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Title: Valerius Terminus: Of the Interpretation of Nature

Author: Francis Bacon

Annotator: Robert Leslie Ellis

Release date: June 1, 2002 [eBook #3290]
Most recently updated: May 18, 2023

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3290

Credits: Mike Pullen and David Widger

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK VALERIUS
TERMINUS: OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE ***

VA L E R I U S T E R M I N U S
OF
T H E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N O F
N AT U R E

By Francis Bacon

CONTENTS

Preface by Robert Leslie Ellis
VALERIUS TERMINUS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE
CHAPTER 1. — OF THE LIMITS AND END OF KNOWLEDGE.
CHAPTER 4.
CHAPTER 7. — THAT THE PRETENDED SUCCESSION OF WITS
HATH BEEN EVIL PLACED, FOR ASMUCH AS AFTER VARIETY OF
SECTS AND OPINIONS, THE MOST POPULAR AND NOT THE
TRUEST PREVAILETH AND WEARETH OUT THE REST; BEING
THE 7TH CHAPTER; A FRAGMENT.
CHAPTER 8. — OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE IN
HANDLING IT BY PARTS, AND IN SLIPPING OFF PARTICULAR
SCIENCES FROM THE ROOT AND STOCK OF UNIVERSAL
KNOWLEDGE, BEING THE 8TH CHAPTER, THE WHOLE
CHAPTER.
CHAPTER 9. — THAT THE END AND SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE
HATH BEEN GENERALLY MISTAKEN, AND THAT MEN WERE
NEVER WELL ADVISED WHAT IT WAS THEY SOUGHT; BEING
THE 9TH CHAPTER, WHEREOF A FRAGMENT (WHICH IS THE
END OF THE SAME CHAPTER) IS BEFORE.
CHAPTER 10. — THE INVENTORY, OR AN ENUMERATION AND
VIEW OF INVENTIONS ALREADY DISCOVERED AND IN USE,
TOGETHER WITH A NOTE OF THE WANTS AND THE NATURE OF
THE SUPPLIES, BEING THE 10TH CHAPTER; AND THIS A SMALL
FRAGMENT THEREOF, BEING THE PREFACE TO THE INVENTORY
CHAPTER 11. — THE CHAPTER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE
INVENTORY; BEING THE 11TH IN ORDER; A PART THEREOF.
CHAPTER 12.

CHAPTER 13.
CHAPTER 14.
CHAPTER 15.
CHAPTER 16.
CHAPTER 17.
CHAPTER 18.
CHAPTER 19.
CHAPTER 21.
CHAPTER 22.
CHAPTER 25.
CHAPTER 26.
BACK COVER

Preface by Robert Leslie Ellis

The following fragments of a great work on the Interpretation of Nature
were first published in Stephens's Letters and Remains [1734] They consist
partly of detached passages, and partly of an epitome of twelve chapters of
the first book of the proposed work. The detached passages contain the first,
sixth, and eighth chapters, and portions of the fourth, fifth, seventh, ninth,
tenth, eleventh, and sixteenth. The epitome contains an account of the
contents of all the chapters from the twelfth to the twenty-sixth inclusive,
omitting the twentieth, twentythird, and twenty-fourth. Thus the sixteenth
chapter is mentioned both in the epitome and among the detached passages,
and we are thus enabled to see that the two portions of the following tract
belong to the same work, as it appears from both that the sixteenth chapter
was to treat of the doctrine of idola.
It is impossible to ascertain the motive which determined Bacon to give
to the supposed author the name of Valerius Terminus, or to his
commentator, of whose annotations we have no remains, that of Hermes
Stella. It may be conjectured that by the name Terminus he intended to
intimate that the new philosophy would put an end to the wandering of
mankind in search of truth, that it would be the TERMINUS AD QUEM in
which when it was once attained the mind would finally acquiesce.
Again, the obscurity of the text was to be in some measure removed by
the annotations of Stella; not however wholly, for Bacon in the epitome of
the eighteenth chapter commends the manner of publishing knowledge
"whereby it shall not be to the capacity nor taste of all, but shall as it were
single and adopt his reader." Stella was therefore to throw a kind of starlight
on the subject, enough to prevent the student's losing his way, but not much
more.
However this may be, the tract is undoubtedly obscure, partly from the
style in which it is written, and partly from its being only a fragment. It is at

the same time full of interest, inasmuch as it is the earliest type of the
INSTAURATIO...
Note to Preface by James Spedding:
The manuscript from which Robert Stephens printed these fragments was
found among some loose papers placed in his hands by the Earl of Oxford,
and is now in the British Museum; Harl. manuscripts 6462. It is a thin paper
volume of the quarto size, written in the hand of one of Bacon's servants,
with corrections, erasures, and interlineations in his own.
The chapters of which it consists are both imperfect in themselves (all
but three),—some breaking off abruptly, others being little more than tables
of contents,—and imperfect in their connexion with each other; so much so
as to suggest the idea of a number of separate papers loosely put together.
But it was not so (and the fact is important) that the volume itself was
actually made up. However they came together, they are here fairly and
consecutively copied out. Though it be a collection of fragments therefore,
it is such a collection as Bacon thought worthy not only of being preserved,
but of being transcribed into a volume; and a particular account of it will
not be out of place.
The contents of the manuscript before Bacon touched it may be thus
described.
1. A titlepage, on which is written "VALERIUS TERMINUS of the
Interpretation of Nature, with the annotations of HERMES STELLA."
2. "Chapter I. Of the limits and end of knowledge;" with a running title,
"Of the Interpretation of Nature."
3. "The chapter immediately following the Inventory; being the 11th in
order."
4. "A part of the 9th chapter, immediately precedent to the Inventory, and
inducing the same."
5. "The Inventory, or an enumeration and view of inventions already
discovered and in use, together with a note of the wants and the nature of
the supplies; being the 10th chapter, and this a fragment only of the same."
6. Part of a chapter, not numbered, "Of the internal and profound errors
and superstitions in the nature of the mind, and of the four sorts of Idols or
fictions which offer themselves to the understanding in the inquisition of
knowledge."

7. "Of the impediments of knowledge; being the third chapter, the preface
only of it."
8. "Of the impediments which have been in the times and in diversion of
wits; being the fourth chapter."
9. "Of the impediments of knowledge for want of a true succession of
wits, and that hitherto the length of one man's life hath been the greatest
measure of knowledge; being the fifth chapter."
10. "That the pretended succession of wits hath been evil placed,
forasmuch as after variety of sects and opinions the most popular and not
the truest prevaileth and weareth out the rest; being the sixth chapter."
11. "Of the impediments of knowledge in handling it by parts, and in
slipping off particular sciences from the root and stock of universal
knowledge; being the seventh chapter."
12. "That the end and scope of knowledge hath been generally mistaken,
and that men were never well advised what it was they sought" (part of a
chapter not numbered).
13. "An abridgment of divers chapters of the first book;" namely, the
l2th, 13th, and 14th, (over which is a running title "Of active knowledge;")
and (without any running title) the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th], 19th, 21st, 22nd,
25th, and 26th. These abridgments have no headings; and at the end is
written, "The end of the Abridgment of the first book of the Interpretation
of Nature."
Such was the arrangement of the manuscript as the transcriber left it;
which I have thought worth preserving, because I seem to see traces in it of
two separate stages in the developement of the work; the order of the
chapters as they are transcribed being probably the same in which Bacon
wrote them; and the numbers inserted at the end of the headings indicating
the order in which, when he placed them in the transcriber's hands, it was
his intention to arrange them; and because it proves at any rate that at that
time the design of the whole book was clearly laid out in his mind.
There is nothing, unfortunately, to fix the DATE of the transcript, unless
it be implied in certain astronomical or astrological symbols written on the
blank outside of the volume; in which the figures 1603 occur. This may
possibly be the transcriber's note of the time when he finished his work; for
which (but for one circumstance which I shall mention presently) I should

think the year 1603 is likely a date as any; for we know from a letter of
Bacon's, dated 3rd July 1603, that he had at that time resolved "to meddle as
little as possible in the King's causes," and to "put his ambition wholly upon
his pen;" and we know from the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING that in
1605 he was engaged upon a work entitled "The Interpretation of Nature:"
to which I may add that there is in the Lambeth Library a copy of a letter
from Bacon to Lord Kinlosse, dated 25th March, 1603, and written in the
same hand as this manuscript.
Bacon's corrections, if I may judge from the character of the handwriting,
were inserted a little later; for it is a fact that about the beginning of James's
reign his writing underwent a remarkable change, from the hurried Saxon
hand full of large sweeping curves and with letters imperfectly formed and
connected, which he wrote in Elizabeth's time, to a small, neat, light, and
compact one, formed more upon the Italian model which was then coming
into fashion; and when these corrections were made it is evident that this
new character had become natural to him and easy. It is of course
impossible to fix the precise date of such a change,—the more so because
his autographs of this period are very scarce,—but whenever it was that he
corrected this manuscript, it is evident that he then considered it worthy of
careful revision. He has not merely inserted a sentence here and there,
altered the numbers of the chapters, and added words to the headings in
order to make the description more exact; but he has taken the trouble to
add the running title wherever it was wanting, thus writing the words "of
the Interpretation of Nature" at full lengths not less than eighteen times
over; and upon the blank space of the titlepage he has written out a
complete table of contents. In short, if he had been preparing the manuscript
for the press or for a fresh transcript, he could not have done it more
completely or carefully,—only that he has given no directions for altering
the order of the chapters so as to make it correspond with the numbers. And
hence I infer that up to the time when he made these corrections, this was
the form of the great work on which he was engaged: it was a work
concerning the Interpretation of Nature; which was to begin where the
NOVUM ORGANUM begins; and of which the first book was to include
all the preliminary considerations preparatory to the exposition of the
formula.
I place this fragment here in deference to Mr. Ellis's decided opinion that
it was written before the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. The positive

ground indeed which he alleges in support of that conclusion I am obliged
to set aside, as founded, I think, upon a misapprehension; and the
supposition that no part of it was written later involves a difficulty which I
cannot yet get over to my own satisfaction. But that the body of it was
written earlier I see no reason to doubt; and if so, this is its proper place.
The particular point on which I venture to disagree with Mr. Ellis I have
stated in a note upon his preface to the NOVUM ORGANUM, promising at
the same time a fuller explanation of the grounds of my own conclusion,
which I will now give.
The question is, whether the "Inventory" in the 10th chapter of
VALERIUS TERMINUS was to have exhibited a general survey of the
state of knowledge corresponding with that which fills the second book of
the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. I think not.
It is true indeed that the title of that 10th chapter,—namely, "The
Inventory, or an enumeration and view of inventions already discovered and
in use, with a note of the wants and the nature of the supplies",—has at first
sight a considerable resemblance to the description of the contents of the
second book of the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,—namely, "A
general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts
thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry
of Man;... wherein nevertheless my purpose is at this time to note only
omissions and deficiencies, and not to make any redargutions of errors,"
and so on. But an "enumeration of INVENTIONS" is not the same thing as
"a perambulation of LEARNING;" and it will be found upon closer
examination that the "Inventory" spoken of in VALERIUS TERMINUS
does really correspond to one, and one only, of the fiftyone Desiderata set
down at the end of the DE AUGMENTIS; viz. that INVENTARIUM
OPUM HUMANARUM, which was to be an appendix to the MAGIA
NATURALIS. See DE AUG. iii. 5. This will appear clearly by comparing
the descriptions of the two.
In the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING Bacon tells us that there are
two points of much purpose pertaining to the department of Natural Magic:
the first of which is, "That there be made a calendar resembling an
Inventory of the ESTATE OF MAN, containing ALL THE INVENTIONS,
BEING THE WORKS OR FRUITS OF NATURE OR ART, which are now
extant AND OF WHICH MAN IS ALREADY POSSESSED; out of which

doth naturally result a note what things are yet held impossible or not
invented; which calendar will be the more artificial and serviceable if to
every reputed impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the
nearest in degree to that impossibility: to the end that by these optatives and
essentials man's inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of
works from the speculation of causes."
The Inventory which was to have been inserted in the 10th chapter of
VALERIUS TERMINUS is thus introduced:—"The plainest method and
most directly pertinent to this intention will be to make distribution of
SCIENCES, ARTS, INVENTIONS, WORKS, and their portions,
ACCORDING TO THE USE AND TRIBUTE WHICH THEY YIELD
AND RENDER TO THE CONDITION OF MAN'S LIFE; and under those
several uses, being as several offices of provisions, to charge and tax what
may be reasonably exacted or demanded,... and then upon those charges and
taxations to distinguish and present as it were in several columns what is
extant and already found, and what is DEFECTIVE AND FURTHER TO
BE PROVIDED. Of which provisions because in many of them, after the
manner of slothful and faulty accomptants, it will be returned by way of
excuse that no such are to be had, it will be fit to give some light OF THE
NATURE OF THE SUPPLIES; whereby it will evidently appear that they
are to be compassed and procured." And that the calendar was to deal, not
with knowledge in general, but only with arts and sciences of invention in
its more restricted sense—the PARS OPERATIVA DE NATURA (DE AUG.
iii. 5.)—appears no less clearly from the opening of the 11th chapter, which
was designed immediately to follow the "Inventory." "It appeareth then
what is now in proposition, not by general circumlocution but by particular
note. No former philosophy," etc. etc. "but the revealing and discovering of
NEW INVENTIONS AND OPERATIONS,... the nature and kinds of which
inventions HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED as they could be discovered," etc. If
further evidence were required of the exact resemblance between the
Inventory of VALERIUS TERMINUS and the Inventarium of the
ADVANCEMENT and the DE AUGMENTIS, I might quote the end of the
9th chapter, where the particular expressions correspond, if possible, more
closely still. But I presume that the passages which I have given are
enough; and that the opinion which I have elsewhere expressed as to the
origin of the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,—namely, that the writing
of it was a by-thought and no part of the work on the Interpretation of

Nature as originally designed,—will not be considered inconsistent with the
evidence afforded by these fragments.
That the VALERIUS TERMINUS was composed before the
ADVANCEMENT, though a conclusion not deducible from the Inventory,
is nevertheless probable: but to suppose that it was so composed EXACTLY
IN ITS PRESENT FORM, involves, as I said, a difficulty; which I will now
state. The point is interesting, as bearing directly upon the developement in
Bacon's mind of the doctrine of Idols; concerning which see preface to
NOVUM ORGANUM, note C. But I have to deal with it here merely as
bearing upon the probable date of this fragment.
In treating of the department of Logic in the ADVANCEMENT, Bacon
notices as altogether wanting "the particular elenches or cautions against
three false appearances" or fallacies by which the mind of man is beset: the
"caution" of which, he says, "doth extremely import the true conduct of
human judgment." These false appearances he describes, though he does
not give their names; and they correspond respectively to what he
afterwards called the Idols of the Tribe, the Cave, and the Forum. But he
makes no mention of the fourth; namely, the Idols of the Theatre. Now in
VALERIUS TERMINUS we find two separate passages in which the Idols
are mentioned; and in both all four are enumerated, and all by name; though
what he afterwards called Idols of the Forum, he there calls Idols of the
Palace; and it seems to me very unlikely that, if when he wrote the
ADVANCEMENT he had already formed that classification he should have
omitted all mention of the Idols of the Theatre; for though it is true that that
was not the place to discuss them, and therefore in the corresponding
passage of the DE AUGMENTIS they are noticed as to be passed by "for
the present," yet they are noticed by name, and in all Bacon's later writings
the confutation of them holds a very prominent place.
To me the most probable explanation of the fact is this. I have already
shown that between the composition and the transcription of these
fragments the design of the work appears to have undergone a considerable
change; the order of the chapters being entirely altered. We have only to
suppose therefore that they were composed before the ADVANCEMENT
and transcribed after, and that in preparing them for the transcriber Bacon
made the same kind of alterations in the originals which he afterwards made
upon the transcript, and the difficulty disappears. Nothing would be easier

than to correct "three" into "four," and insert "the Idols of the Theatre" at
the end of the sentence.
And this reminds me (since I shall have so much to do with these
questions of date) to suggest a general caution with regard to them all;
namely, that in the case of fragments like these, the comparison of isolated
passages can hardly ever be relied upon for evidence of the date or order of
composition, or of the progressive developement of the writer's views; and
for this simple reason,—we can never be sure that the passages as they now
stand formed part of the original writing. The copy of the fragment which
we have may be (as there is reason to believe this was) a transcript from
several loose papers, written at different periods and containing alterations
or additions made from time to time. We may know perhaps that when
Bacon published the ADVANCEMCNT OF LEARNING he was ignorant
of some fact with which he afterwards became acquainted; we may find in
one of these fragments,—say the TEMPORIS PARTUS MASCULUS,—a
passage implying acquaintance with that fact. Does it follow that the
TEMPORIS PARTUS MASCULUS was written after the
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING? No; for in looking over the
manuscript long after it was written, he may have observed and corrected
the error. And we cannot conclude that he at the same time altered the
whole composition so as to bring it into accordance with the views he then
held; for that might be too long a work. He may have inserted a particular
correction, but meant to rewrite the whole; and if so, in spite of the later
date indicated by that particular passage, the body of the work would still
represent a stage in his opinions anterior to the ADVANCEMENT OF
LEARNING.
I have felt some doubt whether in printing this fragment, I should follow
the example of Stephens, who gave it exactly as he found it; or that of later
editors, who have altered the order of the chapters so as to make it agree
with the numbers. The latter plan will perhaps, upon the whole, be the more
convenient. There can he little doubt that the numbers of the chapters
indicate the order in which Bacon meant them to be read; and if any one
wishes to compare it with the order in which they seem to have been
written, he has only to look at Bacon's table of contents, which was made
with reference to the transcript, and which I give unaltered, except as to the
spelling.

of the Interpretation of Nature with the Annotations of a few fragments of
the first book, viz.
1. The first chapter entire. {Of the ends and limits of knowledge.}
2. A portion of the 11th chapter. {Of the scale.}
3. A small portion of the 9th chapter {being an Inducement to the
Inventory.}
4. A small portion of the 10th chapter {being the preface to the
Inventory.}
5. A small portion of the 16th chapter {being a preface to the inward
elenches of the mind.}
6. A small portion of the 4th chapter. {Of the impediments of knowledge
in general.}
7. A small portion of the 5th chapter. {Of the diversion of wits.}
8. The 6th chapter entire. {Of}
9. A portion of the 7th chapter.
10. The 8th chapter entire.
11. Another portion of the 9th chapter.
12. The Abridgment of the 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 21. 22. 25. 26th
chapters of the first book.
13. The first chapter of {the} a book of the same argument written in
Latin and destined {for} to be {traditionary} separate and not public.
None of the Annotations of Stella are set down in these fragments.
[The title] is written in the transcriber's hand: all that follows in Bacon's.
The words between brackets have a line drawn through them. For an exact
facsimile of the whole [see Contents pages 1 and 2].
[13.] refers to the first chapter of the TEMPORIS PARTUS
MASCULUS; which follows in the manuscript volume, but not here. It is
important as bearing upon the date of that fragment.

VALERIUS TERMINUS OF THE
INTERPRETATION OF NATURE

CHAPTER 1. — OF THE LIMITS AND END OF
KNOWLEDGE.

In the divine nature both religion and philosophy hath acknowledged
goodness in perfection, science or providence comprehending all things,
and absolute sovereignty or kingdom. In aspiring to the throne of power the
angels transgressed and fell, in presuming to come within the oracle of
knowledge man transgressed and fell; but in pursuit towards the similitude
of God's goodness or love (which is one thing, for love is nothing else but
goodness put in motion or applied) neither man or spirit ever hath
transgressed, or shall transgress.
The angel of light that was, when he presumed before his fall, said within
himself, I WILL ASCEND AND BE LIKE UNTO THE HIGHEST; not
God, but the highest. To be like to God in goodness, was no part of his
emulation; knowledge, being in creation an angel of light, was not the want
which did most solicit him; only because he was a minister he aimed at a
supremacy; therefore his climbing or ascension was turned into a throwing
down or precipitation.
Man on the other side, when he was tempted before he fell, had offered
unto him this suggestion, THAT HE SHOULD BE LIKE UNTO GOD. But
how? Not simply, but in this part, KNOWING GOOD AND EVIL. For
being in his creation invested with sovereignty of all inferior creatures, he
was not needy of power or dominion; but again, being a spirit newly
inclosed in a body of earth, he was fittest to be allured with appetite of light
and liberty of knowledge; therefore this approaching and intruding into
God's secrets and mysteries was rewarded with a further removing and
estranging from God's presence. But as to the goodness of God, there is no
danger in contending or advancing towards a similitude thereof, as that
which is open and propounded to our imitation. For that voice (whereof the
heathen and all other errors of religion have ever confessed that it sounds
not like man), LOVE YOUR ENEMIES; BE YOU LIKE UNTO YOUR

HEAVENLY FATHER, THAT SUFFERETH HIS RAIN TO FALL BOTH
UPON THE JUST AND THE UNJUST, doth well declare, that we can in
that point commit no excess; so again we find it often repeated in the old
law, BE YOU HOLY AS I AM HOLY; and what is holiness else but
goodness, as we consider it separate and guarded from all mixture and all
access of evil?
Wherefore seeing that knowledge is of the number of those things which
are to be accepted of with caution and distinction; being now to open a
fountain, such as it is not easy to discern where the issues and streams
thereof will take and fall; I thought it good and necessary in the first place
to make a strong and sound head or bank to rule and guide the course of the
waters; by setting down this position or firmament, namely, THAT ALL
KNOWLEDGE IS TO BE LIMITED BY RELIGION, AND TO BE
REFERRED TO USE AND ACTION.
For if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and
material things, to attain to any light for the revealing of the nature or will
of God, he shall dangerously abuse himself. It is true that the contemplation
of the creatures of God hath for end (as to the natures of the creatures
themselves) knowledge, but as to the nature of God, no knowledge, but
wonder; which is nothing else but contemplation broken off; or losing itself.
Nay further, as it was aptly said by one of Plato's school THE SENSE OF
MAN RESEMBLES THE SUN, WHICH OPENETH AND REVEALETH
THE TERRESTRIAL GLOBE, BUT OBSCURETH AND CONCEALETH
THE CELESTIAL; so doth the sense discover natural things, but darken
and shut up divine. And this appeareth sufficiently in that there is no
proceeding in invention of knowledge but by similitude; and God is only
self-like, having nothing in common with any creature, otherwise than as in
shadow and trope. Therefore attend his will as himself openeth it, and give
unto faith that which unto faith belongeth; for more worthy it is to believe
than to think or know, considering that in knowledge (as we now are
capable of it) the mind suffereth from inferior natures; but in all belief it
suffereth from a spirit which it holdeth superior and more authorised than
itself.
To conclude, the prejudice hath been infinite that both divine and human
knowledge hath received by the intermingling and tempering of the one

with the other; as that which hath filled the one full of heresies, and the
other full of speculative fictions and vanities.
But now there are again which in a contrary extremity to those which
give to contemplation an overlarge scope, do offer too great a restraint to
natural and lawful knowledge, being unjustly jealous that every reach and
depth of knowledge wherewith their conceits have not been acquainted,
should be too high an elevation of man's wit, and a searching and ravelling
too far into God's secrets; an opinion that ariseth either of envy (which is
proud weakness and to be censured and not confuted), or else of a deceitful
simplicity. For if they mean that the ignorance of a second cause doth make
men more devoutly to depend upon the providence of God, as supposing the
effects to come immediately from his hand, I demand of them, as Job
demanded of his friends, WILL YOU LIE FOR GOD AS MAN WILL FOR
MAN TO GRATIFY HIM? But if any man without any sinister humour
doth indeed make doubt that this digging further and further into the mine
of natural knowledge is a thing without example and uncommended in the
Scriptures, or fruitless; let him remember and be instructed; for behold it
was not that pure light of natural knowledge, whereby man in paradise was
able to give unto every living creature a name according to his propriety,
which gave occasion to the fall; but it was an aspiring desire to attain to that
part of moral knowledge which defineth of good and evil, whereby to
dispute God's commandments and not to depend upon the revelation of his
will, which was the original temptation. And the first holy records, which
within those brief memorials of things which passed before the flood
entered few things as worthy to be registered but only lineages and
propagations, yet nevertheless honour the remembrance of the inventor both
of music and works in metal. Moses again (who was the reporter) is said to
have been seen in all the Egyptian learning, which nation was early and
leading in matter of knowledge. And Salomon the king, as out of a branch
of his wisdom extraordinarily petitioned and granted from God, is said to
have written a natural history of all that is green from the cedar to the moss,
(which is but a rudiment between putrefaction and an herb,) and also of all
that liveth and moveth. And if the book of Job be turned over, it will be
found to have much aspersion of natural philosophy. Nay, the same
Salomon the king affirmeth directly that the glory of God IS TO
CONCEAL A THING, BUT THE GLORY OF THE KING IS TO FIND IT
OUT, as if according to the innocent play of children the divine Majesty

took delight to hide his works, to the end to have them found out; for in
naming the king he intendeth man, taking such a condition of man as hath
most excellency and greatest commandment of wits and means, alluding
also to his own person, being truly one of those clearest burning lamps,
whereof himself speaketh in another place, when he saith THE SPIRIT OF
MAN IS AS THE LAMB, OF GOD, WHEREWITH HE SEARCHETH
ALL INWARDNESS; which nature of the soul the same Salomon holding
precious and inestimable, and therein conspiring with the affection of
Socrates who scorned the pretended learned men of his time for raising
great benefit of their learning (whereas Anaxagoras contrariwise and divers
others being born to ample patrimonies decayed them in contemplation),
delivereth it in precept yet remaining, BUY THE TRUTH, AND SELL IT
NOT; AND SO OF WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE.
And lest any man should retain a scruple as if this thirst of knowledge
were rather an humour of the mind than an emptiness or want in nature and
an instinct from God, the same author defineth of it fully, saying, GOD
HATH MADE EVERY THING IN BEAUTY ACCORDING TO SEASON;
ALSO HE HATH SET THE WORLD IN MAN'S HEART, YET CAN HE
NOT FIND OUT THE WORK WHICH GOD WORKETH FROM THE
BEGINNING TO THE END: declaring not obscurely that God hath framed
the mind of man as a glass capable of the image of the universal world,
joying to receive the signature thereof as the eye is of light, yea not only
satisfied in beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but
raised also to find out and discern those ordinances and decrees which
throughout all these changes are infallibly observed. And although the
highest generality of motion or summary law of nature God should still
reserve within his own curtain, yet many and noble are the inferior and
secondary operations which are within man's sounding. This is a thing
which I cannot tell whether I may so plainly speak as truly conceive, that as
all knowledge appeareth to be a plant of God's own planting, so it may seem
the spreading and flourishing or at least the bearing and fructifying of this
plant, by a providence of God, nay not only by a general providence but by
a special prophecy, was appointed to this autumn of the world: for to my
understanding it is not violent to the letter, and safe now after the event, so
to interpret that place in the prophecy of Daniel where speaking of the latter
times it is said, MANY SHALL PASS TO AND FRO, AND SCIENCE
SHALL BE INCREASED; as if the opening of the world by navigation and

commerce and the further discovery of knowledge should meet in one time
or age.
But howsoever that be, there are besides the authorities of Scriptures
before recited, two reasons of exceeding great weight and force why
religion should dearly protect all increase of natural knowledge: the one,
because it leadeth to the greater exaltation of the glory of God; for as the
Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to consider and to magnify
the great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest only in the
contemplation of those shews which first offer themselves to our senses, we
should do a like injury to the majesty of God, as if we should judge of the
store of some excellent jeweler by that only which is set out to the street in
his shop. The other reason is, because it is a singular help and a preservative
against unbelief and error; for, saith our Saviour, YOU ERR, NOT
KNOWING THE SCRIPTURES NOR THE POWER OF GOD; laying
before us two books or volumes to study if we will be secured from error;
first the Scriptures revealing the will of God, and then the creatures
expressing his power; for that latter book will certify us that nothing which
the first teacheth shall be thought impossible. And most sure it is, and a true
conclusion of experience, that a little natural philosophy inclineth the mind
to atheism, but a further proceeding bringeth the mind back to religion.
To conclude then, let no man presume to check the liberality of God's
gifts, who, as was said, HATH SET THE WORLD IN MAN'S HEART. So
as whatsoever is not God but parcel of the world, he hath fitted it to the
comprehension of man's mind, if man will open and dilate the powers of his
understanding as he may.
But yet evermore it must be remembered that the least part of knowledge
passed to man by this so large a charter from God must be subject to that
use for which God hath granted it; which is the benefit and relief of the state
and society of man; for otherwise all manner of knowledge becometh
malign and serpentine, and therefore as carrying the quality of the serpent's
sting and malice it maketh the mind of man to swell; as the Scripture saith
excellently, knowledge bloweth up, but charity buildeth up. And again the
same author doth notably disavow both power and knowledge such as is not
dedicated to goodness or love, for saith he, IF I HAVE ALL FAITH SO AS
I COULD REMOVE MOUNTAINS, (there is power active,) IF I RENDER
MY BODY TO THE FIRE, (there is power passive,) IF I SPEAK WITH

THE TONGUES OF MEN AND ANGELS, (there is knowledge, for
language is but the conveyance of knowledge,) ALL WERE NOTHING.
And therefore it is not the pleasure of curiosity, nor the quiet of
resolution, nor the raising of the spirit, nor victory of wit, nor faculty of
speech, nor lucre of profession, nor ambition of honour or fame, nor
inablement for business, that are the true ends of knowledge; some of these
being more worthy than other, though all inferior and degenerate: but it is a
restitution and reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty and
power (for whensoever he shall be able to call the creatures by their true
names he shall again command them) which he had in his first state of
creation. And to speak plainly and clearly, it is a discovery of all operations
and possibilities of operations from immortality (if it were possible) to the
meanest mechanical practice. And therefore knowledge that tendeth but to
satisfaction is but as a courtesan, which is for pleasure and not for fruit or
generation. And knowledge that tendeth to profit or profession or glory is
but as the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, which while she goeth aside
and stoopeth to take up she hindereth the race. And knowledge referred to
some particular point of use is but as Harmodius which putteth down one
tyrant, and not like Hercules who did perambulate the world to suppress
tyrants and giants and monsters in every part. It is true, that in two points
the curse is peremptory and not to be removed; the one that vanity must be
the end in all human effects, eternity being resumed, though the revolutions
and periods may be delayed. The other that the consent of the creature being
now turned into reluctation, this power cannot otherwise be exercised and
administered but with labour, as well in inventing as in executing; yet
nevertheless chiefly that labour and travel which is described by the sweat
of the brows more than of the body; that is such travel as is joined with the
working and discursion of the spirits in the brain: for as Salomon saith
excellently, THE FOOL PUTTETH TO MORE STRENGTH, BUT THE
WISE MAN CONSIDERETH WHICH WAY, signifying the election of the
mean to be more material than the multiplication of endeavour. It is true
also that there is a limitation rather potential than actual, which is when the
effect is possible, but the time or place yieldeth not the matter or basis
whereupon man should work. But notwithstanding these precincts and
bounds, let it be believed, and appeal thereof made to Time, (with
renunciation nevertheless to all the vain and abusing promises of
Alchemists and Magicians, and such like light, idle, ignorant, credulous,

and fantastical wits and sects,) that the new-found world of land was not
greater addition to the ancient continent than there remaineth at this day a
world of inventions and sciences unknown, having respect to those that are
known, with this difference that the ancient regions of knowledge will seem
as barbarous compared with the new, as the new regions of people seem
barbarous compared to many of the old.
The dignity of this end (of endowment of man's life with new
commodities) appeareth by the estimation that antiquity made of such as
guided thereunto. For whereas founders of states, lawgivers, extirpers of
tyrants, fathers of the people, were honoured but with the titles of Worthies
or Demigods, inventors were ever consecrated amongst the Gods
themselves. And if the ordinary ambitions of men lead them to seek the
amplification of their own power in their countries, and a better ambition
than that hath moved men to seek the amplification of the power of their
own countries amongst other nations, better again and more worthy must
that aspiring be which seeketh the amplification of the power and kingdom
of mankind over the world; the rather because the other two prosecutions
are ever culpable of much perturbation and injustice; but this is a work truly
divine, which cometh IN AURA LENI without noise or observation.
The access also to this work hath been by that port or passage, which the
divine Majesty (who is unchangeabIe in his ways) doth infallibly continue
and observe; that is the felicity wherewith he hath blessed an humility of
mind, such as rather laboureth to spell and so by degrees to read in the
volumes of his creatures, than to solicit and urge and as it were to invocate a
man's own spirit to divine and give oracles unto him. For as in the inquiry
of divine truth, the pride of man hath ever inclined to leave the oracles of
God's word and to vanish in the mixture of their own inventions; so in the
self-same manner, in inquisition of nature they have ever left the oracles of
God's works, and adored the deceiving and deformed imagery which the
unequal mirrors of their own minds have represented unto them. Nay it is a
point fit and necessary in the front and beginning of this work without
hesitation or reservation to be professed, that it is no less true in this human
kingdom of knowledge than in God's kingdom of heaven, that no man shall
enter into it EXCEPT HE BECOME FIRST AS A LITTLE CHILD.

CHAPTER 4.

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE, BEING THE 4TH
CHAPTER, THE PREFACE ONLY OF IT.
In some things it is more hard to attempt than to achieve, which falleth
out when the difficulty is not so much in the matter or subject, as it is in the
crossness and indisposition of the mind of man to think of any such thing,
to will or to resolve it. And therefore Titus Livius in his declamatory
digression wherein he doth depress and extenuate the honour of Alexander's
conquests saith, NIHIL ALIUD QUAM BENE AUSUS VANA
CONTEMNERE: in which sort of things it is the manner of men first to
wonder that any such thing should be possible, and after it is found out to
wonder again how the world should miss it so long. Of this nature I take to
be the invention and discovery of knowledge, etc.
THE IMPEDIMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN IN THE TIMES, AND IN
DIVERSION OF WITS, BEING THE 5TH CHAPTER, A SMALL
FRAGMENT IN THE BEGINNING OF THAT CHAPTER.
The encounters of the times have been nothing favourable and
prosperous for the invention of knowledge; so as it is not only the daintiness
of the seed to take, and the ill mixture and unliking of the ground to nourish
or raise this plant, but the ill season also of the weather by which it hath
been checked and blasted. Especially in that the seasons have been proper
to bring up and set forward other more hasty and indifferent plants,
whereby this of knowledge bath been starved and overgrown; for in the
descent of times always there hath been somewhat else in reign and
reputation, which hath generally aliened and diverted wits and labours from
that employment.
For as for the uttermost antiquity which is like fame that muffles her head
and tells tales, I cannot presume much of it; for I would not willingly
imitate the manner of those that describe maps, which when they come to

some far countries whereof they have no knowledge, set down how there be
great wastes and deserts there: so I am not apt to affirm that they knew
little, because what they knew is little known to us. But if you will judge of
them by the last traces that remain to us, you will conclude, though not so
scornfully as Aristotle doth, that saith our ancestors were extreme gross, as
those that came newly from being moulded out of the clay or some earthly
substance; yet reasonably and probably thus, that it was with them in matter
of knowledge but as the dawning or break of day. For at that time the world
was altogether home-bred, every nation looked little beyond their own
confines or territories, and the world had no through lights then, as it hath
had since by commerce and navigation, whereby there could neither be that
contribution of wits one to help another, nor that variety of particulars for
the correcting of customary conceits.
And as there could be no great collection of wits of several parts or
nations, so neither could there be any succession of wits of several times,
whereby one might refine the other, in regard they had not history to any
purpose. And the manner of their traditions was utterly unfit and unproper
for amplification of knowledge. And again the studies of those times, you
shall find, besides wars, incursions, and rapines, which were then almost
every where betwixt states adjoining (the use of leagues and confederacies
being not then known), were to populate by multitude of wives and
generation, a thing at this day in the waster part of the West-Indies
principally affected; and to build sometimes for habitation towns and cities,
sometimes for fame and memory monuments, pyramids, colosses, and the
like. And if there happened to rise up any more civil wits; then would he
found and erect some new laws, customs, and usages, such as now of late
years, when the world was revolute almost to the like rudeness and
obscurity, we see both in our own nation and abroad many examples of, as
well in a number of tenures reserved upon men's lands, as in divers customs
of towns and manors, being the devices that such wits wrought upon in such
times of deep ignorance, etc.
THE IMPEDIMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE FOR WANT OF A TRUE
SUCCESSION OF WITS, AND THAT HITHERTO THE LENGTH OF
ONE MAN'S LIFE HATH BEEN THE GREATEST MEASURE OF
KNOWLEDGE, BEING THE 6TH CHAPTER, THE WHOLE CHAPTER.

In arts mechanical the first device comes shortest and time addeth and
perfecteth. But in sciences of conceit the first author goeth furthest and time
leeseth and corrupteth. Painting, artillery, sailing, and the like, grossly
managed at first, by time accommodate and refined. The philosophies and
sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, of most vigour at
first, by time degenerated and imbased. In the former many wits and
industries contributed in one: In the latter many men's wits spent to deprave
the wit of one.
The error is both in the deliverer and in the receiver. He that delivereth
knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be soonest believed,
and not as may be easiliest examined. He that receiveth knowledge desireth
rather present satisfaction than expectant search, and so rather not to doubt
than not to err. Glory maketh the author not to lay open his weakness, and
sloth maketh the disciple not to know his strength.
Then begin men to aspire to the second prizes; to be a profound
interpreter and commenter, to be a sharp champion and defender, to be a
methodical compounder and abridger. And this is the unfortunate
succession of wits which the world hath yet had, whereby the patrimony of
all knowledge goeth not on husbanded or improved, but wasted and
decayed. For knowledge is like a water that will never arise again higher
than the level from which it fell; and therefore to go beyond Aristotle by the
light of Aristotle is to think that a borrowed light can increase the original
light from whom it is taken. So then no true succession of wits having been
in the world, either we must conclude that knowledge is but a task for one
man's life, and then vain was the complaint that LIFE IS SHORT, AND
ART IS LONG: or else, that the knowledge that now is, is but a shrub, and
not that tree which is never dangerous, but where it is to the purpose of
knowing Good and Evil; which desire ever riseth upon an appetite to elect
and not to obey, and so containeth in it a manifest defection.

CHAPTER 7. — THAT THE PRETENDED
SUCCESSION OF WITS HATH BEEN EVIL
PLACED, FOR ASMUCH AS AFTER VARIETY
OF SECTS AND OPINIONS, THE MOST
POPULAR AND NOT THE TRUEST
PREVAILETH AND WEARETH OUT THE REST;
BEING THE 7TH CHAPTER; A FRAGMENT.

It is sensible to think that when men enter first into search and inquiry,
according to the several frames and compositions of their understanding
they light upon different conceits, and so all opinions and doubts are beaten
over, and then men having made a taste of all wax weary of variety, and so
reject the worst and hold themselves to the best, either some one if it be
eminent, or some two or three if they be in some equality, which afterwards
are received and carried on, and the rest extinct.
But truth is contrary, and that time is like a river which carrieth down
things which are light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which
is sad and weighty. For howsoever governments have several forms,
sometimes one governing, sometimes few, sometimes the multitude; yet the
state of knowledge is ever a DEMOCRATIE, and that prevaileth which is
most agreeable to the senses and conceits of people. As for example there is
no great doubt but he that did put the beginnings of things to be SOLID,
VOID, AND MOTION TO THE CENTRE, was in better earnest than he
that put MATTER, FORM, AND SHIFT; or he that put the MIND,
MOTION, AND MATTER. For no man shall enter into inquisition of
nature, but shall pass by that opinion of Democritus, whereas he shall never

come near the other two opinions, but leave them aloof for the schools and
table-talk. Yet those of Aristotle and Plato, because they be both agreeable
to popular sense, and the one was uttered with subtilty and the spirit of
contradiction, and the other with a stile of ornament and majesty, did hold
out, and the other gave place, etc.

CHAPTER 8. — OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF
KNOWLEDGE IN HANDLING IT BY PARTS,
AND IN SLIPPING OFF PARTICULAR SCIENCES
FROM THE ROOT AND STOCK OF UNIVERSAL
KNOWLEDGE, BEING THE 8TH CHAPTER, THE
WHOLE CHAPTER.

Cicero, the orator, willing to magnify his own profession, and thereupon
spending many words to maintain that eloquence was not a shop of good
words and elegancies but a treasury and receipt of all knowledges, so far
forth as may appertain to the handling and moving of the minds and
affections of men by speech, maketh great complaint of the school of
Socrates; that whereas before his time the same professors of wisdom in
Greece did pretend to teach an universal SAPIENCE and knowledge both
of matter and words, Socrates divorced them and withdrew philosophy and
left rhetoric to itself, which by that destitution became but a barren and
unnoble science. And in particular sciences we see that if men fall to
subdivide their labours, as to be an oculist in physic, or to be perfect in
some one title of the law, or the like, they may prove ready and subtile, but
not deep or sufficient, no not in that subject which they do particularly
attend, because of that consent which it hath with the rest. And it is a matter
of common discourse of the chain of sciences how they are linked together,
insomuch as the Grecians, who had terms at will, have fitted it of a name of
CIRCLE LEARNING. Nevertheless I that hold it for a great impediment
towards the advancement and further invention of knowledge, that
particular arts and sciences have been disincorporated from general
knowledge, do not understand one and the same thing which Cicero's

discourse and the note and conceit of the Grecians in their word CIRCLE
LEARNING do intend. For I mean not that use which one science hath of
another for ornament or help in practice, as the orator hath of knowledge of
affections for moving, or as military science may have use of geometry for
fortifications; but I mean it directly of that use by way of supply of light and
information which the particulars and instances of one science do yield and
present for the framing or correcting of the axioms of another science in
their very truth and notion. And therefore that example of OCULISTS and
TITLE LAWYERS doth come nearer my conceit than the other two; for
sciences distinguished have a dependence upon universal knowledge to be
augmented and rectified by the superior light thereof, as well as the parts
and members of a science have upon the MAXIMS of the same science,
and the mutual light and consent which one part receiveth of another. And
therefore the opinion of Copernicus in astronomy, which astronomy itself
cannot correct because it is not repugnant to any of the appearances, yet
natural philosophy doth correct. On the other side if some of the ancient
philosophers had been perfect in the observations of astronomy, and had
called them to counsel when they made their principles and first axioms,
they would never have divided their philosophy as the Cosmographers do
their descriptions by globes, making one philosophy for heaven and another
for under heaven, as in effect they do.
So if the moral philosophers that have spent such an infinite quantity of
debate touching Good and the highest good, had cast their eye abroad upon
nature and beheld the appetite that is in all things to receive and to give; the
one motion affecting preservation and the other multiplication; which
appetites are most evidently seen in living creatures in the pleasure of
nourishment and generation; and in man do make the aptest and most
natural division of all his desires, being either of sense of pleasure or sense
of power; and in the universal frame of the world are figured, the one in the
beams of heaven which issue forth, and the other in the lap of the earth
which takes in: and again if they had observed the motion of congruity or
situation of the parts in respect of the whole, evident in so many particulars;
and lastly if they had considered the motion (familiar in attraction of things)
to approach to that which is higher in the same kind; when by these
observations so easy and concurring in natural philosophy, they should have
found out this quaternion of good, in enjoying or fruition, effecting or
operation, consenting or proportion, and approach or assumption; they

would have saved and abridged much of their long and wandering
discourses of pleasure, virtue, duty, and religion. So likewise in this same
logic and rhetoric, or arts of argument and grace of speech, if the great
masters of them would but have gone a form lower, and looked but into the
observations of Grammar concerning the kinds of words, their derivations,
deflexions, and syntax; specially enriching the same with the helps of
several languages, with their differing proprieties of words, phrases, and
tropes; they might have found out more and better footsteps of common
reason, help of disputation, and advantages of cavillation, than many of
these which they have propounded. So again a man should be thought to
dally, if he did note how the figures of rhetoric and music are many of them
the same. The repetitions and traductions in speech and the reports and
hauntings of sounds in music are the very same things. Plutarch hath almost
made a book of the Lacedaemonian kind of jesting, which joined ever
pleasure with distaste. SIR, (saith a man of art to Philip king of Macedon
when he controlled him in his faculty,) GOD FORBID YOUR FORTUNE
SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO KNOW THESE THINGS BETTER THAN I.
In taxing his ignorance in his art he represented to him the perpetual
greatness of his fortune, leaving him no vacant time for so mean a skill.
Now in music it is one of the ordinariest flowers to fall from a discord or
hard tune upon a sweet accord. The figure that Cicero and the rest commend
as one of the best points of elegancy, which is the fine checking of
expectation, is no less well known to the musicians when they have a
special grace in flying the close or cadence. And these are no allusions but
direct communities, the same delights of the mind being to be found not
only in music, rhetoric, but in moral philosophy, policy, and other
knowledges, and that obscure in the one, which is more apparent in the
other, yea and that discovered in the one which is not found at all in the
other, and so one science greatly aiding to the invention and augmentation
of another. And therefore without this intercourse the axioms of sciences
will fall out to be neither full nor true; but will be such opinions as Aristotle
in some places doth wisely censure, when he saith THESE ARE THE
OPINIONS OF PERSONS THAT HAVE RESPECT BUT TO A FEW
THINGS. So then we see that this note leadeth us to an administration of
knowledge in some such order and policy as the king of Spain in regard of
his great dominions useth in state; who though he hath particular councils
for several countries and affairs, yet hath one council of State or last resort,

that receiveth the advertisements and certificates from all the rest. Hitherto
of the diversion, succession, and conference of wits.

CHAPTER 9. — THAT THE END AND SCOPE OF
KNOWLEDGE HATH BEEN GENERALLY
MISTAKEN, AND THAT MEN WERE NEVER
WELL ADVISED WHAT IT WAS THEY SOUGHT;
BEING THE 9TH CHAPTER, WHEREOF A
FRAGMENT (WHICH IS THE END OF THE
SAME CHAPTER) IS BEFORE.

It appeareth then how rarely the wits and labours of men have been
converted to the severe and original inquisition of knowledge; and in those
who have pretended, what hurt hath been done by the affectation of
professors and the distraction of such as were no professors; and how there
was never in effect any conjunction or combination of wits in the first and
inducing search, but that every man wrought apart, and would either have
his own way or else would go no further than his guide, having in the one
case the honour of a first, and in the other the ease of a second; and lastly
how in the descent and continuance of wits and labours the succession hath
been in the most popular and weak opinions, like unto the weakest natures
which many times have most children, and in them also the condition of
succession hath been rather to defend and to adorn than to add; and if to
add, yet that addition to be rather a refining of a part than an increase of the
whole. But the impediments of time and accidents, though they have
wrought a general indisposition, yet are they not so peremptory and binding
as the internal impediments and clouds in the mind and spirit of man,
whereof it now followeth to speak.

The Scripture speaking of the worst sort of error saith, ERRARE FECIT
COS IN INVIO ET NON IN VIA. For a man may wander in the way, by
rounding up and down. But if men have failed in their very direction and
address that error will never by good fortune correct itself. Now it hath
fared with men in their contemplations as Seneca saith it fareth with them in
their actions, DE PARTIBUS VITAE QUISQUE DELIBERAT, DE
SUMMA NEMO. A course very ordinary with men who receive for the
most part their final ends from the inclination of their nature, or from
common example and opinion, never questioning or examining them, nor
reducing them to any clear certainty; and use only to call themselves to
account and deliberation touching the means and second ends, and thereby
set themselves in the right way to the wrong place. So likewise upon the
natural curiosity and desire to know, they have put themselves in way
without foresight or consideration of their journey's end.
For I find that even those that have sought knowledge for itself, and not
for benefit or ostentation or any practical enablement in the course of their
life, have nevertheless propounded to themselves a wrong mark, namely
satisfaction (which men call truth) and not operation. For as in the courts
and services of princes and states it is a much easier matter to give
satisfaction than to do the business; so in the inquiring of causes and
reasons it is much easier to find out such causes as will satisfy the mind of
man and quiet objections, than such causes as will direct him and give him
light to new experiences and inventions. And this did Celsus note wisely
and truly, how that the causes which are in use and whereof the knowledges
now received do consist, were in time minors and subsequents to the
knowledge of the particulars out of which they were induced and collected;
and that it was not the light of those causes which discovered particulars,
but only the particulars being first found, men did fall on glossing and
discoursing of the causes; which is the reason why the learning that now is
hath the curse of barrenness, and is courtesanlike, for pleasure, and not for
fruit. Nay to compare it rightly, the strange fiction of the poets of the
transformation of Scylla seemeth to be a lively emblem of this philosophy
and knowledge; a fair woman upwards in the parts of show, but when you
come to the parts of use and generation, Barking Monsters; for no better are
the endless distorted questions, which ever have been, and of necessity must
be, the end and womb of such knowledge.

But yet nevertheless here I may be mistaken, by reason of some which
have much in their pen the referring sciences to action and the use of man,
which mean quite another matter than I do. For they mean a contriving of
directions and precepts for readiness of practice, which I discommend not,
so it be not occasion that some quantity of the science be lost; for else it
will be such a piece of husbandry as to put away a manor lying somewhat
scattered, to buy in a close that lieth handsomely about a dwelling. But my
intention contrariwise is to increase and multiply the revenues and
possessions of man, and not to trim up only or order with conveniency the
grounds whereof he is already stated. Wherefore the better to make myself
understood that I mean nothing less than words, and directly to demonstrate
the point which we are now upon, that is, what is the true end, scope, or
office of knowledge, which I have set down to consist not in any plausible,
delectable, reverend, or admired discourse, or any satisfactory arguments,
but in effecting and working, and in discovery of particulars not revealed
before for the better endowment and help of man's life; I have thought good
to make as it were a Kalendar or Inventory of the wealth, furniture, or
means of man according to his present estate, as far as it is known; which I
do not to shew any universality of sense or knowledge, and much less to
make a satire of reprehension in respect of wants and errors, but partly
because cogitations new had need of some grossness and inculcation to
make them perceived; and chiefly to the end that for the time to come (upon
the account and state now made and cast up) it may appear what increase
this new manner of use and administration of the stock (if it be once
planted) shall bring with it hereafter; and for the time present (in case I
should be prevented by death to propound and reveal this new light as I
purpose) yet I may at the least give some awaking note both of the wants in
man's present condition and the nature of the supplies to be wished; though
for mine own part neither do I much build upon my present anticipations,
neither do I think ourselves yet learned or wise enough to wish reasonably:
for as it asks some knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it
asketh some sense to make a wish not absurd.

CHAPTER 10. — THE INVENTORY, OR AN
ENUMERATION AND VIEW OF INVENTIONS
ALREADY DISCOVERED AND IN USE,
TOGETHER WITH A NOTE OF THE WANTS
AND THE NATURE OF THE SUPPLIES, BEING
THE 10TH CHAPTER; AND THIS A SMALL
FRAGMENT THEREOF, BEING THE PREFACE
TO THE INVENTORY.

The plainest method and most directly pertinent to this intention, will be
to make distribution of sciences, arts, inventions, works, and their portions,
according to the use and tribute which they yield and render to the
conditions of man's life, and under those several uses, being as several
offices of provisions, to charge and tax what may be reasonably exacted or
demanded; not guiding ourselves neither by the poverty of experiences and
probations, nor according to the vanity of credulous imaginations; and then
upon those charges and taxations to distinguish and present, as it were in
several columns, what is extant and already found, and what is defective
and further to be provided. Of which provisions, because in many of them
after the manner of slothful and faulty officers and accomptants it will be
returned (by way of excuse) that no such are to be had, it will be fit to give
some light of the nature of the supplies, whereby it will evidently appear
that they are to be compassed and procured. And yet nevertheless on the
other side again it will be as fit to check and control the vain and void
assignations and gifts whereby certain ignorant, extravagant, and abusing

wits have pretended to indue the state of man with wonders, differing as
much from truth in nature as Caesar's Commentaries differeth from the acts
of King Arthur or Huon of Bourdeaux in story. For it is true that Caesar did
greater things than those idle wits had the audacity to feign their supposed
worthies to have done; but he did them not in that monstrous and fabulous
manner.

CHAPTER 11. — THE CHAPTER IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE INVENTORY; BEING THE
11TH IN ORDER; A PART THEREOF.

It appeareth then what is now in proposition not by general
circumlocution but by particular note. No former philosophy varied in terms
or method; no new PLACET or speculation upon particulars already
known; no referring to action by any manual of practice; but the revealing
and discovering of new inventions and operations. This to be done without
the errors and conjectures of art, or the length or difficulties of experience;
the nature and kinds of which inventions have been described as they could
be discovered; for your eye cannot pass one kenning without further sailing;
only we have stood upon the best advantages of the notions received, as
upon a mount, to shew the knowledges adjacent and confining. If therefore
the true end of knowledge not propounded hath bred large error, the best
and perfectest condition of the same end not perceived will cause some
declination. For when the butt is set up men need not rove, but except the
white be placed men cannot level. This perfection we mean not in the worth
of the effect, but in the nature of the direction; for our purpose is not to stir
up men's hopes, but to guide their travels. The fullness of direction to work
and produce any effect consisteth in two conditions, certainty and liberty.
Certainty is when the direction is not only true for the most part, but
infallible. Liberty is when the direction is not restrained to some definite
means, but comprehendeth all the means and ways possible; for the poet
saith well SAPIENTIBUS UNDIQUE LATAE SUNT VIAE, and where
there is the greatest plurality of change, there is the greatest singularity of
choice. Besides as a conjectural direction maketh a casual effect, so a
particular and restrained direction is no less casual than an uncertain. For
those particular means whereunto it is tied may be out of your power or
may be accompanied with an overvalue of prejudice; and so if for want of

certainty in direction you are frustrated in success, for want of variety in
direction you are stopped in attempt. If therefore your direction be certain,
it must refer you and point you to somewhat which, if it be present, the
effect you seek will of necessity follow, else may you perform and not
obtain. If it be free, then must it refer you to somewhat which if it be absent
the effect you seek will of necessity withdraw, else may you have power
and not attempt. This notion Aristotle had in light, though not in use. For
the two commended rules by him set down, whereby the axioms of sciences
are precepted to be made convertible, and which the latter men have not
without elegancy surnamed the one the rule of truth because it preventeth
deceit, the other the rule of prudence because it freeth election, are the same
thing in speculation and affirmation which we now observe. An example
will make my meaning attained, and yet percase make it thought that they
attained it not. Let the effect to be produced be Whiteness; let the first
direction be that if air and water be intermingled or broken in small portions
together, whiteness will ensue, as in snow, in the breaking of the waves of
the sea and rivers, and the like. This direction is certain, but very particular
and restrained, being tied but to air and water. Let the second direction be,
that if air be mingled as before with any transparent body, such nevertheless
as is uncoloured and more grossly transparent than air itself, that then etc.
as glass or crystal, being beaten to fine powder, by the interposition of the
air becometh white; the white of an egg being clear of itself, receiving air
by agitation becometh white, receiving air by concoction becometh white;
here you are freed from water, and advanced to a clear body, and still tied to
air. Let the third direction exclude or remove the restraint of an uncoloured
body, as in amber, sapphires, etc. which beaten to fine powder become
white; in wine and beer, which brought to froth become white. Let the
fourth direction exclude the restraint of a body more grossly transparent
than air, as in flame, being a body compounded between air and a finer
substance than air; which flame if it were not for the smoke, which is the
third substance that incorporateth itself and dyeth the flame, would be more
perfect white. In all these four directions air still beareth a part. Let the fifth
direction then be, that if any bodies, both transparent but in an unequal
degree, be mingled as before, whiteness will follow; as oil and water beaten
to an ointment, though by settling the air which gathereth in the agitation be
evaporate, yet remaineth white; and the powder of glass or crystal put into
water, whereby the air giveth place, yet remaineth white, though not so

perfect. Now are you freed from air, but still you are tied to transparent
bodies. To ascend further by scale I do forbear, partly because it would
draw on the example to an over-great length, but chiefly because it would
open that which in this work I determine to reserve; for to pass through the
whole history and observation of colours and objects visible were too long a
digression; and our purpose is now to give an example of a free direction,
thereby to distinguish and describe it; and not to set down a form of
interpretation how to recover and attain it. But as we intend not now to
reveal, so we are circumspect not to mislead; and therefore (this warning
being given) returning to our purpose in hand, we admit the sixth direction
to be, that all bodies or parts of bodies which are unequal equally, that is in
a simple proportion, do represent whiteness; we will explain this, though we
induce it not. It is then to be understood, that absolute equality produceth
transparence, inequality in simple order or proportion produceth whiteness,
inequality in compound or respective order or proportion produceth all
other colours, and absolute or orderless inequality produceth blackness;
which diversity, if so gross a demonstration be needful, may be signified by
four tables; a blank, a chequer, a fret, and a medley; whereof the fret is
evident to admit great variety. Out of this assertion are satisfied a multitude
of effects and observations, as that whiteness and blackness are most
incompatible with transparence; that whiteness keepeth light, and blackness
stoppeth light, but neither passeth it; that whiteness or blackness are never
produced in rainbows, diamonds, crystals, and the like; that white giveth no
dye, and black hardly taketh dye; that whiteness seemeth to have an affinity
with dryness, and blackness with moisture; that adustion causeth blackness,
and calcination whiteness; that flowers are generally of fresh colours, and
rarely black, etc. All which I do now mention confusedly by way of
derivation and not by way of induction. This sixth direction, which I have
thus explained, is of good and competent liberty for whiteness fixed and
inherent, but not for whiteness fantastical or appearing, as shall be
afterwards touched. But first do you need a reduction back to certainty or
verity; for it is not all position or contexture of unequal bodies that will
produce colour; for AQUA FORTIS, oil of VITRIOL, etc. more manifestly,
and many other substances more obscurely, do consist of very unequal
parts, which yet are transparent and clear. Therefore the reduction must be,
that the bodies or parts of bodies so intermingled as before be of a certain
grossness or magnitude; for the unequalities which move the sight must

have a further dimension and quantity than those which operate many other
effects. Some few grains of saffron will give a tincture to a tun of water; but
so many grains of civet will give a perfume to a whole chamber of air. And
therefore when Democritus (from whom Epicurus did borrow it) held that
the position of the solid portions was the cause of colours, yet in the very
truth of his assertion he should have added, that the portions are required to
be of some magnitude. And this is one cause why colours have little
inwardness and necessitude with the nature and proprieties of things, those
things resembling in colour which otherwise differ most, as salt and sugar,
and contrariwise differing in colour which otherwise resemble most, as the
white and blue violets, and the several veins of one agate or marble, by
reason that other virtues consist in more subtile proportions than colours do;
and yet are there virtues and natures which require a grosser magnitude than
colours, as well as scents and divers other require a more subtile; for as the
portion of a body will give forth scent which is too small to be seen, so the
portion of a body will shew colours which is too small to be endued with
weight; and therefore one of the prophets with great elegancy describing
how all creatures carry no proportion towards God the creator, saith, THAT
ALL THE NATIONS IN RESPECT OF HIM ARE LIKE THE DUST
UPON THE BALANCE, which is a thing appeareth but weigheth not. But
to return, there resteth a further freeing of this sixth direction; for the
clearness of a river or stream sheweth white at a distance, and crystalline
glasses deliver the face or any other object falsified in whiteness, and long
beholding the snow to a weak eye giveth an impression of azure rather than
of whiteness. So as for whiteness in apparition only and representation by
the qualifying of the light, altering the INTERMEDIUM, or affecting the
eye itself, it reacheth not. But you must free your direction to the producing
of such an incidence, impression, or operation, as may cause a precise and
determinate passion of the eye; a matter which is much more easy to induce
than that which we have passed through; but yet because it hath a full
coherence both with that act of radiation (which hath hitherto been
conceived and termed so unproperly and untruly by some an effluxion of
spiritual species and by others an investing of the INTERMEDIUM with a
motion which successively is conveyed to the eye) and with the act of
sense, wherein I should likewise open that which I think good to withdraw,
I will omit. Neither do I contend but that this motion which I call the
freeing of a direction, in the received philosophies (as far as a swimming

anticipation could take hold) might be perceived and discerned; being not
much other matter than that which they did not only aim at in the two rules
of AXIOMS before remembered, but more nearly also in that which they
term the form or formal cause, or that which they call the true difference;
both which nevertheless it seemeth they propound rather as impossibilities
and wishes than as things within the compass of human comprehension. For
Plato casteth his burden and saith THAT HE WILL REVERE HIM AS A
GOD, THAT CAN TRULY DIVIDE AND DEFINE; which cannot be but
by true forms and differences. Wherein I join hands with him, confessing as
much as yet assuming to myself little; for if any man call by the strength of
his ANTICIPATIONS find out forms, I will magnify him with the foremost.
But as any of them would say that if divers things which many men know
by instruction and observation another knew by revelation and without
those means, they would take him for somewhat supernatural and divine; so
I do acknowledge that if any man can by anticipations reach to that which a
weak and inferior wit may attain to by interpretation, he cannot receive too
high a title. Nay I for my part do indeed admire to see how far some of
them have proceeded by their ANTICIPATIONS; but how? It is as I wonder
at some blind men, to see what shift they make without their eye-sight;
thinking with myself that if I were blind I could hardly do it. Again
Aristotle's school confesseth that there is no true knowledge but by causes,
no true cause but the form, no true form known except one, which they are
pleased to allow; and therefore thus far their evidence standeth with us, that
both hitherto there hath been nothing but a shadow of knowledge, and that
we propound now that which is agreed to be worthiest to be sought, and
hardest to be found. There wanteth now a part very necessary, not by way of
supply but by way of caution; for as it is seen for the most part that the
outward tokens and badges of excellency and perfection are more incident
to things merely counterfeit than to that which is true, but for a meaner and
baser sort; as a dubline is more like a perfect ruby than a spinel, and a
counterfeit angel is made more like a true angel than if it were an angel
coined of China gold; in like manner the direction carrieth a resemblance of
a true direction in verity and liberty which indeed is no direction at all. For
though your direction seem to be certain and free by pointing you to a
nature that is unseparable from the nature you inquire upon, yet if it do not
carry you on a degree or remove nearer to action, operation, or light to
make or produce, it is but superficial and counterfeit. Wherefore to secure

and warrant what is a true direction, though that general note I have given
be perspicuous in itself (for a man shall soon cast with himself whether he
be ever the nearer to effect and operate or no, or whether he have won but
an abstract or varied notion) yet for better instruction I will deliver three
particular notes of caution. The first is that the nature discovered be more
original than the nature supposed, and not more secondary or of the like
degree; as to make a stone bright or to make it smooth it is a good direction
to say, make it even; but to make a stone even it is no good direction to say,
make it bright or make it smooth; for the rule is that the disposition of any
thing referring to the state of it in itself or the parts, is more original than
that which is relative or transitive towards another thing. So evenness is the
disposition of the stone in itself, but smooth is to the hand and bright to the
eye, and yet nevertheless they all cluster and concur; and yet the direction is
more unperfect, if it do appoint you to such a relative as is in the same kind
and not in a diverse. For in the direction to produce brightness by
smoothness, although properly it win no degree, and will never teach you
any new particulars before unknown; yet by way of suggestion or bringing
to mind it may draw your consideration to some particulars known but not
remembered; as you shall sooner remember some practical means of
making smoothness, than if you had fixed your consideration only upon
brightness by making reflexion, as thus, make it such as you may see your
face in it, this is merely secondary, and helpeth neither by way of informing
nor by way of suggestion. So if in the inquiry of whiteness you were
directed to make such a colour as should be seen furthest in a dark light;
here you are advanced nothing at all. For these kinds of natures are but
proprieties, effects, circumstances, concurrences, or what else you shall like
to call them, and not radical and formative natures towards the nature
supposed. The second caution is that the nature inquired be collected by
division before composition, or to speak more properly, by composition
subaltern before you ascend to composition absolute, etc.
OF THE INTERNAL AND PROFOUND ERRORS AND
SUPERSTITIONS IN THE NATURE OF THE MIND, AND OF THE
FOUR SORTS OF IDOLS OR FICTIONS WHICH OFFER
THEMSELVES TO THE UNDERSTANDING IN THE INQUISITION OF
KNOWLEDGE; BEING THE 16TH CHAPTER, AND THIS A SMALL
FRAGMENT THEREOF, BEING A PREFACE TO THE INWARD
ELENCHES OF THE MIND.

The opinion of Epicurus that the gods were of human shape, was rather
justly derided than seriously confuted by the other sects, demanding
whether every kind of sensible creatures did not think their own figure
fairest, as the horse, the bull, and the like, which found no beauty but in
their own forms, as in appetite of lust appeared. And the heresy of the
Anthropomorphites was ever censured for a gross conceit bred in the
obscure cells of solitary monks that never looked abroad. Again the fable so
well known of QUIS PINXIT LEONEM, doth set forth well that there is an
error of pride and partiality, as well as of custom and familiarity. The
reflexion also from glasses so usually resembled to the imagery of the mind,
every man knoweth to receive error and variety both in colour, magnitude,
and shape, according to the quality of the glass. But yet no use hath been
made of these and many the like observations, to move men to search out
and upon search to give true cautions of the native and inherent errors in the
mind of man which have coloured and corrupted all his notions and
impressions.
I do find therefore in this enchanted glass four Idols or false appearances
of several and distinct sorts, every sort comprehending many subdivisions:
the first sort, I call idols of the NATION or TRIBE; the second, idols of the
PALACE; the third, idols of the CAVE; and the fourth, idols of the
THEATRE, etc.
HERE FOLLOWETH AN ABRIDGMENT OF DIVERS CHAPTERS
OF THE FIRST BOOK OF INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

CHAPTER 12.

That in deciding and determining of the truth of knowledge, men have
put themselves upon trials not competent. That antiquity and authority;
common and confessed notions; the natural and yielding consent of the
mind; the harmony and coherence of a knowledge in itself; the establishing
of principles with the touch and reduction of other propositions unto them;
inductions without instances contradictory; and the report of the senses; are
none of them absolute and infallible evidence of truth, and bring no security
sufficient for effects and operations. That the discovery of new works and
active directions not known before, is the only trial to be accepted of; and
yet not that neither, in ease where one particular giveth light to another; but
where particulars induce an axiom or observation, which axiom found out
discovereth and designeth new particulars. That the nature of this trial is not
only upon the point, whether the knowledge be profitable or no, but even
upon the point whether the knowledge be true or no; not because you may
always conclude that the Axiom which discovereth new instances is true,
but contrariwise you may safely conclude that if it discover not any new
instance it is in vain and untrue. That by new instances are not always to be
understood new recipes but new assignations, and of the diversity between
these two. That the subtilty of words, arguments, notions, yea of the senses
themselves, is but rude and gross in comparison of the subtilty of things;
and of the slothful and flattering opinions of those which pretend to honour
the mind of man in withdrawing and abstracting it from particulars, and of
the inducements and motives whereupon such opinions have been
conceived and received.

CHAPTER 13.

Of the error in propounding chiefly the search of causes and productions
of things concrete, which are infinite and transitory, and not of abstract
natures, which are few and permanent. That these natures are as the
alphabet or simple letters, whereof the variety of things consisteth; or as the
colours mingled in the painter's shell, wherewith he is able to make infinite
variety of faces or shapes. An enumeration of them according to popular
note. That at the first one would conceive that in the schools by natural
philosophy were meant the knowledge of the efficients of things concrete;
and by metaphysic the knowledge of the forms of natures simple; which is a
good and fit division of knowledge: but upon examination there is no such
matter by them intended. That the little inquiry into the production of
simple natures sheweth well that works were not sought; because by the
former knowledge some small and superficial deflexions from the ordinary
generations and productions may be found out, but the discovery of all
profound and radical alteration must arise out of the latter knowledge.

CHAPTER 14.

Of the error in propounding the search of the materials or dead
beginnings or principles of things, and not the nature of motions,
inclinations, and applications. That the whole scope of the former search is
impertinent and vain; both because there are no such beginnings, and if
there were they could not be known. That the latter manner of search
(which is all) they pass over compendiously and slightly as a by-matter.
That the several conceits in that kind, as that the lively and moving
beginnings of things should be shift or appetite of matter to privation; the
spirit of the world working in matter according to platform; the proceeding
or fructifying of distinct kinds according to their proprieties; the intercourse
of the elements by mediation of their common qualities; the appetite of like
portions to unite themselves; amity and discord, or sympathy and antipathy;
motion to the centre, with motion of stripe or press; the casual agitation,
aggregation, and essays of the solid portions in the void space; motion of
shuttings and openings; are all mere nugations; and that the calculating and
ordination of the true degrees, moments, limits, and laws of motions and
alterations (by means whereof all works and effects are produced), is a
matter of a far other nature than to consist in such easy and wild
generalities.

CHAPTER 15.

Of the great error of inquiring knowledge in Anticipations. That I call
Anticipations the voluntary collections that the mind maketh of knowledge;
which is every man's reason. That though this be a solemn thing, and serves
the turn to negotiate between man and man (because of the conformity and
participation of men's minds in the like errors), yet towards inquiry of the
truth of things and works it is of no value. That civil respects are a lett that
this pretended reason should not be so contemptibly spoken of as were fit
and medicinable, in regard that hath been too much exalted and glorified, to
the infinite detriment of man's estate. Of the nature of words and their
facility and aptness to cover and grace the defects of Anticipations. That it
is no marvel if these Anticipations have brought forth such diversity and
repugnance in opinions, theories, or philosophies, as so many fables of
several arguments. That had not the nature of civil customs and government
been in most times somewhat adverse to such innovations, though
contemplative, there might have been and would have been many more.
That the second school of the Academics and the sect of Pyrrho, or the
considerers that denied comprehension, as to the disabling of man's
knowledge (entertained in Anticipations) is well to be allowed, but that they
ought when they had overthrown and purged the floor of the ruins to have
sought to build better in place. And more especially that they did unjustly
and prejudicially to charge the deceit upon the report of the senses, which
admitteth very sparing remedy; being indeed to have been charged upon the
Anticipations of the mind, which admitteth a perfect remedy. That the
information of the senses is sufficient, not because they err not, but because
the use of the sense in discovering of knowledge is for the most part not
immediate. So that it is the work, effect, or instance, that trieth the Axiom,
and the sense doth but try the work done or not done, being or not being.
That the mind of man in collecting knowledge needeth great variety of
helps, as well as the hand of man in manual and mechanical practices

needeth great variety of instruments. And that it were a poor work that if
instruments were removed men would overcome with their naked hands.
And of the distinct points of want and insufficiency in the mind of man.

CHAPTER 16.

That the mind of a man, as it is not a vessel of that content or receipt to
comprehend knowledge without helps and supplies, so again it is not
sincere, but of an ill and corrupt tincture. Of the inherent and profound
errors and superstitions in the nature of the mind, and of the four sorts of
Idols or false appearances that offer themselves to the understanding in the
inquisition of knowledge; that is to say, the Idols of the Tribe, the Idols of
the Palace, the Idols of the Cave, and the Idols of the Theatre. That these
four, added to the incapacity of the mind and the vanity and malignity of the
affections, leave nothing but impotency and confusion. A recital of the
particular kinds of these four Idols, with some chosen examples of the
opinions they have begot, such of them as have supplanted the state of
knowledge most.

CHAPTER 17.

Of the errors of such as have descended and applied themselves to
experience, and attempted to induce knowledge upon particulars. That they
have not had the resolution and strength of mind to free themselves wholly
from Anticipations, but have made a confusion and intermixture of
Anticipations and observations, and so vanished. That if any have had the
strength of mind generally to purge away and discharge all Anticipations,
they have not had that greater and double strength and patience of mind, as
well to repel new Anticipations after the view and search of particulars, as
to reject old which were in their mind before; but have from particulars and
history flown up to principles without the mean degrees, and so framed all
the middle generalities or axioms, not by way of scale or ascension from
particulars, but by way of derivation from principles; whence hath issued
the infinite chaos of shadows and notions, wherewith both books and minds
have been hitherto, and may be yet hereafter much more pestered. That in
the course of those derivations, to make them yet the more unprofitable,
they have used when any light of new instance opposite to any assertion
appeared, rather to reconcile the instance than to amend the rule. That if any
have had or shall have the power and resolution to fortify and inclose his
mind against all Anticipations, yet if he have not been or shall not be
cautioned by the full understanding of the nature of the mind and spirit of
man, and therein of the seats, pores and passages both of knowledge and
error, he hath not been nor shall not be possibly able to guide or keep on his
course aright. That those that have been conversant in experience and
observation have used, when they have intended to discover the cause of
any effect, to fix their consideration narrowly and exactly upon that effect
itself with all the circumstances thereof, and to vary the trial thereof as
many ways as can be devised; which course amounteth but to a tedious
curiosity, and ever breaketh off in wondering and not in knowing; and that
they have not used to enlarge their observation to match and sort that effect

with instances of a diverse subject, which must of necessity be before any
cause be found out. That they have passed over the observation of instances
vulgar and ignoble, and stayed their attention chiefly upon instances of
mark; whereas the other sort are for the most part more significant and of
better height and information. That every particular that worketh any effect
is a thing compounded (more or less) of diverse single natures, (more
manifest and more obscure,) and that it appeareth not to whether of the
natures the effect is to be ascribed, and yet notwithstanding they have taken
a course without breaking particulars and reducing them by exclusions and
inclusions to a definite point, to conclude upon inductions in gross, which
empirical course is no less vain than the scholastical. That all such as have
sought action and work out of their inquiry have been hasty and pressing to
discover some practices for present use, and not to discover Axioms, joining
with them the new assignations as their sureties. That the forerunning of the
mind to frame recipes upon Axioms at the entrance, is like Atalanta's golden
ball that hindereth and interrupteth the course, and is to be inhibited till you
have ascended to a certain stage and degree of generalities; which
forbearance will be liberally recompensed in the end; and that chance
discovereth new inventions by one and one, but science by knots and
clusters. That they have not collected sufficient quantity of particulars, nor
them in sufficient certainty and subtilty, nor of all several kinds, nor with
those advantages and discretions in the entry and sorting which are
requisite; and of the weak manner of collecting natural history which hath
been used. Lastly that they had no knowledge of the formulary of
interpretation, the work whereof is to abridge experience and to make
things as certainly found out by Axiom in short time, as by infinite
experiences in ages.

CHAPTER 18.

That the cautels and devices put in practice in the delivery of knowledge
for the covering and palliating of ignorance, and the gracing and
overvaluing of that they utter, are without number; but none more bold and
more hurtful than two; the one that men have used of a few observations
upon any subject to make a solemn and formal art, by filling it up with
discourse, accommodating it with some circumstances and directions to
practice, and digesting it into method, whereby men grow satisfied and
secure, as if no more inquiry were to be made of that matter; the other, that
men have used to discharge ignorance with credit, in defining all those
effects which they cannot attain unto to be out of the compass of art and
human endeavour. That the very styles and forms of utterance are so many
characters of imposture, some choosing a style of pugnacity and contention,
some of satire and reprehension, some of plausible and tempting similitudes
and examples, some of great words and high discourse, some of short and
dark sentences, some of exactness of method, all of positive affirmation,
without disclosing the true motives and proofs of their opinions, or free
confessing their ignorance or doubts, except it be now and then for a grace,
and in cunning to win the more credit in the rest, and not in good faith. That
although men be free from these errors and incumbrances in the will and
affection, yet it is not a thing so easy as is conceived to convey the conceit
of one man's mind into the mind of another without loss or mistaking,
specially in notions new and differing from those that are received. That
never any knowledge was delivered in the same order it was invented, no
not in the mathematic, though it should seem otherwise in regard that the
propositions placed last do use the propositions or grants placed first for
their proof and demonstration. That there are forms and methods of
tradition wholly distinct and differing, according to their ends whereto they
are directed. That there are two ends of tradition of knowledge, the one to
teach and instruct for use and practice, the other to impart or intimate for re-

examination and progression. That the former of these ends requireth a
method not the same whereby it was invented and induced, but such as is
most compendious and ready whereby it may be used and applied. That the
latter of the ends, which is where a knowledge is delivered to be continued
and spun on by a succession of labours, requireth a method whereby it may
be transposed to another in the same manner as it was collected, to the end
it may be discerned both where the work is weak, and where it breaketh off.
That this latter method is not only unfit for the former end, but also
impossible for all knowledge gathered and insinuated by Anticipations,
because the mind working inwardly of itself, no man can give a just account
how he came to that knowledge which he hath received, and that therefore
this method is peculiar for knowledge gathered by interpretation. That the
discretion anciently observed, though by the precedent of many vain
persons and deceivers disgraced, of publishing part, and reserving part to a
private succession, and of publishing in a manner whereby it shall not be to
the capacity nor taste of all, but shall as it were single and adopt his reader,
is not to be laid aside, both for the avoiding of abuse in the excluded, and
the stregthening of affection in the admitted. That there are other virtues of
tradition, as that there be no occasion given to error, and that it carry a
vigour to root and spread against the vanity of wits and injuries of time; all
which if they were ever due to any knowledge delivered, or if they were
never due to any human knowledge heretofore delivered, yet are now due to
the knowledge propounded.

CHAPTER 19.

Of the impediments which have been in the affections, the principle
whereof hath been despair or diffidence, and the strong apprehension of the
difficulty, obscurity, and infiniteness which belongeth to the invention of
knowledge, and that men have not known their own strength, and that the
supposed difficulties and vastness of the work is rather in shew and muster
than in state or substance where the true way is taken. That this diffidence
hath moved and caused some never to enter into search, and others when
they have been entered either to give over or to seek a more compendious
course than can stand with the nature of true search. That of those that have
refused and prejudged inquiry, the more sober and grave sort of wits have
depended upon authors and traditions, and the more vain and credulous
resorted to revelation and intelligence with spirits and higher natures. That
of those that have entered into search, some having fallen upon some
conceits which they after consider to be the same which they have found in
former authors, have suddenly taken a persuasion that a man shall but with
much labour incur and light upon the same inventions which he might with
ease receive from others; and that it is but a vanity and self-pleasing of the
wit to go about again, as one that would rather have a flower of his own
gathering, than much better gathered to his hand. That the same humour of
sloth and diffidence suggesteth that a man shall but revive some ancient
opinion, which was long ago propounded, examined, and rejected. And that
it is easy to err in conceit that a man's observation or notion is the same
with a former opinion, both because new conceits must of necessity be
uttered in old words, and because upon true and erroneous grounds men
may meet in consequence or conclusion, as several lines or circles that cut
in some one point. That the greatest part of those that have descended into
search have chosen for the most artificial and compendious course to induce
principles out of particulars, and to reduce all other propositions unto
principles; and so instead of the nearest way, have been led to no way or a

mere labyrinth. That the two contemplative ways have some resemblance
with the old parable of the two moral ways, the one beginning with
incertainty and difficulty, and ending in plainness and certainty, and the
other beginning with shew of plainness and certainty, and ending in
difficulty and incertainty. Of the great and manifest error and untrue conceit
or estimation of the infiniteness of particulars, whereas indeed all prolixity
is in discourse and derivations; and of the infinite and most laborious
expense of wit that hath been employed upon toys and matters of no fruit or
value. That although the period of one age cannot advance men to the
furthest point of interpretation of nature, (except the work should be
undertaken with greater helps than can be expected), yet it cannot fail in
much less space of time to make return of many singular commodities
towards the state and occasions of man's life. That there is less reason of
distrust in the course of interpretation now propounded than in any
knowledge formerly delivered, because this course doth in sort equal men's
wits, and leaveth no great advantage or preeminence to the perfect and
excellent motions of the spirit. That to draw a straight line or to make a
circle perfect round by aim of hand only, there must be a great difference
between an unsteady and unpractised hand and a steady and practised, but
to do it by rule or compass it is much alike.

CHAPTER 21.

Of the impediments which have been in the two extreme humours of
admiration of antiquity and love of novelty, and again of over-servile
reverence or over-light scorn of the opinions of others.

CHAPTER 22.

Of the impediments which have been in the affection of pride, specially
of one kind, which is the disdain of dwelling and being conversant much in
experiences and particulars, specially such as are vulgar in occurrency, and
base and ignoble in use. That besides certain higher mysteries of pride,
generalities seem to have a dignity and solemnity, in that they do not put
men in mind of their familiar actions, in that they have less affinity with arts
mechanical and illiberal, in that they are not so subject to be controlled by
persons of mean observation, in that they seem to teach men that they know
not, and not to refer them to that they know. All which conditions directly
feeding the humour of pride, particulars do want. That the majesty of
generalities, and the divine nature of the mind in taking them (if they be
truly collected, and be indeed the direct reflexions of things,) cannot be too
much magnified. And that it is true that interpretation is the very natural and
direct intention, action, and progression of the understanding delivered from
impediments. And that all Anticipation is but a deflexion or declination by
accident.

CHAPTER 25.

Of the impediments which have been in the state of heathen religion and
other superstitions and errors of religion. And that in the true religion there
hath not nor is any impediment, except it be by accident or intermixture of
humour. That a religion which consisteth in rites and forms of adoration,
and not in confessions and beliefs, is adverse to knowledge; because men
having liberty to inquire and discourse of Theology at pleasure, it cometh to
pass that all inquisition of nature endeth and limiteth itself in such
metaphysical or theological discourse; whereas if men's wits be shut out of
that port, it turneth them again to discover, and so to seek reason of reason
more deeply. And that such was the religion of the Heathen. That a religion
that is jealous of the variety of learning, discourse, opinions, and sects, (as
misdoubting it may shake the foundations,) or that cherisheth devotion upon
simplicity and ignorance, as ascribing ordinary effects to the immediate
working of God, is adverse to knowledge. That such is the religion of the
Turk, and such hath been the abuse of Christian religion at some several
times, and in some several factions. And of the singular advantage which
the Christian religion hath towards the furtherance of true knowledge, in
that it excludeth and interdicteth human reason, whether by interpretation or
anticipation, from examining or discussing of the mysteries and principles
of faith.

CHAPTER 26.

Of the impediments which have been in the nature of society and the
policies of state. That there is no composition of estate or society, nor order
or quality of persons, which have not some point of contrariety towards true
knowledge. That monarchies incline wits to profit and pleasure, and
commonwealths to glory and vanity. That universities incline wits to
sophistry and affectation, cloisters to fables and unprofitable subtilty, study
at large to variety; and that it is hard to say, whether mixture of
contemplations with an active life, or retiring wholly to contemplations, do
disable and hinder the mind more.

BACK COVER

Philosophy.
Line 1: see commentary
Line 2: libri dimidium est, pagina 34
Line 3: pagellarum numeri veri

Writing on the Back Cover of VALERIUS TERMINUS
The writing in the original is on the outside of the last leaf, which is in
fact the cover. The front cover, if there ever was one, is lost. The ink with
which the line containing the symbols is written corresponds with that in
the body of the manuscript; and the line itself is placed symmetrically in the
middle of the page, near the top. The two lower lines are apparently by
another hand, probably of later date, certainly in ink of a different colour,
and paler. The word "Philosophy" is in Bacon's own hand, written lightly in
the upper corner at the left, and is no doubt merely a docket inserted
afterwards when he was sorting his papers. What connexion there was
between the note and the manuscript it is impossible to say. But it is
evidently a careful memorandum of something, set down by somebody
when the manuscript was at hand; and so many of the characters resemble
those adopted to represent the planets and the signs of the zodiac, that one is
led to suspect in it a note of the positions of the heavenly bodies at the time
of some remarkable accident;—perhaps the plague, of which 30,578
persons died in London, during the year ending 22nd December, 1603. The
period of the commencement, the duration, or the cessation of such an
epidemic might naturally be so noted.
Now three of the characters clearly represent respectively Mercury,
Aquarius, and Sagittarius. The sign for Jupiter, as we find it in old books, is
so like a 4, that the first figure of 45 may very well have been meant for it.
The monogram at the beginning of the line bears a near resemblance to the
sign of Capricorn in its most characteristic feature. And the mark over the

sign of Aquarius appears to be an abbreviation of that which usually
represents the Sun. (The blot between 1603 and B is nothing; being only
meant to represent a figure 6 blotted out with the finger before the ink was
dry.) Suspecting therefore that the writing contained a note of the positions
of Mercury and Jupiter in the year 1603, I sent a copy to a scientific friend
and asked him if from such data he could determine the month indicated.
He found upon a rough calculation (taking account of mean motions only)
that Jupiter did enter the sign of Sagittarius about the 10th of August, 1603,
and continued there for about a twelvemonth; that the Sun entered Aquarius
about the 12th or 13th of January, 1603-4; and that Mercury was about the
16th or 17th of the same month in the 26th or 27th degree of Capricorn: —
coincidences which would have been almost conclusive as to the date
indicated, if Capricorn had only stood where Aquarius does, and vice versa.
But their position as they actually stood in the manuscript is a formidable, if
not fatal, objection to the interpretation.
According to another opinion with which I have been favoured, the first
monogram is a NOTA BENE; the next group may mean DIES MERCURII
(Wednesday) 26TH JANUARY, 1603; and the rest refers to something not
connected with astronomy. But to this also there is a serious objection. The
26th of January, 1603-4, was a Friday, and it seems to me very improbable
that any Englishman would have described the preceding January as
belonging to the year 1603. Bacon himself invariably dated according to the
civil year, and the occasional use of the historical year in loose memoranda
would have involved all his dates in confusion. I should think it more
probable that the writer (who may have been copying a kind of notation
with which he was not familiar) miscopied the sign of Venus into that of
Mercury; in which case it would mean Friday, 26th January, 1603-4. But
even then the explanation would he unsatisfactory, as leaving so much
unexplained. Those however who are familiar with old manuscripts relating
to such subjects may probably be able to interpret the whole.

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