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Title: An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine

Author: John Henry Newman

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Most recently updated: July 4, 2016

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ESSAY ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE ***

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A few typographical errors have been corrected. A complete list
follows the text.

AN ESSAY

ON THE

DEVELOPMENT OF
CHRISTIAN

DOCTRINE.

BY

JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN.

SIXTH EDITION

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS
NOTRE DAME, INDIANA

TO THE

Rev. SAMUEL WILLIAM WAYTE, B.D.

PRESIDENT OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.

My dear President,
Not from any special interest which I anticipate you will take in this
Volume, or any sympathy you will feel in its argument, or intrinsic fitness
of any kind in my associating you and your Fellows with it,—
But, because I have nothing besides it to offer you, in token of my sense of
the gracious compliment which you and they have paid me in making me
once more a Member of a College dear to me from Undergraduate
memories;—

Also, because of the happy coincidence, that whereas its first publication
was contemporaneous with my leaving Oxford, its second becomes, by
virtue of your act, contemporaneous with a recovery of my position there:
—
Therefore it is that, without your leave or your responsibility, I take the bold
step of placing your name in the first pages of what, at my age, I must
consider the last print or reprint on which I shall ever be engaged.
I am, my dear President,
Most sincerely yours,
JOHN H. NEWMAN.
February 23, 1878.

PREFACE TO THE EDITION OF 1878.
The following pages were not in the first instance written to prove the
divinity of the Catholic Religion, though ultimately they furnish a positive
argument in its behalf, but to explain certain difficulties in its history, felt
before now by the author himself, and commonly insisted on by Protestants
in controversy, as serving to blunt the force of its primâ facie and general
claims on our recognition.
However beautiful and promising that Religion is in theory, its history, we
are told, is its best refutation; the inconsistencies, found age after age in its
teaching, being as patent as the simultaneous contrarieties of religious
opinion manifest in the High, Low, and Broad branches of the Church of
England.
In reply to this specious objection, it is maintained in this Essay that,
granting that some large variations of teaching in its long course of 1800
years exist, nevertheless, these, on examination, will be found to arise from
the nature of the case, and to proceed on a law, and with a harmony and a
definite drift, and with an analogy to Scripture revelations, which, instead
of telling to their disadvantage, actually constitute an argument in their
favour, as witnessing to a superintending Providence and a great Design in
the mode and in the circumstances of their occurrence.
Perhaps his confidence in the truth and availableness of this view has
sometimes led the author to be careless and over-liberal in his concessions
to Protestants of historical fact.
If this be so anywhere, he begs the reader in such cases to understand him
as speaking hypothetically, and in the sense of an argumentum ad hominem
and à fortiori. Nor is such hypothetical reasoning out of place in a
publication which is addressed, not to theologians, but to those who as yet
are not even Catholics, and who, as they read history, would scoff at any
defence of Catholic doctrine which did not go the length of covering
admissions in matters of fact as broad as those which are here ventured on.

In this new Edition of the Essay various important alterations have been
made in the arrangement of its separate parts, and some, not indeed in its
matter, but in its text.
February 2, 1878.

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE FIRST EDITION.
OCULI MEI DEFECERUNT IN SALUTARE TUUM.

It is now above eleven years since the writer of the following pages, in one
of the early Numbers of the Tracts for the Times, expressed himself thus:—
"Considering the high gifts, and the strong claims of the Church
of Rome and her dependencies on our admiration, reverence,
love, and gratitude, how could we withstand her, as we do; how
could we refrain from being melted into tenderness, and rushing
into communion with her, but for the words of Truth, which bid
us prefer Itself to the whole world? 'He that loveth father or
mother more than Me, is not worthy of Me.' How could we learn
to be severe, and execute judgment, but for the warning of
Moses against even a divinely-gifted teacher who should preach
new gods, and the anathema of St. Paul even against Angels and
Apostles who should bring in a new doctrine?"[ix:1]
He little thought, when he so wrote, that the time would ever come when he
should feel the obstacle, which he spoke of as lying in the way of
communion with the Church of Rome, to be destitute of solid foundation.
The following work is directed towards its removal.
Having, in former publications, called attention to the supposed difficulty,
he considers himself bound to avow his present belief that it is imaginary.
He has neither the ability to put out of hand a finished composition, nor the
wish to make a powerful and moving representation, on the great subject of
which he treats. His aim will be answered, if he succeeds in suggesting
thoughts, which in God's good time may quietly bear fruit, in the minds of
those to whom that subject is new; and which may carry forward inquirers,
who have already put themselves on the course.

If at times his tone appears positive or peremptory, he hopes this will be
imputed to the scientific character of the Work, which requires a distinct
statement of principles, and of the arguments which recommend them.
He hopes too he shall be excused for his frequent quotations from himself;
which are necessary in order to show how he stands at present in relation to
various of his former Publications. * * *
Littlemore,
October 6, 1845.

POSTSCRIPT.
Since the above was written, the Author has joined the Catholic Church. It
was his intention and wish to have carried his Volume through the Press
before deciding finally on this step. But when he had got some way in the
printing, he recognized in himself a conviction of the truth of the conclusion
to which the discussion leads, so clear as to supersede further deliberation.
Shortly afterwards circumstances gave him the opportunity of acting upon
it, and he felt that he had no warrant for refusing to do so.
His first act on his conversion was to offer his Work for revision to the
proper authorities; but the offer was declined on the ground that it was
written and partly printed before he was a Catholic, and that it would come
before the reader in a more persuasive form, if he read it as the author wrote
it.
It is scarcely necessary to add that he now submits every part of the book to
the judgment of the Church, with whose doctrine, on the subjects of which
he treats, he wishes all his thoughts to be coincident.

FOOTNOTES:
[ix:1] Records of the Church, xxiv. p. 7.

CONTENTS.
PART I.

Doctrinal Developments viewed in Themselves.
PAGE
Introduction 3

CHAPTER I.

The Development of Ideas 33
Section 1.The Process of Development in Ideas 33
Section 2.The Kinds of Development in Ideas 41

CHAPTER II.

The Antecedent Argument in behalf of Developments in Christian
Doctrine 55
Section 1.Developments to be expected 55
Section 2.An infallible Developing Authority to be expected 75
Section 3.The existing Developments of Doctrine the probable
Fulfilment of that Expectation 92

CHAPTER III.

The Historical Argument in behalf of the existing Developments 99
Section 1.Method of Proof 99
Section 2.State of the Evidence 110

CHAPTER IV.

Instances in Illustration 122

Section 1.Instances cursorily noticed 123
§ 1.Canon of the New Testament 123
§ 2.Original Sin 126
§ 3.Infant Baptism 127
§ 4.Communion in one kind 129
§ 5.The Homoüsion 133
Section 2.Our Lord's Incarnation, and the dignity of His Mother and of
all Saints 135
Section 3.Papal Supremacy 148

PART II.

Doctrinal Developments viewed Relatively to Doctrinal Corruptions.

CHAPTER V.

Genuine Developments contrasted with Corruptions 169
Section 1.First Note of a genuine Development of an Idea:
Preservation of its Type 171
Section 2.Second Note: Continuity of its Principles 178
Section 3.Third Note: Its Power of Assimilation 185
Section 4.Fourth Note: Its Logical Sequence 189
Section 5.Fifth Note: Anticipation of its Future 195
Section 6.Sixth Note: Conservative Action upon its Past 199
Section 7.Seventh Note: Its Chronic Vigour 203

CHAPTER VI.

Application of the First Note of a true Development to the Existing
Developments of Christian Doctrine: Preservation of its Type 207
Section 1.The Church of the First Centuries 208
Section 2.The Church of the Fourth Century 248
Section 3.The Church of the Fifth and Sixth Centuries 273

CHAPTER VII.

Application of the Second: Continuity of its Principles 323
§ 1.Principles of Christianity 323
§ 2.Supremacy of Faith 326
§ 3.Theology 336
§ 4.Scripture and its Mystical Interpretation 338
§ 5.Dogma 346
§ 6.Additional Remarks 353

CHAPTER VIII.

Application of the Third: its Assimilative Power 355
§ 1.The Assimilating Power of Dogmatic Truth 357
§ 2.The Assimilating Power of Sacramental Grace 368

CHAPTER IX.

Application of the Fourth: its Logical Sequence 383
§ 1.Pardons 384
§ 2.Penances 385
§ 3.Satisfactions 386
§ 4.Purgatory 388
§ 5.Meritorious Works 393
§ 6.The Monastic Rule 395

CHAPTER X.

Application of the Fifth: Anticipation of its Future 400
§ 1.Resurrection and Relics 401
§ 2.The Virgin Life 407
§ 3.Cultus of Saints and Angels 410
§ 4.Office of the Blessed Virgin 415

CHAPTER XI.

Application of the Sixth: Conservative Action on its Past 419
Section 1.Instances cursorily noticed 420
Section 2.Devotion to the Blessed Virgin 425

CHAPTER XII.

Application of the Seventh: its Chronic Vigour 437
Conclusion 445

PART I.
DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS VIEWED IN
THEMSELVES.

INTRODUCTION.
Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with
it as a fact in the world's history. Its genius and character, its doctrines,
precepts, and objects cannot be treated as matters of private opinion or
deduction, unless we may reasonably so regard the Spartan institutions or
the religion of Mahomet. It may indeed legitimately be made the subject-
matter of theories; what is its moral and political excellence, what its due
location in the range of ideas or of facts which we possess, whether it be
divine or human, whether original or eclectic, or both at once, how far
favourable to civilization or to literature, whether a religion for all ages or
for a particular state of society, these are questions upon the fact, or
professed solutions of the fact, and belong to the province of opinion; but to
a fact do they relate, on an admitted fact do they turn, which must be
ascertained as other facts, and surely has on the whole been so ascertained,
unless the testimony of so many centuries is to go for nothing. Christianity
is no theory of the study or the cloister. It has long since passed beyond the
letter of documents and the reasonings of individual minds, and has become
public property. Its "sound has gone out into all lands," and its "words unto
the ends of the world." It has from the first had an objective existence, and
has thrown itself upon the great concourse of men. Its home is in the world;
and to know what it is, we must seek it in the world, and hear the world's
witness of it.

2.
The hypothesis, indeed, has met with wide reception in these latter times,
that Christianity does not fall within the province of history,—that it is to
each man what each man thinks it to be, and nothing else; and thus in fact is
a mere name for a cluster or family of rival religions all together, religions
at variance one with another, and claiming the same appellation, not
because there can be assigned any one and the same doctrine as the
common foundation of all, but because certain points of agreement may be
found here and there of some sort or other, by which each in its turn is

connected with one or other of the rest. Or again, it has been maintained, or
implied, that all existing denominations of Christianity are wrong, none
representing it as taught by Christ and His Apostles; that the original
religion has gradually decayed or become hopelessly corrupt; nay that it
died out of the world at its birth, and was forthwith succeeded by a
counterfeit or counterfeits which assumed its name, though they inherited at
best but some fragments of its teaching; or rather that it cannot even be said
either to have decayed or to have died, because historically it has no
substance of its own, but from the first and onwards it has, on the stage of
the world, been nothing more than a mere assemblage of doctrines and
practices derived from without, from Oriental, Platonic, Polytheistic
sources, from Buddhism, Essenism, Manicheeism; or that, allowing true
Christianity still to exist, it has but a hidden and isolated life, in the hearts
of the elect, or again as a literature or philosophy, not certified in any way,
much less guaranteed, to come from above, but one out of the various
separate informations about the Supreme Being and human duty, with
which an unknown Providence had furnished us, whether in nature or in the
world.

3.
All such views of Christianity imply that there is no sufficient body of
historical proof to interfere with, or at least to prevail against, any number
whatever of free and independent hypotheses concerning it. But this surely
is not self-evident, and has itself to be proved. Till positive reasons
grounded on facts are adduced to the contrary, the most natural hypotheses,
the most agreeable to our mode of proceeding in parallel cases, and that
which takes precedence of all others, is to consider that the society of
Christians, which the Apostles left on earth, were of that religion to which
the Apostles had converted them; that the external continuity of name,
profession, and communion, argues a real continuity of doctrine; that, as
Christianity began by manifesting itself as of a certain shape and bearing to
all mankind, therefore it went on so to manifest itself; and that the more,
considering that prophecy had already determined that it was to be a power
visible in the world and sovereign over it, characters which are accurately
fulfilled in that historical Christianity to which we commonly give the
name. It is not a violent assumption, then, but rather mere abstinence from

the wanton admission of a principle which would necessarily lead to the
most vexatious and preposterous scepticism, to take it for granted, before
proof to the contrary, that the Christianity of the second, fourth, seventh,
twelfth, sixteenth, and intermediate centuries is in its substance the very
religion which Christ and His Apostles taught in the first, whatever may be
the modifications for good or for evil which lapse of years, or the
vicissitudes of human affairs, have impressed upon it.
Of course I do not deny the abstract possibility of extreme changes. The
substitution is certainly, in idea, supposable of a counterfeit Christianity,—
superseding the original, by means of the adroit innovations of seasons,
places, and persons, till, according to the familiar illustration, the "blade"
and the "handle" are alternately renewed, and identity is lost without the
loss of continuity. It is possible; but it must not be assumed. The onus
probandi is with those who assert what it is unnatural to expect; to be just
able to doubt is no warrant for disbelieving.

4.
Accordingly, some writers have gone on to give reasons from history for
their refusing to appeal to history. They aver that, when they come to look
into the documents and literature of Christianity in times past, they find its
doctrines so variously represented, and so inconsistently maintained by its
professors, that, however natural it be à priori, it is useless, in fact, to seek
in history the matter of that Revelation which has been vouchsafed to
mankind; that they cannot be historical Christians if they would. They say,
in the words of Chillingworth, "There are popes against popes, councils
against councils, some fathers against others, the same fathers against
themselves, a consent of fathers of one age against a consent of fathers of
another age, the Church of one age against the Church of another age:"—
Hence they are forced, whether they will or not, to fall back upon the Bible
as the sole source of Revelation, and upon their own personal private
judgment as the sole expounder of its doctrine. This is a fair argument, if it
can be maintained, and it brings me at once to the subject of this Essay. Not
that it enters into my purpose to convict of misstatement, as might be done,
each separate clause of this sweeping accusation of a smart but superficial
writer; but neither on the other hand do I mean to deny everything that he

says to the disadvantage of historical Christianity. On the contrary, I shall
admit that there are in fact certain apparent variations in its teaching, which
have to be explained; thus I shall begin, but then I shall attempt to explain
them to the exculpation of that teaching in point of unity, directness, and
consistency.

5.
Meanwhile, before setting about this work, I will address one remark to
Chillingworth and his friends:—Let them consider, that if they can criticize
history, the facts of history certainly can retort upon them. It might, I grant,
be clearer on this great subject than it is. This is no great concession.
History is not a creed or a catechism, it gives lessons rather than rules; still
no one can mistake its general teaching in this matter, whether he accept it
or stumble at it. Bold outlines and broad masses of colour rise out of the
records of the past. They may be dim, they may be incomplete; but they are
definite. And this one thing at least is certain; whatever history teaches,
whatever it omits, whatever it exaggerates or extenuates, whatever it says
and unsays, at least the Christianity of history is not Protestantism. If ever
there were a safe truth, it is this.
And Protestantism has ever felt it so. I do not mean that every writer on the
Protestant side has felt it; for it was the fashion at first, at least as a
rhetorical argument against Rome, to appeal to past ages, or to some of
them; but Protestantism, as a whole, feels it, and has felt it. This is shown in
the determination already referred to of dispensing with historical
Christianity altogether, and of forming a Christianity from the Bible alone:
men never would have put it aside, unless they had despaired of it. It is
shown by the long neglect of ecclesiastical history in England, which
prevails even in the English Church. Our popular religion scarcely
recognizes the fact of the twelve long ages which lie between the Councils
of Nicæa and Trent, except as affording one or two passages to illustrate its
wild interpretations of certain prophesies of St. Paul and St. John. It is
melancholy to say it, but the chief, perhaps the only English writer who has
any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian, is the unbeliever
Gibbon. To be deep in history is to cease to be a Protestant.

6.
And this utter incongruity between Protestantism and historical Christianity
is a plain fact, whether the latter be regarded in its earlier or in its later
centuries. Protestants can as little bear its Ante-nicene as its Post-tridentine
period. I have elsewhere observed on this circumstance: "So much must the
Protestant grant that, if such a system of doctrine as he would now
introduce ever existed in early times, it has been clean swept away as if by a
deluge, suddenly, silently, and without memorial; by a deluge coming in a
night, and utterly soaking, rotting, heaving up, and hurrying off every
vestige of what it found in the Church, before cock-crowing: so that 'when
they rose in the morning' her true seed 'were all dead corpses'—Nay dead
and buried—and without gravestone. 'The waters went over them; there was
not one of them left; they sunk like lead in the mighty waters.' Strange
antitype, indeed, to the early fortunes of Israel!—then the enemy was
drowned, and 'Israel saw them dead upon the sea-shore.' But now, it would
seem, water proceeded as a flood 'out of the serpent's mouth,' and covered
all the witnesses, so that not even their dead bodies lay in the streets of the
great city.' Let him take which of his doctrines he will, his peculiar view of
self-righteousness, of formality, of superstition; his notion of faith, or of
spirituality in religious worship; his denial of the virtue of the sacraments,
or of the ministerial commission, or of the visible Church; or his doctrine of
the divine efficacy of the Scriptures as the one appointed instrument of
religious teaching; and let him consider how far Antiquity, as it has come
down to us, will countenance him in it. No; he must allow that the alleged
deluge has done its work; yes, and has in turn disappeared itself; it has been
swallowed up by the earth, mercilessly as itself was merciless."[9:1]
That Protestantism, then, is not the Christianity of history, it is easy to
determine, but to retort is a poor reply in controversy to a question of fact,
and whatever be the violence or the exaggeration of writers like
Chillingworth, if they have raised a real difficulty, it may claim a real
answer, and we must determine whether on the one hand Christianity is still
to represent to us a definite teaching from above, or whether on the other its
utterances have been from time to time so strangely at variance, that we are
necessarily thrown back on our own judgment individually to determine,
what the revelation of God is, or rather if in fact there is, or has been, any
revelation at all.

7.
Here then I concede to the opponents of historical Christianity, that there
are to be found, during the 1800 years through which it has lasted, certain
apparent inconsistencies and alterations in its doctrine and its worship, such
as irresistibly attract the attention of all who inquire into it. They are not
sufficient to interfere with the general character and course of the religion,
but they raise the question how they came about, and what they mean, and
have in consequence supplied matter for several hypotheses.
Of these one is to the effect that Christianity has even changed from the first
and ever accommodates itself to the circumstances of times and seasons;
but it is difficult to understand how such a view is compatible with the
special idea of revealed truth, and in fact its advocates more or less
abandon, or tend to abandon the supernatural claims of Christianity; so it
need not detain us here.
A second and more plausible hypothesis is that of the Anglican divines, who
reconcile and bring into shape the exuberant phenomena under
consideration, by cutting off and casting away as corruptions all usages,
ways, opinions, and tenets, which have not the sanction of primitive times.
They maintain that history first presents to us a pure Christianity in East and
West, and then a corrupt; and then of course their duty is to draw the line
between what is corrupt and what is pure, and to determine the dates at
which the various changes from good to bad were introduced. Such a
principle of demarcation, available for the purpose, they consider they have
found in the dictum of Vincent of Lerins, that revealed and Apostolic
doctrine is "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus," a principle
infallibly separating, on the whole field of history, authoritative doctrine
from opinion, rejecting what is faulty, and combining and forming a
theology. That "Christianity is what has been held always, everywhere, and
by all," certainly promises a solution of the perplexities, an interpretation of
the meaning, of history. What can be more natural than that divines and
bodies of men should speak, sometimes from themselves, sometimes from
tradition? what more natural than that individually they should say many
things on impulse, or under excitement, or as conjectures, or in ignorance?
what more certain than that they must all have been instructed and
catechized in the Creed of the Apostles? what more evident than that what

was their own would in its degree be peculiar, and differ from what was
similarly private and personal in their brethren? what more conclusive than
that the doctrine that was common to all at once was not really their own,
but public property in which they had a joint interest, and was proved by the
concurrence of so many witnesses to have come from an Apostolical
source? Here, then, we have a short and easy method for bringing the
various informations of ecclesiastical history under that antecedent
probability in its favour, which nothing but its actual variations would lead
us to neglect. Here we have a precise and satisfactory reason why we
should make much of the earlier centuries, yet pay no regard to the later,
why we should admit some doctrines and not others, why we refuse the
Creed of Pius IV. and accept the Thirty-nine Articles.

8.
Such is the rule of historical interpretation which has been professed in the
English school of divines; and it contains a majestic truth, and offers an
intelligible principle, and wears a reasonable air. It is congenial, or, as it
may be said, native to the Anglican mind, which takes up a middle position,
neither discarding the Fathers nor acknowledging the Pope. It lays down a
simple rule by which to measure the value of every historical fact, as it
comes, and thereby it provides a bulwark against Rome, while it opens an
assault upon Protestantism. Such is its promise; but its difficulty lies in
applying it in particular cases. The rule is more serviceable in determining
what is not, than what is Christianity; it is irresistible against Protestantism,
and in one sense indeed it is irresistible against Rome also, but in the same
sense it is irresistible against England. It strikes at Rome through England.
It admits of being interpreted in one of two ways: if it be narrowed for the
purpose of disproving the catholicity of the Creed of Pope Pius, it becomes
also an objection to the Athanasian; and if it be relaxed to admit the
doctrines retained by the English Church, it no longer excludes certain
doctrines of Rome which that Church denies. It cannot at once condemn St.
Thomas and St. Bernard, and defend St. Athanasius and St. Gregory
Nazianzen.
This general defect in its serviceableness has been heretofore felt by those
who appealed to it. It was said by one writer; "The Rule of Vincent is not of

a mathematical or demonstrative character, but moral, and requires practical
judgment and good sense to apply it. For instance, what is meant by being
'taught always'? does it mean in every century, or every year, or every
month? Does 'everywhere' mean in every country, or in every diocese? and
does 'the Consent of Fathers' require us to produce the direct testimony of
every one of them? How many Fathers, how many places, how many
instances, constitute a fulfilment of the test proposed? It is, then, from the
nature of the case, a condition which never can be satisfied as fully as it
might have been. It admits of various and unequal application in various
instances; and what degree of application is enough, must be decided by the
same principles which guide us in the conduct of life, which determine us in
politics, or trade, or war, which lead us to accept Revelation at all, (for
which we have but probability to show at most,) nay, to believe in the
existence of an intelligent Creator."[12:1]

9.
So much was allowed by this writer; but then he added:—
"This character, indeed, of Vincent's Canon, will but recommend it to the
disciples of the school of Butler, from its agreement with the analogy of
nature; but it affords a ready loophole for such as do not wish to be
persuaded, of which both Protestants and Romanists are not slow to avail
themselves."
This surely is the language of disputants who are more intent on assailing
others than on defending themselves; as if similar loopholes were not
necessary for Anglican theology.
He elsewhere says: "What there is not the shadow of a reason for saying
that the Fathers held, what has not the faintest pretensions of being a
Catholic truth, is this, that St. Peter or his successors were and are universal
Bishops, that they have the whole of Christendom for their one diocese in a
way in which other Apostles and Bishops had and have not."[13:1] Most true,
if, in order that a doctrine be considered Catholic, it must be formally stated
by the Fathers generally from the very first; but, on the same understanding,
the doctrine also of the apostolical succession in the episcopal order "has
not the faintest pretensions of being a Catholic truth."

Nor was this writer without a feeling of the special difficulty of his school;
and he attempted to meet it by denying it. He wished to maintain that the
sacred doctrines admitted by the Church of England into her Articles were
taught in primitive times with a distinctness which no one could fancy to
attach to the characteristic tenets of Rome.
"We confidently affirm," he said in another publication, "that there is not an
article in the Athanasian Creed concerning the Incarnation which is not
anticipated in the controversy with the Gnostics. There is no question which
the Apollinarian or the Nestorian heresy raised, which may not be decided
in the words of Ignatius, Irenæus and Tertullian."[13:2]

10.
This may be considered as true. It may be true also, or at least shall here be
granted as true, that there is also a consensus in the Ante-nicene Church for
the doctrines of our Lord's Consubstantiality and Coeternity with the
Almighty Father. Let us allow that the whole circle of doctrines, of which
our Lord is the subject, was consistently and uniformly confessed by the
Primitive Church, though not ratified formally in Council. But it surely is
otherwise with the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. I do not see in what
sense it can be said that there is a consensus of primitive divines in its
favour, which will not avail also for certain doctrines of the Roman Church
which will presently come into mention. And this is a point which the writer
of the above passages ought to have more distinctly brought before his
mind and more carefully weighed; but he seems to have fancied that Bishop
Bull proved the primitiveness of the Catholic doctrine concerning the Holy
Trinity as well as that concerning our Lord.
Now it should be clearly understood what it is which must be shown by
those who would prove it. Of course the doctrine of our Lord's divinity
itself partly implies and partly recommends the doctrine of the Trinity; but
implication and suggestion belong to another class of arguments which has
not yet come into consideration. Moreover the statements of a particular
father or doctor may certainly be of a most important character; but one
divine is not equal to a Catena. We must have a whole doctrine stated by a
whole Church. The Catholic Truth in question is made up of a number of
separate propositions, each of which, if maintained to the exclusion of the

rest, is a heresy. In order then to prove that all the Ante-nicene writers
taught the dogma of the Holy Trinity, it is not enough to prove that each still
has gone far enough to be only a heretic—not enough to prove that one has
held that the Son is God, (for so did the Sabellian, so did the Macedonian),
and another that the Father is not the Son, (for so did the Arian), and
another that the Son is equal to the Father, (for so did the Tritheist), and
another that there is but One God, (for so did the Unitarian),—not enough
that many attached in some sense a Threefold Power to the idea of the
Almighty, (for so did almost all the heresies that ever existed, and could not
but do so, if they accepted the New Testament at all); but we must show that
all these statements at once, and others too, are laid down by as many
separate testimonies as may fairly be taken to constitute a "consensus of
doctors." It is true indeed that the subsequent profession of the doctrine in
the Universal Church creates a presumption that it was held even before it
was professed; and it is fair to interpret the early Fathers by the later. This is
true, and admits of application to certain other doctrines besides that of the
Blessed Trinity in Unity; but there is as little room for such antecedent
probabilities as for the argument from suggestions and intimations in the
precise and imperative Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, as it is
commonly understood by English divines, and is by them used against the
later Church and the see of Rome. What we have a right to ask, if we are
bound to act upon Vincent's rule in regard to the Trinitarian dogma, is a
sufficient number of Ante-nicene statements, each distinctly anticipating the
Athanasian Creed.

11.
Now let us look at the leading facts of the case, in appealing to which I
must not be supposed to be ascribing any heresy to the holy men whose
words have not always been sufficiently full or exact to preclude the
imputation. First, the Creeds of that early day make no mention in their
letter of the Catholic doctrine at all. They make mention indeed of a Three;
but that there is any mystery in the doctrine, that the Three are One, that
They are coequal, coeternal, all increate, all omnipotent, all
incomprehensible, is not stated, and never could be gathered from them. Of
course we believe that they imply it, or rather intend it. God forbid we
should do otherwise! But nothing in the mere letter of those documents

leads to that belief. To give a deeper meaning to their letter, we must
interpret them by the times which came after.
Again, there is one and one only great doctrinal Council in Ante-nicene
times. It was held at Antioch, in the middle of the third century, on occasion
of the incipient innovations of the Syrian heretical school. Now the Fathers
there assembled, for whatever reason, condemned, or at least withdrew,
when it came into the dispute, the word "Homoüsion," which was
afterwards received at Nicæa as the special symbol of Catholicism against
Arius.[16:1]
Again, the six great Bishops and Saints of the Ante-nicene Church were St.
Irenæus, St. Hippolytus, St. Cyprian, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, St.
Dionysius of Alexandria, and St. Methodius. Of these, St. Dionysius is
accused by St. Basil of having sown the first seeds of Arianism;[16:2] and St.
Gregory is allowed by the same learned Father to have used language
concerning our Lord, which he only defends on the plea of an economical
object in the writer.[16:3] St. Hippolytus speaks as if he were ignorant of our
Lord's Eternal Sonship;[17:1] St. Methodius speaks incorrectly at least upon
the Incarnation;[17:2] and St. Cyprian does not treat of theology at all. Such
is the incompleteness of the extant teaching of these true saints, and, in their
day, faithful witnesses of the Eternal Son.
Again, Athenagoras, St. Clement, Tertullian, and the two SS. Dionysii
would appear to be the only writers whose language is at any time exact and
systematic enough to remind us of the Athanasian Creed. If we limit our
view of the teaching of the Fathers by what they expressly state, St. Ignatius
may be considered as a Patripassian, St. Justin arianizes, and St. Hippolytus
is a Photinian.
Again, there are three great theological authors of the Ante-nicene
centuries, Tertullian, Origen, and, we may add, Eusebius, though he lived
some way into the fourth. Tertullian is heterodox on the doctrine of our
Lord's divinity,[17:3] and, indeed, ultimately fell altogether into heresy or
schism; Origen is, at the very least, suspected, and must be defended and
explained rather than cited as a witness of orthodoxy; and Eusebius was a
Semi-Arian.

12.
Moreover, it may be questioned whether any Ante-nicene father distinctly
affirms either the numerical Unity or the Coequality of the Three Persons;
except perhaps the heterodox Tertullian, and that chiefly in a work written
after he had become a Montanist:[18:1] yet to satisfy the Anti-roman use of
Quod semper, &c., surely we ought not to be left for these great articles of
doctrine to the testimony of a later age.
Further, Bishop Bull allows that "nearly all the ancient Catholics who
preceded Arius have the appearance of being ignorant of the invisible and
incomprehensible (immensam) nature of the Son of God;"[18:2] an article
expressly taught in the Athanasian Creed under the sanction of its
anathema.
It must be asked, moreover, how much direct and literal testimony the Ante-
nicene Fathers give, one by one, to the divinity of the Holy Spirit? This
alone shall be observed, that St. Basil, in the fourth century, finding that, if
he distinctly called the Third Person in the Blessed Trinity by the Name of
God, he should be put out of the Church by the Arians, pointedly refrained
from doing so on an occasion on which his enemies were on the watch; and
that, when some Catholics found fault with him, St. Athanasius took his
part.[18:3] Could this possibly have been the conduct of any true Christian,
not to say Saint, of a later age? that is, whatever be the true account of it,
does it not suggest to us that the testimony of those early times lies very
unfavourably for the application of the rule of Vincentius?

13.
Let it not be for a moment supposed that I impugn the orthodoxy of the
early divines, or the cogency of their testimony among fair inquirers; but I
am trying them by that unfair interpretation of Vincentius, which is
necessary in order to make him available against the Church of Rome. And
now, as to the positive evidence which those Fathers offer in behalf of the
Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, it has been drawn out by Dr. Burton and
seems to fall under two heads. One is the general ascription of glory to the
Three Persons together, both by fathers and churches, and that on
continuous tradition and from the earliest times. Under the second fall

certain distinct statements of particular fathers; thus we find the word
"Trinity" used by St. Theophilus, St. Clement, St. Hippolytus, Tertullian, St.
Cyprian, Origen, St. Methodius; and the Divine Circumincessio, the most
distinctive portion of the Catholic doctrine, and the unity of power, or
again, of substance, are declared with more or less distinctness by
Athenagoras, St. Irenæus, St. Clement, Tertullian, St. Hippolytus, Origen,
and the two SS. Dionysii. This is pretty much the whole of the evidence.

14.
Perhaps it will be said we ought to take the Ante-nicene Fathers as a whole,
and interpret one of them by another. This is to assume that they are all of
one school, which of course they are, but which in controversy is a point to
be proved; but it is even doubtful whether, on the whole, such a procedure
would strengthen the argument. For instance, as to the second head of the
positive evidence noted by Dr. Burton, Tertullian is the most formal and
elaborate of these Fathers in his statements of the Catholic doctrine. "It
would hardly be possible," says Dr. Burton, after quoting a passage, "for
Athanasius himself, or the compiler of the Athanasian Creed, to have
delivered the doctrine of the Trinity in stronger terms than these."[19:1] Yet
Tertullian must be considered heterodox on the doctrine of our Lord's
eternal generation.[20:1] If then we are to argue from his instance to that of
the other Fathers, we shall be driven to the conclusion that even the most
exact statements are worth nothing more than their letter, are a warrant for
nothing beyond themselves, and are consistent with heterodoxy where they
do not expressly protest against it.
And again, as to the argument derivable from the Doxologies, it must not be
forgotten that one of the passages in St. Justin Martyr includes the worship
of the Angels. "We worship and adore," he says, "Him, and the Son who
came from Him and taught us these things, and the host of those other good
Angels, who follow and are like Him, and the Prophetic Spirit."[20:2] A
Unitarian might argue from this passage that the glory and worship which
the early Church ascribed to our Lord was not more definite than that which
St. Justin was ready to concede to creatures.

15.

Thus much on the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Let us proceed to another
example. There are two doctrines which are generally associated with the
name of a Father of the fourth and fifth centuries, and which can show little
definite, or at least but partial, testimony in their behalf before his time,—
Purgatory and Original Sin. The dictum of Vincent admits both or excludes
both, according as it is or is not rigidly taken; but, if used by Aristotle's
"Lesbian Rule," then, as Anglicans would wish, it can be made to admit
Original Sin and exclude Purgatory.
On the one hand, some notion of suffering, or disadvantage, or punishment
after this life, in the case of the faithful departed, or other vague forms of
the doctrine of Purgatory, has in its favour almost a consensus of the four
first ages of the Church, though some Fathers state it with far greater
openness and decision than others. It is, as far as words go, the confession
of St. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, St. Perpetua, St. Cyprian, Origen,
Lactantius, St. Hilary, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Ambrose, St. Basil, St.
Gregory of Nazianzus, and of Nyssa, St. Chrysostom, St. Jerome, St.
Paulinus, and St. Augustine. And so, on the other hand, there is a certain
agreement of Fathers from the first that mankind has derived some
disadvantage from the sin of Adam.

16.
Next, when we consider the two doctrines more distinctly,—the doctrine
that between death and judgment there is a time or state of punishment; and
the doctrine that all men, naturally propagated from fallen Adam, are in
consequence born destitute of original righteousness,—we find, on the one
hand, several, such as Tertullian, St. Perpetua, St. Cyril, St. Hilary, St.
Jerome, St. Gregory Nyssen, as far as their words go, definitely declaring a
doctrine of Purgatory: whereas no one will say that there is a testimony of
the Fathers, equally strong, for the doctrine of Original Sin, though it is
difficult here to make any definite statement about their teaching without
going into a discussion of the subject.
On the subject of Purgatory there were, to speak generally, two schools of
opinion; the Greek, which contemplated a trial of fire at the last day through
which all were to pass; and the African, resembling more nearly the present
doctrine of the Roman Church. And so there were two principal views of

Original Sin, the Greek and the African or Latin. Of the Greek, the
judgment of Hooker is well known, though it must not be taken in the letter:
"The heresy of freewill was a millstone about those Pelagians' neck; shall
we therefore give sentence of death inevitable against all those Fathers in
the Greek Church which, being mispersuaded, died in the error of freewill?"
[22:1]
Bishop Taylor, arguing for an opposite doctrine, bears a like
testimony: "Original Sin," he says, "as it is at this day commonly
explicated, was not the doctrine of the primitive Church; but when Pelagius
had puddled the stream, St. Austin was so angry that he stamped and
disturbed it more. And truly . . I do not think that the gentlemen that urged
against me St. Austin's opinion do well consider that I profess myself to
follow those Fathers who were before him; and whom St. Austin did
forsake, as I do him, in the question."[22:2] The same is asserted or allowed
by Jansenius, Petavius, and Walch,[22:3] men of such different schools that
we may surely take their agreement as a proof of the fact. A late writer, after
going through the testimonies of the Fathers one by one, comes to the
conclusion, first, that "the Greek Church in no point favoured Augustine,
except in teaching that from Adam's sin came death, and, (after the time of
Methodius,) an extraordinary and unnatural sensuality also;" next, that "the
Latin Church affirmed, in addition, that a corrupt and contaminated soul,
and that, by generation, was carried on to his posterity;"[22:4] and, lastly, that
neither Greeks nor Latins held the doctrine of imputation. It may be
observed, in addition, that, in spite of the forcible teaching of St. Paul on
the subject, the doctrine of Original Sin appears neither in the Apostles' nor
the Nicene Creed.

17.
One additional specimen shall be given as a sample of many others:—I
betake myself to one of our altars to receive the Blessed Eucharist; I have
no doubt whatever on my mind about the Gift which that Sacrament
contains; I confess to myself my belief, and I go through the steps on which
it is assured to me. "The Presence of Christ is here, for It follows upon
Consecration; and Consecration is the prerogative of Priests; and Priests are
made by Ordination; and Ordination comes in direct line from the Apostles.
Whatever be our other misfortunes, every link in our chain is safe; we have
the Apostolic Succession, we have a right form of consecration: therefore

we are blessed with the great Gift." Here the question rises in me, "Who
told you about that Gift?" I answer, "I have learned it from the Fathers: I
believe the Real Presence because they bear witness to it. St. Ignatius calls
it 'the medicine of immortality:' St. Irenæus says that 'our flesh becomes
incorrupt, and partakes of life, and has the hope of the resurrection,' as
'being nourished from the Lord's Body and Blood;' that the Eucharist 'is
made up of two things, an earthly and an heavenly:'[23:1] perhaps Origen,
and perhaps Magnes, after him, say that It is not a type of our Lord's Body,
but His Body: and St. Cyprian uses language as fearful as can be spoken, of
those who profane it. I cast my lot with them, I believe as they." Thus I
reply, and then the thought comes upon me a second time, "And do not the
same ancient Fathers bear witness to another doctrine, which you disown?
Are you not as a hypocrite, listening to them when you will, and deaf when
you will not? How are you casting your lot with the Saints, when you go
but half-way with them? For of whether of the two do they speak the more
frequently, of the Real Presence in the Eucharist, or of the Pope's
supremacy? You accept the lesser evidence, you reject the greater."

18.
In truth, scanty as the Ante-nicene notices may be of the Papal Supremacy,
they are both more numerous and more definite than the adducible
testimonies in favour of the Real Presence. The testimonies to the latter are
confined to a few passages such as those just quoted. On the other hand, of
a passage in St. Justin, Bishop Kaye remarks, "Le Nourry infers that Justin
maintained the doctrine of Transubstantiation; it might in my opinion be
more plausibly urged in favour of Consubstantiation, since Justin calls the
consecrated elements Bread and Wine, though not common bread and wine.
[24:1]
. . . We may therefore conclude that, when he calls them the Body and
Blood of Christ, he speaks figuratively." "Clement," observes the same
author, "says that the Scripture calls wine a mystic symbol of the holy
blood. . . . Clement gives various interpretations of Christ's expressions in
John vi. respecting His flesh and blood; but in no instance does he interpret
them literally. . . . . His notion seems to have been that, by partaking of the
bread and wine in the Eucharist, the soul of the believer is united to the
Spirit, and that by this union the principle of immortality is imparted to the
flesh."[24:2] "It has been suggested by some," says Waterland, "that

Tertullian understood John vi. merely of faith, or doctrine, or spiritual
actions; and it is strenuously denied by others." After quoting the passage,
he adds, "All that one can justly gather from this confused passage is that
Tertullian interpreted the bread of life in John vi. of the Word, which he
sometimes makes to be vocal, and sometimes substantial, blending the ideas
in a very perplexed manner; so that he is no clear authority for construing
John vi. of doctrines, &c. All that is certain is that he supposes the Word
made flesh, the Word incarnate to be the heavenly bread spoken of in that
chapter."[25:1] "Origen's general observation relating to that chapter is, that it
must not be literally, but figuratively understood."[25:2] Again, "It is plain
enough that Eusebius followed Origen in this matter, and that both of them
favoured the same mystical or allegorical construction; whether constantly
and uniformly I need not say."[25:3] I will but add the incidental testimony
afforded on a late occasion:—how far the Anglican doctrine of the
Eucharist depends on the times before the Nicene Council, how far on the
times after it, may be gathered from the circumstance that, when a
memorable Sermon[25:4] was published on the subject, out of about one
hundred and forty passages from the Fathers appended in the notes, not in
formal proof, but in general illustration, only fifteen were taken from Ante-
nicene writers.
With such evidence, the Ante-nicene testimonies which may be cited in
behalf of the authority of the Holy See, need not fear a comparison. Faint
they may be one by one, but at least we may count seventeen of them, and
they are various, and are drawn from many times and countries, and thereby
serve to illustrate each other, and form a body of proof. Whatever
objections may be made to this or that particular fact, and I do not think any
valid ones can be raised, still, on the whole, I consider that a cumulative
argument rises from them in favour of the ecumenical and the doctrinal
authority of Rome, stronger than any argument which can be drawn from
the same period for the doctrine of the Real Presence. I shall have occasion
to enumerate them in the fourth chapter of this Essay.

19.
If it be said that the Real Presence appears, by the Liturgies of the fourth or
fifth century, to have been the doctrine of the earlier, since those very forms

probably existed from the first in Divine worship, this is doubtless an
important truth; but then it is true also that the writers of the fourth and fifth
centuries fearlessly assert, or frankly allow that the prerogatives of Rome
were derived from apostolic times, and that because it was the See of St.
Peter.
Moreover, if the resistance of St. Cyprian and Firmilian to the Church of
Rome, in the question of baptism by heretics, be urged as an argument
against her primitive authority, or the earlier resistance of Polycrates of
Ephesus, let it be considered, first, whether all authority does not
necessarily lead to resistance; next, whether St. Cyprian's own doctrine,
which is in favour of Rome, is not more weighty than his act, which is
against her; thirdly, whether he was not already in error in the main
question under discussion, and Firmilian also; and lastly, which is the chief
point here, whether, in like manner, we may not object on the other hand
against the Real Presence the words of Tertullian, who explains, "This is my
Body," by "a figure of my Body," and of Origen, who speaks of "our
drinking Christ's Blood not only in the rite of the Sacraments, but also when
we receive His discourses,"[26:1] and says that "that Bread which God the
Word acknowledges as His Body is the Word which nourishes souls,"[26:2]
—passages which admit of a Catholic interpretation when the Catholic
doctrine is once proved, but which primâ facie run counter to that doctrine.
It does not seem possible, then, to avoid the conclusion that, whatever be
the proper key for harmonizing the records and documents of the early and
later Church, and true as the dictum of Vincentius must be considered in the
abstract, and possible as its application might be in his own age, when he
might almost ask the primitive centuries for their testimony, it is hardly
available now, or effective of any satisfactory result. The solution it offers is
as difficult as the original problem.

20.
Another hypothesis for accounting for a want of accord between the early
and the late aspects of Christianity is that of the Disciplina Arcani, put
forward on the assumption that there has been no variation in the teaching
of the Church from first to last. It is maintained that doctrines which are
associated with the later ages of the Church were really in the Church from

the first, but not publicly taught, and that for various reasons: as, for the
sake of reverence, that sacred subjects might not be profaned by the
heathen; and for the sake of catechumens, that they might not be oppressed
or carried away by a sudden communication of the whole circle of revealed
truth. And indeed the fact of this concealment can hardly be denied, in
whatever degree it took the shape of a definite rule, which might vary with
persons and places. That it existed even as a rule, as regards the Sacraments,
seems to be confessed on all hands. That it existed in other respects, as a
practice, is plain from the nature of the case, and from the writings of the
Apologists. Minucius Felix and Arnobius, in controversy with Pagans,
imply a denial that then the Christians used altars; yet Tertullian speaks
expressly of the Ara Dei in the Church. What can we say, but that the
Apologists deny altars in the sense in which they ridicule them; or, that they
deny that altars such as the Pagan altars were tolerated by Christians? And,
in like manner, Minucius allows that there were no temples among
Christians; yet they are distinctly recognized in the edicts of the Dioclesian
era, and are known to have existed at a still earlier date. It is the tendency of
every dominant system, such as the Paganism of the Ante-nicene centuries,
to force its opponents into the most hostile and jealous attitude, from the
apprehension which they naturally feel, lest if they acted otherwise, in those
points in which they approximate towards it, they should be misinterpreted
and overborne by its authority. The very fault now found with clergymen of
the Anglican Church, who wish to conform their practices to her rubrics,
and their doctrines to her divines of the seventeenth century, is, that,
whether they mean it or no, whether legitimately or no, still, in matter of
fact, they will be sanctioning and encouraging the religion of Rome, in
which there are similar doctrines and practices, more definite and more
influential; so that, at any rate, it is inexpedient at the moment to attempt
what is sure to be mistaken. That is, they are required to exercise a
disciplina arcani; and a similar reserve was inevitable on the part of the
Catholic Church, at a time when priests and altars and rites all around it
were devoted to malignant and incurable superstitions. It would be wrong
indeed to deny, but it was a duty to withhold, the ceremonial of Christianity;
and Apologists might be sometimes tempted to deny absolutely what at
furthest could only be denied under conditions. An idolatrous Paganism
tended to repress the externals of Christianity, as, at this day, the presence of

Protestantism is said to repress, though for another reason, the exhibition of
the Roman Catholic religion.
On various grounds, then, it is certain that portions of the Church system
were held back in primitive times, and of course this fact goes some way to
account for that apparent variation and growth of doctrine, which
embarrasses us when we would consult history for the true idea of
Christianity; yet it is no key to the whole difficulty, as we find it, for
obvious reasons:—because the variations continue beyond the time when it
is conceivable that the discipline was in force, and because they manifest
themselves on a law, not abruptly, but by a visible growth which has
persevered up to this time without any sign of its coming to an end.[29:1]

21.
The following Essay is directed towards a solution of the difficulty which
has been stated,—the difficulty, as far as it exists, which lies in the way of
our using in controversy the testimony of our most natural informant
concerning the doctrine and worship of Christianity, viz. the history of
eighteen hundred years. The view on which it is written has at all times,
perhaps, been implicitly adopted by theologians, and, I believe, has recently
been illustrated by several distinguished writers of the continent, such as De
Maistre and Möhler: viz. that the increase and expansion of the Christian
Creed and Ritual, and the variations which have attended the process in the
case of individual writers and Churches, are the necessary attendants on any
philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect and heart, and
has had any wide or extended dominion; that, from the nature of the human
mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great
ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though
communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be
comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as being received and
transmitted by minds not inspired and through media which were human,
have required only the longer time and deeper thought for their full
elucidation. This may be called the Theory of Development of Doctrine;
and, before proceeding to treat of it, one remark may be in place.
It is undoubtedly an hypothesis to account for a difficulty; but such too are
the various explanations given by astronomers from Ptolemy to Newton of

the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies, and it is as unphilosophical on
that account to object to the one as to object to the other. Nor is it more
reasonable to express surprise, that at this time of day a theory is necessary,
granting for argument's sake that the theory is novel, than to have directed a
similar wonder in disparagement of the theory of gravitation, or the
Plutonian theory in geology. Doubtless, the theory of the Secret and the
theory of doctrinal Developments are expedients, and so is the dictum of
Vincentius; so is the art of grammar or the use of the quadrant; it is an
expedient to enable us to solve what has now become a necessary and an
anxious problem. For three hundred years the documents and the facts of
Christianity have been exposed to a jealous scrutiny; works have been
judged spurious which once were received without a question; facts have
been discarded or modified which were once first principles in argument;
new facts and new principles have been brought to light; philosophical
views and polemical discussions of various tendencies have been
maintained with more or less success. Not only has the relative situation of
controversies and theologies altered, but infidelity itself is in a different,—I
am obliged to say in a more hopeful position,—as regards Christianity. The
facts of Revealed Religion, though in their substance unaltered, present a
less compact and orderly front to the attacks of its enemies now than
formerly, and allow of the introduction of new inquiries and theories
concerning its sources and its rise. The state of things is not as it was, when
an appeal lay to the supposed works of the Areopagite, or to the primitive
Decretals, or to St. Dionysius's answers to Paul, or to the Cœna Domini of
St. Cyprian. The assailants of dogmatic truth have got the start of its
adherents of whatever Creed; philosophy is completing what criticism has
begun; and apprehensions are not unreasonably excited lest we should have
a new world to conquer before we have weapons for the warfare. Already
infidelity has its views and conjectures, on which it arranges the facts of
ecclesiastical history; and it is sure to consider the absence of any
antagonist theory as an evidence of the reality of its own. That the
hypothesis, here to be adopted, accounts not only for the Athanasian Creed,
but for the Creed of Pope Pius, is no fault of those who adopt it. No one has
power over the issues of his principles; we cannot manage our argument,
and have as much of it as we please and no more. An argument is needed,
unless Christianity is to abandon the province of argument; and those who

find fault with the explanation here offered of its historical phenomena will
find it their duty to provide one for themselves.
And as no special aim at Roman Catholic doctrine need be supposed to
have given a direction to the inquiry, so neither can a reception of that
doctrine be immediately based on its results. It would be the work of a life
to apply the Theory of Developments so carefully to the writings of the
Fathers, and to the history of controversies and councils, as thereby to
vindicate the reasonableness of every decision of Rome; much less can such
an undertaking be imagined by one who, in the middle of his days, is
beginning life again. Thus much, however, might be gained even from an
Essay like the present, an explanation of so many of the reputed
corruptions, doctrinal and practical, of Rome, as might serve as a fair
ground for trusting her in parallel cases where the investigation had not
been pursued.

FOOTNOTES:
[9:1] Church of the Fathers [Hist. Sketches, vol. i. p. 418].
[12:1] Proph. Office [Via Media, vol. i. pp. 55, 56].
[13:1] [Ibid. p. 181.]
[13:2] [British Critic, July, 1836, p. 193. Vid. supr. vol. i. p. 130.]
[16:1] This of course has been disputed, as is the case with almost all facts which
bear upon the decision of controversies. I shall not think it necessary to notice
the possibility or the fact of objections on questions upon which the world may
now be said to be agreed; e. g. the arianizing tone of Eusebius.
[16:2] σχεδὸν ταυτησὶ τῆς νῦν περιθυλλουμένης ἀσεβείας, τῆς κατὰ τὸ Ἀνόμοιον
λέγω, οὗτος ἐστὶν, ὅσα γε ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν, ὁ πρῶτος ἀνθρώποις τὰ σπέρματα
παρασχών. Ep. ix. 2.
[16:3] Bull, Defens. F. N. ii. 12, § 6.
[17:1] "The authors who make the generation temporary, and speak not expressly
of any other, are these following: Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian,
Tertullian, and Hippolytus."—Waterland, vol. i. part 2, p. 104.
[17:2] "Levia sunt," says Maran in his defence, "quæ in Sanctissimam Trinitatem
hic liber peccare dicitur, paulo graviora quæ in mysterium Incarnationis."—Div.

Jes. Christ. p. 527. Shortly after, p. 530, "In tertiâ oratione nonnulla legimus
Incarnationem Domini spectantia, quæ subabsurdè dicta fateor, nego impiè
cogitata."
[17:3] Bishop Bull, who is tender towards him, allows, "Ut quod res est dicam,
cum Valentinianis hic et reliquo gnosticorum grege aliquatenus locutus est
Tertullianus; in re ipsâ tamen cum Catholicis omninò sensit."—Defens. F. N. iii.
10, § 15.
[18:1] Adv. Praxeam.
[18:2] Defens. F. N. iv. 3, § 1.
[18:3] Basil, ed. Ben. vol. 3, p. xcvi.
[19:1] Ante-nicene Test, to the Trinity, p. 69.
[20:1] "Quia et Pater Deus est, et judex Deus est, non tamen ideo Pater et judex
semper, quia Deus semper. Nam nec Pater potuit esse ante Filium, nec judex ante
delictum. Fuit autem tempus, cum et delictum et Filius non fuit, quod judicem, et
qui Patrem Dominum faceret."—Contr. Herm. 3.
[20:2] Vid. infra, towards the end of the Essay, ch. x., where more will be said on
the passage.
[22:1] Of Justification, 26.
[22:2] Works, vol. ix. p. 396.
[22:3] "Quamvis igitur quam maximè fallantur Pelagiani, quum asserant,
peccatum originale ex Augustini profluxisse ingenio, antiquam vero ecclesiam
illud plane nescivisse; diffiteri tamen nemo potest, apud Græcos patres imprimis
inveniri loca, quæ Pelagianismo favere videntur. Hinc et C. Jansenius, 'Græci,'
inquit, 'nisi caute legantur et intelligantur, præbere possunt occasionem errori
Pelagiano;' et D. Petavius dicit, 'Græci originalis fere criminis raram, nec
disertam, mentionem scriptis suis attigerunt.'"—Walch, Miscell. Sacr. p. 607.
[22:4] Horn, Comment. de Pecc. Orig. 1801, p. 98.
[23:1] Hær. iv. 18, § 5.
[24:1] Justin Martyr, ch. 4.
[24:2] Clem. Alex. ch. 11.
[25:1] Works, vol. vii. p. 118-120.
[25:2] Ibid. p. 121.
[25:3] Ibid. p. 127.
[25:4] [Dr. Pusey's University Sermon of 1843.]
[26:1] Numer. Hom. xvi. 9.
[26:2] Interp. Com. in Matt. 85.

[29:1] [Vid. Apolog., p. 198, and Difficulties of Angl. vol. i. xii. 7.]

CHAPTER I.
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS.

SECTION I.

ON THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT IN IDEAS.

It is the characteristic of our minds to be ever engaged in passing judgment
on the things which come before us. No sooner do we apprehend than we
judge: we allow nothing to stand by itself: we compare, contrast, abstract,
generalize, connect, adjust, classify: and we view all our knowledge in the
associations with which these processes have invested it.
Of the judgments thus made, which become aspects in our minds of the
things which meet us, some are mere opinions which come and go, or
which remain with us only till an accident displaces them, whatever be the
influence which they exercise meanwhile. Others are firmly fixed in our
minds, with or without good reason, and have a hold upon us, whether they
relate to matters of fact, or to principles of conduct, or are views of life and
the world, or are prejudices, imaginations, or convictions. Many of them
attach to one and the same object, which is thus variously viewed, not only
by various minds, but by the same. They sometimes lie in such near
relation, that each implies the others; some are only not inconsistent with
each other, in that they have a common origin: some, as being actually
incompatible with each other, are, one or other, falsely associated in our
minds with their object, and in any case they may be nothing more than
ideas, which we mistake for things.
Thus Judaism is an idea which once was objective, and Gnosticism is an
idea which was never so. Both of them have various aspects: those of
Judaism were such as monotheism, a certain ethical discipline, a

ministration of divine vengeance, a preparation for Christianity: those of the
Gnostic idea are such as the doctrine of two principles, that of emanation,
the intrinsic malignity of matter, the inculpability of sensual indulgence, or
the guilt of every pleasure of sense, of which last two one or other must be
in the Gnostic a false aspect and subjective only.

2.
The idea which represents an object or supposed object is commensurate
with the sum total of its possible aspects, however they may vary in the
separate consciousness of individuals; and in proportion to the variety of
aspects under which it presents itself to various minds is its force and depth,
and the argument for its reality. Ordinarily an idea is not brought home to
the intellect as objective except through this variety; like bodily substances,
which are not apprehended except under the clothing of their properties and
results, and which admit of being walked round, and surveyed on opposite
sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights, in evidence of
their reality. And, as views of a material object may be taken from points so
remote or so opposed, that they seem at first sight incompatible, and
especially as their shadows will be disproportionate, or even monstrous, and
yet all these anomalies will disappear and all these contrarieties be adjusted,
on ascertaining the point of vision or the surface of projection in each case;
so also all the aspects of an idea are capable of coalition, and of a resolution
into the object to which it belongs; and the primâ facie dissimilitude of its
aspects becomes, when explained, an argument for its substantiveness and
integrity, and their multiplicity for its originality and power.

3.
There is no one aspect deep enough to exhaust the contents of a real idea,
no one term or proposition which will serve to define it; though of course
one representation of it is more just and exact than another, and though
when an idea is very complex, it is allowable, for the sake of convenience,
to consider its distinct aspects as if separate ideas. Thus, with all our
intimate knowledge of animal life and of the structure of particular animals,
we have not arrived at a true definition of any one of them, but are forced to
enumerate properties and accidents by way of description. Nor can we

inclose in a formula that intellectual fact, or system of thought, which we
call the Platonic philosophy, or that historical phenomenon of doctrine and
conduct, which we call the heresy of Montanus or of Manes. Again, if
Protestantism were said to lie in its theory of private judgment, and
Lutheranism in its doctrine of justification, this indeed would be an
approximation to the truth; but it is plain that to argue or to act as if the one
or the other aspect were a sufficient account of those forms of religion
severally, would be a serious mistake. Sometimes an attempt is made to
determine the "leading idea," as it has been called, of Christianity, an
ambitious essay as employed on a supernatural work, when, even as regards
the visible creation and the inventions of man, such a task is beyond us.
Thus its one idea has been said by some to be the restoration of our fallen
race, by others philanthropy, by others the tidings of immortality, or the
spirituality of true religious service, or the salvation of the elect, or mental
liberty, or the union of the soul with God. If, indeed, it is only thereby
meant to use one or other of these as a central idea for convenience, in order
to group others around it, no fault can be found with such a proceeding: and
in this sense I should myself call the Incarnation the central aspect of
Christianity, out of which the three main aspects of its teaching take their
rise, the sacramental, the hierarchical, and the ascetic. But one aspect of
Revelation must not be allowed to exclude or to obscure another; and
Christianity is dogmatical, devotional, practical all at once; it is esoteric and
exoteric; it is indulgent and strict; it is light and dark; it is love, and it is
fear.

4.
When an idea, whether real or not, is of a nature to arrest and possess the
mind, it may be said to have life, that is, to live in the mind which is its
recipient. Thus mathematical ideas, real as they are, can hardly properly be
called living, at least ordinarily. But, when some great enunciation, whether
true or false, about human nature, or present good, or government, or duty,
or religion, is carried forward into the public throng of men and draws
attention, then it is not merely received passively in this or that form into
many minds, but it becomes an active principle within them, leading them
to an ever-new contemplation of itself, to an application of it in various
directions, and a propagation of it on every side. Such is the doctrine of the

divine right of kings, or of the rights of man, or of the anti-social bearings
of a priesthood, or utilitarianism, or free trade, or the duty of benevolent
enterprises, or the philosophy of Zeno or Epicurus, doctrines which are of a
nature to attract and influence, and have so far a primâ facie reality, that
they may be looked at on many sides and strike various minds very
variously. Let one such idea get possession of the popular mind, or the mind
of any portion of the community, and it is not difficult to understand what
will be the result. At first men will not fully realize what it is that moves
them, and will express and explain themselves inadequately. There will be a
general agitation of thought, and an action of mind upon mind. There will
be a time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in
conflict, and it is uncertain whether anything is to come of the idea at all, or
which view of it is to get the start of the others. New lights will be brought
to bear upon the original statements of the doctrine put forward; judgments
and aspects will accumulate. After a while some definite teaching emerges;
and, as time proceeds, one view will be modified or expanded by another,
and then combined with a third; till the idea to which these various aspects
belong, will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all
together. It will be surveyed too in its relation to other doctrines or facts, to
other natural laws or established customs, to the varying circumstances of
times and places, to other religions, polities, philosophies, as the case may
be. How it stands affected towards other systems, how it affects them, how
far it may be made to combine with them, how far it tolerates them, when it
interferes with them, will be gradually wrought out. It will be interrogated
and criticized by enemies, and defended by well-wishers. The multitude of
opinions formed concerning it in these respects and many others will be
collected, compared, sorted, sifted, selected, rejected, gradually attached to
it, separated from it, in the minds of individuals and of the community. It
will, in proportion to its native vigour and subtlety, introduce itself into the
framework and details of social life, changing public opinion, and
strengthening or undermining the foundations of established order. Thus in
time it will have grown into an ethical code, or into a system of
government, or into a theology, or into a ritual, according to its capabilities:
and this body of thought, thus laboriously gained, will after all be little
more than the proper representative of one idea, being in substance what
that idea meant from the first, its complete image as seen in a combination

of diversified aspects, with the suggestions and corrections of many minds,
and the illustration of many experiences.

5.
This process, whether it be longer or shorter in point of time, by which the
aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form, I call its
development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or
apparent truth on a large mental field. On the other hand this process will
not be a development, unless the assemblage of aspects, which constitute its
ultimate shape, really belongs to the idea from which they start. A republic,
for instance, is not a development from a pure monarchy, though it may
follow upon it; whereas the Greek "tyrant" may be considered as included
in the idea of a democracy. Moreover a development will have this
characteristic, that, its action being in the busy scene of human life, it
cannot progress at all without cutting across, and thereby destroying or
modifying and incorporating with itself existing modes of thinking and
operating. The development then of an idea is not like an investigation
worked out on paper, in which each successive advance is a pure evolution
from a foregoing, but it is carried on through and by means of communities
of men and their leaders and guides; and it employs their minds as its
instruments, and depends upon them, while it uses them. And so, as regards
existing opinions, principles, measures, and institutions of the community
which it has invaded; it developes by establishing relations between itself
and them; it employs itself, in giving them a new meaning and direction, in
creating what may be called a jurisdiction over them, in throwing off
whatever in them it cannot assimilate. It grows when it incorporates, and its
identity is found, not in isolation, but in continuity and sovereignty. This it
is that imparts to the history both of states and of religions, its specially
turbulent and polemical character. Such is the explanation of the
wranglings, whether of schools or of parliaments. It is the warfare of ideas
under their various aspects striving for the mastery, each of them
enterprising, engrossing, imperious, more or less incompatible with the rest,
and rallying followers or rousing foes, according as it acts upon the faith,
the prejudices, or the interest of parties or classes.

6.

Moreover, an idea not only modifies, but is modified, or at least influenced,
by the state of things in which it is carried out, and is dependent in various
ways on the circumstances which surround it. Its development proceeds
quickly or slowly, as it may be; the order of succession in its separate stages
is variable; it shows differently in a small sphere of action and in an
extended; it may be interrupted, retarded, mutilated, distorted, by external
violence; it may be enfeebled by the effort of ridding itself of domestic
foes; it may be impeded and swayed or even absorbed by counter energetic
ideas; it may be coloured by the received tone of thought into which it
comes, or depraved by the intrusion of foreign principles, or at length
shattered by the development of some original fault within it.

7.
But whatever be the risk of corruption from intercourse with the world
around, such a risk must be encountered if a great idea is duly to be
understood, and much more if it is to be fully exhibited. It is elicited and
expanded by trial, and battles into perfection and supremacy. Nor does it
escape the collision of opinion even in its earlier years, nor does it remain
truer to itself, and with a better claim to be considered one and the same,
though externally protected from vicissitude and change. It is indeed
sometimes said that the stream is clearest near the spring. Whatever use
may fairly be made of this image, it does not apply to the history of a
philosophy or belief, which on the contrary is more equable, and purer, and
stronger, when its bed has become deep, and broad, and full. It necessarily
rises out of an existing state of things, and for a time savours of the soil. Its
vital element needs disengaging from what is foreign and temporary, and is
employed in efforts after freedom which become more vigorous and
hopeful as its years increase. Its beginnings are no measure of its
capabilities, nor of its scope. At first no one knows what it is, or what it is
worth. It remains perhaps for a time quiescent; it tries, as it were, its limbs,
and proves the ground under it, and feels its way. From time to time it
makes essays which fail, and are in consequence abandoned. It seems in
suspense which way to go; it wavers, and at length strikes out in one
definite direction. In time it enters upon strange territory; points of
controversy alter their bearing; parties rise and fall around it; dangers and
hopes appear in new relations; and old principles reappear under new

forms. It changes with them in order to remain the same. In a higher world
it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to
have changed often.

SECTION II.

ON THE KINDS OF DEVELOPMENT IN IDEAS.
To attempt an accurate analysis or complete enumeration of the processes of
thought, whether speculative or practical, which come under the notion of
development, exceeds the pretensions of an Essay like the present; but,
without some general view of the various mental exercises which go by the
name we shall have no security against confusion in our reasoning and
necessary exposure to criticism.
1. First, then, it must be borne in mind that the word is commonly used, and
is used here, in three senses indiscriminately, from defect of our language;
on the one hand for the process of development, on the other for the result;
and again either generally for a development, true or not true, (that is,
faithful or unfaithful to the idea from which it started,) or exclusively for a
development deserving the name. A false or unfaithful development is more
properly to be called a corruption.
2. Next, it is plain that mathematical developments, that is, the system of
truths drawn out from mathematical definitions or equations, do not fall
under our present subject, though altogether analogous to it. There can be
no corruption in such developments, because they are conducted on strict
demonstration; and the conclusions in which they terminate, being
necessary, cannot be declensions from the original idea.
3. Nor, of course, do physical developments, as the growth of animal or
vegetable nature, come into consideration here; excepting that, together
with mathematical, they may be taken as illustrations of the general subject
to which we have to direct our attention.

4. Nor have we to consider material developments, which, though effected
by human contrivance, are still physical; as the development, as it is called,
of the national resources. We speak, for instance, of Ireland, the United
States, or the valley of the Indus, as admitting of a great development; by
which we mean, that those countries have fertile tracts, or abundant
products, or broad and deep rivers, or central positions for commerce, or
capacious and commodious harbours, the materials and instruments of
wealth, and these at present turned to insufficient account. Development in
this case will proceed by establishing marts, cutting canals, laying down
railroads, erecting factories, forming docks, and similar works, by which
the natural riches of the country may be made to yield the largest return and
to exert the greatest influence. In this sense, art is the development of
nature, that is, its adaptation to the purposes of utility and beauty, the
human intellect being the developing power.

2.
5. When society and its various classes and interests are the subject-matter
of the ideas which are in operation, the development may be called
political; as we see it in the growth of States or the changes of a
Constitution. Barbarians descend into southern regions from cupidity, and
their warrant is the sword: this is no intellectual process, nor is it the mode
of development exhibited in civilized communities. Where civilization
exists, reason, in some shape or other, is the incentive or the pretence of
development. When an empire enlarges, it is on the call of its allies, or for
the balance of power, or from the necessity of a demonstration of strength,
or from a fear for its frontiers. It lies uneasily in its territory, it is ill-shaped,
it has unreal boundary-lines, deficient communication between its principal
points, or defenceless or turbulent neighbours. Thus, of old time, Eubœa
was necessary for Athens, and Cythera for Sparta; and Augustus left his
advice, as a legacy, to confine the Empire between the Atlantic, the Rhine
and Danube, the Euphrates, and the Arabian and African deserts. In this day,
we hear of the Rhine being the natural boundary of France, and the Indus of
our Eastern empire; and we predict that, in the event of a war, Prussia will
change her outlines in the map of Europe. The development is material; but
an idea gives unity and force to its movement.

And so to take a case of national politics, a late writer remarks of the
Parliament of 1628-29, in its contest with Charles, that, so far from
encroaching on the just powers of a limited monarch, it never hinted at the
securities which were necessary for its measures. However, "twelve years
more of repeated aggressions," he adds, "taught the Long Parliament what a
few sagacious men might perhaps have already suspected; that they must
recover more of their ancient constitution, from oblivion; that they must
sustain its partial weakness by new securities; that, in order to render the
existence of monarchy compatible with that of freedom, they must not only
strip it of all it had usurped, but of something that was its own."[43:1]
Whatever be the worth of this author's theory, his facts or representations
are an illustration of a political development.
Again, at the present day, that Ireland should have a population of one
creed, and a Church of another, is felt to be a political arrangement so
unsatisfactory, that all parties seem to agree that either the population will
develope in power or the Establishment in influence.
Political developments, though really the growth of ideas, are often
capricious and irregular from the nature of their subject-matter. They are
influenced by the character of sovereigns, the rise and fall of statesmen, the
fate of battles, and the numberless vicissitudes of the world. "Perhaps the
Greeks would be still involved in the heresy of the Monophysites," says
Gibbon, "if the Emperor's horse had not fortunately stumbled. Theodosius
expired, his orthodox sister succeeded to the throne."[44:1]

3.
Again, it often happens, or generally, that various distinct and incompatible
elements are found in the origin or infancy of politics, or indeed of
philosophies, some of which must be ejected before any satisfactory
developments, if any, can take place. And they are commonly ejected by the
gradual growth of the stronger. The reign of Charles the First, just referred
to, supplies an instance in point.
Sometimes discordant ideas are for a time connected and concealed by a
common profession or name. Such is the case of coalitions in politics and
comprehensions in religion, of which commonly no good is to be expected.

Such is an ordinary function of committees and boards, and the sole aim of
conciliations and concessions, to make contraries look the same, and to
secure an outward agreement where there is no other unity.
Again, developments, reactions, reforms, revolutions, and changes of
various kinds are mixed together in the actual history of states, as of
philosophical sects, so as to make it very difficult to exhibit them in any
scientific analysis.
Often the intellectual process is detached from the practical, and posterior
to it. Thus it was after Elizabeth had established the Reformation that
Hooker laid down his theory of Church and State as one and the same,
differing only in idea; and, after the Revolution and its political
consequences, that Warburton wrote his "Alliance." And now again a new
theory is needed for the constitutional lawyer, in order to reconcile the
existing political state of things with the just claims of religion. And so,
again, in Parliamentary conflicts, men first come to their conclusions by the
external pressure of events or the force of principles, they do not know
how; then they have to speak, and they look about for arguments: and a
pamphlet is published on the subject in debate, or an article appears in a
Review, to furnish common-places for the many.
Other developments, though political, are strictly subjected and consequent
to the ideas of which they are the exhibitions. Thus Locke's philosophy was
a real guide, not a mere defence of the Revolution era, operating forcibly
upon Church and Government in and after his day. Such too were the
theories which preceded the overthrow of the old regime in France and
other countries at the end of the last century.
Again, perhaps there are polities founded on no ideas at all, but on mere
custom, as among the Asiatics.

4.
6. In other developments the intellectual character is so prominent that they
may even be called logical, as in the Anglican doctrine of the Royal
Supremacy, which has been created in the courts of law, not in the cabinet
or on the field. Hence it is carried out with a consistency and minute
application which the history of constitutions cannot exhibit. It does not

only exist in statutes, or in articles, or in oaths, it is realized in details: as in
the congé d'élire and letter-missive on appointment of a Bishop;—in the
forms observed in Privy Council on the issuing of State Prayers;—in certain
arrangements observed in the Prayer-book, where the universal or abstract
Church precedes the King, but the national or really existing body follows
him; in printing his name in large capitals, while the Holiest Names are in
ordinary type, and in fixing his arms in churches instead of the Crucifix;
moreover, perhaps, in placing "sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebellion,"
before "false doctrine, heresy, and schism" in the Litany.
Again, when some new philosophy or its instalments are introduced into the
measures of the Legislature, or into the concessions made to a political
party, or into commercial or agricultural policy, it is often said, "We have
not seen the end of this;" "It is an earnest of future concessions;" "Our
children will see." We feel that it has unknown bearings and issues.

The admission of Jews to municipal offices has lately been defended[46:1]
on the ground that it is the introduction of no new principle, but a
development of one already received; that its great premisses have been
decided long since; and that the present age has but to draw the conclusion;
that it is not open to us to inquire what ought to be done in the abstract,
since there is no ideal model for the infallible guidance of nations; that
change is only a question of time, and that there is a time for all things; that
the application of principles ought not to go beyond the actual case, neither
preceding nor coming after an imperative demand; that in point of fact Jews
have lately been chosen for offices, and that in point of principle the law
cannot refuse to legitimate such elections.

5.
7. Another class of developments may be called historical; being the
gradual formation of opinion concerning persons, facts, and events.
Judgments, which were at one time confined to a few, at length spread
through a community, and attain general reception by the accumulation and
concurrence of testimony. Thus some authoritative accounts die away;
others gain a footing, and are ultimately received as truths. Courts of law,
Parliamentary proceedings, newspapers, letters and other posthumous
documents, the industry of historians and biographers, and the lapse of

years which dissipates parties and prejudices, are in this day the instruments
of such development. Accordingly the Poet makes Truth the daughter of
Time.[47:1] Thus at length approximations are made to a right appreciation
of transactions and characters. History cannot be written except in an after-
age. Thus by development the Canon of the New Testament has been
formed. Thus public men are content to leave their reputation to posterity;
great reactions take place in opinion; nay, sometimes men outlive
opposition and obloquy. Thus Saints are canonized in the Church, long after
they have entered into their rest.

6.
8. Ethical developments are not properly matter for argument and
controversy, but are natural and personal, substituting what is congruous,
desirable, pious, appropriate, generous, for strictly logical inference. Bishop
Butler supplies us with a remarkable instance in the beginning of the
Second Part of his "Analogy." As principles imply applications, and general
propositions include particulars, so, he tells us, do certain relations imply
correlative duties, and certain objects demand certain acts and feelings. He
observes that, even though we were not enjoined to pay divine honours to
the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity, what is predicated of
Them in Scripture would be an abundant warrant, an indirect command,
nay, a ground in reason, for doing so. "Does not," he asks, "the duty of
religious regards to both these Divine Persons as immediately arise, to the
view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations, as the
inward good-will and kind intention which we owe to our fellow-creatures
arises out of the common relations between us and them?" He proceeds to
say that he is speaking of the inward religious regards of reverence, honour,
love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. "In what external manner this inward
worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure revealed command; . . but the
worship, the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no further
matter of pure revealed command than as the relations they stand in to us
are matter of pure revelation; for, the relations being known, the obligations
to such internal worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those
relations themselves." Here is a development of doctrine into worship, of
which parallel instances are obviously to be found in the Church of Rome.

7.
A development, converse to that which Butler speaks of, must next be
mentioned. As certain objects excite certain emotions and sentiments, so do
sentiments imply objects and duties. Thus conscience, the existence of
which we cannot deny, is a proof of the doctrine of a Moral Governor,
which alone gives it a meaning and a scope; that is, the doctrine of a Judge
and Judgment to come is a development of the phenomenon of conscience.
Again, it is plain that passions and affections are in action in our minds
before the presence of their proper objects; and their activity would of
course be an antecedent argument of extreme cogency in behalf of the real
existence of those legitimate objects, supposing them unknown. And so
again, the social principle, which is innate in us, gives a divine sanction to
society and to civil government. And the usage of prayers for the dead
implies certain circumstances of their state upon which such devotions bear.
And rites and ceremonies are natural means through which the mind
relieves itself of devotional and penitential emotions. And sometimes the
cultivation of awe and love towards what is great, high, and unseen, has led
a man to the abandonment of his sect for some more Catholic form of
doctrine.
Aristotle furnishes us with an instance of this kind of development in his
account of the happy man. After showing that his definition of happiness
includes in itself the pleasurable, which is the most obvious and popular
idea of happiness, he goes on to say that still external goods are necessary
to it, about which, however, the definition said nothing; that is, a certain
prosperity is by moral fitness, not by logical necessity, attached to the
happy man. "For it is impossible," he observes, "or not easy, to practise high
virtue without abundant means. Many deeds are done by the instrumentality
of friends, wealth and political power; and of some things the absence is a
cloud upon happiness, as of noble birth, of hopeful children, and of personal
appearance: for a person utterly deformed, or low-born, or bereaved and
childless, cannot quite be happy: and still less if he have very worthless
children or friends, or they were good and died."[49:1]

8.

This process of development has been well delineated by a living French
writer, in his Lectures on European civilization, who shall be quoted at
some length. "If we reduce religion," he says, "to a purely religious
sentiment . . . it appears evident that it must and ought to remain a purely
personal concern. But I am either strangely mistaken, or this religious
sentiment is not the complete expression of the religious nature of man.
Religion is, I believe, very different from this, and much more extended.
There are problems in human nature, in human destinies, which cannot be
solved in this life, which depend on an order of things unconnected with the
visible world, but which unceasingly agitate the human mind with a desire
to comprehend them. The solution of these problems is the origin of all
religion; her primary object is to discover the creeds and doctrines which
contain, or are supposed to contain it.
"Another cause also impels mankind to embrace religion . . . From whence
do morals originate? whither do they lead? is this self-existing obligation to
do good, an isolated fact, without an author, without an end? does it not
conceal, or rather does it not reveal to man, an origin, a destiny, beyond this
world? The science of morals, by these spontaneous and inevitable
questions, conducts man to the threshold of religion, and displays to him a
sphere from whence he has not derived it. Thus the certain and never-failing
sources of religion are, on the one hand, the problems of our nature; on the
other, the necessity of seeking for morals a sanction, an origin, and an aim.
It therefore assumes many other forms beside that of a pure sentiment; it
appears a union of doctrines, of precepts, of promises. This is what truly
constitutes religion; this is its fundamental character; it is not merely a form
of sensibility, an impulse of the imagination, a variety of poetry.
"When thus brought back to its true elements, to its essential nature,
religion appears no longer a purely personal concern, but a powerful and
fruitful principle of association. Is it considered in the light of a system of
belief, a system of dogmas? Truth is not the heritage of any individual, it is
absolute and universal; mankind ought to seek and profess it in common. Is
it considered with reference to the precepts that are associated with its
doctrines? A law which is obligatory on a single individual, is so on all; it
ought to be promulgated, and it is our duty to endeavour to bring all
mankind under its dominion. It is the same with respect to the promises that
religion makes, in the name of its creeds and precepts; they ought to be

diffused; all men should be incited to partake of their benefits. A religious
society, therefore, naturally results from the essential elements of religion,
and is such a necessary consequence of it that the term which expresses the
most energetic social sentiment, the most intense desire to propagate ideas
and extend society, is the word proselytism, a term which is especially
applied to religious belief, and in fact consecrated to it.
"When a religious society has ever been formed, when a certain number of
men are united by a common religious creed, are governed by the same
religious precepts, and enjoy the same religious hopes, some form of
government is necessary. No society can endure a week, nay more, no
society can endure a single hour, without a government. The moment,
indeed, a society is formed, by the very fact of its formation, it calls forth a
government,—a government which shall proclaim the common truth which
is the bond of the society, and promulgate and maintain the precepts that
this truth ought to produce. The necessity of a superior power, of a form of
government, is involved in the fact of the existence of a religious, as it is in
that of any other society.
"And not only is a government necessary, but it naturally forms itself. . . .
When events are suffered to follow their natural laws, when force does not
interfere, power falls into the hands of the most able, the most worthy, those
who are most capable of carrying out the principles on which the society
was founded. Is a warlike expedition in agitation? The bravest take the
command. Is the object of the association learned research, or a scientific
undertaking? The best informed will be the leader. . . . The inequality of
faculties and influence, which is the foundation of power in civil life, has
the same effect in a religious society. . . Religion has no sooner arisen in the
human mind than a religious society appears; and immediately a religious
society is formed, it produces its government."[52:1]

9.
9. It remains to allude to what, unless the word were often so vaguely and
variously used, I should be led to call metaphysical developments; I mean
such as are a mere analysis of the idea contemplated, and terminate in its
exact and complete delineation. Thus Aristotle draws the character of a
magnanimous or of a munificent man; thus Shakspeare might conceive and

bring out his Hamlet or Ariel; thus Walter Scott gradually enucleates his
James, or Dalgetty, as the action of his story proceeds; and thus, in the
sacred province of theology, the mind may be employed in developing the
solemn ideas, which it has hitherto held implicitly and without subjecting
them to its reflecting and reasoning powers.
I have already treated of this subject at length, with a reference to the
highest theological subject, in a former work, from which it will be
sufficient here to quote some sentences in explanation:—
"The mind which is habituated to the thought of God, of Christ, of the Holy
Spirit, naturally turns with a devout curiosity to the contemplation of the
object of its adoration, and begins to form statements concerning it, before
it knows whither, or how far, it will be carried. One proposition necessarily
leads to another, and a second to a third; then some limitation is required;
and the combination of these opposites occasions some fresh evolutions
from the original idea, which indeed can never be said to be entirely
exhausted. This process is its development, and results in a series, or rather
body, of dogmatic statements, till what was an impression on the
Imagination has become a system or creed in the Reason.
"Now such impressions are obviously individual and complete above other
theological ideas, because they are the impressions of Objects. Ideas and
their developments are commonly not identical, the development being but
the carrying out of the idea into its consequences. Thus the doctrine of
Penance may be called a development of the doctrine of Baptism, yet still is
a distinct doctrine; whereas the developments in the doctrines of the Holy
Trinity and the Incarnation are mere portions of the original impression, and
modes of representing it. As God is one, so the impression which He gives
us of Himself is one; it is not a thing of parts; it is not a system; nor is it
anything imperfect and needing a counterpart. It is the vision of an object.
When we pray, we pray, not to an assemblage of notions or to a creed, but
to One Individual Being; and when we speak of Him, we speak of a Person,
not of a Law or Manifestation . . . Religious men, according to their
measure, have an idea or vision of the Blessed Trinity in Unity, of the Son
Incarnate, and of His Presence, not as a number of qualities, attributes, and
actions, not as the subject of a number of propositions, but as one and
individual, and independent of words, like an impression conveyed through

the senses . . . . Creeds and dogmas live in the one idea which they are
designed to express, and which alone is substantive; and are necessary,
because the human mind cannot reflect upon that idea except piecemeal,
cannot use it in its oneness and entireness, or without resolving it into a
series of aspects and relations."[53:1]

10.
So much on the development of ideas in various subject matters: it may be
necessary to add that, in many cases, development simply stands for
exhibition, as in some of the instances adduced above. Thus both Calvinism
and Unitarianism may be called developments, that is, exhibitions, of the
principle of Private Judgment, though they have nothing in common,
viewed as doctrines.
As to Christianity, supposing the truths of which it consists to admit of
development, that development will be one or other of the last five kinds.
Taking the Incarnation as its central doctrine, the Episcopate, as taught by
St. Ignatius, will be an instance of political development, the Theotokos of
logical, the determination of the date of our Lord's birth of historical, the
Holy Eucharist of moral, and the Athanasian Creed of metaphysical.

FOOTNOTES:

[43:1] Hallam's Constit. Hist. ch. vii. p. 572.
[44:1] ch. xlvii.
[46:1] Times newspaper of March, 1845.
[47:1] Crabbe's Tales.
[49:1] Eth. Nic. i. 8.
[52:1] Guizot, Europ. Civil., Lect. v., Beckwith's Translation.
[53:1] [Univ. Serm. xv. 20-23, pp. 329-332, ed. 3.]

CHAPTER II.
ON THE ANTECEDENT ARGUMENT IN BEHALF OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

SECTION I.

DEVELOPMENTS OF DOCTRINE TO BE EXPECTED.

1. If Christianity is a fact, and impresses an idea of itself on our minds and
is a subject-matter of exercises of the reason, that idea will in course of time
expand into a multitude of ideas, and aspects of ideas, connected and
harmonious with one another, and in themselves determinate and
immutable, as is the objective fact itself which is thus represented. It is a
characteristic of our minds, that they cannot take an object in, which is
submitted to them simply and integrally. We conceive by means of
definition or description; whole objects do not create in the intellect whole
ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a
number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other,
and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a
perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. We cannot
teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing
itself which we are teaching. Two persons may each convey the same truth
to a third, yet by methods and through representations altogether different.
The same person will treat the same argument differently in an essay or
speech, according to the accident of the day of writing, or of the audience,
yet it will be substantially the same.
And the more claim an idea has to be considered living, the more various
will be its aspects; and the more social and political is its nature, the more
complicated and subtle will be its issues, and the longer and more eventful
will be its course. And in the number of these special ideas, which from

their very depth and richness cannot be fully understood at once, but are
more and more clearly expressed and taught the longer they last,—having
aspects many and bearings many, mutually connected and growing one out
of another, and all parts of a whole, with a sympathy and correspondence
keeping pace with the ever-changing necessities of the world, multiform,
prolific, and ever resourceful,—among these great doctrines surely we
Christians shall not refuse a foremost place to Christianity. Such previously
to the determination of the fact, must be our anticipation concerning it from
a contemplation of its initial achievements.

2.
It may be objected that its inspired documents at once determine the limits
of its mission without further trouble; but ideas are in the writer and reader
of the revelation, not the inspired text itself: and the question is whether
those ideas which the letter conveys from writer to reader, reach the reader
at once in their completeness and accuracy on his first perception of them,
or whether they open out in his intellect and grow to perfection in the
course of time. Nor could it surely be maintained without extravagance that
the letter of the New Testament, or of any assignable number of books,
comprises a delineation of all possible forms which a divine message will
assume when submitted to a multitude of minds.
Nor is the case altered by supposing that inspiration provided in behalf of
the first recipients of the Revelation, what the Divine Fiat effected for herbs
and plants in the beginning, which were created in maturity. Still, the time
at length came, when its recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these
recipients the revealed truths would fall, as in other cases, at first vaguely
and generally, though in spirit and in truth, and would afterwards be
completed by developments.
Nor can it fairly be made a difficulty that thus to treat of Christianity is to
level it in some sort to sects and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it
the imperfections which characterize the productions of man. Certainly it is
a sort of degradation of a divine work to consider it under an earthly form;
but it is no irreverence, since our Lord Himself, its Author and Guardian,
bore one also. Christianity differs from other religions and philosophies, in
what is superadded to earth from heaven; not in kind, but in origin; not in

its nature, but in its personal characteristics; being informed and quickened
by what is more than intellect, by a divine spirit. It is externally what the
Apostle calls an "earthen vessel," being the religion of men. And,
considered as such, it grows "in wisdom and stature;" but the powers which
it wields, and the words which proceed out of its mouth, attest its
miraculous nativity.
Unless then some special ground of exception can be assigned, it is as
evident that Christianity, as a doctrine and worship, will develope in the
minds of recipients, as that it conforms in other respects, in its external
propagation or its political framework, to the general methods by which the
course of things is carried forward.

3.
2. Again, if Christianity be an universal religion, suited not simply to one
locality or period, but to all times and places, it cannot but vary in its
relations and dealings towards the world around it, that is, it will develope.
Principles require a very various application according as persons and
circumstances vary, and must be thrown into new shapes according to the
form of society which they are to influence. Hence all bodies of Christians,
orthodox or not, develope the doctrines of Scripture. Few but will grant that
Luther's view of justification had never been stated in words before his
time: that his phraseology and his positions were novel, whether called for
by circumstances or not. It is equally certain that the doctrine of
justification defined at Trent was, in some sense, new also. The refutation
and remedy of errors cannot precede their rise; and thus the fact of false
developments or corruptions involves the correspondent manifestation of
true ones. Moreover, all parties appeal to Scripture, that is, argue from
Scripture; but argument implies deduction, that is, development. Here there
is no difference between early times and late, between a Pope ex cathedrâ
and an individual Protestant, except that their authority is not on a par. On
either side the claim of authority is the same, and the process of
development.
Accordingly, the common complaint of Protestants against the Church of
Rome is, not simply that she has added to the primitive or the Scriptural
doctrine, (for this they do themselves,) but that she contradicts it, and

moreover imposes her additions as fundamental truths under sanction of an
anathema. For themselves they deduce by quite as subtle a method, and act
upon doctrines as implicit and on reasons as little analyzed in time past, as
Catholic schoolmen. What prominence has the Royal Supremacy in the
New Testament, or the lawfulness of bearing arms, or the duty of public
worship, or the substitution of the first day of the week for the seventh, or
infant baptism, to say nothing of the fundamental principle that the Bible
and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants? These doctrines and
usages, true or not, which is not the question here, are surely not gained by
the direct use and immediate application of Scripture, nor by a mere
exercise of argument upon words and sentences placed before the eyes, but
by the unconscious growth of ideas suggested by the letter and habitual to
the mind.

4.
3. And, indeed, when we turn to the consideration of particular doctrines on
which Scripture lays the greatest stress, we shall see that it is absolutely
impossible for them to remain in the mere letter of Scripture, if they are to
be more than mere words, and to convey a definite idea to the recipient.
When it is declared that "the Word became flesh," three wide questions
open upon us on the very announcement. What is meant by "the Word,"
what by "flesh," what by "became"? The answers to these involve a process
of investigation, and are developments. Moreover, when they have been
made, they will suggest a series of secondary questions; and thus at length a
multitude of propositions is the result, which gather round the inspired
sentence of which they come, giving it externally the form of a doctrine,
and creating or deepening the idea of it in the mind.
It is true that, so far as such statements of Scripture are mysteries, they are
relatively to us but words, and cannot be developed. But as a mystery
implies in part what is incomprehensible or at least unknown, so does it in
part imply what is not so; it implies a partial manifestation, or a
representation by economy. Because then it is in a measure understood, it
can so far be developed, though each result in the process will partake of
the dimness and confusion of the original impression.

5.
4. This moreover should be considered,—that great questions exist in the
subject-matter of which Scripture treats, which Scripture does not solve;
questions too so real, so practical, that they must be answered, and, unless
we suppose a new revelation, answered by means of the revelation which
we have, that is, by development. Such is the question of the Canon of
Scripture and its inspiration: that is, whether Christianity depends upon a
written document as Judaism;—if so, on what writings and how many;—
whether that document is self-interpreting, or requires a comment, and
whether any authoritative comment or commentator is provided;—whether
the revelation and the document are commensurate, or the one outruns the
other;—all these questions surely find no solution on the surface of
Scripture, nor indeed under the surface in the case of most men, however
long and diligent might be their study of it. Nor were these difficulties
settled by authority, as far as we know, at the commencement of the
religion; yet surely it is quite conceivable that an Apostle might have
dissipated them all in a few words, had Divine Wisdom thought fit. But in
matter of fact the decision has been left to time, to the slow process of
thought, to the influence of mind upon mind, the issues of controversy, and
the growth of opinion.

6.
To take another instance just now referred to:—if there was a point on
which a rule was desirable from the first, it was concerning the religious
duties under which Christian parents lay as regards their children. It would
be natural indeed in any Christian father, in the absence of a rule, to bring
his children for baptism; such in this instance would be the practical
development of his faith in Christ and love for his offspring; still a
development it is,—necessarily required, yet, as far as we know, not
provided for his need by direct precept in the Revelation as originally given.
Another very large field of thought, full of practical considerations, yet, as
far as our knowledge goes, but only partially occupied by any Apostolical
judgment, is that which the question of the effects of Baptism opens upon
us. That they who came in repentance and faith to that Holy Sacrament
received remission of sins, is undoubtedly the doctrine of the Apostles; but

is there any means of a second remission for sins committed after it? St.
Paul's Epistles, where we might expect an answer to our inquiry, contain no
explicit statement on the subject; what they do plainly say does not
diminish the difficulty:—viz., first, that baptism is intended for the pardon
of sins before it, not in prospect; next, that those who have received the gift
of Baptism in fact live in a state of holiness, not of sin. How do statements
such as these meet the actual state of the Church as we see it at this day?
Considering that it was expressly predicted that the Kingdom of Heaven,
like the fisher's net, should gather of every kind, and that the tares should
grow with the wheat until the harvest, a graver and more practical question
cannot be imagined than that which it has pleased the Divine Author of the
Revelation to leave undecided, unless indeed there be means given in that
Revelation of its own growth or development. As far as the letter goes of
the inspired message, every one who holds that Scripture is the rule of faith,
as all Protestants do, must allow that "there is not one of us but has
exceeded by transgression its revealed Ritual, and finds himself in
consequence thrown upon those infinite resources of Divine Love which are
stored in Christ, but have not been drawn out into form in the appointments
of the Gospel."[62:1] Since then Scripture needs completion, the question is
brought to this issue, whether defect or inchoateness in its doctrines be or
be not an antecedent probability in favour of a development of them.

7.
There is another subject, though not so immediately practical, on which
Scripture does not, strictly speaking, keep silence, but says so little as to
require, and so much as to suggest, information beyond its letter,—the
intermediate state between death and the Resurrection. Considering the long
interval which separates Christ's first and second coming, the millions of
faithful souls who are waiting it out, and the intimate concern which every
Christian has in the determination of its character, it might have been
expected that Scripture would have spoken explicitly concerning it, whereas
in fact its notices are but brief and obscure. We might indeed have argued
that this silence of Scripture was intentional, with a view of discouraging
speculations upon the subject, except for the circumstance that, as in the
question of our post-baptismal state, its teaching seems to proceed upon an

hypothesis inapplicable to the state of the Church after the time when it was
delivered. As Scripture contemplates Christians, not as backsliders, but as
saints, so does it apparently represent the Day of Judgment as immediate,
and the interval of expectation as evanescent. It leaves on our minds the
general impression that Christ was returning on earth at once, "the time
short," worldly engagements superseded by "the present distress,"
persecutors urgent, Christians, as a body, sinless and expectant, without
home, without plan for the future, looking up to heaven. But outward
circumstances have changed, and with the change, a different application of
the revealed word has of necessity been demanded, that is, a development.
When the nations were converted and offences abounded, then the Church
came out to view, on the one hand as a temporal establishment, on the other
as a remedial system, and passages of Scripture aided and directed the
development which before were of inferior account. Hence the doctrine of
Penance as the complement of Baptism, and of Purgatory as the explanation
of the Intermediate State. So reasonable is this expansion of the original
creed, that, when some ten years since the true doctrine of Baptism was
expounded among us without any mention of Penance, our teacher was
accused by many of us of Novatianism; while, on the other hand, heterodox
divines have before now advocated the doctrine of the sleep of the soul
because they said it was the only successful preventive of belief in
Purgatory.

8.
Thus developments of Christianity are proved to have been in the
contemplation of its Divine Author, by an argument parallel to that by
which we infer intelligence in the system of the physical world. In whatever
sense the need and its supply are a proof of design in the visible creation, in
the same do the gaps, if the word may be used, which occur in the structure
of the original creed of the Church, make it probable that those
developments, which grow out of the truths which lie around it, were
intended to fill them up.
Nor can it be fairly objected that in thus arguing we are contradicting the
great philosopher, who tells us, that "upon supposition of God affording us
light and instruction by revelation, additional to what He has afforded us by

reason and experience, we are in no sort judges by what methods, and in
what proportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural light and
instruction would be afforded us,"[64:1] because he is speaking of our
judging before a revelation is given. He observes that "we have no
principles of reason upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be
expected Revelation should have been left, or what was most suitable to the
divine plan of government," in various respects; but the case is altogether
altered when a Revelation is vouchsafed, for then a new precedent, or what
he calls "principle of reason," is introduced, and from what is actually put
into our hands we can form a judgment whether more is to be expected.
Butler, indeed, as a well-known passage of his work shows, is far from
denying the principle of progressive development.

9.
5. The method of revelation observed in Scripture abundantly confirms this
anticipation. For instance, Prophecy, if it had so happened, need not have
afforded a specimen of development; separate predictions might have been
made to accumulate as time went on, prospects might have opened, definite
knowledge might have been given, by communications independent of each
other, as St. John's Gospel or the Epistles of St. Paul are unconnected with
the first three Gospels, though the doctrine of each Apostle is a
development of their matter. But the prophetic Revelation is, in matter of
fact, not of this nature, but a process of development: the earlier prophecies
are pregnant texts out of which the succeeding announcements grow; they
are types. It is not that first one truth is told, then another; but the whole
truth or large portions of it are told at once, yet only in their rudiments, or in
miniature, and they are expanded and finished in their parts, as the course of
revelation proceeds.
The Seed of the woman was to bruise the serpent's head; the sceptre was not
to depart from Judah till Shiloh came, to whom was to be the gathering of
the people. He was to be Wonderful, Counsellor, the Prince of Peace. The
question of the Ethiopian rises in the reader's mind, "Of whom speaketh the
Prophet this?" Every word requires a comment. Accordingly, it is no
uncommon theory with unbelievers, that the Messianic idea, as they call it,
was gradually developed in the minds of the Jews by a continuous and

traditional habit of contemplating it, and grew into its full proportions by a
mere human process; and so far seems certain, without trenching on the
doctrine of inspiration, that the books of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus are
developments of the writings of the Prophets, expressed or elicited by
means of current ideas in the Greek philosophy, and ultimately adopted and
ratified by the Apostle in his Epistle to the Hebrews.

10.
But the whole Bible, not its prophetical portions only, is written on the
principle of development. As the Revelation proceeds, it is ever new, yet
ever old. St. John, who completes it, declares that he writes no "new
commandment unto his brethren," but an old commandment which they
"had from the beginning." And then he adds, "A new commandment I write
unto you." The same test of development is suggested in our Lord's words
on the Mount, as has already been noticed, "Think not that I am come to
destroy the Law and the Prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil."
He does not reverse, but perfect, what has gone before. Thus with respect to
the evangelical view of the rite of sacrifice, first the rite is enjoined by
Moses; next Samuel says, "to obey is better than sacrifice;" then Hosea, "I
will have mercy and not sacrifice;" Isaiah, "Incense is an abomination onto
me;" then Malachi, describing the times of the Gospel, speaks of the "pure
offering" of wheatflour; and our Lord completes the development, when He
speaks of worshipping "in spirit and in truth." If there is anything here left
to explain, it will be found in the usage of the Christian Church
immediately afterwards, which shows that sacrifice was not removed, but
truth and spirit added.
Nay, the effata of our Lord and His Apostles are of a typical structure,
parallel to the prophetic announcements above mentioned, and predictions
as well as injunctions of doctrine. If then the prophetic sentences have had
that development which has really been given them, first by succeeding
revelations, and then by the event, it is probable antecedently that those
doctrinal, political, ritual, and ethical sentences, which have the same
structure, should admit the same expansion. Such are, "This is My Body,"
or "Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build My Church," or "The

meek shall inherit the earth," or "Suffer little children to come unto Me," or
"The pure in heart shall see God."

11.
On this character of our Lord's teaching, the following passage may suitably
be quoted from a writer already used. "His recorded words and works when
on earth . . . come to us as the declarations of a Lawgiver. In the Old
Covenant, Almighty God first of all spoke the Ten Commandments from
Mount Sinai, and afterwards wrote them. So our Lord first spoke His own
Gospel, both of promise and of precept, on the Mount, and His Evangelists
have recorded it. Further, when He delivered it, He spoke by way of parallel
to the Ten Commandments. And His style, moreover, corresponds to the
authority which He assumes. It is of that solemn, measured, and severe
character, which bears on the face of it tokens of its belonging to One who
spake as none other man could speak. The Beatitudes, with which His
Sermon opens, are an instance of this incommunicable style, which befitted,
as far as human words could befit, God Incarnate.
"Nor is this style peculiar to the Sermon on the Mount. All through the
Gospels it is discernible, distinct from any other part of Scripture, showing
itself in solemn declarations, canons, sentences, or sayings, such as
legislators propound, and scribes and lawyers comment on. Surely
everything our Saviour did and said is characterized by mingled simplicity
and mystery. His emblematical actions, His typical miracles, His parables,
His replies, His censures, all are evidences of a legislature in germ,
afterwards to be developed, a code of divine truth which was ever to be
before men's eyes, to be the subject of investigation and interpretation, and
the guide in controversy. 'Verily, verily, I say unto you,'—'But, I say unto
you,'—are the tokens of a supreme Teacher and Prophet.
"And thus the Fathers speak of His teaching. 'His sayings,' observes St.
Justin, 'were short and concise; for He was no rhetorician, but His word was
the power of God.' And St. Basil, in like manner, 'Every deed and every
word of our Saviour Jesus Christ is a canon of piety and virtue. When then
thou hearest word or deed of His, do not hear it as by the way, or after a
simple and carnal manner, but enter into the depth of His contemplations,
become a communicant in truths mystically delivered to thee.'"[67:1]

12.
Moreover, while it is certain that developments of Revelation proceeded all
through the Old Dispensation down to the very end of our Lord's ministry,
on the other hand, if we turn our attention to the beginnings of Apostolical
teaching after His ascension, we shall find ourselves unable to fix an
historical point at which the growth of doctrine ceased, and the rule of faith
was once for all settled. Not on the day of Pentecost, for St. Peter had still
to learn at Joppa that he was to baptize Cornelius; not at Joppa and
Cæsarea, for St. Paul had to write his Epistles; not on the death of the last
Apostle, for St. Ignatius had to establish the doctrine of Episcopacy; not
then, nor for centuries after, for the Canon of the New Testament was still
undetermined. Not in the Creed, which is no collection of definitions, but a
summary of certain credenda, an incomplete summary, and, like the Lord's
Prayer or the Decalogue, a mere sample of divine truths, especially of the
more elementary. No one doctrine can be named which starts complete at
first, and gains nothing afterwards from the investigations of faith and the
attacks of heresy. The Church went forth from the old world in haste, as the
Israelites from Egypt "with their dough before it was leavened, their
kneading troughs being bound up in their clothes upon their shoulders."

13.
Further, the political developments contained in the historical parts of
Scripture are as striking as the prophetical and the doctrinal. Can any
history wear a more human appearance than that of the rise and growth of
the chosen people to whom I have just referred? What had been determined
in the counsels of the Lord of heaven and earth from the beginning, what
was immutable, what was announced to Moses in the burning bush, is
afterwards represented as the growth of an idea under successive
emergencies. The Divine Voice in the bush had announced the Exodus of
the children of Israel from Egypt and their entrance into Canaan; and added,
as a token of the certainty of His purpose, "When thou hast brought forth
the people out of Egypt, ye shall serve God upon this mountain." Now this
sacrifice or festival, which was but incidental and secondary in the great
deliverance, is for a while the ultimate scope of the demands which Moses
makes upon Pharaoh. "Thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel unto

the King of Egypt, and ye shall say unto him, The Lord God of the Hebrews
hath met with us, and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' journey
into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God." It had been
added that Pharaoh would first refuse their request, but that after miracles
he would let them go altogether, nay with "jewels of silver and gold, and
raiment."
Accordingly the first request of Moses was, "Let us go, we pray thee, three
days' journey into the desert, and sacrifice unto the Lord our God." Before
the plague of frogs the warning is repeated, "Let My people go that they
may serve Me;" and after it Pharaoh says, "I will let the people go, that they
may do sacrifice unto the Lord." It occurs again before the plague of flies;
and after it Pharaoh offers to let the Israelites sacrifice in Egypt, which
Moses refuses on the ground that they will have to "sacrifice the
abomination of the Egyptians before their eyes." "We will go three days'
journey into the wilderness," he proceeds, "and sacrifice to the Lord our
God;" and Pharaoh then concedes their sacrificing in the wilderness, "only,"
he says, "you shall not go very far away." The demand is repeated
separately before the plagues of murrain, hail, and locusts, no mention
being yet made of anything beyond a service or sacrifice in the wilderness.
On the last of these interviews, Pharaoh asks an explanation, and Moses
extends his claim: "We will go with our young and with our old, with our
sons and with our daughters, with our flocks and with our herds will we go,
for we must hold a feast unto the Lord." That it was an extension seems
plain from Pharaoh's reply: "Go now ye that are men, and serve the Lord,
for that ye did desire." Upon the plague of darkness Pharaoh concedes the
extended demand, excepting the flocks and herds; but Moses reminds him
that they were implied, though not expressed in the original wording: "Thou
must give us also sacrifices and burnt offerings, that we may sacrifice unto
the Lord our God." Even to the last, there was no intimation of their leaving
Egypt for good; the issue was left to be wrought out by the Egyptians. "All
these thy servants," says Moses, "shall come down unto me, and bow down
themselves unto me, saying, Get thee out and all the people that follow
thee, and after that I will go out;" and, accordingly, after the judgment on
the first-born, they were thrust out at midnight, with their flocks and herds,
their kneading troughs and their dough, laden, too, with the spoils of Egypt,
as had been fore-ordained, yet apparently by a combination of

circumstances, or the complication of a crisis. Yet Moses knew that their
departure from Egypt was final, for he took the bones of Joseph with him;
and that conviction broke on Pharaoh soon, when he and his asked
themselves, "Why have we done this, that we have let Israel go from
serving us?" But this progress of events, vague and uncertain as it seemed
to be, notwithstanding the miracles which attended it, had been directed by
Him who works out gradually what He has determined absolutely; and it
ended in the parting of the Red Sea, and the destruction of Pharaoh's host,
on his pursuing them.
Moreover, from what occurred forty years afterwards, when they were
advancing upon the promised land, it would seem that the original grant of
territory did not include the country east of Jordan, held in the event by
Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh; at least they undertook at first
to leave Sihon in undisturbed possession of his country, if he would let
them pass through it, and only on his refusing his permission did they
invade and appropriate it.

14.
6. It is in point to notice also the structure and style of Scripture, a structure
so unsystematic and various, and a style so figurative and indirect, that no
one would presume at first sight to say what is in it and what is not. It
cannot, as it were, be mapped, or its contents catalogued; but after all our
diligence, to the end of our lives and to the end of the Church, it must be an
unexplored and unsubdued land, with heights and valleys, forests and
streams, on the right and left of our path and close about us, full of
concealed wonders and choice treasures. Of no doctrine whatever, which
does not actually contradict what has been delivered, can it be peremptorily
asserted that it is not in Scripture; of no reader, whatever be his study of it,
can it be said that he has mastered every doctrine which it contains. Butler's
remarks on this subject were just now referred to. "The more distinct and
particular knowledge," he says, "of those things, the study of which the
Apostle calls 'going on unto perfection,'" that is, of the more recondite
doctrines of the Gospel, "and of the prophetic parts of revelation, like many
parts of natural and even civil knowledge, may require very exact thought
and careful consideration. The hindrances too of natural and of supernatural

light and knowledge have been of the same kind. And as it is owned the
whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so, if it ever comes to be
understood, before the 'restitution of all things,' and without miraculous
interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at,
by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty, and by particular
persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing intimations scattered up and
down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the
world. For this is the way in which all improvements are made, by
thoughtful men tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature
accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at
all incredible that a book, which has been so long in the possession of
mankind, should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For all the same
phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, from which such great
discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last
age, were equally in the possession of mankind several thousand years
before. And possibly it might be intended that events, as they come to pass,
should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture."[72:1]
Butler of course was not contemplating the case of new articles of faith, or
developments imperative on our acceptance, but he surely bears witness to
the probability of developments taking place in Christian doctrine
considered in themselves, which is the point at present in question.

15.
It may be added that, in matter of fact, all the definitions or received
judgments of the early and medieval Church rest upon definite, even though
sometimes obscure sentences of Scripture. Thus Purgatory may appeal to
the "saving by fire," and "entering through much tribulation into the
kingdom of God;" the communication of the merits of the Saints to our
"receiving a prophet's reward" for "receiving a prophet in the name of a
prophet," and "a righteous man's reward" for "receiving a righteous man in
the name of a righteous man;" the Real Presence to "This is My Body;"
Absolution to "Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted;" Extreme
Unction to "Anointing him with oil in the Name of the Lord;" Voluntary
poverty to "Sell all that thou hast;" obedience to "He was in subjection to
His parents;" the honour paid to creatures, animate or inanimate, to Laudate

Dominum in sanctis Ejus, and Adorate scabellum pedum Ejus; and so of the
rest.

16.
7. Lastly, while Scripture nowhere recognizes itself or asserts the
inspiration of those passages which are most essential, it distinctly
anticipates the development of Christianity, both as a polity and as a
doctrine. In one of our Lord's parables "the Kingdom of Heaven" is even
compared to "a grain of mustard-seed, which a man took and hid in his
field; which indeed is the least of all seeds, but when it is grown it is the
greatest among herbs, and becometh a tree," and, as St. Mark words it,
"shooteth out great branches, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in
the branches thereof." And again, in the same chapter of St. Mark, "So is the
kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground, and should
sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he
knoweth not how; for the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself." Here an
internal element of life, whether principle or doctrine, is spoken of rather
than any mere external manifestation; and it is observable that the
spontaneous, as well as the gradual, character of the growth is intimated.
This description of the process corresponds to what has been above
observed respecting development, viz. that it is not an effect of wishing and
resolving, or of forced enthusiasm, or of any mechanism of reasoning, or of
any mere subtlety of intellect; but comes of its own innate power of
expansion within the mind in its season, though with the use of reflection
and argument and original thought, more or less as it may happen, with a
dependence on the ethical growth of the mind itself, and with a reflex
influence upon it. Again, the Parable of the Leaven describes the
development of doctrine in another respect, in its active, engrossing, and
interpenetrating power.

17.
From the necessity, then, of the case, from the history of all sects and
parties in religion, and from the analogy and example of Scripture, we may
fairly conclude that Christian doctrine admits of formal, legitimate, and true
developments, that is, of developments contemplated by its Divine Author.

The general analogy of the world, physical and moral, confirms this
conclusion, as we are reminded by the great authority who has already been
quoted in the course of this Section. "The whole natural world and
government of it," says Butler, "is a scheme or system; not a fixed, but a
progressive one; a scheme in which the operation of various means takes up
a great length of time before the ends they tend to can be attained. The
change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very history of
a flower is an instance of this; and so is human life. Thus vegetable bodies,
and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by
degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, who animate these latter
bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners and character
by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a long course
of action. Our existence is not only successive, as it must be of necessity,
but one state of our life and being is appointed by God to be a preparation
for another; and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one:
infancy to childhood, childhood to youth, youth to mature age. Men are
impatient, and for precipitating things; but the Author of Nature appears
deliberate throughout His operations, accomplishing His natural ends by
slow successive steps. And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out,
which, from the nature of it, requires various systems of means, as well as
length of time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution.
Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the very
same manner as in the dispensation of Christianity, making one thing
subservient to another; this, to somewhat farther; and so on, through a
progressive series of means, which extend, both backward and forward,
beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, everything we see in
the course of nature is as much an instance as any part of the Christian
dispensation."[75:1]

SECTION II.

AN INFALLIBLE DEVELOPING AUTHORITY TO BE EXPECTED.

It has now been made probable that developments of Christianity were but
natural, as time went on, and were to be expected; and that these natural and
true developments, as being natural and true, were of course contemplated
and taken into account by its Author, who in designing the work designed
its legitimate results. These, whatever they turn out to be, may be called
absolutely "the developments" of Christianity. That, beyond reasonable
doubt, there are such is surely a great step gained in the inquiry; it is a
momentous fact. The next question is, What are they? and to a theologian,
who could take a general view, and also possessed an intimate and minute
knowledge, of its history, they would doubtless on the whole be easily
distinguishable by their own characters, and require no foreign aid to point
them out, no external authority to ratify them. But it is difficult to say who
is exactly in this position. Considering that Christians, from the nature of
the case, live under the bias of the doctrines, and in the very midst of the
facts, and during the process of the controversies, which are to be the
subject of criticism, since they are exposed to the prejudices of birth,
education, place, personal attachment, engagements, and party, it can hardly
be maintained that in matter of fact a true development carries with it
always its own certainty even to the learned, or that history, past or present,
is secure from the possibility of a variety of interpretations.

2.
I have already spoken on this subject, and from a very different point of
view from that which I am taking at present:—
"Prophets or Doctors are the interpreters of the revelation; they unfold and
define its mysteries, they illuminate its documents, they harmonize its
contents, they apply its promises. Their teaching is a vast system, not to be
comprised in a few sentences, not to be embodied in one code or treatise,
but consisting of a certain body of Truth, pervading the Church like an
atmosphere, irregular in its shape from its very profusion and exuberance;
at times separable only in idea from Episcopal Tradition, yet at times
melting away into legend and fable; partly written, partly unwritten, partly
the interpretation, partly the supplement of Scripture, partly preserved in
intellectual expressions, partly latent in the spirit and temper of Christians;
poured to and fro in closets and upon the housetops, in liturgies, in

controversial works, in obscure fragments, in sermons, in popular
prejudices, in local customs. This I call Prophetical Tradition, existing
primarily in the bosom of the Church itself, and recorded in such measure
as Providence has determined in the writings of eminent men. Keep that
which is committed to thy charge, is St. Paul's injunction to Timothy; and
for this reason, because from its vastness and indefiniteness it is especially
exposed to corruption, if the Church fails in vigilance. This is that body of
teaching which is offered to all Christians even at the present day, though in
various forms and measures of truth, in different parts of Christendom,
partly being a comment, partly an addition upon the articles of the Creed."
[77:1]

If this be true, certainly some rule is necessary for arranging and
authenticating these various expressions and results of Christian doctrine.
No one will maintain that all points of belief are of equal importance.
"There are what may be called minor points, which we may hold to be true
without imposing them as necessary;" "there are greater truths and lesser
truths, points which it is necessary, and points which it is pious to believe."
[77:2]
The simple question is, How are we to discriminate the greater from
the less, the true from the false.

3.
This need of an authoritative sanction is increased by considering, after M.
Guizot's suggestion, that Christianity, though represented in prophecy as a
kingdom, came into the world as an idea rather than an institution, and has
had to wrap itself in clothing and fit itself with armour of its own providing,
and to form the instruments and methods of its prosperity and warfare. If
the developments, which have above been called moral, are to take place to
any great extent, and without them it is difficult to see how Christianity can
exist at all, if only its relations towards civil government have to be
ascertained, or the qualifications for the profession of it have to be defined,
surely an authority is necessary to impart decision to what is vague, and
confidence to what is empirical, to ratify the successive steps of so
elaborate a process, and to secure the validity of inferences which are to be
made the premisses of more remote investigations.

Tests, it is true, for ascertaining the correctness of developments in general
may be drawn out, as I shall show in the sequel; but they are insufficient for
the guidance of individuals in the case of so large and complicated a
problem as Christianity, though they may aid our inquiries and support our
conclusions in particular points. They are of a scientific and controversial,
not of a practical character, and are instruments rather than warrants of right
decisions. Moreover, they rather serve as answers to objections brought
against the actual decisions of authority, than are proofs of the correctness
of those decisions. While, then, on the one hand, it is probable that some
means will be granted for ascertaining the legitimate and true developments
of Revelation, it appears, on the other, that these means must of necessity be
external to the developments themselves.

4.
Reasons shall be given in this Section for concluding that, in proportion to
the probability of true developments of doctrine and practice in the Divine
Scheme, so is the probability also of the appointment in that scheme of an
external authority to decide upon them, thereby separating them from the
mass of mere human speculation, extravagance, corruption, and error, in
and out of which they grow. This is the doctrine of the infallibility of the
Church; for by infallibility I suppose is meant the power of deciding
whether this, that, and a third, and any number of theological or ethical
statements are true.

5.
1. Let the state of the case be carefully considered. If the Christian doctrine,
as originally taught, admits of true and important developments, as was
argued in the foregoing Section, this is a strong antecedent argument in
favour of a provision in the Dispensation for putting a seal of authority
upon those developments. The probability of their being known to be true
varies with that of their truth. The two ideas indeed are quite distinct, I
grant, of revealing and of guaranteeing a truth, and they are often distinct in
fact. There are various revelations all over the earth which do not carry with
them the evidence of their divinity. Such are the inward suggestions and
secret illuminations granted to so many individuals; such are the

traditionary doctrines which are found among the heathen, that "vague and
unconnected family of religious truths, originally from God, but sojourning,
without the sanction of miracle or a definite home, as pilgrims up and down
the world, and discernible and separable from the corrupt legends with
which they are mixed, by the spiritual mind alone."[79:1] There is nothing
impossible in the notion of a revelation occurring without evidences that it
is a revelation; just as human sciences are a divine gift, yet are reached by
our ordinary powers and have no claim on our faith. But Christianity is not
of this nature: it is a revelation which comes to us as a revelation, as a
whole, objectively, and with a profession of infallibility; and the only
question to be determined relates to the matter of the revelation. If then
there are certain great truths, or duties, or observances, naturally and
legitimately resulting from the doctrines originally professed, it is but
reasonable to include these true results in the idea of the revelation itself, to
consider them parts of it, and if the revelation be not only true, but
guaranteed as true, to anticipate that they too will come under the privilege
of that guarantee. Christianity, unlike other revelations of God's will, except
the Jewish, of which it is a continuation, is an objective religion, or a
revelation with credentials; it is natural, I say, to view it wholly as such, and
not partly sui generis, partly like others. Such as it begins, such let it be
considered to continue; granting that certain large developments of it are
true, they must surely be accredited as true.

6.
2. An objection, however, is often made to the doctrine of infallibility in
limine, which is too important not to be taken into consideration. It is urged
that, as all religious knowledge rests on moral evidence, not on
demonstration, our belief in the Church's infallibility must be of this
character; but what can be more absurd than a probable infallibility, or a
certainty resting on doubt?—I believe, because I am sure; and I am sure,
because I suppose. Granting then that the gift of infallibility be adapted,
when believed, to unite all intellects in one common confession, the fact
that it is given is as difficult of proof as the developments which it is to
prove, and nugatory therefore, and in consequence improbable in a Divine
Scheme. The advocates of Rome, it has been urged, "insist on the necessity
of an infallible guide in religious matters, as an argument that such a guide

has really been accorded. Now it is obvious to inquire how individuals are
to know with certainty that Rome is infallible . . . how any ground can be
such as to bring home to the mind infallibly that she is infallible; what
conceivable proof amounts to more than a probability of the fact; and what
advantage is an infallible guide, if those who are to be guided have, after
all, no more than an opinion, as the Romanists call it, that she is infallible?"
[81:1]

7.
This argument, however, except when used, as is intended in this passage,
against such persons as would remove all imperfection in the proof of
Religion, is certainly a fallacious one. For since, as all allow, the Apostles
were infallible, it tells against their infallibility, or the infallibility of
Scripture, as truly as against the infallibility of the Church; for no one will
say that the Apostles were made infallible for nothing, yet we are only
morally certain that they were infallible. Further, if we have but probable
grounds for the Church's infallibility, we have but the like for the
impossibility of certain things, the necessity of others, the truth, the
certainty of others; and therefore the words infallibility, necessity, truth, and
certainty ought all of them to be banished from the language. But why is it
more inconsistent to speak of an uncertain infallibility than of a doubtful
truth or a contingent necessity, phrases which present ideas clear and
undeniable? In sooth we are playing with words when we use arguments of
this sort. When we say that a person is infallible, we mean no more than
that what he says is always true, always to be believed, always to be done.
The term is resolvable into these phrases as its equivalents; either then the
phrases are inadmissible, or the idea of infallibility must be allowed. A
probable infallibility is a probable gift of never erring; a reception of the
doctrine of a probable infallibility is faith and obedience towards a person
founded on the probability of his never erring in his declarations or
commands. What is inconsistent in this idea? Whatever then be the
particular means of determining infallibility, the abstract objection may be
put aside.[81:2]

8.

3. Again, it is sometimes argued that such a dispensation would destroy our
probation, as dissipating doubt, precluding the exercise of faith, and
obliging us to obey whether we wish it or no; and it is urged that a Divine
Voice spoke in the first age, and difficulty and darkness rest upon all
subsequent ones; as if infallibility and personal judgment were
incompatible; but this is to confuse the subject. We must distinguish
between a revelation and a reception of it, not between its earlier and later
stages. A revelation, in itself divine, and guaranteed as such, may from first
to last be received, doubted, argued against, perverted, rejected, by
individuals according to the state of mind of each. Ignorance,
misapprehension, unbelief, and other causes, do not at once cease to operate
because the revelation is in itself true and in its proofs irrefragable. We have
then no warrant at all for saying that an accredited revelation will exclude
the existence of doubts and difficulties on the part of those whom it
addresses, or dispense with anxious diligence on their part, though it may in
its own nature tend to do so. Infallibility does not interfere with moral
probation; the two notions are absolutely distinct. It is no objection then to
the idea of a peremptory authority, such as I am supposing, that it lessens
the task of personal inquiry, unless it be an objection to the authority of
Revelation altogether. A Church, or a Council, or a Pope, or a Consent of
Doctors, or a Consent of Christendom, limits the inquiries of the individual
in no other way than Scripture limits them: it does limit them; but, while it
limits their range, it preserves intact their probationary character; we are
tried as really, though not on so large a field. To suppose that the doctrine of
a permanent authority in matters of faith interferes with our free-will and
responsibility is, as before, to forget that there were infallible teachers in the
first age, and heretics and schismatics in the ages subsequent. There may
have been at once a supreme authority from first to last, and a moral
judgment from first to last. Moreover, those who maintain that Christian
truth must be gained solely by personal efforts are bound to show that
methods, ethical and intellectual, are granted to individuals sufficient for
gaining it; else the mode of probation they advocate is less, not more,
perfect than that which proceeds upon external authority. On the whole,
then, no argument against continuing the principle of objectiveness into the
developments of Revelation arises out of the conditions of our moral
responsibility.

9.
4. Perhaps it will be urged that the Analogy of Nature is against our
anticipating the continuance of an external authority which has once been
given; because in the words of the profound thinker who has already been
cited, "We are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be
expected God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of His
affording one; or how far, and in what way, He would interpose
miraculously to qualify them to whom He should originally make the
revelation for communicating the knowledge given by it, and to secure their
doing it to the age in which they should live, and to secure its being
transmitted to posterity;" and because "we are not in any sort able to judge
whether it were to be expected that the revelation should have been
committed to writing, or left to be handed down, and consequently
corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it."[84:1] But this
reasoning does not apply here, as has already been observed; it
contemplates only the abstract hypothesis of a revelation, not the fact of an
existing revelation of a particular kind, which may of course in various
ways modify our state of knowledge, by settling some of those very points
which, before it was given, we had no means of deciding. Nor can it, as I
think, be fairly denied that the argument from analogy in one point of view
tells against anticipating a revelation at all, for an innovation upon the
physical order of the world is by the very force of the terms inconsistent
with its ordinary course. We cannot then regulate our antecedent view of the
character of a revelation by a test which, applied simply, overthrows the
very notion of a revelation altogether. Any how, Analogy is in some sort
violated by the fact of a revelation, and the question before us only relates
to the extent of that violation.

10.
I will hazard a distinction here between the facts of revelation and its
principles:—the argument from Analogy is more concerned with its
principles than with its facts. The revealed facts are special and singular, not
analogous, from the nature of the case: but it is otherwise with the revealed
principles; these are common to all the works of God: and if the Author of
Nature be the Author of Grace, it may be expected that, while the two

systems of facts are distinct and independent, the principles displayed in
them will be the same, and form a connecting link between them. In this
identity of principle lies the Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion, in
Butler's sense of the word. The doctrine of the Incarnation is a fact, and
cannot be paralleled by anything in nature; the doctrine of Mediation is a
principle, and is abundantly exemplified in its provisions. Miracles are
facts; inspiration is a fact; divine teaching once for all, and a continual
teaching, are each a fact; probation by means of intellectual difficulties is a
principle both in nature and in grace, and may be carried on in the system of
grace either by a standing ordinance of teaching or by one definite act of
teaching, and that with an analogy equally perfect in either case to the order
of nature; nor can we succeed in arguing from the analogy of that order
against a standing guardianship of revelation without arguing also against
its original bestowal. Supposing the order of nature once broken by the
introduction of a revelation, the continuance of that revelation is but a
question of degree; and the circumstance that a work has begun makes it
more probable than not that it will proceed. We have no reason to suppose
that there is so great a distinction of dispensation between ourselves and the
first generation of Christians, as that they had a living infallible guidance,
and we have not.
The case then stands thus:—Revelation has introduced a new law of divine
governance over and above those laws which appear in the natural course of
the world; and in consequence we are able to argue for the existence of a
standing authority in matters of faith on the analogy of Nature, and from the
fact of Christianity. Preservation is involved in the idea of creation. As the
Creator rested on the seventh day from the work which He had made, yet
He "worketh hitherto;" so He gave the Creed once for all in the beginning,
yet blesses its growth still, and provides for its increase. His word "shall not
return unto Him void, but accomplish" His pleasure. As creation argues
continual governance, so are Apostles harbingers of Popes.

11.
5. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that, as the essence of all religion is
authority and obedience, so the distinction between natural religion and
revealed lies in this, that the one has a subjective authority, and the other an

objective. Revelation consists in the manifestation of the Invisible Divine
Power, or in the substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of
conscience. The supremacy of conscience is the essence of natural religion;
the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, is the essence of
revealed; and when such external authority is taken away, the mind falls
back again of necessity upon that inward guide which it possessed even
before Revelation was vouchsafed. Thus, what conscience is in the system
of nature, such is the voice of Scripture, or of the Church, or of the Holy
See, as we may determine it, in the system of Revelation. It may be
objected, indeed, that conscience is not infallible; it is true, but still it is ever
to be obeyed. And this is just the prerogative which controversialists assign
to the See of St. Peter; it is not in all cases infallible, it may err beyond its
special province, but it has in all cases a claim on our obedience. "All
Catholics and heretics," says Bellarmine, "agree in two things: first, that it
is possible for the Pope, even as pope, and with his own assembly of
councillors, or with General Council, to err in particular controversies of
fact, which chiefly depend on human information and testimony; secondly,
that it is possible for him to err as a private Doctor, even in universal
questions of right, whether of faith or of morals, and that from ignorance, as
sometimes happens to other doctors. Next, all Catholics agree in other two
points, not, however, with heretics, but solely with each other: first, that the
Pope with General Council cannot err, either in framing decrees of faith or
general precepts of morality; secondly, that the Pope when determining
anything in a doubtful matter, whether by himself or with his own particular
Council, whether it is possible for him to err or not, is to be obeyed by all
the faithful."[87:1] And as obedience to conscience, even supposing
conscience ill-informed, tends to the improvement of our moral nature, and
ultimately of our knowledge, so obedience to our ecclesiastical superior
may subserve our growth in illumination and sanctity, even though he
should command what is extreme or inexpedient, or teach what is external
to his legitimate province.

12.
6. The common sense of mankind does but support a conclusion thus forced
upon us by analogical considerations. It feels that the very idea of revelation
implies a present informant and guide, and that an infallible one; not a mere

abstract declaration of Truths unknown before to man, or a record of
history, or the result of an antiquarian research, but a message and a lesson
speaking to this man and that. This is shown by the popular notion which
has prevailed among us since the Reformation, that the Bible itself is such a
guide; and which succeeded in overthrowing the supremacy of Church and
Pope, for the very reason that it was a rival authority, not resisting merely,
but supplanting it. In proportion, then, as we find, in matter of fact, that the
inspired Volume is not adapted or intended to subserve that purpose, are we
forced to revert to that living and present Guide, who, at the era of our
rejection of her, had been so long recognized as the dispenser of Scripture,
according to times and circumstances, and the arbiter of all true doctrine
and holy practice to her children. We feel a need, and she alone of all things
under heaven supplies it. We are told that God has spoken. Where? In a
book? We have tried it and it disappoints; it disappoints us, that most holy
and blessed gift, not from fault of its own, but because it is used for a
purpose for which it was not given. The Ethiopian's reply, when St. Philip
asked him if he understood what he was reading, is the voice of nature:
"How can I, unless some man shall guide me?" The Church undertakes that
office; she does what none else can do, and this is the secret of her power.
"The human mind," it has been said, "wishes to be rid of doubt in religion;
and a teacher who claims infallibility is readily believed on his simple
word. We see this constantly exemplified in the case of individual
pretenders among ourselves. In Romanism the Church pretends to it; she
rids herself of competitors by forestalling them. And probably, in the eyes
of her children, this is not the least persuasive argument for her infallibility,
that she alone of all Churches dares claim it, as if a secret instinct and
involuntary misgivings restrained those rival communions which go so far
towards affecting it."[88:1] These sentences, whatever be the errors of their
wording, surely express a great truth. The most obvious answer, then, to the
question, why we yield to the authority of the Church in the questions and
developments of faith, is, that some authority there must be if there is a
revelation given, and other authority there is none but she. A revelation is
not given, if there be no authority to decide what it is that is given. In the
words of St. Peter to her Divine Master and Lord, "To whom shall we go?"
Nor must it be forgotten in confirmation, that Scripture expressly calls the
Church "the pillar and ground of the Truth," and promises her as by
covenant that "the Spirit of the Lord that is upon her, and His words which

He has put in her mouth shall not depart out of her mouth, nor out of the
mouth of her seed, nor out of the mouth of her seed's seed, from henceforth
and for ever."[89:1]

13.
7. And if the very claim to infallible arbitration in religious disputes is of so
weighty importance and interest in all ages of the world, much more is it
welcome at a time like the present, when the human intellect is so busy, and
thought so fertile, and opinion so manifold. The absolute need of a spiritual
supremacy is at present the strongest of arguments in favour of the fact of
its supply. Surely, either an objective revelation has not been given, or it has
been provided with means for impressing its objectiveness on the world. If
Christianity be a social religion, as it certainly is, and if it be based on
certain ideas acknowledged as divine, or a creed, (which shall here be
assumed,) and if these ideas have various aspects, and make distinct
impressions on different minds, and issue in consequence in a multiplicity
of developments, true, or false, or mixed, as has been shown, what power
will suffice to meet and to do justice to these conflicting conditions, but a
supreme authority ruling and reconciling individual judgments by a divine
right and a recognized wisdom? In barbarous times the will is reached
through the senses; but in an age in which reason, as it is called, is the
standard of truth and right, it is abundantly evident to any one, who mixes
ever so little with the world, that, if things are left to themselves, every
individual will have his own view of them, and take his own course; that
two or three will agree to-day to part company to-morrow; that Scripture
will be read in contrary ways, and history, according to the apologue, will
have to different comers its silver shield and its golden; that philosophy,
taste, prejudice, passion, party, caprice, will find no common measure,
unless there be some supreme power to control the mind and to compel
agreement.
There can be no combination on the basis of truth without an organ of truth.
As cultivation brings out the colours of flowers, and domestication changes
the character of animals, so does education of necessity develope
differences of opinion; and while it is impossible to lay down first
principles in which all will unite, it is utterly unreasonable to expect that

this man should yield to that, or all to one. I do not say there are no eternal
truths, such as the poet proclaims,[90:1] which all acknowledge in private,
but that there are none sufficiently commanding to be the basis of public
union and action. The only general persuasive in matters of conduct is
authority; that is, (when truth is in question,) a judgment which we feel to
be superior to our own. If Christianity is both social and dogmatic, and
intended for all ages, it must humanly speaking have an infallible
expounder. Else you will secure unity of form at the loss of unity of
doctrine, or unity of doctrine at the loss of unity of form; you will have to
choose between a comprehension of opinions and a resolution into parties,
between latitudinarian and sectarian error. You may be tolerant or intolerant
of contrarieties of thought, but contrarieties you will have. By the Church of
England a hollow uniformity is preferred to an infallible chair; and by the
sects of England, an interminable division. Germany and Geneva began
with persecution, and have ended in scepticism. The doctrine of infallibility
is a less violent hypothesis than this sacrifice either of faith or of charity. It
secures the object, while it gives definiteness and force to the matter, of the
Revelation.

14.
8. I have called the doctrine of Infallibility an hypothesis: let it be so
considered for the sake of argument, that is, let it be considered to be a mere
position, supported by no direct evidence, but required by the facts of the
case, and reconciling them with each other. That hypothesis is indeed, in
matter of fact, maintained and acted on in the largest portion of
Christendom, and from time immemorial; but let this coincidence be
accounted for by the need. Moreover, it is not a naked or isolated fact, but
the animating principle of a large scheme of doctrine which the need itself
could not simply create; but again, let this system be merely called its
development. Yet even as an hypothesis, which has been held by one out of
various communions, it may not be lightly put aside. Some hypothesis, this
or that, all parties, all controversialists, all historians must adopt, if they
would treat of Christianity at all. Gieseler's "Text Book" bears the
profession of being a dry analysis of Christian history; yet on inspection it
will be found to be written on a positive and definite theory, and to bend
facts to meet it. An unbeliever, as Gibbon, assumes one hypothesis, and an

Ultra-montane, as Baronius, adopts another. The School of Hurd and
Newton hold, as the only true view of history, that Christianity slept for
centuries upon centuries, except among those whom historians call heretics.
Others speak as if the oath of supremacy or the congé d'élire could be made
the measure of St. Ambrose, and they fit the Thirty-nine Articles on the
fervid Tertullian. The question is, which of all these theories is the simplest,
the most natural, the most persuasive. Certainly the notion of development
under infallible authority is not a less grave, a less winning hypothesis, than
the chance and coincidence of events, or the Oriental Philosophy, or the
working of Antichrist, to account for the rise of Christianity and the
formation of its theology.

SECTION III.

THE EXISTING DEVELOPMENTS OF DOCTRINE THE PROBABLE
FULFILMENT OF THAT EXPECTATION.

I have been arguing, in respect to the revealed doctrine, given to us from
above in Christianity, first, that, in consequence of its intellectual character,
and as passing through the minds of so many generations of men, and as
applied by them to so many purposes, and as investigated so curiously as to
its capabilities, implications, and bearings, it could not but grow or
develope, as time went on, into a large theological system;—next, that, if
development must be, then, whereas Revelation is a heavenly gift, He who
gave it virtually has not given it, unless He has also secured it from
perversion and corruption, in all such development as comes upon it by the
necessity of its nature, or, in other words, that that intellectual action
through successive generations, which is the organ of development, must,
so far forth as it can claim to have been put in charge of the Revelation, be
in its determinations infallible.
Passing from these two points, I come next to the question whether in the
history of Christianity there is any fulfilment of such anticipation as I have
insisted on, whether in matter-of-fact doctrines, rites, and usages have
grown up round the Apostolic Creed and have interpenetrated its Articles,

claiming to be part of Christianity and looking like those additions which
we are in search of. The answer is, that such additions there are, and that
they are found just where they might be expected, in the authoritative seats
and homes of old tradition, the Latin and Greek Churches. Let me enlarge
on this point.

2.
I observe, then, that, if the idea of Christianity, as originally given to us
from heaven, cannot but contain much which will be only partially
recognized by us as included in it and only held by us unconsciously; and if
again, Christianity being from heaven, all that is necessarily involved in it,
and is evolved from it, is from heaven, and if, on the other hand, large
accretions actually do exist, professing to be its true and legitimate results,
our first impression naturally is, that these must be the very developments
which they profess to be. Moreover, the very scale on which they have been
made, their high antiquity yet present promise, their gradual formation yet
precision, their harmonious order, dispose the imagination most forcibly
towards the belief that a teaching so consistent with itself, so well balanced,
so young and so old, not obsolete after so many centuries, but vigorous and
progressive still, is the very development contemplated in the Divine
Scheme. These doctrines are members of one family, and suggestive, or
correlative, or confirmatory, or illustrative of each other. One furnishes
evidence to another, and all to each of them; if this is proved, that becomes
probable; if this and that are both probable, but for different reasons, each
adds to the other its own probability. The Incarnation is the antecedent of
the doctrine of Mediation, and the archetype both of the Sacramental
principle and of the merits of Saints. From the doctrine of Mediation follow
the Atonement, the Mass, the merits of Martyrs and Saints, their invocation
and cultus. From the Sacramental principle come the Sacraments properly
so called; the unity of the Church, and the Holy See as its type and centre;
the authority of Councils; the sanctity of rites; the veneration of holy places,
shrines, images, vessels, furniture, and vestments. Of the Sacraments,
Baptism is developed into Confirmation on the one hand; into Penance,
Purgatory, and Indulgences on the other; and the Eucharist into the Real
Presence, adoration of the Host, Resurrection of the body, and the virtue of
relics. Again, the doctrine of the Sacraments leads to the doctrine of

Justification; Justification to that of Original Sin; Original Sin to the merit
of Celibacy. Nor do these separate developments stand independent of each
other, but by cross relations they are connected, and grow together while
they grow from one. The Mass and Real Presence are parts of one; the
veneration of Saints and their relics are parts of one; their intercessory
power and the Purgatorial State, and again the Mass and that State are
correlative; Celibacy is the characteristic mark of Monachism and of the
Priesthood. You must accept the whole or reject the whole; attenuation does
but enfeeble, and amputation mutilate. It is trifling to receive all but
something which is as integral as any other portion; and, on the other hand,
it is a solemn thing to accept any part, for, before you know where you are,
you may be carried on by a stern logical necessity to accept the whole.

3.
Next, we have to consider that from first to last other developments there
are none, except those which have possession of Christendom; none, that is,
of prominence and permanence sufficient to deserve the name. In early
times the heretical doctrines were confessedly barren and short-lived, and
could not stand their ground against Catholicism. As to the medieval period
I am not aware that the Greeks present more than a negative opposition to
the Latins. And now in like manner the Tridentine Creed is met by no rival
developments; there is no antagonist system. Criticisms, objections,
protests, there are in plenty, but little of positive teaching anywhere; seldom
an attempt on the part of any opposing school to master its own doctrines,
to investigate their sense and bearing, to determine their relation to the
decrees of Trent and their distance from them. And when at any time this
attempt is by chance in any measure made, then an incurable contrariety
does but come to view between portions of the theology thus developed,
and a war of principles; an impossibility moreover of reconciling that
theology with the general drift of the formularies in which its elements
occur, and a consequent appearance of unfairness and sophistry in
adventurous persons who aim at forcing them into consistency;[95:1] and,
further, a prevalent understanding of the truth of this representation,
authorities keeping silence, eschewing a hopeless enterprise and
discouraging it in others, and the people plainly intimating that they think
both doctrine and usage, antiquity and development, of very little matter at

all; and, lastly, the evident despair of even the better sort of men, who, in
consequence, when they set great schemes on foot, as for the conversion of
the heathen world, are afraid to agitate the question of the doctrines to
which it is to be converted, lest through the opened door they should lose
what they have, instead of gaining what they have not. To the weight of
recommendation which this contrast throws upon the developments
commonly called Catholic, must be added the argument which arises from
the coincidence of their consistency and permanence, with their claim of an
infallible sanction,—a claim, the existence of which, in some quarter or
other of the Divine Dispensation, is, as we have already seen, antecedently
probable. All these things being considered, I think few persons will deny
the very strong presumption which exists, that, if there must be and are in
fact developments in Christianity, the doctrines propounded by successive
Popes and Councils, through so many ages, are they.

4.
A further presumption in behalf of these doctrines arises from the general
opinion of the world about them. Christianity being one, all its doctrines are
necessarily developments of one, and, if so, are of necessity consistent with
each other, or form a whole. Now the world fully enters into this view of
those well-known developments which claim the name of Catholic. It
allows them that title, it considers them to belong to one family, and refers
them to one theological system. It is scarcely necessary to set about proving
what is urged by their opponents even more strenuously than by their
champions. Their opponents avow that they protest, not against this doctrine
or that, but against one and all; and they seem struck with wonder and
perplexity, not to say with awe, at a consistency which they feel to be
superhuman, though they would not allow it to be divine. The system is
confessed on all hands to bear a character of integrity and indivisibility
upon it, both at first view and on inspection. Hence such sayings as the
"Tota jacet Babylon" of the distich. Luther did but a part of the work,
Calvin another portion, Socinus finished it. To take up with Luther, and to
reject Calvin and Socinus, would be, according to that epigram, like living
in a house without a roof to it. This, I say, is no private judgment of this
man or that, but the common opinion and experience of all countries. The
two great divisions of religion feel it, Roman Catholic and Protestant,

between whom the controversy lies; sceptics and liberals, who are
spectators of the conflict, feel it; philosophers feel it. A school of divines
there is, I grant, dear to memory, who have not felt it; and their exception
will have its weight,—till we reflect that the particular theology which they
advocate has not the prescription of success, never has been realized in fact,
or, if realized for a moment, had no stay; moreover, that, when it has been
enacted by human authority, it has scarcely travelled beyond the paper on
which it was printed, or out of the legal forms in which it was embodied.
But, putting the weight of these revered names at the highest, they do not
constitute more than an exception to the general rule, such as is found in
every subject that comes into discussion.

5.
And this general testimony to the oneness of Catholicism extends to its past
teaching relatively to its present, as well as to the portions of its present
teaching one with another. No one doubts, with such exception as has just
been allowed, that the Roman Catholic communion of this day is the
successor and representative of the Medieval Church, or that the Medieval
Church is the legitimate heir of the Nicene; even allowing that it is a
question whether a line cannot be drawn between the Nicene Church and
the Church which preceded it. On the whole, all parties will agree that, of
all existing systems, the present communion of Rome is the nearest
approximation in fact to the Church of the Fathers, possible though some
may think it, to be nearer still to that Church on paper. Did St. Athanasius or
St. Ambrose come suddenly to life, it cannot be doubted what communion
he would take to be his own. All surely will agree that these Fathers, with
whatever opinions of their own, whatever protests, if we will, would find
themselves more at home with such men as St. Bernard or St. Ignatius
Loyola, or with the lonely priest in his lodging, or the holy sisterhood of
mercy, or the unlettered crowd before the altar, than with the teachers or
with the members of any other creed. And may we not add, that were those
same Saints, who once sojourned, one in exile, one on embassy, at Treves,
to come more northward still, and to travel until they reached another fair
city, seated among groves, green meadows, and calm streams, the holy
brothers would turn from many a high aisle and solemn cloister which they
found there, and ask the way to some small chapel where mass was said in

the populous alley or forlorn suburb? And, on the other hand, can any one
who has but heard his name, and cursorily read his history, doubt for one
instant how, in turn, the people of England, "we, our princes, our priests,
and our prophets," Lords and Commons, Universities, Ecclesiastical Courts,
marts of commerce, great towns, country parishes, would deal with
Athanasius,—Athanasius, who spent his long years in fighting against
sovereigns for a theological term?

FOOTNOTES:
[62:1] Doctrine of Justification, Lect. xiii.
[64:1] Butler's Anal. ii. 3.
[67:1] Proph. Office, Lect. xii. [Via Med. vol. i. pp. 292-3].
[72:1] ii. 3; vide also ii. 4, fin.
[75:1] Analogy, ii. 4, ad fin.
[77:1] Proph. Office, x. [Via Med. p. 250].
[77:2] [Ibid. pp. 247, 254.]
[79:1] Arians, ch. i. sect. 3 [p. 82, ed. 3].
[81:1] Proph. Office [Via Med. vol. i. p. 122].
[81:2] ["It is very common to confuse infallibility with certitude, but the two
words stand for things quite distinct from each other. I remember for certain
what I did yesterday, but still my memory is not infallible. I am quite clear that
two and two makes four, but I often make mistakes in long addition sums. I have
no doubt whatever that John or Richard is my true friend; but I have before now
trusted those who failed me, and I may do so again before I die. I am quite
certain that Victoria is our sovereign, and not her father, the Duke of Kent,
without any claim myself to the gift of infallibility, as I may do a virtuous action,
without being impeccable. I may be certain that the Church is infallible, while I
am myself a fallible mortal; otherwise I cannot be certain that the Supreme
Being is infallible, unless I am infallible myself. Certitude is directed to one or
other definite concrete proposition. I am certain of propositions one, two, three,
four, or five, one by one, each by itself. I can be certain of one of them, without
being certain of the rest: that I am certain of the first makes it neither likely nor
unlikely that I am certain of the second: but, were I infallible, then I should be
certain, not only of one of them, but of all."—Essay on Assent, ch. vii. sect. 2.]
[84:1] Anal. ii. 3.

[87:1] De Rom. Pont. iv. 2. [Seven years ago, it is scarcely necessary to say, the
Vatican Council determined that the Pope, ex cathedrâ, has the same infallibility
as the Church. This does not affect the argument in the text.]
[88:1] Proph. Office [Via Med. vol. i. p. 117].
[89:1] 1 Tim. iii. 16; Isa. lix. 21.
[90:1] Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κὰχθές, κ.τ.λ.
[95:1] [Vid. Via Media, vol. ii. pp. 231-341.]

CHAPTER III.
ON THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT IN BEHALF OF THE
EXISTING DEVELOPMENTS.

SECTION I.

METHOD OF PROOF.

It seems, then, that we have to deal with a case something like the
following: Certain doctrines come to us, professing to be Apostolic, and
possessed of such high antiquity that, though we are only able to assign the
date of their formal establishment to the fourth, or the fifth, or the eighth, or
the thirteenth century, as it may happen, yet their substance may, for what
appears, be coeval with the Apostles, and be expressed or implied in texts of
Scripture. Further, these existing doctrines are universally considered,
without any question, in each age to be the echo of the doctrines of the
times immediately preceding them, and thus are continually thrown back to
a date indefinitely early, even though their ultimate junction with the
Apostolic Creed be out of sight and unascertainable. Moreover, they are
confessed to form one body one with another, so that to reject one is to
disparage the rest; and they include within the range of their system even
those primary articles of faith, as the Incarnation, which many an impugner
of the said doctrinal system, as a system, professes to accept, and which, do
what he will, he cannot intelligibly separate, whether in point of evidence or
of internal character, from others which he disavows. Further, these
doctrines occupy the whole field of theology, and leave nothing to be
supplied, except in detail, by any other system; while, in matter of fact, no
rival system is forthcoming, so that we have to choose between this
theology and none at all. Moreover, this theology alone makes provision for
that guidance of opinion and conduct, which seems externally to be the

special aim of Revelation; and fulfils the promises of Scripture, by adapting
itself to the various problems of thought and practice which meet us in life.
And, further, it is the nearest approach, to say the least, to the religious
sentiment, and what is called ethos, of the early Church, nay, to that of the
Apostles and Prophets; for all will agree so far as this, that Elijah, Jeremiah,
the Baptist, and St. Paul are in their history and mode of life (I do not speak
of measures of grace, no, nor of doctrine and conduct, for these are the
points in dispute, but) in what is external and meets the eye (and this is no
slight resemblance when things are viewed as a whole and from a distance),
—these saintly and heroic men, I say, are more like a Dominican preacher,
or a Jesuit missionary, or a Carmelite friar, more like St. Toribio, or St.
Vincent Ferrer, or St. Francis Xavier, or St. Alphonso Liguori, than to any
individuals, or to any classes of men, that can be found in other
communions. And then, in addition, there is the high antecedent probability
that Providence would watch over His own work, and would direct and
ratify those developments of doctrine which were inevitable.

2.
If this is, on the whole, a true view of the general shape under which the
existing body of developments, commonly called Catholic, present
themselves before us, antecedently to our looking into the particular
evidence on which they stand, I think we shall be at no loss to determine
what both logical truth and duty prescribe to us as to our reception of them.
It is very little to say that we should treat them as we are accustomed to
treat other alleged facts and truths and the evidence for them, such as come
to us with a fair presumption in their favour. Such are of every day's
occurrence; and what is our behaviour towards them? We meet them, not
with suspicion and criticism, but with a frank confidence. We do not in the
first instance exercise our reason upon opinions which are received, but our
faith. We do not begin with doubting; we take them on trust, and we put
them on trial, and that, not of set purpose, but spontaneously. We prove
them by using them, by applying them to the subject-matter, or the
evidence, or the body of circumstances, to which they belong, as if they
gave it its interpretation or its colour as a matter of course; and only when
they fail, in the event, in illustrating phenomena or harmonizing facts, do
we discover that we must reject the doctrines or the statements which we

had in the first instance taken for granted. Again, we take the evidence for
them, whatever it be, as a whole, as forming a combined proof; and we
interpret what is obscure in separate portions by such portions as are clear.
Moreover, we bear with these in proportion to the strength of the antecedent
probability in their favour, we are patient with difficulties in their
application, with apparent objections to them drawn from other matters of
fact, deficiency in their comprehensiveness, or want of neatness in their
working, provided their claims on our attention are considerable.

3.
Thus most men take Newton's theory of gravitation for granted, because it
is generally received, and use it without rigidly testing it first, each for
himself, (as it can be tested,) by phenomena; and if phenomena are found
which it does not satisfactorily solve, this does not trouble us, for a way
there must be of explaining them, consistently with that theory, though it
does not occur to ourselves. Again, if we found a concise or obscure
passage in one of Cicero's letters to Atticus, we should not scruple to admit
as its true explanation a more explicit statement in his Ad Familiares.
Æschylus is illustrated by Sophocles in point of language, and Thucydides
by Aristophanes, in point of history. Horace, Persius, Suetonius, Tacitus,
and Juvenal may be made to throw light upon each other. Even Plato may
gain a commentator in Plotinus, and St. Anselm is interpreted by St.
Thomas. Two writers, indeed, may be already known to differ, and then we
do not join them together as fellow-witnesses to common truths; Luther has
taken on himself to explain St. Augustine, and Voltaire, Pascal, without
persuading the world that they have a claim to do so; but in no case do we
begin with asking whether a comment does not disagree with its text, when
there is a primâ facie congruity between them. We elucidate the text by the
comment, though, or rather because, the comment is fuller and more
explicit than the text.

4.
Thus too we deal with Scripture, when we have to interpret the prophetical
text and the types of the Old Testament. The event which is the
development is also the interpretation of the prediction; it provides a

fulfilment by imposing a meaning. And we accept certain events as the
fulfilment of prophecy from the broad correspondence of the one with the
other, in spite of many incidental difficulties. The difficulty, for instance, in
accounting for the fact that the dispersion of the Jews followed upon their
keeping, not their departing from their Law, does not hinder us from
insisting on their present state as an argument against the infidel. Again, we
readily submit our reason on competent authority, and accept certain events
as an accomplishment of predictions, which seem very far removed from
them; as in the passage, "Out of Egypt have I called My Son." Nor do we
find a difficulty, when St. Paul appeals to a text of the Old Testament, which
stands otherwise in our Hebrew copies; as the words, "A body hast Thou
prepared Me." We receive such difficulties on faith, and leave them to take
care of themselves. Much less do we consider mere fulness in the
interpretation, or definiteness, or again strangeness, as a sufficient reason
for depriving the text, or the action to which it is applied, of the advantage
of such interpretation. We make it no objection that the words themselves
come short of it, or that the sacred writer did not contemplate it, or that a
previous fulfilment satisfies it. A reader who came to the inspired text by
himself, beyond the influence of that traditional acceptation which happily
encompasses it, would be surprised to be told that the Prophet's words, "A
virgin shall conceive," &c., or "Let all the Angels of God worship Him,"
refer to our Lord; but assuming the intimate connexion between Judaism
and Christianity, and the inspiration of the New Testament, we do not
scruple to believe it. We rightly feel that it is no prejudice to our receiving
the prophecy of Balaam in its Christian meaning, that it is adequately
fulfilled in David; or the history of Jonah, that it is poetical in character and
has a moral in itself like an apologue; or the meeting of Abraham and
Melchizedek, that it is too brief and simple to mean any great thing, as St.
Paul interprets it.

5.
Butler corroborates these remarks, when speaking of the particular evidence
for Christianity. "The obscurity or unintelligibleness," he says, "of one part
of a prophecy does not in any degree invalidate the proof of foresight,
arising from the appearing completion of those other parts which are
understood. For the case is evidently the same as if those parts, which are

not understood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown
tongue. Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it is so
evident that one can scarce bring one's self to set down an instance in
common matters to exemplify it."[104:1] He continues, "Though a man
should be incapable, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or
from not having turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge
whether particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled;
yet he may see, in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, as,
upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in
such prophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same
reason also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history, and the
different accounts of historians, the most learned should not be able to make
out to satisfaction that such parts of the prophetic history have been
minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong proof of foresight may
arise from that general completion of them which is made out; as much
proof of foresight, perhaps, as the Giver of prophecy intended should ever
be afforded by such parts of prophecy."

6.
He illustrates this by the parallel instance of fable and concealed satire. "A
man might be assured that he understood what an author intended by a fable
or parable, related without any application or moral, merely from seeing it
to be easily capable of such application, and that such a moral might
naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured that such
persons and events were intended in a satirical writing, merely from its
being applicable to them. And, agreeably to the last observation, he might
be in a good measure satisfied of it, though he were not enough informed in
affairs, or in the story of such persons, to understand half the satire. For his
satisfaction, that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these
writings, would be greater or less, in proportion as he saw the general turn
of them to be capable of such application, and in proportion to the number
of particular things capable of it." And he infers hence, that if a known
course of events, or the history of a person as our Lord, is found to answer
on the whole to the prophetical text, it becomes fairly the right
interpretation of that text, in spite of difficulties in detail. And this rule of
interpretation admits of an obvious application to the parallel case of

doctrinal passages, when a certain creed, which professes to have been
derived from Revelation, comes recommended to us on strong antecedent
grounds, and presents no strong opposition to the sacred text.
The same author observes that the first fulfilment of a prophecy is no valid
objection to a second, when what seems like a second has once taken place;
and, in like manner, an interpretation of doctrinal texts may be literal, exact,
and sufficient, yet in spite of all this may not embrace what is really the full
scope of their meaning; and that fuller scope, if it so happen, may be less
satisfactory and precise, as an interpretation, than their primary and narrow
sense. Thus, if the Protestant interpretation of the sixth chapter of St. John
were true and sufficient for its letter, (which of course I do not grant,) that
would not hinder the Roman, which at least is quite compatible with the
text, being the higher sense and the only rightful. In such cases the
justification of the larger and higher interpretation lies in some antecedent
probability, such as Catholic consent; and the ground of the narrow is the
context, and the rules of grammar; and, whereas the argument of the critical
commentator is that the sacred text need not mean more than the letter,
those who adopt a deeper view of it maintain, as Butler in the case of
prophecy, that we have no warrant for putting a limit to the sense of words
which are not human but divine.

7.
Now it is but a parallel exercise of reasoning to interpret the previous
history of a doctrine by its later development, and to consider that it
contains the later in posse and in the divine intention; and the grudging and
jealous temper, which refuses to enlarge the sacred text for the fulfilment of
prophecy, is the very same that will occupy itself in carping at the Ante-
nicene testimonies for Nicene or Medieval doctrines and usages. When "I
and My Father are One" is urged in proof of our Lord's unity with the
Father, heretical disputants do not see why the words must be taken to
denote more than a unity of will. When "This is My Body" is alleged as a
warrant for the change of the Bread into the Body of Christ, they explain
away the words into a figure, because such is their most obvious
interpretation. And, in like manner, when Roman Catholics urge St.
Gregory's invocations, they are told that these are but rhetorical; or St.

Clement's allusion to Purgatory, that perhaps it was Platonism; or Origen's
language about praying to Angels and the merits of Martyrs, that it is but an
instance of his heterodoxy; or St. Cyprian's exaltation of the Cathedra
Petri, that he need not be contemplating more than a figurative or abstract
see; or the general testimony to the spiritual authority of Rome in primitive
times, that it arose from her temporal greatness; or Tertullian's language
about Tradition and the Church, that he took a lawyer's view of those
subjects; whereas the early condition, and the evidence, of each doctrine
respectively, ought consistently to be interpreted by means of that
development which was ultimately attained.

8.
Moreover, since, as above shown, the doctrines all together make up one
integral religion, it follows that the several evidences which respectively
support those doctrines belong to a whole, and must be thrown into a
common stock, and all are available in the defence of any. A collection of
weak evidences makes up a strong evidence; again, one strong argument
imparts cogency to collateral arguments which are in themselves weak. For
instance, as to the miracles, whether of Scripture or the Church, "the
number of those which carry with them their own proof now, and are
believed for their own sake, is small, and they furnish the grounds on which
we receive the rest."[107:1] Again, no one would fancy it necessary, before
receiving St. Matthew's Gospel, to find primitive testimony in behalf of
every chapter and verse: when only part is proved to have been in existence
in ancient times, the whole is proved, because that part is but part of a
whole; and when the whole is proved, it may shelter such parts as for some
incidental reason have less evidence of their antiquity. Again, it would be
enough to show that St. Augustine knew the Italic version of the Scriptures,
if he quoted it once or twice. And, in like manner, it will be generally
admitted that the proof of a Second Person in the Godhead lightens greatly
the burden of proof necessary for belief in a Third Person; and that, the
Atonement being in some sort a correlative of eternal punishment, the
evidence for the former doctrine virtually increases the evidence for the
latter. And so, a Protestant controversialist would feel that it told little,
except as an omen of victory, to reduce an opponent to a denial of
Transubstantiation, if he still adhered firmly to the Invocation of Saints,

Purgatory, the Seven Sacraments, and the doctrine of merit; and little too for
one of his own party to condemn the adoration of the Host, the supremacy
of Rome, the acceptableness of celibacy, auricular confession, communion
under one kind, and tradition, if he was zealous for the doctrine of the
Immaculate Conception.

9.
The principle on which these remarks are made has the sanction of some of
the deepest of English Divines. Bishop Butler, for instance, who has so
often been quoted here, thus argues in behalf of Christianity itself, though
confessing at the same time the disadvantage which in consequence the
revealed system lies under. "Probable proofs," he observes, "by being
added, not only increase the evidence, but multiply it. Nor should I dissuade
any one from setting down what he thought made for the contrary side. . . .
The truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is to be judged
by all the evidence taken together. And unless the whole series of things
which may be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can
reasonably be supposed to have been by accident (for here the stress of the
argument for Christianity lies), then is the truth of it proved; in like manner,
as if, in any common case, numerous events acknowledged were to be
alleged in proof of any other event disputed, the truth of the disputed event
would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself
clearly imply it, but though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the
acknowledged events, taken together, could not in reason be supposed to
have happened, unless the disputed one were true.
"It is obvious how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to
those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is
easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and such things are
liable to objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in itself; but
impossible to show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument
in one view."[109:1]
In like manner, Mr. Davison condemns that "vicious manner of reasoning,"
which represents "any insufficiency of the proof, in its several branches, as
so much objection;" which manages "the inquiry so as to make it appear
that, if the divided arguments be inconclusive one by one, we have a series

of exceptions to the truths of religion instead of a train of favourable
presumptions, growing stronger at every step. The disciple of Scepticism is
taught that he cannot fully rely on this or that motive of belief, that each of
them is insecure, and the conclusion is put upon him that they ought to be
discarded one after another, instead of being connected and combined."
[109:2]
No work perhaps affords more specimens in a short compass of the
breach of the principle of reasoning inculcated in these passages, than
Barrow's Treatise on the Pope's Supremacy.

10.
The remarks of these two writers relate to the duty of combining doctrines
which belong to one body, and evidences which relate to one subject; and
few persons would dispute it in the abstract. The application which has been
here made of the principle is this,—that where a doctrine comes
recommended to us by strong presumptions of its truth, we are bound to
receive it unsuspiciously, and use it as a key to the evidences to which it
appeals, or the facts which it professes to systematize, whatever may be our
eventual judgment about it. Nor is it enough to answer, that the voice of our
particular Church, denying this so-called Catholicism, is an antecedent
probability which outweighs all others and claims our prior obedience,
loyally and without reasoning, to its own interpretation. This may excuse
individuals certainly, in beginning with doubt and distrust of the Catholic
developments, but it only shifts the blame to the particular Church,
Anglican or other, which thinks itself qualified to enforce so peremptory a
judgment against the one and only successor, heir and representative of the
Apostolic college.

SECTION II.

STATE OF THE EVIDENCE.

Bacon is celebrated for destroying the credit of a method of reasoning much
resembling that which it has been the object of this Chapter to recommend.

"He who is not practised in doubting," he says, "but forward in asserting
and laying down such principles as he takes to be approved, granted and
manifest, and, according to the established truth thereof, receives or rejects
everything, as squaring with or proving contrary to them, is only fitted to
mix and confound things with words, reason with madness, and the world
with fable and fiction, but not to interpret the works of nature."[110:1] But he
was aiming at the application of these modes of reasoning to what should be
strict investigation, and that in the province of physics; and this he might
well censure, without attempting, (what is impossible,) to banish them from
history, ethics, and religion.
Physical facts are present; they are submitted to the senses, and the senses
may be satisfactorily tested, corrected, and verified. To trust to anything but
sense in a matter of sense is irrational; why are the senses given us but to
supersede less certain, less immediate informants? We have recourse to
reason or authority to determine facts, when the senses fail us; but with the
senses we begin. We deduce, we form inductions, we abstract, we theorize
from facts; we do not begin with surmise and conjecture, much less do we
look to the tradition of past ages, or the decree of foreign teachers, to
determine matters which are in our hands and under our eyes.
But it is otherwise with history, the facts of which are not present; it is
otherwise with ethics, in which phenomena are more subtle, closer, and
more personal to individuals than other facts, and not referable to any
common standard by which all men can decide upon them. In such
sciences, we cannot rest upon mere facts, if we would, because we have not
got them. We must do our best with what is given us, and look about for aid
from any quarter; and in such circumstances the opinions of others, the
traditions of ages, the prescriptions of authority, antecedent auguries,
analogies, parallel cases, these and the like, not indeed taken at random, but,
like the evidence from the senses, sifted and scrutinized, obviously become
of great importance.

2.
And, further, if we proceed on the hypothesis that a merciful Providence has
supplied us with means of gaining such truth as concerns us, in different
subject-matters, though with different instruments, then the simple question

is, what those instruments are which are proper to a particular case. If they
are of the appointment of a Divine Protector, we may be sure that they will
lead to the truth, whatever they are. The less exact methods of reasoning
may do His work as well as the more perfect, if He blesses them. He may
bless antecedent probabilities in ethical inquiries, who blesses experience
and induction in the art of medicine.
And if it is reasonable to consider medicine, or architecture, or engineering,
in a certain sense, divine arts, as being divinely ordained means of our
receiving divine benefits, much more may ethics be called divine; while as
to religion, it directly professes to be the method of recommending
ourselves to Him and learning His will. If then it be His gracious purpose
that we should learn it, the means He gives for learning it, be they
promising or not to human eyes, are sufficient, because they are His. And
what they are at this particular time, or to this person, depends on His
disposition. He may have imposed simple prayer and obedience on some
men as the instrument of their attaining to the mysteries and precepts of
Christianity. He may lead others through the written word, at least for some
stages of their course; and if the formal basis on which He has rested His
revelations be, as it is, of an historical and philosophical character, then
antecedent probabilities, subsequently corroborated by facts, will be
sufficient, as in the parallel case of other history, to bring us safely to the
matter, or at least to the organ, of those revelations.

3.
Moreover, in subjects which belong to moral proof, such, I mean, as history,
antiquities, political science, ethics, metaphysics, and theology, which are
pre-eminently such, and especially in theology and ethics, antecedent
probability may have a real weight and cogency which it cannot have in
experimental science; and a mature politician or divine may have a power
of reaching matters of fact in consequence of his peculiar habits of mind,
which is seldom given in the same degree to physical inquirers, who, for the
purposes of this particular pursuit, are very much on a level. And this last
remark at least is confirmed by Lord Bacon, who confesses "Our method of
discovering the sciences does not much depend upon subtlety and strength
of genius, but lies level to almost every capacity and understanding;"[113:1]

though surely sciences there are, in which genius is everything, and rules all
but nothing.

4.
It will be a great mistake then to suppose that, because this eminent
philosopher condemned presumption and prescription in inquiries into facts
which are external to us, present with us, and common to us all, therefore
authority, tradition, verisimilitude, analogy, and the like, are mere "idols of
the den" or "of the theatre" in history or ethics. Here we may oppose to him
an author in his own line as great as he is: "Experience," says Bacon, "is by
far the best demonstration, provided it dwell in the experiment; for the
transferring of it to other things judged alike is very fallacious, unless done
with great exactness and regularity."[113:2] Niebuhr explains or corrects him:
"Instances are not arguments," he grants, when investigating an obscure
question of Roman history,—"instances are not arguments, but in history
are scarcely of less force; above all, where the parallel they exhibit is in the
progressive development of institutions."[113:3] Here this sagacious writer
recognizes the true principle of historical logic, while he exemplifies it.
The same principle is involved in the well-known maxim of Aristotle, that
"it is much the same to admit the probabilities of a mathematician, and to
look for demonstration from an orator." In all matters of human life,
presumption verified by instances, is our ordinary instrument of proof, and,
if the antecedent probability is great, it almost supersedes instances. Of
course, as is plain, we may err grievously in the antecedent view which we
start with, and in that case, our conclusions may be wide of the truth; but
that only shows that we had no right to assume a premiss which was
untrustworthy, not that our reasoning was faulty.

5.
I am speaking of the process itself, and its correctness is shown by its
general adoption. In religious questions a single text of Scripture is all-
sufficient with most people, whether the well disposed or the prejudiced, to
prove a doctrine or a duty in cases when a custom is established or a
tradition is strong. "Not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together" is

sufficient for establishing social, public, nay, Sunday worship. "Where the
tree falleth, there shall it lie," shows that our probation ends with life.
"Forbidding to marry" determines the Pope to be the man of sin. Again, it is
plain that a man's after course for good or bad brings out the passing words
or obscure actions of previous years. Then, on a retrospect, we use the event
as a presumptive interpretation of the past, of those past indications of his
character which, considered as evidence, were too few and doubtful to bear
insisting on at the time, and would have seemed ridiculous, had we
attempted to do so. And the antecedent probability is even found to triumph
over contrary evidence, as well as to sustain what agrees with it. Every one
may know of cases in which a plausible charge against an individual was
borne down at once by weight of character, though that character was
incommensurate of course with the circumstances which gave rise to
suspicion, and had no direct neutralizing force to destroy it. On the other
hand, it is sometimes said, and even if not literally true will serve in
illustration, that not a few of those who are put on trial in our criminal
courts are not legally guilty of the particular crime on which a verdict is
found against them, being convicted not so much upon the particular
evidence, as on the presumption arising from their want of character and the
memory of their former offences. Nor is it in slight matters only or
unimportant that we thus act. Our dearest interests, our personal welfare,
our property, our health, our reputation, we freely hazard, not on proof, but
on a simple probability, which is sufficient for our conviction, because
prudence dictates to us so to take it. We must be content to follow the law of
our being in religious matters as well as in secular.

6.
But there is more to say on the subordinate position which direct evidence
holds among the motiva of conviction in most matters. It is no paradox to
say that there is a certain scantiness, nay an absence of evidence, which
may even tell in favour of statements which require to be made good. There
are indeed cases in which we cannot discover the law of silence or
deficiency, which are then simply unaccountable. Thus Lucian, for
whatever reason, hardly notices Roman authors or affairs.[115:1] Maximus
Tyrius, who wrote several of his works at Rome, nevertheless makes no
reference to Roman history. Paterculus, the historian, is mentioned by no

ancient writer except Priscian. What is more to our present purpose, Seneca,
Pliny the elder, and Plutarch are altogether silent about Christianity; and
perhaps Epictetus also, and the Emperor Marcus. The Jewish Mishna, too,
compiled about A.D. 180, is silent about Christianity; and the Jerusalem and
Babylonish Talmuds almost so, though the one was compiled about A.D.
300, and the other A.D. 500.[115:2] Eusebius again, is very uncertain in his
notice of facts: he does not speak of St. Methodius, nor of St. Anthony, nor
of the martyrdom of St. Perpetua, nor of the miraculous powers of St.
Gregory Thaumaturgus; and he mentions Constantine's luminous cross, not
in his Ecclesiastical History, where it would naturally find a place, but in his
Life of the Emperor. Moreover, those who receive that wonderful
occurrence, which is, as one who rejects it allows,[116:1] "so inexplicable to
the historical inquirer," have to explain the difficulty of the universal silence
on the subject of all the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, excepting
Eusebius.
In like manner, Scripture has its unexplained omissions. No religious school
finds its own tenets and usages on the surface of it. The remark applies also
to the very context of Scripture, as in the obscurity which hangs over
Nathanael or the Magdalen. It is a remarkable circumstance that there is no
direct intimation all through Scripture that the Serpent mentioned in the
temptation of Eve was the evil spirit, till we come to the vision of the
Woman and Child, and their adversary, the Dragon, in the twelfth chapter of
the Apocalypse.

7.
Omissions, thus absolute and singular, when they occur in the evidence of
facts or doctrines, are of course difficulties; on the other hand, not
unfrequently they admit of explanation. Silence may arise from the very
notoriety of the facts in question, as in the case of the seasons, the weather,
or other natural phenomena; or from their sacredness, as the Athenians
would not mention the mythological Furies; or from external constraint, as
the omission of the statues of Brutus and Cassius in the procession. Or it
may proceed from fear or disgust, as on the arrival of unwelcome news; or
from indignation, or hatred, or contempt, or perplexity, as Josephus is silent
about Christianity, and Eusebius passes over the death of Crispus in his life

of Constantine; or from other strong feeling, as implied in the poet's
sentiment, "Give sorrow words;" or from policy or other prudential motive,
or propriety, as Queen's Speeches do not mention individuals, however
influential in the political world, and newspapers after a time were silent
about the cholera. Or, again, from the natural and gradual course which the
fact took, as in the instance of inventions and discoveries, the history of
which is on this account often obscure; or from loss of documents or other
direct testimonies, as we should not look for theological information in a
treatise on geology.

8.
Again, it frequently happens that omissions proceed on some law, as the
varying influence of an external cause; and then, so far from being a
perplexity, they may even confirm such evidence as occurs, by becoming,
as it were, its correlative. For instance, an obstacle may be assignable,
person, or principle, or accident, which ought, if it exists, to reduce or
distort the indications of a fact to that very point, or in that very direction,
or with the variations, or in the order and succession, which do occur in its
actual history. At first sight it might be a suspicious circumstance that but
one or two manuscripts of some celebrated document were forthcoming;
but if it were known that the sovereign power had exerted itself to suppress
and destroy it at the time of its publication, and that the extant manuscripts
were found just in those places where history witnessed to the failure of the
attempt, the coincidence would be highly corroborative of that evidence
which alone remained.
Thus it is possible to have too much evidence; that is, evidence so full or
exact as to throw suspicion over the case for which it is adduced. The
genuine Epistles of St. Ignatius contain none of those ecclesiastical terms,
such as "Priest" or "See," which are so frequent afterwards; and they quote
Scripture sparingly. The interpolated Epistles quote it largely; that is, they
are too Scriptural to be Apostolic. Few persons, again, who are acquainted
with the primitive theology, but will be sceptical at first reading of the
authenticity of such works as the longer Creed of St. Gregory
Thaumaturgus, or St. Hippolytus contra Beronem, from the precision of the
theological language, which is unsuitable to the Ante-nicene period.

9.
The influence of circumstances upon the expression of opinion or testimony
supplies another form of the same law of omission. "I am ready to admit,"
says Paley, "that the ancient Christian advocates did not insist upon the
miracles in argument so frequently as I should have done. It was their lot to
contend with notions of magical agency, against which the mere production
of the facts was not sufficient for the convincing of their adversaries; I do
not know whether they themselves thought it quite decisive of the
controversy. But since it is proved, I conceive with certainty, that the
sparingness with which they appealed to miracles was owing neither to their
ignorance nor their doubt of the facts, it is at any rate an objection, not to
the truth of the history, but to the judgment of its defenders."[118:1] And, in
like manner, Christians were not likely to entertain the question of the
abstract allowableness of images in the Catholic ritual, with the actual
superstitions and immoralities of paganism before their eyes. Nor were they
likely to determine the place of the Blessed Mary in our reverence, before
they had duly secured, in the affections of the faithful, the supreme glory
and worship of God Incarnate, her Eternal Lord and Son. Nor would they
recognize Purgatory as a part of the Dispensation, till the world had flowed
into the Church, and a habit of corruption had been largely superinduced.
Nor could ecclesiastical liberty be asserted, till it had been assailed. Nor
would a Pope arise, but in proportion as the Church was consolidated. Nor
would monachism be needed, while martyrdoms were in progress. Nor
could St. Clement give judgment on the doctrine of Berengarius, nor St.
Dionysius refute the Ubiquists, nor St. Irenæus denounce the Protestant
view of Justification, nor St. Cyprian draw up a theory of toleration. There
is "a time for every purpose under the heaven;" "a time to keep silence and
a time to speak."

10.
Sometimes when the want of evidence for a series of facts or doctrines is
unaccountable, an unexpected explanation or addition in the course of time
is found as regards a portion of them, which suggests a ground of patience
as regards the historical obscurity of the rest. Two instances are obvious to
mention, of an accidental silence of clear primitive testimony as to

important doctrines, and its removal. In the number of the articles of
Catholic belief which the Reformation especially resisted, were the Mass
and the sacramental virtue of Ecclesiastical Unity. Since the date of that
movement, the shorter Epistles of St. Ignatius have been discovered, and
the early Liturgies verified; and this with most men has put an end to the
controversy about those doctrines. The good fortune which has happened to
them, may happen to others; and though it does not, yet that it has happened
to them, is to those others a sort of compensation for the obscurity in which
their early history continues to be involved.

11.
I may seem in these remarks to be preparing the way for a broad admission
of the absence of any sanction in primitive Christianity in behalf of its
medieval form, but I do not make them with this intention. Not from
misgivings of this kind, but from the claims of a sound logic, I think it right
to insist, that, whatever early testimonies I may bring in support of later
developments of doctrine, are in great measure brought ex abundante, a
matter of grace, not of compulsion. The onus probandi is with those who
assail a teaching which is, and has long been, in possession. As for positive
evidence in our behalf, they must take what they can get, if they cannot get
as much as they might wish, inasmuch as antecedent probabilities, as I have
said, go so very far towards dispensing with it. It is a first strong point that,
in an idea such as Christianity, developments cannot but be, and those
surely divine, because it is divine; a second that, if so, they are those very
ones which exist, because there are no others; and a third point is the fact
that they are found just there, where true developments ought to be found,
—namely, in the historic seats of Apostolical teaching and in the
authoritative homes of immemorial tradition.

12.
And, if it be said in reply that the difficulty of admitting these developments
of doctrine lies, not merely in the absence of early testimony for them, but
in the actual existence of distinct testimony against them,—or, as
Chillingworth says, in "Popes against Popes, Councils against Councils,"—
I answer, of course this will be said; but let the fact of this objection be

carefully examined, and its value reduced to its true measure, before it is
used in argument. I grant that there are "Bishops against Bishops in Church
history, Fathers against Fathers, Fathers against themselves," for such
differences in individual writers are consistent with, or rather are involved
in the very idea of doctrinal development, and consequently are no real
objection to it; the one essential question is whether the recognized organ of
teaching, the Church herself, acting through Pope or Council as the oracle
of heaven, has ever contradicted her own enunciations. If so, the hypothesis
which I am advocating is at once shattered; but, till I have positive and
distinct evidence of the fact, I am slow to give credence to the existence of
so great an improbability.

FOOTNOTES:

[104:1] Anal. ii. 7.
[107:1] [On Miracles, Essay ii. 111.]
[109:1] Anal. ii. 7.
[109:2] On Prophecy, i. p. 28.
[110:1] Aphor. 5, vol. iv. p. xi. ed. 1815.
[113:1] Nov. Org. i. 2, § 26, vol. iv. p. 29.
[113:2] Nov. Org. § 70, p. 44.
[113:3] Hist. of Rome, vol. i. p. 345, ed. 1828.
[115:1] Lardner's Heath. Test. p. 22.
[115:2] Paley's Evid. p. i. prop. 1, 7.
[116:1] Milman, Christ. vol. ii. p. 352.
[118:1] Evidences, iii. 5.

CHAPTER IV.
INSTANCES IN ILLUSTRATION.

It follows now to inquire how much evidence is actually producible for
those large portions of the present Creed of Christendom, which have not a
recognized place in the primordial idea and the historical outline of the
Religion, yet which come to us with certain antecedent considerations
strong enough in reason to raise the effectiveness of that evidence to a point
disproportionate, as I have allowed, to its intrinsic value. In urging these
considerations here, of course I exclude for the time the force of the
Church's claim of infallibility in her acts, for which so much can be said,
but I do not exclude the logical cogency of those acts, considered as
testimonies to the faith of the times before them.
My argument then is this:—that, from the first age of Christianity, its
teaching looked towards those ecclesiastical dogmas, afterwards recognized
and defined, with (as time went on) more or less determinate advance in the
direction of them; till at length that advance became so pronounced, as to
justify their definition and to bring it about, and to place them in the
position of rightful interpretations and keys of the remains and the records
in history of the teaching which had so terminated.

2.
This line of argument is not unlike that which is considered to constitute a
sufficient proof of truths in physical science. An instance of this is furnished
us in a work on Mechanics of the past generation, by a writer of name, and
his explanation of it will serve as an introduction to our immediate subject.
After treating of the laws of motion, he goes on to observe, "These laws are
the simplest principles to which motion can be reduced, and upon them the
whole theory depends. They are not indeed self-evident, nor do they admit
of accurate proof by experiment, on account of the great nicety required in
adjusting the instruments and making the experiments; and on account of
the effects of friction, and the air's resistance, which cannot entirely be

removed. They are, however, constantly, and invariably, suggested to our
senses, and they agree with experiment as far as experiment can go; and the
more accurately the experiments are made, and the greater care we take to
remove all those impediments which tend to render the conclusions
erroneous, the more nearly do the experiments coincide with these laws."
[123:1]
And thus a converging evidence in favour of certain doctrines may,
under circumstances, be as clear a proof of their Apostolical origin as can
be reached practically from the Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab
omnibus.
In such a method of proof there is, first, an imperfect, secondly, a growing
evidence, thirdly, in consequence a delayed inference and judgment,
fourthly, reasons producible to account for the delay.

SECTION I.

INSTANCES CURSORILY NOTICED.

1.
(1.) Canon of the New Testament.
As regards the New Testament, Catholics and Protestants receive the same
books as canonical and inspired; yet among those books some are to be
found, which certainly have no right there if, following the rule of
Vincentius, we receive nothing as of divine authority but what has been
received always and everywhere. The degrees of evidence are very various
for one book and another. "It is confessed," says Less, "that not all the
Scriptures of our New Testament have been received with universal consent
as genuine works of the Evangelists and Apostles. But that man must have
predetermined to oppose the most palpable truths, and must reject all
history, who will not confess that the greater part of the New Testament has
been universally received as authentic, and that the remaining books have
been acknowledged as such by the majority of the ancients."[124:1]

2.
For instance, as to the Epistle of St. James. It is true, it is contained in the
old Syriac version in the second century; but Origen, in the third century, is
the first writer who distinctly mentions it among the Greeks; and it is not
quoted by name by any Latin till the fourth. St. Jerome speaks of its gaining
credit "by degrees, in process of time." Eusebius says no more than that it
had been, up to his time, acknowledged by the majority; and he classes it
with the Shepherd of St. Hermas and the Epistle of St. Barnabas.[124:2]
Again: "The Epistle to the Hebrews, though received in the East, was not
received in the Latin Churches till St. Jerome's time. St. Irenæus either does
not affirm, or denies that it is St. Paul's. Tertullian ascribes it to St.
Barnabas. Caius excludes it from his list. St. Hippolytus does not receive it.
St. Cyprian is silent about it. It is doubtful whether St. Optatus received it."
[124:3]

Again, St. Jerome tells us, that in his day, towards A.D. 400, the Greek
Church rejected the Apocalypse, but the Latin received it.
Again: "The New Testament consists of twenty-seven books in all, though
of varying importance. Of these, fourteen are not mentioned at all till from
eighty to one hundred years after St. John's death, in which number are the
Acts, the Second to the Corinthians, the Galatians, the Colossians, the Two
to the Thessalonians, and St. James. Of the other thirteen, five, viz. St.
John's Gospel, the Philippians, the First to Timothy, the Hebrews, and the
First of St. John are quoted but by one writer during the same period."[125:1]

3.
On what ground, then, do we receive the Canon as it comes to us, but on the
authority of the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries? The Church at that
era decided—not merely bore testimony, but passed a judgment on former
testimony,—decided, that certain books were of authority. And on what
ground did she so decide? on the ground that hitherto a decision had been
impossible, in an age of persecution, from want of opportunities for
research, discussion, and testimony, from the private or the local character
of some of the books, and from misapprehension of the doctrine contained

in others. Now, however, facilities were at length given for deciding once
for all on what had been in suspense and doubt for three centuries. On this
subject I will quote another passage from the same Tract: "We depend upon
the fourth and fifth centuries thus:—As to Scripture, former centuries do
not speak distinctly, frequently, or unanimously, except of some chief
books, as the Gospels; but we see in them, as we believe, an ever-growing
tendency and approximation to that full agreement which we find in the
fifth. The testimony given at the latter date is the limit to which all that has
been before said converges. For instance, it is commonly said, Exceptio
probat regulam; when we have reason to think that a writer or an age would
have witnessed so and so, but for this or that, and that this or that were mere
accidents of his position, then he or it may be said to tend towards such
testimony. In this way the first centuries tend towards the fifth. Viewing the
matter as one of moral evidence, we seem to see in the testimony of the
fifth the very testimony which every preceding century gave, accidents
excepted, such as the present loss of documents once extant, or the then
existing misconceptions which want of intercourse between the Churches
occasioned. The fifth century acts as a comment on the obscure text of the
centuries before it, and brings out a meaning, which with the help of the
comment any candid person sees really to be theirs."[126:1]

4.
(2.) Original Sin.
I have already remarked upon the historical fact, that the recognition of
Original Sin, considered as the consequence of Adam's fall, was, both as
regards general acceptance and accurate understanding, a gradual process,
not completed till the time of Augustine and Pelagius. St. Chrysostom lived
close up to that date, but there are passages in his works, often quoted,
which we should not expect to find worded as they stand, if they had been
written fifty years later. It is commonly, and reasonably, said in explanation,
that the fatalism, so prevalent in various shapes pagan and heretical, in the
first centuries, was an obstacle to an accurate apprehension of the
consequences of the fall, as the presence of the existing idolatry was to the
use of images. If this be so, we have here an instance of a doctrine held
back for a time by circumstances, yet in the event forcing its way into its

normal shape, and at length authoritatively fixed in it, that is, of a doctrine
held implicitly, then asserting itself, and at length fully developed.

5.
(3.) Infant Baptism.
One of the passages of St. Chrysostom to which I might refer is this, "We
baptize infants, though they are not defiled with sin, that they may receive
sanctity, righteousness, adoption, heirship, brotherhood with Christ, and
may become His members." (Aug. contr. Jul. i. 21.) This at least shows that
he had a clear view of the importance and duty of infant baptism, but such
was not the case even with saints in the generation immediately before him.
As is well known, it was not unusual in that age of the Church for those,
who might be considered catechumens, to delay their baptism, as
Protestants now delay reception of the Holy Eucharist. It is difficult for us
at this day to enter into the assemblage of motives which led to this
postponement; to a keen sense and awe of the special privileges of baptism
which could only once be received, other reasons would be added,—
reluctance to being committed to a strict rule of life, and to making a public
profession of religion, and to joining in a specially intimate fellowship or
solidarity with strangers. But so it was in matter of fact, for reasons good or
bad, that infant baptism, which is a fundamental rule of Christian duty with
us, was less earnestly insisted on in early times.

6.
Even in the fourth century St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Basil, and St.
Augustine, having Christian mothers, still were not baptized till they were
adults. St. Gregory's mother dedicated him to God immediately on his birth;
and again when he had come to years of discretion, with the rite of taking
the gospels into his hands by way of consecration. He was religiously-
minded from his youth, and had devoted himself to a single life. Yet his
baptism did not take place till after he had attended the schools of Cæsarea,
Palestine, and Alexandria, and was on his voyage to Athens. He had
embarked during the November gales, and for twenty days his life was in
danger. He presented himself for baptism as soon as he got to land. St. Basil
was the son of Christian confessors on both father's and mother's side. His

grandmother Macrina, who brought him up, had for seven years lived with
her husband in the woods of Pontus during the Decian persecution. His
father was said to have wrought miracles; his mother, an orphan of great
beauty of person, was forced from her unprotected state to abandon the
hope of a single life, and was conspicuous in matrimony for her care of
strangers and the poor, and for her offerings to the churches. How
religiously she brought up her children is shown by the singular blessing,
that four out of ten have since been canonized as Saints. St. Basil was one
of these; yet the child of such parents was not baptized till he had come to
man's estate,—till, according to the Benedictine Editor, his twenty-first, and
perhaps his twenty-ninth, year. St. Augustine's mother, who is herself a
Saint, was a Christian when he was born, though his father was not.
Immediately on his birth, he was made a catechumen; in his childhood he
fell ill, and asked for baptism. His mother was alarmed, and was taking
measures for his reception into the Church, when he suddenly got better,
and it was deferred. He did not receive baptism till the age of thirty-three,
after he had been for nine years a victim of Manichæan error. In like
manner, St. Ambrose, though brought up by his mother and holy nuns, one
of them his own sister St. Marcellina, was not baptized till he was chosen
bishop at the age of about thirty-four, nor his brother St. Satyrus till about
the same age, after the serious warning of a shipwreck. St. Jerome too,
though educated at Rome, and so far under religious influences, as, with
other boys, to be in the observance of Sunday, and of devotions in the
catacombs, had no friend to bring him to baptism, till he had reached man's
estate and had travelled.

7.
Now how are the modern sects, which protest against infant baptism, to be
answered by Anglicans with this array of great names in their favour? By
the later rule of the Church surely; by the dicta of some later Saints, as by
St. Chrysostom; by one or two inferences from Scripture; by an argument
founded on the absolute necessity of Baptism for salvation,—sufficient
reasons certainly, but impotent to reverse the fact that neither in Dalmatia
nor in Cappadocia, neither in Rome, nor in Africa, was it then imperative on
Christian parents, as it is now, to give baptism to their young children. It
was on retrospect and after the truths of the Creed had sunk into the

Christian mind, that the authority of such men as St. Cyprian, St.
Chrysostom, and St. Augustine brought round the orbis terrarum to the
conclusion, which the infallible Church confirmed, that observance of the
rite was the rule, and the non-observance the exception.

8.
(4.) Communion in one kind.
In the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Council of Constance
pronounced that, "though in the primitive Church the Sacrament" of the
Eucharist "was received by the faithful under each kind, yet the custom has
been reasonably introduced, for the avoiding of certain dangers and
scandals, that it should be received by the consecrators under each kind, and
by the laity only under the kind of Bread; since it is most firmly to be
believed, and in no wise doubted, that the whole Body and Blood of Christ
is truly contained as well under the kind of Bread as under the kind of
Wine."
Now the question is, whether the doctrine here laid down, and carried into
effect in the usage here sanctioned, was entertained by the early Church,
and may be considered a just development of its principles and practices. I
answer that, starting with the presumption that the Council has
ecclesiastical authority, which is the point here to be assumed, we shall find
quite enough for its defence, and shall be satisfied to decide in the
affirmative; we shall readily come to the conclusion that Communion under
either kind is lawful, each kind conveying the full gift of the Sacrament.
For instance, Scripture affords us two instances of what may reasonably be
considered the administration of the form of Bread without that of Wine;
viz. our Lord's own example towards the two disciples at Emmaus, and St.
Paul's action at sea during the tempest. Moreover, St. Luke speaks of the
first Christians as continuing in the "breaking of bread, and in prayer," and
of the first day of the week "when they came together to break bread."
And again, in the sixth chapter of St. John, our Lord says absolutely, "He
that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me." And, though He distinctly
promises that we shall have it granted to us to drink His blood, as well as to
eat His flesh; nevertheless, not a word does He say to signify that, as He is

the Bread from heaven and the living Bread, so He is the heavenly, living
Wine also. Again, St. Paul says that "whosoever shall eat this Bread or
drink this Cup of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the Body and
Blood of the Lord."
Many of the types of the Holy Eucharist, as far as they go, tend to the same
conclusion; as the Manna, to which our Lord referred, the Paschal Lamb,
the Shewbread, the sacrifices from which the blood was poured out, and the
miracle of the loaves, which are figures of the bread alone; while the water
from the rock, and the Blood from our Lord's side correspond to the wine
without the bread. Others are representations of both kinds; as
Melchizedek's feast, and Elijah's miracle of the meal and oil.

9.
And, further, it certainly was the custom in the early Church, under
circumstances, to communicate in one kind, as we learn from St. Cyprian,
St. Dionysius, St. Basil, St. Jerome, and others. For instance, St. Cyprian
speaks of the communion of an infant under Wine, and of a woman under
Bread; and St. Ambrose speaks of his brother in shipwreck folding the
consecrated Bread in a handkerchief, and placing it round his neck; and the
monks and hermits in the desert can hardly be supposed to have been
ordinarily in possession of consecrated Wine as well as Bread. From the
following Letter of St. Basil, it appears that, not only the monks, but the
whole laity of Egypt ordinarily communicated in Bread only. He seems to
have been asked by his correspondent, whether in time of persecution it was
lawful, in the absence of priest or deacon, to take the communion "in one's
own hand," that is, of course, the Bread; he answers that it may be justified
by the following parallel cases, in mentioning which he is altogether silent
about the Cup. "It is plainly no fault," he says, "for long custom supplies
instances enough to sanction it. For all the monks in the desert, where there
is no priest, keep the communion at home, and partake it from themselves.
In Alexandria too, and in Egypt, each of the laity, for the most part, has the
Communion in his house, and, when he will, he partakes it by means of
himself. For when once the priest has celebrated the Sacrifice and given it,
he who takes it as a whole together, and then partakes of it daily, reasonably
ought to think that he partakes and receives from him who has given it."

[132:1]
It should be added, that in the beginning of the Letter he may be
interpreted to speak of communion in both kinds, and to say that it is "good
and profitable."
Here we have the usage of Pontus, Egypt, Africa, and Milan. Spain may be
added, if a late author is right in his view of the meaning of a Spanish
Canon;[132:2] and Syria, as well as Egypt, at least at a later date, since
Nicephorus[132:3] tells us that the Acephali, having no Bishops, kept the
Bread which their last priests had consecrated, and dispensed crumbs of it
every year at Easter for the purposes of Communion.

10.
But it may be said, that after all it is so very hazardous and fearful a
measure actually to withdraw from Christians one-half of the Sacrament,
that, in spite of these precedents, some direct warrant is needed to reconcile
the mind to it. There might have been circumstances which led St. Cyprian,
or St. Basil, or the Apostolical Christians before them to curtail it, about
which we know nothing. It is not therefore safe in us, because it was safe in
them. Certainly a warrant is necessary; and just such a warrant is the
authority of the Church. If we can trust her implicitly, there is nothing in the
state of the evidence to form an objection to her decision in this instance,
and in proportion as we find we can trust her does our difficulty lessen.
Moreover, children, not to say infants, were at one time admitted to the
Eucharist, at least to the Cup; on what authority are they now excluded
from Cup and Bread also? St. Augustine considered the usage to be of
Apostolical origin; and it continued in the West down to the twelfth century;
it continues in the East among Greeks, Russo-Greeks, and the various
Monophysite Churches to this day, and that on the ground of its almost
universality in the primitive Church.[133:1] Is it a greater innovation to
suspend the Cup, than to cut off children from Communion altogether? Yet
we acquiesce in the latter deprivation without a scruple. It is safer to
acquiesce with, than without, an authority; safer with the belief that the
Church is the pillar and ground of the truth, than with the belief that in so
great a matter she is likely to err.

11.

(5.) The Homoüsion.
The next instance I shall take is from the early teaching on the subject of
our Lord's Consubstantiality and Co-eternity.
In the controversy carried on by various learned men in the seventeenth and
following century, concerning the statements of the early Fathers on this
subject, the one party determined the patristic theology by the literal force
of the separate expressions or phrases used in it, or by the philosophical
opinions of the day; the other, by the doctrine of the Catholic Church, as
afterwards authoritatively declared. The one party argued that those Fathers
need not have meant more than what was afterwards considered heresy; the
other answered that there is nothing to prevent their meaning more. Thus
the position which Bull maintains seems to be nothing beyond this, that the
Nicene Creed is a natural key for interpreting the body of Ante-nicene
theology. His very aim is to explain difficulties; now the notion of
difficulties and their explanation implies a rule to which they are apparent
exceptions, and in accordance with which they are to be explained. Nay, the
title of his work, which is a "Defence of the Creed of Nicæa," shows that he
is not investigating what is true and what false, but explaining and
justifying a foregone conclusion, as sanctioned by the testimony of the great
Council. Unless the statements of the Fathers had suggested difficulties, his
work would have had no object. He allows that their language is not such as
they would have used after the Creed had been imposed; but he says in
effect that, if we will but take it in our hands and apply it equitably to their
writings, we shall bring out and harmonize their teaching, clear their
ambiguities, and discover their anomalous statements to be few and
insignificant. In other words, he begins with a presumption, and shows how
naturally facts close round it and fall in with it, if we will but let them. He
does this triumphantly, yet he has an arduous work; out of about thirty
writers whom he reviews, he has, for one cause or other, to "explain
piously" nearly twenty.

SECTION II.

OUR LORD'S INCARNATION AND THE DIGNITY OF HIS BLESSED
MOTHER AND OF ALL SAINTS.

Bishop Bull's controversy had regard to Ante-nicene writers only, and to
little more than to the doctrine of the Divine Son's consubstantiality and co-
eternity; and, as being controversy, it necessarily narrows and dries up a
large and fertile subject. Let us see whether, treated historically, it will not
present itself to us in various aspects which may rightly be called
developments, as coming into view, one out of another, and following one
after another by a natural order of succession.

2.
First then, that the language of the Ante-nicene Fathers, on the subject of
our Lord's Divinity, may be far more easily accommodated to the Arian
hypothesis than can the language of the Post-nicene, is agreed on all hands.
Thus St. Justin speaks of the Son as subservient to the Father in the creation
of the world, as seen by Abraham, as speaking to Moses from the bush, as
appearing to Joshua before the fall of Jericho,[135:1] as Minister and Angel,
and as numerically distinct from the Father. Clement, again, speaks of the
Word[135:2] as the "Instrument of God," "close to the Sole Almighty;"
"ministering to the Omnipotent Father's will;"[135:3] "an energy, so to say, or
operation of the Father," and "constituted by His will as the cause of all
good."[135:4] Again, the Council of Antioch, which condemned Paul of
Samosata, says that He "appears to the Patriarchs and converses with them,
being testified sometimes to be an Angel, at other times Lord, at others
God;" that, while "it is impious to think that the God of all is called an
Angel, the Son is the Angel of the Father."[136:1] Formal proof, however, is
unnecessary; had not the fact been as I have stated it, neither Sandius would
have professed to differ from the Post-nicene Fathers, nor would Bull have
had to defend the Ante-nicene.

3.
One principal change which took place, as time went on, was the following:
the Ante-nicene Fathers, as in some of the foregoing extracts, speak of the
Angelic visions in the Old Testament as if they were appearances of the

Son; but St. Augustine introduced the explicit doctrine, which has been
received since his date, that they were simply Angels, through whom the
Omnipresent Son manifested Himself. This indeed is the only interpretation
which the Ante-nicene statements admitted, as soon as reason began to
examine what they did mean. They could not mean that the Eternal God
could really be seen by bodily eyes; if anything was seen, that must have
been some created glory or other symbol, by which it pleased the Almighty
to signify His Presence. What was heard was a sound, as external to His
Essence, and as distinct from His Nature, as the thunder or the voice of the
trumpet, which pealed along Mount Sinai; what it was had not come under
discussion till St. Augustine; both question and answer were alike
undeveloped. The earlier Fathers spoke as if there were no medium
interposed between the Creator and the creature, and so they seemed to
make the Eternal Son the medium; what it really was, they had not
determined. St. Augustine ruled, and his ruling has been accepted in later
times, that it was not a mere atmospheric phenomenon, or an impression on
the senses, but the material form proper to an Angelic presence, or the
presence of an Angel in that material garb in which blessed Spirits do
ordinarily appear to men. Henceforth the Angel in the bush, the voice which
spoke with Abraham, and the man who wrestled with Jacob, were not
regarded as the Son of God, but as Angelic ministers, whom He employed,
and through whom He signified His presence and His will. Thus the
tendency of the controversy with the Arians was to raise our view of our
Lord's Mediatorial acts, to impress them on us in their divine rather than
their human aspect, and to associate them more intimately with the ineffable
glories which surround the Throne of God. The Mediatorship was no longer
regarded in itself, in that prominently subordinate place which it had once
occupied in the thoughts of Christians, but as an office assumed by One,
who though having become man in order to bear it, was still God.[137:1]
Works and attributes, which had hitherto been assigned to the Economy or
to the Sonship, were now simply assigned to the Manhood. A tendency was
also elicited, as the controversy proceeded, to contemplate our Lord more
distinctly in His absolute perfections, than in His relation to the First Person
of the Blessed Trinity. Thus, whereas the Nicene Creed speaks of the
"Father Almighty," and "His Only-begotten Son, our Lord, God from God,
Light from Light, Very God from Very God," and of the Holy Ghost, "the
Lord and Giver of Life," we are told in the Athanasian of "the Father

Eternal, the Son Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal," and that "none is
afore or after other, none is greater or less than another."

4.
The Apollinarian and Monophysite controversy, which followed in the
course of the next century, tended towards a development in the same
direction. Since the heresies, which were in question, maintained, at least
virtually, that our Lord was not man, it was obvious to insist on the
passages of Scripture which describe His created and subservient nature,
and this had the immediate effect of interpreting of His manhood texts
which had hitherto been understood more commonly of His Divine
Sonship. Thus, for instance, "My Father is greater than I," which had been
understood even by St. Athanasius of our Lord as God, is applied by later
writers more commonly to His humanity; and in this way the doctrine of
His subordination to the Eternal Father, which formed so prominent a
feature in Ante-nicene theology, comparatively fell into the shade.

5.
And coincident with these changes, a most remarkable result is discovered.
The Catholic polemic, in view of the Arian and Monophysite errors, being
of this character, became the natural introduction to the cultus Sanctorum;
for in proportion as texts descriptive of created mediation ceased to belong
to our Lord, so was a room opened for created mediators. Nay, as regards
the instance of Angelic appearances itself, as St. Augustine explained them,
if those appearances were creatures, certainly creatures were worshipped by
the Patriarchs, not indeed in themselves,[138:1] but as the token of a Presence
greater than themselves. When "Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to
look upon God," he hid his face before a creature; when Jacob said, "I have
seen God face to face and my life is preserved," the Son of God was there,
but what he saw, what he wrestled with, was an Angel. When "Joshua fell
on his face to the earth and did worship before the captain of the Lord's
host, and said unto him, What saith my Lord unto his servant?" what was
seen and heard was a glorified creature, if St. Augustine is to be followed;
and the Son of God was in him.

And there were plain precedents in the Old Testament for the lawfulness of
such adoration. When "the people saw the cloudy pillar stand at the
tabernacle-door," "all the people rose up and worshipped, every man in his
tent-door."[139:1] When Daniel too saw "a certain man clothed in linen"
"there remained no strength" in him, for his "comeliness was turned" in him
"into corruption." He fell down on his face, and next remained on his knees
and hands, and at length "stood trembling," and said "O my Lord, by the
vision my sorrows are turned upon me, and I have retained no strength. For
how can the servant of this my Lord talk with this my Lord?"[139:2] It might
be objected perhaps to this argument, that a worship which was allowable in
an elementary system might be unlawful when "grace and truth" had come
"through Jesus Christ;" but then it might be retorted surely, that that
elementary system had been emphatically opposed to all idolatry, and had
been minutely jealous of everything which might approach to favouring it.
Nay, the very prominence given in the Pentateuch to the doctrine of a
Creator, and the comparative silence concerning the Angelic creation, and
the prominence given to the Angelic creation in the later Prophets, taken
together, were a token both of that jealousy, and of its cessation, as time
went on. Nor can anything be concluded from St. Paul's censure of Angel
worship, since the sin which he is denouncing was that of "not holding the
Head," and of worshipping creatures instead of the Creator as the source of
good. The same explanation avails for passages like those in St. Athanasius
and Theodoret, in which the worship of Angels is discountenanced.

6.
The Arian controversy had led to another development, which confirmed by
anticipation the cultus to which St. Augustine's doctrine pointed. In answer
to the objection urged against our Lord's supreme Divinity from texts which
speak of His exaltation, St. Athanasius is led to insist forcibly on the
benefits which have accrued to man through it. He says that, in truth, not
Christ, but that human nature which He had assumed, was raised and
glorified in Him. The more plausible was the heretical argument against His
Divinity from those texts, the more emphatic is St. Athanasius's exaltation
of our regenerate nature by way of explaining them. But intimate indeed
must be the connexion between Christ and His brethren, and high their
glory, if the language which seemed to belong to the Incarnate Word really

belonged to them. Thus the pressure of the controversy elicited and
developed a truth, which till then was held indeed by Christians, but less
perfectly realized and not publicly recognized. The sanctification, or rather
the deification of the nature of man, is one main subject of St. Athanasius's
theology. Christ, in rising, raises His Saints with Him to the right hand of
power. They become instinct with His life, of one body with His flesh,
divine sons, immortal kings, gods. He is in them, because He is in human
nature; and He communicates to them that nature, deified by becoming His,
that them It may deify. He is in them by the Presence of His Spirit, and in
them He is seen. They have those titles of honour by participation, which
are properly His. Without misgiving we may apply to them the most sacred
language of Psalmists and Prophets. "Thou art a Priest for ever" may be said
of St. Polycarp or St. Martin as well as of their Lord. "He hath dispersed
abroad, he hath given to the poor," was fulfilled in St. Laurence. "I have
found David My servant," first said typically of the King of Israel, and
belonging really to Christ, is transferred back again by grace to His
Vicegerents upon earth. "I have given thee the nations for thine inheritance"
is the prerogative of Popes; "Thou hast given him his heart's desire," the
record of a martyr; "thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity," the
praise of Virgins.

7.
"As Christ," says St. Athanasius, "died, and was exalted as man, so, as man,
is He said to take what, as God, He ever had, in order that even this so high
a grant of grace might reach to us. For the Word did not suffer loss in
receiving a body, that He should seek to receive a grace, but rather He
deified that which He put on, nay, gave it graciously to the race of man. . . .
For it is the Father's glory, that man, made and then lost, should be found
again; and, when done to death, that he should be made alive, and should
become God's temple. For whereas the powers in heaven, both Angels and
Archangels, were ever worshipping the Lord, as they are now too
worshipping Him in the Name of Jesus, this is our grace and high
exaltation, that, even when He became man, the Son of God is worshipped,
and the heavenly powers are not startled at seeing all of us, who are of one
body with Him, introduced into their realms."[141:1] In this passage it is
almost said that the glorified Saints will partake in the homage paid by

Angels to Christ, the True Object of all worship; and at least a reason is
suggested to us by it for the Angel's shrinking in the Apocalypse from the
homage of St. John, the Theologian and Prophet of the Church.[141:2] But St.
Athanasius proceeds still more explicitly, "In that the Lord, even when
come in human body and called Jesus, was worshipped and believed to be
God's Son, and that through Him the Father is known, it is plain, as has
been said, that, not the Word, considered as the Word, received this so great
grace, but we. For, because of our relationship to His Body, we too have
become God's temple, and in consequence have been made God's sons, so
that even in us the Lord is now worshipped, and beholders report, as the
Apostle says, that 'God is in them of a truth.'"[142:1] It appears to be
distinctly stated in this passage, that those who are formally recognized as
God's adopted sons in Christ, are fit objects of worship on account of Him
who is in them; a doctrine which both interprets and accounts for the
invocation of Saints, the cultus of relics, and the religious veneration in
which even the living have sometimes been held, who, being saintly, were
distinguished by miraculous gifts.[142:2] Worship then is the necessary
correlative of glory; and in the same sense in which created natures can
share in the Creator's incommunicable glory, are they also allowed a share
of that worship which is His property alone.

8.
There was one other subject on which the Arian controversy had a more
intimate, though not an immediate influence. Its tendency to give a new
interpretation to the texts which speak of our Lord's subordination, has
already been noticed; such as admitted of it were henceforth explained more
prominently of His manhood than of His Mediatorship or His Sonship. But
there were other texts which did not admit of this interpretation, and which,
without ceasing to belong to Him, might seem more directly applicable to a
creature than to the Creator. He indeed was really the "Wisdom in whom the
Father eternally delighted," yet it would be but natural, if, under the
circumstances of Arian misbelief, theologians looked out for other than the
Eternal Son to be the immediate object of such descriptions. And thus the
controversy opened a question which it did not settle. It discovered a new
sphere, if we may so speak, in the realms of light, to which the Church had
not yet assigned its inhabitant. Arianism had admitted that our Lord was

both the God of the Evangelical Covenant, and the actual Creator of the
Universe; but even this was not enough, because it did not confess Him to
be the One, Everlasting, Infinite, Supreme Being, but as one who was made
by the Supreme. It was not enough in accordance with that heresy to
proclaim Him as having an ineffable origin before all worlds; not enough to
place him high above all creatures as the type of all the works of God's
Hands; not enough to make Him the King of all Saints, the Intercessor for
man with God, the Object of worship, the Image of the Father; not enough,
because it was not all, and between all and anything short of all, there was
an infinite interval. The highest of creatures is levelled with the lowest in
comparison of the One Creator Himself. That is, the Nicene Council
recognized the eventful principle, that, while we believe and profess any
being to be made of a created nature, such a being is really no God to us,
though honoured by us with whatever high titles and with whatever
homage. Arius or Asterius did all but confess that Christ was the Almighty;
they said much more than St. Bernard or St. Alphonso have since said of the
Blessed Mary; yet they left Him a creature and were found wanting. Thus
there was "a wonder in heaven:" a throne was seen, far above all other
created powers, mediatorial, intercessory; a title archetypal; a crown bright
as the morning star; a glory issuing from the Eternal Throne; robes pure as
the heavens; and a sceptre over all; and who was the predestined heir of that
Majesty? Since it was not high enough for the Highest, who was that
Wisdom, and what was her name, "the Mother of fair love, and fear, and
holy hope," "exalted like a palm-tree in Engaddi, and a rose-plant in
Jericho," "created from the beginning before the world" in God's everlasting
counsels, and "in Jerusalem her power"? The vision is found in the
Apocalypse, a Woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet,
and upon her head a crown of twelve stars. The votaries of Mary do not
exceed the true faith, unless the blasphemers of her Son came up to it. The
Church of Rome is not idolatrous, unless Arianism is orthodoxy.

9.
I am not stating conclusions which were drawn out in the controversy, but
of premisses which were laid, broad and deep. It was then shown, it was
then determined, that to exalt a creature was no recognition of its divinity.
Nor am I speaking of the Semi-Arians, who, holding our Lord's derivation

from the Substance of the Father, yet denying His Consubstantiality, really
did lie open to the charge of maintaining two Gods, and present no parallel
to the defenders of the prerogatives of St. Mary. But I speak of the Arians
who taught that the Son's Substance was created; and concerning them it is
true that St. Athanasius's condemnation of their theology is a vindication of
the Medieval. Yet it is not wonderful, considering how Socinians,
Sabellians, Nestorians, and the like, abound in these days, without their
even knowing it themselves, if those who never rise higher in their notions
of our Lord's Divinity, than to consider Him a man singularly inhabited by a
Divine Presence, that is, a Catholic Saint,—if such men should mistake the
honour paid by the Church to the human Mother for that very honour
which, and which alone, is worthy of her Eternal Son.

10.
I have said that there was in the first ages no public and ecclesiastical
recognition of the place which St. Mary holds in the Economy of grace; this
was reserved for the fifth century, as the definition of our Lord's proper
Divinity had been the work of the fourth. There was a controversy
contemporary with those already mentioned, I mean the Nestorian, which
brought out the complement of the development, to which they had been
subservient; and which, if I may so speak, supplied the subject of that
august proposition of which Arianism had provided the predicate. In order
to do honour to Christ, in order to defend the true doctrine of the
Incarnation, in order to secure a right faith in the manhood of the Eternal
Son, the Council of Ephesus determined the Blessed Virgin to be the
Mother of God. Thus all heresies of that day, though opposite to each other,
tended in a most wonderful way to her exaltation; and the School of
Antioch, the fountain of primitive rationalism, led the Church to determine
first the conceivable greatness of a creature, and then the incommunicable
dignity of the Blessed Virgin.

11.
But the spontaneous or traditional feeling of Christians had in great measure
anticipated the formal ecclesiastical decision. Thus the title Theotocos, or
Mother of God, was familiar to Christians from primitive times, and had

been used, among other writers, by Origen, Eusebius, St. Alexander, St.
Athanasius, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory Nyssen, and
St. Nilus. She had been called Ever-Virgin by others, as by St. Epiphanius,
St. Jerome, and Didymus. By others, "the Mother of all living," as being the
antitype of Eve; for, as St. Epiphanius observes, "in truth," not in shadow,
"from Mary was Life itself brought into the world, that Mary might bear
things living, and might become Mother of living things."[146:1] St.
Augustine says that all have sinned "except the Holy Virgin Mary,
concerning whom, for the honour of the Lord, I wish no question to be
raised at all, when we are treating of sins." "She was alone and wrought the
world's salvation," says St. Ambrose, alluding to her conception of the
Redeemer. She is signified by the Pillar of the cloud which guided the
Israelites, according to the same Father; and she had "so great grace, as not
only to have virginity herself, but to impart it to those to whom she
came;"—"the Rod out of the stem of Jesse," says St. Jerome, and "the
Eastern gate through which the High Priest alone goes in and out, yet is
ever shut;"—the wise woman, says St. Nilus, who "hath clad all believers,
from the fleece of the Lamb born of her, with the clothing of incorruption,
and delivered them from their spiritual nakedness;"—"the Mother of Life,
of beauty, of majesty, the Morning Star," according to Antiochus;—"the
mystical new heavens," "the heavens carrying the Divinity," "the fruitful
vine by whom we are translated from death unto life," according to St.
Ephraim;—"the manna which is delicate, bright, sweet, and virgin, which,
as though coming from heaven, has poured down on all the people of the
Churches a food pleasanter than honey," according to St. Maximus.
St. Proclus calls her "the unsullied shell which contains the pearl of price,"
"the sacred shrine of sinlessness," "the golden altar of holocaust," "the holy
oil of anointing," "the costly alabaster box of spikenard," "the ark gilt
within and without," "the heifer whose ashes, that is, the Lord's Body taken
from her, cleanses those who are defiled by the pollution of sin," "the fair
bride of the Canticles," "the stay (στήριγμα) of believers," "the Church's
diadem," "the expression of orthodoxy." These are oratorical expressions;
but we use oratory on great subjects, not on small. Elsewhere he calls her
"God's only bridge to man;" and elsewhere he breaks forth, "Run through
all creation in your thoughts, and see if there be equal to, or greater than,
the Holy Virgin Mother of God."

12.
Theodotus too, one of the Fathers of Ephesus, or whoever it is whose
Homilies are given to St. Amphilochius:—"As debtors and God's well-
affected servants, let us make confession to God the Word and to His
Mother, of the gift of words, as far as we are able. . . Hail, Mother, clad in
light, of the light which sets not; hail all-undefiled mother of holiness; hail
most pellucid fountain of the life-giving stream!" After speaking of the
Incarnation, he continues, "Such paradoxes doth the Divine Virgin Mother
ever bring to us in her holy irradiations, for with her is the Fount of Life,
and breasts of the spiritual and guileless milk; from which to suck the
sweetness, we have even now earnestly run to her, not as in forgetfulness of
what has gone before, but in desire of what is to come."
To St. Fulgentius is ascribed the following: "Mary became the window of
heaven, for God through her poured the True Light upon the world; the
heavenly ladder, for through her did God descend upon earth. . . . Come, ye
virgins, to a Virgin, come ye who conceive to one who did conceive, ye
who bear to one who bore, mothers to a Mother, ye who give suck to one
who suckled, young women to the Young." Lastly, "Thou hast found grace,"
says St. Peter Chrysologus, "how much? he had said above, Full. And full
indeed, which with full shower might pour upon and into the whole
creation."[148:1]

Such was the state of sentiment on the subject of the Blessed Virgin, which
the Arian, Nestorian, and Monophysite heresies found in the Church; and on
which the doctrinal decisions consequent upon them impressed a form and a
consistency which has been handed on in the East and West to this day.

SECTION III.

THE PAPAL SUPREMACY.

I will take one instance more. Let us see how, on the principles which I
have been laying down and defending, the evidence lies for the Pope's
Supremacy.
As to this doctrine the question is this, whether there was not from the first
a certain element at work, or in existence, divinely sanctioned, which, for
certain reasons, did not at once show itself upon the surface of ecclesiastical
affairs, and of which events in the fourth century are the development; and
whether the evidence of its existence and operation, which does occur in the
earlier centuries, be it much or little, is not just such as ought to occur upon
such an hypothesis.

2.
For instance, it is true, St. Ignatius is silent in his Epistles on the subject of
the Pope's authority; but if in fact that authority could not be in active
operation then, such silence is not so difficult to account for as the silence
of Seneca or Plutarch about Christianity itself, or of Lucian about the
Roman people. St. Ignatius directed his doctrine according to the need.
While Apostles were on earth, there was the display neither of Bishop nor
Pope; their power had no prominence, as being exercised by Apostles. In
course of time, first the power of the Bishop displayed itself, and then the
power of the Pope. When the Apostles were taken away, Christianity did not
at once break into portions; yet separate localities might begin to be the
scene of internal dissensions, and a local arbiter in consequence would be
wanted. Christians at home did not yet quarrel with Christians abroad; they
quarrelled at home among themselves. St. Ignatius applied the fitting
remedy. The Sacramentum Unitatis was acknowledged on all hands; the
mode of fulfilling and the means of securing it would vary with the
occasion; and the determination of its essence, its seat, and its laws would
be a gradual supply for a gradual necessity.

3.
This is but natural, and is parallel to instances which happen daily, and may
be so considered without prejudice to the divine right whether of the
Episcopate or of the Papacy. It is a common occurrence for a quarrel and a
lawsuit to bring out the state of the law, and then the most unexpected

results often follow. St. Peter's prerogative would remain a mere letter, till
the complication of ecclesiastical matters became the cause of ascertaining
it. While Christians were "of one heart and one soul," it would be
suspended; love dispenses with laws. Christians knew that they must live in
unity, and they were in unity; in what that unity consisted, how far they
could proceed, as it were, in bending it, and what at length was the point at
which it broke, was an irrelevant as well as unwelcome inquiry. Relatives
often live together in happy ignorance of their respective rights and
properties, till a father or a husband dies; and then they find themselves
against their will in separate interests, and on divergent courses, and dare
not move without legal advisers. Again, the case is conceivable of a
corporation or an Academical body, going on for centuries in the
performance of the routine-business which came in its way, and preserving
a good understanding between its members, with statutes almost a dead
letter and no precedents to explain them, and the rights of its various classes
and functions undefined,—then of its being suddenly thrown back by the
force of circumstances upon the question of its formal character as a body
politic, and in consequence developing in the relation of governors and
governed. The regalia Petri might sleep, as the power of a Chancellor has
slept; not as an obsolete, for they never had been carried into effect, but as a
mysterious privilege, which was not understood; as an unfulfilled prophecy.
For St. Ignatius to speak of Popes, when it was a matter of Bishops, would
have been like sending an army to arrest a housebreaker. The Bishop's
power indeed was from God, and the Pope's could be no more; he, as well
as the Pope, was our Lord's representative, and had a sacramental office:
but I am speaking, not of the intrinsic sanctity or divinity of such an office,
but of its duties.

4.
When the Church, then, was thrown upon her own resources, first local
disturbances gave exercise to Bishops, and next ecumenical disturbances
gave exercise to Popes; and whether communion with the Pope was
necessary for Catholicity would not and could not be debated till a
suspension of that communion had actually occurred. It is not a greater
difficulty that St. Ignatius does not write to the Asian Greeks about Popes,
than that St. Paul does not write to the Corinthians about Bishops. And it is

a less difficulty that the Papal supremacy was not formally acknowledged in
the second century, than that there was no formal acknowledgment on the
part of the Church of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity till the fourth. No
doctrine is defined till it is violated.
And, in like manner, it was natural for Christians to direct their course in
matters of doctrine by the guidance of mere floating, and, as it were,
endemic tradition, while it was fresh and strong; but in proportion as it
languished, or was broken in particular places, did it become necessary to
fall back upon its special homes, first the Apostolic Sees, and then the See
of St. Peter.

5.
Moreover, an international bond and a common authority could not be
consolidated, were it ever so certainly provided, while persecutions lasted.
If the Imperial Power checked the development of Councils, it availed also
for keeping back the power of the Papacy. The Creed, the Canon, in like
manner, both remained undefined. The Creed, the Canon, the Papacy,
Ecumenical Councils, all began to form, as soon as the Empire relaxed its
tyrannous oppression of the Church. And as it was natural that her
monarchical power should display itself when the Empire became
Christian, so was it natural also that further developments of that power
should take place when that Empire fell. Moreover, when the power of the
Holy See began to exert itself, disturbance and collision would be the
necessary consequence. Of the Temple of Solomon, it was said that "neither
hammer, nor axe, nor any tool of iron was heard in the house, while it was
in building." This is a type of the Church above; it was otherwise with the
Church below, whether in the instance of Popes or Apostles. In either case,
a new power had to be defined; as St. Paul had to plead, nay, to strive for
his apostolic authority, and enjoined St. Timothy, as Bishop of Ephesus, to
let no man despise him: so Popes too have not therefore been ambitious
because they did not establish their authority without a struggle. It was
natural that Polycrates should oppose St. Victor; and natural too that St.
Cyprian should both extol the See of St. Peter, yet resist it when he thought
it went beyond its province. And at a later day it was natural that Emperors
should rise in indignation against it; and natural, on the other hand, that it

should take higher ground with a younger power than it had taken with an
elder and time-honoured.

6.
We may follow Barrow here without reluctance, except in his imputation of
motives.
"In the first times," he says, "while the Emperors were pagans, their [the
Popes'] pretences were suited to their condition, and could not soar high;
they were not then so mad as to pretend to any temporal power, and a
pittance of spiritual eminency did content them."
Again: "The state of the most primitive Church did not well admit such an
universal sovereignty. For that did consist of small bodies incoherently
situated, and scattered about in very distant places, and consequently unfit
to be modelled into one political society, or to be governed by one head,
especially considering their condition under persecution and poverty. What
convenient resort for direction or justice could a few distressed Christians in
Egypt, Ethiopia, Parthia, India, Mesopotamia, Syria, Armenia, Cappadocia,
and other parts, have to Rome!"
Again: "Whereas no point avowed by Christians could be so apt to raise
offence and jealousy in pagans against our religion as this, which setteth up
a power of so vast extent and huge influence; whereas no novelty could be
more surprising or startling than the creation of an universal empire over
the consciences and religious practices of men; whereas also this doctrine
could not be but very conspicuous and glaring in ordinary practice, it is
prodigious that all pagans should not loudly exclaim against it," that is, on
the supposition that the Papal power really was then in actual exercise.
And again: "It is most prodigious that, in the disputes managed by the
Fathers against heretics, the Gnostics, Valentinians, &c., they should not,
even in the first place, allege and urge the sentence of the universal pastor
and judge, as a most evidently conclusive argument, as the most efficacious
and compendious method of convincing and silencing them."
Once more: "Even Popes themselves have shifted their pretences, and
varied in style, according to the different circumstances of time, and their

variety of humours, designs, interests. In time of prosperity, and upon
advantage, when they might safely do it, any Pope almost would talk high
and assume much to himself; but when they were low, or stood in fear of
powerful contradiction, even the boldest Popes would speak submissively
or moderately."[153:1]
On the whole, supposing the power to be divinely bestowed, yet in the first
instance more or less dormant, a history could not be traced out more
probable, more suitable to that hypothesis, than the actual course of the
controversy which took place age after age upon the Papal supremacy.

7.
It will be said that all this is a theory. Certainly it is: it is a theory to account
for facts as they lie in the history, to account for so much being told us
about the Papal authority in early times, and not more; a theory to reconcile
what is and what is not recorded about it; and, which is the principal point,
a theory to connect the words and acts of the Ante-nicene Church with that
antecedent probability of a monarchical principle in the Divine Scheme, and
that actual exemplification of it in the fourth century, which forms their
presumptive interpretation. All depends on the strength of that presumption.
Supposing there be otherwise good reason for saying that the Papal
Supremacy is part of Christianity, there is nothing in the early history of the
Church to contradict it.

8.
It follows to inquire in what this presumption consists? It has, as I have
said, two parts, the antecedent probability of a Popedom, and the actual
state of the Post-nicene Church. The former of these reasons has
unavoidably been touched upon in what has preceded. It is the absolute
need of a monarchical power in the Church which is our ground for
anticipating it. A political body cannot exist without government, and the
larger is the body the more concentrated must the government be. If the
whole of Christendom is to form one Kingdom, one head is essential; at
least this is the experience of eighteen hundred years. As the Church grew
into form, so did the power of the Pope develope; and wherever the Pope

has been renounced, decay and division have been the consequence. We
know of no other way of preserving the Sacramentum Unitatis, but a centre
of unity. The Nestorians have had their "Catholicus;" the Lutherans of
Prussia have their general superintendent; even the Independents, I believe,
have had an overseer in their Missions. The Anglican Church affords an
observable illustration of this doctrine. As her prospects have opened and
her communion extended, the See of Canterbury has become the natural
centre of her operations. It has at the present time jurisdiction in the
Mediterranean, at Jerusalem, in Hindostan, in North America, at the
Antipodes. It has been the organ of communication, when a Prime Minister
would force the Church to a redistribution of her property, or a Protestant
Sovereign abroad would bring her into friendly relations with his own
communion. Eyes have been lifted up thither in times of perplexity; thither
have addresses been directed and deputations sent. Thence issue the legal
decisions, or the declarations in Parliament, or the letters, or the private
interpositions, which shape the fortunes of the Church, and are the moving
influence within her separate dioceses. It must be so; no Church can do
without its Pope. We see before our eyes the centralizing process by which
the See of St. Peter became the Sovereign Head of Christendom.
If such be the nature of the case, it is impossible, if we may so speak
reverently, that an Infinite Wisdom, which sees the end from the beginning,
in decreeing the rise of an universal Empire, should not have decreed the
development of a sovereign ruler.
Moreover, all this must be viewed in the light of the general probability, so
much insisted on above, that doctrine cannot but develope as time proceeds
and need arises, and that its developments are parts of the Divine system,
and that therefore it is lawful, or rather necessary, to interpret the words and
deeds of the earlier Church by the determinate teaching of the later.

9.
And, on the other hand, as the counterpart of these anticipations, we are met
by certain announcements in Scripture, more or less obscure and needing a
comment, and claimed by the Papal See as having their fulfilment in itself.
Such are the words, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My
Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and I will give unto

Thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven." Again: "Feed My lambs, feed
My sheep." And "Satan hath desired to have you; I have prayed for thee,
and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." Such, too, are
various other indications of the Divine purpose as regards St. Peter, too
weak in themselves to be insisted on separately, but not without a
confirmatory power; such as his new name, his walking on the sea, his
miraculous draught of fishes on two occasions, our Lord's preaching out of
his boat, and His appearing first to him after His resurrection.
It should be observed, moreover, that a similar promise was made by the
patriarch Jacob to Judah: "Thou art he whom thy brethren shall praise: the
sceptre shall not depart from Judah till Shiloh come;" yet this promise was
not fulfilled for perhaps eight hundred years, during which long period we
hear little or nothing of the tribe descended from him. In like manner, "On
this rock I will build My Church," "I give unto thee the Keys," "Feed My
sheep," are not precepts merely, but prophecies and promises, promises to
be accomplished by Him who made them, prophecies to be fulfilled
according to the need, and to be interpreted by the event,—by the history,
that is, of the fourth and fifth centuries, though they had a partial fulfilment
even in the preceding period, and a still more noble development in the
middle ages.

10.
A partial fulfilment, or at least indications of what was to be, there certainly
were in the first age. Faint one by one, at least they are various, and are
found in writers of many times and countries, and thereby illustrative of
each other, and forming a body of proof. Thus St. Clement, in the name of
the Church of Rome, writes to the Corinthians, when they were without a
bishop; St. Ignatius of Antioch addresses the Roman Church, out of the
Churches to which he writes, as "the Church, which has in dignity the first
seat, of the city of the Romans,"[157:1] and implies that it was too high for
his directing as being the Church of St. Peter and St. Paul. St. Polycarp of
Smyrna has recourse to the Bishop of Rome on the question of Easter; the
heretic Marcion, excommunicated in Pontus, betakes himself to Rome;
Soter, Bishop of Rome, sends alms, according to the custom of his Church,
to the Churches throughout the empire, and, in the words of Eusebius,

"affectionately exhorted those who came to Rome, as a father his children;"
the Montanists from Phrygia come to Rome to gain the countenance of its
Bishop; Praxeas, from Asia, attempts the like, and for a while is successful;
St. Victor, Bishop of Rome, threatens to excommunicate the Asian
Churches; St. Irenæus speaks of Rome as "the greatest Church, the most
ancient, the most conspicuous, and founded and established by Peter and
Paul," appeals to its tradition, not in contrast indeed, but in preference to
that of other Churches, and declares that "to this Church, every Church, that
is, the faithful from every side must resort" or "must agree with it, propter
potiorem principalitatem." "O Church, happy in its position," says
Tertullian, "into which the Apostles poured out, together with their blood,
their whole doctrine;" and elsewhere, though in indignation and bitter
mockery, he calls the Pope "the Pontifex Maximus, the Bishop of Bishops."
The presbyters of St. Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, complain of his
doctrine to St. Dionysius of Rome; the latter expostulates with him, and he
explains. The Emperor Aurelian leaves "to the Bishops of Italy and of
Rome" the decision, whether or not Paul of Samosata shall be dispossessed
of the see-house at Antioch; St. Cyprian speaks of Rome as "the See of
Peter and the principal Church, whence the unity of the priesthood took its
rise, . . whose faith has been commended by the Apostles, to whom
faithlessness can have no access;" St. Stephen refuses to receive St.
Cyprian's deputation, and separates himself from various Churches of the
East; Fortunatus and Felix, deposed by St. Cyprian, have recourse to Rome;
Basilides, deposed in Spain, betakes himself to Rome, and gains the ear of
St. Stephen.

11.
St. Cyprian had his quarrel with the Roman See, but it appears he allows to
it the title of the "Cathedra Petri," and even Firmilian is a witness that Rome
claimed it. In the fourth and fifth centuries this title and its logical results
became prominent. Thus St. Julius (A.D. 342) remonstrated by letter with the
Eusebian party for "proceeding on their own authority as they pleased," and
then, as he says, "desiring to obtain our concurrence in their decisions,
though we never condemned [Athanasius]. Not so have the constitutions of
Paul, not so have the traditions of the Fathers directed; this is another form
of procedure, a novel practice. . . . For what we have received from the

blessed Apostle Peter, that I signify to you; and I should not have written
this, as deeming that these things are manifest unto all men, had not these
proceedings so disturbed us."[158:1] St. Athanasius, by preserving this
protest, has given it his sanction. Moreover, it is referred to by Socrates; and
his account of it has the more force, because he happens to be incorrect in
the details, and therefore did not borrow it from St. Athanasius: "Julius
wrote back," he says, "that they acted against the Canons, because they had
not called him to the Council, the Ecclesiastical Canon commanding that
the Churches ought not to make Canons beside the will of the Bishop of
Rome."[159:1] And Sozomen: "It was a sacerdotal law, to declare invalid
whatever was transacted beside the will of the Bishop of the Romans."[159:2]
On the other hand, the heretics themselves, whom St. Julius withstands, are
obliged to acknowledge that Rome was "the School of the Apostles and the
Metropolis of orthodoxy from the beginning;" and two of their leaders
(Western Bishops indeed) some years afterwards recanted their heresy
before the Pope in terms of humble confession.

12.
Another Pope, St. Damasus, in his letter addressed to the Eastern Bishops
against Apollinaris (A.D. 382), calls those Bishops his sons. "In that your
charity pays the due reverence to the Apostolical See, ye profit yourselves
the most, most honoured sons. For if, placed as we are in that Holy Church,
in which the Holy Apostle sat and taught, how it becometh us to direct the
helm to which we have succeeded, we nevertheless confess ourselves
unequal to that honour; yet do we therefore study as we may, if so be we
may be able to attain to the glory of his blessedness."[159:3] "I speak," says
St. Jerome to the same St. Damasus, "with the successor of the fisherman
and the disciple of the Cross. I, following no one as my chief but Christ, am
associated in communion with thy blessedness, that is, with the See of
Peter. I know that on that rock the Church is built. Whosoever shall eat the
Lamb outside this House is profane; if a man be not in the Ark of Noe, he
shall perish when the flood comes in its power."[160:1] St. Basil entreats St.
Damasus to send persons to arbitrate between the Churches of Asia Minor,
or at least to make a report on the authors of their troubles, and name the
party with which the Pope should hold communion. "We are in no wise
asking anything new," he proceeds, "but what was customary with blessed

and religious men of former times, and especially with yourself. For we
know, by tradition of our fathers of whom we have inquired, and from the
information of writings still preserved among us, that Dionysius, that most
blessed Bishop, while he was eminent among you for orthodoxy and other
virtues, sent letters of visitation to our Church at Cæsarea, and of
consolation to our fathers, with ransomers of our brethren from captivity."
In like manner, Ambrosiaster, a Pelagian in his doctrine, which here is not
to the purpose, speaks of the "Church being God's house, whose ruler at this
time is Damasus."[160:2]

13.
"We bear," says St. Siricius, another Pope (A.D. 385), "the burden of all who
are laden; yea, rather the blessed Apostle Peter beareth them in us, who, as
we trust, in all things protects and defends us the heirs of his government."
[160:3]
And he in turn is confirmed by St. Optatus. "You cannot deny your
knowledge," says the latter to Parmenian, the Donatist, "that, in the city
Rome, on Peter first hath an Episcopal See been conferred, in which Peter
sat, the head of all the Apostles, . . . in which one See unity might be
preserved by all, lest the other Apostles should support their respective
Sees; in order that he might be at once a schismatic and a sinner, who
against that one See (singularem) placed a second. Therefore that one See
(unicam), which is the first of the Church's prerogatives, Peter filled first; to
whom succeeded Linus; to Linus, Clement; to Clement, &c., &c. . . . to
Damasus, Siricius, who at this day is associated with us (socius), together
with whom the whole world is in accordance with us, in the one bond of
communion, by the intercourse of letters of peace."[161:1]
Another Pope: "Diligently and congruously do ye consult the arcana of the
Apostolical dignity," says St. Innocent to the Council of Milevis (A.D. 417),
"the dignity of him on whom, beside those things which are without, falls
the care of all the Churches; following the form of the ancient rule, which
you know, as well as I, has been preserved always by the whole world."
[161:2]
Here the Pope appeals, as it were, to the Rule of Vincentius; while St.
Augustine bears witness that he did not outstep his Prerogative, for, giving
an account of this and another letter, he says, "He [the Pope] answered us as

to all these matters as it was religious and becoming in the Bishop of the
Apostolic See."[161:3]
Another Pope: "We have especial anxiety about all persons," says St.
Celestine (A.D. 425), to the Illyrian Bishops, "on whom, in the holy Apostle
Peter, Christ conferred the necessity of making all men our care, when He
gave him the Keys of opening and shutting." And St. Prosper, his
contemporary, confirms him, when he calls Rome "the seat of Peter, which,
being made to the world the head of pastoral honour, possesses by religion
what it does not possess by arms;" and Vincent of Lerins, when he calls the
Pope "the head of the world."[161:4]

14.
Another Pope: "Blessed Peter," says St. Leo (A.D. 440, &c.), "hath not
deserted the helm of the Church which he had assumed. . . His power lives
and his authority is pre-eminent in his See."[162:1] "That immoveableness,
which, from the Rock Christ, he, when made a rock, received, has been
communicated also to his heirs."[162:2] And as St. Athanasius and the
Eusebians, by their contemporary testimonies, confirm St. Julius; and St.
Jerome, St. Basil; and Ambrosiaster, St. Damasus; and St. Optatus, St.
Siricius; and St. Augustine, St. Innocent; and St. Prosper and Vincent, St.
Celestine; so do St. Peter Chrysologus, and the Council of Chalcedon
confirm St. Leo. "Blessed Peter," says Chrysologus, "who lives and presides
in his own See, supplies truth of faith to those who seek it."[162:3] And the
Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, addressing St. Leo respecting
Dioscorus, Bishop of Alexandria: "He extends his madness even against
him to whom the custody of the vineyard has been committed by the
Saviour, that is, against thy Apostolical holiness."[162:4] But the instance of
St. Leo will occur again in a later Chapter.

15.
The acts of the fourth century speak as strongly as its words. We may
content ourselves here with Barrow's admissions:—

"The Pope's power," he says, "was much amplified by the importunity of
persons condemned or extruded from their places, whether upon just
accounts, or wrongfully, and by faction; for they, finding no other more
hopeful place of refuge and redress, did often apply to him: for what will
not men do, whither will not they go in straits? Thus did Marcion go to
Rome, and sue for admission to communion there. So Fortunatus and
Felicissimus in St. Cyprian, being condemned in Afric, did fly to Rome for
shelter; of which absurdity St. Cyprian doth so complain. So likewise
Martianus and Basilides in St. Cyprian, being outed of their Sees for having
lapsed from the Christian profession, did fly to Stephen for succour, to be
restored. So Maximus, the Cynic, went to Rome, to get a confirmation of
his election at Constantinople. So Marcellus, being rejected for heterodoxy,
went thither to get attestation to his orthodoxy, of which St. Basil
complaineth. So Apiarus, being condemned in Afric for his crimes, did
appeal to Rome. And, on the other side, Athanasius being with great
partiality condemned by the Synod of Tyre; Paulus and other bishops being
extruded from their sees for orthodoxy; St. Chrysostom being condemned
and expelled by Theophilus and his complices; Flavianus being deposed by
Dioscorus and the Ephesine synod; Theodoret being condemned by the
same; did cry out for help to Rome. Chelidonius, Bishop of Besançon,
being deposed by Hilarius of Arles for crime, did fly to Pope Leo."
Again: "Our adversaries do oppose some instances of popes meddling in the
constitution of bishops; as, Pope Leo I. saith, that Anatolius did 'by the
favour of his assent obtain the bishopric of Constantinople.' The same Pope
is alleged as having confirmed Maximus of Antioch. The same doth write to
the Bishop of Thessalonica, his vicar, that he should 'confirm the elections
of bishops by his authority.' He also confirmed Donatus, an African bishop:
—'We will that Donatus preside over the Lord's flock, upon condition that
he remember to send us an account of his faith.' . . Pope Damasus did
confirm the ordination of Peter Alexandrinus."

16.
And again: "The Popes indeed in the fourth century began to practise a fine
trick, very serviceable to the enlargement of their power; which was to
confer on certain bishops, as occasion served, or for continuance, the title of

their vicar or lieutenant, thereby pretending to impart authority to them;
whereby they were enabled for performance of divers things, which
otherwise by their own episcopal or metropolitical power they could not
perform. By which device they did engage such bishops to such a
dependence on them, whereby they did promote the papal authority in
provinces, to the oppression of the ancient rights and liberties of bishops
and synods, doing what they pleased under pretence of this vast power
communicated to them; and for fear of being displaced, or out of affection
to their favourer, doing what might serve to advance the papacy. Thus did
Pope Celestine constitute Cyril in his room. Pope Leo appointed Anatolius
of Constantinople; Pope Felix, Acacius of Constantinople. . . . . Pope
Simplicius to Zeno, Bishop of Seville: 'We thought it convenient that you
should be held up by the vicariat authority of our see.' So did Siricius and
his successors constitute the bishops of Thessalonica to be their vicars in the
diocese of Illyricum, wherein being then a member of the western empire
they had caught a special jurisdiction; to which Pope Leo did refer in those
words, which sometimes are impertinently alleged with reference to all
bishops, but concern only Anastasius, Bishop of Thessalonica: 'We have
entrusted thy charity to be in our stead; so that thou art called into part of
the solicitude, not into plenitude of the authority.' So did Pope Zosimus
bestow a like pretence of vicarious power upon the Bishop of Arles, which
city was the seat of the temporal exarch in Gaul."[164:1]

17.
More ample testimony for the Papal Supremacy, as now professed by
Roman Catholics, is scarcely necessary than what is contained in these
passages; the simple question is, whether the clear light of the fourth and
fifth centuries may be fairly taken to interpret to us the dim, though definite,
outlines traced in the preceding.

FOOTNOTES:
[123:1] Wood's Mechanics, p. 31.

[124:1] Authent. N. T. Tr. p. 237.
[124:2] According to Less.
[124:3] Tracts for the Times, No. 85, p. 78 [Discuss. iii. 6, p. 207].
[125:1] [Ibid. p. 209. These results are taken from Less, and are practically
accurate.]
[126:1] No. 85 [Discuss. p. 236].
[132:1] Ep. 93. I have thought it best to give an over-literal translation.
[132:2] Vid. Concil. Bracar. ap. Aguirr. Conc. Hisp. t. ii. p. 676. "That the cup
was not administered at the same time is not so clear; but from the tenor of this
first Canon in the Acts of the Third Council of Braga, which condemns the
notion that the Host should be steeped in the chalice, we have no doubt that the
wine was withheld from the laity. Whether certain points of doctrine are or are
not found in the Scriptures is no concern of the historian; all that he has to do is
religiously to follow his guides, to suppress or distrust nothing through
partiality."—Dunham, Hist. of Spain and Port. vol. i. p. 204. If pro complemento
communionis in the Canon merely means "for the Cup," at least the Cup is
spoken of as a complement; the same view is contained in the "confirmation of
the Eucharist," as spoken of in St. German's life. Vid. Lives of Saints, No. 9, p.
28.
[132:3] Niceph. Hist. xviii. 45. Renaudot, however, tells us of two Bishops at the
time when the schism was at length healed. Patr. Al. Jac. p. 248. However, these
had been consecrated by priests, p. 145.
[133:1] Vid. Bing. Ant. xv. 4, § 7; and Fleury, Hist. xxvi. 50, note g.
[135:1] Kaye's Justin, p. 59, &c.
[135:2] Kaye's Clement, p. 335.
[135:3] p. 341.
[135:4] Ib. 342.
[136:1] Reliqu. Sacr. t. ii. p. 469, 470.
[137:1] [This subject is more exactly and carefully treated in Tracts Theol. and
Eccles. pp. 192-226.]
[138:1] [They also had a cultus in themselves, and specially when a greater
Presence did not overshadow them. Vid. Via Media, vol. ii. art. iv. 8, note 1.]
[139:1] Exod. xxxiii. 10.
[139:2] Dan. x. 5-17.
[141:1] Athan. Orat. i. 42, Oxf. tr.
[141:2] [Vid. supr. p. 138, note 8.]
[142:1] Athan. ibid.

[142:2] And so Eusebius, in his Life of Constantine: "The all-holy choir of God's
perpetual virgins, he was used almost to worship (σέβων), believing that that
God, to whom they had consecrated themselves, was an inhabitant in the souls of
such." Vit. Const. iv. 28.
[146:1] Hær. 78, 18.
[148:1] Aug. de Nat. et Grat. 42. Ambros. Ep. 1, 49, § 2. In Psalm 118, v. 3, de
Instit. Virg. 50. Hier. in Is. xi. 1, contr. Pelag. ii. 4. Nil. Ep. i. p. 267. Antioch. ap.
Cyr. de Rect. Fid. p. 49. Ephr. Opp. Syr. t. 3, p. 607. Max. Hom. 45. Procl. Orat.
vi. pp. 225-228, p. 60, p. 179, 180, ed. 1630. Theodot. ap. Amphiloch. pp. 39,
&c. Fulgent. Serm. 3, p. 125. Chrysol. Serm. 142. A striking passage from
another Sermon of the last-mentioned author, on the words "She cast in her mind
what manner of salutation," &c., may be added: "Quantus sit Deus satis ignorat
ille, qui hujus Virginis mentem non stupet, animum non miratur. Pavet cœlum,
tremunt Angeli, creatura non sustinet, natura non sufficit; et una puella sic Deum
in sui pectoris capit, recipit, oblectat hospitio, ut pacem terris, cœlis gloriam,
salutem perditis, vitam mortuis, terrenis cum cœlestibus parentelam, ipsius Dei
cum carne commercium, pro ipsâ domûs exigat pensione, pro ipsius uteri
mercede conquirat," &c. Serm. 140. [St. Basil, St. Chrysostom, and St. Cyril of
Alexandria sometimes speak, it is true, in a different tone; on this subject vid.
"Letter to Dr. Pusey," Note iii., Diff. of Angl. vol. 2.]
[153:1] Pope's Suprem. ed. 1836, pp. 26, 27, 157, 171, 222.
[157:1] ἥτις καὶ προκάθηται ἐν τόπῳ χωρίου Ῥωμαίων.
[158:1] Athan. Hist. Tracts. Oxf. tr. p. 56.
[159:1] Hist. ii. 17.
[159:2] Hist. iii. 10.
[159:3] Theod. Hist. v. 10.
[160:1] Coustant, Epp. Pont. p. 546.
[160:2] In 1 Tim. iii. 14, 15.
[160:3] Coustant, p. 624.
[161:1] ii. 3.
[161:2] Coustant, pp. 896, 1064.
[161:3] Ep. 186, 2.
[161:4] De Ingrat. 2. Common. 41.
[162:1] Serm. De Natal. iii. 3.
[162:2] Ibid. v. 4.
[162:3] Ep. ad Eutych. fin.
[162:4] Concil. Hard. t. ii. p. 656.

[164:1] Barrow on the Supremacy, ed. 1836, pp. 263, 331, 384.

PART II.
DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
VIEWED RELATIVELY TO DOCTRINAL
CORRUPTIONS.

CHAPTER V.
GENUINE DEVELOPMENTS CONTRASTED WITH
CORRUPTIONS.

I have been engaged in drawing out the positive and direct argument in
proof of the intimate connexion, or rather oneness, with primitive Apostolic
teaching, of the body of doctrine known at this day by the name of Catholic,
and professed substantially both by Eastern and Western Christendom. That
faith is undeniably the historical continuation of the religious system, which
bore the name of Catholic in the eighteenth century, in the seventeenth, in
the sixteenth, and so back in every preceding century, till we arrive at the
first;—undeniably the successor, the representative, the heir of the religion
of Cyprian, Basil, Ambrose and Augustine. The only question that can be
raised is whether the said Catholic faith, as now held, is logically, as well as
historically, the representative of the ancient faith. This then is the subject,
to which I have as yet addressed myself, and I have maintained that modern
Catholicism is nothing else but simply the legitimate growth and
complement, that is, the natural and necessary development, of the doctrine
of the early church, and that its divine authority is included in the divinity
of Christianity.

2.
So far I have gone, but an important objection presents itself for distinct
consideration. It may be said in answer to me that it is not enough that a
certain large system of doctrine, such as that which goes by the name of
Catholic, should admit of being referred to beliefs, opinions, and usages
which prevailed among the first Christians, in order to my having a logical
right to include a reception of the later teaching in the reception of the
earlier; that an intellectual development may be in one sense natural, and
yet untrue to its original, as diseases come of nature, yet are the destruction,
or rather the negation of health; that the causes which stimulate the growth
of ideas may also disturb and deform them; and that Christianity might

indeed have been intended by its Divine Author for a wide expansion of the
ideas proper to it, and yet this great benefit hindered by the evil birth of
cognate errors which acted as its counterfeit; in a word, that what I have
called developments in the Roman Church are nothing more or less than
what used to be called her corruptions; and that new names do not destroy
old grievances.
This is what may be said, and I acknowledge its force: it becomes necessary
in consequence to assign certain characteristics of faithful developments,
which none but faithful developments have, and the presence of which
serves as a test to discriminate between them and corruptions. This I at once
proceed to do, and I shall begin by determining what a corruption is, and
why it cannot rightly be called, and how it differs from, a development.

3.
To find then what a corruption or perversion of the truth is, let us inquire
what the word means, when used literally of material substances. Now it is
plain, first of all, that a corruption is a word attaching to organized matters
only; a stone may be crushed to powder, but it cannot be corrupted.
Corruption, on the contrary, is the breaking up of life, preparatory to its
termination. This resolution of a body into its component parts is the stage
before its dissolution; it begins when life has reached its perfection, and it is
the sequel, or rather the continuation, of that process towards perfection,
being at the same time the reversal and undoing of what went before. Till
this point of regression is reached, the body has a function of its own, and a
direction and aim in its action, and a nature with laws; these it is now
losing, and the traits and tokens of former years; and with them its vigour
and powers of nutrition, of assimilation, and of self-reparation.

4.
Taking this analogy as a guide, I venture to set down seven Notes of
varying cogency, independence and applicability, to discriminate healthy
developments of an idea from its state of corruption and decay, as follows:
—There is no corruption if it retains one and the same type, the same
principles, the same organization; if its beginnings anticipate its subsequent
phases, and its later phenomena protect and subserve its earlier; if it has a

power of assimilation and revival, and a vigorous action from first to last.
On these tests I shall now enlarge, nearly in the order in which I have
enumerated them.

SECTION I.

FIRST NOTE OF A GENUINE DEVELOPMENT.

PRESERVATION OF TYPE.

This is readily suggested by the analogy of physical growth, which is such
that the parts and proportions of the developed form, however altered,
correspond to those which belong to its rudiments. The adult animal has the
same make, as it had on its birth; young birds do not grow into fishes, nor
does the child degenerate into the brute, wild or domestic, of which he is by
inheritance lord. Vincentius of Lerins adopts this illustration in distinct
reference to Christian doctrine. "Let the soul's religion," he says "imitate the
law of the body, which, as years go on developes indeed and opens out its
due proportions, and yet remains identically what it was. Small are a baby's
limbs, a youth's are larger, yet they are the same."[172:1]

2.
In like manner every calling or office has its own type, which those who fill
it are bound to maintain; and to deviate from the type in any material point
is to relinquish the calling. Thus both Chaucer and Goldsmith have drawn
pictures of a true parish priest; these differ in details, but on the whole they
agree together, and are one in such sense, that sensuality, or ambition, must
be considered a forfeiture of that high title. Those magistrates, again, are
called "corrupt," who are guided in their judgments by love of lucre or
respect of persons, for the administration of justice is their essential
function. Thus collegiate or monastic bodies lose their claim to their
endowments or their buildings, as being relaxed and degenerate, if they
neglect their statutes or their Rule. Thus, too, in political history, a mayor of

the palace, such as he became in the person of Pepin, was no faithful
development of the office he filled, as originally intended and established.

3.
In like manner, it has been argued by a late writer, whether fairly or not
does not interfere with the illustration, that the miraculous vision and dream
of the Labarum could not have really taken place, as reported by Eusebius,
because it is counter to the original type of Christianity. "For the first time,"
he says, on occasion of Constantine's introduction of the standard into his
armies, "the meek and peaceful Jesus became a God of battle, and the
Cross, the holy sign of Christian Redemption, a banner of bloody
strife. . . . . This was the first advance to the military Christianity of the
middle ages, a modification of the pure religion of the Gospel, if directly
opposed to its genuine principles, still apparently indispensable to the social
progress of men."[173:1]
On the other hand, a popular leader may go through a variety of
professions, he may court parties and break with them, he may contradict
himself in words, and undo his own measures, yet there may be a steady
fulfilment of certain objects, or adherence to certain plain doctrines, which
gives a unity to his career, and impresses on beholders an image of
directness and large consistency which shows a fidelity to his type from
first to last.

4.
However, as the last instances suggest to us, this unity of type,
characteristic as it is of faithful developments, must not be pressed to the
extent of denying all variation, nay, considerable alteration of proportion
and relation, as time goes on, in the parts or aspects of an idea. Great
changes in outward appearance and internal harmony occur in the instance
of the animal creation itself. The fledged bird differs much from its
rudimental form in the egg. The butterfly is the development, but not in any
sense the image, of the grub. The whale claims a place among mammalia,
though we might fancy that, as in the child's game of catscradle, some
strange introsusception had been permitted, to make it so like, yet so

contrary, to the animals with which it is itself classed. And, in like manner,
if beasts of prey were once in paradise, and fed upon grass, they must have
presented bodily phenomena very different from the structure of muscles,
claws, teeth, and viscera which now fit them for a carnivorous existence.
Eutychius, Patriarch of Constantinople, on his death-bed, grasped his own
hand and said, "I confess that in this flesh we shall all rise again;" yet flesh
and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, and a glorified body has
attributes incompatible with its present condition on earth.

5.
More subtle still and mysterious are the variations which are consistent or
not inconsistent with identity in political and religious developments. The
Catholic doctrine of the Holy Trinity has ever been accused by heretics of
interfering with that of the Divine Unity out of which it grew, and even
believers will at first sight consider that it tends to obscure it. Yet Petavius
says, "I will affirm, what perhaps will surprise the reader, that that
distinction of Persons which, in regard to proprietates is in reality most
great, is so far from disparaging the Unity and Simplicity of God that this
very real distinction especially avails for the doctrine that God is One and
most Simple."[174:1]
Again, Arius asserted that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity was not
able to comprehend the First, whereas Eunomius's characteristic tenet was
in an opposite direction, viz., that not only the Son, but that all men could
comprehend God; yet no one can doubt that Eunomianism was a true
development, not a corruption of Arianism.
The same man may run through various philosophies or beliefs, which are
in themselves irreconcilable, without inconsistency, since in him they may
be nothing more than accidental instruments or expressions of what he is
inwardly from first to last. The political doctrines of the modern Tory
resemble those of the primitive Whig; yet few will deny that the Whig and
Tory characters have each a discriminating type. Calvinism has changed
into Unitarianism: yet this need not be called a corruption, even if it be not,
strictly speaking, a development; for Harding, in controversy with Jewell,
surmised the coming change three centuries since, and it has occurred not in
one country, but in many.

6.
The history of national character supplies an analogy, rather than an
instance strictly in point; yet there is so close a connexion between the
development of minds and of ideas that it is allowable to refer to it here.
Thus we find England of old the most loyal supporter, and England of late
the most jealous enemy, of the Holy See. As great a change is exhibited in
France, once the eldest born of the Church and the flower of her
knighthood, now democratic and lately infidel. Yet, in neither nation, can
these great changes be well called corruptions.
Or again, let us reflect on the ethical vicissitudes of the chosen people. How
different is their grovelling and cowardly temper on leaving Egypt from the
chivalrous spirit, as it may be called, of the age of David, or, again, from the
bloody fanaticism which braved Titus and Hadrian! In what contrast is that
impotence of mind which gave way at once, and bowed the knee, at the
very sight of a pagan idol, with the stern iconoclasm and bigoted nationality
of later Judaism! How startling the apparent absence of what would be
called talent in this people during their supernatural Dispensation,
compared with the gifts of mind which various witnesses assign to them
now!

7.
And, in like manner, ideas may remain, when the expression of them is
indefinitely varied; and we cannot determine whether a professed
development is truly such or not, without further knowledge than an
experience of the mere fact of this variation. Nor will our instinctive
feelings serve as a criterion. It must have been an extreme shock to St. Peter
to be told he must slay and eat beasts, unclean as well as clean, though such
a command was implied already in that faith which he held and taught; a
shock, which a single effort, or a short period, or the force of reason would
not suffice to overcome. Nay, it may happen that a representation which
varies from its original may be felt as more true and faithful than one which
has more pretensions to be exact. So it is with many a portrait which is not
striking: at first look, of course, it disappoints us; but when we are familiar
with it, we see in it what we could not see at first, and prefer it, not to a

perfect likeness, but to many a sketch which is so precise as to be a
caricature.

8.
On the other hand, real perversions and corruptions are often not so unlike
externally to the doctrine from which they come, as are changes which are
consistent with it and true developments. When Rome changed from a
Republic to an Empire, it was a real alteration of polity, or what may be
called a corruption; yet in appearance the change was small. The old offices
or functions of government remained: it was only that the Imperator, or
Commander in Chief, concentrated them in his own person. Augustus was
Consul and Tribune, Supreme Pontiff and Censor, and the Imperial rule
was, in the words of Gibbon, "an absolute monarchy disguised by the forms
of a commonwealth." On the other hand, when the dissimulation of
Augustus was exchanged for the ostentation of Dioclesian, the real
alteration of constitution was trivial, but the appearance of change was
great. Instead of plain Consul, Censor, and Tribune, Dioclesian became
Dominus or King, assumed the diadem, and threw around him the forms of
a court.
Nay, one cause of corruption in religion is the refusal to follow the course
of doctrine as it moves on, and an obstinacy in the notions of the past.
Certainly: as we see conspicuously in the history of the chosen race. The
Samaritans who refused to add the Prophets to the Law, and the Sadducees
who denied a truth which was covertly taught in the Book of Exodus, were
in appearance only faithful adherents to the primitive doctrine. Our Lord
found His people precisians in their obedience to the letter; He condemned
them for not being led on to its spirit, that is, to its developments. The
Gospel is the development of the Law; yet what difference seems wider
than that which separates the unbending rule of Moses from the "grace and
truth" which "came by Jesus Christ?" Samuel had of old time fancied that
the tall Eliab was the Lord's anointed; and Jesse had thought David only fit
for the sheepcote; and when the Great King came, He was "as a root out of
a dry ground;" but strength came out of weakness, and out of the strong
sweetness.

So it is in the case of our friends; the most obsequious are not always the
truest, and seeming cruelty is often genuine affection. We know the conduct
of the three daughters in the drama towards the old king. She who had
found her love "more richer than her tongue," and could not "heave her
heart into her mouth," was in the event alone true to her father.

9.
An idea then does not always bear about it the same external image; this
circumstance, however, has no force to weaken the argument for its
substantial identity, as drawn from its external sameness, when such
sameness remains. On the contrary, for that very reason, unity of type
becomes so much the surer guarantee of the healthiness and soundness of
developments, when it is persistently preserved in spite of their number or
importance.

SECTION II.

SECOND NOTE. CONTINUITY OF PRINCIPLES.

As in mathematical creations figures are formed on distinct formulæ, which
are the laws under which they are developed, so it is in ethical and political
subjects. Doctrines expand variously according to the mind, individual or
social, into which they are received; and the peculiarities of the recipient are
the regulating power, the law, the organization, or, as it may be called, the
form of the development. The life of doctrines may be said to consist in the
law or principle which they embody.
Principles are abstract and general, doctrines relate to facts; doctrines
develope, and principles at first sight do not; doctrines grow and are
enlarged, principles are permanent; doctrines are intellectual, and principles
are more immediately ethical and practical. Systems live in principles and
represent doctrines. Personal responsibility is a principle, the Being of a
God is a doctrine; from that doctrine all theology has come in due course,

whereas that principle is not clearer under the Gospel than in paradise, and
depends, not on belief in an Almighty Governor, but on conscience.
Yet the difference between the two sometimes merely exists in our mode of
viewing them; and what is a doctrine in one philosophy is a principle in
another. Personal responsibility may be made a doctrinal basis, and
develope into Arminianism or Pelagianism. Again, it may be discussed
whether infallibility is a principle or a doctrine of the Church of Rome, and
dogmatism a principle or doctrine of Christianity. Again, consideration for
the poor is a doctrine of the Church considered as a religious body, and a
principle when she is viewed as a political power.
Doctrines stand to principles, as the definitions to the axioms and postulates
of mathematics. Thus the 15th and 17th propositions of Euclid's book I. are
developments, not of the three first axioms, which are required in the proof,
but of the definition of a right angle. Perhaps the perplexity, which arises in
the mind of a beginner, on learning the early propositions of the second
book, arises from these being more prominently exemplifications of axioms
than developments of definitions. He looks for developments from the
definition of the rectangle, and finds but various particular cases of the
general truth, that "the whole is equal to its parts."

2.
It might be expected that the Catholic principles would be later in
development than the Catholic doctrines, inasmuch as they lie deeper in the
mind, and are assumptions rather than objective professions. This has been
the case. The Protestant controversy has mainly turned, or is turning, on one
or other of the principles of Catholicity; and to this day the rule of Scripture
Interpretation, the doctrine of Inspiration, the relation of Faith to Reason,
moral responsibility, private judgment, inherent grace, the seat of
infallibility, remain, I suppose, more or less undeveloped, or, at least,
undefined, by the Church.
Doctrines stand to principles, if it may be said without fancifulness, as
fecundity viewed relatively to generation, though this analogy must not be
strained. Doctrines are developed by the operation of principles, and
develope variously according to those principles. Thus a belief in the

transitiveness of worldly goods leads the Epicurean to enjoyment, and the
ascetic to mortification; and, from their common doctrine of the sinfulness
of matter, the Alexandrian Gnostics became sensualists, and the Syrian
devotees. The same philosophical elements, received into a certain
sensibility or insensibility to sin and its consequences, leads one mind to the
Church of Rome; another to what, for want of a better word, may be called
Germanism.
Again, religious investigation sometimes is conducted on the principle that
it is a duty "to follow and speak the truth," which really means that it is no
duty to fear error, or to consider what is safest, or to shrink from scattering
doubts, or to regard the responsibility of misleading; and thus it terminates
in heresy or infidelity, without any blame to religious investigation in itself.
Again, to take a different subject, what constitutes a chief interest of
dramatic compositions and tales, is to use external circumstances, which
may be considered their law of development, as a means of bringing out
into different shapes, and showing under new aspects, the personal
peculiarities of character, according as either those circumstances or those
peculiarities vary in the case of the personages introduced.

3.
Principles are popularly said to develope when they are but exemplified;
thus the various sects of Protestantism, unconnected as they are with each
other, are called developments of the principle of Private Judgment, of
which really they are but applications and results.
A development, to be faithful, must retain both the doctrine and the
principle with which it started. Doctrine without its correspondent principle
remains barren, if not lifeless, of which the Greek Church seems an
instance; or it forms those hollow professions which are familiarly called
"shams," as a zeal for an established Church and its creed on merely
conservative or temporal motives. Such, too, was the Roman Constitution
between the reigns of Augustus and Dioclesian.
On the other hand, principle without its corresponding doctrine may be
considered as the state of religious minds in the heathen world, viewed

relatively to Revelation; that is, of the "children of God who are scattered
abroad."
Pagans may have, heretics cannot have, the same principles as Catholics; if
the latter have the same, they are not real heretics, but in ignorance.
Principle is a better test of heresy than doctrine. Heretics are true to their
principles, but change to and fro, backwards and forwards, in opinion; for
very opposite doctrines may be exemplifications of the same principle.
Thus the Antiochenes and other heretics sometimes were Arians, sometimes
Sabellians, sometimes Nestorians, sometimes Monophysites, as if at
random, from fidelity to their common principle, that there is no mystery in
theology. Thus Calvinists become Unitarians from the principle of private
judgment. The doctrines of heresy are accidents and soon run to an end; its
principles are everlasting.
This, too, is often the solution of the paradox "Extremes meet," and of the
startling reactions which take place in individuals; viz., the presence of
some one principle or condition, which is dominant in their minds from first
to last. If one of two contradictory alternatives be necessarily true on a
certain hypothesis, then the denial of the one leads, by mere logical
consistency and without direct reasons, to a reception of the other. Thus the
question between the Church of Rome and Protestantism falls in some
minds into the proposition, "Rome is either the pillar and ground of the
Truth, or she is Antichrist;" in proportion, then, as they revolt from
considering her the latter are they compelled to receive her as the former.
Hence, too, men may pass from infidelity to Rome, and from Rome to
infidelity, from a conviction in both courses that there is no tangible
intellectual position between the two.
Protestantism, viewed in its more Catholic aspect, is doctrine without active
principle; viewed in its heretical, it is active principle without doctrine.
Many of its speakers, for instance, use eloquent and glowing language
about the Church and its characteristics: some of them do not realize what
they say, but use high words and general statements about "the faith," and
"primitive truth," and "schism," and "heresy," to which they attach no
definite meaning; while others speak of "unity," "universality," and
"Catholicity," and use the words in their own sense and for their own ideas.

4.
The science of grammar affords another instance of the existence of special
laws in the formation of systems. Some languages have more elasticity than
others, and greater capabilities; and the difficulty of explaining the fact
cannot lead us to doubt it. There are languages, for instance, which have a
capacity for compound words, which, we cannot tell why, is in matter of
fact denied to others. We feel the presence of a certain character or genius in
each, which determines its path and its range; and to discover and enter into
it is one part of refined scholarship. And when particular writers, in
consequence perhaps of some theory, tax a language beyond its powers, the
failure is conspicuous. Very subtle, too, and difficult to draw out, are the
principles on which depends the formation of proper names in a particular
people. In works of fiction, names or titles, significant or ludicrous, must be
invented for the characters introduced; and some authors excel in their
fabrication, while others are equally unfortunate. Foreign novels, perhaps,
attempt to frame English surnames, and signally fail; yet what every one
feels to be the case, no one can analyze: that is, our surnames are
constructed on a law which is only exhibited in particular instances, and
which rules their formation on certain, though subtle, determinations.
And so in philosophy, the systems of physics or morals, which go by
celebrated names, proceed upon the assumption of certain conditions which
are necessary for every stage of their development. The Newtonian theory
of gravitation is based on certain axioms; for instance, that the fewest
causes assignable for phenomena are the true ones: and the application of
science to practical purposes depends upon the hypothesis that what
happens to-day will happen to-morrow.
And so in military matters, the discovery of gunpowder developed the
science of attack and defence in a new instrumentality. Again, it is said that
when Napoleon began his career of victories, the enemy's generals
pronounced that his battles were fought against rule, and that he ought not
to be victorious.

5.

So states have their respective policies, on which they move forward, and
which are the conditions of their well-being. Thus it is sometimes said that
the true policy of the American Union, or the law of its prosperity, is not the
enlargement of its territory, but the cultivation of its internal resources. Thus
Russia is said to be weak in attack, strong in defence, and to grow, not by
the sword, but by diplomacy. Thus Islamism is said to be the form or life of
the Ottoman, and Protestantism of the British Empire, and the admission of
European ideas into the one, or of Catholic ideas into the other, to be the
destruction of the respective conditions of their power. Thus Augustus and
Tiberius governed by dissimulation; thus Pericles in his "Funeral Oration"
draws out the principles of the Athenian commonwealth, viz., that it is
carried on, not by formal and severe enactments, but by the ethical
character and spontaneous energy of the people.
The political principles of Christianity, if it be right to use such words of a
divine polity, are laid down for us in the Sermon on the Mount.
Contrariwise to other empires, Christians conquer by yielding; they gain
influence by shrinking from it; they possess the earth by renouncing it.
Gibbon speaks of "the vices of the clergy" as being "to a philosophic eye far
less dangerous than their virtues."[184:1]
Again, as to Judaism, it may be asked on what law it developed; that is,
whether Mahometanism may not be considered as a sort of Judaism, as
formed by the presence of a different class of influences. In this contrast
between them, perhaps it may be said that the expectation of a Messiah was
the principle or law which expanded the elements, almost common to
Judaism with Mahometanism, into their respective characteristic shapes.
One of the points of discipline to which Wesley attached most importance
was that of preaching early in the morning. This was his principle. In
Georgia, he began preaching at five o'clock every day, winter and summer.
"Early preaching," he said, "is the glory of the Methodists; whenever this is
dropt, they will dwindle away into nothing, they have lost their first love,
they are a fallen people."

6.

Now, these instances show, as has been incidentally observed of some of
them, that the destruction of the special laws or principles of a development
is its corruption. Thus, as to nations, when we talk of the spirit of a people
being lost, we do not mean that this or that act has been committed, or
measure carried, but that certain lines of thought or conduct by which it has
grown great are abandoned. Thus the Roman Poets consider their State in
course of ruin because its prisci mores and pietas were failing. And so we
speak of countries or persons as being in a false position, when they take up
a course of policy, or assume a profession, inconsistent with their natural
interests or real character. Judaism, again, was rejected when it rejected the
Messiah.
Thus the continuity or the alteration of the principles on which an idea has
developed is a second mark of discrimination between a true development
and a corruption.

SECTION III.

THIRD NOTE. POWER OF ASSIMILATION.

In the physical world, whatever has life is characterized by growth, so that
in no respect to grow is to cease to live. It grows by taking into its own
substance external materials; and this absorption or assimilation is
completed when the materials appropriated come to belong to it or enter
into its unity. Two things cannot become one, except there be a power of
assimilation in one or the other. Sometimes assimilation is effected only
with an effort; it is possible to die of repletion, and there are animals who
lie torpid for a time under the contest between the foreign substance and the
assimilating power. And different food is proper for different recipients.
This analogy may be taken to illustrate certain peculiarities in the growth or
development in ideas, which were noticed in the first Chapter. It is
otherwise with mathematical and other abstract creations, which, like the
soul itself, are solitary and self-dependent; but doctrines and views which
relate to man are not placed in a void, but in the crowded world, and make

way for themselves by interpenetration, and develope by absorption. Facts
and opinions, which have hitherto been regarded in other relations and
grouped round other centres, henceforth are gradually attracted to a new
influence and subjected to a new sovereign. They are modified, laid down
afresh, thrust aside, as the case may be. A new element of order and
composition has come among them; and its life is proved by this capacity of
expansion, without disarrangement or dissolution. An eclectic, conservative,
assimilating, healing, moulding process, a unitive power, is of the essence,
and a third test, of a faithful development.

2.
Thus, a power of development is a proof of life, not only in its essay, but
especially in its success; for a mere formula either does not expand or is
shattered in expanding. A living idea becomes many, yet remains one.
The attempt at development shows the presence of a principle, and its
success the presence of an idea. Principles stimulate thought, and an idea
concentrates it.
The idea never was that throve and lasted, yet, like mathematical truth,
incorporated nothing from external sources. So far from the fact of such
incorporation implying corruption, as is sometimes supposed, development
is a process of incorporation. Mahometanism may be in external
developments scarcely more than a compound of other theologies, yet no
one would deny that there has been a living idea somewhere in a religion,
which has been so strong, so wide, so lasting a bond of union in the history
of the world. Why it has not continued to develope after its first preaching,
if this be the case, as it seems to be, cannot be determined without a greater
knowledge of that religion, and how far it is merely political, how far
theological, than we commonly possess.

3.
In Christianity, opinion, while a raw material, is called philosophy or
scholasticism; when a rejected refuse, it is called heresy.

Ideas are more open to an external bias in their commencement than
afterwards; hence the great majority of writers who consider the Medieval
Church corrupt, trace its corruption to the first four centuries, not to what
are called the dark ages.
That an idea more readily coalesces with these ideas than with those does
not show that it has been unduly influenced, that is, corrupted by them, but
that it has an antecedent affinity to them. At least it shall be assumed here
that, when the Gospels speak of virtue going out of our Lord, and of His
healing with the clay which His lips had moistened, they afford instances,
not of a perversion of Christianity, but of affinity to notions which were
external to it; and that St. Paul was not biassed by Orientalism, though he
said, after the manner of some Eastern sects, that it was "excellent not to
touch a woman."

4.
Thus in politics, too, ideas are sometimes proposed, discussed, rejected, or
adopted, as it may happen, and sometimes they are shown to be unmeaning
and impossible; sometimes they are true, but partially so, or in
subordination to other ideas, with which, in consequence, they are as
wholes or in part incorporated, as far as these have affinities to them, the
power to incorporate being thus recognized as a property of life. Mr.
Bentham's system was an attempt to make the circle of legal and moral
truths developments of certain principles of his own;—those principles of
his may, if it so happen, prove unequal to the weight of truths which are
eternal, and the system founded on them may break into pieces; or again, a
State may absorb certain of them, for which it has affinity, that is, it may
develope in Benthamism, yet remain in substance what it was before. In the
history of the French Revolution we read of many middle parties, who
attempted to form theories of constitutions short of those which they would
call extreme, and successively failed from the want of power or reality in
their characteristic ideas. The Semi-arians attempted a middle way between
orthodoxy and heresy, but could not stand their ground; at length part fell
into Macedonianism, and part joined the Church.

5.

The stronger and more living is an idea, that is, the more powerful hold it
exercises on the minds of men, the more able is it to dispense with
safeguards, and trust to itself against the danger of corruption. As strong
frames exult in their agility, and healthy constitutions throw off ailments, so
parties or schools that live can afford to be rash, and will sometimes be
betrayed into extravagances, yet are brought right by their inherent vigour.
On the other hand, unreal systems are commonly decent externally. Forms,
subscriptions, or Articles of religion are indispensable when the principle of
life is weakly. Thus Presbyterianism has maintained its original theology in
Scotland where legal subscriptions are enforced, while it has run into
Arianism or Unitarianism where that protection is away. We have yet to see
whether the Free Kirk can keep its present theological ground. The Church
of Rome can consult expedience more freely than other bodies, as trusting
to her living tradition, and is sometimes thought to disregard principle and
scruple, when she is but dispensing with forms. Thus Saints are often
characterized by acts which are no pattern for others; and the most gifted
men are, by reason of their very gifts, sometimes led into fatal
inadvertences. Hence vows are the wise defence of unstable virtue, and
general rules the refuge of feeble authority.
And so much may suffice on the unitive power of faithful developments,
which constitutes their third characteristic.

SECTION IV.

FOURTH NOTE. LOGICAL SEQUENCE.

Logic is the organization of thought, and, as being such, is a security for the
faithfulness of intellectual developments; and the necessity of using it is
undeniable as far as this, that its rules must not be transgressed. That it is
not brought into exercise in every instance of doctrinal development is
owing to the varieties of mental constitution, whether in communities or in
individuals, with whom great truths or seeming truths are lodged. The
question indeed may be asked whether a development can be other in any
case than a logical operation; but, if by this is meant a conscious reasoning

from premisses to conclusion, of course the answer must be in the negative.
An idea under one or other of its aspects grows in the mind by remaining
there; it becomes familiar and distinct, and is viewed in its relations; it leads
to other aspects, and these again to others, subtle, recondite, original,
according to the character, intellectual and moral, of the recipient; and thus
a body of thought is gradually formed without his recognizing what is going
on within him. And all this while, or at least from time to time, external
circumstances elicit into formal statement the thoughts which are coming
into being in the depths of his mind; and soon he has to begin to defend
them; and then again a further process must take place, of analyzing his
statements and ascertaining their dependence one on another. And thus he is
led to regard as consequences, and to trace to principles, what hitherto he
has discerned by a moral perception, and adopted on sympathy; and logic is
brought in to arrange and inculcate what no science was employed in
gaining.
And so in the same way, such intellectual processes, as are carried on
silently and spontaneously in the mind of a party or school, of necessity
come to light at a later date, and are recognized, and their issues are
scientifically arranged. And then logic has the further function of
propagation; analogy, the nature of the case, antecedent probability,
application of principles, congruity, expedience, being some of the methods
of proof by which the development is continued from mind to mind and
established in the faith of the community.
Yet even then the analysis is not made on a principle, or with any view to its
whole course and finished results. Each argument is brought for an
immediate purpose; minds develope step by step, without looking behind
them or anticipating their goal, and without either intention or promise of
forming a system. Afterwards, however, this logical character which the
whole wears becomes a test that the process has been a true development,
not a perversion or corruption, from its evident naturalness; and in some
cases from the gravity, distinctness, precision, and majesty of its advance,
and the harmony of its proportions, like the tall growth, and graceful
branching, and rich foliage, of some vegetable production.

2.

The process of development, thus capable of a logical expression, has
sometimes been invidiously spoken of as rationalism and contrasted with
faith. But, though a particular doctrine or opinion which is subjected to
development may happen to be rationalistic, and, as is the original, such are
its results: and though we may develope erroneously, that is, reason
incorrectly, yet the developing itself as little deserves that imputation in any
case, as an inquiry into an historical fact, which we do not thereby make but
ascertain,—for instance, whether or not St. Mark wrote his Gospel with St.
Matthew before him, or whether Solomon brought his merchandise from
Tartessus or some Indian port. Rationalism is the exercise of reason instead
of faith in matters of faith; but one does not see how it can be faith to adopt
the premisses, and unbelief to accept the conclusion.
At the same time it may be granted that the spontaneous process which goes
on within the mind itself is higher and choicer than that which is logical; for
the latter, being scientific, is common property, and can be taken and made
use of by minds who are personally strangers, in any true sense, both to the
ideas in question and to their development.

3.
Thus, the holy Apostles would without words know all the truths
concerning the high doctrines of theology, which controversialists after
them have piously and charitably reduced to formulæ, and developed
through argument. Thus, St. Justin or St. Irenæus might be without any
digested ideas of Purgatory or Original Sin, yet have an intense feeling,
which they had not defined or located, both of the fault of our first nature
and the responsibilities of our nature regenerate. Thus St. Antony said to the
philosophers who came to mock him, "He whose mind is in health does not
need letters;" and St. Ignatius Loyola, while yet an unlearned neophyte, was
favoured with transcendent perceptions of the Holy Trinity during his
penance at Manresa. Thus St. Athanasius himself is more powerful in
statement and exposition than in proof; while in Bellarmine we find the
whole series of doctrines carefully drawn out, duly adjusted with one
another, and exactly analyzed one by one.
The history of empires and of public men supplies so many instances of
logical development in the field of politics, that it is needless to do more

than to refer to one of them. It is illustrated by the words of Jeroboam,
"Now shall this kingdom return to the house of David, if this people go up
to do sacrifice in the house of the Lord at Jerusalem. . . Wherefore the king
took counsel and made two calves of gold, and said unto them, Behold thy
gods, O Israel." Idolatry was a duty of kingcraft with the schismatical
kingdom.

4.
A specimen of logical development is afforded us in the history of
Lutheranism as it has of late years been drawn out by various English
writers. Luther started on a double basis, his dogmatic principle being
contradicted by his right of private judgment, and his sacramental by his
theory of justification. The sacramental element never showed signs of life;
but on his death, that which he represented in his own person as a teacher,
the dogmatic, gained the ascendancy; and "every expression of his upon
controverted points became a norm for the party, which, at all times the
largest, was at last coextensive with the Church itself. This almost
idolatrous veneration was perhaps increased by the selection of declarations
of faith, of which the substance on the whole was his, for the symbolical
books of his Church."[193:1] Next a reaction took place; private judgment
was restored to the supremacy. Calixtus put reason, and Spener the so-
called religion of the heart, in the place of dogmatic correctness. Pietism for
the time died away; but rationalism developed in Wolf, who professed to
prove all the orthodox doctrines, by a process of reasoning, from premisses
level with the reason. It was soon found that the instrument which Wolf had
used for orthodoxy, could as plausibly be used against it;—in his hands it
had proved the Creed; in the hands of Semler, Ernesti, and others, it
disproved the authority of Scripture. What was religion to be made to
consist in now? A sort of philosophical Pietism followed; or rather Spener's
pietism and the original theory of justification were analyzed more
thoroughly, and issued in various theories of Pantheism, which from the
first was at the bottom of Luther's doctrine and personal character. And this
appears to be the state of Lutheranism at present, whether we view it in the
philosophy of Kant, in the open infidelity of Strauss, or in the religious
professions of the new Evangelical Church of Prussia. Applying this
instance to the subject which it has been here brought to illustrate, I should

say that the equable and orderly march and natural succession of views, by
which the creed of Luther has been changed into the infidel or heretical
philosophy of his present representatives, is a proof that that change is no
perversion or corruption, but a faithful development of the original idea.

5.
This is but one out of many instances with which the history of the Church
supplies us. The fortunes of a theological school are made, in a later
generation, the measure of the teaching of its founder. The great Origen
after his many labours died in peace; his immediate pupils were saints and
rulers in the Church; he has the praise of St. Athanasius, St. Basil, and St.
Gregory Nazianzen, and furnishes materials to St. Ambrose and St. Hilary;
yet, as time proceeded, a definite heterodoxy was the growing result of his
theology, and at length, three hundred years after his death, he was
condemned, and, as has generally been considered, in an Ecumenical
Council.[194:1] "Diodorus of Tarsus," says Tillemont, "died at an advanced
age, in the peace of the Church, honoured by the praises of the greatest
saints, and crowned with a glory, which, having ever attended him through
life, followed him after his death;"[194:2] yet St. Cyril of Alexandria
considers him and Theodore of Mopsuestia the true authors of
Nestorianism, and he was placed in the event by the Nestorians among their
saints. Theodore himself was condemned after his death by the same
Council which is said to have condemned Origen, and is justly considered
the chief rationalizing doctor of Antiquity; yet he was in the highest repute
in his day, and the Eastern Synod complains, as quoted by Facundus, that
"Blessed Theodore, who died so happily, who was so eminent a teacher for
five and forty years, and overthrew every heresy, and in his lifetime
experienced no imputation from the orthodox, now after his death so long
ago, after his many conflicts, after his ten thousand books composed in
refutation of errors, after his approval in the sight of priests, emperors, and
people, runs the risk of receiving the reward of heretics, and of being called
their chief."[195:1] There is a certain continuous advance and determinate
path which belong to the history of a doctrine, policy, or institution, and
which impress upon the common sense of mankind, that what it ultimately
becomes is the issue of what it was at first. This sentiment is expressed in
the proverb, not limited to Latin, Exitus acta probat; and is sanctioned by

Divine wisdom, when, warning us against false prophets, it says, "Ye shall
know them by their fruits."
A doctrine, then, professed in its mature years by a philosophy or religion,
is likely to be a true development, not a corruption, in proportion as it
seems to be the logical issue of its original teaching.

SECTION V.

FIFTH NOTE. ANTICIPATION OF ITS FUTURE.

Since, when an idea is living, that is, influential and effective, it is sure to
develope according to its own nature, and the tendencies, which are carried
out on the long run, may under favourable circumstances show themselves
early as well as late, and logic is the same in all ages, instances of a
development which is to come, though vague and isolated, may occur from
the very first, though a lapse of time be necessary to bring them to
perfection. And since developments are in great measure only aspects of the
idea from which they proceed, and all of them are natural consequences of
it, it is often a matter of accident in what order they are carried out in
individual minds; and it is in no wise strange that here and there definite
specimens of advanced teaching should very early occur, which in the
historical course are not found till a late day. The fact, then, of such early or
recurring intimations of tendencies which afterwards are fully realized, is a
sort of evidence that those later and more systematic fulfilments are only in
accordance with the original idea.

2.
Nothing is more common, for instance, than accounts or legends of the
anticipations, which great men have given in boyhood of the bent of their
minds, as afterwards displayed in their history; so much so that the popular
expectation has sometimes led to the invention of them. The child Cyrus
mimics a despot's power, and St. Athanasius is elected Bishop by his
playfellows.

It is noticeable that in the eleventh century, when the Russians were but
pirates upon the Black Sea, Constantinople was their aim; and that a
prophesy was in circulation in that city that they should one day gain
possession of it.
In the reign of James the First, we have an observable anticipation of the
system of influence in the management of political parties, which was
developed by Sir R. Walpole a century afterwards. This attempt is traced by
a living writer to the ingenuity of Lord Bacon. "He submitted to the King
that there were expedients for more judiciously managing a House of
Commons; . . that much might be done by forethought towards filling the
House with well-affected persons, winning or blinding the lawyers . . and
drawing the chief constituent bodies of the assembly, the country
gentlemen, the merchants, the courtiers, to act for the King's advantage; that
it would be expedient to tender voluntarily certain graces and modifications
of the King's prerogative," &c.[197:1] The writer adds, "This circumstance,
like several others in the present reign, is curious, as it shows the rise of a
systematic parliamentary influence, which was one day to become the
mainspring of government."

3.
Arcesilas and Carneades, the founders of the later Academy, are known to
have innovated on the Platonic doctrine by inculcating a universal
scepticism; and they did this, as if on the authority of Socrates, who had
adopted the method of ironia against the Sophists, on their professing to
know everything. This, of course, was an insufficient plea. However, could
it be shown that Socrates did on one or two occasions evidence deliberate
doubts on the great principles of theism or morals, would any one deny that
the innovation in question had grounds for being considered a true
development, not a corruption?
It is certain that, in the idea of Monachism, prevalent in ancient times,
manual labour had a more prominent place than study; so much so that De
Rancé, the celebrated Abbot of La Trappe, in controversy with Mabillon,
maintained his ground with great plausibility against the latter's apology for
the literary occupations for which the Benedictines of France are so famous.
Nor can it be denied that the labours of such as Mabillon and Montfaucon

are at least a development upon the simplicity of the primitive institution.
And yet it is remarkable that St. Pachomius, the first author of a monastic
rule, enjoined a library in each of his houses, and appointed conferences
and disputations three times a week on religious subjects, interpretation of
Scripture, or points of theology. St. Basil, the founder of Monachism in
Pontus, one of the most learned of the Greek Fathers, wrote his theological
treatises in the intervals of agricultural labour. St. Jerome, the author of the
Latin versions of Scripture, lived as a poor monk in a cell at Bethlehem.
These, indeed, were but exceptions in the character of early Monachism;
but they suggest its capabilities and anticipate its history. Literature is
certainly not inconsistent with its idea.

4.
In the controversies with the Gnostics, in the second century, striking
anticipations occasionally occur, in the works of their Catholic opponents,
of the formal dogmatic teaching developed in the Church in the course of
the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies in the fifth. On the other
hand, Paul of Samosata, one of the first disciples of the Syrian school of
theology, taught a heresy sufficiently like Nestorianism, in which that
school terminated, to be mistaken for it in later times; yet for a long while
after him the characteristic of the school was Arianism, an opposite heresy.
Lutheranism has by this time become in most places almost simple heresy
or infidelity; it has terminated, if it has even yet reached its limit, in a denial
both of the Canon and the Creed, nay, of many principles of morals.
Accordingly the question arises, whether these conclusions are in fairness to
be connected with its original teaching or are a corruption. And it is no little
aid towards its resolution to find that Luther himself at one time rejected the
Apocalypse, called the Epistle of St. James "straminea," condemned the
word "Trinity," fell into a kind of Eutychianism in his view of the Holy
Eucharist, and in a particular case sanctioned bigamy. Calvinism, again, in
various distinct countries, has become Socinianism, and Calvin himself
seems to have denied our Lord's Eternal Sonship and ridiculed the Nicene
Creed.
Another evidence, then, of the faithfulness of an ultimate development is its
definite anticipation at an early period in the history of the idea to which it

belongs.

SECTION VI.

SIXTH NOTE. CONSERVATIVE ACTION UPON ITS PAST.

As developments which are preceded by definite indications have a fair
presumption in their favour, so those which do but contradict and reverse
the course of doctrine which has been developed before them, and out of
which they spring, are certainly corrupt; for a corruption is a development
in that very stage in which it ceases to illustrate, and begins to disturb, the
acquisitions gained in its previous history.
It is the rule of creation, or rather of the phenomena which it presents, that
life passes on to its termination by a gradual, imperceptible course of
change. There is ever a maximum in earthly excellence, and the operation
of the same causes which made things great makes them small again.
Weakness is but the resulting product of power. Events move in cycles; all
things come round, "the sun ariseth and goeth down, and hasteth to his
place where he arose." Flowers first bloom, and then fade; fruit ripens and
decays. The fermenting process, unless stopped at the due point, corrupts
the liquor which it has created. The grace of spring, the richness of autumn
are but for a moment, and worldly moralists bid us Carpe diem, for we shall
have no second opportunity. Virtue seems to lie in a mean, between vice
and vice; and as it grew out of imperfection, so to grow into enormity.
There is a limit to human knowledge, and both sacred and profane writers
witness that overwisdom is folly. And in the political world states rise and
fall, the instruments of their aggrandizement becoming the weapons of their
destruction. And hence the frequent ethical maxims, such as, "Ne quid
nimis," "Medio tutissimus," "Vaulting ambition," which seem to imply that
too much of what is good is evil.
So great a paradox of course cannot be maintained as that truth literally
leads to falsehood, or that there can be an excess of virtue; but the
appearance of things and the popular language about them will at least

serve us in obtaining an additional test for the discrimination of a bonâ fide
development of an idea from its corruption.
A true development, then, may be described as one which is conservative of
the course of antecedent developments being really those antecedents and
something besides them: it is an addition which illustrates, not obscures,
corroborates, not corrects, the body of thought from which it proceeds; and
this is its characteristic as contrasted with a corruption.

2.
For instance, a gradual conversion from a false to a true religion, plainly,
has much of the character of a continuous process, or a development, in the
mind itself, even when the two religions, which are the limits of its course,
are antagonists. Now let it be observed, that such a change consists in
addition and increase chiefly, not in destruction. "True religion is the
summit and perfection of false religions; it combines in one whatever there
is of good and true separately remaining in each. And in like manner the
Catholic Creed is for the most part the combination of separate truths,
which heretics have divided among themselves, and err in dividing. So that,
in matter of fact, if a religious mind were educated in and sincerely attached
to some form of heathenism or heresy, and then were brought under the
light of truth, it would be drawn off from error into the truth, not by losing
what it had, but by gaining what it had not, not by being unclothed, but by
being 'clothed upon,' 'that mortality may be swallowed up of life.' That same
principle of faith which attaches it at first to the wrong doctrine would
attach it to the truth; and that portion of its original doctrine, which was to
be cast off as absolutely false, would not be directly rejected, but indirectly,
in the reception of the truth which is its opposite. True conversion is ever of
a positive, not a negative character."[201:1]
Such too is the theory of the Fathers as regards the doctrines fixed by
Councils, as is instanced in the language of St. Leo. "To be seeking for what
has been disclosed, to reconsider what has been finished, to tear up what
has been laid down, what is this but to be unthankful for what is gained?"
[201:2]
Vincentius of Lerins, in like manner, speaks of the development of
Christian doctrine, as profectus fidei non permutatio.[201:3] And so as

regards the Jewish Law, our Lord said that He came "not to destroy, but to
fulfil."

3.
Mahomet is accused of contradicting his earlier revelations by his later,
"which is a thing so well known to those of his sect that they all
acknowledge it; and therefore when the contradictions are such as they
cannot solve them, then they will have one of the contradictory places to be
revoked. And they reckon in the whole Alcoran about a hundred and fifty
verses which are thus revoked."[201:4]
Schelling, says Mr. Dewar, considers "that the time has arrived when an
esoteric speculative Christianity ought to take the place of the exoteric
empiricism which has hitherto prevailed." This German philosopher
"acknowledges that such a project is opposed to the evident design of the
Church, and of her earliest teachers."[202:1]

4.
When Roman Catholics are accused of substituting another Gospel for the
primitive Creed, they answer that they hold, and can show that they hold,
the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement, as firmly as any Protestant
can state them. To this it is replied that they do certainly profess them, but
that they obscure and virtually annul them by their additions; that the cultus
of St. Mary and the Saints is no development of the truth, but a corruption
and a religious mischief to those doctrines of which it is the corruption,
because it draws away the mind and heart from Christ. But they answer
that, so far from this, it subserves, illustrates, protects the doctrine of our
Lord's loving kindness and mediation. Thus the parties in controversy join
issue on the common ground, that a developed doctrine which reverses the
course of development which has preceded it, is no true development but a
corruption; also, that what is corrupt acts as an element of unhealthiness
towards what is sound. This subject, however, will come before us in its
proper place by and by.

5.

Blackstone supplies us with an instance in another subject-matter, of a
development which is justified by its utility, when he observes that "when
society is once formed, government results of course, as necessary to
preserve and to keep that society in order."[202:2]
On the contrary, when the Long Parliament proceeded to usurp the
executive, they impaired the popular liberties which they seemed to be
advancing; for the security of those liberties depends on the separation of
the executive and legislative powers, or on the enactors being subjects, not
executors of the laws.
And in the history of ancient Rome, from the time that the privileges gained
by the tribunes in behalf of the people became an object of ambition to
themselves, the development had changed into a corruption.
And thus a sixth test of a true development is that it is of a tendency
conservative of what has gone before it.

SECTION VII.

SEVENTH NOTE. CHRONIC VIGOUR.

Since the corruption of an idea, as far as the appearance goes, is a sort of
accident or affection of its development, being the end of a course, and a
transition-state leading to a crisis, it is, as has been observed above, a brief
and rapid process. While ideas live in men's minds, they are ever enlarging
into fuller development: they will not be stationary in their corruption any
more than before it; and dissolution is that further state to which corruption
tends. Corruption cannot, therefore, be of long standing; and thus duration
is another test of a faithful development.
Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis; is the Stoical topic of consolation under
pain; and of a number of disorders it can even be said, The worse, the
shorter.

Sober men are indisposed to change in civil matters, and fear reforms and
innovations, lest, if they go a little too far, they should at once run on to
some great calamities before a remedy can be applied. The chance of a slow
corruption does not strike them. Revolutions are generally violent and swift;
now, in fact, they are the course of a corruption.

2.
The course of heresies is always short; it is an intermediate state between
life and death, or what is like death; or, if it does not result in death, it is
resolved into some new, perhaps opposite, course of error, which lays no
claim to be connected with it. And in this way indeed, but in this way only,
an heretical principle will continue in life many years, first running one
way, then another.
The abounding of iniquity is the token of the end approaching; the faithful
in consequence cry out, How long? as if delay opposed reason as well as
patience. Three years and a half are to complete the reign of Antichrist.
Nor is it any real objection that the world is ever corrupt, and yet, in spite of
this, evil does not fill up its measure and overflow; for this arises from the
external counteractions of truth and virtue, which bear it back; let the
Church be removed, and the world will soon come to its end.
And so again, if the chosen people age after age became worse and worse,
till there was no recovery, still their course of evil was continually broken
by reformations, and was thrown back upon a less advanced stage of
declension.

3.
It is true that decay, which is one form of corruption, is slow; but decay is a
state in which there is no violent or vigorous action at all, whether of a
conservative or a destructive character, the hostile influence being powerful
enough to enfeeble the functions of life, but not to quicken its own process.
And thus we see opinions, usages, and systems, which are of venerable and
imposing aspect, but which have no soundness within them, and keep
together from a habit of consistence, or from dependence on political

institutions; or they become almost peculiarities of a country, or the habits
of a race, or the fashions of society. And then, at length, perhaps, they go off
suddenly and die out under the first rough influence from without. Such are
the superstitions which pervade a population, like some ingrained dye or
inveterate odour, and which at length come to an end, because nothing lasts
for ever, but which run no course, and have no history; such was the
established paganism of classical times, which was the fit subject of
persecution, for its first breath made it crumble and disappear. Such
apparently is the state of the Nestorian and Monophysite communions; such
might have been the condition of Christianity had it been absorbed by the
feudalism of the middle ages; such too is that Protestantism, or (as it
sometimes calls itself) attachment to the Establishment, which is not
unfrequently the boast of the respectable and wealthy among ourselves.
Whether Mahometanism external to Christendom, and the Greek Church
within it, fall under this description is yet to be seen. Circumstances can be
imagined which would even now rouse the fanaticism of the Moslem; and
the Russian despotism does not meddle with the usages, though it may
domineer over the priesthood, of the national religion.

Thus, while a corruption is distinguished from decay by its energetic action,
it is distinguished from a development by its transitory character.

4.
Such are seven out of various Notes, which may be assigned, of fidelity in
the development of an idea. The point to be ascertained is the unity and
identity of the idea with itself through all stages of its development from
first to last, and these are seven tokens that it may rightly be accounted one
and the same all along. To guarantee its own substantial unity, it must be
seen to be one in type, one in its system of principles, one in its unitive
power towards externals, one in its logical consecutiveness, one in the
witness of its early phases to its later, one in the protection which its later
extend to its earlier, and one in its union of vigour with continuance, that is,
in its tenacity.

FOOTNOTES:

[172:1] Commonit. 29.
[173:1] Milman, Christ.
[174:1] De Deo, ii. 4, § 8.
[184:1] Ch. xlix.
[193:1] Pusey on German Rationalism, p. 21, note.
[194:1] Halloix, Valesius, Lequien, Gieseler, Döllinger, &c., say that he was
condemned, not in the fifth Council, but in the Council under Mennas.
[194:2] Mem. Eccl. tom. viii. p. 562.
[195:1] Def. Tr. Cap. viii. init.
[197:1] Hallam's Const. Hist. ch. vi. p. 461.
[201:1] Tracts for the Times, No. 85, p. 73. [Discuss. p. 200; vide also Essay on
Assent, pp. 249-251.]
[201:2] Ep. 162.
[201:3] Ib. p. 309.
[201:4] Prideaux, Life of Mahomet, p. 90.
[202:1] German Protestantism, p. 176.
[202:2] Vol. i. p. 118.

CHAPTER VI.
APPLICATION OF THE SEVEN NOTES TO THE
EXISTING
DEVELOPMENTS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

APPLICATION OF THE FIRST NOTE OF A TRUE
DEVELOPMENT.
PRESERVATION OF TYPE.

Now let me attempt to apply the foregoing seven Notes of fidelity in
intellectual developments to the instance of Christian Doctrine. And first as
to the Note of identity of type.
I have said above, that, whereas all great ideas are found, as time goes on,
to involve much which was not seen at first to belong to them, and have
developments, that is enlargements, applications, uses and fortunes, very
various, one security against error and perversion in the process is the
maintenance of the original type, which the idea presented to the world at
its origin, amid and through all its apparent changes and vicissitudes from
first to last.
How does this apply to Christianity? What is its original type? and has that
type been preserved in the developments commonly called Catholic, which
have followed, and in the Church which embodies and teaches them? Let us
take it as the world now views it in its age; and let us take it as the world
once viewed it in its youth, and let us see whether there be any great
difference between the early and the later description of it. The following
statement will show my meaning:—
There is a religious communion claiming a divine commission, and holding
all other religious bodies around it heretical or infidel; it is a well-

organized, well-disciplined body; it is a sort of secret society, binding
together its members by influences and by engagements which it is difficult
for strangers to ascertain. It is spread over the known world; it may be weak
or insignificant locally, but it is strong on the whole from its continuity; it
may be smaller than all other religious bodies together, but is larger than
each separately. It is a natural enemy to governments external to itself; it is
intolerant and engrossing, and tends to a new modelling of society; it breaks
laws, it divides families. It is a gross superstition; it is charged with the
foulest crimes; it is despised by the intellect of the day; it is frightful to the
imagination of the many. And there is but one communion such.
Place this description before Pliny or Julian; place it before Frederick the
Second or Guizot.[208:1] "Apparent diræ facies." Each knows at once,
without asking a question, who is meant by it. One object, and only one,
absorbs each item of the detail of the delineation.

SECTION I.

THE CHURCH OF THE FIRST CENTURIES.

The primâ facie view of early Christianity, in the eyes of witnesses external
to it, is presented to us in the brief but vivid descriptions given by Tacitus,
Suetonius, and Pliny, the only heathen writers who distinctly mention it for
the first hundred and fifty years.
Tacitus is led to speak of the Religion, on occasion of the conflagration of
Rome, which was popularly imputed to Nero. "To put an end to the report,"
he says, "he laid the guilt on others, and visited them with the most
exquisite punishment, those, namely, who, held in abhorrence for their
crimes (per flagitia invisos), were popularly called Christians. The author of
that profession (nominis) was Christ, who, in the reign of Tiberius, was
capitally punished by the Procurator, Pontius Pilate. The deadly superstition
(exitiabilis superstitio), though checked for a while, broke out afresh; and
that, not only throughout Judæa, the original seat of the evil, but through the
City also, whither all things atrocious or shocking (atrocia aut pudenda)

flow together from every quarter and thrive. At first, certain were seized
who avowed it; then, on their report, a vast multitude were convicted, not so
much of firing the City, as of hatred of mankind (odio humani generis)."
After describing their tortures, he continues "In consequence, though they
were guilty, and deserved most signal punishment, they began to be pitied,
as if destroyed not for any public object, but from the barbarity of one
man."
Suetonius relates the same transactions thus: "Capital punishments were
inflicted on the Christians, a class of men of a new and magical superstition
(superstitionis novæ et maleficæ)." What gives additional character to this
statement is its context; for it occurs as one out of various police or
sumptuary or domestic regulations, which Nero made; such as "controlling
private expenses, forbidding taverns to serve meat, repressing the contests
of theatrical parties, and securing the integrity of wills." When Pliny was
Governor of Pontus, he wrote his celebrated letter to the Emperor Trajan, to
ask advice how he was to deal with the Christians, whom he found there in
great numbers. One of his points of hesitation was, whether the very
profession of Christianity was not by itself sufficient to justify punishment;
"whether the name itself should be visited, though clear of flagitious acts
(flagitia), or only when connected with them." He says, he had ordered for
execution such as persevered in their profession, after repeated warnings,
"as not doubting, whatever it was they professed, that at any rate contumacy
and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished." He required them to invoke
the gods, to sacrifice wine and frankincense to the images of the Emperor,
and to blaspheme Christ; "to which," he adds, "it is said no real Christian
can be compelled." Renegades informed him that "the sum total of their
offence or fault was meeting before light on an appointed day, and saying
with one another a form of words (carmen) to Christ, as if to a god, and
binding themselves by oath, (not to the commission of any wickedness, but)
against the commission of theft, robbery, adultery, breach of trust, denial of
deposits; that, after this they were accustomed to separate, and then to meet
again for a meal, but eaten all together and harmless; however, that they had
even left this off after his edicts enforcing the Imperial prohibition of
Hetæriæ or Associations." He proceeded to put two women to the torture,
but "discovered nothing beyond a bad and excessive superstition"
(superstitionem pravam et immodicam), "the contagion" of which, he

continues, "had spread through villages and country, till the temples were
emptied of worshippers."

2.
In these testimonies, which will form a natural and convenient text for what
is to follow, we have various characteristics brought before us of the
religion to which they relate. It was a superstition, as all three writers agree;
a bad and excessive superstition, according to Pliny; a magical superstition,
according to Suetonius; a deadly superstition, according to Tacitus. Next, it
was embodied in a society, and moreover a secret and unlawful society or
hetæria; and it was a proselytizing society; and its very name was
connected with "flagitious," "atrocious," and "shocking" acts.

3.
Now these few points, which are not all which might be set down, contain
in themselves a distinct and significant description of Christianity; but they
have far greater meaning when illustrated by the history of the times, the
testimony of later writers, and the acts of the Roman government towards
its professors. It is impossible to mistake the judgment passed on the
religion by these three writers, and still more clearly by other writers and
Imperial functionaries. They evidently associated Christianity with the
oriental superstitions, whether propagated by individuals or embodied in a
rite, which were in that day traversing the Empire, and which in the event
acted so remarkable a part in breaking up the national forms of worship,
and so in preparing the way for Christianity. This, then, is the broad view
which the educated heathen took of Christianity; and, if it had been very
unlike those rites and curious arts in external appearance, they would not
have confused it with them.
Changes in society are, by a providential appointment, commonly preceded
and facilitated by the setting in of a certain current in men's thoughts and
feelings in that direction towards which a change is to be made. And, as
lighter substances whirl about before the tempest and presage it, so words
and deeds, ominous but not effective of the coming revolution, are
circulated beforehand through the multitude, or pass across the field of
events. This was specially the case with Christianity, as became its high

dignity; it came heralded and attended by a crowd of shadows, shadows of
itself, impotent and monstrous as shadows are, but not at first sight
distinguishable from it by common spectators. Before the mission of the
Apostles, a movement, of which there had been earlier parallels, had begun
in Egypt, Syria, and the neighbouring countries, tending to the propagation
of new and peculiar forms of worship throughout the Empire. Prophecies
were afloat that some new order of things was coming in from the East,
which increased the existing unsettlement of the popular mind; pretenders
made attempts to satisfy its wants, and old Traditions of the Truth,
embodied for ages in local or in national religions, gave to these attempts a
doctrinal and ritual shape, which became an additional point of resemblance
to that Truth which was soon visibly to appear.

4.
The distinctive character of the rites in question lay in their appealing to the
gloomy rather than to the cheerful and hopeful feelings, and in their
influencing the mind through fear. The notions of guilt and expiation, of
evil and good to come, and of dealings with the invisible world, were in
some shape or other pre-eminent in them, and formed a striking contrast to
the classical polytheism, which was gay and graceful, as was natural in a
civilized age. The new rites, on the other hand, were secret; their doctrine
was mysterious; their profession was a discipline, beginning in a formal
initiation, manifested in an association, and exercised in privation and pain.
They were from the nature of the case proselytizing societies, for they were
rising into power; nor were they local, but vagrant, restless, intrusive, and
encroaching. Their pretensions to supernatural knowledge brought them
into easy connexion with magic and astrology, which are as attractive to the
wealthy and luxurious as the more vulgar superstitions to the populace.

5.
Such were the rites of Cybele, Isis, and Mithras; such the Chaldeans, as
they were commonly called, and the Magi; they came from one part of the
world, and during the first and second century spread with busy
perseverance to the northern and western extremities of the empire.[213:1]
Traces of the mysteries of Cybele, a Syrian deity, if the famous temple at

Hierapolis was hers, have been found in Spain, in Gaul, and in Britain, as
high up as the wall of Severus. The worship of Isis was the most widely
spread of all the pagan deities; it was received in Ethiopia and in Germany,
and even the name of Paris has been fancifully traced to it. Both worships,
as well as the Science of Magic, had their colleges of priests and devotees,
which were governed by a president, and in some places were supported by
farms. Their processions passed from town to town, begging as they went
and attracting proselytes. Apuleius describes one of them as seizing a whip,
accusing himself of some offence, and scourging himself in public. These
strollers, circulatores or agyrtæ in classical language, told fortunes, and
distributed prophetical tickets to the ignorant people who consulted them.
Also, they were learned in the doctrine of omens, of lucky and unlucky
days, of the rites of expiation and of sacrifices. Such an agyrtes or itinerant
was the notorious Alexander of Abonotichus, till he managed to establish
himself in Pontus, where he carried on so successful an imposition that his
fame reached Rome, and men in office and station entrusted him with their
dearest political secrets. Such a wanderer, with a far more religious bearing
and a high reputation for virtue, was Apollonius of Tyana, who professed
the Pythagorean philosophy, claimed the gift of miracles, and roamed about
preaching, teaching, healing, and prophesying from India and Alexandria to
Athens and Rome. Another solitary proselytizer, though of an earlier time
and of an avowed profligacy, had been the Sacrificulus, viewed with such
horror by the Roman Senate, as introducing the infamous Bacchic rites into
Rome. Such, again, were those degenerate children of a divine religion,
who, in the words of their Creator and Judge, "compassed sea and land to
make one proselyte," and made him "twofold more the child of hell than
themselves."

6.
These vagrant religionists for the most part professed a severe rule of life,
and sometimes one of fanatical mortification. In the mysteries of Mithras,
the initiation[214:1] was preceded by fasting and abstinence, and a variety of
painful trials; it was made by means of a baptism as a spiritual washing; and
it included an offering of bread, and some emblem of a resurrection. In the
Samothracian rites it had been a custom to initiate children; confession too
of greater crimes seems to have been required, and would naturally be

involved in others in the inquisition prosecuted into the past lives of the
candidates for initiation. The garments of the converts were white; their
calling was considered as a warfare (militia), and was undertaken with a
sacramentum, or military oath. The priests shaved their heads and wore
linen, and when they were dead were buried in a sacerdotal garment. It is
scarcely necessary to refer to the mutilation inflicted on the priests of
Cybele; one instance of their scourgings has been already mentioned; and
Tertullian speaks of their high priest cutting his arms for the life of the
Emperor Marcus.[215:1] The priests of Isis, in lamentation for Osiris, tore
their breasts with pine cones. This lamentation was a ritual observance,
founded on some religious mystery: Isis lost Osiris, and the initiated wept in
memory of her sorrow; the Syrian goddess had wept over dead Thammuz,
and her mystics commemorated it by a ceremonial woe; in the rites of
Bacchus, an image was laid on a bier at midnight,[215:2] which was bewailed
in metrical hymns; the god was supposed to die, and then to revive. Nor
was this the only worship which was continued through the night; while
some of the rites were performed in caves.

7.
Only a heavenly light can give purity to nocturnal and subterraneous
worship. Caves were at that time appropriated to the worship of the infernal
gods. It was but natural that these wild religions should be connected with
magic and its kindred arts; magic has at all times led to cruelty, and
licentiousness would be the inevitable reaction from a temporary strictness.
An extraordinary profession, when men are in a state of mere nature, makes
hypocrites or madmen, and will in no long time be discarded except by the
few. The world of that day associated together in one company, Isiac,
Phrygian, Mithriac, Chaldean, wizard, astrologer, fortune-teller, itinerant,
and, as was not unnatural, Jew. Magic was professed by the profligate
Alexander, and was imputed to the grave Apollonius. The rites of Mithras
came from the Magi of Persia; and it is obviously difficult to distinguish in
principle the ceremonies of the Syrian Taurobolium from those of the
Necyomantia in the Odyssey, or of Canidia in Horace.
The Theodosian Code calls magic generally a "superstition;" and magic,
orgies, mysteries, and "sabbathizings," were referred to the same

"barbarous" origin. "Magical superstitions," the "rites of the Magi," the
"promises of the Chaldeans," and the "Mathematici," are familiar to the
readers of Tacitus. The Emperor Otho, an avowed patron of oriental
fashions, took part in the rites of Isis, and consulted the Mathematici.
Vespasian, who also consulted them, is heard of in Egypt as performing
miracles at the suggestion of Serapis. Tiberius, in an edict, classes together
"Egyptian and Jewish rites;" and Tacitus and Suetonius, in recording it,
speak of the two religions together as "ea superstitio."[216:1] Augustus had
already associated them together as superstitions, and as unlawful, and that
in contrast to others of a like foreign origin. "As to foreign rites (peregrinæ
ceremoniæ)," says Suetonius, "as he paid more reverence to those which
were old and enjoined, so did he hold the rest in contempt."[216:2] He goes
on to say that, even on the judgment-seat, he had recognized the Eleusinian
priests, into whose mysteries he had been initiated at Athens; "whereas,
when travelling in Egypt, he had refused to see Apis, and had approved of
his grandson Caligula's passing by Judæa without sacrificing at Jerusalem."
Plutarch speaks of magic as connected with the mournful mysteries of
Orpheus and Zoroaster, with the Egyptian and the Phrygian; and, in his
Treatise on Superstition, he puts together in one clause, as specimens of that
disease of mind, "covering oneself with mud, wallowing in the mire,
sabbathizings, fallings on the face, unseemly postures, foreign adorations."
[216:3]
Ovid mentions in consecutive verses the rites of "Adonis lamented by
Venus," "The Sabbath of the Syrian Jew," and the "Memphitic Temple of Io
in her linen dress."[216:4] Juvenal speaks of the rites, as well as the language
and the music, of the Syrian Orontes having flooded Rome; and, in his
description of the superstition of the Roman women, he places the low
Jewish fortune-teller between the pompous priests of Cybele and Isis, and
the bloody witchcraft of the Armenian haruspex and the astrology of the
Chaldeans.[217:1]

8.
The Christian, being at first accounted a kind of Jew, was even on that score
included in whatever odium, and whatever bad associations, attended on the
Jewish name. But in a little time his independence of the rejected people
was clearly understood, as even the persecutions show; and he stood upon
his own ground. Still his character did not change in the eyes of the world;

for favour or for reproach, he was still associated with the votaries of secret
and magical rites. The Emperor Hadrian, noted as he is for his inquisitive
temper, and a partaker in so many mysteries,[217:2] still believed that the
Christians of Egypt allowed themselves in the worship of Serapis. They are
brought into connexion with the magic of Egypt in the history of what is
commonly called the Thundering Legion, so far as this, that the rain which
relieved the Emperor's army in the field, and which the Church ascribed to
the prayers of the Christian soldiers, is by Dio Cassius attributed to an
Egyptian magician, who obtained it by invoking Mercury and other spirits.
This war had been the occasion of one of the first recognitions which the
state had conceded to the Oriental rites, though statesmen and emperors, as
private men, had long taken part in them. The Emperor Marcus had been
urged by his fears of the Marcomanni to resort to these foreign
introductions, and is said to have employed Magi and Chaldeans in averting
an unsuccessful issue of the war. It is observable that, in the growing
countenance which was extended to these rites in the third century,
Christianity came in for a share. The chapel of Alexander Severus contained
statues of Abraham, Orpheus, Apollonius, Pythagoras, and our Lord. Here
indeed, as in the case of Zenobia's Judaism, an eclectic philosophy aided the
comprehension of religions. But, immediately before Alexander,
Heliogabalus, who was no philosopher, while he formally seated his Syrian
idol in the Palatine, while he observed the mysteries of Cybele and Adonis,
and celebrated his magic rites with human victims, intended also, according
to Lampridius, to unite with his horrible superstition "the Jewish and
Samaritan religions and the Christian rite, that so the priesthood of
Heliogabalus might comprise the mystery of every worship."[218:1] Hence,
more or less, the stories which occur in ecclesiastical history of the
conversion or good-will of the emperors to the Christian faith, of Hadrian,
Mammæa, and others, besides Heliogabalus and Alexander. Such stories
might often mean little more than that they favoured it among other forms
of Oriental superstition.

9.
What has been said is sufficient to bring before the mind an historical fact,
which indeed does not need evidence. Upon the established religions of
Europe the East had renewed her encroachments, and was pouring forth a

family of rites which in various ways attracted the attention of the
luxurious, the political, the ignorant, the restless, and the remorseful.
Armenian, Chaldee, Egyptian, Jew, Syrian, Phrygian, as the case might be,
was the designation of the new hierophant; and magic, superstition,
barbarism, jugglery, were the names given to his rite by the world. In this
company appeared Christianity. When then three well-informed writers call
Christianity a superstition and a magical superstition, they were not using
words at random, or the language of abuse, but they were describing it in
distinct and recognized terms as cognate to those gloomy, secret, odious,
disreputable religions which were making so much disturbance up and
down the empire.

10.
The impression made on the world by circumstances immediately before
the rise of Christianity received a sort of confirmation upon its rise, in the
appearance of the Gnostic and kindred heresies, which issued from the
Church during the second and third centuries. Their resemblance in ritual
and constitution to the Oriental religions, sometimes their historical
relationship, is undeniable; and certainly it is a singular coincidence, that
Christianity should be first called a magical superstition by Suetonius, and
then should be found in the intimate company, and seemingly the parent, of
a multitude of magical superstitions, if there was nothing in the Religion
itself to give rise to such a charge.

11.

The Gnostic family[219:1] suitably traces its origin to a mixed race, which
had commenced its national history by associating Orientalism with
Revelation. After the captivity of the ten tribes, Samaria was colonized by
"men from Babylon and Cushan, and from Ava, and from Hamath, and from
Sepharvaim," who were instructed at their own instance in "the manner of
the God of the land," by one of the priests of the Church of Jeroboam. The
consequence was, that "they feared the Lord and served their own gods." Of
this country was Simon, the reputed patriarch of the Gnostics; and he is
introduced in the Acts of the Apostles as professing those magical powers
which were so principal a characteristic of the Oriental mysteries. His

heresy, though broken into a multitude of sects, was poured over the world
with a Catholicity not inferior in its day to that of Christianity. St. Peter,
who fell in with him originally in Samaria, seems to have encountered him
again at Rome. At Rome, St. Polycarp met Marcion of Pontus, whose
followers spread through Italy, Egypt, Syria, Arabia, and Persia; Valentinus
preached his doctrines in Alexandria, Rome, and Cyprus; and we read of his
disciples in Crete, Cæsarea, Antioch, and other parts of the East. Bardesanes
and his followers were found in Mesopotamia. The Carpocratians are
spoken of at Alexandria, at Rome, and in Cephallenia; the Basilidians
spread through the greater part of Egypt; the Ophites were apparently in
Bithynia and Galatia; the Cainites or Caians in Africa, and the Marcosians
in Gaul. To these must be added several sects, which, though not strictly of
the Gnostic stock, are associated with them in date, character, and origin;—
the Ebionites of Palestine, the Cerinthians, who rose in some part of Asia
Minor, the Encratites and kindred sects, who spread from Mesopotamia to
Syria, to Cilicia and other provinces of Asia Minor, and thence to Rome,
Gaul, Aquitaine, and Spain; and the Montanists, who, with a town in
Phrygia for their metropolis, reached at length from Constantinople to
Carthage.
"When [the reader of Christian history] comes to the second century," says
Dr. Burton, "he finds that Gnosticism, under some form or other, was
professed in every part of the then civilized world. He finds it divided into
schools, as numerously and as zealously attended as any which Greece or
Asia could boast in their happiest days. He meets with names totally
unknown to him before, which excited as much sensation as those of
Aristotle or Plato. He hears of volumes having been written in support of
this new philosophy, not one of which has survived to our own day."[221:1]
Many of the founders of these sects had been Christians; others were of
Jewish parentage; others were more or less connected in fact with the Pagan
rites to which their own bore so great a resemblance. Montanus seems even
to have been a mutilated priest of Cybele; the followers of Prodicus
professed to possess the secret books of Zoroaster; and the doctrine of
dualism, which so many of the sects held, is to be traced to the same source.
Basilides seems to have recognized Mithras as the Supreme Being, or the
Prince of Angels, or the Sun, if Mithras is equivalent to Abraxas, which was
inscribed upon his amulets: on the other hand, he is said to have been taught

by an immediate disciple of St. Peter, and Valentinus by an immediate
disciple of St. Paul. Marcion was the son of a Bishop of Pontus; Tatian, a
disciple of St. Justin Martyr.

12.
Whatever might be the history of these sects, and though it may be a
question whether they can be properly called "superstitions," and though
many of them numbered educated men among their teachers and followers,
they closely resembled, at least in ritual and profession, the vagrant Pagan
mysteries which have been above described. Their very name of "Gnostic"
implied the possession of a secret, which was to be communicated to their
disciples. Ceremonial observances were the preparation, and symbolical
rites the instrument, of initiation. Tatian and Montanus, the representatives
of very distinct schools, agreed in making asceticism a rule of life. The
followers of each of these sectaries abstained from wine; the Tatianites and
Marcionites, from flesh; the Montanists kept three Lents in the year. All the
Gnostic sects seem to have condemned marriage on one or other reason.
[222:1]
The Marcionites had three baptisms or more; the Marcosians had two
rites of what they called redemption; the latter of these was celebrated as a
marriage, and the room adorned as a marriage-chamber. A consecration to a
priesthood then followed with anointing. An extreme unction was another
of their rites, and prayers for the dead one of their observances. Bardesanes
and Harmonius were famous for the beauty of their chants. The prophecies
of Montanus were delivered, like the oracles of the heathen, in a state of
enthusiasm or ecstasy. To Epiphanes, the son of Carpocrates, who died at
the age of seventeen, a temple was erected in the island of Cephallenia, his
mother's birthplace, where he was celebrated with hymns and sacrifices. A
similar honour was paid by the Carpocratians to Homer, Pythagoras, Plato,
Aristotle, as well as to the Apostles; crowns were placed upon their images,
and incense burned before them. In one of the inscriptions found at Cyrene,
about twenty years since, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Epicurus, and others, are
put together with our Lord, as guides of conduct. These inscriptions also
contain the Carpocratian tenet of a community of women. I am unwilling to
allude to the Agapæ and Communions of certain of these sects, which were
not surpassed in profligacy by the Pagan rites of which they were an
imitation. The very name of Gnostic became an expression for the worst

impurities, and no one dared eat bread with them, or use their culinary
instruments or plates.

13.
These profligate excesses are found in connexion with the exercise of magic
and astrology.[223:1] The amulets of the Basilidians are still extant in great
numbers, inscribed with symbols, some Christian, some with figures of Isis,
Serapis, and Anubis, represented according to the gross indecencies of the
Egyptian mythology.[223:2] St. Irenæus had already connected together the
two crimes in speaking of the Simonians: "Their mystical priests," he says,
"live in lewdness, and practise magic, according to the ability of each. They
use exorcisms and incantations; love-potions too, and seductive spells; the
virtue of spirits, and dreams, and all other curious arts, they diligently
observe."[223:3] The Marcosians were especially devoted to these "curious
arts," which are also ascribed to Carpocrates and Apelles. Marcion and
others are reported to have used astrology. Tertullian speaks generally of the
sects of his day: "Infamous are the dealings of the heretics with sorcerers
very many, with mountebanks, with astrologers, with philosophers, to wit,
such as are given to curious questions. They everywhere remember, 'Seek,
and ye shall find.'"[223:4]
Such were the Gnostics; and to external and prejudiced spectators, whether
philosophers, as Celsus and Porphyry, or the multitude, they wore an
appearance sufficiently like the Church to be mistaken for her in the latter
part of the Ante-nicene period, as she was confused with the Pagan
mysteries in the earlier.

14.
Of course it may happen that the common estimate concerning a person or a
body is purely accidental and unfounded; but in such cases it is not lasting.
Such were the calumnies of child-eating and impurity in the Christian
meetings, which were almost extinct by the time of Origen, and which
might arise from the world's confusing them with the pagan and heretical
rites. But when it continues from age to age, it is certainly an index of a
fact, and corresponds to definite qualities in the object to which it relates. In

that case, even mistakes carry information; for they are cognate to the truth,
and we can allow for them. Often what seems like a mistake is merely the
mode in which the informant conveys his testimony, or the impression
which a fact makes on him. Censure is the natural tone of one man in a case
where praise is the natural tone of another; the very same character or
action inspires one mind with enthusiasm, and another with contempt. What
to one man is magnanimity, to another is romance, and pride to a third, and
pretence to a fourth, while to a fifth it is simply unintelligible; and yet there
is a certain analogy in their separate testimonies, which conveys to us what
the thing is like and what it is not like. When a man's acknowledged note is
superstition, we may be pretty sure we shall not find him an Academic or an
Epicurean; and even words which are ambiguous, as "atheist," or
"reformer," admit of a sure interpretation when we are informed of the
speaker. In like manner, there is a certain general correspondence between
magic and miracle, obstinacy and faith, insubordination and zeal for
religion, sophistry and argumentative talent, craft and meekness, as is
obvious. Let us proceed then in our contemplation of this reflection, as it
may be called of primitive Christianity in the mirror of the world.

15.
All three writers, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny, call it a "superstition;" this
is no accidental imputation, but is repeated by a variety of subsequent
writers and speakers. The charge of Thyestean banquets scarcely lasts a
hundred years; but, while pagan witnesses are to be found, the Church is
accused of superstition. The heathen disputant in Minucius calls
Christianity, "Vana et demens superstitio." The lawyer Modestinus speaks,
with an apparent allusion to Christianity, of "weak minds being terrified
superstitione numinis." The heathen magistrate asks St. Marcellus, whether
he and others have put away "vain superstitions," and worship the gods
whom the emperors worship. The Pagans in Arnobius speak of Christianity
as "an execrable and unlucky religion, full of impiety and sacrilege,
contaminating the rites instituted from of old with the superstition of its
novelty." The anonymous opponent of Lactantius calls it, "Impia et anilis
superstitio." Diocletian's inscription at Clunia was, as it declared, on
occasion of "the total extinction of the superstition of the Christians, and the

extension of the worship of the gods." Maximin, in his Letter upon
Constantine's Edict, still calls it a superstition.[225:1]

16.
Now what is meant by the word thus attached by a consensus of heathen
authorities to Christianity? At least, it cannot mean a religion in which a
man might think what he pleased, and was set free from all yokes, whether
of ignorance, fear, authority, or priestcraft. When heathen writers call the
Oriental rites superstitions, they evidently use the word in its modern sense;
it cannot surely be doubted that they apply it in the same sense to
Christianity. But Plutarch explains for us the word at length, in his Treatise
which bears the name: "Of all kinds of fear," he says, "superstition is the
most fatal to action and resource. He does not fear the sea who does not
sail, nor war who does not serve, nor robbers who keeps at home, nor the
sycophant who is poor, nor the envious if he is a private man, nor an
earthquake if he lives in Gaul, nor thunder if he lives in Ethiopia; but he
who fears the gods fears everything, earth, seas, air, sky, darkness, light,
noises, silence, sleep. Slaves sleep and forget their masters; of the fettered
doth sleep lighten the chain; inflamed wounds, ulcers cruel and agonizing,
are not felt by the sleeping. Superstition alone has come to no terms with
sleep; but in the very sleep of her victims, as though they were in the realms
of the impious, she raises horrible spectres, and monstrous phantoms, and
various pains, and whirls the miserable soul about, and persecutes it. They
rise, and, instead of making light of what is unreal, they fall into the hands
of quacks and conjurers, who say, 'Call the crone to expiate, bathe in the
sea, and sit all day on the ground.'" He goes on to speak of the introduction
of "uncouth names and barbarous terms" into "the divine and national
authority of religion;" observes that, whereas slaves, when they despair of
freedom, may demand to be sold to another master, superstition admits of
no change of gods, since "the god cannot be found whom he will not fear,
who fears the gods of his family and his birth, who shudders at the Saving
and the Benignant, who has a trembling and dread at those from whom we
ask riches and wealth, concord, peace, success of all good words and
deeds." He says, moreover, that, while death is to all men an end of life, it is
not so to the superstitious; for then "there are deep gates of hell to yawn,
and headlong streams of at once fire and gloom are opened, and darkness

with its many phantoms encompasses, ghosts presenting horrid visages and
wretched voices, and judges and executioners, and chasms and dens full of
innumerable miseries."
Presently, he says, that in misfortune or sickness the superstitious man
refuses to see physician or philosopher, and cries, "Suffer me, O man, to
undergo punishment, the impious, the cursed, the hated of gods and spirits.
The Atheist," with whom all along he is contrasting the superstitious
disadvantageously, "wipes his tears, trims his hair, doffs his mourning; but
how can you address, how help the superstitious? He sits apart in sackcloth
or filthy rags; and often he strips himself and rolls in the mud, and tells out
his sins and offences, as having eaten and drunken something, or walked
some way which the divinity did not allow. . . . And in his best mood, and
under the influence of a good-humoured superstition, he sits at home, with
sacrifice and slaughter all round him, while the old crones hang on him as
on a peg, as Bion says, any charm they fall in with." He continues, "What
men like best are festivals, banquets at the temples, initiations, orgies,
votive prayers, and adorations. But the superstitious wishes indeed, but is
unable to rejoice. He is crowned and turns pale; he sacrifices and is in fear;
he prays with a quivering voice, and burns incense with trembling hands,
and altogether belies the saying of Pythagoras, that we are then in best case
when we go to the gods; for superstitious men are in most wretched and evil
case, approaching the houses or shrines of the gods as if they were the dens
of bears, or the holes of snakes, or the caves of whales."

17.
Here we have a vivid picture of Plutarch's idea of the essence of
Superstition; it was the imagination of the existence of an unseen ever-
present Master; the bondage of a rule of life, of a continual responsibility;
obligation to attend to little things, the impossibility of escaping from duty,
the inability to choose or change one's religion, an interference with the
enjoyment of life, a melancholy view of the world, sense of sin, horror at
guilt, apprehension of punishment, dread, self-abasement, depression,
anxiety and endeavour to be at peace with heaven, and error and absurdity
in the methods chosen for the purpose. Such too had been the idea of the
Epicurean Velleius, when he shrunk with horror from the "sempiternus

dominus" and "curiosus Deus" of the Stoics.[228:1] Such, surely, was the
meaning of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny. And hence of course the frequent
reproach cast on Christians as credulous, weak-minded, and poor-spirited.
The heathen objectors in Minucius and Lactantius speak of their "old-
woman's tales."[228:2] Celsus accuses them of "assenting at random and
without reason," saying, "Do not inquire, but believe." "They lay it down,"
he says elsewhere, "Let no educated man approach, no man of wisdom, no
man of sense; but if a man be unlearned, weak in intellect, an infant, let him
come with confidence. Confessing that these are worthy of their God, they
evidently desire, as they are able, to convert none but fools, and vulgar, and
stupid, and slavish, women and boys." They "take in the simple, and lead
him where they will." They address themselves to "youths, house-servants,
and the weak in intellect." They "hurry away from the educated, as not fit
subjects of their imposition, and inveigle the rustic."[228:3] "Thou," says the
heathen magistrate to the Martyr Fructuosus, "who as a teacher dost
disseminate a new fable, that fickle girls may desert the groves and abandon
Jupiter, condemn, if thou art wise, the anile creed."[229:1]

18.
Hence the epithets of itinerant, mountebank, conjurer, cheat, sophist,
sorcerer, heaped upon the teachers of Christianity; sometimes to account for
the report or apparent truth of their miracles, sometimes to explain their
success. Our Lord was said to have learned His miraculous power in Egypt;
"wizard, mediciner, cheat, rogue, conjurer," were the epithets applied to
Him by the opponents of Eusebius;[229:2] they "worship that crucified
sophist," says Lucian;[229:3] "Paul, who surpasses all the conjurers and
impostors who ever lived," is Julian's account of the Apostle. "You have
sent through the whole world," says St. Justin to Trypho, "to preach that a
certain atheistic and lawless sect has sprung from one Jesus, a Galilean
cheat."[229:4] "We know," says Lucian, speaking of Chaldeans and
Magicians, "the Syrian from Palestine, who is the sophist in these matters,
how many lunatics, with eyes distorted and mouth in foam, he raises and
sends away restored, ridding them from the evil at a great price."[229:5] "If
any conjurer came to them, a man of skill and knowing how to manage
matters," says the same writer, "he made money in no time, with a broad

grin at the simple fellows."[229:6] The officer who had custody of St.
Perpetua feared her escape from prison "by magical incantations."[229:7]
When St. Tiburtius had walked barefoot on hot coals, his judge cried out
that Christ had taught him magic. St. Anastasia was thrown into prison as a
mediciner; the populace called out against St. Agnes, "Away with the
witch," Tolle magam, tolle maleficam.
When St. Bonosus and St. Maximilian bore the burning pitch without
shrinking, Jews and Gentiles cried out, Isti magi et malefici. "What new
delusion," says the heathen magistrate concerning St. Romanus, "has
brought in these sophists to deny the worship of the gods? How doth this
chief sorcerer mock us, skilled by his Thessalian charm (carmine) to laugh
at punishment."[230:1]
Hence we gather the meaning of the word "carmen" as used by Pliny; when
he speaks of the Christians "saying with one another a carmen to Christ as
to a god," he meant pretty much what Suetonius expresses by the "malefica
superstitio."[230:2] And the words of the last-mentioned writer and Tacitus
are still more exactly, and, I may say, singularly illustrated by clauses which
occur in the Theodosian code; which seem to show that these historians
were using formal terms and phrases to express their notion of Christianity.
For instance, Tacitus says, "Quos per flagitia invisos, vulgus Christianos
appellabat;" and the Law against the Malefici and Mathematici in the Code
speaks of those, "Quos ob facinorum magnitudinem vulgus maleficos
appellat."[230:3] Again, Tacitus charges Christians with the "odium humani
generis:" this is the very characteristic of a practiser in magic; the Laws call
the Malefici, "humani generis hostes," "humani generis inimici," "naturæ
peregrini," "communis salutis hostes."[230:4]

19.
This also explains the phenomenon, which has created so much surprise to
certain moderns;—that a grave, well-informed historian like Tacitus should
apply to Christians what sounds like abuse. Yet what is the difficulty,
supposing that Christians were considered mathematici and magi, and these
were the secret intriguers against established government, the allies of
desperate politicians, the enemies of the established religion, the

disseminators of lying rumours, the perpetrators of poisonings and other
crimes? "Read this," says Paley, after quoting some of the most beautiful
and subduing passages of St. Paul, "read this, and then think of exitiabilis
superstitio;" and he goes on to express a wish "in contending with heathen
authorities, to produce our books against theirs,"[231:1] as if it were a matter
of books. Public men care very little for books; the finest sentiments, the
most luminous philosophy, the deepest theology, inspiration itself, moves
them but little; they look at facts, and care only for facts. The question was,
What was the worth, what the tendency of the Christian body in the state?
what Christians said, what they thought, was little to the purpose. They
might exhort to peaceableness and passive obedience as strongly as words
could speak; but what did they do, what was their political position? This is
what statesmen thought of then, as they do now. What had men of the world
to do with abstract proofs or first principles? a statesman measures parties,
and sects, and writers by their bearing upon him; and he has a practised eye
in this sort of judgment, and is not likely to be mistaken. "'What is Truth?'
said jesting Pilate." Apologies, however eloquent or true, availed nothing
with the Roman magistrate against the sure instinct which taught him to
dread Christianity. It was a dangerous enemy to any power not built upon
itself; he felt it, and the event justified his apprehension.

20.
We must not forget the well-known character of the Roman state in its
dealings with its subjects. It had had from the first an extreme jealousy of
secret societies; it was prepared to grant a large toleration and a broad
comprehension, but, as is the case with modern governments, it wished to
have jurisdiction and the ultimate authority in every movement of the body
politic and social, and its civil institutions were based, or essentially
depended, on its religion. Accordingly, every innovation upon the
established paganism, except it was allowed by the law, was rigidly
repressed. Hence the professors of low superstitions, of mysteries, of magic,
of astrology, were the outlaws of society, and were in a condition
analogous, if the comparison may be allowed, to smugglers or poachers
among ourselves, or perhaps to burglars and highwaymen. The modern
robber is sometimes made to ask in novels or essays, why the majority of a
people should bind the minority, and why he is amenable to laws which he

does not enact; but the magistrate, relying on the power of the sword,
wishes all men to gain a living indeed, and to prosper, but only in his own
legally sanctioned ways, and he hangs or transports dissenters from his
authority. The Romans applied this rule to religion. Lardner protests against
Pliny's application of the words "contumacy and inflexible obstinacy" to the
Christians of Pontus. "Indeed, these are hard words," he says, "very
improperly applied to men who were open to conviction, and willing to
satisfy others, if they might have leave to speak."[232:1] And he says, "It
seems to me that Pliny acted very arbitrarily and unrighteously, in his
treatment of the Christians in his province. What right had Pliny to act in
this manner? by what law or laws did he punish [them] with death?"—but
the Romans had ever burnt the sorcerer, and banished his consulters for life.
[233:1]
It was an ancient custom. And at mysteries they looked with especial
suspicion, because, since the established religion did not include them in its
provisions, they really did supply what may be called a demand of the age.
The Greeks of an earlier day had naturalized among themselves the
Eleusinian and other mysteries, which had come from Egypt and Syria, and
had little to fear from a fresh invasion from the same quarter; yet even in
Greece, as Plutarch tells us, the "carmina" of the itinerants of Cybele and
Serapis threw the Pythian verses out of fashion, and henceforth the
responses from the temple were given in prose. Soon the oracles altogether
ceased. What would cause in the Roman mind still greater jealousy of
Christianity was the general infidelity which prevailed among all classes as
regards the mythological fables of Charon, Cerberus, and the realms of
punishment.[233:2]

21.
We know what opposition had been made in Rome even to the philosophy
of Greece; much greater would be the aversion of constitutional statesmen
and lawyers to the ritual of barbarians. Religion was the Roman point of
honour. "Spaniards might rival them in numbers," says Cicero, "Gauls in
bodily strength, Carthaginians in address, Greeks in the arts, Italians and
Latins in native talent, but the Romans surpassed all nations in piety and
devotion."[234:1] It was one of their laws, "Let no one have gods by himself,
nor worship in private new gods nor adventitious, unless added on public
authority."[234:2] Lutatius,[234:3] at the end of the first Punic war, was

forbidden by the senate to consult the Sortes Prænestinæ as being "auspicia
alienigena." Some years afterwards the Consul took axe in hand, and
commenced the destruction of the temples of Isis and Serapis. In the second
Punic war, the senate had commanded the surrender of the libri vaticini or
precationes, and any written art of sacrificing. When a secret confraternity
was discovered, at a later date, the Consul spoke of the rule of their
ancestors which forbade the forum, circus, and city to Sacrificuli and
prophets, and burnt their books. In the next age banishment was inflicted on
individuals who were introducing the worship of the Syrian Sabazius; and
in the next the Iseion and Serapeion were destroyed a second time.
Mæcenas in Dio advises Augustus to honour the gods according to the
national custom, because the contempt of the country's deities leads to civil
insubordination, reception of foreign laws, conspiracies, and secret
meetings.[234:4] "Suffer no one," he adds, "to deny the gods or to practise
sorcery." The civilian Julius Paulus lays it down as one of the leading
principles of Roman Law, that those who introduce new or untried religions
should be degraded, and if in the lower orders put to death.[234:5] In like
manner, it is enacted in one of Constantine's Laws that the Haruspices
should not exercise their art in private; and there is a law of Valentinian's
against nocturnal sacrifices or magic. It is more immediately to our purpose
that Trajan had been so earnest in his resistance to Hetæriæ or secret
societies, that, when a fire had laid waste Nicomedia, and Pliny proposed to
him to incorporate a body of a hundred and fifty firemen in consequence,
[235:1]
he was afraid of the precedent and forbade it.

22.
What has been said will suggest another point of view in which the Oriental
rites were obnoxious to the government, viz., as being vagrant and
proselytizing religions. If it tolerated foreign superstitions, this would be on
the ground that districts or countries within its jurisdiction held them; to
proselytize to a rite hitherto unknown, to form a new party, and to propagate
it through the Empire,—a religion not local but Catholic,—was an offence
against both order and reason. The state desired peace everywhere, and no
change; "considering," according to Lactantius, "that they were rightly and
deservedly punished who execrated the public religion handed down to
them by their ancestors."[235:2]

It is impossible surely to deny that, in assembling for religious purposes, the
Christians were breaking a solemn law, a vital principle of the Roman
constitution; and this is the light in which their conduct was regarded by the
historians and philosophers of the Empire. This was a very strong act on the
part of the disciples of the great Apostle, who had enjoined obedience to the
powers that be. Time after time they resisted the authority of the magistrate;
and this is a phenomenon inexplicable on the theory of Private Judgment or
of the Voluntary Principle. The justification of such disobedience lies
simply in the necessity of obeying the higher authority of some divine law;
but if Christianity were in its essence only private and personal, as so many
now think, there was no necessity of their meeting together at all. If, on the
other hand, in assembling for worship and holy communion, they were
fulfilling an indispensable observance, Christianity has imposed a social
law on the world, and formally enters the field of politics. Gibbon says that,
in consequence of Pliny's edict, "the prudence of the Christians suspended
their Agapæ; but it was impossible for them to omit the exercise of public
worship."[236:1] We can draw no other conclusion.

23.
At the end of three hundred years, a more remarkable violation of law
seems to have been admitted by the Christian body. It shall be given in the
words of Dr. Burton; he has been speaking of Maximin's edict, which
provided for the restitution of any of their lands or buildings which had
been alienated from them. "It is plain," he says, "from the terms of this
edict, that the Christians had for some time been in possession of property.
It speaks of houses and lands which did not belong to individuals, but to the
whole body. Their possession of such property could hardly have escaped
the notice of the government; but it seems to have been held in direct
violation of a law of Diocletian, which prohibited corporate bodies, or
associations which were not legally recognized, from acquiring property.
The Christians were certainly not a body recognized by law at the
beginning of the reign of Diocletian, and it might almost be thought that
this enactment was specially directed against them. But, like other laws
which are founded upon tyranny, and are at variance with the first principles
of justice, it is probable that this law about corporate property was evaded.
We must suppose that the Christians had purchased lands and houses before

the law was passed; and their disregard of the prohibition may be taken as
another proof that their religion had now taken so firm a footing that the
executors of the laws were obliged to connive at their being broken by so
numerous a body."[237:1]

24.
No wonder that the magistrate who presided at the martyrdom of St.
Romanus calls them in Prudentius "a rebel people;"[237:2] that Galerius
speaks of them as "a nefarious conspiracy;" the heathen in Minucius, as
"men of a desperate faction;" that others make them guilty of sacrilege and
treason, and call them by those other titles which, more closely resembling
the language of Tacitus, have been noticed above. Hence the violent
accusations against them as the destruction of the Empire, the authors of
physical evils, and the cause of the anger of the gods.
"Men cry out," says Tertullian, "that the state is beset, that the Christians are
in their fields, in their forts, in their islands. They mourn as for a loss that
every sex, condition, and now even rank, is going over to this sect. And yet
they do not by this very means advance their minds to the idea of some
good therein hidden; they allow not themselves to conjecture more rightly,
they choose not to examine more closely. The generality run upon a hatred
of this name, with eyes so closed that in bearing favourable testimony to
any one they mingle with it the reproach of the name. 'A good man Caius
Seius, only he is a Christian.' So another, 'I marvel that that wise man
Lucius Titius hath suddenly become a Christian.' No one reflecteth whether
Caius be not therefore good and Lucius wise because a Christian, or
therefore a Christian because wise and good. They praise that which they
know, they revile that which they know not. Virtue is not in such account as
hatred of the Christians. Now, then, if the hatred be of the name, what guilt
is there in names? What charge against words? Unless it be that any word
which is a name have either a barbarous or ill-omened, or a scurrilous or an
immodest sound. If the Tiber cometh up to the walls, if the Nile cometh not
up to the fields, if the heaven hath stood still, if the earth hath been moved,
if there be any famine, if any pestilence, 'The Christians to the lions' is
forthwith the word."[238:1]

25.
"Men of a desperate, lawless, reckless faction," says the heathen Cæcilius,
in the passage above referred to, "who collect together out of the lowest
rabble the thoughtless portion, and credulous women seduced by the
weakness of their sex, and form a mob of impure conspirators, of whom
nocturnal assemblies, and solemn fastings, and unnatural food, no sacred
rite but pollution, is the bond. A tribe lurking and light-hating, dumb for the
public, talkative in corners, they despise our temples as if graves, spit at our
gods, deride our religious forms; pitiable themselves, they pity, forsooth,
our priests; half-naked themselves, they despise our honours and purple;
monstrous folly and incredible impudence! . . . Day after day, their
abandoned morals wind their serpentine course; over the whole world are
those most hideous rites of an impious association growing into shape: . . .
they recognize each other by marks and signs, and love each other almost
before they recognize; promiscuous lust is their religion. Thus does their
vain and mad superstition glory in crimes. . . The writer who tells the story
of a criminal capitally punished, and of the gibbet (ligna feralia) of the
cross being their observance (ceremonias), assigns to them thereby an altar
in keeping with the abandoned and wicked, that they may worship (colant)
what they merit. . . . Why their mighty effort to hide and shroud whatever it
is they worship (colunt), since things honest ever like the open day, and
crimes are secret? Why have they no altars, no temples, no images known
to us, never speak abroad, never assemble freely, were it not that what they
worship and suppress is subject either of punishment or of shame? . . What
monstrous, what portentous notions do they fabricate! that that God of
theirs, whom they can neither show nor see, should be inquiring diligently
into the characters, the acts, nay the words and secret thoughts of all men;
running to and fro, forsooth, and present everywhere, troublesome, restless,
nay impudently curious they would have him; that is, if he is close at every
deed, interferes in all places, while he can neither attend to each as being
distracted through the whole, nor suffice for the whole as being engaged
about each. Think too of their threatening fire, meditating destruction to the
whole earth, nay the world itself with its stars! . . . Nor content with this
mad opinion, they add and append their old wives' tales about a new birth
after death, ashes and cinders, and by some strange confidence believe each
other's lies. Poor creatures! consider what hangs over you after death, while

you are still alive. Lo, the greater part of you, the better, as you say, are in
want, cold, toil, hunger, and your God suffers it; but I omit common trials.
Lo, threats are offered to you, punishments, torments; crosses to be
undergone now, not worshipped (adorandæ); fires too which ye predict and
fear; where is that God who can recover, but cannot preserve your life? The
answer of Socrates, when he was asked about heavenly matters, is well
known, 'What is above us does not concern us.' My opinion also is, that
points which are doubtful, as are the points in question, must be left; nor,
when so many and such great men are in controversy on the subject, must
judgment be rashly and audaciously given on either side, lest the
consequence be either anile superstition or the overthrow of all religion."

26.
Such was Christianity in the eyes of those who witnessed its rise and
propagation;—one of a number of wild and barbarous rites which were
pouring in upon the Empire from the ancient realms of superstition, and the
mother of a progeny of sects which were faithful to the original they had
derived from Egypt or Syria; a religion unworthy of an educated person, as
appealing, not to the intellect, but to the fears and weaknesses of human
nature, and consisting, not in the rational and cheerful enjoyment, but in a
morose rejection of the gifts of Providence; a horrible religion, as inflicting
or enjoining cruel sufferings, and monstrous and loathsome in its very
indulgence of the passions; a religion leading by reaction to infidelity; a
religion of magic, and of the vulgar arts, real and pretended, with which
magic was accompanied; a secret religion which dared not face the day; an
itinerant, busy, proselytizing religion, forming an extended confederacy
against the state, resisting its authority and breaking its laws. There may be
some exceptions to this general impression, such as Pliny's discovery of the
innocent and virtuous rule of life adopted by the Christians of Pontus; but
this only proves that Christianity was not in fact the infamous religion
which the heathen thought it; it did not reverse their general belief to that
effect.

27.

Now it must be granted that, in some respects, this view of Christianity
depended on the times, and would alter with their alteration. When there
was no persecution, Martyrs could not be obstinate; and when the Church
was raised aloft in high places, it was no longer in caves. Still, I believe, it
continued substantially the same in the judgment of the world external to it,
while there was an external world to judge of it. "They thought it enough,"
says Julian in the fourth century, of our Lord and His Apostles, "to deceive
women, servants, and slaves, and by their means wives and husbands." "A
human fabrication," says he elsewhere, "put together by wickedness, having
nothing divine in it, but making a perverted use of the fable-loving,
childish, irrational part of the soul, and offering a set of wonders to create
belief." "Miserable men," he says elsewhere, "you refuse to worship the
ancile, yet you worship the wood of the cross, and sign it on your foreheads,
and fix it on your doors. Shall one for this hate the intelligent among you, or
pity the less understanding, who in following you have gone to such an
excess of perdition as to leave the everlasting gods and go over to a dead
Jew?" He speaks of their adding other dead men to Him who died so long
ago. "You have filled all places with sepulchres and monuments, though it
is nowhere told you in your religion to haunt the tombs and to attend upon
them." Elsewhere he speaks of their "leaving the gods for corpses and
relics." On the other hand, he attributes the growth of Christianity to its
humanity towards strangers, care in burying the dead, and pretended
religiousness of life. In another place he speaks of their care of the poor.
[241:1]

Libanius, Julian's preceptor in rhetoric, delivers the same testimony, as far
as it goes. He addressed his Oration for the Temples to a Christian Emperor,
and would in consequence be guarded in his language; however it runs in
one direction. He speaks of "those black-habited men," meaning the monks,
"who eat more than elephants, and by the number of their potations trouble
those who send them drink in their chantings, and conceal this by paleness
artificially acquired." They "are in good condition out of the misfortunes of
others, while they pretend to serve God by hunger." Those whom they
attack "are like bees, they like drones." I do not quote this passage to prove
that there were monks in Libanius's days, which no one doubts, but to show
his impression of Christianity, as far as his works betray it.

Numantian, in the same century, describes in verse his voyage from Rome
to Gaul: one book of the poem is extant; he falls in with Christianity on two
of the islands which lie in his course. He thus describes them as found on
one of these: "The island is in a squalid state, being full of light-haters.
They call themselves monks, because they wish to live alone without
witness. They dread the gifts, from fearing the reverses, of fortune. Thus
Homer says that melancholy was the cause of Bellerophon's anxiety; for it
is said that after the wounds of grief mankind displeased the offended
youth." He meets on the other island a Christian, whom he had known, of
good family and fortune, and happy in his marriage, who "impelled by the
Furies had left men and gods, and, credulous exile, was living in base
concealment. Is not this herd," he continues, "worse than Circean poison?
then bodies were changed, now minds."

28.
In the Philopatris, which is the work of an Author of the fourth century,
[242:1]
Critias is introduced pale and wild. His friend asks him if he has seen
Cerberus or Hecate; and he answers that he has heard a rigmarole from
certain "thrice-cursed sophists;" which he thinks would drive him mad, if he
heard it again, and was nearly sending him headlong over some cliff as it
was. He retires for relief with his inquirer to a pleasant place, shadowed by
planes, where swallows and nightingales are singing, and a quiet brook is
purling. Triephon, his friend, expresses a fear lest he has heard some
incantation, and is led by the course of the dialogue, before his friend tells
his tale, to give some account of Christianity, being himself a Christian.
After speaking of the creation, as described by Moses, he falls at once upon
that doctrine of a particular providence which is so distasteful to Plutarch,
Velleius in Cicero, and Cæcilius, and generally to unbelievers. "He is in
heaven," he says, "looking at just and unjust, and causing actions to be
entered in books; and He will recompense all on a day which He has
appointed." Critias objects that he cannot make this consistent with the
received doctrine about the Fates, "even though he has perhaps been carried
aloft with his master, and initiated in unspeakable mysteries." He also asks
if the deeds of the Scythians are written in heaven; for if so, there must be
many scribes there. After some more words, in course of which, as in the
earlier part of the dialogue, the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is introduced,

Critias gives an account of what befell him. He says, he fell in with a crowd
in the streets; and, while asking a friend the cause of it, others joined them
(Christians or monks), and a conversation ensues, part of it corrupt or
obscure, on the subject, as Gesner supposes, of Julian's oppression of the
Christians, especially of the clergy. One of these interlocutors is a wretched
old man, whose "phlegm is paler than death;" another has "a rotten cloke
on, and no covering on head or feet," who says he has been told by some ill-
clad person from the mountains, with a shorn crown, that in the theatre was
a name hieroglyphically written of one who would flood the highway with
gold. On his laughing at the story, his friend Crato, whom he had joined,
bids him be silent, using a Pythagorean word; for he has "most excellent
matters to initiate him into, and that the prediction is no dream but true,"
and will be fulfilled in August, using the Egyptian name of the month. He
attempts to leave them in disgust, but Crato pulls him back "at the
instigation of that old demon." He is in consequence persuaded to go "to
those conjurers," who, says Crato, would "initiate in all mysteries." He
finds, in a building which is described in the language used by Homer of the
Palace of Menelaus, "not Helen, no, but men pale and downcast," who ask,
whether there was any bad news; "for they seemed," he says, "wishing the
worst; and rejoicing in misfortune, as the Furies in the theatres." On their
asking him how the city and the world went on, and his answering that
things went on smoothly and seemed likely to do so still, they frown, and
say that "the city is in travail with a bad birth." "You, who dwell aloft," he
answers, "and see everything from on high, doubtless have a keen
perception in this matter; but tell me, how is the sky? will the Sun be
eclipsed? will Mars be in quadrature with Jupiter? &c.;" and he goes on to
jest upon their celibacy. On their persisting in prophesying evil to the state,
he says, "This evil will fall on your own head, since you are so hard upon
your country; for not as high-flyers have ye heard this, nor are ye adepts in
the restless astrological art, but if divinations and conjurings have seduced
you, double is your stupidity; for they are the discoveries of old women and
things to laugh at." The interview then draws to an end; but more than
enough has been quoted already to show the author's notion of Christianity.

29.

Such was the language of paganism after Christianity had for fifty years
been exposed to the public gaze; after it had been before the world for fifty
more, St. Augustine had still to defend it against the charge of being the
cause of the calamities of the Empire. And for the charge of magic, when
the Arian bishops were in formal disputations with the Catholic, before
Gungebald, Burgundian King of France, at the end of the fifth century, we
find still that they charged the Catholics with being "præstigiatores," and
worshipping a number of gods; and when the Catholics proposed that the
king should repair to the shrine of St. Justus, where both parties might ask
him concerning their respective faiths, the Arians cried out that "they would
not seek enchantments like Saul, for Scripture was enough for them, which
was more powerful than all bewitchments."[245:1] This was said, not against
strangers of whom they knew nothing, as Ethelbert might be suspicious of
St. Augustine and his brother missionaries, but against a body of men who
lived among them.
I do not think it can be doubted then that, had Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny,
Celsus, Porphyry, and the other opponents of Christianity, lived in the
fourth century, their evidence concerning Christianity would be very much
the same as it has come down to us from the centuries before it. In either
case, a man of the world and a philosopher would have been disgusted at
the gloom and sadness of its profession, its mysteriousness, its claim of
miracles, the want of good sense imputable to its rule of life, and the
unsettlement and discord it was introducing into the social and political
world.

30.
On the whole then I conclude as follows:—if there is a form of Christianity
now in the world which is accused of gross superstition, of borrowing its
rites and customs from the heathen, and of ascribing to forms and
ceremonies an occult virtue;—a religion which is considered to burden and
enslave the mind by its requisitions, to address itself to the weak-minded
and ignorant, to be supported by sophistry and imposture, and to contradict
reason and exalt mere irrational faith;—a religion which impresses on the
serious mind very distressing views of the guilt and consequences of sin,
sets upon the minute acts of the day, one by one, their definite value for

praise or blame, and thus casts a grave shadow over the future;—a religion
which holds up to admiration the surrender of wealth, and disables serious
persons from enjoying it if they would;—a religion, the doctrines of which,
be they good or bad, are to the generality of men unknown; which is
considered to bear on its very surface signs of folly and falsehood so
distinct that a glance suffices to judge of it, and that careful examination is
preposterous; which is felt to be so simply bad, that it may be calumniated
at hazard and at pleasure, it being nothing but absurdity to stand upon the
accurate distribution of its guilt among its particular acts, or painfully to
determine how far this or that story concerning it is literally true, or what
has to be allowed in candour, or what is improbable, or what cuts two ways,
or what is not proved, or what may be plausibly defended;—a religion such,
that men look at a convert to it with a feeling which no other denomination
raises except Judaism, Socialism, or Mormonism, viz. with curiosity,
suspicion, fear, disgust, as the case may be, as if something strange had
befallen him, as if he had had an initiation into a mystery, and had come
into communion with dreadful influences, as if he were now one of a
confederacy which claimed him, absorbed him, stripped him of his
personality, reduced him to a mere organ or instrument of a whole;—a
religion which men hate as proselytizing, anti-social, revolutionary, as
dividing families, separating chief friends, corrupting the maxims of
government, making a mock at law, dissolving the empire, the enemy of
human nature, and a "conspirator against its rights and privileges;"[247:1]—a
religion which they consider the champion and instrument of darkness, and
a pollution calling down upon the land the anger of heaven;—a religion
which they associate with intrigue and conspiracy, which they speak about
in whispers, which they detect by anticipation in whatever goes wrong, and
to which they impute whatever is unaccountable;—a religion, the very
name of which they cast out as evil, and use simply as a bad epithet, and
which from the impulse of self-preservation they would persecute if they
could;—if there be such a religion now in the world, it is not unlike
Christianity as that same world viewed it, when first it came forth from its
Divine Author.[247:2]

SECTION II.

THE CHURCH OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.

Till the Imperial Government had become Christian, and heresies were put
down by the arm of power, the face of Christendom presented much the
same appearance all along as on the first propagation of the religion. What
Gnosticism, Montanism, Judaism and, I may add, the Oriental mysteries
were to the nascent Church, as described in the foregoing Section, such
were the Manichean, Donatist, Apollinarian and contemporary sects
afterwards. The Church in each place looked at first sight as but one out of a
number of religious communions, with little of a very distinctive character
except to the careful inquirer. Still there were external indications of
essential differences within; and, as we have already compared it in the first
centuries, we may now contrast it in the fourth, with the rival religious
bodies with which it was encompassed.

2.
How was the man to guide his course who wished to join himself to the
doctrine and fellowship of the Apostles in the times of St. Athanasius, St.
Basil, and St. Augustine? Few indeed were the districts in the orbis
terrarum, which did not then, as in the Ante-nicene era, present a number of
creeds and communions for his choice. Gaul indeed is said at that era to
have been perfectly free from heresies; at least none are mentioned as
belonging to that country in the Theodosian Code. But in Egypt, in the early
part of the fourth century, the Meletian schism numbered one-third as many
bishops as were contained in the whole Patriarchate. In Africa, towards the
end of it, while the Catholic Bishops amounted in all to 466, the Donatists
rivalled them with as many as 400. In Spain Priscillianism was spread from
the Pyrenees to the Ocean. It seems to have been the religion of the
population in the province of Gallicia, while its author Priscillian, whose
death had been contrived by the Ithacians, was honoured as a Martyr. The
Manichees, hiding themselves under a variety of names in different
localities, were not in the least flourishing condition at Rome. Rome and
Italy were the seat of the Marcionites. The Origenists, too, are mentioned by
St. Jerome as "bringing a cargo of blasphemies into the port of Rome." And

Rome was the seat of a Novatian, a Donatist, and a Luciferian bishop, in
addition to the legitimate occupant of the See of St. Peter. The Luciferians,
as was natural under the circumstances of their schism, were sprinkled over
Christendom from Spain to Palestine, and from Treves to Lybia; while in its
parent country Sardinia, as a centre of that extended range, Lucifer seems to
have received the honours of a Saint.
When St. Gregory Nazianzen began to preach at Constantinople, the Arians
were in possession of its hundred churches; they had the populace in their
favour, and, after their legal dislodgment, edict after edict was ineffectually
issued against them. The Novatians too abounded there; and the Sabbatians,
who had separated from them, had a church, where they prayed at the tomb
of their founder. Moreover, Apollinarians, Eunomians, and Semi-arians,
mustered in great numbers at Constantinople. The Semi-arian bishops were
as popular in the neighbouring provinces, as the Arian doctrine in the
capital. They had possession of the coast of the Hellespont and Bithynia;
and were found in Phrygia, Isauria, and the neighbouring parts of Asia
Minor. Phrygia was the headquarters of the Montanists, and was overrun by
the Messalians, who had advanced thus far from Mesopotamia, spreading
through Syria, Lycaonia, Pamphylia, and Cappadocia in their way. In the
lesser Armenia, the same heretics had penetrated into the monasteries.
Phrygia, too, and Paphlagonia were the seat of the Novatians, who besides
were in force at Nicæa and Nicomedia, were found in Alexandria, Africa,
and Spain, and had a bishop even in Scythia. The whole tract of country
from the Hellespont to Cilicia had nearly lapsed into Eunomianism, and the
tract from Cilicia as far as Phœnicia into Apollinarianism. The disorders of
the Church of Antioch are well known: an Arian succession, two orthodox
claimants, and a bishop of the Apollinarians. Palestine abounded in
Origenists, if at that time they may properly be called a sect; Palestine,
Egypt, and Arabia were overrun with Marcionites; Osrhoene was occupied
by the followers of Bardesanes and Harmonius, whose hymns so nearly
took the place of national tunes that St. Ephrem found no better way of
resisting the heresy than setting them to fresh words. Theodoret in
Comagene speaks in the next century of reclaiming eight villages of
Marcionites, one of Eunomians, and one of Arians.

3.

These sects were of very various character. Learning, eloquence, and talent
were the characteristics of the Apollinarians, Manichees, and Pelagians;
Tichonius the Donatist was distinguished in Biblical interpretation; the
Semi-arian and Apollinarian leaders were men of grave and correct
behaviour; the Novatians had sided with the Orthodox during the Arian
persecution; the Montanists and Messalians addressed themselves to an
almost heathen population; the atrocious fanaticism of the Priscillianists,
the fury of the Arian women of Alexandria and Constantinople, and the
savage cruelty of the Circumcellions can hardly be exaggerated. These
various sectaries had their orders of clergy, bishops, priests and deacons;
their readers and ministers; their celebrants and altars; their hymns and
litanies. They preached to the crowds in public, and their meeting-houses
bore the semblance of churches. They had their sacristies and cemeteries;
their farms; their professors and doctors; their schools. Miracles were
ascribed to the Arian Theophilus, to the Luciferian Gregory of Elvira, to a
Macedonian in Cyzicus, and to the Donatists in Africa.

4.
How was an individual inquirer to find, or a private Christian to keep the
Truth, amid so many rival teachers? The misfortunes or perils of holy men
and saints show us the difficulty; St. Augustine was nine years a Manichee;
St. Basil for a time was in admiration of the Semi-arians; St. Sulpicius gave
a momentary countenance to the Pelagians; St. Paula listened, and Melania
assented, to the Origenists. Yet the rule was simple, which would direct
every one right; and in that age, at least, no one could be wrong for any
long time without his own fault. The Church is everywhere, but it is one;
sects are everywhere, but they are many, independent and discordant.
Catholicity is the attribute of the Church, independency of sectaries. It is
true that some sects might seem almost Catholic in their diffusion;
Novatians or Marcionites were in all quarters of the empire; yet it is hardly
more than the name, or the general doctrine or philosophy, that was
universal: the different portions which professed it seem to have been
bound together by no strict or definite tie. The Church might be evanescent
or lost for a while in particular countries, or it might be levelled and buried
among sects, when the eye was confined to one spot, or it might be
confronted by the one and same heresy in various places; but, on looking

round the orbis terrarum, there was no mistaking that body which, and
which alone, had possession of it. The Church is a kingdom; a heresy is a
family rather than a kingdom; and as a family continually divides and sends
out branches, founding new houses, and propagating itself in colonies, each
of them as independent as its original head, so was it with heresy. Simon
Magus, the first heretic, had been Patriarch of Menandrians, Basilidians,
Valentinians, and the whole family of Gnostics; Tatian of Encratites,
Severians, Aquarians, Apotactites, and Saccophori. The Montanists had
been propagated into Tascodrugites, Pepuzians, Artotyrites, and
Quartodecimans. Eutyches, in a later time, gave birth to the Dioscorians,
Gaianites, Theodosians, Agnoetæ, Theopaschites, Acephali, Semidalitæ,
Nagranitæ, Jacobites, and others. This is the uniform history of heresy. The
patronage of the civil power might for a time counteract the law of its
nature, but it showed it as soon as that obstacle was removed. Scarcely was
Arianism deprived of the churches of Constantinople, and left to itself, than
it split in that very city into the Dorotheans, the Psathyrians, and the
Curtians; and the Eunomians into the Theophronians and Eutychians. One
fourth part of the Donatists speedily became Maximinianists; and besides
these were the Rogatians, the Primianists, the Urbanists, and the
Claudianists. If such was the fecundity of the heretical principle in one
place, it is not to be supposed that Novatians or Marcionites in Africa or the
East would feel themselves bound to think or to act with their fellow-
sectaries of Rome or Constantinople; and the great varieties or
inconsistencies of statement, which have come down to us concerning the
tenets of heresies, may thus be explained. This had been the case with the
pagan rites, whether indigenous or itinerant, to which heresy succeeded.
The established priesthoods were local properties, as independent
theologically as they were geographically of each other; the fanatical
companies which spread over the Empire dissolved and formed again as the
circumstances of the moment occasioned. So was it with heresy: it was, by
its very nature, its own master, free to change, self-sufficient; and, having
thrown off the yoke of the Church, it was little likely to submit to any
usurped and spurious authority. Montanism and Manicheeism might
perhaps in some sort furnish an exception to this remark.

5.

In one point alone the heresies seem universally to have agreed,—in hatred
to the Church. This might at that time be considered one of her surest and
most obvious Notes. She was that body of which all sects, however divided
among themselves, spoke ill; according to the prophecy, "If they have called
the Master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of His
household." They disliked and they feared her; they did their utmost to
overcome their mutual differences, in order to unite against her. Their
utmost indeed was little, for independency was the law of their being; they
could not exert themselves without fresh quarrels, both in the bosom of
each, and one with another. "Bellum hæreticorum pax est ecclesiæ" had
become a proverb; but they felt the great desirableness of union against the
only body which was the natural antagonist of all, and various are the
instances which occur in ecclesiastical history of attempted coalitions. The
Meletians of Africa united with the Arians against St. Athanasius; the Semi-
Arians of the Council of Sardica corresponded with the Donatists of Africa;
Nestorius received and protected the Pelagians; Aspar, the Arian minister of
Leo the Emperor, favoured the Monophysites of Egypt; the Jacobites of
Egypt sided with the Moslem, who are charged with holding a Nestorian
doctrine. It had been so from the beginning: "They huddle up a peace with
all everywhere," says Tertullian, "for it maketh no matter to them, although
they hold different doctrines, so long as they conspire together in their siege
against the one thing, Truth."[254:1] And even though active co-operation
was impracticable, at least hard words cost nothing, and could express that
common hatred at all seasons. Accordingly, by Montanists, Catholics were
called "the carnal;" by Novatians, "the apostates;" by Valentinians, "the
worldly;" by Manichees, "the simple;" by Aërians, "the ancient;"[254:2] by
Apollinarians, "the man-worshippers;" by Origenists, "the flesh-lovers," and
"the slimy;" by the Nestorians, "Egyptians;" by Monophysites, the
"Chalcedonians:" by Donatists, "the traitors," and "the sinners," and
"servants of Antichrist;" and St. Peter's chair, "the seat of pestilence;" and
by the Luciferians, the Church was called "a brothel," "the devil's harlot,"
and "synagogue of Satan:" so that it might be called a Note of the Church,
as I have said, for the use of the most busy and the most ignorant, that she
was on one side and all other bodies on the other.

6.

Yet, strange as it may appear, there was one title of the Church of a very
different nature from those which have been enumerated,—a title of honour,
which all men agreed to give her,—and one which furnished a still more
simple direction than such epithets of abuse to aid the busy and the ignorant
in finding her, and which was used by the Fathers for that purpose. It was
one which the sects could neither claim for themselves, nor hinder being
enjoyed by its rightful owner, though, since it was the characteristic
designation of the Church in the Creed, it seemed to surrender the whole
controversy between the two parties engaged in it. Balaam could not keep
from blessing the ancient people of God; and the whole world, heresies
inclusive, were irresistibly constrained to call God's second election by its
prophetical title of the "Catholic" Church. St. Paul tells us that the heretic is
"condemned by himself;" and no clearer witness against the sects of the
earlier centuries was needed by the Church, than their own testimony to this
contrast between her actual position and their own. Sects, say the Fathers,
are called after the name of their founders, or from their locality, or from
their doctrine. So was it from the beginning: "I am of Paul, and I of Apollos,
and I of Cephas;" but it was promised to the Church that she should have no
master upon earth, and that she should "gather together in one the children
of God that were scattered abroad." Her every-day name, which was
understood in the marketplace and used in the palace, which every chance
comer knew, and which state-edicts recognized, was the "Catholic" Church.
This was that very description of Christianity in those times which we are
all along engaged in determining. And it had been recognized as such from
the first; the name or the fact is put forth by St. Ignatius, St. Justin, St.
Clement; by the Church of Smyrna, St. Irenæus, Rhodon or another,
Tertullian, Origen, St. Cyprian, St. Cornelius; by the Martyrs, Pionius,
Sabina, and Asclepiades; by Lactantius, Eusebius, Adimantius, St.
Athanasius, St. Pacian, St. Optatus, St. Epiphanius, St. Cyril, St. Basil, St.
Ambrose, St. Chrysostom, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and Facundus. St.
Clement uses it as an argument against the Gnostics, St. Augustine against
the Donatists and Manichees, St. Jerome against the Luciferians, and St.
Pacian against the Novatians.

7.

It was an argument for educated and simple. When St. Ambrose would
convert the cultivated reason of Augustine, he bade him study the book of
Isaiah, who is the prophet, as of the Messiah, so of the calling of the
Gentiles and of the Imperial power of the Church. And when St. Cyril
would give a rule to his crowd of Catechumens, "If ever thou art sojourning
in any city," he says, "inquire not simply where the Lord's house is, (for the
sects of the profane also make an attempt to call their own dens houses of
the Lord,) nor merely where the Church is, but where is the Catholic
Church. For this is the peculiar name of this Holy Body, the Mother of us
all, which is the Spouse of our Lord Jesus Christ."[256:1] "In the Catholic
Church," says St. Augustine to the Manichees, "not to speak of that most
pure wisdom, to the knowledge of which few spiritual men attain in this life
so as to know it even in its least measure,—as men, indeed, yet, without any
doubt,—(for the multitude of Christians are safest, not in understanding
with quickness, but in believing with simplicity,) not to speak of this
wisdom, which ye do not believe to be in the Catholic Church, there are
many other considerations which most sufficiently hold me in her bosom. I
am held by the consent of people and nations; by that authority which began
in miracles, was nourished in hope, was increased by charity, and made
steadfast by age; by that succession of priests from the chair of the Apostle
Peter, to whose feeding the Lord after His resurrection commended His
sheep, even to the present episcopate; lastly, by the very title of Catholic,
which, not without cause, hath this Church alone, amid so many heresies,
obtained in such sort, that, whereas all heretics wish to be called Catholics,
nevertheless to any stranger, who asked where to find the 'Catholic' Church,
none of them would dare to point to his own basilica or home. These
dearest bonds, then, of the Christian Name, so many and such, rightly hold
a man in belief in the Catholic Church, even though, by reason of the
slowness of our understanding or our deserts, truth doth not yet show
herself in her clearest tokens. But among you, who have none of these
reasons to invite and detain me, I hear but the loud sound of a promise of
the truth; which truth, verily, if it be so manifestly displayed among you that
there can be no mistake about it, is to be preferred to all those things by
which I am held in the Catholic Church; but if it is promised alone, and not
exhibited, no one shall move me from that faith which by so many and great
ties binds my mind to the Christian religion."[257:1] When Adimantius asked
his Marcionite opponent, how he was a Christian who did not even bear that

name, but was called from Marcion, he retorts, "And you are called from
the Catholic Church, therefore ye are not Christians either;" Adimantius
answers, "Did we profess man's name, you would have spoken to the point;
but if we are called from being all over the world, what is there bad in
this?"[257:2]

8.
"Whereas there is one God and one Lord," says St. Clement, "therefore also
that which is the highest in esteem is praised on the score of being sole, as
after the pattern of the One Principle. In the nature then of the One, the
Church, which is one, hath its portion, which they would forcibly cut up
into many heresies. In substance then, and in idea, and in first principle, and
in pre-eminence, we call the ancient Catholic Church sole; in order to the
unity of one faith, the faith according to her own covenants, or rather that
one covenant in different times, which, by the will of one God and through
one Lord, is gathering together those who are already ordained, whom God
hath predestined, having known that they would be just from the foundation
of the world. . . . . But of heresies, some are called from a man's name, as
Valentine's heresy, Marcion's, and that of Basilides (though they profess to
bring the opinion of Matthias, for all the Apostles had, as one teaching, so
one tradition); and others from place, as the Peratici; and others from
nation, as that of the Phrygians; and others from their actions, as that of the
Encratites; and others from their peculiar doctrines, as the Docetæ and
Hematites; and others from their hypotheses, and what they have honoured,
as Cainites and the Ophites; and others from their wicked conduct and
enormities, as those Simonians who are called Eutychites."[258:1] "There are,
and there have been," says St. Justin, "many who have taught atheistic and
blasphemous words and deeds, coming in the name of Jesus; and they are
called by us from the appellation of the men whence each doctrine and
opinion began . . . Some are called Marcians, others Valentinians, others
Basilidians, others Saturnilians."[258:2] "When men are called Phrygians, or
Novatians, or Valentinians, or Marcionites, or Anthropians," says
Lactantius, "or by any other name, they cease to be Christians; for they
have lost Christ's Name, and clothe themselves in human and foreign titles.
It is the Catholic Church alone which retains the true worship."[258:3] "We
never heard of Petrines, or Paulines, or Bartholomeans, or Thaddeans," says

St. Epiphanius; "but from the first there was one preaching of all the
Apostles, not preaching themselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord. Wherefore
also all gave one name to the Church, not their own, but that of their Lord
Jesus Christ, since they began to be called Christians first at Antioch; which
is the Sole Catholic Church, having nought else but Christ's, being a Church
of Christians; not of Christs, but of Christians, He being One, they from that
One being called Christians. None, but this Church and her preachers, are of
this character, as is shown by their own epithets, Manicheans, and
Simonians, and Valentinians, and Ebionites."[259:1] "If you ever hear those
who are said to belong to Christ," says St. Jerome, "named, not from the
Lord Jesus Christ, but from some other, say Marcionites, Valentinians,
Mountaineers, Campestrians, know that it is not Christ's Church, but the
synagogue of Antichrist."[259:2]

9.
St. Pacian's letters to the Novatian Bishop Sympronian require a more
extended notice. The latter had required the Catholic faith to be proved to
him, without distinctly stating from what portion of it he dissented; and he
boasted that he had never found any one to convince him of its truth. St.
Pacian observes that there is one point which Sympronian cannot dispute,
and which settles the question, the very name Catholic. He then supposes
Sympronian to object that, "under the Apostles no one was called Catholic."
He answers, "Be it thus;[259:3] it shall have been so; allow even that. When,
after the Apostles, heresies had burst forth, and were striving under various
names to tear piecemeal and divide 'the Dove' and 'the Queen' of God, did
not the Apostolic people require a name of their own, whereby to mark the
unity of the people that was uncorrupted, lest the error of some should rend
limb by limb 'the undefiled virgin' of God? Was it not seemly that the chief
head should be distinguished by its own peculiar appellation? Suppose this
very day I entered a populous city. When I had found Marcionites,
Apollinarians, Cataphrygians, Novatians, and others of the kind, who call
themselves Christians, by what name should I recognize the congregation of
my own people, unless it were named Catholic? . . . . Whence was it
delivered to me? Certainly that which has stood through so many ages was
not borrowed from man. This name 'Catholic' sounds not of Marcion, nor of
Apelles, nor of Montanus, nor does it take heretics for its authors."

In his second letter, he continues, "Certainly that was no accessory name
which endured through so many ages. And, indeed, I am glad for thee, that,
although thou mayest have preferred others, yet thou agreest that the name
attaches to us, which should you deny nature would cry out. But and if you
still have doubts, let us hold our peace. We will both be that which we shall
be named." After alluding to Sympronian's remark that, though Cyprian was
holy, "his people bear the name of Apostaticum, Capitolinum, or
Synedrium," which were some of the Novatian titles of the Church, St.
Pacian replies, "Ask a century, brother, and all its years in succession,
whether this name has adhered to us; whether the people of Cyprian have
been called other than Catholic? No one of these names have I ever heard."
It followed that such appellations were "taunts, not names," and therefore
unmannerly. On the other hand it seems that Sympronian did not like to be
called a Novatian, though he could not call himself a Catholic. "Tell me
yourselves," says St. Pacian, "what ye are called. Do ye deny that the
Novatians are called from Novatian? Impose on them whatever name you
like; that will ever adhere to them. Search, if you please, whole annals, and
trust so many ages. You will answer, 'Christian.' But if I inquire the genus of
the sect, you will not deny that it is Novatian. . . . Confess it without deceit;
there is no wickedness in the name. Why, when so often inquired for, do
you hide yourself? Why ashamed of the origin of your name? When you
first wrote, I thought you a Cataphrygian. . . . Dost thou grudge me my
name, and yet shun thine own? Think what there is of shame in a cause
which shrinks from its own name."
In a third letter: "'The Church is the Body of Christ.' Truly, the body, not a
member; the body composed of many parts and members knit in one, as
saith the Apostle, 'For the Body is not one member, but many.' Therefore,
the Church is the full body, compacted and diffused now throughout the
whole world; like a city, I mean, all whose parts are united, not as ye are, O
Novatians, some small and insolent portion, and a mere swelling that has
gathered and separated from the rest of the body. . . . Great is the progeny of
the Virgin, and without number her offspring, wherewith the whole world is
filled, wherewith the populous swarms ever throng the circumfluous hive."
And he founds this characteristic of the Church upon the prophecies: "At
length, brother Sympronian, be not ashamed to be with the many; at length
consent to despise these festering spots of the Novatians, and these parings

of yours; and at length, to look upon the flocks of the Catholics, and the
people of the Church extending so far and wide. . . . Hear what David saith,
'I will sing unto Thy name in the great congregation;' and again, 'I will
praise Thee among much people;' and 'the Lord, even the most mighty God,
hath spoken, and called the world from the rising up of the sun unto the
going down thereof.' What! shall the seed of Abraham, which is as the stars
and the sand on the seashore for number, be contented with your poverty?
. . . Recognize now, brother, the Church of God extending her tabernacles
and fixing the stakes of her curtains on the right and on the left; understand
that 'the Lord's name is praised from the rising up of the sun unto the going
down thereof.'"

10.
In citing these passages, I am not proving what was the doctrine of the
Fathers concerning the Church in those early times, or what were the
promises made to it in Scripture; but simply ascertaining what, in matter of
fact, was its then condition relatively to the various Christian bodies among
which it was found. That the Fathers were able to put forward a certain
doctrine, that they were able to appeal to the prophecies, proves that matter
of fact; for unless the Church, and the Church alone, had been one body
everywhere, they could not have argued on the supposition that it was so.
And so as to the word "Catholic;" it is enough that the Church was so
called; that title was a confirmatory proof and symbol of what is even
otherwise so plain, that she, as St. Pacian explains the word, was
everywhere one, while the sects of the day were nowhere one, but
everywhere divided. Sects might, indeed, be everywhere, but they were in
no two places the same; every spot had its own independent communion, or
at least to this result they were inevitably and continually tending.

11.
St. Pacian writes in Spain: the same contrast between the Church and
sectarianism is presented to us in Africa in the instance of the Donatists; and
St. Optatus is a witness both to the fact, and to its notoriety, and to the deep
impressions which it made on all parties. Whether or not the Donatists
identified themselves with the true Church, and cut off the rest of

Christendom from it, is not the question here, nor alters the fact which I
wish distinctly brought out and recognized, that in those ancient times the
Church was that Body which was spread over the orbis terrarum, and sects
were those bodies which were local or transitory.
"What is that one Church," says St. Optatus, "which Christ calls 'Dove' and
'Spouse'? . . . It cannot be in the multitude of heretics and schismatics. If so,
it follows that it is but in one place. Thou, brother Parmenian, hast said that
it is with you alone; unless, perhaps, you aim at claiming for yourselves a
special sanctity from your pride, so that where you will, there the Church
may be, and may not be, where you will not. Must it then be in a small
portion of Africa, in the corner of a small realm, among you, but not among
us in another part of Africa? And not in Spain, in Gaul, in Italy, where you
are not? And if you will have it only among you, not in the three Pannonian
provinces, in Dacia, Mœsia, Thrace, Achaia, Macedonia, and in all Greece,
where you are not? And that you may keep it among yourselves, not in
Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Pamphylia, Phrygia, Cilicia, in the three
Syrias, in the two Armenias, in all Egypt, and in Mesopotamia, where you
are not? Not among such innumerable islands and the other provinces,
scarcely numerable, where you are not? What will become then of the
meaning of the word Catholic, which is given to the Church, as being
according to reason[263:1] and diffused every where? For if thus at your
pleasure you narrow the Church, if you withdraw from her all the nations,
where will be the earnings of the Son of God? where will be that which the
Father hath so amply accorded to Him, saying in the second Psalm 'I will
give thee the heathen for Thine inheritance and the uttermost parts of the
earth for Thy possession,' &c.? . . The whole earth is given Him with the
nations; its whole circuit (orbis) is Christ's one possession."[263:2]

12.
An African writer contemporary with St. Augustine, if not St. Augustine
himself, enumerates the small portions of the Donatist Sect, in and out of
Africa, and asks if they can be imagined to be the fulfilment of the Scripture
promise to the Church. "If the holy Scriptures have assigned the Church to
Africa alone, or to the scanty Cutzupitans or Mountaineers of Rome, or to
the house or patrimony of one Spanish woman, however the argument may

stand from other writings, then none but the Donatists have possession of
the Church. If holy Scripture determines it to the few Moors of the
Cæsarean province, we must go over to the Rogatists: if to the few
Tripolitans or Byzacenes and Provincials, the Maximianists have attained to
it; if in the Orientals only, it is to be sought for among Arians, Eunomians,
Macedonians, and others that may be there; for who can enumerate every
heresy of every nation? But if Christ's Church, by the divine and most
certain testimonies of Canonical Scriptures, is assigned to all nations,
whatever may be adduced, and from whatever quarter cited, by those who
say, 'Lo, here is Christ and lo there,' let us rather hear, if we be His sheep,
the voice of our Shepherd saying unto us, 'Do not believe.' For they are not
each found in the many nations where she is; but she, who is everywhere, is
found where they are."[264:1]
Lastly, let us hear St. Augustine himself again in the same controversy:
"They do not communicate with us, as you say," he observes to Cresconius,
"Novatians, Arians, Patripassians, Valentinians, Patricians, Apellites,
Marcionites, Ophites, and the rest of those sacrilegious names, as you call
them, of nefarious pests rather than sects. Yet, wheresoever they are, there is
the Catholic Church; as in Africa it is where you are. On the other hand,
neither you, nor any one of those heresies whatever, is to be found wherever
is the Catholic Church. Whence it appears, which is that tree whose boughs
extend over all the earth by the richness of its fruitfulness, and which be
those broken branches which have not the life of the root, but lie and wither,
each in its own place."[265:1]

13.
It may be possibly suggested that this universality which the Fathers ascribe
to the Catholic Church lay in its Apostolical descent, or again in its
Episcopacy; and that it was one, not as being one kingdom or civitas "at
unity with itself," with one and the same intelligence in every part, one
sympathy, one ruling principle, one organization, one communion, but
because, though consisting of a number of independent communities, at
variance (if so be) with each other even to a breach of communion,
nevertheless all these were possessed of a legitimate succession of clergy, or
all governed by Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. But who will in seriousness

maintain that relationship, or that sameness of structure, makes two bodies
one? England and Prussia are both of them monarchies; are they therefore
one kingdom? England and the United States are from one stock; can they
therefore be called one state? England and Ireland are peopled by different
races; yet are they not one kingdom still? If unity lies in the Apostolical
succession, an act of schism is from the nature of the case impossible; for as
no one can reverse his parentage, so no Church can undo the fact that its
clergy have come by lineal descent from the Apostles. Either there is no
such sin as schism, or unity does not lie in the Episcopal form or in the
Episcopal ordination. And this is felt by the controversialists of this day;
who in consequence are obliged to invent a sin, and to consider, not
division of Church from Church, but the interference of Church with
Church to be the sin of schism, as if local dioceses and bishops with
restraint were more than ecclesiastical arrangements and by-laws of the
Church, however sacred, while schism is a sin against her essence. Thus
they strain out a gnat, and swallow a camel. Division is the schism, if
schism there be, not interference. If interference is a sin, division which is
the cause of it is a greater; but where division is a duty, there can be no sin
in interference.

14.
Far different from such a theory is the picture which the ancient Church
presents to us; true, it was governed by Bishops, and those Bishops came
from the Apostles, but it was a kingdom besides; and as a kingdom admits
of the possibility of rebels, so does such a Church involve sectaries and
schismatics, but not independent portions. It was a vast organized
association, co-extensive with the Roman Empire, or rather overflowing it.
Its Bishops were not mere local officers, but possessed a quasi-ecumenical
power, extending wherever a Christian was to be found. "No Christian,"
says Bingham, "would pretend to travel without taking letters of credence
with him from his own bishop, if he meant to communicate with the
Christian Church in a foreign country. Such was the admirable unity of the
Church Catholic in those days, and the blessed harmony and consent of her
bishops among one another."[266:1] St. Gregory Nazianzen calls St. Cyprian
an universal Bishop, "presiding," as the same author presently quotes
Gregory, "not only over the Church of Carthage and Africa, but over all the

regions of the West, and over the East, and South, and Northern parts of the
world also." This is evidence of a unity throughout Christendom, not of
mere origin or of Apostolical succession, but of government. Bingham
continues "[Gregory] says the same of Athanasius; that, in being made
Bishop of Alexandria, he was made Bishop of the whole world.
Chrysostom, in like manner, styles Timothy, Bishop of the universe. . . . .
The great Athanasius, as he returned from his exile, made no scruple to
ordain in several cities as he went along, though they were not in his own
diocese. And the famous Eusebius of Samosata did the like, in the times of
the Arian persecution under Valens. . . Epiphanius made use of the same
power and privilege in a like case, ordaining Paulinianus, St. Jerome's
brother, first deacon and then presbyter, in a monastery out of his own
diocese in Palestine."[267:1] And so in respect of teaching, before Councils
met on any large scale, St. Ignatius of Antioch had addressed letters to the
Churches along the coast of Asia Minor, when on his way to martyrdom at
Rome. St. Irenæus, when a subject of the Church of Smyrna, betakes
himself to Gaul, and answers in Lyons the heresies of Syria. The see of St.
Hippolytus, as if he belonged to all parts of the orbis terrarum, cannot be
located, and is variously placed in the neighbourhood of Rome and in
Arabia. Hosius, a Spanish Bishop, arbitrates in an Alexandrian controversy.
St. Athanasius, driven from his Church, makes all Christendom his home,
from Treves to Ethiopia, and introduces into the West the discipline of the
Egyptian Antony. St. Jerome is born in Dalmatia, studies at Constantinople
and Alexandria, is secretary to St. Damasus at Rome, and settles and dies in
Palestine.
Above all the See of Rome itself is the centre of teaching as well as of
action, is visited by Fathers and heretics as a tribunal in controversy, and by
ancient custom sends her alms to the poor Christians of all Churches, to
Achaia and Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, and Cappadocia.

15.
Moreover, this universal Church was not only one; it was exclusive also. As
to the vehemence with which Christians of the Ante-nicene period
denounced the idolatries and sins of paganism, and proclaimed the
judgments which would be their consequence, this is well known, and led to

their being reputed in the heathen world as "enemies of mankind."
"Worthily doth God exert the lash of His stripes and scourges," says St.
Cyprian to a heathen magistrate; "and since they avail so little, and convert
not men to God by all this dreadfulness of havoc, there abides beyond the
prison eternal and the ceaseless flame and the everlasting penalty. . . . Why
humble yourself and bend to false gods? Why bow your captive body
before helpless images and moulded earth? Why grovel in the prostration of
death, like the serpent whom ye worship? Why rush into the downfall of the
devil, his fall the cause of yours, and he your companion? . . . . Believe and
live; you have been our persecutors in time; in eternity, be companions of
our joy."[268:1] "These rigid sentiments," says Gibbon, "which had been
unknown to the ancient world, appear to have infused a spirit of bitterness
into a system of love and harmony."[268:2] Such, however, was the judgment
passed by the first Christians upon all who did not join their own society;
and such still more was the judgment of their successors on those who lived
and died in the sects and heresies which had issued from it. That very
Father, whose denunciation of the heathen has just been quoted, had already
declared it even in the third century. "He who leaves the Church of Christ,"
he says, "attains not to Christ's rewards. He is an alien, an outcast, an
enemy. He can no longer have God for a Father, who has not the Church for
a Mother. If any man was able to escape who remained without the Ark of
Noah, then will that man escape who is out of doors beyond the Church. . .
What sacrifice do they believe they celebrate, who are rivals of the Priests?
If such men were even killed for confession of the Christian name, not even
by their blood is this stain washed out. Inexplicable and heavy is the sin of
discord, and is purged by no suffering . . . They cannot dwell with God who
have refused to be of one mind in God's Church; a man of such sort may
indeed be killed, crowned he cannot be."[269:1] And so again St.
Chrysostom, in the following century, in harmony with St. Cyprian's
sentiment: "Though we have achieved ten thousand glorious acts, yet shall
we, if we cut to pieces the fulness of the Church, suffer punishment no less
sore than they who mangled His body."[269:2] In like manner St Augustine
seems to consider that a conversion from idolatry to a schismatical
communion is no gain. "Those whom Donatists baptize, they heal of the
wound of idolatry or infidelity, but inflict a more grievous stroke in the
wound of schism; for idolaters among God's people the sword destroyed,

but schismatics the gaping earth devoured."[269:3] Elsewhere, he speaks of
the "sacrilege of schism, which surpasses all wickednesses."[269:4] St.
Optatus, too, marvels at the Donatist Parmenian's inconsistency in
maintaining the true doctrine, that "Schismatics are cut off as branches from
the vine, are destined for punishments, and reserved, as dry wood, for hell-
fire."[269:5] "Let us hate them who are worthy of hatred," says St. Cyril,
"withdraw we from those whom God withdraws from; let us also say unto
God with all boldness concerning all heretics, 'Do not I hate them, O Lord,
that hate thee?'"[270:1] "Most firmly hold, and doubt in no wise," says St.
Fulgentius, "that every heretic and schismatic soever, baptized in the name
of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, unless aggregated to the Catholic Church,
how great soever have been his alms, though for Christ's Name he has even
shed his blood, can in no wise be saved."[270:2] The Fathers ground this
doctrine on St. Paul's words that, though we have knowledge, and give our
goods to the poor, and our body to be burned, we are nothing without love.
[270:3]

16.
One more remark shall be made: that the Catholic teachers, far from
recognizing any ecclesiastical relation as existing between the Sectarian
Bishops and Priests and their people, address the latter immediately, as if
those Bishops did not exist, and call on them to come over to the Church
individually without respect to any one besides; and that because it is a
matter of life and death. To take the instance of the Donatists: it was
nothing to the purpose that their Churches in Africa were nearly as
numerous as those of the Catholics, or that they had a case to produce in
their controversy with the Catholic Church; the very fact that they were
separated from the orbis terrarum was a public, a manifest, a simple, a
sufficient argument against them. "The question is not about your gold and
silver," says St. Augustine to Glorius and others, "not your lands, or farms,
nor even your bodily health is in peril, but we address your souls about
obtaining eternal life and fleeing eternal death. Rouse yourself
therefore. . . . . You see it all, and know it, and groan over it; yet God sees
that there is nothing to detain you in so pestiferous and sacrilegious a
separation, if you will but overcome your carnal affection, for the obtaining

the spiritual kingdom, and rid yourselves of the fear of wounding
friendships, which will avail nothing in God's judgment for escaping eternal
punishment. Go, think over the matter, consider what can be said in
answer. . . . No one blots out from heaven the Ordinance of God, no one
blots out from earth the Church of God: He hath promised her, she hath
filled, the whole world." "Some carnal intimacies," he says to his kinsman
Severinus, "hold you where you are. . . . What avails temporal health or
relationship, if with it we neglect Christ's eternal heritage and our perpetual
health?" "I ask," he says to Celer, a person of influence, "that you would
more earnestly urge upon your men Catholic Unity in the region of Hippo."
"Why," he says, in the person of the Church, to the whole Donatist
population, "Why open your ears to the words of men, who say what they
never have been able to prove, and close them to the word of God, saying,
'Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the heathen for Thine inheritance'?" At
another time he says to them, "Some of the presbyters of your party have
sent to us to say, 'Retire from our flocks, unless you would have us kill you.'
How much more justly do we say to them, 'Nay, do you, not retire from, but
come in peace, not to our flocks, but to the flocks of Him whose we are all;
or if you will not, and are far from peace, then do you rather retire from
flocks, for which Christ shed His Blood.'" "I call on you for Christ's sake,"
he says to a late pro-consul, "to write me an answer, and to urge gently and
kindly all your people in the district of Sinis or Hippo into the communion
of the Catholic Church." He publishes an address to the Donatists at another
time to inform them of the defeat of their Bishops in a conference:
"Whoso," he says, "is separated from the Catholic Church, however
laudably he thinks he is living, by this crime alone, that he is separated from
Christ's Unity, he shall not have life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."
"Let them believe of the Catholic Church," he writes to some converts
about their friends who were still in schism, "that is, to the Church diffused
over the whole world, rather what the Scriptures say of it than what human
tongues utter in calumny." The idea of acting upon the Donatists only as a
body and through their bishops, does not appear to have occurred to St.
Augustine at all.[272:1]

17.

On the whole, then, we have reason to say, that if there be a form of
Christianity at this day distinguished for its careful organization, and its
consequent power; if it is spread over the world; if it is conspicuous for
zealous maintenance of its own creed; if it is intolerant towards what it
considers error; if it is engaged in ceaseless war with all other bodies called
Christian; if it, and it alone, is called "Catholic" by the world, nay, by those
very bodies, and if it makes much of the title; if it names them heretics, and
warns them of coming woe, and calls on them one by one, to come over to
itself, overlooking every other tie; and if they, on the other hand, call it
seducer, harlot, apostate, Antichrist, devil; if, however much they differ one
with another, they consider it their common enemy; if they strive to unite
together against it, and cannot; if they are but local; if they continually
subdivide, and it remains one; if they fall one after another, and make way
for new sects, and it remains the same; such a religious communion is not
unlike historical Christianity, as it comes before us at the Nicene Era.

SECTION III.

THE CHURCH OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH CENTURIES.

The patronage extended by the first Christian Emperors to Arianism, its
adoption by the barbarians who succeeded to their power, the subsequent
expulsion of all heresy beyond the limits of the Empire, and then again the
Monophysite tendencies of Egypt and part of Syria, changed in some
measure the aspect of the Church, and claim our further attention. It was
still a body in possession, or approximating to the possession, of the orbis
terrarum; but it was not simply intermixed with sectaries, as we have been
surveying it in the earlier periods, rather it lay between or over against large
schisms. That same vast Association, which, and which only, had existed
from the first, which had been identified by all parties with Christianity,
which had been ever called Catholic by people and by laws, took a different
shape; collected itself in far greater strength on some points of her extended
territory than on others; possessed whole kingdoms with scarcely a rival;
lost others partially or wholly, temporarily or for good; was stemmed in its

course here or there by external obstacles; and was defied by heresy, in a
substantive shape and in mass, from foreign lands, and with the support of
the temporal power. Thus not to mention the Arianism of the Eastern
Empire in the fourth century, the whole of the West was possessed by the
same heresy in the fifth; and nearly the whole of Asia, east of the Euphrates,
as far as it was Christian, by the Nestorians, in the centuries which
followed; while the Monophysites had almost the possession of Egypt, and
at times of the whole Eastern Church. I think it no assumption to call
Arianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychianism heresies, or to identify the
contemporary Catholic Church with Christianity. Now, then, let us consider
the mutual relation of Christianity and heresy under these circumstances.

§ 1. The Arians of the Gothic Race.

No heresy has started with greater violence or more sudden success than the
Arian; and it presents a still more remarkable exhibition of these
characteristics among the barbarians than in the civilized world. Even
among the Greeks it had shown a missionary spirit. Theophilus in the reign
of Constantius had introduced the dominant heresy, not without some
promising results, to the Sabeans of the Arabian peninsula; but under
Valens, Ulphilas became the apostle of a whole race. He taught the Arian
doctrine, which he had unhappily learned in the Imperial Court, first to the
pastoral Mœsogoths; who, unlike the other branches of their family, had
multiplied under the Mœsian mountains with neither military nor religious
triumphs. The Visigoths were next corrupted; by whom does not appear. It
is one of the singular traits in the history of this vast family of heathens that
they so instinctively caught, and so impetuously communicated, and so
fiercely maintained, a heresy, which had excited in the Empire, except at
Constantinople, little interest in the body of the people. The Visigoths are
said to have been converted by the influence of Valens; but Valens reigned
for only fourteen years, and the barbarian population which had been
admitted to the Empire amounted to nearly a million of persons. It is as
difficult to trace how the heresy was conveyed from them to the other
barbarian tribes. Gibbon seems to suppose that the Visigoths acted the part
of missionaries in their career of predatory warfare from Thrace to the
Pyrenees. But such is the fact, however it was brought about, that the
success in arms and the conversion to Arianism, of Ostrogoths, Alani,

Suevi, Vandals, and Burgundians stand as concurrent events in the history
of the times; and by the end of the fifth century the heresy had been
established by the Visigoths in France and Spain, in Portugal by the Suevi,
in Africa by the Vandals, and by the Ostrogoths in Italy. For a while the title
of Catholic as applied to the Church seemed a misnomer; for not only was
she buried beneath these populations of heresy, but that heresy was one, and
maintained the same distinctive tenet, whether at Carthage, Seville,
Toulouse, or Ravenna.

2.
It cannot be supposed that these northern warriors had attained to any high
degree of mental cultivation; but they understood their own religion enough
to hate the Catholics, and their bishops were learned enough to hold
disputations for its propagation. They professed to stand upon the faith of
Ariminum, administering Baptism under an altered form of words, and re-
baptizing Catholics whom they gained over to their sect. It must be added
that, whatever was their cruelty or tyranny, both Goths and Vandals were a
moral people, and put to shame the Catholics whom they dispossessed.
"What can the prerogative of a religious name profit us," says Salvian, "that
we call ourselves Catholic, boast of being the faithful, taunt Goths and
Vandals with the reproach of an heretical appellation, while we live in
heretical wickedness?"[276:1] The barbarians were chaste, temperate, just,
and devout; the Visigoth Theodoric repaired every morning with his
domestic officers to his chapel, where service was performed by the Arian
priests; and one singular instance is on record of the defeat of a Visigoth
force by the Imperial troops on a Sunday, when instead of preparing for
battle they were engaged in the religious services of the day.[276:2] Many of
their princes were men of great ability, as the two Theodorics, Euric and
Leovigild.

3.
Successful warriors, animated by a fanatical spirit of religion, were not
likely to be content with a mere profession of their own creed; they
proceeded to place their own priests in the religious establishments which
they found, and to direct a bitter persecution against the vanquished