_De Bello Gallico_ and Other Commentaries Julius Caesar 3447 downloads.pdf

The Project Gutenberg eBook of "De Bello Gallico" and Other
Commentaries

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will
have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using
this eBook.

Title: "De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries

Author: Julius Caesar

Author of introduction, etc.: Thomas De Quincey

Translator: W. A. McDevitte

Release date: January 1, 2004 [eBook #10657]
Most recently updated: October 28, 2024

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10657

Credits: Produced by Stan Goodman, Ted Garvin, Carol David and PG
Distributed Proofreaders

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK "DE BELLO
GALLICO" AND OTHER COMMENTARIES ***

[Transcriber's Note:

Typographical errors in the original have been corrected and noted using
the notation ** .

Macrons, breves, umlauts etc have been removed from the body of the
text since they were very obtrusive and made reading difficult. However,
they are retained in the Index for reference.

The convention used for these marks is:
Macron (straight line over letter) [=x]
Umlaut (2 dots over letter) [:x]
Grave accent [`x]
Acute accent ['x]
Circumflex [^x]
Breve (u-shaped symbol over letter) [)x]
Cedilla [,x]
]

*****

EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY

EDITED BY ERNEST RHYS

CLASSICAL

CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES
TRANSLATED BY W. A. MACDEVITT

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THOMAS DE QUINCEY

THIS IS NO. 702 OF EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY. THE PUBLISHERS
WILL BE PLEASED TO SEND FREELY TO ALL APPLICANTS A
LIST OF THE PUBLISHED AND PROJECTED VOLUMES
ARRANGED UNDER THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS:

*****

TRAVEL—SCIENCE—FICTION

THEOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY

HISTORY—CLASSICAL

FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

ESSAYS—ORATORY

POETRY & DRAMA

BIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE

ROMANCE

*****

THE ORDINARY EDITION IS BOUND IN CLOTH WITH GILT DESIGN AND
COLOURED TOP. THERE IS ALSO A LIBRARY EDITION IN REINFORCED CLOTH

THE SAGES OF OLD LIVE AGAIN IN US

GLANVILL

"DE BELLO GALLICO" & OTHER COMMENTARIES:
OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR

FIRST PUBLISHED IN THIS EDITION, 1915 REPRINTED 1923,
1929

INTRODUCTION
BY THOMAS DE QUINCEY

The character of the First Caesar has perhaps never been worse
appreciated than by him who in one sense described it best; that is, with
most force and eloquence wherever he really did comprehend it. This was
Lucan, who has nowhere exhibited more brilliant rhetoric, nor wandered
more from the truth, than in the contrasted portraits of Caesar and Pompey.
The famous line, "Nil actum reputans si quid superesset agendum," is a fine
feature of the real character, finely expressed. But, if it had been Lucan's

purpose (as possibly, with a view to Pompey's benefit, in some respects it
was) utterly and extravagantly to falsify the character of the great Dictator,
by no single trait could he more effectually have fulfilled that purpose, nor
in fewer words, than by this expressive passage, "Gaudensque viam fecisse
ruina." Such a trait would be almost extravagant applied even to Marius,
who (though in many respects a perfect model of Roman grandeur, massy,
columnar, imperturbable, and more perhaps than any one man recorded in
History capable of justifying the bold illustration of that character in
Horace, "Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae") had,
however, a ferocity in his character, and a touch of the devil in him, very
rarely united with the same tranquil intrepidity. But, for Caesar, the all-
accomplished statesman, the splendid orator, the man of elegant habits and
polished taste, the patron of the fine arts in a degree transcending all
example of his own or the previous age, and as a man of general literature
so much beyond his contemporaries, except Cicero, that he looked down
even upon the brilliant Sylla as an illiterate person—to class such a man
with the race of furious destroyers exulting in the desolations they spread is
to err not by an individual trait, but by the whole genus. The Attilas and the
Tamerlanes, who rejoice in avowing themselves the scourges of God, and
the special instruments of his wrath, have no one feature of affinity to the
polished and humane Caesar, and would as little have comprehended his
character as he could have respected theirs. Even Cato, the unworthy hero
of Lucan, might have suggested to him a little more truth in this instance,
by a celebrated remark which he made on the characteristic distinction of
Caesar, in comparison with other revolutionary disturbers; for, said he,
whereas others had attempted the overthrow of the state in a continued
paroxysm of fury, and in a state of mind resembling the lunacy of
intoxication, Caesar, on the contrary, among that whole class of civil
disturbers, was the only one who had come to the task in a temper of

sobriety and moderation (unum accessisse sobrium ad rempublicam
delendam)….

Great as Caesar was by the benefit of his original nature, there can be no
doubt that he, like others, owed something to circumstances; and perhaps
amongst those which were most favourable to the premature development
of great self-dependence we must reckon the early death of his father. It is,
or it is not, according to the nature of men, an advantage to be orphaned at
as early age. Perhaps utter orphanage is rarely or never such: but to lose a
father betimes may, under appropriate circumstances, profit a strong mind
greatly. To Caesar it was a prodigious benefit that he lost his father when
not much more than fifteen. Perhaps it was an advantage also to his father
that he died thus early. Had he stayed a year longer, he might have seen
himself despised, baffled, and made ridiculous. For where, let us ask, in any
age, was the father capable of adequately sustaining that relation to the
unique Caius Julius—to him, in the appropriate language of Shakespeare

"The foremost man of all this world?"

And, in this fine and Caesarean line, "this world" is to be understood not
of the order of co-existences merely,` but also of the order of successions;
he was the foremost man not only of his contemporaries, but also, within
his own intellectual class, of men generally—of all that ever should come
after him, or should sit on thrones under the denominations of Czars,
Kesars, or Caesars of the Bosphorus and the Danube; of all in every age that
should inherit his supremacy of mind, or should subject to themselves the
generations of ordinary men by qualities analogous to his. Of this infinite
superiority some part must be ascribed to his early emancipation from
paternal control. There are very many cases in which, simply from
considerations of sex, a female cannot stand forward as the head of a
family, or as its suitable representative. If they are even ladies paramount,

and in situations of command, they are also women. The staff of authority
does not annihilate their sex; and scruples of female delicacy interfere for
ever to unnerve and emasculate in their hands the sceptre however
otherwise potent. Hence we see, in noble families, the merest boys put
forward to represent the family dignity, as fitter supporters of that burden
than their mature mothers. And of Caesar's mother, though little is recorded,
and that little incidentally, this much at least we learn—that, if she looked
down upon him with maternal pride and delight, she looked up to him with
female ambition as the re-edifier of her husband's honours,— looked with
reverence as to a column of the Roman grandeur and with fear and feminine
anxieties as to one whose aspiring spirit carried him but too prematurely
into the fields of adventurous strife. One slight and evanescent sketch of the
relations which subsisted between Caesar and his mother, caught from the
wrecks of time, is preserved both by Plutarch and Suetonius. We see in the
early dawn the young patrician standing upon the steps of his patrimonial
portico, his mother with her arms wreathed about his neck, looking up to his
noble countenance, sometimes drawing auguries of hope from features so
fitted for command, sometimes boding an early blight to promises so
dangerously magnificent. That she had something of her son's aspiring
character, or that he presumed so much in a mother of his, we learn from the
few words which survive of their conversation. He addressed to her no
language that could tranquillise her fears. On the contrary, to any but a
Roman mother his valedictory words, taken in connexion with the known
determination of his character, were of a nature to consummate her
depression, as they tended to confirm the very worst of her fears. He was
then going to stand his chance in a popular electioneering contest for an
office of the highest dignity, and to launch himself upon the storms of the
Campus Martius. At that period, besides other and more ordinary dangers,
the bands of gladiators, kept in the pay of the more ambitious or turbulent
amongst the Roman nobles, gave a popular tone of ferocity and of personal

risk to the course of such contests; and, either to forestall the victory of an
antagonist, or to avenge their own defeat, it was not at all impossible that a
body of incensed competitors might intercept his final triumph by
assassination. For this danger, however, he had no leisure in his thoughts of
consolation; the sole danger which he contemplated, or supposed his mother
to contemplate, was the danger of defeat, and for that he reserved his
consolations. He bade her fear nothing; for that his determination was to
return with victory, and with the ensigns of the dignity he sought, or to
return a corpse.

Early indeed did Caesar's trials commence; and it is probable, that, had
not the death of his father, by throwing him prematurely upon his own
resources, prematurely developed the masculine features of his character,
forcing him whilst yet a boy under the discipline of civil conflict and the
yoke of practical life, even his energies might have been insufficient to
sustain them. His age is not exactly ascertained; but it is past a doubt that he
had not reached his twentieth year when he had the hardihood to engage in
a struggle with Sylla, then Dictator, and exercising the immoderate powers
of that office with the licence and the severity which History has made so
memorable. He had neither any distinct grounds of hope, nor any eminent
example at that time, to countenance him in this struggle—which yet he
pushed on in the most uncompromising style, and to the utmost verge of
defiance. The subject of the contest gives it a further interest. It was the
youthful wife of the youthful Caesar who stood under the shadow of the
great Dictator's displeasure; not personally, but politically, on account of her
connexions: and her it was, Cornelia, the daughter of a man who had been
four times consul, that Caesar was required to divorce: but he spurned the
haughty mandate, and carried his determination to a triumphant issue,
notwithstanding his life was at stake, and at one time saved only by shifting
his place of concealment every night; and this young lady it was who
afterwards became the mother of his only daughter. Both mother and

daughter, it is remarkable, perished prematurely, and at critical periods of
Caesar's life; for it is probable enough that these irreparable wounds to
Caesar's domestic affections threw him with more exclusiveness of
devotion upon the fascinations of glory and ambition than might have
happened under a happier condition of his private life. That Caesar should
have escaped destruction in this unequal contest with an enemy then
wielding the whole thunders of the state, is somewhat surprising; and
historians have sought their solution of the mystery in the powerful
intercessions of the vestal virgins, and several others of high rank amongst
the connexions of his great house. These may have done something; but it is
due to Sylla, who had a sympathy with everything truly noble, to suppose
him struck with powerful admiration for the audacity of the young
patrician, standing out in such severe solitude among so many examples of
timid concession; and that to this magnanimous feeling in the Dictator
much of the indulgence which he showed may have been really due. In fact,
according to some accounts, it was not Sylla, but the creatures of Sylla
(adjutores), who pursued Caesar. We know, at all events, that Sylla formed
a right estimate of Caesar's character, and that, from the complexion of his
conduct in this one instance, he drew that famous prophecy of his future
destiny; bidding his friends beware of that slipshod boy, "for that in him lay
couchant many a Marius." A grander testimony to the awe which Caesar
inspired, or from one who knew better the qualities of that Cyclopean man
by whose scale he measured the patrician boy, cannot be imagined.

It is not our intention, or consistent with our plan, to pursue this great
man through the whole circumstances of his romantic career; though it is
certain that many parts of his life require investigation much keener than
has ever been applied to them, and that many might be placed in a new
light. Indeed, the whole of this most momentous section of ancient history
ought to be recomposed with the critical scepticism of a Niebuhr, and the
same comprehensive collation, resting, if possible, on the felicitous

interpretation of authorities. In reality it is the hinge upon which turned the
future destiny of the whole earth, and, having therefore a common relation
to all modern nations whatsoever, should naturally have been cultivated
with the zeal which belongs to a personal concern. In general, the anecdotes
which express most vividly the grandeur of character in the first Caesar are
those which illustrate his defiance of danger in extremity: the prodigious
energy and rapidity of his decisions and motions in the field (looking to
which it was that Cicero called him [Greek: teras] or portentous revelation);
the skill with which he penetrated the designs of his enemies, and the
electric speed with which he met disasters with remedy and reparation, or,
where that was impossible, with relief; the extraordinary presence of mind
which he showed in turning adverse omens to his own advantage, as when,
upon stumbling in coming on shore (which was esteemed a capital omen of
evil), he transfigured as it were in one instant its whole meaning by
exclaiming, "Thus, and by this contact with the earth, do I take possession
of thee, O Africa!" in that way giving to an accident the semblance of a
symbolic purpose. Equally conspicuous was the grandeur of fortitude with
which he faced the whole extent of a calamity when palliation could do no
good, "non negando, minuendove, sed insuper amplificando,
ementiendoque"; as when, upon finding his soldiery alarmed at the
approach of Juba, with forces really great, but exaggerated by their terrors,
he addressed them in a military harangue to the following effect:—"Know
that within a few days the king will come up with us, bringing with him
sixty thousand legionaries, thirty thousand cavalry, one hundred thousand
light troops, besides three hundred elephants. Such being the case, let me
hear no more of conjectures and opinions, for you have now my warrant for
the fact, whose information is past doubting. Therefore, be satisfied;
otherwise, I will put every man of you on board some crazy old fleet, and
whistle you down the tide—no matter under what winds, no matter towards

what shore." Finally, we might seek for characteristic anecdotes of Caesar
in his unexampled liberalities and contempt of money.

Upon this last topic it is the just remark of Casaubon that some instances
of Caesar's munificence have been thought apocryphal, or to rest upon false
readings, simply from ignorance of the heroic scale upon which the Roman
splendours of that age proceeded. A forum which Caesar built out of the
products of his last campaign, by way of a present to the Roman people,
cost him—for the ground merely on which it stood— nearly eight hundred
thousand pounds. To the citizens of Rome he presented, in one congiary,
about two guineas and a half a head. To his army, in one donation, upon the
termination of the Civil War, he gave a sum which allowed about two
hundred pounds a man to the infantry, and four hundred to the cavalry. It is
true that the legionary troops were then much reduced by the sword of the
enemy, and by the tremendous hardships of their last campaigns. In this,
however, he did perhaps no more than repay a debt. For it is an instance of
military attachment, beyond all that Wallenstein or any commander, the
most beloved amongst his troops, has ever experienced, that, on the
breaking out of the Civil War, not only did the centurions of every legion
severally maintain a horse soldier, but even the privates volunteered to
serve without pay, and (what might seem impossible) without their daily
rations. This was accomplished by subscriptions amongst themselves, the
more opulent undertaking for the maintenance of the needy. Their
disinterested love for Caesar appeared in another and more difficult
illustration: it was a traditionary anecdote in Rome that the majority of
those amongst Caesar's troops who had the misfortune to fall into the
enemy's hands refused to accept their lives under the condition of serving
against him.

In connexion with this subject of his extraordinary munificence, there is
one aspect of Caesar's life which has suffered much from the

misrepresentations of historians, and that is—the vast pecuniary
embarrassments under which he laboured, until the profits of war had
turned the scale even more prodigiously in his favour. At one time of his
life, when appointed to a foreign office, so numerous and so clamorous
were his creditors that he could not have left Rome on his public duties had
not Crassus come forward with assistance in money, or by guarantees, to
the amount of nearly two hundred thousand pounds. And at another he was
accustomed to amuse himself with computing how much money it would
require to make him worth exactly nothing (i.e. simply to clear him of
debts); this, by one account, amounted to upwards of two millions sterling.
Now, the error of historians has been to represent these debts as the original
ground of his ambition and his revolutionary projects, as though the
desperate condition of his private affairs had suggested a civil war to his
calculations as the best or only mode of redressing it. Such a policy would
have resembled the last desperate resource of an unprincipled gambler,
who, on seeing his final game at chess, and the accumulated stakes
depending upon it, all on the brink of irretrievable sacrifice, dexterously
upsets the chess-board, or extinguishes the lights. But Julius, the one sole
patriot of Rome, could find no advantage to his plans in darkness or in
confusion. Honestly supported, he would have crushed the oligarchies of
Rome by crushing in its lairs that venal and hunger-bitten democracy which
made oligarchy and its machineries resistless. Caesar's debts, far from being
stimulants and exciting causes of his political ambition, stood in an inverse
relation to the ambition; they were its results, and represented its natural
costs, being contracted from first to last in the service of his political
intrigues, for raising and maintaining a powerful body of partisans, both in
Rome and elsewhere. Whosoever indeed will take the trouble to investigate
the progress of Caesar's ambition, from such materials as even yet remain,
may satisfy himself that the scheme of revolutionizing the Republic, and
placing himself at its head, was no growth of accident or circumstances;

above all, that it did not arise upon any so petty and indirect a suggestion as
that of his debts; but that his debts were in their very first origin purely
ministerial to his wise, indispensable, and patriotic ambition; and that his
revolutionary plans were at all periods of his life a direct and foremost
object, but in no case bottomed upon casual impulses. In this there was not
only patriotism, but in fact the one sole mode of patriotism which could
have prospered, or could have found a field of action.

Chatter not, sublime reader, commonplaces of scoundrel moralists
against ambition. In some cases ambition is a hopeful virtue; in others (as in
the Rome of our resplendent Julius) ambition was the virtue by which any
other could flourish. It had become evident to everybody that Rome, under
its present constitution, must fall; and the sole question was—by whom?
Even Pompey, not by nature of an aspiring turn, and prompted to his
ambitious course undoubtedly by circumstances and, the friends who
besieged him, was in the habit of saying, "Sylla potuit: ego non potero?"
Sylla found it possible: shall I find it not so? Possible to do what? To
overthrow the political system of the Republic. This had silently collapsed
into an order of things so vicious, growing also so hopelessly worse, that all
honest patriots invoked a purifying revolution, even though bought at the
heavy price of a tyranny, rather than face the chaos of murderous
distractions to which the tide of feuds and frenzies was violently tending.

Such a revolution at such a price was not less Pompey's object than
Caesar's. In a case, therefore, where no benefit of choice was allowed to
Rome as respected the thing, but only as respected the person, Caesar had
the same right to enter the arena in the character of combatant as could
belong to any one of his rivals. And that he did enter that arena
constructively, and by secret design, from his very earliest manhood, may
be gathered from this—that he suffered no openings towards a revolution,
provided they had any hope in them, to escape his participation. It is

familiarly known that he was engaged pretty deeply in the conspiracy of
Catiline, and that he incurred considerable risk on that occasion; but it is
less known that he was a party to at least two other conspiracies. There was
even a fourth, meditated by Crassus, which Caesar so far encouraged as to
undertake a journey to Rome from a very distant quarter merely with a view
to such chances as it might offer to him; but, as it did not, upon
examination, seem to him a very promising scheme, he judged it best to
look coldly upon it, or not to embark in it by any personal co-operation.
Upon these and other facts we build our inference—that the scheme of a
revolution was the one great purpose of Caesar from his first entrance upon
public life. Nor does it appear that he cared much by whom it was
undertaken, provided only there seemed to be any sufficient resources for
carrying it through, and for sustaining the first collision with the regular
forces of the existing oligarchies, taking or not taking the shape of
triumvirates. He relied, it seems, on his own personal superiority for raising
him to the head of affairs eventually, let who would take the nominal lead at
first.

To the same result, it will be found, tended the vast stream of Caesar's
liberalities. From the senator downwards to the lowest faex Romuli, he had
a hired body of dependents, both in and out of Rome, equal in numbers to a
nation. In the provinces, and in distant kingdoms, he pursued the same
schemes. Everywhere he had a body of mercenary partisans; kings even are
known to have taken his pay. And it is remarkable that even in his character
of commander-in-chief, where the number of legions allowed to him for the
accomplishment of his Gaulish mission raised him for a number of years
above all fear of coercion or control, he persevered steadily in the same
plan of providing for the distant day when he might need assistance, not
from the state, but against the state. For, amongst the private anecdotes
which came to light under the researches made into his history after his
death, was this—that, soon after his first entrance upon his government in

Gaul, he had raised, equipped, disciplined, and maintained, from his own
private funds, a legion amounting, possibly, to six or seven thousand men,
who were bound to no sacrament of military obedience to the state, nor
owed fealty to any auspices except those of Caesar. This legion, from the
fashion of their crested helmets, which resembled the heads of a small
aspiring bird, received the popular name of the Alauda (or Lark) legion.
And very singular it was that Cato, or Marcellus, or some amongst those
enemies of Caesar who watched his conduct during the period of his
Gaulish command with the vigilance of rancorous malice, should not have
come to the knowledge of this fact; in which case we may be sure that it
would have been denounced to the Senate.

Such, then, for its purpose and its uniform motive, was the sagacious
munificence of Caesar. Apart from this motive, and considered in and for
itself, and simply with a reference to the splendid forms which it often
assumed, this munificence would furnish the materials for a volume. The
public entertainments of Caesar, his spectacles and shows, his naumachiae,
and the pomps of his unrivalled triumphs (the closing triumphs of the
Republic), were severally the finest of their kind which had then been
brought forward. Sea-fights were exhibited upon the grandest scale,
according to every known variety of nautical equipment and mode of
conflict, upon a vast lake formed artificially for that express purpose.
Mimic land-fights were conducted, in which all the circumstances of real
war were so faithfully rehearsed that even elephants "indorsed with towers,"
twenty on each side, took part in the combat. Dramas were represented in
every known language (per omnium linguarum histriones). And hence (that
is, from the conciliatory feeling thus expressed towards the various tribes of
foreigners resident in Rome) some have derived an explanation of what is
else a mysterious circumstance amongst the ceremonial observances at
Caesar's funeral— that all people of foreign nations then residing at Rome
distinguished themselves by the conspicuous share which they took in the

public mourning; and that, beyond all other foreigners, the Jews for night
after night kept watch and ward about the Emperor's grave. Never before,
according to traditions which lasted through several generations in Rome,
had there been so vast a conflux of the human race congregated to any one
centre, on any one attraction of business or of pleasure, as to Rome on
occasion of these triumphal spectacles exhibited by Caesar.

In our days, the greatest occasional gatherings of the human race are in
India, especially at the great fair of the Hurdwar on the Ganges in northern
Hindustan: a confluence of some millions is sometimes seen at that spot,
brought together under the mixed influences of devotion and commercial
business, but very soon dispersed as rapidly as they had been convoked.
Some such spectacle of nations crowding upon nations, and some such
Babylonian confusion of dresses, complexions, languages, and jargons, was
then witnessed at Rome. Accommodations within doors, and under roofs of
houses, or roofs of temples, was altogether impossible. Myriads encamped
along the streets, and along the high-roads, fields, or gardens. Myriads lay
stretched on the ground, without even the slight protection of tents, in a vast
circuit about the city. Multitudes of men, even senators, and others of the
highest rank, were trampled to death in the crowds. And the whole family of
man might seem at that time to be converged at the bidding of the dead
Dictator. But these, or any other themes connected with the public life of
Caesar, we notice only in those circumstances which have been overlooked,
or partially represented, by historians. Let us now, in conclusion, bring
forward, from the obscurity in which they have hitherto lurked, the
anecdotes which describe the habits of his private life, his tastes, and
personal peculiarities.

In person, he was tall, fair, gracile, and of limbs distinguished for their
elegant proportions. His eyes were black and piercing. These circumstances
continued to be long remembered, and no doubt were constantly recalled to

the eyes of all persons in the imperial palaces by pictures, busts, and
statues; for we find the same description of his personal appearance three
centuries afterwards in a work of the Emperor Julian's. He was a most
accomplished horseman, and a master (peritissimus) in the use of arms. But,
notwithstanding his skill and horsemanship, it seems that, when he
accompanied his army on marches, he walked oftener than he rode; no
doubt, with a view to the benefit of his example, and to express that
sympathy with his soldiers which gained him their hearts so entirely. On
other occasions, when travelling apart from his army, he seems more
frequently to have ridden in a carriage than on horseback. His purpose, in
this preference, must have been with a view to the transport of luggage. The
carriage which he generally used was a rheda, a sort of gig, or rather
curricle; for it was a four-wheeled carriage, and adapted (as we find from
the imperial regulations for the public carriages, etc.) to the conveyance of
about half a ton. The mere personal baggage which Caesar carried with him
was probably considerable; for he was a man of elegant habits, and in all
parts of his life sedulously attentive to elegance of personal appearance. The
length of journeys which he accomplished within a given time appears even
to us at this day, and might well therefore appear to his contemporaries,
truly astonishing. A distance of one hundred miles was no extraordinary
day's journey for him in a rheda, such as we have described it. So refined
were his habits, and so constant his demand for the luxurious
accommodations of polished life as it then existed in Rome, that he is said
to have carried with him, as indispensable parts of his personal baggage, the
little ivory lozenges, squares and circles or ovals, with other costly
materials, wanted for the tessellated flooring of his tent. Habits such as
these will easily account for his travelling in a carriage rather than on
horseback.

The courtesy and obliging disposition of Caesar were notorious; and both
were illustrated in some anecdotes which survived for generations in Rome.

Dining on one occasion, as an invited guest, at a table where the servants
had inadvertently, for salad-oil, furnished some sort of coarse lamp-oil,
Caesar would not allow the rest of the company to point out the mistake to
their host, for fear of shocking him too much by exposing what might have
been construed into inhospitality. At another time, whilst halting at a little
cabaret, when one of his retinue was suddenly taken ill, Caesar resigned to
his use the sole bed which the house afforded. Incidents as trifling as these
express the urbanity of Caesar's nature; and hence one is the more surprised
to find the alienation of the Senate charged, in no trifling degree, upon a
gross and most culpable failure in point of courtesy. Caesar, it is alleged—
but might we presume to call upon antiquity for its authority?— neglected
to rise from his seat, on their approaching him with an address of
congratulation. It is said, and we can believe it, that he gave deeper offence
by this one defect in a matter of ceremonial observance than by all his
substantial attacks upon their privileges. What we find it difficult to believe
is not that result from that offence—this is no more than we should all
anticipate—not that, but the possibility of the offence itself, from one so
little arrogant as Caesar, and so entirely a man of the world. He was told of
the disgust which he had given; and we are bound to believe his apology, in
which he charged it upon sickness, that would not at the moment allow him
to maintain a standing attitude. Certainly the whole tenor of his life was not
courteous only, but kind, and to his enemies merciful in a degree which
implied so much more magnanimity than men in general could understand
that by many it was put down to the account of weakness.

Weakness, however, there was none in Caius Caesar; and, that there
might be none, it was fortunate that conspiracy should have cut him off in
the full vigour of his faculties, in the very meridian of his glory, and on the
brink of completing a series of gigantic achievements. Amongst these are
numbered:—a digest of the entire body of laws, even then become
unwieldy and oppressive; the establishment of vast and comprehensive

public libraries, Greek as well as Latin; the chastisement of Dacia (that
needed a cow-hiding for insolence as much as Affghanistan from us in
1840); the conquest of Parthia; and the cutting a ship canal through the
Isthmus of Corinth. The reformation of the Calendar he had already
accomplished. And of all his projects it may be said that they were equally
patriotic in their purpose and colossal in their proportions.

As an orator, Caesar's merit was so eminent that, according to the general
belief, had he found time to cultivate this department of civil exertion, the
received supremacy of Cicero would have been made questionable, or the
honour would have been divided. Cicero himself was of that opinion, and
on different occasions applied the epithet splendidus to Caesar, as though in
some exclusive sense, or with some peculiar emphasis, due to him. His taste
was much simpler, chaster, and less inclined to the florid and Asiatic, than
that of Cicero. So far he would, in that condition of the Roman culture and
feeling, have been less acceptable to the public; but, on the other hand, he
would have compensated this disadvantage by much more of natural and
Demosthenic fervour.

In literature, the merits of Caesar are familiar to most readers. Under the
modest title of Commentaries, he meant to offer the records of his Gallic
and British campaigns, simply as notes, or memoranda, afterwards to be
worked up by regular historians; but, as Cicero observes, their merit was
such in the eyes of the discerning that all judicious writers shrank from the
attempt to alter them. In another instance of his literary labours he showed a
very just sense of true dignity. Rightly conceiving that everything patriotic
was dignified, and that to illustrate or polish his native language was a
service of real and paramount patriotism, he composed a work on the
grammar and orthoepy of the Latin language. Cicero and himself were the
only Romans of distinction in that age who applied themselves with true
patriotism to the task of purifying and ennobling their mother tongue. Both

were aware of a transcendent value in the Grecian literature as it then stood;
but that splendour did not depress their hopes of raising their own to
something of the same level. As respected the natural wealth of the two
languages, it was the private opinion of Cicero that the Latin had the
advantage; and, if Caesar did not accompany him to that length—which,
perhaps, under some limitations he ought to have done—he yet felt that it
was but the more necessary to draw forth any special or exceptional
advantage which it really had.

Was Caesar, upon the whole, the greatest of men? We restrict the
question, of course, to the classes of men great in action: great by the extent
of their influence over their social contemporaries; great by throwing open
avenues to extended powers that previously had been closed; great by
making obstacles once vast to become trivial, or prizes that once were
trivial to be glorified by expansion. I (said Augustus Caesar) found Rome
built of brick; but I left it built of marble. Well, my man, we reply, for a
wondrously little chap, you did what in Westmoreland they call a good
darroch (day's work); and, if navvies had been wanted in those days, you
should have had our vote to a certainty. But Caius Julius, even under such a
limitation of the comparison, did a thing as much transcending this as it was
greater to project Rome across the Alps and the Pyrenees,—expanding the
grand Republic into crowning provinces of 1. France (Gallia), 2. Belgium,
3. Holland (Batavia), 4. England (Britannia), 5. Savoy (Allobroges), 6.
Switzerland (Helvetia), 7. Spain (Hispania),—than to decorate a street or to
found an amphitheatre. Dr. Beattie once observed that, if that question as to
the greatest man in action upon the rolls of History were left to be collected
from the suffrages already expressed in books and scattered throughout the
literature of all nations, the scale would be found to have turned
prodigiously in Caesar's favour as against any single competitor; and there
is no doubt whatsoever that even amongst his own countrymen, and his own
contemporaries, the same verdict would have been returned, had it been

collected upon the famous principle of Themistocles, that he should be
reputed the first whom the greatest number of rival voices had pronounced
to be the second.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works: Latin folio, Rome, 1469; Venice, 1471; Florence, 1514; London,
1585. De Bello Gallico, Esslingen (?), 1473. Translations by John Tiptoft,
Earl of Worcester (John Rastell), of Julius Caesar's Commentaries-"newly
translated into Englyshe … as much as concerneth thys realme of
England"—1530 folio; by Arthur Goldinge, The Eyght Bookes of C. Julius
Caesar, London, 1563, 1565, 1578, 1590; by Chapman, London, 1604 folio;
by Clem. Edmonds, London, 1609; the same, with Hirtius, 1655, 1670,
1695 folio with commendatory verses by Camden, Daniel, and Ben Johnson
(sic). Works: Translated by W. Duncan, 1753, 1755; by M. Bladen, 8th ed.,
1770; MacDevitt, Bohn's Library, 1848. De Bello Gallico, translated by R.
Mongan, Dublin, 1850; by J.B. Owgan and C.W. Bateman, 1882. Caesar's
Commentaries on the Gallic War, translated by T. Rice Holmes, London,
1908 (see also Holmes' Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, 1911). Caesar's Gallic
War, translated by Rev. F.P. Long, Oxford, 1911; Books IV. and V.
translated by C.H. Prichard, Cambridge, 1912. For Latin text of De Bello
Gallico see Bell's Illustrated Classical Series; Dent's Temple Series of
Classical Texts, 1902; Macmillan and Co., 1905; and Blackie's Latin Texts,
1905-7.

*****

CONTENTS

THE WAR IN GAUL

THE CIVIL WAR

THE COMMENTARIES OF
CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR
THE WAR IN GAUL

BOOK I

I.—All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit,
the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are called Celts, in
ours Gauls, the third. All these differ from each other in language, customs
and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gauls from the Aquitani; the
Marne and the Seine separate them from the Belgae. Of all these, the
Belgae are the bravest, because they are farthest from the civilisation and
refinement of [our] Province, and merchants least frequently resort to them
and import those things which tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the
nearest to the Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are
continually waging war; for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest
of the Gauls in valour, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily
battles, when they either repel them from their own territories, or
themselves wage war on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been
said that the Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone: it is

bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae: it
borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the river
Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgae rise from the extreme
frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine; and look
towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river
Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the ocean which is
near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun and the north star.

II.—Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished
and wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls,
incited by lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and
persuaded the people to go forth from their territories with all their
possessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelled all in
valour, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he the more
easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii are confined on every side by
the nature of their situation; on one side by the Rhine, a very broad and
deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on a
second side by the Jura, a very high mountain which is [situated] between
the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake of Geneva, and by the
river Rhone, which separates our Province from the Helvetii. From these
circumstances it resulted that they could range less widely, and could less
easily make war upon their neighbours; for which reason men fond of war
[as they were] were affected with great regret. They thought, that
considering the extent of their population, and their renown for warfare and
bravery, they had but narrow limits, although they extended in length 240,
and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles.

III.—Induced by these considerations, and influenced by the authority of
Orgetorix, they determined to provide such things as were necessary for
their expedition—to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts of
burden and waggons—to make their sowings as large as possible, so that on

their march plenty of corn might be in store—and to establish peace and
friendship with the neighbouring states. They reckoned that a term of two
years would be sufficient for them to execute their designs; they fix by
decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is chosen to complete
these arrangements. He took upon himself the office of ambassador to the
states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, the son of Catamantaledes
(one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed the sovereignty among the
people for many years, and had been styled "friend" by the senate of the
Roman people), to seize upon the sovereignty in his own state, which his
father had held before him, and he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an
Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who at that time possessed the chief
authority in the state, and was exceedingly beloved by the people, to
attempt the same, and gives him his daughter in marriage. He proves to
them that to accomplish their attempts was a thing very easy to be done,
because he himself would obtain the government of his own state; that there
was no doubt that the Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of
Gaul; he assures them that he will, with his own forces and his own army,
acquire the sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge
and oath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized the
sovereignty, they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant
nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul.

IV.—When this scheme was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they,
according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in chains;
it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire should await him if
condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his cause, Orgetorix
drew together from all quarters to the court all his vassals to the number of
ten thousand persons; and led together to the same place, and all his
dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a great number; by
means of these he rescued himself from [the necessity of] pleading his
cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was endeavouring to assert its

right by arms, and the magistrates were mustering a large body of men from
the country, Orgetorix died; and there is not wanting a suspicion, as the
Helvetii think, of his having committed suicide.

V.—After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which
they had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories. When they
thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire
to all their towns, in number about twelve—to their villages about four
hundred—and to the private dwellings that remained; they burn up all the
corn, except what they intend to carry with them; that after destroying the
hope of a return home, they might be the more ready for undergoing all
dangers. They order every one to carry forth from home for himself
provisions for three months, ready ground. They persuade the Rauraci, and
the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, their neighbours, to adopt the same plan, and
after burning down their towns and villages, to set out with them: and they
admit to their party and unite to themselves as confederates the Boii, who
had dwelt on the other side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the
Norican territory, and assaulted Noreia.

VI.—There were in all two routes by which they could go forth from
their country—one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between
Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one waggon at a time
could be led; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, so
that a very few might easily intercept them); the other, through our
Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flows
between the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who
had lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. The
furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of the
Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the Helvetii. They
thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges, because they did
not seem as yet well-affected towards the Roman people, or compel them

by force to allow them to pass through their territories. Having provided
everything for the expedition, they appoint a day on which they should all
meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was the fifth before the kalends of
April [i.e. the 28th of March], in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus
Gabinius [B.C. 58].

VII.—When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make
their route through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city, and, by
as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and arrives at Geneva.
He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great a number of soldiers as
possible, as there was in all only one legion in Further Gaul: he orders the
bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the Helvetii are apprised of his
arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors, the most illustrious men of their
state (in which embassy Numeius and Verudoctius held the chief place), to
say "that it was their intention to march through the Province without doing
any harm, because they had" [according to their own representations] "no
other route:—that they requested they might be allowed to do so with his
consent." Caesar, inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius,
the consul, had been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the
yoke by the Helvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted;
nor was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of
marching through the Province were given them, would abstain from
outrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until the
soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished] should assemble, he replied
to the ambassadors, that he would take time to deliberate; if they wanted
anything, they might return on the day before the ides of April [on April
12th].

VIII.—Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the
soldiers who had assembled from the Province, he carries along for
nineteen [Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height of

sixteen feet, and a trench, from the lake of Geneva, which flows into the
river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of the Sequani
from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, he distributes
garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he may the more
easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross over against his will.
When the day which he had appointed with the ambassadors came, and they
returned to him, he says that he cannot, consistently with the custom and
precedent of the Roman people, grant any one a passage through the
Province; and he gives them to understand that, if they should attempt to
use violence, he would oppose them. The Helvetii, disappointed in this
hope, tried if they could force a passage (some by means of a bridge of
boats and numerous rafts constructed for the purpose; others, by the fords of
the Rhone, where the depth of the river was least, sometimes by day, but
more frequently by night), but being kept at bay by the strength of our
works, and by the concourse of the soldiers, and by the missiles, they
desisted from this attempt.

IX.—There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which,
on account of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent of the
Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they send
ambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession they
might obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity
and liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly to
the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughter of
Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for a revolution,
and wished to have as many states as possible attached to him by his
kindness towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair, and prevails
upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through their territories,
and arranges that they should give hostages to each other—the Sequani not
to obstruct the Helvetii in their march—the Helvetii, to pass without
mischief and outrage.

X.—It-is again told Caesar that the Helvetii intend to march through the
country of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories of the Santones,
which are not far distant from those boundaries of the Tolosates, which [viz.
Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. If this took place, he saw that it
would be attended with great danger to the Province to have warlike men,
enemies of the Roman people, bordering upon an open and very fertile tract
of country. For these reasons he appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to
the command of the fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds
to Italy by forced marches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from
winter-quarters three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these
five legions marches rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps into
Further Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges,
having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct the army in
their march. After having routed these in several battles, he arrives in the
territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province on the seventh day from
Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the Hither Province; thence he
leads his army into the country of the Allobroges, and from the Allobroges
to the Segusiani. These people are the first beyond the Province on the
opposite side of the Rhone.

XI.—The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the
narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the
territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, as they
could not defend themselves and their possessions against them, send
ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had at all
times so well deserved of the Roman people, that their fields ought not to
have been laid waste—their children carried off into slavery—their towns
stormed, almost within sight of our army. At the same time the Ambarri, the
friends and kinsmen of the Aedui, apprise Caesar that it was not easy for
them, now that their fields had been devastated, to ward off the violence of
the enemy from their towns: the Allobroges likewise, who had villages and

possessions on the other side of the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to
Caesar and assure him that they had nothing remaining, except the soil of
their land. Caesar, induced by these circumstances, decides that he ought
not to wait until the Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies,
should arrive among the Santones.

XII.—There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through the
territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible
slowness, that it cannot be determined by the eye in which direction it
flows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined together.
When Caesar was informed by spies that the Helvetii had already conveyed
three parts of their forces across that river, but that the fourth part was left
behind on this side of the Saone, he set out from the camp with three
legions during the third watch, and came up with that division which had
not yet crossed the river. Attacking them, encumbered with baggage, and
not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great part of them; the rest betook
themselves to flight, and concealed themselves in the nearest woods. That
canton [which was cut down] was called the Tigurine; for the whole
Helvetian state is divided into four cantons. This single canton having left
their country, within the recollection of our fathers, had slain Lucius
Cassius the consul, and had made his army pass under the yoke [B.C. 107].
Thus, whether by chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of
the Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman
people was the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not only the
public, but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini had slain
Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius
Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as Cassius
himself.

XIII.—This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with the
remaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across the

Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by his sudden
arrival, when they found that he had effected in one day what they
themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty, namely,
the crossing of the river, send ambassadors to him; at the head of which
embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in the war
against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar:—that, "if the Roman people
would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that part and there
remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be; but if he should
persist in persecuting them with war, that he ought to remember both the
ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the characteristic valour of the
Helvetii. As to his having attacked one canton by surprise, [at a time] when
those who had crossed the river could not bring assistance to their friends,
that he ought not on that account to ascribe very much to his own valour, or
despise them; that they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to
rely more on valour than on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him not
bring it to pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a
name, from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their
army or transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity]."

XIV.—To these words Caesar thus replied:—that "on that very account
he felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstances
which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more
indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to the
Roman people: for if they had been conscious of having done any wrong it
would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but for that very reason
had they been deceived, because neither were they aware that any offence
had been given by them, on account of which they should be afraid, nor did
they think that they ought to be afraid without cause. But even if he were
willing to forget their former outrage, could he also lay aside the
remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had against his will attempted
a route through the Province by force, in that they had molested the Aedui,

the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That as to their so insolently boasting of
their victory, and as to their being astonished that they had so long
committed their outrages with impunity, [both these things] tended to the
same point; for the immortal gods are wont to allow those persons whom
they wish to punish for their guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer
impunity, in order that they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of
circumstances. Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be
given him by them in order that he may be assured they will do what they
promise, and provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the
outrages which they had committed against them and their allies, and
likewise to the Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them." Divico
replied, that "the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors that they
were accustomed to receive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the Roman
people were witness." Having given this reply, he withdrew.

XV.—On the following day they move their camp from that place;
Caesar does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of
four thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province
and from the Aedui and their allies), to observe towards what parts the
enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the
enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a
disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated with
this battle because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so large a
body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from their rear
to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained his men from
battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from
rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about fifteen days in
such a manner that there was not more than five or six miles between the
enemy's rear and our van.

XVI.—Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn
which they had promised in the name of their state; for, in consequence of
the coldness (Gaul being, as before said, situated towards the north), not
only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was not in store a
sufficiently large quantity even of fodder: besides he was unable to use the
corn which he had conveyed in ships up the river Saone, because the
Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire, had diverted their march
from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from day to day, and saying that
it was being "collected—brought in—on the road." When he saw that he
was put off too long, and that the day was close at hand on which he ought
to serve out the corn to his soldiers,— having called together their chiefs, of
whom he had a great number in his camp, among them Divitiacus, and
Liscus who was invested with the chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style
the Vergobretus, and who is elected annually, and has power of life and
death over his countrymen), he severely reprimands them, because he is not
assisted by them on so urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at
hand, and when [corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields,
particularly as, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken
the war; much more bitterly, therefore, does he complain of his being
forsaken.

XVII.—Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what
he had hitherto kept secret:—that "there are some whose influence with the
people is very great, who, though private men, have more power than the
magistrates themselves: that these by seditious and violent language are
deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they ought to
supply; [by telling them] that, if they cannot any longer retain the
supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government of Gauls
than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should
overpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aedui
together with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men [said he] are our

plans, and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that they
could not be restrained by him: nay more, he was well aware that, though
compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at how great
a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silent as long as he
could."

XVIII.—Caesar perceived that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the
brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling that these
matters should be discussed while so many were present, he speedily
dismisses the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from him when alone,
about those things which he had said in the meeting. He [Liscus] speaks
more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar] makes inquiries on the same
points privately of others, and discovers that it is all true; that "Dumnorix is
the person, a man of the highest daring, in great favour with the people on
account of his liberality, a man eager for a revolution: that for a great many
years he has been in the habit of contracting for the customs and all the
other taxes of the Aedui at a small cost, because when he bids, no one dares
to bid against him. By these means he has both increased his own private
property and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintains
constantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a great
number of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among the
neighbouring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of
strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the
Bituriges to a man the most noble and most influential there; that he has
himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii, and has given his sister by
the mother's side and his female relations in marriage into other states; that
he favours and wishes well to the Helvetii on account of this connection;
and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his own account, because by
their arrival his power was weakened, and his brother, Divitiacus, restored
to his former position of influence and dignity: that, if anything should
happen to the Romans, he entertains the highest hope of gaining the

sovereignty by means of the Helvetii, but that under the government of the
Roman people he despairs not only of royalty but even of that influence
which he already has." Caesar discovered too, on inquiring into the
unsuccessful cavalry engagement which had taken place a few days before,
that the commencement of that flight had been made by Dumnorix and his
cavalry (for Dumnorix was in command of the cavalry which the Aedui had
sent for aid to Caesar); that by their flight the rest of the cavalry was
dismayed.

XIX.—After learning these circumstances, since to these suspicions the
most unequivocal facts were added, viz., that he had led the Helvetii
through the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided that hostages
should be mutually given; that he had done all these things, not only
without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's, but even without
their [the Aedui] knowing anything of it themselves; that he [Dumnorix]
was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the Aedui; he [Caesar]
considered that there was sufficient reason why he should either punish him
himself, or order the state to do so. One thing [however] stood in the way of
all this—that he had learned by experience his brother Divitiacus's very
high regard for the Roman people, his great affection towards him, his
distinguished faithfulness, justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by
the punishment of this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus.
Therefore, before he attempted anything, he orders Divitiacus to be
summoned to him, and when the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn,
converses with him through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province
of Gaul, an intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest
confidence in everything; at the same time he reminds him of what was said
about Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present,
and shows what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own
presence; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence to his feelings, he

may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] after trying the case,
or else order the [Aeduan] state to do so.

XX.-Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many
tears, that "he would not pass any very severe sentence upon his brother;
saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true, and that nobody suffered
more pain on that account than he himself did; for when he himself could
effect a very great deal by his influence at home and in the rest of Gaul, and
he [Dumnorix] very little on account of his youth, the latter had become
powerful through his means, which power and strength he used not only to
the lessening of his [Divitiacus] popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he,
however, was influenced both by fraternal affection and by public opinion.
But if anything very severe from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no
one would think that it had been done without his consent, since he himself
held such a place in Caesar's friendship; from which circumstance it would
arise that the affections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him."
As he was with tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar
takes his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end of
entreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great that he
forgives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, at his
desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in his brother;
he points out what he censures in him; he lays before him what he of
himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns him for the
future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that he pardons the past, for
the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies over Dumnorix that he may
be able to know what he does, and with whom he communicates.

XXI.—Being on the same day informed by his scouts that the enemy had
encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, he sent
persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of what kind
the ascent on every side. Word was brought back that it was easy. During

the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with praetorian
powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions, and
with those as guides who had examined the road; he explains what his plan
is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens to them by the same route
by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all the cavalry before him.
Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very experienced in military
affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterwards in that of
Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts.

XXII.—At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the
possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a mile
and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascertained from the
captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been discovered;
Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him— says that the
mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by Labienus, is in
possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by the Gallic arms and
ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next hill: [and] draws them up in
battle-order. Labienus, as he had been ordered by Caesar not to come to an
engagement unless [Caesar's] own forces were seen near the enemy's camp,
that the attack upon the enemy might be made on every side at the same
time, was, after having taken possession of the mountain, waiting for our
men, and refraining from battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced,
Caesar learned through spies that the mountain was in possession of his
own men, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius,
struck with fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen.
On that day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his
camp three miles from theirs.

XXIII.—The next day (as there remained in all only two days' space [to
the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not
more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-stored

town of the Aedui) he thought that he ought to provide for a supply of corn;
and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced rapidly to Bibracte.
This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some deserters from Lucius
Aemilius, a captain of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because they
thought that the Romans, struck with terror, were retreating from them, the
more so, as the day before, though they had seized on the higher grounds,
they had not joined battle; or because they flattered themselves that they
might be cut off from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their
route, began to pursue and to annoy our men in the rear.

XXIV.—Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next
hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself,
meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of his four veteran
legions in such a manner that he placed above him on the very summit the
two legions which he had lately levied in Hither Gaul, and all the
auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain should be covered with
men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be brought together into one
place, and the position be protected by those who were posted in the upper
line. The Helvetii, having followed with all their waggons, collected their
baggage into one place: they themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry
and formed a phalanx, advanced up to our front line in very close order.

XXV.—Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then
those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away with
the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle. His soldiers,
hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke the enemy's
phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a charge on them with drawn
swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting, that, when several
of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the (Roman) javelins pierced
through and pinned fast together, as the point of the iron had bent itself,
they could neither pluck it out, nor, with their left hand entangled, fight with

sufficient ease; so that many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose
rather to cast away the buckler from their hand, and to fight with their
person unprotected. At length, worn out with wounds, they began to give
way, and as there was in the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off, to
betake themselves thither. When the mountain had been gained, and our
men were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men
closed the enemy's line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having
assailed our men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to
surround them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who had betaken
themselves to the mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle.
The Romans having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions;
the first and second line to withstand those who had been defeated and
driven off the field; the third to receive those who were just arriving.

XXVI.—Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with
doubtful success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our
men, the one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the
mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and waggons. For during the
whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh hour [i.e. 12
(noon)—1 P.M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy with his back
turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till late in the night, for
they had set waggons in the way as a rampart, and from the higher ground
kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came on, and some from
between the waggons and the wheels kept darting their lances and javelins
from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight had lasted some time,
our men gained possession of their baggage and camp. There the daughter
and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken. After that battle about 130,000
men [of the enemy] remained alive, who marched incessantly during the
whole of that night; and after a march discontinued for no part of the night,
arrived in the territories of the Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our men,
having stopped for three days, both on account of the wounds of the

soldiers and the burial of the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar
sent letters and messengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should
not assist them with corn or with anything else; for that if they should assist
them, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After the three
days' interval he began to follow them himself with all his forces.

XXVII.—The Helvetii, compelled by the want of everything, sent
ambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him in the way
and had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tone had
with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to await his
arrival, in the place where they then were, they obeyed his commands.
When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, their arms, and
the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst those things are being sought
for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6000 men of that canton
which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by fear, lest, after delivering
up their arms, they should suffer punishment, or else induced by the hope of
safety, because they supposed that, amid so vast a multitude of those who
had surrendered themselves, their flight might either be concealed or
entirely overlooked, having at night-fall departed out of the camp of the
Helvetii, hastened to the Rhine and the territories of the Germans.

XXVIII.—But when Caesar discovered this, he commanded those
through whose territories they had gone, to seek them, out and to bring
them back again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and considered
them, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he admitted all the rest to
a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, and deserters. He
ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi to return to their
territories from which they had come, and as there was at home nothing
whereby they might support their hunger, all the productions of the earth
having been destroyed, he commanded the Allobroges to let them have a
plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them to rebuild the towns and villages

which they had burnt. This he did, chiefly on this account, because he was
unwilling that the country, from which the Helvetii had departed, should be
untenanted, lest the Germans, who dwell on the other side of the Rhine,
should, on account of the excellence of the lands, cross over from their own
territories into those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the
province of Gaul and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui,
that they might settle the Boii, in their own (i.e. in the Aeduan) territories,
as these were known to be of distinguished valour to whom they gave lands,
and whom they afterwards admitted to the same state of rights and freedom
as themselves.

XXIX.—In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek
characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been
drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their
country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old
men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was:-

Of the Helvetii [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii] 263,000
Of the Tulingi 36,000
Of the Latobrigi 14,000
Of the Rauraci 23,000
Of the Boii 32,000
———-
The sum of all amounted to 368,000

Out of these, such as could bear arms [amounted] to about 92,000. When
the census of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had
commanded, the number was found to be 110,000.

XXX.—When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors
from almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to congratulate
Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although he had taken

vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs done by them to the
Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less to the benefit of
the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the Helvetii, while their
affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their country with the design of
making war upon the whole of Gaul, and seizing the government of it, and
selecting, out of a great abundance, that spot for an abode which they
should judge to be the most convenient and most productive of all Gaul,
and hold the rest of the states as tributaries. They requested that they might
be allowed to proclaim an assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular
day, and to do that with Caesar's permission, [stating] that they had some
things which, with the general consent, they wished to ask of him. This
request having been granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and
ordained by an oath with each other, that no one should disclose [their
deliberations] except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the
general assembly.

XXXI.—When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states,
who had before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be
allowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety of
themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw
themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged and
earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed than that
they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch as they saw
that, if a disclosure were made, they should be put to the greatest tortures.
For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him:— "That there were
two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood at the head of one of
these, the Arverni of the other. After these had been violently struggling
with one another for the superiority for many years, it came to pass that the
Germans were called in for hire by the Arverni and the Sequani. That about
15,000 of them [i.e. of the Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after
that these wild and savage men had become enamoured of the lands and the

refinement and the abundance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that
there were now as many as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that with these the
Aedui and their dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms, that they had
been routed and had sustained a great calamity—had lost all their nobility,
all their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and
calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in Gaul, both
from their own valour and from the Roman people's hospitality and
friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their state
as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath, that they
would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid from the
Roman people, nor refuse to be for ever under their sway and empire. That
he was the only one out of all the state of the Aedui who could not be
prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children as hostages. On that
account he had fled from his state and had gone to the senate at Rome to
beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither by oath nor hostages. But a
worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than the vanquished Aedui,
for Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, had settled in their territories, and
had seized upon a third of their land, which was the best in the whole of
Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart from another third part, because
a few months previously 24,000 men of the Harudes had come to him, for
whom room and settlements must be provided. The consequence would be,
that in a few years they would all be driven from the territories of Gaul, and
all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be
compared with the land of the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the
latter be put on a level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for]
Ariovistus, no sooner did he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which
took place at Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to
demand as hostages the children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on
them every kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod or
pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and that his

commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid in Caesar
and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that the
Helvetii had done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek another
dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, and try
whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be disclosed to
Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that he would inflict the
most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in his possession, [and
says] that Caesar could, either by his own influence and by that of his army,
or by his late victory, or by name of the Roman people, intimidate him, so
as to prevent a greater number of Germans being brought over the Rhine,
and could protect all Gaul from the outrages of Ariovistus."

XXXII.—When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who
were present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar.
Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none of
those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down, gazed
on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this conduct, he
inquired of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, but silently
continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedly inquired of them
and could not elicit any answer at all, the same Divitiacus the Aeduan
answered, that—"the lot of the Sequani was more wretched and grievous
than that of the rest, on this account, because they alone durst not even in
secret complain or supplicate aid; and shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus
[even when] absent, just as if he were present; for, to the rest, despite of
everything, there was an opportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be
endured by the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their
territories, and whose towns were all in his power."

XXXIII.—Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered the minds
of the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be an
object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus,

induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to his
oppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed the assembly; and,
besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to think that this
affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially as he saw that
the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the senate "brethren" and
"kinsmen," were held in the thraldom and dominion of the Germans, and
understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani, which
in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman people he considered very
disgraceful to himself and the republic. That, moreover, the Germans should
by degrees become accustomed to cross the Rhine, and that a great body of
them should come into Gaul, he saw [would be] dangerous to the Roman
people, and judged that wild and savage men would not be likely to restrain
themselves, after they had possessed themselves of all Gaul, from going
forth into the province and thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and
Teutones had done before them), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole
barrier that] separated the Sequani from our province. Against which events
he thought he ought to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover,
Ariovistus, for his part, had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance
that he was felt to be quite insufferable.

XXXIV.—He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to
demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference between
the two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him on state-business and
matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy
Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of anything from Caesar,
he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted anything from him he
ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go without an army
into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of, nor could he,
without great expense and trouble, draw his army together to one place; that
to him, moreover, it appeared strange what business either Caesar or the
Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he had conquered in war.

XXXV.—When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends
ambassadors to him a second time with this message "Since, after having
been treated with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as
he had in his consulship [B.C. 59] been styled 'king and friend' by the
senate), he makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman
people, [viz.] that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not
think that it concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of
mutual interest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that he
do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul; in
the next place, that he restore the hostages which he has from the Aedui,
and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his consent those
hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the Aedui by outrage
nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would accordingly do this,"
[Caesar says] that "he himself and the Roman people will entertain a
perpetual feeling of favour and friendship towards him; but that if he
[Caesar] does not obtain [his desires], that he (forasmuch as in the
consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso [B.C. 61] the senate had
decreed that, whoever should have the administration of the province of
Gaul should, as far as he could do so consistently with the interests of the
republic, protect the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman people) will
not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui."

XXXVI.—To this Ariovistus replied, that "the right of war was, that they
who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in what
manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont to
govern the nations which they had conquered, not according to the dictation
of any other, but according to their own discretion. If he for his part did not
dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in which they were to exercise
their right, he ought not to be obstructed by the Roman people in his right;
that the Aedui, inasmuch as they had tried the fortune of war and had
engaged in arms and been conquered, had become tributaries to him; that

Caesar was doing a great injustice, in that by his arrival he was making his
revenues less valuable to him; that he should not restore their hostages to
the Aedui, but should not make war wrongfully either upon them or their
allies, if they abided by that which had been agreed on, and paid their
tribute annually: if they did not continue to do that, the Roman people's
name of 'brothers' would avail them nought. As to Caesar's threatening him
that be would not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said] that no one
had ever entered into a contest with him [Ariovistus] without utter ruin to
himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would feel
what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond all others
to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, could achieve
by their valour."

XXXVII.—At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar,
ambassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui to
complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul,
were ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchase
peace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri, [to
state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks of the
Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas and
Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things, Caesar
thought that he ought to use all despatch, lest, if this new band of Suevi
should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus] might be less
easily withstood. Having, therefore, as quickly as he could, provided a
supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced marches.

XXXVIII.—When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was
brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on
Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three
days' journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought to take the
greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there was in that town a

most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for war; and so
fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to afford a great facility for
protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs almost surrounds the
whole town, as though it were traced round it with a pair of compasses. A
mountain of great height shuts in the remaining space, which is not more
than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in such a manner that the roots
of that mountain extend to the river's bank on either side. A wall thrown
around it makes a citadel of this [mountain], and connects it with the town.
Hither Caesar hastens by forced marches by night and day, and, after having
seized the town, stations a garrison there.

XXXIX.—Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of
corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the
Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature,
of incredible valour and practice in arms, that ofttimes they, on
encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the
fierceness of their eyes)—so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole
army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This
first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the rest, who,
having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of friendship,
had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging, some of them one
reason, some another, which they said made it necessary for them to depart,
they requested that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw;
some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might avoid
the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose their countenance,
nor even sometimes check their tears: but hidden in their tents, either
bewailed their fate, or deplored with their comrades the general danger.
Wills were sealed universally throughout the whole camp. By the
expressions and cowardice of these men, even those who possessed great
experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the
decurions] who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually

disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed, said
that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of the roads
and the vastness of the forests which lay between them and Ariovistus, or
else that the supplies could not be brought up readily enough. Some even
declared to Caesar that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and
the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command,
nor advance in consequence of their fear.

XL.—When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and
summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely
reprimanded them, "particularly for supposing that it belonged to them to
inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with
what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship, had most
anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should any
one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was
persuaded that, when his demands were known and the fairness of the terms
considered, he would reject neither his nor the Roman people's favour. But
even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them,
what after all were they afraid of?—or why should they despair either of
their own valour or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial had been made within
our fathers' recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by
Caius Marius, the army was regarded as having deserved no less praise than
their commander himself. It had been made lately, too, in Italy; during the
rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which
they had received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a
judgment might be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with
it,—inasmuch as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded
when unarmed, they had afterwards vanquished, when well armed and
flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men whom the
Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in
theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet cannot have been a

match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls
disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the
Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he
had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had
given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this
time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious
more through stratagem and cunning than valour. But though there had been
room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even
[Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped.
That those who ascribed their fear to a pretence about the [deficiency of]
supplies and the narrowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they
seemed either to distrust their general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to
him. That these things were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the
Lingones were to furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields;
that as to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its
being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or
advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew that in the case of
all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either upon some
mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or, that upon some
crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly proved [against
them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good
fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly set
about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and would
break up his camp the next night, in the fourth watch, that he might
ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of honour and duty, or
whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should
follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no
misgivings, and it should be his praetorian cohort."—This legion Caesar
had both greatly favoured, and in it, on account of its valour, placed the
greatest confidence.

XLI.-Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a
surprising, manner, and the highest ardour and eagerness for prosecuting the
war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first to return thanks to
him, through their military tribunes, for his having expressed this most
favourable opinion of them; and assured him that they were quite ready to
prosecute the war. Then, the other legions endeavoured, through their
military tribunes and the centurions of the principal companies, to excuse
themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they had never either doubted or feared,
or supposed that the determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and
not their general's. Having accepted their excuse, and having had the road
carefully reconnoitred by Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the
greatest faith, [he found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles
he might lead his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth
watch, as he had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not
discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of
Ariovistus were only four and twenty miles distant from ours.

XLII.—Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends
ambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a
conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since he
[Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now do it
without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began to think that he
was now returning to a rational state of mind, as he spontaneously proffered
that which he had previously refused to him when requesting it; and was in
great hopes that, in consideration of his own and the Roman people's great
favours towards him, the issue would be that he would desist from his
obstinacy upon his demands being made known. The fifth day after that was
appointed as the day of conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being
often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should
not bring any foot-soldier with him to the conference, [saying] that "he was
afraid of being ensnared by him through treachery; that both should come

accompanied by cavalry; that he would not come on any other condition."
Caesar, as he neither wished that the conference should, by an excuse
thrown in the way, be set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the
Gauls, decided that it would be most expedient to take away from the Gallic
cavalry all their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the
tenth legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence; in order that he
might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any
need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the tenth
legion said, not without a touch of humour, "that Caesar did more for them
than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion in place of
his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into horse."

XLIII.—There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of
considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both
camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference.
Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] on horseback,
200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also took their stand
at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that they should confer on
horseback, and that, besides themselves, they should bring with them ten
men each to the conference. When they were come to the place, Caesar, in
the opening of his speech, detailed his own and the senate's favours towards
him [Ariovistus], "in that he had been styled king, in that [he had been
styled] friend, by the senate— in that very considerable presents had been
sent him; which circumstance he informed him had both fallen to the lot of
few, and had usually been bestowed in consideration of important personal
services; that he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground
for the request, had obtained these honours through the kindness and
munificence of himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how
old and how just were the grounds of connexion that existed between
themselves [the Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate had
been passed in their favour, and how frequent and how honourable; how

from time immemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of
Gaul; even [said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was
the custom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies and friends
should lose none of their property, but be advanced in influence, dignity,
and honour: who then could endure that what they had brought with them to
the friendship of the Roman people, should be torn from them?" He then
made the same demands which he had commissioned the ambassadors to
make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon the Aedui or their
allies, that he should restore the hostages; that, if he could not send back to
their country any part of the Germans, he should at all events suffer none of
them any more to cross the Rhine.

XLIV.—Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar; but
expatiated largely on his own virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhine not of
his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls; that he had
not left home and kindred without great expectations and great rewards; that
he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls themselves; that the
hostages had been given by their own good-will; that he took by right of
war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed to impose on the
conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon
him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and had encamped
against him; that all their forces had been routed and beaten by him in a
single battle; that if they chose to make a second trial, he was ready to
encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy peace, it was unfair to
refuse the tribute, which of their own free-will they had paid up to that time.
That the friendship of the Roman people ought to prove to him an ornament
and a safeguard, not a detriment; and that he sought it with that expectation.
But if through the Roman people the tribute was to be discontinued, and
those who surrendered to be seduced from him, he would renounce the
friendship of the Roman people no less heartily than he had sought it. As to
his leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a

view of securing himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of
this, in that he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not
make war, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the
Roman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond
the frontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?
—why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains?—that this was his province of
Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, if he were
to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that we were unjust to
obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's saying that the Aedui had
been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not so uncivilized nor so
ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in the very last war with
the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to the Romans, nor received
any from the Roman people in the struggles which the Aedui had been
maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He must feel suspicious that
Caesar, though feigning friendship as the reason for his keeping an army in
Gaul; was keeping it with the view of crushing him. And that unless he
depart, and withdraw his army from these parts, he shall regard him not as a
friend, but as a foe; and that, even if he should put him to death, he should
do what would please many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman
people; he had assurance of that from themselves through their messengers,
and could purchase the favour and the friendship of them all by his
[Caesar's] death. But if he would depart and resign to him the free
possession of Gaul, he would recompense him with a great reward, and
would bring to a close whatever wars he wished to be carried on, without
any trouble or risk to him."

XLV.—Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]: "why
he could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman people's
practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he
deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people;
that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by Quintus Fabius

Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and had not
reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And if the
most ancient period was to be regarded—then was the sovereignty of the
Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the senate was to be
observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had
conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws."

XLVI.—While these things are being transacted in the conference, it was
announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching nearer
the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones and weapons
at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to his men;
and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon upon
the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry would
be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think proper to
engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said that they had
been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference. When it was
spread abroad among the common soldiery with what haughtiness
Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had ordered the
Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack upon our
men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater alacrity
and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.

XLVII.—Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state
"that he wished to treat with him about those things which had been begun
to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded"; [and to beg]
that "he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or, if he were not
willing to do that, that he would send one of his [officers] as an ambassador
to him." There did not appear to Caesar any good reason for holding a
conference; and the more so as the day before the Germans could not be
restrained from casting weapons at our men. He thought he should not
without great danger send to him as ambassador one of his [Roman]

officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed [therefore] most
proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus,
a young man of the highest courage and accomplishments (whose father
had been presented with the freedom of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus),
both on account of his fidelity and on account of his knowledge of the
Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long practice, now spoke fluently;
and because in his case the Germans would have no motive for committing
violence; and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality
of Ariovistus. He commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus had to say,
and to report to him. But when Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp,
he cried out in the presence of his army, "Why were they come to him? was
it for the purpose of acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to
speak, and cast them into chains.

XLVIII.—The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a
hill six miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces past
Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design—that
he might cut off Caesar from, the corn and provisions which might be
conveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive days
from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put them in
battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in battle, an
opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this time kept his
army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The method of
battle in which the Germans had practised themselves was this. There were
6000 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one of whom
each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own protection. By
these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in their engagements; to
these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushed forward; if any one,
upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood
around him: if it was necessary to advance farther: than usual, or to retreat

more rapidly, so great, from practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by
the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with their speed.

XLIX.—Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he
might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient
position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped,
at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three lines,
marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to be under
arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the enemy
about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus sent light troops,
about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry; which forces were to
intimidate our men, and hinder them in their fortification. Caesar
nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered two lines to drive off the
enemy: the third to execute the work. The camp being fortified, he left there
two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries; and led back the other four
legions into the larger camp.

L.—The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces
from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew up
his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When he
found that they did not even then come out [from their entrenchments], he
led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last Ariovistus sent part of
his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle was vigorously maintained
on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after many wounds had been
inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back his forces into camp. When
Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an
engagement, he discovered this to be the reason—that among the Germans
it was the custom for their matrons to pronounce from lots and divination
whether it were expedient that the battle should be engaged in or not; that
they had said, "that it was not the will of heaven that the Germans should
conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new moon."

LI.—The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard
for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy,
before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the number of
legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that [thereby] he
might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn
up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then at last
of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp, and disposed them
canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci,
Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with
their chariots and waggons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these
they placed their women, who, with dishevelled hair and in tears, entreated
the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery
to the Romans.

LII.—Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that
every one might have them as witnesses of his valour. He himself began the
battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part of the
enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the signal being
given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so
suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the
javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with
swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly
forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords. There were found
very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the phalanx, and with their
hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above. Although
the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to flight, they
[still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the great number
of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who
commanded the cavalry—as he was more disengaged than those who were
employed in the fight—sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in
distress.

LIII.—Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy
turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river
Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying on
their strength, endeavoured to swim over, or, finding boats, procured their
safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting with a small vessel
tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all the rest of
them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom he had
brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister of king Vocion,
whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither for that
purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their two daughters,
one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus, as he was being
dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triple chain, fell into the
hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy with his cavalry.
This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less pleasure than the victory
itself; because he saw a man of the first rank in the province of Gaul, his
intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued from the hand of the enemy, and
restored to him, and that fortune had not diminished aught of the joy and
exultation [of that day] by his destruction. He [Procillus] said that in his
own presence the lots had been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he
should immediately be put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time:
that by the favour of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found
and brought back to him [Caesar].

LIV.—This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who
had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when the Ubii,
who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed, slew a
great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important wars in
one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the Sequani,
a little earlier than the season of the year required. He appointed Labienus
over the winter quarters, and set out in person for Hither Gaul to hold the
assizes.

BOOK II

I.—While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown
above, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed by
letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae, who we have said are a third part
of Gaul, were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people, and
giving hostages to one another; that the reasons of the confederacy were
these—first, because they feared that, after all [Celtic] Gaul was subdued,
our army would be led against them; secondly, because they were instigated
by several of the Gauls; some of whom as [on the one hand] they had been
unwilling that the Germans should remain any longer in Gaul, so [on the
other] they were dissatisfied that the army of the Roman people should pass
the winter in it, and settle there; and others of them, from a natural
instability and fickleness of disposition, were anxious for a revolution; [the
Belgae were instigated] by several, also, because the government in Gaul
was generally seized upon by the more powerful persons and by those who
had the means of hiring troops, and they could less easily effect this object
under our dominion.

II.—Alarmed by these tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legions
in Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, his
lieutenant, to conduct them further into Gaul. He himself, as soon as there
began to be plenty of forage, came to the army. He gives a commission to
the Senones and the other Gauls who were neighbours of the Belgae, to
learn what is going on amongst them [i.e. the Belgae], and inform him of
these matters. These all uniformly reported that troops were being raised,
and that an army was being collected in one place. Then, indeed, he thought
that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding towards them, and having
provided supplies, moves his camp, and in about fifteen days arrives at the
territories of the Belgae.

III.—As he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than any one
anticipated, the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic] Gaul,
sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius, [two of] the principal persons of the
state, as their ambassadors: to tell him that they surrendered themselves and
all their possessions to the protection and disposal of the Roman people:
and that they had neither combined with the rest of the Belgae, nor entered
into any confederacy against the Roman people: and were prepared to give
hostages, to obey his commands, to receive him into their towns, and to aid
him with corn and other things; that all the rest of the Belgae were in arms;
and that the Germans, who dwell on this side the Rhine, had joined
themselves to them; and that so great was the infatuation of them all that
they could not restrain even the Suessiones, their own brethren and
kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights, and the same laws, and who have one
government and one magistracy [in common] with themselves, from uniting
with them.

IV.—When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how
powerful they were, and what they could do in war, he received the
following information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung from
the Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had
settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had driven out
the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the only people
who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was overrun, had
prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their territories; the
effect of which was that, from the recollection of those events, they
assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness in military matters.
The Remi said that they had known accurately everything respecting their
number, because, being united to them by neighbourhood and by alliances,
they had learnt what number each state had in the general council of the
Belgae promised for that war. That the Bellovaci were the most powerful
amongst them in valour, influence, and number of men; that these could

muster 100,000 armed men, [and had] promised 60,000 picked men out of
that number, and demanded for themselves the command of the whole war.
That the Suessiones were their nearest neighbours and possessed a very
extensive and fertile country; that among them, even in our own memory,
Divitiacus, the most powerful man of all Gaul, had been king; who had held
the government of a great part of these regions, as well as of Britain; that
their king at present was Galba; that the direction of the whole war was
conferred by the consent of all upon him, on account of his integrity and
prudence; that they had twelve towns; that they had promised 50,000 armed
men; and that the Nervii, who are reckoned the most warlike among them,
and are situated at a very great distance, [had promised] as many; the
Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapu,
9000; the Caleti, 10,000; the Velocasses and the Veromandui as many; the
Aduatuci, 19,000; that the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the
Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans, [had promised],
they thought, to the number of 40,000.

V.—Caesar, having encouraged the Remi, and addressed them
courteously, ordered the whole senate to assemble before him, and the
children of their chief men to be brought to him as hostages; all which
commands they punctually performed by the day [appointed]. He,
addressing himself to Divitiacus the Aeduan, with great earnestness, points
out how much it concerns the republic and their common security, that the
forces of the enemy should be divided, so that it might not be necessary to
engage with so large a number at one time. [He asserts] that this might be
effected if the Aedui would lead their forces into the territories of the
Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With these instructions he
dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived that all the forces of
the Belgae, which had been collected in one place, were approaching
towards him, and learnt from the scouts whom he had sent out, and [also]
from the Remi, that they were not then far distant, he hastened to lead his

army over the Aisne, which is on the borders of the Remi, and there pitched
his camp. This position fortified one side of his camp by the banks of the
river, rendered the country which lay in his rear secure from the enemy, and
furthermore ensured that provisions might without danger be brought to
him by the Remi and the rest of the states. Over that river was a bridge:
there he places a guard; and on the other side of the river he leaves Q.
Titurus Sabinus, his lieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a
camp with a rampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in
breadth.

VI.—There was a town of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant
from this camp. This the Belgae on their march began to attack with great
vigour. [The assault] was with difficulty sustained for that day. The Gauls'
mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: when after having
drawn a large number of men around the whole of the fortifications, stones
have begun to be cast against the wall on all sides, and the wall has been
stript of its defenders, [then], forming a testudo, they advance to the gates
and undermine the wall: which was easily effected on this occasion; for
while so large a number were casting stones and darts, no one was able to
maintain his position upon the wall. When night had put an end to the
assault, Iccius, who was then in command of the town, one of the Remi, a
man of the highest rank and influence amongst his people, and one of those
who had come to Caesar as ambassador [to sue] for a peace, sends
messengers to him, [to report] "That, unless assistance were sent to him, he
could not hold out any longer."

VII.—Thither immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the
same persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some
Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearian slingers as a relief to the
townspeople, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together with the hope
of [making good their] defence was infused into the Remi, and, for the same

reason, the hope of gaining the town abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after
staying a short time before the town, and laying waste the country of the
Remi, when all the villages and buildings which they could approach had
been burnt, they hastened with all their forces to the camp of Caesar, and
encamped within less than two miles [of it]; and their camp, as was
indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than eight miles in
breadth.

VIII.—Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well on account
of the great number of the enemy as their distinguished reputation for
valour: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to ascertain by frequent
trials what the enemy could effect by their prowess and what our men
would dare. When he perceived that our men were not inferior, as the place
before the camp was naturally convenient and suitable for marshalling an
army (since the hill where the camp was pitched, rising gradually from the
plain, extended forward in breadth as far as the space which the marshalled
army could occupy, and had steep declines of its side in either direction, and
gently sloping in front gradually sank to the plain), on either side of that hill
he drew a cross trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities
of that trench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, after he
had marshalled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in point of
number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while fighting.
After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions which he had last
raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they might be brought as a
reserve, he formed the other six legions in order of battle before the camp.
The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces which they had brought out
of the camp.

IX.—There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of
the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this; our
men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if the first

attempt to pass should be made by them. In the meantime battle was
commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither
army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse
[proving] favourable to our men, led back his forces into the camp. The
enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it has
been stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they endeavoured to
lead a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they
might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant,
commanded, and might cut off the bridge; but, if they could not do that,
they should lay waste the lands of the Remi, which were of great use to us
in carrying on the war, and might hinder our men from foraging.

X.—Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and
light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and hastens
towards them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Our men, attacking
in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part of them. By the
immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest, who in a most
courageous manner were attempting to pass over their bodies, and
surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who had first crossed
the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their hopes had deceived
them both with regard to their taking the town by storm and also their
passing the river, and did not see our men advance to a more
disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when provisions
began to fail them, having called a council, determined that it was best for
each to return to his country, and resolved to assemble from all quarters to
defend those into whose territories the Romans should first march an army;
that they might contend in their own rather than in a foreign country, and
might enjoy the stores of provisions which they possessed at home.
Together with other causes, this consideration also led them to that
resolution, viz.: that they had learnt that Divitiacus and the Aedui were
approaching the territories of the Bellovaci. And it was impossible to

persuade the latter to stay any longer, or to deter them from conveying
succour to their own people.

XI.—That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at the
second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor under
any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in the
journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure appear very
like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his scouts, [but]
fearing an ambuscade, because he had not yet discovered for what reason
they were departing, kept his army and cavalry within the camp. At
daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by the scouts, he sent
forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave the command of it to two
of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. He ordered T.
Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to follow them closely with three
legions. These, attacking their rear, and pursuing them for many miles, slew
a great number of them as they were fleeing; while those in the rear with
whom they had come up, halted, and bravely sustained the attack of our
soldiers; the van, because they appeared to be removed from danger, and
were not restrained by any necessity or command, as soon as the noise was
heard, broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus
without any risk [to themselves] our men killed as great a number of them
as the length of the day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and
betook themselves into the camp, as they had been commanded.

XII.—On the day following, before the enemy could recover from their
terror and flight, Caesar led his army into the territories of the Suessiones,
which are next to the Remi, and having accomplished a long march, hastens
to the town named Noviodunum. Having attempted to take it by storm on
his march, because he heard that it was destitute of [sufficient] defenders,
he was not able to carry it by assault, on account of the breadth of the ditch
and the height of the wall, though few were defending it. Therefore, having

fortified the camp, he began to bring up the vineae, and to provide whatever
things were necessary for the storm. In the meantime, the whole body of the
Suessiones, after their flight, came the next night into the town. The vineae
having been quickly brought up against the town, a mound thrown up, and
towers built, the Gauls, amazed by the greatness of the works, such as they
had neither seen nor heard of before, and struck, also, by the despatch of the
Romans, send ambassadors to Caesar respecting a surrender, and succeed in
consequence of the Remi requesting that they [the Suessiones] might be
spared.

XIII.—Caesar, having received as hostages the first men of the state, and
even the two sons of king Galba himself; and all the arms in the town
having been delivered up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and led
his army against the Bellovaci. Who, when they had conveyed themselves
and all their possessions into the town called Bratuspantium, and Caesar
with his army was about five miles distant from that town, all the old men,
going out of the town, began to stretch out their hands to Caesar, and to
intimate by their voice that they would throw themselves on his protection
and power, nor would contend in arms against the Roman people. In like
manner, when he had come up to the town, and there pitched his camp, the
boys and the women from the wall, with outstretched hands, after their
custom, begged peace from the Romans.

XIV.—For these Divitiacus pleads (for after the departure of the Belgae,
having dismissed the troops of the Aedui, he had returned to Caesar). "The
Bellovaci had at all times been in the alliance and friendship of the Aeduan
state; that they had revolted from the Aedui and made war upon the Roman
people, being urged thereto by their nobles, who said that the Aedui,
reduced to slavery by Caesar, were suffering every indignity and insult.
That they who had been the leaders of that plot, because they perceived
how great a calamity they had brought upon the state, had fled into Britain.

That not only the Bellovaci, but also the Aedui, entreated him to use his
[accustomed] clemency and lenity towards them [the Bellovaci]: which if
he did, he would increase the influence of the Aedui among all the Belgae,
by whose succour and resources they had been accustomed to support
themselves whenever any wars occurred."

XV.—Caesar said that on account of his respect for Divitiacus and the
Aeduans, he would receive them into his protection, and would spare them;
but, because the state was of great influence among the Belgae, and pre-
eminent in the number of its population, he demanded 600 hostages. When
these were delivered, and all the arms in the town collected, he went from
that place into the territories of the Ambiani, who, without delay,
surrendered themselves and all their possessions. Upon their territories
bordered the Nervii, concerning whose character and customs when Caesar
inquired he received the following information: —That "there was no
access for merchants to them; that they suffered no wine and other things
tending to luxury to be imported; because they thought that by their use the
mind is enervated and the courage impaired: that they were a savage people
and of great bravery: that they upbraided and condemned the rest of the
Belgae who had surrendered themselves to the Roman people and thrown
aside their national courage: that they openly declared they would neither
send ambassadors, nor accept any condition of peace."

XVI.—After he had made three days' march through their territories, he
discovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more than
ten miles from his camp: that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the
other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and the Veromandui,
their neighbours, were there awaiting the arrival of the Romans; for they
had persuaded both these nations to try the same fortune of war [as
themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci were also expected by them,
and were on their march; that they had put their women, and those who

through age appeared useless for war, in a place to which there was no
approach for an army, on account of the marshes.

XVII.—Having learnt these things, he sends forward scouts and
centurions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a great many
of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with
him; some of these, as was afterwards learnt from the prisoners, having
accurately observed, during those days, the army's method of marching,
went by night to the Nervii, and informed them that a great number of
baggage-trains passed between the several legions, and that there would be
no difficulty, when the first legion had come into the camp, and the other
legions were at a great distance, to attack that legion while under baggage,
which being routed, and the baggage-train seized, it would come to pass
that the other legions would not dare to stand their ground. It added weight
also to the advice of those who reported that circumstance, that the Nervii,
from early times, because they were weak in cavalry (for not even at this
time do they attend to it, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they
can), in order that they might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their
neighbours if they came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having
cut young trees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches
[extending] on to the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up
between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall,
through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate
with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed
by these things, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected
by them.

XVIII.—The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the
camp was this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extended to the river
Sambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a
[second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to the former, and

open from about 200 paces at the lowest part; but in the upper part, woody,
(so much so) that it was not easy to see through it into the interior. Within
those woods the enemy kept themselves in concealment; a few troops of
horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of
the river was about three feet.

XIX.—Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close after
them with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march was different
from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For as he was
approaching the enemy Caesar, according to his custom, led on [as the van]
six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placed the
baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which had been last
raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse,
with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action
with the cavalry of the enemy. While they from time to time betook
themselves into the woods to their companions, and again made an assault
out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare to follow them in their
retreat further than the limit to which the plain and open parts extended, in
the meantime the six legions which had arrived first, having measured out
the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage-train
of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been
agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they
had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods,
and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their
forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and
thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible
speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us
almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill
to our camp and to those who were employed in the works.

XX.—Caesar had everything to do at one time: the standard to be
displayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; the
signal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off from the
works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose of seeking
materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle to be formed;
the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of
these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden
approach and charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties two things
proved of advantage; [first] the skill and experience of the soldiers, because,
having been trained by former engagements, they could suggest to
themselves what ought to be done, as conveniently as receive information
from others; and [secondly] that Caesar had forbidden his several
lieutenants to depart from the works and their respective legions, before the
camp was fortified. These, on account of the near approach and the speed of
the enemy, did not then wait for any command from Caesar, but of
themselves executed whatever appeared proper.

XXI.—Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and fro
into whatever quarter fortune carried him to animate the troops, and came to
the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no further speech
than that "they should keep up the remembrance of their wonted valour, and
not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assault of the enemy"; as
the latter were not farther from them than the distance to which a dart could
be cast, he gave the signal for commencing battle. And having gone to
another quarter for the purpose of encouraging [the soldiers], he finds them
fighting. Such was the shortness of the time, and so determined was the
mind of the enemy on fighting, that time was wanting not only for affixing
the military insignia, but even for putting on the helmets and drawing off
the covers from the shields. To whatever part any one by chance came from
the works (in which he had been employed), and whatever standards he saw

first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his own company he should lose the
time for fighting.

XXII.—The army having been marshalled, rather as the nature of the
ground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, than as the
method and order of military matters required; whilst the legions in the
different places were withstanding the enemy, some in one quarter, some in
another, and the view was obstructed by the very thick hedges intervening,
as we have before remarked, neither could proper reserves be posted, nor
could the necessary measures be taken in each part, nor could all the
commands be issued by one person. Therefore, in such an unfavourable
state of affairs, various events of fortune followed.

XXIII.—The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been
stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove
the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them), who were
breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the
higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavouring
to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded
(therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having
advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they
[nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were
opposing them. In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the
eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Veromandui, with whom they
had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of
the river. But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being
then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the
seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body,
with Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened
towards that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their
unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment.

XXIV.—At the same time our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who
had been with those who, as I have related, were routed by the first assault
of the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met the
enemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter; and the
camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate and from the highest ridge of
the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, after going out for
the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw the enemy parading
in our camp, committed themselves precipitately to flight; at the same time
there arose the cry and shout of those who came with the baggage-train; and
they (affrighted) were carried some one way, some another. By all these
circumstances the cavalry of the Treviri were much alarmed (whose
reputation for courage is extraordinary among the Gauls, and who had come
to Caesar, being sent by their state as auxiliaries), and, when they saw our
camp filled with a large number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed and
almost held surrounded, the camp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and
Numidians fleeing on all sides divided and scattered, they, despairing of our
affairs, hastened home, and related to their state that the Romans were
routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy were in possession of their
camp and baggage-train.

XXV.—Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right
wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in
consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together
in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the
fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the
standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of
the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief
centurion of the legion, P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so
exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to
support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their
efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the

battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand], though
advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at
the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the
affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be
brought up; having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in
the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front
of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest
of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend
the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his
arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored,
whilst every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert
his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked.

XXVI.—Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stood
close by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunes of
the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and make their
charge upon the enemy with a double front; which having been done, since
they brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared lest their rear should
be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand their ground more boldly,
and to fight more courageously. In the meantime, the soldiers of the two
legions which had been in the rear of the army, as a guard for the baggage-
train, upon the battle being reported to them, quickened their pace, and were
seen by the enemy on the top of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having gained
possession of the camp of the enemy, and observed from the higher ground
what was going on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as a relief to our men,
who, when they had learnt from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in
what position the affair was, and in how great danger the camp and the
legion and the commander were involved, left undone nothing [which
tended] to despatch.

XXVI.—By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our
men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leant on
their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though
unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though]
armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valour blot out the
disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all
parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed
such great courage that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next
stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were
overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast
their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our
darts which had fallen between [the armies]; so that it ought not to be
concluded, that men of such great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a
very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very
disadvantageous place; since their greatness of spirit had rendered these
actions easy, although in themselves very difficult.

XXVIII.—This battle being ended, and the nation and name of the Nervii
being almost reduced to annihilation, their old men, whom together with the
boys and women we have stated to have been collected together in the
fenny places and marshes, on this battle having been reported to them, since
they were convinced that nothing was an obstacle to the conquerors, and
nothing safe to the conquered, sent ambassadors to Caesar by the consent of
all who remained, and surrendered themselves to him; and in recounting the
calamity of their state, said that their senators were reduced from 600 to
three; that from 60,000 men they [were reduced] to scarcely 500 who could
bear arms; whom Caesar, that he might appear to use compassion towards
the wretched and the suppliant, most carefully spared; and ordered them to
enjoy their own territories and towns, and commanded their neighbours that
they should restrain themselves and their dependants from offering injury or
outrage [to them].

XXIX.—When the Aduatuci, of whom we have written above, were
coming with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, upon this battle
being reported to them, they returned home after they were on the march;
deserting all their towns and forts, they conveyed together all their
possessions into one town, eminently fortified by nature. While this town
had on all sides around it very high rocks and precipices, there was left on
one side a gently ascending approach, of not more than 200 feet in width;
which place they had fortified with a very lofty double wall: besides, they
had placed stones of great weight and sharpened stakes upon the walls.
They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who, when they were
marching into our province and Italy, having deposited on this side the river
Rhine such of their baggage-trains as they could not drive or convey with
them, left 6000 of their men as a guard and defence for them. These having,
after the destruction of their countrymen, been harassed for many years by
their neighbours, while one time they waged war offensively, and at another
resisted it when waged against them, concluded a peace with the consent of
all, and chose this place as their settlement.

XXX.—And on the first arrival of our army they made frequent sallies
from the town, and contended with our men in trifling skirmishes:
afterwards, when hemmed in by a rampart of twelve feet [in height], and
fifteen miles in circuit, they kept themselves within the town. When, vineae
having been brought up and a mound raised, they observed that a tower also
was being built at a distance, they at first began to mock the Romans from
their wall, and to taunt them with the following speeches. "For what
purpose was so vast a machine constructed at so great a distance?" "With
what hands," or "with what strength did they, especially [as they were] men
of such very small stature" (for our shortness of stature, in comparison with
the great size of their bodies, is generally a subject of much contempt to the
men of Gaul), "trust to place against their walls a tower of such great
weight."

XXXI.—But when they saw that it was being moved, and was
approaching their walls, startled by the new and unaccustomed sight, they
sent ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about peace; who spoke in the
following manner: "That they did not believe the Romans waged war
without divine aid, since they were able to move forward machines of such
a height with so great speed, and thus fight from close quarters: that they
resigned themselves and all their possessions to [Caesar's] disposal: that
they begged and earnestly entreated one thing, viz., that if perchance,
agreeably to his clemency and humanity, which they had heard of from
others, he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared, he would not
deprive them of their arms; that all their neighbours were enemies to them
and envied their courage, from whom they could not defend themselves if
their arms were delivered up: that it was better for them, if they should be
reduced to that state, to suffer any fate from the Roman people, than to be
tortured to death by those among whom they had been accustomed to rule."

XXXII.—To these things Caesar replied, "That he, in accordance with his
custom, rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, if they
should surrender themselves before the battering-ram should touch the wall;
but that there was no condition of surrender, except upon their arms being
delivered up; that he should do to them that which he had done in the case
of the Nervii, and would command their neighbours not to offer any injury
to those who had surrendered to the Roman people." The matter being
reported to their countrymen, they said that they would execute his
commands. Having cast a very large quantity of their arms from the wall
into the trench which was before the town, so that the heaps of arms almost
equalled the top of the wall and the rampart, and nevertheless having
retained and concealed, as we afterwards discovered, about a third part in
the town, the gates were opened, and they enjoyed peace for that day.

XXXIII.—Towards evening Caesar ordered the gates to be shut, and the
soldiers to go out of the town, lest the townspeople should receive any
injury from them by night. They [the Aduatuci], by a design before entered
into, as we afterwards understood, because they believed that, as a
surrender had been made, our men would dismiss their guards, or at least
would keep watch less carefully, partly with those arms which they had
retained and concealed, partly with shields made of bark or interwoven
wickers, which they had hastily covered over with skins (as the shortness of
time required) in the third watch, suddenly made a sally from the town with
all their forces [in that direction] in which the ascent to our fortifications
seemed the least difficult. The signal having been immediately given by
fires, as Caesar had previously commanded, a rush was made thither [i.e. by
the Roman soldiers] from the nearest fort; and the battle was fought by the
enemy as vigorously as it ought to be fought by brave men, in the last hope
of safety, in a disadvantageous place, and against those who were throwing
their weapons from a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety
depended on their courage alone. About 4000 of the men having been slain,
the rest were forced back into the town. The day after, Caesar, after
breaking open the gates, which there was no one then to defend, and
sending in our soldiers, sold the whole spoil of that town. The number of
53,000 persons was reported to him by those who had bought them.

XXXIV.—At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had
sent with one legion against the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the
Curiosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which are
maritime states, and touch upon the [Atlantic] ocean, that all these nations
were brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people.

XXXV.—These things being achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so
high an opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians, that
ambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations who dwelt beyond the

Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages and execute his commands.
Which embassies Caesar, because he was hastening into Italy and Illyricum,
ordered to return to him at the beginning of the following summer. He
himself, having led his legions into winter-quarters among the Carnutes, the
Andes, and the Turones, which states were close to those regions in which
he had waged war, set out for Italy; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was
decreed for those achievements, upon receiving Caesar's letter; [an honour]
which before that time had been conferred on none.

BOOK III

I.—When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the
twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, the Veragri, and
Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges, and the lake of
Geneva, and the river Rhone to the top of the Alps. The reason for sending
him was, that he desired that the pass along the Alps, through which [the
Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travel with great danger, and
under great imposts, should be opened. He permitted him, if he thought it
necessary, to station the legion in these places, for the purpose of wintering.
Galba having fought some successful battles, and stormed several of their
forts, upon ambassadors being sent to him from all parts and hostages given
and a peace concluded, determined to station two cohorts among the
Nantuates, and to winter in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a
village of the Veragri, which is called Octodurus; and this village being
situated in a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sides
by very high mountains. As this village was divided into two parts by a
river, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, which
had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. He fortified
this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch.

II.—When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and he had
ordered corn to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by his scouts that
all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the town which he
had given up to the Gauls, and that the mountains which hung over it were
occupied by a very large force of the Sedani and Veragri. It had happened
for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed the design of renewing
the war and cutting off that legion. First, because they despised a single
legion, on account of its small number, and that not quite full (two cohorts
having been detached, and several individuals being absent, who had been
despatched for the purpose of seeking provision); then, likewise, because
they thought that on account of the disadvantageous character of the
situation, even their first attack could not be sustained [by us] when they
would rush from the mountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons
upon us. To this was added, that they were indignant that their children
were torn from them under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded
that the Romans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite
those parts to the neighbouring province [of Gaul], not only to secure the
passes, but also as a constant possession.

III.—Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works of the winter
quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor was sufficient
preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions (since, as a
surrender had been made, and hostages received, he had thought he need
entertain no apprehension of a war), speedily summoning a council, began
to anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council, since so much sudden
danger had happened contrary to the general expectation, and almost all the
higher places were seen already covered with a multitude of armed men,
nor could [either] troops come to their relief, or provisions be brought in, as
the passes were blocked up [by the enemy]; safety being now nearly
despaired of, some opinions of this sort were delivered; that, "leaving their
baggage, and making a sally, they should hasten away for safety by the

same routes by which they had come thither." To the greater part, however,
it seemed best, reserving that measure to the last, to await the issue of the
matter, and to defend the camp.

IV.—A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely given
for arranging and executing those things which they had determined on, the
enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] from all
parts, and discharged stones and darts upon our rampart. Our men at first,
while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did they cast any
weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as any part of the
camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hard pressed, thither they
ran, and brought assistance. But they were over-matched in this, that the
enemy when wearied by the long continuance of the battle, went out of the
action, and others with fresh strength came in their place; none of which
things could be done by our men, owing to the smallness of their number;
and not only was permission not given to the wearied [Roman] to retire
from the fight, but not even to the wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the
post where he had been stationed, and recover.

V.—When they had now been fighting for more than six hours, without
cessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing our men,
and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun to
demolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men were
becoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the last extremity,
P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom we have related to
have been disabled by severe wounds in the engagement with the Nervii,
and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a man of great skill and
valour, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the only hope of safety lay in
making a sally, and trying the last resource. Whereupon, assembling the
centurions, he quickly gives orders to the soldiers to discontinue the fight a
short time, and only collect the weapons flung [at them], and recruit

themselves after their fatigue, and afterwards, upon the signal being given,
sally forth from the camp, and place in their valour all their hope of safety.

VI.—They do what they were ordered; and, making a sudden sally from
all the gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of knowing
what was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus taking a
turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who had entertained
the hope of gaining the camp, and having killed more than the third part of
an army of more than 30,000 men (which number of the barbarians it
appeared certain had come up to our camp), put to flight the rest when
panic-stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even upon the higher grounds.
All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, and stripped of their arms,
[our men] betake themselves to their camp and fortifications. Which battle
being finished, inasmuch as Galba was unwilling to tempt fortune again,
and remembered that he had come into winter quarters with one design, and
saw that he had met with a different state of affairs; chiefly however urged
by the want of corn and provision, having the next day burned all the
buildings of that village, he hastens to return into the province; and as no
enemy opposed or hindered his march, he brought the legion safe into the
[country of the] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and there
wintered.

VII.—These things being achieved, while Caesar had every reason to
suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgae being
overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alps defeated, and
when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, set out for Illyricum, as
he wished to visit those nations, and acquire a knowledge of their countries,
a sudden war sprang up in Gaul. The occasion of that war was this: P.
Crassus, a young man, had taken up his winter quarters with the seventh
legion among the Andes, who border upon the [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there
was a scarcity of corn in those parts, sent out some officers of cavalry and

several military tribunes amongst the neighbouring states, for the purpose of
procuring corn and provision; in which number T. Terrasidius was sent
amongst the Esubii; M. Trebius Gallus amongst the Curiosolitae; Q.
Velanius, with T. Silius, amongst the Veneti.

VIII.—The influence of this state is by far the most considerable of any
of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the Veneti both have a very
great number of ships, with which they have been accustomed to sail to
Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge and experience of
nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scattered along that stormy and
open sea, of which they are in possession, they hold as tributaries almost all
those who are accustomed to traffic in that sea. With them arose the
beginning [of the revolt] by their detaining Silius and Velanius; for they
thought that they should recover by their means the hostages which they
had given to Crassus. The neighbouring people, led on by their influence (as
the measures of the Gauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and
Terrasidius for the same motive; and quickly sending ambassadors, by
means of their leading men, they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing
except by general consent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they
solicit the other states to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they
had received from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans.
All the sea coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they send a
common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], "If he wished to receive back his
officers, let him send back to them their hostages."

IX.—Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, since he was so
far distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the meantime on the
river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised from the
province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being quickly
executed, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits, hastens to
the army. The Veneti, and the other states also, being informed of Caesar's

arrival, when they reflected how great a crime they had committed, in that
the ambassadors (a character which had amongst all nations ever been
sacred and inviolable) had by them been detained and thrown into prison,
resolve to prepare for a war in proportion to the greatness of their danger,
and especially to provide those things which appertain to the service of a
navy; with the greater confidence, inasmuch as they greatly relied on the
nature of their situation. They knew that the passes by land were cut off by
estuaries, that the approach by sea was most difficult, by reason of our
ignorance of the localities, [and] the small number of the harbours, and they
trusted that our army would not be able to stay very long among them, on
account of the insufficiency of corn; and again, even if all these things
should turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful in
their navy. They, well understood that the Romans neither had any number
of ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the harbours, or the islands
of those parts where they would have to carry on the war; and that
navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was in the vast
and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortify their towns,
convey corn into them from the country parts, bring together as many ships
as possible to Venetia, where it appeared Caesar would at first carry on the
war. They unite to themselves as allies for that war, the Osismii, the
Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the
Menapii; and send for auxiliaries from Britain, which is situated over
against those regions.

X.—There were these difficulties which we have mentioned above, in
carrying on the war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to that
war; the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Roman
knights, the rebellion raised after surrendering, the revolt after hostages
were given, the confederacy of so many states, but principally, lest if [the
conduct of] this part was overlooked, the other nations should think that the
same thing was permitted them. Wherefore, since he reflected that almost

all the Gauls were fond of revolution, and easily and quickly excited to war;
that all men likewise, by nature, love liberty and hate the condition of
slavery, he thought he ought to divide and more widely distribute his army,
before more states should join the confederation.

XI.—He therefore sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to
the Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visit the
Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance and repel
the Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae to their
aid) if they attempted to cross the river by force in their ships. He orders P.
Crassus to proceed into Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a great
number of the cavalry, lest auxiliaries should be sent into Gaul by these
states, and such great nations be united. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus, his
lieutenant, with three legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the
Lexovii, to take care that their forces should be kept separate from the rest.
He appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the fleet and those Gallic vessels
which he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni, and
the other provinces which remained at peace; and commands him to
proceed towards the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastens thither
with the land forces.

XII.—The sites of their towns were generally such that, being placed on
extreme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had an approach
by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which always
happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships, because, upon the
tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashed upon the shoals. Thus,
by either circumstance, was the storming of their towns rendered difficult;
and if at any time perchance the Veneti, overpowered by the greatness of
our works (the sea having been excluded by a mound and large dams, and
the latter being made almost equal in height to the walls of the town), had
begun to despair of their fortunes, bringing up a large number of ships, of

which they had a very great quantity, they carried off all their property and
betook themselves to the nearest towns; there they again defended
themselves by the same advantages of situation. They did this the more
easily during a great part of the summer, because our ships were kept back
by storms, and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open
sea, with its strong tides and its harbours far apart and exceedingly few in
number.

XIII.—For their ships were built and equipped after this manner. The
keels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they could
more easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prows
were raised very high, and in like manner the sterns were adapted to the
force of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. The
ships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force and
violence whatever; the benches, which were made of planks a foot in
breadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb; the
anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and for sails they
used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] either through their
want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, or for this reason,
which is more probable, that they thought that such storms of the ocean, and
such violent gales of wind could not be resisted by sails, nor ships of such
great burden be conveniently enough managed by them. The encounter of
our fleet with these ships was of such a nature that our fleet excelled in
speed alone, and the plying of the oars; other things, considering the nature
of the place [and] the violence of the storms, were more suitable and better
adapted on their side; for neither could our ships injure theirs with their
beaks (so great was their strength), nor on account of their height was a
weapon easily cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less
readily locked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm began
to rage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the storm
more easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by the tide

feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which things was
much to be dreaded by our ships.

XIV.—Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving that so much
labour was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not be
prevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not be done
them, he determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came up and was
first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully equipped and
appointed with every kind of [naval] implement, sailed forth from the
harbour, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appear clear to Brutus,
who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes of the soldiers and the
centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned, what to do, or what
system of tactics to adopt; for they knew that damage could not be done by
their beaks; and that, although turrets were built [on their decks], yet the
height of the stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these; so that weapons
could not be cast up from [our] lower position with sufficient effect, and
those cast by the Gauls fell the more forcibly upon us. One thing provided
by our men was of great service, [viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and
fastened upon poles, of a form not unlike the hooks used in attacking town
walls. When the ropes which fastened the sail-yards to the masts were
caught by them and pulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the
oars, they [the ropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards
necessarily fell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended
on their sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entire
management of the ships was taken from them at the same time. The rest of
the contest depended on courage; in which our men decidedly had the
advantage; and the more so because the whole action was carried on in the
sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little more valiant than
ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills and higher grounds, from
which there was a near prospect of the sea, were occupied by our army.

XV.—The sail-yards [of the enemy], as we have said, being brought
down, although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded
each one [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to board the
ships of the enemy: and, after the barbarians observed this taking place, as a
great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief for that evil could be
discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And, having now turned
their vessels to that quarter in which the wind blew, so great a calm and lull
suddenly arose, that they could not move out of their place, which
circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportune for finishing the business;
for our men gave chase and took them one by one, so that very few out of
all the number, [and those] by the intervention of night, arrived at the land,
after the battle had lasted almost from the fourth hour till sunset.

XVI.—By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole of the sea
coast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of more advanced
age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled in that battle;
and they had collected in that one place whatever naval forces they had
anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors had no place to retreat
to, nor means of defending their towns. They accordingly surrendered
themselves and all their possessions to Caesar, on whom Caesar thought
that punishment should be inflicted the more severely, in order that for the
future the rights of ambassadors might be more carefully respected, by
barbarians: having, therefore, put to death all their senate, he sold the rest
for slaves.

XVII.—While these things are going on amongst the Veneti, Q. Titurius
Sabinus with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives in the
territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, and held the
chief command of all those states which had revolted: from which he had
collected a large and powerful army. And in those few days, the Aulerci and
the Sexovii, having slain their senate because they would not consent to be

promoters of the war, shut their gates [against us] and united themselves to
Viridovix; a great multitude besides of desperate men and robbers
assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of plundering and
the love of fighting had called away from husbandry and their daily labour.
Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which was in a position convenient
for everything; while Viridovix encamped over against him at a distance of
two miles, and daily bringing out his forces, gave him an opportunity of
fighting; so that Sabinus had now not only come into contempt with the
enemy, but also was somewhat taunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and
furnished so great a suspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to
approach even to the very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for
the following reason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to
engage in battle with so great a force, especially while he who held the
chief command was absent, except on advantageous ground or some
favourable circumstance presented itself.

XVIII.—After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, he
selected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whom he
had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts and promises to
go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of what he wished to be done.
Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays before them the
fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficulties Caesar himself
was harassed, and that the matter was not far removed from this—that
Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his army out of the camp
and set forth to Caesar, for the purpose of carrying [him] assistance, which,
when they heard, they all cry out together that an opportunity of
successfully conducting their enterprise ought not to be thrown away; that
they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many things persuaded the Gauls to
this measure; the delay of Sabinus during the previous days; the positive
assertion of the [pretended] deserter; want of provisions, for a supply of
which they had not taken the requisite precautions; the hope springing from

the Venetic war; and [also] because in most cases men willingly believe
what they wish. Influenced by these things, they do not discharge Viridovix
and the other leaders from the council, before they gained permission from
them to take up arms and hasten to [our] camp; which being granted,
rejoicing as if victory were fully certain, they collected faggots and
brushwood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, and hasten to the
camp.

XIX.—The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping
from the bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great speed
(in order that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans to
collect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus having
encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestly desired.
While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens which they
were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly made from two gates [of the
camp]. It happened, by the advantage of situation, by the unskilfulness and
the fatigue of the enemy, by the valour of our soldiers, and their experience
in former battles, that they could not stand one attack of our men, and
immediately turned their backs: and our men with full vigour followed them
while disordered, and slew a great number of them; the horse pursuing the
rest, left but few, who escaped by flight. Thus at the same time, Sabinus was
informed of the naval battle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and
all the states immediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the
temper of the Gauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their
mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities.

XX.—About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania
(which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory and the
great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul),
understanding that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few years
before L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant, had been killed, and his army

routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss of
his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be used by him.
Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries and cavalry, [and]
having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and
Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, that border on these
regions [Aquitania], he led his army into the territories of the Sotiates. On
his arrival being known, the Sotiates having brought together great forces
and [much] cavalry, in which their strength principally lay, and assailing our
army on the march, engaged first in a cavalry action, then when their
cavalry was routed, and our men pursuing, they suddenly display their
infantry forces, which they had placed in ambuscade in a valley. These
attacked our men [while] disordered, and renewed the fight.

XXI.—The battle was long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates,
relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the whole of
Aquitania rested on their valour; [and] our men, on the other hand, desired
it might be seen what they could accomplish without their general and
without the other legions, under a very young commander; at length the
enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and a great
number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the [principal] town
of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantly resisting, he raised vineae
and turrets. They at one time attempting a sally, at another forming mines to
our rampart and vineae (at which the Aquitani are eminently skilled,
because in many places amongst them there are copper mines); when they
perceived that nothing could be gained by these operations through the
perseverance of our men, they send ambassadors to Crassus, and entreat
him to admit them to a surrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to
deliver up their arms, comply.

XXII.—And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, in
another part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600 devoted

followers, whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose association are
these,—that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those to whose
friendship they have devoted themselves: if anything calamitous happen to
them, either they endure the same destiny together with them, or commit
suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there been found any one
who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he had devoted himself,
refused to die); Adcantuannus, [I say] endeavouring to make a sally with
these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, upon a shout being
raised at that part of the fortification, and a fierce battle had been fought
there, was driven back into the town, yet he obtained from Crassus [the
indulgence] that he should enjoy the same terms of surrender [as the other
inhabitants].

XXIII.—Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched into
the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, the barbarians
being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortified by the nature of
the place and by art had been taken by us in a few days after our arrival
there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, to combine, to give
hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadors also are sent to those
states of Hither Spain which are nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and
leaders are summoned from them; on whose arrival they proceed to carry
on the war with great confidence, and with a great host of men. They who
had been with Q. Sertorius the whole period [of his war in Spain] and were
supposed to have very great skill in military matters, are chosen leaders.
These, adopting the practice of the Roman people, begin to select
[advantageous] places, to fortify their camp, to cut off our men from
provisions, which, when Crassus observes, [and likewise] that his forces, on
account of their small number, could not safely be separated; that the enemy
both made excursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard
for their camp; that on that account, corn and provision could not very
conveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy was

daily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle. This
matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that all thought the
same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight.

XXIV.—Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, and
marshalled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in the centre, and
waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They, although on
account of their great number and their ancient renown in war, and the
small number of our men, they supposed they might safely fight,
nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without any wound, by
besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and if the Romans, on
account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat, they intended to attack
them while encumbered in their march and depressed in spirit [as being
assailed while] under baggage. This measure being approved of by the
leaders and the forces of the Romans drawn out, the enemy [still] kept
themselves in their camp. Crassus having remarked this circumstance, since
the enemy, intimidated by their own delay, and by the reputation [i.e. for
cowardice arising thence] had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting,
and the remarks of all were heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to
be made in going to the camp, after encouraging his men, he marches to the
camp of the enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops.

XXV.—There, while some were filling up the ditch, and others, by
throwing a large number of darts, were driving the defenders from the
rampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not
much rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to the soldiers],
and by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearance and character
of men engaged in fighting; while also the enemy were fighting resolutely
and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from their higher position, fell
with great effect; the horse, having gone round the camp of the enemy,

reported to Crassus that the camp was not fortified with equal care on the
side of the Decuman gate, and had an easy approach.

XXVI.—Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse to
animate their men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what
he wished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having
brought out the four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for the
camp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by a
somewhat longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of the enemy,
when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quickly arrived
at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and, having demolished
these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seen by them, or it
was known what was going on. And then, a shout being heard in that
quarter, our men, their strength having been recruited (which usually occurs
on the hope of victory), began to fight more vigorously. The enemy,
surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairs being despaired of, made great
attempts to cast themselves down over the ramparts and to seek safety in
flight. These the cavalry pursued over the very open plains, and after
leaving scarcely a fourth part out of the number of 50,000, which it was
certain had assembled out of Aquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late
at night to the camp.

XXVII.—Having heard of this battle, the greatest part of Aquitania
surrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, in which
number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the Vocasates, the
Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates,
the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remote nations, relying on the time
of the year, because winter was at hand, neglected to do this.

XXVIII.—About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearly
past, yet since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapii alone

remained in arms, and had never sent ambassadors to him [to make a treaty]
of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that war might soon be
terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a very different method
from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived that the greatest nations [of
Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routed and overcome, and as they
possessed continuous ranges of forests and morasses, they removed
themselves and all their property thither. When Caesar had arrived at the
opening of these forests, and had begun to fortify his camp, and no enemy
was in the meantime seen, while our men were dispersed on their respective
duties, they suddenly rushed out from all parts of the forest, and made an
attack on our men. The latter quickly took up arms and drove them back
again to their forests; and having killed a great many, lost a few of their
own men while pursuing them too far through those intricate places.

XXIX.—During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut down
the forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of the soldiers,
while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together (opposite to the
enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled it up as a rampart on
either flank. When a great space had been, with incredible speed, cleared in
a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage-
train were already seized by our men, and they themselves were seeking for
the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work
was necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the
soldiers could not any longer remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid
waste all their country, [and] having burnt their villages and houses, Caesar
led back his army and stationed them in winter-quarters among the Aulerci
and Lexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last.

BOOK IV

I.-The following winter (this was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M.
Crassus were consuls), those Germans [called] the Usipetes, and likewise
the Tenchtheri, with a great number of men, crossed the Rhine, not far from
the place at which that river discharges itself into the sea. The motive for
crossing [that river] was that, having been for several years harassed by the
Suevi, they were constantly engaged in war, and hindered from the pursuits
of agriculture. The nation of the Suevi is by far the largest and the most
warlike nation of all the Germans. They are said to possess a hundred
cantons, from each of which they yearly send from their territories for the
purpose of war a thousand armed men: the others who remain at home,
maintain [both] themselves and those engaged in the expedition. The latter
again, in their turn, are in arms the year after: the former remain at home.
Thus neither husbandry nor the art and practice of war are neglected. But
among them there exists no private and separate land; nor are they
permitted to remain more than one year in one place for the purpose of
residence. They do not live much on corn, but subsist for the most part on
milk and flesh, and are much [engaged] in hunting; which circumstance
must, by the nature of their food, and by their daily exercise and the
freedom of their life (for having from boyhood been accustomed to no
employment, or discipline, they do nothing at all contrary to their
inclination), both promote their strength and render them men of vast
stature of body. And to such a habit have they brought themselves, that even
in the coldest parts they wear no clothing whatever except skins, by reason
of the scantiness of which a great portion of their body is bare, and besides
they bathe in open rivers.

II.—Merchants have access to them rather that they may have persons to
whom they may sell those things which they have taken in war, than
because they need any commodity to be imported to them. Moreover, even
as to labouring cattle, in which the Gauls take the greatest pleasure, and
which they procure at a great price, the Germans do not employ such as are

imported, but those poor and ill-shaped animals which belong to their
country; these, however, they render capable of the greatest labour by daily
exercise. In cavalry actions they frequently leap from their horses and fight
on foot; and train their horses to stand still in the very spot on which they
leave them, to which they retreat with great activity when there is occasion;
nor, according to their practice, is anything regarded as more unseemly, or
more unmanly, than to use housings. Accordingly, they have the courage,
though they be themselves but few, to advance against any number
whatever of horse mounted with housings. They on no account permit wine
to be imported to them, because they consider that men degenerate in their
powers of enduring fatigue, and are rendered effeminate by that commodity.

III.—They esteem it their greatest praise as a nation that the lands about
their territories lie unoccupied to a very great extent, inasmuch as [they
think] that by this circumstance is indicated that a great number of nations
cannot, withstand their power; and thus on one side of the Suevi the lands
are said to lie desolate for about six hundred miles. On the other side they
border on the Ubii, whose state was large and flourishing, considering the
condition of the Germans, and who are somewhat more refined than those
of the same race and the rest [of the Germans], and that because they border
on the Rhine, and are much resorted to by merchants, and are accustomed to
the manners of the Gauls, by reason of their approximity to them. Though
the Suevi, after making the attempt frequently and in several wars, could
not expel this nation from their territories, on account of the extent and
population of their state, yet they made them tributaries, and rendered them
less distinguished and powerful [than they had ever been].

IV.—In the same condition were the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri (whom
we have mentioned above), who for many years resisted the power of the
Suevi, but being at last driven from their possessions, and having wandered
through many parts of Germany, came to the Rhine, to districts which the

Menapii inhabited, and where they had lands, houses, and villages on either
side of the river. The latter people, alarmed by the arrival of so great a
multitude, removed from those houses which they had on the other side of
the river, and having placed guards on this side the Rhine, proceeded to
hinder the Germans from crossing. They, finding themselves, after they had
tried all means, unable either to force a passage on account of their
deficiency in shipping, or cross by stealth on account of the guards of the
Menapii, pretended to return to their own settlements and districts; and,
after having proceeded three days' march, returned; and their cavalry having
performed the whole of this journey in one night, cut off the Menapii, who
were ignorant of, and did not expect [their approach, and] who, having
moreover been informed of the departure of the Germans by their scouts,
had without apprehension returned to their villages beyond the Rhine.
Having slain these, and seized their ships, they crossed the river before that
part of the Menapii, who were at peace in their settlements over the Rhine,
were apprised of [their intention]; and seizing all their houses, maintained
themselves upon their provisions during the rest of the winter.

V.—Caesar, when informed of these matters, fearing the fickle
disposition of the Gauls, who are easily prompted to take up resolutions,
and much addicted to change, considered that nothing was to be entrusted to
them; for it is the custom of that people to compel travellers to stop, even
against their inclination, and inquire what they may have heard, or may
know, respecting any matter; and in towns the common people throng
around merchants and force them to state from what countries they come,
and what affairs they know of there. They often engage in resolutions
concerning the most important matters, induced by these reports and stories
alone; of which they must necessarily instantly repent, since they yield to
mere unauthorised reports; and since most people give to their questions
answers framed agreeably to their wishes.

VI.—Caesar, being aware of their custom, in order that he might not
encounter a more formidable war, sets forward to the army earlier in the
year than he was accustomed to do. When he had arrived there, he
discovered that those things, which he had suspected would occur, had
taken place; that embassies had been sent to the Germans by some of the
states, and that they had been entreated to leave the Rhine, and had been
promised that all things which they desired should be provided by the
Gauls. Allured by this hope, the Germans were then making excursions to
greater distances, and had advanced to the territories of the Eburones and
the Condrusi, who are under the protection of the Treviri. After summoning
the chiefs of Gaul, Caesar thought proper to pretend ignorance of the things
which he had discovered; and having conciliated and confirmed their
minds, and ordered some cavalry to be raised, resolved to make war against
the Germans.

VII.—Having provided corn and selected his cavalry, he began to direct
his march towards those parts in which he heard the Germans were. When
he was distant from them only a few days' march, ambassadors come to him
from their state; whose speech was as follows:—"That the Germans neither
make war upon the Roman people first, nor do they decline, if they are
provoked, to engage with them in arms; for that this was the custom of the
Germans handed down to them from their forefathers, to resist whatsoever
people make war upon them and not to avert it by entreaty; this, however,
they confessed,—that they had come hither reluctantly, having been
expelled from their country. If the Romans were disposed to accept their
friendship, they might be serviceable allies to them; and let them either
assign them lands, or permit them to retain those which they had acquired
by their arms; that they are inferior to the Suevi alone, to whom not even
the immortal gods can show themselves equal; that there was none at all
besides on earth whom they could not conquer."

VIII.—To these remarks Caesar replied in such terms as he thought
proper; but the conclusion of his speech was, "That he could make no
alliance with them, if they continued in Gaul; that it was not probable that
they who were not able to defend their own territories, should get
possession of those of others, nor were there any lands lying waste in Gaul
which could be given away, especially to so great a number of men, without
doing wrong [to others]; but they might, if they were desirous, settle in the
territories of the Ubii; whose ambassadors were then with him, and were
complaining of the aggressions of the Suevi, and requesting assistance from
him; and that he would obtain this request from them."

IX.—The ambassadors said that they would report these things to their
countrymen; and, after having deliberated on the matter, would return to
Caesar after the third day, they begged that he would not in the meantime
advance his camp nearer to them. Caesar said that he could not grant them
even that; for he had learned that they had sent a great part of their cavalry
over the Meuse to the Ambivariti, some days before, for the purpose of
plundering and procuring forage. He supposed that they were then waiting
for these horse, and that the delay was caused on this account.

X.—The Meuse rises from mount Le Vosge, which is in the territories of
the Lingones; and, having received a branch of the Rhine, which is called
the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi, and not more than eighty miles
from it it falls into the ocean. But the Rhine takes its course among the
Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and is carried with a rapid current for a long
distance through the territories of the Sarunates, Helvetii, Sequani,
Mediomatrici, Tribuci, and Treviri, and when it approaches the ocean,
divides into several branches; and, having formed many and extensive
islands, a great part of which are inhabited by savage and barbarous nations
(of whom there are some who are supposed to live on fish and the eggs of
sea-fowl), flows into the ocean by several mouths.

XI.—When Caesar was not more than twelve miles distant from the
enemy, the ambassadors return to him, as had been arranged; who meeting
him on the march, earnestly entreated him not to advance any farther. When
they could not obtain this, they begged him to send on a despatch to those
who had marched in advance of the main army, and forbid them to engage;
and grant them permission to send ambassadors to the Ubii, and if the
princes and senate of the latter would give them security by oath, they
assured Caesar that they would accept such conditions as might be proposed
by him; and requested that he would give them the space of three days for
negotiating these affairs. Caesar thought that these things tended to the self-
same point [as their other proposal]; [namely] that, in consequence of a
delay of three days intervening, their horse which were at a distance might
return; however, he said, that he would not that day advance farther than
four miles for the purpose of procuring water; he ordered that they should
assemble at that place in as large a number as possible the following day,
that he might inquire into their demands. In the meantime he sends
messengers to the officers who had marched in advance with all the cavalry
to order them not to provoke the enemy to an engagement, and if they
themselves were assailed, to sustain the attack until he came up with the
army.

XII.—But the enemy, as soon as they saw our horse, the number of
which was 5000, whereas they themselves had not more than 800 horse,
because those which had gone over the Meuse for the purpose of foraging
had not returned, while our men had no apprehensions, because their
ambassadors had gone away from Caesar a little before, and that day had
been requested by them as a period of truce, made an onset on our men, and
soon threw them into disorder. When our men, in their turn, made a stand,
they, according to their practice, leaped from their horses to their feet, and
stabbing our horses in the belly and overthrowing a great many of our men,
put the rest to flight, and drove them forward so much alarmed that they did

not desist from their retreat till they had come in sight of our army. In that
encounter seventy-four of our horse were slain; among them, Piso, an
Aquitanian, a most valiant man, and descended from a very illustrious
family; whose grandfather had held the sovereignty of his state, and had
been styled friend by our senate. He, while he was endeavouring to render
assistance to his brother who was surrounded by the enemy, and whom he
rescued from danger, was himself thrown from his horse, which was
wounded under him, but still opposed [his antagonists] with the greatest
intrepidity, as long as he was able to maintain the conflict. When at length
he fell, surrounded on all sides and after receiving many wounds, and his
brother, who had then retired from the fight, observed it from a distance, he
spurred on his horse, threw himself upon the enemy, and was killed.

XIII.—After this engagement, Caesar considered that neither ought
ambassadors to be received to audience, nor conditions be accepted by him
from those who, after having sued for peace by way of stratagem and
treachery, had made war without provocation. And to wait till the enemy's
forces were augmented and their cavalry had returned, he concluded, would
be the greatest madness; and knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he felt
how much influence the enemy had already acquired among them by this
one skirmish. He [therefore] deemed that no time for converting measures
ought to be afforded them. After having resolved on these things and
communicated his plans to his lieutenants and quaestor in order that he
might not suffer any opportunity for engaging to escape him, a very
seasonable event occurred, namely, that on the morning of the next day, a
large body of Germans, consisting of their princes and old men, came to the
camp to him to practise the same treachery and dissimulation; but, as they
asserted, for the purpose of acquitting themselves for having engaged in a
skirmish the day before, contrary to what had been agreed and to what,
indeed, they themselves had requested; and also if they could by any means
obtain a truce by deceiving him. Caesar, rejoicing that they had fallen into

his power, ordered them to be detained. He then drew all his forces out of
the camp, and commanded the cavalry, because he thought they were
intimidated by the late skirmish, to follow in the rear.

XIV.—Having marshalled his army in three lines, and in a short time
performed a march of eight miles, he arrived at the camp of the enemy
before the Germans could perceive what was going on; who being suddenly
alarmed by all the circumstances, both by the speediness of our arrival and
the absence of their own officers, as time was afforded neither for
concerting measures nor for seizing their arms, are perplexed as to whether
it would be better to lead out their forces against the enemy, or to defend
their camp, or seek their safety by flight. Their consternation being made
apparent by their noise and tumult, our soldiers, excited by the treachery of
the preceding day, rushed into the camp: such of them as could readily get
their arms for a short time withstood our men, and gave battle among their
carts and baggage-waggons; but the rest of the people, [consisting] of boys
and women (for they had left their country and crossed the Rhine with all
their families), began to fly in all directions; in pursuit of whom Caesar sent
the cavalry.

XV.—The Germans when, upon hearing a noise behind them, [they
looked and] saw that their families were being slain, throwing away their
arms and abandoning their standards, fled out of the camp, and when they
had arrived at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, the survivors
despairing of farther escape, as a great number of their countrymen had
been killed, threw themselves into the river and there perished, overcome
by fear, fatigue, and the violence of the stream. Our soldiers, after the alarm
of so great a war, for the number of the enemy amounted to 430,000,
returned to their camp, all safe to a man, very few being even wounded.
Caesar granted those whom he had detained in the camp liberty of
departing. They however, dreading revenge and torture from the Gauls,

whose lands they had harassed, said that they desired to remain with him.
Caesar granted them permission.

XVI.—The German war being finished, Caesar thought it expedient for
him to cross the Rhine, for many reasons; of which this was the most
weighty, that, since he saw the Germans were so easily urged to go into
Gaul, he desired they should have their fears for their own territories when
they discovered that the army of the Roman people both could and dared
pass the Rhine. There was added also, that that portion of the cavalry of the
Usipetes and the Tenchtheri, which I have above related to have crossed the
Meuse for the purpose of plundering and procuring forage, and was not
present at the engagement, had betaken themselves, after the retreat of their
countrymen, across the Rhine into the territories of the Sigambri, and united
themselves to them. When Caesar sent ambassadors to them, to demand that
they should give up to him those who had made war against him and
against Gaul, they replied, "That the Rhine bounded the empire of the
Roman people; if he did not think it just for the Germans to pass over into
Gaul against his consent, why did he claim that anything beyond the Rhine
should be subject to his dominion or power?" The Ubii also, who alone, out
of all the nations lying beyond the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to Caesar,
and formed an alliance and given hostages, earnestly entreated "that he
would bring them assistance, because they were grievously oppressed by
the Suevi; or, if he was prevented from doing so by the business of the
commonwealth, he would at least transport his army over the Rhine; that
that would be sufficient for their present assistance and their hope for the
future; that so great was the name and the reputation of his army, even
among the most remote nations of the Germans, arising from the defeat of
Ariovistus and this last battle which was fought, that they might be safe
under the fame and friendship of the Roman people." They promised a large
number of ships for transporting the army.

XVII.—Caesar, for those reasons which I have mentioned, had resolved
to cross the Rhine; but to cross by ships he neither deemed to be sufficiently
safe, nor considered consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman
people. Therefore, although the greatest difficulty in forming a bridge was
presented to him, on account of the breadth, rapidity, and depth of the river,
he nevertheless considered that it ought to be attempted by him, or that his
army ought not otherwise to be led over. He devised this plan of a bridge.
He joined together at the distance of two feet, two piles, each a foot and a
half thick, sharpened a little at the lower end, and proportioned in length to
the depth of the river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these into the
river, and fixed them at the bottom, and then driven them in with rammers,
not quite perpendicularly, like a stake, but bending forward and sloping, so
as to incline in the direction of the current of the river; he also placed two
[other piles] opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower down,
fastened together in the same manner, but directed against the force and
current of the river. Both these, moreover, were kept firmly apart by beams
two feet thick (the space which the binding of the piles occupied), laid in at
their extremities between two braces on each side; and in consequence of
these being in different directions and fastened on sides the one opposite to
the other, so great was the strength of the work, and such the arrangement
of the materials, that in proportion as the greater body of water dashed
against the bridge, so much the closer were its parts held fastened together.
These beams were bound together by timber laid over them in the direction
of the length of the bridge, and were [then] covered over with laths and
hurdles; and in addition to this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at
the lower side of the bridge, and these serving as buttresses, and being
connected with every portion of the work, sustained the force of the stream:
and there were others also above the bridge, at a moderate distance; that if
trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the river by the barbarians for

the purpose of destroying the work, the violence of such things might be
diminished by these defences, and might not injure the bridge.

XVIII.—Within ten days after the timber began to be collected, the whole
work was completed, and the whole army led over. Caesar, leaving a strong
guard at each end of the bridge, hastens into the territories of the Sigambri.
In the meantime ambassadors from several nations come to him, whom, on
their suing for peace and alliance, he answers in a courteous manner, and
orders hostages to be brought to him. But the Sigambri, at the very time the
bridge was begun to be built, made preparations for a flight (by the advice
of such of the Tenchtheri and Usipetes as they had amongst them), and
quitted their territories and conveyed away all their possessions, and
concealed themselves in deserts and woods.

XIX.—Caesar, having remained in their territories a few days, and burnt
all their villages and houses, and cut down their corn, proceeded into the
territories of the Ubii; and having promised them his assistance, if they
were ever harassed by the Suevi, he learned from them these particulars:
that the Suevi, after they had by means of their scouts found that the bridge
was being built, had called a council, according to their custom, and sent
orders to all parts of their state to remove from the towns and convey their
children, wives, and all their possessions into the woods, and that all who
could bear arms should assemble in one place; that the place thus chosen
was nearly the centre of those regions which the Suevi possessed; that in
this spot they had resolved to await the arrival of the Romans, and give
them battle there. When Caesar discovered this, having already
accomplished all those things on account of which he had resolved to lead
his army over, namely, to strike fear into the Germans, take vengeance on
the Sigambri, and free the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi, having spent
altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had advanced

far enough to serve both honour and interest, he returned into Gaul, and cut
down the bridge.

XX.—During the short part of summer which remained, Caesar, although
in these countries, as all Gaul lies towards the north, the winters are early,
nevertheless resolved to proceed into Britain, because he discovered that in
almost all the wars with the Gauls succours had been furnished to our
enemy from that country; and even if the time of year should be insufficient
for carrying on the war, yet he thought it would be of great service to him if
he only entered the island, and saw into the character of the people, and got
knowledge of their localities, harbours, and landing-places, all which were
for the most part unknown to the Gauls. For neither does any one except
merchants generally go thither, nor even to them was any portion of it
known, except the sea-coast and those parts which are opposite to Gaul.
Therefore, after having called up to him the merchants from all parts, he
could learn neither what was the size of the island, nor what or how
numerous were the nations which inhabited it, nor what system of war they
followed, nor what customs they used, nor what harbours were convenient
for a great number of large ships.

XXI.—He sends before him Caius Volusenus with a ship of war, to
acquire a knowledge of these particulars before he in person should make a
descent into the island, as he was convinced that this was a judicious
measure. He commissioned him to thoroughly examine into all matters, and
then return to him as soon as possible. He himself proceeds to the Morini
with all his forces. He orders ships from all parts of the neighbouring
countries, and the fleet which the preceding summer he had built for the
war with the Veneti, to assemble in this place. In the meantime, his purpose
having been discovered, and reported to the Britons by merchants,
ambassadors come to him from several states of the island, to promise that
they will give hostages, and submit to the government of the Roman people.

Having given them an audience, he after promising liberally, and exhorting
them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own country, and
[despatches] with them Commius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates, he
had created king there, a man whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and
who he thought would be faithful to him, and whose influence ranked
highly in those countries. He orders him to visit as many states as he could,
and persuade them to embrace the protection of the Roman people, and
apprise them that he would shortly come thither. Volusenus, having viewed
the localities as far as means could be afforded one who dared not leave his
ship and trust himself to barbarians, returns to Caesar on the fifth day, and
reports what he had there observed.

XXII.—While Caesar remains in these parts for the purpose of procuring
ships, ambassadors come to him from a great portion of the Morini, to plead
their excuse respecting their conduct on the late occasion; alleging that it
was as men uncivilised, and as those who were unacquainted with our
custom, that they had made war upon the Roman people, and promising to
perform what he should command. Caesar, thinking that this had happened
fortunately enough for him, because he neither wished to leave an enemy
behind him, nor had an opportunity for carrying on a war, by reason of the
time of year, nor considered that employment in such trifling matters was to
be preferred to his enterprise on Britain, imposes a large number of
hostages; and when these were brought, he received them to his protection.
Having collected together and provided about eighty transport ships, as
many as he thought necessary for conveying over two legions, he assigned
such [ships] of war as he had besides to the quaestor, his lieutenants, and
officers of cavalry. There were in addition to these eighteen ships of burden
which were prevented, eight miles from that place, by winds, from being
able to reach the same port. These he distributed amongst the horse; the rest
of the army he delivered to Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta,
his lieutenants, to lead into the territories of the Menapii and those cantons

of the Morini from which ambassadors had not come to him. He ordered P.
Sulpicius Rufus, his lieutenant, to hold possession of the harbour, with such
a garrison as he thought sufficient.

XXIII.—These matters being arranged, finding the weather favourable
for his voyage, he set sail about the third watch, and ordered the horse to
march forward to the farther port, and there embark and follow him. As this
was performed rather tardily by them, he himself reached Britain with the
first squadron of ships, about the fourth hour of the day, and there saw the
forces of the enemy drawn up in arms on all the hills. The nature of the
place was this: the sea was confined by mountains so close to it that a dart
could be thrown from their summit upon the shore. Considering this by no
means a fit place for disembarking, he remained at anchor till the ninth
hour, for the other ships to arrive there. Having in the meantime assembled
the lieutenants and military tribunes, he told them both what he had learnt
from Volusenus, and what he wished to be done; and enjoined them (as the
principle of military matters, and especially as maritime affairs, which have
a precipitate and uncertain action, required) that all things should be
performed by them at a nod and at the instant. Having dismissed them,
meeting both with wind and tide favourable at the same time, the signal
being given and the anchor weighed, he advanced about seven miles from
that place, and stationed his fleet over against an open and level shore.

XXIV.—But the barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans,
sent forward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whom it is
their practice to make great use in their battles, and following with the rest
of their forces, endeavoured to prevent our men landing. In this was the
greatest difficulty, for the following reasons, namely, because our ships, on
account of their great size, could be stationed only in deep water; and our
soldiers, in places unknown to them, with their hands embarrassed,
oppressed with a large and heavy weight of armour, had at the same time to

leap from the ships, stand amidst the waves, and encounter the enemy;
whereas they, either on dry ground, or advancing a little way into the water,
free in all their limbs, in places thoroughly known to them, could
confidently throw their weapons and spur on their horses, which were
accustomed to this kind of service. Dismayed by these circumstances and
altogether untrained in this mode of battle, our men did not all exert the
same vigour and eagerness which they had been wont to exert in
engagements on dry ground.

XXV.—When Caesar observed this, he ordered the ships of war, the
appearance of which was somewhat strange to the barbarians and the
motion more ready for service, to be withdrawn a little from the transport
vessels, and to be propelled by their oars, and be stationed towards the open
flank of the enemy, and the enemy to be beaten off and driven away with
slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of great service to our men; for
the barbarians being startled by the form of our ships and the motions of our
oars and the nature of our engines, which was strange to them, stopped, and
shortly after retreated a little. And while our men were hesitating [whether
they should advance to the shore], chiefly on account of the depth of the
sea, he who carried the eagle of the tenth legion, after supplicating the gods
that the matter might turn out favourably to the legion, exclaimed, "Leap,
fellow soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for my
part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general." When he
had said this with a loud voice, he leaped from the ship and proceeded to
bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men, exhorting one another that
so great a disgrace should not be incurred, all leaped from the ship. When
those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily followed and
approached the enemy.

XXVI.—The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men,
however, as they could neither keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor

follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another from another
assembled around whatever standards they met, were thrown into great
confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the shallows, when
from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one by one, spurred on
their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed; many surrounded a few,
others threw their weapons upon our collected forces on their exposed
flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats of the ships of war
and the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, and sent them up to the succour
of those whom he had observed in distress. Our men, as soon as they made
good their footing on dry ground, and all their comrades had joined them,
made an attack upon the enemy, and put them to flight, but could not pursue
them very far, because the horse had not been able to maintain their course
at sea and reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed
success.

XXVII.—The enemy being thus vanquished in battle, as soon as they
recovered after their flight, instantly sent ambassadors to Caesar to
negotiate about peace. They promised to give hostages and perform what he
should command. Together with these ambassadors came Commius the
Atrebatian, who, as I have above said, had been sent by Caesar into Britain.
Him they had seized upon when leaving his ship, although in the character
of ambassador he bore the general's commission to them, and thrown into
chains: then after the battle was fought, they sent him back, and in suing for
peace cast the blame of that act upon the common people, and entreated that
it might be pardoned on account of their indiscretion. Caesar, complaining
that after they had sued for peace, and had voluntarily sent ambassadors
into the continent for that purpose, they had made war without a reason,
said that he would pardon their indiscretion, and imposed hostages, a part of
whom they gave immediately; the rest they said they would give in a few
days, since they were sent for from remote places. In the meantime they
ordered their people to return to the country parts, and the chiefs assembled

from all quarters, and proceeded to surrender themselves and their states to
Caesar.

XXVIII.—A peace being established by these proceedings four days after
we had come into Britain, the eighteen ships, to which reference has been
made above, and which conveyed the cavalry, set sail from the upper port
with a gentle gale; when, however, they were approaching Britain and were
seen from the camp, so great a storm suddenly arose that none of them
could maintain their course at sea; and some were taken back to the same
port from which they had started;—others, to their great danger, were
driven to the lower part of the island, nearer to the west; which, however,
after having cast anchor, as they were getting filled with water, put out to
sea through necessity in a stormy night, and made for the continent.

XXIX.—It happened that night to be full moon, which usually occasions
very high tides in that ocean; and that circumstance was unknown to our
men. Thus, at the same time, the tide began to fill the ships of war which
Caesar had provided to convey over his army, and which he had drawn up
on the strand; and the storm began to dash the ships of burden which were
riding at anchor against each other; nor was any means afforded our men of
either managing them or of rendering any service. A great many ships
having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, having lost their cables,
anchors, and other tackling, were unfit for sailing, a great confusion, as
would necessarily happen, arose throughout the army; for there were no
other ships in which they could be conveyed back, and all things which are
of service in repairing vessels were wanting, and corn for the winter had not
been provided in those places, because it was understood by all that they
would certainly winter in Gaul.

XXX.—On discovering these things the chiefs of Britain, who had come
up after the battle was fought to perform those conditions which Caesar had

imposed, held a conference, when they perceived that cavalry, and ships,
and corn were wanting to the Romans, and discovered the small number of
our soldiers from the small extent of the camp (which, too, was on this
account more limited than ordinary because Caesar had conveyed over his
legions without baggage), and thought that the best plan was to renew the
war, and cut off our men from corn and provisions and protract the affair till
winter; because they felt confident that, if they were vanquished or cut off
from a return, no one would afterwards pass over into Britain for the
purpose of making war. Therefore, again entering into a conspiracy, they
began to depart from the camp by degrees and secretly bring up their people
from the country parts.

XXXI.—But Caesar, although he had not as yet discovered their
measures, yet, both from what had occurred to his ships, and from the
circumstance that they had neglected to give the promised hostages,
suspected that the thing would come to pass which really did happen. He
therefore provided remedies against all contingencies; for he daily
conveyed corn from the country parts into the camp, used the timber and
brass of such ships as were most seriously damaged for repairing the rest,
and ordered whatever things besides were necessary for this object to be
brought to him from the continent. And thus, since that business was
executed by the soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the
loss of twelve ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest.

XXXII.—While these things are being transacted, one legion had been
sent to forage, according to custom, and no suspicion of war had arisen as
yet, and some of the people remained in the country parts, others went
backwards and forwards to the camp, they who were on duty at the gates of
the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than was usual was seen in
that direction in which the legion had marched. Caesar, suspecting that
which was [really the case],—that some new enterprise was undertaken by

the barbarians, ordered the two cohorts which were on duty to march into
that quarter with him, and two other cohorts to relieve them on duty; the
rest to be armed and follow him immediately. When he had advanced some
little way from the camp, he saw that his men were overpowered by the
enemy and scarcely able to stand their ground, and that, the legion being
crowded together, weapons were being cast on them from all sides. For as
all the corn was reaped in every part with the exception of one, the enemy,
suspecting that our men would repair to that, had concealed themselves in
the woods during the night. Then attacking them suddenly, scattered as they
were, and when they had laid aside their arms, and were engaged in
reaping, they killed a small number, threw the rest into confusion, and
surrounded them with their cavalry and chariots.

XXXIII.—Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they
drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally break
the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of
their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between the troops
of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. The charioteers in the
meantime withdraw some little distance from the battle, and so place
themselves with the chariots that, if their masters are overpowered by the
number of the enemy, they may have a ready retreat to their own troops.
Thus they display in battle the speed of horse, [together with] the firmness
of infantry; and by daily practice and exercise attain to such expertness that
they are accustomed, even on a declining and steep place, to check their
horses at full speed, and manage and turn them in an instant and run along
the pole, and stand on the yoke, and thence betake themselves with the
greatest celerity to their chariots again.

XXXIV.-Under these circumstances, our men being dismayed by the
novelty of this mode of battle, Caesar most seasonably brought assistance;
for upon his arrival the enemy paused, and our men recovered from their

fear; upon which, thinking the time unfavourable for provoking the enemy
and coming to an action, he kept himself in his own quarter, and, a short
time having intervened, drew back the legions into the camp. While these
things were going on, and all our men engaged, the rest of the Britons, who
were in the fields, departed. Storms then set in for several successive days,
which both confined our men to camp and hindered the enemy from
attacking us. In the meantime the barbarians despatched messengers to all
parts and reported to their people the small number of our soldiers, and how
good an opportunity was given for obtaining spoil and for liberating
themselves for ever, if they should only drive the Romans from their camp.
Having by these means speedily got together a large force of infantry and of
cavalry, they came up to the camp.

XXXV.—Although Caesar anticipated that the same thing which had
happened on former occasions would then occur—that, if the enemy were
routed, they would escape from danger by their speed; still, having got
about thirty horse, which Commius the Atrebatian, of whom mention has
been made, had brought over with him [from Gaul], he drew up the legions
in order of battle before the camp. When the action commenced, the enemy
were unable to sustain the attack of our men long, and turned their backs;
our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength permitted, and slew
a great number of them; then, having destroyed and burnt everything far
and wide, they retreated to their camp.

XXXVI.—The same day, ambassadors sent by the enemy came to Caesar
to negotiate a peace. Caesar doubled the number of hostages which he had
before demanded; and ordered that they should be brought over to the
continent, because, since the time of the equinox was near, he did not
consider that, with his ships out of repair, the voyage ought to be deferred
till winter. Having met with favourable weather he set sail a little after
midnight, and all his fleet arrived safe at the continent, except two of the
ships of burden which could not make the same port which the other ships
did, and were carried a little lower down.

XXXVII.—When our soldiers, about 300 in number, had been drawn out
of these two ships, and were marching to the camp, the Morini, whom
Caesar, when setting forth for Britain, had left in a state of peace, excited by
the hope of spoil, at first surrounded them with a small number of men, and
ordered them to lay down their arms, if they did not wish to be slain;
afterwards however, when they, forming a circle, stood on their defence, a
shout was raised and about 6000 of the enemy soon assembled; which being
reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry in the camp as a relief to his men. In
the meantime our soldiers sustained the attack of the enemy, and fought
most valiantly for more than four hours, and, receiving but few wounds
themselves, slew several of them. But after our cavalry came in sight, the
enemy, throwing away their arms, turned their backs, and a great number of
them were killed.

XXXVIII.—The day following Caesar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, with
those legions which he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini,
who had revolted; who, as they had no place to which they might retreat, on
account of the drying up of their marshes (which they had availed
themselves of as a place of refuge the preceding year), almost all fell into
the power of Labienus. In the meantime Caesar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius

and L. Cotta, who had led the legions into the territories of the Menapii,
having laid waste all their lands, cut down their corn and burnt their houses,
returned to Caesar because the Menapii had all concealed themselves in
their thickest woods. Caesar fixed the winter quarters of all the legions
amongst the Belgae. Thither only two British states sent hostages; the rest
omitted to do so. For these successes, a thanksgiving of twenty days was
decreed by the senate upon receiving Caesar's letter.

BOOK V

I.—Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius being consuls, Caesar when
departing from his winter quarters into Italy, as he had been accustomed to
do yearly, commands the lieutenants whom he appointed over the legions to
take care that during the winter as many ships as possible should be built,
and the old repaired. He plans the size and shape of them. For despatch of
lading, and for drawing them on shore, he makes them a little lower than
those which we have been accustomed to use in our sea; and that so much
the more, because he knew that, on account of the frequent changes of the
tide, less swells occurred there; for the purpose of transporting little and a
great number of horses, [he makes them] a little broader than those which
we use in other seas. All these he orders to be constructed for lightness and
expedition, to which object their lowness contributes greatly. He orders
those things which are necessary for equipping ships to be brought thither
from Spain. He himself, on the assizes of Hither Gaul being concluded,
proceeds into Illyricum, because he heard that the part of the province
nearest them was being laid waste by the incursions of the Pirustae. When
he had arrived there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and orders them to
assemble at an appointed place. Which circumstance having been reported
[to them], the Pirustae send ambassadors to him to inform him that no part

of those proceedings was done by public deliberation, and assert that they
were ready to make compensation by all means for the injuries [inflicted].
Caesar, accepting their defence, demands hostages, and orders them to be
brought to him on a specified day, and assures them that unless they did so
he would visit their state with war. These being brought to him on the day
which he had ordered, he appoints arbitrators between the states, who
should estimate the damages and determine the reparation.

II.—These things being finished, and the assizes being concluded, he
returns into Hither Gaul, and proceeds thence to the army. When he had
arrived there, having made a survey of the winter quarter, he finds that, by
the extraordinary ardour of the soldiers, amidst the utmost scarcity of all
materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which we have described
above, and twenty-eight ships of war, had been built, and were not far from
that state that they might be launched in a few days. Having commended
the soldiers and those who had presided over the work, he informs them
what he wishes to be done, and orders all the ships to assemble at port Itius,
from which port he had learned that the passage into Britain was shortest,
[being only] about thirty miles from the continent. He left what seemed a
sufficient number of soldiers for that design; he himself proceeds into the
territories of the Treviri with four legions without baggage, and 800 horse,
because they neither came to the general diets [of Gaul], nor obeyed his
commands, and were, moreover, said to be tampering with the Germans
beyond the Rhine.

III.—This state is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, and has
great forces of infantry, and as we have remarked above, borders on the
Rhine. In that state, two persons, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were then
contending with each other for the supreme power; one of whom, as soon as
the arrival of Caesar and his legions was known, came to him; assures him
that he and all his party would continue in their allegiance, and not revolt

from the alliance of the Roman people, and informs him of the things which
were going on amongst the Treviri. But Indutiomarus began to collect
cavalry and infantry, and make preparations for war, having concealed those
who by reason of their age could not be under arms in the forest Arduenna,
which is of immense size, [and] extends from the Rhine across the country
of the Treviri to the frontiers of the Remi. But after that, some of the chief
persons of the state, both influenced by their friendship for Cingetorix, and
alarmed at the arrival of our army, came to Caesar and began to solicit him
privately about their own interests, since they could not provide for the
safety of the state; Indutiomarus, dreading lest he should be abandoned by
all, sends ambassadors to Caesar, to declare that he absented himself from
his countrymen, and refrained from coming to him on this account, that he
might the more easily keep the state in its allegiance, lest on the departure
of all the nobility the commonalty should, in their indiscretion, revolt. And
thus the whole state was at his control; and that he, if Caesar would permit,
would come to the camp to him, and would commit his own fortunes and
those of the state to his good faith.

IV.—Caesar, though he discerned from what motive these things were
said, and what circumstance deterred him from his meditated plan, still, in
order that he might not be compelled to waste the summer among the
Treviri, while all things were prepared for the war with Britain, ordered
Indutiomarus to come to him with 200 hostages. When these were brought,
[and] among them his son and near relations whom he had demanded by
name, he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him to continue in his
allegiance; yet, nevertheless, summoning to him the chief men of the
Treviri, he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix: this he both thought
should be done by him in justice to the merits of the latter, and also judged
that it was of great importance that the influence of one whose singular
attachment towards him he had fully seen, should prevail as much as
possible among his people. Indutiomarus was very much offended at this

act, [seeing that] his influence was diminished among his countrymen; and
he, who already before had borne a hostile mind towards us, was much
more violently inflamed against us through resentment at this.

V.—These matters being settled, Caesar went to port Itius with the
legions. There he discovers that forty ships which had been built in the
country of the Meldi, having been driven back by a storm, had been unable
to maintain their course, and had returned to the same port from which they
had set out; he finds the rest ready for sailing, and furnished with
everything. In the same place, the cavalry of the whole of Gaul, in number
4000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons of all the states; he had
determined to leave in Gaul a very few of them, whose fidelity towards him
he had clearly discerned, and take the rest with him as hostages; because he
feared a commotion in Gaul when he should be absent.

VI.—There was together with the others, Dumnorix, the Aeduan, of
whom we have made previous mention. Him in particular he had resolved
to have with him, because he had discovered him to be fond of change, fond
of power, possessing great resolution, and great influence among the Gauls.
To this was added that Dumnorix had before said in an assembly of
Aeduans, that the sovereignty of the state had been made over to him by
Caesar; which speech the Aedui bore with impatience and yet dared not
send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of either rejecting or
deprecating [that appointment]. That fact Caesar had learned from his own
personal friends. He at first strove to obtain by every entreaty that he should
be left in Gaul; partly, because, being unaccustomed to sailing, he feared the
sea; partly, because he said he was prevented by divine admonitions. After
he saw that this request was firmly refused him, all hope of success being
lost, he began to tamper with the chief persons of the Gauls, to call them
apart singly and exhort them to remain on the continent; to agitate them
with the fear that it was not without reason that Gaul should be stript of all

her nobility; that it was Caesar's design to bring over to Britain and put to
death all those whom he feared to slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge his
honour to the rest, to ask for their oath that they would by common
deliberation execute what they should perceive to be necessary for Gaul.
These things were reported to Caesar by several persons.

VII.—Having learned this fact, Caesar, because he had conferred so
much honour upon the Aeduan state, determined that Dumnorix should be
restrained and deterred by whatever means he could; and that, because he
perceived his insane designs to be proceeding farther and farther, care
should be taken lest he might be able to injure him and the commonwealth.
Therefore, having stayed about twenty-five days in that place, because the
north wind, which usually blows a great part of every season, prevented the
voyage, he exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in his allegiance [and]
nevertheless learn all his measures: having at length met with favourable
weather, he orders the foot soldiers and the horse to embark in the ships.
But, while the minds of all were occupied, Dumnorix began to take his
departure from the camp homewards with the cavalry of the Aedui, Caesar
being ignorant of it. Caesar, on this matter being reported to him, ceasing
from his expedition and deferring all other affairs, sends a great part of the
cavalry to pursue him, and commands that he be brought back; he orders
that if he use violence and do not submit, that he be slain: considering that
Dumnorix would do nothing as a rational man while he himself was absent,
since he had disregarded his command even when present. He, however,
when recalled, began to resist and defend himself with his hand, and
implore the support of his people, often exclaiming that "he was free and
the subject of a free state." They surround and kill the man as they had been
commanded; but the Aeduan horsemen all return to Caesar.

VIII.—When these things were done [and] Labienus, left on the
continent with three legions and 2000 horse, to defend the harbours and

provide corn, and discover what was going on in Gaul, and take measures
according to the occasion and according to the circumstance; he himself,
with five legions and a number of horse, equal to that which he was leaving
on the continent, set sail at sunset and [though for a time] borne forward by
a gentle south-west wind, he did not maintain his course, in consequence of
the wind dying away about midnight, and being carried on too far by the
tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passed on his left. Then, again,
following the change of tide, he urged on with the oars that he might make
that port of the island in which he had discovered the preceding summer
that there was the best landing-place, and in this affair the spirit of our
soldiers was very much to be extolled; for they with the transports and
heavy ships, the labour of rowing not being [for a moment] discontinued,
equalled the speed of the ships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly
at mid-day; nor was there seen a [single] enemy in that place, but, as Caesar
afterwards found from some prisoners, though large bodies of troops had
assembled there, yet being alarmed by the great number of our ships, more
than eight hundred of which, including the ships of the preceding year, and
those private vessels which each had built for his own convenience, had
appeared at one time, they had quitted the coast and concealed themselves
among the higher points.

IX.—Caesar, having disembarked his army and chosen a convenient
place for the camp, when he discovered from the prisoners in what part the
forces of the enemy had lodged themselves, having left ten cohorts and 300
horse at the sea, to be a guard to the ships, hastens to the enemy, at the third
watch, fearing the less for the ships for this reason, because he was leaving
them fastened at anchor upon an even and open shore; and he placed Q.
Atrius over the guard of the ships. He himself, having advanced by night
about twelve miles, espied the forces of the enemy. They, advancing to the
river with their cavalry and chariots from the higher ground, began to annoy
our men and give battle. Being repulsed by our cavalry, they concealed

themselves in woods, as they had secured a place admirably fortified by
nature and by art, which, as it seemed, they had before prepared on account
of a civil war; for all entrances to it were shut up by a great number of
felled trees. They themselves rushed out of the woods to fight here and
there, and prevented our men from entering their fortifications. But the
soldiers of the seventh legion, having formed a testudo and thrown up a
rampart against the fortification, took the place and drove them out of the
woods, receiving only a few wounds. But Caesar forbade his men to pursue
them in their flight any great distance; both because he was ignorant of the
nature of the ground, and because, as a great part of the day was spent, he
wished time to be left for the fortification of the camp.

X.—The next day, early in the morning, he sent both foot-soldiers and
horse in three divisions on an expedition to pursue those who had fled.
These having advanced a little way, when already the rear [of the enemy]
was in sight, some horse came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius, to report that
the preceding night, a very great storm having arisen, almost all the ships
were dashed to pieces and cast upon the shore, because neither the anchors
and cables could resist, nor could the sailors and pilots sustain the violence
of the storm; and thus great damage was received by that collision of the
ships.

XI.—These things being known [to him], Caesar orders the legions and
cavalry to be recalled and to cease from their march; he himself returns to
the ships: he sees clearly before him almost the same things which he had
heard of from the messengers and by letter, so that, about forty ships being
lost, the remainder seemed capable of being repaired with much labour.
Therefore he selects workmen from the legions, and orders others to be sent
for from the continent; he writes to Labienus to build as many ships as he
could with those legions which were with him. He himself, though the
matter was one of great difficulty and labour, yet thought it to be most

expedient for all the ships to be brought up on shore and joined with the
camp by one fortification. In these matters he employed about ten days, the
labour of the soldiers being unremitting even during the hours of night. The
ships having been brought up on shore and the camp strongly fortified, he
left the same forces which he did before as a guard for the ships; he sets out
in person for the same place that he had returned from. When he had come
thither, greater forces of the Britons had already assembled at that place, the
chief command and management of the war having been entrusted to
Cassivellaunus, whose territories a river, which is called the Thames,
separates from the maritime states at about eighty miles from the sea. At an
earlier period perpetual wars had taken place between him and the other
states; but, greatly alarmed by our arrival, the Britons had placed him over
the whole war and the conduct of it.

XII.—The interior portion of Britain is inhabited by those of whom they
say that it is handed down by tradition that they were born in the island
itself: the maritime portion by those who had passed over from the country
of the Belgae for the purpose of plunder and making war; almost all of
whom are called by the names of those states from which being sprung they
went thither, and having waged war, continued there and began to cultivate
the lands. The number of the people is countless, and their buildings
exceedingly numerous, for the most part very like those of the Gauls: the
number of cattle is great. They use either brass or iron rings, determined at a
certain weight, as their money. Tin is produced in the midland regions; in
the maritime, iron; but the quantity of it is small: they employ brass, which
is imported. There, as in Gaul, is timber of every description, except beech
and fir. They do not regard it lawful to eat the hare, and the cock, and the
goose; they, however, breed them for amusement and pleasure. The climate
is more temperate than in Gaul, the colds being less severe.

XIII.—The island is triangular in its form, and one of its sides is opposite
to Gaul. One angle of this side, which is in Kent, whither almost all ships
from Gaul are directed, [looks] to the east; the lower looks to the south.
This side extends about 500 miles. Another side lies towards Spain and the
west, on which part is Ireland, less, as is reckoned, than Britain by one-half;
but the passage [from it] into Britain is of equal distance with that from
Gaul. In the middle of this voyage is an island, which is called Mona; many
smaller islands besides are supposed to lie [there], of which islands some
have written that at the time of the winter solstice it is night there for thirty
consecutive days. We, in our inquiries about that matter, ascertained
nothing, except that, by accurate measurements with water, we perceived
the nights to be shorter there than on the continent. The length of this side,
as their account states, is 700 miles. The third side is towards the north, to
which portion of the island no land is opposite; but an angle of that side
looks principally towards Germany. This side is considered to be 800 miles
in length. Thus the whole island is [about] 2000 miles in circumference.

XIV.—The most civilised of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent,
which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from the
Gallic customs. Most of the inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but live on
milk and flesh, and are clad with skins. All the Britons, indeed, dye
themselves with wood, which occasions a bluish colour, and thereby have a
more terrible appearance in fight. They wear their hair long, and have every
part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten and even
twelve have wives common to them, and particularly brothers among
brothers, and parents among their children; but if there be any issue by
these wives, they are reputed to be the children of those by whom
respectively each was first espoused when a virgin.

XV.—The horse and charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in a
skirmish with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our men were

conquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but, having
slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some of their men.
But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men were off their
guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushed out of the
woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed on duty before
the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohorts being sent by
Caesar to their relief, and these severally the first of two legions, when
these had taken up their position at a very small distance from each other, as
our men were disconcerted by the unusual mode of battle, the enemy broke
through the middle of them most courageously, and retreated thence in
safety. That day, Q. Laberius Durus, a tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The
enemy, since more cohorts were sent against them, were repulsed.

XVI.—In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement took
place under the eyes of all and before the camp, it was perceived that our
men, on account of the weight of their arms, inasmuch as they could neither
pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit their standards, were little
suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse also fought with great danger,
because they [the Britons] generally retreated even designedly, and, when
they had drawn off our men a short distance from the legions, leaped from
their chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to them advantageous]
battle. But the system of cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal
danger, and indeed the same, both to those who retreat and those who
pursue. To this was added, that they never fought in close order, but in small
parties and at great distances, and had detachments placed [in different
parts], and then the one relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh
succeeded the wearied.

XVII.—The following day the enemy halted on the hills, a distance from
our camp, and presented themselves in small parties, and began to challenge
our horse to battle with less spirit than the day before. But at noon, when

Caesar had sent three legions, and all the cavalry with C. Trebonius, the
lieutenant, for the purpose of foraging, they flew upon the foragers
suddenly from all quarters, so that they did not keep off [even] from the
standards and the legions. Our men making an attack on them vigorously,
repulsed them; nor did they cease to pursue them until the horse, relying on
relief, as they saw the legions behind them, drove the enemy precipitately
before them, and, slaying a great number of them, did not give them the
opportunity either of rallying or halting, or leaping from their chariots.
Immediately after this retreat, the auxiliaries who had assembled from all
sides, departed; nor after that time did the enemy ever engage with us in
very large numbers.

XVIII.—Caesar, discovering their design, leads his army into the
territories of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames; which river can be forded
in one place only, and that with difficulty. When he had arrived there, he
perceives that numerous forces of the enemy were marshalled on the other
bank of the river; the bank also was defended by sharp stakes fixed in front,
and stakes of the same kind fixed under the water were covered by the river.
These things being discovered from [some] prisoners and deserters, Caesar,
sending forward the cavalry, ordered the legions to follow them
immediately. But the soldiers advanced with such speed and such ardour,
though they stood above the water by their heads only, that the enemy could
not sustain the attack of the legions and of the horse, and quitted the banks,
and committed themselves to flight.

XIX.—Cassivellaunus, as we have stated above, all hope [rising out] of
battle being laid aside, the greater part of his forces being dismissed, and
about 4000 charioteers only being left, used to observe our marches and
retire a little from the road, and conceal himself in intricate and woody
places, and in those neighbourhoods in which he had discovered we were
about to march, he used to drive the cattle and the inhabitants from the

fields into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for the sake of plundering and
ravaging the more freely, scattered themselves among the fields, he used to
send out charioteers from the woods by all the well-known roads and paths,
and, to the great danger of our horse, engage with them; and this source of
fear hindered them from straggling very extensively. The result was that
Caesar did not allow excursions to be made to a great distance from the
main body of the legions, and ordered that damage should be done to the
enemy in ravaging their lands and kindling fires only so far as the legionary
soldiers could, by their own exertion and marching, accomplish it.

XX.—In the meantime, the Trinobantes, almost the most powerful state
of those parts, from which the young man Mandubratius embracing the
protection of Caesar had come to the continent of Gaul to [meet] him
(whose father, Imanuentius, had possessed the sovereignty in that state, and
had been killed by Cassivellaunus; he himself had escaped death by flight),
send ambassadors to Caesar, and promise that they will surrender
themselves to him and perform his commands; they entreat him to protect
Mandubratius from the violence of Cassivellaunus, and send to their state
some one to preside over it, and possess the government. Caesar demands
forty hostages from them, and corn for his army, and sends Mandubratius to
them. They speedily performed the things demanded, and sent hostages to
the number appointed, and the corn.

XXI.—The Trinobantes being protected and secured from any violence
of the soldiers, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci,
and the Cassi, sending embassies, surrender themselves to Caesar. From
them he learns that the capital town of Cassivellaunus was not far from that
place, and was defended by woods and morasses, and a very large number
of men and of cattle had been collected in it. (Now the Britons, when they
have fortified the intricate woods, in which they are wont to assemble for
the purpose of avoiding the incursion of an enemy, with an entrenchment

and a rampart, call them a town.) Thither he proceeds with his legions: he
finds the place admirably fortified by nature and art; he, however,
undertakes to attack it in two directions. The enemy, having remained only
a short time, did not sustain the attack of our soldiers, and hurried away on
the other side of the town. A great amount of cattle was found there, and
many of the enemy were taken and slain in their flight.

XXII.—While these things are going forward in those places,
Cassivellaunus sends messengers into Kent, which, we have observed
above, is on the sea, over which districts four several kings reigned,
Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, and commands them to
collect all their forces, and unexpectedly assail and storm the naval camp.
When they had come to the camp, our men, after making a sally, slaying
many of their men, and also capturing a distinguished leader named
Lugotorix, brought back their own men in safety. Cassivellaunus, when this
battle was reported to him, as so many losses had been sustained, and his
territories laid waste, being alarmed most of all by the desertion of the
states, sends ambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about a surrender through the
mediation of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar, since he had determined to
pass the winter on the continent, on account of the sudden revolts of Gaul,
and as much of the summer did not remain, and he perceived that even that
could be easily protracted, demands hostages, and prescribes what tribute
Britain should pay each year to the Roman people; he forbids and
commands Cassivellaunus that he wage not war against Mandubratius or
the Trinobantes.

XXIII.—When he had received the hostages, he leads back the army to
the sea, and finds the ships repaired. After launching these, because he had
a large number of prisoners, and some of the ships had been lost in the
storm, he determines to convey back his army at two embarkations. And it
so happened, that out of so large a number of ships, in so many voyages,

neither in this nor in the previous year was any ship missing which
conveyed soldiers; but very few out of those which were sent back to him
from the continent empty, as the soldiers of the former convoy had been
disembarked, and out of those (sixty in number) which Labienus had taken
care to have built, reached their destination; almost all the rest were driven
back, and when Caesar had waited for them for some time in vain, lest he
should be debarred from a voyage by the season of the year, inasmuch as
the equinox was at hand, he of necessity stowed his soldiers the more
closely, and, a very great calm coming on, after he had weighed anchor at
the beginning of the second watch, he reached land at break of day and
brought in all the ships in safety.

XXIV.—The ships having been drawn up and a general assembly of the
Gauls held at Samarobriva, because the corn that year had not prospered in
Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was compelled to station his army in its
winter-quarters, differently from the former years, and to distribute the
legions among several states: one of them he gave to C. Fabius, his
lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of the Morini; a second to Q.
Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. Roscius, into those of the
Essui; a fourth he ordered to winter with T. Labienus among the Remi in the
confines of the Treviri; he stationed three in Belgium; over these he
appointed M. Crassus, his questor, and L. Munatius Plancus and C.
Trebonius, his lieutenants. One legion which he had raised last on the other
side of the Po, and five cohorts, he sent amongst the Eburones, the greatest
portion of whom lie between the Meuse and the Rhine, [and] who were
under the government of Ambiorix and Cativolcus. He ordered Q. Titurius
Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to take the command of
these soldiers. The legions being distributed in this manner, he thought he
could most easily remedy the scarcity of corn; and yet the winter-quarters of
all these legions (except that which he had given to L. Roscius to be led into
the most peaceful and tranquil neighbourhood) were comprehended within

[about] 100 miles. He himself in the meanwhile, until he had stationed the
legions and knew that the several winter-quarters were fortified, determined
to stay in Gaul.

XXV.—There was among the Carnutes a man named Tasgetius, born of
very high rank, whose ancestors had held the sovereignty in his state. To
him Caesar had restored the position of his ancestors, in consideration of his
prowess and attachment towards him, because in all his wars he had availed
himself of his valuable services. His personal enemies had killed him when
in the third year of his reign, many even of his own state being openly
promoters [of that act]. This event is related to Caesar. He fearing, because
several were involved in the act, that the state might revolt at their
instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with a legion, to proceed quickly from
Belgium to the Carnutes, and winter there, and arrest and send to him the
persons by whose instrumentality he should discover that Tasgetius was
slain. In the meantime, he was apprised by all the lieutenants and questors
to whom he had assigned the legions, that they had arrived in winter-
quarters, and that the place for the quarters was fortified.

XXVI.—About fifteen days after they had come into winter-quarters, the
beginning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix and
Cativolcus, who, though they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the borders
of their kingdom, and had conveyed corn into our winter-quarters, induced
by the messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri, excited their people,
and after having suddenly assailed the soldiers, engaged in procuring wood,
came with a large body to attack the camp. When our men had speedily
taken up arms and had ascended the rampart, and sending out some Spanish
horse on one side, had proved conquerors in a cavalry action, the enemy,
despairing of success, drew off their troops from the assault. Then they
shouted, according to their custom, that some of our men should go forward
to a conference, [alleging] that they had some things which they desired to

say respecting the common interest, by which they trusted their disputes
could be removed.

XXVII.—C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q.
Titurius, and with him Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, who already
on previous occasions had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Caesar's
mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference: before them
Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That he confessed that for Caesar's kindness
towards him he was very much indebted to him, inasmuch as by his aid he
had been freed from a tribute which he had been accustomed to pay to the
Aduatuci, his neighbours; and because his own son and the son of his
brother had been sent back to him, whom, when sent in the number of
hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them in slavery and in chains;
and that he had not done that which he had done in regard to the attacking
of the camp, either by his own judgment or desire, but by the compulsion of
his state; and that his government was of that nature, that the people had as
much of authority over him as he over the people. To the state moreover the
occasion of the war was this —that it could not withstand the sudden
combination of the Gauls; that he could easily prove this from his own
weakness, since he was not so little versed in affairs as to presume that with
his forces he could conquer the Roman people; but that it was the common
resolution of Gaul; that that day was appointed for the storming of all
Caesar's winter-quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to
the relief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls,
especially when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their
common freedom. Since he had performed his duty to them on the score of
patriotism [he said], he has now regard to gratitude for the kindness of
Caesar; that he warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality,
to consult for his and his soldiers' safety; that a large force of the Germans
had been hired and had passed the Rhine; that it would arrive in two days;
that it was for them to consider whether they thought fit, before the nearest

people perceived it, to lead off their soldiers when drawn out of winter-
quarters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one of whom was about fifty miles
distant from them, the other rather more; that this he promised and
confirmed by oath, that he would give them a safe passage through his
territories; and when he did that, he was both consulting for his own state,
because it would be relieved from the winter-quarters, and also making a
requital to Caesar for his obligations."

XXVIII.—Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they had
heard. They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though those things
were spoken by an enemy, still thought they were not to be disregarded; and
they were especially influenced by this consideration, that it was scarcely
credible that the obscure and humble state of the Eburones had dared to
make war upon the Roman people of their own accord. Accordingly, they
refer the matter to a council, and a, great controversy arises among them. L.
Aurunculeius, and several tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions of the
first rank, were of opinion "that nothing should be done hastily, and that
they should not depart from the camp without Caesar's orders"; they
declared, "that any forces of the Germans, however great, might be
encountered by fortified winter-quarters; that this fact was a proof [of it];
that they had sustained the first assault of the Germans most valiantly,
inflicting many wounds upon them; that they were not distressed for corn;
that in the meantime relief would come both from the nearest winter-
quarters and from Caesar"; lastly, they put the query, "what could be more
undetermined, more undignified, than to adopt measures respecting the
most important affairs on the authority of an enemy?"

XXIX.—In opposition to those things Titurius exclaimed, "That they
would do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a junction
with the Germans, should have assembled; or when some disaster had been
received in the neighbouring winter-quarters; that the opportunity for

deliberating was short; that he believed that Caesar had set forth into Italy,
as the Carnutes would not otherwise have taken the measure of slaying
Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had been present, have come to the
camp with so great defiance of us; that he did not regard the enemy, but the
fact, as the authority; that the Rhine was near; that the death of Ariovistus
and our previous victories were subjects of great indignation to the
Germans; that Gaul was inflamed, that after having received so many
defeats she was reduced under the sway of the Roman people, her pristine
glory in military matters being extinguished." Lastly, "who would persuade
himself of this, that Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without
sure grounds? That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be
nothing very formidable, they would go without danger to the nearest
legion; if all Gaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in
despatch. What issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed
from him, have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded,
yet certainly famine, by a protracted siege, was."

XXX.—This discussion having been held on the two sides, when
opposition was offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal officers,
"Prevail," said Sabinus, "if so you wish it"; and he said it with a louder
voice, that a great portion of the soldiers might hear him; "nor am I the
person among you," he said, "who is most powerfully alarmed by the
danger of death; these will be aware of it, and then, if any thing disastrous
shall have occurred, they will demand a reckoning at your hands; these,
who, if it were permitted by you, united three days hence with the nearest
winter-quarters, may encounter the common condition of war with the rest,
and not, as if forced away and separated far from the rest, perish either by
the sword or by famine."

XXXI.—They rise from the council, detain both, and entreat, that "they
do not bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by their dissension and

obstinacy; the affair was an easy one, if only they all thought and approved
of the same thing, whether they remain or depart; on the other hand, they
saw no security in dissension." The matter is prolonged by debate till
midnight. At last Cotta, being overruled, yields his assent; the opinion of
Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed that they will march at day-break; the
remainder of the night is spent without sleep, since every soldier was
inspecting his property, [to see] what he could carry with him, and what, out
of the appurtenances of the winter-quarters, he would be compelled to
leave; every reason is suggested to show why they could not stay without
danger, and how that danger would be increased by the fatigue of the
soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of day they quit the camp, in a
very extended line and with a very large amount of baggage, in such a
manner as men who were convinced that the advice was given by Ambiorix,
not as an enemy, but as most friendly [towards them].

XXXII.—But the enemy, after they had made the discovery of their
intended departure by the noise during the night and their not retiring to
rest, having placed an ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in a
suitable and concealed place, two miles from the camp, waited for the
arrival of the Romans; and when the greater part of the line of march had
descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly presented themselves
on either side of that valley, and began both to harass the rear and hinder the
van from ascending, and to give battle in a place exceedingly
disadvantageous to our men.

XXXIII.—Then at length Titurius, as one who had provided nothing
beforehand, was confused, ran to and fro, and set about arranging his
troops; these very things, however, he did timidly and in such a manner that
all resources seemed to fail him: which generally happens to those who are
compelled to take council in the action itself. But Cotta, who had reflected
that these things might occur on the march, and on that account had not

been an adviser of the departure, was wanting to the common safety in no
respect; both in addressing and encouraging the soldiers, he performed the
duties of a general, and in the battle those of a soldier. And since they
[Titurius and Cotta] could less easily perform everything by themselves,
and provide what was to be done in each place, by reason of the length of
the line of march, they ordered [the officers] to give the command that they
should leave the baggage and form themselves into an orb, which measure,
though in a contingency of that nature it was not to be condemned, still
turned out unfortunately; for it both diminished the hope of our soldiers and
rendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it appeared that this
was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides that happened,
which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for the most part
quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off from the baggage
whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filled with uproar and
lamentation.

XXXIV.—But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for their
leaders ordered [the officers] to proclaim through the ranks "that no man
should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved
whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them consider that all
things depended on their victory." Our men were equal to them in fighting,
both in courage and in number, and though they were deserted by their
leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of safety in their valour,
and as often as any cohort sallied forth on that side, a great number of the
enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when he observed this, orders the command
to be issued that they throw their weapons from a distance and do not
approach too near, and in whatever direction the Romans should make an
attack, there give way (from the lightness of their appointments and from
their daily practice no damage could be done them); [but] pursue them
when betaking themselves to their standards again.

XXXV.—Which command having been most carefully obeyed, when any
cohort had quitted the circle and made a charge, the enemy fled very
precipitately. In the meantime, that part of the Roman army, of necessity,
was left unprotected, and the weapons received on their open flank. Again,
when they had begun to return to that place from which they had advanced,
they were surrounded both by those who had retreated and by those who
stood next them; but if, on the other hand, they wished to keep their place,
neither was an opportunity left for valour, nor could they, being crowded
together, escape the weapons cast by so large a body of men. Yet, though
assailed by so many disadvantages, [and] having received many wounds,
they withstood the enemy, and, a great portion of the day being spent,
though they fought from day-break till the eighth hour, they did nothing
which was unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of T. Balventius, who
the year before had been chief centurion, a brave man and one of great
authority, is pierced with a javelin; Q. Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting
most valiantly, is slain while he assists his son when surrounded by the
enemy; L. Cotta, the lieutenant, when encouraging all the cohorts and
companies, is wounded full in the mouth by a sling.

XXXVI.—Much troubled by these events, Q. Titurius, when he had
perceived Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sends to him his
interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he would spare him and his soldiers.
He, when addressed, replied, "If he wished to confer with him, it was
permitted; that he hoped what pertained to the safety of the soldiers could
be obtained from the people; that to him however certainly no injury would
be done, and that he pledged his faith to that effect." He consults with Cotta,
who had been wounded, whether it would appear right to retire from battle,
and confer with Ambiorix; [saying] that he hoped to be able to succeed
respecting his own and the soldiers' safety. Cotta says he will not go to an
armed enemy, and in that perseveres.

XXXVII.—Sabinus orders those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at
the time around him, and the centurions of the first ranks, to follow him,
and when he had approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered to throw
down his arms, he obeys the order and commands his men to do the same.
In the meantime, while they treat upon the terms, and a longer debate than
necessary is designedly entered into by Ambiorix, being surrounded by
degrees, he is slain. Then they according to their custom shout out
"Victory," and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack on our men, break
their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting, is slain, together with the greater
part of the soldiers; the rest betake themselves to the camp from which they
had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petrosidius, the standard bearer,
when he was overpowered by the great number of the enemy, threw the
eagle within the entrenchments and is himself slain while fighting with the
greatest courage before the camp. They with difficulty sustain the attack till
night; despairing of safety, they all to a man destroy themselves in the night.
A few escaping from the battle, make their way to Labienus at winter-
quarters, after wandering at random through the woods, and inform him of
these events.

XXXVIII.—Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with
his cavalry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neither
day nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Having related
the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the
Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away the opportunity of
liberating themselves for ever and of punishing the Romans for those
wrongs which they had received from them"; [he tells them] "that two
lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion of the army has
perished; that it was not a matter of difficulty for the legion which was
wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly assaulted; he declares
himself ready to co-operate in that design." He easily gains over the Nervii
by this speech.

XXXIX.—Accordingly, messengers having been forthwith despatched to
the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of
whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies as they
can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter-quarters of Cicero, the report of
the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him. That also
occurred to him which was the consequence of a necessary work,—that
some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for the purpose of procuring
timber and therewith constructing fortifications, were intercepted by the
sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. These having been entrapped, the
Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatuci and all their allies and dependants,
begin to attack the legion: our men quickly run together to arms and mount
the rampart: they sustained the attack that day with great difficulty, since
the enemy placed all their hope in despatch, and felt assured that, if they
obtained this victory, they would be conquerors for ever.

XL.—Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewards
being offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All the
passes having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. During the
night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible despatch out of the
timber which they had collected for the purpose of fortification: the things
which seemed necessary to the work are completed. The following day the
enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack the camp [and] fill up the
ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the same manner as the day before:
this same thing is done afterwards during the remaining days. The work is
carried on incessantly in the night: not even to the sick, or wounded, is
opportunity given for rest: whatever things are required for resisting the
assault of the next day are provided during the night: many stakes burnt at
the end, and a large number of mural pikes are procured: towers are built
up, battlements and parapets are formed of interwoven hurdles. Cicero
himself, though he was in very weak health, did not leave himself the night-

time for repose, so that he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous
movement and entreaties of the soldiers.

XLI.—Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy
and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer with him.
When permission was granted, they recount the same things which
Ambiorix had related to Titurius, namely, "that all Gaul was in arms, that
the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the winter-quarters of Caesar and of
the others were attacked." They report in addition also, about the death of
Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose of obtaining credence;
"they are mistaken," say they, "if they hoped for any relief from those who
distrust their own affairs; that they bear such feelings towards Cicero and
the Roman people that they deny them nothing but winter-quarters and are
unwilling that this practice should become constant; that through their [the
Nervii's] means it is possible for them [the Romans] to depart from their
winter-quarters safely and to proceed without fear into whatever parts they
desire." To these Cicero made only one reply: "that it is not the custom of
the Roman people to accept any condition from an armed enemy: if they are
willing to lay down their arms, they may employ him as their advocate and
send ambassadors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Caesar's] justice,
they would obtain the things which they might request."

XLII.—Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-
quarters with a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen feet in depth.
These military works they had learnt from our men in the intercourse of
former years, and, having taken some of our army prisoners, were
instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of iron tools which are
requisite for this service, they were forced to cut the turf with their swords,
and to empty out the earth with their hands and cloaks, from which
circumstance the vast number of the men could be inferred; for in less than
three hours they completed a fortification of ten miles in circumference; and

during the rest of the days they began to prepare and construct towers of the
height of the ramparts, and grappling irons, and mantlets, which the same
prisoners had taught them.

XLIII.—On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind having
sprung up, they began to discharge by their slings hot balls made of burnt or
hardened clay, and heated javelins, upon the huts, which, after the Gallic
custom, were thatched with straw. These quickly took fire, and by the
violence of the wind, scattered their flames in every part of the camp. The
enemy following up their success with a very loud shout, as if victory were
already obtained and secured, began to advance their towers and mantlets,
and climb the rampart with ladders. But so great was the courage of our
soldiers, and such their presence of mind, that though they were scorched
on all sides, and harassed by a vast number of weapons, and were aware
that their baggage and their possessions were burning, not only did no one
quit the rampart for the purpose of withdrawing from the scene, but scarcely
did any one even then look behind; and they all fought most vigorously and
most valiantly. This day was by far the most calamitous to our men; it had
this result, however, that on that day the largest number of the enemy was
wounded and slain, since they had crowded beneath the very rampart, and
the hindmost did not afford the foremost a retreat. The flame having abated
a little, and a tower having been brought up in a particular place and
touching the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort retired from the
place in which they were standing, and drew off all their men: they began to
call on the enemy by gestures and by words, to enter if they wished; but
none of them dared to advance. Then stones having been cast from every
quarter, the enemy were dislodged, and their tower set on fire.

XLIV.—In that legion there were two very brave men, centurions, who
were now approaching the first ranks, T. Pulfio, and L. Varenus. These used
to have continual disputes between them which of them should be

preferred, and every year used to contend for promotion with the utmost
animosity. When the fight was going on most vigorously before the
fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says, "Why do you hesitate, Varenus? or
what [better] opportunity of signalising your valour do you seek? This very
day shall decide our disputes." When he had uttered these words, he
proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on that part of the enemy
which appeared the thickest. Nor does Varenus remain within the rampart,
but respecting the high opinion of all, follows close after. Then, when an
inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfio throws his javelin at the enemy, and
pierces one of the multitude who was running up, and while the latter was
wounded and slain, the enemy cover him with their shields, and all throw
their weapons at the other and afford him no opportunity of retreating. The
shield of Pulfio is pierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This
circumstance turns aside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when
attempting to draw his sword: the enemy crowd around him when [thus]
embarrassed. His rival runs up to him and succours him in this emergency.
Immediately the whole host turn from Pulfio to him, supposing the other to
be pierced through by the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly with his sword
and carries on the combat hand to hand, and having slain one man, for a
short time drove back the rest: while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a
hollow, he fell. To him, in his turn, when surrounded, Pulfio brings relief;
and both having slain a great number, retreat into the fortifications amidst
the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with both in this rivalry and conflict,
that the one competitor was a succour and a safeguard to the other, nor
could it be determined which of the two appeared worthy of being preferred
to the other.

XLV.—In proportion as the attack became daily more formidable and
violent, and particularly because, as a great number of the soldiers were
exhausted with wounds, the matter had come to a small number of
defenders, more frequent letters and messengers were sent to Caesar; a part

of which messengers were taken and tortured to death in the sight of our
soldiers. There was within our camp a certain Nervian, by name Vertico,
born in a distinguished position, who in the beginning of the blockade had
deserted to Cicero, and had exhibited his fidelity to him. He persuades his
slave, by the hope of freedom, and by great rewards, to convey a letter to
Caesar. This he carries out bound about his javelin, and mixing among the
Gauls without any suspicion by being a Gaul, he reaches Caesar. From him
they received information of the imminent danger of Cicero and the legion.

XLVI.—Caesar having received the letter about the eleventh hour of the
day, immediately sends a messenger to the Bellovaci, to M. Crassus,
questor there, whose winter-quarters were twenty-five miles distant from
him. He orders the legion to set forward in the middle of the night and come
to him with despatch. Crassus set out with the messenger. He sends anther
to C. Fabius, the lieutenant, ordering him to lead forth his legion into the
territories of the Atrebates, to which he knew his march must be made. He
writes to Labienus to come with his legion to the frontiers of the Nervii, if
he could do so to the advantage of the commonwealth: he does not consider
that the remaining portion of the army, because it was somewhat farther
distant, should be waited for; but assembles about 400 horse from the
nearest winter-quarters.

XLVII.—Having been apprised of the arrival of Crassus by the scouts at
about the third hour, he advances twenty miles that day. He appoints
Crassus over Samarobriva and assigns him a legion, because he was leaving
there the baggage of the army, the hostages of the states, the public
documents, and all the corn, which he had conveyed thither for passing the
winter. Fabius, without delaying a moment, meets him on the march with
his legion, as he had been commanded. Labienus, having learnt the death of
Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, as all the forces of the Treviri
had come against him, beginning to fear lest, if he made a departure from

his winter-quarters, resembling a flight, he should not be able to support the
attack of the enemy, particularly since he knew them to be elated by their
recent victory, sends back a letter to Caesar, informing him with what great
hazard he would lead out his legion from winter-quarters; he relates at large
the affair which had taken place among the Eburones; he informs him that
all the infantry and cavalry of the Treviri had encamped at a distance of
only three miles from his own camp.

XLVIII.—Caesar, approving of his motives, although he was
disappointed in his expectation of three legions, and reduced to two, yet
placed his only hopes of the common safety in despatch. He goes into the
territories of the Nervii by long marches. There he learns from some
prisoners what things are going on in the camp of Cicero, and in how great
jeopardy the affair is. Then with great rewards he induces a certain man of
the Gallic horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This he sends written in Greek
characters, lest the letter being intercepted, our measures should be
discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if he should be unable to enter, to
throw his spear with the letter fastened to the thong inside the fortifications
of the camp. He writes in the letter, that he having set out with his legions,
will quickly be there: he entreats him to maintain his ancient valour. The
Gaul apprehending danger, throws his spear as he had been directed. It by
chance stuck in a tower, and, not being observed by our men for two days,
was seen by a certain soldier on the third day: when taken down, it was
carried to Cicero. He, after perusing it, reads it out in an assembly of the
soldiers, and fills all with the greatest joy. Then the smoke of the fires was
seen in the distance, a circumstance which banished all doubt of the arrival
of the legions.

XLIX.—The Gauls, having discovered the matter through their scouts,
abandon the blockade, and march towards Caesar with all their forces: these
were about 60,000 armed men. Cicero, an opportunity being now afforded,

again begs of that Vertico, the Gaul, whom we mentioned above, to convey
back a letter to Caesar; he advises him to perform his journey warily; he
writes in the letter that the enemy had departed and had turned their entire
force against him. When this letter was brought to him about the middle of
the night, Caesar apprises his soldiers of its contents, and inspires them with
courage for fighting: the following day, at the dawn, he moves his camp,
and, having proceeded four miles, he espies the forces of the enemy on the
other side of a considerable valley and rivulet. It was an affair of great
danger to fight with such large forces in a disadvantageous situation. For
the present, therefore, inasmuch as he knew that Cicero was released from
the blockade, and thought that he might, on that account, relax his speed, he
halted there and fortifies a camp in the most favourable position he can.
And this, though it was small in itself, [there being] scarcely 7000 men, and
these too without baggage, still by the narrowness of the passages, he
contracts as much as he can, with this object, that he may come into the
greatest contempt with the enemy. In the meanwhile, scouts having been
sent in all directions, he examines by what most convenient path he might
cross the valley.

L.—That day, slight skirmishes of cavalry having taken place near the
river, both armies kept in their own positions: the Gauls, because they were
awaiting larger forces which had not then arrived; Caesar, [to see] if
perchance by pretence of fear he could allure the enemy towards his
position, so that he might engage in battle, in front of his camp, on this side
of the valley; if he could not accomplish this, that, having inquired about
the passes, he might cross the valley and the river with the less hazard. At
day-break the cavalry of the enemy approaches to the camp and joins battle
with our horse. Caesar orders the horse to give way purposely, and retreat to
the camp: at the same time he orders the camp to be fortified with a higher
rampart in all directions, the gates to be barricaded, and in executing these

things as much confusion to be shown as possible, and to perform them
under the pretence of fear.

LI.—Induced by all these things the enemy lead over their forces and
draw up their line in a disadvantageous position; and as our men also had
been led down from the ramparts, they approach nearer, and throw their
weapons into the fortification from all sides, and sending heralds round,
order it to be proclaimed that, if "any, either Gaul or Roman, was willing to
go over to them before the third hour, it was permitted; after that time there
would not be permission"; and so much did they disregard our men, that the
gates having been blocked up with single rows of turf as a mere appearance,
because they did not seem able to burst in that way, some began to pull
down the rampart with their hands, others to fill up the trenches. Then
Caesar, making a sally from all the gates, and sending out the cavalry, soon
puts the enemy to flight, so that no one at all stood his ground with the
intention of fighting; and he slew a great number of them, and deprived all
of their arms.

LII.—Caesar, fearing to pursue them very far, because woods and
morasses intervened, and also [because] he saw that they suffered no small
loss in abandoning their position, reaches Cicero the same day with all his
forces safe. He witnesses with surprise the towers, mantlets, and [other]
fortifications belonging to the enemy: the legion having been drawn out, he
finds that even every tenth soldier had not escaped without wounds. From
all these things he judges with what danger and with what great courage
matters had been conducted; he commends Cicero according to his desert
and likewise the legion; he addresses individually the centurions and the
tribunes of the soldiers, whose valour he had discovered to have been
signal. He receives information of the death of Sabinus and Cotta from the
prisoners. An assembly being held the following day, he states the
occurrence; he consoles and encourages the soldiers; he suggests that the

disaster, which had been occasioned by the misconduct and rashness of his
lieutenant, should be borne with a patient mind, because by the favour of
the immortal gods and their own valour, neither was lasting joy left to the
enemy, nor very lasting grief to them.

LIII.—In the meanwhile the report respecting the victory of Caesar is
conveyed to Labienus through the country of the Remi with incredible
speed, so that, though he was about sixty miles distant from the winter-
quarter of Cicero, and Caesar had arrived there after the ninth hour, before
midnight a shout arose at the gates of the camp, by which shout an
indication of the victory and a congratulation on the part of the Remi were
given to Labienus. This report having been carried to the Treviri,
Indutiormarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus the
following day, flies by night and leads back all his forces into the country of
the Treviri. Caesar sends back Fabius with his legion to his winter-quarters;
he himself determines to winter with three legions near Samarobriva in
three different quarters, and, because such great commotions had arisen in
Gaul, he resolved to remain during the whole winter with the army himself.
For the disaster respecting the death of Sabinus having been circulated
among them, almost all the states of Gaul were deliberating about war,
sending messengers and embassies into all quarters, inquiring what further
measure they should take, and holding councils by night in secluded places.
Nor did any period of the whole winter pass over without fresh anxiety to
Caesar, or without his receiving some intelligence respecting the meetings
and commotions of the Gauls. Among these, he is informed by L. Roscius,
the lieutenant whom he had placed over the thirteenth legion, that large
forces of those states of the Gauls, which are called the Armoricae, had
assembled for the purpose of attacking him and were not more than eight
miles distant; but intelligence respecting the victory of Caesar being carried
[to them], had retreated in such a manner that their departure appeared like
a flight.

LIV.—But Caesar, having summoned to him the principal persons of
each state, in one case by alarming them, since he declared that he knew
what was going on, and in another case by encouraging them, retained a
great part of Gaul in its allegiance. The Senones, however, which is a state
eminently powerful and one of great influence among the Gauls, attempting
by general design to slay Cavarinus whom Caesar had created king among
them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the sovereignty at the period of
the arrival of Caesar in Gaul, and whose ancestors had also previously held
it) when he discovered their plot and fled, pursued him even to the frontiers
[of the state], and drove him from his kingdom and his home; and, after
having sent ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of concluding a peace,
when he ordered all their senate to come to him, did not obey that
command. So far did it operate among those barbarian people, that there
were found some to be the first to wage war; and so great a change of
inclinations did it produce in all, that except the Aedui and the Remi, whom
Caesar had always held in especial honour, the one people for their long
standing and uniform fidelity towards the Roman people, the other for their
late service in the Gallic war, there was scarcely a state which was not
suspected by us. And I do not know whether that ought much to be
wondered at, as well for several other reasons, as particularly because they
who ranked above all nations for prowess in war, most keenly regretted that
they had lost so much of that reputation as to submit to commands from the
Roman people.

LV.—But the Treviri and Indutiomarus let no part of the entire winter
pass without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, importuning the states,
promising money, and asserting that, as a large portion of our army had
been cut off, a much smaller portion remained. However, none of the
German states could be induced to cross the Rhine, since "they had twice
essayed it," they said, "in the war with Ariovistus and in the passage of the
Tenchtheri there; that fortune was not to be tempted any more."

Indutiomarus disappointed in this expectation, nevertheless began to raise
troops, and discipline them, and procure horses from the neighbouring
people and allure to him by great rewards the outlaws and convicts
throughout Gaul. And such great influence had he already acquired for
himself in Gaul by these means, that embassies were flocking to him in all
directions, and seeking, publicly and privately, his favour and friendship.

LVI.—When he perceived that they were coming to him voluntarily; that
on the one side the Senones and the Carnutes were stimulated by their
consciousness of guilt, on the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuci were
preparing war against the Romans, and that forces of volunteers would not
be wanting to him if he began to advance from his own territories, he
proclaims an armed council (this according to the custom of the Gauls is the
commencement of war) at which, by a common law, all the youth were
wont to assemble in arms; whoever of them comes last is killed in the sight
of the whole assembly after being racked with every torture. In that council
he declares Cingetorix, the leader of the other faction, his own son-in-law
(whom we have above mentioned, as having embraced the protection of
Caesar, and never having deserted him) an enemy and confiscates his
property. When these things were finished, he asserts in the council that he,
invited by the Senones and the Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul,
was about to march thither through the territories of the Remi, devastate
their lands, and attack the camp of Labienus: before he does that, he
informs them of what he desires to be done.

LVII.—Labienus, since he was confining himself within a camp strongly
fortified by the nature of the ground and by art, had no apprehensions as to
his own and the legion's danger, but was devising that he might throw away
no opportunity of conducting the war successfully. Accordingly, the speech
of Indutiomarus, which he had delivered in the council, having been made
known [to him] by Cingetorix and his allies, he sends messengers to the

neighbouring states and summons horse from all quarters: he appoints to
them a fixed day for assembling. In the meantime, Indutiomarus, with all
his cavalry, nearly every day used to parade close to his [Labienus's] camp;
at one time, that he might inform himself of the situation of the camp; at
another time, for the purpose of conferring with or of intimidating him.
Labienus confined his men within the fortifications and promoted the
enemy's belief of his fear by whatever methods he could.

LVIII.—Since Indutiomarus was daily advancing up to the camp with
greater defiance, all the cavalry of the neighbouring states which he
[Labienus] had taken care to have sent for, having been admitted in one
night, he confined all his men within the camp by guards with such great
strictness, that that fact could by no means be reported or carried to the
Treviri. In the meanwhile Indutiomarus, according to his daily practice,
advances up to the camp and spends a great part of the day there: his horse
cast their weapons, and with very insulting language call out our men to
battle. No reply being given by our men, the enemy when they thought
proper, depart towards evening in a disorderly and scattered manner,
Labienus unexpectedly sends out all the cavalry by two gates; he gives this
command and prohibition, that, when the enemy should be terrified and put
to flight (which he foresaw would happen, as it did), they should all make
for Indutiomarus, and no one wound any man before he should have seen
him slain, because he was unwilling that he should escape, in consequence
of gaining time by the delay [occasioned by the pursuit] of the rest. He
offers great rewards for those who should kill him: he sends up the cohorts
as a relief to the horse. The issue justifies the policy of the man, and, since
all aimed at one, Indutiomarus is slain, having been overtaken at the very
ford of the river, and his head is carried to the camp: the horse, when
returning, pursue and slay all whom they can. This affair having been
known, all the forces of the Eburones and the Nervii which had assembled,

depart; and for a short time after this action, Caesar was less harassed in the
government of Gaul.

BOOK VI

I.—Caesar, expecting for many reasons a greater commotion in Gaul,
resolves to hold a levy by the means of M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus,
and T. Sextius, his lieutenants: at the same time he requested of Cn.
Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was remaining near the city invested
with military command for the interests of the commonwealth, he would
command those men whom when consul he had levied by the military oath
in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective corps, and to proceed to him;
thinking it of great importance, as far as regarded the opinion which the
Gauls would entertain for the future, that the resources of Italy should
appear so great, that if any loss should be sustained in war, not only could it
be repaired in a short time, but likewise be further supplied by still larger
forces. And when Pompey had granted this to the interests of the
commonwealth and the claims of friendship, Caesar having quickly
completed the levy by means of his lieutenants, after three legions had been
both formed and brought to him before the winter [had] expired, and the
number of those cohorts which he had lost under Q. Titurius had been
doubled, taught the Gauls, both by his dispatch and by his forces, what the
discipline and the power of the Roman people could accomplish.

II.—Indutiomarus having been slain, as we have stated, the government
was conferred upon his relatives by the Treviri. They cease not to importune
the neighbouring Germans and to promise them money: when they could
not obtain [their object] from those nearest them, they try those more
remote. Having found some states willing to accede to their wishes, they

enter into a compact with them by a mutual oath, and give hostages as a
security for the money: they attach Ambiorix to them by an alliance and
confederacy. Caesar, on being informed of their acts, since he saw that war
was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii,
with the addition of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine were under
arms, that the Senones did not assemble according to his command, and
were concerting measures with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states,
that the Germans were importuned by the Treviri in frequent embassies,
thought that he ought to take measures for the war earlier [than usual].

III.-Accordingly, while the winter was not yet ended, having
concentrated the four nearest legions, he marched unexpectedly into the
territories of the Nervii, and before they could either assemble, or retreat,
after capturing a large number of cattle and of men, and wasting their lands
and giving up that booty to the soldiers, compelled them to enter into a
surrender and give him hostages. That business having been speedily
executed, he again led his legions back into winter-quarters. Having
proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning of the spring, as he had been
accustomed [to do], when the deputies from the rest, except the Senones,
the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had come, judging this to be the
commencement of war and revolt, that he might appear to consider all
things of less consequence [than that war], he transfers the council to
Lutetia of the Parisii. These were adjacent to the Senones, and had united
their state to them during the memory of their fathers, but were thought to
have no part in the present plot. Having proclaimed this from the tribunal,
he advances the same day towards the Senones with his legions and arrives
among them by long marches.

IV.—Acco, who had been the author of that enterprise, on being informed
of his arrival, orders the people to assemble in the towns; to them, while
attempting this and before it could be accomplished, news is brought that

the Romans are close at hand: through necessity they give over their design
and send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of imploring pardon; they
make advances to him through the Aedui, whose state was from ancient
times under the protection of Rome. Caesar readily grants them pardon and
receives their excuse at the request of the Aedui; because he thought that the
summer season was one for an impending war, not for an investigation.
Having imposed one hundred hostages, he delivers these to the Aedui to be
held in charge by them. To the same place the Carnutes send ambassadors
and hostages, employing as their mediators the Remi, under whose
protection they were: they receive the same answers. Caesar concludes the
council and imposes a levy of cavalry on the states.

V.—This part of Gaul having been tranquillized, he applies himself
entirely both in mind and soul to the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix. He
orders Cavarinus to march with him with the cavalry of the Senones, lest
any commotion should arise either out of his hot temper, or out of the
hatred of the state which he had incurred. After arranging these things, as he
considered it certain that Ambiorix would not contend in battle, he watched
his other plans attentively. The Menapii bordered on the territories of the
Eburones, and were protected by one continued extent of morasses and
woods; and they alone out of Gaul had never sent ambassadors to Caesar on
the subject of peace. Caesar knew that a tie of hospitality subsisted between
them and Ambiorix: he also discovered that the latter had entered into an
alliance with the Germans by means of the Treviri. He thought that these
auxiliaries ought to be detached from him before he provoked him to war;
lest he, despairing of safety, should either proceed to conceal himself in the
territories of the Menapii, or should be driven to coalesce with the Germans
beyond the Rhine. Having entered upon this resolution, he sends the
baggage of the whole army to Labienus, in the territories of the Treviri and
orders two legions to proceed to him: he himself proceeds against the
Menapii with five lightly-equipped legions. They, having assembled no

troops, as they relied on the defence of their position, retreat into the woods
and morasses, and convey thither all their property.

VI.—Caesar, having divided his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and
M. Crassus, his questor, and having hastily constructed some bridges, enters
their country in three divisions, burns their houses and villages, and gets
possession of a large number of cattle and men. Constrained by these
circumstances, the Menapii send ambassadors to him for the purpose of
suing for peace. He, after receiving hostages, assures them that he will
consider them in the number of his enemies if they shall receive within their
territories either Ambiorix or his ambassadors. Having determinately settled
these things, he left among the Menapii, Commius the Atrebatian with some
cavalry as a guard; he himself proceeds toward the Treviri.

VII.—While these things are being performed by Caesar, the Treviri,
having drawn together large forces of infantry and of cavalry, were
preparing to attack Labienus and the legion which was wintering in their
territories, and were already not further distant from him than a journey of
two days, when they learn that two legions had arrived by the order of
Caesar. Having pitched their camp fifteen miles off, they resolve to await
the support of the Germans. Labienus, having learned the design of the
enemy, hoping that through their rashness there would be some opportunity
of engaging, after leaving a guard of five cohorts for the baggage, advances
against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large body of cavalry,
and, leaving the space of a mile between them, fortifies his camp. There
was between Labienus and the enemy a river difficult to cross and with
steep banks: this neither did he himself design to cross, nor did he suppose
the enemy would cross it. Their hope of auxiliaries was daily increasing. He
[Labienus] openly says in a council that "since the Germans are said to be
approaching, he would not bring into uncertainty his own and the army's
fortunes, and the next day would move his camp at early dawn. These

words are quickly carried to the enemy, since out of so large a number of
cavalry composed of Gauls, nature compelled some to favour the Gallic
interests. Labienus, having assembled the tribunes of the soldiers and
principal centurions by night, states what his design is, and, that he may the
more easily give the enemy a belief of his fears, he orders the camp to be
moved with greater noise and confusion than was usual with the Roman
people. By these means he makes his departure [appear], like a retreat.
These things, also, since the camps were so near, are reported to the enemy
by scouts before daylight.

VIII.—Scarcely had the rear advanced beyond the fortifications when the
Gauls, encouraging one another "not to cast from their hands the anticipated
booty, that it was a tedious thing, while the Romans were panic stricken, to
be waiting for the aid of the Germans, and that their dignity did not suffer
them to fear to attack with such great forces so small a band, particularly
when retreating and encumbered," do not hesitate to cross the river and give
battle in a disadvantageous position. Labienus suspecting that these things
would happen, was proceeding quietly, and using the same pretence of a
march, in order that he might entice them across the river. Then, having sent
forward the baggage some short distance and placed it on a certain
eminence, he says, "Soldiers, you have the opportunity you have sought:
you hold the enemy in an encumbered and disadvantageous position:
display to us your leaders the same valour you have ofttimes displayed to
your general: imagine that he is present and actually sees these exploits." At
the same time he orders the troops to face about towards the enemy and
form in line of battle, and, despatching a few troops of cavalry as a guard
for the bag gage, he places the rest of the horse on the wings. Our men,
raising a shout, quickly throw their javelins at the enemy. They, when,
contrary to their expectation, they saw those whom they believed to be
retreating, advance towards them with threatening banners, were not able to
sustain even the charge, and, being put to flight at the first onslaught, sought

the nearest woods: Labienus pursuing them with the cavalry, upon a large
number being slain, and several taken prisoners, got possession of the state
a few days after; for the Germans who were coming to the aid of the
Treviri, having been informed of their flight, retreated to their homes. The
relations of Indutiomarus, who had been the promoters of the revolt,
accompanying them, quitted their own state with them. The supreme power
and government were delivered to Cingetorix, whom we have stated to have
remained firm in his allegiance from the commencement.

IX.—Caesar, after he came from the territories of the Menapii into those
of the Treviri, resolved for two reasons to cross the Rhine; one of which
was, because they had sent assistance to the Treviri against him; the other,
that Ambiorix might not have a retreat among them. Having determined on
these matters, he began to build a bridge a little above that place, at which
he had before conveyed over his army. The plan having been known and
laid down, the work is accomplished in a few days by the great exertion of
the soldiers. Having left a strong guard at the bridge on the side of the
Treviri, lest any commotion should suddenly arise among them, he leads
over the rest of the forces and the cavalry. The Ubii, who before had sent
hostages and come to a capitulation, send ambassadors to him, for the
purpose of vindicating themselves, to assure him that "neither had
auxiliaries been sent to the Treviri from their state, nor had they violated
their allegiance"; they entreat and beseech him "to spare them, lest, in his
common hatred of the Germans, the innocent should suffer the penalty of
the guilty: they promise to give more hostages, if he desire them." Having
investigated the case, Caesar finds that the auxiliaries had been sent by the
Suevi; he accepts the apology of the Ubii, and makes minute inquiries
concerning the approaches and the routes to the territories of the Suevi. X.
—In the meanwhile he is informed by the Ubii, a few days after, that the
Suevi are drawing all their forces into one place, and are giving orders to
those nations which are under their government to send auxiliaries of

infantry and of cavalry. Having learned these things, he provides a supply
of corn, selects a proper place for his camp, and commands the Ubii to
drive off their cattle and carry away all their possessions from the country
parts into the towns, hoping that they, being a barbarous and ignorant
people, when harassed by the want of provisions, might be brought to an
engagement on disadvantageous terms: he orders them to send numerous
scouts among the Suevi, and learn what things are going on among them.
They execute the orders, and, a few days having intervened, report that all
the Suevi, after certain intelligence concerning the army of the Romans had
come, retreated with all their own forces and those of their allies, which
they had assembled, to the utmost extremities of their territories: that there
is a wood there of very great extent, which is called Bacenis; that this
stretches a great way into the interior, and, being opposed as a natural
barrier, defends from injuries and incursions the Cherusci against the Suevi,
and the Suevi against the Cherusci: that at the entrance of that forest the
Suevi had determined to await the coming up of the Romans.

XI.—Since we have come to this place, it does not appear to be foreign
to our subject to lay before the reader an account of the manners of Gaul
and Germany, and wherein these nations differ from each other. In Gaul
there are factions not only in all the states, and in all the cantons and their
divisions, but almost in each family, and of these factions those are the
leaders who are considered according to their judgment to possess the
greatest influence, upon whose will and determination the management of
all affairs and measures depends. And that seems to have been instituted in
ancient times with this view, that no one of the common people should be in
want of support against one more powerful; for none [of those leaders]
suffers his party to be oppressed and defrauded, and if he do otherwise, he
has no influence among his party. This same policy exists throughout the
whole of Gaul; for all the states are divided into two factions.

XII.—When Caesar arrived in Gaul, the Aedui were the leaders of one
faction, the Sequani of the other. Since the latter were less powerful by
themselves, inasmuch as the chief influence was from of old among the
Aedui, and their dependencies were great, they had united to themselves the
Germans and Ariovistus, and had brought them over to their party by great
sacrifices and promises. And having fought several successful battles and
slain all the nobility of the Aedui, they had so far surpassed them in power,
that they brought over, from the Aedui to themselves, a large portion of
their dependants and received from them the sons of their leading men as
hostages, and compelled them to swear in their public character that they
would enter into no design against them; and held a portion of the
neighbouring land, seized on by force, and possessed the sovereignty of the
whole of Gaul. Divitiacus urged by this necessity, had proceeded to Rome
to the senate, for the purpose of entreating assistance, and had returned
without accomplishing his object. A change of affairs ensued on the arrival
of Caesar, the hostages were returned to the Aedui, their old dependencies
restored, and new acquired through Caesar (because those who had attached
themselves to their alliance saw that they enjoyed a better state and a milder
government), their other interests, their influence, their reputation were
likewise increased, and in consequence, the Sequani lost the sovereignty.
The Remi succeeded to their place, and, as it was perceived that they
equalled the Aedui in favour with Caesar, those, who on account of their old
animosities could by no means coalesce with the Aedui, consigned
themselves in clientship to the Remi. The latter carefully protected them.
Thus they possessed both a new and suddenly acquired influence. Affairs
were then in that position, that the Aedui were considered by far the leading
people, and the Remi held the second post of honour.

XIII.—Throughout all Gaul there are two orders of those men who are of
any rank and dignity: for the commonality is held almost in the condition of
slaves, and dares to undertake nothing of itself and is admitted to no

deliberation. The greater part, when they are pressed either by debt, or the
large amount of their tributes, or the oppression of the more powerful, give
themselves up in vassalage to the nobles, who possess over them the same
rights without exception as masters over their slaves. But of these two
orders, one is that of the Druids, the other that of the knights. The former
are engaged in things sacred, conduct the public and the private sacrifices,
and interpret all matters of religion. To these a large number of the young
men resort for the purpose of instruction, and they [the Druids] are in great
honour among them. For they determine respecting almost all controversies,
public and private; and if any crime has been perpetrated, if murder has
been committed, if there be any dispute about an inheritance, if any about
boundaries, these same persons decide it; they decree rewards and
punishments if any one, either in a private or public capacity, has not
submitted to their decision, they interdict him from the sacrifices. This
among them is the most heavy punishment. Those who have been thus
interdicted are esteemed in the number of the impious and the criminal: all
shun them, and avoid their society and conversation, lest they receive some
evil from their contact; nor is justice administered to them when seeking it,
nor is any dignity bestowed on them. Over all these Druids one presides,
who possesses supreme authority among them. Upon his death, if any
individual among the rest is pre-eminent in dignity, he succeeds; but, if
there are many equal, the election is made by the suffrages of the Druids;
sometimes they even contend for the presidency with arms. These assemble
at a fixed period of the year in a consecrated place in the territories of the
Carnutes, which is reckoned the central region of the whole of Gaul. Hither
all, who have disputes, assemble from every part, and submit to their
decrees and determinations. This institution is supposed to have been
devised in Britain, and to have been brought over from it into Gaul; and
now those who desire to gain a more accurate knowledge of that system
generally proceed thither for the purpose of studying it.

XIV.—The Druids do not go to war, nor pay tribute together with the
rest; they have an exemption from military service and a dispensation in all
matters. Induced by such great advantages, many embrace this profession of
their own accord, and [many] are sent to it by their parents and relations.
They are said there to learn by heart a great number of verses; accordingly
some remain in the course of training twenty years. Nor do they regard it
lawful to commit these to writing, though in almost all other matters, in
their public and private transactions, they use Greek characters. That
practice they seem to me to have adopted for two reasons; because they
neither desire their doctrines to be divulged among the mass of the people,
nor those who learn, to devote themselves the less to the efforts of memory,
relying on writing; since it generally occurs to most men, that, in their
dependence on writing, they relax their diligence in learning thoroughly,
and their employment of the memory. They wish to inculcate this as one of
their leading tenets, that souls do not become extinct, but pass after death
from one body to another, and they think that men by this tenet are in a
great degree excited to valour, the fear of death being disregarded. They
likewise discuss and impart to the youth many things respecting the stars
and their motion, respecting the extent of the world and of our earth,
respecting the nature of things, respecting the power and the majesty of the
immortal gods.

XV.—The other order is that of the knights. These, when there is
occasion and any war occurs (which before Caesar's arrival was for the
most part wont to happen every year, as either they on their part were
inflicting injuries or repelling those which others inflicted on them), are all
engaged in war. And those of them most distinguished by birth and
resources, have the greatest number of vassals and dependants about them.
They acknowledge this sort of influence and power only.

XVI.—The nation of all the Gauls is extremely devoted to superstitious
rites; and on that account they who are troubled with unusually severe
diseases and they who are engaged in battles and dangers, either sacrifice
men as victims, or vow that they will sacrifice them, and employ the Druids
as the performers of those sacrifices; because they think that unless the life
of a man be offered for the life of a man, the mind of the immortal gods
cannot be rendered propitious, and they have sacrifices of that kind
ordained for national purposes. Others have figures of vast size, the limbs
of which formed of osiers they fill with living men, which being set on fire,
the men perish enveloped in the flames. They consider that the oblation of
such as have been taken in theft, or in robbery, or any other offence, is more
acceptable to the immortal gods; but when a supply of that class is wanting,
they have recourse to the oblation of even the innocent.

XVII.—They worship as their divinity, Mercury in particular, and have
many images of him, and regard him as the inventor of all arts, they
consider him, the guide of their journeys and marches, and believe him to
have very great influence over the acquisition of gain and mercantile
transactions. Next to him they worship Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and
Minerva; respecting these deities they have for the most part the same belief
as other nations: that Apollo averts diseases, that Minerva imparts the
invention of manufactures, that Jupiter possesses the sovereignty of the
heavenly powers; that Mars presides over wars. To him when they have
determined to engage in battle, they commonly vow those things they shall
take in war. When they have conquered, they sacrifice whatever captured
animals may have survived the conflict, and collect the other things into one
place. In many states you may see piles of these things heaped up in their
consecrated spots; nor does it often happen that any one, disregarding the
sanctity of the case, dares either to secrete in his house things captured, or
take away those deposited; and the most severe punishment, with torture,
has been established for such a deed.

XVIII.—All the Gauls assert that they are descended from the god Dis,
and say that this tradition has been handed down by the Druids. For that
reason they compute the divisions of every season, not by the number of
days, but of nights; they keep birthdays and the beginnings of months and
years in such an order that the day follows the night. Among the other
usages of their life, they differ in this from almost all other nations, that
they do not permit their children to approach them openly until they are
grown up so as to be able to bear the service of war; and they regard it as
indecorous for a son of boyish age to stand in public in the presence of his
father.

XIX.—Whatever sums of money the husbands have received in the name
of dowry from their wives, making an estimate of it, they add the same
amount out of their own estates. An account is kept of all this money
conjointly, and the profits are laid by: whichever of them shall have
survived [the other], to that one the portion of both reverts, together with
the profits of the previous time. Husbands have power of life and death over
their wives as well as over their children: and when the father of a family,
born in a more than commonly distinguished rank, has died, his relations
assemble, and, if the circumstances of his death are suspicious, hold an
investigation upon the wives in the manner adopted towards slaves; and if
proof be obtained, put them to severe torture, and kill them. Their funerals,
considering the state of civilization among the Gauls, are magnificent and
costly; and they cast into the fire all things, including living creatures,
which they suppose to have been dear to them when alive; and, a little
before this period, slaves and dependants, who were ascertained to have
been beloved by them, were, after the regular funeral rites were completed,
burnt together with them.

XX.—Those states which are considered to conduct their commonwealth
more judiciously, have it ordained by their laws, that, if any person shall

have heard by rumour and report from his neighbours anything concerning
the commonwealth, he shall convey it to the magistrate and not impart it to
any other; because it has been discovered that inconsiderate and
inexperienced men were often alarmed by false reports and driven to some
rash act, or else took hasty measures in affairs of the highest importance.
The magistrates conceal those things which require to be kept unknown;
and they disclose to the people whatever they determine to be expedient. It
is not lawful to speak of the commonwealth, except in council.

XXI.—The Germans differ much from these usages, for they have
neither Druids to preside over sacred offices, nor do they pay great regard to
sacrifices. They rank in the number of the gods those alone whom they
behold, and by whose instrumentality they are obviously benefited, namely,
the sun, fire, and the moon; they have not heard of the other deities even by
report. Their whole life is occupied in hunting and in the pursuits of the
military art; from childhood they devote themselves to fatigue and
hardships. Those who have remained chaste for the longest time, receive the
greatest commendation among their people: they think that by this the
growth is promoted, by this the physical powers are increased and the
sinews are strengthened. And to have had knowledge of a woman before the
twentieth year they reckon among the most disgraceful acts; of which
matter there is no concealment, because they bathe promiscuously in the
rivers and [only] use skins or small cloaks of deers' hides, a large portion of
the body being in consequence naked.

XXII.—They do not pay much attention to agriculture, and a large
portion of their food consists in milk, cheese, and flesh; nor has any one a
fixed quantity of land or his own individual limits; but the magistrates and
the leading men each year apportion to the tribes and families, who have
united together, as much land as, and in the place in which, they think
proper, and the year after compel them to remove elsewhere. For this

enactment they advance many reasons—lest seduced by long-continued
custom, they may exchange their ardour in the waging of war for
agriculture; lest they may be anxious to acquire extensive estates, and the
more powerful drive the weaker from their possessions; lest they construct
their houses with too great a desire to avoid cold and heat; lest the desire of
wealth spring up, from which cause divisions and discords arise; and that
they may keep the common people in a contented state of mind, when each
sees his own means placed on an equality with [those of] the most
powerful.

XXIII.—It is the greatest glory to the several states to have as wide
deserts as possible around them, their frontiers having been laid waste.
They consider this the real evidence of their prowess, that their neighbours
shall be driven out of their lands and abandon them, and that no one dare
settle near them; at the same time they think that they shall be on that
account the more secure, because they have removed the apprehension of a
sudden incursion. When a state either repels war waged against it, or wages
it against another, magistrates are chosen to preside over that war with such
authority, that they have power of life and death. In peace there is no
common magistrate, but the chiefs of provinces and cantons administer
justice and determine controversies among their own people. Robberies
which are committed beyond the boundaries of each state bear no infamy,
and they avow that these are committed for the purpose of disciplining their
youth and of preventing sloth. And when any of their chiefs has said in an
assembly "that he will be their leader, let those who are willing to follow,
give in their names"; they who approve of both the enterprise and the man
arise and promise their assistance and are applauded by the people; such of
them as have not followed him are accounted in the number of deserters and
traitors, and confidence in all matters is afterwards refused them. To injure
guests they regard as impious; they defend from wrong those who have

come to them for any purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable; to
them the houses of all are open and maintenance is freely supplied.

XXIV.—And there was formerly a time when the Gauls excelled the
Germans in prowess, and waged war on them offensively, and, on account
of the great number of their people and the insufficiency of their land, sent
colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the Volcae Tectosages seized on those
parts of Germany which are the most fruitful [and lie] around the Hercynian
forest (which, I perceive, was known by report to Eratosthenes and some
other Greeks, and which they call Orcynia) and settled there. Which nation
to this time retains its position in those settlements, and has a very high
character for justice and military merit: now also they continue in the same
scarcity, indigence, hardihood, as the Germans, and use the same food and
dress; but their proximity to the Province and knowledge of commodities
from countries beyond the sea supplies to the Gauls many things tending to
luxury as well as civilization. Accustomed by degrees to be overmatched
and worsted in many engagements, they do not even compare themselves to
the Germans in prowess.

XXV.—The breadth of this Hercynian forest, which has been referred to
above, is to a quick traveller, a journey of nine days. For it cannot be
otherwise computed, nor are they acquainted with the measures of roads. It
begins at the frontiers of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and extends in
a right line along the river Danube to the territories of the Daci and the
Anartes: it bends thence to the left in a different direction from the river,
and owing to its extent touches the confines of many nations; nor is there
any person belonging to this part of Germany who says that he either has
gone to the extremity of that forest, though he had advanced a journey of
sixty days, or has heard in what place it begins. It is certain that many kinds
of wild beasts are produced in it which have not been seen in other parts; of

which the following are such as differ principally from other animals, and
appear worthy of being committed to record.

XXVI.—There is an ox of the shape of a stag, between whose ears a horn
rises from the middle of the forehead, higher and straighter than those horns
which are known to us. From the top of this, branches, like palms; stretch
out a considerable distance. The shape of the female and of the male is the
same; the appearance and the size of the horns is the same.

XXVII.—There are also [animals] which are called elks. The shape of
these, and the varied colour of their skins, is much like roes, but in size they
surpass them a little and are destitute of horns, and have legs without joints
and ligatures; nor do they lie down for the purpose of rest, nor, if they have
been thrown down by any accident, can they raise or lift themselves up.
Trees serve as beds to them; they lean themselves against them, and thus
reclining only slightly, they take their rest; when the huntsmen have
discovered from the footsteps of these animals whither they are accustomed
to betake themselves, they either undermine all the trees at the roots, or cut
into them so far that the upper part of the trees may appear to be left
standing. When they have leant upon them, according to their habit, they
knock down by their weight the unsupported trees, and fall down
themselves along with them.

XXVIII.-There is a third kind, consisting of those animals which are
called uri. These are a little below the elephant in size, and of the
appearance, colour, and shape of a bull. Their strength and speed are
extraordinary; they spare neither man nor wild beast which they have
espied. These the Germans take with much pains in pits and kill them. The
young men harden themselves with this exercise, and practice themselves in
this kind of hunting, and those who have slain the greatest number of them,
having produced the horns in public, to serve as evidence, receive great

praise. But not even when taken very young can they be rendered familiar
to men and tamed. The size, shape, and appearance of their horns differ
much from the horns of our oxen. These they anxiously seek after, and bind
at the tips with silver, and use as cups at their most sumptuous
entertainments.

XXIX.—Caesar, after he discovered through the Ubian scouts that the
Suevi had retired into their woods, apprehending a scarcity of corn,
because, as we have observed above, all the Germans pay very little
attention to agriculture, resolved not to proceed any farther; but, that he
might not altogether relieve the barbarians from the fear of his return, and
that he might delay their succours, having led back his army, he breaks
down, to the length of 200 feet, the farther end of the bridge, which joined
the banks of the Ubii, and, at the extremity of the bridge raises towers of
four stories, and stations a guard of twelve cohorts for the purpose of
defending the bridge, and strengthens the place with considerable
fortifications. Over that fort and guard he appointed C. Volcatius Tullus, a
young man; he himself, when the corn began to ripen, having set forth for
the war with 40 Ambiorix (through the forest Arduenna, which is the largest
of all Gaul, and reaches from the banks of the Rhine and the frontiers of the
Treviri to those of the Nervii, and extends over more than 500 miles), he
sends forward L. Minucius Basilus with all the cavalry, to try if he might
gain any advantage by rapid marches and the advantage of time, he warns
him to forbid fires being made in the camp, lest any indication of his
approach be given at a distance: he tells him that he will follow
immediately.

XXX.—Basilus does as he was commanded; having performed his march
rapidly, and even surpassed the expectations of all, he surprises in the fields
many not expecting him; through their information he advances towards
Ambiorix himself, to the place in which he was said to be with a few horse.

Fortune accomplishes much, not only in other matters, but also in the art of
war. For as it happened by a remarkable chance, that he fell upon
[Ambiorix] himself unguarded and unprepared, and that his arrival was seen
by the people before the report or information of his arrival was carried
thither; so it was an incident of extraordinary fortune that, although every
implement of war which he was accustomed to have about him was seized,
and his chariots and horses surprised, yet he himself escaped death. But it
was effected owing to this circumstance, that his house being surrounded by
a wood, (as are generally the dwellings of the Gauls, who, for the purpose
of avoiding heat, mostly seek the neighbourhood of woods and rivers) his
attendants and friends in a narrow spot sustained for a short time the attack
of our horse. While they were fighting, one of his followers mounted him
on a horse: the woods sheltered him as he fled. Thus fortune tended much
both towards his encountering and his escaping danger.

XXXI.—Whether Ambiorix did not collect his forces from cool
deliberation, because he considered he ought not to engage in a battle, or
[whether] he was debarred by time and prevented by the sudden arrival of
our horse, when he supposed the rest of the army was closely following, is
doubtful; but certainly, despatching messengers through the country, he
ordered every one to provide for himself; and a part of them fled into the
forest Arduenna, a part into the extensive morasses; those who were nearest
the ocean, concealed themselves in the islands which the tides usually form;
many, departing from their territories, committed themselves and all their
possessions to perfect strangers. Cativolcus, king of one-half of the
Eburones, who had entered into the design together with Ambiorix, since,
being now worn out by age, he was unable to endure the fatigue either of
war or flight, having cursed Ambiorix with every imprecation, as the person
who had been the contriver of that measure, destroyed himself with the
juice of the yew tree, of which there is a great abundance in Gaul and
Germany.

XXXII.—The Segui and Condrusi, of the nation and number of the
Germans, and who are between the Eburones and the Treviri, sent
ambassadors to Caesar to entreat that he would not regard them in the
number of his enemies, nor consider that the cause of all the Germans on
this side the Rhine was one and the same; that they had formed no plans of
war, and had sent no auxiliaries to Ambiorix. Caesar, having ascertained
this fact by an examination of his prisoners commanded that if any of the
Eburones in their flight had repaired to them, they should be sent back to
him; he assures them that if they did that, he will not injure their territories.
Then, having divided his forces into three parts, he sent the baggage of all
the legions to Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort. This is nearly in the
middle of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had been
quartered for the purpose of wintering. This place he selected as well on
other accounts as because the fortifications of the previous year remained,
in order that he might relieve the labour of the soldiers. He left the
fourteenth legion as a guard for the baggage, one of those three which he
had lately raised in Italy and brought over. Over that legion and camp he
places Q. Tullius Cicero and gives him 200 horse.

XXXIII.—Having divided the army, he orders T. Labienus to proceed
with three legions towards the ocean into those parts which border on the
Menappii; he sends C. Trebonius with a like number of legions to lay waste
that district which lies contiguous to the Aduatuci; he himself determines to
go with the remaining three to the river Sambre, which flows into the
Meuse, and to the most remote parts of Arduenna, whither he heard that
Ambiorix had gone with a few horse. When departing, he promises that he
will return before the end of the seventh day, on which day he was aware
corn was due to that legion which was being left in garrison. He directs
Labienus and Trebonius to return by the same day, if they can do so
agreeably to the interests of the republic; so that their measures having been

mutually imparted, and the plans of the enemy having been discovered, they
might be able to commence a different line of operations.

XXXIV.—There was, as we have above observed, no regular army, nor a
town, nor a garrison which could defend itself by arms; but the people were
scattered in all directions. Where either a hidden valley, or a woody spot, or
a difficult morass furnished any hope of protection or of security to any one,
there he had fixed himself. These places were known to those that dwelt in
the neighbourhood, and the matter demanded great attention, not so much in
protecting the main body of the army (for no peril could occur to them
altogether from those alarmed and scattered troops), as in preserving
individual soldiers; which in some measure tended to the safety of the army.
For both the desire of booty was leading many too far, and the woods with
their unknown and hidden routes would not allow them to go in large
bodies. If he desired the business to be completed and the race of those
infamous people to be cut off, more bodies of men must be sent in several
directions and the soldiers must be detached on all sides; if he were
disposed to keep the companies at their standards, as the established
discipline and practice of the Roman army required, the situation itself was
a safeguard to the barbarians, nor was there wanting to individuals the
daring to lay secret ambuscades and beset scattered soldiers. But amidst
difficulties of this nature as far as precautions could be taken by vigilance,
such precautions were taken; so that some opportunities of injuring the
enemy were neglected, though the minds of all were burning to take
revenge, rather than that injury should be effected with any loss to our
soldiers. Caesar despatches messengers to the neighbouring states; by the
hope of booty he invites all to him, for the purpose of plundering the
Eburones, in order that the life of the Gauls might be hazarded in the woods
rather than the legionary soldiers; at the same time, in order that a large
force being drawn around them, the race and name of that state may be

annihilated for such a crime. A large number from all quarters speedily
assembles.

XXXV.—These things were going on in all parts of the territories of the
Eburones, and the seventh day was drawing near, by which day Caesar had
purposed to return to the baggage and the legion. Here it might be learned
how much fortune achieves in war, and how great casualties she produces.
The enemy having been scattered and alarmed, as we related above, there
was no force which might produce even a slight occasion of fear. The report
extends beyond the Rhine to the Germans that the Eburones are being
pillaged, and that all were without distinction invited to the plunder. The
Sigambri, who are nearest to the Rhine, by whom, we have mentioned
above, the Tenchtheri and Usipetes were received after their retreat, collect
2000 horse; they cross the Rhine in ships and barks thirty miles below that
place where the bridge was entire and the garrison left by Caesar; they
arrive at the frontiers of the Eburones, surprise many who were scattered in
flight, and get possession of a large amount of cattle, of which barbarians
are extremely covetous. Allured by booty, they advance farther; neither
morass nor forest obstructs these men, born amidst war and depredations;
they inquire of their prisoners in what parts Caesar is; they find that he has
advanced farther, and learn that all the army has removed. Thereon one of
the prisoners says, "Why do you pursue such wretched and trifling spoil;
you, to whom it is granted to become even now most richly endowed by
fortune? In three hours you can reach Aduatuca; there the Roman army has
deposited all its fortunes; there is so little of a garrison that not even the
wall can be manned, nor dare any one go beyond the fortifications." A hope
having been presented them, the Germans leave in concealment the plunder
they had acquired; they themselves hasten to Aduatuca, employing as their
guide the same man by whose information they had become informed of
these things.

XXXVI.—Cicero, who during all the foregoing days had kept his
soldiers in camp with the greatest exactness, and agreeably to the
injunctions of Caesar, had not permitted even any of the camp-followers to
go beyond the fortification, distrusting on the seventh day that Caesar
would keep his promise as to the number of days, because he heard that he
had proceeded farther, and no report as to his return was brought to him,
and being urged at the same time by the expressions of those who called his
tolerance almost a siege, if, forsooth, it was not permitted them to go out of
the camp, since he might expect no disaster, whereby he could be injured,
within three miles of the camp, while nine legions and all the cavalry were
under arms, and the enemy scattered and almost annihilated, sent five
cohorts into the neighbouring cornlands, between which and the camp only
one hill intervened, for the purpose of foraging. Many soldiers of the
legions had been left invalided in the camp, of whom those who had
recovered in this space of time, being about 300, are set together under one
standard; a large number of soldiers' attendants besides, with a great
number of beasts of burden, which had remained in the camp, permission
being granted, follow them.

XXXVII.—At this very time, the German horse by chance come up, and
immediately, with the same speed with which they had advanced, attempt to
force the camp at the Decuman gate, nor were they seen, in consequence of
woods lying in the way on that side, before they were just reaching the
camp: so much so, that the sutlers who had their booths under the rampart
had not an opportunity of retreating within the camp. Our men, not
anticipating it, are perplexed by the sudden affair, and the cohort on the
outpost scarcely sustains the first attack. The enemy spread themselves on
the other sides to ascertain if they could find any access. Our men with
difficulty defend the gates; the very position of itself and the fortification
secures the other accesses. There is a panic in the entire camp, and one
inquires of another the cause of the confusion, nor do they readily

determine whither the standards should be borne, nor into what quarter each
should betake himself. One avows that the camp is already taken, another
maintains that, the enemy having destroyed the army and commander-in-
chief, are come thither as conquerors; most form strange superstitious
fancies from the spot, and place before their eyes the catastrophe of Cotta
and Titurius, who had fallen in the same fort. All being greatly disconcerted
by this alarm, the belief of the barbarians is strengthened that there is no
garrison within, as they had heard from their prisoner. They endeavour to
force an entrance and encourage one another not to cast from their hands so
valuable a prize.

XXXVIII.-P. Sextius Baculus, who had led a principal century under
Caesar (of whom we have made mention in previous engagements), had
been left an invalid in the garrison, and had now been five days without
food. He, distrusting his own safety and that of all, goes forth from his tent
unarmed; he sees that the enemy are close at hand and that the matter is in
the utmost danger; he snatches arms from those nearest, and stations
himself at the gate. The centurions of that cohort which was on guard
follow him; for a short time they sustain the fight together. Sextius faints,
after receiving many wounds; he is with difficulty saved, drawn away by
the hands of the soldiers. This space having intervened, the others resume
courage, so far as to venture to take their place on the fortifications and
present the aspect of defenders.

XXXIX.—The foraging having in the meantime been completed, our
soldiers distinctly hear the shout; the horse hasten on before and discover in
what danger the affair is. But here there is no fortification to receive them,
in their alarm: those last enlisted and unskilled in military discipline turn
their faces to the military tribune and the centurions; they wait to find what
orders may be given by them. No one is so courageous as not to be
disconcerted by the suddenness of the affair. The barbarians, espying our

standard in the distance, desist from the attack; at first they suppose that the
legions, which they had learned from their prisoners had removed farther
off, had returned; afterwards, despising their small number, they make an
attack on them at all sides.

XL.-The camp-followers run forward to the nearest rising ground; being
speedily driven from this they throw themselves among the standards and
companies: they thus so much the more alarm the soldiers already
affrighted. Some propose that, forming a wedge, they suddenly break
through, since the camp was so near; and if any part should be surrounded
and slain, they fully trust that at least the rest may be saved; others, that
they take their stand on an eminence, and all undergo the same destiny. The
veteran soldiers, whom we stated to have set out together [with the others]
under a standard, do not approve of this. Therefore encouraging each other,
under the conduct of Caius Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had been
appointed over them, they break through the midst of the enemy, and arrive
in the camp safe to a man. The camp-attendants and the horse following
close upon them with the same impetuosity, are saved by the courage of the
soldiers. But those who had taken their stand upon the eminence having
even now acquired no experience of military matters, neither could
persevere in that resolution which they approved of, namely, to defend
themselves from their higher position, nor imitate that vigour and speed
which they had observed to have availed others; but, attempting to reach the
camp, had descended into an unfavourable situation. The Centurions, some
of whom had been promoted for their valour from the lower ranks of other
legions to higher ranks in this legion, in order that they might not forfeit
their glory for military exploits previously acquired, fell together fighting
most valiantly. The enemy having been dislodged by their valour, a part of
the soldiers arrived safe in camp contrary to their expectations; a part
perished, surrounded by the barbarians.

XLI.—The Germans, despairing of taking the camp by storm, because
they saw that our men had taken up their position on the fortifications,
retreated beyond the Rhine with that plunder which they had deposited in
the woods. And so great was the alarm, even after the departure of the
enemy, that when C. Volusenus, who had been sent with the cavalry, arrived
that night, he could not gain credence that Caesar was close at hand with his
army safe. Fear had so pre-occupied the minds of all, that, their reason
being almost estranged, they said that all the other forces having been cut
off, the cavalry alone had arrived there by flight, and asserted that, if the
army were safe, the Germans would not have attacked the camp: which fear
the arrival of Caesar removed.

XLII.—He, on his return, being well aware of the casualties of war,
complained of one thing [only], namely, that the cohorts had been sent
away from the outposts and garrison [duty], and pointed out that room
ought not to have been left for even the most trivial casualty; that fortune
had exercised great influence in the sudden arrival of their enemy; much
greater, in that she had turned the barbarians away from the very rampart
and gates of the camp. Of all which events, it seemed the most surprising
that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with this object, that they
might plunder the territories of Ambiorix, being led to the camp of the
Romans, rendered Ambiorix a most acceptable service.

XLIII.—Caesar, having again marched to harass the enemy, after
collecting a large number [of auxiliaries] from the neighbouring states,
despatches them in all directions. All the villages and all the buildings,
which each beheld, were on fire: spoil was being driven off from all parts;
the corn not only was being consumed by so great numbers of cattle and
men, but also had fallen to the earth, owing to the time of the year and the
storms; so that if any had concealed themselves for the present, still, it
appeared likely that they must perish through want of all things, when the

army should be drawn off. And frequently it came to that point, as so large a
body of cavalry had been sent abroad in all directions, that the prisoners
declared Ambiorix had just then been seen by them in flight, and had not
even passed out of sight, so that the hope of overtaking him being raised,
and unbounded exertions having been resorted to, those who thought they
should acquire the highest favour with Caesar, nearly overcame nature by
their ardour, and continually a little only seemed wanting to complete
success; but he rescued himself by [means of] lurking-places and forests,
and, concealed by the night, made for other districts and quarters, with no
greater guard than that of four horsemen, to whom alone he ventured to
confide his life.

XLIV.—Having devastated the country in such a manner, Caesar leads
back his army with the loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum of the Remi,
and, having summoned a council of Gaul to assemble at that place, he
resolved to hold an investigation respecting the conspiracy of the Senones
and Carnutes, and having pronounced a most severe sentence upon Acco,
who had been the contriver of that plot, he punished him after the custom of
our ancestors. Some fearing a trial, fled; when he had forbidden these fire
and water, he stationed in winter quarters two legions at the frontiers of the
Treviri, two among the Lingones, the remaining six at Agendicum, in the
territories of the Senones; and, having provided corn for the army, he set out
for Italy, as he had determined, to hold the assizes.

BOOK VII

I.—Gaul being tranquil, Caesar, as he had determined, sets out for Italy to
hold the provincial assizes. There he receives intelligence of the death of
Clodius; and, being informed of the decree of the senate [to the effect] that

all the youth of Italy should take the military oath, he determined to hold a
levy throughout the entire province. Report of these events is rapidly borne
into Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls themselves add to the report, and invent
what the case seemed to require, [namely] that Caesar was detained by
commotions in the city, and could not, amidst so violent dissensions, come
to his army. Animated by this opportunity, they who already, previously to
this occurrence, were indignant that they were reduced beneath the
dominion of Rome, begin to organize their plans for war more openly and
daringly. The leading men of Gaul, having convened councils among
themselves in the woods, and retired places, complain of the death of Acco:
they point out that this fate may fall in turn on themselves: they bewail the
unhappy fate of Gaul; and by every sort of promises and rewards, they
earnestly solicit some to begin the war, and assert the freedom of Gaul at
the hazard of their lives. They say that special care should be paid to this,
that Caesar should be cut off from his army, before their secret plans should
be divulged. That this was easy, because neither would the legions, in the
absence of their general, dare to leave their winter quarters, nor could the
general reach his army without a guard: finally, that it was better to be slain
in battle than not to recover their ancient glory in war, and that freedom
which they had received from their forefathers.

II.—Whilst these things are in agitation, the Carnutes declare "that they
would decline no danger for the sake of the general safety," and promise
that they would be the first of all to begin the war; and since they cannot at
present take precautions, by giving and receiving hostages, that the affair
shall not be divulged they require that a solemn assurance be given them by
oath and plighted honour, their military standards being brought together (in
which manner their most sacred obligations are made binding), that they
should not be deserted by the rest of the Gauls on commencing the war.

III.—When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, under the command of
Cotuatus and Conetodunus, desperate men, meet together at Genabum, and
slay the Roman citizens who had settled there for the purpose of trading
(among the rest, Caius Fusius Cita, a distinguished Roman knight, who by
Caesar's orders had presided over the provision department), and plunder
their property. The report is quickly spread among all the states of Gaul; for,
whenever a more important and remarkable event takes place, they transmit
the intelligence through their lands and districts by a shout; the others take
it up in succession, and pass it to their neighbours, as happened on this
occasion; for the things which were done at Genabum at sunrise were heard
in the territories of the Arverni before the end of the first watch, which is an
extent of more than a hundred and sixty miles.

IV.—There in like manner, Vercingetorix the son of Celtillus the
Arvernian, a young man of the highest power (whose father had held the
supremacy of entire Gaul, and had been put to death by his fellow citizens,
for this reason, because he aimed at sovereign power), summoned together
his dependents, and easily excited them. On his design being made known,
they rush to arms: he is expelled from the town of Gergovia by his uncle
Gobanitio and the rest of the nobles, who were of opinion, that such an
enterprise ought not to be hazarded: he did not however desist, but held in
the country a levy of the needy and desperate. Having collected such a body
of troops, he brings over to his 30 sentiments such of his fellow citizens as
he has access to: he exhorts them to take up arms in behalf of the general
freedom, and having assembled great forces he drives from the state his
opponents, by whom he had been expelled a short time previously. He is
saluted king by his partisans; he sends ambassadors in every direction, he
conjures them to adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his
interests the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci,
Lemovice, and all the others who border on the ocean; the supreme
command is conferred on him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this

authority, he demands hostages from all these states, he orders a fixed
number of soldiers to be sent to him immediately; he determines what
quantity of arms each state shall prepare at home, and before what time; he
pays particular attention to the cavalry. To the utmost vigilance he adds the
utmost rigour of authority; and by the severity of his punishments brings
over the wavering: for on the commission of a greater crime he puts the
perpetrators to death by fire and every sort of tortures; for a slighter cause,
he sends home the offenders with their ears cut off, or one of their eyes put
out, that they may be an example to the rest, and frighten others by the
severity of their punishment.

V.—Having quickly collected an army by their punishments, he sends
Lucterius, one of the Cadurci, a man of the utmost daring, with part of his
forces, into the territory of the Ruteni; and marches in person into the
country of the Bituriges. On his arrival, the Bituriges send ambassadors to
the Aedui, under whose protection they were, to solicit aid in order that they
might more easily resist the forces of the enemy. The Aedui, by the advice
of the lieutenants whom Caesar had left with the army, send supplies of
horse and foot to succour the Bituriges. When they came to the river Loire,
which separates the Bituriges from the Aedui, they delayed a few days
there, and, not daring to pass the river, return home, and send back word to
the lieutenants that they had returned through fear of the treachery of the
Bituriges, who, they ascertained, had formed this design, that if the Aedui
should cross the river, the Bituriges on the one side, and the Arverni on the
other, should surround them. Whether they did this for the reason which
they alleged to the lieutenants, or influenced by treachery, we think that we
ought not to state as certain, because we have no proof. On their departure,
the Bituriges immediately unite themselves to the Arverni.

VI.—These affairs being announced to Caesar in Italy at the time when
he understood that matters in the city had been reduced to a more tranquil

state by the energy of Cneius Pompey, he set out for Transalpine Gaul. After
he had arrived there, he was greatly at a loss to know by what means he
could reach his army. For if he should summon the legions into the
province, he was aware that on their march they would have to fight in his
absence; he foresaw too, that if he himself should endeavour to reach the
army, he would act injudiciously, in trusting his safety even to those who
seemed to be tranquillized.

VII.—In the meantime Lucterius the Cadurcan, having been sent into the
country of the Ruteni, gains over that state to the Arverni. Having advanced
into the country of the Nitiobriges, and Gabali, he receives hostages from
both nations, and, assembling a numerous force, marches to make a descent
on the province in the direction of Narbo. Caesar, when this circumstance
was announced to him, thought that the march to Narbo ought to take the
precedence of all his other plans. When he arrived there, he encourages the
timid, and stations garrisons among the Ruteni, in the province of the
Volcae Arecomici, and the country around Narbo which was in the vicinity
of the enemy; he orders a portion of the forces from the province, and the
recruits which he had brought from Italy, to rendezvous among the Helvii
who border on the territories of the Arverni.

VIII.—These matters being arranged, and Lucterius now checked and
forced to retreat, because he thought it dangerous to enter the line of Roman
garrisons, Caesar marches into the country of the Helvii; although mount
Cevennes, which separates the Arverni from the Helvii, blocked up the way
with very deep snow, as it was the severest season of the year; yet having
cleared away the snow to the depth of six feet, and having opened the roads,
he reaches the territories of the Arverni, with infinite labour to his soldiers.
This people being surprised, because they considered themselves defended
by the Cevennes as by a wall, and the paths at this season of the year had
never before been passable even to individuals, he orders the cavalry to

extend themselves as far as they could, and strike as great a panic as
possible into the enemy. These proceedings are speedily announced to
Vercingetorix by rumour and his messengers. Around him all the Arverni
crowd in alarm, and solemnly entreat him to protect their property, and not
to suffer them to be plundered by the enemy, especially as he saw that all
the war was transferred into their country. Being prevailed upon by their
entreaties he moves his camp from the country of the Bituriges in the
direction of the Arverni.

IX.—Caesar, having delayed two days in that place, because he had
anticipated that, in the natural course of events, such would be the conduct
of Vercingetorix, leaves the army under pretence of raising recruits and
cavalry: he places Brutus, a young man, in command of these forces; he
gives him instructions that the cavalry should range as extensively as
possible in all directions; that he would exert himself not to be absent from
the camp longer than three days. Having arranged these matters, he marches
to Vienna by as long journeys as he can, when his own soldiers did not
expect him. Finding there a fresh body of cavalry, which he had sent on to
that place several days before, marching incessantly night and day, he
advanced rapidly through the territory of the Aedui into that of the
Lingones, in which two legions were wintering, that, if any plan affecting
his own safety should have been organised by the Aedui, he might defeat it
by the rapidity of his movements. When he arrived there, he sends
information to the rest of the legions, and gathers all his army into one place
before intelligence of his arrival could be announced to the Arverni.

Vercingetorix, on hearing this circumstance, leads back his army into the
country of the Bituriges; and after marching from it to Gergovia, a town of
the Boii, whom Caesar had settled there after defeating them in the
Helvetian war, and had rendered tributary to the Aedui, he determined to
attack it.

X.—This action caused great perplexity to Caesar in the selection of his
plans; [he feared] lest, if he should confine his legions in one place for the
remaining portion of the winter, all Gaul should revolt when the tributaries
of the Aedui were subdued, because it would appear that there was in him
no protection for his friends; but if he should draw them too soon out of
their winter quarters, he might be distressed by the want of provisions, in
consequence of the difficulty of conveyance. It seemed better, however, to
endure every hardship than to alienate the affections of all his allies, by
submitting to such an insult. Having, therefore, impressed on the Aedui the
necessity of supplying him with provisions, he sends forward messengers to
the Boii to inform them of his arrival, and encourage them to remain firm in
their allegiance, and resist the attack of the enemy with great resolution.
Having left two legions and the luggage of the entire army at Agendicum,
he marches to the Boii.

XI.—On the second day, when he came to Vellaunodunum, a town of the
Senones, he determined to attack it, in order that he might not leave an
enemy in his rear, and might the more easily procure supplies of provisions,
and drew a line of circumvallation around it in two days: on the third day,
ambassadors being sent from the town to treat of a capitulation, he orders
their arms to be brought together, their cattle to be brought forth, and six
hundred hostages to be given. He leaves Caius Trebonius, his lieutenant, to
complete these arrangements; he himself sets out with the intention of
marching as soon as possible to Genabum, a town of the Carnutes, who
having then for the first time received information of the siege of
Vellaunodunum, as they thought that it would be protracted to a longer
time, were preparing a garrison to send to Genabum for the defence of that
town. Caesar arrived here in two days; after pitching his camp before the
town, being prevented by the time of the day, he defers the attack to the
next day, and orders his soldiers to prepare whatever was necessary for that
enterprise; and as a bridge over the Loire connected the town of Genabum

with the opposite bank, fearing lest the inhabitants should escape by night
from the town, he orders two legions to keep watch under arms. The people
of Genabum came forth silently from the city before midnight, and began to
cross the river. When this circumstance was announced by scouts, Caesar,
having set fire to the gates, sends in the legions which he had ordered to be
ready, and obtains possession of the town so completely, that very few of
the whole number of the enemy escaped being taken alive, because the
narrowness of the bridge and the roads prevented the multitude from
escaping. He pillages and burns the town, gives the booty to the soldiers,
then leads his army over the Loire, and marches into the territories of the
Bituriges.

XII.—Vercingetorix, when he ascertained the arrival of Caesar, desisted
from the siege [of Gergovia], and marched to meet Caesar. The latter had
commenced to besiege Noviodunum; and when ambassadors came from
this town to beg that he would pardon them and spare their lives, in order
that he might execute the rest of his designs with the rapidity by which he
had accomplished most of them, he orders their arms to be collected, their
horses to be brought forth, and hostages to be given. A part of the hostages
being now delivered up, when the rest of the terms were being performed, a
few centurions and soldiers being sent into the town to collect the arms and
horses, the enemy's cavalry, which had outstripped the main body of
Vercingetorix's army, was seen at a distance; as soon as the townsmen
beheld them, and entertained hopes of assistance, raising a shout, they
began to take up arms, shut the gates, and line the walls. When the
centurions in the town understood from the signal-making of the Gauls that
they were forming some new design, they drew their swords and seized the
gates, and recovered all their men safe.

XIII.—Caesar orders the horse to be drawn out of the camp, and
commences a cavalry action. His men being now distressed, Caesar sends to

their aid about four hundred German horse, which he had determined, at the
beginning, to keep with himself. The Gauls could not withstand their attack,
but were put to flight, and retreated to their main body, after losing a great
number of men. When they were routed, the townsmen, again intimidated,
arrested those persons by whose exertions they thought that the mob had
been roused, and brought them to Caesar, and surrendered themselves to
him. When these affairs were accomplished, Caesar marched to the
Avaricum, which was the largest and best fortified town in the territories of
the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertile tract of country; because he
confidently expected that on taking that town, he would reduce beneath his
dominion the state of the Bituriges.

XIV.—Vercingetorix, after sustaining such a series of losses at
Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum, summons his men to a
council. He impresses on them "that the war must be prosecuted on a very
different system from that which had been previously adopted; but they
should by all means aim at this object, that the Romans should be prevented
from foraging and procuring provisions; that this was easy, because they
themselves were well supplied with cavalry and were likewise assisted by
the season of the year; that forage could not be cut; that the enemy must
necessarily disperse, and look for it in the houses, that all these might be
daily destroyed by the horse. Besides that the interests of private property
must be neglected for the sake of the general safety; that the villages and
houses ought to be fired, over such an extent of country in every direction
from Boia, as the Romans appeared capable of scouring in their search for
forage. That an abundance of these necessaries could be supplied to them,
because they would be assisted by the resources of those in whose
territories the war would be waged: that the Romans either would not bear
the privation, or else would advance to any distance from the camp with
considerable danger; and that it made no difference whether they slew them
or stripped them of their baggage, since, if it was lost, they could not carry

on the war. Besides that, the towns ought to be burnt which were not
secured against every danger by their fortifications or natural advantages;
that there should not be places of retreat for their own countrymen for
declining military service, nor be exposed to the Romans as inducements to
carry off abundance of provisions and plunder. If these sacrifices should
appear heavy or galling, that they ought to consider it much more
distressing that their wives and children should be dragged off to slavery,
and themselves slain; the evils which must necessarily befall the conquered.

XV.—This opinion having been approved of by unanimous consent,
more than twenty towns of the Bituriges are burnt in one day.
Conflagrations are beheld in every quarter; and although all bore this with
great regret, yet they laid before themselves this consolation, that, as the
victory was certain, they could quickly recover their losses. There is a
debate concerning Avaricum in the general council, whether they should
decide that it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges threw themselves
at the feet of all the Gauls, and entreat that they should not be compelled to
set fire with their own hands to the fairest city of almost the whole of Gaul,
which was both a protection and ornament to the state; they say that "they
could easily defend it, owing to the nature of the ground, for, being
enclosed almost on every side by a river and a marsh, it had only one
entrance, and that very narrow." Permission being granted to them at their
earnest request, Vercingetorix at first dissuades them from it, but afterwards
concedes the point, owing to their entreaties and the compassion of the
soldiers. A proper garrison is selected for the town.

XVI.—Vercingetorix follows closely upon Caesar by shorter marches,
and selects for his camp a place defended by woods and marshes, at the
distance of fifteen miles from Avaricum. There he received intelligence by
trusty scouts, every hour in the day, of what was going on at Avaricum, and
ordered whatever he wished to be done; he closely watched all our

expeditions for corn and forage, and whenever they were compelled to go to
a greater distance, he attacked them when dispersed, and inflicted severe
loss upon them; although the evil was remedied by our men, as far as
precautions could be taken, by going forth at irregular times, and by
different ways.

XVII.—Caesar pitching his camp at that side of the town which was not
defended by the river and marsh, and had a very narrow approach, as we
have mentioned, began to raise the vineae and erect two towers; for the
nature of the place prevented him from drawing a line of circumvallation.
He never ceased to importune the Boii and Aedui for supplies of corn; of
whom the one [the Aedui], because they were acting with no zeal, did not
aid him much; the others [the Boii], as their resources were not great,
quickly consumed what they had. Although the army was distressed by the
greatest want of corn, through the poverty of the Boii, the apathy of the
Aedui, and the burning of the houses, to such a degree, that for several days
the soldiers were without corn, and satisfied their extreme hunger with
cattle driven from the remote villages; yet no language was heard from
them unworthy of the majesty of the Roman people and their former
victories. Moreover, when Caesar addressed the legions, one by one, when
at work, and said that he would raise the siege, if they felt the scarcity too
severely, they unanimously begged him "not to do so; that they had served
for several years under his command in such a manner, that they never
submitted to insult, and never abandoned an enterprise without
accomplishing it; that they should consider it a disgrace if they abandoned
the siege after commencing it; that it was better to endure every hardship
than not to avenge the manes of the Roman citizens who perished at
Genabum by the perfidy of the Gauls." They entrusted the same
declarations to the centurions and military tribunes, that through them they
might be communicated to Caesar.

XVIII.—When the towers had now approached the walls, Caesar
ascertained from the captives that Vercingetorix, after destroying the forage,
had pitched his camp nearer Avaricum, and that he himself with the cavalry
and light-armed infantry, who generally fought among the horse, had gone
to lay an ambuscade in that quarter to which he thought that our troops
would come the next day to forage. On learning these facts, he set out from
the camp secretly at midnight, and reached the camp of the enemy early in
the morning. They having quickly learned the arrival of Caesar by scouts,
hid their cars and baggage in the thickest parts of the woods, and drew up
all their forces in a lofty and open space: which circumstance being
announced, Caesar immediately ordered the baggage to be piled, and the
arms to be got ready.

XIX.—There was a hill of a gentle ascent from the bottom; a dangerous
and impassable marsh, not more than fifty feet broad, begirt it on almost
every side. The Gauls, having broken down the bridges, posted themselves
on this hill, in confidence of their position, and being drawn up in tribes
according to their respective states, held all the fords and passages of that
marsh with trusty guards, thus determined that if the Romans should
attempt to force the marsh, they would overpower them from the higher
ground while sticking in it, so that whoever saw the nearness of the
position, would imagine that the two armies were prepared to fight on
almost equal terms; but whoever should view accurately the disadvantage
of position, would discover that they were showing off an empty affectation
of courage. Caesar clearly points out to his soldiers, who were indignant
that the enemy could bear the sight of them at the distance of so short a
space, and were earnestly demanding the signal for action, "with how great
loss and the death of how many gallant men the victory would necessarily
be purchased: and when he saw them so determined to decline no danger
for his renown, that he ought to be considered guilty of the utmost injustice
if he did not hold their life dearer than his own personal safety." Having

thus consoled his soldiers, he leads them back on the same day to the camp,
and determined to prepare the other things which were necessary for the
siege of the town.

XX.—Vercingetorix, when he had returned to his men, was accused of
treason, in that he had moved his camp nearer the Romans, in that he had
gone away with all the cavalry, in that he had left so great forces without a
commander, in that, on his departure, the Romans had come at such a
favourable season, and with such despatch; that all these circumstances
could not have happened accidentally or without design; that he preferred
holding the sovereignty of Gaul by the grant of Caesar, to acquiring it by
their favour. Being accused in such a manner, he made the following reply
to these charges:—"That his moving his camp had been caused by want of
forage, and had been done even by their advice; that his approaching near
the Romans had been a measure dictated by the favourable nature of the
ground, which would defend him by its natural strength; that the service of
the cavalry could not have been requisite in marshy ground, and was useful
in that place to which they had gone; that he, on his departure, had given the
supreme command to no one intentionally, lest he should be induced by the
eagerness of the multitude to hazard an engagement, to which he perceived
that all were inclined, owing to their want of energy, because they were
unable to endure fatigue any longer. That, if the Romans in the meantime
came up by chance, they [the Gauls] should feel grateful to fortune; if
invited by the information of some one they should feel grateful to him,
because they were enabled to see distinctly from the higher ground the
smallness of the number of their enemy, and despise the courage of those
who, not daring to fight, retreated disgracefully into their camp. That he
desired no power from Caesar by treachery, since he could have it by
victory, which was now assured to himself and to all the Gauls; nay, that he
would even give them back the command, if they thought that they
conferred honour on him, rather then received safety from him. That you

may be assured," said he, "that I speak these words with truth;—listen to
these Roman soldiers!" He produces some camp-followers whom he had
surprised on a foraging expedition some days before, and had tortured by
famine and confinement. They being previously instructed in what answers
they should make when examined, say, "That they were legionary soldiers,
that, urged by famine and want, they had recently gone forth from the camp,
[to see] if they could find any corn or cattle in the fields; that the whole
army was distressed by a similar scarcity, nor had any one now sufficient
strength, nor could bear the labour of the work; and therefore that the
general was determined, if he made no progress in the siege, to draw off his
army in three days." "These benefits," says Vercingetorix, "you receive
from me, whom you accuse of treason—me, by whose exertions you see so
powerful and victorious an army almost destroyed by famine, without
shedding one drop of your blood; and I have taken precautions that no state
shall admit within its territories this army in its ignominious flight from this
place."

XXI.—The whole multitude raise a shout and clash their arms, according
to their custom, as they usually do in the case of him whose speech they
approve; [they exclaim] that Vercingetorix was a consummate general, and
that they had no doubt of his honour; that the war could not be conducted
with greater prudence. They determine that ten thousand men should be
picked out of the entire army and sent into the town, and decide that the
general safety should not be entrusted to the Bituriges alone, because they
were aware that the glory of the victory must rest with the Bituriges, if they
made good the defence of the town.

XXII.—To the extraordinary valour of our soldiers, devices of every sort
were opposed by the Gauls; since they are a nation of consummate
ingenuity, and most skilful in imitating and making those things which are
imparted by any one; for they turned aside the hooks with nooses, and when

they had caught hold of them firmly, drew them on by means of engines,
and undermined the mound the more skilfully on this account, because
there are in their territories extensive iron mines, and consequently every
description of mining operations is known and practised by them. They had
furnished, moreover, the whole wall on every side with turrets, and had
covered them with skins. Besides, in their frequent sallies by day and night,
they attempted either to set fire to the mound, or attack our soldiers when
engaged in the works; and, moreover, by splicing the upright timbers of
their own towers, they equalled the height of ours, as fast as the mound had
daily raised them, and countermined our mines, and impeded the working
of them by stakes bent and sharpened at the ends, and boiling pitch, and
stones of very great weight, and prevented them from approaching the
walls.

XXIII.—But this is usually the form of all the Gallic walls. Straight
beams, connected lengthwise and two feet distant from each other at equal
intervals, are placed together on the ground; these are mortised on the
inside, and covered with plenty of earth. But the intervals which we have
mentioned, are closed up in front by large stones. These being thus laid and
cemented together, another row is added above, in such a manner that the
same interval may be observed, and that the beams may not touch one
another, but equal spaces intervening, each row of beams is kept firmly in
its place by a row of stones. In this manner the whole wall is consolidated,
until the regular height of the wall be completed. This work, with respect to
appearance and variety, is not unsightly, owing to the alternate rows of
beams and stones, which preserve their order in right lines; and, besides, it
possesses great advantages as regards utility and the defence of cities; for
the stone protects it from fire, and the wood from the battering ram, since it
[the wood] being mortised in the inside with rows of beams, generally forty
feet each in length, can neither be broken through nor torn asunder.

XXIV.—The siege having been impeded by so many disadvantages, the
soldiers, although they were retarded during the whole time, by the mud,
cold, and constant showers, yet by their incessant labour overcame all these
obstacles, and in twenty-five days raised a mound three hundred and thirty
feet broad and eighty feet high. When it almost touched the enemy's walls,
and Caesar, according to his usual custom, kept watch at the work, and
encouraged the soldiers not to discontinue the work for a moment: a little
before the third watch they discovered that the mound was sinking, since
the enemy had set it on fire by a mine; and at the same time a shout was
raised along the entire wall, and a sally was made from two gates on each
side of the turrets. Some at a distance were casting torches and dry wood
from the wall on the mound, others were pouring on it pitch, and other
materials, by which the flame might be excited, so that a plan could hardly
be formed, as to where they should first run to the defence, or to what part
aid should be brought. However, as two legions always kept guard before
the camp by Caesar's orders, and several of them were at stated times at the
work, measures were promptly taken, that some should oppose the sallying
party, others draw back the towers and make a cut in the rampart; and
moreover, that the whole army should hasten from the camp to extinguish
the flames.

XXV.—When the battle was going on in every direction, the rest of the
night being now spent, and fresh hopes of victory always arose before the
enemy: the more so on this account because they saw the coverings of our
towers burnt away, and perceived that we, being exposed, could not easily
go to give assistance, and they themselves were always relieving the weary
with fresh men, and considered that all the safety of Gaul rested on this
crisis; there happened in my own view a circumstance which, having
appeared to be worthy of record, we thought it ought not to be omitted. A
certain Gaul before the gate of the town, who was casting into the fire
opposite the turret balls of tallow and fire which were passed along to him,

was pierced with a dart on the right side and fell dead. One of those next
him stepped over him as he lay, and discharged the same office: when the
second man was slain in the same manner by a wound from a cross-bow, a
third succeeded him, and a fourth succeeded the third: nor was this post left
vacant by the besieged, until, the fire of the mound having been
extinguished, and the enemy repulsed in every direction, an end was put to
the fighting.

XXVI.—The Gauls having tried every expedient, as nothing had
succeeded, adopted the design of fleeing from the town the next day, by the
advice and order of Vercingetorix. They hoped that, by attempting it at the
dead of night, they would effect it without any great loss of men, because
the camp of Vercingetorix was not far distant from the town, and the
extensive marsh which intervened was likely to retard the Romans in the
pursuit. And they were now preparing to execute this by night, when the
matrons suddenly ran out into the streets, and weeping cast themselves at
the feet of their husbands, and requested of them, with every entreaty, that
they should not abandon themselves and their common children to the
enemy for punishment, because the weakness of their nature and physical
powers prevented them from taking to flight. When they saw that they (as
fear does not generally admit of mercy in extreme danger) persisted in their
resolution, they began to shout aloud, and give intelligence of their flight to
the Romans. The Gauls being intimidated by fear of this, lest the passes
should be pre-occupied by the Roman cavalry, desisted from their design.

XXVII.—The next day Caesar, the tower being advanced, and the works
which he had determined to raise being arranged, a violent storm arising,
thought this no bad time for executing his designs, because he observed the
guards arranged on the walls a little too negligently, and therefore ordered
his own men to engage in their work more remissly, and pointed out what
he wished to be done. He drew up his soldiers in a secret position within the

vineae, and exhorts them to reap, at least, the harvest of victory
proportionate to their exertions. He proposed a reward for those who should
first scale the walls, and gave the signal to the soldiers. They suddenly flew
out from all quarters and quickly filled the wall.

XXVIII.—The enemy being alarmed by the suddenness of the attack,
were dislodged from the wall and towers, and drew up, in form of a wedge,
in the market-place and the open streets, with this intention that, if an attack
should be made on any side, they should fight with their line drawn up to
receive it. When they saw no one descending to the level ground, and the
enemy extending themselves along the entire wall in every direction,
fearing lest every hope of flight should be cut off, they cast away their arms,
and sought, without stopping, the most remote parts of the town. A part was
then slain by the infantry when they were crowding upon one another in the
narrow passage of the gates; and a part having got without the gates, were
cut to pieces by the cavalry: nor was there one who was anxious for the
plunder. Thus, being excited by the massacre at Genabum and the fatigue of
the siege, they spared neither those worn out with years, women, or
children. Finally, out of all that number, which amounted to about forty
thousand, scarcely eight hundred, who fled from the town when they heard
the first alarm, reached Vercingetorix in safety: and he, the night being now
far spent, received them in silence after their flight (fearing that any sedition
should arise in the camp from their entrance in a body and the compassion
of the soldiers), so that, having arranged his friends and the chiefs of the
states at a distance on the road, he took precautions that they should be
separated and conducted to their fellow countrymen, to whatever part of the
camp had been assigned to each state from the beginning.

XXIX.—Vercingetorix having convened an assembly on the following
day, consoled and encouraged his soldiers in the following words:—"That
they should not be too much depressed in spirit, nor alarmed at their loss;

that the Romans did not conquer by valour nor in the field, but by a kind of
art and skill in assault, with which they themselves were unacquainted; that
whoever expected every event in the war to be favourable, erred; that it
never was his opinion that Avaricum should be defended, of the truth of
which statement he had themselves as witnesses, but that it was owing to
the imprudence of the Bituriges, and the too ready compliance of the rest,
that this loss was sustained; that, however, he would soon compensate it by
superior advantages; for that he would, by his exertions, bring over those
states which severed themselves from the rest of the Gauls, and would
create a general unanimity throughout the whole of Gaul, the union of
which not even the whole earth could withstand, and that he had it already
almost effected; that in the meantime it was reasonable that he should
prevail on them, for the sake of the general safety, to begin to fortify their
camp, in order that they might the more easily sustain the sudden attacks of
the enemy."

XXX.—This speech was not disagreeable to the Gauls, principally,
because he himself was not disheartened by receiving so severe a loss, and
had not concealed himself, nor shunned the eyes of the people: and he was
believed to possess greater foresight and sounder judgment than the rest,
because, when the affair was undecided, he had at first been of opinion that
Avaricum should be burnt, and afterwards that it should be abandoned.
Accordingly, as ill success weakens the authority of other generals, so, on
the contrary, his dignity increased daily, although a loss was sustained: at
the same time they began to entertain hopes, on his assertion, of uniting the
rest of the states to themselves, and on this occasion, for the first time, the
Gauls began to fortify their camps, and were so alarmed that although they
were men unaccustomed to toil, yet they were of opinion that they ought to
endure and suffer everything which should be imposed upon them.

XXXI.—Nor did Vercingetorix use less efforts than he had promised, to
gain over the other states, and [in consequence] endeavoured to entice their
leaders by gifts and promises. For this object he selected fitting emissaries
by whose subtle pleading or private friendship each of the nobles could be
most easily influenced. He takes care that those who fled to him on the
storming of Avaricum should be provided with arms and clothes. At the
same time, that his diminished forces should be recruited, he levies a fixed
quota of soldiers from each state, and defines the number and day before
which he should wish them brought to the camp, and orders all the archers,
of whom there was a very great number in Gaul, to be collected and sent to
him. By these means, the troops which were lost at Avaricum are speedily
replaced. In the meantime, Teutomarus, the son of Ollovicon, the king of
the Nitiobriges, whose father had received the appellation of friend from
our senate, came to him with a great number of his own horse and those
whom he had hired from Aquitania.

XXXII.—Caesar, after delaying several days at Avaricum, and finding
there the greatest plenty of corn and other provisions, refreshed his army
after their fatigue and privation. The winter being almost ended, when he
was invited by the favourable season of the year to prosecute the war and
march against the enemy, [and try] whether he could draw them from the
marshes and woods, or else press them by a blockade; some noblemen of
the Aedui came to him as ambassadors to entreat "that in an extreme
emergency he should succour their state; that their affairs were in the
utmost danger, because, whereas single magistrates had been usually
appointed in ancient times and held the power of king for a single year, two
persons now exercised this office, and each asserted that he was appointed
according to their laws. That one of them was Convictolitanis, a powerful
and illustrious youth; the other Cotus, sprung from a most ancient family,
and personally a man of very great influence and extensive connections. His
brother Valetiacus had borne the same office during the last year: that the

whole state was up in arms; the senate divided, the people divided; that
each of them had his own adherents; and that, if the animosity would be
fomented any longer the result would be that one part of the state would
come to a collision with the other; that it rested with his activity and
influence to prevent it."

XXXIII.—Although Caesar considered it ruinous to leave the war and
the enemy, yet, being well aware what great evils generally arise from
internal dissensions, lest a state so powerful and so closely connected with
the Roman people, which he himself had always fostered and honoured in
every respect, should have recourse to violence and arms, and that the party
which had less confidence in its own power should summon aid from
Vercingetorix, he determined to anticipate this movement; and because, by
the laws of the Aedui, it was not permitted those who held the supreme
authority to leave the country, he determined to go in person to the Aedui,
lest he should appear to infringe upon their government and laws, and
summoned all the senate, and those between whom the dispute was, to meet
him at Decetia. When almost all the state had assembled there, and he was
informed that one brother had been declared magistrate by the other, when
only a few persons were privately summoned for the purpose, at a different
time and place from what he ought, whereas the laws not only forbade two
belonging to one family to be elected magistrates while each was alive, but
even deterred them from being in the senate, he compelled Cotus to resign
his office; he ordered Convictolitanis, who had been elected by the priests,
according to the usage of the state, in the presence of the magistrates, to
hold the supreme authority.

XXXIV.—Having pronounced this decree between [the contending
parties], he exhorted the Aedui to bury in oblivion their disputes and
dissensions, and, laying aside all these things, devote themselves to the war,
and expect from him, on the conquest of Gaul, those rewards which they

should have earned, and send speedily to him all their cavalry and ten
thousand infantry, which he might place in different garrisons to protect his
convoys of provisions, and then divided his army into two parts: he gave
Labienus four legions to lead into the country of the Senones and Parisii;
and led in person six into the country of the Arverni, in the direction of the
town of Gergovia, along the banks of the Allier. He gave part of the cavalry
to Labienus, and kept part to himself. Vercingetorix, on learning this
circumstance, broke down all the bridges over the river and began to march
on the other bank of the Allier.

XXXV.—When each army was in sight of the other, and was pitching
their camp almost opposite that of the enemy, scouts being distributed in
every quarter, lest the Romans should build a bridge and bring over their
troops; it was to Caesar a matter attended with great difficulties, lest he
should be hindered from passing the river during the greater part of the
summer, as the Allier cannot generally be forded before the autumn.
Therefore, that this might not happen, having pitched his camp in a woody
place opposite to one of those bridges which Vercingetorix had taken care
should be broken down, the next day he stopped behind with two legions in
a secret place: he sent on the rest of the forces as usual, with all the
baggage, after having selected some cohorts, that the number of the legions
might appear to be complete. Having ordered these to advance as far as they
could, when now, from the time of day, he conjectured they had come to an
encampment, he began to rebuild the bridge on the same piles, the lower
part of which remained entire. Having quickly finished the work and led his
legions across, he selected a fit place for a camp, and recalled the rest of his
troops. Vercingetorix, on ascertaining this fact, went before him by forced
marches, in order that he might not be compelled to come to an action
against his will.

XXXVI.—Caesar, in five days' march, went from that place to Gergovia,
and after engaging in a slight cavalry skirmish that day, on viewing the
situation of the city, which, being built on a very high mountain, was very
difficult of access, he despaired of taking it by storm, and determined to
take no measures with regard to besieging it before he should secure a
supply of provisions. But Vercingetorix, having pitched his camp on the
mountain near the town, placed the forces of each state separately and at
small intervals around himself, and having occupied all the hills of that
range as far as they commanded a view [of the Roman encampment], he
presented a formidable appearance; he ordered the rulers of the states,
whom he had selected as his council of war, to come to him daily at the
dawn, whether any measure seemed to require deliberation or execution.
Nor did he allow almost any day to pass without testing in a cavalry action,
the archers being intermixed, what spirit and valour there was in each of his
own men. There was a hill opposite the town, at the very foot of that
mountain, strongly fortified and precipitous on every side (which if our men
could gain, they seemed likely to exclude the enemy from a great share of
their supply of water, and from free foraging; but this place was occupied
by them with a weak garrison): however, Caesar set out from the camp in
the silence of night, and dislodging the garrison before succour could come
from the town, he got possession of the place and posted two legions there,
and drew from the greater camp to the less a double trench twelve feet
broad, so that the soldiers could even singly pass secure from any sudden
attack of the enemy.

XXXVII.—Whilst these affairs were going on at Gergovia,
Convictolitanis, the Aeduan, to whom we have observed the magistracy was
adjudged by Caesar, being bribed by the Arverni, holds a conference with
certain young men, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers, who
were born of a most noble family. He shares the bribe with them, and
exhorts them to "remember that they were free and born for empire; that the

state of the Aedui was the only one which retarded the most certain victory
of the Gauls; that the rest were held in check by its authority; and, if it was
brought over, the Romans would not have room to stand on in Gaul; that he
had received some kindness from Caesar, only so far, however, as gaining a
most just cause by his decision; but that he assigned more weight to the
general freedom; for, why should the Aedui go to Caesar to decide
concerning their rights and laws, rather than the Romans come to the
Aedui?" The young men being easily won over by the speech of the
magistrate and the bribe, when they declared that they would even be
leaders in the plot, a plan for accomplishing it was considered, because they
were confident their state could not be induced to undertake the war on
slight grounds. It was resolved that Litavicus should have the command of
the ten thousand which were being sent to Caesar for the war, and should
have charge of them on their march, and that his brothers should go before
him to Caesar. They arrange the other measures, and the manner in which
they should have them done.

XXXVIII.—Litavicus, having received the command of the army,
suddenly convened the soldiers, when he was about thirty miles distant
from Gergovia, and, weeping, said, "Soldiers, whither are we going? All our
knights and all our nobles have perished. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, the
principal men of the state, being accused of treason, have been slain by the
Romans without even permission to plead their cause. Learn this
intelligence from those who have escaped from the massacre; for I, since
my brothers and all my relations have been slain, am prevented by grief
from declaring what has taken place." Persons are brought forward whom
he had instructed in what he would have them say, and make the same
statements to the soldiery as Litavicus had made: that all the knights of the
Aedui were slain because they were said to have held conferences with the
Arverni; that they had concealed themselves among the multitude of
soldiers, and had escaped from the midst of the slaughter. The Aedui shout

aloud and conjure Litavicus to provide for their safety. "As if," said he, "it
were a matter of deliberation, and not of necessity, for us to go to Gergovia
and unite ourselves to the Arverni. Or have we any reasons to doubt that the
Romans, after perpetrating the atrocious crime, are now hastening to slay
us? Therefore, if there be any spirit in us, let us avenge the death of those
who have perished in a most unworthy manner, and let us slay these
robbers." He points to the Roman citizens, who had accompanied them, in
reliance on his protection. He immediately seizes a great quantity of corn
and provisions, cruelly tortures them, and then puts them to death, sends
messengers throughout the entire state of the Aedui, and rouses them
completely by the same falsehood concerning the slaughter of their knights
and nobles; he earnestly advises them to avenge, in the same manner as he
did, the wrongs which they had received.

XXXIX.—Eporedorix, the Aeduan, a young man born in the highest rank
and possessing very great influence at home, and, along with Viridomarus,
of equal age and influence, but of inferior birth, whom Caesar had raised
from a humble position to the highest rank, on being recommended to him
by Divitiacus, had come in the number of horse, being summoned by
Caesar by name. These had a dispute with each other for precedence, and in
the struggle between the magistrates they had contended with their utmost
efforts, the one for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotus. Of these
Eporedorix, on learning the design of Litavicus, lays the matter before
Caesar almost at midnight; he entreats that Caesar should not suffer their
state to swerve from the alliance with the Roman people, owing to the
depraved counsels of a few young men, which he foresaw would be the
consequence if so many thousand men should unite themselves to the
enemy, as their relations could not neglect their safety, nor the state regard it
as a matter of slight importance.

XL.—Caesar felt great anxiety on this intelligence, because he had
always especially indulged the state of the Aedui, and, without any
hesitation, draws out from the camp four light-armed legions and all the
cavalry: nor had he time, at such a crisis, to contract the camp, because the
affair seemed to depend upon despatch. He leaves Caius Fabius, his
lieutenant, with two legions to guard the camp. When he ordered the
brothers of Litavicus to be arrested, he discovers that they had fled a short
time before to the camp of the enemy. He encouraged his soldiers "not to be
disheartened by the labour of the journey on such a necessary occasion,"
and, after advancing twenty-five miles, all being most eager, he came in
sight of the army of the Aedui, and, by sending on his cavalry, retards and
impedes their march; he then issues strict orders to all his soldiers to kill no
one. He commands Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who they thought were
killed, to move among the cavalry and address their friends. When they
were recognized and the treachery of Litavicus discovered, the Aedui began
to extend their hands to intimate submission, and, laying down their arms,
to deprecate death. Litavicus, with his clansmen, who after the custom of
the Gauls consider it a crime to desert their patrons, even in extreme
misfortune, flees forth to Gergovia.

XLI.—Caesar, after sending messengers to the state of the Aedui, to
inform them that they whom he could have put to death by the right of war
were spared through his kindness, and after giving three hours of the night
to his army for his repose, directed his march to Gergovia. Almost in the
middle of the journey, a party of horse that were sent by Fabius stated in
how great danger matters were; they inform him that the camp was attacked
by a very powerful army, while fresh men were frequently relieving the
wearied, and exhausting our soldiers by the incessant toil, since, on account
of the size of the camp, they had constantly to remain on the rampart; that
many had been wounded by the immense number of arrows and all kinds of
missiles; that the engines were of great service in withstanding them; that

Fabius, at their departure, leaving only two gates open, was blocking up the
rest, and was adding breast-works to the ramparts, and was preparing
himself for a similar casualty on the following day. Caesar, after receiving
this information, reached the camp before sunrise owing to the very great
zeal of his soldiers.

XLII.—Whilst these things are going on at Gergovia, the Aedui, on
receiving the first announcements from Litavicus, leave themselves no time
to ascertain the truth of these statements. Some are stimulated by avarice,
others by revenge and credulity, which is an innate propensity in that race
of men to such a degree that they consider a slight rumour as an ascertained
fact. They plunder the property of the Roman citizens, and either massacre
them or drag them away to slavery. Convictolitanis increases the evil state
of affairs, and goads on the people to fury, that by the commission of some
outrage they may be ashamed to return to propriety. They entice from the
town of Cabillonus, by a promise of safety, Marcus Aristius, a military
tribune, who was on his march to his legion; they compel those who had
settled there for the purpose of trading to do the same. By constantly
attacking them on their march they strip them of all their baggage; they
besiege day and night those that resisted; when many were slain on both
sides, they excite a greater number to arms.

XLIII.—In the meantime, when intelligence was brought that all their
soldiers were in Caesar's power, they run in a body to Aristius; they assure
him that nothing had been done by public authority; they order an inquiry to
be made about the plundered property; they confiscate the property of
Litavicus and his brothers; they send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose
of clearing themselves. They do all this with a view to recover their
soldiers; but being contaminated by guilt, and charmed by the gains arising
from the plundered property, as that act was shared in by many, and being
tempted by the fear of punishment, they began to form plans of war and stir

up the other states by embassies. Although Caesar was aware of this
proceeding, yet he addresses the ambassadors with as much mildness as he
can: "That he did not think worse of the state on account of the ignorance
and fickleness of the mob, nor would diminish his regard for the Aedui." He
himself, fearing a greater commotion in Gaul, in order to prevent his being
surrounded by all the states, began to form plans as to the manner in which
he should return from Gergovia and again concentrate his forces, lest a
departure arising from the fear of a revolt should seem like a flight.

XLIV.—Whilst he was considering these things an opportunity of acting
successfully seemed to offer. For, when he had come into the smaller camp
for the purpose of securing the works, he noticed that the hill in the
possession of the enemy was stript of men, although, on the former days, it
could scarcely be seen on account of the numbers on it. Being astonished,
he inquires the reason of it from the deserters, a great number of whom
flocked to him daily. They all concurred in asserting, what Caesar himself
had already ascertained by his scouts, that the back of that hill was almost
level; but likewise woody and narrow, by which there was a pass to the
other side of the town; that they had serious apprehensions for this place,
and had no other idea, on the occupation of one hill by the Romans, than
that, if they should lose the other, they would be almost surrounded, and cut
off from all egress and foraging; that they were all summoned by
Vercingetorix to fortify this place.

XLV.—Caesar, on being informed of this circumstance, sends several
troops of horse to the place immediately after midnight; he orders them to
range in every quarter with more tumult than usual. At dawn he orders a
large quantity of baggage to be drawn out of the camp, and the muleteers
with helmets, in the appearance and guise of horsemen, to ride round the
hills. To these he adds a few cavalry, with instructions to range more widely
to make a show. He orders them all to seek the same quarter by a long

circuit; these proceedings were seen at a distance from the town, as
Gergovia commanded a view of the camp, nor could the Gauls ascertain at
so great a distance what certainty there was in the manoeuvre. He sends one
legion to the same hill, and after it had marched a little, stations it in the
lower ground, and conceals it in the woods. The suspicions of the Gauls are
increased, and all their forces are marched to that place to defend it. Caesar,
having perceived the camp of the enemy deserted, covers the military
insignia of his men, conceals the standards, and transfers his soldiers in
small bodies from the greater to the less camp, and points out to the
lieutenants whom he had placed in command over the respective legions,
what he should wish to be done; he particularly advises them to restrain
their men from advancing too far, through their desire of fighting, or their
hope of plunder; he sets before them what disadvantages the unfavourable
nature of the ground carries with it; that they could be assisted by despatch
alone: that success depended on a surprise, and not on a battle. After stating
these particulars, he gives the signal for action, and detaches the Aedui at
the same time by another ascent an the right.

XLVI.—The town wall was 1200 paces distant from the plain and foot of
the ascent, in a straight line, if no gap intervened; whatever circuit was
added to this ascent, to make the hill easy, increased the length of the route.
But almost in the middle of the hill, the Gauls had previously built a wall
six feet high, made of large stones, and extending in length as far as the
nature of the ground permitted, as a barrier to retard the advance of our
men; and leaving all the lower space empty, they had filled the upper part of
the hill, as far as the wall of the town, with their camps very close to one
another. The soldiers, on the signal being given, quickly advance to this
fortification, and passing over it, make themselves masters of the separate
camps. And so great was their activity in taking the camps, that Teutomarus,
the king of the Nitiobriges, being suddenly surprised in his tent, as he had

gone to rest at noon, with difficulty escaped from the hands of the
plunderers, with the upper part of his person naked, and his horse wounded.

XLVII.—Caesar, having accomplished the object which he had in view,
ordered the signal to be sounded for a retreat; and the soldiers of the tenth
legion, by which he was then accompanied, halted. But the soldiers of the
other legions, not hearing the sound of the trumpet, because there was a
very large valley between them, were however kept back by the tribunes of
the soldiers and the lieutenants, according to Caesar's orders; but being
animated by the prospect of speedy victory, and the flight of the enemy, and
the favourable battles of former periods, they thought nothing so difficult
that their bravery could not accomplish it; nor did they put an end to the
pursuit, until they drew nigh to the wall of the town and the gates. But then,
when a shout arose in every quarter of the city, those who were at a distance
being alarmed by the sudden tumult, fled hastily from the town, since they
thought that the enemy were within the gates. The matrons begin to cast
their clothes and silver over the wall, and bending over as far as the lower
part of the bosom, with outstretched hands beseech the Romans to spare
them, and not to sacrifice to their resentment even women and children, as
they had done at Avaricum. Some of them let themselves down from the
walls by their hands, and surrendered to our soldiers. Lucius Fabius, a
centurion of the eighth legion, who, it was ascertained, had said that day
among his fellow soldiers that he was excited by the plunder of Avaricum,
and would not allow any one to mount the wall before him, finding three
men of his own company, and being raised up by them, scaled the wall. He
himself, in turn, taking hold of them one by one, drew them up to the wall.

XLVIII.—In the meantime those who had gone to the other part of the
town to defend it, as we have mentioned above, at first, aroused by hearing
the shouts, and, afterwards, by frequent accounts that the town was in
possession of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry, and hastened in larger

numbers to that quarter. As each first came he stood beneath the wall, and
increased the number of his countrymen engaged in action. When a great
multitude of them had assembled, the matrons, who a little before were
stretching their hands from the walls to the Romans, began to beseech their
countrymen, and after the Gallic fashion to show their dishevelled hair, and
bring their children into public view. Neither in position nor in numbers was
the contest an equal one to the Romans; at the same time, being exhausted
by running and the long continuation of the fight, they could not easily
withstand fresh and vigorous troops.

XLIX.—Caesar, when he perceived that his soldiers were fighting on
unfavourable ground, and that the enemy's forces were increasing, being
alarmed for the safety of his troops, sent orders to Titus Sextius, one of his
lieutenants, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to lead out his
cohorts quickly from the camp, and post them at the foot of the hill, on the
right wing of the enemy; that if he should see our men driven from the
ground, he should deter the enemy from following too closely. He himself,
advancing with the legion a little from that place where he had taken his
post, awaited the issue of the battle.

L.—While the fight was going on most vigorously, hand to hand, and the
enemy depended on their position and numbers, our men on their bravery,
the Aedui suddenly appeared on our exposed flank, as Caesar had sent them
by another ascent on the right, for the sake of creating a diversion. These,
from the similarity of their arms, greatly terrified our men; and although
they were discovered to have their right shoulders bare, which was usually
the sign of those reduced to peace, yet the soldiers suspected that this very
thing was done by the enemy to deceive them. At the same time Lucius
Fabius the centurion, and those who had scaled the wall with him, being
surrounded and slain, were cast from the wall. Marcus Petreius, a centurion
of the same legion, after attempting to hew down the gates, was

overpowered by numbers, and, despairing of his safety, having already
received many wounds, said to the soldiers of his own company who
followed him: "Since I cannot save you as well as myself, I shall at least
provide for your safety, since I allured by the love of glory, led you into this
danger, do you save yourselves when an opportunity is given." At the same
time he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and slaying two of them, drove
back the rest a little from the gate. When his men attempted to aid him, "In
vain," he says, "you endeavour to procure my safety since blood and
strength are now failing me, therefore leave this, while you have the
opportunity, and retreat to the legion." Thus he fell fighting a few moments
after, and saved his men by his own death.

LI.—Our soldiers, being hard pressed on every side, were dislodged from
their position, with the loss of forty-six centurions; but the tenth legion,
which had been posted in reserve on ground a little more level, checked the
Gauls in their eager pursuit. It was supported by the cohorts of the
thirteenth legion, which, being led from the smaller camp, had, under the
command of Titus Sextius, occupied the higher ground. The legions, as
soon as they reached the plain, halted and faced the enemy. Vercingetorix
led back his men from the part of the hill within the fortifications. On that
day little less than seven hundred of the soldiers were missing.

LII.—On the next day, Caesar, having called a meeting, censured the
rashness and avarice of his soldiers, "In that they had judged for themselves
how far they ought to proceed, or what they ought to do, and could not be
kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants;" and stated,
"what the disadvantage of the ground could effect, what opinion he himself
had entertained at Avaricum, when having surprised the enemy without
either general or cavalry, he had given up a certain victory, lest even a
trifling loss should occur in the contest owing to the disadvantage of
position. That as much as he admired the greatness of their courage, since

neither the fortifications of the camp, nor the height of the mountain, nor
the wall of the town could retard them; in the same degree he censured their
licentiousness and arrogance, because they thought that they knew more
than their general concerning victory, and the issue of actions: and that he
required in his soldiers forbearance and self-command, not less than valour
and magnanimity."

LIII.—Having held this assembly, and having encouraged the soldiers at
the conclusion of his speech, "That they should not be dispirited on this
account, nor attribute to the valour of the enemy what the disadvantage of
position had caused;" entertaining the same views of his departure that he
had previously had, he led forth the legions from the camp, and drew up his
army in order of battle in a suitable place. When Vercingetorix,
nevertheless, would not descend to the level ground, a slight cavalry action,
and that a successful one, having taken place, he led back his army into the
camp. When he had done this, the next day, thinking that he had done
enough to lower the pride of the Gauls, and to encourage the minds of his
soldiers, he moved his camp in the direction of the Aedui. The enemy not
even then pursuing us, on the third day he repaired the bridge over the river
Allier, and led over his whole army.

LIV.—Having then held an interview with Viridomarus and Eporedorix
the Aeduans, he learns that Litavicus had set out with all the cavalry to raise
the Aedui; that it was necessary that they too should go before him to
confirm the state in their allegiance. Although he now saw distinctly the
treachery of the Aedui in many things, and was of opinion that the revolt of
the entire state would be hastened by their departure; yet he thought that
they should not be detained, lest he should appear either to offer an insult,
or betray some suspicion of fear. He briefly states to them when departing
his services towards the Aedui: in what a state and how humbled he had
found them, driven into their towns, deprived of their lands, stripped of all

their forces, a tribute imposed on them, and hostages wrested from them
with the utmost insult; and to what condition and to what greatness he had
raised them, [so much so] that they had not only recovered their former
position, but seemed to surpass the dignity and influence of all the previous
eras of their history. After giving these admonitions he dismissed them.

LV.—Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui, advantageously situated on
the banks of the Loire. Caesar had conveyed hither all the hostages of Gaul,
the corn, public money, a great part of his own baggage and that of his
army; he had sent hither a great number of horses, which he had purchased
in Italy and Spain on account of this war. When Eporedorix and
Viridomarus came to this place, and received information of the disposition
of the state, that Litavicus had been admitted by the Aedui into Bibracte,
which is a town of the greatest importance among them, that
Convictolitanis the chief magistrate and a great part of the senate had gone
to meet him, that ambassadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix to
negotiate a peace and alliance; they thought that so great an opportunity
ought not to be neglected. Therefore, having put to the sword the garrison
of Noviodunum and those who had assembled there for the purpose of
trading or were on their march, they divided the money and horses among
themselves; they took care that the hostages of the [different] states should
be brought to Bibracte, to the chief magistrate; they burnt the town to
prevent its being of any service to the Romans, as they were of opinion that
they could not hold it; they carried away in their vessels whatever corn they
could in the hurry; they destroyed the remainder, by [throwing it] into the
river or setting it on fire; they themselves began to collect forces from the
neighbouring country, to place guards and garrisons in different positions
along the banks of the Loire, and to display the cavalry on all sides to strike
terror into the Romans, [to try] if they could cut them off from a supply of
provisions. In which expectation they were much aided, from the

circumstance that the Loire had swollen to such a degree from the melting
of the snows, that it did not seem capable of being forded at all.

LVI.—Caesar on being informed of these movements was of opinion that
he ought to make haste, even if he should run some risk in completing the
bridges, in order that he might engage before greater forces of the enemy
should be collected in that place. For no one even then considered it an
absolutely necessary act, that changing his design he should direct his
march into the Province, both because the infamy and disgrace of the thing,
and the intervening mount Cevennes, and the difficulty of the roads
prevented him; and especially because he had serious apprehensions for the
safety of Labienus whom he had detached, and those legions whom he had
sent with him. Therefore, having made very long marches by day and night,
he came to the river Loire, contrary to the expectation of all; and having by
means of the cavalry found out a ford, suitable enough considering the
emergency, of such depth that their arms and shoulders could be above
water for supporting their accoutrements, he dispersed his cavalry in such a
manner as to break the force of the current, and having confounded the
enemy at the first sight, led his army across the river in safety; and finding
corn and cattle in the fields, after refreshing his army with them, he
determined to march into the country of the Senones.

LVII.—Whilst these things are being done by Caesar, Labienus, leaving
at Agendicum the recruits who had lately arrived from Italy, to guard the
baggage, marches with four legions to Lutetia (which is a town of the
Parisii, situated on an island of the river Seine), whose arrival being
discovered by the enemy, numerous forces arrived from the neighbouring
states. The supreme command is entrusted to Camulogenus, one of the
Aulerci, who, although almost worn out with age, was called to that honour
on account of his extraordinary knowledge of military tactics. He, when he
observed that there was a large marsh which communicated with the Seine,

and rendered all that country impassable, encamped there, and determined
to prevent our troops from passing it.

LVIII.—Labienus at first attempted to raise vineae, fill up the marsh with
hurdles and clay, and secure a road. After he perceived that this was too
difficult to accomplish, he issued in silence from his camp at the third
watch, and reached Melodunum by the same route by which he came. This
is a town of the Senones, situated on an island in the Seine, as we have just
before observed of Lutetia. Having seized upon about fifty ships and
quickly joined them together, and having placed soldiers in them, he
intimidated by his unexpected arrival the inhabitants, of whom a great
number had been called out to the war, and obtains possession of the town
without a contest. Having repaired the bridge, which the enemy had broken
down during the preceding days, he led over his army, and began to march
along the banks of the river to Lutetia. The enemy, on learning the
circumstance from those who had escaped from Melodunum, set fire to
Lutetia, and order the bridges of that town to be broken down: they
themselves set out from the marsh, and take their position on the banks of
the Seine, over against Lutetia and opposite the camp of Labienus.

LIX.—Caesar was now reported to have departed from Gergovia;
intelligence was likewise brought to them concerning the revolt of the
Aedui, and a successful rising in Gaul; and that Caesar, having been
prevented from prosecuting his journey and crossing the Loire, and having
been compelled by the want of corn, had marched hastily to the province.
But the Bellovaci, who had been previously disaffected of themselves, on
learning the revolt of the Aedui, began to assemble forces and openly to
prepare for war; Then Labienus, as the change in affairs was so great,
thought that he must adopt a very different system from what he had
previously intended, and he did not now think of making any new
acquisitions, or of provoking the enemy to an action; but that he might

bring back his army safe to Agendicum. For, on one side, the Bellovaci, a
state which held the highest reputation for prowess in Gaul, were pressing
on him; and Camulogenus, with a disciplined and well-equipped army, held
the other side; moreover, a very great river separated and cut off the legions
from the garrison and baggage. He saw that, in consequence of such great
difficulties being thrown in his way, he must seek aid from his own energy
of disposition.

LX.—Having, therefore, called a council of war a little before evening,
he exhorted his soldiers to execute with diligence and energy such
commands as he should give; he assigns the ships which he had brought
from Melodunum to Roman knights, one to each, and orders them to fall
down the river silently for four miles, at the end of the fourth watch, and
there wait for him. He leaves the five cohorts, which he considered to be the
most steady in action, to guard the camp; he orders the five remaining
cohorts of the same legion to proceed a little after midnight up the river
with all their baggage, in a great tumult. He collects also some small boats;
and sends them in the same direction, with orders to make a loud noise in
rowing. He himself, a little after, marched out in silence, and, at the head of
three legions, seeks that place to which he had ordered the ships to be
brought.

LXI.—When he had arrived there, the enemy's scouts, as they were
stationed along every part of the river, not expecting an attack, because a
great storm had suddenly arisen, were surprised by our soldiers: the infantry
and cavalry are quickly transported, under the superintendence of the
Roman knights, whom he had appointed to that office. Almost at the same
time, a little before daylight, intelligence was given to the enemy that there
was an unusual tumult in the camp of the Romans, and that a strong force
was marching up the river, and that the sound of oars was distinctly heard in
the same quarter, and that soldiers were being conveyed across in ships a

little below. On hearing these things, because they were of opinion that the
legions were passing in three different places, and that the entire army,
being terrified by the revolt of the Aedui, were preparing for flight, they
divided their forces also into three divisions. For leaving a guard opposite to
the camp and sending a small body in the direction of Metiosedum, with
orders to advance as far as the ships would proceed, they led the rest of
their troops against Labienus.

LXII.—By day-break all our soldiers were brought across and the army
of the enemy was in sight. Labienus, having encouraged his soldiers "to
retain the memory of their ancient valour, and so many most successful
actions, and imagine Caesar himself, under whose command they had so
often routed the enemy, to be present," gives the signal for action. At the
first onset the enemy are beaten and put to flight in the right wing, where
the seventh legion stood: on the left wing, which position the twelfth legion
held, although the first ranks fell transfixed by the javelins of the Romans,
yet the rest resisted most bravely; nor did any one of them show the
slightest intention of flying. Camulogenus, the general of the enemy, was
present and encouraged his troops. But when the issue of the victory was
still uncertain, and the circumstances which were taking place on the left
wing were announced to the tribunes of the seventh legion, they faced about
their legion to the enemy's rear and attacked it: not even then did any one
retreat, but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus met the same fate.
But those who were left as a guard opposite the camp of Labienus, when
they heard that the battle was commenced, marched to aid their countrymen
and take possession of a hill, but were unable to withstand the attack of the
victorious soldiers. In this manner, mixed with their own fugitives, such as
the woods and mountains did not shelter were cut to pieces by our cavalry.
When this battle was finished, Labienus returns to Agendicum, where the
baggage of the whole army had been left: from it he marched with all his
forces to Caesar.

LXIII.—The revolt of the Aedui being known, the war grows more
dangerous. Embassies are sent by them in all directions: as far as they can
prevail by influence, authority, or money, they strive to excite the state [to
revolt]. Having got possession of the hostages whom Caesar had deposited
with them, they terrify the hesitating by putting them to death. The Aedui
request Vercingetorix to come to them and communicate his plans of
conducting the war. On obtaining this request they insist that the chief
command should be assigned to them; and when the affair became a
disputed question, a council of all Gaul is summoned to Bibracte. They
come together in great numbers and from every quarter to the same place.
The decision is left to the votes of the mass: all to a man approve of
Vercingetorix as their general. The Remi, Lingones, and Treviri were absent
from this meeting; the two former because they attached themselves to the
alliance of Rome; the Treviri because they were very remote and were hard
pressed by the Germans; which was also the reason of their being absent
during the whole war, and their sending auxiliaries to neither party. The
Aedui are highly indignant at being deprived of the chief command; they
lament the change of fortune, and miss Caesar's indulgence towards them;
however, after engaging in the war, they do not dare to pursue their own
measures apart from the rest. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, youths of the
greatest promise, submit reluctantly to Vercingetorix.

LXIV.—The latter demands hostages from the remaining states: nay,
more, appointed a day for this proceeding; he orders all the cavalry, fifteen
thousand in number, to quickly assemble here; he says that he will be
content with the infantry which he had before, and would not tempt fortune
nor come to a regular engagement; but since he had abundance of cavalry, it
would be very easy for him to prevent the Romans from obtaining forage or
corn, provided that they themselves should resolutely destroy their corn and
set fire to their houses, by which sacrifice of private property they would
evidently obtain perpetual dominion and freedom. After arranging these

matters he levies ten thousand infantry on the Aedui and Segusiani, who
border on our province: to these he adds eight hundred horse. He sets over
them the brother of Eporedorix, and orders him to wage war against the
Allobroges. On the other side he sends the Gabali and the nearest cantons of
the Arverni against the Helvii; he likewise sends the Ruteni and Cadurci to
lay waste the territories of the Volcae Arecomici. Besides, by secret
messages and embassies, he tampers with the Allobroges, whose minds, he
hopes, had not yet settled down after the excitement of the late war. To their
nobles he promises money, and to their state the dominion of the whole
province.

LXV.—The only guards provided against all these contingencies were
twenty-two cohorts, which were collected from the entire province by
Lucius Caesar, the lieutenant, and opposed to the enemy in every quarter.
The Helvii, voluntarily engaging in battle with their neighbours, are
defeated, and Caius Valerius Donotaurus, the son of Caburus, the principal
man of the state, and several others, being slain, they are forced to retire
within their towns and fortifications. The Allobroges, placing guards along
the course of the Rhine, defend their frontiers with great vigilance and
energy. Caesar, as he perceived that the enemy were superior in cavalry, and
he himself could receive no aid from the province or Italy, while all
communication was cut off, sends across the Rhine into Germany to those
states which he had subdued in the preceding campaigns, and summons
from them cavalry and the light-armed infantry, who were accustomed to
engage among them. On their arrival, as they were mounted on
unserviceable horses, he takes horses from the military tribunes and the rest,
nay, even from the Roman knights and veterans, and distributes them
among the Germans.

LXVI.—In the meantime, whilst these things are going on, the forces of
the enemy from the Arverni, and the cavalry which had been demanded

from all Gaul, meet together. A great number of these having been
collected, when Caesar was marching into the country of the Sequani,
through the confines of the Lingones, in order that he might the more easily
render aid to the province, Vercingetorix encamped in three camps, about
ten miles from the Romans: and having summoned the commanders of the
cavalry to a council, he shows that the time of victory was come; that the
Romans were fleeing into the province and leaving Gaul; that this was
sufficient for obtaining immediate freedom; but was of little moment in
acquiring peace and tranquillity for the future; for the Romans would return
after assembling greater forces, and would not put an end to the war;
Therefore they should attack them on their march, when encumbered. If the
infantry should [be obliged to] relieve their cavalry, and be retarded by
doing so, the march could not be accomplished: if, abandoning their
baggage, they should provide for their safety (a result which, he trusted,
was more likely to ensue), they would lose both property and character. For
as to the enemy's horse, they ought not to entertain a doubt that none of
them would dare to advance beyond the main body. In order that they [the
Gauls] may do so with greater spirit, he would marshal all their forces
before the camp, and intimidate the enemy. The cavalry unanimously shout
out, "That they ought to bind themselves by a most sacred oath, that he
should not be received under a roof, nor have access to his children,
parents, or wife, who shall not twice have ridden through the enemy's
army."

LXVII.—This proposal receiving general approbation, and all being
forced to take the oath, on the next day the cavalry were divided into three
parts, and two of these divisions made a demonstration on our two flanks;
while one in front began to obstruct our march. On this circumstance being
announced, Caesar orders his cavalry also to form three divisions and
charge the enemy. Then the action commences simultaneously in every part:
the main body halts; the baggage is received within the ranks of the legions.

If our men seemed to be distressed, or hard pressed in any quarter, Caesar
usually ordered the troops to advance, and the army to wheel round in that
quarter; which conduct retarded the enemy in the pursuit, and encouraged
our men by the hope of support. At length the Germans, on the right wing,
having gained the top of the hill, dislodge the enemy from their position and
pursue them even as far as the river at which Vercingetorix with the infantry
was stationed, and slay several of them. The rest, on observing this action,
fearing lest they should be surrounded, betake themselves to flight. A
slaughter ensues in every direction, and three of the noblest of the Audi are
taken and brought to Caesar: Cotus, the commander of the cavalry, who had
been engaged in the contest with Convictolitanis the last election,
Cavarillus, who had held the command of the infantry after the revolt of
Litavicus, and Eporedorix, under whose command the Aedui had engaged
in war against the Sequani, before the arrival of Caesar.

LXVIII.—All his cavalry being routed, Vercingetorix led back his troops
in the same order as he had arranged them before the camp, and
immediately began to march to Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii;
and ordered the baggage to be speedily brought forth from the camp, and
follow him closely. Caesar, having conveyed his baggage to the nearest hill,
and having left two legions to guard it, pursued as far as the time of day
would permit, and after slaying about three thousand of the rear of the
enemy, encamped at Alesia on the next day. On reconnoitring the situation
of the city, finding that the enemy were panic-stricken, because the cavalry
in which they placed their chief reliance were beaten, he encouraged his
men to endure the toil, and began to draw a line of circumvallation round
Alesia.

LXIX.—The town itself was situated on the top of a hill, in a very lofty
position, so that it did not appear likely to be taken, except by a regular
siege. Two rivers, on two different sides, washed the foot of the hill. Before

the town lay a plain of about three miles in length; on every other side hills
at a moderate distance, and of an equal degree of height, surrounded the
town. The army of the Gauls had filled all the space under the wall,
comprising the part of the hill which looked to the rising sun, and had
drawn in front a trench and a stone wall six feet high. The circuit of that
fortification, which was commenced by the Romans, comprised eleven
miles. The camp was pitched in a strong position, and twenty-three redoubts
were raised in it, in which sentinels were placed by day, lest any sally
should be made suddenly; and by night the same were occupied by watches
and strong guards.

LXX.-The work having been begun, a cavalry action ensues in that plain,
which we have already described as broken by hills, and extending three
miles in length. The contest is maintained on both sides with the utmost
vigour; Caesar sends the Germans to aid our troops when distressed, and
draws up the legions in front of the camp, lest any sally should be suddenly
made by the enemy's infantry. The courage of our men is increased by the
additional support of the legions; the enemy being put to flight, hinder one
another by their numbers, and as only the narrower gates were left open, are
crowded together in them; then the Germans pursue them with vigour even
to the fortifications. A great slaughter ensues; some leave their horses, and
endeavour to cross the ditch and climb the wall. Caesar orders the legions
which he had drawn up in front of the rampart to advance a little. The
Gauls, who were within the fortifications, were no less panic-stricken,
thinking that the enemy were coming that moment against them, and
unanimously shout "to arms;" some in their alarm rush into the town;
Vercingetorix orders the gates to be shut, lest the camp should be left
undefended. The Germans retreat, after slaying many and taking several
horses.

LXXI.—Vercingetorix adopts the design of sending away all his cavalry
by night, before the fortifications should be completed by the Romans. He
charges them when departing "that each of them should go to his respective
state, and press for the war all who were old enough to bear arms; he states
his own Merits, and conjures them to consider his safety, and not surrender
him, who had deserved so well of the general freedom, to the enemy for
torture; he points out to them that, if they should be remiss, eighty thousand
chosen men would perish with him; that, upon making a calculation, he had
barely corn for thirty days, but could hold out a little longer by economy."
After giving these instructions he silently dismisses the cavalry in the
second watch, [on that side] where our works were not completed; he orders
all the corn to be brought to himself; he ordains capital punishment to such
as should not obey; he distributes among them, man by man, the cattle,
great quantities of which had been driven there by the Mandubii; he began
to measure out the corn sparingly, and by little and little; he receives into
the town all the forces which he had posted in front of it. In this manner he
prepares to await the succours from Gaul, and carry on the war.

LXXII.—Caesar, on learning these proceedings from the deserters and
captives, adopted the following system of fortification; he dug a trench
twenty feet deep, with perpendicular sides, in such a manner that the base of
this trench should extend so far as the edges were apart at the top. He raised
all his other works at a distance of four hundred feet from that ditch; [he
did] that with this intention, lest (since he necessarily embraced so
extensive an area, and the whole works could not be easily surrounded by a
line of soldiers) a large number of the enemy should suddenly, or by night,
sally against the fortifications; or lest they should by day cast weapons
against our men while occupied with the works. Having left this interval, he
drew two trenches fifteen feet broad, and of the same depth; the innermost
of them, being in low and level ground, he filled with water conveyed from
the river. Behind these he raised a rampart and wall twelve feet high: to this

he added a parapet and battlements, with large stakes cut like stags' horns,
projecting from the junction of the parapet and battlements, to prevent the
enemy from scaling it, and surrounded the entire work with turrets, which
were eighty feet distant from one another.

LXXIII.—It was necessary, at one and the same time, to procure timber
[for the rampart], lay in supplies of corn, and raise also extensive
fortifications, and the available troops were in consequence of this reduced
in number, since they used to advance to some distance from the camp, and
sometimes the Gauls endeavoured to attack our works, and to make a sally
from the town by several gates and in great force. On which Caesar thought
that further additions should be made to these works, in order that the
fortifications might be defensible by a small number of soldiers. Having,
therefore, cut down the trunks of trees or very thick branches, and having
stripped their tops of the bark, and sharpened them into a point, he drew a
continued trench everywhere five feet deep. These stakes being sunk into
this trench, and fastened firmly at the bottom, to prevent the possibility of
their being torn up, had their branches only projecting from the ground.
There were five rows in connection with, and intersecting each other; and
whoever entered within them were likely to impale themselves on very
sharp stakes. The soldiers called these "cippi." Before these, which were
arranged in oblique rows in the form of a quincunx, pits three feet deep
were dug, which gradually diminished in depth to the bottom. In these pits
tapering stakes, of the thickness of a man's thigh, sharpened at the top and
hardened in the fire, were sunk in such a manner as to project from the
ground not more than four inches; at the same time for the purpose of
giving them strength and stability, they were each filled with trampled clay
to the height of one foot from the bottom: the rest of the pit was covered
over with osiers and twigs, to conceal the deceit. Eight rows of this kind
were dug, and were three feet distant from each other. They called this a lily
from its resemblance to that flower. Stakes a foot long, with iron hooks

attached to them, were entirely sunk in the ground before these, and were
planted in every place at small intervals; these they called spurs.

LXXIV.—After completing these works, having selected as level ground
as he could, considering the nature of the country, and having enclosed an
area of fourteen miles, he constructed, against an external enemy,
fortifications of the same kind in every respect, and separate from these, so
that the guards of the fortifications could not be surrounded even by
immense numbers, if such a circumstance should take place owing to the
departure of the enemy's cavalry; and in order that the Roman soldiers
might not be compelled to go out of the camp with great risk, he orders all
to provide forage and corn for thirty days.

LXXV.—Whilst those things are carried on at Alesia, the Gauls, having
convened a council of their chief nobility, determine that all who could bear
arms should not be called out, which was the opinion of Vercingetorix, but
that a fixed number should be levied from each state; lest, when so great a
multitude assembled together, they could neither govern nor distinguish
their men, nor have the means of supplying them with corn. They demand
thirty-five thousand men from the Aedui and their dependents, the
Segusiani, Ambivareti, and Aulerci Brannovices; an equal number from the
Arverni in conjunction with the Eleuteti Cadurci, Gabali, and Velauni, who
were accustomed to be under the command of the Arverni; twelve thousand
each from the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, Santones, Ruteni, and Carnutes;
ten thousand from the Bellovaci; the same number from the Lemovici; eight
thousand each from the Pictones, and Turoni, and Parisii, and Helvii; five
thousand each from the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii,
Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges; the same number from the Aulerci
Cenomani; four thousand from the Atrebates; three thousand each from the
Bellocassi, Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices; thirty thousand from the
Rauraci, and Boii; six thousand, from all the states together which border

on the Atlantic, and which in their dialect are called Armoricae (in which
number are comprehended the Curisolites, Rhedones, Ambibari, Caltes,
Osismii, Lemovices, Veneti, and Unelli). Of these the Bellovaci did not
contribute their number, as they said that they would wage war against the
Romans on their own account, and at their own discretion, and would not
obey the order of any one: however, at the request of Commius, they sent
two thousand, in consideration of a tie of hospitality which subsisted
between him and them.

LXXVI.—Caesar had, as we have previously narrated, availed himself of
the faithful and valuable services of this Commius, in Britain, in former
years: in consideration of which merits he had exempted from taxes his
[Commius's] state, and had conferred on Commius himself the country of
the Morini. Yet such was the unanimity of the Gauls in asserting their
freedom, and recovering their ancient renown in war, that they were
influenced neither by favours, nor by the recollection of private friendship;
and all earnestly directed their energies and resources to that war, and
collected eight thousand cavalry, and about two hundred and forty thousand
infantry. These were reviewed in the country of the Aedui, and a calculation
was made of their numbers: commanders were appointed: the supreme
command is entrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and
Eporedorix the Aeduans, and Vergasillaunus the Arvernian, the cousin-
german of Vercingetorix. To them are assigned men selected from each
state, by whose advice the war should be conducted. All march to Alesia,
sanguine and full of confidence: nor was there a single individual who
imagined that the Romans could withstand the sight of such an immense
host: especially in an action carried on both in front and rear, when [on the
inside] the besieged would sally from the town and attack the enemy, and
on the outside so great forces of cavalry and infantry would be seen.

LXXVII.—But those who were blockaded at Alesia, the day being past
on which they had expected auxiliaries from their countrymen, and all their
corn being consumed, ignorant of what was going on among the Aedui,
convened an assembly and deliberated on the exigency of their situation.
After various opinions had been expressed among them, some of which
proposed a surrender, others a sally, whilst their strength would support it,
the speech of Critognatus ought not to be omitted for its singular and
detestable cruelty. He sprung from the noblest family among the Arverni,
and possessing great influence, says, "I shall pay no attention to the opinion
of those who call a most disgraceful surrender by the name of a
capitulation; nor do I think that they ought to be considered as citizens, or
summoned to the council. My business is with those who approve of a
sally: in whose advice the memory of our ancient prowess seems to dwell in
the opinion of you all. To be unable to bear privation for a short time is
disgraceful cowardice, not true valour. Those who voluntarily offer
themselves to death are more easily found than those who would calmly
endure distress. And I would approve of this opinion (for honour is a
powerful motive with me), could I foresee no other loss, save that of life:
but let us, in adopting our design, look back on all Gaul, which we have
stirred up to our aid. What courage do you think would our relatives and
friends have, if eighty thousand men were butchered in one spot, supposing
that they should be forced to come to an action almost over our corpses? Do
not utterly deprive them of your aid, for they have spurned all thoughts of
personal danger on account of your safety; nor by your folly, rashness, and
cowardice, crush all Gaul and doom it to an eternal slavery. Do you doubt
their fidelity and firmness because they have not come at the appointed
day? What then? Do you suppose that the Romans are employed every day
in the outer fortifications for mere amusement? If you cannot be assured by
their despatches, since every avenue is blocked up, take the Romans as
evidence that their approach is drawing near; since they, intimidated by

alarm at this, labour night and day at their works. What, therefore, is my
design? To do as our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri and
Teutones, which was by no means equally momentous; who, when driven
into their towns, and oppressed by similar privations, supported life by the
corpses of those who appeared useless for war on account of their age, and
did not surrender to the enemy: and even if we had not a precedent for such
cruel conduct, still I should consider it most glorious that one should be
established, and delivered to posterity. For in what was that war like this?
The Cimbri, after laying Gaul waste, and inflicting great calamities, at
length departed from our country, and sought other lands; they left us our
rights, laws, lands, and liberty. But what other motive or wish have the
Romans, than, induced by envy, to settle in the lands and states of those
whom they have learned by fame to be noble and powerful in war, and
impose on them perpetual slavery? For they never have carried on wars on
any other terms. But if you know not these things which are going on in
distant countries, look to the neighbouring Gaul, which being reduced to the
form of a province, stripped of its rights and laws, and subjected to Roman
despotism, is oppressed by perpetual slavery."

LXXVIII.—When different opinions were expressed, they determined
that those who, owing to age or ill health, were unserviceable for war,
should depart from the town, and that themselves should try every
expedient before they had recourse to the advice of Critognatus: however,
that they would rather adopt that design, if circumstances should compel
them and their allies should delay, than accept any terms of a surrender or
peace. The Mandubii, who had admitted them into the town, are compelled
to go forth with their wives and children. When these came to the Roman
fortifications, weeping, they begged of the soldiers by every entreaty to
receive them as slaves and relieve them with food. But Caesar, placing
guards on the rampart, forbade them to be admitted.

LXXIX.—In the meantime, Commius and the rest of the leaders, to
whom the supreme command had been intrusted, came with all their forces
to Alesia, and having occupied the entire hill, encamp not more than a mile
from our fortifications. The following day, having led forth their cavalry
from the camp, they fill all that plain, which, we have related, extended
three miles in length, and draw out their infantry a little from that place, and
post them on the higher ground. The town Alesia commanded a view of the
whole plain. The besieged run together when these auxiliaries were seen;
mutual congratulations ensue, and the minds of all are elated with joy.
Accordingly, drawing out their troops, they encamp before the town, and
cover the nearest trench with hurdles and fill it up with earth, and make
ready for a sally and every casualty.

LXXX.—Caesar, having stationed his army on both sides of the
fortifications, in order that, if occasion should arise, each should hold and
know his own post, orders the cavalry to issue forth from the camp and
commence action. There was a commanding view from the entire camp,
which occupied a ridge of hills; and the minds of all the soldiers anxiously
awaited the issue of the battle. The Gauls had scattered archers and light-
armed infantry here and there, among their cavalry, to give relief to their
retreating troops, and sustain the impetuosity of our cavalry. Several of our
soldiers were unexpectedly wounded by these, and left the battle. When the
Gauls were confident that their countrymen were the conquerors in the
action, and beheld our men hard pressed by numbers, both those who were
hemmed in by the line of circumvallation and those who had come to aid
them, supported the spirits of their men by shouts and yells from every
quarter. As the action was carried on in sight of all, neither a brave nor
cowardly act could be concealed; both the desire of praise and the fear of
ignominy, urged on each party to valour. After fighting from noon almost to
sunset, without victory inclining in favour of either, the Germans, on one
side, made a charge against the enemy in a compact body, and drove them

back; and, when they were put to flight, the archers were surrounded and
cut to pieces. In other parts, likewise, our men pursued to the camp the
retreating enemy, and did not give them an opportunity of rallying. But
those who had come forth from Alesia returned into the town dejected and
almost despairing of success.

LXXXI.—The Gauls, after the interval of a day, and after making, during
that time, an immense number of hurdles, scaling ladders, and iron hooks,
silently went forth from the camp at midnight and approached the
fortifications in the plain. Raising a shout suddenly, that by this intimation
those who were besieged in the town might learn their arrival, they began to
cast down hurdles and dislodge our men from the rampart by slings, arrows,
and stones, and executed the other movements which are requisite in
storming. At the same time, Vercingetorix having heard the shout, gives the
signal to his troops by a trumpet, and leads them forth from the town. Our
troops, as each man's post had been assigned him some days before, man
the fortifications; they intimidate the Gauls by slings, large stones, stakes
which they had placed along the works, and bullets. All view being
prevented by the darkness, many wounds are received on both sides; several
missiles are thrown from the engines. But Marcus Antonius, and Caius
Trebonius, the lieutenants, to whom the defence of these parts had been
allotted, draughted troops from the redoubts which were more remote, and
sent them to aid our troops, in whatever direction they understood that they
were hard pressed.

LXXXII.—Whilst the Gauls were at a distance from the fortification,
they did more execution, owing to the immense number of their weapons:
after they came nearer, they either unawares empaled themselves on the
spurs, or were pierced by the mural darts from the ramparts and towers, and
thus perished. After receiving many wounds on all sides, and having forced
no part of the works, when day drew nigh, fearing lest they should be

surrounded by a sally made from the higher camp on the exposed flank,
they retreated to their countrymen. But those within, whilst they bring
forward those things which had been prepared by Vercingetorix for a sally,
fill up the nearest trenches; having delayed a long time in executing these
movements, they learned the retreat of their countrymen before they drew
nigh to the fortifications. Thus they returned to the town without
accomplishing their object.

LXXXIII.—The Gauls, having been twice repulsed with great loss,
consult what they should do: they avail themselves of the information of
those who were well acquainted with the country; from them they ascertain
the position and fortification of the upper camp. There was, on the north
side, a hill, which our men could not include in their works, on account of
the extent of the circuit, and had necessarily made their camp in ground
almost disadvantageous, and pretty steep. Caius Antistius Reginus, and
Caius Caninius Rebilus, two of the lieutenants, with two legions, were in
possession of this camp. The leaders of the enemy, having reconnoitred the
country by their scouts, select from the entire army sixty thousand men;
belonging to those states which bear the highest character for courage: they
privately arrange among themselves what they wished to be done, and in
what manner; they decide that the attack should take place when it should
seem to be noon. They appoint over their forces Vergasillaunus, the
Arvernian, one of the four generals, and a near relative of Vercingetorix.
He, having issued from the camp at the first watch, and having almost
completed his march a little before the dawn, hid himself behind the
mountain, and ordered his soldiers to refresh themselves after their labour
during the night. When noon now seemed to draw nigh, he marched hastily
against that camp which we have mentioned before; and, at the same time,
the cavalry began to approach the fortifications in the plain, and the rest of
the forces to make a demonstration in front of the camp.

LXXXIV.—Vercingetorix, having beheld his countrymen from the
citadel of Alesia, issues forth from the town; he brings forth from the camp
long hooks, movable pent-houses, mural hooks, and other things, which he
had prepared for the purpose of making a sally. They engage on all sides at
once, and every expedient is adopted. They flocked to whatever part of the
works seemed weakest. The army of the Romans is distributed along their
extensive lines, and with difficulty meets the enemy in every quarter. The
shouts which were raised by the combatants in their rear, had a great
tendency to intimidate our men, because they perceived that their danger
rested on the valour of others: for generally all evils which are distant most
powerfully alarm men's minds.

LXXXV.—Caesar, having selected a commanding situation, sees
distinctly whatever is going on in every quarter, and sends assistance to his
troops when hard pressed. The idea uppermost in the minds of both parties
is, that the present is the time in which they would have the fairest
opportunity of making a struggle; the Gauls despairing of all safety, unless
they should succeed in forcing the lines: the Romans expecting an end to all
their labours if they should gain the day. The principal struggle is at the
upper lines, to which, we have said, Vergasillaunus was sent. The least
elevation of ground, added to a declivity, exercises a momentous influence.
Some are casting missiles, others, forming a testudo, advance to the attack;
fresh men by turns relieve the wearied. The earth, heaped up by all against
the fortifications, gives the means of ascent to the Gauls, and covers those
works which the Romans had concealed in the ground. Our men have no
longer arms or strength.

LXXXVI.—Caesar, on observing these movements, sends Labienus with
six cohorts to relieve his distressed soldiers: he orders him, if he should be
unable to withstand them, to draw off the cohorts and make a sally; but not
to do this except through necessity. He himself goes to the rest, and exhorts
them not to succumb to the toil; he shows them that the fruits of all former
engagements depend on that day and hour. The Gauls within, despairing of
forcing the fortifications in the plains on account of the greatness of the
works, attempt the places precipitous in ascent: hither they bring the
engines which they had prepared; by the immense number of their missiles
they dislodge the defenders from the turrets: they fill the ditches with clay
and hurdles, then clear the way; they tear down the rampart and breast-work
with hooks.

LXXXVII.—Caesar sends at first young Brutus, with six cohorts, and
afterwards Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with seven others: finally, as they
fought more obstinately, he leads up fresh men to the assistance of his
soldiers. After renewing the action, and repulsing the enemy, he marches in
the direction in which he had sent Labienus, drafts four cohorts from the
nearest redoubt, and orders part of the cavalry to follow him, and part to
make the circuit of the external fortifications and attack the enemy in the
rear. Labienus, when neither the ramparts or ditches could check the onset
of the enemy, informs Caesar by messengers of what he intended to do.
Caesar hastens to share in the action.

LXXXVIII.—His arrival being known from the colour of his robe, and
the troops of cavalry, and the cohorts which he had ordered to follow him
being seen, as these low and sloping grounds were plainly visible from the
eminences, the enemy join battle. A shout being raised by both sides, it was
succeeded by a general shout along the ramparts and whole line of
fortifications. Our troops, laying aside their javelins, carry on the

engagement with their swords. The cavalry is suddenly seen in the rear of
the Gauls: the other cohorts advance rapidly; the enemy turn their backs;
the cavalry intercept them in their flight, and a great slaughter ensues.
Sedulius the general and chief of the Lemovices is slain; Vergasillaunus, the
Arvernian, is taken alive in the flight, seventy-four military standards are
brought to Caesar, and few out of so great a number return safe to their
camp. The besieged, beholding from the town the slaughter and flight of
their countrymen, despairing of safety, lead back their troops from the
fortifications. A flight of the Gauls from their camp immediately ensues on
hearing of this disaster, and had not the soldiers been wearied by sending
frequent reinforcements, and the labour of the entire day, all the enemy's
forces could have been destroyed. Immediately after midnight, the cavalry
are sent out and overtake the rear, a great number are taken or cut to pieces,
the rest by flight escape in different directions to their respective states.
Vercingetorix, having convened a council the following day, declares, "That
he had undertaken that war, not on account of his own exigencies, but on
account of the general freedom; and since he must yield to fortune, he
offered himself to them for either purpose, whether they should wish to
atone to the Romans by his death, or surrender him alive." Ambassadors are
sent to Caesar on this subject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and
their chieftains delivered up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in
front of the camp, the Gallic chieftains are brought before him. They
surrender Vercingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserving the Aedui and
Arverni, [to try] if he could gain over, through their influence, their
respective states, he distributes one of the remaining captives to each
soldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder.

XC.—After making these arrangements, he marches into the [country of
the] Aedui, and recovers that state. To this place ambassadors are sent by
the Arverni, who promise that they will execute his commands. He demands
a great number of hostages. He sends the legions to winter quarters; he

restores about twenty thousand captives to the Aedui and Arverni; he orders
Titus Labienus to march into the [country of the] Sequani with two legions
and the cavalry, and to him he attaches Marcus Sempronius Rutilus; he
places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus, with two legions in the
country of the Remi, lest they should sustain any loss from the Bellovaci in
their neighbourhood. He sends Caius Antistius Reginus into the [country of
the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextius into the territories of the Bituriges, and Caius
Caninius Rebilus into those of the Ruteni, with one legion each. He stations
Quintus Tullius Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui at Cabillo
and Matisco on the Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself
determines to winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty days is decreed
by the senate at Rome, on learning these successes from Caesar's
despatches.

BOOK VIII
CONTINUATION OF CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR ASCRIBED TO AULUS HIRTIUS

PREFACE

Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in a
most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not my inability, but
indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuation of the
Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to be compared to
his writings, which either precede or follow them; and recently, I have
completed what he left imperfect after the transactions in Alexandria, to the
end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we see no issue, but of Caesar's
life. I wish that those who may read them could know how unwillingly I
undertook to write them, as then I might the more readily escape the
imputation of folly and arrogance, in presuming to intrude among Caesar's

writings. For it is agreed on all hands, that no composition was ever
executed with so great care, that it is not exceeded in elegance by these
Commentaries, which were published for the use of historians, that they
might not want memoirs of such achievements; and they stand so high in
the esteem of all men, that historians seem rather deprived of than furnished
with materials. At which we have more reason to be surprised than other
men; for they can only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which
he finished them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar
possessed not only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style,
but also a thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I
had not even the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war;
and though these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in
conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to those
things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and those which we
design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, whilst I urge every apology, that I
may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the charge of vanity, by thinking it
possible that I can in the judgment of any one be put in competition with
him. Farewell.

I.—Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar having waged war
incessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiers after so
much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was brought him that
several states were simultaneously renewing their hostile intentions, and
forming combinations. For which a probable reason was assigned: namely,
that the Gauls were convinced that they were not able to resist the Romans
with any force they could collect in one place; and hoped that if several
states made war in different places at the same time, the Roman army would
neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to prosecute them all: nor ought any
single state to decline any inconveniences that might befall them, provided
that by such delay the rest should be enabled to assert their liberty.

II.—That this notion might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesar
left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, in charge of his quarters, and set out
himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends of January, from
the town Bibracte, to the thirteenth legion, which he had stationed in the
country of the Bituriges, not far from the territories of the Aedui, and joined
to it the eleventh legion which was next it. Leaving two cohorts to guard the
baggage, he leads the rest of his army into the most plentiful part of the
country of the Bituriges; who, possessing an extensive territory and several
towns, were not to be deterred, by a single legion quartered among them,
from making warlike preparation, and forming combinations.

III.-By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to an
unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by our horse,
whilst cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, before they had
time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy's invasion, which
is generally intimated by the burning of their towns, was forbidden by
Caesar's orders: lest if he advanced far, forage and corn should become
scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to make their escape. Many
thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges as were able to escape the
first coming of the Romans, fled to the neighbouring states, relying either
on private friendship, or public alliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty
marches, anticipated them in every place, nor did he allow any state leisure
to consider the safety of others, in preference to their own. By this activity,
he both retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the
wavering to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the Bituriges,
when they perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was open to
his friendship, and that the neighbouring states had given hostages, without
incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection, they
did the same.

IV.-Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labour and
patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of the
winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, two hundred
sestertii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be given instead of
plunder; and sending his legions back to quarters, he himself returned on
the fortieth day to Bibracte. Whilst he was dispensing justice there, the
Bituriges send ambassadors to him, to entreat his aid against the Carnutes,
who they complained had made war against them. Upon this intelligence,
though he had not remained more than eighteen days in winter quarters, he
draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of quarters on the Saone, where he
had posted them as mentioned in a former Commentary to procure supplies
of corn. With these two legions he marches in pursuit of the Carnutes.

V.—When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, the
Carnutes, terrified by the sufferings of other states, deserted their villages
and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, to meet the
immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselves against the
winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost several towns), and
dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the violent
storms that break out, especially at that season, took up his quarters at
Genabum, a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men in houses, partly
belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the tents, and hastily
covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he sends to all parts to
which he was told the enemy had marched; and not without effect, as our
men generally returned loaded with booty. The Carnutes, overpowered by
the severity of the winter, and the fear of danger, and not daring to continue
long in any place, as they were driven from their houses, and not finding
sufficient protection in the woods, from the violence of the storms, after
losing a considerable number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among
the neighbouring states.

VI.—Caesar, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the
gathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and being
convinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of consequence could
be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius, with the
two legions which he had with him, in quarters at Genabum: and being
informed by frequent embassies from the Remi, that the Bellovaci (who
exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess), and the neighbouring
states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and Comius, the Atrebatian,
were raising an army, and assembling at a general rendezvous, designing
with their united forces to invade the territories of the Suessiones, who were
put under the patronage of the Remi: and moreover, considering that not
only his honour, but his interest was concerned, that such of his allies, as
deserved well of the republic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the
eleventh legion out of quarters and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march
with his two legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to
Trebonius for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the
quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of the
expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his own
toils.

VII.—As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against the
Bellovaci: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troops of
horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he might learn the
enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders, bring him back word
that but few were found in the houses: and that even these had not stayed at
home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration was general from all parts),
but had been sent back to watch our motions. Upon Caesar's inquiring from
them, where the main body of the Bellovaci were posted, and what was
their design: they made answer, "that all the Bellovaci, fit for carrying arms,
had assembled in one place, and along with them the Ambiani, Aulerci,
Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and that they had chosen for their camp

an elevated position, surrounded by a dangerous morass: that they had
conveyed all their baggage into the most remote woods: that several
noblemen were united in the management of the war; but that the people
were most inclined to be governed by Correus, because they knew that he
had the strongest aversion to the name of the Roman people: that a few days
before Comius had left the camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose
nation bordered on theirs, and whose numbers were countless: that the
Bellovaci had come to a resolution, with the consent of all the generals and
the earnest desire of the people, if Caesar should come with only three
legions, as was reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged
to encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a
more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger force,
they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by ambuscade
to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at that season was both
scarce and much scattered), corn, and other necessaries."

VIII.—When Caesar was convinced of the truth of this account from the
concurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the plans which
were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rash resolves of a
barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to use every exertion,
in order that the enemy might despise his small force and come to an action.
For he had three veteran legions of distinguished valour, the seventh,
eighth, and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosen youth of great hopes,
who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared with the others, had
not yet acquired any great reputation for experience and valour. Calling
therefore a council, and laying before it the intelligence which he had
received, he encouraged his soldiers. In order if possible to entice the
enemy to an engagement by the appearance of only three legions, he ranged
his army in the following manner: that the seventh, eighth, and ninth
legions should march before all the baggage; that then the eleventh should
bring up the rear of the whole train of baggage (which however was but

small, as is usual on such expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a
sight of a greater number than they themselves were willing to encounter.
By this disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought
them within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated.

IX.—When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had been reported to
Caesar, saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle
array; either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or
with the design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces
before the camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though Caesar wished
to bring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of the
enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep
rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a rampart
twelve feet high, with breast-works built on it proportioned to its height;
and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with perpendicular sides to be
sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories high, to be raised, with a
communication to each other by galleries laid across and covered over;
which should be guarded in front by small parapets of osiers; that the
enemy might be repulsed by two rows of soldiers. The one of whom, being
more secure from danger by their height, might throw their darts with more
daring and to a greater distance; the other, which was nearer the enemy,
being stationed on the rampart, would be protected by their galleries from
darts falling on their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a
considerable height.

X.-Caesar had a double design in this fortification; for he both hoped that
the strength of his works, and his [apparent] fears would raise confidence in
the barbarians; and when there should be occasion to make a distant
excursion to get forage or corn, he saw that his camp would be secured by
the works with a very small force. In the meantime there were frequent
skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying out between the

two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or German auxiliaries crossed
the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or on the other hand the enemy
passed it and beat back our men. Moreover there happened in the course of
our daily foraging, what must of necessity happen, when corn is to be
collected by a few scattered men out of private houses, that our foragers
dispersing in an intricate country were surrounded by the enemy; by which,
though we suffered but an inconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it
raised foolish hopes in the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius,
who I said had gone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some
cavalry, and though the Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were
elated by their arrival.

XI.-Caesar, observing that the enemy kept for several days within their
camp, which was well secured by a morass and its natural situation, and that
it could not be assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor the place
enclosed with lines without an addition to his army, wrote to Trebonius to
send with all despatch for the thirteenth legion which was in winter-quarters
among the Bituriges under Titus Sextius, one of his lieutenants; and then to
come to him by forced marches with the three legions. He himself sent the
cavalry of the Remi, and Lingones, and other states, from whom he had
required a vast number, to guard his foraging parties, and to support them in
case of any sudden attack of the enemy.

XII.—As this continued for several days, and their vigilance was relaxed
by custom (an effect which is generally produced by time), the Bellovaci,
having made themselves acquainted with the daily stations of our horse, lie
in ambush with a select body of foot in a place covered with woods; to it
they sent their horse the next day, who were first to decoy our men into the
ambuscade, and then when they were surrounded, to attack them. It was the
lot of the Remi to fall into this snare, to whom that day had been allotted to
perform this duty; for, having suddenly got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and

despising their weakness, in consequence of their superior numbers, they
pursued them too eagerly, and were surrounded on every side by the foot.
Being by this means thrown into disorder they returned with more
precipitation than is usual in cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus, the
governor of their state, and the general of their horse, who, though scarcely
able to sit on horseback through years, neither, in accordance with the
custom of the Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse for not accepting the
command, nor would he suffer them to fight without him. The spirits of the
barbarians were puffed up and inflated at the success of this battle, in killing
the prince and general of the Remi; and our men were taught by this loss, to
examine the country, and post their guards with more caution, and to be
more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy.

XIII.—In the meantime daily skirmishes take place continually in view
of both camps; these were fought at the ford and pass of the morass. In one
of these contests the Germans, whom Caesar had brought over the Rhine, to
fight intermixed with the horse, having resolutely crossed the marsh, and
slain the few who made resistance, and boldly pursued the rest, so terrified
them, that not only those who were attacked hand to hand, or wounded at a
distance, but even those who were stationed at a greater distance to support
them, fled disgracefully; and being often beaten from the rising grounds,
did not stop till they had retired into their camp, or some, impelled by fear,
had fled farther. Their danger drew their whole army into such confusion,
that it was difficult to judge whether they were more insolent after a slight
advantage, or more dejected by a trifling calamity.

XIV.—After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of the
Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was advancing nearer with his
legions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, send off by night all who
were disabled by age or infirmity, or unarmed, and along with them their
whole baggage. Whilst they are preparing their disorderly and confused

troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vast multitude of
waggons, even when they have very light baggage), being overtaken by
daylight, they drew their forces out before their camp, to prevent the
Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggage had advanced
to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it prudent to attack
them when standing on their defence, with such a steep hill in their favour,
nor keep his legions at such a distance that they could quit their post
without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was divided from the enemy's
by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he could not pursue with
expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass, which extended almost to
the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by a small valley, he laid a
bridge over the morass and led his army across, and soon reached the plain
on the top of the hill, which was fortified on either side by a steep ascent.
Having there drawn up his army in order of battle, he marched to the
furthest hill, from which he could, with his engines, shower darts upon the
thickest of the enemy.

XV.—The Gauls, confiding in the natural strength of their position,
though they would not decline an engagement if the Romans attempted to
ascend the hill, yet dared not divide their forces into small parties, lest they
should be thrown into disorder by being dispersed, and therefore remained
in order of battle. Caesar, perceiving that they persisted in their resolution,
kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and, measuring out ground there for a
camp, ordered it to be fortified. Having completed his works, he drew up
his legions before the rampart and stationed the cavalry in certain positions,
with their horses bridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to
pursue them, and that they could not wait the whole night, or continue
longer in the same place without provisions, they formed the following plan
to secure a retreat. They handed to one another the bundles of straw and
sticks on which they sat (for it is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn
up in order of battle, as has been asserted in former commentaries), of

which they had great plenty in their camp, and piled them in the front of
their line; and at the close of the day, on a certain signal, set them all on fire
at one and the same time. The continued blaze soon screened all their forces
from the sight of the Romans, which no sooner happened than the
barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation.

XVI.—Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the
intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted that method to
favour their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent a party of horse
to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, and that the enemy
might remain in the same place and endeavour to draw our men into a
disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly. The horse, being
afraid to venture into the smoke and dense line of flame, and those who
were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able to see their horses'
heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat, through fear of an ambuscade.
Thus, by a flight, full at once of cowardice and address, they advanced
without any loss about ten miles, and encamped in a very strong position.
From which, laying numerous ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did
considerable damage to the Roman foragers.

XVII.—After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered, from a
certain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had selected six
thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, with which he designed
to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected the Romans would send to
look for forage, on account of the abundance of corn and grass. Upon
receiving information of their design Caesar drew out more legions than he
usually did, and sent forward his cavalry as usual, to protect the foragers.
With these he intermixed a guard of light infantry, and himself advanced
with the legions as fast as he could.

XVIII.—The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a
level piece of bound, not more than a mile in extent, enclosed on every side
by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this they surrounded.
Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in good order to the
ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, and willing to hazard
any engagement when the legions were at their back. On their approach, as
Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity of effecting his purpose,
he at first shows himself with a small party and attacks the foremost troops.
Our men resolutely stood the charge, and did not crowd together in one
place, as commonly happens from surprise in engagements between the
horse, whose numbers prove injurious to themselves.

XIX.—When by the judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of
our men fought by turns, and did not suffer themselves to be surrounded,
the rest of the enemy broke out from the woods whilst Correus was
engaged. The battle was maintained in different parts with great vigour, and
continued for a long time undecided, till at length a body of foot gradually
advanced from the woods in order of battle and forced our horse to give
ground: the light infantry, which were sent before the legions to the
assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with the horse, fought
with great courage. The battle was for some time doubtful, but, as usually
happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first charge, became superior
from this very circumstance that, though suddenly attacked from an
ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the meantime the legions were
approaching, and several messengers arrived with notice to our men and the
enemy that the [Roman] general was near at hand, with his forces in battle
array. Upon this intelligence, our men, confiding in the support of the
cohorts, fought most resolutely, fearing, lest if they should be slow in their
operations they should let the legions participate in the glory of the
conquest. The enemy lose courage and attempt to escape by different ways.
In vain; for they were themselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they

thought to entrap the Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and
having lost the greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whither-
soever chance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but
were vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the
meantime, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to
quit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of quarter,
but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked our men, elated
with victory, to discharge their weapons against him.

XX.—After this transaction, Caesar, having come up immediately after
the battle, and imagining that the enemy, upon receiving the news of so
great a defeat, would be so depressed that they would abandon their camp,
which was not above eight miles distant from the scene of action, though he
saw his passage obstructed by the river, yet he marched his army over and
advanced. But the Bellovaci and the other states, being informed of the loss
they had sustained by a few wounded men who having escaped by the
shelter of the woods, had returned to them after the defeat, and learning that
everything had turned out unfavourable, that Correus was slain, and the
horse and most valiant of their foot cut off, imagined that the Romans were
marching against them, and calling a council in haste by sound of trumpet,
unanimously cry out to send ambassadors and hostages to Caesar.

XXI.—This proposal having met with general approbation, Comius the
Atrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries
for that war. The rest instantly send ambassadors to Caesar; and requested
that he would be contented with that punishment of his enemy, which if he
had possessed the power to inflict on them before the engagement, when
they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from his usual clemency and
mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the power of the Bellovaci was
crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousands of their choicest foot
had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped to bring the fatal news. That,

however, the Bellovaci had derived from the battle one advantage, of some
importance, considering their loss; that Correus, the author of the rebellion,
and agitator of the people, was slain: for that whilst he lived, the senate had
never equal influence in the state with the giddy populace.

XXII.—Caesar reminded the ambassadors who made these supplications,
that the Bellovaci had at the same season the year before, in conjunction
with other states of Gaul, undertaken a war, and that they had persevered
the most obstinately of all in their purpose, and were not brought to a proper
way of thinking by the submission of the rest; that he knew and was aware
that the guilt of a crime was easily transferred to the dead; but that no one
person could have such influence, as to be able by the feeble support of the
multitude to raise a war and carry it on without the consent of the nobles, in
opposition to the senate, and in despite of every virtuous man; however he
was satisfied with the punishment which they had drawn upon themselves.

XXIII.—The night following the ambassadors bring back his answer to
their countrymen, and prepare the hostages. Ambassadors flock in from the
other states, which were waiting for the issue of the [war with the]
Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive his orders; all except Comius,
whose fears restrained him from entrusting his safety to any person's
honour. For the year before, while Caesar was holding the assizes in Hither
Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comius was tampering with
the states, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar, thought he might punish
his infidelity without perfidy; but judging that he would not come to his
camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put him on his guard by the attempt,
he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with orders to have him put to death
under pretence of a conference. To effect his purpose, he sent with him
some chosen centurions. When they came to the conference, and Volusenus,
as had been agreed on, had taken hold of Comius by the hand, and one of
the centurions, as if surprised at so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill

him, he was prevented by the friends of Comius, but wounded him severely
in the head by the first blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much
with a design to fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius
had received a mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they
had seen, dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this
transaction, it was said that Comius made a resolution never to come within
sight of any Roman.

XXIV.—When Caesar, having completely conquered the most warlike
nations, perceived that there was now no state which could make
preparations for war to oppose him, but that some were removing and
fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he resolved to detach
his army into different parts of the country. He kept with himself Marcus
Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; Caius Fabius was detached
with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part of Gaul, because it was
rumoured that some states had risen in arms, and he did not think that Caius
Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of that country, was strong enough to
protect it with two legions. He ordered Titus Labienus to attend himself,
and sent the twelfth legion which had been under him in winter quarters, to
Hither Gaul, to protect the Roman colonies, and prevent any loss by the
inroads of barbarians, similar to that which had happened the year before to
the Tergestines, who were cut off by a sudden depredation and attack. He
himself marched to depopulate the country of Ambiorix, whom he had
terrified and forced to fly, but despaired of being able to reduce under his
power; but he thought it most consistent with his honour to waste his
country both of inhabitants, cattle, and buildings, so that from the
abhorrence of his countrymen, if fortune suffered any to survive, he might
be excluded from a return to his state for the calamities which he had
brought on it.

XXV.—After he had sent either his legions or auxiliaries through every
part of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword, fire,
and rapine, and had killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sent Labienus
with two legions against the Treviri, whose state, from its vicinity to
Germany, being engaged in constant war, differed but little from the
Germans, in civilization and savage barbarity; and never continued in its
allegiance, except when awed by the presence of his army.

XXVI.—In the meantime Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having received
information by letters and messages from Duracius, who had always
continued in friendship to the Roman people, though a part of his state had
revolted, that a great multitude of the enemy were in arms in the country of
the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum. When he was approaching it,
he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius was shut up by several
thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, and
that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face the enemy with his weak
legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus, having notice of
Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against the legions, and
prepared to assault the Roman camp. But after spending several days in the
attempt, and losing a considerable number of men, without being able to
make a breach in any part of the works, he returned again to the siege of
Limonum.

XXVII.—At the same time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back many
states to their allegiance, and confirms their submission by taking hostages;
he was then informed by letters from Caninius, of the proceedings among
the Pictones. Upon which he set off to bring assistance to Duracius. But
Dumnacus hearing of the approach of Fabius, and despairing of safety, if at
the same time he should be forced to withstand the Roman army without,
and observe, and be under apprehension from the town's people, made a
precipitate retreat from that place with all his forces. Nor did he think that

he should be sufficiently secure from danger, unless he led his army across
the Loire, which was too deep a river to pass except by a bridge. Though
Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy, nor joined Caninius; yet
being informed of the nature of the country, by persons acquainted with it,
he judged it most likely that the enemy would take that way, which he
found they did take. He therefore marched to that bridge with his army, and
ordered his cavalry to advance no further before the legions, than that they
could return to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Our
horse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear, and
attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with
baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having executed
the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp.

XXVIII.—The night following, Fabius sent his horse before him, with
orders to engage the enemy, and delay their march till he himself should
come up. That his orders might be faithfully performed, Quintus Atius
Varus, general of the horse, a man of uncommon spirit and skill, encouraged
his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed some of his troops in convenient
places, and with the rest gave battle to the enemy. The enemy's cavalry
made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other, and making a general halt,
to assist their horse against ours. The battle was warmly contested. For our
men, despising the enemy whom they had conquered the day before, and
knowing that the legions were following them, animated both by the
disgrace of retreating, and a desire of concluding the battle expeditiously by
their own courage, fought most valiantly against the foot: and the enemy,
imagining that no more forces would come against them, as they had
experienced the day before, thought they had got a favourable opportunity
of destroying our whole cavalry.

XXIX.-After the conflict had continued for some time with great
violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a manner, that the foot