Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal_ Nuremburg_ 14 November 1945-1 October 1946_ volume 17 Various 1160 downloads.pdf

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Title: Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military
Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946,
volume 17

Author: Various

Release date: October 18, 2023 [eBook #71899]

Language: English

Original publication: Germany: Unknown, 1947

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBURG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1
OCTOBER 1946, VOLUME 17 ***

TRIAL
OF

THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURE MBE RG
14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946

P UBL I S HE D AT NURE MBE RG, GE RMANY
1 94 8

This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.

VOLUME XVII

OF F I CI AL T E XT
I N T HE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

P ROCE E DI NGS
25 June 1946-8 July 1946

CONTENTS

One Hundred and Sixty-third Day, Tuesday, 25 June 1946,
Morning Session 1
Afternoon Session 37

One Hundred and Sixty-fourth Day, Wednesday, 26 June 1946,
Morning Session 79
Afternoon Session 115

One Hundred and Sixty-fifth Day, Thursday, 27 June 1946,
Morning Session 149

One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Day, Friday, 28 June 1946,
Morning Session 179
Afternoon Session 211

One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Day, Saturday, 29 June 1946,
Morning Session 244

One Hundred and Sixty-eighth Day, Monday, 1 July 1946,
Morning Session 274
Afternoon Session 308

One Hundred and Sixty-ninth Day, Tuesday, 2 July 1946,
Morning Session 339
Afternoon Session 362

One Hundred and Seventieth Day, Wednesday, 3 July 1946,
Morning Session 393
Afternoon Session 426

One Hundred and Seventy-first Day, Thursday, 4 July 1946,
Morning Session 458
Afternoon Session 496

One Hundred and Seventy-second Day, Friday, 5 July 1946,
Morning Session 516
Afternoon Session 546

One Hundred and Seventy-third Day, Monday, 8 July 1946,
Morning Session 575
Afternoon Session 614

ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD DAY
Tuesday, 25 June 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand.]
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, I
should like to advise the Tribunal that the first half of the manuscript of my
final defense speech in typescript will be ready tomorrow and the second
half by next Saturday. I am sorry to say that I personally can furnish only
eight copies, six of which are earmarked for the interpreters to facilitate
their difficult task. I am sorry that I could not furnish more copies since I
personally have no mimeographing machine. I hope the Tribunal will
appreciate the fact that after the statement made by the chief prosecutor for
the United States on Friday, I cannot make any claims on the technical
assistance of the Prosecution.
Therefore, I am asking the Tribunal to decide whether it would be
worth while, in order to expedite the presentation, to have the translation of
my speech put before them. In this event I would request that the necessary
arrangements be made. I am prepared to place my manuscript at the
disposal of the Tribunal, under the conditions announced by you, Mr.
President. What applies for me personally would, so far as I am advised,
apply also for the rest, at least for the majority of Defense Counsel. In order
to expedite the proceedings and to reduce the time spent on the presentation
of the final defense speeches, it is important to have this point clarified.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, if you would hand in the manuscript to
which you have referred, the Tribunal will make arrangements to have it
translated into the various languages. I think that will meet the position so
far as you are concerned.
DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has an announcement upon the
subject, which I am about to read. The announcement is this:
“In view of the discussion which took place on the 13th of June
1946, on the question of time to be taken by Defense Counsel, the
Tribunal has given the matter further consideration.
“When the Defense Counsel stated the time they wished to take,
the Tribunal observed that some of the defendants required more
time than others, and to this extent they did make an
apportionment among themselves. The Tribunal feels that the
suggested times are much too long and some voluntary restriction
should be made.
“Except as to a few of the defendants whose cases are of very
wide scope, the Tribunal is of the opinion that half a day to each
defendant is ample time for the presentation of his defense; and
the Tribunal hopes that counsel will condense their arguments and
limit themselves voluntarily to this time. The Tribunal, however,
will not permit counsel for any defendant to deal with irrelevant
matters or to speak for more than one day in any case. Four hours
will be allowed at the beginning for argument on the general
questions of law and fact, and counsel should co-operate in their
arguments in such a way as to avoid needless repetition.”
As heretofore stated, the Tribunal would like to have a translation of
each argument in French, Russian, and English submitted at the beginning
of the argument. Counsel may arrange for the translation themselves if they
so desire; but if they will submit copies of their arguments to the translating
department as soon as possible and not less than 3 days in advance of
delivery, the translation will be made for them and the contents of the
copies will not be disclosed.
That is all.
Yes, Dr. Lüdinghausen.
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for
Defendant Von Neurath): Last night we had stopped in our treatment of the
various points raised by the Prosecution. I should like to continue now and
to put the following question to you, Herr Von Neurath.

The Prosecution is charging you with the fact that in the Protectorate
Germans had a preferential position as compared with Czechs and that you
were responsible for that. Will you please comment on this?
CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH (Defendant): The position of
Germans in the Protectorate was not a preferential position which was
vested with any real preferences and advantages as compared with the
Czechs, but it was an entirely different position. The Germans had become
citizens of the Reich and, therefore, had the rights of Reich citizens, such as
the right to vote in Reichstag elections. The Czechs did not have this right
to vote, which is understandable in view of the existing difference—
variance between the German people and the Czech people. There were at
no time any actual advantages connected with the position of the Germans
in the Protectorate.
Efforts to have preferential treatment were made, of course, in the
chauvinistic Party and in nationalist circles. But I always opposed them
vigorously and prevented any practical realization of such efforts. In this
connection, however, I should like to stress once more that the Czech
people did not consider themselves inferior to the German people in any
way.
It was a question simply of a different people which had to be treated,
politically and culturally, according to its own characteristics. That was also
the reason for the maintenance of the so-called autonomy which meant
nothing more than the separation of the two nationalities with a view
toward securing for the Czechs their own way of living; and it is evident
that this autonomy had to be kept within certain limits, dictated by the
prevailing necessities of the Reich as a whole, especially in times of war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to deal with the
individual points raised in the Czech indictment, or rather the points found
in the Czech report, which is the basis for this charge. In this report it is
asserted that the freedom of the press was suppressed Is that correct and
what role did Herr Von Gregory play in the treatment of the press?
VON NEURATH: Herr Von Gregory had been the press attaché at the
German Legation in Prague and was subordinate to the Propaganda
Ministry. Then he came, as chief of my press department, to my
administration and controlled the Czech press according to the directives of
the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. The Czech press, of course, was not free

—no more than the German press. Control of circulation and other
measures, especially censorship measures, were the same.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further raises the
charge that the local Czech administrative offices were in many cases
dissolved and then reorganized and key positions filled with officials and
town councillors who were German or Czech collaborators. Is that correct?
VON NEURATH: These were communities with a considerable
German minority, particularly in Moravia. That they should also have a
representation in the local administration seemed to me a natural thing.
Prague, for instance, had a Czech mayor and a German assistant mayor.
This could hardly be objected to. With regard to the attempts of the
Germans in the various cities or districts to take a part in the local
administration to an extent that did not seem justified by their numerical
strength, I intervened and rejected them. In the municipal administrations of
purely Czech districts, such as in West Bohemia, there were generally no
German representatives at all. But on the other hand, there were German-
speaking enclaves, such as the region of Iglau, where the Germans were
dominant in numbers and thus, of course, in influence as well.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of
having—in this way and through the appointment of higher land councillors
(Oberlandräte)—germanized the Czech administration, and this report bases
its accusations on a statement which you allegedly made to the former
Bohemian Landespräsident, Bienert, in which you said, “All that has to be
digested in 2 years time.”
VON NEURATH: I do not recall having made such a statement. And I
cannot imagine having uttered it. Here we are concerned with the co-
ordination of the Czechs—of the Czech with the German administration.
The Oberlandräte were not appointed by me, but their office was created as
a controlling agency by the Reich Government by the decree of 1
September 1939 in connection with the setting up of German
administrations and the Security Police. When the Oberlandräte appeared
before me to give their reports, I told them time and again that they were
not to do any administrative work themselves but were to supervise only.
The Czech method of administration was frequently superior to the
German, I told them.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: With regard to this I should like to
refer to Document Number Neurath-149 of my document book, the decree
on the organization of the administration and the German Security Police,
dated 1 September 1939. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 the appointment and the
duties of these Oberlandräte are described more in detail. A quotation of this
document might be redundant.
The Czech indictment further contains a statement by Herr Bienert to
the effect that on the problem of the co-ordination of the Czech
administration you had remarked to him something like: “That must be
carried out strictly; after all, this is war.” At the same time Bienert stated in
his interrogation that the purpose of this measure, that is, the co-ordination
of the Czech and the German administration, had been to assure Germany
of a peaceful hinterland during the war.
Will you kindly also comment on this.
VON NEURATH: It is possible that I told Bienert something along
these lines. However, I cannot remember it at this date. But it can be taken
for granted that in the sphere of administration, as in every other sphere in
the Protectorate also, the necessities of war were the main concern.
Restrictions of the autonomy in the Czech national administration have to
be considered from this point of view. That it was my constant endeavor to
keep the country quiet in the interest of the Reich, and therewith in the
interest of all, can hardly be held against me. Apart from that, I should like
to remark that the introduction of restrictions on the autonomy was already
contained explicitly in the decree setting up the Protectorate.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer
to the order contained in my document book under Number Neurath-144,
Document Book Number 5. The order was issued by the Führer and Reich
Chancellor on the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and is dated 16
March 1939. Under Article 11 it was even then stipulated that the Reich
could incorporate departments of the administration of the Protectorate into
their own administration. The Czech report further refers to a statement
made by the former Czech Minister Havelka dealing with the persecution of
the members of the Czech Legion of the first World War insofar as they
held public office. What can you tell us about this question of the
Legionnaires?

VON NEURATH: The Czech Legion had been founded in Russia
during the first World War. It was composed partially of volunteers,
partially of the balance of Czech regiments which had belonged to the old
Austro-Hungarian Army and had become prisoners of war in Russia. These
Czech Legionnaires enjoyed a certain exceptional position after the
founding of the Czech Republic. In part they were filled with strong
chauvinistic resentment toward the Reich which dated back to the time of
the nationalities fights. This, the so-called Legionnaire mentality, was a
catchword in Bohemia; and in times of political unrest it could signify a
certain political danger. By the way, this preferential position which the
Legionnaires enjoyed was widely attacked in the Protectorate by the Czechs
themselves. Therefore an effort was made, and by Frank particularly, to
remove the Legionnaires from public office. But this took place only in the
crassest cases and only insofar as those Legionnaires had joined the Czech
Legion voluntarily, that is, it did not apply to those who were members of
the former Austro-Hungarian Army. From the very beginning I tried to
make this discrimination, which approximately corresponds to the situation
—or corresponds with the distinction—which today is made in Germany
between the voluntary members of the SS and the Waffen-SS.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment is further
accusing you of having supported the Czech Fascist organization Vlayka. It
bases this charge on a memorandum which you yourself wrote concerning a
discussion which you had with Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, on
26 March 1940. According to this memorandum you told Hacha that the
personal and moral qualities of the Vlayka leaders were well known to you;
in any case, you had to confirm the fact that this movement, this
organization, was the only one which had taken a positive stand toward the
Reich and toward collaboration with the Reich. How about that?
VON NEURATH: The Vlayka movement was the same as the
collaborationists in France. This movement worked to bring about a
German-Czech collaboration and, in fact, long before the Protectorate was
established. But the leaders of this movement were, in my opinion, rather
dubious characters, as I showed in the words to Hacha quoted above. These
leaders threatened and slandered President Hacha and members of the
Czech Government among others. State Secretary Frank had known these
men from former times and he wanted to support them merely in

consideration of their former co-operation with him. However, I refused to
do this, just as I refused the various applications of these people to visit me.
On the other hand, it is possible that Frank supported them from a fund
which Hitler had placed at his disposal without my knowledge and about
which Frank was under obligation not to tell me anything.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What attitude, now, did you take to the
dissolution of parties—of political parties—and of trade unions?
VON NEURATH: That was like the control of the press, a necessity
which resulted from the system, from the political system of the Reich. In
any event, through this step taken by President Hacha and despite the
measures taken by Germany, no country suffered less from the war than the
Protectorate. The Czech people were the only ones in middle and eastern
Europe who could retain their national, cultural, and economic entity almost
to its full extent.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to turn to the point
raised by the Prosecution which is concerned with an alleged cultural
suppression. What can you tell us about the handling of Czech educational
affairs?
VON NEURATH: The Czech universities and other institutions of
higher education, as has been stated before, were closed at Hitler’s order in
November 1939. Again and again, at the request of President Hacha and of
the Protectorate Government, I appealed directly to Hitler to have these
schools reopened. But due to the dominating position of Herr Himmler, I
had no success. The consequence of the closing of the universities, of
course, was that a large number of young people who otherwise would have
become university students now had to look for work of a manual sort. The
closing of the institutions of higher learning also had repercussions on the
secondary school level. This had already been heavily burdened after the
separation of the Sudetenland in the autumn of 1938, for the entire Czech
intelligentsia from this region had returned to the Czech-speaking area, or
what was later the Protectorate. Hence for the young people from the
secondary schools there was hardly any employment left. It was about the
same situation which is now prevailing in Germany. Concerning the closing
of Czech lower schools and other planned efforts to restrict Czech youth in
their cultural freedom and their educational possibilities, I know nothing.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself approve of the
closing of Czech institutions of higher learning ordered by Hitler?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, he said that he tried to
intervene and get rid of Hitler’s order.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: If that is sufficient for the Tribunal
then he need not answer the question further.
THE PRESIDENT: Don’t you think that is sufficient?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I just wanted to have it expressed
once again in a somewhat stronger way; however, if the Tribunal is satisfied
with the clarification of this problem, I am completely satisfied.
THE PRESIDENT: It would not make it any better if it was said twice.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, if you—but, it is sufficient.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know anything about an alleged
plan, mentioned in the Czech report, to turn the Czech people into a mass of
workers and to rob them of their intellectual elite?
VON NEURATH: No. Only a madman could have made a statement
like that.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment, or report,
asserts that through your agencies, that is, with your consent and
endorsement, destruction and plundering of Czech scientific institutions
took place. On Page 58 of the German text, Page 55 of the English of this
report, USSR-60, it says:
“The Germans occupied all universities and scientific institutions.
They immediately got hold of the valuable apparatus,
instruments, and scientific installations in the occupied
institutions. The scientific libraries were plundered systematically
and methodically. Scientific books and films were torn up or
taken away. The archives of the academic Senate, the highest
university authority, were torn up or burned; and the card indexes
destroyed and scattered to the four winds.”
What can you tell us in regard to this?
VON NEURATH: In this connection, I can say only that I never heard
of any plundering and destruction of the sort described either in Prague or
later. The Czech Hochschulen, or institutions of higher education, were

closed together with the universities in the year 1939 at Hitler’s order. The
buildings and installations of the Prague Czech University, as far as I know,
were partly put at the disposal of the German university which had been
closed earlier by the Czechs, since, after the Czech Hochschulen were
closed, they could not be used any longer for Czech scientific purposes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything at all about
this...
THE PRESIDENT: I did not understand that answer. As I got it, “The
buildings, in part, were put at the disposal of German universities which
had been closed by the Czechs.”
VON NEURATH: In Prague. In Prague was the oldest German
university; it had been closed by the Czechs after the last war, and after the
establishing of the Protectorate it was reopened; and, as far as I know, some
of the equipment and buildings were used for this German university.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the
removal of scientific equipment, collections, objects of art, and so forth?
VON NEURATH: The only case about which I have any knowledge
concerned the removal of historically valuable old Gobelins from the
Maltese Palace in Prague. These were removed by a member of the Foreign
Office in Berlin, allegedly by order of the chief of protocol; and this was
done at night, secretly, and without my knowledge or the knowledge of my
officials. As soon as I learned of this I contacted the Foreign Office, and I
requested immediate restoration. Whether restoration was made, I do not
know; that was only in 1941, and meanwhile I had left Prague.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I here...
VON NEURATH: I know nothing about other incidents. Apart from
that, I specifically prohibited the removal of art objects from the
Protectorate to the Reich.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to
submit an extract from the interrogation of the former State Secretary
Frank, dated 10 June 1945. This is Number Neurath-154 of my Document
Book Number 5, and I should like to ask the Tribunal to take notice of this
statement.

[Turning to the defendant.] What happened to the objects of art and the
furniture, which were Czech State property and with which the Czernin
Palace in Prague, which you used as your official residence, was furnished?
VON NEURATH: This house was the former official residence of the
Czech Foreign Minister, and the partly valuable furnishings belonged to the
Czech State. Since there was no inventory of any sort of these items, before
moving in in the fall of 1939, I called in the Czech director of the castle
administration and the Czech art historian, Professor Strecki; and I had a
very exact inventory taken. One copy of this inventory was left in my office
and another one was deposited with the administration of the castle. After I
left Prague in the autumn of 1941, I had a record made through my former
caretaker and again in the presence of a representative of the castle
administration, Professor Strecki, that the articles which were mentioned in
the inventory were actually still there.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need details of the inventory, but
there is one thing I should like to ask. The translation came through to me
that the inventory was made in the fall of 1938. Was that right?
VON NEURATH: 1939. I only wanted to mention that naturally I did
not take any of these articles.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Another point raised by the Czech
indictment deals with the confiscation of the so-called Masaryk houses in
various cities and with the destruction of Masaryk monuments and
monuments erected to other personalities famous in Czech history. What do
you know about that?
VON NEURATH: While I was in office, some of these Masaryk
houses were closed by the Police because they were centers of agitation
against Germany. The destruction or the removal of Masaryk or other Czech
national monuments I had specifically prohibited. Apart from that, I
expressly permitted the laying of wreaths at the grave of Masaryk at Lanyi,
which Frank had prohibited, and this actually took place on a large scale.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is further asserted that Czech
literature was suppressed and muzzled to a large extent.
VON NEURATH: The printing and dissemination of Czech anti-
German literature was prohibited of course, just as the further dissemination
of English and French works was prohibited in the entire Reich during the
war. Aside from that, all this material was treated according to the direct

orders of the Propaganda Ministry. However, while I was in office, there
were still many Czech book stores and book-publishing concerns which
published books by Czech authors in large numbers and disseminated them.
The selection of Czech books of every type in the book stores was
considerably larger than the selection of German books.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could you say anything about the
suppression of Czech cultural life, of theaters, movies, and so forth, to
which the Prosecution refers?
VON NEURATH: There was no question at all of a limitation of the
cultural autonomy of the Czechs, aside from the university problem. In
Prague a great number of large Czech theaters of every description were
open all the time, especially the Czech opera and several theaters. On the
other hand there was only one permanent German theater with daily
performances. There was a constant production of many Czech plays and
operas, and the same applied to music. The well-known Czech
Philharmonic Orchestra at Prague played Czech music primarily and was
absolutely independent regarding its programs.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we don’t need details. The
defendant says that theaters and cinema theaters were allowed and there
was only one German theater. We don’t want any further details about it.
DR. LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, Mr. President. I asked about these
matters only because they are rather extensively dealt with in the
Indictment.
[Turning to the defendant.] And what about the film industry, Herr Von
Neurath?
VON NEURATH: The same applied to the movie industry. It was even
especially active.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to the
alleged suppression of religious freedom, of which you are being accused in
the Czech indictment. The Czech indictment speaks of a wave of
persecution which inundated the churches and which started immediately
when the German troops marched in to occupy the country. What about
that?
VON NEURATH: A systematic persecution of the churches is quite
out of the question. The population was quite free as concerns public
worship, and I certainly would not have tolerated any restrictions along this

line. The former Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff has testified to that
point here already. It may be true that in individual cases pilgrimages or
certain religious processions were prohibited by the Police, even though I
personally do not remember it clearly. But that took place only because
certain pilgrimages, consisting of many thousands of people, were exploited
as political demonstrations at which anti-German speeches were made. At
any rate, that had actually occurred several times and had been brought to
my knowledge. It is true that a number of clerics were arrested in
connection with the action at the beginning of the war, which we have
already mentioned here. But these arrests did not take place, because the
men were clerics but because they were active political opponents or people
who were political suspects. In cases of this nature I made special efforts to
have these people released.
My personal connections with the archbishop of Prague were
absolutely correct and amicable. He and the archbishop of Olmütz
specifically thanked me for my intervention on behalf of the Church, as I
remember distinctly. I prevented any measure against the public worship of
the Jews. Every synagogue was open to the time I left in the autumn of
1941.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the last point, I
should like to put one more question about the position of Jews in the
Protectorate. What can you tell us about it?
VON NEURATH: The legal position of the Jews had to be co-
ordinated with the position of the Jews in the Reich, according to
instructions from Berlin. The directives with regard to this had been sent to
me already in April of 1939. Through all sorts of inquiries addressed to
Berlin, I tried and succeeded in not having the laws go into effect until June
1939, so as to give the Jews the opportunity to prepare themselves for the
imminent introduction of these laws.
The so-called Nuremberg Laws were introduced into the Protectorate,
too, at that time. Thereby the Jews were removed from public life and from
leading positions in the economic life. However, arrests on a large scale did
not take place. There were also no excesses against Jews, except in a few
single instances. The camp at Theresienstadt was not erected until long after
my time of office, and I prevented the erection of other concentration camps
in the Protectorate, too.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of
personally carrying through anti-Jewish measures. They maintain that, first
of all, you charged the Czech Government, that is to say the autonomous
government, with the carrying through of the anti-Jewish laws and that
when Ministerpräsident Elias refused to do so, you personally took the
necessary steps.
VON NEURATH: As I said just now, the introduction of the anti-
Jewish laws came about on Hitler’s direct order, that is to say through the
competent authorities in Berlin. The representation...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, why do you want to go
over all this again? The defendant has given the evidence that he succeeded
in putting off the laws until June 1939 and that then the Nuremberg Laws
were introduced. He has given us the various qualifications which he said
he made; and then you read him the Czech report and try to get him to go
over it all again, it seems to me. It is now quarter past 11.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: All right, then, I shall consider the first
question sufficiently answered and we shall not deal with the matter of
confiscation either.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Czech report further accuses you of the
dissolution of the organizations of the YMCA and YWCA, and the
confiscation of their property in favor of German organizations.
VON NEURATH: I must admit that I do not recall these confiscations
at all. If this dissolution and confiscation took place before I left, it must
have been a police measure only.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions the
destruction of Czech economic life and the systematic plundering of Czech
stocks of raw materials and accuses you in that regard. What are the facts
with regard to that?
VON NEURATH: With the establishment of the Protectorate, the
Czech economy almost automatically was incorporated into the German
economy. The export trade, for which Czech industries had worked to a
considerable degree, was stopped for the duration of the war, that is to say,
it had to trade with the Reich.
The Czech heavy industries, especially the Skoda Works and the arms
industry, as direct war industries, were taken over to supplement German
armaments production by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.

At the beginning I tried especially to avoid selling out of the
Protectorate, which would have been hard on the population. An effective
means for that purpose was the maintenance of the customs boundaries
which existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany. After heated conflicts
with the Berlin economic departments, I succeeded in having the customs
barrier maintained up to October 1940, for another year and a half, though it
had already been rescinded on 16 March 1939.
I believe I am also accused of having been responsible for the removal
of raw materials and the like. In that connection I should like to say that the
office of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan was the only authority which
could take such measures.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer
to the decree which has already been submitted, the decree dated 16 March
1939, Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5. In this
decree I should like to call special attention to Articles 9 and 10.
[Turning to the defendant.] You are further charged with and accused
of the fact that the rate of exchange of Czech kronen to marks was
established as 10 to 1, for in this way the buying out of Czechoslovakian
goods was said to have been favored. Are you responsible for the
establishing of this rate?
VON NEURATH: No. In the decree of 16 March 1939 dealing with
the establishment of the Protectorate—a decree in the drafting of which I
did not take part in any way—it was already stipulated that the rate of
exchange would be determined by the Reich Government. As far as I know,
the same rate was the customary one at the stock exchange and in trade
before the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich as well as
afterwards. An official rate had to be determined, of course, and this was
done through the decree issued by the authorities in Berlin.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the decree dated 16
March 1939, which was just mentioned and which is to be found under
Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5, I should like to call
your attention especially to Article 10 which sets forth: “The ratio of the
two currencies, the Czechoslovakian and the German, to each other will be
determined by the Reich Government.”
[Turning to the defendant.] The Czech report further accuses you of the
fact that railroad rails allegedly were removed and taken to Germany. Do

you know anything about this matter?
VON NEURATH: I know nothing about this matter and I think this is
certainly an error. I know only that in the year 1940 there were negotiations
between the German Reich railroads and the Czech State railroads
concerning the borrowing of railroad cars and of engines against
remuneration. But the stipulation in this case was that this rolling stock
could be spared by the transport system in the Protectorate. Aside from that,
the railroads in the Protectorate, were not under my supervision; but they
were directly subordinate to the Transportation Ministry in Berlin.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to Article 8 of the
decree which I have just mentioned, a decree which is found under Number
Neurath-144 of my Document Book 5.
[Turning to the defendant.] It is further asserted that the Reich
Commissioner at the Prague National Bank stopped all payments for abroad
and confiscated all the stocks of gold and of foreign currencies of the
National Bank.
Did you have anything to do with this matter?
VON NEURATH: I had nothing at all to do with these matters. The
Reich Commissioner for the Prague National Bank was appointed directly
by the Reichsbank in Berlin, or rather by the Ministry of Finance; and he
got his orders from them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report states further that
you are to be blamed, or are to be made co-responsible, for the alleged
confiscation of the Czech banks and industrial undertakings by the German
economy.
VON NEURATH: The German banks, and to an extent the German
industries as well, had a real interest in getting a firm foothold in the
economic life of the Protectorate. However, this was something which
applied long before the establishment of the Protectorate. Therefore it was
not strange that the big German banks, in particular, used the opportunity to
acquire Czech stocks and securities; and in this way the controlling interest
in two Czech banks together with their industrial holdings were transferred
to German hands in a manner which was economically quite correct.
I believe the Union Bank is mentioned in the Czech report, a bank
which was taken over by the Deutsche Bank; and I know in this case quite
coincidentally that the initiative did not originate on the German side, but

rather from the Czech Union Bank itself. But neither I nor my agencies
tried to foster this development in any way. Apart from that all these
enterprises had Czech general directors, and in very few cases were German
officials taken in. By far the largest part of all industrial enterprises
remained purely Czech as before.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the situation with regard to
the alleged coercive measures which the Prosecution maintains were used
against Czech agriculture? Can you tell something about this and about
your attitude and the measures you took?
VON NEURATH: This chapter belongs to the whole scheme of plans
by the Party and SS, relative to Germanization, which have already been
mentioned. The instrument of this German settlement policy was to be the
Czech Land Office (Bodenamt), which in itself was a Czech office, which
was a survival of the former Czech office for agrarian reform. Himmler first
of all assigned to the Land Office an SS Führer as its provisional leader.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not want to know all the details
about this. The Czech report apparently alleges coercion in agriculture. The
defendant says that it was due, if any, to the Party and the SS; and he had
nothing to do with it. What is the object of his giving us all these details
about the history of agriculture in Czechoslovakia? You must realize the
Tribunal...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I should like to point out one
thing only.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Land Office, which was acting in the
interests of National Socialism, was restaffed by you with new personnel
after a long struggle. I considered it important to clarify this too.
Mr. President, I should like to make a general remark. I said yesterday
that my examination would last another hour. But yesterday, when I left the
session, I found another document book to the indictment which has forced
me to deal in greater detail with individual questions here. And for this
reason, a reason which I could not foresee, I will have to take additional
time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal has not taken up the
question of time at the moment.
Why do you have to go into some questions of—I do not know what
the word is, “Amt”—to do with agriculture? Why do you want to go into

that? He, the defendant, said he had nothing to do with it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, in a way he was connected with it,
Mr. President, insofar as these agricultural efforts were made through the
Land Office.
THE PRESIDENT: If he was connected with it let him explain it. I
thought he said the Party and the SS did it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but via the Land Office, and he
prevented this.
Perhaps you can tell us briefly about this, Herr Von Neurath.
VON NEURATH: I believe that according to the statements of the
President of the Court, that is hardly necessary. As a matter of fact, I had no
direct connection with the Land Office. I only succeeded in having a rather
unpleasant leader of this office, a member of the SS, removed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During your period of office as Reich
Protector, was there any compulsory transportation of workers to the Reich?
VON NEURATH: No. In this connection I shall also be brief.
Compulsory labor did not exist at all while I was in the Protectorate.
There was an emergency service law which was issued by the Protectorate
Government and applied to younger men who were employed in urgently
needed work in the public interest in the Protectorate. Compulsory
deportations of workers to the Reich did not occur in my time. On the
contrary, many young people reported voluntarily for work in Germany,
because labor conditions and wages were better in the Reich than in the
Protectorate at that time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did your resignation from office
—and this is my last question—your leaving your office as Reich Protector
come about?
VON NEURATH: First of all I should like to tell you why I remained
as long as I did, in spite of all these occurrences and difficulties. The reason
for it was that I was convinced, and I am still convinced today, that I had to
stay as long as I could reconcile this with my conscience, in order to
prevent this country, which was entrusted to Germany, from coming under
the definite domination of the SS. Everything that happened to the country
after my departure in 1941 I had actually prevented through my presence;
and even if my work was ever so much limited, I believe that by remaining

I not only rendered a service to my own country but to the Czech people as
well, and under the same circumstances I would not act differently even
today.
Apart from this I believed that in time of war, especially, I should leave
such a difficult and responsible office only in case of the utmost necessity.
The crew of a ship does not go below deck and fold their hands in their laps
if the ship is in danger.
That I could not comply with the wishes of the Czechs 100 percent is
something that will be understood by everybody who had to deal with
politics in a practical and not merely theoretical way. And so I believe that
by my persevering in office I prevented much of the misery which befell the
Czech people after I left. This opinion was also shared by a large number of
the Czech population, as I could gather from the numerous letters which
were addressed to me by the Czech people later on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how did it happen that you left,
that you resigned from your office?
VON NEURATH: On 23 September 1941 I received a telephone call
from Hitler asking me to come to headquarters immediately. There he told
me that I was being too mild with the Czechs and that this state of affairs
could not be continued. He told me that he had decided to adopt severe
measures against the Czech resistance movement and that for this purpose
the notorious Obergruppenführer Heydrich would be sent to Prague. I did
everything in my power to dissuade him from this but was not successful.
Thereupon I asked permission to resign, since I could never be responsible
for any activity of Heydrich’s in Prague. Hitler refused my resignation but
permitted me to go on leave. I flew back to Prague and on the following day
I continued my journey home. At the same hour that I left Prague, Heydrich
arrived.
Then I wrote to Hitler from my home and again asked to resign
immediately. When in spite of a reminder I did not receive any answer I
repeated my request, and at the same time I explained that under no
circumstances would I return to Prague, that I had dissolved my office and I
refused to act as Reich Protector from now on. I was not officially relieved
from my office until October 1943.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to conclude
my examination of the defendant with a brief quotation from the Czech

indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, was your going on leave made
public?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I was just going to quote that, Mr.
President. In that text of the Czech indictment it says:
“When at last in the second half of September the underground
Czech revolt committees, with the help of the BBC, began a
successful boycott campaign against the German controlled press,
the German authorities seized the opportunity to aim a heavy
blow at the Czech population. On 27 September 1941 radio
station Prague gave out the following report:
“ ‘Reich Minister Baron von Neurath, Reich Protector of
Bohemia and Moravia, has found it necessary to ask the Führer
for a long leave in order to restore his impaired health.’ ”
Then in conclusion it says:
“Under these circumstances the Führer agreed to the request of
the Reich Protector and charged SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich
with the direction of the office of Reich Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia during the time of the illness of Reich Minister Von
Neurath.”
With this my examination is ended, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: From September 1941 until October 1943, did you live
on your own estates, or what?
VON NEURATH: Yes, Mr. President.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: My examination is over.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask the
witness any questions?

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Is it
known to you that immediately before Germany left the League of Nations,
Von Papen followed Hitler to Munich to persuade him to remain in the
League of Nations?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is known to me. In fact, I myself induced him
to do so.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: During the time he was Vice Chancellor in 1933 and
1934, did Von Papen protest in the Cabinet against unfriendly acts of the
German policy toward Austria, as for instance, the introduction of the
1,000-mark embargo?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that line was continuously followed by him and by
other ministers and naturally by myself, too.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler mention to you that this attitude of Papen’s
in the Austrian problem induced him to transfer the mission in Vienna to
Papen after the murder of Dollfuss?
VON NEURATH: Yes, Hitler did speak about that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler discuss with you the reasons why he
addressed the letter of 26 July 1934 to Papen, announcing that Papen would
be sent to Austria?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but the way it happened was as follows: When
Hitler told me about his intention to send Papen to Vienna, I reminded him
that, in order to give the latter any weight, he should first of all, after the
events of 30 June, clear up the relationship between himself, Hitler, and
Papen, and clear it up publicly. This letter which was read here in Court can
be traced to that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In 1937 you paid a visit to the Austrian Government
which led to demonstrations. Were you and Von Papen surprised by these
demonstrations, and did you agree with them?
VON NEURATH: The demonstrations were a complete surprise to me,
especially because of their tremendous size. They certainly did not please
me, because they cast a certain shadow on the discussions between Herr
Von Schuschnigg and myself.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, the last question: Before Schleicher’s
Government was formed there was a meeting of the Cabinet on 2 December
1932. The day before Papen had been given orders by Hindenburg to send
the Parliament on leave and to form a new government. Is it correct that
Papen reported on this matter to the Cabinet and that Schleicher, as
Reichswehrminister, made a statement to the effect that this would lead to
civil war and that the forces of the Wehrmacht were too weak to cope with
such a civil war?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I remember this occurrence very accurately. We
were all somewhat surprised at Schleicher’s statement. However it was so
well founded that we had to accept it as true.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?
[There was no response.]
The Prosecution?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United
Kingdom): At the time about which Dr. Kubuschok has just been asking
you, in the second half of 1932, did you know that President Von
Hindenburg, the Defendant Von Papen, and General Von Schleicher were
discussing and considering very hard what would be the best method of
dealing with the Nazi Party?
VON NEURATH: No. As I have already testified, I had no connection in
that respect. I knew absolutely nothing about all these negotiations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make it clear, I am not
suggesting you were in the negotiations. But didn’t you know that the
problem as to how to deal with the Nazi Party was exercising the minds of
the President and the Defendant Von Papen and General Von Schleicher;
that it was a very urgent problem in their minds?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And again, do not think, Defendant, I am
suggesting that you were in the negotiations. You may take it—well, I will
make all the suggestions perfectly clear.

You knew that in the end the method which commended itself to President
Von Hindenburg, to the Defendant Von Papen, and to General Von
Schleicher was that there should be a government with Hitler as Chancellor,
but well brigaded by conservative elements, in harness with conservative
elements; that was the plan that was ultimately resolved on? You knew that
much, I suppose, didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but the plan was not quite like that. At that time, the
time you are talking about, there was only mention of the fact that we were
obliged to bring the Nazi Party into the Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But eventually, when the Nazi Party came
in, on 30 January 1933, the plan was that it would be well harnessed to
conservative elements. That was the idea in President Von Hindenburg’s
mind, was it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you were one of the conservative and
stable elements, if I understand you rightly; isn’t that so?
VON NEURATH: Yes. It has been explained here that it was the special
wish of President Von Hindenburg that I should remain in the Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In order to keep Hitler’s Government
peace-loving and respectable. Is that a fair way of putting it?
VON NEURATH: Yes, so as to prevent Hitler’s revolutionary movement in
general from exercising their methods too much within the Government,
too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Defendant, you have told us that up
to this time you had been a diplomatist. When you became a Minister, did
you not think that you had some responsibility for keeping the Government
respectable and peace-loving as a Minister of the Reich?
VON NEURATH: To be sure, but the question was only how far it was in
my power to accomplish this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to go into the workings of
your mind too much, I just want to get this clear. You realized that as a
Foreign Minister, and as a well-known figure to all the Chancelleries of
Europe, that your presence in the Government would be taken throughout

Europe, as a sign of your approval and your responsibility for what the
Government did, did you not?
VON NEURATH: I doubt that very much. Perhaps one might have hoped
so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let’s consider it. Is it your
case that up to November of 1937 you were perfectly satisfied with the
peace-loving intentions and respectability of the Government?
VON NEURATH: I was convinced of the peaceful intentions of the
Government. I have already stated that. Whether I was satisfied with the
methods...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What about respectability? By
“respectability” I mean the general standard of decency that is required by
any government, under which its people are going to be reasonably happy
and contented. Were you satisfied with that?
VON NEURATH: I was by no means in agreement with the methods, above
all in connection with the domestic policy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to look at that for a
moment. Did you know about the “Brown Terror” in March of 1933, some
6 weeks after the Government was formed?
VON NEURATH: I only knew of the boycott against the Jews, nothing
else.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the affidavit that has
been put in evidence here, made by the American Consul, Mr. Geist,
Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420?
VON NEURATH: May I see it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you. It is a long
affidavit, and there are only one or two parts I want to put to you.
Mr. Geist gives detailed particulars of the bad treatment, the beating, and
assaulting, and insulting, and so on, of Jews as early as March 1933. Did
you know about that?
VON NEURATH: I know of these occurrences; I do not know this affidavit,
I have not seen it, but I do know about the occurrences from complaints

made by foreign diplomatic representatives. And according to them—and as
concerns my attitude to these events—I repeatedly applied to Hitler and
urgently implored him to have them stopped. But I do not know anything
more about the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just leaving that affidavit for the moment,
as Foreign Minister, you would receive—you did receive, did you not, a
synopsis or account of what was appearing in the foreign press?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that I did but whether I received all of those things I
do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me take an example. You had been
Ambassador at the Court of St. James from 1930 to 1932, if my recollection
is right; had you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you realized—whether you agreed
with what was in them or not—the London Times and the Manchester
Guardian were newspapers that had a great deal of influence in England,
didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: Yes, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that in April 1933 both
these newspapers were full of the most terrible stories of the ill-treatment of
Jews, Social Democrats, and Communists in Germany?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite possible. I cannot remember it any
more now; but those were certainly the very cases which I brought up
before Hitler, drawing his attention to the effect that this was having abroad.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want to consider the extent
which these papers were alleging. As early as the 12th of April 1933 the
Manchester Guardian was saying:
“The inquirer, by digging only an inch below the surface, which
to the casual observer may seem tranquil enough, will, in city
after city, village after village, discover such an abundance of
barbarism committed by the Brown Shirts that modern analogies
fail...”—describing them as an instrument—“...of a Terror that
although wanton is systematic—wanton in the sense that unlike a

revolutionary Terror it is imposed by no outward necessity, and
systematic in the sense that it is an organic part of the Hitlerite
regime.”
Did you know that this and quotations like these were appearing in
responsible British papers?
My Lord, that is D-911, which is the collection of extracts and, with
Mr. Wurm’s affidavit, will be Exhibit GB-512.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did you know that was the line that was
being taken, that it was systematic in the sense of being an organic part of
the Hitler regime?
VON NEURATH: No, in that sense certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the British paper,
the Manchester Guardian, was quoting, “...an eminent German
conservative, who is in close touch with the Nationalist members of the
German Government, and certainly more sympathetic to the Right than to
the Left...” has given the number of victims as 20,000—as many as 20,000
in April? Did you know that the figure was being put that high?
VON NEURATH: No, and I do not believe it, either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us see what the German
press was saying.
On the 24th of April 1933 the Times was quoting the Hamburger
Fremdenblatt, which, in turn, was invoking official sources and stating that
there were 18,000 Communists in prison in the Reich and that the 10,000
prisoners in Prussia included many social intellectuals and others.
Would the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, which had a very long career as a
newspaper, if it misquoted official sources under your Government in April
1933, have misrepresented the position? It would not, would it?
VON NEURATH: That I do not know, but I do know that a lot of
trouble is always being stirred up by means of figures.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But Defendant, here is a figure
quoted, as far as I know, by a responsible Hamburg paper, as an official
figure, requoted by the London Times, which is the principal paper in
England. Wasn’t that sufficiently serious for you to bring it up in the
Cabinet?

VON NEURATH: I am very sorry, but with all respect to the papers—
and even the London papers—they do not always tell the truth.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. That is a perfectly reasonable
comment. Newspapers, like everyone else, are misinformed. But when you
had a widespread account of terrible conditions giving large numbers, did
you not, as one of the respectable elements in this Government, think that it
was worthy of bringing it up in Cabinet and finding out whether it was true
or not?
VON NEURATH: How do you know that I did not do that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I am asking. Did you
bring it up, and what was the result when you did?
VON NEURATH: I have already told you before that I always
remonstrated about these incidents, with Hitler—not in the Cabinet, but
with Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I asked you. You
see, Defendant, what I asked you was why you did not bring it up in the
Cabinet. Here was a Cabinet established with conservative elements to keep
it respectable. Why did you not bring it up in the Cabinet and try and get the
support of Herr Von Papen, Herr Hugenberg, and all the other conservative
gentlemen in the Cabinet of whom we have heard? Why did you not bring it
up?
VON NEURATH: For the very simple reason that it seemed to be
more effective to tell Hitler directly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In April 1933, some 2 months after it
was formed, are you telling the Tribunal that you did not think it was worth
while to bring a matter up in the Reich Cabinet? Within 2 months of Hitler
coming into power, it had become so “Führer-principled” that you could not
bring it up in the Cabinet?
VON NEURATH: I repeat—and after all I alone should be the one to
judge—that I considered direct representations made to Hitler more
effective.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, I just want—I do
not suppose you were interested, but did you know about the putting into
concentration camps of any of the gentlemen that I mentioned to the
Defendant Von Papen: Herr Von Ossietzski or Herr Mühsam or Dr.
Hermann Dunker, or any of the other left-wing writers and lawyers and

politicians? Did you know that they had gone to a concentration camp from
which they never returned?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know at all?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, you knew—as your
documents have shown—when you went to London in June, you knew very
well how, at any rate, foreign opinion had crystallized against Germany
because of the treatment of the Jews and the opposition parties, did you not,
when you went to the world economic conference in June?
VON NEURATH: Yes. That was mentioned by me in a report that was
read in Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say that your reaction was
to go to Hitler and protest. I just want to look at what the existing
documents show that you did. Now, let us take April, first of all. Would you
look at Document D-794?
[The document was handed to the defendant.]
My Lord, it is Document Book 12a, Page 8. It will be Exhibit GB-513.
Now, this is a letter from you to Hitler dated the 2d of April 1933:
“The Italian Ambassador telephoned me last night and informed
me that Mussolini had declared himself prepared to deny, through
the Italian delegations abroad, all news about the persecution of
the Jews in Germany that had been distorted by propaganda, if we
should consider this course useful. I thanked Herr Cerruti, also on
your behalf, and told him that we would be glad to accept his
offer.
“I regard this friendly gesture of Mussolini’s as important enough
to bring it to your notice.”
What did you think had been distorted by propaganda?
VON NEURATH: Yes, please read this part. Here it says, “the news
had been distorted by propaganda.” That is what it is about.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I was so interested in,
Defendant. What did you think had been distorted, and how much

knowledge had you, so that you could decide whether the news had been
distorted or not?
VON NEURATH: That I really cannot tell you any more today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew that Jews had been beaten,
killed, taken away from their families, and put into concentration camps and
that their property had been destroyed and was beginning to be sold under
value. You knew that all these things were happening, did you not?
VON NEURATH: No, certainly not at that time. That they were
beaten, yes, that I had heard; but at the time no Jews were murdered or
perhaps only once in one individual case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, so you see that the Times and
Manchester Guardian of that date gave the most circumstantial examples of
typical murders of Jews? You must have seen that; you must have seen that
the foreign press was saying it. Why did you think that it was distorted?
What inquiry did you make to discover whether it was distorted?
VON NEURATH: Who—who—who—who gave me information
about—about—about—murders?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting it to you that it was in
the foreign press. I have given you the two examples from the press of my
own country; and obviously from what Signor Mussolini was saying, it was
in the press of other countries. You must have known what they were
saying. What inquiries did you make to find out whether it was true or not?
VON NEURATH: I used the only way possible for me, namely
through the police authorities concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask Himmler, or did you ask
the Defendant Göring?
VON NEURATH: Most certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What? You asked Himmler? Or did
you ask the Defendant Göring? Why not? Why not? He was the head,
inventing the Gestapo and the concentration camps at that time. He would
have been a very good man to ask, would he not?
VON NEURATH: The man who could have given me information was
the chief, the supreme head of the Police, and it was in no way personally...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask the Defendant Frick?
VON NEURATH: In any case, I did not ask him personally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now...
VON NEURATH: Certainly not personally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I suggest to you that I do not
want to take up time? Why did you not take the trouble to ask Göring or
Frick or anyone who could have given you, as I suggest, proper
information?
Would you look at Document 3893-PS?
[The document was handed to the defendant.]
The Tribunal will find it at Page 128 of Document Book 12a. My Lord,
that will become Exhibit GB-514.
This is the Völkischer Beobachter, quoting you on the 17th of
September 1933, on the Jewish question:
“The Minister had no doubt that the stupid talk abroad about
purely internal German affairs, as for example the Jewish
problem, will quickly be silenced if one realizes that the
necessary cleaning up of public life must temporarily entail
individual cases of personal hardship but that nevertheless it
served only to establish all the more firmly the authority of justice
and law in Germany.”
Was that your view in September 1933, of the action against the Jews
and against the left-wing sympathizers up to that time, that it was a
“necessary cleaning up of public life,” which would, of course, temporarily
involve “individual cases” of hardship, and that was necessary “more
firmly” to establish “the authority of justice and law in Germany”? Was that
your view?
VON NEURATH: I told you during—during—during my—I think it
was the day before yesterday in answer to the question of what my attitude
was toward the Jewish problem, that in view of the inundation and
domination of public life in Germany by Jews which occurred after the last
war, I thought it absolutely right to have these things either eliminated or
restricted. That is what I am referring to here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that it is right—I mean, you are
not running away from what you said on the 17th of September 1933—that
you thought the treatment of the Jews in 1933 a “necessary cleaning up of

public life” in Germany? Are we to take it that your view then is your view
now, and you do not deviate from it at all? Is that right?
VON NEURATH: That is still my view today, do you not see, only it
should have been carried out by different methods.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right. Well, we will not go into
discussions of it.
Am I to take it that you knew and approved of the breakdown of
political opposition?
VON NEURATH: No, that is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, let us take it by stages.
Did you believe in the prescribing, the making illegal of the Communist
Party?
VON NEURATH: In those days, most certainly, because you have
heard, have you not, that we were facing civil war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. You agreed with that. Did
you agree with the breaking down and making illegal of the trade unions?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you do to protest against
the breaking down of the trade unions?
VON NEURATH: That was in a sphere—this sphere did not concern
me at all. I was Foreign Minister and not Minister of the Interior.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, again, I am not going to
argue with you. You thought it was perfectly right as Foreign Minister to
remain and give your support and authority to a government which was
doing something of which you disapproved, like breaking down the trade
union movement. Is that how we are to take it?
VON NEURATH: Yes. Did you ever hear that a minister...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now what about...
VON NEURATH: I would like to say, did you ever hear that every
cabinet minister must leave the cabinet if he does not agree with one
particular thing?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Every cabinet minister for whom I
have any respect left a cabinet if it did something of which he morally
disapproved, and I understood from you that you morally disapproved of

the breaking down of the trade union movement. If I am wrong, correct it. If
you did not disapprove, say so.
VON NEURATH: I did not think that it was immoral. It was a political
measure, but not an immoral one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then let us take Number 3, take the
Social Democratic Party, that was a party which had taken a great share in
the Government of Germany and of Prussia for the years since the war. Did
you think it right, morally right, to make that party illegal and unable to
take any further share in the carrying on of the country?
VON NEURATH: No, certainly not. But I do not at all know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us get it clear. Did you think it
right or not?
VON NEURATH: I just told you “No” but I do not at all know
whether you...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you do to protest against
that? What did you do to protest against the dissolution of the Social
Democratic Party?
VON NEURATH: The most I could do against this dissolution was to
state my objections.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To whom did you state your
objection against the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party?
VON NEURATH: To Hitler, again and again.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Again and again you didn’t raise the
dissolution of the parties, the opposition parties? You never raised that in
the Cabinet; that is right, isn’t it?
VON NEURATH: I cannot remember whether this question was
discussed in the Cabinet; I do not know any more.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. All right. Let us just pass to
another aspect and still on 1933. I just want you to have in mind what was
happening in 1933. Did you know that after you had announced that
Germany was leaving the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations, that orders for military preparations to deal with the possibility of
war, as consequent on that action had been got out?
VON NEURATH: No. In 1932-1933 I knew nothing about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1933, yes, it started—in
Document C-140, Exhibit USA-51—on the 25th of October 1933. Now,
Defendant, you were Foreign Minister. Are you telling the Tribunal that
neither had Hitler nor Marshal Von Blomberg—I think he was
Reichswehrminister—that none of them told you, as a result of this action,
“we shall have to have the preparations ready in case sanctions, including
military sanctions, are imposed on Germany.” Did none of them tell you
that that was to be the result of your move in foreign policy?
VON NEURATH: No, nor was there any action to be feared.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now it is rather—you
will agree with me—it is rather odd not to inform the Foreign Minister of
the possible consequences of his policy in the military preparations you are
taking to deal with it; it is rather odd, isn’t it in any system of government,
of totalitarian, democratic, or anything you like, it is rather odd not to tell
the Foreign Minister what you are doing in the way of military preparations,
to deal with his policy, isn’t it?
VON NEURATH: I certainly had to decide on the opinion as to
whether any danger threatened from our withdrawal from the League of
Nations and the Disarmament Conference, that is, I had to decide whether
this might have any probable consequences. The military had their own
opinion, and presumably—but I do not know, anyhow, I was not informed;
but there were certain discussions amongst the General Staff, I assume.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want to sum up for
1933 and I want to do that quickly. May I take it, that up to the end of 1933,
despite these matters which I have put to you, that you were perfectly
satisfied with the respectability and peace-loving intentions of the
Government; is that right?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just let us turn to 1934.
You remember your conversation with Mr. Dodd, the American
Ambassador, which you mentioned in your Document Book Number 1, at
Page 54. It was on the 28th of May 1934; and Mr. Dodd had told you,
apparently, what he had said to Hitler about the way Americans are trying to
control profiteering by great financial interests. He said he was glad that—
then he says that you said that you were glad that he had informed Hitler

and then Mr. Dodd added “that the Chancellor had not agreed with me.”
Then he says:
“Von Neurath was silent for a moment after my remarks. It was
plain that he was entirely of my way of thinking. He begged me
to say to Washington that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the
German Government purpose, but he did not commit himself on
Hitler.”
What did you mean by that, “...that the outbreak against Jews was
entirely contrary to German Government purpose...”?
VON NEURATH: By that I wanted to say that the members of the
Cabinet, the majority of them, were against these methods. Apart from that,
I can add that I had just asked Mr. Dodd to go and see Hitler personally so
as to give backing to the suggestions I was making to Hitler. I took him
there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you know, in May 1934, that
the German Government was going in for systematic and virulent anti-
Semitism, didn’t you know that?
VON NEURATH: Anti-Semitic propaganda, I knew mainly from Herr
Goebbels’ speeches.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; well, let us pass to something a
little more concrete. Had you any reason for disliking General Von
Schleicher or General Von Bredow?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the effect on your mind of
these two gentlemen and Frau Von Schleicher being killed in the blood
purge of the 30th of June 1934?
VON NEURATH: I hardly need to answer that. Of course, I was
repulsed by it, that is clear; but then I told you the other day that
unfortunately in the case of such a revolt, innocent people always have to
suffer as well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. But just let us get it clear. You
told the Tribunal the other day that you thought—and had some reason for
thinking—that there was a movement in the SA, that is, a movement led by
Röhm and Ernst, and I suppose people that you would consider undesirable,

of that sort. What reason had you to suppose that General Von Schleicher
and General Von Bredow had been in a conspiracy, if any?
VON NEURATH: I had no reason at all, and I do not believe today
that they were plotting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear about the unfortunate
way in which Herr Von Papen kept on losing secretaries at the same time?
You remember, you know.
VON NEURATH: Exactly the same.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Herr Von Bose
and Jung were killed, Von Tschirschky was arrested, and two other
gentlemen were also arrested? Did you hear about that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I did, through Herr Von Papen.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you regard the blood purge
of the 30th of June as just another element in the necessary cleaning up of
public life?
VON NEURATH: To the extent that it was carried out with all the
outrages and murders of innocent people, most certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you go on in a government
that was using murder as an instrument of political action?
VON NEURATH: I have already told you twice that in the case of
such revolutions such mishaps cannot be avoided, most unfortunately.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, let us take just
another of your 1934 experiences. You knew about the terroristic acts that
were going on in Austria in May and June of 1934, did you not? And by
“terroristic acts”—don’t let us have any doubt about it—what I mean is
causing explosions in Austrian public utilities and railways and things like
that. I mean dynamite. I don’t mean anything vague. You knew that such
acts were going on in Austria in May and June 1934, did you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I heard about it, and I always opposed that sort
of thing because I knew that it was done by Nazis; and let me say once
more, mostly by Austrian Nazis.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What position did Herr Köpke have
in your Ministry on the 31st of May 1934?
VON NEURATH: He was the Ministerial Director.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Ministerial Director: Quite a
responsible position, was it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Herr Köpke
reporting to you on the 31st of May 1934, on a visit of Baron von Wächter?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just think; you know. Baron
von Wächter was one of the leaders of the Putsch against Dollfuss 6 weeks
later on the 25th of July. Don’t you remember Herr Köpke making a report
to you and you passing it on to Hitler?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let’s refresh your memory if you
don’t remember it. Would you look at Document D-868? It will become
Exhibit GB-515. Just look at it. I will read it over, but just look at the
signatories carefully; and if you will be good enough to look at the top, I
think you will find on the original, there are your own initials; and on the
left hand side there is a note: “The Reich Chancellor has been informed
6/6.” That is on the 6th of June. That is initialed “L” by Lammers—Dr.
Lammers. Then there is a note below that: “From the Reich Chancellor on
6th June,” also initialed by Lammers I think. And on the other side you will
see there is a note which is certainly initialed “Lammers.” “Habicht is
coming today... L 6/6.” And this memorandum comes back from the Reich
Chancellor to the Foreign Office on the same day. Now just let’s see what
report you were getting from Austria and passing on to Hitler. We will omit,
unless you want it particularly, a description of Baron von Wächter’s fresh,
youthful appearance in Paragraph 1; but it goes on to say:
“His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of
serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and
personalities that came under review was clear and definite. Herr
Von Wächter drew up for me, too, a picture of the situation in
Austria which was, in some of its colors, even darker and more
serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist
tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on
the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Regardless of who
actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in
individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of

extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr Von Wächter
repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was
lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part,
considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time
introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite.
Thus the great terrorist action, as the result of which the railway
lines leading to Vienna were blown up, was by no means
committed by Marxists but by the Austrian SA and indeed against
the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did
not participate in any way either in the act or its preparation. Such
is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and
districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater.”
Then he says that the main seat of unrest is Carinthia, and where
conditions were worst. And then he says:
“Herr Von Wächter thought that here improvements must be
introduced most speedily, that is, by means of the centralization
of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in
and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here.
The decisive word in this connection could, of course, be given
only by the Führer himself. He, Wächter, was in complete
agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he
knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief
conversation with the Reich Chancellor today.”
Now just let’s pause there for a moment. Herr Habicht was appointed
about that time press attaché at the German Embassy in Vienna. The
appointment of Herr Habicht as press attaché would be done either by you
or with your approval, would it not? It was under your department?
VON NEURATH: Right now I no longer know if Herr Habicht—Herr
Habicht was the National Socialist leader (Landesleiter) for Austria in
Munich and whether or not he went to Vienna as press attaché I do not
know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you can take it that he went to
Vienna as press attaché at this time, at the end of May 1934; and what I am
asking you is, was it not either at your order or with your approval that he

was given a post which gave him diplomatic immunity in the middle of his
plottings?
VON NEURATH: If Herr Habicht was really there, this happened
neither with my knowledge nor with my approval; but presumably it was
arranged by the Ministry of Propaganda to whom these press men were
subordinated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you will agree with me,
Defendant, that this is not a very pleasant document; it does not describe a
very pleasant state of affairs. Let me remind you, this came, from your
Ministerial Director to you and went on to the Führer and came back from
Dr. Lammers with a note: “Habicht is coming today.” Surely as...
VON NEURATH: To the Führer?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, yes.
VON NEURATH: Besides, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to point out to you
that here only the Austrian National Socialists are being discussed. With
them I had nothing at all to do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am pointing out to you is that
the document, this Foreign Office document goes to the Reich Chancellery;
it comes back on the 6th of June with a note from Dr. Lammers saying,
“Habicht is coming today.” You must have known all about Habicht on the
6th of June. It is mentioned in this report.
VON NEURATH: Not at all. I have this note from Lammers which
means that Habicht was coming to see the Reich Chancellor. And this report
from my Ministerial Director I immediately passed on to the Reich
Chancellor to show him what the conditions were in Austria. That was the
reason.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you remember Herr Von Papen
giving evidence a few days ago; and when I asked him who were the
leading Reich German personalities who influenced the Putsch in Austria in
July 1934, he thought for a long time and the only leading Reich German
personality that he could remember as influencing the Putsch was this very
Herr Habicht?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, what I am putting to you
is—and pausing there to get it—that you knew very well, on the 6th of June

1934, that Herr Habicht, this leading Reich personality according to the
Defendant Von Papen, was organizing revolution in Austria, didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: Whatever makes you suppose a thing like that? Herr
Habicht never came to see me. He went to see the Reich Chancellor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You saw this report. This is a report
of your Ministerial Director. I have just read what Von Wächter thought.
VON NEURATH: There is not one word about Herr Habicht in it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I just read that to you. May I
remind you:
“The decisive word in this connection could of course be given
only by the Führer himself. He, Wächter, was in complete
agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters.”
In other words, what Wächter is putting to the Foreign Office were the
views of Habicht no less than himself.
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is certainly in there. Well, all these terrorist
acts and all these disturbances which are described in this document were
brought to the attention of the Reich Chancellor by myself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look what the report
says at the foot of the page:
“But when nothing happened in the meantime, and on the other
hand the counter measures of the Austrian Government grew
more brutal and severe from day to day, the radical elements
made themselves felt once more and came forward with the
statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical
reasons and was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of
opposition and had in view, as his own political aim, merely the
weakening of Dollfuss’ hateful system, though in a way which
should be as unobtrusive as possible to the outside world. They
are now working with this argument.”
Listen to the next bit, his suggestion to you, the nearest warning of
trouble which any Foreign Minister ever heard of:
“One constantly stumbles on this idea during discussions and it is
secretly spreading. A change must be made soon and a uniform
leadership created. Otherwise, as Herr Von Wächter concluded his

impressive description, a disaster may occur any day which
would have the worst possible consequences in foreign policy, not
only for Austria alone, but above all for Germany herself.”
And then, dramatically, in the middle of the conversation, Herr Von
Wächter receives a telephone message that he had better not go back to
Vienna or he will be arrested on his arrival; and within 6 weeks he had
started the Putsch and Chancellor Dollfuss had been shot. Do you
remember now? Did you not appreciate, at the beginning of June 1934, that
there was the greatest danger of an uprising and trouble in Austria?
VON NEURATH: Yes, quite definitely so. That is the very reason why
I sent the report to the Chancellor. I could not interfere in Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you can tell me, on the
question on which the Defendant Von Papen was unable to specify, who, in
your opinion, were the other prominent Reich German personalities who
were behind the Dollfuss Putsch in Austria? You say you were not. Who, in
your opinion, were these personalities that Herr Von Papen mentions as
being behind the Dollfuss Putsch?
VON NEURATH: I know absolutely none. I know only Habicht, and
him I knew only as a person against whom I protested to Hitler because of
his inflammatory actions. Apart from him I did not know any Reich
Germans. The others were all Austrian National Socialists who have been
mentioned innumerable times during the Trial but whom I did not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not mentioning them. I am
mentioning the Defendant Von Papen’s prominent Reich German
personalities, and I am trying very hard to find out who they were Are you
taking the same line, that the only one you can remember is the press
attaché, Herr Habicht? Is that all you can help the Tribunal in this matter?
VON NEURATH: I have already said—and that will have to suffice—
I do not know anyone.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is it your opinion that your Minister,
Dr. Rieth, knew nothing about this, despite what Mr. Messersmith says on
that point? Do you think Dr. Rieth knew nothing about the Putsch?
VON NEURATH: I cannot tell you to what extent Herr Rieth was
informed. You know, however, that when he acted ostentatiously later on

that I recalled him right away. Apart from that, I always forbade the
ministers to meddle in such matters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You haven’t any doubt in your own
mind that Dr. Rieth knew all about the impending Putsch, have you?
VON NEURATH: Oh yes, I have considerable doubts that he knew all
about it. I do not believe so because his whole character was not at all like
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, at any rate, you knew on
the 25th of July that the Austrian Nazis had made this Putsch and had
murdered Dollfuss?
VON NEURATH: That is not exactly a secret.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I know it. A lot of these things
were not secrets. What I am interested in was your knowledge—when you
found out.
VON NEURATH: Afterward, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn’t that give you any qualms
about remaining in a government which had extended its policy of murder
from at home to abroad, through the Party elements in Austria?
VON NEURATH: If I were responsible for every single murderer, for
every single German murderer who was active abroad, then I would have
had a lot of work to do, would I not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew, Herr Von Neurath—and I
shall remind you how in a moment—you knew that the Austrian NSDAP
was in close touch with, and acting under, the orders of Hitler all the time
when Hitler was head of your Government; you knew that perfectly well,
didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: He was the chief of the NSDAP. It is quite natural
that they were collaborating with him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now there is just one other
point...
VON NEURATH: Yes. I want to tell you another thing: I continuously
remonstrated with Hitler, together with Herr Von Papen, about the fact that
this Herr Habicht was doing the things he was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take that up in a moment. I
just want to get one point of fact. Does this accord with your recollection: I

have been through all the reports of the Defendant Von Papen; and apart
from three personal reports, two dealing with Herr Von Tschirschky and one
dealing with abuse of Hitler, which is of no political significance, we have
28 reports. Nineteen of these reports are marked as being copies to the
Foreign Office. Is that in accord with your recollection, that three but of
four of Herr Von Papen’s reports would come to you to be seen by you?
VON NEURATH: That I cannot tell you at this late day.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are quite right, Herr Von
Neurath. You wouldn’t know how many went to you, but you say you saw a
considerable number of Herr Von Papen’s reports. I think there were 19; I
am sure you can take it that they are marked—19 are marked, “Passed the
Foreign Office”.
VON NEURATH: I do believe you, yes; but the question is how many
were submitted to me, for I did not receive every individual report from
every ambassador or minister abroad. Otherwise, I would have been
drowned in paper.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite agree; but what I asked you
was, did you receive these from Herr Von Papen, who was supposed to be
in a rather special position dealing with a very difficult problem? Did you
receive a considerable number of reports from Herr Von Papen to Hitler as
passed to you?
VON NEURATH: I can tell you only that I received some reports but
certainly not all. I cannot tell you more than that today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, perhaps this would be a
convenient time to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get two or three facts
clear about 1935 before I put some questions to you.
On the 10th of March Germany announced the establishment of an air
force and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law
introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I
don’t want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the Secret
Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at General
Thomas’ comment on it.
My Lord, it is at Page 52 of Document Book 12. It is about Page 71 of
the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Number 12a or b?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 12, My Lord. That is the
original one; Page 52, My Lord.
“The Central Directorate of the supreme Reich authorities,
ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the
activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that it
is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The foundations had
already been laid, for the central organization of the supreme
Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to 1933 in many
discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the
National Socialists came into power, and especially by the death
of Reich President Von Hindenburg. The latest orders were
decreed in the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, supposed to
be published only in case of war but already declared valid for
carrying out war preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the
Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it
was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity
of the war economy organization.” (Document 2353-PS)
And you will remember that on the same day the Defendant Schacht
had been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy.

Did you appreciate at the time, Defendant, that that law was the
fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy
organization?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but only in case of a war, that is, in case of
mobilization.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that the point that I am
putting to you is that it had already been declared valid for carrying out war
preparations. Didn’t you understand that it was a big step forward for war
preparations?
VON NEURATH: Not at all. It was not a big step forward at all. It was
only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In every
country you have to guarantee the co-operation of the various offices in the
event of an attack.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your view. Now, at this time,
up to May 1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still
staffed by diplomats or Foreign Office officials of the older school and had
not yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you receive any warnings from
your own staff as to the happenings in Austria, or the rearmament, the
declaration of the air force, and the conscription?
VON NEURATH: I was advised about happenings in Austria, as can
be seen from the report which you submitted to me. The re-establishment of
the Armed Forces was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of
course I knew about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but—I am sorry, probably I did
not put the proper emphasis on the word. When I said warning I meant a
real warning from your officials that these happenings were making
Germany regarded abroad as being bloodthirsty and warmongering. Did
you get any warnings from your officials?
VON NEURATH: Certainly not, for that was not the case, and if any
assertions like that were being made abroad, they certainly were not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you look at Document
3308-PS, the affidavit of the interpreter Paul Schmidt.

My Lord, it is Page 68 of Document Book 12a, and it is Page 65 or 66
of the German version, Paragraph 4.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, just let me read you Paragraphs 4 and
5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says:
“4. The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on
25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the
Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the
eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had
been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted
Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within
Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi
methods, both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern
over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon
heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of
influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5
December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded
as a warning by the Nazis.”
Defendant, let’s take that. In these three points, is it correct, as Herr
Schmidt says, that the attempted Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss
seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Office?
VON NEURATH: Not only the career personnel of my office were
disquieted over this but I, of course, was also disquieted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And taking the last sentence:
“This concern”—that is the disturbance by the Putsch—“over the
repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a
recognition of the fact that these episodes”—blood purge and the
Putsch—“were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet
Consultative Pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement
which was not heeded as a warning...”
Is that correct, that among your staff the concern was heightened by
recognizing that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and the
Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the consultative pact?
VON NEURATH: No, that is a personal opinion of the interpreter
Schmidt.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, with respect to you, Defendant,
it is not. What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of
your experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am putting to
you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were concerned
that these events had had their effect on the consultative pact?
VON NEURATH: Not in the least.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate...
VON NEURATH: I can only repeat, the two things had no connection
with each other.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is he correct in his last statement that
that arrangement was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis?
VON NEURATH: That I cannot say; I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at the next
paragraph.
“The announcement in March of the establishment of a German
Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on
2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact
between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the
Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning as
to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the
Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude toward the Western
Powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At
this time the career officials at least expressed their reservations
to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not
Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.”
Now, just let us take that. Did—do you agree that the career personnel
of the Foreign Office regarded the Franco-Soviet pact as a further very
severe, very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German
foreign policy?
VON NEURATH: I do not know in the name of which personnel Herr
Schmidt is making these statements. But I, at any event, heard nothing to
the effect that my career personnel had expressed these opinions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, here is Herr Schmidt saying,
“The career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign
Minister, Neurath.” That is you.

VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you saying that Herr Schmidt,
who after all was a career official although he was an interpreter for a great
deal of the time—are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is
accurate when he says that your permanent officials expressed their concern
to you?
VON NEURATH: But quite decidedly. How could Herr Schmidt, who
was only an insignificant civil servant at that time, know what my career
personnel told me and in addition, how could Schmidt judge this? And I
should also like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that this
affidavit, or whatever it may be, was submitted to him after a serious illness
and that he personally knew absolutely nothing more about the contents.
That now...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may rest assured, the Tribunal
will correct me if I am wrong, that I put these paragraphs to Herr Schmidt
and he agreed with them when he was giving evidence before this Tribunal.
But now just look at one other statement at the end of Paragraph 6.
Well, we’ll just—we will read Paragraph 6, because I want to ask you about
the end:
“The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland
was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A
German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed that the
Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with
the Locarno Treaties and the League Covenant. On the same day
Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for
conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the
background statements in Mein Kampf, offensive to France, the
circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set
for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance
the march into the Rhineland was decided upon. I personally
knew about it and discussed it approximately 2 or 3 weeks before
it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in
military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar
fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common
knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the
only person in Government circles consulted by Hitler who felt

confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed
opposition from Britain and France. Neurath’s position
throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have
more faith in Neurath than in the general run of ‘old school’
diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold in disrespect.”
Well, now, if this minor official, of whom you just talked, knew about
and discussed the march into the Rhineland some 2 or 3 weeks before it
occurred, how much before it occurred had you discussed it?
VON NEURATH: Herr Schmidt must have been clairvoyant, for 2 or 3
weeks in advance even I did not know anything about it. I heard of it about
1 week before Hitler’s decision, and if I—if it says here that I—that it was
generally known in the Foreign Ministry that I was the only one in the
Government circles consulted by Hitler who was confident that the
Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain
and France, it certainly turned out that I was right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were right—but is it true that
you were the only person in Government circles who thought that it could
be occupied without interference by Britain and France? Is that true?
VON NEURATH: I am not in a position to say whether I was the only
one, but at any rate, I was convinced of this on the basis of my knowledge
of international conditions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so that at any rate, whatever the
limitations of Paul Schmidt, he knew what your position was quite
accurately. Was he not right about it in the last sentence, that your position
throughout the period was one which would make Hitler look to you rather
than to the rest, the other figures of pro-Nazi diplomacy and foreign affairs,
because you were the person who was encouraging him? Is that not the
position?
VON NEURATH: I did not encourage him in any way, but I described
the situation to him as I saw it, and it was later proved that I had been right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want you to deal
with one other point, which is really 1936, but we will deal with it as I have
been dealing with Austria.
You have said once or twice that you objected very strongly to the
description of the Austrian treaty, the treaty between the Reich and Austria

of the 11th of July as being a subterfuge or a façade. That is right; is it not?
You objected very strongly to that view?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Hitler had given
instructions to the Gauleiter of the Austrian NSDAP to carry on the struggle
at the same time as the treaty was signed?
VON NEURATH: No, I do not know anything about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me remind you. I do not want
to put anything that seems unfair.
My Lord, it is Document Book 12, Page 97.
[Turning to the defendant.] This is the report of Dr. Rainer, whom the
Tribunal has had the advantage of seeing, and if you will look at the end of
one paragraph he says:

“The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the
activities of these two persons.”—That is Defendant Seyss-
Inquart and Colonel Glaise-Horstenau—“Papen mentioned
Glaise-Horstenau to the Führer as being a trusted person.”
Now the next paragraph:
“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party...”
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say 97 of Document Book 12?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did, My Lord, yes. Yes, My Lord; it
is the third paragraph and begins, “At that time...”
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please:
“At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders of the Party in
Austria, in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian
National Socialists should do.” (Document Number 812-PS)
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was another “at that time” that we
were looking at. Could you give us some other indication?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is in the middle.
THE PRESIDENT: It is on 98 in ours.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am so sorry, My Lord. The paging
must be different. I beg Your Lordship’s pardon.
[Continuing.] “At that time the Führer wished to see the leaders
of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what
Austria National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner
was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor...”
Mind you, this is the man who is making this statement.
“...successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936
Dr. Rainer and Globocznik visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg,
where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the
wishes of the Führer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in
Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from

Rainer on the statement of the Führer and his political instructions
for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiter
received organizational instructions from Globocznik and
Hiedler.”
Did you not know—did Hitler not tell his Foreign Minister, who had
just supervised the conclusion of this treaty, that he intended to give the
illegal Gauleiter instructions as to how to carry on the fight? Didn’t he tell
you that?
VON NEURATH: No, he did not tell me that, but I do remember—I
believe it was the same Dr. Rainer who appeared here as a witness—who
stated that Hitler summoned him and other Gauleiter and told them that in
the future they were to observe strictly the agreements of 1936. By the way,
the matter that you just quoted is not mentioned at all in the document
which was submitted to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that’s not mentioned. What is
mentioned is the political instructions for carrying out the fight and the
organizational instructions from Globocznik. At any rate, you knew nothing
about that?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is rather difficult for you to
judge whether the treaty is made sincerely if you do not know the
instructions that are given to the illegal Party in Austria by Hitler, is it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, naturally.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let’s deal with one or
two other points. I would just like you to look at what Mr. Messersmith says
at the end of 1935. You remember this statement—I will give you the
reference in a moment—that:
“...Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen,
and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are
‘diplomats of the old school.’ They are in fact servile instruments
of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them
as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able
to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are
not in sympathy with the regime.”

Now, can you tell us up to the date on which Mr. Messersmith wrote
that—on October 10, 1935—of a single instruction of Hitler’s that you had
not carried out?
VON NEURATH: I did not quite understand. A single instruction...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry; I mislaid the
reference. It is Document Book 12, Page 107. That is the reference to it.
[Turning to the defendant.] You see, Mr. Messersmith is there saying
that you and the Defendant Von Papen and Von Mackensen are servile
instruments of the regime. Now, I am just asking you whether you could tell
us up to the date that Mr. Messersmith wrote, on 10 October 1935, any
instruction of Hitler’s that you had refused to carry out.
VON NEURATH: Not only one, but quite a few. I have testified as to
the number of times I contradicted Hitler, and I have expressed myself
about what Mr. Messersmith is assuming here again—about the importance
of Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I put it this way: Up to
October 10, 1935, what did you tell the Tribunal was the most serious thing
that Hitler had ordered you to do and you had refused to carry out? What
was the most serious—the one that mattered most?
VON NEURATH: Well on the spur of the moment, that is a question
that I cannot answer. How should I know what the most serious question
was which I opposed? I opposed all sorts of things.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you can’t remember what you
think is the most serious, I shan’t trouble you with it any more, but I want...
VON NEURATH: Well, you are quite welcome to submit it to me, but
don’t produce an allegation out of a clear sky without giving me the chance
to refute it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was asking you to tell us, but I will
pass on to what another American diplomat put. I would like to ask you
about Mr. Bullitt’s report, with which I gather you agree. My Lord, that is
L-150, and it is at Page 72 of the Document Book 12.
My Lord, I hope that there is no difference of the paging—72 of mine.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; it is 74.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is 74. I am sorry, My Lord.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, it is the second paragraph there. After
saying that he had a talk with you, he says:
“Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German
Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the
Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that
until the German fortifications had been constructed on the
French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do
everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak
by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard
to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are constructed
and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot
enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to
feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new
constellation will develop...’ ”
You agree you said that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, yes, certainly. Yesterday or the day before I
testified in detail about what that was supposed to mean. Moreover, it does
not make any difference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to see if you agree with
the meaning I suggest. That is that as soon as you had got your fortifications
in sufficiently good order on your western frontier, you would proceed to
try and secure an Anschluss with Austria and to get back the Sudetenland
from Czechoslovakia. Isn’t that what it means?
VON NEURATH: No, no, not at all. That is quite clear in the
document. What I meant by this and what I expressed was that these
countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and France, would change their
policy toward Germany, because they could no longer march through
Germany so easily.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Defendant, what I
am putting to you? I think I made it quite clear—that at the time that you
were facing the Western Powers with the remilitarization of Germany and
the Rhineland—that is in 1935 and 1936—you were then giving assurances
to Austria, which Hitler did in May 1935, and you made this treaty in 1936.
As soon as you had digested your first steps, you then turned against
Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. I am suggesting, you see, that you
were talking the exact truth and prophesying with a Cassandra-like

accuracy. That is what I am suggesting—that you knew very well that these
intentions were there.
VON NEURATH: What?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you didn’t?
VON NEURATH: Not at all, not at all, not at all! That is an
assumption on your part, for which there is absolutely no proof.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will not argue it further because
we will come on to just one other point before we proceed to 1937.
You have told the Tribunal, not once but many times, that you did not
support the Nazi attitude toward the Christian churches, of oppressing the
churches. That is I have understood you correctly, have I not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, and you say that you resisted
and actively intervened against the repression of the Church. Would you
just look at Document 3758-PS.
My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-516. My Lord, Your Lordship
will find it in Document Book 12a, Page 81.
[Turning to the defendant.] This is an entry which must have been
fairly early in 1936 in the diary of the Reich Minister of Justice:
“The Reich Foreign Minister transmits, with a personal note for
confidential information, a letter from Cardinal State Secretary
Pacelli”—that is the present Pope—“to the German Ambassador
in the Vatican, in which he urges an act of pardon for Vicar
General Seelmeyer. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, remarks to
this that after the heavy attacks on German justice by the Holy
See in the note of 29 January, there is no reason in his opinion to
show any deference to the Vatican. He recommends it, however,
since for foreign policy reasons it is to our interest not to let our
good personal relations with Pacelli cool off.”
Now, Defendant, will you tell me anything that showed the slightest
personal interest in the fate of Father Seelmeyer, or were you only
concerned with showing a firm front to the Vatican and not losing your
good relations with Cardinal Pacelli?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the document has just
been submitted to me; I have had no opportunity whatsoever to look this
document over and inform myself about it. Likewise, I do not know of there
having been any talk about a diary of the Reich Minister of Justice up to
now in this Trial. Therefore, I am not in a position to judge how the Reich
Minister of Justice could have made this entry in his diary at all.
Since these notes have apparently been taken out of their context, it is
not possible for me to form any kind of a picture of the significance of the
entry as a whole, and naturally it is even less possible for the defendant to
do so.
Therefore, I must protest against the admissibility of this question and
against the submission of this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a perfectly good captured
document. It is a copy of the original diary of the Reich Minister of Justice,
and it is therefore admissible against the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, you can see the original
document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, actually, I am just told by
my American colleagues that this diary has been used before, that extracts
were put in in the case against the Defendant Von Schirach.
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, I have no objection...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I could not understand a word, Mr.
President. I am sorry, I could not understand. I can hear now.
THE PRESIDENT: When you make an objection, you should see that
the instrument is in order.
What I said was that you can see the original document. And I am told
now that the original document has been used before, and that therefore
there is nothing to prevent its being used in cross-examination. It is a
captured document, and you can see the original.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not know that, Mr. President.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am putting to you,
Defendant, is that your statement to the Minister of Justice shows no
concern for the individual priest about whom the complaint had been made;
it is merely concerned with your relations with the Vatican and with

Cardinal Pacelli, as he then was. Is that typical of your interferences? Is this
typical of your interferences for the sake of ill-treated priests?
VON NEURATH: I naturally cannot remember this case any more, but
the way it stands there in the entry I was perfectly justified. According to
the entry, I said that we had no reason to show any special consideration
after the then Cardinal State Secretary, or Pope had attacked German
justice, but that, as Foreign Minister I considered it important not to disturb
our relations with Pacelli. I cannot see what conclusions you want to draw
from this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I don’t want to trespass on the
ground of my Soviet colleagues, but you know that the Czech report
accuses you, with complete impartiality as far as sect is concerned, of your
Government ill-treating the Catholics, Protestants, Czech National Church,
and even the Greek Church in Czechoslovakia. You know that all these
churches suffered during your protectorate—do you agree that all these
churches suffered under your protectorate?
VON NEURATH: No, not at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, I won’t go into the details,
but I am suggesting to you that your care about the various religious
confessions did not go very deep.
VON NEURATH: That is again an assertion on your part which you
cannot prove.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to put one
thing. You remember telling the Tribunal this morning of the excellent
terms that you were on with the archbishop of Prague?
VON NEURATH: I said that I had good relations with the archbishop.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at this
copy.
My Lord, this is a copy, but General Ecer assures me that he can get
the original from the Czech Government files. I received it only a half hour
ago. General Ecer, who is here from Czechoslovakia, says that he can vouch
for the original.
I’d like the defendant to look at it. Is that a letter which you received
from the archbishop?
My Lord, it is Document D-920, and it will be Exhibit GB-517:

“Your Excellency, very esteemed Herr Protector of the Reich:
“Your last letter has filled me with such sorrow because I could
not but gather from it that not even Your Excellency is prepared to
believe me—that I lost consciousness and had to call university
Professor Dr. Jirasek, who remained beside my sickbed for an
hour—he is coming again today, together with the specialist on
internal diseases....”
And then he gives his name.
“Your Excellency may be sure that I shall always do what I can to
please you. But please, have mercy on me, too, and do not
demand that I should act against the laws of the Church.
“Yours, et cetera, Karl Cardinal Kaspar, M. P. prince archbishop.”
Do you remember that?
VON NEURATH: I cannot say what this refers to. I have no idea;
there is nothing in it, and I cannot tell you what it referred to.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t remember this occasion
when the prince archbishop wrote to you and told you the effect, the illness
that he had suffered from and beseeched you not to ask him to do something
against the laws of the Church? It doesn’t remain in your mind at all, does
it?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we’ll leave that. Well now,
I want you to just tell me this, before we pass on to the later occurrences in
1937. You remember you dealt yesterday with your speech—I think it was
to the German Academy of Law. You remember the speech, in August of
1937? I can give you a reference. Would you like to look at it?
VON NEURATH: I only need the reference to where I spoke.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember it, I only wanted to
save time. Don’t you remember? I will put it to you if you like. It is the
speech of the 29th of August 1937, and I will give you the reference in one
moment. What I wanted to ask you was this—you said:
“The unity of the racial and national will created through Nazism
with unprecedented élan has made possible a foreign policy by

means of which the chains of the Versailles Treaty were broken.”
What did you mean by “the unity of the racial will” produced by
Nazism?
VON NEURATH: By that I probably meant that all Germans were
unified more than ever before. At this date I can no longer tell you what I
meant by this, either. But nevertheless I was merely establishing a fact.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now tell me. That was in
August 1937. You told the Tribunal the effect that the words of Hitler, on
the 5th of November 1937, had upon you, and your counsel has put in the
statement by Baroness von Ritter. After these words...
VON NEURATH: In November?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, November of 1937.
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, after these words had had that
effect, with whom did you discuss them among the people who had been
present at the Hossbach interview?
VON NEURATH: This speech was not made at Berchtesgaden at all.
That is a mistake; it was at Berlin, this address.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I didn’t say Berchtesgaden; I said at
the Hossbach conference. We call it the Hossbach conference because he
took the minutes.
VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday with whom I
spoke, General Von Fritsch, and with Beck, who was then Chief of the
General Staff; and I also testified that we agreed at that time jointly to
oppose Hitler and the tendency which he had revealed in this speech.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Hitler?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I testified yesterday in detail that I did not have
a chance to speak with Hitler until 14 or 15 January, because he had left
Berlin and I could not see him. That was the very reason why I asked for
my resignation at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Göring or
Raeder?
VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to just tell me one
word or two about this Secret Cabinet Council to which you were appointed
after you left the Foreign Office.
Would you look at the first sentences of the report of that meeting on
the 5th of November?
My Lord, it is Page 81 in the English Document Book 12, and Page 93
of the German document book.
It is only the first two sentences, Defendant:
“The Führer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s
conference was of such importance that its detailed discussion
would certainly, in other states, take place before the Cabinet in
full session. However, he, the Führer, had decided not to discuss
this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet because of its
importance.”
Then, if you will look at the people who were there: There is the
Führer; the Minister for War; the three Commanders-in-Chief; and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Now, Defendant, supposing that in February or March 1938, Hitler had
wanted to discuss Austria before the same Council, the same limited
number of people. Just let us see who would have taken the places of the
people who were there. Instead of Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, you
would have had the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and Von
Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief, would you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As a matter of fact, Raeder and
Göring maintained their positions; the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had taken
yours; and you were president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Lammers was
secretary of the Cabinet, and Goebbels had become more important as
Minister of Propaganda.
Well now, I would just like you to look and see who the people were
that formed the Secret Cabinet Council.
Your Lordship will find that on Page 8 of Document Book 12; and it is
Page 7 of the German document book.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, do you see who they are? There are
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Defendant Göring, the Führer’s Deputy,

Hess, Dr. Goebbels, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, Von
Brauchitsch, Raeder, and Keitel. You are saying, if I understand you, that
this Secret Cabinet Council had no real existence at all. Is that your case?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why were you receiving special
funds for getting diplomatic information as president of the Secret Cabinet
Council?
VON NEURATH: I did not receive any. I should like to know...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn’t you?
VON NEURATH: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us just have a look at this.
Would you look at Document 3945-PS?
My Lord, it is 129 in Document Book 12a. It will be Exhibit GB-518.
If you will look at the letter of the 28th of August 1939 from Lammers
to you:
“In conformity with your request, I have had the sum of 10,000
Reichsmark, which had been placed at your disposal for special
expenses in connection with the obtaining of diplomatic
information, handed to Amtsrat Köppen.
“I enclose the draft of a certificate showing how the money was
used, with the request to send me the certificate after execution, at
the latest by the end of the financial year.”
And if you will turn over to the next page, 131, you will see that at the
end of March, which was toward the end of the financial year, you signed a
certificate saying:
“I have received 10,000 Reichsmark from the Reich Chancellery
for special outlays entailed in obtaining diplomatic information.”
Now, will you tell us why you were getting special expenses for
obtaining diplomatic information?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I can tell you that. That is an expression used at
the request of Lammers who had the treasury of the Reich Chancellery
under him, so that I could meet the expenses of my office; that is, for one
typist and for one secretary. And in order to justify this to—I do not know

which authority, what this authority is called, to the Finance Ministry—I
had no special budget—Herr Lammers asked me to use this expression.
That can be seen from a certificate which is also in there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. I am going to refer
to the other letters. But why was it necessary that the expenses of your one
secretary and one typist should not be audited? As it shows on pages...
My Lord, the pages are 134 and 135.
VON NEURATH: I just said that...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On Page 134 you will see there is a
letter from you to Lammers: “In my bureau there is a need to incur special
expenses, to audit which it does not appear to me advisable.”
Why wasn’t it advisable to audit the expenses of your typist and
secretary?
VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you that just now. But at any
rate, I did not use any more money for diplomatic information; but these are
merely office expenses which I figured in there. And so at the end of this
letter which you have submitted to me there is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now...
VON NEURATH: Please, let me finish my statement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly.
VON NEURATH: There is a report here to me, from my—from this
secretary, in which he says—no, this is not the letter I thought it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you are finished, I
anticipated you might say it was office expenses. Would you look at
Document 3958-PS?
My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-519.
[Turning to the defendant.] I submit, that shows you your office
expenses were carried on the ordinary budget, the letter of 8 April 1942 to
you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the book?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes; I am so sorry. It is
140. I beg Your Lordship’s pardon.
[Turning to the defendant.] That is a letter to you which says:

“The Reich Minister for Finance has agreed that the budgetary
needs announced by you for the financial year 1942 be shown in
Special Plan 1. I therefore have no objections to having the
necessary expenditure granted—even before the establishment of
Special Plan I—within the limits of these amounts, namely:
“For personal administrative expenditures, up to 28,500
Reichsmark; for official administrative expenditures, up to 25,500
Reichsmark; total 54,000 Reichsmark.”
That was providing for your office and personal expenditures during
the same period for which you were getting these additional sums. So I am
suggesting to you that if these sums of 10,000 marks which you got every
now and then were not for office expenditures, I would like you to tell the
Tribunal what they really were for.
VON NEURATH: Yes, I would be very pleased if I were also told
about this, for I no longer know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, they are your letters, and you
got the money. Can’t you tell the Tribunal what you got it for?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot right now. Perhaps I can tell you
afterward.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Possibly it was for obtaining
diplomatic information, it says—
My Lord, Dr. Von Lüdinghausen makes the point that the letter I put
was in 1939. Of course, there were other letters. I have not troubled the
Tribunal with each one, but there is another letter in which there is a
reference to a payment on the 9th of May 1941, and, of course, another
reference to a payment on the 30th of June 1943. My Lord, these are Pages
133 and 134. I am sorry; I did not give the details. Perhaps I ought to have
indicated that.
THE PRESIDENT: The letter on Page 137, which may have some
bearing, is a letter from the man signed “K”—from the man who made the
previous applications?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
Perhaps would you like to look at that, Defendant? It is Document
3945-PS, a letter of the 14th of July 1943, signed “K”:

“When I went into the matter of the special funds, the competent
people in the Reich Chancellery showed an entirely
understanding attitude in this matter and asked for a written
application from Your Excellency. When I replied that I did not
wish to produce such an application before success was
guaranteed, they asked for a little more time for a further
exchange of views. After a few days I was told that I could
produce the application without hesitation, upon which I handed
over the letter which I had previously withheld. The amount
requested has been handed to me today and I have duly entered
this sum in my special cashbook as a credit.”
VON NEURATH: Yes, but in spite of this...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now does that help you? Can
you tell the Tribunal what were the outlays, the special outlays for the
obtaining of diplomatic information for which you received this money?
VON NEURATH: I am very sorry; I absolutely cannot—I can no
longer recall this matter at all. And the remarkable part is that this letter is
dated the 14th of July 1943, when I no longer had any functions
whatsoever, when I had left altogether. At this moment, I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is very strange, you know. In a
further letter, in Document 3958-PS, on 8 January 1943, and in succeeding
letters on the 4th of March and the 20th of April, the end of your occupation
of the premises of 23 Rheinbabenallee is explained there and when your
expenses ceased when you went to live in the country. I was just going to
ask you about that—a little about that house. If you will just look at the
affidavit of Mr. Geist, the American consul...
My Lord, that is Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420.
[Turning to the defendant.] I referred to this this morning, and the
passage that I want you to tell us about is in the middle of a paragraph.
My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11 of the affidavit in the English
version.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the separate document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it is at the foot of
Page 11. The paragraph begins:

“Another instance of the same nature occurred with regard to my
landlord...”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship goes on
another 10 lines, after explaining about his landlord having to give up his
house to the SS, he says:
“I know that on many occasions where it was thought necessary
to increase the pressure, the prospective purchaser or his agent
would appear accompanied by a uniformed SA or SS man. I know
because I lived in the immediate neighborhood and knew the
individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time Foreign
Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner.
Indeed, he was my next-door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s
house was worth approximately 250,000 dollars.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Was that 23 Rheinbabenallee?
VON NEURATH: Yes, yes...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired it for you, so that the
president of the nonexistent Secret Cabinet Council could have it as an
official residence? Who acquired it?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand that. Who did what?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired 23 Rheinbabenallee?
Who got it?
VON NEURATH: I can tell you about that. In the year 1937, when
Hitler was erecting the large buildings for his Reich Chancellery, he told me
one day that I would have to move from my apartment, which was situated
behind the Foreign Office, because he wanted the garden for his Reich
Chancellery, and the house would be torn down.
He said that he had given instructions to the Reich Building
Administration to find other living quarters for me. The Reich Building
Administration offered me various expropriated Jewish residences. But I
refused them. But now I had to look for a house myself, and my personal
physician, to whom I happened to mention this matter, told me that he knew
of a place in Dahlem, that was Number 23 Rheinbabenallee, where he was
house physician to the owner. This owner was Lieutenant Colonel Glotz,
who was the brother of a close friend of mine. I informed the Reich

Building Administration about this and told them that they should get in
touch with this gentleman. In the course of the negotiations, which were
conducted by the Reich Building Administration, a contract of sale was
drawn up for the price quoted by Mr. Geist, and the price was in marks, not
in dollars. This sum, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Glotz, was paid to
him in cash, and on his wish I persuaded the Finance Minister to have this
money transferred to Switzerland.
I might remark that I was still Foreign Minister at the time. Afterward,
I remained in this house for the simple reason that I did not find another
one, and Herr Von Ribbentrop, my successor, moved into the old
Presidential Palace.
Then in the year 1943 this house was destroyed. At the moment,
therefore, I still cannot explain what these moneys were for and whether
they were official payments made by the Reich Treasury. With the best
intentions, I cannot tell you. But the statements made by Mr. Geist here are
completely wrong as I have just stated. I did not buy or have this house
transferred from a Jew, but from the Christian Lieutenant Colonel Glotz.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You tell us that you passed the
money on to Switzerland on his account?
VON NEURATH: I? Yes. Because Herr—Herr Glotz went to
Switzerland. I believe, indeed, his wife was non-Aryan.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I would just like to put the next
sentence and then I will leave this document:
“I know too that Alfred Rosenberg, who lived in the same street
with me, purloined a house from a Jew in similar fashion.”
Do you know anything of that?
VON NEURATH: I do not know how Herr Rosenberg acquired his
house.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I want you to come
now to March of 1938. Perhaps I can take this shortly if I have understood
you correctly. You know that the Prosecution complained about your reply
to the British Ambassador with regard to the Anschluss. As I understand
you, you are not now suggesting that your reply was accurate; but you are
saying that that was the best of your information at the time, is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite correct. It is true. That was an
incorrect statement but I just did not know any better; do you see?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you did not hear—that
neither Hitler nor Göring told you a word about these ultimatums which
were given first of all to Herr Von Schuschnigg and secondly to President
Miklas; you were told nothing about that? Is that what you are telling?
VON NEURATH: No, at that time—at that time I knew nothing. I
heard about them later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to leave that. I
am not going into that incident in detail—we have been over it several
times—in view of the way that the defendant is not contesting the accuracy.
THE PRESIDENT: I should like to know when he heard of the true
facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged.
[Turning to the defendant.] When did you hear of the true facts of the
Anschluss?
VON NEURATH: I heard the details for the very first time here, when
this report of Legation Counsellor Hewel was submitted to me. Prior to this
time I probably heard that there had been pressure exerted on Herr
Schuschnigg, but nothing else. I actually learned the exact details for the
first time here in Nuremberg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I only want to get it quite clear. You
say that between the 11th of March and your coming to Nuremberg, you
never heard anything about the threat of marching into Austria, which had
been made by the Defendant Göring, or Keppler, or General Muff on his
behalf? You never heard anything about that?
VON NEURATH: No, I heard nothing of that sort.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then I do want to ask you about
the assurance that you gave to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in
Berlin. I would like you to look at Document TC-27 which you will find in
Document Book 12, Page 123 of Document Book 12. The passage that I
want to ask you about is in the sixth paragraph. After dealing with the
conversation with the Defendant Göring about the Czechoslovak
mobilization, it goes on:

“M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding
assurances on this subject”—that is, the Czechoslovak
mobilization—“and today”—that is, the 12th of March—“spoke
with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him
on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself
bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention
concluded at Locarno in October 1925.”
Now, you have told the Tribunal—we have had the evidence of
Baroness von Ritter—that the meeting on the 5th of November had this
very disturbing effect on you and in fact produced a bad heart attack. One
of the matters that was discussed at that meeting was attack, not only on
Austria but also on Czechoslovakia, to protect the German flank. Why did
you think, on the 12th of March, that Hitler would ever consider himself
bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty which meant that he
had to refer any dispute with Czechoslovakia to the Council of the League
of Nations or the International Court of Justice? Why on earth did you think
that that was even possible, that Hitler would submit a dispute with
Czechoslovakia to either of these bodies?
VON NEURATH: I can tell you that quite exactly. I already testified
yesterday that Hitler had me summoned to him on the 11th for reasons that I
cannot explain up to this day and told me that the march into Austria was to
take place during the night. In reply to my question, or rather to my remark
that that would cause great uneasiness in Czechoslovakia, he said that he
had no intentions of any kind at this time against Czechoslovakia and that
he was—he even hoped that relations with Czechoslovakia would be
considerably improved by the invasion or occupation of Austria.
From this sentence and from his promise that nothing would happen, I
concluded that matters would remain as they were and that, of course, we
were still bound to this treaty of 1925. Therefore, I was able to assure M.
Mastny of this with an absolutely clear conscience.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you believe a word that Hitler
said on the 12th of March? Did you still believe a word that Hitler said on
the 12th of March 1933?
VON NEURATH: Yes, still at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought Von Fritsch was a friend of
yours; wasn’t he?

VON NEURATH: Who?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Colonel General Von Fritsch; he was
a friend of yours?
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not believe that he had been
guilty of homosexuality did you?
VON NEURATH: No, never.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t they—didn’t you know
that he had been subject in January 1938 to a framed-up charge?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer instead of shaking your
head.
VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that, of course; and I learned of it and
the fact that this charge was a fabrication of the Gestapo but not of Hitler, at
least in my opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn’t you know that those—
these unsavory matters concerning Field Marshal Von Blomberg and
Colonel General Von Fritsch had been faked up by members of the Nazi
gang, who were your colleagues in the Government?
VON NEURATH: Yes. The details were unknown to me, of course.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, you remember that at the
time of Munich, when you came back to the field—came back into activity
for some time, President Beneš did appeal to this German-Czechoslovak
Arbitration Convention and Hitler brushed the appeal to one side. Do you
remember that? In September 1938?
VON NEURATH: No; that, I do not know, for at that time I was not in
office any longer and I did not get to see these matters at all. I do not know
about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you don’t know; of course, it
was in the German press and every other press that he appealed to this
treaty and Hitler refused to look at it; but you say that you honestly believed
on the 12th of March that Hitler would stand by that Arbitration Treaty;
that’s what you said?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I had no misgivings.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that might be a convenient
moment to break off.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you spoke yesterday with
regard to the memorandum of Lieutenant General Friderici. Do you
remember in that memorandum he referred to a memorandum of yours on
how to deal with Czechoslovakia?
Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document 3859-PS, so that
the Tribunal can see your attitude toward the Czechs from your own words.
My Lord, that is at Page 107 of Document Book 12a.
[Turning to the defendant.] I will read first your letter to Lammers of
the 31st of August 1940.
My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-520.
[Turning to the defendant.] You say:
“Dear Herr Lammers: Enclosed I send you the memorandum
which I mentioned in advance in my letter of 13 July 1940 ...
about the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-
Moravian country. I enclose another memorandum on the same
question, which my Secretary of State K. H. Frank has drawn up
independently of me and which, in its train of thoughts, leads to
the same result”—I ask you to note, the next words—“and with
which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the Führer
and arrange a date for a personal interview for myself and State
Secretary Frank. As I have heard from a private source that
individual Party and other offices intend to submit proposals to
the Führer for separating various parts of the Protectorate under
my authority, without my knowing these projects in detail, I
should be grateful to you if you would arrange the date for my
interview early enough for me, as the competent Reich Protector
and one who understands the Czech problem, to have an
opportunity, together with my State Secretary, to place our
opinions before the Führer before all sorts of plans are suggested
to him by other people.”
Now, I would just like to take what I hope will be the gist of your own
memorandum. If you will turn it over—this is your memorandum—take the
first paragraph, Section I:

“Any considerations about the future organization of Bohemia
and Moravia must be based on the goal which is to be laid down
for that territory from a state-political (staatspolitisch) and ethnic-
political (volkspolitisch) point of view.
“From a state-political standpoint there can be but one aim: total
incorporation into the Greater German Reich; from an ethnic-
political standpoint to fill this territory with Germans.”
And then you say that you point the path; and if you go on to Section
II, in the middle of Paragraph 2, you will find a subparagraph beginning—
My Lord, it is the top of Page 109, Your Lordship’s copy:
“These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4 millions live in towns
and communities of under 2,000 and in the country, are led and
influenced by an intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in
proportion to the size of the country. This part of the population
also tried, after the alteration of the constitutional situation of this
area, more or less openly to sabotage or at any rate postpone
necessary measures which were intended to fit the circumstances
of the country to the new state of affairs. The remainder of the
population, that is small craftsmen, peasants, and workmen,
adapted themselves better to the new conditions.”
Then, if you go on to Paragraph 3, you say:
“But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this that the
Government and population behaved in this correct manner
because they had inwardly accepted the loss of their independent
state, and incorporation into Greater Germany. The Germans
continue to be looked upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a
widespread longing for a return to the old state of affairs, even if
the people do not express it openly.
“By and large, the population submit to the new conditions but
they do so only because they either have the necessary rational
insight or else because they fear the consequences of
disobedience. They certainly do not do so from conviction. This
will be the state of affairs for some time to come.

“But”—go on to Section III—“as things are like that, a decision
will have to be taken as to what is to be done with the Czech
people in order to attain the objective of incorporating the country
and filling it with Germans as quickly as possible and as
thoroughly as possible.
“The most radical and theoretically complete solution to the
problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely from this
country and replace them by Germans.”
Then you say that that is not possible because there are not sufficient
Germans to fill it immediately.
Then, if you go on to Paragraph 2, to the second half, you say—My
Lord, that is the last six lines of Page 110:
“It will, where the Czechs are concerned, rather be a case on the
one hand of keeping those Czechs who are suitable for
Germanization by individual selective breeding, while on the
other hand of expelling those who are not useful from a racial
standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the intelligentsia
which has developed in the last 20 years. If we use such a
procedure, Germanization can be carried out successfully.”
Now, Defendant, you know that in the Indictment in this Trial we are
charging you and your fellow defendants, among many other things, with
genocide, which we say is the extermination of racial and national groups,
or, as it has been put in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin, “a co-
ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups with the aim of annihilating the
groups themselves.” What you wanted to do was to get rid of the teachers
and writers and singers of Czechoslovakia, whom you call the intelligentsia,
the people who would hand down the history and traditions of the Czech
people to other generations. These were the people that you wanted to
destroy by what you say in that memorandum, were they not?
VON NEURATH: Not quite. Here there are...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But just before you answer, what did
you mean by saying, in the last passage that I read to you, “...expelling
those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the
Reich, that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years”?

Did you mean what you said? Were you speaking the truth when you said it
was necessary to expel the intelligentsia?
VON NEURATH: To that I can answer only “yes” and “no.” First of
all, I should like to say that from this report it becomes apparent that the
memorandum was written by Frank. I joined my name to it, and this was on
31 August 1940. The memorandum which I—the memorandum which is
referred to in the Friderici report is from a—is dated later I think, although I
do not know offhand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will find—I will give
you, in a moment, the letter from Ziemke, who transmits Hitler’s view, and
I think you will find that it is this memorandum that Hitler is dealing with. I
will show you Frank’s memorandum in a moment. I am suggesting to you
now, as you say to Lammers, that you enclosed your memorandum and you
enclosed another memorandum, of which I will read you the essential part
in a moment, which is the memorandum of Karl Hermann Frank. But this is
a...
VON NEURATH: They are both by Frank.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I’ll show it—no; but look at your
own letter of the 31st of August: “Enclosed I send you the memorandum,”
and you go on: “I enclose another memorandum... which my State
Secretary K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me... with which I
fully agree.” I am suggesting to you, you know that this is your—this is
your memorandum referred to as the—in the Friderici document...
My Lord, that is Page 132 of Document Book 12.
[Turning to the defendant.] ...where General Friderici says, “After
ample deliberation the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various
plans in a memorandum.” I am suggesting to you that this is your
memorandum which you sent on to Lammers for submission to the Führer.
Are you saying—are you really going to tell the Tribunal that this is not
your memorandum?
VON NEURATH: No, I do not want to say that at all. At the moment I
really do not know any longer. I did not write it, but I agreed with its
contents; the letter to Lammers says so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you agreed with its
contents, what did you mean by saying that you would have to expel the
intelligentsia, except that you were going to break down the Czechs as a

national entity and expel the people who would keep going that history and
tradition and language? Isn’t that why you wanted to expel the
intelligentsia?
VON NEURATH: I never mentioned the word “destroy,” but said that
the intelligentsia...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “expel”...
VON NEURATH: I see.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...which is your own word.
VON NEURATH: The class of the intelligentsia was the greatest
obstacle to co-operation between Germans and Czechs. For that reason, if
we wanted to achieve this co-operation, and that was still the aim of our
policy, then this intelligentsia had to be reduced in some way and
principally their influence had to be diminished, and that was the meaning
of my explanation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you said to achieve your policy,
but by achieving your policy you meant to destroy the Czech people as a
national entity with their own language, history, and traditions, and
assimilate them into the Greater German Reich. That was your policy,
wasn’t it?
VON NEURATH: My policy was, first of all, to assimilate
Czechoslovakia, as far as possible. But in the final analysis that could not
have been achieved for generations. The first thing to do was to bring about
co-operation so as to have peace and order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now before I put to you the
memorandum of Frank with which you entirely agree, would you look at
Paragraph VII of your own memorandum?
My Lord, it is Page 113 of Document Book 12a.
[Turning to the defendant.] In Section VII you say:
“If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German nation
after a victorious war, the necessity for a careful and rational
utilization of Germans will be apparent to everyone. There are so
many tasks that have to be tackled at once and simultaneously
that a careful, well-thought-out utilization of the Germans who
are suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary.

“The Greater German Reich will have to make use of the help of
foreigners on a large scale in all spheres and must confine itself to
appointing Germans to the key positions and to taking over
branches of public administration where the interests of the Reich
make it absolutely necessary...”
You were, in this memorandum, blueprinting the plans for dealing with
the Czechs after the war on the basis of the German victory; that is, that
they should disappear as a nation and become assimilated to the German
Reich. Wasn’t that what was in your mind?
VON NEURATH: To make the Czechs disappear as a nation was
altogether impossible. That was not possible at all. But they were to
incorporate themselves more closely into the Reich, and that is what I mean
by the word “assimilate.”
Moreover, it is also stated in this memorandum—earlier, much earlier
—that from the racial point of view—if you want to use that unpleasant
expression—there was an extraordinarily large number of Germans within
Czechoslovakia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn over and see how
the—your State Secretary’s memorandum with which you entirely agree—
how that runs.
My Lord, Your Lordship will find the beginning of that is enclosure
Number 2 on Page 115.
[Turning to the defendant.] The State Secretary states his problem. He
says, in the second sentence:
“The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a Reich
Protector as its head, is suitable for settling the Czech problem
and should therefore be retained or whether it should now give
place to some, other form of government is being raised by
various people and is the cause of this memorandum. It will
briefly: (A) Indicate the nature of the Czech problem; (B) analyze
the present way in which it is being dealt with; (C) examine the
proposed alterations from the point of view of their suitability,
and finally: (D) express an independent opinion on the whole
question.”

Well now, I would like you just to look at your State Secretary’s
independent opinion with which you entirely agree.
THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn’t you to read the last two lines?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, My Lord, I’m sorry.
“On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech
problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to come.”
Now, My Lord, Frank’s own opinion starts on Page 121 in Section D
of the memorandum, and he begins by saying:
“The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be the
complete Germanization of area and people. In order to attain this
there are two possibilities:
“I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia
to a territory outside the Reich and settling Germans in the freed
territory; or,
“II. If one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia and
Moravia the simultaneous application of a great variety of
methods working toward Germanization, in accordance with an
X-year plan.
“Such a Germanization provides for: 1) The changing of the
nationality of racially suitable Czechs; 2) the expulsion of racially
unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of
the Reich, or ‘special treatment’ for these and all destructive
elements; 3) the recolonizing of the territory thus freed with fresh
German blood.”
Now, I want you just to turn to where your State Secretary gets down
to concrete suggestions as to this policy of Germanization. Remember that
you entirely agree, in your letter to Lammers.
If Your Lordship will turn to Page 123, there is a heading “Youth;
fundamental change in education; extermination of the Czech historical
myth.”
[Turning to the defendant.] That is the first point: Destroy any idea
they might have of their history, beginning with the time of St. Wenceslaus,
nearly a thousand years ago. That is your first point.

“Education toward the Reich idea; no getting on without perfect
knowledge of the German language; first doing away with the
secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools; never
again any Czech universities, only transitionally the Collegium
Bohemicum at the German university in Prague; 2 years
compulsory labor service.
“Large-scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and
German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the
German national soil from the north to the suburbs of Prague.
“Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become
merely a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to
disappear completely as an official language.
“Marriage policy after previous racial examination.
“In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier Gaue
must be excluded.
“Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the
granting of advantages as an inducement, severest police
methods, with exile and ‘special treatment’ for all saboteurs.
Principle: ‘Zuckerbrot und Peitsche.’ ”—What is that “Zuckerbrot
und Peitsche”?
“The employment of all these methods has a chance of success
only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its head
controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The direct
subordination of the ‘master in Bohemia’ to the Führer clarifies
the political character of the office and the task, and prevents the
political problem from sinking down to an administrative
problem.”
In other words, it was essential to this policy that you should keep your
job as Reich Protector and Frank should keep his as State Secretary, and the
Gauleiter of the Danube should not be able to interfere and take away Brno
as the capital of his Gau.
Defendant, do you tell this High Tribunal, as you told Dr. Lammers,
that you entirely agree with what I suggest to you are dreadful, callous, and
unprincipled proposals? Do you agree with these proposals?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not agree in the least.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, why did you tell Lammers you
did? Why, when things were going well, did you tell Lammers that you did
agree with them?
VON NEURATH: Later I made an oral report to the Führer about this.
Apart from that, the statements which you just made show quite clearly that
this first memorandum was written by Frank, who then added the second
memorandum to it, and if you say, as you said at the end just now, that it
was my purpose to remain in office as Reich Protector, then I can only tell
you that the purpose, if there was a purpose in this connection, was that
Frank wanted to become Reich Protector. However, from the point of view
of the contents of this memorandum, I can certainly no longer identify
myself with them today, nor did I do so on the occasion when I reported to
the Führer. This becomes clear from the testimony which I gave yesterday.
This testimony...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’m not concerned with your
testimony yesterday; I am concerned with what you wrote in 1940 when
you wrote—and I will read the words again; I have read them three times:
“I enclose another memorandum on the same question which my
State Secretary, K. H. Frank, has drawn up independently of
me”—independently of me—“and which in its train of thoughts
leads to the same result, and with which I fully agree.”
Why did you...
VON NEURATH: I have just now told you that I no longer agree with
these statements today, and that at the time when I verbally reported to the
Führer, I did not support these statements either, but to the contrary, I made
the proposals to him which I explained yesterday and to which I received
his agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are these documents correctly copied?
Because you see that in the letter of the 31st of August 1940 there is a
reference in the margin, “Enclosure 1; Enclosure 2.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Therefore, the letter identifies the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is so. The one is,
as I am suggesting, the defendant’s; the other is Frank’s.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you have mentioned, Defendant,
about what—that you dealt with them otherwise to the Führer. I suggest to
you that that is not true, that is not true that you dealt with them otherwise
to the Führer. I am putting it quite bluntly that it is not true.
VON NEURATH: In that case I must regret to say that you are lying.
For I—I must know. After all, I must know whether I talked to the Führer. I
delivered a verbal report to him in person and Frank was not present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us look at the
report, at your report. Your Lordship will find it on Page 7.
We will see whether it is true or not.
THE PRESIDENT: Page what?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 7, My Lord. It is Document D-
739 of the same book, 12a; it is Exhibit G-521.
Now, this is a memorandum, a secret memorandum of the
representative of the Foreign Office in the Office of the Reich Protector, of
the 5th of October.
[Turning to the defendant.] You will remember your letter was the 31st
of August. It says:
“Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector and State
Secretary Frank by the Führer, I have learned the following from
authentic sources:
“To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Gürtner, gave a report on
the Czech resistance movement, during the course of which he
maintained that the first trial of the four chief ringleaders would
shortly take place before the Peoples’ Court.
“The Führer objected to this procedure and declared that
execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and
rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through legal sentences,
as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter. The
Czechs would regard any sentence as an injustice. As this matter
had already entered the path of legal procedure it was to be
continued with in this form. The trials were to be postponed until
after the war, and then amidst the din of the victory celebrations,

the proceedings would pass unnoticed. Only death sentences
could be pronounced, but would be commuted later on to life
imprisonment or deportation.
“Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the
Führer touched on the following three possibilities:
“1. Continuation of Czech autonomy in which the Germans
would live in the Protectorate as co-citizens with equal rights.
This possibility was, however, out of the question as one had
always to reckon with Czech intrigues.
“2. The deportation of the Czechs and the Germanization of the
Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility
was out of the question too, as it would take 100 years.
“3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by
Germanizing the Czechs, that is, by their assimilation. The latter
would be possible with the greater part of the Czech people.
Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections or who
were anti-German were to be excepted from this assimilation.
This category was to be weeded out.
“The Führer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave
orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the multitude
of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The Führer further
decided that, in the interests of a uniform policy with regard to the
Czechs, a central Reich authority for the whole of the Bohemian
and Moravian area should remain at Prague.
“The present status of the Protectorate thus continues.”
And look at the last sentence:
“The Führer’s decision followed the lines of the memoranda
submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.”
Now, Defendant, although you answered me so sharply a moment ago,
that document says that after the reception of the Reich Protector and the
State Secretary, the representative of the Foreign Office in your office says
that the decision of the Führer followed the lines of the memoranda put
forward by you and your State Secretary Frank. Why do you say that I am

wrong in saying it is untrue that a different line was followed by the Führer?
It is set out in that document.
VON NEURATH: To that I have the following reply to give: First of
all, the document shows that the Führer touched upon the following three
eventualities with reference to the question of the future of the Protectorate.
They are the three possibilities which I said yesterday I had proposed. The
document also shows, though not directly, that the cause for this Führer
conference was primarily quite a different one than merely deciding the
question of the Protectorate. On the contrary, the Minister of Justice was
present and a legal question in regard to the treatment of the members of the
resistance movement was the cause for the discussion and Frank came to
Berlin for this reason. I had been to Berlin before that and I talked to the
Führer, not about the memorandum, which I had in my hand, but about my
misgivings in general and the future of our policy in the Protectorate. My
report included those proposals which are mentioned here under 1, 2, and 3.
It says there at the end, “The decision followed the lines of the
memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank.” That
remark was added by Herr Ziemke or whoever had written the document,
but what I said yesterday about the policy is correct. And even if I admit
that at that time in the letter to Lammers I did identify myself with these
enclosures it was nevertheless dropped.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to remind you that in
the passage which I referred to last in your memorandum, as opposed to
that of Frank, you were putting forward the organization of the Greater
German Reich. I take it in this way, that you envisaged yourself that in the
event of a German victory in the war the Czech part of Czechoslovakia
would remain part of a Greater German Reich.
VON NEURATH: No, I beg your pardon. It had already been
incorporated and here it is also expressly stated that it should remain in that
condition, as a protectorate but as a special structure.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just—are you saying that
your policy, after this period—this was in the autumn of 1940—that your
policy towards the Czechs was sympathetic?
VON NEURATH: I do not think it changed except when there were
strong resistance movements there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, why was it that you
forbade, in the middle of 1941, any reference of the handling—to the
discussion of the handling and treatment of all questions about the German-
Czech problem? Why did you forbid its discussion?
VON NEURATH: To prevent these problems which were the cause of
this memorandum from arising again and again, namely the problem of
individual parts of the Protectorate being torn away and added to the lower
Danube or the Sudeten country with a general resettlement. That was the
purpose of my report to the Führer, as I explained yesterday, so as to put a
stop to that discussion once and for all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you also—you particularly
prohibited, did you not, any public statements addressed to the Czech
population? Well, let us look at the document.
It is Document Number 3862-PS, My Lord. Your Lordship will find it
at Page 126 of Document Book 12a. My Lord, it becomes Exhibit GB-522.
[Turning to the defendant.] It is for distribution through your various
offices and you say:
“For the motive stated I order that in the future, when
arrangements and publications of any kind concerning the
German-Czech problem are made, the views of the whole
population are more than ever to be directed to the war and its
requirements while the duty of the Czech nation to carry out the
war tasks imposed on it jointly with the Greater German Reich is
to be stressed.
“Other questions concerning the German-Czech problem are not
suitable subjects for public discussion at the present time. I wish
to point out that, without detriment to my orders, administrative
handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech
problem are to be in no way alluded to.”
Then the last paragraph:
“Requisite public statements about the political questions of the
Protectorate and in particular those addressed to the Czech
population are my business and mine alone and will be published
in due time.”

Why did you want to prohibit so severely the addressing of any public
statements to the Czech population?
VON NEURATH: That is addressed not only to the Czech population,
but especially to the Germans, and just for this reason—that was some
special event which I no longer remember—it says here “for the motive
stated I order that”—when there was again a discussion about the future of
the Protectorate or something was published. That was the reason and I
pointed out that that is why it was forbidden.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I suggest to you about the
—your proposals and Frank’s speak for themselves. I want you to help me
on one other matter.
Do you remember after the closing of the universities that the question
arose, what was to happen to the students? There were about 18,000
students who were, of course, out of work because they could not...
VON NEURATH: I beg your pardon, I beg your pardon. There were
not so many; there were at the most 1,800 in all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you got it—with the greatest
respect either you are wrong or your office. According to the note from
Group X of your office:
“According to the data at my disposal the number of students
affected by the closure”—I should think that would include high
schools as well—“for 3 years of the Czech universities is 18,998.
“According to the press communications, dated the 21st of this
month only 1,200 persons were arrested in connection with the
events of the 15th of this month.”
And then your office goes on to say by a process of subtraction that
leaves 17,800. You were faced with their occupation.
My Lord, it is Page 104, Document 3858-PS. Exhibit GB-523.
VON NEURATH: I do not want to deny my official’s statement. He
must have known better than I. I am merely surprised that there should have
been 18,000 students in two Czech universities, in a country with a
population of 7 millions.
THE PRESIDENT: Hadn’t you better check that by the original?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I shall. I am much obliged
to Your Lordship. Well, My Lord, it is quite clear that both figures—they
are in figures, and they are 18,998, and then there is the check below, and
you have to take off 1,200; that leaves 17,800. My Lord, if it were only
1,800, the second figure could not arise.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, somewhere there must
be an error. That would have been more for two universities in
Czechoslovakia than there were in Berlin at the best of times. There was a
maximum of 8,000 to 9,000 in Berlin per year and in the case of a nation of
only 7 millions there are supposed to be 18,000 students in two universities.
This cannot be right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it may be that there are
three age groups. Your Lordship sees that it is “according to the data at my
disposal, the number of students affected by the closure for 3 years of the
Czech universities is 18,000.” It may be that is the intake for 2 years, in
addition to present students.
[Turning to the defendant.] Anyhow, this is the figure; and it is this
problem which has been dealt with by your Ministry. It may be that it
includes certain high schools, but at any rate, these are your Ministry’s
documents, and I want to know what happened. This was the minutes, as I
understand it, from Dennler, Dr. Dennler, who was the head of Group X of
your office, to Burgsdorff, who had a superior position; and, if I may
summarize it, this letter of 21 November 1939 suggests that the students
should be taken forcibly from Czechoslovakia to the old Reich and put to
work in the old Reich; and then, the next—on 25 November, you will notice
that in Paragraph 2 it says—the writer, who is Burgsdorff, is saying that he
is dealing with X 119/39, which is Dennler’s memorandum; and Burgsdorff
says that he does not want them to go into the Reich because at that time
there was some unemployment in the Reich, and suggests that they should
be dealt with by compulsory labor on the roads and canals in
Czechoslovakia. Now, these were the two proposals from your office.
My Lord, the second one is Document 3857-PS, which will be Exhibit
GB-524.
[Turning to the defendant.] What happened to the unfortunate
students?
VON NEURATH: Nothing at all happened to them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, did either of these
proposals of Dr. Dennler for forced labor in the Reich and of Burgsdorff for
forced labor in Czechoslovakia, did they come up to you?
VON NEURATH: No, none of them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did they come to you for decision?
Did they come to you for decision?
VON NEURATH: I think they were submitted to me, but I cannot tell
you for certain.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, will you agree with me, or
perhaps you will be able to correct my knowledge, that this is the earliest
suggestion—you said it was not put into effect—but the earliest suggestion
of forced labor came from an officer of your department? Do you know of
any other department of the Reich that had suggested forced labor as early
as November 1939?
VON NEURATH: There is no connection, and, moreover, if you were
to look through suggestions made by all your subordinates, then you, too,
might find some proposal which you afterward rejected. Suggestions made
by an adviser do not mean anything at all.
Apart from that, perhaps I can clear up this figure of 18,000. Here it
says, “According to the data at my disposal, the number of students who
will be affected by closing the Czech universities for 3 years will be
18,000.” It is, therefore, three times 6,000, is it not? Which is approximately
18,000.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had already put forward that
suggestion, Defendant, about 10 minutes ago, but I respectfully agree with
you. That is one matter in which we are not in difference.
Well now, you understand what I am suggesting. It is that these
proposals germinated in your office, because they were quite in keeping
with the proposals in the memoranda which I have just read to the Tribunal,
that you should not only get rid of Czech higher education, but you should
have forced labor. Do you remember that was in the State Secretary’s
memorandum? What I am suggesting is that it was in your department—the
idea of forced labor—as early as 21 November 1939.
Now, Defendant, I have only one other matter, and I hope, as it is a
question of fact, that perhaps you will be able to agree with me on
reflection. You suggested this morning that the German university in Prague

was closed down after the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1919. That is how
it came to us. On reflection, do you not know that it continued and that
many thousands of students graduated in the German university of Prague
between 1919 and 1939?
VON NEURATH: As far as I know, it was a department of the Czech
university, a German part of the Czech university, as far as I know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it continued—it continued as a
university?
VON NEURATH: Yes, it continued, but as a Czech university.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but German students came there
and could take their degrees in German? It was a permitted language? I
suggest to you that there are thousands of people who went there from
Austria and from the old Reich—went there as Germans and took their
degrees in German.
VON NEURATH: Yes, only the old German university, the so-called
Charles University, was closed by the Czechs. But a German department, or
whatever one might call it, still remained. The Germans studied and took
their examinations there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the point is clear. I am not
going to argue about the actual thing, but that there was a German
university, where German students could study, you will agree.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine further?
STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant
Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Defendant, tell us please, when you were
Minister of Foreign Affairs did Ribbentrop try to intervene in the foreign
affairs of Germany?
VON NEURATH: Is that a question?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is a question.
VON NEURATH: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Would you please tell us in what
form this intervention took place?
VON NEURATH: By communicating to the Führer his own ideas on
foreign policy, without giving them to me for consideration.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Yesterday you stated
here that in 1936 you had differences of opinion with Hitler and that on 27

of July 1936 you asked to be relieved of your duties as a Minister. This
document was cited here yesterday, but did you not write to Hitler then?—
and I will read the last sentence of your letter to him:
“Even if I am no longer Minister, I shall be constantly at your
disposal, if you so desire, with my advice and my years of
experience in the field of foreign policy.”
Did you write these words in your letter to the Führer?
VON NEURATH: Yes indeed; yes indeed.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And did you fulfill the promises
you made to Hitler? Whenever it was necessary to cover by diplomatic
manipulations the aggressive actions of Hitler, as for instance at the time of
the annexation of the Sudetenland, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
and so on? Did you help Hitler with your experience? Is that right?
VON NEURATH: That is a great mistake. On the contrary, as I have
stated here yesterday and today, I was called in by Hitler only once; and that
was on the last phase of the Austrian Anschluss. With that my activities
came to an end, but in 1938, to be sure, I went to see him of my own
accord, to restrain him from starting the war. That was my activity.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We have already heard this. I
would like to ask you another question concerning the memorandum of
Friderici without repeating what has already been said here concerning it.
You remember this memorandum well, as it was just presented to the Court
a short time ago. In the last part of the memorandum of Friderici—it is the
last paragraph but one—it is stated:
“If the governing of the Protectorate were in reliable hands and
guided exclusively by the order of the Führer of the 16th of
March 1939, the territory of Bohemia and Moravia would become
an integral part of Germany.”
It was for this purpose that Hitler chose you to be Protector; is that not
so?
VON NEURATH: Not a bit; that was not the reason at all. The reason
was—I have described it in detail yesterday.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. We shall not repeat the
reasons; we spoke about them yesterday.

Well, you deny that you were precisely the man who was supposed to
carry through the invasion of Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: To that I can only answer “no.”
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Do you admit that you
were, in the Protectorate, the only representative of the Führer and of the
Government of the Reich, and that you were directly subordinate to Hitler?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right; that is stated in Hitler’s decree.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, it is stated there. I will not
read this decree, which would only delay the interrogation. This decree has
already been presented to the Court.
Do you acknowledge that all administrative organs and authorities of
the Reich in the Protectorate with the exception of the Armed Forces, were
subordinate to you?
VON NEURATH: No. I am sorry to have to say that that is a mistake.
That is also stated in the same decree of 1 September 1939. Apart from that,
there were numerous other organizations, that is, Reich authorities, which
were not under my jurisdiction; quite apart from the Police.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, as far as the Police are
concerned, we will speak about that separately. So you think it is a mistake
that the decree does not mention it, or do you interpret the decree
otherwise?
I shall read the first paragraph of the decree of 1 September 1939. It is
stated there:
“All the authorities, offices and organizations of the Reich in the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, with the exception of the
Armed Forces, are under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector.”
It is also stated in Paragraph 2:
“The Reich Protector supervises the entire autonomous
administration of the Protectorate.”
And Paragraph 3:
“The office of the Reich Protector is in charge of all
administrative branches of the Reich administration with the
exception of the Armed Forces.”

As you see, it is stated very bluntly and definitely here that all the
institutions of the Reich were subordinate to you, while you were
subordinate to Hitler.
VON NEURATH: I have to tell you again that as to administrative
agencies, yes; but there were a number of other authorities, Reich
authorities and offices which did not come under my jurisdiction, for
instance, the Four Year Plan.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now let us pass to the question of
the Police. Yesterday, in answer to a question of your counsel, you stated to
the Tribunal that as to this decree of 1 September, signed by Göring, Frick,
and Lammers, Paragraph 13 was not comprehensible to you. Let us
examine other paragraphs of the same chapter concerning the Police.
Paragraph 11 says:
“The organs of the German Security Police in the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia have the task of investigating and
combating all hostile attempts toward the government and
population in the territory of the Protectorate, informing the Reich
Protector as well as the subordinate organizations, keeping them
currently informed on important events, and advising them as to
what to do.”
Paragraph 14 of the same decree states:
“The Reich Minister of the Interior (the Reichsführer SS, and the
Chief of the German Police), with the agreement of the Reich
Protector in Bohemia and Moravia releases the legal and
administrative directives necessary for carrying out this order.”
Thus, according to this decree, the Police and the SS were obliged to
let you know about all their measures and, moreover, all their administrative
and legal acts and measures had been carried out with your knowledge. Do
you acknowledge that?
VON NEURATH: No; that is not right. First of all, there was at one
time an order that they were to inform me. But that was not carried out and
was forbidden by Himmler directly. And the other, the second regulation to
the effect that the administrative measures—or whatever it is called—could
or should be carried out with my approval, was never applied.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: So you deny it?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I now present to you the testimony
of Karl Hermann Frank, of 7 March 1946, on this very question; that is, on
the question of the Police and to whom they were subordinated.
Mr. President, I present this testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-494.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this in the English book as well, do you know?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No, Mr. President. This document
that I am presenting now is an original, signed by Frank.
[Turning to the defendant.] Karl Hermann Frank, during an
interrogation, testified:
“According to the order on ‘The Structure of the German
Administration in the Protectorate and the German Security
Police,’ all German authorities and offices in the Protectorate and
thereby the entire Police, too, excepting the Armed Forces are
formally subordinated to the Reich Protector and are bound by his
directions. Owing to this the Security Police was bound to carry
out this basic political policy set forth by the Reich Protector.
Orders as to carrying out State Police measures were mainly
issued by the Chief of the Security Police with the Reich Security
Main Office in Berlin.
“If the Reich Protector wanted to carry out some State Police
measures, he had to have the permission of the Reich Security
Main Office in Berlin; that is, in this case the State Police also
submitted each order for reconfirmation to the Reich Security
Main Office in Berlin. The same applied also to directives for the
carrying out of State Police measures given by the Higher SS and
Police Leader to the Chief of the Security Police.”
I would like to draw your attention to this paragraph that I am reading
now:
“This system of channels for issuing directives remained in force
during the whole existence of the Protectorate and was used as
such by Von Neurath in the Protectorate. In general the Reich
Protector could, on his own initiative, issue directives to the State

Police through the Chief of the Security Police. The carrying out
of such directives was, however, subject to approval by the Reich
Security Main Office if State Police measures were concerned.
“In regard to the SD (Security Service), which had no executive
powers, the authority of the Reich Protector respecting the issuing
of directives to the SD was greater and not subject to the approval
of the Reich Security Main Office in every case.”
Do you confirm this testimony of Frank?
VON NEURATH: No.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right.
VON NEURATH: I refer you to a statement by the same Frank, which
I have learned about here, which was made last year, during which he said
something quite different. He said that the entire Police were not under the
Reich Protector, but came under the Chief of the Police in Berlin, namely,
Himmler. It ought to be here somewhere—this statement.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Don’t worry about it; I will come
back to this testimony.
Tell me, please, who was the political adviser in your service?
VON NEURATH: Political adviser?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, political adviser.
VON NEURATH: In general I had various political advisers.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In order not to waste time, I will
show you a short document, and I ask you to read it.
On 21 July 1939 the Chief of the Security Police wrote a letter to your
State Secretary and Higher SS and Police Leader, Karl Hermann Frank. The
letter had the following contents:
“In an order of 5 May 1939 the Reich Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia appointed the SD Leader and Chief of the Security
Police as his political adviser. I have ascertained that this order
has not yet been published or carried out. Please provide for
carrying out this order.
“Signed, Dr. Best.”
Do you remember your order now?

VON NEURATH: I cannot remember that decree at the moment, but I
do remember that this was never carried out, because I did not have this SD
leader as my political adviser.
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, just one more
minute, please, to finish this question, and then we can break off.
[Turning to the defendant.] But did you issue such an order on 5 May?
VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you about that at this date—but
it is probably true. I do not want to deny it; I do not know any more.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: But you did issue this order?
All right. I thank you, Mr. President. It is possible to adjourn now. I
shall require 30 minutes more.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 26 June 1946, at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH DAY
Wednesday, 26 June 1946

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Thursday, tomorrow
afternoon, in open session, but will sit in closed session. That is to say, we
will sit tomorrow, Thursday, from 10 till 1 in open session, and we will sit
in the afternoon in closed session.
On Saturday morning, the Tribunal will sit in open session from 10 till
1.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am aware that
yesterday when I submitted the Document USSR-494, the necessary copies
of this document were not submitted to the Tribunal. I am very sorry about
this, and I would ask you to accept the necessary copies now which I am
going to submit.
[The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stand.]
Let us go back, Defendant, to your warning issued in August 1939. If I
understood you correctly, you said here before the Tribunal that this
warning was issued in connection with the military situation of the time; is
that correct?
VON NEURATH: With reference to the military situation nothing had
happened at that time; absolutely no political tension had become
noticeable in the meantime; therefore, it was not directly in connection with
the military situation. There was certainly nothing wrong yet at that time.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is regardless of the military
situation, all right. Do you acknowledge that by this order of yours, or by
this warning, you had introduced a system of hostages? Do you admit that?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand the question.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I am going to repeat the question. I
am asking you, do you acknowledge that by means of this warning of
August 1939—I am submitting this document as evidence under Document
Number USSR-490—that by this order you were setting up a system of
hostages? Do you admit that?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was it correctly translated to you
just now?
VON NEURATH: Yes; the translation did not come through on the last
question, or rather the last sentence. I did not understand the last sentence.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, I will put it to you that you
know the document well.
VON NEURATH: Yes; but I did not understand the last sentence of
your question.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I shall try to say it in such a way
that you will understand it now. In this order of yours, in the penultimate
paragraph, it is stated, “The responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be
borne not only by the individual perpetrators, but by the entire
Czechoslovak population.” This means that not only guilty persons have to
be punished, but there were punishments set up for innocent people too.
With this order you inaugurated the mass terrorism against the Czech
population.
VON NEURATH: Not at all. It only meant that the moral
responsibility for any possible acts was to be laid to the account of the
Czech people.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, in Lidice, was this not
applied in practice? Was it only a question of the moral responsibility there?
VON NEURATH: Yes, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In this order you state the
following: “Those who do not take these necessities into account will be
considered enemies of the Reich.” To the enemies of the Reich you applied
only the principles of moral responsibility and nothing else?
VON NEURATH: Yes, if someone did not obey orders, then naturally
he was punished.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: That is exactly what I am trying to
determine and that is why I put this question to you, that just by this order
of August 1939 you started the general terrorism of a massacre and
punishment of innocent people.
VON NEURATH: Well, I do not know how you can draw this
conclusion from this warning.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We are going now to the
deductions which we can make out of this. In the report of the
Czechoslovak Government, submitted as evidence, Document USSR-60,
which is a report on the final result of the investigation of the crimes
committed by you and your collaborators, all this has been stated. And you
just flatly deny all this documentary evidence. I am not going to argue with
you regarding this document, but I am going to read into the record some of
the testimony by the witnesses; and I would like you to reply whether you
corroborate this evidence or whether you deny it. I am going to read into the
record an excerpt from the testimony of the former Minister of Finance,
Josef Kalfus, of 8 November 1945.
The Tribunal will find these excerpts on Page 12 of the English text,
Document USSR-60.
Kalfus stated:
“The economic system introduced by Neurath and after him by
the later German regime, was nothing else than systematic,
organized robbery. As to the occupation of decisive positions in
the Czech industry and finance, it should be pointed out that,
together with Neurath, a vast economic machinery was installed,
which immediately occupied the chief positions in industry. The
Skoda Works, Brno Armament Works, steel works at Vitkovice,
important banks—Bohemian Discount Bank, Länder Bank, and
Bohemian Union Bank—were occupied as well.”
Do you corroborate this evidence?
VON NEURATH: I talked about this matter in great detail yesterday,
and I refer you to my statement I made yesterday. I have nothing to add.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thus, you do not corroborate this
evidence?
VON NEURATH: Not in the least.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: The former, President of Bohemia,
Richard Bienert, during the interrogation of 8 November 1945, stated—Mr.
President, this excerpt is on Page 13 of the English text of the Document
USSR-60:
“When we got to know him more closely, we noticed that he,
Neurath, was ruthless toward the Czechs. As the Landespräsident
of Bohemia I knew that it was Neurath who subjected the political
administration in Bohemia and Moravia to German control, both
the state administration and the local government as well. I
remember also that Neurath caused the abolition of the local
school counsellors, and the appointment of German school
inspectors in their place. Neurath ordered the dissolution of the
regional representative bodies; he caused Czech workers to be
sent to the Reich from April 1939 onward in order to work for the
war machine of the Reich. He ordered the closing down of the
Czech universities and of many Czech secondary and elementary
schools.
“He abolished the Czech sport clubs and associations, such as
Sokol and Orel, and ordered the confiscation of all the property of
these gymnastic organizations; he abolished ... the Czech
recreation homes and sanatoria for young workmen and students,
and ordered the confiscation of their property. The Gestapo
carried out the arrests, but on the order of the Reich Protector ... I
myself was arrested on 1 September 1939, as well.”
Will you still deny this testimony?
VON NEURATH: No, no. About all the matters which are listed here,
I spoke yesterday in great detail. I do not intend to repeat it all over again
now. Moreover, it seems strange to me that Mr. Bienert of all people, who
knew perfectly well what I had ordered and what my relations were to the
Gestapo and so forth, that Mr. Bienert of all people should say things like
that.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. Let us look at some
other testimony. The former Prime Minister of the so-called Protectorate,
Dr. Krejci, during the interrogations on 8 November 1945, stated...

Mr. President, this excerpt can be found on Page 17 of the English text
of the Document USSR-60. Krejci testified:
“I know that the gymnastic associations were disbanded and their
property confiscated at the order of the Reich Protector, and their
funds and equipment handed over to be used by German
associations such as SS, SA, Hitler Youth, and so on. On 1
September 1939, when Poland was attacked by the German Army,
arrests took place on a large scale, especially arrests of army
officers, intellectuals, and important political personalities. The
arrests were made by the Gestapo, but it could not be done
without the approval of the Reich Protector.”
I am reading into the record one more excerpt from the next page of
the testimony:
“As far as the Jewish problem was concerned, the Government of
the Protectorate was forced by the Reich Protector into a
campaign against the Jews, and when this pressure had not the
desired result, the Germans—or the Reich Protector’s office—
started persecuting the Jews according to the German laws. The
result was that tens of thousands of Jews were persecuted and lost
their lives and property.”
Are you going to deny this testimony, too?
VON NEURATH: With reference to the order which you mentioned at
the beginning, concerning the sport clubs, I have to tell you that that was a
police measure which I had not ordered; and I go on to repeat, as I said
yesterday, that the arrests at the beginning of the war were carried out by
the Gestapo, by direct order from Berlin, without my even having heard
about the matter. I did not learn about it until afterward. Finally, with
reference to the Jewish problem which is mentioned in the end, the
statement which is contained in the Indictment, I think, namely, that I had
attempted to get the Government of Czechoslovakia to introduce anti-
Jewish laws, is an incorrect statement. I, or rather my State Secretary, talked
to Mr. Elias, as far as I know. I myself have never talked to him. I talked to
Mr. Hacha only afterward on a later occasion, when there was an attempt to
introduce racial laws with reference to the Czechs; Mr. Hacha objected to
this and I told him he did not have to do this, as this was my responsibility.

The introduction of the anti-Jewish laws was carried out by a decree of
mine, to be sure, because as early as the beginning of April 1939, I had
received orders to introduce the anti-Jewish legislation in the Protectorate
which was not incorporated in the Reich. I delayed this step until July by
means of all sorts of inquiries in Berlin, so as to give time to the Jews to
prepare themselves in some way or other. These are the actual facts.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Tell me, do you know Dr.
Havelka?
VON NEURATH: I know Herr Havelka, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: He knew exactly about your
conversation with Hacha?
VON NEURATH: Well, how much he knew about that, I do not know.
Herr Havelka came to see me once or twice. He was Transport Minister, I
think.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is quite correct. He was
the Minister of Transport, but before that, he was the head of the
chancellery of Hacha’s office.
Havelka, during his interrogation on 9 November last year, gave the
following testimony, which can be found on Pages 18 and 19 of the English
text of Exhibit USSR-60—I am quoting an excerpt:
“He”—Neurath—“was not interested in the Czech nation and
interventions of Cabinet members and Dr. Hacha pressing Czech
demands were on the whole without any result.
“There were the following actions in particular:
“Arrests of Czechoslovak officers, intelligentsia, members of the
Czechoslovak Legion of the first World War, and politicians. At
the time of the attack on Poland by the German Army about six to
eight thousand persons were arrested. They were hostages. The
Germans themselves called them ‘held in protective custody.’ The
majority of those hostages were never interrogated, and all steps
taken at the office of the Reich Protector in favor of these
unfortunate men remained without any result.
“Neurath, as the only representative of the Reich Government in
the territory of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, was

responsible for the execution of nine students on 17 November
1939. The execution was carried out soon after...”
THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, would it not be better and
perhaps fairer to the defendant to ask him one question at a time? You are
reading long passages of these documents which contain many questions.
Perhaps you could take these two paragraphs you read now about the arrest
of officers and ask him whether he says those are true or untrue, and then go
on to the other paragraphs you want. It is very difficult for him to answer a
great number of questions at one time.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, he has these
documents before him and he is acquainted with the testimonies in
question, but I will take into consideration what you have just told me. I
will speak about the shooting of the students separately.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you corroborate this part of the
evidence which I have just read into the record regarding the hostages?
VON NEURATH: About the arrest of the members of the so-called
Vlayka, at the beginning of September 1939, I have spoken earlier, and I
spoke in detail about that yesterday.
I said that these arrests—I am repeating it once more—were carried
out by the Gestapo without my knowledge. Herr Havelka’s statement, that
no steps had been taken in the interest of these people, is untrue. He ought
to know that I continuously fought for these people and that a large number
of them were released through my efforts.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, let us go over to
another question. Here, before this Tribunal, a certain document has already
been introduced several times under Document Number USSR-223. This is
the diary of Frank.
Mr. President, I am not referring to Karl Hermann Frank, who was
sentenced to die for his crimes, but it is the Defendant Frank that I am
speaking about. This excerpt has already been quoted here, but I should like
to put a question to the defendant about it. I shall read it into the record.
During an interview with a correspondent of the Völkischer Beobachter in
1942, the Defendant Frank stated as follows:
“In Prague, for instance, some red placards were put out saying
that seven Czechs were being shot that day. Then I told myself if I

had to issue an order for such placards to be put up regarding
every seven Poles who were shot, then there would not be enough
timber in Poland to manufacture enough paper for such placards.”
Please tell me if it is true that such red placards were put up in Prague?
VON NEURATH: I mentioned that yesterday. I have already said
yesterday that this was the poster where my signature was misused, and that
I had not seen it in advance. That is that red poster.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, if you have not seen these
posters, will you please look at them. We are going to show it to you right
now.
VON NEURATH: Yes, I know it very well.
THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, he did not say he had not seen
it. He said it was put up without his knowledge.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I am going to come
back to this, but I should like to establish that these were the red posters
which were mentioned by Frank in his diary, and I should like to submit this
poster under Document Number USSR-489.
I should like to read it into the record; it is very short and it will not
take much time. The text is as follows:
“In spite of repeated serious warnings, a number of Czech
intellectuals, in collaboration with émigré circles abroad, are
trying to disturb peace and order in the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia by committing major or minor acts of resistance. In
this connection it was possible to prove that the ringleaders of
these resistance acts are especially to be found in the Czech
universities. Since on 28 October and 15 November these
elements gave way to acts of physical violence against individual
Germans, the Czech universities have been closed for the duration
of 3 years, nine of the perpetrators have been shot, and a
considerable number of the participants have been arrested.
“Signed, The Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Freiherr
von Neurath, Prague, 17 November 1939.”
You state here that you never signed this warning? Have I understood
you rightly?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed. I have already explained yesterday or
the day before how this came about, namely, in my absence.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, you should not repeat what
you have already stated.
I am going to read into the record a certain statement by Karl Hermann
Frank of 26 November 1945, connected with the subject. It can be found on
Pages 46 and 47 of the Russian text. The English text will be submitted.
Karl Hermann Frank, giving evidence regarding this poster, the text of
which I have just read into the record, stated:

“This document was dated 17 November 1939 and was signed by
Von Neurath who did not object either to the shooting of the nine
students...”
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I draw your
attention to something connected with this document. The document is
neither dated nor is it signed, at least not the copy I have. It does not make it
at all clear from whom the document originates, and I should like to take
this opportunity to protest against the reading of this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is there not a certificate
about the document?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Not in my copy.
THE PRESIDENT: Well...
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, will you permit me
to explain this misunderstanding. Dr. Von Lüdinghausen has the full text of
the Document USSR-60. The English text was also submitted to the
Tribunal. This document was quoted yesterday by Dr. Lüdinghausen. There
is a certificate regarding the authenticity of this document signed by the
plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak Government, and there is the date, too.
Now, just to facilitate the proceedings, we have submitted another
copy of Frank’s testimony to Dr. Lüdinghausen, and it would be very easy
to determine that there is a certificate regarding the authenticity of this
statement which is dated 17 November...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to say the following about
this point: When I received this long indictment from Colonel Ecer of the
Czech Delegation, the document did not have any additions or appendices,
except texts of laws. I therefore endeavored to obtain these additions
because reference had been made to them. I then received only one annex to
an appendix, or supplement “Number 2”; the others I received in the same
condition as the one which I have here.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, will you wait a minute?
Will you kindly tell us what document it is you are referring to?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: It is USSR-60.
THE PRESIDENT: USSR-60—well, that is the Czech report, is it not?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That is the Czech report, which is
about this thick [indicating] in German; that is the one in question. Annexes
have also been issued to this, and these annexes, I repeat, were not made
available to me; that is, I made a personal effort to get them, but I received
only one which is not identical with this document and which I received
much later and in the same condition as that which I hold in my hand now,
that is to say, without a heading, without a signature, and without a date,
and most certainly without any certificate as to when, where, and by whom
this supposed statement of Frank’s was taken down.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us hear what General Raginsky has got to say
about it.
As I understand General Raginsky, he says there is a certificate
identifying that document and what is being supplied to you is merely a
copy, which may not have the date and may not have the certificate on it,
but which is the same as the document which is certified.
Is that what you said, General Raginsky?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you now show Dr. Von Lüdinghausen the
certificate and the document which is certified?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This certificate can be found on
Page 44 of the Russian text in the appendix to Document USSR-60 and it is
signed for General Ecer by Colonel of the General Staff Corps, Novack.
This certificate was submitted, in due course, by us to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to take up the time of the Tribunal
about this particular document? It seems to me we are wasting a lot of time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After all, it is important. Otherwise I
cannot find out whether it is genuine. That is certainly my right.
THE PRESIDENT: I was asking General Raginsky whether he wanted
to persist in the use of the document. Is it worth while? I do not know what
the document is or what it says.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I consider that is not necessary,
because this document has already been submitted to the Tribunal a few
months ago and accepted by the Tribunal as evidence. I really do not
understand the statements by Dr. Von Lüdinghausen.

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not show Dr. Von Lüdinghausen that
there is a certificate which applies to the document which you put in his
hand?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, certainly, Mr. President. I am
holding in my hand the Russian text of the certificate. I am quoting the
Russian text and I can present it to Dr. Von Lüdinghausen so that he can be
convinced. The original document has been submitted to the Tribunal and is
in the possession of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, is there not a German translation of the
certificate and does not the certificate identify the document? Is there a
German translation of the certificate?
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Just at the moment I do not have
it, but during the intermission I shall be glad to produce the original
German document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal is told that
this document was put in before and the certificate of General Ecer was put
in at the same time, certifying that this document is a part of the Czech
report. In those circumstances, the Tribunal will allow the document to be
used.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, then I have another
objection to the use of this document.
As is known, if any interrogation transcripts or affidavits from
witnesses are presented, the Defense have the right to summon these
witnesses for an interrogation. The former State Secretary Frank, who has
made this statement, is, however, as is known, no longer among the living.
Therefore, I also object for this reason to the use of this document.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this document was offered
and accepted in evidence during the lifetime of this man, K. H. Frank. That
is one reason for accepting it.
The document is admissible under Article 21 of the Charter and was
submitted under that article and there is no such rule as you have stated, that
the Defense are entitled to cross-examine every person who makes an
affidavit. It is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Tribunal and
therefore that objection is rejected.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to
hold you any longer on this matter but I wanted to show that this was an
unnecessary delay as Dr. Von Lüdinghausen used the document himself to
introduce some extracts from the testimony of Frank in his document book.
Now I shall read into the record some statements made by Frank. This
document, I repeat, is in connection with the warning dated 17 November
1939 which we just exhibited to this Tribunal, and signed by Von Neurath,
who did not raise his voice either against the shooting of the nine students
nor as to the number of students who were to be sent to concentration
camps, and he did not really request any changes in this legislation.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did you hear the testimony, Defendant?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I have read it.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Do you deny this?
VON NEURATH: But most definitely. There was no possibility
whatever of my doing so because I was not in Prague and consequently I
could neither have had any knowledge of it, nor could I have signed it or
passed it on.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. You still insist on
stating that the Police never informed you regarding the arrests which were
made and other police measures which were taken? Do you state that
firmly?
VON NEURATH: I did not say that they never informed me, but that
they always informed me afterward. My information always came from
Czech sources.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Was not the state of affairs such
that the Police regularly reported to you regarding the important events
which took place?
VON NEURATH: Not at all. In particular I never learned anything
about what they were planning, at least not until afterward—or if I had
learned it from Czech sources and then made inquiries with the Police.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well. I am going to read an
extract from the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, dated 7 March 1946.
This testimony was submitted by me to the Tribunal yesterday and it was
partially read by me already. Will you give a copy of the testimony, USSR-
494, to the defendant, please?

Frank states:
“The Reich Protector, Von Neurath, regularly received reports on
the most important events in the Protectorate which had some
bearing on the Security Police, from me, from the State Secretary,
as well as from the Chief of the Security Police. For example, Von
Neurath was informed in the special case concerning the student
demonstrations in November 1939 both by me and by the Chief
of the Security Police. This case dealt with Hitler’s direct orders
demanding the shootings of all the ringleaders. The number of
ringleaders was to be fixed by the Prague Stapo and the Reich
Protector was informed about this. In this case an estimate on the
number of the ringleaders was left to the discretion of the State
Police, or rather to the approval of the Reich Protector. Reich
Protector Von Neurath signed the official dispatch announcing the
execution of these students, thereby approving this action. It can
therefore not be said that in this case the Reich Protector was
merely responsible for the carrying out of the general Hitler order
which deals with the execution of all ringleaders, but that he is
also responsible for the fixing of the number of ringleaders,
namely nine. I informed him in detail about the interrogation and
he signed the poster.
“If this had not met with his approval and had he wished to revise
it, as for instance, making it less severe, which he had the right to
do, then I should have had to abide by his decision.”
Now do you deny these statements?
VON NEURATH: Yes; I do not know how many times I have got to
tell you that I was not in Prague at all.
And besides I do not know under what sort of pressure Frank might
have made these statements. It does not give the date, but you just said that
he made this statement on 7 April, and therefore a few days before his
execution.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I should like the Tribunal to note
that the defendant is deliberately distorting the facts. I repeated several
times that these statements were made by Frank on 7 March and not on 7
April, or 2 days before the execution, as you are telling me now.

The document is before you and you can look at it yourself and see the
date.
VON NEURATH: All right, then 7 March instead of 7 April. I think I
said 7 April because I did not see the date at the top. But as I have said—I
think I have already told you three times—I could not have known anything
at all about it because I was not there.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well. But you are making too
many mistakes. Yesterday when giving testimony you were not very clear
as to the number of students, either.
VON NEURATH: I cannot remember what I said yesterday, but I
could hardly have made so many mistakes; I do not know if there were one
or two less.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I would like to remind you.
Yesterday, in reply to a question by Sir David, who submitted to you
Document 3858-PS, from which it was evident that after the closing of the
higher institutions of learning, 18,000 students found themselves out of
school...
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go over Sir David’s cross-
examination again? Surely we have said that we do not want to go over the
same subject twice.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to go
back to the very same thing, and I do not want to add anything to the
questions put by Sir David who has carried out a very detailed
interrogation. I wanted only to establish the truth. When the defendant
stated yesterday that in the document which was submitted by Sir David
there was a mistake—that in Prague there existed only two institutions of
higher learning and that 12,000 students could not have been arrested, this
was not correct. The question was not merely about the closing of two
Prague universities, but, on the basis of the order of 17 November 1939,
there were closed the Czech university in Prague, the Czech university in
Brünn, the Czech Higher Technical School in Brünn, the Czech Higher
Technical School in Prague...
THE PRESIDENT: We heard all this yesterday, and we do not want to
hear it again. We heard all about the closing of the university in Prague.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, Mr. President. I just
wanted to state that not 2 universities were closed, but 10 institutions of

higher learning.
I have just a few questions left which I should like to put to the
defendant.
[Turning to the defendant.] You received many awards from Hitler, as
is evident from the documents, and as you yourself stated. For instance, on
22 September 1940 you received the Iron Cross for Military Service. For
what kind of services did you receive this award from Hitler?
THE PRESIDENT: Surely we went into this yesterday, did we not, in
Sir David’s cross-examination, or in the examination-in-chief, I forget
which? I think it was the examination-in-chief—all these decorations which
were given the defendant.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I do not want to
revert to these orders, but I should like to ask the defendant, for what
special services he received the Iron Cross from Hitler in 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, ask him that.
VON NEURATH: Unfortunately, I cannot tell you. I cannot tell you
what sort of merits I am supposed to have displayed. The award of this
order of merit was made generally to all higher officials who were in
service at the time.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, I am not going to insist
on your reply. I just wanted to state here that you received this award in
1940 after the mass terror was applied against the Czechoslovak population.
VON NEURATH: I do not know that I am supposed to have carried
out a mass terror.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Very well, if you do not
understand, we are not going to argue about this question.
In February 1943, in connection with your jubilee, various articles
about you were published in many newspapers. I am not going to submit all
these papers to the Tribunal or quote these articles, but I should like to read
just two excerpts from the newspaper Fränkischer Kurier of 2 February
1943. We shall submit to you one of the copies of this so that you can
follow me as I read this document into the record.
This newspaper is being submitted to the Tribunal under Document
Number USSR-495.
In connection with your anniversary, it was stated:

“The most outstanding events in the field of foreign policy after
Hitler’s coming to power, in which Freiherr von Neurath played a
most important role as Reich Foreign Minister and with which his
name will always be connected, are: Germany’s leaving the
Geneva Disarmament Conference...the reuniting of the Saar to
Germany...and the denouncing of the Locarno Pact.”
And further on:
“Reich Protector Freiherr von Neurath was repeatedly decorated
by the Führer for outstanding services in the interest of the people
and the Reich. He was decorated with the Golden Party Badge of
Honor, received the rank of SS Gruppenführer, was a knight of
the Order of the Eagle, and received the Gold Badge of Honor for
Faithful Service for his 40 years of diplomatic service.
“In appreciation of his outstanding services in the field of military
efforts in the post of Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia,
the Führer decorated him with the Military Cross, First Class.”
Are the facts correctly stated in this article?
VON NEURATH: If I had to investigate the correctness of every
article written by some journalist or other, I would have had a lot to do.
These statements are the opinion of a journalist and nothing more.
THE PRESIDENT: That was not the question. The question was
whether they were correctly stated, as a matter of fact. You can answer that.
VON NEURATH: Yes—no.
THE PRESIDENT: Which do you mean, “yes” or “no”?
VON NEURATH: The decorations are correctly stated. Apart from that
it is not correct.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I have no further questions to put.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, do you wish to re-examine?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon I
had the feeling and impression, probably not without reason, that Herr Von
Neurath was visibly tired and strained after the previous examination and
that he was no longer in a position to do complete justice to the questions
which were put to him. This, after all, is not surprising, if one considers that
Herr Von Neurath is in his seventy-fourth year and besides that he is also

suffering from a fairly serious heart disease. I feel obliged, therefore, to
refer back to various points of the cross-examination of yesterday and put a
few questions to him.
[Turning to the defendant.] Herr Von Neurath, you stated yesterday
that because of the excesses of the SA and other radical groups in 1933 and
later, you frequently protested to Hitler. What was the reason why you
remonstrated with Hitler directly and did not raise your objections at the
Cabinet meetings which were still taking place at that time?
VON NEURATH: I had already learned from personal experience that
Hitler could not stand contradiction of any kind and that he was not
amenable to any kind of petition if it was made before a fairly large group,
because then he would always develop the complex that he was facing
some sort of opposition against which he had to defend himself. It was
different when one confronted him alone. Then, at least during the earlier
years, he was accessible, thoroughly amenable to reasonable arguments, and
much could be achieved in the way of moderating or weakening radical
measures.
Moreover, I should like to mention again that just after the excesses
mentioned in Mr. Geist’s affidavit there was a meeting of the Cabinet,
during which strong protests were raised against the repetition of such
occurrences by various ministers including non-Nazi ministers. At that time
Hitler thoroughly agreed with these objections, and declared that such
excesses would not be allowed to recur. Shortly afterward he also made a
speech in which he publicly expressed an assurance to this effect. From
then until June 1934 no more excesses took place.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But in April 1933 there was the well-
known anti-Jewish boycott, which lasted 24 hours, if I am not mistaken?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that was one of Herr Goebbels’ provocations.
But actually there were no excesses and acts of violence whatsoever on that
occasion. It was confined merely to boycotting.
Moreover, the fact that no further disturbances arose in that case was
the result of a joint intercession by Herr Von Papen and myself with Hitler
and especially with Hindenburg. A perfectly correct description of this
episode is to be found, as I recall, in an article of Time for April 1933,
which is also contained in my document book.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, it was submitted in my
document book, Document Number Neurath-9.
[Turning to the defendant.] In connection with the events that occurred
at that time, arrests, and so forth, Sir David yesterday referred particularly
to the arrest of the well-known author Ossietzski. Do you recall that this
Ossietzski had already been sentenced to a fairly long prison term by a
German court even before the seizure of power?
VON NEURATH: Yes, I remembered that afterward. I remember
which government—Herr Ossietzski had been sentenced by a Reich that
even before the seizure of power—I do not know under court to a fairly
long term in the penitentiary for high treason, but he had not yet served it,
and consequently was arrested again.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to ask you another
question with reference to the report submitted by the Prosecution
yesterday. It is the letter of Ministerial Director Köpke on 31 May 1934.
That is Document D-868. In this report, from the information noted down
by Herr Köpke, do you see any proof that the Foreign Office was drawn
into the subversive activities of the Austrian Nazis?
VON NEURATH: No, not at all. This has to do with a report which
Ministerial Director Köpke made to me about a visit by Herr Wächter,
whom he described as an Austrian with a sense of responsibility. This Herr
Wächter had tried to establish a connection with the Foreign Office and
with Hitler in order to draw attention to the dangers arising from the
growing radicalism of the Austrian Nazis. The head of the Political
Department, Herr Köpke, identifies himself with Wächter regarding these
apprehensions and agreed to make an oral report to that effect.
I do not think that anyone can doubt that my attitude was not quite the
same as that of Herr Köpke and I passed this report on to Hitler in order to
draw his attention to the matter.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution—or rather, Sir David
—referred yesterday to reports which deal with the treatment of the Czech
problem by you and Frank. This is Document 3859-PS, a letter which you
sent to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, on 31 August 1940,
for the preparation of your oral report to Hitler. Were these reports, that is,
the one drafted by Frank, identical with the memorandum mentioned in the
Friderici document of 15 October?

VON NEURATH: Yes, apparently these are the same reports.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, during your examination you
spoke about the Friderici document, which you said was based on plans of
the SS, various Party circles, and the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube
district, regarding a deportation of Czechs to the Eastern Territories. You
went on to say that in order to stop these plans, which you yourself
described as nonsensical, you had Frank prepare this memorandum in
which a less radical solution was recommended, which later had also been
approved to a certain extent by Hitler; and that in reality nothing happened,
which was what you intended, and that the idea of incorporation had
practically been buried. Is that right?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. This entire affair and the origin of
these memoranda are extremely difficult to explain. It can be understood
only from the entire domestic political development. The efforts of the
Gauleiter of the surrounding districts to divide up the Protectorate had
proceeded rather far. They had all submitted memoranda and Herr Himmler
backed them up. All these memoranda envisaged a radical solution of these
problems; that meant there was reason to fear that Hitler would comply
with the wishes of these Gauleiter. In order to stop this I had to make
several proposals which I myself had said were impracticable, and I
identified myself with them primarily so as to declare them absurd later on.
That is the only explanation of the origin of these memoranda. I did
not draft the memoranda myself, but that was done in my office, in
accordance, to be sure, with instructions given by me.
This was, however, and I should like to emphasize this expressly, a
purely tactical maneuver to get at Hitler, because I was afraid that he would
follow the radical suggestions made by Himmler and his associates. I did
actually manage to get Hitler to issue a strict order, which is what I had
requested, to the effect that all these plans were no longer to be discussed,
but that only the so-called assimilation plan was left, which could be carried
out only over a period of years; and, as a matter of fact, nothing more
happened, and that was exactly what I was aiming at.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: A decree was submitted by the
Prosecution yesterday, which was issued to the German authorities in the
Protectorate, regarding the treatment to be given of the German-Czech
problem publicly. That is Document 3862-PS, dated 27 June 1941. Is that in

any way connected with these memoranda or the discussion you had with
Hitler about it?
VON NEURATH: Yes, it is most closely interconnected, and I think I
said so yesterday. In the following year the same agitation started all over
again for this Germanization and partitioning of the Protectorate, and I
opposed it, and, once the question was decided, I prohibited it from being
reopened.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: A document was submitted yesterday,
USSR-487, the Chief of the Security Police, addressed to State Secretary
Frank, dated 21 July 1943, that is to say, after you had resigned. From that
document the Prosecution are attempting to draw the conclusion that, in
accordance with a decree dated 5 May 1939, you appointed the leader of the
SA and Security Police in Prague as your political expert.
In what way did the latter act in this capacity? Did he act at all?
VON NEURATH: No, he did not; that is just it. It is clearly apparent
from this letter of reminder, dated 21 July 1943, that he never became at all
active in this respect.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to state
here that the question was incorrectly put. This document is not dated in the
year 1943 or 1942, but it is dated 21 July 1939.
VON NEURATH: May I remark here that it makes no difference, as
nothing had happened. I did not appoint any political expert.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What measures followed Documents
3851-PS and 3858-PS, which were introduced yesterday by the Prosecution,
and which were proposals submitted by various departments and
department heads of your administration regarding the utilization for labor
of the students who became unemployed through the closing down of the
Czech universities?
VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday that this
apparently concerned a proposal from an adviser which never even reached
me, but was rejected by my State Secretary before it got to me. Just how I
could possibly be held responsible for the contents of a draft submitted by
an adviser, I cannot understand.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to put one more
question to you regarding the German-Austrian agreement of July 1936. As
is mentioned in a report by Dr. Rainer to Bürckel which the Prosecution

have already submitted—I refer to Document 812-PS—is it correct that
Hitler, immediately after the signing of that agreement, had personally
declared to Dr. Rainer and the Austrian Nazi Leader Globocznik that this
agreement of 11 July 1936 was signed by him in all honesty and sincerity,
and that the Austrian National Socialists, too, should under all
circumstances adhere strictly to this agreement, and that they were to let
themselves be guided by him in their conduct toward the Austrian
Government?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is correct. As I think I said to you
yesterday, I believe I can also remember that Rainer actually confirmed it
when he was here on the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I would like to put a last question...
THE PRESIDENT: He answered these questions perfectly clearly,
according to his view, yesterday.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I am all through now. I should like
to ask him only one more question in conclusion of the entire examination
of my client.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution and also Sir David
brought the following charge against you yesterday: They charged that
although by your own admission you were not in agreement with the Nazi
regime and its methods, and although you considered many of the things
that occurred reprehensible and immoral and abhorred them, you did not
resign, but remained in the Government. Will you please explain that to us
once more?
VON NEURATH: I have already mentioned in the beginning that I had
given my promise to Hindenburg to enter the Government and to remain
there as long as it was at all possible for me to follow a course unfavorable
to any use of violence and to protect Germany from warlike entanglements.
That was my task and nothing else. But it was not only this promise I had
given to Hindenburg, but also my sense of duty, and my feeling of
responsibility toward the German people, to protect them from warlike
entanglements as long as it was at all possible, which bound me to this
office. Beside these considerations all my personal wishes, which were
quite different, had to take second place.

Unfortunately, my power and influence as Foreign Minister did not
reach far enough to enable me to prevent pernicious and immoral actions in
other spheres, as for instance, that of domestic policy, although I did try in
many cases, not least of all in the Jewish question itself.
However, I considered that my highest duty was to carry out the work
assigned to me and not try to escape it, even if in another sphere where I
had no influence, things occurred which hurt me and my opinions very
deeply.
There may be many people who have different ideas and a different
attitude than I. I experienced similar attacks when I placed myself at the
disposal of a Social Democrat Cabinet in the year 1919 after the first
revolution; at that time, too, the strongest attacks and the most serious
accusations were made against me.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yet you yourself have struggled hard
with your conscience, you have often told me.
VON NEURATH: Yes, of course I have. It is not easy to belong to a
government with whose tendencies you do not agree, and for which one is
to be made responsible later on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this completes my
examination. I would suggest we adjourn now and then I might be
permitted to begin the examination of my witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have some questions to ask?
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Mr.
President, I ask permission for my client to be absent from the session this
afternoon and tomorrow, because I have important questions to discuss with
him.
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. HORN: Thank you.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Mr.
President, yesterday afternoon General Raginsky asked whether Rosenberg
interfered in Neurath’s foreign policy. The interpreter just told me that she
translated it wrongly. She translated it “whether Ribbentrop interfered in
Neurath’s policy.” This question, therefore, has not been answered yet;
consequently, I ask permission to ask Baron von Neurath whether
Rosenberg interfered in Neurath’s foreign policy.
VON NEURATH: No, in no way. I never talked to Rosenberg about
matters of foreign policy.
DR. THOMA: Then I ask that the transcript be corrected accordingly,
so it should not read “whether Ribbentrop interfered in Neurath’s policies,”
but “whether Rosenberg interfered in Neurath’s policies.”
THE PRESIDENT: The record will be corrected.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States):
I want to ask you just a very few questions. You will remember that the
Baroness von Ritter said that after the 5th of November 1937 you
recognized—I want to read it exactly:
“When Herr Von Neurath had to recognize for the first time from
Hitler’s statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to
achieve his political aims by using force toward neighboring
states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered severe
heart attacks.”
That is a correct description, is it not, of what you then recognized?
[The defendant nodded assent.]
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you stated that you spoke
immediately after that meeting to General Beck and General Von Fritsch.
Do you remember?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I think you said to Sir David that
you did not speak to the Defendant Göring. What I am asking you now is
whether you spoke of what Hitler had said to anyone else during the next 2
or 3 months. Did you speak to anyone in the Foreign Office?
VON NEURATH: I spoke to my State Secretary.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And with whom else from the Foreign
Office?
VON NEURATH: No one, for Hitler had laid down the condition that
silence should be preserved about all these meetings; and for that reason I
did not speak with my officials about them. They knew nothing. They had
learned nothing from the military men, either.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you speak to the Defendant Von
Papen when you saw him next?
VON NEURATH: No. I believe I did not see him at all at that time.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did you discuss it with anybody
else before your resignation?
VON NEURATH: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, I have only one other question.
You recognized, did you not, that Himmler would use methods which you
would not approve of; is that right?
VON NEURATH: Yes, but only gradually; that could not have been
foreseen from the beginning.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is just what I wanted to know.
When did you first realize that? When did you first begin, just as well as
you could tell? About when did you realize what sort of man Himmler was?
VON NEURATH: That was very difficult to recognize, because
Himmler had two faces; he was a perfect Janus; one could not see
immediately what his real thoughts were at all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not asking you what he was like.
If you would just try to remember, you certainly realized that at some time.
Did you know it in 1937? You knew it in 1937 or 1938? Certainly in 1938,
did you not?
VON NEURATH: Probably in 1938, but it is hard for me to give a date
at the moment.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not want a specific date. My point
is that you knew it before you went to the Protectorate; you knew what
Himmler was before you went to the Protectorate, of course? There is no
question about that, is there?
VON NEURATH: Yes, certainly.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for the
U.S.S.R.): Did you ever express yourself openly against the policy of the
Hitlerite Government?
VON NEURATH: I am sorry, but the translation was not good.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In your explanations made
before the Tribunal you stated that you were not in agreement with the
policy of Hitler’s Government, either on individual questions or taken as a
whole, as well. Is that true?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did you ever express yourself
openly with a statement of your disagreement with Hitler’s policy?
VON NEURATH: I did so more than once.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In what manner was it, then? I
am asking you about your public statements, either in the press or while
addressing any meeting?
VON NEURATH: No. It was no longer possible either to have a voice
in the press, or to hold a meeting. It was quite out of the question. I could
only speak to Hitler personally or, at the beginning, in the Cabinet in protest
against this policy. There was no freedom of the press any longer, any more
than in Russia. In the same way no meeting was possible. Consequently...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you about
Russia; I am asking you about your expressing your views publicly. In other
words, you never expressed them.
VON NEURATH: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in that way nobody in
Germany could know, or did know, about the fact that you were not in
agreement with the policy on the part of Hitler’s Government?
VON NEURATH: I always expressed myself quite unmistakably about
it, but not in articles, nor in meetings either; but otherwise I always
expressed myself clearly about it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, but only in your tête-à-tête
with Hitler, only personally to Hitler. You said so, did you not?
VON NEURATH: No; I tell you I said that to everyone who would
listen, but I could not do so in public meetings, in speeches, or in articles.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And you remained a member of
the Government in spite of the fact that you were not in agreement with the
Government’s policy; is that so?
VON NEURATH: Yes, for that very reason.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In order to counteract his
policy?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Do you know the results of
Such counteracting?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What were the results of
counteracting the policy of Hitler’s Government?
VON NEURATH: Well, I am not in a position to give the details on
that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In particular, as to the question
of aggression, were you against the joining of Germany and Austria?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): The German Government, in
spite of this, joined Austria to Germany; is that so?
VON NEURATH: I believe it has been clearly expressed here that at
the last moment Hitler did that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the seizing of
Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the German Government,
in spite of this, seized Czechoslovakia?
VON NEURATH: I was no longer a member of the Government at
that time.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But as a statesman whose
opinion should have been considered, you, of course, expressed your
opinion against it, did you not?
VON NEURATH: Always.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on
Poland?

VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in spite of that Germany
did attack Poland.
VON NEURATH: I repeat, I was no longer a member of the
Government. I learned of it only at the last moment.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You were against the attack on
the U.S.S.R.?
VON NEURATH: Yes, more so indeed; I always wanted the exact
opposite. I wanted co-operation with the Soviet Union, I said that as early
as 19...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And still Germany attacked the
Soviet Union?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Judging from your
explanations, Hitler must have known about your political opposition and
your disagreement with his policy; is it correct?
VON NEURATH: He knew that very well, for I resigned in 1938 for
that reason.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes. And you know how Hitler
made short work of his political opponents?
VON NEURATH: In the Reich, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And so far as you were
concerned, in spite of the fact that you sided with the opposition, nothing
happened; that is true, is it not?
VON NEURATH: I did not understand.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So far as you were concerned,
in spite of the fact that you declared yourself for the opposition, nothing of
the kind happened?
VON NEURATH: No, but I always expected it.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And could you not tell us
whether Sir Nevile Henderson, in his book, the Failure of a Mission,
expressed the facts concerning you personally correctly or not? Do you
consider that Sir Nevile Henderson expressed the facts correctly concerning
you personally? Does he express them correctly?

VON NEURATH: I must admit frankly that I read this book by Sir
Nevile Henderson only once, 3 or 4 years ago. I cannot remember now what
he said about me. I heard excerpts from it here once or twice but I cannot
say what he writes about me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But I assume that you are
familiar enough with the excerpts presented by your defense counsel in his
document book?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Now, for instance, that which is
expressed in his excerpts so far as you are concerned, is it correct or not?
VON NEURATH: I assume so, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): That is to say, it is correct. And
is it quite correct what he writes in reference to your membership in the
Party? He writes that “Baron von Neurath himself remained in the regime
of Hindenburg, and he was not a member of the Nazi Party.”
VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe I have said so repeatedly here in the
last few days.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And further on he informs us
that “he (Neurath) became a member of the Party later.”
VON NEURATH: I have already explained how that happened. In
1937 I received a Golden Party Badge without my...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes, we have heard that before,
but is it true or not that you became a member of the Nazi Party later, as Sir
Nevile Henderson states?
VON NEURATH: No, I...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): So this particular part is not
correct, is it?
VON NEURATH: I received the Golden Party Badge with Hitler’s
statement that this involved no obligations towards the Party.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): We have heard this already.
That means that in Sir Nevile Henderson’s statements not everything is true
as far as your person is concerned?
VON NEURATH: I do not know. With the best intentions I cannot
remember what Sir Nevile Henderson wrote about me.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And the last question I have,
which is in regard to your memorandum: I did not quite understand the
explanations which were given by you to Sir David and later to your
defense counsel. Now, in forwarding Frank’s memorandum, in the letter
addressed to Lammers, you wrote that you considered this memorandum
absolutely correct. Is that true?
VON NEURATH: Yes, that is true. I should also like to tell you the
reasons. This memorandum...
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): You already explained the
reasons before. I just wanted to establish the fact that you really wrote this.
VON NEURATH: Up to now I have not told the reason why I wrote
this to Lammers. The reason why I wrote to Lammers to this effect was that
he was the one who submitted this memorandum to the Führer. So I had to
write to the same effect.
THE PRESIDENT: There are two subjects I want to ask you about and
the first relates to the letter that you wrote on the 31st of August 1940. That
is the letter which General Nikitchenko has just referred to; you remember
that?
VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: And you remember that you said in that letter that
you fully agreed with the memorandum which your Secretary of State
Frank had drawn up independently of you. He said that “Germanization
provides for the changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; and
secondly, the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the
intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich or special treatment for these
and all destructive elements.” My question is: What did you understand by
“special treatment”?
VON NEURATH: Well, as far as I read this extract at all at the time, I
had in no way ever thought of the term “special treatment” as it has become
known here during the Trial. I was certainly not at all in agreement with this
attitude of Frank as represented in the report, and I only had the intention of
frustrating this whole affair in order to sidetrack it. The content of these
reports was only intended to present this to Hitler in Hitler’s language, or in
the language of Himmler and others, in order to dissuade him from it later
on.

THE PRESIDENT: Was it not misleading to write to Herr Lammers
with the view that it should be put forward to Hitler, saying that you fully
agreed with the memorandum with which you did not agree?
VON NEURATH: Mr. President, as things were, I could not write to
Lammers. I did not intend to carry out anything which is written in there,
but since Lammers was presenting this to Hitler, I first had to tell him I
agreed with it. Afterward I reported to Hitler and gave him an explanation
in a personal conference during the meeting with Frank and Gürtner which
has been mentioned here.
THE PRESIDENT: Then your answer is that you do not know what
was meant by “special treatment”?
VON NEURATH: No; in any case I did not know at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, there is one other question that I should like
to put to you. You remember when you were called on the 11th of March
1938, at the time of the Anschluss with Austria, and you wrote the letter of
the 12th of March 1938, in answer to the memorandum which you received
from the British Government through Sir Nevile Henderson. You knew Sir
Nevile Henderson quite well, did you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And in that letter you said this:
“It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring about
this development; especially the assertion, which was spread later
by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had
presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is
pure invention. According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a
proposed candidate as Chancellor and form a Cabinet conforming
to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the
invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect.”
And then you go on to say what you allege was the truth of the matter.
You know now, do you not, that your statements in that letter were entirely
untrue?
VON NEURATH: That did not come through.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you heard any part of the question that I was
putting to you?
VON NEURATH: Unfortunately not.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that you did not say so earlier. Do you
remember the 11th of March 1938 and being called in to represent the
Foreign Office, and you have told me just now that you knew Sir Nevile
Henderson quite well?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you remember the letter which you wrote on
the 12th of March 1938?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you admitted to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe that
the statements in that letter were untrue?
VON NEURATH: Untrue, yes—not entirely. They are presented
incorrectly.
THE PRESIDENT: What steps did you take to find out whether or not
they were true?
VON NEURATH: I did not learn of the incorrectness of this
presentation until much later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to my question. I said,
“What steps did you take to find out whether the statement was correct?”
VON NEURATH: The statement which Hitler gave me I first simply
presumed to be true. I certainly could not check up on it in any way.
THE PRESIDENT: Why should you assume it to be true when it was
in contradiction of what the British Government had stated?
VON NEURATH: I had no other knowledge of the events which had
occurred and therefore could only say what I knew.
THE PRESIDENT: You had the letter, the protest from the British
Government, had you not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You knew Sir Nevile Henderson perfectly well?
VON NEURATH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you then wrote this letter contradicting the
statements which had been made on behalf of the British Government; that
is right, is it not?
VON NEURATH: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And you took no steps to check the facts which
had been stated to you by Hitler? Will you answer that, please?
VON NEURATH: Yes. Your Lordship, how was I to do that? There
was no one else who knew about it. It was only what Hitler had
commissioned me to tell the Foreign Office. The draft of this note was
drawn up by the Foreign Office according to the information which I had
received from Hitler. I had no other chance to clear this up.
THE PRESIDENT: There were all the other persons who were
concerned with the matter whom you could have communicated with, but
your statement is that you did nothing?
VON NEURATH: I can only repeat that I had no opportunity to
procure any other information. No one knew about it except Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling the Tribunal that Göring did not
know about it?
VON NEURATH: Perhaps Göring knew about it.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The defendant can return to the dock.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to call
the first witness, the former Ministerial Director, and head of the political
section in the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Köpke.
[The witness Köpke took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
GERHARD KÖPKE (Witness): Gerhard Köpke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God
—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Dr. Köpke, how long have you known
Herr Von Neurath?
KÖPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath for over 40 years. His career
is well known. Therefore I can limit myself to stating that we worked
together as vice consuls in London, as legation counsellors in the Foreign
Office and later, after Herr Von Neurath became Minister in 1932, until my
resignation in 1935. In the meantime Von Neurath was in Copenhagen,

Rome, London, and for some time at his home, and finally in Prague. We
met only occasionally when I was in Berlin, and we kept up a
comparatively lively correspondence with each other as old friends. I
myself was employed in the Foreign Office during the entire period. From
1921 on I was director of the Legal Department, and from 1923 I was
director of the political, so-called Western Department, which I directed
until I left the service. I voluntarily tendered my resignation at the end of
1935.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the attitude,
the fundamental attitude of Herr Von Neurath on domestic and foreign
policy, but only on broad lines?
KÖPKE: In domestic politics, Herr Von Neurath stood close to the
conservative circles but he was never a member of the Conservative Party.
From this basic conservative attitude and also because of his outstanding
character traits of loyalty to duty and reliability, he had the confidence of
Reich President Von Hindenburg, and retained it without interruption until
the latter’s death. Herr Von Hindenburg esteemed Von Neurath as a prudent,
moderate, reliable diplomat. Men of other party inclinations also had
confidence in Von Neurath. I shall mention only the deceased Reich
President, Ebert, who recalled Neurath to office during his term.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Von
Neurath’s appointment as Reich Foreign Minister in the summer of 1932?
KÖPKE: The appointment of Herr Von Neurath as Reich Foreign
Minister was based on a personal wish of President Von Hindenburg.
Neurath did not become Foreign Minister within the Von Papen Cabinet,
but became Foreign Minister as the special confidant of President Von
Hindenburg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then how did it happen that Von
Neurath remained Foreign Minister in the new Hitler Government also?
KÖPKE: Von Neurath did not participate so far as I know in the
negotiations with Hitler about the assumption of power. If I can rely only on
my memory, he was sick abed with a heart disease during the decisive days,
but he remained Foreign Minister, again at the special wish of Von
Hindenburg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us anything about the
attitude, the relationship of Neurath to Hitler?

KÖPKE: I should like to remark by way of introduction that I cannot
testify on this subject from my own immediate observation. I was never
present at conferences which Herr Von Neurath held with Hitler. I myself
never had any official conversation with Hitler whatsoever. But, according
to Neurath’s own description, and according to the information which I
received from other important personalities in the course of time, I had the
impression that, especially in the first years, Hitler treated Herr Von
Neurath carefully and politely. To what extent this was out of respect for the
Reich President, whose regard for Von Neurath was, of course, known to
Hitler, I cannot say. In any case, Neurath was never actually in the
confidence of Hitler and was not in the small circle close to Hitler, the
powerful men of the Party. After the death of President Von Hindenburg,
Von Neurath remained because he had promised the Reich President to do
so. During the following period also, Neurath repeatedly attempted to
exercise his moderating and calming influence on the Party. However, I
know that as disappointments and differences of opinion multiplied, Herr
Von Neurath tried many times to separate from Hitler. In this connection I
can recall two occasions on which he offered his resignation, and one of
these appeals he showed me. It was in writing and must have been dated
from the beginning of the year 1936. For at that time I had already resigned
and visited Herr Von Neurath as a friend in a purely private capacity.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now can you also give us a brief
picture of Neurath’s attitude toward the National Socialist Party?
KÖPKE: At first Herr Von Neurath adopted an attitude of reserve
toward the Party and in particular its leading men. To my knowledge he was
personally acquainted with hardly any of these men, since, indeed, he had
lived most of the time abroad. Neurath was convinced that by reason of his
years of experience as an old diplomat and supported by his confidential
position with the Reich President, and the latter’s moderating influence, he
would succeed in working in accordance with his policy, which was
directed toward compromise and understanding.
Before me, and I believe also before his other colleagues, Neurath
frequently referred to experiences of this sort which he had had with
Fascism in Rome. He occasionally said that such revolutionary elements
should just be allowed to develop and that these hotheads would come to
their senses if they were given time and opportunity to gather experience
themselves in responsible positions.

By the way, Neurath also shared the opinions of State Secretary Von
Bülow in this respect. He retained this State Secretary of Reich Chancellor
Brüning, and also protected him until his death against repeated attempts of
the Party to get rid of him.
Moreover, I should like to mention a small detail which was very
valuable to us in the office at the time. When State Secretary Von Bülow,
who was generally popular, died suddenly, Neurath managed to get Hitler to
attend the funeral at the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church. The old officials
of the Foreign Office saw in that a gratifying and reassuring sign for the
strong position of our Minister in relation to the Party. This event, which in
itself is perhaps unimportant, happened exactly 10 years ago today.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As head of the Political Department of
the Foreign Office, you were one of Neurath’s foremost co-workers, and
can surely tell us what was the dominant tendency of Neurath’s foreign
policy.
KÖPKE: Neurath’s political attitude on the whole was, in accordance
with his whole character and his years of experience in politics, inclined
toward compromise, waiting, negotiation. Measures backed up by
ultimatums and attempts at solution by violence did not suit Von Neurath’s
temperament. Neurath was neither a gambler nor a fighter by nature.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to individual important
foreign political events which occurred during the period in which you
worked under Herr Von Neurath and were head of the political section.
In October 1933 Germany left the Disarmament Conference and the
League of Nations. Now, I should like to ask you whether this step of
Germany’s, leaving the Conference and the League of Nations, was based
on any aggressive or belligerent tendencies for the moment or for the
future?
KÖPKE: No. As far as the picture of the events mentioned by
defendant’s counsel was clear to us, the experts, it was as follows: No one
of us in the Foreign Office thought of warlike plans or preparations for war.
It was only done to proclaim as impressively as possible that Germany
would no longer allow herself to be considered a nation without the same
rights and obligations as other peoples.
In the same way the militarization of the Rhineland was not based on
any aggressive intention, either for the moment or for the future.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the next few years, in 1935,
Germany’s military sovereignty was reintroduced, and a year later, the
demilitarized Rhineland zone was remilitarized. I should like to read you
one sentence from the affidavit of the former minister and interpreter Paul
Schmidt of the Foreign Office. He says the following with regard to the
events in the spring of 1935:
“The conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance between France
and Russia on 2 May 1935 followed the proclamation of the
establishment of a German Air Force and the introduction of
general compulsory military service in March 1935.”
Will you please give us a brief review of the historical development of
these matters which led to the reintroduction of military sovereignty in 1935
and to the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936?
KÖPKE: I believe...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, we have had the historical
development of these matters over and over again. Surely we do not want it
from this witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Only very briefly, only the dates, in
proper order, Mr. President; no explanations about it. I should only like to
emphasize strongly once more how the individual events are connected
with each other.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have the dates in their minds. We
really have had these dates in our minds for some months.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well. If the Court believes that it
does not need to be informed about it, I must, of course, dispense with it.
Then I come to a last...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put any question you really want to
put about it, but you said, “Will you give us the historical developments
from the 2d of May 1935?” We have heard that over and over again.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, Mr. President. I was interested
only in the following: From this affidavit of Herr Schmidt which I have just
quoted, one could directly follow...
THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, whatever you want to ask about
this affidavit.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then I shall formulate the question as
follows:
[Turning to the witness.] I have just read this sentence by Herr
Schmidt, and I have also told you what can be read from it; namely, that the
conclusion of the Franco-Russian Pact of 2 May 1935 was the result of the
restoration of military sovereignty. Is that true or what was the case?
KÖPKE: That question is difficult to answer if one merely considers
these two events in chronological order. The conclusion of the Franco-
Russian Pact was on 2 May 1935; the restoration of military sovereignty
was already in March 1935.
However, the negotiations for this treaty of assistance go back much
farther, and I should like to recall the fact that the critical stage, into which
these negotiations had entered before the restoration of military sovereignty,
is shown very clearly in the report of the French Military Committee’s
reporter in which the latter speaks quite openly of a close entente between
the two nations. That was on 23 November 1934.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to another question and
should like to ask you whether you know the opinions and attitude of Von
Neurath concerning the Austrian question, at least during your time?
KÖPKE: I have known Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the
Austrian question for a much longer time than the period when we worked
together during his term as Minister, for as a southern German he was
always particularly interested in the problem and I recall many
conversations which I had with him even when I was still a vice consul. His
attitude and intentions had always been to make the relations between
Germany and Austria closer in the economic sphere, chiefly in the interests
of Austria, and politically to guarantee a similar policy by treaties, but
otherwise not to encroach on Austria’s independence; that is what we in the
Foreign Office had already learned several years before he became
Minister, from our experience with the customs union, which at that time
was actually intended only in an economic sense. The fact that this attempt
was quite generally considered as a political union gave pause for thought
and should have warned everyone who had resolved to touch this hot iron
again. Therefore, Neurath, during his period of office, whenever he
discussed the problem with me and worked on it, thought along just these
lines.

I should like to add here that the critical time on the Austrian question
was probably after I left office. Moreover, even Hitler originally shared
Neurath’s moderate conception, as was shown in his conversation with
Mussolini in Venice in the summer of 1934. Especially interesting,
however, are the remarks which Hitler made on the Anschluss problem to
Sir John Simon during the negotiations in Berlin in March 1935. At that
time Hitler expressed himself to the English statesman about that as
follows:
If the people in London knew Austria as well as he did, they would
believe his assurance that he could not want to increase our economic
troubles by adding another field of economic difficulties. Germany did not
want to interfere in this country at all. He was perfectly aware that any
interference in Austrian affairs, even if it meant carrying out the wish of the
Austrian people themselves for an Anschluss, could not be legalized. That
was Hitler’s opinion at that time.
Neurath also rejected all interference in Austrian internal affairs and
strongly condemned the attempts which could be noticed in Party circles to
give direct support to the Austrian National Socialists. During my time
Neurath did everything he could to keep the Foreign Office out of the
internal political struggle in Austria.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Still one more question. Up to the time
of your resignation at the beginning of 1936, was there ever any talk in the
Foreign Office of attacking Czechoslovakia or not observing existent
treaties with Czechoslovakia?
KÖPKE: Never, neither the one nor the other. Our economic and
political relations with Czechoslovakia were, as long as I was in office, very
good. We had no occasion whatsoever to change them, not even the
slightest.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And now my last question. Can you
tell us anything about Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward the race question?
KÖPKE: On this question Neurath was completely opposed to the
Party attitude. In this connection I should like to recall an experience which
Neurath told me personally.
When the Jewish legislation was about to be proclaimed the Reich
Minister of Justice Gürtner came to him in great excitement and told Von
Neurath that he, Gürtner, had warned Hitler in vain against proclaiming

these quite impossible laws. He strongly urged Herr Von Neurath as Foreign
Minister to point out the enormous dangers which this madness could set
loose abroad. Neurath told me that he did this immediately, but that all his
efforts had been in vain.
Neurath’s personal attitude on the Jewish problem was thoroughly
conciliatory and reasonable, in keeping with his generally kind personality
and his religious attitude. Among many examples I should like to refer here
to only one, which is the following:
During the time when we were in London together, the Jewish doctor
at the Embassy was also one of the closest friends of the Neurath family.
When he had to leave London during the World War and was homeless and
without employment, Neurath immediately took active steps to help his old
friend.
As Reich Foreign Minister also, Von Neurath always helped non-
Aryan colleagues, although that brought him often under attack from the
Party circles and was not always easy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further
questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel
want to ask any question?
[There was no response.]
Do the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Tribunal will, of
course, not consider that the Prosecution are accepting every statement of
the witness; but I do not think that it would be a useful appropriation of
time to cross-examine him. Therefore, I shall ask no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Sir David. Sir David, would it be
convenient to you and to the members of the defendants’ counsel to discuss
the questions of supplementary applications for witnesses and documents at
2 o’clock?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord, it would be very
convenient to me. I do not think there are many serious matters about which
there will be serious dispute.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I thought there were not. Very well, we will do
that then.

The witness can retire.
Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, call your next witness and then we can have
him sworn before the adjournment.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May I ask that Dr. Dieckhoff be
allowed to follow Dr. Köpke?
[The witness Dieckhoff took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name please?
HANS HEINRICH DIECKHOFF (Witness): Hans Heinrich
Dieckhoff.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God
—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Now the Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, My Lord,
the first application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath with regard
to M. François-Poncet. That has been dealt with; that is covered.
Then, My Lord, the next is an application from Dr. Marx on behalf of
the Defendant Streicher to put in an affidavit by the publisher, Herr Gassner
of Der Stürmer. My Lord, the publisher is intended to deal with the
question of the rise and the circulation of Der Stürmer during the years
1933 to 1935. The Prosecution have already submitted to the Tribunal that
they did not think that that was relevant when an application was made to
call Herr Gassner as a witness. The Prosecution still take the same position.
My Lord, it is for an affidavit, and we leave to the Tribunal as to whether
they would like the affidavit, but the Prosecution fail to see the relevance of
that evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Would Dr. Marx like to say something about that
now?
DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): Mr.
President, I have just discussed this matter with Defendant Streicher; and he
tells me that the witness, Herr Gassner, whom I have proposed to call and
from whom an affidavit had been proposed, would only be in a position to
speak about the publication figures of Der Stürmer from the year 1941
onwards. That, of course, is of no interest whatever to the defense. I shall,
therefore, forego the affidavit and rely on what the witness Hiemer has said
in that respect. Therefore, it will not be necessary at all to procure the
affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is by
Dr. Kranzbühler on behalf of the Defendant Dönitz for further consideration
and admission of the affidavit of the former fleet judge, Jäckel, by reason of
the course of the cross-examination.
My Lord, I think the most convenient course would be if the
Prosecution do not object to the application at this time but reserve the
right, when Dr. Kranzbühler makes the use that he desires of the affidavit,
to consider whether we shall then object.

THE PRESIDENT: This is really evidence in rebuttal, is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, in rebuttal of the points raised in
the cross-examination. It is very difficult to decide whether one should
make a final objection until one knows what use Dr. Kranzbühler is going
to make of it. I suggest that we do not object at this stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, these applications and the Tribunal’s orders
granting the witnesses are always subject to that provision.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, then the
Prosecution makes no further objection.
My Lord, then there are two applications on behalf of the Defendant
Von Neurath, a request for minutes from the interrogatory of the...
THE PRESIDENT: They have both been withdrawn, have they not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, they have? I was not certain.
My Lord, then Dr. Thoma makes application on behalf of the
Defendant Rosenberg for three matters: The exchange of letters between Dr.
Ley and the defendant; the entry of Dr. Strauber 27 May 1944; and third, a
note of the Ministerialrat, Dr. Beil.
My Lord, the Prosecution feel that these documents are cumulative,
and they leave it to the Tribunal with that suggestion—that the case is
already well covered. I do not know if Dr. Thoma wishes to say anything
further.
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg):
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I should like to refer to it quite briefly, as
apparently there is an error in the matter of Dr. Beil. It is a question here of
the interrogatory. I have sent to Beil an interrogatory which has not yet been
returned. Otherwise, there is nothing that I know about this matter; but I
have made an application which has not been mentioned yet. I applied for
some of Rosenberg’s writings, Tradition und Gegenwart, new speeches and
translations, to be included in the document book, for these deal with
questions which were discussed on the occasion of Gau educational
meetings and discussions and which also deal with such questions as the
peaceful living together of the nations of Europe, religious tolerance, his
advocacy of an ideal humanity, and similar writings. I request that these
articles be admitted. Apart from that, I have no further applications to make;
and for the rest I leave the decision, of course, to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: If I understand what you said aright, Dr. Thoma,
you were not referring to any of the applications which are before us. The
applications which are before us are an exchange of letters between Dr. Ley
and the defendant in the autumn of 1944; another is an entry which Dr.
Strauber made; and the third is a note of Dr. Beil; you have not referred to
them, have you?
DR. THOMA: Yes, that is right. I have to confess that these
applications are completely new to me. These applications must have been
made by Rosenberg on his own initiative, because I cannot find any trace of
them. Or perhaps an error was made in the memorandum to the Tribunal. I
do not know the applications.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, the copies of the applications are
before us, and they appear to be signed both by the Defendant Rosenberg
and by yourself.
DR. THOMA: In that case, this must have happened months ago. I
cannot remember; this is from 3 June.
THE PRESIDENT: At any rate, you do not want them?
DR. THOMA: Application Number 3 is settled.
I have re-read the applications just now, and I do remember them. I ask
you to make a decision favorable to the defendant.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next applications are
for a number of documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Papen, and the
Prosecution have no objection to this.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them—certainly
Numbers 3, 5, and 13—have either been admitted or rejected, I think.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. I had a note
opposite 13. I really think they have been dealt with, My Lord; they are in
the books, and I do not think any further discussion is required.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in the book?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think so, My Lord. I do not know if
—Dr. Kubuschok says he agrees with me.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, the next is
an application on behalf of the Defendant Bormann, a request for a decree

of Hitler’s and a decree issued by Bormann in 1944. My Lord, the
Prosecution have no objection to these.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not quite understand the meaning of the last
one. Can you tell me what it means?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I took it myself that it was
“to” the SD, instead of “of” the SD—the appertaining of members of the
head office of the National Socialist Party of the SD. I am afraid that that
guess on my part does not meet with approval.
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): My
Lord, this concerns a decree from Bormann in which he prohibits members
of the Party Chancellery belonging to the SD. It is a decree of Bormann’s
applying to the Party Chancellery.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the remaining applications
are on behalf of the Defendant Göring, the admission of an affidavit by
Baron von Gersdorff, and a book by Joseph Chapski. My Lord, my Soviet
colleague has dealt with that by submission in writing, dated 20 June. I did
not propose to say anything further about that, My Lord. Colonel Pokrovsky
is here if Your Lordship would like to hear him further.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already made an order with
reference to this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship has.
THE PRESIDENT: We made the order on 9 June, apparently, that for
the Defendant Göring three witnesses could be produced either personally...
Perhaps we had better hear from Dr. Stahmer about this.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Mr.
President, that is the way I understood the decision of the Tribunal. I had
applied for five witnesses. The Tribunal ordered that I could produce only
three out of the five witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: That is right.
DR. STAHMER: Then with reference to the affidavit nothing was said,
as far as I can remember, in that particular decision, so that I had assumed
that I would be free to ask for admission of affidavits insofar as the Tribunal
considers them necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, after the Tribunal had made that order
about limiting the number of witnesses to three, did you not receive a
communication, to which you have replied, I think, suggesting that possibly
you might be able to dispense with actual oral witnesses and do that whole
part of the case by affidavits?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, I received that communication;
and I have already negotiated about the matter with the Russian
Prosecution. We did not quite reach an agreement, however; and therefore I
made a written application to the Tribunal a few days ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but was not the agreement which you were
trying to arrive at an agreement that only three affidavits should be
produced on either side? Or was it more than three?
DR. STAHMER: No. The question which remains and which we have
not agreed upon is whether I will be given the opportunity to read a few of
the affidavits here.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Dr. Stahmer, I think the position is, then, that
unless you are able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet Prosecution,
we shall have to abide by our previous order.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: You will make further efforts to achieve an
agreement with the Soviet Prosecution and let the Tribunal know.
DR. STAHMER: I will.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if your Lordship will grant
me the indulgence of mentioning three exhibits. They all refer to the diary
of Admiral Assmann, My Lord, which was introduced during the cases of
the Defendants Dönitz and Raeder. There are three exhibits concerned.
The first is Document D-879. We thought that would be more
complete if a connecting page was put in to make the continuity of the
exhibit. For that purpose, My Lord, the Prosecution asks that Exhibit GB-
482 be withdrawn and that there be submitted the two pages which were
originally in it with a connecting page. That is merely adding a connecting
page, My Lord.
The second is Document D-881...
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to that on the part of the
Defense?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think so, My Lord; I have
not heard of any.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the documents relate to, did you say?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The diary of Admiral Assmann, who
was on the staff of the Defendant Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is only a question of
putting the exhibit in proper form.
The second document, My Lord, is D-881, which is another passage
from the same diary, on 23 February 1940. I promised Your Lordship that I
should put in an exhibit when I dealt with the diary in cross-examination;
and, My Lord, the exhibit has been prepared, and I want to put it in under
the Number GB-475. That is, Document D-881 will become Exhibit GB-
475.
The third, which is in the same position as the second, is Document D-
892. That exhibit has now been prepared and will become Exhibit GB-476.
Copies are available for the defendants and will be given to them after the
approval of the Court is given.
THE PRESIDENT: And copies, of course, will be supplied to the
Court as well?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, My Lord. They are just
awaiting the formal approval of the Court, and they will be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David, that is all right.
Then, Sir David, we will consider the other matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.
THE PRESIDENT; Very well.
Yes, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I just wanted to use this opportunity to
submit to the Tribunal the affidavit of Robert Scholz, the Chief of Special
Staff Rosenberg. It has been translated into English and French, and I
should now like to submit it under Exhibit Number 41 to the Tribunal. I
have already shown it to Mr. Dodd, and he has not objected.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant
Schacht): Mr. President, I wanted to ascertain whether and up to what date
after this session we may submit affidavits and documents. The reason is
that during recent days I have received two affidavits and a document, the
relevance of which we have not yet definitely decided upon.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like to know when
the Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense think would be
the best time to deal with these matters which are outstanding and with any
evidence which either the Defense or the Prosecution may wish to bring in
rebuttal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I have not had the
chance of discussing it with any of the Counsel for the Defense; but I
should have thought at the end of the evidence. One might reasonably hope
that the evidence will finish this week. It might be possible to deal with it
on Saturday morning or on Monday, and suit the Counsel for the Defense,
and, of course, as the Tribunal decides.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal, I think, will expect the Defense
Counsel and the Prosecution to be ready, directly when the end of the
evidence comes, to deal with all these additional questions which are
outstanding and also with any applications that they may have with
reference to rebuttal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I wanted that to be clearly understood, that it will
be expected that it is to be done immediately the evidence closes. That, I
think, answers Dr. Kraus’ point about the affidavits and documents. That
would be the most appropriate time.
Sir David, have you got any ideas as to how long that would take?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think a very short time. I
should have thought that 2 days or thereabouts would see it through. I have
discussed it with Mr. Dodd, and that was the view we took.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In about 2 days at the outside?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the outside, My Lord, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please.
[The witness Dieckhoff resumed the stand.]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, since what date do you know
Herr Von Neurath?
DIECKHOFF: Since 1913; I met him when I joined the Foreign
Office. He was legation counsellor in the Foreign Office at that time. I then
met him again in Constantinople, and there I had contact with him. Then I
did not meet him again until 1930.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In what capacity did you have dealings
with Herr Von Neurath beginning with 1930?
DIECKHOFF: Herr Von Neurath was then, from 1930 till 1932,
Ambassador to London; and I was head of the Department “England-
America” in the Foreign Office.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How was the co-operation during that
time between the Foreign Office—that is, yourself—and Herr Von Neurath,
who was then Ambassador to London?
DIECKHOFF: The co-operation was excellent.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von
Neurath’s appointment to the position of Reich Foreign Minister?
DIECKHOFF: I remember that most of the leading officials of the
Foreign Office were greatly upset by the sudden departure of Brüning,
whose steady and moderate policy we approved at the time. We submitted
to the change in the person of the Foreign Minister only because Neurath
replaced Brüning and we knew that Herr Von Neurath was a man of high
standards and an experienced diplomat. Furthermore, we knew that he had
represented Brüning’s policy in London; and we expected that as Foreign
Minister he would continue Brüning’s policy.
I welcomed Herr Von Neurath, I think it was on 2 June, at the station
in Berlin when he arrived in Germany. From conversations with him I
gathered the impression that he very much disliked to leave London and to
take over the Foreign Ministry. But he said to me, “I do not think I shall be
able to refuse the wish of the old gentleman.” That, of course, was Reich
President Von Hindenburg.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What position did you hold yourself
during the time when you worked under Herr Von Neurath in the Foreign
Ministry?

DIECKHOFF: At first, I remained at the head of the England-America
Department until 1936. Afterward, in April 1936, I took over the re-
established political department. In June State Secretary Von Bülow died,
and in August 1936 I was appointed acting State Secretary in the Foreign
Office. I remained in that provisional position until March 1937, and then I
became Ambassador to Washington.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, as Foreign
Minister, retain the old officials of the Foreign Office?
DIECKHOFF: He retained the old officials in practically all the
leading positions of both the domestic and the foreign service. The State
Secretary Von Bülow for instance remained for 4 years, until his death, in
the same position in the Foreign Office.
He sent Ambassador Von Hoesch to London as his successor, and he
sent Ambassador Von Hassell to Rome, and Ambassador Köster to Paris—
all of these were old diplomatic officials.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you tell us from your own
experience during your activities what the aims of Neurath’s foreign policy
were?
DIECKHOFF: It was the aim of Herr Von Neurath to maintain good
relations with all states and thereby to re-establish gradually Germany’s
status of equal rights which we had lost in 1919. This was the same policy
that had been pursued by Stresemann and Brüning. Herr Von Neurath was
aware of the difficulties of Germany’s position. He talked to me about it
repeatedly. He was under no misapprehension about it. He saw things
realistically. His tendency was to exercise moderation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about Herr Von
Neurath’s entry into Hitler’s Government, which was formed on 30 January
1933?
DIECKHOFF: I know about this only what I was told by State
Secretary Von Bülow when I returned to Berlin from leave at the beginning
of February 1933. According to this, Herr Von Neurath had no part in the
formation of the new Cabinet, that is, Hitler’s Cabinet. Apart from that, he
was sick during that time. He heard of the plan of making Hitler Reich
Chancellor and of forming a new government. He wanted to discuss it with
Reich President Von Hindenburg in order to obtain certain reservations for
himself; but he came too late and could not obtain these reservations. In

spite of this, he retained the Foreign Ministry in the new Cabinet because he
did not want to refuse the wish of the Reich President.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Herr Von
Neurath’s attitude toward the National Socialist domestic policy?
DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath, soon after 30 January
1933 viewed the domestic policy with some anxiety, chiefly because he felt
that it strongly affected our foreign policy. When, in June 1933, I visited
him in London, where he attended a conference as head of the German
delegation, he told me about his anxieties; but he thought that these things
would die down and that developments would be similar to those in Fascist
Italy, where things had been very wild in the beginning, but had settled
down afterward. He was hoping that the same would happen in Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I am coming now to the year 1936.
One of the principal questions which dominated that year was the Austrian
problem. Can you tell us what Herr Von Neurath’s attitude was toward the
repeated interferences of German circles in the internal affairs of Austria?
DIECKHOFF: Yes. Herr Von Neurath considered such German
interference in the internal affairs of Austria not only inadmissible but
damaging. He told me so repeatedly. He was striving for an improvement of
the economic relations with Austria and thereby trying to improve gradually
the political relations also. He wanted to leave the sovereignty of Austria
untouched. This was also the aim of the agreement of 11 July 1936 between
Germany and Austria, that is, the economic strengthening of Austria and
thereby the re-establishment of good political relations between the two
countries.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you hear anything before March of
1938 that Hitler had the intention to incorporate Austria into Germany, if
necessary, with force?
DIECKHOFF: No.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever hear anything before
1938 that Hitler had intended to solve the Sudeten problem by force or even
to attack Czechoslovakia?
DIECKHOFF: No.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Hitler was in
full agreement until November 1937 with the peaceful policy which Herr

Von Neurath pursued with regard to both Austria and Czechoslovakia and
also with regard to the other European countries?
DIECKHOFF: Until Herr Von Neurath’s resignation in February 1938,
I always presumed that Hitler agreed with the peaceful policy pursued by
Herr Von Neurath; and I never heard or learned anything to the contrary.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know what the thoughts, the
considerations of Herr Von Neurath in 1935 were regarding the question of
rearmament, that is to say, the re-establishment of Germany’s military
sovereignty?
DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath held the view that
Germany, by the declaration of the Western Powers on 11 December 1932,
had been granted equality of rights; and he considered her to have the
indisputable right to rearm after all disarmament efforts had failed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put the same question
to you, with regard to the considerations and attitude of Herr Von Neurath,
with reference to the remilitarization of the demilitarized Rhineland.
DIECKHOFF: I know that Herr Von Neurath was aware of the
seriousness of this problem, for he knew that the problem of the
remilitarization of the Rhineland was interconnected with the Locarno Pact;
but I know that he saw a breach of the Locarno Pact in the Franco-Russian
Agreement of Mutual Assistance concluded in May 1935 and that as a
result of the ratification of this pact, or its going into effect, he firmly
believed that Germany had the right to re-establish military sovereignty in
the Rhineland.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the general political
situation in those days? Taking it into consideration, was it not justified to
assume that sooner or later a peaceful solution of this Rhineland problem
would be arrived at in any case?
DIECKHOFF: At any rate, the actual development after 7 March 1936
showed that the Western Powers, though they did not agree to the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, nevertheless very quickly acquiesced in
the fait accompli.
I was at that time, during the second half of March 1936, for 2 weeks
in London on behalf of the Reich Government; and I had the opportunity to
discuss this matter with many Englishmen; and the view I found in the
widest circles was that as Germany had been granted equality of rights one

could not deny her the right to remilitarize the Rhineland. In some circles I
even found the view that it was a relief that the remilitarization of the
Rhineland, which was due sooner or later in any case, was carried out so
quickly and comparatively painlessly.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And now one last question. What do
you know about Herr Von Neurath’s resignation from the position of Reich
Foreign Minister in February 1938?
DIECKHOFF: I was Ambassador to Washington at that time and I was
completely surprised by Foreign Minister Von Neurath’s sudden departure. I
did know that there were many things he did not agree with and that he had
asked several times to be allowed to resign. I also knew that he was ill; he
suffered from a neurotic heart. I also knew that he had passed his sixty-fifth
birthday, which gave him the right to retire. But I was surprised all the
same, particularly as I did not know the details at that time. I regretted the
resignation of the Foreign Minister, in whose peace policy I had confidence,
very much. I remember that the official circles in Washington also regretted
the departure of Herr Von Neurath very much, for Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles approached me a few days after this event and told me that
the American Government regretted the departure of this man who had
pursued a moderate policy.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further
questions to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel
wish to ask him any questions?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: One single question, Witness. You said that if
Von Neurath assumed the office of Foreign Minister, you had expected that
he would continue Stresemann’s and Brüning’s policy. According to your
knowledge did he actually continue this policy of Brüning’s after he became
Foreign Minister?
DIECKHOFF: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on the same basis I
intimated with regard to the last witness, the Prosecution do not desire to
take up time by asking any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I then have your
permission to call my third and last witness, Dr. Völkers, into the witness
stand.
[The witness Völkers took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HANS HERMANN VÖLKERS (Witness): Hans Hermann Völkers.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God
—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, you were twice the personal
adviser to Herr Von Neurath; first in his position as Foreign Minister and
later in his position as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; is that
correct?
VÖLKERS: Yes; since 1920 I was a member of the Foreign Office,
and I spent all my time abroad. Under Stresemann I spent 4 years in Geneva
as Consul General and as the permanent German representative to the
League of Nations; and in 1932 I was called to the Foreign Office and
became personal adviser to the newly, appointed Foreign Minister, Herr Von
Neurath. I remained in that position for a year; and then, upon my own
request, I was sent to Madrid as Embassy Counsellor, and later I became
Minister to Havana. In 1939 I was called back to the Foreign Office to act
as personal adviser with the title of chief of the office of Herr Von Neurath,
who in the meantime had been appointed Reich Protector in Prague.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did this appointment as personal
adviser to Herr Von Neurath in Prague take place on the basis of any
personal relations or merely for professional reasons?
VÖLKERS: Only for professional reasons. Until I was his attaché in
Berlin I did not know Herr Von Neurath.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the attitude of the officials of
the Foreign Ministry toward Herr Von Neurath’s appointment as Foreign
Minister?
VÖLKERS: I had the impression that the officials of the Foreign
Office were generally most satisfied that in view of the difficult internal

political situation an old professional diplomat and expert minister took
over the direction of the Foreign Ministry, because they saw in that a
guarantee for a steady foreign political course; all the more so as it was
known that Herr Von Neurath had the special confidence of Reich President
Von Hindenburg and because he enjoyed, due to his entire personality and
his equanimity, the special recognition and veneration of all the officials of
the Foreign Office.
When Hitler came to power I had the impression that he was skeptical
and reserved toward him. He did not belong to the circle of the closer
associates of Hitler, and during the time I was with him he never attended
these evening conferences which Hitler held in the Reich Chancellery in
those days.
Gradually, however, the pressure on the Foreign Office increased more
and more. The Auslands-Organisation was created and the office of
Ribbentrop started a competitive enterprise into which were called all sorts
of people who had been abroad. They made all sorts of reports which went
directly to the Führer without being controlled by the Foreign Office. And
then later on the head of the Auslands-Organisation was installed as
commissioner in the Foreign Office while Prince Waldeck was transferred
into the personnel department of the Foreign Office. At that stage the
pressure became so strong that finally one could not fight against it any
more.
But the fact that the Foreign Office had isolated itself for so long and
that it was still evading the pressure of the Party, that, I think, is certainly
the merit of the then Foreign Minister and his State Secretary Von Bülow.
When the Jewish laws were then introduced into the Foreign Office, too, I
know that Herr Von Neurath protected, as far as that was possible, his
officials. I was in Stockholm during the last 2 years of the war and met
there two former colleagues of mine with whom I am close friends. One is
Ministerial Director Richard Meier who used to be in charge of the Eastern
department and who had to leave quite soon and who often told me in
Stockholm how grateful he was to Herr Von Neurath for not only having
enabled him to take with him his family and his furniture and everything
when he went abroad but also that Herr Von Neurath, until the collapse,
continued to pay him his monthly pensions in Swedish kroner.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your position and your
activity in Prague in the Government of the Protectorate?
VÖLKERS: My position in Prague with the Government of the
Protectorate was approximately the same as the one I had 7 years earlier
when I had been personal adviser to the Foreign Minister in the Foreign
Office in Berlin, with the exception that in the Foreign Office there is a
special protocol department and a chief of protocol, whereas in Prague I
was also in charge of all protocols and ceremonial affairs, and that was
really my chief occupation. I was head of the so-called Office of the Reich
Protector, not to be confused with the principal authority, with which I had
nothing to do. When I came to Prague in the summer of 1939 the office
already had been functioning for several months. My predecessor was one
Legation Counsellor Von Kessel from the Foreign Office. Apart from
myself two other officials from the Foreign Office, who were subordinated
to me, belonged to the Office of the Reich Protector, also one Count
Waldburg, whose mother was a Czech and who was engaged by the Reich
Protector because he was hoping to establish, especially through him, good
relations with the Czechs.
The office was responsible, apart from the general and usual routine
matters, for dealing with the private correspondence and the handling of
personal petitions. In the course of time we had to set up a special
department, because later on, when the many arrests took place, we
received so many petitions, most of which were addressed to the Reich
Protector personally...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, surely this is very remote
from anything we have got to consider, and all the previous evidence this
witness has given has been cumulative evidence which has not been cross-
examined upon before; and now what he is saying is all very remote to
anything we have to consider.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In fact, I have already come to an end,
Mr. President. I merely wanted to show that he is in a position to answer the
following questions from his own knowledge.
[Turning to the witness.] What can you tell us from your own
observations and experiences about the attitude of Herr Von Neurath toward
the Czechs?

VÖLKERS: I can give you only general impressions. As I have
already told you, I had nothing to do with the actual activities of the office
but was attached to Herr Von Neurath personally only for his private affairs
and all ceremonial matters. But I do know, and he told me, that when he
took over his position as Reich Protector, he did so with the intention of
treating the Czech population as justly and decently as possible in order to
create, by smoothing out the differences, a healthy basis for a peaceful
living, side by side, of the two nations. He told me frequently that he was
appointed Reich Protector, that is, protector of the Czechs; and we knew
that the last German Ambassador in Prague, Dr. Eisenlohr, had often
reported that the last Czechoslovakian Government, for their part, had been
prepared to effect an Anschluss with Germany. He was an opponent of
using military measures, and Herr Von Neurath told me when I came to
Prague—I think it was in September 1938—that he had expressed himself
very strongly against their use and that he together with Göring had visited
Hitler in Munich in order to dissuade him from that.
In my office I experienced again and again that Herr Von Neurath—
shall I go on—was very open-handed toward the Czechs with regard to
petitions. He had a lot of sympathy and understanding; he examined each
individual case, and that was very well known among the Czechs. And as
we in this office had the possibility of submitting each single request and
petition of Czech individuals directly to the highest chief, the Czech
petitioners very frequently and gladly used this channel because the
prospects for a positive action on their private requests and petitions
through the highest local chief promised to be much more favorable than if
they were quickly processed by the authorities concerned in the
Government. Particularly this practice brought us in conflict with the State
Secretary...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, this witness is simply
making speeches, you know. You are not asking him any questions at all.
He is simply going on...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, what do you know about the
personal and official relationship between Von Neurath and the President of
State Hacha?
VÖLKERS: According to my observations, the personal and official
relationship between the Reich Protector and the President of State Hacha

was excellent; and I believe that this was not merely a matter of form, but I
had the impression that Herr Von Neurath really and sincerely liked the
President of State because he considered him a very decent and upright man
who, under the existing circumstances...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you see your counsel has heard
enough of your answer, surely you can stop...
VÖLKERS: Very well.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the relationship between
Herr Von Neurath and the State Secretary attached to him, Frank?
VÖLKERS: That was a very bad one. Herr Von Neurath told me
already at the time when I assumed my office that he had had considerable
difficulties with him because of his definite anti-Czech attitude, as a
Sudeten German—an attitude which a Reich German could not easily
understand. He had always hoped, however, that Frank, who was not a civil
servant but an outsider, would gradually follow his policy and adapt himself
to the civil service staff. But unfortunately this was not possible. I do not
know when...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you describe to us briefly
what the actual official powers of Herr Von Neurath and Frank were in
relation to each other?
VÖLKERS: Herr Von Neurath was the superior of the State Secretary.
The State Secretary was in charge of the entire internal administration,
which was a very large one. Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who I
think has been examined already before this High Tribunal, worked under
him. Besides being State Secretary, Frank was also the Higher Police and
SS Leader.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, did Herr Von Neurath have a
certain influence on this part of Frank’s activities, that is to say, in his
capacity as Higher SS and Police Leader?
VÖLKERS: The way conditions were he had practically no influence.
I do not know whether in the beginning the matter had already been legally
settled. In practice, however, the Police and the State Secretary were
completely independent from Herr Von Neurath regarding police measures.
This had some connection with the situation in the Reich, where Himmler,
too, led the entire Police and SS, having taken the police powers away from
the Ministry of the Interior. As far as I can remember, the matter was legally

settled in the autumn of 1939 to the effect that the Police was independent
and that Herr Von Neurath was to be informed afterward of all measures
taken.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You mean by that the decree regarding
the organization of the administration and the German Security Police in the
Protectorate, under date of 1 September 1939?
VÖLKERS: Yes, I think that is the one. The first part referred to the
administration and the second part to the Police.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I remind you that
the wording of this decree is contained in my document book under
Number Neurath-149.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been submitted as evidence?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I merely wanted to remind you
that I have presented it.
[Turning to the witness.] Was Herr Von Neurath at least informed
afterward, in accordance with the instructions, of the police actions which
Frank carried out independently?
VÖLKERS: The Chief of the Police was an SS man by the name of
Böhme. He used to report to the Reich Protector several times each week. I
do not believe that he informed him in advance of intended police actions.
We never heard anything like that. Whether he reported such actions
afterward and in their entirety is something which I cannot say. The rule
was that the Reich Protector sent to him, for comment, the various petitions
from the next of kin of Czechs who had been arrested and that Böhme
would bring them along when he came to report. That was generally the
way the Reich Protector was afterward informed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well then, when Herr Von Neurath was
later on informed of such police measures, no matter in which way, did he
make attempts for the suspension of arrests or for any limitation and
mitigation of such police measures?
VÖLKERS: As I have already told you, we had set up in the small
office of the Reich Protector a special department for the purpose of
receiving such applications. This department, which of course was directly
under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector, did everything possible in
order to reassure the next of kin and to bring about the releases of the
detained persons. The work was particularly difficult because these local

departments, the local police chief and also State Secretary Frank, usually
took a negative attitude. Again and again the Reich Protector would then
appeal directly to Himmler and very often to the Führer himself. I know and
remember that there was a very excited correspondence with Himmler and
that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly complained to the Führer about this.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, can you judge, or can you tell
us how far Herr Von Neurath, as Reich Protector, apart from the Police and
police measures, was free and independent in his political and economic
measures and orders, or how far he was depending on Berlin when giving
those?
VÖLKERS: When I came to Prague there were all sorts of other
offices beside that of the Reich Protector. For instance, there was a Reich
Commissioner for Economy who, as far as I can remember and as I heard at
the time, had already begun to exercise his functions when the Office of the
Reich Protector had not yet been established. Then there was a
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and there was the Armed Forces
Plenipotentiary who had a large staff. Even the Party agencies were not
centrally organized. Prague and the north belonged to the Sudetengau under
Gauleiter Henlein; the whole of Moravia belonged to the Niederdonau Gau,
under Gauleiter Dr. Jury; and the west belonged to a third Gau. All these
Gauleiter tried, in turn, on their part...
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, this is all detail, is it not, and quite
unnecessary detail?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von
Neurath’s attitude toward numerous plans of germanizing the Czechs?
VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that. I remember only that, right
at the beginning of the war, Herr Von Neurath told me that the whole
structure of the Protectorate was regarded by him as a temporary solution
and that the peace would have to decide the ultimate fate of
Czechoslovakia.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Well, then, as you probably remember,
in the autumn of 1939 there were the first demonstrations in Prague on the
occasion of the Independence Day of Czechoslovakia, on 28 October 1939.
VÖLKERS: Well, I cannot remember the details. There were
demonstrations on a Czech national holiday in October. As far as I can

remember, they took place on the Wenzel Platz, and the Národni-ulice. I,
personally, did...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about the
consequences of new demonstrations particularly on the part of the students
at Prague when a wounded student died and was buried on 15 November?
What do you know about these demonstrations and what happened
immediately in the wake of these demonstrations?
VÖLKERS: Previous to the second demonstration, as far as I
remember, the instruction was given to exercise restraint. The
demonstrations were generally, as I was told later, not particularly alarming.
In spite of this, Frank had reported to Berlin about it. At any rate, the Reich
Protector and Frank and General Friderici were called to Berlin for a
conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery. I accompanied the Reich
Protector at the time. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Minister in Berlin, was also
invited. I was present when Hitler, in a very excited and rude manner,
reproached the Minister because of the events, for which he was holding the
Czech Government responsible. Whether the closing of universities was
discussed on that occasion, I cannot remember, nor can I remember having
heard him threaten the shooting or arrest of students. The manner in which
Hitler treated the Minister was most embarrassing to us. The Minister then
left the room without saying a single further word. As far as I can
remember, the subject was then mentioned no further. We had lunch, and
when saying goodby, Hitler said to Frank that he wanted to talk with him
some more.
Herr Von Neurath was not asked to stay and I remember that while
walking home with him he was very angry about it. On the following day, I
traveled back with Herr Von Neurath while Frank had already left the same
night for Prague. I remember that when I came into the office in Prague, I
saw a red poster declaring that because of the demonstrations, the shooting
of the leaders and the arrest of students and the closing of universities had
been ordered; that poster carried Neurath’s signature. As I did not know
what had happened in Prague in the meantime, I was utterly surprised,
because I had heard nothing about these measures in Berlin; and I suspected
an intrigue on Frank’s part and went to report the matter to Neurath. I had
the impression that Herr Von Neurath was deeply upset and just as
unpleasantly surprised as I was and that he had known nothing at all about
this previously. Soon afterward Frank passed through my room going into

Neurath’s room, carrying that red poster under his arm. I do not know
whether Von Neurath had sent for him or whether he came on his own
initiative.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath afterwards, at
least after this unfortunate matter had occurred, use his influence for the
release of these students who had been arrested?
VÖLKERS: Yes. He immediately used his influence, but he did not
even succeed in getting hold of the list of names of the arrested students.
Only after urging the Czechs for a long time did we receive from the Czech
Government an incomplete list of names. In spite of this, Herr Von Neurath
immediately worked for their release; and he did, in fact, have excellent
results in that connection as time went by.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about what was
done to accommodate or employ those students who, on account of these
demonstrations and the subsequent closing of the universities, had more or
less become idle?
VÖLKERS: No, I know nothing about that, and I had nothing to do
with that matter.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know whether Herr Von
Neurath repeatedly urged Hitler to reopen the universities?
VÖLKERS: Yes, I remember that the chancellor, named Rosny, of the
Czech University, whom I knew well, had asked me once for that and I
reported it to Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Neurath again made efforts at
the time; but as far as I know, as long as we were in Prague the universities
were not reopened.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember a Czech Fascist
organization, Vlayka? I do not know whether I pronounce the name
correctly.
VÖLKERS: Yes, I do, but I know very little about it. I only know that
we received in the office a number of pledges of loyalty sent to us by
members of the movement, and I also know that we had been informed by
Czech sources that these people were partly criminal and generally not
worth much. Herr Von Neurath adopted quite generally the view that this
was an internal affair of the Czechs and that, after all, these were people
who wanted to work together with us. But he, on his part, refused any

collaboration; and such letters and pledges were never answered, I believe,
by our office. But I know...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also, besides
being Reich Protector, president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Did you,
since you partly handled his correspondence of a more personal nature,
notice anything indicating that Herr Von Neurath became active in this
capacity as president of the Secret Cabinet Council?
VÖLKERS: No. As long as I was in Prague, Herr Von Neurath was
never active. On the contrary, on one occasion he told me that Hitler, when
he appointed him, had told him that he should not think that he would ever
call a meeting of the Cabinet Council.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was also a member
of the so-called Defense Council. Did he ever have anything to do in this
capacity in Prague?
VÖLKERS: No, I did not know that he was a member of the Defense
Council. The fundamental decrees from Berlin concerning the Protectorate
were frequently signed by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Reich—I believe that was the name—but Neurath had never signed or
countersigned them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath was appointed, as is
well known, an honorary Gruppenführer of the SS and later, honorary
Obergruppenführer of the SS. Did Herr Von Neurath at that time, when he
was in Prague, ever wear that uniform?
VÖLKERS: As a rule, he wore his Reich Minister uniform. A portrait
was also once made of him in that uniform. He used to wear civilian clothes
a great deal. It may be that he once wore the black uniform of the SS, on the
occasion of a parade of the SS; but I do not know for certain now.
Otherwise, he never wore it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the
circumstances and reasons concerning Herr Von Neurath’s departure from
Prague in September 1941?
VÖLKERS: When Herr Von Neurath was ordered to come to
headquarters that September, he was accompanied by his military adjutant. I
met him at the airfield; and in the car he told me that Hitler had been
furious because of the acts of sabotage in the Protectorate and wanted to
send Heydrich to do some exemplary punishing. He, Neurath, had stated

that he did not want to have anything to do with that and had asked for his
release. Hitler then had ordered that he should first of all go on leave, and
so he did. He departed on one of the following days.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further
questions.
Mr. President, may I make one request at the end of my case. I have
not yet been able to submit all documents because I have not yet received
all the translations. May I reserve myself the right to submit the few
remaining documents, perhaps at the end of the case of my colleague, Dr.
Fritz?
THE PRESIDENT: You need not wait for the translation. You can
offer the documents in evidence now. Put in a list with the numbers.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have not got them with
me, I am afraid. Perhaps, if I may, I could do so tomorrow or the day after
when Dr. Fritz is finished.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution do not
wish to cross-examine, on the same basis.
My Lord, may I refer to one collection of documents that are in our
Document Book 12b, the collection of the anti-Jewish decrees in the
Protectorate. They are all from the Verordnungsblatt for the Protectorate,
and the Prosecution ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them as being
an official publication. The collection is merely for convenience and access
of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
Then that closes your case for the present, Dr. Lüdinghausen. The
Tribunal will now adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Fritzsche.

DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Mr. President,
I intend to present the case of the Defendant Fritzsche as follows:
First, I should like to call the Defendant Fritzsche to the witness stand
and then the witness Von Schirmeister. In the course of these two
examinations I intend to present to the Tribunal a few affidavits and to refer
to these and to the rest of the contents of my two document books.
In its decision of 8 March 1946 the Tribunal granted as witnesses for
my case: First, Herr Von Schirmeister, second Dr. Krieg; and as documents:
The text of all radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche from 1932 to 1945
and the archives of Deutscher Schnelldienst (fast official news service) of
the Propaganda Ministry. Of all the evidence, in spite of the efforts of the
General Secretary, unfortunately only the witness Von Schirmeister could
be brought here. Therefore, I had to rearrange my case and ask for the
indulgence of the Tribunal if I go into a somewhat greater detail than
originally intended in examining the Defendant Fritzsche and the witness
Von Schirmeister.
With the approval of the Tribunal I shall now call the Defendant
Fritzsche to the witness stand.
[The Defendant Fritzsche took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HANS FRITZSCHE (Defendant): Hans Fritzsche.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God
—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[The defendant repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. FRITZ: Herr Fritzsche, will you please describe briefly your
career up to the year 1933?
FRITZSCHE: As to that, may I refer to my affidavit, Document 3469-
PS, Points 1 and 3 to 8? In addition I can limit myself now to a broad
outline.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I should like to remark at the beginning of
the examination that my document books, of which I have two, have not yet
been completely translated. This affidavit, which the defendant has just

mentioned, is also contained in the document book for the Prosecution. I do
not know whether the Tribunal now has this document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on.
FRITZSCHE: I was born on 21 April 1900. My father was a civil
servant. I attended the gymnasium to study classics. Then I was a soldier in
the first World War, returned to school, and afterward, studied philosophy,
history, and national economics at various universities.
After the first World War my life and my work were determined by the
distress of my people. We called this distress “Versailles.” Enough has been
said here as to the Versailles Treaty. I need add nothing to what has already
been said.
DR. FRITZ: You were striving then in your journalistic work before
1933 for a change of the Versailles Treaty?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, of course.
DR. FRITZ: Did you seek this change through war?
FRITZSCHE: No, I sought it through the means of law, of politics, and
economic common sense, which were at that time all on the German side.
Along with this, certain restoration of the power of the German Reich
would have been desirable because I saw in the weakness of the Reich a
potential danger of war. But to change the Treaty of Versailles by means of
war did not seem to me to be possible, expedient, nor desirable. The same
sentiment prevailed later under the Hitler Government.
Adolf Hitler gave two assurances on just this point which, for me and
for millions of other Germans, were especially impressive. The first was the
assurance: “I myself was a simple soldier and therefore know what war
means.” The second was the statement: “In all the bloody wars of the last
thousand years not even the victors gained as much as they had sacrificed in
the war.” These two assurances sounded to German ears like holy and
binding oaths. Whatever in Hitler’s policy should have violated these two
assurances was a betrayal of the German people.
DR. FRITZ: When, how, and why did you come to the NSDAP?
FRITZSCHE: After my entry into the Propaganda Ministry I joined the
Party. I refer again to my affidavit, 3469-PS, to Points 9 to 13.
I did not join the NSDAP on account of the Party program, nor through
Hitler’s book Mein Kampf; nor did I join because of the personality of

Hitler, whose suggestive power, which has frequently been mentioned here,
escaped me entirely. I rejected the harsh radicalism of the methods of the
Party. This harsh radicalism was contrary to the habits of my whole life and
my personal principles. Due to this coarse practice I even came into a
conflict with the Party in 1932.
I joined the Party when it had, without doubt, won over the majority of
the German people. This Party had overcome, at the time, the disunion of
the German people and brought it unity after Brüning’s great attempt at
recovery on a democratic basis had failed on account of the foreign political
opposition, not because of the resistance of the German people. After the
cabinets also had failed to find a footing among the people, the appointment
of Hitler, as Reich Chancellor, meant a return to democratic principles.
Much has been said here about these matters. I ask for permission to cite
one circumstance which, to my knowledge, has not yet been mentioned here
and which does have a certain significance.
When I joined the NSDAP I did not believe I was really joining a party
in the true sense of the word, for the NSDAP did not have a party theory
similar to those of the Marxist parties which had a developed and mature
theory; all theorists of the Party were disputed. The theoretical writings of
Gottfried Feder had been prohibited. The theorist Rosenberg was disputed
in the Party to the very end. The lack of a theory for the Party was so great
that even the printing of the bare Party program was forbidden for the
German papers. The German papers were even forbidden a few years after
1933 to quote arbitrarily any part of Hitler’s Mein Kampf.
At that time, then, I did not believe that I was joining a narrowly
defined party but I thought I was joining a movement, a movement which
united in itself contrasts such as those between Ley and Funk, between
Rosenberg and the Reich bishop; a movement which was variable in its
choice of methods; which at one time prohibited the labor of women and at
some other time solicited this same labor of women. I believed I was
joining such a movement because one group within the NSDAP saw in the
swastika flag nothing but a new combination, a new form for the colors
black, white, and red, while another group saw in this banner the red flag
with a swastika. It is a fact that there were whole groups of the former
German Nationalist Party in the NSDAP or of former Communists in the
NSDAP. Thus, I hoped to find in this wide-flung Movement a forum for
intellectual discussions which would no longer be carried on with the

murderous animosity which had previously ruled in Germany but which
could be carried on with a certain discipline dominated by nationalist and
socialist conceptions.
For this reason and by making constant compromises, I put aside my
own wishes, my own misgivings, my own political beliefs. In many
conversations I advised my friends to do the same when they complained
that they and their interests were not given proper consideration during the
time of the Nazification. I came to the conviction that millions of Germans
had joined the Party only for this reason and in this expectation. They
thought they were serving a good cause. Out of pure idealism they were
willing to sacrifice everything to this cause, everything except their honor.
Meanwhile, I had to realize that the leader of this cause accepted the
sacrifice of these idealists, that he squandered it, and that, besides, he
stained their honor with a senseless and inhuman murder, unique in history
—a murder which no war necessity could have justified, for which one
could not even find any reason in any necessity of war.
DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution accuses you of having—and I
quote, “...sworn the customary oath of unconditional loyalty to Hitler” in
1933. For whatever reason you did this, the fact that you took this oath is
true, is it not?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, I also swore, twice, an oath to the Weimar
Constitution, in 1933 and 1938. Let me add something. It was always and it
still is my conviction that no oath relieves a man of his general duties to
humanity. No one is made an irresponsible tool by an oath. My oath would
never have made me carry out an order if I had recognized it to be criminal.
Never in my life did I obey anyone blindly. For that reason, I do not refer
for any of my actions to my duty to obey.
DR. FRITZ: Did you keep the oath which you took?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. No actions were expected of me which I could have
considered criminal or a violation of written or unwritten laws. Moreover, I
kept the oath which I took, not to Hitler, but to the German people.
DR. FRITZ: How long did you keep the oath?
FRITZSCHE: I kept it to the end. Then, it is true, I remained in Berlin,
in violation of the order which I was given. When Hitler and his entourage
took the way of suicide or fled toward the West, I was, to my knowledge,
the only higher official to remain in Berlin. At that time I gathered together

the employees of the highest Reich authorities, who had been left to their
fate, in the ruins of my office. Hitler had left behind an order to fight on.
The commander of Berlin could not be found. Therefore, as a civilian, I felt
obliged to offer to the Russian Marshal Zhukov the capitulation. As I was
sending off the emissaries who were to go across the battleline, the last
military adjutant of Hitler appeared—General Burgdorf—and was going to
shoot me in compliance with Hitler’s order. Nevertheless, we capitulated,
even though it was signed by the commander, who had been found in the
meantime. Thus, I believe I kept my oath, the oath which I had taken to the
German people in the person of Hitler.
DR. FRITZ: Did you hold an office in the Party?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Were you a political leader?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Were you in the SA or the SS or any one of the other
organizations which are accused here?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Did you ever take part in a Party rally?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: In one of the celebrations of 9 November in Munich?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: Then, please describe briefly your position and your work
from 1933 to 1945.
FRITZSCHE: Here, again, I may refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, that
is, to the rest of the affidavit. Thus I may again limit myself to a very brief
presentation to supplement what is said in the affidavit.
At the seizure of power by National Socialism, I remained what I had
been previously, Chief Editor of Drahtloser Dienst. That was the name of
the German radio news service. I held that position for 5 more years.
In May 1933 this wireless service, which had been a part of the Reich
Radio Company, was incorporated into the press section of the Propaganda
Ministry. As I was a specialist in journalistic news service, I soon was
entrusted with the news agencies, first the smaller ones such as Transozean
or Europapress or Eildienst. Later I was entrusted with the big Deutsches
Nachrichtenbüro (German news service).

At that time, I had no power to issue orders to the agencies, for I was
still an employee of the Ministry and not yet an official. I also had no right
to determine the contents of the news. I had only the organizational
supervision, but I believe that my advice was respected at the time. In those
days I also gave other advice of a journalistic nature. Then in December
1938 I became head of the German Press Section. I became Ministerial
Director. As an official I still felt like the journalist I had been for decades
previously. I continued to direct the German Press Section until the spring
of 1942.
At that time I did not agree, among other things, with the colored press
reports of my superior, Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. For that reason, I
became a soldier and went to the Eastern Front.
In the fall of 1942 I was called back by Dr. Goebbels. Dr. Goebbels
approved my previous criticism, of which he knew. He offered me the
direction of the Radio Section of his Ministry. I answered that I could return
to the Propaganda Ministry only if I had the certainty that a termination of
the war by political means would be sought and that total military victory
would not be striven after, which from the first day of the war I had
considered impossible. I told Dr. Goebbels at that time literally, “I am not
going to participate as a propagandist in a fight of self—destruction such as
was fought by the Goths at Mount Vesuvius.”
Dr. Goebbels answered that Hitler and he, also, were seeking a
termination of the war by diplomatic means on the basis of reaching some
sort of understanding. He promised me that he would inform me in time if
he noticed that the Führer was changing these intentions. Dr. Goebbels
repeated this promise at intervals of a few months, up to the end of the war;
and each time that he repeated it, he always gave me substantiated
indications about the political efforts in progress at the moment. Today I
have the feeling that he broke his promise.
Well, at that time I took over the Radio Section of the Propaganda
Ministry, and I became Ministerial Director.
DR. FRITZ: Those were your official positions. But they were less
known to the public. Better known were your radio speeches. What about
them?
FRITZSCHE: Since 1932 I spoke once a week, for 10 to 15 minutes,
on some German stations and on the Deutschlandsender (radio station for

foreign broadcasts). At the beginning of the war I spoke daily on all the
stations, I believe for 3 or 4 months. Then I spoke three times a week, then
twice a week, and finally once a week again. At first these radio speeches
were just reviews of newspaper articles; that is, a collection of quotations
from domestic and foreign newspapers. After the beginning of the war,
however, these speeches, of course, became a polemic on the basis of
quotations mostly from foreign papers and foreign radio stations.
DR. FRITZ: Did your speeches have an official character? The
Prosecution says that they were, of course, under the control of the
Propaganda Ministry.
FRITZSCHE: That is not correct in that form. The speeches were not
official. At the beginning they were purely personal elaborations. Of course,
I could not prevent, as time went on, the private speeches of a man holding
a position in the Propaganda Ministry being no longer considered as
personal, but semi-official.
DR. FRITZ: You just said “personal elaborations,” which was later
considered “semi-official.” For clarification I ask, could one criticize these
speeches, or was one arrested for so doing?
FRITZSCHE: Criticism was not only allowed, but actually it was
done. I had an extensive correspondence with my critics, although only with
those who signed their names. There were of course also anonymous critics,
but I may add that the anonymous critics had only general complaints.
After the outbreak of the war a South German office of public
prosecution and later the Ministry of Justice, offered me a certain protection
for my publications, apparently on the assumption that they were official or
semi-official. It was suggested to me to appear as co-plaintiff in possible
libel actions. I categorically refused this, stating, as I have often done both
privately and publicly, that people must be allowed to grumble about
something. If they are forbidden to criticize the State and the Government,
then they must be allowed at least to criticize the press, the radio, and me.
DR. FRITZ: How did you prepare these speeches? Were they put down
in writing and censored beforehand?
FRITZSCHE: I always refused to let them be censored beforehand.
The material was gathered very carefully. It was kept in the so-called
“Archiv-Schnelldienst” which had been applied for and approved by the
Tribunal to be brought here but which could not be found.

The material consisted of clippings from papers, reports of news
agencies, and reports from foreign broadcasts. The investigation of doubtful
matters was done by a special official. A rough draft of the speech was then
dictated and then delivered freely. Therefore, this procedure was different to
that of writing an article; not every sentence had to be polished, because in
a written matter every word counts, whereas in a speech it is more the total
impression which is decisive.
DR. FRITZ: Now, you worked in the Propaganda Ministry; Dr.
Goebbels was the Minister. His name has been mentioned here frequently in
connection with his various positions as Reich Minister for Propaganda,
Reich Propaganda Director of the NSDAP, Delegate for Total War Effort,
and Gauleiter of Berlin. In which of these capacities did you deal with Dr.
Goebbels?
FRITZSCHE: Exclusively in his capacity as Propaganda Minister.
DR. FRITZ: Were you his representative there?
FRITZSCHE: No. In the last 2½ years I was his commissioner for
radio broadcasting and, in addition, head of one of the 12 departments of his
Ministry. Dr. Goebbels’ representatives were his state secretaries. The last
one was Dr. Naumann who was his successor for one day.
DR. FRITZ: Was Dr. Goebbels your only and direct superior?
FRITZSCHE: No. There were many offices between him and me at
first, and still a few later on. This is the first time, here in the dock, that I am
without official superiors.
DR. FRITZ: By the way, whom of the defendants did you know or
with whom did you have official or personal relations?
FRITZSCHE: I had two or three official conversations, shortly after
1933, with Funk, who was then State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry,
mainly dealing with economic and organizational matters. I discussed with
him the financial plans for the reorganization of the news service.
Then, I once had a talk with Grossadmiral Dönitz on a technical
matter. I called on Seyss-Inquart in The Hague, and on Papen in Istanbul. I
knew all the others only by sight and first made their personal acquaintance
during the Trial.
DR. FRITZ: How about Hitler?

FRITZSCHE: I never had a conversation with him. In the course of 12
years, however, I saw him, of course, several times at the Reichstag on big
occasions or receptions. Once I was at his headquarters and was invited to
dinner with a large number of other people. Otherwise, I received
instructions from Hitler only through Dr. Dietrich or his representative or
through Dr. Goebbels and his various representatives.
DR. FRITZ: What were your relations with Dr. Goebbels? Were you
on friendly terms with him? Did you meet with him frequently?
FRITZSCHE: One can by no means say that we were friends. The
relationship was on an official basis, reserved and to a certain extent formal.
I was personally even less frequently with him than other assistants of Dr.
Goebbels of my rank. But I believed I observed that he treated me with
more respect than any other of his co-workers. To that extent, I occupied a
certain special position. I valued Dr. Goebbels’ intelligence and his ability,
at least sometimes, to change his own opinion in favor of a better argument.
I saw him about twice a year during the first 5 years. When I was head of a
department I saw him perhaps once a month. After the outbreak of war I
saw him daily in the course of a conference with 30 to 50 fellow
employees; and in addition, about once a week I had a conference on
special subjects with him.
DR. FRITZ: Now we come to the subject of propaganda. Can you
sketch the propaganda system in the Third Reich?
FRITZSCHE: I shall try it. There were three types of propaganda. The
first was the unorganized agitation of the radical fanatics in the Party. It was
present in all fields, in the fields of religion, racial policy, art, general
policy, and the conduct of the war. As time went by Martin Bormann
became more and more the leader of this unorganized agitation.
The second type of propaganda was under the Reich Propaganda
Directorate of the NSDAP. The head of this was Dr. Goebbels. It attempted
to put the agitation of the radicals on a more presentable basis.
The third type was the state organization of the Reich Propaganda
Ministry.
DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution contended at the beginning that you had
been also head of the Radio Section of the Propaganda Directorate of the
NSDAP. How about that?

FRITZSCHE: The Prosecution have withdrawn that assertion. They
said that they had no proof. It would have been more correct to say that this
statement has been proved to be false. I refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS,
Point 37. There I state that I was not—in contrast to all of my predecessors,
as far as I know—head of the Radio Section of the Ministry and at the same
time head of the Radio Section of the Party. Today I supplement this
statement by saying that I held no office whatever in the Party.
DR. FRITZ: You have been accused of having helped Dr. Goebbels
plunge the world into the blood-bath of aggressive war. Is that true? Did Dr.
Goebbels ever speak with you about aggressive plans?
FRITZSCHE: No; I never heard of any intention to wage aggressive
war, either from Dr. Goebbels or from anyone else.
DR. FRITZ: In the course of this Trial some conferences have been
mentioned here several times at which, it was said, various aggressive plans
were discussed; for example, before the attack on Czechoslovakia, before
the attack on Poland, and on Norway, and on Russia. Did you participate in
these conferences? Did you hear of them?
FRITZSCHE: I did not participate in a single one of these conferences.
I heard of them for the first time here in the courtroom.
DR. FRITZ: Now, in case no plans for an attack were discussed in
these conferences, was there any talk at all about war or the possibility of
war?
FRITZSCHE: No; but the danger of war was mentioned as early as
1933—the danger of war due to the one-sided disarmament of one state in
the midst of other states which were highly armed. This disproportion
between armament and nonarmament had to be considered as enticing an
attack.
German propaganda after 1933 underlined this consideration and this
contention as one of the main reasons, first, for the demand for
disarmament of the other powers and afterwards for the German demand for
equality of armament. That seemed completely logical to me. But never was
the danger of war mentioned without, at the same time, making a reference
to the German will for peace. That seemed to me honest.
In the summer of 1939, when the danger of war became more and
more imminent, I saw Dr. Goebbels more often than ever before. I gave Dr.
Goebbels a number of little memoranda as, so to speak, a contribution from

my field of work, the news service. They were analyses of public opinion in
western countries, and they repeatedly indicated that England was
determined to go to war in case of a conflict with Poland. I recall that Dr.
Goebbels was deeply impressed when I once again gave him one of these
memoranda. He expressed his concern and decided immediately to fly to
Hitler. He said to me, literally, “Believe me, we did not work successfully
for 6 years in order to risk everything in a war now.”
Furthermore, in the summer of 1939, I knew of some serious gaps in
German armament which have already been mentioned in part here in the
courtroom. Therefore I was convinced of the honesty of the peaceful
intentions in Hitler’s policy.
If documents have been submitted during this Trial which indicate that
Hitler secretly thought differently or acted differently, then I am at a loss to
form a judgment, since the documents of the opposite side have not yet
been published. But if it should be, as the documents submitted here say, I
must state that I was deceived about the aims of German policy.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at the beginning of my case I had stated
that we were unable to produce here the radio speeches of the Defendant
Fritzsche. I tried to obtain them from German radio stations and succeeded
in getting at least a small part from the years 1939 and 1940. I have selected
a few of these speeches which I should like to submit to the Tribunal as
Exhibit Number Fritzsche-1.
To support what the defendant has just said, I should like to quote only
one sentence from the radio speech of Fritzsche of 15 November 1939:

“The sole reason for war, which a nation that as a whole never
longs for war, may have at all—the sole reason for war which is
also morally justifiable is the threat to the existence, to the life of
that nation.”
And this line emphasized by the Defendant Fritzsche at the beginning
of the war, was adhered to by him during the war as well. As proof of this, I
should like to quote another passage from the same document, from a radio
speech of Fritzsche of 23 July 1940:
“We Germans have experienced in the course of our history, and
especially 30 years ago, enough blood and tears and death to face
things honestly now. We knew what war meant, and therefore we
did not want war. And because the Führer knows it so well and
had experienced it himself, he offered on 6 October and 19 July to
make peace.”
DR. FRITZ: Did you in any way have anything to do with war
preparations of an intellectual or organizational kind?
FRITZSCHE: Not directly, but perhaps indirectly. I demanded the
disarmament of the others, and then equality of armament; and I advocated
the arming (Wehrhaftmachung) of the German people. The expression
“Wehrhaftmachung” is liable to be misunderstood, at any rate, to be easily
misinterpreted. I should like to define it expressly as the ability to fight in
self-defense. The German people were promised again and again, often by
me, that the restoration of military sovereignty would be for defensive
purposes only.
DR. FRITZ: How and where did you propagate this idea?
FRITZSCHE: In the modest sphere of my weekly radio speeches,
while making casual remarks. I was a patriot; but I feel myself to be free
from chauvinism, that is, exaggerated nationalism. To me, as a historian, it
was at that time already clear that, especially in the narrow confines of
Europe, the old nationalism was an anachronism and that it was
incompatible with modern communications and weapons. At that time I
believed I saw in Hitler’s doctrine also certain elements for a new type of
mutual understanding among peoples. It was particularly the constantly
repeated thesis that only the nationalism of one people can understand the
nationalism of another people.

Only today have I realized ideologically—but particularly, of course
materially—through the further development of arms, that the time of
nationalism is past, if mankind does not want to commit suicide, and that
the period of internationalism has come, for good or evil.
At that time, however, nationalism was not considered a crime.
Everyone advocated it. It can be seen that it is still advocated today, and I
also advocated it.
DR. FRITZ: Now, the Prosecution points out that before every attack a
press campaign was launched in Germany, the aim of which was to weaken
the victim of a planned attack and to prepare the German people
psychologically for the new drive. Although this is stated by the
Prosecution without as yet actually referring to you personally and even
though later no direct charge is made that you organized these press
campaigns, the Prosecution, nevertheless, stress very strongly your
connection with this practice.
Now, what facts do you have to state about your role in these
journalistic polemics?
FRITZSCHE: First, I can only point out that I described the
propagandistic actions in detail in my affidavit, Document Number 3469-
PS, Points 23 to 33, starting with the Rhineland occupation up to the attack
on the Soviet Union. These descriptions also contain information about the
type and extent of my participation in these actions. Beyond that, I may
emphasize that any reference is missing in the description made in my
affidavit as to the question of the right in each case. All attempts at political
justification are lacking. I should like to emphasize explicitly that in each
case, in each action, I believed I represented a good and just cause. It would
be leading too far if I were to explain that here for each case, inasmuch as
many of these cases have already been discussed here. I assume, or rather I
hope, that the Prosecution will ask questions on this subject for I assert that,
no matter what the facts may have been in the individual cases, at every
moment from the Anschluss of Austria on to the attack on Russia,
information given to me and through me to the German public left no doubt
of the legality or the urgent necessity of the German action; and I, as the
only surviving informer of the German public, consider it my duty to be
available here for any investigation of the correctness of this statement of
mine, which is of especial importance for the German public.

DR. FRITZ: Some newspaper headlines are mentioned in your
affidavit which are considered typical for the various states of tension prior
to the individual action. What have you to say to that?
FRITZSCHE: The headlines are taken without exception from the
Völkischer Beobachter. These headlines were submitted to me and, of
course, I had to confirm their truth; but I may emphasize that the Völkischer
Beobachter was not typical for the result of my press policy. The Völkischer
Beobachter generally had its own direct connections to headquarters and to
Hitler. Typical products of my press policy were papers such as the
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, and the
Hamburger Fremdenblatt, to name only a few.
DR. FRITZ: But the Prosecution is of the opinion that you also incited
to war by your domestic propaganda insofar as you tried to arouse hostile
feelings in the German people toward other peoples of Europe and the
world. In Captain Sprecher’s trial brief it is said, for instance, that terms like
“antagonism against the peoples of the Soviet Union” and “an atmosphere
of senselessness and hatred” were created by you or that you had incited the
Germans to blind hatred. Did you do that?
FRITZSCHE: No, I did not do that. Never did I attempt to arouse
hatred against the English, French, Americans, or Russians, et cetera. There
is not a single word of this type in perhaps a thousand speeches which I
made before the microphone. I did speak strongly against governments,
members of governments, governmental systems; but I never preached
hatred generally or attempted to awaken it indirectly as was the case—and I
ask your pardon for my taking an example from the courtroom—at the
moment when a film was presented here and the words were spoken, “Here
you see Germans laughing over hanged Yugoslavs.” Never did I try to
awaken hatred in this general form and I may point out that for years many
anti-National Socialist statements from certain countries, which were still
neutral at that time, remained unanswered.
DR. FRITZ: Did your superiors demand that you mark your
propaganda with the stamp of antagonism or to stimulate hatred?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, that happened frequently, but it was not demanded
that antagonism or hatred should be stirred up against peoples. That was
expressly forbidden because we wanted to win these peoples over to our

side, but again and again I was requested to arouse hatred against
individuals and against systems.
DR. FRITZ: Who requested you to do this?
FRITZSCHE: Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich, and both of them frequently
on the direct orders of Adolf Hitler. The reproach was repeatedly made that
the German press and the German radio did not arouse hatred at all against
Roosevelt, Churchill, or Stalin but that they made these three personalities
popular as efficient men. For that reason, for years the German press was
forbidden to mention these three names at all unless, in an individual case,
permission was given with exact instructions.
DR. FRITZ: Do you mean to say that you refused the request to
change your propaganda to incite antagonism and to arouse hatred and did
not carry it out?
FRITZSCHE: I should like to outline exactly what I did. When the
reproaches of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Dietrich accumulated, I had all
caricatures from the first and second World War collected—from England,
the United States of America, France, and a few from Russia. In addition, I
had all anti-German propaganda films which I could lay my hands on,
collected. Then in five to six demonstrations of several hours each, I
presented these caricatures and these films to German journalists and
German radio speakers. I, myself, spoke only 2 or 3 minutes in
introduction. It is quite possible that I created hatred through these
showings, but I should like to leave the judgment of this means of
producing hatred in the midst of war to the Tribunal. In any case, Dr.
Goebbels said later that he was dissatisfied and we were “bunglers.”
I may add one statement. I would have had a means of carrying out my
orders of arousing real hatred, that is, not one means but a whole group of
methods; that would have been, to give only one example, a German edition
of the last two volumes of the Tarzan series, an adventure series which was
very popular in Germany at that time and of which the last two volumes
were strongly anti-German. I need not describe them here. I never pointed
out such early products of anti-German propaganda. I always deliberately
ignored such methods.
DR. FRITZ: If you say that you dispensed with hatred and antagonism
in your propaganda, what means did you use in your propaganda during the
war?

FRITZSCHE: During the war I conducted the propaganda almost
exclusively with the concept of the necessity and the obligation to fight. I
repeatedly painted the results of defeat very dark and systematically I gave
quotations from the press and the radio of the enemy countries. I quoted
repeatedly the enemy demands for unconditional surrender. I used the
expression of the “super-Versailles” frequently and did—I emphasize that—
describe the consequences of a lost war very pessimistically. It does not
behoove me today to make a comparison with reality.
DR. FRITZ: But could you not learn from the broadcasts of the enemy
that the fight of the Allies was not directed against the German people but
only against its leaders? Did you keep that from the German people?
FRITZSCHE: On the contrary, I did not keep it from them, but
repeatedly quoted it. However, I called it “incredible.” For example, I once
used the trick of quoting the wording of a medieval declaration of war in
which it had already been said that a war was declared only on the King of
France but that one wanted to bring freedom to the French people.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

[The Tribunal adjourned until 27 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH DAY
Thursday, 27 June 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Fritzsche resumed the stand.]
MARSHAL (Lieutenant Colonel James R. Gifford): If it please the
Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Ribbentrop is absent.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, first a very
brief explanation: Yesterday I repeatedly mentioned the Indictment and
intend to do so in the course of the examination. Thereby I mean the
presentation of Fritzsche’s case by Captain Sprecher in the morning session
of 23 January 1946.
Herr Fritzsche, yesterday you spoke of your radio speeches concerning
the Allied propaganda—my last question: Did you attempt to split the front
of the Allies by your propaganda?
FRITZSCHE: Of course I attempted to do that. I elaborated on all
ideological and all practical political contrasts or differences between the
individual Allied nations. I considered that a permissible method of waging
war. At that time I wanted a split between the Allies just as much as today I
wish their unity, since Germany would be the first victim of any conflict.
DR. FRITZ: Now, you are accused of assisting in establishing Nazi
control throughout Germany. Did you agitate against democracy?
FRITZSCHE: I never agitated against democracy as such. I attacked
the democracy of the 36 parties, the democracy which had prevailed in
Germany previously, the democracy under which even strong groups such
as the two Marxist parties, for example, were powerless. I criticized foreign
democracy only on two points: First, the elements which limited the basic
concept of democracy—I believe it is superfluous and perhaps it would be
misunderstood to enumerate them today. Secondly, I criticized the demands

of the foreign democracies to force their form of government on us.
According to my knowledge and information at that time, it seemed
unjustified to me.
DR. FRITZ: Well, did you consider dictatorship a better form of
government?
FRITZSCHE: I should like to emphasize that at that time, under the
existing conditions and only for a temporary emergency period, I did; today,
of course, no. After the totalitarian form of government has brought about
the catastrophe of the murder of 5 millions, I consider this form of
government wrong even in times of emergency. I believe any kind of
democratic control, even a restricted democratic control, would have made
such a catastrophe impossible.
DR. FRITZ: You are accused, furthermore, of having spread the
doctrine of the “master race.” The Prosecution makes this charge indirectly
against you. How about that?
FRITZSCHE: I never set up or voiced the theory of the “master race.”
I even avoided this term. I expressly prohibited this term being used by the
German press and the German radio when I was in charge of one or the
other. I believe that the term “master race” played a greater role in the anti-
National Socialist propaganda than in Germany proper. I do not know who
invented this term. To my knowledge it was publicly mentioned only by
men like Dr. Ley, for example, men—and I must explain this frankly and
expressly—who were not taken seriously by anyone in this connection. It is
true, however, that this term played a great role, without being expressed
openly, among the SS because of its racial exclusiveness; but people of
intelligence, tact and insight, and with some knowledge of the world, very
carefully avoided the use of this word.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at this opportunity, I should like to offer an
affidavit to the Tribunal by Dr. Scharping of 17 May 1946. Dr. Scharping
was Government Counsellor in the Propaganda Ministry up to the end.
From this affidavit I shall now quote only one sentence from Page 13. I
quote:
“In this connection it can be explained that Fritzsche always
opposed the term ‘the master race.’ He even expressly prohibited
the use of this word on the radio.”

[Turning to the defendant.] But the Prosecution has quoted a passage
from one of your radio speeches to prove this assertion.
FRITZSCHE: The quotation is correct, but I ask you just to read it
carefully. The term “master race” is rejected in this quotation for the Jewish
and for the German people. The quotation cannot be misunderstood.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, that is in Captain Sprecher’s speech for the
Prosecution, English text, Pages 31 and 32.
[Turning to the defendant.] But you carried on propaganda not only in
Germany, but also abroad. What was the difference?
FRITZSCHE: In my radio speeches there was no difference. Before
the outbreak of war I made a slight difference in the speeches for Germany
and those for other countries simply because the audience was different, and
because I had to presuppose a different level of knowledge. During the war
my speeches on the Reich German radio were simply transmitted over the
short-wave stations. What was said for Germany or for other countries
could be controlled by both sides. Moreover in the 12 years during which I
spoke on the German radio, I never permitted my speeches to be translated,
since that always involved a differentiation in emphasis. Written articles can
be translated, perhaps official speeches also, but not rather light and half-
improvised chats.
DR. FRITZ: Were your broadcasts abroad criticized internationally?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, very frequently. During the war there was often
daily criticism from some country or other. I had these criticisms collected.
I asked for them as documents, but my application was refused by the
Court. As far as I know, I am not accused of inciting war in these criticisms.
DR. FRITZ: Now you not only acted as a mouthpiece for propaganda,
but also as an organizer of it. You are accused of having helped to create an
important instrument for the alleged conspiracy. The Prosecution says that
for 13 years you aided in the creation of the propaganda machine which the
conspiracy was able to put to such good use. Did you create the press
organization of the National Socialist State?
FRITZSCHE: No, I did not create this organization nor did I have any
part in its creation. It was created by Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Dietrich, and
Reichsleiter Amann. When, in the winter of 1938, I became head of the so-
called German Press Section, I attempted to loosen the bonds which had
been imposed on the German press. I attempted that in the material and

personnel field. For example, I called back to their work with the press
hundreds of editors of other parties who had been dismissed in 1933 and
1934. Today they will be angry with me. I had the best intentions at that
time. In addition to the official press conferences which were very strictly
controlled, also as far as their records were concerned, by my superiors, I
also arranged the so-called supplementary conferences in which I met the
representatives of the 50 or 60 most important papers and discussed more
freely the possibilities of their work. I coined the slogan which was often
used there: “You may write any criticism you like in the German papers
provided such criticism is not shown in big headlines but is buried
somewhere in the text in an elegant form.” Very many German journalists
made use of this possibility in the past 12 years. I should be glad if this
work, which was hidden work, would be honored in some way today in the
interest of these people who, in part, returned to their profession as
journalists only out of personal confidence in me. Of course, I must add that
the possibility of criticizing was not unlimited.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, on this occasion, with the approval of the
Prosecution, I offer the Tribunal a document as Document Number
Fritzsche-4. It is an excerpt from a letter of the German Lieutenant General
Dittmar, who frequently commented on the military situation on the
German radio during the war and who is in British captivity. The well-
known English radio commentator, Mr. Liddell-Hart, has sent an excerpt
from the letter to the British Prosecution. I should like to quote briefly this
memorandum which was sent to me. May I quote this passage?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may.
DR. FRITZ: Dittmar writes that the possibility of retaining the critical
attitude in his radio commentary is due primarily to the silent approval and
the protection of Hans Fritzsche, the director of the political radio. He
believes that Fritzsche was a secret opponent of the regime and that he was
glad of the opportunity to have found a commentator who discreetly
expressed ideas which resembled his own and which insidiously would tend
to reduce confidence in the regime.
Following this quotation, there is another quotation from the affidavit
of Dr. Scharping, which I have already submitted as Document Number
Fritzsche-2. It is on Page 11 of this affidavit. I quote:

“The radio men and the journalists knew Fritzsche’s tolerance
quite well. It repeatedly happened that, for example, Fritzsche at
his conference had a copy of the Völkischer Beobachter in his
hand and commented ironically on an anti-Jewish article. I recall
that once he expressed his criticism in about the following words:
“ ‘A Berlin paper’—then he held up the Völkischer Beobachter so
that everyone could see it—‘has once more, in an editorial, made
more than two blunders. Perhaps the publisher may yet succeed in
hitting the right tune.’
“With such ironical remarks, Fritzsche always had the approval of
his listeners, but there was some danger for him, for Goebbels
daily read the records of these press conferences.”
Herr Fritzsche, following the statement of Lieutenant General Dittmar,
one question: Did you feel yourself to be an enemy of the system, or how
does General Dittmar come to this statement?
FRITZSCHE: I was not an enemy of the system. It would be ridiculous
and unworthy to try to assert that today. But I was definitely an opponent of
all misuse of the system. The obvious one which I noticed the most,
because it was in my field of work, was whitewashing of news during the
war. The aim of all my news policy was realism, and apparently that is what
General Dittmar means in the part of his statement which has been read
here.
I met General Dittmar in December 1942 or January 1943 at the
moment when the German 6th Army at Stalingrad was already surrounded,
but when this fact was still being kept secret from the German people.
Together with General Dittmar, in face of the prohibition, I publicly
announced the fact that the 6th Army was surrounded at Stalingrad. This
caused a great sensation at the time.
In the following months and years I always defended General Dittmar
and his realistic presentation of the military situation against all attacks,
especially against the attacks of the Party, but also against the attacks of the
Foreign Office, which repeatedly pointed out that these sober presentations
of Dittmar had a bad effect on Germany’s allies.
In connection with this struggle for realistic news service, later—and I
ask permission to mention this briefly—I waged a desperate battle against

the irresponsible propaganda of miracle weapons. Only 1 year after Dr.
Goebbels had mentioned the future miracle weapons did I mention a new
type of weapon for the first time. Speer has mentioned SS Standartenführer
Berg, who is said to have carried on secret propaganda for the miracle
weapon in connection with the Propaganda Ministry. He wrote an article in
Das Reich which attracted much attention, with the sensational and very
promising heading, “We, the Bearers of Secrets.” I had to fight against
things like that.
Another especially striking example was this: Another member of the
SS, Hernau, wrote, at the moment when the invasion had succeeded, an
article in which he presented the situation as if the evacuation of France had
been a very secret trick of the German Command, which offered the
possibility for a particularly strong counterblow. I prohibited this article in
my field, and I repeatedly had to oppose the irresponsible rumors which
were spread in secret about mysterious weapons. I did so publicly, and I
plainly stated my point of view on the radio against this propaganda.
On the other hand I may point out that at every moment of the war my
superiors always made well-founded promises to me, first, of some military
offensive which was just being prepared; for instance, a thrust from East
Prussia toward the south, a thrust from Upper Silesia to the Vistula, a thrust
from Alsace toward the north, and so forth. Hand in hand with these
promises, which were thoroughly detailed, were the political promises
which were mentioned briefly yesterday, that is, the descriptions given by
Dr. Goebbels that foreign political negotiations were in progress with the
enemy on one or the other side.
DR. FRITZ: Another question: Who was in charge of press policy?
FRITZSCHE: Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. He gave very
specialized instructions, mostly in a precise wording, the so-called “slogan
of the day of the Reich Press Chief.”
Generally he even gave the wording of the commentaries which were
to be added in the press conference.
For the most part, Dr. Dietrich was at the Führer’s headquarters and
received his instructions directly from Hitler. Dr. Dietrich’s representatives
were Sündermann and Lorenz. The second factor decisive for German press
policy was Reichsleiter Amann who was at the head of the organization of
publishers. The third factor was Dr. Goebbels as Reich Propaganda

Minister. Dietrich and Amann were nominally subordinate to him; actually,
both had the same authority as he had and I always had to adjust differences
or co-ordinate among these three authorities.
DR. FRITZ: Did you create the organization of the journalistic news
service?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, I did create this organization. In principle, it
originated with me. I may refer to my affidavit, 3469-PS, Point 17. I was in
charge of the journalistic news service from about 1934 to 1938. I was
proud of the fact that at the beginning of the war even the enemy
recognized the good functioning of this news machine. However, at that
time I was no longer the head of the so-called news service department. As
an expert I created this organization in peacetime without thinking of the
possibility of using it during war. The conclusion of the Prosecution that I
also determined the contents of the news service is not correct.
DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution has said that the Propaganda Ministry
was the most fabulous lie factory of all times. What do you have to say
about this?
FRITZSCHE: First, for myself personally, I should like to make the
following quite clear. I state under oath: On really serious questions of
policy and the conduct of war I did not commit a single falsification and did
not consciously use a single lie.
How often I myself became the victim of a falsehood or a lie I cannot
say after the revelations of this Trial. The same is true, as far as I know, of
all my fellow workers, but I do not by any means want to deny that I and
my fellow workers selected news and quotations following a certain
tendency. It is the curse of propaganda during war that one works only with
black and white. Only a few great minds remain independent. I believe that
this painting in black and white is a luxury which also cannot be afforded
any longer.
As to the Propaganda Ministry itself, as such, I must say that I can
only judge of the one-twelfth, that is the one section of which I was in
charge at any time. But to my knowledge it is a mistake to believe that in
the Propaganda Ministry thousands of little lies were hatched out. In details
we worked quite cleanly and honestly, technically even perfectly. If we had
lied on a thousand small things, the enemy would have been able to deal
with us more easily than was the case. But decisive for such a news

machine is not the detail but the final fundamental basis on which
propaganda is built. Decisive is the belief in the incorruptibility of the
leaders of the state, on which every journalist must rely and this basis is
shaken by what has become known today of mass murders, of senseless
atrocities, and it is shaken by the doubt in the honesty of Hitler’s
protestations for peace, the factual details of which I am not in a position to
judge.
DR. FRITZ: In this Trial it has been pointed out that there are no
regulations in international law on the methods of propaganda in war and
peace.
FRITZSCHE: I know very well that international law places no
restrictions on propaganda, especially propaganda during war. I also know
very well that only in a very few individual treaties between states are there
regulations about the use of propaganda; for example in the German-Polish
treaty and in the German-Soviet Union treaty. But in all my life as a
journalist I have emphasized that the lack of international regulations as to
propaganda is no excuse for lies. I always emphasized the moral
responsibility of the journalist and newsman. I did so long before the war in
an international discussion with Radio Luxembourg but it would lead too
far afield to go into that here.
If last May I did not seek death, one of the reasons for this was my
wish—I wanted to render an account of where, in that system, there were
the pure idealism and the heroic sacrifices of millions, and where there were
lies and the brutality which did not shrink from committing crimes.
DR. FRITZ: Please give us examples of cases wherein you felt you
were deceived.
FRITZSCHE: During this Trial the news was discussed which
circulated at the beginning of the Polish war about the attack on the
Gleiwitz radio station. At that time I firmly believed in the truth of the
official German news. I need say nothing about this case.
Then, in December of last year, here in the prison in Nuremberg, I
realized from a talk with Grand Admiral Raeder that it was actually a
German submarine which sank the Athenia. Up to that time I had firmly
believed in the truth of the official German report that there had been no
German submarine in the neighborhood. I have asked my lawyer to pick out
the most caustic statements I made in my radio speeches about the Athenia

case and include them in my document book. They are utterances which
would really speak against me but which, on the other hand, show that I
worked not alone on the basis of the official German news, but that I also
collected the news which supported the official German version; for
example, the fact which was not at first made public and therefore was
suspicious, that the wreck of the Athenia, one day after the catastrophe, was
sunk by being shelled by British destroyers, which is a matter of course in
the interest of shipping but which at the time seemed to me to be an
occasion for suspicion. I also used American news on the same subject. But
the most impressive false news of which I was a victim was given out in the
last few days of the war. I must describe it for the sake of clearing up
matters.
In the days when Berlin was surrounded by the Russian Army the
people of Berlin were told that a relief army, the army of General Wenk,
was marching on Berlin; that there was no more fighting on the Western
Front. The news was given out that Ribbentrop had gone to the Western
Front and had concluded a treaty there, and handbills were printed in Berlin
which contained approximately this text: “Soldiers of the Wenk army, we
Berliners know that you are as far as Potsdam. Hurry, come quickly, help
us.” These handbills were printed at a time when the Wenk army no longer
existed and had already been captured. These handbills were apparently
dropped over Berlin inadvertently and were to give the inhabitants of Berlin
new courage. That happened in the days when Hitler, according to Speer’s
testimony, had already told his entourage that there was no use trying to do
anything for the rest of the German people.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, the two radio speeches which the
Defendant Fritzsche has mentioned dealing with the Athenia case are in the
Document Number Fritzsche-1, which I submitted yesterday. I refer only to
the contents of these radio speeches.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please give examples of untruths which
you knew and which you did not consider lies.
FRITZSCHE: One example is the so-called “V” drive. Colonel
Britton, a British colonel, proclaimed this “V” drive, this “Victory” drive on
the British radio. On the same evening I stood before a German microphone
and said, apparently harmlessly, “We will have a ‘V’ drive; the ‘V’ stands
for ‘Victoria.’ ”

Then Colonel Britton said that I had stolen the “V” from him. I said
that was not the case, that I thought of it first.
DR. FRITZ: If you thought you were operating only with the truth,
why your sharp language, why the prohibition against listening on the radio
to foreign stations?
FRITZSCHE: I have already emphasized in my affidavit that in my
opinion the sharpness of my language was always less than that of my
opponents. The prohibition against listening to foreign radio stations was
issued decidedly against my will. This prohibition was only a hindrance for
me in my discussions with my foreign opponents in the various countries.
Due to this prohibition my enemy was, so to speak, half in shadow; I could
not speak to him officially, but, on the other hand, I knew that many of my
listeners had heard him.
May I mention here that I always advocated a mild judgment on the
violators of this prohibition against listening to foreign radio stations. Legal
authorities often consulted me as an expert. I may emphasize that,
particularly after Stalingrad, I established my own listening service for the
Russian radio in order to learn the names of German soldiers captured at
Stalingrad which were mentioned on the Russian radio and report them to
the relatives, because it seemed cruel to me to deprive the relatives of such
a source of information about the fate of their people.
Moreover, there was only one alternative with regard to the prohibition
of listening to the radio. That was either to confiscate all radios and stop the
whole German radio system—the Party often demanded this—or the
prohibition against listening to foreign stations, which seemed to me the
lesser of the two evils.
Finally, we were in a war, and the enemy was not too particular in his
methods. I should like to give an example. That was the station Gustav
Siegfried 2, which at the beginning of its work gained listeners in Germany
with stories that I do not want to characterize more precisely but which
caused me to prohibit my own listening station from receiving this
broadcast.
DR. FRITZ: You have been charged with urging a policy of ruthless
exploitation of the occupied territories. Do you acknowledge such a policy?
FRITZSCHE: No. The aim of all my propaganda work in Europe was,
and had to be, to win over the peoples of Europe to the German cause.

Anything else would have been illogical. All the radio broadcasts in all
European languages, which were made under my direction, had for years
only one aim: That was to win the voluntary co-operation, especially of the
occupied territories, for the fight of the Reich.
DR. FRITZ: Were you of the opinion that the German administration
in the occupied territories recruited voluntary co-operation?
FRITZSCHE: At the beginning, certainly, with one single exception.
That was Koch in the Ukraine. Otherwise, as far as I could see, all
administrations of occupied territories sought this collaboration more or less
skillfully. I saw the gigantic efforts which the Allies made to interfere with
this German collaboration policy, which was very dangerous for them. I
saw that in these efforts the Allies were at first using their means of
propaganda. This alone would not have worked. Then I saw that they used
other means in these efforts, that is, outrages and sabotage. These latter
efforts had great success. Outrages always called for reprisals and reprisals
always called forth new outrages.
I hope I will not be misunderstood, and this is not meant cynically, if I
say the following: I, as a propagandist, considered for example the murder
of Heydrich a minor success. The destruction of Lidice, carried out by the
Germans, however, was a tremendous success for the Allies. In other words,
I always was and had to be an opponent of reprisals of all kinds.
DR. FRITZ: Did you know of the reprisals? How did you deal with
them in your propaganda?
FRITZSCHE: I learned of Lidice, which I just mentioned, only after
months, because at that time I was at the Eastern Front. I learned—and this
is significant—only of the destruction of the houses of Lidice and the
driving out of the inhabitants. I learned only here in the courtroom of the
killing of a part of the inhabitants. I learned that hostages were taken, but
not that they were killed. The killing of hostages was made public only in
the occupied territories. If shootings occurred anywhere, I was told that they
had been of persons condemned to death on account of outrages or
conspiracy.
The Night and Fog Decree was also unknown to me. On the other
hand, I frequently learned of fines which had been imposed on towns or
districts. In our propaganda, we always referred to the causes of such
reprisals.

DR. FRITZ: And how did you describe the work of the German
administrations in your propaganda?
FRITZSCHE: I always referred to the constructive work which, in
spite of all difficulties and all resistance, was being done in the various
occupied territories, especially and far ahead, the work for the
intensification of agriculture; then that to increase industrial production. I
had references made to the supplying of the occupied territories with food,
often, as I should like to emphasize, from scant German stocks. I had
reports made of the creation of schools, and I received at times very
impressive reports and had them worked on, for example, on the supplying
of cities such as Paris, in spite of sabotage by the enemy against railroad
lines or other supply channels. I had such reports collected in permanent
files and had speeches and whole series of speeches made on them. There
were many such reports. I must emphasize that, as far as I know, in not a
single German-occupied territory was there an infant mortality of 80
percent, and in none were there fields lying fallow, and it is simply not true,
as the Prosecution said here once, although in a moment of excitement, that
Germany and the Germans were well fed and happy during the war while
the occupied territories starved. That is not true.
DR. FRITZ: What did you know about bad conditions in the occupied
territories?
FRITZSCHE: Above all, the failure to call on the population for their
own administration and the lack of decisive political concessions to the
countries which administered themselves. Immediately after the French
campaign, I had repeatedly demanded the establishment of a Magna Charta
for Europe, laying down the basic rights of the European peoples. I
prepared many memoranda on this subject which were accepted by Dr.
Goebbels and taken to Hitler; and when in the autumn of 1942 I decided to
return to the Propaganda Ministry, one of the promises which Dr. Goebbels
gave me was that now finally that Magna Charta for Europe would be
proclaimed.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, on this occasion I should like to quote a
passage from the Scharping affidavit, Document Number Fritzsche-2, Page
13 of the affidavit:
“After the occupation of various European countries, Fritzsche
issued directives for news releases to the effect that the peoples of

Europe were to form a league of states on the basis of equality
with Germany. He told me to work out a series of speeches to this
effect in which this point of view was to play the decisive role
and which at the same time should give the authorities hints for a
healthy reconstruction in the occupied territories.”
[Turning to the defendant.] Did you know what has been said here by
the Prosecution about the activity of the Police in the occupied territories?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: At this point I should like to interpolate a question: I have
already asked the witness Paulus about your conduct after you learned of
the Commissar Order. How about that?
FRITZSCHE: I learned of the order to shoot captured Soviet
commissars at the beginning of May 1942 when I came to the 6th Army. I
immediately opposed it. Whether it was carried out or not, I do not know.
Field Marshal Paulus, no doubt, is correct when he said that he had already
prevented in his army the execution of this order. At any rate, I made it my
business to have the order as such rescinded, and I achieved this. The 6th
Army, at my advice, gave certain information to the High Command of the
Wehrmacht or to the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I am convinced,
moreover, that many army leaders acted in the same way as the leader of the
6th Army and simply did not carry out the order. At any rate, it was
expressly rescinded afterward.
DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution quotes two paragraphs from your radio
speech of 5 July 1941.
Mr. President, that is in the English record of Captain Sprecher, Pages
32 and 33.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution concludes from this
presentation that you had agitated for ruthless measures against the
population of the Soviet Union. You are said to have vilified the people of
the Soviet Union.
THE PRESIDENT: We cannot find it here. What is the PS number?
DR. FRITZ: It is in the transcript, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: We have not got the transcript here. We have the
document book. The document book does not contain 32 and 33 pages. It
contains only 32 or 31 and a little bit...

DR. FRITZ: I can give the document number which is 3064-PS,
Exhibit USA-723 and...
THE PRESIDENT: It is Page 14 in our book. Well, did you say 5 July?
DR. FRITZ: 5 July 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have got the 7th and 10th of July but not
the 5th. What page in the shorthand notes was it? You know it?
DR. FRITZ: On Page 32, Page 33 in the English transcript. I have the
English transcript here.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better read it then.
DR. FRITZ: This quotation from Captain Sprecher’s speech for the
Prosecution reads:
“Letters from the front, film reporters, propaganda companies
attached to the German Army wherever it advanced, P. K.
reporters, and soldiers on leave confirm: In this battle in the East
it is not one ideology fighting against another, not one political
system against another, but culture, civilization, and human
dignity have revolted against devilish principles of an
underworld.”
FRITZSCHE: I should like to state the following: With this statement I
was neither calling for ruthless measures against the population of the
Soviet Union, nor did I want to vilify the people of the Soviet Union. I refer
to the full text of the speech of 5 July. I do not wish to read this speech, but
I should like permission to sum it up briefly.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, in my Document Book 1—I do not know
whether the Tribunal already has it—I have all the radio speeches...
THE PRESIDENT: No, we haven’t got it.
DR. FRITZ: I have all these radio speeches of the Defendant Fritzsche
from which the Prosecution quoted passages against him in my document
book in their full text.
THE PRESIDENT: It has just been handed up to me. What page is it?
DR. FRITZ: Pages 8 to 13, the radio speech of 5 July 1941.
[Turning to the defendant.] Will you continue?
FRITZSCHE: I ask for permission to sum up the contents very briefly.

I spoke of the reports which the German public received about what
German soldiers had seen in their advance in the Soviet Union, especially in
connection with prisoners in the prisons in various cities. I did not describe
these things once more; I only recalled them from the reports which had
been given out at the time. From them I drew the conclusion that now one
saw how necessary the fight was against a system under which such
atrocities were possible. For the peoples of the Soviet Union I expressly
used words of compassion and sympathy.
DR. FRITZ: In the same connection, and with the same tendency, the
Prosecution then quotes a sentence from a paragraph of your radio speech
of 10 July 1941.
Mr. President, that is in Document Book 1—the speech of 10 July
1941—also in its full text, on Pages 14 to 19.
[Turning to the defendant.] What do you have to say to this charge?
FRITZSCHE: What I just said becomes even clearer in this quotation,
and in this whole speech. I referred once more to the reports just mentioned.
I also referred to the descriptions coming from foreign correspondents. I
then quite frankly reported Moscow’s attitude toward these events and I
said, quite honestly, “Radio Moscow says that these atrocities are facts, but
it maintains that these atrocities were not committed by Russians but by
Germans.”
In view of this attitude of Moscow, I, so to speak, took the public into
my confidence. I called upon millions of German soldiers as witnesses; I
called upon their mothers and fathers and wives as witnesses. I formally
called as witnesses the inhabitants of the occupied territories in which
Germans were in power at the time, and in which, as I said, they were
subordinated only to the moral laws in their own breasts. Then I drew the
conclusion: These German soldiers cannot have committed the atrocities
which were described by Berlin and Moscow in the same way.
The Prosecution asserted that this attempt to ascribe German atrocities
to the Russians was ridiculous. I do not consider it ridiculous; I consider it
tragic. It shows clearly, as I understand it, the absolute cleanliness and
honesty of the whole German conduct of the war. I still believe today that
murder and violence and Sonderkommandos only clung like a foreign body,
like a boil, to the morally sound body of the German people and their
Armed Forces.

DR. FRITZ: Finally, the Prosecution quotes a passage from your
speech of 9 October 1941, another quotation from which was brought out
elsewhere.
Mr. President, this is in the Fritzsche Document Book Number 1; the
speech in its full text is on Pages 20 to 25. The quotations of the
Prosecution are summed up in a document in the Fritzsche document book
of the Prosecution. I think the Tribunal can easily compare it.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution concludes from this
quotation that you had approved of the policy of the Nazi conspirators in
their ruthless exploitation of the occupied territories. What have you to say
to that?
FRITZSCHE: There is no question of ruthlessness either in the
quotation given by the Prosecution or in the rest of the text of the speech of
9 October 1941. I refer to my affidavit 3469-PS, Paragraph 39, a paragraph
which the Prosecution very fairly quoted in this connection.
In addition, may I once more sum up, very briefly, the sense of this
speech.
That was the time when German soldiers were stationed from the
Black Sea to the Bay of Biscay. I spoke of the possibility of exploiting the
resources of this enormous territory. I said, “The possibilities of this
continent are so considerable that they can cover any need for war and for
peace.” I said, in this connection, that a starving-out by blockade, such as
was attempted in 1914-18, was now out of the question. I spoke of the
possibilities of the organization of Europe which could begin in the midst of
the war...
DR. FRITZ: In the midst of war?
FRITZSCHE: ...in the midst of war, and I meant the organization of
European nations with equal rights. It is beyond all doubt that at that time I
was not thinking of ruthless exploitation of the occupied territories, but only
of winning them over politically and economically after the storms of war
had blown by.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I now come to another subject, so perhaps
this would be a good time to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. THOMA: I have a request, Mr. President. I would like to have my
client excused for the rest of the day because I want to talk to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. FRITZ: What did you know about the removal of Jews from
occupied countries?
FRITZSCHE: I did not know anything of their removal, but I heard
that certain individuals were being arrested, Jews and non-Jews.
DR. FRITZ: What did you know about the topic, which we discussed
here, of slave labor?
FRITZSCHE: I knew that millions of foreign workers were working in
the Reich. I did not consider them slaves, for I saw them daily walking
about free on the streets of all the cities.
DR. FRITZ: What did you know about their treatment, about their
living conditions, and their wages?
FRITZSCHE: Reports about these things were sent to me or to my co-
workers from the office of Sauckel and the German Labor Front. From
these reports, among other things, I remember the fact that the foreign
workers were given the same treatment as the German workers in every
respect. I further recall having heard that the initial inferior treatment
accorded to Eastern Workers had been done away with. I received many
reports from listeners complaining about the fact that foreign workers were
allegedly in better position than German workers; and in this connection, I
remember a reference to the fact that the foreign workers were permitted to
send home money in the form of foreign exchange.
I also talked with foreign workers many times. I did not hear any
special complaints. On the other hand, in the Propaganda Ministry, through
official channels, I heard a great deal about the care given to foreign
workers even along cultural lines. Frequently I was approached by Sauckel
or the German Labor Front—I do not remember which it was—with the
request to have radio broadcasts sent to one or another group of foreign
workers. I was approached also with the request for turning over receiving
sets to camps of foreign workers, et cetera.

DR. FRITZ: Did you know that most of them did not come to
Germany voluntarily?
FRITZSCHE: That was exactly what I did not know. Here in this
proceeding it was mentioned that Sauckel in one meeting or another made a
statement about the fact that only a small percentage had come voluntarily.
That was unknown to me.
I did hear the following complaints: First of all, that extravagant
promises were made at the time of recruitment of the foreign workers,
which could not be kept afterward. In the interest of my propaganda I had
objections raised against that through the propaganda department of my
Ministry when I heard about it. Then, I remember having heard complaints
from Poland dealing with the fact that employers were “pirating” Polish
workers from one another.
DR. FRITZ: Sauckel testified that in this connection he co-operated
with the Propaganda Ministry and that he had many discussions with the
Propaganda Ministry. Did you participate in such discussions?
FRITZSCHE: No, I did not participate in these conferences. I thought
that I met Sauckel here for the first time. He reminded me of our meeting in
the spring of 1945 at the home of Dr. Goebbels when some evening
gathering took place.
DR. FRITZ: Did you have anything to do with the propaganda used in
the recruitment of foreign workers in occupied countries?
FRITZSCHE: No.
DR. FRITZ: What did you have to do with the propaganda which was
disseminated in the occupied countries?
FRITZSCHE: This propaganda, as it applied to occupied countries,
was not subordinate to me, not even in the branches of the press or radio.
This propaganda was under the direction and supervision of the local Reich
commissioner, military commander, or governor. However, I did exert
influence on this propaganda in the occupied countries on two, three, or
four occasions when this propaganda in the occupied countries was contrary
to the directives which applied to the Reich. I usually gathered this from the
echo abroad. I remember one special case which received general attention.
A certain man by the name of Friedrich attacked the Pope over the German
radio in Paris. I had this man Friedrich replaced. That was the extent of my
influence.

Dr. Goebbels, however, exerted much more influence on the
propaganda in the occupied countries, especially through his foreign section
or his Foreign Press Department or through his liaison officer to the OKW.
DR. FRITZ: Did you not make any radio broadcasts in the occupied
countries?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, broadcasts of two types. An example of the first
type is as follows: At the time of the occupation, Radio Paris was under
German influence. Despite that, I retained the old German broadcast in the
French language via Radio Stuttgart. I wanted to have it understood quite
specifically that the occupation was an abnormal and a temporary situation,
and anything that was taking place during the period of occupation did not
have anything to do with that part of, let us say, German-French
conversations, which was being carried on by the two mother countries.
The second example is as follows: It concerns German broadcasts in
the Spanish and Portuguese languages. I had them transmitted through three
stations in southern France, for it was easier to receive these transmissions
in the Pyrenees peninsula. The basis for my work in this connection was a
contract which we had with these stations and the payment of regular
charges. Negotiations for this contract were carried out through the Foreign
Office.
DR. FRITZ: I shall now turn to a different topic. You are accused of
making anti-Semitic statements. Were you anti-Semitic, and in what way
did you participate in anti-Semitic propaganda?
FRITZSCHE: I was not anti-Semitic in the idea of a noisy anti-
Semitism. The Prosecution has asserted that all defendants—that is,
including myself—had shouted, “Germany awake and Judaism shall die.” I
will state under oath that I never raised this cry or one similar. I was not
anti-Semitic in the sense of either the radical theories or methods beginning
with Theodor Fritsch to Julius Streicher.
The Prosecution has stated that even the Defendant Streicher, the main
anti-Jewish agitator of all times, could hardly have excelled Fritzsche when
it came to libels against the Jews. I protest against this statement. I do not
believe that I deserve any such accusation. Never did I give out any
propaganda dealing with ritual murders, cabala, and the so-called secrets of
the Elders of Zion. At all times of my life I considered them machinations
of a rather primitive agitation. For humanitarian reasons, I regret that I have

to make a further statement, but I cannot refrain from making this statement
in the interests of truth.
My co-workers and I, in the press and on the radio, without exception I
would say, rejected Der Stürmer radically. I personally, during a period of
13 years of regular newspaper comments, never quoted this paper. Der
Stürmer was not quoted in the German press either. The editors did not
belong to the journalists’ union and the publisher did not belong to the
publishers’ organization during my term of office. How things were later
on, I do not know.
As I have already stated in my affidavit, I tried twice to ban Der
Stürmer. However, I did not succeed. Then it was proposed that I censor
Der Stürmer. However, I declined the offer. I wanted to prohibit the
publishing of Der Stürmer, not just because the mere verbatim reproduction
of a page of the newspaper Der Stürmer was the most effective anti-German
propaganda which ever existed, but I wanted to ban Der Stürmer simply for
reasons of good taste. I wanted to prohibit it as a source of radicalism
against which I fought wherever I met it.
The great secret for the sudden increase in the circulation of Der
Stürmer after 1933 to half a million, already referred to in this Court, lay in
the same cause as the secret of the sudden increase of such organizations as
the SA.
The Party in 1933 had blocked the influx of new members, and a great
many people tried to get in somehow, if not directly with the Party, then
with some organization connected with the Party, such as, perhaps, the SA.
Or they tried to show sympathy with National Socialist ideas by subscribing
to Der Stürmer and displaying it. Therefore, in that sense, I was not anti-
Semitic.
But I was anti-Semitic in this sense: I wanted a restriction of the
predominant influence of Jewry in German politics, economy, and culture,
such as was manifested after the first World War. I wanted a restriction
based on the ratio of Jews to Germans. I proclaimed publicly this view of
mine on occasions, but I did not exploit these views in extensive systematic
propaganda.
Those anti-Semitic statements with which I am charged by the
Prosecution have a different connection. The facts are as follows: After the
outbreak of the war I referred frequently to the fact that Jewish emigrants

immediately after 1933, were the first ones to emphasize that a war against
the National Socialist German State was necessary; for instance, Emil
Ludwig or George Bernhard or the Pariser Tageblatt. As far as I recall, this
was the only connection in which I made anti-Semitic statements of any
kind. I cannot say this without asking to be permitted to emphasize one
more point. Only in these proceedings here did I learn that in the autumn of
1939 there was more at stake than just one city and a road through the
Corridor; that in truth and in fact, a new partition of Poland had already
been prepared at least, and only here in these proceedings did I learn that
Hitler had confirmed in a dreadful manner the warnings of the Jews against
him by an order to murder them. If I had known both of these things at that
time, then I would have pictured the role of Jewish propaganda before the
outbreak of the war quite differently.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to
the document which has already been submitted, Document Number
Fritzsche-2, the affidavit by Dr. Scharping, with reference to Pages 9 to 11.
This document is found in my Document Book Number 2; however, I do
not know whether this document book has been submitted to the High
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it has.
DR. FRITZ: Pages 9 to 11. I refer to the contents of this document.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution has quoted a passage from
the book by Müller, dealing with the Propaganda Ministry. According to
this, among other things, it was the task of this Ministry to enlighten the
population about the Jewish question. According to the picture drawn by the
Prosecution, matters stood as though you were the one charged with the
task of this enlightenment; is that correct?
FRITZSCHE: No. The “Jewry” department was a branch of the
propaganda department which carried on this so-called active propaganda in
opposition to the specialized or administrative departments. I never directed
this department of propaganda.
DR. FRITZ: I should like to interpolate a question. The Defendant
Streicher, on 29 April, stated that the Propaganda Ministry published a
National Socialist Correspondence which was sent to Der Stürmer as well
and which contained in each issue several anti-Semitic articles. Is that true?

FRITZSCHE: No. The National Socialist Correspondence was not
published by the Propaganda Ministry, but by the Reichspressestelle (Reich
Press Office) of the NSDAP; however, I did not have the impression that
the particular policy followed by Der Stürmer took its character from these
articles. On the other hand, Der Stürmer may have published one or the
other article which was given out by the NSK.
DR. FRITZ: The Prosecution quoted a passage from a speech which
you made over the radio on 18 December 1941. This speech will be found
in full in my Document Book Number 1, Pages 26 to 32. In this instance,
you said that the fate of Jewry in Europe had been rather unpleasant and
that this fate in all probability would stretch over to the New World as well.
The Prosecution holds the view that this was a proclamation of further
actions in the persecution of Jews. What can you tell us about this?
FRITZSCHE: In this quotation, I discussed the unpleasant fate of
Jewry in Europe. According to the things that we know today, this must
appear as though I meant the murder of the Jews. But in this connection, I
should like to state that at that time I did not know about these murders;
therefore I could not have meant it. I did not even mean the evacuation of
Jews, for even this was not carried out in Berlin at least until a year or two
later.
What I meant was simply the elimination of Jews from politics and
economic life. The expression “unpleasant” hints at this; otherwise the
inoffensiveness of this term could not be explained. And now to the
question of why I spoke about the Jews in America in this connection. The
sentence quoted by the Prosecution is inextricably connected with a
communication preceding it, stating that a Jewish National Council had
submitted to President Roosevelt their wish to enter the war. Not even this
association of ideas, which is perhaps understandable now, was used by me
without good reason. The largest part of the speech in question, perhaps
nine-tenths of it, in fact, deals with the investigation commission set up in
the United States to investigate the causes of Pearl Harbor.
THE PRESIDENT: There are a lot of pages in this.
DR. FRITZ: The Document Book Number 1, Mr. President, Pages 26
to 32.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I wanted to know whether first of all we are
on Page 31.

DR. FRITZ: He is referring in his statements which he is making now
to the entire contents of the speech, Mr. President. The Prosecution had
quoted only the very last paragraph of this speech.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please continue.
FRITZSCHE: In this polemic address I not only suggested
investigating whether the guards of the U. S. Navy had been careless but I
also advised checking into American politics, as to whether someone might
not have been interested in the outbreak of the war. In this connection, I
recalled that an investigating committee of the American Senate, 20 years
after the first World War, had investigated the causes for entry of the United
States in the war in 1917. I said verbatim, “This Senate committee proved
that Wilson, when entering the war, knew that he was the victim of a few
warmongers.” I deplored...
THE PRESIDENT: The investigation committee of the Americans
about the entry into the last war? Isn’t he going rather far back?
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I believe that the defendant can stop at this
point. He only wanted to show that the quotation of the last paragraph cited
by the Prosecution in order to incriminate him was, torn from its contents.
That is the fact he wanted to show, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] The second quotation used by the
Prosecution is an excerpt from your radio speech of 18 March 1941. The
Prosecution was of the opinion that this was also an incitement for the
persecution of Jews, and they said, further, that it was proof of your
propaganda with the term “master race.”
Mr. President, this speech of 18 March 1941 may be found in my
Document Book Number 1, Pages 2 to 7.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution quoted only one paragraph
from this speech. What can you tell us in this connection?
FRITZSCHE: I do not wish to read this quotation. I rather ask that you
read it carefully yourself, and after you have read it you will see that I
completely agreed with Mr. Roosevelt when he said that there was no
master race. I endorsed the correctness of this sentence not only as it
applied to the German people, but to Jewry as well. The Prosecution
concluded from this sentence that it was a justification for acts committed
in Jewish persecutions in the past and that it was a foreboding of more

persecutions to come. I do not understand this conclusion; it has no basis
whatsoever.
THE PRESIDENT: In our copy there is no date at the top of Page 2 of
your Volume I—yes, I see it is in the index. Which page of it is the passage
that the Prosecution quotes?
DR. FRITZ: On Page 5 under Point 5, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well.
DR. FRITZ: It begins with the words, “But the crown...” and so forth.
That is the quotation used by the Prosecution.
[Turning to the defendant.] The third quotation used by the Prosecution
is a passage from the speech which you made on 9 October 1941.
Mr. President, the whole speech is to be found in Document Book
Number 1, Pages 20 to 25.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution quoted only one paragraph
from this speech as well.
In this paragraph, you, Herr Fritzsche, are speaking about a new wave
of international Jewish-democratic-bolshevistic agitation. What can you tell
us about this?
FRITZSCHE: I have very little to say in this connection. This speech
was made in those days of the autumn of 1941 when the Reich Press Chief
had announced that German victory in the East had been decisive. I had
warned the entire German press about taking this slogan without
reservations. I did not believe in this decision which supposedly had already
taken place. I suggested to all German newspapers that they speak about a
prolonged duration of the war. In this speech of mine I wanted to weaken
the impression of the official victory bulletin. Therefore, in this speech, and
perhaps for the first time in Germany, I mentioned those three factors
which, in fact, later on determined the war in the East against Germany:
First of all, the partisans; secondly, the international help in the way of arms
and munitions; and thirdly, propaganda. This last part alone was quoted by
the Prosecution. As I have already said, this last part is quite in accord with
the knowledge and opinion I held at that time.
DR. FRITZ: The next quotation used by the Prosecution is an extract
from a speech which you made on 8 January 1944.

The complete speech, Mr. President, may be found in my Document
Book Number 1. It is speech Number 7, to be found on Pages 40 to 45.
[Turning to the defendant.] In this speech you are stating that it was
not a new form of government or a new form of socialism which had
brought about the war, but rather the agitation of Jews and plutocrats was
responsible for this. How did you come to make that statement?
FRITZSCHE: To justify it, I should like to refer here, too, to
everything that I have already said, and beyond that, I should like to
emphasize that this rather heated accusation was not made by me just out of
the blue or just because I wanted to agitate. This is proven by the context.
If I may be permitted to do so, I should like to state briefly the
connection in this case. The topic of this speech was the differences of
opinion which existed at that time between the Polish Exile Government in
Moscow—rather, in London—and the Soviet Government in Moscow.
There was a matter of territorial demands which they disagreed on, and on
this occasion I quoted the London Times word for word. The London Times
said that “the relinquishing of Polish regions, as demanded by Russia, was
only a small and modest price for the absolute and reliable guarantee to
Poland of help through the Soviet Union.” This statement made by the
London Times I used as a matter of course in a polemic statement in which
I said, “Well, if the Times had written in such a strain in August of 1939,
that it was only about a city or a road, then surely there would not have
been any war,” and so forth.
On this occasion I should like to state that all of these quotations,
almost without exception, show only the combination of the concept Jew,
Plutocrat, Bolshevik. The question of race was not the primary one, but the
thing that was primary was the ideological struggle as it seemed, to my
mind, to be taking place.
DR. FRITZ: The next quotations used by the Prosecution are some
excerpts from your speech of 13 January 1945.
Mr. President, this is speech Number 8, contained in full in Document
Book Number 1, to be found on Pages 46 to 51. The Prosecution in this
case is quoting only two paragraphs, one on Page 50 of my document book,
Paragraph 2.
[Turning to the defendant.] In these passages you mention Jewish
influence on British policies. How could you make those statements? What

were your reasons?
FRITZSCHE: The Prosecution assumes from this quotation that it was
the introduction to further persecution of the Jews and to their complete
extermination. This conclusion, however, is justified neither in the words
nor in the sense nor when seen in the light of the context...
I shall forego giving you in this case a picture of the connections, not
even in a brief summary. It can be gathered when you read the speech in
question.
However, I cannot see where an appeal for the extermination of the
Jews is to be found.
DR. FRITZ: Forming a part of the general crimes against humanity
you are accused of incitive libel against the Jews, the logical result of which
is said to have been further persecutions.
Therefore, I want to ask you about the murder of Jews. Did you know
of Hitler’s decree, as testified by the witness Hoess, a decree according to
which the Jews were to be murdered?
FRITZSCHE: I should like to state under my oath that I did not know
of this order by Hitler. If I had known it, I would not have served that
person who had given this order for another hour. I should like to state
further that evidently this decree, as well as this entire action, was
concealed with specific care from me and my co-workers, because once I
almost discovered its existence.
DR. FRITZ: Did you receive at any time an indication about the killing
of a large number of innocent people?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. In February or March 1942 I received a letter from
a medium-ranking SS leader of the Ukraine. I do not recall this man’s name.
The contents of the letter were to the effect that the author was the
commander of an SS unit, that he had received an order to kill the Jews and
the Ukrainian intelligentsia of his area. Upon receipt of this order, he had
suffered a nervous breakdown and he was now in a hospital. It seemed to
him that a complaint along official channels was quite impossible for him.
He said he did not know me but had confidence in me; perhaps I could help
in some way. He asked me not to mention his name as he was bound to
silence at the cost of his life.
Without much hesitation and immediately upon receipt of this letter I
called Heydrich, the Obergruppenführer, then leader of the RSHA or the

Gestapo. I hardly knew him personally, but he declared himself quite
willing to receive me immediately. I visited him and asked him pointblank,
“Is your SS there for the purpose of committing mass murders?”
Heydrich was quite indignant at this question, and said that larger or
smaller SS units had been assigned by him for police purposes to various
ministers, Reich commissioners, and so forth. These special details of SS
men had been misused on various occasions, and he thought this might
apply to the unit which had been placed at the disposal of Gauleiter Koch.
He told me that he would have an investigation started immediately.
Next noon he called me, from headquarters as he said, and let me
know that this action had actually been attempted on the order of Koch.
Koch, for his part, had referred to the Führer. The Führer, however, had not
answered as yet. Heydrich said I would receive further details.
Two days later Heydrich asked me to come and visit him and said
Hitler had expressly declared that he had not given this order; Koch now
said that there was a misunderstanding. I was further told that an
investigation of Koch had been started. At any rate, Heydrich promised me
that this action would not be carried through. I remember particularly well
one sentence which was used in this discussion, words used by Heydrich:
“Believe me, Herr Fritzsche, anyone who has the reputation of being cruel
does not have to be cruel; he can act humanely.”
Shortly thereafter, I was made a soldier and asked to be sent to the 6th
Army and was sent to the Ukraine.
DR. FRITZ: Did you...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I did not understand that last
sentence. Heydrich said, “Believe me, Herr Fritzsche...” and then...
FRITZSCHE: May I repeat: “...anyone who has the reputation of being
cruel does not have to be cruel; he can act humanely.”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but then you went on about going to the 6th
Army?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, shortly thereafter I became a soldier...
DR. FRITZ: He added, Mr. President, that shortly after this meeting
with Heydrich, he himself, that is the Defendant Fritzsche, became a soldier
and he specifically asked to be detailed to the 6th Army which at that time
was stationed in the Ukraine.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of this incident?
FRITZSCHE: February-March 1942.
DR. FRITZ: When you were a soldier in the Ukraine, did you try to
check the statements of Heydrich as to their correctness?
FRITZSCHE: I had no official authority to do this, but as an old
journalist I made investigations on my own, of course.
First of all, I investigated in Kiev, with the local German radio station.
The answer was: Yes, several shootings actually did take place, specifically
after the blowing up of certain blocks of houses in Kiev, on which occasion
many German soldiers lost their lives. However, they were shootings
according to sentences imposed by courts-martial.
Then, for 3 days I traveled in all directions between Kiev and Poltava.
Mostly I traveled alone. I found the population in utmost peace; there were
no signs of terror whatsoever, and by the way, I was received very well
myself.
At Poltava I checked with officers and soldiers. On these occasions as
well, I was told, “Yes, there were some court-martial sentences. The reason
for these sentences was sabotage.”
Then, in Kharkov itself, I visited the SS command stationed there, and
I spoke with the Sturmführer Rexlach. He denied any shooting actions. He
showed me the prison and there were perhaps 50 inmates, no more. I asked
him about camps and he stated that there were none.
Then I visited a Ukrainian family; I questioned a German agricultural
leader at Bielgorod, and I met with the same result in every case: no
shooting actions took place.
I certainly assumed from that that it had been an attempted individual
action which had not been carried through.
DR. FRITZ: Before this letter which the SS leader had sent you, did
you not already have suspicions, perhaps from Allied radio broadcasts to
which you had access?
FRITZSCHE: These radio broadcasts were accessible to me. I had
reports on atrocities specially gathered at that time and selected from the
great number of enemy broadcasts which we received every day, and then I
had these reports investigated and checked.
DR. FRITZ: And who concerned himself with this checking?

FRITZSCHE: The competent specialist, Oberregierungsrat Körber, in
charge of the Schnelldienst office of the Press Department, or one of his co-
workers, or I myself.
DR. FRITZ: Where was this checked?
FRITZSCHE: We inquired of the RSHA, for in most of these reports
of atrocities the SS or Gestapo were mentioned as the ones who had
perpetrated the murders.
DR. FRITZ: At which of the many branches of this office did you
inquire?
FRITZSCHE: We inquired at the various competent offices, and I do
not doubt that we inquired of Eichmann, who has been mentioned in these
proceedings here. Apart from that, we inquired of Sturmbannführer
Spengler or his deputy Von Kielpinsky, both of them members of that office
which, at that time or later, was taken over by Ohlendorf who has also
appeared here as a witness. Frequently we inquired of the branch offices of
the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the so-called state police control offices as
well, especially if there were reports from a special area.
DR. FRITZ: What were the answers you received?
FRITZSCHE: We always received the answer that the report in
question was either completely wrong and was an invention, or that the
report had this or that legal basis.
Frequently figures and details were reported which in effect were quite
disarming.
DR. FRITZ: Are there any records of this?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. The more important questions and answers were
noted and were even reproduced and sent to the various offices within and
outside the Propaganda Ministry. All the material was collected in the
archives called “Schnelldienst,” for which I applied here and which was
granted to me but not found.
DR. FRITZ: And you just believed these answers?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, I did believe them, for after all this was information
which was given to me by official sources and furthermore I had
experienced on numerous occasions that the authenticity of such reports
from these sources had been proved very drastically.
DR. FRITZ: What do you mean by that?

FRITZSCHE: Perhaps I might give you an example. The first
propaganda action of the war was the report given out by Warsaw about the
destruction of the picture of the “Black Madonna” of Czestochowa. This
report was transmitted around the world. We took German and foreign
journalists to Czestochowa, who could assure themselves that this report
was not true.
But I must be quite honest here and say that I really wanted to cite
another example in reply to this question put by my counsel, another report
which really had its surprising after-effects for me in this courtroom some 2
or 3 days ago. The British newspaper News Chronicle, on 24 September
1939, printed the report that the German...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the evidential value of the News Chronicle
in 1939?
DR. FRITZ: The defendant wants to prove to the High Tribunal that he
found that many reports from abroad, dealing with German atrocities,
actually were false, so that...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not need details about that. No doubt
there were frequent reports which were not accurate. We do not want you to
go into details.
FRITZSCHE: I wanted to prove with just one news item how at that
time something which the world believed could be denied and then, in the
shadow of this denial, quite unnoticed by the German public, something did
take place, such as a larger wave of arrests or a similar matter.
THE PRESIDENT: He can state the facts, but he need not go into
detail about a particular issue of the newspaper.
DR. FRITZ: Was it only once, Herr Fritzsche, that you learned of the
falsehood of such foreign broadcasts?
FRITZSCHE: No, that took place quite frequently.
DR. FRITZ: Please be very brief, Herr Fritzsche.
FRITZSCHE: One of my co-workers gathered the necessary material
for an article entitled, “In 8 Weeks of War 107 Lies.” I should like to say
only one thing about this. The compilation of such false reports given out
by our enemy gave me a sense of moral superiority over that type of
reporting, and this feeling was the basis of my later work, which could not
be explained without this feeling.

DR. FRITZ: Did it not strike you that such false reports occurred only
in the beginning of the war?
FRITZSCHE: No, that thought never occurred to me. The reports were
so numerous in the beginning and I could also notice them in later years.
Some affected me personally.
DR. FRITZ: How far did they affect you personally? Can you sketch it
in a few brief words?
FRITZSCHE: Just one of many statements: An enemy front
propaganda bulletin accused me of the fact that 600,000 Swedish kroner...
THE PRESIDENT: What is he going to now? What is the purpose of
this?
DR. FRITZ: He wants to give an example of how a false statement
applied to him personally. He wanted to state that briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I said already, there were, no doubt,
erroneous statements made in the foreign press and every press. We cannot
investigate those sorts of matters.
DR. FRITZ: Then I shall pass on to another question.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did you not, as an experienced journalist in
the news service, have the feeling that where there is smoke there is fire?
Did you not believe that at least something must be true of the enemy
reports about murders and so forth in the areas under German domination?
FRITZSCHE: Precisely because I was a professional newsman I did
not have this feeling. Again and again I thought—and I repeatedly reminded
the public—of one erroneous bit of reporting of the first World War. I beg
the Tribunal to grant me permission to mention it quite briefly because it is
also a part of the fundamentals of the propaganda which I carried on.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I have already pointed out that we assume that
there are a variety of errors. We do not want to go into detail.
DR. FRITZ: Then I shall turn to another question.
[Turning to the defendant.] But surely you knew that the Jews had
been evacuated from the Reich; you must have noticed that they
disappeared from the streets?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, I did notice that even though this occurred very
gradually. Beyond that I heard Dr. Goebbels say on the occasion of a

ministerial conference that as Gauleiter in Berlin he had demanded the
evacuation of Jews.
DR. FRITZ: Where were these Jews taken in your opinion and what
were you told about these things?
FRITZSCHE: Dr. Goebbels told me that they were taken to
reservations in Poland. The suspicion that they were taken to concentration
camps, or that they were even being murdered, never arose.
DR. FRITZ: Did you inquire about these reservations into which the
Jews were allegedly being taken?
FRITZSCHE: Of course I did that. For instance, I learned of various
things from a former co-worker of mine who had been transferred into the
administration of the Government General and who had an administrative
position in the region Biala-Podlaska. He said that the area under his control
had become a Jewish area, and he repeatedly pictured the arrival and the
housing of these transportees. He also mentioned the difficulties and the
employment of Jews as workers or on plantations. His entire description
bore witness to his humane point of view. He told me that under him the
Jews fared better than they had in the Reich.
DR. FRITZ: What was the name of this man?
FRITZSCHE: Oberregierungsrat Hubert Kühl.
DR. FRITZ: Did you hear unfavorable reports about these deported
Jews?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. Sturmbannführer Radke of the staff of the
Reichsführer SS reported, perhaps in the winter of 1942, that the mortality
rate of the Jews in the eastern ghettos was abnormally high due to the
changeover from mental work to manual labor. He mentioned there were
even some isolated cases of typhus.
Apart from that, Dr. Tauber, who was head of the section dealing with
Jewish questions in the propaganda department, told me in 1941, if I
remember correctly, that there had been pogroms during the occupation of
Lvov and Kovno, but they were carried out by the local population. He
assured me at the same time that the German authorities had taken steps
against these pogroms. Nevertheless the references to such things caused
me to criticize matters severely, even though these things today look almost
insignificant compared with what we know of today. My criticism was
directed against my superiors, particularly Dr. Goebbels, and also against

co-workers and members of the Gestapo and of the Party. I referred
repeatedly to the legal, political, and moral necessity of protecting these
Jews, who, after all, had been entrusted to our care.
DR. FRITZ: Did you learn anything else about the fate of these Jews?
FRITZSCHE: On several occasions Jews or relatives or friends of
Jews appealed to me because of discrimination or arrests. A large number of
non-Jews also did this as my name had become well-known to the public.
Without exception, I made their pleas my own and I tried to help through
various offices such as the RSHA, through the personnel section of my
Ministry, through individual ministers and Gauleiter, et cetera.
DR. FRITZ: Why did you turn to so many different authorities and
offices?
FRITZSCHE: Very many requests were involved, and if my name had
appeared too often at the same office its effectiveness would have been
exhausted very quickly.
DR. FRITZ: Did you on occasion turn down these requests?
FRITZSCHE: No, not in one single instance, and I should like to
emphasize that particularly because a letter addressed to me in this prison
here was not handed over to me but was published in the press. It was a
letter in which a woman asserted that I had turned down a request for
pardon. I remember this case specifically and I should like to emphasize
briefly that in this case I had expressly called on the Reich Minister of
Justice...
THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient for him to say that he did not turn
them down. We do not want one instance of somebody who wrote to him.
How long are you going to be, Dr. Fritz?
DR. FRITZ: I believe I shall be able to conclude the entire Fritzsche
case tomorrow morning.
Mr. President, I have heard that there is no open session this
afternoon...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. FRITZ: ...otherwise I would have been able to conclude the entire
Fritzsche case today. However, I hope to be able to conclude my
examination of the defendant in his own case and that of the witness Von
Schirmeister. I hope that tomorrow noon I shall be able to conclude.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes so too, because, as I have
pointed out to you, we do not want you to go into such elaborate detail. You
have been going, in the opinion of the Tribunal, far too much into detail,
and we want the matter dealt with more generally.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 28 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH DAY
Friday, 28 June 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Fritzsche resumed the stand.]
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Bench, the Defendant
Fritzsche, toward the end of yesterday morning’s session, testified as to how
he tried to aid persecuted persons, within the scope of his limited
opportunities. In order to conclude this subject, and with the approval of the
Prosecution, I submit Document Number Fritzsche-6, an affidavit of Count
Westarp, which is to be found in my Document Book Number 2 on Pages
23 to 25, dated 15 June 1946. I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
the contents of this document.
Furthermore, as another piece of evidence, I should like to offer
another affidavit, made by a Frau Krüger, Berlin, which is to be Document
Number Fritzsche-8. This affidavit has not yet been included in my
document book. However, the original was made by Frau Krüger in German
as well as in English and both copies have been affirmed and sworn to. I
should like to refer to the contents of this affidavit, especially to the last two
paragraphs. From the last paragraph but one we can see that apart from
individual cases Frau Krüger has a general knowledge of the defendant’s
activities. And the last paragraph is quite interesting; it deals with the
manner of life led by the Defendant Fritzsche.
Apart from that, I also refer here to the entire contents of this article
and I ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
Finally, in this connection, I should like to refer to an affidavit made
by Dr. Scharping which has been frequently quoted, Document Number
Fritzsche-2, which is to be found in the Fritzsche Document Book Number

2, Pages 6 to 15. I refer particularly to Page 13 at the bottom of the page,
and the top of Page 14.
Herr Fritzsche, I should like to put two more general questions to you
on this topic. During the last period of the war, did you not try to find out
something about the final fate of the Jews?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. I made the most of an opportunity to which I will
refer briefly later on. I asked a colleague of Obergruppenführer Glücks, in
Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, about the Jews. Briefly summarized, his
answer was as follows: The Jews were under the special protection of the
Reichsführer SS who wished to make a political deal with them. He looked
upon them as a kind of hostages and he did not wish a single hair from their
heads to be harmed.
DR. FRITZ: Some of the Prosecution’s Witnesses have asserted during
this Trial that the German public knew about these murders. Now I just
want to ask you, as a journalist who worked in the National Socialist State,
what was, as far as you know, the attitude of the broad mass of the German
people to the Jews? Did the people know about the murder of the Jews?
Please be brief.
FRITZSCHE: Leaving out all those matters which have already been
mentioned at this Trial, I should like to mention only a few observations
which to me seem important. I shall omit the period shortly after the first
World War, which has already been described, during which certain anti-
Semitic feelings were popular in Germany. I should like to state only that in
1933 at the time of the Jewish boycott, which was organized by the
NSDAP, the sympathies of the German people clearly turned again in favor
of the Jews. For a number of years the Party tried hard to prevent the public
from buying in Jewish stores. Finally they even had to resort to threats. A
profound and decisive factor in this development was the promulgating of
the Nuremberg Laws. As a result of these the fight against the Jews was
taken for the first time out of the sphere of pure agitation, that is, the kind of
agitation from which one could remain aloof, and shifted to the field of
State Police.
At that time a deep feeling of fear ran through the German people, for
now dissension spread even to individual families. At that time many
human tragedies resulted, tragedies which were obvious to many, probably
to everyone, and there was only one justification for these racial laws. There

was only one excuse for them and one explanation; that was the assertion
and the hope: Well, now that the separation of the two peoples is being
carried out, although painfully, there will at last be an end to the wild and
unbridled agitation; and due to this separation there will be peace where
formerly only unrest reigned.
When the Jews were forced to wear the emblem of a star and when, for
instance, in Berlin they were prohibited from occupying seats on streetcars,
the German people openly took sides with the Jews and it happened again
and again that Jews were ostentatiously offered seats. In this connection I
heard several declarations by Dr. Goebbels, who was extremely bitter about
this undesired effect of the marking of the Jews.
I, as a journalist who worked during that period, am firmly convinced
that the German people were unaware of the mass murders of the Jews and
assertions to that effect were considered rumors; and reports which reached
the German people from outside were officially denied again and again. As
these documents are not in my possession, I cannot quote from memory
individual cases of denial; but one case I do remember with particular
clearness. That was the moment when the Russians, after they recaptured
Kharkov, started legal proceedings during which killing by gas was
mentioned for the first time.
I ran to Dr. Goebbels with these reports and asked him about the facts.
He stated he would have the matter investigated and would discuss it with
Himmler and with Hitler. The next day he sent me notice of denial. This
denial was not made public; and the reason stated was that in German legal
proceedings it is necessary to state in a much plainer manner matters that
need clarification. However, Dr. Goebbels explicitly informed me that the
gas vans mentioned in the Russian legal proceeding were pure invention
and that there was no actual proof to support it.
It was not without reason that the people who operated these vans were
put under the ban of strictest secrecy. If the German people had learned of
these mass murders, they would certainly no longer have supported Hitler.
They would probably have sacrificed 5 million for a victory, but never
would the German people have wished to bring about victory by the murder
of 5 million people.
I should like to state further that this murder decree of Hitler’s seems
to me the end of every race theory, every race philosophy, every kind of

race propaganda, for after this catastrophe any further advocacy of race
theory would be equivalent to approval in theory of further murder. An
ideology in the name of which 5 million people were murdered is a theory
which cannot continue to exist.
DR. FRITZ: Now I shall turn to a different topic. You are accused by
the Prosecution of having incited atrocities, and that the results of your
propaganda covered every phase of the conspiracy, including abnormal and
inhuman treatment and behavior. In this connection I shall, therefore, have
to ask you about the whole question of concentration camps.
Did you know that the concentration camps existed?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, the fact of their creation was announced publicly, I
believe in 1933; and the concentration camps were mentioned later in
official communiqués.
DR. FRITZ: What was the purpose of these camps in your opinion at
that time?
FRITZSCHE: As far as I can recollect, the persons to be taken to these
camps were those who could not be restrained from taking an active part
against the new State. It was stated that the reason for the establishment of
these camps was the abnormal internal political situation prevailing at that
time: A weak center party and two strong extreme parties, one of which had
now assumed power. Steps were taken to put matters on a proper legal
basis. Only later was it mentioned that habitual criminals were also to be
brought to the concentration camps to prevent them from reverting to crime.
DR. FRITZ: Did you know anything about the number of
concentration camps which were established in the course of time?
FRITZSCHE: Before the war I had heard about three camps. During
the war I suspected there were five to six; and the chart of a large number of
camps which was exhibited here, was quite a surprise to me.
DR. FRITZ: Did you know anything about the number of prisoners in
these camps?
FRITZSCHE: Nothing definite. At the beginning of the war, foreign
reports mentioned millions of prisoners. At that time, together with a few
journalists, I asked Obergruppenführer Heydrich to arrange an interview
with members of the local and foreign press in order to discuss the matter.
He did so. As far as I can recollect, he did not give any definite figures; but
rather he compared them with the number of inmates at the prisons and

penitentiaries in former days. This comparison did not seem to be
disquieting. That was in the winter of 1940 or 1941.
DR. FRITZ: Did you not have any doubts as to the accuracy of those
figures?
FRITZSCHE: Not at that time.
DR. FRITZ: Did you know anything about the conditions in the
concentration camps? Did you speak to anyone who had ever been in a
concentration camp?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. Even as early as 1933 or 1934 I spoke to a
journalist who had been interned for a few weeks in the Oranienburg
concentration camp, which was the old Oranienburg camp. He informed me
that he himself had not been tortured but that he had seen and heard how
others had been beaten and how their fingers had deliberately been
squeezed in a door.
DR. FRITZ: Did you just accept these reports and do nothing about
them?
FRITZSCHE: Quite the contrary! I made quite a row. This journalist—
I believe his name was Stolzenberg, as far as I remember—did not wish to
have his name mentioned. I wrote three letters, one to Dr. Goebbels—and
he informed me that he would look into the matter—another letter to Frick
as Minister of the Interior, and one to Göring as Prussian Prime Minister.
Senior officials from both these offices rang me up and told me that an
investigation was being carried out. A short time afterwards, I heard that
this old camp Oranienburg had been dissolved and that the commander had
been sentenced to death. This was a report given to me by a Herr Von
Lützow, who was press reporter for Diels or Diehl, who at that time was
chief of the State Police.
DR. FRITZ: After this first successful protest against ill-treatment, did
you receive any further reports about atrocities in concentration camps?
FRITZSCHE: No. I received no further reports about ill-treatment. On
the contrary, I frequently made individual inquiries of members of the
Gestapo or of the press section of the Reichsführer SS. All of the
individuals whom I asked declared the following: Beastliness in the
concentration camps only occurred in 1933 or at the beginning of 1934 at
the time when these camps were guarded by members of the SA, who had
no profession—that is to say, by those members of the SA who had the

whole day at their disposal, and some of them were far from being the best
type of men. In this connection I was told further that the 30th of June
signified that a purge had taken place. The 30th of June had removed those
Gauleiter and those SA leaders who had abused their power. They declared
finally that the concentration camps were now being guarded by the SS,
who had engaged professional guards, professional administrators and
officials expert in dealing with criminal matters, and prison control
officials. I was told that this would be a guarantee against abuses.
DR. FRITZ: Did you inquire about certain individuals who were in
concentration camps?
FRITZSCHE: Of course, I inquired about well-known personalities
such as Parson Niemöller or Schuschnigg, also about Leipkins, Hess’
private secretary who had been arrested; and in each case I received
information which was reassuring.
DR. FRITZ: They, of course, may have been exceptions because they
were well known and were prominent people. Did you not try to speak to
other people who had been in concentration camps?
FRITZSCHE: Yes. In April of 1942 I met a former official of the
Communist Party, whose name was Reintgen. We had been soldiers
together for 6 months; and therefore he reported quite frankly to me,
without keeping anything back. He said that he had been ill-treated in 1933,
having had lashes on his back, but not afterwards. This information fully
coincided with my observations.
DR. FRITZ: Did you yourself visit concentration camps?
FRITZSCHE: No, I have never been inside the compound of a
concentration camp. However, during the winter of 1944-45 I was
frequently in the administration building near the Oranienburg-
Sachsenhausen camp. Apart from that, I spoke to prisoners as often as I was
able to do so, if I happened to see them either on the march or at work.
DR. FRITZ: With whom did you speak at Oranienburg?
FRITZSCHE: With a colleague of Obergruppenführer Glücks and
twice also with him personally. They told me that the foreign reports
regarding cruel treatment were false. They said that the treatment was not
only humane but decidedly good, as after all, the prisoners were valuable
laborers. I spoke at some length about the working hours, for at that time a
rather silly decree had been issued about a general extension of working

hours. The attitude taken by Glücks was very reasonable, namely, that
longer working hours would not necessarily result in greater output.
Therefore the working hours of 8 to 10 hours a day remained as, before. He
did not mention anything about extermination through overwork. That is
something I heard about for the first time in Court.
DR. FRITZ: And how about your questions which you put to the
prisoners direct?
FRITZSCHE: Well, first of all, there was always a guard present, and
quite naturally the prisoners were suspicious; but eventually I always
received positive replies to positive questions. Briefly, the gist of these
replies was always the same, that they had been unjustly arrested. Their
food was really better than in prison and I frequently heard this phrase:
“Well, anyway we are not soldiers here.” The weapons carried by the
guards were only rifles or revolvers; I did not see any truncheons.
DR. FRITZ: Did you not become more and more suspicious about
these concentration camps, after listening to foreign radio reports?
FRITZSCHE: Not for a long time, for the reasons which I gave
yesterday. Reports from English members of Parliament regarding the
Buchenwald case were first mentioned in April 1945. But this case is so
very recent that for brevity’s sake I do not need to describe particulars of
the incidents that occurred in the Ministry of Propaganda.
DR. FRITZ: How can you explain the fact that crimes and ill-treatment
of the worst kind undoubtedly took place in concentration camps?
FRITZSCHE: I am on the horns of a frightful dilemma, since I heard
the first reliable reports about these things here in prison. Only a part of
these terrible conditions, which were found to exist, can be explained
through the stoppage of traffic and communications at the end of the war.
The rest is more than enough. Obviously, the decree for the secret murder of
masses of people had brutalized to a terrible extent those people who were
entrusted with the execution of this decree.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not know whether this
explanation is of any value to us as evidence. We have already heard all
about this matter. He has given us his explanation as to why he says he did
not know.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I have but two more questions I should like
to put to the defendant.

Herr Fritzsche, it has been said here in Court that conditions in
concentration camps were generally known to the German people. As a
journalist, will you give us your opinion and the reasons on which it is
based?
THE PRESIDENT: Has he not given us that already?
DR. FRITZ: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President. He gave his opinion
when it was a question of the ill-treatment and extermination of Jews, but
on the topic of the extermination of Jews, I asked him...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are asking him what his opinion as a
journalist was. I do not see that that is of any importance to us.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I should be grateful if you would allow me
to put the question, as this is my last question but one. I expect an answer
from the defendant, an answer which would assist the Tribunal in arriving at
a judgment.
THE PRESIDENT: On what matter do you want his opinion as a
journalist?
DR. FRITZ: The Defendant Fritzsche would like to repeat a few
statements such as some made, for instance, by Dr. Goebbels.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, you may ask the question.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did you understand the question?
FRITZSCHE: I believe a confusion has arisen, inasmuch as I do not
wish to quote Dr. Goebbels on this subject but rather in relation to our last
series of questions which seem to me more important than the question you
have just put to me now.
DR. FRITZ: In any event, I should like you to give me a brief answer
to my question. Shall I repeat the question?
FRITZSCHE: Thank you, no. In this connection I should like to refer
briefly to the statements which I already made about the murders; that there
were many rumors but those rumors were denied. Undoubtedly an iron ring
of silence surrounded these terrible events and the only thing I observed in
the course of my work, and which appears to me to be important, is that in
the RSHA and some of its branches there must have existed groups who
worked systematically with the view of concealing these atrocities by
issuing reassuring statements and denials to the offices which represented
the public.

DR. FRITZ: Now I should like to put a last comprehensive question.
In the course of your examination by me, you made statements about Hitler
and his policies which were entirely different from those you made long ago
in your radio broadcasts, et cetera. Can you tell us briefly the date and the
reason for your change of opinion?
FRITZSCHE: I would like to answer this question very precisely. The
first milestone on the road to this realization was not due to the German
defeat, for right or wrong is independent of victory or defeat. The fact was
that Hitler tried to use this defeat for the extermination of the German
people, as Speer has now horribly confirmed and as I was able to observe
during the last phase of the conflict in Berlin when, through deceit by
raising false hopes, boys of 15, 14, 13, and 12 years of age were equipped
with small arms to fight against tanks and called into battle, boys who
otherwise might have been the hope for future reconstruction. Hitler found
escape in death, leaving behind him the order to keep on fighting. He also
left behind him the official report that he had died in battle.
I learned that he had committed suicide; and thus my last public
statement, on 2 May 1945, was to let everybody know of this suicide, for I
wanted to kill a Hitler legend in the bud.
Then, while in prison, I heard from a fellow prisoner, a German major
named Sforner, that he had been arrested by the Gestapo, that he had been
tortured in order to make him confess, and that in his presence, his wife had
been beaten. That was the second milestone.
The third stage concerned another coprisoner, the world-famous
geographer, General Niedermeier, who proved to me that the reasons given
by Hitler for the attack on Russia were false, at least on one important
point. After he had talked with the interpreter, he could tell me that in the
decisive discussion between Molotov and Ribbentrop in 1941, Molotov had
not put forth any new demands but that, rather, he demanded that the
assurances which had been given in 1939 should be effective. Therefore, a
part of the reasons given—and I stress this point—that our attack on Russia
was to anticipate a Russian attack, was no longer valid.
The fourth factor was the proof submitted in Court here of the murder
of 5 million Jews. I have already spoken about this matter.
I consider it only my duty to testify to still another statement, a
statement which Dr. Goebbels made in my presence on Saturday, 21 April

1945. Dr. Goebbels, who was in a great state of utmost excitement,
speaking about the last decisive break-through of the Russians near Berlin,
said,
“After all, the German people did not want it otherwise. The
German people by a great majority decided through a plebiscite
on the withdrawal from the League of Nations and against a
policy of yielding and chose, instead, a policy of courage and
honor; thereby”—concluded Dr. Goebbels—“the German people
themselves chose the war which they have now lost.”
These were the last words which I heard from Dr. Goebbels and these
words are untrue. I declare under oath: Dr. Goebbels had never previously
given such significance to that plebiscite. Never had he given it that
interpretation. The exact opposite was the case. At the time of this
plebiscite, the German people were explicitly given once again a solemn
assurance of the will for peace on the part of Hitler and his associates.
Therefore, I am convinced that Hitler and at least some of his
colleagues had deliberately lied to the people on decisive points, right from
the beginning of their political career; and, something that is not so
important to history, I personally felt deceived on these points, too.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to the
Defendant Fritzsche.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?
DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you ever hear or ascertain, at the
beginning when the concentration camps were being organized, that in
addition to the regular camps other so-called “wildcat camps” existed which
had been established by the SA leaders without the knowledge of the
competent authorities?
FRITZSCHE: No. I heard nothing about it at that time. I heard about
this distinction in the concentration camps for the first time here in Court.
DR. STAHMER: On the basis of your present-day knowledge, can you
assert whether the abuses which you described occurred in these “wildcat”
concentration camps?
FRITZSCHE: I can give you a very precise answer to that question.
These abuses about which I learned occurred in the old camp Oranienburg,

a camp situated in the Berliner Strasse. I do not know to which category
that camp belonged. However, these abuses were stopped; and I emphasized
in my testimony that, almost immediately after I sent my letter to the
Prussian Prime Minister, I was called in by a ministerial counsellor or
Ministerialdirektor, and I was assured that an investigation would be made
—a promise which was kept—but in any case I do not remember whether a
final report was sent me from this office.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In June 1934 the publication of Von Papen’s
Marburg speech was forbidden. Is it correct to say that from that time
onward, any statement on the part of the Defendant Von Papen could be
published only with the previous approval of the Ministry of Propaganda?
FRITZSCHE: That is correct, and in even a closer sense. Confiscation
of the Marburg speech, as I remember distinctly, was carried out at the
instigation of Berndt, who later became Ministerialdirektor. This man drew
Dr. Goebbels’ attention to the speech. With regard to any other of Papen’s
announcements, the principle was that not even the Ministry of Propaganda
had the right to release them for publication but, rather, that they had to be
forwarded either to the Minister personally or to the Führer.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In your testimony you mentioned that you had
known the Defendant Von Papen for some time and that you got to know
him when you visited Turkey. Just when did you visit Turkey?
FRITZSCHE: In January, I believe it was 1944.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the purpose of your visit?
FRITZSCHE: I delivered a speech to the German colony in Istanbul
and Ankara on the occasion of the 30th of January.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen have anything to do with
this speech and with this festivity?
FRITZSCHE: No, less than nothing. I received an official request from
Berlin to see to it that Herr Von Papen would not ostensibly depart before
the celebration of the 30th of January, as he wanted to do. I did not attempt
to persuade Herr Von Papen to stay and so he left his office in time to go
skiing.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is all.

DR. THEODOR KLEFISCH (Counsel for SA): Witness, you just now
said that it had been reported to you that at the end of the year 1933 and at
the beginning of 1934 unemployed SA men were guarding certain
concentration camps and that abuses were probably to be traced back to that
fact. I have but one question: Who reported that to you? Who was the
author of that report?
FRITZSCHE: The then press chief or press expert of Reichsführer SS
Himmler, whose name was Gerhard Ratke.
DR. KLEFISCH: Thank you very much.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): Witness, the day
before yesterday you stated that the Defendant Funk was not concerned
with propaganda in the Propaganda Ministry but that in the main he was
concerned with organizational and financial matters. Now I should like to
ask you to answer several questions regarding the activities of the
Defendant Funk in the Propaganda Ministry.
You know, Witness, that at the beginning there was a Press Department
of the Reich Government and that it was a State institution. How long did
this Press Department exist, and what became of it?
FRITZSCHE: It had existed for quite some time, at least up until
March 1933, when it was a branch of the Foreign Office. From then on it
became a branch of the Propaganda Ministry, and it had a dual mission to
carry on: First of all to be the Press Department of this Ministry and
secondly, to continue functioning as the Press Department for the Reich
Government.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, can you tell me who, beginning with March
of 1933—that is, from the incorporation of the Press Department into the
Propaganda Ministry—was the chief of this Press Department and, for all
practical purposes, was the chief of the press system? Was that Funk or was
it someone else?
FRITZSCHE: No, that was Ministerial Counsellor Jahnke, successor
to Ministerial Director Berndt. This Press Department was then divided into
three sections: German press...
DR. SAUTER: I am not interested in that, Witness, I am interested
only in knowing whether the chief of this department was the Defendant
Funk or whether it is correct to say that he had nothing to do with these
matters.

FRITZSCHE: Nominally, of course, he was the chief, but with the
practical operation he had nothing to do. That was taken care of by Dr.
Goebbels, Hahnke, and Jahnke.
DR. SAUTER: And later Berndt?
FRITZSCHE: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, I have another question. Who had the
management of the press policy in the Propaganda Ministry? I am still
referring to the State organ. Did the Defendant Funk have anything to do
with it, or just who was it? Who directed the press policy?
FRITZSCHE: At that time Dr. Goebbels himself exercised that
function. Later on it was the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich.
DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Funk was State Secretary in the
Propaganda Ministry, or at least he had the title of State Secretary. Now,
looking at this matter rather generally, I would be interested in knowing
this: Did he, in fact, have the position of a State Secretary and exercise
authority as such, or did another official exercise the function of State
Secretary as the regular deputy of the Minister?
FRITZSCHE: As a matter of course, naturally, he had the position, the
power, the prestige, and the salary of a State Secretary; but the practical
work was distributed a little differently.
DR. SAUTER: Just how was it handled?
FRITZSCHE: I have already mentioned that. Practically, Funk
concerned himself with organization and finance as they applied to the
gigantic cultural concern which was being developed at that time; whereas
the actual policy was set up by Dr. Goebbels with the chief of his
ministerial office, Hahnke, who was the successor of Funk as State
Secretary.
DR. SAUTER: I have one final question, Witness, which refers to
another topic.
Do you know what Minister Dr. Goebbels, in November of 1938 or
later, said about the Jewish pogroms of 9 November 1938, with regard to
Defendant Funk?
FRITZSCHE: Much later Dr. Goebbels stated in my presence that
sometimes radical measures would just simply have to be taken, for
instance, when Funk had constantly declared that the Jews could not be

eliminated from economic life; but he, Dr. Goebbels, had to prove to Funk
that it could be done by organizing the riots of 8 November.
DR. SAUTER: In this connection did he say anything about the fact
that this Jewish action, for which Dr. Goebbels was responsible, was also
instigated with the purpose of discrediting Dr. Funk and confronting him
with a fait accompli? Did he state anything like that?
FRITZSCHE: That was the sense of the answer that I just gave you.
DR. SAUTER: I have no further questions; Mr. President.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Herr
Fritzsche, in this Court we have heard what grave accusations are made
against the Defendant Raeder because of an article in the newspaper
Völkischer Beobachter. The article I refer to is “Churchill Sinks the
Athenia,” which was published on 23 October 1939.
Mr. President, this is Document 3260-PS, or Exhibit GB-218.
I should like to put a few questions pertaining to the Athenia case. Herr
Fritzsche, when did the Propaganda Ministry receive the report about the
torpedoing of the Athenia, and through what channels?
FRITZSCHE: I cannot give you the date from memory, but I do know
that we received this report by wireless; that is, we listened in to a foreign
broadcast.
DR. SIEMERS: This wireless report came in shortly after the sinking
of the Athenia, is that right?
FRITZSCHE: Without doubt.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the Propaganda Ministry get in touch with the
High Command of the Navy in order to learn the details of this matter?
FRITZSCHE: Yes, I personally did that because I happened to have a
liaison officer from the Navy High Command in my office for censorship
advice.
DR. SIEMERS: Whom did you get in touch with in the High
Command of the Navy, and what did you learn?
FRITZSCHE: First of all, I spoke to the officer who was with me,
whom I have just mentioned, Kapitänleutnant Hahn. Then he telephoned,
and in all probability I phoned, too, to the OKM (the High Command of the
Navy). As far as I recall, I spoke to Korvettenkapitän Wolf.
DR. SIEMERS: And what did Korvettenkapitän Wolf tell you?

FRITZSCHE: He told me already at this early stage that no German U-
boat was in the area in question.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to remind you that the Athenia was sunk
on 4 September 1939.
What did the Propaganda Ministry do after the High Command of the
Navy had stated that it was not a German U-boat which had sunk the ship?
FRITZSCHE: Then this report was announced.
DR. SIEMERS: Herr Fritzsche, how did it happen that about 6 to 7
weeks later the article, “Churchill Sinks the Athenia,” appeared, which was
published on 23 October 1939? Shall I show you the article?
FRITZSCHE: Thank you, no. I remember this incident especially well,
as I have checked my memory about it since this case was mentioned again
for the first time here in the Court.
I know that Hitler himself ordered this article to be written, giving
detailed instructions. The order to write the article came through two
different channels: First, through a telephone call by the Reich Press Chief,
Dr. Dietrich; and secondly through a telephone call by Dr. Goebbels or one
of his officials—I am not able to tell you which of the two. This order was
to be transmitted to the Völkischer Beobachter.
Now we come to the circumstances on account of which I remember
the details. When I told one of my co-workers to inform the Völkischer
Beobachter, he came back to me with the report that it would not be
necessary because the Völkischer Beobachter had already heard the
necessary details directly from the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. SIEMERS: When was this order given by Hitler, or rather,
Goebbels?
FRITZSCHE: The day before it appeared, I assume.
DR. SIEMERS: Did any office in the High Command of the Navy
have any connection with this article?
FRITZSCHE: According to my knowledge, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Before this article was published, did you speak with
Grossadmiral Raeder about this article, or did you advise him of the order
given by Hitler in this direction?
FRITZSCHE: No, I believe that the High Command of the Navy had
no knowledge of the article at all. The article originated in the manner that I