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Title: Industrial Cuba

Author: Robert P. Porter

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INDUSTRIAL
CUBA ***

Every attempt has been made to replicate
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ENTRANCE TO HAVANA HARBOUR.

INDUSTRIAL CUBA
BEING A STUDY OF PRESENT COMMERCIAL
AND
INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS, WITH
SUGGESTIONS
AS TO THE OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED IN THE
ISLAND FOR AMERICAN CAPITAL,

ENTERPRISE,
AND LABOUR.

BY
ROBERT P. PORTER
SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA
AND PORTO RICO

——
WITH MAPS AND 62 ILLUSTRATIONS
——

G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1899

Copyright, 1899
by

ROBERT P. PORTER
Entered at Stationers’ Hall, London
The Knickerbocker Press, New York

TO

WILLIAM McKINLEY

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THIS BOOK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY
THE AUTHOR

INTRODUCTION

T HIS volume deals with the living questions of Cuba—the questions
which confront the United States in the reconstruction of the Island. It
aims to give a description of Cuba as it appeared to the author when, as
Special Commissioner of the United States, he was sent by President
McKinley to report on its industrial, commercial, and financial condition,
soon after the signing of the protocol of peace, August 12, 1898. It is the
result of nearly seven months’ inquiry and hard work, in which the Island
has been visited three times, over five hundred witnesses have been
examined, and innumerable statements have been studied and analysed. In
the course of this inquiry the author has visited all the provinces and nearly
all the principal cities and towns. The merit of the book lies in the freshness
and originality of the material brought together, and the demerit in the fact
that it has been written by one who was obliged to snatch a few hours at a
time to map out or write a chapter. The author realises the defects and asks
the indulgence of the reader on the ground that it is the first attempt to
discuss the economic and political future of Cuba under its new form of
government.
Whatever the future may have in store for this wonderful and
unfortunate Island, the author can truly say that the task allotted him by the
President has, so far as Cuba and the Cuban people are concerned, been
conscientiously and faithfully performed. The measures inaugurated for the
government of the Island, which were based upon the author’s reports, have
been scrupulously framed in the interest of Cuba and not with a view of
benefiting by discrimination the United States. The machinery of the new
government has been set running in Cuba, and though some time may
elapse before it is working as smoothly as we would wish, it has been
inaugurated with the sole desire of doing the best possible by Cuba. Of the
rest, the reader must judge for himself. The subject at least is interesting,
even though its treatment here may be a little statistical. The account of the
visit to General Gomez was deemed sufficiently interesting and important
to give it in full, exactly as the report was made through the Honourable
Secretary of the Treasury, Lyman J. Gage, to the President.
Recognition is due to Mr. W. J. Lampton for his assistance to the writer.

R. P. P.
36 East Sixty-fifth Street,
New York.
February 9, 1899.

CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. —Cuba—Political and Economic 1
II. —Conditions which Confront us 14
III. —Political Future of Cuba 32
IV. —The English in Jamaica 47
V. —The Americans in Santiago 62
VI. —Outlook in Cuba for Labour 73
VII. —The Population of Cuba 90
VIII. —Sanitary Work in Cuba 108
IX. —Cities and Towns of Cuba 122
X. —Havana 139
XI. —Colonel Waring’s Sanitary Report 154
XII. —Municipal Problems in Havana 172
XIII. —Banks and Currency 190
XIV.—Payment of Insurgent Soldiers 204
XV. —The Revenue of Cuba—Customs Tariffs 211
XVI.—The Amended Tariff—Official 221
XVII. —The Revenue of Cuba—Internal Taxes 248
XVIII. —How the Revenue was Spent 256
XIX.—Commerce 267
XX. —Sugar 281
XXI.—Tobacco 302
XXII. —Mines and Mining 318
XXIII. —Agriculture and Stock 329
XXIV. —Timber and Fruit 338
XXV. —Transportation 351
XXVI. —Navigation 362
XXVII. —Education and Religion 376
XXVIII. —A Meeting with General Gomez 390
XXIX. —Conclusion—The Outlook for the Future 408

Index

Frontispiece. ENTRANCE TO HAVANA HARBOUR.

Illustrations
PAGE
ENTRANCE TO HAVANA HARBOUR Frontispiece
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF PINAR DEL RIO 8
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCES OF HAVANA AND
MATANZAS 16
BATEY OF SANTA CATALINA 22
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTA CLARA 28
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF PUERTO
PRINCIPE 38
SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DE
CUBA 44
ON THE ROAD TO CASTLETON, JAMAICA 50
CATHEDRAL STREET, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 66
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
CANE CUTTERS 76
A COUNTRY VILLA 92
CUBAN "GUARACHERO" (MINSTREL) 96
A NATIVE HUT 100
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
STREET VIEW, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 108
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
WATERMAN IN THE COUNTRY 112
MARIANAO WATER VENDOR 116
SQUARE IN FRONT OF GOVERNOR'S PALACE AT
SANTIAGO DE CUBA 122
A MULE TRAIN, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 124
From a photograph by J. F. Coonley, Nassau, N. P.
MATANZAS YUMURI RIVER AND ENTRANCE TO THE
VALLEY 128
PANORAMA FROM THE ROAD TO THE CAVES,
MATANZAS 132

THE PLAZA, CIENFUEGOS 136
HAVANA, FROM ACROSS THE BAY 146
THE PRADO, HAVANA 150
YARD OF AMERICAN CLUB, HAVANA 156
THE PRADO AND INDIAN STATUE, HAVANA 166
HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT, HAVANA 180
TACON MARKET, HAVANA 186
FIRE DEPARTMENT, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 196
MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 206
PALM TREE BRIDGE 220
AVENUE OF PALM TREES, PALATINO 238
ROAD IN A PINE GROVE OF YUELTA ABAJO 252
A COCOANUT GROVE 262
A SUGAR-CANE TRAIN 272
SUGAR-CANE SCALES 276
CANE FIELDS 282
CUTTING SUGAR-CANE 286
UNLOADING CANE AT A BATEY 290
CYLINDERS FOR GRINDING SUGAR-CANE 294
APPARATUS FOR PACKING SUGAR AT THE SAN JOSE
CENTRAL 298
PLANTING TOBACCO 302
TOBACCO FARM AND DWELLING 304
WETTING THE TOBACCO LEAF 308
TOBACCO-DRYING HOUSE 310
BALING TOBACCO 314
OLD COPPER MINES AT LA COPERA 318
MINING CAMP AT FIRENEZA 322
ORE BANK OF JURAGUA MINES 326
OX CART 332
A FOWL VENDOR 334
ROYAL PALMS, YUMURI VALLEY 336
SAGO PALM 338
MAHOGANY CARRIED BY OXEN 340

CUBAN FRUITS 344
COFFEE MILL, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 348
A CONVOY IN THE HILLS 352
A CUBAN VOLANTE 354
CUBAN MULE CART 358
A CURVE ON THE YAGUAJAY RAILROAD 360
THE HAVANA FLOATING DOCK 364
A CUBAN FERRY 368
PIER OF THE JURAGUA IRON CO., LTD. 372
OLD ARCH OF THE JESUIT COLLEGE, HAVANA 378
OLD CATHOLIC CHURCH AT LA COPERA 380
THE CATHEDRAL, HAVANA 384
THE CATHEDRAL, SANTIAGO DE CUBA 388
SPANISH FORT ON RAILROAD TO JURAGUA MINES 396
MAP OF CUBA 416

INDUSTRIAL CUBA

CHAPTER I

CUBA—POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

A NATION, like an individual, must be gauged by its endowments, its
environment, its opportunities, and the various causes which from time
to time accelerate or retard its progress.
Cuba is richly endowed with natural resources, it is within a short
distance of the best and most profitable market in the world, and its
opportunities, under favourable conditions of trade, should have made its
population contented and prosperous. Had it not been for the numerous
causes which have retarded all progress in this Island, what would have
been its industrial, commercial, and social conditions at the close of the
present century?
Numbering over a million population fifty years ago, the Island of Cuba,
at the rate of growth common to the more prosperous countries of the
western hemisphere, ought to number at the present time between four and
a half and five millions of inhabitants. With this population, and a
government giving everyone the right to the fruits of his own labour, Cuba’s
sugar crop alone would have been more than double the high-water mark of
the last prosperous year, exceeding two millions of tons, with a value of one
hundred millions of dollars.
Tobacco, coffee, tropical fruits, iron ore, other minerals of various kinds,
lumber, cattle, and innumerable other products which form the commercial
wealth of this marvellous Island, would have increased the annual value of
its products to figures ranging between two hundred and two hundred and
fifty millions of dollars, and thus more than doubled, perhaps trebled, its
commercial importance. Laws favourable to trade, and a government
interested in development of home industry would have retained for Cuba a
large proportion of this wealth, and there would have sprung up an
industrial system giving actual employment to as many people in the
gainful occupations as will be found in all Cuba when the last Spanish
soldier departs from the desolate and prostrate Island.

Cuba should have developed some diversified industries, if only those
branches of manufacture which are necessary to supply the requirements of
its own population. In its mineral resources it has the basis for the
manufacture of iron and steel and for the establishment of machine-shops to
supply home demands. In its untouched forests of excellent hardwood,
Cuba possesses the chief raw material for the manufacture of furniture and
other articles for which the Spanish race are justly famous. With steel and
wood for the first quality in abundance, and a water tonnage of considerable
magnitude, there should have sprung up, in many of the unequalled
harbours of the coast of Cuba, shipyards of no mean dimensions. Without
becoming a manufacturing country, except in sugar and tobacco and a few
other products in which Cuba excels, it might, under favourable conditions,
at this period of its industrial history have been producing many articles of
home consumption which, by reason of the unhappy management of its
affairs, it has been compelled to purchase abroad. Not abroad in the open
markets of the world, for that is another story; but of Spain, because the
most infamous discriminating duties have shut Cuba out of the cheaper
markets; and while thus gagged and bound, the Island has been plundered
and despoiled by the mother country. In this manner have resources and
revenue alike been drained away and nothing left, either for home
enterprise or improvement, nor for reserve capital with which to do
business.
Cuba should have established a central railway system running the
length of the Island from east to west, with branches extending on all sides,
like its rivers, to the many good towns and harbours on both north and south
coasts. Instead of this it has a little less than a thousand miles of line,
operated by seven timid companies, extending in various directions, but
leaving the two ends of the Island farther apart in actual days of travel than
are New York and San Francisco. The capital city of Cuba, Havana, has
within it the possibilities of a great and beautiful city; the commercial and
industrial city of a prosperous country of five millions of people, and the
winter health-resort for the rich and fashionable families of all North
America. Its public buildings should have been of the best, its tropical parks
and gardens the most fascinating in the world, its streets and pavements the
most substantial, its healthfulness unquestioned, and its harbours and docks
thronged with shipping and resonant with commercial activity. The
merchants of Havana should rank among the richest and most prosperous in

the world, and the business, manufacturing, and social interests of the place
be equal to those of Boston or Baltimore or San Francisco. What applies to
Havana applies only in a lesser degree to the other cities of Cuba, many of
which are excellently located and should be important industrial and
commercial centres, with numerous fields for the modern municipal
enterprise which has done so much to improve the condition of the urban
population of Europe and of the United States. Last, though not least, the
Island should have been dotted over with the trinity of civilisation—the
home, the schoolhouse, and the church. It is the lack of these three great
elements of national strength and progress, underlying Cuba’s ills, that is
the cause of much of its misfortune.
The building of the home, the establishment of the school, and the
tolerance of religious worship in half a century changed Texas from a
wilderness to a great and prosperous State, with the possibilities of an
empire. These same forces, had full play been given them in Cuba during
the same period, would have transformed that Island into all that has herein
been depicted. Its resources are abundant to maintain five and even ten
millions of persons, for only a small proportion of its area is populated. The
climate is healthful and the dangers to those unacclimated which lurk in its
seaport towns may all be controlled by sanitary and engineering science.
That these possibilities have not been realised does not lie with Cuba itself,
but is due to the numerous causes which have retarded and stopped its
development, and which have finally, after years of strife and war, left the
Island with population depleted, agriculture prostrate, industry destroyed,
and commerce devastated.
It may be necessary for a clear view of the subject in hand to review
briefly the causes which have led to this unhappy end; but, happily, a work
dealing with the rehabilitation or industrial reconstruction of Cuba does not
require the author either to dwell long upon nor to emphasise the gloomy
side of the picture. The results of Spanish robbery and misrule speak too
plainly. The reader has seen what Cuba might have been under an honest,
stable government, or under the protecting ægis of the United States. The
picture presented is not exaggerated, but is coloured by a moderate brush.
What Cuba is, alas! is too well known to American and English readers to
call for more than a brief summary of conditions as they existed when the
author was requested by the President of the United States to visit the
Island, report upon its industrial condition, and suggest plans for the relief

of the population and for the commercial and industrial reconstruction of
the country.
Visiting the Island immediately after the signing of the protocol of the
cessation of hostilities between the United States and Spain, August 12,
1898, and again returning to Santiago in December after that province had
been in charge of the United States military authorities for nearly six
months, he had ample and satisfactory opportunity for the study of
conditions and future needs of the people. Surely the horrors and the
desolating hand of war were never laid more heavily upon a once
prosperous country. Nearly a third of the population wiped out by battle,
wholesale slaughter, starvation, exposure, or disease, and a large proportion
of those left enfeebled by deprivation and too weak to take up their
occupations; the cane-fields and tobacco plantations, which formed the
basis of prosperity, burned, and whole sections of country swept of every
vestige of civilisation; sugar-centrals, houses, and structures of all kinds
destroyed, and inhabitants either dead or huddled half starved in miserable
huts near the towns and cities; not a living creature to be seen where once
browsed innumerable cattle, and death, destruction, and desolation spread
throughout this land that should, and under ordinary circumstances would,
be as full of life and prosperity as the richest agricultural section of our own
country.
Nor were the cities and towns exempted. Trade and commerce at a
standstill; the few sickly manufacturing industries which at the best
struggled under the most adverse conditions closed, the ruined buildings
emphasising the scene of desolation. In Havana, the wharves and numerous
large warehouses were empty, or converted into rendezvous and hospitals
for Spanish troops. Hungry and discouraged, the native population stood
listlessly on the streets and in the public places. At each station the railroad
trains were boarded by half-starving women or children begging for bread
or coppers. The principal signs of life were exhibited by the Spanish
soldiers, who, with their blue cotton uniforms and Mauser rifles, seemed to
form the greater part of the population of the cities and towns, while at the
small country railroad stations the squads of woe-begone soldiers alongside
the blockhouses comprised the only living relief to miles of waste. The
Cuban railways, like all other implements of industry in the unfortunate
Island, show evidences of the conflict. Stations burned, bridges destroyed,
tracks torn up, freight-cars made into portable blockhouses, locomotives

blown to pieces, and passenger-cars dilapidated and dingy. In short, a
country more systematically pillaged, more infamously deprived of its
resources, more wantonly plundered of its revenues, and a population more
completely deprived of its rights by those who had every reason to foster
and protect a valuable possession cannot be found recorded in ancient or
modern history. Cuba, as it was left at the close of this year by the Spanish,
who to the last moment seemed loth to leave the emaciated body which
their inordinate greed had thus reduced, presents a picture so sad and
sorrowful that, for the sake of our common humanity, it is better to draw a
curtain over the past and direct attention to the happier omens which point
to the possibilities of the future.
The work of industrial, commercial, and social reconstruction of Cuba
must date from the eventful day when the Stars and Stripes were unfurled
above Morro Castle. It is with this work that the present volume deals.
Whatever form the government of Cuba may take, the responsibility of the
commercial and industrial rehabilitation of the Island must rest with the
United States. The power that forced the Spanish to evacuate the Island is
the power which the world will hold responsible for the future welfare of its
people. The timid, the weak, and the craven-hearted who contend that the
United States has no responsibility, after it has assumed all responsibility,
are entitled to no voice in the disposition of Cuba. The cost to the United
States cannot be put in the balance against the duty of the United States.
The moral obligation, therefore, toward Cuba and humanity must come
first. The war was a war of humanity and not of conquest. The same
principle must guide those upon whose shoulders will fall the more difficult
task of restoring peace, forming a stable government, and reviving
commerce and industry. For the United States to desert Cuba in its hour of
greatest need would be more inhuman than it would have been to have left
it to Weyler and his policy of extermination. The plain duty of the hour, so
far as the United States is concerned, and the best means of solving all
political questions which may arise in connection with the Island, is to
begin at once the work of economic or industrial reconstruction, postponing
for future discussion all political questions. To this end the mission already
referred to was projected. To this end a firm military government, capable
of keeping law and order, will be established. To this end the attention of
the people of Cuba should be at once directed toward the economic
questions upon which depend the progress and prosperity of the population.

The destruction and disorganisation brought about by the war will make
the work of placing the Island in a favourable economic condition costly
and protracted, and many years must elapse before Cuba will take its
rightful place in the economies of the world. By this is meant the position to
which its resources and location entitle it. If it is true, and I doubt it not, that
the causes which have led to war, both in 1868 and in 1895, were more
economic than political (and the greater importance of economic over
political questions in such a colony of small and mixed population as Cuba
is easy to understand), then Cuba to-day is free. The Spanish Government
would have more willingly granted political freedom to Cuba had it not
been for the well-grounded fear that economic concessions would have
necessarily followed. Those United States officials who have been in Cuba
since the signing of the protocol of peace understand this fully. The United
States Military Commissioners, in their daily intercourse with Spanish
officials, have found no sentiment of resentment toward the United States.
The regrets have all been of a sordid character and may be summed up in
loss of revenue and commerce for Spain.
The war which has just been brought to an end really began in 1868.
Although between 1878 and 1895 there was some appearance of peace, the
real situation in Cuba during these seventeen years was one of silent
economic struggle with Spain. The meaning of the peace of Zanjon (1878)
was that Spaniards and Cubans were to be treated alike. The fact has been,
however, that the Cuban native population has been kept in a condition
similar to slavery. The means employed have been skilful and full of
cunning. Leaving to the Cubans complete liberty of discussion by means of
the press, the Government has felt itself powerful enough to despise them,
and when warned of the danger of a new revolution, always considered
impossible this last extremity. This feeling of absolute confidence and
reliance on the military power of Spain has constantly been expressed in
Madrid, both officially and privately, and also by the Spanish party in Cuba.
During the years 1878-1895, a political organisation (the Autonomist party)
was formed in opposition to the obstinate Spanish party. It would be too
tedious to go now into the details of contemporary Cuban politics; it is
enough to say that the Spanish Government has been to the last moment
strenuously opposed to any plan of real autonomy, that is, to an autonomy
that would grant industrial freedom to Cuba. Even the laws of autonomy
actually conceded in 1897-1898, as a last and desperate resource against the

revolution, were not granted in good faith, as is well known to those who
have carefully watched the course of Cuban-Spanish politics. Therefore,
although the Cubans knew very well how superior to their own strength was
the Spanish power, and understood equally well how great and numerous
were the dangers of a new insurrection, nevertheless the sufferings of the
entire native population were such that the popular sentiment became
irresistible, and after a few fruitless outbreaks the war was renewed in 1895.

SKETCH MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF PINAR DEL RIO.

The long contest between Spain and Cuba has been finally decided by
American intervention, without which the war must have been protracted
until the Island was completely devastated and ruined; and even then Spain
would never have given it up. Not from patriotic motives, but simply and
solely because it yielded revenue to Spain’s depleted treasury, and gave her
sons an opportunity for pillage and plunder. The tenacity with which these
officials have clung to the offices, and the difficulty which the United States
Commissioners encountered in obtaining a relinquishment of the custom-
houses, all point to the cupidity of the Spanish, and show that they were in
Cuba for revenue exclusively.

Considering now the political aspect of Cuban affairs after the protocol
of August 12, 1898, it will be found that no well-defined scheme of political
organisation exists in Cuba, and that the only really popular and, it may be
said, unanimous feeling is that liberty, in all the legitimate meanings of this
word, is necessary. The actual situation may be compared to an anarchy, for
there is really no supreme authority. How to discuss and establish any
political laws in the midst of this existing legal anarchy and complete lack
of political experience, is the question confronting the United States
Government. This situation and many other conditions that are the natural
consequences of the last events point out the necessity of forming
provisionally a strong government in Cuba, under the guidance and
protection of the United States. Under such protection the work of
rebuilding the industries destroyed, and of once more making productive
the fields burned and the plantations dismantled and devastated, can be
carried on, and in no other way.
With these general conditions in mind, it may be well to ascertain if
there exist any facts of a promising nature, which will contribute to make
easier the work the United States has undertaken. It is undoubtedly true that
the people of Cuba can be brought together on economic questions, if not
on those of a political character. The United States has specifically
disclaimed “any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said Island,” except for “the pacification
thereof.” If, therefore, the pacification can be more easily and surely
accomplished by giving Cuba industrial freedom,—the right to buy in the
most advantageous markets in the world, and sell where the natural
demands for its products exist,—the United States has the right before all
the world to carry out that programme. Spain never granted this right to
Cuba, not even in the alleged Autonomist Government wrung from Madrid
when war with the United States seemed imminent and Spanish diplomacy
was in the last ditch.
The signs and omens for crystallising public sentiment in the Island of
Cuba on all industrial questions are far more hopeful at the present moment
than are those which indicate the possibility of establishing a stable
government, and thus leaving the management and control of the Island to
its people. There is now no opposition nor rivalry of different interests
among the Cubans, as the strong and important industries in Cuba, most of
them agricultural, are of such a nature that they may all thrive at the same

time. Until now the condition has been different, because the prosperity of
all Cuban industries has been thwarted and impeded by the protection and
privileges which the Spanish Government had to grant to the Peninsular
industries, whose interests (always in opposition to the legitimate wants of
Cuba) have ever been systematically preferred to those most vital in the
Island. Another fact is that the productive energy of Cuba and the fertility of
its soil are so great, and the real needs of the population so very small, that
the process of accumulating capital will become very rapid, after the worst
results of the late war are over and a settled and stable government has been
established. How far the natural resources of the country will contribute to
this result will soon be understood and appreciated. Heretofore, the yearly
increase of public wealth has been a very doubtful quantity, and it has never
been possible to build any hope on that ground, because all industrial profits
have been absorbed by Spain, without leaving any surplus to provide for the
accumulation of capital and the material progress of the Island. The
consequences of the Spanish colonial system have been such that even
before the present war Cuba was already ruined. The 1895-1898 war has
completed and aggravated to the utmost degree the material ruin of the
Island. The ultimate result of this industrial thraldom has been the never-
ending removal of Cuban wealth to Spain, without any return. The means
employed for securing that object were numberless.
The irresponsible methods of governing Cuba converted the Island into a
powerful means of political influence in the hands of the Ministers. The
most difficult political questions, either personal or otherwise, were usually
decided at the expense of Cuba. Very often the single signature of a
Minister of the Colonies was sufficient to make the fortune of a man for his
whole life; and it is easy to understand that every political party in Spain
would be opposed to any reform that should deprive it of such efficient
means of influence and power. With very few exceptions, all the Spanish
officials in Cuba, from the lowest to the highest, came from Spain. Their
number was extraordinarily large, and their work, as a general rule, pitifully
bad; their constant aim being to do as little work as possible, and to enrich
themselves, at the cost of Cuba, as quickly as they could. The fleet of the
Spanish transatlantic steamers was constantly employed in transferring
impecunious officials from Spain to Cuba, and taking them back again with
more or less wealth acquired during their residence in the Island, and
sometimes with pensions during their lives and the lives of their widows

and daughters. Even a share of the passage money of these officials “both
ways” was paid by Cuba.
Besides this salaried staff of officials, backed by the army and navy
(which were wholly paid by Cuba), Spain depended for the support of its
rule in Cuba on the so-called Spanish political party, known since 1878 as
the “Union Constitutional.” This party comprises the whole of the Spanish
population in Cuba, which is very numerous; and the blind and
unconditional support it gave to every measure of government, or of
misgovernment, whether the ruling party in Spain was liberal or
conservative, was paid for by the Government in many different ways, and
in such a degree that whatever might be the economic situation of Cuba, the
men belonging to the Spanish party had always the means of enriching
themselves. To these causes of impoverishment must be added the results of
the commercial policy of Spain; a subject which will receive attention later
in this volume. In vain the productive classes of Cuba protested, during
many years, against this deadly regime. It is no wonder, therefore, that the
insatiable ambition of Spain should have led to such an antagonism of
interests as to render a Cuban insurrection necessary, there being no
peaceful means of convincing Spain of its folly. In the same measure as
Cuba was reduced to utter bankruptcy and poverty, the importation of
Cuban wealth into Spain, without any return, increased year after year.
More particularly after the price of sugar fell permanently (in 1884) to
about one-half of its former value, and after the complete abolition of
slavery took place (in 1885), was the contrast strikingly manifested between
the gradual exhaustion of Cuba and the ever-increasing exactions of the
mother country. It may with accuracy be said that after the slavery of the
negroes came to an end, Spain possessed the power of reducing to real
slavery the whole native Cuban population, both white and black.
For this systematic process of thorough draining, Prime Minister
Canovas invented the name or appellation of realidad nacional (national
reality), meaning thereby that the necessity of maintaining the old colonial
system could not be avoided, as it had become interwoven with the Spanish
economics in such a degree as to make it impossible for any Government,
either conservative or liberal, to interfere with it. The Cubans could not
accept, without repeatedly protesting against it, the oppressive system of the
“national reality,” for which name they substituted, very properly and
accurately, the denomination of “economical slavery.” It is now useless to

explain in how many forms, and how often, the Cubans have appealed to
the Madrid Government, especially since 1890. But all their efforts failed,
and the necessary outcome of those failures was war. Cuba, no more a
European colony, will henceforth be an entirely American country. It is now
completely ruined and devastated, and many years of peaceful industry will
be necessary in order to convert its unhappy people into a prosperous
nation. How that can best be accomplished is of far more importance to the
people of Cuba at this time than the question of who shall administer the
government. For the present, at least, if its people are wise, the Island will
be content with the industrial freedom which has been accorded to it, and
rejoice in the fact that it is an American country, and not a Spanish
dependency.

CHAPTER II

CONDITIONS WHICH CONFRONT US

T O treat of Cuba as an American country is the purpose of this volume. If
the people of the Island, regardless of nationality, will only postpone the
question of the particular form of government for the present, and give
all their attention to the new economic questions which confront them, the
future will be full of promise. Cuba is no longer a European colony, but an
American country, under the protection of the United States. So long as the
Island is occupied and governed by the military forces of the United States,
law and order will be maintained and equal rights will be granted to all the
people. From an industrial point of view Cuba will have practically
obtained what she has been fighting for for nearly a generation: namely,
industrial and commercial freedom. The United States will administer the
laws for the Cubans in the interest of Cuba. The United States asks nothing
in return but the same opportunity for trade and commerce as is accorded to
the other countries of the world. The Republic will levy no tribute, nor will
it exact a dollar of taxation over and above the revenue necessary for
protecting life and property, and the cost of inaugurating such works for the
improvement of sanitation, or the carrying on of industries, as may become
necessary.
Many Cubans, and a very large number of Spaniards, who appeared
before the author when in Cuba, for the purpose of giving testimony on
industrial and commercial matters, took it for granted that the United States
would, in making up the new fiscal laws for the Island, exact discriminating
duties in favour of the United States and against European countries. When
told nothing of the sort was contemplated, the Cubans were surprised and
the Spaniards incredulous. Indeed, the latter were astounded, and seemed to
wonder what the United States was in Cuba for. Even American citizens
interested in pushing their Cuban trade have expressed surprise at the
absolute freedom which has been allowed all fiscal legislation, and the
scrupulous care exercised by our Government not to exact any right itself
which is not accorded to other nations. In such matters we are of course
bound by our international treaties, and so long as Cuba remains under the

protection of the Republic, and not part of it, she must be treated, so far as
customs regulations and navigation laws are concerned, as a free country. In
the preliminary work of economic reconstruction these sound principles
have been kept in mind and adhered to. In fact, the fullest and broadest plan
was chosen by the Administration to secure information in Cuba; and the
refrain of the instructions, both from President McKinley and his able and
broad-minded Secretary of the Treasury, was, to spare neither time nor
money to secure the views of all the people of Cuba; for whatever the
United States Government finds necessary to do in the Island must be done,
as far as possible, by the people of Cuba, for Cubans, and in the interests of
Cuba. By this it must not be inferred that those of Spanish birth were to be
excluded, but, on the contrary, that the views of all who proposed to remain
in Cuba and help by their labour and thrift to build up the industry and
commerce of the Island should be sought and considered.
In following out the spirit of these statesmanlike instructions, the author
invited, through the newspapers, all persons interested in the industry, trade,
foreign commerce, and currency and banking system of Cuba to express
their views on these and kindred topics. Many responded, and as may be
imagined the information gathered took a wide range, and will, it is hoped,
be of practical value in adjusting the questions with which the Government
of the United States will have to deal during the military occupation of the
Island. In the prosecution of this work, public hearings were given in
Havana, Cienfuegos, and Santiago; and to committees of persons
representing interests at Trinidad, Caibarien, Sagua la Grande, and other
parts of the Island an opportunity was given to express their views as to the
industrial necessities of their respective communities. In New York and
Washington opportunity was given to those interested in Cuban commerce
and such American citizens as represent large sugar estates, iron mines, and
tobacco and fruit interests in the Island of Cuba, to present a full and free
expression of their views on all topics included in the scope of the
investigation. A large amount of information was thus obtained, and no
inconsiderable assistance rendered by these gentlemen. With hardly an
exception, such assistance has been rendered freely and disinterestedly, and
the author takes this occasion to thank a large number of business men who
have been found ready and willing to drop their business at any moment
and devote much valuable time in an endeavour to elucidate the somewhat

complicated conditions which surround the commerce and industry of
Cuba.

SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCES OF HAVANA AND MATANZAS

In Cuba every possible consideration was shown to the writer and no
pains nor trouble were spared on the part of the Spanish officials and
business men to give all required information and to aid in the inquiry
undertaken. In this work neither political prejudice nor nationality took any
part. The Spanish bankers and merchants, whose influence a few weeks
previously had been arrayed against the United States, came forward and
placed such information as they had at the disposal of the United States
Government. The Cubans engaged in business, and the military
commanders in the field, from Generals Gomez and Rodriguez down, have
alike assured me of their sympathy in the work thus instituted by the United
States, and proffered their services in its prosecution. The following
expression from the veteran warrior, General Gomez, dated Boffill
Plantation, October 3, 1898, will be read in this connection with interest:

“I must congratulate you cordially for the high mission which you have had entrusted to you. I
am completely identified in all and with all concerning it; I reserve for a better opportunity giving
you my personal views on the matter.... On my side I am working in the same sense; I am doing all I
can for the immediate reconstruction of the country; its wounds will heal with the rapid promotion of
the work. This is the battle we are now fighting, and all men of good will should join us in our
struggle. I avail myself of this opportunity to tender my services.”

The business men and merchants of Havana and other large cities,
regardless of nationality, have rendered services of incalculable value to this
inquiry, on the ground that the one thing that Cuba wants more than all else
is, as General Gomez truly says, that its people should lay down their arms
and take up the implements of peace. The Presidents of the Chambers of
Commerce of Havana, Cienfuegos, and Santiago have all taken an interest
in this work and elaborate reports were prepared by committees appointed
especially to aid in gauging the industrial necessities of the Island. A similar
report has been prepared for Matanzas.
Whatever may be the shortcomings of this volume on Industrial Cuba,
they must not be attributed either to lack of interest on the part of the people
of Cuba, or to any failure on their part to give information, especially on all
matters relating to foreign commerce. There is, of course, a dearth of
statistical information, in consequence of which it has been difficult to work
out certain fiscal statements and estimates with the degree of exactitude
easily attainable on the same lines at home. The information which has been
obtained, however, would seem to leave no room for doubt as to the wisest
course for the United States Government to pursue in adjusting Cuban
customs duties, in establishing a sound currency, in protecting the savings
of the people, in preventing usury, in abolishing onerous and iniquitous
taxation, in establishing free schools, in starting new and reviving the old
industries of Cuba, in increasing commerce, in improving the sanitary
condition of the cities, in distributing labour, and in the general industrial
and moral upbuilding of the people.
The present volume touches on all these topics, and endeavours to give
the reader a clear and practical idea of the present industrial condition of
Cuba. The present chapter aims to present in a concise form a few of the
more important problems which the United States Government was called
upon to face January 1, 1899, and with which it may have to grapple during
the first years of the new century. No attempt is made to forecast the
manner of their settlement. It is not, as a rule, wise to worry about how we
are to cross a bridge until we get to it. Many Cuban economic problems

which at a distance seem to be complicated, will simplify as we come
within close range. Once the United States military authorities are in
possession, ways and means will suggest themselves to overcome obstacles
which now seem almost insurmountable. The most urgent needs of the
Island, when it was turned over to our Government, were those briefly
discussed in this review of the economic conditions of Cuba.
First among these needs of the Island was a tariff that should bear
lightest in directions where the people could least afford the burden of
taxation, and heaviest on commodities which the well-to-do and those
engaged in large enterprises required. The Spanish tariff was made by
Spaniards, for Spain, in the interests of the Spanish. That seems to be the
actuating principle of it. On any other theory it was inexplicable. In
adopting, July, 1898, for an exigency measure, the rates of duty which
Spain levied for her own commodities, the United States acted wisely.
These rates, however, were full of inequalities, and were not levied on any
sound principle, but on the “heads, Spain wins; tails, Cuba loses” idea
which prevailed in the whole fiscal fabric. It was found that the only way to
remedy these inequalities, equalise the rates of duties, improve the
administration, and reduce the rates of duties on all articles of general
consumption, was to frame a practically new tariff. This was done, and the
new tariff now in force will undoubtedly do its share in the industrial
reconstruction of Cuba. In this tariff it was not thought advisable to make
radical changes in the administrative branches, nor to change weights and
measures into United States equivalents, because the people of Cuba are
accustomed to the metric system. As a rule, all duties in Cuba are levied by
the kilo and hundred kilos. United States currency, however, was substituted
for the Spanish pesos. This will simplify collection of taxes, as customs
duties were collected by Spain in three different classes of currency: gold,
silver, and bank notes, all (for the gold coins used in Cuba have fictitious
values) fluctuating in value.
The tariff adopted by the United States, when the military forces took
charge of the custom-houses, reduced all duties about sixty per cent. on the
old Spanish rate, and averages fully two-thirds less than the rates exacted by
Spain in Cuban ports during the last five months of its occupancy of the
Island. The reasons for these reductions, together with the reasons which
led up to the decision of the President to admit cattle and agricultural
implements free into Cuban ports in possession of the United States, are

fully given in another chapter. Still another chapter will be devoted to an
analysis and discussion of the Cuban Budget, in which the effect of the new
tariff on the revenue of the country, together with the other sources of
revenue, are explained and discussed. It will naturally be asked: With such a
large reduction of duties, how does the United States expect to secure
revenue for the purpose of administering the government of the Island?
There are several answers to this question, and the facts bearing on the
subject are given in full in the chapter on the Cuban Budget. The general
answer is that by reason of fraudulent classification and smuggling, much
of the revenue collected from the people of Cuba never found its way into
the treasury of that Island, nor of Spain. The cupidity and rapacity of the
Spanish officials in Cuba are beyond conception, and, if one may judge by
the reports of the United States customs officials at Santiago, as much
revenue will be received from a tariff whose duties are from a half to two
thirds less than the Spanish tariff as was received under the iniquitous and
exasperating law which has been abolished by the advent of the American
forces. As the officials recommending the measure believed, the reduction
to a reasonable rate of duty in certain schedules—such, for example, as
those relating to machinery and railway supplies—would increase
importation, and certainly the revenue would be greater than during the
period of prohibitory duties. A railway company naturally hesitated to
import a locomotive when the duty was equivalent to the value of the
engine. With a revised tariff of twenty-five per cent. ad valorem, it may
import two, or four, or even six. In adjusting such schedules, the revenue
features alone need be considered, because Cuba has no locomotive works,
or any iron or steel industry. The same is true of a variety of other articles.
In all cases where there are home industries in Cuba capable of
supplying a manufactured product made by home labour, care was
exercised by those who framed this tariff (either by making free the raw
material, or by not making a too radical reduction of duty) not to injure their
prospects. In so doing, the Administration is only carrying out the policy
which has been fruitful in developing the industries of the United States and
in securing diversified employment for its labour. If honestly enforced, the
new tariff established in Cuba by the United States will yield sufficient
revenue, enable Cuba to buy in the cheapest markets of the world, and not
compel her to purchase from Spain inferior commodities at a high price. In
every section it is a Cuban measure, and in no single case can there be

found a section that discriminates in favour of the United States as against
any other market. The United States purposes to take its chances for the
Cuban trade with the rest of the world. If Cuba can purchase cheaper and
better articles on more favourable terms of the United States than of
Europe, we shall secure the trade. If not, the Cuban consumer is free to
purchase in the markets of the world. In this one act alone, conservative,
thoughtful Cubans must realise that they have attained to the commercial
freedom which some, not without reason, contend was the real object of the
two insurrections. However that may be, Cuba has secured a right which
England would never concede to Ireland, namely, a separate revenue
system. In granting this economic freedom to her other colonies, England
has strengthened their ties to the mother country. With industrial freedom
assured, a colonial country may be indifferent to the form of its political
government.
Next in importance to the fiscal laws for the revenue of the Island comes
the currency question. No country can be permanently prosperous unless its
currency is sound and its credit good. Bad financial management of state
affairs begets bad credit, and impaired credit is the forerunner of
depreciated currency. Although Cuba is afflicted with many kinds of
depreciated currency, the established basis is strictly gold, and in any
commercial engagement the value is understood to be in Spanish gold,
unless there is a specification to the contrary. Indeed, there is something
almost pathetic in the manner in which Cuba, though plundered and
depleted of her resources and wealth, has never wavered from the gold
standard. The business interests of the Island are, as the author found,
unanimously in favour of a continued gold basis; for the Cubans have
suffered so much from Spain’s various attempts to force upon the people a
depreciated currency, both in the form of silver and bank bills, that they
want no further experiments with the currency. The Spanish silver money
current in the Island is taken at the daily value only, which is fixed, partly
by the larger or smaller demand for wages and necessities of the
Government to pay troops, but principally by the continually fluctuating
value of the Spanish money in the European markets. As this Spanish silver
is legal tender in Spain for its face value, it is able to maintain a fictitious
value for purposes of shipment to that country. This silver dollar, therefore,
fluctuates in value with the fitful changes in Spain’s credit, and it is
probable, should the United States establish American currency as sole legal

tender for the Island of Cuba, that all the Spanish silver dollars will be
shipped to Spain. There was in Cuba during the last months of Spanish
control a margin of thirty per cent. on the silver dollars. It is not probable
that these dollars will go down to a point where it will not pay to ship the
Spanish silver to Spain and utilise the American dollar in Cuba. In this
event the United States Government will, of course, ship its own silver
dollars to Cuba; which, with the subsidiary coins, will be required for small
payments. At Santiago the immediate disappearance of Spanish dollars and
minor coins has made small transactions extremely difficult. Some think
that the present stock of Spanish silver in the Island exceeds the necessities;
but however this may be in the western part of the Island, it was evidently
not the case in Santiago.

BATEY OF SANTA CATALINA.

Besides the silver, there is a bank-note circulation, but that has no actual
bearing on the question of currency, as the trade and business of the Island
has refused to accept it, and the present quoted value is less than ten cents
on the dollar. The greater part of this emission, which was a war issue made
by the Spanish Government at Madrid through the Banco Espanol de la Isla
de Cuba (not by that bank), is largely in the hands of speculators and

government contractors. The only public application is for the payment in
the custom-house of the so-called ten per cent. ad valorem duty assessed on
the official value of imported merchandise in addition to the regular specific
rate of duty exacted. The abolition of this duty, under the new tariff, ends
the life of these bank bills. There still remains a question as to whether the
Spanish Bank of Cuba was in any way responsible for these bills, and the
question will come up for future adjustment. The Bank will probably deny
responsibility and refer those who hold this depreciated currency to the
Spanish Government at Madrid. It is an interesting fact in this connection
that the credit of the Spanish Bank of Cuba is of a higher standard than the
credit of the Spanish Government, for the Bank has never failed to redeem
its own paper during nearly half a century of its existence, first as the Bank
of Spain of Havana and subsequently under its present name. It has at times
suffered embarrassment, but ultimately the bills of the Spanish Bank of the
Island of Cuba have always been redeemed.
The gold coins current in Cuba are the Spanish and French coins, the
bulk of which consists of Spanish twenty-five-peseta pieces, so-called
Alfonsinos, which for many years have been inflated by royal decree to
$5.30, and the French twenty-franc piece, so-called Napoleons, which have
also been given a legal value of $4.24 and decreed since the end of 1893 as
legal money.[1] When the necessity for adopting and inflating another gold
coin besides the Spanish Alfonsino was under discussion, the suggestion
was made that the United States gold eagle would make an excellent coin
for this purpose, as it would figure out almost exactly eleven dollars
Spanish gold.[2] The idea was not entertained, because of the general
distrust of Americans, and the fear lest the relations between the United
States and Cuba should become too intimately interwoven.
STATEMENT SHOWING VALUE OF UNITED STATES GOLD IN COMPARISON WITH
SPANISH AND FRENCH GOLD ON THE BASIS OF PAR VALUE
Spanish Alfonsino $5.
French Napoleon 4.
Spanish Alfonsino, value in Havana $5.
Value in United States mint ($4.80 less shipping
4.776
expenses, .024)
$0.224.
Exchange 4-11/16%
French Napoleon, value in Havana $4.
Value in United States mint ($3.84 less shipping
3.8208
expenses, .0192)

$0.1792
Exchange 4-11/16%
Value of $5, less ½% shipping expenses $4.975. At 4-11/16%
Quotations: £ Stlg., Spain, $39.40 currency in Havana, 10% £ in U. S. 4.84

STATEMENT SHOWING ACTUAL VALUE OF $1. SPANISH SILVER
100,000 dollars Spanish silver can be bought to-day here with $66,000 Spanish
gold, equal to $60,000 U. S. currency.
100,000 silver dollars shipped to Spain after deducting 1% shipping expenses
would produce $99,000.
99,000 dollars Spanish silver on Spain will buy at rate of £1, which is $7.88,
£12,563. £12,563 would produce in the U. S. at $4.84, $60,804.92.

Cost $60,000
Proceeds 60,804.92
$ 804.92, from which deduct commission, revenue stamp, interest,
and profit.

While the principal banking concerns are unanimous as to the gold
standard, there is a difference of opinion in relation to the advisability of
squeezing the inflation out of these gold coins. Some of the Cuban bankers
and financiers contend that the United States Government should add
another gold coin to the currency, namely, the American eagle; and, by
maintaining the fictitious value given to the other two gold coins, leave it
equivalent to eleven dollars in Cuba. This, it is claimed, will be a very easy
way of leaving matters in statu quo, as it were, until such time as permanent
government and laws shall be provided for the Island. They fear that to
make the United States currency legal tender would work an injury to the
creditor class, whose contracts would then be payable in gold worth six per
cent. less than the gold specified in such contracts. There are others, whose
opinions are equally worthy of consideration, who recommend as the only
logical remedy for this situation the substitution of the American currency
as sole legal tender. Such action on the part of the United States
Government it is believed would not seriously interfere with present
contracts, which are invariably expressed as payable in Spanish gold, and
which might be arranged for accordingly.
The premium on Spanish gold was never agreed to by the business
people. Having thus arbitrarily put a premium on Spanish gold, the same
authorities later put a premium on French gold, and to make the matter
more complicated, the United States Government is now requested, by
some of the Cuban financiers, to introduce another gold coin, which,

practically, will be worth ten per cent. more in Cuba than in the United
States; that is, a man owing $1,100 gold in Cuba may pay that debt with
$1,000 gold in United States currency. As a temporary measure, and in view
of the fact that this inflation so far as Spanish coin goes has been in force
for over half a century, this may be justifiable. The process, however, is
entirely artificial, and to continue it would certainly result in many
complications. Some Cuban financiers think it inadvisable to introduce
American money at this time, while certain planters are fearful lest their
labourers should refuse to take one American silver dollar instead of two
Spanish silver dollars. The latter looks larger in amount, it must be granted;
but if the purchasing power of the American dollar, by reason of the sound
credit of the United States, is double that of the depreciated dollar, with
only Spain’s guaranty between it and its intrinsic value of fifty cents, there
will be no difficulty in the end. A country which is just now going through
an operation involving its very existence will hardly be seriously affected
by taking this fictitious value out of the gold coin and establishing once and
for all a sound currency that will be good for a hundred cents on the dollar
—no more, no less—the world over.
Cuba has no banks in the national sense. There are some excellent
private banks, and since its establishment, nearly half a century ago, the
Spanish Bank of Cuba has cut an important figure in the finance of the
Island.
In another chapter, a brief history of banking in the Island from the
earliest period to the present time will be given. For the present, the banking
facilities are adequate to the business, because it would be extremely
hazardous to loan money in Cuba on any kind of collateral or property.
Upon the revival of business, however, the agricultural interests will require
facilities for obtaining money in advance of the crops at reasonable rates of
interest, and protection from the abominable usury which heretofore has
blighted the strongest industries of the Island and added materially to the
burdens of the Cuban planters.
There are so many forms of obnoxious taxes in Cuba that even a brief
description of them would occupy considerable space and convert this
volume into a treatise on the evils of Spanish taxation. Foremost among the
taxes which the United States will abolish is the “consumption tax,” on the
killing of cattle, which is an exaction that greatly increases the price of food
to the people. This tax, like many others, was simply farmed out to private

firms or corporations, whose emissaries in its collection became a constant
menace to thrift and industry in their respective districts. Another tax, which
will fall of its own weight, now that the United States forces control the
Island, is the “cedula,” or head tax, which varied in amount from a few
cents to one hundred dollars, according to the rank and importance of the
individual. Curiously enough, this tax, when not collected, became under
Spanish rule a greater source of injustice and annoyance than when
collected. It was generally allowed to run until some occasion came for the
unhappy victim of Spanish rapacity to require a public document, a permit
to bury a child or relative, a licence to marry, a transfer of real estate, or a
notarial acknowledgment. Then it was that the petty rascals in charge of
public business came down heavily, and unless the fines and back “cedula”
and a handsome “gratification” to the official was forthcoming, the body
must await interment, the marriage must be postponed, or the transaction be
delayed.
The United States Government will not continue taxes that yield nothing
in revenue and were simply the means by which unprincipled officials
whose cupidity seemed to know no bounds were enabled to plunder and
distress the weak and the unfortunate. The “consumption tax,” the “cedula,”
and the revenue from “lotteries,” must necessarily disappear with the advent
of United States administration of affairs.
Until the tax laws of Cuba can be thoroughly revised, the revenue from
customs, from the various forms of internal revenue (and there are many),
and from the receipts from taxes upon municipal real estate will, if the
strictest economy prevail, suffice for immediate wants, without resorting to
measures of taxation which are alike debasing and tyrannical. It is
impossible to make specific suggestions at this time in relation to a subject
so hopelessly complicated. After the administration of affairs of the Island
has been longer in the hands of United States officials, these matters may be
carefully studied and adjusted on a basis of equality and justice to all
concerned. The true inwardness of Spanish taxation, as developed in the
Island of Cuba, can be studied and remedied only after time has elapsed and
all the facts are in possession of those who have assumed the responsibility
of control.
The question of education is one that will receive early attention, and in
which the President of the United States has personally evinced
considerable interest. Free public schools exist, but the teachers have the

right to take pay scholars, and naturally those who do not pay get little or no
attention. In the cities from which data are available it was found that only a
small portion of the school population attend school. There were 888
schools for boys and girls in 1893 and the amount paid for their support was
$775,646. It is impossible even to approximate the situation at the present
moment. In a general way, it may be described as simply deplorable. A free
public-school system must be immediately established, for much of the
misfortune and suffering Cuba has undergone may be traceable to the
neglect of education. The number of people who are illiterate is very great.
Some statistics show only one in forty of the labouring classes able to read
and write. There can be no stable government in Cuba until this has been
remedied.
The reader familiar with Cuban history will remember that the first
movement toward the emancipation of the slaves was the practical freeing
of all children born subsequent to 1868, the year the revolution started
which ended in the abolition of slavery. In the same way, the first act
looking toward political emancipation should be the establishment of a free
public-school system, which shall have for its aim the preparation of the
young Cubans for self-government, whether exercised as part of a Cuban
republic or part of the greater republic the basis of which is industrial
freedom and the common school.

SKETCH MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTA CLARA.

Manufacturing in Cuba is limited to a few industries in Havana, to the
manufacture of sugar and tobacco, and to machine-shops and small
foundries scattered over the Island for the convenience of the railway
companies, sugar-centrals, and harbours. The author visited all the
manufacturing plants in Havana, some of which were located in quarters of
the city reeking of filth and teeming with disease germs. There is little hope
for industrial enterprise in the broader sense until the sanitary conditions
have been improved in all the industrial centres of the Island. The fear of
that deadly enemy to all enterprise and thrift, yellow fever, which lurks in
the vicinity of the most flourishing industries of Havana, makes it
dangerous for those unacclimatised to enter these occupations. The
initiatory success of manufacturing in Cuba must depend upon the
importation of skilled labour from the United States or Europe. With this
invisible and deadly foe in the background, ready to strike when least
expected, and against which, as a Confederate officer now in the United
States Army at Havana said, “You cannot even raise an old-fashioned rebel
yell,” the outlook is far from attractive.
Not only the commercial prosperity of Cuba, but to a considerable extent
that of the southern portion of the United States depends upon the
possibility of destroying the foci of yellow fever which exist in the larger
cities and towns—especially in Havana and Matanzas—and which have
been the cause of the epidemics of this disease which have occurred in the
United States during the present century. It is believed that to destroy these
germs is possible, and from a mere industrial and commercial point of view
it would be a paying investment to spend several millions of dollars, if
necessary, to effect it. Until this has been accomplished, and the centres of
industrial activity of Cuba made safe for the influx of skilled artisans,
whose advent alone will make it possible for Cuba to diversify its industries
and elevate the condition of its labour, it will be vain to hope for the
establishment of new manufactures. The importance of sanitation is so great
and the subject of so much general interest to all those looking towards
Cuba with the idea of residence or investment there, that considerable space
in this volume will hereafter be devoted to a consideration of the subject.
The railway system of Cuba, consisting of seven companies, the
aggregate length of whose lines is only 1,467 kilometres, or 917 miles, is
entirely inadequate in bringing the extreme ends of the Island together;
Santiago and Havana in point of time being as far apart as San Francisco

and New York, though only separated by a distance of a few hundred miles.
The facts gathered on this subject and the maps presented elsewhere point
to the advisability of immediately constructing a trunk railway from end to
end of the Island, with branches extending north and south to the important
cities and ports. From whatever standpoint it may be viewed, no one
enterprise could do so much to improve the situation on the Island. No
revolution could have existed in Cuba if such a railroad had been completed
by the former Government, and nothing will so rapidly tend to the revival
of commercial and general business as the facility for quick passage from
one end of the Island to the other, and from the trunk line over branches to
the seaboard cities. All political turbulence will be quieted thereby and
prevented in the future. The entire country will be open to commerce; lands
now of practically no value, and unproductive, will be worked; the seaport
towns will become active and commerce between the Island and the United
States will soon be restored to the former figures of approximately one
hundred millions of dollars per annum. Business enterprise, ever alert to
conditions such as herein described, has already surveyed the route, and
there are several projects on foot looking toward prompt action in this
direction. After a careful study of the situation, it would seem extremely
doubtful if such an enterprise could be made a commercial success for
many years to come, without material assistance from those responsible for
the industrial future of Cuba.
The questions arising in relation to navigation between Cuba and the
United States are delicate, and involve, as does the question of
discriminating duties in favour of the United States, in a greater or less
degree our international relations with other countries. Those interested in
American shipping suggest discrimination in favour of American vessels
between Cuba and the United States, and some go so far as to indicate that a
joint arrangement of the American and Cuban flags would be a solution of
the problem. Much of this is mere speculation. We cannot discriminate in
favour of American vessels in the trade between Cuba and foreign
countries, just as we cannot do so in the case of American vessels in trade
between New York and foreign countries, on account of our commercial
treaties. The chapter on this subject has been submitted to Mr. Eugene T.
Chamberlain, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation of the Treasury
Department, and this experienced and efficient official has thrown

considerable light on the subject which, it is believed, will be of value to the
commercial interests of both Cuba and the United States.
These are some of the most important economic questions with which
the United States will be called upon to deal during its military occupancy
of Cuba. That we are capable of dealing with them intelligently and
satisfactorily can hardly be doubted. Questions of far greater magnitude are
continually presenting themselves at home, and as a rule the people of the
United States have been found equal to the task of adjustment. To doubt our
capacity as a nation to bring about complete pacification of the Island,
industrially and politically, is to throw a doubt on our most cherished
institutions and to cast a shadow on the Republic itself.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL FUTURE OF CUBA

T HE political future of Cuba is a matter of much speculation and interest.
Considerable will hereafter be said in this volume on the economic and
industrial future of this wonderfully productive Island, and little doubt
can be entertained that with an honest effort and stable government the
commercial future of Cuba will be full of promise. What of the political
future? The industrial independence of the Island attained, what, if any,
steps are likely to be taken for the political independence? At the present
moment, it is difficult to discern any nucleus around which is likely to
crystallise sentiment strong enough to form, with any degree of unanimity, a
cohesive, independent government. The strongest and uppermost sentiment
in the Island, as I have found it since the close of the war, is for peace and
reconstruction under the guidance of the United States. Those who have
made the greatest sacrifice for independence are apparently willing to rest
for a while and enjoy the glorious results of industrial and commercial
independence and a release for ever from Spanish misrule. Let the future
shape its own political policy, is the desire of all intelligent Cubans. In
commercial and business circles (and it must be remembered that the author
has, in the course of his inquiries, been very largely thrown in contact with
business people), the desire for ultimate absorption or annexation by the
United States is almost unanimous. Those who have property, those
engaged in industrial pursuits, those carrying on commerce, those interested
in affairs, regardless of nationality, see the greatest future for Cuba in
ultimate annexation to the United States, and openly advocate that policy.
There are others who advocate annexation on grounds of sentiment, and
who take the stand that the degree of real freedom enjoyed by a State of the
Republic is greater, and the advantages far in excess of those likely to
accrue to the mixed population of Cuba by the establishment of any sort of
independent government. This is not a matter for surprise when it is recalled
that a large proportion of the most enlightened Cubans have been educated
in the United States, while no inconsiderable number of the most active
participants in the war for Cuban freedom carried individually, alike into

battle and into conference, the grandest badge of freedom so far vouchsafed
to mankind—United States citizenship.
These ideas are admirably set forth in a pamphlet just written by Fran
Figueras, who makes an eloquent plea for the annexation of Cuba to the
United States. The title of the little book—for it is more than a pamphlet—
suggests the line of argument: Cuba Libre—Independence or Annexation.
Exactly! Cuba is free to-day! Liberty came when Spanish sovereignty
ended. Adapting the lines of Kipling, the Cubans may truthfully say:

“If blood be the price of liberty,
Lord God, we ha’ bought it fair.”

Liberty, therefore, has been won and paid for. By the very nature of
things there can be no forcible annexation to the nation representing the
absolute liberties of the people. If Cuba becomes part of the United States,
it will be because the Cubans, having won their liberty, shall so decree.
Intelligent Cubans understand this perfectly well and none better than the
author referred to above.
After reviewing the state of public opinion in Spain late in 1896 and the
sentiments predominating in Cuba among the native population in regard to
the mutual relations with the mother country, Mr. Figueras analyses the
present situation, and considers that public opinion in Cuba is divided into
three classes. Those wanting:
1. Immediate and absolute independence.
2. Independence under American protectorate.
3. Annexation, more or less immediate.
He allows independence to be the ideal of all peoples, but considers
Cuban independence to be still in embryo, and compares the sudden
liberation of the island from Spanish dominion to a premature birth, brought
on by American intervention and subject to the dangers attending its early
advent at an unexpected time. The author contends that to form a nation it is
important that the inhabitants shall have some common interests, usually
apparent in countries where one element predominates. He finds that in
Cuba there are three races equally strong: the autochthonic or white Cuban
(pure white), the Cuban with unmistakable and acknowledged signs of
black descent, and the white Spaniard; the first of which by its number, the

second by its greater acclimation, and the third by its wealth preserve the
balance. The fact that these people do not live in different provinces but in
the same places makes this adjustment all the more noticeable. Sometimes
in one house you will see a patriarchal Spanish father with conservative
ideas in the same room with his son of high-flown, Robespierre-like ideas,
convinced that a country progresses more in a year of revolution than in a
century of peaceful campaigning; while in a dark corner the negro servant, a
slave only yesterday, to-day free and taking an interest by no means meagre
in the revolutionary legend, curses his colour but does not fail to realise
how better fitted he is for rough work than his white neighbours.
“And in the present situation which, pray, of these elements,” the author asks, “is victorious?
Which has conquered and is ready to take under its protecting ægis the other two? Is it perchance the
revolutionary party that has had its work crowned with success and that can therefore force its
criterion of independence on all the inhabitants? Facts answer this question negatively and it would
be sheer madness to constitute one nation out of such heterogeneous elements.”

The author establishes comparisons with the other southern republics,
contends that Cuba will be in a chronic state of revolution if left to herself,
calls attention to the handicap to Cuban sugar, tobacco, and coffee
industries by the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and asks if
it is to be expected that the United States understands that her interest in
Cuba’s welfare is to justify damaging that of the new colonies for Cuba’s
exclusive benefit.
Arguing against a protectorate, the author calls attention to the fact that
Cuba has nothing to fear from foreign nations. Her dangers are at home; it
is pronunciamentos and the like that threaten, and a protectorate will not
avoid this; it is only absolute annexation that will.
“If before 1895,” continues the author of Cuba Libre, “all Cubans were
satisfied with a Canadian autonomy system given by Spain, why should the
United States be refused a trust given to a nation like Spain, which has
treated Cuba with injustice, bad government, and extortion, against the
tested ‘cash’ good faith of the other?”
Refuting arguments upon the offensiveness of annexation to Cuban
dignity, the author calls attention to the fact that dignity does not always
accompany independence, as, for example, it is often seen how an English,
German, or Italian schoolship silences the dignity of some independent
states by firing a few shots.
In conclusion he says:

“We Cubans have been tyrannised by an unscrupulous mother country and the proceeding has
dishonoured the nation which did so, and we victims have withstood the humiliation with dignity. We
stood with dignity when we were burdened with a system of colonial servitude, it was with dignity
that we rebelled, staining the chains that bound us with our own and foreign blood; we have kept our
dignity whilst the Americans have cut them for us; when to-morrow comes, and we ask for
annexation to the United States, we shall do so with the same dignity.”

There is sentiment, force, and good hard business sense in this attitude.
A flag, after all, is nothing in itself, but all in what it represents. The Stars
and Stripes have for a century or more represented human liberty and have
taken into their folds millions of the people of the old world. The historic
flags of all nations have been fully and freely and joyously repudiated by
them, in search of broader liberties, for that fascinating emblem of the
people’s rights; and under it scarred and impoverished Cuba may in truth
rest with dignity and content.
Adolfo Muñoz, one of the ablest and most thoughtful Cubans it has been
my pleasure to meet, gave utterance to similar views in relation to the future
of Cuba, though he approached the subject more from a commercial than a
sentimental point of view.
“A new community,” said Mr. Muñoz to the author, “particularly a small one, after a long and
destructive war, is always surrounded by many dangers, both internal and external; and the only
safety Cuba may find against them is a close connection with the United States which will afford the
immediate protection of the American Government. Cuba left alone could not enjoy a high credit,
either public or private; neither could she build a respectable navy, which her geographical position
renders necessary. In these, and in many other respects, Cuba has to depend exclusively on the
United States. The political connection between both countries becomes consequently a matter of
extreme importance, which cannot be discussed, and much less decided upon, in haste.”

Continuing, Mr. Muñoz said:
“The liberty which, by the aid of the United States, Cuba has now conquered, will enable her to
frame an entirely new tariff. This work, which must be done in accordance with other financial laws,
will prove to be a rather easy task, because the commercial relations between Cuba and the United
States are naturally beneficial to both countries. Perhaps the best arrangement, both on commercial
and political grounds, would be to convert these relations into a coastwise trade, so that the
productions of either country should be admitted free of duty in the other; provided that the question
of the United States sugar industry could be settled by means of some compensation or otherwise.
Cuba expects to be placed, in what respects custom duties, on the same footing as Puerto Rico; as it
is necessary to save her sugar industry from its present depression and ruin.”

Here is annexation clearly marked out though not actually advocated. A
country without credit cannot start up the machinery of government. To
make the trade coastwise for Cuba, as we have already done in the case of
Puerto Rico, means ultimate annexation. If, therefore, as Mr. Muñoz says,

Cuba “expects to be placed on the same footing as Puerto Rico,” she
expects annexation—nothing more, nothing less.
Attention is next directed to another, though not less interesting view of
the future of Cuba. When in Cienfuegos the author had the honour and
pleasure of meeting the Marquis de Apezteguia, President of the
Conservative party, and, although a Cuban born, a strong sympathiser with
Spain. There are few abler men in Cuba than the Marquis de Apezteguia.
Educated in London, Paris, and Madrid, and at home in the best circles of
New York, the Marquis is, in a sense, a cosmopolitan. His interests,
however, are all bound up in Cuba. If Cuba once more flourishes the
Marquis will become rich again; if it does not his large fortune will have
gone, and he himself have been reduced to penury. Asked to give his
opinion of the present and future condition of the Island of Cuba, the
Marquis de Apezteguia did so without hesitation, clothing his thoughts in
English so pointed and vigorous that it would be an injustice to the reader to
abridge or change it, and it is therefore made part of this chapter.
“In regard to the disposition of Cuba,” said the Marquis de Apezteguia to the author, “you have
first of all to consider the population of the Island, then you have its geographical position, which
makes it of importance to the United States; nay, if there is anything in geographical position, which
makes it dependent upon the United States. Key West is not an offensive position, it is simply a
defensive position for the United States, because it commands the defence of the American coasts.
The defence of your coast, with the Island of Cuba, is trebled with the same number of vessels, as its
750 miles practically makes the Gulf an inland sea, outside of the possibility of incursions from
foreigners. Up to Cape Hatteras, Cuba defends your eastern coast. Therefore, to you as a military
nation and as a naval power, Cuba is a necessity; without Cuba, you have simply Key West, and
Cuba is an excellent substitute for Key West. Having this naval defence, which makes the United
States non-attackable from Cape Hatteras to the Rio Grande, with how much more efficacy, and
without danger, you can move your armies! Cuba is of immense value to the United States, and
therefore from that point of view we will develop the others. Under the naval and military aspect in
regard to the concentration of the army, we command the Gulf of Mexico as an inland sea of the
United States, and we are the principal factor in the trans-oceanic traffic.

SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF PUERTO PRINCIPE

“The Cuban question is not a difficult one, because there is an imposed issue. In commercial
development, to all evidence, you have been a long time a borrowing country, but to-day you have
great banking centres: New York, Philadelphia, and Boston constituting an eastern centre; Chicago,
St. Louis, and Cincinnati constituting another; with a smaller one at New Orleans, and a western one
at San Francisco. Certain centres, such as the New York one, which has an excess of capital, will act
in this annexation of Cuba as a multiple in the matter of capital. The capital will in preference come
to Cuba, instead of going west.
“In the political problem, the condition of the population of Cuba must be considered. It is not a
new country, but four hundred years old,—a totally different nation, with different habits, ways, and
languages. Then how can you profitably absorb that population as a State? You cannot afford to
sacrifice the United States for Cuba, but must lend Cuba both moral and material riches without
forgetting yourself. Is it profitable for the United States to absorb Cuba as a State? If I were an
American, I would oppose it. I do not think the Cuban people have sufficient adaptation; in fact they
will not Americanise for quite a while, and therefore you must create an empire and a public right
that is not within the federal bounds. Your territorial laws pursue colonisation towards the end of
absorption, and have placed in your Constitution a limit of population, which we initially possess.
Were I an American, I would not be for annexation of Cuba as one of the units of the Union. I think
there is a condition of injustice which would be felt by both parties, if you held Cuba in an inferior
political state so close to Florida. I say that this is inevitably American, from the material defence

which it procures to the United States, and it is a military necessity. It cannot, however, be absorbed
and governed rapidly, and for a time you will have to create a new political right, for it is inevitable.
You cannot absorb it without creating a different political right.
“Now I have said that, in my belief, the issue is imposed and inevitable; Cuba has to be American
territory, and cannot be anything else, with restringent or lax ties uniting it; but in the exterior life it
will have to be American. You have no laws so far that can be established here; the new political right
will have to be created because of the way in which you acquired the Island. You cannot govern it
until you give it those things which have been assured it. You have acquired responsibilities which
you are not at liberty to throw away and go back on; that is your position towards Cuba and towards
the world, and therefore towards yourself. The American people must not feel that they are making of
Cuba a business, but a necessity, to be maintained by force if necessary until evolution can be
accomplished.
“Since we see the problem is one with an imposed ultimate solution, the easiest way is to
continue the same action that brought the Island. You need, as a guaranty to yourself, and to the
Cubans not in arms (which are the majority), a material force here that cannot be disputed with any
chance of success. After Spain has abandoned her sovereignty here you are under the responsibility
of keeping a force here which will make it a crazy enterprise to dispute. This is a moral duty which
you are obliged to fulfil; you cannot have the excuse of want of power that Spain had. The first
element of success is the destruction beforehand of all insurgent or insurrection element. All minor
things should be put aside and the American mind have a national policy toward the colonisation and
final prosperity of Cuba. You do not want the Cuban question to become one of those burning
questions of American politics; but it will, unless you have strength to determine it in the way it
should go. If it is disputed now in the transient state, you will convert it into an interior American
question, which would make things worse than if you had never come into the thing at all. It is the
duty of your Administration to mark out these lines and tell the American people that it is a duty
outside of small political lines.
“What is the duty of the Cuban people? Your trouble comes from having to handle an unknown
land. The business of the President is, not to show business people how they can make money, but to
show the people their duty, and leave the rest to American ingenuity. The Cubans are a good people.
The population is divided about equally between whites and blacks, and has decreased about one
third during the war. I do not wish to discuss the inferiority of the black race, but, so far as I can see
in this country from whatever cause, they do not meet worry. The act of force is the determining one
with them, and in it they are of great value. In all other social determinations they count very little
indeed. From this you derive two lines of conduct: you must try to satisfy the whites as far as
possible, and you must content the black so that he will not lend his brutal force to the discontent of
the white. The insurrection caused a great fraternity, that is to say, the distinction of race which
existed before the war does not exist now. This is not, however, one of the elements that is going to
cause trouble, if you do not let them conflict. The insurgents have fought many years for
independence, making great sacrifices for the sake of it, and therefore they will not be satisfied with
anything short of independence. If you leave them in the future to their own inferior force, I do not
think there will be a strong fight towards acquiring total independence in the exterior world, because
they recognise the fact that their country is comparatively small and the United States is large, but if
these people see that this independence at any moment is not given to them, they will rise in arms—
to what extent I do not know. A man who has lost family, suffered sickness, and has no interest now
in the home where he was born, is a very reduced moral being. He has not the energies of a total
being. The Island of Cuba has been debased by a war of extermination, brought about by its own
manner of warfare, and by the Spanish warfare. The Island of Cuba is now totally inert and totally
incapable of any governing faculties, not only because of the dead, but by making the rich poor, by
making the poor indigent, and the indigent dying. You have in the Island of Cuba a reduced specimen
both of material and moral wealth, and these individuals are not capable of determinations of value

and worth towards the natural end of civilisation. You then see how much you can depend on the help
of the individual. If you attempt to govern by carpet-bag legislation, you will bring on an
insurrection. If you help the indigent, and bring them to a condition like they were before the war,
you will do them no good. Therefore, you must have a force to establish an indisputable power, and
then you must have a policy in which each one finds a solution to his own interest and welfare, under
the idea that the Cuban people are unable to take care of themselves to-day, and that none of them
have definite ideas or definite plans for their welfare. These plans must come through a strange
guidance and not from the Cubans. I have on the Constancia in my care about five thousand people
to-day, whom I have helped all I could. I shall have to employ means of coercion to throw these
people outside of my house, so little is the sense of dignity in them to-day, and shall have to give
them lands, and help them, in order to get them to find their own way in life. This is the real
condition of things. The more energetic element is the one in the insurrection, but these on my estate
are such as constitute the element which took no sides but suffered the distress of both.
“The size of property was one of the causes of the war, together with the total neglect of the
lower orders of population.
“Of the element in arms, you have to distinguish between those who made the war and those who
are wittily called the ‘Veterans of 1898’—about one half are Veterans of 1898. These people have
energy, and these people have accustomed themselves to that life of civil warfare, but their condition
is very bad to-day, and because of this they would like to come into order, although they have great
inclination to continue. This is about the only energy left here, but it will be of no use to you except
by getting these people out of the way. They have gone to war and acquired honours and salary to the
extent of probably $10,000,000. The only way you can do is to offer them the security of what they
have acquired so far as material welfare is concerned,—that is, their salaries. It would be an error not
to give it all to them. If you give them work in the face of that inert mass I have shown you, and let
them see their superiority, giving them certain annuities or monthly payments, you can bridge over
the troublesome part of this population, but you cannot do it through their moral nature. You will
have to bridge over several months by a strong occupation, by destroying the insurgent energy, by
helping the other people, and by drawing general lines which all parties in the United States will
accept. You must outline a distinct American policy which must be followed by both parties, and
which no party can differ from. With these conditions you will have no trouble in the Island of Cuba.
“If you name your high officials Cubans, this will run off into Cuban solution, and not American.
If the occupation is made by sufficient force, and you name only a few high officials who have the
confidence of the Administration and have a general plan to carry through, and these appoint lower
officials, taking the best class of Cubans and insurgents, the problem is solved. As a Spaniard born in
Cuba and wishing this country all the good I can, I think it would be absurd to hope for the peace of
the Island without a strong military force. The place must be occupied on strategic lines and not as
Spain occupied it, and with good means of communication. This is the solution of the question. If this
is not done, guerrilla warfare will have the advantage and it will be the same as when the Island was
occupied by the Spanish forces; there were no enemies and no battles and it was like making a
cavalry charge on a cloud or a mist.”

The above is a vigorous statement of the situation from the standpoint of
one who has lost his all, not in fighting for independence, but in a contest
for what he believed was a strong government. The Marquis wastes no
sentiment. He tells some hard truths which all who know Cuba will
recognise as such. Few foreigners know the United States better than the
Marquis de Apezteguia and few have his ability of touching the weak spots
in our armour. He tells us we cannot absorb Cuba, and as an American he

would oppose annexation. These observations, as well as some others, will
delight Mr. Andrew Carnegie, Mr. Edward Atkinson, Mr. Charles Francis
Adams, and other opponents of annexation. The talk of strategic necessity,
the exertion of power, and the material force necessary to make Cuba
American territory will give these gentlemen who have raised the anti-
Imperialist cry sentences which will greatly increase their stock of phrases,
but in no way solve the question of what shall be done with our new
possessions. Indeed, the Marquis, consoling the so-called anti-Imperialists
with his well turned sentences, offers them medicine more stringent and a
remedy more drastic than annexation. The word “Empire” has no terror for
this Cuban-born Spaniard. You must create an Imperialistic policy, or right,
not granted in the Federal Constitution, you must maintain American
ascendency at any cost, and do your duty toward the people of Cuba and the
people of the world. Cuba must, for all time to come, be American territory.
It is only by a policy of this sort the Marquis thinks we shall succeed. In
carrying out this plan, we are warned not to allow the Cuban question to
become a burning question of American policy, but we are enjoined to hold
up President McKinley’s hands in establishing a stable government in Cuba.
It must not be made into a business, but a necessity. Carpet-bag legislation,
he thinks, would bring on an insurrection. In this the Marquis is
undoubtedly right. Lastly, he offers the good advice that something must be
done and done quickly for the insurgents in arms, whose deplorable
condition he vividly portrays. That these soldiers should be speedily paid
off there can be no doubt, for until that is done, the rural districts of Cuba
can never become productive.
Presumptuous as it may be to pass judgment on the utterances of a man
of such wide range of experience in Cuba as the Marquis de Apezteguia, I
believe the President of the late Conservative party of Cuba underestimates
the Cuban capacity, both for self-government and for annexation to the
United States. The work of final absorption may take a generation, but it
will surely come. Once annexed, Cuba would become an English-speaking
country, and the alert Cuban mind would grasp those great principles of
fundamental liberty with far greater alacrity than the Spanish. Let the word
go forth to teach English in every schoolhouse in Cuba, and the work of
amalgamation would be half done. The more the Cubans know of the
United States and of our institutions, the better they will like us. As
confidence takes the place of distrust in the minds of the population of

Cuba,—native or foreign-born, black or white,—the sooner all will reach
the conclusion that the most promising future for Cuba can only be attained
by complete union with the greater Republic.

SKETCH-MAP OF THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA

In support of this opinion as to the political future of Cuba it is only
necessary to quote the utterance of one whose opportunity for making such
a forecast has been exceptional. Major-General Matthew C. Butler, of South
Carolina, combines in his make-up and experience both soldier and
statesman. The Confederate cause can point to no more brave and capable
officer than General Butler. For sixteen years he represented his State in the
United States Senate, and during that period grappled with all the important
questions of the day. No man on the Cuban Evacuation Commission was so
well equipped to study the political and economic side of the Cuban
question as General Butler; and no man took so much pains to ascertain the
facts in relation to the condition and sentiment of the people of Cuba. For a
month last autumn the author was daily and closely associated with General
Butler at the Vedado, near Havana, where the Military Commission had its
headquarters. Between acquaintances of many years, in Washington, it is
not strange that conversation during those long evenings at the Hotel
Trotcha turned on the future of Cuba and that the exchange of thought was
both free and frank. Summed up, the opinion of General Butler on the
future of Cuba is as follows:

“You ask an expression of my opinion before leaving Cuba as to the character of the people of
the Island and their future prospects. If they will be patient, following the dictates of prudence, and
trust the Government of the United States, a very prosperous and happy future awaits them. The
process of rehabilitation may be slow, but by cordial co-operation of all classes it will be more certain
and permanent.
“The army of the United States is here to guarantee public order and enforce obedience to law. Its
use will be controlled very largely by the conduct of the people themselves. If they uphold the law
and insure public tranquillity, if each will respect the rights and persons of the other, there will be no
occasion for interference by American troops. And you may take my word for it they will not
interfere with the people in their peaceful vocations, if the conditions I have suggested prevail.
“The officers and soldiers on duty in the Island of Cuba are American citizens as well as
American soldiers, accustomed to rendering loyal obedience to law; and they will not abandon on
this Island their devotion to the principles of American liberty regulated by law. I therefore repeat
that the people of Cuba may safely trust the officers and soldiers of the United States to establish and
maintain the principles of government as set forth in our Constitution and laws, which mean freedom,
not licentiousness, and equality before the law for all.
“We have no such thing as ‘one man power’ in the United States, and cannot so far depart from
our devotion to popular liberty as to tolerate it here. So I say, if the people of Cuba (I include in the
word ‘people’ all classes and conditions) will await with patience and resolution the establishment of
good government, honestly and impartially administered, a brilliant future is in store for them. If, on
the contrary, bickerings among themselves, unreasonable complaints, and demands in disregard of
the rights of persons and property should lead to bloodshed and breaches of the peace and the
disturbance of public order and tranquillity, as they most surely will, the day of their deliverance will
be indefinitely deferred.
“You ask me whether I think the people of the Island of Cuba capable of self-government. This is
a very difficult question to answer. I may, however, say that I have no sympathy with the harsh and
unjust judgments of those who condemn them without a hearing and settle in advance a problem
which requires time for solution.
“Officially I have no opinion to express as to the status of such a commonwealth, for that is a
question to be settled by the people themselves in their aggregate capacity, but personally I should
like to see Cuba a State in the American Union, enjoying all the rights of local autonomy and self-
government on terms of equality with the other commonwealths of the United States. She would then
have liberty, regulated by a written constitution, where the military is subordinate to the civil power,
and where each of the three great co-ordinate branches of the government, legislative, executive, and
judicial, execute the will of the people.”

The above statement, which, with General Butler’s consent, is made part
of this chapter, was prepared with great precision and care and only after
long deliberation. Moreover, it was submitted to some of his colleagues,
and the subject-matter fully discussed with the author, who is in full and
hearty accord with the views expressed. Officially the author has no opinion
to express as to the status of such a commonwealth, for the work committed
to him was purely of an economic and fiscal and not of a political character.
Personally, however, the author, with General Butler, looks forward to the
day when Cuba will be a State of the Union, in the enjoyment of that full

degree of liberty and self-government which is accorded the other
commonwealths of the United States.

CHAPTER IV

THE ENGLISH IN JAMAICA

H AVING sought light and information in relation to the future political
government of Cuba from both Cuban and Spanish sources, for the
Marquis de Apezteguia is more Spanish than Cuban, it may be well to
ascertain if any useful lesson may be found in British colonial
administration. With this thought in view, the author, after completing the
work in Cuba, made a brief visit to the island of Jamaica. Through the
courtesy of the American Mail Steamship Company, the S.S. Admiral
Sampson stopped at Santiago and thus enabled me to reach Port Antonio,
Jamaica, in seven hours. At this point I met Captain L. D. Baker, the head of
the vast American fruit interests of Jamaica, and with him visited Kingston
and had an interview with the Governor-General of Jamaica, and with the
heads of nearly all the Departments of Government. In this connection it
affords me pleasure to mention the name of Dr. James Johnston, member of
the Jamaica Council for St. Ann’s Parish and member of the Commission
now revising the revenue law of Jamaica. Dr. Johnston was a fellow-
passenger on the S.S. Sampson, on its return voyage to the United States,
and furnished much valuable explanatory information in relation to the
government of Jamaica, for which this opportunity is taken to express
thanks.
The information thus obtained and the data gathered from the various
blue books and the reports of the Royal Commission on the British West
India Islands, all have a special bearing on the problem the United States is
now confronting in Cuba, and hence on the political future of the Island.
Better to appreciate the present aims of British administration in Jamaica,
one should read the following extract from an article in the December
number of Scribner’s Magazine, by the Right Honourable Joseph
Chamberlain, British Colonial Secretary:
“In the first period of this eventful history the territories acquired by conquest or discovery were
treated as possessions to be exploited entirely for the advantage of the occupying nation, and little or
no thought was given to the rights or the interests either of the original inhabitants or of the colonists
who had dispossessed them. This view of the relations between a state and its outlying territories

continued more or less throughout the eighteenth century, although the War of Independence in
America did much to modify and dispel it. The success of the Revolution not only destroyed the hope
that colonies could be made tributary to the mother country, but led ultimately to the conclusion that,
since they would never be a source of direct revenue, we should be better without colonies at all.
Assuming that an entirely independent and separate existence was the ultimate destiny of all our
possessions abroad, and believing that this consummation would relieve us of burdensome
obligations, we readily conceded self-government to the colonies in the temperate zones, in the hopes
that this would hasten the inevitable and desirable result. We found, not without surprise, that in spite
of hints to this effect, our kinsfolk and fellow-subjects resented the idea of separation and, fortunately
for us, preferred to remain, each ‘daughter in her mother’s house and mistress in her own.’ Influenced
by the same idea, we elaborated constitutions by the score for every kind of tropical dependency, in
the vain expectation that the native population would appreciate forms of government evolved in our
own civilisation, and would learn quickly to be self-supporting and to develop for themselves the
territories in which we began to think we had only a temporary interest. We were disappointed, and
we have had to recognise the fact that, for an indefinite period of time, the ideas and standards of our
political and social order cannot be intelligently accepted or applied by races which are centuries
behind us in the process of national evolution. The experience of Hayti and Liberia under
independent native government, of many of the South American republics, of Egypt and of India, and
the stagnation of all tropical countries, in regard to matters dependent on local effort, make it evident
that wherever the white man cannot be permanently or advantageously acclimatised and wherever,
therefore, the great majority of the population must always be natives, the only security for good
government and for the effective development of the resources of the country consists in providing
this native population with white superintendence, and with rulers and administrators who will bring
to their task the knowledge derived from the experience of a higher civilisation; and, constantly
changing, will be always under the influence of the standards and ideals which they have been
brought up to respect.
“This is the root idea of British administration in the tropics. At the same time we have
abandoned forever any desire to secure tribute from these possessions, and we no longer seek any
direct or exclusive advantage.
“We find our profit in the increased prosperity of the people for whose interests we have made
ourselves responsible, and in the development of, and access to, markets which we open at the same
time to the rest of the world. Our primary obligation is to maintain peace, and safety of life and
property, and equal justice for all irrespective of race or class. Subject to these conditions, we
interfere as little as possible with native religions, customs, or laws; and under this system we are
successfully administering the affairs of hundreds of millions of people of almost every race under
the sun, with trifling cost to the British taxpayer, and with the smallest army of white soldiers of any
of the powers of Europe. In India, where three hundred millions of people acknowledge the Queen as
Empress, the total white garrison is only seventy thousand men; in Egypt, with a population of nine
millions, the normal white garrison is thirty-five hundred men; while in Ceylon, the Straits
Settlements and protected States, the West Indies, and West Africa not a single white regiment is
stationed for the maintenance of our rule, which is secured entirely by coloured soldiers and police
under British officers. Our experience should at least go far to satisfy the objections of those
Americans who anticipate that the occupation of tropical countries would involve the retention of
vast numbers of American soldiers in an unhealthy climate, and would lay an intolerable burden on
the American treasury.”

The Spanish idea in its government of Cuba was purely and absolutely
the idea of possession, and the facts pointing to this will be abundantly set
forth in the several chapters in this volume relating to the fiscal,

commercial, and industrial condition of the Island of Cuba. The work of
reconstruction already so auspiciously begun by the United States
Government in Santiago, and described in a subsequent chapter, is
absolutely in line with what Mr. Chamberlain aptly terms the root idea of
British administration in the tropics. The primary obligation of the United
States in Cuba is to maintain peace, the safety of life and property, and
equal justice for all, irrespective of race or class. The final instructions
given by the President of the United States, last August, to the author,
leaving for Cuba, were to the effect that the United States desired to secure
no tribute from Cuba, that the work of reconstruction must be performed in
the interests of the people of Cuba, only, and that the profit to the United
States must come in the increased prosperity of the people of Cuba, and in
the benefits accruing from a peaceful, instead of a constantly warring
neighbour. According to Mr. Chamberlain, this is the fundamental principle
underlying England’s operation in her tropical colonies.

ON THE ROAD TO CASTLETON, JAMAICA.

In comparing British administration in Jamaica with any possible
operations of the United States Government in Cuba, the fact of the great

difference in the population must be considered. In Jamaica not over 15,000
of the 700,000 population are white. When England began to treat this
island as a trust, and not as a possession,—say about 1834,—the population
was made up of 311,070 slaves, 15,000 whites, 40,000 coloured, or brown
people, as they are called in Jamaica, and 5000 free blacks. In Cuba a
majority of the population are white—the census of 1887 showing
1,102,889 white and 528,798 coloured—in all provinces; Matanzas, with
forty-five per cent. coloured, and Santiago, with forty-two per cent.
coloured, representing the strongest coloured sections of the Island. That
half a century of British rule in Jamaica has improved the population of
Jamaica, nearly all of whom were slaves when the work was begun, is self-
evident, though it is equally true that similar government in Cuba would
have resulted, by reason of the preponderance of white population, in more
far-reaching results. That is, Cuba, under such a government as England has
given Jamaica, would, in all reasonable probability, have numbered at this
time a population of from four to five millions, with a greatly increased
commerce, diversified industries, magnificent main and parochial roads, an
adequate railway system, many prosperous and well-built cities, and a
degree of prosperity and civilisation far in excess of that which the United
States officials found when they took possession of the Island. With the
disadvantages of race, with the scars of slavery, and, until recently, with the
single industry of sugar and its allied product, rum, the policy set forth so
clearly by Mr. Chamberlain has been successful in making habitable and
law-abiding and measurably prosperous a tropical island which might have
been in a condition little better than that of savagery.
To be sure, England has not made Anglo-Saxons of these people, but it
has made of them peaceful, law-abiding, and, in the main, self-respecting
citizens. There is little doubt that the bulk of the inhabitants of Jamaica are
in a position which compares not unfavourably with that of the peasants of
most countries in the world. The facts given farther along show that the
condition of the labouring classes of Jamaica is infinitely better than that of
the labouring classes—especially the coloured population—of Cuba, who
are in a deplorable state, even on plantations where work is abundant. The
number of holdings in Jamaica is 92,979, of which 81,924 are under ten
acres each. In 1882 there were only 52,608 holdings, of which 43,707 were
under ten acres each. Even allowing for the fact that some persons may hold
two or more plots of land, it is clear that the island already contains a very

large and increasing number of peasant proprietors. The Crown Land
Regulations offer facilities for the settlement of the labouring population on
the land, and as sugar estates are abandoned some of them will probably fall
into the hands of small cultivators. In the last ten years the number of
savings-bank accounts of the amount of twenty-five dollars and under has
nearly doubled. The census returns of 1891 show that in the ten years, 1881
to 1891, there had been an increase of thirty per cent. in the number of
persons able to read and write. The acreage of provision grounds has
increased more than thirty per cent. in ten years. There are 70,000 holdings
of less than five acres. The area in coffee, usually in small lots, increased in
ten years from 17,000 to 23,000 acres. More than 6,000 small sugar-mills
are owned by the peasantry. The number of enrolled scholars was 100,400
in 1896, as against 49,000 in 1881; while the actual average daily
attendance at schools had increased from 26,600 to 59,600. These facts
indicate considerable advance, though no doubt in certain districts the
people are poor. The Royal Commission appointed to investigate and report
on the agricultural, commercial, and industrial condition of the West Indies
came to the conclusion that the depression in Jamaica was the result of the
almost entire dependence of the island on a single industry. Here is what
they say:

“The general statement regarding the danger of depending on a single industry applies with very
special force to the dependence of the West Indian Colonies upon the sugar industry, for the
cultivation of sugar collects together a larger number of people upon the land than can be employed
or supported in the same area by any other form of cultivation. In addition to this it also unfits the
people, or at any rate gives them no training, for the management or cultivation of the soil for any
other purpose than that of growing sugar-cane. The failure, therefore, of a sugar estate not only leaves
destitute a larger number of labourers than can be supported upon the land in other ways, but leaves
them also without either the knowledge, skill, or habits requisite for making a good use of the land.
In those colonies where the sugar industry cannot be carried on without imported coolie labour the
position of dependence upon this one industry is still more dangerous. In these cases not only is there
a yearly charge upon the public revenue to meet the cost of immigration, but a liability for back
passages is incurred, which a failure of the industry would leave the colony without funds to meet.
Whilst, therefore, the vital importance of the sugar industry to the present prosperity of nearly all the
colonies is beyond dispute, we wish to observe that so long as they remain dependent upon sugar
their position can never be sound or secure. It has become a commonplace of criticism to remark
upon the perpetual recurrence of crises in the West Indian Colonies, and we submit that the repeated
recurrence of such crises, as well as the fact that the present crisis is more ominous than any of the
previous ones, illustrates the danger to which we have referred, and adds much force to our
recommendations for the adoption of special measures to facilitate the introduction of other
industries.”

The special remedies recommended were as follows:
“1. The settlement of the labouring population on small plots of land as peasant proprietors.
“2. The establishment of minor agricultural industries, and the improvement of the system of
cultivation, especially in the case of small proprietors.
“3. The improvement of the means of communication between the different islands.
“4. The encouragement of a trade in fruit with New York, and, possibly, at a future time, with
London.
“5. The grant of a loan from the Imperial Exchequer for the establishment of central factories in
Barbadoes.
“The subject of emigration from the distressed tracts also requires the careful attention of the
various governments, though we do not find ourselves at the present time in a position to make
recommendations in detail.”

The fact is, Captain L. D. Baker, of the Boston Fruit Company, and the
other companies engaged in the banana and orange business of Jamaica,
have pointed a way out of the present difficulties, and that industry, in the
course of a short time, bids fair to be as important as the sugar industry was
in former times. Last year this single company shipped five million bunches
of bananas to New York. There are now over one hundred thousand orange
trees planted in Jamaica, which in a few years will be bearing finely and
give additional prosperity to the country. With the American fruit market
inadequately supplied, and the English market practically untouched, there
is hope both in Jamaica and Cuba—especially Santiago province—for

diversified industries created by rapid transportation. The recent
establishment of a fleet of fast steamships between New York, Philadelphia,
Boston, and Baltimore, and the various ports of Jamaica, and the probability
that these or similar lines will be established between the United States and
Cuban ports, are all factors of promise for the industrial future of both the
British and the American West Indies.
While Jamaica is a well-governed country, and its revenue is all honestly
expended for the public good of the people, it is far from an economically
administered government. Order is thoroughly established, laws are obeyed,
justice for the humblest is easily obtainable, education is general, sanitary
matters admirably administered, roads maintained, the rights of all
conserved, and the revenue honestly collected and expended. In these
particulars the government of Jamaica differs widely from that which the
author found in Cuba. In that unhappy Island all is absolutely the reverse of
this. The cost of governing Jamaica, however, is nearly twenty-five per
cent. of the value of its commerce, whereas the cost of governing Cuba—if
gauged by the actual revenue raised—under Spanish rule ranged from 12½
to 15 per cent. of the value of its commerce. The comparison, however, is of
little value, because Cuba got nothing for the money exacted by taxation,
while Jamaica not only gets all, but also the taxpayers are informed in
advance of the purposes for which much of the money is wanted, and the
sums thus raised are rigidly applied to the purposes for which they are
appropriated. The most useful lessons for those responsible for
administering the affairs of Cuba can be learned by a study of the Jamaica
Budgets. The methods of raising the needed revenue are intelligent and
simple, and the method of expenditure not only enables the authorities to
get as much as possible for the money, but also makes possible the strictest
accountability. The Legislative Council of Jamaica discusses every item of
the budget as closely as the Town Council of Glasgow or the County
Council of London, both model public bodies, so far as honesty of purpose
goes, even if some of their legislative experiments fail. The humblest
Jamaica negro, if he can read and write, may at least know the purposes for
which the revenue he pays in taxes is expended. He may even have the
pleasure of deciding which of these items of expenditure he regards the
least important. At the present moment the annual cost of education,
$350,000, is regarded as too high, and a proposition to reduce it to $250,000
is pending. The total expenditures of Jamaica have reached nearly

$4,000,000 and additional revenue is necessary to meet these expenses. The
customs tariff is in course of revision, with a view of increasing the
revenue, and many articles formerly on the free list will have to be put upon
the dutiable list, while the general ad valorem rates of duty must be raised
from 12½ to 16-2/3 per cent. Before going into the future sources of
revenue, it may be well to look at the present sources, and for that purpose
the subjoined table has been compiled from official sources:
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF REVENUE OF JAMAICA, 1896-97
Revenue. Pounds. Dollars.
Customs 321,780 1,608,900
Excise 122,735 613,675
Licences 732 3,660
Stamps 23,947 119,735
Post-Office 24,072 120,360
Telegraph 5,364 26,820
Tax on Stock [3]

Court Fees 8,284 41,420
Tax in lieu of Education Fees 11,243 56,215
Fines, etc. 4,412 22,060
Jamaica Railway 208 1,040
Reimbursements 35,969 179,845
Miscellaneous 13,992 69,960
Revenues now appropriated 181,663 908,315
Interest on Sinking Funds 14,199 70,995
Savings Bank 3,927 19,635
Total 773,527 3,867,635

Immigration Revenue.

Capitation Tax, etc., Laws 7 of 1878 and 14 of 1891, 1,476 7,380
Miscellaneous 205 1,025
Total 1,681 8,405

Appropriated Revenue.

Poor Rates 39,339 196,695
Kingston Streets 4,354 21,770
Market Dues
Pounds

Main Road Revenue, Law 17 of 1890 28,091 140,455
Parochial Roads 45,538 227,690
Sanitary 7,862 39,310
Fire Rates, Kingston 1,561 7,805
Trade, Metal, Hawker, and Gunpowder Licences,
Surplus Fund[4] 13,271 66,355
Gas Rates, etc. 3,793 18,965
Parochial General Purposes 4,503 22,515
Agricultural Produce Licences Law, 37 of 1896 3,685 18,425
Miscellaneous 8,544 42,720
Advances from General Revenue in aid of Funds 21,122 105,610
Total 181,663 908,315

Customs, excise, and appropriated revenue, as will be seen above, are
the principal sources of income, while the expenditures for the same period
are divided under the following heads:
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF EXPENDITURE OF JAMAICA, 1896-97
Expenditure Pounds. Dollars.
Charges of Debt 82,417 412,085
Governor and Staff 7,368 36,840
Privy Council 62 310
Legislative Council 2,469 12,345
Colonial Secretariat 5,612 28,060
Director of Public Works 17,979 89,895
Audit Office 3,629 18,145
Treasury 4,634 23,170
Savings Bank 3,275 16,375
Stamp Office 1,106 5,530
Post-Office and Telegraphs 35,910 179,550
Revenue Departments 39,969 199,845
Judicial 45,611 228,055
Ecclesiastical 2,927 14,635
Medical 59,307 296,535
Police 60,889 304,445
Prisons and Reformatories 27,836 139,180
Education 67,540 337,700
Harbour-Masters and Harbours and Pilotage 2,741 13,705
Colonial Allowances and Military Expenditure 12,814 64,070
Miscellaneous 29,571 147,855
Census

Steam Communication 1,800 9,000
Stationery and Printing 7,989 39,945
Library and Museum 2,404 12,020
Plantations and Gardens 6,484 32,420
Railway[5]
Main Roads and Buildings 80,467 402,335
Pensions, etc 16,962 84,810
Purposes now supplied by Appropriated Revenue 135,842 679,210
Total Expenditure from Income 765,607 3,828,035
Sinking-Funds, etc 14,199 70,995
Total Payments from Income 779,806 3,899,030
Less Debt Payments as above 14,199 70,995
765,607 3,828,035
Add Expenditures from Moneys raised by Loans 8,125 40,625
Total 773,732 3,868,660
Immigration 979 4,895

A glance at the above tables and then a glance at the budget of Cuba,
which will be found in a subsequent chapter, is all that is necessary to show
the vast difference between the British and the Spanish methods of dealing
with the fiscal interests of their colonies. The business-like methods of the
one, and the blind, slip-shod methods of the other, are in sharp contrast. In
dealing with Cuba, it may be difficult to follow entirely these English
methods of accounting at once. The sooner, however, the United States
inaugurates its own clear methods of national bookkeeping and official
accountability, the quicker the people of Cuba will appreciate sound
business principles in the conduct of their own affairs. It makes no
difference whether Cuba is annexed to the United States or established as an
independent government; these lessons must be learned in either event, or
the Island will come to grief. It is hardly necessary to do more than call
attention to the principal items of expenditure.
First of all come roads. England has discovered that good roads are not
only an important factor in mountainous countries in keeping order, but also
the basis of industrial development and prosperity. In the budget given
above the following items must be added together in order to ascertain the
amount expended in 1897 for roads:
Main Roads and Buildings $ 402,335
Parochial Roads 227,690

$ 630,025

Here may be found a good illustration of England’s policy which is a
great contrast to the policy of Spain in Cuba. No money has been spent on
the roads of Cuba, all of which are in a deplorable condition. Attention
should at once be given to this important question and a liberal sum out of
both local and general revenues of the Island set apart for this purpose. The
debt of Jamaica is not excessive; it is in the neighbourhood of $10,000,000,
with an annual charge of about $400,000. Police and medical charges are
about the same, averaging about $300,000 each, or in all $600,000.
In this connection attention is called to the annual expenditure on roads
in Jamaica for fourteen years:
EXPENDITURE FOR MAIN AND PAROCHIAL ROADS IN
JAMAICA, FROM 1883-84 TO 1896-97, INCLUSIVE
Appropriated
Expenditure
revenue for
Year. for Main Roads Total.
Parochial
and Buildings.
Roads.
Pounds sterling. Pounds sterling. Pounds sterling. Dollars.
1883-84 39,514 48,156 87,670 438,350
1884-85 40,496 47,614 88,110 440,550
1885-86 38,246 52,285 90,531 452,655
1886-87 39,670 48,080 87,750 438,750
1887-88 42,935 52,318 95,253 476,265
1888-89 42,146 57,632 99,778 498,890
1889-90 [6] 20,740 32,210 52,950 264,750
1890-91 50,317 91,659 141,976 709,880
1891-92 44,845 91,659 136,504 682,520
1892-93 48,520 83,718 132,238 661,190
1893-94 50,169 58,460 108,629 543,145
1894-95 47,111 65,647 112,758 563,790
1895-96 48,398 68,654 117,052 585,260
1896-97 45,538 80,467 126,005 630,025
Total for 14 years 1,477,204 7,386,020
Average per year 527,573

The necessity of liberal expenditure for maintaining the health of the
community is of first importance. A study of this budget may be found a
preparation for the subsequent study of the Cuban budget, to which the
reader’s attention will be invited presently.

The present Jamaica tariff was evidently framed with the two ideas of
revenue for the island and a market for British goods. Food products, for
example, such as bacon, beef, beans, bread, butter, cheese, corn, meats,
oats, oil, pork, rice, salt, sausages, wheat, sugar, tea, coffee, and many other
staple articles are all on the dutiable list, some paying a fairly stiff rate of
duty. On the other hand, many articles of merchandise, bricks, bridges, carts
and waggons, clocks, diamonds, machinery, locomotives, and a host of
other things, which England supplies the island, are all exempted from duty.
Under a general ad valorem clause, 12½ per cent. is collected on all articles
not enumerated. The enumerated list of the Jamaica tariff is not large, so a
large amount of merchandise has been actually imported under this clause.
The proposed new tariff, which will probably go into effect next year, takes
many articles off the free list and puts them on the dutiable list. It also
increases the ad valorem rate to 16-2/3 per cent. This has been found
necessary because there has been a deficit in the revenue. The new tariff is
expected to yield £400,000, or about $2,000,000, and from internal revenue
or excise £150,000, or $750,000, and £250,000, or $1,250,000, from
appropriated revenue which will really come from the land and
householders. Here it is summarised:
$
Revenue from Customs
2,000,000
“ “ Excise 750,000
“ “ Appropriated Revenue (land and household
1,250,000
taxes, etc.)
$
4,000,000
If this amount can be secured, the revenue of Jamaica will be a trifle
more than expenditure, and the result will be happiness. If not, expenses
must be reduced. Some members of the Legislative Council favour this
latter plan. The Commission has the whole fiscal question now in hand, and
within a short time will probably reach conclusions.
There is much more of interest that might be said about the present
economic condition of Jamaica, but the points herein brought out appear to
be the only ones that bear especially on the problem continually facing the
reader in a volume dealing with the industrial and commercial

reconstruction of Cuba. It will also be interesting to compare the British
method of colonial administration with the idea set forth in the previous
chapter by the Marquis de Apezteguia, whose point of view in such matters
is wholly Spanish. That is, the idea of possession is paramount. The
Marquis evidently has no faith in the ability of the United States to
administer the affairs of Cuba as a trust.

CHAPTER V

THE AMERICANS IN SANTIAGO

A VISIT to Santiago should give relief to those suffering from “the
craven fear of being great,” for there may be found much that is
encouraging. In this province of Cuba may be seen in full operation the
work which the Government of the United States has been impelled to
undertake, and here may be studied the character of the forces upon which
the people of the United States must rely in the work of reconstruction now
in progress. The machinery of government is running with a fair degree of
smoothness, and the men responsible for it, from the humblest official to the
capable commander of the province, understand their business and are
masters of the situation. It is a striking illustration of the marvellous
adaptability of the American character. Every department of the public
service is carrying on its work; the only difference apparent to one so
recently in parts of Cuba still in possession of Spain being the absence of
Spanish soldiers and the more businesslike methods of the officials. The
disagreeable smells of the typical Cuban city are less pronounced in
Santiago, and whitewash, limewash, fresh paint, and all sorts of
disinfectants have deodorised the surrounding atmosphere and made the old
town really habitable. The streets are no longer used as sewers, and the
unhappy person who violates the law and escapes the lash of the Sanitary
Commissioner’s whip is compelled to work on the streets for thirty days.
This official, Major George M. Barbour, with one hundred and twenty-five
men, dressed in spotless white, and thirty-two good United States mule-
teams and carts, having dug out from the streets of Santiago the filth of
ages, is now able to keep them absolutely clean. Every day by the aid of
that great disinfectant, petroleum, the garbage of the city is burned. The
work of sanitation is not confined to the streets, but extends to the dwelling-
houses, shops, and buildings of all kinds. Indeed, the campaign against dirt
and disease has been as sharp and hot as the charge of San Juan Hill, and as
productive of beneficial results. The resistance on the part of the native
population was even more stubborn than that of the Spanish soldiers to our
forces around Santiago. The doors of houses had to be smashed in; people

making sewers of the thoroughfares were publicly horsewhipped in the
streets of Santiago; eminently respectable citizens were forcibly brought
before the commanding general and sentenced to aid in cleaning the streets
they were in the habit of defiling. The campaign has ended in the complete
surrender to the sanitary authorities, and the inhabitants of Santiago,
regardless of class, have had their first object-lesson in the new order of
things inaugurated by the war. Looking backward five months and picturing
Santiago in July, and comparing it with the more hopeful condition existing
on all sides at the present moment, it is easy to discern the omens which
point to the coming prosperity of the whole Island under intelligent and
honest government.
Besides the improved sanitary conditions, there are many other
indications of the good work of Major-General Leonard Wood and his
capable corps of assistants. Several important thoroughfares have been
repaved. All the public buildings have been thoroughly cleaned and put in
good order, the work even extending to the large opera house, which is now
ready for the opening performance under American auspices; for General
Wood believes in furnishing decent amusements for the soldiers of his
command. The law courts abolished when General Shafter took the city
have been re-organised, and it was the privilege of the author to take part in
the brief, simple ceremonies on December 1st, when in a modest speech the
American commander turned over the legal business of the province to the
judiciary and inaugurated the Supreme Court. This Court was composed of
carefully selected Cuban judges, the appointees nominated wholly on
account of legal attainments; the Bar Association of the province having
been consulted as to the character and qualifications of the new judges. As
the occasion of turning over the judiciary of the province to the people was
one of considerable moment, a brief description may not be out of place. A
committee selected by the Court called at the palace on the morning of
December 1st, and after being presented to General Wood, escorted him to
the Supreme Court Building. The room in which the Supreme Court of
Santiago holds its sessions is one story up a rather rickety-looking stairway.
It looks more like a long, narrow store than a court-room. At the far end is
the bench where the Court sits. It was draped with scarlet cloth and the
chairs are of dark oak. The courtroom was filled by interested spectators.
General Wood appeared in a fatigue uniform, taking a position in the centre
of the group of jurists, under the canopy over the seat of the Chief-Justice,

and in a businesslike manner proceeded to state the object of the gathering.
He told those assembled they had met for the purpose of starting up the
judicial machinery of the province. While the military authorities still
retained the power to revise all cases involving life and death, there was no
disposition to interfere with civil matters. Innumerable cases had been
piling up during the five months of military occupation, and it was time
they were adjusted. He hoped the gentlemen appointed to this, the highest
Court in the province, would prove equal to the trust.
“Your enemies who say the Cubans cannot govern themselves,” said General Wood, turning
toward the Court, “will watch you critically, and your friends hopefully. Above and beyond all, be
honest in your decisions, for absolute integrity must ever be the foundation of a fair and impartial
judiciary. I pray you do not follow the example of those who have made the courts of Cuba a byword
for corruption. With sincere hope for your success in dealing with these matters, and with assurance
of all the assistance in my power, I hereby reinstate the Judiciary of the Province of Santiago de
Cuba.”

Then the Chief-Justice, a man of fifty-five or sixty, attired in a rich black
silk gown, with handsome white lace cuffs, arose, and in a few graceful
words accepted the responsibility in the spirit in which it was tendered, and
assuring General Wood of his fealty to the United States Government
during the military occupancy, made a profound bow, and the ceremony
was over. Two members of the Court then escorted General Wood and the
author, who was invited to represent the civil authorities of the United
States, to the top of the staircase, and with a cordial adieu the Military went
out and the Judiciary came in and was reinstated. In a few moments the
Court was in session.
“Let me walk back,” said General Wood, and the waiting carriage was
dismissed.
Passing the city jail, General Wood exclaimed to the author, “Take a look
at the jail, and see the good work we are doing there.” There were no
prisoners, and it was evident the building was being renovated for some
new and more inspiring purpose. There is no more practical man in the
military service of the United States to-day than Major-General Leonard
Wood. He is just the man to build up the city and the province of Santiago.
Not only has the judiciary been reinstated, but also, in the same manner,
local government has been restored, and native mayors and officials have
been appointed; the only requirement being that persons accepting such
offices shall take the oath recognising the military occupancy of the Island

by the United States. They are in no way committed to any future form of
government. The wisdom of this action cannot be doubted, and the moral
effect upon the people of Cuba will be far-reaching.[7]
In constant meetings between General Wood and the author, during the
former’s recent brief visit to the United States, he informed me that all
arrangements have been completed for the spring elections of Santiago.
Thus the next movement is towards a system of local self-government
which the Cubans heretofore have never enjoyed.
The Spanish, when in possession of Cuba, assumed absolute control not
only of the judiciary, but also of the municipal government, the larger
portion of the taxes raised for municipal purposes being diverted, with the
other revenues, into channels which either led to Spain or into Spanish
pockets. It will be even a greater stroke of wisdom if these taxes are
hereafter used exclusively for local purposes, and, as far as may be deemed
practicable, collected and disbursed by properly constituted local
authorities.

CATHEDRAL STREET, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY J. F. COONLEY, NASSAU, N. P.

There could be no wiser expenditure of local revenue for several years
than upon the streets and sewers of the cities and towns of Cuba. For years
the money which should have been used for these purposes has been
drained away to Spain, and all local improvements shamefully neglected.
The rural districts of Santiago de Cuba have been so depleted that it will be
impossible to collect taxes over and above those needed for the bare
necessities of schools, for the poor, and possibly, in small sums, for the
improvement of sanitary conditions. The dawn of prosperity should,
however, be the signal for inaugurating systematic work on the country
roads. The province of Santiago de Cuba is similar in geographical and
geological structure to the island of Jamaica, where, as is shown elsewhere
in this volume, the good main and parochial roads have been the principal
stay of the population. In another chapter will be found a brief history of the
nearly two thousand miles of good roads in Jamaica, together with an
account of the expenditure thereon and cost of keeping them in repair. The
British Administration spends on an average annually for roads in Jamaica
about $500,000. Without underestimating the strategical importance of a
central railway from east to west in Cuba the immediate returns to the
population from good roads would be far in excess of the more pretentious
enterprise. The money thus expended, whether from the general funds of
the Island, or from the local budgets, would come back a hundredfold, and
make Santiago one of the richest sugar-, coffee-, and fruit-growing districts
of the West Indies.
Santiago Province should be a profitable producing country for bananas.
It is good for the poorer classes to undertake the cultivation of this fruit.
The banana takes only fourteen months to grow and therefore, unlike coffee
and oranges, the cultivator does not have to wait several years for the crop.
All the capital in this business can be turned quickly, and the banana can be
planted near the hut of the small planter and attended easily. Banes, Sigua,
and Baracoa are good ports to export them from. The Dumois family
invested considerably in the business and used to ship to the United States.
This business is soon to be revived on a much larger scale. The extension of
good roads would largely increase the possibilities of this industry in many
parts of Santiago Province. With quick transportation the market for
bananas is rapidly extending to Europe, while the United States market is
only partially supplied with this fruit and with oranges.

The internal, industrial, professional, licensing, and other miscellaneous
taxes have so far been remitted in this part of Cuba, but the military
authorities are now preparing to enforce them. In this connection the author
suggests that, now the customs tariff has been disposed of,[8] an immediate
scheme be prepared for levying and collecting internal revenue taxes for the
entire Island. The question of separating these taxes from purely municipal
taxes should also be considered at the earliest possible moment, in order
that no revenue shall be lost.
Methods of local administration differ so greatly in different provinces in
Cuba that the wisdom of appointing a governor or commander for each
province is unquestioned. As much latitude as possible should be given to
these officials. The provincial governors should have power to decide all
questions appertaining to local matters, for the fewer the references to
Havana the sooner the people of Cuba will realise the difference between
Spanish possession and United States occupancy. For military purposes, the
government of the Island may be easily vested in one central authority at
Havana. For civil purposes, each province should be made as absolutely
independent as is possible, with general supervision by the commander of
the United States forces. The secret of General Wood’s success in Santiago
is entirely due to the fact that he has good judgment, the courage to use it,
and full power in Santiago Province to exercise both. The supervising
power over the civil department-commander should be made, as far as
possible, advisory on such matters as relate to the general welfare of all the
people of the Island, but all department questions should be scrupulously
relegated to the provincial governors. There will of course have to be some
general scheme inaugurated as to the collection and the expenditure of the
general revenue, but before this can be intelligently arranged it will be
necessary to designate what revenue shall be considered local, what, if any,
for the exclusive use of the department, and what may fairly be regarded as
revenue applicable for the general purpose of the whole Island. In thus
distributing the revenue, the greatest care should be exercised not to hamper
the provincial governor by an arbitrary division of the purposes for which
the money must be expended, until he has been given ample opportunity to
ascertain the needs of his department. A country undergoing such changes
as Cuba is, cannot be judged by ordinary circumstances, and the most
successful results will certainly be obtained by giving the generals in
command of the several provinces the rein, and with the excellent example

of the commander of Santiago before them tell them to go and do likewise.
Apportionments and divisions of revenue will come later. The present
emergency demands large sums for sanitary purposes, for cleaning up cities,
for fighting disease, for renovating public buildings, for maintaining order,
and for establishing a decent, efficient administration of public affairs.
These operations must be done quickly and be planned chiefly by the
judgment of the man on the spot, acquainted with local conditions. The
results of a free hand are plainly visible in Santiago. The same policy must
be followed elsewhere, or summer will bring dangers from which the
unacclimatised population may well seek to escape.
As this is being written, the first difficulty has arisen at Santiago in
relation to the distribution of the customs revenue. The order of General
Brooke to send the customs receipts to Havana has met with opposition.
This is a natural result of the peculiar conditions existing there, and no one
can be blamed for it. For nearly five months no municipal, internal, or local
taxes have been collected; and with the exception of about ten thousand
dollars collected by Mr. Donaldson as cemetery and meat taxes, the entire
revenue of Santiago Province was derived from customs dues. This money
has been expended, as above shown, by General Wood in cleaning up the
city, in making new streets, in renovating public buildings, in fighting
disease, and in many other ways, all with a view of benefiting the
community. All this and much more was justifiable in the emergency with
which he was confronted. Meanwhile the machinery for collecting local and
other public dues was, for various reasons, not put in motion until a few
weeks ago. The taxes from these sources rightfully belong to the
municipality, and hereafter will be expended thereon. The Spanish
authorities collected all the taxes, local and general, returning of the local
taxes but a small percentage to the municipalities. There is no intention on
the part of the military authorities of the United States in Cuba to use these
local taxes for other than local purposes, but it stands to reason that the
customs taxes must be collected by one central authority, equalised and
expended for the general welfare of the whole community. The ports of
Santiago Province, being practically the only ports in possession of the
United States, naturally used all moneys collected. January 1, 1899, all
other Cuban ports came into possession of the United States, and Santiago
becomes again part of the Island of Cuba, and as such is entitled to equal,
but not special consideration.

The people of Santiago have had over one hundred thousand dollars of
local taxes remitted, in consequence of the delay in getting the tax-levying
and tax-collecting machinery at work. This has been saved to the
community. All these taxes, being local, would have probably been spent on
local works or would at this time have been available for such purposes. It
is not the intention of the Government to have these sent to Havana, nor
does the order include them. New York might as well demand that she be
allowed to keep all the customs dues collected at that port, or, more to the
point, Havana. Over sixty per cent. of all Cuba’s customs dues are collected
at Havana, but Havana will have to pool her receipts, just as New York
does, and take back such portion as appropriations for public works as may
hereafter be decided to be rightfully her share. There is really no need for
the people of Santiago to get excited over the order, which is reasonable,
just, and in the line of fair government. On the contrary, the people should
rejoice to think they have had so much of the money expended in improving
the city, and that for several months they have practically been relieved of
local taxes.
The Custom-House at Santiago the author found to be under very
capable management. Mr. Walter A. Donaldson, who has had charge of the
office, has performed the rather difficult initiatory duties devolving upon
him with enthusiasm and ability. His knowledge of Spanish and his long
training in the customs service of the United States have enabled him to
recast the old Spanish methods and inaugurate the more businesslike
methods of our own custom-house without much friction; and as a result we
find to-day a complete organisation at Santiago, with branches at all the
other ports in the province, working efficiently and collecting the revenue.
While Mr. Donaldson has been able to dispense with about twenty of the
seventy employees, he has retained fifty of the Cuban and Spanish already
in the service, and with five United States officers is able to collect the
revenues expeditiously and administer the affairs of the port with general
satisfaction to the merchants and shippers of Santiago.
Mr. Donaldson estimated, that at the end of December, the total custom-
house receipts in his entire district would aggregate in the neighbourhood of
four hundred thousand dollars. It is safe to say that the collections in this
port for the twelve months under American administration will be twice the
amount collected during the last twelve months of Spanish control. As the
rates of the tariff have been reduced two-thirds this fact would seem to be a

good sign alike for the interest of American administration and the
possibilities of a low tariff for producing sufficient revenue. As is stated
elsewhere in this volume, the hope of sufficient revenue to manage the
affairs of the Island is largely—under greatly reduced taxation—based upon
honest and efficient collections. If it were otherwise, the natural
consequence of reducing the rates of duty by two-thirds (a measure which
the President of the United States has authorised) in a tariff capable of
producing a revenue of fifteen million dollars per annum, would mean a
revenue of five million dollars per annum. To accomplish this feat and still
have fifteen or even ten millions of revenue the future management of the
custom-houses in Cuba must be more businesslike and more honest. The
industrial importance of Santiago will be treated in the chapter on Mines
and Mining, the idea of this chapter being to give a glimpse of some of the
changes in this old city already brought about by American military
occupancy.

CHAPTER VI

OUTLOOK IN CUBA FOR LABOUR

T HAT the wounds of Cuba will soon heal with the rapid promotion of
work, is undoubtedly true. This is the struggle the United States is now
entering upon, and the employment of the people should be the first aim
of those responsible for the management of affairs. There will naturally be
many disappointments, some disillusioning. The condition of labour in the
Island requires the most serious attention of our Government. A brief
history of it during the present century may elucidate the existing situation.
In 1815, after the Napoleonic wars, the principal nations of Europe came
together and agreed upon the Treaty of Vienna. An important provision of
this Treaty was that henceforth slavery should be abolished. Spain, in
common with other nations, signed this agreement, but, as is her habit, kept
it not. The horrors of slavery were continued in her colonies, and in the
middle of the present century almost reached the depths of inhumanity. At
this time the population of Cuba was nearly a million people, and the traffic
in human flesh and blood was a prosperous and profitable business. How
long it would have continued is impossible to say, had not England
interfered. After painful delays, much threatening, and innumerable broken
promises on the part of Spain to observe the Treaty of Vienna, England
agreed to give that country two millions of dollars to compensate those who
owned “slave factories” in Havana, provided the nefarious business was
stopped. Spain simply pocketed the money, told her noble sons engaged in
the slave business in Cuba to look out for British cruisers when bringing
slaves, assured them that no harm beyond the loss of cargo should come to
them if caught—and the plantations of Cuba continued to be supplied as
usual with slaves. Interesting facts in relation to conditions in Cuba during
this period, when British cruisers kept watch of Spanish slave-ships, have
been recently given in a series of articles in the Century Magazine, written
in 1859.
According to this chronicle, the Spaniards in Cuba were in open
sympathy with the slave-dealers, and a story is told of a slaver chased by a

cruiser into the harbour of Havana, the shores being lined with people
cheering the slaver. The cruiser would have effected a capture, but the
slaver, dodging into a corner of the harbour, came to anchor, and her
officers told the slaves on board to jump overboard and swim ashore, as the
British were cannibals and would eat them all if captured. The slaves
escaped to the shore, where the Spaniards picked them up and laughed at
the British and the trick.
The same writer notes that by law the British must sell captured slaves
by a mixed commission at fifty dollars each for a seven years’ term of
labour. These slaves were known as emancipados and each wore a tin tag
on his neck, showing the date of his sale and the date of the expiration of
his slave service; but emancipados, strangely, seldom reached the end of
their terms; the Spaniards prevented that, by taking the tag from an
emancipado whenever one of their slaves died and putting it on the corpse.
This was sufficient evidence that the emancipado was dead, and the Spanish
owner had a new slave. As for the general condition of the emancipado, it
was much worse than that of the real slave, for his master, knowing he must
soon lose him, treated him cruelly, by overwork and starving, and when at
last the poor emancipado had his freedom, he had neither strength nor
health to enjoy it.
A Cuban gentleman, now over threescore years and ten, told the author,
in Cuba, that nothing in ancient or modern history exceeded in horror the
slave-trade of Cuba during this period. In spite of England’s watchfulness, it
could be made profitable, even if occasional mishaps sent a shipful of
unhappy Africans, chained together below decks, to the bottom of the sea,
or a catastrophe set fire to the load of writhing humanity, fettered to prevent
escape. Naturally a large percentage died on the voyage, and the condition
of those landed was so awful that a description would be impossible in
these pages. It will suffice to say that upon one occasion a young Cuban,
who had been sent down by his employer to land some of these unfortunate
creatures, was so impressed by the awful spectacle that he shot himself
through the brain with a revolver and died on the spot.
So long as this traffic continued, and the plantations of the Island were
supplied by the unhappy African victims of man’s inhumanity to man, there
was no labour trouble in Cuba. Under such conditions sugar-growing was a
comparatively simple process, and those engaged in it became wealthy. The
day of reckoning, however, was at hand. After repeated disappointments,

England succeeded in absolutely stopping further importations of slaves
into Cuba. Up to the time of the breaking out of the insurrection of 1868,
black labour had been almost exclusively used on the sugar estates of Cuba.
Bad as slavery is at the best, there was in Cuba probably the worst system
ever known. The work was of the hardest, the climatic conditions severe,
and the unhappy victims of cupidity were ill-treated and brutalised. With
such a beginning, continuing in one form and another until 1885, how could
such conditions produce aught but dissatisfaction and misery at the present
time?
The same causes demoralised the Cubans. They were reared in luxury
and idleness and looked upon work as fit only for slaves. The owners of
plantations were rich men, their children were educated abroad, and, as a
rule, spent most of their time in foreign travel. A large proportion of them
were simply alien landlords. Unskilled in business, when the change took
place and the slaves were freed, these people were not prepared to meet the
new conditions which confronted them and to adjust themselves to a new
form of life. Here the Spaniard, who is always anxious for gain, took
advantage of the situation, and at the end of the rebellion of 1868-1878 the
Cuban planters, who were formerly rich, found themselves impoverished.
Their slave labour had been taken from them, their opportunities for further
employment of contract coolies had been lost, and they found themselves in
need of outside assistance. The Spaniards and some others responded by
advancing money to them at the current rate of interest (twelve per cent.),
but the planters, unaccustomed to economise, could not pay expenses and
interest, and year by year their debts grew heavier. Some managed to
continue operations, but many broke down under their burdens and their
plantations went to satisfy their creditors, chiefly Spaniards. Short of
labour, the crops declined; and to add to their troubles, beet-sugar made its
advent. The European beet-growers, with a clear knowledge of conditions
in the Island, were quick to take advantage of them and push their product
forward to supply the Cuban cane-sugar deficit, and so successful were they
that at the end of the insurrection of 1868, say in 1878, Cuba was
practically bankrupt. Competition with the European beet-growers was
difficult, and it was impossible to induce capital from the United States to
restore the sugar industry of Cuba, owing to a lack of confidence in the
stability of the government of the Island.

CANE CUTTERS.

During the ten years of rebellion, the planters were able to protect their
property by paying regular taxes to the Spanish Government, and at the
same time allowing a certain amount to the insurgents, who agreed for this
not to destroy the plantations. During this period they employed slave and
coolie labour; but they were then subject to the Moret law, which was, in
effect, that each planter should liberate a certain number of his slaves each
year, and this was to continue until slavery had disappeared. Before this
occurred, however, the treaty of Zanjon was made, whereby all slaves were
liberated. By the Moret law, numbers were given to the slaves by the
municipality, the name and number of the slave written on a slip, which was
put in a box and each year ten per cent. of the names were drawn out. The
owners were then officially notified that certain slaves, giving their
numbers, were free, and this was published in a local paper. Most of these
slaves remained with the planters. This law had a very good effect.
Returning for a moment to the outbreak of the rebellion of 1868, it is
necessary to refer to another sad page in the history of labour in Cuba;
namely, the introduction of coolie labour from China. In 1869 the
importation of slaves into Cuba was stopped, and then commenced the
traffic in coolies, who were shipped from China, cargoes of them being
landed at Havana. They were brought over under a contract for eight years

by a company in Havana which had its own line of steamers. The contracts
were sold to anyone who wished to buy them, at from four hundred to five
hundred dollars per contract. The conditions of a contract were that the
Chinaman was to serve for eight years. He was to be paid at the rate of four
dollars per month, with rations, and was to receive two suits of clothes and
a blanket. If ill for fifteen days, his wages were to be deducted and his time
lost.
One of the conditions of the contract was that at the end of eight years he
was to be considered a citizen of Cuba with such privileges as were
extended to Spanish subjects. Before the expiration of the eight years,
however, those holding these Chinese contracts were notified by the
Spanish authorities that at the expiration of the contract of any coolie in
their employ they were to deliver said coolie to the authorities of the
locality where they were at work. Here, the authorities placed the coolie on
public land, obliging him to work for the municipality, and held him there
until someone offered to take him under a new contract. This was entirely
by force and not optional on the part of the coolie. The conditions of the
new contract were for four years more at seventeen dollars per month,
twelve dollars of which were to be retained by the municipality, and five
dollars were to be given to the coolie. At the expiration of the four years, if
the coolie’s conduct had been satisfactory to his employer, then the
municipality was to return to the Chinaman the money it had retained. The
treatment of these coolies was quite as severe as was ever meted out to an
African, and when this condition of affairs was learned by the Chinese
Government, a commission was sent to Cuba to investigate. A report was
made to the Chinese Government, which resulted in the prohibition of
further coolie emigration from China to Cuba.
Confronted by the loss of his slaves and by the prohibition of further
contracts for coolie labour, the Cuban was at a loss whither to turn for help.
His only hope lay with the Spanish peasants and the Canary Islanders, and
these, in as large numbers as could be secured, were imported. They were
much more valuable than the slaves or the coolies, but jealousies arose
among the Cuban labourers, and the newcomers, being less numerous, were
unable to protect themselves and in many instances were forced into the
towns for protection, thus leaving the planters quite as short of labour as
before, and at the same time increasing the complications of the labour
problem.

In this condition we find Cuba to-day. The great problem will be how to
obtain labour for the plantations, for the mines, and for agricultural
purposes, in order to carry on the work of industrial reconstruction. All sorts
of schemes have been suggested, but upon examination of the conditions in
Cuba, it is feared they will prove impracticable. The life of the labourer, in
consequence of the lack of diversified employment, and the fact that labour
in Cuba is the severest kind of toil, has few attractions. If the Spanish
soldiers are willing to remain and take up peaceful pursuits, it will aid in the
solution of the problem. Possibly Italians may be induced to emigrate to
Cuba, if assured of a stable government and plenty of work. The
opportunity (small allotments and homes) is limited, and the drudgery on
large plantations, without family life, is not likely to attract those from
Europe who are ever eager to seek homes and broader opportunities in the
United States.
When in Cuba, the author visited many plantations and talked with many
planters and overseers on the labour question. The extracts from notes taken
on the spot will be found instructive on this point. The following excellent
explanatory account of farm labour was prepared by an American who has
spent the best part of his life on Cuban plantations and is now working a
prosperous colona, or cane farm:

“From the 1st of December to the 1st of June an average of about 350
people were employed; of these ten per cent. were Canary Islanders or
Spaniards, ten per cent. negro women and boys (white women do no field
work), twenty per cent. native whites, and about sixty per cent. negroes and
mulattos. From the 1st of June to the 1st of December an average of about
150 were employed. Women do no field work during this period.
“During harvest I give the negro women preference and pay them the
same salaries as the best male labour; they are more constant, their work is
usually well done, and each one keeps her man straight, which is an
appreciable item.
“Next I prefer the negro, because he is, as a rule, a more faithful worker
than either the native white or mulatto, the most of whom are addicted to
gambling, and they cannot be depended on from one day to another.
“For stowing cane on the cars, ploughing, ditching, road repairing, and
railroad work, Canary Islanders and Spaniards are preferable; they are more

used to this kind of work, more constant, and have fewer vices.
“For cane cutting, carting, planting, and cultivating, native labour, in
particular negro labour, is preferable; because the natives, being experts,
work more rapidly, the cane plant suffers less injury, bringing in more
remunerative returns, and its life is prolonged, which is a big item to the
farmer; the natives are also much less addicted to smoking in the field, and
danger from this source is materially reduced. But as a rule they are
dishonest, and untruthful in the extreme, and this is general and applies both
to whites and blacks, the latter being the champions. Canary Islanders and
Spaniards are cigarette smokers and they are dangerous in the cane fields.
“At the present time labour is very poor and very much demoralised.
Many of the abler men are in the insurrection, a great number of those
remaining have seen mothers, wives, and children dying a lingering death
from hunger; some could obtain work for their food, while others earned a
salary of from six to eight dollars per month in depreciated Spanish silver.
Provisions were high, and the Government increased taxes on meats and
other necessaries, until these poor ignorant people, bent down by great
sorrow and seeing no help for themselves, gave up in despair and became
indifferent.
“During the past crop, as well as at the present time, I employ a
considerable number of Asiatics, but many of these are opium smokers and
much debilitated, and we calculate on sixty per cent. only being at work,
while forty per cent. are resting in their barracon.[9]
SALARIES
“The average salaries paid by this colona during normal times, that is, previous to the insurrection,
were about as follows:
ALL THE YEAR
Administration per month, $166.66 gold, and maintenance.
Servant “ “ 30.00 “ “ “
Overseer “ “ 85.00 “ “ “
Second overseer “ “ 35.00 “ “ “
Steward and bookkeeper “ “ 50.00 “ “ “
Assistant “ “ 25.00 “ “ “
Carpenter “ “ 35.00 “ “ “
Montero “ “ 25.00 “ “ “
Assistant “ “ 20.00 “ “ “
Hostler “ “ 20.00 “ “ “
Assistant “ “ 15.00 “ “ “
Pumping water “ “ 6.00 “ “ “

Cook “ “ 30.00 “ “ “
Assistant “ “ 25.00 “ “ “
Night watchman “ “ 20.00 “ “ “
Mounted field-guard “ “ 30.00 “ “ “
“ “ “ “ “ 25.00 “ “ “
DURING CROP TIME
Mounted field guard per month, $25.00 gold, and maintenance.
“ “ “ “ “ 25.00 “ “ “
Time-keeper “ “ 20.00 “ “ “
Waiter for operatives’ table “ “ 15.00 “ “ “
Vegetable gardener “ “ 20.00 “ “ “
Bueyero “ “ 22.00 “ “ “
Assistant “ “ 16.00 “ “ “
“ “ “ 12.00 “ “ “
Foreman with cartmen “ “ 30.00 “ “ “
Assistant “ “ 23.00 “ “ “
Foreman with stevedores “ “ 28.00 “ “ “
Cartmen “ “ 23.00 “ “ “
Ploughmen “ “ 23.00 “ “ “
Cane cutters “ “ 21.00 “ “ “
Cane lifters “ “ 15.00 “ “ “
Cane loaders (stevedores) “ “ 21.00 “ “ “

“During the summer months wages for field labour averaged about $17
per month. Cost for maintaining labour averaged about $7.50 per month in
gold; cost for maintaining overseers, foremen, carpenters, cooks, stewards,
guards, etc., amounted to about $12 per month.
“Rations for each man per day were as follows:
“Clear beef, one pound, or its equivalent in tasajo or salt fish.
“Rice, one pound, or its equivalent in beans, peas, macaroni, etc.
“Lard, two ounces.
“Coffee, one ounce.
“Sugar, two ounces.
“Bread, six ounces, or instead of bread, sweet potatoes, plantains, or
melanga.
“Sweet-oil, bacon, salt, and spices sufficient to season the food.
“During the winter months, cabbage, tomatoes, and turnips are served
every day without regard to rations.
RULES AND REGULATIONS

“When a labourer enters his name on the pay-roll he receives his
machete or hoe, tin plate, tin dipper, and spoon, the same being charged to
him and credited when returned.
“Time-keeper makes his rounds twice every day.
“Away from the batey[10] smoking is absolutely prohibited, and the
penalty is immediate dimissal.
“Salaries are paid any day between 11 A.M. and 1 P.M., Sundays excepted,
to those who desire the money.
“Except in case of sickness, meals are charged to those who are not at
work.
“To the sick such medicines as we have are given free; the most
prominent of these is quinine.
“If a man remains in the barracon sick for more than two days he is sent
to his home, or to a hospital. If it is an injury received in the service of the
colona, he is cared for until able to work again.
“The bell tolls at 4 A.M. for the people to get up; at break of day, after
having drunk a cup of coffee, they go to the field; at 11 o’clock they return
to breakfast; at 1 o’clock they again go to the field; at 6 o’clock they come
in to dinner, and at 8 o’clock the bell sounds silence, after which absolute
quiet is enforced. The negro is fond of his music and dancing, and this is
permitted at seasonable hours, and sometimes the overseer gives special
permission to prolong their amusements beyond the usual hour.
“Gambling is prohibited, but the rule cannot be successfully enforced.
“In the dry season (at mid-day) when the people are in the batey,
sentinels are stationed on the hills to give timely warning of cane fires.
“Armed guards patrol the fields by day, and guard the cattle at night—
this applies to times of peace.
ADVANTAGES OF LARGE COLONAS OVER SMALL ONES
“During my experience in this vicinity I have never known a single
instance where a small colona prospered or was able to extricate itself from
debt, and this condition is owing to various causes. A colona employing
from three hundred to four hundred men can be carried on more
economically than one employing from one hundred to two hundred men.
The high-salaried men in the one are very nearly the same as in the other,
but the small farmers with fifty or two hundred acres fare much worse.

These purchase everything they require at retail, often paying from fifteen
to thirty per cent. more than the large farmers, who purchase at wholesale
and receive rebate for prompt payment. A small farmer employing ten men
requires a cook; the larger, employing three hundred men, requires but two
cooks. The small farmer is always cramped for money, has but a limited
credit with the central, and outside of that none, except with an occasional
country storekeeper, who may consider the risk and accommodate him by
charging exorbitant interest. The money which ought to be expended on the
cane fields goes to pay this interest, his fields get to such low ebb that the
cane no longer pays the expense for harvesting, he can obtain no money for
replanting, fails to pay his rent, and the owner of the land takes possession
of what remains, resulting in some other poor fellow stepping in only to
repeat his predecessor’s experience.
“The cost for preparing, breaking up, cross-ploughing, making,
furrowing, seed cane, planting, cultivating, wear and tear to implements,
and weeding one caballeria[11] of cane to maturity, and doing it well, is from
$1400 to $1600, according to conditions of soil, salaries, etc., and under
normal conditions will here require from three to four years before the
farmer can see any profits, and then only by intelligent management and
good soil; soil which requires planting every three to five years will ruin
any man.
“The average yield of cane per caballeria in Guabairo for 1895 was
about 71,500 arrobas,[12] and the cost per one hundred arrobas for weeding,
cutting, carting, and delivering to the central amounted to about $1.84.
“During the crop time we employed from one hundred and fifty to two
hundred Chinamen; of the balance of the labourers, probably there were
more negroes than Spanish, with the white Cubans in a distinct minority.
The Chinamen we have here now make very steady workmen, but they are
weak, and not able to do as much work per day as either a negro or a
Spaniard can do in the field. The best workmen we have, if we can get
enough of them, are the negroes. One negro in cutting cane, can do as much
as two of any other class; but I do not think this country is adapted for the
American negro, from what I have heard of him, as he would have to put up
with hardships here, and a style of eating and living which, I imagine, is not
as good as he has in the southern part of the United States. The immigration
of Chinese is prohibited, although a few manage to get in at a time. I do not
know of any other restrictions on immigration. I do not believe the Jamaica

negro would make a good workman; for, from what I have heard of him, he
is very lazy, and would not be at all a desirable labourer. Thus our only
hope for labour is to retain here the Canary Islanders, because they are
harder working and can stand the climate better than others. They are men
who can save money here, and that in itself is proof that they must be
steady workmen, because they earn so little. Galicians are also good
workers, but so far as I know of the men working here, the Canary Islanders
are the best. The white men are mainly employed as stevedores in the batey,
though they are also good labourers in the field.
“As a rule the labourers are not married. The families of the married
labourers live in the villages in the neighbourhood. The men must sleep in
the batey at night. Sunday they work half a day, and get paid for a full day,
provided they have worked five full days during the week; otherwise they
only get half a day’s pay. The men sleep in large rooms called barracones;
sleeping in hammocks, and not taking their clothes off. Many of them
possess but one suit, and on Sundays, after breakfast, they go to a stream,
wash their clothes, lie around until they are dry, and then put them on again.
For the better class of workmen, employed in the factory, the machinery
helpers, etc., we have bath-houses. These men have rooms, and as a rule
they are unmarried. Most of the labouring men, if they have families, when
they are paid off, go away for a day, or a day and a half, and take their
money to their families, and then come back to work. Those who are not
married, keep on working or stay off a few days. It is quite uncommon to
find a labouring man who can read and write. Their chief vice is gambling,
the Cuban and Spaniard being similar about this, though we try on this
estate to prevent gambling as much as possible. The Chinese gamble and
smoke opium. The bell rings at 8 P.M., at which time the men are supposed
to be in their barracones, and are not supposed to walk around the batey,
this rule not being enforced except during the last two years.
“The price of labour, in 1895, for cutting cane, etc., before the
insurrection commenced, varied from fourteen dollars to twenty dollars per
month, Spanish gold. This has fallen off to from twelve dollars to fifteen
dollars, Spanish silver, paid during the past crop for the same labour—in
American gold about fifty-five per cent. of this. The maintenance per month
per man is nine dollars, Spanish gold. This fall in wages was necessitated
by the fall in the price of sugar, and by the fact that but few plantations in
the neighbourhood were able to continue working.”

Labour seeking employment in Cuba must face these conditions. That
the field will prove sufficiently attractive to tempt immigration in large
numbers, even from the poorer sections of Europe, is doubtful. Still, with
more prosperous times, the Canary Islanders may try their fortunes in the
future as they have tried them successfully in the past; and so with Italians,
Spaniards, South and Central Americans, and even the Southern negro of
the United States, despite the fact, as stated above, that the American negro
will not come to Cuba because the work is too hard and the food and
accommodations too poor. But the American negro will, unwittingly, no
doubt be the pioneer of a new labour era in Cuba. With the coming of the
new order and new people, will come higher ideas of labour, and that which
has ennobled labour in the United States will have its elevating influence
among the labouring people of Cuba. Herding labourers in barracones like
so many cattle, sleeping them, feeding them, bathing them, with less care
than is shown to fine cattle, ruling them with whip and spur, making no
provision or allowing no time for their mental or moral improvement,
regarding them merely as so much live stock, but of less value than cattle,
because when too old to work they cannot be slaughtered and eaten, it is
small wonder that the crying need of the sugar-planter for two centuries has
been sufficient and efficient labour. When the planter, under the newer
influences which shall soon prevail, learns that by education, by the
adoption and enforcement of sanitary regulations, by the establishment of
homes, by the observance of the decent amenities of life, by the liberalising
of religious belief, by the recognition of human rights, and by the general
uplifting of the sentiment of work, a sufficiency of labour may be easily
secured, and its efficiency guaranteed, the problem so long unsolved will be
made as clear as day, and Cuba will enter an era of prosperity for all classes
that will astonish and attract the world.
There is at this time a steady increase in the demand for labour on
plantations and, in Santiago Province, for the mines. While in Cuba the
author received one cable despatch calling for fifteen hundred labourers for
the mines, while three large planters stood ready, among them, to employ a
thousand men to work in the sugar fields. In the neighbourhood of the sugar
plantations all the able-bodied men had either been killed in battle, died of
disease and starvation, or were still in a state of practical destitution, hidden
away in the insurgent camps. Those who offered themselves for

employment were, as a rule, too weak to endure the hard labour. Three
years of privations and lack of food had destroyed their stamina. To be sure,
there is surplus labour in Havana,—able-bodied labour,—but those who
applied there had no means of transportation to the localities where they
could obtain work. Through a suggestion made by the writer to an
enterprising American concern, four hundred of these Havana labourers
were sent to Santiago. It is estimated that at least three thousand additional
labourers could be well employed in these mines at once, if it were possible
to send them from the spots where starvation stares them in the face to the
localities where work can be obtained for those able to endure, as already
indicated, the hardest toil under trying climatic conditions. Many Spanish
soldiers desire to remain in the Island. They have formed alliances in Cuba;
some of them have married and have families there. These men have come
before American officials and entreated them to aid in finding them
employment of some kind, either as Civil Guards, in the mines, or on the
plantations. As a rule they make industrious and faithful labourers.
Attention is called to an extract from a letter written by a prominent
business man of Havana,—the man, in fact, who in October was employed
to send the four hundred labourers from that city to Santiago:
“I advertised for labourers in the Santiago mines in our principal newspapers, and, in
consequence, have had for the last three days at least one hundred and twenty men calling at my
office for situations. They are willing to accept the price offered, but not one of them can pay the
passage from this port to Santiago.
“Lots of soldiers, lots of labourers, many of whom have already worked in the Santiago mines
and know all about the work, living, and everything else, but were taken away from there as
guerrillas, volunteers, and soldiers of some kind, are willing to go; but, as you will understand, the
people here have been without work and the soldiers without any pay, and therefore nobody can pay
the passage.
“While I have been writing these lines several men have called on me, but it is the same thing
over and over again; they need work, and are willing to work, but they have not got one cent to save
their souls.”

It is believed this indicates clearly and without exaggeration the present
conditions in Havana as regards would-be labourers and their suffering for
want of work. During fifteen years’ experience in operating iron mines in
Cuba, those who know say, the labour question there has always been the
unsolved problem, as never during that time have they been able fully to
supply their wants in this direction. If the number of labourers has not in
normal times been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of all industries in
Cuba, how much will it fall short under the new conditions? The only hope

for the renewal of prosperity in the Island is, first, the rehabilitation of the
sugar industry; second, a revival of work on the tobacco plantations; and
third, a full complement of men in the mining districts. These industries are
the basis of the prosperity of the Island. A better distribution of labour will
aid somewhat, and if this is accomplished intelligently by the United States
Government, employment can be found for thousands whose presence in
Havana without work is a menace to the city. It should be borne in mind
that the Cuban harvest is in the winter months, and therefore plans should at
once be inaugurated by which those who want work can be immediately
brought to those anxious to give them employment. A small expenditure of
money in this direction now will save a large expenditure in the future in
some other and less desirable ways.
It is useless to try to create new industries until the old and strong
industries of the Island are re-established. If it is difficult, after the Spanish
soldiers leave, to secure the necessary labour for the plantations, producing,
as they will this year, a maximum of 400,000 tons of sugar for export,
where are the labourers coming from to produce the high-water mark of
1,100,000 tons of sugar? The process of industrial reconstruction will
necessarily be slow and depend in a large degree upon the stability of the
Government and the rapidity with which the people settle down to work.
There is no possibility, however, of a surplus labour supply. Work can be
found for all capable and willing to perform hard labour now that the affairs
of the Island have passed into the hands of the United States military
authorities and the new customs tariff has gone into force. From this time
the work of repairing the dismantled sugar plantations should go forward
and thousands of labourers will be required. Whatever may be the future of
Cuba, the present must be provided for and life and property and the right to
labour be protected.
The disposal of the insurgent troops is so intimately interwoven with the
labour problem that it is difficult to separate the two. Some of the insurgent
troops should be, and probably will be, utilised as Civil Guards,
supplementing the United States forces; but those who are not needed for
this purpose should be systematically aided as far as possible in any
endeavours they may make to secure work. Men with hardly clothes to
cover their nakedness, who have existed for three years on a diet that would
kill the ordinary American labourer in three weeks, and who have
practically foraged for their daily existence, must be helped a little before

they can stand alone—helped at least to the extent of food and raiment and
transportation to the locality where there is work in abundance.
Lastly, in this connection, the need of homes in Cuba is one of the most
pressing. The condition of those who labour on the plantations is truly
deplorable. They literally have none of the necessities of civilisation. A
complete state of savagery would be preferable to the condition of those
employed on the sugar estates, who toil from early sunrise to sunset on
rations of the plainest sort, and live in huts built of the bark of palm trees
and thatched with the palm leaf.

CHAPTER VII

THE POPULATION OF CUBA

T HE number and the characteristics of the people of Cuba are matters of
doubt. If not of doubt exactly, at least there seem to be many
discrepancies in relation to the numerical side of the problem, and great
variation in opinion as to the qualities and peculiarities of the several
classes of inhabitants which constitute the people of the Island. Before
attempting to discuss the traits of the people, it may be advisable to
ascertain, as far as practicable, the component parts of the population, and
for that purpose recourse must be had to such statistical data as may be
found available. The census report of Cuba can be obtained, but it is not
issued, like our own, in book form, or even as printed reports. The results,
moreover, are not worked out with any degree of detail as to age, sex, race,
marital condition, occupation, and such other data as make an analysis of
the population of the United States a comparatively easy task. The first
census of Cuba was taken as far back as 1774, and since then the population
has been enumerated at various periods, apparently when it suited the
convenience or desire of the authorities at Madrid. The last count of the
people was in December, 1897, but the returns from this enumeration have
not been tabulated. The authorities admit they are imperfect in the four
provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, and that
they lack entirely the population of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba.
It may, therefore, be expedient that this work should be abandoned and that
the United States authorities should take a complete and satisfactory census
of the Island in December (for it cannot be taken in the month of June),
1899, or December, 1900, either of which dates will be near enough to the
date of our own Twelfth Census, which will be June 1, 1900—the earlier
date will probably be better for Cuba and nearer our own census. Such an
enumeration should elicit information in relation to occupations and such
social topics as will aid in constructing a suitable government for the people
of Cuba. The method of taking the Cuban census has been crude and the
returns not very reliable. The organisation for the work has always been
made in Spain and delegated to a Central Board in Cuba, which board is

presided over by a Cabinet Minister—the last by Mr. Montoro, Secretary of
State. The Secretary to this Board is the Director of Census. The schedules
are then forwarded to the municipalities, who thus control their own
enumerations. Fortunately for Cuba, there are no “boom towns,” so the
returns are not unduly padded. The schedules for the rural districts are
handled from the capital of the province. When the schedules are filled,
they are sent to Havana, where the work of tabulation is performed. The
completed work is sent to Spain for approval and promulgation. The
method seems roundabout and cumbersome and must result in a large
percentage of errors. The official who had charge of the last census
admitted it was not exact—excepting possibly for some places where the
municipal authorities took pride in the work. This was the case in Matanzas,
where a census was taken in 1893, which seems on the face to be careful
statistical work. A study of the census columns of unfortunate Cuba reveals
the story of that Island in unmistakable terms. (See table on page 92.)
Disease and war have performed their fatal work and from time to time
decimated the inhabitants. The cheerful side of the picture is the constant
increase of population from 1852 to 1867. These few years were called the
Golden Age of Cuba. The cholera visited Cuba at the end of the year 1868,
and the Ten Years’ War began October 10, 1868, at which time many
Cubans emigrated. This will explain the decrease of the year 1869. From
1870 to 1877 Spanish soldiers poured into the country, and not less than
200,000 Spaniards were sent there to crush the insurrection of 1868 to 1878
(Ten Years’ War).
POPULATION OF CUBA AT THE SEVERAL ENUMERATIONS
OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLAND
Increase Decrease
Years. Totals.
Per cent. Per cent.
1774 171,620 .... ....
1787 176,167 2.64 ....
1792 273,939 55.49 ....
1804 432,000 57.69 ....
1810 600,000 38.88 ....
1817 635,604 5.93 ....
1819 553,033 .... 12.99
1825 715,000 29.28 ....
1827 704,487 .... 1.47
1830 755,695 7.26 ....
1841 1,007,625 33.33 ....

1846 898,754 .... 10.80
1849 945,440 5.19 ....
1850 973,742 2.99 ....
1852 984,042 1.05 ....
1855 1,044,185 6.11 ....
1857 1,110,095 6.31 ....
1859 1,129,304 1.72 ....
1860 1,199,429 6.20 ....
1862 1,396,470 16.42 ....
1867 1,426,475 2.14 ....
1869 1,399,811 .... 1.86
1874 1,446,372 3.32 ....
1877 1,521,684 5.20 ....
1887 1,631,687 7.23 ....
1899 (est.) 1,200,000 .... 2.65

A COUNTRY VILLA.

Then came the last war, which has been even more disastrous, and many
competent authorities put the loss by disease, starvation, and slain at
400,000. It is impossible to verify these figures until we shall have an
accurate enumeration of the population, so it must remain guesswork until
then. Whatever the result of the next census may show, the fact remains
apparent that the population of Cuba, by reason of its misfortunes, is far

behind the natural increment; that is, the growth by excess of births over
deaths. This is shown by the following table, giving the estimated
population of the Island of Cuba from 1774 to 1894, by decades, taking the
average rate of increase of the native population in the United States by
census decades:
Estimated
Year.
Population.
1774 171,620 As by Mr. Bonnet’s
1784 216,928 table as increased by
1794 274,197 United States census
1804 346,585 rates, estimated averages.
1814 438,083
1824 554,537
1834 700,934
1844 885,981
1854 1,119,880
From 1850 to 1890 native
and foreign were given 1864 1,459,204
separately by census 1874 1,772,718
takers; previously no 1884 2,336,442
such count was made. 1894 2,869,150

In the opening chapter of this volume the point was made that Cuba, had
it been permitted to remain in peace and enjoy its advantages, should have
had a population ranging from 4,500,000 to 5,000,000. That this statement
is borne out may be noted in the subjoined table, which gives the estimated
population of the Island of Cuba from 1774 to 1894, taking the average rate
of increase of the total population in the United States, by census decades:
Estimated
Year.
Population.
1774 171,620 —As per Mr. Bonnet’s table.
1784 231,687}
1794 312,777}
1804 378,460}
1814 516,144}
1824 686,832} —Increased at United States census
1834 917,264} rates for decades, estimated
1844 1,216,934} averages.
1854 1,653,448}
1864 2,241,745}
1874 2,749,051}
1884 3,575,965}

1894 4,464,950}

The rate of growth of the Western Hemisphere, had Cuba been allowed
to enjoy her natural advantages, would have found her at the close of 1900
with close upon 5,000,000 population and a country as flourishing as that
pictured in the early part of this volume.
The population of the Island of Cuba, as enumerated on the 31st of
December, 1887, was 1,631,687. This population was scattered over an area
of about 122,606 square kilometres. These figures give an average density
of population of 13.31 inhabitants to the square kilometre, the maximum of
which appeared to be in the province of Havana (52.49), and the minimum
in the province of Puerto Principe (2.10).
CENSUS OF DECEMBER 31, 1887
Density per
Number Square
Province. Square
Inhabitants. Kilometres.
Kilometre.
Havana 451,928 8,610 52.49
Matanzas 259,578 8,486 30.59
Pinar del Rio 225,891 14,967 15.09
Puerto Principe 67,789 32,341 2.10
Santa Clara 354,122 23,083 15.34
Santiago de Cuba 272,379 35,119 7.76
1,631,687 122,606 13.31

Distributed as white population and coloured people, the latter
comprising negroes and half-breeds and Asiatics, the proportions were as
follows:
CENSUS OF DECEMBER 31, 1887
Number Density per
Percentage.
Province. Inhabitants. Square Kilometre.
Whites. Coloured. Whites. Coloured. Whites. Coloured.
Havana 335,782 116,146 39.00 13.49 74.30 25.70
Matanzas 142,040 117,538 16.74 13.85 54.72 45.28
Pinar del Rio 166,678 59,213 11.14 3.95 73.79 26.21
Puerto Principe 54,581 13,208 1.69 0.41 80.52 19.48
Santa Clara 245,097 109,025 10.62 4.72 69.27 30.73
Santiago de Cuba 158,711 113,668 4.52 3.24 58.27 41.73
1,102,889 528,798 9.00 4.31 67.59 32.41
1,631,687 13.31 100.

It will be observed that the number of whites is greatest in the province
of Havana, but the highest percentage of whites is found in the province of
Puerto Principe (80.52). The province of Matanzas shows the greatest
number of the coloured race, which is explained by the fact that slavery
prevailed more extensively in that province than elsewhere. The proportion
of males and females was as follows:
CENSUS OF DECEMBER 31, 1887
Number of
Percentage.
Province. Inhabitants.
Males. Females. Males. Females.
Havana 243,966 207,962 53.98 46.02
Matanzas 148,876 110,702 57.35 42.65
Pinar del Rio 122,829 103,062 54.38 45.62
Puerto Principe 35,843 31,946 52.87 47.13
Santa Clara 193,496 160,626 54.64 45.36
Santiago de Cuba 137,590 134,789 50.51 49.49
882,600 749,087 54.09 45.91

Notice that in each province, males are in excess of females. The
immigration of women into Cuba has always been small. The proportion of
males and females of the white and coloured races is as follows:
CENSUS OF DECEMBER 31, 1887
Whites.
Number of
Province. Percentage.
Inhabitants.
Males. Females. Males. Females.
Havana 188,269 147,513 56.07 43.93
Matanzas 79,362 62,678 55.87 44.13
Pinar del Rio 91,627 75,051 54.97 45.03
Puerto Principe 29,473 25,108 53.99 46.01
Santa Clara 134,412 110,685 54.84 45.16
Santiago de Cuba 84,044 74,667 52.95 47.05
607,187 495,702 55.05 44.95

Coloured.
Number of
Province. Percentage.
Inhabitants.
Males. Females. Males. Females.
Havana 55,697 60,449 47.95 52.05
Matanzas 69,514 48,024 59.14 40.86
Pinar del Rio 31,202 28,011 52.69 47.31
Puerto Principe 6,370 6,838 48.23 51.77

Santa Clara 59,084 49,941 54.12 45.88
Santiago de Cuba 53,546 60,122 47.20 52.80
275,413 253,385 52.46 47.54

Notice that the proportion of males is larger in the white race than in the
coloured. The enumeration of the population of Cuba in 1877 resulted as
follows:
CENSUS OF YEAR 1877
Number of
Density. Percentage.
Province. Inhabitants.
Whites. Coloured. Whites. Coloured. Whites. Coloured.
Havana 321,951 113,945 37.59 13.24 73.86 26.14
Matanzas 160,806 122,315 19.11 14.41 56.80 43.20
Pinar del Rio 128,986 53,218 8.62 3.55 70.79 29.21
Puerto Principe 57,692 11,553 1.78 0.36 83.32 16.68
Santa Clara 219,294 102,103 9.50 4.42 68.23 31.77
Santiago de Cuba 143,706 86,115 4.09 2.45 62.53 37.47
1,032,435 489,249 8.42 3.99 67.85 32.15
1,521,684 12.41 100

The increase in population from 1877 to 1887 was 110,003 individuals,
or 7.23 per cent. The number of whites increased 70,454; the number of
coloured people increased 39,549. Asiatics in this census, numbering
43,811, were included with the whites.

CUBAN “GUARACHERO” (MINSTREL).

There are four classes of Cuban residents: the whites, the coloured, the
blacks, and the Chinese.
The whites comprise native Cubans, Spaniards, and foreigners; a certain
proportion in the interior being Canary Islanders, who are fitted by
constitution, habits, and tastes for farm work.
The native Cuban is usually bright, and is gifted particularly with a
remarkable memory. Children are very precocious, and, when given
educational advantages, they develop into men of no mean ability. In
addition to the intelligent Cubans residing in the Island, whose reputation in
different branches of learning extends abroad, there are many who have
attained honourable distinction in foreign countries, in competition with

others whose advantages were conspicuously greater. Dr. Albarran, the
well-known Paris physician, and Albertini, the violinist, are two of the
many Cubans who have struggled and succeeded in Europe by dint of their
individual exertions and natural talents. In America, a most distinguished
professor of civil engineering, two leading civil engineers in the navy, and
the most eminent authority on yellow fever in the country are native
Cubans.
Havana is the only city in Cuba where any instruction is obtainable, and
it is noticeable there that even the boys of the poorer classes are anxious to
follow the university courses after leaving school.
In former days the sons of wealthy Cubans led the typical life of
gentlemen of leisure. It was customary among them to take a profession, if
that could be accomplished with little or no exertion. The remainder of their
lives was usually spent in travelling through Europe. The present
generation, however, is very different. It is composed of the sons of men
who have been on the verge of bankruptcy for many years, owing to their
thoughtless extravagance. They have had to work for their living from the
moment they have left college, and, owing to the increasing poverty of the
Island, they have never been able to reconstruct the fortunes ill spent by
their forbears. The consequence is that one finds in Cuba the younger
generation to be, as a class, vastly superior to the older men in principles,
education, and working capacity.
The Cuban is more analytical than inventive. His mind easily grasps
subjects on which he has received very little information; but he is
decidedly lacking in inventive and constructive power.
The Cuban mother is very affectionate, but her maternal fondness often
leads her into indulgence of the many failings of childhood, that, in later
life, are impossible to overcome. Prevarication and pilfering are no
uncommon failings of child-life in Cuba. Despite these weaknesses,
children are so generous that their parents find it hard to prevent them from
sharing their pocket-money with their young friends. Their politeness and
affability are striking.
Cuban hospitality is proverbial. In the old and prosperous days of wealth
it was a common thing for whole families to constitute themselves guests at
the country-house of some friendly sugar-planter, and spend Christmas or
Holy Week there without having given the host a word of warning. The

planter, far from resenting this proceeding, invariably provided
entertainment for his self-invited guests in the shape of riding parties,
picnics, and dancing, considering himself highly honoured by the
unforeseen advent of his friends. Like most Southerners, the Cubans are
musically inclined. They dance well, and prolonged dancing parties are a
favourite form of amusement.
There was an old Spanish law, in force up to some years ago, which
entitled all suitors in marriage, whose proposals had been opposed, to
demand that the lady’s parents state before the courts the reasons of their
objections. There are interesting cases recorded of proud young Cubans
who, animated by a high sense of honour, have availed themselves of this
harsh expedient, in preference to breaking their vows to their lady-loves.
The opposition in most cases was due to the fact that the father of the young
lady was Spanish and the suitor Cuban. There is an instance of a man
prominent in Havana circles who, taking advantage of this privilege,
married a lady, and refused to accept his wife’s patrimony, and the father-in-
law brought suit to compel him to do so. It was only after many years, when
the allowance, handed periodically to the court, had accumulated to a
considerable sum, that a compromise was reached and a reconciliation took
place between the father and the married couple.
Cubans are very much attached to family life. Deep affection usually
exists among the members of families, and they follow each other’s affairs
with great interest, even after the families break up.
In Cuban houses, the first morning meal, or “coffee” as it is called,
consists of coffee and rolls; breakfast then follows at ten or eleven o’clock,
consisting, usually, of fried eggs, hash, fried plantains, sweet potatoes,
meat, and café au lait. Dinner takes place at six or seven o’clock.
Occasionally fruit is served at two or three o’clock. Visits are exchanged in
the evening; but ladies follow the European custom of calling in the
afternoon. Most families have an “at home” one evening every week to
receive their friends. Married ladies may go out shopping alone early in the
day. Among intimate friends young men occasionally call on their young
lady friends alone, but this is not general, European customs prevailing.
The Cubans are very fond of fencing, and it is remarkable that the good
fencers scarcely ever have duels, or seek quarrels. Duelling is practised ad
libitum in all Cuba among the upper class. Just before the war it had

become an everyday occurrence; in fact, in one week as many as five duels
took place between men well known in Havana society and clubs. As a rule
the seconds manage to stop the fight after the first wound, even catching at
the pretext of a flesh wound on the forearm; appealing to the attending
surgeon to state whether he considers the wound will impair the free use of
the arm, and also if there is any chance of nervous twitches setting in from
the pain. It is unnecessary to add that the surgeon invariably finds that it is
very likely that all of these contingencies may occur—thereby stopping the
duel, and “honour is satisfied.”
Baseball, bull-fights, and cock-fights were the most popular
entertainments until recently; cock-fights have waned now in popularity
considerably, whilst bull-fights are patronised by the Spanish element
exclusively. Baseball continues to hold public favour, and since its
introduction some twenty years ago a taste for athletics has developed
among the Cubans, which was lacking before. Horse-racing was in vogue
while there was capital to import foreign half-breeds, but it has now
completely died out.
The foreign population of the Island is comparatively limited. A large
number of German merchants are engaged in all branches of the tobacco
business, which they practically control. It will be found that the knowledge
and experience of the Germans in this respect have given them preferment
in the direction and management of the largest syndicates and tobacco
firms. A sprinkling of English, Americans, and French are to be found
throughout the country.
The coloured inhabitants of Cuba (mulattoes) are usually the children of
black women and white fathers—the cases of a white woman having
children with a black father being so rare as to be nearly unknown. In the
cities the mulattoes are servants,—not hotel waiters, for they are all
Spaniards,—barbers, and occasionally musicians. Mulatto women, though
usually very statuesque in appearance, are unprincipled and insolent.

A NATIVE HUT.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY J. F. COONLEY, NASSAU, N. P.

The Cuban negro inherits from his forefathers, the African slaves, a
physique and a character strengthened and tempered by the toil of
generations. During the sugar season he works steadily, from four in the
morning until sunset every day, taking only two hours of rest with his
meals. The coloured population shows no inclination to be on terms of
equality with the white, and though under General Calleja’s administration
negroes and mulattoes were all granted the handle of “Don” (Mr.) to their
names, and though the right to be recognised in hotels, theatres, street-cars,
etc., on equal terms with the whites has been extended to them, they have
not availed themselves of the privilege to any extent.
The savagery of the African negro has, unfortunately, shown itself
among his descendants in the Island. Some years ago a secret society called
“Ñañigos” was introduced in Havana. These Ñañigos are divided into
bands, whose object is to fight and kill each other. They commit all sorts of
depredations and crimes. It has often been shown that the police have been
in their pay. Some four hundred were banished some time ago to Spanish
penitentiaries, together with political suspects, with whom they were

chained in couples and marched through the streets of Havana prior to
embarking. This is one of the many acts of refined cruelty that the
Spaniards committed during the late insurrection; most respectable and
honourable men, accused of sympathising in the cause of the rebellion,
were chained arm to arm with negroes of the lowest caste, who, besides
being convicted for crime, defiled the very atmosphere around them from
the filth of their attire. The Ñañigos have lately been returned to Havana
and set free, where they have lost no time in renewing their criminal work.
The Chinese element was brought over by contract for working on sugar
plantations. They were virtually slaves until the Chinese Government
intervened in their behalf.
The following extract from the comprehensive report of Mr. Robert T.
Hill, of the United States Geological Survey on the Island of Cuba, may be
considered as authority on the subject of population:

THE CUBANS
“Seventy-five percent. of the native population of the Island is found outside of the Spanish
capital of Habana, which, being the seat of an unwelcome foreign despotism, is no more
representative of Cuban life or character than is the English city of Hong Kong of the rural Chinese.
While the Habanese have had the freest communication with the United States during the last three
years of the revolution, Americans have had little opportunity to hear from the true white Cuban
population. The Cubans are mostly found in the provinces and provincial cities, especially in Pinar
del Rio and the eastern provinces of Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago. Although of Spanish
blood, the Cubans, through adaptation to environment, have become a different class from the people
of the mother country, just as the American stock has differentiated from the English. Under the
influence of their surroundings, they have developed into a gentle, industrious, and normally
peaceable race, not to be judged by the combativeness which they have developed under a tyranny
such as has never been imposed upon any other people. The better class of Camagueynos, as the
natives are fond of calling themselves, are certainly the finest, the most valiant, and the most
independent men of the Island, while the women have the highest type of beauty. It is their boast that
no Cuban woman has ever become a prostitute, and crime is certainly almost unknown among them.
“While these people may not possess our local customs and habits, they have strong traits of
civilised character, including honesty, family attachment, hospitality, politeness of address, and a
respect for the golden rule. While numerically inferior to the annual migration of Poles, Jews, and
Italians into the eastern United States, against which no official voice is raised, they are too far
superior to these people to justify the abuse that has been heaped upon them by those who have
allowed their judgment to be prejudiced by fears that they might by some means be absorbed into our
future population.
“Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the Cubans have laboured, they have
contributed many members to the learned professions. To educate their sons and daughters in the
institutions of the United States, England, and France has always been the highest ambition of the
creoles of Cuba and Porto Rico. The influence of their educated men is felt in many countries, the
most distinguished professor of civil engineering, two leading civil engineers of our navy, and the

most eminent authority on yellow fever in our country belonging to this class. Thousands of these
people, driven from their beloved Island, have settled in Paris, London, New York, Mexico, and the
West Indies, where they hold honourable positions in society, and even the exiles of the lower
classes, with their superior agricultural arts, have been eagerly welcomed in countries like Jamaica,
Mexico, and Florida, which hope to share with Cuba the benefits of its tobacco culture.

“THE NEGROES
“In addition to the white creole population, thirty-two per cent. are black or coloured—using the
latter word in its correct signification, of a mixture of the black and white. This black population of
Cuba has been as little understood in this country as has been the creole, especially by those who
have alleged that in case Cuba should gain her freedom the Island would become a second Haiti. The
black and coloured people of the Island as a class are more independent and manly in their bearing
than their brethren of the United States, having possessed even before slavery was abolished on the
Island the four rights of free marriage, of seeking a new master at their option, of purchasing their
freedom by labour, and of acquiring property. While the negro shares with the creole the few local
rights possessed by any of the inhabitants, their social privileges are greater than here, although a
strong caste feeling exists. Miscegenation has also produced many mulattoes, but race mixture is no
more common than in this country.
“The coloured people of Cuba belong to several distinct classes. The majority of them are
descendants of slaves imported during the present century, but a large number, like the negroes of
Colombia and the maroons of Jamaica, come from a stock which accompanied the earliest Spanish
settlers, like Estevan, the negro, who, with the two white companions of Cabeza de Vaca, first
crossed the United States from the Gulf of Mexico to California in 1528-36. The amalgamation of
this class in the past century with the Spanish stock produced a superior class of free mulattoes of the
Antonio Maceo type, unlike any people in this country with which they can be compared.
“The current expressions of fear concerning the future relations of this race in Cuba seem
inexplicable. The slaves of the South were never subjected to a more abject servitude than have been
the free-born whites of Cuba, for they at least were protected from arbitrary capital punishment,
imprisonment, and deportation without form of trial, such as that to which all Cubans are still
subjected, and the white race of this or any other country has furnished few more exalted examples of
patriotism than the mulattoes Toussaint L’Ouverture or Antonio Maceo.
“The experiences of the past have shown that there is no possibility of Cuba becoming
Africanised without constant renewal by immigration. The 520,000 coloured people, one-half of
whom are mulattoes, represent the diminished survival of over 1,000,000 African slaves that have
been imported. The Spaniards had the utmost difficulty in acclimatising and establishing this race
upon the Island. While Jamaica and other West India islands are a most prolific negro-breeding
ground, the race could not be made to thrive in Cuba.
“Those persons who undertake to say what the social conditions of Cuba would be under
independence should look elsewhere than to Haiti for a comparison. Even were the population of
Cuba black, as it is not, the island of Jamaica would afford a much better contrast. This island, only
about one-tenth the size of Cuba, is composed of mountainous lands like the least fertile portion of
Cuba; has a population wherein the blacks outnumber the whites forty-four to one; yet, under the
beneficent influence of the English colonial system, its civilisation is one of which any land might be
proud, possessing highways, sanitation, and other public improvements even superior to those of our
own country, and such as have never been permitted by Spain in Cuba. Even though Cuba should
become a second Haiti, which it could not, there is some satisfaction in knowing, in the light of
historic events, that Haiti free, although still grovelling in the savagery which it inherited, is better off

than it would have been had Napoleon succeeded in forcing its people back into slavery, as he
endeavoured to do.
“Another fact which will stand against the Africanising of Cuba is that it is highly probable that
nearly one-half of these five hundred thousand coloured people have been destroyed during the
present insurrection. A large number of them had but recently been released from the bonds of
slavery, and were naturally the poorer class of the Island, upon which the hardships have mostly
fallen, being generally the field hands in the sugar districts of Habana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara,
where the death-rate of the terrible Weyler reconcentramiento has been greatest. Three hundred
thousand of the five hundred thousand blacks belonged to these provinces, and of this number fully
one-half have been starved to death. The population of Cuba has undergone great modification since
the collection of the statistics given. What changes the deplorable conflict has wrought can only be
surmised. Beyond doubt, however, the population has at least been reduced to a million inhabitants
by emigration of non-combatants, destruction in battle, official deportation of suspects and political
prisoners, and by the reconcentration.
“The rural population of the four western provinces of Pinar del Rio, Habana, Matanzas, and
Santa Clara has been totally obliterated. Estimates of this extermination are all more or less
conjectural, but the Bishop of Habana is authority for the statement that more than four hundred
thousand people have been buried in the consecrated cemetery.”

Mr. Charles M. Pepper, in one of his newspaper letters, speaking of the
negroes in Cuba, cites instances of their industry and thrift, and says:

“These notes are perhaps not conclusive, yet they have established in my own mind that the
negro in Cuba is not an idler or a clog on industrial progress. He will do his part in rebuilding the
industries of the Island, and no capitalist need fear to engage in enterprises because of an indefinite
fear regarding negro labour. In the country, for a time, the black labourers may be in the majority.
That is one of the results of the reconcentration. The blacks stood it better than the whites, and
relatively a larger number of them are left for the work in the fields. When the present conditions are
improved the question will arise over the immigration of labour. No need for discussing it has yet
arisen. The leading blacks are opposed to the wholesale negro immigration to Cuba, and the mass of
their people apparently agree with them.
“On its political side the black population of Cuba has a definite status. Social equality does not
exist, but social toleration prevails. There is no colour line. Visitors to the Island invariably remark
this fact. In places in the interior I have seen the coloured serving-woman occupying a box at the
theatre with the family, and no one seemed to be the worse for it. The custom is not general, yet the
toleration of the white and black races is strong enough for an incident of this kind to pass without
notice. I have heard Americans say it won’t do at all after the Island is Americanised. One ambitious
young fellow from a Southern State said to me that he was going back because the coloured race
occupied too prominent a place in Cuba. He did not speak with bitterness or intolerance. He had been
brought up under different conditions and felt that he would not be in harmony with such
surroundings. Those who feel as he does had better stay away.
“The part taken in the insurrection by the blacks has unquestionably strengthened their future
influence. In order to depreciate the white Cubans the Spaniards were in the habit of giving all the
credit for the warfare of the bush to the black insurgents. Some Americans have thereby been led into
error. When the insurrection began the population of the Island was about two-thirds white and one-
third black. That proportion was maintained among the insurgent troops. In some of the regiments
more than one-half were black, but in others they did not amount to twenty per cent. In the beginning
Maceo drew a large following in the eastern provinces, and this was almost entirely of blacks.
“When the insurrection spread over the entire Island the disproportion between the two races was
removed. Many of the officers among the insurgents to-day are blacks. They have few officers of the
higher rank, because most of these were killed. Of all the insurgent generals who are seen in Havana
—and there is a legion of them—the one who attracts the most attention from Americans is General
Ducasse. He is a mulatto, and was educated, I think, at the French military school of St. Cyr. A
brother, more famous than he, was killed during the last year of the insurrection in Pinar del Rio
Province. This General Ducasse is of polished manners and undeniable force of character. A few
weeks ago I read an address of his to the black insurgents, in which he counselled them with
moderation, and impressed on them the duty of preparing for their new responsibilities.
“These coloured Cubans have at no time been clamorous for recognition. They seem disposed to
ask less than is due them. At least they are not forward in their demands. Back of all this is a
consciousness of their own strength. In the States a jovial piece of advice used to be given the
negroes—‘Don’t hit the white man, but if you do hit him, hit hard.’ Such advice would be
unnecessary in Cuba. It is not probable that a temporary influx of Americans with inherited race
prejudices will ever succeed in creating a colour line in political affairs. If that should happen the
black Cuban would not need to be advised about hitting the white man hard. He would hit both hard
and quick, and it would be a long time before Anglo-Saxon civilisation recovered from the blow and
proved its superiority. Fortunately, this is never likely to happen. The black man will share the future
of Cuba with the white man.
“The race has far more than its proportion of criminals. Some tendencies toward retrogression
have to be watched. But in the midst of many discouraging circumstances the unprejudiced student
must recognise the great advance that has been made. When Cuba has a system of common schools
the advance will be greater. What is significant in the present is that the black man has been doing

very well. He will continue to do well, and even better, if too many people do not stay up nights
worrying other people with their fears of the future.”

CHAPTER VIII

SANITARY WORK IN CUBA

U NDERLYING the prosperity and happiness of the people of any country is
health, for without it there can be no strength, no energy, no success,
even if all other conditions be favourable. This is true of every section
of the world, and is notably true of Cuba, which with almost every
advantage that nature could bestow has ever been feared for its malarious
diseases, the fatal typhus, and the dreaded “yellow jack,” which
acknowledges no master save the frost. For years the world has quarantined
against Havana, and other cities have drawn away from this sister in the
tropics as from one plague-stricken. Yet this condition is not of nature’s
making, but of man’s, and by man shall it be changed into something better.
Spain in herself was a tyrant contagion and everything she touched became
diseased and rotten to its vitals. And this terrible condition was not only
physical, but moral, for moral uncleanness is sure always to follow physical
uncleanness. This truth constitutes a corollary out of which has grown the
maxim, “Cleanliness is next to Godliness.”
The first consideration, then, with the American authorities who have
undertaken to clean Spain’s Augean Stables in Cuba is sanitation; and
already the best thought and knowledge and experience we have are being
brought to bear upon the stupendous task before us.

STREET VIEW, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY J. F. COONLEY, NASSAU, N. P.

As has been stated, Cuba is not naturally unhealthful for a hot, wet
country; and among the mountains in its interior and in many places along
the coasts, removed from the filthiness of aggregated population, the
average mortality is not higher than it is in lands of better repute for
healthfulness, and the general health is quite as good. As might be expected,
there is not that strength and robustness of physique characterising the
people of the higher latitudes, nor is the climate conducive to the pink-and-
white health of northerners; but though the people are less rugged of
constitution and frame and lungs, and lack the outward signs of northern
health, they are by no means constant subjects for physicians’ care and they
are anything but chronic candidates for the cemetery. Even in the nasty
cities they are not all so, for there are many who are able to have their own
houses well located, and to adopt modern methods of sanitation for their
own private use. But the public health is not considered of importance, and
there is not a city in Cuba which is not wofully lacking in good water, good
drainage, and good health. One or two towns, which in America would have

a contagion flag run up over them, are so much cleaner than the average
that in every description of them by any writer appears the statement that
they are said to be the cleanest towns in Cuba. It may be said in this
connection that the towns are not large.
Beginning with Havana, the capital of the country and the largest city in
it, the stories of its great filthiness can scarcely be believed by those who
have seen the place upon the surface and moved about in beautiful parks, in
brilliant cafés, on the lovely drives, and elsewhere, among pleasure-loving
people, all clothed in their clean white suits and smoking their dainty
cigarettes. Yet Havana is viler than words can express; and the vileness has
slopped over until her harbour is a veritable cesspool, whose waters are
deadly, and whose bottom is so covered with filth that ships will not drop
their anchors in it, because it is necessary to clean and disinfect them before
they can be taken on board. Havana has been in Spain’s possession for four
hundred years, and that harbour is a typical result of Spain’s good
government. In the city itself the poor people are huddled in ill-built houses
—there are only about eighteen thousand houses in the entire place—more
densely than in any city of the world, on narrow streets without sewerage,
upon the surface of which garbage and all kinds of refuse are thrown. No
attention is paid to ventilation. The houses are built so low that the floors
rest upon the soft, damp—in many places swampy—ground; the material is
a porous conglomerate which absorbs moisture as a sponge does. Sinks are
totally inadequate or absent. Water is not sufficiently supplied, and there is
scarcely any effort by the authorities to exercise that care and provision for
the public well-being which is characteristic of every properly governed
city in the world. As an indication of what might be expected from such a
condition of affairs the following table, prepared for American officials by
the Havana Department of Sanitation showing the number of deaths for the
first eleven months of 1898, is cited:

January 1,081
February 1,518
March 1,500
April 1,411
May 1,298
June 1,129
July 1,381

August 1,975
September 2,390
October 2,249
November 1,828
Total 17,760

And this out of a population of about 200,000, in which there were only
a few, if any, reconcentrados to starve to death. During this period there
were only 2,224 births, showing a net loss of 14,336, or about seven per
cent. of the population; a condition of health which would produce a panic
in a northern city as soon as the figures were known. Speaking of these
figures, Captain Davis, who has been inspecting hospitals, prisons, and
public buildings under General Greene, says:
“Vienna, with its million and a half of population, has been called the pest-hole of Europe,
because of its death-rate of more than twenty-five to the thousand; yet Havana, with less than one-
sixth of its population, has more deaths in one month than Vienna in twelve. The deaths this year in
Havana will outnumber those in Chicago by probably five thousand, and will exceed the totals of
Boston, St. Louis, Baltimore, and San Francisco combined.”

New York City at this rate would have a death-roll of 270,000 a year and
London 450,000, and the deaths in the United States, which are now about
1,000,000 a year, would be about 7,000,000. Of course the figures for 1898
are greatly in excess of other years, owing to the war and the generally
disturbed condition of affairs, but even in the healthiest years the death-rate
was two or three times greater than the average of other cities.
The leading diseases are consumption, a common disease in hot, wet
countries; diarrhœa, dysentery, cholera infantum, and fevers, worst of which
is the yellow fever, which is present in Havana every month of the year,
although much worse at certain times than at others. It is said that portions
of Havana are permanently infected by yellow-fever germs, but Surgeon-
General Sternberg, Dr. Wyman, Supervising Surgeon-General of the Marine
Hospital Service, and other authorities say that by proper sanitary
regulations and careful quarantining, the city may be made free of the
disease and kept so, as is the case in Jamaica, where the English have had
control for years. The work of sanitation will be difficult and expensive, and
years will be required to accomplish it, but it must be done before Havana’s
future is assured. Sewers are few and far between, and those which exist are
filled with refuse from the streets and are never cleaned, as the odours that

rise from them constantly most disagreeably testify. They empty into the
bay. Most of the drainage is surface, and as the city lies so low that a heavy
wind across the waters of the bay will inundate many of the streets, it will
be understood that the drainage is sluggish, and that what should be carried
off by water is usually left to be rotted and dried by the sun—except in the
rainy season, when it rots without drying. Much of the lower part of the city
is built on swamp and “made-land,” and what this means for the health of
those who live upon it needs no elucidation.
The following statement, made by José M. Yzquierdo, civil engineer, of
Havana, under date of September 28, 1898, will throw some light upon
street-sweeping contracts in Havana, show why the work cannot be
properly done, and also indicate the part that the city authorities have
always taken in the good cause:
“I now have the contract for cleaning the streets and have been connected with the city
government a long time. The present system of cleaning the streets is a combination of old and new.
When I took up the work about five years ago, I ascertained that the system was very deficient, so I
went to New York and studied up the matter. To begin with, the pavements were very bad. The
automatic street-sweepers cannot be used to advantage, though I have two sweeping-machines. At
night time my people go out with the sweeping-machines and a sprinkler and clean the streets, and
from there the dirt is taken to the railroad cars and from the station about nine miles from here, and
there I do some business with it; that is, I make a kind of fertilizer. I employ 230 men. We have no
furnace to burn up the garbage. I am now going to make a proposition to the city council to clean the
cities for the same price and use crematories, doing it on the American plan. For cleaning the city I
am to be paid $2350.50 weekly, but I do not get the money; they owe me $180,000. A year or two
ago, by giving ten per cent. to the city mayors, etc., I collected $20,000 in one week. Immediately
after I got the contract the aldermen called upon me and directed my attention to certain articles in it,
so that I finally had to take these aldermen into partnership in order to collect the money.

WATERMAN IN THE COUNTRY.

“I have also had the slaughter-house privilege. I paid the city council $800,000 per year for the
privilege of collecting the slaughter-house taxes, and one year I collected nearly $880,000, out of
which, of course, I had to pay my men. This has fallen off a great deal. To slaughter cattle, you have
to pay 4½ cents per kilo, $1 per head for the corral, $1.25 to kill and dress it, and then 50 cents to
take it to the market. The present slaughter-house is a new one, and not very efficient at present, but it
could be made into a good one. All the refuse from the slaughter-house now goes into the bay.”

What is true of Havana is true in lesser degree of the other cities and
towns of the Island, the degree being governed chiefly by the difference in
size; the larger the town, the nastier it is.
Cienfuegos, which, by the way, is the most promising town in the Island,
in the commercial sense, is notoriously ill policed, and is a sprouting-
ground for all manner of diseases. A report dated November 21, 1898, made
by D. E. Dudley, Sanitary Inspector, U.S.M.H.S., notes the fact that its
elevation above sea-level is only about eight feet and it is surrounded by a
belt of lowlands from eight to ten miles wide. The streets are seventy feet
wide, unclean, and out of repair, and in the wet season are fields of nasty
mud. There are three sewers, one from the Hotel Union, and another from
buildings in the same block, and the third and only public sewer is from the
Civil Hospital. The first two of these sewers empty into the bay at the

steamer wharf, about two feet above the water-line, and when the wind is in
the right direction the gases and vile odours are blown back into the
buildings, filling them with stenches. The Hotel Union, the Charity
Hospital, and a few private dwellings have modern water-closets, but
elsewhere over the city the houses have shallow privy sinks, which are
emptied at night and the contents dumped against the cemetery walls.
Around the cemetery is also the dumping-ground for garbage, dead animals,
and all the refuse of the city, the disposal of which is not under any especial
authority. This dumping-ground is a mile and a half from the Hotel Union.
Dr. Dudley says:
“Here in this garbage reservation can be seen large numbers of buzzards, feasting on dead horses
or dogs, or perched on the cemetery walls, waiting for fresh consignments. Extensive lagoons and
lakes of fœcal matter taken from privy vaults lie spread upon the ground. A small section of this
reservation faces the bay, and here the collector of the garbage has his living-quarters, in an old
tumble-down hut.
“The only cemetery is situated a mile and a half from the heart of the city. It is surrounded by a
wall twelve feet high, which furnishes vault room. The cemetery is very small and the section
reserved for paupers is more than overcrowded. During my visit ten graves were being dug. By actual
measurement I found these graves three feet in depth. Coffins are loaned by the municipalities to
paupers, and the bodies alone are buried. In these pauper graves three bodies are buried, one over the
other; and then, in less than one year’s time, they are reopened and made ready for new bodies.
Portions of skeletons were thrown out of each of the ten graves I saw. In consideration of a dollar, a
grave was opened for me, and I counted four skulls. In closing up the graves, these bones are packed
around the new bodies. As a rule the topmost corpse is so near the surface that the earth has to be
banked up a foot in order completely to cover it.
“Water.—This is one of the most serious problems which confront the municipal authorities of
this city, and one of much concern to us, if American troops are to be quartered there. The supply is
absolutely inadequate to the demands of the city. The hotels and a few residences have cement
cisterns built in the ground and use rain-water; but the chief supply comes from a small (and said to
be badly polluted) stream, the Jicotea River, a small branch of the Cannau. The water is pumped into
two aqueducts; the principal one, which is called after the Jicotea River, holds four hundred thousand
litres; a smaller one, the Bouffartique, holds three hundred thousand litres. Pipes from these two
aqueducts run through a few of the streets, above ground, alongside the curbing. The gates are open
only two hours daily. The hospitals use this water, after boiling. As a remedy for this condition, I am
told, there was a project to bring water from a point twenty miles distant, from the falls of the
Hanabanilla River, 1200 feet above the sea. Absolute freedom from pollution was claimed. It was
abandoned on account of the war. The estimated cost for this work was $1,000,000. The Jicotea
aqueduct is simply a large open cistern, built of rock and cement, attached to a brick building in
which the Spanish quartermaster has his stores. There are about two hundred wells in the city, but
infected, the privy sinks being within a few feet.
“Quarantine.—At a point nine miles from the city, on the western shore, I found, in my opinion,
an ideal location for a quarantine station. The place, the Concha, owned by the Marquis de
Apezteguia as a winter resort, can be purchased. The palace, built on a terrace near the water’s edge,
was burned by the insurgent forces. A pier thirty to fifty feet can be built so that steamers can have
eight fathoms of water. An island about one-half a mile distant could be used, and a hospital for
infectious and contagious diseases built.

“In concluding this report I wish to call your attention to the probability of an extensive spread of
smallpox in the interior. At a town eight hours’ ride from Habana to Colon, I saw beggars
convalescent from smallpox.”

During the first ten months in 1898 the total number of deaths in
Cienfuegos was 3626, out of a population which before the war was 21,500;
adding soldiers and reconcentrados, it might be said to be 25,000, and at
these figures a monthly death-rate of 362 is something fearful to
contemplate. Estimating the deaths for a year at 4144, we have a rate of 166
per 1000. In the ten years ending December 31, 1889, reported by Dr. Luis
Perna, over fifty per cent. of the deaths were from infectious and contagious
diseases due almost entirely to bad or no sanitation. During the same year
the births exceeded the deaths by 1982, a much better showing than in
Havana, the difference there being 12,433 against the population in four
years, and in Matanzas, 2397 lost in eight years.
Of the effect of proper sanitary regulations and personal attention on
tuberculosis, Dr. Perna says:
“There can be no doubt that the ravages of tuberculosis could be materially arrested by
compliance with the laws of hygiene. Infractions of civil law may or may not be punished, but
infractions of the laws of hygiene are inevitably paid for sooner or later. In combating tuberculosis
we must consider the air we breathe, the food we eat, the roof that covers us, and the clothes we wear.
The disease should be recognised as contagious. Phthisical patients should be kept in well-ventilated
apartments; sputa should be disinfected, and clothing and utensils used by such patients should be
disinfected.”

Matanzas is situated on high ground, with the rivers San Juan and
Yumuri running through it, and the natural facilities for drainage are
excellent; but only two streets have sewers, and these drains have few or no
connections with buildings. The water supply is of excellent quality, from
springs seven miles away; but only two thousand of the five thousand
houses take it, and the majority of the people prefer to buy water from street
vendors, who are quite as likely to get it from fever-infected wells as
elsewhere. There are public fountains, but those who need Cuban water
most are too lazy to carry it home. Privies and sinks are more numerous
than modern closets, and are handled as elsewhere, with the usual results.
The streets are narrow (thirty feet wide), dirty, and unpaved; in the wet
season they are vile. The houses are built of porous stone, which absorbs
the dampness; the floors, laid on the ground, are overflowed by the rains,
and their smell at all times is difficult to describe and dangerous to health.
The deaths per year for 1895 were 1465, with a nominal population of

50,000, although it was cut to 35,000 by the insurrection; in 1896, 2399; in
1897, 6795; and in 1898, to September, 3901—which fearful figures may
be accounted for by the fact that Matanzas was the centre for
reconcentrados, and they died like sheep—eighty per cent. of them from
starvation. The only disinfection that could reach this condition was applied
to Spain by the United States, and there will never be any more epidemics
of starvation in Cuba, or any more reconcentrados, for that matter. But even
without her reconcentrado population, Matanzas is no health resort, and the
cleansing hand must be applied to her early and rigorously.

MARIANAO WATER VENDOR

Cardenas, a city of twenty thousand people, more or less, is set down in
the midst of a swamp, rarely more than ten feet above sea-level, and oftener
only three or four. Its narrow streets are lacking in pavements or sewers.
Lying contiguous to the south-east side of the city are more than thirty
thousand acres of swamp, a fecund breeding-ground for typhus-and yellow-
fever germs. Twenty years ago a commission was appointed to inquire into
the construction of a canal to drain this swamp into the Anton River, but at

this present date no canal is in sight, and the fever germs go merrily on in
their work of supplying the cemeteries with subjects. The water supply is
good, but many of the people prefer to buy dangerous well-water from
street vendors, because of its cheapness. At Cape Hicacos, near Cardenas,
are extensive salt-pits, the chlorides of which are supposed to act as a
disinfectant, and that immediate locality is said to be the most healthful
along the coast.
Puerto Principe, a town of forty thousand inhabitants, the largest of the
inland cities, is situated on high ground, well watered and well drained, and
though antiquated and utterly lacking in modern conveniences or sanitary
regulations, as they are known among northern people, is so much more
healthful than other Cuban towns as to warrant a milder animadversion than
in the case of others. Yellow fever is only known sporadically, if at all, and
contagion and infection are so much less flourishing than in the coast towns
that Puerto Principe seems positively healthful in comparison, albeit in an
American community the condition of the city would warrant the
impeachment of any board of health having control of its sanitation.
Santiago de Cuba, with a population of, say forty thousand, is next to
Havana in importance among the cities of Cuba, and has been accumulating
filth since 1514, when the first Spaniards settled there. Just what nearly four
hundred years of Spanish sanitation means is better imagined than
experienced. Moreover, its location is down among hills which shut off the
breeze, and in summer the city becomes intolerably hot and dangerous to
health. It is situated on a hillside, with a landlocked bay before it, removed
from all sea or coast currents, and for 384 years the drainage of the town—
not by sewers, for they do not exist—has gone into this bay, until its bottom
and waters are vile beyond expression. In the city itself filth everywhere
prevails—or did prevail until the United States authorities took charge,
since which time Governor Wood and his assistants have done an amount of
cleaning up that is as wholesome as it is difficult to accomplish. This work
has been so vigorously prosecuted and the results so beneficial that a
chapter has been devoted to the subject. It is said that in time man may
become accustomed to any condition of life, and the dozen generations of
Santiagoans seem to have got used to their town, for its ordinary death-rate
was but 29.8 per 1000, with an increase to 33 to 35 when yellow fever or
smallpox became more violent than usual. In 1895 the death-rate went up to
51.2 per 1000, and in 1896 to 82.77. Four thousand people died in that year,

and this is the last record known. This large increase was due to the
presence of unacclimated troops from Spain, and though it may explain the
high death-rate, it scarcely can excuse a sanitary condition which is so fatal
to Spanish soldiers, who have had experience with Spanish sanitary
regulations in their own country until they ought to be almost used to it. In
1896 there were 372 deaths from yellow fever and 509 from smallpox.
Santiago has one inventive sanitarian in the person of Dr. Garcia, who, five
years ago, devised a “cold box” for the case of yellow-fever patients. As is
known, the frost will kill the germs of yellow fever; and as natural frost is
impossible in Cuba Dr. Garcia hit upon the idea of producing artificial cold.
His device is simple enough. The main feature is a small house, say five
feet by seven, and six feet high, which is practically a refrigerator, with
double roof and walls for packing the ice. A window is put in for light, and
the patient is laid in his bed in a temperature of about freezing. He has no
attendants inside, except when needed, and he is watched through the
window. This method usually kills or cures the patient in from twelve to
thirty-six hours. At first the box was not successful, for condensation
practically drowned the patient out; but that was remedied by draining the
water off. There is a great difference of opinion in relation to the efficacy of
this treatment; some physicians entirely disapproving it, while others as
strongly recommend it.
What may be done for the proper sanitary regulation of Santiago is a
serious problem, as, owing to the distance from the sea and the landlocked
character of the bay, the sewage, which may be easily drained down the
sloping streets of the town, is bound to remain near the shore. For the
present, Major Barbour, Superintendent of the Santiago Street Department,
disposes of the sewage by sprinkling it with petroleum and burning it.
Manzanillo, population nine thousand, with a large and beautiful military
plaza, has filthy streets and no public improvements of any kind looking to
the health or comfort of the people; and the people seem to like it. The
streets are unpaved, and Manzanillo mud is an alliterative term which has
become a household word for the nastiest mud on the Island. The town is
twenty feet above the bay, with hills to the rear, and near it are great
swamps filled with mosquitoes and malaria, which spread themselves
abroad in every direction.
Guantanamo, population nine thousand, seven miles inland, one hundred
and fifteen feet above the bay of the same name, is situated on the river

Guaso, and might be easily and thoroughly drained; but no efforts have
been made in that direction, and malaria and fevers prevail. With any kind
of decent care, the city could be made as healthful as any in the same
latitude.
Pinar del Rio, the capital of its province, with 5500 population, is
situated 25 miles from the sea, 160 feet above it, and on a hill 70 feet high.
It is in the midst of the famous Vuelta Abajo tobacco district, and it might
be made a clean town; but its streets are narrow and filthy, its people are a
mixture of French and African, and it is a reflection on the great American
Republic, in that it was founded in 1776.
Batabano, the southern seaport of Havana, thirty miles away, in its
narrow, dirty streets presents a condition of neglect and nastiness suggesting
that it is also a receptacle for the surplus refuse of the capital.
Guanabacoa, a high and beautifully located city of twenty-five thousand
people, just outside of Havana, several degrees cooler than the capital city,
in the midst of pleasant breezes and cool groves, has narrow, filthy streets,
no pavements, no public improvements, small houses with no modern
conveniences, huddled together, and is a dozen times worse than if nature
had not done so much for it.
Güines and Marianao are so much cleaner and sweeter than any other
towns as to make one wonder why they are the exception instead of the
rule.
Possibly it is hardly fair to call attention to or animadvert upon the
sanitary regulations and conditions of Santa Clara, an inland city and capital
of Santa Clara Province, seeing that in ten and a half months of 1897 there
were over one hundred thousand deaths in the province, of which nearly
one third occurred in Santa Clara district. These were chiefly
reconcentrados, and show that there are some things Spanish even worse
than Spanish sanitation. The town has a population of twenty thousand, is
situated in a healthful locality, and while little has been done toward public
health, there is no yellow fever.
As with the cities and towns above mentioned, with the two exceptions
named, so of all Cuban aggregations of population. Everywhere there is
ignorance, carelessness, filth, disease, and death, and only education, care,
and time can remedy the evil. It may not, cannot be that Cuba will ever
enjoy the robuster health of the north, but she can be clean, and to that end

must every ability of knowledge, labour, and means be directed, not only by
those who are in authority, but by those whose direct welfare is at stake.
Outside of the cities, conditions prevail which will be more difficult, if
not in many cases impossible, to remedy. Much of the Island along the
coasts is swampy; there malaria and fevers breed, and these sections, if not
capable of drainage, must be deserted by man, and left to the alligators,
toads, and lizards. Many of the swamps may be drained and the land
converted into fields yielding rich harvests; these should be given the
proper attention. In many places the tropical forests are of such dense and
tangled growth that no sunlight ever penetrates them, and here, after
nightfall, deadly miasmas arise, full of poison and disease. Vast areas of
such forests are filled with valuable timber, and when these woods are
cleared and converted into money, and the sunlight can get in and exercise
its saving grace upon the land, a wonderful improvement will follow.
Back from the coasts, particularly in the eastern part of the Island, the
land is high and well drained, with mountains in some portions rising from
five thousand to eight thousand feet above the level of the sea. While the
heat and humidity incidental to the latitude prevail all over the Island, they
are much less in the uplands than along the coast, and the climate for half
the year is very agreeable and the air has a brilliant clearness that has
become famous. Over all these lands there should be in the future a
population which should develop into a contradiction of the tradition that
the people of the tropics live because they are too lazy to die.

CHAPTER IX

CITIES AND TOWNS OF CUBA

T HE political divisions of Cuba, known as provinces, are six in number,
and are named as follows, beginning at the west: Pinar del Rio, Havana,
Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba; the
capital city of each bearing the same name as its province.
Of the provinces it may be said that Pinar del Rio, with an area of 8486
square miles, has a population of 225,891 (167,160 white and 58,731
black), and is the centre of the tobacco industry, the famous Vuelta Abajo
district lying within its limits; sugar, coffee, rice, corn, cotton, and fruits are
also raised. Havana, with an area of 8610 square miles, has a population of
451,928 (344,417 white and 107,511 black). It is the centre of manufacture,
the capital province, and the most populous province of the Island.
Matanzas, with an area of 14,967 square miles, has a population of 259,578
(143,169 white and 115,409 black), and is the centre of the sugar industry;
corn, rice, honey, wax, and fruits are produced and the province contains a
deposit of peat and copper. Santa Clara, with an area of 23,083 square
miles, has a population of 354,122 (244,345 white and 109,777 black), and
it is rich in sugar, fruits, and minerals, including gold deposits in the Arino
River. Puerto Principe, with an area of 32,341 square miles, has a
population of 67,789 (54,232 white and 13,557 black), and is a
mountainous region, with the largest caves and the highest mountains;
building and cabinet woods and guava jelly are its chief products. Santiago
de Cuba, with an area of 35,119 square miles, the largest of the provinces,
has a population of 272,379 (57,980 white and 114,399 black), and not only
possesses all the agricultural products found in the other provinces, but also
has deposits of gold, iron, copper, zinc, asphalt, manganese, mercury,
marble and alabaster, rock crystal, and gems, and its commerce is most
extensive.

SQUARE IN FRONT OF GOVERNOR’S PALACE AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

There are 115 cities and towns in the Island having an estimated
population of 200 and upwards named as follows:
Cities Population Cities Population
Havana 200,000 Macurijes 4,100
Matanzas 50,000 Bayamo 3,634
Puerto Principe 40,679 San Luis 3,556
Santiago de Cuba 40,000 San Cristobal 3,522
Cienfuegos 25,790 Guira de Melena 3,500
Guanabacoa 25,000 Morón 3,017
Santa Clara 24,635 La Cruces 3,000
Cardenas 20,505 Alfonso XII 3,000
Trinidad 18,000 Arroyo Navanijo 3,000
Sancti Spiritu 17,540 Sabanillo del Encomendador 2,991
Sagua la Grande 14,000 Palmira 2,987
Regla 10,486 Guanajayabo 2,879
Manzanillo 9,036 Nueva Paz 2,737
Guantanamo 9,000 Alquizar 2,700
San Antonio de las Baños 7,500 San Felipe 2,311
San Juan de los Remedios 7,230 San Juan de las Yeras 2,267
San Fernando de Nuevitas 6,991 Jaruco 2,200

San Julian de los Guines 6,828 San Jose de las Lajas 2,170
Colón 6,525 La Esperanza 2,147
Bejucal 6,239 San Juan y Martinez 2,100
Jorellanos (Bemba) 6,000 Corral Nuevo 2,092
Santiago de las Vegas 6,000 Consolacion del Sur 2,000
Guanajay 6,000 Guines 2,000
Pinar del Rio 5,500 Santa Cruz 2,000
Holguin 5,500 Quemados de Guines 2,000
Caibarien 5,500 Quivican 1,950
Baracoa 5,213 Bahia Honda 1,889
Guira 5,000 Batabano 1,864
La Isabela 5,000 Bolondron 1,758
Artemisa 5,000 Santa Domingo 1,750
Santa Isabel de las Lajas 4,924 Mariel 1,637
Guana 4,650 Cuevitas 1,629
Gibara 4,608 Cervantes 1,560
Macagua 4,100 Ranchuelo 1,533
Cabañas 1,509 Managua 896
San Antonio de Cabezas 1,500 Ceiba del Agua 892
Zaza 1,500 Roque 800
Calaboya 1,500 Salud 800
Cartagena 1,497 Canasi 700
Calabazar 1,481 Caney 700
Palmillas 1,471 Jibacos 696
Aguacate 1,427 Cidra 695
San Diego del Valle 1,403 Vereda Nueva 672
Jiguani 1,393 Santa Maria del Rosario 660
Mantua 1,380 Rancho Velez 656
Cayajabos 1,352 Santa Ana 601
Marianao 1,225 San Jose de los Remos 570
San Antonio de Rio Blanco del Norte 1,200 Lagunillas 520
Candelaria 1,200 Guane 510
Ciego de Avila 1,167 San Matias de Rio Blanco 400
Catalina 1,165 Alto Songo 400
San Antonio de las Vegas 1,136 Limonar 330
Tapaste 1,130 Amaro 320
San Nicolas 1,100 San Miguel 300
Melena del Sur 1,082 Madruga 300
Santa Cruz del Sur 1,000 Cimarrones 300
Bainoa 1,000 Mangar 209
Sagua de Tanamo 981 La Boca 200

Vinales 925 Alonso Rojos 200

In addition to these are 132 places with less than 200 population,
including railroad stations, bathing and health resorts, and farm hamlets.
As will be observed by the student of municipal nomenclature, the
Spanish were liberal to Cuba in christening the towns in the Island, however
parsimonious the mother country was in respect of all other things; and
many Cuban towns have more name than anything else. The oldest town is
Baracoa, in the province of Santiago de Cuba. It was laid out in 1512. Its
chief products are bananas, cocoa, and cocoa oil, and there are some
remarkable caves near by, noted for beautiful stalactites and well preserved
fossil human remains.
The largest city in the Island is Havana, the capital, to which a chapter is
devoted elsewhere in this volume.

A MULE TRAIN, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY J. F. COONLEY, NASSAU, N. P.

Matanzas, in size the second city of the Island, and the capital of the
province of Matanzas, is, in some particulars, the most attractive city of

Cuba, although but one-fourth the size of Havana. It lies seventy-four miles
by rail to the east of Havana, on the fine bay of Matanzas, with beautiful
hills at its back. The town is divided into three parts by the rivers San Juan
and Yumuri, two streams which water the valley of Yumuri, situated behind
the hills of Matanzas, and presenting the most exquisite scenery in Cuba.
The climate and soil of the valley make Yumuri, to Cubans, synonymous
with poesy and Paradise. Notwithstanding the commercial importance of
Matanzas, the Spanish authorities have neglected the wharves and permitted
its harbour to become so filled with sediment from the river that ships are
compelled to load and unload by means of lighters in the roadstead. The
city was founded in 1693, and has paved streets, usually thirty feet in width,
with three-foot sidewalks; interesting stuccoed houses of two stories,
coloured drab and ochre, with balconies; pleasant parks, with fountains and
flowers; a pleasure promenade and drive—the Paseo; one of the best hotels
in Cuba; several theatres, among them the Esteban; some notable churches,
including the Hermitage, on Mount Montserrat, at whose shrine marvellous
cures are said to be effected. The people are well content.
The leading industries are rum distilleries, sugar refineries, guava-jelly
factories, machine and railroad-car shops. Shipments of sugar and molasses
to the United States in 1891-95 were about $60,000,000. The city has gas-
works and an electric-light plant, but no street-cars, and since 1872 it has
had a fine water supply, though only about half the houses are connected
with the water system, and many of the people still buy water of street
vendors, without knowledge as to the source of supply or purity of the
water. Sewers run through only two streets, though the location of the city is
well adapted to secure excellent drainage. The suburbs, or rather divisions,
of the city by the river are known as Versailles, on the north-east, and to the
south-east, Pueblo Nuevo. Through the latter part of the city leads the road
to the famous caves of Bellamar, three and a half miles, where many
invalids resort for the health-giving qualities of the warm air of the caverns.
The most beautiful and striking feature of Matanzas is the cañon of the
Yumuri, a great gorge of perpendicular walls green-clad with tropical
vegetation through which the rivers of the Yumuri Valley flow down to the
sea. This is a constant resort for the pleasure-loving Matanzans, and they
thoroughly realise its beauty and value to the city. There are many
interesting drives and excursions by river and rail from Matanzas. The
waggon roads extending into the interior, as everywhere in Cuba, are in

wretched condition; the railroad connections by several routes are fairly
good, the roads being equipped with American-cars and engines. Its
population of fifty thousand is nominal, having been reduced about one-
third by the war.
The third city in the Island is Puerto Principe, capital of the province of
Puerto Principe, and known to the natives as Camagüey, the original name
of the town and province. It is forty-five miles from the south coast and
thirty-five from the north, although it is forty-five miles from its seaport,
Nuevitas, with which it is connected by its only railroad. It is located in the
midst of what once was the grazing district,—though the cattle are now
destroyed,—and being on a plain seven hundred feet above the sea it is a
healthful place. Camagüey is a back-number town, so to speak, having
narrow streets with narrow sidewalks, or none at all, old houses, old
fashions, and fewer foreigners than any of the other Cuban towns. It is
distinctively Cuban, and the new era of Cuba will no doubt work a long
time on the good people of Camagüey before they set aside the old things
and step out into the procession of progress, clothed in the uniforms of the
modern “hustlers.” In this city of over forty thousand people there is not a
hotel, and the inhabitants are noted for their hospitality.
Of great commercial significance is Cienfuegos, one of the south-coast
cities, and in some respects one of the best towns on the Island. It is situated
on the landlocked bay of Jagua, with one of the safest harbours in the
world, and though built only since 1819, and restored after a hurricane in
1825, it has developed a spirit of energy and progress rare in Cuban cities. It
has an extensive and growing commerce, with numerous wharves and piers
for its shipping; a railroad 190 miles to Havana and one to Sagua la Grande
on the north coast; electric lights and gas-works; 25,790 people; 3000 stone
and wooden houses; the famous Terry theatre and one of the finest plazas in
Cuba; a good location for drainage, but with stagnant water in the streets,
and no sewers; much bad health, and one of the finest opportunities on earth
to take advantage of the new order of things and convert its energy and
youth into a power that will make Cienfuegos the Chicago of Cuba. There is
one good hotel. The only serious strike that ever occurred in Cuba took
place in Cienfuegos among the longshoremen, and resulted in the sending
of all the recalcitrants by the authorities to the Isle of Pines as criminals.
The bay of Jagua is noted for its beautiful clear blue water with a bottom of
the whitest sand. The climate is more variable than that of Cuban coast

cities as a rule, the mercury marking as high as ninety-three degrees in
summer and going down into the fifties during the night in the rainy season.
The Cuban city held to be the most healthful, though sanitary regulations
are practically unknown, is Trinidad, in the province of Santa Clara. It is
also one of the oldest, having been founded by Diego Velasquez in 1514. It
is three miles in the interior from its seaport, Casilda, though coastwise
vessels of light draft can approach it by the river Guaurabo. The town has a
picturesque location, on the slope of La Vija (“Lookout”), a hill rising nine
hundred feet above the sea. The harbour of Casilda is three miles long by
one and a half miles wide, and has only about eleven feet of water. From
this bay Cortez sailed for Mexico. There are several fine public parks and
drives, and socially Trinidad in the winter season is one of the gayest cities
on the Island. It is lighted by gas, and though it has no sewers, its location is
such that the rains keep it washed clean. The population is eighteen
thousand. In good times Trinidad has shipped to the United States $903,700
worth of sugar, mahogany, coffee, and honey in one year, but times have
been poor in recent years, and Trinidad is one of the towns which will feel
the reviving effects of the new era of prosperity.
Santa Clara, the capital of the province of that name, has a population of
twenty-five thousand, and is popularly known as Villa Clara. It was founded
in 1689, and was once known for its great wealth and beautiful women; its
glory in this latter regard still continues. It has one excellent hotel, kept in
modern fashion, and a fine theatre. Its railway connections are excellent in
all directions; indeed, it is the terminus of the Cuban system of railways. It
is 248 miles by rail from Havana, and thirty miles from the north and forty
from the south coast. Its location is high, and a fine grazing country
surrounds it. Minerals also abound, and ten thousand tons of a fine
asphaltum have been shipped in a year. Silver yielding as much as $200 per
ton has been found, but the mines have not been worked. Evidences of
natural gas are present near the town. Santa Clara has wide streets, and
despite its healthful location, it is, by reason of poor or no sanitary
regulations, an unhealthful place, though there is never any yellow fever.

YUMURI RIVER AND ENTRANCE TO THE VALLEY, MATANZAS.

The capital of the province of Santiago de Cuba is Santiago de Cuba,
generally known as Cuba to the natives and Santiago to foreigners. Owing
to its war record it is the best-known town in the Island. It is situated on the
south coast, one hundred miles from the west end of Cuba, and its harbour
is one of the safest and finest in the world, having an opening into the sea
only one hundred and eighty yards in width, extending back six miles into a
beautiful bay, three miles wide at its greatest width. Santiago has a
population of forty thousand (estimated sixty thousand in 1895), and is the
second oldest city in Cuba, the capital having been removed thither from
Baracoa in 1514 by Velasquez. It is historically the most interesting city in
Cuba, and it promises to be for the future second in importance to none in
the Island, except Havana. It became a bishopric as early as 1527 and is
now the metropolis of the Catholic Church in Cuba, the Archbishop of
Santiago being the Primate. The celebrations of church festivals are
conducted with ceremonies more elaborate than those anywhere else in the
Island, and the cathedral, in the Hispano-American style, is the largest in
Cuba, if not the handsomest. It is said that in a Santiago theatre Adelina
Patti made her first public appearance, at the age of fourteen years;
Velasquez is buried in this city, and so is Antomarchi, the physician of

Napoleon, who died, as his emperor did, upon a foreign island. Cuba’s
greatest poet, José Maria Heredia, was born here, as were Milanes, Dona
Luisa Perez de Montes de Oca, Dona Gertrudis Gomez de Avellanda; and
Placido, next to Heredia in merit, passed several years here.
Although well located for drainage, Santiago is one of the most
unhealthful towns in Cuba, and its beautiful bay is little better than a
cesspool. Yellow fever and smallpox have been the prevailing epidemics for
years, but under the new order a new condition will arise. Santiago, with
very poor business houses and offices, does a flourishing trade, wholesale,
retail, and in shipping. The surrounding country has many people employed
not only in agriculture, but in mining as well, for Santiago is the centre of
the mining district. Its railway facilities are practically nil, being located
two hundred miles east of the last railway leading anywhere. The city is
Moorish in its aspect. It is sufficiently ancient to be without hotels, though
there are several clubs where civilised beings may be entertained
comfortably. The fortifications about the city are interesting: the Morro,—
which is one hundred years older than that of Havana,—La Socapa, La
Estrella, and Smith Key—all these have received much mention during the
late war. The mining interests of Santiago will be considered under a
separate chapter.
Cardenas may be said to be the newest town in Cuba, and is known as
“the American city,” owing to the fact that many Americans are located here
in business, or make it their headquarters, with business interests elsewhere
in the Island. It was founded in 1828, is a thriving town, with wide streets,
numerous wharves, a plaza with a bronze statue of Columbus, and is a
purely commercial city. The harbour is shallow, and the piers running into it
are from three hundred to one thousand feet in length. Although without
sewers and located on swampy ground, Cardenas is not unhealthful as the
term is understood in Cuba. There are fine water-works, but many of the
people still prefer to buy water of street vendors. Gas and electricity light
the town. Its chief business is in sugar, but, unlike other Cuban cities, it
possesses numerous and varied manufactures, producing liquors, beers,
metal-work, soap, cigars, fabrics, etc. It has connection by steamer and rail
with the chief points of the Island. The population is 20,505, over 15,000 of
which is white. Cardenas exported goods in 1894 to the amount of
$10,008,565, of which $9,682,335 was in sugar shipped to the United
States, as against $10,000,000 the previous year. Her imports in 1892 were

$4,900,000, and in 1895 the United States sent 32,283 tons of coal to this
port. Situated in one of the richest agricultural sections of Cuba, Cardenas is
also not poor in mineral wealth, notably asphalt. Peculiar mines of asphalt
are found in the waters of the bay. The mineral is broken loose by bars
dropped from ten to twelve feet through the water upon it, and the pieces
are scooped up with a net. The supply of the mineral is renewed from some
unknown source as fast as it is taken away. One of these mines has
furnished as much as 20,000 tons, and the supply is inexhaustible. Asphalt
of the first grade is worth from $80 to $125 per ton.
Sagua la Grande, twenty-five miles from the mouth of the river of that
name, is almost wholly a sugar town. It has a population of 14,000, and is
the northern terminus of the Havana Railway system. Its seaport is La
Isabela, with a poor harbour; and its exports in 1895 reached nearly
$5,000,000—with a great falling off since, as it has suffered as much as any
town in the Island from the insurrection. As an indication of this it may be
said that immediately before the insurrection there were 23,500 cattle, 4500
horses, 4000 hogs, 700 sheep, and 450 mules in the Sagua district,
practically all of which have been destroyed or stolen. Sagua has an ice
plant whose product has sold at $3 per hundredweight. The railway from
Sagua to Cienfuegos marks the boundary between the western and eastern
districts of Cuba.
Caibarien is another nineteenth-century town, having been founded in
1822. Its houses are of brick, and its warehouses of recent styles of
architecture. Its population is fifty-five hundred, and it is said to be not
unhealthful, though its general level is not much more than ten feet above
the sea, and the country is swampy. Its chief industry is sugar, although
recently an active business in sponges has grown up, principally of local
consumption, the annual value approaching half a million of dollars. The
harbour is extensive, but shallow and poor. A railway extends to San
Andres, twenty-eight and one-half miles in the interior. Some waggon
roads, unusually good for Cuba, connect it with various sugar estates. The
future possibilities of Caibarien are numerous and great.
Manzanillo is the best town on the south coast between Trinidad and
Santiago, and was founded in 1784. It has a population of nine thousand,
and is the seaport of several interior towns and a rich sugar district, and is
also the gateway to the fertile valley of the Cauto River, the most important
stream in the Island. It has a fine plaza, and numerous inferior houses on

fairly good streets, wider than the usual Cuban street. There are no water-
works, gas-works, electric lights, or street-cars. The town is one of the most
unhealthful in the Island, and of Manzanillo mud the author has spoken in a
previous chapter. The principal shipments are lumber, tobacco, sugar,
honey, and wax. In 1892-93-94 four million feet of mahogany and two
million one hundred thousand feet of cedar were exported.
Pinar del Rio, the capital of its province, should be particularly
interesting to Americans, as it was founded in 1776. It is a brick and stone
town of 5500 population and is neither clean nor attractive. It has very few
foreigners and is in no sense a modern place. It is, however, of commercial
importance, being the centre of the famous Vuelta Abajo tobacco district,
which produces the finest tobacco in the world. Pinar del Rio is essentially
a tobacco town. It is connected with Havana by a highroad (calzada) and
also by railway. The town is lacking in most of the modern conveniences,
and the spirit of the people is not quick to respond to new notions.
An alphabetical list of the lesser towns may serve a useful purpose to the
reader whose geography of Cuba is as yet not complete.
Artemisa (Pinar del Rio) is a town of five thousand people, with a paved
road to Guanajay, nine miles, and a railway to Havana, thirty-five miles. It
is in a fine tobacco and sugar district, and is a low and unhealthful place,
but beautifully shaded with palms.

PANORAMA FROM THE ROAD TO THE CAVES, MATANZAS.

Bahia Honda (Pinar del Rio), with about two thousand population, is one
of the chief seaports of the mountain coast; and although it possesses none
of the visible evidences of future promise, still it is one of the places which
impress the visitor with belief in its future greatness. Its population is
largely black, its wharves are miserable, its houses are poor; though over
one hundred years old, it is not a port of entry—and still Bahia is
promising. The harbour is one of the finest on the coast, the surrounding
country is rich in tobacco and sugar soil, the climatic conditions are
favourable, and the new times will be good times for Bahia.
Cabanas (Pinar del Rio), with a population of fifteen hundred, has a
landlocked, shallow harbour, four miles by seven in extent, and its
connections with the interior are bad. It came into prominence during the
war, and was partly destroyed by General Maceo.
Consolacion del Sur (Pinar del Rio) is, after Bahia Honda, the chief
commercial town of the province. It has a population of two thousand, and
is in the centre of the Vuelta Abajo tobacco district, with eight hundred
plantations tributary to it.
Guanajay (Pinar del Rio) has a population of six thousand, is the
junction of several paved roads, and is considerably above the average

interior town in progressive spirit. It is lacking, however, in modern
conveniences and suffered by the war.
San Cristobal (Pinar del Rio), though one of the oldest towns in the
Island, is very enterprising and its people are energetic and prosperous. It
has a railway and good waggon roads, and its thirty-five hundred people
have a good climate and good health. It is in the midst of the Vuelta Abajo
tobacco district.
San Diego de los Banos (Pinar del Rio) is to be especially mentioned for
its wonderful sulphur baths. In one enclosure there are four of these springs,
having a temperature of ninety degrees, and they have effected cures in
leprosy, other cutaneous diseases, and rheumatism which are passing belief.
It has beautiful surroundings of hill and sea and its caves of Arcos de
Carguanabo are famous.
Vinales (Pinar del Rio), a small town of 925 people, is the interior
terminus of the railroad running to the north coast and the celebrated San
Vincente mineral springs.
Batabano (Havana) is the southern seaport of the city of Havana, thirty-
three miles to the north, and connected with it by rail and paved roads. The
town, in two parts, La Plaza and Surgirdero, is meanly built, and has about
nineteen hundred people. It has no harbour, but is the western terminus of
the south-coast line of steamers. The waters about Batabano are notable for
the beautiful submarine views they present to observers on steamers.
Batabano is hot and unhealthful.
Bejucal (Havana), built in 1710, has a population of six thousand two
hundred, an elevation of three hundred feet, and a situation in the midst of
pleasing scenery. The town itself is unattractive to the eye, but its health is
good, the people being noted for their long lives.
Cojimar (Havana), four miles from Havana, has a beautiful sand beach,
the finest in Cuba, and in time will become a profitable seaside resort,
though now unimproved. The British landed here in 1762.
Guanabacoa (Havana) is practically a suburb of Havana and has a
population of twenty-five thousand. With every opportunity and possibility
of being a clean, modern city, it is quite the reverse.
Güines (Havana), thirty miles from Havana over a fine waggon road, and
forty-four by rail, has a population of about seven thousand, and one of the
most desirable situations in the Island. It has bridges over the river Catalina,

a good hotel, a fine railway station; about it lies a rich agricultural and
grazing country, and the town is, in respect of health, thrift, and progress, a
model town—for Cuba.
Jaruco (Havana), with a population of two thousand two hundred, claims
recognition chiefly because it is clean. Naturally its health is better than that
of most Cuban towns.
Madruga (Havana) is famed for its warm mineral springs. It is fifty-five
miles from Havana by rail. Population three hundred.
Marianao (Havana), a suburb of Havana six miles away, has a population
of twelve hundred, and is said to be the cleanest and prettiest town in Cuba.
Its people are entirely of the better class.
Regla (Havana), a suburb of Havana, connected with the city by ferries,
has the largest and finest sugar warehouses in the world and a bull-ring
vying in popularity with those of Havana.
San Antonio de los Banos (Havana), with seven thousand five hundred
people, twenty miles from Havana, is the most popular mineral-springs
resort in the Island and its climate is famous for its health-giving qualities.
Colon (Matanzas), on the railway between Matanzas and Cardenas, in
the heart of the sugar-producing district of this section, has six thousand
five hundred people and is of much commercial importance. Like all the
others, it needs public improvements.
Jovellanos (Matanzas), also known as Bemba, is a coloured town, the
bulk of its population being negroes, and its only hotel is kept by a
Chinaman.
Macagua (Matanzas) is noted for its extensive sugar estates. Some of the
largest in Cuba are immediately around it. Population four thousand one
hundred. It has a railway to Colon and Santa Clara.
Calaboya (Santa Clara) has a population of fifteen hundred and
possesses, in the bridge over the Calaboya River, the longest railway bridge
in Cuba. Otherwise it is not important.
La Cruces (Santa Clara) is a railway junction and was at one time
actively engaged in shipping horses, cattle, and sugar. The people are active
and energetic, and have been complimented with the name of the “Yankees
of Cuba.”

La Isabela (Santa Clara), called also Concha and La Boca, is the seaport
of Sagua la Grande, and has five thousand people. It is the shore terminus
of the railway to Sagua and is of considerable commercial importance, with
a cosmopolitan people.
Remedios (Santa Clara), with a population of seven thousand, is in a fine
country and is one of the cities of the future, naturally and logically.
Sancti Spiritus (Santa Clara), also known as Santo Espiritu, founded in
1514, is one of the old towns of the Island. Despite its size (seventeen
thousand), it is of no great commercial importance, and is a dirty town in a
good location for cleanliness.
Santa Isabel (Santa Clara), with a population of five thousand, does a
good business in sugar and cattle. Cienfuegos is its seaport and is connected
with it by a railroad twenty-five miles long.
Tunas de Zaza (Santa Clara), with fifteen hundred population, is in such
a poor country agriculturally and aquatically, that the railway has a
monopoly in carrying vegetables and water supply to the people. The town
is hot and healthful. It has shipped as much as half a million dollars’ worth
of sugar, mahogany, cedar, honey, beeswax, etc., to the United States in one
year.
Nuevitas (Puerto Principe), population seven thousand, is a town of
promise and no public improvements. Water, in the dry season, commands
nearly as high a price as whiskey. It is the seaport of Puerto Principe,
Cuba’s largest inland town, and is connected with it by forty-five miles of
railroad. It has a fine harbour and a good location for drainage. It was at or
near Nuevitas that Columbus first saw Cuba. Its annual exports to the
United States have, in a good year, exceeded one million dollars.
Banes (Santiago de Cuba) is noted for its fruit business, as many as
4,651,000 bunches of bananas having been exported since 1890. Thirty-two
thousand pineapples were shipped in 1894, but the insurrection ruined the
business in 1896.
Baracoa (Santiago de Cuba) is the most eastern port of importance on
the north coast. It is the oldest town in Cuba and formerly was the capital. It
was founded in 1512 by Velasquez, whose house is still shown to the
traveller. Baracoa is far behind the times, but it has all the potentialities for
future greatness. The country along the coast is not healthful, but the
interior is not only fine scenically but also excellent as to its health

standard. There are no good roads and no railways of any kind. Baracoa
imports about nineteen thousand pints of beer per annum from the United
States, and Milwaukee sells at twenty-five cents a bottle. Copper, cocoanuts
and oil, bananas, and cocoa constitute the exports. General Maceo and his
followers inaugurated the last Cuban revolution in Baracoa, on the 20th of
February, 1895, and within a year had marched through the Island to
Mantua in the west of Pinar del Rio.

THE PLAZA, CIENFUEGOS.

Bayamo (Santiago de Cuba), with a population of about 4000 and an age
of about 350 years, is a Spanish relic city, being very like the earlier cities
of the mother country. It has eleven churches. It has none of the modern
conveniences and no railways, and its waggon roads are impassable in the
wet season. Bayamo never had a boom. It was the cradle of the Ten Years’
War.
Cobre (Santiago de Cuba), founded in 1558, is famous for its copper
mines. It has a magnificent sanctuary, in which is the little statue known as
the Virgin of Charity, which is claimed to have effected miraculous cures of
all kinds.

Gibara (Santiago de Cuba), also spelled with a “J,” is the seaport for
Holguin, with which it is connected by a railroad seventeen miles long and
by a very bad waggon road. It has a population of about five thousand. It is
greatly in need of improvement.
Guantanamo (Santiago de Cuba) has a population of nine thousand, and
is the centre of the coffee district. Other agricultural products and minerals
abound. It was founded in 1843, and still is not a modern town in the matter
of conveniences. It is unhealthful because it has no sanitary provisions. It
has a fine harbour and is of much commercial importance. It came into
prominence during the late war.
Holguin (Santiago de Cuba), with a high and healthful location and fifty-
five hundred people, ought to be a much better town than it is, and will
improve under the new order. It is fifteen miles from the north coast, and is
in the centre of the hardwood industry. It was of great military importance
during the late war.
Jiguani (Santiago de Cuba), with a picturesque mountainous location,
and an old castle in the vicinity, will be attractive to tourists and artists.
Of the 570 islands, or keys, on the north coast of Cuba and the 730 on
the south, the Isle of Pines is the only one of sufficient size to be of
importance; its area being 1214 square miles to 1350 square miles for all
the other 1299 Islands. The Isle of Pines belongs to the judicial district of
Bejucal (Havana), and was first called “Evangelist Island” by Columbus,
who discovered it in 1494. It has a population of 2000, of which 1800 is
about equally divided between its two chief towns, Nueva Gerona and
Santa Fe. The people are rather superior to those of the Island of Cuba, and
the climate is drier and better than that of the main Island. Besides the pines
which flourish on the island, there is a great quantity of mahogany, cedar,
and other hardwoods. There are deposits of fine marble, as well as of silver,
mercury, and iron, yet to be developed. Turtle fishing and pineapple raising
flourish to some extent. The Isle of Pines is really two islands, separated by
a tide-covered swamp, over which there is a causeway. The south portion is
rough and barren, while the northern part is fertile and pleasing to the eye.
The towns are poor. Its mineral waters are much recommended for
affections of the stomach.
A few of the other islands, or keys, are inhabited in a small way, and the
largest of them, Cayo Romano, has an area of 140 square miles, with three

hills rising from its flat plain.

CHAPTER X

HAVANA
“Oh Queen of many-coloured garb
And red-tiled crown!—in glory
The poets who
Have sung of you
Have set your name and story.

“No fairer Queen, they sing, than you,
The fairest of the daughters
Of Southern seas
Who take their ease
Beside the sunlit waters.

“And I, as they, would sing thy praise
As is to be expected;
But ere I sing,
Oh Queenly Thing,
Won’t you be disinfected?”
W. J. LAMPTON.

W HATEVER may be said of Havana, the capital city of the Island of
Cuba, however sonorously its high-sounding name, San Cristobal de
la Habana, may be rolled forth, what titles of Queen of the Antilles,
Key of the New World, or other titular effervescence may be thrown about
it by the sentimental Spaniard, or the vivid-minded visitor, the plain, prosaic
fact remains that Havana for centuries has smelt bad, and man’s other four
senses are utterly routed from any field of enjoyment when his nose goes on
the warpath. Unfortunately Havana has, for this reason, never been the city
of delight that Nature intended it should be for at least one third of every
year of its existence. In the great majority of instances bad smells arise from
a condition of sanitary neglect which means bad health; and Havana has
been, to all intents and purposes, a plague spot for centuries. Yellow fever is

always present, malarial diseases of all kinds are prevalent, smallpox rings
the changes at every opportunity, and every ill that tropic flesh is heir to has
found a home and government encouragement in Havana.
This chapter on Cuba’s capital city is thus introduced because, before
anything else is done looking to the reorganisation and the regeneration of
the city and the Island, thorough measures for the health of the people must
be formulated and put into immediate and active operation. With the new
order must come thousands of new people; and if these newcomers,
accustomed, as the poorest of them are, to better sanitary regulations and
conditions than have existed in Havana and Cuba, are permitted to enter the
Island and inhale its deadly stenches, Cuba will become an international
cemetery and it will receive a backset worse than the worst Spain ever did
for it.
Whatever Havana is now commercially, the time was when it ranked
eighth among the commercial cities of the globe, and the wealth of its
people was of the fabulous kind which characterised everything in the New
World. The city was founded about 1519, and it received its name, San
Cristobal de la Habana, from a small town of that name established by
Velasquez near Batabano, on the south coast. This was practically the first
settlement, but the second town absorbed the settlers of the less important
place. So large was the hope of a great future for the new town that Diego
Velasquez, the first Governor of the Island, called it Lláve del Nuevo
Mundo, the “Key of the New World.” Later, Las Casas obtained a grant of
civic rights for it, and it became the permanent capital. It was burned by the
buccaneers in 1528 and was rebuilt by De Soto, who discovered the
Mississippi, and he surrounded the city by well constructed fortifications. It
was captured and sacked by the pirate Jacob Sores in 1556, but was
refortified, and in 1573-1589 Philip II. built the castles, Morro and Los Tres
Reyes, which still exist. In 1628 an attack of the Dutch fleet was repulsed,
and in 1762 it was taken by the British. It was restored to the Spanish July
18, 1763, who held it until December 31, 1898, when it passed into the
hands of the United States as trustee for the people of Cuba.
The approach to Havana from the sea is most pleasing to the eye, the
narrow entrance to the harbour (one thousand feet wide) being flanked on
either side by castellated forts, the best known of which are Morro Castle
and Cabañas, whose names are familiar to all Americans since the Spanish-
American war. The harbour is three miles in length by one and one half

miles in width, is naturally very fine and of ample capacity for the business
of the port; but the Spanish authorities have, for four hundred years and
more, permitted it to be filled with the filth of the city and the sediment
from various small streams which empty into it, until now a large part of it
is useless for navigable purposes, and it is a constant source of ill-health to
both native and visitor. The natural depth of the harbour is forty feet, but it
has filled up to such an extent that an available depth of only about eighteen
to twenty feet is possible. The tide on the Cuban coast rises and falls only
about two feet. The water-front of the bay, comparatively of small extent, is
lined with docks and piers, some of them built of iron, and of the first class.
Still, the bulk of the shipping business is done by lighters, and the harbour
is alive with small boats. Two lines of ferry-boats connect Havana with
Regla, across the harbour, where the principal coal docks are situated. The
harbour sea-wall, which is backed by a wide street lined with parks and fine
buildings, gives to the city a most attractive appearance from the water.
Havana has a fluctuating population, variously estimated at from two
hundred thousand to three hundred thousand souls; at present it is probably
not greater than the former number. The people represent the best there is in
Cuba, in point of wealth, education, and progress, and they are largely
Spaniards, either Spanish-or Cuban-born. The city is by far the largest and
richest in the Island, and has always been to Cuba what Paris is to France.
The city is especially noticeable in that its houses, built of the absorbent,
porous stone of the Island, are painted in yellows and pinks and greens and
blues and whites, with a prevailing red in the tiled roofs. Of the seventeen
or eighteen thousand houses of the city, three-fourths are of one story and
only about two dozen have four stories. The people live very closely
together; the rich and the poor, the good and the bad, are strangely huddled,
all of them more or less regardless of the simplest laws of sanitation. It is
not so great a wonder that the health of the city is so bad, as that any health
exists. Rents are high, with the result that as many poor persons as possible
live in one house, and the moral health suffers no less than the physical. If
any animals are owned—as, for example, horses—they find quarters on the
ground floor. Except in the best houses (and some fine specimens of elegant
homes exist in the city), modern conveniences are unknown. Iron bars take
the place of glass in the windows and doors, and windows are always open
in dry weather. The domestic life of the Havanese is an open book to all
who wish to look upon it as they pass, for the houses open directly upon the

street, and the lower story is on the street-level. Most of the floors are laid
directly on the ground, and it would seem as if the people did all in their
power to maintain a low degree of health. All the good houses have marble
floors.
Churches are numerous all over the city, the Cathedral in which the
remains of Columbus are said to have reposed being the chief in point of
interest.[13] The women of Havana constitute a large portion of the
congregations; the men give little attention to church attendance.
The Government buildings are numerous, but neither modern nor
beautiful. The cigar factories and tobacco warehouses are commodious
structures; indeed, some of the former occupy what were at one time
official or private palaces. The retail stores are usually small places, with
the stocks of goods mostly in the windows.
There are numerous parks. The Parque Central, the first in importance, is
the fashionable centre of the city. About it are hotels, theatres, public
buildings, and cafés; a band plays there during certain evenings, and at
night it is a blaze of light and alive with promenaders. The streets in old
Havana, that portion originally within the walls, are very narrow; often the
sidewalks are not wider than two feet, and sometimes they are entirely
lacking. In the newer portions of the city the streets are thirty-three feet
wide, with five-foot sidewalks. Some of the streets are paved with blocks of
stone in poor fashion, and some are dirt roads which are almost impassable
in the wet season. Naturally, this condition of the streets does not improve
the public health. Some effort was making when the war began, looking to
street improvement, and contracts were let to an American firm; but the war
stopped all operations in that direction. The handsomest street in Havana is
the Cerro, running up the hill back of the city, and lined with handsome
villas in grounds and gardens of tropical loveliness. Here many of the
aristocracy reside. Another fine public promenade-street is the Prado, which
follows, as nearly as may be, the line of the old walls. The Prado, and the
Paseo de Tacon, are the Champs Élysées of Havana, and on many nights the
former is as brilliant as that famed Parisian promenade.
Havana lies so low that a wind tide will inundate the streets near the
water; and as much of that portion of the city is built on made-ground, the
material being of the worst sort of refuse, it is scarcely to be expected that
health will abound. Owing to the narrowness of the streets, the possibilities

for street-railway building are small, although there are twenty-seven miles
of track in the city, with cars run by horse power; in the suburbs by steam
dummies. The field for development in this line presents especial attractions
for American capital, and the future promises much. The cab system of
Havana was unusually good before the war. At that time there were six
thousand public vehicles, with a maximum fare of twenty cents, and many
were so cheap that labouring people could afford to use them as street-cars
are used in this country. The volante, once the national vehicle of Cuba, has
been relegated to the rougher roads of the country districts. There is also a
‘bus line, doing about three times the business of the street-cars.
The sewerage system is in a deplorable condition, and the last effort
made to improve it was stopped by the war. What should be done is a
problem to be solved by American engineers, and had Colonel Waring, of
New York, not fallen a victim to Havanese filth, he would no doubt have
done for the city what Spain in all her years of possession failed to do. The
task is now upon the shoulders of General Ludlow, whose efficiency is
beyond question. The city is lighted by gas and electricity, the works being
operated by a Spanish-American company, controlled from New York City.
The water supply of the city has been excellent since the new aqueduct
was completed, in 1893, after thirty-two years of delay. The water is
gathered from about four hundred springs in the neighbourhood of Vento,
ten miles from the city; it is calculated that they will yield nearly forty
millions of gallons every twenty-four hours. The aqueduct, tunnel, and
receiving basin cost $3,500,000. The reservoirs, four miles from the city,
with a capacity of eight millions of gallons, cost $566,486, and the laying of
pipes, etc., $1,566,374, or a total of over $5,000,000. The works are owned
by the city.
The telephone system, owned by the Government, is leased to the Red
Telefonica de la Habana, and had, previous to the war, twenty-one miles of
line and fifteen hundred subscribers.
Two companies comprise the fire department of the city, and these are of
the old-style “volunteer” variety. One of the companies is supported by the
city, the other by private enterprise. Fires are rare and seldom extensive, the
annual losses not aggregating half a million dollars, and insurance
companies find Havana risks most desirable.

The death-rate of Havana is about 33 per 1000, a figure 25 per cent. in
excess of the majority of American cities. In one year (1893) there were
6610 deaths to 4175 births, showing a loss in population of 2435. While
yellow fever and diseases due to lack of sanitation are the chief causes of
death, it is noticeable that 20 per cent. of the deaths are due to consumption,
a disease not generally understood to prevail in the soft air of the tropics.
The proportion of illegitimacy, which is 147 per 1000 births in Austria, the
leading European country in this regard, is over 250 in Havana among the
whites. What it is among the blacks is unknown.
There are 120 tobacco manufactories of the first class in the city, and
many of lesser rank, and thousands of people find employment in them.
Some of the larger factories employ between 400 and 500 hands each. The
shipments of cigars from Havana from 1888 to 1896 reached the enormous
total of 1,615,720,000; the United States taking 739,162,000, or somewhat
less than half. Owing to the heavy tariff, the shipments decreased from
188,750,000 in 1888 to 60,000,000 in 1896 and for several years
previously. Ninety-nine per cent. of the Cuban cigars received in the United
States come from Havana.
Havana easily leads the other seaports of the Island in commerce, about
one-third of all the shipments from the Island coming from that port. An
average of 1200 vessels a year clear from the port, with an aggregate
tonnage of over 1,500,000. In 1894, 1309 foreign vessels entered the port,
having a tonnage of 1,794,597 tons.
Commercially, Havana occupies a most important position, and when by
the adoption of modern ideas in all matters of progress she has regenerated
herself, cleansed herself, rejuvenated herself, there is no doubt that she will
take her place among the rich and powerful cities of the world.
The Botanical Gardens are situated on the Paseo de Carlos III., next to
the Captain-General’s estate. They were originally intended for giving
practical lessons in botany to the students of the University of Havana; but
there was so much disorder during these lessons that they had to be
suppressed. These gardens are on one of the most beautiful places in the
outskirts of Havana and have been comparatively well kept. Some ten years
ago a stone and iron wall that had surrounded the Campo de Marte was
removed from there and placed around the Botanical Gardens. If the
Spanish Government had attended to the cultivation and preservation of

tropical plants and fruits in the way that has been done in the British
colonies, especially in Jamaica, these gardens would be to-day of the
greatest utility; but with the characteristic slackness that they have shown in
all the branches of administration of public affairs they have neglected
botany, and, from a scientific point of view, the gardens are of little or no
value. Probably a scientist could find in some of the gardens for the
cultivation and sale of flowers just as valuable material as he could here.
Let us hope that under the new regime the necessity of studying the tropical
flora will be realised.

HAVANA, FROM ACROSS THE BAY.

Education in Havana and in all Cuba is in a very primitive condition—
old-fashioned, theoretical systems are general, and the lack of practical
applications of the different subjects taught is greatly felt. This difficulty is
mainly due to the fact that the Government has hitherto controlled
education in all its branches, and, far from applying to its improvement the
receipts from other sources, it has attempted to arrange matters in such a
way that the bulk of the expense should be borne by a portion of those
receiving instruction. In the last Cuban budget the revenue from
matriculation fees alone reached $90,000. These fees are paid by students of

all schools which are not free. If to this the other items, as, for example,
“examination fees” and “inscription of certificates,” are added, the receipts
will probably reach $150,000, nearly two-thirds of the total sum of
$247,000 yearly appropriated for public instruction in the same budget.
Under Spanish Government control all teaching is divided into three
classes: first, or primary instruction; second, or elementary instruction; and
professions. To follow these courses, a student must have matriculated and
passed the examinations of the preceding ones, either in Spain or a Spanish
Government college, no foreign titles being respected. There is only one
examination required to pass from first to second instruction; the third
instruction, however, is a five years’ course, divided as follows:
First year: Latin and Spanish grammar, geography.
Second year: Latin and Spanish grammar, Spanish history.
Third year: Arithmetic and algebra, universal history, rhetoric, French,
English, or German.
Fourth year: Geometry and trigonometry, philosophy (logic, ethics, and
psychology), and languages (French, English, or German).
Fifth year: Physics, chemistry, natural history, agriculture, physiology.
After being examined in these each year, the student passes the Bachelor
of Arts examination, which consists of two oral exercises on the subjects he
has studied during the previous five years. To enter the professional courses
at the University a candidate must show the title of A. B.
It must be said to the honour of some schools, that, although they have
been bound to follow the plan of studies ordered by the Government, they
have not confined themselves to it strictly, and other courses have been
taught in them in addition. The best schools in Havana are the Jesuits’, the
Pious schools, and one or two others of a smaller number of students. There
is a class of cheap day-schools both in the city of Havana and throughout
the Island which is very objectionable; the instruction given is very bad and
the children are so neglected that they acquire in a very short period of time
a number of vicious habits and lose all idea of morality and self-respect.
Cuban children are generally gifted with remarkable memories, and this is
taken advantage of by some of their teachers, who cram their heads with
stuff which they cannot understand and which consequently proves utterly
useless to them.

The University of Havana is established in the old convent of Saint
Dominic in the centre of the city, facing the back of the Governor’s Palace.
The building is over three hundred years old and is a typical specimen of
the old Spanish monastical architecture; the quadrangles are surrounded by
arched cloisters, the stone steps are long and wide, and the walls are six feet
thick of solid masonry. All the mortar on the outer wall has long since fallen
off, and the building has more the aspect of an old-fashioned fortress than
of a peaceful temple of contemplation and learning.
When the old Dominicans owned the convent they instituted a free
school for children, and as the requirements of the city became more
pressing they extended their teaching to other and higher branches of
learning, among which the study of law, medicine, and philosophy was
included. They also had an annex school for special instruction.
At present the lectures are given by graduates of Spanish universities
who have taken the degree of Doctor in the course they may have followed.
The number of students, in some years, has reached two thousand. None of
them sleep in the building. To be a professor it is necessary either to have
acquired distinction in the vacant chair of the special profession, or to be
the best in a public contest against all the others aspiring to the chair, or to
be appointed by the Crown.
The students of the Havana University wear no caps and gowns, but the
professors on every official occasion appear in their “togas” and caps,
which are black, with tassels, lining, and cuffs of the colour of their
respective faculties. Medicine is yellow, Law is red, Science is dark blue,
Philosophy and Letters, light blue. Pharmacy, purple, and so on.
In spite of strict orders from the rectors and professors and covert threats
from the Spanish Government officers, no student has attended lectures on
the 27th of November since 1871, when seven students were unjustly
accused by the Spanish Volunteers of having desecrated the tomb of a
patriot. It was in vain that a brave Spanish officer, called Capdevilla,
showed that the scratches on the glass of the coffin were covered with
moss: all he succeeded in doing was to provoke the Volunteers, who did
their best to kill him, and to spoil his career; he lived twenty-seven years
more and was never promoted. He died in Santiago. The students were
executed two days after their arrest. When the son of the man whose tomb
had been the cause of so much villainy went to Cuba for his father’s

remains, twenty years after that event, a notary public attended the
ceremony and the son was a witness to the declaration that all was in
exactly the same condition as at the time of the burial. A monument was
erected to the memory of the students after the Spanish Cortes had declared
that they had been innocent of the charge that had been brought against
them. There is a significant statue of a blindfold woman with broken scales
in her hand on one side of the monument whilst History on the other side
appears recording.
After this disgraceful act it is not surprising that the students of Havana
University furnished such a ready contingent to the ranks of the rebellion.
When in Havana last September the author, accompanied by Admiral
Sampson, paid a visit to the Boys’ Technical School. It was just starting up
again after the blockade, and though there were not many scholars, the
opportunity was afforded to observe the possibilities of this admirable
institution. Many specimens of the boys’ work were given to the author, and
on returning to the United States some of them were shown the President,
who expressed gratification at these signs of industrial life and a hope that
the school would be provided for in the new budget of the Island. The
Havana Provincial School of Arts and Trades is an institution for the
promotion of technical knowledge among workmen and the training of
youths (preferably artisans’ sons) in the theories and practice of trades. It is
maintained at the expense of the Deputation of the Province of Havana.
The first courses given in this school commenced in 1882. In 1889,
thanks to the efforts of its founder, Don Fernando Aguado y Rico and some
zealous assistants, some shops were added to the school. They succeeded in
having an increase allowed in the appropriation voted by the Provincial
Deputation. The present cost of the school is $16,350 a year. This school is
absolutely a free school. The instruction is divided into day courses and
night courses. In view of its limited resources, to provide for boarders in the
institution has, thus far, been impossible, consequently all the pupils are day
scholars. A good deal may be said of Mr. Aguado’s work in this school. It is
to be regretted that, like so many others who work for the public good, the
results should not correspond to the labour. He conceived the idea of
creating this school a few years after graduating from the University of
Havana. After several unsuccessful attempts he managed to start his
enterprise, and since then the improvement of the instruction and the
general welfare of its scholars have been the main object of his life. The

acquisition of a lot of ground and the building of a suitable house for the
shops for mechanical training have been the most important steps taken
since the foundation. The new building is outside the city and is high and
airy. Part of the ground purchased will have a building erected for an
agricultural and industrial museum.
It is to be regretted that this school, which is the only one of its class in
Cuba, should furnish accommodation for only the limited number of 491
pupils. A city of 250,000 inhabitants, like Havana, should be able to provide
more for this object. It is to be remarked that, out of the number mentioned,
as many as 316 take night courses.

THE PRADO, HAVANA.

There is perhaps no branch of instruction that may lead to such
important developments in Cuba as the training of her youths in the
mechanical trades; the want has been felt for a long time, and with the only
exception of this school no efforts have been made to alleviate it. The
Cuban, being naturally quick, makes a good mechanic, but unless he is
trained to his work and has some knowledge of technicalities he can never
reach the degree of skill which the modern mechanic requires to master his

trade. However bright a man may be he can never acquire perfection in any
branch of industry if he confines himself to the results of individual practice
and personal observation. In a place like Cuba, where the wealth and
prosperity of the country depend materially on one industry like the sugar
industry, which is worked with huge machinery, there is no excuse for
bringing over every year foreign engineers and mechanics to oversee any
important repairs that may be necessary, or to erect new plants. One would
expect that being constantly on the ground, seeing daily the working of this
machinery, those interested would acquire such complete mastery of the
processes that, far from having to depend on outsiders, they would be
making and suggesting improvements. The explanation is, as has been
stated, merely the want of technical knowledge; give the Cubans complete
mechanical instruction, technical and practical, and tangible results will be
seen in a remarkably short period. Let us hope that Mr. Aguado will
continue working with the zeal and ardour that he has shown heretofore,
and that ere long he may enjoy the satisfaction of seeing his work
completed in a way that may exceed his most sanguine expectations.
Havana feels the want of good hotels. There are some where a certain
degree of comfort may be had by paying high prices, but even then it falls
short of what can be obtained in other places at very much lower rates.
Travellers in Cuba have to be satisfied with taking what they can get in this
respect, as among those of so-called first-class standard there is little
difference between one hotel and another. Anybody who has been in
Havana during the winter months can have no doubt how profitable an
investment would be an hotel on American lines. As every steamer arrives
there is a rush for rooms most uncomfortable for travellers, to say nothing
of their disappointment after they have succeeded in securing what, judging
by the rate, they expect to find an unusually fine apartment, and which
actually turns out to be a small whitewashed den, with very second-rate
furniture and an iron bed. No curtains, no carpets, and bare walls. The most
frequented are the Inglaterra and Pasaje hotels. Besides these, there is the
Louvre, which, though much smaller than the other two, is beyond
comparison more comfortable and better furnished.
There are several theatres in Havana. The Tacon, now owned by
American capitalists, is the third largest in the world.
The Church of the Merced (Mercy) is the most fashionable in the city.
The Belen (Jesuit) is the most frequented. It has, connected with it, a

school, a laboratory, an observatory, and a museum of natural history. More
men go to the Church of Santo Domingo than to any other because more
pretty women go there.
Fine suburbs of hill and seashore hedge Havana in. Notable among these
are Jesus del Monte, the highest point, 220 feet; Cerro, Chorreta Vedado
(beautiful and fashionable), Marianao, eight miles out; Regla, across the
harbour, famed for its bull-ring and large sugar warehouses; Guanabacoa,
Casa Blanco, Playa de Marianao (seashore); La Cienaga, Puertos Grandes,
and others of less importance. These places are of varying quality, from the
very fashionable to the kind which exist because existence there is cheaper
than in the city. The roads (calzadas) leading out of Havana are, as a rule,
good, though, owing to the war, some are just now in bad repair.
Weather observations have been made in Havana since 1859. The rainy
season continues from June to November; the rest of the year is dry,
although about one-third of the rainfall of the year comes in the dry season.
The average rainfall is about 50 inches. The temperature varies from 64
degrees to 85 degrees, and the humidity, which rarely falls below 75, makes
the heat most oppressive. The early morning and late afternoon and evening
are the hours devoted to business and pleasure.
The Jersey mosquito is a silken-winged messenger of mercy compared
with his cousins in Havana.
There are many asylums and hospitals in the city which are not lacking
in funds or attention, but they are all conducted upon antiquated notions,
which greatly lessen their usefulness. As in other Catholic cities, Sunday is
the amusement day of the week, and all the Havanese are out in gala attire
on that day after morning service at the churches. There are many parks and
promenades. The Alameda, the Plaza de Armas, the Parque de Isabella, and
the Prado are the chief places of resort.

CHAPTER XI

COLONEL WARING’S SANITARY REPORT

W HEN in October, 1898, the late Colonel George E. Waring, of New
York City, who had been sent by the Government to investigate the
physical condition of Havana, became the victim of the monster he
had sought to throttle, he had already written a large portion of his report,
and he left copious notes for the completion of it, from which his efficient
secretary and assistant, Mr. G. Everett Hill, prepared a full report. From this
report the following extracts are made:
“The death-rate of the city has always been high. In five years (not
consecutive) between 1800 and 1819, with a population less than one-third
of the present number of inhabitants, 26,576 people perished from yellow
fever alone. In 1832 the cholera killed 10,000. The official reports of the
Spanish garrison show that up to January 16, 1896, more than 82 per cent.
of the total losses were due to yellow fever. In 1897 the total mortality by
disease in the Spanish army in Cuba was 32,534.
“At present the death-rate in Havana is enormous. The mortality for the
week ending October 6, 1898, was 536—an annual rate of 139.36 per cent.
per 1000. Since then owing to the change of season and to the removal of
certain contributing causes, it has fallen to 114.4.
“The surroundings and customs of domestic life are disgusting almost
beyond belief. Sixteen thousand houses, out of a total of less than 20,000,
are but one story high, and at least 90 per cent. of the population live in
these—averaging say 11 to each house. Usually the house covers the entire
lot, so that there is no yard; though one or two courts are commonly
included in the building. According to the general—almost the universal—
plan, the front rooms are used as parlours or reception rooms. Beyond them
is a court, on which open the dining-rooms and sleeping-rooms. Beyond
these, on another court, are—I might say is—the ‘kitchen, stable, and privy,
practically all in one.’” In Colonel Waring’s own words:
“The characteristic feature of the whole establishment—perhaps the only feature which is
conspicuous in every house without exception—is the privy-vault, and sometimes a second vault for

kitchen waste. These occupy a space practically under and almost in the kitchen. It is very rarely,
indeed, that a Cuban privy has a ventilating pipe, so it belches forth its nauseous odours throughout
the house and pervades the streets.”
“There is no ordinance—at least none in force—requiring a householder to empty his privy vault.
He uses it until it threatens to overflow; then he hires a night-scavenger, who comes with a cart,
carrying the requisite number of barrels. These are filled through square holes at the top, and
discharged through a plugged orifice at the bottom.
“The workmen use tub-like ladles with long handles, with which they scoop up the filth. These
they carry, dripping as they go, through kitchen, dining-room, reception-room, and hall to the street.”
“When the barrels are filled, the cart starts, ostensibly for the prescribed place of disposal; but
often, in a dark street, the plugs come out, and, before the waggon has gone very far, the barrels are
empty.
“Lest the conditions above set forth should fail to do their appointed work of destruction,
stimulus for their effectiveness is furnished by an extraneous source of malaria of the very worst
character.
“The southerly edge of the harbour is bordered by broad marshes, through which flow a number
of watercourses, and to which these bring the offscouring of a very poor quarter of the town, and
especially the effluent of the slaughtering-pens and of other foul establishments; while a large portion
of the flat is used as a dumping-ground for garbage.
“This intimate relation of marsh and filth is greatly aggravated by the admixture of fresh and salt
water, by occasional floods, and by a daily scorching sun.
“The vicinity of such marshes would be deadly in this climate, even to a veritable ‘City of
Hygeia.’ Their proximity to this foul, fever-cursed town has always been recognised as disastrous,
even by intelligent Habaneros themselves.”

The water supply of Havana is very pure and abundant,—more than two
hundred gallons per head per day:
“This and the winds of the Gulf save the city from being absolutely and unqualifiedly bad; but
they are powerless to make it tolerable. It is a veritable plague-spot.
“Its own people, largely immune though they are to yellow fever, which has prevailed here
without interruption for one hundred and sixty-eight years, fall constant victims under the pernicious
malarial and depressing influences to which they are always subjected; and it needs only the
immigration of fresh material, which the enterprise of our population is sure to bring here, to create a
sacrifice such as we have not yet known; while commerce will carry the terror and the terrible
scourge of yellow fever to our shores, until we rise again in a war of humanity, and at all costs wipe
out an enemy with which no military valour can cope.

YARD OF AMERICAN CLUB, HAVANA.

“Can Havana be purified? And if so, will such purification result in the eradication of yellow
fever and malaria? Both questions can be answered affirmatively and positively. Havana is no dirtier
than many another city has been. In England, in the olden time, the earthen floors were strewn with
rushes. When these became sodden with filth beyond all endurance, fresh rushes were thrown over
the old ones, and these in turn were buried, until the foul accumulation was several feet deep.
Excrement was allowed to remain in and around the houses indefinitely, or was thrown into the
streets regardless of consequences. In London, the frequent cry of, ‘Ware below!’ indicated that the
household slops were about to be poured from an upper window. These conditions remained until
repeated visits of the great sanitary teachers—the plague, the black death, the cholera, and other
pestilences, which devastated cities and swept whole villages out of existence—had taught their hard
lesson. On the continent the ignorance and neglect were, if possible, even greater. We have profited
by the bitter experience of our ancestors; and no intelligent person questions the merit of sanitary
works. But their true value is not yet fully appreciated, even by educated men whose interests are at
stake.
“The poison of yellow fever is ponderable. It clings to low levels and usually follows the lines of
greatest humidity. Like malaria, it is more active—or at least more to be feared—by night than by
day. The danger from it in any quarter of an infected locality depends upon the presence primarily of
filth, secondarily of dampness; and it increases in direct proportion to the confinement and stagnation
of the air. Infected cellars are more dangerous than infected rooms. The holds of ships are notorious
hotbeds of the disease.
“In Havana the average height of the ground floor of a house above the soil is but six or seven
inches; and this space is unventilated. The earth is not only damp, but is sodden with putrefying
organic matter. The houses are closely built, without adequate space for ventilation between them. In
the poorer quarters the population is crowded, a whole family often occupying a single room. The
emanations from the cesspool and garbage-vault pervade, as has been stated, the kitchen and the
sleeping-and living-rooms, even of houses of the better class. The standard of personal cleanliness is,
necessarily, very low. These conditions, for which the citizens are responsible, are sufficient in

themselves to transform the most healthy locality into a fever-nest. In the case of Havana, they are
accumulated by climatic conditions favourable to, but in no case accountable for, the propagation of
disease. No amount of rainfall, no high average of humidity, and no degree of temperature will cause
zymotic pestilence, if cleanliness be secured and maintained, and proper drainage of the soil
established.”

In the notes which Colonel Waring brought with him from Cuba, the
following improvements are specified as absolutely necessary for the
sanitary redemption of Havana:
(1) The immediate organisation of a Department of Public Cleaning,”
under the full control of a single Commissioner experienced in the conduct
of such work,” who should have authority to act as occasion may require.
The chief function of the Department would be the maintenance of a
“constant state of cleanliness” in all the streets and places of public business
or resort, including the abattoirs and markets. “It should also control the
disposal of all wastes, except sewage—by cremation and otherwise.”
(2) The construction of a system of sewers “to receive the liquid wastes
of all houses of the main city.” The topography of the city divides it
naturally into several districts. Each of these should be served by a distinct
sewerage system, which should discharge directly into the harbour or the
Gulf, as the case may be. “ Before such discharge, the effluent should be
effectively clarified by one of the various well known methods; so that it
would carry only its dissolved impurities.” The dilution would be
immediate and more than sufficient; for the daily movement of sea water
into and out of the harbour is about six thousand times as great as would be
the day’s discharge of clarified sewage from the harbour slope of the city.
(3) The clearing out and filling with clean earth of all the cesspools and
garbage-vaults, and the supplying to each house of a suitable water-closet
connected with the public sewer system. The closets furnished should be
practically automatic in operation, and not liable to damage from ignorance
or carelessness. They should be made so that no foreign substance able to
cause an obstruction in the house drain or the sewer could pass out of sight.
If more elaborate plumbing be desired, this may be put in by the
householder, under proper supervision, at his own expense. The immediate
installation of the water-closet in each house is the only course which will
make possible the annihilation of the cesspool; and Havana will not be a
healthy city until this result is accomplished. The benefit that will be gained
when it is done is out of all proportion to the insignificant cost of the doing.

(4) The paving, or repaving, of all the streets with the best quality of
asphaltum. Some form of artificial paving of the streets of cities is
indispensable. Mr. Edwin Chadwick says that between the two divisions of
a town population, similarly situated in general condition, one part
inhabiting streets which are unpaved and another inhabiting streets that are
paved, a difference of health is observed. He cites instances showing the
sanitary benefit resulting from paving.
Laying aside all considerations of comfort and economy, which in
themselves are sufficient to warrant its construction, asphaltum is the best
paving material from a hygienic standpoint. Being a monolithic sheet it is
impervious alike to the rise of exhalations from the earth and the soakage of
liquids into the earth. It is easily cleaned; and, as it can be cleaned without
sprinkling, it can be cleaned dry. At intervals it can be thoroughly washed
with a hose, and all surplus water removed immediately with a squeegee.
The absence of dust and the minimising of noise are hygienic benefits of
secondary degree.
(5) The erection of a new abattoir, adequate to all the needs of the
population, and furnished with modern appliances for the inoffensive
utilisation of the entire animal, so that no refuse remains to be got rid of.
(6) The construction of “a suitable and sufficient incinerating furnace,
for the complete and inoffensive destruction of garbage and other refuse,”
including dead animals, street sweepings, mattresses, discarded clothing,
rags, excelsior, paper, and similar substances, which might serve as vehicles
of contagion. The experiments made by Colonel Waring while Street
Cleaning Commissioner of New York, indicated that such a furnace may
produce steam in quantities large enough to be valuable.
(7) The reclamation and drainage of all the marshes, or at least of those
bordering on the harbour on the south and west. “This reclamation to be
made after the ‘Polder’ method of Holland—by diking out the harbour and
the watercourses and removing the water by pumping.”
(8) The establishment of a “power-plant sufficient for this pumping, for
pumping sewage where necessary, and for propelling the machinery of the
abattoir.”
In concluding his paper, Mr. Hill says:
“It may seem strange that no reference has been made to the dredging of the harbour—so
urgently advocated by some advisers—or to any improvement of it, save such as would be effected

by the withholding of solid organic matters from the abattoir, sewage, and dumping grounds, and by
the construction of the dikes at its southern end. As has been said, the tidal flow is more than
sufficient to effect the purification of the clarified sewage, which Colonel Waring proposed to empty
into the harbour. So long as solid wastes are withheld, its surplus oxidizing power will gradually
destroy the accumulation of putrescible material.
“To dredge the harbour now would be dangerous work; for it would stir up and expose to the air
vast quantities of putrid filth. Later, if Colonel Waring’s recommendations should be carried out, it
would mean only the removal of innocuous mud. Navigation is not yet impeded by the deposits; and
the rate at which the harbour is silting up—one-third of one per cent. per year—makes it evident that
a delay of even ten years would not be injurious to commerce. Long before this time has elapsed the
harbour should be clean.
“Havana can be freed from her curse. The price of her freedom is about $10,000,000. Can the
United States afford to redeem her? For once humanity, patriotism, and self-interest should be
unanimous, and their answer should be, Yes!”

General Greene, U.S.A., has submitted an extended report on the city’s
condition. General Greene notes that about sixty per cent. of the street
surface is not paved, and that which is paved is in very poor condition. In
some streets are small drains, connecting by gratings with the gutters, but
no official record is kept of them, and no city plat shows whither they go,
but as in Havana all sewers lead to the bay, it is supposed that is their
destination. Some few private houses have their own sewers, but no official
knows anything further than that permits were granted to build them and
they are never cleaned. In parts of the city a drain two feet deep and two
feet wide, covered or uncovered, runs alongside of the streets and into these
all manner of ill-smelling and nasty refuse is dumped and left to wash away
by the rain or to rot in the sun. For four years previous to the war the
authorities had been considering an elaborate plan of street improvement
and sewerage system, submitted by an American contractor, but no action
had been taken. The estimated cost was $7,000,000.
For three hundred years or more house drainage has been discharged into
cesspools, varying in size from three to ten feet in diameter, and from four
to eight feet deep, closed at the top with a stone. While rules for taking
proper care of these cesspools are plenty, enforcement of them is so
neglected that some of them have not been cleaned in five years. They are
not cemented inside and they drain off into the soil and rock, infecting
everything in reach.
The paved streets (surface) are cleaned by contract, by methods
prevailing in this country twenty-five years ago, and the work is fairly well
done. The cleanings are carried eight miles from the city, where they are
dumped and left on the ground, and the condition there is fearful. During

the blockade the authorities ordered the cleanings to be dumped into the
marsh near the Christina Street station, and here in the wet soil they remain,
a dangerous menace to health. The thousands of reconcentrados and
soldiers in the city used the unpaved streets as open privies, and when the
Americans went into the city they found these streets utterly noxious and
foul, and set to work at once to clean them, the street-cleaning contractor
being permitted to continue his work on the paved streets.
There is but one slaughter-house in the city and it is owned by the
municipality. It is mortgaged, like other city properties, to the Spanish
Bank. From three hundred to four hundred cattle are killed daily, and the
offal, which might easily be saved, and is, in American slaughter-houses, is
dumped into Chavez Creek, where it is left to rot in the sun. The
construction of a new building in a different locality has been long
discussed, but opposition has been made to it, and nothing has been done.
In the meantime the dumping continues in Chavez Creek.
The military hospitals have not yet been examined. Of the nine city
hospitals, asylums, and homes examined by Surgeon Davis, three were in
fairly good condition, two in bad condition, and four are most deplorable.
Some of the houses are overcrowded and the inmates half starved. These
hospitals can be put in good condition very soon.
The two principal markets, the Colon and the Tacon, are owned by the
city and mortgaged to the Spanish Bank. Their sanitary condition is bad as
it can be, but it can be remedied easily and quickly.
An elaborate code of Health Regulations, a volume of fifty pages, exists,
but it is seldom or never referred to or its provisions carried out. Dairies
prevail in many parts of the city, where twenty to thirty cows are kept in
stalls in the same house where human beings live; livery stables are located
in the most thickly settled parts of the city; dead dogs, cats, and other
animals are left in the open streets for weeks; slops, filth, and night soil are
thrown out of the windows and doors on the streets in the poorer localities
and no kind of regard is paid to health regulations of any kind.
The condition of the harbour is gone into at length, one new fact being
noted, to wit: that the water is so foul that the bottom cannot be seen two
feet below the surface, while at Marianao, eight miles away, the bottom at
twenty feet is plainly visible.

Both General Greene and Surgeon Davis are of the opinion that the
harbour is not such a menace to health as are the cesspools, slaughter-house,
and general filth of the city, and that it should come last in the cleaning
process.
In recapitulation, General Greene says:
“From the foregoing it is apparent that the first steps toward sanitation are the improvement of
the slaughter-house, the cleaning of cesspools, the inauguration of a proper system of street cleaning,
and the devising and rigid enforcement of health regulations. I have therefore advised that
immediately on taking possession of the city government a board be appointed, consisting of three
army surgeons and two civilians—one from New York and one from Chicago—of long experience
on the Health Boards in those cities; that this board study the sanitary conditions of the city and draw
up a new code of sanitary regulations, including the management of the hospitals; and that this code
be rigidly enforced by the new city police, assisted by such number of sanitary inspectors as may
prove to be necessary. In this manner I believe that the sanitary conditions can be improved and the
death-rate enormously reduced before the next rainy season sets in. The death-rate in October last
was at the rate of 133 per 1000 per annum; in December it had been reduced to 106, and with only
two deaths per week from yellow fever.
“In order completely to stamp out yellow fever it will be necessary to destroy a limited number
of the worst infected houses occupied by the poorest classes, to construct a system of sewers, and lay
new pavements. This will involve a very large expenditure of money, and it is not at present clear
how the city can raise this money. It is probable, however, that a feasible financial scheme could be
devised after thorough study, and in the meantime a commission of engineers should be appointed to
study the problem, and either acquire the existing surveys by purchase, at a fair valuation, or else
make new surveys, and a definite report covering the whole ground, so that the matter may be
intelligently considered.”

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF THE HAVANA YELLOW
FEVER COMMISSION, 1879

TEMPERATURE
“This is conceded to be a climatic element of greatest importance, and
the ‘annual mean’ to be the chief factor. Throughout the West Indies the
mean annual temperature, near the sea, is from 78 degrees to 80, the mean
daily range is only about 6 degrees, and the extreme annual range does not
usually exceed 20 degrees. At Havana the mean annual temperature varies
in different years from 77 degrees to 79; the mean temperature of the hottest
months, July and August, varies from 82 to 85 degrees; and of the coldest
months, December and January, from 70 to 76 degrees. The minimum
temperature is very rarely as low as 50 degrees, and the maximum as rarely
exceeds 100 degrees; in fact, the thermometer, in the shade, seldom rises

above 94 degrees. There are no records nor any tradition of frost having
ever occurred except on December 24 and 25, 1856. It is alleged that even
in the sparsely inhabited mountains in the east of Cuba, where the Tarquino
peak reaches an altitude of about 8000 feet, frost rarely occurs, and snow
never.”

RAINFALL
“During the sixteen years, 1859-74, the average number of rainy days at
Havana was 113; the minimum number, 97 days, occurred in 1869, and the
maximum number, 141 days, occurred in 1862. The average amount of rain
for the sixteen years was 49 inches, the minimum was 42.5 in 1861, and the
maximum was 70 inches in 1867. The maximum amount of rain falling in
any one season is from May to September, inclusive, but especially during
August and September. The rain then descends with such rapidity that it
runs off in torrents; but, as is seen, the usual belief that the annual rainfall is
excessive is erroneous. The annual mean relative humidity varies in
different years from about 73 to 74.5, and that of the different months of the
year from 66 to 79; the minimum, occurring in any day of the year, may be
as low as 34, and the maximum as high as 96. Evaporation is extremely
rapid.”

ANNUAL DEATHS IN HAVANA, 1870-79
Deaths Deaths by
by all Deaths by
Diseases all Yellow Fever. Small Pox. Cholera.
in the Diseases in
Military Military Military
Military the Civil
and Civil Civil Population. and Civil and Civil
and Civil Population.
Population. Population. Population.
Population.
1870 10,379 9,451 665 277 681 1,655
1871 9,174 8,290 991 796 1,126 ....
1872 7,031 6,036 515 372 174 ....
1873 7,755 6,932 1,244 1,019 47 ....
1874 9,604 8,523 1,225 1,236 772 ....
1875 8,390 7,044 1,001 94 711 ....
1876 9,122 7,438 1,619 904 160 ....
1877 10,217 7,139 1,374 567 97 ....
1878 11,507 8,594 1,559 758 1,225 ....
1879 9,052 7,826 1,444 737 523 ....

92,231 77,273 11,837 6,760 5,516 1,655

“Spanish army losses to January 16, 1896:
Killed in action and died from wounds 405
Died from yellow fever 3,190
All other diseases 282
3,877

“Total mortality of Spanish army in Cuba in 1897 (from Public Health
Report, U. S. Marine Hospital Service, April 29, 1898):
Died from yellow fever 3,190
Deaths from yellow fever 6,034
Deaths from enteric fever 2,500
Enteritis and dysentery 12,000
Malarial fevers 7,000
All other diseases 5,000
Deaths from all diseases 32,534

“The above table ... clearly proves that ‘the actual sanitary condition of
the principal ports of Cuba’ is very unfavourable, since, in recent years,
their death-rates have ranged from 31.9 to 66.7. It also proves that the
sanitary condition of the inland towns is very little, if at all, better than that
of the seaports. The high death-rates of Guanabacoa and of Marianao are
especially notable, because these suburban towns, within three and six
miles of Havana, are summer resorts, and enjoy, especially Marianao, a
high repute for salubrity. Taking a general view of the death-rates for the
total population of all the twenty towns in the above list—towns selected
solely because the only ones which furnish reliable official reports, though
many others were solicited, it will be found that twenty-six death-rates are
given; that these range from 23.5 to 66.7, and that, while only eight of the
twenty-six are under 35, twelve of them are 50 or more.”
“The portion of the city in worst repute is the fifth district, and especially
Jesus Maria, one of its wards. This is, to considerable extent, reclaimed
swamp lands, filled in largely with street refuse and garbage. It fronts the
bottom of the harbour. Its rough, unpaved streets are in many places almost
impassable in wet weather, even to pedestrians. Great mud-holes, covered
with green slime, and fit only for the abode of hogs, are numerous. The
houses, as well as the streets, have an uncared-for, filthy, and disgusting

appearance; and the sickly, anæmic residents look as dirty and cheerless as
the streets and houses.
“The Punta or Colon wards in the third district—at least the portions
which immediately front the sea—have a reputation almost as bad as the
Jesus Maria ward. The foundation rocks were, during the last century,
excavated to build fortifications, and these excavations were filled up with
street refuse and garbage; hence this ward is, like Jesus Maria, to some
extent, reclaimed land. These portions are alleged to be very unhealthful,
while houses only six or eight blocks distant are not so; comparatively light
rains flood the banquettes and run into the houses. The streets are wider and
the houses better than in Jesus Maria. Some consider the location of the
latter, at the bottom of the harbour, a chief cause for its unhealthfulness, but
the unhealthy portion of the city now referred to fronts the sea.

THE PRADO AND INDIAN STATUE, HAVANA.

“The Pueblo Nuevo ward, still farther to the west, also fronts the sea,
and is built on a slope which attains an altitude of nearly seventy feet.
Notwithstanding these advantages, it is very badly drained, and has, as it
apparently deserves, an ill repute for healthfulness....

“The three suburban wards, Jesus del Monte, the Cerro, and Vedado,
enjoy the best reputation for salubrity, and also for their freedom from
yellow fever. Intelligent residents are readily found, who will assert with
great assurance that no one is ever attacked in these wards except those who
have been elsewhere infected. The summit of Jesus del Monte has an
altitude of 67 meters, or 220 feet, the highest point in Havana, or its
immediate vicinity. However, there are few, if any, houses about the
summit; the average level of the ward is only 80 feet, and more inhabitants
live below than above this level. The natural drainage is excellent, the
houses in the elevated portion occupy more ground and are better ventilated
than in Havana.”

GEOLOGICAL FORMATION
“The surface soil of Havana consists for the most part of a thin layer of
red, yellow, or black earths. At varying depths beneath this, often not
exceeding one or two feet, lie the solid rocks. These foundation rocks are
(especially in the northern and more modern portion of the city, towards the
coast of the sea and not of the harbour) quarternary and especially tertiary
formation so permeable that liquids emptied into excavations are absorbed
and disappear. In the southern and greater portion of the city, these rocks are
of cretaceous formation, and so much less permeable that sinks and other
excavations readily fill to overflowing. About twenty thousand persons or
one-tenth of the population, live on land reclaimed from the sea, in large
measure, by dumping on garbage and street refuse. Much of this reclaimed
land was formerly mangrove swamps, and Havana still lies adjacent to
these breeders of malarial poison. There are few if any towns in Cuba which
are not subjected to malarial effluvia from mangrove or other swamps, and
many of these suffer to greater extent than Havana.”

Messrs. Ariza and Herrera reported a population of 3000 on the reclaimed parts of the first
district, 5000 on parts of the third and fourth, 5000 on part of the fifth, and 600 on part of the sixth
district.

THE CLEANSING OF THE HARBOUR
“The sanitarian cannot hesitate to advocate, for general reasons if not
especially for yellow fever, the cleansing of the harbour, the cessation of
daily additions to it of large masses of filth, and the replenishment of it by
constant currents of pure water. To accomplish the last, it has been much
insisted on, in the United States, as well as in Cuba, that canals should be
dug. Out of Cuba it ought to be better understood that Havana is by no
means deficient in highly educated, skilful, practical engineers, who are
fully alive to the sanitary interests of the city, and to the merits of this
especial subject. Among these, Colonel Albear stands pre-eminent, and in
September, 1879, he delivered before the Academy of Sciences an
extremely able address on this subject, which is so full of instruction, on
other local conditions also of interest to the sanitarian, that this address has
been translated and is presented, as a most interesting part of this report.
Colonel Albear seems to have conclusively demonstrated the
impracticability of these proposed canals; and my own conviction is that if
practicable they could not possibly place the small harbour of Havana in as
favourable sanitary conditions as are by nature the large harbour of
Matanzas and of Cienfuegos, where yellow fever none the less prevails.”

DRAINAGE
“In Cuban cities, generally, good drainage is not found except in such
comparatively inextensive parts where nature required little or no
assistance. Even in Havana, the oldest and wealthiest city, the visitor is
often astounded, especially in the rainy season, by impassable mud-holes,
and green, slimy, stagnant pools in the streets and in the backyards. This
condition was found even in the Pueblo Nuevo ward, which is located so
admirably for good drainage that little labour would be required to make it
perfect.
“Messrs. Ariza and Herrera reported: ‘Havana has no sewers save in a
few principal streets. These sewers have been built at interrupted intervals,
without reference to any general plan for drainage. They are seldom cleaned

and are generally obstructed in part or wholly with sediment or filth from
the streets, and exhale offensive odours. As the sewers are few in number,
the greater part of the water of the city empties through the streets, into the
harbour or the sea; but the quantity flowing into the sea is comparatively
small.’ Mr. A. H. Taylor, a civil engineer, thoroughly informed on this
subject, testified that the sewers of only three streets subserved any good
purpose whatever, and that the remainder were so defective that the city
would really be much better off without them. Through the gratings, which
have large interspaces, the dirt and refuse of the streets find such ready
entrance that a number of these sewers were soon filled up, with apparently
solid materials, to within a few inches of the surface openings. Since very
few houses or privies are connected with sewers, these are less offensive
than they would otherwise be, but no one who has seen them can find any
words except of unhesitating condemnation for their grossly defective
structure.”

THE PAVING OF STREETS
“Less than one-third of the population live on paved streets, and these
are well paved and kept as clean, it is believed cleaner, than is usual in the
United States. The remainder live on unpaved streets, which for the most
part are very filthy. Many of these, even in old and densely populated parts
of the city, are no better than rough country roads, full of rocks, crevices,
mud-holes, and other irregularities, so that vehicles traverse them with
difficulty at all times, and in the rainy season they are sometimes
impassable for two months. Rough, muddy, or both, these streets serve
admirably as permanent receptacles for much decomposing animal and
vegetable matter. Finally, not less, probably more, than one-half of the
population of Havana live on streets which are constantly in an extremely
insanitary condition, but these streets, though so numerous, are not in the
beaten track of the pleasure tourist, in which capacity the writer, in 1856,
spent ten days in Havana without witnessing many of the evils now testified
to with emphasis.”

DENSITY OF POPULATION
“Of the various evils recounted in connection with the subject of houses,
there are two which deserve special attention. Many facts, besides those

associated with the holds of vessels, justify the belief that the growth of the
poison of yellow fever is specially favoured in warm, moist, ill-ventilated
places, where air is closely confined. The low-lying floors touching the
earth, the small, densely packed houses, the unusually contracted
ventilating space in their rear, the large unventilated excavation for privies
and sinks, all furnish, as is firmly believed, the most favourable breeding-
places for the poison of yellow fever. In addition, statistics prove that in
great cities subjected to their ordinary unfavourable conditions, the denser
their population the sicklier and shorter-lived their inhabitants. Common-
sense and experience unite to teach that the denser a population the more
widespread and frightful the havoc of diseases, especially of communicable
diseases. Elsewhere will be found a special report on the density of the
population of Havana compared with numerous other cities, and it therein
appears that more than three-fourths of the people of Havana live in the
most densely populated localities in the world. A tropical climate renders
this enormous evil still greater. Not only in Havana but throughout Cuba the
average number of inhabitants to each house is unusually great, and this fact
enables us better to understand the great prevalence in Cuba of those
communicable diseases which its climate and other local conditions favour.
“The Registry Office in Havana reports that there are upwards of
eighteen thousand fincas in this registry district, which comprises the
village of Marianao in addition to the city of Havana.
“A finca is a piece of land, with definite boundaries or limits whether
large or small, and whether it has buildings on it or not.
“Of the eighteen thousand fincas in the district about fourteen thousand
have houses upon them, and the other four thousand being vacant lots in the
city, or fincas rusticas, in the rural districts.
“At least twelve in every thirteen inhabitants live in one-story houses;
and as the total civil, military, and transient population exceeds two hundred
thousand, there are more than twelve inhabitants to every house. Tenement
houses may have many small rooms, but each room is occupied by a family.
Generally, the one-story houses have four or five rooms; but house-rent (as
also food and clothing) is rendered so expensive by taxation, by export as
well as import duties, that it is rare for a workman, even when paid fifty to
one hundred dollars a month, to enjoy the exclusive use of one of these
mean little houses. Reserving one or two rooms for his family, he rents the

balance. This condition of affairs is readily understood when it is known
that so great a necessity as flour costs in Havana $15.50, when its price in
the United States was $6.50 per barrel.
“In the densely populated portions of the city the houses generally have
no back yard, properly so called, but a flagged court, or narrow vacant
space into which sleeping-rooms open at the side; and in close proximity
with these, at the rear of this contracted court, are located the kitchen, the
privy, and often a stall for animals.”
“Messrs. Ariza and Herrera report that in Havana the average height of
the ground floor is from seven to eleven inches above the pavement, but in
Havana, and more frequently in other Cuban towns, one often encounters
houses which are entered by stepping down from the sidewalk; and some
floors are even below the level of the streets. In Havana some of the floors;
in Matanzas more; in Cardenas and Cienfuegos many, are of bare earth
itself, or of planks raised only a few inches above the damp ground.
“The privy and the sink for slops, the open kitchen shed, and the stable
immediately adjoin each other, confined in a very contracted space close to
sleeping-rooms. The privy consists of an excavation which often extends
several feet laterally under the stone flags of the court. Even if the sides be
walled, the bottom is of the original porous earth or subsoil rock, thus
permitting widespread saturation of the soil.”

LA LUCHA OCTOBER, 21, 1896
“These houses are veritable pig-styes. Houses which rent from thirty to
forty-five dollars per month—an extremely high price for a country where
wealth has been destroyed by war—are devoid of all comfort. They are
unhealthful habitations. A very distinguished stranger, who visited us some
time ago, said of them: ‘They are composed solely of four walls and a
pavement which are stained with dampness and a privy whose fetid and
constant emanations poison the air that must be breathed.’”

CHAPTER XII

MUNICIPAL PROBLEMS IN HAVANA

T HE American authorities and American enterprise have jointly taken
hold of the municipal problem of Havana with considerable energy.
This subject is of such vital importance, not only to the industrial
reconstruction of Cuba, but to the future of the Island itself, that no apology
is necessary for devoting an entire chapter to it. The problems which
General Ludlow, the present Governor of Havana, has taken up
energetically are those relating to the reorganisation of the police force,
public works, water and gas supply, fire department, and other branches of
local government. Private enterprise, both English and American, has lost
no time in securing the street-railway system and some of the public
theatres, and in various ways engaged in semi-public enterprises, the result
of which will be greatly to improve existing conditions, and make Havana a
much more desirable city, both for business and residence.
Next to the question of sanitary improvement, which is absolutely
imperative unless the United States stands ready to sacrifice thousands of
lives next summer, is the organisation of the police force for the
preservation of life and property. For several years past it is said the
attention of the police of Havana has been directed more to political arrests
than to prevention of crime. Whether these rumours are well founded or not,
General Greene, whose report upon the sanitation of Cuba was presented in
the previous chapter, is not prepared to assert; but he contends that at the
time he made his report, last December, the police force was completely
disorganised. As it formerly existed, the police force of Havana consisted of
two parts, namely: the Government police, under the direct orders of the
civil governor of the province; and the municipal police, under the orders of
the Alcalde, or Mayor. The functions of the latter were mainly those of
inspectors, to look after the enforcement of city ordinances in regard to
buildings, public health, and such matters. They numbered 200. The
Government police consisted of a battalion called the Orden Publico, the
colonel in command of which was chief of police. The battalion numbered
about 1200 men, and was recruited from the Spanish army, among men who

had passed through not less than six years’ service, who held the grade of
sergeant, and who had won certificates of perfectly good character. This
force was disarmed and shipped to Spain in November, on the ground of
alleged mutiny; the facts being that they claimed the money belonging to
them which had been deposited with the regimental paymaster, and by him
embezzled.
In addition to the municipal police and the Orden Publico, there was a
force, detailed from the Guarda Civil, whose total strength was about 3500
men. This force constituted the rural police of the entire Island, under the
orders of the civil governor of each province. About 300 were used by the
civil governor of Havana for duty in the suburbs of Jesus del Monte, Cerro,
and other outlying neighbourhoods.
At the time the control of the city passed from Spanish into American
hands, the police force consisted simply of the municipal police, about 200
in number, with a few additions, all of whom were temporarily organised
into a Government police force after the disarmament of the Orden Publico.
The city, according to General Greene’s report, is divided into ten
districts, and these are still further subdivided into thirty-nine barrios, or
wards. The barrios correspond in a measure to the precincts in New York,
and in each there was a celador, corresponding to a sergeant in New York.
He received $100 per month, and had charge of the police in his barrio, or
precinct. There were five inspectors, each of whom had two of the principal
districts under his charge. They received $125 per month. They were in turn
subject to the orders of the chief of police, and he to the orders of the civil
governor. The appointments to all of the positions named were made by the
Governor-General on the nomination of the Governor. Each inspector had
an office on the ground floor of the house where he lived, and these were all
connected by telephone, through the Telephone Exchange, with the Police
Headquarters on Cuba Street, near Quarteles Street. Similarly, each of the
celadors had an office in his own house. There were a large number of
details for special service at banks, theatres, public offices, and similar
places, and while the nominal strength of the Orden Publico was 1200, yet
vacancy, sickness, and other causes reduced its effective strength to 800 or
900.
According to this report, in the opinion of the civil governor, a force of
600 carefully selected men, thoroughly well organised, under proper

officers, will be ample for the security of life and property in this city. The
orders of the President of the United States authorised the organisation of a
force of 1000 men. Subsequently the Secretary of War telegraphed General
Greene to employ such number of men as was necessary. In the judgment of
the commanding general the number authorised by the President was
sufficient, and the proposed organisation, inaugurated by General Greene
and just completed under the direction of General Ludlow, aided by ex-
Chief of Police of New York City, McCullough, is as follows:
Salary per month
1 Colonel (U S V ), Chief of Police
1 Deputy Chief of Police $250
1 Secretary Inspector 165
1 Chief of Detectives, Deputy Inspector 165
6 Inspectors, officers U S V
6 Deputy Inspectors 150
12 Captains 115
48 Lieutenants 90
48 Patrol Sergeants 65
10 Detective Sergeants 115
14 Detectives 100
12 Detectives 75
820Patrolmen 50
1 Stenographer and Interpreter 150
6 Clerks 50
6 Drivers 40
12 Janitors 35
2 Surgeons 100
The total expenses for salary would be $56,360 per month, or $676,020
per annum. In addition there would be expenses for rent of office,
telephone, telegrams, patrol service, 100 horses for use in suburban
districts, and other expenses, which would bring the total cost of the police
up to about $723,660 per annum.
It is proposed to put the entire police management under charge of an
officer of the volunteer army, and to give him a deputy chief, who shall be a

resident of the Island, and, if possible, experienced in police matters.
Similarly, to put officers of the army of junior rank as inspectors in the
principal districts—six in number—and to give to each a deputy inspector,
who will be a resident. At the beginning, it is deemed essential that the
police management should be in the hands of army officers who can be
relied upon, but each will have a deputy who will be a resident, and if
possible thoroughly experienced in the police service. It may be necessary
to change these resident officers once or more before the best men for the
positions are finally found. After the system has been in operation, and the
men have proved their efficiency, it will be possible for the army officers to
be relieved, and the native or resident officers to assume full control.
In his report on the organisation of the Havana police force General
Greene says:
“There are three sources from which the men can be obtained, namely, the existing police force,
the Cuban troops under General Menocal, and the discharged Spanish soldiers. The President’s
instructions are positive that this force should be selected without reference to previous affiliations,
either for or against the revolutionary movement, and by drawing from the three classes above
named; these instructions will be carried out in letter and in spirit.”

In accordance with the President’s instructions, every officer and
member of the police force will be required to subscribe the following oath,
which will be printed in both Spanish and English:
“I do solemnly swear that I will bear true and exclusive faith and allegiance to the Government of
the United States existing in the Island of Cuba, and that I will faithfully and obediently perform my
duty as a member of the police force of Havana under the said Government. So help me God.”

The uniform of the new Havana police officer will consist of straw hat,
dark blue blouse and trousers, tan-coloured shoes, and white gloves.
The public works needed in Havana are sewers, pavements, a new
slaughter-house, buildings for the police, fire, and health departments, and
new hospitals. All of these will require a very large sum of money, and the
ability of the city to raise this money is not yet evident. For the present, all
that can be done is thoroughly to clean, disinfect, and repair the existing
public buildings, either owned or rented, so as to make them habitable for
the public officials, both American and native. The means of
communication are entirely inadequate. They consist of lines of tramways
running out to Jesus del Monte, Cerro, and the foot of the Principe Hill. The
tracks are in bad order, the cars are old and dirty, and they are drawn by
three horses each. The live stock is in bad condition, and the stables are

filthy. These lines are owned by a company called the Ferro Carril Urbano
y Omnibus de la Habana, under a concession granted February 5, 1859. The
same company also runs, in the suburban districts, a few lines of very small
omnibuses, drawn by two mules. The service is extremely bad. In addition
to these facilities for transportation there is a “dummy” line, running from
the centre of the city to the western end of the Vedado, a distance of about
four miles. The track is in bad order, and the service is unsatisfactory.
Undoubtedly one of the first enterprises that will be pushed to
completion in Havana will be an entirely new tramway system, with
mechanical traction. General Greene recognises the necessity of this when
he says in his report:
“There is a great need of a thorough and modern system of electric street railways in this city.
While the streets are narrow, yet a single track could be laid on each street, near the curbstone on one
side, in such a manner as not to impede traffic. It is a question, however, whether these tracks should
be laid prior to the laying of the sewers, which would cause the tearing up of every street in the
thickly populated portion of the city.”

General Greene is undoubtedly right in saying that the new sewerage,
gas, and water pipes, tramways, and paving of Havana should all be done at
one time. If a general plan of this sort were inaugurated, the streets could be
taken one at a time and finished. It should be borne in mind that this sort of
work cannot be done as it is done in American cities, by reason of the fact
that the streets are so narrow that to pull part of them up and leave any
room for traffic is impossible. Added to this, the paving which should be
done in Havana is more like masonry work than ordinary paving, because in
consequence of the tremendous rains in the rainy season when the streets
practically become small rivers (for it is not an unusual thing to see small
boys swimming in the street), the sort of pavements we are familiar with
would be entirely inadequate.
In the chapter on Havana mention was made of the excellent water
supply. While the following description of the water supply of Havana by
General Greene partially covers the statement already made, it brings out an
interesting point in relation to the necessity of not only encouraging but also
insisting on the additional use of water in Havana. It is nothing less than
criminal for a city so abundantly supplied with magnificent spring water as
is Havana not to insist upon its more liberal use. The waterworks
themselves were built by American enterprise and there can be no doubt
that those responsible for their management will be glad enough to increase

the use of the water, and in so doing reduce the price to the consumer.
However this may be, the water supply of Havana is so closely allied to its
sanitary condition, that whatever the United States Government may decide
to do in regard to its sewerage should be taken up in conjunction with the
water supply. It is not a matter that should be left to the decision of the
people of Havana themselves, but should be managed with no uncertain
hand by those in authority, and the supply paid for by the city if the people
are too poor or too indifferent to appreciate the necessity of cleanliness.
Note what General Greene says on this point:
“The present water supply of Havana is excellent, although it is used by only a portion of the
population. It comes from enormous springs on the banks of the Almendares River, about eight miles
due south of the city. These springs are inclosed in a masonry structure, about 150 feet in diameter at
its base, and 250 feet at the top, and 60 feet deep. Masonry drains are laid around the upper surface to
prevent any surface water from washing into the spring. At the base of this spring the water is
constantly bubbling up, and appears to be of remarkable purity. The supply is so large that it more
than fills all the present requirements, and a large portion of it runs to waste. From the spring the
water is conveyed under the Almendares River by pipes situated in a tunnel, and from the north side
of the river the water is conveyed in a masonry tunnel or aqueduct for a distance of about six miles,
where it discharges into a receiving reservoir, the altitude of which is 35 metres, or about 108 feet,
above the sea level. From the distributing reservoir the water is carried into the city by gravity in
pipes, the highest point in the thickly populated portion of the city being, as already stated, 68 feet.
The pipes in the streets are said to be small, and there is not sufficient pressure to carry the water to
the upper stories of the small number of buildings which exceed one story in height. In these
buildings pumping is necessary.
“There are said to be about 18,000 houses in the city, and from a report made by the municipality
in 1897 it appears that the number of houses directly connected with the water pipes is 9233. The
poorer houses, which are not thus connected, obtain water either by purchase from the street vendors
or by getting it from public taps, of which there are a certain number scattered throughout the city.”

Of the efficiency of the fire department, General Greene, in his report,
said that he was unable to speak without further knowledge. “It is generally
considered,” he says, “to be very satisfactory, and the inhabitants of the city
take great pride in it.”
The fire department of Havana appears to consist of two branches—the
Municipal Fire Department and the Commercial Fire Department, the
former being partly supported at public expense and the latter at the
expense of private individuals.
The Municipal Fire Department is organised as a battalion, as follows:
1 Colonel, Chief of Fire Department. 74 Corporals.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, Deputy-Chief. 10 Cornets.
2 Majors 1531 Firemen.
1 Adjutant. 1 Chief Surgeon.

12 Captains. 4 Assistant Surgeons.
16 First Lieutenants. 1 Chief Apothecary.
13 Second Lieutenants. 2 Assistant Apothecaries.
44 Sergeants.

The only paid employes, however, are a few machinists, drivers, clerks,
and a telegraph operator. The entire expense in the budget of 1897-98 is as
follows:
For salaries $6,713
For materials 7,062
Total $13,774

The apparatus consists of five steam fire engines in Havana, one in Jesus
del Monte, and one in Marianao; two hose-carts, and one hook and ladder
carriage.
There are 78 fire-alarm stations and 356 water-plugs distributed in
different parts of the city.
The debt of the city of Havana on December 31, 1898, according to a
statement signed by the Mayor and Controller, was as follows:
Loan of April 22, 1889, fifty-year 6 per cent bonds (mortgagee,
Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba) $6,721,000 00
Loan of October 17, 1891, fifty-year 6 per cent bonds (mortgagee,
Bank of Commerce, United Railroads, and Regla Warehouses) 2,882,000 00
Notes 23,830,94
Floating debt for salaries, materials, interest, and sinking fund 2,450,064 78
Total $ 12,076,895 72

By the end of this year the floating debt will be still greater, and the total
obligations of the city at that time will probably be about $12,500,000.

HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT, HAVANA

The mortgage for the loan of 1889 to the Spanish Bank is a document of
158 printed pages, including the index. It recites that in 1877 the city
borrowed from the Spanish Bank a sum of money which, together with its
interest, amounted in 1889 to $3,177,053.25; that the city was in arrears for
interest and sinking fund, and that lawsuits have been in progress to compel
the city to pay; that the city also desired funds for the completing the water-
works and other purposes, and it was finally agreed that the city would
issue $6,500,000 6 per cent. fifty-year bonds for the purpose of taking up
the existing debt and completing the water-works, the expense of which was
estimated at $1,850,000; and that the balance of the loan, which was taken
at 90, was to be turned over to the city for general purposes. There was a
further provision that the loan might be increased to $7,000,000 in case the
city found it necessary, and this was done. The sinking fund provides for
withdrawal by lot and payment of a certain number of bonds every three
months during the fifty years, the amount at the end of the first quarter
being $5000 and the last quarter $100,000. As security for the loan the city
gave a first mortgage on the following property:
Canal de Vento, valued at $5,030,000

The aqueduct of Fernando VII., valued at 153,000
The Cristina market, valued at 103,000
The Tacon market, valued at 960,000
The Colon market, valued at 304,000
Making a total of $6,550,000

together with all revenues and receipts from them during the period of the
loan. In addition the municipality mortgaged as further security upward of
fifty houses which it owns in various sections of the city. The amount of
this loan was $7,000,000, which has been reduced by the operations of the
sinking fund to $6,721,000. The mortgage of 1891 is also for fifty years and
at 6 per cent., with the same property as security. The original amount was
$3,000,000, which has now been reduced by the operations of the sinking
fund to $2,882,000. The amount of arrears of interest and sinking fund on
the two loans is $343,600.56, which figures as part of the floating debt first
above stated.
The floating debt of Havana arises from the failure to pay practically any
salaries, contractors, or bills for materials during the whole of the year
1898, and for some debts contracted prior to this year. The items are given
as follows:
Salaries $678,117.55
Supplies 230,205.77
Materials 1,183,312.31
Public works 2,568.59
Interest and sinking fund of debts 343,600.56
Notes overdue 12,160.00
$2,450,064.78

This is prima facie a valid obligation of the municipality, and should be
funded. But before making a new loan for the purpose of paying these debts
it would be only proper to have a court of claims established, before which
all the creditors of the municipality could appear and definitely prove the
amount of their claims and the date at which they accrued.
The debt question of Havana can not be disposed of lightly. In his
instructive report on the municipal finances of Havana, General Greene
gives it as his opinion that $12,500,000 is not excessive for a city of the size
and wealth of Havana. Discussing the question with prominent financiers of
Havana, the author found that these gentlemen agreed substantially with
General Greene, some going so far as to declare the city could easily stand

double the present debt, which would bring it up to $25,000,000. According
to the last census, the only city comparable with Havana in the United
States that carries a debt approaching this was Cincinnati, which had then a
debt of $24,737,611. Cleveland, on the other hand, with a population about
the same, had in 1890 a debt of only $6,143,206. The other United States
cities of about the same population are respectively Pittsburg, debt,
$10,026,806; Buffalo, debt, $10,843,029; Milwaukee, debt only
$2,915,900; and San Francisco, less than $1,000,000 of municipal
indebtedness. The debts of both Boston and Philadelphia were in 1890 less
than $30,000,000. It will be bad financiering to burden Havana at present
with more debt. When the budget is fully examined by expert accountants a
large floating debt will be found, some of which it may be right and just to
pay, and much of which is fraudulent. There will be long past-due gas bills,
aggregating over $500,000; unpaid bills for street cleaning; salary accounts
unadjusted, and a great variety of debts the validity of which may have to
be tried in the courts. To meet current expenses the revenues of the city will
have to be increased and honestly expended. Naturally, the city will have to
bear its share of the important sanitary work which must be done in
Havana, but as this work is for the general welfare of the Island, part of it
may rightly be taken from the general funds. Judged from an American
point of view, the municipal debt of Havana at the present moment is quite
large enough, and great care should be taken not to increase it beyond the
danger line.
The revenue of the city is derived entirely from licences and indirect
taxation. Real estate is not directly taxed, and the municipality does not
receive directly anything from it. The Island of Cuba imposes, among other
taxes, a duty of 12 per cent. on the estimated rental value of all houses in
the city and country, and it pays over to the city of Havana 18 per cent. of
the amount thus collected on rents within the city limit. The Island of Cuba
also levies a tax on industry, commerce, and professions, and it pays over to
the city of Havana 25 per cent. of all such taxes collected within the city
limits. The other sources of city revenue, which are directly collected by the
municipality, are the rent of houses owned by the municipality, revenues of
the waterworks, slaughter-house, and markets, taxes on meat, coke, and
wood, licences on factories and business of all kinds, and various minor
licences. The total estimated revenue for the year 1897-98 is slightly in

excess of $2,000,000, and the principal items, taken from the budget, are as
follows:
1. Rent of houses owned by the city $159,598.16
2. Special taxes and licences:
Street vendors $15,000.00
Slaughter-house 163,000.00
Water rents 300,000.00
Tax on pleasure houses 12,000.00
Tax on wood 9,000.00
Tax on charcoal and coke 44,660.00
Licence on factories 26,000.00
Licence on advertisements and signs 8,101.90
Sundry licences, etc. 12,496.00
590,257.90
3. Charities—Income of legacies 4,000.00
4. Public Instruction—Income of legacies 1,138.80
5. Public Correction—Income from shops, private cells, etc. 30,638.42
6. Extraordinary Receipts:
Building permits $29,000.00
Fines, municipal ordinances 6,000.00
Special sewer tax 50,000.00
Replacing street openings 22,258.57
Licence on cedulas 28,000.00
Tax on business 111,300.00
Tax on meat 663,000.00
Special deposits 20,000.00
Sundries 3,300.00
932,858.57
7. Contributions by General Government:
Quota from real estate $165,200.00
Quota from industry and commerce 206,700.00
371,900.00
Total $2,090,441.95

These receipts amount to something between $8 and $10 per head of a
population estimated between 200,000 and 250,000.
The expenses of Havana are such as are common in every city, namely:
expenses of the Mayor and Council (Ayuntamiento), police, fire, health,
schools, charities, correction, courts, street cleaning, lighting, repairs and
paving, interest, and sinking fund. There is only one unusual item, namely:
a contribution of $100,000 towards the expenses of the government of the

province. The items are shown in the following statement, taken from the
budget of 1897-98:
1. Council:
Salaries 79,220.00
Materials 9,792.00
Elections 9,100.00
Cost of collections 49,500.00
Sundries 1,874.00
$149,486.00
2. Police:
Mayor, deputies, etc. 43,060.00
Salaries, municipal police 99,470.00
Materials 3,650.00
Fire Department 13,974.00
$160,154.00
3. Urban and rural police:
Sundries 806.00
Street lighting 134,589.50
Street cleaning 125,577.28
Tree planting, etc. 11,212.00
Slaughter-house 20,149.50
292,334.28
4. Schools:
Salaries 53,452.00
Materials 13,890.00
Rents 28,904.90
Sundries 300.00
96,546.90
5. Charities 177,308.80
6. Public works:
Salaries 22,270.00
Labor, repair streets 170,000.00
Material, repair streets 12,200.00
Sundries, repair streets 4,500.00
208,970.00
7. Corrections—Prisons 78,683.50
8. Trees 1,000.00
9. Justice and Legal Credits:
Interest and Sinking Fund 676,195.00
Provincial expenses 100,000.00
Repayment special deposits, etc. 26,950.00
Litigation 11,000.00
Street condemnation 5,000.00
Subsidy in harbour works 5,000.00

Sundries 9,013.47
833,158.47
10. New Works:
Ditches and Drains $45,000.00
Subscription private Fire Department 2,400.00
47,400.00
11. Contingencies:
Public Calamities and unforeseen contingencies 45,400.00
Total 2,090,441.95

The current annual estimated expenses of Havana, according to the
printed budget, which the author has had translated for 1897-98, were
$2,090,441.95, and the revenue, of course, is made to balance. This looks
all right on paper, but it is exceedingly doubtful that the present authorities
will find the real facts corresponding with these figures. The items that are
excessively high are moneys spent for salaries, for office of mayor, for gas,
for street cleaning, for charitable institutions, for paving, and for contingent
expenses. By “excessive” is of course meant excessive when compared with
what the city receives for the money thus expended. The officials do little or
nothing for their salaries, the gas is wretched and intolerably expensive, the
streets are not cleaned, only the vilest patchwork in the way of paving has
of late years been done, and the charitable institutions, so called, are in a
miserable and filthy condition. In spite of this, the city of Havana is mulcted
to this extent for these purposes:
Salary of employés and experts and expenses of mayor’s office $120,000
Municipal lighting 134,000
Street cleaning 125,577
Charitable institutions 177,308
Pavements and paving and drains 208,000
Provincial contingent 100,000
$864,885

If honestly and economically expended, these sums would produce good
results without greatly increasing the taxes. The interest and liquidation of
the debt makes an annual charge of $676,195, about one-third of the present
total revenue of Havana; which, if not excessive, is quite enough under
existing conditions of the population. General Greene thinks the revenues
may be with safety increased, say to $3,000,000. There is force in this, but
probably the better way would be before the debt and taxes are increased to

try what an honest expenditure of the present revenue will do for the
rehabilitation of Havana. Here is what General Greene says on this subject:

TACON MARKET, HAVANA.

“I am inclined to think, although further study might modify this opinion, that the wealth of
Havana is such that a judicious system of taxation would yield a revenue of $15 per head, or upward
of $3,000,000, and this, if honestly and judiciously collected and expended, would probably be twice
the actual net revenue now enjoyed by the city. The collection of taxes of all kinds is now farmed out
on a basis of five per cent. commission for collection, which is added to the tax. The tax collector
states that there are no arrears, but this statement is vigorously disputed. The whole system of
taxation is radically different from that used in American cities, and the system has been so long in
operation, and is so intertwined with the system of taxation for the Island, that it would probably be
unwise to attempt to introduce American methods during the period of military occupation, the
duration of which is so uncertain. It would seem that all that can be done is to make an honest
collection, substantially on the basis of existing laws, increasing such items as in the judgment of the
military governor can stand an increase without hardship. Such arbitrary changes would create no
surprise, as the population has for generations been accustomed to having them made by the Spanish
Governor-General.”

Arbitrary changes are the one thing the military authorities should avoid
in Cuba, for therein lies our greatest danger with these people. The fact that
the people were accustomed to such action under Spanish rule makes them
far more sensitive to such action than they otherwise would have been. Note

the flutter in Santiago because of the order to send the custom-house funds
to Havana, a perfectly righteous order in itself, but promulgated in too
arbitrary a manner. Notwithstanding this it created something akin to a
panic in Santiago, principally because it reminded the people of that
province of the high-handed Spanish way of doing things. It is not advisable
to increase either the debt or revenue of Havana at present, but, in the
opinion of the author, it would be far wiser to keep the total revenues about
as they now exist. The sources of revenue may be changed, however, to
great advantage; increased in some directions, reduced in others. For
example, ordinances should be passed compelling the owners of all houses
not having water supply (and, according to General Greene, there are about
18,000 of these) to put in a water supply immediately. If this were done the
water tax could be spread over a larger number of population, the individual
taxes reduced, and yet the revenue from this source measurably increased.
A good water-works, like that of Havana, should be made self-sustaining,
and under proper management the profits from this department could easily
be made sufficient to pay all the expenses, and at the same time to take care
of the interest and sinking fund of the water-works bonds. From the
American point of view the most unwise tax in Havana is that which has
made the slaughter-houses of that city a constant source of scandal. To-day
every kilogram of meat killed and used costs the people of Havana 4¼
cents, and thus the cost of living of the poorer classes is greatly increased;
yet the revenues of the slaughter-house are pledged to pay the interest on
the water-works bonds, when the water-works themselves are ample
security for this purpose.
The real estate of the city should be reassessed fairly and justly, and a
tax-rate arranged which would relieve many of the professions and
industries of unnecessary taxation. It would seem from a glance at the
budget of Havana that, if this were done, and the petty, annoying taxes
abolished, sufficient revenue could easily be raised for all legitimate
purposes. As a matter of fact, a very large proportion of the taxes collected
for municipal purposes in Havana has been diverted from legitimate
channels only to find its way into the pockets of those who have had charge
of municipal affairs. According to the evidence of several witnesses who
appeared before the author in Havana, a large amount of money was
exacted from the people of the city by corruption, in the way of petty fines
paid direct to officials, and not into the treasury of the state, and also large

sums of money in the shape of payment for indulgences, much in the same
manner as the Tammany officials exact tribute from those conducting
illegitimate business or those engaged in breaking the ordinances of the
city. Relief from this sort of exaction has been at once felt in Havana, but
will not be fully appreciated until the present Governor of the city is able to
ferret out and stop these several forms of imposition.

CHAPTER XIII

BANKS AND CURRENCY

T HE heading of this chapter is somewhat misleading, for, strictly
speaking, Cuba has neither banks nor currency—that is, of her own. The
basis of the money which circulated in Cuba before the military
occupation of the United States was Spanish gold, principally the centen, or
twenty-five-peseta piece, the value of which had been inflated to $5.30 by
royal decree. Owing to the scarcity of this coin and to the fear that it might
leave the Island, in 1893 the French louis, or twenty-franc piece was
similarly inflated by royal decree and made legal tender in Cuba at $4.24.
The silver coins of Cuba were of Spanish origin: the peso, or dollar, the
medio peso, or half dollar, the peseta, twenty-cent piece, the real, or dime,
and the medio real, corresponding to our nickel. There are also the usual
bronze coins. The silver money of Cuba has for some time been worth only
its market value, and that subject to daily changes. At various periods in the
history of Cuba the Spanish Government at Madrid has attempted to force
bank bills on the people of Cuba, and such attempts, as a rule, have ended
disastrously to the people of the Island. The Spanish Bank of the Island of
Cuba, a semi-official institution, whose governor was appointed by the
Spanish Government, has also at times issued bank bills, and to the credit of
this institution they have always been redeemed ultimately. As much cannot
be said of the Government, whose repudiated bank bills, aggregating about
$17,000,000, are at this moment only worth six or seven cents on the dollar.
The passing of the control of the Island into the hands of the military
authorities of the United States has happily ended all the currency
complications of Cuba, and the order of President McKinley, which went
into force January 1, 1899, will in a short time not only bring order out of
confusion, but gradually reduce the currency systems of Cuba to a sound
basis, making gold and silver alike worth one hundred cents the world over
—no more, no less. The object of this order is not only to unify the Cuban
currency, but in time to replace the present system by the monetary system
of the United States.

There is no need for entering further into the history of Cuban currency,
but in the following pages will be given the reasons which led up to the
Executive Order of December 28, 1898. Considering that the author was
called upon by the President of the United States and the Secretary of the
Treasury to make a report upon this subject, and the report was
subsequently adopted and acted upon, therefore the facts herein stated may
be regarded as official. The real point at issue in relation to Cuban currency
and the only one which caused the United States authorities any trouble was
that arising from the inflation by royal decree of the Spanish twenty-five-
peseta pieces, popularly known as alfonsinos, or centen, and the subsequent
inflation of the French twenty-franc piece, the so-called louis, which, as we
have seen, were given a legal value of $4.24 and decreed since the end of
1893 as legal money.
The Spanish authorities at Madrid, having thus inflated two gold coins
six per cent. above their current value and about ten per cent. above their
intrinsic value—for the mint value of these two coins at Havana is $4.776
and $3.8208 respectively—the United States authorities at Washington were
now called upon to inflate a third gold coin and make the American eagle
worth $11 in Cuba and our $5 gold piece current there at $5.50. As a
temporary measure this might have had some justification, and the
statements in support of it from Cuban bankers, planters, and business men
had a certain degree of plausibility. The process, however, is entirely
artificial, and whatever was done in this direction to-day must be undone
some other day, and the only question the Administration had to decide was
whether the inflation should be taken out when the United States authorities
took possession or the operation postponed to some more opportune time.
The danger in following the advice of some influential financiers of Havana
lay in the adoption by the United States Government of a bad precedent in
Cuban financiering, inaugurated by the Spanish Government, a precedent
for which the United States was in no manner responsible.
The reckoning day must come for all inflated values, whether of paper,
of silver, or of gold; and when that day comes someone will suffer.
Fortunately, in this case the degree of suffering was small, varying only
from six to ten per cent. The practical question would seem to be how to
disinflate these two coins with the least possible disturbance to mortgages,
contracts, notes, and all classes of existing agreements to pay money.

Current matters will adjust and take care of themselves. It is generally
known that all transactions in Cuba since the close of the war have been
made with the belief that the United States would not continue the royal
decree of Spain, and that the inflations would collapse with the
disappearance of Spanish rule.
In Santiago the author found the bankers and financiers in favour of
leaving matters as they existed and adopting similar methods in the rest of
the Island, namely, reducing the $5.30 gold piece to $5. This was the view
taken by Mr. Schuman, of Schuman & Co., Santiago.
On this question the Chamber of Commerce of Santiago, in a
thoughtfully prepared memorial, submitted to the President of the United
States, say:
“It is frequently difficult in this market to effect change, especially in small sales, for the want of
fractional currency. As this makes considerable difference in transactions, the chamber considers it
necessary for the American Government to remedy this difficulty by sending sufficient silver
fractional money, utilising it to pay the army of occupation.
“This chamber has heard that the administration of the custom-house of this port has solicited the
Government at Washington to declare American money legal and obligatory tender in all transactions
which take place in this territory, and we consider this movement premature, as the political situation
of the country is not settled; and furthermore, prejudicial to commercial interests and to the public
wealth by the depreciation it would cause in the Spanish gold in circulation and for the difficulty it
will occasion through the lack of American money in sufficient quantity for these transactions. For
this reason we beg that this petition will not be considered, it being even more inopportune, since the
resolution of the civil governor of the province on the first of August last, establishing the legal value
of Spanish gold, is just and has given satisfactory results.”

Speaking to the author on the same subject, Mr. Brooks, of Brooks &
Co., Santiago, a careful financier and capable business man, said:
“Regarding the currency question, we should also be inclined to support the opinion of the
Chamber of Commerce, to leave matters as they are at present, i.e., the Spanish and French gold
coins having been disinflated, to leave them as current circulating medium, including for the payment
of custom-house duties. It is also always a small advantage for the sugar estates to pay their labour in
Spanish gold as it represents a saving of three to four per cent. as compared with paying them in
American money, as where a planter now pays $5 Spanish, he would, with a change in the circulating
medium, have to pay $5 American, which would represent from three to four per cent. advance in
wages without receiving any compensation from his sugar shipped to the United States, from which,
in former years, and with inflated gold values, he derived an advantage of ten per cent.”

A partial adjustment of the question was suggested to the author by Dr.
Antonio Jover, director of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, and as
Dr. Jover is an authority on Cuban finances, the statement thus made is
quoted in full:

“The only way to settle all the difficulties of the present Spanish monetary state of things is to
declare legal tender the American dollar and admit at par all Spanish gold coins.
“1. Thus the onza should be worth $16; the medio onza $8; the doubloon, $4; the escudo, $2; the
centen, $5—that is, pretty nearly its intrinsic alloy and weight value.
“2. The English sovereign ought to be taken for $5, and the French louis (which circulates in
Cuba in great numbers) for $4.
“This arrangement, that slightly improves the value of the Spanish gold,—for the centen is worth
in the New York market $4.87 or $4.90 at the utmost,—would tend to drive to Cuba the foreign coins
of this country, perfectly useless for circulation. As for the Spanish silver, it is considered there
almost as a merchandise or stock value subject to daily quotation, and it is really troublesome in its
use. Therefore I would propose to give it a fixed value in American gold, thus—

Value.
The peso $0.60
The medio-peso .30
The peseta .12
The real .06
The medio-real .03

“This value is a little less than the price of quotation to-day, but it is much more than it was a few
months ago, but I do not think acceptable the use of any coin without a fixed, invariable value. Now,
as the American currency and the American silver would stand at the par value, and, on the other
hand, the Spanish silver is at the present quoted higher in Spain, there too would likely go a large
quantity, if not all, Spanish silver coins; that nevertheless would not be objectionable, but rather
convenient to both nations. Bronze or copper coins should be received just at half their face value;
the centavo for half a cent American gold, and the two-centavo piece for one cent. But as this implies
a change in the standard value of the Spanish gold dollar, which up to the present has been the basis
of all contracts and dealings of the country, it will be necessary to fix a date to implant the new
system, and that can be no other but the 1st of January next. Hence, from that date all money
transactions will be understood to be on the basis of American gold, with American currency;
Spanish, French, and English gold at par value; American silver to be accepted also at its full value
only in quantities not exceeding $5; Spanish silver at the stated rate, and foreign silver coin as
merchandise.
“As for all contracts and stipulations in money matters standing at present to be fulfilled after the
appointed date of the 1st of January, I believe it would be but right to be paid off with six per cent.
discount, which would simply disinflate them, because they were made with the basis of gold coins
which had six per cent. premium; and discounting the same six per cent. when they were settled with
coins whose said premium had been taken off, although the intrinsic value of which coins had
remained unaltered during the time, would only be common morality and fair equity. Lastly, all those
who would attempt to alter the value of money ought to be severely punished, according to the law of
the country.”

With these supplemental facts, the case is fully and impartially before
the reader. To accept the proposition of the Havana bankers meant a
continuation of the inflated value of ten per cent. To concede the
proposition of Dr. Jover and the Santiago financier would reduce the
inflation about six per cent., still retaining Spanish and French gold in
circulation at a slightly increased value. (Dr. Jover even includes the British

sovereign at $5.) The other and only remaining course would be to accept
United States money at its full value for customs and taxes and the foreign
coins at their intrinsic or mint value.
After carefully considering all these facts, the Honourable Secretary of
the Treasury, Lyman J. Gage, prepared and submitted to the President the
following order in relation to the future currency of Cuba:
“Executive Mansion, Washington,
December 28, 1898.
“It is hereby ordered that on and after January 1, 1899, and until otherwise provided, all customs,
taxes, public and postal dues in the Island of Cuba shall be paid in United States money, or in foreign
gold coin such as the Spanish alfonsinos (centen) and the French louis, which will be accepted in
payment of such customs, taxes, public and postal dues at the following rates:

Alfonsinos (25-peseta piece) $4.82
Louis (20-franc piece) 3.86

“That all existing contracts for the payments of money shall be payable in the money
denominated in such contracts, and where French and Spanish gold shall be the stipulated money of
payment they shall be received in their present decreed inflated values, i. e., alfonsinos (25-peseta
piece) $5.30; louis (20-franc piece) $4.24, or in United States money at the relative value set forth in
the above table, namely, $4.82 for alfonsinos (25-peseta piece) and $3.86 for louis (20-franc piece).
“It is further ordered that on and after January 1, 1899, and until further provided, the following
Spanish silver coins now in circulation in the Island of Cuba shall be received for customs, taxes,
public and postal dues at the following fixed rates in American money:

The peso $0.60
The medio-peso .30
The peseta .12
The real .06
The medio-real .03

“Bronze and copper coins now current in the Island of Cuba will be received at their face value
for fractional parts of a dollar in a single payment to an amount not exceeding 12 cents (1 peseta).
“William McKinley.”

FIRE DEPARTMENT, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

In signing and promulgating the above order, the currency question of
Cuba has been settled for all time to come on a sound basis. In offering to
accept for the present the Cuban peso or silver dollar for sixty cents,
American money, the United States Government merely delays the
migration of the coin to Spain. At this price it is profitable to ship them to
Spain, but at fifty cents they would have disappeared so rapidly that a
commercial disturbance might have followed on account of scarcity of
silver dollars and fractional currency. It is not probable, nor is it asserted
that this adjustment can be accomplished without hardship to some debtors
and a slight financial disturbance. It is not, however, apprehended that the
trouble will be as great as some have anticipated. In Santiago the first step
to absolutely sound finance was taken last summer and six per cent. of the
inflation squeezed out. The business interests in that part of the Island were
opposed to a continuation of the ten per cent. inflation, and merely asked of
the United States Government that the several gold coins in circulation
should be left at their face value. As one of the evils arising from
disinflation, certain Cuban bankers put forward the fact that it will mean an
increase of from four to ten per cent. in the wages of labour, which Cuban
industries cannot afford. Such a result, if true, cannot be regarded as an evil,

but, on the contrary, a benefit to the poorer classes, whose condition in
Cuba is deplorable beyond description.
In the iron mines at Santiago the large American enterprises have already
adjusted themselves to the new conditions and are paying their labour
seventy-five cents per day American currency instead of a Spanish dollar
worth sixty-five cents in Cuba and only sixty cents in exchange for United
States currency. The author, when in the mining districts of this province,
heard no complaints, either from the proprietors or the labourers. Stress was
laid in the arguments before the President and Secretary Gage upon the loss
to the debtor who has borrowed on a fictitious value and must pay the
premium, and the unfortunate Cuban sugar-planter is especially singled out
for sympathy. That the planter will suffer cannot be denied, but the advent
of the United States into Cuba will lighten so many of his burdens that his
condition is not without hope. All the customs duties on his imported food
supplies, as will be seen in the chapter on the tariff, have been reduced, and
many important commodities put upon the free list. The duty on his sugar
machinery has been reduced to ten per cent. ad valorem; on his locomotives
and railway supplies to twenty per cent.; and all along the line the taxes
have been cut down. It is not probable that his land taxes will be collected
during the present fiscal year, and the return of peace, establishment of law
and order, and protection of property will immeasurably improve his lot. If,
therefore, the sugar-planter of Cuba will gauge his present outlook by a
glance backward and compare it with his condition last year at this time, he
may face the new year with less gloomy premonitions as to his future than
some of the testimony taken by the United States Government on the effects
of disinflation would indicate. The action of the President, by and with the
advice of the able financier at the head of the Treasury Department, will
give Cuba a sound currency, which must be the foundation of her future
fiscal prosperity.
The proof of the poverty of Cuba is a scarcity of capital, manifest in
many different ways. The difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of selling
sugar plantations proves the scarcity of capital and at the same time the
precarious situation of the sugar industry. The decrease in the price of
property is a natural consequence of lack of disposable capital, and this is
why the rate of money is so high; it can only be caused by lack of capital,
and not of money, since scarcity or abundance of money has only a limited
influence on rates of interest. Nearly all the banks established for the last

twenty or thirty years in Cuba have disappeared, owing to the losses
experienced by the gradual increase of the poverty of the country; the want
of resources rendering it impossible to start these banks anew or establish
new ones with Cuban capital.
A few years ago there were in Havana, besides the Spanish Bank and the
Bank of Commerce, the Industrial Bank, the San José, the Alianza, the
Maritime Security Bank, and the Caja de Ahorros (savings bank). Excepting
the first two, all have stopped working, and if the two surviving ones have
outlived the others, it is because the Spanish Bank enjoys official privilege,
and because the Bank of Commerce, though compelled twice to reduce its
capital, owns valuable property, as, for example, the Regla warehouses and
the United Railroads, which property, if the Island were prosperous, would
be worth several millions more than it is to-day.
It is almost incredible that, having such extensive relations with foreign
countries, the condition of banks in Cuba should be so precarious,
especially as the Island feels more every year the need of banking facilities,
without which no modern country can prosper. Although not as important as
regular banks, savings banks are a gauge of public wealth, since their object
is to gather the economies of the working classes and create capital for the
promotion of industries. The only savings bank in Cuba failed in 1884,
ruining in its fall not only those who had deposited their funds, but also the
shareholders; and to this day no other institution has been established to
take its place, and at the present moment there is not a single public
institution where money can be deposited in large or small quantities
earning interest!
In foreign countries the thrift of the working classes is the corner-stone
of new industries. Are there in Cuba any economies or annual profits that
can be capitalised? The sugar industry, the base of Cuban wealth, yields to-
day no profit save in exceptional cases. The tobacco industry since 1895 has
been in a critical condition, and as all the other industries depend on these
two, or are of comparatively limited importance, it may be said that work
and capital yield no profit in Cuba at present; since either no profits are
realised, or, if they are, they leave the Island. This aspect of the present
economic situation of Cuba is of immense importance and not only explains
the actual situation at this moment, but shows that the hope of improvement
alone lies in the prosperity of these industries.

The history of banking in Cuba is sad with financial disasters. The only
bank which has survived during half a century is the Spanish Bank of the
Island of Cuba. This concern was originally chartered as the Spanish Bank
of Havana, and although it was a private institution, owned by shareholders,
the Spanish Government maintained the right of appointing the governor,
and in many other ways controlled its actions. At various times this bank
has itself issued bank bills, and at other times it has been the medium
through which the Spanish Government endeavoured to circulate its own
paper money. The notes of the bank itself, as already stated, have never
been repudiated, though during hard times, as a result of the Ten Years’ War,
the bank bills of the Spanish Bank were at a small discount. Sixteen years
ago the Spanish Bank of Havana was reorganised and the name changed to
the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba. At the present time this bank has no
bills in circulation; the paper currency now valued at but a few cents on the
dollar, which was issued during the war by the Spanish Government
through the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, is not regarded by the
shareowners of the bank nor by the public as the issue of the bank itself.
The history of these bills is briefly as follows: In order to meet the expenses
of the last war, the Spanish Government arranged to issue $20,000,000
worth of paper money. As a security and partial fund for redemption of the
same, the Madrid authorities deposited in the vaults of the Spanish Bank of
the Island of Cuba $6,330,000 in silver against this issue. For a while this
bullion, together with the mandate of the Spanish Government that these
bills must be accepted as legal tender, kept the currency floating somewhat
below par. The people of Cuba, however, had been deceived so many times
in relation to paper money that they were suspicious of these bills from the
beginning, and when in due course of time Spain gradually and dishonestly
absorbed from the bank all silver upon which the paper money had been
issued, the bills depreciated until they were absolutely refused in all
business transactions. This entailed considerable loss, as the street railways
and cabs of the city were compelled to take them in spite of this great
depreciation in value. Finally, they were repudiated on all sides. A
temporary value was given this paper by accepting ten per cent. in the
payment of customs dues. This raised it up to twelve to fifteen cents on the
dollar. Immediately upon the military occupancy of the United States the
value of these bills fell still lower, and they are to-day worth but a few cents

on the dollar, and are held chiefly by Government contractors and
speculators.
Realising that a decided change would take place in banking as soon as
the United States took charge of affairs, the shareholders of the Bank of
Spain met some months ago in Havana and reorganised the bank, making it
a private concern, and changing its by-laws so that it could do business as a
private institution, untrammelled by Government interference.
Among other uses to which the Government of Spain put the Spanish
Bank was that of a collecting agency for practically all taxes other than
those of the custom-houses. The value of receipts for direct taxation that
have been delivered for collection to the Spanish Bank of the Island of
Cuba, from the fiscal year 1885-86, when this institution commenced the
collection, with right of seizure, to 1894-95, both inclusive, actual amounts
collected, deductions, and amounts pending collection as per vouchers, and
accounts rendered to the Treasury by this institution, are as follows:
Deductions
Per cent.
Pending
Pending of face
Fiscal Years. Face Value. Collected. for which
Collections. value
Bank was not
uncollected.
responsible.
Pesos C. Pesos C. Pesos C. Pesos C.
1885-86 5,021,271.25 4,561,976.18 438,029.78 21,265.29 0.423
1886-87 5,240,651.50 4,655,776.10 547,435.19 37,440.21 0.714
1887-88 5,386,627.83 4,758,446.22 575,840.11 52,341.50 0.971
1888-89 5,316,367.75 4,694,829.26 549,628.25 71,910.24 1.352
1889-90 4,878,047.21 4,304,196.24 497,220.89 76,630.08 1.570
1890-91 5,336,611.25 4,659,477.26 571,994.17 105,139.82 1.970
1891-92 4,242,982.34 3,696,877.74 428,374.80 117,729.80 2.774
1893-93 5,357,928.97 4,635,278.61 572,890.51 149,759.85 2.795
1893-94 5,092,200.41 4,505,426.32 432,163.62 154,610.47 3.036
1894-95 5,163,321.70 4,421,631.99 534,492.41 207,197.30 4.012
51,036,010.21 44,893,915.92 5,148,069.73 994,024.56

The above table gives a good idea of how this arrangement worked
during normal times. There were two or three features in it, however, which
were bad, and which the author is glad to notice that the United States
Government in renewing the agreement of the Bank of Spain for the present
fiscal year, that is, the year ending June 30, 1899, has obliterated. The
Spanish Government paid the five per cent. on the receipts given the bank,
and not on the money collected. This resulted in great abuses, because the

delinquents during the years of war were fifteen, sixteen, and forty-three per
cent. respectively. The punishment of delinquents has also been
considerably modified by the United States authorities.
The following table gives the receipts for direct taxation that have been
delivered for collection to the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba from the
fiscal year 1895-96 to 1896-97, both inclusive, actual amounts collected,
deductions, and receipts pending collection up to December 12, 1898, as
per data at hand in the Spanish Bank:
Deductions
Per cent.
Pending
Pending of face
Fiscal Years. Face Value. Collected. for which
Collections. value
Bank was not
uncollected.
responsible.
1895-96 $ 4,802,936.66 $3,460,998.24 $ 579,002.52 $ 762,935.90 15.88
1896-97 4,589,735.08 3,283,286.51 547,975.70 758,472.87 16.52
1897-98 4,341,112.87 2,250,806.74 223,119.47 1,867,186.66 43.01
$13,733,784.61 $8,995,091.49 $1,350,097.69 $3,388,595.43

This table and the one preceding it were prepared for the author by the
governor of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba and differ from the
table prepared by the Spanish authorities which will be found in the chapter
on the revenue of Cuba. In the report furnished by the officials, the face
value of the tax receipts is given in one column and the actual amount
collected in another, the third column showing, under the caption of “Total
Delinquent Taxes,” the amounts uncollected, without any explanation as to
why they were not collected. The governor of the Spanish Bank in the two
tables given above includes a fourth column, namely, deductions for which
the bank was not responsible. The bank authorities claim that the amounts
represented in this column were receipts which were not valid, inasmuch as
they were claims in many cases upon persons dead and upon property
which had been destroyed by fire. The governor of the bank thinks it an
injustice to the bank to add these under the general head of delinquent
taxes, without this explanation.
It is easy to enforce and collect the customs duties; but the collection of
internal revenue taxes is a much more difficult matter. The United States
authorities found, on coming into possession of the Island of Cuba, January
1st, that all the receipts of taxes for the present fiscal year were in the hands
of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba; that this institution had not only

six or seven branch banks in various parts of the Island, but also in the
neighbourhood of 258 sub-district or collecting agencies. The bank assumed
all the responsibility of these agencies, and it was decided to place in its
hands for the present fiscal year this work, for the reason that it had all the
machinery and there would be no loss in revenue. An agreement was
entered into between the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba and the United
States military authorities, and an order issued from Washington to the bank
to make the collection, but the arrangement engendered such opposition
among the Cubans that the order was revoked and the work was placed
entirely in the hands of the American authorities under General Brooke.

CHAPTER XIV

PAYMENT OF INSURGENT SOLDIERS

T HE question of the payment of insurgent soldiers and of certain
legitimate indebtedness incurred by the insurgent government has an
important bearing upon the civil, if not the industrial reconstruction of
the Island of Cuba. This matter was referred to a commission of Cuban
officers, consisting of General Garcia, General José Miguel Gomez,
Colonel Manuel Sanguily, Colonel José Ramon Villalon, Dr. José Gonzales
Lanuza, Señor Gonzalo de Quesada, and Mr. Horatio S. Rubens, who acted
as interpreter. This commission came to Washington in November for the
purpose of aiding in the pacification of the people of Cuba. General Garcia
unhappily was taken ill of pneumonia and died. This delayed the work
somewhat and took from the commission one of its strongest members. The
commission had several informal interviews with the President, the
members of the Cabinet, and finally with the author, who, as Special
Commissioner for the United States to Cuba, took the testimony of these
gentlemen and prepared a report on the subject for the consideration of the
President and Secretary of the Treasury. The substance of this report is of
permanent public interest, as it was the first official step towards the
settlement of a question that must be adjusted before the entire Cuban army
will disband and go to work. It also has considerable bearing upon the
industrial future of Cuba.
The gentlemen comprising this commission were briefly informed by the
author as to the work committed to him, namely, an inquiry into the
economic condition of the Island of Cuba and the recommendation of such
measures for the commercial and industrial reconstruction of that country as
might appear advisable after impartially consulting all interests. They were
told that so far as the United States was concerned, Cuba had won her
economic and industrial freedom. That the work had been performed with
scrupulous regard to the interest of the people of Cuba. That the aim had
been the rehabilitation of its industries and the building up of the country
generally with as little friction as possible. That in accordance with
instructions received from both the President and Secretary of the Treasury

the tariff of Cuba had been framed so that there should be no discrimination
in favour of the United States, and that the same tariff laws would be
applied alike to all countries, so that Cuba was now free to purchase her
supplies in the world’s markets wherever they were best and cheapest, and
not compelled to buy in a dear market, as under Spanish rule. They were
furthermore informed that hereafter the revenues of the country were to be
used exclusively for the economical and honest government of the Island
and that the largest portion would not be drained away to pay the enormous
interest charged (aggregating $10,500,000) upon an indebtedness which had
unrighteously been saddled upon a people already bowed down under the
double yoke of war and debt. Lastly they were asked to state fully and
frankly, as citizens of Cuba, their views on any subject bearing upon the
reconstruction of Cuba.
In reply, these gentlemen said, in substance, that they were entirely
satisfied with the course the Government of the United States had pursued
in relation to these economic questions, and realised the fact that Cuba had
become free, commercially and industrially. They then proceeded to discuss
the important problem of how the existing transitory condition of the Island
could best be changed to a permanent civil life, without friction in Cuba or
trouble and annoyance throughout the United States. Their purpose, they
avowed, was simply to co-operate with the United States toward the
restoration of order, without which, in their opinion, there could be no
reconstruction of industries and no return of prosperity. Their purpose was,
they assured the author, to advise with the people of the United States, to
the end that everything might be harmonious and that the people of Cuba
might get to work as soon as possible.
Speaking for all the gentlemen above named, Colonel José R. Villalon
said:
“The discharge of the army of Cuba is a very complex and difficult problem. It has to be done for
humanity’s sake, in one sense; those men who have been working and suffering have to be
remunerated in some way. But that is not the only point of view. We have got to look towards the
maintaining of order and we have got to give them compensation or gratification or a certain amount
of money with which they can go back to their homes and their agricultural labours. In doing that we
have a duty to our country so far as the Cubans are concerned, but, at the same time, it seems to me
that it is a high political measure on the part of the United States to prevent now what would
afterwards be very difficult to suppress. If we scatter these 30,000 men (approximately) throughout
the country without any resources whatever—men who for the last two or three years have been
accustomed to live upon the resources of the country or forage on the enemy and who are used to the
hardships of the campaign—it will not be very difficult to foresee that in spite of the good nature and

good disposition of the people these men will be forced to do what they do not wish to do by their
nature. If the men are left as they are, with their present needs unsupplied, they will go to the woods
and will be a source of disorder and brigandage, which will be very difficult for the United States to
suppress; and for the sake possibly of saving a few million dollars now the nation will be obliged
afterwards to spend many more millions, in addition to the sacrifice of many lives. It is an economic
question. Unless something is done to relieve their needs the disorder of the Island will be prolonged
indefinitely. As an example, I would call attention to the case of your Indians in this country, who
now and then break away. In Cuba the condition will be worse, for there they would have the shelter
of the woods, and besides the Americans would not be able to stand the climate as well as they stand
their own. Ultimately, of course, they will succumb, but it will be at the cost of a great many lives
and a great many millions of dollars.

MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

“Besides, there is another thing; that if to-day we provide for their needs and restore order, it is
the wish of every inhabitant of Cuba to contribute their share towards this. If these men are supplied
now, they will not have the moral support of the people of Cuba should they not go to work; but the
people of Cuba will see that they are punished. If, however, they had the moral support of the people
of Cuba it would be difficult to punish them.
“There is another point, and that is with regard to the amount of money required. Although they
have not said anything about this, nevertheless, there is a tendency to lessen this amount. We want to
say that although the measure, in principle, will be very good, even if it does not attend to all of the
needs at present; though it will be a moral obligation from ourselves to the United States, it will not
solve the problem, because the sum determined upon is not enough. If the revenues of the Island of
Cuba ought to be mortgaged to repay whatever advances they have received from the United States
now, it will not be a very difficult matter to make this amount a few millions more.”

The above gives a fair summary of the general tenor of the testimony
taken, and it is believed fairly represents the views of these gentlemen.
Testimony was also taken in relation to the payment of certain legitimate
debts which, as these gentlemen felt, the good faith of the people of Cuba
had been pledged to pay. On being asked the probable amount of this
indebtedness, they said it was not in excess of $2,250,000 or $2,500,000.
The first and most important matter and the one which, they insist, will
have much to do with the pacification of the Island, is the payment of some
sort of compensation to the impoverished Cuban soldiers. These gentlemen
were asked if they had in their possession any estimate as to the number of
soldiers, the length of service, and the amount of money necessary for the
purpose they had in mind. An itemised account, they were told, would make
a useful supplement to the interesting and instructive testimony given.
In compliance with this request, these gentlemen prepared and presented
certain tables, with additional verbal testimony. This testimony was
subsequently reduced to writing. It purports to be a statement showing the
number of officers and privates of the Cuban army and their time of service.
On behalf of Cuba, these gentlemen informed the author that had Cuba been
recognised as an independent nation, their first duty would have been to pay
all legal obligations contracted during the struggle for independence. They
request that the United States, acting as trustee for Cuba, will give this
subject a careful hearing and enable the people of Cuba to disband the army
and complete the pacification of the Island. They recognise the fact that
$3,000,000 has been appropriated for a purpose similar to this, but regard it
as inadequate. The figures submitted by these gentlemen, as representing
the pay which the insurgent army, in their opinion, has earned, are
somewhat startling. The summary is as follows:
ESTIMATE FOR PAYMENT OF INSURGENT TROOPS
11 Major-Generals $179,450
19 Generals of Division 296,175
54 Brigadier-Generals 682,825
153 Colonels 1,491,750
290 Lieutenant-Colonels 2,362,800
578 Majors 3,870,240
965 Captains 4,561,800
1245 Lieutenants 3,763,800
1794 Sub-Lieutenants 4,952,880
2130 1st Sergeants 3,796,200

3123 2d Sergeants 4,605,600
4509 Corporals 5,238,240
30,160 Privates 21,502,620
45,031 $57,304,380

The pay promised the Cuban army is very much higher (except in the
grade of generals) than the amounts actually paid the officers and men in
the United States army, as will be seen from the following comparison of
the salaries of the two armies:
SALARIES PAID CUBAN AND UNITED STATES ARMIES
PER MONTH
United
Cuban.
States.
Major-General. $500 $625
General of Division 450 ...
Brigadier-General 400 458.33
Colonel 325 290.67
Lieutenant-Colonel 275 250
Major 220 208.33
Captain 130 150
Lieutenant 100 125
Sub-Lieutenant 90 116.67
1st Sergeant 60 25
2d Sergeant 50 18
Corporal 40 15
Private 30 13

It is not assumed by the gentlemen who prepared the above estimates
that claims of such magnitude could be seriously considered by an
independent Republic. The resources of the Island at present are entirely
inadequate to shoulder such a debt. Upon the reduced basis of the salaries
paid the United States soldiers, the reduction would be about one half, or
less than $30,000,000, an equally impossible sum. On the other hand, that
some aid should be rendered by the United States to enable these soldiers to
disband and go to work would seem both feasible and just. It could easily
be met by the revenue of the Island, and would have a decided effect in
securing permanent peace and the early establishment of a stable
government in Cuba. If done now under the guidance of the United States it
would prevent excessive payment to the troops hereafter. In the same
manner the liquidation of the small amount of outstanding obligation—not
exceeding $2,500,000—might settle the debt question for all time to come.

Especially if all other advances for these purposes were prohibited until
such debt was adjusted to the satisfaction of the United States. In case the
ultimate solution of the Cuban question should be, as it is quite within the
range of probability, annexation, the independent government will not
previously have had the opportunity of incurring improvident indebtedness,
which ultimately may have to be assumed by the United States. In short,
whatever may be done in this matter, or however it may be done, the United
States should control and safeguard the finances of the Island for a
considerable period. It has been very truly stated that should an independent
government be established and recognised, the United States will no longer
be able to control the financial legislation of the Island. It can, however, by
the plan proposed, and very properly, not only save money for Cuba while
under its military possession or control, but also prevent the making of
unnecessary improvident or other loans by such independent government,
except with the consent, or approval in advance, of the United States. This
can be readily done, if, when making an advance for the benefit of Cuba,
the right to apply the customs receipts and other revenues of the Island to
the repayment of the principal and interest of such advance be reserved to
the United States. In this way all reckless expenditure may be prevented and
all speculative or independent bond issues be avoided and at the same time
quick assistance be rendered those whose position at present is deplorable
in the extreme.

CHAPTER XV

REVENUE—CUSTOMS TARIFF

T HE revenues and expenditures of the Island of Cuba for the fiscal year
1898-99, according to the reports obtained by the author from the
Secretary of the Treasury, Marquis Rafael Montoro, may be thus
summarised:
BALANCE OF THE ESTIMATED RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
OF THE BUDGET OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA FOR 1898-99
Expenditures. Amount. Receipts. Amount.
Sovereignty Expenditure $22,500,808.59 Custom-Houses 14,705,000
Local. Internal Revenue 1,640,650
General Expenditures 159,605.50 Lotteries 1,900,500
State-Church, Justice, and Government 1,612,859.44 Miscellaneous Revenue 1,536,000
Treasury 708,978.51
Public Instruction 247,033.02 Estimates of Total Revenue $26,374,045.68
Public Works and Communications 1,036,582.10
Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce 108,178.52
Deduct Amounts not Specified 17,314.27
Total $26,356,731.41

Receipts $ 26,359,650.00
Expenses 26,356,731.41
Surplus $2,918.59

While the revenues are all derived from the various species of taxation
exacted from the people of Cuba, the expenditures are divided into two
important classes: those under the head of “Sovereignty Expenses,” or
expenses of the General Government, which, according to this estimate,
aggregate $22,500,808.59, and those which, under the head of “Local
Expenses” aggregating $3,873,237.09, constitute the expenditures for the
immediate necessities of the Island. In order to obtain a clear view of the
possibilities of revenue and the probable future expenses of the Island of
Cuba, these receipts and expenditures should be further examined.
Taxes in Cuba, as will be seen from the above exhibit, are collected
under six general classifications, namely: (1) taxes and imposts, including

excise and liquor taxes, and taxes on railway freight and passengers; (2)
receipts from custom-houses, which include taxes on imports and exports,
loading and unloading merchandise, fines and passports; (3) internal
revenue, including stamped paper,[14] postage stamps, warrants for payment
issued by the State, diplomas and titles, stamps on letters of exchange or
deeds of transfer, on insurance policies, on matches, and on almost every
other conceivable sort of deed and document; (4) lotteries, are put down in
the above table as yielding $1,900,500; (5) revenue from State property,
including rents and sale of lands and rent from docks; (6) revenue from
miscellaneous sources, some of which seem somewhat mythical. These
comprise the general sources of revenue which appear in this report, and
from which the Secretary of the Treasury, Marquis Montoro, informed the
author he hoped to secure for the fiscal year 1898-99 the following sums:
Estimated Amount
Sources of Revenue.
Spanish Gold.
Taxes and Imposts $ 6,142,500
Custom-Houses 14,705,000
Internal Revenue 1,640,650
Lotteries 1,900,500
State Property 435,000
Miscellaneous Revenue 1,536,000
Total Estimated Revenue $26,359,650

As to how much of this has been collected or how much can be
collected, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty. Spanish
official reports are not very reliable documents at the best, and during the
last three years of internal dissensions, frequent changes in officials, and
war, they appear to be at their worst. The only possible light on the subject
which the author was able to obtain was a statement of the actual taxes as
levied between 1887 and 1897, inclusive, and the actual amounts collected
at the custom-houses and by the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba, for
under Spanish administration the latter institution collected all taxes other
than customs.
According to these figures, the custom-house receipts of Cuba fell from
$14,708,509.10 in 1895 to $9,648,369.94 in 1897-98. While the value of the
tax receipts handed to the Spanish Bank for collection for the fiscal year
1896-97 exceeded $5,000,000, the actual money collected was only
$3,266,583.37, while for the next fiscal year, 1897-98, out of receipts

aggregating in the neighbourhood of $4,500,000, only $2,377,742.21 was
realised. The exhibits show that rural real estate, which, under prosperous
conditions, should yield in taxes from $880,000 to $1,000,000, is incapable
of paying anything. Out of receipts aggregating in 1897-98 over $800,000,
the Spanish Bank only collected $89,661.98 from these properties. Nor will
it be possible in the reconstruction of the Island to secure revenue from
these sources, for the burned and destroyed estates are yielding nothing to
their owners. City property which, in times of prosperity, should yield
upward of $2,000,000, or even $3,000,000, in 1897-98 only yielded
$1,140,230.12.
This tax, however, and the receipts from customs will be the first to
recover, as the immediate effects of permanent peace and honest
government will be felt in the cities and towns and seaports. Lotteries will
become a doubtful, if not impossible source of revenue. The collections
from internal revenue may keep up to the estimate, though the income from
State property and miscellaneous revenues seems upon examination a rather
doubtful resource for the new government to rely upon. Judged from the
actual revenue collected in 1897-98, had present conditions prevailed, it is
extremely doubtful if the real revenue collected for 1898-99 would have
reached more than half the rosy estimates put forth by the Marquis
Montoro. The fact is apparent to those who know existing conditions in
Cuba that the people of the Island are just now in such an impoverished
condition that the agricultural interests are simply incapable of paying
taxes.
The cities will soon be all right again, and under honest municipal
government, taxes on urban property will be paid. The influx of
commodities of all sorts, to make up for losses and destruction by war and
low stocks due to the blockade, will increase the custom-house receipts.
The reduction of duties on machinery and railway supplies may increase the
importations of these articles, and thus the lower rates of duty will yield a
revenue which the present high rates, by making importations impossible,
fail to do. By putting an end to smuggling, and by honestly administering
the custom-houses, the United States Government may increase the
revenue, but the proposed reduction of duties of the amended tariff in a
measure offsets this. Unless, therefore, some new source of revenue is
found practicable (and the Spanish seem to have exhausted all known
means of raising revenue), reliance for the future will have to be on five of

the six revenue sources above enumerated. If for the first year or two they
should yield in all $15,000,000, it will probably be all the revenue that may
safely be estimated. Much will naturally depend upon the foreign imports.
The cable despatches from Havana, as this volume goes to press, indicate
that the customs revenue will be fully up to the author’s estimates.
Aside from special imports, such as specie, leaf tobacco, etc., the value
of the imports of merchandise proper into Cuba the last normal year (1895)
was upward of $60,000,000. An average tariff rate of twenty-five per cent.
on this valuation of imported merchandise would itself yield $15,000,000.
As a matter of fact, the duties collected in 1895 were $14,587,920.57, on a
total importation of merchandise other than specie of $61,443,334.65, or
about an average of twenty-five per cent. To be sure, the nominal tariff rates
were much higher in 1895 than they will be in 1899, but there is a
possibility of making up for the loss by reason of lower duties by abolishing
smuggling and honestly administering the custom-houses. It is impossible,
however, to estimate on this, because, to do so with any degree of success,
it would be necessary to reduce to figures the losses of revenue by
smuggling, undervaluation, and misclassification. This is an impossibility.
The tariff which the Spanish Government enacted and put in force in the
Island of Cuba in September, 1897, and which, with modifications in the
shape of war taxes, was in force in ports of Cuba in possession of the
Spanish Government until the change of government, January 1, 1899, is
based upon the preceding tariffs. Both this tariff and its predecessors seem
to lack rational basis, so far as Cuba is concerned, the aim apparently being
to secure, by the means of exorbitant customs duties revenue for the
Spanish exchequer and profits for Spanish subjects, without the slightest
regard for the welfare of the people of Cuba. While the duties seem to have
been levied with this idea, the classifications and methods of administration
are so complicated and obscure that they easily lend themselves to every
known species of revenue fraud, from false classifications and
undervaluations to smuggling of the most barefaced character. In fact, the
author, after a careful inquiry into the Cuban tariff and an examination of
several hundred witnesses in Havana and other cities of Cuba, reached the
conclusion that almost every form of revenue iniquity has been perpetrated
upon the people of this Island by the ruling powers.
Not only was the tariff constructed in a way that compelled the Cuban
producer to purchase the articles he needed and could not himself

manufacture, of Spain, instead of in the cheaper markets, but also it levied
almost prohibitive duties on such articles as Spain could not under any
circumstances send to Cuba. For example, the Spanish exporter was able,
by a discriminating duty of more than one hundred per cent. against other
countries, to import from Minnesota to Barcelona American flour and
reship it to Cuba at a price just below the price of the American article
shipped direct to Cuba, upon which a duty nearly three times as great as that
exacted from Spain had to be paid. On the other hand, Spain took little
interest in such articles as machinery and railway supplies, including steel
rails and locomotives, because she neither produced them nor could she
purchase elsewhere and reship as Spanish production.
The amended tariff for the Island, which went into force January 1,
1899, was framed on the general plan of the “open door” for all nations;
that is, the merchandise of all nations will be admitted on an equal footing,
or at the same rate of duty. There is but one uniform rate of duty, and that,
as far as possible, a revenue, not a protective rate. In a few cases, a
protective rate has been allowed, for the purpose of encouraging Cuban
home industry, but as over half of all the imports into Cuba are food
products, not produced to advantage in the Island, the rates of duty rarely
exceed twenty-five per cent. ad valorem. In this connection, it will be
interesting to note the value of the merchandise imported, divided by
schedules or classes (page 217).
It will be seen from the following exhibit that Schedule 12, “Alimentary
Substances,” covering all food products, is the most important of all the
schedules, representing more than half the total imports into Cuba during
1895, and aggregating over $31,000,000. Next in importance to this is
Schedule 4, “Cotton and Manufactures thereof,” aggregating nearly
$6,000,000, or ten per cent. of the total imports; Schedule 1, “Ores, etc.,”
aggregating in the neighbourhood of $4,750,000, ranking third, and so on
through the list.
TABLE SHOWING VALUE OF IMPORTS INTO CUBA BY TARIFF
CLASSES FOR THE LAST NORMAL YEAR, 1895-96
Number of Value Imports,
Commodity.
Schedule. 1895-96.
Class I. Stones, earths, ores, etc. $ 4,733,358.12
“ II. Metals, and manufactures of 2,063,281.95
“ III. Pharmacy and chemicals 2,166,414.92
“ IV. Cotton, and manufactures of 5,908,202.23

Hemp, flax, jute, and other vegetable fibres and manufactures
“ V. 3,587,713.23
of
“ VI. Wool, bristles, etc., and manufactures of 1,060,192.13
“ VII. Silk, and manufactures of 315,010.00
“ VIII. Paper and its applications 1,257,132.94
“ IX. Wood, etc., and manufactures of 2,054,057.57
“ X. Animals and animal wastes 3,880,209.64
“ XI. Instruments, machinery, etc. 2,123,315.43
“ XII. Alimentary substances 31,179,289.98
“ XIII. Miscellaneous 1,115,156.51
$61,443,334.65

In conjunction with the above table, the following recapitulation of
values of exports and reshipments into Cuba during 1895-96 is given:
RECAPITULATION OF VALUES OF EXPORTS AND RESHIPMENTS
IN CUBA DURING 1895-96
First Second Third Fourth
Exports Total
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Classes of goods:
Timber $286,190.70 $ 267,068.47 $ 200,878.03 $ 130,463.90 $ 848,601.10
Cigars 6,616,458.97 4,374,938.70 6,389,770.95 6,666,672.71 24,047,841.33
Sugar 26,288,456.91 30,457,278.50 10,679,269.55 7,572,016.36 74,997,021.32
Molasses 427,886.11 1,010,657.35 152,205.65 8,846.30 1,599,595.41
Rum and liquors 352,393.44 292,808.18 267,277.53 121,991.00 1,034,470.15
Other articles 1,332,714.86 2,538,509.69 2,738,024.01 1,112,242.44 7,721,491.00
Total 35,304,100.99 38,941,260.89 20,427,425.72 15,612,232.71 110,285,020.31
Reshipment:
Foreign goods 15,462.65 8,477.91 17,567.05 27,524.08 69,031.69
Spanish goods 61,343.08 27,477.62 28,718.17 29,276.53 146,815.40
Total 76,805.73 35,955.53 46,285.22 56,800.61 215,847.09
Special exports 207,477.55 166,881.15 2,092,960.13 153,326.30 2,620,645.13
Grand total $35,588,384.27 $39,144,097.57 $22,566,671.07 $15,822,359.62 $113,121,512.53

The grand total of the trade of the Cuban ports for the last normal year
was nearly $175,000,000. Perhaps with allowance for smuggling and
undervaluations, this total may have reached $200,000,000; possibly it may
have exceeded those figures. However this may be, Cuba, under a
satisfactory government and normal conditions, may be easily said to
represent from $200,000,000 to $250,000,000 in the world’s commerce.
This fact gives some idea of the vast trade possibilities of Cuba after a
complete rehabilitation and industrial reconstruction of the Island.

In the following table the author has carefully compiled from the several
available sources of information the average receipts from 1886 to 1897,
inclusive, of the several custom-houses of Cuba:
TOTAL CUSTOM-HOUSE RECEIPTS IN ISLAND OF CUBA
FROM 1886 TO 1897, INCLUSIVE
Custom-Houses. Total for Twelve Years. Average per Year. Ratio of Total.
Havana $106,132,753.38 $ 8,844,396.11 69.9
Cienfuegos 13,691,144.65 1,140,928.72 9.0
Matanzas 9,381,754.10 781,812.84 6.2
Santiago de Cuba 7,668,501.66 639,041.81 5.1
Cardenas 4,363,935.76 363,661.32 2.9
Sagua la Grande 2,994,082.56 249,506.88 2.0
Caibarien 1,705,523.71 142,126.97 1.1
Nuevitas 1,564,595.30 130,382.94 1.0
Guantanamo 1,380,693.44 115,057.79 0.9
Gibara 1,186,480.34 98,873.37 0.8
Manzanillo 913,896.91 76,158.07 0.6
Baracoa 373,498.11 31,124.85 0.2
Trinidad 194,656.85 16,221.40 0.1
Santa Cruz 107,935.59 8,994.63 0.1
Zaza 91,276.51 7,606.38 0.1
Total $151,750,728.87 $12,645,894.08 100.00

During the twelve years, it should be stated the largest amount of
revenue was collected in 1886, when it was $15,330,778.96, and the
smallest amount last year, namely, $9,648,369.94. The receipts show the
working of the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, which, while it
greatly added to the prosperity of the Island, decreased the revenues which
Spain sought to secure for herself.
From the above table it will be seen that the total amount of revenue
collected during these twelve years averaged $12,645,894.08 per year; that
the custom-house of Havana collected 69.9 per cent, and Cienfuegos—
which is an important city, and, in the opinion of the author, the city which,
under the new conditions, will show the most rapid development—9 per
cent., ranking second. In the custom-house district of Santiago, the average
revenue receipts per year have been 5.1 per cent. The inclusion in this
district of Guantanamo, Gibara, Manzanillo, and Baracoa will probably
increase the collections for the province to nearly ten per cent. of the total
revenue of the Island.

The following is a similar table to that given above, but gives at a glance
the customs receipts from imports and exports at each port:
RECEIPTS FROM IMPORTS AND EXPORTS—1886-1897
Imports. Exports.
Per Cent. Per Cent.
Custom-Houses. Average Average
of Total of Total
Twelve Years. Twelve Years.
Imports. Exports.
Havana $7,882,855.48 $961,540.63
Cienfuegos 1,094,962.53 45,966.19
Matanzas 723,978.04 57,834.80
Santiago de Cuba 625,517.97 13,523.84
Cardenas 297,738.05 65,923.27
Sagua la Grande 207,422.23 42,084.65
Caibarien 127,011.98 15,114.99
Nuevitas 122,282.25 8,100.69
Guantanamo 103,198.88 11,858.91
Gibara 63,371.21 35,502.16
Manzanillo 60,664.85 15,493.22
Baracoa 31,122.49 2.36
Trinidad 11,963.02 4,258.38
Santa Cruz 4,679.98 4,314.65
Zaza 4,520.12 3,086.26
Aggregate $11,361,289.08 8.33 $1,284,605.00 8.33

During the war, as already explained, the customs receipts have naturally
declined, therefore the year preceding that has been selected as indicating
the average revenue from custom-houses, when not disturbed by
commercial treaty, such as that made in connection with the McKinley
Tariff law of the United States, nor the other disturbances, such as civil war
and subsequently the blockade of Cuban ports by the United States navy.
The value of the following table is in the fact that it shows customs receipts
from the several sources other than those which may be considered strictly
import duties.
CUSTOM-HOUSE RECEIPTS DURING 1895-96, SPECIFYING TAXES
First Second Third Fourth
Tariff Total.
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
Import Duties $2,464,392.70 $2,387,357.28 $1,947,152.48 $1,977,028.01 $ 8,775,930.47
Ten per cent. on Imports 272,162.34 237,673.86 521,216.92 209,483.87 970,536.99
Provisional fifteen per
84,126.55 312,346.57 302,821.71 267,337.93 966,632.76
cent. on Imports
Export Duties 344,850.62 227,858.34 359,135.46 369,237.95 1,301,082.37
Navigation Tax 2,539.75 4,635.50 6,232.50 5,305.00 18,712.75

Loading Tax 254,316.53 346,953.59 124,242.98 91,509.85 817,022.95
Unloading Tax 140,562.35 128,938.58 129,965.77 112,984.47 512,451.17
Passenger Tax 8,925.75 7,808.00 6,190.25 6,229.75 29,153.75
Merchants’ Bonds 332.05 143.50 208.56 228.84 912.95
Fines 18,308.40 22,496.45 13,346.50 16,663.15 70,814.50
Interest on Promissory
695.03 ... ... ... 695.03
Notes
Excise Tax 333,003.78 252,265.95 333,525.56 205,179.59 1,123,974.88
Totals $3,924,215.85 $3,928,477.62 $3,474,038.69 $3,261,188.41 $14,587,920.57

Having treated as fully as possible on the revenue of Cuba in the past
from customs and made such forecasts as to the probable revenue as would
seem warranted by the official figures, the next chapter will be devoted to a
summary of the schedules of the amended tariff now in force, which will
probably remain during United States occupancy the customs revenue law
of the Island.

PALM-TREE BRIDGE.

CHAPTER XVI

THE AMENDED CUBAN TARIFF—OFFICIAL

A FTER a careful consideration of the facts given in the foregoing chapter,
Assistant-Secretary of the Treasury, William B. Howell, and the author
recommended the adoption of the following amended tariff, the order
for the establishment of which President McKinley signed on the 13th of
December, 1898; and the tariff was promulgated and took effect in all
Cuban ports in the possession of the United States January 1, 1899. The
new tariff, at the time this volume goes to press, is reported by the several
custom-houses of the Island as working smoothly, and yielding an amount
of revenue equivalent to the estimates given in the chapters relating to the
revenue of the Island.

CUSTOMS TARIFF FOR PORTS IN CUBA
FREE LIST

The undermentioned articles may be imported into Cuba exempt from the duties stipulated in the
tariffs on compliance with the prescribed conditions and the formalities established for every case in
the customs ordinances:
346. Manures, natural.
347. Trees, plants, and moss, in natural or fresh state.
348. National products returning from foreign exhibitions, on presentation of the bill of lading or
certificate proving their exportation from the Island and of satisfactory evidence attesting that such
products have been presented and have been shipped to their point of departure.
349. Carriages, trained animals, portable theatres, panoramas, wax figures, and other similar
objects for public entertainment, imported temporarily, provided bond be given.
350. Receptacles exported from Cuba with fruits, sugar, molasses, honey, and brandy, and
reimported empty, including receptacles of galvanised iron intended for the exportation of alcohol.
351. Specimens and collections of mineralogy, botany, and zoology; also small models for public
museums, schools, academies, and scientific and artistic corporations, on proof of their destination.
352. Used furniture of persons coming to settle in the Island.
353. Samples of felt, wall paper, and tissues, when they comply with the following conditions:
(a) When they do not exceed 40 centimetres in length, measured in the warp or length of the
piece, even when such samples have the entire width of the piece. The width shall, for tissues, be
determined by the list, and for felts and wall paper by the narrow border which has not passed
through the press.
(b) Samples not having these indications shall only be admitted free of duty when they do not
exceed 40 centimetres in any dimension.
(c) In order to avoid abuse, the samples declared for free entry must have cuts at every 20
centimetres of their width, so as to render them unfit for any other purpose.
354. Samples of trimmings in small pieces, of no commercial value or possible application.
355. Archæological and numismatical objects for public museums, academies, and scientific and
artistic corporations, on proof of their destination.
356. Works of fine art acquired by the Government, academies, or other official corporations, and
intended for museums, galleries, or art schools, when due proof is given as to their destination.
357. Gold in bars, powder, or coined; also national silver or bronze coins.
358. Wearing apparel, toilet objects, and articles for personal use, bed and table linen, books,
portable tools and instruments, theatrical costumes, jewels, and table services bearing evident trace of
having been used, imported by travellers in their luggage in quantities proportionate to their class,
profession, and position.
359. When travellers do not bring their baggage with them, the clearing of the same may be made
by the conductor or persons authorised for the purpose, provided they prove, to the satisfaction of the
customs, that the effects are intended for private use.
360. Stone, unwrought, for paving purposes.
361. Ploughs, hoes, hatchets, machetes, cane knives, etc., for agricultural purposes, and other
agricultural implements not machinery.
362. Quinine, sulphate and bisulphate of, and all alkaloids or salts of cinchona bark.
363. Hemp, flax, and ramie, raw, hackled, or tow.
364. Abaca, heniquen, pita, jute, and other vegetable fibres, raw, hackled, or tow.
365. Single yarns made of jute for the manufacture of sugar bags only, to be imported by sugar-
bag manufacturers only, the importer to give a bond to use the yarn exclusively for the manufacture
of sugar bags.

366. Books, maps, and scientific instruments, for the use of schools.
367. Coal and coke.
368. Mineral, carbonated or seltzer waters, natural or artificial, root beer, ginger ale, and other
similar non-alcoholic beverages, not otherwise provided for.
369. Fresh fish.
370. Second-hand clothing donated for charitable purposes to needy persons, and not for sale.
371. Articles of the growth, produce, and manufacture of the island of Cuba exported to a foreign
country and returned without having been advanced in value or improved in condition by any process
of manufacture or other means, and upon which no drawback or bounty has been allowed.

IMPORT RATES OF DUTY
ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE TARIFF
G. W. = Gross weight. T. = Tare. Kilog. = Kilogram.
N. W. = Net weight. S. T. = Special tare. Hectog. = Hectogram.
G. W.; T. = Gross weight or tare, as the case may be. Kil. = Kilograms. Hectol. = Hectoliter.

Duties shall be paid in United States money, or in foreign gold coin, such as the Spanish
alfonsinos (centen) and the French louis, which will be accepted at the following rates: Alfonsinos
(25-peseta piece), $4.82; louis (20-franc piece), $3.86.
The following Spanish silver coins now in circulation in the Island of Cuba shall be received for
customs at the following fixed rates in American money: Peso, 60 cents; medio peso, 30 cents;
peseta, 12 cents; real, 6 cents; medio real, 3 cents.
Bronze and copper coins now current in the Island of Cuba will be received at their face value for
fractional parts of a dollar in a single payment to an amount not exceeding 12 cents (1 peseta).
The metrical system of weights and measures is in use in Cuba.
Importations from the United States are dutiable like other commodities.

Class I.—Stones, Earths, Ores, Glass, and Ceramic Products
Group I.—Stones and earths employed in building, arts, and manufactures
1. Marble, jasper, and alabaster:
a. In the rough or in dressed pieces, squared or prepared for
shaping, G. W. 100 kil. $0.50
b. Slabs, plates, or steps of any dimension, polished or not, G.W. 100 kil. 1.00
c. Sculptures, high and bas-reliefs, vases, urns, and similar articles
for house decoration, T. 100 kil. 3.10
d. Wrought or chiselled into other articles, polished or not, T. 100 kil. 2.00
2. Stones, other, natural or artificial:
a. Slabs, plates, or steps, G. W. do. .50
b. Wrought into all other articles, T. do. 1.00
3. Earths employed in manufactures and arts: Cement, lime, and
gypsum, G. W 100 kil. .60
4. Gypsum manufactured into articles:
a. Statuettes, T. do. 3.00
b. Articles, other, T. do. .75
Group 2. Coal.
(See Free list).
Group 3.——Schists, bitumens, and their derivatives

6. Tar and mineral pitch, asphalts, bitumens, and schists, G. W., 100 kil. $0.60
7. Oleonaphtha, crude natural petroleum and crude oils derived from
schists, G. W. 100 kil. 1.40
a. Crude petroleum to be used exclusively in the manufacture of
illuminating gas and only at gas works in Cuba, said gas works to
be subject to inspection by the customs authorities, and to be used
for no other purpose, provided that the importer gives such bond as
may be regarded necessary by the acting collector, G. W. 100 kil. .70
8. Petroleum and other mineral oils, rectified or refined, intended for
illumination; benzine, gasoline, and mineral oils not specially
mentioned; vaseline, G. W. 100 kil. 4.70
a. A product from petroleum known under the name of cordage oil,
imported by and used exclusively for cordage works in their
manufacture of rope and cordage, provided that the importation be
made at the direct demand of the president of the cordage company,
and that the latter submit their works at all times to the inspection
of the customs authorities, and that the importer give such bond as
may be regarded necessary by the acting collector, G. W. 100 kil. 2.35
Group 4.——Ores
9. Ores, G. W. 100 kil. .10
Group 5.——Crystal and Glass
10. Common or ordinary hollow glassware; electric insulators, T. 100 kil. 1.00
Common bottles of glass, intended to contain beer, rum, and
sparkling wines, manufactured with native fruit, and garrafones or
demijohns and siphons to contain mineral, carbonated, or seltzer
waters, shall enjoy a rebate of 60 per cent. of the duties stipulated
in this number, when imported and declared in the custom-house by
the manufacturers of said beverages.
11. Crystal, and glass imitating crystal:
a. Articles, cut, engraved, or gilt, T. 100 kil. 14.00
b. Articles, other, T. do. 7.00
12. Plate glass and crystal:
a. Slabs, paving or roofing, T. 100 kil. 1.65
b. For windows or in other articles, provided they be neither
polished, bevelled, engraved, nor annealed, T. 100 kil. 3.40
c. Window glass set in lead and polished, or bevelled plate glass, T. 100 kil. $4.90
d. Articles, engraved or annealed, T. do. 9.80
13. Glass and crystal, tinned, silvered, or coated with other metals:
a. Common mirrors not exceeding 2 mm. in thickness, coated with
red or dark mercurial varnish, T. 100 kil. 10.00
b. Mirrors, other, not bevelled, T. do. 15.00
c. Mirrors, bevelled, T. do. 18.00
14. Glass and crystal in statuettes, flower stands, and vases and similar
articles for toilet purposes and house decorations; spectacle and
watch glasses; imitations of precious or fine stones; enamel, T. kilog. .56
15. Incandescent electric lamps, mounted or not hundred. 2.50
Group 6.——Pottery, earthenware, and porcelain

16. Bricks of clay, not glazed, for building purposes, furnaces, etc.;
articles of fire clay, G. W. 100 kil. .30
17. Roofing tiles of clay, not glazed, for building purposes, per square
(10 by 10 feet) 1.50
18. Slabs or conduits of clay, glazed or unglazed, cement or stoneware,
G. W. 100 kil. .50
19. Ceramic tiles of all kinds and glazed roofing tiles, per square (10 by
10 feet) 2.50
20. Hollow ware, glazed or not, of clay or stoneware:
a. Household and kitchen utensils, T. 100 kil. .80
b. Dishes or other articles, provided that they be neither gilt,
painted, nor ornamented in relief, T. 100 kil. 5.50
c. Common bottles of earthenware, to contain beer, etc. do. 1.00
d. Articles, gilt, painted, or ornamented in relief, T. do. 5.60
21. Hollow ware or dishes of faience:
a. Neither painted, gilt, nor in relief, T. do. 3.50
b. Gilt, painted, or with ornaments in relief, T. do. 6.40
22. Hollow ware or dishes of porcelain:
a. Neither painted, gilt, nor in relief, T. do. 5.80
b. Painted, gilt, or with ornaments in relief, T. do. 9.30
23. Statuettes, flower stands, and vases, high and bas-reliefs, articles
for toilet purposes and house decoration, of fine clay, faience,
stoneware, porcelain, or bisque, T. kilog. .25
Class II.—Metals, and all Manufactures in which a Metal Enters as a Principal Element
Group I.—Gold, silver, and platinum, and alloys of these metals
24. Gold and platinum in jewelry or goldsmiths’ wares, with or without
precious stones or pearls; jewelry or wares of silver, with precious
stones, pearls and seed pearls, not set, N. W. hectog. $7.50
25. Gold or platinum wrought in articles, other, of all kinds, N. W. hectog. $2.80
26. Silver in ingots, bars, plates, sheets, or powder, N. W. kilog. 2.60
27. Jewelry or wares of silver, without precious stones or pearls, N.W. hectog. 1.50
28. Silversmiths’ wares, other, of all kinds, and platinum in ingots, N.
W. kilog. 8.00
29. Plate, N. W. do. 2.40
Group 2.—Cast iron (I)
(I) Articles of malleable cast iron are dutiable as manufactures of
wrought iron,
Cast iron:
30. Pigs, G. W. 100 kil. .10
31. Articles not coated or ornamented with another metal or porcelain,
neither polished or turned—
a. Bars, beams, plates, grates for furnaces, columns, and pipes, G.
W. 100 kil. .50
b. Lubricating boxes for railway trucks and carriages, and railway
chairs, G. W. 100 kil. .35
c. Articles, other, G. W. do. .75

32. Articles of all kinds not coated or ornamented with another metal or
porcelain, polished or turned, T. 100 kil. 1.20
33. Articles of all kinds, enamelled, gilt, tinned, or coated or
ornamented with other metals or porcelain, T. 100 kil. 2.30
Group 3.—Wrought iron and steel
34. Iron, soft or wrought, in ingots or “tochos”; steel in ingots, G. W., 100 kil. .40
35. Wrought iron or steel, rolled—
a. Rails, G. W. do. .425
b. Bars of all kinds, including rods, tires, hoops, and beams, G. W. 100 kil. .90
c. Bars of all kinds of fine crucible steel, G. W. do. 1.60
36. Sheets, rolled—
a. Neither polished nor tinned, of 3 millimetres and more in
thickness, G. W. 100 kil. 1.10
b. Neither polished nor tinned, of less than 3 millimetres in
thickness, and hoop iron, G. W. 100 kil. 1.20
c. Tinned and tin plate, G. W. do. 1.50
d. Polished, corrugated, perforated, cold-rolled, galvanised or not,
and bands of polished hoop iron, G. W. 100 kil. 1.30
37.
Wrought iron or steel:
Cast in pieces, in the rough, neither polished, turned, nor adjusted,
weighing, each—
a. 25 kil. or more, G. W. 100 kil. $1.00
b. Less than 25 kil., G. W. do. 1.35
38. Cast in pieces, finished—
a. Wheels weighing more than 100 kilograms, fish plates, chairs,
sleepers, and straight axles; springs for railways and tramways;
lubricating boxes, G. W. 100 kil. .60
b. Wheels weighing 100 kilograms or less; springs other than for
railways and tramways; bent axles and cranks, G. W. 100 kil. 1.40
39. Pipes—
a. Covered with sheet brass, G. W. do. 1.40
b. Other, galvanised or not, G. W. do. 1.40
40. Wire, galvanised or not—
a. 2 millim. or more in diameter, T. do. 1.00
b. More than ½ and up to 2 millim. in diameter, T. do. 1.30
c. ½ millim. or less in diameter, and wire covered with any kind of
tissue, T. 100 kil. 1.60
41. In large pieces, composed of bars or bars and sheets fastened by
means of rivets or screws; the same, unriveted, perforated, or cut to
measure for bridges, frames, and other buildings, G. W., 100 kil. 1.80
42. Anchors, chains for vessels or machines, moorings, switches, and
signal disks, G. W. 100 kil. .80
42a. Anvils, T. do. 2.50
43. Wire gauze—
a. Up to 20 threads per inch, T. do. 2.00

b. Of 20 threads or more per inch, T. kilog. .06
44. Cables, fencing (barbed wire), and netting; furniture springs, G. W., 100 kil. 1.00
45. Tools and implements—
a. Fine, for arts, trades, and professions, of crucible steel, T. 100 kil. 8.00
b. Other, T. do. 2.50
46. Screws, nuts, bolts, washers, and rivets; Parisian and similar tacks,
T 100 kil. 1.50
47. Nails, clasp nails, and brads, T. do. 1.00
48. Buckles:
a. Gilt, silvered, or nickeled, T. kilog. .20
b. Other, T. do. .15
49. Needles, sewing or embroidering, pins, and pens; pieces of
clockworks, N. W. kilog. .30
50. Crochet hooks and the like; hooks, hairpins, and surgical
instruments, N. W. kilog. .30
51. Cutlery of all kinds; tailors’ scissors; sidearms and pieces for same,
T. kilog. .40
52. Firearms:
a. Barrels, unfinished, for portable arms, G. W. kilog. $ .25
b. Small arms, such as pistols and revolvers, also their detached
parts, T. kilog. 1.00
c. Sporting guns: Muzzle-loading, and detached parts thereof, T. kilog. .60
d. Breech-loading, and detached parts thereof, T. do. 2.50
53. Manufactures of tin plate, T. 100 kil. 4.00
Wrought iron or steel:
54. Articles of all kinds not specially mentioned, common, even coated
with lead, tin, or zinc, or painted or varnished—
a. In which sheet predominates, T. 100 kil. 3.00
b. In which sheet does not predominate, T. do. 2.00
55. Articles of all kinds not specially mentioned, fine, i.e., polished,
enamelled, coated with porcelain, nickel, or other metals (with the
exception of lead, tin, or zinc), or with ornaments, borders, or parts
of other metals, or combined with glass or earthenware—
a. In which sheet predominates, T. 100 kil. 3.00
b. In which sheet does not predominate do. 3.00
Group 4.—Copper and alloys of common metals with copper (brass, bronze, etc.)
56. Copper scales, copper of first fusion, old copper, brass, etc., G. W. 100 kil. 3.00
57. Copper and alloys of copper in ingots, G. W. do. 4.00
58. Rolled in bars of all kinds, G. W. do. 4.50
59. Rolled in sheets, G. W. do. 5.00
60. Wire, galvanised or not—
a. 1 millimetre and more in diameter, T. do. 6.00
b. Less than 1 millimetre in diameter, T. do. 6.00
c. Gilt, silvered, or nickeled, T. kilog. .50
61. Wire covered with tissues or insulating materials; conducting
cables for electricity over public thoroughfares, T. 100 kil. 7.50

62. Wire gauze—
a. Up to 100 threads per inch, T. 100 kil. 6.00
b. Of 100 threads or more per inch, T. kilog. .15
63. Pipes, bearings, plates for fireplaces, and boilermakers’ wares
partially wrought, G. W. 100 kil. 4.50
64. Nails and tacks:
a. Gilt, silvered, or nickeled, T. kilog. .20
b. Other, T. do. .12
65. Pins or pens, N. W. do. .60
Copper and alloys of copper:
66. Articles not specially mentioned, varnished or not, T. kilog. .20
67. Articles, gilt, silvered, or nickeled, not specially mentioned, T. kilog. .50
Group 5.—Other metals and their alloys
68. Mercury, G. W. kilog. $ .20
Nickel, aluminium, and alloys having for a basis these metals:
69. In lumps or ingots, G. W 100 kil. 3.00
Tin and alloys thereof:
70. In lumps or ingots, G. W. do. 4.00
Zinc, lead, and other metals not specially mentioned, as well as
their alloys:
71. In lumps or ingots, G. W. 100 kil. 1.00
Nickel, aluminium, and their alloys:
72. In bars, sheets, pipes, and wire, G. W.. do. 7.00
Tin and alloys thereof:
73. In bars, sheets, pipes, and wire, G. W.. do. 7.00
Zinc, lead and other metals:
74. In bars, sheets, pipes, and wire, G. W. 1.50
75. Tin hammered in thin leaves (tin foil) and capsules for bottles, T. kilog. .04
Nickel, or aluminium, and their alloys:
76. Articles of all kinds, T. do. .50
Tin and alloys thereof (Britannia metal, etc.):
77. Articles of all kinds, T. do. .50
78. Zinc, lead, and other metals, and their alloys:
a. Articles, gilt, silvered, or nickeled, T. do. .30
b. Articles, other, T do. .15
Group 6.—Wastes and scoriæ
79. Filings, shavings, cuttings of iron or steel, and other wastes of cast
iron or from the manufacture of common metals, fit only for
resmelting, G. W. 100 kil. .15
80. Scoriæ resulting from the smelting of ores, G. W. do. .03
Class III.—Substances Employed in Pharmacy and Chemical
Industries, And Products Composed of these Substances
Group 1.—Simple drugs
81. Oleaginous seeds, copra or cocoanuts, G. W. 100 kil. $2.00
82. Resins and gums:
a. Colophany, pitch, and similar products, G. W. do. .50

b. Spirits of turpentine, T. do. 2.50
c. Caoutchouc and gutta-percha, raw or melted in lumps, G. W. 100 kil. 3.00
83. Extracts of licorice, camphor, aloes, and other similar vegetable
juices, G. W. 100 kil. 5.25
84. Tan bark, G. W do. .25
85. Opium, G. W. kilog. 6.00
86. Other simple vegetable products, not specially mentioned, G. W. 100 kil. $2.75
87. Animal products employed in medicine, not specially mentioned,
G. W. 100 kil. 1.80
88. Natural colours, in powder or in lumps (ochres, etc.), do. .60
Group 2.—Colours, dyes, and varnishes
89. Artificial colours of metallic bases:
a. In powder or lumps, G. W.; T. 100 kil. 2.55
b. Prepared in the paste, oil, or water; also lead or coloured pencils,
G. W.; T. 100 kil. 5.00
90. Other artificial colours, in powder, crystals, lumps, or paste, G. W.;
T. kilog. .25
91. Natural dyes:
a. Woods, barks, roots, etc., for dyeing, G. W. 100 kil. .20
b. Madder, G. W. do. 4.50
c. Indigo and cochineal, G. W. kilog. .20
92. Artificial dyes:
a. Extracts from logwood, archil, and other dyeing extracts, G. W.;
T. 100 kil. 5.00
b. Writing, drawing, or printing inks, G. W.; T. do. 3.00
c. Colours derived from coal, G. W.; T. kilog. .20
93. Varnish, G. W.; T. 100 kil. 7.50
94. Blacking, G. W. do. 3.00
Group 3.—Chemical and pharmaceutical products
95. Simple bodies:
a. Sulphur, G. W 100 kil. .15
b. Bromine, boron, iodine, and phosphorus. Phosphorus, T.; other,
G. W. kilog. .18
96. Inorganic acids:
a. Hydrochloric, boric, nitric, and sulphuric, also aqua regia, G. W. 100 kil. .30
b. Liquid carbonic acid, N. W. do. 5.00
c. Other, G. W. do. 5.00
97. Organic acids:
a. Oxalic, citric, tartaric, and carbolic, G. W. do. 1.00
b. Oleic, stearic, and palmetic, G. W. do. 1.40
c. Acetic, G. W. do. 6.00
d. Other, G. W. do. 5.00
98. Oxides and oxyhydrates: Of ammoniac, potash, and other caustic
and barilla alkalies, G. W. 100 kil. .25
99. Inorganic salts:
a. Chloride of sodium (common salt), G. W. do. .50

b. Chloride of potassium; sulphates of soda, iron, or magnesia;
carbonate of magnesia; alum, G. W. 100 kil. $0.45
c. Sulphate of ammoniac; phosphates and superphosphates of lime;
nitrate of potash and soda, G. W. 100 kil. .03
d. Other salts of ammoniac, salts of copper, chloride of lime,
sulphate of potash, hyposulphite of soda and borax, G. W., 100 kil. .75
e. Chlorates of soda and potash, G. W. do 1.80
100. Organic salts:
a. Acetates and oxalates, G. W. do 2.50
b. Citrates and tartrates, T. do 3.00
101. Alkaloids and their salts; chlorides of gold and silver, N. W., kilog. 6.75
102. Chemical products not specially mentioned, G. W.; T. do .05
103. Pills, capsules, medicinal dragees, and the like, T. do .25
104. Pharmaceutical products not specially mentioned, T. do .10
Group 4.—Oils, fats, wax, and their derivatives
105. Vegetable oils:
a. Solid (cocoanut, palm, etc.), G. W. 100 kil. 2.50
b. Liquid, except olive oil, G. W. do 3.00
106. Crude oils and animal fats:
a. Cod-liver oil and other medicinal oils, not refined, G. W. 100 kil. 1.47
b. Glycerin, olein, stearin, and spermaceti, crude, G. W. do 1.40
c. Other crude oils and fats, G. W. 100 kil. .50
107. Mineral, vegetable, or animal wax, unwrought, and paraffin in
lumps, G. W. 100 kil. 2.50
108. Articles of stearin and paraffin, wax of all kinds, wrought, T. 100 kil. 2.40
109. Common soap, G. W.; T. do 1.50
110. Perfumery and essences, T. kilog. .20
Group 5.—Various
111. Artificial or chemical fertilizers, G. W. 100 kil. .05
112. Starch and feculæ for industrial uses; dextrin and glucose, G. W.; T. 100 kil. 1.40
113. Glues, albumens, and gelatin, G. W. do 3.90
114. Carbons prepared for electric lighting, G. W. do 3.00
115. Gunpowder and explosives:
a. Gunpowder, explosive compounds, and miners’ fuses, G. W.; T. 100 kil. 4.00
b. Gunpowder, sporting, and other explosives not intended for
mines, N. W. kilog. .20
Class IV.—Cotton and Manufactures Thereof.
Group 1.—Cotton in the wool and yarns
116. Cotton in the wool and cotton waste, G. W. 100 kil. $1.00
117. Cotton yarn and thread for crocheting, embroidering, and sewing;
including the weight of reels, N. W. kilog. .33
Group 2.—Tissues
118. Tissues, plain and without figures, napped or not, weighing 10
kilograms or more per 100 square metres, unbleached, bleached, or
dyed, having:
a. Up to 9 threads, N. W. kilog. .13

b. From 10 to 15 threads, N. W. do .17
c. From 16 to 19 threads, N. W. do .23
d. 20 threads or more, N. W. do .35
118
The same tissues, printed or manufactured with dyed yarns:
a.
Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 30 per cent., N. W.
119. Tissues, plain and without figures, napped or not, weighing less
than 10 kilograms per 100 square metres, unbleached, bleached, or
dyed, having:
a. Up to 6 threads, N. W. kilog. .15
b. From 7 to 11 threads. N. W. do .20
c. From 12 to 15 threads, N. W. do .27
d. From 16 to 19 threads, N. W. do .37
e. 26 threads or more, N. W. do .50
119 The same tissue, printed or manufactured with dyed yarns: Dutiable
a. as the tissue, with a surtax of 40 per cent., N. W.
120. Tissues, twilled or figured on the loom, napped or not, weighing 10
kilograms or more per 100 square meters, unbleached, bleached, or
dyed, having:
a. Up to 6 threads, N. W. kilog. .15
b. From 7 to 11 threads, N. W. do .18
c. From 12 to 15 threads, N. W. do .20
d. From 16 to 19 threads, N. W. do .32
e. 20 threads or more, N. W. do .42
120 The same tissues, printed or manufactured with dyed yarns:
a. Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 30 per cent., N. W.
121. Tissues, twilled or figured on the loom, napped or not, weighing
less than 10 kilograms per 100 square metres, unbleached,
bleached, or dyed, having:
a. Up to 6 threads. N. W. kilog. .18
b. From 7 to 11 threads, N. W. do .23
c. From 12 to 15 threads, N. W. do .32
d. From 16 to 19 threads, N. W. do .43
e. 20 threads or more, N. W. do .55
121a. The same tissues, printed or manufactured with dyed yarns:
Dutiable as the tissues, with surtax of 40 per cent., N. W.
122. Tissues for counterpanes, N. W. $
kilog. 0.24
123. Piqués of all kinds, N. W. do .45
124. Carded tissues:
a. Unbleached, half bleached, or dyed in the piece, N. W. do .08
b. Bleached, printed or manufactured with dyed yarns, N. W., kilog. .20
125. Velvety tissues, such as corduroys and velveteens; three-ply plush
tissues, cut or not, N. W. kilog. .47
126. Knitted goods, even with needlework. do. .30
a. Undershirts and drawers of simple finish or rough sewing, N. W. kilog. .70

b. Undershirts and drawers of double sewing or fine finish, N. W., kilog. .80
c. Stockings, socks, gloves, and other small articles of simple finish
or rough sewing, N. W. kilog. .70
d. Stockings, socks, gloves, and other small articles of double
sewing or fine finish, N. W. kilog. .90
127. Tulles:
a. Plain, N. W. do. .70
b. Figured or embroidered on the loom, N. W. do. .92
128. Lace, blondes, and tulle for borders, of all kinds, N. W. do. 1.47
129. Carpets of cotton, N. W. kilog. .15
130. Tissues called tapestry, for upholstering furniture and for curtains
manufactured with dyed yarns; table-covers and counterpanes of
the same kind, N. W. kilog. .32
131. Wicks for lamps and candles, N. W. do. .15
132. Trimmings of cotton; ribbons and galloons, N. W. do. .52
Class V.—Hemp, Flax, Pita, Jute, and other Vegetable Fibres, and Their Manufactures
Group 1.—Raw and spun
133. Twisted yarns of two or more ends (including the weight of the
reels); also the fibres of abaca, heniquen, pita, jute, and other
vegetable fibres, prepared for spinning, not otherwise provided for, $
N. W. kilog. 0.10
133a. Bags for sugar 100 kil. 2.00
134. Rope and cordage:
a. Twine or rope yarn and cord of hemp, not exceeding 3
millimetres in thickness, G. W. 100 kil. 6.00
b. Cordage- and ropemakers’ wares of hemp, exceeding 3
millimetres in thickness, N. W. 100 kil. 6.00
c. Cordage- and ropemakers’ wares of abaca, heniquen, pita, jute,
or other fibres, N. W. 100 kil. 6.00
Group 2.—Tissues
135. Tissues of hemp, linen, ramie, jute, or other vegetable fibres, not
specially mentioned, plain, twilled or damasked, weighing 35
kilograms or more per 100 square metres, unbleached, half
bleached, or dyed in the piece, having:
a. Up to 5 threads, N. W. 100 kil. $2.00
b. From 6 to 8 threads, N. W. kilog. .05
c. 9 threads or more, N. W. do. .08
135a. The same tissues, bleached or printed:
Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 15 per cent., N. W.
135b. The same tissues, manufactured with dyed yarns:
Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 25 per cent., N. W.
136. Tissues, plain, twilled, or damasked, weighing from 20 to 35
kilograms per 100 square metres, unbleached, half bleached, or
dyed in the piece, having:
a. Up to 5 threads, N. W. kilog. .06
b. From 6 to 8 threads, N. W. do. .08
c. From 9 to 12 threads, N. W. do. .12

d. From 13 to 16 threads, N. W. do. .16
e. 17 threads or more, N. W. do. .20
136a. The same tissues, bleached or printed:
Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 25 per cent., N. W.
136b. The same tissues, manufactured with dyed yarns:
Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 40 per cent., N. W.
137. Tissues, plain, twilled, or damasked, weighing from 10 to 20
kilograms per 100 square metres, unbleached, half bleached, or
dyed in the piece, having:
a. Up to 8 threads, N. W. kilog .08
b. From 9 to 12 threads, N. W. do .12
c. From 13 to 16 threads, N. W. do .18
d. From 17 to 20 threads, N. W. do .25
e. 21 threads or more, N. W. do .35
137a. The same tissues, bleached or printed:
Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 30 per cent., N. W.
137b. The same tissues, manufactured with dyed yarns:
Dutiable as the tissue, with a surtax of 50 per cent., N. W.
138. Tissues, plain, twilled, or damasked, weighing less than 8
kilograms per 100 square metres, unbleached, half bleached, or
dyed in the piece, having:
a. Up to 8 threads, N. W. kilog. .10
b. From 9 to 12 threads, N. W. do .14
c. From 13 to 16 threads, N. W. do .20
d. From 17 to 20 threads, N. W. do .35
e. 21 threads or more, N. W. do .06
138a. The same tissues, bleached or printed: Dutiable as the tissue, with a
surtax of 30 per cent., N. W.
138b. The same tissues, manufactured with dyed yarns: Dutiable as the
tissue, with a surtax of 50 per cent., N. W.
139. Velvets and plushes of linen, jute, etc., N. W. kilog. $0.20
140. Knitted goods of linen or hemp, mixed or not with cotton or other
vegetable fibres, even with needlework:
a. In the piece, jerseys, or drawers, N. W. kilog. .80
b. Stockings, socks, gloves, and other small articles, N.W. do 1.00
141. Tulles:
a. Plain, N. W. do .60
b. Figured or embroidered on the loom, N. W. do .75
142. Lace, blonde, and tulles for borders, N. W. do 2.00
143. Carpets of jute, hemp, or other vegetable fibres without admixture
of wool, N. W. kilog. .05
144. Tissues called tapestry for upholstering furniture and for curtains,
mixed or not with cotton, figured or damasked, provided they be
manufactured with yarns dyed prior to being woven; table- covers
and counterpanes of the same kind, N. W. kilog. .28

145. Trimmings of hemp, jute, linen, ramie, etc.; ribbons and galloons,
N. W. kilog. .40
Class VI.—Wool, Bristles, Hair, Horsehair, and their Manufactures
Group 1.—Raw and spun
146. Bristles, hair, and horsehair per cent. ad valorem 40
147. Wool, raw do. 40
148. Woollen yarn, unbleached, bleached or dyed, single or twisted per cent. ad valorem. 40
Woollen yarns mixed with silk shall be liable to the following
surtaxes:
When containing up to one-fifth of silk, per cent. ad valorem 22
When containing up to two-fifths of silk do 50
When containing three-fifths or more of silk the yarns shall be
dutiable as untwisted silk.
Group 2.—Tissues and fulled stuffs
149. Swanskin of pure or mixed wool per cent. ad valorem 40
150. Baizes:
a. Of pure wool do 40
b. Of mixed wool do 40
151. Flannels, white or colored, for underclothing:
a. Of pure wool do 40
b. Of mixed wool do 40
152. Blankets or counterpanes of wool, pure or mixed with other
materials:
a. Grey blankets (“pardas”) per cent. ad valorem 40
b. Other do 40
153. Astrakhans, plushes, and velvets of wool, pure or mixed do 40
154. Cloths and other tissues not specially mentioned, of wool, hair, or
flock wool, comprised or not in drapery, weighing per square
metre:
300 grams or more:
a. Of wool, hair, or flock wool, pure per cent. ad valorem 40
b. Of wool or hair, mixed do 40
155. From 175 to 300 grams:
a. Of wool, hair, or flock wool, pure do 40
b. Of wool or hair, mixed do 40
156. Less than 175 grams:
a. Of wool, hair, or flock wool, pure do 40
b. Of wool or hair mixed do 40
157. Tissues of bristle or horsehair, with or without an admixture of
cotton or other vegetable fibres per cent. ad valorem 40
158. Knitted stuffs, with or without an admixture of cotton or other
vegetable fibres, even with needlework:
a. In the piece, jerseys, or drawers per cent. ad valorem 40
b. In stockings, socks, gloves, and other small articles do 40
159. Carpets of wool, pure or mixed with other materials:
a. With uncut pile do 40

b. Plushy or with cut pile do 40
160. Tissues called tapestry, for curtains and uphol- stering furniture, of
wool, pure or mixed with cotton or other vegetable fibres, even
figured or damasked, weighing more than 350 grams per square
metre; table- covers and counterpanes of the same kind per cent. ad valorem 40
161. Felts of wool, pure or mixed do 40
162. Trimmings of wool; ribbons and galloons do 40
Class VII.—Silk and Manufactures of Silk
Group 1.—Yarns
163. Silk and floss silk, spun or twisted, in skeins per cent. ad valorem 50
164. Silk on reels, including weight of the reels do 50
Group 2.—Tissues
165. Tissues of unbleached silk per cent. ad valorem 50
166. Tissues of silk or floss silk: Not mixed with any other material—
Plain, not figured, twilled, or serged—
a. Black do 50
b. Coloured do 50
167. Figured, plushy or velvety do 50
168. Mixed with another material:
Plain, not figured, twilled, or serged—
a. Mixed with cotton or other vegetable fibres do 50
b. Mixed with wool or hair do 50
169. Figured, plushy or velvety do 50
170. Knitted stuffs of boiled silk, of unbleached silk; or of floss silk,
made up in any kind of article:
a. Of pure silk per cent. ad valorem 50
b. Mixed with other textile materials do 50
171. Tulles of silk or floss silk, pure or mixed:
a. Plain do 50
b. Figured or embroidered on the loom do 50
172. Lace tulles for borders and blondes, of silk or floss silk, plain or
figured:
a. Not mixed per cent. ad valorem 50
b. Mixed with cotton or other vegetable fibres do 50
173. Trimmings of silk do 50
Class VIII.—Paper and its Applications
Group 1.
174. Paper pulp, G. W. 100 kil. $0.15
Group 2.—Printing and writing paper
175. Paper, endless or in sheets, white or coloured, uncut and unprinted,
for printing purposes, T. 100 kil. 4.00
176. Paper, endless or in sheets, white or coloured, used for wrapping
purposes, T. 100 kil. 2.50
177. Paper in sheets, unruled, unprinted, and uncut, white or coloured,
used for writing purposes 100 kil. 8.00
Group 3.—Paper, printed, engraved, or photographed

178. Books, bound or unbound, and similar printed matter 100 kil. 1.25
179. Headed paper, forms for invoices, labels, cards, and the like, T. kilog. .10
180. Prints, maps, charts, etc., drawings, photographs, and engravings;
pictures, lithographs, chromolithographs, oleographs, etc., used as
labels and wrappers for tobacco or other purposes:
a. Of a single printing and bronze or leaf, including labels printed
only in bronze or leaf, T. kilog. .05
b. Of two printings and bronze or leaf, T. do. .20
c. Of three to ten printings (inclusive) and bronze or leaf, T. kilog. .40
d. Of more than ten printings and bronze or leaf, T. do. .80
Group 4.—Wallpaper
181. Wall paper printed:
a. On natural ground, T. 100 kil $4.00
b. On dull or glazed ground, T. do 6.00
c. With gold, silver, wool, or glass, T. kilog .27
Group 5.—Pasteboard and various papers
182. Blotting paper, common packing paper, and sand or glass paper, T. 100 kil 1.75
183. Thin paper, of common pulp, for packing fruit, T. do 2.30
184. Other paper not specially mentioned, T. do 4.60
185. Pasteboard in sheets:
a. Cardboard paper and fine, glazed, or pressed cardboard, T. 100 kil 3.50
b. Other pasteboard, T. do 1.00
186. Manufactures of pasteboard:
a. Boxes lined with ordinary paper, T. do 1.00
b. Boxes with ornaments or lined with fine paper, T. kilog .22
c. Articles not specially mentioned, T. do .17
187. Paste and carton-pierre:
a. In mouldings or unfinished articles, T. 100 kil 1.00
b. In finished articles, T. kilog .15
Class IX.—Wood and other Vegetable Materials Employed in Industry, and Articles
Manufactured therewith
Group 1.—Wood
188. Staves thousand $0.80
189. Ordinary wood:
a. In boards, deals, rafters, beams, round wood, and timber for
shipbuilding, G. W. cubic metre .40
b. Planed or dovetailed, for boxes and flooring, broomsticks and
cases wherein imported goods were packed, G. W. 100 kil .16
190. Fine wood for cabinetmakers:
a. In boards, deals, trunks, or logs, G. W. do 1.20
b. Sawn in veneers, T. do 1.75
191. Coopers’ wares:
a. Fitted together, G. W. do .65
b. In shooks, also hoops and headings, G. W. do .36
192. Wood, cut, for making hogsheads or casks for sugar or molasses, G.
W. 100 kil .06

193. Latticework and fencing, G. W. do .60

AVENUE OF PALM TREES, PALATINO.

Group 2.——Furniture and manufactures of wood
194. Common wood manufactured into joiners’ wares, and articles of all
kinds, turned or not, painted or not, varnished or not, but neither
chiselled, inlaid, nor carved, T. 100 kil 4.75
195. Fine wood manufactured into furniture or other wares, turned or
not, polished or not, varnished or not, and furniture and common
wooden wares veneered with fine wood; furniture upholstered with
tissue (other than with silk or stuffs containing an admixture
thereof, or with leather), provided that the articles specified in this
number be neither chiselled, carved, inlaid, nor ornamented with
metal, T. 100 kil. $15.00
196. Furniture of bent wood, T. do. 12.00

197. Battens:
a. Molded, varnished, or prepared for gilding, T. 100 kil. 5.05
b. Gilt or carved, T. kilog. .20
198. Wood of any kind manufactured into furniture or other wares, gilt,
chiselled, carved, inlaid, or veneered with mother-of-pearl or other
fine materials, or ornamented with metal, and furniture upholstered
with stuffs of pure or mixed silk or leather, N. W. kilog. .68
Group 3.—Various
199. Charcoal, firewood, and other vegetable fuel, G. W. 1000 kil. 1.50
200. Cork:
a. In the rough or in boards, G. W. 100 kil. 1.40
b. Manufactured, T. do. 4.50
201. Rushes, vegetable hair, cane, osiers, fine straw, palm, and genista,
raw, raw esparto, and baskets and other common wares of esparto,
G. W. 100 kil. 1.83
Baskets wherein imported goods were packed shall be dutiable
according to this number, with a rebate of 60 per cent.
202. Esparto manufactured into fine articles; rushes, vegetable hair,
cane, osiers, fine straw, palm, and genista, manufactured into
articles of all kinds not specially mentioned, T. 100 kil. 13.10
Class X.—Animals and Animal Wastes Employed in Industry
Group 1.—Animals
203. Horses and mares:
a. Above the standard height each $10.00
b. Other do. 5.00
204. Mules do. 5.00
205. Asses do. 5.00
206. Bovine animals:
a. Oxen do. 1.00
b. Cows do. 1.00
c. Bullocks, calves, and heifers do. 1.00
207. Pigs do. 1.00
208. Sucking pigs do. 1.00
209. Sheep, goats, and animals not specially mentioned do. 1.00
210. Singing birds, parrots, etc. per cent. ad valorem .25
Group 2.—Hides, Skins, and Leather Wares
211. Pelts in their natural state or dressed, G. W. kilog. $1.50
212. Hides and skins, green or not tanned, G. W. do. .02
Wet-salted hides and skins shall enjoy a reduction of 60 per cent. in
respect of salt and moisture.
Dry-salted hides and skins shall be allowed a rebate of 30 per cent.
213. Hides tanned with the hair, G. W. kilog. .20
214. Hides tanned without the hair:
a. Cow and other large hides, whole, G. W. do. .15
b. Other and backs of large hides, G. W. do. .20
215. Hides and skins, curried, dyed or not:

a. Sheepskins (basils), T. do. .20
b. Calf or goat skins, T. do. .25
c. Kid, lamb, or young calf skins, T. do. .36
d. Cow and other large hides, whole, T. do. .15
e. Backs of large hides and hides and skins not specially
mentioned, T. kilog. .30
216. Hides and skins, varnished, satiny, grained, dulled, and hides and
skins with figures, engravings, or embossed, T. kilog. .50
Leather cut out for boots and shoes or other articles shall be liable
to a surtax of 30 per cent, of the respective duties leviable thereon.
217. Chamois leather or parchment of all kinds and gilt or bronzed
hides and skins, T. kilog. .60
218. Gloves of skin, T. do. 3.50
219. Shoes of cowhide and similar leather:
a. For men dozen 2.50
b. For women do. 2.00
c. For boys below size 4½ do. 1.50
220. Shoes of patent and similar leather:
a. For men do. 2.75
b. For women do. 2.25
c. For boys below size 4½ do. 1.75
221. Boots of calfskin, with elastics, or for lacing:
a. For men do. 5.00
b. For women do. 3.00
c. For boys below size 4½ do. 2.00
222. Boots of patent and similar leather:
a. For men do. 6.00
b. For women, and top-boots (“polacas”) do. 7.00
c. For boys below size 4½ do. 5.00
223. Other boots and shoes, fancy do. 8.00
224. Riding boots pair 2.00
225. Sandals dozen .40
226. Saddlery and harnessmakers’ wares; valises, hat-boxes, and
travelling bags of cardboard or leather, T. kilog. $0.20
227. Other manufactures of leather or covered with leather, T. kilog. .40
Group 3.—Various
228. Feathers for ornament, in their natural state or manufactured, N. W. kilog. 2.00
229. Other feathers and feather dusters, T. do. .40
230. Intestines, dried, N. W. do. 2.00
231. Animal wastes, unmanufactured, not specially mentioned, G. W. 100 kil. .50
Class XI.—Instruments, Machinery, and Apparatus Employed in Agriculture, Industry, and
Locomotion
Group 1.—Instruments
232. Pianos:
a. Grand per cent. ad valorem .40
b. Other do. .40