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Title: Aviation in Peace and War

Author: Sir Frederick Hugh Sykes

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Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AVIATION IN
PEACE AND WAR ***

AVIATION IN
PEACE AND WAR

BY

Major-General Sir F. H. SYKES
G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G.
Late Chief of the Air Staff
and
Controller-General of Civil Aviation

LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD & CO.
1922
[All rights reserved]

CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction 7

Chapter I. Pre-War 9
Early Thoughts on Flight. The Invention of the Balloon.
First Experiments in Gliders and Aeroplanes. The
Wright Brothers and their Successors in Europe. The
First Airships. The Beginnings of Aviation in England.
The Inception and Development of Aircraft as Part of
the Forces of the Crown: the Balloon Factory; the Air
Battalion; the Royal Flying Corps, the Military Wing,
the Naval Wing. Tactics and the Machine. Conclusions.
Chapter II. War 44
General Remarks on War Development. Co-operation
with the Army: Reconnaissance; Photography;
Wireless; Bombing; Contact Patrol; Fighting. Co-
operation with the Navy: Coast Defence, Patrol and
Convoy Work; Fleet Assistance, Reconnaissance,
Spotting for Ships' Guns; Bombing; Torpedo Attack.
Home Defence: Night Flying and Night Fighting. The
Machine and Engine. Tactics and the Strategic Air
Offensive. Organization.
Chapter III. Peace 96
The Future of Aerial Defence. Civil Aviation: as a
Factor in National Security; as an Instrument of
Imperial Progress; Financial and Economic Problems;
Weather Conditions and Night Flying; Organization; the

Machine and Engine. Air Services: British, Continental
and Imperial.
Conclusion 131

INTRODUCTION
Since the earliest communities of human beings first struggled for
supremacy and protection, the principles of warfare have remained
unchanged. New methods have been evolved and adopted with the progress
of science, but no discovery, save perhaps that of gunpowder, has done so
much in so short a time to revolutionize the conduct of war as aviation, the
youngest, yet destined perhaps to be the most effective fighting-arm. Yet to-
day we are only on the threshold of our knowledge, and, striking as was the
impetus given to every branch of aeronautics during the four years of war,
its future power can only dimly be seen.
We may indeed feel anxious about this great addition of aviation to the
destructive power of modern scientific warfare. Bearing its terrors in mind,
we may even impotently seek to check its advance, but the appeal of flying
is too deep, its elimination is now impossible, and granted that war is
inevitable, it must be accepted for good or ill. Fortunately, although with the
other great scientific additions, chemical warfare and the submarine, its
potentialities for destruction are very great, yet aircraft, unlike the
submarine, can be utilized not only in the conduct of war but in the interests
of peace, and it is here that we can guide and strengthen it for good. Just as
the naval supremacy of Britain was won because commercially we were the
greatest seafaring people in the world, so will air supremacy be achieved by
that country which, making aviation a part of its everyday life, becomes an
airfaring community.
Our nation as a whole has been educated, owing to its geographical
situation and by tradition, to interest itself in the broader aspects of marine
policy and development. It requires to take the same interest in aviation, a
comparatively new subject, unhampered to a great extent by preconceived
notions and therefore offering greater scope for individual thought.
The following sketch[1] has been written in the hope that some of those
who read it may be inspired to study aviation in one or other of its branches,

whether from the historical, technical, strategical, or commercial point of
view. Any opinions expressed are, of course, my own and not official.
[1] First written and delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures at Cambridge
University in February and March, 1921.

I propose first briefly to trace the history of aviation from its beginnings
to the outbreak of war; next to describe the evolution of aircraft and of air
strategy during the war; and last to estimate the present position and to look
into the future.

CHAPTER I

PRE-WAR

Early Thoughts on Flight.

The story of the growth of aviation may be likened to that of the
discovery and opening up of a new continent. A myth arises, whence no one
can tell, of the existence of a new land across the seas. Eventually this land
is found without any realization of the importance of the discovery. Then
comes the period of colonization and increasing knowledge. But the interior
remains unexplored. So, in the case of aviation, man was long convinced,
for no scientific reason, that flight was possible. With the first ascent by
balloon came the imagined mastery of the air; later, the invention of flight
that can be controlled at will. To-day we are still in the stage of
colonization. The future resources of the air remain hidden from our view.
The Daedalean myth and the ancient conception of the winged angelic
host show how the human mind has long been fascinated by the idea of
flight, but the first design of an apparatus to lift man into the air, a
parachute-like contrivance, was only reached at the end of the fifteenth
century in one of Leonardo da Vinci's manuscripts. About the same time
lived the first of the long line of daring practical aviators, without whom
success would never have been achieved, one John Damian, a physician of
the Court of James IV of Scotland, who "took in hand to fly with wings, and
to that effect caused make a pair of wings of feathers, which being fastened
upon him, he flew off the castle wall of Stirling, but shortly he fell to the
ground and brake his thigh-bone."
Nearly 250 years later the aeronaut had not made much progress, for we
read of the Marquis de Bacqueville in 1742 attaching to his arms and legs
planes of his own design and launching himself from his house in the
attempt to fly across the Seine, into which, regrettably, he fell.
Meanwhile the seventeenth-century philosophers had been theorizing. In
1638 John Wilkins, the founder of the Royal Society, published a book

entitled Daedalus, or Mechanical Motions. A few years later John Glanville
wrote in Scepsis Scientifica "to them that come after us it may be as
ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly into remotest regions, as now a pair of
boots to ride a journey," the sceptic proving a truer prophet than the
enthusiast. By 1680 Giovanni Borelli had reached the conclusion, in his
book De Volatu, that it was impossible that man should ever achieve flight
by his own strength. Nor was he more likely to do so in the first aerial ship,
designed in 1670 by Francesco Lana, which was to be buoyed up in the air
by being suspended from four globes, made of thin copper sheeting, each of
them about 25 feet in diameter. From these globes the air was to be
exhausted, so that each, being lighter than the atmosphere, would support
the weight of two or three men. A hundred years elapsed before Dr. Joseph
Black of the University of Edinburgh made the first practical suggestion,
that a balloon inflated with hydrogen would rise.

The Invention of the Balloon.

It was in 1783 that Montgolfier conceived the idea of utilizing the lifting
power of hot air and invited the Assembly of Vivarais to watch an
exhibition of his invention, when a balloon, 10 feet in circumference, rose
to a height of 6,000 feet in under ten minutes. This was followed by a
demonstration before Louis XVI at Versailles, when a balloon carrying a
sheep, a cock, and a duck, rose 1,500 feet and descended safely. And on
November 21st of the same year Pilatre de Rozier, accompanied by the
Marquis d'Arlande, made the first human ascent, in the "Reveillon,"
travelling 5 miles over Paris in twenty minutes.
England, it is not surprising to learn, was behind with the invention, but
on November 25th, 1783, Count Francesco Zambeccari sent up from
Moorfields a small oilskin hydrogen balloon which fell at Petworth; and in
August of 1784 James Tytler ascended at Edinburgh in a fire balloon, thus
achieving the first ascent in Great Britain. In the same year Lunardi came to
London and ballooning became the rage. It was an Englishman, Dr.
Jefferies, who accompanied Blanchard in the first cross-Channel flight on
January 7th, 1785. Fashionable society soon turned to pursuits other than
watching balloon ascents, however, and the joys of the air were confined to

a few adventurous spirits, such as Green and Holland, who first substituted
coal gas for hydrogen and in 1836 made a voyage of 500 miles from
Vauxhall Gardens to Weilburg in Nassau, and James Glaisher, who in the
middle of the century began to make meteorological observations from
balloons, claiming on one occasion, in 1862, to have reached the great
height of 7 miles.

First Experiments in Gliders and Aeroplanes.

The world seemed content to have achieved the balloon, but there were a
few men who realized that the air had not been conquered, and who
believed that success could only be attained by the scientific study and
practice of gliding. Prominent among these, Sir George Cayley, in 1809,
published a paper on the Navigation of the Air, and forecasted the modern
aeroplane, and the action of the air on wings. In 1848 Henson and
Stringfellow, the latter being the inventive genius, designed and produced a
small model aeroplane—the first power-driven machine which actually
flew. It is now in the Smithsonian Institute at Washington. Of greater
practical value were the gliding experiments by Otto Lilienthal, of Berlin,
and Percy Pilcher, an Englishman, at the end of the last century. Both these
men met their death in the cause of aviation. Another step forward was
made by Laurence Hargrave, an Australian, who invented the box and
soaring kite and eighteen machines which flew.
From the theoretical point of view, Professor Langley, an American,
reached in his Experiments in Aerodynamics the important conclusion that
weight could best be countered by speed. From theory Langley turned to
practice and in 1896 designed a steam-driven machine which flew three-
quarters of a mile without an operator. Seven years later, at the end of 1903,
he produced a new machine fitted with a 52 horse-power engine weighing
less than 5 lb. per horse-power; but this machine was severely damaged ten
days before Wilbur Wright made his first flight in a controlled power-driven
aeroplane.

The Wright Brothers and their Successors in Europe.

The Wright brothers directed their whole attention to aviation in 1899.
By 1902, as the result of many experiments, they had invented a glider with
a horizontal vane in front, a vertical vane behind, and a device for
"warping" the wings. Their longest glide was 622¼ feet. This was followed
by the construction of a machine weighing 600 lb., including the operator
and an 8 horse-power engine, which on December 17th, 1903, realized the
dreams of centuries.
After an increasing number of experiments, a machine built in 1905 flew
24¼ miles at a speed of 38 miles an hour. It is interesting to recall that the
new invention was refused once by the United States and three times by the
British Government.
It was not until September 13th, 1906, that Ellehammer, a Danish
engineer, made the first free flight in Europe, his machine flying 42 metres
at a height of a metre and a half. About the same time reports of the
Wrights' successes began to reach Europe and were quickly appreciated by
the French.
Space forbids that I should enter into the achievements of the early
French aviators, among whom the names of Ferber, Bleriot and Farman will
always rank high in the story of human faith, courage and determination. It
is a record of rapid advance. Farman made a circuit flight of 1 kilometre in
1908, and flew from Chalons to Rheims, a distance of 27 kilometres, in
twenty minutes. Bleriot crossed the Channel in a monoplane of his own
design in forty minutes. French designers improved the control system, and
French machines became famous. The records of the Rheims meeting of
1909 serve to illustrate the progress made during the first phase of aviation.
Latham won the altitude prize by flying to a height of over 500 feet. Farman
the prize for the flight of longest duration by remaining more than three
hours in the air, and the passenger carrying prize by carrying two
passengers round a 10-kilometre course in 10½ minutes. The Gnome rotary
engine was first used with success at this meeting.
Before turning to the pioneer efforts in England and the pre-war
organization of our air forces, some account of the development of the
lighter-than-air dirigible is desirable.

The First Airships.

The earliest conception of an airship is to be found in General Meusnier's
design in 1784 for an egg-shaped balloon driven by three screw propellers,
worked, of course, by hand. The chief interest in his design, though it never
materialized, lies in the fact that it provided for a double envelope and was
the precursor of the ballonet. The first man-carrying airship was built by
Henri Giffard in 1852. It had a capacity of 87,000 cu. feet, a length of 144
feet, a 3 horse-power engine, and a speed of 6 miles an hour. A gas engine
was first used twenty years later in an Austrian dirigible, giving a speed of 3
miles an hour. About the same time much useful work was accomplished by
Dupuy de Lome, whose dirigible, with a propeller driven by man power,
gave a speed of 5½ miles an hour. Twelve years later, in 1884, two French
Army officers, Captain Kubs and Captain Renard, constructed the first
successful power-driven lighter-than-air craft fitted with an 8½ horse-power
electric motor, which may be regarded as the progenitor of all subsequent
non-rigid airships. In 1901 Santos Dumont flew round the Eiffel Tower,
travelling 6¾ miles in 1½ hours, and in 1903 the flight of the "Lebaudy,"
covering a distance of 40 miles at a speed of 20 miles an hour, led the
French military authorities to take up the question of airships.
What the French initiated, the Germans, concentrating with characteristic
thoroughness on the development of the rigid as opposed to the non-rigid
airship, improved. In 1896 Wolfert's rigid airship attained a speed of 9 miles
an hour and in 1900 the first Zeppelin was launched. Whatever we may
think of the German methods of using their airships during the war, we
cannot but admire the courage and determination of Count Zeppelin, who,
in spite of many mishaps, succeeded in producing the finest airships in the
world and inspiring the German people with a faith in the air which they
have never lost. From 1905 onwards development was rapid. In 1907
Zeppelin voyaged in stages from Friedrichshaven to Frankfort, a distance of
200 miles in 7½ hours. Popular enthusiasm is illustrated by the fact that
within a few months the same airship made four hundred trips, carrying
8,551 passengers and covering 29,430 miles. Other airships showed similar
records. Between 1909 and 1913 eighteen of the Parseval type were built,
and 1912 saw the construction of the first Schutte-Lanz, designed expressly

for naval and military purposes. If France at this period led the world in
aeroplane design, Germany was undeniably ahead in airship development.
In Great Britain, in 1905, we had one very small airship, designed and
constructed by Willows.

The Beginnings of Aviation in England.

Though the names of Pilcher, Dunne, Howard Wright, and Rolls testify to
the fact that the science of aviation had its followers in England at the
beginning of this century, flying came comparatively late, and the real
interest of the movement centres round the early efforts of military aviation
from 1912 onwards. Nevertheless this country could ill have dispensed with
the experiments of that small and courageous band of aviators, among
whom Dickson and Cody were prominent. By 1908 Cody had built an
aeroplane and was making experimental flights at Aldershot. In 1907, A. V.
Roe, working under great difficulties, constructed and flew his first
machine, a triplane fitted with an 8-10 horse-power twin cylinder Jap
bicycle engine, the first tractor type machine produced by any country, and
a very important contribution to the science of flight. In 1910 and 1911 we
find de Havilland, Frank Maclean and the Short Brothers, Ogilvie,
Professor Huntingdon, Sopwith and the Bristol Company, starting on the
design and construction of machines, of which the names have since
become famous. At the same time certain centres of aviation came into
existence, such as Brooklands, where I well remember beginning to fly in
August, 1910, Hendon, Larkhill and Eastchurch, destined to be the centre of
naval aviation. It is significant, however, of the slow progress made that by
November 1st, 1910, only twenty-two pilot's certificates had been issued,
and it was Conneau, a French naval officer, who in 1911 won the so-called
"Circuit of Britain," i.e. a flight from Brooklands and back via Edinburgh,
Glasgow, Exeter and Brighton. Cody and Valentine were the only British
competitors to complete the full course.
In May 1911 a demonstration was organized by the owners of the
Hendon Aerodrome to which a large number of Cabinet Ministers, members
of parliament, and army and navy officers were invited. The War Office co-
operated by arranging for a small force of horse, foot and guns to be

secretly disposed in a specified area some miles distant and by detailing two
officers, of whom I was one, to test what could be done to find and report
them by air. I remember that I had a special map prepared, the first used in
this, and I think any country, for the aeroplane reconnaissance of troops.
After a sufficiently exciting trip, and with the troops successfully marked on
the map, Hubert, my French pilot, and I, returned and made our report to
General Murray, the Director of Military Training. It was a very interesting
flight; the weather good; our height about 1,500 feet; the machine a 50
horse-power Gnome "box-kite" Henri Farman, which at one period of our
35 mile an hour return journey elected to point itself skywards for an
unpleasant second or two and fly "cabré"; I can see Hubert now anxiously
forcing his front elevator downwards and shouting to me to lean forward in
order to help to bring the nose to a more comfortable bearing!
Many pages could be filled with the difficulties and exploits of the first
British aviators, but enough has been said to show that, compared with that
of aeroplanes in France and of airships in Germany, development in this
country started late, progressed slowly and excited little public interest. The
work of the pioneers was, however, not in vain, since it opened the eyes of
our military authorities to the value of aviation and led to the formation of
that small but highly efficient flying corps which during the war expanded
into an organization without rival. Let us now turn to the inception of the air
forces of the Crown and the position with regard to these and to air tactics
at the outbreak of war.

The Inception and Development of Aircraft as Part of the
Forces of the Crown.

Nations have tended to regard flight as a prerogative of war. A balloon
school was formed in the early days of the French revolutionary wars; the
French victory at Fleurus in 1794 was ascribed to balloon reconnaissance;
balloons were used by the Federal Army in the American Civil War, and
during the Siege of Paris Gambetta effected his escape by balloon in 1871.

The Balloon Factory.

In England experiments were begun at Woolwich Arsenal in 1878, and in
1883 a Balloon Factory, a Depôt and a School of Instruction were
established at Chatham. The expedition to Bechuanaland in 1884, under the
command of Sir Charles Warren, was accompanied by a detachment of
three balloons, and the following year balloons co-operated with the Sudan
Expeditionary Force, when Major Elsdale carried out some photographic
experiments from the air.
In 1890 a balloon section was introduced into the Army as a unit of the
Royal Engineers, and not long afterwards, the Balloon Factory was
established at South Farnborough, where in 1912 it was transformed into
the Royal Aircraft Factory. Four balloon sections took part in the South
African War and were used during the Siege of Ladysmith, at
Magersfontein and Paardeburg. Colonel Lynch, who served in the Boer
Army, stated at a lecture delivered in Paris after the war that "the Boers took
a dislike to balloons. All other instruments of war were at their command;
they had artillery superior for the most part to, and better served than, that
of the English; they had telegraphic and heliographic apparatus; but the
balloons were the symbol of a scientific superiority of the English which
seriously disquieted them."
I went through a course in ballooning during leave from West Africa in
1904 and remember that partly owing to the energy of Colonel Capper,
partly to the impetus given by the South African War, and partly to the
growing interest in all things aeronautical throughout the civilized world, it
was noticeable that the activities of the Balloon Factory were increasing in
many directions. Although the spherical balloon had been improved, its
disabilities were recognized and experiments were made with elongated
balloons, man-flying kites, air photography, signalling devices, observation
of artillery fire, mechanical apparatus for hauling down balloons, and petrol
motors. A grant for a dirigible balloon was obtained in 1903, though it was
not until 1907, the year in which Cody began the construction of his
aeroplane at Farnborough, and Charles Rolls his experiments, that the
airship "Nulli Secundus" made her first flight. She was about 120 feet long
and 30 feet in diameter, and was driven by a 40 horse-power engine at a
speed of 30 miles an hour. On October 5th this airship flew to London in an
hour and a half, circled round St. Paul's, manœuvred over Buckingham
Palace, and descended at the Crystal Palace. In the same year, be it

remembered, a Zeppelin had made a trip of 200 miles from Friedrichshaven
to Frankfort. The "Nulli Secundus" was followed in 1910 by the "Beta" and
the "Gamma."
Meanwhile an Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had been appointed,
and the National Physical Laboratory had organized a department at
Teddington for the investigation of aeronautical problems in co-operation
with the Balloon Factory.

The Air Battalion.

In 1911 the authorities could no longer close their eyes, especially at a
time when rumours of war were rife, to the rapid development of heavier-
than-air craft on the Continent. So far, as we have seen, the aeroplane had
been regarded in England as little more than the plaything of a few
adventurous but foolhardy spirits. A certain amount of experience in
piloting and handling aeroplanes had been gained by a handful of Army
officers, but the machines used either belonged to the officers themselves,
to civilians, or to aviation firms. I was at that time a general staff officer in
the Directorate of Military Operations under General Wilson, now Field
Marshal and late Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and was the only
officer in the War Office who had learned to fly. It appeared very important
that a study of the military possibilities of aviation should be made. The
prime rôle of cavalry, reconnaissance, seemed to have passed from it. In
addition to my normal duties, I visited France, Germany and Italy, collected
information on foreign activities, wrote reports, and tried to create a
knowledge of the possible effect of future military aeronautics and to urge
the formation of a flying corps.
In 1911 the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers, consisting of
Headquarters, No. 1 Company (Airships) and No. 2 Company (Aeroplanes),
was formed and superseded the Balloon School. The creation of No. 2
Company, stationed at Larkhill, marked the first formation of a British
military unit composed entirely of heavier-than-air aircraft. The same year
witnessed the inception of the B.E., F.E. and S.E. type machines in the
Balloon Factory, but the total of our machines, both for naval and military
requirements, amounted to something less than twelve aeroplanes and two

small airships; and the mishaps suffered by the military machines on their
flight from Larkhill to Cambridge, to take part in Army Manœuvres, were
significant of their unreliability.

The Royal Flying Corps.

In view, therefore, of the reports received of the progress abroad, the Air
Battalion was clearly insufficient to meet the demands which might be
made upon it in the event of war; and at the end of 1911 the Prime Minister
instructed a standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence
to consider the future development of air navigation for naval and military
purposes. As a result of their deliberations the Committee recommended the
creation of a British Air Service to be regarded as one and designated the
Royal Flying Corps; the division of the Corps into a Naval Wing, a Military
Wing, and a Central Flying School; the maintenance of the closest possible
collaboration between the Corps, the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
and the Aircraft (late Balloon) Factory; and the appointment of a permanent
Consultative Committee, named the Air Committee, to deal with all
aeronautical questions affecting both the Admiralty and the War Office.
Consequent upon these recommendations, a Technical Sub-Committee
was formed, consisting of Brig.-General Henderson, Major MacInnes of the
directorate of Military Training at the War Office, a splendid officer, who
died during the war, and myself, to draft the new scheme. The objects kept
in view in framing our peace organization were to suit it to war conditions,
as far as they could be foreseen, to base it on an efficient self-contained
unit, and, while allowing for the wide differences between naval and
military requirements, to ensure the maximum co-operation between the
two branches of the Service. Success beyond expectation was achieved in
the first two objects, but, as will be seen, the naval and military branches
tended for unforeseen but good reasons to diverge, until they joined hands
again in 1918 as the Royal Air Force. The bases of the military organization
were, a headquarters, the squadron, and the flying depôt. These proved their
value during the war and have remained the units of our air forces to this
day. The Military Wing was to form a single and complete organization and
contain a headquarters, seven aeroplane squadrons, each to consist of
twelve active machines and six in reserve, one airship and kite squadron,

and a flying depôt. All pilots, whether of the Naval or the Military Wing,
were eventually to graduate at the Central Flying School, whence they
could join either the Naval Wing at Eastchurch or one of the Military
Squadrons. In time of war each branch of the Service was to form a reserve
for the other if required.

The Military Wing.

In accordance with this scheme I received instructions to organize,
recruit, train and command the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps.
The functions of the Military Wing were quite clear: it was to meet the air
requirements of the Expeditionary Force primarily for reconnaissance
purposes, but its organization was framed so that it could easily be
expanded and the scope of its duties widened. Headquarters were
established at Farnborough on May 13th, 1912: Barrington-Kennett, an
officer of the Grenadier Guards who had been attached to the Air Battalion,
was appointed, and made the best of all possible adjutants; and the nucleus
of the Corps, consisting at first of the cadres of an airship squadron under
Edward Maitland, of two aeroplane squadrons under Burke and Brooke-
Popham, and a flying depôt (later the aircraft park) under Carden, who was
a little later greatly assisted in the complex matter of technical stores by
Beatty, came into existence. At the same time the construction of the
Central Flying School was started at Upavon, under Captain G. Payne, R.N.
With regard to the other squadrons provided for, the nucleus of No. 4
Squadron was formed the same year, and that of No. 5 Squadron the
following year, of Nos. 6 and 7 Squadrons in 1914, while No. 8 Squadron
was not started until after the outbreak of war.
Records of the progress and growth of the Corps were left at
Farnborough when the Headquarters and four squadrons went to France in
August, 1914, and have been lost. This is particularly unfortunate because
without them it will be difficult for the historian of the Corps adequately to
describe the beginnings and to assess the value of the work then carried out.
The task of forming the new service, which was to do much to assist the
Army in saving England, was begun. The time was very short. A great
energy had to be brought to the work. As with all things new, it had to

contend with apathy and opposition on all sides. There was no precedent to
help. The organization of the Corps to its smallest detail of technical stores,
supply and transport had to be thought out. The type of machine required;
the method of obtaining it from a struggling industry; its use and
maintenance; the personnel, its training and equipment; these, and a
thousand other aspects of the question, required the employment of a large
staff of experts. But the experts did not exist and the duties were carried out
almost entirely at Farnborough, where in addition time had to be found to
compile the official training and other text books and regulations required
for an entirely new arm.
In addition to the innumerable problems inherent in the organization,
growth and training of the Military Wing, the two years between its
inception and the outbreak of war were strenuously applied to solving the
problems of air tactics and strategy. Until the South African War the British
Army had been drilled under the influence of stereotyped Prussian ideas.
Perhaps the South African War led too far in an opposite direction, but it
taught us one thing, which was to prove of such importance in 1914—the
value of mobility; and we realized in aircraft the advent of the most mobile
arm the world has yet seen.
All was new. A new Corps. A new element in which to work. New
conditions in peace akin to those in war. And there had to be developed a
new spirit, combining the discipline of the old Army, the technical skill of
the Navy, and the initiative, energy and dash inseparable from flying. There
were the inevitable accidents, but training had to be done. We existed for
war and war alone would show whether we had thought and worked
without respite aright. We had to prove our value to the other arms, many of
the leaders of which, owing to a long period of peace, found difficulty in
differentiating between the normal usages of peace and war and in
understanding the right use of aircraft. Somehow or other time was found
during 1912, 1913 and 1914 to write to reviews, to lecture at army and
other centres of training, to attend Staff rides, and to endeavour in every
way possible to learn how best to work in with the army commands and to
teach those commands the usefulness and limitations of aircraft.
As Ruskin wrote:

"Man is the engine whose motive power is the soul and the largest quantity of
work will not be done by this curious engine for pay, or under pressure, or by the
help of any kind of fuel which may be supplied by the cauldron. It will be done
only when the will or spirit of the creature is brought to its own greatest strength
by its own proper fuel, namely the affection."

I was intensely proud of my command and often thought of the time
when, as I had been promised, I should, in the event of war, command it in
the field. We worked at white heat believing that war was coming soon;
believing that our efforts would have a real effect on the result; and
determined that the new arm should rank second to none among the forces
of the Crown. Esprit de Corps was of vital importance, but as officers and
non-commissioned officers were drawn from every branch and every
regiment of the army this was no easy matter and was only achieved by the
splendid example and precept of such men as Herbert, Becke, Longcroft,
Chinnery and Barrington-Kennett. We selected our motto: "Per Ardua ad
Astra." It was in this atmosphere that the Military Wing grew in peace. It
was in this atmosphere that the soul was formed which later under the great
strain of war impelled our pilots forward cheerfully to face every duty and
every danger in the true spirit of manliness and fearless confidence.
As in framing the original scheme on paper, so in giving it life it was our
aim to organize the Corps, so that, whatever its future strength, it would be
sound and efficient, and its continuity of growth effected without even
temporary dislocation or waste. The tactical unit of the Military Wing—the
squadron, consisting of three flights, each of four machines with two in
reserve—had the advantage that it was of sufficient size to act
independently, while it was not too unwieldy for a single command. It was
equally suitable for independent or co-operative action, and the full
complement of seven squadrons would, in addition to a reserve, furnish one
squadron for each division of an Army Expeditionary force of the size then
contemplated, though no definite allotment of aeroplanes to the lower
commands was at first intended. The French and Germans, on the other
hand, were building up their organizations with smaller units, with the
result that they found even greater difficulties than ourselves in obtaining
sufficient experienced officers to command them. It is probable that the
consequent lack of concentration, knowledge and determination to stick to
sound principles of action was one of the causes underlying the non-success
of the German air service in the opening phases of the war.

According to the system employed squadrons were formed, organized,
equipped, and a certain amount of preliminary training carried out, at
Farnborough, when on completion the squadron moved to one of the
stations which I had established or was forming at Netheravon, Montrose,
Gosport, Dover, and Orfordness, Netheravon being the largest. This
dispersion of squadrons did not affect the entity and cohesion, under Wing
headquarters at Farnborough, of the Corps as a whole. No. 3 Squadron, one
of the original two referred to, removed to Netheravon from Larkhill in
June.
Similarly, and in order to avoid congestion at Farnborough, to foster a
spirit of self-support and to enable air operations to be carried out with
troops in Scotland, No. 2 Squadron was sent to Montrose. Five of its
machines flew all the way, and it became one of the principles of training
that machines should fly whenever a move was ordered. Thus in 1913 six
machines from this squadron were flown from Montrose to Limerick—a
great feat then—to take part in the Irish Command manœuvres, the crossing
of the Irish Channel being successfully carried out both ways by all
machines. Another flight of an experimental nature was made by Longcroft,
with myself as passenger, from Farnborough to Montrose in a single day
with only one landing.
The unavoidable and never-relaxing strain inherent in the daily and
hourly use of an instrument, in the design, maintenance and improvement of
which we could only grope our way, was very great. In peace before the
war, as later in the war, the only variation to strain lay in periods of
increased strain.
At Headquarters, in addition to the normal duties of command and co-
ordination, and the supply of all technical stores to squadrons, there was
carried out all recruiting, and I also formed a specialized flight for the study
of technical problems, such as the use of wireless from aircraft. The bulk of
experimental work was originally undertaken by the Royal Aircraft Factory,
under the Superintendent, Mr. O'Gorman, who always helped us in every
way possible, but by 1913 I felt it necessary to enlarge the duties of the
special flight and an Experimental Section was formed at Wing
Headquarters at Farnborough with an officer, Musgrave, in charge. In
addition, for each squadron an officer was appointed Squadron Officer for

Experiments, thus ensuring the diffusion of information throughout the
Corps, and affording the opportunity to each unit of carrying out the
experiments best suited to the material and apparatus at its command.
Similarly other individual officers were detailed in each squadron on a co-
ordinated scheme, for such duties as Officer-in-charge of Stores,
Workshops, Mechanical Transport, Meteorology, etc.
The formation at Farnborough of the Line of Communications R.F.C.
Workshop or Flying Depôt—later known as the Aircraft Park—completed
the organization of the Military Wing.
I was very anxious as early as possible to prove the structure as a unified
self-supporting, mobile and easily handled flying corps as far as it had
gone, and in June, 1914, this was done by the concentration in camp at
Netheravon of the entire Military Wing, comprising Headquarters and
Headquarters Flight, the four completed squadrons and the nucleus of No. 6
Squadron, the Aircraft Park and a detachment of the Kite Section.
Mobilization, a very difficult process when it came, would have been
almost impossible had the concentration not taken place. The object of the
camp was a month's combined training to test personnel, both in the air and
on the ground, and the handling of aircraft and transport both by day and
night. Endeavours were made to solve by means of lectures, discussions and
committees the problems connected with mobilization, technical and
military training, observation, wireless telegraphy, signals, night flying,
photography, bomb-dropping, workshops, stores, meteorology, transport,
shifting of camp and aerodrome, supply and maintenance of units in the
field, etc.—in fact the whole organization essential to the efficiency and
cohesion of a Flying Corps, under conditions as similar as possible to those
expected on active service. Very valuable experience was obtained from the
work carried out. The necessarily wide gaps in our knowledge were brought
home in more concrete form. It was also evident that the force was very
small. But within three months it was proved under the strain of war that the
organization and training had been laid down on sound principles.

The Naval Wing.

As in the case of the Army, it was to airships that the Navy first turned its
attention, and the birth of naval aviation may be said to date from July 21st,
1908, when Admiral Bacon submitted proposals for the construction of a
rigid airship, the ill-fated "Mayfly" which was destroyed on her preliminary
trials. The Admiralty thereupon decided to discontinue the construction of
airships, the development of which was left to the Army until May, 1914,
when it was decided that all airships—that is No. 1 Squadron of the
Military Wing—should be taken over by the Naval Wing. This was partly
the result of a report by two Naval Officers, who visited France, Austria and
Germany, as was the purchase of two vessels of the Parseval and Astra
Torres types, and a small non-rigid from Willows. The construction of a
number of other airships was ordered, but for various reasons was delayed
or never completed up to the outbreak of war.
Although at first sight the functions of the Naval Wing—coast defence
and work with the Fleet—seemed hardly more difficult to perform than
those of the Military Wing, in practice, as I was to find later from personal
experience when in command of the R.N.A.S. at Gallipoli, they were more
complicated, while the slowness of the Admiralty in evolving a clear
scheme of employment and a definite objective made itself felt. Before the
war the achievements of the Naval Wing were due rather to individual effort
than to a definite policy of organized expansion. It was the pilot and the
machine rather than the organization which developed.
As already stated, Eastchurch was chosen by the Short Brothers for their
experiments in aeroplanes in 1909, but it was not until 1911 that the
Admiralty bought two machines and established the first Naval Flying
School at that place. The same year Commander O. Swann purchased from
Messrs. A. V. Roe a 35 horse-power biplane and began to carry out
experiments with different types of floats, as a result of which a twin-float
seaplane was produced—the first to rise off the water in this country.
For some time seaplanes were in a very experimental stage and at best
could only rise from, and alight on, calm water, though it is interesting to
note that as far back as 1911 the employment of seaplanes for torpedo
attack, which I think will be one of the most important developments of
aircraft in the future, engaged the attention of the Navy, and a Sopwith
seaplane carrying a 14-inch torpedo made its first flight at Calshot in 1913.

For this reason, therefore, it appeared that principally aeroplanes and
airships would have to be employed from shore bases for coast defence and
that "carrier" ships would be necessary to enable seaplanes to work with the
Fleet.
The first stations set up were Eastchurch, Isle of Grain, Calshot,
Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Cromarty and Kingsnorth, from which at the
outbreak of war an organized coastal patrol was established.
From the outset the Naval Wing, assisted by its large percentage of
skilled technical personnel, paid great attention to experimental work of all
sorts. Thus in 1912 the detection of submarines by aircraft was taken up, in
1913 valuable results were obtained from bomb-dropping, and a large
number of experiments in wireless, machine gunnery and fighting carried
out. In addition, efforts were made to extend the power, range and capacity
of engine and machine.
The second Naval problem, that of co-operation with the Fleet, involved
the flight of aircraft from ships and the design of aircraft carriers. In 1911
an aeroplane for the first time took off successfully from the deck of a
cruiser at anchor, and the following year an aeroplane flew from H.M.S.
"Hibernia," while under weigh, but it was not until after the outbreak of war
that alighting on decks was successfully accomplished. The first ship to be
fitted up as a parent ship for seaplanes was the "Hermes" in 1913.
These specialized technical requirements and developments explain why
the Naval Wing and the Royal Naval Air Service tended towards
individualism rather than cohesion. While the Military Wing, or Royal
Flying Corps, progressed further as an organized fighting force, the Royal
Naval Air Service, amongst the 100 odd aeroplanes and seaplanes on charge
which were mainly of the Short, Sopwith, Avro, Farman and Wright types,
possessed in 1914 the more powerful engines and a number of aeroplanes
fitted with wireless and machine guns, while their bomb-dropping
arrangements were also in a more advanced stage of development.
An Air Department was formed at the Admiralty in 1912 to deal with all
questions relating to naval aircraft. Naval officers were trained from the
beginning at Eastchurch rather than at the Central Flying School, and in
1913 the appointment of an Inspecting Captain for Aircraft, with a Central

Air Office at Sheerness as his headquarters, accentuated a growing
tendency for the Naval Wing to work on independent lines.
The Naval Wing grew rapidly and in the middle of 1914 was reorganized
as the Royal Naval Air Service, comprising the Air Department of the
Admiralty, the Central Air Office, the Royal Naval Flying School, the Royal
Naval Air Stations, and all aircraft, seaplane ships and balloons employed
for naval purposes. This placed the naval air force on a self-supporting basis
and the entity of the Royal Flying Corps as a whole, as originally provided
for, was lost.

Tactics and the Machine.

The value of the application of flying to war requires little demonstration.
The most important attributes of generalship are quick appreciation of a
situation and quick decision. To the ordinary Commander the absence of
information is paralysing. In the nineteenth century the mass of cavalry was
the special instrument of information and to obtain it contact with the
enemy's main forces had to be effected. It thus acted as a shield and also
tried to provide the information necessary to enable the infantry to take the
offensive.
Aviation, by the wide field of observation it commands, by the speed
with which it can collect and transmit information, to a great extent lifts the
fog of war and enables a general to act on knowledge where before he acted
largely on deduction. Information once obtained, its mobile and far-
reaching offensive power introduces the element of surprise, and permits of
lightning strokes against the enemy's vital points.
Before the war reconnaissance was regarded as the principal duty of the
aircraft of the Military Wing. This was due to two reasons, first, the obvious
one that aircraft possessed advantages shared by no other arm for obtaining
information quickly and over wide areas and reporting to Headquarters, and
second, that experiment had proved the difficulty of loading aeroplanes
with offensive weapons, such as bombs or machine guns, without impairing
speed and climb.

The following statement, which I drafted and which was issued by the
General Staff before the Army Manœuvres of 1912, summarizes the
position:—
"As regards strategical reconnaissance," it says, "a General is probably now
justified in requiring a well-trained flyer, flying a modern aeroplane, to
reconnoitre some 70 miles out and return 70 miles. This would be done at a
speed of, say, 60 miles an hour in ordinary weather over ordinary country. Thus
within four hours, allowing a wide margin, a report as to the approximate
strength, formation and direction of movement of the enemy, if he is within a 70-
mile radius, should be in the hands of the Commander."

To those imbued with a knowledge of military history this new method of
ascertaining the enemy's movements might well seem revolutionary.
Let us take two instances illustrating what aircraft, with a radius of little
over 100 miles, might have done in previous campaigns. For the operations
which terminated in the capitulation of Ulm in 1805 Napoleon concentrated
two army corps at Würzburg and five along the left bank of the Rhine
between Mannheim and Strasburg, his main body of cavalry under Murat
being at the latter place. The Austrian Army under Mack was behind the
Iller between Ulm and Memmingen, and expected the French to advance
through the defiles of the Black Forest, where Napoleon did actually make a
feint with his cavalry. Napoleon, however, crossing the Rhine on September
26th, 1805, moved east, and it was not until October 2nd, when the French
Army had reached the line Ansbach, Langenburg, Hall and Ludwigsburg,
and his envelopment was far advanced, that Mack realized that the main
French advance was coming from the north. Aeroplanes of the type we
possessed in 1914 could have reconnoitred the whole of Napoleon's
preliminary position, could have detected his line of advance, especially as
it was concentrated on a very narrow front, and could have brought back the
information to the Austrian Headquarters within a few hours.
Aircraft would have been of even greater value on August 16th, 1870, at
the Battle of Rezonville, where neither the French nor the Germans were
aware of the other's movements. On the 14th a battle had been fought east
of Metz which had resulted in the French retreat. On the morning of the
16th Moltke thought the French had retired west by the Metz-Verdun road
and those to the north of it, and consequently he directed his left wing due
west towards the Meuse to head off the French, sending his right army

towards Rezonville to harass their rearguard. The French retreat, however,
had been slow and two corps were still at Rezonville, while three corps and
the reserve cavalry were within easy reach, some 130,000 men in all. At 9
in the morning the German 3rd Corps, unaided and far from support,
attacked a position within reach of the whole French Army, believing it had
to deal with a rearguard only. Bazaine, on the other hand, thinking that he
was faced by the German main army, remained on the defensive, and lost
the opportunity of defeating in detail first the 3rd and then the 10th German
Corps. A few aeroplanes operating on a radius of 30 miles would have
disclosed between daybreak and 10 a.m. the true position to either
commander. Neither the German nor the French cavalry, though both were
engaged, obtained any reliable information.
The problem as to how far aircraft would reduce the value of cavalry was
widely discussed before the war. It was seen that by day aircraft could
obtain quicker and more accurate information, but that cavalry retained
their power of night reconnaissance, of mobile offensive action and of
pinning the enemy to his ground by fighting. This was found to be so during
the retreat, when, in addition to the direct value of aircraft for long-distance
reconnaissance, an indirect asset of great importance lay in the release of
the cavalry for battle action in assistance of the infantry. The question has
become more acute since the offensive action of aircraft against ground
targets has developed, but although we must never forget the splendid work
of the mounted arm during the Retreat from Mons, and in March, 1918,
factors have arisen tending to make the use of cavalry a problem of extreme
difficulty in European wars, and it is possible that, in addition to their
reconnaissance functions, aircraft will supersede the shock tactics and
delaying action of cavalry, though this may be modified if, the sabre being a
thing of the past, cavalry are converted into mounted machine gunners.
Air tactics and training were, therefore, chiefly studied from the point of
view of reconnaissance. In addition to the possibility of being shot at by
other aircraft, an important consideration was vulnerability from the
ground. Before the war reconnaissances were carried out at heights varying
from 2,000 to 6,000 feet, but it was generally considered that the aeroplane
was safe from fire from the ground at heights above 3,000 feet.

Serious difficulties affecting the mobility of aircraft were the means of
providing a regular supply of fuel and the selection of landing grounds
when moving camp, which had to be close enough behind the front line as
not to entail waste of time in flying out and back over friendly territory.
This was later brought home to us in a very acute form during the Retreat
from Mons.
As machines improved, increasing attention was paid to bettering their
power of reconnaissance by air photography, their value in co-operation
with artillery by wireless equipment, their offensive action by bomb
dropping and their offence and defence by armament.
The value of a correct initiative and the aeroplane's rôle as an offensive
weapon were fully appreciated and brought out in the Training Manual of
the Royal Flying Corps which we compiled at Farnborough, and which was
published early in 1914 by the War Office. It says:—
"It is probable that one phase of the struggle for the command of the air will
resolve itself into a series of combats between individual aeroplanes, or pairs of
aeroplanes. If the pilots of one side can succeed in obtaining victory in a
succession of such combats, they will establish a moral ascendancy over the
surviving pilots of the enemy, and be left free to carry out their duties of
reconnaissance. The actual tactics must depend on the types of the aeroplanes
engaged, the object of the pilot being to obtain for his passenger the free use of
his own weapon while denying to the enemy the use of his. To disable the pilot
of the opposing aeroplane will be the first object. In the case of fast
reconnaissance aeroplanes it will often be advisable to avoid fighting, in order to
carry out a mission or to deliver information; but it must be borne in mind that
this will be sometimes impossible, and that, as in every other class of fighting, a
fixed determination to attack and win will be the surest road to victory."

Speaking generally, the evolution of the machine, as apart from the
engine, which hung behind, followed upon the evolution of air tactics. As
soon as experience, often hard won at the cost of a valuable life, opened up
new fields of activity for aircraft, the designer and constructor evolved new
designs to meet the new requirements. It was no small achievement in this
period to have solved the problem of inherent stability, both in theory and
practice, so successfully, that from the aerodynamic standpoint our
machines in 1914 compare favourably with those in use at the end of the
war.

In dealing with the evolution of the machine during the three years prior
to the war there are three landmarks: in the autumn of 1911 the few
machines belonging to the Air Battalion failed to reach their destination for
Army Manœuvres; in May, 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was formed and
experiments with a view to meeting military requirements were for the first
time energetically and methodically prosecuted; and in August, 1914, four
squadrons flew to France with machines which had attained a high degree
of stability and were not inferior to any of those possessed by other
countries. When it is remembered in what a short time these machines were
evolved, it is not surprising that attention had been chiefly confined to the
problem of the 'plane and stability, the engine and speed and reliability.
Wireless, bombing, photography, night flying and machine gunnery had
been discussed and experimented with, but no progress was made
comparable to that effected under war conditions.
Machines and engines before the war were chiefly French. It is
interesting to note those with which No. 3 Squadron, one of the first to be
formed, commenced its career in May, 1912. They consisted of one 50
horse-power Gnome Nieuport, one Deperdussin, which by the way was
privately owned, one Gnome Bristol, two Gnome Bleriot monoplanes, one
Avro and one Bristol box-kite biplane. By September, 1912, the Squadron
possessed fourteen monoplanes, but in that month, owing to the number of
accidents incurred by them, the use of monoplanes was temporarily
forbidden, and it was not until April, 1913, that the Squadron was fully
equipped with B.E. and Maurice Farman biplanes organized in flights.
These types formed the backbone of the Military Wing, which also
included Codys, Breguets, Avros, and, later, Sopwiths. The B.E.2c was
produced by the Royal Aircraft Factory in the autumn of 1913 and
demonstrated its high degree of stability by flying from Aldershot to Froyle
and from Froyle to Fleet, distances of 6¾ and 8 miles respectively, without
the use of ailerons or elevators. The progress made is illustrated by the fact
that at the Army Manœuvres of 1913 twelve machines covered 4,545 miles
on reconnaissance and 3,210 miles on other flights, accurate observations
being made from a height of 6,000 feet, without serious mishap.
In 1913 I recommended the gradual substitution of B.E.'s for Farmans on
the ground of the all-round efficiency and superior fighting qualities of the

former, and to secure the advantage of standardization, but it was objected
by the War Office that the Farmans were the only machines that could
mount weapons in front—an objection which was not met until firing
through the airscrew was introduced—and that the slower Farmans offered
greater advantages for observation, an idea which was long prevalent. As a
result, a compromise was effected, and two squadrons were equipped with
B.E.'s and two with homogeneous flights of Farmans, Bleriots and Avros.
At the outbreak of war the most successful machines possessed by the
Military Wing were the B.E.2 tractor with a 70 horse-power Renault engine,
a speed of 73 miles an hour, and a climb of 3,000 feet in nine minutes; and a
Henri Farman pusher with a speed of 60 miles an hour, and a climb of 3,000
feet in fourteen minutes. A special study was being made in 1914 of the best
methods of ensuring clear observation of the ground, and partly in this
connection staggered planes were introduced, culminating in the B.E.2c's,
which were not, however, available for service in any numbers until 1915.
To sum up, the technical development of aircraft has taken place, and will
continue side by side with the evolution of the uses to which aircraft can be
put. While due attention was paid to problems connected with the
anticipated duties of aircraft ancillary to that of reconnaissance, owing to
the short space of time between the formation of the Royal Flying Corps
and the outbreak of war, to the difficulties connected with the engine, and to
causes inseparable from peace conditions, development had been more or
less confined to evolving a stable and reliable machine with a good field of
view.

Conclusions.

The foregoing outline of the development of aviation from the earliest
times up to the war—a story of human endeavour and achievement in the
air with its attendant dangers and difficulties—is not without value in
endeavouring to assess that which has since occurred.
At the beginning of the year 1912 the Royal Flying Corps did not exist.
At the beginning of the Great War, in 1914, England found herself with an
air service which, though much smaller than those of Germany or France,

was so excellently manned and organized, trained and equipped, that it
placed her at a bound in the front rank of aviation.
The machine was stable, but the engine still unequal to the tasks laid
upon it. Civil Aviation practically did not exist.
I shall now describe the extension of air duties under war conditions; the
increasing value of aircraft for general action and air tactics and their
development and far-reaching effect as the right hand of strategy. This
resulted in the expansion of our flying corps from a total of 1,844 officers
and men, and seven squadrons with some 150 machines fit for war use, to a
total of nearly 300,000 officers and men, and 201 squadrons and 22,000
machines in use at the end of the war, and in the evolution of the machine to
a point where we can regard it, not only as a weapon of war, but as a new
method of transport for commercial purposes in peace.

CHAPTER II

WAR

General Remarks on War Development.

In dealing with the story of the beginnings of aviation and the evolution
of aircraft up to the war, we have seen that though its growth was
infinitesimal compared with that which came with the impetus of war, the
air service took definite and practical shape more rapidly than had up to that
time any other arm of the Army or Navy in peace.
In 1914 we had reached a point where we possessed a small but mobile
and efficient flying force, equipped and trained essentially for
reconnaissance. Although experiments had been made, little had been
achieved in the use of wireless from aircraft, air photography, bomb
dropping, armament or the development of air fighting. As with the Army
and Navy, war quickened and expanded all the attributes of air operations in
a way which could not have been foreseen before the struggle occurred;
and, as it would have been impossible for the Army and Navy to build up
their war organization without the foundation of the pre-war service, so it
was the splendid quality of the original Royal Flying Corps that made this
expansion possible.
Before the war the Royal Flying Corps was considerably smaller than the
air services of either France or Germany, and to attain even the strength
with which the Military Wing left England the bulk of the trained officers
and men, and almost all the machines fit for service, had to be taken. When
I started to raise the Corps, in May, 1912, the War Office estimated that its
organization, (of a headquarters and seven aeroplane and one airship
squadrons) would take at least four years; instead, there had been little more
than two. Even at the risk of leaving insufficient personnel and material
behind to form and train new squadrons, I recommended that four complete
squadrons (including the wireless machines which had to be thrown in to
make up the numbers) should be sent overseas to help the British
Expeditionary Force in bearing the brunt of the terrific blow that was to

come. It was a very serious matter that so little could be left with which to
carry on in England, but we considered it essential to dispatch at once to
France every available machine and pilot, because both political and
military authorities were of opinion that for economic and financial reasons
a war with a great European power could not last more than a few months.
Another reason was that those of us who had been at the Staff College
during the few years before the war, or who had recently served on the
General Staff at the War Office, believed that the weight of the German
attack would be made through Belgium, where, owing to the enclosed
nature of the country, cavalry would be at a disadvantage, and we realized
therefore, and urged, the great effect which the air would have from the
commencement of operations—a view which was not widely held,
especially among senior officers in the Army. We also felt the necessity of
using our maximum air strength from the outset, so as to prove its supreme
importance as quickly and practically as possible. It required the Retreat
from Mons before even G.H.Q. as a whole would accept the fact, though
Colonel Macdonogh, the head of the intelligence section, was our firm ally.
The iron of confidence, both to used and user, had to be welded with the
first great blows on the anvil of war. For these reasons it was vital that
every available trained pilot and suitable machine should be employed with
the Army, even at the danger of serious initial depletion at Home. The
smooth progress of expansion was largely attributable alike to the strength
of the pre-war spirit, organization and training,[2] and to the results actual
and moral obtained by the first four squadrons during the Retreat and the
following weeks of the war under centralized control. The French
distributed their "Escadrilles," which were approximately of the size of our
"flight," from the beginning, and it is probable that one cause of failure in
the German air service during the same period lay in the initial dispersion of
units and lack of unified control by the higher command. The British
Expeditionary Force having been saved during the Retreat, Paris having
been saved at the Marne, the great German army having made a retirement,
a lengthy war of position having become obvious, confidence in the air
service, both within and without, having been established, the centralized
system necessarily adopted up to that time could be relaxed, and we were
able to send home officers and men with greatly increased experience to
help build up the many new squadrons which would be required to co-
operate with the new armies.

[2] On October 17, 1914, Sir J. French wrote: "Such efficiency as the R.F.C. may
have shown in the field is, in my opinion, principally due to organization and
training."

Gradually, as the numbers in the field permitted, increased duties were
undertaken. The Army, though it did not do so at first, yet came to
understand the immense importance to itself of air reconnaissance. So much
so indeed that our machines and pilots were generally many too few to
attempt more than the absolute essentials, and calls were often made upon
them which were beyond their strength to meet. An ironic contrast to this
was supplied, however, at the evacuation of the Dardanelles, where I was
commanding the air service (the R.N.A.S.), and was asked to be careful not
to do too much air work. This at a time when through stress and strain and
loss we had, I think, a total of five machines left able to take the air!
Observation was, and remains, the prime purpose for which the Royal
Flying Corps was formed. 1914 was a year of reconnaissance, but with the
advent of trench warfare at the Battle of the Aisne, the first attempts were
made to extend its scope by the use of wireless for artillery co-operation,
and by air photography, both of which developed rapidly. Headway was
also being made with bombing. Then machines carrying out their special
duties had to be protected, while it became necessary to prevent hostile
machines from effecting similar functions, with the result that 1915 saw the
beginnings of systematic air fighting.
In 1915 the easily manœuvrable Fokker, with its machine-gun
synchronizing gear for firing through the propeller, gave the Germans a
temporary lead, but by the Battle of the Somme this was outclassed and in
1916 our air superiority became marked. The Royal Flying Corps was by
that time organized into Brigades and Wings, one Wing operating with each
Army for fighting and distant reconnaissance, and one Wing with each
Corps for short reconnaissance and such specialized work as artillery co-
operation and contact patrols. Both types of machine took part in bombing
operations.
There is generally perhaps a tendency, when reviewing the army and air
effort in the war, to deal almost entirely with the Western Front and to
forget the prodigious work done in many other theatres.

In 1915 the Royal Naval Air Service carried out all air work with the
Army and Navy in the Gallipoli campaign and showed how a single air
force could effect really important co-operation with both services. In
addition to the normal duties of co-operation with the Army and the Fleet,
and in spite of the difficulties of transport, supply and workshop
arrangements, photographs were taken from the air of the greater part of the
Peninsula, and the original inaccurate maps corrected therefrom; frequent
bombing raids were carried out against objectives on the Peninsula, the
Turkish lines of communications, and even Constantinople itself. In this
campaign, too, torpedoes were used for the first time by aircraft and three
ships were destroyed in the Dardanelles by this means. The distance from
the hub of affairs, a line of supply about 6,000 miles in length, sickness and
the climatic and geographical conditions rendered maintenance very
difficult. Sand and dust driven in clouds by high winds greatly shortened
the working life of engines. The heat during the summer caused the rapid
deterioration of machines, while long oversea flights entailed loss from
forced landings. There are many aspects of the deepest interest to be
brought out when a complete history of the Campaign in Gallipoli comes to
be written. It is true that the Allies would have lost all if they had been
defeated in the west, and that the call of the Armies for more and more men
and munitions for that theatre was insistent; it is equally true, however, that
in France there could be nothing but batter and counter-batter, and the only
remaining point where strategic principles could be brought to bear was at
the Dardanelles. But what is more relevant to the subject of these pages is
that when in future years the story of Helles and Anzac and Suvla is
weighed, it will, I think, appear that had the necessary air service been built
up from the beginning and sustained, the Army and Navy could have forced
the Straits and taken Constantinople. I insistently urged the dependence of
the naval and military forces upon air assistance and the necessity for
carrying out a strong aerial offensive, especially by bombing, for which the
local conditions governing the enemy operations on the Peninsula offered
exceptional advantages.
From the autumn of 1915 onwards Egypt became the centre of training
and expansion for operations in the Middle East and, as the organization
developed, a brigade was formed with Wings in Macedonia, Sinai and a
training Wing, which by 1918 had become a training brigade, in Egypt. The

work of the Wing sent to Sinai in 1916, and expanded in 1917 into a
brigade, is well summarized in the following extract from a telegram
received from Egypt on October 3rd, 1918:—
"Before operations commenced our mastery of the air was complete and this
was maintained throughout, enabling the cavalry turning movement to be
completely protected and concealed. Enemy retreating columns were so
effectively machine gunned and bombed by offensive machines that in all three
cases the surviving personnel abandoned their vehicles and consequently upset
all plans of retirement. An enemy column thus abandoned was seven miles in
length."

The Wings in Macedonia and Mesopotamia, though they could not beat the
record of the Palestine Brigade, gained a marked supremacy over the
enemy. Air operations in East Africa were originally carried out by the
Royal Naval Air Service with seaplanes, which in 1915 were brought up to
the strength of two squadrons and replaced by aeroplanes under the orders
of the military forces, their duties being carried out under the difficult
conditions of bush warfare. Valuable work was also done by the Royal
Flying Corps squadrons which were sent out to operate in the south.
In addition to these major operations, air forces were used in the
expeditions on the Indian frontier, against Darfur and in the vicinity of
Aden. Five squadrons were sent to Italy after the Italian retreat from the
Isonzo and took a prominent part in the final Austrian defeat; a Royal Air
Force contingent was sent to Russia to operate from Archangel; and
material assistance was given to France and the other Allies, but especially
to the United States in the training and equipment of her air forces.
At the beginning of 1918 the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval
Air Force were amalgamated and the Royal Air Force came into existence,
and during the year achieved a supremacy more complete than that at any
time since the Somme.
The following description gives a vivid idea of air activity at the front in
1918:—
"All day long there were 'dog fights' waged at heights up to three or four miles
above the shell-torn battlefields of France, whilst the low-flying aeroplanes were
attacking suitable targets from the height of a few dozen feet. Passing backwards
and forwards went the reconnaissance machines and the bombers, and along the
whole front observers were sending out by wireless to the artillery the point of

impact of their shells. Such was the picture of the air on any fine day at the
time."

1918, however, saw not only the accumulative effect of the tactical co-
operation of aircraft with our armies in the field, but also the formation of
the Independent Air Force and the carrying out of the strategic air offensive
against centres of war industry in the interior of Germany.
A vast organization was also required at Home to meet the rapid
expansion of units in the Field and to supply reinforcements. Thus at the
Armistice there were 199 training squadrons, the pupils under instruction
including cadets numbered 30,000, and during the war some 22,000
graduated as efficient for active service. At the beginning of the war pilots
were sent overseas with only 11 hours' flying experience. This was much
too little and there is no doubt that increased training would have ensured
fewer casualties. Fortunately, however, the length of training was increased
in the latter part of the war and a remarkable advance in training was made
possible by the use of an entirely new and extraordinarily efficient system
of instruction evolved by Smith-Barry.
The war demonstrated the beginnings of what air power meant, though in
November, 1918, it was still in its infancy. Before many years the ability to
make war successfully, or even at all, will depend upon air power.
Let us now briefly survey the development of the several duties of
aircraft, the evolution of machines and progress in tactics, strategy and the
organization of our Air Forces during the war.
I had recognized the great difficulty of mobilizing with the clockwork
precision of older units and, in the belief that war was coming, had ordered
a provisional mobilization of the Corps some days before it was actually
declared. Thanks to this step and to the work done at our Concentration
Camp at Netheravon in June, 1914, the greater part of the Royal Flying
Corps was enabled to concentrate without hitch at our aerodrome at Dover,
and the machines flew via Calais to Amiens on August 13th.

Co-operation with the Army.

Reconnaissance.

In the event of France and England declaring war concurrently against
Germany, the strategic plan agreed to by the British and French general
staffs before the war had been that the British Expeditionary Force should
be moved to the Le Cateau, Maubeuge, Mons, area and take up a line on the
left flank of the French Army near Mons. But England had withheld her
declaration until three days after the French, and on landing in France the
first words I heard said by a Frenchman were: "Oui, l'armée anglaise arrive
mais on a manqué le premier plan." It was not until after the arrival of
G.H.Q. at Amiens on August 14th that, although late, it was decided that the
advanced line should be taken up. The Royal Flying Corps moved by air
and road to an existing aerodrome outside the antique defences of
Maubeuge 12 miles from Mons on the 16th. On the 19th the first
reconnaissance was carried out, and the entire country over which the
German armies were advancing, as far as Brussels and Louvain, was kept
under observation. One of the best reconnaissances ever made was that of
August 21st, which discovered the 2nd German Corps moving from
Brussels through Ninhove and Grammont.
From Maubeuge we had to retire on the 24th to Le Cateau, on the 25th to
St. Quentin, on the 26th to La Fère, on the 28th to Compiègne, on the 30th
to Senlis, on the 31st to Juilly, on September 2nd to Serris, on the 3rd to
Touquin, on the 4th to Melun, where we were thankful at last to get orders
again to advance on the 7th to Touquin, and on the 9th to Coulommiers,
reaching Fère-en-Tardennois on the 12th for the Battle of the Aisne.
Of the many recollections of the early days one which will remain
longest in my mind is the terrible sadness of the flocks of refugees, of the
poor people we left behind. And the glare of villages burning by the hand of
the Boche. It was indeed war.
Valuable reconnaissances were made during the whole Retreat from
Mons to the Marne in spite of the tremendous difficulties involved by
constant movement, transport, and the selection of new landing grounds,
but, in the words of Sir John French, "It was the timely warning aircraft
gave which chiefly enabled me to make speedy dispositions to avert danger
and disaster. There can be no doubt indeed that even then the presence and

co-operation of aircraft saved the very frequent use of cavalry patrols and
detailed supports." The Royal Flying Corps was an important factor in
helping the British Expeditionary Force to escape von Kluck's nearly
successful efforts to secure another and a British Sedan.
The reconnaissance resulting in the most valuable information of all, and,
I think, during the whole of the war, was that of September 3rd, during the
critical operations on the Marne, which formed one of the decisive battles in
the world's history, when von Kluck's turning movement to the south-east
against the French left was accurately reported and Marshal Joffre was
enabled to make his dispositions accordingly. "The precision, exactitude
and regularity of the news brought in," he said in a message to the British
Commander-in-Chief, "are evidence of the perfect training of pilots and
observers." The reports of the German air service, on the other hand, would
appear from von Kluck's movements to have been of no assistance to him.
The system adopted from the first was for the pilot or observer, or both,
immediately on their return to bring their report to R.F.C. Headquarters,
whence the Commander, or his staff officer, accompanied them to G.H.Q.,
where the map was filled in in accordance with the report. G.H.Q. could
then ask questions and obtain any further information which the observer
could give, while R.F.C. Headquarters could ascertain what further reports
were most urgently required. The form of the reports, which were ready
printed, had been most carefully thought out at R.F.C. Headquarters in
peace and experimented with at the Concentration Camp.
The maps thus compiled at G.H.Q. from air reconnaissance reports
between August 31st and September 3rd were of vital interest, though it was
sometimes very difficult to get the information put on the map for prompt
consideration. For instance, at Dammartin on the evening of September 1st,
when it was thought that German cavalry were within a few miles, G.H.Q.
made a very hurried departure, and I was unable to find anyone to whom to
give very important reports.
It was at the Battle of the Marne that machines were for the first time
allotted to Army Corps for tactical work, while long-distance
reconnaissance was carried out by other machines operating from
Headquarters. Later on, this system was established as a part of our

permanent organization, squadrons being allotted to, and reporting direct to,
Corps for tactical reconnaissance, artillery co-operation and contact patrols,
and to Armies for longer-distance reconnaissance and fighting.
The last phase of the war of movement was the race for the Channel
Ports and it devolved upon aircraft to observe the enemy's movements from
his centre and left flank to meet the Allied movement to the coast, to
observe the movements of the four newly-formed corps which came into
action at Ypres and to maintain liaison with the Belgian and British forces at
Antwerp and Ostend. Information was very difficult to obtain and on one
occasion I flew from the Aisne to Antwerp, under Sir John French's
instructions, in order as far as possible to clear up the general situation
when our G.H.Q. was in doubt as to whether Antwerp was completely
surrounded or not. It was an interesting piece of work. There was a light
drizzle, and the forest of Compiègne had to be flown over at about 200 feet.
The B.E. could not make the distance without refilling, and although only a
short halt was made at Amiens for the purpose, it was too late to fly direct
to Antwerp. Instead, a landing was made in a very sticky field under light
plough, which was selected from the air about 4 miles north of Bruges, to
which town I rode on a borrowed bicycle. At Bruges there was great
consternation and uncertainty as to the position at Antwerp, but the
Commander kindly placed a large open car and its very energetic driver at
my disposal to try and get through. After many difficulties we managed to
find our way into Antwerp by about midnight, and I was received by the
Belgian Commander. He explained that though the Germans had broken
through the South-Eastern sector and his troops were very hard pressed (and
pointing repeatedly to a piece of an 18-inch German shell in the corner of
the room, he said, "Mais qu'est-ce qu'on peut faire avec ces choses-là!"), he
hoped to be able to hold out for a time. After giving him General French's
message and obtaining as much information as possible, I managed to get
clear of Antwerp, reaching Bruges again at 3.15 a.m. At 4 a.m. we set out
and found a very wet machine in a wetter field and after considerable
difficulty and flying through the top of the surrounding hedge, struggled
into the upper air on the way back to Headquarters at Fère-en-Tardennois.
During the Battles of the Aisne and of Ypres strategical reconnaissance
was carried out by the few machines available at Headquarters. Shephard,
the best reconnaissance officer I have ever known, who was killed later,

used to fly his B.E.2 without observer over the greater part of Belgium two
or three times a week and always brought in a long, closely packed, and
extraordinarily valuable report. Tactical reconnaissance to a depth of 15 to
20 miles was done by units attached to Corps.
After the Battle of the Aisne, which was the turning point in the evolution
from the war of movement to trench warfare, pure reconnaissance, though
still the basis of air work, tended to become a matter of routine, while many
new and specialized forms of it—such as air photography and artillery
spotting by wireless—were developed.

Photography.

Though experiments had been made in the problem of photography from
the air before the war, principally by Fletcher, Hubbard and Laws, and its
value to survey was recognized, it had not become of practical utility. We
only took one official camera with us to France on August 13th, 1914, and it
was not until September 15th that the first attempt at air photography was
made, when five plates were exposed over positions behind the enemy's
lines with very imperfect results. Its great value as an aid to observation in
trench warfare was, however, very apparent, fresh brains were brought to
the task, Moore-Brabazon, Campbell and Dr. Swan, and by the end of the
year better success was obtained, though positions even then had to be filled
in by the observer with red ink. Experiments at home during 1915 led to a
great improvement in lenses, and at the beginning of 1916 air photography
was universal. At the Battle of the Somme new enemy positions were
photographed as soon as they were seen, and the camera did invaluable
work in the reconnaissance of the Hindenburg Line during the German
retreat of 1917, and the taking of over a thousand photographs was a daily
occurrence. On September 4th, 1917, a record of 1,805 photographs was
made.
The development of air photography, very remarkable in itself, is even
more so when it is remembered that the improvement in enemy anti-aircraft
guns drove our machines to carry out their work at altitudes increasing up to
20,000 and even 22,000 feet, at which heights the negatives had to be as
distinct as those taken at 4,000 in the earlier days of the war.

At the beginning of the Dardanelles operations our apparatus consisted of
one camera, a printing frame and a dark room lamp. The first photographs
were taken by Butler in April, 1915, from a H. Farman machine at
necessarily low altitudes. Butler was wounded in June and was succeeded
by Thomson, who alone made 900 exposures and sent in 3,600 prints.
In addition to the assistance of air photography to reconnaissance, the
war gave it great impetus as the handmaid of survey and mapping. It was, in
fact, the only means of mapping or correcting the maps of country held by
the enemy, which in certain cases, as at Gallipoli and in Palestine, were
very inaccurate.
By the end of the war photographic processes and equipment had reached
a high standard of excellence. There are still, however, certain difficulties in
regard to the production of accurate maps, which have not been overcome,
the most obvious being the necessity of an initial framework of fixed points
and of contouring. The subject is considered so important that an "Air
Survey Committee," consisting of representatives of the Air Ministry, the
Geographical section of the War Office, the Ordnance Survey, the School of
Military Engineering and the Artillery Survey School, has recently been
formed. In addition, the School of Aeronautics of Cambridge University is
studying the question. The Survey of India and the Survey of Egypt are also
conducting experiments.

Wireless.

From the outset, part of the German scheme of tactics was to batter down
resistance by means of superior weight of heavy armament, and with the
beginning of warfare of fixed position the observation and direction of our
artillery fire became as important as distant reconnaissance. Besides its
immense value in increasing the effect of the batteries, it had the indirect
advantage of more closely binding the ties of mutual understanding
between the air and ground troops, a point which fortunately seems to have
been misunderstood by the Germans. In September, 1914, the first attempts
were made to signal enemy movements from the aeroplanes of a
Headquarters Wireless Flight which had been formed for the purpose, and
this practice was continued with success throughout the Battle of the Aisne.

In the earliest stages artillery co-operation was also carried out by
dropping coloured lights, but from the Battle of Ypres onwards, though for
some time very few wireless machines were available, this was effected by
wireless or signal lamps. In his dispatch on the Battle of Loos, Sir John
French wrote: "The work of observation for the guns from aeroplanes has
now become an important factor in artillery fire, and the personnel of the
two arms work in closest co-operation."
By the Battle of the Somme artillery co-operation had assumed very large
dimensions. For instance, on September 15th, 1916, on the front of the 4th
Army alone, seventy hostile batteries were located, twenty-nine being
silenced. Counter-battery work was so effective before the offensive which
opened on the Ypres front at the end of July, 1917, that the Germans
withdrew their guns and the attack was delayed for three days in order that
their new positions might be located.
Recognition marks on aeroplanes were at this time, and indeed
throughout the war, a matter of great difficulty. It had been suggested before
the war that they would not be necessary, but the reverse was found to be
the case, as even with the distinctive marks which were adopted our
machines were often fired at by British troops, and we should undoubtedly
have lost very heavily if we had flown over our own lines with false marks,
as was suggested, or none.

Bombing.

The bombing operations, which reached their climax in the raids on
German industrial centres in 1918, arose from very primitive methods used
at the beginning of the war. During the retreat from Mons a few hand
grenades were carried experimentally in the pockets of pilots and observers,
or, in the case of the larger varieties, tied to their bodies, and these were
dropped over the side of the machine as opportunity occurred. At the
Marne, for instance, small petrol bombs set fire to a transport park and
scattered a mixed column of infantry and transport. I think I am right in
saying that the first German bombs were dropped on us—unsuccessfully—
at Compiègne on August 29th, 1914. It was not, however, until the
beginning of 1915 that special bombing raids were started by the Royal

Flying Corps, one of the first places to be attacked being the Ghistelles
aerodrome in West Flanders.
The most important bombing operations and raids into Germany in the
early days of the war were carried out by the Naval Air Service, units of
which landed at Ostend on August 27th and operated with the Royal Naval
Division from Antwerp. They were subsequently withdrawn to Dunkirk to
form the nucleus of an aircraft centre from which excellent work was done
in attacking the bases established on or near the Belgian coast from which
German submarines and airships conducted their operations.
Just before the Germans entered Antwerp, the first raid was made against
a German town, one machine reaching Dusseldorf, when it descended from
6,000 to 400 feet and dropped three bombs on an airship shed.
From the end of 1914 onwards the activities of the Royal Naval Air
Service in this theatre of operations continually increased, the chief
objectives being the gun emplacements at Middelkerke and Blankenburghe,
the submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Bruges, the minefield and dock of
Ostend, the airship sheds near Brussels, and the dockyards at Antwerp. The
first airship destroyed in the air was attacked over Ghent.
An interesting experiment was the attempt by the R.N.A.S. at the
Dardanelles to sink the heavy wire anti-submarine net, which had been
stretched on buoys across the Straits at Nagara by the Turks, by means of
parachute bombs.
To return to the Royal Flying Corps. During 1915 railway junctions were
the principal bombing objectives, and raids were carried out on an ever-
increasing scale, formations of fourteen to twenty machines taking part. At
the Battle of Neuve Chapelle for instance, the railway junctions at Menin,
Courtrai and Douai were attacked. One officer of No. 5 Squadron, carrying
one 100 lb. bomb, arrived over Menin at 3,500 feet, descended to 120 feet,
and dropped his bomb on the railway line. The first V.C. of the Royal
Flying Corps was obtained at the Second Battle of Ypres by Lieutenant W.
B. Rhodes-Moorhouse, who in bombing Courtrai came down to three or
four hundred feet, under heavy fire, but piloted his machine 35 miles back
to Merville at the height of a few hundred feet, and died a few days later
from his wounds.

One of the most instructive features of the Battle of Loos in September,
1915, was the definite co-ordination of bombing attacks with army
operations. Many types of machines, belonging both to Army and Corps
Squadrons, carried bombs in order to destroy dumps, communications, cut
off reinforcements, and the like, while at the Somme bombing was carried
out by formations of Wings. In October, 1917, 113 tons, and for a period of
six days in March, 1918, 95 tons, of explosives were dropped. This
illustrates the enormous progress of bombing which was so largely resorted
to in the later stages of the war. The hand grenades of 1914 had become
bombs weighing three-quarters of a ton: the pilot's pocket a mechanically
released rack: and aim, assisted by instruments, was becoming fairly
accurate.
Night bombing, necessitated by the fact that by day a large machine
heavily laden with bombs was an easy prey to the fighting scout, came into
prominence in 1916, increasing in intensity up to the end of the war; and
raids into Germany recommenced. Early in 1918 these raids included the
bombing of Maintz, Stuttgart, Coblentz, Cologne, and Metz. Machines
sometimes dropped their bombs from heights of about 12,000 feet and at
other times descended to within 200 feet of their objectives.

Contact Patrol.

Contact patrol, the name given to the direct co-operation of aircraft with
troops on the ground, was first extensively practised at the Battle of the
Somme, though experiments in this direction had been made in 1915,
messages being dropped at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle at pre-arranged
points.
The main objects of contact patrols were to assist the telephone (which
was frequently cut by shellfire), to keep the various headquarters informed
of the progress of their troops during the attack, so also saving them from
the possibility of coming under the fire of their own artillery, to report on
enemy positions, to transmit messages from the troops engaged to the
headquarters of their units, to attack ground formations, and to co-operate
with tanks. A system of red flares on the floor of the trenches was used to

mark the disposition of the troops, and aircraft communicated their
information by means of signalling lamps, wireless and message-bags.
During the German retreat of 1917 contact patrols attacked enemy
foundations from 100 feet and in some cases landed behind the enemy lines
to obtain information. The skill of low-flying pilots in taking cover by
flying behind woods, houses, etc., became increasingly important. The fact
that 62,673 rounds of ammunition were fired from the air against enemy
ground targets between November 20th and 26th, 1917, and 163,567
between March 13th and 18th, 1918, indicates the rapid development of this
form of aircraft action, the effect of which was frequently more deadly than
bombing.
Two of many protagonists of contact patrol were Pretyman and Bishop.
On one occasion the latter, in attacking an aerodrome at about 50 feet,
riddled the officers' and men's quarters with bullets, put two or three
machines on the ground out of action, and three in succession as they got
into the air. Another interesting example of contact patrol work occurred in
1917 when a pilot flew his machine at a low altitude over the enemy
trenches, and he and his observer attracted the attention of the Germans by
firing their machine guns and Verey lights. The Germans were so busy with
the aeroplane that they had their backs turned to the front line and our
infantry were able to cross no-man's land without any artillery preparation,
take prisoners and bomb dug-outs.
An article in the Cologne Gazette showed what the Germans thought of
low "strafing."
"The operations" (i.e. of June 7th, 1917), it says, "were prefaced by
innumerable enemy airmen, who, at the beginning of the preparation for the
attack, appeared like a swarm of locusts and swamped the front. They also work
on cunningly calculated methods. Their habit is to work in three layers—one
quite high, one in the middle, and the third quite low. The English who fly lowest
show an immense insolence; they came down to 200 metres and shot at our
troops with their machine guns, which are specially adapted to this purpose."

Armour was first employed as a result of Shephard finding at Maubeuge
a bullet lodged in the seat of his leather suit. Thin sheets of steel were at
once cut out and placed in the wickerwork seats of aeroplanes. This

primitive protection developed into the armoured machine mentioned later,
which was about to make its appearance at the Armistice.
I may mention here the "special duty" flights, which consisted in
establishing secret communication between our Intelligence Branch and
agents in the territory occupied by the Germans. Agents, mostly French and
Belgian, were carried by aeroplane over the enemy lines and landed there.
This work was started in 1914.

Fighting.

At the beginning of the war it became obvious that it was not only the
duty of aircraft to obtain information but also to prevent enemy aircraft
crossing our lines. In addition to the reconnaissance machine, and in order
to make its work possible, a machine designed purely for fighting was
required. In August, 1914, the aeroplane's armament consisted simply of
rifle, or carbine, and revolver, but our pilots nevertheless attacked hostile
machines whenever the opportunity occurred. The first German machine to
fly over us was at Maubeuge on August 22nd, 1914, and, though fighting on
an extensive scale did not take place until 1916, as early as August 25th,
1914, there were three encounters in the air in which two enemy machines
were driven down. One interesting report of an early fight is that between a
B.E. and a German machine on December 20th, 1914.
"A German aeroplane with one passenger and pilot being encountered over
Poperinghe, we followed to Morbecque and then to Armentières. The passenger
of the B.E. fired 40 rounds from his rifle and the German passenger replied with
some rounds from his revolver. The B.E. crossed the bows of the German
machine to permit the pilot to use his revolver. The German switched off and
dived below the B.E., and is believed to have landed somewhere north-west of
Lille."

Another instance of the early air combats was when Holt, single-handed,
and armed only with a rifle, lashed to a strut of his machine, attacked ten
Germans near Dunkirk, causing them to drop their bombs in the field and
make off to their own lines.
We managed to bring down a number of German machines, mainly by
rifle fire (five had already been brought down by September 7th, 1914), but

our great difficulty early in the war was to get the enemy into action, and,
although during October and November, 1914, there was a certain amount
of fighting, as a rule the German when attacked made for his own lines and
the protection of his anti-aircraft guns. This, though offensive carried to the
extent of wastefulness of life is equally bad, was a serious mistake in all
ways from his point of view, entailing as it did a tendency for the
confidence of the troops and the morale of the air service to be undermined
from the outset. The error was rectified, but only temporarily, at the
Somme.
As the specialized duties of aircraft increased, the Corps machines
engaged in them needed protection and it was realized that the best method
of protection was the development of the air offensive. This was rendered
possible by the adaptation of the machine gun to the aeroplane. Early in
1915 the invention of the "synchronizing gear" enabled a machine gun to
fire through the propeller, and by the end of 1915 fighting in the air became
the general rule. The first squadron, No. 24, composed purely of fighting
machines, took its place on the Western Front in February, 1916, and
gradually Wings were attached to Armies solely for fighting and the
protection of Corps machines. During the long months of the Battle of the
Somme, for instance, when, though the Royal Flying Corps dominated the
air, the Germans put up a strenuous opposition, bombing machines were
protected by fighting patrols in formation on the far side of the points
attacked. The rapidity with which fighting in the air developed is shown by
the fact that at the end of 1916 twenty new fighting squadrons were asked
for on the Western Front; the establishment was increased to twenty-four
machines per squadron, and by the end of the war even night-fighting
squadrons were operating with considerable success and, had the war
continued, would have proved a very important factor in air warfare.
The development of aerobatics, air fighting, and formation tactics
brought many airmen into prominence. For example Albert Ball, who
ascribed his successes to keen application to aerial gunnery; J. B.
McCudden, the first man to bring four hostile machines down in a day; and
Trollope, who later on brought down six. Hawker met his death fighting
von Richthofen, who describes the fight in his book The Red Air Fighter as
follows:—

"Soon I discovered that I was not fighting a beginner. He had not the slightest
intention to break off the fight.... The gallant fellow was full of pluck, and when
we had got down to 3,000 feet he merrily waved to me as if to say, 'Well, how do
you do?'... The circles which we made round one another were so narrow that
their diameter was probably not more than 250 or 300 feet.... At that time his
first bullets were flying round me, as up to then neither of us had been able to do
any shooting."

At 300 feet Hawker was compelled to fly in a zig-zag course to avoid
bullets from the ground and this enabled Richthofen to dive on his tail from
a distance of 150 feet.
This indicates a heavy disadvantage under which our aircraft laboured in
all their work on the Western Front. The prevailing westerly wind which,
while it assisted the enemy in his homeward flight, made it very difficult for
a British machine, perhaps damaged by anti-aircraft fire, to make its way—
still under fire—to its base.
I cannot leave the subject of air fighting without giving one or two more
examples. One which comes to mind is that of five British machines
attacking twenty-five of the enemy. One of ours gliding down with its
engine stopped and being attacked by two Germans was saved by another
British one attacking and driving off the two enemy. The result of the
combat was five German machines destroyed and four driven down out of
control, whilst all of ours returned safely. Another example, that of Barker
who, whilst destroying an enemy two-seater, was wounded from below by
another German machine and fell some distance in a spin. Recovering, he
found himself surrounded by fifteen Fokkers, two of which he attacked
indecisively but shot down a third in flames. Whilst doing this he was again
wounded, again fainted, again fell, again recovered control and again, being
attacked by a large formation, shot down an enemy in flames. A bullet now
shattered his left elbow and, fainting a third time, he fell several thousand
feet, where he was again attacked, and thinking his machine had been set on
fire he tried, as he thought in a final effort, to ram a Fokker, but instead
drove it down on fire! Barker was by this time without the use of both legs
and an arm. Diving to a few thousand feet of the ground he again found his
retreat barred by eight of the enemy, but these he was able to shake off after
short bursts of fire and he returned a few feet above the ground to our lines.

Though at the beginning our machines were rather better than either the
French or German, it was the marked superiority of our pilots which gave
us the greatest advantage. We should have been superior even had the
machines been exchanged.

Co-operation with the Navy.

We have seen that the functions of co-operation with the Navy—Coast
defence and Fleet assistance—were very complicated, and that at the
outbreak of war the splendid pilots and excellent equipment of the R.N.A.S.
were not so highly organized and were wanting in cohesion, but that the
R.N.A.S. had advanced further than the Royal Flying Corps in specialized
technical development. In the earlier part of the war, in addition to its main
duties, the R.N.A.S. ventured in many directions, many of them of
considerable value to the Army, as, for instance, at Antwerp.

Coast Defence, Patrol and Convoy Work.

Immediately war broke out a system of coastal patrols was established
between the Humber and the Thames Estuary and over the Channel—the
latter serving as an escort to the Expeditionary Force crossing to France.
Patrols were at first, through limitations of equipment, mainly confined to
the Home coast, but, as the war went on and machines improved, they were
rapidly extended, especially in connection with the detection and
destruction of submarines; reconnaissances were carried out over the
enemy's shores, and in 1918 there were forty-three flights of seaplanes,
thirty flights of aeroplanes, together with flying boats and airships,
operating from, and communicating with, an ever-increasing number of
shore stations. Not only was anti-submarine work carried out in the vicinity
of the coast, but organized hunts were made for submarines, ships were
convoyed on the high seas, shipping routes were protected, and action was
taken to bar the passage of submarines through narrow channels. This was
effected by an intensive system of combining and interlocking patrols, and
by maintaining, in close co-operation with surface craft, a protective
barrage across suitable stretches of water, such as the Straits of Dover.

Airships from the beginning, when patrols operated from Kingsnorth
during the crossing of the Expeditionary Force to France, proved
particularly useful for escort, in addition to patrol work, and twenty-seven
small airships, known as the S.S. type, were completed in 1915. In 1916 the
Coastal type with a longer range was designed and constructed and new
airship bases were established.

Fleet Assistance, Reconnaissance, Spotting for Ships' Guns.

The successful use of Drachen kite-balloons borne in ships at the
Dardanelles led to their extensive development. Up to about May, 1915,
when the vessels to which they were attached could stand in close to shore
and overlook the enemy's positions from a distance of three or four
thousand yards, a large amount of spotting of great value was carried out by
these balloons for ships at Gallipoli, but when the Turks brought long-range
guns into position, kite-balloon vessels were obliged to lie out beyond
11,000 yards and their services were rendered comparatively slight for this
purpose. From 1916, however, they were towed by merchant auxiliaries and
light cruisers to spot submarines, observers communicating with the patrol
ship by means of telephone. One of the most wonderful sights I have ever
seen was from the observer's basket of the kite-balloon let up from S.S.
"Manica" in June, 1915. We were spotting for the guns of H.M.S. "Lord
Nelson" bombarding Chanak. The sky and sea were a marvellous blue and
visibility excellent, the peninsula, where steady firing was going on all the
time, lay below us, the Straits, with their ships and boats, the Asiatic shore
gradually disappearing in a golden haze, the Gulf of Xeros, the Marmora,
and behind one the islands of the Ægean affording a perfect background.
No one who was at the Dardanelles, however vivid the horrors and the heat
and dust and flies, will forget the beauty of the scene, especially at sunset,
and it was seen at its best from the basket of a kite-balloon.
The ever-increasing assistance rendered by aircraft to surface vessels in
crippling Germany's submarine campaign is shown by the fact that in 1915
ten submarines were attacked from the air and in 1918 126 were sighted and
93 attacked. Nor was the principle forgotten in countering the submarine
menace that offence is the best defence, and among the many duties of
R.N.A.S. aircraft, based on Dunkirk from the early days of the war, were

anti-submarine patrols along the Belgian coast and the bombing of hostile
submarine bases, such as Bruges.
As in the case of the Army Corps observation machines, fighting scouts
became necessary for the protection of patrols and to counter the enemy's
efforts at raids and sea reconnaissance, and the considerable amount of
experiment in air fighting which the R.N.A.S. had made before the war bore
useful fruit.
For the immediate protection of the Grand Fleet seaplane and aeroplane
bases were established at Scapa Flow and Thurso at the beginning of the
war, but, owing to damage from a gale in November, 1914, aircraft
operations with the Fleet were carried out from the seaplane carrier
"Campania." The problem of using carriers with the Fleet had not been
seriously tackled before the war, and though experiments were strenuously
carried out, and there were fourteen carrier ships in commission in 1918,
and a seaplane carrier operated with the Battle Cruiser Squadron at Jutland,
the use of aircraft in this way did not become very efficient. One of the
chief difficulties was limitation in size, and consequently in radius of
action, of aircraft employed from carriers or the decks of battleships. The
total number of aeroplanes and seaplanes allotted to the Grand Fleet in 1918
was 350.
Seaplane carriers occasionally co-operated with fighting ships. For
instance in October, 1915, a fast carrier at the Dardanelles accompanied
ships detailed for the bombardment of Dedeagatch, and her seaplanes not
only co-operated in spotting but also made a valuable reconnaissance of the
Bulgarian coast and railway. But as a rule fighting and reconnaissance
aircraft had mainly to work from shore bases. To assist in this direction,
units were sent overseas to be nearer their sphere of action, as, for instance,
the R.N.A.S. squadrons stationed at Dunkirk which, besides general
reconnaissance, helped the Navy to keep open the Straits of Dover, carried
out bombing raids against German bases and dockyards, such as Ostend,
Zeebrugge, and Bruges, and co-operated with monitors in the bombardment
of the Belgian coast. The development of a long-range seaplane or flying
boat was also taken in hand, though an efficient type was not produced until
the last year of the war.

As with the Army, an important part of naval aircraft duties was spotting
for gunfire; and likewise single-seater fighters were required for the
protection of our own aircraft, for preventing enemy aircraft
reconnaissance, for attacking the enemy's fleet and protecting our own. The
use of offensive patrols steadily increased during the war.

Bombing.

I have already referred to bombing and mentioned the attack on
Dusseldorf as an instance of the work done. Bombing raids had always been
looked on with favour by the R.N.A.S. and were used throughout the war as
a means of countering hostile aircraft operations from bases in Belgium.
One of the first successful raids was that against the Friedrichshaven
Zeppelin works by three Avro machines, which flew 250 miles over enemy
country on November 21st, 1914. Another noteworthy example was the
attempted raid against Cuxhaven on Christmas Day, 1914, carried out by
seaplanes, which were still in an experimental stage, and three carriers
escorted by naval units. Powerful machines for bombing purposes were
ordered and bombs of greatly increased size and gear for dropping them
were designed.

Torpedo Attack.

The impetus given to bombing helped forward another use of naval
aircraft: torpedo attack. This is likely to develop in the future into one of the
most important uses of aircraft in naval operations, but during the war it
was never given an objective by the German fleet. In May, 1915, two
Sunbeam Short machines were embarked in the "Ben-my-Chree" for
operations at Gallipoli, and it was in this theatre that for the first time in
history ships were sunk by torpedoes released from aircraft. I shall never
forget the night when we steamed silently up the narrow Gulf of Xeros and
lay waiting to release our seaplanes in the still darkness of the early
morning. The machines were lowered noiselessly into the water, and, their
engines started, flew across the narrow neck of Bulair under fire from the
old Turkish line; then, reaching the northern end of the Dardanelles at
dawn, they descended low (one machine actually landed on the water and

discharged its torpedo), sank their targets, and returned. In addition to the
possibility of submarine attack, the Gulf of Xeros is so narrow that our ship
could have been hit by the cross fire of field guns. It was a very fine
performance and, although during many years I have spent anxious hours
hoping for the distant purr of a safe returning machine, I have never been
happier than when after a long wait our seaplanes were again quickly raised
on board. The only torpedo machine employed at the Battle of Jutland was a
Sunbeam fitted with a 14-inch torpedo, and it was not until just before the
Armistice that a squadron of torpedo aircraft was ready for operations with
the Grand Fleet.
The Germans also tried to develop the use of torpedo-carrying seaplanes
and, as with their submarines, had the advantage over us of a vast number
of targets close to hand in our North Sea and Channel shipping, but
fortunately the British fighting scouts were able to destroy several of their
machines before they had done much damage.

Home Defence.

At the beginning of the war the R.N.A.S. assumed responsibility for the
defence of Great Britain against attacks by hostile aircraft, and a scheme for
the defence of London and other large towns was entrusted to an anti-
aircraft section of the Admiralty Air Department. Its resources, however,
consisting of a few unsuitable and widely scattered aeroplanes, some 1 pdr.
pom-poms with searchlights manned by a special corps, were inadequate
and it was fortunate that only three small daylight aeroplane raids, mainly
for reconnaissance, were made during 1914—the first German machine to
visit England dropping a bomb near Dover on December 21st.

Night Flying and Night Fighting.

In spite of continuous action by the R.N.A.S. against German airship
bases in Belgium, there were in 1915 nineteen airship and eight aeroplane
raids—one by night—over England, and, although the new and powerful
Zeppelin L.Z.38, which attacked London on May 31st, was destroyed by an
aeroplane counter-attack in its shed near Brussels, no real counter measures

were evolved until 1916, when Home Defence was taken over by the War
Office. During that year a Home Defence Squadron of B.E.2c's, rapidly
expanded to a Wing, was formed; and the systematic training of night
pilots, the standardization of night-flying equipment and armament, and the
lighting of aerodromes, was taken in hand. A continuous aeroplane and
searchlight barrage with night landing grounds was gradually formed
between Dover and the Forth; the wireless signals employed to assist
Zeppelins in finding their way were intercepted, thus enabling our rapidly
improving fighting machines to pick up and attack raiding airships; and the
constant attacks to which airship sheds were exposed in Belgium, caused
their withdrawal to positions further inland and increased their distance
from England. During 1916 there were twenty-two raids by airships, six of
which were destroyed, the first being brought down in September at Cuffley
by Leefe Robinson. Thenceforward airship raids declined, the destruction of
the majority of the largest and latest which raided England on October 19th,
1917, sealing their fate.
On the other hand, aeroplane daylight and night raids on London, the first
of which occurred in November, 1916, increased in number and strength
with the object, in addition to the destruction of material and civilian
morale, of forcing upon us the unsound retention at home of a considerable
air defence force. The largest of these attacks was made by seventeen
aeroplanes at midday on June 13th, 1917, but, the Zeppelin danger nullified,
counter measures to meet the new menace were gradually evolved. New
squadrons were raised and the number of home defence squadrons was
raised to fourteen service and eight night training squadrons; a Northern
Home Defence Wing was formed at York; and the Home Defence Group
became the 6th Brigade. The first night aeroplane raid occurred in
September, and the systematic training of night-fighting pilots on scout
machines was hurried on. Separate zones for aeroplanes, guns and
searchlights—the latter provided with sound locators—forming an outer
barrage, were instituted, and aprons, supported by kite-balloons, formed a
protective barrage up to 8,000 feet. A system of wireless and ground
telephonic communication was improvised for plotting the course of
attacking aircraft and thus enabling squadron commanders to concentrate
machines at the point of attack. By 1918 the night-fighting aeroplane,
assisted by these means, had countered the night-bombing aeroplane. At

first, this had been the result of the retention of a large number of fighting
aircraft and a complete organization at home.
Meanwhile, night fighting, especially the protection of night bombers by
fighting machines, had become of paramount importance on the Western
Front. The chief feature of activity in September, 1918, was the successful
co-operation between searchlights in the forward areas and No. 151 night-
fighting squadron. This was the first night-fighting squadron, trained by the
6th Brigade, to be sent to France. It was proposed to send four more such
squadrons and thus form a first line of offensive defence which would react
on hostile raids over England. Thus once again the old doctrine was
gradually observed that offence is the only true defence, and that purely
defensive measures, however efficient, by keeping men and material from
the vital point, are necessarily expensive out of all proportion to their
effectiveness. Both the Germans and ourselves made the initial mistake of
organizing large local defence systems partly to placate public opinion.
During the German offensive of 1918 a further development of night
fighting took place in the bombing and low strafing of enemy troops and
unlighted transport with the aid of flares.

The Machine and Engine.

Turning now to the machine and engine, the Military Trials held in 1912,
when the Royal Flying Corps was started, represented the first organized
effort to assist the evolution of service aeroplanes in this country and a brief
comparison will be useful to show the performance of the average machines
and engines of that date, at the beginning, and at the end of the war, and of
civil machines of to-day.
At the Military Competitions of 1912, of the eight types—Avro, B.E.,
Bristol, Cody, Bleriot, Deperdussin, Hanriot, and M. Farman—the first four
were British, though only the Avro had a British engine, and the last four
French, fitted with French engines. The average horse-power was about 83,
the average maximum speed 67, and the minimum 50 miles per hour; the
climb to 1,000 feet was effected in 4½ minutes with an average load of 640
lb., which included pilot, fuel for four hours and useful load. The loading
per square foot was, for biplanes, about 4½, and, for monoplanes, 6 lb.

On the outbreak of war, and until the end of 1914, of the ten types in use
—Avro, B.E., Bristol, Sopwith, Vickers, M. Farman, H. Farman, Caudron,
Morane, and Voisin—five were British and five were French and all were
fitted with French engines. The average horse-power was still about 83, but
the average maximum speed had risen to 74, and the minimum had fallen to
41 miles per hour. The load averaged 609 lb.
A remarkable advance in machine and engine construction is shown by
referring to the tables for 1918. At the Armistice of the twelve types—Avro,
Bristol Fighter, Sopwith Snipe, S.E. 5a, de Havilland 4 and 9a, Vickers
Vimy, Handley Page O/400 and V/1,500, Fairey Seaplane 3c, F. 2 A. and F.
5—all were British and, except the de Havilland 9a, which had an American
engine, were fitted with engines of British manufacture. The F. 2 A., and F.
5, were twin-engined, while one, the Handley Page V/1,500, was equipped
with four engines. The average horse-power was per engine, 344, and per
machine, 516; the average maximum speed 111, and the minimum 53½
miles per hour, the climb to 6,500 feet was carried out in 13 minutes and to
10,000 feet in 24 minutes with an average load, including fuel for 5½ hours,
of 2,742 lb. The average ceiling was 15,500 feet; the loading per square foot
about 8 lb.
The years following the Armistice have witnessed the conversion of
military machines and the development of new designs for commercial
purposes. In 1921 there were thirteen types fitted with British engines:
Avro, Bristol, de Havilland 4, 16 and 18, Vickers Vimy, Handley Page
O/400 and W. 8, B.A.T., Westland, Fairey, Supermarine and Vickers
Amphibians. No British machine had a foreign engine. The Vickers Vimy,
Handley Page O/400 and W. 8, which had a passenger-carrying capacity of
15, were twin-engined. The average horse-power was per engine, 387, and
per machine, 474; the average maximum speed 114, and the minimum 49,
miles per hour. With an average load of 2,467 lb., including fuel for 4½
hours, 19 minutes was required for a climb to 10,000 feet. The average
loading per square foot was about 13 lb., and the average ceiling 15,793
feet.
Before the war, in addition to the Royal Aircraft Factory, there were only
eight firms engaged, on a very small scale, in the manufacture of aircraft in
England, and an aero engine industry hardly existed. Until 1916, the greater

proportion of our machines, and almost all our engines, were French, and
we were very dependent upon France for the replacement of our heavy
losses in material. By the end of the war the bulk of our material was of
British design and construction, though there was still a certain number of
British built engines of French design. One American engine—the Liberty
—was also employed. The fact that in October, 1918, the Royal Air Force
had 22,171 machines and 37,702 engines on charge, and that during the ten
months January to October the output of machines had been 26,685 and of
engines 29,561, gives some idea of the enormous growth in production.
In the first few months of the war it was not possible to progress far with
new inventions or improvements. Fortunately, our Aircraft Factory had
evolved in the B.E. a machine of considerable stability which in this respect
compared favourably with German machines, and was well adapted to its
work of reconnaissance.
Technical progress during the war often unfortunately involved the loss
of valuable lives, as for instance those of Professor Hopkinson and Busk, to
both of whom heavy debts of gratitude are owed, but gradually obstacle
after obstacle, problem after problem, was successfully tackled by our
designers and constructors. With a view to enlarging the field of
observation, staggered planes were introduced in the B.E.2c. This machine
also proved that it was possible to calculate the degree of stability and thus
paved the way for the design of aeroplanes with indifference to stability and
increased manœuvrability for fighting purposes, or with great inherent
stability for bombing. During 1915 the B.E.2c was used for all purposes,
but the extra loading involved by the increasing use of aeroplanes for
bombing and fighting caused a decrease in the rate of speed and climb, and
our aeroplanes were temporarily inferior in fighting power to the Fokker.
The necessity of preventing the enemy obtaining information soon led to
the development of air fighting. At the beginning of the war the sole
armament of aeroplanes was the rifle or revolver. The machine gun soon
followed, but its use in tractor machines was impracticable on account of
the danger of hitting the airscrew. The first "fighters" were therefore two-
seater pushers, such as the "Short-horn" Maurice Farmans which, though
not designed for fighting, and too slow to chase enemy aircraft, were the
first to be fitted with Lewis guns, and F.E.'s, the first machine designed

specifically for fighting, with the machine-gun operator in front of the pilot.
These "pusher" fighters had an excellent field of view and fire forwards, but
suffered from lack of speed and a large "blind" area to the rear. On the other
hand, the single-seater tractors were potentially the superior fighters, and in
order to protect the blades of the airscrew the French were the first to use
deflector blades on them in tractor machines.
Our early single-seater tractors were fitted with a Lewis gun fixed so as
to fire over or at the side of the airscrew and actuated by a bowden wire, the
most efficient, though not the most numerous, fighting machines at the end
of 1915 being the Bristol Scouts.
By the Summer of 1916, however, we had adapted the "synchronizing
gear" to our machine guns, enabling them to be fired through the propeller;
while aircraft engines developed much greater power and full allowance
was made for all equipment carried. From that time the development of our
single-seater fighters was steadily progressive. One of the first of these was
the Sopwith "Pup," which had a speed of 106½ miles an hour at 6,500 feet,
climbed 10,000 feet in just over 14 minutes, and could attain a ceiling of
17,500 feet. In 1917 appeared the Sopwith "Camel," a typical example of
this type, which was simple, stable, easily controllable and possessed two
guns. It had a speed of 121 miles an hour at 10,000 feet, to which height it
could climb in under 10½ minutes, and a ceiling of 23,000 feet. The
Martinsyde F.4, embodying further improvements, was not ready in time for
active service.
While the single-seater tractor was developing for purely offensive
action, the two-seater fighter, of which the field of view, manœuvrability
and general performance were being improved, retained its utility as a
reconnaissance machine. In 1916 the "pusher" type was superseded by the
Sopwith "1½ Strutter" armed with a synchronized Vickers gun, which for
its 130 horse-power was never surpassed. The pilot was close to the engine
and had a good view of the ground, while the gunner was placed behind
him with a rotary Lewis gun turret. Early in 1917 these qualities were
further developed in the Bristol Fighter.
With the advent of these improved types the B.E.2c was relegated to the
work of artillery co-operation, until superseded by the B.E.2e. Towards the

end of 1916 appeared the R.E.8 with a Vickers synchronized gun and a
Lewis gun, which after many vicissitudes became the standard machine for
artillery work.
Systematic bombing was practised by nearly all types of machines, but
real accuracy was never obtained. Thus, the B.E.2c was first used in
formations, but with a full load of bombs it could not carry an observer, and
its moderate speed left it an easy prey to hostile fighters. Early in 1916
appeared the Martinsyde single-seater bomber with an endurance of 4½
hours, and in 1917 the D.H.4 which was much used for day-bombing. The
F.E.2b pusher, discarded as a fighting machine, became the principal night-
bomber.
It was comparatively late in the war before special bombing machines
were evolved. They were then divided into day-bombers and night-
bombers, the D.H.9 and 9a machines being typical of the former and the
Handley Page of 1917—a large twin-engine aeroplane, the first really
effective night-bomber, of considerable carrying power but low
performance—of the latter. By November 8th, 1918, two super-Handley
Pages were ready to start to Berlin. They possessed a maximum range of
1,100 miles, a crew of seven, four 350 horse-power Rolls-Royce engines,
arranged in pairs, a tractor and a pusher in tandem on either side of the
machine, and, as they would be compelled to fly both by night and day, a
gun defence system. The D.H.10a and the Vickers Vimy, for day and night
bombing respectively, were also being produced at the date of the
Armistice.
In the early days of the war an aeroplane had little to fear above 4,000
feet. With the improvement of the anti-aircraft gun there was, by the end of
the war, no immunity at 20,000 feet. Very low flying for attack was,
however, being rapidly developed, and would have proved of great effect in
1919. The aeroplane used for this purpose was the single-seater fighter, and
the Sopwith "Salamander," with two guns, a speed of 125 miles an hour,
and 650 lb. of armoured plates, was about to make its appearance at the
Armistice.
I have previously mentioned how dependent the improvement of design
and performance of aircraft has been upon the less simple and tardier

development of the engine. The invention of the light motor made aviation
possible, and development has synchronized with the evolution of lighter,
more powerful and more reliable engines. One of the most difficult
problems still confronting us is the production of a cheap, high-powered
and reliable engine, but the existence at the end of the war of machines
weighing 15 tons indicates the progress achieved, while British engines of
600 horse-power are now in use, and one of 1,000 horse-power will shortly
be available.

Tactics and the Strategic Air Offensive.

During the war there were three concurrent movements in process: the
ratios of the various forms of air tactics were constantly changing, and the
components of our air forces varied in accordance with the development of
reconnaissance, artillery co-operation, bombing and fighting. Secondly,
their total strength was increasing rapidly; and, thirdly, it was increasing
relatively faster than the Army or Navy.
It was an evident and logical development and in accord with the
shortage of national man power and the consequent tendency to a reduction
in the strength of the Army, that, the necessary uses of aircraft with the
Army and Navy being ensured, any available margin of air power should be
employed on an independent basis for definite strategic purposes. The
difficulty was to arrive at an agreement as to the minimum tactical and
grand tactical requirements of the Army and Navy. The British Army was
not alone in asserting that there was no minimum and that it wanted every
available airman, and agreed with the French that anything which it could
temporarily spare should be lent to the French Army. It was argued that the
Armies could as easily and better arrange for strategic bombing. Fortunately
in 1918, when I was Chief of the Air Staff, we managed to secure a margin
and formed the Independent Air Force in June of that year. It was, of course,
understood that, in the event of either the British or French Armies being
hard put to it, the Independent Air Force could temporarily come to their
direct assistance and act in close co-operation with them.
In 1915 in accordance with the old doctrine that offence is the best
defence, the surest method of protecting specialized machines on the battle

front was found to be in the attack of enemy aircraft by fighting machines.
In 1918 it was decided that raids on the centres of German war industry
would not only cripple the enemy's output of material essential to victory,
but also relieve the pressure on the Western Front, the vital point of the war.
The Germans had had the same intention in the many raids which started
over Dover on December 21st, 1914.
Long-range bombing had, however, been carried out spasmodically
before 1918. In addition to its taste for bombing in general, the Royal Naval
Air Service were keenly bent from the outset on long-range bombing in
particular. The question of forming an Allied squadron to bomb German
munition factories was first raised in 1915 at one of the monthly meetings
between the French and British Aviation departments; and in February,
1916, a small squadron of Sopwith "1½ Strutters" was formed at Detling for
the purpose of bombing Essen and Dusseldorf from England, but the Army
in France, being short of machines, asked that they should be sent to the
front, and therefore the scheme did not mature; neither, for similar reasons,
did one for the co-operation in 1916 of British and French bombing
squadrons, operating from Luxeuil.
It was not until October, 1917, that the first striking force, consisting of
three squadrons, was formed under the Army with Ochey as its base. It was
mainly used in raids against the ironworks in the Alsace-Lorraine Basin and
the chemical industry in the neighbourhood of Mannheim. As I have said, a
definite offensive policy by means of an independent strategic force was
later decided upon, and the "Independent" Air Force was brought into
existence. It originally comprised two day-bomber and two night-bomber
squadrons. During the summer additional squadrons were allotted to it,
including D.H.9's and Handley Pages. Day-bombing squadrons had to fight
their way to objectives in close formation, and the problems connected with
navigation, calculation of petrol supply, action of wind and ceiling, were all
accentuated. Casualties were heavy, with the result that a squadron of
Fighters, composed of Sopwith "Camels," was incorporated for the purpose
of protection. Thus we see the beginnings of an air fleet analogous to the
naval fleet with its capital ships and protective craft.
The main objectives were the centre of the chemical industry at
Mannheim and Frankfort; the iron and steel works at Briey and Longwy

and the Saar Basin; the machine shops in the Westphalian district and the
magneto works at Stuttgart; the submarine bases at Wilhelmshaven,
Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, and Hamburg, and the accumulator factories at
Hagen and Berlin.
It will be seen from a map that three of the main industrial centres were
situated near the west frontier of Germany; and, therefore, one portion of
the striking force was based at Ochey, which lies within a few miles of the
Saar Basin, within 180 miles of Essen, and within 150 miles of Frankfurt.
Another portion was based on Norfolk, where a group of super-Handley
Page machines were established for the specific purpose of attacking Berlin,
a distance of 540 miles, and the naval bases within 400 miles. It was
obvious that though aircraft from England would have to cover greater
distances, they would not expose themselves to the strong hostile defences
in rear of the battle front.
Three instances of the Independent Air Force's action may be cited. On
the night of August 21st/22nd, two Handley Page machines dropped over
one ton of bombs on Cologne Station, the raid occupying seven hours. On
the night of August 25th/26th two Handley Pages attacked the Badische
Aniline und Soda Fabrik of Mannheim; bombs were dropped from a height
of 200 feet, direct hits being obtained in every case; and the machines then
remained over the town, which they swept with machine-gun fire. On
August 12th the first attack was made on Frankfurt by twelve D.H.4 day-
bombers, every machine reaching the objective and returning safely in spite
of being attacked, over Mannheim and throughout the return journey, by
some forty hostile fighters.
During the five months of its existence the Independent Air Force
dropped 550 tons of bombs, 160 by day and 390 by night. Of these 200 tons
were dropped on aerodromes, largely by the short-distance F.E.2b's, as a
result of which, hostile attacks on Allied aerodromes became practically
negligible. Theoretically, machines of the Independent Air Force should not
have been utilized for attacking purely military objectives in the Army
zone, such as aerodromes, and their co-operation with the Army for this
purpose shows that their true rôle was either not appreciated or not favoured
by the French and other Commands.

There is ample testimony to the spirit of demoralization which pervaded
the civil population of the towns attacked.

"My eyes won't keep open whilst I am writing," reads one captured letter. "In
the night twice into the cellar and then again this morning. One feels as if one
were no longer a human being. One air raid after another. In my opinion this is
no longer war but murder. Finally, in time, one becomes horribly cold, and one is
daily, nay, hourly, prepared for the worst." "Yesterday afternoon," says another,
"it rained so much and was so cloudy that no one thought it was possible for
them to come. It is horrible; one has no rest day or night."

Although, for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter here, only a
comparatively small percentage of the efforts of the Independent Force
were directed against the industrial targets for which the force had been
created, yet by the end of the war the strategic conception of air power was
bearing fruit, and the Air Ministry had in hand measures for bombing which
would have gone far to shatter German munitionment. The defence
measures forced upon the Germans within their own country were reacting
on their offensive action at the front, which was at the same time denuded
of fighting aircraft at various points to meet the menace of our strategic
force at Ochey.

Organization.

As in peace on a small, so in war on a large scale, the history of the
organization of aircraft, while we were fighting for our national existence
and competing with similar enemy expansion, is one of continuous
development, of decentralization of command and co-ordination of duties.
Headquarters, the Squadron and the Aircraft Park, as originally conceived
in peace, though subject to variations in size, remained the basis of our
organization. For instance, the original eighteen machines of our squadron
were increased to twenty-four for single-seater fighters and reduced to six
in the case of the super-Handley Page bombers. The four squadrons
originally operated directly under Headquarters, were soon allocated to
Corps for tactical reconnaissance and artillery co-operation, while a unit
remained at Headquarters for strategical and long-distance reconnaissance
and a few special duties. The next step was in November, 1914, when two
Wings, composed originally of two, and later, of five squadrons each, were
formed, R.F.C. Headquarters retaining one squadron and the wireless flight

for G.H.Q. requirements. The Wing Headquarters co-ordinated the work of
the squadrons which were allocated to Army Corps.
A further development, in 1916, was the formation for each of the three
Armies of a Brigade, consisting of two Wings and an Aircraft Park. One—
the Corps Wing—carried out artillery co-operation and close
reconnaissance (including photography) with Army Corps, the other—the
Army Wing—carried out more distant reconnaissance and fighting patrols
under Army Headquarters. Our air superiority at the Battle of the Somme in
1916 led us to expect German counter-measures in 1917, and our
programme for the following winter contemplated a proportion of two
fighting squadrons to each Corps Squadron. By 1917 there were five British
Armies in France and Belgium and our air forces were increased to provide
a Brigade for each of the two new Armies. The Headquarters of the flying
force in the field (except in the case of the Independent Air Force, which
was responsible to the Supreme War Council and the Air Ministry in
London) remained attached to G.H.Q. throughout the war.
The main difficulty in the higher organization was the lack of co-
operation between the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service
and their competition for the supply of men and machines—the demands of
both being urgent and insatiable. As a first step to overcome this, an Air
Board was formed in May, 1916, to discuss general air policy, especially the
combined operation of the Naval and Military Air Services, to make
recommendations on the types of machines required by each, and to co-
ordinate the supply of material. The Air Board was an improvement, but not
a remedy, and, therefore, in 1917 it was decided to form an Air Ministry
responsible for war aviation in all its branches and to amalgamate the Naval
and Military Air Services as the Royal Air Force. This was carried into
effect early in 1918, with Lord Rothermere as Secretary of State for Air
with a seat in the Cabinet, and the air became the third service of the
Crown, with an independent Government department permeated with a
knowledge of air navigation, machinery, and weather, and closely allied to
the industrial world for the initiation, guidance, and active supervision of
research and experimental work.
I will mention later some of the many arguments for and against the
retention of an independent Air Ministry and autonomous Air Force in

peace. The amalgamation was certainly advantageous in war. It effected the
correlation of a number of hitherto independent services according to a
uniform policy and prevented overlapping by centralizing administration.
Under single control it was possible to carry out, on a carefully co-ordinated
plan, recruiting and training, to supply men and material, to organize air
power according to the strategic situation in each of the various theatres of
war, and to form the correct ratio between the air forces in the field and the
reserves in training at home. The difficulty was that the amalgamation had
to be carried out during the most intensive period of air effort, but by the
end of the war most of these objects had been attained without jeopardizing
the close co-operation with the Army and Navy. Co-operation with the
Naval and General Staffs and with naval and military formations was, in
fact, improved, independent action was beginning to bear fruit, and we
possessed an Air Force without rival.

CHAPTER III

PEACE

The Future of Aerial Defence.

In the evolution of aviation during the war the conclusion has been
reached that the most remarkable lines of development at the Armistice
were in the direction of ground and night fighting, torpedo attack and long-
range bombing, exemplifying respectively the three spheres of air
operations—military co-operation, naval co-operation, and the strategic use
of aircraft. It must be remembered that this progress in tactics and strategy,
in the machine, and the airman's skill, was made in the short period of four
years, and that every war has started with a great advance in scientific
knowledge, accumulated during peace, over that obtaining at the close of
the previous war. We may therefore assume, provided the danger is averted
of a retrograde movement from recent scientific methods to pre-war
conditions—sabres, bayonets, and guns—that by the outbreak of another
war on a large scale, which we hope may never occur, the knowledge of
Service aeronautics will have increased immeasurably since 1918, and may
be, not a contributory, but a decisive factor in securing victory.
The period since the Armistice has been employed in the reduction and
consolidation of the Royal Air Force. In England the cadre system has been
adopted, while abroad the greatest concentration of effort is aimed at, with
Egypt, at present the most important strategic point in the Imperial air
system, as the centre of activity. Iraq is being handed over to the control of
the Royal Air Force, whose share in the policing of overseas possessions is
likely usefully to grow provided any tendency to the concurrent building up
of a large ground organization is withstood. The advantages of aircraft for
"garrison" duties lie, under suitable geographical conditions, in their swift
action and wide range, their economy, and, during disturbances their
capacity for constant pressure against the enemy without fear of retaliation.
One of the main problems is at present that of personnel. Service flying is
restricted to comparatively young men, and therefore the majority of
officers can only be commissioned for short periods. For this reason the

experiment is being made of taking officers direct from civil life on short
engagements, and at the same time endeavouring to ensure, by technical
and general education, that the Royal Air Force shall not become a blind-
alley occupation.
Though it is difficult to foretell on what lines aircraft will develop for any
one purpose, as in the past, the problem of military co-operation will
perhaps be less complex than that of co-operation with the Navy. It will
probably consist of improvements along the lines already indicated, such as
increased range, speed, climb, manœuvrability, offensive armament,
armour, the assistance of tank and anti-tank action, and the utilization of
gas. Fighting will undoubtedly take place at very high altitudes to keep the
enemy's fighting machines away from the zone of operations—necessitating
the development of the single-seater so as to increase climb and
manœuvrability, and obtain, if possible, a speed of 200 miles an hour at
30,000 feet. Cavalry, unless retained, as I think they should be, in the form
of mounted machine-gunners, will, I think, disappear in European warfare,
but infantry will remain, and it will be the object of aircraft to assist their
advance by reconnaissance, ground attack, artillery and tank co-operation,
and the destruction of the enemy's supplies and communications. In this
connection ground tactics and air tactics must develop pari passu and
commanders of Corps and Armies must work out during peace training the
fullest schemes for the most intimate co-operation between air and land
forces.
The future of naval co-operation is a difficult problem, more especially as
there was no major naval engagement after Jutland in which aircraft could
be used, and consequently we have little to go on in estimating their
practical value in direct co-operation with the fleet. It is impossible at
present to judge between the conflicting opinions as to the future of the
capital ship, but it is certain that aviation will materially modify naval
tactics and construction. Coast defence, reconnaissance, anti-submarine
work, escort, and the bombing of enemy bases, will doubtless continue and
develop with ever-increasing machinery and equipment; but torpedo attack
by aircraft may reach a point where the very existence of opposing fleets
may be endangered. It is already questionable whether a battleship could
survive an attack launched by even a small force of this mobile arm.

As was the case during the war, the action of aircraft at sea is restricted
by range, the difficulty being to find the mean between the opposing
conditions of radius of flight and limitation in the size of aircraft imposed
by the deck-space of "carriers," but there is reason to suppose that on the
one hand engines will be so improved as to afford a sufficient radius of
action to comparatively small aircraft, while, on the other, devices will be
found to economize deck-space.
Fleets operating near the enemy's coast will be vulnerable from land
aircraft bases, and thus close blockade will be rendered increasingly
difficult. The possibility of gas attack on enemy bases from the air in co-
operation with submarines and of effecting a blockade by this means must
be envisaged.
Since the Armistice the operational work of the Royal Air Force on
behalf of the Navy has been conducted under the auspices of the Admiralty.
Improvements have been made in large flying boats and amphibians,
especially with a view to facilitating their landing on "carriers" and the
decks of battleships. There has also been considerable progress in the
construction and use of torpedo aircraft.
The war lasted long enough to prove the effect of the strategic offensive
by air. In spite of the dictates of humanity, it cannot be eliminated. It is true
that modern war is inimical to the progress of mankind and brings only less
suffering to the victors than to the vanquished. To ensure peace should
therefore be our ideal. But a great war once joined is to-day a war of
peoples. Not only armies in the field, but men, women, and even children at
home, are concentrated on the single purpose of defeating the enemy, and
armies, navies, and air forces are dependent upon the application to work,
the output of war supplies, and, above all, the morale of the civil
population. Just as gas was used notwithstanding the Hague Convention, so
air war, in spite of any and every international agreement to the contrary,
will be carried into the enemy's country, his industries will be destroyed, his
nerve centres shattered, his food supply disorganized, and the will power of
the nation as a whole shaken. Formidable as is the prospect of this type of
air warfare, it will become still more terrible with the advent of new
scientific methods of life-destruction, such as chemical and bacterial attack
on great industrial and political centres. Various proposals, such as the

control of the air effort, service and civil, of all countries by the League of
Nations, and even the complete elimination of aviation, have been put
forward as a means of avoiding the horrors of aerial warfare and its
appurtenances, but they are untenable, and any power wishing and able to
sweep them aside will undoubtedly do so.
A future war, as I see it, will begin something after this manner, provided
either side possesses large air forces. Huge day and night bombers will
assemble at the declaration of war to penetrate into the enemy's country for
the attack of his centres of population, his mobilization zones, his arsenals,
harbours, strategic railways, shipping and rolling stock. Corps and Army
squadrons will concentrate in formation to accompany the armies to the
front; reconnaissance and fighting patrols will scatter in all directions from
coastal air bases to discover the enemy's concentrations and cover our own;
the fleet, whatever its nature, will emerge with its complement of
reconnaissance and protective machines and torpedo aircraft for direct
action against the enemy's fleet. A few fighting defence units will remain
behind.
But it must not be imagined that these functions will be carried out
unopposed. Local battles in the air will occur between fighting machines for
the protection of specialized machines, while the main air forces in large
formations will concentrate independently to produce, if possible, a
shattering blow on the enemy and obtain from the outset a supremacy in the
air comparable to our supremacy on the sea in the last war.
In mobilization the time factor is all-important. Our national history has
been one of extraordinary good fortune in this respect, but the margin
allowable for luck is becoming very narrow and, whereas in 1914 it was
some twenty days between the declaration of war and the exchange of the
first shots, in the next war the air battle may be joined within as many
hours, and an air attack launched almost simultaneously with the
declaration of war. In modern war the mobilization period tends to shorten,
and every effort will be made towards its further reduction, since mobilizing
armies are particularly vulnerable from air attack.

Civil Aviation as a Factor in National Security.

The picture I have drawn may appear highly coloured for the reason that
no country is likely for some time to possess sufficiently large air forces to
obtain a decisive victory, or at any rate an uncontested superiority, at the
outbreak of war. Though in air, as in every other form of warfare, attack is
more effective than defence, we cannot afford to keep our air forces up to
war strength in peace any more than our Army or Navy.
The problem, from a military point of view, is therefore to ensure an
adequate reserve and to maintain our capacity for expansion to meet
emergencies. The number of units maintained at war establishment should
be the absolute minimum for safety and of the type immediately required on
mobilization, i.e. long-range bombing and naval reconnaissance squadrons.
The remainder should be in cadre form. We can, of course, maintain a fixed
number of machines and pilots in reserve for every one on the active list,
but, although some such system is necessary, on a large scale it is open to
many and serious objections. First of all, even on a cadre basis, it means
keeping inactive at considerable cost a number of machines which may
never be used and which, however carefully stored, quickly deteriorate.
Knowledge of aeronautics is still slender and improvements are made so
continuously that machines may become obsolete within a few months.
Moreover, the growth of service aviation in peace must tend to become
artificial and conventional rather than natural, and this will react on design
and construction, which will be cramped, both technically and financially,
within the limits imposed by service requirements.
It is obvious therefore that the capacity of the construction industry to
expand cannot be fostered by service aviation alone; furthermore, in the
event of another war of attrition, expansion will be more essential than any
amount of machine reserve power immediately available, and in the event
of a war of short duration that power will win which has the greatest
preponderance of machines, service or civil, fit to take the air. The
asphyxiation of a large enemy city, if within range, can be done by night-
flying commercial machines, and it would require a defending force of
great numerical superiority for its successful defence.
Whether, therefore, from this point of view, or others, which I will
mention later, another solution must be found, and this lies in the
development of civil aviation. An analogy in the Navy and the Mercantile

Marine has long been apparent. "Sea power," says Mahan, "is based upon a
flourishing industry." Substitute "air" for "sea" and the analogy is still true.
The Navy owed its origin to our mercantile enterprise and to-day it depends
upon the Mercantile Marine for its reserve power of men and material. In
the same way must air power be built up on commercial air supremacy. If
we accept Mahan, or the dictum of any other great naval or military
historian or strategist, a service air force by itself is not air power, and after
a brief if brilliant flash must wither if reserves are not immediately at hand.
A large commercial air fleet will provide, not only a reserve of men and
machines, but it will keep in existence an aircraft industry, with its
designing and constructional staffs, capable of quick and wide expansion in
emergency; and such an industry will not be employed on the design of
contrivances for use in a possible war, but on meeting the practical
requirements of everyday air transport and navigation.
Thus a natural, practical and healthy, as opposed to a stereotyped and
artificial, growth will be ensured. Our naval supremacy is largely
attributable to the interest which the people as a whole have traditionally
taken in naval policy; in other words, to the fact that we are a seafaring
nation. Similarly air supremacy can only be secured if the air-sense of the
man in the street is fostered, and aviation is not confined to military
operations, but becomes a part of everyday life. At the present time
commercial aviation is far too small to play the part of reservoir to the
Royal Air Force—an object which must constitute one of the principal
claims for support of the nucleus already in existence.

Civil Aviation as an Instrument of Imperial Progress.

Civil aviation, however, has not only an indirect military, but, with its
superiority in speed over other means of transport, a direct commercial
utility. The nation which first substitutes aircraft for other means of
transport will be more than half-way towards the supremacy of the air.
Moreover, as the Roman Empire was built upon its roads and as the
foundations of the British Empire have hitherto rested upon its shipping, as
steam, the cable and wireless have each in turn been harnessed to the work
of speeding up communications, so to-day, with the opening of a new era of

Imperial co-operation and consultation, this new means of transport by air,
with a speed hitherto undreamed of, must be utilized for communication
and commerce between the various portions of the Empire.
A comparison of the French and British attitudes towards civil aviation
clearly demonstrates the two policies I have mentioned. Both France and
England grant subsidies—France the very much larger sum—but the great
difference lies in the objects aimed at. French policy is fostering civil
aviation as a part of its military policy and, a portion of the subsidy being
given to machines fulfilling service requirements, there is a strong tendency
for French civil aviation to be military air power camouflaged. British
policy, on the other hand, should aim at fostering civil aviation primarily as
a commercial concern and believes that air commerce is the basis of air
power as a whole. We are prepared to face the tendency of military and civil
machines to diverge if that divergence is essential to the commercial
machine.
An alternative to the British policy of maintaining a small air force and
fostering commercial aviation as a reserve is the Canadian plan of a small
air force training school and a civil Government flying service with such
objects as forest patrol, survey and coastguard duties, the work being
carried out on repayment for Government departments, provincial
governments and private corporations. The former method, allowing of
independent commercial expansion, is better suited to British mentality and
requirements, but its success will depend on a genuine endeavour to make
commercial aviation the real and vital basis of our air power. Experience in
commercial operation cannot be gained by the exploitation of air routes or
the carriage of mails or passengers under Service auspices. It is only by
running transport services, as far as possible under private management,
that operational data can be obtained, economies effected, and the design of
strictly commercial machines improved.
To sum up. Military air supremacy can best be assured by the intensive
development of industrial air organization for commercial purposes. The
conception of civil aviation as the mainstay of air power as a whole is right.
Service aviation is bound by technical and financial limits; its scope
confined to the requirements of war. Civil aviation, on the other hand, opens
out a prospect of productive expansion. The steady growth of the

Continental services is already beginning to demonstrate the importance of
air transport.

Financial and Economic Problems.

The commercial exploitation of air transport is passing through a period
of experiment, and suffering in the general war reaction from the incapacity
of the public to think of aviation except as a fighting service. The machines
hitherto used on the lines to and on the Continent are principally converted
war machines, and to transform military into commercial craft and to use
them as such is of small assistance to civil aviation, which requires reliable,
economic machines as one of the basic conditions of its financial success.
The cost of running an air transport service is considerable. Depreciation is
one heavy item of expenditure. New machines must be evolved suitable to
the requirements of mail, passenger and freight transport, but, in the present
state of financial stringency, capital is not forthcoming for experiment
unless there is every promise of a safe return. Then there are the expenses
involved in general ground organization, maintenance, fuel, insurance, etc.
The question is how can we carry on until the really economic type of
commercial machine is evolved. It will never be evolved unless there is
continuous flying and a continuous demand for new and improved
machines for commercial work. To meet this in France, the Government
came forward with a liberal grant of subsidies which have now been
increased and placed on a more favourable basis, permitting of a very
considerable reduction in the fares for transport by air. The British
Government has also granted a subsidy for British firms operating on the
cross-Channel routes, which it is hoped will place them before long on a
sound, self-supporting, commercial basis. Part of this subsidy is allocated to
assist transport companies in obtaining the latest type of commercial
machines on a hire purchase system. With a few services properly
supported by the State we shall pull through the experimental period of civil
aviation.
The services to the Continent, although the distance is on the short side
for the merits of air transport to be properly demonstrated, effect a
considerable saving in time, and it is certain that the amount of mail,

especially parcels, carried on these routes will continue to increase and lead
to the eventual adoption of normal rates for air postage. An extension of the
use of aircraft as the regular means of carrying mails will be of great
assistance in the development of air transport. Aircraft revolutionize the
speed of intercommunication by letter, and banks and financial houses will
gradually realize that large savings can be made by utilizing air mails for
the transaction of business. A difficulty lies in the fact that the area of the
British Isles is not very favourable for an extensive air mail service, which
can only operate by day, since by the existing means of transport mails are
carried during the out-of-business hours and can generally reach their
destination in a night, while the distances to Paris and Brussels are too short
to afford outstanding advantage.
Lastly, we require public support and a spirit of confidence in the air.
This can only be secured by increased reliability, reduction of charges and
keeping the public informed of the progress made. It is the nature of man to
distrust new departures. He disliked the introduction of mechanical devices
into the Lancashire weaving mills. He scoffed at the steamship and railway.
To-day he is inclined to treat as premature the serious exploitation of the air.
In spite of the great decrease of accidents, in spite of the increased comfort
of air travel, in spite of increased regularity, the average person is slow to
realize that the communication of the busy man of the future will be by air.
The majority of the business world is too conservative to make general use
of the opportunities offered by aircraft for the quick transmission of its
correspondence, while, though speed must be paid for, the high fares
hitherto charged have deterred the general public from substituting the
aeroplane for the train or boat. The running costs represented by these fares
are being materially reduced as a more economic machine is evolved, and
the reduction of fares which helps to place competition with foreign
subsidized services and with the older forms of transport on more equal
terms must for a time depend upon the assistance of Government grants.

Weather Conditions and Night Flying.

The safety of the machine and the reliability of an air service largely
depend on accurate weather forecasts. In order to co-ordinate the

meteorological work of the country as a whole, and for the special
assistance of aviation, the Meteorological Services of Great Britain have
been amalgamated under the Department of Civil Aviation, and, working in
close co-operation with the Communications Branch of the Department,
have made improvements in the rapid collection and distribution of
meteorological information for all purposes. In addition to the forecasts
issued four times daily, collective reports are issued hourly by wireless from
the London terminal aerodrome at Croydon and copies are distributed to
transport companies and others concerned.
A feature of meteorology which is often overlooked is its economic
value. By making use of a knowledge of the wind at different heights,
aircraft can complete journeys more quickly than would otherwise be
possible, and thereby save their own fuel and their passengers' time. This
will be specially useful in the tropics where the regularity of the surface
winds has its counterpart in the upper air, but even in Europe time-tables
can be drawn up with due attention to the favourable and unfavourable
effect of prevailing winds. The planning of airship routes in particular, must
be considered in close connection with this aspect of weather conditions.
To-day, however, the aeroplane may be considered as an "all-weather"
craft, save for mist and fog—the enemies of all transport and particularly to
that of the air—to which unfortunately England is particularly liable during
the winter. Experiments have been carried out on the dispersal of fog, the
illumination of aerodromes by fog-piercing lights, and instruments to record
the exact position of the aeroplane and its height above the ground, but
success has not yet been achieved.
Similar to the problems of flying and landing in mist and fog is that of
night flying. Until night flying is practicable, only half the value of the
aeroplane's speed is obtainable, since other transport services run
continuously day and night. Further, as machines become rapidly obsolete
owing to technical progress, it is essential that they should be in use for the
greatest number of hours during their life. Much has been done in the
lighting and marking of aerodromes and in the equipment of aeroplanes
with wireless telephone and direction-finding apparatus.

It may here be mentioned that there are two methods of obtaining the
position of aircraft by means of wireless telegraphy, known as direction-
finding and position-finding. Direction-finding is effected by means of two
coils set at right angles in the aircraft, by means of which the bearing of a
transmitting ground station with reference to the aircraft's compass can be
taken. When two or more bearings on different ground stations, whose
position is known, have been obtained, a "cut" or "fix" of the aircraft is
obtained. The position-finding system consists of two or more ground
stations fitted with apparatus capable of taking bearings with respect to true
north and connected by direct telephone line. The aircraft calls up by
wireless one of these stations, requests her position and then makes a series
of signals for about half a minute. The stations take the aircraft's bearings,
plot its position, and transmit the information to the aircraft. Wireless
direction and position-finding, as well as wireless telephony, have on
several occasions proved their value to navigation, but in spite of instances
of successful night flying, developments have not been such as to render
night services practicable.
Marine experience has been a valuable guide, but aerial illumination has
entailed many new problems of its own—the distribution of light through
very wide angles, the installation of light and powerful lamps in aircraft, the
elimination of shadows and the prevention of dazzle, the provision of
apparatus to indicate the strength and direction of the wind, and the like.
Very shortly the first organized and equipped night-flying route will be
available; that between London and Lympne on the Continental air
highway. The Boulogne-Paris section will probably be ready a little later.
There will be four lighthouses on the English section, of which two will be
automatic, requiring no attention for twelve months at a time. These, and
many other, facilities will much assist the progressive establishment of
services during the hours of darkness, and will provide valuable data for the
establishment of other night-flying routes. There is no real difficulty given a
reasonably clear atmosphere.

Organization.

I have mentioned the broad lines on which the organization of the air
services was built up before and during the war. We have seen that the
initial foundations and framework remained and bore the great systematic
structural development which was gradually required. In August, 1914,
there were some 240 officers, 1800 men and 200 machines; in November,
1918, 30,000 officers, 170,000 men, and 22,000 machines, all of them
better and of a higher performance than those of 1914. Our casualties
during the war were about 18,000; air formations had been active in some
fifteen theatres of operations; 8,000 enemy machines and 300 observation
balloons had been destroyed; some three-quarters of a million photographs
taken over hostile country, and 12,000,000 rounds had been fired from the
air at ground targets. At Home two organizations had expanded
independently from the same seed until, impeding one another's growth,
their trunks had joined and a single and improved tree was the result.
This is the only country where a unified air service has been adopted. In
war the arrangement was successful. Against its continuance in peace the
Army and Navy urge that, with the best of wills, there is a great difference
between having an integral branch of a service to work with other services
and having to deal with an independent organization, and argue increased
cost, duplication, competition and disjointed action. There is no doubt that
the liaison of the General, Naval and Air Staffs must be closened, and if co-
operation with the senior services was really becoming less satisfactory, a
return to the old system should be considered amongst other alternatives,
but I do not think that it should be so. It must also be remembered that,
although air co-operation is vital to naval and military operations, it is
fortunately unlikely that there will be another war for a long time and,
meanwhile, the growing essential, independent strategic action would be
irretrievably impaired by the reabsorption of the Air into the Army and
Navy.
On the other hand, even apart from supply, such a reversion would also
cause much duplication, e.g. training. The solution and the correct and
logical outcome of the unification of the Air service is the close grouping of
the three arms in a Ministry of Defence, and this, even in face of the
obvious practical difficulties, should be adopted and co-ordination thus
increased step by step. Apart from Supply, some of the services in which
this could be effected are the medical, education, chaplains, mobilization

stores, transport, works and buildings, accounting, communications,
ordnance and national factories. A modified scheme might also be studied
in which, under a Ministry of Defence, the Army and Navy each had
tactical air units of seconded personnel for artillery co-operation, spotting
and reconnaissance, and the Air Ministry dealt with supply, research, initial
training and reserves, civil aviation and an independent air force.
One of many good examples of the necessity of co-ordination is afforded
by the position of the aircraft supply services at the beginning of the war
and their development. We have already seen that there were some eight
private firms manufacturing aircraft in a small way and there was
practically speaking no engine industry at all. For the Royal Flying Corps,
the War Office had relied largely on the Royal Aircraft Factory, and,
although the methods of control adopted had many advantages, there was in
them a tendency to retard private enterprise and development. The
Admiralty, on the other hand, had assisted by dealing almost entirely with
firms for Royal Naval Air Service supply. The conditions in France
fortunately were very much better than those in this country, and for the
first year or two French factories helped us out with both machines and
engines. By the end of the war we had the largest and most efficient aircraft
industry in the world. There were no less than seventy-six great factories
turning out vast numbers of complete aeroplanes, in addition to thirty-three
manufacturing complete engines and over 3,000 turning out spares and
equipment. Such expansion is not possible within a few weeks, it took a
long time to arrive at this position, and it causes one very seriously to think
what would have happened had France not been our ally, and points the
moral which has been mentioned of the necessity for a thriving aircraft and
engine industry in peace. During the war Germany also had a very large
number of firms engaged on this work.

The Machine and Engine.

The general differences between service and civil requirements in aircraft
fall under the headings of ceiling, load and speed. For service purposes very
much higher ceiling and greater climb and speed are required and the
design is much affected by the condensed nature of the load. For peace

purposes, besides the primary advantage of speed which the air has over
other forms of transport, regularity must be ensured and the correct ratio
between speed, duration and load-carrying power determined. Great ceiling,
manœuvrability and climb are not required.
However great the speed and load, there is no value in air transport,
whether for passengers or mails or goods, unless it is safe and also
compares favourably from an economic point of view with the older
methods. Without these the public cannot be expected to utilize air
transport, nor is there any inducement to surrender mails and freight for
carriage by air. Every endeavour compatible with economy is made, as far
as the equipment of aerodromes and the organization of the routes are
concerned, to render air navigation as safe as possible, yet, though both
safety and economy of running have been improved, much remains to be
done. Safety depends largely on engine reliability, fire prevention and the
capacity of the machine to land in small spaces.
Though neither roads nor rails have to be laid and aircraft possess the
great advantages of mobility and point to point transit, the initiation and
maintenance of an air service is a very complex and costly matter. The
utilization of converted war machines is no longer sufficient and those
specially designed for commercial work are beginning to make their
appearance. Such are the Handley Page W.8, the Vickers, the D.H.18 and
34, and the Bristol 10-seater.
The first two are twin-engine and the last three single-engine machines.
Opinions differ as to the relative advantages of the twin and single-engine
type. The first and running costs of the single engine are lower, but the twin
has greater power and carrying capacity, while most pilots prefer to have a
surplus of power over and above that required for normal flight. For these
reasons, and because of the psychological effect on insurance companies
and on passengers, the twin engine will probably remain in use for large
commercial machines, until long-lived and economic engines of more than
500 horse-power are available. On the other hand, where extra power is not
required, the twin-engine is not safer than the single-engine machine; no
existing twin-engine commercial aeroplane can maintain its height and land
safely with only one engine running. Experiments have been made,
especially in Germany, on the multi-engined machine with all the engines in

the fuselage, but its advantages have so far been counterbalanced by loss of
efficiency due to transmission gearing and shaft drives to the propellers and
the vibration and weight of the gearing.
High-powered engines are very expensive to run and every effort has
therefore to be made by aerodynamic efficiency to carry more useful load
with less horse-power. Improvement is being made in this direction; thus
the D.H.18 carries eight passengers at 56 horse-power per passenger, the
D.H.32 is designed for the same number at 45 horse-power each, and the
D.H.34 for ten passengers at 45 horse-power each.
The two best German commercial machines, the Junkers and the Fokker,
have a comparatively low horse-power and a low fuel load, but greater
attention has been paid to the design of the machines, which are
monoplanes with cantilever wings, offering less resistance to the air than
our biplanes. One of the most difficult problems is to evolve a high-lift
wing which does not impair the aircraft's speed in the air. For commercial
machines we must aim at the largest possible commercial load, the smallest
possible fuel load and, consequently, an engine which uses fuel
economically and, conversely, a lighter fuel. The development of the engine
is receiving constant attention, as are also various safety devices, among
which may be mentioned those guarding against fire and those varying the
lift of wings so as to lower the landing speed and thus decrease the dangers
attendant upon forced landings.
In addition to the high initial cost of machines and engines, their
maintenance also requires the greatest care. Detailed investigation must be
made into all serious accidents. This is now compulsory under the new Air
Navigation Act, and the fitness of pilots is ensured by periodical medical
examination.
Apart from the weather, the safety of an aircraft depends upon its engine,
and perhaps even more upon the installation and accessibility of engines
and their adjuncts, such as the petrol, oil, water and ignition systems.
During the earlier stages of the war the average life of an engine before
complete overhaul was necessary was, of stationary engines, from 50 to 60
hours, and of rotary engines, about 15 hours. To-day these figures stand at
200 hours and upwards and from 50 to 60 hours respectively. For

commercial purposes this must be further increased to 300-500 hours as a
normal working period.
There are two schools of thought with regard to the efficiency, reliability
and the economy of engines. One school advocates using a light power
plant per horse-power, run normally at about half its maximum; the other
favours a plant of greater weight, more solid construction and greater
efficiency, running at nearly its full horse-power. The former is more
expensive in primary cost and upkeep, but allows a higher performance and
provides reserve horse-power for emergency; the latter is cheaper, but
involves a certain risk owing to lack of surplus power. We have hitherto
shown a tendency to adopt the former method, the Germans the latter. For
commercial purposes a compromise will probably be found to be best.
Apart from the initial outlay on "air stock," the maintenance, overhead,
fuel, insurance and depreciation charges are very heavy. These are much
affected by such items as simplicity of design, strength against wear and
tear, ease of assembly and interchangeability of parts, easily removable
engines, increase in durability by the use of metal construction for parts of
the machine and the propeller, the elimination of rubber joints, substitution
of air for water cooling, facilities for loading and unloading in a commercial
machine, simple and efficient navigational instruments and self-starter.
Every improvement, however small, will assist to reduce running costs.
Then revenue must be increased and the comfort of passengers, as, for
instance, ventilation, warmth, luggage capacity and, more than all, a
reduction of noise has to be carefully considered or they will not travel a
second time by air. An effective engine silencer is at last well on the way. It
is obvious what a great advantage this attainment will be both for service
and civil purposes. Roughly speaking, a high-powered engine without a
silencer is audible at a distance of some seven miles and at a height of
13,000 feet at night time, though these distances are reduced by about a
third by day when normal ground noises exist. The bulk of noise is caused
by the exhaust, the propeller and mechanical noises in the engine.
I cannot leave this subject without emphasizing the value of research,
both abstract and concrete. But, though it is the keystone of progress, its
results must largely depend on the amount of flying done. It is clear that for
economic reasons new designs can only thoroughly be tried out by

commercial use, and therefore again that real progress is dependent on
commercial activity.
The advance of civil aviation is bound to be slower than was that of war
aviation. But, as war experience improved old and evolved new types, so
will peace requirements and experience shape the type and design of
aircraft and engine best suited to its purposes. Although a good deal has
under the circumstances already been achieved in peace, much remains to
be done. Gradually, however, with a modicum of research, improvements in
the factors already mentioned and the reduction of initial cost and
maintenance expenses, air transport for mails, passengers and goods will
take its place as a normal commercial public utility service, and the
increased speed of communication will assist in the general development of
trade.

Air Services: British, Continental and Imperial.

International civil flying commenced officially on August 26th, 1919,
and gradually expanded, both in the United Kingdom and on the Continent,
especially during the summer of 1920. France, aided by considerable
subsidies, conducted services from Paris to London, Brussels and Strasburg,
from Toulouse to Montpelier and across Spain to Casablanca in Morocco;
Belgium, from Brussels to London and Paris; Holland, from Amsterdam to
London; Germany, in spite of the restrictions placed upon her, entered the
field as a competitor and her aircraft flew regularly from Berlin to
Copenhagen and Bremen, and from Bremen to Amsterdam. On the
American Continent, the United States Post Office ran mail services from
New York to Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco, with extensions
from Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and St. Louis.
For reasons which I shall give, there were no internal services in the
United Kingdom, but there were four companies operating air lines from
London to Paris, one of which held the contract for the carriage of mails.
There were also air mail services between London and Brussels and
Amsterdam. The mileage flown and the number of passengers and the
weight of goods carried were considerable, while the number of letters
steadily increased, especially on the Amsterdam service; and an efficiency

of 76 per cent., 94 per cent., and 84 per cent. was obtained on the London-
Paris, London-Brussels, and London-Amsterdam services respectively.
It must be remembered that these results were obtained without any
direct assistance on the part of the State, such as was given by the French
Government to air-transport companies in the form of subsidies. British
economic policy is traditionally opposed to subsidies, believing that
enterprise can be healthily built up on private initiative. Therefore, until
1921 civil aviation had to content itself with the indirect assistance of the
State, which consisted mainly in the adjustment of international flying; the
laying-out and equipment of aerodromes on the air routes; the provision of
wireless communication and meteorological information; research and the
collection and issue of general information concerning aviation.
This indirect assistance, however, proved inadequate to maintain the
progress achieved during 1920, and therefore the maintenance of air
services by means of temporary direct financial assistance had to be
arranged.
I have already pointed out the difficulty against which commercial
aviation has to contend in regard to the geographical features and position
of the United Kingdom. Its comparatively small size, the propinquity of
industrial centres, our efficient day and night express railway services,
especially those running north and south, lessen the value of aircraft's
superior speed and militate against the operation of successful internal air
services. Possible exceptions might include amphibian services between
London and Dublin, accelerating the delivery of mails five or six hours;
between Glasgow and Belfast, where the Clyde and the harbour of Belfast
could be used as terminals; or between London and the Channel Islands. I
may point out in parenthesis that the development of alighting stations on
rivers passing through the centres of towns is important, as a great deal of
time is at present wasted in reaching the aerodromes necessarily situated
some miles outside large centres of population.
Our immediate opportunities of development near home are therefore
afforded by the air services to Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam; but even
here the saving in time is not great, and our position is unfavourable
compared to that of the United States, where the Post Office saves two days

in the delivery of mails by air between New York and San Francisco; or
compared to that of Germany, where Berlin is within a 350-mile radius of
Copenhagen, Cologne, Munich, Warsaw, and Vienna, which is itself in an
advantageous situation as the junction for a South European system
extending to the Balkan States and the Near East.
The ultimate use of the air, however, is not exemplified by a few
passengers flying daily between London and the Continent any more than
by a few squadrons of fighting craft. In a decade or two overhead transit
will become the main factor in the express delivery of passengers, mails,
and goods. It is the one means left to the Empire of speeding up world-
communication to an extent as yet unrealized. For the price of a battleship a
route to Australia could be organized, the value of which would be beyond
computation.
The British Empire as a whole offers vast fields for expansion. In Africa,
Canada, and Australia are found the great distances suitable to the operation
of aircraft, the wide undeveloped areas through which air transport may
prove more economic than the construction of railways, and the trans-
oceanic routes over which travel by steamship has reached, and in many
cases passed, its economic maximum speed. Air transport, careless whether
the route be over land or sea, unhampered by foreign frontiers, gives the
Empire precisely those essential powers of direct, supple, and speedy
intercommunication which ship and rail have already shown us to be vital.
Here again the geographical position of England presents a difficult
problem. England is divided from the rest of the Empire by a wide expanse,
either of ocean or foreign territory. Egypt, the starting-point for air routes to
India, Australia, and South Africa, may be described as the centre of a circle
of which England is on the circumference; and it may be some years before
an aeroplane can complete the journey between England and Egypt with
only Malta as a stopping-place.
The future of long-distance oceanic air routes may depend upon the
airship. Lighter-than-air craft, mainly for reasons of cost and vulnerability,
did not receive such an impetus from the war as did the aeroplane, but the
modern airship has claims for use over distances exceeding 1,000 miles. It
can fly by night with even greater ease than by day; fog is no deterrent;

engine trouble does not bring it down; and it can take advantage of
prevailing winds. It would reduce the sea journey from England to Karachi
from 22 to 5 days; from England to Johannesburg from 21 to 7 days; and
from England to Perth from 32 to 10½ days. Its achievements have already
been considerable. In November, 1917, the German L.57 flew from
Constantinople to East Africa and back—a distance of 4,000 miles—in 96
hours; in June, 1919, the R.34 flew from East Fortune to Danzig and back
in 57 hours; and in July it crossed the Atlantic, was moored out in America
for four days, and returned, a total distance of 8,000 miles, in the flying
time of 108 hours for the outward and 75 hours for the homeward journey.
Before and during the war Germany gained wide experience in the
design, construction, and handling of airships. It is probable that as soon as
the peace terms and financial position permit she will begin to establish this
form of transport on a commercial basis. In accordance with the Peace
Treaty, and the Ultimatum of the London Conference of 1921, the
construction of aircraft of all kinds is at present forbidden, but Germany is
fostering airship development by the means left at her disposal. Her
scientists are probing the constructional problems connected with large
airships, while efforts are being made, by financial and other assistance, to
maintain her technical staffs and airship bases in existence. At the same
time German commercial interests are negotiating with foreign countries
with a view to the development of airships abroad, and plans are being
discussed for an airship service between Spain and Argentina.
The United States, France, and Italy are all interesting themselves, either
financially or constructionally, in the future of airship development.
In Great Britain we have made great strides, particularly in the
construction of small types, and our practical air experience in lighter-than-
air craft, during the war, is the greatest in the world. With a view to carrying
out the experiments necessary further to demonstrate the capacity of
airships for commercial long-distance flights, a few months ago the
Department of Civil Aviation took over all airship material surplus to
service requirements. The main object was to test the practicability and
value of mooring airships to a mast. Up to the present, a principal factor
militating against the economic operation of airships has been the large and
expensive personnel required for handling them on the ground, especially in

stormy weather. The mooring-mast experiments have had considerable
success and airships have been moored in high winds and over long periods
with the assistance of a very small personnel.
The Government has decided, however, though recognizing their
potentialities for speeding up communications between the various
Dominions and the Mother Country, that the operation of airships cannot be
carried out by the State on account of the present financial position.
Recognizing the limitations of Home services and those to the Continent,
it was for the purpose of directing attention to the Imperial aspect of civil
aviation that the great demonstration flights were organized in which
Alcock flew the Atlantic in a Vickers "Vimy," Scott crossed to the United
States and back in the R.34, Ross-Smith flew from England to Australia,
and van Ryneveld from London to the Cape.
These flights necessitated, too, considerable ground organization in
laying out aerodromes, as the following report on one in Africa vividly
illustrates: "If aerodromes are left unattended for one year," it says,
"practically all the work would have to be undertaken afresh, particularly in
Rhodesia. The growth of vegetation is enormous, especially during the
rains, and grass will grow to a height of eleven feet in six months; and trees
stumped two feet below the surface will throw out suckers and replant
themselves within a month after the rains have started.... It is most
important that rough drains should be traced.... I have just started planting
Doub grass. This grass gives an ideal surface for landing, kills other
grasses, and possesses deep interlacing roots which will bind the entire
surface of the aerodromes, making it permanent and free from washaways
and the formation of sluits."
The demonstration flights, however, showed what could, rather than what
should, be done, and what we look for to-day is the inception of practical
undertakings, however small, in the various portions of the Empire. The
most important of these is the service contemplated between Egypt and
India; another instance is afforded by the West Indies, which suffer from the
lack of inter-island communications, both for mails and passengers, and this
could be partially rectified by an air service employing seaplanes or
amphibians for the Leeward and Windward Islands and the Bahamas, and

between the Bahamas and the American Continent, where an American
company is actually conducting a service. Another project, given up owing
to recent disturbances, was one for a flying-boat service on the Nile.
Services are also being considered from Malta to Italy, Geraldton to Derby
in Western Australia, Sydney to Adelaide and Brisbane, and Melbourne to
Hobart in Tasmania. Canadian activity takes the form of work carried out
by Government-owned civil machines in connection with forest patrol,
photographic survey, exploration, anti-smuggling patrols, etc. It would be a
great advantage if railway and steamship companies seriously considered
the value of supplementing their services by air.
With regard to Government undertakings on the Imperial air routes,
Malta is being equipped with an aerodrome, and a line of wireless stations
has been established between Egypt and India, but the organization of this
route has been delayed owing to the recent disturbances in the Middle East,
and the financial outlay involved in ground organization. As I have said, the
air route on which we should first concentrate, over and above the
Continental services, is that between Egypt and India. Both strategically
and commercially it is the most important in the Imperial system; it is a step
towards Australia; it offers possibilities of the greatest volume of traffic; it
should be much simpler to control than many international routes, which
inevitably have many complications; weather conditions are not
unfavourable; and the time taken for the journey by sea would be reduced
by about one-half. If the shortcomings in point of distance of the continental
routes in reaping the full advantages of travel by air, and the importance of
the best possible communications for the Empire, are recognized, it is
essential that a practical form of assistance should be given in the near
future to the conduct of weekly or even bi-weekly services each way
between Cairo and Karachi. Although it will not be a commercial
proposition for some time, the Egypt-Karachi route, shortening as it will the
delivery of mails between England and India by two-thirds, and England
and Australia by one-third, offers greater results than the various other
schemes at present contemplated. There are, however, certain
considerations which will have to be weighed before the immense amount
of work necessary to its initiation as a commercial air route is begun. The
French, for instance, hope to push a trunk air route to India via
Constantinople, and this line has the advantage of avoiding a long sea and

desert crossing. On the other hand, it will be a very difficult matter to
negotiate the mountains of Anatolia.
If enterprises of this kind are successfully started, if each of our self-
governing Dominions and Colonies encourages civil aviation within its own
territory, and develops the air-sense of its people, each portion of the
Empire, by a process of natural expansion, and by the gradual extension of
local air lines to merge with those from other portions of the Empire, will
assist in eventually forming a continuous chain of inter-Imperial air
communication. Such a process of internal development, supported by close
co-operation between the States of the Imperial Commonwealth, is the best
method of obtaining rapidity of air intercommunication and a system of
Imperial air bases necessary to the strategic security of the Empire.

CONCLUSION
Within the necessarily narrow limits of this survey there has been traced
the history of aviation from the earliest days; the tremendous impetus given
to it by the war has been described, during the course of which not only did
air co-operation become essential to the Navy and Army, but the importance
of the Air Force as a separate arm, with its own strategic action, steadily
grew; the increasing preponderance which aerial warfare will have in the
future, and the horrors which it may bring, have been touched upon; and the
possibilities of civil aviation in peace and war have been outlined.
The conclusion has been reached that we cannot dispense with aviation,
even if we would. We must consider it as a whole and lay down the broad
principles on which it should be developed. The air (I write as one who
during the last months of the war held the post of Chief of the Air Staff)
materially helped, if it did not actually win, the fight. It has greatly
complicated and increased the problems of defence. In future its influence
on these problems will be still greater. The air has no boundaries. Great
Britain and the Empire are no longer protected by the seas. A correct
assessment of their needs will entail a growing ratio of air force to Army
and Navy, and air power will in itself depend on the development of civil
aviation.
But though air action may be expected with justice to grow in proportion
to that of the Army and Navy, and will certainly absorb certain functions of
both, it would be unwise, at this early stage of development, for air forces to
attempt too much at a time—such as, for instance, to garrison
geographically unsuitable countries.
A certain amount of reliance could also be placed on civil machines
temporarily borrowed for purely policing measures in uncivilized countries,
or for the assistance of Government during civil disturbances; and for such
purposes it should not be difficult to devise a scheme, especially when the
State exercises a measure of control through the grant of subsidies, for the
obligatory enrolment of civil commercial pilots in the reserve, and for

periodical refresher courses for pilots, who are not actually in the service of
companies, at civil aerodromes. Such systems are in force in France and
Canada. In the event of war the independent striking air force could thus
count upon a large proportion of civil reserve pilots and machines.
Air, allied to chemistry and the submarine, will be a difficult combination
to withstand. The more its potential terrors are grasped, the less likely is
war to be loosed upon the world, and it cannot be realized too clearly how
much more easily than any other instrument of warfare aircraft and gas can
be cheaply and secretly prepared by a would-be belligerent. Meanwhile, if
civil aviation can be built up as a productive organization to a position
relative to that held by our mercantile marine, we must understand that it
will ensure air supremacy better than a large unproductive outlay on
armaments. And I am convinced that, with public support, this can, and
will, be done. Others will do it if we do not. But air power, although
drawing its vitality from the expansion of air commerce and the growth of
the civil aircraft industry, must at the same time rely upon the nucleus of a
highly trained and technical air force. Service aviation must be the
spearhead, civil aviation the shaft, of our air effort.
The present isolation of England in terms of air from the rest of the
Empire, and the geographical conditions already described, certainly render
the national expansion of aviation, both external and internal, a difficult
problem. It is clear that for this reason it must rather develop on an Imperial
basis. The Dominions have already started valuable civil air work and have
appointed Air Boards. Whatever the political settlement of Egypt may be, it
is important that our air interests at this "hub" of Imperial aviation should
be safeguarded. Air communication between the various portions of the
Empire may prove of inestimable value in a future world war, and
Dominion air forces may be able quickly to concentrate against enemy
territory which is out of the range of aircraft operating from home. We have
seen the value of aircraft operating from land bases for naval patrol, anti-
submarine action, and direct attack on enemy shipping. With the increasing
radius of action of seaplanes and other naval aircraft, the Army and Navy
may be relieved of certain of their duties in coast defence and in protecting
Imperial trade routes. For these reasons, aircraft bases are required
throughout the Empire, and it is the commercial development of aviation
which is the best means of ensuring their establishment. It will be for the

Imperial authorities, while attending to local conditions and requirements,
to co-ordinate as far as possible the air effort of the Empire, so that in peace
communications may be developed and in the event of war its full power
may rapidly be utilized on a co-operative basis.
Civil aviation is not, however, merely a method of amplifying service air
power. It has a vast potential value of its own. Communications shape
human destinies. The evolution of our civilization bears strongly the marks
of the systems which at various stages have made the intercourse of men
and ideas possible. Its history is one of endeavour to extend the limits
imposed upon human living and mobility in each of the great phases
through which it has passed.
There was the phase of the coracle and the roller-wheeled vehicle,
stretching back into the roadless mists of unrecorded time; of roads which
gradually linked the important areas of the Roman Empire; of inland and
coastal waterways; of ocean traffic, and its huge advance with the discovery
of steam-power, which brought England to the fore.
With each phase the world shrinks smaller and the mists of the unknown
recede. The development of human mobility is the greatest marvel of the
present age. We can hardly realize that it was only the other day, as these
things go—in 1819, just a hundred years before the same feat was
accomplished by air-that the first sailing ship fitted with auxiliary steam
(and not until 1828 that a real steamship) crossed the Atlantic.
Strain and competition are increasing. Trains vie with ships; motor
transport with trains. Telephones, wireless, cables, and flying are speeding
up communications to a degree undreamed of a few years ago. If the air is
to be a prime factor in the world-phase to come, how will the British
Empire be affected? Stretching from Great Britain to Australia and the
Pacific Ocean, the Empire depends more than any other political and
commercial organization on the most modern and speedy communications,
and as each of its portions assumes greater responsibility there is greater
need for co-operation, the distribution of information, and the personal
contact of statesmen and business men. "The old order changeth, yielding
place to new"; and in communications the new order is air transport.

Equally important is the international aspect. To-day we are deeply
concerned with the maintenance of peace, and this can be achieved, not so
much by the action of Governments, or the efforts of the League of Nations,
as by the personal association of individuals of one nation with those of
another, and an increasing recognition of common interests. I conceive that
civil aviation, by reducing the time factor of intercommunication, will tend
to bring peoples into closer touch with each other and will make for mutual
understanding. The Peace Treaty provided for an Air Convention for the
international control of civil aviation. The Convention has been signed by
all the Allied nations which took part in the war, and I hope other countries
will shortly be included. As soon as the Convention has been ratified, the
International Commission of Air Navigation will be established, and for the
first time the world will see the international control of a great transport
service. I believe this will prove an important practical step towards
international co-operation and goodwill.
We have no excuse for ignorance of the effects of Imperial and
international co-operation. The war gave us an example of what the British
Empire can do, provided its combined knowledge and effort is brought to
bear for one great purpose; and in no respect was this better exemplified
than in the utilization and scientific development of aviation. The world-
position of the Empire as a whole is still the best. Commerce and
communications are its bonds, and, if we are so determined, it is in our
power to shape the destinies of the future.
A definite advance has been made since the Armistice and, if all goes
well, a very much greater one will be made during the next two or three
years, and in ten years mercantile air services will be operating on a self-
supporting basis. The science and concentration employed in the war must
be made to serve the requirements of peace. Readiness for, and success in,
war are vital when war is unavoidable, but in peace it is civil and
commercial activity which is vital.
As in its infancy it seemed incredible to those responsible for the
direction of the older services that the air would be their most valuable
partner; as, during the war, they grudged its logical development to strike
widely where they could not reach, and tried to tether it closely to them, so
now in peace the air is struggling to attain the apotheosis of communication.

In the phase of world commerce of which we are on the threshold,
science, brain-power, energy, and faith must, and increasingly will, be
harnessed to the work of perfecting air communication so that human
mobility can be increased, knowledge interchanged, and the fruits of
production distributed throughout the world.
As a soldier I have of course dwelt on the possibility of war in the future
and of the part which aviation would play in it, but it would be a great
mistake—though I think that mistake is constantly made—to suppose that
soldiers look forward with equanimity to the prospect of war. On the
contrary, soldiers, more even than civilians, if this be possible, realize the
horrors of war and recognize that the great task rests upon the statesmen of
all nations, and upon humanity itself, of taking whatever steps can be taken
to prevent its recurrence.
We may at least assume that another great war will not be allowed in our
generation. But war, in spite of its horrors, in spite of its bereavements, is
only too quickly forgotten. A comparatively few years, and those who have
passed through its fire are no more. New wealth is created; new
antagonisms arise; and a new generation remembers only the romantic
stories and the martial deeds of its fathers, or, more fatally, organizes itself
to avenge defeat. Then, once again, forgetful of the terrible lesson we have
learned, the great nations of the world may unsheathe the sword as the only
solution to their problems. Our only hope lies in using the ensuing years to
educate mankind to the principle that war brings misery and
impoverishment to all engaged in it, that in the final victory it is not a
question of which is left the strongest, but which is the least exhausted, and
that national are as susceptible as personal differences to discussion and
arbitration. Above all, let us guard against the old mistake of competitive
armaments. There is no reason, for instance, why, because France, our
friend and ally, is adopting a policy of air armaments, we should blindly
pile up aeroplane against aeroplane, pilot against pilot, and thus provoke
mutual suspicion.
The possibility of war remains, however, and I wish in conclusion to
emphasize the fact that in my belief the security of this country in the event
of war will depend upon our strength in the air. The development of the
offensive powers of aviation have already destroyed "the silver streak" on

which we relied in the past. When we remember that it is less than twenty
years since the first successful aeroplane was flown, when we recall the
almost miraculous development of the fighting powers of aircraft during the
four and a half years of war, and also the further developments which were
on the point of being utilized when the war ended, it seems certain that from
the point of view of war Britain has ceased to be an island. The "silver
streak" would have been little protection but for our naval supremacy, and
in the future our security will depend as much upon superiority in the air as
it has depended in the past upon our superiority at sea. And this superiority
in the air can only be attained in the same way in which we secured our
supremacy at sea. That supremacy was not really gained by developing
great navies. It was gained by our mercantile marine, which made the great
navies possible. Our future security can only be gained by the development
of commercial aviation.

Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner, Frome and London.

Transcriber's Note: Minor typographical
errors have been corrected without note. Variant
spellings, e.g. Frankfort and Frankfurt, remain
as printed. Significant amendments have been
listed below:
Page 67, 'Poperighe' amended to Poperinghe.
Page 117, 'Junker' amended to Junkers.

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