke the truth on that point when he remarked that Byron, great by
the flow and source of poetry, feared that Shakespeare was more powerful
than himself in the creation and realisation of his characters. "He would
Page 152
have liked to deny it; the elevation so free from egoism irritated him; he felt
when near it that he could not display himself at ease. He never denied
Pope, because he did not fear him; he knew that Pope was only a low wall
by his side."
If, as Byron desired, Pope's school had kept the supremacy and a sort of
honorary empire in the past, Byron would have been the first and only poet
in his particular style; the height of Pope's wall shuts out Shakespeare's
great figure from sight, whereas when Shakespeare reigns and rules in all
his greatness, Byron is only second.
In France there was no great classic before the age of Louis XIV.; the
Dantes and Shakespeares, the early authorities to whom, in times of
emancipation, men sooner or later return, were wanting. There were mere
sketches of great poets, like Mathurin Regnier, like Rabelais, without any
ideal, without the depth of emotion and the seriousness which canonises.
Montaigne was a kind of premature classic, of the family of Horace, but for
want of worthy surroundings, like a spoiled child, he gave himself up to the
unbridled fancies of his style and humour. Hence it happened that France,
less than any other nation, found in her old authors a right to demand
vehemently at a certain time literary liberty and freedom, and that it was
more difficult for her, in enfranchising herself, to remain classical.
However, with Moliere and La Fontaine among her classics of the great
period, nothing could justly be refused to those who possessed courage and
ability.
The important point now seems to me to be to uphold, while extending,
the idea and belief. There is no receipt for making classics; this point should
be clearly recognised. To believe that an author will become a classic by
imitating certain qualities of purity, moderation, accuracy, and elegance,
independently of the style and inspiration, is to believe that after Racine the
when near it that he could not display himself at ease. He never denied
Pope, because he did not fear him; he knew that Pope was only a low wall
by his side."
If, as Byron desired, Pope's school had kept the supremacy and a sort of
honorary empire in the past, Byron would have been the first and only poet
in his particular style; the height of Pope's wall shuts out Shakespeare's
great figure from sight, whereas when Shakespeare reigns and rules in all
his greatness, Byron is only second.
In France there was no great classic before the age of Louis XIV.; the
Dantes and Shakespeares, the early authorities to whom, in times of
emancipation, men sooner or later return, were wanting. There were mere
sketches of great poets, like Mathurin Regnier, like Rabelais, without any
ideal, without the depth of emotion and the seriousness which canonises.
Montaigne was a kind of premature classic, of the family of Horace, but for
want of worthy surroundings, like a spoiled child, he gave himself up to the
unbridled fancies of his style and humour. Hence it happened that France,
less than any other nation, found in her old authors a right to demand
vehemently at a certain time literary liberty and freedom, and that it was
more difficult for her, in enfranchising herself, to remain classical.
However, with Moliere and La Fontaine among her classics of the great
period, nothing could justly be refused to those who possessed courage and
ability.
The important point now seems to me to be to uphold, while extending,
the idea and belief. There is no receipt for making classics; this point should
be clearly recognised. To believe that an author will become a classic by
imitating certain qualities of purity, moderation, accuracy, and elegance,
independently of the style and inspiration, is to believe that after Racine the
Page 153
father there is a place for Racine the son; dull and estimable role, the worst
in poetry. Further, it is hazardous to take too quickly and without opposition
the place of a classic in the sight of one's contemporaries; in that case there
is a good chance of not retaining the position with posterity. Fontanes in his
day was regarded by his friends as a pure classic; see how at twenty-five
years' distance his star has set. How many of these precocious classics are
there who do not endure, and who are so only for a while! We turn round
one morning and are surprised not to find them standing behind us.
Madame de Sevigne would wittily say they possessed but an evanescent
colour. With regard to classics, the least expected prove the best and
greatest: seek them rather in the vigorous genius born immortal and
flourishing for ever. Apparently the least classical of the four great poets of
the age of Louis XIV. was Moliere; he was then applauded far more than he
was esteemed; men took delight in him without understanding his worth.
After him, La Fontaine seemed the least classical: observe after two
centuries what is the result for both. Far above Boileau, even above Racine,
are they not now unanimously considered to possess in the highest degree
the characteristics of an all-embracing morality?
Meanwhile there is no question of sacrificing or depreciating anything. I
believe the temple of taste is to be rebuilt; but its reconstruction is merely a
matter of enlargement, so that it may become the home of all noble human
beings, of all who have permanently increased the sum of the mind's
delights and possessions. As for me, who cannot, obviously, in any degree
pretend to be the architect or designer of such a temple, I shall confine
myself to expressing a few earnest wishes, to submit, as it were, my designs
for the edifice. Above all I should desire not to exclude any one among the
worthy, each should be in his place there, from Shakespeare, the freest of
creative geniuses, and the greatest of classics without knowing it, to
Andrieux, the last of classics in little. "There is more than one chamber in
the mansions of my Father;" that should be as true of the kingdom of the
in poetry. Further, it is hazardous to take too quickly and without opposition
the place of a classic in the sight of one's contemporaries; in that case there
is a good chance of not retaining the position with posterity. Fontanes in his
day was regarded by his friends as a pure classic; see how at twenty-five
years' distance his star has set. How many of these precocious classics are
there who do not endure, and who are so only for a while! We turn round
one morning and are surprised not to find them standing behind us.
Madame de Sevigne would wittily say they possessed but an evanescent
colour. With regard to classics, the least expected prove the best and
greatest: seek them rather in the vigorous genius born immortal and
flourishing for ever. Apparently the least classical of the four great poets of
the age of Louis XIV. was Moliere; he was then applauded far more than he
was esteemed; men took delight in him without understanding his worth.
After him, La Fontaine seemed the least classical: observe after two
centuries what is the result for both. Far above Boileau, even above Racine,
are they not now unanimously considered to possess in the highest degree
the characteristics of an all-embracing morality?
Meanwhile there is no question of sacrificing or depreciating anything. I
believe the temple of taste is to be rebuilt; but its reconstruction is merely a
matter of enlargement, so that it may become the home of all noble human
beings, of all who have permanently increased the sum of the mind's
delights and possessions. As for me, who cannot, obviously, in any degree
pretend to be the architect or designer of such a temple, I shall confine
myself to expressing a few earnest wishes, to submit, as it were, my designs
for the edifice. Above all I should desire not to exclude any one among the
worthy, each should be in his place there, from Shakespeare, the freest of
creative geniuses, and the greatest of classics without knowing it, to
Andrieux, the last of classics in little. "There is more than one chamber in
the mansions of my Father;" that should be as true of the kingdom of the
Page 154
beautiful here below, as of the kingdom of Heaven. Homer, as always and
everywhere, should be first, likest a god; but behind him, like the
procession of the three wise kings of the East, would be seen the three great
poets, the three Homers, so long ignored by us, who wrote epics for the use
of the old peoples of Asia, the poets Valmiki, Vyasa of the Hindoos, and
Firdousi of the Persians: in the domain of taste it is well to know that such
men exist, and not to divide the human race. Our homage paid to what is
recognized as soon as perceived, we must not stray further; the eye should
delight in a thousand pleasing or majestic spectacles, should rejoice in a
thousand varied and surprising combinations, whose apparent confusion
would never be without concord and harmony. The oldest of the wise men
and poets, those who put human morality into maxims, and those who in
simple fashion sung it, would converse together in rare and gentle speech,
and would not be surprised at understanding each other's meaning at the
very first word. Solon, Hesiod, Theognis, Job, Solomon, and why not
Confucius, would welcome the cleverest moderns, La Rochefoucauld and
La Bruyere, who, when listening to them, would say "they knew all that we
know, and in repeating life's experiences, we have discovered nothing." On
the hill, most easily discernible, and of most accessible ascent, Virgil,
surrounded by Menander, Tibullus, Terence, Fenelon, would occupy himself
in discoursing with them with great charm and divine enchantment: his
gentle countenance would shine with an inner light, and be tinged with
modesty; as on the day when entering the theatre at Rome, just as they
finished reciting his verses, he saw the people rise with an unanimous
movement and pay to him the same homage as to Augustus. Not far from
him, regretting the separation from so dear a friend, Horace, in his turn,
would preside (as far as so accomplished and wise a poet could preside)
over the group of poets of social life who could talk although they sang,—
Pope, Boileau, the one become less irritable, the other less fault-finding.
Montaigne, a true poet, would be among them, and would give the finishing
everywhere, should be first, likest a god; but behind him, like the
procession of the three wise kings of the East, would be seen the three great
poets, the three Homers, so long ignored by us, who wrote epics for the use
of the old peoples of Asia, the poets Valmiki, Vyasa of the Hindoos, and
Firdousi of the Persians: in the domain of taste it is well to know that such
men exist, and not to divide the human race. Our homage paid to what is
recognized as soon as perceived, we must not stray further; the eye should
delight in a thousand pleasing or majestic spectacles, should rejoice in a
thousand varied and surprising combinations, whose apparent confusion
would never be without concord and harmony. The oldest of the wise men
and poets, those who put human morality into maxims, and those who in
simple fashion sung it, would converse together in rare and gentle speech,
and would not be surprised at understanding each other's meaning at the
very first word. Solon, Hesiod, Theognis, Job, Solomon, and why not
Confucius, would welcome the cleverest moderns, La Rochefoucauld and
La Bruyere, who, when listening to them, would say "they knew all that we
know, and in repeating life's experiences, we have discovered nothing." On
the hill, most easily discernible, and of most accessible ascent, Virgil,
surrounded by Menander, Tibullus, Terence, Fenelon, would occupy himself
in discoursing with them with great charm and divine enchantment: his
gentle countenance would shine with an inner light, and be tinged with
modesty; as on the day when entering the theatre at Rome, just as they
finished reciting his verses, he saw the people rise with an unanimous
movement and pay to him the same homage as to Augustus. Not far from
him, regretting the separation from so dear a friend, Horace, in his turn,
would preside (as far as so accomplished and wise a poet could preside)
over the group of poets of social life who could talk although they sang,—
Pope, Boileau, the one become less irritable, the other less fault-finding.
Montaigne, a true poet, would be among them, and would give the finishing
Page 155
touch that should deprive that delightful corner of the air of a literary
school. There would La Fontaine forget himself, and becoming less volatile
would wander no more. Voltaire would be attracted by it, but while finding
pleasure in it would not have patience to remain. A little lower down, on the
same hill as Virgil, Xenophon, with simple bearing, looking in no way like
a general, but rather resembling a priest of the Muses, would be seen
gathering round him the Attics of every tongue and of every nation, the
Addisons, Pellissons, Vauvenargues—all who feel the value of an easy
persuasiveness, an exquisite simplicity, and a gentle negligence mingled
with ornament. In the centre of the place, in the portico of the principal
temple (for there would be several in the enclosure), three great men would
like to meet often, and when they were together, no fourth, however great,
would dream of joining their discourse or their silence. In them would be
seen beauty, proportion in greatness, and that perfect harmony which
appears but once in the full youth of the world. Their three names have
become the ideal of art—Plato, Sophocles, and Demosthenes. Those demi-
gods honoured, we see a numerous and familiar company of choice spirits
who follow, the Cervantes and Molieres, practical painters of life, indulgent
friends who are still the first of benefactors, who laughingly embrace all
mankind, turn man's experience to gaiety, and know the powerful workings
of a sensible, hearty, and legitimate joy. I do not wish to make this
description, which if complete would fill a volume, any longer. In the
middle ages, believe me, Dante would occupy the sacred heights: at the feet
of the singer of Paradise all Italy would be spread out like a garden;
Boccaccio and Ariosto would there disport themselves, and Tasso would
find again the orange groves of Sorrento. Usually a corner would be
reserved for each of the various nations, but the authors would take delight
in leaving it, and in their travels would recognise, where we should least
expect it, brothers or masters. Lucretius, for example, would enjoy
discussing the origin of the world and the reducing of chaos to order with
school. There would La Fontaine forget himself, and becoming less volatile
would wander no more. Voltaire would be attracted by it, but while finding
pleasure in it would not have patience to remain. A little lower down, on the
same hill as Virgil, Xenophon, with simple bearing, looking in no way like
a general, but rather resembling a priest of the Muses, would be seen
gathering round him the Attics of every tongue and of every nation, the
Addisons, Pellissons, Vauvenargues—all who feel the value of an easy
persuasiveness, an exquisite simplicity, and a gentle negligence mingled
with ornament. In the centre of the place, in the portico of the principal
temple (for there would be several in the enclosure), three great men would
like to meet often, and when they were together, no fourth, however great,
would dream of joining their discourse or their silence. In them would be
seen beauty, proportion in greatness, and that perfect harmony which
appears but once in the full youth of the world. Their three names have
become the ideal of art—Plato, Sophocles, and Demosthenes. Those demi-
gods honoured, we see a numerous and familiar company of choice spirits
who follow, the Cervantes and Molieres, practical painters of life, indulgent
friends who are still the first of benefactors, who laughingly embrace all
mankind, turn man's experience to gaiety, and know the powerful workings
of a sensible, hearty, and legitimate joy. I do not wish to make this
description, which if complete would fill a volume, any longer. In the
middle ages, believe me, Dante would occupy the sacred heights: at the feet
of the singer of Paradise all Italy would be spread out like a garden;
Boccaccio and Ariosto would there disport themselves, and Tasso would
find again the orange groves of Sorrento. Usually a corner would be
reserved for each of the various nations, but the authors would take delight
in leaving it, and in their travels would recognise, where we should least
expect it, brothers or masters. Lucretius, for example, would enjoy
discussing the origin of the world and the reducing of chaos to order with
Page 156
Milton. But both arguing from their own point of view, they would only
agree as regards divine pictures of poetry and nature.
Such are our classics; each individual imagination may finish the sketch
and choose the group preferred. For it is necessary to make a choice, and
the first condition of taste, after obtaining knowledge of all, lies not in
continual travel, but in rest and cessation from wandering. Nothing blunts
and destroys taste so much as endless journeyings; the poetic spirit is not
the Wandering Jew. However, when I speak of resting and making choice,
my meaning is not that we are to imitate those who charm us most among
our masters in the past. Let us be content to know them, to penetrate them,
to admire them; but let us, the late-comers, endeavour to be ourselves. Let
us have the sincerity and naturalness of our own thoughts, of our own
feelings; so much is always possible. To that let us add what is more
difficult, elevation, an aim, if possible, towards an exalted goal; and while
speaking our own language, and submitting to the conditions of the times in
which we live, whence we derive our strength and our defects, let us ask
from time to time, our brows lifted towards the heights and our eyes fixed
on the group of honoured mortals: what would that say of us?
But why speak always of authors and writings? Maybe an age is coming
when there will be no more writing. Happy those who read and read again,
those who in their reading can follow their unrestrained inclination! There
comes a time in life when, all our journeys over, our experiences ended,
there is no enjoyment more delightful than to study and thoroughly examine
the things we know, to take pleasure in what we feel, and in seeing and
seeing again the people we love: the pure joys of our maturity. Then it is
that the word classic takes its true meaning, and is defined for every man of
taste by an irresistible choice. Then taste is formed, it is shaped and
definite; then good sense, if we are to possess it at all, is perfected in us. We
have neither more time for experiments, nor a desire to go forth in search of
agree as regards divine pictures of poetry and nature.
Such are our classics; each individual imagination may finish the sketch
and choose the group preferred. For it is necessary to make a choice, and
the first condition of taste, after obtaining knowledge of all, lies not in
continual travel, but in rest and cessation from wandering. Nothing blunts
and destroys taste so much as endless journeyings; the poetic spirit is not
the Wandering Jew. However, when I speak of resting and making choice,
my meaning is not that we are to imitate those who charm us most among
our masters in the past. Let us be content to know them, to penetrate them,
to admire them; but let us, the late-comers, endeavour to be ourselves. Let
us have the sincerity and naturalness of our own thoughts, of our own
feelings; so much is always possible. To that let us add what is more
difficult, elevation, an aim, if possible, towards an exalted goal; and while
speaking our own language, and submitting to the conditions of the times in
which we live, whence we derive our strength and our defects, let us ask
from time to time, our brows lifted towards the heights and our eyes fixed
on the group of honoured mortals: what would that say of us?
But why speak always of authors and writings? Maybe an age is coming
when there will be no more writing. Happy those who read and read again,
those who in their reading can follow their unrestrained inclination! There
comes a time in life when, all our journeys over, our experiences ended,
there is no enjoyment more delightful than to study and thoroughly examine
the things we know, to take pleasure in what we feel, and in seeing and
seeing again the people we love: the pure joys of our maturity. Then it is
that the word classic takes its true meaning, and is defined for every man of
taste by an irresistible choice. Then taste is formed, it is shaped and
definite; then good sense, if we are to possess it at all, is perfected in us. We
have neither more time for experiments, nor a desire to go forth in search of
Page 157
pastures newf We cling to our friends, to those proved by long intercourse.
Old wine, old books, old friends. We say to ourselves with Voltaire in these
delightful lines:—"Let us enjoy, let us write, let us live, my dear Horace!…I
have lived longer than you: my verse will not last so long. But on the brink
of the tomb I shall make it my chief care—to follow the lessons of your
philosophy—to despise death in enjoying life—to read your writings full of
charm and good sense—as we drink an old wine which revives our senses."
In fact, be it Horace or another who is the author preferred, who reflects
our thoughts in all the wealth of their maturity, of some one of those
excellent and antique minds shall we request an interview at every moment;
of some one of them shall we ask a friendship which never deceives, which
could not fail us; to some one of them shall we appeal for that sensation of
serenity and amenity (we have often need of it) which reconciles us with
mankind and with ourselves.
Old wine, old books, old friends. We say to ourselves with Voltaire in these
delightful lines:—"Let us enjoy, let us write, let us live, my dear Horace!…I
have lived longer than you: my verse will not last so long. But on the brink
of the tomb I shall make it my chief care—to follow the lessons of your
philosophy—to despise death in enjoying life—to read your writings full of
charm and good sense—as we drink an old wine which revives our senses."
In fact, be it Horace or another who is the author preferred, who reflects
our thoughts in all the wealth of their maturity, of some one of those
excellent and antique minds shall we request an interview at every moment;
of some one of them shall we ask a friendship which never deceives, which
could not fail us; to some one of them shall we appeal for that sensation of
serenity and amenity (we have often need of it) which reconciles us with
mankind and with ourselves.
Page 158
THE POETRY OF THE CELTIC RACES
BY ERNEST RENAN
TRANSLATED BY W. G. HUTCHISON
BY ERNEST RENAN
TRANSLATED BY W. G. HUTCHISON
Page 159
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Ernest Renan was born in 1823, at Treguier in Brittany. He was educated
for the priesthood, but never took orders, turning at first to teaching. He
continued his studies in religion and philology, and, after traveling in Syria
on a government commission, he returned to Paris and became professor of
Hebrew in the College de France, from which he was suspended for a time
on account of protests against his heretical teachings. He died in 1892.
Renan's activity divides itself into two parts. The first culminated in his
two great works on the "Origins of Christianity" and on the "History of
Israel." As to the scientific value of these books there is difference of
opinion, as was to be expected in a treatment of such subjects to the
exclusion of the miraculous. But the delicacy and vividness of his portraits
of the great personalities of Hebrew history, and the acuteness of his
analysis of national psychology, are not to be denied.
The other part of his work is more miscellaneous, but most of it is in
some sense philosophical or autobiographical. Believing profoundly in
scientific method, Renan was unable to find in science a basis for either
ethics or metaphysics, and ended in a skepticism often ironical, yet not
untinged with mysticism.
"He was an amazing writer," says M. Faguet, "and disconcerted criticism
by the impossibility of explaining his methods of procedure; he was
Ernest Renan was born in 1823, at Treguier in Brittany. He was educated
for the priesthood, but never took orders, turning at first to teaching. He
continued his studies in religion and philology, and, after traveling in Syria
on a government commission, he returned to Paris and became professor of
Hebrew in the College de France, from which he was suspended for a time
on account of protests against his heretical teachings. He died in 1892.
Renan's activity divides itself into two parts. The first culminated in his
two great works on the "Origins of Christianity" and on the "History of
Israel." As to the scientific value of these books there is difference of
opinion, as was to be expected in a treatment of such subjects to the
exclusion of the miraculous. But the delicacy and vividness of his portraits
of the great personalities of Hebrew history, and the acuteness of his
analysis of national psychology, are not to be denied.
The other part of his work is more miscellaneous, but most of it is in
some sense philosophical or autobiographical. Believing profoundly in
scientific method, Renan was unable to find in science a basis for either
ethics or metaphysics, and ended in a skepticism often ironical, yet not
untinged with mysticism.
"He was an amazing writer," says M. Faguet, "and disconcerted criticism
by the impossibility of explaining his methods of procedure; he was
Page 160
luminous, supple, naturally pliant and yielding; beneath his apparently
effeminate grace an extraordinary strength of character would suddenly
make itself felt; he had, more than any nineteenth-century writer, the quality
of charm; he exercised a caressing innuence which enveloped, and finally
conquered, the reader."
In no kind of writing was Renan's command of style more notable than in
the description of scenery; and in his pictures of his native Brittany in the
essay on "The Poetry of the Celtic Races," as well as in his analysis of
national qualities, two of his most characteristic powers are admirably
displayed.
effeminate grace an extraordinary strength of character would suddenly
make itself felt; he had, more than any nineteenth-century writer, the quality
of charm; he exercised a caressing innuence which enveloped, and finally
conquered, the reader."
In no kind of writing was Renan's command of style more notable than in
the description of scenery; and in his pictures of his native Brittany in the
essay on "The Poetry of the Celtic Races," as well as in his analysis of
national qualities, two of his most characteristic powers are admirably
displayed.
Page 161
THE POETRY OF THE CELTIC RACES
Every one who travels through the Armorican peninsula experiences a
change of the most abrupt description, as soon as he leaves behind the
district most closely bordering upon the continent, in which the cheerful but
commonplace type of face of Normandy and Maine is continually in
evidence, and passes into the true Brittany, that which merits its name by
language and race. A cold wind arises full of a vague sadness, and carries
the soul to other thoughts; the tree-tops are bare and twisted; the heath with
its monotony of tint stretches away into the distance; at every step the
granite protrudes from a soil too scanty to cover it; a sea that is almost
always sombre girdles the horizon with eternal moaning. The same contrast
is manifest in the people: to Norman vulgarity, to a plump and prosperous
population, happy to live, full of its own interests, egoistical as are all these
who make a habit of enjoyment, succeeds a timid and reserved race living
altogether within itself, heavy in appearance but capable of profound
feeling, and of an adorable delicacy in its religious instincts. A like change
is apparent, I am told, in passing from England into Wales, from the
Lowlands of Scotland, English by language and manners, into the Gaelic
Highlands; and too, though with a perceptible difference, when one buries
oneself in the districts of Ireland where the race has remained pure from all
admixture of alien blood. It seems like entering on the subterranean strata of
another world, and one experiences in some measure the impression given
us by Dante, when he leads us from one circle of his Inferno to another.
Every one who travels through the Armorican peninsula experiences a
change of the most abrupt description, as soon as he leaves behind the
district most closely bordering upon the continent, in which the cheerful but
commonplace type of face of Normandy and Maine is continually in
evidence, and passes into the true Brittany, that which merits its name by
language and race. A cold wind arises full of a vague sadness, and carries
the soul to other thoughts; the tree-tops are bare and twisted; the heath with
its monotony of tint stretches away into the distance; at every step the
granite protrudes from a soil too scanty to cover it; a sea that is almost
always sombre girdles the horizon with eternal moaning. The same contrast
is manifest in the people: to Norman vulgarity, to a plump and prosperous
population, happy to live, full of its own interests, egoistical as are all these
who make a habit of enjoyment, succeeds a timid and reserved race living
altogether within itself, heavy in appearance but capable of profound
feeling, and of an adorable delicacy in its religious instincts. A like change
is apparent, I am told, in passing from England into Wales, from the
Lowlands of Scotland, English by language and manners, into the Gaelic
Highlands; and too, though with a perceptible difference, when one buries
oneself in the districts of Ireland where the race has remained pure from all
admixture of alien blood. It seems like entering on the subterranean strata of
another world, and one experiences in some measure the impression given
us by Dante, when he leads us from one circle of his Inferno to another.
Page 162
Sufficient attention is not given to the peculiarity of this fact of an
ancient race living, until our days and almost under our eyes, its own life in
some obscure islands and peninsulas in the West, more and more affected, it
is true, by external influences, but still faithful to its own tongue, to its own
memories, to its own customs, and to its own genius. Especially is it
forgotten that this little people, now concentrated on the very confines of
the world, in the midst of rocks and mountains whence its enemies have
been powerless to force it, is in possession of a literature which, in the
Middle Ages, exercised an immense influence, changed the current of
European civilisation, and imposed its poetical motives on nearly the whole
of Christendom. Yet it is only necessary to open the authentic monuments
of the Gaelic genius to be convinced that the race which created them has
had its own original manner of feeling and thinking, that nowhere has the
eternal illusion clad itself in more seductive hues, and that in the great
chorus of humanity no race equals this for penetrative notes that go to the
very heart. Alas! it too is doomed to disappear, this emerald set in the
Western seas. Arthur will return no more from his isle of faery, and St.
Patrick was right when he said to Ossian, "The heroes that thou weepest are
dead; can they be born again?" It is high time to note, before they shall have
passed away, the divine tones thus expiring on the horizon before the
growing tumult of uniform civilisation. Were criticism to set itself the task
of calling back these distant echoes, and of giving a voice to races that are
no more, would not that suffice to absolve it from the reproach,
unreasonably and too frequently brought against it, of being only negative?
Good works now exist which facilitate the task of him who undertakes
the study of these interesting literatures. Wales, above all, is distinguished
by scientific and literary activity, not always accompanied, it is true, by a
very rigorous critical spirit, but deserving the highest praise. There,
researches which would bring honour to the most active centres of learning
in Europe are the work of enthusiastic amateurs. A peasant called Owen
ancient race living, until our days and almost under our eyes, its own life in
some obscure islands and peninsulas in the West, more and more affected, it
is true, by external influences, but still faithful to its own tongue, to its own
memories, to its own customs, and to its own genius. Especially is it
forgotten that this little people, now concentrated on the very confines of
the world, in the midst of rocks and mountains whence its enemies have
been powerless to force it, is in possession of a literature which, in the
Middle Ages, exercised an immense influence, changed the current of
European civilisation, and imposed its poetical motives on nearly the whole
of Christendom. Yet it is only necessary to open the authentic monuments
of the Gaelic genius to be convinced that the race which created them has
had its own original manner of feeling and thinking, that nowhere has the
eternal illusion clad itself in more seductive hues, and that in the great
chorus of humanity no race equals this for penetrative notes that go to the
very heart. Alas! it too is doomed to disappear, this emerald set in the
Western seas. Arthur will return no more from his isle of faery, and St.
Patrick was right when he said to Ossian, "The heroes that thou weepest are
dead; can they be born again?" It is high time to note, before they shall have
passed away, the divine tones thus expiring on the horizon before the
growing tumult of uniform civilisation. Were criticism to set itself the task
of calling back these distant echoes, and of giving a voice to races that are
no more, would not that suffice to absolve it from the reproach,
unreasonably and too frequently brought against it, of being only negative?
Good works now exist which facilitate the task of him who undertakes
the study of these interesting literatures. Wales, above all, is distinguished
by scientific and literary activity, not always accompanied, it is true, by a
very rigorous critical spirit, but deserving the highest praise. There,
researches which would bring honour to the most active centres of learning
in Europe are the work of enthusiastic amateurs. A peasant called Owen
Page 163
Jones published in 1801-7, under the name of the Myvyrian Archaiology of
Wales, the precious collection which is to this day the arsenal of Cymric
antiquities. A number of erudite and zealous workers, Aneurin Owen,
Thomas Price of Crickhowell, William Rees, and John Jones, following in
the footsteps of the Myvyrian peasant, set themselves to finish his work,
and to profit from the treasures which he had collected. A woman of
distinction, Lady Charlotte Guest, charged herself with the task of
acquainting Europe with the collection of the Mabinogion, [Footnote: The
Mabinogion, from the Llyfr Coch O Hergest and other ancient Welsh
Manuscripts, with an English Translation and Notes. By Lady Charlotte
Guest. London and Llandovery, 1837-49. The word Mabinogi (in the plural
Mabinogion) designates a form of romantic narrative peculiar to Wales. The
origin and primitive meaning of this word are very uncertain, and Lady
Guest's right to apply it to the whole of the narratives which she has
published is open to doubt.] the pearl of Gaelic literature, the completest
expression of the Cymric genius. This magnificent work, executed in twelve
years with the luxury that the wealthy English amateur knows how to use in
his publications, will one day attest how full of life the consciousness of the
Celtic races remained in the present century. Only indeed the sincerest
patriotism could inspire a woman to undertake and achieve so vast a literary
monument. Scotland and Ireland have in like measure been enriched by a
host of studies of their ancient history. Lastly, our own Brittany, though all
too rarely studied with the philological and critical rigour now exacted in
works of erudition, has furnished Celtic antiquities with her share of worthy
research. Does it not suffice to cite M. de la Villemarque, whose name will
be henceforth associated among us with these studies, and whose services
are so incontestable, that criticism need have no fear of depreciating him in
the eyes of a public which has accepted him with so much warmth and
sympathy?
I.
Wales, the precious collection which is to this day the arsenal of Cymric
antiquities. A number of erudite and zealous workers, Aneurin Owen,
Thomas Price of Crickhowell, William Rees, and John Jones, following in
the footsteps of the Myvyrian peasant, set themselves to finish his work,
and to profit from the treasures which he had collected. A woman of
distinction, Lady Charlotte Guest, charged herself with the task of
acquainting Europe with the collection of the Mabinogion, [Footnote: The
Mabinogion, from the Llyfr Coch O Hergest and other ancient Welsh
Manuscripts, with an English Translation and Notes. By Lady Charlotte
Guest. London and Llandovery, 1837-49. The word Mabinogi (in the plural
Mabinogion) designates a form of romantic narrative peculiar to Wales. The
origin and primitive meaning of this word are very uncertain, and Lady
Guest's right to apply it to the whole of the narratives which she has
published is open to doubt.] the pearl of Gaelic literature, the completest
expression of the Cymric genius. This magnificent work, executed in twelve
years with the luxury that the wealthy English amateur knows how to use in
his publications, will one day attest how full of life the consciousness of the
Celtic races remained in the present century. Only indeed the sincerest
patriotism could inspire a woman to undertake and achieve so vast a literary
monument. Scotland and Ireland have in like measure been enriched by a
host of studies of their ancient history. Lastly, our own Brittany, though all
too rarely studied with the philological and critical rigour now exacted in
works of erudition, has furnished Celtic antiquities with her share of worthy
research. Does it not suffice to cite M. de la Villemarque, whose name will
be henceforth associated among us with these studies, and whose services
are so incontestable, that criticism need have no fear of depreciating him in
the eyes of a public which has accepted him with so much warmth and
sympathy?
I.
Page 164
If the excellence of races is to be appreciated by the purity of their blood
and the inviolability of their national character, it must needs be admitted
that none can vie in nobility with the still surviving remains of the Celtic
race. [Footnote: To avoid all misunderstanding, I ought to point out that by
the word Celtic I designate here, not the whole of the great race which, at a
remote epoch, formed the population of nearly the whole of Western
Europe, but simply the four groups which, in our days, still merit this name,
as opposed to the Teutons and to the Neo-Latin peoples. These four groups
are: (i) The inhabitants of Wales or Cambria, and the peninsula of Cornwall,
bearing even now the ancient name of Cymry; (2) the Bretons bretonnants,
or dwellers in French Brittany speaking Bas-Breton, who represent an
emigration of the Cymry from Wales; (3) the Gaels of the North of Scotland
speaking Gaelic; (4) the Irish, although a very profound line of demarcation
separates Ireland from the rest of the Celtic family. [It is also necessary to
point out that Renan in this essay applies the name Breton both to the
Bretons proper, i. e. the inhabitants of Brittany, and to the British members
of the Celtic race.—Translator's Note.]]
Never has a human family lived more apart from the world, and been
purer from all alien admixture. Confined by conquest within forgotten
islands and peninsulas, it has reared an impassable barrier against external
influences; it has drawn all from itself; it has lived solely on its own capital.
From this ersues that powerful individuality, that hatred of the foreigner,
which even in our own days has formed the essential feature of the Celtic
peoples. Roman civilisation scarcely reached them, and left among them
but few traces. The Teutonic invasion drove them back, but did not
penetrate them. At the present hour they are still constant in resistance to an
invasion dangerous in an altogether different way,- -that of modern
civilisation, destructive as it is of local variations and national types. Ireland
in particular (and herein we perhaps have the secret of her irremediable
weakness) is the only country in Europe where the native can produce the
and the inviolability of their national character, it must needs be admitted
that none can vie in nobility with the still surviving remains of the Celtic
race. [Footnote: To avoid all misunderstanding, I ought to point out that by
the word Celtic I designate here, not the whole of the great race which, at a
remote epoch, formed the population of nearly the whole of Western
Europe, but simply the four groups which, in our days, still merit this name,
as opposed to the Teutons and to the Neo-Latin peoples. These four groups
are: (i) The inhabitants of Wales or Cambria, and the peninsula of Cornwall,
bearing even now the ancient name of Cymry; (2) the Bretons bretonnants,
or dwellers in French Brittany speaking Bas-Breton, who represent an
emigration of the Cymry from Wales; (3) the Gaels of the North of Scotland
speaking Gaelic; (4) the Irish, although a very profound line of demarcation
separates Ireland from the rest of the Celtic family. [It is also necessary to
point out that Renan in this essay applies the name Breton both to the
Bretons proper, i. e. the inhabitants of Brittany, and to the British members
of the Celtic race.—Translator's Note.]]
Never has a human family lived more apart from the world, and been
purer from all alien admixture. Confined by conquest within forgotten
islands and peninsulas, it has reared an impassable barrier against external
influences; it has drawn all from itself; it has lived solely on its own capital.
From this ersues that powerful individuality, that hatred of the foreigner,
which even in our own days has formed the essential feature of the Celtic
peoples. Roman civilisation scarcely reached them, and left among them
but few traces. The Teutonic invasion drove them back, but did not
penetrate them. At the present hour they are still constant in resistance to an
invasion dangerous in an altogether different way,- -that of modern
civilisation, destructive as it is of local variations and national types. Ireland
in particular (and herein we perhaps have the secret of her irremediable
weakness) is the only country in Europe where the native can produce the
Page 165
titles of his descent, and designate with certainty, even in the darkness of
prehistoric ages, the race from which he has sprung.
It is in this secluded life, in this defiance of all that comes from without,
that we must search for the explanation of the chief features of the Celtic
character. It has all the failings, and all the good qualities, of the solitary
man; at once proud and timid, strong in feeling and feeble in action, at
home free and unreserved, to the outside world awkward and embarrassed.
It distrusts the foreigner, because it sees in him a being more refined than
itself, who abuses its simplicity. Indifferent to the admiration of others, it
asks only one thing, that it should be left to itself. It is before all else a
domestic race, fitted for family life and fireside joys. In no other race has
the bond of blood been stronger, or has it created more duties, or attached
man to his fellow with so much breadth and depth. Every social institution
of the Celtic peoples was in the beginning only an extension of the family.
A common tradition attests, to this very day, that nowhere has the trace of
this great institution of relationship been better preserved than in Brittany.
There is a widely-spread belief in that country, that blood speaks, and that
two relatives, unknown one to the other, in any part of the world
wheresoever it may be, recognise each other by the secret and mysterious
emotion which they feel in each other's presence. Respect for the dead rests
on the same principle. Nowhere has reverence for the dead been greater
than among the Briton peoples; nowhere have so many memories and
prayers clustered about the tomb. This is because life is not for these people
a personal adventure, undertaken by each man on his own account, and at
his own risks and perils; it is a link in a long chain, a gift received and
handed on, a debt paid and a duty done.
It is easily discernible how little fitted were natures so strongly
concentrated to furnish one of those brilliant developments, which imposes
the momentary ascendency of a people on the world; and that, no doubt, is
prehistoric ages, the race from which he has sprung.
It is in this secluded life, in this defiance of all that comes from without,
that we must search for the explanation of the chief features of the Celtic
character. It has all the failings, and all the good qualities, of the solitary
man; at once proud and timid, strong in feeling and feeble in action, at
home free and unreserved, to the outside world awkward and embarrassed.
It distrusts the foreigner, because it sees in him a being more refined than
itself, who abuses its simplicity. Indifferent to the admiration of others, it
asks only one thing, that it should be left to itself. It is before all else a
domestic race, fitted for family life and fireside joys. In no other race has
the bond of blood been stronger, or has it created more duties, or attached
man to his fellow with so much breadth and depth. Every social institution
of the Celtic peoples was in the beginning only an extension of the family.
A common tradition attests, to this very day, that nowhere has the trace of
this great institution of relationship been better preserved than in Brittany.
There is a widely-spread belief in that country, that blood speaks, and that
two relatives, unknown one to the other, in any part of the world
wheresoever it may be, recognise each other by the secret and mysterious
emotion which they feel in each other's presence. Respect for the dead rests
on the same principle. Nowhere has reverence for the dead been greater
than among the Briton peoples; nowhere have so many memories and
prayers clustered about the tomb. This is because life is not for these people
a personal adventure, undertaken by each man on his own account, and at
his own risks and perils; it is a link in a long chain, a gift received and
handed on, a debt paid and a duty done.
It is easily discernible how little fitted were natures so strongly
concentrated to furnish one of those brilliant developments, which imposes
the momentary ascendency of a people on the world; and that, no doubt, is
Page 166
why the part played externally by the Cymric race has always been a
secondary one. Destitute of the means of expansion, alien to all idea of
aggression and conquest, little desirous of making its thought prevail
outside itself, it has only known how to retire so far as space has permitted,
and then, at bay in its last place of retreat, to make an invincible resistance
to its enemies. Its very fidelity has been a useless devotion. Stubborn of
submission and ever behind the age, it is faithful to its conquerors when its
conquerors are no longer faithful to themselves. It was the last to defend its
religious independence against Rome—and it has become the staunchest
stronghold of Catholicism; it was the last in France to defend its political
independence against the king—and it has given to the world the last
royalists.
Thus the Celtic race has worn itself out in resistance to its time, and in
the defence of desperate causes. It does not seem as though in any epoch it
had any aptitude for political life. The spirit of family stifled within it all
attempts at more extended organisation. Moreover, it does not appear that
the peoples which form it are by themselves susceptible of progress. To
them life appears as a fixed condition, which man has no power to alter.
Endowed with little initiative, too much inclined to look upon themselves as
minors and in tutelage, they are quick to believe in destiny and resign
themselves to it. Seeing how little audacious they are against God, one
would scarcely believe this race to be the daughter of Japhet.
Thence ensues its sadness. Take the songs of its bards of the sixth
century; they weep more defeats than they sing victories. Its history is itself
only one long lament; it still recalls its exiles, its flights across the seas. If at
times it seems to be cheerful, a tear is not slow to glisten behind its smile; it
does not know that strange forgetfulness of human conditions and destinies
which is called gaiety. Its songs of joy end as elegies; there is nothing to
equal the delicious sadness of its national melodies. One might call them
secondary one. Destitute of the means of expansion, alien to all idea of
aggression and conquest, little desirous of making its thought prevail
outside itself, it has only known how to retire so far as space has permitted,
and then, at bay in its last place of retreat, to make an invincible resistance
to its enemies. Its very fidelity has been a useless devotion. Stubborn of
submission and ever behind the age, it is faithful to its conquerors when its
conquerors are no longer faithful to themselves. It was the last to defend its
religious independence against Rome—and it has become the staunchest
stronghold of Catholicism; it was the last in France to defend its political
independence against the king—and it has given to the world the last
royalists.
Thus the Celtic race has worn itself out in resistance to its time, and in
the defence of desperate causes. It does not seem as though in any epoch it
had any aptitude for political life. The spirit of family stifled within it all
attempts at more extended organisation. Moreover, it does not appear that
the peoples which form it are by themselves susceptible of progress. To
them life appears as a fixed condition, which man has no power to alter.
Endowed with little initiative, too much inclined to look upon themselves as
minors and in tutelage, they are quick to believe in destiny and resign
themselves to it. Seeing how little audacious they are against God, one
would scarcely believe this race to be the daughter of Japhet.
Thence ensues its sadness. Take the songs of its bards of the sixth
century; they weep more defeats than they sing victories. Its history is itself
only one long lament; it still recalls its exiles, its flights across the seas. If at
times it seems to be cheerful, a tear is not slow to glisten behind its smile; it
does not know that strange forgetfulness of human conditions and destinies
which is called gaiety. Its songs of joy end as elegies; there is nothing to
equal the delicious sadness of its national melodies. One might call them
Page 167
emanations from on high which, falling drop by drop upon the soul, pass
through it like memories of another world. Never have men feasted so long
upon these solitary delights of the spirit, these poetic memories which
simultaneously intercross all the sensations of life, so vague, so deep, so
penetrative, that one might die from them, without being able to say
whether it was from bitterness or sweetness.
The infinite delicacy of feeling which characterises the Celtic race is
closely allied to its need of concentration. Natures that are little capable of
expansion are nearly always those that feel most deeply, for the deeper the
feeling, the less it tends to express itself. Thence we have that charming
shamefastness, that veiled and exquisite sobriety, equally far removed from
the sentimental rhetoric too familiar to the Latin races, and the reflective
simplicity of Germany, which are so admirably displayed in the ballads
published by M. de la Villemarque. The apparent reserve of the Celtic
peoples, often taken for coldness, is due to this inward timidity which
makes them believe that a feeling loses half its value if it be expressed; and
that the heart ought to have no other spectator than itself.
If it be permitted us to assign sex to nations as to individuals, we should
have to say without hesitance that the Celtic race, especially with regard to
its Cymric or Breton branch, is an essentially feminine race. No human
family, I believe, has carried so much mystery into love. No other has
conceived with more delicacy the ideal of woman, or been more fully
dominated by it. It is a sort of intoxication, a madness, a vertigo. Read the
strange Mabinogi of Peredur, or its French imitation Parceval le Gallois; its
pages are, as it were, dewy with feminine sentiment. Woman appears
therein as a kind of vague vision, an intermediary between man and the
supernatural world. I am acquainted with no literature that offers anything
analogous to this. Compare Guinevere or Iseult with those Scandinavian
furies Gudrun and Chrimhilde, and you will avow that woman such as
through it like memories of another world. Never have men feasted so long
upon these solitary delights of the spirit, these poetic memories which
simultaneously intercross all the sensations of life, so vague, so deep, so
penetrative, that one might die from them, without being able to say
whether it was from bitterness or sweetness.
The infinite delicacy of feeling which characterises the Celtic race is
closely allied to its need of concentration. Natures that are little capable of
expansion are nearly always those that feel most deeply, for the deeper the
feeling, the less it tends to express itself. Thence we have that charming
shamefastness, that veiled and exquisite sobriety, equally far removed from
the sentimental rhetoric too familiar to the Latin races, and the reflective
simplicity of Germany, which are so admirably displayed in the ballads
published by M. de la Villemarque. The apparent reserve of the Celtic
peoples, often taken for coldness, is due to this inward timidity which
makes them believe that a feeling loses half its value if it be expressed; and
that the heart ought to have no other spectator than itself.
If it be permitted us to assign sex to nations as to individuals, we should
have to say without hesitance that the Celtic race, especially with regard to
its Cymric or Breton branch, is an essentially feminine race. No human
family, I believe, has carried so much mystery into love. No other has
conceived with more delicacy the ideal of woman, or been more fully
dominated by it. It is a sort of intoxication, a madness, a vertigo. Read the
strange Mabinogi of Peredur, or its French imitation Parceval le Gallois; its
pages are, as it were, dewy with feminine sentiment. Woman appears
therein as a kind of vague vision, an intermediary between man and the
supernatural world. I am acquainted with no literature that offers anything
analogous to this. Compare Guinevere or Iseult with those Scandinavian
furies Gudrun and Chrimhilde, and you will avow that woman such as
Page 168
chivalry conceived her, an ideal of sweetness and loveliness set up as the
supreme end of life, is a creation neither classical, nor Christian, nor
Teutonic, but in reality Celtic.
Imaginative power is nearly always proportionate to concentration of
feeling, and lack of the external development of life. The limited nature of
Greek and Italian imagination is due to the easy expansiveness of the
peoples of the South, with whom the soul, wholly spread abroad, reflects
but little within itself. Compared with the classical imagination, the Celtic
imagination is indeed the infinite contrasted with the finite. In the fine
Mabinogi of the Dream of Maxem Wledig, the Emperor Maximus beholds
in a dream a young maiden so beautiful, that on waking he declares he
cannot live without her. For several years his envoys scour the world in
search of her; at last she is discovered in Brittany. So is it with the Celtic
race; it has worn itself out in taking dreams for realities, and in pursuing its
splendid visions. The essential element in the Celt's poetic life is the
adventure—that is to say, the pursuit of the unknown, an endless quest after
an object ever flying from desire. It was of this that St. Brandan dreamed,
that Peredur sought with his mystic chivalry, that Knight Owen asked of his
subterranean journeyings. This race desires the infinite, it thirsts for it, and
pursues it at all costs, beyond the tomb, beyond hell itself. The
characteristic failing of the Breton peoples, the tendency to drunkenness—a
failing which, according to the traditions of the sixth century, was the cause
of their disasters—is due to this invincible need of illusion. Do not say that
it is an appetite for gross enjoyment; never has there been a people more
sober and more alien to all sensuality. No, the Bretons sought in mead what
Owen, St. Brandan, and Peredur sought in their own way,—the vision of the
invisible world. To this day in Ireland drunkenness forms a part of all
Saint's Day festivals—that is to say, the festivals which best have retained
their national and popular aspect.
supreme end of life, is a creation neither classical, nor Christian, nor
Teutonic, but in reality Celtic.
Imaginative power is nearly always proportionate to concentration of
feeling, and lack of the external development of life. The limited nature of
Greek and Italian imagination is due to the easy expansiveness of the
peoples of the South, with whom the soul, wholly spread abroad, reflects
but little within itself. Compared with the classical imagination, the Celtic
imagination is indeed the infinite contrasted with the finite. In the fine
Mabinogi of the Dream of Maxem Wledig, the Emperor Maximus beholds
in a dream a young maiden so beautiful, that on waking he declares he
cannot live without her. For several years his envoys scour the world in
search of her; at last she is discovered in Brittany. So is it with the Celtic
race; it has worn itself out in taking dreams for realities, and in pursuing its
splendid visions. The essential element in the Celt's poetic life is the
adventure—that is to say, the pursuit of the unknown, an endless quest after
an object ever flying from desire. It was of this that St. Brandan dreamed,
that Peredur sought with his mystic chivalry, that Knight Owen asked of his
subterranean journeyings. This race desires the infinite, it thirsts for it, and
pursues it at all costs, beyond the tomb, beyond hell itself. The
characteristic failing of the Breton peoples, the tendency to drunkenness—a
failing which, according to the traditions of the sixth century, was the cause
of their disasters—is due to this invincible need of illusion. Do not say that
it is an appetite for gross enjoyment; never has there been a people more
sober and more alien to all sensuality. No, the Bretons sought in mead what
Owen, St. Brandan, and Peredur sought in their own way,—the vision of the
invisible world. To this day in Ireland drunkenness forms a part of all
Saint's Day festivals—that is to say, the festivals which best have retained
their national and popular aspect.
Page 169
Thence arises the profound sense of the future and of the eternal destinies
of his race, which has ever borne up the Cymry, and kept him young still
beside his conquerors who have grown old. Thence that dogma of the
resurrection of the heroes, which appears to have been one of those that
Christianity found most difficulty in rooting out. Thence Celtic Messianism,
that belief in a future avenger who shall restore Cambria, and deliver her
out of the hands of her oppressors, like the mysterious Leminok promised
by Merlin, the Lez- Breiz of the Armoricans, the Arthur of the Welsh.
[Footnote: M. Augustin Thierry has finely remarked that the renown
attaching to Welsh prophecies in the Middle Ages was due to their
steadfastness in affirming the future of their race. (Histoire de la Conquete
d'Angleterre.)] The hand that arose from the mere, when the sword of
Arthur fell therein, that seized it, and brandished it thrice, is the hope of the
Celtic races. It is thus that little peoples dowered with imagination revenge
themselves on their conquerors. Feeling themselves to be strong inwardly
and weak outwardly, they protest, they exult; and such a strife unloosing
their might, renders them capable of miracles. Nearly all great appeals to
the supernatural are due to peoples hoping against all hope. Who shall say
what in our own times has fermented in the bosom of the most stubborn, the
most powerless of nationalities—Poland? Israel in humiliation dreamed of
the spiritual conquest of the world, and the dream has come to pass.
II
At a first glance the literature of Wales is divided into three perfectly
distinct distinct branches: the bardic or lyric, which shines forth in
splendour in the sixth century by the works of Taliessin, of Aneurin, and of
Liware'h Hen, and continues through an uninterrupted series of imitations
up to modern times; the Mabinogion, or literature of romance, fixed
towards the twelfth century, but linking themselves in the groundwork of
their ideas with the remotest ages of the Celtic genius; finally, an
of his race, which has ever borne up the Cymry, and kept him young still
beside his conquerors who have grown old. Thence that dogma of the
resurrection of the heroes, which appears to have been one of those that
Christianity found most difficulty in rooting out. Thence Celtic Messianism,
that belief in a future avenger who shall restore Cambria, and deliver her
out of the hands of her oppressors, like the mysterious Leminok promised
by Merlin, the Lez- Breiz of the Armoricans, the Arthur of the Welsh.
[Footnote: M. Augustin Thierry has finely remarked that the renown
attaching to Welsh prophecies in the Middle Ages was due to their
steadfastness in affirming the future of their race. (Histoire de la Conquete
d'Angleterre.)] The hand that arose from the mere, when the sword of
Arthur fell therein, that seized it, and brandished it thrice, is the hope of the
Celtic races. It is thus that little peoples dowered with imagination revenge
themselves on their conquerors. Feeling themselves to be strong inwardly
and weak outwardly, they protest, they exult; and such a strife unloosing
their might, renders them capable of miracles. Nearly all great appeals to
the supernatural are due to peoples hoping against all hope. Who shall say
what in our own times has fermented in the bosom of the most stubborn, the
most powerless of nationalities—Poland? Israel in humiliation dreamed of
the spiritual conquest of the world, and the dream has come to pass.
II
At a first glance the literature of Wales is divided into three perfectly
distinct distinct branches: the bardic or lyric, which shines forth in
splendour in the sixth century by the works of Taliessin, of Aneurin, and of
Liware'h Hen, and continues through an uninterrupted series of imitations
up to modern times; the Mabinogion, or literature of romance, fixed
towards the twelfth century, but linking themselves in the groundwork of
their ideas with the remotest ages of the Celtic genius; finally, an
Page 170
ecclesiastical and legendary literature, impressed with a distinct stamp of its
own. These three literatures seem to have existed side by side, almost
without knowledge of one another. The bards, proud of their solemn
rhetoric, held in disdain the popular tales, the form of which they
considered careless; on the other hand, both bards and romancers appear to
have had few relations with the clergy; and one at times might be tempted
to suppose that they ignored the existence of Christianity. To our thinking it
is in the Mabinogion that the true expression of the Celtic genius is to be
sought; and it is surprising that so curious a literature, the source of nearly
all the romantic creations of Europe, should have remained unknown until
our own days. The cause is doubtless to be ascribed to the dispersed state of
the Welsh manuscripts, pursued till last century by the English, as seditious
books compromising those who possessed them. Often too they fell into
hands of ignorant owners whose caprice or ill-will sufficed to keep them
from critical research.
The Mabinogion have been preserved for us in two principal documents
—one of the thirteenth century from the library of Hengurt, belonging to the
Vaughan family; the other dating from the fourteenth century, known under
the name of the Red Book of Hergest, and now in Jesus College, Oxford.
No doubt it was some such collection that charmed the weary hours of the
hapless Leolin in the Tower of London, and was burned after his
condemnation, with the other Welsh books which had been the companions
of his captivity. Lady Charlotte Guest has based her edition on the Oxford
manuscript; it cannot be sufficiently regretted that paltry considerations
have caused her to be refused the use of the earlier manuscript, of which the
later appears to be only a copy. Regrets are redoubled when one knows that
several Welsh texts, which were seen and copied fifty years ago, have now
disappeared. It is in the presence of facts such as these that one comes to
believe that revolutions—in general so destructive of the works of the past
—are favourable to the preservation of literary monuments, by compelling
own. These three literatures seem to have existed side by side, almost
without knowledge of one another. The bards, proud of their solemn
rhetoric, held in disdain the popular tales, the form of which they
considered careless; on the other hand, both bards and romancers appear to
have had few relations with the clergy; and one at times might be tempted
to suppose that they ignored the existence of Christianity. To our thinking it
is in the Mabinogion that the true expression of the Celtic genius is to be
sought; and it is surprising that so curious a literature, the source of nearly
all the romantic creations of Europe, should have remained unknown until
our own days. The cause is doubtless to be ascribed to the dispersed state of
the Welsh manuscripts, pursued till last century by the English, as seditious
books compromising those who possessed them. Often too they fell into
hands of ignorant owners whose caprice or ill-will sufficed to keep them
from critical research.
The Mabinogion have been preserved for us in two principal documents
—one of the thirteenth century from the library of Hengurt, belonging to the
Vaughan family; the other dating from the fourteenth century, known under
the name of the Red Book of Hergest, and now in Jesus College, Oxford.
No doubt it was some such collection that charmed the weary hours of the
hapless Leolin in the Tower of London, and was burned after his
condemnation, with the other Welsh books which had been the companions
of his captivity. Lady Charlotte Guest has based her edition on the Oxford
manuscript; it cannot be sufficiently regretted that paltry considerations
have caused her to be refused the use of the earlier manuscript, of which the
later appears to be only a copy. Regrets are redoubled when one knows that
several Welsh texts, which were seen and copied fifty years ago, have now
disappeared. It is in the presence of facts such as these that one comes to
believe that revolutions—in general so destructive of the works of the past
—are favourable to the preservation of literary monuments, by compelling
Page 171
their concentration in great centres, where their existence, as well as their
publicity, is assured.
The general tone of the Mabinogion is rather romantic than epic. Life is
treated naively and not too emphatically. The hero's individuality is
limitless. We have free and noble natures acting in all their spontaneity.
Each man appears as a kind of demi-god characterised by a supernatural
gift. This gift is nearly always connected with some miraculous object,
which in some measure is the personal seal of him who possesses it. The
inferior classes, which this people of heroes necessarily supposes beneath it,
scarcely show themselves, except in the exercise of some trade, for
practising which they are held in high esteem. The somewhat complicated
products of human industry are regarded as living beings, and in their
manner endowed with magical properties. A multiplicity of celebrated
objects have proper names, such as the drinking-cup, the lance, the sword,
and the shield of Arthur; the chess-board of Gwendolen, on which the black
pieces played of their own accord against the white; the horn of Bran Galed,
where one found whatever liquor one desired; the chariot of Morgan, which
directed itself to the place to which one wished to go; the pot of Tyrnog,
which would not cook when meat for a coward was put into it; the
grindstone of Tudwal, which would only sharpen brave men's swords; the
coat of Padarn, which none save a noble could don; and the mantle of
Tegan, which no woman could put upon herself were she not above
reproach. [Footnote: Here may be recognised the origin of trial by court
mantle, one of the most interesting episodes in Lancelot of the Lake.] The
animal is conceived in a still more individual way; it has a proper name,
personal qualities, and a role which it develops at its own will and with full
consciousness. The same hero appears as at once man and animal, without it
being possible to trace the line of demarcation between the two natures.
publicity, is assured.
The general tone of the Mabinogion is rather romantic than epic. Life is
treated naively and not too emphatically. The hero's individuality is
limitless. We have free and noble natures acting in all their spontaneity.
Each man appears as a kind of demi-god characterised by a supernatural
gift. This gift is nearly always connected with some miraculous object,
which in some measure is the personal seal of him who possesses it. The
inferior classes, which this people of heroes necessarily supposes beneath it,
scarcely show themselves, except in the exercise of some trade, for
practising which they are held in high esteem. The somewhat complicated
products of human industry are regarded as living beings, and in their
manner endowed with magical properties. A multiplicity of celebrated
objects have proper names, such as the drinking-cup, the lance, the sword,
and the shield of Arthur; the chess-board of Gwendolen, on which the black
pieces played of their own accord against the white; the horn of Bran Galed,
where one found whatever liquor one desired; the chariot of Morgan, which
directed itself to the place to which one wished to go; the pot of Tyrnog,
which would not cook when meat for a coward was put into it; the
grindstone of Tudwal, which would only sharpen brave men's swords; the
coat of Padarn, which none save a noble could don; and the mantle of
Tegan, which no woman could put upon herself were she not above
reproach. [Footnote: Here may be recognised the origin of trial by court
mantle, one of the most interesting episodes in Lancelot of the Lake.] The
animal is conceived in a still more individual way; it has a proper name,
personal qualities, and a role which it develops at its own will and with full
consciousness. The same hero appears as at once man and animal, without it
being possible to trace the line of demarcation between the two natures.
Page 172
The tale of Kilhwch and Olwen, the most extraordinary of the
Mabinogion, deals with Arthur's struggle against the wild-boar king Twrch
Trwyth, who with his seven cubs holds in check all the heroes of the Round
Table. The adventures of the three hundred ravens of Kerverhenn similarly
form the subject of the Dream of Rhonabwy. The idea of moral merit and
demerit is almost wholly absent from all these compositions. There are
wicked beings who insult ladies, who tyrannise over their neighbours, who
only find pleasure in evil because such is their nature; but it does not appear
that they incur wrath on that account. Arthur's knights pursue them, not as
criminals but as mischievous fellows. All other beings are perfectly good
and just, but more or less richly gifted. This is the dream of an amiable and
gentle race which looks upon evil as being the work of destiny, and not a
product of the human conscience. All nature is enchanted, and fruitful as
imagination itself in indefinitely varied creations. Christianity rarely
discloses itself; although at times its proximity can be felt, it alters in no
respect the purely natural surroundings in which everything takes place. A
bishop figures at table beside Arthur, but his function is strictly limited to
blessing the dishes. The Irish saints, who at one time present themselves to
give their benediction to Arthur and receive favours at his hands, are
portrayed as a race of men vaguely known and difficult to understand. No
mediaeval literature held itself further removed from all monastic influence.
We evidently must suppose that the Welsh bards and story-tellers lived in a
state of great isolation from the clergy, and had their culture and traditions
quite apart.
The charm of the Mabinogion principally resides in the amiable serenity
of the Celtic mind, neither sad nor gay, ever in suspense between a smile
and a tear. We have in them the simple recital of a child, unwitting of any
distinction between the noble and the common; there is something of that
softly animated world, of that calm and tranquil ideal to which Ariosto's
stanzas transport us. The chatter of the later mediaeval French and German
Mabinogion, deals with Arthur's struggle against the wild-boar king Twrch
Trwyth, who with his seven cubs holds in check all the heroes of the Round
Table. The adventures of the three hundred ravens of Kerverhenn similarly
form the subject of the Dream of Rhonabwy. The idea of moral merit and
demerit is almost wholly absent from all these compositions. There are
wicked beings who insult ladies, who tyrannise over their neighbours, who
only find pleasure in evil because such is their nature; but it does not appear
that they incur wrath on that account. Arthur's knights pursue them, not as
criminals but as mischievous fellows. All other beings are perfectly good
and just, but more or less richly gifted. This is the dream of an amiable and
gentle race which looks upon evil as being the work of destiny, and not a
product of the human conscience. All nature is enchanted, and fruitful as
imagination itself in indefinitely varied creations. Christianity rarely
discloses itself; although at times its proximity can be felt, it alters in no
respect the purely natural surroundings in which everything takes place. A
bishop figures at table beside Arthur, but his function is strictly limited to
blessing the dishes. The Irish saints, who at one time present themselves to
give their benediction to Arthur and receive favours at his hands, are
portrayed as a race of men vaguely known and difficult to understand. No
mediaeval literature held itself further removed from all monastic influence.
We evidently must suppose that the Welsh bards and story-tellers lived in a
state of great isolation from the clergy, and had their culture and traditions
quite apart.
The charm of the Mabinogion principally resides in the amiable serenity
of the Celtic mind, neither sad nor gay, ever in suspense between a smile
and a tear. We have in them the simple recital of a child, unwitting of any
distinction between the noble and the common; there is something of that
softly animated world, of that calm and tranquil ideal to which Ariosto's
stanzas transport us. The chatter of the later mediaeval French and German
Page 173
imitators can give no idea of this charming manner of narration. The skilful
Chretien de Troyes himself remains in this respect far below the Welsh
story- tellers, and as for Wolfram of Eschenbach, it must be avowed that the
joy of the first discovery has carried German critics too far in the
exaggeration of his merits. He loses himself in interminable descriptions,
and almost completely ignores the art of his recital.
What strikes one at a first glance in the imaginative compositions of the
Celtic races, above all when they are contrasted with those of the Teutonic
races, is the extreme mildness of manners pervading them. There are none
of those frightful vengeances which fill the Edda and the Niebelungen.
Compare the Teutonic with the Gaelic hero,—Beowulf with Peredur, for
example. What a difference there is! In the one all the horror of disgusting
and blood-embrued barbarism, the drunkenness of carnage, the disinterested
taste, if I may say so, for destruction and death; in the other a profound
sense of justice, a great height of personal pride it is true, but also a great
capacity for devotion, an exquisite loyalty. The tyrannical man, the monster,
the Black Man, find a place here like the Lestrigons and the Cyclops of
Homer only to inspire horror by contrast with softer manners; they are
almost what the wicked man is in the naive imagination of a child brought
up by a mother in the ideas of a gentle and pious morality. The primitive
man of Teutonism is revolting by his purposeless brutality, by a love of evil
that only gives him skill and strength in the service of hatred and injury.
The Cymric hero on the other hand, even in his wildest flights, seems
possessed by habits of kindness and a warm sympathy with the weakv.
Sympathy indeed is one of the deepest feelings among the Celtic peoples.
Even Judas is not denied a share of their pity. St. Brandan found him upon a
rock in the midst of the Polar seas; once a week he passes a day there to
refresh himself from the fires of hell. A cloak that he had given to a beggar
is hung before him, and tempers his sufferings.
Chretien de Troyes himself remains in this respect far below the Welsh
story- tellers, and as for Wolfram of Eschenbach, it must be avowed that the
joy of the first discovery has carried German critics too far in the
exaggeration of his merits. He loses himself in interminable descriptions,
and almost completely ignores the art of his recital.
What strikes one at a first glance in the imaginative compositions of the
Celtic races, above all when they are contrasted with those of the Teutonic
races, is the extreme mildness of manners pervading them. There are none
of those frightful vengeances which fill the Edda and the Niebelungen.
Compare the Teutonic with the Gaelic hero,—Beowulf with Peredur, for
example. What a difference there is! In the one all the horror of disgusting
and blood-embrued barbarism, the drunkenness of carnage, the disinterested
taste, if I may say so, for destruction and death; in the other a profound
sense of justice, a great height of personal pride it is true, but also a great
capacity for devotion, an exquisite loyalty. The tyrannical man, the monster,
the Black Man, find a place here like the Lestrigons and the Cyclops of
Homer only to inspire horror by contrast with softer manners; they are
almost what the wicked man is in the naive imagination of a child brought
up by a mother in the ideas of a gentle and pious morality. The primitive
man of Teutonism is revolting by his purposeless brutality, by a love of evil
that only gives him skill and strength in the service of hatred and injury.
The Cymric hero on the other hand, even in his wildest flights, seems
possessed by habits of kindness and a warm sympathy with the weakv.
Sympathy indeed is one of the deepest feelings among the Celtic peoples.
Even Judas is not denied a share of their pity. St. Brandan found him upon a
rock in the midst of the Polar seas; once a week he passes a day there to
refresh himself from the fires of hell. A cloak that he had given to a beggar
is hung before him, and tempers his sufferings.
Page 174
If Wales has a right to be proud of her Mabinogion, she has not less to
felicitate herself in having found a translator truly worthy of interpreting
them. For the proper understanding of these original beauties there was
needed a delicate appreciation of Welsh narration, and an intelligence of the
naive order, qualities of which an erudite translator would with difficulty
have been capable. To render these gracious imaginings of a people so
eminently dowered with feminine tact, the pen of a woman was necessary.
Simple, animated, without effort and without vulgarity, Lady Guest's
translation is a faithful mirror of the original Cymric. Even supposing that,
as regards philology, the labours of this noble Welsh lady be destined to
receive improvement, that does not prevent her book from for ever
remaining a work of erudition and highly distinguished taste. [Footnote: M.
de la Villemarque published in 1843 under the title of Cantes populaires des
anciens Bretons, a French translation of the narratives that Guest had
already presented in English at that time.]
The Mabinogion, or at least the writings which Lady Guest thought she
ought to include under this common name, divide themselves into two
perfectly distinct classes—some connected exclusively with the two
peninsulas of Wales and Cornwall, and relating to the heroic personality of
Arthur; the others alien to Arthur, having for their scene not only the parts
of England that have remained Cymric, but the whole of Great Britain, and
leading us back by the persons and traditions mentioned in them to the later
years of the Roman occupation. The second class, of greater antiquity than
the first, at least on the ground of subject, is also distinguished by a much
more mythological character, a bolder use of the miraculous, an enigmatical
form, a style full of alliteration and plays upon words. Of this number are
the tales of Pwyll, of Bramwen, of Manawyddan, of Math the son of
Mathonwy, the Dream of the Emperor Maximus, the story of Llud and
Llewelys, and the legend of Taliessin. To the Arthurian cycle belong the
narratives of Owen, of Geraint, of Peredur, of Kilhwch and Olwen, and the
felicitate herself in having found a translator truly worthy of interpreting
them. For the proper understanding of these original beauties there was
needed a delicate appreciation of Welsh narration, and an intelligence of the
naive order, qualities of which an erudite translator would with difficulty
have been capable. To render these gracious imaginings of a people so
eminently dowered with feminine tact, the pen of a woman was necessary.
Simple, animated, without effort and without vulgarity, Lady Guest's
translation is a faithful mirror of the original Cymric. Even supposing that,
as regards philology, the labours of this noble Welsh lady be destined to
receive improvement, that does not prevent her book from for ever
remaining a work of erudition and highly distinguished taste. [Footnote: M.
de la Villemarque published in 1843 under the title of Cantes populaires des
anciens Bretons, a French translation of the narratives that Guest had
already presented in English at that time.]
The Mabinogion, or at least the writings which Lady Guest thought she
ought to include under this common name, divide themselves into two
perfectly distinct classes—some connected exclusively with the two
peninsulas of Wales and Cornwall, and relating to the heroic personality of
Arthur; the others alien to Arthur, having for their scene not only the parts
of England that have remained Cymric, but the whole of Great Britain, and
leading us back by the persons and traditions mentioned in them to the later
years of the Roman occupation. The second class, of greater antiquity than
the first, at least on the ground of subject, is also distinguished by a much
more mythological character, a bolder use of the miraculous, an enigmatical
form, a style full of alliteration and plays upon words. Of this number are
the tales of Pwyll, of Bramwen, of Manawyddan, of Math the son of
Mathonwy, the Dream of the Emperor Maximus, the story of Llud and
Llewelys, and the legend of Taliessin. To the Arthurian cycle belong the
narratives of Owen, of Geraint, of Peredur, of Kilhwch and Olwen, and the
Page 175
Dream of Rhonabwy. It is also to be remarked that the two last-named
narratives have a particularly antique character. In them Arthur dwells in
Cornwall, and not as in the others at Caerleon on the Usk. In them he
appears with an individual character, hunting and taking a personal part in
warfare, while in the more modern tales he is only an emperor all- powerful
and impassive, a truly sluggard hero, around whom a pleiad of active heroes
groups itself. The Mabinogi of Kilhwch and Olwen, by its entirely primitive
aspect, by the part played in it by the wild-boar in conformity to the spirit of
Celtic mythology, by the wholly supernatural and magical character of the
narration, by innumerable allusions the sense of which escapes us, forms a
cycle by itself. It represents for us the Cymric conception in all its purity,
before it had been modified by the introduction of any foreign element.
Without attempting here to analyse this curious poem, I should like by some
extracts to make its antique aspect and high originality apparent.
Kilhwch, the son of Kilydd, prince of Kelyddon, having heard some one
mention the name of Olwen, daughter of Yspaddaden Penkawr, falls
violently in love, without having ever seen her. He goes to find Arthur, that
he may ask for his aid in the difficult undertaking which he meditates; in
point of fact, he does not know in what country the fair one of his affection
dwells. Yspaddaden is besides a frightful tyrant who suffers no man to go
from his castle alive, and whose death is linked by destiny to the marriage
of his daughter. [Footnote: The idea of making the death of the father the
condition of possession of the daughter is to be found in several romances
of the Breton cycle, in Lancelot for example.] Arthur grants Kilhwch some
of his most valiant comrades in arms to assist him in this enterprise. After
wonderful adventures the knights arrive at the castle of Yspaddaden, and
succeed in seeing the young maiden of Kilhwch's dream. Only after three
days of persistent struggle do they manage to obtain a response from
Olwen's father, who attaches his daughter's hand to conditions apparently
impossible of realisation. The performance of these trials makes a long
narratives have a particularly antique character. In them Arthur dwells in
Cornwall, and not as in the others at Caerleon on the Usk. In them he
appears with an individual character, hunting and taking a personal part in
warfare, while in the more modern tales he is only an emperor all- powerful
and impassive, a truly sluggard hero, around whom a pleiad of active heroes
groups itself. The Mabinogi of Kilhwch and Olwen, by its entirely primitive
aspect, by the part played in it by the wild-boar in conformity to the spirit of
Celtic mythology, by the wholly supernatural and magical character of the
narration, by innumerable allusions the sense of which escapes us, forms a
cycle by itself. It represents for us the Cymric conception in all its purity,
before it had been modified by the introduction of any foreign element.
Without attempting here to analyse this curious poem, I should like by some
extracts to make its antique aspect and high originality apparent.
Kilhwch, the son of Kilydd, prince of Kelyddon, having heard some one
mention the name of Olwen, daughter of Yspaddaden Penkawr, falls
violently in love, without having ever seen her. He goes to find Arthur, that
he may ask for his aid in the difficult undertaking which he meditates; in
point of fact, he does not know in what country the fair one of his affection
dwells. Yspaddaden is besides a frightful tyrant who suffers no man to go
from his castle alive, and whose death is linked by destiny to the marriage
of his daughter. [Footnote: The idea of making the death of the father the
condition of possession of the daughter is to be found in several romances
of the Breton cycle, in Lancelot for example.] Arthur grants Kilhwch some
of his most valiant comrades in arms to assist him in this enterprise. After
wonderful adventures the knights arrive at the castle of Yspaddaden, and
succeed in seeing the young maiden of Kilhwch's dream. Only after three
days of persistent struggle do they manage to obtain a response from
Olwen's father, who attaches his daughter's hand to conditions apparently
impossible of realisation. The performance of these trials makes a long
Page 176
chain of adventures, the framework of a veritable romantic epic which has
come to us in a very fragmentary form. Of the thirty-eight adventures
imposed on Kilhwch the manuscript used by Lady Guest only relates seven
or eight. I choose at random one of these narratives, which appears to me
fitted to give an idea of the whole composition. It deals with the finding of
Mabon the son of Modron, who was carried away from his mother three
days after his birth, and whose deliverance is one of the labours exacted of
Kilhwch.
"His followers said unto Arthur, 'Lord, go thou home; thou canst not
proceed with thy host in quest of such small adventures as these.' Then said
Arthur, 'It were well for thee, Gwrhyr Gwalstawd Ieithoedd, to go upon this
quest, for thou knowest all languages, and art familiar with those of the
birds and the beasts. Thou, Eidoel, oughtest likewise to go with my men in
search of thy cousin. And as for you, Kai and Bedwyr, I have hope of
whatever adventure ye are in quest of, that ye will achieve it. Achieve ye
this adventure for me.'"
They went forward until they came to the Ousel of Cilgwri. And Gwrhyr
adjured her for the sake of Heaven, saying, "Tell me if thou knowest aught
of Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken when three nights old from
between his mother and the wall." And the Ousel answered, "When I first
came here there was a smith's anvil in this place, and I was then a young
bird; and from that time no work has been done upon it, save the pecking of
my beak every evening, and now there is not so much as the size of a nut
remaining thereof; yet all the vengeance of Heaven be upon me, if during
all that time I have ever heard of the man for whom you enquire.
Nevertheless I will do that which is right, and that which it is fitting I
should do for an embassy from Arthur. There is a race of animals who were
formed before me, and I will be your guide to them."
come to us in a very fragmentary form. Of the thirty-eight adventures
imposed on Kilhwch the manuscript used by Lady Guest only relates seven
or eight. I choose at random one of these narratives, which appears to me
fitted to give an idea of the whole composition. It deals with the finding of
Mabon the son of Modron, who was carried away from his mother three
days after his birth, and whose deliverance is one of the labours exacted of
Kilhwch.
"His followers said unto Arthur, 'Lord, go thou home; thou canst not
proceed with thy host in quest of such small adventures as these.' Then said
Arthur, 'It were well for thee, Gwrhyr Gwalstawd Ieithoedd, to go upon this
quest, for thou knowest all languages, and art familiar with those of the
birds and the beasts. Thou, Eidoel, oughtest likewise to go with my men in
search of thy cousin. And as for you, Kai and Bedwyr, I have hope of
whatever adventure ye are in quest of, that ye will achieve it. Achieve ye
this adventure for me.'"
They went forward until they came to the Ousel of Cilgwri. And Gwrhyr
adjured her for the sake of Heaven, saying, "Tell me if thou knowest aught
of Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken when three nights old from
between his mother and the wall." And the Ousel answered, "When I first
came here there was a smith's anvil in this place, and I was then a young
bird; and from that time no work has been done upon it, save the pecking of
my beak every evening, and now there is not so much as the size of a nut
remaining thereof; yet all the vengeance of Heaven be upon me, if during
all that time I have ever heard of the man for whom you enquire.
Nevertheless I will do that which is right, and that which it is fitting I
should do for an embassy from Arthur. There is a race of animals who were
formed before me, and I will be your guide to them."
Page 177
So they proceeded to the place where was the Stag of Redynvre. "Stag of
Redynvre, behold we are come to thee, an embassy from Arthur, for we
have not heard of any animal older than thou. Say, knowest thou aught of
Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken from his mother when three
nights old?" The Stag said, "When first I came hither there was a plain all
around me, without any trees save one oak sapling, which grew up to be an
oak with an hundred branches. And that oak has since perished, so that now
nothing remains of it but the withered stump; and from that day to this I
have been here, yet have I never heard of the man for whom you enquire.
Nevertheless, being an embassy from Arthur, I will be your guide to the
place where there is an animal which was formed before I was."
So they proceeded to the place where was the Owl of Cwm Cawlwyd.
"Owl of Cwm Cawlwyd, here is an embassy from Arthur; knowest thou
aught of Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken after three nights from
his mother?" "If I knew I would tell you. When first I came hither, the wide
valley you see was a wooded glen. And a race of men came and rooted it
up. And there grew there a second wood; and this wood is the third. My
wings, are they not withered stumps? Yet all this time, even until to-day, I
have never heard of the man for whom you enquire. Nevertheless I will be
the guide of Arthur's embassy until you come to the place where is the
oldest animal in the world, and the one that has travelled most, the Eagle of
Gwern Abwy."
Gwrhyr said, "Eagle of Gwern Abwy, we have come to thee an embassy
from Arthur, to ask thee if thou knowest aught of Mabon the son of
Modron, who was taken from his mother when he was three nights old."
The Eagle said, "I have been here for a great space of time, and when I first
came hither there was a rock here, from the top of which I pecked at the
stars every evening; and now it is not so much as a span high. From that day
to this I have been here, and I have never heard of the man for whom you
Redynvre, behold we are come to thee, an embassy from Arthur, for we
have not heard of any animal older than thou. Say, knowest thou aught of
Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken from his mother when three
nights old?" The Stag said, "When first I came hither there was a plain all
around me, without any trees save one oak sapling, which grew up to be an
oak with an hundred branches. And that oak has since perished, so that now
nothing remains of it but the withered stump; and from that day to this I
have been here, yet have I never heard of the man for whom you enquire.
Nevertheless, being an embassy from Arthur, I will be your guide to the
place where there is an animal which was formed before I was."
So they proceeded to the place where was the Owl of Cwm Cawlwyd.
"Owl of Cwm Cawlwyd, here is an embassy from Arthur; knowest thou
aught of Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken after three nights from
his mother?" "If I knew I would tell you. When first I came hither, the wide
valley you see was a wooded glen. And a race of men came and rooted it
up. And there grew there a second wood; and this wood is the third. My
wings, are they not withered stumps? Yet all this time, even until to-day, I
have never heard of the man for whom you enquire. Nevertheless I will be
the guide of Arthur's embassy until you come to the place where is the
oldest animal in the world, and the one that has travelled most, the Eagle of
Gwern Abwy."
Gwrhyr said, "Eagle of Gwern Abwy, we have come to thee an embassy
from Arthur, to ask thee if thou knowest aught of Mabon the son of
Modron, who was taken from his mother when he was three nights old."
The Eagle said, "I have been here for a great space of time, and when I first
came hither there was a rock here, from the top of which I pecked at the
stars every evening; and now it is not so much as a span high. From that day
to this I have been here, and I have never heard of the man for whom you
Page 178
enquire, except once when I went in search of food as far as Llyn Llyw.
And when I came there, I struck my talons into a salmon, thinking he would
serve me as food for a long time. But he drew me into the deep, and I was
scarcely able to escape from him. After that I went with my whole kindred
to attack him, and to try to destroy him, but he sent messengers, and made
peace with me; and came and besought me to take fifty fish spears out of
his back. Unless he know something of him whom you seek, I cannot tell
who may. However, I will guide you to the place where he is."
So they went thither; and the Eagle said, "Salmon of Llyn Llyw, I have
come to thee with an embassy from Arthur, to ask thee if thou knowest
aught concerning Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken away at three
nights old from his mother." "As much as I know I will tell thee. With every
tide I go along the river upwards, until I come near to the walls of
Gloucester, and there have I found such wrong as I never found elsewhere;
and to the end that ye may give credence thereto, let one of you go thither
upon each of my two shoulders." So Kai and Gwrhyr Gwalstawd Ieithoedd
went upon the shoulders of the salmon, and they proceeded until they came
unto the wall of the prison, and they heard a great wailing and lamenting
from the dungeon. Said Gwrhyr, "Who is it that laments in this house of
stone?" "Alas there is reason enough for whoever is here to lament. It is
Mabon the son of Modron who is here imprisoned; and no imprisonment
was ever so grievous as mine, neither that of Lludd Llaw Ereint, nor that of
Greid the son of Eri." "Hast thou hope of being released for gold or for
silver, or for any gifts of wealth, or through battle and fighting?" "By
fighting will whatever I may gain be obtained."
We shall not follow the Cymric hero through trials the result of which
can be foreseen. What, above all else, is striking in these strange legends is
the part played by animals, transformed by the Welsh imagination into
intelligent beings. No race conversed so intimately as did the Celtic race
And when I came there, I struck my talons into a salmon, thinking he would
serve me as food for a long time. But he drew me into the deep, and I was
scarcely able to escape from him. After that I went with my whole kindred
to attack him, and to try to destroy him, but he sent messengers, and made
peace with me; and came and besought me to take fifty fish spears out of
his back. Unless he know something of him whom you seek, I cannot tell
who may. However, I will guide you to the place where he is."
So they went thither; and the Eagle said, "Salmon of Llyn Llyw, I have
come to thee with an embassy from Arthur, to ask thee if thou knowest
aught concerning Mabon the son of Modron, who was taken away at three
nights old from his mother." "As much as I know I will tell thee. With every
tide I go along the river upwards, until I come near to the walls of
Gloucester, and there have I found such wrong as I never found elsewhere;
and to the end that ye may give credence thereto, let one of you go thither
upon each of my two shoulders." So Kai and Gwrhyr Gwalstawd Ieithoedd
went upon the shoulders of the salmon, and they proceeded until they came
unto the wall of the prison, and they heard a great wailing and lamenting
from the dungeon. Said Gwrhyr, "Who is it that laments in this house of
stone?" "Alas there is reason enough for whoever is here to lament. It is
Mabon the son of Modron who is here imprisoned; and no imprisonment
was ever so grievous as mine, neither that of Lludd Llaw Ereint, nor that of
Greid the son of Eri." "Hast thou hope of being released for gold or for
silver, or for any gifts of wealth, or through battle and fighting?" "By
fighting will whatever I may gain be obtained."
We shall not follow the Cymric hero through trials the result of which
can be foreseen. What, above all else, is striking in these strange legends is
the part played by animals, transformed by the Welsh imagination into
intelligent beings. No race conversed so intimately as did the Celtic race
Page 179
with the lower creation, and accorded it so large a share of moral life.
[Footnote: See especially the narratives of Nennius, and of Giraldus
Cambrensis. In them animals have at least as important a part as men.] The
close association of man and animal, the fictions so dear to mediaeval
poetry of the Knight of the Lion, the Knight of the Falcon, the Knight of the
Swan, the vows consecrated by the presence of birds of noble repute, are
equally Breton imaginings. Ecclesiastical literature itself presents analogous
features; gentleness towards animals informs all the legends of the saints of
Brittany and Ireland. One day St. Kevin fell asleep, while he was praying at
his window with outstretched arms; and a swallow perceiving the open
hand of the venerable monk, considered it an excellent place wherein to
make her nest. The saint on awaking saw the mother sitting upon her eggs,
and, loth to disturb her, waited for the little ones to be hatched before he
arose from his knees.
This touching sympathy was derived from the singular vivacity with
which the Celtic races have inspired their feeling for nature. Their
mythology is nothing more than a transparent naturalism, not that
anthropomorphic naturalism of Greece and India, in which the forces of the
universe, viewed as living beings and endowed with consciousness, tend
more and more to detach themselves from physical phenomena, and to
become moral beings; but in some measure a realistic naturalism, the love
of nature for herself, the vivid impression of her magic, accompanied by the
sorrowful feeling that man knows, when, face to face with her, he believes
that he hears her commune with him concerning his origin and his destiny.
The legend of Merlin mirrors this feeling. Seduced by a fairy of the woods,
he flies with her and becomes a savage. Arthur's messengers come upon
him as he is singing by the side of a fountain; he is led back again to court;
but the charm carries him away. He returns to his forests, and this time for
ever. Under a thicket of hawthorn Vivien has built him a magical prison.
There he prophesies the future of the Celtic races; he speaks of a maiden of
[Footnote: See especially the narratives of Nennius, and of Giraldus
Cambrensis. In them animals have at least as important a part as men.] The
close association of man and animal, the fictions so dear to mediaeval
poetry of the Knight of the Lion, the Knight of the Falcon, the Knight of the
Swan, the vows consecrated by the presence of birds of noble repute, are
equally Breton imaginings. Ecclesiastical literature itself presents analogous
features; gentleness towards animals informs all the legends of the saints of
Brittany and Ireland. One day St. Kevin fell asleep, while he was praying at
his window with outstretched arms; and a swallow perceiving the open
hand of the venerable monk, considered it an excellent place wherein to
make her nest. The saint on awaking saw the mother sitting upon her eggs,
and, loth to disturb her, waited for the little ones to be hatched before he
arose from his knees.
This touching sympathy was derived from the singular vivacity with
which the Celtic races have inspired their feeling for nature. Their
mythology is nothing more than a transparent naturalism, not that
anthropomorphic naturalism of Greece and India, in which the forces of the
universe, viewed as living beings and endowed with consciousness, tend
more and more to detach themselves from physical phenomena, and to
become moral beings; but in some measure a realistic naturalism, the love
of nature for herself, the vivid impression of her magic, accompanied by the
sorrowful feeling that man knows, when, face to face with her, he believes
that he hears her commune with him concerning his origin and his destiny.
The legend of Merlin mirrors this feeling. Seduced by a fairy of the woods,
he flies with her and becomes a savage. Arthur's messengers come upon
him as he is singing by the side of a fountain; he is led back again to court;
but the charm carries him away. He returns to his forests, and this time for
ever. Under a thicket of hawthorn Vivien has built him a magical prison.
There he prophesies the future of the Celtic races; he speaks of a maiden of
Page 180
the woods, now visible and now unseen, who holds him captive by her
spells. Several Arthurian legends are impressed with the same character.
Arthur himself in popular belief became, as it were, a woodland spirit. "The
foresters on their nightly round by the light of the moon," says Gervais of
Tilbury, [Footnote: An English chronicler of the twelfth century.] "often
hear a great sound as of horns, and meet bands of huntsmen; when they are
asked whence they come, these huntsmen make reply that they are of King
Arthur's following." [Footnote: This manner of explaining all the unknown
noises of the wood by Arthur's Hunting is still to be found in several
districts. To understand properly the cult of nature, and, if I may say so, of
landscape among the Celts, see Gildas and Nennius, pp. 131, 136, 137, etc.
(Edit. San Marte, Berlin. 1884);] Even the French imitators of the Breton
romances keep an impression—although a rather insipid one—of the
attraction exercised by nature on the Celtic imagination. Elaine, the heroine
of Lancelot, the ideal of Breton perfection, passes her life with her
companions in a garden, in the midst of flowers which she tends. Every
flower culled by her hands is at the instant restored to life; and the
worshippers of her memory are under an obligation, when they cut a flower,
to sow another in its place.
The worship of forest, and fountain, and stone is to be explained by this
primitive naturalism, which all the Councils of the Church held in Brittany
united to proscribe. The stone, in truth, seems the natural symbol of the
Celtic races. It is an immutable witness that has no death. The animal, the
plant, above all the human figure, only express the divine life under a
determinate form; the stone on the contrary, adapted to receive all forms,
has been the fetish of peoples in their childhood. Pausanias saw, still
standing erect, the thirty square stones of Pharse, each bearing the name of
a divinity. The men-hir to be met with over the whole surface of the ancient
world, what is it but the monument of primitive humanity, a living witness
of its faith in Heaven? [Footnote: It is, however, doubtful whether the
spells. Several Arthurian legends are impressed with the same character.
Arthur himself in popular belief became, as it were, a woodland spirit. "The
foresters on their nightly round by the light of the moon," says Gervais of
Tilbury, [Footnote: An English chronicler of the twelfth century.] "often
hear a great sound as of horns, and meet bands of huntsmen; when they are
asked whence they come, these huntsmen make reply that they are of King
Arthur's following." [Footnote: This manner of explaining all the unknown
noises of the wood by Arthur's Hunting is still to be found in several
districts. To understand properly the cult of nature, and, if I may say so, of
landscape among the Celts, see Gildas and Nennius, pp. 131, 136, 137, etc.
(Edit. San Marte, Berlin. 1884);] Even the French imitators of the Breton
romances keep an impression—although a rather insipid one—of the
attraction exercised by nature on the Celtic imagination. Elaine, the heroine
of Lancelot, the ideal of Breton perfection, passes her life with her
companions in a garden, in the midst of flowers which she tends. Every
flower culled by her hands is at the instant restored to life; and the
worshippers of her memory are under an obligation, when they cut a flower,
to sow another in its place.
The worship of forest, and fountain, and stone is to be explained by this
primitive naturalism, which all the Councils of the Church held in Brittany
united to proscribe. The stone, in truth, seems the natural symbol of the
Celtic races. It is an immutable witness that has no death. The animal, the
plant, above all the human figure, only express the divine life under a
determinate form; the stone on the contrary, adapted to receive all forms,
has been the fetish of peoples in their childhood. Pausanias saw, still
standing erect, the thirty square stones of Pharse, each bearing the name of
a divinity. The men-hir to be met with over the whole surface of the ancient
world, what is it but the monument of primitive humanity, a living witness
of its faith in Heaven? [Footnote: It is, however, doubtful whether the
Page 181
monuments known in France at Celtic (men-hir. dot-men, etc.) are the work
of the Celts. With M. Worsaae and the Copenhagen archaeologists, I am
inclined to think that these monuments belong to a more ancient humanity.
Never, in fact, has any branch of the Indo-European race built in this
fashion. (See two articles by M. Merimee in L'Athenaum franfais, Sept.
11th, 1852, and April 25th, 1853.)]
It has frequently been observed that the majority of popular beliefs still
extant in our different provinces are of Celtic origin. A not less remarkable
fact is the strong tinge of naturalism dominant in these beliefs. Nay more,
every time that the old Celtic spirit appears in our history, there is to be
seen, re-born with it, faith in nature and her magic influences. One of the
most characteristic of these manifestations seems to me to be that of Joan of
Arc. That indomitable hope, that tenacity in the affirmation of the future,
that belief that the salvation of the kingdom will come from a woman,—all
those features, far removed as they are from the taste of antiquity, and from
Teutonic taste, are in many respects Celtic. The memory of the ancient cult
perpetuated itself at Domremy, as in so many other places, under the form
of popular superstition. The cottage of the family of Arc was shaded by a
beech tree, famed in the country and reputed to be the abode of fairies. In
her childhood Joan used to go and hang upon its branches garlands of
leaves and flowers, which, so it was said, disappeared during the night. The
terms of her accusation speak with horror of this innocent custom, as of a
crime against the faith; and indeed they were not altogether deceived, those
unpitying theologians who judged the holy maid. Although she knew it not,
she was more Celtic than Christian. She has been foretold by Merlin; she
knows of neither Pope nor Church,— she only believes the voice that
speaks in her own heart. This voice she hears in the fields, in the sough of
the wind among the trees, when measured and distant sounds fair upon her
ears. During her trial, worn out with questions and scholastic subtleties, she
is asked whether she still hears her voices. "Take me to the woods." she
of the Celts. With M. Worsaae and the Copenhagen archaeologists, I am
inclined to think that these monuments belong to a more ancient humanity.
Never, in fact, has any branch of the Indo-European race built in this
fashion. (See two articles by M. Merimee in L'Athenaum franfais, Sept.
11th, 1852, and April 25th, 1853.)]
It has frequently been observed that the majority of popular beliefs still
extant in our different provinces are of Celtic origin. A not less remarkable
fact is the strong tinge of naturalism dominant in these beliefs. Nay more,
every time that the old Celtic spirit appears in our history, there is to be
seen, re-born with it, faith in nature and her magic influences. One of the
most characteristic of these manifestations seems to me to be that of Joan of
Arc. That indomitable hope, that tenacity in the affirmation of the future,
that belief that the salvation of the kingdom will come from a woman,—all
those features, far removed as they are from the taste of antiquity, and from
Teutonic taste, are in many respects Celtic. The memory of the ancient cult
perpetuated itself at Domremy, as in so many other places, under the form
of popular superstition. The cottage of the family of Arc was shaded by a
beech tree, famed in the country and reputed to be the abode of fairies. In
her childhood Joan used to go and hang upon its branches garlands of
leaves and flowers, which, so it was said, disappeared during the night. The
terms of her accusation speak with horror of this innocent custom, as of a
crime against the faith; and indeed they were not altogether deceived, those
unpitying theologians who judged the holy maid. Although she knew it not,
she was more Celtic than Christian. She has been foretold by Merlin; she
knows of neither Pope nor Church,— she only believes the voice that
speaks in her own heart. This voice she hears in the fields, in the sough of
the wind among the trees, when measured and distant sounds fair upon her
ears. During her trial, worn out with questions and scholastic subtleties, she
is asked whether she still hears her voices. "Take me to the woods." she
Page 182
says, "and I shall hear them clearly." Her legend is tinged with the same
colours; nature loved her, the wolves never touched the sheep of her flock.
When she was a little girl, the birds used to come and eat bread from her lap
as though they were tame. [Footnote: Since the first publication of these
views, on which I should not like more emphasis to be put than what
belongs to a passing impression, similar considerations have been
developed, in terms that appear a little too positive, by M. H. Martin
(History of France, vol. vi., 1856). The objections raised to it are, for the
most part, due to the fact that very few people are capable of delicately
appreciating questions of this kind, relative to the genius of races. It
frequently happens that the resurrection of an old national genius takes
place under a very different form from that which one would have expected,
and by means of individuals who have no idea of the ethnographical part
which they play.]
III
The MABINOGION do not recommend themselves to our study, only as
a manifestation of the romantic genius of the Breton races. It was through
them that the Welsh imagination exercised its influence upon the Continent,
that it transformed, in the twelfth century, the poetic art of Europe, and
realised this miracle,—that the creations of a half-conquered race have
become the universal feast of imagination for mankind.
Few heroes owe less to reality than Arthur. Neither Gildas nor Aneurin,
his contemporaries, speak of him; Bede did not even know his name;
Taliessin and Liwarc'h Hen gave him only a secondary place. In Nennius,
on the other hand, who lived about 850, the legend has fully unfolded.
Arthur is already the exterminator of the Saxons; he has never experienced
defeat; he is the suzerain of an army of kings. Finally, in Geoffrey of
Monmouth, the epic creation culminates. Arthur reigns over the whole
colours; nature loved her, the wolves never touched the sheep of her flock.
When she was a little girl, the birds used to come and eat bread from her lap
as though they were tame. [Footnote: Since the first publication of these
views, on which I should not like more emphasis to be put than what
belongs to a passing impression, similar considerations have been
developed, in terms that appear a little too positive, by M. H. Martin
(History of France, vol. vi., 1856). The objections raised to it are, for the
most part, due to the fact that very few people are capable of delicately
appreciating questions of this kind, relative to the genius of races. It
frequently happens that the resurrection of an old national genius takes
place under a very different form from that which one would have expected,
and by means of individuals who have no idea of the ethnographical part
which they play.]
III
The MABINOGION do not recommend themselves to our study, only as
a manifestation of the romantic genius of the Breton races. It was through
them that the Welsh imagination exercised its influence upon the Continent,
that it transformed, in the twelfth century, the poetic art of Europe, and
realised this miracle,—that the creations of a half-conquered race have
become the universal feast of imagination for mankind.
Few heroes owe less to reality than Arthur. Neither Gildas nor Aneurin,
his contemporaries, speak of him; Bede did not even know his name;
Taliessin and Liwarc'h Hen gave him only a secondary place. In Nennius,
on the other hand, who lived about 850, the legend has fully unfolded.
Arthur is already the exterminator of the Saxons; he has never experienced
defeat; he is the suzerain of an army of kings. Finally, in Geoffrey of
Monmouth, the epic creation culminates. Arthur reigns over the whole
Page 183
earth; he conquers Ireland, Norway, Gascony, and France. At Caerleon he
holds a tournament at which all the monarchs of the world are present; there
he puts upon his head thirty crowns, and exacts recognition as the sovereign
lord of the universe. So incredible is it that a petty king of the sixth century,
scarcely remarked by his contemporaries, should have taken in posterity
such colossal proportions, that several critics have supposed that the
legendary Arthur and the obscure chieftain who bore that name have
nothing in common, the one with the other, and that the son of Uther
Pendragon is a wholly ideal hero, a survivor of the old Cymric mythology.
As a matter of fact, in the symbols of Neo-Druidism—that is to say, of that
secret doctrine, the outcome of Druidism, which prolonged its existence
even to the Middle Ages under the form of Freemasonry—we again find
Arthur transformed into a divine personage, and playing a purely
mythological part. It must at least be allowed that, if behind the fable some
reality lies hidden, history offers us no means of attaining it. It cannot be
doubted that the discovery of Arthur's tomb in the Isle of Avalon in 1189
was an invention of Norman policy, just as in 1283, the very year in which
Edward I. was engaged in crushing out the last vestiges of Welsh
independence, Arthur's crown was very conveniently found, and forthwith
united to the other crown jewels of England.
We naturally expect Arthur, now become the representative of Welsh
nationality, to sustain in the Mabinogion a character analogous to this role,
and therein, as in Nennius, to serve the hatred of the vanquished against the
Saxons. But such is not the case. Arthur, in the Mabinogion, exhibits no
characteristics of patriotic resistance; his part is limited to uniting heroes
around him, to maintaining the retainers of his palace, and to enforcing the
laws of his order of chivalry. He is too strong for any one to dream of
attacking him. He is the Charlemagne of the Carlovingian romances, the
Agamemnon of Homer,—one of those neutral personalities that serve but to
give unity to the poem. The idea of warfare against the alien, hatred towards
holds a tournament at which all the monarchs of the world are present; there
he puts upon his head thirty crowns, and exacts recognition as the sovereign
lord of the universe. So incredible is it that a petty king of the sixth century,
scarcely remarked by his contemporaries, should have taken in posterity
such colossal proportions, that several critics have supposed that the
legendary Arthur and the obscure chieftain who bore that name have
nothing in common, the one with the other, and that the son of Uther
Pendragon is a wholly ideal hero, a survivor of the old Cymric mythology.
As a matter of fact, in the symbols of Neo-Druidism—that is to say, of that
secret doctrine, the outcome of Druidism, which prolonged its existence
even to the Middle Ages under the form of Freemasonry—we again find
Arthur transformed into a divine personage, and playing a purely
mythological part. It must at least be allowed that, if behind the fable some
reality lies hidden, history offers us no means of attaining it. It cannot be
doubted that the discovery of Arthur's tomb in the Isle of Avalon in 1189
was an invention of Norman policy, just as in 1283, the very year in which
Edward I. was engaged in crushing out the last vestiges of Welsh
independence, Arthur's crown was very conveniently found, and forthwith
united to the other crown jewels of England.
We naturally expect Arthur, now become the representative of Welsh
nationality, to sustain in the Mabinogion a character analogous to this role,
and therein, as in Nennius, to serve the hatred of the vanquished against the
Saxons. But such is not the case. Arthur, in the Mabinogion, exhibits no
characteristics of patriotic resistance; his part is limited to uniting heroes
around him, to maintaining the retainers of his palace, and to enforcing the
laws of his order of chivalry. He is too strong for any one to dream of
attacking him. He is the Charlemagne of the Carlovingian romances, the
Agamemnon of Homer,—one of those neutral personalities that serve but to
give unity to the poem. The idea of warfare against the alien, hatred towards
Page 184
the Saxon, does not appear in a single instance. The heroes of the
Mabinogion have no fatherland; each fights to show his personal
excellence, and satisfy his taste for adventure, but not to defend a national
cause. Britain is the universe; no one suspects that beyond the Cymry there
may be other nations and other races.
It was by this ideal and representative character that the Arthurian legend
had such an astonishing prestige throughout the whole world. Had Arthur
been only a provincial hero, the more or less happy defender of a little
country, all peoples would not have adopted him, any more than they have
adopted the Marco of the Serbs, [Footnote: A Servian ballad-hero.] or the
Robin Hood of the Saxons. The Arthur who has charmed the world is the
head of an order of equality, in which all sit at the same table, in which a
man's worth depends upon his valour and his natural gifts. What mattered to
the world the fate of an unknown peninsula, and the strife waged on its
behalf? What enchanted it was the ideal court presided over by
Gwenhwyvar (Guinevere), where around the monarchical unity the flower
of heroes was gathered together, where ladies, as chaste as they were
beautiful, loved according to the laws of chivalry, and where the time was
passed in listening to stories, and learning civility and beautiful manners.
This is the secret of the magic of that Round Table, about which the
Middle Ages grouped all their ideas of heroism, of beauty, of modesty, and
of love. We need not stop to inquire whether the ideal of a gentle and
polished society in the midst of the barbarian world is, in all its features, a
purely Breton creation, whether the spirit of the courts of the Continent has
not in some measure furnished the model, and whether the Mabinogion
themselves have not felt the reaction of the French imitations;[Footnote:
The surviving version of the Mdbinogian has a later date than these
imitations, and the Red Book includes several tales borrowed from the
French trouveres. But it is out of the question to maintain that the really
Mabinogion have no fatherland; each fights to show his personal
excellence, and satisfy his taste for adventure, but not to defend a national
cause. Britain is the universe; no one suspects that beyond the Cymry there
may be other nations and other races.
It was by this ideal and representative character that the Arthurian legend
had such an astonishing prestige throughout the whole world. Had Arthur
been only a provincial hero, the more or less happy defender of a little
country, all peoples would not have adopted him, any more than they have
adopted the Marco of the Serbs, [Footnote: A Servian ballad-hero.] or the
Robin Hood of the Saxons. The Arthur who has charmed the world is the
head of an order of equality, in which all sit at the same table, in which a
man's worth depends upon his valour and his natural gifts. What mattered to
the world the fate of an unknown peninsula, and the strife waged on its
behalf? What enchanted it was the ideal court presided over by
Gwenhwyvar (Guinevere), where around the monarchical unity the flower
of heroes was gathered together, where ladies, as chaste as they were
beautiful, loved according to the laws of chivalry, and where the time was
passed in listening to stories, and learning civility and beautiful manners.
This is the secret of the magic of that Round Table, about which the
Middle Ages grouped all their ideas of heroism, of beauty, of modesty, and
of love. We need not stop to inquire whether the ideal of a gentle and
polished society in the midst of the barbarian world is, in all its features, a
purely Breton creation, whether the spirit of the courts of the Continent has
not in some measure furnished the model, and whether the Mabinogion
themselves have not felt the reaction of the French imitations;[Footnote:
The surviving version of the Mdbinogian has a later date than these
imitations, and the Red Book includes several tales borrowed from the
French trouveres. But it is out of the question to maintain that the really
Page 185
Welsh narratives have been borrowed in a like manner, since among them
are some unknown to the trouveres, which could only possess interest for
Breton countries] it suffices for us that the new order of sentiments which
we have just indicated was, throughout the whole of the Middle Ages,
persistently attached to the groundwork of the Cymric romances. Such an
association could not be fortuitous; if the imitations are all so glaring in
colour, it is evidently because in the original this same colour is to be found
united to particularly strong character. How otherwise shall we explain why
a forgotten tribe on the very confines of the world should have imposed its
heroes upon Europe, and, in the domain of imagination, accomplished one
of the most singular revolutions known to the historian of letters?
If, in fact, one compares European literature before the introduction of
the Cymric romances, with what it became when the trouveres set
themselves to draw from Breton sources, one recognises readily that with
the Breton narratives a new element entered into the poetic conception of
the Christian peoples, and modified it profoundly. The Carlovingian poem,
both by its structure and by the means which it employs, does not depart
from classical ideas. The motives of man's action are the same as in the
Greek epic. The essentially romantic element, the life of forests and
mysterious adventure, the feeling for nature, and that impulse of
imagination which makes the Breton warrior unceasingly pursue the
unknown;— nothing of all this is as yet to be observed. Roland differs from
the heroes of Homer only by his armour; in heart he is the brother of Ajax
or Achilles. Perceval, on the contrary, belongs to another world, separated
by a great gulf from that in which the heroes of antiquity live and act.
It was above all by the creation of woman's character, by introducing into
mediaeval poetry, hitherto hard and austere, the nuances of love, that the
Breton romances brought about this curious metamorphosis. It was like an
electric spark; in a few years European taste was changed. Nearly all the
are some unknown to the trouveres, which could only possess interest for
Breton countries] it suffices for us that the new order of sentiments which
we have just indicated was, throughout the whole of the Middle Ages,
persistently attached to the groundwork of the Cymric romances. Such an
association could not be fortuitous; if the imitations are all so glaring in
colour, it is evidently because in the original this same colour is to be found
united to particularly strong character. How otherwise shall we explain why
a forgotten tribe on the very confines of the world should have imposed its
heroes upon Europe, and, in the domain of imagination, accomplished one
of the most singular revolutions known to the historian of letters?
If, in fact, one compares European literature before the introduction of
the Cymric romances, with what it became when the trouveres set
themselves to draw from Breton sources, one recognises readily that with
the Breton narratives a new element entered into the poetic conception of
the Christian peoples, and modified it profoundly. The Carlovingian poem,
both by its structure and by the means which it employs, does not depart
from classical ideas. The motives of man's action are the same as in the
Greek epic. The essentially romantic element, the life of forests and
mysterious adventure, the feeling for nature, and that impulse of
imagination which makes the Breton warrior unceasingly pursue the
unknown;— nothing of all this is as yet to be observed. Roland differs from
the heroes of Homer only by his armour; in heart he is the brother of Ajax
or Achilles. Perceval, on the contrary, belongs to another world, separated
by a great gulf from that in which the heroes of antiquity live and act.
It was above all by the creation of woman's character, by introducing into
mediaeval poetry, hitherto hard and austere, the nuances of love, that the
Breton romances brought about this curious metamorphosis. It was like an
electric spark; in a few years European taste was changed. Nearly all the
Page 186
types of womankind known to the Middle Ages, Guinevere, Iseult, Enid, are
derived from Arthur's court. In the Carlovingian poems woman is a
nonentity without character or individuality; in them love is either brutal, as
in the romance of "Ferebras," or scarcely indicated, as in the "Song of
Roland." In the "Mabinogion," on the other hand, the principal part always
belongs to the women. Chivalrous gallantry, which makes the warrior's
happiness to consist in serving a woman and meriting her esteem, the belief
that the noblest use of strength is to succour and avenge weakness, results, I
know, from a turn of imagination which possessed nearly all European
peoples in the twelfth century; but it cannot be doubted that this turn of
imagination first found literary expression among the Breton peoples. One
of the most surprising features in the Mabinogion is the delicacy of the
feminine feeling breathed in them; an impropriety or a gross word is never
to be met with. It would be necessary to quote at length the two romances
of Peredur and Geraint to demonstrate an innocence such as this; but the
naive simplicity of these charming compositions forbids us to see in this
innocence any underlying meaning. The zeal of the knight in the defence of
ladies' honour became a satirical euphemism only in the French imitators,
who transformed the virginal modesty of the Breton romances into a
shameless gallantry—so far indeed that these compositions, chaste as they
are in the original, became the scandal of the Middle Ages, provoked
censures, and were the occasion of the ideas of immorality which, for
religious people, still cluster about the name of romance.
Certainly chivalry is too complex a fact for us to be permitted to assign it
to any single origin. Let us say however that in the idea of envisaging the
esteem of a woman as the highest object of human activity, and setting up
love as the supreme principle of morality, there is nothing of the antique
spirit, or indeed of the Teutonic. Is it in the "Edda" or in the "Niebelungen"
that we shall find the germ of this spirit of pure love, of exalted devotion,
which forms the very soul of chivalry? As to following the suggestion of
derived from Arthur's court. In the Carlovingian poems woman is a
nonentity without character or individuality; in them love is either brutal, as
in the romance of "Ferebras," or scarcely indicated, as in the "Song of
Roland." In the "Mabinogion," on the other hand, the principal part always
belongs to the women. Chivalrous gallantry, which makes the warrior's
happiness to consist in serving a woman and meriting her esteem, the belief
that the noblest use of strength is to succour and avenge weakness, results, I
know, from a turn of imagination which possessed nearly all European
peoples in the twelfth century; but it cannot be doubted that this turn of
imagination first found literary expression among the Breton peoples. One
of the most surprising features in the Mabinogion is the delicacy of the
feminine feeling breathed in them; an impropriety or a gross word is never
to be met with. It would be necessary to quote at length the two romances
of Peredur and Geraint to demonstrate an innocence such as this; but the
naive simplicity of these charming compositions forbids us to see in this
innocence any underlying meaning. The zeal of the knight in the defence of
ladies' honour became a satirical euphemism only in the French imitators,
who transformed the virginal modesty of the Breton romances into a
shameless gallantry—so far indeed that these compositions, chaste as they
are in the original, became the scandal of the Middle Ages, provoked
censures, and were the occasion of the ideas of immorality which, for
religious people, still cluster about the name of romance.
Certainly chivalry is too complex a fact for us to be permitted to assign it
to any single origin. Let us say however that in the idea of envisaging the
esteem of a woman as the highest object of human activity, and setting up
love as the supreme principle of morality, there is nothing of the antique
spirit, or indeed of the Teutonic. Is it in the "Edda" or in the "Niebelungen"
that we shall find the germ of this spirit of pure love, of exalted devotion,
which forms the very soul of chivalry? As to following the suggestion of
Page 187
some critics and seeking among the Arabs for the beginnings of this
institution, surely of all literary paradoxes ever mooted, this is one of the
most singular. The idea of conquering woman in a land where she is bought
and sold, of seeking her esteem in a land where she is scarcely considered
capable of moral merit! I shall oppose the partizans of this hypothesis with
one single fact,—the surprise experienced by the Arabs of Algeria when, by
a somewhat unfortunate recollection of mediaeval tournaments, the ladies
were entrusted with the presentation of prizes at the Beiram races. What to
the knight appeared an unparalleled honour seemed to the Arabs a
humiliation and almost an insult.
The introduction of the Breton romances into the current of European
literature worked a not less profound revolution in the manner of
conceiving and employing the marvellous. In the Carlovingian poems the
marvellous is timid, and conforms to the Christian faith; the supernatural is
produced directly by God or his envoys. Among the Cymry, on the contrary,
the principle of the marvel is in nature herself, in her hidden forces, in her
inexhaustible fecundity. There is a mysterious swan, a prophetic bird, a
suddenly appearing hand, a giant, a black tyrant, a magic mist, a dragon, a
cry that causes the hearer to die of terror, an object with extraordinary
properties. There is no trace of the monotheistic conception, in which the
marvellous is only a miracle, a derogation of eternal laws. Nor are there any
of those personifications of the life of nature which form the essential part
of the Greek and Indian mythologies. Here we have perfect naturalism, an
unlimited faith in the possible, belief in the existence of independent beings
bearing within themselves the principle of their strength,—an idea quite
opposed to Christianity, which in such beings necessarily sees either angels
or fiends. And besides, these strange beings are always presented as being
outside the pale of the Church; and when the knight of the Round Table has
conquered them, he forces them to go and pay homage to Guinevere, and
have themselves baptised.
institution, surely of all literary paradoxes ever mooted, this is one of the
most singular. The idea of conquering woman in a land where she is bought
and sold, of seeking her esteem in a land where she is scarcely considered
capable of moral merit! I shall oppose the partizans of this hypothesis with
one single fact,—the surprise experienced by the Arabs of Algeria when, by
a somewhat unfortunate recollection of mediaeval tournaments, the ladies
were entrusted with the presentation of prizes at the Beiram races. What to
the knight appeared an unparalleled honour seemed to the Arabs a
humiliation and almost an insult.
The introduction of the Breton romances into the current of European
literature worked a not less profound revolution in the manner of
conceiving and employing the marvellous. In the Carlovingian poems the
marvellous is timid, and conforms to the Christian faith; the supernatural is
produced directly by God or his envoys. Among the Cymry, on the contrary,
the principle of the marvel is in nature herself, in her hidden forces, in her
inexhaustible fecundity. There is a mysterious swan, a prophetic bird, a
suddenly appearing hand, a giant, a black tyrant, a magic mist, a dragon, a
cry that causes the hearer to die of terror, an object with extraordinary
properties. There is no trace of the monotheistic conception, in which the
marvellous is only a miracle, a derogation of eternal laws. Nor are there any
of those personifications of the life of nature which form the essential part
of the Greek and Indian mythologies. Here we have perfect naturalism, an
unlimited faith in the possible, belief in the existence of independent beings
bearing within themselves the principle of their strength,—an idea quite
opposed to Christianity, which in such beings necessarily sees either angels
or fiends. And besides, these strange beings are always presented as being
outside the pale of the Church; and when the knight of the Round Table has
conquered them, he forces them to go and pay homage to Guinevere, and
have themselves baptised.
Page 188
Now, if in poetry there is a marvellous element that we might accept,
surely it is this. Classical mythology, taken in its first simplicity, is too bold,
taken as a mere figure of rhetoric, too insipid, to give us satisfaction. As to
the marvellous element in Christianity, Boileau is right: no fiction is
compatible with such a dogmatism. There remains then the purely
naturalistic marvellous, nature interesting herself in action and acting
herself, the great mystery of fatality unveiling itself by the secret conspiring
of all beings, as in Shakespeare and Ariosto. It would be curious to ascertain
how much of the Celt there is in the former of these poets; as for Ariosto he
is the Breton poet par excellence. All his machinery, all his means of
interest, all his fine shades of sentiment, all his types of women, all his
adventures, are borrowed from the Breton romances.
Do we now understand the intellectual role of that little race which gave
to the world Arthur, Guinevere, Lancelot, Perceval, Merlin, St. Brandan, St.
Patrick, and almost all the poetical cycles of the Middle Ages? What a
striking destiny some nations have, in alone possessing the right to cause
the acceptance of their heroes, as though for that were necessary a quite
peculiar degree of authority, seriousness, and faith! And it is a strange thing
that it is to the Normans, of all peoples the one least sympathetically
inclined towards the Bretons, that we owe the renown of the Breton fables.
Brilliant and imitative, the Norman everywhere became the pre- eminent
representative of the nation on which he had at first imposed himself by
force. French in France, English in England, Italian in Italy, Russian at
Novgorod, he forgot his own language to speak that of the race which he
had conquered, and to become the interpreter of its genius. The deeply
suggestive character of the Welsh romances could not fail to impress men
so prompt to seize and assimilate the ideas of the foreigner. The first
revelation of the Breton fables, the Latin Chronicle of Geoffrey of
Monmouth, appeared about the year 1137, under the auspices of Robert of
Gloucester, natural son of Henry I. Henry II. acquired a taste for the same
surely it is this. Classical mythology, taken in its first simplicity, is too bold,
taken as a mere figure of rhetoric, too insipid, to give us satisfaction. As to
the marvellous element in Christianity, Boileau is right: no fiction is
compatible with such a dogmatism. There remains then the purely
naturalistic marvellous, nature interesting herself in action and acting
herself, the great mystery of fatality unveiling itself by the secret conspiring
of all beings, as in Shakespeare and Ariosto. It would be curious to ascertain
how much of the Celt there is in the former of these poets; as for Ariosto he
is the Breton poet par excellence. All his machinery, all his means of
interest, all his fine shades of sentiment, all his types of women, all his
adventures, are borrowed from the Breton romances.
Do we now understand the intellectual role of that little race which gave
to the world Arthur, Guinevere, Lancelot, Perceval, Merlin, St. Brandan, St.
Patrick, and almost all the poetical cycles of the Middle Ages? What a
striking destiny some nations have, in alone possessing the right to cause
the acceptance of their heroes, as though for that were necessary a quite
peculiar degree of authority, seriousness, and faith! And it is a strange thing
that it is to the Normans, of all peoples the one least sympathetically
inclined towards the Bretons, that we owe the renown of the Breton fables.
Brilliant and imitative, the Norman everywhere became the pre- eminent
representative of the nation on which he had at first imposed himself by
force. French in France, English in England, Italian in Italy, Russian at
Novgorod, he forgot his own language to speak that of the race which he
had conquered, and to become the interpreter of its genius. The deeply
suggestive character of the Welsh romances could not fail to impress men
so prompt to seize and assimilate the ideas of the foreigner. The first
revelation of the Breton fables, the Latin Chronicle of Geoffrey of
Monmouth, appeared about the year 1137, under the auspices of Robert of
Gloucester, natural son of Henry I. Henry II. acquired a taste for the same
Page 189
narratives, and at his request Robert Wace, in 1155, wrote in French the first
history of Arthur, thus opening the path in which walked after him a host of
poets or imitators of all nationalities, French, Provencal, Italian, Spanish,
English, Scandinavian, Greek, and Georgian. We need not belittle the glory
of the first trouveres who put into a language, then read and understood
from one end of Europe to the other, fictions which, but for them, would
have doubtless remained for ever unknown. It is however difficult to
attribute to them an inventive faculty, such as would permit them to merit
the title of creators. The numerous passages in which one feels that they do
not fully understand the original which they imitate, and in which they
attempt to give a natural significance to circumstances of which the
mythological bearing escaped them, suffice to prove that, as a rule, they
were satisfied to make a fairly faithful copy of the work before their eyes.
What part has Armorican Brittany played in the creation or propagation
of the legends of the Round Table? It is impossible to say with any degree
of precision; and in truth such a question becomes a matter of secondary
import once we form a just idea of the close bonds of fraternity, which did
not cease until the twelfth century to unite the two branches of the Breton
peoples. That the heroic traditions of Wales long continued to live in the
branch of the Cymric family which came and settled in Armorica cannot be
doubted when we find Geraint, Urien, and other heroes become saints in
Lower Brittany; [Footnote: I shall only cite a single proof; it is a law of
Edward the Confessor: "Britones vero Armorici quum venerint in regno
isto, suscipi debent et in regno protegi sicut probi cives de corpore regni
hujus; exierunt quondam de sanguine Britonum regni hujus."—Wilkins,
Leges Anglo-Saxonicae, p. 206.]and above all when we see one of the most
essential episodes of the Arthurian cycle, that of the Forest of Broceliande,
placed in the same country. A large number of facts collected by M. de la
Villemarrque [Footnote: "Les Romans de la Table-Ronde et les contes des
anciens Bretons" (Paris, 1859), pp. 20 et seq. In the "Contes populaires des
history of Arthur, thus opening the path in which walked after him a host of
poets or imitators of all nationalities, French, Provencal, Italian, Spanish,
English, Scandinavian, Greek, and Georgian. We need not belittle the glory
of the first trouveres who put into a language, then read and understood
from one end of Europe to the other, fictions which, but for them, would
have doubtless remained for ever unknown. It is however difficult to
attribute to them an inventive faculty, such as would permit them to merit
the title of creators. The numerous passages in which one feels that they do
not fully understand the original which they imitate, and in which they
attempt to give a natural significance to circumstances of which the
mythological bearing escaped them, suffice to prove that, as a rule, they
were satisfied to make a fairly faithful copy of the work before their eyes.
What part has Armorican Brittany played in the creation or propagation
of the legends of the Round Table? It is impossible to say with any degree
of precision; and in truth such a question becomes a matter of secondary
import once we form a just idea of the close bonds of fraternity, which did
not cease until the twelfth century to unite the two branches of the Breton
peoples. That the heroic traditions of Wales long continued to live in the
branch of the Cymric family which came and settled in Armorica cannot be
doubted when we find Geraint, Urien, and other heroes become saints in
Lower Brittany; [Footnote: I shall only cite a single proof; it is a law of
Edward the Confessor: "Britones vero Armorici quum venerint in regno
isto, suscipi debent et in regno protegi sicut probi cives de corpore regni
hujus; exierunt quondam de sanguine Britonum regni hujus."—Wilkins,
Leges Anglo-Saxonicae, p. 206.]and above all when we see one of the most
essential episodes of the Arthurian cycle, that of the Forest of Broceliande,
placed in the same country. A large number of facts collected by M. de la
Villemarrque [Footnote: "Les Romans de la Table-Ronde et les contes des
anciens Bretons" (Paris, 1859), pp. 20 et seq. In the "Contes populaires des
Page 190
anciens Bretons," of which the above may be considered as a new edition,
the learned author had somewhat exaggerated the influence of French
Brittany. In the present article, when first published, I had, on the other
hand, depreciated it too much.] prove, on the other hand, that these same
traditions produced a true poetic cycle in Brittany, and even that at certain
epochs they must have recrossed the Channel, as though to give new life to
the mother country's memories. The fact that Gauthier Calenius,
Archdeacon of Oxford, brought back from Brittany to England (about 1125)
the very text of the legends which were translated into Latin ten years
afterwards by Geoffrey of Monmouth is here decisive. I know that to
readers of the Mabinogion such an opinion will appear surprising at a first
glance, All is Welsh in these fables, the places, the genealogies, the
customs; in them Armorica is only represented by Hoel, an important
personage no doubt, but one who has not achieved the fame of the other
heroes of Arthur's court. Again, if Armorica saw the birth of the Arthurian
cycle, how is it that we fail to find there any traces of that brilliant nativity?
[Footnote: M. de la Villemarque makes appeal to the popular songs still
extant in Brittany, in which Arthur's deeds are celebrated. In fact, in his
Chants populaires de la Bretagne two poems are to be found in which that
hero's name figures.]
These objections, I avow, long barred my way, but I no longer find them
insoluble. And first of all there is a class of Mabinogion, including those of
Owen, Geraint, and Peredur, stories which possess no very precise
geographical localisation. In the second place, national written literature
being less successfully defended in Brittany than in Wales against the
invasion of foreign culture, it may be conceived that the memory of the old
epics should be there more obliterated. The literary share of the two
countries thus remains sufficiently distinct. The glory of French Brittany is
in her popular songs; but it is only in Wales that the genius of the Breton
the learned author had somewhat exaggerated the influence of French
Brittany. In the present article, when first published, I had, on the other
hand, depreciated it too much.] prove, on the other hand, that these same
traditions produced a true poetic cycle in Brittany, and even that at certain
epochs they must have recrossed the Channel, as though to give new life to
the mother country's memories. The fact that Gauthier Calenius,
Archdeacon of Oxford, brought back from Brittany to England (about 1125)
the very text of the legends which were translated into Latin ten years
afterwards by Geoffrey of Monmouth is here decisive. I know that to
readers of the Mabinogion such an opinion will appear surprising at a first
glance, All is Welsh in these fables, the places, the genealogies, the
customs; in them Armorica is only represented by Hoel, an important
personage no doubt, but one who has not achieved the fame of the other
heroes of Arthur's court. Again, if Armorica saw the birth of the Arthurian
cycle, how is it that we fail to find there any traces of that brilliant nativity?
[Footnote: M. de la Villemarque makes appeal to the popular songs still
extant in Brittany, in which Arthur's deeds are celebrated. In fact, in his
Chants populaires de la Bretagne two poems are to be found in which that
hero's name figures.]
These objections, I avow, long barred my way, but I no longer find them
insoluble. And first of all there is a class of Mabinogion, including those of
Owen, Geraint, and Peredur, stories which possess no very precise
geographical localisation. In the second place, national written literature
being less successfully defended in Brittany than in Wales against the
invasion of foreign culture, it may be conceived that the memory of the old
epics should be there more obliterated. The literary share of the two
countries thus remains sufficiently distinct. The glory of French Brittany is
in her popular songs; but it is only in Wales that the genius of the Breton
Page 191
people has succeeded in establishing itself in authentic books and achieved
creations.
IV.
In comparing the Breton cycle as the French trouveres knew it, and the
same cycle as it is to be found in the text of the Mabinogion, one might be
tempted to believe that the European imagination, enthralled by these
brilliant fables, added to them some poetical themes unknown to the Welsh.
Two of the most celebrated heroes of the continental Breton romances,
Lancelot and Tristan, do not figure in the Mabinogion; on the other hand,
the characteristics of the Holy Grail are presented in a totally different way
from that which we find in the French and German poets. A more attentive
study shows that these elements, apparently added by the French poets, are
in reality of Cymric origin. And first of all, M. de la Villemarque has
demonstrated to perfection that the name of Lancelot is only a translation of
that of the Welsh hero Mael, who in point of fact exhibits the fullest analogy
with the Lancelot of the French romances. [Footnote: Ancelot is the
diminutive of Ancel, and means servant, page, or esquire. To this day in the
Cymric dialects Mael has the same signification. The surname of
Poursigant, which we find borne by some Welshmen in the French service
in the early part of the fourteenth century, is also no doubt a translation of
Mael.] The context, the proper names, all the details of the romance of
Lancelot also present the most pronounced Breton aspect. As much must be
said of the romance of Tristan. It is even to be hoped that this curious
legend will be discovered complete in some Welsh manuscript. Dr. Owen
states that he has seen one of which he was unable to obtain a copy. As to
the Holy Grail, it must be avowed that the mystic cup, the object after
which the French Parceval and the German Parsifal go in search, has not
nearly the same importance among the Welsh. In the romance of Peredur it
creations.
IV.
In comparing the Breton cycle as the French trouveres knew it, and the
same cycle as it is to be found in the text of the Mabinogion, one might be
tempted to believe that the European imagination, enthralled by these
brilliant fables, added to them some poetical themes unknown to the Welsh.
Two of the most celebrated heroes of the continental Breton romances,
Lancelot and Tristan, do not figure in the Mabinogion; on the other hand,
the characteristics of the Holy Grail are presented in a totally different way
from that which we find in the French and German poets. A more attentive
study shows that these elements, apparently added by the French poets, are
in reality of Cymric origin. And first of all, M. de la Villemarque has
demonstrated to perfection that the name of Lancelot is only a translation of
that of the Welsh hero Mael, who in point of fact exhibits the fullest analogy
with the Lancelot of the French romances. [Footnote: Ancelot is the
diminutive of Ancel, and means servant, page, or esquire. To this day in the
Cymric dialects Mael has the same signification. The surname of
Poursigant, which we find borne by some Welshmen in the French service
in the early part of the fourteenth century, is also no doubt a translation of
Mael.] The context, the proper names, all the details of the romance of
Lancelot also present the most pronounced Breton aspect. As much must be
said of the romance of Tristan. It is even to be hoped that this curious
legend will be discovered complete in some Welsh manuscript. Dr. Owen
states that he has seen one of which he was unable to obtain a copy. As to
the Holy Grail, it must be avowed that the mystic cup, the object after
which the French Parceval and the German Parsifal go in search, has not
nearly the same importance among the Welsh. In the romance of Peredur it
Page 192
only figures in an episodical fashion, and without a well-defined religious
intention.
"Then Peredur and his uncle discoursed together, and he beheld two
youths enter the hall, and proceed up to the chamber, bearing a spear of
mighty size, with three streams of blood flowing from the point to the
ground. And when all the company saw this, they began wailing and
lamenting. But for all that, the man did not break off his discourse with
Peredur. And as he did not tell Peredur the meaning of what he saw, he
forbore to ask him concerning it. And when the clamour had a little
subsided, behold two maidens entered, with a large salver between them, in
which was a man's head, surrounded by a profusion of blood. And
thereupon the company of the court made so great an outcry, that it was
irksome to be in the same hall with them. But at length they were silent."
This strange and wondrous circumstance remains an enigma to the end of
the narrative. Then a mysterious young man appears to Peredur, apprises
him that the lance from which the blood was dropping is that with which his
uncle was wounded, that the vessel contains the blood and the head of one
of his cousins, slain by the witches of Kerloiou, and that it is predestined
that he, Peredur, should be their avenger. In point of fact, Peredur goes and
convokes the Round Table; Arthur and his knights come and put the witches
of Kerloiou to death.
If we now pass to the French romance of Parceval, we find that all this
phantasmagoria clothes a very different significance. The lance is that with
which Longus pierced Christ's side, the Grail or basin is that in which
Joseph of Arimathea caught the divine blood. This miraculous vase
procures all the good things of heaven and earth; it heals wounds, and is
filled at the owner's pleasure with the most exquisite food. To approach it
one must be in a state of grace; only a priest can tell of its marvels. To find
these sacred relics after the passage of a thousand trials,—such is the object
intention.
"Then Peredur and his uncle discoursed together, and he beheld two
youths enter the hall, and proceed up to the chamber, bearing a spear of
mighty size, with three streams of blood flowing from the point to the
ground. And when all the company saw this, they began wailing and
lamenting. But for all that, the man did not break off his discourse with
Peredur. And as he did not tell Peredur the meaning of what he saw, he
forbore to ask him concerning it. And when the clamour had a little
subsided, behold two maidens entered, with a large salver between them, in
which was a man's head, surrounded by a profusion of blood. And
thereupon the company of the court made so great an outcry, that it was
irksome to be in the same hall with them. But at length they were silent."
This strange and wondrous circumstance remains an enigma to the end of
the narrative. Then a mysterious young man appears to Peredur, apprises
him that the lance from which the blood was dropping is that with which his
uncle was wounded, that the vessel contains the blood and the head of one
of his cousins, slain by the witches of Kerloiou, and that it is predestined
that he, Peredur, should be their avenger. In point of fact, Peredur goes and
convokes the Round Table; Arthur and his knights come and put the witches
of Kerloiou to death.
If we now pass to the French romance of Parceval, we find that all this
phantasmagoria clothes a very different significance. The lance is that with
which Longus pierced Christ's side, the Grail or basin is that in which
Joseph of Arimathea caught the divine blood. This miraculous vase
procures all the good things of heaven and earth; it heals wounds, and is
filled at the owner's pleasure with the most exquisite food. To approach it
one must be in a state of grace; only a priest can tell of its marvels. To find
these sacred relics after the passage of a thousand trials,—such is the object
Page 193
of Peredur's chivalry, at once worldly and mystical. In the end he becomes a
priest; he takes the Grail and the lance into his hermitage; on the day of his
death an angel bears them up to Heaven. Let us add that many traits prove
that in the mind of the French trouvere the Grail is confounded with the
eucharist. In the miniatures which occasionally accompany the romance of
Parceval, the Grail is in the form of a pyx, appearing at all the solemn
moments of the poem as a miraculous source of succour.
Is this strange myth, differing as it does from the simple narrative
presented in the Welsh legend of Peredur, really Cymric, or ought we rather
to see in it an original creation of the trouveres, based upon a Breton
foundation? With M. de la Villemarque we believe that this curious fable is
essentially Cymric. [Footnote: See the excellent discussion of this
interesting problem in the introduction to "Contes populaires des anciens
Bretons" (pp. 181 et seq.).] In the eighth century a Breton hermit had a
vision of Joseph of Arimathea bearing the chalice of the Last Supper, and
wrote the history called the Gradal. The whole Celtic mythology is full of
the marvels of a magic caldron under which nine fairies blow silently, a
mysterious vase which inspires poetic genius, gives wisdom, reveals the
future, and unveils the secrets of the world. One day as Bran the Blessed
was hunting in Ireland upon the shore of a lake, he saw come forth from it a
black man bearing upon his back an enormous caldron, followed by a witch
and a dwarf. This caldron was the instrument of the supernatural power of a
family of giants. It cured all ills, and gave back life to the dead, but without
restoring to them the use of speech—an allusion to the secret of the bardic
initiation. In the same way Perceval's wariness forms the whole plot of the
quest of the Holy Grail. The Grail thus appears to us in its primitive
meaning as the pass-word of a kind of free-masonry which survived in
Wales long after the preaching of the Gospel, and of which we find deep
traces in the legend of Taliessin. Christianity grafted its legend upon the
mythological data, and a like transformation was doubtless made by the
priest; he takes the Grail and the lance into his hermitage; on the day of his
death an angel bears them up to Heaven. Let us add that many traits prove
that in the mind of the French trouvere the Grail is confounded with the
eucharist. In the miniatures which occasionally accompany the romance of
Parceval, the Grail is in the form of a pyx, appearing at all the solemn
moments of the poem as a miraculous source of succour.
Is this strange myth, differing as it does from the simple narrative
presented in the Welsh legend of Peredur, really Cymric, or ought we rather
to see in it an original creation of the trouveres, based upon a Breton
foundation? With M. de la Villemarque we believe that this curious fable is
essentially Cymric. [Footnote: See the excellent discussion of this
interesting problem in the introduction to "Contes populaires des anciens
Bretons" (pp. 181 et seq.).] In the eighth century a Breton hermit had a
vision of Joseph of Arimathea bearing the chalice of the Last Supper, and
wrote the history called the Gradal. The whole Celtic mythology is full of
the marvels of a magic caldron under which nine fairies blow silently, a
mysterious vase which inspires poetic genius, gives wisdom, reveals the
future, and unveils the secrets of the world. One day as Bran the Blessed
was hunting in Ireland upon the shore of a lake, he saw come forth from it a
black man bearing upon his back an enormous caldron, followed by a witch
and a dwarf. This caldron was the instrument of the supernatural power of a
family of giants. It cured all ills, and gave back life to the dead, but without
restoring to them the use of speech—an allusion to the secret of the bardic
initiation. In the same way Perceval's wariness forms the whole plot of the
quest of the Holy Grail. The Grail thus appears to us in its primitive
meaning as the pass-word of a kind of free-masonry which survived in
Wales long after the preaching of the Gospel, and of which we find deep
traces in the legend of Taliessin. Christianity grafted its legend upon the
mythological data, and a like transformation was doubtless made by the
Page 194
Cymric race itself. If the Welsh narrative of Peredur does not offer the same
developments as the French romance of Parceval, it is because the Red
Book of Hergest gives us an earlier version than that which served as a
model for Chretien de Troyes. It is also to be remarked that, even in
Parceval, the mystical idea is not as yet completely developed, that the
trouvere seems to treat this strange theme as a narrative which he has found
already complete, and the meaning of which he can scarcely guess. The
motive that sets Parceval a-field in the French romance, as well as in the
Welsh version, is a family motive; he seeks the Holy Grail as a talisman to
cure his uncle the Fisherman- King, in such a way that the religious idea is
still subordinated to the profane intention. In the German version, on the
other hand, full as it is of mysticism and theology, the Grail has a temple
and priests. Parsifal, who has become a purely ecclesiastical hero, reaches
the dignity of King of the Grail by his religious enthusiasm and his chastity.
[Footnote: It is indeed remarkable that all the Breton heroes in their last
transformation are at once gallant and devout. One of the most celebrated
ladies of Arthur's court, Luned, becomes a saint and a martyr for her
chastity, her festival being celebrated on August 1st. She it is who figures in
the French romances under the name of Lunette. See Lady Guest, vol. i., pp.
113, 114.] Finally, the prose versions, more modern still, sharply distinguish
the two chivalries, the one earthly, the other mystical. In them Parceval
becomes the model of the devout knight. This was the last of the
metamorphoses which that all-powerful enchantress called the human
imagination made him undergo; and it was only right that, after having gone
through so many dangers, he should don a monkish frock, wherein to take
his rest after his life of adventure.
V.
When we seek to determine the precise moment in the history of the
Celtic races at which we ought to place ourselves in order to appreciate
developments as the French romance of Parceval, it is because the Red
Book of Hergest gives us an earlier version than that which served as a
model for Chretien de Troyes. It is also to be remarked that, even in
Parceval, the mystical idea is not as yet completely developed, that the
trouvere seems to treat this strange theme as a narrative which he has found
already complete, and the meaning of which he can scarcely guess. The
motive that sets Parceval a-field in the French romance, as well as in the
Welsh version, is a family motive; he seeks the Holy Grail as a talisman to
cure his uncle the Fisherman- King, in such a way that the religious idea is
still subordinated to the profane intention. In the German version, on the
other hand, full as it is of mysticism and theology, the Grail has a temple
and priests. Parsifal, who has become a purely ecclesiastical hero, reaches
the dignity of King of the Grail by his religious enthusiasm and his chastity.
[Footnote: It is indeed remarkable that all the Breton heroes in their last
transformation are at once gallant and devout. One of the most celebrated
ladies of Arthur's court, Luned, becomes a saint and a martyr for her
chastity, her festival being celebrated on August 1st. She it is who figures in
the French romances under the name of Lunette. See Lady Guest, vol. i., pp.
113, 114.] Finally, the prose versions, more modern still, sharply distinguish
the two chivalries, the one earthly, the other mystical. In them Parceval
becomes the model of the devout knight. This was the last of the
metamorphoses which that all-powerful enchantress called the human
imagination made him undergo; and it was only right that, after having gone
through so many dangers, he should don a monkish frock, wherein to take
his rest after his life of adventure.
V.
When we seek to determine the precise moment in the history of the
Celtic races at which we ought to place ourselves in order to appreciate
Page 195
their genius in its entirety, we find ourselves led back to the sixth century of
our era. Races have nearly always a predestined hour at which, passing
from simplicity to reflection, they bring forth to the light of day, for the first
time, all the treasures of their nature. For the Celtic races the poetic moment
of awakening and primal activity was the sixth century. Christianity, still
young amongst them, has not completely stifled the national cult; the
religion of the Druids defends itself in its schools and holy places; warfare
against the foreigner, without which a people never achieves a full
consciousness of itself, attains its highest degree of spirit. It is the epoch of
all the heroes of enduring fame, of all the characteristic saints of the Breton
Church; finally, it is the great age of bardic literature, illustrious by the
names of Taliessin, of Aneurin, of Liwarc'h Hen.
To such as would view critically the historical use of these half- fabulous
names and would hesitate to accept as authentic, poems that have come
down to us through so long a series of ages, we reply that the objections
raised to the antiquity of the bardic literature— objections of which W.
Schlegel made himself the interpreter in opposition to M. Fauriel—have
completely disappeared under the investigations of an enlightened and
impartial criticism. [Footnote: This evidently does not apply to the language
of the poems in question. It is well known that mediaeval scribes, alien as
they were to all ideas of archaeology, modernised the texts, in measure as
they copied them; and that a manuscript in the vulgar tongue, as a rule, only
attests the language of him who transcribed it.] By a rare exception
sceptical opinion has for once been found in the wrong. The sixth century is
in fact for the Breton peoples a perfectly historical century. We touch this
epoch of their history as closely and with as much certainty as Greek or
Roman antiquity. It is indeed known that, up to a somewhat late period, the
bards continued to compose pieces under the names—which had become
popular—of Aneurin, Taliessin, and Liwarc'h Hen; but no confusion can be
made between these insipid rhetorical exercises and the really ancient
our era. Races have nearly always a predestined hour at which, passing
from simplicity to reflection, they bring forth to the light of day, for the first
time, all the treasures of their nature. For the Celtic races the poetic moment
of awakening and primal activity was the sixth century. Christianity, still
young amongst them, has not completely stifled the national cult; the
religion of the Druids defends itself in its schools and holy places; warfare
against the foreigner, without which a people never achieves a full
consciousness of itself, attains its highest degree of spirit. It is the epoch of
all the heroes of enduring fame, of all the characteristic saints of the Breton
Church; finally, it is the great age of bardic literature, illustrious by the
names of Taliessin, of Aneurin, of Liwarc'h Hen.
To such as would view critically the historical use of these half- fabulous
names and would hesitate to accept as authentic, poems that have come
down to us through so long a series of ages, we reply that the objections
raised to the antiquity of the bardic literature— objections of which W.
Schlegel made himself the interpreter in opposition to M. Fauriel—have
completely disappeared under the investigations of an enlightened and
impartial criticism. [Footnote: This evidently does not apply to the language
of the poems in question. It is well known that mediaeval scribes, alien as
they were to all ideas of archaeology, modernised the texts, in measure as
they copied them; and that a manuscript in the vulgar tongue, as a rule, only
attests the language of him who transcribed it.] By a rare exception
sceptical opinion has for once been found in the wrong. The sixth century is
in fact for the Breton peoples a perfectly historical century. We touch this
epoch of their history as closely and with as much certainty as Greek or
Roman antiquity. It is indeed known that, up to a somewhat late period, the
bards continued to compose pieces under the names—which had become
popular—of Aneurin, Taliessin, and Liwarc'h Hen; but no confusion can be
made between these insipid rhetorical exercises and the really ancient
Page 196
fragments which bear the names of the poets cited— fragments full of
personal traits, local circumstances, and individual passions and feelings.
Such is the literature of which M. de la Villemarque has attempted to
unite the most ancient and authentic monuments in his "Breton Bards of the
Sixth Century." Wales has recognised the service that our learned
compatriot has thus rendered to Celtic studies. We confess, however, to
much preferring to the "Bards" the "Popular Songs of Brittany." It is in the
latter that M. de la Villemarque has best served Celtic studies, by revealing
to us a delightful literature, in which, more clearly than anywhere else, are
apparent these features of gentleness, fidelity, resignation, and timid reserve
which form the character of the Breton peoples. [Footnote: This interesting
collection ought not, however, to be accepted unreservedly; and the
absolute confidence with which it has been quoted is not without its
inconveniences. We believe that when M. de la Villemarque comments on
the fragments which, to his eternal honour, he has been the first to bring to
light, his criticism is far from being proof against all reproach, and that
several of the historical allusions which he considers that he finds in them
are hypotheses more ingenious than solid. The past is too great, and has
come down to us in too fragmentary a manner, for such coincidences to be
probable. Popular celebrities are rarely those of history, and when the
rumours of distant centuries come to us by two channels, one popular, the
other historical, it is a rare thing for these two forms of tradition to be fully
in accord with one another. M. de la Villemarque is also too ready to
suppose that the people repeats for centuries songs that it only half
understands. When a song ceases to be intelligible, it is nearly always
altered by the people, with the end of approximating it to the sounds
farmliar and significant to their ears. Is it not also to be feared that in this
case the editor, in entire good faith, may lend some slight inflection to the
text, so as to find in it the sense that he desires, or has in his mind?]
personal traits, local circumstances, and individual passions and feelings.
Such is the literature of which M. de la Villemarque has attempted to
unite the most ancient and authentic monuments in his "Breton Bards of the
Sixth Century." Wales has recognised the service that our learned
compatriot has thus rendered to Celtic studies. We confess, however, to
much preferring to the "Bards" the "Popular Songs of Brittany." It is in the
latter that M. de la Villemarque has best served Celtic studies, by revealing
to us a delightful literature, in which, more clearly than anywhere else, are
apparent these features of gentleness, fidelity, resignation, and timid reserve
which form the character of the Breton peoples. [Footnote: This interesting
collection ought not, however, to be accepted unreservedly; and the
absolute confidence with which it has been quoted is not without its
inconveniences. We believe that when M. de la Villemarque comments on
the fragments which, to his eternal honour, he has been the first to bring to
light, his criticism is far from being proof against all reproach, and that
several of the historical allusions which he considers that he finds in them
are hypotheses more ingenious than solid. The past is too great, and has
come down to us in too fragmentary a manner, for such coincidences to be
probable. Popular celebrities are rarely those of history, and when the
rumours of distant centuries come to us by two channels, one popular, the
other historical, it is a rare thing for these two forms of tradition to be fully
in accord with one another. M. de la Villemarque is also too ready to
suppose that the people repeats for centuries songs that it only half
understands. When a song ceases to be intelligible, it is nearly always
altered by the people, with the end of approximating it to the sounds
farmliar and significant to their ears. Is it not also to be feared that in this
case the editor, in entire good faith, may lend some slight inflection to the
text, so as to find in it the sense that he desires, or has in his mind?]
Page 197
The theme of the poetry of the bards of the sixth century is simple and
exclusively heroic; it ever deals with the great motives of patriotism and
glory. There is a total absence of all tender feeling, no trace of love, no
well-marked religious idea, but only a vague and naturalistic mysticism,—a
survival of Druidic teaching,— and a moral philosophy wholly expressed in
Triads, similar to that taught in the half-bardic, half-Christian schools of St.
Cadoc and St. Iltud. The singularly artificial and highly wrought form of the
style suggests the existence of a system of learned instruction possessing
long traditions. A more pronounced shade, and there would be a danger of
falling into a pedantic and mannered rhetoric. The bardic literature, by its
lengthened existence through the whole of the Middle Ages, did not escape
this danger. It ended by being no more than a somewhat insipid collection
of unoriginalities in style, and conventional metaphors. [Footnote: A Welsh
scholar, Mr. Stephens, in his History of Cymric Literature (Llandovery,
1849), has demonstrated these successive transformations very well.]
The opposition between bardism and Christianity reveals itself in the
pieces translated by M. de la Villemarque by many features of original and
pathetic interest. The strife which rent the soul of the old poets, their
antipathy to the grey men of the monastery, their sad and painful
conversion, are to be found in their songs. The sweetness and tenacity of the
Breton character can alone explain how a heterodoxy so openly avowed as
this maintained its position in face of the dominant Christianity, and how
holy men, Kolumkill for example, took upon themselves the defence of the
bards against the kings who desired to stamp them out. The strife was the
longer in its duration, in that Christianity among the Celtic peoples never
employed force against rival religions, and, at the worst, left to the
vanquished the liberty of ill humour. Belief in prophets, indestructible
among these peoples, created, in despite of faith the Anti-Christian type of
Merlin, and caused his acceptance by the whole of Europe. Gildas and the
orthodox Bretons were ceaseless in their thunderings against the prophets,
exclusively heroic; it ever deals with the great motives of patriotism and
glory. There is a total absence of all tender feeling, no trace of love, no
well-marked religious idea, but only a vague and naturalistic mysticism,—a
survival of Druidic teaching,— and a moral philosophy wholly expressed in
Triads, similar to that taught in the half-bardic, half-Christian schools of St.
Cadoc and St. Iltud. The singularly artificial and highly wrought form of the
style suggests the existence of a system of learned instruction possessing
long traditions. A more pronounced shade, and there would be a danger of
falling into a pedantic and mannered rhetoric. The bardic literature, by its
lengthened existence through the whole of the Middle Ages, did not escape
this danger. It ended by being no more than a somewhat insipid collection
of unoriginalities in style, and conventional metaphors. [Footnote: A Welsh
scholar, Mr. Stephens, in his History of Cymric Literature (Llandovery,
1849), has demonstrated these successive transformations very well.]
The opposition between bardism and Christianity reveals itself in the
pieces translated by M. de la Villemarque by many features of original and
pathetic interest. The strife which rent the soul of the old poets, their
antipathy to the grey men of the monastery, their sad and painful
conversion, are to be found in their songs. The sweetness and tenacity of the
Breton character can alone explain how a heterodoxy so openly avowed as
this maintained its position in face of the dominant Christianity, and how
holy men, Kolumkill for example, took upon themselves the defence of the
bards against the kings who desired to stamp them out. The strife was the
longer in its duration, in that Christianity among the Celtic peoples never
employed force against rival religions, and, at the worst, left to the
vanquished the liberty of ill humour. Belief in prophets, indestructible
among these peoples, created, in despite of faith the Anti-Christian type of
Merlin, and caused his acceptance by the whole of Europe. Gildas and the
orthodox Bretons were ceaseless in their thunderings against the prophets,
Page 198
and opposed to them Elias and Samuel, two bards who only foretold good;
even in the twelfth century Giraldus Cambrensis saw a prophet in the town
of Caerleon.
Thanks to this toleration bardism lasted into the heart of the Middle Ages,
under the form of a secret doctrine, with a conventional language, and
symbols almost wholly borrowed from the solar divinity of Arthur. This
may be termed Neo-Druidism, a kind of Druidism subtilised and reformed
on the model of Christianity, which may be seen growing more and more
obscure and mysterious, until the moment of its total disappearance. A
curious fragment belonging to this school, the dialogue between Arthur and
Eliwlod, has transmitted to us the latest sighs of this latest protestation of
expiring naturalism. Under the form of an eagle Eliwlod introduces the
divinity to the sentiment of resignation, of subjection, and of humility, with
which Christianity combated pagan pride. Hero-worship recoils step by step
before the great formula, which Christianity ceases not to repeat to the
Celtic races to sever them from their memories: There is none greater than
God. Arthur allows himself to be persuaded to abdicate from his divinity,
and ends by reciting the Pater.
I know of no more curious spectacle than this revolt of the manly
sentiments of hero-worship against the feminine feeling which flowed so
largely into the new faith. What, in fact, exasperates the old representatives
of Celtic society are the exclusive triumph of the pacific spirit and the men,
clad in linen and chanting psalms, whose voice is sad, who preach
asceticism, and know the heroes no more. [Footnote: The antipathy to
Christianity attributed by the Armorican people to the dwarfs and korigans
belongs in like measure to traditions of the opposition encountered by the
Gospel in its beginnings. The korigans in fact are, for the Breton peasant,
great princesses who would not accept Christianity when the apostles came
to Brittany. They hate the clergy and the churches, the bells of which make
even in the twelfth century Giraldus Cambrensis saw a prophet in the town
of Caerleon.
Thanks to this toleration bardism lasted into the heart of the Middle Ages,
under the form of a secret doctrine, with a conventional language, and
symbols almost wholly borrowed from the solar divinity of Arthur. This
may be termed Neo-Druidism, a kind of Druidism subtilised and reformed
on the model of Christianity, which may be seen growing more and more
obscure and mysterious, until the moment of its total disappearance. A
curious fragment belonging to this school, the dialogue between Arthur and
Eliwlod, has transmitted to us the latest sighs of this latest protestation of
expiring naturalism. Under the form of an eagle Eliwlod introduces the
divinity to the sentiment of resignation, of subjection, and of humility, with
which Christianity combated pagan pride. Hero-worship recoils step by step
before the great formula, which Christianity ceases not to repeat to the
Celtic races to sever them from their memories: There is none greater than
God. Arthur allows himself to be persuaded to abdicate from his divinity,
and ends by reciting the Pater.
I know of no more curious spectacle than this revolt of the manly
sentiments of hero-worship against the feminine feeling which flowed so
largely into the new faith. What, in fact, exasperates the old representatives
of Celtic society are the exclusive triumph of the pacific spirit and the men,
clad in linen and chanting psalms, whose voice is sad, who preach
asceticism, and know the heroes no more. [Footnote: The antipathy to
Christianity attributed by the Armorican people to the dwarfs and korigans
belongs in like measure to traditions of the opposition encountered by the
Gospel in its beginnings. The korigans in fact are, for the Breton peasant,
great princesses who would not accept Christianity when the apostles came
to Brittany. They hate the clergy and the churches, the bells of which make
Page 199
them take to flight. The Virgin above all is their great enemy; she it is who
has hounded them forth from their fountains, and on Saturday, the day
consecrated to her, whosoever beholds them combing their hair or counting
their treasures is sure to perish. (Villemarque, Chants populaires,
Introduction.)] We know the use that Ireland has made of this theme, in the
dialogues which she loves to imagine between the representatives of her
profane and religious life, Ossian and St. Patrick. [Footnote: See Miss
Brooke's Reliques of Irish Poetry, Dublin, 1789, pp. 37 et seq., PP. 75 et
seq.] Ossian regrets the adventures, the chase, the blast of the horn, and the
kings of old time. "If they were here," he says to St. Patrick, "thou should'st
not thus be scouring the country with the psalm-singing flock." Patrick
seeks to calm him by soft words, and sometimes carries his condescension
so far as to listen to his long histories, which appear to interest the saint but
slightly. "Thou hast heard my story," says the old bard in conclusion; "albeit
my memory groweth weak, and I am devoured with care, yet I desire to
continue still to sing the deeds of yore, and to live upon ancient glories.
Now am I stricken with years, my life is frozen within me, and all my joys
are fleeting away. No more can my hand grasp the sword, nor mine arm
hold the lance in rest. Among priests my last sad hour lengtheneth out, and
psalms take now the place of songs of victory." "Let thy songs rest," says
Patrick, "and dare not to compare thy Finn to the King of Kings, whose
might knoweth no bounds: bend thy knees before Him, and know Him for
thy Lord." It was indeed necessary to surrender, and the legend relates how
the old bard ended his days in the cloister, among the priests whom he had
so often used rudely, in the midst of these chants that he knew not. Ossian
was too good an Irishman for any one to make up his mind to damn him
utterly. Merlin himself had to cede to the new spell. He was, it is said,
converted by St. Columba; and the popular voice in the ballads repeats to
him unceasingly this sweet and touching appeal: "Merlin, Merlin, be
converted; there is no divinity save that of God."
has hounded them forth from their fountains, and on Saturday, the day
consecrated to her, whosoever beholds them combing their hair or counting
their treasures is sure to perish. (Villemarque, Chants populaires,
Introduction.)] We know the use that Ireland has made of this theme, in the
dialogues which she loves to imagine between the representatives of her
profane and religious life, Ossian and St. Patrick. [Footnote: See Miss
Brooke's Reliques of Irish Poetry, Dublin, 1789, pp. 37 et seq., PP. 75 et
seq.] Ossian regrets the adventures, the chase, the blast of the horn, and the
kings of old time. "If they were here," he says to St. Patrick, "thou should'st
not thus be scouring the country with the psalm-singing flock." Patrick
seeks to calm him by soft words, and sometimes carries his condescension
so far as to listen to his long histories, which appear to interest the saint but
slightly. "Thou hast heard my story," says the old bard in conclusion; "albeit
my memory groweth weak, and I am devoured with care, yet I desire to
continue still to sing the deeds of yore, and to live upon ancient glories.
Now am I stricken with years, my life is frozen within me, and all my joys
are fleeting away. No more can my hand grasp the sword, nor mine arm
hold the lance in rest. Among priests my last sad hour lengtheneth out, and
psalms take now the place of songs of victory." "Let thy songs rest," says
Patrick, "and dare not to compare thy Finn to the King of Kings, whose
might knoweth no bounds: bend thy knees before Him, and know Him for
thy Lord." It was indeed necessary to surrender, and the legend relates how
the old bard ended his days in the cloister, among the priests whom he had
so often used rudely, in the midst of these chants that he knew not. Ossian
was too good an Irishman for any one to make up his mind to damn him
utterly. Merlin himself had to cede to the new spell. He was, it is said,
converted by St. Columba; and the popular voice in the ballads repeats to
him unceasingly this sweet and touching appeal: "Merlin, Merlin, be
converted; there is no divinity save that of God."
Page 200
VI.
We should form an altogether inadequate idea of the physiognomy of the
Celtic races, were we not to study them under what is perhaps the most
singular aspect of their development—that is to say, their ecclesiastical
antiquities and their saints. Leaving on one side the temporary repulsion
which Christian mildness had to conquer in the classes of society which
saw their influence diminished by the new order of things, it can be truly
said, that the gentleness of manners and the exquisite sensibility of the
Celtic races, in conjunction with the absence of a formerly existing religion
of strong organisation, predestined them to Christianity. Christianity in fact,
addressing itself by preference to the more humble feelings in human
nature, met here with admirably prepared disciples; no race has so
delicately understood the charm of littleness, none has placed the simple
creature, the innocent, nearer God. The ease with which the new religion
took possession of these peoples is also remarkable. Brittany and Ireland
between them scarce count two or three martyrs; they are reduced to
venerating as such those of their compatriots who were slain in the Anglo-
Saxon and Danish invasions. Here comes to light the profound difference
dividing the Celtic from the Teutonic race. The Teutons only received
Christianity tardily and in spite of themselves, by scheming or by force,
after a sanguinary resistance, and with terrible throes, Christianity was in
fact on several sides repugnant to their nature; and one understands the
regrets of pure Teutonists who, to this day, reproach the new faith with
having corrupted their sturdy ancestors.
Such was not the case with the Celtic peoples; that gentle little race was
naturally Christian. Far from changing them, and taking away some of their
qualities, Christianity finished and perfected them. Compare the legends
relating to the introduction of Christianity into the two countries, the Kristni
Saga for instance, and the delightful legends of Lucius and St. Patrick.
We should form an altogether inadequate idea of the physiognomy of the
Celtic races, were we not to study them under what is perhaps the most
singular aspect of their development—that is to say, their ecclesiastical
antiquities and their saints. Leaving on one side the temporary repulsion
which Christian mildness had to conquer in the classes of society which
saw their influence diminished by the new order of things, it can be truly
said, that the gentleness of manners and the exquisite sensibility of the
Celtic races, in conjunction with the absence of a formerly existing religion
of strong organisation, predestined them to Christianity. Christianity in fact,
addressing itself by preference to the more humble feelings in human
nature, met here with admirably prepared disciples; no race has so
delicately understood the charm of littleness, none has placed the simple
creature, the innocent, nearer God. The ease with which the new religion
took possession of these peoples is also remarkable. Brittany and Ireland
between them scarce count two or three martyrs; they are reduced to
venerating as such those of their compatriots who were slain in the Anglo-
Saxon and Danish invasions. Here comes to light the profound difference
dividing the Celtic from the Teutonic race. The Teutons only received
Christianity tardily and in spite of themselves, by scheming or by force,
after a sanguinary resistance, and with terrible throes, Christianity was in
fact on several sides repugnant to their nature; and one understands the
regrets of pure Teutonists who, to this day, reproach the new faith with
having corrupted their sturdy ancestors.
Such was not the case with the Celtic peoples; that gentle little race was
naturally Christian. Far from changing them, and taking away some of their
qualities, Christianity finished and perfected them. Compare the legends
relating to the introduction of Christianity into the two countries, the Kristni
Saga for instance, and the delightful legends of Lucius and St. Patrick.
Page 201
What a difference we find! In Iceland the first apostles are pirates,
converted by some chance, now saying mass, now massacring their
enemies, now resuming their former profession of sea-rovers; everything is
done in accord with expediency, and without any serious faith.
In Ireland and Brittany grace operates through women, by I know not
what charm of purity and sweetness. The revolt of the Teutons was never
effectually stifled; never did they forget the forced baptisms, and the sword-
supported Carlovingian missionaries, until the day when Teutonism took its
revenge, and Luther through seven centuries gave answer to Witikind. On
the other hand, the Celts were, even in the third century, perfect Christians.
To the Teutons Christianity was for long nothing but a Roman institution,
imposed from without. They entered the Church only to trouble it; and it
was not without very great difficulty that they succeeded in forming a
national clergy. To the Celts, on the contrary, Christianity did not come
from Rome; they had their native clergy, their own peculiar usages, their
faith at first hand. It cannot, in fact, be doubted that in apostolic times
Christianity was preached in Brittany; and several historians, not without
justification, have considered that it was borne there by Judaistic Christians,
or by disciples of the school of St. John. Everywhere else Christianity
found, as a first substratum, Greek or Roman civilisation. Here it found a
virgin soil of a nature analogous to its own, and naturally prepared to
receive it.
Few forms of Christianity have offered an ideal of Christian perfection so
pure as the Celtic Church of the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries.
Nowhere, perhaps, has God been better worshipped in spirit than in those
great monastic communities of Hy, or of Iona, of Bangor, of Clonard, or of
Lindisfarne. One of the most distinguished developments of Christianity—
doubtless too distinguished for the popular and practical mission which the
Church had to undertake—Pelagianism, arose from it. The true and refined
converted by some chance, now saying mass, now massacring their
enemies, now resuming their former profession of sea-rovers; everything is
done in accord with expediency, and without any serious faith.
In Ireland and Brittany grace operates through women, by I know not
what charm of purity and sweetness. The revolt of the Teutons was never
effectually stifled; never did they forget the forced baptisms, and the sword-
supported Carlovingian missionaries, until the day when Teutonism took its
revenge, and Luther through seven centuries gave answer to Witikind. On
the other hand, the Celts were, even in the third century, perfect Christians.
To the Teutons Christianity was for long nothing but a Roman institution,
imposed from without. They entered the Church only to trouble it; and it
was not without very great difficulty that they succeeded in forming a
national clergy. To the Celts, on the contrary, Christianity did not come
from Rome; they had their native clergy, their own peculiar usages, their
faith at first hand. It cannot, in fact, be doubted that in apostolic times
Christianity was preached in Brittany; and several historians, not without
justification, have considered that it was borne there by Judaistic Christians,
or by disciples of the school of St. John. Everywhere else Christianity
found, as a first substratum, Greek or Roman civilisation. Here it found a
virgin soil of a nature analogous to its own, and naturally prepared to
receive it.
Few forms of Christianity have offered an ideal of Christian perfection so
pure as the Celtic Church of the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries.
Nowhere, perhaps, has God been better worshipped in spirit than in those
great monastic communities of Hy, or of Iona, of Bangor, of Clonard, or of
Lindisfarne. One of the most distinguished developments of Christianity—
doubtless too distinguished for the popular and practical mission which the
Church had to undertake—Pelagianism, arose from it. The true and refined
Page 202
morality, the simplicity, and the wealth of invention which give distinction
to the legends of the Breton and Irish saints are indeed admirable. No race
adopted Christianity with so much originality, or, while subjecting itself to
the common faith, kept its national characteristics more persistently. In
religion, as in all else, the Bretons sought isolation, and did not willingly
fraternise with the rest of the world. Strong in their moral superiority,
persuaded that they possessed the veritable canon of faith and religion,
having received their Christianity from an apostolic and wholly primitive
preaching, they experienced no need of feeling themselves in communion
with Christian societies less noble than their own. Thence arose that long
struggle of the Breton churches against Roman pretensions, which is so
admirably narrated by M. Augustin Thierry, [Footnote: In his History of the
Conquest. The objections raised by M. Varin and some other scholars to M.
Thierry's narrative only affect some secondary details, which were rectified
in the edition published after the illustrious historian's death.] thence those
inflexible characters of Columba and the monks of Iona, defending their
usages and institutions against the whole Church, thence finally the false
position of the Celtic peoples in Catholicism, when that mighty force,
grown more and more aggressive, had drawn them together from all
quarters, and compelled their absorption in itself. Having no Catholic past,
they found themselves unclassed on their entrance into the great family, and
were never able to succeed in creating for themselves an Archbishopric. All
their efforts and all their innocent deceits to attribute that title to the
Churches of Dol and St. Davids were wrecked on the overwhelming
divergence of their past; their bishops had to resign themselves to being
obscure suffragans of Tours and Canterbury.
It remains to be said that, even in our own days, the powerful originality
of Celtic Christianity is far from being effaced. The Bretons of France,
although they have felt the consequences of the revolutions undergone by
Catholicism on the Continent, are, at the present hour, one of the
to the legends of the Breton and Irish saints are indeed admirable. No race
adopted Christianity with so much originality, or, while subjecting itself to
the common faith, kept its national characteristics more persistently. In
religion, as in all else, the Bretons sought isolation, and did not willingly
fraternise with the rest of the world. Strong in their moral superiority,
persuaded that they possessed the veritable canon of faith and religion,
having received their Christianity from an apostolic and wholly primitive
preaching, they experienced no need of feeling themselves in communion
with Christian societies less noble than their own. Thence arose that long
struggle of the Breton churches against Roman pretensions, which is so
admirably narrated by M. Augustin Thierry, [Footnote: In his History of the
Conquest. The objections raised by M. Varin and some other scholars to M.
Thierry's narrative only affect some secondary details, which were rectified
in the edition published after the illustrious historian's death.] thence those
inflexible characters of Columba and the monks of Iona, defending their
usages and institutions against the whole Church, thence finally the false
position of the Celtic peoples in Catholicism, when that mighty force,
grown more and more aggressive, had drawn them together from all
quarters, and compelled their absorption in itself. Having no Catholic past,
they found themselves unclassed on their entrance into the great family, and
were never able to succeed in creating for themselves an Archbishopric. All
their efforts and all their innocent deceits to attribute that title to the
Churches of Dol and St. Davids were wrecked on the overwhelming
divergence of their past; their bishops had to resign themselves to being
obscure suffragans of Tours and Canterbury.
It remains to be said that, even in our own days, the powerful originality
of Celtic Christianity is far from being effaced. The Bretons of France,
although they have felt the consequences of the revolutions undergone by
Catholicism on the Continent, are, at the present hour, one of the
Page 203
populations in which religious feeling has retained most independence. The
new devotions find no favour with it; the people are faithful to the old
beliefs and the old saints; the psalms of religion have for them an ineffable
harmony. In the same way, Ireland keeps, in her more remote districts, quite
unique forms of worship from those of the rest of the world, to which
nothing in other parts of Christendom can be compared. The influence of
modern Catholicism, elsewhere so destructive of national usages, has had
here a wholly contrary effect, the clergy having found it incumbent on them
to seek a vantage ground against Protestantism, in attachment to local
practices and the customs of the past.
It is the picture of these Christian institutions, quite distinct from those of
the remainder of the West, of this sometimes strange worship, of these
legends of the saints marked with so distinct a seal of nationality, that lends
an interest to the ecclesiastical antiquities of Ireland, of Wales, and of
Armorican Brittany. No hagiology has remained more exclusively natural
than that of the Celtic peoples; until the twelfth century those peoples
admitted very few alien saints into their martyrology. None, too, includes so
many naturalistic elements. Celtic Paganism offered so little resistance to
the new religion, that the Church did not hold itself constrained to put in
force against it the rigour with which elsewhere it pursued the slightest
traces of mythology. The conscientious essay by W. Rees on the "Saints of
Wales", and that by the Rev. John Williams, an extremely learned
ecclesiastic of the diocese of St. Asaph, on the "Ecclesiastical Antiquities of
the Cymry", suffice to make one understand the immense value which a
complete and intelligent history of the Celtic Churches, before their
absorption in the Roman Church, would possess. To these might be added
the learned work of Dom Lobineau on the Saints of Brittany, re-issued in
our days by the Abbe Tresvaux, had not the half- criticism of the
Benedictine, much worse than a total absence of criticism, altered those
new devotions find no favour with it; the people are faithful to the old
beliefs and the old saints; the psalms of religion have for them an ineffable
harmony. In the same way, Ireland keeps, in her more remote districts, quite
unique forms of worship from those of the rest of the world, to which
nothing in other parts of Christendom can be compared. The influence of
modern Catholicism, elsewhere so destructive of national usages, has had
here a wholly contrary effect, the clergy having found it incumbent on them
to seek a vantage ground against Protestantism, in attachment to local
practices and the customs of the past.
It is the picture of these Christian institutions, quite distinct from those of
the remainder of the West, of this sometimes strange worship, of these
legends of the saints marked with so distinct a seal of nationality, that lends
an interest to the ecclesiastical antiquities of Ireland, of Wales, and of
Armorican Brittany. No hagiology has remained more exclusively natural
than that of the Celtic peoples; until the twelfth century those peoples
admitted very few alien saints into their martyrology. None, too, includes so
many naturalistic elements. Celtic Paganism offered so little resistance to
the new religion, that the Church did not hold itself constrained to put in
force against it the rigour with which elsewhere it pursued the slightest
traces of mythology. The conscientious essay by W. Rees on the "Saints of
Wales", and that by the Rev. John Williams, an extremely learned
ecclesiastic of the diocese of St. Asaph, on the "Ecclesiastical Antiquities of
the Cymry", suffice to make one understand the immense value which a
complete and intelligent history of the Celtic Churches, before their
absorption in the Roman Church, would possess. To these might be added
the learned work of Dom Lobineau on the Saints of Brittany, re-issued in
our days by the Abbe Tresvaux, had not the half- criticism of the
Benedictine, much worse than a total absence of criticism, altered those
Page 204
naive legends and cut away from them, under the pretext of good sense and
religious reverence, that which to us gives them interest and charm.
Ireland above all would offer a religious physiognomy quite peculiar to
itself, which would appear singularly original, were history in a position to
reveal it in its entirety. When we consider the legions of Irish saints who in
the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries inundated the Continent and arrived
from their isle bearing with them their stubborn spirit, their attachment to
their own usages, their subtle and realistic turn of mind, and see the Scots
(such was the name given to the Irish) doing duty, until the twelfth century,
as instructors in grammar and literature to all the West, we cannot doubt
that Ireland, in the first half of the Middle Ages, was the scene of a singular
religious movement. Studious philologists and daring philosophers, the
Hibernian monks were above all indefatigable copyists; and it was in part
owing to them that the work of the pen became a holy task. Columba,
secretly warned that his last hour is at hand, finishes the page of the psalter
which he has commenced, writes at the foot that he bequeaths the
continuation to his successor, and then goes into the church to die. Nowhere
was monastic life to find such docile subjects. Credulous as a child, timid,
indolent, inclined to submit and obey, the Irishman alone was capable of
lending himself to that complete self-abdication in the hands of the abbot,
which we find so deeply marked in the historical and legendary memorials
of the Irish Church. One easily recognises the land where, in our own days,
the priest, without provoking the slightest scandal, can, on a Sunday before
quitting the altar, give the orders for his dinner in a very audible manner,
and announce the farm where he intends to go and dine, and where he will
hear his flock in confession. In the presence of a people which lived by
imagination and the senses alone, the Church did not consider itself under
the necessity of dealing severely with the caprices of religious fantasy. It
permitted the free action of the popular instinct; and from this freedom
emerged what is perhaps of all cults the most mythological and most
religious reverence, that which to us gives them interest and charm.
Ireland above all would offer a religious physiognomy quite peculiar to
itself, which would appear singularly original, were history in a position to
reveal it in its entirety. When we consider the legions of Irish saints who in
the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries inundated the Continent and arrived
from their isle bearing with them their stubborn spirit, their attachment to
their own usages, their subtle and realistic turn of mind, and see the Scots
(such was the name given to the Irish) doing duty, until the twelfth century,
as instructors in grammar and literature to all the West, we cannot doubt
that Ireland, in the first half of the Middle Ages, was the scene of a singular
religious movement. Studious philologists and daring philosophers, the
Hibernian monks were above all indefatigable copyists; and it was in part
owing to them that the work of the pen became a holy task. Columba,
secretly warned that his last hour is at hand, finishes the page of the psalter
which he has commenced, writes at the foot that he bequeaths the
continuation to his successor, and then goes into the church to die. Nowhere
was monastic life to find such docile subjects. Credulous as a child, timid,
indolent, inclined to submit and obey, the Irishman alone was capable of
lending himself to that complete self-abdication in the hands of the abbot,
which we find so deeply marked in the historical and legendary memorials
of the Irish Church. One easily recognises the land where, in our own days,
the priest, without provoking the slightest scandal, can, on a Sunday before
quitting the altar, give the orders for his dinner in a very audible manner,
and announce the farm where he intends to go and dine, and where he will
hear his flock in confession. In the presence of a people which lived by
imagination and the senses alone, the Church did not consider itself under
the necessity of dealing severely with the caprices of religious fantasy. It
permitted the free action of the popular instinct; and from this freedom
emerged what is perhaps of all cults the most mythological and most
Page 205
analogous to the mysteries of antiquity, presented in Christian annals, a cult
attached to certain places, and almost exclusively consisting in certain acts
held to be sacramental.
Without contradiction the legend of St. Brandan is the most singular
product of this combination of Celtic naturalism with Christian spiritualism.
The taste of the Hibernian monks for making maritime pilgrimages through
the archipelago of the Scottish and Irish seas, everywhere dotted with
monasteries, [Footnote: The Irish saints literally covered the Western seas.
A very considerable number of the saints of Brittany, St. Tenenan, St.
Renan, etc., were emigrants from Ireland. The Breton legends of St. Malo,
St. David, and of St. Pol of Leon are replete with similar stories of voyages
to the distant isles of the West.] and the memory of yet more distant
voyages in Polar seas, furnished the framework of this curious composition,
so rich in local impressions. From Pliny (IV. xxx. 3) we learn that, even in
his time, the Bretons loved to venture their lives upon the high seas, in
search of unknown isles. M. Letronne has proved that in 795, sixty-five
years consequently before the Danes, Irish monks landed in Iceland and
established themselves on the coast. In this island the Danes found Irish
books and bells; and the names of certain localities still bear witness to the
sojourn of those monks, who were known by the name of Papae (fathers).
In the Faroe Isles, in the Orkneys, and the Shetlands, indeed in all parts of
the Northern seas, the Scandinavians found themselves preceded by those
Papas, whose habits contrasted so strangely with their own. [Footnote: On
this point see the careful researches of Humboldt in his History of the
Geography of the New Continent, vol. ii.] Did they not have a glimpse too
of that great land, the vague memory of which seems to pursue them, and
which Columbus was to discover, following the traces of their dreams? It is
only known that the existence of an island, traversed by a great river and
situated to the west of Ireland, was, on the faith of the Irish, a dogma for
mediaeval geographers.
attached to certain places, and almost exclusively consisting in certain acts
held to be sacramental.
Without contradiction the legend of St. Brandan is the most singular
product of this combination of Celtic naturalism with Christian spiritualism.
The taste of the Hibernian monks for making maritime pilgrimages through
the archipelago of the Scottish and Irish seas, everywhere dotted with
monasteries, [Footnote: The Irish saints literally covered the Western seas.
A very considerable number of the saints of Brittany, St. Tenenan, St.
Renan, etc., were emigrants from Ireland. The Breton legends of St. Malo,
St. David, and of St. Pol of Leon are replete with similar stories of voyages
to the distant isles of the West.] and the memory of yet more distant
voyages in Polar seas, furnished the framework of this curious composition,
so rich in local impressions. From Pliny (IV. xxx. 3) we learn that, even in
his time, the Bretons loved to venture their lives upon the high seas, in
search of unknown isles. M. Letronne has proved that in 795, sixty-five
years consequently before the Danes, Irish monks landed in Iceland and
established themselves on the coast. In this island the Danes found Irish
books and bells; and the names of certain localities still bear witness to the
sojourn of those monks, who were known by the name of Papae (fathers).
In the Faroe Isles, in the Orkneys, and the Shetlands, indeed in all parts of
the Northern seas, the Scandinavians found themselves preceded by those
Papas, whose habits contrasted so strangely with their own. [Footnote: On
this point see the careful researches of Humboldt in his History of the
Geography of the New Continent, vol. ii.] Did they not have a glimpse too
of that great land, the vague memory of which seems to pursue them, and
which Columbus was to discover, following the traces of their dreams? It is
only known that the existence of an island, traversed by a great river and
situated to the west of Ireland, was, on the faith of the Irish, a dogma for
mediaeval geographers.
Page 206
The story went that, towards the middle of the sixth century, a monk
called Barontus, on his return from voyaging upon the sea, came and craved
hospitality at the monastery of Clonfert. Brandan the abbot besought him to
give pleasure to the brothers by narrating the marvels of God that he had
seen on the high seas. Barontus revealed to them the existence of an island
surrounded by fogs, where he had left his disciple Mernoc; it is the Land of
Promise that God keeps for his saints. Brandan with seventeen of his monks
desired to go in quest of this mysterious land. They set forth in a leather
boat, bearing with them as their sole provision a utensil of butter, wherewith
to grease the hides of their craft. For seven years they lived thus in their
boat, abandoning to God sail and rudder, and only stopping on their course
to celebrate the feasts of Christmas and Easter on the back of the king of
fishes, Jasconius. Every step of this monastic Odyssey is a miracle, on
every isle is a monastery, where the wonders of a fantastical universe
respond to the extravagances of a wholly ideal life. Here is the Isle of
Sheep, where these animals govern themselves according to their own laws;
elsewhere the Paradise of Birds, where the winged race lives after the
fashion of monks, singing matins and lauds at the canonical hours. Brandan
and his companions celebrate mass here with the birds, and remain with
them for fifty days, nourishing themselves with nothing but the singing of
their hosts. Elsewhere there is the Isle of Delight, the ideal of monastic life
in the midst of the seas. Here no material necessity makes itself felt; the
lamps light of themselves for the offices of religion, and never burn out, for
they shine with a spiritual light. An absolute stillness reigns in the island;
every one knows precisely the hour of his death; one feels neither cold, nor
heat, nor sadness, nor sickness of body or soul. All this has endured since
the days of St. Patrick, who so ordained it. The Land of Promise is more
marvellous still; there an eternal day reigns; all the plants have flowers, all
the trees bear fruits. Some privileged men alone have visited it. On their
called Barontus, on his return from voyaging upon the sea, came and craved
hospitality at the monastery of Clonfert. Brandan the abbot besought him to
give pleasure to the brothers by narrating the marvels of God that he had
seen on the high seas. Barontus revealed to them the existence of an island
surrounded by fogs, where he had left his disciple Mernoc; it is the Land of
Promise that God keeps for his saints. Brandan with seventeen of his monks
desired to go in quest of this mysterious land. They set forth in a leather
boat, bearing with them as their sole provision a utensil of butter, wherewith
to grease the hides of their craft. For seven years they lived thus in their
boat, abandoning to God sail and rudder, and only stopping on their course
to celebrate the feasts of Christmas and Easter on the back of the king of
fishes, Jasconius. Every step of this monastic Odyssey is a miracle, on
every isle is a monastery, where the wonders of a fantastical universe
respond to the extravagances of a wholly ideal life. Here is the Isle of
Sheep, where these animals govern themselves according to their own laws;
elsewhere the Paradise of Birds, where the winged race lives after the
fashion of monks, singing matins and lauds at the canonical hours. Brandan
and his companions celebrate mass here with the birds, and remain with
them for fifty days, nourishing themselves with nothing but the singing of
their hosts. Elsewhere there is the Isle of Delight, the ideal of monastic life
in the midst of the seas. Here no material necessity makes itself felt; the
lamps light of themselves for the offices of religion, and never burn out, for
they shine with a spiritual light. An absolute stillness reigns in the island;
every one knows precisely the hour of his death; one feels neither cold, nor
heat, nor sadness, nor sickness of body or soul. All this has endured since
the days of St. Patrick, who so ordained it. The Land of Promise is more
marvellous still; there an eternal day reigns; all the plants have flowers, all
the trees bear fruits. Some privileged men alone have visited it. On their
Page 207
return a perfume is perceived to come from them, which their garments
keep for forty days.
In the midst of these dreams there appears with a surprising fidelity to
truth the feeling for the picturesque in Polar voyages,- -the transparency of
the sea, the aspect of bergs and islands of ice melting in the sun, the
volcanic phenomena of Iceland, the sporting of whales, the characteristic
appearance of the Norwegian fiords, the sudden fogs, the sea calm as milk,
the green isles crowned with grass which grows down to the very verge of
the waves. This fantastical nature created expressly for another humanity,
this strange topography at once glowing with fiction and speaking of truth,
make the poem of St. Brandan one of the most extraordinary creations of
the human mind, and perhaps the completest expression of the Celtic ideal.
All is lovely, pure, and innocent; never has a gaze so benevolent and so
gentle been cast upon the earth; there is not a single cruel idea, not a trace
of frailty or repentance. It is the world seen through the crystal of a stainless
conscience, one might almost say a human nature, as Pelagius wished it,
that has never sinned. The very animals participate in this universal
mildness. Evil appears under the form of monsters wandering on the deep,
or of Cyclops confined in volcanic islands; but God causes them to destroy
one another, and does not permit them to do hurt to the good.
We have just seen how, around the legend of a monk the Irish
imagination grouped a whole cycle of physical and maritime myths. The
Purgatory of St. Patrick became the framework of another series of fables,
embodying the Celtic ideas concerning the other life and its different
conditions. [Footnote: See Thomas Wright's excellent dissertation, Saint
Patrick's Purgatory (London, 1844), and Calderon's The Well of Saint
Patrick.] Perhaps the profoundest instinct of the Celtic peoples is their
desire to penetrate the unknown. With the sea before them, they wish to
know what lies beyond; they dream of a Promised Land. In the face of the
keep for forty days.
In the midst of these dreams there appears with a surprising fidelity to
truth the feeling for the picturesque in Polar voyages,- -the transparency of
the sea, the aspect of bergs and islands of ice melting in the sun, the
volcanic phenomena of Iceland, the sporting of whales, the characteristic
appearance of the Norwegian fiords, the sudden fogs, the sea calm as milk,
the green isles crowned with grass which grows down to the very verge of
the waves. This fantastical nature created expressly for another humanity,
this strange topography at once glowing with fiction and speaking of truth,
make the poem of St. Brandan one of the most extraordinary creations of
the human mind, and perhaps the completest expression of the Celtic ideal.
All is lovely, pure, and innocent; never has a gaze so benevolent and so
gentle been cast upon the earth; there is not a single cruel idea, not a trace
of frailty or repentance. It is the world seen through the crystal of a stainless
conscience, one might almost say a human nature, as Pelagius wished it,
that has never sinned. The very animals participate in this universal
mildness. Evil appears under the form of monsters wandering on the deep,
or of Cyclops confined in volcanic islands; but God causes them to destroy
one another, and does not permit them to do hurt to the good.
We have just seen how, around the legend of a monk the Irish
imagination grouped a whole cycle of physical and maritime myths. The
Purgatory of St. Patrick became the framework of another series of fables,
embodying the Celtic ideas concerning the other life and its different
conditions. [Footnote: See Thomas Wright's excellent dissertation, Saint
Patrick's Purgatory (London, 1844), and Calderon's The Well of Saint
Patrick.] Perhaps the profoundest instinct of the Celtic peoples is their
desire to penetrate the unknown. With the sea before them, they wish to
know what lies beyond; they dream of a Promised Land. In the face of the
Page 208
unknown that lies beyond the tomb, they dream of that great journey which
the pen of Dante has celebrated. The legend tells how, while St. Patrick was
preaching about Paradise and Hell to the Irish, they confessed that they
would feel more assured of the reality of these places, if he would allow one
of them to descend there, and then come back with information St. Patrick
consented. A pit was dug, by which an Irishman set out upon the
subterranean journey. Others wished to attempt the journey after him. With
the consent of the abbot of the neighbouring monastery, they descended into
the shaft, they passed through the torments of Hell and Purgatory, and then
each told of what he had seen. Some did not emerge again; those who did
laughed no more, and were henceforth unable to join in any gaiety. Knight
Owen made a descent in 1153, and gave a narrative of his travels which had
a prodigious success.
Other legends related that when St. Patrick drove the goblins out of
Ireland, he was greatly tormented in this place for forty days by legions of
black birds. The Irish betook themselves to the spot, and experienced the
same assaults which gave them an immunity from Purgatory. According to
the narrative of Giraldus Cambrensis, the isle which served as the theatre of
this strange superstition was divided into two parts. One belonged to the
monks, the other was occupied by evil spirits, who celebrated religious rites
in their own manner, with an infernal uproar. Some people, for the expiation
of their sins, voluntarily exposed themselves to the fury of those demons.
There were nine ditches in which they lay for a night, tormented in a
thousand different ways. To make the descent it was necessary to obtain the
permission of the bishop. His duty it was to dissuade the penitent from
attempting the adventure, and to point out to him how many people had
gone in who had never come out again. If the devotee persisted, he was
ceremoniously conducted to the shaft. He was lowered down by means of a
rope, with a loaf and a vessel of water to strengthen him in the combat
against the fiend which he proposed to wage. On the following morning the
the pen of Dante has celebrated. The legend tells how, while St. Patrick was
preaching about Paradise and Hell to the Irish, they confessed that they
would feel more assured of the reality of these places, if he would allow one
of them to descend there, and then come back with information St. Patrick
consented. A pit was dug, by which an Irishman set out upon the
subterranean journey. Others wished to attempt the journey after him. With
the consent of the abbot of the neighbouring monastery, they descended into
the shaft, they passed through the torments of Hell and Purgatory, and then
each told of what he had seen. Some did not emerge again; those who did
laughed no more, and were henceforth unable to join in any gaiety. Knight
Owen made a descent in 1153, and gave a narrative of his travels which had
a prodigious success.
Other legends related that when St. Patrick drove the goblins out of
Ireland, he was greatly tormented in this place for forty days by legions of
black birds. The Irish betook themselves to the spot, and experienced the
same assaults which gave them an immunity from Purgatory. According to
the narrative of Giraldus Cambrensis, the isle which served as the theatre of
this strange superstition was divided into two parts. One belonged to the
monks, the other was occupied by evil spirits, who celebrated religious rites
in their own manner, with an infernal uproar. Some people, for the expiation
of their sins, voluntarily exposed themselves to the fury of those demons.
There were nine ditches in which they lay for a night, tormented in a
thousand different ways. To make the descent it was necessary to obtain the
permission of the bishop. His duty it was to dissuade the penitent from
attempting the adventure, and to point out to him how many people had
gone in who had never come out again. If the devotee persisted, he was
ceremoniously conducted to the shaft. He was lowered down by means of a
rope, with a loaf and a vessel of water to strengthen him in the combat
against the fiend which he proposed to wage. On the following morning the
Page 209
sacristan offered the rope anew to the sufferer. If he mounted to the surface
again, they brought him back to the church, bearing the cross and chanting
psalms. If he were not to be found, the sacristan closed the door and
departed. In more modern times pilgrims to the sacred isles spent nine days
there. They passed over to them in a boat hollowed out of the trunk of a
tree. Once a day they drank of the water of the lake; processions and
stations were performed in the beds or cells of the saints. Upon the ninth
day the penitents entered into the shaft. Sermons were preached to them
warning them of the danger they were about to run, and they were told of
terrible examples. They forgave their enemies and took farewell of one
another, as though they were at their last agony. According to contemporary
accounts, the shaft was a low and narrow kiln, into which nine entered at a
time, and in which the penitents passed a day and a night, huddled and
tightly pressed against one another. Popular belief imagined an abyss
underneath, to swallow up the unworthy and the unbelieving. On emerging
from the pit they went and bathed in the lake, and so their Purgatory was
accomplished. It would appear from the accounts of eye-witnesses that, to
this day, things happen very nearly after the same fashion.
The immense reputation of the Purgatory of St. Patrick filled the whole
of the Middle Ages. Preachers made appeal to the public notoriety of this
great fact, to controvert those who had their doubts regarding Purgatory. In
the year 1358 Edward III. gave to a Hungarian of noble birth, who had
come from Hungary expressly to visit the sacred well, letters patent
attesting that he had undergone his Purgatory. Narratives of those travels
beyond the tomb became a very fashionable form of literature; and it is
important for us to remark the wholly mythological, and as wholly Celtic,
characteristics dominant in them. It is in fact evident that we are dealing
with a mystery or local cult, anterior to Christianity, and probably based
upon the physical appearance of the country. The idea of Purgatory, in its
final and concrete form, fared specially well amongst the Bretons and the
again, they brought him back to the church, bearing the cross and chanting
psalms. If he were not to be found, the sacristan closed the door and
departed. In more modern times pilgrims to the sacred isles spent nine days
there. They passed over to them in a boat hollowed out of the trunk of a
tree. Once a day they drank of the water of the lake; processions and
stations were performed in the beds or cells of the saints. Upon the ninth
day the penitents entered into the shaft. Sermons were preached to them
warning them of the danger they were about to run, and they were told of
terrible examples. They forgave their enemies and took farewell of one
another, as though they were at their last agony. According to contemporary
accounts, the shaft was a low and narrow kiln, into which nine entered at a
time, and in which the penitents passed a day and a night, huddled and
tightly pressed against one another. Popular belief imagined an abyss
underneath, to swallow up the unworthy and the unbelieving. On emerging
from the pit they went and bathed in the lake, and so their Purgatory was
accomplished. It would appear from the accounts of eye-witnesses that, to
this day, things happen very nearly after the same fashion.
The immense reputation of the Purgatory of St. Patrick filled the whole
of the Middle Ages. Preachers made appeal to the public notoriety of this
great fact, to controvert those who had their doubts regarding Purgatory. In
the year 1358 Edward III. gave to a Hungarian of noble birth, who had
come from Hungary expressly to visit the sacred well, letters patent
attesting that he had undergone his Purgatory. Narratives of those travels
beyond the tomb became a very fashionable form of literature; and it is
important for us to remark the wholly mythological, and as wholly Celtic,
characteristics dominant in them. It is in fact evident that we are dealing
with a mystery or local cult, anterior to Christianity, and probably based
upon the physical appearance of the country. The idea of Purgatory, in its
final and concrete form, fared specially well amongst the Bretons and the
Page 210
Irish. Bede is one of the first to speak of it in a descriptive manner, and the
learned Mr. Wright very justly observes that nearly all the descriptions of
Purgatory come from Irishmen, or from Anglo-Saxons who have resided in
Ireland, such as St. Fursey, Tundale, the Northumbrian Dryhthelm, and
Knight Owen. It is likewise a remarkable thing that only the Irish were able
to behold the marvels of their Purgatory. A canon from Hemstede in
Holland, who descended in 1494, saw nothing at all. Evidently this idea of
travels in the other world and its infernal categories, as the Middle Ages
accepted it, is Celtic. The belief in the three circles of existence is again to
be found in the Triads, [Footnote: A series of aphorisms under the form of
triplets, which give us, with numerous interpolations, the ancient teaching
of the bards, and that traditional wisdom which, according to the testimony
of the ancients, was transmitted by means of mnemonic verses in the
schools of the Druids. under an aspect which does not permit one to see any
Christian interpolation.]
The soul's peregrinations after death are also the favourite theme of the
most ancient Armorican poetry. Among the features by which the Celtic
races most impressed the Romans were the precision of their ideas upon the
future life, their inclination to suicide, and the loans and contracts which
they signed with the other world in view. The more frivolous peoples of the
South saw with awe in this assurance the fact of a mysterious race, having
an understanding of the future and the secret of death. Through the whole of
classical antiquity runs the tradition of an Isle of Shadows, situated on the
confines of Brittany, and of a folk devoted to the passage of souls, which
lives upon the neighbouring coast. In the night they hear dead men prowling
about their cabin, and knocking at the door. Then they rise up; their craft is
laden with invisible beings; on their return it is lighter. Several of these
features reproduced by Plutarch, Claudian, Procopius, [Footnote: A
Byzantine historian of the fifth and sixth centuries.] and Tzetzes [Footnote:
A Greek poet and grammarian of the twelfth century.] would incline one to
learned Mr. Wright very justly observes that nearly all the descriptions of
Purgatory come from Irishmen, or from Anglo-Saxons who have resided in
Ireland, such as St. Fursey, Tundale, the Northumbrian Dryhthelm, and
Knight Owen. It is likewise a remarkable thing that only the Irish were able
to behold the marvels of their Purgatory. A canon from Hemstede in
Holland, who descended in 1494, saw nothing at all. Evidently this idea of
travels in the other world and its infernal categories, as the Middle Ages
accepted it, is Celtic. The belief in the three circles of existence is again to
be found in the Triads, [Footnote: A series of aphorisms under the form of
triplets, which give us, with numerous interpolations, the ancient teaching
of the bards, and that traditional wisdom which, according to the testimony
of the ancients, was transmitted by means of mnemonic verses in the
schools of the Druids. under an aspect which does not permit one to see any
Christian interpolation.]
The soul's peregrinations after death are also the favourite theme of the
most ancient Armorican poetry. Among the features by which the Celtic
races most impressed the Romans were the precision of their ideas upon the
future life, their inclination to suicide, and the loans and contracts which
they signed with the other world in view. The more frivolous peoples of the
South saw with awe in this assurance the fact of a mysterious race, having
an understanding of the future and the secret of death. Through the whole of
classical antiquity runs the tradition of an Isle of Shadows, situated on the
confines of Brittany, and of a folk devoted to the passage of souls, which
lives upon the neighbouring coast. In the night they hear dead men prowling
about their cabin, and knocking at the door. Then they rise up; their craft is
laden with invisible beings; on their return it is lighter. Several of these
features reproduced by Plutarch, Claudian, Procopius, [Footnote: A
Byzantine historian of the fifth and sixth centuries.] and Tzetzes [Footnote:
A Greek poet and grammarian of the twelfth century.] would incline one to
Page 211
believe that the renown of the Irish myths made its way into classical
antiquity about the first or second century. Plutarch, for example, relates,
concerning the Cronian Sea, fables identical with those which fill the
legend of St. Malo. Procopius, describing the sacred Island of Brittia, which
consists of two parts separated by the sea, one delightful, the other given
over to evil spirits, seems to have read in advance the description of the
Purgatory of St. Patrick, which Giraldus Cambrensis was to give seven
centuries later. It cannot be doubted for a moment, after the able researches
of Messrs. Ozanam, Labitte, and Wright, that to the number of poetical
themes which Europe owes to the genius of the Celts, is to be added the
framework of the Divine Comedy.
One can understand how greatly this invincible attraction to fables must
have discredited the Celtic race in the eyes of nationalities that believed
themselves to be more serious. It is in truth a strange thing, that the whole
of the mediaeval epoch, whilst submitting to the influence of the Celtic
imagination, and borrowing from Brittany and Ireland at least half of its
poetical subjects, believed itself obliged, for the saving of its own honour,
to slight and satirise the people to which it owed them. Even Chretien de
Troyes, for example, who passed his life in exploiting the Breton romances
for his own purposes, originated the saying—
"Les Gallois sont tous par nature
Plus sots que betes de pature."
Some English chronicler, I know not who, imagined he was making a
charming play upon words when he described those beautiful creations, the
whole world of which deserved to live, as "the childish nonsense with
which those brutes of Bretons amuse themselves." The Bollandists
[Footnote: A group of Jesuits who issued a collection of "Lives of the
Saints". The first five volumes were edited by John Bolland.] found it
antiquity about the first or second century. Plutarch, for example, relates,
concerning the Cronian Sea, fables identical with those which fill the
legend of St. Malo. Procopius, describing the sacred Island of Brittia, which
consists of two parts separated by the sea, one delightful, the other given
over to evil spirits, seems to have read in advance the description of the
Purgatory of St. Patrick, which Giraldus Cambrensis was to give seven
centuries later. It cannot be doubted for a moment, after the able researches
of Messrs. Ozanam, Labitte, and Wright, that to the number of poetical
themes which Europe owes to the genius of the Celts, is to be added the
framework of the Divine Comedy.
One can understand how greatly this invincible attraction to fables must
have discredited the Celtic race in the eyes of nationalities that believed
themselves to be more serious. It is in truth a strange thing, that the whole
of the mediaeval epoch, whilst submitting to the influence of the Celtic
imagination, and borrowing from Brittany and Ireland at least half of its
poetical subjects, believed itself obliged, for the saving of its own honour,
to slight and satirise the people to which it owed them. Even Chretien de
Troyes, for example, who passed his life in exploiting the Breton romances
for his own purposes, originated the saying—
"Les Gallois sont tous par nature
Plus sots que betes de pature."
Some English chronicler, I know not who, imagined he was making a
charming play upon words when he described those beautiful creations, the
whole world of which deserved to live, as "the childish nonsense with
which those brutes of Bretons amuse themselves." The Bollandists
[Footnote: A group of Jesuits who issued a collection of "Lives of the
Saints". The first five volumes were edited by John Bolland.] found it
Page 212
incumbent to exclude from their collection, as apocryphal extravagances,
those admirable religious legends, with which no Church has anything to
compare. The decided leaning of the Celtic race towards the ideal, its
sadness, its fidelity, its good faith, caused it to be regarded by its neighbours
as dull, foolish, and superstitious. They could not understand its delicacy
and refined manner of feeling. They mistook for awkwardness the
embarrassment experienced by sincere and open natures in the presence of
more artificial natures. The contrast between French frivolity and Breton
stubbornness above all led, after the fourteenth century, to most deplorable
conflicts, whence the Bretons ever emerged with a reputation for wrong-
headedness.
It was still worse, when the nation that most prides itself on its practical
good sense found confronting it the people that, to its own misfortune, is
least provided with that gift. Poor Ireland, with her ancient mythology, with
her Purgatory of St. Patrick, and her fantastic travels of St. Brandan, was
not destined to find grace in the eyes of English puritanism. One ought to
observe the disdain of English critics for these fables, and their superb pity
for the Church which dallies with Paganism, so far as to keep up usages
which are notoriously derived from it. Assuredly we have here a
praiseworthy zeal, arising from natural goodness; and yet, even if these
flights of imagination did no more than render a little more supportable
many sufferings which are said to have no remedy, that after all would be
something. Who shall dare to say where, here on earth, is the boundary
between reason and dreaming? Which is worth more, the imaginative
instinct of man, or the narrow orthodoxy that pretends to remain rational,
when speaking of things divine? For my own part, I prefer the frank
mythology, with all its vagaries, to a theology so paltry, so vulgar, and so
colourless, that it would be wronging God to believe that, after having made
the visible world so beautiful he should have made the invisible world so
prosaically reasonable.
those admirable religious legends, with which no Church has anything to
compare. The decided leaning of the Celtic race towards the ideal, its
sadness, its fidelity, its good faith, caused it to be regarded by its neighbours
as dull, foolish, and superstitious. They could not understand its delicacy
and refined manner of feeling. They mistook for awkwardness the
embarrassment experienced by sincere and open natures in the presence of
more artificial natures. The contrast between French frivolity and Breton
stubbornness above all led, after the fourteenth century, to most deplorable
conflicts, whence the Bretons ever emerged with a reputation for wrong-
headedness.
It was still worse, when the nation that most prides itself on its practical
good sense found confronting it the people that, to its own misfortune, is
least provided with that gift. Poor Ireland, with her ancient mythology, with
her Purgatory of St. Patrick, and her fantastic travels of St. Brandan, was
not destined to find grace in the eyes of English puritanism. One ought to
observe the disdain of English critics for these fables, and their superb pity
for the Church which dallies with Paganism, so far as to keep up usages
which are notoriously derived from it. Assuredly we have here a
praiseworthy zeal, arising from natural goodness; and yet, even if these
flights of imagination did no more than render a little more supportable
many sufferings which are said to have no remedy, that after all would be
something. Who shall dare to say where, here on earth, is the boundary
between reason and dreaming? Which is worth more, the imaginative
instinct of man, or the narrow orthodoxy that pretends to remain rational,
when speaking of things divine? For my own part, I prefer the frank
mythology, with all its vagaries, to a theology so paltry, so vulgar, and so
colourless, that it would be wronging God to believe that, after having made
the visible world so beautiful he should have made the invisible world so
prosaically reasonable.
Page 213
In presence of the ever-encroaching progress of a civilisation which is of
no country, and can receive no name, other than that of modern or
European, it would be puerile to hope that the Celtic race is in the future to
succeed in obtaining isolated expression of its originality. And yet we are
far from believing that this race has said its last word. After having put in
practice all chivalries, devout and worldly, gone with Peredur in quest of
the Holy Grail and fair ladies, and dreamed with St. Brandan of mystical
Atlantides, who knows what it would produce in the domain of intellect, if
it hardened itself to an entrance into the world, and subjected its rich and
profound nature to the conditions of modern thought? It appears to me that
there would result from this combination, productions of high originality, a
subtle and discreet manner of taking life, a singular union of strength and
weakness, of rude simplicity and mildness. Few races have had so complete
a poetic childhood as the Celtic; mythology, lyric poetry, epic, romantic
imagination, religious enthusiasm—none of these failed them; why should
reflection fail them? Germany, which commenced with science and
criticism, has come to poetry; why should not the Celtic races, which began
with poetry, finish with criticism? There is not so great a distance from one
to the other as is supposed; the poetical races are the philosophic races, and
at bottom philosophy is only a manner of poetry. When one considers how
Germany, less than a century ago, had her genius revealed to her, how a
multitude of national individualities, to all appearance effaced, have
suddenly risen again in our own days, more instinct with life than ever, one
feels persuaded that it is a rash thing to lay down any law on the
intermittence and awakening of nations; and that modern civilisation, which
appeared to be made to absorb them, may perhaps be nothing more than
their united fruition.
no country, and can receive no name, other than that of modern or
European, it would be puerile to hope that the Celtic race is in the future to
succeed in obtaining isolated expression of its originality. And yet we are
far from believing that this race has said its last word. After having put in
practice all chivalries, devout and worldly, gone with Peredur in quest of
the Holy Grail and fair ladies, and dreamed with St. Brandan of mystical
Atlantides, who knows what it would produce in the domain of intellect, if
it hardened itself to an entrance into the world, and subjected its rich and
profound nature to the conditions of modern thought? It appears to me that
there would result from this combination, productions of high originality, a
subtle and discreet manner of taking life, a singular union of strength and
weakness, of rude simplicity and mildness. Few races have had so complete
a poetic childhood as the Celtic; mythology, lyric poetry, epic, romantic
imagination, religious enthusiasm—none of these failed them; why should
reflection fail them? Germany, which commenced with science and
criticism, has come to poetry; why should not the Celtic races, which began
with poetry, finish with criticism? There is not so great a distance from one
to the other as is supposed; the poetical races are the philosophic races, and
at bottom philosophy is only a manner of poetry. When one considers how
Germany, less than a century ago, had her genius revealed to her, how a
multitude of national individualities, to all appearance effaced, have
suddenly risen again in our own days, more instinct with life than ever, one
feels persuaded that it is a rash thing to lay down any law on the
intermittence and awakening of nations; and that modern civilisation, which
appeared to be made to absorb them, may perhaps be nothing more than
their united fruition.
Page 214
THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE
BY
GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSINO
TRANSLATED BY
F. W. ROBERTSON
BY
GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSINO
TRANSLATED BY
F. W. ROBERTSON
Page 215
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Lessing's life has been sketched in the introduction to his "Minna von
Barnhelm" in the volume of Continental Dramas in The Harvard Classics.
"The Education of the Human Race" is the culmination of a bitter
theological controversy which began with the publication by Lessing, in
1774-1778, of a series of fragments of a work on natural religion by the
German deist, Reimarus. This action brought upon Lessing the wrath of the
orthodox German Protestants, led by J. M. Goeze, and in the battle that
followed Lessing did his great work for the liberalising of religious thought
in Germany. The present treatise is an extraordinarily condensed statement
of the author's attitude towards the fundamental questions of religion, and
gives his view of the signification of the previous religious history of
mankind, along with his faith And hope for the future.
As originally issued, the essay purported to be merely edited by Lessing;
but there is no longer any doubt as to his having been its author. It is an
admirable and characteristic expression of the serious and elevated spirit in
which he dealt with matters that had then, as often, been degraded by the
virulence of controversy.
Lessing's life has been sketched in the introduction to his "Minna von
Barnhelm" in the volume of Continental Dramas in The Harvard Classics.
"The Education of the Human Race" is the culmination of a bitter
theological controversy which began with the publication by Lessing, in
1774-1778, of a series of fragments of a work on natural religion by the
German deist, Reimarus. This action brought upon Lessing the wrath of the
orthodox German Protestants, led by J. M. Goeze, and in the battle that
followed Lessing did his great work for the liberalising of religious thought
in Germany. The present treatise is an extraordinarily condensed statement
of the author's attitude towards the fundamental questions of religion, and
gives his view of the signification of the previous religious history of
mankind, along with his faith And hope for the future.
As originally issued, the essay purported to be merely edited by Lessing;
but there is no longer any doubt as to his having been its author. It is an
admirable and characteristic expression of the serious and elevated spirit in
which he dealt with matters that had then, as often, been degraded by the
virulence of controversy.
Page 216
THE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE
1
That which Education is to the Individual, Revelation is to the
Race.
2
Education is Revelation coming to the Individual Man; and Revelation is
Education which has come, and is yet coming, to the Human Race.
3
Whether it can be of any advantage to the science of instruction to
contemplate Education in this point of view, I will not here inquire; but in
Theology it may unquestionably be of great advantage, and may remove
many difficulties, if Revelation be conceived of as the Educator of
Humanity.
4
Education gives to Man nothing which he might not educe out of
himself; it gives him that which he might educe out of himself, only quicker
and more easily. In the same way too, Revelation gives nothing to the
1
That which Education is to the Individual, Revelation is to the
Race.
2
Education is Revelation coming to the Individual Man; and Revelation is
Education which has come, and is yet coming, to the Human Race.
3
Whether it can be of any advantage to the science of instruction to
contemplate Education in this point of view, I will not here inquire; but in
Theology it may unquestionably be of great advantage, and may remove
many difficulties, if Revelation be conceived of as the Educator of
Humanity.
4
Education gives to Man nothing which he might not educe out of
himself; it gives him that which he might educe out of himself, only quicker
and more easily. In the same way too, Revelation gives nothing to the
Page 217
human species, which the human reason left to itself might not attain; only
it has given, and still gives to it, the most important of these things earlier.
5
And just as in Education, it is not a matter of indifference in what order
the powers of a man are developed, as it cannot impart to a man all at once;
so was God also necessitated to maintain a certain order, and a certain
measure in His Revelation.
6
Even if the first man were furnished at once with a conception of the One
God; yet it was not possible that this conception, imparted, and not gained
by thought, should subsist long in its clearness. As soon as the Human
Reason, left to itself, began to elaborate it, it broke up the one
Immeasurable into many Measurables, and gave a note or sign of mark to
every one of these parts.
7
Hence naturally arose polytheism and idolatry. And who can say how
many millions of years human reason would have been bewildered in these
errors, even though in all places and times there were individual men who
recognized them as errors, had it not pleased God to afford it a better
direction by means of a new Impulse?
8
But when He neither could nor would reveal Himself any more to each
individual man, He selected an individual People for His special education;
and that exactly the most rude and the most unruly, in order to begin with it
from the very commencement.
it has given, and still gives to it, the most important of these things earlier.
5
And just as in Education, it is not a matter of indifference in what order
the powers of a man are developed, as it cannot impart to a man all at once;
so was God also necessitated to maintain a certain order, and a certain
measure in His Revelation.
6
Even if the first man were furnished at once with a conception of the One
God; yet it was not possible that this conception, imparted, and not gained
by thought, should subsist long in its clearness. As soon as the Human
Reason, left to itself, began to elaborate it, it broke up the one
Immeasurable into many Measurables, and gave a note or sign of mark to
every one of these parts.
7
Hence naturally arose polytheism and idolatry. And who can say how
many millions of years human reason would have been bewildered in these
errors, even though in all places and times there were individual men who
recognized them as errors, had it not pleased God to afford it a better
direction by means of a new Impulse?
8
But when He neither could nor would reveal Himself any more to each
individual man, He selected an individual People for His special education;
and that exactly the most rude and the most unruly, in order to begin with it
from the very commencement.
Page 218
9
This was the Hebrew People, respecting whom we do not in the least
know what kind of Divine Worship they had in Egypt. For so despised a
race of slaves was not permitted to take part in the worship of the
Egyptians; and the God of their fathers was entirely unknown to them.
10
It is possible that the Egyptians had expressly prohibited the Hebrews
from having a God or Gods, perhaps they had forced upon them the belief
that their despised race had no God, no Gods, that to have a God or Gods
was the prerogative of the superior Egyptians only, and this may have been
so held in order to have the power of tyrannising over them with a greater
show of fairness. Do Christians even now do much better with their slaves?
11
To this rude people God caused Himself to be announced first, simply as
"the God of their fathers," in order to make them acquainted and familiar
with the idea of a God belonging to them also, and to begin with confidence
in Him.
12
Through the miracles with which He led them out of Egypt, and planted
them in Canaan, He testified of Himself to them as a God mightier than any
other God.
13
And as He proceeded, demonstrating Himself to be the Mightiest of all,
which only One can be, He gradually accustomed them thus to the idea of
This was the Hebrew People, respecting whom we do not in the least
know what kind of Divine Worship they had in Egypt. For so despised a
race of slaves was not permitted to take part in the worship of the
Egyptians; and the God of their fathers was entirely unknown to them.
10
It is possible that the Egyptians had expressly prohibited the Hebrews
from having a God or Gods, perhaps they had forced upon them the belief
that their despised race had no God, no Gods, that to have a God or Gods
was the prerogative of the superior Egyptians only, and this may have been
so held in order to have the power of tyrannising over them with a greater
show of fairness. Do Christians even now do much better with their slaves?
11
To this rude people God caused Himself to be announced first, simply as
"the God of their fathers," in order to make them acquainted and familiar
with the idea of a God belonging to them also, and to begin with confidence
in Him.
12
Through the miracles with which He led them out of Egypt, and planted
them in Canaan, He testified of Himself to them as a God mightier than any
other God.
13
And as He proceeded, demonstrating Himself to be the Mightiest of all,
which only One can be, He gradually accustomed them thus to the idea of
Page 219
THE ONE.
14
But how far was this conception of The One, below the true
transcendental conception of the One which Reason learnt to derive, so late
with certainty, from the conception of the Infinite One?
15
Although the best of the people were already more or less approaching
the true conception of the One only, the people as a whole could not for a
long time elevate themselves to it. And this was the sole true reason why
they so often abandoned their one God, and expected to find the One, i. e.,
as they meant, the Mightiest, in some God or other, belonging to another
people.
16
But of what kind of moral education was a people so raw, so incapable of
abstract thoughts, and so entirely in their childhood capable? Of none other
but such as is adapted to the age of children, an education by rewards and
punishments addressed to the senses.
17
Here too Education and Revelation meet together. As yet God could give
to His people no other religion, no other law than one through obedience to
which they might hope to be happy, or through disobedience to which they
must fear to be unhappy. For as yet their regards went no further than this
earth. They knew of no immortality of the soul; they yearned after no life to
come. But now to reveal these things to one whose reason had as yet so
little growth, what would it have been but the same fault in the Divine Rule
14
But how far was this conception of The One, below the true
transcendental conception of the One which Reason learnt to derive, so late
with certainty, from the conception of the Infinite One?
15
Although the best of the people were already more or less approaching
the true conception of the One only, the people as a whole could not for a
long time elevate themselves to it. And this was the sole true reason why
they so often abandoned their one God, and expected to find the One, i. e.,
as they meant, the Mightiest, in some God or other, belonging to another
people.
16
But of what kind of moral education was a people so raw, so incapable of
abstract thoughts, and so entirely in their childhood capable? Of none other
but such as is adapted to the age of children, an education by rewards and
punishments addressed to the senses.
17
Here too Education and Revelation meet together. As yet God could give
to His people no other religion, no other law than one through obedience to
which they might hope to be happy, or through disobedience to which they
must fear to be unhappy. For as yet their regards went no further than this
earth. They knew of no immortality of the soul; they yearned after no life to
come. But now to reveal these things to one whose reason had as yet so
little growth, what would it have been but the same fault in the Divine Rule
Page 220
as is committed by the schoolmaster, who chooses to hurry his pupil too
rapidly, and boast of his progress, rather than thoroughly to ground him?
18
But, it will be asked, to what purpose was this education of so rude a
people, a people with whom God had to begin so entirely from the
beginning? I reply, in order that in the process of time He might employ
particular members of this nation as the Teachers of other people. He was
bringing up in them the future Teachers of the human race. It was the Jews
who became their teachers, none but Jews; only men out of a people so
brought up, could be their teachers.
19
For to proceed. When the Child by dint of blows and caresses had grown
and was now come to years of understanding, the Father sent it at once into
foreign countries: and here it recognised at once the Good which in its
Father's house it had possessed, and had not been conscious of.
20.
While God guided His chosen people through all the degrees of a child-
like education, the other nations of the earth had gone on by the light of
reason. The most part had remained far behind the chosen people. Only a
few had got before them. And this too, takes place with children, who are
allowed to grow up left to themselves: many remain quite raw, some
educate themselves even to an astonishing degree.
21
But as these more fortunate few prove nothing against the use and
necessity of Education, so the few heathen nations, who even appear to
rapidly, and boast of his progress, rather than thoroughly to ground him?
18
But, it will be asked, to what purpose was this education of so rude a
people, a people with whom God had to begin so entirely from the
beginning? I reply, in order that in the process of time He might employ
particular members of this nation as the Teachers of other people. He was
bringing up in them the future Teachers of the human race. It was the Jews
who became their teachers, none but Jews; only men out of a people so
brought up, could be their teachers.
19
For to proceed. When the Child by dint of blows and caresses had grown
and was now come to years of understanding, the Father sent it at once into
foreign countries: and here it recognised at once the Good which in its
Father's house it had possessed, and had not been conscious of.
20.
While God guided His chosen people through all the degrees of a child-
like education, the other nations of the earth had gone on by the light of
reason. The most part had remained far behind the chosen people. Only a
few had got before them. And this too, takes place with children, who are
allowed to grow up left to themselves: many remain quite raw, some
educate themselves even to an astonishing degree.
21
But as these more fortunate few prove nothing against the use and
necessity of Education, so the few heathen nations, who even appear to
Page 221
have made a start in the knowledge of God before the chosen people, prove
nothing against a Revelation. The Child of Education begins with slow yet
sure footsteps; it is late in overtaking many a more happily organised child
of nature; but it does overtake it; and thenceforth can never be distanced by
it again.
22
Similarly—Putting aside the doctrine of the Unity of God, which in a
way is found, and in a way is not found, in the books of the Old Testament
—that the doctrine of immortality at least is not discoverable in it, is wholly
foreign to it, that all doctrine connected therewith of reward and
punishment in a future life, proves just as little against the Divine origin of
these books. Notwithstanding the absence of these doctrines, the account of
miracles and prophecies may be perfectly true. For let us suppose that these
doctrines were not only wanting therein, but even that they were not at all
true; let us suppose that for mankind all was over in this life; would the
Being of God be for this reason less demonstrated? Would God be for this
less at liberty, would it less become Him to take immediate charge of the
temporal fortunes of any people out of this perishable race? The miracles
which He performed for the Jews, the prophecies which He caused to be
recorded through them, were surely not for the few mortal Jews, in whose
time they had happened and been recorded: He had His intentions therein in
reference to the whole Jewish people, to the entire Human Race, which,
perhaps, is destined to remain on earth forever, though every individual Jew
and every individual man die forever.
23
Once more, The absence of those doctrines in the writings of the Old
Testament proves nothing against their Divinity. Moses was sent from
God even though the sanction of his law only extended to this life.
nothing against a Revelation. The Child of Education begins with slow yet
sure footsteps; it is late in overtaking many a more happily organised child
of nature; but it does overtake it; and thenceforth can never be distanced by
it again.
22
Similarly—Putting aside the doctrine of the Unity of God, which in a
way is found, and in a way is not found, in the books of the Old Testament
—that the doctrine of immortality at least is not discoverable in it, is wholly
foreign to it, that all doctrine connected therewith of reward and
punishment in a future life, proves just as little against the Divine origin of
these books. Notwithstanding the absence of these doctrines, the account of
miracles and prophecies may be perfectly true. For let us suppose that these
doctrines were not only wanting therein, but even that they were not at all
true; let us suppose that for mankind all was over in this life; would the
Being of God be for this reason less demonstrated? Would God be for this
less at liberty, would it less become Him to take immediate charge of the
temporal fortunes of any people out of this perishable race? The miracles
which He performed for the Jews, the prophecies which He caused to be
recorded through them, were surely not for the few mortal Jews, in whose
time they had happened and been recorded: He had His intentions therein in
reference to the whole Jewish people, to the entire Human Race, which,
perhaps, is destined to remain on earth forever, though every individual Jew
and every individual man die forever.
23
Once more, The absence of those doctrines in the writings of the Old
Testament proves nothing against their Divinity. Moses was sent from
God even though the sanction of his law only extended to this life.
Page 222
For why should it extend further? He was surely sent only to the
Israelitish people of that time, and his commission was perfectly
adapted to the knowledge, capacities, yearnings of the then existing
Israelitish people, as well as to the destination of that which
belonged to the future. And this is sufficient.
24
So far ought Warburton to have gone, and no further. But that learned
man overdrew his bow. Not content that the absence of these doctrines was
no discredit to the Divine mission of Moses, it must even be a proof to him
of the Divinity of the mission. And if he had only sought this proof in the
adaptation of such a law to such a people!
But he betook himself to the hypothesis of a miraculous system
continued in an unbroken line from Moses to Christ, according to which,
God had made every individual Jew exactly happy or unhappy, in the
proportion to his obedience or disobedience to the law deserved. He would
have it that this miraculous system had compensated for the want of those
doctrines (of eternal rewards and punishments, &c.), without which no state
can subsist; and that such a compensation even proved what that want at
first sight appeared to negative.
25
How well it was that Warburton could by no argument prove or even
make likely this continuous miracle, in which he placed the existence of
Israelitish Theocracy! For could he have done so, in truth, he could then,
and not till then, have made the difficulty really insuperable, to me at least.
For that which was meant to prove the Divine character of the Mission of
Moses, would have rendered the matter itself doubtful, which God, it is
Israelitish people of that time, and his commission was perfectly
adapted to the knowledge, capacities, yearnings of the then existing
Israelitish people, as well as to the destination of that which
belonged to the future. And this is sufficient.
24
So far ought Warburton to have gone, and no further. But that learned
man overdrew his bow. Not content that the absence of these doctrines was
no discredit to the Divine mission of Moses, it must even be a proof to him
of the Divinity of the mission. And if he had only sought this proof in the
adaptation of such a law to such a people!
But he betook himself to the hypothesis of a miraculous system
continued in an unbroken line from Moses to Christ, according to which,
God had made every individual Jew exactly happy or unhappy, in the
proportion to his obedience or disobedience to the law deserved. He would
have it that this miraculous system had compensated for the want of those
doctrines (of eternal rewards and punishments, &c.), without which no state
can subsist; and that such a compensation even proved what that want at
first sight appeared to negative.
25
How well it was that Warburton could by no argument prove or even
make likely this continuous miracle, in which he placed the existence of
Israelitish Theocracy! For could he have done so, in truth, he could then,
and not till then, have made the difficulty really insuperable, to me at least.
For that which was meant to prove the Divine character of the Mission of
Moses, would have rendered the matter itself doubtful, which God, it is
Page 223
true, did not intend then to reveal; but which on the other hand, He certainly
would not render unattainable.
26
I explain myself by that which is a picture of Revelation. A Primer for
children may fairly pass over in silence this or that important piece of
knowledge or art which it expounds, respecting which the Teacher judged,
that it is not yet fitted for the capacities of the children for whom he was
writing. But it must contain absolutely nothing which blocks up the way
towards the knowledge which is held back, or misleads the children from it.
Rather far, all the approaches towards it must be carefully left open; and to
lead them away from even one of these approaches, or to cause them to
enter it later than they need, would alone be enough to change the mere
imperfection of such a Primer into an actual fault.
27
In the same way, in the writings of the Old Testament those primers for
the rude Israelitish people, unpractised in thought, the doctrines of the
immortality of the soul, and future recompenses, might be fairly left out:
but they were bound to contain nothing which could have even
procrastinated the progress of the people, for whom they were written, in
their way to this grand truth. And to say but a small thing, what could have
more procrastinated it than the promise of such a miraculous recompense in
this life? A promise made by Him who promises nothing that He does not
perform.
28
For although unequal distribution of the goods of this life, Virtue and
Vice seem to be taken too little into consideration, although this unequal
would not render unattainable.
26
I explain myself by that which is a picture of Revelation. A Primer for
children may fairly pass over in silence this or that important piece of
knowledge or art which it expounds, respecting which the Teacher judged,
that it is not yet fitted for the capacities of the children for whom he was
writing. But it must contain absolutely nothing which blocks up the way
towards the knowledge which is held back, or misleads the children from it.
Rather far, all the approaches towards it must be carefully left open; and to
lead them away from even one of these approaches, or to cause them to
enter it later than they need, would alone be enough to change the mere
imperfection of such a Primer into an actual fault.
27
In the same way, in the writings of the Old Testament those primers for
the rude Israelitish people, unpractised in thought, the doctrines of the
immortality of the soul, and future recompenses, might be fairly left out:
but they were bound to contain nothing which could have even
procrastinated the progress of the people, for whom they were written, in
their way to this grand truth. And to say but a small thing, what could have
more procrastinated it than the promise of such a miraculous recompense in
this life? A promise made by Him who promises nothing that He does not
perform.
28
For although unequal distribution of the goods of this life, Virtue and
Vice seem to be taken too little into consideration, although this unequal
Page 224
distribution docs not exactly afford a strong proof of the immortality of the
soul and of a life to come, in which this difficulty will be reserved hereafter,
it is certain that without this difficulty the human understanding would not
for a long time, perhaps never, have arrived at better or firmer proofs. For
what was to impel it to seek for these better proofs? Mere curiosity?
29
An Israelite here and there, no doubt, might have extended to every
individual member of the entire commonwealth, those promises and
threatenings which belong to it as a whole, and be firmly persuaded that
whosoever should be pious must also be happy, and that whoever was
unhappy must be bearing the penalty of his wrong-doing, which penalty
would forthwith change itself into blessing, as soon as he abandoned his
sin. Such a one appears to have written Job, for the plan of it is entirely in
this spirit.
30
But daily experience could not possibly be permitted to confirm this
belief, or else it would have been all over, for ever, with people who had
this experience, so far as all recognition and reception was concerned of the
truth as yet unfamiliar to them. For if the pious were absolutely happy, and
it also of course was a necessary part of his happiness that his satisfaction
should be broken by no uneasy thoughts of death, and that he should die
old, and satisfied with life to the full: how could he yearn after another life?
and how could he reflect upon a thing after which he did not yearn? But if
the pious did not reflect thereupon, who then should reflect? The
transgressor? he who felt the punishments of his misdeeds, and if he cursed
this life, must have so gladly renounced that other existence?
31
soul and of a life to come, in which this difficulty will be reserved hereafter,
it is certain that without this difficulty the human understanding would not
for a long time, perhaps never, have arrived at better or firmer proofs. For
what was to impel it to seek for these better proofs? Mere curiosity?
29
An Israelite here and there, no doubt, might have extended to every
individual member of the entire commonwealth, those promises and
threatenings which belong to it as a whole, and be firmly persuaded that
whosoever should be pious must also be happy, and that whoever was
unhappy must be bearing the penalty of his wrong-doing, which penalty
would forthwith change itself into blessing, as soon as he abandoned his
sin. Such a one appears to have written Job, for the plan of it is entirely in
this spirit.
30
But daily experience could not possibly be permitted to confirm this
belief, or else it would have been all over, for ever, with people who had
this experience, so far as all recognition and reception was concerned of the
truth as yet unfamiliar to them. For if the pious were absolutely happy, and
it also of course was a necessary part of his happiness that his satisfaction
should be broken by no uneasy thoughts of death, and that he should die
old, and satisfied with life to the full: how could he yearn after another life?
and how could he reflect upon a thing after which he did not yearn? But if
the pious did not reflect thereupon, who then should reflect? The
transgressor? he who felt the punishments of his misdeeds, and if he cursed
this life, must have so gladly renounced that other existence?
31
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Much less would it signify if an Israelite here and there directly and
expressly denied the immortality of the soul and future recompense, on
account of the law having no reference thereto. The denial of an individual,
had it even been a Solomon, did not arrest the progress of the general
reason, and was even in itself a proof that the nation had now come a great
step nearer the truth For individuals only deny what the many are bringing
into consideration; and to bring into consideration that, concerning which
no one troubled himself at all before, is half way to knowledge.
32
Let us also acknowledge that it is a heroic obedience to obey the laws of
God simply because they are God's laws, and not because He has promised
to reward the obedience to them here and there; to obey them even though
there be an entire despair of future recompense, and uncertainty respecting
a temporal one.
33
Must not a people educated in this heroic obedience towards God have
been destined, must they not have been capable beyond all others of
executing Divine purpose? of quite a special character? Let the soldier, who
pays blind obedience to his leader, become also convinced of his leader's
wisdom, and then say what that leader may not undertake to achieve with
him.
34
As yet the Jewish people had reverenced in their Jehovah rather the
mightiest than the wisest of all Gods; as yet they had rather feared Him as a
Jealous God than loved Him: a proof this too, that the conception which
they had of their eternal One God was not exactly the right conception
expressly denied the immortality of the soul and future recompense, on
account of the law having no reference thereto. The denial of an individual,
had it even been a Solomon, did not arrest the progress of the general
reason, and was even in itself a proof that the nation had now come a great
step nearer the truth For individuals only deny what the many are bringing
into consideration; and to bring into consideration that, concerning which
no one troubled himself at all before, is half way to knowledge.
32
Let us also acknowledge that it is a heroic obedience to obey the laws of
God simply because they are God's laws, and not because He has promised
to reward the obedience to them here and there; to obey them even though
there be an entire despair of future recompense, and uncertainty respecting
a temporal one.
33
Must not a people educated in this heroic obedience towards God have
been destined, must they not have been capable beyond all others of
executing Divine purpose? of quite a special character? Let the soldier, who
pays blind obedience to his leader, become also convinced of his leader's
wisdom, and then say what that leader may not undertake to achieve with
him.
34
As yet the Jewish people had reverenced in their Jehovah rather the
mightiest than the wisest of all Gods; as yet they had rather feared Him as a
Jealous God than loved Him: a proof this too, that the conception which
they had of their eternal One God was not exactly the right conception
Page 226
which we should have of God. However, now the time was come that these
conceptions of theirs were to be expanded, ennobled, rectified, to
accomplish which God availed Himself of a quite natural means, a better
and more correct measure, by which it got the opportunity of appreciating
Him.
35
Instead of, as hitherto, appreciating Him in contrast with the miserable
idols of the small neighboring peoples, with whom they lived in constant
rivalry, they began, in captivity under the wise Persians, to measure Him
against the "Being of all Beings" such as a more disciplined reason
recognized and reverenced.
36
Revelation had guided their reason, and now, all at once, reason gave
clearness to their Revelation.
37
This was the first reciprocal influence which these two (Reason and
Revelation) exercised on one another; and so far is the mutual influence
from being unbecoming to the Author of them both, that without it either of
them would have been useless.
38
The child, sent abroad, saw other children who knew more, who lived
more becomingly, and asked itself, in confusion, "Why do I not know that
too? Why do I not live so too? Ought I not to have been taught and
admonished of all this in my father's house?" Thereupon it again sought out
its Primer, which had long been thrown into a corner, in order to throw off a
conceptions of theirs were to be expanded, ennobled, rectified, to
accomplish which God availed Himself of a quite natural means, a better
and more correct measure, by which it got the opportunity of appreciating
Him.
35
Instead of, as hitherto, appreciating Him in contrast with the miserable
idols of the small neighboring peoples, with whom they lived in constant
rivalry, they began, in captivity under the wise Persians, to measure Him
against the "Being of all Beings" such as a more disciplined reason
recognized and reverenced.
36
Revelation had guided their reason, and now, all at once, reason gave
clearness to their Revelation.
37
This was the first reciprocal influence which these two (Reason and
Revelation) exercised on one another; and so far is the mutual influence
from being unbecoming to the Author of them both, that without it either of
them would have been useless.
38
The child, sent abroad, saw other children who knew more, who lived
more becomingly, and asked itself, in confusion, "Why do I not know that
too? Why do I not live so too? Ought I not to have been taught and
admonished of all this in my father's house?" Thereupon it again sought out
its Primer, which had long been thrown into a corner, in order to throw off a
Page 227
blame upon the Primer. But behold, it discovers that the blame does not rest
upon the books, that the shame is solely its own, for not having long ago,
known this very thing, and lived in this very way.
39
Since the Jews, by this time, through the medium of the pure Persian
doctrine, recognized in their Jehovah, not simply the greatest of all national
deities, but GOD; and since they could, the more readily find Him and
indicate Him to others in their sacred writings, inasmuch as He was really
in them; and since they manifested as great an aversion for sensuous
representations, or at all events, were instructed in these Scriptures, to have
an aversion to them as great as the Persians had always felt; what wonder
that they found favor in the eyes of Cyrus, with a Divine Worship which he
recognized as being, no doubt, far below pure Sabeism, but yet far above
the rude idolatries which in its stead had taken possession of the forsaken
land of the Jews.
40
Thus enlightened respecting the treasures which they had possessed,
without knowing it, they returned, and became quite another people, whose
first care it was to give permanency to this illumination amongst
themselves. Soon an apostacy and idolatry among them was out of the
question. For it is possible to be faithless to a national deity, but never to
God, after He has once been recognised.
The theologians have tried to explain this complete change in the Jewish
people in a different way; and one, who has well demonstrated the
insufficiency of these explanations, at last was for giving us, as a true
account—"the visible fulfilment of the prophecies which had been spoken
and written respecting the Babylonish captivity and the restoration from it."
upon the books, that the shame is solely its own, for not having long ago,
known this very thing, and lived in this very way.
39
Since the Jews, by this time, through the medium of the pure Persian
doctrine, recognized in their Jehovah, not simply the greatest of all national
deities, but GOD; and since they could, the more readily find Him and
indicate Him to others in their sacred writings, inasmuch as He was really
in them; and since they manifested as great an aversion for sensuous
representations, or at all events, were instructed in these Scriptures, to have
an aversion to them as great as the Persians had always felt; what wonder
that they found favor in the eyes of Cyrus, with a Divine Worship which he
recognized as being, no doubt, far below pure Sabeism, but yet far above
the rude idolatries which in its stead had taken possession of the forsaken
land of the Jews.
40
Thus enlightened respecting the treasures which they had possessed,
without knowing it, they returned, and became quite another people, whose
first care it was to give permanency to this illumination amongst
themselves. Soon an apostacy and idolatry among them was out of the
question. For it is possible to be faithless to a national deity, but never to
God, after He has once been recognised.
The theologians have tried to explain this complete change in the Jewish
people in a different way; and one, who has well demonstrated the
insufficiency of these explanations, at last was for giving us, as a true
account—"the visible fulfilment of the prophecies which had been spoken
and written respecting the Babylonish captivity and the restoration from it."
Page 228
But even this reason can be only so far the true one, as it presupposes the,
by this time, exalted ideas of God. The Jews must by this time have
recognised that to do miracles, and to predict the future, belonged only to
God, both of which they had ascribed formerly to false idols, by which it
came to pass that even miracles and prophecies had hitherto made so weak
an impression upon them.
42
Doubtless, the Jews were made more acquainted with the doctrine of
immortality among the Chaldeans and Persians. They became more familiar
with it too in the schools of the Greek Philosophers in Egypt.
43
However, as this doctrine was not in the same condition in reference to
their Scriptures that the doctrines of God's Unity and Attributes were—
since the former were entirely overlooked by that sensual people, while the
latter would be sought for:—and since too, for the former, previous
exercising was necessary, and as yet there had been only hints and
allusions, the faith in the immortality of the soul could naturally never be
the faith of the entire people. It was and continued to be only the creed of a
certain section of them.
44
An example of what I mean by "previous exercising" for the doctrine of
immortality, is the Divine threatenings of punishing the misdeeds of the
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation. This
accustomed the fathers to live in thought with their remotest posterity, and
to feel, as it were, beforehand, the misfortune which they had brought upon
these guiltless ones.
by this time, exalted ideas of God. The Jews must by this time have
recognised that to do miracles, and to predict the future, belonged only to
God, both of which they had ascribed formerly to false idols, by which it
came to pass that even miracles and prophecies had hitherto made so weak
an impression upon them.
42
Doubtless, the Jews were made more acquainted with the doctrine of
immortality among the Chaldeans and Persians. They became more familiar
with it too in the schools of the Greek Philosophers in Egypt.
43
However, as this doctrine was not in the same condition in reference to
their Scriptures that the doctrines of God's Unity and Attributes were—
since the former were entirely overlooked by that sensual people, while the
latter would be sought for:—and since too, for the former, previous
exercising was necessary, and as yet there had been only hints and
allusions, the faith in the immortality of the soul could naturally never be
the faith of the entire people. It was and continued to be only the creed of a
certain section of them.
44
An example of what I mean by "previous exercising" for the doctrine of
immortality, is the Divine threatenings of punishing the misdeeds of the
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation. This
accustomed the fathers to live in thought with their remotest posterity, and
to feel, as it were, beforehand, the misfortune which they had brought upon
these guiltless ones.
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45
By an allusion I mean that which was intended only to excite curiosity
and to occasion questions. As, for instance, the oft- recurring mode of
expression, describing death by "he was gathered to his fathers."
By a "hint" I mean that which already contains any germ, out of which
the, as yet, held back truth allows itself to be developed. Of this character
was the inference of Christ from the naming of God "the God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob." This hint appears to me to be unquestionably capable of
being worked out into a strong proof.
47
In such previous exercitations, allusions, hints, consists the positive
perfection of a Primer; just as the above-mentioned peculiarity of not
throwing difficulties or hindrances in the way to the suppressed truth
constitutes the negative perfection of such a book.
48
Add to all this the clothing and style.
1. The clothing of abstract truths, which were not entirely to be passed
over, in allegories and instructive single circumstances, which were narrated
as actual occurrences. Of this character are the Creation under the image of
growing Day; the Origin of Evil in the story of the Forbidden Tree; the
source of the variety of languages in the history of the Tower of Babel, &c.
49 2. The style—sometimes plain and simple, sometimes poetical,
throughout full of tautologies, but of such a kind as practised sagacity, since
they sometimes appear to be saying something else, and yet the same thing;
By an allusion I mean that which was intended only to excite curiosity
and to occasion questions. As, for instance, the oft- recurring mode of
expression, describing death by "he was gathered to his fathers."
By a "hint" I mean that which already contains any germ, out of which
the, as yet, held back truth allows itself to be developed. Of this character
was the inference of Christ from the naming of God "the God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob." This hint appears to me to be unquestionably capable of
being worked out into a strong proof.
47
In such previous exercitations, allusions, hints, consists the positive
perfection of a Primer; just as the above-mentioned peculiarity of not
throwing difficulties or hindrances in the way to the suppressed truth
constitutes the negative perfection of such a book.
48
Add to all this the clothing and style.
1. The clothing of abstract truths, which were not entirely to be passed
over, in allegories and instructive single circumstances, which were narrated
as actual occurrences. Of this character are the Creation under the image of
growing Day; the Origin of Evil in the story of the Forbidden Tree; the
source of the variety of languages in the history of the Tower of Babel, &c.
49 2. The style—sometimes plain and simple, sometimes poetical,
throughout full of tautologies, but of such a kind as practised sagacity, since
they sometimes appear to be saying something else, and yet the same thing;
Page 230
sometimes the same thing over again, and yet to signify or to be capable of
signifying at the bottom, something else:—
50
And then you have all the properties of excellence which belong to a
Primer for a childlike people, as well as for children.
51
But every Primer is only for a certain age. To delay the child, that has
outgrown it, longer in it than it was intended for, is hurtful. For to be able to
do this is a way in any sort profitable, you must insert into it more than
there is really in it, and extract from it more than it can contain. You must
look for and make too much of allusions and hints; squeeze allegories too
closely; interpret examples too circumstantially; press too much upon
words. This gives the child a petty, crooked, hair splitting understanding: it
makes him full of mysteries, superstitions; full of contempt for all that is
comprehensible and easy.
52
The very way in which the Rabbins handled their sacred books! The very
character which they thereby imparted to the character of their people!
53
A Better Instructor must come and tear the exhausted Primer from the
child's hands. CHRIST came!
54
signifying at the bottom, something else:—
50
And then you have all the properties of excellence which belong to a
Primer for a childlike people, as well as for children.
51
But every Primer is only for a certain age. To delay the child, that has
outgrown it, longer in it than it was intended for, is hurtful. For to be able to
do this is a way in any sort profitable, you must insert into it more than
there is really in it, and extract from it more than it can contain. You must
look for and make too much of allusions and hints; squeeze allegories too
closely; interpret examples too circumstantially; press too much upon
words. This gives the child a petty, crooked, hair splitting understanding: it
makes him full of mysteries, superstitions; full of contempt for all that is
comprehensible and easy.
52
The very way in which the Rabbins handled their sacred books! The very
character which they thereby imparted to the character of their people!
53
A Better Instructor must come and tear the exhausted Primer from the
child's hands. CHRIST came!
54
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That portion of the human race which God had willed to comprehend in
one Educational plan, was ripe for the Second step of Education. He had,
however, only willed to comprehend on such a plan, one which by
language, mode of action, government, and other natural and political
relationships, was already united in itself.
55
That is, this portion of the human race was come so far in the exercise of
its reason, as to need, and to be able to make use of nobler and worthier
motives of moral action than temporal rewards and punishments, which had
hitherto been its guides. The child had become a youth. Sweetmeats and
toys have given place to the budding desire to go as free, as honored, and as
happy as its elder brother.
56
For a long time, already, the best individuals of that portion of the human
race (called above the elder brother); had been accustomed to let themselves
be ruled by the shadow of such nobler motives. The Greek and Roman did
everything to live on after this life, even if it were only in the remembrance
of their fellow-citizens.
57
It was time that another true life to be expected after this should gain an
influence over the youth's actions.
58
And so Christ was the first certain practical Teacher of the immortality of
the soul.
one Educational plan, was ripe for the Second step of Education. He had,
however, only willed to comprehend on such a plan, one which by
language, mode of action, government, and other natural and political
relationships, was already united in itself.
55
That is, this portion of the human race was come so far in the exercise of
its reason, as to need, and to be able to make use of nobler and worthier
motives of moral action than temporal rewards and punishments, which had
hitherto been its guides. The child had become a youth. Sweetmeats and
toys have given place to the budding desire to go as free, as honored, and as
happy as its elder brother.
56
For a long time, already, the best individuals of that portion of the human
race (called above the elder brother); had been accustomed to let themselves
be ruled by the shadow of such nobler motives. The Greek and Roman did
everything to live on after this life, even if it were only in the remembrance
of their fellow-citizens.
57
It was time that another true life to be expected after this should gain an
influence over the youth's actions.
58
And so Christ was the first certain practical Teacher of the immortality of
the soul.
Page 232
59
The first certain Teacher. Certain, through the prophecies which were
fulfilled in Him; certain, through the miracles which He achieved; certain,
through His own revival after a death through which He had sealed His
doctrine. Whether we can still prove this revival, these miracles, I put aside,
as I leave on one side who the Person of Christ was. All that may have been
at that time of great weight for the reception of His doctrine, but it is now
no longer of the same importance for the recognition of the truth of His
doctrine.
60
The first practical Teacher. For it is one thing to conjecture, to wish, and
to believe the immortality of the soul, as a philosophic speculation: quite
another thing to direct the inner and outer acts by it.
61
And this at least Christ was the first to teach. For although, already
before Him, the belief had been introduced among many nations, that bad
actions have yet to be punished in that life; yet they were only such actions
as were injurious to civil society, and consequently, too, had already had
their punishment in civil society. To enforce an inward purity of heart in
reference to another life, was reserved for Him alone.
62
His disciples have faithfully propagated these doctrines: and if they had
even had no other merit, than that of having effected a more general
publication, among other nations, of a Truth which Christ had appeared to
have destined only for the Jews, yet would they have even on that account
The first certain Teacher. Certain, through the prophecies which were
fulfilled in Him; certain, through the miracles which He achieved; certain,
through His own revival after a death through which He had sealed His
doctrine. Whether we can still prove this revival, these miracles, I put aside,
as I leave on one side who the Person of Christ was. All that may have been
at that time of great weight for the reception of His doctrine, but it is now
no longer of the same importance for the recognition of the truth of His
doctrine.
60
The first practical Teacher. For it is one thing to conjecture, to wish, and
to believe the immortality of the soul, as a philosophic speculation: quite
another thing to direct the inner and outer acts by it.
61
And this at least Christ was the first to teach. For although, already
before Him, the belief had been introduced among many nations, that bad
actions have yet to be punished in that life; yet they were only such actions
as were injurious to civil society, and consequently, too, had already had
their punishment in civil society. To enforce an inward purity of heart in
reference to another life, was reserved for Him alone.
62
His disciples have faithfully propagated these doctrines: and if they had
even had no other merit, than that of having effected a more general
publication, among other nations, of a Truth which Christ had appeared to
have destined only for the Jews, yet would they have even on that account
Page 233
alone, to be reckoned among the Benefactors and Fosterers of the Human
Race.
63
If, however, they transplanted this one great Truth together with other
doctrines, whose truth was less enlightening, whose usefulness was of a less
exalted character, how could it be otherwise. Let us not blame them for this,
but rather seriously examine whether these very commingled doctrines have
not become a new impulse of directions for human reason.
64
At least, it is already clear that the New Testament Scriptures, in which
these doctrines after some time were found preserved, have afforded, and
still afford, the second better Primer for the race of man.
65
For seven hundred years past they have exercised human reason more
than all other books, and enlightened it more, were it even only through the
light which the human reason itself threw into them.
66
It would have been impossible for any other book to become so generally
known among different nations: and indisputably, the fact that modes of
thought so diverse from each other have been occupied on the same book,
has helped on the human reason more than if every nation had had its own
Primer specially for itself.
67
Race.
63
If, however, they transplanted this one great Truth together with other
doctrines, whose truth was less enlightening, whose usefulness was of a less
exalted character, how could it be otherwise. Let us not blame them for this,
but rather seriously examine whether these very commingled doctrines have
not become a new impulse of directions for human reason.
64
At least, it is already clear that the New Testament Scriptures, in which
these doctrines after some time were found preserved, have afforded, and
still afford, the second better Primer for the race of man.
65
For seven hundred years past they have exercised human reason more
than all other books, and enlightened it more, were it even only through the
light which the human reason itself threw into them.
66
It would have been impossible for any other book to become so generally
known among different nations: and indisputably, the fact that modes of
thought so diverse from each other have been occupied on the same book,
has helped on the human reason more than if every nation had had its own
Primer specially for itself.
67
Page 234
It was also highly necessary that each people for a period should hold this
Book as the ne plus ultra of their knowledge. For the youth must consider
his Primer as the first of all books, that the impatience to finish this book,
may not hurry him on to things for which he has, as yet, laid no basis.
68
And one thing is also of the greatest importance even now. Thou abler
spirit, who art fretting and restless over the last page of the Primer, beware!
Beware of letting thy weaker fellow scholars mark what thou perceivest
afar, or what thou art beginning to see!
Until these weaker fellow scholars are up with thee, rather return once
more into this Primer, and examine whether that which thou takest only for
duplicates of the method, for a blunder in the teaching, is not perhaps
something more.
70
Thou hast seen in the childhood of the human race, respecting the
doctrine of God's unity, that God makes immediate revelations of mere
truths of reason, or has permitted and caused pure truths of reason to be
taught, for some time, as truths of immediate revelation, in order to
promulgate them the more rapidly, and ground them the more firmly.
71
Thou experiencest in the boyhood of the Race the same thing in reference
to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It is preached in the better
Primer as a Revelation, instead of taught as a result of human reason.
72
Book as the ne plus ultra of their knowledge. For the youth must consider
his Primer as the first of all books, that the impatience to finish this book,
may not hurry him on to things for which he has, as yet, laid no basis.
68
And one thing is also of the greatest importance even now. Thou abler
spirit, who art fretting and restless over the last page of the Primer, beware!
Beware of letting thy weaker fellow scholars mark what thou perceivest
afar, or what thou art beginning to see!
Until these weaker fellow scholars are up with thee, rather return once
more into this Primer, and examine whether that which thou takest only for
duplicates of the method, for a blunder in the teaching, is not perhaps
something more.
70
Thou hast seen in the childhood of the human race, respecting the
doctrine of God's unity, that God makes immediate revelations of mere
truths of reason, or has permitted and caused pure truths of reason to be
taught, for some time, as truths of immediate revelation, in order to
promulgate them the more rapidly, and ground them the more firmly.
71
Thou experiencest in the boyhood of the Race the same thing in reference
to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It is preached in the better
Primer as a Revelation, instead of taught as a result of human reason.
72
Page 235
As we by this time can dispense with the Old Testament, in reference to
the doctrine of the unity of God, and as we are by degrees beginning also to
be less dependent on the New Testament, in reference to the immortality of
the soul: might there not in this Book also be other truths of the same sort
prefigured, mirrored, as it were, which we are to marvel at, as revelations,
exactly so long as until the time shall come when reason shall have learned
to educe them, out of its other demonstrated truths and bind them up with
them?
73
For instance, the doctrine of the Trinity. How if this doctrine should at
last, after endless errors, right and left, only bring men on the road to
recognise that God cannot possibly be One in the sense in which finite
things are one, that even His unity must be a transcendental unity, which
does not exclude a sort of purality? Must not God at least have the most
perfect conception of Himself, i. e., a conception in which is found
everything which is in Him? But would everything be found in it which is
in Him, if a mere conception, a mere possibility, were found even of his
necessary Reality as well as of His other qualities? This possibility exhausts
the being of His other qualities. Does it that of His necessary Reality? I
think not. Consequently God can either have no perfect conception of
himself at all, or this perfect conception is just as necessarily real, i. e.,
actually existent, as He Himself is. Certainly the image of myself in the
mirror is nothing but an empty representation of me, because it only has
that of me upon the surface of which beams of light fall. But now if this
image had everything, everything without exception, which I have myself,
would it then still be a mere empty representation, or not rather a true
reduplication of myself? When I believe that I recognise in God a familiar
reduplication, I perhaps do not so much err, as that my language is
insufficient for my ideas: and so much at least for ever incontrovertible, that
the doctrine of the unity of God, and as we are by degrees beginning also to
be less dependent on the New Testament, in reference to the immortality of
the soul: might there not in this Book also be other truths of the same sort
prefigured, mirrored, as it were, which we are to marvel at, as revelations,
exactly so long as until the time shall come when reason shall have learned
to educe them, out of its other demonstrated truths and bind them up with
them?
73
For instance, the doctrine of the Trinity. How if this doctrine should at
last, after endless errors, right and left, only bring men on the road to
recognise that God cannot possibly be One in the sense in which finite
things are one, that even His unity must be a transcendental unity, which
does not exclude a sort of purality? Must not God at least have the most
perfect conception of Himself, i. e., a conception in which is found
everything which is in Him? But would everything be found in it which is
in Him, if a mere conception, a mere possibility, were found even of his
necessary Reality as well as of His other qualities? This possibility exhausts
the being of His other qualities. Does it that of His necessary Reality? I
think not. Consequently God can either have no perfect conception of
himself at all, or this perfect conception is just as necessarily real, i. e.,
actually existent, as He Himself is. Certainly the image of myself in the
mirror is nothing but an empty representation of me, because it only has
that of me upon the surface of which beams of light fall. But now if this
image had everything, everything without exception, which I have myself,
would it then still be a mere empty representation, or not rather a true
reduplication of myself? When I believe that I recognise in God a familiar
reduplication, I perhaps do not so much err, as that my language is
insufficient for my ideas: and so much at least for ever incontrovertible, that
Page 236
they who wish to make the idea thereof popular for comprehension, could
scarcely have expressed themselves more intelligibly and suitably than by
giving the name of a Son begotten from Eternity.
74
And the doctrine of Original Sin. How, if at last everything were to
convince us that man standing on the first and lowest step of his humanity,
is not so entirely master of his actions as to be able to obey moral laws?
75
And the doctrine of the Son's satisfaction. How, if at last, all compelled
us to assume that God, in spite of that original incapacity of man, chose
rather to give him moral laws, and forgive him all transgressions in
consideration of His Son, i. e., in consideration of the self-existent total of
all His own perfections, compared with which, and in which, all
imperfections of the individual disappear, than not to give him those laws,
and then to exclude him from all moral blessedness, which cannot be
conceived of without moral laws.
Let it not be objected that speculations of this description upon the
mysteries of religion are forbidden. The word mystery signified, in the first
ages of Christianity, something quite different from what it means now: and
the cultivation of revealed truths into truths of reason, is absolutely
necessary, if the human race is to be assisted by them. When they were
revealed they were certainly no truths of reason, but they were revealed in
order to become such. They were like the "that makes"—of the ciphering
master, which he says to the boys, beforehand, in order to direct them
thereby in their reckoning. If the scholars were to be satisfied with the "that
makes," they would never learn to calculate, and would frustrate the
scarcely have expressed themselves more intelligibly and suitably than by
giving the name of a Son begotten from Eternity.
74
And the doctrine of Original Sin. How, if at last everything were to
convince us that man standing on the first and lowest step of his humanity,
is not so entirely master of his actions as to be able to obey moral laws?
75
And the doctrine of the Son's satisfaction. How, if at last, all compelled
us to assume that God, in spite of that original incapacity of man, chose
rather to give him moral laws, and forgive him all transgressions in
consideration of His Son, i. e., in consideration of the self-existent total of
all His own perfections, compared with which, and in which, all
imperfections of the individual disappear, than not to give him those laws,
and then to exclude him from all moral blessedness, which cannot be
conceived of without moral laws.
Let it not be objected that speculations of this description upon the
mysteries of religion are forbidden. The word mystery signified, in the first
ages of Christianity, something quite different from what it means now: and
the cultivation of revealed truths into truths of reason, is absolutely
necessary, if the human race is to be assisted by them. When they were
revealed they were certainly no truths of reason, but they were revealed in
order to become such. They were like the "that makes"—of the ciphering
master, which he says to the boys, beforehand, in order to direct them
thereby in their reckoning. If the scholars were to be satisfied with the "that
makes," they would never learn to calculate, and would frustrate the
Page 237
intention with which their good master gave them a guiding clue in their
work.
77
And why should not we too, by the means of a religion whose historical
truth, if you will, looks dubious, be conducted in a familiar way to closer
and better conceptions of the Divine Being, our own nature, our relation to
God, truths at which the human reason would never have arrived of itself?
78
It is not true that speculations upon these things have ever done harm or
become injurious to the body politic. You must reproach, not the
speculations, but the folly and the tyranny of checking them. You must lay
the blame on those who would not permit men having their own
speculations to exercise them.
79
On the contrary, speculations of this sort, whatever the result, are
unquestionably the most fitting exercises of the human heart, generally, so
long as the human heart, generally, is at best only capable of loving virtue
for the sake of its eternal blessed consequences.
80
For in this selfishness of the human heart, to will to practice the
understanding too, only on that which concerns our corporal needs, would
be to blunt rather than to sharpen it. It absolutely will be exercised on
spiritual objects, if it is to attain its perfect illumination, and bring out that
purity of heart which makes us capable of loving virtue for its own sake
alone.
work.
77
And why should not we too, by the means of a religion whose historical
truth, if you will, looks dubious, be conducted in a familiar way to closer
and better conceptions of the Divine Being, our own nature, our relation to
God, truths at which the human reason would never have arrived of itself?
78
It is not true that speculations upon these things have ever done harm or
become injurious to the body politic. You must reproach, not the
speculations, but the folly and the tyranny of checking them. You must lay
the blame on those who would not permit men having their own
speculations to exercise them.
79
On the contrary, speculations of this sort, whatever the result, are
unquestionably the most fitting exercises of the human heart, generally, so
long as the human heart, generally, is at best only capable of loving virtue
for the sake of its eternal blessed consequences.
80
For in this selfishness of the human heart, to will to practice the
understanding too, only on that which concerns our corporal needs, would
be to blunt rather than to sharpen it. It absolutely will be exercised on
spiritual objects, if it is to attain its perfect illumination, and bring out that
purity of heart which makes us capable of loving virtue for its own sake
alone.
Page 238
81
Or, is the human species never to arrive at this highest step of
illumination and purity?—Never?
82
Never?—Let me not think this blasphemy, All Merciful! Education has
its goal, in the Race, no less than in the Individual. That which is educated
is educated for something.
83
The flattering prospects which are open to the people, the Honor and
Well-being which are painted to him, what are they more than the
means of educating him to become a man, who, when these prospects of
Honor and Well-being have vanished, shall be able to do his Duty?
84
This is the aim of human education, and should not the Divine education
extend as far? Is that which is successful in the way of Art with the
individual, not to be successful in the way of Nature with the whole?
Blasphemy! Blasphemy!!
85
No! It will come! it will assuredly come! the time of the perfecting, when
man, the more convinced his understanding feels itself of an ever better
Future, will nevertheless not be necessitated to borrow motives of action
from this Future; for he will do the Right because it is right, not because
arbitrary rewards are annexed thereto, which formerly were intended simply
Or, is the human species never to arrive at this highest step of
illumination and purity?—Never?
82
Never?—Let me not think this blasphemy, All Merciful! Education has
its goal, in the Race, no less than in the Individual. That which is educated
is educated for something.
83
The flattering prospects which are open to the people, the Honor and
Well-being which are painted to him, what are they more than the
means of educating him to become a man, who, when these prospects of
Honor and Well-being have vanished, shall be able to do his Duty?
84
This is the aim of human education, and should not the Divine education
extend as far? Is that which is successful in the way of Art with the
individual, not to be successful in the way of Nature with the whole?
Blasphemy! Blasphemy!!
85
No! It will come! it will assuredly come! the time of the perfecting, when
man, the more convinced his understanding feels itself of an ever better
Future, will nevertheless not be necessitated to borrow motives of action
from this Future; for he will do the Right because it is right, not because
arbitrary rewards are annexed thereto, which formerly were intended simply
Page 239
to fix and strengthen his unsteady gaze in recognising the inner, better,
rewards of well-doing.
86
It will assuredly come! the time of a new eternal Gospel, which is
promised us in the Primer of the New Testament itself!
87
Perhaps even some enthusiasts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
had caught a glimpse of a beam of this new eternal Gospel, and only erred
in that they predicted its outburst at so near to their own time.
88
Perhaps their "Three Ages of the World" were not so empty a speculation
after all, and assuredly they had no contemptible views when they taught
that the New Covenant must become as much antiquated as the old has
been. There remained by them the similarity of the economy of the same
God. Ever, to let them speak my words, ever the self-same plan of the
Education of the Race.
89
Only they were premature. Only they believed that they could make their
contemporaries, who had scarcely outgrown their childhood, without
enlightenment, without preparation, men worthy of their Third Age.
90
And it was just this which made them enthusiasts. The enthusiast often
casts true glances into the future, but for this future he cannot wait. He
rewards of well-doing.
86
It will assuredly come! the time of a new eternal Gospel, which is
promised us in the Primer of the New Testament itself!
87
Perhaps even some enthusiasts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
had caught a glimpse of a beam of this new eternal Gospel, and only erred
in that they predicted its outburst at so near to their own time.
88
Perhaps their "Three Ages of the World" were not so empty a speculation
after all, and assuredly they had no contemptible views when they taught
that the New Covenant must become as much antiquated as the old has
been. There remained by them the similarity of the economy of the same
God. Ever, to let them speak my words, ever the self-same plan of the
Education of the Race.
89
Only they were premature. Only they believed that they could make their
contemporaries, who had scarcely outgrown their childhood, without
enlightenment, without preparation, men worthy of their Third Age.
90
And it was just this which made them enthusiasts. The enthusiast often
casts true glances into the future, but for this future he cannot wait. He
Page 240
wishes this future accelerated, and accelerated through him. That for which
nature takes thousands of years is to mature itself in the moment of his
existence. For what possession has he in it if that which he recognises as the
Best does not become the best in his lifetime? Does he come back? Does he
expect to come back? Marvellous only that this enthusiastic expectation
does not become more the fashion among enthusiasts. 91
Go thine inscrutable way, Eternal Providence! Only let me not despair in
Thee, because of this inscrutableness. Let me not despair in Thee, even if
Thy steps appear to me to be going back. It is not true that the shortest line
is always straight.
92
Thou hast on Thine Eternal Way so much to carry on together, so much to
do! So many aside steps to take! And what if it were as good as proved that
the vast flow wheel which brings mankind nearer to this perfection is only
put in motion by smaller, swifter wheels, each of which contributes its own
individual unit thereto?
93
It is so! The very same Way by which the Race reaches its perfection,
must every individual man—one sooner—another later— have travelled
over. Have travelled over in one and the same life? Can he have been, in
one and the self-same life, a sensual Jew and a spiritual Christian? Can he
in the self-same life have overtaken both?
94
Surely not that! But why should not every individual man have existed
more than once upon this World?
nature takes thousands of years is to mature itself in the moment of his
existence. For what possession has he in it if that which he recognises as the
Best does not become the best in his lifetime? Does he come back? Does he
expect to come back? Marvellous only that this enthusiastic expectation
does not become more the fashion among enthusiasts. 91
Go thine inscrutable way, Eternal Providence! Only let me not despair in
Thee, because of this inscrutableness. Let me not despair in Thee, even if
Thy steps appear to me to be going back. It is not true that the shortest line
is always straight.
92
Thou hast on Thine Eternal Way so much to carry on together, so much to
do! So many aside steps to take! And what if it were as good as proved that
the vast flow wheel which brings mankind nearer to this perfection is only
put in motion by smaller, swifter wheels, each of which contributes its own
individual unit thereto?
93
It is so! The very same Way by which the Race reaches its perfection,
must every individual man—one sooner—another later— have travelled
over. Have travelled over in one and the same life? Can he have been, in
one and the self-same life, a sensual Jew and a spiritual Christian? Can he
in the self-same life have overtaken both?
94
Surely not that! But why should not every individual man have existed
more than once upon this World?
Page 241
95
Is this hypothesis so laughable merely because it is the oldest?
Because the human understanding, before the sophistries of the
Schools had dissipated and debilitated it, lighted upon it at once?
Why may not even I have already performed those steps of my perfecting
which bring to man only temporal punishments and rewards?
97
And once more, why not another time all those steps, to perform which
the views of Eternal Rewards so powerfully assist us?
Why should I not come back as often as I am capable of acquiring fresh
knowledge, fresh expertness? Do I bring away so much from once, that
there is nothing to repay the trouble of coming back?
99
Is this a reason against it? Or, because I forget that I have been here
already? Happy is it for me that I do forget. The recollection of my former
condition would permit me to make only a bad use of the present. And that
which even I must forget now, is that necessarily forgotten for ever?
100
Or is it a reason against the hypothesis that so much time would have
been lost to me? Lost?—And how much then should I miss?—Is not a
whole Eternity mine?
Is this hypothesis so laughable merely because it is the oldest?
Because the human understanding, before the sophistries of the
Schools had dissipated and debilitated it, lighted upon it at once?
Why may not even I have already performed those steps of my perfecting
which bring to man only temporal punishments and rewards?
97
And once more, why not another time all those steps, to perform which
the views of Eternal Rewards so powerfully assist us?
Why should I not come back as often as I am capable of acquiring fresh
knowledge, fresh expertness? Do I bring away so much from once, that
there is nothing to repay the trouble of coming back?
99
Is this a reason against it? Or, because I forget that I have been here
already? Happy is it for me that I do forget. The recollection of my former
condition would permit me to make only a bad use of the present. And that
which even I must forget now, is that necessarily forgotten for ever?
100
Or is it a reason against the hypothesis that so much time would have
been lost to me? Lost?—And how much then should I miss?—Is not a
whole Eternity mine?
Page 242
LETTERS UPON THE AESTHETIC
EDUCATION OF MAN
BY
J. C. FRIEDRICH VON SCHILLER
EDUCATION OF MAN
BY
J. C. FRIEDRICH VON SCHILLER
Page 243
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
An outline of the life of Schiller will be found prefixed to the translation of
"Wilhelm Tell" in the volume of Continental Dramas in The Harvard
Classics.
Schiller's importance in the intellectual history of Germany is by no
means confined to his poetry and dramas. He did notable work in history
and philosophy, and in the department of esthetics especially, he made
significant contributions, modifying and developing in important respects
the doctrines of Kant. In the letters on "Esthetic Education" which are here
printed, he gives the philosophic basis for his doctrine of art, and indicates
clearly and persuasively his view of the place of beauty in human life.
LETTERS UPON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN
LETTER I.
By your permission I lay before you, in a series of letters, the results of my
researches upon beauty and art. I am keenly sensible of the importance as
well as of the charm and dignity of this undertaking. I shall treat a subject
which is closely connected with the better portion of our happiness and not
far removed from the moral nobility of human nature. I shall plead this
cause of the Beautiful before a heart by which her whole power is felt and
An outline of the life of Schiller will be found prefixed to the translation of
"Wilhelm Tell" in the volume of Continental Dramas in The Harvard
Classics.
Schiller's importance in the intellectual history of Germany is by no
means confined to his poetry and dramas. He did notable work in history
and philosophy, and in the department of esthetics especially, he made
significant contributions, modifying and developing in important respects
the doctrines of Kant. In the letters on "Esthetic Education" which are here
printed, he gives the philosophic basis for his doctrine of art, and indicates
clearly and persuasively his view of the place of beauty in human life.
LETTERS UPON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN
LETTER I.
By your permission I lay before you, in a series of letters, the results of my
researches upon beauty and art. I am keenly sensible of the importance as
well as of the charm and dignity of this undertaking. I shall treat a subject
which is closely connected with the better portion of our happiness and not
far removed from the moral nobility of human nature. I shall plead this
cause of the Beautiful before a heart by which her whole power is felt and
Page 244
exercised, and which will take upon itself the most difficult part of my task
in an investigation where one is compelled to appeal as frequently to
feelings as to principles.
That which I would beg of you as a favour, you generously impose upon
me as a duty; and, when I solely consult my inclination, you impute to me a
service. The liberty of action you prescribe is rather a necessity for me than
a constraint little exercised in formal rules, I shall scarcely incur the risk of
sinning against good taste by any undue use of them; my ideas, drawn
rather from within than from reading or from an intimate experience with
the world, will not disown their origin; they would rather incur any
reproach than that of a sectarian bias, and would prefer to succumb by their
innate feebleness than sustain themselves by borrowed authority and
foreign support.
In truth, I will not keep back from you that the assertions which follow
rest chiefly upon Kantian principles; but if in the course of these researches
you should be reminded of any special school of philosophy, ascribe it to
my incapacity, not to those principles. No; your liberty of mind shall be
sacred to me; and the facts upon which I build will be furnished by your
own sentiments; your own unfettered thought will dictate the laws
according to which we to proceed.
With regard to the ideas which predominate in the practical part of Kant's
system, philosophers only disagree, whilst mankind, I am confident of
proving, have never done so. If stripped of their technical shape, they will
appear as the verdict of reason pronounced from time immemorial by
common consent, and as facts of the moral instinct which nature, in her
wisdom, has given to man in order to serve as guide and teacher until his
enlightened intelligence gives him maturity. But this very technical shape
which renders truth visible to the understanding conceals it from the
in an investigation where one is compelled to appeal as frequently to
feelings as to principles.
That which I would beg of you as a favour, you generously impose upon
me as a duty; and, when I solely consult my inclination, you impute to me a
service. The liberty of action you prescribe is rather a necessity for me than
a constraint little exercised in formal rules, I shall scarcely incur the risk of
sinning against good taste by any undue use of them; my ideas, drawn
rather from within than from reading or from an intimate experience with
the world, will not disown their origin; they would rather incur any
reproach than that of a sectarian bias, and would prefer to succumb by their
innate feebleness than sustain themselves by borrowed authority and
foreign support.
In truth, I will not keep back from you that the assertions which follow
rest chiefly upon Kantian principles; but if in the course of these researches
you should be reminded of any special school of philosophy, ascribe it to
my incapacity, not to those principles. No; your liberty of mind shall be
sacred to me; and the facts upon which I build will be furnished by your
own sentiments; your own unfettered thought will dictate the laws
according to which we to proceed.
With regard to the ideas which predominate in the practical part of Kant's
system, philosophers only disagree, whilst mankind, I am confident of
proving, have never done so. If stripped of their technical shape, they will
appear as the verdict of reason pronounced from time immemorial by
common consent, and as facts of the moral instinct which nature, in her
wisdom, has given to man in order to serve as guide and teacher until his
enlightened intelligence gives him maturity. But this very technical shape
which renders truth visible to the understanding conceals it from the
Page 245
feelings; for, unhappily, understanding begins by destroying the object of
the inner sense before it can appropriate the object. Like the chemist, the
philosopher finds synthesis only by analysis, or the spontaneous work of
nature only through the torture of art. Thus, in order to detain the fleeting
apparition, he must enchain it in the fetters of rule, dissect its fair
proportions into abstract notions, and preserve its living spirit in a fleshless
skeleton of words. Is it surprising that natural feeling should not recognise
itself in such a copy, and if in the report of the analyst the truth appears as
paradox?
Permit me therefore to crave your indulgence if the following researches
should remove their object from the sphere of sense while endeavouring to
draw it towards the understanding. That which I before said of moral
experience can be applied with greater truth to the manifestation of "the
beautiful." It is the mystery which enchants, and its being is extinguished
with the extinction of the necessary combination of its elements.
LETTER II.
But I might perhaps make a better use of the opening you afford me if I
were to direct your mind to a loftier theme than that of art. It would appear
to be unseasonable to go in search of a code for the aesthetic world, when
the moral world offers matter of so much higher interest, and when the
spirit of philosophical inquiry is so stringently challenged by the
circumstances of our times to occupy itself with the most perfect of all
works of art—the establishment and structure of a true political freedom.
It is unsatisfactory to live out of your own age and to work for other
times. It is equally incumbent on us to be good members of our own age as
of our own state or country. If it is conceived to be unseemly and even
unlawful for a man to segregate himself from the customs and manners of
the circle in which he lives, it would be inconsistent not to see that it is
the inner sense before it can appropriate the object. Like the chemist, the
philosopher finds synthesis only by analysis, or the spontaneous work of
nature only through the torture of art. Thus, in order to detain the fleeting
apparition, he must enchain it in the fetters of rule, dissect its fair
proportions into abstract notions, and preserve its living spirit in a fleshless
skeleton of words. Is it surprising that natural feeling should not recognise
itself in such a copy, and if in the report of the analyst the truth appears as
paradox?
Permit me therefore to crave your indulgence if the following researches
should remove their object from the sphere of sense while endeavouring to
draw it towards the understanding. That which I before said of moral
experience can be applied with greater truth to the manifestation of "the
beautiful." It is the mystery which enchants, and its being is extinguished
with the extinction of the necessary combination of its elements.
LETTER II.
But I might perhaps make a better use of the opening you afford me if I
were to direct your mind to a loftier theme than that of art. It would appear
to be unseasonable to go in search of a code for the aesthetic world, when
the moral world offers matter of so much higher interest, and when the
spirit of philosophical inquiry is so stringently challenged by the
circumstances of our times to occupy itself with the most perfect of all
works of art—the establishment and structure of a true political freedom.
It is unsatisfactory to live out of your own age and to work for other
times. It is equally incumbent on us to be good members of our own age as
of our own state or country. If it is conceived to be unseemly and even
unlawful for a man to segregate himself from the customs and manners of
the circle in which he lives, it would be inconsistent not to see that it is
Page 246
equally his duty to grant a proper share of influence to the voice of his own
epoch, to its taste and its requirements, in the operations in which he
engages.
But the voice of our age seems by no means favorable to art, at all events
to that kind of art to which my inquiry is directed. The course of events has
given a direction to the genius of the time that threatens to remove it
continually further from the ideal of art. For art has to leave reality, it has to
raise itself bodily above necessity and neediness for art is the daughter of
freedom, and it requires its prescriptions and rules to be furnished by the
necessity of spirits and not by that of matter. But in our day it is necessity,
neediness, that prevails, and bends a degraded humanity under its iron yoke.
Utility is the great idol of the time, to which all powers do homage and all
subjects are subservient. In this great balance of utility, the spiritual service
of art has no weight, and, deprived of all encouragement, it vanishes from
the noisy Vanity Fair of our time. The very spirit of philosophical inquiry
itself robs the imagination of one promise after another, and the frontiers of
art are narrowed, in proportion as the limits of science are enlarged.
The eyes of the philosopher as well as of the man of the world are
anxiously turned to the theatre of political events, where it is presumed the
great destiny of man is to be played out. It would almost seem to betray e
culpable indifference to the welfare of society if we did not share this
general interest. For this great commerce in social and moral principles is of
necessity a matter of the greatest concern to every human being, on the
ground both of its subject and of its results. It must accordingly be of
deepest moment to every man to think for himself. It would seem that now
at length a question that formerly was only settled by the law of the stronger
is to be determined by the calm judgment of the reason, and every man who
is capable of placing himself in a central position, and raising his
individuality into that of his species, can look upon himself as in possession
epoch, to its taste and its requirements, in the operations in which he
engages.
But the voice of our age seems by no means favorable to art, at all events
to that kind of art to which my inquiry is directed. The course of events has
given a direction to the genius of the time that threatens to remove it
continually further from the ideal of art. For art has to leave reality, it has to
raise itself bodily above necessity and neediness for art is the daughter of
freedom, and it requires its prescriptions and rules to be furnished by the
necessity of spirits and not by that of matter. But in our day it is necessity,
neediness, that prevails, and bends a degraded humanity under its iron yoke.
Utility is the great idol of the time, to which all powers do homage and all
subjects are subservient. In this great balance of utility, the spiritual service
of art has no weight, and, deprived of all encouragement, it vanishes from
the noisy Vanity Fair of our time. The very spirit of philosophical inquiry
itself robs the imagination of one promise after another, and the frontiers of
art are narrowed, in proportion as the limits of science are enlarged.
The eyes of the philosopher as well as of the man of the world are
anxiously turned to the theatre of political events, where it is presumed the
great destiny of man is to be played out. It would almost seem to betray e
culpable indifference to the welfare of society if we did not share this
general interest. For this great commerce in social and moral principles is of
necessity a matter of the greatest concern to every human being, on the
ground both of its subject and of its results. It must accordingly be of
deepest moment to every man to think for himself. It would seem that now
at length a question that formerly was only settled by the law of the stronger
is to be determined by the calm judgment of the reason, and every man who
is capable of placing himself in a central position, and raising his
individuality into that of his species, can look upon himself as in possession
Page 247
of this judicial faculty of reason; being moreover, as man and member of
the human family, a party in the case under trial and involved more or less
in its decisions. It would thus appear that this great political process is not
only engaged with his individual case, it has also to pronounce enactments,
which he as a rational spirit is capable of enunciating and entitled to
pronounce.
It is evident that it would have been most attractive to me to inquire into
an object such as this, to decide such a question in conjunction with a
thinker of powerful mind, a man of liberal sympathies, and a heart imbued
with a noble enthusiasm for the weal of humanity. Though so widely
separated by worldly position, it would have been a delightful surprise to
have found your unprejudiced mind arriving at the same result as my own
in the field of ideas, Nevertheless, I think I can not only excuse, but even
justify by solid grounds, my step in resisting this attractive purpose and in
preferring beauty to freedom. I hope that I shall succeed in convincing you
that this matter of art is less foreign to the needs than to the tastes of our
age; nay, that, to arrive at a solution even in the political problem, the road
of aesthetics must be pursued, because it is through beauty that we arrive at
freedom. But I cannot carry out this proof without my bringing to your
remembrance the principles by which the reason is guided in political
legislation.
LETTER III.
Man is not better treated by nature in his first start than her other works
are; so long as he is unable to act for himself as an independent intelligence,
she acts for him. But the very fact that constitutes him a man is, that he does
not remain stationary, where nature has placed him, that he can pass with
his reason, retracing the steps nature had made him anticipate, that he can
the human family, a party in the case under trial and involved more or less
in its decisions. It would thus appear that this great political process is not
only engaged with his individual case, it has also to pronounce enactments,
which he as a rational spirit is capable of enunciating and entitled to
pronounce.
It is evident that it would have been most attractive to me to inquire into
an object such as this, to decide such a question in conjunction with a
thinker of powerful mind, a man of liberal sympathies, and a heart imbued
with a noble enthusiasm for the weal of humanity. Though so widely
separated by worldly position, it would have been a delightful surprise to
have found your unprejudiced mind arriving at the same result as my own
in the field of ideas, Nevertheless, I think I can not only excuse, but even
justify by solid grounds, my step in resisting this attractive purpose and in
preferring beauty to freedom. I hope that I shall succeed in convincing you
that this matter of art is less foreign to the needs than to the tastes of our
age; nay, that, to arrive at a solution even in the political problem, the road
of aesthetics must be pursued, because it is through beauty that we arrive at
freedom. But I cannot carry out this proof without my bringing to your
remembrance the principles by which the reason is guided in political
legislation.
LETTER III.
Man is not better treated by nature in his first start than her other works
are; so long as he is unable to act for himself as an independent intelligence,
she acts for him. But the very fact that constitutes him a man is, that he does
not remain stationary, where nature has placed him, that he can pass with
his reason, retracing the steps nature had made him anticipate, that he can
Page 248
convert the work of necessity into one of free solution, and elevate physical
necessity into a moral law.
When man is raised from his slumber in the senses, he feels that he is a
man, he surveys his surroundings, and finds that he is in a state. He was
introduced into this state, by the power of circumstances, before he could
freely select his own position. But as a moral being he cannot possibly rest
satisfied with a political condition forced upon him by necessity, and only
calculated for that condition; and it would be unfortunate if this did satisfy
him. In many cases man shakes off this blind law of necessity, by his free
spontaneous action, of which among many others we have an instance, in
his ennobling by beauty and suppressing by moral influence the powerful
impulse implanted in him by nature in the passion of love. Thus, when
arrived at maturity, he recovers his childhood by an artificial process, he
founds a state of nature in his ideas, not given him by any experience, but
established by the necessary laws and conditions of his reason, and he
attributes to this ideal condition an object, an aim, of which he was not
cognisant in the actual reality of nature. He gives himself a choice of which
he was not capable before, and sets to work just as if he were beginning
anew, and were exchanging his original state of bondage for one of
complete independence, doing this with complete insight and of his free
decision. He is justified in regarding this work of political thraldom as non-
existing, though a wild and arbitrary caprice may have founded its work
very artfully; though it may strive to maintain it with great arrogance and
encompass it with a halo of veneration. For the work of blind powers
possesses no authority, before which freedom need bow, and all must be
made to adapt itself to the highest end which reason has set up in his
personality. It is in this wise that a people in a state of manhood is justified
in exchanging a condition of thraldom for one of moral freedom.
necessity into a moral law.
When man is raised from his slumber in the senses, he feels that he is a
man, he surveys his surroundings, and finds that he is in a state. He was
introduced into this state, by the power of circumstances, before he could
freely select his own position. But as a moral being he cannot possibly rest
satisfied with a political condition forced upon him by necessity, and only
calculated for that condition; and it would be unfortunate if this did satisfy
him. In many cases man shakes off this blind law of necessity, by his free
spontaneous action, of which among many others we have an instance, in
his ennobling by beauty and suppressing by moral influence the powerful
impulse implanted in him by nature in the passion of love. Thus, when
arrived at maturity, he recovers his childhood by an artificial process, he
founds a state of nature in his ideas, not given him by any experience, but
established by the necessary laws and conditions of his reason, and he
attributes to this ideal condition an object, an aim, of which he was not
cognisant in the actual reality of nature. He gives himself a choice of which
he was not capable before, and sets to work just as if he were beginning
anew, and were exchanging his original state of bondage for one of
complete independence, doing this with complete insight and of his free
decision. He is justified in regarding this work of political thraldom as non-
existing, though a wild and arbitrary caprice may have founded its work
very artfully; though it may strive to maintain it with great arrogance and
encompass it with a halo of veneration. For the work of blind powers
possesses no authority, before which freedom need bow, and all must be
made to adapt itself to the highest end which reason has set up in his
personality. It is in this wise that a people in a state of manhood is justified
in exchanging a condition of thraldom for one of moral freedom.
Page 249
Now the term natural condition can be applied to every political body
which owes its establishment originally to forces and not to laws, and such
a state contradicts the moral nature of man, because lawfulness can alone
have authority over this. At the same time this natural condition is quite
sufficient for the physical man, who only gives himself laws in order to get
rid of brute force. Moreover, the physical man is a reality, and the moral
man problematical. Therefore when the reason suppresses the natural
condition, as she must if she wishes to substitute her own, she weighs the
real physical man against the problematical moral man, she weighs the
existence of society against a possible, though morally necessary, ideal of
society. She takes from man something which he really possesses, and
without which he possesses nothing, and refers him as a substitute to
something that he ought to possess and might possess; and if reason had
relied too exclusively on him, she might, in order to secure him a state of
humanity in which he is wanting and can want without injury to his life,
have robbed him even of the means of animal existence which is the first
necessary condition of his being a man. Before he had opportunity to hold
firm to the law with his will, reason would have withdrawn from his feet the
ladder of nature.
The great point is therefore to reconcile these two considerations: to
prevent physical society from ceasing for a moment in time, while the
moral society is being formed in the idea; in other words, to prevent its
existence from being placed in jeopardy, for the sake of the moral dignity of
man. When the mechanic has to mend a watch, he lets the wheels run out,
but the living watchworks of the state have to be repaired while they act,
and a wheel has to be exchanged for another during its revolutions.
Accordingly props must be sought for to support society and keep it going
while it is made independent of the natural condition from which it is
sought to emancipate it.
which owes its establishment originally to forces and not to laws, and such
a state contradicts the moral nature of man, because lawfulness can alone
have authority over this. At the same time this natural condition is quite
sufficient for the physical man, who only gives himself laws in order to get
rid of brute force. Moreover, the physical man is a reality, and the moral
man problematical. Therefore when the reason suppresses the natural
condition, as she must if she wishes to substitute her own, she weighs the
real physical man against the problematical moral man, she weighs the
existence of society against a possible, though morally necessary, ideal of
society. She takes from man something which he really possesses, and
without which he possesses nothing, and refers him as a substitute to
something that he ought to possess and might possess; and if reason had
relied too exclusively on him, she might, in order to secure him a state of
humanity in which he is wanting and can want without injury to his life,
have robbed him even of the means of animal existence which is the first
necessary condition of his being a man. Before he had opportunity to hold
firm to the law with his will, reason would have withdrawn from his feet the
ladder of nature.
The great point is therefore to reconcile these two considerations: to
prevent physical society from ceasing for a moment in time, while the
moral society is being formed in the idea; in other words, to prevent its
existence from being placed in jeopardy, for the sake of the moral dignity of
man. When the mechanic has to mend a watch, he lets the wheels run out,
but the living watchworks of the state have to be repaired while they act,
and a wheel has to be exchanged for another during its revolutions.
Accordingly props must be sought for to support society and keep it going
while it is made independent of the natural condition from which it is
sought to emancipate it.
Page 250
This prop is not found in the natural character of man, who, being selfish
and violent, directs his energies rather to the destruction than to the
preservation of society. Nor is it found in his moral character, which has to
be formed, which can never be worked upon or calculated on by the
lawgiver, because it is free and never appears. It would seem therefore that
another measure must be adopted. It would seem that the physical character
of the arbitrary must be separated from moral freedom; that it is incumbent
to make the former harmonise with the laws and the latter dependent on
impressions; it would be expedient to remove the former still farther from
matter and to bring the latter somewhat more near to it; in short to produce
a third character related to both the others—the physical and the moral—
paving the way to a transition from the sway of mere force to that of law,
without preventing the proper development of the moral character, but
serving rather as a pledge in the sensuous sphere of a morality in the
unseen.
LETTER IV.
Thus much is certain. It is only when a third character, as previously
suggested, has preponderance that a revolution in a state according to moral
principles can be free from injurious consequences; nor can anything else
secure its endurance. In proposing or setting up a moral state, the moral law
is relied upon as a real power, and free will is drawn into the realm of
causes, where all hangs together, mutually with stringent necessity and
rigidity. But we know that the condition of the human will always remains
contingent, and that only in the Absolute Being physical coexists with
moral necessity. Accordingly if it is wished to depend on the moral conduct
of man as on natural results, this conduct must become nature, and he must
be led by natural impulse to such a course of action as can only and
invariably have moral results. But the will of man is perfectly free between
inclination and duty, and no physical necessity ought to enter as a sharer in
and violent, directs his energies rather to the destruction than to the
preservation of society. Nor is it found in his moral character, which has to
be formed, which can never be worked upon or calculated on by the
lawgiver, because it is free and never appears. It would seem therefore that
another measure must be adopted. It would seem that the physical character
of the arbitrary must be separated from moral freedom; that it is incumbent
to make the former harmonise with the laws and the latter dependent on
impressions; it would be expedient to remove the former still farther from
matter and to bring the latter somewhat more near to it; in short to produce
a third character related to both the others—the physical and the moral—
paving the way to a transition from the sway of mere force to that of law,
without preventing the proper development of the moral character, but
serving rather as a pledge in the sensuous sphere of a morality in the
unseen.
LETTER IV.
Thus much is certain. It is only when a third character, as previously
suggested, has preponderance that a revolution in a state according to moral
principles can be free from injurious consequences; nor can anything else
secure its endurance. In proposing or setting up a moral state, the moral law
is relied upon as a real power, and free will is drawn into the realm of
causes, where all hangs together, mutually with stringent necessity and
rigidity. But we know that the condition of the human will always remains
contingent, and that only in the Absolute Being physical coexists with
moral necessity. Accordingly if it is wished to depend on the moral conduct
of man as on natural results, this conduct must become nature, and he must
be led by natural impulse to such a course of action as can only and
invariably have moral results. But the will of man is perfectly free between
inclination and duty, and no physical necessity ought to enter as a sharer in
Page 251
this magisterial personality. If therefore he is to retain this power of
solution, and yet become a reliable link in the causal concatenation of
forces, this can only be effected when the operations of both these impulses
are presented quite equally in the world of appearances. It is only possible
when, with every difference of form, the matter of man's volition remains
the same, when all his impulses agreeing with his reason are sufficient to
have the value of a universal legislation.
It may be urged that every individual man carries, within himself, at least
in his adaptation and destination, a purely ideal man. The great problem of
his existence is to bring all the incessant changes of his outer life into
conformity with the unchanging unity of this ideal. This pure ideal man,
which makes itself known more or less clearly in every subject, is
represented by the state, which is the objective and, so to speak, canonical
form in which the manifold differences of the subjects strive to unite. Now
two ways present themselves to the thought, in which the man of time can
agree with the man of idea, and there are also two ways in which the state
can maintain itself in individuals. One of these ways is when the pure ideal
man subdues the empirical man, and the state suppresses the individual, or
again when the individual BECOMES the state, and the man of time is
ENNOBLED to the man of idea.
I admit that in a one-sided estimate from the point of view of morality
this difference vanishes, for the reason is satisfied if her law prevails
unconditionally. But when the survey taken is complete and embraces the
whole man (anthropology), where the form is considered together with the
substance, and a living feeling has a voice, the difference will become far
more evident. No doubt the reason demands unity, and nature variety, and
both legislations take man in hand. The law of the former is stamped upon
him by an incorruptible consciousness, that of the latter by an ineradicable
feeling. Consequently education will always appear deficient when the
solution, and yet become a reliable link in the causal concatenation of
forces, this can only be effected when the operations of both these impulses
are presented quite equally in the world of appearances. It is only possible
when, with every difference of form, the matter of man's volition remains
the same, when all his impulses agreeing with his reason are sufficient to
have the value of a universal legislation.
It may be urged that every individual man carries, within himself, at least
in his adaptation and destination, a purely ideal man. The great problem of
his existence is to bring all the incessant changes of his outer life into
conformity with the unchanging unity of this ideal. This pure ideal man,
which makes itself known more or less clearly in every subject, is
represented by the state, which is the objective and, so to speak, canonical
form in which the manifold differences of the subjects strive to unite. Now
two ways present themselves to the thought, in which the man of time can
agree with the man of idea, and there are also two ways in which the state
can maintain itself in individuals. One of these ways is when the pure ideal
man subdues the empirical man, and the state suppresses the individual, or
again when the individual BECOMES the state, and the man of time is
ENNOBLED to the man of idea.
I admit that in a one-sided estimate from the point of view of morality
this difference vanishes, for the reason is satisfied if her law prevails
unconditionally. But when the survey taken is complete and embraces the
whole man (anthropology), where the form is considered together with the
substance, and a living feeling has a voice, the difference will become far
more evident. No doubt the reason demands unity, and nature variety, and
both legislations take man in hand. The law of the former is stamped upon
him by an incorruptible consciousness, that of the latter by an ineradicable
feeling. Consequently education will always appear deficient when the
Page 252
moral feeling can only be maintained with the sacrifice of what is natural;
and a political administration will always be very imperfect when it is only
able to bring about unity by suppressing variety. The state ought not only to
respect the objective and generic but also the subjective and specific in
individuals; and while diffusing the unseen world of morals, it must not
depopulate the kingdom of appearance, the external world of matter.
When the mechanical artist places his hand on the formless block, to give
it a form according to his intention, he has not any scruples in doing
violence to it. For the nature on which he works does not deserve any
respect in itself, and he does not value the whole for its parts, but the parts
on account of the whole. When the child of the fine arts sets his hand to the
same block, he has no scruples either in doing violence to it, he only avoids
showing this violence. He does not respect the matter in which he works,
any more than the mechanical artist; but he seeks by an apparent
consideration for it to deceive the eye which takes this matter under its
protection. The political and educating artist follows a very different course,
while making man at once his material and his end. In this case the aim or
end meets in the material, and it is only because the whole serves the parts
that the parts adapt themselves to the end. The political artist has to treat his
material—man—with a very different kind of respect from that shown by
the artist of fine art to his work. He must spare man's peculiarity and
personality, not to produce a deceptive effect on the senses, but objectively
and out of consideration for his inner being.
But the state is an organisation which fashions itself through itself and for
itself, and for this reason it can only be realised when the parts have been
accorded to the idea of the whole. The state serves the purpose of a
representative, both to pure ideal and to objective humanity, in the breast of
its citizens, accordingly it will have to observe the same relation to its
citizens in which they are placed to it, and it will only respect their
and a political administration will always be very imperfect when it is only
able to bring about unity by suppressing variety. The state ought not only to
respect the objective and generic but also the subjective and specific in
individuals; and while diffusing the unseen world of morals, it must not
depopulate the kingdom of appearance, the external world of matter.
When the mechanical artist places his hand on the formless block, to give
it a form according to his intention, he has not any scruples in doing
violence to it. For the nature on which he works does not deserve any
respect in itself, and he does not value the whole for its parts, but the parts
on account of the whole. When the child of the fine arts sets his hand to the
same block, he has no scruples either in doing violence to it, he only avoids
showing this violence. He does not respect the matter in which he works,
any more than the mechanical artist; but he seeks by an apparent
consideration for it to deceive the eye which takes this matter under its
protection. The political and educating artist follows a very different course,
while making man at once his material and his end. In this case the aim or
end meets in the material, and it is only because the whole serves the parts
that the parts adapt themselves to the end. The political artist has to treat his
material—man—with a very different kind of respect from that shown by
the artist of fine art to his work. He must spare man's peculiarity and
personality, not to produce a deceptive effect on the senses, but objectively
and out of consideration for his inner being.
But the state is an organisation which fashions itself through itself and for
itself, and for this reason it can only be realised when the parts have been
accorded to the idea of the whole. The state serves the purpose of a
representative, both to pure ideal and to objective humanity, in the breast of
its citizens, accordingly it will have to observe the same relation to its
citizens in which they are placed to it, and it will only respect their
Page 253
subjective humanity in the same degree that it is ennobled to an objective
existence. If the internal man is one with himself, he will be able to rescue
his peculiarity, even in the greatest generalisation of his conduct, and the
state will only become the exponent of his fine instinct, the clearer formula
of his internal legislation. But if the subjective man is in conflict with the
objective and contradicts him in the character of the people, so that only the
oppression of the former can give the victory to the latter, then the state will
take up the severe aspect of the law against the citizen, and in order not to
fall a sacrifice, it will have to crush under foot such a hostile individuality,
without any compromise.
Now man can be opposed to himself in a twofold manner: either as a
savage, when his feelings rule over his principles; or as a barbarian, when
his principles destroy his feelings. The savage despises art, and
acknowledges nature as his despotic ruler; the barbarian laughs at nature,
and dishonours it, but he often proceeds in a more contemptible way than
the savage, to be the slave of his senses. The cultivated man makes of
nature his friend, and honours its friendship, while only bridling its caprice.
Consequently, when reason brings her moral unity into physical society,
she must not injure the manifold in nature. When nature strives to maintain
her manifold character in the moral structure of society, this must not create
any breach in moral unity; the victorious form is equally remote from
uniformity and confusion. Therefore, TOTALITY of character must be
found in the people which is capable and worthy to exchange the state of
necessity for that of freedom.
LETTER V.
Does the present age, do passing events, present this character? I direct
my attention at once to the most prominent object in this vast structure.
existence. If the internal man is one with himself, he will be able to rescue
his peculiarity, even in the greatest generalisation of his conduct, and the
state will only become the exponent of his fine instinct, the clearer formula
of his internal legislation. But if the subjective man is in conflict with the
objective and contradicts him in the character of the people, so that only the
oppression of the former can give the victory to the latter, then the state will
take up the severe aspect of the law against the citizen, and in order not to
fall a sacrifice, it will have to crush under foot such a hostile individuality,
without any compromise.
Now man can be opposed to himself in a twofold manner: either as a
savage, when his feelings rule over his principles; or as a barbarian, when
his principles destroy his feelings. The savage despises art, and
acknowledges nature as his despotic ruler; the barbarian laughs at nature,
and dishonours it, but he often proceeds in a more contemptible way than
the savage, to be the slave of his senses. The cultivated man makes of
nature his friend, and honours its friendship, while only bridling its caprice.
Consequently, when reason brings her moral unity into physical society,
she must not injure the manifold in nature. When nature strives to maintain
her manifold character in the moral structure of society, this must not create
any breach in moral unity; the victorious form is equally remote from
uniformity and confusion. Therefore, TOTALITY of character must be
found in the people which is capable and worthy to exchange the state of
necessity for that of freedom.
LETTER V.
Does the present age, do passing events, present this character? I direct
my attention at once to the most prominent object in this vast structure.
Page 254
It is true that the consideration of opinion is fallen, caprice is unnerved,
and, although still armed with power, receives no longer any respect. Man
has awaked from his long lethargy and self- deception, and he demands
with impressive unanimity to be restored to his imperishable rights. But he
does not only demand them; he rises on all sides to seize by force what, in
his opinion, has been unjustly wrested from him. The edifice of the natural
state is tottering, its foundations shake, and a physical possibility seems at
length granted to place law on the throne, to honour man at length as an
end, and to make true freedom the basis of political union. Vain hope! The
moral possibility is wanting, and the generous occasion finds an
unsusceptible rule.
Man paints himself in his actions, and what is the form depicted in the
drama of the present time? On the one hand, he is seen running wild, on the
other in a state of lethargy; the two extremest stages of human degeneracy,
and both seen in one and the same period.
In the lower larger masses, coarse, lawless impulses come to view,
breaking loose when the bonds of civil order are burst asunder, and
hastening with unbridled fury to satisfy their savage instinct. Objective
humanity may have had cause to complain of the state; yet subjective man
must honour its institutions. Ought he to be blamed because he lost sight of
the dignity of human nature, so long as he was concerned in preserving his
existence? Can we blame him that he proceeded to separate by the force of
gravity, to fasten by the force of cohesion, at a time when there could be no
thought of building or raising up? The extinction of the state contains its
justification. Society set free, instead of hastening upward into organic life,
collapses into its elements.
On the other hand, the civilized classes give us the still more repulsive
sight of lethargy, and of a depravity of character which is the more revolting
and, although still armed with power, receives no longer any respect. Man
has awaked from his long lethargy and self- deception, and he demands
with impressive unanimity to be restored to his imperishable rights. But he
does not only demand them; he rises on all sides to seize by force what, in
his opinion, has been unjustly wrested from him. The edifice of the natural
state is tottering, its foundations shake, and a physical possibility seems at
length granted to place law on the throne, to honour man at length as an
end, and to make true freedom the basis of political union. Vain hope! The
moral possibility is wanting, and the generous occasion finds an
unsusceptible rule.
Man paints himself in his actions, and what is the form depicted in the
drama of the present time? On the one hand, he is seen running wild, on the
other in a state of lethargy; the two extremest stages of human degeneracy,
and both seen in one and the same period.
In the lower larger masses, coarse, lawless impulses come to view,
breaking loose when the bonds of civil order are burst asunder, and
hastening with unbridled fury to satisfy their savage instinct. Objective
humanity may have had cause to complain of the state; yet subjective man
must honour its institutions. Ought he to be blamed because he lost sight of
the dignity of human nature, so long as he was concerned in preserving his
existence? Can we blame him that he proceeded to separate by the force of
gravity, to fasten by the force of cohesion, at a time when there could be no
thought of building or raising up? The extinction of the state contains its
justification. Society set free, instead of hastening upward into organic life,
collapses into its elements.
On the other hand, the civilized classes give us the still more repulsive
sight of lethargy, and of a depravity of character which is the more revolting
Page 255
because it roots in culture. I forget who of the older or more recent
philosophers makes the remark, that what is more noble is the more
revolting in its destruction. The remark applies with truth to the world of
morals. The child of nature, when he breaks loose, becomes a madman; but
the art scholar, when he breaks loose, becomes a debased character. The
enlightenment of the understanding, on which the more refined classes
pride themselves with some ground, shows on the whole so little of an
ennobling influence on the mind that it seems rather to confirm corruption
by its maxims. We deny nature in her legitimate field and feel her tyranny in
the moral sphere, and while resisting her impressions, we receive our
principles from her. While the affected decency of our manners does not
even grant to nature a pardonable influence in the initial stage, our
materialistic system of morals allows her the casting vote in the last and
essential stage. Egotism has founded its system in the very bosom of a
refined society, and without developing even a sociable character, we feel
all the contagions and miseries of society. We subject our free judgment to
its despotic opinions, our feelings to its bizarre customs, and our will to its
seductions. We only maintain our caprice against her holy rights. The man
of the world has his heart contracted by a proud self- complacency, while
that of the man of nature often beats in sympathy; and every man seeks for
nothing more than to save his wretched property from the general
destruction, as it were from some great conflagration. It is conceived that
the only way to find a shelter against the aberrations of sentiment is by
completely foregoing its indulgence, and mockery, which is often a useful
chastener of mysticism, slanders in the same breath the noblest aspirations.
Culture, far from giving us freedom, only develops, as it advances, new
necessities; the fetters of the physical close more tightly around us, so that
the fear of loss quenches even the ardent impulse toward improvement, and
the maxims of passive obedience are held to be the highest wisdom of life.
Thus the spirit of the time is seen to waver between perversions and
philosophers makes the remark, that what is more noble is the more
revolting in its destruction. The remark applies with truth to the world of
morals. The child of nature, when he breaks loose, becomes a madman; but
the art scholar, when he breaks loose, becomes a debased character. The
enlightenment of the understanding, on which the more refined classes
pride themselves with some ground, shows on the whole so little of an
ennobling influence on the mind that it seems rather to confirm corruption
by its maxims. We deny nature in her legitimate field and feel her tyranny in
the moral sphere, and while resisting her impressions, we receive our
principles from her. While the affected decency of our manners does not
even grant to nature a pardonable influence in the initial stage, our
materialistic system of morals allows her the casting vote in the last and
essential stage. Egotism has founded its system in the very bosom of a
refined society, and without developing even a sociable character, we feel
all the contagions and miseries of society. We subject our free judgment to
its despotic opinions, our feelings to its bizarre customs, and our will to its
seductions. We only maintain our caprice against her holy rights. The man
of the world has his heart contracted by a proud self- complacency, while
that of the man of nature often beats in sympathy; and every man seeks for
nothing more than to save his wretched property from the general
destruction, as it were from some great conflagration. It is conceived that
the only way to find a shelter against the aberrations of sentiment is by
completely foregoing its indulgence, and mockery, which is often a useful
chastener of mysticism, slanders in the same breath the noblest aspirations.
Culture, far from giving us freedom, only develops, as it advances, new
necessities; the fetters of the physical close more tightly around us, so that
the fear of loss quenches even the ardent impulse toward improvement, and
the maxims of passive obedience are held to be the highest wisdom of life.
Thus the spirit of the time is seen to waver between perversions and
Page 256
savagism, between what is unnatural and mere nature, between superstition
and moral unbelief, and it is often nothing but the equilibrium of evils that
sets bounds to it.
LETTER VI.
Have I gone too far in this portraiture of our times? I do not anticipate
this stricture, but rather another—that I have proved too much by it. You
will tell me that the picture I have presented resembles the humanity of our
day, but it also bodies forth all nations engaged in the same degree of
culture, because all, without exception, have fallen off from nature by the
abuse of reason, before they can return to it through reason.
But if we bestow some serious attention to the character of our times, we
shall be astonished at the contrast between the present and the previous
form of humanity, especially that of Greece. We are justified in claiming the
reputation of culture and refinement, when contrasted with a purely natural
state of society, but not so comparing ourselves with the Grecian nature. For
the latter was combined with all the charms of art and with all the dignity of
wisdom, without, however, as with us, becoming a victim to these
influences. The Greeks put us to shame not only by their simplicity, which
is foreign to our age; they are at the same time our rivals, nay, frequently
our models, in those very points of superiority from which we seek comfort
when regretting the unnatural character of our manners. We see that
remarkable people uniting at once fulness of form and fulness of substance,
both philosophising and creating, both tender and energetic, uniting a
youthful fancy; to the virility of reason in a glorious humanity.
At the period of Greek culture, which was an awakening of the powers of
the mind, the senses and the spirit had no distinctly separated property; no
division had yet torn them asunder, leading them to partition in a hostile
attitude, and to mark off their limits with precision. Poetry had not yet
and moral unbelief, and it is often nothing but the equilibrium of evils that
sets bounds to it.
LETTER VI.
Have I gone too far in this portraiture of our times? I do not anticipate
this stricture, but rather another—that I have proved too much by it. You
will tell me that the picture I have presented resembles the humanity of our
day, but it also bodies forth all nations engaged in the same degree of
culture, because all, without exception, have fallen off from nature by the
abuse of reason, before they can return to it through reason.
But if we bestow some serious attention to the character of our times, we
shall be astonished at the contrast between the present and the previous
form of humanity, especially that of Greece. We are justified in claiming the
reputation of culture and refinement, when contrasted with a purely natural
state of society, but not so comparing ourselves with the Grecian nature. For
the latter was combined with all the charms of art and with all the dignity of
wisdom, without, however, as with us, becoming a victim to these
influences. The Greeks put us to shame not only by their simplicity, which
is foreign to our age; they are at the same time our rivals, nay, frequently
our models, in those very points of superiority from which we seek comfort
when regretting the unnatural character of our manners. We see that
remarkable people uniting at once fulness of form and fulness of substance,
both philosophising and creating, both tender and energetic, uniting a
youthful fancy; to the virility of reason in a glorious humanity.
At the period of Greek culture, which was an awakening of the powers of
the mind, the senses and the spirit had no distinctly separated property; no
division had yet torn them asunder, leading them to partition in a hostile
attitude, and to mark off their limits with precision. Poetry had not yet
Page 257
become the adversary of wit, nor had speculation abused itself by passing
into quibbling. In cases of necessity both poetry and wit could exchange
parts, because they both honoured truth only in their special way. However
high might be the flight of reason, it drew matter in a loving spirit after it,
and, while sharply and stiffly defining it, never mutilated what it touched. It
is true the Greek mind displaced humanity, and recast it on a magnified
scale in the glorious circle of its gods; but it did this not by dissecting
human nature, but by giving it fresh combinations, for the whole of human
nature was represented in each of the gods. How different is the course
followed by us moderns! We also displace and magnify individuals to form
the image of the specks, but we do this in a fragmentary way, not by altered
combinations, so that it is necessary to gather up from different individuals
the elements that form the species in its totality. It would almost appear is if
the powers of mind express themselves with us in real life or empirically as
separately as the psychologist distinguishes them in the representation. For
we see not only individual subjects, but whole classes of men, uphold their
capacities only in part, while the rest of their faculties scarcely show a germ
of activity, as in the case of the stunted growth of plants.
I do not overlook the advantages to which the present race, regarded as a
unity and in the balance of the understanding, may lay claim over what is
best in the ancient world; but it is obliged to engage in the contest as a
compact mass, and measure itself as a whole against a whole. Who among
the moderns could step forth, man against man, and strive with an Athenian
for the prize of higher humanity?
Whence comes this disadvantageous relation of individuals coupled with
great advantages of the race? Why could the individual Greek be qualified
as the type of his time? and why can no modern dare to offer himself as
such? Because all-uniting nature imparted its forms to the Greek, and an all-
dividing understanding gives our forms to us.
into quibbling. In cases of necessity both poetry and wit could exchange
parts, because they both honoured truth only in their special way. However
high might be the flight of reason, it drew matter in a loving spirit after it,
and, while sharply and stiffly defining it, never mutilated what it touched. It
is true the Greek mind displaced humanity, and recast it on a magnified
scale in the glorious circle of its gods; but it did this not by dissecting
human nature, but by giving it fresh combinations, for the whole of human
nature was represented in each of the gods. How different is the course
followed by us moderns! We also displace and magnify individuals to form
the image of the specks, but we do this in a fragmentary way, not by altered
combinations, so that it is necessary to gather up from different individuals
the elements that form the species in its totality. It would almost appear is if
the powers of mind express themselves with us in real life or empirically as
separately as the psychologist distinguishes them in the representation. For
we see not only individual subjects, but whole classes of men, uphold their
capacities only in part, while the rest of their faculties scarcely show a germ
of activity, as in the case of the stunted growth of plants.
I do not overlook the advantages to which the present race, regarded as a
unity and in the balance of the understanding, may lay claim over what is
best in the ancient world; but it is obliged to engage in the contest as a
compact mass, and measure itself as a whole against a whole. Who among
the moderns could step forth, man against man, and strive with an Athenian
for the prize of higher humanity?
Whence comes this disadvantageous relation of individuals coupled with
great advantages of the race? Why could the individual Greek be qualified
as the type of his time? and why can no modern dare to offer himself as
such? Because all-uniting nature imparted its forms to the Greek, and an all-
dividing understanding gives our forms to us.
Page 258
It was culture itself that gave these wounds to modern humanity. The
inner union of human nature was broken, and a destructive contest divided
its harmonious forces directly; on the one hand, an enlarged experience and
a more distinct thinking necessitated a sharper separation of the sciences,
while on the other hand, the more complicated machinery of states
necessitated a stricter sundering of ranks and occupations. Intuitive and
speculative understanding took up a hostile attitude in opposite fields,
whose borders were guarded with jealousy and distrust; and by limiting its
operation to a narrow sphere, men have made unto themselves a master who
is wont not unfrequently to end by subduing and oppressing all the other
faculties. Whilst on the one hand a luxuriant imagination creates ravages in
the plantations that have cost the intelligence so much labour, on the other
hand a spirit of abstraction suffocates the fire that might have warmed the
heart and inflamed the imagination.
This subversion, commenced by art and learning in the inner man, was
carried out to fulness and finished by the spirit of innovation in government.
It was, no doubt, reasonable to expect that the simple organisation of the
primitive republics should survive the quaintness of primitive manners and
of the relations of antiquity. But, instead of rising to a higher and nobler
degree of animal life, this organisation degenerated into a common and
coarse mechanism. The zoophyte condition of the Grecian states, where
each individual enjoyed an independent life, and could, in cases of
necessity, become a separate whole and unit in himself, gave way to an
ingenious mechanism, when, from the splitting up into numberless parts,
there results a mechanical life in the combination. Then there was a rupture
between the state and the church, between laws and customs; enjoyment
was separated from labour, the means from the end, the effort from the
reward. Man himself eternally chained down to a little fragment of the
whole, only forms a kind of fragment; having nothing in his ears but the
monotonous sound of the perpetually revolving wheel, he never develops
inner union of human nature was broken, and a destructive contest divided
its harmonious forces directly; on the one hand, an enlarged experience and
a more distinct thinking necessitated a sharper separation of the sciences,
while on the other hand, the more complicated machinery of states
necessitated a stricter sundering of ranks and occupations. Intuitive and
speculative understanding took up a hostile attitude in opposite fields,
whose borders were guarded with jealousy and distrust; and by limiting its
operation to a narrow sphere, men have made unto themselves a master who
is wont not unfrequently to end by subduing and oppressing all the other
faculties. Whilst on the one hand a luxuriant imagination creates ravages in
the plantations that have cost the intelligence so much labour, on the other
hand a spirit of abstraction suffocates the fire that might have warmed the
heart and inflamed the imagination.
This subversion, commenced by art and learning in the inner man, was
carried out to fulness and finished by the spirit of innovation in government.
It was, no doubt, reasonable to expect that the simple organisation of the
primitive republics should survive the quaintness of primitive manners and
of the relations of antiquity. But, instead of rising to a higher and nobler
degree of animal life, this organisation degenerated into a common and
coarse mechanism. The zoophyte condition of the Grecian states, where
each individual enjoyed an independent life, and could, in cases of
necessity, become a separate whole and unit in himself, gave way to an
ingenious mechanism, when, from the splitting up into numberless parts,
there results a mechanical life in the combination. Then there was a rupture
between the state and the church, between laws and customs; enjoyment
was separated from labour, the means from the end, the effort from the
reward. Man himself eternally chained down to a little fragment of the
whole, only forms a kind of fragment; having nothing in his ears but the
monotonous sound of the perpetually revolving wheel, he never develops
Page 259
the harmony of his being; and instead of imprinting the seal of humanity on
his being, he ends by being nothing more than the living impress of the craft
to which he devotes himself, of the science that he cultivates. This very
partial and paltry relation, linking the isolated members to the whole, does
not depend on forms that are given spontaneously; for how could a
complicated machine, which shuns the light, confide itself to the free will of
man? This relation is rather dictated, with a rigorous strictness, by a
formulary in which the free intelligence of man is chained down. The dead
letter takes the place of a living meaning, and a practised memory becomes
a safer guide than genius and feeling.
If the community or state measures man by his function, only asking of
its citizens memory, or the intelligence of a craftsman, or mechanical skill,
we cannot be surprised that the other faculties of the mind are neglected, for
the exclusive culture of the one that brings in honour and profit. Such is the
necessary result of an organisation that is indifferent about character, only
looking to acquirements, whilst in other cases it tolerates the thickest
darkness, to favour a spirit of law and order; it must result if it wishes that
individuals in the exercise of special aptitudes 'should gain in depth what
they are permitted to lose in extension. We are aware, no doubt, that a
powerful genius does not shut up its activity within the limits of its
functions; but mediocre talents consume in the craft fallen to their lot the
whole of their feeble energy; and if some of their energy is reserved for
matters of preference, without prejudice to its functions, such a state of
things at once bespeaks a spirit soaring above the vulgar. Moreover, it is
rarely a recommendation in the eye of a state to have a capacity superior to
your employment, or one of those noble intellectual cravings of a man of
talent which contend in rivalry with the duties of office. The state is so
jealous of the exclusive possession of its servants that it would prefer—nor
can it be blamed in this—for functionaries to show their powers with the
Venus of Cytherea rather than the Uranian Venus.
his being, he ends by being nothing more than the living impress of the craft
to which he devotes himself, of the science that he cultivates. This very
partial and paltry relation, linking the isolated members to the whole, does
not depend on forms that are given spontaneously; for how could a
complicated machine, which shuns the light, confide itself to the free will of
man? This relation is rather dictated, with a rigorous strictness, by a
formulary in which the free intelligence of man is chained down. The dead
letter takes the place of a living meaning, and a practised memory becomes
a safer guide than genius and feeling.
If the community or state measures man by his function, only asking of
its citizens memory, or the intelligence of a craftsman, or mechanical skill,
we cannot be surprised that the other faculties of the mind are neglected, for
the exclusive culture of the one that brings in honour and profit. Such is the
necessary result of an organisation that is indifferent about character, only
looking to acquirements, whilst in other cases it tolerates the thickest
darkness, to favour a spirit of law and order; it must result if it wishes that
individuals in the exercise of special aptitudes 'should gain in depth what
they are permitted to lose in extension. We are aware, no doubt, that a
powerful genius does not shut up its activity within the limits of its
functions; but mediocre talents consume in the craft fallen to their lot the
whole of their feeble energy; and if some of their energy is reserved for
matters of preference, without prejudice to its functions, such a state of
things at once bespeaks a spirit soaring above the vulgar. Moreover, it is
rarely a recommendation in the eye of a state to have a capacity superior to
your employment, or one of those noble intellectual cravings of a man of
talent which contend in rivalry with the duties of office. The state is so
jealous of the exclusive possession of its servants that it would prefer—nor
can it be blamed in this—for functionaries to show their powers with the
Venus of Cytherea rather than the Uranian Venus.
Page 260
It is thus that concrete individual life is extinguished, in order that the
abstract whole may continue its miserable life, and the state remains for
ever a stranger to its citizens, because feeling does not discover it
anywhere. The governing authorities find themselves compelled to classify,
and thereby simplify, the multiplicity of citizens, and only to know
humanity in a representative form and at second hand. Accordingly they
end by entirely losing sight of humanity, and by confounding it with a
simple artificial creation of the understanding, whilst on their part the
subject classes cannot help receiving coldly laws that address themselves so
little to their personality. At length society, weary of having a burden that
the state takes so little trouble to lighten, falls to pieces and is broken up—a
destiny that has long since attended most European states. They are
dissolved in what may be called a state of moral nature, in which public
authority is only one function more, hated and deceived by those who think
it necessary, respected only by those who can do without it.
Thus compressed between two forces, within and without, could
humanity follow any other course than that which it has taken? The
speculative mind, pursuing imprescriptible goods and rights in the sphere of
ideas, must needs have become a stranger to the world of sense, and lose
sight of matter for the sake of form. On its part, the world of public affairs,
shut up in a monotonous circle of objects, and even there restricted by
formulas, was led to lose sight of the life and liberty of the whole, while
becoming impoverished at the same time in its own sphere. Just as the
speculative mind was tempted to model the real after the intelligible, and to
raise the subjective of its imagination into laws constituting the existence of
things, so the state spirit rushed into the opposite extreme, wished to make a
particular and fragmentary experience the measure of all observation, and to
apply without exception to all affairs the rules of its own particular craft.
The speculative mind had necessarily to become the prey of a vain subtlety,
the state spirit of a narrow pedantry; for the former was placed too high to
abstract whole may continue its miserable life, and the state remains for
ever a stranger to its citizens, because feeling does not discover it
anywhere. The governing authorities find themselves compelled to classify,
and thereby simplify, the multiplicity of citizens, and only to know
humanity in a representative form and at second hand. Accordingly they
end by entirely losing sight of humanity, and by confounding it with a
simple artificial creation of the understanding, whilst on their part the
subject classes cannot help receiving coldly laws that address themselves so
little to their personality. At length society, weary of having a burden that
the state takes so little trouble to lighten, falls to pieces and is broken up—a
destiny that has long since attended most European states. They are
dissolved in what may be called a state of moral nature, in which public
authority is only one function more, hated and deceived by those who think
it necessary, respected only by those who can do without it.
Thus compressed between two forces, within and without, could
humanity follow any other course than that which it has taken? The
speculative mind, pursuing imprescriptible goods and rights in the sphere of
ideas, must needs have become a stranger to the world of sense, and lose
sight of matter for the sake of form. On its part, the world of public affairs,
shut up in a monotonous circle of objects, and even there restricted by
formulas, was led to lose sight of the life and liberty of the whole, while
becoming impoverished at the same time in its own sphere. Just as the
speculative mind was tempted to model the real after the intelligible, and to
raise the subjective of its imagination into laws constituting the existence of
things, so the state spirit rushed into the opposite extreme, wished to make a
particular and fragmentary experience the measure of all observation, and to
apply without exception to all affairs the rules of its own particular craft.
The speculative mind had necessarily to become the prey of a vain subtlety,
the state spirit of a narrow pedantry; for the former was placed too high to
Page 261
see the individual, and the latter too low to survey the whole. But the
disadvantage of this direction of mind was not confined to knowledge and
mental production; it extended to action and feeling. We know that the
sensibility of the mind depends, as to degree, on the liveliness, and for
extent on the richness of the imagination. Now the predominance of the
faculty of analysis must necessarily deprive the imagination of its warmth
and energy, and a restricted sphere of objects must diminish its wealth. It is
for this reason that the abstract thinker has very often a cold heart, because
he analyses impressions, which only move the mind by their combination or
totality; on the other hand, the man of business, the statesman, has very
often a narrow heart, because shut up in the narrow circle of his
employment his imagination can neither expand nor adapt itself to another
manner of viewing things.
My subject has led me naturally to place in relief the distressing tendency
of the character of our own times to show the sources of the evil, without its
being my province to point out the compensations offered by nature. I will
readily admit to you that, although this splitting up of their being was
unfavourable for individuals, it was the only road open for the progress of
the race. The point at which we see humanity arrived among the Greeks was
undoubtedly a maximum; it could neither stop there nor rise higher. It could
not stop there, for the sum of notions acquired forced infallibly the
intelligence to break with feeling and intuition, and to lead to clearness of
knowledge. Nor could it rise any higher; for it is only in a determinate
measure that clearness can be reconciled with a certain degree of abundance
and of warmth. The Greeks had attained this measure, and to continue their
progress in culture, they, as we, were obliged to renounce the totality of
their being, and to follow different and separate roads in order to seek after
truth.
disadvantage of this direction of mind was not confined to knowledge and
mental production; it extended to action and feeling. We know that the
sensibility of the mind depends, as to degree, on the liveliness, and for
extent on the richness of the imagination. Now the predominance of the
faculty of analysis must necessarily deprive the imagination of its warmth
and energy, and a restricted sphere of objects must diminish its wealth. It is
for this reason that the abstract thinker has very often a cold heart, because
he analyses impressions, which only move the mind by their combination or
totality; on the other hand, the man of business, the statesman, has very
often a narrow heart, because shut up in the narrow circle of his
employment his imagination can neither expand nor adapt itself to another
manner of viewing things.
My subject has led me naturally to place in relief the distressing tendency
of the character of our own times to show the sources of the evil, without its
being my province to point out the compensations offered by nature. I will
readily admit to you that, although this splitting up of their being was
unfavourable for individuals, it was the only road open for the progress of
the race. The point at which we see humanity arrived among the Greeks was
undoubtedly a maximum; it could neither stop there nor rise higher. It could
not stop there, for the sum of notions acquired forced infallibly the
intelligence to break with feeling and intuition, and to lead to clearness of
knowledge. Nor could it rise any higher; for it is only in a determinate
measure that clearness can be reconciled with a certain degree of abundance
and of warmth. The Greeks had attained this measure, and to continue their
progress in culture, they, as we, were obliged to renounce the totality of
their being, and to follow different and separate roads in order to seek after
truth.
Page 262
There was no other way to develop the manifold aptitudes of man than to
bring them in opposition with one another. This antagonism of forces is the
great instrument of culture, but it is only an instrument; for as long as this
antagonism lasts, man is only on the road to culture. It is only because these
special forces are isolated in man, and because they take on themselves to
impose an exclusive legislation, that they enter into strife with the truth of
things, and oblige common sense, which generally adheres imperturbably to
external phaenomena, to dive into the essence of things. While pure
understanding usurps authority in the world of sense, and empiricism
attempts to subject this intellect to the conditions of experience, these two
rival directions arrive at the highest possible development, and exhaust the
whole extent of their sphere. While on the one hand imagination, by its
tyranny, ventures to destroy the order of the world, it forces reason, on the
other side, to rise up to the supreme sources of knowledge, and to invoke
against this predominance of fancy the help of the law of necessity.
By an exclusive spirit in the case of his faculties, the individual is fatally
led to error; but the species is led to truth. It is only by gathering up all the
energy of our mind in a single focus, and concentrating a single force in our
being, that we give in some sort wings to this isolated force, and that we
draw it on artificially far beyond the limits that nature seems to have
imposed upon it. If it be certain that all human individuals taken together
would never have arrived, with the visual power given them by nature, to
see a satellite of Jupiter, discovered by the telescope of the astronomer, it is
just as well established that never would the human understanding have
produced the analysis of the infinite, or the critique of pure reason, if in
particular branches, destined for this mission, reason had not applied itself
to special researches, and if, after having, as it were, freed itself from all
matter, it had not by the most powerful abstraction given to the spiritual eye
of man the force necessary, in order to look into the absolute. But the
question is, if a spirit thus absorbed in pure reason and intuition will be able
bring them in opposition with one another. This antagonism of forces is the
great instrument of culture, but it is only an instrument; for as long as this
antagonism lasts, man is only on the road to culture. It is only because these
special forces are isolated in man, and because they take on themselves to
impose an exclusive legislation, that they enter into strife with the truth of
things, and oblige common sense, which generally adheres imperturbably to
external phaenomena, to dive into the essence of things. While pure
understanding usurps authority in the world of sense, and empiricism
attempts to subject this intellect to the conditions of experience, these two
rival directions arrive at the highest possible development, and exhaust the
whole extent of their sphere. While on the one hand imagination, by its
tyranny, ventures to destroy the order of the world, it forces reason, on the
other side, to rise up to the supreme sources of knowledge, and to invoke
against this predominance of fancy the help of the law of necessity.
By an exclusive spirit in the case of his faculties, the individual is fatally
led to error; but the species is led to truth. It is only by gathering up all the
energy of our mind in a single focus, and concentrating a single force in our
being, that we give in some sort wings to this isolated force, and that we
draw it on artificially far beyond the limits that nature seems to have
imposed upon it. If it be certain that all human individuals taken together
would never have arrived, with the visual power given them by nature, to
see a satellite of Jupiter, discovered by the telescope of the astronomer, it is
just as well established that never would the human understanding have
produced the analysis of the infinite, or the critique of pure reason, if in
particular branches, destined for this mission, reason had not applied itself
to special researches, and if, after having, as it were, freed itself from all
matter, it had not by the most powerful abstraction given to the spiritual eye
of man the force necessary, in order to look into the absolute. But the
question is, if a spirit thus absorbed in pure reason and intuition will be able
Page 263
to emancipate itself from the rigorous fetters of logic, to take the free action
of poetry, and seize the individuality of things with a faithful and chaste
sense? Here nature imposes even on the most universal genius a limit it
cannot pass, and truth will make martyrs as long as philosophy will be
reduced to make its principal occupation the search for arms against errors.
But whatever may be the final profit for the totality of the world, of this
distinct and special perfecting of the human faculties, it cannot be denied
that this final aim of the universe, which devotes them to this kind of
culture, is a cause of suffering, and a kind of malediction for individuals. I
admit that the exercises of the gymnasium form athletic bodies; but beauty
is only developed by the free and equal play of the limbs. In the same way
the tension of the isolated spiritual forces may make extraordinary men; but
it is only the well-tempered equilibrium of these forces that can produce
happy and accomplished men. And in what relation should we be placed
with past and future ages if the perfecting of human nature made sach a
sacrifice indispensable? In that case we should have been the slaves of
humanity, we should have consumed our forces in servile work for it during
some thousands of years, and we should have stamped on our humiliated,
mutilated nature the shameful brand of this slavery—all this in order that
future generations, in a happy leisure, might consecrate themselves to the
cure of their moral health, and develop the whole of human nature by their
free culture.
But can it be true that man has to neglect himself for any end whatever?
Can nature snatch from us; for any end whatever, the perfection which is
prescribed to us by the aim of reason? It must be false that the perfecting of
particular faculties renders the sacrifice of their totality necessary; and even
if the law of nature had imperiously this tendency, we must have the power
to reform by a superior art this totality of our being, which art has
destroyed.
of poetry, and seize the individuality of things with a faithful and chaste
sense? Here nature imposes even on the most universal genius a limit it
cannot pass, and truth will make martyrs as long as philosophy will be
reduced to make its principal occupation the search for arms against errors.
But whatever may be the final profit for the totality of the world, of this
distinct and special perfecting of the human faculties, it cannot be denied
that this final aim of the universe, which devotes them to this kind of
culture, is a cause of suffering, and a kind of malediction for individuals. I
admit that the exercises of the gymnasium form athletic bodies; but beauty
is only developed by the free and equal play of the limbs. In the same way
the tension of the isolated spiritual forces may make extraordinary men; but
it is only the well-tempered equilibrium of these forces that can produce
happy and accomplished men. And in what relation should we be placed
with past and future ages if the perfecting of human nature made sach a
sacrifice indispensable? In that case we should have been the slaves of
humanity, we should have consumed our forces in servile work for it during
some thousands of years, and we should have stamped on our humiliated,
mutilated nature the shameful brand of this slavery—all this in order that
future generations, in a happy leisure, might consecrate themselves to the
cure of their moral health, and develop the whole of human nature by their
free culture.
But can it be true that man has to neglect himself for any end whatever?
Can nature snatch from us; for any end whatever, the perfection which is
prescribed to us by the aim of reason? It must be false that the perfecting of
particular faculties renders the sacrifice of their totality necessary; and even
if the law of nature had imperiously this tendency, we must have the power
to reform by a superior art this totality of our being, which art has
destroyed.
Page 264
LETTER VII.
Can this effect of harmony be attained by the state? That is not possible,
for the state, as at present constituted, has given occasion to evil, and the
state as conceived in the idea, instead of being able to establish this more
perfect humanity, ought to be based upon it. Thus the researches in which I
have indulged would have brought me back to the same point from which
they had called me off for a time. The present age, far from offering us this
form of humanity, which we have acknowledged as a necessary condition
of an improvement of the state, shows us rather the diametrically opposite
form. If therefore the principles I have laid down are correct, and if
experience confirms the picture I have traced of the present time, it would
be necessary to qualify as unseasonable every attempt to effect a similar
change in the state, and all hope as chimerical that would be based on such
an attempt, until the division of the inner man ceases, and nature has been
sufficiently developed to become herself the instrument of this great change
and secure the reality of the political creation of reason.
In the physical creation, nature shows us the road that we have to follow
in the moral creation. Only when the Struggle of elementary forces has
ceased in inferior organisations, nature rises to the noble form of the
physical man. In like manner, the conflict of the elements of the moral man
and that of blind instincts must have ceased, and a coarse antagonism in
himself, beiore the attempt can be hazarded. On the other hand, the
independence of man's character must be secured, and his submission to
despotic forms must have given place to a suitable liberty, before the variety
in his constitution can be made subordinate to the unity of the ideal. When
the man of nature still makes such an anarchical abuse of his will, his
liberty ought hardly to be disclosed to him. And when the man fashioned by
culture makes so little use of his freedom, his free will ought not to be taken
from him. The concession of liberal principles becomes a treason to social
Can this effect of harmony be attained by the state? That is not possible,
for the state, as at present constituted, has given occasion to evil, and the
state as conceived in the idea, instead of being able to establish this more
perfect humanity, ought to be based upon it. Thus the researches in which I
have indulged would have brought me back to the same point from which
they had called me off for a time. The present age, far from offering us this
form of humanity, which we have acknowledged as a necessary condition
of an improvement of the state, shows us rather the diametrically opposite
form. If therefore the principles I have laid down are correct, and if
experience confirms the picture I have traced of the present time, it would
be necessary to qualify as unseasonable every attempt to effect a similar
change in the state, and all hope as chimerical that would be based on such
an attempt, until the division of the inner man ceases, and nature has been
sufficiently developed to become herself the instrument of this great change
and secure the reality of the political creation of reason.
In the physical creation, nature shows us the road that we have to follow
in the moral creation. Only when the Struggle of elementary forces has
ceased in inferior organisations, nature rises to the noble form of the
physical man. In like manner, the conflict of the elements of the moral man
and that of blind instincts must have ceased, and a coarse antagonism in
himself, beiore the attempt can be hazarded. On the other hand, the
independence of man's character must be secured, and his submission to
despotic forms must have given place to a suitable liberty, before the variety
in his constitution can be made subordinate to the unity of the ideal. When
the man of nature still makes such an anarchical abuse of his will, his
liberty ought hardly to be disclosed to him. And when the man fashioned by
culture makes so little use of his freedom, his free will ought not to be taken
from him. The concession of liberal principles becomes a treason to social
Page 265
order when it is associated with a force still in fermentation, and increases
the already exuberant energy of its nature. Again, the law of conformity
under one level becomes tyranny to the individual when it is allied to a
weakness already holding sway and to natural obstacles, and when it comes
to extinguish the last spark of spontaneity and of originality.
The tone of the age must therefore rise from its profound moral
degradation; on the one hand it must emancipate itself from the blind
service of nature, and on the other it must revert to its simplicity, its truth,
and its fruitful sap; a sufficient task for more than a century. However, I
admit readily, more than one special effort may meet with success, but no
improvement of the whole will result from it, and contradictions in action
will be a continual protest against the unity of maxims. It will be quite
possible, then, that in remote corners of the world humanity may be
honoured in the person of the negro, while in Europe it may be degraded in
the person of the thinker. The old principles will remain, but they will adopt
the dress of the age, and philosophy will lend its name to an oppression that
was formerly authorised by the Church. In one place, alarmed at the liberty
which in its opening efforts always shows itself an enemy, it will cast itself
into the arms of a convenient servitude. In another place, reduced to despair
by a pedantic tutelage, it will be driven into the savage license of the state
of nature. Usurpation will invoke the weakness of human nature, and
insurrection will invoke its dignity, till at length the great sovereign of all
human things, blind force, shall come in and decide, like a vulgar pugilist,
this pretended contest of principles.
LETTER VIII.
Must philosophy therefore retire from this field, disappointed in its
hopes? Whilst in all other directions the dominion of forms is extended,
must this the most precious of all gifts be abandoned to a formless chance?
the already exuberant energy of its nature. Again, the law of conformity
under one level becomes tyranny to the individual when it is allied to a
weakness already holding sway and to natural obstacles, and when it comes
to extinguish the last spark of spontaneity and of originality.
The tone of the age must therefore rise from its profound moral
degradation; on the one hand it must emancipate itself from the blind
service of nature, and on the other it must revert to its simplicity, its truth,
and its fruitful sap; a sufficient task for more than a century. However, I
admit readily, more than one special effort may meet with success, but no
improvement of the whole will result from it, and contradictions in action
will be a continual protest against the unity of maxims. It will be quite
possible, then, that in remote corners of the world humanity may be
honoured in the person of the negro, while in Europe it may be degraded in
the person of the thinker. The old principles will remain, but they will adopt
the dress of the age, and philosophy will lend its name to an oppression that
was formerly authorised by the Church. In one place, alarmed at the liberty
which in its opening efforts always shows itself an enemy, it will cast itself
into the arms of a convenient servitude. In another place, reduced to despair
by a pedantic tutelage, it will be driven into the savage license of the state
of nature. Usurpation will invoke the weakness of human nature, and
insurrection will invoke its dignity, till at length the great sovereign of all
human things, blind force, shall come in and decide, like a vulgar pugilist,
this pretended contest of principles.
LETTER VIII.
Must philosophy therefore retire from this field, disappointed in its
hopes? Whilst in all other directions the dominion of forms is extended,
must this the most precious of all gifts be abandoned to a formless chance?
Page 266
Must the contest of blind forces last eternally in the political world, and is
social law never to triumph over a hating egotism?
Not in the least. It is true that reason herself will never attempt directly a
struggle with this brutal force which resists her arms, and she will be as far
as the son of Saturn in the 'Iliad' from descending into the dismal field of
battle, to fight them in person. But she chooses the most deserving among
the combatants, clothes him with divine arms as Jupiter gave them to his
son-in-law, and by her triumphing force she finally decides the victory.
Reason has done all that she could in finding the law and promulgating it;
it is for the energy of the will and the ardour of feeling to carry it out. To
issue victoriously from her contest with force, truth herself must first
become a force, and turn one of the instincts of man into her champion in
the empire of phenomena. For instincts are the only motive forces in the
material world. If hitherto truth has so little manifested her victorious
power, this has not depended on the understanding, which could not have
unveiled it, but on the heart which remained closed to it, and on instinct
which did not act with it.
Whence, in fact, proceeds this general sway of prejudices, this might of
the understanding in the midst of the light disseminated by philosophy and
experience? The age is enlightened, that is to say, that knowledge, obtained
and vulgarised, suffices to set right at least our practical principles. The
spirit of free inquiry has dissipated the erroneous opinions which long
barred the access to truth, and has undermined the ground on which
fanaticism and deception had erected their throne. Reason has purified itself
from the il lusions of the senses and from a mendacious sophistry, and
philosophy herself raises her voice and exhorts us to return to the bosom of
nature, to which she had first made us unfaithful. Whence then is it that we
remain still barbarians?
social law never to triumph over a hating egotism?
Not in the least. It is true that reason herself will never attempt directly a
struggle with this brutal force which resists her arms, and she will be as far
as the son of Saturn in the 'Iliad' from descending into the dismal field of
battle, to fight them in person. But she chooses the most deserving among
the combatants, clothes him with divine arms as Jupiter gave them to his
son-in-law, and by her triumphing force she finally decides the victory.
Reason has done all that she could in finding the law and promulgating it;
it is for the energy of the will and the ardour of feeling to carry it out. To
issue victoriously from her contest with force, truth herself must first
become a force, and turn one of the instincts of man into her champion in
the empire of phenomena. For instincts are the only motive forces in the
material world. If hitherto truth has so little manifested her victorious
power, this has not depended on the understanding, which could not have
unveiled it, but on the heart which remained closed to it, and on instinct
which did not act with it.
Whence, in fact, proceeds this general sway of prejudices, this might of
the understanding in the midst of the light disseminated by philosophy and
experience? The age is enlightened, that is to say, that knowledge, obtained
and vulgarised, suffices to set right at least our practical principles. The
spirit of free inquiry has dissipated the erroneous opinions which long
barred the access to truth, and has undermined the ground on which
fanaticism and deception had erected their throne. Reason has purified itself
from the il lusions of the senses and from a mendacious sophistry, and
philosophy herself raises her voice and exhorts us to return to the bosom of
nature, to which she had first made us unfaithful. Whence then is it that we
remain still barbarians?
Page 267
There must be something in the spirit of man—as it is not in the objects
themselves—which prevents us from receiving the truth, notwithstanding
the brilliant light she diffuses, and from accepting her, whatever may be her
strength for producing conviction. This something was perceived and
expressed by an ancient sage in this very significant maxim: sapere aude
[Footnote: Dare to be wise].
Dare to be wise! A spirited courage is required to triumph over the
impediments that the indolence of nature as well as the cowardice of the
heart oppose to our in struction. It was not without reason that the ancient
Mythos made Minerva issue fully armed from the head of Jupiter, for it is
with warfare that this instruction com mences. From its very outset it has to
sustain a hard fight against the senses, which do not like to be roused from
their easy slumber. The greater part of men are much too exhausted and
enervated by their struggle with want to be able to engage in a new and
severe contest with error. Satisfied if they themselves can escape from the
hard labour of thought, they willingly abandon to others the guardianship of
their thoughts. And if it happens that nobler necessities agitate their soul,
they cling with a greedy faith to the formulas that the state and the church
hold in reserve for such cases. If these unhappy men deserve our
compassion, those others deserve our just contempt, who, though set free
from those necessities by more fortunate circumstances, yet willingly bend
to their yoke. These latter persons prefer this twilight of obscure ideas;
where the feelings have more intensity, and the imagination can at will
create convenient chimeras, to the rays of truth which put to flight the
pleasant illusions of their dreams. They have founded the whole structure of
their happiness on these very illusions, which ought to be combated and
dissipated by the light of knowledge, and they would think they were
paying too dearly for a truth which begins by robbing them of all that has
value in their sight. It would be necessary that they should be already sages
to love wisdom: a truth that was felt at once by him to whom philosophy
themselves—which prevents us from receiving the truth, notwithstanding
the brilliant light she diffuses, and from accepting her, whatever may be her
strength for producing conviction. This something was perceived and
expressed by an ancient sage in this very significant maxim: sapere aude
[Footnote: Dare to be wise].
Dare to be wise! A spirited courage is required to triumph over the
impediments that the indolence of nature as well as the cowardice of the
heart oppose to our in struction. It was not without reason that the ancient
Mythos made Minerva issue fully armed from the head of Jupiter, for it is
with warfare that this instruction com mences. From its very outset it has to
sustain a hard fight against the senses, which do not like to be roused from
their easy slumber. The greater part of men are much too exhausted and
enervated by their struggle with want to be able to engage in a new and
severe contest with error. Satisfied if they themselves can escape from the
hard labour of thought, they willingly abandon to others the guardianship of
their thoughts. And if it happens that nobler necessities agitate their soul,
they cling with a greedy faith to the formulas that the state and the church
hold in reserve for such cases. If these unhappy men deserve our
compassion, those others deserve our just contempt, who, though set free
from those necessities by more fortunate circumstances, yet willingly bend
to their yoke. These latter persons prefer this twilight of obscure ideas;
where the feelings have more intensity, and the imagination can at will
create convenient chimeras, to the rays of truth which put to flight the
pleasant illusions of their dreams. They have founded the whole structure of
their happiness on these very illusions, which ought to be combated and
dissipated by the light of knowledge, and they would think they were
paying too dearly for a truth which begins by robbing them of all that has
value in their sight. It would be necessary that they should be already sages
to love wisdom: a truth that was felt at once by him to whom philosophy
Page 268
owes its name. [Footnote: The Greek word means, as is known, love of
wisdom.]
It is therefore not going far enough to say that the light of the
understanding only deserves respect when it reacts on the character; to a
certain extent it is from the character that this light proceeds; for the road
that terminates in the head must pass through the heart. Accordingly, the
most pressing need of the present time is to educate the sensibility, because
it is the means, not only to render efficacious in practice the improvement
of ideas, but to call this improvement into existence.
LETTER IX.
But perhaps there is a vicious circle in our previous reasoning?
Theoretical culture must it seems bring along with it practical culture, and
yet the latter must be the condition of the former. All improvement in the
political sphere must proceed from the ennobling of the character. But,
subject to the influence of a social constitution still barbarous, how can
character become ennobled? It would then be necessary to seek for this end
an instrument that the state does not furnish, and to open sources that would
have preserved themselves pure in the midst of political corruption.
I have now reached the point to which all the considerations tended that
have engaged me up to the present time. This instrument is the art of the
beautiful; these sources are open to us in its immortal models.
Art, like science, is emancipated from all that is positive, and all that is
humanly conventional; both are completely independent of the arbitrary
will of men. The political legislator may place their empire under an
interdict, but he cannot reign there. He can proscribe the friend of truth, but
truth subsists; he can degrade the artist, but he cannot change art. No doubt,
nothing is more common than to see science and art bend before the spirit
wisdom.]
It is therefore not going far enough to say that the light of the
understanding only deserves respect when it reacts on the character; to a
certain extent it is from the character that this light proceeds; for the road
that terminates in the head must pass through the heart. Accordingly, the
most pressing need of the present time is to educate the sensibility, because
it is the means, not only to render efficacious in practice the improvement
of ideas, but to call this improvement into existence.
LETTER IX.
But perhaps there is a vicious circle in our previous reasoning?
Theoretical culture must it seems bring along with it practical culture, and
yet the latter must be the condition of the former. All improvement in the
political sphere must proceed from the ennobling of the character. But,
subject to the influence of a social constitution still barbarous, how can
character become ennobled? It would then be necessary to seek for this end
an instrument that the state does not furnish, and to open sources that would
have preserved themselves pure in the midst of political corruption.
I have now reached the point to which all the considerations tended that
have engaged me up to the present time. This instrument is the art of the
beautiful; these sources are open to us in its immortal models.
Art, like science, is emancipated from all that is positive, and all that is
humanly conventional; both are completely independent of the arbitrary
will of men. The political legislator may place their empire under an
interdict, but he cannot reign there. He can proscribe the friend of truth, but
truth subsists; he can degrade the artist, but he cannot change art. No doubt,
nothing is more common than to see science and art bend before the spirit
Page 269
of the age, and creative taste receive its law from critical taste. When the
character becomes stiff and hardens itself, we see science severely keeping
her limits, and art subject to the harsh restraint of rules; when the character
is relaxed and softened, science endeavours to please and art to rejoice. For
whole ages philosophers as well as artists show themselves occupied in
letting down truth and beauty to the depths of vulgar humanity. They
themselves are swallowed up in it; but, thanks to their essential vigour and
indestructible life, the true and the beautiful make a victorious fight, and
issue triumphant from the abyss.
No doubt the artist is the child of his time, but unhappy for him if he is its
disciple or even its favourite. Let a beneficent deity carry off in good time
the suckling from the breast of its mother, let it nourish him on the milk of a
better age, and suffer him to grow up and arrive at virility under the distant
sky of Greece. When he has attained manhood, let him come back,
presenting a face strange to his own age; let him come, not to delight it with
his apparition, but rather to purify it, terrible as the son of Agamemnon. He
will, indeed, receive his matter from the present time, but he will borrow
the form from a nobler time and even beyond all time, from the essential,
absolute, immutable unity. There, issuing from the pure ether of its
heavenly nature, flows the source of all beauty, which was never tainted by
the corruption of generations or of ages, which roll along far beneath it in
dark eddies. Its matter may be dishonoured as well as ennobled by fancy,
but the ever chaste form escapes from the caprices of imagination. The
Roman had already bent his knee for long years to the divinity of the
emperors, and yet the statues of the gods stood erect; the temples retained
their sanctity for the eye long after the gods had become a theme for
mockery, and the noble architecture of the palaces that shielded the infamies
of Nero and of Commodus were a protest against them. Humanity has lost
its dignity, but art has saved it, and preserves it in marbles full of meaning;
truth continues to live in illusion, and the copy will serve to re- establish the
character becomes stiff and hardens itself, we see science severely keeping
her limits, and art subject to the harsh restraint of rules; when the character
is relaxed and softened, science endeavours to please and art to rejoice. For
whole ages philosophers as well as artists show themselves occupied in
letting down truth and beauty to the depths of vulgar humanity. They
themselves are swallowed up in it; but, thanks to their essential vigour and
indestructible life, the true and the beautiful make a victorious fight, and
issue triumphant from the abyss.
No doubt the artist is the child of his time, but unhappy for him if he is its
disciple or even its favourite. Let a beneficent deity carry off in good time
the suckling from the breast of its mother, let it nourish him on the milk of a
better age, and suffer him to grow up and arrive at virility under the distant
sky of Greece. When he has attained manhood, let him come back,
presenting a face strange to his own age; let him come, not to delight it with
his apparition, but rather to purify it, terrible as the son of Agamemnon. He
will, indeed, receive his matter from the present time, but he will borrow
the form from a nobler time and even beyond all time, from the essential,
absolute, immutable unity. There, issuing from the pure ether of its
heavenly nature, flows the source of all beauty, which was never tainted by
the corruption of generations or of ages, which roll along far beneath it in
dark eddies. Its matter may be dishonoured as well as ennobled by fancy,
but the ever chaste form escapes from the caprices of imagination. The
Roman had already bent his knee for long years to the divinity of the
emperors, and yet the statues of the gods stood erect; the temples retained
their sanctity for the eye long after the gods had become a theme for
mockery, and the noble architecture of the palaces that shielded the infamies
of Nero and of Commodus were a protest against them. Humanity has lost
its dignity, but art has saved it, and preserves it in marbles full of meaning;
truth continues to live in illusion, and the copy will serve to re- establish the
Page 270
model. If the nobility of art has survived the nobility of nature, it also goes
before it like an inspiring genius, forming and awakening minds. Before
truth causes her triumphant light to penetrate into the depth of the heart,
poetry intercepts her rays, and the summits of humanity shine in a bright
light, while a dark and humid night still hangs over the valleys.
But how will the artist avoid the corruption of his time which encloses
him on all hands? Let him raise his eyes to his own dignity, and to law; let
him not lower them to necessity and fortune. Equally exempt from a vain
activity which would imprint its trace on the fugitive moment, and from the
dreams of an impatient enthusiasm which applies the measure of the
absolute to the paltry productions of time, let the artist abandon the real to
the understanding, for that is its proper field. But let the artist endeavour to
give birth to the ideal by the union of the possible and of the necessary. Let
him stamp illusion and truth with the effigy of this ideal; let him apply it to
the play of his imagination and his most serious actions, in short, to all
sensuous and spiritual forms; then let him quietly launch his work into
infinite time.
But the minds set on fire by this ideal have not all received an equal share
of calm from the creative genius—that great and patient temper which is
required to impress the ideal on the dumb marble, or to spread it over a
page of cold, sober letters, and then entrust it to the faithful hands of time.
This divine instinct, and creative force, much too ardent to follow this
peaceful walk, often throws itself immediately on the present, on active life,
and strives to transform the shapeless matter of the moral world. The
misfortune of his brothers, of the whole species, appeals loudly to the heart
of the man of feeling; their abasement appeals still louder; enthusiasm is
inflamed, and in souls endowed with energy the burning desire aspires
impatiently to action and facts. But has this innovator examined himself to
see if these disorders of the moral world wound his reason, or if they do not
before it like an inspiring genius, forming and awakening minds. Before
truth causes her triumphant light to penetrate into the depth of the heart,
poetry intercepts her rays, and the summits of humanity shine in a bright
light, while a dark and humid night still hangs over the valleys.
But how will the artist avoid the corruption of his time which encloses
him on all hands? Let him raise his eyes to his own dignity, and to law; let
him not lower them to necessity and fortune. Equally exempt from a vain
activity which would imprint its trace on the fugitive moment, and from the
dreams of an impatient enthusiasm which applies the measure of the
absolute to the paltry productions of time, let the artist abandon the real to
the understanding, for that is its proper field. But let the artist endeavour to
give birth to the ideal by the union of the possible and of the necessary. Let
him stamp illusion and truth with the effigy of this ideal; let him apply it to
the play of his imagination and his most serious actions, in short, to all
sensuous and spiritual forms; then let him quietly launch his work into
infinite time.
But the minds set on fire by this ideal have not all received an equal share
of calm from the creative genius—that great and patient temper which is
required to impress the ideal on the dumb marble, or to spread it over a
page of cold, sober letters, and then entrust it to the faithful hands of time.
This divine instinct, and creative force, much too ardent to follow this
peaceful walk, often throws itself immediately on the present, on active life,
and strives to transform the shapeless matter of the moral world. The
misfortune of his brothers, of the whole species, appeals loudly to the heart
of the man of feeling; their abasement appeals still louder; enthusiasm is
inflamed, and in souls endowed with energy the burning desire aspires
impatiently to action and facts. But has this innovator examined himself to
see if these disorders of the moral world wound his reason, or if they do not
Page 271
rather wound his self-love? If he does not determine this point at once, he
will find it from the impulsiveness with which he pursues a prompt and
definite end. A pure, moral motive has for its end the absolute; time does
not exist for it, and the future becomes the present to it directly, by a
necessary development, it has to issue from the present. To a reason having
no limits the direction towards an end becomes confounded with the
accomplishment of this end, and to enter on a course is to have finished it.
If, then, a young friend of the true and of the beautiful were to ask me
how, notwithstanding the resistance of the times, he can satisfy the noble
longing of his heart, I should reply: Direct the world on which you act
towards that which is good, and the measured and peaceful course of time
will bring about the results. You have given it this direction if by your
teaching you raise its thoughts towards the necessary and the eternal; if, by
your acts or your creations, you make the necessary and the eternal the
object of your leanings. The structure of error and of all that is arbitrary,
must fall, and it has already fallen, as soon as you are sure that it is
tottering. But it is important that it should not only totter in the external but
also in the internal man. Cherish triumphant truth in the modest sanctuary
of your heart; give it an incarnate form through beauty, that it may not only
be the understanding that does homage to it, but that feeling may lovingly
grasp its appearance. And that you may not by any chance take from
external reality the model which you yourself ought to furnish, do not
venture into its dangerous society before you are assured in your own heart
that you have a good escort furnished by ideal nature. Live with your age,
but be not its creation; labour for your contemporaries, but do for them
what they need, and not what they praise. Without having shared their
faults, share their punishment with a noble resignation, and bend under the
yoke which they find is as painful to dispense with as to bear. By the
constancy with which you will despise their good fortune, you will prove to
them that it is not through cowardice that you submit to their sufferings. See
will find it from the impulsiveness with which he pursues a prompt and
definite end. A pure, moral motive has for its end the absolute; time does
not exist for it, and the future becomes the present to it directly, by a
necessary development, it has to issue from the present. To a reason having
no limits the direction towards an end becomes confounded with the
accomplishment of this end, and to enter on a course is to have finished it.
If, then, a young friend of the true and of the beautiful were to ask me
how, notwithstanding the resistance of the times, he can satisfy the noble
longing of his heart, I should reply: Direct the world on which you act
towards that which is good, and the measured and peaceful course of time
will bring about the results. You have given it this direction if by your
teaching you raise its thoughts towards the necessary and the eternal; if, by
your acts or your creations, you make the necessary and the eternal the
object of your leanings. The structure of error and of all that is arbitrary,
must fall, and it has already fallen, as soon as you are sure that it is
tottering. But it is important that it should not only totter in the external but
also in the internal man. Cherish triumphant truth in the modest sanctuary
of your heart; give it an incarnate form through beauty, that it may not only
be the understanding that does homage to it, but that feeling may lovingly
grasp its appearance. And that you may not by any chance take from
external reality the model which you yourself ought to furnish, do not
venture into its dangerous society before you are assured in your own heart
that you have a good escort furnished by ideal nature. Live with your age,
but be not its creation; labour for your contemporaries, but do for them
what they need, and not what they praise. Without having shared their
faults, share their punishment with a noble resignation, and bend under the
yoke which they find is as painful to dispense with as to bear. By the
constancy with which you will despise their good fortune, you will prove to
them that it is not through cowardice that you submit to their sufferings. See
Page 272
them in thought such as they ought to be when you must act upon them; but
see them as they are when you are tempted to act for them. Seek to owe
their suffrage to their dignity; but to make them happy keep an account of
their unworthiness; thus, on the one hand, the nobleness of your heart will
kindle theirs, and, on the other, your end will not be reduced to nothingness
by their unworthiness. The gravity of your principles will keep them off
from you, but in play they will still endure them. Their taste is purer than
their heart, and it is by their taste you must lay hold of this suspicious
fugitive. In vain will you combat their maxims, in vain will you condemn
their actions; but you can try your moulding hand on their leisure. Drive
away caprice, frivolity, and coarseness, from their pleasures, and you will
banish them imperceptibly from their acts, and at length from their feelings.
Everywhere that you meet them, surround them with great, noble, and
ingenious forms; multiply around them the symbols of perfection, till
appearance triumphs over reality, and art over nature.
LETTER X.
Convinced by my preceding letters, you agree with me on this point, that
man can depart from his destination by two opposite roads, that our epoch
is actually moving on these two false roads, and that it has become the prey,
in one case, of coarseness, and elsewhere of exhaustion and de pravity. It is
the beautiful that must bring it back from this twofold departure. But how
can the cultivation of the fine arts remedy, at the same time, these opposite
defects, and unite in itself two contradictory qualities? Can it bind nature in
the savage, and set it free in the barbarian? Can it at once tighten a spring
and loose it, and if it cannot produce this double effect, how will it be
reasonable to expect from it so important a result as the education of man?
It may be urged that it is almost a proverbial adage that the feeling
developed by the beautiful refines manners, and any new proof offered on
see them as they are when you are tempted to act for them. Seek to owe
their suffrage to their dignity; but to make them happy keep an account of
their unworthiness; thus, on the one hand, the nobleness of your heart will
kindle theirs, and, on the other, your end will not be reduced to nothingness
by their unworthiness. The gravity of your principles will keep them off
from you, but in play they will still endure them. Their taste is purer than
their heart, and it is by their taste you must lay hold of this suspicious
fugitive. In vain will you combat their maxims, in vain will you condemn
their actions; but you can try your moulding hand on their leisure. Drive
away caprice, frivolity, and coarseness, from their pleasures, and you will
banish them imperceptibly from their acts, and at length from their feelings.
Everywhere that you meet them, surround them with great, noble, and
ingenious forms; multiply around them the symbols of perfection, till
appearance triumphs over reality, and art over nature.
LETTER X.
Convinced by my preceding letters, you agree with me on this point, that
man can depart from his destination by two opposite roads, that our epoch
is actually moving on these two false roads, and that it has become the prey,
in one case, of coarseness, and elsewhere of exhaustion and de pravity. It is
the beautiful that must bring it back from this twofold departure. But how
can the cultivation of the fine arts remedy, at the same time, these opposite
defects, and unite in itself two contradictory qualities? Can it bind nature in
the savage, and set it free in the barbarian? Can it at once tighten a spring
and loose it, and if it cannot produce this double effect, how will it be
reasonable to expect from it so important a result as the education of man?
It may be urged that it is almost a proverbial adage that the feeling
developed by the beautiful refines manners, and any new proof offered on
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the subject would appear superfluous. Men base this maxim on daily
experience, which shows us almost always clearness of intellect, deli cacy
of feeling, liberality and even dignity of conduct, associated with a
cultivated taste, while an uncultivated taste is almost always accompanied
by the opposite qualities. With considerable assurance, the most civilised
nation of antiquity is cited as an evidence of this, the Greeks, among whom
the perception of the beautiful attained its highest development, and, as a
contrast, it is usual to point to nations in a partial savage state, and partly
barbarous, who expiate their insensibility to the beautiful by a coarse or, at
all events, a hard austere character. Nevertheless, some thinkers are tempted
occasionally to deny either the fact itself or to dispute the legitimacy of the
consequences that are derived from it. They do not entertain so
unfavourable an opinion of that savage coarseness which is made a
reproach in the case of certain nations; nor do they form so advantageous an
opinion of the refinement so highly lauded in the case of cultivated nations.
Even as far back as in antiquity there were men who by no means regarded
the culture of the liberal arts as a benefit, and who were consequently led to
forbid the entrance of their republic to imagination.
I do not speak of those who calumniate art, because they have never been
favoured by it. These persons only appreciate a possession by the trouble it
takes to acquire it, and by the profit it brings; and how could they properly
appreciate the silent labour of taste in the exterior and in terior man? How
evident it is that the accidental disadvantages attending liberal culture
would make them lose sight of its essential advantages! The man deficient
in form despises the grace of diction as a means of corruption, courtesy in
the social relations as dissimulation, delicacy and generosity in conduct as
an affected exaggeration. He cannot forgive the favourite of the Graces for
having enlivened all assemblies as a man of the world, of having directed
all men to his views like a statesman, and of giving his impress to the whole
century as a writer; while he, the victim of labour, can only obtain, with all
experience, which shows us almost always clearness of intellect, deli cacy
of feeling, liberality and even dignity of conduct, associated with a
cultivated taste, while an uncultivated taste is almost always accompanied
by the opposite qualities. With considerable assurance, the most civilised
nation of antiquity is cited as an evidence of this, the Greeks, among whom
the perception of the beautiful attained its highest development, and, as a
contrast, it is usual to point to nations in a partial savage state, and partly
barbarous, who expiate their insensibility to the beautiful by a coarse or, at
all events, a hard austere character. Nevertheless, some thinkers are tempted
occasionally to deny either the fact itself or to dispute the legitimacy of the
consequences that are derived from it. They do not entertain so
unfavourable an opinion of that savage coarseness which is made a
reproach in the case of certain nations; nor do they form so advantageous an
opinion of the refinement so highly lauded in the case of cultivated nations.
Even as far back as in antiquity there were men who by no means regarded
the culture of the liberal arts as a benefit, and who were consequently led to
forbid the entrance of their republic to imagination.
I do not speak of those who calumniate art, because they have never been
favoured by it. These persons only appreciate a possession by the trouble it
takes to acquire it, and by the profit it brings; and how could they properly
appreciate the silent labour of taste in the exterior and in terior man? How
evident it is that the accidental disadvantages attending liberal culture
would make them lose sight of its essential advantages! The man deficient
in form despises the grace of diction as a means of corruption, courtesy in
the social relations as dissimulation, delicacy and generosity in conduct as
an affected exaggeration. He cannot forgive the favourite of the Graces for
having enlivened all assemblies as a man of the world, of having directed
all men to his views like a statesman, and of giving his impress to the whole
century as a writer; while he, the victim of labour, can only obtain, with all
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his learning, the least attention or overcome the least difficulty. As he
cannot learn from his fortunate rival the secret of pleasing, the only course
open to him is to deplore the corruption of human nature, which adores
rather the appearance than the reality.
But there are also opinions deserving respect, that pronounce themselves
adverse to the effects of the beautiful, and find formidable arms in
experience, with which to wage war against it. "We are free to admit"—
such is their language—"that the charms of the beautiful can further
honourable ends in pure hands; but it is not repugnant to its nature to
produce, in impure hands, a directly contrary effect, and to employ in the
service of injustice and error the power that throws the soul of man into
chains. It is exactly because taste only attends to the form and never to the
substance; it ends by placing the soul on the dangerous incline, leading it to
neglect all reality and to sacrifice truth and morality to an attractive
envelope. All the real difference of things vanishes, and it is only the
appearance that determines their value! How many men of talent"—thus
these arguers proceed—"have been turned aside from all effort by the
seductive power of the beautiful, or have been led away from all serious
exercise of their activity, or have been induced to use it very feebly? How
many weak minds have been impelled to quarrel with the organisation of
society, simply because it has pleased the imagination of poets to present
the image of a world constituted differently, where no propriety chains
down opinion and no artifice helds nature in thraldom? What a dangerous
logic of the passions they have learned since the poets have painted them in
their pictures in the most brilliant colours and since, in the contest with law
and duty, they have commonly re mained masters of the battlefield. What
has society gained by the relations of society, formerly under the sway of
truth, being now subject to the laws of the beautiful, or by the external
impression deciding the estimation in which merit is to be held? We admit
that all virtues whose appearance produces an agreeable effect are now seen
cannot learn from his fortunate rival the secret of pleasing, the only course
open to him is to deplore the corruption of human nature, which adores
rather the appearance than the reality.
But there are also opinions deserving respect, that pronounce themselves
adverse to the effects of the beautiful, and find formidable arms in
experience, with which to wage war against it. "We are free to admit"—
such is their language—"that the charms of the beautiful can further
honourable ends in pure hands; but it is not repugnant to its nature to
produce, in impure hands, a directly contrary effect, and to employ in the
service of injustice and error the power that throws the soul of man into
chains. It is exactly because taste only attends to the form and never to the
substance; it ends by placing the soul on the dangerous incline, leading it to
neglect all reality and to sacrifice truth and morality to an attractive
envelope. All the real difference of things vanishes, and it is only the
appearance that determines their value! How many men of talent"—thus
these arguers proceed—"have been turned aside from all effort by the
seductive power of the beautiful, or have been led away from all serious
exercise of their activity, or have been induced to use it very feebly? How
many weak minds have been impelled to quarrel with the organisation of
society, simply because it has pleased the imagination of poets to present
the image of a world constituted differently, where no propriety chains
down opinion and no artifice helds nature in thraldom? What a dangerous
logic of the passions they have learned since the poets have painted them in
their pictures in the most brilliant colours and since, in the contest with law
and duty, they have commonly re mained masters of the battlefield. What
has society gained by the relations of society, formerly under the sway of
truth, being now subject to the laws of the beautiful, or by the external
impression deciding the estimation in which merit is to be held? We admit
that all virtues whose appearance produces an agreeable effect are now seen
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to flourish, and those which, in society, give a value to the man who
possesses them. But, as a compensation, all kinds of excesses are seen to
prevail, and all vices are in vogue that can be reconciled with a graceful
exterior." It is certainly a matter entitled to reflection that, at almost all the
periods of history when art flourished and taste held sway, humanity is
found in a state of decline; nor can a single instance be cited of the union of
a large diffusion of aesthetic culture with political liberty and social virtue,
of fine manners associated with good morals, and of politeness fraternising
with truth and loyalty of character and life.
As long as Athens and Sparta preserved their independence, and as long
as their institutions were based on respect for the laws, taste did not reach
its maturity, art remained in its infancy, and beauty was far from exer cising
her empire over minds. No doubt, poetry had already taken a sublime flight,
but it was on the wings of genius, and we know that genius borders very
closely on savage coarseness, that it is a light which shines readily in the
midst of darkness, and which therefore often argues against rather than in
favour of the taste of the time. When the golden age of art appears under
Pericles and Alexander, and the sway of taste becomes more general,
strength and liberty have abandoned Greece; eloquence corrupts the truth,
wisdom offends it on the lips of Socrates, and virtue in the life of Phocion.
It is well known that the Romans had to exhaust their energies in civil wars,
and, corrupted by Oriental luxury, to bow their heads under the yoke of a
fortunate despot, before Grecian art triumphed over the stiffness of their
character. The same was the case with the Arabs: civilisation only dawned
upon them when the vigour of their military spirit became softened under
the sceptre of the Abbassides. Art did not appear in modern Italy till the
glorious Lombard League was dissolved, Florence submitting to the
Medici, and all those brave cities gave up the spirit of independ ence for an
inglorious resignation. It is almost super fluous to call to mind the example
of modern nations, with whom refinement has increased in direct proportion
possesses them. But, as a compensation, all kinds of excesses are seen to
prevail, and all vices are in vogue that can be reconciled with a graceful
exterior." It is certainly a matter entitled to reflection that, at almost all the
periods of history when art flourished and taste held sway, humanity is
found in a state of decline; nor can a single instance be cited of the union of
a large diffusion of aesthetic culture with political liberty and social virtue,
of fine manners associated with good morals, and of politeness fraternising
with truth and loyalty of character and life.
As long as Athens and Sparta preserved their independence, and as long
as their institutions were based on respect for the laws, taste did not reach
its maturity, art remained in its infancy, and beauty was far from exer cising
her empire over minds. No doubt, poetry had already taken a sublime flight,
but it was on the wings of genius, and we know that genius borders very
closely on savage coarseness, that it is a light which shines readily in the
midst of darkness, and which therefore often argues against rather than in
favour of the taste of the time. When the golden age of art appears under
Pericles and Alexander, and the sway of taste becomes more general,
strength and liberty have abandoned Greece; eloquence corrupts the truth,
wisdom offends it on the lips of Socrates, and virtue in the life of Phocion.
It is well known that the Romans had to exhaust their energies in civil wars,
and, corrupted by Oriental luxury, to bow their heads under the yoke of a
fortunate despot, before Grecian art triumphed over the stiffness of their
character. The same was the case with the Arabs: civilisation only dawned
upon them when the vigour of their military spirit became softened under
the sceptre of the Abbassides. Art did not appear in modern Italy till the
glorious Lombard League was dissolved, Florence submitting to the
Medici, and all those brave cities gave up the spirit of independ ence for an
inglorious resignation. It is almost super fluous to call to mind the example
of modern nations, with whom refinement has increased in direct proportion
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to the decline of their liberties. Wherever we direct our eyes in past times,
we see taste and freedom mutually avoiding each other. Everywhere we see
that the beautiful only founds its sway on the ruins of heroic virtues.
And yet this strength of character, which is commonly sacrificed to
establish aesthetic culture, is the most power ful spring of all that is great
and excellent in man, and no other advantage, however great, can make up
for it. Accordingly, if we only keep to the experiments hitherto made, as to
the influence of the beautiful, we cannot certainly be much encouraged in
developing feelings so dangerous to the real culture of man. At the risk of
being hard and coarse, it will seem preferable to dispense with this
dissolving force of the beautiful, rather than see human nature a prey to its
enervating influence, notwithstanding all its refining advantages. However,
experience is perhaps not the proper tribunal at which to decide such a
question; before giving so much weight to its testimony, it would be well to
inquire if the beauty we have been discussing is the power that is
condemned by the previous examples. And the beauty we are discussing
seems to assume an idea of the beautiful derived from a source different
from experience, for it is this higher notion of the beautiful which has to
decide if what is called beauty by experience is entitled to the name.
This pure and rational idea of the beautiful—supposing it can be placed
in evidence—cannot be taken from any real and special case, and must, on
the contrary, direct and give sanction to our judgment in each special case.
It must therefore be sought for by a process of abstraction, and it ought to
be deduced from the simple possibility of a nature both sensuous and
rational; in short, beauty ought to present itself as a necessary condition of
humanity. It is therefore essential that we should rise to the pure idea of
humanity, and as experience shows us nothing but individuals, in particular
cases, and never humanity at large, we must endeavour to find in their
individual and variable mode of being the absolute and the permanent, and
we see taste and freedom mutually avoiding each other. Everywhere we see
that the beautiful only founds its sway on the ruins of heroic virtues.
And yet this strength of character, which is commonly sacrificed to
establish aesthetic culture, is the most power ful spring of all that is great
and excellent in man, and no other advantage, however great, can make up
for it. Accordingly, if we only keep to the experiments hitherto made, as to
the influence of the beautiful, we cannot certainly be much encouraged in
developing feelings so dangerous to the real culture of man. At the risk of
being hard and coarse, it will seem preferable to dispense with this
dissolving force of the beautiful, rather than see human nature a prey to its
enervating influence, notwithstanding all its refining advantages. However,
experience is perhaps not the proper tribunal at which to decide such a
question; before giving so much weight to its testimony, it would be well to
inquire if the beauty we have been discussing is the power that is
condemned by the previous examples. And the beauty we are discussing
seems to assume an idea of the beautiful derived from a source different
from experience, for it is this higher notion of the beautiful which has to
decide if what is called beauty by experience is entitled to the name.
This pure and rational idea of the beautiful—supposing it can be placed
in evidence—cannot be taken from any real and special case, and must, on
the contrary, direct and give sanction to our judgment in each special case.
It must therefore be sought for by a process of abstraction, and it ought to
be deduced from the simple possibility of a nature both sensuous and
rational; in short, beauty ought to present itself as a necessary condition of
humanity. It is therefore essential that we should rise to the pure idea of
humanity, and as experience shows us nothing but individuals, in particular
cases, and never humanity at large, we must endeavour to find in their
individual and variable mode of being the absolute and the permanent, and
Page 277
to grasp the necessary conditions of their existence, suppressing all
accidental limits. No doubt this transcendental procedure will remove us for
some time from the familiar circle of phaenomena and the living presence
of objects, to keep us on the unproductive ground of abstract ideas; but we
are engaged in the search after a principle of knowledge solid enough not to
be shaken by anything, and the man who does not dare to rise above reality
will never conquer this truth.
LETTER XI.
If abstraction rises to as great an eievation as possible, it arrives at two
primary ideas, before which it is obliged to stop and to recognise its limits.
It distinguishes in man something that continues, and something that
changes in cessantly. That which continues it names his person; that which
changes his position, his condition.
The person and the condition, I and my determinations, which we
represent as one and the same thing in the neces sary being, are eternally
distinct in the finite being. Not withstanding all continuance in the person,
the condition changes; in spite of all change of condition, the person
remains. We pass from rest to activity, from emotion to indifference, from
assent to contradiction, but we are always we ourselves, and what
immediately springs from ourselves remains. It is only in the absolute
subject that all his determinations continue with his personality. All that
Divinity is, it is because it is so; consequently it is eternally what it is,
because it is eternal.
As the person and the condition are distinct in man, be cause he is a finite
being, the condition cannot be founded on the person, nor the person on the
condition. Admitting the second case, the person would have to change; and
in the former case, the condition would have to continue. Thus in either
supposition either the personality or the quality of a finite being would
accidental limits. No doubt this transcendental procedure will remove us for
some time from the familiar circle of phaenomena and the living presence
of objects, to keep us on the unproductive ground of abstract ideas; but we
are engaged in the search after a principle of knowledge solid enough not to
be shaken by anything, and the man who does not dare to rise above reality
will never conquer this truth.
LETTER XI.
If abstraction rises to as great an eievation as possible, it arrives at two
primary ideas, before which it is obliged to stop and to recognise its limits.
It distinguishes in man something that continues, and something that
changes in cessantly. That which continues it names his person; that which
changes his position, his condition.
The person and the condition, I and my determinations, which we
represent as one and the same thing in the neces sary being, are eternally
distinct in the finite being. Not withstanding all continuance in the person,
the condition changes; in spite of all change of condition, the person
remains. We pass from rest to activity, from emotion to indifference, from
assent to contradiction, but we are always we ourselves, and what
immediately springs from ourselves remains. It is only in the absolute
subject that all his determinations continue with his personality. All that
Divinity is, it is because it is so; consequently it is eternally what it is,
because it is eternal.
As the person and the condition are distinct in man, be cause he is a finite
being, the condition cannot be founded on the person, nor the person on the
condition. Admitting the second case, the person would have to change; and
in the former case, the condition would have to continue. Thus in either
supposition either the personality or the quality of a finite being would
Page 278
necessarily cease. It is not because we think, feel, and will, that we are; it is
not because we are that we think, feel, and will. We are because we are. We
feel, think, and will, because there is out of us something that is not
ourselves.
Consequently the person must have its principle of exist ence in itself
because the permanent cannot be derived from the changeable, and thus we
should be at once in possession of the idea of the absolute being, founded
on itself; that is to say, of the idea of freedom. The condition must have a
foundation, and as it is not through the person, and is not therefore absolute,
it must be a sequence and a result; and thus, in the second place, we should
have arrived at the condition of every dependent being, of everything in the
process of becoming something else: that is, of the idea of time. "Time is
the necessary condition of all processes, of becoming (werden);" this is an
indentical proposition, for it says nothing but this: "That something may
follow, there must be a succession."
The person which manifests itself in the eternally continuing Ego, or I
myself, and only in him, cannot become something or begin in time,
because it is much rather time that must begin with him, because the
permanent must serve as basis to the changeable. That change may take
place, something must change; this something cannot therefore be the
change itself. When we say the flower opens and fades, we make of this
flower a permanent being in the midst of this transformation; we lend it, in
some sort, a personality, in which these two conditions are manifested. It
cannot be objected that man is born, and becomes something; for man is not
only a person simply, but he is a person finding himself in a determinate
condition. Now our determinate state of condition springs up in time, and it
is thus that man, as a phenomenon or appearance, must have a beginning,
though in him pure intelligence is eternal. Without time, that is, without a
becoming, he would not be a determinate being; his personality would exist
not because we are that we think, feel, and will. We are because we are. We
feel, think, and will, because there is out of us something that is not
ourselves.
Consequently the person must have its principle of exist ence in itself
because the permanent cannot be derived from the changeable, and thus we
should be at once in possession of the idea of the absolute being, founded
on itself; that is to say, of the idea of freedom. The condition must have a
foundation, and as it is not through the person, and is not therefore absolute,
it must be a sequence and a result; and thus, in the second place, we should
have arrived at the condition of every dependent being, of everything in the
process of becoming something else: that is, of the idea of time. "Time is
the necessary condition of all processes, of becoming (werden);" this is an
indentical proposition, for it says nothing but this: "That something may
follow, there must be a succession."
The person which manifests itself in the eternally continuing Ego, or I
myself, and only in him, cannot become something or begin in time,
because it is much rather time that must begin with him, because the
permanent must serve as basis to the changeable. That change may take
place, something must change; this something cannot therefore be the
change itself. When we say the flower opens and fades, we make of this
flower a permanent being in the midst of this transformation; we lend it, in
some sort, a personality, in which these two conditions are manifested. It
cannot be objected that man is born, and becomes something; for man is not
only a person simply, but he is a person finding himself in a determinate
condition. Now our determinate state of condition springs up in time, and it
is thus that man, as a phenomenon or appearance, must have a beginning,
though in him pure intelligence is eternal. Without time, that is, without a
becoming, he would not be a determinate being; his personality would exist
Page 279
virtually, no doubt, but not in action. It is not by the succession of its
perceptions that the immutable Ego or person manifests himself to himself.
Thus, therefore, the matter of activity, or reality, that the supreme
intelligence draws from its own being, must be received by man; and he
does, in fact, receive it, through the medium of perception, as something
which is outside him in space, and which changes in him in time. This
matter which changes in him is always accompanied by the Ego, the
personality, that never changes; and the rule prescribed for man by his
rational nature is to remain immutably himself in the midst of change, to
refer all perceptions to experience, that is, to the unity of knowledge, and to
make of each of its manifestations of its modes in time the law of all time.
The matter only exists in as far as it changes; he, his personality, only exists
in as far as he does not change. Consequently, represented in his perfection,
man would be the permanent unity, which remains always the same, among
the waves of change.
Now, although an infinite being, a divinity could not become (or be
subject to time), still a tendency ought to be named divine which has for its
infinite end the most characteristic attribute of the divinity; the absolute
manifestation of power—the reality of all the possible—and the absolute
unity of the manifestation (the necessity of all reality). It cannot be disputed
that man bears within himself, in his personality, a predisposition for
divinity. The way to divinity—if the word "way" can be applied to what
never leads to its end-is open to him in every direction.
Considered in itself and independently of all sensuous matter, his
personality is nothing but the pure virtuality of a possible infinite
manifestation, and so long as there is neither intuition nor feeling, it is
nothing more than a form, an empty power. Considered in itself, and
independently of all spontaneous activity of the mind, sensuousness can
perceptions that the immutable Ego or person manifests himself to himself.
Thus, therefore, the matter of activity, or reality, that the supreme
intelligence draws from its own being, must be received by man; and he
does, in fact, receive it, through the medium of perception, as something
which is outside him in space, and which changes in him in time. This
matter which changes in him is always accompanied by the Ego, the
personality, that never changes; and the rule prescribed for man by his
rational nature is to remain immutably himself in the midst of change, to
refer all perceptions to experience, that is, to the unity of knowledge, and to
make of each of its manifestations of its modes in time the law of all time.
The matter only exists in as far as it changes; he, his personality, only exists
in as far as he does not change. Consequently, represented in his perfection,
man would be the permanent unity, which remains always the same, among
the waves of change.
Now, although an infinite being, a divinity could not become (or be
subject to time), still a tendency ought to be named divine which has for its
infinite end the most characteristic attribute of the divinity; the absolute
manifestation of power—the reality of all the possible—and the absolute
unity of the manifestation (the necessity of all reality). It cannot be disputed
that man bears within himself, in his personality, a predisposition for
divinity. The way to divinity—if the word "way" can be applied to what
never leads to its end-is open to him in every direction.
Considered in itself and independently of all sensuous matter, his
personality is nothing but the pure virtuality of a possible infinite
manifestation, and so long as there is neither intuition nor feeling, it is
nothing more than a form, an empty power. Considered in itself, and
independently of all spontaneous activity of the mind, sensuousness can
Page 280
only make a material man; without it, it is a pure form; but it cannot in any
way establish a union between matter and it. So long as he only feels,
wishes, and acts under the influence of desire, he is nothing more than the
world, if by this word we point out only the formless contents of time.
Without doubt, it is only his sensuousness that makes his strength pass into
efficacious acts, but it is his personality alone that makes this activity his
own. Thus, that he may not only be a world, he must give form to matter,
and in order not to be a mere form, he must give reality to the virtuality that
he bears in him. He gives matter to form by creating time, and by opposing
the immutable to change, the diversity of the world to the eternal unity of
the Ego. He gives a form to matter by again suppressing time, by
maintaining permanence in change, and by placing the diversity of the
world under the unity of the Ego.
Now from this source issue for man two opposite exigencies, the two
fundamental laws of sensuous-rational nature. The first has for its object
absolute reality; it must make a world of what is only form, manifest all that
in it is only a force. The second law has for its object absolute formality; it
must destroy in him all that is only world, and carry out harmony in all
changes. In other terms, he must manifest all that is internal, and give form
to all that is external. Considered in its most lofty accomplishment, this
twofold labour brings us back to the idea of humanity which was my
starting- point.
LETTER XII.
This twofold labour or task, which consists in making the necessary pass
into reality in us and in making out of us reality subject to the law of
necessity, is urged upon us as a duty by two opposing forces, which are
justly styled impulsions or instincts, because they impel us to realise their
object. The first of these impulsions, which I shall call the sensuous instinct,
way establish a union between matter and it. So long as he only feels,
wishes, and acts under the influence of desire, he is nothing more than the
world, if by this word we point out only the formless contents of time.
Without doubt, it is only his sensuousness that makes his strength pass into
efficacious acts, but it is his personality alone that makes this activity his
own. Thus, that he may not only be a world, he must give form to matter,
and in order not to be a mere form, he must give reality to the virtuality that
he bears in him. He gives matter to form by creating time, and by opposing
the immutable to change, the diversity of the world to the eternal unity of
the Ego. He gives a form to matter by again suppressing time, by
maintaining permanence in change, and by placing the diversity of the
world under the unity of the Ego.
Now from this source issue for man two opposite exigencies, the two
fundamental laws of sensuous-rational nature. The first has for its object
absolute reality; it must make a world of what is only form, manifest all that
in it is only a force. The second law has for its object absolute formality; it
must destroy in him all that is only world, and carry out harmony in all
changes. In other terms, he must manifest all that is internal, and give form
to all that is external. Considered in its most lofty accomplishment, this
twofold labour brings us back to the idea of humanity which was my
starting- point.
LETTER XII.
This twofold labour or task, which consists in making the necessary pass
into reality in us and in making out of us reality subject to the law of
necessity, is urged upon us as a duty by two opposing forces, which are
justly styled impulsions or instincts, because they impel us to realise their
object. The first of these impulsions, which I shall call the sensuous instinct,
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issues from the physical existence of roan, or from sensuous nature; and it
is this instinct which tends to enclose him in the limits of time and to make
of him a material being; I do not say to give him matter, for to do that a
certain free activity of the personality would be necessary, which, receiving
matter, distinguishes it from the Ego, or what is permanent. By matter I
only understand in this place the change or reality that fills time.
Consequently the instinct requires that there should be change, and that
time should contain something. This simply filled state of time is named
sensation, and it is only in this state that physical existence manifests itself.
As all that is in time is successive, it follows by that fact alone that
something is: all the remainder is excluded. When one note on an
instrument is touched, among all those that it virtually offers, this note alone
is real. When man is actually modified, the infinite possibility of all his
modifications is limited to this single mode of existence. Thus, then, the
exclusive action of sensuous impulsion has for its necessary consequence
the narrowest limitation. In this state man is only a unity of magnitude, a
complete moment in time; or, to speak more correctly, he is not, for his
personality is suppressed as long as sensation holds sway over him and
carries time along with it.
This instinct extends its domains over the entire sphere of the finite in
man, and as form is only revealed in matter, and the absolute by means of
its limits, the total manifestation of human nature is connected on a close
analysis with the sensuous instinct. But though it is only this instinct that
awakens and develops what exists virtually in man, it is nevertheless this
very instinct which renders his perfection impossible. It binds down to the
world of sense by indestructible ties the spirit that tends higher and it calls
back to the limits of the present, abstraction Which had its free development
in the sphere of the infinite. No doubt, thought can escape it for a moment,
and a firm will victoriously resists its exigencies; but soon compressed
is this instinct which tends to enclose him in the limits of time and to make
of him a material being; I do not say to give him matter, for to do that a
certain free activity of the personality would be necessary, which, receiving
matter, distinguishes it from the Ego, or what is permanent. By matter I
only understand in this place the change or reality that fills time.
Consequently the instinct requires that there should be change, and that
time should contain something. This simply filled state of time is named
sensation, and it is only in this state that physical existence manifests itself.
As all that is in time is successive, it follows by that fact alone that
something is: all the remainder is excluded. When one note on an
instrument is touched, among all those that it virtually offers, this note alone
is real. When man is actually modified, the infinite possibility of all his
modifications is limited to this single mode of existence. Thus, then, the
exclusive action of sensuous impulsion has for its necessary consequence
the narrowest limitation. In this state man is only a unity of magnitude, a
complete moment in time; or, to speak more correctly, he is not, for his
personality is suppressed as long as sensation holds sway over him and
carries time along with it.
This instinct extends its domains over the entire sphere of the finite in
man, and as form is only revealed in matter, and the absolute by means of
its limits, the total manifestation of human nature is connected on a close
analysis with the sensuous instinct. But though it is only this instinct that
awakens and develops what exists virtually in man, it is nevertheless this
very instinct which renders his perfection impossible. It binds down to the
world of sense by indestructible ties the spirit that tends higher and it calls
back to the limits of the present, abstraction Which had its free development
in the sphere of the infinite. No doubt, thought can escape it for a moment,
and a firm will victoriously resists its exigencies; but soon compressed
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nature resumes her rights to give an imperious reality to our existence, to
give it contents, substance, knowledge, and an aim for our activity.
The second impulsion, which may be named the formal instinct, issues
from the absolute existence of man, or from his rational nature, and tends to
set free, and bring harmony into the diversity of its manifestations, and to
maintain personality notwithstanding all the changes of state. As this
personality, being an absolute and indivisible unity, can never be in
contradiction with itself, as we are ourselves for ever, this impulsion, which
tends to maintain personality, can never exact in one time anything but what
it exacts and requires for ever. It therefore decides for always what it
decides now, and orders now what it orders for ever. Hence it embraces the
whole series of times, or what comes to the same thing, it suppresses time
and change. It wishes the real to be necessary and eternal, and it wishes the
eternal and the necessary to be real; in other terms, it tends to truth and
justice.
If the sensuous instinct only produces ACCIDENTS, the formal instinct
gives laws, laws for every judgment when it is a question of knowledge,
laws for every will when it is a question of action. Whether, therefore, we
recognise an object or conceive an objective value to a state of the subject,
whether we act in virtue of knowledge or make of the objective the
determining principle of our state; in both cases we withdraw this state from
the jurisdiction of time, and we attribute to it reality for all men and for all
time, that is, universality and necessity. Feeling can only say: "That is true
FOR THIS SUBJECT AND AT THIS MOMENT," and there may come
another moment, another subject, which withdraws the affirmation from the
actual feeling. But when once thought pronounces and says: "THAT IS" it
decides for ever and ever, and the validity of its decision is guaranteed by
the personality itself, which defies all change. Inclination can only say:
"That is good FOR YOUR INDIVIDUALITY and PRESENT
give it contents, substance, knowledge, and an aim for our activity.
The second impulsion, which may be named the formal instinct, issues
from the absolute existence of man, or from his rational nature, and tends to
set free, and bring harmony into the diversity of its manifestations, and to
maintain personality notwithstanding all the changes of state. As this
personality, being an absolute and indivisible unity, can never be in
contradiction with itself, as we are ourselves for ever, this impulsion, which
tends to maintain personality, can never exact in one time anything but what
it exacts and requires for ever. It therefore decides for always what it
decides now, and orders now what it orders for ever. Hence it embraces the
whole series of times, or what comes to the same thing, it suppresses time
and change. It wishes the real to be necessary and eternal, and it wishes the
eternal and the necessary to be real; in other terms, it tends to truth and
justice.
If the sensuous instinct only produces ACCIDENTS, the formal instinct
gives laws, laws for every judgment when it is a question of knowledge,
laws for every will when it is a question of action. Whether, therefore, we
recognise an object or conceive an objective value to a state of the subject,
whether we act in virtue of knowledge or make of the objective the
determining principle of our state; in both cases we withdraw this state from
the jurisdiction of time, and we attribute to it reality for all men and for all
time, that is, universality and necessity. Feeling can only say: "That is true
FOR THIS SUBJECT AND AT THIS MOMENT," and there may come
another moment, another subject, which withdraws the affirmation from the
actual feeling. But when once thought pronounces and says: "THAT IS" it
decides for ever and ever, and the validity of its decision is guaranteed by
the personality itself, which defies all change. Inclination can only say:
"That is good FOR YOUR INDIVIDUALITY and PRESENT
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NECESSITY?" but the changing current of affairs will sweep them away,
and what you ardently desire to-day will form the object of your aversion
to-morrow. But when the moral feeling says: "That ought to be," it decides
for ever. If you confess the truth because it is the truth, and if you practice
justice because it is justice, you have made of a particular case the law of all
possible cases, and treated one moment of your life as eternity.
Accordingly, when the formal impulse holds sway and the pure object
acts in us, the being attains its highest expansion, all barriers disappear, and
from the unity of magnitude in which man was enclosed by a narrow
sensuousness, he rises to the UNITY OF IDEA, which embraces and keeps
subject the entire sphere of phenomena. During this operation we are no
longer in time, but time is in us with its infinite succession. We are no
longer individuals but a species; the judgment of all spirits is expressed by
our own, and the choice of all hearts is represented by our own act.
LETTER XIII.
On a first survey, nothing appears more opposed than these two
impulsions; one having for its object change, the other immutability, and yet
it is these two notions that exhaust the notion of humanity, and a third
FUNDAMENTAL IMPULSION, holding a medium between them, is quite
inconceivable. How then shall we re- establish the unity of human nature, a
unity that appears completely destroyed by this primitive and radical
opposition?
I admit these two tendencies are contradictory, but it should be noticed
that they are not so in the SAME OBJECTS. But things that do not meet
cannot come into collision. No doubt the sensuous impulsion desires
change; but it does not wish that it should extend to personality and its field,
nor that there should be a change of principles. The formal impulsion seeks
unity and permanence, but it does not wish the condition to remain fixed
and what you ardently desire to-day will form the object of your aversion
to-morrow. But when the moral feeling says: "That ought to be," it decides
for ever. If you confess the truth because it is the truth, and if you practice
justice because it is justice, you have made of a particular case the law of all
possible cases, and treated one moment of your life as eternity.
Accordingly, when the formal impulse holds sway and the pure object
acts in us, the being attains its highest expansion, all barriers disappear, and
from the unity of magnitude in which man was enclosed by a narrow
sensuousness, he rises to the UNITY OF IDEA, which embraces and keeps
subject the entire sphere of phenomena. During this operation we are no
longer in time, but time is in us with its infinite succession. We are no
longer individuals but a species; the judgment of all spirits is expressed by
our own, and the choice of all hearts is represented by our own act.
LETTER XIII.
On a first survey, nothing appears more opposed than these two
impulsions; one having for its object change, the other immutability, and yet
it is these two notions that exhaust the notion of humanity, and a third
FUNDAMENTAL IMPULSION, holding a medium between them, is quite
inconceivable. How then shall we re- establish the unity of human nature, a
unity that appears completely destroyed by this primitive and radical
opposition?
I admit these two tendencies are contradictory, but it should be noticed
that they are not so in the SAME OBJECTS. But things that do not meet
cannot come into collision. No doubt the sensuous impulsion desires
change; but it does not wish that it should extend to personality and its field,
nor that there should be a change of principles. The formal impulsion seeks
unity and permanence, but it does not wish the condition to remain fixed
Page 284
with the person, that there should be identity of feeling. Therefore these two
impulsions are not divided by nature, and if, nevertheless, they appear so, it
is because they have become divided by transgressing nature freely, by
ignoring themselves, and by confounding their spheres. The office of
culture is to watch over them and to secure to each one its proper LIMITS;
therefore culture has to give equal justice to both, and to defend not only the
rational impulsion against the sensuous, but also the latter against the
former. Hence she has to act a twofold part: first, to protect sense against
the attacks of freedom; secondly, to secure personality against the power of
sensations. One of these ends is attained by the cultivation of the sensuous,
the other by that of the reason.
Since the world is developed in time, or change, the perfection of the
faculty that places men in relation with the world will necessarily be the
greatest possible mutability and extensiveness. Since personality is
permanence in change, the perfection of this faculty, which must be
opposed to change, will be the greatest possible freedom of action
(autonomy) and intensity. The more the receptivity is developed under
manifold aspects, the more it is movable and offers surfaces to
phaenomena, the larger is the part of the world seized upon by man, and the
more virtualities he develops in himself. Again, in proportion as man gains
strength and depth, and depth and reason gain in freedom, in that proportion
man TAKES IN a larger share of the world, and throws out forms outside
himself. Therefore his culture will consist, first, in placing his receptivity on
contact with the world in the greatest number of points possible, and is
raising passivity to the highest exponent on the side of feeling; secondly, in
procuring for the determining faculty the greatest possible amount of
independence, in relation to the receptive power, and in raising activity to
the highest degree on the side of reason. By the union of these two qualities
man will associate the highest degree of self-spontaneity (autonomy) and of
freedom with the fullest plenitude of existence, and instead of abandoning
impulsions are not divided by nature, and if, nevertheless, they appear so, it
is because they have become divided by transgressing nature freely, by
ignoring themselves, and by confounding their spheres. The office of
culture is to watch over them and to secure to each one its proper LIMITS;
therefore culture has to give equal justice to both, and to defend not only the
rational impulsion against the sensuous, but also the latter against the
former. Hence she has to act a twofold part: first, to protect sense against
the attacks of freedom; secondly, to secure personality against the power of
sensations. One of these ends is attained by the cultivation of the sensuous,
the other by that of the reason.
Since the world is developed in time, or change, the perfection of the
faculty that places men in relation with the world will necessarily be the
greatest possible mutability and extensiveness. Since personality is
permanence in change, the perfection of this faculty, which must be
opposed to change, will be the greatest possible freedom of action
(autonomy) and intensity. The more the receptivity is developed under
manifold aspects, the more it is movable and offers surfaces to
phaenomena, the larger is the part of the world seized upon by man, and the
more virtualities he develops in himself. Again, in proportion as man gains
strength and depth, and depth and reason gain in freedom, in that proportion
man TAKES IN a larger share of the world, and throws out forms outside
himself. Therefore his culture will consist, first, in placing his receptivity on
contact with the world in the greatest number of points possible, and is
raising passivity to the highest exponent on the side of feeling; secondly, in
procuring for the determining faculty the greatest possible amount of
independence, in relation to the receptive power, and in raising activity to
the highest degree on the side of reason. By the union of these two qualities
man will associate the highest degree of self-spontaneity (autonomy) and of
freedom with the fullest plenitude of existence, and instead of abandoning
Page 285
himself to the world so as to get lost in it, he will rather absorb it in himself,
with all the infinitude of its phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his
reason.
But man can invert this relation, and thus fail in attaining his destination
in two ways. He can hand over to the passive force the intensity demanded
by the active force; he can encroach by material impulsion on the formal
impulsion, and convert the receptive into the determining power. He can
attribute to the active force the extensiveness belonging to the passive force,
he can encroach by the formal impulsion on the material impulsion, and
substitute the determining for the receptive power. In the former case, he
will never be an Ego, a personality; in the second case, he will never be a
Non-Ego, and hence in both cases he will be NEITHER ONE NOR THE
OTHER, consequently he will nothing.
In fact, if the sensuous impulsion becomes determining, if the senses
become law-givers, and if the world stifles personality, he loses as object
what he gains in force. It may be said of man that when he is only the
contents of time, he is not and consequently HE HAS no other contents. His
condition is destroyed at the same time as his personality, because these are
two correlative ideas, because change presupposes permanence, and a
limited reality implies an infinite reality. If the formal impulsion becomes
receptive, that is, if thought anticipates sensation, and the person substitutes
itself in the place of the world, it loses as a subject and autonomous force
what it gains as object, because immutability implies change, and that to
manifest itself also absolute reality requires limits. As soon as man is only
form, he has no form, and the personality vanishes with the condition. In a
word, it is only inasmuch as he is spontaneous, autonomous, that there is
reality out of him, that he is also receptive; and it is only inasmuch as he is
receptive that there is reality in him, that he is a thinking force.
with all the infinitude of its phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his
reason.
But man can invert this relation, and thus fail in attaining his destination
in two ways. He can hand over to the passive force the intensity demanded
by the active force; he can encroach by material impulsion on the formal
impulsion, and convert the receptive into the determining power. He can
attribute to the active force the extensiveness belonging to the passive force,
he can encroach by the formal impulsion on the material impulsion, and
substitute the determining for the receptive power. In the former case, he
will never be an Ego, a personality; in the second case, he will never be a
Non-Ego, and hence in both cases he will be NEITHER ONE NOR THE
OTHER, consequently he will nothing.
In fact, if the sensuous impulsion becomes determining, if the senses
become law-givers, and if the world stifles personality, he loses as object
what he gains in force. It may be said of man that when he is only the
contents of time, he is not and consequently HE HAS no other contents. His
condition is destroyed at the same time as his personality, because these are
two correlative ideas, because change presupposes permanence, and a
limited reality implies an infinite reality. If the formal impulsion becomes
receptive, that is, if thought anticipates sensation, and the person substitutes
itself in the place of the world, it loses as a subject and autonomous force
what it gains as object, because immutability implies change, and that to
manifest itself also absolute reality requires limits. As soon as man is only
form, he has no form, and the personality vanishes with the condition. In a
word, it is only inasmuch as he is spontaneous, autonomous, that there is
reality out of him, that he is also receptive; and it is only inasmuch as he is
receptive that there is reality in him, that he is a thinking force.
Page 286
Consequently these two impulsions require limits, and looked upon as
forces, they need tempering; the former that it may not encroach on the
field of legislation, the latter that it may not invade the ground of feeling.
But this tempering and moderating the sensuous impulsion ought not to be
the effect of physical impotence or of a blunting of sensations, which is
always a matter for contempt. It must be a free act, an activity of the person,
which by its moral intensity moderates the sensuous intensity, and by the
sway of impressions takes from them in depth what it gives them in surface
or breadth. The character must place limits to temperament, for the senses
have only the right to lose elements if it be to the advantage of the mind. In
its turn, the tempering of the formal impulsion must not result from moral
impotence, from a relaxation of thought and will, which would degrade
humanity. It is necessary that the glorious source of this second tempering
should be the fulness of sensations; it is necessary that sensuousness itself
should defend its field with a victorious arm and resist the violence that the
invading activity of the mind would do to it. In a word, it is necessary that
the material impulsion should be contained in the limits of propriety by
personality, and the formal impulsion by receptivity or nature.
LETTER XIV.
We have been brought to the idea of such a correlation between the two
impulsions that the action of the one establishes and limits at the same time
the action of the other, and that each of them, taken in isolation, does arrive
at its highest manifestation just because the other is active.
No doubt this correlation of the two impulsions is simply a problem
advanced by reason, and which man will only be able to solve in the
perfection of his being. It is in the strictest signification of the term: the idea
of his humanity; accordingly, it is an infinite to which he can approach
nearer and nearer in the course of time, but without ever reaching it. "He
forces, they need tempering; the former that it may not encroach on the
field of legislation, the latter that it may not invade the ground of feeling.
But this tempering and moderating the sensuous impulsion ought not to be
the effect of physical impotence or of a blunting of sensations, which is
always a matter for contempt. It must be a free act, an activity of the person,
which by its moral intensity moderates the sensuous intensity, and by the
sway of impressions takes from them in depth what it gives them in surface
or breadth. The character must place limits to temperament, for the senses
have only the right to lose elements if it be to the advantage of the mind. In
its turn, the tempering of the formal impulsion must not result from moral
impotence, from a relaxation of thought and will, which would degrade
humanity. It is necessary that the glorious source of this second tempering
should be the fulness of sensations; it is necessary that sensuousness itself
should defend its field with a victorious arm and resist the violence that the
invading activity of the mind would do to it. In a word, it is necessary that
the material impulsion should be contained in the limits of propriety by
personality, and the formal impulsion by receptivity or nature.
LETTER XIV.
We have been brought to the idea of such a correlation between the two
impulsions that the action of the one establishes and limits at the same time
the action of the other, and that each of them, taken in isolation, does arrive
at its highest manifestation just because the other is active.
No doubt this correlation of the two impulsions is simply a problem
advanced by reason, and which man will only be able to solve in the
perfection of his being. It is in the strictest signification of the term: the idea
of his humanity; accordingly, it is an infinite to which he can approach
nearer and nearer in the course of time, but without ever reaching it. "He
Page 287
ought not to aim at form to the injury of reality, nor to reality to the
detriment of the form. He must rather seek the absolute being by means of a
determinate being, and the determinate being by means of an infinite being.
He must set the world before him because he is a person, and he must be a
person because he has the world before him. He must feel because he has a
consciousness of himself, and he must have a consciousness of himself
because he feels." It is only in conformity with this idea that he is a man in
the full sense of the word; but he cannot be convinced of this so long as he
gives himself up exclusively to one of these two impulsions, or only
satisfies them one after the other. For as long as he only feels, his absolute
personality and existence remain a mystery to him, and as long as he only
thinks, his condition or existence in time escapes him. But if there were
cases in which he could have at once this twofold experience in which he
would have the consciousness of his freedom and the feeling of his
existence together, in which he would simultaneously feel as matter and
know himself as spirit, in such cases, and in such only, would he have a
complete intuition of his humanity, and the object that would procure him
this intuition would be a symbol of his accomplished destiny, and
consequently serve to express the infinite to him—since this destination can
only be fulfilled in the fulness of time.
Presuming that cases of this kind could present themselves in experience,
they would awake in him a new impulsion, which, precisely because the
two other impulsions would co-operate in it, would be opposed to each of
them taken in isolation, and might, with good grounds, be taken for a new
impulsion. The sensuous impulsion requires that there should be change,
that time should have contents; the formal impulsion requires that time
should be suppressed, that there should be no change. Consequently, the
impulsion in which both of the others act in concert—allow me to call it the
instinct of play, till I explain the term—the instinct of play would have as its
detriment of the form. He must rather seek the absolute being by means of a
determinate being, and the determinate being by means of an infinite being.
He must set the world before him because he is a person, and he must be a
person because he has the world before him. He must feel because he has a
consciousness of himself, and he must have a consciousness of himself
because he feels." It is only in conformity with this idea that he is a man in
the full sense of the word; but he cannot be convinced of this so long as he
gives himself up exclusively to one of these two impulsions, or only
satisfies them one after the other. For as long as he only feels, his absolute
personality and existence remain a mystery to him, and as long as he only
thinks, his condition or existence in time escapes him. But if there were
cases in which he could have at once this twofold experience in which he
would have the consciousness of his freedom and the feeling of his
existence together, in which he would simultaneously feel as matter and
know himself as spirit, in such cases, and in such only, would he have a
complete intuition of his humanity, and the object that would procure him
this intuition would be a symbol of his accomplished destiny, and
consequently serve to express the infinite to him—since this destination can
only be fulfilled in the fulness of time.
Presuming that cases of this kind could present themselves in experience,
they would awake in him a new impulsion, which, precisely because the
two other impulsions would co-operate in it, would be opposed to each of
them taken in isolation, and might, with good grounds, be taken for a new
impulsion. The sensuous impulsion requires that there should be change,
that time should have contents; the formal impulsion requires that time
should be suppressed, that there should be no change. Consequently, the
impulsion in which both of the others act in concert—allow me to call it the
instinct of play, till I explain the term—the instinct of play would have as its
Page 288
object to suppress time in time to conciliate the state of transition or
becoming with the absolute being, change with identity.
The sensuous instinct wishes to be determined, it wishes to receive an
object; the formal instinct wishes to determine itself, it wishes to produce an
object. Therefore the instinct of play will endeavor to receive as it would
itself have produced, and to produce as it aspires to receive.
The sensuous impulsion excludes from its subject all autonomy and
freedom; the formal impulsion excludes all dependence and passivity. But
the exclusion of freedom is physical necessity; the exclusion of passivity is
moral necessity. Thus the two impulsions subdue the mind: the former to
the laws of nature, the latter to the laws of reason. It results from this that
the instinct of play, which unites the double action of the two other
instincts, will content the mind at once morally and physically. Hence, as it
suppresses all that is contingent, it will also suppress all coercion, and will
set man free physically and morally. When we welcome with effusion some
one who deserves our contempt, we feel painfully that nature is constrained.
When we have a hostile feeling against a person who commands our
esteem, we feel painfully the constraint of reason. But if this person inspires
us with interest, and also wins our esteem, the constraint of feeling vanishes
together with the constraint of reason, and we begin to love him, that is to
say, to play, to take recreation, at once with our inclination and our esteem.
Moreover, as the sensuous impulsion controls us physically, and the
formal impulsion morally, the former makes our formal constitution
contingent, and the latter makes our material constitution contingent, that is
to say, there is contingence in the agreement of our happiness with our
perfection, and reciprocally. The instinct of play, in which both act in
concert, will render both our formal and our material constitution
contingent; accordingly, our perfection and our happiness in like manner.
becoming with the absolute being, change with identity.
The sensuous instinct wishes to be determined, it wishes to receive an
object; the formal instinct wishes to determine itself, it wishes to produce an
object. Therefore the instinct of play will endeavor to receive as it would
itself have produced, and to produce as it aspires to receive.
The sensuous impulsion excludes from its subject all autonomy and
freedom; the formal impulsion excludes all dependence and passivity. But
the exclusion of freedom is physical necessity; the exclusion of passivity is
moral necessity. Thus the two impulsions subdue the mind: the former to
the laws of nature, the latter to the laws of reason. It results from this that
the instinct of play, which unites the double action of the two other
instincts, will content the mind at once morally and physically. Hence, as it
suppresses all that is contingent, it will also suppress all coercion, and will
set man free physically and morally. When we welcome with effusion some
one who deserves our contempt, we feel painfully that nature is constrained.
When we have a hostile feeling against a person who commands our
esteem, we feel painfully the constraint of reason. But if this person inspires
us with interest, and also wins our esteem, the constraint of feeling vanishes
together with the constraint of reason, and we begin to love him, that is to
say, to play, to take recreation, at once with our inclination and our esteem.
Moreover, as the sensuous impulsion controls us physically, and the
formal impulsion morally, the former makes our formal constitution
contingent, and the latter makes our material constitution contingent, that is
to say, there is contingence in the agreement of our happiness with our
perfection, and reciprocally. The instinct of play, in which both act in
concert, will render both our formal and our material constitution
contingent; accordingly, our perfection and our happiness in like manner.
Page 289
And on the other hand, exactly because it makes both of them contingent,
and because the contingent disappears with necessity, it will suppress this
contingence in both, and will thus give form to matter and reality to form.
In proportion that it will lessen the dynamic influence of feeling and
passion, it will place them in harmony with rational ideas, and by taking
from the laws of reason their moral constraint, it will reconcile them with
the interest of the senses.
LETTER XV.
I approach continually nearer to the end to which I lead you, by a path
offering few attractions. Be pleased to follow me a few steps further, and a
large horizon will open up to you and a delightful prospect will reward you
for the labour of the way.
The object of the sensuous instinct, expressed in a universal conception,
is named Life in the widest acceptation: a conception that expresses all
material existence and all that is immediately present in the senses. The
object of the formal instinct, expressed in a universal conception, is called
shape or form, as well in an exact as in an inexact acceptation; a conception
that embraces all formal qualities of things and all relations of the same to
the thinking powers. The object of the play instinct, represented in a general
statement, may therefore bear the name of living form; a term that serves to
describe all aesthetic qualities of phaenomena, and what people style, in the
widest sense, beauty.
Beauty is neither extended to the whole field of all living things nor
merely enclosed in this field. A marble block, though it is and remains
lifeless, can nevertheless become a living form by the architect and
sculptor; a man, though he lives and has a form, is far from being a living
form on that account. For this to be the case, it is necessary that his form
should be life, and that his life should be a form. As long as we only think
and because the contingent disappears with necessity, it will suppress this
contingence in both, and will thus give form to matter and reality to form.
In proportion that it will lessen the dynamic influence of feeling and
passion, it will place them in harmony with rational ideas, and by taking
from the laws of reason their moral constraint, it will reconcile them with
the interest of the senses.
LETTER XV.
I approach continually nearer to the end to which I lead you, by a path
offering few attractions. Be pleased to follow me a few steps further, and a
large horizon will open up to you and a delightful prospect will reward you
for the labour of the way.
The object of the sensuous instinct, expressed in a universal conception,
is named Life in the widest acceptation: a conception that expresses all
material existence and all that is immediately present in the senses. The
object of the formal instinct, expressed in a universal conception, is called
shape or form, as well in an exact as in an inexact acceptation; a conception
that embraces all formal qualities of things and all relations of the same to
the thinking powers. The object of the play instinct, represented in a general
statement, may therefore bear the name of living form; a term that serves to
describe all aesthetic qualities of phaenomena, and what people style, in the
widest sense, beauty.
Beauty is neither extended to the whole field of all living things nor
merely enclosed in this field. A marble block, though it is and remains
lifeless, can nevertheless become a living form by the architect and
sculptor; a man, though he lives and has a form, is far from being a living
form on that account. For this to be the case, it is necessary that his form
should be life, and that his life should be a form. As long as we only think
Page 290
of his form, it is lifeless, a mere abstraction; as long as we only feel his life,
it is without form, a mere impression. It is only when his form lives in our
feeling, and his life in our understanding, he is the living form, and this will
everywhere be the case where we judge him to be beautiful.
But the genesis of beauty is by no means declared because we know how
to point out the component parts, which in their combination produce
beauty. For to this end it would be necessary to comprehend that
combination itself, which continues to defy our exploration, as well as all
mutual operation between the finite and the infinite. The reason, on
transcendental grounds, makes the following demand: There shall be a
communion between the formal impulse and the material impulse-that is,
there shall be a play instinct—because it is only the unity of reality with the
form, of the accidental with the necessary, of the passive state with
freedom, that the conception of humanity is completed. Reason is obliged to
make this demand, because her nature impels her to completeness and to the
removal of all bounds; while every exclusive activity of one or the other
impulse leaves human nature incomplete and places a limit in it.
Accordingly, as soon as reason issues the mandate, "a humanity shall exist,"
it proclaims at the same time the law, "there shall be a beauty." Experience
can answer us if there is a beauty, and we shall know it as soon as she has
taught us if a humanity can exist. But neither reason nor experience can tell
us how beauty can be, and how a humanity is possible.
We know that man is neither exclusively matter nor exclusively spirit.
Accordingly, beauty, as the consummation of humanity, can neither be
exclusively mere life, as has been asserted by sharp- sighted observers, who
kept too close to the testimony of experience, and to which the taste of the
time would gladly degrade it; Nor can beauty be merely form, as has been
judged by speculative sophists, who departed too far from experience, and
by philosophic artists, who were led too much by the necessity of art in
it is without form, a mere impression. It is only when his form lives in our
feeling, and his life in our understanding, he is the living form, and this will
everywhere be the case where we judge him to be beautiful.
But the genesis of beauty is by no means declared because we know how
to point out the component parts, which in their combination produce
beauty. For to this end it would be necessary to comprehend that
combination itself, which continues to defy our exploration, as well as all
mutual operation between the finite and the infinite. The reason, on
transcendental grounds, makes the following demand: There shall be a
communion between the formal impulse and the material impulse-that is,
there shall be a play instinct—because it is only the unity of reality with the
form, of the accidental with the necessary, of the passive state with
freedom, that the conception of humanity is completed. Reason is obliged to
make this demand, because her nature impels her to completeness and to the
removal of all bounds; while every exclusive activity of one or the other
impulse leaves human nature incomplete and places a limit in it.
Accordingly, as soon as reason issues the mandate, "a humanity shall exist,"
it proclaims at the same time the law, "there shall be a beauty." Experience
can answer us if there is a beauty, and we shall know it as soon as she has
taught us if a humanity can exist. But neither reason nor experience can tell
us how beauty can be, and how a humanity is possible.
We know that man is neither exclusively matter nor exclusively spirit.
Accordingly, beauty, as the consummation of humanity, can neither be
exclusively mere life, as has been asserted by sharp- sighted observers, who
kept too close to the testimony of experience, and to which the taste of the
time would gladly degrade it; Nor can beauty be merely form, as has been
judged by speculative sophists, who departed too far from experience, and
by philosophic artists, who were led too much by the necessity of art in
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explaining beauty; it is rather the common object of both impulses, that is,
of the play instinct. The use of language completely justifies this name, as it
is wont to qualify with the word play what is neither subjectively nor
objectively accidental, and yet does not impose necessity either externally
or internally. As the mind in the intuition of the beautiful finds itself in a
happy medium between law and necessity, it is, because it divides itself
between both, emancipated from the pressure of both. The formal impulse
and the material impulse are equally earnest in their demands, because one
relates in its cognition to things in their reality and the other to their
necessity; because in action the first is directed to the preservation of life,
the second to the preservation of dignity, and therefore both to truth and
perfection. But life becomes more indifferent when dignity is mixed up with
it, and duty no longer coerces when inclination attracts. In like manner the
mind takes in the reality of things, material truth, more freely and tranquilly
as soon as it encounters formal truth, the law of necessity; nor does the
mind find itself strung by abstraction as soon as immediate intuition can
accompany it. In one word, when the mind comes into communion with
ideas, all reality loses its serious value because it becomes small; and as it
comes in contact with feeling, necessity parts also with its serious value
because it is easy.
But perhaps the objection has for some time occurred to you, Is not the
beautiful degraded by this, that it is made a mere play? and is it not reduced
to the level of frivolous objects which have for ages passed under that
name? Does it not contradict the conception of the reason and the dignity of
beauty, which is nevertheless regarded as an instrument of culture, to
confine it to the work of being a mere play? and does it not contradict the
empirical conception of play, which can coexist with the exclusion of all
taste, to confine it merely to beauty?
of the play instinct. The use of language completely justifies this name, as it
is wont to qualify with the word play what is neither subjectively nor
objectively accidental, and yet does not impose necessity either externally
or internally. As the mind in the intuition of the beautiful finds itself in a
happy medium between law and necessity, it is, because it divides itself
between both, emancipated from the pressure of both. The formal impulse
and the material impulse are equally earnest in their demands, because one
relates in its cognition to things in their reality and the other to their
necessity; because in action the first is directed to the preservation of life,
the second to the preservation of dignity, and therefore both to truth and
perfection. But life becomes more indifferent when dignity is mixed up with
it, and duty no longer coerces when inclination attracts. In like manner the
mind takes in the reality of things, material truth, more freely and tranquilly
as soon as it encounters formal truth, the law of necessity; nor does the
mind find itself strung by abstraction as soon as immediate intuition can
accompany it. In one word, when the mind comes into communion with
ideas, all reality loses its serious value because it becomes small; and as it
comes in contact with feeling, necessity parts also with its serious value
because it is easy.
But perhaps the objection has for some time occurred to you, Is not the
beautiful degraded by this, that it is made a mere play? and is it not reduced
to the level of frivolous objects which have for ages passed under that
name? Does it not contradict the conception of the reason and the dignity of
beauty, which is nevertheless regarded as an instrument of culture, to
confine it to the work of being a mere play? and does it not contradict the
empirical conception of play, which can coexist with the exclusion of all
taste, to confine it merely to beauty?
Page 292
But what is meant by a MERE PLAY, when we know that in all
conditions of humanity that very thing is play, and only that is play which
makes man complete and develops simultaneously his twofold nature?
What you style LIMITATION, according to your representation of the
matter, according to my views, which I have justified by proofs, I name
ENLARGEMENT. Consequently, I should have said exactly the reverse:
man is serious ONLY with the agreeable, with the good, and with the
perfect, but he PLAYS with beauty. In saying this we must not indeed think
of the plays that are in vogue in real life, and which commonly refer only to
his material state. But in real life we should also seek in vain for the beauty
of which we are here speaking. The actually present beauty is worthy of the
really, of the actually, present play-impulse; but by the ideal of beauty,
which is set up by the reason, an ideal of the play-instinct is also presented,
which man ought to have before his eyes in all his plays.
Therefore, no error will ever be incurred if we seek the ideal of beauty on
the same road on which we satisfy our play-impulse. We can immediately
understand why the ideal form of a Venus, of a Juno, and of an Apollo, is to
be sought not at Rome, but in Greece, if we contrast the Greek population,
delighting in the bloodless athletic contests of boxing, racing, and
intellectual rivalry at Olympia, with the Roman people gloating over the
agony of a gladiator. Now the reason pronounces that the beautiful must not
only be life and form, but a living form, that is, beauty, inasmuch as it
dictates to man the twofold law of absolute formality and absolute reality.
Reason also utters the decision that man shall only PLAY with beauty, and
he SHALL ONLY PLAY with BEAUTY.
For, to speak out once for all, man only plays when in the full meaning of
the word he is a man, and HE IS ONLY COMPLETELY A MAN WHEN
HE PLAYS. This proposition, which at this moment perhaps appears
paradoxical, will receive a great and deep meaning if we have advanced far
conditions of humanity that very thing is play, and only that is play which
makes man complete and develops simultaneously his twofold nature?
What you style LIMITATION, according to your representation of the
matter, according to my views, which I have justified by proofs, I name
ENLARGEMENT. Consequently, I should have said exactly the reverse:
man is serious ONLY with the agreeable, with the good, and with the
perfect, but he PLAYS with beauty. In saying this we must not indeed think
of the plays that are in vogue in real life, and which commonly refer only to
his material state. But in real life we should also seek in vain for the beauty
of which we are here speaking. The actually present beauty is worthy of the
really, of the actually, present play-impulse; but by the ideal of beauty,
which is set up by the reason, an ideal of the play-instinct is also presented,
which man ought to have before his eyes in all his plays.
Therefore, no error will ever be incurred if we seek the ideal of beauty on
the same road on which we satisfy our play-impulse. We can immediately
understand why the ideal form of a Venus, of a Juno, and of an Apollo, is to
be sought not at Rome, but in Greece, if we contrast the Greek population,
delighting in the bloodless athletic contests of boxing, racing, and
intellectual rivalry at Olympia, with the Roman people gloating over the
agony of a gladiator. Now the reason pronounces that the beautiful must not
only be life and form, but a living form, that is, beauty, inasmuch as it
dictates to man the twofold law of absolute formality and absolute reality.
Reason also utters the decision that man shall only PLAY with beauty, and
he SHALL ONLY PLAY with BEAUTY.
For, to speak out once for all, man only plays when in the full meaning of
the word he is a man, and HE IS ONLY COMPLETELY A MAN WHEN
HE PLAYS. This proposition, which at this moment perhaps appears
paradoxical, will receive a great and deep meaning if we have advanced far
Page 293
enough to apply it to the twofold seriousness of duty and of destiny. I
promise you that the whole edifice of aesthetic art and the still more
difficult art of life will be supported by this principle. But this proposition is
only unexpected in science; long ago it lived and worked in art and in the
feeling of the Greeks, her most accomplished masters; only they removed to
Olympus what ought to have been preserved on earth. Influenced by the
truth of this principle, they effaced from the brow of their gods the
earnestness and labour which furrow the cheeks of mortals, and also the
hollow lust that smoothes the empty face. They set free the ever serene from
the chains of every purpose, of every duty, of every care, and they made
INDOLENCE and INDIFFERENCE the envied condition of the godlike
race; merely human appellations for the freest and highest mind. As well the
material pressure of natural laws as the spiritual pressure of moral laws lost
itself in its higher idea of necessity, which embraced at the same time both
worlds, and out of the union of these two necessities issued true freedom.
Inspired by this spirit, the Greeks also effaced from the features of their
ideal, together with DESIRE or INCLINATION, all traces of VOLITION,
or, better still, they made both unrecognisable, because they knew how to
wed them both in the closest alliance. It is neither charm nor is it dignity
which speaks from the glorious face of the Juno Ludovici; it is neither of
these, for it is both at once. While the female god challenges our veneration,
the godlike woman at the same time kindles our love. But while in ecstacy
we give ourselves up to the heavenly beauty, the heavenly self-repose awes
us back. The whole form rests and dwells in itself—a fully complete
creation in itself—and as if she were out of space, without advance or
resistance; it shows no force contending with force, no opening through
which time could break in. Irresistibly carried away and attracted by her
womanly charm, kept off at a distance by her godly dignity, we also find
ourselves at length in the state of the greatest repose, an4 the result is a
promise you that the whole edifice of aesthetic art and the still more
difficult art of life will be supported by this principle. But this proposition is
only unexpected in science; long ago it lived and worked in art and in the
feeling of the Greeks, her most accomplished masters; only they removed to
Olympus what ought to have been preserved on earth. Influenced by the
truth of this principle, they effaced from the brow of their gods the
earnestness and labour which furrow the cheeks of mortals, and also the
hollow lust that smoothes the empty face. They set free the ever serene from
the chains of every purpose, of every duty, of every care, and they made
INDOLENCE and INDIFFERENCE the envied condition of the godlike
race; merely human appellations for the freest and highest mind. As well the
material pressure of natural laws as the spiritual pressure of moral laws lost
itself in its higher idea of necessity, which embraced at the same time both
worlds, and out of the union of these two necessities issued true freedom.
Inspired by this spirit, the Greeks also effaced from the features of their
ideal, together with DESIRE or INCLINATION, all traces of VOLITION,
or, better still, they made both unrecognisable, because they knew how to
wed them both in the closest alliance. It is neither charm nor is it dignity
which speaks from the glorious face of the Juno Ludovici; it is neither of
these, for it is both at once. While the female god challenges our veneration,
the godlike woman at the same time kindles our love. But while in ecstacy
we give ourselves up to the heavenly beauty, the heavenly self-repose awes
us back. The whole form rests and dwells in itself—a fully complete
creation in itself—and as if she were out of space, without advance or
resistance; it shows no force contending with force, no opening through
which time could break in. Irresistibly carried away and attracted by her
womanly charm, kept off at a distance by her godly dignity, we also find
ourselves at length in the state of the greatest repose, an4 the result is a
Page 294
wonderful impression, for which the understanding has no idea and
language no name.
LETTER XVI.
From the antagonism of the two impulsions, and from the association of
two opposite principles, we have seen beauty to result, of which the highest
ideal must therefore be sought in the most perfect union and equilibrium
possible of the reality and of the form. But this equilibrium remains always
an idea that reality can never completely reach. In reality, there will always
remain a preponderance of one of these elements over the other, and the
highest point to which experience can reach will consist in an oscillation
between two principles, when sometimes reality and at others form will
have the advantage. Ideal beauty is therefore eternally one and indivisible,
because there can only be one single equilibrium; on the contrary,
experimental beauty will be eternally double, because in the oscillation the
equilibrium may be destroyed in two ways—this side and that.
I have called attention in the foregoing letters to a fact that can also be
rigorously deduced from the considerations that have engaged our attention
to the present point; this fact is that an exciting and also a moderating action
may be expected from the beautiful. The TEMPERING action is directed to
keep within proper limits the sensuous and the formal impulsions; the
EXCITING, to maintain both of them in their full force. But these two
modes of action of beauty ought to be completely identified in the idea. The
beautiful ought to temper while uniformly exciting the two natures, and it
ought also to excite while uniformly moderating them. This result flows at
once from the idea of a correlation, in virtue of which the two terms
mutually imply each other, and are the reciprocal condition one of the other,
a correlation of which the purest product is beauty. But experience does not
offer an example of so perfect a correlation. In the field of experience it will
language no name.
LETTER XVI.
From the antagonism of the two impulsions, and from the association of
two opposite principles, we have seen beauty to result, of which the highest
ideal must therefore be sought in the most perfect union and equilibrium
possible of the reality and of the form. But this equilibrium remains always
an idea that reality can never completely reach. In reality, there will always
remain a preponderance of one of these elements over the other, and the
highest point to which experience can reach will consist in an oscillation
between two principles, when sometimes reality and at others form will
have the advantage. Ideal beauty is therefore eternally one and indivisible,
because there can only be one single equilibrium; on the contrary,
experimental beauty will be eternally double, because in the oscillation the
equilibrium may be destroyed in two ways—this side and that.
I have called attention in the foregoing letters to a fact that can also be
rigorously deduced from the considerations that have engaged our attention
to the present point; this fact is that an exciting and also a moderating action
may be expected from the beautiful. The TEMPERING action is directed to
keep within proper limits the sensuous and the formal impulsions; the
EXCITING, to maintain both of them in their full force. But these two
modes of action of beauty ought to be completely identified in the idea. The
beautiful ought to temper while uniformly exciting the two natures, and it
ought also to excite while uniformly moderating them. This result flows at
once from the idea of a correlation, in virtue of which the two terms
mutually imply each other, and are the reciprocal condition one of the other,
a correlation of which the purest product is beauty. But experience does not
offer an example of so perfect a correlation. In the field of experience it will
Page 295
always happen more or less that excess on the one side will give rise to
deficiency on the other, and deficiency will give birth to excess. It results
from this that what in the beau-ideal is only distinct in the idea, is different
in reality in empirical beauty, The beau-ideal, though simple and
indivisible, discloses, when viewed in two different aspects, on the one
hand a property of gentleness and grace, and on the other an energetic
property; in experience there is a gentle and graceful beauty, and there is an
energetic beauty. It is so, and it will be always so, so long as the absolute is
enclosed in the limits of time, and the ideas of reason have to be realised in
humanity. For example, the intellectual man has the idea of virtue, of truth,
and of happiness; but the active man will only practise VIRTUES, will only
grasp TRUTHS, and enjoy HAPPY DAYS. The business of physical and
moral education is to bring back this multiplicity to unity, to put morality in
the place of manners, science in the place of knowledge; the business of
aesthetic education is to make out of beauties the beautiful.
Energetic beauty can no more preserve a man from a certain residue of
savage violence and harshness than graceful beauty can secure him against
a certain degree of effeminacy and weakness. As it is the effect of the
energetic beauty to elevate the mind in a physical and moral point of view
and to augment its momentum, it only too often happens that the resistance
of the temperament and of the character diminishes the aptitude to receive
impressions, that the delicate part of humanity suffers an oppression which
ought only to affect its grosser part, and that this course nature participates
in an increase of force that ought only to tun? to the account of free
personality. It is for this reason that at the periods when we find much
strength and abundant sap in humanity, true greatness of thought is seen
associated with what is gigantic and extravagant, and the sublimest feeling
is found coupled with the most horrible excess of passion. It is also the
reason why, in the periods distinguished for regularity and form, nature is as
often oppressed as it is governed, as often outraged as it isi surpassed. And
deficiency on the other, and deficiency will give birth to excess. It results
from this that what in the beau-ideal is only distinct in the idea, is different
in reality in empirical beauty, The beau-ideal, though simple and
indivisible, discloses, when viewed in two different aspects, on the one
hand a property of gentleness and grace, and on the other an energetic
property; in experience there is a gentle and graceful beauty, and there is an
energetic beauty. It is so, and it will be always so, so long as the absolute is
enclosed in the limits of time, and the ideas of reason have to be realised in
humanity. For example, the intellectual man has the idea of virtue, of truth,
and of happiness; but the active man will only practise VIRTUES, will only
grasp TRUTHS, and enjoy HAPPY DAYS. The business of physical and
moral education is to bring back this multiplicity to unity, to put morality in
the place of manners, science in the place of knowledge; the business of
aesthetic education is to make out of beauties the beautiful.
Energetic beauty can no more preserve a man from a certain residue of
savage violence and harshness than graceful beauty can secure him against
a certain degree of effeminacy and weakness. As it is the effect of the
energetic beauty to elevate the mind in a physical and moral point of view
and to augment its momentum, it only too often happens that the resistance
of the temperament and of the character diminishes the aptitude to receive
impressions, that the delicate part of humanity suffers an oppression which
ought only to affect its grosser part, and that this course nature participates
in an increase of force that ought only to tun? to the account of free
personality. It is for this reason that at the periods when we find much
strength and abundant sap in humanity, true greatness of thought is seen
associated with what is gigantic and extravagant, and the sublimest feeling
is found coupled with the most horrible excess of passion. It is also the
reason why, in the periods distinguished for regularity and form, nature is as
often oppressed as it is governed, as often outraged as it isi surpassed. And
Page 296
as the action of gentle and graceful beauty is to relax the mind in the moral
sphere as well as the physical, it happens quite as easily that the energy of
feelings is extinguished with the violence of desires, and that character
shares in the loss of strength which ought only to affect the passions. This is
the reason why, in ages assumed to be refined, it is not a rare thing to see
gentleness degenerate into effeminacy, politeness into platitude, correctness
into empty sterility, liberal ways into arbitrary caprice, ease into frivolity,
calm into apathy, and, lastly, a most miserable caricature treads on the heels
of the noblest, the most beautiful type of humanity. Gentle and graceful
beauty is therefore a want to the man who suffers the constraint of matter
and of forms, for he is moved by grandeur and strength long before he
becomes sensible to harmony and grace. Energetic beauty is a necessity to
the man who is under the indulgent sway of taste, for in his state of
refinement he is only too much disposed to make light of the strength that
he retained in his state of rude savagism.
I think I have now answered and also cleared up the contradiction
commonly met in the judgments of men respecting the influence of the
beautiful, and the appreciation of aesthetic culture. This contradiction is
explained directly we remember that there are two sorts of experimental
beauty, and that on both hands an affirmation is extended to the entire race,
when it can only be proved of one of the species. This contradiction
disappears the moment we distinguish a twofold want in humanity to which
two kinds of beauty correspond. It is therefore probable that both sides
would make good their claims if they come to an understanding respecting
the kind of beauty and the form of humanity that they have in view.
Consequently in the sequel of my researches I shall adopt the course that
nature herself follows with man considered from the point of view of
sesthetics, and setting out from the two kinds of beauty, I shall rise to the
idea of the genus. I shall examine the effects produced on man by the gentle
sphere as well as the physical, it happens quite as easily that the energy of
feelings is extinguished with the violence of desires, and that character
shares in the loss of strength which ought only to affect the passions. This is
the reason why, in ages assumed to be refined, it is not a rare thing to see
gentleness degenerate into effeminacy, politeness into platitude, correctness
into empty sterility, liberal ways into arbitrary caprice, ease into frivolity,
calm into apathy, and, lastly, a most miserable caricature treads on the heels
of the noblest, the most beautiful type of humanity. Gentle and graceful
beauty is therefore a want to the man who suffers the constraint of matter
and of forms, for he is moved by grandeur and strength long before he
becomes sensible to harmony and grace. Energetic beauty is a necessity to
the man who is under the indulgent sway of taste, for in his state of
refinement he is only too much disposed to make light of the strength that
he retained in his state of rude savagism.
I think I have now answered and also cleared up the contradiction
commonly met in the judgments of men respecting the influence of the
beautiful, and the appreciation of aesthetic culture. This contradiction is
explained directly we remember that there are two sorts of experimental
beauty, and that on both hands an affirmation is extended to the entire race,
when it can only be proved of one of the species. This contradiction
disappears the moment we distinguish a twofold want in humanity to which
two kinds of beauty correspond. It is therefore probable that both sides
would make good their claims if they come to an understanding respecting
the kind of beauty and the form of humanity that they have in view.
Consequently in the sequel of my researches I shall adopt the course that
nature herself follows with man considered from the point of view of
sesthetics, and setting out from the two kinds of beauty, I shall rise to the
idea of the genus. I shall examine the effects produced on man by the gentle
Page 297
and graceful beauty when its springs of action are in full play, and also
those produced by energetic beauty when they are relaxed. I shall do this to
confound these two sorts of beauty in the unity of the beau-ideal, in the
same way that the two opposite forms and modes of being of humanity are
absorbed in the unity of the ideal man.
LETTER XVII.
While we were only engaged in deducing the universal idea of beauty
from the conception of human nature in general, we had only to consider in
the latter the limits established essentially in itself, and inseparable from the
notion of the finite. Without attending to the contingent restrictions that
human nature may undergo in the real world of phenomena, we have drawn
the conception of this nature directly from reason, as a source of every
necessity, and the ideal of beauty has been given us at the same time with
the ideal of humanity.
But now we are coming down from the region of ideas to the scene of
reality, to find man in a DETERMINATE STATE, and consequently in
limits which are not derived from the pure conception of humanity, but
from external circumstances and from an accidental use of his freedom. But
although the limitation of the idea of humanity may be very manifold in the
individual, the contents of this idea suffice to teach us that we can only
depart from it by TWO opposite roads. For if the perfection of man consist
in the harmonious energy of his sensuous and spiritual forces, he can only
lack this perfection through the want of harmony and the want of energy.
Thus then, before having received on this point the testimony of experience,
reason suffices to assure us that we shall find the real and consequently
limited man in a state of tension or relaxation, according as the exclusive
activity of isolated forces troubles the harmony of his being, or as the unity
of his nature is based on the uniform relaxation of his physical and spiritual
those produced by energetic beauty when they are relaxed. I shall do this to
confound these two sorts of beauty in the unity of the beau-ideal, in the
same way that the two opposite forms and modes of being of humanity are
absorbed in the unity of the ideal man.
LETTER XVII.
While we were only engaged in deducing the universal idea of beauty
from the conception of human nature in general, we had only to consider in
the latter the limits established essentially in itself, and inseparable from the
notion of the finite. Without attending to the contingent restrictions that
human nature may undergo in the real world of phenomena, we have drawn
the conception of this nature directly from reason, as a source of every
necessity, and the ideal of beauty has been given us at the same time with
the ideal of humanity.
But now we are coming down from the region of ideas to the scene of
reality, to find man in a DETERMINATE STATE, and consequently in
limits which are not derived from the pure conception of humanity, but
from external circumstances and from an accidental use of his freedom. But
although the limitation of the idea of humanity may be very manifold in the
individual, the contents of this idea suffice to teach us that we can only
depart from it by TWO opposite roads. For if the perfection of man consist
in the harmonious energy of his sensuous and spiritual forces, he can only
lack this perfection through the want of harmony and the want of energy.
Thus then, before having received on this point the testimony of experience,
reason suffices to assure us that we shall find the real and consequently
limited man in a state of tension or relaxation, according as the exclusive
activity of isolated forces troubles the harmony of his being, or as the unity
of his nature is based on the uniform relaxation of his physical and spiritual
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forces. These opposite limits are, as we have now to prove, suppressed by
the beautiful, which re-establishes harmony in man when excited, and
energy in man when relaxed; and which, in this way, in conformity with the
nature of the beautiful, restores the state of limitation to an absolute state,
and makes of man a whole, complete in himself.
Thus the beautiful by no means belies in reality the idea which we have
made of it in speculation; only its action is much less free in it than in the
field of theory, where we were able to apply it to the pure conception of
humanity. In man, as experience shows him to us, the beautiful finds a
matter, already damaged and resisting, which robs him in IDEAL perfection
of what it communicates to him of its individual mode of being.
Accordingly in reality the beautiful will always appear a peculiar and
limited species, and not as the pure genus; in excited minds in the state of
tension, it will lose its freedom and variety; in relaxed minds, it will lose its
vivifying force; but we, who have become familiar with the true character
of this contradictory phenomenon, cannot be led astray by it. We shall not
follow the great crowd of critics, in determining their conception by
separate experiences, and to make them answerable for the deficiencies
which man shows under their influence. We know rather that it is man who
transfers the imperfections of his individuality over to them, who stands
perpetually in the way of their perfection by his subjective limitation, and
lowers their absolute ideal to two limited forms of phenomena.
It was advanced that soft beauty is for an unstrung mind, and the
energetic beauty for the tightly strung mind. But I apply the term unstrung
to a man when he is rather under the pressure of feelings than under the
pressure of conceptions. Every exclusive sway of one of his two
fundamental impulses is for man a state of compulsion and violence, and
freedom only exists in the co-operation of his two natures. Accordingly, the
man governed preponderately by feelings, or sensuously unstrung, is
the beautiful, which re-establishes harmony in man when excited, and
energy in man when relaxed; and which, in this way, in conformity with the
nature of the beautiful, restores the state of limitation to an absolute state,
and makes of man a whole, complete in himself.
Thus the beautiful by no means belies in reality the idea which we have
made of it in speculation; only its action is much less free in it than in the
field of theory, where we were able to apply it to the pure conception of
humanity. In man, as experience shows him to us, the beautiful finds a
matter, already damaged and resisting, which robs him in IDEAL perfection
of what it communicates to him of its individual mode of being.
Accordingly in reality the beautiful will always appear a peculiar and
limited species, and not as the pure genus; in excited minds in the state of
tension, it will lose its freedom and variety; in relaxed minds, it will lose its
vivifying force; but we, who have become familiar with the true character
of this contradictory phenomenon, cannot be led astray by it. We shall not
follow the great crowd of critics, in determining their conception by
separate experiences, and to make them answerable for the deficiencies
which man shows under their influence. We know rather that it is man who
transfers the imperfections of his individuality over to them, who stands
perpetually in the way of their perfection by his subjective limitation, and
lowers their absolute ideal to two limited forms of phenomena.
It was advanced that soft beauty is for an unstrung mind, and the
energetic beauty for the tightly strung mind. But I apply the term unstrung
to a man when he is rather under the pressure of feelings than under the
pressure of conceptions. Every exclusive sway of one of his two
fundamental impulses is for man a state of compulsion and violence, and
freedom only exists in the co-operation of his two natures. Accordingly, the
man governed preponderately by feelings, or sensuously unstrung, is
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emancipated and set free by matter. The soft and graceful beauty, to satisfy
this twofold problem, must therefore show herself under two aspects—in
two distinct forms. First as a form in repose, she will tone down savage life,
and pave the way from feeling to thought. She will, secondly, as a living
image equip the abstract form with sensuous power, and lead back the
conception to intuition and law to feeling. The former service she does to
the man of nature, the second to the man of art. But because she does not in
both cases hold complete sway over her matter, but depends on that which
is furnished either by formless nature or unnatural art, she will in both cases
bear traces of her origin, and lose herself in one place in material life and in
another in mere abstract form.
To be able to arrive at a conception how beauty can become a means to
remove this twofold relaxation, we must explore its source in the human
mind. Accordingly, make up your mind to dwell a little longer in the region
of speculation, in order then to leave it for ever, and to advance with securer
footing on the ground of experience.
LETTER XVIII.
By beauty the sensuous man is led to form and to thought; by beauty the
spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense.
From this statement it would appear to follow that between matter and
form, between passivity and activity, there must be a middle state, and that
beauty plants us in this state. It actually happens that the greater part of
mankind really form this conception of beauty as soon as they begin to
reflect on its operations, and all experience I seems to point to this
conclusion. But, on the other hand, nothing is more unwarrantable and
contradictory than such a conception, because the aversion of matter and
form, the passive and the active, feeling and thought, is eternal and I cannot
be mediated in any way. How can we remove this contradiction? Beauty
this twofold problem, must therefore show herself under two aspects—in
two distinct forms. First as a form in repose, she will tone down savage life,
and pave the way from feeling to thought. She will, secondly, as a living
image equip the abstract form with sensuous power, and lead back the
conception to intuition and law to feeling. The former service she does to
the man of nature, the second to the man of art. But because she does not in
both cases hold complete sway over her matter, but depends on that which
is furnished either by formless nature or unnatural art, she will in both cases
bear traces of her origin, and lose herself in one place in material life and in
another in mere abstract form.
To be able to arrive at a conception how beauty can become a means to
remove this twofold relaxation, we must explore its source in the human
mind. Accordingly, make up your mind to dwell a little longer in the region
of speculation, in order then to leave it for ever, and to advance with securer
footing on the ground of experience.
LETTER XVIII.
By beauty the sensuous man is led to form and to thought; by beauty the
spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense.
From this statement it would appear to follow that between matter and
form, between passivity and activity, there must be a middle state, and that
beauty plants us in this state. It actually happens that the greater part of
mankind really form this conception of beauty as soon as they begin to
reflect on its operations, and all experience I seems to point to this
conclusion. But, on the other hand, nothing is more unwarrantable and
contradictory than such a conception, because the aversion of matter and
form, the passive and the active, feeling and thought, is eternal and I cannot
be mediated in any way. How can we remove this contradiction? Beauty
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weds the two opposed conditions of feeling and thinking, and yet there is
absolutely no medium between them. The former is immediately certain
through experience, the other through the reason.
This is the point to which the whole question of beauty leads, and if we
succeed in settling this point in a satisfactory way, we have at length found
the clue that will conduct us through the whole labyrinth of aesthetics.
But this requires two very different operations, which must necessarily
support each other in this inquiry. Beauty it is said, weds two conditions
with one another which are opposite to each other, and can never be one.
We must start from this opposition; we must grasp and recognise them in
their entire purity and strictness, so that both conditions are separated in the
most definite matter; otherwise we mix, but we do not unite them.
Secondly, it is usual to say, beauty unites those two opposed conditions, and
therefore removes the opposition. But because both conditions remain
eternally opposed to one another, they cannot be united in any other way
than by being suppressed. Our second business is therefore to make this
connection perfect, to carry them out with such purity and perfection that
both conditions disappear entirely in a third one, and no trace of separation
remains in the whole; otherwise we segregate, but do not unite. All the
disputes that have ever prevailed and still prevail in the philosophical world
respecting the conception of beauty have no other origin than their
commencing without a sufficiently strict distinction, or that it is not carried
out fully to a pure union. Those philosophers who blindly follow their
feeling in reflecting on this topic can obtain no other conception of beauty,
because they distinguish nothing separate in the totality of the sensuous
impression. Other philosophers, who take the understanding as their
exclusive guide, can never obtain a conception of beauty, because they
never see anything else in the whole than the parts, and spirit and matter
remain eternally separate, even in their most perfect unity. The first fear to
absolutely no medium between them. The former is immediately certain
through experience, the other through the reason.
This is the point to which the whole question of beauty leads, and if we
succeed in settling this point in a satisfactory way, we have at length found
the clue that will conduct us through the whole labyrinth of aesthetics.
But this requires two very different operations, which must necessarily
support each other in this inquiry. Beauty it is said, weds two conditions
with one another which are opposite to each other, and can never be one.
We must start from this opposition; we must grasp and recognise them in
their entire purity and strictness, so that both conditions are separated in the
most definite matter; otherwise we mix, but we do not unite them.
Secondly, it is usual to say, beauty unites those two opposed conditions, and
therefore removes the opposition. But because both conditions remain
eternally opposed to one another, they cannot be united in any other way
than by being suppressed. Our second business is therefore to make this
connection perfect, to carry them out with such purity and perfection that
both conditions disappear entirely in a third one, and no trace of separation
remains in the whole; otherwise we segregate, but do not unite. All the
disputes that have ever prevailed and still prevail in the philosophical world
respecting the conception of beauty have no other origin than their
commencing without a sufficiently strict distinction, or that it is not carried
out fully to a pure union. Those philosophers who blindly follow their
feeling in reflecting on this topic can obtain no other conception of beauty,
because they distinguish nothing separate in the totality of the sensuous
impression. Other philosophers, who take the understanding as their
exclusive guide, can never obtain a conception of beauty, because they
never see anything else in the whole than the parts, and spirit and matter
remain eternally separate, even in their most perfect unity. The first fear to
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suppress beauty dynamically, that is, as a working power, if they must
separate what is united in the feeling. The others fear to suppress beauty
logically, that is, as a conception, when they have to hold together what in
the understanding is separate. The former wish to think of beauty as it
works; the latter wish it to work as it is thought. Both therefore must miss
the truth; the former because they try to follow infinite nature with their
limited thinking power; the others, because they wish to limit unlimited
nature according to their laws of thought The first fear to rob beauty of its
freedom by a too strict dissection, the others fear to destroy the distinctness
of the conception by a too violent union. But the former do not reflect that
the freedom in which they very properly place the essence of beauty is not
lawlessness, but harmony of laws; not caprice, but the highest internal
necessity. The others do not remember that distinctness, which they with
equal right demand from beauty, does not consist in the exclusion of certain
realities, but the absolute including of all; that is not therefore limitation,
but infinitude. We shall avoid the quicksands on which both have made
shipwreck if we begin from the two elements in which beauty divides itself
before the understanding, but then afterwards rise to a pure aesthetic unity
by which it works on feeling, and in which both those conditions
completely disappear.
LETTER XIX
Two principal and different states of passive and active capacity of being
determined [Footnote: Bestimmbarkeit] can be distinguished in man; in like
manner two states of passive and active determination. [Footnote:
Bestimmung.] The explanation of this proposition leads us most readily to
our end.
The condition of the state of man before destination or direction is given
him by the impressions of the senses is an unlimited capacity of being
separate what is united in the feeling. The others fear to suppress beauty
logically, that is, as a conception, when they have to hold together what in
the understanding is separate. The former wish to think of beauty as it
works; the latter wish it to work as it is thought. Both therefore must miss
the truth; the former because they try to follow infinite nature with their
limited thinking power; the others, because they wish to limit unlimited
nature according to their laws of thought The first fear to rob beauty of its
freedom by a too strict dissection, the others fear to destroy the distinctness
of the conception by a too violent union. But the former do not reflect that
the freedom in which they very properly place the essence of beauty is not
lawlessness, but harmony of laws; not caprice, but the highest internal
necessity. The others do not remember that distinctness, which they with
equal right demand from beauty, does not consist in the exclusion of certain
realities, but the absolute including of all; that is not therefore limitation,
but infinitude. We shall avoid the quicksands on which both have made
shipwreck if we begin from the two elements in which beauty divides itself
before the understanding, but then afterwards rise to a pure aesthetic unity
by which it works on feeling, and in which both those conditions
completely disappear.
LETTER XIX
Two principal and different states of passive and active capacity of being
determined [Footnote: Bestimmbarkeit] can be distinguished in man; in like
manner two states of passive and active determination. [Footnote:
Bestimmung.] The explanation of this proposition leads us most readily to
our end.
The condition of the state of man before destination or direction is given
him by the impressions of the senses is an unlimited capacity of being
Page 302
determined. The infinite of time and space is given to his imagination for its
free use; and, because nothing is settled in this kingdom of the possible, and
therefore nothing is excluded from it, this state of absence of determination
can be named an empty infiniteness, which must not by any means be
confounded with an infinite void.
Now it is necessary that his sensuous nature should be modified, and that
in the indefinite series of possible determinations one alone should become
real. One perception must spring up in it. That which, in the previous state
of determinableness, was only an empty potency becomes now an active
force, and receives contents; but at the same time, as an active force it
receives a limit, after having been, as a simple power, unlimited. Reality
exists now, but the infinite has disappeared. To describe a figure in space,
we are obliged to limit infinite space; to represent to ourselves a change in
time, we are obliged to divide the totality of time. Thus we only arrive at
reality by limitation, at the positive, at a real position, by negation or
exclusion; to determination, by the suppression of our free
determinableness.
But mere exclusion would never beget a reality, nor would a mere
sensuous impression ever give birth to a perception, if there were not
something from which it was excluded, if by an absolute act of the mind the
negation were not referred to something positive, and if opposition did not
issue out of non-position. This act of the mind is styled judging or thinking,
and the result is named thought.
Before we determine a place in space, there is no space for us; but
without absolute space we could never determine a place. The same is the
case with time. Before we have an instant, there is no time to us; but
without infinite time—eternity—we should never have a representation of
the instant. Thus, therefore, we can only arrive at the whole by the part, to
free use; and, because nothing is settled in this kingdom of the possible, and
therefore nothing is excluded from it, this state of absence of determination
can be named an empty infiniteness, which must not by any means be
confounded with an infinite void.
Now it is necessary that his sensuous nature should be modified, and that
in the indefinite series of possible determinations one alone should become
real. One perception must spring up in it. That which, in the previous state
of determinableness, was only an empty potency becomes now an active
force, and receives contents; but at the same time, as an active force it
receives a limit, after having been, as a simple power, unlimited. Reality
exists now, but the infinite has disappeared. To describe a figure in space,
we are obliged to limit infinite space; to represent to ourselves a change in
time, we are obliged to divide the totality of time. Thus we only arrive at
reality by limitation, at the positive, at a real position, by negation or
exclusion; to determination, by the suppression of our free
determinableness.
But mere exclusion would never beget a reality, nor would a mere
sensuous impression ever give birth to a perception, if there were not
something from which it was excluded, if by an absolute act of the mind the
negation were not referred to something positive, and if opposition did not
issue out of non-position. This act of the mind is styled judging or thinking,
and the result is named thought.
Before we determine a place in space, there is no space for us; but
without absolute space we could never determine a place. The same is the
case with time. Before we have an instant, there is no time to us; but
without infinite time—eternity—we should never have a representation of
the instant. Thus, therefore, we can only arrive at the whole by the part, to
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the unlimited through limitation; but reciprocally we only arrive at the part
through the whole, at limitation through the unlimited.
It follows from this, that when it is affirmed of beauty that it mediates for
man, the transition from feeling to thought, this must not be understood to
mean that beauty can fill up the gap that separates feeling from thought, the
passive from the active. This gap is infinite; and, without the interposition
of a new and independent faculty, it is impossible for the general to issue
from the individual, the necessary from the contingent. Thought is the
immediate act of this absolute power, which, I admit, can only be
manifested in connection with sensuous impressions, but which in this
manifestation depends so little on the sensuous that it reveals itself specially
in an opposition to it. The spontaneity or autonomy with which it acts
excludes every foreign influence; and it is not in as far as it helps thought—
which comprehends a manifest contradiction—but only in as far as it
procures for the intellectual faculties the freedom to manifest themselves in
conformity with their proper laws. It does it only because the beautiful can
become a means of leading man from matter to form, from feeling to laws,
from a limited existence to an absolute existence.
But this assumes that the freedom of the intellectual faculties can be
balked, which appears contradictory to the conception of an autonomous
power. For a power which only receives the matter of its activity from
without can only be hindered in its action by the privation of this matter,
and consequently by way of negation; it is therefore a misconception of the
nature of the mind, to attribute to the sensuous passions the power of
oppressing positively the freedom of the mind. Experience does indeed
present numerous examples where the rational forces appear compressed in
proportion to the violence of the sensuous forces. But instead of deducing
this spiritual weakness from the energy of passion, this passionate energy
must rather be explained by the weakness of the human mind. For the sense
through the whole, at limitation through the unlimited.
It follows from this, that when it is affirmed of beauty that it mediates for
man, the transition from feeling to thought, this must not be understood to
mean that beauty can fill up the gap that separates feeling from thought, the
passive from the active. This gap is infinite; and, without the interposition
of a new and independent faculty, it is impossible for the general to issue
from the individual, the necessary from the contingent. Thought is the
immediate act of this absolute power, which, I admit, can only be
manifested in connection with sensuous impressions, but which in this
manifestation depends so little on the sensuous that it reveals itself specially
in an opposition to it. The spontaneity or autonomy with which it acts
excludes every foreign influence; and it is not in as far as it helps thought—
which comprehends a manifest contradiction—but only in as far as it
procures for the intellectual faculties the freedom to manifest themselves in
conformity with their proper laws. It does it only because the beautiful can
become a means of leading man from matter to form, from feeling to laws,
from a limited existence to an absolute existence.
But this assumes that the freedom of the intellectual faculties can be
balked, which appears contradictory to the conception of an autonomous
power. For a power which only receives the matter of its activity from
without can only be hindered in its action by the privation of this matter,
and consequently by way of negation; it is therefore a misconception of the
nature of the mind, to attribute to the sensuous passions the power of
oppressing positively the freedom of the mind. Experience does indeed
present numerous examples where the rational forces appear compressed in
proportion to the violence of the sensuous forces. But instead of deducing
this spiritual weakness from the energy of passion, this passionate energy
must rather be explained by the weakness of the human mind. For the sense
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can only have a sway such as this over man when the mind has
spontaneously neglected to assert its power.
Yet in trying by these explanations to move one objection, I appear to
have exposed myself to another, and I have only saved the autonomy of the
mind at the cost of its unity. For how can the mind derive at the same time
from itself the principles of inactivity and of activity, if it is not itself
divided, and if it is not in opposition with itself?
Here we must remember that we have before us, not the infinite mind,
but the finite. The finite mind is that which only becomes active through the
passive, only arrives at the absolute through limitation, and only acts and
fashions in as far as it receives matter. Accordingly, a mind of this nature
must associate with the impulse towards form or the absolute, an impulse
towards matter or limitation, conditions without which it could not have the
former impulse nor satisfy it. How can two such opposite tendencies exist
together in the same being? This is a problem that can no doubt embarrass
the metaphysician, but not the transcendental philosopher. The latter does
not presume to explain the possibility of things, but he is satisfied with
giving a solid basis to the knowledge that makes us understand the
possibility of experience. And as experience would be equally impossible
without this autonomy in the mind, and without the absolute unity of the
mind, it lays down these two conceptions as two conditions of experience
equally necessary without troubling itself any more to reconcile them.
Moreover, this immanence of two fundamental impulses does not in any
degree contradict the absolute unity of the mind, as soon as the mind itself,
its selfhood, is distinguished from these two motors. No doubt, these two
impulses exist and act in it, but itself is neither matter nor form, nor the
sensuous nor reason, and this is a point that does not seem always to have
occurred to those who only look upon the mind as itself acting when its acts
spontaneously neglected to assert its power.
Yet in trying by these explanations to move one objection, I appear to
have exposed myself to another, and I have only saved the autonomy of the
mind at the cost of its unity. For how can the mind derive at the same time
from itself the principles of inactivity and of activity, if it is not itself
divided, and if it is not in opposition with itself?
Here we must remember that we have before us, not the infinite mind,
but the finite. The finite mind is that which only becomes active through the
passive, only arrives at the absolute through limitation, and only acts and
fashions in as far as it receives matter. Accordingly, a mind of this nature
must associate with the impulse towards form or the absolute, an impulse
towards matter or limitation, conditions without which it could not have the
former impulse nor satisfy it. How can two such opposite tendencies exist
together in the same being? This is a problem that can no doubt embarrass
the metaphysician, but not the transcendental philosopher. The latter does
not presume to explain the possibility of things, but he is satisfied with
giving a solid basis to the knowledge that makes us understand the
possibility of experience. And as experience would be equally impossible
without this autonomy in the mind, and without the absolute unity of the
mind, it lays down these two conceptions as two conditions of experience
equally necessary without troubling itself any more to reconcile them.
Moreover, this immanence of two fundamental impulses does not in any
degree contradict the absolute unity of the mind, as soon as the mind itself,
its selfhood, is distinguished from these two motors. No doubt, these two
impulses exist and act in it, but itself is neither matter nor form, nor the
sensuous nor reason, and this is a point that does not seem always to have
occurred to those who only look upon the mind as itself acting when its acts
Page 305
are in harmony with reason, and who declare it passive when its acts
contradict reason.
Arrived at its development, each of these two fundamental impulsions
tends of necessity and by its nature to satisfy itself; but precisely because
each of them has a necessary tendency, and both nevertheless have an
opposite tendency, this twofold constraint mutually destroys itself, and the
will preserves an entire freedom between them both. It is therefore the will
that conducts itself like a power—as the basis of reality—with respect to
both these impulses; but neither of them can by itself act as a power with
respect to the other. A violent man, by his positive tendency to justice,
which never fails in him, is turned away from injustice; nor can a
temptation of pleasure, however strong, make a strong character violate its
principles. There is in man no other power than his will; and death alone,
which destroys man, or some privation of self-consciousness, is the only
thing that can rob man of his internal freedom.
An external necessity determines our condition, our existence in time, by
means of the sensuous. The latter is quite involuntary, and directly it is
produced in us, we are necessarily passive. In the same manner an internal
necessity awakens our personality in connection with sensations, and by its
antagonism with them; for consciousness cannot depend on the will, which
presupposes it. This primitive manifestation of personality is no more a
merit to us than its privation is a defect in us. Reason can only be required
in a being who is self-conscious, for reason is an absolute consecutiveness
and universality of consciousness; before this is the case, he is not a man,
nor can any act of humanity be expected from him. The metaphysician can
no more explain the limitation imposed by sensation on a free and
autonomous mind than the natural philosopher can understand the infinite,
which is revealed in consciousness in connection with these limits. Neither
abstraction nor experience can bring us back to the source whence issue our
contradict reason.
Arrived at its development, each of these two fundamental impulsions
tends of necessity and by its nature to satisfy itself; but precisely because
each of them has a necessary tendency, and both nevertheless have an
opposite tendency, this twofold constraint mutually destroys itself, and the
will preserves an entire freedom between them both. It is therefore the will
that conducts itself like a power—as the basis of reality—with respect to
both these impulses; but neither of them can by itself act as a power with
respect to the other. A violent man, by his positive tendency to justice,
which never fails in him, is turned away from injustice; nor can a
temptation of pleasure, however strong, make a strong character violate its
principles. There is in man no other power than his will; and death alone,
which destroys man, or some privation of self-consciousness, is the only
thing that can rob man of his internal freedom.
An external necessity determines our condition, our existence in time, by
means of the sensuous. The latter is quite involuntary, and directly it is
produced in us, we are necessarily passive. In the same manner an internal
necessity awakens our personality in connection with sensations, and by its
antagonism with them; for consciousness cannot depend on the will, which
presupposes it. This primitive manifestation of personality is no more a
merit to us than its privation is a defect in us. Reason can only be required
in a being who is self-conscious, for reason is an absolute consecutiveness
and universality of consciousness; before this is the case, he is not a man,
nor can any act of humanity be expected from him. The metaphysician can
no more explain the limitation imposed by sensation on a free and
autonomous mind than the natural philosopher can understand the infinite,
which is revealed in consciousness in connection with these limits. Neither
abstraction nor experience can bring us back to the source whence issue our
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ideas of necessity and of universality; this source is concealed in its origin
in time from the observer, and its super-sensuous origin from the researches
of the metaphysician. But, to sum up in a few words, consciousness is there,
and, together with its immutable unity, the law of all that is for man is
established, as well as of all that is to be by man, for his understanding and
his activity. The ideas of truth and of right present themselves inevitable,
incorruptible, immeasurable, even in the age of sensuousness; and without
our being able to say why or how, we see eternity in time, the necessary
following the contingent. It is thus that, without any share on the part of the
subject, the sensation and self-consciousness arise, and the origin of both is
beyond our volition, as it is out of the sphere of our knowledge.
But as soon as these two faculties have passed into action, and man has
verified by experience, through the medium of sensation, a determinate
existence, and through the medium of consciousness, its absolute existence,
the two fundamental impulses exert their influence directly their object is
given. The sensuous impulse is awakened with the experience of life—with
the beginning of the individual; the rational impulsion with the experience
of law—with the beginning of his personality; and it is only when these two
inclinations have come into existence that the human type is realised. Up to
that time, everything takes place in man according to the law of necessity;
but now the hand of nature lets him go, and it is for him to keep upright
humanity which nature places as a germ in his heart. And thus we see that
directly the two opposite and fundamental impulses exercise their influence
in him, both lose their constraint, and the autonomy of two necessities gives
birth to freedom. LETTER XX.
That freedom Is an active and not a passive principle results from its very
conception; but that liberty itself should be an effect of nature (taking this
word in its widest sense), and not the work of man, and therefore that it can
be favoured or thwarted by natural means, is the necessary consequence of
in time from the observer, and its super-sensuous origin from the researches
of the metaphysician. But, to sum up in a few words, consciousness is there,
and, together with its immutable unity, the law of all that is for man is
established, as well as of all that is to be by man, for his understanding and
his activity. The ideas of truth and of right present themselves inevitable,
incorruptible, immeasurable, even in the age of sensuousness; and without
our being able to say why or how, we see eternity in time, the necessary
following the contingent. It is thus that, without any share on the part of the
subject, the sensation and self-consciousness arise, and the origin of both is
beyond our volition, as it is out of the sphere of our knowledge.
But as soon as these two faculties have passed into action, and man has
verified by experience, through the medium of sensation, a determinate
existence, and through the medium of consciousness, its absolute existence,
the two fundamental impulses exert their influence directly their object is
given. The sensuous impulse is awakened with the experience of life—with
the beginning of the individual; the rational impulsion with the experience
of law—with the beginning of his personality; and it is only when these two
inclinations have come into existence that the human type is realised. Up to
that time, everything takes place in man according to the law of necessity;
but now the hand of nature lets him go, and it is for him to keep upright
humanity which nature places as a germ in his heart. And thus we see that
directly the two opposite and fundamental impulses exercise their influence
in him, both lose their constraint, and the autonomy of two necessities gives
birth to freedom. LETTER XX.
That freedom Is an active and not a passive principle results from its very
conception; but that liberty itself should be an effect of nature (taking this
word in its widest sense), and not the work of man, and therefore that it can
be favoured or thwarted by natural means, is the necessary consequence of
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that which precedes. It begins only when man is complete, and when these
two fundamental impulsions have been developed. It will then be wanting
whilst he is incomplete, and while one of these impulsions is excluded, and
it will be re-established by all that gives back to man his integrity.
Thus it is possible, both with regard to the entire species as to the
individual, to remark the moment when man is yet incomplete, and when
one of the two exclusions acts solely in him. We know that man commences
by life simply, to end by form; that he is more of an individual than a
person, and that he starts from the limited or finite to approach the infinite.
The sensuous impulsion comes into play therefore before the rational
impulsion, because sensation precedes consciousness; and in this priority of
sensuous impulsion we find the key of the history of the whole of human
liberty.
There is a moment, in fact, when the instinct of life, not yet opposed to
the instinct of form, acts as nature and as necessity; when the sensuous is a
power because man has not begun; for even in man there can be no other
power than his will. But when man shall have attained to the power of
thought, reason, on the contrary, will be a power, and moral or logical
necessity will take the place of physical necessity. Sensuous power must
then be annihilated before the law which must govern it can be established.
It is not enough that something shall begin which as yet was not; previously
something must end which had begun. Man cannot pass immediately from
sensuousness to thought. He must step backwards, for it is only when one
determination is suppressed that the contrary determination can take place.
Consequently, in order to exchange passive against active liberty, a passive
determination against an active, he must be momentarily free from all
determination, and must traverse a state of pure determinability. He has then
to return in some degree to that state of pure negative indetermination in
which he was before his senses were affected by anything. But this state
two fundamental impulsions have been developed. It will then be wanting
whilst he is incomplete, and while one of these impulsions is excluded, and
it will be re-established by all that gives back to man his integrity.
Thus it is possible, both with regard to the entire species as to the
individual, to remark the moment when man is yet incomplete, and when
one of the two exclusions acts solely in him. We know that man commences
by life simply, to end by form; that he is more of an individual than a
person, and that he starts from the limited or finite to approach the infinite.
The sensuous impulsion comes into play therefore before the rational
impulsion, because sensation precedes consciousness; and in this priority of
sensuous impulsion we find the key of the history of the whole of human
liberty.
There is a moment, in fact, when the instinct of life, not yet opposed to
the instinct of form, acts as nature and as necessity; when the sensuous is a
power because man has not begun; for even in man there can be no other
power than his will. But when man shall have attained to the power of
thought, reason, on the contrary, will be a power, and moral or logical
necessity will take the place of physical necessity. Sensuous power must
then be annihilated before the law which must govern it can be established.
It is not enough that something shall begin which as yet was not; previously
something must end which had begun. Man cannot pass immediately from
sensuousness to thought. He must step backwards, for it is only when one
determination is suppressed that the contrary determination can take place.
Consequently, in order to exchange passive against active liberty, a passive
determination against an active, he must be momentarily free from all
determination, and must traverse a state of pure determinability. He has then
to return in some degree to that state of pure negative indetermination in
which he was before his senses were affected by anything. But this state
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was absolutely empty of all contents, and now the question is to reconcile
an equal determination and a determinability equally without limit, with the
greatest possible fulness, because from this situation something positive
must immediately follow. The determination which man received by
sensation must be preserved, because he should not lose the reality; but at
the same time, in so far as finite, it should be suppressed, because a
determinability without limit would take place. The problem consists then
in annihilating the determination of the mode of existence, and yet at the
same time in preserving it, which is only possible in one way: in opposing
to it another. The two sides of a balance are in equilibrium when empty;
they are also in equilibrium when their contents are of equal weight.
Thus, to pass from sensation to thought, the soul traverses a medium
position, in which sensibility and reason are at the same time active, and
thus they mutually destroy their determinant power, and by their
antagonism produce a negation. This medium situation in which the soul is
neither physically nor morally constrained, and yet is in both ways active,
merits essentially the name of a free situation; and if we call the state of
sensuous determination physical, and the state of rational determination
logical or moral, that state of real and active determination should be called
the aesthetic.
LETTER XXI.
I have remarked in the beginning of the foregoing letter that there is a
twofold condition of determinableness and a twofold condition of
determination. And now I can clear up this proposition.
The mind can be determined—is determinate—only in as far as it is not
determined; it is, however, determinable also, in as far as it is not
exclusively determined; that is, if it is not confined in its determination. The
former is only a want of determination—it is without limits, because it is
an equal determination and a determinability equally without limit, with the
greatest possible fulness, because from this situation something positive
must immediately follow. The determination which man received by
sensation must be preserved, because he should not lose the reality; but at
the same time, in so far as finite, it should be suppressed, because a
determinability without limit would take place. The problem consists then
in annihilating the determination of the mode of existence, and yet at the
same time in preserving it, which is only possible in one way: in opposing
to it another. The two sides of a balance are in equilibrium when empty;
they are also in equilibrium when their contents are of equal weight.
Thus, to pass from sensation to thought, the soul traverses a medium
position, in which sensibility and reason are at the same time active, and
thus they mutually destroy their determinant power, and by their
antagonism produce a negation. This medium situation in which the soul is
neither physically nor morally constrained, and yet is in both ways active,
merits essentially the name of a free situation; and if we call the state of
sensuous determination physical, and the state of rational determination
logical or moral, that state of real and active determination should be called
the aesthetic.
LETTER XXI.
I have remarked in the beginning of the foregoing letter that there is a
twofold condition of determinableness and a twofold condition of
determination. And now I can clear up this proposition.
The mind can be determined—is determinate—only in as far as it is not
determined; it is, however, determinable also, in as far as it is not
exclusively determined; that is, if it is not confined in its determination. The
former is only a want of determination—it is without limits, because it is
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without reality; but the latter, the aesthetic determinableness, has no limits,
because it unites all reality.
The mind is determined, inasmuch as it is only limited; but it is also
determined because it limits itself of its own absolute capacity. It is situated
in the former position when it feels, in the second when it thinks.
Accordingly the aesthetic constitution is in relation to determinableness
what thought is in relation to determination. The latter is a negative from
internal and infinite completeness, the former a limitation from internal
infinite power. Feeling and thought come into contact in one single point,
the mind is determined in both conditions, the man becomes something and
exists—either as individual or person—by exclusion; in other cases these
two faculties stand infinitely apart. Just in the same manner, the aesthetic
determinableness comes in contact with the mere want of determination in a
single point, by both excluding every distinct determined existence, by thus
being in all other points nothing and all, and hence by being infinitely
different. Therefore, if the latter, in the absence of determination from
deficiency, is represented as an empty infiniteness, the aesthetic freedom of
determination, which forms the proper counterpart to the former, can be
considered, as a completed infiniteness; a representation which exactly
agrees with the teachings of the previous investigations.
Man is therefore nothing in the aesthetic state, if attention is given to the
single result, and not to the whole faculty, and if we regard only the absence
or want of every special determination. We must therefore do justice to
those who pronounce the beautiful, and the disposition in which it places
the mind, as entirely indifferent and unprofitable, in relation to knowledge
and feeling. They are perfectly right; for it is certain that beauty gives no
separate, single result, either for the understanding or for the will; it does
not carry out a single intellectual or moral object; it discovers no truth, does
not help us to fulfil a single duty, and, in one word, is equally unfit to found
because it unites all reality.
The mind is determined, inasmuch as it is only limited; but it is also
determined because it limits itself of its own absolute capacity. It is situated
in the former position when it feels, in the second when it thinks.
Accordingly the aesthetic constitution is in relation to determinableness
what thought is in relation to determination. The latter is a negative from
internal and infinite completeness, the former a limitation from internal
infinite power. Feeling and thought come into contact in one single point,
the mind is determined in both conditions, the man becomes something and
exists—either as individual or person—by exclusion; in other cases these
two faculties stand infinitely apart. Just in the same manner, the aesthetic
determinableness comes in contact with the mere want of determination in a
single point, by both excluding every distinct determined existence, by thus
being in all other points nothing and all, and hence by being infinitely
different. Therefore, if the latter, in the absence of determination from
deficiency, is represented as an empty infiniteness, the aesthetic freedom of
determination, which forms the proper counterpart to the former, can be
considered, as a completed infiniteness; a representation which exactly
agrees with the teachings of the previous investigations.
Man is therefore nothing in the aesthetic state, if attention is given to the
single result, and not to the whole faculty, and if we regard only the absence
or want of every special determination. We must therefore do justice to
those who pronounce the beautiful, and the disposition in which it places
the mind, as entirely indifferent and unprofitable, in relation to knowledge
and feeling. They are perfectly right; for it is certain that beauty gives no
separate, single result, either for the understanding or for the will; it does
not carry out a single intellectual or moral object; it discovers no truth, does
not help us to fulfil a single duty, and, in one word, is equally unfit to found
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the character or to clear the head. Accordingly, the personal worth of a man,
or his dignity, as far as this can only depend on himself, remains entirely
undetermined by aesthetic culture, and nothing further is attained than that,
on the part of nature, it is made profitable for him to make of himself what
he will; that the freedom to be what he ought to be is restored perfectly to
him.
But by this, something infinite is attained. But as soon as we remember
that freedom is taken from man by the one-sided compulsion of nature in
feeling, and by the exclusive legislation of the reason in thinking, we must
consider the capacity restored to him by the aesthetical disposition, as the
highest of all gifts, as the gift of humanity. I admit that he possesses this
capacity for humanity, before every definite determination in which he may
be placed. But as a matter of fact, he loses it with every determined
condition, into which he may come, and if he is to pass over to an opposite
condition, humanity must be in every case restored to him by the aesthetic
life.
It is therefore not only a poetical license, but also philosophically correct,
when beauty is named our second creator. Nor is this inconsistent with the
fact that she only makes it possible for us to attain and realise humanity,
leaving this to our free will. For in this she acts in common with our
original creator, nature, which has imparted to us nothing further than this
capacity for humanity, but leaves the use of it to our own determination of
will.
LETTER XXII.
Accordingly, if the aesthetic disposition of the mind must be looked upon
in one respect as nothing—that is, when we confine our view to separate
and determined operations—it must be looked upon in another respect as a
state of the highest reality, in as far as we attend to the absence of all limits
or his dignity, as far as this can only depend on himself, remains entirely
undetermined by aesthetic culture, and nothing further is attained than that,
on the part of nature, it is made profitable for him to make of himself what
he will; that the freedom to be what he ought to be is restored perfectly to
him.
But by this, something infinite is attained. But as soon as we remember
that freedom is taken from man by the one-sided compulsion of nature in
feeling, and by the exclusive legislation of the reason in thinking, we must
consider the capacity restored to him by the aesthetical disposition, as the
highest of all gifts, as the gift of humanity. I admit that he possesses this
capacity for humanity, before every definite determination in which he may
be placed. But as a matter of fact, he loses it with every determined
condition, into which he may come, and if he is to pass over to an opposite
condition, humanity must be in every case restored to him by the aesthetic
life.
It is therefore not only a poetical license, but also philosophically correct,
when beauty is named our second creator. Nor is this inconsistent with the
fact that she only makes it possible for us to attain and realise humanity,
leaving this to our free will. For in this she acts in common with our
original creator, nature, which has imparted to us nothing further than this
capacity for humanity, but leaves the use of it to our own determination of
will.
LETTER XXII.
Accordingly, if the aesthetic disposition of the mind must be looked upon
in one respect as nothing—that is, when we confine our view to separate
and determined operations—it must be looked upon in another respect as a
state of the highest reality, in as far as we attend to the absence of all limits
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and the sum of powers which are commonly active in it. Accordingly we
cannot pronounce them, again, to be wrong who describe the aesthetic state
to be the most productive in relation to knowledge and morality. They are
perfectly right, for a state of mind which comprises the whole of humanity
in itself must of necessity include in itself also—necessarily and potentially
—every separate expression of it. Again, a disposition of mind that removes
all limitation from the totality of human nature must also remove it from
every social expression of the same. Exactly because its "aesthetic
disposition" does not exclusively shelter any separate function of humanity,
it is favourable to all without distinction, nor does it favour any particular
functions, precisely because it is the foundation of the possibility of all. All
other exercises give to the mind some special aptitude, but for that very
reason give it some definite limits; only the aesthetical leads him to the
unlimited. Every other condition, in which we can live, refers us to a
previous condition, and requires for its solution a following condition; only
the aesthetic is a complete whole in itself, for it unites in itself all conditions
of its source and of its duration. Here alone we feel ourselves swept out of
time, and our humanity expresses itself with purity and integrity as if it had
not yet received any impression or interruption from the operation of
external powers.
That which flatters our senses in immediate sensation opens our weak
and volatile spirit to every impression, but makes us in the same degree less
apt for exertion. That which stretches our thinking power and invites to
abstract conceptions strengthens our mind for every kind of resistance, but
hardens it also in the same proportion, and deprives us of susceptibility in
the same ratio that it helps us to greater mental activity. For this very
reason, one as well as the other brings us at length to exhaustion, because
matter cannot long do without the shaping, constructive force, and the force
cannot do without the constructible material. But on the other hand, if we
have resigned ourselves to the enjoyment of genuine beauty, we are at such
cannot pronounce them, again, to be wrong who describe the aesthetic state
to be the most productive in relation to knowledge and morality. They are
perfectly right, for a state of mind which comprises the whole of humanity
in itself must of necessity include in itself also—necessarily and potentially
—every separate expression of it. Again, a disposition of mind that removes
all limitation from the totality of human nature must also remove it from
every social expression of the same. Exactly because its "aesthetic
disposition" does not exclusively shelter any separate function of humanity,
it is favourable to all without distinction, nor does it favour any particular
functions, precisely because it is the foundation of the possibility of all. All
other exercises give to the mind some special aptitude, but for that very
reason give it some definite limits; only the aesthetical leads him to the
unlimited. Every other condition, in which we can live, refers us to a
previous condition, and requires for its solution a following condition; only
the aesthetic is a complete whole in itself, for it unites in itself all conditions
of its source and of its duration. Here alone we feel ourselves swept out of
time, and our humanity expresses itself with purity and integrity as if it had
not yet received any impression or interruption from the operation of
external powers.
That which flatters our senses in immediate sensation opens our weak
and volatile spirit to every impression, but makes us in the same degree less
apt for exertion. That which stretches our thinking power and invites to
abstract conceptions strengthens our mind for every kind of resistance, but
hardens it also in the same proportion, and deprives us of susceptibility in
the same ratio that it helps us to greater mental activity. For this very
reason, one as well as the other brings us at length to exhaustion, because
matter cannot long do without the shaping, constructive force, and the force
cannot do without the constructible material. But on the other hand, if we
have resigned ourselves to the enjoyment of genuine beauty, we are at such
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a moment of our passive and active powers in the same degree master, and
we shall turn with ease from grave to gay, from rest to movement, from
submission to resistance, to abstract thinking and intuition.
This high indifference and freedom of mind, united with power and
elasticity, is the disposition in which a true work of art ought to dismiss us,
and there is no better test of true aesthetic excellence. If after an enjoyment
of this kind we find ourselves specially impelled to a particular mode of
feeling or action, and unfit for other modes, this serves as an infallible proof
that we have not experienced any pure aesthetic effect, whether this is
owing to the object, to our own mode of feeling—as generally happens—or
to both together.
As in reality no purely aesthetical effect can be met with—for man can
never leave his dependence on material forces—the excellence of a work of
art can only consist in its greater approximation to its ideal of aesthetic
purity, and however high we may raise the freedom of this effect, we shall
always leave it with a particular disposition and a particular bias. Any class
of productions or separate work in the world of art is noble and excellent in
proportion to the universality of the disposition and the unlimited character
of the bias thereby presented to our mind. This truth can be applied to
works in various branches of art, and also to different works in the same
branch. We leave a grand musical performance with our feelings excited,
the reading of a noble poem with a quickened imagination, a beautiful
statue or building with an awakened understanding; but a man would not
choose an opportune moment who attempted to invite us to abstract
thinking after a high musical enjoyment, or to attend to a prosaic affair of
common life after a high poetical enjoyment, or to kindle our imagination
and astonish our feelings directly after inspecting a fine statue or edifice.
The reason of this is that music, BY ITS MATTER, even when most
spiritual, presents a greater affinity with the senses than is permitted by
we shall turn with ease from grave to gay, from rest to movement, from
submission to resistance, to abstract thinking and intuition.
This high indifference and freedom of mind, united with power and
elasticity, is the disposition in which a true work of art ought to dismiss us,
and there is no better test of true aesthetic excellence. If after an enjoyment
of this kind we find ourselves specially impelled to a particular mode of
feeling or action, and unfit for other modes, this serves as an infallible proof
that we have not experienced any pure aesthetic effect, whether this is
owing to the object, to our own mode of feeling—as generally happens—or
to both together.
As in reality no purely aesthetical effect can be met with—for man can
never leave his dependence on material forces—the excellence of a work of
art can only consist in its greater approximation to its ideal of aesthetic
purity, and however high we may raise the freedom of this effect, we shall
always leave it with a particular disposition and a particular bias. Any class
of productions or separate work in the world of art is noble and excellent in
proportion to the universality of the disposition and the unlimited character
of the bias thereby presented to our mind. This truth can be applied to
works in various branches of art, and also to different works in the same
branch. We leave a grand musical performance with our feelings excited,
the reading of a noble poem with a quickened imagination, a beautiful
statue or building with an awakened understanding; but a man would not
choose an opportune moment who attempted to invite us to abstract
thinking after a high musical enjoyment, or to attend to a prosaic affair of
common life after a high poetical enjoyment, or to kindle our imagination
and astonish our feelings directly after inspecting a fine statue or edifice.
The reason of this is that music, BY ITS MATTER, even when most
spiritual, presents a greater affinity with the senses than is permitted by
Page 313
aesthetic liberty; it is because even the most happy poetry, having FOR TIS
MEDIUM the arbitrary and contingent play of the imagination, always
shares in it more than the intimate necessity of the really beautiful allows; it
is because the best sculpture touches on severe science BY WHAT IS
DETERMINATE IN ITS CONCEPTION. However, these particular
affinities are lost in proportion as the works of these three kinds of art rise
to a greater elevation, and it is a natural and necessary consequence of their
perfection, that, without confounding their objective limits, the different arts
come to resemble each other more and more, in the action WHICH THEY
EXERCISE ON THE MIND. At its highest degree of ennobling, music
ought to become a form, and act on us with the calm power of an antique
statue; in its most elevated perfection, the plastic art ought to become music
and move us by the immediate action exercised on the mind by the senses;
in its most complete developmentment, poetry ought both to stir us
powerfully like music and like plastic art to surround us with a peaceful
light. In each art, the perfect style consists exactly in knowing how to
remove specific limits, while sacrificing at the same time the particular
advantages of the art, and to give it by a wise use of what belongs to it
specially a more general character.
Nor is it only the limits inherent in the specific character of each kind of
art that the artist ought to overstep in putting his hand to the work; he must
also triumph over those which are inherent in the particular subject of
which he treats. In a really beautiful work of art, the substance ought to be
inoperative, the form should do everything; for by the form, the whole man
is acted on; the substance acts on nothing but isolated forces. Thus, however
vast and sublime it may be, the substance always exercises a restrictive
action on the mind, and true aesthetic liberty can only be expected from the
form. Consequently the true search of the master consists in destroying
matter by the form; and the triumph of art is great in proportion as it
overcomes matter and maintains its sway over those who enjoy its work. It
MEDIUM the arbitrary and contingent play of the imagination, always
shares in it more than the intimate necessity of the really beautiful allows; it
is because the best sculpture touches on severe science BY WHAT IS
DETERMINATE IN ITS CONCEPTION. However, these particular
affinities are lost in proportion as the works of these three kinds of art rise
to a greater elevation, and it is a natural and necessary consequence of their
perfection, that, without confounding their objective limits, the different arts
come to resemble each other more and more, in the action WHICH THEY
EXERCISE ON THE MIND. At its highest degree of ennobling, music
ought to become a form, and act on us with the calm power of an antique
statue; in its most elevated perfection, the plastic art ought to become music
and move us by the immediate action exercised on the mind by the senses;
in its most complete developmentment, poetry ought both to stir us
powerfully like music and like plastic art to surround us with a peaceful
light. In each art, the perfect style consists exactly in knowing how to
remove specific limits, while sacrificing at the same time the particular
advantages of the art, and to give it by a wise use of what belongs to it
specially a more general character.
Nor is it only the limits inherent in the specific character of each kind of
art that the artist ought to overstep in putting his hand to the work; he must
also triumph over those which are inherent in the particular subject of
which he treats. In a really beautiful work of art, the substance ought to be
inoperative, the form should do everything; for by the form, the whole man
is acted on; the substance acts on nothing but isolated forces. Thus, however
vast and sublime it may be, the substance always exercises a restrictive
action on the mind, and true aesthetic liberty can only be expected from the
form. Consequently the true search of the master consists in destroying
matter by the form; and the triumph of art is great in proportion as it
overcomes matter and maintains its sway over those who enjoy its work. It
Page 314
is great particularly in destroying matter when most imposing, ambitious,
and attractive, when therefore matter has most power to produce the effect
proper to it, or, again, when it leads those who consider it more closely to
enter directly into relation with it. The mind of the spectator and of the
hearer must remain perfectly free and intact; it must issue pure and entire
from the magic circle of the artist, as from the hands of the Creator. The
most frivolous subject ought to be treated in such a way that we preserve
the faculty to exchange it immediately for the most serious work. The arts
which have passion for their object, as a tragedy for example, do not present
a difficulty here; for, in the first place these arts are not entirely free,
because they are in the service of a particular end (the pathetic), and then no
connoisseur will deny that even in this class a work is perfect in proportion
as amidst the most violent storms of passion it respects the liberty of the
soul. There is a fine art of passion, but an impassioned fine art is a
contradiction in terms, for the infallible effect of the beautiful is
emancipation from the passions. The idea of an instructive fine art (didactic
art) or improving (moral) art is no less contradictory, for nothing agrees less
with the idea of the beautiful than to give a determinate tendency to the
mind.
However, from the fact that a work produces effects only by its
substance, it must not always be inferred that there is a want of form in this
work; this conclusion may quite as well testify to a want of form in the
observer. If his mind is too stretched or too relaxed, if it is only accustomed
to receive things either by the senses or the intelligence, even in the most
perfect combination, it will only stop to look at the parts, and it will only
see matter in the most beautiful form. Only sensible of the coarse elements,
he must first destroy the aesthetic organisation of a work to find enjoyment
in it, and carefully disinter the details which genius has caused to vanish,
with infinite art, in the harmony of the whole. The interest he takes in the
work is either solely moral or exclusively physical; the only thing wanting
and attractive, when therefore matter has most power to produce the effect
proper to it, or, again, when it leads those who consider it more closely to
enter directly into relation with it. The mind of the spectator and of the
hearer must remain perfectly free and intact; it must issue pure and entire
from the magic circle of the artist, as from the hands of the Creator. The
most frivolous subject ought to be treated in such a way that we preserve
the faculty to exchange it immediately for the most serious work. The arts
which have passion for their object, as a tragedy for example, do not present
a difficulty here; for, in the first place these arts are not entirely free,
because they are in the service of a particular end (the pathetic), and then no
connoisseur will deny that even in this class a work is perfect in proportion
as amidst the most violent storms of passion it respects the liberty of the
soul. There is a fine art of passion, but an impassioned fine art is a
contradiction in terms, for the infallible effect of the beautiful is
emancipation from the passions. The idea of an instructive fine art (didactic
art) or improving (moral) art is no less contradictory, for nothing agrees less
with the idea of the beautiful than to give a determinate tendency to the
mind.
However, from the fact that a work produces effects only by its
substance, it must not always be inferred that there is a want of form in this
work; this conclusion may quite as well testify to a want of form in the
observer. If his mind is too stretched or too relaxed, if it is only accustomed
to receive things either by the senses or the intelligence, even in the most
perfect combination, it will only stop to look at the parts, and it will only
see matter in the most beautiful form. Only sensible of the coarse elements,
he must first destroy the aesthetic organisation of a work to find enjoyment
in it, and carefully disinter the details which genius has caused to vanish,
with infinite art, in the harmony of the whole. The interest he takes in the
work is either solely moral or exclusively physical; the only thing wanting
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to it is to be exactly what it ought to be—aesthetical. The readers of this
class enjoy a serious and pathetic poem as they do a sermon; a simple and
playful work, as an inebriating draught; and if on the one hand they have so
little taste as to demand edification from a tragedy or from an epos, even
such as the "Messias," on the other hand they will be infallibly scandalised
by a piece after the fashion of Anacreon and Catullus.
LETTER XXIII.
I take up the thread of my researches, which I broke off only to apply the
principles I laid down to practical art and the appreciation of its works.
The transition from the passivity of sensuousness to the activity of
thought and of will can be effected only by the intermediary state of
aesthetic liberty; and though in itself this state decides nothing respecting
our opinions and our sentiments, and therefore leaves our intellectual and
moral value entirely problematical, it is, however, the necessary condition
without which we should never attain to an opinion or a sentiment. In a
word, there is no other way to make a reasonable being out of a sensuous
man than by making him first aesthetic.
But, you might object: Is this mediation absolutely indispensable? Could
not truth and duty, one or the other, in themselves and by themselves, find
access to the sensuous man? To this I reply: Not only is it possible, but it is
I absolutely necessary that they owe solely to themselves their determining
force, and nothing would be more contradictory to our preceding
affirmations than to appear to defend the contrary opinion. It has been
expressly proved that the beautiful furnishes no result, either for the
comprehension or for the will; that it mingles with no operations, either of
thought or of resolution; and that it confers this double power without
determining anything with regard to the real exercise of this power. Here all
foreign help disappears, and the pure logical form, the idea, would speak
class enjoy a serious and pathetic poem as they do a sermon; a simple and
playful work, as an inebriating draught; and if on the one hand they have so
little taste as to demand edification from a tragedy or from an epos, even
such as the "Messias," on the other hand they will be infallibly scandalised
by a piece after the fashion of Anacreon and Catullus.
LETTER XXIII.
I take up the thread of my researches, which I broke off only to apply the
principles I laid down to practical art and the appreciation of its works.
The transition from the passivity of sensuousness to the activity of
thought and of will can be effected only by the intermediary state of
aesthetic liberty; and though in itself this state decides nothing respecting
our opinions and our sentiments, and therefore leaves our intellectual and
moral value entirely problematical, it is, however, the necessary condition
without which we should never attain to an opinion or a sentiment. In a
word, there is no other way to make a reasonable being out of a sensuous
man than by making him first aesthetic.
But, you might object: Is this mediation absolutely indispensable? Could
not truth and duty, one or the other, in themselves and by themselves, find
access to the sensuous man? To this I reply: Not only is it possible, but it is
I absolutely necessary that they owe solely to themselves their determining
force, and nothing would be more contradictory to our preceding
affirmations than to appear to defend the contrary opinion. It has been
expressly proved that the beautiful furnishes no result, either for the
comprehension or for the will; that it mingles with no operations, either of
thought or of resolution; and that it confers this double power without
determining anything with regard to the real exercise of this power. Here all
foreign help disappears, and the pure logical form, the idea, would speak
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immediately to the intelligence, as the pure moral form, the law,
immediately to the will.
But that the pure form should be capable of it, and that there is in general
a pure form for sensuous man, is that, I maintain, which should be rendered
possible by the aesthetic disposition of the soul. Truth is not a thing which
can be received from without like reality or the visible existence of objects.
It is the thinking force, in his own liberty and activity, which produces it,
and it is just this liberty proper to it, this liberty which we seek in vain in
sensuous man. The sensuous man is already determined physically, and
thenceforth he has no longer his free determinability; he must necessarily
first enter into possession of this lost determinability before he can
exchange the passive against an active determination. Therefore, in order to
recover it, he must either lose the passive determination that he had, or he
should enclose already in Himself the active determination to which he
should pass. If he confined himself to lose passive determination, he would
at the same time lose with it the possibility of an active determination,
because thought needs a body, and form can only be realised through
matter. He must therefore contain already in himself the active
determination that he may be at once both actively and passively
determined, that is to say, he becomes necessarily aesthetic.
Consequently, by the aesthetic disposition of the soul the proper activity
of reason is already revealed in the sphere of sensuousness, the power of
sense is already broken within its own boundaries, and the ennobling of
physical man carried far enough, for spiritual man has only to develop
himself according to the laws of liberty. The transition from an aesthetic
state to a logical and moral state (from the beautiful to truth and duty) is
then infinitely more easy than the transition from the physical state to the
aesthetic state (from life pure and blind to form). This transition man can
effectuate alone by his liberty, whilst he has only to enter into possession of
immediately to the will.
But that the pure form should be capable of it, and that there is in general
a pure form for sensuous man, is that, I maintain, which should be rendered
possible by the aesthetic disposition of the soul. Truth is not a thing which
can be received from without like reality or the visible existence of objects.
It is the thinking force, in his own liberty and activity, which produces it,
and it is just this liberty proper to it, this liberty which we seek in vain in
sensuous man. The sensuous man is already determined physically, and
thenceforth he has no longer his free determinability; he must necessarily
first enter into possession of this lost determinability before he can
exchange the passive against an active determination. Therefore, in order to
recover it, he must either lose the passive determination that he had, or he
should enclose already in Himself the active determination to which he
should pass. If he confined himself to lose passive determination, he would
at the same time lose with it the possibility of an active determination,
because thought needs a body, and form can only be realised through
matter. He must therefore contain already in himself the active
determination that he may be at once both actively and passively
determined, that is to say, he becomes necessarily aesthetic.
Consequently, by the aesthetic disposition of the soul the proper activity
of reason is already revealed in the sphere of sensuousness, the power of
sense is already broken within its own boundaries, and the ennobling of
physical man carried far enough, for spiritual man has only to develop
himself according to the laws of liberty. The transition from an aesthetic
state to a logical and moral state (from the beautiful to truth and duty) is
then infinitely more easy than the transition from the physical state to the
aesthetic state (from life pure and blind to form). This transition man can
effectuate alone by his liberty, whilst he has only to enter into possession of
Page 317
himself not to give it himself; but to separate the elements of his nature, and
not to enlarge it. Having attained to the aesthetic disposition, man will give
to his judgments and to his actions a universal value as soon as he desires it
This passage from brute nature to beauty, in which an entirely new faculty
would awaken in him, nature would render easier, and his will has no power
over a disposition which, we know, itself gives birth to the will. To bring
the aesthetic man to profound views, to elevated sentiments, he requires
nothing more than important occasions; to obtain the same thing from the
sensuous man, his nature must at first be changed. To make of the former a
hero, a sage, it is often only necessary to meet with a sublime situation,
which exercises upon the faculty of the will the more immediate action; for
the second, it must first be transplanted under another sky.
One of the most important tasks of culture, then, is to submit man to
form, even in a purely physical life, and to render it aesthetic as far as the
domain of the beautiful can be extended, for it is alone in the aesthetic state,
and not in the physical state, that the moral state can be developed. If in
each particular case man ought to possess the power to make his judgment
and his will the judgment of the entire species; if he ought to find in each
limited existence the transition to an infinite existence; if, lastly, he ought
from every dependent situation to take his flight to rise to autonomy and to
liberty, it must be observed that at no moment is he only individual and
solely obeys the law of nature. To be apt and ready to raise himself from the
narrow circle of the ends of nature, to rational ends, in the sphere of the
former he must already have exercised himself in the second; he must
already have realised his physical destiny with a certain liberty that belongs
only to spiritual nature, that is to say, according to the laws of the beautiful.
And that he can effect without thwarting in the least degree his physical
aim. The exigencies of nature with regard to him turn only upon what he
does—upon the substance of his acts; but the ends of nature in no degree
not to enlarge it. Having attained to the aesthetic disposition, man will give
to his judgments and to his actions a universal value as soon as he desires it
This passage from brute nature to beauty, in which an entirely new faculty
would awaken in him, nature would render easier, and his will has no power
over a disposition which, we know, itself gives birth to the will. To bring
the aesthetic man to profound views, to elevated sentiments, he requires
nothing more than important occasions; to obtain the same thing from the
sensuous man, his nature must at first be changed. To make of the former a
hero, a sage, it is often only necessary to meet with a sublime situation,
which exercises upon the faculty of the will the more immediate action; for
the second, it must first be transplanted under another sky.
One of the most important tasks of culture, then, is to submit man to
form, even in a purely physical life, and to render it aesthetic as far as the
domain of the beautiful can be extended, for it is alone in the aesthetic state,
and not in the physical state, that the moral state can be developed. If in
each particular case man ought to possess the power to make his judgment
and his will the judgment of the entire species; if he ought to find in each
limited existence the transition to an infinite existence; if, lastly, he ought
from every dependent situation to take his flight to rise to autonomy and to
liberty, it must be observed that at no moment is he only individual and
solely obeys the law of nature. To be apt and ready to raise himself from the
narrow circle of the ends of nature, to rational ends, in the sphere of the
former he must already have exercised himself in the second; he must
already have realised his physical destiny with a certain liberty that belongs
only to spiritual nature, that is to say, according to the laws of the beautiful.
And that he can effect without thwarting in the least degree his physical
aim. The exigencies of nature with regard to him turn only upon what he
does—upon the substance of his acts; but the ends of nature in no degree
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determine the way in which he acts, the form of his actions. On the
contrary, the exigencies of reason have rigorously the form of his activity
for its object. Thus, so much as it is necessary for the moral destination of
man, that he be purely moral, that he shows an absolute personal activity, so
much is he indifferent that his physical destination be entirely physical, that
he acts in a manner entirely passive. Henceforth with regard to this last
destination, it entirely depends on him to fulfil it solely as a sensuous being
and natural force (as a force which acts only as it diminishes) or, at the
same time, as absolute force, as a rational being. To which of these does his
dignity best respond? Of this, there can be no question. It is as disgraceful
and contemptible for him to do under sensuous impulsion that which he
ought to have determined merely by the motive of duty, as it is noble and
honourable for him to incline towards conformity with laws, harmony,
independence; there even where the vulgar man only satisfies a legitimate
want. In a word, in the domain of truth and morality, sensuousness must
have nothing to determine; but in the sphere of happiness, form may find a
place, and the instinct of play prevail.
Thus then, in the indifferent sphere of physical life, man ought to already
commence his moral life; his own proper activity ought already to make
way in passivity, and his rational liberty beyond the limits of sense; he
ought already to impose the law of his will upon his inclinations; he ought
—if you will permit me the expression—to carry into the domain of matter
the war against matter, in order to be dispensed from combatting this
redoubtable enemy upon the sacred field of liberty; he ought to learn to
have nobler desires, not to be forced to have sublime volitions. This is the
fruit of aesthetic culture, which submits to the laws of the beautiful, in
which neither the laws of nature nor those of reason suffer, which does not
force the will of man, and which by the form it gives to exterior life already
opens internal life.
contrary, the exigencies of reason have rigorously the form of his activity
for its object. Thus, so much as it is necessary for the moral destination of
man, that he be purely moral, that he shows an absolute personal activity, so
much is he indifferent that his physical destination be entirely physical, that
he acts in a manner entirely passive. Henceforth with regard to this last
destination, it entirely depends on him to fulfil it solely as a sensuous being
and natural force (as a force which acts only as it diminishes) or, at the
same time, as absolute force, as a rational being. To which of these does his
dignity best respond? Of this, there can be no question. It is as disgraceful
and contemptible for him to do under sensuous impulsion that which he
ought to have determined merely by the motive of duty, as it is noble and
honourable for him to incline towards conformity with laws, harmony,
independence; there even where the vulgar man only satisfies a legitimate
want. In a word, in the domain of truth and morality, sensuousness must
have nothing to determine; but in the sphere of happiness, form may find a
place, and the instinct of play prevail.
Thus then, in the indifferent sphere of physical life, man ought to already
commence his moral life; his own proper activity ought already to make
way in passivity, and his rational liberty beyond the limits of sense; he
ought already to impose the law of his will upon his inclinations; he ought
—if you will permit me the expression—to carry into the domain of matter
the war against matter, in order to be dispensed from combatting this
redoubtable enemy upon the sacred field of liberty; he ought to learn to
have nobler desires, not to be forced to have sublime volitions. This is the
fruit of aesthetic culture, which submits to the laws of the beautiful, in
which neither the laws of nature nor those of reason suffer, which does not
force the will of man, and which by the form it gives to exterior life already
opens internal life.
Page 319
LETTER XXIV.
Accordingly three different moments or stages of development can be
distinguished, which the individual man, as well as the whole race, must of
necessity traverse in a determinate order if they are to fulfil the circle of
their determination. No doubt, the separate periods can be lengthened or
shortened, through accidental causes which are inherent either in the
influence of external things or under the free caprice of men; but neither of
them can be overstepped, and the order of their sequence cannot be inverted
either by nature or by the will. Man, in his PHYSICAL condition, suffers
only the power of nature; he gets rid of this power in the aesthetical
condition, and he rules them in the moral state.
What is man before beauty liberates him from free pleasure, and the
serenity of form tames down the savageness of life? Eternally uniform in
his aims, eternally changing in his judgments, self- seeking without being
himself, unfettered without being free, a slave without serving any rule. At
this period, the world is to him only destiny, not yet an object; all has
existence for him only in as far as it procures existence to him; a thing that
neither seeks from nor gives to him is non-existent. Every phenomenon
stands out before him, separate and cut off, as he finds himself in the series
of beings. All that is, is to him through the bias of the moment; every
change is to him an entirely fresh creation, because with the necessary IN
HIM, the necessary OUT OF HIM is wanting, which binds together all the
changing forms in the universe, and which holds fast the law on the theatre
of his action, while the individual departs. It is in vain that nature lets the
rich variety of her forms pass before him; he sees in her glorious fulness
nothing but his prey, in her power and greatness nothing but his enemy.
Either he encounters objects, and wishes to draw them to himself in desire,
or the objects press in a destructive manner upon him, and he thrusts them
away in dismay and terror. In both cases his relation to the world of sense is
Accordingly three different moments or stages of development can be
distinguished, which the individual man, as well as the whole race, must of
necessity traverse in a determinate order if they are to fulfil the circle of
their determination. No doubt, the separate periods can be lengthened or
shortened, through accidental causes which are inherent either in the
influence of external things or under the free caprice of men; but neither of
them can be overstepped, and the order of their sequence cannot be inverted
either by nature or by the will. Man, in his PHYSICAL condition, suffers
only the power of nature; he gets rid of this power in the aesthetical
condition, and he rules them in the moral state.
What is man before beauty liberates him from free pleasure, and the
serenity of form tames down the savageness of life? Eternally uniform in
his aims, eternally changing in his judgments, self- seeking without being
himself, unfettered without being free, a slave without serving any rule. At
this period, the world is to him only destiny, not yet an object; all has
existence for him only in as far as it procures existence to him; a thing that
neither seeks from nor gives to him is non-existent. Every phenomenon
stands out before him, separate and cut off, as he finds himself in the series
of beings. All that is, is to him through the bias of the moment; every
change is to him an entirely fresh creation, because with the necessary IN
HIM, the necessary OUT OF HIM is wanting, which binds together all the
changing forms in the universe, and which holds fast the law on the theatre
of his action, while the individual departs. It is in vain that nature lets the
rich variety of her forms pass before him; he sees in her glorious fulness
nothing but his prey, in her power and greatness nothing but his enemy.
Either he encounters objects, and wishes to draw them to himself in desire,
or the objects press in a destructive manner upon him, and he thrusts them
away in dismay and terror. In both cases his relation to the world of sense is
Page 320
immediate CONTACT; and perpetually anxious through its pressure,
restless and plagued by imperious wants, he nowhere finds rest except in
enervation, and nowhere limits save in exhausted desire.
"True, his is the powerful breast and the mighty hand of the
Titans…
A certain inheritance; yet the god welded
Round his forehead a brazen band;
Advice, moderation, wisdom, and patience,—
Hid it from his shy, sinister look.
Every desire is with him a rage,
And his rage prowls around limitless."—"Iphigenia in Tauris"
Ignorant of his own human dignity, he is far removed from honouring it
in others, and conscious of his own savage greed, he fears it in every
creature that he sees like himself. He never sees others in himself, only
himself in others, and human society, instead of enlarging him to the race,
only shuts him up continually closer in his individuality. Thus limited, he
wanders through his sunless life, till favouring nature rolls away the load of
matter from his darkened senses, reflection separates him from things, and
objects show themselves at length in the after-glow of the consciousness.
It is true we cannot point out this state of rude nature as we have here
portrayed it in any definite people and age. It is only an idea, but an idea
with which experience agrees most closely in special features. It may be
said that man was never in this animal condition, but he has not, on the
other hand, ever entirely escaped from it. Even in the rudest subjects,
unmistakable traces of rational freedom can be found, and even in the most
cultivated, features are not wanting that remind us of that dismal natural
condition. It is possible for man, at one and the same time, to unite the
highest and the lowest in his nature; and if his DIGNITY depends on a strict
restless and plagued by imperious wants, he nowhere finds rest except in
enervation, and nowhere limits save in exhausted desire.
"True, his is the powerful breast and the mighty hand of the
Titans…
A certain inheritance; yet the god welded
Round his forehead a brazen band;
Advice, moderation, wisdom, and patience,—
Hid it from his shy, sinister look.
Every desire is with him a rage,
And his rage prowls around limitless."—"Iphigenia in Tauris"
Ignorant of his own human dignity, he is far removed from honouring it
in others, and conscious of his own savage greed, he fears it in every
creature that he sees like himself. He never sees others in himself, only
himself in others, and human society, instead of enlarging him to the race,
only shuts him up continually closer in his individuality. Thus limited, he
wanders through his sunless life, till favouring nature rolls away the load of
matter from his darkened senses, reflection separates him from things, and
objects show themselves at length in the after-glow of the consciousness.
It is true we cannot point out this state of rude nature as we have here
portrayed it in any definite people and age. It is only an idea, but an idea
with which experience agrees most closely in special features. It may be
said that man was never in this animal condition, but he has not, on the
other hand, ever entirely escaped from it. Even in the rudest subjects,
unmistakable traces of rational freedom can be found, and even in the most
cultivated, features are not wanting that remind us of that dismal natural
condition. It is possible for man, at one and the same time, to unite the
highest and the lowest in his nature; and if his DIGNITY depends on a strict
Page 321
separation of one from the other, his HAPPINESS depends on a skilful
removal of this separation. The culture which is to bring his dignity into
agreement with his happiness will therefore have to provide for the greatest
purity of these two principles in their most intimate combination.
Consequently the first appearance of reason in man is not the beginning
of humanity. This is first decided by his freedom, and reason begins first by
making his sensuous dependence boundless; a phenomenon that does not
appear to me to have been sufficiently elucidated, considering its
importance and universality. We know that the reason makes itself known to
man by the demand for the absolute—the self-dependent and necessary. But
as this want of the reason cannot be satisfied in any separate or single state
of his physical life, he is obliged to leave the physical entirely and to rise
from a limited reality to ideas. But although the true meaning of that
demand of the reason is to withdraw him from the limits of time and to lead
him up from the world of sense to an ideal world, yet this same demand of
reason, by a misapplication—scarcely to be avoided in this age, prone to
sensuousness—can direct him to physical life, and, instead of making man
free, plunge him in the most terrible slavery.
Facts verify this supposition. Man raised on the wings of imagination
leaves the narrow limits of the present, in which mere animality is enclosed,
in order to strive on to an unlimited future. But while the limitless is
unfolded to his dazed IMAGINATION, his heart has not ceased to live in
the separate, and to serve the moment. The impulse towards the absolute
seizes him suddenly in the midst of his animality, and as in this cloddish
condition all his efforts aim only at the material and temporal, and are
limited by his individuality, he is only led by that demand of the reason to
extend his individuality into the infinite, instead of to abstract from it. He
will be led to seek instead of form an inexhaustible matter, instead of the
unchangeable an everlasting change and an absolute securing of his
removal of this separation. The culture which is to bring his dignity into
agreement with his happiness will therefore have to provide for the greatest
purity of these two principles in their most intimate combination.
Consequently the first appearance of reason in man is not the beginning
of humanity. This is first decided by his freedom, and reason begins first by
making his sensuous dependence boundless; a phenomenon that does not
appear to me to have been sufficiently elucidated, considering its
importance and universality. We know that the reason makes itself known to
man by the demand for the absolute—the self-dependent and necessary. But
as this want of the reason cannot be satisfied in any separate or single state
of his physical life, he is obliged to leave the physical entirely and to rise
from a limited reality to ideas. But although the true meaning of that
demand of the reason is to withdraw him from the limits of time and to lead
him up from the world of sense to an ideal world, yet this same demand of
reason, by a misapplication—scarcely to be avoided in this age, prone to
sensuousness—can direct him to physical life, and, instead of making man
free, plunge him in the most terrible slavery.
Facts verify this supposition. Man raised on the wings of imagination
leaves the narrow limits of the present, in which mere animality is enclosed,
in order to strive on to an unlimited future. But while the limitless is
unfolded to his dazed IMAGINATION, his heart has not ceased to live in
the separate, and to serve the moment. The impulse towards the absolute
seizes him suddenly in the midst of his animality, and as in this cloddish
condition all his efforts aim only at the material and temporal, and are
limited by his individuality, he is only led by that demand of the reason to
extend his individuality into the infinite, instead of to abstract from it. He
will be led to seek instead of form an inexhaustible matter, instead of the
unchangeable an everlasting change and an absolute securing of his
Page 322
temporal existence. The same impulse which, directed to his thought and
action, ought to lead to truth and morality, now directed to his passion and
emotional state, produces nothing but an unlimited desire and an absolute
want. The first fruits, therefore, that he reaps in the world of spirits, are
cares and fear—both operations of the reason; not of sensuousness, but of a
reason that mistakes its object and applies its categorical imperative to
matter. All unconditional systems of happiness are fruits of this tree,
whether they have for their object the present day or the whole of life, or
what does not make them any more respectable, the whole of eternity, for
their object. An unlimited duration of existence and of well-being is only an
ideal of the desires; hence a demand which can only be put forth by an
animality striving up to the absolute. Man, therefore, without gaining
anything for his humanity by a rational expression of this sort, loses the
happy limitation of the animal over which he now only possesses the
unenviable superiority of losing the present for an endeavour after what is
remote, yet without seeking in the limitless future anything but the present.
But even if the reason does not go astray in its object, or err in the
question, sensuousness will continue to falsify the answer for a long time.
As soon as man has begun to use his understanding and to knit together
phenomena in cause and effect, the reason, according to its conception,
presses on to an absolute knitting together and to an unconditional basis. In
order merely to be able to put forward this demand man must already have
stepped beyond the sensuous, but the sensuous uses this very demand to
bring back the fugitive.
In fact it is now that he ought to abandon entirely the world of sense in
order to take his flight into the realm of ideas; for the intelligence temains
eternally shut up in the finite and in the contingent, and does not cease
putting questions without reaching the last link of the chain. But as the man
with whom we are engaged is not yet capable of such an abstraction, and
action, ought to lead to truth and morality, now directed to his passion and
emotional state, produces nothing but an unlimited desire and an absolute
want. The first fruits, therefore, that he reaps in the world of spirits, are
cares and fear—both operations of the reason; not of sensuousness, but of a
reason that mistakes its object and applies its categorical imperative to
matter. All unconditional systems of happiness are fruits of this tree,
whether they have for their object the present day or the whole of life, or
what does not make them any more respectable, the whole of eternity, for
their object. An unlimited duration of existence and of well-being is only an
ideal of the desires; hence a demand which can only be put forth by an
animality striving up to the absolute. Man, therefore, without gaining
anything for his humanity by a rational expression of this sort, loses the
happy limitation of the animal over which he now only possesses the
unenviable superiority of losing the present for an endeavour after what is
remote, yet without seeking in the limitless future anything but the present.
But even if the reason does not go astray in its object, or err in the
question, sensuousness will continue to falsify the answer for a long time.
As soon as man has begun to use his understanding and to knit together
phenomena in cause and effect, the reason, according to its conception,
presses on to an absolute knitting together and to an unconditional basis. In
order merely to be able to put forward this demand man must already have
stepped beyond the sensuous, but the sensuous uses this very demand to
bring back the fugitive.
In fact it is now that he ought to abandon entirely the world of sense in
order to take his flight into the realm of ideas; for the intelligence temains
eternally shut up in the finite and in the contingent, and does not cease
putting questions without reaching the last link of the chain. But as the man
with whom we are engaged is not yet capable of such an abstraction, and
Page 323
does not find it in the sphere of sensuous knowledge, and because he does
not look for it in pure reason, he will seek for it below in the region of
sentiment, and will appear to find it. No doubt the sensuous shows him
nothing that has its foundation in itself, and that legislates for itself, but it
shows him something that does not care for foundation or law; therefore
thus not being able to quiet the intelligence by showing it a final cause, he
reduces it to silence by the conception which desires no cause; and being
incapable of understanding the sublime necessity of reason, he keeps to the
blind constraint of matter. As sensuousness knows no other end than its
interest, and is determined by nothing except blind chance, it makes the
former the motive of its actions, and the latter the master of the world.
Even the divine part in man, the moral law, in its first manifestation in
the sensuous cannot avoid this perversion, As this moral law is only
prohibited and combats in man the interest of sensuous egotism, it must
appear to him as something strange until he has come to consider this self-
love as the stranger, and the voice of reason as his true self. Therefore he
confines himself to feeling the fetters which the latter imposes on him,
without having the consciousness of the infinite emancipation which it
procures for him. Without suspecting in himself the dignity of lawgiver, he
only experiences the constraint and the impotent revolt of a subject fretting
under the yoke, because in this experience the sensuous impulsion precedes
the moral impulsion, he gives to the law of necessity a beginning in him, a
positive origin, and by the most unfortunate of all mistakes he converts the
immutable and the eternal in himself into a transitory accident He makes up
his mind to consider the notions of the just and the unjust as statutes which
have been introduced by a will, and not as having in themselves an eternal
value. Just as in the explanation of certain natural phenomena he goes
beyond nature and seeks out of her what can only be found in her, in her
own laws; so also in the explanation of moral phenomena he goes beyond
reason and makes light of his humanity, seeking a god in this way. It is not
not look for it in pure reason, he will seek for it below in the region of
sentiment, and will appear to find it. No doubt the sensuous shows him
nothing that has its foundation in itself, and that legislates for itself, but it
shows him something that does not care for foundation or law; therefore
thus not being able to quiet the intelligence by showing it a final cause, he
reduces it to silence by the conception which desires no cause; and being
incapable of understanding the sublime necessity of reason, he keeps to the
blind constraint of matter. As sensuousness knows no other end than its
interest, and is determined by nothing except blind chance, it makes the
former the motive of its actions, and the latter the master of the world.
Even the divine part in man, the moral law, in its first manifestation in
the sensuous cannot avoid this perversion, As this moral law is only
prohibited and combats in man the interest of sensuous egotism, it must
appear to him as something strange until he has come to consider this self-
love as the stranger, and the voice of reason as his true self. Therefore he
confines himself to feeling the fetters which the latter imposes on him,
without having the consciousness of the infinite emancipation which it
procures for him. Without suspecting in himself the dignity of lawgiver, he
only experiences the constraint and the impotent revolt of a subject fretting
under the yoke, because in this experience the sensuous impulsion precedes
the moral impulsion, he gives to the law of necessity a beginning in him, a
positive origin, and by the most unfortunate of all mistakes he converts the
immutable and the eternal in himself into a transitory accident He makes up
his mind to consider the notions of the just and the unjust as statutes which
have been introduced by a will, and not as having in themselves an eternal
value. Just as in the explanation of certain natural phenomena he goes
beyond nature and seeks out of her what can only be found in her, in her
own laws; so also in the explanation of moral phenomena he goes beyond
reason and makes light of his humanity, seeking a god in this way. It is not
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wonderful that a religion which he has purchased at the cost of his humanity
shows itself worthy of this origin, and that he only considers as absolute
and eternally binding laws that have never been binding from all eternity.
He has placed himself in relation with, not a holy being, but a powerful.
Therefore the spirit of his religion, of the homage that he gives to God, is a
fear that abases him, and not a veneration that elevates him in his own
esteem.
Though these different aberrations by which man departs from the ideal
of his destination cannot all take place at the same time, because several
degrees have to be passed over in the transition from the obscure of thought
to error, and from the obscure of will to the corruption of the will; these
degrees are all, without exception, the consequence of his physical state,
because in all the vital impulsion sways the formal impulsion. Now, two
cases may happen: either reason may not yet have spoken in man, and the
physical may reign over him with a blind necessity, or reason may not be
sufficiently purified from sensuous impressions, and the moral may still be
subject to the physical; in both cases the only principle that has a real power
over him is a material principle, and man, at least as regards his ultimate
tendency, is a sensuous being. The only difference is, that in the former case
he is an animal without reason, and in the second case a rational animal.
But he ought to be neither one nor the other: he ought to be a man. Nature
ought not to rule him exclusively; nor reason conditionally. The two
legislations ought to be completely independent and yet mutually
complementary.
LETTER XXV.
Whilst man, in his first physical condition, is only passively affected by
the world of sense, he is still entirely identified with it; and for this reason
the external world, as yet, has no objective existence for him. When he
shows itself worthy of this origin, and that he only considers as absolute
and eternally binding laws that have never been binding from all eternity.
He has placed himself in relation with, not a holy being, but a powerful.
Therefore the spirit of his religion, of the homage that he gives to God, is a
fear that abases him, and not a veneration that elevates him in his own
esteem.
Though these different aberrations by which man departs from the ideal
of his destination cannot all take place at the same time, because several
degrees have to be passed over in the transition from the obscure of thought
to error, and from the obscure of will to the corruption of the will; these
degrees are all, without exception, the consequence of his physical state,
because in all the vital impulsion sways the formal impulsion. Now, two
cases may happen: either reason may not yet have spoken in man, and the
physical may reign over him with a blind necessity, or reason may not be
sufficiently purified from sensuous impressions, and the moral may still be
subject to the physical; in both cases the only principle that has a real power
over him is a material principle, and man, at least as regards his ultimate
tendency, is a sensuous being. The only difference is, that in the former case
he is an animal without reason, and in the second case a rational animal.
But he ought to be neither one nor the other: he ought to be a man. Nature
ought not to rule him exclusively; nor reason conditionally. The two
legislations ought to be completely independent and yet mutually
complementary.
LETTER XXV.
Whilst man, in his first physical condition, is only passively affected by
the world of sense, he is still entirely identified with it; and for this reason
the external world, as yet, has no objective existence for him. When he
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begins in his aesthetic state of mind to regard the world objectively, then
only is his personality severed from it, and the world appears to him an
objective reality, for the simple reason that he has ceased to form an
identical portion of it.
That which first connects man with the surrounding universe is the power
of reflective contemplation. Whereas desire seizes at once its object,
reflection removes it to a distance and renders it inalienably her own by
saving it from the greed of passion. The necessity of sense which he obeyed
during the period of mere sensations, lessens during the period of reflection;
the senses are for the time in abeyance; even ever-fleeting time stands still
whilst the scattered rays of consciousness are gathering and shape
themselves; an image of the infinite is reflected upon the perishable ground.
As soon as light dawns in man, there is no longer night outside of him; as
soon as there is peace within him the storm lulls throughout the universe,
and the contending forces of nature find rest within prescribed limits. Hence
we cannot wonder if ancient traditions allude to these great changes in the
inner man as to a revolution in surrounding nature, and symbolise thought
triumphing over the laws of time, by the figure of Zeus, which terminates
the reign of Saturn.
As long as man derives sensations from a contact with nature, he is her
slave; but as soon as he begins to reflect upon her objects and laws he
becomes her lawgiver. Nature, which previously ruled him as a power, now
expands before him as an object. What is objective to him can have no
power over him, for in order to become objective it has to experience his
own power. As far and as long as he impresses a form upon matter, he
cannot be injured by its effect; for a spirit can only be injured by that which
deprives it of its freedom. Whereas he proves his own freedom by giving a
form to the formless; where the mass rules heavily and without shape, and
its undefined outlines are for ever fluctuating between uncertain boundaries,
only is his personality severed from it, and the world appears to him an
objective reality, for the simple reason that he has ceased to form an
identical portion of it.
That which first connects man with the surrounding universe is the power
of reflective contemplation. Whereas desire seizes at once its object,
reflection removes it to a distance and renders it inalienably her own by
saving it from the greed of passion. The necessity of sense which he obeyed
during the period of mere sensations, lessens during the period of reflection;
the senses are for the time in abeyance; even ever-fleeting time stands still
whilst the scattered rays of consciousness are gathering and shape
themselves; an image of the infinite is reflected upon the perishable ground.
As soon as light dawns in man, there is no longer night outside of him; as
soon as there is peace within him the storm lulls throughout the universe,
and the contending forces of nature find rest within prescribed limits. Hence
we cannot wonder if ancient traditions allude to these great changes in the
inner man as to a revolution in surrounding nature, and symbolise thought
triumphing over the laws of time, by the figure of Zeus, which terminates
the reign of Saturn.
As long as man derives sensations from a contact with nature, he is her
slave; but as soon as he begins to reflect upon her objects and laws he
becomes her lawgiver. Nature, which previously ruled him as a power, now
expands before him as an object. What is objective to him can have no
power over him, for in order to become objective it has to experience his
own power. As far and as long as he impresses a form upon matter, he
cannot be injured by its effect; for a spirit can only be injured by that which
deprives it of its freedom. Whereas he proves his own freedom by giving a
form to the formless; where the mass rules heavily and without shape, and
its undefined outlines are for ever fluctuating between uncertain boundaries,
Page 326
fear takes up its abode; but man rises above any natural terror as soon as he
knows how to mould it, and transform it into an object of his art. As soon as
he upholds his independence toward phaenomenal nature, he maintains his
dignity toward her as a thing of power and with a noble freedom he rises
against his gods. They throw aside the mask with which they had kept him
in awe during his infancy, and to his surprise his mind perceives the
reflection of his own image. The divine monster of the Oriental, which
roams about changing the world with the blind force of a beast of prey,
dwindles to the charming outline of humanity in Greek fable; the empire of
the Titans is crushed, and boundless force is tamed by infinite form.
But whilst I have been merely searching for an issue from the material
world and a passage into the world of mind, the bold flight of my
imagination has already taken me into the very midst of the latter world.
The beauty of which we are in search we have left behind by passing from
the life of mere sensations to the pure form and to the pure object. Such a
leap exceeds the condition of human nature; in order to keep pace with the
latter we must return to the world of sense. Beauty is indeed the sphere of
unfettered contemplation and reflection; beauty conducts us into the world
of ideas, without however taking us from the world of sense, as occurs
when a truth is perceived and acknowledged. This is the pure product of a
process of abstraction from everything material and accidental, a pure
object free from every subjective barrier, a pure state of self-activity
without any admixture of passive sensations. There is indeed a way back to
sensation from the highest abstraction; for thought teaches the inner
sensation, and the idea of logical and moral unity passes into a sensation of
sensual accord. But if we delight in knowledge we separate very accurately
our own conceptions from our sensations; we look upon the latter as
something accidental, which might have been omitted without the
knowledge being impaired thereby, without truth being less true. It would,
however, be a vain attempt to suppress this connection of the faculty of
knows how to mould it, and transform it into an object of his art. As soon as
he upholds his independence toward phaenomenal nature, he maintains his
dignity toward her as a thing of power and with a noble freedom he rises
against his gods. They throw aside the mask with which they had kept him
in awe during his infancy, and to his surprise his mind perceives the
reflection of his own image. The divine monster of the Oriental, which
roams about changing the world with the blind force of a beast of prey,
dwindles to the charming outline of humanity in Greek fable; the empire of
the Titans is crushed, and boundless force is tamed by infinite form.
But whilst I have been merely searching for an issue from the material
world and a passage into the world of mind, the bold flight of my
imagination has already taken me into the very midst of the latter world.
The beauty of which we are in search we have left behind by passing from
the life of mere sensations to the pure form and to the pure object. Such a
leap exceeds the condition of human nature; in order to keep pace with the
latter we must return to the world of sense. Beauty is indeed the sphere of
unfettered contemplation and reflection; beauty conducts us into the world
of ideas, without however taking us from the world of sense, as occurs
when a truth is perceived and acknowledged. This is the pure product of a
process of abstraction from everything material and accidental, a pure
object free from every subjective barrier, a pure state of self-activity
without any admixture of passive sensations. There is indeed a way back to
sensation from the highest abstraction; for thought teaches the inner
sensation, and the idea of logical and moral unity passes into a sensation of
sensual accord. But if we delight in knowledge we separate very accurately
our own conceptions from our sensations; we look upon the latter as
something accidental, which might have been omitted without the
knowledge being impaired thereby, without truth being less true. It would,
however, be a vain attempt to suppress this connection of the faculty of
Page 327
feeling with the idea of beauty, consequently, we shall not succeed in
representing to ourselves one as the effect of the other, but we must look
upon them both together and reciprocally as cause and effect. In the
pleasure which we derive from knowledge we readily distinguish the
passage from the active to the passive state, and we clearly perceive that the
first ends when the second begins. On the contrary, from the pleasure which
we take in beauty, this transition from the active to the passive is not
perceivable, and reflection is so intimately blended with feeling that we
believe we feel the form immediately. Beauty is then an object to us, it is
true, because reflection is the condition of the feeling which we have of it;
but it is also a state of our personality (our Ego), because the feeling is the
condition of the idea we conceive of it: beauty is therefore doubtless form,
because we contemplate it, but it is equally life because we feel it. In a
word, it is at once our state and our act. And precisely because it is at the
same time both a state and an act, it triumphantly proves to us that the
passive does not exclude the active, neither matter nor form, neither the
finite nor the infinite; and that consequently the physical dependence to
which man is necessarily devoted does not in any way destroy his moral
liberty. This is the proof of beauty, and I ought to add that this ALONE can
prove it. In fact, as in the possession of truth or of logical unity, feeling is
not necessarily one with the thought, but follows it accidentally; it is a fact
which only proves that a sensitive nature can succeed a rational nature, and
vice versa; not that they co-exist, that they exercise a reciprocal action one
over the other, and lastly that they ought to be united in an absolute and
necessary manner. From this exclusion of feeling as long as there is
thought, and of thought so long as there is feeling, we should on the
contrary conclude that the two natures are incompatible, so that in order to
demonstrate that pure reason is to be realised in humanity, the best proof
given by the analysis is that this realisation is demanded. But, as in the
realisation of beauty or of aesthetic unity, there is a real union, mutual
representing to ourselves one as the effect of the other, but we must look
upon them both together and reciprocally as cause and effect. In the
pleasure which we derive from knowledge we readily distinguish the
passage from the active to the passive state, and we clearly perceive that the
first ends when the second begins. On the contrary, from the pleasure which
we take in beauty, this transition from the active to the passive is not
perceivable, and reflection is so intimately blended with feeling that we
believe we feel the form immediately. Beauty is then an object to us, it is
true, because reflection is the condition of the feeling which we have of it;
but it is also a state of our personality (our Ego), because the feeling is the
condition of the idea we conceive of it: beauty is therefore doubtless form,
because we contemplate it, but it is equally life because we feel it. In a
word, it is at once our state and our act. And precisely because it is at the
same time both a state and an act, it triumphantly proves to us that the
passive does not exclude the active, neither matter nor form, neither the
finite nor the infinite; and that consequently the physical dependence to
which man is necessarily devoted does not in any way destroy his moral
liberty. This is the proof of beauty, and I ought to add that this ALONE can
prove it. In fact, as in the possession of truth or of logical unity, feeling is
not necessarily one with the thought, but follows it accidentally; it is a fact
which only proves that a sensitive nature can succeed a rational nature, and
vice versa; not that they co-exist, that they exercise a reciprocal action one
over the other, and lastly that they ought to be united in an absolute and
necessary manner. From this exclusion of feeling as long as there is
thought, and of thought so long as there is feeling, we should on the
contrary conclude that the two natures are incompatible, so that in order to
demonstrate that pure reason is to be realised in humanity, the best proof
given by the analysis is that this realisation is demanded. But, as in the
realisation of beauty or of aesthetic unity, there is a real union, mutual
Page 328
substitution of matter and of form, of passive and of active, by this alone is
proved the compatibility of the two natures, the possible realisation of the
infinite in the finite, and consequently also the possibility of the most
sublime humanity.
Henceforth we need no longer be embarrassed to find a transition from
dependent feeling to moral liberty, because beauty reveals to us the fact that
they can perfectly co-exist, and that to show himself a spirit, man need not
escape from matter. But if on one side he is free, even in his relation with a
visible world, as the fact of beauty teaches, and if on the other side freedom
is something absolute and super-sensuous, as its idea necessarily implies,
the question is no longer how man succeeds in raising himself from the
finite to the absolute, and opposing himself in his thought and will to
sensuality, as this has already been produced in the fact of beauty. In a
word, we have no longer to ask how he passes from virtue to truth, which is
already included in the former, but how he opens a way for himself from
vulgar reality to aesthetic reality, and from the ordinary feelings of life to
the perception of the beautiful.
LETTER XXVI.
I have shown in the previous letters that it is only the aesthetic
disposition of the soul that gives birth to liberty, it cannot therefore be
derived from liberty nor have a moral origin. It must be a gift of nature; the
favour of chance alone can break the bonds of the physical state and bring
the savage to duty. The germ of the beautiful will find an equal difficulty in
developing itself in countries where a severe nature forbids man to enjoy
himself, and in those where a prodigal nature dispenses him from all effort;
where the blunted senses experience no want, and where violent desire can
never be satisfied. The delightful flower of the beautiful will never unfold
itself in the case of the Troglodyte hid in his cavern always alone, and never
proved the compatibility of the two natures, the possible realisation of the
infinite in the finite, and consequently also the possibility of the most
sublime humanity.
Henceforth we need no longer be embarrassed to find a transition from
dependent feeling to moral liberty, because beauty reveals to us the fact that
they can perfectly co-exist, and that to show himself a spirit, man need not
escape from matter. But if on one side he is free, even in his relation with a
visible world, as the fact of beauty teaches, and if on the other side freedom
is something absolute and super-sensuous, as its idea necessarily implies,
the question is no longer how man succeeds in raising himself from the
finite to the absolute, and opposing himself in his thought and will to
sensuality, as this has already been produced in the fact of beauty. In a
word, we have no longer to ask how he passes from virtue to truth, which is
already included in the former, but how he opens a way for himself from
vulgar reality to aesthetic reality, and from the ordinary feelings of life to
the perception of the beautiful.
LETTER XXVI.
I have shown in the previous letters that it is only the aesthetic
disposition of the soul that gives birth to liberty, it cannot therefore be
derived from liberty nor have a moral origin. It must be a gift of nature; the
favour of chance alone can break the bonds of the physical state and bring
the savage to duty. The germ of the beautiful will find an equal difficulty in
developing itself in countries where a severe nature forbids man to enjoy
himself, and in those where a prodigal nature dispenses him from all effort;
where the blunted senses experience no want, and where violent desire can
never be satisfied. The delightful flower of the beautiful will never unfold
itself in the case of the Troglodyte hid in his cavern always alone, and never
Page 329
finding humanity outside himself; nor among nomads, who, travelling in
great troops, only consist of a multitude, and have no individual humanity.
It will only flourish in places where man converses peacefully with himself
in his cottage, and with the whole race when he issues from it. In those
climates where a limpid ether opens the senses to the lightest impression,
whilst a life-giving warmth developes a luxuriant nature, where even in the
inanimate creation the sway of inert matter is overthrown, and the
victorious form ennobles even the most abject natures; in this joyful state
and fortunate zone, where activity alone leads to enjoyment, and enjoyment
to activity, from life itself issues a holy harmony, and the laws of order
develope life, a different result takes place. When imagination incessantly
escapes from reality, and does not abandon the simplicity of nature in its
wanderings: then and there only the mind and the senses, the receptive force
and the plastic force, are developed in that happy equilibrium which is the
soul of the beautiful and the condition of humanity.
What phaenomenon accompanies the initiation of the savage into
humanity? However far we look back into history the phaenomenon is
identical among all people who have shaken off the slavery of the animal
state, the love of appearance, the inclination for dress and for games.
Extreme stupidity and extreme intelligence have a certain affinity in only
seeking the real and being completely insensible to mere appearance. The
former is only drawn forth by the immediate presence of an object in the
senses, and the second is reduced to a quiescent state only by referring
conceptions to the facts of experience. In short, stupidity cannot rise above
reality, nor the intelligence descend below truth. Thus, in as far as the want
of reality and attachment to the real are only the consequence of a want and
a defect, indifference to the real and an interest taken in appearances are a
real enlargement of humanity and a decisive step towards culture. In the
first place it is the proof of an exterior liberty, for as long as necessity
great troops, only consist of a multitude, and have no individual humanity.
It will only flourish in places where man converses peacefully with himself
in his cottage, and with the whole race when he issues from it. In those
climates where a limpid ether opens the senses to the lightest impression,
whilst a life-giving warmth developes a luxuriant nature, where even in the
inanimate creation the sway of inert matter is overthrown, and the
victorious form ennobles even the most abject natures; in this joyful state
and fortunate zone, where activity alone leads to enjoyment, and enjoyment
to activity, from life itself issues a holy harmony, and the laws of order
develope life, a different result takes place. When imagination incessantly
escapes from reality, and does not abandon the simplicity of nature in its
wanderings: then and there only the mind and the senses, the receptive force
and the plastic force, are developed in that happy equilibrium which is the
soul of the beautiful and the condition of humanity.
What phaenomenon accompanies the initiation of the savage into
humanity? However far we look back into history the phaenomenon is
identical among all people who have shaken off the slavery of the animal
state, the love of appearance, the inclination for dress and for games.
Extreme stupidity and extreme intelligence have a certain affinity in only
seeking the real and being completely insensible to mere appearance. The
former is only drawn forth by the immediate presence of an object in the
senses, and the second is reduced to a quiescent state only by referring
conceptions to the facts of experience. In short, stupidity cannot rise above
reality, nor the intelligence descend below truth. Thus, in as far as the want
of reality and attachment to the real are only the consequence of a want and
a defect, indifference to the real and an interest taken in appearances are a
real enlargement of humanity and a decisive step towards culture. In the
first place it is the proof of an exterior liberty, for as long as necessity
Page 330
commands and want solicits, the fancy is strictly chained down to the real;
it is only when want is satisfied that it developes without hindrance. But it
is also the proof of an internal liberty, because it reveals to us a force which,
independent of an external substratum, sets itself in motion, and has
sufficient energy to remove from itself the solicitations of nature. The
reality of things is effected by things, the appearance of things is the work
of man, and a soul that takes pleasure in appearance does not take pleasure
in what it receives but in what it makes.
It is self-evident that I am speaking of aesthetical evidence different from
reality and truth, and not of logical appearance identical with them.
Therefore if it is liked it is because it is an appearance, and not because it is
held to be something better than it is: the first principle alone is a play
whilst the second is a deception. To give a value to the appearance of the
first kind can never injure truth, because it is never to be feared that it will
supplant it—the only way in which truth can be injured. To despise this
appearance is to despise in general all the fine arts of which it is the
essence. Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that the understanding carries
its zeal for reality as far as this intolerance, and strikes with a sentence of
ostracism all the arts relating to beauty in appearance, because it is only an
appearance. However, the intelligence only shows this vigorous spirit when
it calls to mind the affinity pointed out further back. I shall find some day
the occasion to treat specially of the limits of beauty in its appearance.
It is nature herself which raises man from reality to appearance by
endowing him with two senses which only lead him to the knowledge of the
real through appearance. In the eye and the ear the organs of the senses are
already freed from the persecutions of nature, and the object with which we
are immediately in contact through the animal senses is remoter from us.
What we see by the eye differs from what we feel; for the understanding to
reach objects overleaps the light which separates us from them. In truth, we
it is only when want is satisfied that it developes without hindrance. But it
is also the proof of an internal liberty, because it reveals to us a force which,
independent of an external substratum, sets itself in motion, and has
sufficient energy to remove from itself the solicitations of nature. The
reality of things is effected by things, the appearance of things is the work
of man, and a soul that takes pleasure in appearance does not take pleasure
in what it receives but in what it makes.
It is self-evident that I am speaking of aesthetical evidence different from
reality and truth, and not of logical appearance identical with them.
Therefore if it is liked it is because it is an appearance, and not because it is
held to be something better than it is: the first principle alone is a play
whilst the second is a deception. To give a value to the appearance of the
first kind can never injure truth, because it is never to be feared that it will
supplant it—the only way in which truth can be injured. To despise this
appearance is to despise in general all the fine arts of which it is the
essence. Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that the understanding carries
its zeal for reality as far as this intolerance, and strikes with a sentence of
ostracism all the arts relating to beauty in appearance, because it is only an
appearance. However, the intelligence only shows this vigorous spirit when
it calls to mind the affinity pointed out further back. I shall find some day
the occasion to treat specially of the limits of beauty in its appearance.
It is nature herself which raises man from reality to appearance by
endowing him with two senses which only lead him to the knowledge of the
real through appearance. In the eye and the ear the organs of the senses are
already freed from the persecutions of nature, and the object with which we
are immediately in contact through the animal senses is remoter from us.
What we see by the eye differs from what we feel; for the understanding to
reach objects overleaps the light which separates us from them. In truth, we
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are passive to an object; in sight and hearing the object is a form we create.
While still a savage, man only enjoys through touch merely aided by sight
and sound. He either does not rise to perception through sight, or does not
rest there. As soon as he begins to enjoy through sight, vision has an
independent value, he is aesthetically free, and the instinct of play is
developed.
The instinct of play likes appearance, and directly it is awakened it is
followed by the formal imitative instinct which treats appearance as an
independent thing. Directly man has come to distinguish the appearance
from the reality, the form from the body, he can separate, in fact he has
already done so. Thus the faculty of the art of imitation is given with the
faculty of form in general. The inclination that draws us to it reposes on
another tendency I have not to notice here. The exact period when the
aesthetic instinct, or that of art, developes, depends entirely on the attraction
that mere appearance has for men.
As every real existence proceeds from nature as a foreign power, whilst
every appearance comes in the first place from man as a percipient subject,
he only uses his absolute sight in separating semblance from essence, and
arranging according to subjective law. With an unbridled liberty he can
unite what nature has severed, provided he can imagine his union, and he
can separate what nature has united, provided this separation can take place
in his intelligence. Here nothing can be sacred to him but his own law: the
only condition imposed upon him is to respect the border which separates
his own sphere from the existence of things or from the realm of nature.
This human right of ruling is exercised by man in the art of appearance;
and his success in extending the empire of the beautiful, and guarding the
frontiers of truth, will be in proportion with the strictness with which he
While still a savage, man only enjoys through touch merely aided by sight
and sound. He either does not rise to perception through sight, or does not
rest there. As soon as he begins to enjoy through sight, vision has an
independent value, he is aesthetically free, and the instinct of play is
developed.
The instinct of play likes appearance, and directly it is awakened it is
followed by the formal imitative instinct which treats appearance as an
independent thing. Directly man has come to distinguish the appearance
from the reality, the form from the body, he can separate, in fact he has
already done so. Thus the faculty of the art of imitation is given with the
faculty of form in general. The inclination that draws us to it reposes on
another tendency I have not to notice here. The exact period when the
aesthetic instinct, or that of art, developes, depends entirely on the attraction
that mere appearance has for men.
As every real existence proceeds from nature as a foreign power, whilst
every appearance comes in the first place from man as a percipient subject,
he only uses his absolute sight in separating semblance from essence, and
arranging according to subjective law. With an unbridled liberty he can
unite what nature has severed, provided he can imagine his union, and he
can separate what nature has united, provided this separation can take place
in his intelligence. Here nothing can be sacred to him but his own law: the
only condition imposed upon him is to respect the border which separates
his own sphere from the existence of things or from the realm of nature.
This human right of ruling is exercised by man in the art of appearance;
and his success in extending the empire of the beautiful, and guarding the
frontiers of truth, will be in proportion with the strictness with which he
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separates form from substance: for if he frees appearance from reality he
must also do the converse.
But man possesses sovereign power only in the world of appearance, in
the unstibstantial realm of imagination, only by abstaining from giving
being to appearance in theory, and by giving it being in practice. It follows
that the poet transgresses his proper limits when he attributes being to his
ideal, and when he gives this ideal aim as a determined existence. For he
can only reach this result by exceeding his right as a poet, that of
encroaching by the ideal on the field of experience, and by pretending to
determine real existence in virtue of a simple possibility, or else he
renounces his right as poet by letting experience encroach on the sphere of
the ideal, and by restricting possibility to the conditions of reality.
It is only by being frank or disclaiming all reality, and by being
independent or doing without reality, that the appearance is aesthetical.
Directly it apes reality or needs reality for effect it is nothing more than a
vile instrument for material ends, and can prove nothing for the freedom of
the mind. Moreover, the object in which we find beauty need not be unreal
if pur judgment disregards this reality; nor if it regards this the judgment is
no longer aesthetical. A beautiful woman if living would no doubt please us
as much and rather more than an equally beautiful woman seen in painting;
but what makes the former please men is not her being an independent
appearance; she no longer pleases the pure aesthetic feeling. In the painting,
life must only attract as an appearance, and reality as an idea. But it is
certain that to feel in a living object only the pure appearance, requires a
greatly higher aesthetic culture than to do without life in the appearance.
When the frank and independent appearance is found in man separately,
or in a whole people, it may be inferred they have mind, taste, and all
prerogatives connected with them. In this case, the ideal will be seen to
must also do the converse.
But man possesses sovereign power only in the world of appearance, in
the unstibstantial realm of imagination, only by abstaining from giving
being to appearance in theory, and by giving it being in practice. It follows
that the poet transgresses his proper limits when he attributes being to his
ideal, and when he gives this ideal aim as a determined existence. For he
can only reach this result by exceeding his right as a poet, that of
encroaching by the ideal on the field of experience, and by pretending to
determine real existence in virtue of a simple possibility, or else he
renounces his right as poet by letting experience encroach on the sphere of
the ideal, and by restricting possibility to the conditions of reality.
It is only by being frank or disclaiming all reality, and by being
independent or doing without reality, that the appearance is aesthetical.
Directly it apes reality or needs reality for effect it is nothing more than a
vile instrument for material ends, and can prove nothing for the freedom of
the mind. Moreover, the object in which we find beauty need not be unreal
if pur judgment disregards this reality; nor if it regards this the judgment is
no longer aesthetical. A beautiful woman if living would no doubt please us
as much and rather more than an equally beautiful woman seen in painting;
but what makes the former please men is not her being an independent
appearance; she no longer pleases the pure aesthetic feeling. In the painting,
life must only attract as an appearance, and reality as an idea. But it is
certain that to feel in a living object only the pure appearance, requires a
greatly higher aesthetic culture than to do without life in the appearance.
When the frank and independent appearance is found in man separately,
or in a whole people, it may be inferred they have mind, taste, and all
prerogatives connected with them. In this case, the ideal will be seen to
Page 333
govern real life, honour triumphing over fortune, thought over enjoyment,
the dream of immortality over a transitory existence.
In this case public opinion will no longer be feared and an olive crown
will be more valued than a purple mantle. Impotence and perversity alone
have recourse to false and paltry semblance, and individuals as well as
nations who lend to reality the support of appearance, or to the aesthetical
appearance the support of reality, show their moral unworthiness and their
aesthetical impotence. Therefore, a short and conclusive answer can be
given to this question—How far will appearance be permitted in the moral
world? It will run thus in proportion as this appearance will be sesthetical,
that is, an appearance that does not try to make up for reality, nor requires to
be made up for by it. The aesthetical appearance can never endanger the
truth of morals: wherever it seems to do so the appearance is not aesthetical.
Only a stranger to the fashionable world can take the polite assurances,
which are only a form, for proofs of affection, and say he has been
deceived; but only a clumsy fellow in good society calls in the aid of
duplicity and flatters to become amiable. The former lacks the pure sense
for independent appearance; therefore he can only give a value to
appearance by truth. The second lacks reality, and wishes to replace it by
appearance. Nothing is more common than to hear depreciators of the times
utter these paltry complaints—that all solidity has disappeared from the
world, and that essence is neglected for semblance. Though I feel by no
means called upon to defend this age against these reproaches, I must say
that the wide application of these criticisms shows that they attach blame to
the age, not only on the score of the falsez but also of the frank appearance.
And even the exceptions they admit in favour of the beautiful have for their
object less the independent appearance than the needy appearance. Not only
do they attack the artificial colouring that hides truth and replaces reality,
but also the beneficent appearance that fills a vacuum and clothes poverty;
and they even attack the ideal appearance that ennobles a vulgar reality.
the dream of immortality over a transitory existence.
In this case public opinion will no longer be feared and an olive crown
will be more valued than a purple mantle. Impotence and perversity alone
have recourse to false and paltry semblance, and individuals as well as
nations who lend to reality the support of appearance, or to the aesthetical
appearance the support of reality, show their moral unworthiness and their
aesthetical impotence. Therefore, a short and conclusive answer can be
given to this question—How far will appearance be permitted in the moral
world? It will run thus in proportion as this appearance will be sesthetical,
that is, an appearance that does not try to make up for reality, nor requires to
be made up for by it. The aesthetical appearance can never endanger the
truth of morals: wherever it seems to do so the appearance is not aesthetical.
Only a stranger to the fashionable world can take the polite assurances,
which are only a form, for proofs of affection, and say he has been
deceived; but only a clumsy fellow in good society calls in the aid of
duplicity and flatters to become amiable. The former lacks the pure sense
for independent appearance; therefore he can only give a value to
appearance by truth. The second lacks reality, and wishes to replace it by
appearance. Nothing is more common than to hear depreciators of the times
utter these paltry complaints—that all solidity has disappeared from the
world, and that essence is neglected for semblance. Though I feel by no
means called upon to defend this age against these reproaches, I must say
that the wide application of these criticisms shows that they attach blame to
the age, not only on the score of the falsez but also of the frank appearance.
And even the exceptions they admit in favour of the beautiful have for their
object less the independent appearance than the needy appearance. Not only
do they attack the artificial colouring that hides truth and replaces reality,
but also the beneficent appearance that fills a vacuum and clothes poverty;
and they even attack the ideal appearance that ennobles a vulgar reality.
Page 334
Their strict sense of truth is rightlyl offended by the falsity of manners;
unfortunately, they class politeness in this category. It displeases them that
the noisy and showy so often eclipse true merit, but they are no less
shocked that appearance is also demanded from merit, and that a real
substance does not dispense with an agreeable form. They regret the
cordiality, the energy, and solidity of ancient times; they would restore with
them ancient coarseness, heaviness, and the old Gothic profusion. By
judgments of this kind they show an esteem for the matter itself unworthy
of humanity, which ought only to value tne matter inasmuch as it can
receive a form and enlarge the empire of ideas. Accordingly, the taste of the
age need not much fear these criticisms, if it can clear itself before better
judges. Our defect is not to grant a value to aesthetic appearance (we do not
do this enough): a severe judge of the beautiful might rather reproach us
with not having arrived at pure appearance, with not having separated
clearly enough existence from the phaenomenon, and thus established their
limits. We shall deserve this reproach so long as we cannot enjoy the
beautiful in living nature without desiring it; as long as we cannot admire
the beautiful in the imitative arts without having an end in view; as long as
we do not grant to imagination an absolute legislation of its own; and as
long as we do not inspire it with care for its dignity by the esteem we testify
for its works.
LETTER XXVII.
Do not fear for reality and truth. Even if the elevated idea of aesthetic
appearance became general, it would not become so, as long as man
remains so little cultivated as to abuse it; and if it became general, this
would result from a culture that would prevent all abuse of it. The pursuit of
independent appearance requires more power of abstraction, freedom of
heart, and energy of will than man requires to shut himself up in reality; and
he must have left the latter behind him if he wishes to attain to aesthetic
unfortunately, they class politeness in this category. It displeases them that
the noisy and showy so often eclipse true merit, but they are no less
shocked that appearance is also demanded from merit, and that a real
substance does not dispense with an agreeable form. They regret the
cordiality, the energy, and solidity of ancient times; they would restore with
them ancient coarseness, heaviness, and the old Gothic profusion. By
judgments of this kind they show an esteem for the matter itself unworthy
of humanity, which ought only to value tne matter inasmuch as it can
receive a form and enlarge the empire of ideas. Accordingly, the taste of the
age need not much fear these criticisms, if it can clear itself before better
judges. Our defect is not to grant a value to aesthetic appearance (we do not
do this enough): a severe judge of the beautiful might rather reproach us
with not having arrived at pure appearance, with not having separated
clearly enough existence from the phaenomenon, and thus established their
limits. We shall deserve this reproach so long as we cannot enjoy the
beautiful in living nature without desiring it; as long as we cannot admire
the beautiful in the imitative arts without having an end in view; as long as
we do not grant to imagination an absolute legislation of its own; and as
long as we do not inspire it with care for its dignity by the esteem we testify
for its works.
LETTER XXVII.
Do not fear for reality and truth. Even if the elevated idea of aesthetic
appearance became general, it would not become so, as long as man
remains so little cultivated as to abuse it; and if it became general, this
would result from a culture that would prevent all abuse of it. The pursuit of
independent appearance requires more power of abstraction, freedom of
heart, and energy of will than man requires to shut himself up in reality; and
he must have left the latter behind him if he wishes to attain to aesthetic
Page 335
appearance. Therefore a man would calculate very badly who took the road
of the ideal to save himself that of reality. Thus reality would not have
much to fear from appearance, as we understand it; but, on the other hand,
appearance would have more to fear from reality. Chained to matter, man
uses appearance for his purposes before he allows it a proper personality in
the art of the ideal: to come to that point a complete revolution must take
place in his mode of feeling, otherwise he would not be even on the way to
the ideal. Consequently, when we find in man the signs of a pure and
disinterested esteem, we can infer that this revolution has taken place in his
nature, and that humanity has really begun in him. Signs of this kind are
found even in the first and rude attempts that he makes to embellish his
existence, even at the risk of making it worse in its material conditions. As
soon as he begins to prefer form to substance and to risk reality for
appearance (known by him to be such), the barriers of animal life fall, and
he finds himself on a track that has no end.
Not satisfied with the needs of nature, he demands the superfluous. First,
only the superfluous of matter, to secure his enjoyment beyond the present
necessity; but afterwards he wishes a superabundance in matter, an
aesthetical supplement to satisfy the impulse for the formal, to extend
enjoyment beyond necessity. By piling up provisions simply for a future
use, and anticipating their enjoyment in the imagination, he outsteps the
limits of the present moment, but not those of time in general. He enjoys
more; he does not enjoy differently. But as soon as he makes form enter into
his enjoyment, and he keeps in view the forms of the objects which satisfy
his desires, he has not only increased his pleasure in extent and intensity,
but he has also ennobled it in mode and species.
No doubt nature has given more than is necessary to unreasoning beings;
she has caused a gleam of freedom to shine even in the darkness of animal
life. When the lion is not tormented by hunger, and when no wild beast
of the ideal to save himself that of reality. Thus reality would not have
much to fear from appearance, as we understand it; but, on the other hand,
appearance would have more to fear from reality. Chained to matter, man
uses appearance for his purposes before he allows it a proper personality in
the art of the ideal: to come to that point a complete revolution must take
place in his mode of feeling, otherwise he would not be even on the way to
the ideal. Consequently, when we find in man the signs of a pure and
disinterested esteem, we can infer that this revolution has taken place in his
nature, and that humanity has really begun in him. Signs of this kind are
found even in the first and rude attempts that he makes to embellish his
existence, even at the risk of making it worse in its material conditions. As
soon as he begins to prefer form to substance and to risk reality for
appearance (known by him to be such), the barriers of animal life fall, and
he finds himself on a track that has no end.
Not satisfied with the needs of nature, he demands the superfluous. First,
only the superfluous of matter, to secure his enjoyment beyond the present
necessity; but afterwards he wishes a superabundance in matter, an
aesthetical supplement to satisfy the impulse for the formal, to extend
enjoyment beyond necessity. By piling up provisions simply for a future
use, and anticipating their enjoyment in the imagination, he outsteps the
limits of the present moment, but not those of time in general. He enjoys
more; he does not enjoy differently. But as soon as he makes form enter into
his enjoyment, and he keeps in view the forms of the objects which satisfy
his desires, he has not only increased his pleasure in extent and intensity,
but he has also ennobled it in mode and species.
No doubt nature has given more than is necessary to unreasoning beings;
she has caused a gleam of freedom to shine even in the darkness of animal
life. When the lion is not tormented by hunger, and when no wild beast
Page 336
challenges him to fight, his unemployed energy creates an object for
himself; full of ardour, he fills the re-echoing desert with his terrible roars,
and his exuberant force rejoices in itself, showing itself without an object.
The insect flits about rejoicing in life in the sunlight, and it is certainly not
the cry of want that makes itself heard in the melodious song of the bird;
there is undeniably freedom in these movements, though it is not
emancipation from want in general, but from a determinate external
necessity.
The animal works, when a privation is the motor of its activity, and it
plays when the plenitude of force is this motor, when an exuberant life is
excited to action. Even in inanimate nature a luxury of strength and a
latitude of determination are shown, which in this material sense might be
styled play. The tree produces numberless germs that are abortive without
developing, and it sends forth more roots, branches and leaves, organs of
nutrition, than are used for the preservation of the species. Whatever this
tree restores to the elements of its exuberant life, without using it, or
enjoying it, may be expended by life in free and joyful movements. It is
thus that nature offers in her material sphere a sort of prelude to the
limitless, and that even there she suppresses partially the chains from which
she will be completely emancipated in the realm of form. The constraint of
superabundance or physical play, answers as a transition from the constraint
of necessity, or of physical seriousness, to aesthetical play; and before
shaking off, in the supreme freedom of the beautiful, the yoke of any
special aim, nature already approaches, at least remotely, this independence,
by the free movement which is itself its own end and means.
The imagination, like the bodily organs, has in man its free movement
and its material play, a play in which, without any reference to form, it
simply takes pleasure in its arbitrary power and in the absence of all
hindrance. These plays of fancy, inasmuch as form is not mixed up with
himself; full of ardour, he fills the re-echoing desert with his terrible roars,
and his exuberant force rejoices in itself, showing itself without an object.
The insect flits about rejoicing in life in the sunlight, and it is certainly not
the cry of want that makes itself heard in the melodious song of the bird;
there is undeniably freedom in these movements, though it is not
emancipation from want in general, but from a determinate external
necessity.
The animal works, when a privation is the motor of its activity, and it
plays when the plenitude of force is this motor, when an exuberant life is
excited to action. Even in inanimate nature a luxury of strength and a
latitude of determination are shown, which in this material sense might be
styled play. The tree produces numberless germs that are abortive without
developing, and it sends forth more roots, branches and leaves, organs of
nutrition, than are used for the preservation of the species. Whatever this
tree restores to the elements of its exuberant life, without using it, or
enjoying it, may be expended by life in free and joyful movements. It is
thus that nature offers in her material sphere a sort of prelude to the
limitless, and that even there she suppresses partially the chains from which
she will be completely emancipated in the realm of form. The constraint of
superabundance or physical play, answers as a transition from the constraint
of necessity, or of physical seriousness, to aesthetical play; and before
shaking off, in the supreme freedom of the beautiful, the yoke of any
special aim, nature already approaches, at least remotely, this independence,
by the free movement which is itself its own end and means.
The imagination, like the bodily organs, has in man its free movement
and its material play, a play in which, without any reference to form, it
simply takes pleasure in its arbitrary power and in the absence of all
hindrance. These plays of fancy, inasmuch as form is not mixed up with
Page 337
them, and because a free succession of images makes all their charm,
though confined to man, belong exclusively to animal life, and only prove
one thing—that he is delivered from all external sensuous constraint—
without our being entitled to infer that there is in it an independent plastic
force.
From this play of free association of ideas, which is still quite material in
nature and is explained by simple natural laws, the imagination, by making
the attempt of creating a free form, passes at length at a jump to the
aesthetic play: I say at one leap, for quite a new force enters into action
here; for here, for the first time, the legislative mind is mixed with the acts
of a blind instinct, subjects the arbitrary march of the imagination to its
eternal and immutable unity, causes its independent permanence to enter in
that which is transitory, and its infinity in the sensuous. Nevertheless, as
long as rude nature, which knows of no other law than running incessantly
from change to change, will yet retain too much strength, it will oppose
itself by its different caprices to this necessity; by its agitation to this
permanence; by its manifold needs to this independence, and by its
insatiability to this sublime simplicity. It will be also troublesome to
recognise the instinct of play in its first trials, seeing that the sensuous
impulsion, with its capricious humour and its violent appetites, constantly
crosses. It is on that account that we see the taste, still coarse, seize that
which is new and startling, the disordered, the adventurous and the strange,
the violent and the savage, and fly from nothing so much as from calm and
simplicity. It invents grotesque figures, it likes rapid transitions, luxurious
forms, sharply marked changes, acute tones, a pathetic song. That which
man calls beautiful at this time, is that which excites him, that which gives
him matter; but that which excites him to give his personality to the object,
that which gives matter to a possible plastic operation, for otherwise it
would not be the beautiful for him. A remarkable change has therefore taken
place in the form of his judgments; he searches for these objects, not
though confined to man, belong exclusively to animal life, and only prove
one thing—that he is delivered from all external sensuous constraint—
without our being entitled to infer that there is in it an independent plastic
force.
From this play of free association of ideas, which is still quite material in
nature and is explained by simple natural laws, the imagination, by making
the attempt of creating a free form, passes at length at a jump to the
aesthetic play: I say at one leap, for quite a new force enters into action
here; for here, for the first time, the legislative mind is mixed with the acts
of a blind instinct, subjects the arbitrary march of the imagination to its
eternal and immutable unity, causes its independent permanence to enter in
that which is transitory, and its infinity in the sensuous. Nevertheless, as
long as rude nature, which knows of no other law than running incessantly
from change to change, will yet retain too much strength, it will oppose
itself by its different caprices to this necessity; by its agitation to this
permanence; by its manifold needs to this independence, and by its
insatiability to this sublime simplicity. It will be also troublesome to
recognise the instinct of play in its first trials, seeing that the sensuous
impulsion, with its capricious humour and its violent appetites, constantly
crosses. It is on that account that we see the taste, still coarse, seize that
which is new and startling, the disordered, the adventurous and the strange,
the violent and the savage, and fly from nothing so much as from calm and
simplicity. It invents grotesque figures, it likes rapid transitions, luxurious
forms, sharply marked changes, acute tones, a pathetic song. That which
man calls beautiful at this time, is that which excites him, that which gives
him matter; but that which excites him to give his personality to the object,
that which gives matter to a possible plastic operation, for otherwise it
would not be the beautiful for him. A remarkable change has therefore taken
place in the form of his judgments; he searches for these objects, not
Page 338
because they affect him, but because they furnish him with the occasion of
acting; they please him, not because they answer to a want, but because
they satisfy a law, which speaks in his breast, although quite low as yet.
Soon it will not be sufficient for things to please him; he will wish to
please: in the first place, it is true, only by that which belongs to him;
afterwards by that which he is. That which he possesses, that which he
produces, ought not merely to bear any more the traces of servitude, nor to
mark out the end, simply and scrupulously, by the form. Independently of
the use to which it is destined, the object ought also to reflect the
enlightened intelligence which imagines it, the hand which shaped it with
affection, the mind free and serene which chose it and exposed it to view.
Now, the ancient German searches for more magnificent furs, for more
splendid antlers of the stag, for more elegant drinking horns; and the
Caledonian chooses the prettiest shells for his festivals. The arms
themselves ought to be no longer only objects of terror, but also of pleasure;
and the skilfully worked scabbard will not attract less attention than the
homicidal edge of the sword. The instinct of play, not satisfied with
bringing into the sphere of the necessary an aesthetic superabundance for
the future more free, is at last completely emancipated from the bonds of
duty, and the beautiful becomes of itself an object of man's exertions. He
adorns himself. The free pleasure comes to take a place among his wants,
and the useless soon becomes the best part of his joys. Form, which from
the outside gradually approaches him, in his dwelling, his furniture, his
clothing, begins at last to take possession of the man himself, to transform
him, at first exteriorly, and afterwards in the interior. The disordered leaps
of joy become the dance, the formless gesture is changed into an amiable
and harmonious pantomime, the confused accents of feeling are developed,
and begin to obey measure and adapt themselves to song. When, like the
flight of cranes, the Trojan army rushes on to the field of battle with
thrilling cries, the Greek army approaches in silence and with a noble and
acting; they please him, not because they answer to a want, but because
they satisfy a law, which speaks in his breast, although quite low as yet.
Soon it will not be sufficient for things to please him; he will wish to
please: in the first place, it is true, only by that which belongs to him;
afterwards by that which he is. That which he possesses, that which he
produces, ought not merely to bear any more the traces of servitude, nor to
mark out the end, simply and scrupulously, by the form. Independently of
the use to which it is destined, the object ought also to reflect the
enlightened intelligence which imagines it, the hand which shaped it with
affection, the mind free and serene which chose it and exposed it to view.
Now, the ancient German searches for more magnificent furs, for more
splendid antlers of the stag, for more elegant drinking horns; and the
Caledonian chooses the prettiest shells for his festivals. The arms
themselves ought to be no longer only objects of terror, but also of pleasure;
and the skilfully worked scabbard will not attract less attention than the
homicidal edge of the sword. The instinct of play, not satisfied with
bringing into the sphere of the necessary an aesthetic superabundance for
the future more free, is at last completely emancipated from the bonds of
duty, and the beautiful becomes of itself an object of man's exertions. He
adorns himself. The free pleasure comes to take a place among his wants,
and the useless soon becomes the best part of his joys. Form, which from
the outside gradually approaches him, in his dwelling, his furniture, his
clothing, begins at last to take possession of the man himself, to transform
him, at first exteriorly, and afterwards in the interior. The disordered leaps
of joy become the dance, the formless gesture is changed into an amiable
and harmonious pantomime, the confused accents of feeling are developed,
and begin to obey measure and adapt themselves to song. When, like the
flight of cranes, the Trojan army rushes on to the field of battle with
thrilling cries, the Greek army approaches in silence and with a noble and
Page 339
measured step. On the one side we see but the exuberance of a blind force,
on the other; the triumph of form and the simple majesty of law.
Now, a nobler necessity binds the two sexes mutually, and the interests of
the heart contribute in rendering durable an alliance which was at first
capricious and changing like the desire that knits it. Delivered from the
heavy fetters of desire, the eye, now calmer, attends to the form, the soul
contemplates the soul, and the interested exchange of pleasure becomes a
generous exchange of mutual inclination. Desire enlarges and rises to love,
in proportion as it sees humanity dawn in its object; and, despising the vile
triumphs gained by the senses, man tries to win a nobler victory over the
will. The necessity of pleasing subjects the powerful nature to the gentle
laws of taste; pleasure may be stolen, but love must be a gift. To obtain this
higher recompense, it is only through the form and not through matter that
it can carry on the contest. It must cease to act on feeling as a force, to
appear in the intelligence as a simple phenomenon; it must respect liberty,
as it is liberty it wishes to please. The beautiful reconciles the contrast of
different natures in its simplest and purest expression. It also reconciles the
eternal contrast of the two sexes, in the whole complex framework of
society, or at all events it seeks to do so; and, taking as its model the free
alliance it has knit between manly strength and womanly gentleness, it
strives to place in harmony, in the moral world, all the elements of
gentleness and of violence. Now, at length, weakness becomes sacred, and
an unbridled strength disgraces; the injustice of nature is corrected by the
generosity of chivalrous manners. The being whom no power can make
tremble, is disarmed by the amiable blush of modesty, and tears extinguish
a vengeance that blood could not have quenched. Hatred itself hears the
delicate voice of honour, the conqueror's sword spares the disarmed enemy,
and a hospitable hearth smokes for the stranger on the dreaded hill-side
where murder alone awaited him before.
on the other; the triumph of form and the simple majesty of law.
Now, a nobler necessity binds the two sexes mutually, and the interests of
the heart contribute in rendering durable an alliance which was at first
capricious and changing like the desire that knits it. Delivered from the
heavy fetters of desire, the eye, now calmer, attends to the form, the soul
contemplates the soul, and the interested exchange of pleasure becomes a
generous exchange of mutual inclination. Desire enlarges and rises to love,
in proportion as it sees humanity dawn in its object; and, despising the vile
triumphs gained by the senses, man tries to win a nobler victory over the
will. The necessity of pleasing subjects the powerful nature to the gentle
laws of taste; pleasure may be stolen, but love must be a gift. To obtain this
higher recompense, it is only through the form and not through matter that
it can carry on the contest. It must cease to act on feeling as a force, to
appear in the intelligence as a simple phenomenon; it must respect liberty,
as it is liberty it wishes to please. The beautiful reconciles the contrast of
different natures in its simplest and purest expression. It also reconciles the
eternal contrast of the two sexes, in the whole complex framework of
society, or at all events it seeks to do so; and, taking as its model the free
alliance it has knit between manly strength and womanly gentleness, it
strives to place in harmony, in the moral world, all the elements of
gentleness and of violence. Now, at length, weakness becomes sacred, and
an unbridled strength disgraces; the injustice of nature is corrected by the
generosity of chivalrous manners. The being whom no power can make
tremble, is disarmed by the amiable blush of modesty, and tears extinguish
a vengeance that blood could not have quenched. Hatred itself hears the
delicate voice of honour, the conqueror's sword spares the disarmed enemy,
and a hospitable hearth smokes for the stranger on the dreaded hill-side
where murder alone awaited him before.
Page 340
In the midst of the formidable realm of forces, and of the sacred empire
of laws, the aesthetic impulse of form creates by degrees a third and a
joyous realm, that of play and of the appearance, where she emancipates
man from fetters, in all his relations, and from all that is named constraint,
whether physical or moral.
If in the dynamic state of rights men mutually move and come into
collision as forces, in the moral (ethical) state of duties, man opposes to
man the majesty of the laws, and chains down his will. In this realm of the
beautiful or the aesthetic state, man ought to appear to man only as a form,
and an object of free play. To give freedom through freedom is the
fundamental law of this realm.
The dynamic state can only make society simply possible by subduing
nature through nature; the moral (ethical) state can only make it morally
necessary by submitting the will of the individual to the general will. The
aesthetic state alone can make it real, because it carries out the will of all
through the nature of the individual. If necessity alone forces man to enter
into society, and if his reason engraves on his soul social principles, it is
beauty only that can give him a social character; taste alone brings harmony
into society, because it creates harmony in the individual. All other forms of
perception divide the man, because they are based exclusively either in the
sensuous or in the spiritual part of his being. It is only the perception of
beauty that makes of him an entirety, because it demands the co-operation
of his two natures. All other forms of communication divide society,
because they apply exclusively either to the receptivity or to the private
activity of its members, and therefore to what distinguishes men one from
the other. The aesthetic communication alone unites society, because it
applies to what is common to all its members. We only enjoy the pleasures
of sense as individuals, without the nature of the race in us sharing in it;
accordingly, we cannot generalise our individual pleasures, because we
of laws, the aesthetic impulse of form creates by degrees a third and a
joyous realm, that of play and of the appearance, where she emancipates
man from fetters, in all his relations, and from all that is named constraint,
whether physical or moral.
If in the dynamic state of rights men mutually move and come into
collision as forces, in the moral (ethical) state of duties, man opposes to
man the majesty of the laws, and chains down his will. In this realm of the
beautiful or the aesthetic state, man ought to appear to man only as a form,
and an object of free play. To give freedom through freedom is the
fundamental law of this realm.
The dynamic state can only make society simply possible by subduing
nature through nature; the moral (ethical) state can only make it morally
necessary by submitting the will of the individual to the general will. The
aesthetic state alone can make it real, because it carries out the will of all
through the nature of the individual. If necessity alone forces man to enter
into society, and if his reason engraves on his soul social principles, it is
beauty only that can give him a social character; taste alone brings harmony
into society, because it creates harmony in the individual. All other forms of
perception divide the man, because they are based exclusively either in the
sensuous or in the spiritual part of his being. It is only the perception of
beauty that makes of him an entirety, because it demands the co-operation
of his two natures. All other forms of communication divide society,
because they apply exclusively either to the receptivity or to the private
activity of its members, and therefore to what distinguishes men one from
the other. The aesthetic communication alone unites society, because it
applies to what is common to all its members. We only enjoy the pleasures
of sense as individuals, without the nature of the race in us sharing in it;
accordingly, we cannot generalise our individual pleasures, because we
Page 341
cannot generalise our individuality. We enjoy the pleasures of knowledge as
a race, dropping the Individual in our judgment; but we cannot generalise
the pleasures of the understanding, because we cannot eliminate
individuality from the judgments of others as we do from our own. Beauty
alone can we enjoy both as individuals and as a race, that is, as representing
a race. Good appertaining to sense can only make one person happy,
because it is founded on inclination, which is always exclusive; and it can
only make a man partially happy, because his real personality does not
share in it. Absolute good can only render a man happy conditionally, for
truth is only the reward of abnegation, and a pure heart alone has faith in a
pure will. Beauty alone confers happiness on all, and under its influence
every being forgets that he is limited.
Taste does not suffer any superior or absolute authority, and the sway of
beauty is extended over appearance. It extends up to the seat of reason's
supremacy, suppressing all that is material. It extends down to where
sensuous impulse rules with blind compulsion, and form is undeveloped.
Taste ever maintains its power on these remote borders, where legislation is
taken from it. Particular desires must renounce their egotism, and the
agreeable, otherwise tempting the senses, must in matters of taste adorn the
mind with the attractions of grace.
Duty and stern necessity must change their forbidding tone, only excused
by resistance, and do homage to nature by a nobler trust in her. Taste leads
our knowledge from the mysteries of science into the open expanse of
common sense, and changes a narrow scholasticism into the common
property of the human race. Here the highest genius must leave its
particular elevation, and make itself familiar to the comprehension even of
a child. Strength must let the Graces bind it, and the arbitrary lion must
yield to the reins of love. For this purpose taste throws a veil over physical
necessity, offending a free mind by its coarse nudity, and dissimulating our
a race, dropping the Individual in our judgment; but we cannot generalise
the pleasures of the understanding, because we cannot eliminate
individuality from the judgments of others as we do from our own. Beauty
alone can we enjoy both as individuals and as a race, that is, as representing
a race. Good appertaining to sense can only make one person happy,
because it is founded on inclination, which is always exclusive; and it can
only make a man partially happy, because his real personality does not
share in it. Absolute good can only render a man happy conditionally, for
truth is only the reward of abnegation, and a pure heart alone has faith in a
pure will. Beauty alone confers happiness on all, and under its influence
every being forgets that he is limited.
Taste does not suffer any superior or absolute authority, and the sway of
beauty is extended over appearance. It extends up to the seat of reason's
supremacy, suppressing all that is material. It extends down to where
sensuous impulse rules with blind compulsion, and form is undeveloped.
Taste ever maintains its power on these remote borders, where legislation is
taken from it. Particular desires must renounce their egotism, and the
agreeable, otherwise tempting the senses, must in matters of taste adorn the
mind with the attractions of grace.
Duty and stern necessity must change their forbidding tone, only excused
by resistance, and do homage to nature by a nobler trust in her. Taste leads
our knowledge from the mysteries of science into the open expanse of
common sense, and changes a narrow scholasticism into the common
property of the human race. Here the highest genius must leave its
particular elevation, and make itself familiar to the comprehension even of
a child. Strength must let the Graces bind it, and the arbitrary lion must
yield to the reins of love. For this purpose taste throws a veil over physical
necessity, offending a free mind by its coarse nudity, and dissimulating our
Page 342
degrading parentage with matter by a delightful illusion of freedom.
Mercenary art itself rises from the dust; and the bondage of the bodily, at its
magic touch, falls off from the inanimate and animate. In the aesthetic state
the most slavish tool is a free citizen, having the same rights as the noblest;
and the intellect which shapes the mass to its intent must consult it
concerning its destination. Consequently in the realm of aesthetic
appearance, the idea of equality is realised, which the political zealot would
gladly see carried out socially. It has often been said that perfect politeness
is only found near a throne. If thus restricted in the material, man has, as
elsewhere appears, to find compensation in the ideal world.
Does such a state of beauty in appearance exist, and where? It must be in
every finely harmonised soul; but as a fact, only in select circles, like the
pure ideal of the church and state—in circles where manners are not formed
by the empty imitations of the foreign, but by the very beauty of nature;
where man passes through all sorts of complications in all simplicity and
innocence, neither forced to trench on another's freedom to preserve his
own, nor to show grace at the cost of dignity.
Mercenary art itself rises from the dust; and the bondage of the bodily, at its
magic touch, falls off from the inanimate and animate. In the aesthetic state
the most slavish tool is a free citizen, having the same rights as the noblest;
and the intellect which shapes the mass to its intent must consult it
concerning its destination. Consequently in the realm of aesthetic
appearance, the idea of equality is realised, which the political zealot would
gladly see carried out socially. It has often been said that perfect politeness
is only found near a throne. If thus restricted in the material, man has, as
elsewhere appears, to find compensation in the ideal world.
Does such a state of beauty in appearance exist, and where? It must be in
every finely harmonised soul; but as a fact, only in select circles, like the
pure ideal of the church and state—in circles where manners are not formed
by the empty imitations of the foreign, but by the very beauty of nature;
where man passes through all sorts of complications in all simplicity and
innocence, neither forced to trench on another's freedom to preserve his
own, nor to show grace at the cost of dignity.
Page 343
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
BY
IMMANUEL KANT
TRANSLATED BY
T. K. ABBOTT
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
BY
IMMANUEL KANT
TRANSLATED BY
T. K. ABBOTT
Page 344
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Immanuel Kant was born in Konigsberg, East Prussia, April 22, 1724, the
son of a saddler of Scottish descent. The family was pietist, and the future
philosopher entered the university of his native city in 1740, with a view to
studying theology. He developed, however, a many-sided interest in
learning, and his earlier publications were in the field of speculative
physics. After the close of his period of study at the university he became a
private tutor; then In 1755, privat-docent; and in 1770, professor. During
the first eleven years of his professorship Kant published little, spending his
energies in the meditation that was to result in the philosophical system of
which the first part was given to the world in his "Critique of Pure Reason"
in 1781. From that time till near the end of the century he issued volume
after volume; yet when he died In 1804 he regarded his statement of his
system as fragmentary.
Of the enormous importance of Kant in the history of philosophy, no idea
can be given here. The important document which follows was published in
1785, and forms the basis of the moral system on which he erected the
whole structure of belief in God, Freedom, and Immortality. Kant is often
difficult and obscure, and became more so as he grew older; but the present
treatise can be followed, in its main lines, by any intelligent person who is
interested enough in the fundamental problems of human life and conduct
to give it serious and concentrated attention. To such a reader the subtle yet
Immanuel Kant was born in Konigsberg, East Prussia, April 22, 1724, the
son of a saddler of Scottish descent. The family was pietist, and the future
philosopher entered the university of his native city in 1740, with a view to
studying theology. He developed, however, a many-sided interest in
learning, and his earlier publications were in the field of speculative
physics. After the close of his period of study at the university he became a
private tutor; then In 1755, privat-docent; and in 1770, professor. During
the first eleven years of his professorship Kant published little, spending his
energies in the meditation that was to result in the philosophical system of
which the first part was given to the world in his "Critique of Pure Reason"
in 1781. From that time till near the end of the century he issued volume
after volume; yet when he died In 1804 he regarded his statement of his
system as fragmentary.
Of the enormous importance of Kant in the history of philosophy, no idea
can be given here. The important document which follows was published in
1785, and forms the basis of the moral system on which he erected the
whole structure of belief in God, Freedom, and Immortality. Kant is often
difficult and obscure, and became more so as he grew older; but the present
treatise can be followed, in its main lines, by any intelligent person who is
interested enough in the fundamental problems of human life and conduct
to give it serious and concentrated attention. To such a reader the subtle yet
Page 345
clear distinctions, and the lofty and rigorous principles of action, which it
lays down, will prove an intellectual and moral tonic such as hardly any
other modern writer affords.
lays down, will prove an intellectual and moral tonic such as hardly any
other modern writer affords.
Page 346
PREFACE
Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: Physics, Ethics,
and Logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing, and
the only improvement that can be made in it is to add the principle on which
it is based, so that we may both satisfy ourselves of its completeness, and
also be able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions.
All rational knowledge is either material or formal: the former considers
some object, the latter is concerned only with the form of the understanding
and of the reason itself, and with the universal laws of thought in general
without distinction of its objects. Formal philosophy is called Logic.
Material philosophy, however, which has to do with determinate objects and
the laws to which they are subject, is again two-fold; for these laws are
either laws of nature or of freedom. The science of the former is Physics,
that of the latter, Ethics; they are also called natural philosophy and moral
philosophy respectively.
Logic cannot have any empirical part; that is, a part in which the
universal and necessary laws of thought should rest on grounds taken from
experience; otherwise it would not be logic, i. e. a canon for the
understanding or the reason, valid for all thought, and capable of
demonstration. Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each
have their empirical part, since the former has to determine the laws of
nature as an object of experience; the latter the laws of the human will, so
Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: Physics, Ethics,
and Logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing, and
the only improvement that can be made in it is to add the principle on which
it is based, so that we may both satisfy ourselves of its completeness, and
also be able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions.
All rational knowledge is either material or formal: the former considers
some object, the latter is concerned only with the form of the understanding
and of the reason itself, and with the universal laws of thought in general
without distinction of its objects. Formal philosophy is called Logic.
Material philosophy, however, which has to do with determinate objects and
the laws to which they are subject, is again two-fold; for these laws are
either laws of nature or of freedom. The science of the former is Physics,
that of the latter, Ethics; they are also called natural philosophy and moral
philosophy respectively.
Logic cannot have any empirical part; that is, a part in which the
universal and necessary laws of thought should rest on grounds taken from
experience; otherwise it would not be logic, i. e. a canon for the
understanding or the reason, valid for all thought, and capable of
demonstration. Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each
have their empirical part, since the former has to determine the laws of
nature as an object of experience; the latter the laws of the human will, so
Page 347
far as it is affected by nature: the former, however, being laws according to
which everything does happen; the latter, laws according to which
everything ought to happen. [Footnote: The word "law" is here used in two
different senses, on which see Whately's Logic, Appendix, Art. "Law."]
Ethics, however, must also consider the conditions under which what ought
to happen frequently does not.
We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on grounds of
experience: on the other hand, that which delivers its doctrines from a priori
principles alone we may call pure philosophy. When the latter is merely
formal it is logic; if it is restricted to definite objects of the understanding it
is metaphysic.
In this way there arises the idea of a two-fold metaphysic—a metaphysic
of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus have an empirical
and also a rational part. It is the same with Ethics; but here the empirical
part might have the special name of practical anthropology, the name
morality being appropriated to the rational part.
All trades, arts, and handiworks have gained by division of labour,
namely, when, instead of one man doing everything, each confines himself
to a certain kind of work distinct from others in the treatment it requires, so
as to be able to perform it With greater facility and. in the greatest
perfection. Where the different kinds of work are not so distinguished and
divided, where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades, there manufactures remain
still in the greatest barbarism. It might deserve to be considered whether
pure philosophy in all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to
it, and whether it would not be better for the whole business of science if
those who, to please the tastes of the public, are wont to blend the rational
and empirical elements together, mixed in all sorts of proportions unknown
to themselves, and who call themselves independent thinkers, giving the
which everything does happen; the latter, laws according to which
everything ought to happen. [Footnote: The word "law" is here used in two
different senses, on which see Whately's Logic, Appendix, Art. "Law."]
Ethics, however, must also consider the conditions under which what ought
to happen frequently does not.
We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on grounds of
experience: on the other hand, that which delivers its doctrines from a priori
principles alone we may call pure philosophy. When the latter is merely
formal it is logic; if it is restricted to definite objects of the understanding it
is metaphysic.
In this way there arises the idea of a two-fold metaphysic—a metaphysic
of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus have an empirical
and also a rational part. It is the same with Ethics; but here the empirical
part might have the special name of practical anthropology, the name
morality being appropriated to the rational part.
All trades, arts, and handiworks have gained by division of labour,
namely, when, instead of one man doing everything, each confines himself
to a certain kind of work distinct from others in the treatment it requires, so
as to be able to perform it With greater facility and. in the greatest
perfection. Where the different kinds of work are not so distinguished and
divided, where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades, there manufactures remain
still in the greatest barbarism. It might deserve to be considered whether
pure philosophy in all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to
it, and whether it would not be better for the whole business of science if
those who, to please the tastes of the public, are wont to blend the rational
and empirical elements together, mixed in all sorts of proportions unknown
to themselves, and who call themselves independent thinkers, giving the
Page 348
name of minute philosophers to those who apply themselves to the rational
part only—if these, I say, were warned not to carry on two employments
together which differ widely in the treatment they demand, for each of
which perhaps a special talent is required, and the combination of which in
one person only produces bunglers. But I only ask here whether the nature
of science does not require that we should always carefully separate the
empirical from the rational part, and prefix to Physics proper (or empirical
physics) a metaphysic of nature, and to practical anthropology a metaphysic
of morals, which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, so that
we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases,
and from whnat sources it draws this its a priori teaching, and that whether
the latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists (whose name is legion), or
only by some who feel a calling thereto.
As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question
suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a
pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only
empirical, and which belongs to anthropology? for that such a philosophy
must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral
laws. Every one must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i. e. to be
the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for
example, the precept, "Thou shalt not lie," is not valid for men alone, as if
other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other
moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must
not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstanced in the world in
which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason;
and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere
experience may be in certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even
in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a
precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be called a moral law.
part only—if these, I say, were warned not to carry on two employments
together which differ widely in the treatment they demand, for each of
which perhaps a special talent is required, and the combination of which in
one person only produces bunglers. But I only ask here whether the nature
of science does not require that we should always carefully separate the
empirical from the rational part, and prefix to Physics proper (or empirical
physics) a metaphysic of nature, and to practical anthropology a metaphysic
of morals, which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, so that
we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases,
and from whnat sources it draws this its a priori teaching, and that whether
the latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists (whose name is legion), or
only by some who feel a calling thereto.
As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question
suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a
pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only
empirical, and which belongs to anthropology? for that such a philosophy
must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral
laws. Every one must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i. e. to be
the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for
example, the precept, "Thou shalt not lie," is not valid for men alone, as if
other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other
moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must
not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstanced in the world in
which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason;
and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere
experience may be in certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even
in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a
precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be called a moral law.
Page 349
Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially
distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there
is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part.
When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the
knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as
a rational being. No doubt these laws require a judgment sharpened by
experience, in order on the one hand to distinguish in what cases they are
applicable, and on the other to procure for them access to the will of the
man, and effectual influence on conduct; since man is acted on by so many
inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is
not so easily able to make it effective in concrete in his life.
A metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not merely
for speculative reasons, in order to investigate the sources of the practical
principles which are to be found a priori in our reason, but also because
morals themselves are liable to all sorts of corruption, as long as we are
without that clue and supreme canon by which to estimate them correctly.
For in order that an action should be morally good, it is not enough that it
conform to the moral law, but it must also be done for the sake of the law,
otherwise that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain; since a
principle which is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions
conformable to the law, will also often produce actions which contradict it.
Now it is only in a pure philosophy that we can look for the moral law in its
purity and genuineness (and, in a practical matter, this is of the utmost
consequence): we must, therefore, begin with pure philosophy
(metaphysic), and without it there cannot be any moral philosophy at all.
That which mingles these pure principles with the empirical does not
deserve the name of philosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy from
common rational knowledge is, that it treats in separate sciences what the
latter only comprehends confusedly); much less does it deserve that of
distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there
is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part.
When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the
knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as
a rational being. No doubt these laws require a judgment sharpened by
experience, in order on the one hand to distinguish in what cases they are
applicable, and on the other to procure for them access to the will of the
man, and effectual influence on conduct; since man is acted on by so many
inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is
not so easily able to make it effective in concrete in his life.
A metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not merely
for speculative reasons, in order to investigate the sources of the practical
principles which are to be found a priori in our reason, but also because
morals themselves are liable to all sorts of corruption, as long as we are
without that clue and supreme canon by which to estimate them correctly.
For in order that an action should be morally good, it is not enough that it
conform to the moral law, but it must also be done for the sake of the law,
otherwise that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain; since a
principle which is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions
conformable to the law, will also often produce actions which contradict it.
Now it is only in a pure philosophy that we can look for the moral law in its
purity and genuineness (and, in a practical matter, this is of the utmost
consequence): we must, therefore, begin with pure philosophy
(metaphysic), and without it there cannot be any moral philosophy at all.
That which mingles these pure principles with the empirical does not
deserve the name of philosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy from
common rational knowledge is, that it treats in separate sciences what the
latter only comprehends confusedly); much less does it deserve that of
Page 350
moral philosophy, since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of morals
themselves, and counteracts its own end.
Let it not be thought, however, that what is here demanded is already
extant in the propaedeutic prefixed by the celebrated Wolf [Footnote:
Johann Christian Von Wolf (1679-1728) was the author of treatises on
philosophy, mathematics, &c., which were for a long time the standard text-
books in the German Universities. His philosophy was founded on that of
Leibnitz.] to his moral philosophy, namely, his so-called general practical
philosophy, and that, therefore, we have not to strike into an entirely new
field. Just because it was to be a general practical philosophy, it has not
taken into consideration a will of any particular kind-say one which should
be determined solely from a priori principles without any empirical
motives, and which we might call a pure will, but volition in general, with
all the actions and conditions which belong to it in this general
signification. By this it is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, just as
general logic, which treats of the acts and canons of thought in general, is
distinguished from transcendental philosophy, which treats of the particular
acts and canons of pure thought, i. e. that whose cognitions are altogether a
priori. For the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and the
principles of a possible pure will, and not the acts and conditions of human
volition generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology. It is
true that moral laws and duty are spoken of in the general practical
philosophy (contrary indeed to all fitness). But this is no objection, for in
this respect, also the authors of that science remain true to their idea of it;
they do not distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason
alone altogether a priori, and which are properly moral, from the empirical
motives which the understanding raises to general conceptions merely by
comparison of experiences; but without noticing the difference of their
sources, and looking on them all as homogeneous, they consider only their
greater or less amount. It is in this way they frame their notion of
themselves, and counteracts its own end.
Let it not be thought, however, that what is here demanded is already
extant in the propaedeutic prefixed by the celebrated Wolf [Footnote:
Johann Christian Von Wolf (1679-1728) was the author of treatises on
philosophy, mathematics, &c., which were for a long time the standard text-
books in the German Universities. His philosophy was founded on that of
Leibnitz.] to his moral philosophy, namely, his so-called general practical
philosophy, and that, therefore, we have not to strike into an entirely new
field. Just because it was to be a general practical philosophy, it has not
taken into consideration a will of any particular kind-say one which should
be determined solely from a priori principles without any empirical
motives, and which we might call a pure will, but volition in general, with
all the actions and conditions which belong to it in this general
signification. By this it is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, just as
general logic, which treats of the acts and canons of thought in general, is
distinguished from transcendental philosophy, which treats of the particular
acts and canons of pure thought, i. e. that whose cognitions are altogether a
priori. For the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and the
principles of a possible pure will, and not the acts and conditions of human
volition generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology. It is
true that moral laws and duty are spoken of in the general practical
philosophy (contrary indeed to all fitness). But this is no objection, for in
this respect, also the authors of that science remain true to their idea of it;
they do not distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason
alone altogether a priori, and which are properly moral, from the empirical
motives which the understanding raises to general conceptions merely by
comparison of experiences; but without noticing the difference of their
sources, and looking on them all as homogeneous, they consider only their
greater or less amount. It is in this way they frame their notion of
Page 351
obligation, which though anything but moral, is all that can be asked for in
a philosophy which passes no judgment at all on the origin of all possible
practical concepts, whether they are a priori, or only a posteriori.
Intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, I issue in the first
instance these fundamental principles. Indeed there is properly no other
foundation for it than the critical examination of a pure practical reason;
just as that of metaphysics is the critical examination of the pure speculative
reason, already published. But in the first place the former is not so
absolutely necessary as the latter, because in moral concerns human reason
can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness,
even in the commonest understanding, while on the contrary in its theoretic
but pure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second place if the critique
of a pure practical reason is to be complete, it must be possible at the same
time to show its identity with the speculative reason in a common principle,
for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be
distinguished merely in its application. I could not, however, bring it to
such completeness here, without introducing considerations of a wholly
different kind, which would be perplexing to the reader. On this account I
have adopted the title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of
Morals, instead of that of a Critical Examination of the pure practical
Reason.
But in the third place, since a metaphysic of morals, in spite of the;
discouraging title, is yet capable of being presented in a popular form, and
one adapted to the common understanding, I find it useful to separate from
it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental principles, in order that I may
not hereafter have need to introduce these necessarily subtle discussions
into a book of a more simple character.
a philosophy which passes no judgment at all on the origin of all possible
practical concepts, whether they are a priori, or only a posteriori.
Intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, I issue in the first
instance these fundamental principles. Indeed there is properly no other
foundation for it than the critical examination of a pure practical reason;
just as that of metaphysics is the critical examination of the pure speculative
reason, already published. But in the first place the former is not so
absolutely necessary as the latter, because in moral concerns human reason
can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness,
even in the commonest understanding, while on the contrary in its theoretic
but pure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second place if the critique
of a pure practical reason is to be complete, it must be possible at the same
time to show its identity with the speculative reason in a common principle,
for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be
distinguished merely in its application. I could not, however, bring it to
such completeness here, without introducing considerations of a wholly
different kind, which would be perplexing to the reader. On this account I
have adopted the title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of
Morals, instead of that of a Critical Examination of the pure practical
Reason.
But in the third place, since a metaphysic of morals, in spite of the;
discouraging title, is yet capable of being presented in a popular form, and
one adapted to the common understanding, I find it useful to separate from
it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental principles, in order that I may
not hereafter have need to introduce these necessarily subtle discussions
into a book of a more simple character.
Page 352
The present treatise is, however, nothing more than the investigation and
establishment of the supreme principle of morality, and this alone
constitutes a study complete in itself, and one which ought to be kept apart
from every other moral investigation. No doubt my conclusions on this
weighty question, which has hitherto been very unsatisfactorily examined,
would receive much light from the application of the same principle to the
whole system, and would be greatly confirmed by the adequacy which it
exhibits throughout; but I must forego this advantage, which indeed would
be after all more gratifying than useful, since the easy applicability of a
principle and its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its
soundness, but rather inspire a certain partiality, which prevents us from
examining and estimating it strictly in itself, and without regard to
consequences.
I have adopted in this work the method which I think most suitable,
proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the determination of its
ultimate principle, and again descending synthetically from the examination
of this principle and its sources to the common knowledge in which we find
it employed. The division will, therefore, be as follows:—
1. First section.—Transition from the common rational knowledge of
morality to the philosophical.
2. Second section.—Transition from popular moral philosophy to the
metaphysic of morals.
3. Third section.—Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the
critique of the pure practical reason.
establishment of the supreme principle of morality, and this alone
constitutes a study complete in itself, and one which ought to be kept apart
from every other moral investigation. No doubt my conclusions on this
weighty question, which has hitherto been very unsatisfactorily examined,
would receive much light from the application of the same principle to the
whole system, and would be greatly confirmed by the adequacy which it
exhibits throughout; but I must forego this advantage, which indeed would
be after all more gratifying than useful, since the easy applicability of a
principle and its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its
soundness, but rather inspire a certain partiality, which prevents us from
examining and estimating it strictly in itself, and without regard to
consequences.
I have adopted in this work the method which I think most suitable,
proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the determination of its
ultimate principle, and again descending synthetically from the examination
of this principle and its sources to the common knowledge in which we find
it employed. The division will, therefore, be as follows:—
1. First section.—Transition from the common rational knowledge of
morality to the philosophical.
2. Second section.—Transition from popular moral philosophy to the
metaphysic of morals.
3. Third section.—Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the
critique of the pure practical reason.
Page 353
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
FIRST SECTION
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY TO
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, of even out of it, which
can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will Intelligence,
wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be
named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament,
are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of
nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is
to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called
character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches,
honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's
condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if
there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and
with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt it to its end.
The sight of a Deing who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and
good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an
impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the
indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
FIRST SECTION
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY TO
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, of even out of it, which
can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will Intelligence,
wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be
named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament,
are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of
nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is
to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called
character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches,
honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's
condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if
there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and
with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt it to its end.
The sight of a Deing who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and
good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an
impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the
indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.
Page 354
There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will
itself, and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic
unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies
the esteem that we justly have for them, and does not permit us to regard
them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-
control and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even
seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far
from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have
been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles
of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a
villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him
more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its
aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the
volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be
esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of
any inclination, nay, even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it
should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly
provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to
accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve
nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere
wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it
would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in
itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add to nor take away
anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable
us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to
it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend
it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.
itself, and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic
unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies
the esteem that we justly have for them, and does not permit us to regard
them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-
control and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even
seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far
from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have
been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles
of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a
villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him
more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its
aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the
volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be
esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of
any inclination, nay, even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it
should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly
provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to
accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve
nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere
wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it
would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in
itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add to nor take away
anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable
us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to
it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend
it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.
Page 355
There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value
of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that
notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet
a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere
high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of
nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will
examine this idea from this point of view.
In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted
suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that
no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best
adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the
proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its
happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in
selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the
actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and
the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by
instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more
certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have been
communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have
served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to
congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent
cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive
guidance, and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word,
nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into
practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think
out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature
would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the
means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct.
of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that
notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet
a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere
high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of
nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will
examine this idea from this point of view.
In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted
suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that
no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best
adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the
proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its
happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in
selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the
actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and
the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by
instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more
certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have been
communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have
served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to
congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent
cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive
guidance, and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word,
nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into
practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think
out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature
would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the
means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct.
Page 356
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with
deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more
does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there
arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of
misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are
most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the
advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of
common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after
all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact,
only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in
happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more
common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct,
and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we
must admit, that the judgment of those who would very much lower the
lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the
happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below
zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the
world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgments the idea
that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for
happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be
regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must,
for the most part, be postponed. For as reason is not competent to guide the
will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our
wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which
an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and
since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i. e. as
one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature
generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the
end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a
means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely
deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more
does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there
arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of
misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are
most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the
advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of
common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after
all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact,
only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in
happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more
common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct,
and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we
must admit, that the judgment of those who would very much lower the
lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the
happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below
zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the
world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgments the idea
that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for
happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be
regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must,
for the most part, be postponed. For as reason is not competent to guide the
will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our
wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which
an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and
since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i. e. as
one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature
generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the
end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a
means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely
Page 357
necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good,
must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the
desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing
inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the
reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in
many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second,
which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it
to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason
recognises the establishment of a good will as its highest practical
destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of
its own proper kind, namely, that from the attainment of an end, which end
again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve
many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.
We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly
esteemed for itself, and is good without a view to anything further, a notion
which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to
be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our
actions always takes the first place, and constitutes the condition of all the
rest. In order to do this we will take the notion of duty, which includes that
of a good will, although implying certain subjectve restrictions and
hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it
unrecognisable, rather bring it out by contrast, and make it shine forth so
much the brighter.
I omit here all actions which are already recognised as inconsistent with
duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the
question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they
even conflict with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to
duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because
they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can
must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the
desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing
inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the
reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in
many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second,
which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it
to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason
recognises the establishment of a good will as its highest practical
destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of
its own proper kind, namely, that from the attainment of an end, which end
again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve
many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.
We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly
esteemed for itself, and is good without a view to anything further, a notion
which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to
be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our
actions always takes the first place, and constitutes the condition of all the
rest. In order to do this we will take the notion of duty, which includes that
of a good will, although implying certain subjectve restrictions and
hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it
unrecognisable, rather bring it out by contrast, and make it shine forth so
much the brighter.
I omit here all actions which are already recognised as inconsistent with
duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the
question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they
even conflict with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to
duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because
they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can
Page 358
readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from
duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when
the action accords with duty, and the subject has besides a direct inclination
to it. For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not
overcharge an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much
commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed
price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are
thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the
tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own
advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he
might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it
were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another.
Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct
inclination, but merely with a selfish view.
On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition,
everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the often
anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their
maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no
doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other hand, if adversity and
hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the
unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding
or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it—
not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim has a moral
worth.
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many
minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of
vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them
and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own
work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however
duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when
the action accords with duty, and the subject has besides a direct inclination
to it. For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not
overcharge an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much
commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed
price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are
thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the
tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own
advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he
might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it
were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another.
Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct
inclination, but merely with a selfish view.
On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition,
everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the often
anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their
maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no
doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other hand, if adversity and
hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the
unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding
or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it—
not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim has a moral
worth.
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many
minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of
vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them
and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own
work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however
Page 359
proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth,
but is on a level with other inclinations, e. g. the inclination to honour,
which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and
accordant with duty, and consequently honourable, deserves praise and
encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the moral import,
namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put the
case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own,
extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that while he still has
the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched oy their trouble
because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself
out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any
inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine
moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little sympathy in the heart of
this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament
cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because in respect
of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude, and
supposes, or even requires, that others should have the same—and such a
man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature—but if nature
had not specially framed him for a philanthropist, would he not still find in
himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that
of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in this
that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably
the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but
from duty.
To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent
with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst
unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression
of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the
strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in
this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. But the precept of
but is on a level with other inclinations, e. g. the inclination to honour,
which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and
accordant with duty, and consequently honourable, deserves praise and
encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the moral import,
namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put the
case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own,
extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that while he still has
the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched oy their trouble
because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself
out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any
inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine
moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little sympathy in the heart of
this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament
cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because in respect
of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude, and
supposes, or even requires, that others should have the same—and such a
man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature—but if nature
had not specially framed him for a philanthropist, would he not still find in
himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that
of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in this
that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably
the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but
from duty.
To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent
with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst
unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression
of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the
strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in
this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. But the precept of
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happiness is often of such a sort that it greatly interferes with some
inclinations, and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception
of the sum of satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not
then to be wandered at that a single inclination, definite both as to what it
promises and as to the time within which it can be gratified, is often able to
overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that a gouty patient, for instance, can
choose to enjoy what he likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according
to his calculation, on this occasion at least, he has [only] not sacrificed the
enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a
happiness which is supposed to be found in health. But even in this case, if
the general desire for happiness did not influence his will, and supposing
that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this
calculation, there yet remains in this, sas in all other cases, this law, namely,
that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty,
land by this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth.
It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those
passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our
neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be
commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not
impelled to it by any inclination—nay, are even repelled by a natural and
unconquerable aversion. This is practical love, and not pathological—a love
which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense—in
principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone
which can be commanded.
The second [Footnote: The first proposition was that to have moral worth
an action must be done from duty.] proposition is: That an action done from
duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained
by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not
depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the
inclinations, and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception
of the sum of satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not
then to be wandered at that a single inclination, definite both as to what it
promises and as to the time within which it can be gratified, is often able to
overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that a gouty patient, for instance, can
choose to enjoy what he likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according
to his calculation, on this occasion at least, he has [only] not sacrificed the
enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a
happiness which is supposed to be found in health. But even in this case, if
the general desire for happiness did not influence his will, and supposing
that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this
calculation, there yet remains in this, sas in all other cases, this law, namely,
that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty,
land by this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth.
It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those
passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our
neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be
commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not
impelled to it by any inclination—nay, are even repelled by a natural and
unconquerable aversion. This is practical love, and not pathological—a love
which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense—in
principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone
which can be commanded.
The second [Footnote: The first proposition was that to have moral worth
an action must be done from duty.] proposition is: That an action done from
duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained
by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not
depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the
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principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to
any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which
we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and
springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth.
In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in
reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle
of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action.
For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a
posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be
determined by something, it follows that it must be determined by the
formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case
every material principle has been withdrawn from it.
The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I
would express thus: Duty is the necessity "of acting from respect for the
law." I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed
action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect
and not an energy of will. Similarly, I cannot have respect for inclination,
whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if
another's, sometimes even love it; i.e. look on it as favourable to my own
interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no
means as an effect—what does not subserve my inclination, but overpowers
it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation—in other
words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence
a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the
influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing
remains which can determine the will except objectively the LAW, and
subjectively PURE RESPECT for this practical law, and consequently the
maxim [Footnote: A MAXIM is the subjective principle of volition. The
objective principle (i. e. that which would also serve subjectively as a
practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the
any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which
we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and
springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth.
In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in
reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle
of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action.
For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a
posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be
determined by something, it follows that it must be determined by the
formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case
every material principle has been withdrawn from it.
The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I
would express thus: Duty is the necessity "of acting from respect for the
law." I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed
action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect
and not an energy of will. Similarly, I cannot have respect for inclination,
whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if
another's, sometimes even love it; i.e. look on it as favourable to my own
interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no
means as an effect—what does not subserve my inclination, but overpowers
it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation—in other
words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence
a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the
influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing
remains which can determine the will except objectively the LAW, and
subjectively PURE RESPECT for this practical law, and consequently the
maxim [Footnote: A MAXIM is the subjective principle of volition. The
objective principle (i. e. that which would also serve subjectively as a
practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the
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faculty of desire) is the practical LAW.] that I should follow this law even to
the thwarting of all my inclinations.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from
it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from
this expected effeet. For all these effects— agreeableness of one's condition,
and even the promotion of the happiness of others—could have been also
brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no
need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the
supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good
which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than THE
CONCEPTION OF LAW in itself, WHICH CERTAINLY IS ONLY
POSSIBLE IN A RATIONAL BEING, in so far as this conception, and not
the expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already
present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to
appear first in the result. [Footnote: It might be here objected to me that I
take refuge behind the word RESPECT in an obscure feeling, instead of
giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason. But
although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling RECEIVED through
influence, but is SELF-WROUGHT by a rational concept, and, therefore, is
specifically distinct from all feelings of the former kind, which may be
referred either to inclination or fear, What I recognise immediately as a law
for me, I recognise with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness
that my will is SUBORDINATE to a law, without the intervention of other
influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the
law, and the consciousness of this is called RESPECT, so that this is
regarded as an EFFECT of the law on the subject, and not as the CAUSE of
it. Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-
love. Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as am object
of inclination nor of fear, although it has something analogous to both. The
OBJECT of respect is the LAW only, and that, the law which we impose on
the thwarting of all my inclinations.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from
it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from
this expected effeet. For all these effects— agreeableness of one's condition,
and even the promotion of the happiness of others—could have been also
brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no
need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the
supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good
which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than THE
CONCEPTION OF LAW in itself, WHICH CERTAINLY IS ONLY
POSSIBLE IN A RATIONAL BEING, in so far as this conception, and not
the expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already
present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to
appear first in the result. [Footnote: It might be here objected to me that I
take refuge behind the word RESPECT in an obscure feeling, instead of
giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason. But
although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling RECEIVED through
influence, but is SELF-WROUGHT by a rational concept, and, therefore, is
specifically distinct from all feelings of the former kind, which may be
referred either to inclination or fear, What I recognise immediately as a law
for me, I recognise with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness
that my will is SUBORDINATE to a law, without the intervention of other
influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the
law, and the consciousness of this is called RESPECT, so that this is
regarded as an EFFECT of the law on the subject, and not as the CAUSE of
it. Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-
love. Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as am object
of inclination nor of fear, although it has something analogous to both. The
OBJECT of respect is the LAW only, and that, the law which we impose on
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OURSELVES, and yet recognise as necessary in itself. As a law, we are
subjected to it without consulting self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves,
it is a result of our will. In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the
latter to inclination. Respect for a person is properly only respect for the
law (of honesty, &c.), of which he gives us an example. Since we also look
on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a
person of talents, as it were, the EXAMPLE OF A LAW (viz. to become
like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our respect. All so-called
moral INTEREST consists simply in RESPECT for the law.]
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine
the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in
order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification?
As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from
obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of
its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.
e. I am never to act otherwise than so THAT I COULD ALSO WILL THAT
MY MAXIM SHOULD BECOME A UNIVERSAL LAW. Here now, it is
the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular
law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and
must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion.
The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides
with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the
question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the
intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between the two
significations which the question may have. Whether it is prudent, or
whether it is right, to make a false promise. The former may undoubtedly
often be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate
myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be
well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much
greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with
subjected to it without consulting self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves,
it is a result of our will. In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the
latter to inclination. Respect for a person is properly only respect for the
law (of honesty, &c.), of which he gives us an example. Since we also look
on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a
person of talents, as it were, the EXAMPLE OF A LAW (viz. to become
like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our respect. All so-called
moral INTEREST consists simply in RESPECT for the law.]
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine
the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in
order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification?
As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from
obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of
its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.
e. I am never to act otherwise than so THAT I COULD ALSO WILL THAT
MY MAXIM SHOULD BECOME A UNIVERSAL LAW. Here now, it is
the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular
law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and
must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion.
The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides
with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the
question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the
intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between the two
significations which the question may have. Whether it is prudent, or
whether it is right, to make a false promise. The former may undoubtedly
often be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate
myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be
well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much
greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with
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all my supposed CUNNING, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen
but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any
mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it
would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim,
and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of
keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be
based on the fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be
truthful from duty, and to be so from apprehension of injurious
consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action already implies
a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see
what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to
deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to be
unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me,
although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an
unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying
promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content that
my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should
hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? and should I
be able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he
finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate
himself"? Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can
by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law
there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my
intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this
allegation, or if they overhastily did so, would pay me back in my own coin.
Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would
necessarily destroy itself.
I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I
have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the
course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I
but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any
mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it
would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim,
and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of
keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be
based on the fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be
truthful from duty, and to be so from apprehension of injurious
consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action already implies
a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see
what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to
deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to be
unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me,
although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an
unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying
promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content that
my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should
hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? and should I
be able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he
finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate
himself"? Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can
by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law
there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my
intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this
allegation, or if they overhastily did so, would pay me back in my own coin.
Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would
necessarily destroy itself.
I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I
have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the
course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I
Page 365
only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal
law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage
accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a
principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me
immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern on
what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I
understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all
worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of
acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to
which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a
will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything.
Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human
reason, we have arrived at its principle. And although, no doubt, common
men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they
always have it really before their eyes, and use it as the standard of their
decision. Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand,
men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good,
what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least
teaching them anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to
the principle they themselves employ; and that therefore we do not need
science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good,
yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have conjectured
beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and
therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the
commonest. [Footnote: Compare the note to the Preface to the Critique of
the Practical Reason, p. 111. A specimen of Kant's proposed application of
the Socratic method may be found in Mr. Semple'a translation of the
Metaphysic of Ethics, p. 290.] Here we cannot forbear admiration when we
see how great an advantage the practical judgment has over the theoretical
in the common understanding of men. In the latter, if common reason
law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage
accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a
principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me
immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern on
what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I
understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all
worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of
acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to
which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a
will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything.
Thus, then, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human
reason, we have arrived at its principle. And although, no doubt, common
men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they
always have it really before their eyes, and use it as the standard of their
decision. Here it would be easy to show how, with this compass in hand,
men are well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good,
what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent with it, if, without in the least
teaching them anything new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to
the principle they themselves employ; and that therefore we do not need
science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good,
yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have conjectured
beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and
therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the
commonest. [Footnote: Compare the note to the Preface to the Critique of
the Practical Reason, p. 111. A specimen of Kant's proposed application of
the Socratic method may be found in Mr. Semple'a translation of the
Metaphysic of Ethics, p. 290.] Here we cannot forbear admiration when we
see how great an advantage the practical judgment has over the theoretical
in the common understanding of men. In the latter, if common reason
Page 366
ventures to depart from the laws of experience and from the perceptions of
the senses it falls into mere inconceivabilities and self-contradictions, at
least into chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in the practical
sphere it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible
springs from practical laws that its power of judgment begins to show itself
to advantage. It then becomes even subtle, whether it be that it chicanes
with its own conscience or with other claims respecting what is to be called
right, or whether it desires for its own instruction to determine honestly the
worth of actions; and, in the latter case, it may even have as good a hope of
hitting the mark as any philosopher whatever can promise himself. Nay, it is
almost more sure of doing so, because the philosopher cannot have any
other principle, while he may easily perplex his judgment by a multitude of
considerations foreign to the matter, and so turn aside from the right way.
Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in the
judgment of common reason or at most only to call in philosophy for the
purpose of rendering the system of morals more complete and intelligible,
and its rules more convenient for use (especially for disputation), but not so
as to draw off the common understanding from its happy simplicity, or to
bring it by means of philosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction?
Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, only, on the other hand, it is very
sad that it cannot well maintain itself, and is easily seduced. On this account
even wisdom—which otherwise consists more in conduct than in
knowledge—yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to
secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Against all the
commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of
respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and
inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of
happiness. Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without
promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and
contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so
the senses it falls into mere inconceivabilities and self-contradictions, at
least into chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in the practical
sphere it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible
springs from practical laws that its power of judgment begins to show itself
to advantage. It then becomes even subtle, whether it be that it chicanes
with its own conscience or with other claims respecting what is to be called
right, or whether it desires for its own instruction to determine honestly the
worth of actions; and, in the latter case, it may even have as good a hope of
hitting the mark as any philosopher whatever can promise himself. Nay, it is
almost more sure of doing so, because the philosopher cannot have any
other principle, while he may easily perplex his judgment by a multitude of
considerations foreign to the matter, and so turn aside from the right way.
Would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in the
judgment of common reason or at most only to call in philosophy for the
purpose of rendering the system of morals more complete and intelligible,
and its rules more convenient for use (especially for disputation), but not so
as to draw off the common understanding from its happy simplicity, or to
bring it by means of philosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction?
Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, only, on the other hand, it is very
sad that it cannot well maintain itself, and is easily seduced. On this account
even wisdom—which otherwise consists more in conduct than in
knowledge—yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to
secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Against all the
commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of
respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and
inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of
happiness. Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without
promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and
contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so
Page 367
plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any
command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i. e. a disposition, to argue
against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least
their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant
with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very
source, and entirely to destroy their worth—a thing which even common
practical reason cannot ultimately call good.
Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its sphere, and
to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy, not to satisfy any
speculative want (which never occurs to it as long as it is content to be mere
sound reason), but even on practical grounds, in order to attain in it
information and clear instruction respecting the source of its principle, and
the correct determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based
on wants and inclinations, so that it may escape from the perplexity of
opposite claims, and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral principles
through the equivocation into which it easily falls. Thus, when practical
reason cultivates itself, there insensibly arises in it a dialectic which forces
it to seek aid in philosophy, just as happens to it in its theoretic use; and in
this case, therefore, as well as in the other, it will find rest nowhere but in a
thorough critical examination of our reason.
command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i. e. a disposition, to argue
against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least
their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant
with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very
source, and entirely to destroy their worth—a thing which even common
practical reason cannot ultimately call good.
Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its sphere, and
to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy, not to satisfy any
speculative want (which never occurs to it as long as it is content to be mere
sound reason), but even on practical grounds, in order to attain in it
information and clear instruction respecting the source of its principle, and
the correct determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based
on wants and inclinations, so that it may escape from the perplexity of
opposite claims, and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral principles
through the equivocation into which it easily falls. Thus, when practical
reason cultivates itself, there insensibly arises in it a dialectic which forces
it to seek aid in philosophy, just as happens to it in its theoretic use; and in
this case, therefore, as well as in the other, it will find rest nowhere but in a
thorough critical examination of our reason.
Page 368
SECOND SECTION
TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS
If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of our
practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have treated it as
an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to the experience of men's
conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves allow, just complaints that
one cannot find a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure
duty. Although many things are done in conformity with what duty
prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly
from duty, so as to have a moral worth. Hence there have, at all times, been
philosophers who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists
at all in human actions, and have ascribed everything to a more or less
refined self-love. Not that they have on that account questioned the
soundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary, they spoke with
sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature, which thought
noble enough to take as its rule an idea so worthy of respect, is yet too weak
to follow it, and employs reason, which ought to give it the law only for the
purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations, whether singly or at
the best in the greatest possible harmony with one another.
In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however
TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS
If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of our
practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred that we have treated it as
an empirical notion. On the contrary, if we attend to the experience of men's
conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves allow, just complaints that
one cannot find a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure
duty. Although many things are done in conformity with what duty
prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly
from duty, so as to have a moral worth. Hence there have, at all times, been
philosophers who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists
at all in human actions, and have ascribed everything to a more or less
refined self-love. Not that they have on that account questioned the
soundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary, they spoke with
sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature, which thought
noble enough to take as its rule an idea so worthy of respect, is yet too weak
to follow it, and employs reason, which ought to give it the law only for the
purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations, whether singly or at
the best in the greatest possible harmony with one another.
In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however
Page 369
right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception of
duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest self-examination we can
find nothing beside the moral principle of duty which could have been
powerful enough to move us to this or that action and to so great a sacrifice;
yet we cannot from this infer with certainty that it was not really some
secret impulse of self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the
actual determining cause of the will. We like then to flatter ourselves by
falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we can never,
even by the strictest examination, get completely behind the secret springs
of action; since, when the question is of moral worth, it is not with the
actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward
principles of them which we do not see.
Moreover, we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule all
morality as a mere chimera of human imagination overstepping itself from
vanity, than by conceding to them that notions of duty must be drawn only
from experience (as from indolence, people are ready to think is also the
case with all other notions); for this is to prepare for them a certain triumph.
I am willing to admit out of love of humanity that even most of our actions
are correct, but if we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the
dear self which is always prominent, and it is this they have in view, and not
the strict command of duty which would often require self-denial. Without
being an enemy of virtue, a cool observer, one that does not mistake the
wish for good, however lively, for its reality, may sometimes doubt whether
true virtue is actually found anywhere in the world, and this especially as
years increase and the judgment is partly made wiser by experience, and
partly also more acute in observation. This being so, nothing can secure us
from falling away altogether from our ideas of duty, or maintain in the soul
a well- grounded respect for its law, but the clear conviction that although
there should never have been actions which really sprang from such pure
sources, yet whether this or that takes place is not at all the question; but
duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest self-examination we can
find nothing beside the moral principle of duty which could have been
powerful enough to move us to this or that action and to so great a sacrifice;
yet we cannot from this infer with certainty that it was not really some
secret impulse of self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the
actual determining cause of the will. We like then to flatter ourselves by
falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we can never,
even by the strictest examination, get completely behind the secret springs
of action; since, when the question is of moral worth, it is not with the
actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward
principles of them which we do not see.
Moreover, we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule all
morality as a mere chimera of human imagination overstepping itself from
vanity, than by conceding to them that notions of duty must be drawn only
from experience (as from indolence, people are ready to think is also the
case with all other notions); for this is to prepare for them a certain triumph.
I am willing to admit out of love of humanity that even most of our actions
are correct, but if we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the
dear self which is always prominent, and it is this they have in view, and not
the strict command of duty which would often require self-denial. Without
being an enemy of virtue, a cool observer, one that does not mistake the
wish for good, however lively, for its reality, may sometimes doubt whether
true virtue is actually found anywhere in the world, and this especially as
years increase and the judgment is partly made wiser by experience, and
partly also more acute in observation. This being so, nothing can secure us
from falling away altogether from our ideas of duty, or maintain in the soul
a well- grounded respect for its law, but the clear conviction that although
there should never have been actions which really sprang from such pure
sources, yet whether this or that takes place is not at all the question; but
Page 370
that reason of itself, independent on all experience, ordains what ought to
take place, that accordingly actions of which perhaps the world has hitherto
never given an example, the feasibility even of which might be very much
doubted by one who founds everything on experience, are nevertheless
inflexibly commanded by reason; that, ex. gr. even though there might
never yet have been a sincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity
in friendship required of every man, because, prior to all experience, this
duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining the will by a
priori principles.
When we add further that, unless we deny that the notion of morality has
any truth or reference to any possible object, we must admit that its law
must be valid, not merely for men, but for all rational creatures generally,
not merely under certain contingent conditions or with exceptions, but with
absolute necessity, then it is clear that no experience could enable us to infer
even the possibility of such apodictic laws. For with what right could we
bring into unbounded respect as a universal precept for every rational nature
that which perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity?
Or how could laws of the determination of OUR will be regarded as laws of
the determination of the will of rational beings generally, and for us only as
such, if they were merely empirical, and did not take their origin wholly a
priori from pure but practical reason?
Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should wish to
derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set before me must
be first itself tested by principles of morality, whether it is worthy to serve
as an original example, i. e., as a pattern, but by no means can it
authoritatively furnish the conception of morality. Even the Holy One of the
Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before
we can recognise Him as such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye Me
(whom you see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God only
take place, that accordingly actions of which perhaps the world has hitherto
never given an example, the feasibility even of which might be very much
doubted by one who founds everything on experience, are nevertheless
inflexibly commanded by reason; that, ex. gr. even though there might
never yet have been a sincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity
in friendship required of every man, because, prior to all experience, this
duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining the will by a
priori principles.
When we add further that, unless we deny that the notion of morality has
any truth or reference to any possible object, we must admit that its law
must be valid, not merely for men, but for all rational creatures generally,
not merely under certain contingent conditions or with exceptions, but with
absolute necessity, then it is clear that no experience could enable us to infer
even the possibility of such apodictic laws. For with what right could we
bring into unbounded respect as a universal precept for every rational nature
that which perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity?
Or how could laws of the determination of OUR will be regarded as laws of
the determination of the will of rational beings generally, and for us only as
such, if they were merely empirical, and did not take their origin wholly a
priori from pure but practical reason?
Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should wish to
derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set before me must
be first itself tested by principles of morality, whether it is worthy to serve
as an original example, i. e., as a pattern, but by no means can it
authoritatively furnish the conception of morality. Even the Holy One of the
Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before
we can recognise Him as such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye Me
(whom you see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God only
Page 371
(whom ye do not see)?" But whence have we the conception of God as the
supreme good? Simply from the IDEA of moral perfection, which reason
frames a priori, and connects inseparably with the notion of a free-will.
Imitation finds no place at all in morality, and examples serve only for
encouragement, i. e. they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law
commands, they make visible that which the practical rule expresses more
generally, but they can never authorise us to set aside the true original
which lies in reason, and to guide ourselves by examples.
If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what must
rest simply on pure reason, independent on all experience, I think it is not
necessary even to put the question, whether it is good to exhibit these
concepts in their generality (in abstracto) as they are established a priori
along with the principles belonging to them, if our knowledge is to be
distinguished from the vulgar, and to be called philosophical. In our times
indeed this might perhaps be necessary; for if we collected votes, whether
pure rational knowledge separated from everything empirical, that is to say,
metaphysic of morals, or whether popular practical philosophy is to be
preferred, it is easy to guess which side would preponderate.
This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if the
ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and been
satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first found Ethics on
Metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established, procure a hearing for it
by giving it a popular character. But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in
the first inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles depends. It is not
only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true
philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being intelligible if one
renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it produces a disgusting
medley of compiled observations and half- reasoned principles. Shallow
pates enjoy this because it can be used for every-day chat, but the sagacious
supreme good? Simply from the IDEA of moral perfection, which reason
frames a priori, and connects inseparably with the notion of a free-will.
Imitation finds no place at all in morality, and examples serve only for
encouragement, i. e. they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law
commands, they make visible that which the practical rule expresses more
generally, but they can never authorise us to set aside the true original
which lies in reason, and to guide ourselves by examples.
If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what must
rest simply on pure reason, independent on all experience, I think it is not
necessary even to put the question, whether it is good to exhibit these
concepts in their generality (in abstracto) as they are established a priori
along with the principles belonging to them, if our knowledge is to be
distinguished from the vulgar, and to be called philosophical. In our times
indeed this might perhaps be necessary; for if we collected votes, whether
pure rational knowledge separated from everything empirical, that is to say,
metaphysic of morals, or whether popular practical philosophy is to be
preferred, it is easy to guess which side would preponderate.
This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if the
ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and been
satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first found Ethics on
Metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established, procure a hearing for it
by giving it a popular character. But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in
the first inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles depends. It is not
only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true
philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being intelligible if one
renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it produces a disgusting
medley of compiled observations and half- reasoned principles. Shallow
pates enjoy this because it can be used for every-day chat, but the sagacious
Page 372
find in it only confusion, and being unsatisfied and unable to help
themselves, they turn away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite
well through this delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a
time from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be rightfully
popular after they have attained a definite insight.
We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite fashion,
and we shall find at one time the Special constitution of human nature
(including, however, the idea of a rational nature generally), at one time
perfection, at another happiness, here moral sense, there fear of God, a little
of this, and a little of that, in marvellous mixture, without its occurring to
them to ask whether the principles of morality are to be sought in the
knowledge of human nature at all (which we can have only from
experience); and, if this is not so, if these principles are to be found
altogether a priori free from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts
only, and nowhere else, not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt
the method of making this a separate inquiry, as pure practical philosophy,
or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of morals, [Footnote:
Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure logic from
applied, so if we choose we may alse distinguish pure philosophy of morals
(metaphysic) from applied (viz. applied to human nature). By this
designation we are also at once reminded that moral principles are not
based on properties of human nature, but must subsist a priori of themselves
while from such principles practical rules must be capable of being deduced
for every rational nature, and accordingly for that of man.] to bring it by
itself to completeness, and to require the public, which wishes for popular
treatment, to await the issue of this undertaking.
Such a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, not mixed with any
anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics, and still less with occult
qualities (which we might call hypophysical), is not only an indispensable
themselves, they turn away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite
well through this delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a
time from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be rightfully
popular after they have attained a definite insight.
We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite fashion,
and we shall find at one time the Special constitution of human nature
(including, however, the idea of a rational nature generally), at one time
perfection, at another happiness, here moral sense, there fear of God, a little
of this, and a little of that, in marvellous mixture, without its occurring to
them to ask whether the principles of morality are to be sought in the
knowledge of human nature at all (which we can have only from
experience); and, if this is not so, if these principles are to be found
altogether a priori free from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts
only, and nowhere else, not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt
the method of making this a separate inquiry, as pure practical philosophy,
or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of morals, [Footnote:
Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure logic from
applied, so if we choose we may alse distinguish pure philosophy of morals
(metaphysic) from applied (viz. applied to human nature). By this
designation we are also at once reminded that moral principles are not
based on properties of human nature, but must subsist a priori of themselves
while from such principles practical rules must be capable of being deduced
for every rational nature, and accordingly for that of man.] to bring it by
itself to completeness, and to require the public, which wishes for popular
treatment, to await the issue of this undertaking.
Such a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, not mixed with any
anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics, and still less with occult
qualities (which we might call hypophysical), is not only an indispensable
Page 373
substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge of duties, but is at the same
time a desideratum of the highest importance to the actual fulfilment of
their precepts. For the pure conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign
addition of empirical attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral
law, exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first
becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an influence so
much more powerful than all other springs [Footnote: I have a letter from
the late excellent Sulzer, in which he asks me what can be the reason that
moral instruction, although containing much that is convincing for the
reason, yet accomplishes so little? My answer was postponed in order that I
might make it complete. But it is simply this, that the teachers themselves
have not got their own notions clear, and when they endeavour to make up
for this by raking up motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying
to make their physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest
understanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of honesty
done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage of any kind
in this world or another, and even under the greatest temptations of
necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a similar act which was
affected, in however low a degree, by a foreign motive, the former leaves
far behind and eclipses the second; it elevates the soul, and inspires the
wish to be able to act in like manner oneself. Even moderately young
children feel this impression, and one should never represent duties to them
in any other light.] which may be derived from the field of experience, that
in the consciousness of its worth, despises the latter, and can by degrees
become their master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded partly of
motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of
conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives which
cannot be brought under any principle, which lead to good only by mere
accident, and very often also to evil.
time a desideratum of the highest importance to the actual fulfilment of
their precepts. For the pure conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign
addition of empirical attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral
law, exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first
becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an influence so
much more powerful than all other springs [Footnote: I have a letter from
the late excellent Sulzer, in which he asks me what can be the reason that
moral instruction, although containing much that is convincing for the
reason, yet accomplishes so little? My answer was postponed in order that I
might make it complete. But it is simply this, that the teachers themselves
have not got their own notions clear, and when they endeavour to make up
for this by raking up motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying
to make their physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest
understanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of honesty
done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage of any kind
in this world or another, and even under the greatest temptations of
necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a similar act which was
affected, in however low a degree, by a foreign motive, the former leaves
far behind and eclipses the second; it elevates the soul, and inspires the
wish to be able to act in like manner oneself. Even moderately young
children feel this impression, and one should never represent duties to them
in any other light.] which may be derived from the field of experience, that
in the consciousness of its worth, despises the latter, and can by degrees
become their master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded partly of
motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of
conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives which
cannot be brought under any principle, which lead to good only by mere
accident, and very often also to evil.
Page 374
From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their
seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that, moreover, in the
commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree
speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical,
and therefore merely contingent knowledge; that it is just this purity of their
origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle,
and that just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from
their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not
only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, but is
also of the greatest practical importance to derive these notions and laws
from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine
the compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge, i. e. to determine
the whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must not
make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human reason,
though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at
times be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold good for every
rational creature, we must derive them from the general concept of a
rational being. In this way, although for its application to man morality has
need of anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it
independently as pure philosophy, i. e. as metaphysic, complete in itself (a
thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily done); knowing
well that unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to
determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of
speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on their
genuine principles, even for common practical purposes, especially of
moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft
them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest possible good in the
world.
But in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the natural
steps from the common moral judgment (in this case very worthy of
seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that, moreover, in the
commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree
speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical,
and therefore merely contingent knowledge; that it is just this purity of their
origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle,
and that just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from
their genuine influence, and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not
only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, but is
also of the greatest practical importance to derive these notions and laws
from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine
the compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge, i. e. to determine
the whole faculty of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must not
make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human reason,
though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at
times be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold good for every
rational creature, we must derive them from the general concept of a
rational being. In this way, although for its application to man morality has
need of anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it
independently as pure philosophy, i. e. as metaphysic, complete in itself (a
thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily done); knowing
well that unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be vain to
determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of
speculative criticism, but it would be impossible to base morals on their
genuine principles, even for common practical purposes, especially of
moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft
them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest possible good in the
world.
But in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the natural
steps from the common moral judgment (in this case very worthy of
Page 375
respect) to the philosophical, as has been already done, but also from a
popular philosophy, which goes no further than it can reach by groping with
the help of examples, to metaphysic (which does not allow itself to be
checked by anything empirical, and as it must measure the whole extent of
this kind of rational knowledge, goes as far as ideal conceptions, where
even examples fail us), we must follow and clearly describe the practical
faculty of reason, from the general rules of its determination to the point
where the notion of duty springs from it.
Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have
the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according
to principles, i. e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from
principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason
infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are
recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i. e., the
will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination
recognises as practically necessary, i. e., as good. But if reason of itself does
not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective
conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the
objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely
accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions
which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent,
and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is
obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is
not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a
rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature
does not of necessity follow.
The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a
will, is called a command (of reason); and the formula of the command is
called an Imperative.
popular philosophy, which goes no further than it can reach by groping with
the help of examples, to metaphysic (which does not allow itself to be
checked by anything empirical, and as it must measure the whole extent of
this kind of rational knowledge, goes as far as ideal conceptions, where
even examples fail us), we must follow and clearly describe the practical
faculty of reason, from the general rules of its determination to the point
where the notion of duty springs from it.
Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have
the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according
to principles, i. e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from
principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason
infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are
recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i. e., the
will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent on inclination
recognises as practically necessary, i. e., as good. But if reason of itself does
not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective
conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the
objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely
accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions
which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent,
and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is
obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is
not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a
rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature
does not of necessity follow.
The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a
will, is called a command (of reason); and the formula of the command is
called an Imperative.
Page 376
All imperatives are expressed by the word OUGHT [or SHALL], and
thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which
from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an
obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but
they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is
conceived to be good to do it. That is practically GOOD, however, which
determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and
consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on
principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is
distinguished from the PLEASANT, as that which influences the will only
by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the
sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for
every one. [Footnote 3: The dependence of the desires on sensations is
called inclination, and this accordingly always indicates a WANT. The
dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason is
called an INTEREST. This therefore is found only in the case of a
dependent will, which does not always of itself conform to reason; in the
Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the human will can also
TAKE AN INTEREST in a thing without therefore acting FROM
INTEREST. The former signifies the PRACTICAL interest in the action,
the latter the PATHOLOGICAL in the object of the action. The former
indicates only dependence of the will or principles of reason in themselves;
the second, dependence on principles of reason for the sake of inclination,
reason supplying only the practical rules how the requirement of the
inclination may he satisfied. In the first case the action interests me; in the
second the object of the action (because it is pleasant to me), We have seen
in the first section that in an action done from duty we must look not to the
interest in the object, but only to that in the action itself, and in its rational
principle (viz. the law).]
thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which
from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an
obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but
they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is
conceived to be good to do it. That is practically GOOD, however, which
determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and
consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on
principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is
distinguished from the PLEASANT, as that which influences the will only
by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the
sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for
every one. [Footnote 3: The dependence of the desires on sensations is
called inclination, and this accordingly always indicates a WANT. The
dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason is
called an INTEREST. This therefore is found only in the case of a
dependent will, which does not always of itself conform to reason; in the
Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the human will can also
TAKE AN INTEREST in a thing without therefore acting FROM
INTEREST. The former signifies the PRACTICAL interest in the action,
the latter the PATHOLOGICAL in the object of the action. The former
indicates only dependence of the will or principles of reason in themselves;
the second, dependence on principles of reason for the sake of inclination,
reason supplying only the practical rules how the requirement of the
inclination may he satisfied. In the first case the action interests me; in the
second the object of the action (because it is pleasant to me), We have seen
in the first section that in an action done from duty we must look not to the
interest in the object, but only to that in the action itself, and in its rational
principle (viz. the law).]
Page 377
A perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to objective
laws (viz. laws of good), but could not be conceived as OBLIGED thereby
to act lawfully, because of itself from its subjective constitution it can only
be determined by the conception of good. Therefore no imperatives hold for
the Divine will, or in general for a HOLY will; OUGHT is here out of place,
because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law.
Therefore imperatives are only formulae to express the relation of objective
laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that
rational being, e. g. the human will.
Now all IMPERATIVES command either HYPOTHETICALLY or
CATEGORICALLY. The former represent the practical necessity of a
possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which
one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which
represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another
end, i. e., as objectively necessary.
Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and on this
account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary,
all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary
according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action
is good only as a means TO SOMETHING ELSE, then the imperative is
HYPOTHETICAL; if it is conceived as good IN ITSELF and consequently
as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to
reason, then it is CATEGORICAL.
Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be good,
and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which does not forthwith
perform an action simply because it is good, whether because the subject
does not always know that it is good, or because, even if it know this, yet its
maxims might be opposed to the objective principles of practical reason.
laws (viz. laws of good), but could not be conceived as OBLIGED thereby
to act lawfully, because of itself from its subjective constitution it can only
be determined by the conception of good. Therefore no imperatives hold for
the Divine will, or in general for a HOLY will; OUGHT is here out of place,
because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law.
Therefore imperatives are only formulae to express the relation of objective
laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that
rational being, e. g. the human will.
Now all IMPERATIVES command either HYPOTHETICALLY or
CATEGORICALLY. The former represent the practical necessity of a
possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which
one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which
represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another
end, i. e., as objectively necessary.
Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and on this
account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary,
all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary
according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action
is good only as a means TO SOMETHING ELSE, then the imperative is
HYPOTHETICAL; if it is conceived as good IN ITSELF and consequently
as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to
reason, then it is CATEGORICAL.
Thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be good,
and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which does not forthwith
perform an action simply because it is good, whether because the subject
does not always know that it is good, or because, even if it know this, yet its
maxims might be opposed to the objective principles of practical reason.
Page 378
Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good
for some purpose, POSSIBLE or ACTUAL. In the first case it is a
Problematical, in the second an Assertorial practical principle. The
categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively necessary
in itself without reference to any purpose, i. e., without any other end, is
valid as an Apodictic (practical) principle.
Whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may also
be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore the
principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain some possible
purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All sciences have a practical part,
consisting of problems expressing that some end is possible for us, and of
imperatives directing how it may be attained. These may, therefore, be
called in general imperatives of Skill. Here there is no question whether the
end is rational and good, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The
precepts for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a
poisoner to ensure certain death, are of equal value in this respect, that each
serves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth it cannot be
known what ends are likely to occur to us in the course of life, parents seek
to have their children taught a great many things, and provide for their skill
in the use of means for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none of which can they
determine whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to their pupil,
but which it is at all events possible that he might aim at; and this anxiety is
so great that they commonly neglect to form and correct their judgment on
the value of the things which may be chosen as ends.
There is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually such to
all rational beings (so far as imperatives apply to them, viz. as dependent
beings), and therefore, one purpose which they not merely MAY have, but
which we may with certainty assume that they all actually HAVE by a
natural necessity, and this is HAPPINESS. The hypothetical imperative
for some purpose, POSSIBLE or ACTUAL. In the first case it is a
Problematical, in the second an Assertorial practical principle. The
categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively necessary
in itself without reference to any purpose, i. e., without any other end, is
valid as an Apodictic (practical) principle.
Whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may also
be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and therefore the
principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain some possible
purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All sciences have a practical part,
consisting of problems expressing that some end is possible for us, and of
imperatives directing how it may be attained. These may, therefore, be
called in general imperatives of Skill. Here there is no question whether the
end is rational and good, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The
precepts for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a
poisoner to ensure certain death, are of equal value in this respect, that each
serves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth it cannot be
known what ends are likely to occur to us in the course of life, parents seek
to have their children taught a great many things, and provide for their skill
in the use of means for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none of which can they
determine whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to their pupil,
but which it is at all events possible that he might aim at; and this anxiety is
so great that they commonly neglect to form and correct their judgment on
the value of the things which may be chosen as ends.
There is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually such to
all rational beings (so far as imperatives apply to them, viz. as dependent
beings), and therefore, one purpose which they not merely MAY have, but
which we may with certainty assume that they all actually HAVE by a
natural necessity, and this is HAPPINESS. The hypothetical imperative
Page 379
which expresses the practical necessity of an action as means to the
advancement of happiness is Assertorial. We are not to present it as
necessary for an uncertain and merely possible purpose, but for a purpose
which we may presuppose with certainty and a priori in every man, because
it belongs to his being. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest
well- being may be called prudence [The word prudence is taken in two
senses; in the one it may bear the name of knowledge of the world, in the
other that of private prudence. The former is a man's ability to influence
others so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to
combine all these purposes for his own lasting benefit. This latter is
properly that to which the value even of the former is reduced, and when a
man is prudent in the former sense, but not in the latter, we might better say
of him that he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent.
Compare on the difference between klug and gescheu here alluded to,
Anthropologie, 45, ed. Schubert, p. no.] in the narrowest sense. And thus
the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness,
i. e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not
commanded absolutely, but only as means to another purpose.
Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct
immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be
attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of
the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is
itself a result, and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental
disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be
called that of Morality.
There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these three
sorts of principles in the DISSIMILARITY of the obligation of the will. In
order to mark this difference more clearly, I think they would be most
suitably named in their order if we said they are either RULES of skill, or
advancement of happiness is Assertorial. We are not to present it as
necessary for an uncertain and merely possible purpose, but for a purpose
which we may presuppose with certainty and a priori in every man, because
it belongs to his being. Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest
well- being may be called prudence [The word prudence is taken in two
senses; in the one it may bear the name of knowledge of the world, in the
other that of private prudence. The former is a man's ability to influence
others so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity to
combine all these purposes for his own lasting benefit. This latter is
properly that to which the value even of the former is reduced, and when a
man is prudent in the former sense, but not in the latter, we might better say
of him that he is clever and cunning, but, on the whole, imprudent.
Compare on the difference between klug and gescheu here alluded to,
Anthropologie, 45, ed. Schubert, p. no.] in the narrowest sense. And thus
the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness,
i. e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not
commanded absolutely, but only as means to another purpose.
Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct
immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be
attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of
the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is
itself a result, and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental
disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be
called that of Morality.
There is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these three
sorts of principles in the DISSIMILARITY of the obligation of the will. In
order to mark this difference more clearly, I think they would be most
suitably named in their order if we said they are either RULES of skill, or
Page 380
COUNSELS of prudence, or COMMANDS (LAWS) of morality. For it is
LAW only that involves the conception of an UNCONDITIONAL and
objective necessity, which is consequently universally valid; and commands
are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in
opposition to inclination. COUNSELS, indeed, involve necessity, but one
which can only hold under a contingent subjective condition, viz. they
depend on whether this or that man reckons this or that as part of his
happiness; the categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any
condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be
quite properly called a command. We might also call the first kind of
imperatives TECHNICAL (belonging to art), the second PRAGMATIC (to
welfare), [It seems to me that the proper signification of the word pragmatic
may be most accurately defined in this way. For sanctions [see Cr. of Pract.
Reas., p. 271] are called pragmatic which flow properly, not from the law of
the states as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general
welfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches prudence, i. e.
instructs the world how it can provide for its interests better, or at least as
well as the men of former time.]; the third MORAL (belonging to free
conduct generally, that is, to morals).
Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible? This
question does not seek to know how we can conceive the accomplishment
of the action which the imperative ordains, but merely how we can conceive
the obligation of the will which the imperative expresses. No special
explanation is needed to show how an imperative of skill is possible.
Whoever wills the end, wills also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the
means in his power which are indispensably necessary thereto. This
proposition is, as regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as
my effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an acting
cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the imperative educes from
the conception of volition of an end the conception of actions necessary to
LAW only that involves the conception of an UNCONDITIONAL and
objective necessity, which is consequently universally valid; and commands
are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, even in
opposition to inclination. COUNSELS, indeed, involve necessity, but one
which can only hold under a contingent subjective condition, viz. they
depend on whether this or that man reckons this or that as part of his
happiness; the categorical imperative, on the contrary, is not limited by any
condition, and as being absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be
quite properly called a command. We might also call the first kind of
imperatives TECHNICAL (belonging to art), the second PRAGMATIC (to
welfare), [It seems to me that the proper signification of the word pragmatic
may be most accurately defined in this way. For sanctions [see Cr. of Pract.
Reas., p. 271] are called pragmatic which flow properly, not from the law of
the states as necessary enactments, but from precaution for the general
welfare. A history is composed pragmatically when it teaches prudence, i. e.
instructs the world how it can provide for its interests better, or at least as
well as the men of former time.]; the third MORAL (belonging to free
conduct generally, that is, to morals).
Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives possible? This
question does not seek to know how we can conceive the accomplishment
of the action which the imperative ordains, but merely how we can conceive
the obligation of the will which the imperative expresses. No special
explanation is needed to show how an imperative of skill is possible.
Whoever wills the end, wills also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the
means in his power which are indispensably necessary thereto. This
proposition is, as regards the volition, analytical; for, in willing an object as
my effect, there is already thought the causality of myself as an acting
cause, that is to say, the use of the means; and the imperative educes from
the conception of volition of an end the conception of actions necessary to
Page 381
this end. Synthetical propositions must no doubt be employed in denning
the means to a proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act
of the will, but the object and its realization. Ex. gr., that in order to bisect a
line on an unerring principle I must draw from its extremities two
intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical
propositions; but if I know that it is only by this process that the intended
operation can be performed, then to say that if I fully will the operation, I
also will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for it is one
and the same thing to conceive something as an effect which I can produce
in a certain way, and to conceive myself as acting in this way.
If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of happiness,
the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with those of skill,
and would likewise be analytical. For in this case as in that, it could be said,
whoever wills the end, wills also (according to the dictate of reason
necessarily) the indispensable means thereto which are in his power. But,
unfortunately, the notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every
man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently
what it is that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all the
elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether empirical,
i. e. they must be borrowed from experience, and nevertheless the idea of
happiness requires an absolute whole, a maximum of welfare in my present
and all future circumstances. Now it is impossible that the most clear-
sighted, and at the same time most powerful being (supposed finite), should
frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does
he will riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby
draw upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment,
perhaps it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him
so much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him, and
that cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires, which
already give him concern enough. Would he have long life, who guarantees
the means to a proposed end; but they do not concern the principle, the act
of the will, but the object and its realization. Ex. gr., that in order to bisect a
line on an unerring principle I must draw from its extremities two
intersecting arcs; this no doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical
propositions; but if I know that it is only by this process that the intended
operation can be performed, then to say that if I fully will the operation, I
also will the action required for it, is an analytical proposition; for it is one
and the same thing to conceive something as an effect which I can produce
in a certain way, and to conceive myself as acting in this way.
If it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of happiness,
the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with those of skill,
and would likewise be analytical. For in this case as in that, it could be said,
whoever wills the end, wills also (according to the dictate of reason
necessarily) the indispensable means thereto which are in his power. But,
unfortunately, the notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every
man wishes to attain it, yet he never can say definitely and consistently
what it is that he really wishes and wills. The reason of this is that all the
elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether empirical,
i. e. they must be borrowed from experience, and nevertheless the idea of
happiness requires an absolute whole, a maximum of welfare in my present
and all future circumstances. Now it is impossible that the most clear-
sighted, and at the same time most powerful being (supposed finite), should
frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does
he will riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby
draw upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment,
perhaps it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him
so much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him, and
that cannot be avoided, or to impose more wants on his desires, which
already give him concern enough. Would he have long life, who guarantees
Page 382
to him that it would not be a long misery? would he at least have health?
how often has uneasiness of the body restrained from excesses into which
perfect health would have allowed one to fall? and so on. In short he is
unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him
truly happy; because to do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot
therefore act on any definite principles to secure happiness, but only on
empirical counsels, ex. gr. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, &c.,
which experience teaches do, on the average, most promote well- being.
Hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not, strictly speaking,
command at all, that is, they cannot present actions objectively as
practically necessary; that they are rather to be regarded as counsels
(consilia) than precepts (praecepta) of reason, that the problem to determine
certainly and universally what action would promote the happiness of a
rational being is completely insoluble, and consequently no imperative
respecting it is possible which should, in the strict sense, command to do
what makes happy; because happiness is not an ideal of reason but of
imagination, resting solely on empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect
that these should define an action by which one could attain the totality of a
series of consequences which is really endless. This imperative of prudence
would however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means to
happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is distinguished from the
imperative of skill only by this, that in the latter the end is merely possible,
in the former it is given; as however both only ordain the means to that
which we suppose to be willed as an end, it follows that the imperative
which ordains the willing of the means to him who wills the end is in both
cases analytical. Thus there is no difficulty in regard to the possibility of an
imperative of this kind either.
On the other hand the question, how the imperative of morality is
possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one? demanding a solution, as this is
not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which it presents cannot
how often has uneasiness of the body restrained from excesses into which
perfect health would have allowed one to fall? and so on. In short he is
unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty what would make him
truly happy; because to do so he would need to be omniscient. We cannot
therefore act on any definite principles to secure happiness, but only on
empirical counsels, ex. gr. of regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve, &c.,
which experience teaches do, on the average, most promote well- being.
Hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not, strictly speaking,
command at all, that is, they cannot present actions objectively as
practically necessary; that they are rather to be regarded as counsels
(consilia) than precepts (praecepta) of reason, that the problem to determine
certainly and universally what action would promote the happiness of a
rational being is completely insoluble, and consequently no imperative
respecting it is possible which should, in the strict sense, command to do
what makes happy; because happiness is not an ideal of reason but of
imagination, resting solely on empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect
that these should define an action by which one could attain the totality of a
series of consequences which is really endless. This imperative of prudence
would however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means to
happiness could be certainly assigned; for it is distinguished from the
imperative of skill only by this, that in the latter the end is merely possible,
in the former it is given; as however both only ordain the means to that
which we suppose to be willed as an end, it follows that the imperative
which ordains the willing of the means to him who wills the end is in both
cases analytical. Thus there is no difficulty in regard to the possibility of an
imperative of this kind either.
On the other hand the question, how the imperative of morality is
possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one? demanding a solution, as this is
not at all hypothetical, and the objective necessity which it presents cannot
Page 383
rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the hypothetical imperatives.
Only here we must never leave out of consideration that we cannot make
out by any example, in other words empirically, whether there is such an
imperative at all; but it is rather to be feared that all those which seem to be
categorical may yet be at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the
precept is: Thou shalt not promise deceitfully; and it is assumed that the
necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so that it
should mean: thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it become known
thou shouldst destroy thy credit, but that an action of this kind must be
regarded as evil in itself, so that the imperative of the prohibition is
categorical; then we cannot show with certainty in any example that the will
was determined merely by the law, without any other spring of action,
although it may appear to be so. For it is always possible that fear of
disgrace, perhaps also obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret
influence on the will. Who can prove by experience the non-existence of a
cause when all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it? But in
such a case the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to be
categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a pragmatic precept,
drawing our attention to our own interests, and merely teaching us to take
these into consideration.
We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a
categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its
reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility
should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the
mean-time it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative
alone has the purport of a practical law: all the rest may indeed be called
principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the
attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself
contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up
the purpose: on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no
Only here we must never leave out of consideration that we cannot make
out by any example, in other words empirically, whether there is such an
imperative at all; but it is rather to be feared that all those which seem to be
categorical may yet be at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the
precept is: Thou shalt not promise deceitfully; and it is assumed that the
necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil, so that it
should mean: thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it become known
thou shouldst destroy thy credit, but that an action of this kind must be
regarded as evil in itself, so that the imperative of the prohibition is
categorical; then we cannot show with certainty in any example that the will
was determined merely by the law, without any other spring of action,
although it may appear to be so. For it is always possible that fear of
disgrace, perhaps also obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret
influence on the will. Who can prove by experience the non-existence of a
cause when all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it? But in
such a case the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to be
categorical and unconditional, would in reality be only a pragmatic precept,
drawing our attention to our own interests, and merely teaching us to take
these into consideration.
We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a
categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its
reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility
should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the
mean-time it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative
alone has the purport of a practical law: all the rest may indeed be called
principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the
attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself
contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up
the purpose: on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no
Page 384
liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that
necessity which we require in a law.
Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality, the
difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very profound one. It is an a
priori synthetical practical proposition; [Footnote: I connect the act with the
will without presupposing any condition resulting from any inclination, but
d priori, and therefore necessarily (though only objectively, i. e. assuming
the idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives). This
is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce the willing of
an action by mere analysis from another already presupposed (for we have
not such a perfect will), but connects it immediately with the conception of
the will of a rational being, as something not contained in it.] and as there is
so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions
of this kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less
with the practical.
In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of a
categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the formula of
it, containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative;
for even if we know the tenor of such absolute command, yet how it is
possible will require further special and laborious study, which we postpone
to the last section.
When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know
beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I
conceive a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For as
the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims
[Footnote: A MAXIM is a subjective principle of action, and must be
distinguished from the objective principle, namely, practical law. The
former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the conditions
necessity which we require in a law.
Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality, the
difficulty (of discerning its possibility) is a very profound one. It is an a
priori synthetical practical proposition; [Footnote: I connect the act with the
will without presupposing any condition resulting from any inclination, but
d priori, and therefore necessarily (though only objectively, i. e. assuming
the idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives). This
is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce the willing of
an action by mere analysis from another already presupposed (for we have
not such a perfect will), but connects it immediately with the conception of
the will of a rational being, as something not contained in it.] and as there is
so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions
of this kind, it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less
with the practical.
In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of a
categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the formula of
it, containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative;
for even if we know the tenor of such absolute command, yet how it is
possible will require further special and laborious study, which we postpone
to the last section.
When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know
beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I
conceive a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For as
the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims
[Footnote: A MAXIM is a subjective principle of action, and must be
distinguished from the objective principle, namely, practical law. The
former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the conditions
Page 385
of the subject (often its ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the
principle on which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle
valid for every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to act
that is an imperative.] shall conform to this law, while the law contains no
conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that
the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this
conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.
[Footnote: I have no doubt that "den" in the original before "Imperativ" is a
misprint for "der," and have translated accordingly. Mr. Semple has done
the same. The editions that I have seen agree in reading "den," and M. Barni
so translates. With this reading, it is the conformity that presents the
imperative as necessary.]
There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only
on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should
become a universal law.
Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative
as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided whether
what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able
to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.
Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced
constiutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to
form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general
laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of
thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature.
We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them
into duties to ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.
[Footnote: It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a
future metaphysic of morals; so that I give it here only as an arbitrary one
principle on which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle
valid for every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to act
that is an imperative.] shall conform to this law, while the law contains no
conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that
the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this
conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.
[Footnote: I have no doubt that "den" in the original before "Imperativ" is a
misprint for "der," and have translated accordingly. Mr. Semple has done
the same. The editions that I have seen agree in reading "den," and M. Barni
so translates. With this reading, it is the conformity that presents the
imperative as necessary.]
There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only
on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should
become a universal law.
Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative
as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided whether
what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able
to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.
Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced
constiutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to
form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general
laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of
thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature.
We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them
into duties to ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.
[Footnote: It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a
future metaphysic of morals; so that I give it here only as an arbitrary one
Page 386
(in order to arrange my examples). For the rest, I understand by a perfect
duty one that admits no exception in favour of inclination, and then I have
not merely external, but also internal perfect duties. This is contrary to the
use of the word adopted in the schools; but I do not intend to justify it here,
as it is all one for my purpose whether it is admitted or not. [Perfect duties
are usually understood to be those which can be enforced by external law;
imperfect, those which cannot be enforced. They are also called
respectively determinate and indeterminate, officia juris and officia
virtutis.]]
I. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of
life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself
whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life.
Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal
law of nature. His maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a principle to
shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than
satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-
love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a
system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the
very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life
would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature;
hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature, and
consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of
all duty. [Footnote: On suicide cf. further Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 274.]
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows
that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to
him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to
make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: Is
it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this
way? Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his
duty one that admits no exception in favour of inclination, and then I have
not merely external, but also internal perfect duties. This is contrary to the
use of the word adopted in the schools; but I do not intend to justify it here,
as it is all one for my purpose whether it is admitted or not. [Perfect duties
are usually understood to be those which can be enforced by external law;
imperfect, those which cannot be enforced. They are also called
respectively determinate and indeterminate, officia juris and officia
virtutis.]]
I. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of
life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself
whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life.
Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal
law of nature. His maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a principle to
shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than
satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-
love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a
system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the
very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life
would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature;
hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature, and
consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of
all duty. [Footnote: On suicide cf. further Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 274.]
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows
that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to
him, unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to
make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: Is
it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this
way? Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his
Page 387
action would be expressed thus: When I think myself in want of money, I
will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never
can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may
perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now
is, Is it right? I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law,
and state the question thus: How would it be if my maxim were a universal
law? Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature,
but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal
law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to
promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise,
the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one
might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was
promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture
might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in
comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to
take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks,
however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing
with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He
sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal
law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rust,
and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and
propagation of their species—in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot
possibly WILL that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted
in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily
wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been
given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to
contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: What
will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never
can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may
perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now
is, Is it right? I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law,
and state the question thus: How would it be if my maxim were a universal
law? Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature,
but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal
law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to
promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise,
the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one
might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was
promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture
might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in
comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to
take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks,
however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing
with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He
sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal
law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rust,
and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and
propagation of their species—in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot
possibly WILL that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted
in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily
wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been
given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to
contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: What
Page 388
concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as heaven pleases, or as he
can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I
do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in
distress! Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the
human race might very well subsist, and doubtless even better than in a
state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care
occasionally to put it into practice, but on the other side, also cheats when
he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although
it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with
that maxim, it is impossible to WILL that such a principle should have the
universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would
contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would
have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law
of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of
the aid he desires.
These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as
such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we
have laid down. We must be ABLE TO WILL that a maxim of our action
should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the
action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim
cannot without contradiction be even CONCEIVED as a universal law of
nature, far from it being possible that we should WILL that it SHOULD be
so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible
to WILL THAT their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of
nature, since such a will would contradict itself. It is easily seen that the
former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; the latter only laxer
(meritorious) duty. Thus it has been completely shown by these examples
how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object
of the action) on the same principle.
can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I
do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in
distress! Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the
human race might very well subsist, and doubtless even better than in a
state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care
occasionally to put it into practice, but on the other side, also cheats when
he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although
it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with
that maxim, it is impossible to WILL that such a principle should have the
universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would
contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would
have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law
of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of
the aid he desires.
These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as
such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we
have laid down. We must be ABLE TO WILL that a maxim of our action
should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the
action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim
cannot without contradiction be even CONCEIVED as a universal law of
nature, far from it being possible that we should WILL that it SHOULD be
so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible
to WILL THAT their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of
nature, since such a will would contradict itself. It is easily seen that the
former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; the latter only laxer
(meritorious) duty. Thus it has been completely shown by these examples
how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object
of the action) on the same principle.
Page 389
If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty,
we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a
universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the contrary we will that the
opposite should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of
making an EXCEPTION in our own favour or (just for this time only) in
favour of our inclination. Consequently if we considered all cases from one
and the same point of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a
contradiction in our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be
objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be
universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment regard
our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and
then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected
by inclination, there is not really any contradiction, but an antagonism of
inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the universality of the
principle is changed into a mere generality, so that the practical principle of
reason shall meet the maxim half way. Now, although this cannot be
justified in our own impartial judgment, yet it proves that we do really
recognise the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all respect for
it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and
forced from us.
We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception
which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it
can only be expressed in categorical, and not at all in hypothetical
imperatives. We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly
and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical
imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a
thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove a priori
that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law which
commands absolutely of itself, and without any other impulse, and that the
following of this law is duty.
we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a
universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the contrary we will that the
opposite should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of
making an EXCEPTION in our own favour or (just for this time only) in
favour of our inclination. Consequently if we considered all cases from one
and the same point of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a
contradiction in our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be
objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be
universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at one moment regard
our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and
then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected
by inclination, there is not really any contradiction, but an antagonism of
inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the universality of the
principle is changed into a mere generality, so that the practical principle of
reason shall meet the maxim half way. Now, although this cannot be
justified in our own impartial judgment, yet it proves that we do really
recognise the validity of the categorical imperative and (with all respect for
it) only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and
forced from us.
We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception
which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it
can only be expressed in categorical, and not at all in hypothetical
imperatives. We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly
and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical
imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a
thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove a priori
that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law which
commands absolutely of itself, and without any other impulse, and that the
following of this law is duty.
Page 390
With the view of attaining to this it is of extreme importance to remember
that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this
principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a
practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all
rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all) and for this reason
only be also a law for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced
from the particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain feelings
and propensions, [Footnote: Kant distinguishes "Hang (propensio)" from
"Neigung (inclinatio)" as follows:—"Hang" is a predisposition to the desire
of some enjoyment; in other words, it is the subjective possibility of
excitement of a certain desire, which precedes the conception of its object.
When the enjoyment has been experienced, it produces a "Neigung"
(inclination) to it, which accordingly is defined "habitual sensible desire."—
Anthropologie, 72, 79; Religion, p. 31.] nay even, if possible, from any
particular tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily
hold for the will of every rational being; this may indeed supply us with a
maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective principle on which we may
have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an objective principle
on which we should be enjoined to act, even though all our propensions,
inclinations, and natural dispositions were opposed to it. In fact the
sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the
more evident, the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they
oppose it, without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the
obligation of the law or to distinguish its validity.
Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it has to
be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to support it either in
heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute dictator of its own
laws, not the herald of those which are whispered to it by an implanted
sense or who knows what tutelary nature. Although these may be better than
nothing, yet they can never afford principles dictated by reason, which must
that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this
principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a
practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all
rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all) and for this reason
only be also a law for all human wills. On the contrary, whatever is deduced
from the particular natural characteristics of humanity, from certain feelings
and propensions, [Footnote: Kant distinguishes "Hang (propensio)" from
"Neigung (inclinatio)" as follows:—"Hang" is a predisposition to the desire
of some enjoyment; in other words, it is the subjective possibility of
excitement of a certain desire, which precedes the conception of its object.
When the enjoyment has been experienced, it produces a "Neigung"
(inclination) to it, which accordingly is defined "habitual sensible desire."—
Anthropologie, 72, 79; Religion, p. 31.] nay even, if possible, from any
particular tendency proper to human reason, and which need not necessarily
hold for the will of every rational being; this may indeed supply us with a
maxim, but not with a law; with a subjective principle on which we may
have a propension and inclination to act, but not with an objective principle
on which we should be enjoined to act, even though all our propensions,
inclinations, and natural dispositions were opposed to it. In fact the
sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the
more evident, the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they
oppose it, without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the
obligation of the law or to distinguish its validity.
Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it has to
be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to support it either in
heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute dictator of its own
laws, not the herald of those which are whispered to it by an implanted
sense or who knows what tutelary nature. Although these may be better than
nothing, yet they can never afford principles dictated by reason, which must
Page 391
have their source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority,
expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect for
it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man to self-contempt
and inward abhorrence.
Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid
to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of
morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will
consists just in this, that the principle of action is free, from all influence of
contingent grounds, which alone experience can furnish. We cannot too
much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit
of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and
laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in
a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it
substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various
derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it; only not like
virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form. [Footnote: To
behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but to contemplate morality
stripped of all admixture of sensible things and of every spurious ornament
of reward or self- love. How much she then eclipses everything else that
appears charming to the affections, every one may readily perceive with the
least exertion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction.]
The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational beings that
they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which they can
themselves will that they should serve as universal laws? If it is so, then it
must be connected (altogether a priori) with the very conception of the will
of a rational being generally. But in order to discover this connexion we
must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a
domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the
metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the reasons
expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect for
it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man to self-contempt
and inward abhorrence.
Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid
to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of
morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will
consists just in this, that the principle of action is free, from all influence of
contingent grounds, which alone experience can furnish. We cannot too
much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit
of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and
laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in
a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it
substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various
derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it; only not like
virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form. [Footnote: To
behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but to contemplate morality
stripped of all admixture of sensible things and of every spurious ornament
of reward or self- love. How much she then eclipses everything else that
appears charming to the affections, every one may readily perceive with the
least exertion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction.]
The question then is this: Is it a necessary law for all rational beings that
they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which they can
themselves will that they should serve as universal laws? If it is so, then it
must be connected (altogether a priori) with the very conception of the will
of a rational being generally. But in order to discover this connexion we
must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, although into a
domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely, the
metaphysic of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the reasons
Page 392
of what happens that we have to ascertain, but the laws of what ought to
happen, even although it never does, i. e., objective practical laws, there it is
not necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or
displeases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste, and
whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason; on what
the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and
inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of
reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would
constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy
of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are concerned
with objective practical laws, and consequently with the relation of the will
to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which case whatever
has reference to anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason
of itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of this that
we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a priori.
The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in
accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be
found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the
objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and if this is assigned
by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that
which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the
effect is the end, this is called the means. The subjective ground of the
desire is the spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence
the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs and objective
ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical
principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends, they are
material when they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action.
The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of
his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to
the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which
happen, even although it never does, i. e., objective practical laws, there it is
not necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or
displeases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste, and
whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason; on what
the feeling of pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and
inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the co-operation of
reason: for all this belongs to an empirical psychology, which would
constitute the second part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy
of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But here we are concerned
with objective practical laws, and consequently with the relation of the will
to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which case whatever
has reference to anything empirical is necessarily excluded; since if reason
of itself alone determines the conduct (and it is the possibility of this that
we are now investigating), it must necessarily do so a priori.
The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in
accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be
found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the
objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and if this is assigned
by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that
which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the
effect is the end, this is called the means. The subjective ground of the
desire is the spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence
the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs and objective
ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical
principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends, they are
material when they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action.
The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of
his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to
the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which
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therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational
beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these
relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.
Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in
itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a
source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would He the source of a
possible categorical imperative, i. e., a practical law.
Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in
himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but
in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings,
must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the
inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the
wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without
value. But the inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far
from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on the
contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly
free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our
action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our
will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a
relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on
the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as
ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as
means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of
respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence
has a worth for us as an effect of our action but objective ends, that is things
whose existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can
be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise
nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were
beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these
relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.
Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in
itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a
source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would He the source of a
possible categorical imperative, i. e., a practical law.
Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in
himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but
in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings,
must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the
inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the
wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without
value. But the inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far
from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on the
contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly
free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our
action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our
will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a
relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on
the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as
ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as
means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of
respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence
has a worth for us as an effect of our action but objective ends, that is things
whose existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can
be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise
nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were
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conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme
practical principle of reason whatever.
If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human
will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the
conception of that which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an
end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore
serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is:
rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own
existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human
actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just
on the same rational principle that holds for me: [Footnote: This proposition
is here stated as a postulate. The grounds of it will be found in the
concluding section.] so that it is at the same time an objective principle,
from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable
of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows:
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now
inquire whether this can be practically carried out.
To abide by the previous examples:
Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who
contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be
consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys
himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person
merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But
a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as
means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in
himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person
so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to
practical principle of reason whatever.
If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human
will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the
conception of that which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an
end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore
serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is:
rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own
existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human
actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just
on the same rational principle that holds for me: [Footnote: This proposition
is here stated as a postulate. The grounds of it will be found in the
concluding section.] so that it is at the same time an objective principle,
from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable
of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows:
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will now
inquire whether this can be practically carried out.
To abide by the previous examples:
Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who
contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be
consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys
himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person
merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But
a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as
means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in
himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person
so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to
Page 395
define this principle more precisely so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e.
g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself; as to
exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, &c. This question is
therefore omitted here.)
Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation,
towards others; he who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will
see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without
the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I
propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly
assent to my mode of acting towards him, and therefore cannot himself
contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in
other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom
and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the
rights of men, intends to use the person of others merely as means, without
considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as
ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the
end of the very same action. [Footnote: Let it not be thought that the
common: quod tibi non vis fieri, &c., could serve here as the rule or
principle. For it is only a deduction from the former, though with several
limitations; it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle
of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for many a
one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only
that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finally
that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this principle the
criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him, and so on.]
Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself; it is not
enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an
end in itself, it must also harmonise with it. Now there are in humanity
capacities of greater perfection which belong to the end that nature has in
g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself; as to
exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, &c. This question is
therefore omitted here.)
Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation,
towards others; he who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will
see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without
the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I
propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly
assent to my mode of acting towards him, and therefore cannot himself
contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in
other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom
and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the
rights of men, intends to use the person of others merely as means, without
considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as
ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the
end of the very same action. [Footnote: Let it not be thought that the
common: quod tibi non vis fieri, &c., could serve here as the rule or
principle. For it is only a deduction from the former, though with several
limitations; it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle
of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for many a
one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only
that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finally
that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this principle the
criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him, and so on.]
Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself; it is not
enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an
end in itself, it must also harmonise with it. Now there are in humanity
capacities of greater perfection which belong to the end that nature has in
Page 396
view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these
might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in
itself, but not with the advancement of this end.
Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: the natural end
which all men have in their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed
subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of
others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but
after all, this would only harmonise negatively not positively with humanity
as an end in itself, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies,
to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in
himself, ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to
have its full effect with me.
This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an
end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every man's
freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it is
universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience
is not capable of determining anything about them; secondly, because it
does not present humanity as an end to men (subjectively), that is as an
object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an
objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting
condition of all our subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must
therefore spring from pure, reason. In fact the objective principle of all
practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its
form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e. g., a law
of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the second
principle the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an
end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is
the ultimate condition of its harmony with the universal practical reason,
might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in
itself, but not with the advancement of this end.
Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: the natural end
which all men have in their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed
subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of
others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but
after all, this would only harmonise negatively not positively with humanity
as an end in itself, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies,
to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in
himself, ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to
have its full effect with me.
This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an
end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every man's
freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it is
universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience
is not capable of determining anything about them; secondly, because it
does not present humanity as an end to men (subjectively), that is as an
object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an
objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting
condition of all our subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must
therefore spring from pure, reason. In fact the objective principle of all
practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its
form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e. g., a law
of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the second
principle the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an
end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is
the ultimate condition of its harmony with the universal practical reason,
Page 397
viz.: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative
will.
On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent with the
will being itself universal legislator. Thus the will is not subject simply to
the law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the law, and
on this ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the
author).
In the previous imperatives, namely, that based on the conception of the
conformity of actions to general laws, as in a physical system of nature, and
that based on the universal prerogative of rational beings as ends in
themselves—these imperatives just because they were conceived as
categorical, excluded from any share in their authority all admixture of any
interest as a spring of action; they were however only assumed to be
categorical, because such an assumption was necessary to explain the
conception of duty. But we could not prove independently that there are
practical propositions which command categorically, nor can it be proved in
this section; one thing however could be done, namely, to indicate in the
imperative itself by some determinate expression, that in the case of
volition from duty all interest is renounced, which is the specific criterion of
categorical as distinguished from hypothetical imperatives. This is done in
the present (third) formula of the principle, namely, in the idea of the will of
every rational being as a universally legislating will.
For although a will which is subject to laws may be attached to this law
by means of an interest, yet a will which is itself a supreme lawgiver so far
as it is such cannot possibly depend on any interest, since a will so
dependent would itself still need another law restricting the interest of its
self-love by the condition that it should be valid as universal law.
will.
On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent with the
will being itself universal legislator. Thus the will is not subject simply to
the law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the law, and
on this ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the
author).
In the previous imperatives, namely, that based on the conception of the
conformity of actions to general laws, as in a physical system of nature, and
that based on the universal prerogative of rational beings as ends in
themselves—these imperatives just because they were conceived as
categorical, excluded from any share in their authority all admixture of any
interest as a spring of action; they were however only assumed to be
categorical, because such an assumption was necessary to explain the
conception of duty. But we could not prove independently that there are
practical propositions which command categorically, nor can it be proved in
this section; one thing however could be done, namely, to indicate in the
imperative itself by some determinate expression, that in the case of
volition from duty all interest is renounced, which is the specific criterion of
categorical as distinguished from hypothetical imperatives. This is done in
the present (third) formula of the principle, namely, in the idea of the will of
every rational being as a universally legislating will.
For although a will which is subject to laws may be attached to this law
by means of an interest, yet a will which is itself a supreme lawgiver so far
as it is such cannot possibly depend on any interest, since a will so
dependent would itself still need another law restricting the interest of its
self-love by the condition that it should be valid as universal law.
Page 398
Thus the principle that every human will is a will which in all its maxims
gives universal laws [Footnote: I may be excused from adducing examples
to elucidate this principle, as those which have already been used to
elucidate the categorical imperative and its formula would all serve for the
like purpose here.] provided it be otherwise justified, would be very well
adapted to be the categorical imperative, in this respect, namely, that just
because of the idea of universal legislation it is not based on any interest,
and therefore it alone among all possible imperatives can be unconditional.
Or still better, converting the proposition, if there is a categorical imperative
(i.e. a law for the will of every rational being), it can only command that
everything be done from maxims of one's will regarded as a will which
could at the same time will that it should itself give universal laws, for in
that case only the practical principle and the imperative which it obeys are
unconditional, since they cannot be based on any interest.
Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle of
morality, we need not wonder why they all fail. It was seen that man was
bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed that the laws to which he is
subject are only those of his own giving, though at the same time they are
universal, and that he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will;
a will, however, which is designed by nature to give universal laws. For
when one has conceived man only as subject to a law (no matter what), then
this law required some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint,
since it did not originate as a law from his own will, but this will was
according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain manner.
Now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in finding a
supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men never elicited duty,
but only a necessity of acting from a certain interest. Whether this interest
was private or otherwise, in any case the imperative must be conditional,
and could not by any means be capable of being a moral command. I will
therefore call this the principle of Autonomy of the will, in contrast with
gives universal laws [Footnote: I may be excused from adducing examples
to elucidate this principle, as those which have already been used to
elucidate the categorical imperative and its formula would all serve for the
like purpose here.] provided it be otherwise justified, would be very well
adapted to be the categorical imperative, in this respect, namely, that just
because of the idea of universal legislation it is not based on any interest,
and therefore it alone among all possible imperatives can be unconditional.
Or still better, converting the proposition, if there is a categorical imperative
(i.e. a law for the will of every rational being), it can only command that
everything be done from maxims of one's will regarded as a will which
could at the same time will that it should itself give universal laws, for in
that case only the practical principle and the imperative which it obeys are
unconditional, since they cannot be based on any interest.
Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle of
morality, we need not wonder why they all fail. It was seen that man was
bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed that the laws to which he is
subject are only those of his own giving, though at the same time they are
universal, and that he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will;
a will, however, which is designed by nature to give universal laws. For
when one has conceived man only as subject to a law (no matter what), then
this law required some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint,
since it did not originate as a law from his own will, but this will was
according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain manner.
Now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in finding a
supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men never elicited duty,
but only a necessity of acting from a certain interest. Whether this interest
was private or otherwise, in any case the imperative must be conditional,
and could not by any means be capable of being a moral command. I will
therefore call this the principle of Autonomy of the will, in contrast with
Page 399
every other which I accordingly reckon as Heteronomy? [Footnote: Cp.
"Critical Examination of Practical Reason," p. 184.]
The conception of every rational being as one which must consider itself
as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself
and its actions from this point of view—this conception leads to another
which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely, that of a kingdom of ends.
By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in a
system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are determined
as regards their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the personal
differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their
private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic
whole (including both rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the
special ends which each may propose to himself), that is to say, we can
conceive a kingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles is possible.
For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat
itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same
time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic union of rational
beings by common objective laws, i.e. a kingdom which may be called a
kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of
these beings to one another as ends and means. It is certainly only an ideal.
A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when,
although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws.
He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, he is not subject to
the will of any other.
A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as
member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by
the freedom of will. He cannot, however, maintain the latter position merely
"Critical Examination of Practical Reason," p. 184.]
The conception of every rational being as one which must consider itself
as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself
and its actions from this point of view—this conception leads to another
which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely, that of a kingdom of ends.
By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings in a
system by common laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are determined
as regards their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the personal
differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their
private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic
whole (including both rational beings as ends in themselves, and also the
special ends which each may propose to himself), that is to say, we can
conceive a kingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles is possible.
For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat
itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case at the same
time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic union of rational
beings by common objective laws, i.e. a kingdom which may be called a
kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of
these beings to one another as ends and means. It is certainly only an ideal.
A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when,
although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws.
He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, he is not subject to
the will of any other.
A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as
member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by
the freedom of will. He cannot, however, maintain the latter position merely
Page 400
by the maxims of his will, but only in case he is a completely independent
being without wants and with unrestricted power adequate to his will.
Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the legislation
which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This legislation must
be capable of existing in every rational being, and of emanating from his
will, so that the principle of this will is, never to act on any maxim which
could not without contradiction be also a universal law, and accordingly
always so to act that the will could at the same time regard itself as giving
in its maxims universal laws. If now the maxims of rational beings are not
by their own nature coincident with this objective principle, then the
necessity of acting on it is called practical necessitation, i. e., duty. Duty
does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it does to every
member of it and to all in the same degree.
The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i. e., duty, does not rest
at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but solely on the relation of
rational beings to one another, a relation in which the will of a rational
being must always be regarded as legislative, since otherwise it could not be
conceived as an end in itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will,
regarding it as legislating universally, to every other will and also to every
action towards oneself; and this not on account of any other practical
motive or any future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of a
rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself also gives.
In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity. Whatever
has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent;
whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no
equivalent, has a dignity.
Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind
has a market value; whatever, without presupposing a want, corresponds to
being without wants and with unrestricted power adequate to his will.
Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the legislation
which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This legislation must
be capable of existing in every rational being, and of emanating from his
will, so that the principle of this will is, never to act on any maxim which
could not without contradiction be also a universal law, and accordingly
always so to act that the will could at the same time regard itself as giving
in its maxims universal laws. If now the maxims of rational beings are not
by their own nature coincident with this objective principle, then the
necessity of acting on it is called practical necessitation, i. e., duty. Duty
does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it does to every
member of it and to all in the same degree.
The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i. e., duty, does not rest
at all on feelings, impulses, or inclinations, but solely on the relation of
rational beings to one another, a relation in which the will of a rational
being must always be regarded as legislative, since otherwise it could not be
conceived as an end in itself. Reason then refers every maxim of the will,
regarding it as legislating universally, to every other will and also to every
action towards oneself; and this not on account of any other practical
motive or any future advantage, but from the idea of the dignity of a
rational being, obeying no law but that which he himself also gives.
In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value or Dignity. Whatever
has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent;
whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no
equivalent, has a dignity.
Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind
has a market value; whatever, without presupposing a want, corresponds to
Page 401
a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of our
faculties, has a fancy value; but that which constitutes the condition under
which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative
worth, i. e., value, but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity.
Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be
an end in himself, since by this alone it is possible that he should be a
legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus morality, and humanity as
capable of it, is that which alone has dignity. Skill and diligence in labour
have a market value; wit, lively imagination, and humour, have fancy value;
on the other hand, fidelity to promises, benevolence from principle (not
from instinct), have an intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor art contains
anything which in default of these it could put in their place, for their worth
consists not in the effects which spring from them, not in the use and
advantage which they secure, but in the disposition of mind, that is, the
maxims of the will which are ready to manifest themselves in such actions,
even though they should not have the desired effect. These actions also
need no recommendation from any subjective taste or sentiment, that they
may be looked on with immediate favour and satisfaction: they need no
immediate propension or feeling for them; they exhibit the will that
performs them as an object of an immediate respect, and nothing but reason
is required to IMPOSE them on the will; not to FLATTER it into them,
which, in the case of duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation
therefore shows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity, and places it
infinitely above all value, with which it cannot for a moment be brought
into comparison or competition without as it were violating its sanctity.
What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good disposition, in
making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than the privilege it secures to
the rational being of participating in the giving of universal laws, by which
it qualifies him to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege
faculties, has a fancy value; but that which constitutes the condition under
which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative
worth, i. e., value, but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity.
Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be
an end in himself, since by this alone it is possible that he should be a
legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus morality, and humanity as
capable of it, is that which alone has dignity. Skill and diligence in labour
have a market value; wit, lively imagination, and humour, have fancy value;
on the other hand, fidelity to promises, benevolence from principle (not
from instinct), have an intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor art contains
anything which in default of these it could put in their place, for their worth
consists not in the effects which spring from them, not in the use and
advantage which they secure, but in the disposition of mind, that is, the
maxims of the will which are ready to manifest themselves in such actions,
even though they should not have the desired effect. These actions also
need no recommendation from any subjective taste or sentiment, that they
may be looked on with immediate favour and satisfaction: they need no
immediate propension or feeling for them; they exhibit the will that
performs them as an object of an immediate respect, and nothing but reason
is required to IMPOSE them on the will; not to FLATTER it into them,
which, in the case of duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation
therefore shows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity, and places it
infinitely above all value, with which it cannot for a moment be brought
into comparison or competition without as it were violating its sanctity.
What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good disposition, in
making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than the privilege it secures to
the rational being of participating in the giving of universal laws, by which
it qualifies him to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege
Page 402
to which he was already destined by his own nature as being an end in
himself, and on that account legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as
regards all laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he
himself gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal
law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has any
worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself which
assigns the worth of everything, must for that very reason possess dignity,
that is an unconditional incomparable worth, and the word RESPECT alone
supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a rational being must
have for it. AUTONOMY then is the basis of the dignity of human and of
every rational nature.
The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have been
adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and
each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a difference in
them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively practical, intended
namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to intuition (by means of a
certain analogy), and thereby nearer to feeling. All maxims, in fact, have—
1. A FORM, consisting in universality; and in this view the formula of
the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the maxims must be so chosen
as if they were to serve as universal laws of nature.
2. A MATTER [Footnote: The reading "Maxima," which is that both of
Rosenkranz and Hartenstein, is obviously an error for "Materie."] namely,
an end, and here the formula says that the rational being, as it is an end by
its own nature and therefore an end in itself, must in every maxim serve as
the condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends.
3. A COMPLETE CHARACTERISATION of all maxims by means of
that formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to
harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature.
himself, and on that account legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as
regards all laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he
himself gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal
law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has any
worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself which
assigns the worth of everything, must for that very reason possess dignity,
that is an unconditional incomparable worth, and the word RESPECT alone
supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a rational being must
have for it. AUTONOMY then is the basis of the dignity of human and of
every rational nature.
The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have been
adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and
each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a difference in
them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively practical, intended
namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to intuition (by means of a
certain analogy), and thereby nearer to feeling. All maxims, in fact, have—
1. A FORM, consisting in universality; and in this view the formula of
the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the maxims must be so chosen
as if they were to serve as universal laws of nature.
2. A MATTER [Footnote: The reading "Maxima," which is that both of
Rosenkranz and Hartenstein, is obviously an error for "Materie."] namely,
an end, and here the formula says that the rational being, as it is an end by
its own nature and therefore an end in itself, must in every maxim serve as
the condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends.
3. A COMPLETE CHARACTERISATION of all maxims by means of
that formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to
harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature.
Page 403
[Footnote: Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; Ethics regards
a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case, the
kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted to explain what actually is. In
the latter it is a practical idea, adopted to bring about that which is not yet,
but which can be realised by our conduct, namely, if it conforms to this
idea.] There is a progress here in the order of the categories of UNITY of
the form of the will (its universality), PLURALITY of the matter (the
objects, i. e. the ends), and TOTALITY of the system of these. In forming
our moral JUDGMENT of actions it is better to proceed always on the strict
method, and start from the general formula of the categorical imperative:
ACT ACCORDING TO A MAXIM WHICH CAN AT THE SAME TIME
MAKE ITSELF A UNIVERSAL LAW. If, however, we wish to gain an
ENTRANCE for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and the same
action under the three specified conceptions, and thereby as far as possible
to bring it nearer to intuition.
We can now end where we started at the beginning, namely, with the
conception of a will unconditionally good. THAT WILL is ABSOLUTELY
GOOD which cannot be evil, in other words, whose maxim, if made a
universal law, could never contradict itself. This principle then is its
supreme law: Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time
will to be a universal law; this is the sole condition under which a will can
never contradict itself; and such an imperative is categorical. Since the
validity of the will as a universal law for possible actions is analogous to
the universal connexion of the existence of things by general laws, which is
the formal notion of nature in general, the categorical imperative can also
be expressed thus: ACT ON MAXIMS WHICH CAN AT THE SAME
TIME HAVE FOR THEIR OBJECT THEMSELVES AS UNIVERSAL
LAWS OF NATURE. Such then is the formula of an absolutely good will.
a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case, the
kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted to explain what actually is. In
the latter it is a practical idea, adopted to bring about that which is not yet,
but which can be realised by our conduct, namely, if it conforms to this
idea.] There is a progress here in the order of the categories of UNITY of
the form of the will (its universality), PLURALITY of the matter (the
objects, i. e. the ends), and TOTALITY of the system of these. In forming
our moral JUDGMENT of actions it is better to proceed always on the strict
method, and start from the general formula of the categorical imperative:
ACT ACCORDING TO A MAXIM WHICH CAN AT THE SAME TIME
MAKE ITSELF A UNIVERSAL LAW. If, however, we wish to gain an
ENTRANCE for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and the same
action under the three specified conceptions, and thereby as far as possible
to bring it nearer to intuition.
We can now end where we started at the beginning, namely, with the
conception of a will unconditionally good. THAT WILL is ABSOLUTELY
GOOD which cannot be evil, in other words, whose maxim, if made a
universal law, could never contradict itself. This principle then is its
supreme law: Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time
will to be a universal law; this is the sole condition under which a will can
never contradict itself; and such an imperative is categorical. Since the
validity of the will as a universal law for possible actions is analogous to
the universal connexion of the existence of things by general laws, which is
the formal notion of nature in general, the categorical imperative can also
be expressed thus: ACT ON MAXIMS WHICH CAN AT THE SAME
TIME HAVE FOR THEIR OBJECT THEMSELVES AS UNIVERSAL
LAWS OF NATURE. Such then is the formula of an absolutely good will.
Page 404
Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets
before itself an end. This end would be the matter of every good will. But
since in the idea of a will that is absolutely good without being limited by
any condition (of attaining this or that end) we must abstract wholly from
every end TO BE EFFECTED (since this would make every will only
relatively good), it follows that in this case the end must be conceived, not
as an end to be effected, but as an INDEPENDENTLY existing end.
Consequently it is conceived only negatively, i.e., as that which we must
never act against, and which, therefore, must never be regarded merely as
means, but must in every volition be esteemed as an end likewise. Now this
end can be nothing but the subject of all possible ends, since this is also the
subject of a possible absolutely good will; for such a will cannot without
contradiction be postponed to any other object. The principle: So act in
regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may always have
place in thy maxim as an end in himself, is accordingly essentially identical
with this other: Act upon a maxim which, at the same time, involves its own
universal validity for every rational being. For that in using means for every
end I should limit my maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law
for every subject, this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental
principle of all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends, i. e.,
the rational being himself, be never employed merely as means, but as the
supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in every case as
an end likewise.
It follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any rational being may be
subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard himself as also
legislating universally in respect of these same laws, since it is just this
fitness of his maxims for universal legislation that distinguishes him as an
end in himself; also it follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative)
above all mere physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from
the point of view which regards himself, and likewise every other rational
before itself an end. This end would be the matter of every good will. But
since in the idea of a will that is absolutely good without being limited by
any condition (of attaining this or that end) we must abstract wholly from
every end TO BE EFFECTED (since this would make every will only
relatively good), it follows that in this case the end must be conceived, not
as an end to be effected, but as an INDEPENDENTLY existing end.
Consequently it is conceived only negatively, i.e., as that which we must
never act against, and which, therefore, must never be regarded merely as
means, but must in every volition be esteemed as an end likewise. Now this
end can be nothing but the subject of all possible ends, since this is also the
subject of a possible absolutely good will; for such a will cannot without
contradiction be postponed to any other object. The principle: So act in
regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may always have
place in thy maxim as an end in himself, is accordingly essentially identical
with this other: Act upon a maxim which, at the same time, involves its own
universal validity for every rational being. For that in using means for every
end I should limit my maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law
for every subject, this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental
principle of all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends, i. e.,
the rational being himself, be never employed merely as means, but as the
supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in every case as
an end likewise.
It follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any rational being may be
subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard himself as also
legislating universally in respect of these same laws, since it is just this
fitness of his maxims for universal legislation that distinguishes him as an
end in himself; also it follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative)
above all mere physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from
the point of view which regards himself, and likewise every other rational
Page 405
being, as lawgiving beings (on which account they are called persons). In
this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is possible as a
kingdom of ends, and this by virtue of the legislation proper to all persons
as members. Therefore every rational being must so act as if he were by his
maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of
ends. The formal principle of these maxims is: So act as if thy maxim were
to serve likewise as the universal law (of all rational beings). A kingdom of
ends is thus only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature, the former
however only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the latter only by the
laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from without.
Nevertheless, although the system of nature is looked upon as a machine,
yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its ends, it is given on this
account the name of a kingdom of nature. Now such a kingdom of ends
would be actually realised by means of maxims conforming to the canon
which the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings, IF THEY
WERE UNIVERSALLY FOLLOWED. But although a rational being, even
if he punctually follows this maxim himself, cannot reckon upon all others
being therefore true to the same, nor expect that the kingdom of nature and
its orderly arrangements shall be in harmony with him as a fitting member,
so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he himself contributes, that is to
say, that it shall favour his expectation of happiness, still that law: Act
according to the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends
legislating in it universally, remains in its full force, inasmuch as it
commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox lies; that the
mere dignity of a man as a rational creature, without any other end or
advantage to be attained thereby, in other words, respect for a mere idea,
should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the will, and that it is precisely
in this independence of the maxim on all such springs of action that its
sublimity consists; and it is this that makes every rational subject worthy to
be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends: for otherwise he would
this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is possible as a
kingdom of ends, and this by virtue of the legislation proper to all persons
as members. Therefore every rational being must so act as if he were by his
maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of
ends. The formal principle of these maxims is: So act as if thy maxim were
to serve likewise as the universal law (of all rational beings). A kingdom of
ends is thus only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature, the former
however only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the latter only by the
laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from without.
Nevertheless, although the system of nature is looked upon as a machine,
yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its ends, it is given on this
account the name of a kingdom of nature. Now such a kingdom of ends
would be actually realised by means of maxims conforming to the canon
which the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings, IF THEY
WERE UNIVERSALLY FOLLOWED. But although a rational being, even
if he punctually follows this maxim himself, cannot reckon upon all others
being therefore true to the same, nor expect that the kingdom of nature and
its orderly arrangements shall be in harmony with him as a fitting member,
so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he himself contributes, that is to
say, that it shall favour his expectation of happiness, still that law: Act
according to the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends
legislating in it universally, remains in its full force, inasmuch as it
commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox lies; that the
mere dignity of a man as a rational creature, without any other end or
advantage to be attained thereby, in other words, respect for a mere idea,
should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the will, and that it is precisely
in this independence of the maxim on all such springs of action that its
sublimity consists; and it is this that makes every rational subject worthy to
be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends: for otherwise he would
Page 406
have to be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his wants. And
although we should suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of
ends to be united under one sovereign, so that the latter kingdom thereby
ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality, then it would no doubt
gain the accession of a strong spring, but by no means any increase of its
intrinsic worth. For this sole absolute lawgiver must, notwithstanding this,
be always conceived as estimating the worth of rational beings only by their
disinterested behaviour, as prescribed to themselves from that idea [the
dignity of man] alone. The essence of things is not altered by their external
relations, and that which abstracting from these, alone constitutes the
absolute worth of man, is also that by which he must be judged, whoever
the judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being. MORALITY then is the
relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to the potential
universal legislation by its maxims. An action that is consistent with the
autonomy of the will is PERMITTED; one that does not agree therewith is
FORBIDDEN. A will whose maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of
autonomy is a HOLY will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not
absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (moral necessitation) is
obligation. This then cannot be applied to a holy being. The objective
necessity of actions from obligation is called DUTY.
From what has just been said, it is easy to see how it happens that
although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law, we yet
ascribe a certain DIGNITY and sublimity to the person who fulfills all his
duties. There is not, indeed, any sublimity in him, so far as he is subject to
the moral law; but inasmuch as in regard to that very law he is like-wise a
legislator, and on that account alone subject to it, he has sublimity. We have
also shown above that neither fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the
law, is the spring which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so
far as we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are
potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is the
although we should suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of
ends to be united under one sovereign, so that the latter kingdom thereby
ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality, then it would no doubt
gain the accession of a strong spring, but by no means any increase of its
intrinsic worth. For this sole absolute lawgiver must, notwithstanding this,
be always conceived as estimating the worth of rational beings only by their
disinterested behaviour, as prescribed to themselves from that idea [the
dignity of man] alone. The essence of things is not altered by their external
relations, and that which abstracting from these, alone constitutes the
absolute worth of man, is also that by which he must be judged, whoever
the judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being. MORALITY then is the
relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to the potential
universal legislation by its maxims. An action that is consistent with the
autonomy of the will is PERMITTED; one that does not agree therewith is
FORBIDDEN. A will whose maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of
autonomy is a HOLY will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not
absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (moral necessitation) is
obligation. This then cannot be applied to a holy being. The objective
necessity of actions from obligation is called DUTY.
From what has just been said, it is easy to see how it happens that
although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law, we yet
ascribe a certain DIGNITY and sublimity to the person who fulfills all his
duties. There is not, indeed, any sublimity in him, so far as he is subject to
the moral law; but inasmuch as in regard to that very law he is like-wise a
legislator, and on that account alone subject to it, he has sublimity. We have
also shown above that neither fear nor inclination, but simply respect for the
law, is the spring which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, so
far as we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are
potentially universal laws, this ideal will which is possible to us is the
Page 407
proper object of respect, and the dignity of humanity consists just in this
capacity of being universally legislative, though with the condition that it is
itself subject to this same legislation.
The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality
Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself
(independently on any property of the objects of volition). The principle of
autonomy then is: Always so to choose that the same volition shall
comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law. We cannot prove
that this practical rule is an imperative, i.e., that the will of every rational
being is necessarily bound to it as a condition, by a mere analysis of the
conceptions which occur in it, since it is a synthetical proposition; we must
advance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical examination of the
subject, that is of the pure practical reason, for this synthetic proposition
which commands apodictically must be capable of being cognised wholly a
priori. This matter, however, does not belong to the present section. But that
the principle of autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be
readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this
analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative, and that
what this commands is neither more nor less than this very autonomy.
Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles of
Morality
If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in
the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation,
consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of
any of its objects, there always results HETERONOMY. The will in that
case does not give itself the law, but it is given by the object through its
relation to the will. This relation whether it rests on inclination or on
conceptions of reason only admits of hypothetical imperatives: I ought to do
capacity of being universally legislative, though with the condition that it is
itself subject to this same legislation.
The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality
Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself
(independently on any property of the objects of volition). The principle of
autonomy then is: Always so to choose that the same volition shall
comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law. We cannot prove
that this practical rule is an imperative, i.e., that the will of every rational
being is necessarily bound to it as a condition, by a mere analysis of the
conceptions which occur in it, since it is a synthetical proposition; we must
advance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical examination of the
subject, that is of the pure practical reason, for this synthetic proposition
which commands apodictically must be capable of being cognised wholly a
priori. This matter, however, does not belong to the present section. But that
the principle of autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be
readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this
analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative, and that
what this commands is neither more nor less than this very autonomy.
Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles of
Morality
If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in
the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation,
consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of
any of its objects, there always results HETERONOMY. The will in that
case does not give itself the law, but it is given by the object through its
relation to the will. This relation whether it rests on inclination or on
conceptions of reason only admits of hypothetical imperatives: I ought to do
Page 408
something BECAUSE I WISH FOR SOMETHING ELSE. On the contrary,
the moral, and therefore categorical, imperative says: I ought to do so and
so, even though I should not wish for anything else. Ex. gr., the former says:
I ought not to lie if I would retain my reputation; the latter says: I ought not
to lie although it should not bring me the least discredit. The latter therefore
must so far abstract from all objects that they shall have no INFLUENCE
on the will, in order that practical reason (will) may not be restricted to
administering an interest not belonging to it, but may simply show its own
commanding authority as the supreme legislation. Thus, ex. gr., I ought to
endeavour to promote the happiness of others, not as if its realization
involved any concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any
satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but simply because a maxim
which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law [Footnote: I
read allgemeines instead of allgemeinem.] in one and the same volition.
Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be founded on the
Conception of Heteronomy.
Here as elsewhere human reason in its pure use, so long as it was not
critically examined, has first tried all possible wrong ways before it
succeeded in finding the one true way.
All principles which can be taken from this point of view are either
EMPIRICAL or RATIONAL. The FORMER, drawn from the principle of
HAPPINESS, are built on physical or moral feelings; the LATTER, drawn
from the principle of PERFECTION, are built either on the rational
conception of perfection as a possible effect, or on that of an independent
perfection (the will of God) as the determining cause of our will.
EMPIRICAL PRINCIPLES are wholly incapable of serving as a
foundation for moral laws. For the universality with which these should
hold for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical
the moral, and therefore categorical, imperative says: I ought to do so and
so, even though I should not wish for anything else. Ex. gr., the former says:
I ought not to lie if I would retain my reputation; the latter says: I ought not
to lie although it should not bring me the least discredit. The latter therefore
must so far abstract from all objects that they shall have no INFLUENCE
on the will, in order that practical reason (will) may not be restricted to
administering an interest not belonging to it, but may simply show its own
commanding authority as the supreme legislation. Thus, ex. gr., I ought to
endeavour to promote the happiness of others, not as if its realization
involved any concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any
satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but simply because a maxim
which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law [Footnote: I
read allgemeines instead of allgemeinem.] in one and the same volition.
Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be founded on the
Conception of Heteronomy.
Here as elsewhere human reason in its pure use, so long as it was not
critically examined, has first tried all possible wrong ways before it
succeeded in finding the one true way.
All principles which can be taken from this point of view are either
EMPIRICAL or RATIONAL. The FORMER, drawn from the principle of
HAPPINESS, are built on physical or moral feelings; the LATTER, drawn
from the principle of PERFECTION, are built either on the rational
conception of perfection as a possible effect, or on that of an independent
perfection (the will of God) as the determining cause of our will.
EMPIRICAL PRINCIPLES are wholly incapable of serving as a
foundation for moral laws. For the universality with which these should
hold for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical
Page 409
necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when their foundation is
taken from the PARTICULAR CONSTITUTION OF HUMAN NATURE,
or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed. The principle of
PRIVATE HAPPINESS, however, is the most objectionable, not merely
because it is false, and experience contradicts the supposition that
prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct, nor yet merely because
it contributes nothing to the establishment of morality—since it is quite a
different thing to make a prosperous man and a good man, or to make one
prudent and sharp- sighted for his own interests, and to make him virtuous
—but because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather
undermine it and destroy its sublimity, since they put the motives to virtue
and to vice in the same class, and only teach us to make a better calculation,
the specific difference between virtue and vice being entirely extinguished.
On the other hand, as to moral feeling, this supposed special sense
[Footnote: I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness,
because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by
the agreeableness that a thing affords, whether it be immediately and
without a view to profit, or whether profit be regarded. We must likewise,
with Hutcheson, class the principle of sympathy with the happiness of
others under his assumed moral sense.] the appeal to it is indeed superficial
when those who cannot THINK believe that FEELING will help them out,
even in what concerns general laws: and besides, feelings which naturally
differ infinitely in degree cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and
evil, nor has anyone a right to form judgments for others by his own
feelings: nevertheless this moral feeling is nearer to morality and its dignity
in this respect, that it pays virtue the honour of ascribing to her
IMMEDIATELY the satisfaction and esteem we have for her, and does not,
as it were, tell her to her face that we are not attached to her by her beauty
but by profit.
taken from the PARTICULAR CONSTITUTION OF HUMAN NATURE,
or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed. The principle of
PRIVATE HAPPINESS, however, is the most objectionable, not merely
because it is false, and experience contradicts the supposition that
prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct, nor yet merely because
it contributes nothing to the establishment of morality—since it is quite a
different thing to make a prosperous man and a good man, or to make one
prudent and sharp- sighted for his own interests, and to make him virtuous
—but because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather
undermine it and destroy its sublimity, since they put the motives to virtue
and to vice in the same class, and only teach us to make a better calculation,
the specific difference between virtue and vice being entirely extinguished.
On the other hand, as to moral feeling, this supposed special sense
[Footnote: I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness,
because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by
the agreeableness that a thing affords, whether it be immediately and
without a view to profit, or whether profit be regarded. We must likewise,
with Hutcheson, class the principle of sympathy with the happiness of
others under his assumed moral sense.] the appeal to it is indeed superficial
when those who cannot THINK believe that FEELING will help them out,
even in what concerns general laws: and besides, feelings which naturally
differ infinitely in degree cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and
evil, nor has anyone a right to form judgments for others by his own
feelings: nevertheless this moral feeling is nearer to morality and its dignity
in this respect, that it pays virtue the honour of ascribing to her
IMMEDIATELY the satisfaction and esteem we have for her, and does not,
as it were, tell her to her face that we are not attached to her by her beauty
but by profit.
Page 410
Amongst the RATIONAL principles of morality, the ontological
conception of PERFECTION, notwithstanding its defects, is better than the
theological conception which derives morality from a Divine absolutely
perfect will. The former is, no doubt, empty and indefinite, and
consequently useless for finding in the boundless field of possible reality
the greatest amount suitable for us; moreover, in attempting to distinguish
specifically the reality of which we are now speaking from every other, it
inevitably tends to turn in a circle, and cannot avoid tacitly presupposing
the morality which it is to explain; it is nevertheless preferable to the
theological view, first, because we have no intuition of the Divine
perfection, and can only deduce it from our own conceptions, the most
important of which is that of morality, and our explanation would thus be
involved in a gross circle; and, in the next place, if we avoid this, the only
notion of the Divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of the
attributes of desire of glory and dominion, combined with the awful
conceptions of might and vengeance, and any system of morals erected on
this foundation would be directly opposed to morality.
However, if I had to choose between the notion of the moral sense and
that of perfection in general (two systems which at least do not weaken
morality, although they are totally incapable of serving as its foundation),
then I should decide for the latter, because it at least withdraws the decision
of the question from the sensibility and brings it to the court of pure reason;
and although even here it decides nothing, it at all events preserves the
indefinite idea (of a will good in itself) free from corruption, until it shall be
more precisely defined.
For the rest I think I may be excused here from a detailed refutation of all
these doctrines; that would only be superfluous labour, since it is so easy,
and is probably so well seen even by those whose office requires them to
decide for one of these theories (because their hearers would not tolerate
conception of PERFECTION, notwithstanding its defects, is better than the
theological conception which derives morality from a Divine absolutely
perfect will. The former is, no doubt, empty and indefinite, and
consequently useless for finding in the boundless field of possible reality
the greatest amount suitable for us; moreover, in attempting to distinguish
specifically the reality of which we are now speaking from every other, it
inevitably tends to turn in a circle, and cannot avoid tacitly presupposing
the morality which it is to explain; it is nevertheless preferable to the
theological view, first, because we have no intuition of the Divine
perfection, and can only deduce it from our own conceptions, the most
important of which is that of morality, and our explanation would thus be
involved in a gross circle; and, in the next place, if we avoid this, the only
notion of the Divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of the
attributes of desire of glory and dominion, combined with the awful
conceptions of might and vengeance, and any system of morals erected on
this foundation would be directly opposed to morality.
However, if I had to choose between the notion of the moral sense and
that of perfection in general (two systems which at least do not weaken
morality, although they are totally incapable of serving as its foundation),
then I should decide for the latter, because it at least withdraws the decision
of the question from the sensibility and brings it to the court of pure reason;
and although even here it decides nothing, it at all events preserves the
indefinite idea (of a will good in itself) free from corruption, until it shall be
more precisely defined.
For the rest I think I may be excused here from a detailed refutation of all
these doctrines; that would only be superfluous labour, since it is so easy,
and is probably so well seen even by those whose office requires them to
decide for one of these theories (because their hearers would not tolerate
Page 411
suspension of judgment). But what interests us more here is to know that
the prime foundation of morality laid down by all these principles is
nothing but heteronomy of the will, and for this reason they must
necessarily miss their aim.
In every case where an object of the will has to be supposed in order that
the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the will, there the rule is
simply heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely, IF or BECAUSE
one wishes for this object, one should act so and so: hence it can never
command morally, that is categorically. Whether the object determines the
will by means of inclination, as in the principle of private happiness, or by
means of reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally, as in
the principle of perfection, in either case the will never determines itself
IMMEDIATELY by the conception of the action, but only by the influence
which the foreseen effect of the action has on the will; I OUGHT TO DO
SOMETHING, ON THIS ACCOUNT, BECAUSE I WISH FOR
SOMETHING ELSE; and here there must be yet another law assumed in
me as its subject, by which I necessarily will this other thing, and this law
again requires an imperative to restrict this maxim. For the influence which
the conception of an object within the reach of our faculties can exercise on
the will of the subject in consequence of its natural properties, depends on
the nature of the subject, either the sensibility (inclination and taste), or the
understanding and reason, the employment of which is by the peculiar
constitution of their nature attended with satisfaction. It follows that the law
would be, properly speaking, given by nature, and as such, it must be
known and proved by experience, and would consequently be contingent,
and therefore incapable of being an apodictic practical rule, such as the
moral rule must be. Not only so, but it is INEVITABLY ONLY
HETERONOMY; the will does not give itself the law, but it is given by a
foreign impulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject
adapted to receive it. An absolutely good will, then, the principle of which
the prime foundation of morality laid down by all these principles is
nothing but heteronomy of the will, and for this reason they must
necessarily miss their aim.
In every case where an object of the will has to be supposed in order that
the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the will, there the rule is
simply heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely, IF or BECAUSE
one wishes for this object, one should act so and so: hence it can never
command morally, that is categorically. Whether the object determines the
will by means of inclination, as in the principle of private happiness, or by
means of reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally, as in
the principle of perfection, in either case the will never determines itself
IMMEDIATELY by the conception of the action, but only by the influence
which the foreseen effect of the action has on the will; I OUGHT TO DO
SOMETHING, ON THIS ACCOUNT, BECAUSE I WISH FOR
SOMETHING ELSE; and here there must be yet another law assumed in
me as its subject, by which I necessarily will this other thing, and this law
again requires an imperative to restrict this maxim. For the influence which
the conception of an object within the reach of our faculties can exercise on
the will of the subject in consequence of its natural properties, depends on
the nature of the subject, either the sensibility (inclination and taste), or the
understanding and reason, the employment of which is by the peculiar
constitution of their nature attended with satisfaction. It follows that the law
would be, properly speaking, given by nature, and as such, it must be
known and proved by experience, and would consequently be contingent,
and therefore incapable of being an apodictic practical rule, such as the
moral rule must be. Not only so, but it is INEVITABLY ONLY
HETERONOMY; the will does not give itself the law, but it is given by a
foreign impulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject
adapted to receive it. An absolutely good will, then, the principle of which
Page 412
must be a categorical imperative, will be indeterminate as regards all
objects, and will contain merely the FORM OF VOLITION generally, and
that as autonomy, that is to say, the capability of the maxims of every good
will to make themselves a universal law, is itself the only law which the will
of every rational being imposes on itself, without needing to assume any
spring or interest as a foundation.
HOW SUCH A SYNTHETICAL PRACTICAL a priori PROPOSITION
IS POSSIBLE and why it is necessary, is a problem whose solution does
not lie within the bounds of the metaphysic of morals; and we have not here
affirmed its truth, much less professed to have a proof of it in our power.
We simply showed by the development of the universally received notion of
morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably connected with it, or
rather is its foundation. Whoever then holds morality to be anything real,
and not a chimerical idea without any truth, must likewise admit the
principle of it that is here assigned. This section then, like the first, was
merely analytical. Now to prove that morality is no creation of the brain,
which it cannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of
the will is true, and as an a priori principle absolutely necessary, this
supposes the POSSIBILITY OF A SYNTHETIC USE OF PURE
PRACTICAL REASON, which however we cannot venture on without first
giving a critical examination of this faculty of reason. In the concluding
section we shall give the principle outlines of this critical examination as far
as is sufficient for our purpose.
objects, and will contain merely the FORM OF VOLITION generally, and
that as autonomy, that is to say, the capability of the maxims of every good
will to make themselves a universal law, is itself the only law which the will
of every rational being imposes on itself, without needing to assume any
spring or interest as a foundation.
HOW SUCH A SYNTHETICAL PRACTICAL a priori PROPOSITION
IS POSSIBLE and why it is necessary, is a problem whose solution does
not lie within the bounds of the metaphysic of morals; and we have not here
affirmed its truth, much less professed to have a proof of it in our power.
We simply showed by the development of the universally received notion of
morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably connected with it, or
rather is its foundation. Whoever then holds morality to be anything real,
and not a chimerical idea without any truth, must likewise admit the
principle of it that is here assigned. This section then, like the first, was
merely analytical. Now to prove that morality is no creation of the brain,
which it cannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of
the will is true, and as an a priori principle absolutely necessary, this
supposes the POSSIBILITY OF A SYNTHETIC USE OF PURE
PRACTICAL REASON, which however we cannot venture on without first
giving a critical examination of this faculty of reason. In the concluding
section we shall give the principle outlines of this critical examination as far
as is sufficient for our purpose.
Page 413
THIRD SECTION
TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE CRITIQUE OF PURE
PRACTICAL REASOH
The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of the
Will
The WILL is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as
they are rational, and FREEDOM would be this property of such causality
that it can be efficient, independently on foreign causes DETERMINING it;
just as PHYSICAL NECESSITY is the property that the causality of all
irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of
foreign causes.
The preceding definition of freedom is NEGATIVE, and therefore
unfruitful for the discovery of its essence; but it leads to a POSITIVE
conception which is so much the more full and fruitful Since the conception
of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something that we
call cause, something else, namely, the effect, must be produced [laid
down]; [Footnote: (Gesetzt.-There is in the original a play on the etymology
of Gesetz, which does not admit of reproduction in English. It must be
confessed that without it the statement is not self-evident.)] hence, although
freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is
not for that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting
TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE CRITIQUE OF PURE
PRACTICAL REASOH
The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Autonomy of the
Will
The WILL is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as
they are rational, and FREEDOM would be this property of such causality
that it can be efficient, independently on foreign causes DETERMINING it;
just as PHYSICAL NECESSITY is the property that the causality of all
irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of
foreign causes.
The preceding definition of freedom is NEGATIVE, and therefore
unfruitful for the discovery of its essence; but it leads to a POSITIVE
conception which is so much the more full and fruitful Since the conception
of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something that we
call cause, something else, namely, the effect, must be produced [laid
down]; [Footnote: (Gesetzt.-There is in the original a play on the etymology
of Gesetz, which does not admit of reproduction in English. It must be
confessed that without it the statement is not self-evident.)] hence, although
freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws, yet it is
not for that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting
Page 414
according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will
would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient
causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that
something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What
else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is the property of
the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: The will is in every action
a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than
that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law. Now this is
precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of
morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the
same.
On the hypothesis then of freedom of the will, morality together with its
principle follows from it by mere analysis of the conception. However the
latter is still a synthetic proposition; viz., an absolutely good will is that
whose maxim can always include itself regarded as a universal law; for this
property of its maxim can never be discovered by analysing the conception
of an absolutely good will. Now such synthetic propositions are only
possible in this way: that the two cognitions are connected together by their
union with a third in which they are both to be found. The POSITIVE
concept of freedom furnishes this third cognition, which cannot, as with
physical causes, be the nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which
we find conjoined the concept of something in relation as cause to
SOMETHING ELSE as effect). We cannot now at once show what this
third is to which freedom points us, and of which we have an idea a priori,
nor can we make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown to be
legitimate from principles of pure practical reason, and with it the
possibility of a categorical imperative; but some further preparation is
required.
would be an absurdity. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient
causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that
something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What
else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is the property of
the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: The will is in every action
a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than
that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law. Now this is
precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of
morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the
same.
On the hypothesis then of freedom of the will, morality together with its
principle follows from it by mere analysis of the conception. However the
latter is still a synthetic proposition; viz., an absolutely good will is that
whose maxim can always include itself regarded as a universal law; for this
property of its maxim can never be discovered by analysing the conception
of an absolutely good will. Now such synthetic propositions are only
possible in this way: that the two cognitions are connected together by their
union with a third in which they are both to be found. The POSITIVE
concept of freedom furnishes this third cognition, which cannot, as with
physical causes, be the nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which
we find conjoined the concept of something in relation as cause to
SOMETHING ELSE as effect). We cannot now at once show what this
third is to which freedom points us, and of which we have an idea a priori,
nor can we make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown to be
legitimate from principles of pure practical reason, and with it the
possibility of a categorical imperative; but some further preparation is
required.
Page 415
Freedom must be presupposed as a Property of the Will of all
Rational Beings
It is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will, from whatever
reason, if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same of all
rational beings. For as morality serves as a law for us only because we are
RATIONAL BEINGS, it must also hold for all rational beings; and as it
must be deduced simply from the property of freedom, it must be shown
that freedom also is a property of all rational beings. It is not enough then to
prove it from certain supposed experiences of human nature (which indeed
is quite impossible, and it can only be shown a priori), but we must show
that it belongs to the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will.
Now I say every being that cannot act except UNDER THE IDEA OF
FREEDOM is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free,
that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have
the same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in itself by a
proof theoretically conclusive. [Footnote: I adopt this method of assuming
freedom merely AS AN IDEA which rational beings suppose in their
actions, in order to avoid the necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect
also. The former is sufficient for my purpose; for even though the
speculative proof should not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except
with the idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a
being who was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus which
presses on the theory. (Compare Butler's treatment of the question of liberty
in his "Analogy," part I., ch. vi.)] Now I affirm that we must attribute to
every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and
acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that
is practical, that is, has causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot
possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other
quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe the
determination of its judgment not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It
Rational Beings
It is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will, from whatever
reason, if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same of all
rational beings. For as morality serves as a law for us only because we are
RATIONAL BEINGS, it must also hold for all rational beings; and as it
must be deduced simply from the property of freedom, it must be shown
that freedom also is a property of all rational beings. It is not enough then to
prove it from certain supposed experiences of human nature (which indeed
is quite impossible, and it can only be shown a priori), but we must show
that it belongs to the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will.
Now I say every being that cannot act except UNDER THE IDEA OF
FREEDOM is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free,
that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have
the same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in itself by a
proof theoretically conclusive. [Footnote: I adopt this method of assuming
freedom merely AS AN IDEA which rational beings suppose in their
actions, in order to avoid the necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect
also. The former is sufficient for my purpose; for even though the
speculative proof should not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except
with the idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a
being who was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus which
presses on the theory. (Compare Butler's treatment of the question of liberty
in his "Analogy," part I., ch. vi.)] Now I affirm that we must attribute to
every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and
acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that
is practical, that is, has causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot
possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other
quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe the
determination of its judgment not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It
Page 416
must regard itself as the author of its principles independent on foreign
influences. Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational
being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being
cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom. This idea must
therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being.
Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality
We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of
freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be actually a property
of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw that it must be presupposed if
we would conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in
respect of its actions, i. e., as endowed with a will; and so we find that on
just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason
and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its
freedom.
Now it resulted also from the presupposition of this idea that we became
aware of a law that the subjective principles of action, i.e., maxims, must
always be so assumed that they can also hold as objective, that is, universal
principles, and so serve as universal laws of our own dictation. But why
then should I subject myself to this principle and that simply as a rational
being, thus also subjecting to it all other beings endowed with reason? I will
allow that no interest urges me to this, for that would not give a categorical
imperative, but I must take an interest in it and discern how this comes to
pass; for this "I ought" is properly an "I would," valid for every rational
being, provided only that reason determined his actions without any
hindrance. But for beings that are in addition affected as we are by springs
of a different kind, namely, sensibility, and in whose case that is not always
done which reason alone would do, for these that necessity is expressed
influences. Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational
being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being
cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom. This idea must
therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being.
Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality
We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of
freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be actually a property
of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw that it must be presupposed if
we would conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in
respect of its actions, i. e., as endowed with a will; and so we find that on
just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason
and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its
freedom.
Now it resulted also from the presupposition of this idea that we became
aware of a law that the subjective principles of action, i.e., maxims, must
always be so assumed that they can also hold as objective, that is, universal
principles, and so serve as universal laws of our own dictation. But why
then should I subject myself to this principle and that simply as a rational
being, thus also subjecting to it all other beings endowed with reason? I will
allow that no interest urges me to this, for that would not give a categorical
imperative, but I must take an interest in it and discern how this comes to
pass; for this "I ought" is properly an "I would," valid for every rational
being, provided only that reason determined his actions without any
hindrance. But for beings that are in addition affected as we are by springs
of a different kind, namely, sensibility, and in whose case that is not always
done which reason alone would do, for these that necessity is expressed
Page 417
only as an "ought," and the subjective necessity is different from the
objective.
It seems then as if the moral law, that is, the principle of autonomy of the
will, were properly speaking only presupposed in the idea of freedom, and
as if we could not prove its reality and objective necessity independently. In
that case we should still have gained something considerable by at least
determining the true principle more exactly than had previously been done;
but as regards its validity and the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to
it, we should not have advanced a step. For if we were asked why the
universal validity of our maxim as a law must be the condition restricting
our actions, and on what we ground the worth which we assign to this
manner of acting—a worth so great that there cannot be any higher interest;
and if we were asked further how it happens that it is by this alone a man
believes he feels his own personal worth, in comparison with which that of
an agreeable or disagreeable condition is to be regarded as nothing, to these
questions we could give no satisfactory answer.
We find indeed sometimes that we can take an interest [Footnote:
"Interest" means a spring of the will, in so far as this spring is presented by
Reason. See note, p. 391.] in a personal quality which does not involve any
interest of external condition, provided this quality makes us capable of
participating in the condition in case reason were to effect the allotment;
that is to say, the mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself even
without the motive of participating in this happiness. This judgment,
however, is in fact only the effect of the importance of the moral law which
we before presupposed (when by the idea of freedom we detach ourselves
from every empirical interest); but that we ought to detach ourselves from
these interests, i. e., to consider ourselves as free in action and yet as subject
to certain laws, so as to find a worth simply in our own person whiph can
compensate us for the loss of everything that give worth to our condition;
objective.
It seems then as if the moral law, that is, the principle of autonomy of the
will, were properly speaking only presupposed in the idea of freedom, and
as if we could not prove its reality and objective necessity independently. In
that case we should still have gained something considerable by at least
determining the true principle more exactly than had previously been done;
but as regards its validity and the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to
it, we should not have advanced a step. For if we were asked why the
universal validity of our maxim as a law must be the condition restricting
our actions, and on what we ground the worth which we assign to this
manner of acting—a worth so great that there cannot be any higher interest;
and if we were asked further how it happens that it is by this alone a man
believes he feels his own personal worth, in comparison with which that of
an agreeable or disagreeable condition is to be regarded as nothing, to these
questions we could give no satisfactory answer.
We find indeed sometimes that we can take an interest [Footnote:
"Interest" means a spring of the will, in so far as this spring is presented by
Reason. See note, p. 391.] in a personal quality which does not involve any
interest of external condition, provided this quality makes us capable of
participating in the condition in case reason were to effect the allotment;
that is to say, the mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself even
without the motive of participating in this happiness. This judgment,
however, is in fact only the effect of the importance of the moral law which
we before presupposed (when by the idea of freedom we detach ourselves
from every empirical interest); but that we ought to detach ourselves from
these interests, i. e., to consider ourselves as free in action and yet as subject
to certain laws, so as to find a worth simply in our own person whiph can
compensate us for the loss of everything that give worth to our condition;
Page 418
this we are not yet able to discern in this way, nor do we see how it is
possible so to act—in other words, whence the moral law derives its
obligation.
It must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle here from which it
seems impossible to escape. In the order of efficient causes we assume
ourselves free, in order that in the order of ends we may conceive ourselves
as subject to moral laws: and we afterwards conceive ourselves as subject to
these laws, bjecause we have attributed to ourselves freedom of will: for
freedom and self- legislation of will are both autonomy, and therefore are
reciprocal conceptions, and for this very reason one must not be used to
explain the other or give the reason of it, but at most only for logical
purposes to reduce apparently different notions of the same object to one
single concept (as we reduce different fractions of the same value to the
lowest terms).
One resource retrains to us, namely, to inquire whether we do not occupy
different points of view when by means of freedom we think ourselves as
causes efficient a priori, and when we form our conception of ourselves
from our actions as effects which we see before our eyes.
It is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to make, but which we
may assume that even the commonest understanding can make, although it
be after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgment which it calls
feeling, that all the "ideas" [Footnote: The common understanding being
here spoken of, I use the word "idea" in its popular sense.] that comes to us
involuntarily (as those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects
otherwise than as they affect us; so that what they may be in themselves
remains unknown to us, and consequently that as regards "ideas" of this
kind even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding can
apply to them, we can by them only attain to the knowledge of appearances,
possible so to act—in other words, whence the moral law derives its
obligation.
It must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle here from which it
seems impossible to escape. In the order of efficient causes we assume
ourselves free, in order that in the order of ends we may conceive ourselves
as subject to moral laws: and we afterwards conceive ourselves as subject to
these laws, bjecause we have attributed to ourselves freedom of will: for
freedom and self- legislation of will are both autonomy, and therefore are
reciprocal conceptions, and for this very reason one must not be used to
explain the other or give the reason of it, but at most only for logical
purposes to reduce apparently different notions of the same object to one
single concept (as we reduce different fractions of the same value to the
lowest terms).
One resource retrains to us, namely, to inquire whether we do not occupy
different points of view when by means of freedom we think ourselves as
causes efficient a priori, and when we form our conception of ourselves
from our actions as effects which we see before our eyes.
It is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to make, but which we
may assume that even the commonest understanding can make, although it
be after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgment which it calls
feeling, that all the "ideas" [Footnote: The common understanding being
here spoken of, I use the word "idea" in its popular sense.] that comes to us
involuntarily (as those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects
otherwise than as they affect us; so that what they may be in themselves
remains unknown to us, and consequently that as regards "ideas" of this
kind even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding can
apply to them, we can by them only attain to the knowledge of appearances,
Page 419
never to that of things in themselves. As soon as this distinction has once
been made (perhaps merely in consequence of the difference observed
between the ideas given us from without, and in which we are passive, and
those that we produce simply from ourselves, and in which we show our
own activity), then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume
behind the appearance something else that is not an appearance, namely, the
things in themselves; although we must admit that as they can never be
known to us except as they affect us, we can come no nearer to them, nor
can we ever know what they are in themselves. This must furnish a
distinction, however crude, between a world of sense and the world of
understanding, of which the former may be different according to the
difference of the sensuous impressions in—various observers, while the
second which is its basis always remains the same. Even as to himself, a
man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he
has by internal sensation. For as he does not as it were create himself, and
does not come by the conception of himself a priori but empirically, it
naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by
the inner sense, and consequently only through the appearances of his
nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected. At the same time
beyond these characteristics of his own subject, made up of mere
appearances, he must necessarily suppose something else as their basis,
namely, his ego, whatever its characteristics in itself may be. Thus in
respect to mere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon
himself as belonging to the world of sense, but in respect of whatever there
may be of pure activity in him (that which reaches consciousness
immediately and not through affecting the senses) he must reckon himself
as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, he has no further
knowledge. To such a conclusion the reflecting man must come with respect
ito all the things which can be presented to him: it is probably to be met
with even in persons of the commonest understanding, who, as is well
been made (perhaps merely in consequence of the difference observed
between the ideas given us from without, and in which we are passive, and
those that we produce simply from ourselves, and in which we show our
own activity), then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume
behind the appearance something else that is not an appearance, namely, the
things in themselves; although we must admit that as they can never be
known to us except as they affect us, we can come no nearer to them, nor
can we ever know what they are in themselves. This must furnish a
distinction, however crude, between a world of sense and the world of
understanding, of which the former may be different according to the
difference of the sensuous impressions in—various observers, while the
second which is its basis always remains the same. Even as to himself, a
man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he
has by internal sensation. For as he does not as it were create himself, and
does not come by the conception of himself a priori but empirically, it
naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by
the inner sense, and consequently only through the appearances of his
nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected. At the same time
beyond these characteristics of his own subject, made up of mere
appearances, he must necessarily suppose something else as their basis,
namely, his ego, whatever its characteristics in itself may be. Thus in
respect to mere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon
himself as belonging to the world of sense, but in respect of whatever there
may be of pure activity in him (that which reaches consciousness
immediately and not through affecting the senses) he must reckon himself
as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, he has no further
knowledge. To such a conclusion the reflecting man must come with respect
ito all the things which can be presented to him: it is probably to be met
with even in persons of the commonest understanding, who, as is well
Page 420
known, are very much inclined to suppose behind the objects of the senses
something else invisible and acting of itself. They spoil it, however, by
presently sensualizing this invisible again; that is to say, wanting to make it
an object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit the wiser.
Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes
himself from everything else, even from himself as affected by objects, and
that is Reason. This being pure spontaneity is even elevated above the
understanding. For although the latter is a spontaneity and does not, like
sense, merely contain intuitions that arise when we are affected by things
(and are therefore passive), yet it cannot produce from its activity any other
conceptions than those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense
under rulesf and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, and without
this use of the sensibility it could not think at all; whereas, on the contrary,
Reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I call Ideas [Ideal
Conceptions] that it thereby far transcends everything that the sensibility
can give it, and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the
world of sense from that of understanding, and thereby prescribing the
limits of the understanding itself.
For this reason a rational being must regard himself qua intelligence (not
from the side of his lower faculties) as belonging not to the world of sense,
but to that of understanding; hence he has two points of view from which he
can regard himself, and recognise laws of the exercise of his faculties, and
consequently of all his actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of
sense, he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as
belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which being independent on
nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone.
As a rational being, and consequently belonging to the intelligible world,
man can never conceive the causality of his own will otherwise than on
something else invisible and acting of itself. They spoil it, however, by
presently sensualizing this invisible again; that is to say, wanting to make it
an object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit the wiser.
Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes
himself from everything else, even from himself as affected by objects, and
that is Reason. This being pure spontaneity is even elevated above the
understanding. For although the latter is a spontaneity and does not, like
sense, merely contain intuitions that arise when we are affected by things
(and are therefore passive), yet it cannot produce from its activity any other
conceptions than those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense
under rulesf and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, and without
this use of the sensibility it could not think at all; whereas, on the contrary,
Reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what I call Ideas [Ideal
Conceptions] that it thereby far transcends everything that the sensibility
can give it, and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the
world of sense from that of understanding, and thereby prescribing the
limits of the understanding itself.
For this reason a rational being must regard himself qua intelligence (not
from the side of his lower faculties) as belonging not to the world of sense,
but to that of understanding; hence he has two points of view from which he
can regard himself, and recognise laws of the exercise of his faculties, and
consequently of all his actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of
sense, he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as
belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which being independent on
nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone.
As a rational being, and consequently belonging to the intelligible world,
man can never conceive the causality of his own will otherwise than on
Page 421
condition of the idea of freedom. for independence on the determining
causes of the sensible world (an independence which Reason must always
ascribe to itself) is freedom. Now the idea of freedom is inseparably
connected with the conception of autonomy, and this again with the
universal principle of morality which is ideally the foundation of all actions
of rational beings, just as the law of nature is of all phenomena.
Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above, that there was a
latent circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy, and from
this to the moral law, viz.: that we laid down the idea of freedom because of
the moral law only that we might afterwards in turn infer the latter from
freedom and that consequently we could assign no reason at all for this law,
but could only [present] [Footnote: The verb is wanting in the original.] it as
a petitio principii which well disposed minds would gladly concede to us,
but which we could never put forward as a provable proposition. For now
we see that when we conceive ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into
the—world of understanding as members of it, and recognise the autonomy
of the will with its consequence, morality; whereas, if we conceive
ourselves as under obligation we consider ourselves as belonging to the
world of sense, and at the same time to the world of understanding.
How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?
Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging to the
world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient cause belonging to
that world that he calls his causality a will. On the other side he is also
conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense in which his actions
which are mere appearances [phenomena] of that causality are displayed;
we cannot, however, discern how they are possible from this causality
which we do not know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the
sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, namely,
causes of the sensible world (an independence which Reason must always
ascribe to itself) is freedom. Now the idea of freedom is inseparably
connected with the conception of autonomy, and this again with the
universal principle of morality which is ideally the foundation of all actions
of rational beings, just as the law of nature is of all phenomena.
Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above, that there was a
latent circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy, and from
this to the moral law, viz.: that we laid down the idea of freedom because of
the moral law only that we might afterwards in turn infer the latter from
freedom and that consequently we could assign no reason at all for this law,
but could only [present] [Footnote: The verb is wanting in the original.] it as
a petitio principii which well disposed minds would gladly concede to us,
but which we could never put forward as a provable proposition. For now
we see that when we conceive ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into
the—world of understanding as members of it, and recognise the autonomy
of the will with its consequence, morality; whereas, if we conceive
ourselves as under obligation we consider ourselves as belonging to the
world of sense, and at the same time to the world of understanding.
How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?
Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging to the
world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient cause belonging to
that world that he calls his causality a will. On the other side he is also
conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense in which his actions
which are mere appearances [phenomena] of that causality are displayed;
we cannot, however, discern how they are possible from this causality
which we do not know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the
sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, namely,
Page 422
—desires and inclinations. If therefore I were only a member of the world
of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the
principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were only a part of the world of
sense they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural
law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature.
(The former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter on
happiness.), Since, however, the world of understanding contains the
foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws alsof and
accordingly gives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of
understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows that,
although on the one side I must regard myself as a being belonging to the
world of sense, yet on the other side I must recognise myself as subject as
an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, i. e., to reason,
which contains this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to
the autonomy of the will: consequently I must regard the laws of the world
of understanding as imperatives for me, and the actions which conform to
them as duties.
And thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that the
idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in
consequence of which if I were nothing else all my actions would always
conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same time intuite myself
as a member of the world of sense, they ought so to conform, and this
categorical "ought" implies a synthetic a priori proposition, inasmuch as
besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is added further the
idea of the same will but as belonging to the world of the understanding,
pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according
to Reason of the former will; precisely as to the intuitions of sense there are
added concepts of the understanding which of themselves signify nothing
but regular form in general, and in this way synthetic a priori propositions
become possible, on which all knowledge of physical nature rests.
of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the
principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were only a part of the world of
sense they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural
law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature.
(The former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, the latter on
happiness.), Since, however, the world of understanding contains the
foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws alsof and
accordingly gives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of
understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it follows that,
although on the one side I must regard myself as a being belonging to the
world of sense, yet on the other side I must recognise myself as subject as
an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, i. e., to reason,
which contains this law in the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to
the autonomy of the will: consequently I must regard the laws of the world
of understanding as imperatives for me, and the actions which conform to
them as duties.
And thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that the
idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in
consequence of which if I were nothing else all my actions would always
conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same time intuite myself
as a member of the world of sense, they ought so to conform, and this
categorical "ought" implies a synthetic a priori proposition, inasmuch as
besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is added further the
idea of the same will but as belonging to the world of the understanding,
pure and practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according
to Reason of the former will; precisely as to the intuitions of sense there are
added concepts of the understanding which of themselves signify nothing
but regular form in general, and in this way synthetic a priori propositions
become possible, on which all knowledge of physical nature rests.
Page 423
The practical use of common human reason confirms this reasoning.
There is no one, not even the most consummate villain, provided only that
he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set before
him examples of tionesty of purposea of steadfastness in following good
maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even combined with great
sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not wish that he might also
possess these qualities. Only on account of his inclinations and impulses he
cannot attain this in himself, but at the same time he wishes to be free from
such inclinations which are burdensome to himself. He proves by this that
he transfers himself in thought with a will free from the impulses of—the
sensibility into an order of things wholly different from that of his desires in
the field of the sensibility; since he cannot expect to obtain by that wish any
gratification of his desires, nor any position which would satisfy any of his
actual or supposable inclinations (for this would destroy the pre-eminence
of the very idea which wrests that wish from him): he can only expect a
greater intrinsic worth of his own person. This better person, however, he
imagines himself to be when he transfers himself to the point of view of a
member of the world of the understanding, to which he is involuntarily
forced by the idea of freedom, i. e., of independence on determining causes
of the world of sense; and from this point of view he is conscious of a good
will, which by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad will that
he possesses as a member of the world of sense-a law whose authority he
recognises while transgressing it. What he morally "ought" is then what he
necessarily "would" as a member of the world of the understanding, and is
conceived by him as an "ought" only inasmuch as he likewise considers
himself as a member of the world of sense.
On the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy
All men attribute to themselves freedom of will. Hence come all
judgments upon actions as being such as ought to have been done, although
There is no one, not even the most consummate villain, provided only that
he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set before
him examples of tionesty of purposea of steadfastness in following good
maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even combined with great
sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not wish that he might also
possess these qualities. Only on account of his inclinations and impulses he
cannot attain this in himself, but at the same time he wishes to be free from
such inclinations which are burdensome to himself. He proves by this that
he transfers himself in thought with a will free from the impulses of—the
sensibility into an order of things wholly different from that of his desires in
the field of the sensibility; since he cannot expect to obtain by that wish any
gratification of his desires, nor any position which would satisfy any of his
actual or supposable inclinations (for this would destroy the pre-eminence
of the very idea which wrests that wish from him): he can only expect a
greater intrinsic worth of his own person. This better person, however, he
imagines himself to be when he transfers himself to the point of view of a
member of the world of the understanding, to which he is involuntarily
forced by the idea of freedom, i. e., of independence on determining causes
of the world of sense; and from this point of view he is conscious of a good
will, which by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad will that
he possesses as a member of the world of sense-a law whose authority he
recognises while transgressing it. What he morally "ought" is then what he
necessarily "would" as a member of the world of the understanding, and is
conceived by him as an "ought" only inasmuch as he likewise considers
himself as a member of the world of sense.
On the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy
All men attribute to themselves freedom of will. Hence come all
judgments upon actions as being such as ought to have been done, although
Page 424
they have not been done. However, this freedom is not a conception of
experience, nor can it be so, since it still remains, even though experience
shows the contrary of what on supposition of freedom are conceived as its
necessary consequences. On the other side it is equally necessary that
everything that takes place should be fixedly determined according to laws
of nature. This necessity of nature is likewise tot an empirical conception,
just for this reason, that it involves the motion of necessity and
consequently of a priori cognition. But this conception of a system of nature
is confirmed by experience, and it must even be inevitably presupposed if
experience itself is to be possible, that is, a connected knowledge of the
objects of sense resting on general laws. Therefore freedom is only an Idea
[Ideal Conception] of Reason, and its objective reality in itself is doubtful,
while nature is a concept of the understanding which proves, and must
necessarily prove, its reality in examples of experience.
There arises from this a dialectic of Reason, since the freedom attributed
to the will appears to contradict the necessity of nature, and placed between
these two ways Reason for speculative purposes finds the road of physical
necessity much more beaten and more appropriate than that of freedom; yet
for practical purposes the narrow footpath of freedom is the only one on
which it is possible to make use of reason in our conduct; hence it is just as
impossible for the subtlest philosophy as for the commonest reason of men
to argue away freedom. Philosophy must then assume that no real
contradiction will be found between freedom and physical necessity of the
same human actions, for it cannot give up the conception of nature any
more than that of freedom.
Nevertheless, even though we should never be able to comprehend how
freedom is possible, we must at least remove this apparent contradiction in
a convincing manner. For if the thought of freedom contradicts either itself
experience, nor can it be so, since it still remains, even though experience
shows the contrary of what on supposition of freedom are conceived as its
necessary consequences. On the other side it is equally necessary that
everything that takes place should be fixedly determined according to laws
of nature. This necessity of nature is likewise tot an empirical conception,
just for this reason, that it involves the motion of necessity and
consequently of a priori cognition. But this conception of a system of nature
is confirmed by experience, and it must even be inevitably presupposed if
experience itself is to be possible, that is, a connected knowledge of the
objects of sense resting on general laws. Therefore freedom is only an Idea
[Ideal Conception] of Reason, and its objective reality in itself is doubtful,
while nature is a concept of the understanding which proves, and must
necessarily prove, its reality in examples of experience.
There arises from this a dialectic of Reason, since the freedom attributed
to the will appears to contradict the necessity of nature, and placed between
these two ways Reason for speculative purposes finds the road of physical
necessity much more beaten and more appropriate than that of freedom; yet
for practical purposes the narrow footpath of freedom is the only one on
which it is possible to make use of reason in our conduct; hence it is just as
impossible for the subtlest philosophy as for the commonest reason of men
to argue away freedom. Philosophy must then assume that no real
contradiction will be found between freedom and physical necessity of the
same human actions, for it cannot give up the conception of nature any
more than that of freedom.
Nevertheless, even though we should never be able to comprehend how
freedom is possible, we must at least remove this apparent contradiction in
a convincing manner. For if the thought of freedom contradicts either itself
Page 425
or nature, which is equally necessary, it must in competition with physical
necessity be entirely given up.
It would, however, be impossible to escape this contradiction if the
thinking subject, which seems to itself free, conceived itself in the same
sense or in the very same relation when it calls itself free as when in respect
of the same action it assumes itself to be subject to the law of nature. Hence
it is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy to show that its
illusion respecting the contradiction rests on this, that we think of man in a
different sense and relation when we call him free, and when we regard him
as subject to the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature. It must,
therefore, show that not only can both these very well co- exist, but that
both must be thought as necessarily united in the same subject, since
otherwise no reason could be given why we should burden reason with an
idea which, though it may possibly without contradiction be reconciled with
another that is sufficiently established, yet entangles us in a perplexity
which sorely embarrasses Reason in its theoretic employment. This duty,
however, belongs only to speculative philosophy, in order that it may clear
the way for practical philosophy. The philosopher then has no option
whether he will remove the apparent contradiction or leave it untouched; for
in fhe latter case the theory respecting this would be bonum vacans into the
possession of which the fatalist would have a right to enter, and chase all
morality out of its supposed domain as occupying it without title.
We cannot, however, as yet say that we are touching the bounds of
practical philosophy. For the settlement of that controversy does not belong
to it; it only demands from speculative reason $hat it should put an end to
the discord in which it entangles itself in theoretical questions, so that
practical reason may have rest and security from external attacks which
might make the ground debatable on which it desires to build.
necessity be entirely given up.
It would, however, be impossible to escape this contradiction if the
thinking subject, which seems to itself free, conceived itself in the same
sense or in the very same relation when it calls itself free as when in respect
of the same action it assumes itself to be subject to the law of nature. Hence
it is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy to show that its
illusion respecting the contradiction rests on this, that we think of man in a
different sense and relation when we call him free, and when we regard him
as subject to the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature. It must,
therefore, show that not only can both these very well co- exist, but that
both must be thought as necessarily united in the same subject, since
otherwise no reason could be given why we should burden reason with an
idea which, though it may possibly without contradiction be reconciled with
another that is sufficiently established, yet entangles us in a perplexity
which sorely embarrasses Reason in its theoretic employment. This duty,
however, belongs only to speculative philosophy, in order that it may clear
the way for practical philosophy. The philosopher then has no option
whether he will remove the apparent contradiction or leave it untouched; for
in fhe latter case the theory respecting this would be bonum vacans into the
possession of which the fatalist would have a right to enter, and chase all
morality out of its supposed domain as occupying it without title.
We cannot, however, as yet say that we are touching the bounds of
practical philosophy. For the settlement of that controversy does not belong
to it; it only demands from speculative reason $hat it should put an end to
the discord in which it entangles itself in theoretical questions, so that
practical reason may have rest and security from external attacks which
might make the ground debatable on which it desires to build.
Page 426
The claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded
on the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is
independent on merely subjectively determined causes which together
Constitute what belongs to sensation only, and which consequently come
under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering himself in this
way as an intelligence, places himself thereby in a different order of things
and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind when on
the one hand he thinks of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will,
and consequently with causality, and when on the other he perceives
himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also), and
affirms that his causality is subject to external determination according to
laws of nature. [Footnote: The punctuation of the original gives the
following sense: "Submits his causality, as regards its external
determination, to laws of nature." have ventured to make what appears to be
a necessary correction, by simply removing a comma.] Now he soon
becomes aware that both can hold good, nay, must hold good at the same
time. For there is not the smallest contradiction in saying that a thing in
appearance (belonging to the world of sense) is subject to certain laws, on
which the very same as a thing or being in itself is independent; and that he
must conceive and think of himself in this twofold way, rests as to the first
on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses,
and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an intelligence, i. e.,
as independent on sensible impressions in the employment of his reason (in
other words as belonging to the world of understanding).
Hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will which
takes no account of anything that comes under the head of desires and
inclinations, and on the contrary conceives actions as possible to him, nay,
even as necessary, which can only be done by disregarding all desires and
sensible inclinations. The causality of such actions [Footnote: M. Barni
translates as if he read desselben instead of derselben, "the causality of this
on the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is
independent on merely subjectively determined causes which together
Constitute what belongs to sensation only, and which consequently come
under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering himself in this
way as an intelligence, places himself thereby in a different order of things
and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind when on
the one hand he thinks of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will,
and consequently with causality, and when on the other he perceives
himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also), and
affirms that his causality is subject to external determination according to
laws of nature. [Footnote: The punctuation of the original gives the
following sense: "Submits his causality, as regards its external
determination, to laws of nature." have ventured to make what appears to be
a necessary correction, by simply removing a comma.] Now he soon
becomes aware that both can hold good, nay, must hold good at the same
time. For there is not the smallest contradiction in saying that a thing in
appearance (belonging to the world of sense) is subject to certain laws, on
which the very same as a thing or being in itself is independent; and that he
must conceive and think of himself in this twofold way, rests as to the first
on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses,
and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an intelligence, i. e.,
as independent on sensible impressions in the employment of his reason (in
other words as belonging to the world of understanding).
Hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will which
takes no account of anything that comes under the head of desires and
inclinations, and on the contrary conceives actions as possible to him, nay,
even as necessary, which can only be done by disregarding all desires and
sensible inclinations. The causality of such actions [Footnote: M. Barni
translates as if he read desselben instead of derselben, "the causality of this
Page 427
will." So also Mr. Semple.] lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of
effects and actions [which depend] on the principles of an intelligible world,
of which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure reason alone
independent on sensibility gives the law; moreover since it is only in that
world, as an intelligence, that he is his proper self (being as man only the
appearance of himself) those laws apply to him directly and categorically,
so that the incitements of inclinations and appetites (in other words the
whole nature of the world of sense) cannot impair the laws of his volition as
an intelligence. Nay, he does not even hold himself responsible for the
former or ascribe them to his proper self, i. e., his will: he only ascribes to
his will any indulgence which he might yield them if he allowed them to
influence his maxims to the prejudice of the rational laws of the will.
When practical Reason thinks itself into a world of understanding it does
not thereby transcend its own limits, as it would if it tried to enter it by
intuition or sensation. The former is only a negative thought in respect of
the world of sense, which does not give any laws to reason in determining
the will, and is positive only in this single point that this freedom as a
negative characteristic is at the same time conjoined with a (positive)
faculty and even with a causality of reason, which we designate a will,
namely, a faculty of so acting that the principle of the actions shall conform
to the essential character of a rational motive, i. e., the condition that the
maxim have universal validity as a law. But were it to borrow an object of
will, that is, a motive, from the world of understanding, then it would
overstep its bounds and pretend to be acquainted with something of which it
knows nothing. The conception of a world of the understanding is then only
a point of view which Reason finds itself compelled to take outside the
appearances in order to conceive itself as practical, which would not be
possible if the influences of the sensibility had a determining power on
man, but which is necessary unless he is to be denied the consciousness of
himself as an intelligence, and consequently as a rational cause, energizing
effects and actions [which depend] on the principles of an intelligible world,
of which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure reason alone
independent on sensibility gives the law; moreover since it is only in that
world, as an intelligence, that he is his proper self (being as man only the
appearance of himself) those laws apply to him directly and categorically,
so that the incitements of inclinations and appetites (in other words the
whole nature of the world of sense) cannot impair the laws of his volition as
an intelligence. Nay, he does not even hold himself responsible for the
former or ascribe them to his proper self, i. e., his will: he only ascribes to
his will any indulgence which he might yield them if he allowed them to
influence his maxims to the prejudice of the rational laws of the will.
When practical Reason thinks itself into a world of understanding it does
not thereby transcend its own limits, as it would if it tried to enter it by
intuition or sensation. The former is only a negative thought in respect of
the world of sense, which does not give any laws to reason in determining
the will, and is positive only in this single point that this freedom as a
negative characteristic is at the same time conjoined with a (positive)
faculty and even with a causality of reason, which we designate a will,
namely, a faculty of so acting that the principle of the actions shall conform
to the essential character of a rational motive, i. e., the condition that the
maxim have universal validity as a law. But were it to borrow an object of
will, that is, a motive, from the world of understanding, then it would
overstep its bounds and pretend to be acquainted with something of which it
knows nothing. The conception of a world of the understanding is then only
a point of view which Reason finds itself compelled to take outside the
appearances in order to conceive itself as practical, which would not be
possible if the influences of the sensibility had a determining power on
man, but which is necessary unless he is to be denied the consciousness of
himself as an intelligence, and consequently as a rational cause, energizing
Page 428
by reason, that is, operating freely. This thought certainly involves the idea
of an order and a system of laws different from that of the mechanism of
nature which belongs to the sensible world, and it makes the conception of
an intelligible world necessary (that is to say, the whole system of rational
beings as things in themselves). But it does not in the least authorize us to
think of it further than as to its formal condition only, that is, the
universality of the maxims of the will as laws, and consequently the
autonomy of the latter, which alone is consistent with its freedom; whereas,
on the contrary, all laws that refer to a definite object give heteronomy,
which only belongs to laws of nature, and can only apply to the sensible
world.
But Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how
pure reason can be practical, which would be exactly the same problem as
to explain how freedom is possible.
For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the
object of which can be given in some possible experience. But freedom is a
mere Idea [Ideal Conception], the objective reality of which can in no wise
be shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in any possible
experience; and for this reason it can never be comprehended or
understood, because we cannot support it by any sort of example or
analogy. It holds good only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being
that believes itself conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from
mere desire (namely, a faculty of determining itself to action as an
intelligence), in other words, by laws of reason independently on natural
instincts. Now where determination according to laws of nature ceases,
there all explanation ceases also, and nothing remains but defence, i. e. the
removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the
nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible. We can
only point out to them that the supposed contradiction that they have
of an order and a system of laws different from that of the mechanism of
nature which belongs to the sensible world, and it makes the conception of
an intelligible world necessary (that is to say, the whole system of rational
beings as things in themselves). But it does not in the least authorize us to
think of it further than as to its formal condition only, that is, the
universality of the maxims of the will as laws, and consequently the
autonomy of the latter, which alone is consistent with its freedom; whereas,
on the contrary, all laws that refer to a definite object give heteronomy,
which only belongs to laws of nature, and can only apply to the sensible
world.
But Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how
pure reason can be practical, which would be exactly the same problem as
to explain how freedom is possible.
For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the
object of which can be given in some possible experience. But freedom is a
mere Idea [Ideal Conception], the objective reality of which can in no wise
be shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in any possible
experience; and for this reason it can never be comprehended or
understood, because we cannot support it by any sort of example or
analogy. It holds good only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being
that believes itself conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from
mere desire (namely, a faculty of determining itself to action as an
intelligence), in other words, by laws of reason independently on natural
instincts. Now where determination according to laws of nature ceases,
there all explanation ceases also, and nothing remains but defence, i. e. the
removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the
nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible. We can
only point out to them that the supposed contradiction that they have
Page 429
discovered in it arises only from this, that in order to be able to apply the
law of nature to human actions, they must necessarily consider man as an
appearance: then when we demand of them that they should also think of
him qua intelligence as a thing in itself, they still persist in considering him
in this respect also as an appearance. In this view it would no doubt be a
contradiction to suppose the causality of the same subject (that is, his will)
to be withdrawn from all the natural laws of the sensible world. But this
contradiction disappears, if they would only bethink themselves and admit,
as is reasonable, that behind the appearances there must also lie at their root
(although hidden) the things in themselves, and that we cannot expect the
laws of these to be the same as those that govern their appearances.
The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is
identical with the impossibility of discovering and explaining an interest
[Footnote: Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i. e., a cause
determining the will. Hence we say of rational beings only that they take an
interest in a thing; irrational beings only feel sensual appetites. Reason
takes a direct interest in action then only when the universal validity of its
maxims is alone sufficient to determine the will. Such an interest alone is
pure. But if it can determine the will only by means of another object of
desire or on the suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject, then
Reason takes only an indirect interest in the action, and as Reason by itself
without experience cannot discover either objects of the will or a Special
feeling actuating it, this latter interest would only be empirical, and not a
pure rational interest. The logical interest of Reason (namely, to extend its
insight) is never direct, but presupposes purposes for which reason is
employed.] which man can take in the moral law. Nevertheless he does
actually take an interest in it, the basis of which in us we call the moral
feeling, which some have falsely assigned as the standard of our moral
judgment, whereas it must rather be viewed as the subjective effect that the
law of nature to human actions, they must necessarily consider man as an
appearance: then when we demand of them that they should also think of
him qua intelligence as a thing in itself, they still persist in considering him
in this respect also as an appearance. In this view it would no doubt be a
contradiction to suppose the causality of the same subject (that is, his will)
to be withdrawn from all the natural laws of the sensible world. But this
contradiction disappears, if they would only bethink themselves and admit,
as is reasonable, that behind the appearances there must also lie at their root
(although hidden) the things in themselves, and that we cannot expect the
laws of these to be the same as those that govern their appearances.
The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is
identical with the impossibility of discovering and explaining an interest
[Footnote: Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i. e., a cause
determining the will. Hence we say of rational beings only that they take an
interest in a thing; irrational beings only feel sensual appetites. Reason
takes a direct interest in action then only when the universal validity of its
maxims is alone sufficient to determine the will. Such an interest alone is
pure. But if it can determine the will only by means of another object of
desire or on the suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject, then
Reason takes only an indirect interest in the action, and as Reason by itself
without experience cannot discover either objects of the will or a Special
feeling actuating it, this latter interest would only be empirical, and not a
pure rational interest. The logical interest of Reason (namely, to extend its
insight) is never direct, but presupposes purposes for which reason is
employed.] which man can take in the moral law. Nevertheless he does
actually take an interest in it, the basis of which in us we call the moral
feeling, which some have falsely assigned as the standard of our moral
judgment, whereas it must rather be viewed as the subjective effect that the
Page 430
law exercises on the will, the objective principle of which is furnished by
Reason alone.
In order indeed that a rational being who is also affected through the
senses should will what Reason alone directs such beings that they ought to
will, it is no doubt requisite that reason should have a power to infuse a
feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty, that is to say,
that it should have a causality by which it determines the sensibility
according to its own principles. But it is quite impossible to discern, i. e., to
make it intelligible a priori, how a mere thought, which itself contains
nothing sensible, can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain; for this
is a particular kind of causality of which as of every other causality we can
determine nothing whatever a priori, we must only consult experience about
it. But as this cannot supply us with any relation of cause and effect except
between two objects of experience, whereas in this case, although indeed
the effect produced lies within experience, yet the cause is supposed to be
pure reason acting through mere ideas which offer no object to experience,
it follows that for us men it is quite impossible to explain how and why the
universality of the maxim as a law, that is, morality, interests. This only is
certain, that it is not because it interests us that it has validity for us (for that
would be heteronomy and dependence of practical reason on sensibility,
namely, on a feeling as its principle, in which case it could never give moral
laws), but that it interests us because it is valid for us as men, inasmuch as it
had its source in our will as intelligences, in other words in our proper self,
and what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason
to the nature of the thing in itself.
The question then: How a categorical imperative is possible can be
answered to this extent that we can assign the only hypothesis on which it is
possible, namely, the idea of freedom; and we can also discern the necessity
of this hypothesis, and this is sufficient for the practical exercise of reason,
Reason alone.
In order indeed that a rational being who is also affected through the
senses should will what Reason alone directs such beings that they ought to
will, it is no doubt requisite that reason should have a power to infuse a
feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty, that is to say,
that it should have a causality by which it determines the sensibility
according to its own principles. But it is quite impossible to discern, i. e., to
make it intelligible a priori, how a mere thought, which itself contains
nothing sensible, can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain; for this
is a particular kind of causality of which as of every other causality we can
determine nothing whatever a priori, we must only consult experience about
it. But as this cannot supply us with any relation of cause and effect except
between two objects of experience, whereas in this case, although indeed
the effect produced lies within experience, yet the cause is supposed to be
pure reason acting through mere ideas which offer no object to experience,
it follows that for us men it is quite impossible to explain how and why the
universality of the maxim as a law, that is, morality, interests. This only is
certain, that it is not because it interests us that it has validity for us (for that
would be heteronomy and dependence of practical reason on sensibility,
namely, on a feeling as its principle, in which case it could never give moral
laws), but that it interests us because it is valid for us as men, inasmuch as it
had its source in our will as intelligences, in other words in our proper self,
and what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason
to the nature of the thing in itself.
The question then: How a categorical imperative is possible can be
answered to this extent that we can assign the only hypothesis on which it is
possible, namely, the idea of freedom; and we can also discern the necessity
of this hypothesis, and this is sufficient for the practical exercise of reason,
Page 431
that is, for the conviction of the validity of this imperative, and hence of the
moral law; but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned
by any human reason. On the hypothesis, however, that the will of an
intelligence is free, its autonomy, as the essential formal condition of its
determination, is a necessary consequence. Moreover, this freedom of will
is not merely quite possible as a hypothesis (not involving any contradiction
to the principle of physical necessity in the connexion of the phenomena of
the sensible world) as speculative philosophy can show: but further, a
rational being who is conscious of a causality [Footnote: Reading "einer"
for "seiner."] through reason, that is to say, of a will (distinct from desires),
must of necessity make it practically, that is, in idea, the condition of all his
voluntary actions. But to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical
without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other
source, i. e. how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its
maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical
reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any matter (object) of the will
in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can produce
an interest which would be called purely moral; or in other words, how pure
reason can be practical—to explain this is beyond the power of human
reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost.
It is just the same as if I sought to find out how freedom itself is possible
as the causality of a will. For then I quit the ground of philosophical
explanation, and I have no other to go upon. I might indeed revel in the
world of intelligences which still remains to me, but although I have an idea
of it which is well founded, yet I have not the least knowledge of it, nor can
I ever attain to such knowledge with all the efforts of my natural faculty of
reason. It signifies only a something that remains over when I have
eliminated everything belonging to the world of sense from the actuating
principles of my will, serving merely to keep in bounds the principle of
motives taken from the field of sensibility; fixing its limits and showing that
moral law; but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned
by any human reason. On the hypothesis, however, that the will of an
intelligence is free, its autonomy, as the essential formal condition of its
determination, is a necessary consequence. Moreover, this freedom of will
is not merely quite possible as a hypothesis (not involving any contradiction
to the principle of physical necessity in the connexion of the phenomena of
the sensible world) as speculative philosophy can show: but further, a
rational being who is conscious of a causality [Footnote: Reading "einer"
for "seiner."] through reason, that is to say, of a will (distinct from desires),
must of necessity make it practically, that is, in idea, the condition of all his
voluntary actions. But to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical
without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other
source, i. e. how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its
maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical
reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any matter (object) of the will
in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can produce
an interest which would be called purely moral; or in other words, how pure
reason can be practical—to explain this is beyond the power of human
reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost.
It is just the same as if I sought to find out how freedom itself is possible
as the causality of a will. For then I quit the ground of philosophical
explanation, and I have no other to go upon. I might indeed revel in the
world of intelligences which still remains to me, but although I have an idea
of it which is well founded, yet I have not the least knowledge of it, nor can
I ever attain to such knowledge with all the efforts of my natural faculty of
reason. It signifies only a something that remains over when I have
eliminated everything belonging to the world of sense from the actuating
principles of my will, serving merely to keep in bounds the principle of
motives taken from the field of sensibility; fixing its limits and showing that
Page 432
it does not contain all in all within itself, but that there is more beyond it;
but this something more I know no further. Of pure reason which frames
this ideal, there remains after the abstraction of all matter, i. e., knowledge
of objects, nothing but the form, namely, the practical law of the
universality of the maxims, and in conformity with this the conception of
reason in reference to a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient
cause, that is a cause determining the will. There must here be a total
absence of springs; unless this idea of an intelligible world is itself the
spring, or that in which reason primarily takes an interest; but to make this
intelligible is precisely the problem that we cannot solve.
Here now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry, and it is of great
importance to determine it even on this account, in order that reason may
not on the one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek about in the world of
sense for the supreme motive and an interest comprehensible but empirical;
and on the other hand, that it may not impotently flap its wings without
being able to move in the (for it) empty space of transcendent concepts
which we call the intelligible world, and so lose itself amidst chimeras. For
the rest, the idea of a pure world of understanding as a system of all
intelligences, and to which we ourselves as tational beings belong (although
we are likewise on the other side members of the sensible world), this
remains always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of rational
belief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold, useful, namely, to
produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the noble ideal
of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational beings), to which we
can belong as members then only when we carefully conduct ourselves
according to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.
Concluding Remark
but this something more I know no further. Of pure reason which frames
this ideal, there remains after the abstraction of all matter, i. e., knowledge
of objects, nothing but the form, namely, the practical law of the
universality of the maxims, and in conformity with this the conception of
reason in reference to a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient
cause, that is a cause determining the will. There must here be a total
absence of springs; unless this idea of an intelligible world is itself the
spring, or that in which reason primarily takes an interest; but to make this
intelligible is precisely the problem that we cannot solve.
Here now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry, and it is of great
importance to determine it even on this account, in order that reason may
not on the one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek about in the world of
sense for the supreme motive and an interest comprehensible but empirical;
and on the other hand, that it may not impotently flap its wings without
being able to move in the (for it) empty space of transcendent concepts
which we call the intelligible world, and so lose itself amidst chimeras. For
the rest, the idea of a pure world of understanding as a system of all
intelligences, and to which we ourselves as tational beings belong (although
we are likewise on the other side members of the sensible world), this
remains always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of rational
belief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold, useful, namely, to
produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the noble ideal
of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational beings), to which we
can belong as members then only when we carefully conduct ourselves
according to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.
Concluding Remark
Page 433
The speculative employment of reason with respect to nature leads to the
absolute necessity of some supreme cause of the world: the practical
employment of reason with a view to freedom leads also to absolute
necessity, but only of the laws of the actions of a rational being as such.
Now it is an essential principle of reason, however employed, to push its
knowledge to a consciousness of its necessity (without which it would not
be rational knowledge). It is however an equally essential restriction of the
same reason that it can neither discern the necessity of what is or what
happens, nor of what ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed on
which it is or happens or ought to happen. In this way, however, by the
constant inquiry for the condition, the satisfaction of reason is only further
and further postponed. Hence it unceasingly seeks the unconditionally
necessary, and finds itself forced to assume it, although without any means
of making it comprehensible to itself, happy enough if only it can discover
a conception which agrees with this assumption. It is therefore no fault in
our deduction of the supreme principle of morality, but an objection that
should be made to human reason in general, that it cannot enable us to
conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law (such as
the categorical imperative must be). It cannot be blamed for refusing to
explain this necessity by a condition, that is to say, by means of some
interest assumed as a basis, since the law would then cease to be a moral
law, i. e. a supreme law of freedom. And thus while we do not comprehend
the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet
comprehend its incomprehensibility, and this is all that can be fairly
demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the
very limit of human reason.
absolute necessity of some supreme cause of the world: the practical
employment of reason with a view to freedom leads also to absolute
necessity, but only of the laws of the actions of a rational being as such.
Now it is an essential principle of reason, however employed, to push its
knowledge to a consciousness of its necessity (without which it would not
be rational knowledge). It is however an equally essential restriction of the
same reason that it can neither discern the necessity of what is or what
happens, nor of what ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed on
which it is or happens or ought to happen. In this way, however, by the
constant inquiry for the condition, the satisfaction of reason is only further
and further postponed. Hence it unceasingly seeks the unconditionally
necessary, and finds itself forced to assume it, although without any means
of making it comprehensible to itself, happy enough if only it can discover
a conception which agrees with this assumption. It is therefore no fault in
our deduction of the supreme principle of morality, but an objection that
should be made to human reason in general, that it cannot enable us to
conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law (such as
the categorical imperative must be). It cannot be blamed for refusing to
explain this necessity by a condition, that is to say, by means of some
interest assumed as a basis, since the law would then cease to be a moral
law, i. e. a supreme law of freedom. And thus while we do not comprehend
the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet
comprehend its incomprehensibility, and this is all that can be fairly
demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the
very limit of human reason.
Page 434
BYRON AND GOETHE
BY GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Giuseppe Mazzini, the great political idealist of the Italian struggle for
independence, was born at Genoa, June 22, 1805. His faith in democracy
and his enthusiasm for a free Italy he inherited from his parents; and while
still a student in the University of Genoa he gathered round him a circle of
youths who shared his dreams. At the age of twenty-two he joined the secret
society of the Carbonari, and was sent on a mission to Tuscany, where he
was entrapped and arrested. On his release, he set about the formation,
among the Italian exiles in Marseilles, of the Society of Young Italy, which
had for its aim the establishment of a free and united Italian republic. His
activities led to a decree for his banishment from France, but he succeeded
in outwitting the spies of the Government and going on with his work. The
conspiracy for a national rising planned by Young Italy was discovered,
many of the leaders were executed, and Mazsini himself condemned to
death.
Almost at once, however, he resumed operations, working this time from
Geneva; but another abortive expedition led to his expulsion from
Switzerland. He found refuge, but at first hardly a livelihood, in London,
where he continued his propaganda by means of his pen. He went back to
BY GIUSEPPE MAZZINI
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Giuseppe Mazzini, the great political idealist of the Italian struggle for
independence, was born at Genoa, June 22, 1805. His faith in democracy
and his enthusiasm for a free Italy he inherited from his parents; and while
still a student in the University of Genoa he gathered round him a circle of
youths who shared his dreams. At the age of twenty-two he joined the secret
society of the Carbonari, and was sent on a mission to Tuscany, where he
was entrapped and arrested. On his release, he set about the formation,
among the Italian exiles in Marseilles, of the Society of Young Italy, which
had for its aim the establishment of a free and united Italian republic. His
activities led to a decree for his banishment from France, but he succeeded
in outwitting the spies of the Government and going on with his work. The
conspiracy for a national rising planned by Young Italy was discovered,
many of the leaders were executed, and Mazsini himself condemned to
death.
Almost at once, however, he resumed operations, working this time from
Geneva; but another abortive expedition led to his expulsion from
Switzerland. He found refuge, but at first hardly a livelihood, in London,
where he continued his propaganda by means of his pen. He went back to
Page 435
Italy when the revolution of 1848 broke out, and fought fiercely but in vain
against the French, when they besieged Rome and ended the Roman
Republic in 1849.
Defeated and broken, he returned to England, where he remained till
called to Italy by the insurrection of 1857. He worked with Garibaldi for
some time; but the kingdom established under Victor Emmanuel by Cavour
and Garibaldi was far from the ideal Italy for which Mazsini had striven.
The last years of his life were spent mainly in London, but at the end he
returned to Italy, where he died on March 10,1872. Hardly has any age seen
a political martyr of a purer or nobler type.
Massini's essay on Byron and Goethe is more than literary criticism, for it
exhibits that philosophical quality which gives so remarkable a unity to the
writings of Massini, whether literary, social, or political.
against the French, when they besieged Rome and ended the Roman
Republic in 1849.
Defeated and broken, he returned to England, where he remained till
called to Italy by the insurrection of 1857. He worked with Garibaldi for
some time; but the kingdom established under Victor Emmanuel by Cavour
and Garibaldi was far from the ideal Italy for which Mazsini had striven.
The last years of his life were spent mainly in London, but at the end he
returned to Italy, where he died on March 10,1872. Hardly has any age seen
a political martyr of a purer or nobler type.
Massini's essay on Byron and Goethe is more than literary criticism, for it
exhibits that philosophical quality which gives so remarkable a unity to the
writings of Massini, whether literary, social, or political.
Page 436
BYRON AND GOETHE
I stood one day in a Swiss village at the foot of the Jura, and watched the
coming of the storm. Heavy black clouds, their edges purpled by the setting
sun, were rapidly covering the loveliest sky in Europe, save that of Italy.
Thunder growled in the distance, and gusts of biting wind were driving
huge drops of rain over the thirsty plain. Looking upwards, I beheld a large
Alpine falcon, now rising, now sinking, as he floated bravely in the very
midst of the storm and I could almost fancy that he strove to battle with it.
At every fresh peal of thunder, the noble bird bounded higher aloft, as if in
answering defiance. I followed him with my eyes for a long time, until he
disappeared in the east. On the ground, about fifty paces beneath me, stood
a stork; perfectly tranquil and impassive in the midst of the warring
elements. Twice or thrice she turned her head towards the quarter from
whence the wind came, with an indescribable air of half indifferent
curiosity; but at length she drew up one of her long sinewy legs, hid her
head beneath her wing, and calmly composed herself to sleep.
I thought of Byron and Goethe; of the stormy sky that overhung both; of
the tempest-tossed existence, the lifelong struggle, of the one, and the calm
of the other; and of the two mighty sources of poetry exhausted and closed
by them.
Byron and Goethe—the two names that predominate, and, come what
may, ever will predominate, over our every recollection of the fifty years
I stood one day in a Swiss village at the foot of the Jura, and watched the
coming of the storm. Heavy black clouds, their edges purpled by the setting
sun, were rapidly covering the loveliest sky in Europe, save that of Italy.
Thunder growled in the distance, and gusts of biting wind were driving
huge drops of rain over the thirsty plain. Looking upwards, I beheld a large
Alpine falcon, now rising, now sinking, as he floated bravely in the very
midst of the storm and I could almost fancy that he strove to battle with it.
At every fresh peal of thunder, the noble bird bounded higher aloft, as if in
answering defiance. I followed him with my eyes for a long time, until he
disappeared in the east. On the ground, about fifty paces beneath me, stood
a stork; perfectly tranquil and impassive in the midst of the warring
elements. Twice or thrice she turned her head towards the quarter from
whence the wind came, with an indescribable air of half indifferent
curiosity; but at length she drew up one of her long sinewy legs, hid her
head beneath her wing, and calmly composed herself to sleep.
I thought of Byron and Goethe; of the stormy sky that overhung both; of
the tempest-tossed existence, the lifelong struggle, of the one, and the calm
of the other; and of the two mighty sources of poetry exhausted and closed
by them.
Byron and Goethe—the two names that predominate, and, come what
may, ever will predominate, over our every recollection of the fifty years
Page 437
that have passed away. They rule; the master-minds, I might almost say the
tyrants, of a whole period of poetry; brilliant, yet sad; glorious in youth and
daring, yet cankered by the worm in the bud, despair. They are the two
representative poets of two great schools; and around them we are
compelled to group all the lesser minds which contributed to render the era
illustrious. The qualities which adorn and distinguish their works are to be
found, although more thinly scattered, in other poets their contemporaries;
still theirs are the names that involuntarily rise to our lips whenever we seek
to characterize the tendencies of the age in which they lived. Their genius
pursued different, even opposite routes; and yet very rarely do our thoughts
turn to either without evoking the image of the other, as a sort of necessary
complement to the first. The eyes of Europe were fixed upon the pair, as the
spectators gaze on two mighty wrestlers in the same arena; and they, like
noble and generous adversaries, admired, praised, and held out the hand to
each other. Many poets have followed in their footsteps; none have been so
popular. Others have found judges and critics who have appreciated them
calmly and impartially; not so they: for them there have been only
enthusiasts or enemies, wreaths or stones; and when they vanished into the
vast night that envelops and transforms alike men and things—silence
reigned around their tombs. Little by little, poetry had passed away from
our world, and it seemed as if their last sigh had extinguished the sacred
flame.
A reaction has now commenced; good, in so far as it reveals a desire for
and promise of new life; evil, in so far as it betrays narrow views, a
tendency to injustice towards departed genius, and the absence of any fixed
rule or principle to guide our appreciation of the past. Human judgment,
like Luther's drunken peasant, when saved from falling on one side, too
often topples over on the other. The reaction against Goethe, in his own
country especially, which was courageously and justly begun by Menzel
during his lifetime, has been carried to exaggeration since his death. Certain
tyrants, of a whole period of poetry; brilliant, yet sad; glorious in youth and
daring, yet cankered by the worm in the bud, despair. They are the two
representative poets of two great schools; and around them we are
compelled to group all the lesser minds which contributed to render the era
illustrious. The qualities which adorn and distinguish their works are to be
found, although more thinly scattered, in other poets their contemporaries;
still theirs are the names that involuntarily rise to our lips whenever we seek
to characterize the tendencies of the age in which they lived. Their genius
pursued different, even opposite routes; and yet very rarely do our thoughts
turn to either without evoking the image of the other, as a sort of necessary
complement to the first. The eyes of Europe were fixed upon the pair, as the
spectators gaze on two mighty wrestlers in the same arena; and they, like
noble and generous adversaries, admired, praised, and held out the hand to
each other. Many poets have followed in their footsteps; none have been so
popular. Others have found judges and critics who have appreciated them
calmly and impartially; not so they: for them there have been only
enthusiasts or enemies, wreaths or stones; and when they vanished into the
vast night that envelops and transforms alike men and things—silence
reigned around their tombs. Little by little, poetry had passed away from
our world, and it seemed as if their last sigh had extinguished the sacred
flame.
A reaction has now commenced; good, in so far as it reveals a desire for
and promise of new life; evil, in so far as it betrays narrow views, a
tendency to injustice towards departed genius, and the absence of any fixed
rule or principle to guide our appreciation of the past. Human judgment,
like Luther's drunken peasant, when saved from falling on one side, too
often topples over on the other. The reaction against Goethe, in his own
country especially, which was courageously and justly begun by Menzel
during his lifetime, has been carried to exaggeration since his death. Certain
Page 438
social opinions, to which I myself belong, but which, although founded on a
sacred principle, should not be allowed to interfere with the impartiality of
our judgment, have weighed heavily in the balance; and many young,
ardent, and enthusiastic minds of our day have reiterated with Bonne that
Goethe is the worst of despots; the cancer of the German body.
The English reaction against Byron—I do not speak of that mixture of
cant and stupidity which denies the poet his place in Westminster Abbey,
but of literary reaction—has shown itself still more unreasoning. I have met
with adorers of Shelley who denied the poetic genius of Byron; others who
seriously compared his poems with those of Sir Walter Scott. One very
much overrated critic writes that "Byron makes man after his own image,
and woman after his own heart; the one is a capricious tyrant, the other a
yielding slave." The first forgot the verses in which their favorite hailed
"The pilgrim of eternity, whose fame
Over his living head like Heaven is bent;"
[Footnote: Adonais.]
the second, that after the appearance of "The Giaour" and "Childe
Harold," Sir Walter Scott renounced writing poetry. [Footnote: Lockhart.]
The last forgot that while he was quietly writing criticisms, Byron was
dying for new-born liberty in Greece. All judged, too many in each country
still judge, the two poets, Byron and Goethe, after an absolute type of the
beautiful, the true, or the false, which they had formed in their own minds;
without regard to the state of social relations as they were or are; without
any true conception of the destiny or mission of poetry, or of the law by
which it, and every other artistic manifestation of human life, is governed.
There is no absolute type on earth: the absolute exists in the Divine Idea
alone; the gradual comprehension of which man is destined to attain;
although its complete realization is impossible on earth; earthly life being
sacred principle, should not be allowed to interfere with the impartiality of
our judgment, have weighed heavily in the balance; and many young,
ardent, and enthusiastic minds of our day have reiterated with Bonne that
Goethe is the worst of despots; the cancer of the German body.
The English reaction against Byron—I do not speak of that mixture of
cant and stupidity which denies the poet his place in Westminster Abbey,
but of literary reaction—has shown itself still more unreasoning. I have met
with adorers of Shelley who denied the poetic genius of Byron; others who
seriously compared his poems with those of Sir Walter Scott. One very
much overrated critic writes that "Byron makes man after his own image,
and woman after his own heart; the one is a capricious tyrant, the other a
yielding slave." The first forgot the verses in which their favorite hailed
"The pilgrim of eternity, whose fame
Over his living head like Heaven is bent;"
[Footnote: Adonais.]
the second, that after the appearance of "The Giaour" and "Childe
Harold," Sir Walter Scott renounced writing poetry. [Footnote: Lockhart.]
The last forgot that while he was quietly writing criticisms, Byron was
dying for new-born liberty in Greece. All judged, too many in each country
still judge, the two poets, Byron and Goethe, after an absolute type of the
beautiful, the true, or the false, which they had formed in their own minds;
without regard to the state of social relations as they were or are; without
any true conception of the destiny or mission of poetry, or of the law by
which it, and every other artistic manifestation of human life, is governed.
There is no absolute type on earth: the absolute exists in the Divine Idea
alone; the gradual comprehension of which man is destined to attain;
although its complete realization is impossible on earth; earthly life being
Page 439
but one stage of the eternal evolution of life, manifested in thought and
action; strengthened by all the achievements of the past, and advancing
from age to age towards a less imperfect expression of that idea. Our
earthly life is one phase of the eternal aspiration of the soul towards
progress, which is our law ascending in increasing power and purity from
the finite towards the infinite; from the real towards the Ideal; from that
which is, towards that which is to come. In the immense storehouse of the
past evolutions of life constituted by universal tradition, and in the
prophetic instinct brooding in the depths of the human soul, does poetry
seek inspiration. It changes with the times, for it is their expression; it is
transformed with society, for— consciously or unconsciously—it sings the
lay of Humanity; although, according to the individual bias or
circumstances of the singer, it assumes the hues of the present, or of the
future in course of elaboration, and foreseen by the inspiration of genius. It
sings now a dirge and now a cradle song; it initiates or sums up.
Byron and Goethe summed up. Was it a defect in them? No; it was the
law of the times, and yet society at the present day, twenty years after they
have ceased to sing, assumes to condemn them for having been born too
soon. Happy indeed are the poets whom God raises up at the
commencement of an era, under the rays of the rising sun. A series of
generations will lovingly repeat their verses, and attribute to them the new
life which they did but foresee in the germ.
Byron and Goethe summed up. This is at once the philosophical
explanation of their works, and the secret of their popularity. The spirit of
an entire epoch of the European world became incarnate in them ere its
decease, even as—in the political sphere—the spirit of Greece and Rome
became incarnate before death in Caesar and Alexander. They were the
poetic expression of that principle, of which England was the economic,
France the political, and Germany the philosophic expression: the last
action; strengthened by all the achievements of the past, and advancing
from age to age towards a less imperfect expression of that idea. Our
earthly life is one phase of the eternal aspiration of the soul towards
progress, which is our law ascending in increasing power and purity from
the finite towards the infinite; from the real towards the Ideal; from that
which is, towards that which is to come. In the immense storehouse of the
past evolutions of life constituted by universal tradition, and in the
prophetic instinct brooding in the depths of the human soul, does poetry
seek inspiration. It changes with the times, for it is their expression; it is
transformed with society, for— consciously or unconsciously—it sings the
lay of Humanity; although, according to the individual bias or
circumstances of the singer, it assumes the hues of the present, or of the
future in course of elaboration, and foreseen by the inspiration of genius. It
sings now a dirge and now a cradle song; it initiates or sums up.
Byron and Goethe summed up. Was it a defect in them? No; it was the
law of the times, and yet society at the present day, twenty years after they
have ceased to sing, assumes to condemn them for having been born too
soon. Happy indeed are the poets whom God raises up at the
commencement of an era, under the rays of the rising sun. A series of
generations will lovingly repeat their verses, and attribute to them the new
life which they did but foresee in the germ.
Byron and Goethe summed up. This is at once the philosophical
explanation of their works, and the secret of their popularity. The spirit of
an entire epoch of the European world became incarnate in them ere its
decease, even as—in the political sphere—the spirit of Greece and Rome
became incarnate before death in Caesar and Alexander. They were the
poetic expression of that principle, of which England was the economic,
France the political, and Germany the philosophic expression: the last
Page 440
formula, effort, and result of a society founded on the principle of
individuality. That epoch, the mission of which had been, first through the
labors of Greek philosophy, and afterwards through Christianity, to
rehabilitate, emancipate, and develop individual man—appears to have
concentrated in them, in Fichte, in Adam Smith, and in the French school
des drolls de l'homme, its whole energy and power, in order fully to
represent and express all that it had achieved for mankind. It was much; but
it was not the whole; and therefore it was doomed to pass away. The epoch
of individuality was deemed near the goal; when low immense horizons
were revealed; vast unknown lands in whose untrodden forests the principle
of individuality was an insufficient guide. By the long and painful labors of
that epoch the human unknown quantity had been disengaged from the
various quantities of different nature by which it had been surrounded; but
only to be left weak, isolated, and recoiling in terror from the solitude in
which it stood. The political schools of the epoch had proclaimed the sole
basis of civil organization to be the right to liberty and equality (liberty for
all), but they had encountered social anarchy by the way. The philosophy of
the epoch had asserted the sovereignty of the human Ego, and had ended in
the mere adoration of fact, in Hegelian immobility. The Economy of the
epoch imagined it had organized free competition, while it had but
organized the oppression of the weak by the strong; of labor by capital; of
poverty by wealth. The Poetry of the epoch had represented individuality in
its every phase; had translated in sentiment what science had theoretically
demonstrated; and it had encountered the void. But as society at last
discovered that the destinies of the race were not contained in a mere
problem of liberty, but rather in the harmonization of liberty with
association—so did poetry discover that the life it had hitherto drawn from
individuality alone was doomed to perish for want of aliment; and that its
future existence depended on enlarging and transforming its sphere. Both
society and poetry uttered a cry of despair: the death-agony of a form of
individuality. That epoch, the mission of which had been, first through the
labors of Greek philosophy, and afterwards through Christianity, to
rehabilitate, emancipate, and develop individual man—appears to have
concentrated in them, in Fichte, in Adam Smith, and in the French school
des drolls de l'homme, its whole energy and power, in order fully to
represent and express all that it had achieved for mankind. It was much; but
it was not the whole; and therefore it was doomed to pass away. The epoch
of individuality was deemed near the goal; when low immense horizons
were revealed; vast unknown lands in whose untrodden forests the principle
of individuality was an insufficient guide. By the long and painful labors of
that epoch the human unknown quantity had been disengaged from the
various quantities of different nature by which it had been surrounded; but
only to be left weak, isolated, and recoiling in terror from the solitude in
which it stood. The political schools of the epoch had proclaimed the sole
basis of civil organization to be the right to liberty and equality (liberty for
all), but they had encountered social anarchy by the way. The philosophy of
the epoch had asserted the sovereignty of the human Ego, and had ended in
the mere adoration of fact, in Hegelian immobility. The Economy of the
epoch imagined it had organized free competition, while it had but
organized the oppression of the weak by the strong; of labor by capital; of
poverty by wealth. The Poetry of the epoch had represented individuality in
its every phase; had translated in sentiment what science had theoretically
demonstrated; and it had encountered the void. But as society at last
discovered that the destinies of the race were not contained in a mere
problem of liberty, but rather in the harmonization of liberty with
association—so did poetry discover that the life it had hitherto drawn from
individuality alone was doomed to perish for want of aliment; and that its
future existence depended on enlarging and transforming its sphere. Both
society and poetry uttered a cry of despair: the death-agony of a form of
Page 441
society produced the agitation we have seen constantly increasing in Europe
since 1815: the death-agony of a form of poetry evoked Byron and Goethe.
I believe this point of view to be the only one that can lead us to a useful
and impartial appreciation of these two great spirits.
There are two forms of individuality; the expressions of its internal and
external, or—as the Germans would say—of its subjective and objective
life. Byron was the poet of the first, Goethe of the last. In Byron the Ego is
revealed in all its pride of power, freedom, and desire, in the uncontrolled
plenitude of all its faculties; inhaling existence at every pore, eager to seize
"the life of life." The world around him neither rules nor tempers him. The
Byronian Ego aspires to rule it; but solely for dominion's sake, to exercise
upon it the Titanic force of his will. Accurately speaking, he cannot be said
to derive from it either color, tone, or image; for it is he who colors; he who
sings; he whose image is everywhere reflected and reproduced. His poetry
emanates from his own soul; to be thence diffused upon things external; he
holds his state in the centre of the universe, and from thence projects the
light radiating from the depths of his own mind; as scorching and intense as
the concentrated solar ray. Hence that terrible unity which only the
superficial reader could mistake for monotony.
Byron appears at the close of one epoch, and before the dawn of the
other; in the midst of a community based upon an aristocracy which has
outlived the vigor of its prime; surrounded by a Europe containing nothing
grand, unless it be Napoleon on one side and Pitt on the other, genius
degraded to minister to egotism; intellect bound to the service of the past.
No seer exists to foretell the future: belief is extinct; there is only its
pretence: prayer is no more; there is only a movement of the lips at a fixed
day or hour, for the sake of the family, or what is called the people; love is
no more; desire has taken its place; the holy warfare of ideas is abandoned;
the conflict is that of interests. The worship of great thoughts has passed
since 1815: the death-agony of a form of poetry evoked Byron and Goethe.
I believe this point of view to be the only one that can lead us to a useful
and impartial appreciation of these two great spirits.
There are two forms of individuality; the expressions of its internal and
external, or—as the Germans would say—of its subjective and objective
life. Byron was the poet of the first, Goethe of the last. In Byron the Ego is
revealed in all its pride of power, freedom, and desire, in the uncontrolled
plenitude of all its faculties; inhaling existence at every pore, eager to seize
"the life of life." The world around him neither rules nor tempers him. The
Byronian Ego aspires to rule it; but solely for dominion's sake, to exercise
upon it the Titanic force of his will. Accurately speaking, he cannot be said
to derive from it either color, tone, or image; for it is he who colors; he who
sings; he whose image is everywhere reflected and reproduced. His poetry
emanates from his own soul; to be thence diffused upon things external; he
holds his state in the centre of the universe, and from thence projects the
light radiating from the depths of his own mind; as scorching and intense as
the concentrated solar ray. Hence that terrible unity which only the
superficial reader could mistake for monotony.
Byron appears at the close of one epoch, and before the dawn of the
other; in the midst of a community based upon an aristocracy which has
outlived the vigor of its prime; surrounded by a Europe containing nothing
grand, unless it be Napoleon on one side and Pitt on the other, genius
degraded to minister to egotism; intellect bound to the service of the past.
No seer exists to foretell the future: belief is extinct; there is only its
pretence: prayer is no more; there is only a movement of the lips at a fixed
day or hour, for the sake of the family, or what is called the people; love is
no more; desire has taken its place; the holy warfare of ideas is abandoned;
the conflict is that of interests. The worship of great thoughts has passed
Page 442
away. That which is, raises the tattered banner of some corpse-like
traditions; that which would be, hoists only the standard of physical wants,
of material appetites: around him are ruins, beyond him the desert; the
horizon is a blank. A long cry of suffering and indignation bursts from the
heart of Byron: he is answered by anathemas. He departs; he hurries
through Europe in search of an ideal to adore; he traverses it distracted,
palpitating, like Mazeppa on the wild horse; borne onwards by a fierce
desire; the wolves of envy and calumny follow in pursuit. He visits Greece;
he visits Italy; if anywhere a lingering spark of the sacred fire, a ray of
divine poetry, is preserved, it must be there. Nothing. A glorious past, a
degraded present; none of life's poetry; no movement, save that of the
sufferer turning on his couch to relieve his pain. Byron, from the solitude of
his exile, turns his eyes again towards England; he sings. What does he
sing? What springs from the mysterious and unique conception which rules,
one would say in spite of himself, over all that escapes him in his sleepless
vigil? The funeral hymn, the death-song, the epitaph of the aristocratic idea;
we discovered it, we Continentalists; not his own countrymen. He takes his
types from amongst those privileged by strength, beauty, and individual
power. They are grand, poetical, heroic, but solitary; they hold no
communion with the world around them, unless it be to rule, over it; they
defy alike the good and evil principle; they "will bend to neither." In life
and in death "they stand upon their strength;" they resist every power, for
their own is all their, own; it was purchased by
"Superior science—penance—daring-
And length of watching-strength of mind—and skill
In knowledge of our fathers."
Each of them is the personification, slightly modified, of a single type, a
single idea—the individual; free, but nothing more than free; such as the
epoch now closing has made him; Faust, but without the compact which
traditions; that which would be, hoists only the standard of physical wants,
of material appetites: around him are ruins, beyond him the desert; the
horizon is a blank. A long cry of suffering and indignation bursts from the
heart of Byron: he is answered by anathemas. He departs; he hurries
through Europe in search of an ideal to adore; he traverses it distracted,
palpitating, like Mazeppa on the wild horse; borne onwards by a fierce
desire; the wolves of envy and calumny follow in pursuit. He visits Greece;
he visits Italy; if anywhere a lingering spark of the sacred fire, a ray of
divine poetry, is preserved, it must be there. Nothing. A glorious past, a
degraded present; none of life's poetry; no movement, save that of the
sufferer turning on his couch to relieve his pain. Byron, from the solitude of
his exile, turns his eyes again towards England; he sings. What does he
sing? What springs from the mysterious and unique conception which rules,
one would say in spite of himself, over all that escapes him in his sleepless
vigil? The funeral hymn, the death-song, the epitaph of the aristocratic idea;
we discovered it, we Continentalists; not his own countrymen. He takes his
types from amongst those privileged by strength, beauty, and individual
power. They are grand, poetical, heroic, but solitary; they hold no
communion with the world around them, unless it be to rule, over it; they
defy alike the good and evil principle; they "will bend to neither." In life
and in death "they stand upon their strength;" they resist every power, for
their own is all their, own; it was purchased by
"Superior science—penance—daring-
And length of watching-strength of mind—and skill
In knowledge of our fathers."
Each of them is the personification, slightly modified, of a single type, a
single idea—the individual; free, but nothing more than free; such as the
epoch now closing has made him; Faust, but without the compact which
Page 443
submits him to the enemy; for the heroes of Byron make no such compact.
Cain kneels not to Arimanes; and Manfred, about to die, exclaims:
"The mind, which is immortal, makes itself
Requital for its good and evil thoughts-
Is its own origin of ill, and end-
And its own place and time, its innate sense,
When stripped of this mortality, derives
No color from the fleeting things without,
But is absorbed in sufferance or in joy;
Born from the knowledge of its own desert."
They have no kindred: they live from their own life only they repulse
humanity, and regard the crowd with disdain. Each of them says: "I have
faith in myself"; never, "I have faith in ourselves." They all aspire to power
or to happiness. The one and the other alike escape them; for they bear
within them, untold, unacknowledged even to themselves, the presentiment
of a life that mere liberty can never give them. Free they are; iron souls in
iron frames, they climb the Alps of the physical world as well as the Alps of
thought; still is their visage stamped with a gloomy and ineffaceable
sadness; still is their soul-whether, as in Cain and Manfred, it plunge into
the abyss of the infinite, "intoxicated with eternity," or scour the vast plain
and boundless ocean with the Corsair and Giaour—haunted by a secret and
sleepless dread. It seems as if they were doomed to drag the broken links of
the chain they have burst asunder, riveted to their feet. Not only in the petty
society against which they rebel does their soul feel fettered and restrained;
but even in the world of the spirit. Neither is it to the enmity of society that
they succumb; but under the assaults of this nameless anguish; under the
corroding action of potent faculties "inferior still to their desires and their
conceptions"; under the deception that comes from within. What can they
do with the liberty so painfully won? On whom, on what, expend the
Cain kneels not to Arimanes; and Manfred, about to die, exclaims:
"The mind, which is immortal, makes itself
Requital for its good and evil thoughts-
Is its own origin of ill, and end-
And its own place and time, its innate sense,
When stripped of this mortality, derives
No color from the fleeting things without,
But is absorbed in sufferance or in joy;
Born from the knowledge of its own desert."
They have no kindred: they live from their own life only they repulse
humanity, and regard the crowd with disdain. Each of them says: "I have
faith in myself"; never, "I have faith in ourselves." They all aspire to power
or to happiness. The one and the other alike escape them; for they bear
within them, untold, unacknowledged even to themselves, the presentiment
of a life that mere liberty can never give them. Free they are; iron souls in
iron frames, they climb the Alps of the physical world as well as the Alps of
thought; still is their visage stamped with a gloomy and ineffaceable
sadness; still is their soul-whether, as in Cain and Manfred, it plunge into
the abyss of the infinite, "intoxicated with eternity," or scour the vast plain
and boundless ocean with the Corsair and Giaour—haunted by a secret and
sleepless dread. It seems as if they were doomed to drag the broken links of
the chain they have burst asunder, riveted to their feet. Not only in the petty
society against which they rebel does their soul feel fettered and restrained;
but even in the world of the spirit. Neither is it to the enmity of society that
they succumb; but under the assaults of this nameless anguish; under the
corroding action of potent faculties "inferior still to their desires and their
conceptions"; under the deception that comes from within. What can they
do with the liberty so painfully won? On whom, on what, expend the
Page 444
exuberant vitality within them? They are alone; this is the secret of their
wretchedness and impotence. They "thirst for good"—Cain has said it for
them all—but cannot achieve it; for they have no mission, no belief, no
comprehension even of the world around them. They have never realized
the conception of Humanity in the multitudes that have preceded, surround,
and will follow after them; never thought on their own place between the
past and future; on the continuity of labor that unites all the generations into
one whole; on the common end and aim, only to be realized by the common
effort; on the spiritual post-sepulchral life even on earth of the individual,
through the thoughts he transmits to his fellows; and, it may be— when he
lives devoted and dies. in faith—through the guardian agency he is allowed
to exercise over the loved ones left on earth.
Gifted with a liberty they know not how to use; with a power and energy
they know not how to apply; with a life whose purpose and aim they
comprehend not; they drag through their useless and convulsed existence.
Byron destroys them one after the other, as if he were the executioner of a
sentence decreed in heaven. They fall unwept, like a withered leaf into the
stream of time.
"Nor earth nor sky shall yield a single tear,
Nor cloud shall gather more, nor leaf shall fall,
Nor gale breathe forth one sigh for thee, for all."
They die, as they have lived, alone; and a popular malediction hovers
round their solitary tombs.
This, for those who can read with the soul's eyes, is what Byron sings; or
rather what humanity sings through him. The emptiness of the life and
death of solitary individuality has never been so powerfully and
efficaciously summed up as in the pages of Byron. The crowd do not
comprehend him: they listen; fascinated for an instant; then repent, and
wretchedness and impotence. They "thirst for good"—Cain has said it for
them all—but cannot achieve it; for they have no mission, no belief, no
comprehension even of the world around them. They have never realized
the conception of Humanity in the multitudes that have preceded, surround,
and will follow after them; never thought on their own place between the
past and future; on the continuity of labor that unites all the generations into
one whole; on the common end and aim, only to be realized by the common
effort; on the spiritual post-sepulchral life even on earth of the individual,
through the thoughts he transmits to his fellows; and, it may be— when he
lives devoted and dies. in faith—through the guardian agency he is allowed
to exercise over the loved ones left on earth.
Gifted with a liberty they know not how to use; with a power and energy
they know not how to apply; with a life whose purpose and aim they
comprehend not; they drag through their useless and convulsed existence.
Byron destroys them one after the other, as if he were the executioner of a
sentence decreed in heaven. They fall unwept, like a withered leaf into the
stream of time.
"Nor earth nor sky shall yield a single tear,
Nor cloud shall gather more, nor leaf shall fall,
Nor gale breathe forth one sigh for thee, for all."
They die, as they have lived, alone; and a popular malediction hovers
round their solitary tombs.
This, for those who can read with the soul's eyes, is what Byron sings; or
rather what humanity sings through him. The emptiness of the life and
death of solitary individuality has never been so powerfully and
efficaciously summed up as in the pages of Byron. The crowd do not
comprehend him: they listen; fascinated for an instant; then repent, and
Page 445
avenge their momentary transport by calumniating and insulting the poet.
His intuition of the death of a form of society they call wounded self-love;
his sorrow for all is misinterpreted as cowardly egotism. They credit not the
traces of profound suffering revealed by his lineaments; they credit not the
presentiment of a new life which from time to time escapes his trembling
lips; they believe not in the despairing embrace in which he grasps the
material universe—stars, lakes, alps, and sea—and identifies himself with
it, and through it with God, of whom—to him at least—it is a symbol. They
do, however, take careful count of some unhappy moments, in which,
wearied out by the emptiness of life, he has raised—with remorse I am sure
—the cup of ignoble pleasures to his lips, believing he might find
forgetfulness there. How many times have not his accusers drained this cup,
without redeeming the sin by a single virtue; without—I will not say
bearing—but without having even the capacity of appreciating the burden
which weighed on Byron! And did he not himself dash into fragments the
ignoble cup, so soon as he beheld something worthy the devotion of his
life?
Goethe—individuality in its objective life—having, like Byron, a sense
of the falsehood and evil of the world round him-followed exactly the
opposite path. After having—he, too, in his youth— uttered a cry of anguish
in his Werther; after having laid bare the problem of the epoch in all its
terrific nudity, in Faust; he thought he had done enough, and refused to
occupy himself with its solution. It is possible that the impulse of rebellion
against social wrong and evil which burst forth for an instant in Werther
may long have held his soul in secret travail; but that he despaired of the
task of reforming it as beyond his powers. He himself remarked in his later
years, when commenting on the exclamation made by a Frenchman on first
seeing him: "That is the face of a man who has suffered much": that he
should rather have said: "That is the face of a man who has struggled
energetically;" but of this there remains no trace in his works. Whilst Byron
His intuition of the death of a form of society they call wounded self-love;
his sorrow for all is misinterpreted as cowardly egotism. They credit not the
traces of profound suffering revealed by his lineaments; they credit not the
presentiment of a new life which from time to time escapes his trembling
lips; they believe not in the despairing embrace in which he grasps the
material universe—stars, lakes, alps, and sea—and identifies himself with
it, and through it with God, of whom—to him at least—it is a symbol. They
do, however, take careful count of some unhappy moments, in which,
wearied out by the emptiness of life, he has raised—with remorse I am sure
—the cup of ignoble pleasures to his lips, believing he might find
forgetfulness there. How many times have not his accusers drained this cup,
without redeeming the sin by a single virtue; without—I will not say
bearing—but without having even the capacity of appreciating the burden
which weighed on Byron! And did he not himself dash into fragments the
ignoble cup, so soon as he beheld something worthy the devotion of his
life?
Goethe—individuality in its objective life—having, like Byron, a sense
of the falsehood and evil of the world round him-followed exactly the
opposite path. After having—he, too, in his youth— uttered a cry of anguish
in his Werther; after having laid bare the problem of the epoch in all its
terrific nudity, in Faust; he thought he had done enough, and refused to
occupy himself with its solution. It is possible that the impulse of rebellion
against social wrong and evil which burst forth for an instant in Werther
may long have held his soul in secret travail; but that he despaired of the
task of reforming it as beyond his powers. He himself remarked in his later
years, when commenting on the exclamation made by a Frenchman on first
seeing him: "That is the face of a man who has suffered much": that he
should rather have said: "That is the face of a man who has struggled
energetically;" but of this there remains no trace in his works. Whilst Byron
Page 446
writhed and suffered under the sense of the wrong and evil around him, he
attained the calm—I cannot say of victory—but of indifference. In Byron
the man always ruled, and even at times, overcame the artist: the man was
completely lost in the artist in Goethe. In him there was no subjective life;
no unity springing either from heart or head. Goethe is an intelligence that
receives, elaborates, and reproduces the poetry affluent to him from all
external objects: from all points of the circumference; to him as centre. He
dwells aloft alone; a mighty watcher in the midst of creation. His curious
scrutiny investigates, with equal penetration and equal interest, the depths
of the ocean and the calyx of the floweret. Whether he studies the rose
exhaling its Eastern perfume to the sky, or the ocean casting its countless
wrecks upon the shore, the brow of the poet remains equally calm: to him
they are but two forms of the beautiful; two subjects for art.
Goethe has been called a pantheist. I know not in what sense critics apply
this vague and often ill-understood word to him. There is a materialistic
pantheism and a spiritual pantheism; the pantheism of Spinoza and that of
Giordano Bruno; of St. Paul; and of many others- -all different. But there is
no poetic pantheism possible, save on the condition of embracing the whole
world of phenomena in one unique conception: of feeling and
comprehending the life of the universe in its divine unity. There is nothing
of this in Goethe. There is pantheism in some parts of Wordsworth; in the
third canto of "Childe Harold," and in much of Shelley; but there is none in
the most admirable compositions of Goethe; wherein life, though admirably
comprehended and reproduced in each of its successive manifestations, is
never understood as a whole. Goethe is the poet of details, not of unity; of
analysis, not of synthesis. None so able to investigate details; to set off and
embellish minute and apparently trifling points; none throw so beautiful a
light on separate parts; but the connecting link escapes him. His works
resemble a magnificent encyclopaedia, unclassified. He has felt everything
but he has never felt the whole. Happy in detecting a ray of the beautiful
attained the calm—I cannot say of victory—but of indifference. In Byron
the man always ruled, and even at times, overcame the artist: the man was
completely lost in the artist in Goethe. In him there was no subjective life;
no unity springing either from heart or head. Goethe is an intelligence that
receives, elaborates, and reproduces the poetry affluent to him from all
external objects: from all points of the circumference; to him as centre. He
dwells aloft alone; a mighty watcher in the midst of creation. His curious
scrutiny investigates, with equal penetration and equal interest, the depths
of the ocean and the calyx of the floweret. Whether he studies the rose
exhaling its Eastern perfume to the sky, or the ocean casting its countless
wrecks upon the shore, the brow of the poet remains equally calm: to him
they are but two forms of the beautiful; two subjects for art.
Goethe has been called a pantheist. I know not in what sense critics apply
this vague and often ill-understood word to him. There is a materialistic
pantheism and a spiritual pantheism; the pantheism of Spinoza and that of
Giordano Bruno; of St. Paul; and of many others- -all different. But there is
no poetic pantheism possible, save on the condition of embracing the whole
world of phenomena in one unique conception: of feeling and
comprehending the life of the universe in its divine unity. There is nothing
of this in Goethe. There is pantheism in some parts of Wordsworth; in the
third canto of "Childe Harold," and in much of Shelley; but there is none in
the most admirable compositions of Goethe; wherein life, though admirably
comprehended and reproduced in each of its successive manifestations, is
never understood as a whole. Goethe is the poet of details, not of unity; of
analysis, not of synthesis. None so able to investigate details; to set off and
embellish minute and apparently trifling points; none throw so beautiful a
light on separate parts; but the connecting link escapes him. His works
resemble a magnificent encyclopaedia, unclassified. He has felt everything
but he has never felt the whole. Happy in detecting a ray of the beautiful
Page 447
upon the humblest blade of grass gemmed with dew; happy in seizing the
poetic elements of an incident the most prosaic in appearance—he was
incapable of tracing all to a common source, and recomposing the grand
ascending scale in which, to quote a beautiful expression of Herder's "every
creature is a numerator of the grand denominator, Nature." How, indeed,
should he comprehend these things, he who had no place in his works or in
his poet's heart for humanity, by the light of which conception only can the
true worth of sublunary things be determined? "Religion and politics,"
[Footnote: Goethe and his Contemporaries.] said he, "are a troubled element
for art. I have always kept myself aloof from them as much as possible."
Questions of life and death for the millions were agitated around him;
Germany re-echoed to the war songs of Korner; Fichte, at the close of one
of his lectures, seized his musket, and joined the volunteers who were
hastening (alas! what have not the Kings made of that magnificent outburst
of nationality!) to fight the battles of their fatherland. The ancient soil of
Germany thrilled beneath their tread; he, an artist, looked on unmoved; his
heart knew no responsive throb to the emotion that shook his country; his
genius, utterly passive, drew apart from the current that swept away entire
races. He witnessed the French Revolution in all its terrible grandeur, and
saw the old world crumble beneath its strokes; and while all the best and
purest spirits of Germany, who had mistaken the death-agony of the old
world for the birth-throes of a new, were wringing their hands at the
spectacle of dissolution, he saw in it only the subject of a farce. He beheld
the glory and the fall of Napoleon; he witnessed the reaction of down-
trodden nationalities—sublime prologue of the grand epopee of the peoples
destined sooner or later to be unfolded- -and remained a cold spectator. He
had neither learned to esteem men, to better them, nor even to suffer with
them. If we except the beautiful type of Berlichingen, a poetic inspiration of
his youth, man, as the creature of thought and action; the artificer of the
future, so nobly sketched by Schiller in his dramas, has no representative in
poetic elements of an incident the most prosaic in appearance—he was
incapable of tracing all to a common source, and recomposing the grand
ascending scale in which, to quote a beautiful expression of Herder's "every
creature is a numerator of the grand denominator, Nature." How, indeed,
should he comprehend these things, he who had no place in his works or in
his poet's heart for humanity, by the light of which conception only can the
true worth of sublunary things be determined? "Religion and politics,"
[Footnote: Goethe and his Contemporaries.] said he, "are a troubled element
for art. I have always kept myself aloof from them as much as possible."
Questions of life and death for the millions were agitated around him;
Germany re-echoed to the war songs of Korner; Fichte, at the close of one
of his lectures, seized his musket, and joined the volunteers who were
hastening (alas! what have not the Kings made of that magnificent outburst
of nationality!) to fight the battles of their fatherland. The ancient soil of
Germany thrilled beneath their tread; he, an artist, looked on unmoved; his
heart knew no responsive throb to the emotion that shook his country; his
genius, utterly passive, drew apart from the current that swept away entire
races. He witnessed the French Revolution in all its terrible grandeur, and
saw the old world crumble beneath its strokes; and while all the best and
purest spirits of Germany, who had mistaken the death-agony of the old
world for the birth-throes of a new, were wringing their hands at the
spectacle of dissolution, he saw in it only the subject of a farce. He beheld
the glory and the fall of Napoleon; he witnessed the reaction of down-
trodden nationalities—sublime prologue of the grand epopee of the peoples
destined sooner or later to be unfolded- -and remained a cold spectator. He
had neither learned to esteem men, to better them, nor even to suffer with
them. If we except the beautiful type of Berlichingen, a poetic inspiration of
his youth, man, as the creature of thought and action; the artificer of the
future, so nobly sketched by Schiller in his dramas, has no representative in
Page 448
his works. He has carried something—of this nonchalance even into the
manner in which his heroes conceive love. Goethe's altar is spread with the
choicest flowers, the most exquisite perfumes, the first-fruits of nature; but
the Priest is wanting. In his work of second creation—for it cannot be
denied that such it was—he has gone through the vast circle of living and
visible things; but stopped short before the seventh day. God withdrew from
him before that time; and the creatures the poet has evoked wander within
the circle, dumb and prayerless; awaiting until the man shall come to give
them a name, and appoint them to a destination.
No, Goethe is not the poet of Pantheism; he is a polytheist in his method
as an artist; the pagan poet of modern times. His world is, above all things,
the world of forms: a multiplied Olympus. The Mosaic heaven and the
Christian are veiled to him. Like the pagans, he parcels out Nature into
fragments, and makes of each a divinity; like them, he worships the
sensuous rather than the ideal; he looks, touches, and listens far more than
he feels. And what care and labor are bestowed upon the plastic portion of
his art! what importance is given—I will not say to the objects themselves
—but to the external representation of objects! Has he not somewhere said
that "the beautiful is the result of happy position?"[Footnote: In the Kunst
und Alterthum, I think.]
Under this definition is concealed an entire system of poetic materialism,
substituted for the worship of the ideal; involving a whole series of
consequences, the logical result of which was to lead Goethe to
indifference, that moral suicide of some of the noblest energies of genius.
The absolute concentration of every faculty of observation on each of the
objects to be represented, without relation to the ensemble; the entire
avoidance of every influence likely to modify the view taken of that object,
became in his hands one of the most effective means of art. The poet, in his
eyes, was neither the rushing stream a hundred times broken on its course,
manner in which his heroes conceive love. Goethe's altar is spread with the
choicest flowers, the most exquisite perfumes, the first-fruits of nature; but
the Priest is wanting. In his work of second creation—for it cannot be
denied that such it was—he has gone through the vast circle of living and
visible things; but stopped short before the seventh day. God withdrew from
him before that time; and the creatures the poet has evoked wander within
the circle, dumb and prayerless; awaiting until the man shall come to give
them a name, and appoint them to a destination.
No, Goethe is not the poet of Pantheism; he is a polytheist in his method
as an artist; the pagan poet of modern times. His world is, above all things,
the world of forms: a multiplied Olympus. The Mosaic heaven and the
Christian are veiled to him. Like the pagans, he parcels out Nature into
fragments, and makes of each a divinity; like them, he worships the
sensuous rather than the ideal; he looks, touches, and listens far more than
he feels. And what care and labor are bestowed upon the plastic portion of
his art! what importance is given—I will not say to the objects themselves
—but to the external representation of objects! Has he not somewhere said
that "the beautiful is the result of happy position?"[Footnote: In the Kunst
und Alterthum, I think.]
Under this definition is concealed an entire system of poetic materialism,
substituted for the worship of the ideal; involving a whole series of
consequences, the logical result of which was to lead Goethe to
indifference, that moral suicide of some of the noblest energies of genius.
The absolute concentration of every faculty of observation on each of the
objects to be represented, without relation to the ensemble; the entire
avoidance of every influence likely to modify the view taken of that object,
became in his hands one of the most effective means of art. The poet, in his
eyes, was neither the rushing stream a hundred times broken on its course,
Page 449
that it may carry fertility to the surrounding country; nor the brilliant flame,
consuming itself in the light it sheds around while ascending to heaven; but
rather the placid lake, reflecting alike the tranquil landscape and the
thunder-cloud; its own surface the while unruffled even by the lightest
breeze. A serene and passive calm with the absolute clearness and
distinctness of successive impressions, in each of which he was for the time
wholly absorbed, are the peculiar characteristics of Goethe. "I allow the
objects I desire to comprehend, to act tranquilly upon me," said he; "I then
observe the impression I have received from them, and I endeavor to render
it faithfully." Goethe has here portrayed his every feature to perfection. He
was in life such as Madame Von Arnim proposed to represent him after
death; a venerable old man, with a serene, almost radiant countenance;
clothed in an antique robe, holding a lyre resting on his knees, and listening
to the harmonies drawn from it either by the hand of a genius, or the breath
of the winds. The last chords wafted his soul to the East; to the land of
inactive contemplation. It was time: Europe had become too agitated for
him.
Such were Byron and Goethe in their general characteristics; both great
poets; very different, and yet, complete as is the contrast between them, and
widely apart as are the paths they pursue, arriving at the same point. Life
and death, character and poetry, everything is unlike in the two, and yet the
one is the complement of the other. Both are the children of fatality—for it
is especially at the close of epochs that the providential law which directs
the generations assumes towards individuals the semblance of fatality—and
compelled by it unconsciously to work out a great mission. Goethe
contemplates the world in parts, and delivers the impressions they make
upon him, one by one, as occasion presents them. Byron looks upon the
world from a single comprehensive point of view; from the height of which
he modifies in his own soul the impressions produced by external objects,
as they pass before him. Goethe successively absorbs his own individuality
consuming itself in the light it sheds around while ascending to heaven; but
rather the placid lake, reflecting alike the tranquil landscape and the
thunder-cloud; its own surface the while unruffled even by the lightest
breeze. A serene and passive calm with the absolute clearness and
distinctness of successive impressions, in each of which he was for the time
wholly absorbed, are the peculiar characteristics of Goethe. "I allow the
objects I desire to comprehend, to act tranquilly upon me," said he; "I then
observe the impression I have received from them, and I endeavor to render
it faithfully." Goethe has here portrayed his every feature to perfection. He
was in life such as Madame Von Arnim proposed to represent him after
death; a venerable old man, with a serene, almost radiant countenance;
clothed in an antique robe, holding a lyre resting on his knees, and listening
to the harmonies drawn from it either by the hand of a genius, or the breath
of the winds. The last chords wafted his soul to the East; to the land of
inactive contemplation. It was time: Europe had become too agitated for
him.
Such were Byron and Goethe in their general characteristics; both great
poets; very different, and yet, complete as is the contrast between them, and
widely apart as are the paths they pursue, arriving at the same point. Life
and death, character and poetry, everything is unlike in the two, and yet the
one is the complement of the other. Both are the children of fatality—for it
is especially at the close of epochs that the providential law which directs
the generations assumes towards individuals the semblance of fatality—and
compelled by it unconsciously to work out a great mission. Goethe
contemplates the world in parts, and delivers the impressions they make
upon him, one by one, as occasion presents them. Byron looks upon the
world from a single comprehensive point of view; from the height of which
he modifies in his own soul the impressions produced by external objects,
as they pass before him. Goethe successively absorbs his own individuality
Page 450
in each of the objects he reproduces. Byron stamps every object he portrays
with his own individuality. To Goethe, nature is the symphony; to Byron it
is the prelude. She furnishes to the one the entire subject; to the other the
occasion only of his verse. The one executes her harmonies; the other
composes on the theme she has suggested. Goethe better exgresses lives;
Byron life. The one is most vast; the other more deep. The first searches
everywhere for the beautiful, and loves, above all things, harmony and
repose; the other seeks the sublime, and adores action and force. Characters,
such as Coriolanus or Luther, disturbed Goethe. I know not if, in his
numerous pieces of criticism, he has ever spoken of Dante; but assuredly he
must have shared the antipathy felt for him by Sir Walter Scott; and
although he would undoubtedly have sufficiently respected his genius to
admit him into his Pantheon, yet he would certainly have drawn a veil
between his mental eye and the grand but sombre figure of the exiled seer,
who dreamed of the future empire of the world for his country, and of the
world's harmonious development under her guidance. Byron loved and
drew inspiration from Dante. He also loved Washington and Franklin, and
followed, with all the sympathies of a soul athirst for action, the meteor-like
career of the greatest genius of action our age has produced, Napoleon;
feeling indignant— perhaps mistakenly—that he did not die in the struggle.
When travelling in that second fatherland of all poetic souls— Italy—the
poets still pursued divergent routes; the one experienced sensations; the
other emotions; the one occupied himself especially with nature; the other
with the greatness dead, the living wrongs, the human memories. [Footnote:
The contrast between the two poets is nowhere more strikingly displayed
than by the manner in which they were affected by the sight of Rome. In
Goethe's Elegies and in his Travels in Italy we find the impressions of the
artist only. He did not understand Rome. The eternal synthesis that, from
the heights of the Capitol and St. Peter, is gradually unfolded in ever-
widening circles, embracing first a nation and then Europe, as it will
with his own individuality. To Goethe, nature is the symphony; to Byron it
is the prelude. She furnishes to the one the entire subject; to the other the
occasion only of his verse. The one executes her harmonies; the other
composes on the theme she has suggested. Goethe better exgresses lives;
Byron life. The one is most vast; the other more deep. The first searches
everywhere for the beautiful, and loves, above all things, harmony and
repose; the other seeks the sublime, and adores action and force. Characters,
such as Coriolanus or Luther, disturbed Goethe. I know not if, in his
numerous pieces of criticism, he has ever spoken of Dante; but assuredly he
must have shared the antipathy felt for him by Sir Walter Scott; and
although he would undoubtedly have sufficiently respected his genius to
admit him into his Pantheon, yet he would certainly have drawn a veil
between his mental eye and the grand but sombre figure of the exiled seer,
who dreamed of the future empire of the world for his country, and of the
world's harmonious development under her guidance. Byron loved and
drew inspiration from Dante. He also loved Washington and Franklin, and
followed, with all the sympathies of a soul athirst for action, the meteor-like
career of the greatest genius of action our age has produced, Napoleon;
feeling indignant— perhaps mistakenly—that he did not die in the struggle.
When travelling in that second fatherland of all poetic souls— Italy—the
poets still pursued divergent routes; the one experienced sensations; the
other emotions; the one occupied himself especially with nature; the other
with the greatness dead, the living wrongs, the human memories. [Footnote:
The contrast between the two poets is nowhere more strikingly displayed
than by the manner in which they were affected by the sight of Rome. In
Goethe's Elegies and in his Travels in Italy we find the impressions of the
artist only. He did not understand Rome. The eternal synthesis that, from
the heights of the Capitol and St. Peter, is gradually unfolded in ever-
widening circles, embracing first a nation and then Europe, as it will
Page 451
ultimately embrace humanity, remained unrevealed to him; he saw only the
inner circle of paganism; the least prolific, as well as least indigenous. One
might fancy that he caught a glimpse of it for an instant, when he wrote:
"History is read here far otherwise than in any other spot in the universe;
elsewhere we read it from without to within; here one seems to read it from
within to without; "but if so, he soon lost sight of it again, and became
absorbed in external nature." Whether we halt or advance, we discover a
landscape ever renewing itself in a thousand fashions. We have palaces and
ruins; gardens and solitudes: the horizon lengthens in the distance, or
suddenly contracts; huts and stables, columns and triumphal arches, all lie
pell-mell, and often so close that we might find room for all on the same
sheet of paper."
At Rome Byron forgot passions, sorrows, his own individuality, all, in
the presence of a great idea; witness this utterance of a soul born for
devotedhess:—
"O Rome! my country! city of the soul!
The orphans of the heart must turn to thee,
Lone mother of dead empires! and control
In their shut breasts their petty misery."
When at last he came to a recollection of himself and his position, it was
with a hope for the world (stanza 98) and a pardon for his enemies. From
the fourth canto of Childe Harold, the daughter of Byron might learn more
of the true spirit of her father than from all the reports she may have heard,
and all the many volumes that have been written upon him.]
And yet, notwithstanding all the contrasts, which I have only hinted at,
but which might be far more elaborately displayed by extracts from their
works; they arrived—Goethe, the poet of individuality in its objective life—
at the egotism of indifference; Byron—the poet of individuality an its
inner circle of paganism; the least prolific, as well as least indigenous. One
might fancy that he caught a glimpse of it for an instant, when he wrote:
"History is read here far otherwise than in any other spot in the universe;
elsewhere we read it from without to within; here one seems to read it from
within to without; "but if so, he soon lost sight of it again, and became
absorbed in external nature." Whether we halt or advance, we discover a
landscape ever renewing itself in a thousand fashions. We have palaces and
ruins; gardens and solitudes: the horizon lengthens in the distance, or
suddenly contracts; huts and stables, columns and triumphal arches, all lie
pell-mell, and often so close that we might find room for all on the same
sheet of paper."
At Rome Byron forgot passions, sorrows, his own individuality, all, in
the presence of a great idea; witness this utterance of a soul born for
devotedhess:—
"O Rome! my country! city of the soul!
The orphans of the heart must turn to thee,
Lone mother of dead empires! and control
In their shut breasts their petty misery."
When at last he came to a recollection of himself and his position, it was
with a hope for the world (stanza 98) and a pardon for his enemies. From
the fourth canto of Childe Harold, the daughter of Byron might learn more
of the true spirit of her father than from all the reports she may have heard,
and all the many volumes that have been written upon him.]
And yet, notwithstanding all the contrasts, which I have only hinted at,
but which might be far more elaborately displayed by extracts from their
works; they arrived—Goethe, the poet of individuality in its objective life—
at the egotism of indifference; Byron—the poet of individuality an its
Page 452
subjective life—at the egotism (I say it with regret, but it, too, is egotism) of
despair: a double sentence upon the epoch which it was their mission to
represent and to close!
Both of them—I am not speaking of their purely literary merits,
incontestable and universally acknowledged—the one by the spirit of
resistance that breathes through all his creations; the other by the spirit of
sceptical irony that pervades his works, and by the independent sovereignty
attributed to art over all social relations- -greatly aided the cause of
intellectual emancipation, and awakened in men's minds the sentiment of
liberty. Both of them—the one, directly, by the implacable war he waged
against the vices and absurdities of the privileged classes, and indirectly, by
investing his heroes with all the most brilliant qualities of the despot, and
then dashing them to pieces as if in anger;—the other, by the poetic
rehabilitation of forms the most modest, and objects the most insignificant,
as well as by the importance attributed to details— combated aristocratic
prejudices, and developed in men's minds the sentiment of equality. And
having by their artistic excellence exhausted both forms of the poetry of
individuality, they have completed the cycle cf its poets; thereby reducing
all followers in the same sphere to the subaltern position of imitators, and
creating the necessity of a new order of poetry; teaching us to recognize a
want where before we felt only a desire. Together they have laid an era in
the tomb; covering it with a pall that none may lift; and, as if to proclaim its
death to the young generation, the poetry of Goethe has written its history,
while that of Byron has graven its epitaph.
And now farewell to Goethe; farewell to Byron! farewell to the sorrows
that crush but sanctify not—to the poetic flame that illumines but warms
not—to the ironical philosophy that dissects without reconstructing—to all
poetry which, in an age where there is so much to do, teaches us inactive
contemplation; or which, in a world where there is so much need of
despair: a double sentence upon the epoch which it was their mission to
represent and to close!
Both of them—I am not speaking of their purely literary merits,
incontestable and universally acknowledged—the one by the spirit of
resistance that breathes through all his creations; the other by the spirit of
sceptical irony that pervades his works, and by the independent sovereignty
attributed to art over all social relations- -greatly aided the cause of
intellectual emancipation, and awakened in men's minds the sentiment of
liberty. Both of them—the one, directly, by the implacable war he waged
against the vices and absurdities of the privileged classes, and indirectly, by
investing his heroes with all the most brilliant qualities of the despot, and
then dashing them to pieces as if in anger;—the other, by the poetic
rehabilitation of forms the most modest, and objects the most insignificant,
as well as by the importance attributed to details— combated aristocratic
prejudices, and developed in men's minds the sentiment of equality. And
having by their artistic excellence exhausted both forms of the poetry of
individuality, they have completed the cycle cf its poets; thereby reducing
all followers in the same sphere to the subaltern position of imitators, and
creating the necessity of a new order of poetry; teaching us to recognize a
want where before we felt only a desire. Together they have laid an era in
the tomb; covering it with a pall that none may lift; and, as if to proclaim its
death to the young generation, the poetry of Goethe has written its history,
while that of Byron has graven its epitaph.
And now farewell to Goethe; farewell to Byron! farewell to the sorrows
that crush but sanctify not—to the poetic flame that illumines but warms
not—to the ironical philosophy that dissects without reconstructing—to all
poetry which, in an age where there is so much to do, teaches us inactive
contemplation; or which, in a world where there is so much need of
Page 453
devotedness, would instil despair. Farewell to all types of power without an
aim; to all personifications of the solitary individuality which seeks an aim
to find it not, and knows not how to apply the life stirring within it; to all
egotistic joys and griefs:
"Bastards of the soul;
O'erweening slips of idleness: weeds—no more-
Self-springing here and there from the rank soil;
O'erflowings of the lust of that same mind
Whose proper issue and determinate end,
When wedded to the love of things divine,
Is peace, complacency, and happiness."
Farewell, a long farewell to the past! The dawn of the future is
announced to such as can read its signs, and we owe ourselves wholly to it.
The duality of the Middle Ages, after having struggled for centuries
under the banners of emperor and pope; after having left its trace and borne
its fruit in every branch of intellectual development; has reascended to
heaven—its mission accomplished—in the twin flames of poesy called
Goethe and Byron. Two hitherto distinct formulae of life became incarnate
in these two men. Byron is isolated man, representing only the internal
aspect of life; Goethe isolated man, representing only the external.
Higher than these two incomplete existences; at the point of intersection
between the two aspirations towards a heaven they were unable to reach,
will be revealed the poetry of the future; of humanity; potent in new
harmony, unity, and life.
But because, in our own day, we are beginning, though vaguely, to
foresee this new social poetry, which will soothe the suffering soul by
teaching it to rise towards God through humanity; because we now stand on
aim; to all personifications of the solitary individuality which seeks an aim
to find it not, and knows not how to apply the life stirring within it; to all
egotistic joys and griefs:
"Bastards of the soul;
O'erweening slips of idleness: weeds—no more-
Self-springing here and there from the rank soil;
O'erflowings of the lust of that same mind
Whose proper issue and determinate end,
When wedded to the love of things divine,
Is peace, complacency, and happiness."
Farewell, a long farewell to the past! The dawn of the future is
announced to such as can read its signs, and we owe ourselves wholly to it.
The duality of the Middle Ages, after having struggled for centuries
under the banners of emperor and pope; after having left its trace and borne
its fruit in every branch of intellectual development; has reascended to
heaven—its mission accomplished—in the twin flames of poesy called
Goethe and Byron. Two hitherto distinct formulae of life became incarnate
in these two men. Byron is isolated man, representing only the internal
aspect of life; Goethe isolated man, representing only the external.
Higher than these two incomplete existences; at the point of intersection
between the two aspirations towards a heaven they were unable to reach,
will be revealed the poetry of the future; of humanity; potent in new
harmony, unity, and life.
But because, in our own day, we are beginning, though vaguely, to
foresee this new social poetry, which will soothe the suffering soul by
teaching it to rise towards God through humanity; because we now stand on
Page 454
the threshold of a new epoch, which, but for them, we should not have
reached; shall we decry those who were unable to do more for us than cast
their giant forms into the gulf that held us all doubting and dismayed on the
other side? From the earliest times has genius been made the scapegoat of
the generations. Society has never lacked men who have contented
themselves with reproaching the Chattertons of their day with not being
patterns of self-devotion, instead of physical or moral suicides; without ever
asking themselves whether they had, during their lifetime, endeavored to
place aught within the reach of such but doubt and destitution. I feel the
necessity of protesting earnestly against the reaction set on foot by certain
thinkers against the mighty-souled, which serves as a cloak for the cavilling
spirit of mediocrity. There is something hard, repulsive, and ungrateful in
the destructive instinct which so often forgets what has been done by the
great men who preceded us, to demand of them merely an account of what
more might have been done. Is the pillow of scepticism so soft to genius as
to justify the conclusion that it is from egotism only that at times it rests its
fevered brow thereon? Are we so free from the evil reflected in their verse
as to have a right to condemn their memory? That evil was not introduced
into the world by them. They saw it, felt it, respired it; it was around, about,
on every side of them, and they were its greatest victims. How could they
avoid reproducing it in their works? It is not by deposing Goethe or Byron
that we shall destroy either sceptical or anarchical indifference amongst us.
It is by becoming believers and organizers ourselves. If we are such, we
need fear nothing. As is the public, so will be the poet. If we revere
enthusiasm, the fatherland, and humanity; if our hearts are pure, and our
souls steadfast and patient, the genius inspired to interpret our aspirations,
and bear to heaven our ideas and our sufferings, will not be wanting. Let
these statues stand. The noble monuments of feudal times create no desire
to return to the days of selfdom.
reached; shall we decry those who were unable to do more for us than cast
their giant forms into the gulf that held us all doubting and dismayed on the
other side? From the earliest times has genius been made the scapegoat of
the generations. Society has never lacked men who have contented
themselves with reproaching the Chattertons of their day with not being
patterns of self-devotion, instead of physical or moral suicides; without ever
asking themselves whether they had, during their lifetime, endeavored to
place aught within the reach of such but doubt and destitution. I feel the
necessity of protesting earnestly against the reaction set on foot by certain
thinkers against the mighty-souled, which serves as a cloak for the cavilling
spirit of mediocrity. There is something hard, repulsive, and ungrateful in
the destructive instinct which so often forgets what has been done by the
great men who preceded us, to demand of them merely an account of what
more might have been done. Is the pillow of scepticism so soft to genius as
to justify the conclusion that it is from egotism only that at times it rests its
fevered brow thereon? Are we so free from the evil reflected in their verse
as to have a right to condemn their memory? That evil was not introduced
into the world by them. They saw it, felt it, respired it; it was around, about,
on every side of them, and they were its greatest victims. How could they
avoid reproducing it in their works? It is not by deposing Goethe or Byron
that we shall destroy either sceptical or anarchical indifference amongst us.
It is by becoming believers and organizers ourselves. If we are such, we
need fear nothing. As is the public, so will be the poet. If we revere
enthusiasm, the fatherland, and humanity; if our hearts are pure, and our
souls steadfast and patient, the genius inspired to interpret our aspirations,
and bear to heaven our ideas and our sufferings, will not be wanting. Let
these statues stand. The noble monuments of feudal times create no desire
to return to the days of selfdom.
Page 455
But I shall be told, there are imitators. I know it too well; but what lasting
influence can be exerted on social life by those who have no real life of
their own? They will but flutter in the void, so long as void there be. On the
day when the living shall arise to take the place of the dead, they will
vanish like ghosts at cock- crow. Shall we never be sufficiently firm in our
own faith to dare to show fitting reverence for the grand typical figures of
an anterior age? It would be idle to speak of social art at all, or of the
comprehension of humanity, if we could not raise altars to the new gods,
without overthrowing the old. Those only should dare to utter the sacred
name of progress, whose souls possess intelligence enough to comprehend
the past, and whose hearts possess sufficient poetic religion to reverence its
greatness. The temple of the true believer is not the chapel of a sect; it is a
vast Pantheon, in which the glorious images of Goethe and Byron will hold
their honored place, long after Goetheism and Byronism shall have ceased
to be.
When, purified alike from imitation and distrust, men learn to pay
righteous reverence to the mighty fallen, I know not whether Goethe will
obtain more of their admiration as an artist, but I am certain that Byron will
inspire them with more love, both as man and poet—a love increased even
by the fact of the great injustice hitherto shown to him. While Goethe held
himself aloof from us, and from the height of his Olympian calm seemed to
smile with disdain at our desires, our struggles, and our sufferings—Byron
wandered through the world, sad, gloomy, and unquiet; wounded, and
bearing the arrow in the wound. Solitary and unfortunate in his infancy;
unfortunate in his first love, and still more terribly so in his ill-advised
marriage; attacked and calumniated both in his acts and intentions without
inquiry or defence; harassed by pecuniary difficulties; forced to quit his
country, home, and child; friendless—we have seen it too clearly since his
death—pursued even on the Continent by a thousand absurd and infamous
falsehoods, and by the cold malignity of a world that twisted even his
influence can be exerted on social life by those who have no real life of
their own? They will but flutter in the void, so long as void there be. On the
day when the living shall arise to take the place of the dead, they will
vanish like ghosts at cock- crow. Shall we never be sufficiently firm in our
own faith to dare to show fitting reverence for the grand typical figures of
an anterior age? It would be idle to speak of social art at all, or of the
comprehension of humanity, if we could not raise altars to the new gods,
without overthrowing the old. Those only should dare to utter the sacred
name of progress, whose souls possess intelligence enough to comprehend
the past, and whose hearts possess sufficient poetic religion to reverence its
greatness. The temple of the true believer is not the chapel of a sect; it is a
vast Pantheon, in which the glorious images of Goethe and Byron will hold
their honored place, long after Goetheism and Byronism shall have ceased
to be.
When, purified alike from imitation and distrust, men learn to pay
righteous reverence to the mighty fallen, I know not whether Goethe will
obtain more of their admiration as an artist, but I am certain that Byron will
inspire them with more love, both as man and poet—a love increased even
by the fact of the great injustice hitherto shown to him. While Goethe held
himself aloof from us, and from the height of his Olympian calm seemed to
smile with disdain at our desires, our struggles, and our sufferings—Byron
wandered through the world, sad, gloomy, and unquiet; wounded, and
bearing the arrow in the wound. Solitary and unfortunate in his infancy;
unfortunate in his first love, and still more terribly so in his ill-advised
marriage; attacked and calumniated both in his acts and intentions without
inquiry or defence; harassed by pecuniary difficulties; forced to quit his
country, home, and child; friendless—we have seen it too clearly since his
death—pursued even on the Continent by a thousand absurd and infamous
falsehoods, and by the cold malignity of a world that twisted even his
Page 456
sorrows into a crime; he yet, in the midst of inevitable reaction, preserved
his love for his sister and his Ada; his compassion for misfortune; his
fidelity to the affections of his childhood and youth, from Lord Clare to his
old servant Murray, and his nurse Mary Gray. He was generous with his
money to all whom he could help or serve, from his literary friends down to
the wretched libeller Ashe. Though impelled by the temper of his genius, by
the period in which he lived, and by that fatality of his mission to which I
have alluded, towards a poetic individualism, the inevitable incompleteness
of which I have endeavored to explain, he by no means set it up as a
standard. That he presaged the future with the prevision of genius is proved
by his definition of poetry in his journal—a definition hitherto
misunderstood, but yet the best I know: "Poetry is the feeling of a former
world and of a future." Poet as he was, he preferred activity for good, to all
that his art could do. Surrounded by slaves and their oppressors; a traveller
in countries where even remembrance seemed extinct; never did he desert
the cause of the peoples; never was he false to human sympathies. A
witness of the progress of the Restoration, and the triumph of the principles
of the Holy Alliance, he never swerved from his courageous opposition; he
preserved and publicly proclaimed his faith in the rights of the peoples and
in the final
[Footnote:
Yet, Freedom! yet, thy banner torn, but flying,
Streams, like the thunder-storm, against the wind:
Thy trumpet voice, though broken now and dying,
The loudest still the tempest leaves behind.
The tree hath lost its blossomes, and the rind,
Chopped by the axe, looks rough and little worth,
But the sap lasts—and still the seed we find
Sown deep, even in the bosom of the North,
So shall a better spring less bitter fruit bring forth."]
his love for his sister and his Ada; his compassion for misfortune; his
fidelity to the affections of his childhood and youth, from Lord Clare to his
old servant Murray, and his nurse Mary Gray. He was generous with his
money to all whom he could help or serve, from his literary friends down to
the wretched libeller Ashe. Though impelled by the temper of his genius, by
the period in which he lived, and by that fatality of his mission to which I
have alluded, towards a poetic individualism, the inevitable incompleteness
of which I have endeavored to explain, he by no means set it up as a
standard. That he presaged the future with the prevision of genius is proved
by his definition of poetry in his journal—a definition hitherto
misunderstood, but yet the best I know: "Poetry is the feeling of a former
world and of a future." Poet as he was, he preferred activity for good, to all
that his art could do. Surrounded by slaves and their oppressors; a traveller
in countries where even remembrance seemed extinct; never did he desert
the cause of the peoples; never was he false to human sympathies. A
witness of the progress of the Restoration, and the triumph of the principles
of the Holy Alliance, he never swerved from his courageous opposition; he
preserved and publicly proclaimed his faith in the rights of the peoples and
in the final
[Footnote:
Yet, Freedom! yet, thy banner torn, but flying,
Streams, like the thunder-storm, against the wind:
Thy trumpet voice, though broken now and dying,
The loudest still the tempest leaves behind.
The tree hath lost its blossomes, and the rind,
Chopped by the axe, looks rough and little worth,
But the sap lasts—and still the seed we find
Sown deep, even in the bosom of the North,
So shall a better spring less bitter fruit bring forth."]
Page 457
triumph of liberty. The following passage from his journal is the very
abstract of the law governing the efforts of the true party of progress at the
present day: "Onwards! it is now the time to act; and what signifies self, if a
single spark of that which would be worthy of the past [Footnote: Written in
Italy.] can be bequeathed unquenchably to the future? It is not one man, nor
a million, but the SPIRIT of liberty which must be spread. The waves which
dash on the shore are, one by one, broken; but yet the OCEAN conquers
nevertheless. It overwhelms the armada; it wears the rock; and if the
Neptunians are to be believed, it has not only destroyed but made a world."
At Naples, in the Romagna, wherever he saw a spark of noble life stirring,
he was ready for any exertion; or danger, to blow it into a flame. He
stigmatized baseness, hypocrisy, and injustice, whencesoever they sprang.
Thus lived Byron, ceaselessly tempest-tossed between the ills of the
present and his yearnings after the future; often unequal; sometimes
sceptical; but always suffering—often most so when he seemed to laugh;
[Footnote:
"And if I laugh at any mortal thing,
'Tis that I may not weep."]
and always loving, even
when he seemed to curse.
Never did "the eternal spirit of the chainless mind" make a brighter
apparition amongst us. He seems at times a transformation of that immortal
Prometheus, of whom he has written so nobly; whose cry of agony, yet of
futurity, sounded above the cradle of the European world; and whose grand
and mysterious form, transfigured by time, reappears from age to age,
between the entombment of one epoch and the accession of another; to wail
forth the lament of genius, tortured by the presentment of things it will not
see realized in its time. Byron, too, had the "firm will" and the "deep
abstract of the law governing the efforts of the true party of progress at the
present day: "Onwards! it is now the time to act; and what signifies self, if a
single spark of that which would be worthy of the past [Footnote: Written in
Italy.] can be bequeathed unquenchably to the future? It is not one man, nor
a million, but the SPIRIT of liberty which must be spread. The waves which
dash on the shore are, one by one, broken; but yet the OCEAN conquers
nevertheless. It overwhelms the armada; it wears the rock; and if the
Neptunians are to be believed, it has not only destroyed but made a world."
At Naples, in the Romagna, wherever he saw a spark of noble life stirring,
he was ready for any exertion; or danger, to blow it into a flame. He
stigmatized baseness, hypocrisy, and injustice, whencesoever they sprang.
Thus lived Byron, ceaselessly tempest-tossed between the ills of the
present and his yearnings after the future; often unequal; sometimes
sceptical; but always suffering—often most so when he seemed to laugh;
[Footnote:
"And if I laugh at any mortal thing,
'Tis that I may not weep."]
and always loving, even
when he seemed to curse.
Never did "the eternal spirit of the chainless mind" make a brighter
apparition amongst us. He seems at times a transformation of that immortal
Prometheus, of whom he has written so nobly; whose cry of agony, yet of
futurity, sounded above the cradle of the European world; and whose grand
and mysterious form, transfigured by time, reappears from age to age,
between the entombment of one epoch and the accession of another; to wail
forth the lament of genius, tortured by the presentment of things it will not
see realized in its time. Byron, too, had the "firm will" and the "deep
Page 458
sense;" he, too, made of his "death a victory." When he heard the cry of
nationality and liberty burst forth in the land he had loved and sung in early
youth, he broke his harp and set forth. While the CHRISTIAN Powers were
protocolizing or worse—while the CHRISTIAN nations were doling forth
the alms of a few piles of ball in aid of the CROSS struggling with the
Crescent; he, the poet, and pretended sceptic, hastened to throw his fortune,
his genius, and his life at the feet of the first people that had arisen in the
name of the nationality and liberty he loved.
I know no more beautiful symbol of the future destiny and mission of art
than the death of Byron in Greece. The holy alliance of poetry with the
cause of the peoples; the union—still so rare—of thought and action—
which alone completes the human Word, and is destined to emancipate the
world; the grand solidarity of all nations in the conquest of the rights
ordained by God for all his children, and in the accomplishment of that
mission for which alone such rights exist—all that is now the religion and
the hope of the party of progress throughout Europe, is gloriously typified
in this image, which we, barbarians that we are, have already forgotten.
The day will come when democracy will remember all that it owes to
Byron. England, too, will, I hope, one day remember the mission—so
entirely English, yet hitherto overlooked by her—which Byron fulfilled on
the Continent; the European role given by him to English literature, and the
appreciation and sympathy for England which he awakened amongst us.
Before he came, all that was known of English literature was the French
translation of Shakespeare, and the anathema hurled by Voltaire against the
"intoxicated barbarian." It is since Byron that we Continentalists have
learned to study Shakespeare and other English writers. From him dates the
sympathy of all the true-hearted amongst us for this land of liberty, whose
nationality and liberty burst forth in the land he had loved and sung in early
youth, he broke his harp and set forth. While the CHRISTIAN Powers were
protocolizing or worse—while the CHRISTIAN nations were doling forth
the alms of a few piles of ball in aid of the CROSS struggling with the
Crescent; he, the poet, and pretended sceptic, hastened to throw his fortune,
his genius, and his life at the feet of the first people that had arisen in the
name of the nationality and liberty he loved.
I know no more beautiful symbol of the future destiny and mission of art
than the death of Byron in Greece. The holy alliance of poetry with the
cause of the peoples; the union—still so rare—of thought and action—
which alone completes the human Word, and is destined to emancipate the
world; the grand solidarity of all nations in the conquest of the rights
ordained by God for all his children, and in the accomplishment of that
mission for which alone such rights exist—all that is now the religion and
the hope of the party of progress throughout Europe, is gloriously typified
in this image, which we, barbarians that we are, have already forgotten.
The day will come when democracy will remember all that it owes to
Byron. England, too, will, I hope, one day remember the mission—so
entirely English, yet hitherto overlooked by her—which Byron fulfilled on
the Continent; the European role given by him to English literature, and the
appreciation and sympathy for England which he awakened amongst us.
Before he came, all that was known of English literature was the French
translation of Shakespeare, and the anathema hurled by Voltaire against the
"intoxicated barbarian." It is since Byron that we Continentalists have
learned to study Shakespeare and other English writers. From him dates the
sympathy of all the true-hearted amongst us for this land of liberty, whose
Page 459
true vocation he so worthily represented among the oppressed. He led the
genius of Britain on a pilgrimage throughout all Europe.
England will one day feel how ill it is—not for Byron but for herself—
that the foreigner who lands upon her shores should search in vain in that
temple which should be her national Pantheon, for the poet beloved and
admired by all the nations of Europe, and for whose death Greece and Italy
wept as it had been that of the noblest of their own sons.
In these few pages—unfortunately very hasty—my aim has been, not so
much to criticise either Goethe or Byron, for which both time and space are
wanting, as to suggest, and if possible lead, English criticism upon a
broader, more impartial, and more useful path than the one generally
followed. Certain travellers of the eleventh century relate that they saw at
Teneriffe a prodigiously lofty tree, which, from its immense extent of
foliage, collected all the vapors of the atmosphere; to discharge them, when
its branches were shaken, in a shower of pure and refreshing water. Genius
is like this tree, and the mission of criticism should be to shake the
branches. At the present day it more resembles a savage striving to hew
down the noble tree to the roots.
genius of Britain on a pilgrimage throughout all Europe.
England will one day feel how ill it is—not for Byron but for herself—
that the foreigner who lands upon her shores should search in vain in that
temple which should be her national Pantheon, for the poet beloved and
admired by all the nations of Europe, and for whose death Greece and Italy
wept as it had been that of the noblest of their own sons.
In these few pages—unfortunately very hasty—my aim has been, not so
much to criticise either Goethe or Byron, for which both time and space are
wanting, as to suggest, and if possible lead, English criticism upon a
broader, more impartial, and more useful path than the one generally
followed. Certain travellers of the eleventh century relate that they saw at
Teneriffe a prodigiously lofty tree, which, from its immense extent of
foliage, collected all the vapors of the atmosphere; to discharge them, when
its branches were shaken, in a shower of pure and refreshing water. Genius
is like this tree, and the mission of criticism should be to shake the
branches. At the present day it more resembles a savage striving to hew
down the noble tree to the roots.
Page 460
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