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Title: Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, Volume II.

Author: Walter Scott

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Most recently updated: October 24, 2024

Language: English

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LIFE OF NAPOLEON
Pocket Edition

VOL. II.

LIFE OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
By SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.

VOL. 2.

Vincennes
EDINBURGH; A. & C. BLACK.
1876

PAGE
Chap. I.—Corsica—Family of Buonaparte—Napoleon born 15th August,
1769—His early Habits—Sent to the Royal Military School at Brienne—
His great Progress in Mathematical Science—Deficiency in Classical
Literature—Anecdotes—Removed to the General School of Paris—When
in his Seventeenth Year, appointed Second Lieutenant of Artillery—His
early Politics—Promoted to a Captaincy—Pascal Paoli—Napoleon sides
with the French Government against Paoli—And is Banished from Corsica
—Visits Marseilles, and Publishes the Souper de Beaucaire, 1
Chap. II.—Siege of Toulon—Recapitulation—Buonaparte appointed to the
Command of the Artillery at Toulon—Finds every thing in Disorder—His
Plan for obtaining the Surrender of the Place Adopted—Anecdotes during
the Siege—Allied Troops resolve to evacuate Toulon—Dreadful Particulars
of the Evacuation—England Censured on this occasion—Lord Lynedoch—
Fame of Buonaparte increases, and he is appointed Chief of Battalion in the
Army of Italy—Joins Headquarters at Nice—On the Fall of Robespierre,
Buonaparte superseded in Command—Arrives in Paris in May, 1795, to
solicit Employment—He is unsuccessful—Retrospect of the Proceedings of
the National Assembly—Difficulties in forming a New Constitution—
Appointment of the Directory—Of the Two Councils of Elders and of Five
Hundred—Nation at Large, and Paris in Particular, Disgusted with their
Pretensions—Paris assembles in Sections—General Danican appointed
their Commander-in-Chief—Menou appointed by the Directory to Disarm
the National Guards—But Suspended for Incapacity—Buonaparte
appointed in his Room—The Day of the Sections—Conflict betwixt the
Troops of the Convention under Buonaparte, and those of the Sections of
Paris under Danican—The latter Defeated with much Slaughter—
Buonaparte appointed Second in Command of the Army of the Interior—
Then General-in-Chief—Marries Madame Beauharnais—Her Character—
Buonaparte immediately afterwards joins the Army of Italy, 14
Chap. III.—The Alps—Feelings and Views of Buonaparte on being
appointed to the Command of the Army of Italy—General Account of his
new Principles of Warfare—Mountainous Countries peculiarly favourable
to them—Retrospect of Military Proceedings since October, 1795—
Hostility of the French Government to the Pope—Massacre of the French
Envoy, Basseville, at Rome—Austrian Army under Beaulieu—Napoleon's

Plan for entering Italy—Battle of Montenotte, and Buonaparte's first
Victory—Again defeats the Austrians at Millesimo—and again under Colli
—Takes possession of Cherasco—King of Sardinia requests an Armistice,
which leads to a Peace, concluded on very severe Terms—Close of the
Piedmontese Campaign—Napoleon's Character at this period, 43
Chap. IV.—Farther Progress of the French Army under Buonaparte—He
crosses the Po, at Placenza, on 7th May—Battle of Lodi takes place on the
10th, in which the French are victorious—Remarks on Napoleon's Tactics
in this celebrated Action—French take possession of Cremona and
Pizzighitone—Milan deserted by the Archduke Ferdinand and his Duchess
—Buonaparte enters Milan on the 15th May—General situation of the
Italian States at this period—Napoleon inflicts fines upon the Neutral and
unoffending States of Parma and Modena, and extorts the surrender of some
of their finest Pictures—Remarks upon this novel Procedure, 59
Chap. V.—Directory proposes to divide the Army of Italy betwixt
Buonaparte and Kellermann—Buonaparte resigns, and the Directory give
up the point—Insurrection against the French at Pavia—Crushed—and the
Leaders shot—Also at the Imperial Fiefs, and Lugo, quelled and punished
in the same way—Reflections—Austrians defeated at Borghetto, and
Retreat behind the Adige—Buonaparte narrowly escapes being made
Prisoner at Valeggio—Mantua blockaded—Verona occupied by the French
—King of Naples secedes from Austria—Armistice purchased by the Pope
—The Neutrality of Tuscany violated, and Leghorn occupied by the French
troops—Views of Buonaparte respecting the Revolutionizing of Italy—He
temporizes—Conduct of the Austrian Government at this Crisis—Beaulieu
displaced, and succeeded by Wurmser—Buonaparte sits down before
Mantua, 79
Chap. VI.—Campaign on the Rhine—General Plan—Wartensleben and the
Archduke Charles retire before Jourdan and Moreau—The Archduke forms
a Junction with Wartensleben, and defeats Jourdan, who retires—Moreau,
also, makes his celebrated Retreat through the Black Forest—Buonaparte
raises the Siege of Mantua, and defeats the Austrians at Salo and Lonato—
Misbehaviour of the French General Valette, at Castiglione—Lonato taken,
with the French Artillery, on 3d August—Retaken by Massena and
Augereau—Singular escape of Buonaparte from being captured at Lonato

—Wurmser defeated between Lonato and Castiglione, and retreats on Trent
and Roveredo—Buonaparte resumes his position before Mantua—Effects
of the French Victories on the different Italian States—Inflexibility of
Austria—Wurmser recruited—Battle of Roveredo—French victorious, and
Massena occupies Trent—Buonaparte defeats Wurmser at Primolano—and
at Bassano, 8th September—Wurmser flies to Vicenza—Battle of Saint-
George—Wurmser finally shut up within the walls of Mantua, 95
Chap. VII.—Corsica reunited with France—Critical situation of Buonaparte
in Italy at this period—The Austrian General Alvinzi placed at the head of a
new Army—Various Contests, attended with no decisive result—Want of
Concert among the Austrian Generals—French Army begin to murmur—
First Battle of Arcola—Napoleon in Personal danger—No decisive result—
Second Battle of Arcola—The French victorious—Fresh want of Concert
among the Austrian Generals—General Views of Military and Political
Affairs, after the conclusion of the fourth Italian Campaign—Austria
commences a fifth Campaign—but has not profited by Experience—Battle
of Rivoli, and Victory of the French—Further successful at La Favorita—
French regain their lost ground in Italy—Surrender of Mantua—Instances
of Napoleon's Generosity, 111
Chap. VIII.—Situation and Views of Buonaparte at this period—His politic
Conduct towards the Italians—Popularity—Severe terms of Peace proposed
to the Pope—Rejected—Napoleon differs from the Directory, and
Negotiations are renewed—but again Rejected—The Pope raises his Army
to 40,000 men—Napoleon Invades the Papal Territories—The Papal Troops
defeated near Imola—and at Ancona—which is captured—Loretto taken—
Clemency of Buonaparte to the French recusant Clergy—Peace of Tolentino
—Napoleon's Letter to the Pope—San Marino—View of the situation of the
different Italian States—Rome—Naples—Tuscany—Venice, 130
Chap. IX.—Archduke Charles—Compared with Napoleon—Fettered by the
Aulic Council—Napoleon, by a stratagem, passes the Tagliamento, and
compels the Archduke to retreat—Gradisca carried by storm—Chusa-
Veneta taken—Trieste and Fiume occupied—Venice breaks the Neutrality
—Terrified on learning that an Armistice had taken place betwixt France
and Austria—The Archduke retreats by hasty marches on Vienna—The
Government irresolute—and the Treaty of Leoben signed—Venice makes

humiliating submissions—Napoleon's Speech to her Envoys—He declares
War against Venice, and evades obeying the orders of the Directory to spare
it—The Great Council, on 31st May, concede every thing to Buonaparte—
Terms granted, 147
Chap. X.—Napoleon's Amatory Correspondence with Josephine—His
Court at Montebello—Negotiations and Pleasure mingled there—Genoa—
Revolutionary spirit of the Genoese—They rise in insurrection, but are
quelled by the Government, and the French plundered and imprisoned—
Buonaparte interferes, and appoints the outlines of a new Government—
Sardinia—Naples—The Cispadane, Transpadane, and Emilian Republics,
united under the name of the Cisalpine Republic—The Valteline—The
Grisons—The Valteline united to Lombardy—Great improvement of Italy,
and the Italian Character, from these changes—Difficulties in the way of
Pacification betwixt France and Austria—The Directory and Napoleon take
Different Views—Treaty of Campo Formio—Buonaparte takes leave of the
Army of Italy, to act as French Plenipotentiary at Rastadt, 166
Chap. XI.—Retrospect—The Directory—They become unpopular—Causes
of their unpopularity—Also at enmity among themselves—State of Public
feeling in France—In point of numbers, favourable to the Bourbons—but
the Army and Monied Interest against them—Pichegru, head of the
Royalists, appointed President of the Council of Five Hundred—Barbé
Marbois, another Royalist, President of the Council of Ancients—Directory
throw themselves upon the succour of Hoche and Buonaparte—
Buonaparte's personal Politics discussed—Pichegru's Correspondence with
the Bourbons—known to Buonaparte—He despatches Augereau to Paris—
Directory arrest their principal Opponents in the Councils on the 18th
Fructidor, and Banish them to Guiana—Narrow and Impolitic Conduct of
the Directory to Buonaparte—Projected Invasion of England, 178
Chap. XII.—View of the respective Situations of Great Britain and France,
at the Period of Napoleon's return from Italy—Negotiations at Lisle—
broken off—Army of England decreed, and Buonaparte named to the
Command—He takes up his Residence in Paris—Public Honours—The real
Views of the Directory discovered to be the expedition to Egypt—Armies
of Italy and the Rhine, compared and contrasted—Napoleon's Objects and
Motives in heading the Egyptian Expedition—Those of the Directory

regarding it—Its actual Impolicy—Curious Statement by Miot—The
Armament sails from Toulon, on 19th May, 1798—Napoleon arrives before
Malta on 10th June—Proceeds on his course, and, escaping the British
Squadron, lands at Alexandria on the 1st July—Description of the various
Classes who inhabit Egypt:—1. The Fellahs and Bedouins—2. The Cophts
—3. The Mamelukes—Napoleon issues a Proclamation against the
Mamelukes—Marches against them on the 7th July—Discontent of the
French Troops—Battle of the Pyramids on 21st of July—Cairo surrenders,
192
Chap. XIII.—French Fleet—Conflicting Statements of Buonaparte and
Admiral Gantheaume—Battle of Aboukir on 1st August 1798—The
French Admiral, Brueyes, killed, and his Ship, L'Orient, blown up—The
Victory complete—Effects of this disaster—Means by which Napoleon
proposed to establish himself in Egypt—His Administration, in many
respects, praiseworthy—in others, his Conduct absurd—He aspires to be
regarded an Envoy of the Deity—His endeavours to propitiate the Porte—
The Fort of El Arish falls into his hands—Massacre of Jaffa—Admitted by
Buonaparte himself—His Arguments in its defence—Replies to them—
General Conclusions—Plague in the French Army—Napoleon's Humanity
and Courage upon this occasion—Proceeds against Acre to attack Djezzar
Pacha—Sir Sidney Smith—His Character—Captures a French Convoy, and
throws himself into Acre—French arrive before Acre on 17th March, 1799,
and effect a breach on the 28th, but are driven back—Assaulted by an Army
of Moslems assembled without the Walls of Acre, whom they defeat and
disperse—Personal Misunderstanding and Hostility between Napoleon and
Sir Sidney Smith—Explained—Buonaparte is finally compelled to raise the
Siege, 216
Chap. XIV.—Discussion concerning the alleged Poisoning of the Sick in the
Hospitals at Jaffa—Napoleon acquitted of the charge—French Army re-
enter Cairo on the 14th June—Retrospect of what had taken place in Upper
and Lower Egypt during Napoleon's Absence—Incursion of Murad Bey—
18,000 Turks occupy Aboukir—Attacked and defeated—This Victory
terminates Napoleon's career in Egypt—Admiral Gantheaume receives
Orders to make ready for Sea—On the 22d August, Napoleon embarks for
France—Arrives in Ajaccio on the 30th September—and lands at Frejus on
the 9th October, 236

Chap. XV.—Retrospect of Public Events since the Departure of Napoleon
for Egypt—Invasion and Conquest of Switzerland—Seizure of Turin—
Expulsion of the Pope—The Neapolitans declare War against France—The
French enter Naples—Disgraceful Avarice exhibited by the Directory—
Particularly in their Negotiations with the United States of America—
Russia comes forward in the general Cause—Her Strength and Resources—
Reverses of the French in Italy, and on the Rhine—Insurrections in Belgium
and Holland against the French—Anglo-Russian Expedition sent to Holland
—The Chouans again in the Field—Great and Universal Unpopularity of
the Directory—State of Parties in France—Law of Hostages—Abbé Siêyes
becomes one of the Directory—His Character and Genius—Description of
the Constitution proposed by him for the Year Three—Ducos, Gohier, and
Moulins, also introduced into the Directory—Family of Napoleon strive to
keep him in the Recollection of the People—Favourable Change in the
French Affairs—Holland evacuated by the Anglo-Russian Army—
Korsakow defeated by Massena—and Suwarrow retreats before Lecourbe,
246
Chap. XVI.—General rejoicing on the return of Buonaparte—Advances
made to him on all sides—Napoleon Coalesces with Siêyes—Revolution of
the 18th Brumaire (Nov. 9)—Clashing Views of the Councils of Ancients,
and the Five Hundred—Barras and his Colleagues resign—Proceedings of
the Councils on the 18th—and 19th—Sittings removed from Paris to St.
Cloud—Commotion in the Council of Five Hundred—Napoleon menaced
and assaulted, and finally extricated by his Grenadiers—Lucien
Buonaparte, the President, retires from the Hall—Declares the Council
dissolved—Provisional Consular Government of Buonaparte, Siêyes, and
Ducos, 260
Chap. XVII.—Clemency of the New Consulate—Beneficial change in the
Finances—Law of Hostages repealed—Religious liberty allowed—
Improvements in the War Department—Pacification of La Vendée—
Ascendancy of Napoleon—Disappointment of Siêyes—Committee formed
to consider Siêyes' Plan of a Constitution—Rejected as to essentials—A
new one adopted, monarchical in every thing but form—Siêyes retires from
Public life—General View of the new Government—Despotic Power of the
First Consul, 276

Chap. XVIII.—Proceedings of Buonaparte in order to consolidate his power
—His great Success—Causes that led to it—Cambacérès and Le Brun
chosen Second and Third Consuls—Talleyrand appointed Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and Fouché Minister of Police—Their Characters—Other
Ministers nominated—Various Changes made in order to mark the
Commencement of a new Era—Napoleon addresses a Letter personally to
the King of England—Answered by Lord Grenville—Negotiation for peace
that followed, speedily broken off—Campaigns in Italy and on the Rhine—
Successes of Moreau—Censured by Napoleon for over-caution—The
Charge considered—The Chief Consul resolves to bring back, in Person,
Victory to the French Standards in Italy—His Measures for that purpose,
292
Chap. XIX.—The Chief Consul leaves Paris on 6th May, 1800—Has an
Interview with Necker at Geneva on 8th—Arrives at Lausanne on the 13th
—Various Corps put in motion to cross the Alps—Napoleon, at the head of
the Main Army, marches on the 15th, and ascends Mont St. Bernard—On
the 16th, the Vanguard takes possession of Aosta—Fortress and Town of
Bard threaten to baffle the whole plan—The Town is captured—and
Napoleon contrives to send his Artillery through it, under the fire of the
Fort, his Infantry and Cavalry passing over the Albaredo—Lannes carries
Ivrea—Recapitulation—Operations of the Austrian General Melas—At the
commencement of the Campaign, Melas advances towards Genoa—Actions
betwixt him and Massena—In March, Lord Keith blockades Genoa—Melas
compelled to retreat—Enters Nice—Recalled from thence by the news of
Napoleon's having crossed Mont St. Bernard—Genoa surrenders—
Buonaparte enters Milan—Battle of Montebello—The Chief Consul is
joined by Desaix—Battle of Marengo on the 14th—Death of Desaix—
Capitulation on the 15th, by which Genoa, &c., are yielded—Napoleon
returns to Paris on the 2d July, 305
Chap. XX.—Napoleon offers, and the Austrian Envoy accepts, a new Treaty
—The Emperor refuses it, unless England is included—Negotiations with
England—fail—Renewal of the War—Armistice—Resumption of
Hostilities—Battle of Hohenlinden—Other Battles—The Austrians agree to
a separate Peace—Treaty of Luneville—Convention between France and
the United States—The Queen of Naples repairs to Petersburgh—Paul
receives her with cordiality, and applies in her behalf to Buonaparte—His

Envoy received at Paris with the utmost distinction, and the Royal Family
of Naples saved for the present—Rome restored to the authority of the Pope
—Napoleon demands of the King of Spain to declare War against Portugal
—Olivenza and Almeida taken—Malta, after a Blockade of Two Years,
obliged to submit to the English, 324
Chap. XXI.—Internal Government of France—General Attachment to the
Chief Consul—Plot to remove him by Assassination—Defeated—Vain
hopes of the Royalists, that Napoleon would restore the Bourbons—Infernal
Machine—It fails—Suspicion first falls on the Republicans—The actual
Conspirators executed—Use made by Buonaparte of the Conspiracy to
consolidate Despotism—System of Police—Fouché—His Skill, Influence,
and Power—Apprehension entertained by the Chief Consul of the effects of
Literature—Persecution of Madame de Staël—The Concordat—Plan for a
general System of Jurisprudence—Amnesty granted to the Emigrants—
Plans of Public Education—Hopes of a General Peace, 337
Chap. XXII.—Return to the external Relations of France—Her universal
Ascendancy—Napoleon's advances to the Emperor Paul—Plan of
destroying the British Power in India—Right of Search at Sea—Death of
Paul—Its effects on Buonaparte—Affairs of Egypt—Assassination of
Kleber—Menou appointed to succeed him—British Army lands in Egypt—
Battle and Victory of Alexandria—Death of Sir Ralph Abercromby—
General Hutchinson succeeds him—The French General Belliard
capitulates—as does Menou—War in Egypt brought to a victorious
Conclusion, 356
Chap. XXIII.—Preparations for the Invasion of Britain—Nelson put in
command of the Sea—Attack of the Boulogne Flotilla—Pitt leaves the
Ministry—succeeded by Mr. Addington—Negotiations for Peace—Just
punishment of England, in regard to the conquered Settlements of the
enemy—Forced to restore them all, save Ceylon and Trinidad—Malta is
placed under the guarantee of a Neutral Power—Preliminaries of Peace
signed—Joy of the English Populace, and doubts of the better classes—
Treaty of Amiens signed—The ambitious projects of Napoleon,
nevertheless, proceed without interruption—Extension of his power in Italy
—He is appointed Consul for life, with the power of naming his Successor
—His Situation at this period, 364

Chap. XXIV.—Different Views entertained by the English Ministers and the
Chief Consul of the effects of the Treaty of Amiens—Napoleon, misled by
the Shouts of a London Mob, misunderstands the Feelings of the People of
Great Britain—His continued encroachments on the Independence of
Europe—His conduct to Switzerland—Interferes in their Politics, and sets
himself up, uninvited, as Mediator in their concerns—Ney enters
Switzerland at the head of 40,000 men—The patriot, Reding, disbands his
Forces, and is imprisoned—Switzerland is compelled to furnish France with
a Subsidiary Army of 16,000 Troops—The Chief Consul adopts the title of
Grand Mediator of the Helvetic Republic, 372
APPENDIX—

No. I.—Buonaparte's Letter to General Paoli, 381
No. II.—Letter of Napoleon Buonaparte to M. Matteo Buttafuoco,
Deputy from Corsica to the National Assembly, 382
No. III.—The Supper of Beaucaire, 388
No. IV.—Letters of Napoleon to Josephine, 392
No. V.—Descent of the French in South Wales, under General Tate,
396
No. VI.—Buonaparte's Camp-Library, 397
No. VII.—Buonaparte, Member of the National Institute, Commander-
in-Chief, to the People of Egypt, 398
No. VIII.—Historical Notes on the Eighteenth Brumaire, 399

Corsica—Family of Buonaparte—Napoleon born 15th August,
1769—His early habits—Sent to the Royal Military School at
Brienne—His great Progress in Mathematical Science—
Deficiency in Classical Literature—Anecdotes—Removed to the
General School of Paris—When in his Seventeenth Year,
appointed Second Lieutenant of Artillery—His early Politics—
Promoted to a Captaincy—Pascal Paoli—Napoleon sides with
the French Government against Paoli—And is banished from
Corsica—Visits Marseilles, and publishes the Souper de
Beaucaire.
The island of Corsica was, in ancient times, remarkable as the scene of
Seneca's exile, and in the last century was distinguished by the memorable
stand which the natives made in defence of their liberties against the
Genoese and French, during a war which tended to show the high and
indomitable spirit of the islanders, united as it is with the fiery and
vindictive feelings proper to their country and climate.
In this island, which was destined to derive its future importance chiefly
from the circumstance, Napoleon Buonaparte, or Bonaparte,[1] had his
origin. His family was noble, though not of much distinction, and rather
reduced in fortune. Flattery afterwards endeavoured to trace the name
which he had made famous, into remote ages, and researches were made
through ancient records, to discover that there was one Buonaparte who had
written a book,[2] another who had signed a treaty—a female of the name
who had given birth to a pope,[3] with other minute claims of distinction,
which Napoleon justly considered as trivial, and unworthy of notice. He
answered the Emperor of Austria, who had a fancy of tracing his son-in-
law's descent from one of the petty sovereigns of Treviso, that he was the

Rodolph of Hapsbourg of his family; and to a genealogist, who made a
merit of deducing his descent from some ancient line of Gothic princes, he
caused reply to be made, that he dated his patent of nobility from the battle
of Montenotte, that is, from his first victory.[4]
All that is known with certainty of Napoleon's family
CORSICA. may be told in few words. The Buonapartes were a
family of some distinction in the middle ages;[5] their
names are inscribed in the Golden Book at Treviso, and their armorial
bearings are to be seen on several houses in Florence. But attached, during
the civil war, to the party of the Ghibellines, they of course were persecuted
by the Guelphs; and being exiled from Tuscany, one of the family took
refuge in Corsica, and there established himself and his successors, who
were regularly enrolled among the noble natives of the island, and enjoyed
all the privileges of gentle blood.
The father of Napoleon, Charles Buonaparte, was the principal descendant
of this exiled family. He was regularly educated at Pisa, to the study of the
law, and is stated to have possessed a very handsome person, a talent for
eloquence, and a vivacity of intellect, which he transmitted to his son. He
was a patriot also and a soldier, and assisted at the gallant stand made by
Paoli against the French. It is said he would have emigrated along with
Paoli, who was his friend, but was withheld by the influence of his father's
brother, Lucien Buonaparte, who was Archdeacon of the Cathedral of
Ajaccio, and the wealthiest person of the family.
It was in the middle of civil discord, fights, and skirmishes, that Charles
Buonaparte married Lætitia Ramolini, one of the most beautiful young
women of the island, and possessed of a great deal of firmness of character.
She partook the dangers of her husband during the years of civil war, and is
said to have accompanied him on horseback in some military expeditions,
or perhaps hasty flights, shortly before her being delivered of the future
emperor.[6] Though left a widow in the prime of life, she had already born
her husband thirteen children, of whom five sons and three daughters
survived him. I. Joseph, the eldest, who, though placed by his brother in an
obnoxious situation, as intrusive King of Spain, held the reputation of a
good and moderate man. II. Napoleon himself. III. Lucien, scarce inferior to
his brother in ambition and talent. IV. Louis, the merit of whose character

consists in its unpretending worth, and who renounced a crown rather than
consent to the oppression of his subjects. V. Jerome, whose disposition is
said to have been chiefly marked by a tendency to dissipation. The females
were, I. Maria Anne, afterwards Grand Duchess of Tuscany, by the name of
Eliza.[7] II. Maria Annonciada, who became Maria Pauline, Princess of
Borghese.[8] III. Carlotta, or Caroline, wife of Murat, and Queen of Naples.
The family of Buonaparte being reconciled to the French government after
the emigration of Paoli, enjoyed the protection of the Count de Marbœuf,
the French Governor of Corsica, by whose interest Charles was included in
a deputation of the nobles of the island, sent to Louis XVI. in 1779. As a
consequence of this mission, he was appointed to a judicial situation—that
of assessor of the Tribunal of Ajaccio—the income of which aided him to
maintain his increasing family, which the smallness of his patrimony, and
some habits of expense, would otherwise have rendered difficult. Charles
Buonaparte, the father of Napoleon, died at the age of about forty years, of
an ulcer in the stomach, on the 24th February 1785.[9] His celebrated son
fell a victim to the same disease. During Napoleon's grandeur, the
community of Montpellier expressed a desire to erect a monument to the
memory of Charles Buonaparte. His answer was both sensible and in good
taste. "Had I lost my father yesterday," he said, "it would be natural to pay
his memory some mark of respect consistent with my present situation. But
it is twenty years since the event, and it is one in which the public can take
no concern. Let us leave the dead in peace."
The subject of our narrative was born upon the 15th day of August 1769, at
his father's house in Ajaccio, forming one side of a court which leads out of
the Rue Charles.[10] We read with interest, that his mother's good
constitution, and bold character of mind, having induced her to attend mass
upon the day of his birth, (being the Festival of the Assumption,) she was
obliged to return home immediately, and as there was no time to prepare a
bed or bedroom, she was delivered of the future victor upon a temporary
couch prepared for her accommodation, and covered with an ancient piece
of tapestry, representing the heroes of the Iliad. The infant was christened
by the name of Napoleon, an obscure saint, who had dropped to leeward,
and fallen altogether out of the calendar, so that his namesake never knew
which day he was to celebrate as the festival of his patron. When questioned
on this subject by the bishop who confirmed him, he answered smartly, that

there were a great many saints, and only three hundred and sixty-five days
to divide amongst them. The politeness of the Pope promoted the patron in
order to compliment the god-child, and Saint Napoleon des Ursins was
accommodated with a festival. To render this compliment, which no one but
a Pope could have paid, still more flattering, the feast of Saint Napoleon
was fixed for the 15th August, the birthday of the Emperor, and the day on
which he signed the Concordat.[11] So that Napoleon had the rare honour of
promoting his patron saint.
The young Napoleon had, of course, the simple and hardy education proper
to the natives of the mountainous island of his birth, and in his infancy was
not remarkable for more than that animation of temper, and wilfulness and
impatience of inactivity, by which children of quick parts and lively
sensibility are usually distinguished.[12] The winter of the year was
generally passed by the family of his father at Ajaccio, where they still
preserve and exhibit, as the ominous plaything of Napoleon's boyhood, the
model of a brass cannon, weighing about thirty pounds.[13] We leave it to
philosophers to inquire, whether the future love of war was suggested by
the accidental possession of such a toy; or whether the tendency of the mind
dictated the selection of it; or, lastly, whether the nature of the pastime,
corresponding with the taste which chose it, may not have had each their
action and reaction, and contributed between them to the formation of a
character so warlike.
The same traveller who furnishes the above anecdote, gives an interesting
account of the country retreat of the family of Buonaparte, during the
summer.
Going along the sea-shore from Ajaccio towards the Isle Sanguinière, about
a mile from the town, occur two stone pillars, the remains of a door-way,
leading up to a dilapidated villa, once the residence of Madame
Buonaparte's half-brother on the mother's side, whom Napoleon created
Cardinal Fesch.[14] The house is approached by an avenue, surrounded and
overhung by the cactus and other shrubs, which luxuriate in a warm
climate. It has a garden and a lawn, showing amidst neglect, vestiges of
their former beauty, and the house is surrounded by shrubberies, permitted
to run to wilderness. This was the summer residence of Madame
Buonaparte and her family. Almost enclosed by the wild olive, the cactus,

the clematis, and the almond-tree, is a very singular and isolated granite
rock, called Napoleon's grotto, which seems to have resisted the
decomposition which has taken place around. The remains of a small
summer-house are visible beneath the rock, the entrance to which is nearly
closed by a luxuriant fig-tree. This was Buonaparte's frequent retreat, when
the vacations of the school at which he studied permitted him to visit home.
—How the imagination labours to form an idea of the visions, which, in this
sequestered and romantic spot, must have arisen before the eyes of the
future hero of a hundred battles!
The Count de Marbœuf, already mentioned as
BRIENNE. Governor of Corsica, interested himself in the young
Napoleon, so much as to obtain him an appointment
[April, 1779] to the Royal Military School at Brienne, which was
maintained at the royal expense, in order to bring up youths for the engineer
and artillery service. The malignity of contemporary historians has ascribed
a motive of gallantry towards Madame Buonaparte as the foundation of this
kindness; but Count Marbœuf had arrived at a period of life when such
connexions are not to be presumed, nor did the scandal receive any
currency from the natives of Ajaccio.
Nothing could be more suitable to the nature of young Buonaparte's genius,
than the line of study which thus fortunately was opened before him. His
ardour for the abstract sciences amounted to a passion, and was combined
with a singular aptitude for applying them to the purposes of war, while his
attention to pursuits so interesting and exhaustless in themselves, was
stimulated by his natural ambition and desire of distinction. Almost all the
scientific teachers at Brienne, being accustomed to study the character of
their pupils, and obliged by their duty to make memoranda and occasional
reports on the subject, spoke of the talents of Buonaparte, and the progress
of his studies, with admiration. Circumstances of various kinds,
exaggerated or invented, have been circulated concerning the youth of a
person so remarkable. The following are given upon good authority.[15]
The conduct of Napoleon among his companions, was that of a studious and
reserved youth, addicting himself deeply to the means of improvement, and
rather avoiding than seeking the usual temptations to dissipation of time. He
had few friends, and no intimates; yet at different times when he chose to

exert it, he exhibited considerable influence over his fellow-students, and
when there was any joint plan to be carried into effect, he was frequently
chosen dictator of the little republic.
In the time of winter, Buonaparte upon one occasion engaged his
companions in constructing a fortress out of the snow, regularly defended
by ditches and bastions, according to the rules of fortification. It was
considered as displaying the great powers of the juvenile engineer in the
way of his profession, and was attacked and defended by the students, who
divided into parties for the purpose, until the battle became so keen that
their superiors thought it proper to proclaim a truce.
The young Buonaparte gave another instance of address and enterprise
upon the following occasion. There was a fair held annually in the
neighbourhood of Brienne, where the pupils of the Military School used to
find a day's amusement; but on account of a quarrel betwixt them and the
country people upon a former occasion, or for some such cause, the masters
of the institution had directed that the students should not, on the fair day,
be permitted to go beyond their own precincts, which were surrounded with
a wall. Under the direction of the young Corsican, however, the scholars
had already laid a plot for securing their usual day's diversion. They had
undermined the wall which encompassed their exercising ground, with so
much skill and secrecy, that their operations remained entirely unknown till
the morning of the fair, when a part of the boundary unexpectedly fell, and
gave a free passage to the imprisoned students, of which they immediately
took the advantage, by hurrying to the prohibited scene of amusement.
But although on these, and perhaps other occasions, Buonaparte displayed
some of the frolic temper of youth, mixed with the inventive genius and the
talent for commanding others by which he was distinguished in after time,
his life at school was in general that of a recluse and severe student,
acquiring by his judgment, and treasuring in his memory, that wonderful
process of almost unlimited combination, by means of which he was
afterwards able to simplify the most difficult and complicated undertakings.
His mathematical teacher was proud of the young islander, as the boast of
his school, and his other scientific instructors had the same reason to be
satisfied.

In languages Buonaparte was less a proficient, and never acquired the art of
writing or spelling French, far less foreign languages, with accuracy or
correctness; nor had the monks of Brienne any reason to pride themselves
on the classical proficiency of their scholar. The full energies of his mind
being devoted to the scientific pursuits of his profession, left little time or
inclination for other studies.
Though of Italian origin, Buonaparte had not a decided taste for the fine
arts, and his taste in composition seems to have leaned towards the
grotesque and the bombastic. He used always the most exaggerated phrases;
and it is seldom, if ever, that his bulletins present those touches of sublimity
which are founded on dignity and simplicity of expression.
Notwithstanding the external calmness and reserve of his deportment, he
who was destined for such great things, had, while yet a student at Brienne,
a full share of that ambition for distinction and dread of disgrace, that
restless and irritating love of fame, which is the spur to extraordinary
attempts. Sparkles of this keen temper sometimes showed themselves. On
one occasion, a harsh superintendent imposed on the future Emperor, for
some trifling fault, the disgrace of wearing a penitential dress, and being
excluded from the table of the students, and obliged to eat his meal apart.
His pride felt the indignity so severely, that it brought on a severe nervous
attack; to which, though otherwise of good constitution, he was subject
upon occasions of extraordinary irritation. Father Petrault,[16] the professor
of mathematics, hastened to deliver his favourite pupil from the punishment
by which he was so much affected.
It is also said that an early disposition to the popular side distinguished
Buonaparte even when at Brienne. Pichegru, afterwards so celebrated, who
acted as his monitor in the military school, (a singular circumstance,) bore
witness to his early principles, and to the peculiar energy and tenacity of his
temper. He was long afterwards consulted whether means might not be
found to engage the commander of the Italian armies in the royal interest.
"It will be but lost time to attempt it," said Pichegru. "I knew him in his
youth—his character is inflexible—he has taken his side, and he will not
change it."[17]

In October, 1784, Napoleon Buonaparte, then only fifteen years old, was,
though under the usual age, selected by M. de Keralio,[18] the inspector of
the twelve military schools, to be sent to have his education completed in
the general school of Paris. It was a compliment paid to the precocity of his
extraordinary mathematical talent, and the steadiness of his application.
While at Paris he attracted the same notice as at Brienne; and among other
society, frequented that of the celebrated Abbé Raynal, and was admitted to
his literary parties. His taste did not become correct, but his appetite for
study in all departments was greatly enlarged; and notwithstanding the
quantity which he daily read, his memory was strong enough to retain, and
his judgment sufficiently ripe to arrange and digest, the knowledge which
he then acquired; so that he had it at his command during all the rest of his
busy life. Plutarch was his favourite author; upon the study of whom he had
so modelled his opinions and habits of thought, that Paoli afterwards
pronounced him a young man of an antique caste, and resembling one of
the classical heroes.[19]
Some of his biographers have, about this time, ascribed to him the anecdote
of a certain youthful pupil of the military school, who desired to ascend in
the car of a balloon with the æronaut Blanchard, and was so mortified at
being refused, that he made an attempt to cut the balloon with his sword.[20]
The story has but a flimsy support, and indeed does not accord well with the
character of the hero, which was deep and reflective, as well as bold and
determined, and not likely to suffer its energies to escape in idle and useless
adventure.
A better authenticated anecdote states, that at this time he expressed himself
disrespectfully towards the king in one of his letters to his family.
According to the practice of the school, he was obliged to submit the letter
to the censorship of M. Domairon, the professor of belles lettres, who,
taking notice of the offensive passage, insisted upon the letter being burnt,
and added a severe rebuke. Long afterwards, in 1802, M. Domairon
appeared at Napoleon's levee; when the first consul reminded his old tutor
good-humouredly, that times had changed considerably since the burning of
the letter.
Napoleon Buonaparte, in his seventeenth year, [September, 1785,] received
his first commission as second lieutenant in the regiment of La Fère, or first

artillery, then quartered at Valence. He mingled with
VALENCE— society when he joined his regiment, more than he had
AUXONNE.
hitherto been accustomed to do; mixed in public
amusements, and exhibited the powers of pleasing which he possessed in an
uncommon degree, when he chose to exert them. His handsome and
intelligent features, with his active and neat, though slight figure, gave him
additional advantages. His manners could scarcely be called elegant, but
made up in vivacity and variety of expression, and often in great spirit and
energy, for what they wanted in grace and polish.
In 1786, he became an adventurer for the honours of literature also, and was
anonymously a competitor for the prize offered by the Academy of Lyons
on Raynal's question, "What are the principles and institutions, by
application of which mankind can be raised to the highest pitch of
happiness?" The prize was adjudged to the young soldier. It is impossible to
avoid feeling curiosity to know the character of the juvenile theories
respecting government, advocated by one who at length attained the power
of practically making what experiments he pleased. Probably his early ideas
did not exactly coincide with his more mature practice; for when
Talleyrand, many years afterwards, got the Essay out of the records of the
Academy, and returned it to the author, Buonaparte destroyed it, after he
had read a few pages.[21] He also laboured under the temptation of writing a
journey from Valence to Mount Cenis, after the manner of Sterne, which he
was fortunate enough finally to resist.[22] The affectation which pervades
Sterne's peculiar style of composition, was not likely to be simplified under
the pen of Buonaparte.
In 1789, Buonaparte, then quartered at Auxonne, had composed a work,
which might form two volumes, on the political, civil, and military history
of Corsica. He addressed a letter to General Paoli, then residing in London,
on the subject of the proposed work, and the actual condition of his
countrymen.[23] He also submitted it to the Abbé Raynal, who
recommended the publication of it.[24] With this view, Buonaparte invited
M. Joly, a bookseller of Dole, to visit him at Auxonne. He came, he says,
and found the future Emperor in a naked barrack room, the sole furniture of
which consisted of a wretched bed without curtains, a table placed in the
embrasure of a window, loaded with books and papers, and two chairs. His
brother Louis, whom he was teaching mathematics, lay on a wretched

mattress, in an adjoining closet. M. Joly and the author agreed on the price
of the impression of the book, but Napoleon was at the time in uncertainty
whether he was to remain at Auxonne or not. The work was never printed,
nor has a trace of it been discovered.[25]
In 1790, Buonaparte, still at Auxonne, composed a political tract in the form
of a letter to M. de Buttafuoco, major-general, and deputy of the Corsican
noblesse in the National Assembly. A hundred copies were printed and sent
to Corsica; where it was adopted and republished by the patriotic society of
Ajaccio,[26] who passed a resolution, attaching the epithet infamous, to the
name of their noble deputy.[27]
Sterner times were fast approaching, and the nation was now fully divided
by those factions which produced the Revolution. The officers of
Buonaparte's regiment were also divided into Royalists and Patriots; and it
is easily to be imagined, that the young and the friendless stranger and
adventurer should adopt that side to which he had already shown some
inclination, and which promised to open the most free career to those who
had only their merit to rely upon. "Were I a general officer," he is alleged to
have said, "I would have adhered to the King; being a subaltern, I join the
Patriots."
There was a story current, that in a debate with some brother officers on the
politics of the time, Buonaparte expressed himself so outrageously, that
they were provoked to throw him into the Saone, where he had nearly
perished. But this is an inaccurate account of the accident which actually
befell him. He was seized with the cramp when bathing in the river. His
comrades saved him with difficulty; but his danger was matter of pure
chance.
Napoleon has himself recorded that he was a warm patriot during the whole
sitting of the National Assembly; but that, on the appointment of the
Legislative Assembly, he became shaken in his opinions. If so, his original
sentiments regained force; for we shortly afterwards find him entertaining
such as went to the extreme heights of the Revolution.
Early in the year 1792, Buonaparte became a captain in the artillery by
seniority; and in the same year, being at Paris, he witnessed the two
insurrections of the 20th June and 10th August. He was accustomed to

speak of the insurgents as the most despicable banditti, and to express with
what ease a determined officer could have checked these apparently
formidable, but dastardly and unwieldy masses.[28] But, with what a
different feeling of interest would Napoleon have looked on that infuriated
populace, those still resisting though overpowered Swiss, and that burning
palace, had any seer whispered to him, "Emperor that shall be, all this blood
and massacre is but to secure your future empire!" Little anticipating the
potent effect which the passing events were to bear on his own fortune,
Buonaparte, anxious for the safety of his mother and family, was now
desirous to exchange France for Corsica, where the same things were acting
on a less distinguished stage.
It was a singular feature in the French Revolution, that
PAOLI—CORSICA. it brought out from his retirement the celebrated Pascal
Paoli, who, long banished from Corsica, the freedom
and independence of which he had so valiantly defended, returned from
exile with the flattering hope of still witnessing the progress of liberty in his
native land. On visiting Paris, he was received there with enthusiastic
veneration, and the National Assembly and Royal Family contended which
should show him most distinction. He was created president of the
department, and commander of the national guard of his native island, and
used the powers intrusted to him with great wisdom and patriotism.
But Paoli's views of liberty were different from those which unhappily
began to be popular in France. He was desirous of establishing that
freedom, which is the protector, not the destroyer of property, and which
confers practical happiness, instead of aiming at theoretical perfection. In a
word, he endeavoured to keep Corsica free from the prevailing infection of
Jacobinism; and in reward, he was denounced in the Assembly. Paoli,
summoned to attend for the purpose of standing on his defence, declined the
journey on account of his age, but offered to withdraw from the island.
A large proportion of the inhabitants took part with the aged champion of
their freedom, while the Convention sent an expedition, at the head of
which were La Combe Saint Michel,[29] and Salicetti,[30] one of the
Corsican deputies to the Convention, with the usual instructions for
bloodshed and pillage issued to their commissaries.[31]

Buonaparte was in Corsica, upon leave of absence from his regiment, when
these events were taking place; and although he himself, and Paoli, had
hitherto been on friendly terms, the young artillery officer did not hesitate
which side to choose. He embraced that of the Convention with heart and
hand; and his first military exploit was in the civil war of his native island.
In the year 1793, he was despatched from Bastia, in possession of the
French party, to surprise his native town Ajaccio, then occupied by Paoli or
his adherents. Buonaparte was acting provisionally, as commanding a
battalion of national guards. He landed in the gulf of Ajaccio with about
fifty men, to take possession of a tower called the Torre di Capitello, on the
opposite side of the gulf, and almost facing the city. He succeeded in taking
the place; but as there arose a gale of wind which prevented his
communicating with the frigate which had put him ashore, he was besieged
in his new conquest by the opposite faction, and reduced to such distress,
that he and his little garrison were obliged to feed on horse-flesh. After five
days he was relieved by the frigate, and evacuated the tower, having first in
vain attempted to blow it up. The Torre di Capitello still shows marks of the
damage it then sustained, and its remains may be looked on as a curiosity,
as the first scene of his combats, before whom

"Temple and tower
Went to the ground."[32]

The strength of Paoli increasing, and the English preparing to assist him,
Corsica became no longer a safe or convenient residence for the Buonaparte
family. Indeed, both Napoleon and his brother Joseph, who had
distinguished themselves as partisans of the French, were subjected to a
decree of banishment from their native island; and Madame Buonaparte,
with two of her daughters, set sail under their protection, and settled for a
time, first at Nice, and afterwards at Marseilles, where the family remained
in obscurity, until the dawning prospects of Napoleon afforded him the
means of assisting them.
One small fountain at Ajaccio is pointed out as the only ornament which, in
after days, his bounty bestowed on his birth-place.[33] He might perhaps
think it impolitic to do any thing which might remind the country he ruled
that he was not a child of her soil, nay, was in fact very near having been
born an alien, for Corsica was not united to, or made an integral part of

France, until June 1769, a few weeks only before Napoleon's birth. This
stigma was repeatedly cast upon him by his opponents, some of whom
reproached the French with having adopted a master, from a country from
which the ancient Romans were unwilling even to choose a slave; and
Napoleon may have been so far sensible to it, as to avoid showing any
predilection to the place of his birth, which might bring the circumstance
strongly under observation of the great nation, with which he and his family
seemed to be indissolubly united. But as a traveller already quoted, and who
had the best opportunities to become acquainted with the feelings of the
proud islanders, has expressed it,—"The Corsicans are still highly patriotic,
and possess strong local attachment—in their opinion, contempt for the
country of one's birth is never to be redeemed by any other qualities.
Napoleon, therefore, certainly was not popular in Corsica, nor is his
memory cherished there."[34]
The feelings of the parties were not unnatural on either side. Napoleon,
little interested in the land of his birth, and having such an immense stake in
that of his adoption, in which he had every thing to keep and lose,[35]
observed a policy towards Corsica which his position rendered advisable;
and who can blame the high-spirited islanders, who, seeing one of their
countrymen raised to such exalted eminence, and disposed to forget his
connexion with them, returned with slight and indifference the disregard
with which he treated them?
On his return from Corsica, Buonaparte had arrived at Nice, and was
preparing to join his regiment, when General Degear, who commanded the
artillery of "the army of Italy," then encamped round the city, required his
services, and employed him in several delicate operations. Shortly after, the
insurrection of Marseilles broke out—a movement consequent upon the
arrest of the leaders of the Girondist party in the Convention, on the first
Prairial (31st May;) and which extended with violence into the departments.
The insurgents of Marseilles organized a force of six thousand men, with
which they took possession of Avignon, and thereby intercepted the
communications of the army of Italy. The general-in-chief being much
embarrassed by this circumstance, sent Buonaparte to the insurgents, to try
to induce them to let the convoys pass. In July he went to Marseilles and
Avignon, had interviews with the leaders, convinced them that it was their

own interest not to excite the resentment of the army of Italy, and in fine
secured the transit of the convoys.
During his residence at Marseilles, when sent to the insurgents, having, he
says, an opportunity of observing all the weakness and incoherence of their
means of resistance, he drew up a little pamphlet, which he called "Le
Souper de Beaucaire," and which he published in that city. "He
endeavoured," he says, "to open the eyes of these frantic people, and
predicted that the only result of their revolt would be to furnish a pretext to
the men of blood of the day, for sending the principal persons amongst them
to the scaffold." "It produced," he adds, "a very powerful effect, and
contributed to calm the agitation which prevailed."[36] During these
proceedings Toulon had surrendered to the English. Buonaparte was
ordered on service to the siege of that town, and joined the army on the 12th
of September.

CHAPTER II.
Siege of Toulon—Recapitulation—Buonaparte appointed to the
Command of the Artillery at Toulon—Finds every thing in
disorder—His plan for obtaining the Surrender of the Place—
Adopted—Anecdotes during the Siege—Allied troops resolve to
evacuate Toulon—Dreadful Particulars of the Evacuation—
England censured on this occasion—Lord Lynedoch—Fame of
Buonaparte increases, and he is appointed Chief of Battalion in
the Army of Italy—Joins Headquarters at Nice—On the Fall of
Robespierre, Buonaparte superseded in command—Arrives in
Paris in May, 1795, to solicit employment—He is unsuccessful—
Retrospect of the Proceedings of the National Assembly—
Difficulties in forming a new Constitution—Appointment of the
Directory—of the Two Councils of Elders and of Five Hundred
—Nation at large, and Paris in particular, disgusted with their
pretensions—Paris assembles in Sections—General Danican
appointed their Commander-in-Chief—Menou appointed by the
Directory to disarm the National Guards—but suspended for
incapacity—Buonaparte appointed in his room—The Day of the
Sections—Conflict betwixt the Troops of the Convention under
Buonaparte, and those of the Sections of Paris under Danican—
The latter defeated with much slaughter—Buonaparte appointed
Second in Command of the Army of the Interior—then General-
in-Chief—Marries Madame Beauharnais—Her Character—
Buonaparte immediately afterwards joins the Army of Italy.
The siege of Toulon was the first incident of
SIEGE OF TOULON. importance, which enabled Buonaparte to distinguish
himself in the eyes of the French Government, and of
the world at large.
Buonaparte's professional qualifications were still better vouched than the
soundness of his political principles, though these were sufficiently decided.
The notes which the inspectors of the Military School always preserve

concerning their scholars, described his genius as being of the first order;
and to these he owed his promotion to the rank of a lieutenant-colonel of
artillery, with the command of the artillery during this siege.
We have already mentioned that a general diffidence, and dread of the
proceedings of the Jacobins, joined to the intrigues of the Girondists, had,
after the fall of the latter party, induced several of the principal towns in
France to take arms against the Convention, or rather against the Jacobin
party, who had attained the complete mastery in that body. We have also
said that Toulon, taking a more decided step than either Marseilles or
Lyons, had declared for the King and the Constitution of 1791, and invited
the support of the English and Spanish squadrons, who were cruising upon
the coast. A disembarkation was made, and a miscellaneous force, hastily
collected, of Spaniards, Sardinians, Neapolitans, and English, was thrown
into the place.
This was one of the critical periods when vigorous measures, on the part of
the allies, might have produced marked effects on the result of the war.
Toulon is the arsenal of France, and contained at that time immense naval
stores, besides a fleet of seventeen sail of the line ready for sea, and thirteen
or fourteen more, which stood in need of refitting. The possession of it was
of the last importance, and with a sufficiently large garrison, or rather an
army strong enough to cover the more exposed points without the town, the
English might have maintained their footing at Toulon, as they did at a later
period both at Lisbon and Cadiz. The sea would, by maintaining the
defensive lines necessary to protect the roadstead, have been entirely at the
command of the besieged; and they could have been supplied with
provisions in any quantity from Sicily, or the Barbary States, while the
besiegers would have experienced great difficulty, such was the dearth in
Provence at the time, in supporting their own army. But to have played this
bold game, the presence of an army, instead of a few battalions, would have
been requisite; and a general of consummate ability must have held the
chief command. This was the more especially necessary, as Toulon, from
the nature of the place, must have been defended by a war of posts,
requiring peculiar alertness, sagacity, and vigilance. On the other hand,
there were circumstances very favourable for the defence, had it been
conducted with talent and vigour. In order to invest Toulon on the right and
left side at once, it was necessary there should be two distinct blockading

armies; and these could scarce communicate with each other, as a steep
ridge of mountains, called Pharon, must interpose betwixt them. This gave
opportunity to the besieged to combine their force, and choose the object of
attack when they sallied; while, on the other hand, the two bodies of
besiegers could not easily connect their operations, either for attack or
defence.
Lord Mulgrave,[37] who commanded personally in the place,
notwithstanding the motley character of the garrison, and other
discouraging circumstances, began the defence with spirit. Sir George Keith
Elphinstone[38] also defeated the Republicans at the mountain pass, called
Ollioules. The English for some time retained possession of this important
gorge, but were finally driven out from it. Cartaux, a republican general
whom we have already mentioned,[39] now advanced on the west of Toulon,
at the head of a very considerable army, while General Lapoype blockaded
the city on the east, with a part of the army of Italy. It was the object of the
French to approach Toulon on both sides of the mountainous ridge, called
Pharon. But on the east the town was covered by the strong and regular fort
of La Malgue, and on the west side of the road by a less formidable work,
called Malbosquet. To support Malbosquet, and to protect the entrance to
the roadstead and harbour, the English engineers fortified with great skill an
eminence, called Hauteur de Grasse. The height bent into a sort of bay, the
two promontories of which were secured by redoubts, named L'Eguillette
and Balagnier, which communicated with and supported the new
fortification, which the English had termed Fort Mulgrave.
Several sallies and skirmishes took place, in most of which the Republicans
were worsted. Lieutenant-General O'Hara arrived from Gibraltar with
reinforcements, and assumed the chief command.
Little could be said for the union of the commanders within Toulon; yet
their enterprises were so far successful, that the French began to be alarmed
at the slow progress of the siege. The dearth of provisions was daily
increasing, the discontent of the people of Provence was augmented; the
Catholics were numerous in the neighbouring districts of Vivarais and
Lower Languedoc; and Barras and Fréron wrote from Marseilles [Dec. 1] to
the Convention, suggesting that the siege of Toulon should be raised, and
the besieging army withdrawn beyond the Durance.[40] But while weaker

minds were despairing, talents of the first order were preparing to achieve
the conquest of Toulon.
When Napoleon arrived at the scene of action, and had visited the posts of
the besieging army, he found so many marks of incapacity, that he could not
conceal his astonishment. Batteries had been erected for destroying the
English shipping, but they were three gun-shots' distance from the point
which they were designed to command; red-hot balls were preparing, but
they were not heated in furnaces beside the guns, but in the country-houses
in the neighbourhood at the most ridiculous distance, as if they had been
articles of easy and ordinary transportation. Buonaparte with difficulty
obtained General Cartaux's permission to make a shot or two by way of
experiment; and when they fell more than half-way short of the mark, the
general had no excuse but to rail against the aristocrats, who had, he said,
spoiled the quality of the powder with which he was supplied.[41]
The young officer of artillery, with prudence, and at the same time with
spirit, made his remonstrances to the member of Convention, Gasparin,[42]
who witnessed the experiment, and explained the necessity of proceeding
more systematically, if any successful result was expected.
At a council of war, where Gasparin presided, the instructions of the
Committee of Public Safety were read, directing that the siege of Toulon
should be commenced according to the usual forms, by investing the body
of the place, in other words, the city itself. The orders of the Committee of
Public Safety were no safe subject of discussion or criticism for those who
were to act under them; yet Buonaparte ventured to recommend their being
departed from on this important occasion. His comprehensive genius had at
once discovered a less direct, yet more certain manner, of obtaining the
surrender of the place. He advised, that, neglecting the body of the town,
the attention of the besiegers should be turned to attain possession of the
promontory called Hauteur de Grasse, by driving the besiegers from the
strong work of fort Mulgrave, and the two redoubts of L'Eguillette and
Balagnier, by means of which the English had established the line of
defence necessary to protect the fleet and harbour. The fortress of
Malbosquet, on the same point, he also recommended as a principal object
of attack. He argued, that if the besiegers succeeded in possessing
themselves of these fortifications, they must obtain a complete command of

the roads where the English fleet lay, and oblige them to put to sea. They
would, in the same manner, effectually command the entrance of the bay,
and prevent supplies or provisions from being thrown into the city. If the
garrison were thus in danger of being totally cut off from supplies by their
vessels being driven from their anchorage, it was natural to suppose that the
English troops would rather evacuate Toulon, than remain within the place,
blockaded on all sides, until they might be compelled to surrender by
famine.
The plan was adopted by the council of war after much hesitation, and the
young officer by whom it was projected received full powers to carry it on.
He rallied round him a number of excellent artillery officers and soldiers;
assembled against Toulon more than two hundred pieces of cannon, well
served; and stationed them so advantageously, that he annoyed considerably
the English vessels in the roads, even before he had constructed those
batteries on which he depended for reducing forts Mulgrave and
Malbosquet, by which they were in a great measure protected.
In the meanwhile, General Doppet, formerly a physician, had superseded
Cartaux, whose incapacity could no longer be concealed by his
rhodomontading language; and, wonderful to tell, it had nearly been the fate
of the ex-doctor to take Toulon, at a time when such an event seemed least
within his calculation. A tumultuary attack of some of the young French
Carmagnoles on a body of Spanish troops which garrisoned fort Mulgrave,
had very nearly been successful. Buonaparte galloped to the spot, hurrying
his reluctant commander along with him, and succours were ordered to
advance to support the attack, when an aide-de-camp was shot by Doppet's
side; on which the medical general, considering this as a bad symptom,
pronounced the case desperate, and, to Buonaparte's great indignation,
ordered a retreat to be commenced. Doppet being found as incapable as
Cartaux, was in his turn superseded by Dugommier, a veteran who had
served for fifty years, was covered with scars, and as fearless as the weapon
he wore.
From this time the commandant of artillery, having the complete
concurrence of his general, had no doubt of success. To ensure it, however,
he used the utmost vigilance and exertion, and exposed his person to every
risk.

One of the dangers which he incurred was of a singular character. An
artilleryman being shot at the gun which he was serving, while Napoleon
was visiting a battery, he took up the dead man's rammer, and, to give
encouragement to the soldiers, charged the gun repeatedly with his own
hands. In consequence of using this implement he caught an infectious
cutaneous complaint, which, being injudiciously treated and thrown inward,
was of great prejudice to his health until after his Italian campaigns, when
he was completely cured by Dr. Corvissart; after which, for the first time,
he showed that tendency to embonpoint which marked the latter part of his
life.[43]
Upon another occasion, while Napoleon was overlooking the construction
of a battery, which the enemy endeavoured to interrupt by their fire, he
called for some person who could write, that he might dictate an order. A
young soldier stepped out of the ranks, and resting the paper on the breast-
work, began to write accordingly. A shot from the enemy's battery covered
the letter with earth the instant it was finished. "Thank you—we shall have
no occasion for sand this bout," said the military secretary. The gaiety and
courage of the remark drew Buonaparte's attention on the young man, who
was the celebrated General Junot, afterwards created Duke D'Abrantes.[44]
During this siege, also, he discovered the talents of Duroc, afterwards one
of his most faithful adherents. In these and many other instances,
Buonaparte showed his extensive knowledge of mankind, by the deep
sagacity which enabled him to discover and attach to him those whose
talents were most capable of rendering him service.
Notwithstanding the influence which the commandant of artillery had
acquired, he found himself occasionally thwarted by the members of the
Convention upon mission to the siege of Toulon, who latterly were Fréron,
Ricord, Salicetti, and the younger Robespierre. These representatives of the
people, knowing that their commission gave them supreme power over
generals and armies, never seem to have paused to consider whether nature
or education had qualified them to exercise it, with advantage to the public
and credit to themselves. They criticized Buonaparte's plan of attack,
finding it impossible to conceive how his operations, being directed against
detached fortifications at a distance from Toulon, could be eventually the
means of placing the town itself with facility in their hands. But Napoleon
was patient and temporizing; and having the good opinion of Salicetti, and

some intimacy with young Robespierre, he contrived to have the works
conducted according to his own plan.
The presumption of these dignitaries became the means of precipitating his
operations. It was his intention to complete his proposed works against fort
Mulgrave before opening a large and powerful battery, which he had
constructed with great silence and secrecy against Malbosquet, so that the
whole of his meditated assault might confound the enemy by commencing
at the same time. The operations being shrouded by an olive plantation, had
been completed without being observed by the English, whom Buonaparte
proposed to attack on the whole line of defence simultaneously. Messrs.
Fréron and Robespierre, however, in visiting the military posts, stumbled
upon this masked battery; and having no notion why four mortars and eight
twenty-four pounders should remain inactive, they commanded the fire to
be opened on Malbosquet without any farther delay.
General O'Hara, confounded at finding this important post exposed to a fire
so formidable and unexpected, determined by a strong effort to carry the
French battery at once. Three thousand men[45] were employed in this sally;
and the general himself, rather contrary to what is considered the duty of
the governor of a place of importance, resolved to put himself at their head.
The sally was at first completely successful; but while the English pursued
the enemy too far, in all the confidence of what they considered as assured
victory, Buonaparte availed himself of some broken ground and a covered
way, to rally a strong body of troops, bring up reserves, and attack the
scattered English both in flank and rear. There was a warm skirmish, in
which Napoleon himself received a bayonet wound in the thigh, by which,
though a serious injury, he was not, however, disabled. The English were
thrown into irretrievable confusion, and retreated, leaving their general
wounded, and a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. It is singular, that
during his long warfare, Buonaparte was never personally engaged with the
British, except in his first, and at Waterloo, his last and fatal battle. The
attack upon Acre can scarce be termed an exception, as far as his own
person was concerned.
The loss of their commandant, added to the discouragement which began to
prevail among the defenders of Toulon, together with the vivacity of the
attack which ensued, seem finally to have disheartened the garrison. Five

batteries were opened on fort Mulgrave, the possession of which
Buonaparte considered as ensuring success. After a fire of twenty-four
hours, Dugommier and Napoleon resolved to try the fate of a general attack,
for which the representatives of the people showed no particular zeal. The
attacking columns advanced before day, during a heavy shower of rain.
They were at first driven back on every point by the most determined
opposition; and Dugommier, as he saw the troops fly in confusion,
exclaimed, well knowing the consequences of bad success to a general of
the Republic, "I am a lost man!"[46] Renewed efforts, however, at last
prevailed; the Spanish artillerymen giving way on one point, the fort fell
[Dec. 18] into the possession of the French, who showed no mercy to its
defenders.[47]
Three hours, according to Buonaparte, after the fort was taken, the
representatives of the people appeared in the trenches, with drawn swords,
to congratulate the soldiers on their successful valour, and hear from their
commandant of artillery, the reiterated assurance, that, this distant fort being
gained, Toulon was now their own. In their letter to the Convention, the
deputies gave a more favourable account of their own exploits, and failed
not to represent Ducos, Salicetti, and young Robespierre, as leading the
attack with sabre in hand, and, to use their own phrase, showing the troops
the road to victory.[48] On the other hand, they ungraciously forgot, in their
despatches, to mention so much as the name of Buonaparte, to whom the
victory was entirely to be ascribed.[49]
In the meantime, Napoleon's sagacity was not deceived
EVACUATION OF in the event. The officers of the allied troops, after a
TOULON.
hurried council of war, resolved to evacuate Toulon,
since the posts gained by the French must drive the English ships from their
anchorage, and deprive them of a future opportunity of retreating, if they
neglected the passing moment. Lord Hood alone urged a bolder resolution,
and recommended the making a desperate effort to regain fort Mulgrave,
and the heights which it commanded. But his spirited counsel was rejected,
and the evacuation resolved on;[50] which the panic of the foreign troops,
especially the Neapolitans, would have rendered still more horrible than it
proved, but for the steadiness of the British seamen.

The safety of the unfortunate citizens, who had invoked their protection,
was not neglected even amid the confusion of the retreat. The numerous
merchant vessels and other craft, offered means of transportation to all,
who, having to fear the resentment of the Republicans, might be desirous of
quitting Toulon. Such was the dread of the victors' cruelty, that upwards of
fourteen thousand persons accepted this melancholy refuge.[51] Meantime
there was other work to do.
It had been resolved, that the arsenal and naval stores, with such of the
French ships as were not ready for sea, should be destroyed; and they were
set on fire accordingly. This task was in a great measure intrusted to the
dauntless intrepidity of Sir Sydney Smith, who carried it through with a
degree of order, which, everything considered, was almost marvellous. The
assistance of the Spaniards was offered and accepted; and they undertook
the duty of scuttling and sinking two vessels used as powder magazines,
and destroying some part of the disabled shipping. The rising conflagration
growing redder and redder, seemed at length a great volcano, amid which
were long distinctly seen the masts and yards of the burning vessels, and
which rendered obscurely visible the advancing bodies of Republican
troops, who attempted on different points to push their way into the place.
The Jacobins began to rise in the town upon the flying Royalists;—horrid
screams and yells of vengeance, and revolutionary chorusses, were heard to
mingle with the cries and plaintive entreaties of the remaining fugitives,
who had not yet found means of embarkation. The guns from Malbosquet,
now possessed by the French, and turned on the bulwarks of the town,
increased the uproar. At once a shock, like that of an earthquake, occasioned
by the explosion of many hundred barrels of gunpowder, silenced all noise
save its own, and threw high into the midnight heaven a thousand blazing
fragments, which descended, threatening ruin wherever they fell. A second
explosion took place, as the other magazine blew up, with the same
dreadful effects.
This tremendous addition to the terrors of the scene, so dreadful in itself,
was owing to the Spaniards setting fire to those vessels used as magazines,
instead of sinking them, according to the plan which had been agreed upon.
Either from ill-will, carelessness, or timidity, they were equally awkward in
their attempts to destroy the dismantled ships intrusted to their charge,
which fell into the hands of the French but little damaged. The British fleet,

with the flotilla crowded with fugitives which it escorted, left Toulon
without loss, notwithstanding an ill-directed fire maintained on them from
the batteries which the French had taken.
It was upon this night of terror, conflagration, tears, and blood, that the star
of Napoleon first ascended the horizon; and though it gleamed over many a
scene of horror ere it set, it may be doubtful whether its light was ever
blended with those of one more dreadful.
The capture of Toulon crushed all the hopes of resistance to the Jacobins,
which had been cherished in the south of France. There was a strong
distrust excited against England, who was judged only desirous to avail
herself of the insurrection of these unhappy citizens to cripple and destroy
the naval power of France, without the wish of effectually assisting the
Royalists. This was an unjust belief, but it cannot be denied that there were
specious grounds for the accusation. The undertaking the protection of a
city in such a situation as that of Toulon, if the measure was embraced at
all, should have been supported by efforts worthy of the country whose
assistance was implored and granted. Such efforts were not made, and the
assistance actually afforded was not directed by talent, and was squandered
by disunion. The troops showed gallantry; but the leaders, excepting the
naval officers, evinced little military skill, or united purpose of defence.
One gentleman, then in private life, chancing to be in Toulon at the time,
distinguished himself as a volunteer,[52] and has since achieved a proud
career in the British army. Had he, or such as he, been at the head of the
garrison, the walls of Toulon might have seen a battle like that of Barossa,
and a very different result of the siege might probably have ensued.
So many of the citizens of Toulon concerned in the late resistance had
escaped, by the means provided by the English, that Republican vengeance
could not collect its victims in the usual numbers.[53] Many were shot,
however, and it has been said that Buonaparte commanded the artillery, by
which, as at Lyons, they were exterminated; and also that he wrote a letter
to Fréron and the younger Robespierre, congratulating them and himself on
the execution of these aristocrats, and signed Brutus Buonaparte, Sans-
Culotte. If he actually commanded at this execution, he had the poor
apology, that he must do so or himself perish; but, had the fact and the letter
been genuine, there has been enough of time since his downfall to prove the

truth of the accusation, and certainly enough of writers disposed to give
these proofs publicity. He himself positively denied the charge; and alleged
that the victims were shot by a detachment of what was called the
Revolutionary Army, and not by troops of the line.[54] This we think highly
probable. Buonaparte has besides affirmed, that far from desiring to sharpen
the vengeance of the Jacobins, or act as their agent, he hazarded the
displeasure of those whose frown was death, by interposing his protection
to save the unfortunate family of Chabrillan, emigrants and aristocrats, who,
being thrown by a storm on the coast of France, shortly after the siege of
Toulon, became liable to punishment by the guillotine, but whom he saved
by procuring them the means of escape by sea.[55]
In the meanwhile, the young general of artillery was rapidly rising in
reputation. The praises which were suppressed by the representatives of the
people, were willingly conferred and promulgated by the frank old veteran,
Dugommier. Buonaparte's name was placed on the list of those whom he
recommended for promotion, with the pointed addition, that if neglected, he
would be sure to force his own way.[56] He was accordingly confirmed in
his provisional situation of chief of battalion, and appointed [March] to hold
that rank in the army of Italy. Before joining that army, the genius of
Napoleon was employed by the Convention in surveying and fortifying the
sea-coast of the Mediterranean; a very troublesome task, as it involved
many disputes with the local authorities of small towns and villages, and
even hamlets, all of whom wished to have batteries erected for their own
special protection, without regard to the general safety. It involved him,
moreover, as we shall presently see, in some risk with the Convention at
home.
The chief of battalion discharged his task scientifically. He divided the
necessary fortifications into three classes, distinguishing those designed to
protect harbours and roadsteads, from such as were intended to defend
anchorages of less consequence, and both from the third class, which were
to be placed on proper situations, to prevent insults and partial descents on
the coast by an enemy superior at sea. Napoleon dictated to General
Gourgaud[57] hints on this subject, which must be of consequence to the
sea-coasts which need such military defences.[58]

Having made his report to the Convention, Buonaparte proceeded to join
the headquarters of the French army, then lying at Nice, straitened
considerably and hemmed in by the Sardinians and Austrians, who, after
some vain attempts of General Brunet[59] to dislodge them, had remained
masters of the Col de Tende, and lower passes of the Alps, together with the
road leading from Turin to Nice by Saorgio.
Buonaparte had influence enough to recommend with
SAORGIO. success to the general, Dumerbion,[60] and the
representatives of the people, Ricord and Robespierre, a
plan for driving the enemy out of this position, forcing them to retreat
beyond the higher Alps, and taking Saorgio; all which measures succeeded
as he had predicted.[61] Saorgio surrendered, [April 29,] with much stores
and baggage, and the French army obtained possession of the chain of the
higher Alps, which, being tenable by defending few and difficult passes,
placed a great part of the army of Italy, (as it was already termed, though
only upon the frontier,) at disposal for actual service.[62]
While directing the means of attaining these successes, Buonaparte, at the
same time, acquired a complete acquaintance with that Alpine country, in
which he was shortly to obtain victories in his own name, not in that of
others, who obtained reputation by acting on his suggestions. But, while he
was thus employed, he was involved in an accusation before the
Convention, which, had his reputation been less for approved patriotism,
might have cost him dear.
In his plans for the defence of the Mediterranean, Napoleon had proposed
repairing an old state prison at Marseilles, called fort Saint Nicholas, that it
might serve as a powder Magazine. This plan his successor on the station
proceeded to execute, and by doing so, gave umbrage to the patriots, who
charged the commandant of artillery then at Marseilles, and superintending
the work, with an intention to rebuild this fort, to serve as a Bastile for
controlling the good citizens. The officer being summoned to the bar of the
Convention, proved that the plan was not his own, but drawn out by
Buonaparte. The representatives of the army in Italy, however, not being
able to dispense with his services, wrote to the Convention in his behalf,
and gave such an account of the origin and purpose of the undertaking, as

divested it of all shade of suspicion even in the suspicious eye of the
Committee of Public Safety.[63]
In the remainder of the year 1794, there was little service of consequence in
the army of Italy, and the 9th and 10th Thermidor (27th and 28th July) of
that year, brought the downfall of Robespierre, and threatened unfavourable
consequences to Buonaparte, who had been in close communication with
the tyrant's brother, and was understood to have participated in the tone of
exaggerated patriotism affected by his party. He endeavoured to shelter
himself under his ignorance of the real tendency of the proceedings of those
who had fallen,—an apology which resolves itself into the ordinary excuse,
that he found his late friends had not been the persons he took them for.
According to this line of defence, he made all haste to disclaim accession to
the political schemes of which they were accused. "I am somewhat
affected," he wrote to a correspondent,[64] "at the fate of the younger
Robespierre; but, had he been my brother, I would have poniarded him with
my own hand, had I been aware that he was forming schemes of tyranny."
Buonaparte's disclamations do not seem at first to have been favourably
received. His situation was now precarious; and when those members were
restored to the Convention, who had been expelled and proscribed by the
Jacobins, it became still more so. The reaction of the moderate party,
accompanied by horrible recollections of the past, and fears for the future,
began now to be more strongly felt, as their numbers in the Convention
acquired strength. Those officers who had attached themselves to the
Jacobin party, were the objects of their animosity; and, besides, they were
desirous to purify the armies, as far as possible, of those whom they
considered as their own enemies, and those of good order; the rather, that
the Jacobinical principles still continued to be more favoured in the armies
than in the interior. To the causes of this we have before alluded; but it may
not be unnecessary to repeat, that the soldiers had experienced all the
advantages of the fierce energies of a government which sent them out to
conquest, and offered them the means of achieving it; and they had not been
witnesses to the atrocities of their tyranny in the interior.
Before the downfall of Robespierre took place, Buonaparte had received
regular but secret instructions to examine the fortifications of Genoa. M.
Ricord, by whom these instructions had been signed, having now been

superseded, and the younger Robespierre guillotined, Albitte, Salicetti, and
Laporte, the new superintendents of the army of Italy, were pleased to
suspect that Buonaparte had engaged in some plot of betraying Genoa to the
enemy: he was arrested accordingly early in August; but his papers
effectually established his innocence, and after the lapse of a fortnight he
was released.[65]
In March 1795, he was sent to Toulon to take the command of the artillery
in an expedition destined against Rome; but this scheme was not persevered
in. During his visit to Toulon, however, he had the opportunity of saving
from the violence of the populace, a party of unfortunate emigrants,
including the noble family of Chabrillant, who had been landed from a
Spanish prize. His influence with some cannoneers who had served under
him during the siege, enabled him to rescue these individuals; and he
unhesitatingly did so, though at considerable risk to himself. On his
rejoining the troops in the Maritime Alps, near the end of March, he found
the army about to be altered in some parts of its organization, and placed
under the command of General Kellermann. A recent arrangement had
recalled to the service many officers of high rank who had of late been
unemployed; and he, as the youngest on the list of generals, could not only
not be allowed to retain his command of the artillery in the army of
Kellermann, but was removed to the infantry. He repaired therefore to Paris,
with the view of soliciting professional employment elsewhere, and
especially of remonstrating against his permanent removal from the branch
of the service in which he had spent so many years. On his way to the
capital he visited his mother at Marseilles, and found his brother Joseph
respectably married in that city.
On reaching Paris in May, he found his pretensions thwarted by Aubry, the
President of the Military Committee, who was disposed to treat with little
attention his statement respecting the siege of Toulon, and his two years of
successful service in the army of Italy. When, in the heat of discussion,
Aubry objected his youth, Buonaparte replied, that presence in the field of
battle ought to anticipate the claim of years. The president, who had not
been much in action, considered his reply as a personal insult; and
Napoleon, disdaining farther answer, tendered his resignation.[66] It was not,
however, accepted; and he still remained in the rank of expectants, but
among those whose hopes were entirely dependent upon their merits.[67]

It may be observed that, at a subsequent period, Aubry, being among those
belonging to Pichegru's party who were banished to Cayenne, was excepted
from the decree which permitted the return of those unfortunate exiles, and
died at Demerara.
Meantime, his situation becoming daily more unpleasant, Buonaparte
solicited Barras and Fréron, who, as Thermidoriens, had preserved their
credit, for occupation in almost any line of his profession, and even
negotiated for permission to go into the Turkish service, to train the
Mussulmans to the use of artillery. A fanciful imagination may pursue him
to the rank of pacha, or higher; for, go where he would, he could not have
remained in mediocrity. His own ideas had a similar tendency. "How
strange," he said, "it would be, if a little Corsican officer of artillery were to
become King of Jerusalem!" He was offered a command in La Vendée,
which he declined to accept, and was finally named to command a brigade
of artillery in Holland. But it was in a land where there still existed so many
separate and conflicting factions, as in France, that he was doomed to be
raised, amid the struggles of his contending countrymen, and upon their
shoulders and over their heads, to the very highest eminence to which
fortune can exalt an individual. The times required such talents as his, and
the opportunity for exercising them soon arose.
The French nation were in general tired of the National
RETROSPECT. Convention, which successive proscriptions had
drained of all the talent, eloquence, and energy it had
once possessed; and that Assembly had become hateful and contemptible to
all men, by suffering itself to be the passive tool of the Terrorists for two
years, when, if they had shown proper firmness, the revolution of the 9th
Thermidor might as well have been achieved at the beginning of that
frightful anarchy, as after that long period of unheard-of suffering. The
Convention was not greatly improved in point of talent, even by the return
of their banished brethren; and, in a word, they had lost the confidence of
the public entirely. They therefore prepared to gratify the general wish by
dissolving themselves.
But before they resigned their ostensible authority, it was necessary to
prepare some mode of carrying on the government in future.

The Jacobin constitution of 1793 still existed on paper; but although there
was an unrepealed law, menacing with death any one who should propose
to alter that form of government, no one appeared disposed to consider it as
actually in exercise; and, notwithstanding the solemnity with which it had
been received and ratified by the sanction of the national voice, it was
actually passed over and abrogated as a matter of course, by a tacit but
unanimous consent. Neither was there any disposition to adopt the
Girondist constitution of 1791, or to revert to the democratic monarchy of
1792, the only one of these models which could be said to have had even
the dubious endurance of a few months. As at the general change of the
world, all former things were to be done away—all was to be made anew.
Each of these forms of government had been solemnized by the national
oaths and processions customary on such occasions; but the opinion was
now universally entertained, that not one of them was founded on just
principles, or contained the power of defending itself against aggression,
and protecting the lives and rights of the subject. On the other hand, every
one not deeply interested in the late anarchy, and implicated in the horrid
course of bloodshed and tyranny which was its very essence, was frightened
at the idea of reviving a government which was a professed continuation of
the despotism ever attendant upon a revolution, and which, in all civilized
countries, ought to terminate with the extraordinary circumstances by which
revolution has been rendered necessary. To have continued the
revolutionary government, indeed, longer than this, would have been to
have imitated the conduct of an ignorant empiric, who should persist in
subjecting a convalescent patient to the same course of exhausting and
dangerous medicines, which a regular physician would discontinue as soon
as the disease had been brought to a favourable crisis.
It seems to have been in general felt and admitted, that the blending of the
executive and legislative power together, as both had been exercised by the
existing Convention, opened the road to the most afflicting tyranny; and
that to constitute a stable government, the power of executing the laws, and
administering the ministerial functions, must be vested in some separate
individuals, or number of individuals, who should, indeed, be responsible to
the national legislature for the exercise of this power, but neither subject to
their direct control, nor enjoying it as emanating immediately from their
body. With these reflections arose others, on the utility of dividing the

legislative body itself into two assemblies, one of which might form a check
on the other, tending, by some exercise of an intermediate authority, to
qualify the rash rapidity of a single chamber, and obstruct the progress of
any individual, who might, like Robespierre, obtain a dictatorship in such a
body, and become, in doing so, an arbitrary tyrant over the whole
authorities of the state. Thus, loth and late, the French began to cast an eye
on the British constitution, and the system of checks and balances upon
which it is founded, as the best means of uniting the protection of liberty
with the preservation of order. Thinking men had come gradually to be
aware, that in hopes of getting something better than a system which had
been sanctioned by the experience of ages, they had only produced a set of
models, which were successively wondered at, applauded, neglected, and
broken to pieces, instead of a simple machine, capable, in mechanical
phrase, of working well.
Had such a feeling prevailed during the commencement of the Revolution,
as was advocated by Mounier and others,[68] France and Europe might have
been spared the bloodshed and distress which afflicted them during a period
of more than twenty years of war, with all the various evils which
accompanied that great convulsion. France had then a king; nobles, out of
whom a senate might have been selected; and abundance of able men to
have formed a lower house, or house of commons. But the golden
opportunity was passed over; and when the architects might, perhaps, have
been disposed to execute the new fabric which they meditated, on the plan
of a limited monarchy, the materials for the structure were no longer to be
found.
The legitimate King of France no doubt existed, but he was an exile in a
foreign country; and the race of gentry, from whom a house of peers, or
hereditary senate, might have been chiefly selected, were to be found only
in foreign service, too much exasperated by their sufferings to admit a
rational hope that they would ever make any compromise with those who
had forced them from their native land, and confiscated their family
property. Saving for these circumstances, and the combinations which arose
out of them, it seems very likely, that at the period at which we have now
arrived, the tide, which began to set strongly against the Jacobins, might
have been adroitly turned in favour of the Bourbons. But, though there was
a general feeling of melancholy regret, which naturally arose from

comparing the peaceful days of the monarchy with those of the Reign of
Terror,—the rule of Louis the XVI. with that of Robespierre,—the memory
of former quiet and security with the more recent recollections of blood and
plunder,—still it seems to have existed rather in the state of a predisposition
to form a royal party, than as the principle of one already existing. Fuel was
lying ready to catch the flame of loyalty, but the match had not yet been
applied; and to counteract this general tendency, there existed the most
formidable obstacles.
In the first place, we have shown already the circumstances by which the
French armies were strongly attached to the name of the Republic, in whose
cause all their wars had been waged, and all their glory won; by whose
expeditious and energetic administration the military profession was
benefited, while they neither saw nor felt the misery entailed on the nation
at large. But the French soldier had not only fought in favour of democracy,
but actively and directly against royalty. As Vive la République was his war-
cry, he was in La Vendée, on the Rhine, and elsewhere, met, encountered,
and sometimes defeated and driven back, by those who used the opposite
signal-word, Vive le Roi. The Royalists were, indeed, the most formidable
opponents of the military part of the French nation; and such was the
animosity of the latter at this period to the idea of returning to the ancient
system, that if a general could have been found capable of playing the part
of Monk, he would probably have experienced the fate of La Fayette and
Dumouriez.
A second and almost insuperable objection to the restoration of the
Bourbons, occurred in the extensive change of property that had taken
place. If the exiled family had been recalled, they could not, at this very
recent period, but have made stipulations for their devoted followers, and
insisted that the estates forfeited in their cause, should have been
compensated or restored; and such a resumption would have inferred ruin to
all the purchasers of national demesnes, and, in consequence, a general
shock to the security of property through the kingdom.
The same argument applied to the Church lands. The Most Christian King
could not resume his throne, without restoring the ecclesiastical
establishment in part, if not in whole. It was impossible to calculate the
mass of persons of property and wealth, with their various connexions,

who, as possessors of national demesnes, that is, of the property of the
Church, or of the emigrants, were bound by their own interest to oppose the
restoration of the Bourbon family. The revolutionary government had
followed the coarse, but striking and deeply politic, admonition of the
Scottish Reformer—"Pull down the nests," said Knox, when he urged the
multitude to destroy churches and abbeys, "and the rooks will fly off." The
French government, by dilapidating and disposing of the property of the
emigrants and clergy, had established an almost insurmountable barrier
against the return of the original owners. The cavaliers in the great Civil
War of England had been indeed fined, sequestrated, impoverished; but
their estates were still, generally speaking, in their possession; and they
retained, though under oppression and poverty, the influence of a national
aristocracy, diminished, but not annihilated. In France, that influence of
resident proprietors had all been transferred to other hands, tenacious in
holding what property they had acquired, and determined to make good the
defence of it against those who claimed a prior right.
Lastly, the fears and conscious recollections of those who held the chief
power in France for the time, induced them to view their own safety as
deeply compromised by any proposition of restoring the exiled royal family.
This present sitting and ruling Convention had put to death Louis XVI.,—
with what hope of safety could they install his brother on the throne? They
had formally, and in full conclave, renounced belief in the existence of a
Deity—with what consistence could they be accessory to restore a national
church? Some remained Republicans from their heart and upon conviction;
and a great many more of the deputies could not abjure democracy, without
confessing at the same time, that all the violent measures which they had
carried through for the support of that system, were so many great and
treasonable crimes.
These fears of a retributive reaction were very generally felt in the
Convention. The Thermidoriens, in particular, who had killed Robespierre,
and now reigned in his stead, had more substantial grounds of apprehension
from any counter-revolutionary movement, than even the body of the
representatives at large, many of whom had been merely passive in scenes
where Barras and Tallien had been active agents. The timid party of The
Plain might be overawed by the returning prince; and the members of the
Girondists, who could indeed scarce be said to exist as a party, might be

safely despised. But the Thermidoriens themselves stood in a different
predicament. They were of importance enough to attract both detestation
and jealousy; they held power, which must be an object of distrust to the
restored monarch; and they stood on precarious ground, betwixt the hatred
of the moderate party, who remembered them as colleagues of Robespierre
and Danton, and that of the Jacobins, who saw in Tallien and Barras
deserters of that party, and the destroyers of the power of the Sans-Culottes.
They had, therefore, just reason to fear, that, stripped of the power which
they at present possessed, they might become the unpitied and unaided
scapegoats, to expiate all the offences of the Revolution.
Thus each favourable sentiment towards the cause of the Bourbons was
opposed; I. By their unpopularity with the armies; II. By the apprehensions
of the confusion and distress which must arise from a general change of
property; and III. By the conscious fears of those influential persons, who
conceived their own safety concerned in sustaining the republican model.
Still, the idea of monarchy was so generally received as the simplest and
best mode of once more re-establishing good order and a fixed government,
that some statesmen proposed to resume the form, but change the dynasty.
With this view, divers persons were suggested by those, who supposed that
by passing over the legitimate heir to the crown, the dangers annexed to his
rights and claims might be avoided, and the apprehended measures of
resumption and reaction might be guarded against. The son of the Duke of
Orleans was named, but the infamy of his father clung to him. In another
wild hypothesis the Duke of York, or the Duke of Brunswick, were
suggested as fit to be named constitutional Kings of France. The Abbé
Siêyes is said to have expressed himself in favour of the prince last named.
[69]

But without regarding the wishes or opinions of the people without doors,
the Convention resolved to establish such a model of government as should
be most likely to infuse into a republic something of the stability of a
monarchical establishment; and thus repair at once former errors, and
preserve an appearance of consistency in the eyes of Europe.
For this purpose eleven commissioners, chiefly selected
NEW amongst the former Girondists, were appointed [April]
CONSTITUTION.

to draw up a new Constitution upon a new principle, which was again to
receive the universal adhesion of the French by acclamation and oath, and
to fall, in a short time, under the same neglect which had attended every
preceding model. This, it was understood, was to be so constructed, as to
unite the consistency of a monarchical government with the name and
forms of a democracy.
That the system now adopted by the French commissioners might bear a
form corresponding to the destinies of the nation, and flattering to its vanity,
it was borrowed from that of the Roman republic, an attempt to imitate
which had already introduced many of the blunders and many of the crimes
of the Revolution. The executive power was lodged in a council of five
persons, termed Directors, to whom were to be consigned the conduct of
peace and war, the execution of the laws, and the general administration of
the government. They were permitted no share of the legislative authority.
This arrangement was adopted to comply with the jealousy of those, who,
in the individual person of a single Director, holding a situation similar to
that of the Stadtholder in Holland, or the President of the United States, saw
something too closely approaching to a monarchical government. Indeed, it
is said, Louvet warned them against establishing such an office, by assuring
them, that when they referred the choice of the individual who was to hold
it, to the nation at large, they would see the Bourbon heir elected.[70] But the
inconvenience of this pentarchy could not be disguised; and it seemed to
follow as a necessary consequence of such a numerous executive council,
either that there would be a schism, and a minority and majority established
in that pre-eminent body of the state, where unity and vigour were chiefly
requisite, or else that some one or two of the ablest and most crafty among
the Directors would establish a supremacy over the others, and use them
less as their colleagues than their dependents. The legislators, however,
though they knew that the whole Roman empire was found insufficient to
satiate the ambition of three men, yet appeared to hope that the concord and
unanimity of their five directors might continue unbroken, though they had
but one nation to govern; and they decided accordingly.
The executive power being thus provided for, the legislative body was to
consist of two councils; one of Elders, as it was called, serving as a House
of Lords; another of Youngers, which they termed, from its number, the

Council of Five Hundred. Both were elective, and the difference of age was
the only circumstance which placed a distinction betwixt the two bodies.
The members of the Council of Five Hundred were to be at least twenty-
five years old, a qualification which, after the seventh year of the Republic,
was to rise to thirty years complete. In this assembly laws were to be first
proposed; and, having received its approbation, they were to be referred to
the Council of Ancients. The requisites to sit in the latter senate, were the
age of forty years complete, and the being a married man or a widower.
Bachelors, though above that age, were deemed unfit for legislation,
perhaps from want of domestic experience.
The Council of Ancients had the power of rejecting the propositions laid
before them by the Council of Five Hundred, or, by adopting and approving
them, that of passing them into laws. These regulations certainly gained one
great point, in submitting each proposed legislative enactment to two
separate bodies, and of course, to mature and deliberate consideration. It is
true, that neither of the councils had any especial character, or separate
interest which could enable or induce the Ancients, as a body, to suggest to
the Five Hundred a different principle of considering any proposed
measure, from that which was likely to occur to them in their own previous
deliberation. No such varied views, therefore, were to be expected, as must
arise between assemblies composed of persons who differ in rank or
fortune, and consequently view the same question in various and opposite
lights. Still, delay and reconsideration were attained, before the irrevocable
fiat was imposed upon any measure of consequence; and so far much was
gained. An orator was supposed to answer all objections to the system of
the two councils thus constituted, when he described that of the Juniors as
being the imagination, that of the Ancients as being the judgment of the
nation; the one designed to invent and suggest national measures, the other
to deliberate and decide upon them. This was, though liable to many
objections, an ingenious illustration indeed; but an illustration is not an
argument, though often passing current as such.
On the whole, the form of the Constitution[71] of the year Three, i. e. 1795,
showed a greater degree of practical efficacy, sense, and consistency, than
any of those previously suggested; and in the introduction, though there was
the usual proclamation of the rights of man, his duties to the laws and to the
social system were for the first time enumerated in manly and forcible

language, intimating the desire of the framers of these institutions to put a
stop to the continuation of revolutionary violence in future.
But the constitution, now promulgated, had a blemish common to all its
predecessors; it was totally new, and unsanctioned by the experience either
of France or any other country; a mere experiment in politics, the result of
which could not be known until it had been put in exercise, and which, for
many years at least, must be necessarily less the object of respect than of
criticism. Wise legislators, even when lapse of time, alteration of manners,
or increased liberality of sentiment, require corresponding alterations in the
institutions of their fathers, are careful, as far as possible, to preserve the
ancient form and character of those laws, into which they are endeavouring
to infuse principles and a spirit accommodated to the altered exigencies and
temper of the age. There is an enthusiasm in patriotism as well as in
religion. We value institutions, not only because they are ours, but because
they have been those of our fathers; and if a new constitution were to be
presented to us, although perhaps theoretically showing more symmetry
than that by which the nation had been long governed, it would be as
difficult to transfer to it the allegiance of the people, as it would be to
substitute the worship of a Madonna, the work of modern art, for the
devotion paid by the natives of Saragossa to their ancient Palladium, Our
Lady of the Pillar.
But the constitution of the year Three, with all its defects, would have been
willingly received by the nation in general, as affording some security from
the revolutionary storm, had it not been for a selfish and usurping device of
the Thermidoriens to mutilate and render it nugatory at the very outset, by
engrafting upon it the means of continuing the exercise of their own
arbitrary authority. It must never be forgotten, that these conquerors of
Robespierre had shared all the excesses of his party before they became his
personal enemies; and that when deprived of their official situations and
influence, which they were likely to be by a representative body freely and
fairly elected, they were certain to be exposed to great individual danger.
Determined, therefore, to retain the power in their own hands, the
Thermidoriens suffered, with an indifference amounting almost to
contempt, the constitution to pass through, and be approved of by, the
Convention. But, under pretence that it would be highly impolitic to deprive

the nation of the services of men accustomed to public business, they
procured [Aug. 22] two decrees to be passed; the first ordaining the
electoral bodies of France to choose, as representatives to the two councils
under the new constitution, at least two-thirds of the members presently
sitting in Convention; and the second declaring, that in default of a return of
two-thirds of the present deputies, as prescribed, the Convention themselves
should fill up the vacancies out of their own body; in other words, should
name a large proportion of themselves their own successors in legislative
power.[72]
These decrees were sent down to the Primary Assemblies of the people, and
every art was used to render them acceptable.
But the nation, and particularly the city of Paris, generally revolted at this
stretch of arbitrary authority. They recollected, that all the members who
had sat in the first National Assembly, so remarkable for talent, had been
declared ineligible, on that single account, for the second legislative body;
and now, men so infinitely the inferiors of those who were the colleagues of
Mirabeau, Mounier, and other great names, presumed not only to declare
themselves eligible by re-election, but dared to establish two-thirds of their
number as indispensable ingredients of the legislative assemblies, which,
according to the words alike and spirit of the constitution, ought to be
chosen by the free voice of the people. The electors, and particularly those
of the sections of Paris, angrily demanded to know, upon what public
services the deputies of the Convention founded their title to a privilege so
unjust and anomalous. Among the more active part of them, to whom the
measure was chiefly to be ascribed, they saw but a few reformed Terrorists,
who wished to retain the power of tyranny, though disposed to exercise it
with some degree of moderation, and the loss of whose places might be
possibly followed by that of their heads; in the others, they only beheld a
flock of timid and discountenanced Helots, willing to purchase personal
security at the sacrifice of personal honour and duty to the public; while in
the Convention as a body, who pronounced so large a proportion of their
number as indispensable to the service of the state, judging from their
conduct hitherto, they could but discover an image composed partly of iron,
partly of clay, deluged with the blood of many thousand victims—a pageant
without a will of its own, and which had been capable of giving its
countenance to the worst of actions, at the instigation of the worst of men—

a sort of Moloch, whose name had been used by its priests to compel the
most barbarous sacrifices. To sum up the whole, these experienced men of
public business, without whose intermediation it was pretended the national
affairs could not be carried on, could only shelter themselves from the
charge of unbounded wickedness, by pleading their unlimited cowardice,
and by poorly alleging that for two years they had sat, voted, and
deliberated under a system of compulsion and terror. So much meanness
rendered those who were degraded by it unfit, not merely to rule, but to
live; and yet two-thirds of their number were, according to their own
decrees, to be intruded on the nation as an indispensable portion of its
representatives.
Such was the language held in the assemblies of the
THE SECTIONS. sections of Paris, who were the more irritated against
the domineering and engrossing spirit exhibited in these
usurping enactments, because it was impossible to forget that it was their
interference, and the protection afforded by their national guard, which had
saved the Convention from massacre on more occasions than one.
In the meanwhile, reports continued to be made from the Primary
Assemblies, of their adhesion to the constitution, in which they were almost
unanimous, and of their sentiments concerning the two decrees, authorizing
and commanding the re-election of two-thirds of the Convention, on which
there existed a strong difference of opinion. The Convention, determined, at
all rates, to carry through with a high hand the iniquitous and arbitrary
measure which they proposed, failed not to make these reports such as they
desired them to be, and announced that the two decrees had been accepted
by a majority of the Primary Assemblies. The citizens of Paris challenged
the accuracy of the returns—alleged that the reports were falsified—
demanded a scrutiny, and openly bid defiance to the Convention. Their
power of meeting together in their sections, on account of the appeal to the
people, gave them an opportunity of feeling their own strength, and
encouraging each other by speeches and applauses. They were further
emboldened and animated by men of literary talent, whose power was
restored with the liberty of the press.[73] Finally, they declared their sittings
permanent, and that they had the right to protect the liberties of France. The
greater part of the national guards were united on this occasion against the
existing government; and nothing less was talked of, than that they should

avail themselves of their arms and numbers, march down to the Tuileries,
and dictate law to the Convention with their muskets, as the revolutionary
mob of the suburbs used to do with their pikes.
The Convention, unpopular themselves, and embarked in an unpopular
cause, began to look anxiously around for assistance. They chiefly relied on
the aid of about five thousand regular troops, who were assembled in and
around Paris. These declared for government with the greater readiness, that
the insurrection was of a character decidedly aristocratical, and that the
French armies, as already repeatedly noticed, were attached to the Republic.
But besides, these professional troops entertained the usual degree of
contempt for the national guards, and on this account alone were quite
ready to correct the insolence of the pekins,[74] or muscadins,[75] who
usurped the dress and character of soldiers. The Convention had also the
assistance of several hundred artillerymen, who, since the taking of the
Bastile, had been always zealous democrats. Still apprehensive of the result,
they added to this force another of a more ominous description. It was a
body of volunteers, consisting of about fifteen hundred men, whom they
chose to denominate the Sacred Band, or the Patriots of 1789. They were
gleaned out of the suburbs, and from the jails, the remnants of the
insurrectional battalions which had formed the body-guard of Hébert and
Robespierre, and had been the instruments by which they executed their
atrocities. The Convention proclaimed them men of the 10th of August—
undoubtedly, they were also men of the massacres of September. It was
conceived that the beholding such a pack of blood-hounds, ready to be let
loose, might inspire horror into the citizens of Paris, to whom their very
aspect brought so many fearful recollections. It did so, but it also inspired
hatred; and the number and zeal of the citizens, compensating for the fury
of the Terrorists, and for the superior discipline of the regular troops to be
employed against them, promised an arduous and doubtful conflict.
Much, it was obvious, must depend on the courage and conduct of the
leaders.
The sections employed, as their commander-in-chief, General Danican, an
old officer of no high reputation for military skill, but otherwise a worthy
and sincere man. The Convention at first made choice of Menou, and
directed him, supported by a strong military force, to march into the section

Le Pelletier, and disarm the national guards of that district. This section is
one of the most wealthy, and of course most aristocratic, in Paris, being
inhabited by bankers, merchants, the wealthiest class of tradesmen, and the
better orders in general. Its inhabitants had formerly composed the battalion
of national guards des Filles Saint Thomas, the only one which, taking part
in the defence of the Tuileries, shared the fate of the Swiss Guards upon the
memorable 10th of August. The section continued to entertain sentiments of
the same character, and when Menou appeared at the head of his forces,
accompanied by La Porte, a member of the Convention, he found the
citizens under arms, and exhibiting such a show of resistance, as induced
him, after a parley, to retreat without venturing an attack upon them.
Menou's indecision showed that he was not a man suited to the times, and
he was suspended from his command by the Convention, and placed under
arrest. The general management of affairs and the direction of the
Conventional forces, was then committed to Barras; but the utmost anxiety
prevailed among the members of the committees by whom government was
administered, to find a general of nerve and decision enough to act under
Barras, in the actual command of the military force, in a service so delicate,
and times so menacing. It was then that a few words from Barras, addressed
to his colleagues, Carnot and Tallien, decided the fate of Europe for
wellnigh twenty years, "I have the man," he said, "whom you want, a little
Corsican officer, who will not stand upon ceremony."[76]
The acquaintance of Barras and Buonaparte had been, as we have already
said, formed at the siege of Toulon, and the former had not forgotten the
inventive and decisive genius of the young officer to whom the conquest of
that city was to be ascribed. On the recommendation of Barras, Buonaparte
was sent for. He had witnessed the retreat of Menou, and explained with
much simplicity the causes of that check, and the modes of resistance which
ought to be adopted in case of the apprehended attack. His explanations
gave satisfaction. Buonaparte was placed at the head of the Conventional
forces, and took all the necessary precautions to defend the same palace
which he had seen attacked and carried by a body of insurgents on the 10th
of August. But he possessed far more formidable means of defence than
were in the power of the unfortunate Louis. He had two hundred pieces of
cannon, which his high military skill enabled him to distribute to the utmost
advantage. He had more than five thousand regular forces, and about fifteen

hundred volunteers. He was thus enabled to defend the whole circuit of the
Tuileries; to establish posts in all the avenues by which it could be
approached; to possess himself of the bridges, so as to prevent co-operation
between the sections which lay on the opposite banks of the river; and
finally, to establish a strong reserve in the Place Louis Quinze, or, as it was
then called, Place de la Révolution. Buonaparte had only a few hours to
make all these arrangements, for he was named in place of Menou late on
the night before the conflict.
A merely civic army, having no cannon, (for the field-pieces, of which each
section possessed two, had been almost all given up to the Convention after
the disarming the suburb of Saint Antoine,) ought to have respected so
strong a position as the Tuileries, when so formidably defended. Their
policy should have been, as in the days of Henry II., to have barricaded the
streets at every point, and cooped up the Conventional troops within the
defensive position they had assumed, till want of provisions obliged them to
sally at disadvantage, or to surrender. But a popular force is generally
impatient of delay. The retreat of Menou had given them spirit, and they
apprehended, with some show of reason, that the sections, if they did not
unite their forces, might be attacked and disarmed separately. They
therefore resolved to invest the Convention in a hostile manner, require of
the members to recall the obnoxious decrees, and allow the nation to make
a free and undictated election of its representatives.
On the thirteenth Vendemaire, corresponding to the 4th October, the civil
affray, commonly called the Day of the Sections, took place. The national
guards assembled, to the number of thirty thousand men and upwards, but
having no artillery. They advanced by different avenues, in close columns,
but everywhere found the most formidable resistance. One large force
occupied the quays on the left bank of the Seine, threatening the palace
from that side of the river. Another strong division advanced on the
Tuileries, through the Rue St. Honoré, designing to debouche on the palace,
where the Convention was sitting, by the Rue de Echelle. They did so,
without duly reflecting that they were flanked on most points by strong
posts in the lanes and crossings, defended by artillery.
The contest began in the Rue St. Honoré. Buonaparte had established a
strong post with two guns at the cul-de-sac Dauphine, opposite to the

church of St. Roche. He permitted the imprudent Parisians to involve their
long and dense columns in the narrow street without interruption, until they
established a body of grenadiers in the front of the church, and opposite to
the position at the cul-de-sac. Each party, as usual, throws on the other the
blame of commencing the civil contest for which both were prepared. But
all agree the firing commenced with musketry. It was instantly followed by
discharges of grape-shot and cannister, which, pointed as the guns were,
upon thick columns of the national guards, arranged on the quays and in the
narrow streets, made an astounding carnage. The national guards offered a
brave resistance, and even attempted to rush on the artillery, and carry the
guns by main force. But a measure which is desperate enough in the open
field, becomes impossible when the road to assault lies through narrow
streets, which are swept by the cannon at every discharge. The citizens were
compelled to give way. By a more judicious arrangement of their respective
forces, different results might have been hoped; but how could Danican, in
any circumstances have competed with Buonaparte? The affair, in which
several hundred men were killed and wounded, was terminated as a general
action in about an hour; and the victorious troops of the Convention,
marching into the different sections, completed the dispersion and
disarming of their opponents, an operation which lasted till late at night.
The Convention used this victory with the moderation which recollection of
the Reign of Terror had inspired. Only two persons suffered death for the
Day of the Sections. One of them, La Fond, had been a garde de corps, was
distinguished for his intrepidity, and repeatedly rallied the national guard
under the storm of grape shot. Several other persons having fled, were in
their absence capitally condemned, but were not strictly looked after; and
deportation was the punishment inflicted upon others. The accused were
indebted for this clemency chiefly to the interference of those members of
the Convention, who, themselves exiled on the 31st of May, had suffered
persecution and learned mercy.
The Convention showed themselves at the same time liberal to their
protectors. General Berruyer,[77] who commanded the volunteers of 1789,
and other general officers employed on the Day of the Sections, were
loaded with praises and preferment. But a separate triumph was destined to
Buonaparte, as the hero of the day. Five days after the battle, Barras
solicited the attention of the Convention to the young officer, by whose

prompt and skilful dispositions the Tuileries had been protected on the 13th
Vendemaire, and proposed that they should approve of General
Buonaparte's appointment as second in command of the army of the
interior, Barras himself still remaining commander-in-chief. The proposal
was adopted by acclamation. The Convention retained their resentment
against Menou, whom they suspected of treachery; but Buonaparte
interfering as a mediator, they were content to look over his offence.
After this decided triumph over their opponents, the Convention ostensibly
laid down their authority, and retiring from the scene in their present
character, appeared upon it anew in that of a Primary Assembly, in order to
make choice of such of their members as, by virtue of the decrees of two-
thirds, as they were called, were to remain on the stage, as members of the
Legislative Councils of Elders and Five Hundred.
After this change of names and dresses, resembling the shifts of a strolling
company of players, the two-thirds of the old Convention, with one-third of
members newly elected, took upon them the administration of the new
constitution. The two re-elected thirds formed a large proportion of the
councils, and were, in some respects, much like those unfortunate women,
who, gathered from jails and from the streets of the metropolis, have been
sometimes sent out to foreign settlements; and, however profligate their
former lives may have been, often regain character, and become tolerable
members of society, in a change of scene and situation.
The Directory consisted of Barras, Siêyes, Reubel,
THE DIRECTORY. Latourneur de la Manche, and Reveillière-Lepaux, to
the exclusion of Tallien, who was deeply offended.
Four of these directors were reformed Jacobins, or Thermidoriens; the fifth,
Reveillière-Lepaux, was esteemed a Girondist. Siêyes, whose taste was
rather for speculating in politics than acting in them, declined what he
considered a hazardous office, and was replaced by Carnot.
The nature of the insurrection of the Sections was not ostensibly royalist,
but several of its leaders were of that party in secret, and, if successful, it
would most certainly have assumed that complexion. Thus, the first step of
Napoleon's rise commenced by the destruction of the hopes of the House of
Bourbon, under the reviving influence of which, twenty years afterwards,

he himself was obliged to succumb. But the long path which closed so
darkly, was now opening upon him in light and joy. Buonaparte's high
services, and the rank which he had obtained, rendered him now a young
man of the first hope and expectation, mingling on terms of consideration
among the rulers of the state, instead of being regarded as a neglected
stranger, supporting himself with difficulty, and haunting public offices and
bureaux in vain, to obtain some chance of preferment, or even employment.
From second in command, the new general soon became general-in-chief of
the army of the interior, Barras having found his duties as a director
incompatible with those of military command. He employed his genius,
equally prompt and profound, in improving the state of the military forces;
and, in order to prevent the recurrence of such insurrections as that of the
13th Vendemaire, or Day of the Sections, and as the many others by which
it was preceded, he appointed and organized a guard for the protection of
the representative body.
As the dearth of bread, and other causes of disaffection, continued to
produce commotions in Paris, the general of the interior was sometimes
obliged to oppose them with a military force. On one occasion, it is said,
that when Buonaparte was anxiously admonishing the multitude to disperse,
a very bulky woman exhorted them to keep their ground. "Never mind these
coxcombs with the epaulets," she said; "they do not care if we are all
starved, so they themselves feed and get fat."—"Look at me, good woman,"
said Buonaparte, who was then as thin as a shadow, "and tell me which is
the fatter of us two." This turned the laugh against the Amazon, and the
rabble dispersed in good-humour.[78] If not among the most distinguished of
Napoleon's victories, this is certainly worthy of record, as achieved at the
least cost.
Meantime, circumstances, which we will relate, according to his own
statement, introduced Buonaparte to an acquaintance, which was destined to
have much influence on his future fate. A fine boy of ten or twelve years
old, presented himself at the levee of the general of the interior, with a
request of a nature unusually interesting. He stated his name to be Eugene
Beauharnais, son of the ci-devant Vicomte de Beauharnais, who, adhering
to the revolutionary party, had been a general in the Republican service
upon the Rhine, and falling under the causeless suspicion of the Committee

of Public Safety, was delivered to the Revolutionary Tribunal, and fell by its
sentence just four days before the overthrow of Robespierre. Eugene was
come to request of Buonaparte, as general of the interior, that his father's
sword might be restored to him. The prayer of the young supplicant was as
interesting as his manners were engaging, and Napoleon felt so much
interest in him, that he was induced to cultivate the acquaintance of
Eugene's mother, afterwards the Empress Josephine.[79]
This lady was a Creolian, the daughter of a planter in
JOSEPHINE St. Domingo. Her name at full length was Marie-Joseph
BEAUHARNAIS.
Rose Detacher de la Pagérie. She had suffered her share
of revolutionary miseries. After her husband, General Beauharnais, had
been deprived of his command, she was arrested as a suspected person, and
detained in prison till the general liberation, which succeeded the revolution
of 9th Thermidor. While in confinement, Madame Beauharnais had formed
an intimacy with a companion in distress, Madame Fontenai, now Madame
Tallien,[80] from which she derived great advantages after her friend's
marriage. With a remarkably graceful person, amiable manners, and an
inexhaustible fund of good humour, Madame Beauharnais was formed to be
an ornament to society. Barras, the Thermidorien hero, himself an ex-noble,
was fond of society, desirous of enjoying it on an agreeable scale, and of
washing away the dregs which Jacobinism had mingled with all the dearest
interests of life. He loved show, too, and pleasure, and might now indulge
both without the risk of falling under the suspicion of incivism, which, in
the Reign of Terror, would have been incurred by any attempt to
intermingle elegance with the enjoyments of social intercourse. At the
apartments which he occupied as one of the directory, in the Luxemburg
palace, he gave its free course to his natural taste, and assembled an
agreeable society of both sexes. Madame Tallien and her friend formed the
soul of these assemblies, and it was supposed that Barras was not insensible
to the charms of Madame Beauharnais,—a rumour which was likely to
arise, whether with or without foundation.
When Madame Beauharnais and General Buonaparte became intimate, the
latter assures us, and we see no reason to doubt him, that although the lady
was two or three years older than himself,[81] yet being still in the full
bloom of beauty, and extremely agreeable in her manners, he was induced,
solely by her personal charms, to make her an offer of his hand, heart, and

fortunes,—little supposing, of course, to what a pitch the latter were to
arise.
Although he himself is said to have been a fatalist, believing in destiny and
in the influence of his star, he knew nothing, probably, of the prediction of a
negro sorceress, who, while Marie-Joseph was but a child, prophesied she
should rise to a dignity greater than that of a queen, yet fall from it before
her death.[82] This was one of those vague auguries, delivered at random by
fools or imposters, which the caprice of Fortune sometimes matches with a
corresponding and conforming event. But without trusting to the African
sibyl's prediction, Buonaparte may have formed his match under the
auspices of ambition as well as love. The marrying Madame Beauharnais
was a mean of uniting his fortune with those of Barras and Tallien, the first
of whom governed France as one of the directors; and the last, from talents
and political connexions, had scarcely inferior influence. He had already
deserved well of them for his conduct on the Day of the Sections, but he
required their countenance to rise still higher; and without derogating from
the bride's merits, we may suppose her influence in their society
corresponded with the views of her lover. It is, however, certain, that he
always regarded her with peculiar affection; that he relied on her fate,
which he considered as linked with and strengthening his own; and reposed,
besides, considerable confidence in Josephine's tact and address in political
business. She had at all times the art of mitigating his temper, and turning
aside the hasty determinations of his angry moments, not by directly
opposing, but by gradually parrying and disarming them. It must be added,
to her great praise, that she was always a willing, and often a successful
advocate, in the cause of humanity.
They were married 9th March 1796; and the dowery of the bride was the
chief command of the Italian armies, a scene which opened a full career to
the ambition of the youthful general. Buonaparte remained with his wife
only three days after his marriage, hastened to see his family, who were still
at Marseilles, and having enjoyed the pleasure of exhibiting himself as a
favourite of Fortune in the city which he had lately left in a very
subordinate capacity, proceeded rapidly to commence the career to which
Fate called him, by placing himself at the head of the Italian army.[83]

CHAPTER III.
The Alps—Feelings and Views of Buonaparte on being
appointed to the Command of the Army of Italy—General
Account of his new Principles of Warfare—Mountainous
Countries peculiarly favourable to them—Retrospect of Military
Proceedings since October 1795—Hostility of the French
Government to the Pope—Massacre of the French Envoy
Basseville, at Rome—Austrian Army under Beaulieu—
Napoleon's Plan for entering Italy—Battle of Montenotte, and
Buonaparte's first Victory—Again defeats the Austrians at
Millesimo—and again under Colli—Takes possession of
Cherasco—King of Sardinia requests an Armistice, which leads
to a Peace, concluded on very severe Terms—Close of the
Piedmontese Campaign—Napoleon's Character at this period.
Napoleon has himself observed, that no country in the world is more
distinctly marked out by its natural boundaries than Italy.[84] The Alps seem
a barrier erected by Nature herself, on which she has inscribed in gigantic
characters, "Here let ambition be staid." Yet this tremendous
circumvallation of mountains, as it could not prevent the ancient Romans
from breaking out to desolate the world, so it has been in like manner
found, ever since the days of Hannibal, unequal to protect Italy herself from
invasion. The French nation, in the times of which we treat, spoke indeed of
the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to authorise them to claim all
which lay on the western side of these mountains, as naturally pertaining to
their dominions; but they never deigned to respect them as such, when the
question respected their invading, on their own part, the territories of other
states, which lay on or beyond the formidable frontier. They assumed the
law of natural limits as an unchallengeable rule when it made in favour of
France, but never allowed it to be quoted against her interest.
During the Revolutionary War, the general fortune of
COMMANDER-IN- battle had varied from time to time in the
CHIEF.
neighbourhood of these mighty boundaries. The King

of Sardinia[85] possessed almost all the fortresses which command the
passes on these mountains, and had therefore been said to wear the keys of
the Alps at his girdle. He had indeed lost his Dukedom of Savoy, and the
County of Nice, in the late campaigns; but he still maintained a very
considerable army, and was supported by his powerful ally the Emperor of
Austria, always vigilant regarding that rich and beautiful portion of his
dominions which lies in the north of Italy. The frontiers of Piedmont were
therefore covered by a strong Austro-Sardinian army, opposed to the
French, of which Napoleon had been just named commander-in-chief. A
strong Neapolitan force[86] was also to be added, so that in general numbers
their opponents were much superior to the French; but a great part of this
force was cooped up in garrisons which could not be abandoned.
It may be imagined with what delight the general, scarce aged twenty-six,
advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest, confident in his
own powers, and in the perfect knowledge of the country, which he had
acquired when by his scientific plans of the campaign, he had enabled
General Dumerbion to drive the Austrians back, and obtain possession of
the Col di Tende, Saorgio, and the gorges of the higher Alps.[87]
Buonaparte's achievements had hitherto been under the auspices of others.
He made the dispositions before Toulon, but it was Dugommier who had
the credit of taking the place. Dumerbion, as we have just said, obtained the
merit of the advantages in Piedmont. Even in the civil turmoil of the 13th
Vendemaire, his actual services had been overshadowed by the official
dignity of Barras as commander-in-chief. But if he reaped honour in Italy,
the success would be exclusively his own; and that proud heart must have
throbbed to meet danger upon such terms; that keen spirit have toiled to
discover the means of success.
For victory he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto unpractised in
war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale. It may not be
unnecessary to pause, to take a general view of the principles which he now
called into action.
Nations in the savage state, being constantly engaged in war, always form
for themselves some peculiar mode of fighting, suited to the country they
inhabit, and to the mode in which they are armed. The North-American
Indian becomes formidable as a rifleman or sharpshooter, lays ambuscades

in his pathless forests, and practises all the arts of irregular war. The Arab,
or Scythian, manœuvres his clouds of cavalry, so as to envelope and destroy
his enemy in his deserts by sudden onsets, rapid retreats, and unexpected
rallies; desolating the country around, cutting off his antagonist's supplies,
and practising, in short, the species of war proper to a people superior in
light cavalry.
The first stage of civilisation is less favourable to success in war. As a
nation advances in the peaceful arts, and the character of the soldier begins
to be less familiarly united with that of the citizen, this system of natural
tactics falls out of practice; and when foreign invasion, or civil broils, call
the inhabitants to arms, they have no idea save that of finding out the
enemy, rushing upon him, and committing the event to superior strength,
bravery, or numbers. An example may be seen in the great Civil War of
England, where men fought on both sides, in almost every county of the
kingdom, without any combination, or exact idea of uniting in mutual
support, or manœuvring so as to form their insulated bands into an army of
preponderating force. At least, what was attempted for that purpose must
have been on the rudest plan possible, where, even in actual fight, that part
of an army which obtained any advantage, pursued it as far as they could,
instead of using their success for the support of their companions; so that
the main body was often defeated when a victorious wing was in pursuit of
those whom their first onset had broken.
But—as war becomes a profession, and a subject of deep study—it is
gradually discovered, that the principles of tactics depend upon
mathematical and arithmetical science; and that the commander will be
victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same
point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the
enemy when the general force is computed on both sides. No man ever
possessed in a greater degree than Buonaparte, the power of calculation and
combination necessary for directing such decisive manœuvres. It
constituted, indeed, his secret—as it was for some time called—and that
secret consisted in an imagination fertile in expedients which would never
have occurred to others; clearness and precision in forming his plans; a
mode of directing with certainty the separate moving columns which were
to execute them, by arranging so, that each division should arrive on the
destined position at the exact time when their service was necessary; and

above all, in the knowledge which enabled such a master-spirit to choose
the most fitting subordinate implements, to attach them to his person, and,
by explaining to them so much of his plan as it was necessary each should
execute, to secure the exertion of their utmost ability in carrying it into
effect.
Thus, not only were his manœuvres, however daring, executed with a
precision which warlike operations had not attained before his time; but
they were also performed with a celerity which gave them almost always
the effect of surprise. Napoleon was like lightning in the eyes of his
enemies; and when repeated experience had taught them to expect this
portentous rapidity of movement, it sometimes induced his opponents to
wait, in a dubious and hesitating posture, for attacks, which, with less
apprehension of their antagonist, they would have thought it more prudent
to frustrate and to anticipate.
Great sacrifices were necessary to enable the French troops to move with
that degree of celerity which Buonaparte's combinations required. He made
no allowance for impediments or unexpected obstacles; the time which he
had calculated for execution of manœuvres prescribed, was on no account
to be exceeded—every sacrifice was to be made of baggage, stragglers,
even artillery, rather than the column should arrive too late at the point of its
destination. Hence, all that had hitherto been considered as essential not
only to the health, but to the very existence of an army, was in a great
measure dispensed with in the French service; and, for the first time, troops
were seen to take the field without tents, without camp-equipage, without
magazines of provisions, without military hospitals;—the soldiers eating as
they could, sleeping where they could, dying where they could; but still
advancing, still combating, and still victorious.
It is true that the abandonment of every object, save success in the field,
augmented frightfully all the usual horrors of war. The soldier, with arms in
his hands, and wanting bread, became a marauder in self-defence; and, in
supplying his wants by rapine, did mischief to the inhabitants, in a degree
infinitely beyond the benefit he himself received; for it may be said of
military requisition, as truly as of despotism, that it resembles the
proceedings of a savage, who cuts down a tree to come at the fruit. Still,
though purchased at a high rate, that advantage was gained by this rapid

system of tactics, which in a slower progress, during which the soldier was
regularly maintained, and kept under the restraint of discipline, might have
been rendered doubtful. It wasted the army through disease, fatigue, and all
the consequences of want and toil; but still the victory was attained, and
that was enough to make the survivors forget their hardships, and to draw
forth new recruits to replace the fallen. Patient of labours, light of heart and
temper, and elated by success beyond all painful recollections, the French
soldiers were the very men calculated to execute this desperate species of
service under a chief, who, their sagacity soon discovered, was sure to lead
to victory all those who could sustain the hardships by which it was to be
won.
The character of the mountainous countries, among
SYSTEM OF which he was, for the first time, to exercise his system,
TACTICS.
was highly favourable to Buonaparte's views.
Presenting many lines and defensible positions, it induced the Austrian
generals to become stationary, and occupy a considerable extent of ground,
according to their old system of tactics. But though abounding in such
positions as might at first sight seem absolutely impregnable, and were too
often trusted to as such, the mountains also exhibited to the sagacious eye
of a great captain, gorges, defiles, and difficult and unsuspected points of
access, by which he could turn the positions that appeared in front so
formidable; and, by threatening them on the flank and on the rear, compel
the enemy to a battle at disadvantage, or to a retreat with loss.
The forces which Buonaparte had under his command were between fifty
and sixty thousand good troops, having, many of them, been brought from
the Spanish campaign, in consequence of the peace with that country; but
very indifferently provided with clothing, and suffering from the hardships
they had endured in those mountainous, barren, and cold regions.[88] The
cavalry, in particular, were in very poor order; but the nature of their new
field of action not admitting of their being much employed, rendered this of
less consequence. The misery of the French army, until these Alpine
campaigns were victoriously closed by the armistice of Cherasco, could,
according to Buonaparte's authority,[89] scarce bear description. The officers
for several years had received no more than eight livres a-month (twenty
pence sterling a-week) in name of pay, and staff-officers had not amongst
them a single horse. Berthier preserved, as a curiosity, an order of the day,

dated Albenga, directing an advance of four Louis d'or to every general of
division, to enable them to enter on the campaign.[90] Among the generals to
whom this paltry supply was rendered acceptable by their wants, were, or
might have been, many whose names became afterwards the praise and
dread of war.[91] Augereau, Massena,[92] Serrurier, Joubert, Lasnes, and
Murat, all generals of the first consideration, served under Buonaparte in his
first Italian campaign.
The position of the French army had repeatedly varied since October 1795,
after the skirmish at Cairo. At that time the extreme left of the line, which
extended from south to north, rested upon the Col d'Argentine, and
communicated with the higher Alps—the centre was on the Col di Tende
and Mount Bertrand—the left occupied the heights of Saint Bertrand, Saint
Jacques, and other ridges running in the same direction, which terminated
on the Mediterranean shore, near Finale.
The Austrians, strongly reinforced, attacked this line, and carried the
heights of Mont Saint Jacques; and Kellermann, after a vain attempt to
regain that point of his position, retreated to the line of defence more
westward, which rests on Borghetto. Kellermann, an active and good
brigade officer, but without sufficient talent to act as commander-in-chief,
was superseded, and Scherer was placed in command of the army of Italy.
He risked a battle with the Austrians near Loana, in which the talents of
Massena and Augereau were conspicuous; and by the victory which ensued,
the French regained the line of Saint Jacques and Finale, which Kellermann
had been forced to abandon; so that in a general point of view, the relative
position of the two opposed armies was not very different from that in
which they had been left by Buonaparte.[93]
But though Scherer had been thus far victorious, he was
THE POPE. not the person to whom the Directory desired to intrust
the daring plan of assuming the offensive on a grand
scale upon the Alpine frontier, and, by carrying their arms into Italy,
compelling the Austrians to defend themselves in that quarter, and to
diminish the gigantic efforts which that power had hitherto continued with
varied success, but unabated vigour, upon the Rhine. The rulers of France
had a farther object in this bold scheme. They desired to intimidate, or
annihilate and dethrone the Pope. He was odious to them as head of the

Church, because the attachment of the French clergy to the Roman See, and
the points of conscience which rested upon that dependence, had
occasioned the recusancy of the priests, especially of those who were most
esteemed by the people, to take the constitutional oath. To the Pope, and his
claims of supremacy, were therefore laid the charge of the great civil war in
La Vendée, and the general disaffection of the Catholics in the south of
France.
But this was not the only cause of the animosity entertained by the
Directory against the head of the Catholic Church. They had, three years
before, sustained an actual injury from the See of Rome, which was yet
unavenged. The people of Rome were extremely provoked that the French
residing there, and particularly the young artists, had displayed the three-
coloured cockade, and were proposing to exhibit the scutcheon containing
the emblems of the Republic, over the door of the French consul. The Pope,
through his minister, had intimated his desire that this should not be
attempted, as he had not acknowledged the Republic as a legitimate
government. The French, however, pursued their purpose; and the
consequence was, that a popular commotion arose, which the papal troops
did not greatly exert themselves to suppress. The carriage of the French
envoy, or chargé des affaires, named Basseville, was attacked in the streets,
and chased home; his house was broken into by the mob, and he himself,
unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. The French Government
considered this very naturally as a gross insult, and were the more desirous
of avenging it, that by doing so they would approach nearer to the dignified
conduct of the Roman Republic, which, in good or evil, seems always to
have been their model. The affair happened in 1793, but was not forgotten
in 1796.[94]
The original idea entertained by the French Government for prosecuting
their resentment, had been by a proposed landing at Civita Vecchia with an
army of ten thousand men, marching to Rome, and exacting from the
pontiff complete atonement for the murder of Basseville. But as the English
fleet rode unopposed in the Mediterranean, it became a matter of very
doubtful success to transport such a body of troops to Civita Vecchia by sea,
not to mention the chance that, even if safely landed, they would have
found themselves in the centre of Italy, cut off from supplies and succours,
assaulted on all hands, and most probably blockaded by the British fleet.

Buonaparte, who was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy
should be first conquered, in order that Rome might be with safety
approached and chastised; and this scheme, though in appearance scarce a
less bold measure, was a much safer one than the Directory had at first
inclined to, since Buonaparte would only approach Rome in the event of his
being able to preserve his communications with Lombardy and Tuscany,
which he must conquer in the first place.[95]
The plan of crossing the Alps and marching into Italy, suited in every
respect the ambitious and self-confident character of the general to whom it
was now intrusted. It gave him a separate and independent authority, and
the power of acting on his own judgment and responsibility; for his
countryman Salicetti, the deputy who accompanied him as a commissioner
of the Government, was not probably much disposed to intrude his
opinions. He had been Buonaparte's patron, and was still his friend.[96] The
young general's mind was made up to the alternative of conquest or ruin, as
may be judged from his words to a friend at taking leave of him. "In three
months," he said, "I will be either at Milan or at Paris;" intimating at once
his desperate resolution to succeed, and his sense that the disappointment of
all his prospects must be the consequence of a failure.
On the 27th of March Buonaparte reached Nice. The picture of the army
which General Scherer[97] laid before him, was even worse than he had
formed any idea of. The supply of bread was very uncertain; distributions of
meat had long ceased; and for means of conveyance there were only mules,
and not above five hundred of these could be reckoned upon.
The headquarters had never been removed from Nice, since the
commencement of the war: they were instantly ordered to be transferred to
Albenga. On the march thither, along the rugged and precipitous shore of
the Mediterranean, the staff, broken with the rear and baggage of the army,
were exposed to the cannonade of Nelson's squadron; but the young
commander-in-chief would not allow the columns to halt, for the purpose
either of avoiding or of returning it.[98] On the 3d of April, the army reached
port Maunie, near Oneglia, and on the 4th arrived at Albenga; where, with
the view of animating his followers to ambitious hopes, he addressed the
army of Italy to the following purpose:—"Soldiers, you are hungry and
naked.—The Republic owes you much, but she has not the means to acquit

herself of her debts. The patience with which you support your hardships
among these barren rocks is admirable, but it cannot procure you glory. I
am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the sun beholds—Rich
provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at your disposal—Soldiers, with such
a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy?" This was
showing the deer to the hound when the leash is about to be slipped.
The Austro-Sardinian army, to which Buonaparte was opposed, was
commanded by Beaulieu, an Austrian general of great experience and some
talent, but no less than seventy-five years old; accustomed all his life to the
ancient rules of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate, or frustrate,
those plans, formed by a genius so fertile as that of Napoleon.
Buonaparte's plan for entering Italy differed from that of former conquerors
and invaders, who had approached that fine country by penetrating or
surmounting at some point or other her Alpine barriers. This inventive
warrior resolved to attain the same object, by turning round the southern
extremity of the Alpine range, keeping as close as possible to the shores of
the Mediterranean, and passing through the Genoese territory by the narrow
pass called the Boccheta leading around the extremity of the mountains, and
betwixt these and the sea. Thus he proposed to penetrate into Italy, by the
lowest level which the surface of the country presented, which must be of
course where the range of the Alps unites with that of the Apennines. The
point of junction where these two immense ranges of mountains touch upon
each other, is at the heights of Mount Saint Jacques, above Genoa, where
the Alps, running north-westward, ascend to Mont Blanc, their highest
peak, and the Apennines, running to the south-east, gradually elevate
themselves to Monte Velino, the tallest mountain of the range.
To attain his object of turning the Alps in the manner proposed, it was
necessary that Buonaparte should totally change the situation of his army;
those occupying a defensive line, running north and south, being to assume
an offensive position, extending east and west. Speaking of an army as of a
battalion, he was to form into column upon the right of the line which he
had hitherto occupied. This was an extremely delicate operation, to be
undertaken in presence of an active enemy, his superior in numbers; nor
was he permitted to execute it uninterrupted.

No sooner did Beaulieu learn that the French general was concentrating his
forces, and about to change his position, than he hastened to preserve
Genoa, without possession of which, or at least of the adjacent territory,
Buonaparte's scheme of advance could scarce have been accomplished. The
Austrian divided his army into three bodies. Colli, at the head of a Sardinian
division, he stationed on the extreme right at Ceva; his centre division,
under D'Argenteau, having its head at Sasiello, had directions to march on a
mountain called Montenotte, with two villages of the same name, near to
which was a strong position at a place called Montelegino, which the
French had occupied in order to cover their flank during their march
towards the east. At the head of his left wing, Beaulieu himself moved from
Novi upon Voltri, a small town within ten miles of Genoa, for the protection
of that ancient city, whose independence and neutrality were like to be held
in little reverence. Thus it appears, that while the French were endeavouring
to penetrate into Italy by an advance from Sardinia by the way of Genoa,
their line of march was threatened by three armies of Austro-Sardinians,
descending from the skirts of the Alps, and menacing to attack their flank.
But though a skilful disposition, Beaulieu's had, from the very mountainous
character of the country, the great disadvantage of wanting connexion
between the three separate divisions; neither, if needful, could they be easily
united on any point desired, while the lower line, on which the French
moved, permitted constant communication and co-operation.
On the 10th of April, D'Argenteau, with the central
BATTLE OF division of the Austro-Sardinian army, marched on
MONTENOTTE.
Montenotte, while Beaulieu on the left attacked the van
of the French army, which had come as far as Voltri. General Cervoni,
commanding the French division which sustained the attack of Beaulieu,
was compelled to fall back on the main body of his countrymen; and had
the assault of D'Argenteau been equally animated, or equally successful, the
fame of Buonaparte might have been stifled in the birth. But Colonel
Rampon, a French officer, who commanded the redoubts near Montelegino,
stopped the progress of D'Argenteau by the most determined resistance. At
the head of not more than fifteen hundred men, whom he inspired with his
own courage, and caused to swear either to maintain their post or die there,
[99] he continued to defend the redoubts, during the whole of the 11th, until
D'Argenteau, whose conduct was afterwards greatly blamed for not making

more determined efforts to carry them, drew off his forces for the evening,
intending to renew the attack next morning.
But, on the morning of the 12th, the Austrian general found himself
surrounded with enemies. Cervoni, who retreated before Beaulieu, had
united himself with La Harpe, and both advancing northward during the
night of the 11th, established themselves in the rear of the redoubts of
Montelegino, which Rampon had so gallantly defended. This was not all.
The divisions of Augereau and Massena had marched, by different routes,
on the flank and on the rear of D'Argenteau's column; so that next morning,
instead of renewing his attack on the redoubts, the Austrian general was
obliged to extricate himself by a disastrous retreat, leaving behind him
colours and cannon, a thousand slain, and two thousand prisoners.[100]
Such was the battle of Montenotte, the first of Buonaparte's victories;
eminently displaying that truth and mathematical certainty of combination,
[101] which enabled him on many more memorable occasions, even when
his forces were inferior in numbers, and apparently disunited in position,
suddenly to concentrate them and defeat his enemy, by overpowering him
on the very point where he thought himself strongest. He had accumulated a
superior force on the Austrian centre, and destroyed it, while Colli, on the
right, and Beaulieu himself, on the left, each at the head of numerous
forces, did not even hear of the action till it was fought and won.[102]
In consequence of the success at Montenotte, and the close pursuit of the
defeated Austrians, the French obtained possession of Cairo, which placed
them on that side of the Alps which slopes towards Lombardy, and where
the streams from these mountains run to join the Po.
Beaulieu had advanced to Voltri, while the French withdrew to unite
themselves in the attack upon D'Argenteau. He had now to retreat
northward with all haste to Dego, in the valley of the river Bormida, in
order to resume communication with the right wing of his army, consisting
chiefly of Sardinians, from which he was now nearly separated by the
defeat of the centre. General Colli, by a corresponding movement on the
right, occupied Millesimo, a small town about nine miles from Dego, with
which he resumed and maintained communication by a brigade stationed on
the heights of Biastro. From the strength of this position, though his forces

were scarce sufficiently concentrated, Beaulieu hoped to maintain his
ground till he should receive supplies from Lombardy, and recover the
consequences of the defeat at Montenotte. But the antagonist whom he had
in front had no purpose of permitting him such respite.
Determined upon a general attack on all points of the
BATTLE OF Austrian position, the French army advanced in three
MILLESIMO.
bodies upon a space of four leagues in extent.
Augereau, at the head of the division which had not fought at Montenotte,
advanced on the left against Millesimo; the centre, under Massena, directed
themselves upon Dego, by the vale of the Bormida; the right wing,
commanded by La Harpe, proceeded by the heights of Cairo, for the
purpose of turning Beaulieu's left flank. Augereau, whose division had not
engaged at the battle of Montenotte, was the first who came in contact with
the enemy. He attacked General Colli on the 13th April. His troops,
emulous of the honour acquired by their companions, behaved with great
bravery, rushed upon the outposts of the Sardinian army at Millesimo,
forced, and retained possession of the gorge by which it was defended, and
thus separated from the Sardinian army a body of about two thousand men,
under the Austrian General Provera, who occupied a detached eminence
called Cossaria, which covered the extreme left of General Colli's position.
But the Austrian showed the most obstinate courage. Although surrounded
by the enemy, he threw himself into the ruinous castle of Cossaria, which
crowned the eminence, and showed a disposition to maintain the place to
the last; the rather that, as he could see from the turrets of his stronghold the
Sardinian troops, from whom he had been separated, preparing to fight on
the ensuing day, he might reasonably hope to be disengaged.[103]
Buonaparte in person came up; and seeing the necessity of dislodging the
enemy from this strong post, ordered three successive attacks to be made on
the castle. Joubert, at the head of one of the attacking columns, had actually,
with six or seven others, made his way into the outworks, when he was
struck down by a wound in the head. General Banel, and Adjutant-general
Quénin fell, each at the head of the column which he commanded; and
Buonaparte was compelled to leave the obstinate Provera in possession of
the castle for the night. The morning of the 14th brought a different scene.
Contenting himself with blockading the castle of Cossaria, Buonaparte now
gave battle to General Colli, who made every effort to relieve it. These

attempts were all in vain. He was defeated and cut off from Beaulieu; he
retired as well as he could upon Ceva, leaving to his fate the brave General
Provera, who was compelled to surrender at discretion.
On the same day, Massena, with the centre, attacked the
ACTION OF DEGO. heights of Biastro, being the point of communication
betwixt Beaulieu and Colli, while La Harpe, having
crossed the Bormida, where the stream came up to the soldiers' middle,
attacked in front and in flank the village of Dego, where the Austrian
commander-in-chief was stationed. The first attack was completely
successful,—the heights of Biastro were carried, and the Piedmontese
routed. The assault of Dego was not less so, although after a harder
struggle. Beaulieu was compelled to retreat, and was entirely separated
from the Sardinians, who had hitherto acted in combination with him. The
defenders of Italy now retreated in different directions, Colli moving
westward towards Ceva, while Beaulieu, closely pursued through a difficult
country, retired upon D'Aqui.[104]
Even the morning after the victory, it was nearly wrested out of the hands of
the conquerors. A fresh division of Austrians, who had evacuated Voltri
later than the others, and were approaching to form a junction with their
general, found the enemy in possession of Beaulieu's position. They arrived
at Dego like men who had been led astray, and were no doubt surprised at
finding it in the hands of the French. Yet they did not hesitate to assume the
offensive, and by a brisk attack drove out the enemy, and replaced the
Austrian eagles in the village. Great alarm was occasioned by this sudden
apparition; for no one among the French could conceive the meaning of an
alarm beginning on the opposite quarter to that on which the enemy had
retreated, and without its being announced from the outposts towards
D'Aqui.
Buonaparte hastily marched on the village. The Austrians repelled two
attacks; at the third, General Lanusse, afterwards killed in Egypt, put his hat
upon the point of his sword, and advancing to the charge, penetrated into
the place. Lannes also, afterwards Duke of Montebello, distinguished
himself on the same occasion by courage and military skill, and was
recommended by Buonaparte to the Directory for promotion. In this battle
of Dego, more commonly called of Millesimo, the Austro-Sardinian army

lost five or six thousand men, thirty pieces of cannon, with a great quantity
of baggage. Besides, the Austrians were divided from the Sardinians; and
the two generals began to show, not only that their forces were disunited,
but that they themselves were acting upon separate motives; the Sardinians
desiring to protect Turin, whereas the movements of Beaulieu seemed still
directed to prevent the French from entering the Milanese territory.[105]
Leaving a sufficient force on the Bormida to keep in check Beaulieu,
Buonaparte now turned his strength against Colli, who, overpowered, and
without hopes of succour, abandoned his line of defence near Ceva, and
retreated to the line of the Tanaro.
Napoleon, in the meantime, fixed his head-quarters at Ceva, and enjoyed
from the heights of Montezemoto, the splendid view of the fertile fields of
Piedmont stretching in boundless perspective beneath his feet, watered by
the Po, the Tanaro, and a thousand other streams which descend from the
Alps. Before the eyes of the delighted army of victors lay this rich expanse
like a promised land; behind them was the wilderness they had passed;—
not indeed, a desert of barren sand, similar to that in which the Israelites
wandered, but a huge tract of rocks and inaccessible mountains, crested
with ice and snow, seeming by nature designed as the barrier and rampart of
the blessed regions which stretched eastward beneath them. We can
sympathize with the self-congratulation of the general who had surmounted
such tremendous obstacles in a way so unusual. He said to the officers
around him, as they gazed upon this magnificent scene, "Hannibal took the
Alps by storm. We have succeeded as well by taming their flank."[106]
The dispirited army of Colli was attacked at Mondovi during his retreat, by
two corps of Buonaparte's army, from two different points, commanded by
Massena and Serrurier. The last general, the Sardinian repulsed with loss;
but when he found Massena, in the meantime, was turning the left of his
line, and that he was thus pressed on both flanks, his situation became
almost desperate.[107] The cavalry of the Piedmontese made an effort to
renew the combat. For a time they overpowered and drove back those of the
French; and General Stengel, who commanded the latter, was slain in
attempting to get them into order.[108] But the desperate valour of Murat,
unrivalled perhaps in the heady charge of cavalry combat, renewed the
fortune of the field; and the horse, as well as the infantry of Colli's army,

were compelled to a disastrous retreat. The defeat was decisive; and the
Sardinians, after the loss of the best of their troops, their cannon, baggage,
and appointments, and being now totally divided from their Austrian allies,
and liable to be overpowered by the united forces of the French army, had
no longer hopes of effectually covering Turin. Buonaparte, pursuing his
victory, took possession of Cherasco, within ten leagues of the Piedmontese
capital.[109]
Thus Fortune, in the course of a campaign of scarce a month, placed her
favourite in full possession of the desired road to Italy by command of the
mountain-passes, which had been invaded and conquered with so much
military skill. He had gained three battles over forces far superior to his
own; inflicted on the enemy a loss of twenty-five thousand men in killed,
wounded, and prisoners; taken eighty pieces of cannon, and twenty-one
stand of colours;[110] reduced to inaction the Austrian army; almost
annihilated that of Sardinia; and stood in full communication with France
upon the eastern side of the Alps, with Italy lying open before him, as if to
invite his invasion. But it was not even with such laurels, and with facilities
which now presented themselves for the accomplishment of new and more
important victories upon a larger scale, and with more magnificent results,
that the career of Buonaparte's earliest campaign was to be closed. The head
of the royal house of Savoy, if not one of the most powerful, still one of the
most distinguished in Europe, was to have the melancholy experience, that
he had encountered with the Man of Destiny, as he was afterwards proudly
called, who, for a time, had power, in the emphatic phrase of Scripture, "to
bind kings with chains, and nobles with fetters of iron."
The shattered relics of the Sardinian army had fallen back, or rather fled, to
within two leagues of Turin, without hope of being again able to make an
effectual stand. The Sovereign of Sardinia, Savoy, and Piedmont, had no
means of preserving his capital, nay, his existence on the continent,
excepting by an almost total submission to the will of the victor. Let it be
remembered, that Victor Amadeus the Third was the descendant of a race of
heroes, who, from the peculiar situation of their territories, as constituting a
neutral ground of great strength betwixt France and the Italian possessions
of Austria, had often been called on to play a part in the general affairs of
Europe, of importance far superior to that which their condition as a
second-rate power could otherwise have demanded. In general, they had

compensated their inferiority of force by an ability and gallantry which did
them the highest credit, both as generals and as politicians; and now
Piedmont was at the feet, in her turn, of an enemy weaker in numbers than
her own. Besides the reflections on the past fame of his country, the present
humiliating situation of the King was rendered more mortifying by the state
of his family connexions. Victor Amadeus was the father-in-law of
Monsieur (Louis XVIII.,) and of the Comte d'Artois, (afterwards Charles
X.) He had received his sons-in-law at his court at Turin, had afforded them
an opportunity of assembling around them their forces, consisting of the
emigrant noblesse, and had strained all the power he possessed, and in
many instances successfully, to withstand both the artifices and the arms of
the French Republicans. And now, so born, so connected, and with such
principles, he was condemned to sue for peace, on any terms which might
be dictated, from a General of France, aged twenty-six years, who, a few
months before, was desirous of an appointment in the artillery service of the
Grand Signior.
Under these afflicting circumstances, a suspension of
ARMISTICE OF hostilities was requested by the King of Sardinia; and,
CHERASCO.
on the 24th April, conferences were held at Carru, the
headquarters of the French, but an armistice could only be purchased by
placing two of the King's strongest fortresses—Coni and Tortona, in the
hands of the French, and thus acknowledging that he surrendered at
discretion. The armistice was agreed on [April 28] at Cherasco, but
commissioners were sent by the King to Paris, to arrange with the Directory
the final terms of peace. These were such as victors give to the vanquished.
Besides the fortresses already surrendered, the King of Sardinia was to
place in the hands of the French five others of the first importance. The road
from France to Italy was to be at all times open to the French armies; and
indeed the King, by surrender of the places mentioned, had lost the power
of interrupting their progress. He was to break off every species of alliance
and connexion with the combined powers at war with France, and become
bound not to entertain at his court, or in his service, any French emigrants
whatever, or any of their connexions; nor was an exception even made in
favour of his own two daughters. In short, the surrender was absolute.[111]
Victor Amadeus exhibited the utmost reluctance to subscribe this treaty, and
did not long survive it.[112] His son succeeded in name to the kingdom of

Piedmont; but the fortresses and passes, which had rendered him a prince of
some importance, were, excepting Turin, and one or two of minor
consequence, all surrendered into the hands of the French.
Viewing this treaty with Sardinia as the close of the Piedmontese campaign,
we pause to consider the character which Buonaparte displayed at that
period. The talents as a general which he had exhibited were of the very
first order. There was no disconnexion in his objects; they were all attained
by the very means he proposed, and the success was improved to the
utmost. A different conduct usually characterises those who stumble
unexpectedly on victory, either by good fortune or by the valour of their
troops. When the favourable opportunity occurs to such leaders, they are
nearly as much embarrassed by it as by a defeat. But Buonaparte, who had
foreseen the result of each operation by his sagacity, stood also prepared to
make the most of the advantages which might be derived from it.
His style in addressing the Convention was, at this period, more modest and
simple, and therefore more impressive, than the figurative and bombastic
style which he afterwards used in his bulletins. His self-opinion, perhaps,
was not risen so high as to permit him to use the sesquipedalian words and
violent metaphors, to which he afterwards seems to have given a
preference. We may remark also, that the young victor was honourably
anxious to secure for such officers as distinguished themselves, the
preferment which their services entitled them to.[113] He urges the
promotion of his brethren in arms in almost every one of his despatches,—a
conduct not only just and generous, but also highly politic. Were his
recommendations successful, their general had the gratitude due for the
benefit; were they overlooked, thanks equally belonged to him for his good
wishes, and the resentment for the slight attached itself to the government,
who did not give effect to them.
If Buonaparte spoke simply and modestly on his own achievements, the
bombast which he spared was liberally dealt out to the Convention by an
orator named Daubermesnil, who invokes all bards, from Tyrtæus and
Ossian down to the author of the Marseillois Hymn—all painters, from
Apelles to David—all musicians, from Orpheus to the author of the Chant
du départ, to sing, paint, and compose music, upon the achievements of the
General and Army of Italy.[114]

With better taste, a medal of Buonaparte was struck in the character of the
Conqueror of the battle of Montenotte. The face is extremely thin, with lank
hair, a striking contrast to the fleshy square countenance exhibited on his
later coins. On the reverse, Victory, bearing a palm branch, a wreath of
laurel, and a naked sword, is seen flying over the Alps. This medal we
notice as the first of the splendid series which records the victories and
honours of Napoleon, and which was designed by Denon as a tribute to the
genius of his patron.

CHAPTER IV.
Farther progress of the French Army under Buonaparte—He
crosses the Po, at Placenza, on 7th May—Battle of Lodi takes
place on the 10th, in which the French are victorious—Remarks
on Napoleon's Tactics in this celebrated Action—French take
possession of Cremona and Pizzighitone—Milan deserted by the
Archduke Ferdinand and his Duchess—Buonaparte enters
Milan on the 15th May—General situation of the Italian States
at this period—Napoleon inflicts Fines upon the neutral and
unoffending States of Parma and Modena, and extorts the
surrender of some of their finest Pictures—Remarks upon this
novel procedure.
The ardent disposition of Buonaparte did not long
PROGRESS OF THE permit him to rest after the advantages which he had
FRENCH ARMY.
secured. He had gazed on Italy with an eagle's eye; but
it was only for a moment, ere stooping on her with the wing, and pouncing
on her with the talons, of the king of birds.
A general with less extraordinary talent would perhaps have thought it
sufficient to have obtained possession of Piedmont, revolutionizing its
government as the French had done that of Holland, and would have
awaited fresh supplies and reinforcements from France before advancing to
farther and more distant conquests, and leaving the Alps under the
dominion of a hostile, though for the present a subdued and disarmed
monarchy. But Buonaparte had studied the campaign of Villars in these
regions, and was of opinion that it was by that general's hesitation to
advance boldly into Italy, after the victories which the Marshal de Coigni
had obtained at Parma and Guastalla, that the enemy had been enabled to
assemble an accumulating force, before which the French were compelled
to retreat.[115] He determined, therefore, to give the Republic of Venice, the
Grand Duke of Tuscany, and other states in Italy, no time to muster forces,
and take a decided part, as they were likely to do, to oppose a French
invasion. Their terror and surprise could not fail to be increased by a sudden

irruption; while months, weeks, even days of consideration, might afford
those states, attached as the rulers must be to their ancient oligarchical
forms of government, time and composure to assume arms to maintain
them. A speedy resolution was the more necessary, as Austria, alarmed for
her Italian possessions, was about to make every effort for their defence.
Orders had already been sent by the Aulic Council of War to detach an army
of thirty thousand men, under Wurmser, from the Army of the Rhine to the
frontiers of Italy. These were to be strengthened by other reinforcements
from the interior, and by such forces as could be raised in the mountainous
district of the Tyrol, which furnishes perhaps the most experienced and
most formidable sharpshooters in the world. The whole was to be united to
the fragments of Beaulieu's defeated troops. If suffered to form a junction,
and arrange their plans for attack or defence, an army, of force so superior
to the French in numbers, veterans in discipline, and commanded by a
general like Wurmser, was likely to prevent all the advantages which the
French might gain by a sudden irruption, ere an opposition so formidable
was collected and organized. But the daring scheme which Napoleon
contemplated, corresponding to the genius of him who had formed it,
required to be executed with caution, united with secrecy and celerity.
These were the more necessary, as, although the thanks of the French
Government had been voted to the army of Italy five times in the course of
a month, yet the Directory, alarmed at the more doubtful state of hostilities
upon the Rhine, had turned their exertions chiefly in that direction; and,
trusting to the skill of their general, and the courage of his troops, had not
transmitted recruits and supplies upon the scale necessary for the great
undertakings which he meditated. But Italiam—Italiam![116]—the idea of
penetrating into a country so guarded and defended by nature, as well as by
military skill, the consciousness of having surmounted obstacles of a nature
so extraordinary, and the hope that they were approaching the reward of so
many labours—above all, their full confidence in a leader, who seemed to
have bound Victory to his standard—made the soldiers follow their general,
without counting their own deficiencies, or the enemy's numbers.[117]
To encourage this ardour, Buonaparte circulated an address,[118] in which,
complimenting the army on the victories they had gained, he desired them
at the same time "to consider nothing as won so long as the Austrians held
Milan, and while the ashes of those who had conquered the Tarquins were

soiled by the presence of the assassins of Basseville." It would appear that
classical allusions are either familiar to the French soldiers, or that, without
being more learned than others of their rank, they are pleased with being
supposed to understand them. They probably considered the oratory of their
great leader as soldier-like words, and words of exceeding good command.
The English soldier, addressed in such flights of eloquence, would either
have laughed at them, or supposed that he had got a crazed play-actor put
over him, instead of a general. But there is this peculiar trait in the French
character, that they are willing to take every thing of a complimentary kind
in the manner in which it seems to be meant. They appear to have made that
bargain with themselves on many points, which the audience usually do in a
theatre,—to accept of the appearance of things for the reality. They never
inquire whether a triumphal arch is of stone or of wood; whether a
scutcheon is of solid metal, or only gilt; or whether a speech, of which the
tendency is flattering to their national vanity, contains genuine eloquence,
or only tumid extravagance.
All thoughts were therefore turned to Italy. The fortress
TORTONA. of Tortona was surrendered to the French by the King
of Sardinia; Buonaparte's headquarters were fixed there,
[May 4.] Massena concentrated another part of the army at Alexandria,
menacing Milan, and threatening, by the passage of the Po, to invade the
territories belonging to Austria on the northern bank of that stream. As
Buonaparte himself observed, the passage of a great river is one of the most
critical operations in modern war; and Beaulieu had collected his forces to
cover Milan, and prevent the French, if possible, from crossing the Po. But,
in order to avert the dangerous consequences of attempting to force his
passage on the river, defended by a formidable enemy in front, Buonaparte's
subtle genius had already prepared the means for deceiving the old Austrian
respecting his intended operations.
Valenza appeared to be the point of passage proposed
PASSAGE OF THE by the French; it is one of those fortresses which cover
PO.
the eastern frontier of Piedmont, and is situated upon
the Po. During the conferences previous to the armistice of Cherasco,
Buonaparte had thrown out hints as if he were particularly desirous to be
possessed of this place, and it was actually stipulated in the terms of the
treaty, that the French should occupy it for the purpose of effecting their

passage over the river. Beaulieu did not fail to learn what had passed, which
coinciding with his own ideas of the route by which Buonaparte meant to
advance upon Milan, he hastened to concentrate his army on the opposite
bank, at a place called Valeggio, about eighteen miles from Valenza, the
point near which he expected the attempt to be made, and from which he
could move easily in any direction towards the river, before the French
could send over any considerable force. Massena also countenanced this
report, and riveted the attention of the Austrians on Valenza, by pushing
strong reconnoitring parties from Alexandria in the direction of that fortress.
Besides, Beaulieu had himself crossed the Po at this place, and, like all men
of routine—(for such he was though a brave and approved soldier)—he was
always apt to suppose that the same reasons which directed himself, must
needs seem equally convincing to others. In almost all delicate affairs,
persons of ordinary talents are misled by their incapacity to comprehend,
that men of another disposition will be likely to view circumstances, and act
upon principles, with an eye and opinion very different from their own.
But the reports which induced the Austrian general to take the position at
Valeggio, arose out of a stratagem of war. It was never Buonaparte's
intention to cross the Po at Valenza. The proposal was a feint to draw
Beaulieu's attention to that point, while the French accomplished the desired
passage at Placenza, nearly fifty miles lower down the river than Valeggio,
where their subtle general had induced the Austrians to take up their line of
defence. Marching for this purpose with incredible celerity, Buonaparte, on
the 7th of May, assembled his forces at Placenza, when their presence was
least expected, and where there were none to defend the opposite bank,
except two or three squadrons of Austrians, stationed there merely for the
purpose of reconnoitring. General Andréossi (for names distinguished
during those dreadful wars begin to rise on the narrative, as the stars
glimmer out on the horizon) commanded an advanced guard of five
hundred men. They had to pass in the common ferry-boats, and the crossing
required nearly half an hour; so that the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of
achieving the operation, had they been seriously opposed, appears to
demonstration. Colonel Lannes threw himself ashore first with a body of
grenadiers, and speedily dispersed the Austrian hussars, who attempted to
resist their landing. The vanguard having thus opened the passage, the other
divisions of the army were enabled to cross in succession, and in the course

of two days the whole were in the Milanese territory, and on the left bank of
the Po. The military manœuvres, by means of which Buonaparte achieved,
without the loss of a man, an operation of so much consequence, and which,
without such address as he displayed, must have been attended with great
loss, and risk of failure, have often been considered as among his most
masterly movements.
Beaulieu, informed too late of the real plans of the French general, moved
his advanced guard, composed of the division of General Liptay, from
Valeggio towards the Po, in the direction of Placenza. But here also the alert
general of the French had been too rapid in his movements for the aged
German. Buonaparte had no intention to wait an attack from the enemy with
such a river as the Po in his rear, which he had no means of recrossing if the
day should go against him; so that a defeat, or even a material check, would
have endangered the total loss of his army. He was, therefore, pushing
forward in order to gain ground on which to manœuvre, and the advanced
divisions of the two armies met at a village called Fombio, not far from
Casal, on the 8th of May. The Austrians threw themselves into the place,
fortified and manned the steeples, and whatever posts else could be made
effectual for defence, and reckoned upon defending themselves there until
the main body of Beaulieu's army should come up to support them. But they
were unable to sustain the vivacity of the French onset, to which so many
successive victories had now given a double impulse. The village was
carried at the bayonet's point; the Austrians lost their cannon, and left
behind one-third of their men, in slain, wounded, and prisoners. The wreck
of Liptay's division saved themselves by crossing the Adda at Pizzighitone,
while they protected their retreat by a hasty defence of that fortress.[119]
Another body of Austrians having advanced from Casal, to support, it may
be supposed, the division of Liptay, occasioned a great loss to the French
army in the person of a very promising officer. This was General La Harpe,
highly respected and trusted by Buonaparte, and repeatedly mentioned in
the campaigns of Piedmont. Hearing the alarm given by the out-posts, when
the Austrian patrols came in contact with them, La Harpe rode out to satisfy
himself concerning the nature and strength of the attacking party. On his
return to his own troops, they mistook him and his attendants for the enemy,
fired upon, and killed him. He was a Swiss by birth, and had been
compelled to leave his country on account of his democratical opinions; a

grenadier, says Buonaparte, in stature and in courage, but of a restless
disposition. The soldiers with the superstition belonging to their profession,
remarked, that during the battle of Fombio, on the day before, he was less
animated than usual, as if an obscure sense of his approaching fate already
overwhelmed him.[120]
The Austrian regiment of cavalry which occasioned this loss, after some
skirmishing, was content to escape to Lodi, a point upon which Beaulieu
was again collecting his scattered forces, for the purpose of covering Milan,
by protecting the line of the Adda.
"The passage of the Po," said Buonaparte, in his report
BATTLE OF LODI. to the Directory, "had been expected to prove the
boldest and most difficult manœuvre of the campaign,
nor did we expect to have an action of more vivacity than that of Dego. But
we have now to recount the battle of Lodi."[121] As the conqueror
deservedly congratulated himself on this hard-won victory, and as it has
become in a manner especially connected with his name and military
character, we must, according to our plan, be somewhat minute in our
details respecting it.
The Adda, a large and deep river, though fordable at some places and in
some seasons, crosses the valley of the Milanese, rising in the Tyrolese
Alps, and joining the Po at Pizzighitone; so that, if the few points at which
it can be crossed are fortified or defended, it forms a line covering all the
Milanese territory to the eastward, from any force approaching from the
direction of Piedmont. This line Beaulieu proposed to make good against
the victor before whom he had so often retreated, and he conjectured (on
this occasion rightly) that, to prosecute his victory by marching upon Milan,
Buonaparte would first desire to dislodge the covering army from the line
of the Adda, as he could not safely advance to the capital of Lombardy,
leaving the enemy in possession of such a defensive line upon their flank.
He also conjectured that this attempt would be made at Lodi.
This is a large town, containing twelve thousand inhabitants. It has old
Gothic walls, but its chief defence consists in the river Adda, which flows
through it, and is crossed by a wooden bridge about five hundred feet in
length. When Beaulieu, after the affair of Fombio, evacuated Casal, he

retreated to this place with about ten thousand men. The rest of his army
was directed upon Milan and Cassano, a town situated, like Lodi, upon the
Adda.
Buonaparte calculated that, if he could accomplish the passage of the Adda
at Lodi, he might overtake and disperse the remainder of Beaulieu's army,
without allowing the veteran time to concentrate them for farther resistance
in Milan, or even for rallying under the walls of the strong fortress of
Mantua. The judgment of the French general was in war not more
remarkable for seizing the most advantageous moment of attack, than for
availing himself to the very uttermost of success when obtained. The quick-
sighted faculty and power of instant decision with which nature had
endowed him, had, it may be supposed, provided beforehand for the
consequences of the victory ere it was yet won, and left no room for doubt
or hesitation when his hopes had become certainties. We have already
remarked, that there have been many commanders, who, after an accidental
victory, are so much at a loss what is next to be done, that while they are
hesitating, the golden moments pass away unimproved; but Buonaparte
knew as well how to use advantages, as to obtain them.
Upon the 10th day of May, attended by his best generals, and heading the
choicest of his troops, Napoleon pressed forward towards Lodi. About a
league from Casal, he encountered the Austrian rear-guard, who had been
left, it would appear, at too great a distance from the main body. The French
had no difficulty in driving these troops before them into the town of Lodi,
which was but slightly defended by the few soldiers whom Beaulieu had
left on the western or right side of the Adda. He had also neglected to
destroy the bridge, although he ought rather to have supported a defence on
the right bank of the river, (for which the town afforded many facilities,) till
the purpose of destruction was completed, than have allowed it to exist. If
his rear-guard had been actually stationed in Lodi, instead of being so far in
the rear of the main body, they might, by a protracted resistance from the
old walls and houses, have given time for this necessary act of demolition.
But though the bridge was left standing, it was swept by twenty or thirty
Austrian pieces of artillery, whose thunders menaced death to any who
should attempt that pass of peril. The French, with great alertness, got as
many guns in position on the left bank, and answered this tremendous fire

with equal spirit. During this cannonade, Buonaparte threw himself
personally amongst the fire, in order to station two guns loaded with grape-
shot in such a position, as rendered it impossible for any one to approach
for the purpose of undermining or destroying the bridge; and then calmly
proceeded to make arrangements for a desperate attempt.
His cavalry was directed to cross, if possible, at a place where the Adda was
said to be fordable,—a task which they accomplished with difficulty.
Meantime, Napoleon observed that the Austrian line of infantry was thrown
considerably behind the batteries of artillery which they supported, in order
that they might have the advantage of a bending slope of ground, which
afforded them shelter from the French fire. He therefore drew up a close
column of three thousand grenadiers, protected from the artillery of the
Austrians by the walls and houses of the town, and yet considerably nearer
to the enemy's line of guns on the opposite side of the Adda than were their
own infantry, which ought to have protected them. The column of
grenadiers, thus secured, waited in comparative safety, until the appearance
of the French cavalry, who had crossed the ford, began to disquiet the flank
of the Austrians. This was the critical moment which Buonaparte expected.
A single word of command wheeled the head of the column of grenadiers to
the left, and placed it on the perilous bridge. The word was given to
advance, and they rushed on with loud shouts of Vive la République! But
their appearance upon the bridge was the signal for a redoubled shower of
grape-shot, while from the windows of the houses on the left side of the
river, the soldiers who occupied them poured volley after volley of
musketry on the thick column as it endeavoured to force its way over the
long bridge. At one time the French grenadiers, unable to sustain this
dreadful storm, appeared for an instant to hesitate. But Berthier, the chief of
Buonaparte's staff, with Massena, L'Allemagne, and Corvini, hurried to the
head of the column, and by their presence and gallantry renewed the
resolution of the soldiers, who now poured across the bridge. The Austrians
had but one resource left; to rush on the French with the bayonet, and kill,
or drive back into the Adda, those who had forced their passage, before they
could deploy into line, or receive support from their comrades, who were
still filing along the bridge. But the opportunity was neglected, either
because the troops, who should have executed the manœuvre, had been, as
we have already noticed, withdrawn too far from the river; or because the

soldiery, as happens when they repose too much confidence in a strong
position, became panic-struck when they saw it unexpectedly carried. Or it
may be, that General Beaulieu, so old and so unfortunate, had somewhat
lost that energy and presence of mind which the critical moment demanded.
Whatever was the cause, the French rushed on the artillerymen, from whose
fire they had lately suffered so tremendously, and, unsupported as they
were, had little difficulty in bayoneting them.
The Austrian army now completely gave way, and lost in their retreat,
annoyed as it was by the French cavalry, upwards of twenty guns, a
thousand prisoners, and perhaps two thousand more wounded and slain.[122]
Such was the famous passage of the Bridge of Lodi; achieved with such
skill and gallantry, as gave the victor the same character for fearless
intrepidity, and practical talent in actual battle, which the former part of the
campaign had gained him as a most able tactitian.
Yet this action, though successful, has been severely criticized by those who
desire to derogate from Buonaparte's military talents. It has been said, that
he might have passed over a body of infantry at the same ford where the
cavalry had crossed; and that thus, by manœuvring on both sides of the
river, he might have compelled the Austrians to evacuate their position on
the left bank of the Adda, without hazarding an attack upon their front,
which could not but cost the assailants very dearly.
Buonaparte had perhaps this objection in his recollection when he states,
that the column of grenadiers was so judiciously sheltered from the fire
until the moment when their wheel to the left brought them on the bridge,
that they only lost two hundred men[123] during the storm of the passage.
We cannot but suppose, that this is a very mitigated account of the actual
loss of the French army. So slight a loss is not to be easily reconciled with
the horrors of the battle, as he himself detailed them in his despatches; nor
with the conclusion, in which he mentions, that of the sharp contests which
the army of Italy had to sustain during the campaign, none was to be
compared with that "terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi."[124]
In fact, as we may take occasion to prove hereafter, the Memoranda of the
great general, dictated to his officers at Saint Helena, have a little too much
the character of his original bulletins; and, while they show a considerable

disposition to exaggerate the difficulties to be overcome, the fury of the
conflict, and the exertions of courage by which the victory was attained,
show a natural inconsistency, from the obvious wish to diminish the loss
which was its unavoidable price.
But, admitting that the loss of the French had been greater on this occasion
than their general cared to recollect or acknowledge, his military conduct
seems not the less justifiable.
Buonaparte appears to have had two objects in view in this daring exploit.
The first was, to improve and increase the terror into which his previous
successes had thrown the Austrians, and to impress on them the conviction,
that no position, however strong, was able to protect them against the
audacity and talent of the French. This discouraging feeling, exemplified by
so many defeats, and now by one in circumstances where the Austrians
appeared to have every advantage, it was natural to suppose, would hurry
Beaulieu's retreat, induce him to renounce all subsequent attempts to cover
Milan, and rather to reunite the fragments of his army, particularly that part
of Liptay's division, which, after being defeated at Fombio, had thrown
themselves into Pizzighitone. To have manœuvred slowly and cautiously,
would not have struck that terror and confusion which was inspired by the
desperate attack on the position at Lodi. Supposing these to have been his
views, the victor perfectly succeeded; for Beaulieu, after his misadventure,
drew off without any farther attempt to protect the ancient capital of
Lombardy, and threw himself upon Mantua, with the intention of covering
that strong fortress, and at the same time of sheltering under it the remains
of his army, until he could form a junction with the forces which Wurmser
was bringing to his assistance from the Rhine.
Buonaparte himself has pointed out a second object, in which he was less
successful. He had hoped the rapid surprise of the bridge of Lodi might
enable him to overtake or intercept the rest of Beaulieu's army, which, as we
have said, had retreated by Cassano. He failed, indeed, in this object; for
these forces also made their way into the Mantuan territory, and joined
Beaulieu, who, by crossing the classical Mincio, placed another strong line
of military defence betwixt him and his victor. But the prospect of
intercepting and destroying so large a force, was worth the risk he
encountered at Lodi,[125] especially taking into view the spirit which his

army had acquired from a long train of victory, together with the
discouragement which had crept into the Austrian ranks from a uniform
series of defeats.
It should also be remembered, in considering the necessity of forcing the
bridge of Lodi, that the ford over the Adda was crossed with difficulty even
by the cavalry, and that when once separated by the river, the
communication between the main army and the detachment of infantry,
(which his censors say Napoleon should have sent across in the same
manner,) being in a great degree interrupted, the latter might have been
exposed to losses, from which Buonaparte, situated as he was on the right
bank, could have had no means of protecting them.
Leaving the discussion of what might have been, to
PIZZIGHITONE. trace that which actually took place, the French cavalry
pursued the retreating Austrians as far as Cremona, of
which they took possession. Pizzighitone was obliged to capitulate, the
garrison being cut off from all possibility of succour. About five hundred
prisoners surrendered in that fortress; the rest of Liptay's division, and other
Austrian corps, could no otherwise escape, than by throwing themselves
into the Venetian territory.
It was at this time that Buonaparte had some conversation with an old
Hungarian officer made prisoner in one of the actions, whom he met with at
a bivouac by chance, and who did not know him. The veteran's language
was a curious commentary on the whole campaign; nay, upon Buonaparte's
general system of warfare, which appeared so extraordinary to those who
had long practised the art on more formal principles. "Things are going on
as ill and as irregularly as possible," said the old martinet. "The French have
got a young general, who knows nothing of the regular rules of war; he is
sometimes on our front, sometimes on the flank, sometimes on the rear.
There is no supporting such a gross violation of rules."[126] This somewhat
resembles the charge which foreign tactitians have brought against the
English, that they gained victories by continuing, with their insular
ignorance and obstinacy, to fight on, long after the period when, if they had
known the rules of war, they ought to have considered themselves as
completely defeated.

A peculiar circumstance is worth mentioning. The French soldiers had a
mode at that time of amusing themselves, by conferring an imaginary rank
upon their generals, when they had done some remarkable exploit. They
showed their sense of the bravery displayed by Buonaparte at the Battle of
Lodi, by creating him a Corporal; and by this phrase, of the Little Corporal,
he was distinguished in the intrigues formed against him, as well as those
which were carried on in his favour; in the language of Georges Cadoudal,
who laid a scheme for assassinating him, and in the secret consultation of
the old soldiers and others, who arranged his return from Elba.[127]
We are now to turn for a time from war to its consequences, which possess
an interest of a nature different from the military events we have been
detailing.
The movements which had taken place since the King of Sardinia's defeat,
had struck terror into the Government of Milan, and the Archduke
Ferdinand, by whom Austrian Lombardy was governed. But while Beaulieu
did his best to cover the capital by force of arms, the measures resorted to
by the Government were rather of a devotional than warlike character.
Processions were made, relics exposed, and rites resorted to, which the
Catholic religion prescribes as an appeal to Heaven in great national
calamities. But the saints they invoked were deaf or impotent; for the
passage of the bridge of Lodi, and Beaulieu's subsequent retreat to Mantua,
left no possibility of defending Milan. The archduke and his duchess
immediately left Milan, followed by a small retinue, and leaving only a
moderate force in the citadel, which was not in a very defensible condition.
Their carriages passed through a large crowd which filled the streets. As
they moved slowly along, the royal pair were observed to shed natural tears,
at leaving the capital of these princely possessions of their house. The
people observed a profound silence, only broken by low whispers. They
showed neither joy nor sorrow at the event which was passing—all thoughts
were bent in anxious anticipation upon what was to happen next.[128]
When the archduke had departed, the restraint which his presence had
imposed from habit and sentiment, as much as from fear of his authority,
was of course removed, and many of the Milanese citizens began, with real
or affected zeal for republicanism, to prepare themselves for the reception
of the French. The three-coloured cockade was at first timidly assumed; but

the example being shown, it seemed as if these emblems had fallen like
snow into the caps and hats of the multitude. The imperial arms were
removed from the public buildings, and a placard was put on the palace of
the government with an inscription—"This house is to be let—apply for the
keys to the French Commissioner Salicetti." The nobles hastened to lay
aside their armorial bearings, their servants' liveries, and other badges of
aristocracy. Meantime the magistrates caused order to be maintained in the
town, by regular patrols of the burgher guard. A deputation of the principal
inhabitants of Milan, with Melzi[129] at its head, was sent to the victorious
general with offers of full submission, since there was no longer room for
resistance, or for standing upon terms.
On the 15th of May, Buonaparte made his public entry into Milan, under a
triumphal arch prepared for the occasion, which he traversed, surrounded
by his guards, and took up his residence in the archiepiscopal palace. The
same evening a splendid entertainment was given, and the Tree of Liberty,
(of which the aristocrats observed, that it was a bare pole without either
leaves or fruit, roots or branches,) was erected with great form in the
principal square. All this affectation of popular joy did not disarm the
purpose of the French general, to make Milan contribute to the relief of his
army. He imposed upon the place a requisition of twenty millions of livres,
but offered to accept of goods of any sort in kind, and at a rateable
valuation; for it may be easily supposed that specie, the representative of
value, must be scarce in a city circumstanced as Milan was.[130] The public
funds of every description, even those dedicated to the support of hospitals,
went into the French military chest; the church-plate was seized as a part of
the requisition; and, when all this was done, the citizens were burdened
with the charge of finding rations for fifteen thousand men daily, by which
force the citadel, with its Austrian garrison, was instantly to be blockaded.
[131]

While Lombardy suffered much, the neighbouring
SITUATION OF THE countries were not spared. The reader must be aware,
ITALIAN STATES.
that for more than a century Italy had been silently
declining into that state of inactivity which succeeds great exertion, as a
rapid and furious blaze sinks down into exhaustion and ashes. The keen
judgment of Napoleon had seen, that the geographical shape of Italy, though
presenting in many respects advantages for a great and commercial nation,

offered this main impediment to its separate existence as one independent
state, that its length being too great in proportion to its breadth, there was
no point sufficiently central to preserve the due influence of a metropolis in
relation to its extreme northern and southern provinces; and that the
inhabitants of Naples and Lombardy being locally so far divided, and
differing in climate, habits, and the variety of temper which climate and
habits produce, could hardly be united under the same government. From
these causes Italy was, after the demolition of the great Roman Empire,
early broken up into different subdivisions, which, more civilized than the
rest of Europe at the time, attracted in various degrees the attention of
mankind; and at length, from the sacerdotal power of Rome, the wealth and
extensive commerce of Venice and Genoa, the taste and splendour of
Florence, and the ancient fame of the metropolis of the world, became of
importance much over-proportioned to their actual extent of territory. But
this time had passed away, and the Italian states, rich in remembrances,
were now comparatively poor in point of immediate consequence in the
scale of nations. They retained their oligarchical or monarchical forms and
constitutions, as in the more vigorous state of their existence, but appeared
to have lost their energies both for good and evil. The proud and jealous
love which each Italian used to bear towards his own province was much
abated; the hostility of the factions which divided most of their states, and
induced the citizens to hazard their own death or exile in the most trifling
party quarrel, had subsided into that calm, selfish indifference, which
disregards public interests of all kinds. They were ill governed, in so far as
their rulers neglected all means of benefiting the subjects or improving the
country; and they were thus far well-governed, that, softened by the
civilisation of the times, and perhaps by a tacit sense of their own weakness,
their rulers had ceased, in a great measure, to exercise with severity the
despotic powers with which they were in many cases invested, though they
continued to be the cause of petty vexations, to which the natives had
become callous. The Vatican slept like a volcano, which had exhausted its
thunders; and Venice, the most jealous and cruel of oligarchies, was now
shutting her wearied eyes, and closing her ears, against informers and spies
of state. The Italian states stood, therefore, like a brotherhood of old trees,
decayed at heart and root, but still making some show of branches and
leaves; until the French invasion rushed down, like the whirlwind which
lays them prostrate.

In the relations between France and Italy, it must be observed, that two of
the most considerable of these states, Tuscany and Venice, were actually in
league with the former country, having acknowledged the republic, and
done nothing to deserve the chastisement of her armies. Others might be
termed neutral, not having perhaps deemed themselves of consequence
sufficient to take part in the quarrel of the coalesced powers against France.
The Pope had given offence by the affair of Basseville, and the
encouragement which his countenance afforded to the non-conforming
clergy of France. But, excepting Naples and Austrian Lombardy, no state in
Italy could be exactly said to be at open war with the new republic.
Buonaparte was determined, however, that this should make no difference
in his mode of treating them.
The first of these slumbering potentates with whom he
SEIZURE OF came in contact, was the Duke of Parma.[132] This petty
WORKS OF ART.
sovereign, even before Buonaparte entered Milan, had
deprecated the victor's wrath; and although neither an adherent of the
coalition, nor at war with France, he found himself obliged to purchase an
armistice by heavy sacrifices. He paid a tribute of two millions of livres,
besides furnishing horses and provisions to a large amount, and agreeing to
deliver up twenty of the finest paintings in his cabinet, to be chosen by the
French general.[133]
The next of these sufferers was the Duke of Modena.[134] This prince was a
man of moderate abilities; his business was hoarding money, and his
pleasure consisted in nailing up, with his own princely hands, the tapestry
which ornamented churches on days of high holiday; from which he
acquired the nickname of "the royal upholsterer." But his birth was
illustrious as the descendant of that celebrated hero of Este, the patron of
Tasso and of Ariosto; and his alliance was no less splendid, having married
the sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, and of Joseph the Second:
then his daughter was married to the Archduke Ferdinand, the Governor of
Milan. Notwithstanding his double connexion with the Imperial family, the
principality of Modena was so small that he might have been passed over as
scarce worthy of notice, but for the temptation of his treasures, in the works
of art, as well as in specie. On the approach of a column of the French army
to Modena, the duke fled from his capital, but sent his brother, the
Chevalier d'Este, to capitulate with Napoleon, [May 20.][135]

It might have been urged in his favour, that he was no avowed partner in the
coalition; but Buonaparte took for granted his good-will towards his
brother-in-law the Emperor of Austria, and esteemed it a crime deserving
atonement.[136] Indeed it was one which had not been proved by any open
action, but neither could it admit of being disproved. The duke was
therefore obliged to purchase the privilege of neutrality, and to expiate his
supposed good inclination for the house of Austria. Five millions and a half
of French livres, with large contributions in provisions and accoutrements,
perhaps cost the Duke of Modena more anxious thoughts than he had
bestowed on the misfortunes of his imperial relatives.
To levy on obnoxious states or princes the means of paying or
accommodating troops, would have been only what has been practised by
victors in all ages. But an exaction of a new kind was now for the first time
imposed on these Italian Princes. The Duke of Modena, like the Duke of
Parma, was compelled to surrender twenty of his choicest pictures, to be
selected at the choice of the French general, and the persons of taste with
whom he might advise. This was the first time that a demand of this nature
had been made in modern times in a public and avowed manner,[137] and we
must pause to consider the motives and justice of such a requisition.[138]
Hitherto, works of art had been considered as sacred,
WORKS OF ART. even during the utmost extremities of war. They were
judged to be the property, not so much of the nation or
individuals who happened to possess them, as of the world in general, who
were supposed to have a common interest in these productions, which, if
exposed to become the ordinary spoils of war, could hardly escape damage
or destruction. To take a strong example of forbearance, Frederick of
Prussia was a passionate admirer of the fine arts, and no scrupulous
investigator of the rights conferred by conquest, but rather disposed to
stretch them to the uttermost. Yet, when he obtained possession of Dresden
under circumstances of high irritation, Frederick respected the valuable
gallery, cabinets, and museums of the capital of Saxony, and preserved their
contents inviolate, as a species of property which could not, and ought not,
to fall within the rights of a conqueror. He considered the elector as only the
keeper of the gallery; and regarded the articles which it contained as
belonging to the civilized world at large.

There are persons who demand the cause of this distinction, and require to
know why works of art, the value of which is created solely by the opinion
of those who pretend to understand them, and is therefore to be regarded as
merely imaginary, or, as it is called by lawyers, a mere pretium affectionis,
should be exempted from that martial law which disposes at pleasure of the
real property of the vanquished.
It might easily be shown in reply, that the respect due to genius of the
highest order, attaches with a sort of religious zeal to the objects of our
admiration in the fine arts, and renders it a species of sacrilege to subject
them to the chances of war. It has besides already been hinted, that these
chefs-d'œuvre being readily liable to damage, scarcely admitting of being
repaired, and absolutely incapable of being replaced, their existence is
hazarded by rendering them the objects of removal, according to the
fluctuation of victory.
But it is surely sufficient to say, that wherever the progress of civilisation
has introduced rules to qualify and soften the extremities of war, these
should be strictly adhered to. In the rudest ages of society, man avails
himself of the right of the strongest in the fullest extent. The victor of the
Sandwich islands devours his enemy—the North American Indian tortures
him to death—almost all savage tribes render their prisoners slaves, and sell
them as such. As society advances, these inhumanities fall out of practice;
and it is unnecessary to add, that, as the victorious general deserves
honourable mention in history, who, by his clemency, relaxes in any respect
the rigorous laws of conquest, so he must be censured in proportion whose
conduct tends to retrograde towards the brutal violence of primitive
hostility.
Buonaparte cannot be exempted from this censure. He, as the willing agent
of the Directory under whose commands he acted, had resolved to disregard
the neutrality which had hitherto been considered as attaching to the
productions of the fine arts, and, for the first time, had determined to view
them as the spoils of conquest. The motive is more easily discovered than
justified.
In the Reign of Terror and Equality, the fine arts, with every thing
connected with cultivated feelings, had been regarded as inconsistent with

the simplicity of the Republican character; and, like the successful fanatics
of England, and the first enthusiastic votaries of the Koran, the true Sans-
Culottes were disposed to esteem a taste which could not generally exist
without a previous superior education, as something aristocratic, and alien
from the imaginary standard of equality, to which it was their purpose to
lower all the exertions of intellect, as well as the possession of property.
Palaces were therefore destroyed, and monuments broken to pieces.
But this brutal prejudice, with the other attempts of these frantic democrats
to bring back the world to a state of barbarism, equally in moral and in
general feeling, was discarded at the fall of the Jacobin authority. Those
who succeeded to the government, exerted themselves laudably in
endeavouring rather to excite men's minds to a love of those studies and
tastes, which are ever found to humanize and soften the general tone of
society, and which teach hostile nations that they have points of friendly
union, even because they unite in admiring the same masterpieces of art. A
museum was formed at Paris, for the purpose of collecting and exhibiting to
public admiration paintings and statues, and whatever was excellent in art,
for the amusement of the citizens, whose chief scene of pleasure hitherto
had been a wild and ill-regulated civic festival, to vary the usual exhibition
of the procession of a train of victims moving towards the guillotine. The
substitution of such a better object of popular attention was honourable,
virtuous, and politic in itself, and speedily led the French people, partly
from taste, partly from national vanity, to attach consequence to the fine arts
and their productions.
Unfortunately there were no ordinary measures by which the French, as
purchasers, could greatly augment the contents of their Museum; and more
unfortunately for other nations, and ultimately for themselves, they had the
power and the will to increase their possessions of this kind, without
research or expense, by means of the irresistible progress of their arms. We
have no right to say that this peculiar species of spoliation originated with
Buonaparte personally. He probably obeyed the orders of the Directory;
and, besides, instances might no doubt be found in the history of all nations,
of interesting articles of this nature having been transferred by the chance of
war from one country to another, as in cases of plunder of an ordinary
description, which, though seldom avowed or defended, are not the less
occasionally practised. But Napoleon was unquestionably the first and most

active agent, who made such exactions a matter of course, and enforced
them upon principle; and that he was heartily engaged in this scheme of
general plunder, is sufficiently proved from his expressions to the Directory,
upon transmitting those paintings which the Duke of Modena, the first
sufferer on this system, was compelled to surrender, and which were
transferred to Paris as the legitimate spoils of war.
But before copying the terms in which Napoleon announces the
transmission of masterpieces of art to the National Museum, it ought to be
remarked, that the celebrated Saint Jerome, by Correggio, which he
mentions with a sort of insulting triumph, was accounted so valuable, that
the Duke of Modena offered two millions of livres as the ransom of that
picture alone. This large sum the French general, acting on the principle
which many in his situation were tempted to recognise, might have safely
converted to his own use, under the certainty that the appropriation,
indispensable as his services were to the government, would neither have
been inquired into nor censured. But avarice cannot be the companion, far
less the controller, of ambition. The feelings of the young victor were of a
character too elevated to stoop to the acquisition of wealth; nor was his
career, at that or any other period, sullied by this particular and most
degrading species of selfishness. When his officers would have persuaded
him to accept the money, as more useful for the army, he replied, that the
two millions of livres would soon be spent, but the Correggio[139] would
remain an ornament of the city of Paris for ages, and inspire the production
of future masterpieces.[140]
In his despatch to the Directory, of 17th Floreal (8th of May,) Napoleon
desires to have some artists sent to him, who might collect the monuments
of art; which shows that the purpose of seizing upon them had been already
formed.[141] In the letter which accompanied the transmission of the
pictures, he has these remarkable expressions:—"You will receive the
articles of the suspension of arms which I have granted to the Duke of
Parma. I will send you as soon as possible the finest pictures of Correggio,
amongst others a Saint Jerome, which is said to be his masterpiece. I must
own that the saint takes an unlucky time to visit Paris, but I hope you will
grant him the honours of the Museum."[142]

The same system was followed at Milan, where several of the most valuable
articles were taken from the Ambrosian collection. The articles were
received in the spirit with which they were transmitted. The most able
critics were despatched to assist the general in the selection of the
monuments of the fine arts to be transferred to Paris, and the Secretary-
general of the Lyceum, confounding the possession of the production of
genius with the genius itself which created them, congratulated his
countrymen on the noble dispositions which the victors had evinced. "It is
no longer blood," said the orator, "which the French soldier thirsts for. He
desires to lead no slaves in triumph behind his chariot—it is the glorious
spoils of the arts and of industry with which he longs to decorate his
victories—he cherishes that devouring passion of great souls, the love of
glory, and the enthusiasm for high talents, to which the Greeks owed their
astonishing successes. It was the defence of their temples, their monuments,
their statues, their great artists, that stimulated their valour. It was from such
motives they conquered at Salamis and at Marathon. It is thus that our
armies advance, escorted by the love of arts, and followed by sweet peace,
from Coni to Milan, and soon to proceed from thence to the proud basilic of
St. Peter's." The reasoning of the Secretary of the Lyceum is lost amidst his
eloquence; but the speech, if it means any thing, signifies, that the seizing
on those admired productions placed the nation which acquired the forcible
possession of them, in the same condition as if she had produced the great
men by whom they were achieved;—just as the ancient Scythians believed
they became inspired with the talents and virtues of those whom they
murdered. Or, according to another interpretation, it may mean that the
French, who fought to deprive other nations of their property, had as
praiseworthy motives of action as the Greeks, who made war in defence of
that which was their own. But however their conduct might be regarded by
themselves, it is very certain that they did by no means resemble those
whose genius set the example of such splendid success in the fine arts. On
the contrary, the classical prototype of Buonaparte in this transaction, was
the Roman Consul Mummius, who violently plundered Greece of those
treasures of art, of which he himself and his countrymen were insensible to
the real and proper value.
It is indeed little to the purpose, in a moral point of view, whether the
motive for this species of rapine were or were not genuine love of the art.

The fingering connoisseur who secretes a gem, cannot plead in mitigation,
that he stole it, not on account of the value of the stone, but for the
excellence of the engraving; any more than the devotee who stole a Bible
could shelter herself under a religious motive. But, in truth, we do not
believe that the French or their general were actuated on this occasion by
the genuine love of art. This taste leads men to entertain respect for the
objects which it admires; and feeling its genuine influence, a conqueror
would decline to give an example of a species of rapine, which, depriving
those objects of admiration of the protection with which the general
sentiment of civilized nations had hitherto invested them, must hold them
up, like other ordinary property, as a prey to the strongest soldier. Again, we
cannot but be of opinion, that a genuine lover of the arts would have
hesitated to tear those paintings from the churches or palaces, for the
decoration of which they had been expressly painted, and where they must
always have been seen to the best effect, whether from the physical
advantages of the light, size of apartment, and other suitable localities
connected with their original situation, or from the moral feelings which
connect the works themselves with the place for which they were primarily
designed, and which they had occupied for ages. The destruction of these
mental connexions, which give so much additional effect to painting and
statuary, merely to gratify the selfish love of appropriation, is like taking a
gem out of the setting, which in many cases may considerably diminish its
value.
We cannot, therefore, believe, that this system of spoliation was dictated by
any sincere and manly love of the arts, though this was so much talked of in
France at the time. It must, on the contrary, be ascribed to the art and
ambition of the Directory who ordered, and the general who obeyed; both
of whom, being sensible that the national vanity would be flattered by this
species of tribute, hastened to secure it an ample gratification. Buonaparte,
in particular, was at least sufficiently aware, that, with however little purity
of taste the Parisians might look upon these exquisite productions, they
would be sufficiently alive to the recollection, that, being deemed by all
civilized people the most admirable specimens in the world, the valour of
the French armies, and the skill of their unrivalled general, had sent them to
adorn the metropolis of France; and might hope, that once brought to the
prime city of the Great Nation, such chefs-d'œuvre could not again be

subject to danger by transportation, but must remain there, fixed as
household gods, for the admiration of posterity. So hoped, as we have seen,
the victor himself; and doubtless with the proud anticipation, that in future
ages the recollection of himself, and of his deeds, must be inseparably
connected with the admiration which the Museum, ordained and enriched
by him, was calculated to produce.
But art and ambition are apt to estimate the advantages of a favourite
measure somewhat too hastily. By this breach of the law of nations, as
hitherto acknowledged and acted upon, the French degraded their own
character, and excited the strongest prejudice against their rapacity among
the Italians, whose sense of injury was in proportion to the value which they
set upon those splendid works, and to the dishonour which they felt at being
forcibly deprived of them. Their lamentations were almost like those of
Micah the Ephraimite, when robbed of "the graven image, and the
Teraphim, and the Ephod, and the molten image," by the armed and
overbearing Danites—"Ye have taken away my gods that I have made, and
what have I more?"
Again, by this unjust proceeding, Buonaparte prepared for France and her
capital the severe moral lesson inflicted upon her by the allies in 1815.
Victory has wings as well as Riches; and the abuse of conquest, as of
wealth, becomes frequently the source of bitter retribution. Had the
paintings of Correggio, and other great masters, been left undisturbed in the
custody of their true owners, there could not have been room, at an after
period, when looking around the Louvre, for the reflection, "Here once
were disposed the treasures of art, which, won by violence, were lost by
defeat."[143]

CHAPTER V.
Directory proposes to divide the Army of Italy betwixt
Buonaparte and Kellermann—Buonaparte resigns, and the
Directory give up the point—Insurrection against the French at
Pavia—crushed—and the Leaders shot—Also at the Imperial
Fiefs, and Lugo, quelled and punished in the same way—
Reflections—Austrians defeated at Borghetto, and retreat behind
the Adige—Buonaparte narrowly escapes being made Prisoner
at Valeggio—Mantua blockaded—Verona occupied by the
French—King of Naples secedes from Austria—Armistice
purchased by the Pope—The Neutrality of Tuscany violated, and
Leghorn occupied by the French Troops—Views of Buonaparte
respecting the Revolutionizing of Italy—He temporizes—
Conduct of the Austrian Government at this Crisis—Beaulieu
displaced, and succeeded by Wurmser—Buonaparte sits down
before Mantua.
Occupying Milan, and conqueror in so many battles, Buonaparte might be
justly considered as in absolute possession of Lombardy, while the broken
forces of Beaulieu had been compelled to retreat under that sole remaining
bulwark of the Austrian power, the strong fortress of Mantua, where they
might await such support as should be detached to them through the Tyrol,
but could undertake no offensive operations. To secure his position, the
Austrian general had occupied the line formed by the Mincio, his left flank
resting upon Mantua, his right upon Peschiera, a Venetian city and fortress,
but of which he had taken possession, against the reclamation of the
Venetian government, who were desirous of observing a neutrality between
such powerful belligerents, not perhaps altogether aware how far the victor,
in so dreadful a strife, might be disposed to neglect the general law of
nations. The Austrian defence on the right was prolonged by the lago di
Guarda, a large lake out of which the Mincio flows, and which, running
thirty-five miles northward into the mountains of the Tyrol, maintained
uninterrupted Beaulieu's communication with Germany.

Buonaparte, in the meantime, permitted his forces only the repose of four or
five days, ere he again summoned them to active exertion. He called on
them to visit the Capitol, there to re-establish (he ought to have said to
carry away) the statues of the great men of antiquity, and to change, or
rather renovate, the destinies of the finest district of Europe. But while thus
engaged, he received orders from Paris respecting his farther proceedings,
which must have served to convince him that all his personal enemies, all
who doubted and feared him, were not to be found in the Austrian ranks.
The Directory themselves had begun to suspect the prudence of suffering
the whole harvest of success which Italy afforded, to be reaped by the
adventurous and haughty character who had first thrust in the sickle. They
perhaps felt already an instinctive distrust of the waxing influence, which
was destined one day to overpower their own. Under some such impression,
they resolved [May 7] to divide the army of Italy betwixt Buonaparte and
Kellermann, directing the former general to pass the Po, and advance
southward on Rome and Naples, with twenty thousand men, while
Kellermann, with the other moiety of the Italian army, should press the
siege of Mantua, and make head against the Austrians.[144]
This was taking Buonaparte's victory out of his grasp; and he resented the
proposal accordingly, by transmitting his resignation [May 14,] and
declining to have any concern in the loss of his army, and the fruits of his
conquests. He affirmed, that Kellermann, with an army reduced to twenty
thousand men, could not face Beaulieu, but would be speedily driven out of
Lombardy; and that, in consequence, the army which advanced southward
would be overwhelmed and destroyed. One bad general, he said, was better
than two good ones.[145] The Directory must have perceived from such a
reply, the firm and inflexible nature of the man they had made the leader of
their armies, but they dared not, such was his reputation, proceed in the plan
they had formed for the diminution of his power; and, perhaps for the first
time since the Revolution, the executive government of France was
compelled to give way to a successful general, and adopt his views instead
of their own. The campaign was left to his sole management;[146] he
obtained an ascendancy which he took admirable care not to relinquish, and
it became the only task of the Directory, so far as Italy was concerned, to
study phrases for intimating their approbation of the young general's
measures.

Whatever were the ultimate designs of Buonaparte against Rome, he
thought it prudent to suspend them until he should be free from all danger
of the Austrians, by the final defeat of Beaulieu. For this object, he directed
the divisions of his army towards the right bank of the Mincio, with a view
of once more forcing Beaulieu's position, after having taken precautions for
blockading the citadel of Milan, where the Austrians still held out, and for
guarding Pavia and other points, which appeared necessary to secure his
conquests.
Napoleon himself fixed his headquarters at Lodi, upon
REVOLT OF PAVIA. the 24th of May. But he was scarcely arrived there,
when he received the alarming intelligence, that the city
of Pavia, with all the surrounding districts, were in arms in his rear; that the
tocsin was ringing in every village, and that news were circulated, that the
Prince of Condé's army, united with a strong Austrian force, had descended
from the Tyrol into Italy. Some commotions had shown themselves in
Milan, and the Austrian garrison there made demonstrations towards
favouring the insurrection in Pavia, where the insurgents were completely
successful, and had made prisoners a French corps of three hundred men.
Buonaparte represents these disturbances as effected by Austrian agents;
[147] but he had formerly assured us, that the Italians took little interest in
the fate of their German masters. The truth is, that, having entered Italy with
the most flattering assurances of observing respect for public and private
property, the French had alienated the inhabitants, by exacting the
contributions which they had imposed on the country with great severity. As
Catholics, the Italians were also disgusted with the open indignities thrown
on the places and objects of public worship, as well as on the persons and
character of their priests.[148]
The nobles and the clergy naturally saw their ruin in the success of the
French; and the lower classes joined them for the time, from dislike to
foreigners, love of national independence, resentment of the exactions
made, and the acts of sacrilege committed by the ultramontane invaders.
About thirty thousand insurgents were in arms; but having no regular forces
on which to rest as a rallying point, they were ill calculated to endure the
rapid assault of the disciplined French.

Buonaparte, anxious to extinguish a flame so formidable, instantly returned
from Lodi to Milan, at the head of a strong division, took order for the
safety of the capital of Lombardy, and moved next morning towards Pavia,
the centre of the insurrection. The village of Benasco, which was defended
against Lannes, was taken by storm, the inhabitants put to the sword, and
the place plundered and burnt. Napoleon himself arrived before Pavia, blew
the gates open with his cannon, dispersed with ease the half-armed
insurgents, and caused the leaders of the insurrection to be put to death, for
having attempted to defend the independence of their country. He then
seized on the persons of many inhabitants, and sent them to Paris as
hostages for the subjection of their fellow-citizens.[149]
The French general published a proclamation in the Republican style, in
which he reproaches the insurgents for presuming to use arms in defence of
their country, and menaces with fire and sword whatever individuals should
in future prosecute the same daring course. He made his threat good some
weeks afterwards, when a similar insurrection took place in those districts
called the Imperial Fiefs,[150] and still later, when an effort at resistance was
attempted in the town of Lugo. On both occasions, the leaders of the armed
inhabitants were tried by a military commission, condemned, and shot. On
the last, indeed, to revenge the defeat sustained by a squadron of French
dragoons, Lugo was taken by storm, pillaged, burnt, and the men put to the
sword; while some credit seems to be taken by Buonaparte in his
despatches, for the clemency of the French, which spared the women and
children.[151]
It is impossible to read the account of these barbarities, without contrasting
them with the opinions professed on other occasions, both by the republican
and imperial governments of France. The first of these exclaimed as at an
unheard of cruelty, when the Duke of Brunswick, in his celebrated
proclamation, threatened to treat as a brigand every Frenchman, not being a
soldier, whom he should find under arms, and to destroy such villages as
should offer resistance to the invading army. The French at that time
considered with justice, that, if there is one duty more holy than another, it
is that which calls on men to defend their native country against invasion.
Napoleon, being emperor, was of the same opinion in the years 1813 and
1814, when the allies entered the French territories, and when, in various
proclamations, he called on the inhabitants to rise against the invaders with

the implements of their ordinary labour when they had no better arms, and
"to shoot a foreigner as they would a wolf." It would be difficult to
reconcile these invitations with the cruel vengeance taken on the town of
Lugo,[152] for observing a line of conduct which, in similar circumstances,
Buonaparte so keenly and earnestly recommended to those whom fortune
had made his own subjects.
The brief insurrection of Pavia suppressed by these severities, Buonaparte
once more turned his thoughts to the strong position of the Austrians, with
the purpose of reducing Beaulieu to a more decided state of disability,
before he executed the threatened vengeance of the Republic on the
Sovereign Pontiff. For this purpose he advanced to Brescia, and manœuvred
in such a manner as induced Beaulieu, whom repeated surprises of the same
kind had not put upon his guard, to believe, that either the French general
intended to attempt the passage of the Mincio at the small but strong town
of Peschiera, where that river issues from the lago di Guarda, or else that,
marching northward along the eastern bank, he designed to come round the
head of the lake, and thus turn the right of the Austrian position. While
Beaulieu disposed his forces as expecting an attack on the right of his line,
Buonaparte, with his usual celerity, proposed to attack him on the centre, at
Borghetto, a town situated on the Mincio, and commanding a bridge over it,
above ten miles lower than Peschiera.
On the 30th May, the French general attacked with
BATTLE OF superior force, and repulsed across the Mincio, an
BORGHETTO.
Austrian corps who endeavoured to cover the town. The
fugitives attempted to demolish the bridge, and did break down one of its
arches. But the French, rushing forward with impetuosity, under cover of a
heavy fire, upon the retreating Austrians, repaired the broken arch so as to
effect a passage, and the Mincio, passed as the Po and the Adda had been
before, ceased in its turn to be a protection to the army drawn up behind it.
Beaulieu, who had his headquarters at Valeggio, a village nearly opposite to
Borghetto, hastened to retreat, and evacuating Peschiera, marched his
dismayed forces behind the Adige, leaving five hundred prisoners, with
other trophies of victory, in the hands of the French. Buonaparte had
designed that this day of success should have been still more decisive; for
he meditated an attack upon Peschiera at the moment when the passage at

Borghetto was accomplished; but ere Augereau, to whom this manœuvre
was committed, had time to approach Peschiera, it was evacuated by the
Austrians, who were in full retreat by Castel Nuovo, protected by their
cavalry.[153]
The left of the Austrian line, cut off from the centre by the passage of the
French, had been stationed at Puzzuolo, lower on the Mincio. When
Sebottendorf, who commanded the Imperial troops stationed on the left
bank, heard the cannonade, he immediately ascended the river, to assist his
commander-in-chief to repel the French, or to take them in flank if it was
already crossed. The retreat of Beaulieu made both purposes impossible;
and yet this march of Sebottendorf had almost produced a result of greater
consequence than would have been the most complete victory.
The French division which first crossed the Mincio, had passed through
Valeggio without halting, in pursuit of Beaulieu, by whom the village had
been just before abandoned. Buonaparte with a small retinue remained in
the place, and Massena's division were still on the right bank of the Mincio,
preparing their dinner. At this moment the advanced guard of Sebottendorf,
consisting of hulans and hussars, pushed into the village of Valeggio. There
was but barely time to cry to arms, and, shutting the gates of the inn, to
employ the general's small escort in its defence, while Buonaparte, escaping
by the garden, mounted his horse and galloped towards Massena's division.
The soldiers threw aside their cookery, and marched instantly against
Sebottendorf, who, with much difficulty, and not without loss, effected a
retreat in the same direction as his commander-in-chief Beaulieu. This
personal risk induced Buonaparte to form what he called the corps of
guides, veterans of ten years' service at least, who were perpetually near his
person, and, like the Triarii of the Romans, were employed only when the
most desperate efforts of courage were necessary. Bessières, afterwards
Duke of Istria, and Marshal of France, was placed at the head of this chosen
body, which gave rise to the formation of the celebrated Imperial Guards of
Napoleon.[154]
The passage of the Mincio obliged the Austrians to
FORTRESS OF retire within the frontier of the Tyrol; and they might
MANTUA.
have been considered as completely expelled from Italy,
had not Mantua and the citadel of Milan still continued to display the

Imperial banners. The castle of Milan was a place of no extraordinary
strength, the surrender of which might be calculated on so soon as the
general fate of war had declared itself against the present possessors. But
Mantua was by nature one of those almost impregnable fortresses, which
may long, relying on its own resources, defy any compulsion but that of
famine.
The town and fortress of Mantua are situated on a species of island, five or
six leagues square, called the seraglio, formed by three lakes, which
communicate with, or rather are formed by, the Mincio. This island has
access to the land by five causeways, the most important of which was in
1796 defended by a regular citadel, called, from the vicinity of a ducal
palace, La Favorità. Another was defended by an intrenched camp,
extending between the fortress and the lake. The third was protected by a
horn-work. The remaining two causeways were only defended by gates and
draw-bridges. Mantua, low in situation, and surrounded by water, in a warm
climate, is naturally unhealthy; but the air was likely to be still more
destructive to a besieging army, (which necessarily lay in many respects
more exposed to the elements, and were besides in greater numbers, and
less habituated to the air of the place,) than to a garrison who had been
seasoned to it, and were well accommodated within the fortress.
To surprise a place so strong by a coup-de-main was impossible, though
Buonaparte represents his soldiers as murmuring that such a desperate feat
was not attempted. But he blockaded Mantua [June 4] with a large force,
and proceeded to take such other measures to improve his success, as might
pave the way to future victories. The garrison was numerous, amounting to
from twelve to fourteen thousand men; and the deficiencies of the
fortifications, which the Austrians had neglected in over security, were
made up for by the natural strength of the place. Yet of the five causeways,
Buonaparte made himself master of four; and thus the enemy lost
possession of all beyond the walls of the town and citadel, and had only the
means of attaining the mainland through the citadel of La Favorità. Lines of
circumvallation were formed, and Serrurier was left in blockade of the
fortress, which the possession of four of the accesses enabled him to
accomplish with a body of men inferior to the garrison.[155]

To complete the blockade, it was necessary to come to some arrangement
with the ancient republic of Venice. With this venerable government
Napoleon had the power of working his own pleasure; for although the state
might have raised a considerable army to assist the Austrians, to whom its
senate, or aristocratic government, certainly bore good will, yet, having
been in amity with the French Republic, they deemed the step too
hazardous, and vainly trusting that their neutrality would be respected, they
saw the Austrian power completely broken for the time, before they took
any active measures either to stand in their defence, or to deprecate the
wrath of the victor. But when the line of the Mincio was forced, and
Buonaparte occupied the Venetian territory on the left bank, it was time to
seek by concessions that deference to the rights of an independent country
which the once haughty aristocracy of Venice had lost a favourable
opportunity of supporting by force.
There was one circumstance which rendered their cause
VERONA—LOUIS unfavourable. Louis XVIII., under the title of a private
XVIII.
person, the Comte de Lille, had received the hospitality
of the republic, and was permitted to remain at Verona, living in strict
seclusion. The permission to entertain this distinguished exile, the Venetian
government had almost mendicated from the French revolutionary rulers, in
a manner which we would term mean, were it not for the goodness of the
intention, which leads us to regard the conduct of the ancient mistress of the
Adriatic with pity rather than contempt. But when the screen of the Austrian
force no longer existed between the invading armies of France and the
Venetian territories—when the final subjugation of the north of Italy was
resolved on—the Directory peremptorily demanded, and the senate of
Venice were obliged to grant, an order, removing the Comte de Lille from
the boundaries of the republic.
The illustrious exile protested against this breach of hospitality, and
demanded, before parting, that his name, which had been placed on the
golden book of the republic, should be erased, and that the armour
presented by Henry IV. to Venice, should be restored to his descendant.[156]
Both demands were evaded, as might have been expected in the
circumstances, and the future monarch of France left Verona on the 21st of
April, 1796, for the army of the Prince of Condé, in whose ranks he
proposed to place himself, without the purpose of assuming any command,

but only that of fighting as a volunteer in the character of the first
gentleman in France. Other less distinguished emigrants, to the number of
several hundreds, who had found an asylum in Italy, were, by the successes
at Lodi and Borghetto, compelled to fly to other countries.
Buonaparte, immediately after the battle of Borghetto, and the passage of
the Mincio, occupied the town of Verona [June 3,] and did not fail to
intimate to its magistrates, that if the Pretender, as he termed him, to the
throne of France, had not left Verona before his arrival, he would have burnt
to the ground a town which, acknowledging him as King of France,
assumed, in doing so, the air of being itself the capital of that republic.[157]
This might, no doubt, sound gallant in Paris; but Buonaparte knew well that
Louis of France was not received in the Venetian territory as the successor
to his brother's throne, but only with the hospitality due to an unfortunate
prince, who, suiting his claim and title to his situation, was content to
shelter his head, as a private man might have done, from the evils which
seemed to pursue him.
The neutrality of Venice was, however, for the time admitted, though not
entirely from respect for the law of nations; for Buonaparte is at some pains
to justify himself for not having seized without ceremony on the territories
and resources of that republic, although a neutral power as far as her utmost
exertions could preserve neutrality. He contented himself for the time with
occupying Verona, and other dependencies of Venice upon the line of the
Adige. "You are too weak," he said to the Proveditore Foscarelli, "to
pretend to enforce neutrality, with a few hundred Sclavonians, on two such
nations as France and Austria. The Austrians have not respected your
territory where it suited their purpose, and I must, in requital, occupy such
part as falls within the line of the Adige."[158]
But he considered that the Venetian territories to the westward should in
policy be allowed to retain the character of neutral ground, which The
Government, as that of Venice was emphatically called, would not, for their
own sakes, permit them to lose; while otherwise, if occupied by the French
as conquerors, these timid neutrals might, upon any reverse, have resumed
the character of fierce opponents. And, at all events, in order to secure a
territory as a conquest, which, if respected as neutral, would secure itself,
there would have been a necessity for dividing the French forces, which it

was Buonaparte's wish to concentrate. From interested motives, therefore, if
not from respect to justice, Buonaparte deferred seizing the territory of
Venice when within his grasp, conscious that the total defeat of the
Austrians in Italy would, when accomplished, leave the prey as attainable,
and more defenceless than ever. Having disposed his army in its position,
and prepared some of its divisions for the service which they were to
perform as moveable columns, he returned to Milan to reap the harvest of
his successes.
The first of these consisted in the defection of the King of Naples from the
cause of Austria, to which, from family connexion, he had yet remained
attached, though of late with less deep devotion. His cavalry had behaved
better during the engagements on the Mincio, than has been of late the
custom with Neapolitan troops, and had suffered accordingly. The King,
discouraged with the loss, solicited an armistice, which he easily obtained
[June 5]; for his dominions being situated at the lower extremity of Italy,
and his force extending to sixty thousand men at least, it was of importance
to secure the neutrality of a power who might be dangerous, and who was
not, as matters stood, under the immediate control of the French. A
Neapolitan ambassador was sent to Paris to conclude a final peace; in the
meanwhile, the soldiers of the King of the Two Sicilies were withdrawn
from the army of Beaulieu, and returned to their own country. The
dispositions of the Court of Naples continued, nevertheless, to vacillate, as
opportunity of advantage, joined with the hatred of the Queen, (sister of
Marie Antoinette,) or the fear of the French military superiority, seemed to
predominate.[159]
The storm now thickened round the devoted head of the Pope. Ferrara and
Bologna, the territories of which belonged to the Holy See, were occupied
by the French troops. In the latter place, four hundred of the Papal troops
were made prisoners, with a cardinal who acted as their officer. The latter
was dismissed on his parole. But when summoned to return to the French
headquarters, his eminence declined to obey, and amused the republican
officers a good deal, by alleging, that the Pope had dispensed with his
engagement. Afterwards, however, there were officers of no mean rank in
the French service, who could contrive to extricate themselves from the
engagement of a parole, without troubling the Pope for his interference on
the occasion. Influenced by the approaching danger, the Court of Rome sent

Azara, the Spanish minister, with full powers to treat for an armistice. It
was a remarkable part of Buonaparte's character, that he knew as well when
to forbear as when to strike. Rome, it was true, was an enemy whom
France, or at least its present rulers, both hated and despised; but the
moment was then inopportune for the prosecution of their resentment. To
have detached a sufficient force in that direction, would have weakened the
French army in the north of Italy, where fresh bodies of German troops
were already arriving, and might have been attended with great ultimate
risk, since there was a possibility that the English might have transported to
Italy the forces which they were about to withdraw from Corsica,
amounting to six thousand men. But, though these considerations
recommended to Napoleon a negotiation with the Pope, his holiness was
compelled to purchase the armistice [June 23] at a severe rate. Twenty-one
millions of francs, in actual specie, with large contributions in forage and
military stores, the cession of Ancona, Bologna, and Ferrara, not forgetting
one hundred of the finest pictures, statues, and similar objects of art, to be
selected according to the choice of the committee of artists who attended
the French army, were the price of a respite which was not of long duration.
It was particularly stipulated, with republican ostentation, that the busts of
the elder and younger Brutus were to be among the number of ceded
articles, and it was in this manner that Buonaparte made good his vaunt, of
establishing in the Roman capitol the statues of the illustrious and classical
dead.[160]
The Archduke of Tuscany was next to undergo the
LEGHORN republican discipline. It is true, that prince had given no
VIOLATED.
offence to the French Republic; on the contrary, he had
claims of merit with them, from having been the very first power in Europe
who acknowledged them as a legal government, and having ever since been
in strict amity with them. It seemed also, that while justice required he
should be spared, the interest of the French themselves did not oppose the
conclusion. His country could have no influence on the fate of the
impending war, being situated on the western side of the Apennines. In
these circumstances, to have seized on his museum, however tempting, or
made requisitions on his territories, would have appeared unjust towards the
earliest ally of the French Republic; so Buonaparte contented himself with
seizing on the grand duke's seaport of Leghorn [June 27,] confiscating the

English goods which his subjects had imported, and entirely ruining the
once flourishing commerce of the dukedom. It was a principal object with
the French to seize the British merchant vessels, who, confiding in the
respect due to a neutral power, were lying in great numbers in the harbour;
but the English merchantmen had such early intelligence as enabled them to
set sail for Corsica, although a very great quantity of valuable goods fell
into the possession of the French.
While the French general was thus violating the neutrality of the grand
duke, occupying by surprise his valuable seaport, and destroying the
commerce of his state, the unhappy prince was compelled to receive him at
Florence,[161] with all the respect due to a valued friend, and profess the
utmost obligation to him for his lenity, while Manfredini, the Tuscan
minister, endeavoured to throw a veil of decency over the transactions at
Leghorn, by allowing that the English were more masters in that port than
was the grand duke himself. Buonaparte disdained to have recourse to any
paltry apologies. "The French flag," he said, "has been insulted in Leghorn
—You are not strong enough to cause it to be respected. The Directory has
commanded me to occupy the place."[162] Shortly after, Buonaparte, during
an entertainment given to him by the grand duke at Florence, received
intelligence that the citadel of Milan had at length surrendered. He rubbed
his hands with self-congratulation, and turning to the grand duke, observed,
"that the Emperor, his brother, had now lost his last possession in
Lombardy."
When we read of the exactions and indignities to which the strong reduce
the weak, it is impossible not to remember the simile of Napoleon himself,
who compared the alliance of France and an inferior state, to a giant
embracing a dwarf. "The poor dwarf," he added, "may probably be
suffocated in the arms of his friend; but the giant does not mean it, and
cannot help it."
While Buonaparte made truce with several of the old states in Italy, or
rather adjourned their destruction in consideration of large contributions, he
was far from losing sight of the main object of the French Directory, which
was to cause the adjacent governments to be revolutionized and new-
modelled on a republican form, corresponding to that of the Great Nation
herself.

This scheme was, in every respect, an exceedingly artful one. In every state
which the French might overrun or conquer, there must occur, as we have
already repeatedly noticed, men fitted to form the members of revolutionary
government, and who, from their previous situation and habits, must
necessarily be found eager to do so. Such men are sure to be supported by
the rabble of large towns, who are attracted by the prospect of plunder, and
by the splendid promises of liberty, which they always understand as
promising the equalization of property. Thus provided with materials for
their edifice, the bayonets of the French army were of strength sufficient to
prevent the task from being interrupted, and the French Republic had soon
to greet sister states, under the government of men who held their offices by
the pleasure of France, and who were obliged, therefore, to comply with all
her requisitions, however unreasonable.
This arrangement afforded the French government an opportunity of
deriving every advantage from the subordinate republics, which could
possibly be drained out of them, without at the same time incurring the
odium of making the exactions in their own name. It is a custom in some
countries, when a cow who has lost her calf will not yield her milk freely, to
place before the refractory animal the skin of her young one stuffed, so as to
have some resemblance to life. The cow is deceived by this imposture, and
yields to be milked upon seeing this representative of her offspring. In like
manner, the show of independence assigned to the Batavian, and other
associated republics, enabled France to drain these countries of supplies,
which, while they had the appearance of being given to the governments of
those who granted the supplies, passed, in fact, into the hands of their
engrossing ally. Buonaparte was sufficiently aware that it was expected
from him to extend the same system to Italy, and to accelerate, in the
conquered countries of that fertile land, this species of political
regeneration; but it would appear that, upon the whole, he thought the soil
scarcely prepared for a republican harvest. He mentions, no doubt, that the
natives of Bologna and Reggio, and other districts, were impatient to unite
with the French as allies, and intimate friends; but even these expressions
are so limited as to make it plain that the feelings of the Italians in general
were not as yet favourable to that revolution which the Directory desired,
and which he endeavoured to forward.

He had, indeed, in all his proclamations, declared to the inhabitants of the
invaded countries, that his war was not waged with them but with their
governments, and had published the strictest orders for the discipline to be
observed by his followers. But though this saved the inhabitants from
immediate violence at the hand of the French soldiery, it did not diminish
the weight of the requisitions with which the country at large was burdened,
and to which poor and rich had to contribute their share. They were pillaged
with regularity, and by order, but they were not the less pillaged; and
Buonaparte himself has informed us, that the necessity of maintaining the
French army at their expense very much retarded the march of French
principles in Italy. "You cannot," he says, with much truth, "at the same
moment strip a people of their substance, and persuade them, while doing
so, that you are their friend and benefactor."
He mentions also in the St. Helena manuscripts,[163] the regret expressed by
the wise and philosophical part of the community, that the revolution of
Rome, the source and director of superstitious opinions, had not been
commenced; but frankly admits that the time was not come for going to
such extremities, and that he was contented with plundering the Roman See
of its money and valuables, waiting until the fit moment should arrive of
totally destroying that ancient hierarchy.
It was not without difficulty that Buonaparte could
VIEWS AGAINST bring the Directory to understand and relish these
ITALY.
temporizing measures. They had formed a false idea of
the country, and of the state and temper of the people, and were desirous at
once to revolutionize Rome, Naples, and Tuscany.
Napoleon, more prudently, left these extensive regions under the direction
of their old and feeble governments, whom he compelled, in the interim, to
supply him with money and contributions, in exchange for a protracted
existence, which he intended to destroy so soon as the fit opportunity
should offer itself. What may be thought of this policy in diplomacy, we
pretend not to say; but in private life it would be justly branded as
altogether infamous. In point of morality, it resembles the conduct of a
robber, who, having exacted the surrender of the traveller's property, as a
ransom for his life, concludes his violence by murder. It is alleged, and we
have little doubt with truth, that the Pope was equally insincere, and

struggled only, by immediate submission, to prepare for the hour when the
Austrians should strengthen their power in Italy. But it is the duty of the
historian loudly to proclaim, that the bad faith of one party in a treaty forms
no excuse for that of the other; and that national contracts ought to be,
especially on the stronger side, as pure in their intent, and executed as
rigidly, as if those with whom they were contracted were held to be equally
sincere in their propositions. If the more powerful party judge otherwise,
the means are in their hand to continue the war; and they ought to encounter
their more feeble enemy by detection, and punishment of his fraud, not by
anticipating the same deceitful course which their opponent has resorted to
in the consciousness of his weakness,—like a hare which doubles before the
hounds when she has no other hope of escape. It will be well with the
world, when falsehood and finesse are as thoroughly exploded in
international communication, as they are among individuals in all civilized
countries.
But though those states, whose sovereigns could afford to pay for
forbearance, were suffered for a time to remain under their ancient
governments, it might have been thought that Lombardy, from which the
Austrians had been almost totally driven, and where, of course, there was
no one to compound with on the part of the old government, would have
been made an exception. Accordingly, the French faction in these districts,
with all the numerous class who were awakened by the hope of national
independence, expected impatiently the declaration of their freedom from
the Austrian yoke, and their erection, under the protection of France, into a
republic on the same model with that of the Great Nation. But although
Buonaparte encouraged men who held these opinions, and writers who
supported them, he had two weighty reasons for procrastinating on this
point. First, if France manumitted Lombardy, and converted her from a
conquered province into an ally, she must in consistency have abstained
from demanding of the liberated country those supplies, by which
Buonaparte's army was entirely paid and supported. Again, if this difficulty
could be got over, there remained the secret purpose of the Directory to be
considered. They had determined, when they should make peace with the
Emperor of Austria, to exact the cession of Belgium and the territory of
Luxembourg, as provinces lying convenient to France, and had resolved,
that under certain circumstances, they would even give up Lombardy again

to his dominion, rather than not obtain these more desirable objects. To
erect a new republic in the country which they were prepared to restore to
its former sovereign, would have been to throw a bar in the way of their
own negotiation. Buonaparte had therefore the difficult task of at once
encouraging, on the part of the republicans of Lombardy, the principles
which induced them to demand a separate government, and of soothing
them to expect with patience events, which he was secretly conscious might
possibly never come to pass. The final issue shall be told elsewhere. It may
be just necessary to observe, that the conduct of the French towards the
republicans whom they had formed no predetermination to support, was as
uncandid as towards the ancient governments whom they treated with. They
sold to the latter false hopes of security, and encouraged the former to
express sentiments and opinions, which must have exposed them to ruin, in
case of the restoration of Lombardy to its old rulers, an event which the
Directory all along contemplated in secret. Such is, in almost all cases, the
risk incurred by a domestic faction, who trust to carry their peculiar objects
in the bosom of their own country by means of a foreign nation. Their too
powerful auxiliaries are ever ready to sacrifice them to their own views of
emolument.
Having noticed the effect of Buonaparte's short but brilliant campaign on
other states, we must observe the effects which his victories produced on
Austria herself. These were entirely consistent with her national character.
The same tardiness which has long made the government of Austria slow in
availing themselves of advantageous circumstances, cautious in their plans,
and unwilling to adopt, or indeed to study to comprehend, a new system of
tactics, even after having repeatedly experienced its terrible efficacies, is
combined with the better qualities of firm determination, resolute
endurance, and unquenchable spirit. The Austrian slowness and obstinacy,
which have sometimes threatened them with ruin, have, on the other hand,
often been compensated by their firm perseverance and courage in
adversity.
Upon the present occasion, Austria showed ample demonstration of the
various qualities we have ascribed to her. The rapid and successive victories
of Buonaparte, appeared to her only the rash flight of an eaglet, whose
juvenile audacity had over-estimated the strength of his pinion. The
Imperial Council resolved to sustain their diminished force in Italy, with

such reinforcements as might enable them to reassume the complete
superiority over the French, though at the risk of weakening their armies on
the Rhine. Fortune in that quarter, though of a various complexion, had
been, on the whole, more advantageous to the Austrians than elsewhere, and
seemed to authorise the detaching considerable reinforcements from the
eastern frontier, on which they had been partially victorious, to Italy, where,
since Buonaparte had descended from the Alps, they had been uniformly
unfortunate.
Beaulieu, aged and unlucky, was no longer considered
BEAULIEU as a fit opponent to his inventive, young, and active
DISPLACED.
adversary. He was as full of displeasure, it is said,
against the Aulic Council, for the associates whom they had assigned him,
as they could be with him for his bad success.[164] He was recalled,
therefore, in that species of disgrace which misfortune never fails to infer,
and the command of his remaining forces, now drawn back and secured
within the passes of the Tyrol, was provisionally assigned to the veteran
Melas.
Meanwhile Wurmser, accounted one of the best of the Austrian generals,
was ordered to place himself at the head of thirty thousand men from the
Imperial forces on the Rhine, and, traversing the Tyrol, and collecting what
recruits he could in that warlike district, to assume the command of the
Austrian army, which, expelled from Italy, now lay upon its frontiers, and
might be supposed eager to resume their national supremacy in the fertile
climate out of which they had been so lately driven.
Aware of the storm which was gathering, Buonaparte made every possible
effort to carry Mantua before arrival of the formidable Austrian army,
whose first operation would doubtless be to raise the siege of that important
place. A scheme to take the city and castle by surprise, by a detachment
which should pass to the Seraglio, or islet on which Mantua is situated, by
night and in boats, having totally failed, Buonaparte was compelled to open
trenches, and proceed as by regular siege. The Austrian general, Canto
D'Irles, when summoned to surrender it, replied that his orders were to
defend the place to extremity. Napoleon, on his side, assembled all the
battering ordnance which could be collected from the walls of the
neighbouring cities and fortresses, and the attack and defence commenced

in the most vigorous manner on both sides; the French making every effort
to reduce the city before Wurmser should open his campaign, the governor
determined to protract his resistance, if possible, until he was relieved by
the advance of that general. But although red-hot balls were expended in
profusion, and several desperate and bloody assaults and sallies took place,
many more battles were to be fought, and much more blood expended,
before Buonaparte was fated to succeed in this important object.[165]

CHAPTER VI.
Campaign on the Rhine—General Plan—Wartensleben and the
Archduke Charles retire before Jourdan and Moreau—The
Archduke forms a junction with Wartensleben, and defeats
Jourdan, who retires—Moreau, also, makes his celebrated
Retreat through the Black Forest—Buonaparte raises the Siege
of Mantua, and defeats the Austrians at Salo and Lonato—
Misbehaviour of the French General Valette, at Castiglione—
Lonato taken, with the French Artillery, on 3d August—Retaken
by Massena and Augereau—Singular escape of Buonaparte
from being captured at Lonato—Wurmser defeated between
Lonato and Castiglione, and retreats on Trent and Roveredo—
Buonaparte resumes his position before Mantua—Effects of the
French Victories on the different Italian States—Inflexibility of
Austria—Wurmser recruited—Battle of Roveredo—French
victorious, and Massena occupies Trent—Buonaparte defeats
Wurmser at Primolano—and at Bassano, 8th September—
Wurmser flies to Vicenza—Battle of Saint-George—Wurmser
finally shut up within the walls of Mantua.
The reader must, of course, be aware, that Italy, through
CAMPAIGN ON which we are following the victorious career of
THE RHINE.
Napoleon, was not the only scene of war betwixt
France and Austria, but that a field of equally strenuous and much more
doubtful contest was opened upon the Rhine, where the high military talents
of the Archduke Charles were opposed to those of Moreau and Jourdan.
The plan which the Directory had adopted for the campaign of 1796 was of
a gigantic character, and menaced Austria, their most powerful enemy upon
the continent, with nothing short of total destruction. It was worthy of the
genius of Carnot, by whom it was formed, and of Napoleon and Moreau, by
whom it had been revised and approved. Under sanction of this general
plan, Buonaparte regulated the Italian campaign in which he had proved so
successful; and it had been schemed, that to allow Austria no breathing

space, Moreau, with the army of the Sambre and Meuse, should press
forward on the eastern frontier of Germany, supported on the left by
Jourdan, at the head of the army of the Rhine, and that both generals should
continue to advance, until Moreau should be in a position to communicate
with Buonaparte through the Tyrol. When this junction of the whole forces
of France, in the centre of the Austrian dominions, was accomplished, it
was Carnot's ultimate plan that they should advance upon Vienna, and
dictate peace to the Emperor under the walls of his capital.[166]
Of this great project, the part intrusted to Buonaparte was completely
executed, and for some time the fortune of war seemed equally auspicious
to France upon the Rhine as in Italy. Moreau and Jourdan crossed that great
national boundary at Neuwied and Kehl, and moved eastward through
Germany, forming a connected front of more than sixty leagues in breadth,
until Moreau had actually crossed the river Lech, and was almost touching
with his right flank the passes of the Tyrol, through which he was,
according to the plan of the campaign, to have communicated with
Buonaparte.
During this advance of two hostile armies, amounting each to seventy-five
thousand men, which filled all Germany with consternation, the Austrian
leader Wartensleben was driven from position to position by Jourdan, while
the Archduke Charles was equally unable to maintain his ground before
Moreau. The imperial generals were reduced to this extremity by the loss of
the army, consisting of from thirty to thirty-five thousand men, who had
been detached under Wurmser to support the remains of Beaulieu's forces,
and reinstate the Austrian affairs in Italy, and who were now on their march
through the Tyrol for that purpose. But the archduke was an excellent and
enterprising officer, and at this important period he saved the empire of
Austria by a bold and decided manœuvre. Leaving a large part of his army
to make head against Moreau, or at least to keep him in check, the archduke
moved to the right with the rest, so as to form a junction with Wartensleben,
and overwhelm Jourdan with a local superiority of numbers, being the very
principle on which the French themselves achieved so many victories.
Jourdan was totally defeated, and compelled to make a hasty and disorderly
retreat, which was rendered disastrous by the insurrection of the German
peasantry around his fugitive army. Moreau, also unable to maintain
himself in the heart of Germany, when Jourdan, with the army which

covered his left flank, was defeated, was likewise under the necessity of
retiring, but conducted his retrograde movement with such dexterity, that
his retreat through the Black Forest, where the Austrians hoped to cut him
off, has been always judged worthy to be compared to a great victory.[167]
Such were the proceedings on the Rhine, and in the interior of Germany,
which must be kept in view as influencing at first by the expected success
of Moreau and Jourdan, and afterwards by their actual failure, the
movements of the Italian army.[168]
As the divisions of Wurmser's army began to arrive on
ADVANCE OF the Tyrolese district of Trent, where the Austrian
WURMSER.
general had fixed his head-quarters, Buonaparte became
urgent, either that reinforcements should be despatched to him from France,
or that the armies of the Rhine should make such a movement in advance
towards the point where they might co-operate with him, as had been
agreed upon at arranging the original plan of the campaign. But he obtained
no succours; and though the campaign on the Rhine commenced, as we
have seen, in the month of June, yet that period was too late to afford any
diversion in favour of Napoleon, Wurmser and his whole reinforcements
being already either by that time arrived, or on the point of arriving, at the
place where they were to commence operations against the French army of
Italy.[169]
The thunder-cloud which had been so long blackening on the mountains of
the Tyrol, seemed now about to discharge its fury. Wurmser, having under
his command perhaps eighty thousand men, was about to march from Trent
against the French, whose forces, amounting to scarce half so many, were
partly engaged in the siege of Mantua, and partly dispersed in the towns and
villages on the Adige and Chiese, for covering the division of Serrurier,
which carried on the siege. The Austrian veteran, confident in his numbers,
was only anxious so to regulate his advance, as to derive the most
conclusive consequences from the victory which he doubted not to obtain.
With an imprudence which the misfortunes of Beaulieu ought to have
warned him against, he endeavoured to occupy with the divisions of his
army so large an extent of country, as rendered it very difficult for them to
maintain their communications with each other. This was particularly the
case with his right wing under Quasdonowich, the Prince of Reuss, and
General Ocskay, who were detached down the valley of the river Chiese,

with orders to direct their march on Brescia. This division was destined to
occupy Brescia, and cut off the retreat of the French in the direction of
Milan. The left wing of Wurmser's army, under Melas, was to descend the
Adige by both banks at once, and manœuvre on Verona, while the centre,
commanded by the Austrian field-marshal in person, was to march
southward by the left bank of the lago di Guarda, take possession of
Peschiera, which the French occupied, and, descending the Mincio, relieve
the siege of Mantua. There was this radical error in the Austrian plan, that,
by sending the right wing by the valley of Chiese, Wurmser placed the
broad lake of Guarda, occupied by a French flotilla, between that division
and the rest of his army, and of course made it impossible for the centre and
left to support Quasdonowich, or even to have intelligence of his motions or
his fate.[170]
The active invention of Buonaparte, sure as he was to be seconded by the
zeal and rapidity of the French army, speedily devised the means to draw
advantage from this dislocation of the Austrian forces. He resolved not to
await the arrival of Wurmser and Melas, but, concentrating his whole
strength, to march into the valley of Chiese, and avail himself of the local
superiority thus obtained, to attack and overpower the Austrian division left
under Quasdonowich, who was advancing on Brescia, down the eastern
side of the lake. For this purpose one great sacrifice was necessary. The
plan inevitably involved the raising of the siege of Mantua. Napoleon did
not hesitate to relinquish this great object, at whatever loss, as it was his
uniform system to sacrifice all secondary views, and to incur all lesser
hazards, to secure what he considered as the main object of the campaign.
Serrurier, who commanded the blockading army, was hastily ordered to
destroy as much as possible of the cannon and stores which had been
collected with so much pains for the prosecution of the siege.[171] A hundred
guns were abandoned in the trenches, and Wurmser, on arriving at Mantua,
found that Buonaparte had retired with a precipitation resembling that of
fear.[172]
On the night of the 31st July this operation took place, and, leaving the
division of Augereau at Borghetto, and that of Massena at Peschiera, to
protect, while it was possible, the line of the Mincio, Buonaparte rushed, at
the head of an army which his combinations had rendered superior, upon
the right wing of the Austrians, which had already directed its march to

Lonato, near the bottom of the lago di Guarda, in order to approach the
Mincio, and resume its communication with Wurmser. But Buonaparte,
placed by the celerity of his movements between the two hostile armies,
defeated one division of the Austrian right at Salo, upon the lake, and
another at Lonato. At the same time, Augereau and Massena, leaving just
enough of men at their posts of Borghetto and Peschiera to maintain a
respectable defence against Wurmser, made a forced march to Brescia,
which they supposed to be still occupied by a third division of the Austrian
right wing. But that body, finding itself insulated, and conceiving that the
whole French army was debouching on them from different points, was
already in full retreat towards the Tyrol, from which it had advanced with
the expectation of turning Buonaparte's flank, and destroying his retreat
upon Milan. Some French troops were left to accelerate their flight, and
prevent their again making head, while Massena and Augereau, rapidly
countermarching, returned to the banks of the Mincio to support their
respective rear-guards, which they had left at Borghetto and Peschiera, on
the line of that river.
They received intelligence, however, which induced
BATTLE OF them to halt upon this counter-march. Both rear-guards
LONATO.
had been compelled to retire from the line of the
Mincio, of which river the Austrians had forced the passage. The rear-guard
of Massena, under General Pigeon, had fallen back in good order, so as to
occupy Lonato; that of Augereau fled with precipitation and confusion, and
failed to make a stand at Castiglione, which was occupied by Austrians,
who intrenched themselves there. Valette, the officer who commanded this
body, was deprived of his commission in presence of his troops for
misbehaviour,[173] an example which the gallantry of the French generals
rendered extremely infrequent in their service.
Wurmser became now seriously anxious about the fate of his right wing,
and determined to force a communication with Quasdonowich at all risks.
But he could only attain the valley of the Chiese, and the right bank of the
lago di Guarda, by breaking a passage through the divisions of Massena and
Augereau. On the 3d of August, at break of day, two divisions of Austrians,
who had crossed the Mincio in pursuit of Pigeon and Valette, now directed
themselves, with the most determined resolution, on the French troops, in
order to clear the way between the commander-in-chief and his right wing.

The late rear-guard of Massena, which, by his counter-march, had now
become his advanced-guard, was defeated, and Lonato, the place which
they occupied, was taken by the Austrians, with the French artillery, and the
general officer who commanded them. But the Austrian general, thus far
successful, fell into the great error of extending his line too much towards
the right, in order, doubtless, if possible, to turn the French position on their
left flank, thereby the sooner to open a communication with his own troops
on the right bank of the lago di Guarda, to force which had been his
principal object in the attack. But, in thus manœuvring,[174] he weakened
his centre, an error of which Massena instantly availed himself. He formed
two strong columns under Augereau, with which he redeemed the victory,
by breaking through and dividing the Austrian line, and retaking Lonato at
the point of the bayonet. The manœuvre is indeed a simple one, and the
same by which, ten years afterwards, Buonaparte gained the battle of
Austerlitz; but it requires the utmost promptitude and presence of mind to
seize the exact moment for executing such a daring measure to advantage.
If it is but partially successful, and the enemy retains steadiness, it is very
perilous; since the attacking column, instead of flanking the broken
divisions of the opposite line, may be itself flanked by decided officers and
determined troops, and thus experience the disaster which it was their
object to occasion to the enemy. On the present occasion, the attack on the
centre completely succeeded. The Austrians, finding their line cut asunder,
and their flanks pressed by the victorious columns of the French, fell into
total disorder. Some, who were farthest to the right, pushed forward, in
hopes to unite themselves to Quasdonowich, and what they might find
remaining of the original right wing; but these were attacked in front by
General Soret, who had been active in defeating Quasdonowich upon the
30th July, and were at the same time pursued by another detachment of the
French, which had broken through their centre.
Such was the fate of the Austrian right at the battle of Lonato, while that of
the left was no less unfavourable. They were attacked by Augereau with the
utmost bravery, and driven from Castiglione, of which they had become
masters by the bad conduct of Valette. Augereau achieved this important
result at the price of many brave men's lives;[175] but it was always
remembered as an essential service by Buonaparte, who afterwards, when
such dignities came in use, bestowed on Augereau the title of Duke of

Castiglione.[176] After their defeat, there can be nothing imagined more
confused or calamitous than the condition of the Austrian divisions, who,
having attacked, without resting on each other, found themselves opposed
and finally overwhelmed by an enemy who appeared to possess ubiquity,
simply from his activity and power of combining his forces.
A remarkable instance of their lamentable state of disorder and confusion,
resembling in its consequences more than one example of the same sort,
occurred at Lonato. It might, with any briskness of intelligence, or firmness
of resolution, have proved a decisive advantage to their arms; it was, in its
result, a humiliating illustration, how completely the succession of bad
fortune had broken the spirit of the Austrian soldiers. The reader can hardly
have forgotten the incident at the battle of Millesimo, when an Austrian
column which had been led astray, retook, as if it were by chance, the
important village of Dego;[177] or the more recent instance, when a body of
Beaulieu's advanced guard, alike unwittingly, had nearly made Buonaparte
prisoner in his quarters.[178] The present danger arose from the same cause,
the confusion and want of combination of the enemy; and now, as in the
former perilous occurrences, the very same circumstances which brought on
the danger, served to ward it off.
A body of four or five thousand Austrians, partly
ESCAPE AT composed of those who had been cut off at the battle of
LONATO.
Lonato, partly of stragglers from Quasdonowich,
received information from the peasantry, the French troops, having departed
in every direction to improve their success, had only left a garrison of
twelve hundred men in the town of Lonato. The commander of the division
resolved instantly to take possession of the town, and thus to open his
march to the Mincio, to join Wurmser. Now, it happened that Buonaparte
himself, coming from Castiglione with only his staff for protection, had just
entered Lonato. He was surprised when an Austrian officer was brought
before him blindfolded, as is the custom on such occasions, who summoned
the French commandant of Lonato to surrender to a superior force of
Austrians, who, he stated, were already forming columns of attack to carry
the place by irresistible force of numbers. Buonaparte, with admirable
presence of mind, collected his numerous staff around him, caused the
officer's eyes to be unbandaged, that he might see in whose presence he
stood, and upbraided him with the insolence of which he had been guilty, in

bringing a summons of surrender to the French commander-in-chief in the
middle of his army.[179] The credulous officer, recognising the presence of
Buonaparte, and believing it impossible that he could be there without at
least a strong division of his army, stammered out an apology, and returned
to persuade his dispirited commander to surrender himself, and the four
thousand men and upwards whom he commanded, to the comparatively
small force which occupied Lonato. They grounded their arms accordingly,
to one-fourth of their number, and missed an inviting and easy opportunity
of carrying Buonaparte prisoner to Wurmser's headquarters.
The Austrian general himself, whose splendid army was thus destroyed in
detail, had been hitherto employed in revictualling Mantua, and throwing in
supplies of every kind; besides which, a large portion of his army had been
detached in the vain pursuit of Serrurier, and the troops lately engaged in
the siege, who had retreated towards Marcaria. When Wurmser learned the
disasters of his right wing, and the destruction of the troops despatched to
form a communication with it, he sent to recall the division which we have
mentioned, and advanced against the French position between Lonato and
Castiglione, with an army still numerous, notwithstanding the reverses
which it had sustained. But Buonaparte had not left the interval
unimproved. He had recalled Serrurier from Marcaria, to assail the left wing
and the flank of the Austrian field-marshal. The opening of Serrurier's fire
was a signal for a general attack on all points of Wurmser's line. He was
defeated, and nearly made prisoner; and it was not till after suffering great
losses in the retreat and pursuit, that he gained with difficulty Trent and
Roveredo, the positions adjacent to the Tyrol, from which he had so lately
sallied with such confidence of victory. He had lost perhaps one half of his
fine army, and the only consolation which remained was, that he had
thrown supplies into the fortress of Mantua. His troops also no longer had
the masculine confidence which is necessary to success in war. They were
no longer proud of themselves and of their commanders; and those,
especially, who had sustained so many losses under Beaulieu, could hardly
be brought to do their duty, in circumstances where it seemed that Destiny
itself was fighting against them.
The Austrians are supposed to have lost nearly forty thousand men in these
disastrous battles. The French must have at least suffered the loss of one-
fourth of the number, though Buonaparte confesses only to seven thousand

men;[180] and their army, desperately fatigued by so many marches, such
constant fighting, and the hardships of a campaign, where even the general
for seven days never laid aside his clothes, or took any regular repose,
required some time to recover their physical strength.
Meantime, Napoleon resumed his position before Mantua; but the want of
battering cannon, and the commencement of the unhealthy heats of autumn,
amid lakes and inundations, besides the great chance of a second attack on
the part of Wurmser, induced him to limit his measures to a simple
blockade, which, however, was so strict as to retain the garrison within the
walls of the place, and cut them off even from the islet called the Seraglio.
The events of this hurried campaign threw light on the feelings of the
different states of Italy. Lombardy in general remained quiet, and the
citizens of Milan seemed so well affected to the French, that Buonaparte,
after the victory of Castiglione, returned them his thanks in name of the
Republic.[181] But at Pavia, and elsewhere, a very opposite disposition was
evinced; and at Ferrara, the Cardinal Mattei, archbishop of that town, made
some progress in exciting an insurrection. His apology, when introduced to
Buonaparte's presence to answer for his conduct, consisted in uttering the
single word Peccavi! and Napoleon, soothed by his submission, imposed no
punishment on him for his offence,[182] but, on the contrary, used his
mediation in some negotiations with the court of Rome. Yet though the
Bishop of Ferrara, overawed and despised, was permitted to escape, the
conduct of his superior, the Pope, who had shown vacillation in his
purposes of submission, when he heard of the temporary raising of Mantua,
was carefully noted and remembered for animadversion, when a suitable
moment should occur.
Nothing is more remarkable, during these campaigns,
INFLEXIBILITY OF than the inflexibility of Austria, which, reduced to the
AUSTRIA.
extremity of distress by the advance of Moreau and
Jourdan into her territories, stood nevertheless on the defensive at every
point, and by extraordinary exertions again recruited Wurmser with fresh
troops, to the amount of twenty thousand men; which reinforcement
enabled that general, though under no more propitious star, again to resume
the offensive, by advancing from the Tyrol. Wurmser, with less confidence
than before, hoped now to relieve the siege of Mantua a second time, and at

a less desperate cost, by moving from Trent towards Mantua, through the
defiles formed by the river Brenta. This manœuvre he proposed to execute
with thirty thousand men, while he left twenty thousand, under General
Davidowich, in a strong position at or near Roveredo, for the purpose of
covering the Tyrol; an invasion of which district, on the part of the French,
must have added much to the general panic which already astounded
Germany, from the apprehended advance of Moreau and Jourdan from the
banks of the Rhine.
Buonaparte penetrated the design of the veteran general, and suffered him
without disturbance to march towards Bassano upon the Brenta, in order to
occupy the line of operations on which he intended to manœuvre, with the
secret intention that he would himself assume the offensive, and overwhelm
Davidowich as soon as the distance betwixt them precluded a
communication betwixt that general and Wurmser. He left General
Kilmaine, an officer of Irish extraction[183] in whom he reposed confidence,
with about three thousand men, to cover the siege of Mantua, by posting
himself under the walls of Verona, while, concentrating a strong body of
forces, Napoleon marched upon the town of Roveredo, situated in the valley
of the Adige, and having in its rear the strong position of Calliano. The
town is situated on the high road to Trent, and Davidowich lay there with
twenty-five thousand Austrians, intended to protect the Tyrol, while
Wurmser moved down the Brenta, which runs in the same direction with
the Adige, but at about thirty miles' distance, so that no communication for
mutual support could take place betwixt Wurmser and his lieutenant-
general. It was upon Davidowich that Buonaparte first meant to pour his
thunder.
The battle of Roveredo, fought upon the 4th of
Sept. 4. September, was one of that great general's splendid
days. Before he could approach the town, one of his
divisions had to force the strongly intrenched camp of Mori, where the
enemy made a desperate defence. Another attacked the Austrians on the
opposite bank of the Adige, (for the action took place on both sides of the
river,) until the enemy at length retreated, still fighting desperately.
Napoleon sent his orders to General Dubois, to charge with the first
regiment of hussars:—he did so, and broke the enemy, but fell mortally

wounded with three balls. "I die," he said, "for the Republic—bring me but
tidings that the victory is certain."[184]
The retreating enemy were driven through the town of Roveredo, without
having it in their power to make a stand. The extreme strength of the
position of Calliano seemed to afford them rallying ground. The Adige is
there bordered by precipitous mountains, approaching so near its course, as
only to leave a pass of forty toises' breadth between the river and the
precipice, which opening was defended by a village, a castle, and a strong
defensive wall resting upon the rock, all well garnished with artillery. The
French, in their enthusiasm of victory, could not be stopped even by these
obstacles. Eight pieces of light artillery were brought forward, under cover
of which the infantry charged and carried this strong position; so little do
natural advantages avail when the minds of the assailants are influenced
with an opinion that they are irresistible, and those of the defenders are
depressed by a uniform and uninterrupted course of defeat. Six or seven
thousand prisoners, and fifteen pieces of cannon captured, were the fruits of
this splendid victory; and Massena the next morning took possession of
Trent in the Tyrol, so long the stronghold where Wurmser had maintained
his headquarters.[185]
The wrecks of Davidowich's army fled deeper into the Tyrol, and took up
their position at Lavisa, a small village on a river of a similar name, about
three leagues to the northward of Trent, and situated in the principal road
which communicates with Brixen and Inspruck. Buonaparte instantly
pursued them with a division of his army, commanded by Vaubois, and
passed the Lavisa with his cavalry, while the enemy were amused with an
assault upon the bridge. Thus he drove them from their position, which,
being the entrance of one of the chief defiles of the Tyrol, it was of
importance to secure, and it was occupied accordingly by Vaubois with his
victorious division.
Buonaparte, in consequence of his present condition,
THE TYROL. became desirous to conciliate the martial inhabitants of
the Tyrol, and published a proclamation, in which he
exhorted them to lay down their arms, and return to their homes; assuring
them of protection against military violence, and labouring to convince
them, that they had themselves no interest in the war which he waged

against the Emperor and his government, but not against his subjects.[186]
That his conduct might appear to be of a piece with his reasoning, Napoleon
issued an edict, disuniting the principality of Trent from the German
empire, and annexing it in point of sovereignty to the French Republic,
while he intrusted, or seemed to intrust, the inhabitants themselves with the
power of administering their own laws and government.
Bounties which depended on the gift of an armed enemy, appeared very
suspicious to the Tyrolese, who were aware that, in fact, the order of a
French officer would be more effectual law, whenever that nation had the
power, than that of any administrator of civil affairs whom they might
themselves be permitted to choose. As for the proclamation, the French
general might as well have wasted his eloquence on the rocks of the
country. The Tyrol, one of the earliest possessions of the House of Austria,
had been uniformly governed by those princes with strict respect to the
privileges of the inhabitants, who were possessed already of complete
personal freedom. Secured in all the immunities which were necessary for
their comfort, these sagacious peasants saw nothing to expect from the hand
of a stranger general, excepting what Buonaparte himself has termed, those
vexations necessarily annexed to a country which becomes the seat of war,
and which, in more full detail, include whatever the avarice of the general,
the necessities of the soldiers, not to mention the more violent outrage of
marauders and plunderers, may choose to exact from the inhabitants. But,
besides this prudent calculation of consequences, the Tyrolese felt the
generous spirit of national independence, and resolved that their mountains
should not be dishonoured by the march of an armed enemy, if the unerring
rifle-guns of their children were able to protect their native soil from such
indignity. Every mode of resistance was prepared; and it was then that those
piles of rocks, stones, and trunks of trees, were collected on the verge of the
precipices which line the valley of the Inn, and other passes of the Tyrol,
but which remained in grim repose till rolled down, to the utter annihilation
of the French and Bavarian invaders in 1809, under the direction of the
valiant Hofer and his companions in arms.
More successful with the sword than the pen, Buonaparte had no sooner
disposed of Davidowich and his army, than he began his operations against
Wurmser himself, who had by this time learned the total defeat of his
subordinate division, and that the French were possessed of Trent. The

Austrian field-marshal immediately conceived that the French general, in
consequence of his successes, would be disposed to leave Italy behind, and
advance to Inspruck, in order to communicate with the armies of Moreau
and Jourdan, which were now on the full advance into Germany. Instead,
therefore, of renouncing his own scheme of relieving Mantua, Wurmser
thought the time favourable for carrying it into execution; and in place of
falling back with his army on Friuli, and thus keeping open his
communication with Vienna, he committed the great error of involving
himself still deeper in the Italian passes to the southward, by an attempt,
with a diminished force, to execute a purpose, which he had been unable to
accomplish when his army was double the strength of the French. With this
ill-chosen plan, he detached Mezaros with a division of his forces, to
manœuvre on Verona, where, as we have seen, Buonaparte had stationed
Kilmaine to cover the siege, or rather the blockade, of Mantua. Mezaros
departed accordingly, and leaving Wurmser at Bassano on the Brenta,
marched south-westward towards the collateral valley of the Adige, and
attacked Kilmaine, who, by drawing his men under cover of the
fortifications of Verona, made a resolute defence. The Austrian general,
finding it impossible to carry the place by a coup-de-main, was meditating
to cross the Adige, when he was recalled by the most urgent commands to
rejoin Wurmser with all possible despatch.
As soon as Buonaparte learned this new separation of Wurmser from a large
division of his army, he anticipated the possibility of defeating the field-
marshal himself, driving him from his position at Bassano, and of
consequence, cutting off at his leisure the division of Mezaros, which had
advanced so far to the southward as effectually to compromise its safety.
To execute this plan required the utmost rapidity of movement; for, should
Wurmser learn that Buonaparte was advancing towards Bassano, in time to
recall Mezaros, he might present a front too numerous to be attacked with
hope of success. There are twenty leagues' distance betwixt Trent and
Bassano, and that ground was to be traversed by means of very difficult
roads, in the space of two days at farthest. But it was in such circumstances
that the genius of Napoleon triumphed, through the enthusiastic power
which he possessed over the soldiery, and by which he could urge them to
the most incredible exertions. He left Trent on the 6th September, at break
of day, and reached, in the course of the evening, Borgo di Val Lugano, a

march of ten French leagues. A similar forced march of five leagues and
upwards, brought him up with Wurmser's advanced-guard, which was
strongly posted at Primolano.
The effect of the surprise, and the impetuosity of the French attack
surmounted all the advantages of position. The Austrian double-lines were
penetrated by a charge of three French columns—the cavalry occupied the
high-road, and cut off the enemy's retreat on Bassano—in a word,
Wurmser's vanguard was totally destroyed, and more than four thousand
men laid down their arms.[187] From Primolano the French, dislodging
whatever enemies they encountered, advanced to Cismone, a village, where
a river of the same name unites with the Brenta. There they halted
exhausted with fatigue; and on that evening no sentinel in the army endured
more privations than Napoleon himself, who took up his quarters for the
night without either staff-officers or baggage, and was glad to accept a share
of a private soldier's ration of bread, of which the poor fellow lived to
remind his general when he was become Emperor.[188]
Cismone is only about four leagues from Bassano, and
BATTLE OF Wurmser heard with alarm, that the French leader,
BASSANO.
whom he conceived to be already deeply engaged in the
Tyrolese passes, had destroyed his vanguard, and was menacing his own
position. It was under this alarm that he despatched expresses, as already
mentioned, to recall Mezaros and his division. But it was too late; for that
general was under the walls of Verona, nigh fifteen leagues from Wurmser's
position, on the night of the 7th September, when the French army was at
Cismone, within a third part of that distance. The utmost exertions of
Mezaros could only bring his division as far as Montebello, upon the 8th
September, when the battle of Bassano seemed to decide the fate of his
unfortunate commander-in-chief.
This victory was as decisive as any which Buonaparte
Sept. 8. had hitherto obtained. The village of Salagna was first
carried by main force, and then the French army,
continuing to descend the defiles of the Brenta, attacked Wurmser's main
body, which still lay under his own command in the town of Bassano.
Augereau penetrated into the town upon the right, Massena upon the left.
They bore down all opposition, and seized the cannon by which the bridge

was defended, in spite of the efforts of the Austrian grenadiers, charged
with the duty of protecting Wurmser and his staff, who were now in
absolute flight.
The field-marshal himself, with the military chest of his army, nearly fell
into the hands of the French; and though he escaped for the time, it was
after an almost general dispersion of his troops.[189] Six thousand Austrians
surrendered to Buonaparte;[190] Quasdonowich, with three or four thousand
men, effected a retreat to the north-east, and gained Friuli; while Wurmser
himself, finding it impossible to escape otherwise, fled to Vicenza in the
opposite direction, and there united the scattered forces which still followed
him, with the division of Mezaros. When this junction was accomplished,
the aged marshal had still the command of about sixteen thousand men, out
of sixty thousand, with whom he had, scarce a week before, commenced the
campaign. The material part of his army, guns, waggons, and baggage, was
all lost—his retreat upon the hereditary states of Austria was entirely cut off
—the flower of his army was destroyed—courage and confidence were
gone—there seemed no remedy but that he should lay down his arms to the
youthful conqueror by whose forces he was now surrounded on all sides,
without, as it appeared, any possibility of extricating himself. But Fate itself
seemed to take some tardy compassion on this venerable and gallant
veteran, and not only adjourned his final fall, but even granted him leave to
gather some brief-dated laurels, as the priests of old were wont to garland
their victims before the final sacrifice.
Surrounded by dangers, and cut off from any other retreat, Wurmser formed
the gallant determination to throw himself and his remaining forces into
Mantua, and share the fate of the beleaguered fortress which he had vainly
striven to relieve. But to execute this purpose it was necessary to cross the
Adige, nor was it easy to say how this was to be accomplished. Verona, one
point of passage, was defended by Kilmaine, who had already repulsed
Mezaros. Legnago, where there was a bridge, was also garrisoned by the
French; and Wurmser had lost his bridge of pontoons at the battle of
Bassano. At the village of Albarado, however, there was an established
ferry, totally insufficient for passing over so considerable a force with the
necessary despatch, but which Wurmser used for the purpose of sending
across two squadrons of cavalry, in order to reconnoitre the blockade of
Mantua, and the facilities which might present themselves for

accomplishing a retreat on that fortress. This precaution proved for the time
the salvation of Wurmser, and what remained of his army.
Fortune, which has such influence in warlike affairs, had so ordered it, that
Kilmaine, apprehending that Wurmser would attempt to force a passage at
Verona, and desirous to improve his means of resistance against so great a
force, had sent orders that the garrison of four hundred men who guarded
the bridge at Legnago should join him at Verona, and that an equal number
should be detached from the blockade of Mantua, to supply their place on
the Lower Adige. The former part of his command had been obeyed, and
the garrison of Legnago were on their march for Verona. But the relief
which was designed to occupy their post, though on their way to Legnago,
had not yet arrived. The Austrian cavalry, who had passed over at Albarado,
encountering this body on its march from the vicinity of Mantua, attacked
them with spirit, and sabred a good many. The commander of the French
battalion, confounded at this appearance, concluded that the whole Austrian
army had gained the right bank of the Adige, and that he should necessarily
be cut off if he prosecuted his march to Legnago. Thus the passage at that
place was left altogether undefended; and Wurmser, apprised of this
unhoped-for chance of escape, occupied the village, and took possession of
the bridge.[191]
Buonaparte, in the meantime, having moved from Bassano to Arcola in
pursuit of the defeated enemy, learned, at the latter place, that Wurmser still
lingered at Legnago, perhaps to grant his troops some indispensable repose,
perhaps to watch whether it might be even yet possible to give the slip to
the French divisions by which he was surrounded, and, by a rapid march
back upon Padua, to regain his communication with the Austrian territories,
instead of enclosing himself in Mantua. Buonaparte hastened to avail
himself of these moments of indecision. Augereau was ordered to march
upon Legnago by the road from Padua, so as to cut off any possibility of
Wurmser's retreat in that direction; while Massena's division was thrown
across the Adige by a ferry at Ronco, to strengthen General Kilmaine, who
had already occupied the line of a small river called the Molinella, which
intersects the country between Legnago and Mantua. If this position could
be made good, it was concluded that the Austrian general, unable to reach
Mantua, or to maintain himself at Legnago, must even yet surrender himself
and his army.

On the 12th September, Wurmser began his march. He
ACTION OF was first opposed at Cerea, where Murat and Pigeon
CEREA.
had united their forces. But Wurmser made his
dispositions, and attacked with a fury which swept out of the way both the
cavalry and infantry of the enemy, and obtained possession of the village. In
the heat of the skirmish, and just when the French were giving way,
Buonaparte himself entered Cerea, with the purpose of personally
superintending the dispositions made for intercepting the retreat of
Wurmser, when, but for the speed of his horse, he had nearly fallen as a
prisoner into the hands of the general whose destruction he was labouring to
ensure. Wurmser arrived on the spot a few minutes afterwards, and gave
orders for a pursuit in every direction; commanding, however, that the
French general should, if possible, be taken alive—a conjunction of
circumstances worthy of remark, since it authorised the Austrian general for
the moment to pronounce on the fate of him, who, before and after was the
master of his destiny.
Having again missed this great prize, Wurmser continued his march all
night, and turning aside from the great road, where the blockading army had
taken measures to intercept him, he surprised a small bridge over the
Molinella, at a village called Villa Impenta, by which he eluded
encountering the forces of Kilmaine. A body of French horse, sent to
impede his progress, was cut to pieces by the Austrian cavalry. On the 14th,
Wurmser obtained a similar success at Duc Castelli, where his cuirassiers
destroyed a body of French infantry; and having now forced himself into a
communication with Mantua, he encamped between the suburb of Saint
George and the citadel, and endeavoured to keep open the communication
with the country, for the purpose of obtaining a supply of forage and
provisions.
But it was not Buonaparte's intention to leave him
Sept. 19. undisturbed in so commodious a position. Having
received the surrender of an Austrian corps which was
left in Porto Legnago, and gleaned up such other remnants of Wurmser's
army as could not accompany their general in his rapid march to Mantua, he
resolved once more to force his way into the islet of the Seraglio, upon
which Mantua is built, and confine the besieged within the walls of their
garrison. On the 19th, after a very severe and bloody action, the French

obtained possession of the suburb of Saint George, and the citadel termed
La Favorita, and a long series of severe sallies and attacks took place,
which, although gallantly fought by the Austrians, generally tended to their
disadvantage, so that they were finally again blockaded within the walls of
the city and castle.[192]
The woes of war now appeared among them in a different and even more
hideous form than when inflicted with the sword alone. When Wurmser
threw himself into Mantua, the garrison might amount to twenty-six
thousand men; yet, ere October was far advanced, there were little above
the half of the number fit for service. There were nearly nine thousand sick
in the hospitals,—infectious diseases, privations of every kind, and the
unhealthy air of the lakes and marshes with which they were surrounded,
had cut off the remainder. The French also had lost great numbers; but the
conquerors could reckon up their victories, and forget the price at which
they had been purchased.
It was a proud vaunt, and a cure in itself for many losses, that the minister
of war had a right to make the following speech to the Directory, at the
formal introduction of Marmont, then aide-de-camp of Buonaparte, and
commissioned to present on his part the colours and standards taken from
the enemy:—"In the course of a single campaign," he truly said, "Italy had
been entirely conquered—three large armies had been entirely destroyed—
more than fifty stand of colours had been taken by the victors—forty
thousand Austrians had laid down their arms—and, what was not the least
surprising part of the whole, these deeds had been accomplished by an army
of only thirty thousand Frenchmen, commanded by a general scarce twenty-
six years old."[193]

CHAPTER VII.
Corsica reunited with France—Critical situation of Buonaparte
in Italy at this period—The Austrian General Alvinzi placed at
the head of a new Army—Various Contests, attended with no
decisive result—Want of Concert among the Austrian Generals
—French Army begin to murmur—First Battle of Arcola—
Napoleon in personal danger—No decisive result—Second
Battle of Arcola—The French victorious—Fresh want of concert
among the Austrian Generals—General Views of Military and
Political Affairs, after the conclusion of the fourth Italian
Campaign—Austria commences a fifth Campaign—but has not
profited by experience—Battle of Rivoli, and Victory of the
French—Further successful at La Favorita—French regain their
lost ground in Italy—Surrender of Mantua—Instances of
Napoleon's Generosity.
About this period the reunion of Corsica with France
CORSICA took place. Buonaparte contributed to this change in the
REUNITED WITH
FRANCE. political relations of his native country indirectly, in
part by the high pride which his countrymen must have
originally taken in his splendid career; and he did so more immediately, by
seizing the town and port of Leghorn, and assisting those Corsicans, who
had been exiled by the English party, to return to their native island.[194] He
intimated the event to the Directory, and stated that he had appointed
Gentili, the principal partisan of the French, to govern the island
provisionally; and that the Commissioner Salicetti was to set sail for the
purpose of making other necessary arrangements.[195] The communication
is coldly made, nor does Buonaparte's love of his birth-place induce him to
expatiate upon its importance, although the Directory afterwards made the
acquisition of that island a great theme of exultation. But his destinies had
called him to too high an elevation to permit his distinguishing the obscure
islet which he had arisen from originally. He was like the young lion, who,
while he is scattering the herds and destroying the hunters, thinks little of
the forest-cave in which he first saw the light.[196]

Indeed, Buonaparte's situation, however brilliant, was at the same time
critical, and required his undivided thoughts. Mantua still held out, and was
likely to do so. Wurmser had caused about three-fourths of the horses
belonging to his cavalry to be killed and salted for the use of the garrison,
and thus made a large addition, such as it was, to the provisions of the
place. His character for courage and determination was completely
established; and being now engaged in defending a fortress by ordinary
rules of art, which he perfectly understood, he was in no danger of being
over-reached and out-manœuvred by the new system of tactics, which
occasioned his misfortunes in the open field.
While, therefore, the last pledge of Austria's dominions
ALVINZI. in Italy was confided to such safe custody, the Emperor
and his ministers were eagerly engaged in making a
new effort to recover their Italian territories. The defeat of Jourdan, and the
retreat of Moreau before the Archduke Charles, had given the Imperialists
some breathing time, and enabled them, by extensive levies in the warlike
province of Illyria, as well as draughts from the army of the Rhine, to take
the field with a new army, for the recovery of the Italian provinces, and the
relief of Mantua. By orders of the Aulic Council, two armies were
assembled on the Italian frontier; one at Friuli, which was partly composed
of that portion of the army of Wurmser, which, cut off from their main body
at the battle of Bassano, had effected, under Quasdonowich, a retreat in that
direction; the other was to be formed on the Tyrol. They were to operate in
conjunction, and both were placed under the command of Marshal Alvinzi,
[197] an officer of high reputation, which was then thought merited.

Thus, for the fourth time, Buonaparte was to contest the same objects on the
same ground, with new forces belonging to the same enemy. He had,
indeed, himself, received from France, reinforcements to the number of
twelve battalions, from those troops which had been formerly employed in
La Vendée. The army, in general, since victory had placed the resources of
the rich country which they occupied at the command of their leader, had
been well supplied with clothes, food, and provisions, and were devotedly
attached to the chief who had conducted them from starving on the barren
Alps into this land of plenty, and had directed their military efforts with
such skill, that they could scarce ever be said to have failed of success in
whatever they undertook under his direction.

Napoleon had also on his side the good wishes, if not of the Italians in
general, of a considerable party, especially in Lombardy, and friends and
enemies were alike impressed with belief in his predestined success. During
the former attempts of Wurmser, a contrary opinion had prevailed, and the
news that the Austrians were in motion, had given birth to insurrections
against the French in many places, and to the publication of sentiments
unfavourable to them almost every where. But now, when all predicted the
certain success of Napoleon, the friends of Austria remained quiet, and the
numerous party who desire in such cases to keep on the winning side, added
weight to the actual friends of France, by expressing their opinions in her
favour. It seems, however, that Victory, as if displeased that mortals should
presume to calculate the motives of so fickle a deity, was, on this occasion,
disposed to be more coy than formerly even to her greatest favourite, and to
oblige him to toil harder than he had done even when the odds were more
against him.[198]
Davidowich commanded the body of the Austrians which was in the Tyrol,
and which included the fine militia of that martial province. There was little
difficulty in prevailing on them to advance into Italy, convinced as they
were that there was small security for their national independence while the
French remained in possession of Lombardy. Buonaparte, on the other
hand, had placed Vaubois in the passes upon the river Lavisa, above Trent,
to cover that new possession of the French Republic, and check the advance
of Davidowich. It was the plan of Alvinzi to descend from Friuli, and
approach Vicenza, to which place he expected Davidowich might penetrate
by a corresponding movement down the Adige. Having thus brought his
united army into activity, his design was to advance on Mantua, the
constant object of bloody contention. He commenced his march in the
beginning of October, 1796.
As soon as Buonaparte heard that Alvinzi was in motion, he sent orders to
Vaubois to attack Davidowich, and to Massena to advance to Bassano upon
the Brenta, and make head against the Austrian commander-in-chief. Both
measures failed in effect.
Vaubois indeed made his attack, but so unsuccessfully,
Nov. 5. that after two days' fighting he was compelled to retreat
before the Austrians, to evacuate the city of Trent, and

to retreat upon Calliano, already mentioned as a very strong position, in the
previous account of the battle of Roveredo. A great part of his opponents
being Tyrolese, and admirably calculated for mountain warfare, they forced
Vaubois from a situation which was almost impregnable; and their army,
descending the Adige upon the right bank, appeared to manœuvre with the
purpose of marching on Montebaldo and Rivoli, and thus opening the
communication with Alvinzi.
On the other hand, though Massena had sustained no loss, for he avoided an
engagement, the approach of Alvinzi, with a superior army, compelled him
to evacuate Bassano, and to leave the enemy in undisputed possession of
the valley of the Brenta. Buonaparte, therefore, himself saw the necessity of
advancing with Augereau's division, determined to give battle to Alvinzi,
and force him back on the Piave before the arrival of Davidowich. But he
experienced unusual resistance; and it is amid complaints of the weather, of
misadventures and miscarriages of different sorts, that he faintly claims the
name of a victory for his first encounter with Alvinzi. It is clear that he had
made a desperate attempt to drive the Austrian general from Bassano—that
he had not succeeded; but, on the contrary, was under the necessity of
retreating to Vicenza. It is further manifest, that Buonaparte was sensible
this retreat did not accord well with his claim of victory; and he says, with a
consciousness which is amusing, that the inhabitants of Vicenza were
surprised to see the French army retire through their town, as they had been
witnesses of their victory on the preceding day.[199] No doubt there was
room for astonishment if the Vicenzans had been as completely convinced
of the fact as Buonaparte represents them. The truth was, Buonaparte was
sensible that Vaubois, being in complete retreat, was exposed to be cut off
unless he was supported, and he hasted to prevent so great a loss, by
meeting and reinforcing him. His own retrograde movement, however,
which extended as far as Verona, left the whole country betwixt the Brenta
and Adige open to the Austrians; nor does there occur to those who read the
account of the campaign, any good reason why Davidowich and Alvinzi,
having no body of French to interrupt their communication, should not
instantly have adjusted their operations on a common basis.[200] But it was
the bane of the Austrian tactics, through the whole war, to neglect that
connexion and co-operation betwixt their separate divisions, which is
essential to secure the general result of a campaign. Above all, as

Buonaparte himself remarked of them, their leaders were not sufficiently
acquainted with the value of time in military movements.
Napoleon having retreated to Verona, where he could at pleasure assume the
offensive by means of the bridge, or place the Adige between himself and
the enemy, visited, in the first place, the positions of Rivoli and Corona,
where were stationed the troops which had been defeated by Davidowich.
They appeared before him with dejected countenances,
MURMURS OF THE and Napoleon upbraided them with their indifferent
TROOPS.
behaviour. "You have displeased me," he said;—"You
have shown neither discipline, nor constancy, nor bravery. You have
suffered yourselves to be driven from positions where a handful of brave
men might have arrested the progress of a large army. You are no longer
French soldiers.—Let it be written on their colours—'They are not of the
Army of Italy.'" Tears, and groans of sorrow and shame, answered this
harangue—the rules of discipline could not stifle their sense of
mortification, and several of the grenadiers, who had deserved and wore
marks of distinction, called out from the ranks—"General, we have been
misrepresented—Place us in the advance, and you may then judge whether
we do not belong to the army of Italy." Buonaparte having produced the
necessary effect, spoke to them in a more conciliatory tone; and the
regiments who had undergone so severe a rebuke, redeemed their character
in the subsequent part of the campaign.[201]
While Napoleon was indefatigable in concentrating his troops on the right
bank of the Adige, and inspiring them with his own spirit of enterprise,
Alvinzi had taken his position on the left bank, nearly opposite to Verona.
His army occupied a range of heights called Caldiero, on the left of which,
and somewhat in the rear, is the little village of Arcola, situated among
marshes, which extend around the foot of that eminence. Here the Austrian
general had stationed himself, with a view, it may be supposed, to wait until
Davidowich and his division should descend the right bank of the Adige,
disquiet the French leader's position on that river, and give Alvinzi himself
the opportunity of forcing a passage.
Buonaparte, with his usual rapidity of resolution, resolved to drive the
Austrian from his position on Caldiero, before the arrival of Davidowich.

But neither on this occasion was fortune propitious to him.[202] A strong
French division, under Massena, attacked the heights amid a storm of rain;
but their most strenuous exertions proved completely unsuccessful, and left
to the general only his usual mode of concealing a check, by railing at the
elements.[203]
The situation of the French became critical, and, what was worse, the
soldiers perceived it; and complained that they had to sustain the whole
burden of the war, had to encounter army after army, and must succumb at
last under the renewed and unwearied efforts of Austria. Buonaparte parried
these natural feelings as well as he could,[204] promising that their conquest
of Italy should be speedily sealed by the defeat of this Alvinzi; and he
applied his whole genius to discover the means of bringing the war to an
effective struggle, in which he confided that, in spite of numbers, his own
talents, and the enterprising character of an army so often victorious, might
assure him a favourable result. But it was no easy way to discover a mode
of attacking, with even plausible hopes of success. If he advanced
northward on the right bank to seek out and destroy Davidowich, he must
weaken his line on the Adige, by the troops withdrawn to effect that
purpose; and during his absence, Alvinzi would probably force the passage
of the river at some point, and thus have it in his power to relieve Mantua.
The heights of Caldiero, occupied by the Austrian main body, and lying in
his front, had, by dire experiment, been proved impregnable.
In these doubtful circumstances the bold scheme occurred to the French
general, that the position of Caldiero, though it could not be stormed, might
be turned, and that by possessing himself of the village of Arcola, which
lies to the left, and in the rear of Caldiero, the Austrians might be compelled
to fight to disadvantage. But the idea of attacking Arcola was one which
would scarce have occurred to any general save Buonaparte.
Arcola is situated upon a small stream called the Alpon, which, as already
hinted, finds its way into the Adige, through a wilderness of marshes,
intersected with ditches, and traversed by dikes in various directions. In
case of an unsuccessful attack, the assailants were like to be totally cut off
in the swamps. Then to debouche from Verona, and move in the direction of
Arcola, would have put Alvinzi and his whole army on their guard. Secrecy

and celerity are the soul of enterprise. All these difficulties gave way before
Napoleon's genius.
Verona, it must be remembered, is on the left bank of the Adige—on the
same with the point which was the object of Buonaparte's attack. At
nightfall, the whole forces at Verona were under arms; and leaving fifteen
hundred men under Kilmaine to defend the place from any assault, with
strict orders to secure the gates, and prevent all communication of his
nocturnal expedition to the enemy, Buonaparte commenced his march at
first to the rear, in the direction of Peschiera; which seemed to imply that
his resolution was at length taken to resign the hopes of gaining Mantua,
and perhaps to abandon Italy. The silence with which the march was
conducted, the absence of all the usual rumours which used in the French
army to precede a battle, and the discouraging situation of affairs, appeared
to presage the same issue. But after the troops had marched a little way in
this direction, the heads of columns were wheeled to the left, out of the line
of retreat, and descended the Adige as far as Ronco, which they reached
before day. Here a bridge had been prepared, by which they passed over the
river, and were placed on the same bank with Arcola, the object of their
attack, and lower than the heights of Caldiero.
There were three causeways by which the marsh of
FIRST BATTLE OF Arcola is traversed—each was occupied by a French
ARCOLA.
column. The central column moved on the causeway
which led to the village so named. The dikes and
Nov. 15.
causeways were not defended, but Arcola and its bridge
were protected by two battalions of Croats with two pieces of cannon,
which were placed in a position to enfilade the causeway. These received
the French column with so heavy a fire on its flank, that it fell back in
disorder. Augereau rushed forward upon the bridge with his chosen
grenadiers; but enveloped as they were in a destructive fire, they were
driven back on the main body.
Alvinzi, who conceived it only an affair of light troops, sent, however,
forces into the marsh by means of the dikes which traversed them, to drive
out the French. These were checked by finding that they were to oppose
strong columns of infantry, yet the battle continued with unabated vigour. It
was essential to Buonaparte's plan that Arcola should be carried; but the fire

continued tremendous. At length, to animate his soldiers to a final exertion,
he caught a stand of colours, rushed on the bridge, and planted them there
with his own hand. A fresh body of Austrians arrived at that moment, and
the fire on flank blazed more destructively than ever. The rear of the French
column fell back; the leading files, finding themselves unsupported, gave
way; but, still careful of their general, bore him back in their arms through
the dead and dying, the fire and the smoke. In the confusion he was at
length pushed into the marsh. The Austrians were already betwixt him and
his own troops, and he must have perished or been taken, had not the
grenadiers perceived his danger. The cry instantly arose, "Forward—
forward—save the general!" Their love to Buonaparte's person did more
than even his commands and example had been able to accomplish.[205]
They returned to the charge, and at length pushed the Austrians out of the
village; but not till the appearance of a French corps under General Guieux
had turned the position, and he had thrown himself in the rear of it. These
succours had passed at the ferry of Alborado, and the French remained in
possession of the long-contested village. It was at the moment a place of the
greatest importance; for the possession of it would have enabled
Buonaparte, had the Austrians remained in their position, to operate on their
communications with the Brenta, interpose between Alvinzi and his
reserves, and destroy his park of artillery. But the risk was avoided by the
timely caution of the Austrian field-marshal.[206]
Alvinzi was no sooner aware that a great division of the French army was in
his rear than, without allowing them time for farther operations, he instantly
broke up his position on Caldiero, and evacuated these heights by a steady
and orderly retreat. Buonaparte had the mortification to see the Austrians
effect this manœuvre by crossing a bridge in their rear over the Alpon, and
which could he have occupied, as was his purpose, he might have rendered
their retreat impossible, or at least disastrous. As matters stood, however,
the village of Arcola came to lose its consequence as a position, since, after
Alvinzi's retreat, it was no longer in the rear, but in the front of the enemy.
Buonaparte remembered he had enemies on the right as well as the left of
the Adige; and that Davidowich might be once more routing Vaubois, while
he was too far advanced to afford him assistance. He therefore evacuated
Arcola, and the village of Porcil, situated near it, and retreating to Ronco,

recrossed the river, leaving only two demi-brigades in advance upon the left
bank.
The first battle of Arcola, famous for the obstinacy with which it was
disputed, and the number of brave officers and men who fell, was thus
attended with no decisive result. But it had checked the inclination of
Alvinzi to advance on Verona—it had delayed all communication betwixt
his army and that of the Tyrol—above all, it had renewed the Austrians'
apprehensions of the skill of Buonaparte and the bravery of his troops, and
restored to the French soldiery the usual confidence of their national
character.
Buonaparte remained stationary at Ronco until next
Nov. 16. morning at five o'clock, by which time he received
intelligence that Davidowich had lain quiet in his
former position; that he had no cause to be alarmed for Vaubois' safety, and
might therefore operate in security against Alvinzi. This was rendered the
more easy, (16th November,) as the Austrian general, not aware of
Buonaparte's having halted his army at Ronco, imagined he was on his
march to concentrate his forces nearer Mantua, and hastened therefore to
overwhelm the rear-guard, whom he expected to find at the ferry.
Buonaparte spared them the trouble of a close advance to the Adige. He
again crossed to the left side, and again advanced his columns upon the
dikes and causeways which traversed the marshes of Arcola. On such
ground, where it was impossible to assign to the columns more breadth than
the causeways could accommodate, the victorious soldiers of France had
great advantage over the recent levies of Austria; for though the latter might
be superior in number on the whole, success must in such a case depend on
the personal superiority of the front or leading files only. The French,
therefore, had the first advantage, and drove back the Austrians upon the
village of Arcola; but here, as on the former day, Alvinzi constituted his
principal point of defence, and maintained it with the utmost obstinacy.
After having repeatedly failed when attacking in front a post so difficult of
approach, Napoleon endeavoured to turn the position by crossing the little
river Alpon, near its union with the Adige. He attempted to effect a passage
by means of fascines, but unsuccessfully; and the night approached without
any thing effectual being decided. Both parties drew off, the French to

Ronco, where they recrossed the Adige; the Austrians to a position behind
the well-contested village of Arcola.
The battle of the 16th November was thus far favourable to the French, that
they had driven back the Austrians, and made many prisoners in the
commencement of the day; but they had also lost many men; and Napoleon,
if he had gained ground in the day, was fain to return to his position at
night, lest Davidowich, by the defeat of Vaubois, might either relieve
Mantua, or move on Verona. The 17th was to be a day more decisive.
The field of battle, and the preliminary manœuvres,
SECOND BATTLE were much the same as on the preceding day; but those
OF ARCOLA.
of the French were nearly disconcerted by the sinking
of one of the boats which constituted their bridge over
Nov. 17.
the Adige. The Austrians instantly advanced on the
demi-brigade which had been stationed on the left bank to defend the
bridge. But the French having repaired the damage, advanced in their turn,
and compelled the Austrians to retreat upon the marsh. Massena directed his
attack on Porcil—General Robert pressed forward on Arcola. But it was at
the point where he wished to cross the Alpon that Buonaparte chiefly
desired to attain a decided superiority; and in order to win it, he added
stratagem to audacity. Observing one of his columns repulsed, and
retreating along the causeway, he placed the 32d regiment in ambuscade in
a thicket of willows which bordered the rivulet, and saluting the pursuing
enemy with a close, heavy, and unexpected fire, instantly rushed to close
with the bayonet, and attacking the flank of a column of nearly three
thousand Croats, forced them into the marsh, where most of them perished.
It was now that, after a calculation of the losses sustained by the enemy,
Napoleon conceived their numerical superiority so far diminished, and their
spirit so much broken, that he need no longer confine his operations to the
dikes, but meet his enemy on the firm plain which extended beyond the
Alpon. He passed the brook by means of a temporary bridge which had
been prepared during night, and the battle raged as fiercely on the dry level,
as it had done on the dikes and amongst the marshes.
The Austrians fought with resolution, the rather that their left, though
stationed on dry ground, was secured by a marsh which Buonaparte had no

means of turning. But though this was the case, Napoleon contrived to gain
his point by impressing on the enemy an idea that he had actually
accomplished that which he had no means of doing. This he effected by
sending a daring officer, with about thirty of the guides, (his own body-
guards they may be called,) with four trumpets; and directing these
determined cavaliers to charge, and the trumpets to sound, as if a large body
of horse had crossed the marsh. Augereau attacked the Austrian left at the
same moment; and a fresh body of troops advancing from Legnago,
compelled them to retreat, but not to fly.
Alvinzi was now compelled to give way, and commence his retreat on
Montebello. He disposed seven thousand men in echelon to cover this
movement, which was accomplished without very much loss; but his ranks
had been much thinned by the slaughter of the three battles of Arcola. Eight
thousand men has been stated as the amount of his losses.[207] The French
who made so many and so sanguinary assaults upon the villages, must also
have suffered a great deal. Buonaparte acknowledges this in energetic
terms. "Never," he writes to Carnot, "was field of battle so disputed. I have
almost no generals remaining—I can assure you that the victory could not
have been gained at a cheaper expense. The enemy were numerous, and
desperately resolute."[208] The truth is, that Buonaparte's mode of striking
terror by these bloody and desperate charges in front upon strong positions,
was a blemish in his system. They cost many men, and were not uniformly
successful. That of Arcola was found a vain waste of blood, till science was
employed instead of main force, when the position was turned by Guieux
on the first day; and on the third, by the troops who crossed the Alpon.
The tardy conduct of Davidowich, during these three undecided days of
slaughterous struggle, is worthy of notice and censure. It would appear that
from the 10th November that general had it in his power to attack the
division which he had hitherto driven before him, and that he had delayed
doing so till the 16th; and on the 18th, just the day after Alvinzi had made
his retreat, he approached Verona on the right bank. Had these movements
taken place before Alvinzi's defeat, or even during any of the three days
preceding, when the French were engaged before Arcola, the consequences
must have been very serious. Finding, however, that Alvinzi had retreated,
Davidowich followed the same course, and withdrew into the mountains,
not much annoyed by the French, who respected the character of his army,

which had been repeatedly victorious, and felt the weakness incident to
their own late losses.[209]
Another incidental circumstance tends equally strongly to mark the want of
concert and communication among the Austrian generals. Wurmser, who
had remained quiet in Mantua during all the time when Alvinzi and
Davidowich were in the neighbourhood, made a vigorous sally on the 23d
November; when his doing so was of little consequence, since he could not
be supported.
Thus ended the fourth campaign undertaken for the Austrian possessions in
Italy. The consequences were not so decidedly in Buonaparte's favour as
those of the three former. Mantua, it is true, had received no relief; and so
far the principal object of the Austrians had miscarried. But Wurmser was
of a temper to continue the defence till the last moment, and had already
provided for a longer defence than the French counted upon, by curtailing
the rations of the garrison. The armies of Friuli and the Tyrol had also, since
the last campaign, retained possession of Bassano and Trent, and removed
the French from the mountains through which access is gained to the
Austrian hereditary dominions. Neither had Alvinzi suffered any such heavy
defeat as his predecessors Beaulieu or Wurmser; while Davidowich, on the
contrary, was uniformly successful, had he known how to avail himself of
his victories. Still the Austrians were not likely, till reinforced again, to
interrupt Buonaparte's quiet possession of Lombardy.
During two months following the battle of Arcola and the retreat of the
Austrians, the war which had been so vigorously maintained in Italy
experienced a short suspension, and the attention of Buonaparte was turned
towards civil matters—the arrangement of the French interests with the
various powers of Italy, and with the congress of Lombardy, as well as the
erection of the districts of Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and Modena, into what
was called the Transpadane Republic. These we shall notice elsewhere, as it
is not advisable to interrupt the course of our military annals, until we have
recounted the last struggle of the Austrians for the relief of Mantua.
It must be in the first place observed, that whether from
FRENCH AND jealousy or from want of means, supplies and recruits
AUSTRIAN
ARMIES. were very slowly transmitted from France to their

Italian army. About seven thousand men, who were actually sent to join
Buonaparte, scarcely repaired the losses which he had sustained in the late
bloody campaigns.[210] At the same time the treaty with the Pope being
broken off, the supreme pontiff threatened to march a considerable army
towards Lombardy. Buonaparte endeavoured to supply the want of
reinforcements by raising a defensive legion among the Lombards, to which
he united many Poles. This body was not fit to be brought into line against
the Austrians, but was more than sufficient to hold at bay the troops of the
papal see, who have never enjoyed of late years a high degree of military
reputation.
Meantime Austria, who seemed to cling to Italy with the tenacity of a dying
grasp, again, and now for the fifth time, recruited her armies on the frontier,
and placing Alvinzi once more at the head of sixty thousand men,
commanded him to resume the offensive against the French in Italy.[211]
The spirit of the country had been roused instead of discouraged by the late
defeats. The volunteer corps, consisting of persons of respectability and
consideration, took the field, for the redemption, if their blood could
purchase it, of the national honour. Vienna furnished four battalions, which
were presented by the Empress with a banner, that she had wrought for
them with her own hands. The Tyrolese also thronged once more to their
sovereign's standard, undismayed by a proclamation made by Buonaparte
after the retreat from Arcola, and which paid homage, though a painful one,
to these brave marksmen. "Whatever Tyrolese," said this atrocious
document, "is taken with arms in his hand, shall be put to instant death."
Alvinzi sent abroad a counter proclamation, "that for every Tyrolese put to
death as threatened, he would hang up a French officer." Buonaparte again
replied, "that if the Austrian general should use the retaliation he threatened,
he would execute in his turn officer for officer out of his prisoners,
commencing with Alvinzi's own nephew, who was in his power." A little
calmness on either side brought them to reflect on the cruelty of
aggravating the laws of war, which are already too severe; so that the
system of military execution was renounced on both sides.
But notwithstanding this display of zeal and loyalty on
AUSTRIAN PLAN the part of the Austrian nation, its councils do not
OF OPERATIONS.
appear to have derived wisdom from experience. The
losses sustained by Wurmser and by Alvinzi, proceeded in a great measure

from the radical error of having divided their forces, and commenced the
campaign on a double line of operation, which could not, or at least were
not made to, correspond and communicate with each other. Yet they
commenced this campaign on the same unhappy principles. One army
descending from the Tyrol upon Montebaldo, the other was to march down
by the Brenta on the Paduan territory, and then to operate on the lower
Adige, the line of which, of course, they were expected to force, for the
purpose of relieving Mantua. The Aulic Council ordered that these two
armies were to direct their course so as to meet, if possible, upon the
beleaguered fortress. Should they succeed in raising the siege, there was
little doubt that the French must be driven out of Italy; but even were the
scheme only partially successful, still it might allow Wurmser with his
cavalry to escape from that besieged city, and retreat into the Romagna,
where it was designed that he should, with the assistance of his staff and
officers, organize and assume the command of the papal army. In the
meantime, an intelligent agent was sent to communicate, if possible, with
Wurmser.[212]
This man fell into the hands of the besiegers. It was in vain that he
swallowed his despatches, which were inclosed in a ball of wax; means
were found to make the stomach render up its trust, and the document
which the wax enclosed was found to be a letter, signed by the Emperor's
own hand, directing Wurmser to enter into no capitulation, but to hold out
as long as possible in expectation of relief, and if compelled to leave
Mantua, to accept of no conditions, but to cut his way into the Romagna,
and take upon himself the command of the papal army. Thus Buonaparte
became acquainted with the storm which was approaching, and which was
not long of breaking.[213]
Alvinzi, who commanded the principal army, advanced from Bassano to
Roveredo upon the Adige. Provera, distinguished for his gallant defence of
Cossaria, during the action of Millesimo,[214] commanded the divisions
which were to act upon the lower Adige. He marched as far as Bevi
l'Acqua, while his advanced guard, under Prince Hohenzollern, compelled a
body of French to cross to the right bank of the Adige.
Buonaparte, uncertain which of these attacks he was to
Jan. 12. consider as the main one, concentrated his army at

Verona, which had been so important a place during all these campaigns as
a central point, from which he might at pleasure march either up the Adige
against Alvinzi, or descend the river to resist the attempts of Provera. He
trusted that Joubert, whom he had placed in defence of La Corona, a little
town which had been strongly fortified for the purpose, might be able to
make a good temporary defence. He despatched troops for Joubert's support
to Castel Nuovo, but hesitated to direct his principal force in that direction
until ten in the evening of 13th January, when he received information that
Joubert had been attacked at La Corona by an immense body, which he had
resisted with difficulty during the day, and was now about to retreat, in
order to secure the important eminence at Rivoli, which was the key of his
whole position.[215]
Judging from this account, that the principal danger occurred on the upper
part of the Adige, Buonaparte left only Augereau's division to dispute with
Provera the passage of that river on the lower part of its course. He was
especially desirous to secure the elevated and commanding position of
Rivoli, before the enemy had time to receive his cavalry and cannon, as he
hoped to bring on an engagement ere he was united with those important
parts of his army. By forced marches Napoleon arrived at Rivoli at two in
the morning of the 14th, and from that elevated situation, by the assistance
of a clear moonlight, he was able to discover, that the bivouac of the enemy
was divided into five distinct and separate bodies, from which he inferred
that their attack the next day would be made in the same number of
columns.[216]
The distance at which the bivouacs were stationed from the position of
Joubert, made it evident to Napoleon that they did not mean to make their
attack before ten in the morning, meaning probably to wait for their infantry
and artillery. Joubert was at this time in the act of evacuating the position
which he only occupied by a rear-guard. Buonaparte commanded him
instantly to counter-march and resume possession of the important
eminence of Rivoli.
A few Croats had already advanced so near the French
BATTLE OF line as to discover that Joubert's light troops had
RIVOLI.
abandoned the chapel of Saint Marc, of which they took
possession. It was retaken by the French, and the struggle to recover and

maintain it brought on a severe action, first with the
Jan. 14. regiment to which the detachment of Croats belonged,
and afterwards with the whole Austrian column which
lay nearest to that point, and which was commanded by Ocskay. The latter
was repulsed, but the column of Kobler pressed forward to support them,
and having gained the summit, attacked two regiments of the French who
were stationed there, each protected by a battery of cannon.
Notwithstanding this advantage, one of the regiments gave way, and
Buonaparte himself galloped to bring up reinforcements. The nearest
French were those of Massena's division, which, tired with the preceding
night's march, had lain down to take some rest. They started up, however, at
the command of Napoleon, and suddenly arriving on the field, in half an
hour the column of Kobler was beaten and driven back. That of Liptay
advanced in turn; and Quasdonowich, observing that Joubert, in prosecuting
his success over the division of Ocskay, had pushed forward and abandoned
the chapel of Saint Marc, detached three battalions to ascend the hill, and
occupy that post. While the Austrians scaled, on one side, the hill on which
the chapel is situated, three battalions of French infantry, who had been
countermarched by Joubert to prevent Quasdonowich's purpose, struggled
up the steep ascent on another point. The activity of the French brought
them first to the summit, and having then the advantage of the ground, it
was no difficult matter for them to force the advancing Austrians headlong
down the hill which they were endeavouring to climb. Meantime, the
French batteries thundered on the broken columns of the enemy—their
cavalry made repeated charges, and the whole Austrians who had been
engaged fell into inextricable disorder. The columns which had advanced
were irretrievably defeated; those who remained were in such a condition,
that to attack would have been madness.
Amid this confusion, the division of Lusignan, which was the most remote
of the Austrian columns, being intrusted with the charge of the artillery and
baggage of the army, had, after depositing these according to order,
mounted the heights of Rivoli, and assumed a position in rear of the French.
Had this column attained the same ground while the engagement continued
in front, there can be no doubt that it would have been decisive against
Napoleon. Even as it was, their appearance in the rear would have startled
troops, however brave, who had less confidence in their general; but those

of Buonaparte only exclaimed, "There arrive farther supplies to our
market," in full reliance that their commander could not be out-manœuvred.
The Austrian division, on the other hand, arriving after the battle was lost,
being without artillery or cavalry, and having been obliged to leave a
proportion of their numbers to keep a check upon a French brigade, felt
that, instead of being in a position to cut off the French, by attacking their
rear while their front was engaged, they themselves were cut off by the
intervention of the victorious French betwixt them and their defeated army.
Lusignan's division was placed under a heavy fire of the artillery in reserve,
and was soon obliged to lay down its arms. So critical are the events of war,
that a military movement, which, executed at one particular period of time,
would have ensured victory, is not unlikely, from the loss of a brief interval,
to occasion only more general calamity.[217] The Austrians, on this, as on
some other occasions, verified too much Napoleon's allegation, that they
did not sufficiently consider the value of time in military affairs.
The field of Rivoli was one of the most desperate that Buonaparte ever
won, and was gained entirely by superior military skill, and not by the
overbearing system of mere force of numbers, to which he has been accused
of being partial.[218] He himself had his horses repeatedly wounded in the
course of the action, and exerted to the utmost his personal influence to
bring up the troops into action where their presence was most required.[219]
Alvinzi's error, which was a very gross one, consisted in supposing that no
more than Joubert's inconsiderable force was stationed at Rivoli, and in
preparing, therefore, to destroy him at his leisure; when his acquaintance
with the French celerity of movement[220] ought to have prepared him for
the possibility of Buonaparte's night march, by which, bringing up the
chosen strength of his army into the position where the enemy only
expected to find a feeble force, he was enabled to resist and defeat a much
superior army, brought to the field upon different points, without any just
calculation on the means of resistance which were to be opposed; without
the necessary assistance of cavalry and artillery; and, above all, without a
preconcerted plan of co-operation and mutual support. The excellence of
Napoleon's manœuvres was well supported by the devotion of his generals,
and the courage of his soldiers. Massena, in particular, so well seconded his
general, that afterwards, when Napoleon, as Emperor, conferred on him the
title of Duke, he assigned him his designation from the battle of Rivoli.[221]

Almost before this important and decisive victory was absolutely gained,
news arrived[222] which required the presence of Buonaparte elsewhere. On
the very same day of the battle, Provera, whom we left manœuvring on the
Lower Adige, threw a bridge of pontoons over that river, where the French
were not prepared to oppose his passage, and pushed forward to Mantua,
the relief of which fortress he had by stratagem nearly achieved. A regiment
of his cavalry, wearing white cloaks, and resembling, in that particular, the
first regiment of French hussars, presented themselves before the suburb of
Saint George, then only covered by a mere line of circumvallation. The
barricades were about to be opened without suspicion, when it occurred to a
sagacious old French sergeant, who was beyond the walls gathering wood,
that the dress of this regiment of white cloaks was fresher than that of the
French corps, called Bertini's, for whom they were mistaken. He
communicated his suspicions to a drummer who was near him; they gained
the suburb, and cried to arms, and the guns of the defences were opened on
the hostile cavalry, whom they were about to have admitted in the guise of
friends.[223]
About the time that this incident took place, Buonaparte
Jan. 16 himself arrived at Roverbella, within twelve miles of
Mantua, to which he had marched with incredible
despatch from the field of battle at Rivoli, leaving to Massena, Murat, and
Joubert, the task of completing his victory, by the close pursuit of Alvinzi
and his scattered forces.
In the meanwhile, Provera communicated with the
BATTLE OF LA garrison of Mantua across the lake, and concerted the
FAVORITA.
measures for its relief with Wurmser. On the 16th of
January, being the morning after the battle of Rivoli, and the unsuccessful
attempt to surprise the suburb of Saint George, the garrison of Mantua
sallied from the place in strength, and took post at the causeway of La
Favorita, being the only one which is defended by an enclosed citadel or
independent fortress. Napoleon, returning at the head of his victorious
forces, surrounded and attacked with fury the troops of Provera, while the
blockading army compelled the garrison, at the bayonet's point, to re-enter
the besieged city of Mantua. Provera, who had in vain, though with much
decision and gallantry, attempted the relief of Mantua, which his Imperial
master had so much at heart, was compelled to lay down his arms with a

division of about five thousand men, whom he had still united under his
person. The detached corps which he had left to protect his bridge, and
other passes in his rear, sustained a similar fate. Thus one division of the
army, which had commenced the campaign of January only on the 7th of
that month, were the prisoners of the destined conqueror before ten days
had elapsed. The larger army, commanded by Alvinzi, had no better fortune.
They were closely pursued from the bloody field of Rivoli, and never were
permitted to draw breath or to recover their disorder. Large bodies were
intercepted and compelled to surrender, a practice now so frequent among
the Austrian troops, that it ceased to be shameful.[224]
Nevertheless, one example is so peculiar as to deserve commemoration, as a
striking instance of the utter consternation and dispersion of the Austrians
after this dreadful defeat, and of the confident and audacious promptitude
which the French officers derived from their unvaried success. René, a
young officer, was in possession of the village called Garda, on the lake of
the same name, and, in visiting his advanced posts, he perceived some
Austrians approaching, whom he caused his escort to surround and make
prisoners. Advancing to the front to reconnoitre, he found himself close to
the head of an imperial column of eighteen hundred men, which a turning in
the road had concealed till he was within twenty yards of them. "Down with
your arms!" said the Austrian commandant; to which René answered with
the most ready boldness,—"Do you lay down your arms! I have destroyed
your advanced guard, as witness these prisoners—ground your arms or no
quarter." And the French soldiers, catching the hint of their leader, joined in
the cry of "Ground your arms." The Austrian officer hesitated, and proposed
to enter into capitulation; the Frenchman would admit of no terms but
instant and immediate surrender. The dispirited imperialist yielded up his
sword, and commanded his soldiers to imitate his example. But the Austrian
soldiers began to suspect the truth; they became refractory, and refused to
obey their leader, whom René addressed with the utmost apparent
composure. "You are an officer, sir, and a man of honour—you know the
rules of war—you have surrendered—you are therefore my prisoner, but I
rely on your parole. Here, I return your sword—compel your men to
submission, otherwise I direct against you the division of six thousand men
who are under my command." The Austrian was utterly confounded,
betwixt the appeal to his honour and the threat of a charge from six

thousand men. He assured René he might rely on his punctilious
compliance with the parole he had given him; and speaking in German to
his soldiers, persuaded them to lay down their arms, a submission which he
had soon afterwards the satisfaction to see had been made to one-twelfth
part of their number.
Amid such extraordinary success, the ground which the French had lost in
Italy was speedily resumed. Trent and Bassano were again occupied by the
French. They regained all the positions and strongholds which they had
possessed on the frontiers of Italy before Alvinzi's first descent, and might
perhaps have penetrated deeper into the mountainous frontier of Germany
but for the snow which choked up the passes.[225]
One crowning consequence of the victories of Rivoli
SURRENDER OF and of La Favorita, was the surrender of Mantua itself,
MANTUA.
that prize which had cost so much blood, and had been
defended with such obstinacy.
For several days after the decisive actions which left
Feb. 2. him without a shadow of hope of relief, Wurmser
continued the defence of the place in a sullen yet
honourable despair, natural to the feelings of a gallant veteran, who, to the
last, hesitated between the desire to resist, and the sense that, his means of
subsistence being almost totally expended, resistance was absolutely
hopeless. At length he sent his aide-de-camp, Klenau, (afterwards a name of
celebrity,) to the headquarters of Serrurier, who commanded the blockade,
to treat of a surrender. Klenau used the customary language on such
occasions. He expatiated on the means which he said Mantua still possessed
of holding out, but said, that as Wurmser doubted whether the place could
be relieved in time, he would regulate his conduct as to immediate
submission, or farther defence, according to the conditions of surrender to
which the French generals were willing to admit him.
A French officer of distinction was present, muffled in his cloak, and
remaining apart from the two officers, but within hearing of what had
passed. When their discussion was finished, this unknown person stepped
forward, and taking a pen wrote down the conditions of surrender to which
Wurmser was to be admitted—conditions more honourable and favourable

by far than what his extremity could have exacted. "These," said the
unknown officer to Klenau, "are the terms which Wurmser may accept at
present, and which will be equally tendered to him at any period when he
finds farther resistance impossible. We are aware he is too much a man of
honour to give up the fortress and city, so long and honourably defended,
while the means of resistance remain in his power. If he delays accepting
the conditions for a week, for a month, for two months, they shall be
equally his when he chooses to accept them. Tomorrow I pass the Po, and
march upon Rome." Klenau, perceiving that he spoke to the French
commander-in-chief, frankly admitted that the garrison could not longer
delay surrender, having scarce three days' provisions unconsumed.[226]
This trait of generosity towards a gallant but unfortunate enemy, was highly
favourable to Buonaparte. The taste which dictated the stage-effect of the
cloak may indeed be questioned; but the real current of his feeling towards
the venerable object of his respect, and at the same time compassion, is
ascertained otherwise. He wrote to the Directory on the subject, that he had
afforded to Wurmser such conditions of surrender as became the generosity
of the French nation towards an enemy, who, having lost his army by
misfortune, was so little desirous to secure his personal safety, that he threw
himself into Mantua, cutting his way through the blockading army; thus
voluntarily undertaking the privations of a siege, which his gallantry
protracted until almost the last morsel of provisions was exhausted.[227]
But the young victor paid still a more delicate and noble-minded
compliment, in declining to be personally present when the veteran
Wurmser had the mortification to surrender his sword, with his garrison of
twenty thousand men, ten thousand of whom were fit for service. This self-
denial did Napoleon as much credit nearly as his victory, and must not be
omitted in a narrative, which, often called to stigmatize his ambition and its
consequences, should not be the less ready to observe marks of dignified
and honourable feeling. The history of this remarkable man more frequently
reminds us of the romantic and improbable victories imputed to the heroes
of the romantic ages, than of the spirit of chivalry attributed to them; but in
this instance Napoleon's conduct towards Wurmser may be justly compared
to that of the Black Prince to his royal prisoner, King John of France.

Serrurier, who had conducted the leaguer, had the honour to receive the
surrender of Wurmser, after the siege of Mantua had continued for six
months, during which the garrison is said by Napoleon to have lost twenty-
seven thousand men by disease, and in the various numerous and bloody
sallies which took place. This decisive event put an end to the war in Italy.
The contest with Austria was hereafter to be waged on the hereditary
dominions of that haughty power.
The French, possessed of this grand object of their wishes, were not long in
displaying their national characteristics. Their military and prescient
sagacity was evinced in employing one of the most celebrated of their
engineers, to improve and bring nearly to perfection the defence of a city
which may be termed the citadel of Italy. They set afoot, besides, civic
feasts and ceremonies, and among others, one in honour of Virgil, who,
being the panegyrist of an emperor, was indifferently selected as the
presiding genius of an infant republic. Their cupidity was evinced by their
artists' exercising their ingenuity in devising means to cut from the wall and
carry off the fresco paintings, by Titian, of the wars between the Gods and
the Giants, at all risks of destroying what could never be replaced. Luckily,
the attempt was found totally unadvisable.

CHAPTER VIII.
Situation and Views of Buonaparte at this period—His politic
Conduct towards the Italians—Popularity—Severe terms of
Peace proposed to the Pope—rejected—Napoleon differs from
the Directory, and Negotiations are renewed—but again rejected
—The Pope raises his army to 40,000 Men—Napoleon invades
the Papal Territories—The Papal Troops defeated near Imola—
and at Ancona—which is captured—Loretto taken—Clemency of
Buonaparte to the French recusant Clergy—Peace of Tolentino
—Napoleon's Letter to the Pope—San Marino—View of the
Situation of the different Italian States—Rome—Naples—
Tuscany—Venice.
The eyes of all Europe were now riveted on Napoleon
PRE-EMINENCE OF Buonaparte, whose rise had been so sudden, that he was
NAPOLEON.
become the terror of empires and the founder of states
—the conqueror of the best generals and most disciplined troops in Europe;
within a few months after he had been a mere soldier of fortune, rather
seeking for subsistence than expecting honourable distinction. Such sudden
elevations have occasionally happened amid semi-barbarous nations, where
great popular insurrections, desolating and decisive revolutions, are
common occurrences, but were hitherto unheard of in civilized Europe. The
pre-eminence which he had suddenly obtained had, besides, been subjected
to so many trials, as to afford every proof of its permanence. Napoleon
stood aloft, like a cliff on which successive tempests had expended their
rage in vain. The means which raised him were equally competent to make
good his greatness. He had infused into the armies which he commanded
the firmest reliance on his genius, and the greatest love for his person; so
that he could always find agents ready to execute his most difficult
commands. He had even inspired them with a portion of his own
indefatigable exertion and his commanding intelligence. The maxim which
he inculcated upon them when practising those long and severe marches
which formed one essential part of his system, was, "I would rather gain
victory at the expense of your legs than at the price of your blood."[228] The

French, under his training, seemed to become the very men he wanted, and
to forget in the excitation of war and the hope of victory, even the feelings
of weariness and exhaustion. The following description of the French
soldier by Napoleon himself, occurs in his despatches to the Directory
during his first campaign in Italy:—
"Were I to name all those who have been distinguished by acts of personal
bravery, I must send the muster-roll of all the grenadiers and carabineers of
the advanced-guard. They jest with danger, and laugh at death; and if any
thing can equal their intrepidity, it is the gaiety with which, singing
alternately songs of love and patriotism, they accomplish the most severe
forced marches. When they arrive at their bivouac, it is not to take their
repose, as might be expected, but to tell each his story of the battle of the
day, and produce his plan for that of to-morrow; and many of them think
with great correctness on military subjects. The other day I was inspecting a
demi-brigade, and as it filed past me, a common chasseur approached my
horse, and said, 'General, you ought to do so and so.'—'Hold your peace,
you rogue!' I replied. He disappeared immediately, nor have I since been
able to find him out. But the manœuvre which he recommended was the
very same which I had privately resolved to carry into execution."[229]
To command this active, intelligent, and intrepid soldiery, Buonaparte
possessed officers entirely worthy of the charge; men young, or at least not
advanced in years, to whose ambition the Revolution, and the wars which it
had brought on, had opened an unlimited career, and whose genius was
inspired by the plans of their leader, and the success which attended them.
Buonaparte, who had his eye on every man, never neglected to distribute
rewards and punishments, praise and censure with a liberal hand, or omitted
to press for what latterly was rarely if ever denied to him—the promotion of
such officers as particularly distinguished themselves. He willingly
assumed the task of soothing the feelings of those whose relations had
fallen under his banners. His letter of consolation to General Clarke upon
the death of young Clarke, his nephew, who fell at Arcola, is affecting, as
showing that amid all his victories he felt himself the object of reproach and
criticism.[230] His keen sensitiveness to the attacks of the public press
attended him through life, and, like the slave in the triumphal car, seemed to
remind him, that he was still a mortal man.

It should farther be remarked, that Napoleon withstood, instantly and
boldly, all the numerous attempts made by commissaries, and that
description of persons, to encroach upon the fund destined for the use of the
army. Much of his public, and more of his private correspondence, is filled
with complaints against these agents, although he must have known that, in
attacking them, he disobliged men of the highest influence, who had
frequently some secret interest in their wealth. But his military fame made
his services indispensable, and permitted him to set at defiance the enmity
of such persons, who are generally as timid as they are sordid.
Towards the general officers there took place a gradual change of
deportment, as the commander-in-chief began to feel gradually, more and
more, the increasing sense of his own personal importance. We have been
informed by an officer of the highest rank, that, during the earlier
campaigns, Napoleon used to rejoice with, and embrace them as associates,
nearly on the same footing, engaged in the same tasks. After a period, his
language and carriage became those of a frank soldier, who, sensible of the
merit of his subordinate assistants, yet makes them sensible, by his manner,
that he is their commander-in-chief. When his infant fortunes began to
come of age, his deportment to his generals was tinctured with that lofty
courtesy which princes use towards their subjects, and which plainly
intimated, that he held them as subjects in the war, not as brethren.[231]
Napoleon's conduct towards the Italians individually
CONDUCT TO THE was, in most instances, in the highest degree prudent
ITALIANS.
and political; while, at the same time, it coincided, as
true policy usually does, with the rules of justice and moderation, and
served, in a great measure, to counterbalance the odium which he incurred
by despoiling Italy of the works of art, and even by his infringements on the
religious system of the Catholics.
On the latter subject, the general became particularly cautious, and his
dislike or contempt of the Church of Rome was no longer shown in that
gross species of satire which he had at first given loose to. On the contrary,
it was veiled under philosophical indifference; and, while relieving the
clergy of their worldly possessions, Napoleon took care to avoid the error of
the Jacobins; never proposing their tenets as an object of persecution, but

protecting their persons, and declaring himself a decided friend to general
toleration on all points of conscience.
In point of politics, as well as religion, the opinions of Buonaparte appear to
have experienced a great change. It may be doubted, indeed, if he ever in
his heart adopted those of the outrageous Jacobins.[232] At all events, his
clear and sound good sense speedily made him aware, that such a violence
on the established rules of reason and morality, as an attempt to make the
brutal strength of the multitude the forcible controller of those possessed of
the wisdom, property, and education of a country, is too unnatural to remain
long, or to become the basis of a well-regulated state. Being at present a
Republican of the Thermidorien party, Buonaparte, even though he made
use of the established phrases, Liberty and Equality, acknowledged no
dignity superior to citizen, and thee'd and thou'd whomsoever he addressed,
was permitted to mix many grains of liberality with those democratic forms.
Indeed, the republican creed of the day began to resemble the leathern
apron of the brazier, who founded a dynasty in the East—his descendants
continued to display it as their banner, but enriched it so much with gems
and embroidery, that there was little of the original stuff to be discovered.
Jacobinism, for example, being founded on the principle of assimilating the
national character to the gross ignorance of the lower classes, was the
natural enemy of the fine arts and of literature, whose productions the Sans-
Culottes could not comprehend, and which they destroyed for the same
enlightened reasons that Jack Cade's followers hanged the clerk of
Chatham, with his pen and inkhorn about his neck.[233] Buonaparte, on the
contrary, saw that knowledge, of whatever kind, was power; and therefore
he distinguished himself honourably amidst his victories, by seeking the
conversation of men distinguished for literary attainments, and displaying
an interest in the antiquities and curiosities of the towns which he visited,
that could not but seem flattering to the inhabitants. In a letter addressed
publicly to Oriani,[234] a celebrated astronomer, he assures him, that all men
of genius, all who had distinguished themselves in the republic of letters,
were to be accounted natives of France, whatever might be the actual place
of their birth. "Hitherto," he said, "the learned in Italy did not enjoy the
consideration to which they were entitled—they lived retired in their
laboratories and libraries, too happy if they could escape the notice, and
consequently the persecution, of kings and priests. It is now no longer thus

—there is no longer religious inquisition, nor despotic power. Thought is
free in Italy. I invite the literary and scientific persons to consult together,
and propose to me their ideas on the subject of giving new vigour and life to
the fine arts and sciences. All who desire to visit France will be received
with distinction by the government. The people of France have more pride
in enrolling among their citizens a skilful mathematician, a painter of
reputation, a distinguished man in any class of literature, than in adding to
their territories a large and wealthy city. I request, citizen, that you will
make my sentiments known to the most distinguished literary persons in the
state of Milan."[235] To the municipality of Pavia he wrote, desiring that the
professors of their celebrated university should resume their course of
instruction under the security of his protection, and inviting them to point
out to him such measures as might occur, for giving a more brilliant
existence to their ancient seminaries.
The interest which he thus took in the literature and literary institutions of
Italy was shown by admitting men of science or letters freely to his person.
Their communication was the more flattering, that being himself of Italian
descent, and familiar with the beautiful language of the country from his
infancy, his conversation with men of literary eminence was easily
conducted. It may be mentioned episodically, that Napoleon found a
remnant of his family in Italy, in the person of the Abbate Gregorio
Buonaparte, the only remaining branch of that Florentine family, of whom
the Corsican line were cadets. He resided at San Miniato, of which he was
canon, and was an old man, and said to be wealthy. The relationship was
eagerly acknowledged, and the general, with his whole staff, dined with the
Canon Gregorio. The whole mind of the old priest was wrapt up in a project
of obtaining the honours of regular canonization for one of the family called
Bonaventura, who had been a Capuchin in the seventeenth century, and was
said to have died in the odour of sanctity, though his right to divine honours
had never been acknowledged.[236] It must have been ludicrous enough to
have heard the old man insist upon a topic so uninteresting to Napoleon,
and press the French republican general to use his interest with the Pope.
There can be little doubt that the holy father, to have escaped other
demands, would have canonized a whole French regiment of Carmagnoles,
and ranked them with the old militia of the calendar, the Theban Legion.

But Napoleon was sensible that any request on such a subject coming from
him, would be only ludicrous.[237]
The progress which Buonaparte made personally in the
POLITIC favour of the Italians, was, doubtless, a great assistance
CONDUCT.
to the propagation of the new doctrines which were
connected with the French Revolution, and was much aided by the trust
which he seemed desirous to repose in the natives of the country. He
retained, no doubt, in his own hands, the ultimate decision of every thing of
consequence; but in matters of ordinary importance, he permitted and
encouraged the Italians to act for themselves, in a manner they had not been
accustomed to under their German masters. The internal government of
their towns was intrusted to provisional governors, chosen without respect
to rank, and the maintenance of police was committed to the armed
burghers, or national guards. Conscious of the importance annexed to these
privileges, they already became impatient for national liberty. Napoleon
could hardly rein back the intense ardour of the large party among the
Lombards who desired an immediate declaration of independence, and he
had no other expedient left than to amuse them with procrastinating
excuses, which enhanced their desire of such an event, while they delayed
its gratification. Other towns of Italy,—for it was among the citizens of the
towns that these sentiments were chiefly cultivated,—began to evince the
same wish to new-model their governments on the revolutionary system;
and this ardour was chiefly shown on the southern side of the Po.
It must be remembered, that Napoleon had engaged in treaty with the Duke
of Modena, and had agreed to guarantee his principality, on payment of
immense contributions in money and stores, besides the surrender of the
most valuable treasures of his museum. In consequence, the Duke of
Modena was permitted to govern his states by a regency, he himself fixing
his residence in Venice. But his two principal towns, Reggio and Modena,
especially the former, became desirous of shaking off his government.
Anticipating in doing so the approbation of the French general and
government, the citizens of Reggio rose in insurrection, expelled from their
town a body of the ducal troops, and planted the tree of liberty, resolved, as
they said, to constitute themselves a free state, under the protection of the
French Republic. The ducal regency, with a view of protecting Modena

from a similar attempt, mounted cannon on their ramparts, and took other
defensive measures.
Buonaparte affected to consider these preparations as designed against the
French; and marching a body of troops, took possession of the city without
resistance, deprived the duke of all the advantages which he had purchased
by the mediation of the celebrated Saint Jerome, and declared the town
under protection of France. Bologna and Ferrara, legations appertaining to
the Papal See, had been already occupied by French troops, and placed
under the management of a committee of their citizens. They were now
encouraged to coalesce with Reggio and Modena. A congress of a hundred
delegates from the four districts was summoned, to effect the formation of a
government which should extend over them all. The congress met
accordingly, engaged their constituents in a perpetual union, under title of
the Cispadane Republic, from their situation on the right of the river Po;
thus assuming the character of independence, while in fact they remained
under the authority of Buonaparte, like clay in the hands of the potter, who
may ultimately model it into any shape he has a mind. In the meantime, he
was careful to remind them, that the liberty which it was desirable to
establish, ought to be consistent with due subjection to the laws. "Never
forget," he said, in reply to their address announcing their new form of
government, "that laws are mere nullities without the force necessary to
support them. Attend to your military organization, which you have the
means of placing on a respectable footing—you will be more fortunate than
the people of France, for you will arrive at liberty without passing through
the ordeal of revolution."[238]
This was not the language of a Jacobin; and it fortifies the belief, that even
now, while adhering ostensibly to the republican system, Buonaparte
anticipated considerable changes in that of France.
Meanwhile the Lombards betrayed much uneasiness at seeing their
neighbours outstrip them in the path of revolution, and of nominal
independence. The municipality of Milan proceeded to destroy all titles of
honour, as a badge of feudal dependence, and became so impatient, that
Buonaparte was obliged to pacify them by a solemn assurance that they
should speedily enjoy the benefits of a Republican constitution; and, to

tranquillize their irritation, placed them under the government of a
provisional council, selected from all classes, labourers included.
This measure made it manifest, that the motives which
Jan. 3. had induced the delay of the French Government to
recognise the independence (as they termed it) of
Lombardy, were now of less force; and in a short time, the provisional
council of Milan, after some modest doubts on their own powers,
revolutionized their country, and assumed the title of the Transpadane
Republic, which they afterwards laid aside, when, on their union with the
Cispadane, both were united under the name of the Cisalpine
Commonwealth. This decisive step was adopted 3d January, 1797. Decrees
of a popular character had preceded the declaration of independence, but an
air of moderation was observed in the revolution itself. The nobles,
deprived of their feudal rights and titular dignities, were subjected to no
incapacities; the reformation of the Church was touched upon gently, and
without indicating any design of its destruction. In these particulars, the
Italian commonwealth stopped short of their Gallic prototype.[239]
If Buonaparte may be justly charged with want of faith,
NEGOTIATIONS in destroying the authority of the Duke of Modena,
WITH THE POPE.
after having accepted of a price for granting him peace
and protection, we cannot object to him the same charge for acceding to the
Transpadane Republic, in so far as it detached the legations of Ferrara and
Bologna from the Roman See. These had been in a great measure reserved
for the disposal of the French, as circumstances should dictate, when a final
treaty should take place betwixt the Republic and the Sovereign Pontiff. But
many circumstances had retarded this pacification, and seemed at length
likely to break it off without hope of renewal.
If Buonaparte is correct in his statement, which we see no reason to doubt,
the delay of a pacification with the Roman See was chiefly the fault of the
Directory, whose avaricious and engrossing spirit was at this period its most
distinguishing characteristic. An armistice, purchased by treasure, by
contributions, by pictures and statues, and by the cession of the two
legations of Bologna and Ferrara, having been mediated for his Holiness by
the Spanish ambassador Azara, the Pope sent two plenipotentiaries to Paris
to treat of a definitive peace. But the conditions proposed were so severe,

that however desperate his condition, the Pope found them totally
inadmissible. His Holiness was required to pay a large contribution in grain
for ten years, a regular tribute of six millions of Roman crowns for six
years, to cede to France in perpetuity the ports of Ancona and Civita
Vecchia, and to declare the independence of Ferrara, Bologna, and
Ravenna. To add insult to oppression, the total cession of the Clementine
Museum was required, and it was stipulated that France should have under
management of her minister at Rome, a separate tribunal for judging her
subjects, and a separate theatre for their amusement. Lastly, the secular
sovereignty of the dominions of the Church was to be executed by a senate
and a popular body.[240]
These demands might have been complied with, although they went the
length of entirely stripping his Holiness of the character of a secular prince.
But there were others made on him, in his capacity of head of the Church,
which he could not grant, if he meant in future to lay claim to any authority
under that once venerable title. The Sovereign Pontiff was required to recall
all the briefs which he had issued against France since 1789, to sanction the
constitutional oath which released the French clergy from the dominion of
the Holy See, and to ratify the confiscation of the church-lands. Treasures
might be expended, secular dignities resigned, and provinces ceded; but it
was clear that the Sovereign Pontiff could not do what was expressly
contrary to the doctrines of the Church which he represented. There were
but few clergymen in France who had hesitated to prove their devotion to
the Church of Rome, by submitting to expulsion, rather than take the
constitutional oath. It was now for the Head of the Church to show in his
own person a similar disinterested devotion to her interests.
Accordingly, the College of Cardinals having rejected the proposals of
France, as containing articles contrary to conscience, the Pope declared his
determination to abide by the utmost extremity, rather than accede to
conditions destructive, degrading, and, in his opinion, impious. The
Directory instantly determined on the total ruin of the Pope, and of his
power, both spiritual and temporal.
Napoleon dissented from the opinion of the Government. In point of moral
effect, a reconciliation with the Pope would have been of great advantage to
France, and have tended to reunite her with other Catholic nations, and

diminish the horror with which she was regarded as sacrilegious and
atheistical. Even the army of the Holy See was not altogether to be
despised, in case of any reverse taking place in the war with the Austrians.
Under these considerations, he prevailed on the Directory to renew the
negotiations at Florence.[241] But the French commissioners, having
presented as preliminaries sixty indispensable conditions, containing the
same articles which had been already rejected, as contrary to the conscience
of the Pontiff, the conferences broke up; and the Pope, in despair, resolved
to make common cause with the House of Austria, and have recourse to the
secular force, which the Roman See had disused for so many years.[242]
It was a case of dire necessity; but the arming of the Pope's government,
whose military force had been long the subject of ridicule,[243] against the
victorious conqueror of five Austrian armies, reminds us of Priam, when, in
extremity of years and despair, he buckled on his rusty armour, to oppose
age and decrepitude to the youthful strength of Pyrrhus.[244] Yet the
measures of Sextus indicated considerable energy. He brought back to
Rome an instalment of sixteen millions of stipulated tribute, which was on
the road to Buonaparte's military chest—took every measure to increase his
army, and by the voluntary exertions of the noble families of Rome, he
actually raised it to forty thousand men, and placed at its head the same
General Colli, who had commanded with credit the troops of Sardinia
during the campaign on the Alps. The utmost pains were taken by the
clergy, both regular and secular, to give the expected war the character of a
crusade, and to excite the fierce spirit of those peasantry who inhabit the
Apennines, and were doubly disposed to be hostile to the French, as
foreigners and as heretics. The Pope endeavoured also to form a close
alliance with the King of the Two Sicilies, who promised in secret to cover
Rome with an army of thirty thousand men. Little reliance was indeed to be
placed in the good faith of the Court of Naples; but the Pope was compared,
by the French envoy, Cacault,[245] to a man who, in the act of falling, would
grasp for support at a hook of red-hot iron.[246]
While the Court of Rome showed this hostile
INVASION OF THE disposition, Napoleon reproached the French
PAPAL
TERRITORIES. Government for having broken off the negotiation,
which they ought to have protracted till the event of
Alvinzi's march into Italy was known; at all events, until their general had

obtained possession of the sixteen millions, so much wanted to pay his
forces. In reply to his remonstrances, he received permission to renew the
negotiations upon modified terms. But the Pope had gone too far to recede.
Even the French victory of Arcola, and the instant threats of Buonaparte to
march against him at the head of a flying column, were unable to move his
resolution. "Let the French general march upon Rome," said the Papal
minister; "the Pope, if necessary, will quit his capital. The farther the French
are drawn from the Adige, the nearer they are to their ultimate destruction."
[247] Napoleon was sensible, on receiving a hostile answer, that the Pope
still relied on the last preparations which were made for the relief of
Mantua, and it was not safe to attempt his chastisement until Alvinzi and
Provera should be disposed of. But the decisive battles of Rivoli and La
Favorita having ruined these armies, Napoleon was at leisure to execute his
purpose of crushing the power, such as it was, of the Holy See. For this
purpose he despatched Victor with a French division of four thousand men,
and an Italian army of nearly the same force, supplied by Lombardy and by
the Transpadane republic, to invade the Territories of the Church on the
eastern side of Italy, by the route of Imola.
Meantime, the utmost exertions had been made by the
Feb. 3. clergy of Romagna, to raise the peasants in a mass, and
a great many obeyed the sound of the tocsin. But an
insurrectionary force is more calculated to embarrass the movements of a
regular army, by alarms on their flanks and rear, by cutting off their
communications, and destroying their supplies, defending passes, and
skirmishing in advantageous positions, than by opposing them in the open
field. The Papal army, consisting of about seven or eight thousand men,
were encamped on the river Senio, which runs on the southward of the town
of Imola, to dispute the passage. The banks were defended with cannon; but
the river being unusually low, the French crossed about a league and a half
higher up than the position of the Roman army, which, taken in the rear,
fled in every direction, after a short resistance. A few hundreds were killed,
among whom were several monks, who, holding the crucifix in their hand,
had placed themselves in the ranks to encourage the soldiers. Faenza stood
out and was taken by storm; but the soldiers were withheld from pillage by
the generosity or prudence of Napoleon,[248] and he dismissed the prisoners
of war[249] to carry into the interior of the country the news of their own

defeat, of the irresistible superiority of the French army, and of the
clemency of their general.[250]
Next day, three thousand of the Papal troops, occupying
Feb. 4. an advantageous position in front of Ancona, and
commanded by Colli, were made prisoners without
firing a shot; and Ancona was taken after slight resistance, though a place of
some strength. A curious piece of priestcraft had been played off in this
town, to encourage the people to resistance. A miraculous image was seen
to shed tears, and the French artists could not discover the mode in which
the trick was managed until the image was brought to headquarters, when a
glass shrine, by which the illusion was managed, was removed. The
Madonna was sent back to the church which owned her, but apparently had
become reconciled to the foreign visitors, and dried her tears in
consequence of her interview with Buonaparte.[251]
On the 10th of February, the French, moving with great
CAPTURE OF celerity, entered Loretto, where the celebrated Santa
LORETTO.
Casa is the subject of the Catholic's devotional triumph,
or secret scorn, according as his faith or his doubts predominate. The wealth
which this celebrated shrine is once supposed to have possessed by gifts of
the faithful, had been removed by Colli—if, indeed, it had not been
transported to Rome long before the period of which we treat; yet, precious
metal and gems to the amount of a million of livres, fell into the possession
of the French, whose capture was also enriched by the holy image of our
Lady of Loretto, with the sacred porringer, and a bedgown of dark-coloured
camlet, warranted to have belonged to the Blessed Virgin.[252] This image,
said to have been of celestial workmanship, was sent to Paris, but was
restored to the Pope in 1802. We are not informed that any of the treasures
were given back along with the Madonna, to whom they had been devoted.
As the French army advanced upon the Roman territory, there was a
menace of the interference of the King of Naples, worthy to be mentioned,
both as expressing the character of that court, and showing Napoleon's
readiness in anticipating and defeating the arts of indirect diplomacy.
The Prince of Belmonte-Pignatelli, who attended Buonaparte's
headquarters, in the capacity, perhaps, of an observer, as much as of

ambassador for Naples, came to the French general in secrecy, to show him,
under strict confidence, a letter of the Queen of the Two Sicilies, proposing
to march an army of thirty thousand men towards Rome. "Your confidence
shall be repaid," said Buonaparte, who at once saw through the spirit of the
communication—"You shall know what I have long since settled to do in
case of such an event taking place." He called for the port-folio containing
the papers respecting Naples, and presented to the disconcerted Prince the
copy of a despatch written in November preceding, which contained this
passage:—"the approach of Alvinzi would not prevent my sending six
thousand men to chastise the court of Rome; but as the Neapolitan army
might march to their assistance, I will postpone this movement till after the
surrender of Mantua; in which case, if the King of Naples should interfere, I
shall be able to spare twenty-five thousand men to march against his capital,
and drive him over to Sicily." Prince Pignatelli was quite satisfied with the
result of this mutual confidence, and there was no more said of Neapolitan
armed interference.[253]
From Ancona, the division commanded by Victor turned westward to
Foligno, to unite itself with another column of French which penetrated into
the territories of the Church by Perugia, which they easily accomplished.
Resistance seemed now unavailing. The Pope in vain solicited his subjects
to rise against the second Alaric, who was approaching the Holy City. They
remained deaf to his exhortations, though made in the names of the Blessed
Virgin, and of the Apostles Peter and Paul, who had of old been the visible
protectors of the metropolis of the Christian world in a similar emergency.
All was dismay and confusion in the patrimony of Saint Peter's, which was
now the sole territory remaining in possession of his representative.
But there was an unhappy class of persons, who had found shelter in Rome,
rather than disown whose allegiance they had left their homes, and resigned
their means of living. These were the recusant French clergy, who had
refused to take the constitutional oath and who now, recollecting the scenes
which they witnessed in France, expected little else, than that, on the
approach of the Republican troops, they would, like the Israelitish captain,
be slain between the horns of the very altar at which they had taken refuge.
It is said that one of their number, frantic at the thoughts of the fate which
he supposed awaited them, presented himself to Buonaparte, announced his
name and condition, and prayed to be led to instant death. Napoleon took

the opportunity to show once more that he was acting on principles different
from the brutal and persecuting spirit of Jacobinism. He issued a
proclamation, in which, premising that the recusant priests, though banished
from the French territory, were not prohibited from residing in countries
which might be conquered by the French arms, he declares himself satisfied
with their conduct. The proclamation goes on to prohibit, under the most
severe penalty, the French soldiery, and all other persons, from doing any
injury to these unfortunate exiles. The convents are directed to afford them
lodging, nourishment, and fifteen French livres (twelve shillings and
sixpence British) monthly, to each individual, for which the priest was to
compensate by saying masses ad valorem;—thus assigning the Italian
convents payment for their hospitality, in the same coin with which they
themselves requited the laity.
Perhaps this liberality might have some weight with the Pope in inducing
him to throw himself upon the mercy of France, as had been recommended
to him by Buonaparte in a confidential communication through the superior
of the monastic order of Camalduli, and more openly in a letter addressed to
Cardinal Mattei. The King of Naples made no movement to his assistance.
In fine, after hesitating what course to take, and having had at one time his
equipage ready harnessed to leave Rome and fly to Naples, the Pontiff
judged resistance and flight alike unavailing, and chose the humiliating
alternative of entire submission to the will of the conqueror.
It was the object of the Directory entirely to destroy the secular authority of
the Pope, and to deprive him of all his temporalities. But Buonaparte
foresaw, that whether the Roman territories were united with the new
Cispadane republic, or formed into a separate state, it would alike bring on
prematurely a renewal of the war with Naples, ere the north of Italy was yet
sufficiently secure to admit the marching a French force into the southern
extremities of the Italian peninsula, exposed to descents of the English, and
insurrections in the rear. These Napoleon foresaw would be the more
dangerous and difficult to subdue, that, though he might strip the Pope of
his temporalities, he could not deprive him of the supremacy assigned him
in spiritual matters by each Catholic; which, on the contrary, was, according
to the progress of human feeling, likely to be the more widely felt and
recognised in favour of a wanderer and a sufferer for what would be
accounted conscience-sake, than of one who, submitting to circumstances,

retained as much of the goods of this world as the clemency of his
conqueror would permit.[254]
Influenced by these considerations, Buonaparte
TREATY OF admitted the Pope to a treaty, which terminated in the
TOLENTINA.
peace of Tolentino, by which Sextus purchased such a
political existence as was left to him, at the highest rate which he had the
least chance of discharging. Napoleon mentions, as a curious instance of the
crafty and unscrupulous character of the Neapolitans, that the same
Pignatelli, whom we have already commemorated, attached himself closely
to the plenipotentiaries during the whole treaty of Tolentino; and in his
ardour to discover whether there existed any secret article betwixt the Pope
and Buonaparte which might compromise the interests of his master, was
repeatedly discovered listening at the door of the apartment in which the
discussions were carried on.[255]
The articles which the Pope was obliged to accept at
Feb. 19. Tolentino,[256] included the cession of Avignon and its
territories, the appropriation of which by France, had
never yet been recognised; the resigning the legations of Bologna, Ferrara,
and Romagna; the occupation of Ancona, the only port excepting Venice,
which Italy has in the Adriatic; the payment of thirty millions of livres, in
specie or in valuable effects; the complete execution of the article in the
armistice of Bologna respecting the delivery of paintings, manuscripts, and
objects of art; and several other stipulations of similar severity.[257]
Buonaparte informs us, that it was a principal object in this treaty to compel
the abolition of the Inquisition, from which he had only departed in
consequence of receiving information, that it had ceased to be used as a
religious tribunal, and subsisted only as a court of police. The conscience of
the Pope seemed also so tenderly affected by the proposal, that he thought it
safe to desist from it.
The same despatch, in which Buonaparte informs the Directory, that his
committee of artist collectors "had made a good harvest of paintings in the
Papal dominions, and which, with the objects of art ceded by the Pope,
included almost all that was curious and valuable, excepting some few
objects at Turin and Naples," conveyed to them a document of a very

different kind. This was a respectful and almost reverential letter from
Napoleon to the Pope,[258] recommending to his Holiness to distrust such
persons as might excite him to doubt the good intentions of France, assuring
him that he would always find the Republic most sincere and faithful, and
expressing in his own name the perfect esteem and veneration which he
entertained for the person of his Holiness, and the extreme desire which he
had to afford him proofs to that effect.[259]
This letter furnished much amusement at the time, and seemed far less to
intimate the sentiments of a sans-culotte general, than those of a civilized
highwayman of the old school of Macheath, who never dismissed the
travellers whom he had plundered, without his sincere good wishes for the
happy prosecution of their journey.
A more pleasing view of Buonaparte's character was
REPUBLIC OF SAN exhibited about this time, in his conduct towards the
MARINO.
little interesting republic of San Marino. That state,
which only acknowledges the Pope as a protector, not as a sovereign, had
maintained for very many years an independence, which conquerors had
spared either in contempt or in respect. It consists of a single mountain and
a single town, and boasts about seven thousand inhabitants, governed by
their own laws. Citizen Monge, the chief of the committee of collecting
artists, was sent deputy to San Marino to knit the bands of amity between
the two republics,—which might well resemble a union between Lilliput
and Brobdingnag. There were no pictures in the little republic, or they
might have been a temptation to the citizen collector. The people of San
Marino conducted themselves with much sagacity; and although more
complimentary to Buonaparte than Diogenes to Alexander the Great, when
he came to visit the philosopher in his tub, they showed the same judgment
in eschewing too much courtesy.[260] They respectfully declined an
accession of territory, which could but have involved them in subsequent
quarrels with the sovereign from whom it was to be wrested, and only
accepted as an honorary gift the present of four field pieces, being a train of
artillery upon the scale of their military force, and of which, it is to be
hoped, the Captain Regents of the little contented state will never have any
occasion to make use.[261]

Rome might, for the present at least, be considered as completely
subjugated. Naples was at peace, if the signature of a treaty can create
peace. At any rate, so distant from Rome, and so controlled by the defeat of
the Papal arms—by the fear that the English fleet might be driven from the
Mediterranean—and by their distance from the scene of action—the King
of the Two Sicilies, or rather his wife, the high-spirited daughter of Maria
Theresa, dared not offer the least interference with the purposes of the
French general. Tuscany had apparently consented to owe her political
existence to any degree of clemency or contempt which Buonaparte might
extend to her; and, entertaining hopes of some convention betwixt the
French and English, by which the grand duke's port of Leghorn might be
restored to him, remained passive as the dead. The republic of Venice alone,
feeling still the stimulus arising from her ancient importance, and yet
painfully conscious of her present want of power, strained every exertion to
place herself in a respectable attitude. That city of lofty remembrances, the
Tyre of the middle ages, whose traders were princes, and her merchants the
honourable of the earth, fallen as she was from her former greatness, still
presented some appearance of vigour. Her oligarchical government, so long
known and so dreaded, for jealous precautions, political sagacity, the
impenetrability of their plans, and the inflexibility of their rigour, still
preserved the attitude of independence, and endeavoured, by raising
additional regiments of Sclavonians, disciplining their peasantry, who were
of a very martial character, and forming military magazines of considerable
extent, to maintain such an aspect as might make their friendship to be
courted, and their enmity to be feared. It was already evident that the
Austrians, notwithstanding all their recent defeats, were again about to
make head on their Italo-German frontier; and France, in opposing them,
could not be indifferent to the neutrality of Venice, upon whose territories,
to all appearance, Buonaparte must have rested the flank of his operations,
in case of his advancing towards Friuli. So circumstanced, and when it was
recollected that the mistress of the Adriatic had still fifty thousand men at
her command, and those of a fierce and courageous description, chiefly
consisting of Sclavonians, Venice, even yet, was an enemy not to be lightly
provoked. But the inhabitants were not unanimous, especially those of the
Terra Firma, or mainland, who, not being enrolled in the golden book of the
insular nobility of Venice, were discontented, and availed themselves of the
encouragement and assistance of the new-created republics on the Po to

throw off their allegiance. Brescia and Bergamo, in particular, were
clamorous for independence.
Napoleon saw, in this state of dissension, the means of playing an adroit
game; and while, on the one hand, he endeavoured to restrain, till a more
favourable opportunity, the ardour of the patriots, he attempted on the other,
to convince the Senate, that they had no safe policy but in embracing at
once the alliance of France, offensive and defensive, and joining their
forces to those of the army with which he was about to move against the
Austrians. He offered, on these conditions, to guarantee the possessions of
the republic, even without exacting any modification of their oligarchical
constitution. But Venice declared for an impartial neutrality.[262] It had
been, they said, their ancient and sage policy, nor would they now depart
from it. "Remain then neuter," said Napoleon; "I consent to it. I march upon
Vienna, yet will leave enough of French troops in Italy to control your
republic.—But dismiss these new levies; and remark, that if, while I am in
Germany, my communications shall be interrupted, my detachments cut off,
or my convoys intercepted in the Venetian territories, the date of your
republic is terminated. She will have brought on herself annihilation."[263]
Lest these threats should be forgotten while he was at a distance, he took
the best precautions in his power, by garrisoning advantageous points on the
line of the Adige; and trusting partly to this defence, partly to the insurgents
of Bergamo and Brescia, who, for their own sakes, would oppose any
invasion of the mainland by their Venetian masters, whose yoke they had
cast aside, Napoleon again unfurled his banners, and marched to new
triumphs over yet untried opponents.

CHAPTER IX.
Archduke Charles—Compared with Napoleon—Fettered by the
Aulic Council—Napoleon, by a stratagem, passes the
Tagliamento, and compels the Archduke to retreat—Gradisca
carried by storm—Chusa-Veneta taken—Trieste and Fiume
occupied—Venice breaks the Neutrality—Terrified on learning
that an Armistice had taken place betwixt France and Austria—
The Archduke retreats by hasty marches on Vienna—The
Government irresolute—and the Treaty of Leoben signed—
Venice makes humiliating submissions—Napoleon's Speech to
her Envoys—He declares War against Venice, and evades
obeying the orders of the Directory to spare it—The Great
Council, on 31st May, concede everything to Buonaparte—
Terms granted.
The victories of the Archduke Charles on the Rhine,
ARCHDUKE and his high credit with the soldiery, seemed to point
CHARLES.
him out as the commander falling most naturally to be
employed against the young general of the French republic, who, like a
gifted hero of romance, had borne down successively all opponents who
had presented themselves in the field. The opinions of Europe were
suspended concerning the probable issue of the contest. Both generals were
young, ambitious, enthusiastic in the military profession, and warmly
beloved by their soldiers. The exploits of both had filled the trumpet of
Fame; and although Buonaparte's success had been less uninterrupted, yet it
could not be denied, that if the Archduke's plans were not equally brilliant
and original with those of his great adversary, they were just and sound, and
had been attended repeatedly with great results, and by the defeat of such
men as Moreau and Jourdan. But there were two particulars in which the
Austrian prince fell far short of Napoleon,—first, in that ready, decided, and
vigorous confidence, which seizes the favourable instant for the execution
of plans resolved upon,—and, secondly, in having the disadvantage to be
subjected, notwithstanding his high rank, to the interference of the Aulic
Council; who, sitting at Vienna, and ignorant of the changes and

vicissitudes of the campaign, were yet, by the ancient and jealous laws of
the Austrian empire, entitled to control his opinion, and prescribe
beforehand the motions of the armies, while the generals, intrusted with the
execution of their schemes, had often no choice left but that of adherence to
their instructions, however emerging circumstances might require a
deviation.[264]
But although the encounter betwixt these two distinguished young generals
be highly interesting, our space will not permit us to detail the campaigns of
Austria at the same length as those of Italy. The latter formed the
commencement of Buonaparte's military career, and at no subsequent
period of his life did he achieve the same wondrous victories against such
immense odds, or with such comparatively inadequate means. It was also
necessary, in the outset of his military history, to show, in minute detail, the
character of his tactics, and illustrate that spirit of energetic concentration,
which, neglecting the extremities of an extended line of operations,
combined his whole strength, like a bold and skilful fencer, for one thrust at
a vital part, which, if successful, must needs be fatal. The astonishing
rapidity of his movements, the audacious vivacity of his attack, having been
so often described in individual cases, may now be passed over with general
allusions; nor will we embarrass ourselves and our readers with minute
details of positions, or encumber our pages with the names of obscure
villages, unless when there is some battle calling for a particular narrative,
either from its importance or its singularity.
By the direction of the Aulic Council, the Archduke Charles had taken up
his position at Friuli, where it had been settled that the sixth Austrian army,
designed to act against Buonaparte for the defence of the Italo-German
frontier, should be assembled. This position was strangely preferred to the
Tyrol, where the Archduke could have formed a junction ten days sooner
with an additional force of forty thousand men from the army of the Rhine,
marching to reinforce his own troops,—men accustomed to fight and
conquer under their leader's eye; whilst those with whom he occupied
Friuli, and the line of the Piave, belonged to the hapless Imperial forces,
which, under Beaulieu, Wurmser, and Alvinzi, had never encountered
Buonaparte without incurring some notable defeat.

While the Archduke was yet expecting those
FRENCH PLAN OF reinforcements which were to form the strength of his
THE CAMPAIGN.
army, his active adversary had been joined by more
than twenty thousand men, sent from the French armies on the Rhine, and
which gave him at the moment a numerical superiority over the Austrian
general. Instead, therefore, of waiting, as on former occasions, until the
Imperialists should commence the war by descending into Italy, Napoleon
resolved to anticipate the march of the succours expected by the Archduke,
drive him from his position on the Italian frontiers, and follow him into
Germany, even up to the walls of Vienna. No scheme appeared too bold for
the general's imagination to form, or his genius to render practicable; and
his soldiers, with the view before them of plunging into the midst of an
immense empire, and placing chains of mountains betwixt them and every
possibility of reinforcement or communication, were so confident in the
talents of their leader, as to follow him under the most undoubting
expectation of victory. The Directory had induced Buonaparte to expect a
co-operation by a similar advance on the part of the armies of the Rhine, as
had been attempted in the former campaign.
Buonaparte took the field in the beginning of March, advancing from
Bassano.[265] The Austrians had an army of observation under Lusignan on
the bank of the Piave, but their principal force was stationed upon the
Tagliamento, a river whose course is nearly thirty miles more to the
eastward, though collateral with the Piave. The plains on the Tagliamento
afforded facilities to the Archduke to employ the noble cavalry who have
always been the boast of the Austrian army; and to dislodge him from the
strong country which he occupied, and which covered the road that
penetrates between the mountains and the Adriatic, and forms the mode of
communication in that quarter betwixt Vienna and Italy, through Carinthia,
it was not only necessary that he should be pressed in front—a service
which Buonaparte took upon himself—but also that a French division,
occupying the mountains on the Prince's right, should precipitate his retreat,
by maintaining the perpetual threat of turning him on that wing. With this
view, Massena had Buonaparte's orders, which he executed with equal skill
and gallantry. He crossed the Piave about the eleventh March, and
ascending that river, directed his course into the mountains towards
Belluno, driving before him Lusignan's little corps of observation, and

finally compelling his rear-guard, to the number of five hundred men, to
surrender.
The Archduke Charles, in the meantime, continued to maintain his position
on the Tagliamento, and the French approached the right bank, with
Napoleon at their head, determined apparently to force a passage. Artillery
and sharpshooters were disposed in such a manner as to render this a very
hazardous attempt, while two beautiful lines of cavalry were drawn up,
prepared to charge any troops who might make their way to the left bank,
while they were yet in the confusion of landing.
A very simple stratagem disconcerted this fair display of resistance. After a
distant cannonade, and some skirmishing, the French army drew off, as if
despairing to force their passage, moved to the rear, and took up apparently
their bivouac for the night. The Archduke was deceived. He imagined that
the French, who had marched all the preceding night, were fatigued, and he
also withdrew from the bank of the river to his camp. But two hours
afterwards, when all seemed profoundly quiet, the French army suddenly
got under arms, and, forming in two lines, marched rapidly to the side of the
river, ere the astonished Austrians were able to make the same dispositions
as formerly for defence. Arrived on the margin, the first line instantly broke
up into columns, which, throwing themselves boldly into the stream,
protected on the flanks by the cavalry, passed through and attained the
opposite bank.[266] They were repeatedly charged by the Austrian cavalry,
but it was too late—they had gotten their footing, and kept it. The Archduke
attempted to turn their flank, but was prevented by the second line of the
French, and by their reserve of cavalry. He was compelled to retreat,
leaving prisoners and cannon in the hands of the enemy. Such was the first
disastrous meeting between the Archduke Charles and his future relative.
[267]

The Austrian prince had the farther misfortune to learn,
March 16. that Massena had, at the first sound of the cannonade,
pushed across the Tagliamento, higher up than his line
of defence, and destroying what troops he found before him, had occupied
the passes of the Julian Alps at the sources of that river, and thus interposed
himself between the imperial right wing and the nearest communication
with Vienna. Sensible of the importance of this obstacle, the Archduke

hastened, if possible, to remove it. He brought up a fine column of
grenadiers from the Rhine, which had just arrived at Klagenfurt, in his rear,
and joining them to other troops, attacked Massena with the utmost fury,
venturing his own person like a private soldier, and once or twice narrowly
escaping being made prisoner. It was in vain—all in vain. He charged
successively and repeatedly, even with the reserve of the grenadiers, but no
exertion could change the fortune of the day.[268]
Still the Archduke hoped to derive assistance from the
March 19. natural or artificial defences of the strong country
through which he was thus retreating, and in doing so
was involuntarily introducing Buonaparte, after he should have surmounted
the border frontier into the most fertile provinces of his brother's empire.
The Lisonzo, usually a deep and furious torrent, closed in by a chain of
impassable mountains, seemed to oppose an insurmountable barrier to his
daring pursuers. But nature, as well as events, fought against the Austrians.
The stream, reduced by frost, was fordable in several places. The river thus
passed, the town of Gradisca, which had been covered with field-works to
protect the line of the Lisonzo, was surprised and carried by storm, and its
garrison of two thousand five hundred men made prisoners, by the divisions
of Bernadotte and Serrurier.
Pushed in every direction, the Austrians sustained every day additional and
more severe losses. The strong fort of Chiusa-Veneta was occupied by
Massena, who continued his active and indefatigable operations on the right
of the retreating army. This success caused the envelopement, and
dispersion or surrender, of a whole division of Austrians, five thousand of
whom remained prisoners, while their baggage, cannon, colours, and all
that constituted them an army, fell into the hands of the French. Four
generals were made prisoners on this occasion; and many of the
mountaineers of Carniola and Croatia, who had joined the Austrian army
from their natural love of war, seeing that success appeared to have
abandoned the imperial cause, became despondent, broke up their corps,
and retired as stragglers to their villages.
Buonaparte availed himself of their loss of courage, and
TRIESTE AND had recourse to proclamations, a species of arms which
FIUME.
he valued himself as much upon using to advantage, as

he did upon his military fame. He assured them that the French did not
come into their country to innovate on their rights, religious customs, and
manners. He exhorted them not to meddle in a war with which they had no
concern, but encouraged them to afford assistance and furnish supplies to
the French army, in payment of which he proposed to assign the public
taxes which they had been in the habit of paying to the Emperor.[269] His
proposal seems to have reconciled the Carinthians to the presence of the
French, or, more properly speaking, they submitted to the military exactions
which they had no means of resisting.[270] In the meanwhile, the French
took possession of Trieste and Fiume, the only seaports belonging to
Austria, where they seized much English merchandise, which was always a
welcome prize, and of the quicksilver mines of Idria, where they found a
valuable deposit of that mineral.
Napoleon repaired the fortifications of Klagenfurt, and converted it into a
respectable place of arms, where he established his headquarters. In a space
of scarce twenty days, he had defeated the Austrians in ten combats, in the
course of which Prince Charles had lost at least one-fourth of his army. The
French had surmounted the southern chain of the Julian Alps; the northern
line could, it was supposed, offer no obstacle sufficient to stop their
irresistible general; and the Archduke, the pride and hope of the Austrian
armies, had retired behind the river Mehur, and seemed to be totally without
the means of covering Vienna.
There were, however, circumstances less favourable to the French, which
require to be stated. When the campaign commenced, the French general
Joubert was posted with his division in the gorge of the Tyrol above Trent,
upon the same river Levisa, the line of which had been lost and won during
the preceding winter. He was opposed by the Austrian generals Kerpen and
Laudon, who, besides some regular regiments, had collected around them a
number of the Tyrolese militia, who among their own mountains were at
least equally formidable. They remained watching each other during the
earlier part of the campaign; but the gaining of the battle of the Tagliamento
was the signal for Joubert to commence the offensive. His directions were
to push his way through the Tyrol to Brixen, at which place Napoleon
expected he might hear news of the advance of the French armies from the
Rhine, to co-operate in the march upon Vienna. But the Directory, fearing
perhaps to trust nearly the whole force of the Republic in the hands of a

general so successful and so ambitious as Napoleon, had not fulfilled their
promises in this respect. The army of Moreau had not as yet crossed the
Rhine.
Joubert, thus disappointed of his promised object, began to find himself in
an embarrassing situation. The whole country was in insurrection around
him, and a retreat in the line by which he had advanced, might have
exposed him to great loss, if not to destruction. He determined, therefore, to
elude the enemy, and by descending the river Drave, to achieve a junction
with his commander-in-chief Napoleon. He accomplished his difficult
march by breaking down the bridges behind him, and thus arresting the
progress of the enemy; but it was with difficulty, and not without loss, that
he effected his proposed union, and his retreat from the Tyrol gave infinite
spirits not only to the martial Tyrolese, but to all the favourers of Austria in
the North of Italy. The Austrian general Laudon sallied from the Tyrol at the
head of a considerable force, and compelled the slender body of French
under Balland, to shut themselves up in garrisons; and their opponents were
for the moment again lords of a part of Lombardy. They also re-occupied
Trieste and Fiume, which Buonaparte had not been able sufficiently to
garrison; so that the rear of the French army seemed to be endangered.[271]
The Venetians, at this crisis, fatally for their ancient republic, if indeed its
doom had not, as is most likely, been long before sealed, received with
eager ears the accounts, exaggerated as they were by rumour, that the
French were driven from the Tyrol, and the Austrians about to descend the
Adige, and resume their ancient empire in Italy. The Senate were aware that
neither their government nor their persons were acceptable to the French
general, and that they had offended him irreconcilably by declining the
intimate alliance and contribution of troops which he had demanded. He
had parted from them with such menaces as were not easily to be
misunderstood. They believed, if his vengeance might not be instant, it was
only the more sure; and conceiving him now deeply engaged in Germany,
and surrounded by the Austrian levies en masse from the warlike countries
of Hungary and Croatia, they imagined that throwing their own weight into
the scale at so opportune a moment, must weigh it down for ever. To
chastise their insurgent subjects of Bergamo and Brescia, was an additional
temptation.

Their mode of making war savoured of the ancient
April 16. vindictive temper ascribed to their countrymen. An
insurrection was secretly organized through all the
territories which Venice still possessed on the mainland, and broke out, like
the celebrated Sicilian vespers, in blood and massacre. In Verona they
assassinated more than a hundred Frenchmen, many of them sick soldiers in
the hospitals[272]—an abominable cruelty which could not fail to bring a
curse on their undertaking. Fioravante, a Venetian general, marched at the
head of a body of Sclavonians to besiege the forts of Verona, into which the
remaining French had made their retreat, and where they defended
themselves. Laudon made his appearance with his Austrians and Tyrolese,
and it seemed as if the fortunes of Buonaparte had at length found a check.
But the awakening from this pleasing dream was
OVERTURES OF equally sudden and dreadful. News arrived that
PEACE.
preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon, and an
armistice signed between France and Austria. Laudon, therefore, and the
auxiliaries on whom the Venetians had so much relied, retired from Verona.
The Lombards sent an army to the assistance of the French. The
Sclavonians, under Fioravante, after fighting vigorously, were compelled to
surrender. The insurgent towns of Vicenza, Treviso, and Padua, were again
occupied by the Republicans. Rumour proclaimed the terrible return of
Napoleon and his army, and the ill-advised Senate of Venice were lost in
stupor, and scarce had sense left to decide betwixt unreserved submission
and hopeless defence.
It was one of the most artful rules in Buonaparte's policy, that when he had
his enemy at decided advantage, by some point having been attained which
seemed to give a complete turn to the campaign in his favour, he seldom
failed to offer peace, and peace upon conditions much more favourable than
perhaps the opposite party expected. By doing this, he secured such
immediate and undisputed fruits of his victory, as the treaty of peace
contained; and he was sure of means to prosecute farther advantages at
some future opportunity. He obtained, moreover, the character of
generosity; and, in the present instance, he avoided the great danger of
urging to bay so formidable a power as Austria, whose despair might be
capable of the most formidable efforts.

With this purpose, and assuming for the first time that
March 31. disregard for the usual ceremonial of courts, and
etiquette of politics, which he afterwards seemed to
have pleasure in displaying, he wrote a letter in person to the Archduke
Charles on the subject of peace.
This composition affects that abrupt laconic severity of style, which cuts
short argument, by laying down general maxims of philosophy of a trite
character, and breaks through the usual laboured periphrastic introductions
with which ordinary politicians preface their proposals, when desirous of
entering upon a treaty. "It is the part of a brave soldier," he said, "to make
war, but to wish for peace. The present strife has lasted six years. Have we
not yet slain enough of men, and sufficiently outraged humanity? Peace is
demanded on all sides. Europe at large has laid down the arms assumed
against the French Republic. Your nation remains alone in hostility, and yet
blood flows faster than ever. This sixth campaign has commenced under
ominous circumstances.—End how it will, some thousands of men more
will be slain on either side; and at length, after all, we must come to an
agreement, for every thing must have an end at last, even the angry passions
of men. The Executive Directory made known to the Emperor their desire
to put a period to the war which desolates both countries, but the
intervention of the Court of London opposed it. Is there then no means of
coming to an understanding, and must we continue to cut each other's
throats for the interests or passions of a nation, herself a stranger to the
miseries of war? You, the general-in-chief, who approach by birth so near to
the crown, and are above all those petty passions which agitate ministers,
and the members of government, will you resolve to be the benefactor of
mankind, and the true saviour of Germany? Do not suppose that I mean by
that expression to intimate, that it is impossible for you to defend yourself
by force of arms; but under the supposition, that fortune were to become
favourable to you, Germany would be equally exposed to ravage. With
respect to my own feelings, general, if this proposition should be the means
of saving one single man's life, I should prefer a civic crown so merited, to
the melancholy glory attending military success."
The whole tone of the letter is ingeniously calculated to give the proposition
the character of moderation, and at the same time to avoid the appearance
of too ready an advance towards his object. The Archduke, after a space of

two days, returned this brief answer, in which he stripped Buonaparte's
proposal of its gilding, and treated it upon the footing of an ordinary
proposal for a treaty of peace, made by a party, who finds it convenient for
his interest:—"Unquestionably, sir, in making war, and in following the
road prescribed by honour and duty, I desire as much as you the attainment
of peace for the happiness of the people, and of humanity. Considering,
however, that in the situation which I hold, it is no part of my business to
inquire into and determine the quarrel of the belligerent powers; and that I
am not furnished on the part of the Emperor with any plenipotentiary
powers for treating, you will excuse me, general, if I do not enter into
negotiation with you touching a matter of the highest importance, but which
does not lie within my department. Whatever shall happen, either respecting
the future chances of the war, or the prospect of peace, I request you to be
equally convinced of my distinguished esteem."[273]
The Archduke would willingly have made some advantage of this proposal
by obtaining an armistice of five hours, sufficient to enable him to form a
junction with the corps of Kerpen, which, having left the Tyrol to come to
the assistance of the commander-in-chief, was now within a short distance.
But Buonaparte took care not to permit himself to be hampered by any such
ill-timed engagement, and, after some sharp fighting, in which the French,
as usual, were successful, he was able to interpose such a force as to
prevent the junction taking place.
Two encounters followed at Neumark and at Unzmark—both gave rise to
fresh disasters, and the continued retreat of the Archduke Charles and the
Imperial army. The French general then pressed forward on the road to
Vienna, through mountain-passes and defiles, which could not have been
opened otherwise than by turning them on the flank. But these natural
fastnesses were no longer defences. Judenburg, the capital of Upper Styria,
was abandoned to the French without a blow, and shortly after Buonaparte
entered Gratz, the principal town of Lower Styria, with the same facility.
The Archduke now totally changed his plan of warfare.
THE ARCHDUKE'S He no longer disputed the ground foot by foot, but
RETREAT.
began to retreat by hasty marches towards Vienna,
determined to collect the last and utmost strength which the extensive states
of the Emperor could supply, and fight for the existence, it might be, of his

brother's throne, under the walls of his capital. However perilous this
resolution might appear, it was worthy of the high-spirited prince by whom
it was adopted; and there were reasons, perhaps, besides those arising from
soldierly pride and princely dignity, which seemed to recommend it.
The army with which the enterprising French general was now about to
debouche from the mountains, and enter the very centre of Germany, had
suffered considerably since the commencement of the campaign, not only
by the sword, but by severity of weather, and the excessive fatigue which
they endured in executing the rapid marches, by which their leader
succeeded in securing victory; and the French armies on the Rhine had not,
as the plan of the campaign dictated, made any movement in advance
corresponding with the march of Buonaparte.
Nor, in the country which they were about to enter with diminished forces,
could Buonaparte trust to the influence of the same moral feeling in the
people invaded, which had paved the way to so many victories on the
Rhine. The citizens of Austria, though living under a despotic government,
are little sensible of its severities, and are sincerely attached to the Emperor,
whose personal habits incline him to live with his people without much
form, and mix in public amusements, or appear in the public walks, like a
father in the midst of his family. The nobility were as ready as in former
times to bring out their vassals, and a general knowledge of discipline is
familiar to the German peasant as a part of his education. Hungary
possessed still the high spirited race of barons and cavaliers, who, in their
great convocation in 1740, rose at once, and drawing their sabres, joined in
the celebrated exclamation, "Moriamur pro regenostro, Maria Teresa!" The
Tyrol was in possession of its own warlike inhabitants, all in arms, and so
far successful, as to have driven Joubert out of their mountains. Trieste and
Fiume were retaken in the rear of the French army. Buonaparte had no line
of communication when separated from Italy, and no means of obtaining
supplies, but from a country which would probably be soon in insurrection
in his rear, as well as on his flanks. A battle lost, when there was neither
support, reserve, nor place of arms nearer than Klagenfurt, would have been
annihilation. To add to these considerations, it was now known that the
Venetian republic had assumed a formidable and hostile aspect in Italy; by
which, joined to a natural explosion of feeling, religious and national, the
French cause was considerably endangered in that country. There were so

many favourers of the old system, together with the general influence of the
Catholic clergy, that it seemed not unlikely this insurrection might spread
fast and far. Italy, in that case, would have been no effectual place of refuge
to Buonaparte or his army. The Archduke enumerated all these advantages
to the Cabinet of Vienna, and exhorted them to stand the last cast of the
bloody die.
But the terror, grief, and confusion, natural in a great metropolis, whose
peace for the first time for so many years was alarmed with the approach of
the unconquered and apparently fated general, who having defeated and
destroyed five of their choicest armies, was now driving under its walls the
remnants of the last, though commanded by that prince whom they regarded
as the hope and flower of Austrian warfare, opposed this daring resolution.
The alarm was general, beginning with the court itself; and the most
valuable property and treasure were packed up to be carried into Hungary,
where the royal family determined to take refuge. It is worthy of mention,
that among the fugitives of the Imperial House was the Archduchess Maria
Louisa, then between five and six years old, whom our imagination may
conceive agitated by every species of childish terror derived from the
approach of the victorious general on whom she was, at a future and similar
crisis, destined to bestow her hand.
The cries of the wealthy burghers were of course for peace. The enemy
were within fourteen or fifteen days' march of their walls; nor had the city
(perhaps fortunately) any fortifications, which in the modern state of war
could have made it defensible even for a day. They were, moreover,
seconded by a party in the Cabinet; and, in short, whether it chanced for
good or for evil, the selfish principle of those who had much to lose, and
were timid in proportion, predominated against that, which desired at all
risks the continuance of a determined and obstinate defence. It required
many lessons to convince both sovereign and people, that it is better to put
all on the hazard—better even to lose all, than to sanction the being pillaged
at different times, and by degrees, under pretence of friendship and amity. A
bow which is forcibly strained back will regain its natural position; but if
supple enough to yield of itself to the counter direction, it will never
recover its elasticity.

The affairs, however, of the Austrians were in such a
PEACE OF condition, that it could hardly be said whether the party
LEOBEN.
who declared for peace, to obtain some respite from the
distresses of the country, or those who wished to continue war with the
chances of success which we have indicated, advised the least embarrassing
course. The Court of Vienna finally adopted the alternative of treaty, and
that of Leoben was set on foot.
Generals Bellegarde and Merfield, on the part of the Emperor, presented
themselves at the headquarters of Buonaparte, 13th April, 1797, and
announced the desire of their sovereign for peace. Buonaparte granted a
suspension of arms, to endure for five days only; which was afterwards
extended, when the probability of the definitive treaty of peace was evident.
It is affirmed, that in the whole discussions respecting this most important
armistice, Napoleon—as a conqueror, whose victories had been in a certain
degree his own, whose army had been supported and paid from the
resources of the country which he conquered, who had received
reinforcements from France only late and reluctantly, and who had recruited
his army by new levies among the republicanized Italians—maintained an
appearance of independence of the Government of France. He had, even at
this period, assumed a freedom of thought and action, the tenth part of the
suspicion attached to which would have cost the most popular general his
head in the times of Danton and Robespierre. But, though acquired slowly,
and in counteraction to the once overpowering, and still powerful,
democratic influence, the authority of Buonaparte was great; and, indeed,
the power which a conquering general attains, by means of his successes, in
the bosom of his soldiers, becomes soon formidable to any species of
government, where the soldier is not intimately interested in the liberties of
the subject.
Yet it must not be supposed that Napoleon exhibited publicly any of that
spirit of independence which the Directory appear to have dreaded, and
which, according to the opinion which he himself intimates, seems to have
delayed the promised co-operation, which was to be afforded by the eastern
armies on the banks of the Rhine. Far from testifying such a feeling, his
assertion of the rights of the Republic was decidedly striking, of which the
following is a remarkable instance. The Austrian commissioner, in hopes to

gain some credit for the admission, had stated in the preliminary articles of
the convention, as a concession of consequence, that his Imperial Majesty
acknowledged the French Government in its present state. "Strike out that
condition," said Buonaparte sternly, "the French Republic is like the sun in
heaven. The misfortune lies with those who are so blind as to be ignorant of
the existence of either."[274] It was gallantly spoken; but how strange to
reflect, that the same individual, in three or four years afterwards, was able
to place an extinguisher on one of those suns, without even an eclipse being
the consequence.[275]
It is remarkable also, that while asserting to foreigners this supreme dignity
of the French Republic, Buonaparte should have departed so far from the
respect he owed its rulers. The preliminaries of peace were proposed for
signature on the 18th April. But General Clarke, to whom the Directory had
committed full powers to act in the matter, was still at Turin. He was
understood to be the full confidant of his masters, and to have instructions
to watch the motions of Buonaparte, nay, to place him under arrest, should
he see cause to doubt his fealty to the French Government. Napoleon,
nevertheless, did not hesitate to tender his individual signature and
warrantry, and these were readily admitted by the Austrian
plenipotentiaries;—an ominous sign of the declension of the powers of the
Directory, considering that a military general, without the support even of
the commissioners from the government, or proconsuls, as they were called,
was regarded as sufficient to ratify a treaty of such consequence. No doubt
seems to have been entertained that he had the power to perform what he
had guaranteed; and the part which he acted was the more remarkable,
considering the high commission of General Clarke.[276]
The articles in the treaty of Leoben remained long
TREATY OF secret; the cause of which appears to have been, that the
LEOBEN.
high contracting parties were not willing comparisons
should be made between the preliminaries as they were originally settled,
and the strange and violent altercations which occurred in the definitive
treaty of Campo Formio. These two treaties of pacification differed, the one
from the other, in relation to the degree and manner how a meditated
partition of the territory of Venice, of the Cisalpine republic, and other
smaller powers was to be accomplished, for the mutual benefit of France
and Austria. It is melancholy to observe, but it is nevertheless an important

truth, that there is no moment during which independent states of the
second class have more occasion to be alarmed for their security, than when
more powerful nations in their vicinity are about to conclude peace. It is so
easy to accommodate these differences of the strong at the expense of such
weaker states, as, if they are injured, have neither the power of making their
complaints heard, nor of defending themselves by force, that, in the iron age
in which it has been our fate to live, the injustice of such an arrangement
has never been considered as offering any counterpoise to its great
convenience, whatever the law of nations might teach to the contrary.
It is unnecessary to enter upon the subject of the preliminaries of Leoben,
until we notice the treaty of Campo Formio, under which they were finally
modified, and by which they were adjusted and controlled. It may be,
however, the moment to state, that Buonaparte was considerably blamed, by
the Directory and others, for stopping short in the career of conquest, and
allowing the House of Austria terms which left her still formidable to
France, when, said the censors, it would have cost him but another victory
to blot the most constant and powerful enemy of the French Republic out of
the map of Europe; or, at least, to confine her to her hereditary states in
Germany. To such criticism he replied, in a despatch to the Directory from
Leoben, during the progress of the treaty: "If, at the commencement of
these Italian campaigns, I had made a point of going to Turin, I should
never have passed the Po—had I insisted prematurely on advancing to
Rome, I could never have secured Milan—and now, had I made an
indispensable object of reaching Vienna, I might have destroyed the
Republic."[277]
Such was his able and judicious defence of a conduct, which, by stopping
short of some ultimate and extreme point apparently within his grasp,
extracted every advantage from fear, which despair perhaps might not have
yielded him, if the enemy had been driven to extremity. And it is
remarkable, that the catastrophe of Napoleon himself was a corollary of the
doctrine which he now laid down; for, had he not insisted upon penetrating
to Moscow, there is no judging how much longer he might have held the
empire of France.
The contents of the treaty of Leoben, so far as they were announced to the
representatives of the French nation by the Directory, only made known, as

part of the preliminaries, that the cession of the Belgic provinces, and of
such a boundary as France might choose to demand upon the Rhine, had
been admitted by Austria; and that she had consented to recognise a single
republic in Italy, to be composed out of those which had been provisionally
established. But shortly afterwards it transpired, that Mantua, the subject of
so much and such bloody contest, and the very citadel of Italy, as had
appeared from the events of these sanguinary campaigns, was to be
resigned to Austria, from whose tenacious grasp it had been wrenched with
so much difficulty. This measure was unpopular; and it will be found that
Buonaparte had the ingenuity, in the definitive treaty of peace, to substitute
an indemnification, which he ought not to have given, and which was
certainly the last which the Austrians should have accepted.
It was now the time for Venice to tremble. She had
VENICE. declared against the French in their absence; her
vindictive population had murdered many of them; the
April 9 resentment of the French soldiers was excited to the
utmost, and the Venetians had no right to reckon upon
the forbearance of their general. The treaty of Leoben left the Senate of that
ancient state absolutely without support; nay, as they afterwards learned,
Austria, after pleading their cause for a certain time, had ended by
stipulating for a share of their spoils, which had been assigned to her by a
secret article of the treaty. The doom of the oligarchy was pronounced ere
Buonaparte had yet traversed the Noric and Julian Alps, for the purpose of
enforcing it. By a letter to the doge, dated from the capital of Upper Styria,
Napoleon, bitterly upbraiding the Senate for requiting his generosity with
treachery and ingratitude, demanded that they should return by his aide-de-
camp who bore the letter, their instant choice betwixt war and peace, and
allowing them only four-and-twenty hours to disperse their insurgent
peasantry, and submit to his clemency.[278]
Junot, introduced into the Senate, made the threats of his master ring in the
astounded ears of the members, and by the blunt and rough manner of a
soldier, who had risen from the ranks, added to the dismay of the trembling
nobles. The Senate returned a humble apology to Buonaparte, and
despatched agents to deprecate his wrath. These envoys were doomed to
experience one of those scenes of violence which were in some degree
natural to this extraordinary man, but to which in certain cases he seems to

have designedly given way, in order to strike consternation into those whom
he addressed. "Are the prisoners at liberty?" he said, with a stern voice, and
without replying to the humble greetings of the terrified envoys. They
answered with hesitation that they had liberated the French, the Polish, and
the Brescians, who had been made captive in the insurrectionary war. "I will
have them all—all!" exclaimed Buonaparte—"all who are in prison on
account of their political sentiments. I will go myself to destroy your
dungeons on the Bridge of Tears—opinions shall be free—I will have no
Inquisition. If all the prisoners are not set at instant liberty, the English
envoy dismissed, the people disarmed, I declare instant war. I might have
gone to Vienna if I had listed—I have concluded a peace with the Emperor
—I have eighty thousand men, twenty gun-boats—I will hear of no
Inquisition, and no Senate either—I will dictate the law to you—I will
prove an Attila to Venice. If you cannot disarm your population, I will do it
in your stead—your government is antiquated—it must crumble to pieces."
[279]

While Buonaparte, in these disjointed yet significant threats, stood before
the deputies like the Argantes of Italy's heroic poet, and gave them the
choice of peace and war with the air of a superior being, capable at once to
dictate their fate, he had not yet heard of the massacre of Verona, or of the
batteries of a Venetian fort on the Lido having fired upon a French vessel,
which had run into the port to escape the pursuit of two armed Austrian
ships. The vessel was alleged to have been sunk, and the master and some
of the crew to have been killed. The news of these fresh aggressions did not
fail to aggravate his indignation to the highest pitch. The terrified deputies
ventured to touch with delicacy on the subject of pecuniary atonement.
Buonaparte's answer was worthy of a Roman. "If you could proffer me," he
said, "the treasures of Peru—if you could strew the whole district with gold,
it could not atone for the French blood which has been treacherously spilt."
[280]

Accordingly, on the 3d of May, Buonaparte declared
May 3. war against Venice, and ordered the French minister to
leave the city; the French troops, and those of the new
Italian republics, were at the same time commanded to advance, and to
destroy in their progress, wherever they found it displayed, the winged Lion

of Saint Mark, the ancient emblem of Venetian sovereignty. The declaration
is dated at Palma Nova.[281]
It had been already acted upon by the French who were on the Venetian
frontier, and by La Hotze, a remarkable character, who was then at the head
of the army of the Italian republics of the new model, and the forces of the
towns of Brescia and Bergamo, which aspired to the same independence.
This commander was of Swiss extraction; an excellent young officer, and at
that time enamoured of liberty on the French system, though he afterwards
saw so much reason to change his opinions, that he lost his life, as we may
have occasion to mention, fighting under the Austrian banners.
The terrified Senate of Venice proved unworthy descendants of the Zenos,
Dandolos, and Morosinis, as the defenders of Christendom, and the proud
opposers of Papal oppression. The best resource they could imagine to
themselves, was to employ at Paris those golden means of intercession
which Buonaparte had so sturdily rejected. Napoleon assures us, that they
found favour by means of these weighty arguments. The Directory, moved,
we are informed, by the motives of ten millions of French francs,
transmitted from Venice in bills of exchange, sent to the general of Italy
orders to spare the ancient senate and aristocracy. But the account of the
transaction, with the manner in which the remittances were distributed, fell
into the hands of Napoleon, by despatches intercepted at Milan. The
members of the French Government, whom these documents would have
convicted of peculation and bribery, were compelled to be silent; and
Buonaparte, availing himself of some chicanery as to certain legal
solemnities, took it on him totally to disregard the orders he had received.
The Senate of Venice, rather stupified than stimulated by the excess of their
danger, were holding on the 30th April, a sort of privy council in the
apartments of the doge, when a letter from the commandant of their flotilla
informed them, that the French were erecting fortifications on the low
grounds contiguous to the lagoons or shallow channels which divide from
the main-land and from each other the little isles on which the amphibious
mistress of the Adriatic holds her foundation; and proposing, in the blunt
style of a gallant sailor, to batter them to pieces about their ears before the
works could be completed.[282] Indeed, nothing would have been more easy
than to defend the lagoons against an enemy, who, notwithstanding

Napoleon's bravado, had not even a single boat. But the proposal, had it
been made to an abbess and a convent of nuns, could scarce have appeared
more extraordinary than it did to these degenerate nobles. Yet the sense of
shame prevailed; and though trembling for the consequences of the order
which they issued, the Senate directed that the admiral should proceed to
action.[283] Immediately after the order was received, their deliberations
were interrupted by the thunder of the cannon on either side—the Venetian
gun-boats pouring their fire on the van of the French army, which had
begun to arrive at Fusini.
To interrupt these ominous sounds, two plenipotentiaries were despatched
to make intercession with the French general; and, to prevent delay, the
doge himself undertook to report the result.
The Grand Council was convoked on the 1st of May, when the doge, pale in
countenance, and disconcerted in demeanour, proposed, as the only means
of safety, the admission of some democratic modifications into their forms,
under the direction of General Buonaparte; or, in other words, to lay their
institutions at the feet of the conqueror, to be remodelled at his pleasure. Of
six hundred and nineteen patricians, only twenty-one dissented from a vote
which inferred the absolute surrender of their constitution. The conditions
to be agreed on were, indeed, declared subject to the revision of the
Council; but this, in the circumstances, could only be considered as a clause
intended to save appearances. The surrender must have been regarded as
unconditional and total.[284]
Amidst the dejection and confusion which possessed the Government, some
able intriguer (the secretary, it was said, of the French ambassador at
Venice, whose principal had been recalled) contrived to induce the Venetian
Government to commit an act of absolute suicide, so as to spare Buonaparte
the trouble and small degree of scandal which might attach to totally
destroying the existence of the republic.
On the 9th of May, as the committee of the Great Council were in close
deliberation with the doge, two strangers intruded upon those councils,
which heretofore—such was the jealous severity of the oligarchy—were
like those of supernatural beings; those who looked on them died. But now,
affliction, confusion, and fear, had withdrawn the guards from these secret

and mysterious chambers and laid open to the intrusion of strangers those
stern haunts of a suspicious oligarchy, where, in other days, an official or
lictor of the Government might have been punished with death even for too
loud a foot-fall, far more for the fatal crime of having heard more than was
designed to come to his knowledge. All this was now ended; and without
check or rebuke the two strangers were permitted to communicate with the
Senate by writing. Their advice, which had the terms of a command, was, to
anticipate the intended reforms of the French—to dissolve the present
Government—throw open their prisons—disband their Sclavonian soldiers
—plant the tree of liberty on the place of Saint Mark, and to take other
popular measures of the same nature, the least of which, proposed but a few
months before, would have been a signal of death to the individual who had
dared to hint at it.[285]
An English satirist has told us a story of a man persuaded by an eloquent
friend, to hang himself, in order to preserve his life. The story of the fall of
Venice vindicates the boldness of the satire. It does not appear that
Buonaparte could have gone farther; nay, it seems unlikely he would have
gone so far, as was now recommended.
As the friendly advisers had hinted that the utmost speed was necessary, the
committee scarce interposed an interval of three days, between receiving
the advice and recommending it to the Great Council; and began in the
meanwhile to anticipate the destruction of their government and surrender
of their city, by dismantling their fleet and disbanding their soldiers.
At length, the Great Council assembled on the 12th of May. The doge had
commenced a pathetic discourse on the extremities to which the country
was reduced, when an irregular discharge of fire-arms took place under the
very windows of the council-house. All started up in confusion. Some
supposed the Sclavonians were plundering the citizens; some that the lower
orders had risen on the nobility; others, that the French had entered Venice,
and were proceeding to sack and pillage it. The terrified and timid
counsellors did not wait to inquire what was the real cause of the
disturbance, but hurried forward, like sheep, in the path which had been
indicated to them. They hastened to despoil their ancient government of all
authority, to sign in a manner its sentence of civil death—added every thing
which could render the sacrifice more agreeable to Buonaparte—and

separated in confusion, but under the impression that they had taken the
best measure in their power for quelling the tumult, by meeting the wishes
of the predominant party. But this was by no means the case. On the
contrary, they had the misfortune to find that the insurrection, of which the
firing was the signal, was directed not against the aristocrats, but against
those who proposed the surrender of the national independence. Armed
bands shouted, "Long live Saint Mark, and perish foreign domination!"
Others indeed there were, who displayed in opposition three-coloured
banners, with the war-cry of "Liberty for ever!" The disbanded and
mutinous soldiers mixed among these hostile groups, and threatened the
town with fire and pillage.[286]
Amid this horrible confusion, and while the parties were firing on each
other, a provisional government was hastily named. Boats were despatched
to bring three thousand French soldiers into the city. These took possession
of the place of Saint Mark,[287] while some of the inhabitants shouted; but
the greater part, who were probably not the less sensible of the execrable
tyranny of the old aristocracy, saw it fall in mournful silence, because there
fell along with the ancient institutions of their country, however little some
of these were to be regretted, the honour and independence of the state
itself.
The terms which the French granted, or rather imposed, appeared
sufficiently moderate, so far as they were made public. They announced,
that the foreign troops would remain so long, and no longer, than might be
necessary to protect the peace of Venice[288]—they undertook to guarantee
the public debt, and the payment of the pensions allowed to the
impoverished gentry. They required, indeed, the continuance of the
prosecution against the commander of that fort of Luco who had fired on
the French vessel; but all other offenders were pardoned, and Buonaparte
afterwards suffered even this affair to pass into oblivion; which excited
doubt whether the transaction had ever been so serious as had been alleged.
Five secret and less palatable articles attended these avowed conditions.
One provided for the various exchanges of territory which had been already
settled at the Venetian expense betwixt Austria and France. The second and
third stipulated the payment of three millions of francs in specie, and as
many in naval stores. Another prescribed the cession of three ships of war,

and of two frigates, armed and equipped. A fifth ratified the exaction, in the
usual style of French cupidity, of twenty pictures and five hundred
manuscripts.[289]
It will be seen hereafter what advantages the Venetians purchased by all
these unconscionable conditions. At the moment, they understood that the
stipulations were to imply a guarantee of the independent existence of their
country as a democratical state. In the meanwhile, the necessity for raising
the supplies to gratify the rapacity of the French, obliged the provisional
government to have recourse to forced loans; and in this manner they
inhospitably plundered the Duke of Modena (who had fled to Venice for
refuge when Buonaparte first entered Lombardy) of his remaining treasure,
amounting to one hundred and ninety thousand sequins.

CHAPTER X.
Napoleon's Amatory Correspondence with Josephine—His
Court at Montebello—Negotiations and Pleasure mingled there
—Genoa—Revolutionary spirit of the Genoese—They rise in
insurrection, but are quelled by the Government, and the French
plundered and imprisoned—Buonaparte interferes, and appoints
the Outlines of a new Government—Sardinia—Naples—The
Cispadane, Transpadane, and Emilian Republics, united under
the name of the Cisalpine Republic—The Valteline—The
Grisons—The Valteline united to Lombardy—Great
improvement of Italy, and the Italian Character, from these
changes—Difficulties in the way of Pacification betwixt France
and Austria—The Directory and Napoleon take different Views
—Treaty of Campo Formio—Buonaparte takes leave of the
Army of Italy, to act as French Plenipotentiary at Rastadt.
When peace returns, it brings back the domestic affections, and affords the
means of indulging them. Buonaparte was yet a bridegroom, though he had
now been two years married, and upwards. A part of his correspondence
with his bride has been preserved, and gives a curious picture of a
temperament as fiery in love as in war. The language of the conqueror, who
was disposing of states at his pleasure, and defeating the most celebrated
commanders of the time, is as enthusiastic as that of an Arcadian. We
cannot suppress the truth, that (in passages which we certainly shall not
quote) it carries a tone of indelicacy, which, notwithstanding the intimacy of
the married state, an English husband would not use, nor an English wife
consider as the becoming expression of connubial affection. There seems no
doubt, however, that the attachment which these letters indicate was
perfectly sincere, and on one occasion at least, it was chivalrously
expressed;—"Wurmser shall buy dearly the tears which he makes you
shed."[290]
It appears from this correspondence that Josephine had rejoined her
husband, under the guardianship of Junot, when he returned from Paris,

after having executed his mission of delivering to the Directory, and
representatives of the French people, the banners and colours taken from
Beaulieu. In December, 1796, Josephine was at Genoa, where she was
received with studied magnificence, by those in that ancient state who
adhered to the French interest, and where, to the scandal of the rigid
Catholics, the company continued assembled, at a ball given by M. de
Serva, till a late hour on Friday morning, despite the presence of a senator
having in his pocket, but not venturing to enforce, a decree of the senate for
the better observation of the fast day upon the occasion. These, however,
were probably only occasional visits; but after the signature of the treaty of
Leoben, and during the various negotiations which took place before it was
finally adjusted, as ratified at Campo Formio, Josephine lived in domestic
society with her husband, at the beautiful seat, or rather palace, of
Montebello.
This villa, celebrated from the important negotiations of which it was the
scene, is situated a few leagues from Milan, on a gently sloping hill, which
commands an extensive prospect over the fertile plains of Lombardy. The
ladies of the highest rank, as well as those celebrated for beauty and
accomplishments,—all, in short, who could add charms to society,—were
daily paying their homage to Josephine, who received them with a felicity
of address which seemed as if she had been born for exercising the high
courtesies that devolved upon the wife of so distinguished a person as
Napoleon.
Negotiations proceeded amid gaiety and pleasure. The
COURT AT various ministers and envoys of Austria, of the Pope, of
MONTEBELLO.
the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, of the Duke of
Parma, of the Swiss Cantons, of several of the Princes of Germany,—the
throng of generals, of persons in authority, of deputies of towns,—with the
daily arrival and despatch of numerous couriers, the bustle of important
business, mingled with fêtes and entertainments, with balls and with
hunting parties,—gave the picture of a splendid court, and the assemblage
was called accordingly, by the Italians, the Court of Montebello. It was such
in point of importance; for the deliberations agitated there were to regulate
the political relations of Germany, and decide the fate of the King of
Sardinia, of Switzerland, of Venice, of Genoa: all destined to hear from the

voice of Napoleon, the terms on which their national existence was to be
prolonged or terminated.
Montebello was not less the abode of pleasure. The sovereigns of this
diplomatic and military court made excursions to the lago Maggiore, to lago
di Como, to the Borromean islands, and occupied at pleasure the villas
which surround those delicious regions. Every town, every village, desired
to distinguish itself by some peculiar mark of homage and respect to him,
whom they then named the Liberator of Italy.[291] These expressions are in a
great measure those of Napoleon himself, who seems to have looked back
on this period of his life with warmer recollections of pleasurable
enjoyment than he had experienced on any other occasion.
It was probably the happiest time of his life. Honour, beyond that of a
crowned head, was his own, and had the full relish of novelty to a mind
which two or three years before was pining in obscurity. Power was his, and
he had not experienced its cares and risks; high hopes were formed of him
by all around, and he had not yet disappointed them. He was in the flower
of youth, and married to the woman of his heart. Above all, he had the glow
of Hope, which was marshalling him even to more exalted dominion; and
he had not yet become aware that possession brings satiety, and that all
earthly desires and wishes terminate, when fully attained, in vanity and
vexation of spirit.
The various objects which occupied Buonaparte's mind during this busy yet
pleasing interval, were the affairs of Genoa, of Sardinia, of Naples, of the
Cisalpine republic, of the Grisons, and lastly, and by far the most important
of them, the definitive treaty with Austria, which involved the annihilation
of Venice as an independent state.
Genoa, the proud rival of Venice, had never attained the
GENOA. same permanent importance with that sister republic;
but her nobility, who still administered her government
according to the model assigned them by Andrew Doria, preserved more
national spirit, and a more warlike disposition. The neighbourhood of
France, and the prevalence of her opinions, had stirred up among the
citizens of the middling class a party, taking the name of Morandists, from a
club so termed,[292] whose object it was to break down the oligarchy, and

revolutionize the government. The nobles were naturally opposed to this,
and a large body of the populace much employed by them, and strict
Catholics, were, ready to second them in their defence.
The establishment of two Italian democracies upon the Po, made the
Genoese revolutionists conceive the time was arrived when their own state
ought to pass through a similar ordeal of regeneration. They mustered their
strength, and petitioned the doge for the abolition of the government as it
existed, and the adoption of a democratic model. The doge condescended so
far to their demand, as to name a committee of nine persons, five of them of
plebeian birth, to consider and report on the means of infusing a more
popular spirit into the constitution.[293]
The three chief Inquisitors of State, or Censors, as the actual rulers of the
oligarchy were entitled, opposed the spirit of religious enthusiasm to that of
democratic zeal. They employed the pulpit and the confessional as the
means of warning good Catholics against the change demanded by the
Morandists—they exposed the Holy Sacrament, and made processions and
public prayers, as if threatened with a descent of the Algerines.
Meanwhile, the Morandists took up arms, displayed the
May 22. French colours, and conceiving their enterprise was on
the point of success, seized the gate of the arsenal and
that of the harbour. But their triumph was short. Ten thousand armed
labourers started as from out of the earth, under the command of their
syndics, or municipal officers, with cries of "Viva Maria!" and declared for
the aristocracy. The insurgents, totally defeated, were compelled to shut
themselves up in their houses, where they were assailed by the stronger
party, and finally routed. The French residing in Genoa were maltreated by
the prevailing party, their houses pillaged, and they themselves dragged to
prison.
The last circumstance gave Buonaparte an ostensible right to interfere,
which he would probably have done even had no such violence been
committed. He sent his aide-de-camp La Valette to Genoa, with the threat of
instantly moving against the city a division of his army, unless the prisoners
were set at liberty, the aristocratic party disarmed, and such alterations, or
rather such a complete change of government adopted, as should be

agreeable to the French commander-in-chief. Against this there was no
appeal. The inquisitors were laid under arrest, for having defended, with the
assistance of their fellow-citizens, the existing institutions of the state; and
the doge, with two other magistrates of the first rank, went to learn at
Montebello, the headquarters of Napoleon, what was to be the future fate of
the City, proudly called of Palaces.[294] They received the outlines of such a
democracy as Napoleon conceived suitable for them; and he appears to
have been unusually favourable to the state, which, according to the French
affectation of doing every thing upon a classical model, now underwent
revolutionary baptism, and was called the Ligurian Republic. It was
stipulated, that the French who had suffered should be indemnified; but no
contributions were exacted for the use of the French army, nor did the
collections and cabinets of Genoa pay any tribute to the Parisian Museum.
[295]

Shortly after, the democratic party having gone so far as
Nov. 11. to exclude the nobles from the government, and from
all offices of trust, called down by doing so a severe
admonition from Buonaparte. He discharged them to offend the prejudices,
or insult the feelings of the more scrupulous Catholics, declaring farther,
that to exclude those of noble birth from public functions, is a revolting
piece of injustice, and, in fact, as criminal as the worst of the errors of the
patricians.[296] Buonaparte says, he felt a partiality for Genoa; and the
comparative liberality with which he treated the state on this occasion,
furnishes a good proof that he did so.
The King of Sardinia had been prostrated at the feet of France by the
armistice of Cherasco, which concluded Napoleon's first campaign; and that
sagacious leader had been long desirous that the Directory should raise the
royal supplicant (for he could be termed little else) into some semblance of
regal dignity, so as to make his power available as an ally. Nay, General
Clarke had, 5th April, 1797, subscribed, with the representative of his
Sardinian Majesty, a treaty offensive and defensive, by which Napoleon
expected to add to the army under his command four thousand Sardinian or
Piedmontese infantry, and five hundred cavalry; and he reckoned much on
this contingent, in case of the war being renewed with Austria. But the
Directory shifted and evaded his solicitations, and declined confirming this
treaty, probably because they considered the army under his command as

already sufficiently strong, being, as the soldiers were, so devoted to their
leader. At length, however, the treaty was ratified, but too late to serve
Buonaparte's object.
Naples, whose conduct had been vacillating and insincere, as events seemed
to promise victory or threaten defeat to the French general, experienced,
notwithstanding, when he was in the height of triumph, the benefit of his
powerful intercession with the government, and retained the full advantage
secured to her by the treaty of Paris of 10th October, 1796.
A most important subject of consideration remained after the pacification of
Italy, respecting the mode in which the new republics were to be governed,
and the extent of territory which should be assigned to them. On this
subject, there had been long discussions; and as there was much animosity
and ancient grudge betwixt some of the Italian cities and provinces, it was
no very easy matter to convince them, that their true interest lay in as many
of them being united under one energetic and active government as should
render them a power of some importance, instead of being divided as
heretofore into petty states, which could not offer effectual resistance even
to invasion on the part of a power of the second class, much more if
attacked by France or Austria.
The formation of a compact and independent state in the north of Italy, was
what Napoleon had much at heart. But the Cispadane and Transpadane
republics were alike averse to a union, and that of Romagna had declined
on its part a junction with the Cispadane commonwealth, and set up for a
puny and feeble independence, under the title of the Emilian Republic.
Buonaparte was enabled to overcome these grudgings and heart-burnings,
by pointing out to them the General Republic, which it was now his system
to create, as being destined to form the kernel of a state which should be
enlarged from time to time as opportunities offered, until it should include
all Italy under one single government. This flattering prospect, in assigning
to Italy, though at some distant date, the probability of forming one great
country, united in itself, and independent of the rest of Europe, instead of
being, as now, parcelled out into petty states, naturally overcame all the
local dislikes and predilections which might have prevented the union of the
Cispadane, Transpadane, and Emilian republics into one, and that important
measure was resolved upon accordingly.

The Cisalpine republic was the name fixed upon to
CISALPINE designate the united commonwealth. The French would
REPUBLIC.
more willingly have named it, with respect to Paris, the
Transalpine republic; but that would have been innovating upon the ancient
title which Rome has to be the central point, with reference to which, all
other parts of Italy assume their local description. It would have destroyed
all classical propriety, and have confused historical recollections, if, what
had hitherto been called the Ultramontane side of the Alps, had, to gratify
Parisian vanity, been termed the Hither side of the same chain of mountains.
The constitution assigned to the Cisalpine republic, was the same which the
French had last of all adopted, in what they called the year five, having a
Directory of executive administrators, and two Councils. They were
installed upon the 30th of June, 1797. Four members of the Directory were
named by Buonaparte, and the addition of a fifth was promised with all
convenient speed. On the 14th of July following, a review was made of
thirty thousand national guards. The fortresses of Lombardy, and the other
districts, were delivered up to the local authorities, and the French army,
retiring from the territories of the new republic, took up cantonments in the
Venetian states. Proclamation had already been made, that the states
belonging to the Cisalpine republic having been acquired by France by the
right of conquest, she had used her privilege to form them into their present
free and independent government, which, already recognised by the
Emperor and the Directory, could not fail to be acknowledged within a short
time by all the other powers of Europe.[297]
Buonaparte soon after showed that he was serious in his
TREATY OF design of enlarging the Cisalpine republic, as
CAMPO-FORMIO.
opportunity could be made to serve. There are three
valleys, termed the Valteline districts, which run down from the Swiss
mountains towards the lake of Como. The natives of the Valteline are about
one hundred and sixty thousand souls. They speak Italian, and are chiefly of
the Catholic persuasion. These valleys were at this period the subjects of the
Swiss Cantons, called the Grisons, not being a part of their league, or
enjoying any of their privileges, but standing towards the Swiss community,
generally and individually, in the rank of vassals to sovereigns. This
situation of thraldom and dependence was hard to endure, and
dishonourable in itself; and we cannot be surprised that, when the nations

around them were called upon to enjoy liberty and independence, the
inhabitants of the Valteline should have driven their Swiss garrisons out of
their valleys, adopted the symbol of Italian freedom, and carried their
complaints against the oppression of their German and Protestant masters to
the feet of Buonaparte.
The inhabitants of the Valteline unquestionably had a right to assert their
natural liberty, which is incapable of suffering prescription; but it is not
equally clear how the French could, according to the law of nations, claim
any title to interfere between them and the Grisons, with whom, as well as
with the whole Swiss Union, they were in profound peace. This scruple
seems to have struck Buonaparte's own mind.[298] He pretended, however,
to assume that the Milanese government had a right to interfere, and his
mediation was so far recognised, that the Grisons pleaded before him in
answer to their contumacious vassals. Buonaparte gave his opinion, by
advising the canton of the Grisons, which consists of three leagues, to admit
their Valteline subjects to a share of their franchises, in the character of a
fourth association. The moderation of the proposal may be admitted to
excuse the irregularity of the interference.
The representatives of the Grey League, were, notwithstanding, profoundly
hurt at a proposal which went to make their vassals their brother-freemen,
and to establish the equality of the Italian serf, who drank of the Adda, with
the free-born Switzer, who quaffed the waters of the Rhine. As they turned a
deaf ear to his proposal, deserted his tribunal, and endeavoured to find
support at Bern, Paris, Vienna, and elsewhere, Napoleon resolved to
proceed against them in default of appearance; and declaring, that as the
Grisons had failed to appear before him, or to comply with his injunctions,
by admitting the people of the Valteline to be parties to their league, he
therefore adjudged the state, or district, of the Valteline, in time coming, to
belong to, and be part of, the Cisalpine republic. The Grisons in vain
humbled themselves when it was too late, and protested their readiness to
plead before a mediator too powerful to be declined under any ground
known in law; and the Valteline territory was adjudged [October 10]
inalienably annexed to and united with Lombardy; of which, doubtless, it
forms, from manners and contiguity, a natural portion.[299]

The existence of a state having free institutions, however imperfect, seemed
to work an almost instant amelioration on the character of the people of the
north of Italy. The effeminacy and trifling habits which resigned all the
period of youth to intrigue and amusement, began to give place to firmer
and more manly virtues—to the desire of honourable minds to distinguish
themselves in arts and arms.[300] Buonaparte had himself said, that twenty
years would be necessary to work a radical change on the national character
of the Italians; but even already those seeds were sown, among a people
hitherto frivolous because excluded from public business, and timorous
because they were not permitted the use of arms, which afterwards made
the Italians of the north equal the French themselves in braving the terrors
of war, besides producing several civil characters of eminence.
Amid those subordinate discussions, as they might be termed, in
comparison to the negotiations betwixt Austria and France, these two high
contracting parties found great difficulty in agreeing as to the pacific
superstructure which they should build upon the foundation which had been
laid by the preliminaries exchanged at Leoben. Nay, it seemed as if some of
the principal stipulations, which had been there agreed upon as the corner-
stones of their treaty, were even already beginning to be unsettled.
It will be remembered, that, in exchange for the cession of Flanders, and of
all the countries on the left side of the Rhine, including the strong city of
Mayence, which she was to yield up to France in perpetuity, Austria
stipulated an indemnification on some other frontier. The original project
bore, that the Lombardic republic, since termed the Cisalpine, should have
all the territories extending from Piedmont to the river Oglio. Those to the
eastward of that river were to be ceded to Austria as an equivalent for the
cession of Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine. The Oglio, rising in the
Alps, descends through the fertile districts of Brescia and Cremasco, and
falls into the Po near Borgo-forte, enclosing Mantua on its left bank, which
strong fortress, the citadel of Italy, was, by this allocation, to be restored to
Austria. There were farther compensations assigned to the Emperor, by the
preliminaries of Leoben. Venice was to be deprived of her territories on the
mainland, which were to be confiscated to augment the indemnity destined
for the empire; and this, although Venice, as far as Buonaparte yet knew,
had been faithful to the neutrality she had adopted. To redeem this piece of
injustice, another was to be perpetrated. The state of Venice was to receive

the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, in lieu of the dominions
which she was to cede to Austria; and these legations, it must not be
forgotten, were the principal materials of the Cispadane republic, founded
by Buonaparte himself. These, however, with their population, which he
had led to hope for a free popular government, he was now about to turn
over to the dominion of Venice, the most jealous oligarchy in the world,
which was not likely to forgive those who had been forward in expressing a
desire of freedom. This was the first concoction of the treaty of Leoben,
from which it appears that the negotiators of the two great powers regarded
the secondary and weaker states, whether ancient or of modern erection,
merely as make-weights, to be thrown into either scale, as might be
necessary to adjust the balance.
It is true, the infant Cispadane republic escaped the fate to which its patron
and founder was about to resign it; for after this arrangement had been
provisionally adjusted, news came of the insurrection of Venice, the attack
upon the French through her whole territory, and the massacre at Verona.
This aggression placed the ancient republic, so far as France was concerned,
in the light of a hostile power, and entitled Buonaparte to deal with her as a
conquered one, perhaps to divide, or altogether to annihilate her. But, on the
other hand, he had received their submission, ratified the establishment of
their new popular constitution, and possessed himself of the city, under
pretence of assigning it a free government, according to the general hope
which he had held out to Italy at large. The right of conquest was limited by
the terms on which surrender had been accepted. Austria, on the other hand,
was the more deeply bound to have protected the ancient republic, for it
was in her cause that Venice so rashly assumed arms; but such is the
gratitude of nations, such the faith of politicians, that she appears, from the
beginning, to have had no scruple in profiting by the spoils of an ally, who
had received a death-wound in her cause.
By the time the negotiators met for finally discussing the preliminaries, the
Directory of France, either to thwart Buonaparte, whose superiority became
too visible, or because they actually entertained the fears they expressed,
were determined that Mantua, which had been taken with such difficulty,
should remain the bulwark of the Cisalpine republic, instead of returning to
be once more that of the Austrian territories in Italy. The Imperial
plenipotentiaries insisted, on the other hand, that Mantua was absolutely

necessary to the safety of their Italian possessions, and became more so
from the peculiar character of their new neighbour, the Cisalpine republic,
whose example was likely to be so perilous to the adjacent dependencies of
an ancient monarchy. To get over this difficulty, the French general
proposed that the remaining dominions of Venice should be also divided
betwixt Austria and France, the latter obtaining possession of the Albanian
territories and the Ionian islands belonging to the republic, of which the
high contracting powers signed the death-warrant; while Istria, Dalmatia,
Venice herself, and all her other dominions, should be appropriated to
Austria. The latter power, through her minister, consented to this
arrangement with as little scruple, as to the former appropriation of her
forlorn ally's possessions on the Terra Firma.
But as fast as obstacles were removed on one side, they appeared to start up
on another, and a sort of pause ensued in the deliberations, which neither
party seemed to wish to push to a close. In fact, both Napoleon,
plenipotentiary for France, and Count Cobentzel,[301] a man of great
diplomatic skill and address, who took the principal management on the
part of Austria, were sufficiently aware that the French government, long
disunited, was in the act of approaching to a crisis. This accordingly took
place, under circumstances to be hereafter noticed, on the eighteenth of
Fructidor, creating, by a new revolutionary movement, a total change of
administration. When this revolution was accomplished, the Directory, who
accomplished it, feeling themselves more strong, appeared to lay aside the
idea of peace, and showed a strong disposition to push their advantages to
the utmost.
Buonaparte was opposed to this. He knew that if war was resumed, the
difficulties of the campaign would be thrown on him, and the blame also, if
the results were not happy. He was determined, therefore, in virtue of his
full powers, to bring the matter to a conclusion, whether the Directory
would or not. For this purpose he confronted Cobentzel, who still saw his
game in gaining delay, with the sternness of a military envoy. On the 16th
October, the conferences were renewed upon the former grounds, and
Cobentzel went over the whole subject of the indemnifications—insisting
that Mantua, and the line of the Adige, should be granted to the Emperor;
threatening to bring down the Russians in case the war should be renewed;
and insinuating that Buonaparte sacrificed the desire of peace to his military

fame, and desired a renewal of the war. Napoleon, with stern but restrained
indignation, took from a bracket an ornamental piece of china, on which
Cobentzel set some value, as being a present from the Empress Catherine.
"The truce," he said, "is then ended, and war declared. But beware—before
the end of autumn, I will break your empire into as many fragments as this
potsherd."[302] He dashed the piece of china against the hearth, and
withdrew abruptly. Again we are reminded of the Argantes of Tasso.[303]
The Austrian plenipotentiaries no longer hesitated to submit to all
Napoleon's demands, rather than again see him commence his tremendous
career of irresistible invasion. The treaty of Campo Formio therefore was
signed on the following day; not the less promptly, perhaps, that the affairs
at Paris appeared so doubtful as to invite an ambitious and aspiring man like
Napoleon to approach the scene where honours and power were distributed,
and where jarring factions seemed to await the influence of a character so
distinguished and so determined.
The fate of Venice, more from her ancient history than either the value of
her institutions, which were execrable, or the importance of her late
existence, still dwells somewhat on the memory. The ancient republic fell
"as a fool dieth." The aristocrats cursed the selfishness of Austria, by whom
they were swallowed up, though they had perilled themselves in her cause.
The republicans hastened to escape from Austrian domination, grinding
their teeth with rage, and cursing no less the egotistic policy of the French,
who, making a convenient pretext of their interest, had pretended to assign
them a free constitution, and then resigned them to become the vassals of a
despotic government.
The French secretary of legation, who had played a remarkably active part
during the Revolution, hazarded a remonstrance to Buonaparte on the
surrender of Venice to Austria, instead of its being formed into a free
democracy, or united with the Cisalpine republic.[304] Buonaparte laughed
to scorn a man, whose views were still fixed on diffusing and propagating
the principles of Jacobinism. "I have received your letter," was the stern and
contemptuous reply, "and cannot comprehend it. The Republic of France is
not bound by any treaty, to sacrifice its interests and advantages to the
Committee of Public Safety in Venice, or to any other class of individuals.
France does not make war in behalf and for the benefit of others.[305] I

know it costs nothing for a few chattering declaimers, whom I might better
describe as madmen, to talk of a universal republic—I wish they would try
a winter campaign. The Venetian republic exists no longer. Effeminate,
corrupted, treacherous, and hypocritical, the Venetians are unfit for liberty.
If she has the spirit to appreciate, or courage to assert it, the time is not
unfavourable—let her stand up for it."[306] Thus, with insult added to
misery, and great contempt thrown by Napoleon on the friends of liberty all
over the world, the fate of Venice was closed. The most remarkable incident
of the final transfer to the Austrians was, that the aged Doge Marini dropt
down senseless as he was about to take the oath of allegiance to the
Imperial commissioner, and died shortly after.
Napoleon Buonaparte had now finished for the present
CONGRESS OF his career of destiny in Italy, which country first saw his
RASTADT.
rising talents, and was always a subject of peculiar
interest to him. He took an affecting leave of the
Nov. 12.
soldiers,[307] who could scarce hope ever to see him
replaced by a general of merits so transcendent, and made a moderate and
judicious address to the Cisalpine republic. Finally, he departed, to return
through Switzerland to Rastadt, where a congress was sitting for the
settlement and pacification of the German empire, and where he was to act
as a plenipotentiary on the part of France.[308]
On the journey he was observed to be moody and deeply contemplative.
The separation from a hundred thousand men whom he might call his own,
and the uncertainty of the future destinies to which he might be summoned,
are enough to account for this, without supposing, as some have done, that
he already had distinctly formed any of those projects of ambition which
Time opened to him. Doubtless, however, his ardent ambition showed him
remote and undefined visions of greatness. He could not but be sensible that
he returned to the capital of France in a situation which scarce admitted of
any mediocrity. He must either be raised to a yet more distinguished height,
or altogether broken down, levelled with the mass of subjects, and
consigned to comparative obscurity. There was no middle station for the
Conqueror and Liberator of Italy.

CHAPTER XI.
Retrospect—The Directory—they become unpopular—Causes of
their unpopularity—Also at enmity among themselves—State of
public feeling in France—In point of numbers, favourable to the
Bourbons; but the Army and monied Interest against them—
Pichegru, head of the Royalists, appointed President of the
Council of Five Hundred—Barbé Marbois, another Royalist,
President of the Council of Ancients—Directory throw
themselves upon the succour of Hoche and Buonaparte—
Buonaparte's personal Politics discussed—Pichegru's
Correspondence with the Bourbons—known to Buonaparte—He
despatches Augereau to Paris—Directory arrest their principal
Opponents in the Councils on the 18th Fructidor, and Banish
them to Guiana—Narrow and Impolitic Conduct of the
Directory to Buonaparte—Projected Invasion of England.
While the conqueror of Italy was pursuing his victories beyond the Alps, the
French Directory, in whose name he achieved them, had become, to the
conviction of all men, as unlikely to produce the benefits of a settled
government, as any of their predecessors vested with the supreme rule.
It is with politics as with mechanics, ingenuity is not
RETROSPECT. always combined with utility. Some one observed to the
late celebrated Mr. Watt, that it was wonderful for what
a number of useless inventions, illustrated by the most ingenious and
apparently satisfactory models, patents were yearly issued: he replied, that
he had often looked at them with interest, and had found several, the idea of
which had occurred to himself in the course of his early studies. "But," said
he, with his natural masculine sagacity, "it is one thing to make an
ingenious model, and another to contrive an engine which shall work its
task. Most of these pretty toys, when they are applied to practical purposes,
are found deficient in some point of strength, or correctness of mechanism,
which destroys all chance of their ever becoming long or generally useful."
Some such imperfection seems to have attended the works of these

speculative politicians who framed the various ephemeral constitutions of
France. However well they looked upon paper, and however reasonable
they sounded to the ear, no one ever thought of them as laws which required
veneration and obedience. Did a constitutional rule preclude a favourite
measure, to break it down, or leap over it, was the French statesman's
unhesitating practice. A rule was always devised applicable to
circumstances; and before that, the theory of the constitution was uniformly
made to give way.
The constitution of the year Three was not more
THE DIRECTORY. permanent than those by which it had been preceded.
For some time, the Directory, which contained men of
considerable talent, conducted themselves with great prudence. The
difficulty and danger of their situation served to prevent their separating, as
the weight put above an arch keeps the stones in their places. Their
exertions in the attempt to redeem the finances, support the war, and re-
establish the tranquillity of the country, were attended at first with success.
The national factions also sunk before them for a season. They had defeated
the aristocratic citizens of Paris on the 13th Vendemiaire; and when the
original revolutionists, or democrats, attempted a conspiracy, under the
conduct of Gracchus Babœuf,[309] their endeavours to seduce the troops
totally failed, and their lives paid the forfeit of their rash attempt to bring
back the Reign of Terror. Thus, the Directory, or executive power, under the
constitution of the year Three, were for a season triumphant over the
internal factions, and, belonging to neither, were in a situation to command
both.
But they had few who were really, and on principle, attached to their
government, and most endured it only as something better than a new
revolutionary movement, and otherwise in no respect eligible. To have
rendered their authority permanent, the Directory must have had great
unanimity in their own body, and also brilliant success abroad, and they
enjoyed neither one nor the other. The very concoction of their body
included the principles of disunion. They were a sort of five kings, retiring
from office by rotation, inhabiting each his separate class of apartments in
the Luxembourg palace, having each his different establishments, classes of
clients, circles of courtiers, flatterers, and instruments. The republican
simplicity, of late so essential to a patriot, was laid aside entirely. New

costumes of the most splendid kind were devised for the different office-
bearers of the state. This change took its rise from the weakness and vanity
of Barras, who loved show, and used to go a-hunting with all the formal
attendance of a prince. But it was an indulgence of luxury, which gave
scandal to both the great parties in the state;—the Republicans, who held it
altogether in contempt;—and the Royalists, who considered it as an
usurpation of the royal dress and appendages.[310]
The finances became continually more and more a subject of uneasiness. In
the days of terror, money was easily raised, because it was demanded under
pain of death, and assignats were raised to par by guillotining those who
bought or sold them at less than their full value; but the powerful argument
of violence and compulsion being removed, the paper money fell to a
ruinous discount, till its depression threatened, unless remedied, altogether
to stop the course of public business.[311] It perhaps arose from the
difficulty of raising supplies, that the Directory assumed towards other
countries a greedy, grasping, and rapacious character, which threw disgrace
at once upon the individuals who indulged it, and the state whom they
represented. They loaded with exactions the trade of the Bavarian republic,
whose freedom they had pretended to recognise, and treated with most
haughty superiority the ambassadors of independent states. Some of these
high officers, and Barras in particular, were supposed accessible to gross
corruption, and believed to hold communication with those agents and
stock-brokers, who raised money by jobbing in the public funds—a more
deservedly unpopular accusation than which can hardly be brought against
a minister. It was, indeed, a great error in the constitution, that, though one
hundred thousand livres were yearly allowed to each director while in
office, yet he had no subsequent provision after he had retired from his
fractional share of sovereignty. This penury, on the part of the public,
opened a way to temptation, though of a kind to which mean minds only are
obnoxious; and such men as Barras[312] were tempted to make provision for
futurity, by availing themselves of present opportunity.
Their five majesties (sires) of the Luxembourg, as people called them in
ridicule, had also their own individual partialities and favourite objects,
which led them in turn to tease the French people with unnecessary
legislation. La Reveillere-Lepaux was that inconsistent yet not uncommon
character, an intolerant philosopher and an enthusiastic deist. He established

a priesthood, and hymns and ceremonies for deism; and, taking up the
hopeful project of substituting a deistical worship for the Christian faith,
just where Robespierre had laid it down, he harassed the nation with laws to
oblige them to observe the decades of their new calendar as holidays, and to
work at their ordinary trades on the Christian Sabbath.[313] At La
Reveillere's theory freethinkers laughed, and religious men shuddered; but
all were equally annoyed by the legislative measures adopted on a subject
so ridiculous as this new ritual of heathenism.[314] Another cause of
vexation was the philosophical arrangement of weights and measures upon
a new principle, which had, in the meantime, the inconvenience of
introducing doubt and uncertainty into all the arrangements of internal
commerce, and deranging entirely such as France continued to hold with
countries who were only acquainted with the ordinary standard.[315]
It might have been thought that the distinguished success of the French
arms under the auspices of the Directory would have dazzled the eyes of the
French, attached as they have always been to military glory, and blinded
them to other less agreeable measures of their government. But the public
were well aware, that the most brilliant share of these laurels had been
reaped by Buonaparte on his own account; that he had received but slender
reinforcements from France—the magnitude of his achievements
considered; and that in regard to the instructions of government, much of
his success was owing to his departure from them, and following his own
course. It was also whispered, that he was an object of suspicion to the
directors, and on his part undervalued their talents, and despised their
persons. On the Rhine, again, though nothing could have been more
distinguished than the behaviour of the Republican armies, yet their
successes had been checkered with many reverses, and, contrasted with the
Italian campaigns, lost their impression on the imagination.
While they were thus becoming unpopular in the public opinion, the
Directory had the great misfortune to be at enmity among themselves. From
the time that Letourneur[316] retired from office in terms of the constitution,
and Barthelemy was elected in his stead, there was a majority and an
opposition in the Directory, the former consisting of Barras, Rewbel,[317]
and La Reveillere—the latter, of Carnot and Barthelemy. Of the two last,
Carnot (who had been, it may be remembered, a member of the Committee
of Public Safety under Robespierre) was a determined Republican, and

Barthelemy a Royalist;—so strangely do revolutionary changes, like the
eddies and currents of a swollen river, bring together and sweep down side
by side in the same direction, objects the most different and opposed.
Barthelemy of course dissented from the majority of the Directors, because
secretly and warmly he desired the restoration of the Bourbons—an event
which must have been fraught with danger to his colleagues, all of whom
had voted for the death of Louis XVI. Carnot also differed from the
majority, certainly with no such wish or view; but, his temper being as
overbearing as his genius was extensive, he was impatient of opposition,
especially in such cases where he knew he was acting wisely. He advised
strongly, for example, the ratification of the articles of Leoben, instead of
placing all which France had acquired, and all which she might lose, on the
last fatal cast with an enemy, strong in his very despair, and who might raise
large armies, while that of Buonaparte could neither be reinforced nor
supported in case of a reverse. Barras's anger on the occasion was so great,
that he told Carnot at the council-board, it was to him they owed that
infamous treaty of Leoben.
While the Directory were thus disunited among themselves, the nation
showed their dissatisfaction openly, and particularly in the two bodies of
representatives. The majority indeed of the Council of Elders adhered to the
Directory, many of that body belonging to the old republican partisans. But
in the more popularly composed Council of Five Hundred, the opposition to
the government possessed a great majority, all of whom were decidedly
against the Directory, and most of them impressed with the wish of
restoring, upon terms previously to be adjusted, the ancient race of
legitimate monarchs. This body of persons so thinking, was much increased
by the number of emigrants, who obtained, on various grounds, permission
to return to their native country after the fall of Robespierre. The forms of
civil life began now to be universally renewed; and, as had been the case in
France at all times, excepting during the bloody Reign of Terror, women of
rank, beauty, talent, and accomplishments, began again to resume their
places in society, and their saloons or boudoirs were often the scene of deep
political discourse, of a sort which in Britain is generally confined to the
cabinet, library, or dining-parlour. The wishes of many, or most of these
coteries, were in favour of royalty; the same feelings were entertained by
the many thousands who saw no possible chance of settling the nation on

any other model; and there is little doubt, that had France been permitted at
that moment an uninfluenced choice, the Bourbon family would have been
recalled to the throne by the great majority of the French people.
But, for reasons mentioned elsewhere, the military were the decided
opponents of the Bourbons, and the purchasers of national domains,
through every successive sale which might have taken place, were deeply
interested against their restoration. Numbers might be on the side of the
Royalists; but physical force, and the influence of wealth and of the monied
interest, were decidedly against them.
Pichegru might now be regarded as chief of the Royal
PICHEGRU. party. He was an able and successful general, to whom
France owed the conquest of Holland. Like La Fayette
and Dumouriez, he had been disgusted with the conduct of the Revolution;
and like the last of the two generals named, had opened a communication
with the Bourbons. He was accused of having suffered his army to be
betrayed in a defeat by Clairfait; and the government, in 1796, removed him
from the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, offering him in
exchange the situation of ambassador to Sweden. He declined this species
of honourable exile, and, retiring to Franche Compté, continued his
correspondence with the Imperial generals.[318] The Royalists expected
much from the countenance of a military man of a name so imposing; but
we have seen more than once in the course of these memoirs, that a general
without an army is like a hilt without the blade which it should wield and
direct.
An opportunity, however, offered Pichegru the means of serving his party in
a civil capacity, and that a most important one. The elections of May, 1797,
made to replace that proportion of the councils which retired by rotation,
terminated generally in favour of the Royalists, and served plainly to show
on which side the balance of popular feeling now leaned. Pichegru, who
had been returned as one of the deputies, was chosen by acclamation
President of the Council of Five Hundred, and Barbé Marbois, another
Royalist, was elected to the same office by the Council of Ancients, while,
as we have already said, Barthelemy likewise friendly to monarchy, was
introduced into the Directory.

These elections were evil signs for the Directory, who did not fail soon to
be attacked on every side, and upbraided with the continuance of the war
and the financial distresses. Various journals were at the disposal of the
party opposed to the majority of the directors, and hostilities were
commenced between the parties, both in the assemblies, where the
Royalists had the advantage, and in the public papers, where they were also
favourably listened to. The French are of an impatient temper, and could not
be long brought to carry on their warfare within the limits assigned by the
constitution. Each party, without much regard to the state of the law, looked
about for the means of physical force with which they might arm
themselves. The Directory, (that is, the majority of that body,) sensible of
their unpopularity, and the predominance of the opposite party, which
seemed for a time to have succeeded to the boldness and audacity of the
revolutionary class had, in their agony of extremity, recourse to the army,
and threw themselves upon the succour of Hoche and of Buonaparte.
We have elsewhere said, that Buonaparte at this period was esteemed a
steady Republican. Pichegru believed him to be such when he dissuaded the
Royalists from any attempt to gain over the General of Italy; and as he had
known him at school at Brienne, declared him of too stubborn a character to
afford the least hope of success. Augereau was of the same opinion, and
mistook his man so much, that when Madame de Staël asked whether
Buonaparte was not inclined to make himself King of Lombardy, he replied,
with great simplicity, "that he was a young man of too elevated a character."
[319] Perhaps Buonaparte himself felt the same for a moment, when, in a
despatch to the Directory, he requests their leave to withdraw from the
active service of the Republic, as one who had acquired more glory than
was consistent with happiness. "Calumny," he said, "may torment herself in
vain with ascribing to me treacherous designs. My civil, like my military
career, shall be conforming to republican principles."[320]
The public papers also, those we mean on the side of the Directory, fell into
a sort of rapture on the classical republican feelings by which Buonaparte
was actuated, which they said rendered the hope of his return a pleasure
pure and unmixed, and precluded the possibility of treachery or engrossing
ideas on his side. "The factious of every class," they said, "cannot have an
enemy more steady, or the government a friend more faithful, than he who,
invested with the military power of which he has made so glorious a use,

sighs only to resign a situation so brilliant, prefers happiness to glory, and
now that the Republic is graced with triumph and peace, desires for himself
only a simple and retired life."[321]
But though such were the ideas then entertained of Buonaparte's truly
republican character, framed, doubtless, on the model of Cincinnatus in his
classical simplicity, we may be permitted to look a little closer into the
ultimate views of him, who was admitted by his enemies and friends,
avouched by himself, and sanctioned by the journals, as a pure and
disinterested republican: and we think the following changes may be traced.
Whether Buonaparte was ever at heart a real Jacobin even for the moment,
may be greatly doubted, whatever mask his situation obliged him to wear.
He himself always repelled the charge as an aspersion. His engagement in
the affair of the Sections probably determined his opinions as Republican,
or rather Thermidorien, at the time, as became him by whom the
Republican army had been led and commanded on that day. Besides, at the
head of an army zealously republican, even his power over their minds
required to be strengthened, for some time at least, by an apparent
correspondence in political sentiments betwixt the troops and the general.
But in the practical doctrines of government which he recommended to the
Italian Republics, his ideas were studiously moderate, and he expressed the
strongest fear of, and aversion to, revolutionary doctrines. He recommended
the granting equal rights and equal privileges to the nobles, as well as to the
indignant vassals and plebeians who had risen against them. In a word, he
advocated a free set of institutions, without the intermediate purgatory of a
revolution. He was, therefore, at this period, far from being a Jacobin.
But though Buonaparte's wishes were thus wisely moderated by practical
views, he was not the less likely to be sensible that he was the object of
fear, of hatred, and of course of satire and misrepresentation, to that side of
the opposed parties in France which favoured royalty. Unhappily for
himself, he was peculiarly accessible to every wound of this nature, and,
anxiously jealous of his fame, suffered as much under the puny attacks of
the journalists,[322] as a noble steer or a gallant horse does amid his rich
pasture, under the persecutions of insects, which, in comparison to himself,
are not only impotent, but nearly invisible. In several letters to the
Directory, he exhibits feelings of this nature which would have been more

gracefully concealed, and evinces an irritability against the opposition
prints, which we think likely to have increased the zeal with which he came
forward on the Republican side at this important crisis.[323]
Another circumstance, which, without determining
INTRIGUES OF Buonaparte's conduct, may have operated in increasing
PICHEGRU.
his good-will to the cause which he embraced, was his
having obtained the clew of Pichegru's correspondence with the house of
Bourbon.[324] To have concealed this, would have been but a second rate
merit with the exiled family, whose first thanks must have been due to the
partisan whom he protected. This was no part for Buonaparte to play; not
that we have a right to say he would have accepted the chief character had it
been offered to him, but his ambition could never have stooped to any
inferior place in the drama. In all probability, his ideas fluctuated betwixt
the example of Cromwell and of Washington—to be the actual liberator, or
the absolute governor of his country.
His particular information respecting Pichegru's negotiations, was derived
from an incident at the capture of Venice.
When the degenerate Venetians, more under the impulse of vague terror
than from any distinct plan, adopted in haste and tumult the measure of
totally surrendering their constitution and rights, to be new modelled by the
French general after his pleasure, they were guilty of a gross and aggravated
breach of hospitality, in seizing the person and papers of the Comte
d'Entraigues,[325] agent or envoy of the exiled Bourbons, who was then
residing under their protection. The envoy himself, as Buonaparte alleges,
was not peculiarly faithful to his trust; but, besides his information, his
portfolio contained many proofs of Pichegru's correspondence with the
allied generals, and with the Bourbons, which placed his secret absolutely
in the power of the General of Italy, and might help to confirm the line of
conduct which he had already meditated to adopt.
Possessed of these documents, and sure that, in addressing a French army of
the day, he would swim with the tide if he espoused the side of
Republicanism, Buonaparte harangued his troops on the anniversary of the
taking the Bastille, in a manner calculated to awake their ancient
democratic enthusiasm:—"Soldiers, this is the 14th July! You see before

you the names of our companions in arms, dead in the field of honour for
the liberty of their country. They have set you an example; you owe your
lives to thirty millions of Frenchmen, and to the national name, which has
received new splendour from your victories. Soldiers! I am aware you are
deeply affected by the dangers which threaten the country. But she can be
subjected to none which are real. The same men who made France triumph
over united Europe, still live.—Mountains separate us from France, but you
would traverse them with the speed of eagles, were it necessary to maintain
the constitution, defend liberty, protect the Government and the
Republicans. Soldiers, the Government watches over the laws as a sacred
deposit committed to them. The Royalists shall only show themselves to
perish. Dismiss all inquietude, and let us swear by the manes of those
heroes who have died by our sides for liberty—let us swear, too, on our
standards—War to the enemies of the Republic, and of the Constitution of
the year Three!"[326]
It is needless to remark, that, under the British constitution, or any other
existing on fixed principles, the haranguing an armed body of soldiers, with
the purpose of inducing them to interfere by force in any constitutional
question, would be in one point of view mutiny, in another high treason.
The hint so distinctly given by the general, was immediately adopted by the
troops. Deep called to deep, and each division of the army, whatever its
denomination, poured forth its menaces of military force and compulsion
against the opposition party in the councils, who held opinions different
from those of their military chief, but which they had, at least hitherto, only
expressed and supported by those means of resistance which the
constitution placed in their power. In other words, the soldiers' idea of a
republic was, that the sword was to decide the constitutional debates, which
give so much trouble to ministers in a mixed or settled government. The
Pretorian bands, the Strelitzes, the Janissaries, have all in their turn
entertained this primitive and simple idea of reforming abuses in a state,
and changing, by the application of military force, an unpopular dynasty, or
an obnoxious ministry.
It was not by distant menaces alone that Buonaparte
AUGEREAU served the Directory at this important crisis. He
DESPATCHED TO
PARIS. despatched Augereau to Paris, ostensibly for the