Sun Tzŭ on the Art of War_ The Oldest Military Treatise in the World active 6th century B.C. Sunzi 3411 downloads.pdf

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Sun Tzŭ on the
Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the
World

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in
the United States and most other parts of the
world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-
use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg
License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of
the country where you are located before using
this eBook.

Title: Sun Tzŭ on the Art of War: The Oldest
Military Treatise in the World
Author: active 6th century B.C. Sunzi

Translator: Lionel Giles

Release date: November 11, 2021 [eBook
#66706]
Most recently updated: October 18,
2024

Language: English

Original publication: United Kingdom: Luzac &
Co., 1910

Other information and formats:
www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/66706

Credits: Ronald Grenier (This file was produced
from images generously made
available by the Internet
Archive/University of Toronto
libraries)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG
EBOOK SUN TZŬ ON THE ART OF WAR: THE
OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD
***
Transcriber’s Note

This is a complete unabridged transcription of Lionel Gile’s translation of The Art of War.
See additional notes at the end of the book.

法 兵 子 孫
SUN TZŬ
ON THE

ART OF WAR
THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

Translated from the Chinese with introduction and
critical notes

by

LIONEL GILES, M.A.
Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS. in the
British Museum

LONDON
LUZAC & Co.
1910

printed by e. j. bbill, Leyden (Holland).

To my brother
Captain Valentine Giles, R.G.
in the hope that
a work 2400 years old
may yet contain lessons worth consideration
by the soldier of to-day
this translation
is affectionately dedicated

CONTENTS

Page
Preface vii
Introduction
Sun Wu and his Book xi
The Text of Sun Tzŭ xxx
The Commentators xxxiv
Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ xlii
Apologies for War xliii
Bibliography l
Chap. I. Laying Plans 1
„ II. Waging War 9
„ III. Attack by Stratagem 17
„ IV. Tactical Dispositions 26
„ V. Energy 33
„ VI. Weak Points and Strong 42
„ VII. Manœuvring 55
„ VIII. Variation of Tactics 71

„ IX. The Army on the March 80
„ X. Terrain 100
„ XI. The Nine Situations 114
„ XII. The Attack by Fire 150
„ XIII. The Use of Spies 160
Chinese Concordance 176
Index 192

PREFACE

The seventh volume of “Mémoires concernant
l’histoire, les sciences, les arts, les mœurs, les usages,
&c., des Chinois”[1] is devoted to the Art of War, and
contains, amongst other treatises, “Les Treize Articles
de Sun-tse,” translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit
Father, Joseph Amiot. Père Amiot appears to have
enjoyed no small reputation as a sinologue in his day,
and the field of his labours was certainly extensive.
But his so-called translation of Sun Tzŭ, if placed
side by side with the original, is seen at once to be
little better than an imposture. It contains a great deal
that Sun Tzŭ did not write, and very little indeed of
what he did. Here is a fair specimen, taken from the
opening sentences of chapter 5:—
De l’habileté dans le gouvernement des Troupes. Sun-tse dit:
Ayez les noms de tous les Officiers tant généraux que
subalternes; inscrivez-les dans un catalogue à part, avec la note
des talents & de la capacité de chacun d’eux, afin de pouvoir les

employer avec avantage lorsque l’occasion en sera venue. Faites
en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez commander soient
persuadés que votre principale attention est de les préserver de
tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer contre
l’ennemi doivent être comme des pierres que vous lanceriez
contre des œufs. De vous à l’ennemi il ne doit y avoir d’autre
différence que celle du fort au foible, du vuide au plein.
Attaquez à découvert, mais soyez vainqueur en secret. Voilà en
peu de mots en quoi consiste l’habileté & toute la perfection
même du gouvernement des troupes.

Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a
wonderful development in the study of Chinese
literature, no translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzŭ,
although his work was known to be highly valued in
China as by far the oldest and best compendium of
military science. It was not until the year 1905 that
the first English translation, by Capt. E. F. Calthrop,
R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo under the title “Sonshi”
(the Japanese form of Sun Tzŭ)[2]. Unfortunately, it
was evident that the translator’s knowledge of
Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to grapple with
the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzŭ. He himself
plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two
Japanese gentlemen “the accompanying translation
would have been impossible.” We can only wonder,
then, that with their help it should have been so
excessively bad. It is not merely a question of

downright blunders, from which none can hope to be
wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent; hard
passages were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Such
offences are less pardonable. They would not be
tolerated in any edition of a Greek or Latin classic,
and a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted
upon in translations from Chinese.
From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe
that the present translation is free. It was not
undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own
powers; but I could not help feeling that Sun Tzŭ
deserved a better fate than had befallen him, and I
knew that, at any rate, I could hardly fail to improve
on the work of my predecessors. Towards the end of
1908, a new and revised edition of Capt. Calthrop’s
translation was published in London, this time,
however, without any allusion to his Japanese
collaborators. My first three chapters were then
already in the printer’s hands, so that the criticisms of
Capt. Calthrop therein contained must be understood
as referring to his earlier edition. In the subsequent
chapters I have of course transferred my attention to
the second edition. This is on the whole an
improvement on the other, though there still remains

much that cannot pass muster. Some of the grosser
blunders have been rectified and lacunae filled up,
but on the other hand a certain number of new
mistakes appear. The very first sentence of the
introduction is startlingly inaccurate; and later on,
while mention is made of “an army of Japanese
commentators” on Sun Tzŭ (who are these, by the
way?), not a word is vouchsafed about the Chinese
commentators, who nevertheless, I venture to assert,
form a much more numerous and infinitely more
important “army.”
A few special features of the present volume may
now be noticed. In the first place, the text has been
cut up into numbered paragraphs, both in order to
facilitate cross-reference and for the convenience of
students generally. The division follows broadly that
of Sun Hsing-yen’s edition; but I have sometimes
found it desirable to join two or more of his
paragraphs into one. In quoting from other works,
Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare title
by way of reference, and the task of research is apt to
be seriously hampered in consequence. With a view
to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzŭ is
concerned, I have also appended a complete

concordance of Chinese characters, following in this
the admirable example of Legge, though an
alphabetical arrangement has been preferred to the
distribution under radicals which he adopted. Another
feature borrowed from “The Chinese Classics” is the
printing of text, translation and notes on the same
page; the notes, however, are inserted, according to
the Chinese method, immediately after the passages
to which they refer. From the mass of native
commentary my aim has been to extract the cream
only, adding the Chinese text here and there when it
seemed to present points of literary interest. Though
constituting in itself an important branch of Chinese
literature, very little commentary of this kind has
hitherto been made directly accessible by translation.
[3]

I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing
off of my sheets as they were completed, the work
has not had the benefit of a final revision. On a
review of the whole, without modifying the substance
of my criticisms, I might have been inclined in a few
instances to temper their asperity. Having chosen to
wield a bludgeon, however, I shall not cry out if in
return I am visited with more than a rap over the

knuckles. Indeed, I have been at some pains to put a
sword into the hands of future opponents by
scrupulously giving either text or reference for every
passage translated. A scathing review, even from the
pen of the Shanghai critic who despises “mere
translations,” would not, I must confess, be altogether
unwelcome. For, after all, the worst fate I shall have
to dread is that which befell the ingenious paradoxes
of George in The Vicar of Wakefield.

INTRODUCTION

Sun Wu and his Book.
Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien gives the following biography of
Sun Tzŭ:[4]—
孫子武 Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch‘i State. His Art of
War brought him to the notice of 闔廬 Ho Lu, King of 吳 Wu.
[5]

Ho Lu said to him: I have carefully perused your 13 chapters.
May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?
Sun Tzŭ replied: You may.
Ho Lu asked: May the test be applied to women?
The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements
were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzŭ
divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King’s
favourite concubines at the head of each. He then bade them all
take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: I presume
you know the difference between front and back, right hand and
left hand?
The girls replied: Yes.
Sun Tzŭ went on: When I say “Eyes front,” you must look
straight ahead. When I say “Left turn,” you must face towards
your left hand. When I say “Right turn,” you must face towards

your right hand. When I say “About turn,” you must face right
round towards the back.
Again the girls assented. The words of command having been
thus explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to
begin the drill. Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order
“Right turn.” But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said:
If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not
thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame.
So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order
“Left turn,” whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of
laughter. Sun Tzŭ said: If words of command are not clear and
distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is
to blame. But if his orders are clear, and the soldiers
nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers.
So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be
beheaded. Now the King of Wu was watching the scene from
the top of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite
concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed
and hurriedly sent down the following message: We are now
quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If We
are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose
their savour. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded.
Sun Tzŭ replied: Having once received His Majesty’s
commission to be general of his forces, there are certain
commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am
unable to accept.
Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and
straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in their
place. When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the
drill once more; and the girls went through all the evolutions,
turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling
back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision,
not venturing to utter a sound. Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger

to the King saying: Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled
and disciplined, and ready for Your Majesty’s inspection. They
can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; bid them
go through fire and water, and they will not disobey.
But the King replied: Let our general cease drilling and return
to camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect
the troops.
Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: The King is only fond of words, and
cannot translate them into deeds.
After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how
to handle an army, and finally appointed him general. In the
West, he defeated the Ch‘u State and forced his way into Ying,
the capital; to the north, he put fear into the States of Ch‘i and
Chin, and spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes.
And Sun Tzŭ shared in the might of the King.

About Sun Tzŭ himself this is all that Ssŭ-ma
Ch‘ien has to tell us in this chapter. But he proceeds
to give a biography of his descendant, 孫臏
Sun Pin,
born about a hundred years after his famous
ancestor’s death, and also the outstanding military
genius of his time. The historian speaks of him too as
Sun Tzŭ, and in his preface we read: 孫子臏脚而論
兵法 “Sun Tzŭ had his feet cut off and yet continued
to discuss the art of war.”[6] It seems likely, then, that
“Pin” was a nickname bestowed on him after his
mutilation, unless indeed the story was invented in
order to account for the name. The crowning incident
of his career, the crushing defeat of his treacherous

rival P‘ang Chüan, will be found briefly related on p.
40.
To return to the elder Sun Tzŭ. He is mentioned in
two other passages of the Shih Chi:—
In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, King of Wu,
took the field with子胥 Tzŭ-hsü [i.e.伍員 Wu Yüan] and 伯嚭
Po P‘ei, and attacked Ch‘u. He captured the town of 舒 Shu and
slew the two prince’s sons who had formerly been generals of
Wu. He was then meditating a descent on 郢 Ying [the capital];
but the general Sun Wu said: “The army is exhausted.[7] It is not
yet possible. We must wait”....[8] [After further successful
fighting,] in the ninth year [506 B.C.], King Ho Lu of Wu
addressed Wu Tzŭ-hsü and Sun Wu, saying: “Formerly, you
declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying. Is the
time ripe now?” The two men replied: “Ch‘u’s general, 子常
Tzŭ-ch‘ang,[9] is grasping and covetous, and the princes of 唐
T‘ang and 蔡 Ts‘ai both have a grudge against him. If Your
Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over
T‘ang and Ts‘ai, and then you may succeed.” Ho Lu followed
this advice, [beat Ch‘u in five pitched battles and marched into
Ying].[10]

This is the latest date at which anything is recorded
of Sun Wu. He does not appear to have survived his
patron, who died from the effects of a wound in 496.
In the chapter entitled 律書
(the earlier portion of
which M. Chavannes believes to be a fragment of a
treatise on Military Weapons), there occurs this
passage:[11]

From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose,
咎犯
one after the other: Kao-fan,[12] who was employed by the
Chin State; Wang-tzŭ,[13] in the service of Ch‘i; and Sun Wu, in
the service of Wu. These men developed and threw light upon
申明軍約
the principles of war ( ).

It is obvious that Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien at least had no
doubt about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical
personage; and with one exception, to be noticed
presently, he is by far the most important authority on
the period in question. It will not be necessary,
therefore, to say much of such a work as the 吳越春
秋 Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu, which is supposed to have
been written by 趙曄Chao Yeh of the 1st century
A.D. The attribution is somewhat doubtful; but even
if it were otherwise, his account would be of little
value, based as it is on the Shih Chi and expanded
with romantic details. The story of Sun Tzŭ will be
found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only
new points in it worth noting are: 1) Sun Tzŭ was
first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzŭ-hsü. 2) He is
called a native of Wu.[14] 3) He had previously lived a
retired life, and his contemporaries were unaware of
his ability.[15]
The following passage occurs in Huai-nan 淮南子
Tzŭ: “When sovereign and ministers show perversity

of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun Tzŭ to
encounter the foe.”[16] Assuming that this work is
genuine (and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it),
we have here the earliest direct reference to Sun Tzŭ,
for Huai-nan Tzŭ died in 122 B.C., many years
before the Shih Chi was given to the world.
劉向 Liu Hsiang (B.C. 80–9) in his 新序 says:
“The reason why Sun Wu at the head of 30,000 men
beat Ch‘u with 200,000 is that the latter were
undisciplined.”[17]
鄧 名 世 Têng Ming-shih in his 姓 氏 辨 證 書
(completed in 1134) informs us that the surname 孫
was bestowed on Sun Wu’s grandfather by 景 公
Duke Ching of Ch‘i [547–490 B.C.]. Sun Wu’s father
Sun 馮 P‘ing, rose to be a Minister of State in Ch‘i,
and Sun Wu himself, whose style was 長卿 Ch‘ang-
ch‘ing, fled to Wu on account of the rebellion which
was being fomented by the kindred of 田鮑 T‘ien
Pao. He had three sons, of whom the second, named
明 Ming, was the father of Sun Pin. According to this
[18]
account, then, Pin was the grandson of Wu, which,
considering that Sun Pin’s victory over 魏 Wei was
gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as
chronologically impossible. Whence these data were

obtained by Têng Ming-shih I do not know, but of
course no reliance whatever can be placed in them.
An interesting document which has survived from
the close of the Han period is the short preface
written by the great 曹操
Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, or Wei 魏武帝
Wu Ti, for his edition of Sun Tzŭ. I shall give it in
full:—
I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their
advantage.[19] The Lun Yü says: “There must be a sufficiency of
military strength.”[20] The Shu Ching mentions “the army”
among the “eight objects of government.”[21] The I Ching says:
師
“ ‘army’ indicates firmness and justice; the experienced leader
will have good fortune.”[22] The Shih Ching says: “The King
rose majestic in his wrath, and he marshalled his troops.”[23] The
Yellow Emperor, T‘ang the Completer and Wu Wang all used
spears and battle-axes in order to succour their generation. The
Ssŭ-ma Fa says: “If one man slay another of set purpose, he
himself may rightfully be slain.”[24] He who relies solely on
warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on
peaceful measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch‘ai[25]
on the one hand and Yen Wang on the other.[26] In military
matters, the Sage’s rule is normally to keep the peace, and to
move his forces only when occasion requires. He will not use
armed force unless driven to it by necessity.[27]
Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting;
but the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them
all. [Sun Tzŭ was a native of the Ch‘i state, his personal name
was Wu. He wrote the Art of War in 13 chapters for Ho Lü, King
of Wu. Its principles were tested on women, and he was
subsequently made a general. He led an army westwards,

crushed the Ch‘u State and entered Ying the capital. In the north,
he kept Ch‘i and Chin in awe. A hundred years and more after
his time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu].[28] In his
treatment of deliberation and planning, the importance of
rapidity in taking the field,[29] clearness of conception, and
depth of design, Sun Tzŭ stands beyond the reach of carping
criticism. My contemporaries, however, have failed to grasp the
full meaning of his instructions, and while putting into practice
the smaller details in which his work abounds, they have
overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive which has
led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole.[30]

One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit
statement that the 13 chapters were specially
composed for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the
internal evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear
that some ruler is addressed.
In the bibliographical section of the Han Shu,[31]
there is an entry which has given rise to much
discussion: 吳孫子八十二篇圖九卷 “The works of
Sun Tzŭ of Wu in 82 p‘ien (or chapters), with
diagrams in 9 chüan.” It is evident that this cannot be
merely the 13 chapters known to Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien, or
those we possess to-day. Chang Shou-chieh in his 史
記正義 refers to an edition of Sun Tzŭ’s of 兵法
which the “13 chapters” formed the first chüan,
adding that there were two other chüan besides.[32]
This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk of these

82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzŭ—
we should call them apocryphal—similar to the 問答
Wên Ta, of which a specimen dealing with the Nine
通典
Situations[33] is preserved in the T‘ung Tien, and
another in Ho Shih’s commentary. It is suggested that
before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzŭ had only
written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a
sort of exegesis in the form of question and answer
between himself and the King. 畢以珣 Pi I-hsün,
author of the 孫子敘錄 Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu, backs this
up with a quotation from the Wu Yüeh Ch‘un Ch‘iu:
“The King of Wu summoned Sun Tzŭ, and asked him
questions about the art of war. Each time he set forth
a chapter of his work, the King could not find words
enough to praise him.”[34] As he points out, if the
whole work was expounded on the same scale as in
the above-mentioned fragments, the total number of
chapters could not fail to be considerable.[35] Then
the numerous other treatises attributed to Sun Tzŭ[36]
might also be included. The fact that the Han Chih
mentions no work of Sun Tzŭ except the 82 p‘ien,
whereas the Sui and T‘ang bibliographies give the
titles of others in addition to the “13 chapters,” is
good proof, Pi I-hsün thinks, that all of these were
contained in the 82 p‘ien. Without pinning our faith

to the accuracy of details supplied by the Wu Yüeh
Ch‘un Ch‘iu, or admitting the genuineness of any of
the treatises cited by Pi I-hsün, we may see in this
theory a probable solution of the mystery. Between
Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of time
for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up
under the magic name of Sun Tzŭ, and the 82 p‘ien
may very well represent a collected edition of these
lumped together with the original work. It is also
possible, though less likely, that some of them existed
in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely
ignored by him.[37]
Tu Mu, after Ts‘ao Kung the most important
commentator on Sun Tzŭ, composed the preface to
his edition[38] about the middle of the ninth century.
After a somewhat lengthy defence of the military art,
[39] he comes at last to Sun Tzŭ himself, and makes

one or two very startling assertions:—“The writings
of Sun Wu,” he says, “originally comprised several
hundred thousand words, but Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, the
Emperor Wu Wei, pruned away all redundancies and
wrote out the essence of the whole, so as to form a
single book in 13 chapters.”[40] He goes on to remark
that Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s commentary on Sun Tzŭ leaves a

certain proportion of difficulties unexplained. This, in
Tu Mu’s opinion, does not necessarily imply that he
was unable to furnish a complete commentary.[41]
According to the Wei Chih, Ts‘ao himself wrote a
book on war in something over 100,000 words,
known as the 新書 . It appears to have been of such
exceptional merit that he suspects Ts‘ao to have used
for it the surplus material which he had found in Sun
Tzŭ. He concludes, however, by saying: “The Hsin
Shu is now lost, so that the truth cannot be known for
certain.”[42]
Tu Mu’s conjecture seems to be based on a passage
in the 漢官解詁 “Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun
Wu’s Art of War,”[43] which in turn may have resulted
from a misunderstanding of the final words of Ts‘ao
Kung’s preface: 故撰爲略解焉 . This, as Sun Hsing-
yen points out,[44] is only a modest way of saying that
he made an explanatory paraphrase,[45] or in other
words, wrote a commentary on it. On the whole, the
theory has met with very little acceptance. Thus, the
四庫全書 says:[46] “The mention of the 13 chapters
in the Shih Chi shows that they were in existence
before the Han Chih, and that later accretions are not

to be considered part of the original work. Tu Mu’s
assertion can certainly not be taken as proof.”[47]
There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13
chapters existed in the time of Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien
practically as we have them now. That the work was
then well known he tells us in so many words: “Sun
Tzŭ’s 13 Chapters and Wu Ch‘i’s Art of War are the
two books that people commonly refer to on the
subject of military matters. Both of them are widely
distributed, so I will not discuss them here.”[48] But
as we go further back, serious difficulties begin to
arise. The salient fact which has to be faced is that
the Tso Chuan, the great contemporary record, makes
no mention whatever of Sun Wu, either as a general
or as a writer. It is natural, in view of this awkward
circumstance, that many scholars should not only cast
doubt on the story of Sun Wu as given in the Shih
Chi, but even show themselves frankly sceptical as to
the existence of the man at all. The most powerful
presentment of this side of the case is to be found in
the following disquisition by
[49]
葉水心
Yeh Shui-hsin:
—
It is stated in Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s history that Sun Wu was a
native of the Ch‘i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the
reign of Ho Lü he crushed Ch‘u, entered Ying, and was a great

general. But in Tso’s Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is
true that Tso’s Commentary need not contain absolutely
everything that other histories contain. But Tso has not omitted
to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruffians such as Ying
K‘ao-shu,[50] Ts‘ao Kuei,[51] Chu Chih-wu[52] and Chuan Shê-
chu.[53] In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements
were so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again,
details are given, in their due order, about his contemporaries
Wu Yüan and the Minister P‘ei.[54] Is it credible that Sun Wu
alone should have been passed over?[55]
In point of literary style, Sun Tzŭ’s work belongs to the same
school as Kuan Tzŭ,[56] the Liu T‘ao,[57] and the Yüeh Yü,[58] and
may have been the production of some private scholar living
towards the end of the “Spring and Autumn” or the beginning of
the “Warring States” period.[59] The story that his precepts were
actually applied by the Wu State, is merely the outcome of big
talk on the part of his followers.[60]
From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty[61] down to
the time of the “Spring and Autumn,” all military commanders
were statesmen as well, and the class of professional generals,
for conducting external campaigns, did not then exist. It was not
until the period of the “Six States”[62] that this custom changed.
Now although Wu was an uncivilised State, is it conceivable that
Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great
general and yet held no civil office? What we are told, therefore,
about Jang-chü[63] and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but the
reckless fabrication of theorising pundits. The story of Ho Lü’s
experiment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous
and incredible.[64]

Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien as having
said that Sun Wu crushed Ch‘u and entered Ying.
This is not quite correct. No doubt the impression left

on the reader’s mind is that he at least shared in these
exploits; but the actual subject of the verbs , , 破入威
and 顯 闔廬
is certainly , as is shown by the next
words: 孫子與有力焉 .[65] The fact may or may not
be significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in
the Shih Chi either that Sun Tzŭ was general on the
occasion of the taking of Ying, or that he even went
there at all. Moreover, as we know that Wu Yüan and
Po P‘ei both took part in the expedition, and also that
its success was largely due to the dash and enterprise
of 夫槩 Fu Kai, Ho Lu’s younger brother, it is not
easy to see how yet another general could have
played a very prominent part in the same campaign.
陳振孫 Ch‘ên Chên-sun of the Sung dynasty has
the note:[66]—
Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art.
But the fact that he does not appear in the Tso Chuan, although
he is said to have served under Ho Lü King of Wu, makes it
uncertain what period he really belonged to.[67]

He also says:—
The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch‘i may be of genuine
antiquity.[68]

It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch‘ên
Chên-sun, while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu

as he figures in Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s history, are inclined
to accept the date traditionally assigned to the work
which passes under his name. The author of the Hsü
Lu fails to appreciate this distinction, and
consequently his bitter attack on Ch‘ên Chên-sun
really misses its mark. He makes one or two points,
however, which certainly tell in favour of the high
antiquity of our “13 chapters.” “Sun Tzŭ,” he says,
“must have lived in the age of Ching Wang [519–
476], because he is frequently plagiarised in
subsequent works of the Chou, Ch‘in and Han
dynasties.”[69] The two most shameless offenders in
this respect are Wu Ch‘i and Huai-nan Tzŭ, both of
them important historical personages in their day.
The former lived only a century after the alleged date
of Sun Tzŭ, and his death is known to have taken
place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according to Liu
Hsiang, that 曾申 Tsêng Shên delivered the Tso
Chuan, which had been entrusted to him by its
author.[70] Now the fact that quotations from the Art
of War, acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found
in so many authors of different epochs, establishes a
very strong probability that there was some common
source anterior to them all,—in other words, that Sun
Tzŭ’s treatise was already in existence towards the

end of the 5th century B.C. Further proof of Sun
Tzŭ’s antiquity is furnished by the archaic or wholly
obsolete meanings attaching to a number of the
words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps
be extended, is given in the Hsü Lu; and though some
of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument
is hardly affected thereby.[71] Again, it must not be
forgotten that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and critic of
the first rank, deliberately pronounces the style of the
13 chapters to belong to the early part of the fifth
century. Seeing that he is actually engaged in an
attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself,
we may be sure that he would not have hesitated to
assign the work to a later date had he not honestly
believed the contrary. And it is precisely on such a
point that the judgment of an educated Chinaman will
carry most weight. Other internal evidence is not far
to seek. Thus, in XIII. § 1, there is an unmistakable
allusion to the ancient system of land-tenure which
had already passed away by the time of Mencius,
who was anxious to see it revived in a modified form.
[72]
The only warfare Sun Tzŭ knows is that carried
on between the various feudal princes ( 諸侯 ), in
which armoured chariots play a large part. Their use
seems to have entirely died out before the end of the

Chou dynasty. He speaks as a man of Wu, a state
which ceased to exist as early as 473 B.C. On this I
shall touch presently.
But once refer the work to the 5th century or
earlier, and the chances of its being other than a bonâ
fide production are sensibly diminished. The great
age of forgeries did not come until long after. That it
should have been forged in the period immediately
following 473 is particularly unlikely, for no one, as a
rule, hastens to identify himself with a lost cause. As
for Yeh Shui-hsin’s theory, that the author was a
literary recluse,[73] that seems to me quite untenable.
If one thing is more apparent than another after
reading the maxims of Sun Tzŭ, it is that their
essence has been distilled from a large store of
personal observation and experience. They reflect the
mind not only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare
faculty of generalisation, but also of a practical
soldier closely acquainted with the military
conditions of his time. To say nothing of the fact that
these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all
the greatest captains of Chinese history, they offer a
combination of freshness and sincerity, acuteness and
common sense, which quite excludes the idea that

they were artificially concocted in the study. If we
admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine
production of a military man living towards the end
of the “Ch‘un Ch‘iu” period, are we not bound, in
spite of the silence of the Tso Chuan, to accept Ssŭ-
ma Ch‘ien’s account in its entirety? In view of his
high repute as a sober historian, must we not hesitate
to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun
Wu’s biography were false and untrustworthy? The
answer, I fear, must be in the negative. There is still
one grave, if not fatal, objection to the chronology
involved in the story as told in the Shih Chi, which,
so far as I am aware, nobody has yet pointed out.
There are two passages in Sun Tzŭ in which he
alludes to contemporary affairs. The first is in VI. §
21:—
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed
our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the
matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

The other is in XI. § 30:—
Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I
should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are
enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are
caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just
as the left hand helps the right.

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as
evidence of the date of composition. They assign the
work to the period of the struggle between Wu and
Yüeh. So much has been observed by Pi I-hsün. But
what has hitherto escaped notice is that they also
seriously impair the credibility of Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien’s
narrative. As we have seen above, the first positive
date given in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B.C. He
is then spoken of as a general, acting as confidential
adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged introduction to
that monarch had already taken place, and of course
the 13 chapters must have been written earlier still.
But at that time, and for several years after, down to
the capture of Ying in 506, 楚 Ch‘u, and not Yüeh,
was the great hereditary enemy of Wu. The two
states, Ch‘u and Wu, had been constantly at war for
over half a century,[74] whereas the first war between
Wu and Yüeh was waged only in 510,[75] and even
then was no more than a short interlude sandwiched
in the midst of the fierce struggle with Ch‘u. Now
Ch‘u is not mentioned in the 13 chapters at all. The
natural inference is that they were written at a time
when Yüeh had become the prime antagonist of Wu,
that is, after Ch‘u had suffered the great humiliation

of 506. At this point, a table of dates may be found
useful.
B.C.
514 Accession of Ho Lu.
Ho Lu attacks Ch‘u, but is dissuaded from
512 entering 郢 Ying, the capital. Shih Chi
mentions Sun Wu as general.
511 Another attack on Ch‘u.
Wu makes a successful attack on Yüeh. This
510
is the first war between the two states.
509
Ch‘u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at
or
508
豫章 Yü-chang.
Ho Lu attacks Ch‘u with the aid of T‘ang and
506
Ts‘ai. Decisive battle of柏舉 Po-chü, and
capture of Ying. Last mention of Sun Wu in
Shih Chi.
Yüeh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its
505 army. Wu is beaten by Ch‘in and evacuates
Ying.
504 Ho Lu sends 夫差 Fu Ch‘ai to attack Ch‘u.
497 勾踐 Kou Chien becomes King of Yüeh.

Wu attacks Yüeh, but is defeated by Kou
496
Chien at 檇李 Tsui-li. Ho Lu is killed.
Fu Ch‘ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle
494 of 夫椒 Fu-chiao, and enters the capital of
Yüeh.
485
Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of
or
Wu Tzŭ-hsü.
484
Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu
482
Ch‘ai.
478
to Further attacks by Yüeh on Wu.
476
475 Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.
473 Final defeat and extinction of Wu.
The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly
strikes me as one that could have been written in the
full flush of victory. It seems rather to imply that, for
the moment at least, the tide had turned against Wu,
and that she was getting the worst of the struggle.
Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in
existence in 505, before which date Yüeh does not
appear to have scored any notable success against
Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so that if the book was

written for him, it must have been during the period
505–496, when there was a lull in the hostilities, Wu
having presumably been exhausted by its supreme
effort against Ch‘u. On the other hand, if we choose
to disregard the tradition connecting Sun Wu’s name
with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light
between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482–
473, when Yüeh was once again becoming a very
serious menace.[76] We may feel fairly certain that the
author, whoever he may have been, was not a man of
any great eminence in his own day. On this point the
negative testimony of the Tso Chuan far outweighs
any shred of authority still attaching to the Shih Chi,
if once its other facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen,
however, makes a feeble attempt to explain the
omission of his name from the great commentary. It
was Wu Tzŭ-hsü, he says, who got all the credit of
Sun Wu’s exploits, because the latter (being an alien)
was not rewarded with an office in the State.[77]
How then did the Sun Tzŭ legend originate? It may
be that the growing celebrity of the book imparted by
degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It
was felt to be only right and proper that one so well
versed in the science of war should have solid

achievements to his credit as well. Now the capture
of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in
Ho Lu’s reign; it made a deep and lasting impression
on all the surrounding states, and raised Wu to the
short-lived zenith of her power. Hence, what more
natural, as time went on, than that the acknowledged
master of strategy, Sun Wu, should be popularly
identified with that campaign, at first perhaps only in
the sense that his brain conceived and planned it;
afterwards, that it was actually carried out by him in
conjunction with Wu Yüan,[78] Po P‘ei and Fu Kai?
It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even
the outline of Sun Tzŭ’s life must be based almost
wholly on conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I
should say that he probably entered the service of Wu
about the time of Ho Lu’s accession, and gathered
experience, though only in the capacity of a
subordinate officer, during the intense military
activity which marked the first half of that prince’s
reign.[79] If he rose to be a general at all, he certainly
was never on an equal footing with the three above
mentioned. He was doubtless present at the
investment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed
Wu’s sudden collapse in the following year. Yüeh’s

attack at this critical juncture, when her rival was
embarrassed on every side, seems to have convinced
him that this upstart kingdom was the great enemy
against whom every effort would henceforth have to
be directed. Sun Wu was thus a well-seasoned
warrior when he sat down to write his famous book,
which according to my reckoning must have
appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning,
of Ho Lu’s reign. The story of the women may
possibly have grown out of some real incident
occurring about the same time. As we hear no more
of Sun Wu after this from any source, he is hardly
likely to have survived his patron or to have taken
part in the death-struggle with Yüeh, which began
with the disaster at Tsui-li.
If these inferences are approximately correct, there
is a certain irony in the fate which decreed that
China’s most illustrious man of peace should be
contemporary with her greatest writer on war.

The Text of Sun Tzŭ.
I have found it difficult to glean much about the
history of Sun Tzŭ’s text. The quotations that occur

in early authors go to show that the “13 chapters” of
which Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien speaks were essentially the
same as those now extant. We have his word for it
that they were widely circulated in his day, and can
only regret that he refrained from discussing them on
that account.[80] Sun Hsing-yen says in his preface:—
During the Ch‘in and Han dynasties Sun Tzŭ’s Art of War was
in general use amongst military commanders, but they seem to
have treated it as a work of mysterious import, and were
unwilling to expound it for the benefit of posterity. Thus it came
about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary on it.[81]

As we have already seen, there is no reasonable
ground to suppose that Ts‘ao Kung tampered with the
text. But the text itself is often so obscure, and the
number of editions which appeared from that time
onward so great, especially during the T‘ang and
Sung dynasties, that it would be surprising if
numerous corruptions had not managed to creep in.
Towards the middle of the Sung period, by which
time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzŭ were in
existence, a certain 吉天保Chi T‘ien-pao published
a work in 15 chüan entitled 十家孫子會注 “Sun Tzŭ
with the collected commentaries of ten writers.”[82]
There was another text, with variant readings put
forward by Chu Fu of 大興
Ta-hsing,[83] which also

had supporters among the scholars of that period; but
in the Ming editions, Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these
readings were for some reason or other no longer put
into circulation.[84] Thus, until the end of the 18th
century, the text in sole possession of the field was
one derived from Chi T‘ien-pao’s edition, although
no actual copy of that important work was known to
have survived. That, therefore, is the text of Sun Tzŭ
which appears in the War section of the great
Imperial encyclopaedia printed in 1726, the 古今圖
書集成 Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng. Another copy
at my disposal of what is practically the same text,
周秦十
with slight variations, is that contained in the
一子 “Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch‘in
dynasties” [1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt.
Calthrop’s first edition is evidently a similar version
which has filtered through Japanese channels. So
things remained until 孫星衍 Sun Hsing-yen [1752–
1818], a distinguished antiquarian and classical
scholar,[85] who claimed to be an actual descendant of
Sun Wu,[86] accidentally discovered a copy of Chi
T‘ien-pao’s long-lost work, when on a visit to the
華陰
library of the Hua-yin temple.[87] Appended to it
was the 遺說 I Shuo of 鄭友賢 Chêng Yu-hsien,
mentioned in the T‘ung Chih, and also believed to

have perished.[88] This is what Sun Hsing-yen
designates as the 古本 原本 or “original edition (or
text)”—a rather misleading name, for it cannot by
any means claim to set before us the text of Sun Tzŭ
in its pristine purity. Chi T‘ien-pao was a careless
compiler,[89] and appears to have been content to
reproduce the somewhat debased version current in
his day, without troubling to collate it with the
earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two
versions of Sun Tzŭ, even older than the newly
discovered work, were still extant, one buried in the
T‘ung Tien, Tu Yu’s great treatise on the Constitution,
the other similarly enshrined in the T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan
encyclopaedia. In both the complete text is to be
found, though split up into fragments, intermixed
with other matter, and scattered piecemeal over a
number of different sections. Considering that the Yü
Lan takes us back to the year 983, and the T‘ung Tien
about 200 years further still, to the middle of the
T‘ang dynasty, the value of these early transcripts of
Sun Tzŭ can hardly be overestimated. Yet the idea of
utilising them does not seem to have occurred to
anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under
Government instructions, undertook a thorough
recension of the text. This is his own account:—

Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzŭ
which his editors had handed down, the Government ordered
that the ancient edition [of Chi T‘ien-pao] should be used, and
that the text should be revised and corrected throughout. It
happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor Pi Kua, and Hsi, a
graduate of the second degree, had all devoted themselves to this
study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have had
the whole work cut on blocks as a text-book for military men.[90]

The three individuals here referred to had
evidently been occupied on the text of Sun Tzŭ prior
to Sun Hsing-yen’s commission, but we are left in
doubt as to the work they really accomplished. At any
rate, the new edition, when ultimately produced,
appeared in the names of Sun Hsing-yen and only
one co-editor, 吳人驥 Wu Jên-chi. They took the
“original text” as their basis, and by careful
comparison with the older versions, as well as the
extant commentaries and other sources of
information such as the I Shuo, succeeded in
restoring a very large number of doubtful passages,
and turned out, on the whole, what must be accepted
as the closest approximation we are ever likely to get
to Sun Tzŭ’s original work. This is what will
hereafter be denominated the “standard text.”
The copy which I have used belongs to a re-issue
dated 1877. It is in 6 pên, forming part of a well-

printed set of 23 early philosophical works in 83 pên.
[91]
It opens with a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely
quoted in this introduction), vindicating the
traditional view of Sun Tzŭ’s life and performances,
and summing up in remarkably concise fashion the
evidence in its favour. This is followed by Ts‘ao
Kung’s preface to his edition, and the biography of
Sun Tzŭ from the Shih Chi, both translated above.
Then come, firstly, Chêng Yu-hsien’s I Shuo,[92] with
author’s preface, and next, a short miscellany of
historical and bibliographical information entitled 孫
子敘錄 Sun Tzŭ Hsü Lu, compiled by 畢以珣 Pi I-
hsün. As regards the body of the work, each separate
sentence is followed by a note on the text, if required,
and then by the various commentaries appertaining to
it, arranged in chronological order. These we shall
now proceed to discuss briefly, one by one.

The Commentators.
Sun Tzŭ can boast an exceptionally long and
distinguished roll of commentators, which would do
honour to any classic. 歐陽修 Ou-yang Hsiu remarks
on this fact, though he wrote before the tale was
complete, and rather ingeniously explains it by

saying that the artifices of war, being inexhaustible,
must therefore be susceptible of treatment in a great
variety of ways.[93]
1. 曹操 Ts‘ao Ts‘ao or 曹公 Ts‘ao Kung,
afterwards known as 魏武帝 Wei Wu Ti [A.D. 155–
220]. There is hardly any room for doubt that the
earliest commentary on Sun Tzŭ actually came from
the pen of this extraordinary man, whose biography
in the San Kuo Chih[94] reads like a romance. One of
the greatest military geniuses that the world has seen,
and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations, he was
especially famed for the marvellous rapidity of his
marches, which has found expression in the line 說曹
操曹操就到 “Talk of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, and Ts‘ao Ts‘ao
will appear.” Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that he was a
great captain who “measured his strength against
Tung Cho, Lü Pu and the two Yüan, father and son,
and vanquished them all; whereupon he divided the
Empire of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself
king. It is recorded that whenever a council of war
was held by Wei on the eve of a far-reaching
campaign, he had all his calculations ready; those
generals who made use of them did not lose one
battle in ten; those who ran counter to them in any

particular saw their armies incontinently beaten and
put to flight.”[95] Ts‘ao Kung’s notes on Sun Tzŭ,
models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly
characteristic of the stern commander known to
history, that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as
the work of a mere littérateur. Sometimes, indeed,
owing to extreme compression, they are scarcely
intelligible and stand no less in need of a
commentary than the text itself.[96] As we have seen,
Ts‘ao Kung is the reputed author of the 新書 , a book
on war in 100,000 odd words, now lost, but
mentioned in the 魏志 .[97]
2.孟氏 Mêng Shih. The commentary which has
come down to us under this name is comparatively
meagre, and nothing about the author is known. Even
his personal name has not been recorded. Chi T‘ien-
pao’s edition places him after Chia Lin, and 鼂公武
Ch‘ao Kung-wu also assigns him to the T‘ang
dynasty,[98] but this is obviously a mistake, as his
work is mentioned in the 隋書經籍志 . In Sun Hsing-
yen’s preface, he appears as Mêng Shih of the Liang
dynasty [502–557]. Others would identify him with
孟康 宋史藝文
Mêng K‘ang of the 3rd century. In the
志 ,[99] he is named last of the 五家 “Five

Commentators,” the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu,
Ch‘ên Hao and Chia Lin.
3.李筌 Li Ch‘üan of the 8th century was a well-
known writer on military tactics. His 太白陰經 has
been in constant use down to the present day. The 通
志 mentions 閫外春秋 (lives of famous generals
from the Chou to the T‘ang dynasty) as written by
him.[100] He is also generally supposed to be the real
author of the popular Taoist tract, the 陰符經 .
According to Ch‘ao Kung-wu and the T‘ien-i-ko
catalogue,[101] he followed the太乙遁甲 text of Sun
Tzŭ, which differs considerably from those now
extant. His notes are mostly short and to the point,
and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes
from Chinese history.
4.杜佑 Tu Yu (died 812) did not publish a separate
commentary on Sun Tzŭ, his notes being taken from
the T‘ung Tien, the encyclopaedic treatise on the
Constitution which was his life-work. They are
largely repetitions of Ts‘ao Kung and Mêng Shih,
besides which it is believed that he drew on the
ancient commentaries of 王凌 Wang Ling and others.
Owing to the peculiar arrangement of the T‘ung Tien,
he has to explain each passage on its merits, apart

from the context, and sometimes his own explanation
does not agree with that of Ts‘ao Kung, whom he
always quotes first. Though not strictly to be
reckoned as one of the “Ten Commentators,” he was
added to their number by Chi T‘ien-pao, being
wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu.
5.杜牧 Tu Mu (803–852) is perhaps best known
as a poet—a bright star even in the glorious galaxy of
the T‘ang period. We learn from Ch‘ao Kung-wu that
although he had no practical experience of war, he
was extremely fond of discussing the subject, and
was moreover well read in the military history of the
Ch‘un Ch‘iu and Chan Kuo eras.[102] His notes,
therefore, are well worth attention. They are very
copious, and replete with historical parallels. The gist
of Sun Tzŭ’s work is thus summarised by him:
“Practise benevolence and justice, but on the other
hand make full use of artifice and measures of
expediency.”[103] He further declared that all the
military triumphs and disasters of the thousand years
which had elapsed since Sun Wu’s death would, upon
examination, be found to uphold and corroborate, in
every particular, the maxims contained in his book.

[104]
Tu Mu’s somewhat spiteful charge against Ts‘ao
Kung has already been considered elsewhere.
6. 陳皥 Ch‘ên Hao appears to have been a
contemporary of Tu Mu. Ch‘ao Kung-wu says that he
was impelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzŭ
because Ts‘ao Kung’s on the one hand was too
obscure and subtle, and that of Tu Mu on the other
too long-winded and diffuse.[105] Ou-yang Hsiu,
writing in the middle of the 11th century, calls Ts‘ao
Kung, Tu Mu and Ch‘ên Hao the three chief
commentators on Sun Tzŭ ( 三家 ), and observes that
Ch‘ên Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu’s
shortcomings. His commentary, though not lacking in
merit, must rank below those of his predecessors.
7. 賈林 Chia Lin is known to have lived under the
T‘ang dynasty, for his commentary on Sun Tzŭ is
mentioned in the 唐書 and was afterwards
republished by 紀燮 Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty
together with those of Mêng Shih and Tu Yu.[106] It is
of somewhat scanty texture, and in point of quality,
too, perhaps the least valuable of the eleven.
8. 梅堯臣Mei Yao-ch‘ên (1002–1060), commonly
known by his “style” as Mei 聖兪Shêng-yü, was,

like Tu Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary
was published with a laudatory preface by the great
Ou-yang Hsiu, from which we may cull the
following:—
Later scholars have misread Sun Tzŭ, distorting his words and
trying to make them square with their own one-sided views.
Thus, though commentators have not been lacking, only a few
have proved equal to the task. My friend Shêng-yü has not fallen
into this mistake. In attempting to provide a critical commentary
for Sun Tzŭ’s work, he does not lose sight of the fact that these
sayings were intended for states engaged in internecine warfare;
that the author is not concerned with the military conditions
prevailing under the sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties,
[107]
nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to the
Minister of War.[108] Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but
his meaning is always deep. Whether the subject be marching an
army, or handling soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or
controlling the forces of victory, it is always systematically
treated; the sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence,
though this has been obscured by commentators who have
probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary,
Mei Shêng-yü has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of
these critics, and has tried to bring out the true meaning of Sun
Tzŭ himself. In this way, the clouds of confusion have been
dispersed and the sayings made clear. I am convinced that the
present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the
three great commentaries; and for a great deal that they find in
the sayings, coming generations will have constant reason to
thank my friend Shêng-yü.[109]

Making some allowance for the exuberance of
friendship, I am inclined to endorse this favourable

judgment, and would certainly place him above
Ch‘ên Hao in order of merit.
9. 王晳 Wang Hsi, also of the Sung dynasty, is
decidedly original in some of his interpretations, but
much less judicious than Mei Yao-ch‘ên, and on the
whole not a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of
comparing his own commentary with that of Ts‘ao
Kung, but the comparison is not often flattering to
him. We learn from Ch‘ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi
revised the ancient text of Sun Tzŭ, filling up lacunae
and correcting mistakes.[110]
何延錫
10. Ho Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. The
personal name of this commentator is given as above
by 鄭樵 Chêng Ch‘iao in the T‘ung Chih, written
about the middle of the twelfth century, but he
appears simply as 何氏 Ho Shih in the Yü Hai, and
Ma Tuan-lin quotes Ch‘ao Kung-wu as saying that
his personal name is unknown. There seems to be no
reason to doubt Chêng Ch‘iao’s statement, otherwise
I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and
identify him with one 何去非 Ho Ch‘ü-fei, the author
of a short treatise on war entitled備論 , who lived in
the latter part of the 11th century.[111] Ho Shih’s
commentary, in the words of the T‘ien-i-ko catalogue,

有 所 裨 益 “contains helpful additions” here and
there, but is chiefly remarkable for the copious
extracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic
histories and other sources.
11. 張預 Chang Yü. The list closes with a
commentator of no great originality perhaps, but
gifted with admirable powers of lucid exposition. His
commentary is based on that of Ts‘ao Kung, whose
terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in
masterly fashion. Without Chang Yü, it is safe to say
that much of Ts‘ao Kung’s commentary would have
remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and
therefore valueless. His work is not mentioned in the
Sung history, the T‘ung K‘ao, or the Yü Hai, but it
finds a niche in the T‘ung Chih, which also names
him as the author of the 百將傳 “Lives of Famous
Generals.”[112]
It is rather remarkable that the last-named four
should all have flourished within so short a space of
time. Ch‘ao Kung-wu accounts for it by saying:
“During the early years of the Sung dynasty the
Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace, and men
ceased to practise the art of war. But when [Chao]
Yüan-hao’s rebellion came [1038–42] and the

frontier generals were defeated time after time, the
Court made strenuous enquiry for men skilled in war,
and military topics became the vogue amongst all the
high officials. Hence it is that the commentators of
Sun Tzŭ in our dynasty belong mainly to that
period.”[113]
Besides these eleven commentators, there are
several others whose work has not come down to us.
王凌
The Sui Shu mentions four, namely Wang Ling
王子 張子尙
(often quoted by Tu Yu as ); Chang Tzŭ-
shang;賈詡 魏 沈友
Chia Hsü of Wei;[114] and Shên
Yu of 吳 孫鎬
Wu. The T‘ang Shu adds Sun Hao, and
蕭吉
the T‘ung Chih Hsiao Chi, while the T‘u Shu
黃潤玉
mentions a Ming commentator, Huang Jun-
yü. It is possible that some of these may have been
merely collectors and editors of other commentaries,
like Chi T‘ien-pao and Chi Hsieh, mentioned above.
紀夑注孫
Certainly in the case of the latter, the entry
子 in the T‘ung K‘ao, without the following note,
would give one to understand that he had written an
independent commentary of his own.
There are two works, described in the Ssu K‘u
Ch‘üan Shu[115] and no doubt extremely rare, which I
should much like to have seen. One is entitled 孫子

參同 , in 5 chüan. It gives selections from four new
commentators, probably of the Ming dynasty, as well
as from the eleven known to us. The names of the
four are 解元 Hsieh Yüan; 張鏊 Chang Ao; 李村
Li
Ts‘ai; and黃治徵 Huang Chih-chêng. The other
work is 孫子彚徵 in 4 chüan, compiled by 鄭端
Chêng Tuan of the present dynasty. It is a
compendium of information on ancient warfare, with
special reference to Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters.

Appreciations of Sun Tzŭ.
Sun Tzŭ has exercised a potent fascination over the
minds of some of China’s greatest men. Among the
famous generals who are known to have studied his
pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned 韓信 Han
Hsin (d. B.C. 196),[116]馮異 Fêng I (d. A.D. 34),[117]
呂蒙 Lü Mêng (d. 219),[118] and 岳飛 Yo Fei (1103–
1141).[119] The opinion of Ts‘ao Kung, who disputes
with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese military
annals, has already been recorded.[120] Still more
remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of purely
literary men, such as 蘇洵 Su Hsün (the father of Su
Tung-p‘o), who wrote several essays on military

topics, all of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun
Tzŭ. The following short passage by him is preserved
in the Yü Hai:[121]—
Sun Wu’s saying, that in war one cannot make certain of
conquering,[122] is very different indeed from what other books
tell us.[123] Wu Ch‘i was a man of the same stamp as Sun Wu:
they both wrote books on war, and they are linked together in
popular speech as “Sun and Wu.” But Wu Ch‘i’s remarks on war
are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more crudely stated,
and there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun Tzŭ’s work,
where the style is terse, but the meaning fully brought out.[124]

The 性理彚要 , ch. 17, contains the following
藝圃折衷
extract from the “Impartial Judgments in
the Garden of Literature” by 鄭厚
Chêng Hou:—
Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all
military men’s training, but also compel the most careful
attention of scholars and men of letters. His sayings are terse yet
elegant, simple yet profound, perspicuous and eminently
practical. Such works as the Lun Yü, the I Ching and the great
Commentary,[125] as well as the writings of Mencius, Hsün
K‘uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzŭ.[126]

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first
part of the criticism, although he dislikes the
audacious comparison with the venerated classical
works. Language of this sort, he says, “encourages a
ruler’s bent towards unrelenting warfare and reckless
militarism.”[127]

Apologies for War.
Accustomed as we are to think of China as the
greatest peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some
danger of forgetting that her experience of war in all
its phases has also been such as no modern State can
parallel. Her long military annals stretch back to a
point at which they are lost in the mists of time. She
had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge
standing army along her frontier centuries before the
first Roman legionary was seen on the Danube. What
with the perpetual collisions of the ancient feudal
States, the grim conflicts with Huns, Turks and other
invaders after the centralisation of government, the
terrific upheavals which accompanied the overthrow
of so many dynasties, besides the countless rebellions
and minor disturbances that have flamed up and
flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much
to say that the clash of arms has never ceased to
resound in one portion or another of the Empire.
No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious
captains to whom China can point with pride. As in
all countries, the greatest are found emerging at the
most fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch‘i
stands out conspicuous in the period when Ch‘in was

entering upon her final struggle with the remaining
independent states. The stormy years which followed
the break-up of the Ch‘in dynasty are illumined by
the transcendent genius of Han Hsin. When the
House of Han in turn is tottering to its fall, the great
and baleful figure of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao dominates the
scene. And in the establishment of the T‘ang dynasty,
one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the
superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the
Emperor T‘ai Tsung) was seconded by the brilliant
strategy of Li Ching. None of these generals need
fear comparison with the greatest names in the
military history of Europe.
In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese
sentiment, from Lao Tzŭ downwards, and especially
as reflected in the standard literature of
Confucianism, has been consistently pacific and
intensely opposed to militarism in any form. It is
such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati
defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it
worth while to collect and translate a few passages in
which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following,
by Ssŭ-ma Ch‘ien, shows that for all his ardent

admiration of Confucius, he was yet no advocate of
peace at any price:—
Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish
violence and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove
difficulties and dangers, and to succour those who are in peril.
Every animal with blood in its veins and horns on its head will
fight when it is attacked. How much more so will man, who
carries in his breast the faculties of love and hatred, joy and
anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection springs up
within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into play.
That is the natural law which governs his being.... What then
shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great
issues, and without any appreciation of relative values, who can
only bark out their stale formulas about “virtue” and
“civilisation,” condemning the use of military weapons? They
will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonour and
the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least, they will
bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and
general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the
position they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in the
family the teacher must not spare the rod, and punishments
cannot be dispensed with in the State, so military chastisement
can never be allowed to fall into abeyance in the Empire. All one
can say is that this power will be exercised wisely by some,
foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms some
will be loyal and others rebellious.[128]

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu’s preface to
his commentary on Sun Tzŭ:—
War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the
functions of government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and
Jan Ch‘iu, both disciples of Confucius. Nowadays, the holding
of trials and hearing of litigation, the imprisonment of offenders

and their execution by flogging in the market-place, are all done
by officials. But the wielding of huge armies, the throwing down
of fortified cities, the haling of women and children into
captivity, and the beheading of traitors—this is also work which
is done by officials. The objects of the rack[129] and of military
weapons are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic
difference between the punishment of flogging and cutting off
heads in war. For the lesser infractions of law, which are easily
dealt with, only a small amount of force need be employed:
hence the institution of torture and flogging. For more serious
outbreaks of lawlessness, which are hard to suppress, a greater
amount of force is necessary: hence the use of military weapons
and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in
view is to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and
relief to the good....[130]
Chi-sun asked Jan Yu, saying: “Have you, Sir, acquired your
military aptitude by study, or is it innate?” Jan Yu replied: “It has
been acquired by study.”[131] “How can that be so,” said Chi-
sun, “seeing that you are a disciple of Confucius?” “It is a fact,”
replied Jan Yu; “I was taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the
great Sage should exercise both civil and military functions,
though to be sure my instruction in the art of fighting has not yet
gone very far.”
Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the
“civil” and the “military,” and the limitation of each to a
separate sphere of action, or in what year of which dynasty it
was first introduced, is more than I can say. But, at any rate, it
has come about that the members of the governing class are
quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or do so only in a
shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss the
subject, they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of
coarse and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance
of the way in which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men
unhappily lose sight of fundamental principles.[132]

When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch‘êng Wang, he
regulated ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of
scholarship and learning; yet when the barbarians of the River
Huai revolted,[133] he sallied forth and chastised them. When
Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu, and a meeting was
convened at Chia-ku,[134] he said: “If pacific negotiations are in
progress, warlike preparations should have been made
beforehand.” He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch‘i, who
cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can
it be said that these two great Sages had no knowledge of
military matters?[135]

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzŭ
in high esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the
Classics:—
Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: “I
have never studied matters connected with armies and
battalions.”[136] Replying to K‘ung Wên-tzŭ, he said: “I have not
been instructed about buff-coats and weapons.”[137] But if we
turn to the meeting at Chia-ku,[138] we find that he used armed
force against the men of Lai,[139] so that the marquis of Ch‘i was
overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted, he
ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon they were
defeated and fled in confusion.[140] He once uttered the words:
“If I fight, I conquer.”[141] And Jan Yu also said: “The Sage
exercises both civil and military functions.”[142] Can it be a fact
that Confucius never studied or received instruction in the art of
war? We can only say that he did not specially choose matters
connected with armies and fighting to be the subject of his
teaching.[143]

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzŭ, writes in
similar strain:—
Confucius said: “I am unversed in military matters.” He also
said: “If I fight, I conquer.”[144] Confucius ordered ceremonies
and regulated music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes
of State ceremonial,[145] and must not be treated as an
independent branch of study. Hence, the words “I am unversed
in” must be taken to mean that there are things which even an
inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have to lead an
army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But if one
can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzŭ, who
was employed by Wu Tzŭ-hsü, there is no need to learn it
oneself. Hence the remark added by Confucius: “If I fight, I
conquer.”[146]
The men of the present day, however, wilfully interpret these
words of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant
that books on the art of war were not worth reading. With blind
persistency, they adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored
over his father’s books to no purpose,[147] as a proof that all
military theory is useless. Again, seeing that books on war have
to do with such things as opportunism in designing plans, and
the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral and
unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies
of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials also
require steady application and practice before efficiency is
reached. The ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere
novices to botch their work.[148] Weapons are baneful[149] and
fighting perilous; and unless a general is in constant practice, he
ought not to hazard other men’s lives in battle.[150] Hence it is
essential that Sun Tzŭ’s 13 chapters should be studied.[151]
Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi[152] in the art of
war. Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but

would not pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the
consequence being that he was finally defeated and overthrown.
He did not realise that the tricks and artifices of war are beyond
verbal computation. Duke Hsiang of Sung[153] and King Yen of
Hsü[154] were brought to destruction by their misplaced
humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war
necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the
occasion. There is a case on record of Confucius himself having
violated an extorted oath,[155] and also of his having left the
Sung State in disguise.[156] Can we then recklessly arraign Sun
Tzŭ for disregarding truth and honesty?[157]

Bibliography.
The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on
war, after Sun Tzŭ. The notes on each have been
四庫全書簡明目錄
drawn principally from the Ssŭ
k‘u ch‘üan shu chien ming mu lu, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.
1. 吳子 Wu Tzŭ, in 1 chüan or 6 篇 chapters. By
吳起 Wu Ch‘i (d. B.C. 381). A genuine work. See
Shih Chi, ch. 65.
2. 司馬法 Ssŭ-ma Fa, in 1 chüan or 5 chapters.
Wrongly attributed to 司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü of
the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early,
as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are
constantly to be met with in its pages.[158] See Shih
Chi, ch. 64.

The Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu (ch. 99, f. 1) remarks that
the oldest three treatises on war, Sun Tzŭ, Wu Tzŭ and
the Ssŭ-ma Fa, are, generally speaking, only
concerned with things strictly military—the art of
producing, collecting, training and drilling troops,
and the correct theory with regard to measures of
expediency, laying plans, transport of goods and the
handling of soldiers[159]—in strong contrast to later
works, in which the science of war is usually blended
with metaphysics, divination and magical arts in
general.
3.六韜 Liu T‘ao, in 6 chüan or 60 chapters.
呂望
Attributed to Lü Wang (or Lü 尙 Shang, also
太公
known as T‘ai Kung) of the 12th century B.C.
[160] But its style does not belong to the era of the

Three Dynasties.[161] 陸德明 Lu Tê-ming (550–625
A.D.) mentions the work, and enumerates the
文武虎豹龍
headings of the six sections, , , , , and
犬 , so that the forgery cannot have been later than the
Sui dynasty.
4. 尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ, in 5 chüan. Attributed to
Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who studied under the
famous鬼谷子 Kuei-ku Tzŭ. The 漢志, under 兵家
,
mentions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas

the text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is
sound enough in the main, though the strategical
devices differ considerably from those of the Warring
States period.[162] It has been furnished with a
張
commentary by the well-known Sung philosopher
載 Chang Tsai.
5. 三略 San Lüeh, in 3 chüan. Attributed to 黃石
公 Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage who is
said to have bestowed it on Chang Liang (d. B.C.
187) in an interview on a bridge.[163] But here again,
the style is not that of works dating from the Ch‘in or
Han period. The Han Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25–
57] apparently quotes from it in one of his
proclamations; but the passage in question may have
been inserted later on, in order to prove the
genuineness of the work. We shall not be far out if
we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420–478
A.D.], or somewhat earlier.[164]
6. 李衞公問對 Li Wei Kung Wên Tui, in 3
sections. Written in the form of a dialogue between
T‘ai Tsung and his great general 李靖 Li Ching, it is
usually ascribed to the latter. Competent authorities
consider it a forgery, though the author was evidently
well versed in the art of war.[165]

7.李靖兵法 Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be
confounded with the foregoing) is a short treatise in 8
chapters, preserved in the T‘ung Tien, but not
published separately. This fact explains its omission
from the Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu.
8.握奇經 Wu Ch‘i Ching,[166] in 1 chüan.
Attributed to the legendary minister 風后 Fêng Hou,
with exegetical notes by 公孫宏 Kung-sun Hung of
the Han dynasty (d. B.C. 121), and said to have been
eulogised by the celebrated general 馬隆 Ma Lung
(d. A.D. 300). Yet the earliest mention of it is in the
宋志 . Although a forgery, the work is well put
together.[167]
Considering the high popular estimation in which
諸葛亮 Chu-ko Liang has always been held, it is not
surprising to find more than one work on war
十六策
ascribed to his pen. Such are (1) the Shih Liu
Ts‘ê (1 chüan), preserved in the 永樂大典 Yung Lo
Ta Tien; (2)將苑 Chiang Yüan (1 ch.); and (3) 心書
Hsin Shu (1 ch.), which steals wholesale from Sun
Tzŭ. None of these has the slightest claim to be
considered genuine.

Most of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain
extensive sections devoted to the literature of war.
The following references may be found useful:—
通典 T‘ung Tien (circâ 800 A.D.), ch. 148–162.
太平御覽 T‘ai P‘ing Yü Lan (983), ch. 270–359.
文獻通考 Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (13 cent.), ch.
th

221.
玉海 Yü Hai (13 cent.), ch. 140, 141.
th

三才圖會 San Ts‘ai T‘u Hui (16 cent.), 人事 ch.
th

7, 8.
廣博物志 Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.
潛確類書 Ch‘ien Ch‘io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.
淵鑑類函 Yüan Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206–
229.
古今圖書集成 Ku Chin T‘u Shu Chi Ch‘êng
(1726), section XXX, esp. ch. 81–90.
續文獻通考 Hsü Wên Hsien T‘ung K‘ao (1784),
ch. 121–134.
皇朝經世文編 Huang Ch‘ao Ching Shih Wên
Pien (1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical
works also deserve mention:—
前漢書 Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 30.
隋書 Sui Shu, ch. 32–35.
舊唐書 Chiu T‘ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.
新唐書 Hsin T‘ang Shu, ch. 57–60.
宋史 Sung Shih, ch. 202–209.
通志 T‘ung Chih (circâ 1150), ch. 68.
To these of course must be added the great
Catalogue of the Imperial Library:—
四庫全書總目提要 Ssŭ K‘u Ch‘üan Shu Tsung
Mu T‘i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.

I. 計篇
LAYING PLANS.
This is the only possible meaning of 計 , which M. Amiot and Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translate “Fondements de l’art militaire” and “First
principles” respectively. Ts‘ao Kung says it refers to the deliberations
in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we
should say, in his tent. See § 26.

1. 孫子曰兵者國之大事
Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance
to the State.

2. 死生之地存亡之道不可不察也
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry
which can on no account be neglected.

3. 故經之以五校之以計而索其情

The art of war, then, is governed by five constant
factors, to be taken into account in one’s
deliberations, when seeking to determine the
conditions obtaining in the field.
The old text of the T‘ung Tien has 故經之以五校之計 , etc. Later
editors have inserted 事 五 以
after 計
, and before . The former
correction is perhaps superfluous, but the latter seems necessary in
order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading in § 12,
where the same words recur. I am inclined to think, however, that the
whole sentence from 校 情 to is an interpolation and has no business
here at all. If it be retained, Wang Hsi must be right in saying that 計
denotes the “seven considerations” in § 13. 情 are the circumstances or
conditions likely to bring about victory or defeat. The antecedent of the
first之 兵者
is 五校
; of the second, . contains the idea of “comparison
with the enemy,” which cannot well be brought out here, but will
appear in § 12. Altogether, difficult though it is, the passage is not so
hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop in burking it entirely.

4. 一曰道二曰天三曰地四曰將五曰法
These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3)
Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and
discipline.
It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by 道
a principle of
harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral aspect. One might
be tempted to render it by “morale,” were it not considered as an
attribute of the ruler in § 13.

5. 道者令民與上同意也

6. 故可與之死可與之生而民不畏危
The Moral Law causes the people to be in
complete accord with their ruler, so that they will
follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by
any danger.
The original text omits令民 以
, inserts an 可
after each , and omits民
而
after . Capt. Calthrop translates: “If the ruling authority be upright,
the people are united”—a very pretty sentiment, but wholly out of
place in what purports to be a translation of Sun Tzŭ.

7. 天者陰陽寒暑時制也
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,
times and seasons.
The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of 陰陽 .
Thus Mêng Shih defines the words as 剛柔盈縮 “the hard and the soft,
waxing and waning,” which does not help us much. Wang Hsi,
however, may be right in saying that what is meant is 總天道 “the
general economy of Heaven,” including the five elements, the four
seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.

8. 地者遠近險易廣狹死生也
Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger
and security; open ground and narrow passes; the
chances of life and death.

死 生 (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) may have been included here
because the safety of an army depends largely on its quickness to turn
these geographical features to account.

9. 將者智信仁勇嚴也
The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,
sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.
The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) 仁 humanity or
義
benevolence; (2) 禮
uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-
智
control, or “proper feeling;” (4) 信
wisdom; (5) sincerity or good
faith. Here智 信 and 仁
are put before , and the two military virtues of
義 禮
“courage” and “strictness” substituted for and .

10. 法者曲制官道主用也
By Method and discipline are to be understood the
marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions,
the gradations of rank among the officers, the
maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach
the army, and the control of military expenditure.
The Chinese of this sentence is so concise as to be practically
unintelligible without commentary. I have followed the interpretation
of Ts‘ao Kung, who joins 曲制 and again 主用 . Others take each of the
曲
six predicates separately. has the somewhat uncommon sense of
“cohort” or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop translates: “Partition
and ordering of troops,” which only covers曲制 .

11. 凡此五者將莫不聞知之者勝不知者不勝

These five heads should be familiar to every
general: he who knows them will be victorious; he
who knows them not will fail.

12. 故校之以計而索其情
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to
determine the military conditions, let them be made
the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
The Yü Lan has an interpolated 五 計
before . It is obvious, however,
that the 五者 just enumerated cannot be described as 計 . Capt.
Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which he had
omitted in § 3, shows himself decidedly hazy: “Further, with regard to
these and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must
be compared with our own.” He does not appear to see that the seven
queries or considerations which follow arise directly out of the Five
heads, instead of being supplementary to them.

曰主孰有道將孰有能天地孰得法令孰行兵衆孰
13.
强士卒孰練賞罰孰明
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with
the Moral law?
I.e., “is in harmony with his subjects.” Cf. § 5.

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from
Heaven and Earth?

See §§ 7, 8.

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously
enforced?
Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao (A.D. 155–220),
who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his
own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned
himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of
corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy
his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s own comment
on the present passage is characteristically curt:設而不犯犯而必誅
“when you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is
disobeyed, the offender must be put to death.”

(5) Which army is the stronger?
Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch‘ên puts it, 內和外附 ,
which might be freely rendered “esprit de corps and ‘big battalions.’”

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly
trained?
Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: “Without constant practice, the officers
will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the
crisis is at hand.”

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both
in reward and punishment?
明 , literally “clear;” that is, on which side is there the most absolute
certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily
punished?

14. 吾以此知勝負矣
By means of these seven considerations I can
forecast victory or defeat.

15. 將聽吾計用之必勝留之將不聽吾計用之必敗去
之
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts
upon it, will conquer:—let such a one be retained in
command! The general that hearkens not to my
counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such
a one be dismissed!
The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was
composed expressly for the benefit of his patron 闔閭 Ho Lü, king of
the Wu State. It is not necessary, however, to understand我 before留
之 (as some commentators do), or to take 將 as “generals under my
command.”

16. 計利以聽乃爲之勢以佐其外
While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail
yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and
beyond the ordinary rules.
Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: “Wherefore,
with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the
advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which

promises victory.” Mere logic should have kept him from penning such
frothy balderdash.

17. 勢者因利而制權也
According as circumstances are favourable, one
should modify one’s plans.
Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the “bookish theoric.”
He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; “for,” as
Chang Yü puts it, “while the main laws of strategy can be stated
clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by
the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favourable position
in actual warfare.” On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord
Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in
order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow,
because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-
in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment.
The Duke listened quietly and then said: “Who will attack the first to-
morrow—I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord Uxbridge.
“Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not given me any idea of
his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you
expect me to tell you what mine are?”[168]

18. 兵者詭道也
All warfare is based on deception.
The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every
soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many
military qualities, was especially distinguished by “the extraordinary
skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend
and foe.”

故能而示之不能用而示之不用近而示之遠遠而
19.
示之近
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when
we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are
far away; when far away, we must make him believe
we are near.

20. 利而誘之亂而取之
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,
and crush him.
取 , as often in Sun Tzŭ, is used in the sense of 擊 . It is rather
remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang Yü,
refer 亂 to the enemy: “when he is in disorder, crush him.” It is more
natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating the uses of deception
in war.

21. 實而備之强而避之
If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If
he is in superior strength, evade him.
The meaning of 實 is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed to
虛 “weak or vulnerable spots.” 强, according to Tu Yu and other
commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as to
numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an extraordinarily far-
fetched translation: “If there are defects, give an appearance of

perfection, and awe the enemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the
enemy to avoid you”!

22. 怒而撓之卑而驕之
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow
arrogant.
I follow Chang Yü in my interpretation of . 怒卑 is expanded by Mei
Yao-ch‘ên into 示以卑弱 . Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the
good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse,
first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing
upon him.

23. 佚而勞之親而離之
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch‘ên has the note: 以
我之佚待彼之勞 “while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to
tire himself out.” The Yü Lan has 引而勞之 “Lure him on and tire him
out.” This would seem also to have been Ts‘ao Kung’s text, judging by
his comment 以利勞之 .

If his forces are united, separate them.
Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the
commentators: “If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division
between them.”

24. 攻其無備出其不意

Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where
you are not expected.

25. 此兵家之勝不可先傳也
These military devices, leading to victory, must not
be divulged beforehand.
This seems to be the way in which Ts‘ao Kung understood the passage,
and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text as it stands. Most
of the commentators give the following explanation: “It is impossible
to lay down rules for warfare before you come into touch with the
enemy.” This would be very plausible if it did not ignore 此 , which
unmistakably refers to the maxims which Sun Tzŭ has been laying
down. It is possible, of course, that此 may be a later interpolation, in
which case the sentence would practically mean: “Success in warfare
cannot be taught.” As an alternative, however, I would venture to
suggest that a second 不 可
may have fallen out after , so that we get:
“These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought to be
imparted.”

夫未戰而廟算勝者得算多也未戰而廟算不勝者
26.
得算少也多算勝少算不勝而況於無算乎吾以此觀
之勝負見矣
Now the general who wins a battle makes many
calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
Chang Yü tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple
to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field,
in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign. Capt.

Calthrop misunderstands it as “the shrine of the ancestors,” and gives a
loose and inaccurate rendering of the whole passage.

The general who loses a battle makes but few
calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations
lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how
much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to
this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or
lose.

II. 作戰篇
WAGING WAR.
Ts‘ao Kung has the note: 欲戰必先算其費務 “He who wishes to fight
must first count the cost,” which prepares us for the discovery that the
subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is
primarily a consideration of ways and means.

孫子曰凡用兵之法馳車千駟革車千乘帶甲十萬
1.
千里饋糧則內外之費賓客之用膠漆之材車甲之奉
日費千金然後十萬之師舉矣
Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there
are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many
heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad
soldiers,
The 馳車 were lightly built and, according to Chang Yü, used for the
attack; the革車 were heavier, and designed for purposes of defence. Li
Ch‘üan, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly
probable. Capt. Calthrop translates “chariots” and “supply wagons”
respectively, but is not supported by any commentator. It is interesting
to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the
Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important
factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain

number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are
informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and
each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be
divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots
and a hundred men.

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,
2.78 modern li go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since
Sun Tzŭ’s time.

the expenditure at home and at the front, including
entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and
paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will
reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
則 , which follows 糧 in the textus receptus, is important as indicating
the apodosis. In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it is omitted, so that
he is led to give this meaningless translation of the opening sentence:
“Now the requirements of War are such that we need 1,000 chariots,”
費
etc. The second , which is redundant, is omitted in the Yü Lan. 千金 ,
like千里 above, is meant to suggest a large but indefinite number. As
the Chinese have never possessed gold coins, it is incorrect to translate
it “1000 pieces of gold.”

Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
Capt. Calthrop adds: “You have the instruments of victory,” which he
seems to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.

2. 其用戰也勝久則鈍兵挫銳攻城則力屈
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is
long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull

and their ardour will be damped.
勝
The Yü Lan omits ; but though 勝久 is certainly a bold phrase, it is
more likely to be right than not. Both in this place and in § 4, the T‘ung
Tien and Yü Lan read 頓 鈍
(in the sense of “to injure”) instead of .

If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your
strength.
As synonyms to 屈 are given 盡, 殫, 窮 and 困.
3. 久暴師則國用不足
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources
of the State will not be equal to the strain.
久暴師 means literally, “If there is long exposure of the army.” Of 暴
in this sense K‘ang Hsi cites an instance from the biography of 竇融
Tou Jung in the Hou Han Shu, where the commentary defines it by 露.
Cf. also the following from the 戰國策 : 將軍久暴露於外 “General,
you have long been exposed to all weathers.”

夫鈍兵挫銳屈力殫貨則諸侯乘其幣而起雖有智
4.
者不能善其後矣
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour
damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure
spent, other chieftains will spring up to take
advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however
wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must
ensue.

Following Tu Yu, I understand 善
in the sense of “to make good,” i.e.
to mend. But Tu Mu and Ho Shih explain it as “to make good plans”—
for the future.

5. 故兵聞拙速未睹巧之久也
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long
delays.
This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the
commentators. Ts‘ao Kung, Li Ch‘üan, Mêng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and
Mei Yao-ch‘ên have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally
stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho
Shih says: “Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of
energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they
bring calamity in their train.” Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by
remarking: “Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth
being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people;
true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities.”
Chang Yü says: “So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is
preferable to clever dilatoriness.” Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever,
except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better
than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something
much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be
injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only
because it means impoverishment to the nation. Capt. Calthrop
indulges his imagination with the following: “Therefore it is
acknowledged that war cannot be too short in duration. But though
conducted with the utmost art, if long continuing, misfortunes do
always appear.” It is hardly worth while to note the total disappearance
of 拙速 in this precious concoction. In considering the point raised
here by Sun Tzŭ, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will
inevitably occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured the

endurance of Rome against that of Hannibal’s isolated army, because it
seemed to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long
campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether
his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their
reversal, it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative
presumption in their favour.

6. 夫兵久而國利者未之有也
There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.
The Yü Lan has 圖 instead of 國—evidently the mistake of a scribe.
7. 故不盡知用兵之害者則不能盡知用兵之利也
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with
the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the
profitable way of carrying it on.
That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a
long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it
to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation,
but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, “He
who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits,” is
distinctly pointless.

8. 善用兵者役不再籍糧不三載
The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy,
neither are his supply-waggons loaded more than

twice.
Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for
reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but
crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an
audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from
Julius Caesar to Napoleon Buonaparte, the value of time—that is,
being a little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than
either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to
commissariat. 籍 賦
is used in the sense of . The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan
have the inferior reading 藉 . The commentators explain 不三載 by
saying that the waggons are loaded once before passing the frontier,
and that the army is met by a further consignment of supplies on the
homeward march. The Yü Lan, however, reads 再 here as well.

9. 取用於國因糧於敵故軍食可足也
Bring war material with you from home, but
forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food
enough for its needs.
用 , “things to be used,” in the widest sense. It includes all the
impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.

10. 國之貧於師者遠輸遠輸則百姓貧
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to
be maintained by contributions from a distance.
Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes
the people to be impoverished.

The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next,
though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so
awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It
never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation
may be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them here.
Sun Tzŭ says that the cause of the people’s impoverishment is 遠輸 ; it
is clear, therefore, that the words have reference to some system by
which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army
direct. But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way,
except because the State or Government is too poor to do so?
Assuming then that 貧 ought to stand first in the sentence in order to
balance 近 (the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and thus
getting rid of國之 於師
, we are still left with , which latter word seems
國
to me an obvious mistake for . “Poverty in the army” is an unlikely
expression, especially as the general has just been warned not to
encumber his army with a large quantity of supplies. If we suppose that
師 somehow got written here instead of 國 (a very simple supposition,
as we have近於師 in the next sentence), and that later on somebody,
scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss 國之 貧 to , without however
erasing 於師 , the whole muddle may be explained. My emended text
貧於國者
then would be , etc.

11. 近於師者貴賣貴賣則百姓財竭
On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes
prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s
substance to be drained away.
近, that is, as Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own territory.
Ts‘ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed the
frontier. Capt. Calthrop drops the 於 , reading 近師者 , but even so it is
impossible to justify his translation “Repeated wars cause high prices.”

12. 財竭則急於丘役
When their substance is drained away, the
peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
丘民 丘役
Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where has the same meaning as .
丘 司馬
was an ancient measure of land. The full table, as given in the
法 尺 步 步 畝 畝
, may not be out of place here: 6 = 1 ; 100 = 1 ; 100 =
夫 夫 屋 屋 井 井 邑 邑 丘 丘 甸
1 ;3 =1 ;3 =1 ;4 =1 ;4 =1 ;4 =1 .
井
According to the Chou Li, there were nine husbandmen to a , which
畝
would assign to each man the goodly allowance of 100 (of which
6.6 now go to an acre). What the values of these measures were in Sun
尺
Tzŭ’s time is not known with any certainty. The lineal , however, is
急
supposed to have been about 20 cm. may include levies of men, as
well as other exactions.

13. 力屈財殫中原內虛於家百姓之費十去其七
14. 公家之費破車罷馬甲胄矢弩戟楯蔽櫓丘牛大車
十去其六
With this loss of substance and exhaustion of
strength, the homes of the people will be stripped
bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be
dissipated;
The Yü Lan omits 財殫 力屈則
. I would propose the emended reading
中 , etc. In view of the fact that we have 財竭 in the two preceding
paragraphs, it seems probable that 財 則殫
is a scribe’s mistake for ,
having been added afterwards to make sense. 中原內虛於家 , literally:
中原
“Within the middle plains there is emptiness in the homes.” For
十去其七
cf. Shih Ching II. 3. vi. 3 and II. 5. ii. 3. With regard to , Tu
Mu says: 家業十耗其七也 , and Wang Hsi: 民費大半矣 ; that is, the

people are mulcted not of 3⁄10, but of 7⁄10, of their income. But this is
hardly to be extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag:
國以民爲本民以食爲天居人上者宜乎重惜 “The people being
regarded as the essential part of the State, and food as the people’s
heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be
careful of both?”

while Government expenses for broken chariots,
worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and
arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets,
draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to
four-tenths of its total revenue.
The Yü Lan has several various readings here, the more important of
which are 疲 for the less common 罷 干 蔽
(read p‘i2), for , and 兵牛
for 丘牛 , which latter, if right, must mean “oxen from the country
櫓
districts” (cf. supra, § 12). For the meaning of , see note on III, § 4.
Capt. Calthrop omits to translate丘牛大車 .

故智將務食於敵食敵一鍾當吾二十鍾 秆一石
15.
當吾二十石
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on
the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is
equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a
single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty
from one’s own store.
Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of
transporting one cartload to the front. According to Ts‘ao Kung, a =鍾
6斛 㪷 㪷
4 , or 64 , but according to Mêng Shih, 10 斛 鍾
make a . The

石 picul consisted of 70 斤 catties (Tu Mu and others say 120). 秆,
literally, “beanstalks and straw.”

16. 故殺敵者怒也取敵之利者貨也
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be
roused to anger; that there may be advantage from
defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
These are two difficult sentences, which I have translated in
accordance with Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase. We may incontinently
reject Capt. Calthrop’s extraordinary translation of the first: “Wantonly
to kill and destroy the enemy must be forbidden.” Ts‘ao Kung quotes a
jingle current in his day: 軍無財士不來軍無賞士不往 . Tu Mu says:
“Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage
of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy,
they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen
desire to fight, each on his own account.” Chang Yü takes 利 as the
取
direct object of , which is not so good.

故車戰得車十乘已上賞其先得者而更其旌旗車
17.
雜而乘之卒善而養之
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more
chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded
who took the first.
Capt. Calthrop’s rendering is: “They who are the first to lay their hands
on more than ten of the enemy’s chariots, should be encouraged.” We
should have expected the gallant captain to see that such Samson-like
prowess deserved something more substantial than mere

encouragement. The T‘u Shu omits 故 , and has 以上 in place of the
more archaic 已上 .

Our own flags should be substituted for those of the
enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in
conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should
be kindly treated and kept.

18. 是謂勝敵而益强
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment
one’s own strength.

19. 故兵貴勝不貴久
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not
lengthy campaigns.
As Ho Shih remarks: 兵不可玩武不可黷 “Soldiers are not to be used
as playthings. War is not a thing to be trifled with.” Sun Tzŭ here
reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to enforce.

20. 故知兵之將民之司命國家安危之主也
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is
the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it
depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in
peril.

In the original text, there is a 生 before the 民.

III. 謀攻篇
ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.

孫子曰凡用兵之法全國爲上破國次之全軍爲上
1.
破軍次之全旅爲上破旅次之全卒爲上破卒次之全
伍爲上破伍次之
Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best
thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and
intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too,
it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it,
to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company
entire than to destroy them.
A 軍 “army corps,” according to the Ssŭ-ma Fa, consisted nominally
旅
of 12500 men; according to Ts‘ao Kung, a contained 500 men, a卒
any number between 100 and 500, and a 伍 any number between 5 and
100. For the last two, however, Chang Yü gives the exact figures of
100 and 5 respectively.

是故百戰百勝非善之善者也不戰而屈人之兵善
2.
之善者也

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in
breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old
Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the
huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.

3. 故上兵伐謀其次伐交其次伐兵下政攻城
Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk
the enemy’s plans;
伐其始謀也
I.e., as Li Ch‘üan says ( ), in their very inception. Perhaps
伐
the word “baulk” falls short of expressing the full force of , which
implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be content to
foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but an active policy of
counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: “When the
enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by
delivering our own attack first.”

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s
forces;
Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in
speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or
principalities into which the China of his day was split up.

the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the
field;
When he is already in full strength.

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The use of the word 政 is somewhat unusual, which may account for
the reading of the modern text: 其下攻城 .

攻城之法爲不得已修櫓轒轀具器械三月而後成
4.
距闉又三月而後已
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can
possibly be avoided.
Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in
1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley,
Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would
have been masters of the situation before the British were ready
seriously to oppose them.

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and
various implements of war, will take up three whole
months;
It is not quite clear what櫓 were. Ts‘ao Kung simply defines them as
大楯 “large shields,” but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch‘üan,
who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting
the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman
testudo, ready made. Tu Mu says they were “what are now termed 彭
排 ” (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, according to K‘ang
Hsi), but this is denied by Ch‘ên Hao. See supra, II. 14. The name is
also applied to turrets on city walls. Of 轒轀 (fên yün) we get a fairly
clear description from several commentators. They were wooden
missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within,
covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of
men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling

moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called 木驢 “wooden
donkeys.” Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates the term, “battering-
rams.” I follow Ts‘ao Kung in taking 具as a verb, co-ordinate and
synonymous with 修 . Those commentators who regard 修as an
adjective equivalent to 長 “long,” make 具
presumably into a noun.

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls
will take three months more.
The 距闉 堙 (or , in the modern text) were great mounds or ramparts of
earth heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to discover
the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the 樓櫓 fortified
turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Tu Yu quotes the Tso Chuan:
楚司馬子反乘堙而窺宋城也 .

將不勝其忿而蟻附之殺士三分之一而城不拔者
5.
此攻之災
The general, unable to control his irritation, will
launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as Ts‘ao
Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a
wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay,
may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of
war are ready.

with the result that one-third of his men are slain,
while the town still remains untaken. Such are the
disastrous effects of a siege.
We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port
Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. The T‘ung

Tien reads不勝心之忿 則殺士卒 攻城之災 其忿 the Yü
... ... . For
Lan has 心怒 而城不拔者 , and
. Capt. Calthrop does not translate
此攻之災
mistranslates .

故善用兵者屈人之兵而非戰也拔人之城而非攻
6.
也毁人之國而非久也
Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s
troops without any fighting; he captures their cities
without laying siege to them; he overthrows their
kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
國
Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the , that is, the Government,
but does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang,
who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed “Father
and mother of the people.”

7. 必以全爭於天下故兵不頓而利可全此謀攻之法
也
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery
of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his
triumph will be complete.
Owing to the double meanings of , 兵頓 鈍 利
[= ] and , the latter part
of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: “And thus,
the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect.”
Chang Yü says that 利 is “the advantage of a prosperous kingdom and
a strong army.”

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. 故用兵之法十則圍之五則攻之倍則分之
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the
enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack
him;
Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
Note that 之 does not refer to the enemy, as in the two preceding
clauses. This sudden change of object is quite common in Chinese. Tu
Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears
to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts‘ao Kung, however, gives
a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: 以二敵一則一術爲正一術爲奇 “Being
two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our army in the regular
way, and the other for some special diversion.” [For explanation of 正
奇
and , see V. 3, note.] Chang Yü thus further elucidates the point: “If
our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split
up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall
upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed
from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front. This
is what is meant by saying that “one part may be used in the regular
way, and the other for some special diversion.” Tu Mu does not
understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as
concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in
calling this a mistake.”

9. 敵則能戰之少則能逃之不若則能避之
If equally matched, we can offer battle;
Li Ch‘üan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: 主客
力敵惟善者戰 “If attackers and attacked are equally matched in

strength, only the able general will fight.” He thus takes 能 as though it
were 能者 , which is awkward.

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the
enemy;
The T‘u Shu has 守 逃
instead of , which is hardly distinguishable in
sense from 避 in the next clause. The meaning, “we can watch the
enemy,” is certainly a great improvement on the above; but
unfortunately there appears to be no very good authority for the
variant. Chang Yü reminds us that the saying only applies if the other
factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than
counterbalanced by superior energy and discipline.

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. 故小敵之堅大敵之擒也
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a
small force, in the end it must be captured by the
larger force.
In other words: “C’est magnifique; mais ce n’est pas la guerre.”

11. 夫將者國之輔也輔周則國必强輔隙則國必弱
Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the
bulwark is complete at all points, the State will be
strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be
weak.

隙 cannot be restricted to anything so particular as in Capt. Calthrop’s
translation, “divided in his allegiance.” It is simply keeping up the
周
metaphor suggested by . As Li Ch‘üan tersely puts it: 隙缺也將才
不備兵必弱 “Ch‘i, gap, indicates deficiency; if the general’s ability is
not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his profession), his
army will lack strength.”

12. 故君之所以患於軍者三
There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army:—

不知軍之不可以進而謂之進不知軍之不可以退
13.
而謂之退是謂縻軍
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to
retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.
This is called hobbling the army.
Ts‘ao Kung weakly defines 縻 御 as “control,” “direct.” Cf. § 17 ad
fin. But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors which from time
to time illuminate Sun Tzŭ’s work, and is rightly explained by Li
絆
Ch‘üan as = . He adds the comment: 如絆驥足無馳驟也 . “It is like
tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to
gallop.” One would naturally think of “the ruler” in this passage as
being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a
distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote
the saying of T‘ai Kung: 國不可以從外治軍不可以從中御 “A
kingdom should not be governed from without, an army should not be
directed from within.” Of course it is true that, during an engagement,
or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the

thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he will
be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong orders.

14. 不知三軍之事而同三軍之政者則軍士惑矣
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same
way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of
the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes
restlessness in the soldier’s minds.
Ts‘ao Kung’s note is: 軍容不入國國容不入軍禮不可以治兵也 ,
which may be freely translated: “The military sphere and the civil
sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid gloves.”
And Chang Yü says: “Humanity and justice ( 仁義 ) are the principles
on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and
權變
flexibility ( ), on the other hand, are military rather than civic
virtues.” 同三軍之政 , “to assimilate the governing of an army”—to
that of a State, understood. The T‘ung Tien has 欲inserted before ,同
here and in § 15.

15. 不知三軍之權而同三軍之任則軍士疑矣
(3) By employing the officers of his army without
discrimination,
That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.

through ignorance of the military principle of
adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the
confidence of the soldiers.

I follow Mei Yao-ch‘ên here. The other commentators make 不知 etc.
refer, not to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs.
Thus Tu Yu says: 將若不知權變不可付以勢位 “If a general is
ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with
黃石公
a position of authority.” Tu Mu quotes : “The skilful employer
of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man,
and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit,
the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is
quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death.”
The T‘ung Tien reads 軍覆疑 , which Tu Yu explains as 覆敗 “is utterly
defeated.” Capt. Calthrop gives a very inaccurate rendering: “Ignorant
of the situation of the army, to interfere in its dispositions.”

16. 三軍既惑且疑則諸侯之難至矣是謂亂軍引勝
But when the army is restless and distrustful,
trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes.
This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and
flinging victory away.
Most of the commentators take 引 奪
in the sense of , which it seems to
bear also in the Li Chi, 玉藻 卻
, I. 18. [ is there given as its equivalent,
but Legge tries notwithstanding to retain the more usual sense,
translating “draw ... back,” which is hardly defensible.] Tu Mu and
Wang Hsi, however, think 引勝 means “leading up to the enemy’s
victory.”

故知勝有五知可以戰與不可以戰者勝識衆寡之
17.
用者勝上下同欲者勝以虞待不虞者勝將能而君不
御者勝此五者知勝之道也

Thus we may know that there are five essentials
for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight
and when not to fight.
Chang Yü says: “If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if
he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will
invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive
or the defensive.”

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both
superior and inferior forces.
This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers correctly,
as Li Ch‘üan and others make out. Chang Yü expounds the saying
more satisfactorily: “By applying the art of war, it is possible with a
lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice versâ. The secret lies in an eye
for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzŭ
says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior
one, make for difficult ground.’”

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same
spirit throughout all its ranks.
Ts‘ao Kung refers 上下 less well to sovereign and subjects.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not
interfered with by the sovereign.
Tu Yu quotes 王子 as saying: 指授在君決戰在將也 “It is the
sovereign’s function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle
is the function of the general.” It is needless to dilate on the military

disasters which have been caused by undue interference with
operations in the field on the part of the home government. Napoleon
undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he
was not hampered by any central authority,—that he was, in fact, 將
and 君 in one.

Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.
Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of victory.”

故曰知彼知己百戰不殆不知彼而知己一勝一負
18.
不知彼不知己每戰必殆
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the
enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a
defeat.
Li Ch‘üan cites the case of 苻堅 秦
Fu Chien, prince of Ch‘in, who in
383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the 晉 Chin Emperor.
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the
services of such men as 謝安 Hsieh An and 桓沖 Huan Ch‘ung, he
boastfully replied: “I have the population of eight provinces at my
back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they
could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips
into the stream. What danger have I to fear?” Nevertheless, his forces
were soon after disastrously routed at the 淝 Fei River, and he was
obliged to beat a hasty retreat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle.

The modern text, represented by the 北堂書鈔 and T‘u Shu, has 必敗 ,
which I should be inclined to adopt in preference to 殆 here, though
the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan both have the latter. Chang Yü offers the
best commentary on 知彼知己 . He says that these words “have
reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables you to
take the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the
defensive.” He adds: 攻是守之機守是攻之策 “Attack is the secret of
defence; defence is the planning of an attack.” It would be hard to find
a better epitome of the root-principle of war.

IV. 形篇
TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.
形 is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally,
“form,” “body,” it comes to mean “appearance,” “attitude” or
“disposition;” and here it is best taken as something between, or
perhaps combining, “tactics” and “disposition of troops.” Ts‘ao Kung
explains it as軍之形也，我動彼應兩敵相察情也 “marching and
counter-marching on the part of the two armies with a view to
discovering each other’s condition.” Tu Mu says: “It is through the 形
dispositions of an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal
your dispositions (無形 ), and your condition will remain secret, which
leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your condition will
become patent, which leads to defeat.” Wang Hsi remarks that the
good general can 變化其形因敵以制勝 “secure success by modifying
his tactics to meet those of the enemy.” In the modern text, the title of
軍形
the chapter appears as , which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly
translates “the order of battle.”

1. 孫子曰昔之善戰者先爲不可勝以待敵之可勝
Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put
themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then
waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. 不可勝在己可勝在敵
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own
hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is
provided by the enemy himself.
That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has: “The
causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy’s
camp,” which, though certainly an improvement on his previous
attempt, is still incorrect.

3. 故善戰者能爲不可勝不能使敵必可勝
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself
against defeat,
“By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks,
and taking unremitting precautions” (Chang Yü).

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
使敵之可勝
The original text reads , which the modern text has further
modified into 使敵之必可勝 . Capt. Calthrop makes out the impossible
meaning, “and further render the enemy incapable of victory.”

4. 故曰勝可知而不可爲
Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer
without being able to do it.
Capt. Calthrop translates: “The conditions necessary for victory may
be present, but they cannot always be obtained,” which is more or less
unintelligible.

5. 不可勝者守也可勝者攻也
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;
ability to defeat the enemy means taking the
offensive.
For 不可勝 I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in §§ 1–3, in
spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning
they give, “He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,” is plausible
enough, but it is highly improbable that 勝 should suddenly become
active in this way. An incorrect variant in the Yü Lan is不可勝則守可
勝則攻 .

6. 守則不足攻則有餘
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

善守者藏於九地之下善攻者動於九天之上故能
7.
自保而全勝也
The general who is skilled in defence hides in the
most secret recesses of the earth;
Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” which is a metaphor indicating
the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know
his whereabouts. The 九地 of this passage have of course no
connection with the 九地 “Nine situations” of chap. XI.

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the
topmost heights of heaven.

Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a
thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the
opinion of most of the commentators, though Ts‘ao Kung, followed by
Tu Yu, explains 地 as the hills, rivers, and other natural features which
will afford shelter or protection to the attacked, and天 as the phases of
weather which may be turned to account by the attacking party. Capt.
Calthrop’s “The skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven” conveys
no meaning at all.

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect
ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following: “If
these precepts be observed, victory is certain.”

8. 見勝不過衆人之所知非善之善者也
To see victory only when it is within the ken of the
common herd is not the acme of excellence.
As Ts‘ao Kung remarks, 當見未萌 “the thing is to see the plant before
it has germinated,” to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li
Ch‘üan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the
vastly superior army of 趙 Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the
city of成安 Ch‘êng-an, said to his officers: “Gentlemen, we are going
to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner.” The officers
hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But
Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever
stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and
inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story, see 前漢
書 , chap. 34,韓信傳 . Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly with: “A
victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk,
may not be a true success.”

9. 戰勝而天下曰善非善之善者也
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and
conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: 陰謀潛運攻心伐謀勝敵之日
曾不血刃 “To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the
enemy’s intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may
be won without shedding a drop of blood.” Sun Tzŭ reserves his
approbation for things that

“the world’s coarse thumb
And finger fail to plumb.”

故舉秋毫不爲多力見日月不爲明目聞雷霆不爲
10.
聰耳
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
秋毫 is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when
it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese
writers. Cf. Mencius, I. 1. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzŭ, 知北遊, et al.

to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear
the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick
hearing:烏獲 Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; 離
朱 Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no
bigger than a mustard seed; and 師曠 Shih K‘uang, a blind musician
who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.

11. 古之所謂善戰者勝勝易勝者也
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one
who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
The original text, followed by the T‘u Shu, has勝於易勝者也 . But this
is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness of 勝勝
易勝者也 , which means literally: “one who, conquering, excels in easy
conquering.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “He who only sees the obvious,
wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of
things, wins with ease.”

12. 故善戰者之勝也無智名無勇功
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation
for wisdom nor credit for courage.
Tu Mu explains this very well: “Inasmuch as his victories are gained
over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large
knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom;
inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any
bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.”

13. 故其戰勝不忒不忒者其所措必勝勝已敗者也
He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
Ch‘ên Hao says: “He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no
futile attacks.” The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yü:
“One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be
at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished;
whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are
not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably

win.” Li Ch‘üan thinks that the character 忒 should be 貳 “to have
doubts.” But it is better not to tamper with the text, especially when no
improvement in sense is the result.

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty
of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is
already defeated.
The T‘u Shu omits . 必措 置
is here = . Chia Lin says it is put for 錯
in
the sense of 雜 ; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop altogether
ignores the important word .忒
14. 故善戰者立於不敗之地而不失敵之敗也
Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a
position which makes defeat impossible, and does not
miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
A 不可爲之計 “counsel of perfection,” as Tu Mu truly observes. 地
need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the
troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise
general will make to increase the safety of his army.

15. 是故勝兵先勝而後求戰敗兵先戰而後求勝
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only
seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas
he who is destined to defeat first fights and
afterwards looks for victory.

Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: “In warfare, first lay plans which
will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not
begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no
longer be assured.”

16. 善用兵者修道而保法故能爲勝敗之政
The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,
and strictly adheres to method and discipline;
道 法
For and , see supra, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Yü is wrong in
爲戰之道
altering their signification here, and taking them as and 制
敵之法 respectively.

thus it is in his power to control success.

17. 兵法一曰度二曰量三曰數四曰稱五曰勝
In respect of military method, we have, firstly,
Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity;
thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
fifthly, Victory.

18. 地生度度生量量生數數生稱稱生勝
Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation
to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to
Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

It is not easy to distinguish the four terms 度量數稱 very clearly. The
first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which
enable us to 量 form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to 數
make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to
稱 a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with
our own; if the latter turn the scale, then 勝 victory ensues. The chief
數
difficulty lies in , which some commentators take as a calculation of
量
numbers, thereby making it nearly synonymous with . Perhaps量 is
情
rather a consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition (
形勢
or ), while數 is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the
other hand, Tu Mu defines 數 機數 as , and adds: 强弱已定然後能用
機變數也 “the question of relative strength having been settled, we
can bring the varied resources of cunning into play.” Ho Shih seconds
this interpretation, which is weakened, however, by the fact that 稱 is
數
given as logically consequent on ; this certainly points to the latter
being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt. Calthrop’s version the less
said the better.

19. 故勝兵若以鎰稱銖敗兵若以銖稱鎰
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a
pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single
grain.
Literally, “a victorious army is like an 鎰i (20 oz.) weighed against a
銖 shu (1⁄24 oz.); a routed army as a shu weighed against an i.” The
point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force,
flushed with victory, has over one demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his
note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the 鎰to be 24 Chinese ounces, and
corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li
Ch‘üan of the T‘ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.

20. 勝者之戰民也若決積水於千仞之谿者形也

The onrush of a conquering force is like the
bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand
fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.
The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the
民也 仞 尺
general sense is plain. The T‘u Shu omits .A =8 or Chinese
feet.

V. 埶篇
ENERGY.
埶 here is said to be an older form of 勢 ; Sun Tzŭ, however, would
seem to have used the former in the sense of “power,” and the latter
only in the sense of “circumstances.” The fuller title 兵勢 is found in
the T‘u Shu and the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it into 積勢之變
“the application, in various ways, of accumulated power;” and Chang
Yü says: 兵勢以成然後任勢以取勝 “When the soldiers’ energy has
reached its height, it may be used to secure victory.”

1. 孫子曰凡治衆如治寡分數是也
Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the
same in principle as the control of a few men: it is
merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with
subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han
Hsin’s famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him:
“How large an army do you think I could lead?” “Not more than
100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor. “Oh!” he
多多益辦耳
answered, “the more the better” ( ). Chang Yü gives the
following curious table of the subdivisions of an army:—5 men make a
列 列;2 火 火 隊 隊 官 官
make a ; 5 曲 make a ; 2 make a ; 2 make a ;
2曲 部 部 校 校
make a ; 2 裨 裨 軍 軍
make a ; 2 make a ; 2 make a . A

or army corps thus works out at 3200 men. But cf. III. § 1, note. For
曲 官
, see I. § 10. It is possible that in that paragraph may also be used
in the above technical sense.

2. 鬥衆如鬥寡形名是也
Fighting with a large army under your command is
nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is
merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
One must be careful to avoid translating 鬥衆 “fighting against a large
number,” no reference to the enemy being intended. 形 is explained by
Ts‘ao Kung as denoting flags and banners, by means of which every
soldier may recognise his own particular regiment or company, and
thus confusion may be prevented. 名 he explains as drums and gongs,
which from the earliest times were used to sound the advance and the
retreat respectively. Tu Mu defines 形 陳形 as “marshalling the troops
in order,” and takes名 as the flags and banners. Wang Hsi also dissents
from Ts‘ao Kung, referring 形 to the ordering of the troops by means
of banners, drums and gongs, and 名 to the various names by which
the regiments might be distinguished. There is much to be said for this
view.

3. 三軍之衆可使必受敵而無敗者奇正是也
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the
brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—
this is effected by manœuvres direct and indirect.
必 畢
For , there is another reading , “all together,” adopted by Wang
Hsi and Chang Yü. We now come to one of the most interesting parts
of Sun Tzŭ’s treatise, the discussion of the正 奇
and the . As it is by no

means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to
render them at all consistently by good English equivalents, it may be
as well to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject
before proceeding further. Li Ch‘üan: 當敵爲正傍出爲奇 “Facing the
enemy is chêng, making lateral diversions is ch‘i.” Chia Lin: 當敵以正
陳取勝以奇兵 “In presence of the enemy, your troops should be
arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal
manœuvres must be employed.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên: 動爲奇靜爲正靜以
待之動以勝之 “Ch‘i is active, chêng is passive; passivity means
waiting for an opportunity, activity brings the victory itself.” Ho Shih:
我之正使敵視之爲奇我之奇使敵視之爲正正亦爲奇奇亦爲正 “We
must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that
is secretly designed, and vice versâ; thus chêng may also be ch‘i, and
ch‘i may also be chêng.” He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin,
who when marching ostensibly against 臨晉 Lin-chin (now 朝邑
Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow
River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. [Ch‘ien Han
正
Shu, ch. 34.] Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was , and the
奇
surprise manœuvre was . Chang Yü gives the following summary of
opinions on the words: “Military writers do not all agree with regard to
the meaning of ch‘i and chêng. 尉繚子 Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.]
says: 正兵貴先奇兵貴後 ‘Direct warfare favours frontal attacks,
indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts‘ao Kung says: ‘Going
straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on the
enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuvre.’ 李衛公 Li Wei-kung [6th and
7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is chêng; turning
movements, on the other hand, are ch‘i.’ These writers simply regard
chêng as chêng, and ch‘i as ch‘i; they do not note that the two are
mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of
a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment of the T‘ang Emperor T‘ai Tsung
goes to the root of the matter: ‘A ch‘i manœuvre may be chêng, if we
make the enemy look upon it as chêng; then our real attack will be
ch‘i, and vice versâ. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so
that he cannot fathom our real intent.’” To put it perhaps a little more
正
clearly: any attack or other operation is , on which the enemy has

奇
had his attention fixed; whereas that is , which takes him by surprise
or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a
奇
movement which is meant to be , it immediately becomes . 正
4. 兵之所加如以碬投卵者虛實是也
That the impact of your army may be like a
grindstone dashed against an egg—this is effected by
the science of weak points and strong.
虛實 , literally “the hollow and the solid,” is the title of chap. VI. 碫
tuan is the T‘u Shu reading, 碬 hsia that of the standard text. It appears
from K‘ang Hsi that there has been much confusion between the two
characters, and indeed, it is probable that one of them has really crept
into the language as a mistake for the other.

5. 凡戰者以正合以奇勝
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for
joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in
order to secure victory.
Chang Yü says: 徐發奇兵或擣其旁或擊其後 “Steadily develop
indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy’s flanks or falling on his
rear.” A brilliant example of “indirect tactics” which decided the
fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march round the
Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.[169]

故善出奇者無窮如天地不竭如江河終而復始日
6.
月是也死而復生四時是也

Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are
inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the
flow of rivers and streams;
奇 is the universally accepted emendation for 兵, the reading of the 北
堂書鈔.
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
like the four seasons, they pass away but to return
once more.
Tu Yu and Chang Yü understand this of the permutations of 奇 正 and .
But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of 正 at all, unless, indeed, we
suppose with 鄭友賢 Chêng Yu-hsien that a clause relating to it has
fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed out, the
two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they
cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression,
in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.

7. 聲不過五五聲之變不可勝聽也
There are not more than five musical notes,
宮商角微羽.
yet the combinations of these five give rise to more
melodies than can ever be heard.

8. 色不過五五色之變不可勝觀也
There are not more than five primary colours,

靑黃赤白黑 blue, yellow, red, white and black.
yet in combination they produce more hues than can
ever be seen.

9. 味不過五五味之變不可勝嘗也
There are not more than five cardinal tastes,
酸辛醎甘苦 sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter.
yet combinations of them yield more flavours than
can ever be tasted.

10. 戰埶不過奇正奇正之變不可勝窮也
In battle, there are not more than two methods of
attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in
combination give rise to an endless series of
manœuvres.

11. 奇正相生如循環之無端孰能窮之
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in
turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to
an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their
combination?

哉
The T‘u Shu adds . The final 之 may refer either to the circle or,
more probably, to the 奇正之變 understood. Capt. Calthrop is wrong
with: “They are a mystery that none can penetrate.”

12. 激水之疾至於漂石者埶也
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
which will even roll stones along in its course.

13. 鷙鳥之疾至於毁折者節也
The quality of decision is like the well-timed
swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and
destroy its victim.
For疾 擊
the Yü Lan reads , which is also supported by a quotation in
the呂氏春秋 [3rd cent. B.C.]. 節 in this context is a word which really
defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu says that it is equivalent
to 節 量 遠 近 “the measurement or estimation of distance.” But this
meaning does not quite fit the illustrative simile in § 15. As applied to
the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of self-restraint which
keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment,
together with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived.
The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being
able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it will be most
effective. When the “Victory” went into action at Trafalgar at hardly
more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes exposed to a
storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson
coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he
brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.
That was a case of 節.

14. 是故善戰者其埶險其節短
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his
onset, and prompt in his decision.
斷
Tu Yu defines 節 here by the word , which is very like “decision” in
English. 短 is certainly used in a very unusual sense, even if, as the
commentators say, it = 近 . This would have reference to the
measurement of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near
before striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use
the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom “short and
sharp.” Cf. Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing the falcon’s mode
of attack, proceeds: 兵之乘機當如是耳 “This is just how the
‘psychological moment’ should be seized in war.” I do not care for
Capt. Calthrop’s rendering: “The spirit of the good fighter is terrifying,
his occasions sudden.”

15. 埶如彍弩節如發機
Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross-
bow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.
“Energy” seems to be the best equivalent here for 埶 , because the
comparison implies that the force is potential, being stored up in the
bent cross-bow until released by the finger on the trigger. None of the
commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile.

紛紛紜紜鬥亂而不可亂也渾渾沌沌形圓而不可
16.
敗也
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;

amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without
head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
形圓, literally “formation circular”, is explained by Li Ch‘üan as 無向
背也 “without back or front.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: “The subdivisions
of the army having been previously fixed, and the various signals
agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting
which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance
of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be
without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of
your forces quite out of the question.” It is a little difficult to decide
whether 鬥亂 and 形圓 should not be taken as imperatives: “fight in
disorder (for the purpose of deceiving the enemy), and you will be
亂而取之
secure against real disorder.” Cf. I. § 20: .

17. 亂生於治怯生於勇弱生於彊
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline;
simulated fear postulates courage; simulated
weakness postulates strength.
In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone
down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts‘ao Kung throws
out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: 皆毁形匿情也 “These
things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one’s condition.” But
Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly: “If you wish to feign
confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect
discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy,
you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness
in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding
strength.”

18. 治亂數也勇怯埶也彊弱形也
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is
simply a question of subdivision;
See supra, § 1.

concealing courage under a show of timidity
presupposes a fund of latent energy;
埶
It is passing strange that the commentators should understand here
as “circumstances”—a totally different sense from that which it has
previously borne in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: 見有利之勢而不動
敵人以我爲實怯也 “seeing that we are favourably circumstanced and
yet make no move, the enemy will believe that we are really afraid.”

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by
tactical dispositions.
Chang Yü relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han
Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report
on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed
all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm
soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that the spies
one and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack.” 婁敬 Lou
Ching alone opposed them, saying: “When two countries go to war,
they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their
strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity.
This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would be
unwise for us to attack.” The Emperor, however, disregarding this
advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at 白登 Po-
têng.”

19. 故善動敵者形之敵必從之予之敵必取之

Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on
the move maintains deceitful appearances, according
to which the enemy will act.
Ts‘ao Kung’s note is 見羸形也 “Make a display of weakness and
want,” but Tu Mu rightly points out that 形 does not refer only to
weakness: “If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s,
weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he
must be led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off.
In fact, all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs
that we choose to give him.” The following anecdote of 孫臏 Sun Pin,
a descendant of Sun Wu, is related at length in the 史記, chap. 65: In
341 B.C., the 齊 Ch‘i State being at war with 魏 田忌
Wei, sent T‘ien
Chi and Sun Pin against the general 龐涓 P‘ang Chüan, who happened
to be a deadly personal enemy of the latter. Sun Pin said: “The Ch‘i
State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary
despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account.” Accordingly,
when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave
orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and
the night after only 20,000. P‘ang Chüan pursued them hotly, saying to
himself: “I knew these men of Ch‘i were cowards: their numbers have
already fallen away by more than half.” In his retreat, Sun Pin came to
a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach after
dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the
words: “Under this tree shall P‘ang Chüan die.” Then, as night began
to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with
orders to shoot directly they saw a light. Later on, P‘ang Chüan arrived
at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what
was written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of
arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu
Mu’s version of the story; the Shih Chi, less dramatically but probably
with more historical truth, makes P‘ang Chüan cut his own throat with
an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch
at it.
予 here = 與.
20. 以利動之以卒待之
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for
him.
卒
This would appear to be the meaning if we retain , which Mei Yao-
ch‘ên explains as 精卒 “men of spirit.” The T‘u Shu reads 本
, an
emendation suggested by 李靖 Li Ching. The meaning then would be,
“He lies in wait with the main body of his troops.”

21. 故善戰者求之於埶不責於人故能擇人而任埶
The clever combatant looks to the effect of
combined energy, and does not require too much
from individuals.
Tu Mu says: “He first of all considers the power of his army in the
bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each
man according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from
the untalented.”

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and to
utilise combined energy.
Another reading has 之 埶
instead of . It would be interesting if Capt.
Calthrop could tell us where the following occurs in the Chinese: “yet,

when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to its limits.”

任埶者其戰人也如轉木石木石之性安則靜危則
22.
動方則止圓則行
When he utilises combined energy, his fighting
men become as it were like unto rolling logs or
stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain
motionless on level ground, and to move when on a
slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
round-shaped, to go rolling down.
Ts‘ao Kung calls this 任自然勢 “the use of natural or inherent power.”
Capt. Calthrop ignores the last part of the sentence entirely. In its stead
he has: “So await the opportunity, and so act when the opportunity
arrives”—another absolutely gratuitous interpolation. The T‘ung Tien
任
omits .

23. 故善戰人之埶如轉圓石於千仞之山者埶也
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men
is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a
mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.
善
The T‘ung Tien omits . The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s
opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and
sudden rushes. “Great results,” he adds, “can thus be achieved with
small forces.”

VI. 虛實篇
WEAK POINTS AND STRONG.
Chang Yü attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:
“Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the
defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect
methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of
attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect
methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two
methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points.
For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and
defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again
on the above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately
after the chapter on Energy.”

孫子曰凡先處戰地而待敵者佚後處戰地而趨戰
1.
者勞
Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and
awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the
fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten
to battle, will arrive exhausted.
處 據
Instead of , the Yü Lan has in both clauses the stronger word . For
the antithesis between佚 勞
and , cf. I. § 23, where however 勞is used
as a verb.

2. 故善戰者致人而不致於人
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be
imposed on him.
The next paragraph makes it clear that 致 does not merely mean, as Tu
Mu says, 令敵來就我 “to make the enemy approach me,” but rather to
make him go in any direction I please. It is thus practically
制
synonymous with . Cf. Tu Mu’s own note on V. § 19. One mark of a
great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at all.[170]

3. 能使敵人自至者利之也能使敵人不得至者害之
也
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the
enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by
inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the
enemy to draw near.
In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will
strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.

4. 故敵佚能勞之飽能飢之安能動之
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-Ch‘ên’s
interpretation of I. § 23.

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;

飢 is probably an older form than 饑 , the reading of the original text.
Both are given in the 說文.

if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
The subject to 能 善戰者
is still ; but these clauses would read better as
direct admonitions, and in the next sentence we find Sun Tzŭ dropping
insensibly into the imperative.

5. 出其所必趨趨其所不意
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to
defend; march swiftly to places where you are not
expected.
The original text, adopted by the T‘u Shu, has 出其所不趨 ; it has been
altered to suit the context and the commentaries of Ts‘ao Kung and Ho
Shih, who evidently read 必趨 . The other reading would mean:
“Appear at points to which the enemy cannot hasten;” but in this case
趨
there is something awkward in the use of . Capt. Calthrop is wrong
of course with “appearing where the enemy is not.”

6. 行千里而不勞者行於無人之地也
An army may march great distances without
distress, if it marches through country where the
enemy is not.
無人之地
We must beware of understanding as “uninhabited country.”
Sun Tzŭ habitually uses 人 敵
in the sense of , e.g. supra, § 2. Ts‘ao
Kung sums up very well: 出空擊虛避其所守擊其不意 “Emerge from
the void [q.d. like “a bolt from the blue”], strike at vulnerable points,

shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters.” The
difference of meaning between 空 虛
and is worth noting.

攻而必取者攻其所不守也守而必固者守其所不
7.
攻也
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if
you only attack places which are undefended.
所 不 守 is of course hyperbolical; Wang Hsi rightly explains it as
“weak points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or
the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the
precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or
provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst
themselves.”

You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only
hold positions that cannot be attacked.
I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There
is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter clause.
Tu Mu, Ch‘ên Hao, and Mei Yao-ch‘ên assume the meaning to be: “In
order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend even those
places that are not likely to be attacked;” and Tu Mu adds: “How much
more, then, those that will be attacked.” Taken thus, however, the
clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration
in the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang
Yü, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: “He who is
skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see
IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This
being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the
enemy cannot defend.... He who is skilled in defence hides in the most
secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to

estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are
precisely those that the enemy cannot attack.”

8. 故善攻者敵不知其所守善守者敵不知其所攻
Hence that general is skilful in attack whose
opponent does not know what to defend; and he is
skilful in defence whose opponent does not know
what to attack.
An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.

微乎微乎至於無形神乎神乎至於無聲故能爲敵
9.
之司命
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you
we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
Literally, “without form or sound,” but it is said of course with
reference to the enemy. Chang Yü, whom I follow, draws no sharp
distinction between 微 and 神 , but Tu Mu and others think that 微
神
indicates the secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and the
rapidity to be displayed in attack. The Yü Lan text differs considerably
from ours, reading: 微乎微乎故能隱於常形神乎神乎故能爲敵司命 .

and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
The T‘ung Tien has 故能爲變化司命 . Capt. Calthrop’s version of this
paragraph is so remarkable that I cannot refrain from quoting it in full:
“Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended,
as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when
these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered.”

進而不可禦者衝其虛也退而不可追者速而不可
10.
及也
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if
you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may
retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are
more rapid than those of the enemy.
The second member of the sentence is weak, because 不可及 is nearly
tautologous with 不可追 . The Yü Lan reads 遠 速
for .

故我欲戰敵雖高壘深溝不得不與我戰者攻其所
11.
必救也
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
engagement even though he be sheltered behind a
high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is to
attack some other place that he will be obliged to
relieve.
Tu Mu says: “If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of
communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return;
if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign
himself.” It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late
Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.

12. 我不欲戰畫地而守之敵不得與我戰者乖其所之
也

If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the
enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our
encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All
we need do is to throw something odd and
unaccountable in his way.
In order to preserve the parallelism with § 11, I should prefer to follow
the T‘u Shu text, which inserts 雖 before畫地 . This extremely concise
expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin: 雖未修壘壍 “even
though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch.” The real crux of
乖其所之也 之
the passage lies in 至 . of course = . Ts‘ao Kung defines
乖 戾
by the word , which is perhaps a case of obscurum per obscurius.
設奇異而疑之
Li Ch‘üan, however, says: “we puzzle him by strange
and unusual dispositions;” and Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by
諸葛亮
three illustrative anecdotes—one of Chu-ko Liang, who when
occupying 陽平 Yang-p‘ing and about to be attacked by 司馬懿 Ssŭ-
ma I, suddenly struck his colours, stopped the beating of the drums,
and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in
sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had
the intended effect; for Ssŭ-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew
off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here, therefore,
is nothing more nor less than the timely use of “bluff.” Capt. Calthrop
translates: “and prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in
suspense,” which shows that he has not fully grasped the meaning of
乖 .

13. 故形人而我無形則我專而敵分
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and
remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces
concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yü (after Mei
Yao-ch‘ên) rightly explains it thus: “If the enemy’s dispositions are
visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own
dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his
forces in order to guard against attack from every quarter.” 形
is here
used as an active verb: “to make to appear.” See IV, note on heading.
Capt. Calthrop’s “making feints” is quite wrong.

14. 我專爲一敵分爲十是以十共其一也則我衆而敵
寡
We can form a single united body, while the enemy
must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a
whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,
以敵攻其一也
The original text has , which in accordance with the
T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan has been altered as above. I adopt the more
是以十攻其一也
plausible reading of the T‘u Shu: , in spite of having
to refer 十 to ourselves and not to the enemy. Thus Tu Yu and Mei
十
Yao-ch‘ên both regard as the undivided force, consisting of so
一
many parts, and as each of the isolated fractions of the enemy. The
攻 共
alteration of into can hardly be right, though the true text might
是以十共攻其一也
conceivably have been .

which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s
few.

15. 能以衆擊寡者則吾之所與戰者約矣
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire

straits.
擊 敵
For , the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan have . Tu Yu, followed by the
other commentators, arbitrarily defines 約 少而易勝
as “few and easy
to conquer,” but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence
absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “In superiority
of numbers there is economy of strength,” its meaning is probably
known to himself alone. In justification of my own rendering of , I 約
would refer to Lun Yü IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).

吾所與戰之地不可知不可知則敵所備者多敵所
16.
備者多則吾所與戰者寡矣
The spot where we intend to fight must not be
made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
against a possible attack at several different points;
Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by
saying that “while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering
what he was going to do, he was thinking most of what he was going
to do himself.”

and his forces being thus distributed in many
directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any
given point will be proportionately few.

故備前則後寡備後則前寡備左則右寡備右則左
17.
寡無所不備則無所不寡
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will
weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will

weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will
weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he
will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements
everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
In Frederick the Great’s Instructions to his Generals we read: “A
defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those
generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every
point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession,
having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow,
and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to avoid greater.”

18. 寡者備人者也衆者使人備己者也
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
against possible attacks; numerical strength, from
compelling our adversary to make these preparations
against us.
The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is “to compel the
enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force
against each fraction in turn.”

19. 故知戰之地知戰之日則可千里而會戰
Knowing the place and the time of the coming
battle, we may concentrate from the greatest
distances in order to fight.
There is nothing about “defeating” anybody in this sentence, as Capt.
Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice

calculation of distances and that masterly employment of strategy
which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and
rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right
spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming
strength. Among many such successful junctions which military
history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive was the
appearance of Blücher just at the critical moment on the field of
Waterloo.

不知戰地不知戰日則左不能救右右不能救左前
20.
不能救後後不能救前而況遠者數十里近者數里乎
But if neither time nor place be known, then the
left wing will be impotent to succour the right, the
right equally impotent to succour the left, the van
unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the
van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the
army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even
the nearest are separated by several li!
The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the
mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army
advancing towards a given rendez-vous in separate columns, each of
which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the
various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise
instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able
to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yü’s note may be worth quoting
here: “If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to
concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be
forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we
hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we
shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support

will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is
any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of the
army.”

以吾度之越人之兵雖多亦奚益於勝敗哉故曰勝
21.
可爲也
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of
Yüeh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
them nothing in the matter of victory.
Capt. Calthrop omits 以吾度之 , and his translation of the remainder is
flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tzŭ was in the service of the 吳 Wu
State, it has been proposed to read 吳 instead of 吾 —a wholly
unnecessary tampering with the text. Yüeh coincided roughly with the
present province of Chehkiang. Li Ch‘üan very strangely takes 越 not
as the proper name, but in the sense of 過 “to surpass.” No other
commentator follows him. 勝敗 belongs to the class of expressions
like遠近 “distance,” 大小 “magnitude,” etc., to which the Chinese
have to resort in order to express abstract ideas of degree. The T‘u Shu,
however, omits .敗
I say then that victory can be achieved.
Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states
ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by 勾踐 Kou Chien and
its incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s
death. With his present assertion compare IV. § 4: 勝可知而不可爲
(which is the obviously mistaken reading of the Yü Lan here). Chang
Yü is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus
goes on to explain: “In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said,
‘One may know how to conquer without being able to do it,’ whereas
here we have the statement that ‘victory can be achieved.’ The
explanation is, that in the former chapter, where the offensive and

defensive are under discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully
prepared, one cannot make certain of beating him. But the present
passage refers particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to
Sun Tzŭ’s calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place
of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be
achieved.”

22. 敵雖衆可使無鬥故策之而知得失之計
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we
may prevent him from fighting.
Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates: “If the enemy be many
in number, prevent him,” etc.

Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood
of their success.
This is the first of four similarly constructed sentences, all of which
present decided difficulties. Chang Yü explains 知得失之計 知其計 as
之得失 . This is perhaps the best way of taking the words, though Chia
計
Lin, referring to ourselves and not the enemy, offers the alternative
我得彼失之計皆先知也
of “Know beforehand all plans conducive to
our success and to the enemy’s failure.”

23. 作之而知動靜之理形之而知死生之地
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity
or inactivity.
作
Instead of , the T‘ung Tien, Yü Lan, and also Li Ch‘üan’s text have
候 , which the latter explains as “the observation of omens,” and Chia
Lin simply as “watching and waiting.” 作 is defined by Tu Mu as 激

作, and Chang Yü tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the
enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether
his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Chu-
ko Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to
Ssŭ-ma I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his
vulnerable spots.
Two commentators, Li Ch‘üan and Chang Yü, take 形之 in the sense
of 示之 “put on specious appearances.” The former says: “You may
either deceive the enemy by a show of weakness—striking your
colours and silencing your drums; or by a show of strength—making a
hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners.” And the latter
quotes V. 19, where 形之 certainly seems to bear this sense. On the
other hand, I would point to § 13 of this chapter, where 形 must with
equal certainty be active. It is hard to choose between the two
interpretations, but the context here agrees better, I think, with the one
that I have adopted. Another difficulty arises over 死生之地 , which
most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of the 死地 in XI. § 1,
refer to the actual ground on which the enemy is encamped. The notes
of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch‘ên, however, seem to favour my view. The
same phrase has a somewhat different meaning in I. § 2.

24. 角之而知有餘不足之處
Carefully compare the opposing army with your
own,
Tu Yu is right, I think, in attributing this force to 角
; Ts‘ao Kung
defines it simply as 量 . Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with the
staggering translation “Flap the wings”! Can the Latin cornu (in its
figurative sense) have been at the back of his mind?

so that you may know where strength is
superabundant and where it is deficient.
Cf. IV. § 6.

故形兵之極至於無形無形則深閒不能窺知者不
25.
能謀
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
you can attain is to conceal them;
The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. 無形 is perhaps
not so much actual invisibility (see supra, § 9) as “showing no sign” of
what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from
the prying of the subtlest spies, from the
machinations of the wisest brains.
深閒 is expanded by Tu Mu into 雖有閒者深來窺我 . [For 閒 , see
XIII, note on heading.] He explains 知者 in like fashion: 雖有智能之
士亦不能謀我也 “though the enemy may have clever and capable
officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us.”

26. 因形而錯勝於衆衆不能知
How victory may be produced for them out of the
enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude
cannot comprehend.

All the commentators except Li Ch‘üan make 形
refer to the enemy.
So Ts‘ao Kung: 因敵形而立勝 錯 . 置
is defined as . The T‘u Shu has
措 , with the same meaning. See IV. § 13. The Yü Lan reads , 作
evidently a gloss.

27. 人皆知我所以勝之形而莫知吾所以制勝之形
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but
what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
is evolved.
I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they
cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has
形
preceded the battle. It seems justifiable, then, to render the first by
“tactics” and the second by “strategy.”

28. 故其戰勝不復而應形於無窮
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you
one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the
infinite variety of circumstances.
As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: “There is but one root-principle ( ) 理
形
underlying victory, but the tactics ( ) which lead up to it are infinite
in number.” With this compare Col. Henderson; “The rules of strategy
are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be
taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such
knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon
than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon.”

29. 夫兵形象水水之行避高而趨下

Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
natural course runs away from high places and
hastens downwards.
行 is 劉晝子 Liu Chou-tzŭ’s reading for 形 in the original text.
30. 兵之形避實而擊虛
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to
strike at what is weak.
Like water, taking the line of least resistance.

31. 水因地而制流兵因敵而制勝
Water shapes its course according to the nature of
the ground over which it flows;
The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read 制形 ,—the latter also 制行 . The
present text is derived from Chêng Yu-hsien.

the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe
whom he is facing.

32. 故兵無常勢水無常形
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. 能因敵變化而取勝者謂之神
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be
called a heaven-born captain.

34. 故五行無常勝四時無常位日有短長月有死生
The five elements
Water, fire, wood, metal, earth.

are not always equally predominant;
That is, as Wang Hsi says: 迭相克也 “they predominate alternately.”
the four seasons make way for each other in turn.
Literally, “have no invariable seat.”

There are short days and long; the moon has its
periods of waning and waxing.
Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of
fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature. The
comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the
phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.

VII. 軍爭篇
MANŒUVRING.
The commentators, as well as the subsequent text, make it clear that
this is the real meaning of 軍爭 . Thus, Li Ch‘üan says that 爭 means
趨利 爭者
“marching rapidly to seize an advantage”; Wang Hsi says:
爭利得利則勝 “‘Striving’ means striving for an advantage; this being
obtained, victory will follow;” and Chang Yü: 兩軍相對而爭利也
“The two armies face to face, and each striving to obtain a tactical
advantage over the other.” According to the latter commentator, then,
the situation is analogous to that of two wrestlers manœuvring for a
“hold,” before coming to actual grips. In any case, we must beware of
translating 爭 by the word “fighting” or “battle,” as if it were
戰
equivalent to . Capt. Calthrop falls into this mistake.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法將受命於君
Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his
commands from the sovereign.
君 there is another reading 天, which Li Ch‘üan explains as 恭行
For
天罰 “being the reverent instrument of Heaven’s chastisement.”
2. 合軍聚衆交和而舍

Having collected an army and concentrated his
forces, he must blend and harmonise the different
elements thereof before pitching his camp.
Ts‘ao Kung takes 和 as referring to the 和門 or main gate of the
military camp. This, Tu Mu tells us, was formed with a couple of flags
hung across. [Cf. Chou Li, ch. xxvii. fol. 31 of the Imperial edition: 直
旌門 交和 .] would then mean “setting up his 和門 opposite that of the
enemy.” But Chia Lin’s explanation, which has been adopted above, is
on the whole simpler and better. Chang Yü, while following Ts‘ao
Kung, adds that the words may also be taken to mean “the
establishment of harmony and confidence between the higher and
lower ranks before venturing into the field;” and he quotes a saying of
Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): “Without harmony in the State, no military
expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle
array can be formed.” In the historical romance 東周列國 , chap. 75,
Sun Tzŭ himself is represented as saying to 伍員 Wu Yüan: 大凡行兵
之法先除內患然後方可外征 “As a general rule, those who are
waging war should get rid of all domestic troubles before proceeding
舍
to attack the external foe.” is defined as 止 . It here conveys the
notion of encamping after having taken the field.

3. 莫難於軍爭軍爭之難者以迂爲直以患爲利
After that, comes tactical manœuvring, than which
there is nothing more difficult.
I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts‘ao
Kung, who says: 從始受命至於交和軍爭難也 “From the time of
receiving the sovereign’s instructions until our encampment over
against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult.” It
seems to me that the 軍爭 tactics or manœuvres can hardly be said to
begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch‘ên Hao’s

note gives colour to this view: “For levying, concentrating,
harmonising and intrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules
which will serve. The real difficulty comes when we engage in tactical
operations.” Tu Yu also observes that “the great difficulty is to be
beforehand with the enemy in seizing favourable positions.”

The difficulty of tactical manœuvring consists in
turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune
into gain.
以迂爲直 is one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical
expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is explained by
Ts‘ao Kung: 示以遠速其道里先敵至也 “Make it appear that you are
a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene
before your opponent.” Tu Mu says: “Hoodwink the enemy, so that he
may be remiss and leisurely while you are dashing along with the
utmost speed.” Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn to the sentence:
“Although you may have difficult ground to traverse and natural
obstacles to encounter, this is a drawback which can be turned into
actual advantage by celerity of movement.” Signal examples of this
saying are afforded by the two famous passages across the Alps—that
of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two
thousand years later, which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.

故迂其途而誘之以利後人發先人至此知迂直之
4.
計者也
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after
enticing the enemy out of the way, and though
starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before
him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.

Chia Lin understands 途 as the enemy’s line of march, thus: “If our
adversary’s course is really a short one, and we can manage to divert
him from it ( 迂之 ) either by simulating weakness or by holding out
some small advantage, we shall be able to beat him in the race for
good positions.” This is quite a defensible view, though not adopted by
any other commentator. 人 敵
of course = , and 後 先 and are to be
taken as verbs. Tu Mu cites the famous march of 趙奢 Chao Shê in
270 B.C. to relieve the town of 閼與 O-yü, which was closely invested
by a 秦 Ch‘in army. [It should be noted that the above is the correct
pronunciation of 閼與 , as given in the commentary on the Ch‘ien Han
Shu, ch. 34. Giles’ dictionary gives “Yü-yü,” and Chavannes, I know
not on what authority, prefers to write “Yen-yü.” The name is omitted
altogether from Playfair’s “Cities and Towns.”] The King of Chao first
consulted 廉頗 Lien P‘o on the advisability of attempting a relief, but
the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country
too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao Shê, who
fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: “We
shall be like two rats fighting in a hole—and the pluckier one will
win!” So he left the capital with his army, but had only gone a distance
of 30 li when he stopped and began throwing up intrenchments. For 28
days he continued strengthening his fortifications, and took care that
spies should carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch‘in general was
overjoyed, and attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the
beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not actually part of
Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner departed than Chao Shê
began a forced march lasting for two days and one night, and arrived
on the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was able
to occupy a commanding position on the 北山 “North hill” before the
enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for
the Ch‘in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yü in all
haste and retreat across the border. [See 史記, chap. 81.]

5. 故軍爭爲利衆爭爲危

Manœuvring with an army is advantageous; with
an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
I here adopt the reading of the T‘ung Tien, Chêng Yu-hsien and the T‘u
Shu, where 衆 appears to supply the exact nuance required in order to
make sense. The standard text, on the other hand, in which 軍 is
repeated, seems somewhat pointless. The commentators take it to mean
that manœuvres may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all
depends on the ability of the general. Capt. Calthrop translates 衆爭
“the wrangles of a multitude”!

6. 舉軍而爭利則不及委軍而爭利則輜重捐
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order
to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will
be too late.
The original text has 故 instead of 舉; but a verb is needed to balance
委 .

On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the
purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and
stores.
委軍 is evidently unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who
paraphrase the sentence as though it began with 棄 輜 . Absolute
tautology in the apodosis can then only be avoided by drawing an
impossibly fine distinction between 棄 and 捐 . I submit my own
rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is
some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that
Sun Tzŭ does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken
without supplies. Cf. infra, § 11.

是故卷甲而趨日夜不處倍道兼行百里而爭利則
7.
擒三將軍
Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-
coats,
卷 甲 does not mean “to discard one’s armour,” as Capt. Calthrop
translates, but implies on the contrary that it is to be carried with you.
Chang Yü says: 猶悉甲也 “This means, in full panoply.”

and make forced marches without halting day or
night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 li; but on one
occasion, when pursuing 劉備 Liu Pei, Ts‘ao Ts‘ao is said to have
covered the incredible distance of 300 li within twenty-four hours.

doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the
leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the
hands of the enemy.

8. 勁者先罷者後其法十一而至
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones
will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of
your army will reach its destination.
罷
For , see II. § 14. The moral is, as Ts‘ao Kung and others point out:
Don’t march a hundred li to gain a tactical advantage, either with or
without impedimenta. Manœuvres of this description should be
confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: “The hardships of
forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle.” He

did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was
only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was
imperative, that he sacrificed everything to speed.[171]

9. 五十里而爭利則蹶上將軍其法半至
If you march fifty li in order to outmanœuvre the
enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division,
and only half your force will reach the goal.
蹶 is explained as similar in meaning to 挫: literally, “the leader of the
first division will be torn away.” Cf. Tso Chuan, 襄 19 year: 是謂蹶
th

其本 “This is a case of [the falling tree] tearing up its roots.”
10. 三十里而爭利則三分之二至
If you march thirty li with the same object, two-
thirds of your army will arrive.
In the T‘ung Tien is added:以是知軍爭之難 “From this we may know
the difficulty of manœuvring.”

11. 是故軍無輜重則亡無糧食則亡無委積則亡
We may take it then that an army without its
baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
without bases of supply it is lost.
委積 is explained by Tu Yu as 芻草之屬 “fodder and the like;” by Tu
Mu and Chang Yü as 財貨 “goods in general;” and by Wang Hsi as 薪
鹽蔬材之屬 “fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.” But I think what Sun Tzŭ

輜重
meant was “stores accumulated in dépôts,” as distinguished from
糧食
and , the various impedimenta accompanying an army on its
委人 斂薪芻凡疏材木材凡畜
march. Cf. Chou Li, ch. xvi. fol. 10: ...
聚之物 .

12. 故不知諸侯之謀者不能豫交
We cannot enter into alliances until we are
acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.
豫 = 先 . Li Ch‘üan understands it as 備 “guard against,” which is
hardly so good. An original interpretation of 交 is given by Tu Mu,
who says it stands for 交兵 or 合戰 “join in battle.”

13. 不知山林險阻沮澤之形者不能行軍
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless
we are familiar with the face of the country—its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls
險, defined as 坑塹 (Ts‘ao Kung) or 坑坎 (Chang Yü).
and precipices,
阻, defined as 一高一下.
its marshes
沮, defined as 水草漸洳者.
and swamps.
澤, defined as 衆水所歸而不流者.

14. 不用鄉導者不能得地利
We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to
account unless we make use of local guides.
§§ 12–14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.

15. 故兵以詐立以利動
In war, practise dissimulation, and you will
succeed.
According to Tu Mu, 立 stands for立勝 . Cf. I. § 18. In the tactics of
Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the numerical
strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.[172]

Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.
This is the interpretation of all the commentators except Wang Hsi,
who has the brief note 誘之也 “Entice out the enemy” (by offering
him some apparent advantage).

16. 以分合爲變者也
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,
must be decided by circumstances.

17. 故其疾如風其徐如林
Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift
but, as Mei Yao-ch‘ên points out, 無形跡 “invisible and leaves no
tracks.”

your compactness that of the forest.
徐
It is hardly possible to take here in its ordinary sense of “sedate,” as
Tu Yu tries to do. Mêng Shih comes nearer the mark in his note 緩行
須有行列 “When slowly marching, order and ranks must be
preserved”—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural forests
do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of
density or compactness. I think then that Mei Yao-ch‘ên uses the right
adjective in saying如林之森然 .

18. 侵掠如火不動如山
In raiding and plundering be like fire,
如火烈烈則莫我敢曷 “Fierce as a blazing
Cf. Shih Ching, IV. 3. iv. 6:
fire which no man can check.”

in immovability like a mountain.
That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to
dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice
you into a trap.

19. 難知如陰動如雷霆
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
The original text has 震 instead of 霆
. Cf. IV. § 7. Tu Yu quotes a
saying of T‘ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: 疾雷不及掩耳

疾電不及瞑目 “You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes
to the lightning—so rapid are they.” Likewise, an attack should be
made so quickly that it cannot be parried.

20. 掠鄉分衆廓地分利
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
divided amongst your men;
The reading of Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and apparently Ts‘ao Kung, is 指向分
衆 , which is explained as referring to the subdivision of the army,
mentioned in V. §§ 1, 2, by means of banners and flags, serving to
指 向
point out ( ) to each man the way he should go ( ). But this is very
forced, and the ellipsis is too great, even for Sun Tzŭ. Luckily, the
嚮
T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan have the variant , which not only suggests
the true reading 鄉 , but affords some clue to the way in which the
corruption arose. Some early commentator having inserted 向 as the
鄉
sound of , the two may afterwards have been read as one character;
and this being interchangeable with 向 鄉 , must finally have
disappeared altogether. Meanwhile, 掠 would have been altered to 指
in order to make sense. As regards 分衆 , I believe that Ho Shih alone
has grasped the real meaning, the other commentators understanding it
as “dividing the men into parties” to search for plunder. Sun Tzŭ
wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting
that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may
afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.

when you capture new territory, cut it up into
allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
That this is the meaning, may be gathered from Tu Mu’s note:開土拓
境則分割與有功者 . The 三略 gives the same advice: 獲地裂之 廓 .
means “to enlarge” or “extend”—at the expense of the enemy,
understood. Cf. Shih Ching, III. 1. vii. 1: 憎其式廓 “hating all the

great States.” Ch‘ên Hao also says 屯兵種蒔 “quarter your soldiers on
the land, and let them sow and plant it.” It is by acting on this
principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese have
succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and
triumphant expeditions, such as that of 班超 Pan Ch‘ao who
penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of 福康安
Fu-k‘ang-an and 左宗棠 Tso Tsung-t‘ang.

21. 懸權而動
Ponder and deliberate
Note that both these words, like the Chinese 懸 權 , are really
metaphors derived from the use of scales.

before you make a move.
Chang Yü quotes 尉繚子 as saying that we must not break camp until
we have gauged the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of
the opposing general. Cf. the “seven comparisons” in I. § 13. Capt.
Calthrop omits this sentence.

22. 先知迂直之計者勝此軍爭之法也
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of
deviation.
See supra, §§ 3, 4.

Such is the art of manœuvring.
With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But
there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an
earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when

Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different
from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to
its genuineness.

23. 軍政曰言不相聞故爲金鼓視不相見故爲旌旗
The Book of Army Management says:
It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us
any information about this work. Mei Yao-ch‘ên calls it 軍之舊典 “an
ancient military classic,” and Wang Hsi, 古軍書 “an old book on war.”
Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for
centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time between the various kingdoms and
principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of
military maxims should have been made and written down at some
earlier period.

On the field of battle,
Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the
institution of gongs and drums.
I have retained the words 金鼓 of the original text, which recur in the
next paragraph, in preference to the other reading 鼓鐸 “drums and
bells,” which is found in the T‘ung Tien, Pei T‘ang Shu Ch‘ao and Yü
Lan. 鐸 is a bell with a clapper. See Lun Yü III. 24, Chou Li XXIX. 15,
29. 金 of course would include both gongs and bells of every kind. The
T‘u Shu inserts a 之 爲
after each .

Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough:
hence the institution of banners and flags.

24. 夫金鼓旌旗者所以一民之耳目也
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means
whereby the ears and eyes of the host
The original text, followed by the T‘u Shu, has 人 for 民 here and in
the next two paragraphs. But, as we have seen, 人 is generally used in
Sun Tzŭ for the enemy.

may be focussed on one particular point.
Note the use of 一 as a verb. Chang Yü says: 視聽均齊則雖百萬之衆
進退如一矣 “If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the
same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like
those of a single man”!

民既專一則勇者不得獨進怯者不得獨退此用衆
25.
之法也
The host thus forming a single united body, it is
impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or
for the cowardly to retreat alone.
Chang Yü quotes a saying: 令不進而進與令不退而退厥罪惟均
“Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who
吳起
retreat against orders.” Tu Mu tells a story in this connection of
Wu Ch‘i, when he was fighting against the Ch‘in State. Before the
battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied
forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to
camp. Wu Ch‘i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer
ventured to remonstrate, saying: “This man was a good soldier, and
ought not to have been beheaded.” Wu Ch‘i replied: “I fully believe he

was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without
orders.”

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. 故夜戰多火鼓晝戰多旌旗所以變民之耳目也
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-
fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and
banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes
of your army.
The T‘ung Tien has the bad variant 便 變 for . With regard to the latter
word, I believe I have hit off the right meaning, the whole phrase being
slightly elliptical for “influencing the movements of the army through
their senses of sight and hearing.” Li Ch‘üan, Tu Mu and Chia Lin
certainly seem to understand it thus. The other commentators,
however, take 民 人 (or ) as the enemy, and 變 變惑
as equivalent to or
變亂 “to perplex” or “confound.” This does not agree so well with
what has gone before, though on the other hand it renders the transition
to § 27 less abrupt. The whole question, I think, hinges on the
alternative readings 民 人
and . The latter would almost certainly
denote the enemy. Ch‘ên Hao alludes to 李光弼 Li Kuang-pi’s night
ride to河陽 Ho-yang at the head of 500 mounted men; they made such
an imposing display with torches, that though the rebel leader 史思明
Shih Ssŭ-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute their
passage. [Ch‘ên Hao gives the date as 天寳末 A.D. 756; but according
to the新唐書 New T‘ang History, 列傳 61, it must have been later
than this, probably 760.]

27. 故三軍可奪氣將軍可奪心

A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
“In war,” says Chang Yü, “if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade
all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be
irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest
when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue
not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardour and enthusiasm have
worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of
their keen spirit.” Li Ch‘üan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in
the Tso Chuan, 莊公 year 10, § 1) of 曹劌 Ts‘ao Kuei, a protégé of
Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch‘i, and the
Duke was about to join battle at 長勺 Ch‘ang-cho, after the first roll of
the enemy’s drums, when Ts‘ao said: “Not just yet.” Only after their
drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack.
Then they fought, and the men of Ch‘i were utterly defeated.
Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay,
Ts‘ao Kuei replied: “In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now
the first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second
it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I
attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence
吳子
our victory.” (chap. 4) puts “spirit” first among the “four
important influences” in war, and continues: 三軍之衆百萬之師張設
輕重在於一人是謂氣機 “The value of a whole army—a mighty host
of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such is the
influence of spirit!”

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence
of mind.
Capt. Calthrop goes woefully astray with “defeat his general’s
ambition.” Chang Yü says: 心者將之所主也夫治亂勇怯皆主於心
“Presence of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is the
quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage
李靖
into the panic-stricken.” The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571–
649) has a saying: 夫攻者不止攻其城擊其陳而已必有攻其心之術焉

“Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or
striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing
the enemy’s mental equilibrium.” [ 問對 , pt. 3.]

28. 是故朝氣銳晝氣惰暮氣歸
Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning;
Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of
the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting,
whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy,
XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,
his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

29. 故善用兵者避其銳氣擊其惰歸此治氣者也
A clever general, therefore,
The 故, which certainly seems to be wanted here, is omitted in the T‘u
Shu.

avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it
when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the
art of studying moods.
The T‘ung Tien, for reasons of 避諱 “avoidance of personal names of
the reigning dynasty,” reads 理 for 治 in this and the two next
paragraphs.

30. 以治待亂以靜待譁此治心者也

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of
disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the
art of retaining self-possession.

31. 以近待遠以佚待勞以飽待飢此治力者也
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far
from it, to wait at ease
The T‘ung Tien has 逸 for 佚 . The two characters are practically
synonymous, but according to the commentary, the latter is the form
always used in Sun Tzŭ.

while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-
fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of
husbanding one’s strength.

32. 無要正正之旗勿擊堂堂之陳此治變者也
To refrain from intercepting
邀 is the reading of the original text. But the 兵書要訣 quotes the
passage with 要 yao (also meaning “to intercept”), and this is
1

supported by the Pei T‘ang Shu Ch‘ao the Yü Lan, and Wang Hsi’s
text.

an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to
refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and
confident array:

For this translation of 堂堂, I can appeal to the authority of Tu Mu,
who defines the phrase as 無懼 . The other commentators mostly
follow Ts‘ao Kung, who says 大 , probably meaning “grand and
imposing”. Li Ch‘üan, however, has 部分“in subdivisions,” which is
somewhat strange.

—this is the art of studying circumstances.
I have not attempted a uniform rendering of the four phrases 治氣 治 ,
心 治力
, and 治變 , though 治 really bears the same meaning in each
case. It is to be taken, I think, not in the sense of “to govern” or
“control,” but rather, as K‘ang Hsi defines it, = 簡習 “to examine and
practise,” hence “look after,” “keep a watchful eye upon.” We may
find an example of this use in the Chou Li, XVIII. fol. 46: 治其大禮 .
Sun Tzŭ has not told us to control or restrain the quality which he calls
氣 心
, but only to observe the time at which it is strongest. As for , it is
important to remember that in the present context it can only mean
“presence of mind.” To speak of “controlling presence of mind” is
absurd, and Capt. Calthrop’s “to have the heart under control” is hardly
less so. The whole process recommended here is that of VI. § 2: 致人
而不致於人 .

33. 故用兵之法高陵勿向背邱勿逆
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against
the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes
downhill.
The Yü Lan reads 倍 for 背.
34. 佯北勿從銳卒勿攻

Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do
not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. 餌兵勿食歸師勿遏
Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.
Li Ch‘üan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor,
take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been
poisoned by the enemy. Ch‘ên Hao and Chang Yü carefully point out
that the saying has a wider application. The T‘ung Tien reads 貪
“to
食
covet” instead of . The similarity of the two characters sufficiently
accounts for the mistake.

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by
saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the
death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too
dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yü quotes the words of
Han Hsin: 從思東歸之士何所不克 “Invincible is the soldier who hath
his desire and returneth homewards.” A marvellous tale is told of Ts‘ao
Ts‘ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the San Kuo Chih, 武帝紀 : In
198 A.D., he was besieging 張繡 Chang Hsiu in 穰 劉表
Jang, when
Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts‘ao’s retreat.
The latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself
hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a
narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In this desperate plight
Ts‘ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain
side and laid an ambush in it. Then he marched on with his baggage-
train, and when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the bird had
flown, pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole army had
passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts‘ao himself turned
and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into confusion

and annihilated. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao said afterwards: 虜遏吾歸師而與吾死地
戰吾是以知勝矣 “The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat
and brought me to battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to
overcome them.”

36. 圍師必闕窮宼勿迫
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.
This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The
object, as Tu Mu puts it, is 示以生路令無必死之心 “to make him
believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with
因而擊之
the courage of despair.” Tu Mu adds pleasantly: “After that,
you may crush him.”

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
For 迫 , the T‘u Shu reads 追 “pursue.” Ch‘ên Hao quotes the saying:
鳥窮則搏獸窮則噬 “Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use
their claws and teeth.” Chang Yü says: 敵若焚舟破釜決一戰則不可
逼迫來 “If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his
cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must
not be pushed to extremities.” The phrase 窮宼 doubtless originated
with Sun Tzŭ. The P‘ei Wên Yün Fu gives four examples of its use, the
earliest being from the Ch‘ien Han Shu, and I have found another in
chap. 34 of the same work. Ho Shih illustrates the meaning by a story
taken from the life of 符彥卿 Fu Yen-ch‘ing in ch. 251 of the 宋史 .
That general, together with his colleague 杜重威 Tu Chung-wei, was
surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D.
The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was
soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, and
the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the
moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch‘ing
exclaimed: “We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country
than to go with fettered hands into captivity!” A strong gale happened

to be blowing from the north-east and darkening the air with dense
clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung-wei was for waiting until this had
李
abated before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer,
守貞 Li Shou-chêng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and
said: “They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this
sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the
strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally.” Accordingly, Fu
Yen-ch‘ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his
cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to
safety. [Certain details in the above account have been added from the
歴代紀事年表 , ch. 78.]

37. 此用兵之法也
Such is the art of warfare.
Chêng Yu-hsien in his 遺說 inserts妙 after 法 . I take it that these
words conclude the extract from the 軍政 which began at § 23.

VIII. 九變篇
VARIATION OF TACTICS.
The heading means literally “The Nine Variations,” but as Sun Tzŭ
does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told
us (V. §§ 6–11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are
practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi,
who says that “Nine” stands for an indefinitely large number. “All it
means is that in warfare 當極其變 we ought to vary our tactics to the
utmost degree ... I do not know what Ts‘ao Kung makes these Nine
變其正得其所用九也
Variations out to be [the latter’s note is ], but it
has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations”—
of chap. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yü: see note on 死地 ,
§ 2. The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been
lost—a supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends
some weight.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法將受命於君合軍聚衆
Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his
commands from the sovereign, collects his army and
concentrates his forces.
Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may
have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to
the chapter.

2. 圮地無舍衢地合交絶地無留圍地則謀死地則戰
When in difficult country, do not encamp.
For explanation of 圮地, see XI. § 8.
In country where high roads intersect, join hands
with your allies.
See XI, §§ 6, 12. Capt. Calthrop omits 衢地.
Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.
絶地 is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning of
chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43, q.v.). We may compare it with
重地 (XI. § 7). Chang Yü calls it a 危絶之地 , situated across the
frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch‘üan says it is “country in which
there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;”
Chia Lin, “one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by
which to advance.”

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to
stratagem.
See XI. §§ 9, 14. Capt. Calthrop has “mountainous and wooded
圍
country,” which is a quite inadequate translation of .

In a desperate position, you must fight.
See XI. §§ 10, 14. Chang Yü has an important note here, which must
be given in full. “From 圮地無舍 ,” he says, “down to this point, the
Nine Variations are presented to us. The reason why only five are
舉其大略也
given is that the subject is treated en précis ( ). So in chap.
XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics corresponding to the
Nine Grounds, Sun Tzŭ mentions only six variations; there again we
have an abridgment. [I cannot understand what Chang Yü means by

this statement. He can only be referring to §§ 11–14 or §§ 46–50 of
chap. XI; but in both places all the nine grounds are discussed. Perhaps
地形
he is confusing these with the Six of chap. X.] All kinds of
ground have corresponding military positions, and also a variation of
tactics suitable to each (凡地有勢有變 ). In chap. XI, what we find
enumerated first [§§ 2–10] are the situations; afterwards [§§ 11–14]
the corresponding tactics. Now, how can we tell that the 九變 “Nine
Variations” are simply the 九地之變 “variations of tactics
corresponding to the Nine Grounds”? It is said further on [§ 5] that
‘the general who does not understand the nine variations of tactics may
be well acquainted with the features of the country, yet he will not be
able to turn his knowledge to practical account.’ Again, in chap. XI [§
41] we read: ‘The different measures adapted to the nine varieties of
ground ( 九地之變 ) and the expediency of aggressive or defensive
tactics must be carefully examined.’ From a consideration of these
passages the meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds
are enumerated, Sun Tzŭ recurs to these nine variations. He wishes
here to speak of the Five Advantages [see infra, § 6], so he begins by
setting forth the Nine Variations. These are inseparably connected in
practice, and therefore they are dealt with together.” The weak point of
this argument is the suggestion that 五事 “five things” can stand as a
大畧 , that is, an abstract or abridgment, of nine, when those that are
omitted are not less important than those that appear, and when one of
the latter is not included amongst the nine at all.

塗有所不由軍有所不擊城有所不攻地有所不爭
3.
君命有所不受
There are roads which must not be followed,
“Especially those leading through narrow defiles,” says Li Ch‘üan,
“where an ambush is to be feared.”

armies which must not be attacked,

More correctly, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be
attacked.” Ch‘ên Hao says: “When you see your way to obtain a trivial
advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from
attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength.”

towns
Capt. Calthrop says “castles”—an unfortunate attempt to introduce
local colour.

which must not be besieged,
Cf. III. § 4. Ts‘ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own
experience. When invading the territory of 徐州 Hsü-chou, he ignored
the city of華費 Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on
into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by
the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district
cities. Chang Yü says: “No town should be attacked which, if taken,
cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble.” 荀罃 Hsün
Ying, when urged to attack 偪陽 Pi-yang, replied: “The city is small
and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, ’t will be no great feat
of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock.” In the
seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It
was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches,
countermarches and manœuvres. He said: “It is a great mistake to
waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will
gain a province.”[173]

positions which must not be contested, commands of
the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for
authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:
兵者凶器也爭者逆德也將者死官也 “Weapons are baleful
instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the
negation of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however, that

even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity. Cf.
III. § 17. (5), X. § 23. The T‘ung Tien has 將在軍 before 君命 , etc.
This is a gloss on the words by Chu-ko Liang, which being repeated by
Tu Yu became incorporated with the text. Chang Yü thinks that these
五利
five precepts are the referred to in § 6. Another theory is that the
mysterious 九變 圮地無舍
are here enumerated, starting with and
ending at 地有所不爭 , while the final clause君命有所不受 embraces
and as it were sums up all the nine. Thus Ho Shih says: “Even if it be
your sovereign’s command to encamp in difficult country, linger in
isolated positions, etc., you must not do so.” The theory is perhaps a
little too ingenious to be accepted with confidence.

4. 故將通於九變之利者知用兵矣
The general who thoroughly understands the
advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows
how to handle his troops.
Before 利 in the original text there is a 地 which is obviously not
required.

5. 將不通於九變之利者雖知地形不能得地之利矣
The general who does not understand these, may
be well acquainted with the configuration of the
country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge
to practical account.
Literally, “get the advantage of the ground,” which means not only
securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in
every possible way. Chang Yü says: “Every kind of ground is
characterised by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a

certain variability of plan. How is it possible to turn these natural
features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented
by versatility of mind?”

6. 治兵不知九變之術雖知五利不能得人之用矣
So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of
varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with
the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of
his men.
Ts‘ao Kung says that the 五利 下五事也
are “the five things that
follow;” but this cannot be right. We must rather look back to the five
“variations” contained in § 3. Chia Lin (who reads 五變 here to
balance the 五利 ) tells us that these imply five obvious and generally
advantageous lines of action, namely: “if a certain road is short, it must
be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a
parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it
must be attempted; and if consistent with military operations, the
ruler’s commands must be obeyed.” But there are circumstances which
sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, “a
certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it
abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on
it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack,
but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with
desperation, he will refrain from striking,” and so on. Here the 變
comes in to modify the 利 , and hence we see the uselessness of
knowing the one without the other—of having an eye for weaknesses
in the enemy’s armour without being clever enough to recast one’s
plans on the spur of the moment. Capt. Calthrop offers this slovenly
translation: “In the management of armies, if the art of the Nine
Changes be understood [sic], a knowledge of the Five Advantages is of
no avail.”

7. 是故智者之慮必雜於利害
Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of
advantage and of disadvantage will be blended
together.
“Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,” says
Ts‘ao Kung, “the opposite state should be always present to your
mind.”

8. 雜於利而務可信也
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this
way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential
part of our schemes.
信 , according to Tu Mu, is equivalent to 申 , and 務 可 信 也 is
paraphrased by Chang Yü as 可以伸己之事. Tu Mu goes on to say: “If
we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our
minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also
doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our
calculations.”

9. 雜於害而患可解也
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we
are always ready to seize an advantage, we may
extricate ourselves from misfortune.
A translator cannot emulate the conciseness of 雜於害 “to blend
[thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage,” but the meaning is as

given. Tu Mu says: “If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous
position, I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but
also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my
counsels these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed
in liberating myself.... For instance, if I am surrounded by the enemy
and only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy
will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better
to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the
advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils.” See the
story of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao, VII. § 35, note. In his first edition, Capt. Calthrop
translated §§ 7–9 as follows: “The wise man perceives clearly wherein
lies advantage and disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he
does not overlook the risks, and saves future anxiety.” This has now
been altered into: “The wise man considers well both advantage and
disadvantage. He sees a way out of adversity, and on the day of victory
to danger is not blind.” Owing to a needless inversion of the Chinese,
the words which I have italicised are evidently intended to represent §
8!

10. 是故屈諸侯者以害役諸侯者以業趨諸侯者以利
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on
them;
Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of
which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—“Entice away the
enemy’s best and wisest men, so that he may be left without
counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government
policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus
sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every
artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of
his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into
excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely
women.” Chang Yü (after Wang Hsi) considers the 害to be military

chastisement: “Get the enemy,” he says, “into a position where he must
suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord.” Capt. Calthrop
twists Sun Tzŭ’s words into an absurdly barbarous precept: “In
reducing an enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon
him.”

make trouble for them,
業 is defined by Ts‘ao Kung as 事 , and his definition is generally
adopted by the commentators. Tu Mu, however, seems to take it in the
sense of “possessions,” or, as we might say, “assets,” which he
considers to be兵衆國富人和令行 “a large army, a rich exchequer,
harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfilment of commands.”
These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.

and keep them constantly engaged;
役 , literally, “make servants of them.” Tu Yu says 令 不 得 安 佚
“prevent them from having any rest.”

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to
any given point.
Mêng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use
of 變 令忘變而速至
: “cause them to forget pien (the reasons for
acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our
direction.”

故用兵之法無恃其不來恃吾有以待也無恃其不
11.
攻恃吾有所不可攻也
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the
likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own
readiness to receive him;

The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read 有能以待之也, but the conciser form
is more likely to be right.

not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on
the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan insert 吾也 after the first 攻, and omit 有
所 .

故將有五危必死可殺也必生可虜也忿速可侮也
12.
廉潔可辱也愛民可煩也
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a
general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
勇而無慮 “Bravery without forethought,” as Ts‘ao Kung analyses it,
which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull.
Such an opponent, says Chang Yü, “must not be encountered with
brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain.” Cf. Wu Tzŭ,
凡人論將常觀於勇勇之於將乃數分之一耳夫勇者
chap. IV ad init.:
必輕合輕合而不知利未可也 “In estimating the character of a general,
men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that
courage is only one out of many qualities which a general should
possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who
fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be
condemned.” The Ssŭ-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark 上死不
勝 “Simply going to one’s death does not bring about victory.”

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
必生 is explained by Ts‘ao Kung of the man “whom timidity prevents
from advancing to seize an advantage,” and Wang Hsi adds, “who is
quick to flee at the sight of danger.” Mêng Shih gives the closer
paraphrase 志必生反 “he who is bent on returning alive,” that is, the

man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be
achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T‘ai Kung said: 失
利後時反受其殃 “He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently
bring upon himself real disaster.” In 404 A.D., 劉裕 Liu Yü pursued
桓
the rebel Huan Hsüan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle
崢嶸洲
with him at the island of Ch‘êng-hung. The loyal troops
numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great
force. But Huan Hsüan, fearing the fate which was in store for him
should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his
war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice.
The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly
quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with
fireships, all striving with the utmost ardour to be first in the fray,
Huan Hsüan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and
fled for two days and nights without stopping. [See 晉書 , chap. 99, fol.
13.] Chang Yü tells a somewhat similar story of 趙嬰齊 Chao Ying-
ch‘i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the army of
Ch‘u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the river,
wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get across.

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
I fail to see the meaning of Capt. Calthrop’s “which brings insult.” Tu
姚襄
Mu tells us that Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357 A.D. by 黃眉
Huang Mei, 鄧羌 Têng Ch‘iang and others, shut himself up behind his
walls and refused to fight. Têng Ch‘iang said: “Our adversary is of a
choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and
break down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out. Once we
can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey.” This plan
was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured on as far as
三原 San-yuan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked
and slain.

(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;

This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect
in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated
sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung
by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch‘ên truly observes,
though somewhat paradoxically: 徇名不顧 “The seeker after glory
should be careless of public opinion.”

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to
worry and trouble.
Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless of
the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise is the danger of
sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort
of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the
troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of
the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will
often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a
hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It is now
generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the
South African War were so many strategical blunders which defeated
their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very man
who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the
interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of
one of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried
once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was
always “so good to his men.” By this plea, had he but known it, he was
only condemning him out of Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.

13. 凡此五者將之過也用兵之災也
These are the five besetting sins of a general,
ruinous to the conduct of war.

14. 覆軍殺將必以五危不可不察也
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,
the cause will surely be found among these five
dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX. 行軍篇
THE ARMY ON THE MARCH.
The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1 than
by this heading.

1. 孫子曰凡處軍相敵絶山依谷
Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of
encamping the army, and observing signs of the
enemy.
處軍
The discussion of , as Chang Yü points out, extends from here
伏姦之所藏處也
down to (§§ 1–17), and 相敵 from that point down
to 必謹察之 (§§ 18–39). The rest of the chapter consists of a few
desultory remarks, chiefly on the subject of discipline.

Pass quickly over mountains,
絶
For this use of , cf. infra. § 3. See also 荀子 , ch. 1. fol. 2 (standard
絶江河
edition of 1876): ; Shih Chi, ch. 27 ad init.:後六星絶漢 .

and keep in the neighbourhood of valleys.
Tu Mu says that 依 近
here = . The idea is, not to linger among barren
uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass. Capt.
Calthrop translates “camp in valleys,” heedless of the very next

無當天竈
sentence. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: “Abide not in natural ovens,”
i.e.大谷之口 “the openings of large valleys.” Chang Yü tells the
following anecdote: “ 武都羗 Wu-tu Ch‘iang was a robber captain in
馬援
the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yüan was sent to exterminate
his gang. Ch‘iang having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yüan made no
attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable positions
commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch‘iang was soon in such a
desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a
total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the
neighbourhood of valleys.”

2. 視生處高戰隆無登此處山之軍也
Camp in high places,
Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the
surrounding country.

facing the sun.
視生 = 面陽. Tu Mu takes this to mean “facing south,” and Ch‘ên Hao
“facing east.” Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13.

Do not climb heights in order to fight.
隆 is here simply equivalent to 高. The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read 降.
So much for mountain warfare.
After 山, the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan insert 谷.
3. 絶水必遠水

After crossing a river, you should get far away
from it.
“In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,” according to Ts‘ao
Kung, and also, says Chang Yü, “in order not to be impeded in your
evolutions.” The T‘ung Tien reads 敵若絶水 “If the enemy crosses a
river,” etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an
interpolation.

4. 客絶水而來勿迎之於水內令半濟而擊之利
When an invading force crosses a river in its
onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-
stream. It will be best to let half the army get across,
and then deliver your attack.
The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read 度 濟for , without change of meaning.
Wu Tzŭ plagiarises this passage twice over:—ch. II ad fin., 涉水半渡
可擊 ; ch. V,敵若絶水半渡而擊 . Li Ch‘üan alludes to the great victory
龍且
won by Han Hsin over Lung Chü at the 濰 Wei River. Turning to
the Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as
follows: “The two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river.
In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand
sacks filled with sand and construct a dam a little higher up. Then,
leading half his army across, he attacked Lung Chü; but after a time,
pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the
other bank. Lung Chü was much elated by this unlooked-for success,
and exclaiming: “I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a coward!” he
pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now
sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of
water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of Lung
Chü’s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which
had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chü himself being amongst

the slain. The rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and
fled in all directions.”

5. 欲戰者無附於水而迎客
If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to
meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.
For fear of preventing his crossing. Capt. Calthrop makes the
injunction ridiculous by omitting 欲戰者
.

6. 視生處高無迎水流此處水上之軍也
Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and
facing the sun.
See supra, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water
is very awkward. Chang Yü has the note: 或岸邊爲陳或水上泊舟皆
須面陽而居高 “Said either of troops marshalled on the river-bank, or
of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to be
higher than the enemy and facing the sun.” The other commentators
are not at all explicit. One is much tempted to reject their explanation
視生
of altogether, and understand it simply as “seeking safety.” [Cf.
必生 視
in VIII. § 12, and infra, § 9.] It is true that this involves taking
in an unusual, though not, I think, an impossible sense. Of course the
earlier passage would then have to be translated in like manner.

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
Tu Mu says: “As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp
on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the
sluices and sweep us away in a flood. This is implied above in the
words 視生處高 . Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that ‘in river warfare
we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as much as to say

that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then
they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short
work of us.” There is also the danger, noted by other commentators,
that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to
us. Capt. Calthrop’s first version was: “Do not cross rivers in the face
of the stream”—a sapient piece of advice, which made one curious to
know what the correct way of crossing rivers might be. He has now
improved this into: “Do not fight when the enemy is between the army
and the source of the river.”

So much for river warfare.

7. 絶斥澤惟亟去無留
In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should
be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and
last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.

若交軍於斥澤之中必依水草而背衆樹此處斥澤
8.
之軍也
If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have
water and grass near you, and get your back to a
clump of trees.
Li Ch‘üan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous
where there are trees, while Tu Yu says that they will serve to protect
the rear. Capt. Calthrop, with a perfect genius for going wrong, says
“in the neighbourhood of a marsh.” For 若 the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan
爲
wrongly read , and the latter also has 倍 背
instead of .

So much for operations in salt-marshes.

9. 平陸處易而右背高前死後生此處平陸之軍也
In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible
position
易 險
This is doubtless the force of , its opposite being . Thus, Tu Mu
explains it as坦易平穩之處 “ground that is smooth and firm,” and
therefore adapted for cavalry; Chang Yü as 坦易無坎陷之處 “level
ground, free from depressions and hollows.” He adds later on that
although Sun Tzŭ is discussing flat country, there will nevertheless be
slight elevations and hillocks.

with rising ground to your right and on your rear,
The Yü Lan again reads 倍 背
for . Tu Mu quotes T‘ai Kung as saying:
“An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or
tumulus on its right.”

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie
behind.
Wang Hsi thinks that 後生 contradicts the saying 視生 in § 2, and
therefore suspects a mistake in the text.

So much for campaigning in flat country.

10. 凡此四軍之利黃帝之所以勝四帝也
These are the four useful branches of military
knowledge

Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes,
and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s “Military Maxims,” no. 1.

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four
several sovereigns.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên asks, with some plausibility, whether 帝 is not a
mistake for 軍 “armies,” as nothing is known of Huang Ti having
conquered four other Emperors. The Shih Chi (ch. I ad init.) speaks
only of his victories over炎帝 蚩尤
Yen Ti and Ch‘ih Yu. In the六韜
it is mentioned that he “fought seventy battles and pacified the
Empire.” Ts‘ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was
the first to institute the feudal system of vassal princes, each of whom
(to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch‘üan
tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it
from his Minister 風后 Fêng Hou.

11. 凡軍喜高而惡下貴陽而賤陰
All armies prefer high ground to low,
“High ground,” says Mei Yao-ch‘ên, “is not only more agreeable and
salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low
ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for
fighting.” The original text and the T‘u Shu have 好
instead of . 喜
and sunny places to dark.

12. 養生而處實軍無百疾是謂必勝
If you are careful of your men,
Ts‘ao Kung says: 向水草可放牧養畜 “Make for fresh water and
pasture, where you can turn out your animals to graze.” And the other

commentators follow him, apparently taking 生 牲
as = . Cf. Mencius,
V. 1. ix. 1, where養牲者 means a cattle-keeper. But here 養生 surely
has reference to the health of the troops. It is the title of Chuang Tzŭ’s
third chapter, where it denotes moral rather than physical well-being.

and camp on hard ground,
實 must mean dry and solid, as opposed to damp and marshy, ground.
This is to be found as a rule in high places, so the commentators
explain 實 as practically equivalent to 高.

the army will be free from disease of every kind,
Chang Yü says: “The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak
of illness.”

and this will spell victory.

13. 邱陵隄防必處其陽而右背之此兵之利地之助也
When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the
sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus
you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers
and utilise the natural advantages of the ground.

14. 上雨水沫至欲涉者待其定也
When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a
river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked
with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan have a superfluous 下 before 水.

凡地有絶澗天井天牢天羅天陷天隙必亟去之勿
15.
近也
Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with
torrents running between,
絶澗, explained by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as 前後險峻水橫其中.
deep natural hollows,
天井, explained as 四面峻坂澗壑所歸 “places enclosed on every side
by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.”

confined places,
天牢 “natural pens or prisons,” explained as 三面環絶易入難出
“places surrounded by precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but
hard to get out of.”

tangled thickets,
天羅 , explained as 草木蒙密鋒鏑莫施 “places covered with such
dense undergrowth that spears cannot be used.”

quagmires
天陷 , explained as 卑下汙 車騎不通 “low-lying places, so heavy
with mud as to be impassible for chariots and horsemen.”

and crevasses,
天隙 is explained by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as 兩山相向洞道狹惡 “a narrow
difficult way between beetling cliffs,” but Ts‘ao Kung says 山澗迫狹
地形深數尺長數丈者 , which seems to denote something on a much
smaller scale. Tu Mu’s note is 地多溝坑坎陷木石 “ground covered
with trees and rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls.”
This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile

or narrow pass: 兩邊險絶形狹長而數里 , and Chang Yü takes much
the same view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly
inclines to the rendering “defile”. But the ordinary meaning of 隙 (a
絶澗
crack or fissure) and the fact that above must be something in the
nature of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzŭ is here speaking of
crevasses. The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read 郄 for 隙, with the same
meaning; the latter also has大害 天郄
after —a palpable gloss.

should be left with all possible speed and not
approached.

16. 吾遠之敵近之吾迎之敵背之
While we keep away from such places, we should
get the enemy to approach them; while we face them,
we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

軍旁有險阻蔣潢井生葭葦小林蘙薈必謹覆索之
17.
此伏姦之所藏處也
If in the neighbourhood of your camp
The original text has 軍行 , but 旁 has been generally adopted as
yielding much better sense.

there should be any hilly country,
險阻 is 邱阜之地, according to Chang Yü.
ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins
filled with reeds,

The original text omits 蔣 生
and , so that 潢 and 井 join to make a
pair: “ponds and basins.” This is plausible enough at first sight, but
there are several objections to the reading: (1) 蔣 is unlikely to have
潢
got into the text as a gloss on ; (2) it is easy to suppose, on the other
hand, that 蔣 and afterwards 生 (to restore the balance of the sentence)
were omitted by a copyist who jumped to the conclusion that 潢 and
井 must go together; (3) the sense, when one comes to consider it,
蔣
actually requires , for it is absurd to talk of pools and ponds as in
themselves suitable places for an ambush; (4) Li Ching (571–649 A.
D.) in his 兵法 “Art of War” has the words: 蔣潢蘙薈則必索其伏 .
This is evidently a reminiscence of Sun Tzŭ, so there can be little
doubt that 蔣 stood in the text at this early date. It may be added that
蔣
the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan both have , and the latter also reads 并
井
for .

or woods with thick undergrowth,
I read 小林 with the Yü Lan in preference to 山林, given in the original
text, which is accepted by the commentators without question. The text
of the T‘u Shu up to this point runs as follows:潢井蒹葭林木蘙薈者 .

they must be carefully routed out and searched; for
these are places where men in ambush or insidious
spies are likely to be lurking.
The original text omits 藏 , which has been restored from the T‘ung
Tien and Yü Lan. The T‘u Shu omits 處 所
as well, making a
姦
substantive. On Chang Yü has the note: 又慮姦細潛隱覘我虛實聽
我號令伏姦當爲兩事 “We must also be on our guard against traitors
who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and
overhearing our instructions. Fu and chien are to be taken separately.”

18. 敵近而靜者恃其險也

When the enemy is close at hand and remains
quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his
position.
Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which
is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like
Gen. Baden-Powell’s “Aids to Scouting.”

19. 遠而挑戰者欲人之進也
When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle,
he is anxious for the other side to advance.
Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to
dislodge us. “If he came close up to us,” says Tu Mu, “and tried to
force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less
probability of our responding to the challenge.”

20. 其所居者易利也
If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is
tendering a bait.
易 is here the opposite of 險 in § 18. The reading of the T‘ung Tien and
Yü Lan, 其所處者居易利也 , is pretty obviously corrupt. The original
text, which transposes 易 and 者 , may very possibly be right. Tu Mu
tells us that there is yet another reading: 士爭其所居者易利也.

21. 衆樹動者來也衆草多障者疑也

Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that
the enemy is advancing.
Ts‘ao Kung explains this as “felling trees to clear a passage,” and
Chang Yü says: “Every army sends out scouts to climb high places and
observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving
and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a
passage for the enemy’s march.”

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst
of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us
suspicious.
Whenever the meaning of a passage happens to be somewhat elusive,
Capt. Calthrop seems to consider himself justified in giving free rein to
the imagination. Thus, though his text is here identical with ours, he
renders the above: “Broken branches and trodden grass, as of the
passing of a large host, must be regarded with suspicion.” Tu Yu’s
explanation, borrowed from Ts‘ao Kung, is as follows: “The presence
of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a
sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed
these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an ambush.” It appears
that these “screens” were hastily knotted together out of any long grass
which the retreating enemy happened to come across.

22. 鳥起者伏也獸駭者覆也
The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an
ambuscade.
Chang Yü’s explanation is doubtless right: “When birds that are flying
along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers
are in ambush at the spot beneath.”

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is
coming.
An example of 覆 fou4 in the meaning of “ambuscade” may be found
in the Tso Chuan, 隱 君爲三覆以待之
9th year: . In the present
伏
passage, however, it is to be distinguished from just above, in that it
implies onward motion on the part of the attacking force. Thus, Li
Ch‘üan defines it as不意而至 來襲我也
, and Tu Mu as .

塵高而銳者車來也卑而廣者徒來也散而條達者
23.
樵採也少而往來者營軍也
When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the
sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but
spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of
infantry.
高而銳 “high and sharp,” or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat
exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the
phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than
men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-
track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast.
According to Chang Yü, “every army on the march must have scouts
探候之人
( ) some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the
enemy, will gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief.” Cf.
Gen. Baden-Powell: “As you move along, say, in a hostile country,
your eyes should be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him:
figures, dust rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc.”[174]

When it branches out in different directions, it shows
that parties have been sent to collect firewood.

There is some doubt about the reading 樵採 . The T‘ung Tien and Yü
Lan have 薪採 , and Li Ch‘üan proposes 薪來.
A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that
the army is encamping.
Chang Yü says: “In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light
horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and
strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of
dust and its motion.”

24. 辭卑而益備者進也辭强而進驅者退也
Humble words and increased preparations are
signs that the enemy is about to advance.
“As though they stood in great fear of us,” says Tu Mu. “Their object
is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack
us.” Chang Yü alludes to the story of 田單 T‘ien Tan of the Ch‘i State,
who in 279 B.C. was hard-pressed in his defence of 卽墨 Chi-mo
against the Yen forces, led by 騎劫 Ch‘i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the Shih
Chi we read: “T‘ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen
army may cut off the noses of their Ch‘i prisoners and place them in
the front rank to fight against us; that would be the undoing of our
city.’ The other side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the
suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing their
fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should
fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend themselves more
obstinately than ever. Once again T‘ien Tan sent back converted spies
who reported these words to the enemy: ‘What I dread most is that the
men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by
inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-
hearted.’ Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the
corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the

outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were all impatient
to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold. T‘ien Tan knew
then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. But instead of a
sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be
distributed amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up
with their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining
rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers were told to
keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with the old and weaker
men and with women. This done, envoys were despatched to the
enemy’s camp to arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army
began shouting for joy. T‘ien Tan also collected 20,000 ounces of
silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send
it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the town capitulated, he
would not allow their homes to be plundered or their women to be
maltreated. Ch‘i Chieh, in high good humour, granted their prayer; but
his army now became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile,
T‘ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of
red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with coloured stripes, and
fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on their
tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes, and drove
the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in the walls,
backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The animals,
maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy’s camp where
they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their tails acted as
torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies, and the
weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom they came
into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with gags
in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same
moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained
behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums and
hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed
by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly
pursued by the men of Ch‘i, who succeeded in slaying their general
Ch‘i Chieh.... The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of
some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch‘i State.”

Violent language and driving forward as if to the
attack are signs that he will retreat.
I follow the original text here, also adopted by the T‘u Shu. The
standard text reads 辭詭而强進驅者退也 on the strength of Ts‘ao
Kung’s commentary 詭詐也 , which shows that his text included the
詭
word . Strong as this ground is, I do not think it can counterbalance
the obvious superiority of the other reading in point of sense. 詭 not
卑
only provides no antithesis to , but makes the whole passage absurd;
for if the language of the enemy is calculated to deceive, it cannot be
known as deceitful at the time, and can therefore afford no “sign.”
Moreover, the extra word in 强進驅者 (an awkward locution, by the
益備者
way) spoils the parallelism with .

25. 輕車先出居其側者陳也
When the light chariots
The same, according to Tu Yu, as the 馳車 of II. § 1.
come out first and take up a position on the wings, it
is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
The T‘ung Tien omits 出.
26. 無約而請和者謀也
Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn
covenant indicate a plot.
Tu Yu defines 約 要約
as , and Li Ch‘üan as 質盟之約 “a treaty
confirmed by oaths and hostages.” Wang Hsi and Chang Yü, on the
無故
other hand, simply say “without reason,” “on a frivolous

pretext,” as though 約 bore the rather unusual sense of “important.”
Capt. Calthrop has “without consultation,” which is too loose.

27. 奔走而陳兵者期也
When there is much running about
Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental
banner.

and the soldiers fall into rank,
車 after 兵 . Tu Mu quotes the Chou
I follow the T‘u Shu in omitting
Li, ch. xxix. fol. 31:車驟徒趨及表乃止.
it means that the critical moment has come.
What Chia Lin calls 晷刻之期, as opposed to 尋常之期.
28. 半進半退者誘也
When some are seen advancing and some
retreating, it is a lure.
Capt. Calthrop is hardly right in translating: “An advance, followed by
sudden retirement.” It is rather a case of feigned confusion. As Tu Mu
says:僞爲雜亂不整之狀 .

29. 倚仗而立者飢也
When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears,
they are faint from want of food.

仗 is here probably not a synonym for 倚 , but = 兵 “a weapon.” The
original text has 杖而立者 , which has been corrected from the T‘ung
Tien and Yü Lan.

30. 汲而先飮者渴也
If those who are sent to draw water begin by
drinking themselves, the army is suffering from
thirst.
As Tu Mu remarks: 覩一人三軍可知也 “One may know the condition
of a whole army from the behaviour of a single man.” The 先 may
mean either that they drink before drawing water for the army, or
before they return to camp. Chang Yü takes the latter view. The T‘ung
Tien has the faulty reading汲役先飮者 , and the Yü Lan, worse still, 汲
設飮者 .

31. 見利而不進者勞也
If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained
Not necessarily “booty,” as Capt. Calthrop translates it. The T‘ung Tien
and Yü Lan read 向人見利 , etc.

and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are
exhausted.

32. 鳥集者虛也夜呼者恐也
If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch‘ên Hao says,
the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.

Clamour by night betokens nervousness.
Owing to false alarms; or, as Tu Mu explains it: 恐懼不安故夜呼以自
壯也 “Fear makes men restless; so they fall to shouting at night in
喧
order to keep up their courage.” The T‘ung Tien inserts 呼
before .

33. 軍擾者將不重也旌旗動者亂也吏怒者倦也
If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s
authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted
about, sedition is afoot.
The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan omit 旌.
If the officers are angry, it means that the men are
weary.
And therefore, as Capt. Calthrop says, slow to obey. Tu Yu understands
the sentence differently: “If all the officers of an army are angry with
their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue” [owing to the
exertions which he has demanded from them].

34. 粟馬肉食軍無懸缻不返其舍者窮宼也
When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills
its cattle for food,
粟馬肉食 is expanded by Mei Yao-ch‘ên (following Tu Mu) into 給糧
以𥞊乎馬殺畜以饗乎士, which is the sense I have given above. In the

ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and the
horses chiefly on grass.

and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots
缶
The T‘ung Tien reads , which is much the same as 缻 , and the Yü
箠
Lan , which is manifestly wrong.

over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return
to their tents,
For 返, the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan both read 及.
you may know that they are determined to fight to the
death.
For 窮宼 , see VII. § 36. I may quote here the illustrative passage from
the Hou Han Shu, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the P‘ei Wên
Yün Fu: “The rebel 王國 梁
Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the
town of 陳倉 皇甫嵩
Ch‘ên-ts‘ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was in
supreme command, and 董卓 Tung Cho were sent out against him. The
latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his
counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw
down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was now for advancing
to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war not to pursue
desperate men and not to press a retreating host.’ Sung answered: ‘That
does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a
retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganised
multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advanced to the
attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo
being slain.” The inferior reading of the T‘u Shu for § 34 is as follows:
殺馬肉食者軍無糧也懸缻不返其舍者窮宼也 . The first clause strikes
me as rather shallow for Sun Tzŭ, and it is hard to make anything of 懸
缻 in the second without the negative. Capt. Calthrop, nothing daunted,
set down in his first edition: “When they cast away their cooking-
pots.” He now has: “When the cooking-pots are hung up on the wall.”

35. 諄諄翕翕徐言入入者失衆也
The sight of men whispering together
諄諄 is well explained by Tu Mu as 乏氣聲促 “speaking with bated
breath.”

in small knots
The Shuo Wên rather strangely defines 翕 起
by the word , but the Êrh
Ya says 合
“to join” or “contract,” which is undoubtedly its primary
聚
meaning. Chang Yü is right, then, in explaining it here by the word .
The other commentators are very much at sea: Ts‘ao Kung says 失志
貌 不眞
, Tu Yu顚倒失次貌, Tu Mu , Chia Lin 不安貌 , Mei Yao-ch‘ên
曠職事 患其上
, Wang Hsi .

or speaking in subdued tones
入入 is said to be the same as 如如.
points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.
失衆 is equivalent to 失其衆心 , the subject of course being “the
general,” understood. In the original text, which seems to be followed
by several commentators, the whole passage stands thus: 諄諄翕翕徐
與人言者失衆也 . Here it would be the general who is talking to his
men, not the men amongst themselves. For 翕 , which is the chief
stumbling-block in the way of this reading, the T‘u Shu gives the very
plausible emendation 𧬈 (also read hsi, and defined by K‘ang Hsi as 疾
言 “to speak fast”). But this is unnecessary if we keep to the standard
text.

36. 屢賞者窘也數罰者困也

Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at
the end of his resources;
Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always
a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good
temper.

too many punishments betray a condition of dire
distress.
Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted
severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.

37. 先暴而後畏其衆者不精之至也
To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at
the enemy’s numbers, shows a supreme lack of
intelligence.
先輕敵後聞其衆則心惡之
I follow the interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung:
也 , also adopted by Li Ch‘üan, Tu Mu and Chang Yü. Another possible
meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Wang Hsi,
is: “The general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in
terror lest they should mutiny, etc.” This would connect the sentence
with what went before about rewards and punishments. The T‘ung Tien
and Yü Lan read 情 精
“affection” instead of .

38. 來委謝者欲休息也
When envoys are sent with compliments in their
mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

Tu Mu says: 所以委質來謝此乃勢已窮或有他故必欲休息也 “If the
enemy open friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that
they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is
exhausted or for some other reason.” But it hardly needs a Sun Tzŭ to
draw such an obvious inference; and although Tu Mu is supported by
Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü, I cannot think that hostages are
委
indicated by the word .

39. 兵怒而相迎久而不合又不相去必謹察之
If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain
facing ours for a long time without either joining
battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is
one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
相
Capt. Calthrop falls into a trap which often lurks in the word . He
translates: “When both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a
considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring,” etc. Had he
reflected a little, he would have seen that this is meaningless as
addressed to a commander who has control over the movements of his
own troops. 相迎 , then, does not mean that the two armies go to meet
each other, but simply that the other side comes up to us. Likewise
with 相去 . If this were not perfectly clear of itself, Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s
paraphrase would make it so: 怒而來逆我 , etc. As Ts‘ao Kung points
out, a manœuvre of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time for an
unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.

40. 兵非益多也惟無武進足以倂力料敵取人而已
If our troops are no more in number than the
enemy, that is amply sufficient;

Wang Hsi’s paraphrase, partly borrowed from Ts‘ao Kung, is 權力均
足矣 . Another reading, adopted by Chia Lin and the T‘u Shu, is 兵非
貴益多 , which Capt. Calthrop renders, much too loosely: “Numbers
are no certain mark of strength.”

it only means that no direct attack can be made.
Literally, “no martial advance.” That is to say,正 “chêng” tactics and
frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our
available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy,
and obtain reinforcements.
This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in
squeezing very good sense out of it. The difficulty lies chiefly in the
words 取人 , which have been taken in every possible way. I follow Li
惟得人者勝也
Ch‘üan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation:
“Only the side that gets more men will win.” Ts‘ao Kung’s note,
厮養足也
concise as usual to the verge of incomprehensibility, is .
Fortunately we have Chang Yü to expound its meaning to us in
兵力既均又未見便雖未足剛進足以
language which is lucidity itself:
取人於厮養之中以并兵合力察敵而取勝不必假他兵以助己 “When
the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself,
although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack,
we can find additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-
followers, and then, concentrating our forces and keeping a close
watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But we must avoid
borrowing foreign soldiers to help us.” He then quotes from Wei Liao
Tzŭ, ch. 3:助卒名爲十萬其實不過數萬耳 “The nominal strength of
mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more
取人
than half that figure.” According to this interpretation, means “to
get recruits,” not from outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which
follows in the wake of a large army. This does not sound a very
soldierly suggestion, and I feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tzŭ

meant. Chia Lin, on the other hand, takes the words in a different sense
altogether, namely “to conquer the enemy” [cf. I. § 20]. But in that
case they could hardly be followed by 而已 . Better than this would be
the rendering “to make isolated captures,” as opposed to 武進 “a
general attack.”

41. 夫惟無慮而易敵者必擒於人
He who exercises no forethought but makes light
of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
The force of 夫惟 is not easy to appreciate. Ch‘én Hao says 殊無遠慮
但輕敵者 惟
, thus referring to the second verb. He continues, quoting
from the Tso Chuan: 蜂蠆有毒而况國乎則小敵亦不可輕 “If bees and
scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! [ 僖公 ,
XXII. 3.] Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with
contempt.”

卒未親附而罰之則不服不服則難用也卒已親附
42.
而罰不行則不可用也
If soldiers are punished before they have grown
attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and,
unless submissive, they will be practically useless. If,
when the soldiers have become attached to you,
punishments are not enforced, they will still be
useless.
This is wrongly translated by Capt. Calthrop: “If the troops know the
general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are useless.”

43. 故令之以文齊之以武是謂必取
Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first
instance with humanity, but kept under control by
means of iron discipline.
文 and 武, according to Ts‘ao Kung, are here equivalent to 仁 and 法
respectively. Compare our two uses of the word “civil.” 晏子 Yen Tzŭ
[✝ B.C. 493] said of 司馬穰苴 Ssŭ-ma Jang-chü: 文能附衆武能威敵
也 “His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess
kept his enemies in awe.” Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 init.: 夫總文武者軍之將
也兼剛柔者兵之事也 “The ideal commander unites culture with a
warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of
hardness and tenderness.” Again I must find fault with Capt. Calthrop’s
translation: “By humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority
brings uniformity.”

This is a certain road to victory.

令素行以教其民則民服令不素行以教其民則民
44.
不服
If in training soldiers commands are habitually
enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its
discipline will be bad.
The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read: 令素行以教其人者也令素行則人服
令素不行則人不服 .

45. 令素信著者與衆相得也

If a general shows confidence in his men but
always insists on his orders being obeyed,
The original text has 令素行者 令素 . is certainly awkward without , 行
but on the other hand it is clear that Tu Mu accepted the T‘ung Tien
text, which is identical with ours. He says: “A general ought in time of
peace to show kindly confidence in his men and also make his
authority respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders
may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and
look up to him.” What Sun Tzŭ has said in § 44, however, would lead
one rather to expect something like this: “If a general is always
confident that his orders will be carried out,” etc. Hence I am tempted
to think that he may have written 令素信行者 . But this is perhaps too
conjectural.

the gain will be mutual.
Chang Yü says: 上以信使民民以信服上是上下相得也 “The general
has confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile,
having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual.” He quotes a
pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: 令之之法小過無更小疑
無中 “The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders
and not to be swayed by petty doubts.” Vacillation and fussiness are
the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army. Capt. Calthrop
winds up the chapter with a final mistranslation of a more than usually
heinous description: “Orders are always obeyed, if general and soldiers
are in sympathy.” Besides inventing the latter half of the sentence, he
has managed to invert protasis and apodosis.

X. 地形篇
TERRAIN.
Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1–13, deals with 地
形 , the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The “six calamities”
are discussed in §§ 14–20, and the rest of the chapter is again a mere
string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps, on
that account.

孫子曰地形有通者有挂者有支者有隘者有險者
1.
有遠者
Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of
terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground;
Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 道路交達 “plentifully provided with roads and
means of communication.”

(2) entangling ground;
The same commentator says: 網羅之地往必掛綴 “Net-like country,
venturing into which you become entangled.”

(3) temporising ground;
Tu Yu explains 支 as 久 . This meaning is still retained in modern
phrases such as 支托 , 支演 “stave off,” “delay.” I do not know why

Capt. Calthrop calls 支地 “suspended ground,” unless he is confusing
it with挂地 .

(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights;
The root idea in 隘 is narrowness; in 險, steepness.
(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.
It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification. A
strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman’s
unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.

2. 我可以往彼可以來曰通
Ground which can be freely traversed by both
sides is called accessible.
Generally speaking, 平陸 “level country” is meant. Cf. IX. § 9: 處易.
3. 通形者先居高陽利糧道以戰則利
With regard to ground of this nature,
The T‘ung Tien reads 居通地.
be before the enemy in occupying the raised and
sunny spots,
See IX. § 2. The T‘ung Tien reads 先據其地.
and carefully guard your line of supplies.
A curious use of 利 as a verb, if our text is right. The general meaning
is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, 無使敵絶己糧道 “not to allow the enemy

to cut your communications.” Tu Mu, who was not a soldier and can
hardly have had any practical experience of fighting, goes more into
detail and speaks of protecting the line of communications by a wall
壘
( ), or enclosing it by embankments on each side ( 作甬道 )! In view
of Napoleon’s dictum, “the secret of war lies in the
communications,”[175] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than
skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11.
Col. Henderson says: “The line of supply may be said to be as vital to
the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just
as the duellist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with
certain death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his
adversary’s movements, and to content himself with warding off his
thrusts, so the commander whose communications are suddenly
threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if
he has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less
isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground
which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an
ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the surrender of his whole
army.”[176]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.

4. 可以往難以返曰挂
Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-
occupy is called entangling.
Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating 返 “retreat from it.”
挂形者敵無備出而勝之敵若有備出而不勝難以
5.
返不利

From a position of this sort, if the enemy is
unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But
if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you
fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,
disaster will ensue.
不利 (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as 必受
制 “you will receive a check.”
6. 我出而不利彼出而不利曰支
When the position is such that neither side will
gain by making the first move, it is called
temporising ground.
俱不便久相持也 “Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the
situation remains at a deadlock” (Tu Yu).

支形者敵雖利我我無出也引而去令敵半出而擊
7.
之利
In a position of this sort, even though the enemy
should offer us an attractive bait,
Tu Yu says 佯背我去 “turning their backs on us and pretending to
flee.” But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit
our position. Here again 利 is used as a verb, but this time in a
different sense: “to hold out an advantage to.”

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to
retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then,
when part of his army has come out, we may deliver
our attack with advantage.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme
各居所險，先出必敗，利而誘我，我不可
of rhymes being abcbdd:
愛，僞去引敵，半出而擊 .

8. 隘形者我先居之必盈之以待敵
With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy
them first,
Capt. Calthrop says: “Defiles, make haste to occupy.” But this is a
conditional clause, answering to若敵先居之 in the next paragraph.

let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent
of the enemy.
Because then, as Tu Yu observes, 皆制在我然後出奇以制敵 “the
initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden and unexpected
attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.” The commentators
make a great pother about the precise meaning of 盈 , which to the
foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.

9. 若敵先居之盈而勿從不盈而從之
Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a
pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully
garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. 險形者我先居之必居高陽以待敵
With regard to precipitous heights, if you are
beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy
the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to
come up.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 地形險隘尤不可致於人 “The particular advantage
of securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be
dictated by the enemy.” [For the enunciation of the grand principle
alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yü tells the following anecdote of 裴行
儉 P‘ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619–682), who was sent on a punitive
expedition against the Turkic tribes. “At nightfall he pitched his camp
as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and
ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its
quarters to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers,
who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on
the men. P‘ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their
remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The
same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place
of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant
officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the
wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked.
P‘ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey
orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ [See Chiu T‘ang Shu,
ch. 84, fol. 12 ro, and Hsin T‘ang Shu, ch. 108, fol. 5 vo.] From this it
may be seen,” Chang Yü continues, “that high and sunny places are
advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are immune
from disastrous floods.”

11. 若敵先居之引而去之勿從也

If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not
follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
The turning-point of 李世民 Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D.
against the two rebels,竇建德 Tou Chien-tê, King of 夏 Hsia, and 王
世充 Wang Shih-ch‘ung, Prince of 鄭 Chêng, was his seizure of the
heights of武牢 Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-tê persisted in his
attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner.
[See Chiu T‘ang Shu, ch. 2, fol. 5 vo and also ch. 54.]

12. 遠形者勢均難以挑戰戰而不利
If you are situated at a great distance from the
enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,
The T‘ung Tien reads 夫通形均勢.
it is not easy to provoke a battle,
Ts‘ao Kung says that 挑戰 means 延敵 “challenging the enemy.” But
the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says, 迎敵
“going to meet him.” The point of course is, that we must not think of
undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which 是我困
敵銳 “we should, be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen.”

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. 凡此六者地之道也將之至任不可不察也
These six are the principles connected with Earth.
Or perhaps, “the principles relating to ground.” See, however, I. § 8.

The general who has attained a responsible post must
be careful to study them.
Capt. Calthrop omits 至任. Out of the foregoing six 地形 , it will be
noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the configuration
of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to convey any definite
geographical idea.

故兵有走者有弛者有陷者有崩者有亂者有北者
14.
凡此六者非天之災將之過也
Now an army is exposed to six several calamities,
not arising from natural causes,
The T‘u Shu reads 天地之災.
but from faults for which the general is responsible.
These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3)
collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.
I take exception to Capt. Calthrop’s rendering of 陷 and 崩 as
“distress” and “disorganisation,” respectively.

15. 夫勢均以一擊十曰走
Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled
against another ten times its size, the result will be
the flight of the former.
不料力
Cf. III. § 10. The general’s fault here is that of “not calculating
the enemy’s strength.” It is obvious that勢 cannot have the same force

兵力
as in § 12, where it was equivalent to . I should not be inclined,
將之智勇兵之利銳
however, to limit it, with Chang Yü, to “the
wisdom and valour of the general and the sharpness of the weapons.”
As Li Ch‘üan very justly remarks, 若得形便之地用奇伏之計則可矣
“Given a decided advantage in position, or the help of some stratagem
such as a flank attack or an ambuscade, it would be quite possible [to
fight in the ratio of one to ten].”

16. 卒强吏弱曰弛吏强卒弱曰陷
When the common soldiers are too strong and their
officers too weak, the result is insubordination.
弛 “laxity”—the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt.
Calthrop’s “relaxation” is not good, on account of its ambiguity. Tu
Mu cites the unhappy case of 田布 T‘ien Pu [Hsin T‘ang Shu, ch. 148],
who was sent to 魏 Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army
against 王 廷 湊 Wang T‘ing-ts‘ou. But the whole time he was in
command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and
openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys,
several thousands at a time. T‘ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to
this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an
attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in
every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by
cutting his throat.

When the officers are too strong and the common
soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 吏强欲進卒弱輒陷 “The officers are energetic and
want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly
弱
collapse.” Note that is to be taken literally of physical weakness,
whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch‘üan makes 陷

equivalent to 敗, and Tu Mu explains it as 陷沒於死地 “stumbling into
a death-trap.”

17. 大吏怒而不服遇敵懟而自戰將不知其能曰崩
When the higher officers
大吏 , according to Ts‘ao Kung, are the 小將 “generals of inferior
rank.” But Li Ch‘üan, Ch‘ên Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as
simply convertible with 將 or 大將.

are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the
enemy give battle on their own account from a
feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief
can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the
result is ruin.
大將
Ts‘ao Kung makes 怒
, understood, the subject of , which seems
rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi’s note is: 謂將怒不以理且不知裨佐之才
激致其兇懟如山之崩壞也 “This means, the general is angry without
just cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his
subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an
能
avalanche of ruin upon his head.” He takes , therefore, in the sense
才
of ; but I think that Ch‘ên Hao is right in his paraphrase 不顧能否
“they don’t care if it be possible or no.” My interpretation of the whole
passage is that of Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü. Tu Mu gives a long
extract from the Tso Chuan, 宣公 , XII. 3, showing how the great battle
of邲 Pi [597 B.C.] was lost for the 晉 Chin State through the
contumacy of 先縠 Hsien Hu and the resentful spite of 魏錡 Wei I and
趙旃 Chao Chan. Chang Yü also alludes to the mutinous conduct of 欒
黶 Luan Yen [ibid. 襄公 , XIV. 3].

18. 將弱不嚴教道不明吏卒無常陳兵縱橫曰亂
When the general is weak and without authority;
when his orders are not clear and distinct;
Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: 上無疑令，則衆不二聽，動無疑事，則
衆不二志 “If the commander gives his orders with decision, the
soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made
without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing
their duty.” General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: “The
secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one
nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive.”[177]
Assuming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much
未有不信其心而能得其
what Wei Liao Tzŭ (loc. cit.) goes on to say:
力者也 . Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: 用兵之害猶豫最大三軍之災生於狐
疑 “the most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worst
calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation.”

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers
and men,
吏卒皆不拘常度 “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine”
[Tu Mu].

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard
manner, the result is utter disorganisation.

19. 將不能料敵以少合衆以弱擊强兵無選鋒曰北
When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s
strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger
one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful

one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front
rank, the result must be a rout.
不選驍勇之士使
Chang Yü paraphrases the latter part of the sentence
爲先鋒兵必敗北也 , and continues:凡戰必用精銳爲前鋒者一則壯吾
志一則挫敵威也 “Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest
spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to
strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the
enemy.” Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar (“De Bello Gallico,” V. 28, 44
北
et al.). There seems little to distinguish from 走 in § 15, except that
北 is a more forcible word.

20. 凡此六者敗之道也將之至任不可不察也
These are six ways of courting defeat,
Ch‘ên Hao makes them out to be: (1) 不量寡衆 “neglect to estimate
the enemy’s strength;” (2) 本乏刑德 “want of authority;” (3) 失於訓
練 非理興怒
“defective training;” (4) “unjustifiable anger;” (5) 法令
不行 “non-observance of discipline;” (6) 不擇驍果 “failure to use
picked men.”

which must be carefully noted by the general who
has attained a responsible post.
See supra, § 13.

夫地形者兵之助也料敵制勝計險阨遠近上將之
21.
道也
The natural formation of the country is the
soldier’s best ally;

Chia Lin’s text has the reading易 助
for . Ch‘ên Hao says: 天時不如地
利 “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those
connected with ground.”

but a power of estimating the adversary,
The insertion of a “but” is necessary to show the connection of thought
here. A general should always utilise, but never rely wholly on natural
advantages of terrain.

of controlling the forces of victory,
制勝 is one of those condensed expressions which mean so much in
Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to imply
is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.

and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and
distances,
The T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan read 計極險易利害遠近 . I am decidedly
puzzled by Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “an eye for steepness,
command and distances.” Where did he find the word which I have put
in italics?

constitutes the test of a great general.
道
A somewhat free translation of . As Chang Yü remarks, these are 兵
之本 “the essentials of soldiering,” ground being only a helpful
accessory.

22. 知此而用戰者必勝不知此而用戰者必敗
He who knows these things, and in fighting puts
his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He

who knows them not, nor practises them, will surely
be defeated.

故戰道必勝主曰無戰必戰可也戰道不勝主曰必
23.
戰無戰可也
If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you
must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting
will not result in victory, then you must not fight
even at the ruler’s bidding.
Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang-shih Kung of the Ch‘in dynasty, who is said to
張良
have been the patron of 三
Chang Liang and to have written the
略 , has these words attributed to him:出軍行師將在自專進退內御則
功難成故聖主明王跪而推轂 “The responsibility of setting an army in
motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance and retreat are
controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved.
Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to
play a humble part in furthering their country’s cause [lit., kneel down
to push the chariot wheel].” This means that 閫外之事將軍裁之 “in
matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military
軍中
commander must be absolute.” Chang Yü also quotes the saying:
不聞天子之詔 “Decrees of the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the
walls of a camp.” Napoleon, who has been accused of allowing his
generals too little independence of action, speaks in the same sense:
“Un général en chef n’est pas à couvert de ses fautes à la guerre par un
ordre de son souverain ou du ministre, quand celui qui le donne est
éloigné du champ d’opération, et qu’il connaît mal, ou ne connaît pas
du tout le dernier état des choses.”[178]

故進不求名退不避罪唯民是保而利合於主國之
24.
寳也
The general who advances without coveting fame
and retreats without fearing disgrace,
It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for a
soldier is to retreat.

whose only thought is to protect his country and do
good service for his sovereign,
合 , which is omitted by the T‘u Shu, is said by Ch‘ên Hao to be
equivalent to 歸 . If it had to be separately translated, it would be
something like our word “accrue.”

is the jewel of the kingdom.
A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese “happy warrior.”
Such a man, says Ho Shih, 罪及其身不悔也 “even if he had to suffer
punishment, would not regret his conduct.”

視卒如嬰兒故可與之赴深谿視卒如愛子故可與
25.
之俱死
Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on
them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand
by you even unto death.
Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture
of the famous general Wu Ch‘i, from whose treatise on war I have
frequently had occasion to quote: “He wore the same clothes and ate

the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a
horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations
wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of
his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch‘i himself
sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing
and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your
son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself
has sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied: ‘Many years
ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never
left him afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the
enemy. And now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall
fighting I know not where’.” Li Ch‘üan mentions 楚子 the Viscount of
Ch‘u, who invaded the small state of 蕭 Hsiao during the winter. 申公
The Duke of Shên said to him: “Many of the soldiers are suffering
severely from the cold.” So he made a round of the whole army,
comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if
宣公
they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk. [Tso Chuan, ,
XII. 5]. Chang Yü alludes to the same passage, saying: 温言一撫士同
挾纊 .

厚而不能使愛而不能令亂而不能治譬如驕子不
26.
可用也
If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make
your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to
enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of
quelling disorder:
Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last he
translates: “overindulgence may produce disorder.”

then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children;
they are useless for any practical purpose.

Cf. IX. § 42. We read in the 陰符經 , pt. 2:害生于思 “Injury comes
out of kindness.” Li Ching once said that if you could make your
soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu
recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in 219
A.D., when 呂蒙 Lü Mêng was occupying the town of 江陵 Chiang-
ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the
inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a
certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-
笠
townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat ( ) belonging to one
of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a
protection against the rain. Lü Mêng considered that the fact of his
being also a native of 汝南 Ju-nan should not be allowed to palliate a
clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary
execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This
act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time
forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. [San
Kuo Chih, ch. 54, f. 13 ro. & vo.].

27. 知吾卒之可以擊而不知敵之不可擊勝之半也
If we know that our own men are in a condition to
attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to
attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
That is, as Ts‘ao Kung says, “the issue in this case is uncertain.”

28. 知敵之可擊而不知吾卒之不可以擊勝之半也
If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but
are unaware that our own men are not in a condition

to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
victory.
Cf. III. § 13 (1).

知敵之可擊知吾卒之可以擊而不知地形之不可
29.
以戰勝之半也
If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and
also know that our men are in a condition to attack,
but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes
fighting impracticable, we have still gone only
halfway towards victory.
I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice distinction in
meaning between 擊 攻
and . The latter is simply “to attack” without
any further implication, whereas 擊 is a stronger word which in nine
cases out of ten means “to attack with expectation of victory,” “to fall
upon,” as we should say, or even “to crush.” On the other hand, 擊 is
伐
not quite synonymous with , which is mostly used of operations on a
larger scale, as of one State making war on another, often with the
added idea of invasion. 征 , finally, has special reference to the
subjugation of rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.

30. 故知兵者動而不迷舉而不窮
Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is
never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is
never at a loss.

The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures
so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. “He does not move
recklessly,” says Chang Yü, “so that when he does move, he makes no
mistakes.” Another reading substitutes 困 迷 for and頓 窮for . The
latter variant only is adopted by the T‘ung Tien and Yü Lan. Note that
窮 here means “at the end of his mental resources.”

31. 故曰知彼知己勝乃不殆知地知天勝乃可全
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;
Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified.

if you know Heaven and know Earth,
天 and 地 are transposed for the sake of the jingle between 天 and 全.
The original text, however, has 知天知地 , and the correction has been
made from the T‘ung Tien.

you may make your victory complete.
As opposed to 勝之半 , above. The original text has 勝乃不窮 , the
corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of 不窮 in the
preceding sentence. Here, however 不窮 would not be synonymous
with 不困 , but equivalent to 不可以窮 “inexhaustible,” “beyond
computation.” Cf. V. § 11. The T‘ung Tien has again supplied the true
人事天時地利三者同知則百
reading. Li Ch‘üan sums up as follows:
戰百勝 “Given a knowledge of three things—the affairs of man, the
seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth—, victory will
invariably crown your battles.”

XI. 九地篇
THE NINE SITUATIONS.
勝敵之地
Li Ch‘üan is not quite right in calling these . As we shall see,
some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military point of
view. Wang Hsi more correctly says: 用兵之地利害有九也 “There are
nine military situations, good and bad.” One would like to distinguish
九地
the from the six 地形 of chap. X by saying that the latter refer to
the natural formation or geographical features of the country, while the
九地 have more to do with the condition of the army, being 地勢
“situations” as opposed to “grounds.” But it is soon found impossible
to carry out the distinction. Both are cross-divisions, for among the 地
形 we have “temporising ground” side by side with “narrow passes,”
while in the present chapter there is even greater confusion.

孫子曰用兵之法有散地有輕地有爭地有交地有
1.
衢地有重地有圮地有圍地有死地
Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine
varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile
ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5)
ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground;
(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9)
desperate ground.

2. 諸侯自戰其地者爲散地
When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it
is dispersive ground.
So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious
to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity
afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. “In their advance,”
observes Tu Mu, “they will lack the valour of desperation, and when
者
they retreat, they will find harbours of refuge.” The , which appears
in the T‘u Shu, seems to have been accidentally omitted in my edition
of the standard text.

3. 入人之地而不深者爲輕地
When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but
to no great distance, it is facile ground.
輕於退也
Li Ch‘üan and Ho Shih say “because of the facility for
retreating,” and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu
Mu remarks: 師出越境必焚舟梁示民無返顧之心 “When your army
has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in
order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after
home.” I do not think that “disturbing ground,” Capt. Calthrop’s
rendering of 輕地 , has anything to justify it. If an idiomatic translation
is out of the question, one should at least attempt to be literal.

4. 我得則利彼得亦利者爲爭地
Ground the possession of which imports great
advantage to either side, is contentious ground.

I must apologise for using this word in a sense not known to the
dictionary, i.e. “to be contended for”—Tu Mu’s 必爭之地 . Ts‘ao Kung
says: 可以少勝衆弱勝强 “ground on which the few and the weak can
defeat the many and the strong,” such as 阨喉 “the neck of a pass,”
instanced by Li Ch‘üan. Thus, Thermopylae was a 爭地 , because the
possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire
invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ,
以一擊十莫善於阨
ch. V. ad init.: “For those who have to fight in the
ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass.” When
呂光 Lü Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to
Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as 宜禾 I-ho, laden with
spoils, 梁熙 Liang Hsi, administrator of 涼州 Liang-chou, taking
advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch‘in, plotted against him
and was for barring his way into the province. 楊翰 Yang Han,
governor of 高昌 Kao-ch‘ang, counselled him, saying: “Lü Kuang is
fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and
mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we
shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan.
Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the 高梧 Kao-wu
pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops
are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without
moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could
make a stand against him at the 伊吾 I-wu pass, which is nearer. The
cunning and resource of 子房 Tzŭ-fang himself [i.e. 張良 ] would be
expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two
positions.” Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed
and swept away by the invader. [See 晉書 歴代
, ch. 122, fol. 3 ro, and
紀事年表 , ch. 43, fol. 26.]

5. 我可以往彼可以來者爲交地
Ground on which each side has liberty of
movement is open ground.

This is only a makeshift translation of交 , which according to Ts‘ao
Kung stands for 交錯 “ground covered with a network of roads,” like a
chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by Ho Shih, is 交通
“ground on which intercommunication is easy.” In either case, it must
evidently be 平原 “flat country,” and therefore不可杜絶 “cannot be
blocked.” Cf.通形 , X. § 2.

6. 諸侯之地三屬先至而得天下之衆者爲衢地
Ground which forms the key to three contiguous
states,
我與敵相當而旁有他國也 “Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a
third country conterminous with both.” [Ts‘ao Kung.] Mêng Shih
instances the small principality of 鄭 Chêng, which was bounded on
the north-east by 齊 Ch‘i, on the west by 晉 Chin, and on the south by
楚 Ch‘u.
so that he who occupies it first has most of the
Empire at his command,
天下 of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into which
China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent who holds
this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his
衆
allies. See infra, § 48. appears at first sight to be “the masses” or
“population” of the Empire, but it is more probably, as Tu Yu says,諸
侯之衆 .

is ground of intersecting highways.
Capt. Calthrop’s “path-ridden ground” might stand well enough for 交
地 above, but it does not bring out the force of 衢地 , which clearly
denotes the central position where important highways meet.

7. 入人之地深背城邑多者爲重地
When an army has penetrated into the heart of a
hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in
its rear,
After 多, the T‘ung Tien intercalates the gloss 難以返.
it is serious ground.
Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that 兵至此者事勢重也 “when
an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.” Li Ch‘üan
instances (1) the victorious march of樂毅 Yo I into the capital of Ch‘i
in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch‘u, six years later, by the Ch‘in
general 白起Po Ch‘i.

8. 山林險阻沮澤凡難行之道者爲圮地
Mountain forests,
Or simply, “forests.” I follow the T‘u Shu in omitting the行 before 山
林 , given in the standard text, which is not only otiose but spoils the
rhythm of the sentence.

rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is
hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
圮 p‘i (to be distinguished from 圯 i ) is defined by K‘ang Hsi (after
3 4

the Shuo Wên) as 毁 “to destroy.” Hence Chia Lin explains 圮地 as
ground 經水所毁 “that has been ruined by water passing over it,” and
Tu Yu simply as 沮洳之地 “swampy ground.” But Ch‘ên Hao says that
the word is specially applied to deep hollows—what Chu-ko Liang, he
tells us, used to designate by the expressive term 地獄 “earth-hells.”
Compare the 天井 of IX. § 15.

所由入者隘所從歸者迂彼寡可以擊吾之衆者爲
9.
圍地
Ground which is reached through narrow gorges,
and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths,
so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to
crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in
ground.

10. 疾戰則存不疾戰則亡者爲死地
Ground on which we can only be saved from
destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate
ground.
圍地
The situation, as pictured by Ts‘ao Kung, is very similar to the ,
except that here escape is no longer possible: 前有高山後有大水進則
不得退則有礙 “A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind,
人在死地如坐
advance impossible, retreat blocked.” Ch‘ên Hao says:
漏船伏燒屋 “to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking
boat or crouching in a burning house.” Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a
vivid description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: “Suppose an
army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls
into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a
mountain on the right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be
roped together and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in
front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file (鴈
行魚貫之嚴 ). Then, before there is time to range our soldiers in order
of battle, the enemy in overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the
scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating,
we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet

standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite. If we
simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the
moment we make a move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on
front and rear. The country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the
army is lacking in the necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the
men worn-out, all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the
pass so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of
ten thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all points
of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even
though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons,
how could they be employed with the slightest effect?” Students of
Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian
expedition, and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and
Demosthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].

11. 是故散地則無以戰輕地則無止爭地則無攻
On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On
facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack
not.
But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous
position first. So Ts‘ao Kung. Li Ch‘üan and others, however, suppose
the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, so that it
would be sheer madness to attack. In the 孫子敘錄 , when the King of
Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: “The
rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have
the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured
first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by
pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make
a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood
and raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your
best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent
will sally forth to the rescue.”

12. 交地則無絶衢地則合交
On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s
way.
Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking
force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations of 無絶 .I
follow that of Chang Yü ( 不可以兵阻絶其路 ). The other is indicated
in Ts‘ao Kung’s brief note:相及屬也 “Draw closer together”—i.e., see
that a portion of your own army is not cut off. Wang Hsi points out that
交地 通地
is only another name for the “accessible ground” of X. § 2,
and says that the advice here given is simply a variation of 利糧道
“keep a sharp eye on the line of supplies,” be careful that your
communications are not cut. The T‘ung Tien reads 無相絶 .

On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with
your allies.
Or perhaps, “form alliances with neighbouring states.” Thus Ts‘ao
Kung has: 結諸侯也 . Capt. Calthrop’s “cultivate intercourse” is much
too timid and vague. The original text reads 交合 .

13. 重地則掠圮地則行
On serious ground, gather in plunder.
深入敵境不可非
On this, Li Ch‘üan has the following delicious note:
義失人心如漢高祖入秦無犯婦女無取寳貨得人心也此筌以掠字爲
無掠字 “When an army penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care
must be taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow
the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch‘in
territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of valuables.
[Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause us to blush for
the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won

the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true
reading must be, not 掠 無掠
‘plunder’, but ‘do not plunder’.” Alas, I
fear that in this instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his
judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has no such illusions. He says: “When
encamped on ‘serious ground,’ there being no inducement as yet to
advance further, and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take
measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all
sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy.” Cf. also II. § 9: 因糧於
敵 .

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
Or, in the words of VIII. §2, 無舍 “do not encamp.”
14. 圍地則謀死地則戰
On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 發奇謀 “Try the effect of some unusual artifice;”
and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: 居此則當權謀詐譎可以免難 “In
such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the
circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the peril
may be escaped.” This is exactly what happened on the famous
occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the
road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the Dictator
Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was
remarkably like that which T‘ien Tan had also employed with success
exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came on,
bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set
on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the
mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The
strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and
discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and
Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III.
93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16, 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.
For, as Chia Lin remarks: 力戰或生守隅則死 “if you fight with all
your might, there is a chance of life; whereas death is certain if you
cling to your corner.”

所謂古之善用兵者能使敵人前後不相及衆寡不
15.
相恃貴賤不相救上下不相扶
Those who were called skilful leaders of old
所謂 is omitted in the T‘u Shu text.
knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s
front and rear;
More literally, “cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other.”

to prevent co-operation between his large and small
divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the
bad,
I doubt if 貴賤 can mean “officers and men,” as Capt. Calthrop
translates. This is wanted for上下 .

the officers from rallying their men.
The reading 扶 , derived from the Yü Lan, must be considered very
救
doubtful. The original text has , and the T‘u Shu . 收
16. 卒離而不集兵合而不齊

When the enemy’s men were scattered, they
prevented them from concentrating;
Capt. Calthrop translates 卒 離 “they scattered the enemy,” which
cannot be right.

even when their forces were united, they managed to
keep them in disorder.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s note makes the sense plain: 或已離而不能合或雖合
而不能齊 不齊 , are dependent
. All these clauses, of course, down to
使
on in § 15.

17. 合於利而動不合於利而止
When it was to their advantage, they made a
forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên connects this with the foregoing: 然能使敵若此當須有
利則動無利則止 “Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy,
they would push forward in order to secure any advantage to be
gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would remain
where they were.”

18. 敢問敵衆整而將來待之若何曰先奪其所愛則聽
矣
If asked how to cope with a great host of the
enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching
to the attack,
敢問 is like 或問, introducing a supposed question.

I should say: “Begin by seizing something which
your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable
to your will.”
Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts‘ao Kung thinks it
其所恃之利
is “some strategical advantage on which the enemy is
depending.” Tu Mu says: 據我便地畧我田野利其糧道斯三者敵人之
所愛惜倚恃者也 “The three things which an enemy is anxious to do,
and on the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to
capture our favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3)
to guard his own communications.” Our object then must be to thwart
his plans in these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf.
III. § 3.] But this exegesis unduly strains the meaning of 奪 愛
and ,
and I agree with Ch‘ên Hao, who says that 所愛 does not refer only to
strategical advantages, but is any person or thing that may happen to
be of importance to the enemy. By boldly seizing the initiative in this
way, you at once throw the other side on the defensive.

19. 兵之情主速乘人之不及由不虞之道攻其所不戒
也
Rapidity is the essence of war:
兵之情 means “the conditions of war,” not, as Capt. Calthrop says,
“the spirit of the troops.” According to Tu Mu, 此統言兵之情狀 “this
is a summary of leading principles in warfare,” and he adds: 此乃兵之
深情將之至事也 “These are the profoundest truths of military science,
and the chief business of the general.” The following anecdotes, told
by Ho Shih, show the importance attached to speed by two of China’s
greatest generals. In 227 A.D.,孟達 Mêng Ta, governor of 新城 Hsin-
ch‘êng under the Wei Emperor Wên Ti, was meditating defection to the
House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko
Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssŭ-ma I was

then military governor of 宛 Wan, and getting wind of Mêng Ta’s
treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt,
having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly
import. Ssŭ-ma’s officers came to him and said: “If Mêng Ta has
leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly
investigated before we make a move.” Ssŭ-ma I replied: “Mêng Ta is
an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once,
while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask.”
Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the
walls of Hsin-ch‘êng within the space of eight days. Now Mêng Ta had
previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: “Wan is 1200 li from here.
When the news of my revolt reaches Ssŭ-ma I, he will at once inform
his Imperial Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can
be taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssŭ-
ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent
against us are not worth troubling about.” The next letter, however,
was filled with consternation: “Though only eight days have passed
since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates.
What miraculous rapidity is this!” A fortnight later, Hsin-ch‘êng had
fallen and Mêng Ta had lost his head. [See Chin Shu, ch. 1, f. 3.] In
621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from 夔州 K‘uei-chou in Ssŭ-ch‘uan to
reduce the successful rebel 蕭銑 Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as
Emperor at the modern 荆州 Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn,
and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that
his adversary would venture to come down through the gorges, and
consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army
without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other
generals implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a
less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching replied: “To the soldier,
overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never
miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even
knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present
moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital
with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you
have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII, § 19, note.] This is the
great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will

have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to
oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours.” All came about
as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly
stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the
penalty of death. [See Hsin T‘ang Shu, ch. 93, f. 1 vo.]

take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make
your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded
spots.

20. 凡爲客之道深入則專主人不克
The following are the principles to be observed by
an invading force: The further you penetrate into a
country, the greater will be the solidarity of your
troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against
you.

21. 掠於饒野三軍足食
Make forays in fertile country in order to supply
your army with food.
Cf. supra, § 13. Li Ch‘üan does not venture on a note here.

22. 謹養而勿勞併氣積力運兵計謀爲不可測
Carefully study the well-being of your men,

謹養 , according to Wang Hsi, means: 撫循飮食周謹之 “Pet them,
humour them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them
generally.”

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy
and hoard your strength.
Tu Mu explains these words in a rhyming couplet: 氣全力盛一發取
勝 ; and Ch‘ên Hao recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the
famous general 王翦 Wang Chien, whose military genius largely
contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the
Ch‘u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. But,
being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to
fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch‘u
general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his
walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and energy
to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that
they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided
facilities for bathing, and employed every method of judicious
indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogeneous body. After
some time had elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the
men were amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were
contending with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping
投石超距
( ). When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these
athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the
required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time
the Ch‘u army, after repeating their challenge again and again, had
marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch‘in general immediately
broke up his camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued
they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the whole of
Ch‘u was conquered by Ch‘in, and the king 負芻 Fu-ch‘u led into
captivity. [See Shih Chi, ch. 73, f. 5 ro. It should be noted that, 楚
being a taboo character under the Ch‘in dynasty, the name figures as
荆 throughout.]

Keep your army continually on the move,
In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has
運兵
struck me, however, that the true reading might be, not , but 連兵
“link your army together” [cf. supra § 46, 吾將使之屬 ], which would
be more in keeping with 併氣積力 . Capt. Calthrop cuts the Gordian
knot by omitting the words altogether.

and devise unfathomable plans.
Ch‘ang Yü’s paraphrase is: 常爲不可測度之計.
23. 投之無所往死且不北死焉不得士人盡力
Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is
no escape, and they will prefer death to flight.
Cf. Nicias’ speech to the Athenians: Τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες
στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι ὡς μὴ
ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθείητε, etc. [Thuc. VII.
77. vii.]

If they will face death, there is nothing they may not
achieve.
死 by itself constitutes the protasis, and 焉 is the interrogative = 安 .
Capt. Calthrop makes the protasis end with 得 : “If there be no
alternative but death.” But I do not see how this is to be got out of the
Chinese. Chang Yü gives a clear paraphrase: 士卒死戰安不得志 , and
quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): 一夫仗劔擊於市萬人無不
避之者臣謂非一人之獨勇萬人皆不肖也何則必死與必生固不侔也
“If one man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and
everybody else tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that this
man alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible

cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who sets some value
on his life do not meet on even terms.”

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost
strength.
士人 appears to stand for the more usual 士卒. Chang Yü says: 同在難
地安得不共竭其力 “If they are in an awkward place together, they
will surely exert their united strength to get out of it.”

24. 兵士甚陷則不懼無所往則固深入則拘不得已則
鬥
Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of
fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand
firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile country, they
will show a stubborn front.
Capt. Calthrop weakly says: “there is unity,” as though the text were
則專 , as in § 20. But 拘
introduces quite a new idea—that of tenacity
—which Ts‘ao Kung tries to explain by the word 縛
“to bind fast.”

If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.

25. 是故其兵不修而戒不求而得不約而親不令而信
Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the
soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive;
Tu Mu says: 不待修整而自戒懼. Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates 不
修 “without warnings.”

without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;
Literally, “without asking, you will get.” Chang Yü’s paraphrase is: 不
求索而得情意 .

without restrictions, they will be faithful;
Chang Yü says: 不約束而親上.
without giving orders, they can be trusted.
This last clause is very similar in sense to the one preceding, except
that親 indicates the soldiers’ attachment to their leader, and 信 the
信
leader’s attitude towards them. I rather doubt if can mean “they will
have confidence in their leader,” as the commentary seems to indicate.
That way, the sense is not nearly so good. On the other hand, it is just
possible that here, as in VIII. § 8 and infra, § 55, 信 may = 申 :
“without orders, they will carry out [their leader’s plans].” The whole
of this paragraph, of course, has reference to “desperate ground.”

26. 禁祥去疑至死無所災
Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with
superstitious doubts.
祥 is amplified by Ts‘ao Kung into 妖祥之言, and 疑 into 疑惑之計.
Cf. the Ssŭ-ma Fa, ch. 3: 滅厲祥.

Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be
feared.
The superstitious, “bound in to saucy doubts and fears,” degenerate
into cowards and “die many times before their deaths.” Tu Mu quotes
Huang-shih Kung: 禁巫祝不得爲吏士卜問軍之吉凶恐亂軍士之心
“‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no officer

allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear
the soldier’s minds should be seriously perturbed.’ The meaning is,” he
continues, “that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will
never falter in their resolution until they die.” The reading of the
standard text is無所之 “there will be no refuge,” which does not fit in
災
well here. I therefore prefer to adopt the variant , which evidently
stood in Li Ch‘üan’s text.

27. 吾士無餘財非惡貨也無餘命非惡壽也
If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it
is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their
lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are
disinclined to longevity.
貨與壽人之所愛也所以
Chang Yü has the best note on this passage:
燒擲財寳割棄性命者非憎惡之也不得已也 “Wealth and long life are
things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn
or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they
dislike them, but simply that they have no choice.” Sun Tzŭ is slyly
insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see
that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their
way. Capt. Calthrop, mistaking 惡 for the adjective, has: “not because
money is a bad thing ... not because long life is evil.”

令發之日士卒坐者涕霑襟偃臥者涕交頤投之無
28.
所往者諸劌之勇也
On the day they are ordered out to battle, your
soldiers may weep,

The word in the Chinese is 涕 “snivel.” This is taken to indicate more
genuine grief than tears alone.

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those
lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts‘ao Kung says, 皆持必
死之計 “all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die.” We may
remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in
showing their emotion. Chang Yü alludes to the mournful parting at
the 易 I River between 荆軻 Ching K‘o and his friends, when the
former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch‘in (afterwards
First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he
bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: 風蕭蕭兮，易水
寒，壯士一去兮，不復還 “The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the
burn; Your champion is going—Not to return.”[179]

But let them once be brought to bay, and they will
display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
諸 was the personal name of 專諸 Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State
and contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by 公子
光 Kung-tzŭ Kuang, better known as Ho Lü Wang, to assassinate his
sovereign 王僚 Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the
belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but
was immediately hacked to pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was
in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, 曹劌 Ts‘ao Kuei (or Ts‘ao 沫
Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166
years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch‘i, and was
just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory,
when Ts‘ao Kuei suddenly seized 桓公 Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch‘i,
as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his chest. None
of the Duke’s retainers dared to move a muscle, and Ts‘ao Kuei
proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was being
unjustly treated because she was a smaller and weaker state. Huan

Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts‘ao
Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the
terrified assemblage without having so much as changed colour. As
was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the
bargain, but his wise old counsellor 管仲 Kuan Chung pointed out to
him the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this
bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three
pitched battles. [For another anecdote of Ts‘ao Kuei see VII. § 27,
note; and for the biographies of these three bravos, Ts‘ao, Chuan and
Ching, see Shih Chi, ch. 86.]

故善用兵譬如率然率然者常山之虵也擊其首則
29.
尾至擊其尾則首至擊其中則首尾俱至
The skilful tactician may be likened to the shuai-
jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the
Ch‘ang mountains.
率然 means “suddenly” or “rapidly,” and the snake in question was
doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through
this passage, the term has now come to be used in the sense of
“military manœuvres.” The 常山 have apparently not been identified.

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail;
strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head;
strike at its middle,
Another reading in the Yü Lan for 中 is 腹 “belly.”
and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

敢問兵可使如率然乎曰可夫吳人與越人相惡也
30.
當其同舟而濟遇風其相救也如左右手
Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-
jan,
That is, as Mei Yao-ch‘ên says, 可使兵首尾率然相應如一體乎 “Is it
possible to make the front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive
to attack on the other, just as though they were parts of a single living
body?”

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men
of Yüeh are enemies;
Cf. VI. § 21.

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and
are caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s
assistance just as the left hand helps the right.
The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of
common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army,
bound together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling.
Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack
of co-operation, especially in the case of allied armies.

31. 是故方馬埋輪未足恃也
Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the
tethering of horses,
方 is said here to be equivalent to 縛.

and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.
These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall
the Athenian hero Sôphanes, who carried an anchor with him at the
battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one
spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to render
flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed
unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a
spirit of sympathetic co-operation. This is the lesson which can be
learned from the shuai-jan.

32. 齊勇若一政之道也
The principle on which to manage an army is to set
up one standard of courage which all must reach.
Literally, “level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one.” If
the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that
the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same
quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard.
Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo
as “the worst he had ever commanded” meant no more than that it was
deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and courage. Had
he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops
in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.

33. 剛柔皆得地之理也
How to make the best of both strong and weak—
that is a question involving the proper use of ground.
This is rather a hard sentence on the first reading, but the key to it will
得
be found, firstly, in the pause after , and next, in the meaning of 得

itself. The best equivalent for this that I can think of is the German
“zur Geltung kommen.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s paraphrase is: 兵無强弱皆得
用者是因地之勢也 “The way to eliminate the differences of strong
and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilise accidental features
of the ground.” Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will
hold out as long as better troops on more exposed terrain. The
advantage of position neutralises the inferiority in stamina and
courage. Col. Henderson says: “With all respect to the text books, and
to ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of
ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance
is attached to the selection of positions ... and to the immense
advantages that are to be derived, whether you are defending or
attacking, from the proper utilisation of natural features.”[180]

34. 故善用兵者攜手若使一人不得已也
Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as
though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by
the hand.
Tu Mu says: 喩易也 “The simile has reference to the ease with which
不得已
he does it.” means that he makes it impossible for his troops to
do otherwise than obey. Chang Yü quotes a jingle, to be found in Wu
Tzŭ, ch. 4:將之所揮，莫不從移，將之所指，莫不前死 .

35. 將軍之事靜以幽正以治
It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain
order.

靜 seems to combine the meanings “noiseless” and “imperturbable,”
both of which attributes would of course conduce to secrecy. Tu Mu
explains 幽 as 幽深難測 “deep and inscrutable,” and 正 as 平正無偏
“fair and unbiassed.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên alone among the commentators
takes 治 in the sense of 自治 “self-controlled.” 幽 and 治 are causally
connected with 靜 and 正 respectively. This is not brought out at all in
Capt. Calthrop’s rendering: “The general should be calm, inscrutable,
just and prudent.” The last adjective, moreover, can in no sense be said
治
to represent .

36. 能愚士卒之耳目使之無知
He must be able to mystify his officers and men by
false reports and appearances,
Literally, “to deceive their eyes and ears”— 愚 being here used as a
誤
verb in the sense of .

and thus keep them in total ignorance.
Ts‘ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: 民可與樂成不
可與慮始 “The troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in
the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy
outcome.” “To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,” is one of the
first principles in war, as has been frequently pointed out. But how
about the other process—the mystification of one’s own men? Those
who may think that Sun Tzŭ is over-emphatic on this point would do
well to read Col. Henderson’s remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley
campaign: “The infinite pains,” he says, “with which Jackson sought to
conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his
intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have
pronounced useless”—etc. etc.[181] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in
ch. 47 of the Hou Han Shu, “Pan Ch‘ao took the field with 25,000 men
from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of crushing
Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief

commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the
kingdoms of Wên-su, Ku-mo and Wei-t‘ou, totalling 50,000 men. Pan
Ch‘ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council
of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make
head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and
disperse, each in a different direction. The King of Khotan will march
away by the easterly route, and I will then return myself towards the
west. Let us wait until the evening drum has sounded and then start.’
Pan Ch‘ao now secretly released the prisoners whom he had taken
alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much
elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000
horsemen to bar Pan Ch‘ao’s retreat in the west, while the King of
Wên-su rode eastwards with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King
of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch‘ao knew that the two chieftains had
gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, and at
cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it lay
encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and were
closely pursued by Pan Ch‘ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back as
trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and
valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha and
the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time
forward, Pan Ch‘ao’s prestige completely overawed the countries of
the west.” In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept
his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the
bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.

37. 易其事革其謀使人無識易其居迂其途使人不得
慮
By altering his arrangements and changing his
plans,
Wang Hsi thinks that this means, not using the same stratagem twice.
He says:已行之事已施之謀當革易之不可再之 .

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
人
Note that 士卒
denotes the enemy, as opposed to the of § 36. Capt.
Calthrop, not perceiving this, joins the two paragraphs into one. Chang
太白山人
Yü quotes as saying: 兵貴詭道者非止詭敵也抑詭我士卒
使由而不使知之也 “The axiom, that war is based on deception, does
not apply only to deception of the enemy. You must deceive even your
own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without letting them know
why.”

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he
prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
Wang Hsi paraphrases 易其居 處易者 as “camp on easy ground,” and
其居則去險而就易
Chang Yü follows him, saying: . But this is an
迂其途
utterly untenable view. For , cf. VII. 4. Chia Lin, retaining his
old interpretation of those words, is now obliged to explain 易其居 as
“cause the enemy to shift his camp,” which is awkward in the extreme.

帥與之期如登高而去其梯帥與之深入諸侯之地
38.
而發其機
At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts
like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks
away the ladder behind him.
I must candidly confess that I do not understand the syntax of 帥與之
期 , though the meaning is fairly plain. The difficulty has evidently
been felt, for Tu Mu tells us that one text omits 期如 . It is more likely,
however, that a couple of characters have dropped out.

He carries his men deep into hostile territory before
he shows his hand.

發其機, literally, “releases the spring” (see V. § 15), that is, takes some
decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like
項羽 Hsiang Yü, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch‘ên Hao,
followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as 發其心機
“puts forth every artifice at his command.” But 機 in this derived sense
occurs nowhere else in Sun Tzŭ.

39. 焚舟破釜若驅羣羊而往驅而來莫知所之
He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots;
Omitted in the T‘u Shu.

like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his
men this way and that, and none knows whither he is
going.
The T‘u Shu inserts another 驅 羊
after . Tu Mu says: 三軍但知進退之
命不知攻取之端也 “The army is only cognisant of orders to advance
or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and
conquering.”

40. 聚三軍之衆投之於險此謂將軍之事也
To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this
may be termed the business of the general.
Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilisation there should be no delay in
aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. With 投之於險 投
cf. supra, § 23:
之無所往 . Note how he returns again and again to this point. Among
the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much
more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of to-day.

41. 九地之變屈伸之利人情之理不可不察也
The different measures suited to the nine varieties
of ground;
Chang Yü says: 九地之法不可拘泥 “One must not be hide-bound in
interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground.

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics;
屈伸
The use of “contraction and expansion” may be illustrated by the
saying 屈以求伸 , which almost exactly corresponds to the French “il
faut reculer pour mieux sauter.”[182] Capt. Calthrop, more suo, avoids a
real translation and has: “the suiting of the means to the occasion.”

and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are
things that must most certainly be studied.

42. 凡爲客之道深則專淺則散
When invading hostile territory, the general
principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion;
penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
Cf. supra, § 20.

43. 去國越境而師者絶地也四達者衢地也
When you leave your own country behind, and
take your army across neighbouring territory,
Chang Yü’s paraphrase is 而用師者.

you find yourself on critical ground.
This “ground” is cursorily mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not figure
among the Nine 地 of this chapter or the Six地形 in chap. X. One’s
first impulse would be to translate it “distant ground” ( 絶域 is
commonly used in the sense of “distant lands”), but this, if we can trust
the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch‘ên
進不及輕退不及散在二地之間也
says it is “a position not far enough
advanced to be called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be
called ‘dispersive,’ but something between the two.” That, of course,
絶
does not explain the name , which seems to imply that the general
has severed his communications and temporarily cut himself off from
his base. Thus, Wang Hsi says: “It is ground separated from home by
an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in order to
reach it. Hence it is incumbent on us to settle our business there
quickly.” He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which is the
reason why it is not included among the 九地 . Capt. Calthrop gives but
a poor rendering of this sentence: “To leave home and cross the
borders is to be free from interference.”

When there are means of communication
The T‘u Shu reads 通 for 達.
on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting
highways.
From 四達 down to the end of § 45, we have some of the definitions of
the early part of the chapter repeated in slightly different language.
Capt. Calthrop omits these altogether.

44. 入深者重地也入淺者輕地也

When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is
serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way,
it is facile ground.

45. 背固前隘者圍地也無所往者死地也
When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your
rear,
固 = 險固.
and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground.
When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate
ground.

46. 是故散地吾將一其志輕地吾將使之屬
Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire
my men with unity of purpose.
This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the
defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, § 11.

On facile ground, I would see that there is close
connection between all parts of my army.
The T‘ung Tien has 其 之
instead of . The present reading is supported
by the 遺說 of Chêng Yu-hsien. As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard
一者備其逃逸二者恐其敵至
against two possible contingencies: “(1)
the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack on the part of the
enemy.” Cf. VII. § 17: 其徐如林 行則隊校相繼
. Mei Yao-ch‘ên says:

止則營壘聯屬 “On the march, the regiments should be in close touch;
in an encampment, there should be continuity between the
fortifications.” He seems to have forgotten, by the way, what Sun Tzŭ
says above: 輕地則無止 .

47. 爭地吾將趨其後
On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
This is Ts‘ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yü adopts it, saying: 當疾
進其後使首尾俱至 “We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head
and tail may both reach the goal.” That is, they must not be allowed to
straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch‘ên offers another equally
plausible explanation: 敵未至其地我若在後則當疾趨以爭之
“Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and
we are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to
dispute its possession.” 其 would thus denote the enemy, 後 being the
趨
preposition, and would retain its usual intransitive sense. Cf. VII. §
4:後人發先人至 . Ch‘ên Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the
enemy has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1, where
Sun Tzŭ warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own
若地利在前先分精銳
idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed:
以據之彼若恃衆來爭我以大衆趨其後無不尅者 “If there is a
favourable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of
troops to occupy it; then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come
up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your
main body, and victory will be assured.” It was thus, he adds, that
Chao Shê beat the army of Ch‘in. [See p. 57.] Li Ch‘üan would read
多 趨 for , it is not easy to see why.

48. 交地吾將謹其守衢地吾將固其結

On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on
my defences.
As Wang Hsi says, 懼襲我也 “fearing a surprise attack.” The T‘ung
Tien reads here 固其結 (see next sentence).
On ground of intersecting highways, I would
consolidate my alliances.
謹其市
The T‘ung Tien reads , which Tu Yu explains as “watching the
變事之端
market towns,” “the hotbeds of revolution.” Capt. Calthrop
translates固其結 by the same words as 合交 in § 12: “cultivate
intercourse.”

49. 重地吾將繼其食圮地吾將進其塗
On serious ground, I would try to ensure a
continuous stream of supplies.
The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as
one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.
One text, indeed, gives the reading 掠其食 . Cf. § 13. Capt. Calthrop’s
繼
“be careful of supplies” fails to render the force of .

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along
the road.
Capt. Calthrop’s “do not linger” cannot be called a translation, but only
a paraphrase of the paraphrase offered by Ts‘ao Kung: 疾過去也 “Pass
away from it in all haste.”

50. 圍地吾將塞其闕死地吾將示之以不活

On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of
retreat.
意欲突圍示以守固 “To make it seem that I mean to defend the
position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the
enemy’s lines” [Mêng Shih]; 使士卒必死戰也 “in order to make my
soldiers fight with desperation” [Mei Yao-ch‘ên]; 懼人有走心 “fearing
lest my men be tempted to run away” [Wang Hsi]. Tu Mu points out
that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the enemy who is
surrounded. In 532 A.D., 高歡 Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and
canonised as 神武 Shên-wu, was surrounded by a great army under 爾
朱兆 Êrh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively
small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot.
The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps
being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to escape,
actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets himself by
driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped together. As
soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for it but to
conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation,
and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks
broke and crumbled under their onslaught. [See Tu Mu’s commentary,
and 北齊書 ch. 1, fol. 6.]

On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my
soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
Tu Yu says: 焚輜重棄糧食塞井夷竈示之無活必殊死戰也 “Burn
your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and
provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make
it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the
death.” Mei Yao-ch‘ên says epigrammatically: 必死可生 “The only
chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it.” This concludes what Sun
Tzŭ has to say about “grounds” and the “variations” corresponding to
them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we
cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in

which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate
“variations” before touching on “grounds” at all, but only mentions
five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is
not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier
portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with
six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again,
though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the
next chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par
excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down
to § 14. In §§ 43–45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8
and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed in
chap VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once more
from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, being
different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to
account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts
may be brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title,
should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an
abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds.
Several these are defined twice over, besides which there are two
distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the
chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I
do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the
general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us
in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective
and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has
either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.

51. 故兵之情圍則禦不得已則鬥過則從
For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an
obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard
when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly
when he has fallen into danger.

過則從 is rendered by Capt. Calthrop: “to pursue the enemy if he
retreat.” But 過 cannot mean “to retreat.” Its primary sense is to pass
over, hence to go too far, to exceed or to err. Here, however, the word
has lost all implication of censure, and appears to mean “to pass the
boundary line dividing safety from danger,” or, as Chang Yü puts it, 深
陷于危難之地 “to be deeply involved in a perilous position.” The
latter commentator alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch‘ao’s devoted
followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the Hou Han Shu, ch. 47,
fol. 1 vo: “When Pan Ch‘ao arrived at 鄯善 Shan-shan, 廣 Kuang, the
King of the country, received him at first with great politeness and
respect; but shortly afterwards his behaviour underwent a sudden
change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch‘ao spoke about
this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you not noticed,’ he said, ‘that
Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that
envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently
he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in
his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can
perceive things before they have come to pass; how much more, then,
those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon he called one of the natives
who had been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying:
‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some days
ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he
presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch‘ao, keeping his informant
carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of
his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the
wine had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit
still further by addressing them thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the
heart of an isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by
some great exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the
Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result
is that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal host
has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to seize our party
and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu, our bones will become food for the
wolves of the desert. What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers
replied: ‘Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our

commander through life and death’ ( 今在危亡之地死生從司馬).” For
the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1, note.

是故不知諸侯之謀者不能預交不知山林險阻沮
52.
澤之形者不能行軍不用鄉導者不能得地利
We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring
princes until we are acquainted with their designs.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we
are familiar with the face of the country—its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its
marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn
natural advantages to account unless we make use of
local guides.
These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12–14—in order to
emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer
to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to
the following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have
added that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their
treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13):
Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the
neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be
occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of
Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of
Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that
direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost
arrived.

53. 四五者不知一非霸王之兵也

To be ignorant of any one of the following four or
five principles
Referring, I think, to what is contained in §§ 54, 55. Ts‘ao Kung,
thinking perhaps of the五利 in VIII. § 6, takes them to be 九地之利害
“the advantages and disadvantages attendant on the nine varieties of
此五者
ground.” The T‘u Shu reads .

does not befit a warlike prince.
霸王 , “one who rules by force,” was a term specially used for those
princes who established their hegemony over other feudal states. The
famous 五霸 of the 7 century B.C. were (1) 齊桓公 Duke Huan of
th

Ch‘i, (2) 晉文公 Duke Wên of Chin, (3) 宋襄公 Duke Hsiang of
Sung, (4) 楚莊王 Prince Chuang of Ch‘u, (5) 秦穆公 Duke Mu of
Ch‘in. Their reigns covered the period 685–591 B.C.

夫霸王之兵伐大國則其衆不得聚威加於敵則其
54.
交不得合
When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his
generalship shows itself in preventing the
concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his
opponents,
Here and in the next sentence, the Yü Lan inserts 家 after 敵.
and their allies are prevented from joining against
him.
Mei Yao-ch‘ên constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so
much affected by the Chinese: “In attacking a powerful state, if you
can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you

have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you
overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if
the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be
prevented from joining her.” The following gives a stronger meaning
to威加 若大國一敗則小國離而不聚矣
: “If the great state has once
been defeated (before she has had time to summon her allies), then the
lesser states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces.”
Ch‘ên Hao and Chang Yü take the sentence in quite another way. The
former says: “Powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large
state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some
extent on external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening
confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy,
he will surely be defeated.” Chang Yü puts his view thus: “If we
recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be discontented and
hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our display of military
force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will
take fright and refuse to join us.” According to this interpretation, 其
would refer, not to the大國 霸王
, but to the himself.

是故不爭天下之交不養天下之權信己之私威加
55.
於敵故其城可拔其國可隳
Hence he does not strive
For 爭 the Yü Lan reads 事.
to ally himself with all and sundry,
天下, as in § 6, stands for 諸侯 “the feudal princes,” or the states ruled
by them.

nor does he foster the power of other states. He
carries out his own secret designs,

For 信 (read shên1) in the meaning of 伸 , cf. VIII. § 8. The
commentators are unanimous on this point, and we must therefore
beware of translating 信己之私 by “secretly self-confident” or the like.
之私
Capt. Calthrop (omitting ) has: “he has confidence in himself.”

keeping his antagonists in awe.
The train of thought appears to be this: Secure against a combination
of his enemies, 能絶天下之交惟得伸己之私志威而無外交者 “he can
afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret
designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense with external
friendships.” (Li Ch‘üan.)

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow
their kingdoms.
This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch‘in State
became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which
the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final
triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yü, following up his previous
note, thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded
selfishness and haughty isolation. He again refers 其 to the warlike
prince, thus making it appear that in the end he is bound to succumb.

56. 施無法之賞懸無政之令犯三軍之衆若使一人
Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: 進有重賞退有重刑 “Let advance be
richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished.”

issue orders
懸, literally, “hang” or “post up.”

without regard to previous arrangements;
杜姦媮 “In order to prevent treachery,” says Wang Hsi. The general
meaning is made clear by Ts‘ao Kung’s quotation from the Ssŭ-ma Fa:
見敵作誓瞻功作賞 “Give instructions only on sighting the enemy;
give rewards only when you see deserving deeds.” 無政 , however,
presents some difficulty. Ts‘ao Kung’s paraphrase, 軍法令不應預施懸
也 , I take to mean: “The final instructions you give to your army
should not correspond with those that have been previously posted
up.” Chang Yü simplifies this into 政 不 預 告 “your arrangements
should not be divulged beforehand.” And Chia Lin says: 不守常法常
政 “there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements.” Not
only is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often
necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last moment.

and you will be able to handle a whole army
犯, according to Ts‘ao Kung, is here equal to 用. The exact meaning is
brought out more clearly in the next paragraph.

as though you had to do with but a single man.
Cf. supra, § 34.

57. 犯之以事勿告以言犯之以利勿告以害
Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never
let them know your design.
Literally, “do not tell them words;” i.e. do not give your reasons for
any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to “give no
reasons” for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a
general than to a judge. Capt. Calthrop translates this sentence with
beautiful simplicity: “Orders should direct the soldiers.” That is all.

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes;
but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.

58. 投之亡地然後存陷之死地然後生
Place your army in deadly peril, and it will
survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will
come off in safety.
Compare the paradoxical saying 亡者存之基死者生之本 . These
words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of the
tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already alluded
to on p. 28, In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and
halted ten miles from the mouth of the 井陘 Ching-hsing pass, where
the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a
body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a
red flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow
defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. “When the men of Chao
see me in full flight,” Han Hsin said, “they will abandon their
fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in,
pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of 漢 Han in
their stead.” Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: “Our
adversary holds a strong position, and is not likely to come out and
attack us until he sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-
chief, for fear I should turn back and escape through the mountains.”
So saying, he first of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men,
and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the River
泜 Ti. Seeing this manœuvre, the whole army of Chao broke into loud
laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying
the generalissimo’s flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating,
and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed,
lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague 張耳
Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled to the division

on the river bank, where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy
rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding
their ramparts of men; but the two generals succeeded in joining the
other army, which was fighting with the utmost desperation. The time
had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as
they saw the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped
behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them
by those of Han. When the Chao army turned back from the pursuit,
the sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the
Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild
disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain.
Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and completed the
rout, killing a great number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was
King 歇 Ya himself.... After the battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers
came to him and said: “In the Art of War we are told to have a hill or
tumulus on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left front. [This
appears to be a blend of Sun Tzŭ and T‘ai Kung. See IX. § 9, and
note.] You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the
river at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain
the victory?” The general replied: “I fear you gentlemen have not
studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there:
‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety;
place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual
course, I should never have been able to bring my colleagues round.
經
What says the Military Classic ( )?—‘Swoop down on the market-
place and drive the men off to fight’ ( 毆市人而戰之 ). [This passage
does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my
troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their lives, but
had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have
been a general débandade, and it would have been impossible to do
anything with them.” The officers admitted the force of his argument,
and said: “These are higher tactics than we should have been capable
of.” [See Ch‘ien Han Shu, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.]

59. 夫衆陷於害然後能爲勝敗
For it is precisely when a force has fallen into
harm’s way that it is capable of striking a blow for
victory.
Danger has a bracing effect.

60. 故爲兵之事在於順詳敵之意
Success in warfare is gained by carefully
accommodating ourselves to the enemy’s purpose.
Ts‘ao Kung says: 佯愚也 “Feign stupidity”—by an appearance of
yielding and falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yü’s note
makes the meaning clear: “If the enemy shows an inclination to
advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on
purpose that he may carry out his intention.” The object is to make him
remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our attack.

61. 并敵一向千里殺將
By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank,
I understand the first four words to mean “accompanying the enemy in
one direction.” Ts‘ao Kung says: 幷兵向敵 “unite the soldiers and
make for the enemy.” But such a violent displacement of characters is
quite indefensible. Mei Yao-ch‘ên is the only commentator who seems
to have grasped the meaning: 隨敵一向然後發伏出奇 . The T‘u Shu
reads并力 .

we shall succeed in the long run