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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Ocean Steam Navigation and
the Ocean Post
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
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Title: Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post
Author: Thomas Rainey
Release date: April 19, 2008 [eBook #25104]
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/25104
Credits: Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Chris Logan, The Philatelic
Digital Library Project at http://www.tpdlp.net and the
Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OCEAN STEAM
NAVIGATION AND THE OCEAN POST ***
OCEAN STEAM NAVIGATION
the Ocean Post
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will
have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using
this eBook.
Title: Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post
Author: Thomas Rainey
Release date: April 19, 2008 [eBook #25104]
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/25104
Credits: Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Chris Logan, The Philatelic
Digital Library Project at http://www.tpdlp.net and the
Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OCEAN STEAM
NAVIGATION AND THE OCEAN POST ***
OCEAN STEAM NAVIGATION
Page 4
AND THE
OCEAN POST.
OCEAN POST.
Page 5
BY THOMAS RAINEY.
NEW-YORK:
D. APPLETON & CO., 346 & 348 BROADWAY.
TRÜBNER & CO.,
PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON.
1858.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by
JOHN GLENN RAINEY,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New-York.
DEDICATED,
IN TOKEN OF
RESPECT AND ESTEEM,
TO THE
HON. AARON VENABLE BROWN
NEW-YORK:
D. APPLETON & CO., 346 & 348 BROADWAY.
TRÜBNER & CO.,
PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON.
1858.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by
JOHN GLENN RAINEY,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New-York.
DEDICATED,
IN TOKEN OF
RESPECT AND ESTEEM,
TO THE
HON. AARON VENABLE BROWN
Page 6
POST MASTER GENERAL
OF THE
UNITED STATES.
Reprinted 1977
by Eastern Press, Inc.
New Haven, Conn.
Published by
Edward N. Lipson
Distributed by
a Gatherin'
Post Office Box 175
Wynantskill, N.Y. 12198
OF THE
UNITED STATES.
Reprinted 1977
by Eastern Press, Inc.
New Haven, Conn.
Published by
Edward N. Lipson
Distributed by
a Gatherin'
Post Office Box 175
Wynantskill, N.Y. 12198
Page 7
PREFACE.
In offering to the Government and the public this little volume on Ocean
Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post, I am conscious of my inability to
present any new views on a subject that has engaged the attention of many
of the most gifted statesmen and economists of this country and Europe.
There is, however, no work, so far as I am informed, in any country, which
treats of Marine Steam Navigation in its commercial, political, economic,
social, and diplomatic bearings, or discusses so far the theory and practice
of navigation as to develop the cost and difficulties attending high speed on
the ocean, or the large expense incurred in a rapid, regular, and reliable
transport of the foreign mails.
It has been repeatedly suggested to the undersigned by members of
Congress, and particularly by some of the members of the committees on
the Post Office and Post Roads in the Senate and House of Representatives,
that there was no reliable statement, such as that which I have endeavored
to furnish, on the general topics connected with trans-marine steam
navigation, to which those not specially informed on the subject, could refer
for the settlement of the many disputed points brought before Congress and
the Departments. It is represented that there are many conflicting statements
regarding the capabilities of ocean steam; the cost of running vessels; the
consumption of fuel; the extent and costliness of repairs; the depreciation of
vessels; the cost of navigating them; the attendant incidental expenses; the
influence of ocean mails in promoting trade; the wants of commercial
communities; the adaptation of the mail vessels to the war service; the
rights of private enterprise; and the ability of ocean steamers generally to
support themselves on their own receipts.
While this is true, there is no work on this general subject to which persons
can refer for the authoritative settlement of any of these points, either
absolutely or proximately; and while a simple statement of facts,
acknowledged by all steamship-men, may tend to dispel much
misapprehension on this interesting subject, it will also be not unprofitable,
I trust, to review some of the prominent arguments on which the mail
In offering to the Government and the public this little volume on Ocean
Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post, I am conscious of my inability to
present any new views on a subject that has engaged the attention of many
of the most gifted statesmen and economists of this country and Europe.
There is, however, no work, so far as I am informed, in any country, which
treats of Marine Steam Navigation in its commercial, political, economic,
social, and diplomatic bearings, or discusses so far the theory and practice
of navigation as to develop the cost and difficulties attending high speed on
the ocean, or the large expense incurred in a rapid, regular, and reliable
transport of the foreign mails.
It has been repeatedly suggested to the undersigned by members of
Congress, and particularly by some of the members of the committees on
the Post Office and Post Roads in the Senate and House of Representatives,
that there was no reliable statement, such as that which I have endeavored
to furnish, on the general topics connected with trans-marine steam
navigation, to which those not specially informed on the subject, could refer
for the settlement of the many disputed points brought before Congress and
the Departments. It is represented that there are many conflicting statements
regarding the capabilities of ocean steam; the cost of running vessels; the
consumption of fuel; the extent and costliness of repairs; the depreciation of
vessels; the cost of navigating them; the attendant incidental expenses; the
influence of ocean mails in promoting trade; the wants of commercial
communities; the adaptation of the mail vessels to the war service; the
rights of private enterprise; and the ability of ocean steamers generally to
support themselves on their own receipts.
While this is true, there is no work on this general subject to which persons
can refer for the authoritative settlement of any of these points, either
absolutely or proximately; and while a simple statement of facts,
acknowledged by all steamship-men, may tend to dispel much
misapprehension on this interesting subject, it will also be not unprofitable,
I trust, to review some of the prominent arguments on which the mail
Page 8
steamship system is based. That system should stand or fall on its own
merits or demerits alone; and to be permanent, it must be based on the
necessities of the community, and find its support in the common
confidence of all classes. I have long considered a wise, liberal, and
extended steam mail system vitally essential to the commerce of the
country, and to the continued prosperity and power of the American Union.
Yet, I am thoroughly satisfied that this very desirable object can never be
attained by private enterprise, or otherwise than through the direct
pecuniary agency and support of the General Government. The
abandonment of our ocean steam mail system is impossible so long as we
are an active, enterprising, and commercial people. And so far from the
service becoming self-supporting, it is probable that it will never be
materially less expensive than at the present time.
It has been my constant endeavor to give the best class of authorities on all
the points of engineering which I have introduced, as that regarding the cost
of steam and high mail speed; and to this end I have recently visited
England and France, and endeavored to ascertain the practice in those
countries, especially in Great Britain.
I desire to return my sincere acknowledgments for many courtesies received
from Mr. Charles Atherton, of London, England; Robert Murray, Esq.,
Southampton; and Hon. Horatio King, of Washington, D. C.
THOMAS RAINEY.
New-York, December 9, 1857.
merits or demerits alone; and to be permanent, it must be based on the
necessities of the community, and find its support in the common
confidence of all classes. I have long considered a wise, liberal, and
extended steam mail system vitally essential to the commerce of the
country, and to the continued prosperity and power of the American Union.
Yet, I am thoroughly satisfied that this very desirable object can never be
attained by private enterprise, or otherwise than through the direct
pecuniary agency and support of the General Government. The
abandonment of our ocean steam mail system is impossible so long as we
are an active, enterprising, and commercial people. And so far from the
service becoming self-supporting, it is probable that it will never be
materially less expensive than at the present time.
It has been my constant endeavor to give the best class of authorities on all
the points of engineering which I have introduced, as that regarding the cost
of steam and high mail speed; and to this end I have recently visited
England and France, and endeavored to ascertain the practice in those
countries, especially in Great Britain.
I desire to return my sincere acknowledgments for many courtesies received
from Mr. Charles Atherton, of London, England; Robert Murray, Esq.,
Southampton; and Hon. Horatio King, of Washington, D. C.
THOMAS RAINEY.
New-York, December 9, 1857.
Page 9
THE ARGUMENT.
. Assumed (Section I.) that steam mails upon the ocean control the commerce
and diplomacy of the world; that they are essential to our commercial and
producing country; that we have not established the ocean mail facilities
commensurate with our national ability and the demands of our commerce;
and that we to-day are largely dependent on, and tributary to our greatest
commercial rival, Great Britain, for the postal facilities, which should be
purely national, American, and under our own exclusive control:
. Assumed (Section II.) that fast ocean mails are exceedingly desirable for
our commerce, our defenses, our diplomacy, the management of our
squadrons, our national standing, and that they are demanded by our
people at large:
. Assumed (Section III.) that fast steamers alone can furnish rapid transport
to the mails; that these steamers can not rely on freights; that sailing
vessels will ever carry staple freights at a much lower figure, and
sufficiently quickly; that while steam is eminently successful in the coasting
trade, it can not possibly be so in the transatlantic freighting business; and
that the rapid transit of the mails, and the slower and more deliberate
transport of freight is the law of nature:
. Assumed (Section IV.) that high, adequate mail speed is extremely costly, in
the prime construction of vessels, their repairs, and their more numerous
employées; that the quantity of fuel consumed is enormous, and ruinous to
unaided private enterprise; and that this is clearly proven both by theory
and indisputable facts as well as by the concurrent testimony of the ablest
writers on ocean steam navigation:
. Assumed (Section V.) that ocean mail steamers can not live on their own
receipts; that neither the latest nor the anticipated improvements in steam
shipping promise any change in this fact; that self-support is not likely to be
attained by increasing the size of steamers; that the propelling power in fast
steamers occupies all of the available space not devoted to passengers and
express freight; and that steamers must be fast to do successful mail and
profitable passenger service:
. Assumed (Section I.) that steam mails upon the ocean control the commerce
and diplomacy of the world; that they are essential to our commercial and
producing country; that we have not established the ocean mail facilities
commensurate with our national ability and the demands of our commerce;
and that we to-day are largely dependent on, and tributary to our greatest
commercial rival, Great Britain, for the postal facilities, which should be
purely national, American, and under our own exclusive control:
. Assumed (Section II.) that fast ocean mails are exceedingly desirable for
our commerce, our defenses, our diplomacy, the management of our
squadrons, our national standing, and that they are demanded by our
people at large:
. Assumed (Section III.) that fast steamers alone can furnish rapid transport
to the mails; that these steamers can not rely on freights; that sailing
vessels will ever carry staple freights at a much lower figure, and
sufficiently quickly; that while steam is eminently successful in the coasting
trade, it can not possibly be so in the transatlantic freighting business; and
that the rapid transit of the mails, and the slower and more deliberate
transport of freight is the law of nature:
. Assumed (Section IV.) that high, adequate mail speed is extremely costly, in
the prime construction of vessels, their repairs, and their more numerous
employées; that the quantity of fuel consumed is enormous, and ruinous to
unaided private enterprise; and that this is clearly proven both by theory
and indisputable facts as well as by the concurrent testimony of the ablest
writers on ocean steam navigation:
. Assumed (Section V.) that ocean mail steamers can not live on their own
receipts; that neither the latest nor the anticipated improvements in steam
shipping promise any change in this fact; that self-support is not likely to be
attained by increasing the size of steamers; that the propelling power in fast
steamers occupies all of the available space not devoted to passengers and
express freight; and that steamers must be fast to do successful mail and
profitable passenger service:
Page 10
. Assumed (Section VI.) that sailing vessels can not successfully transport
the mails; that the propeller can not transport them as rapidly or more
cheaply than side-wheel vessels; that with any considerable economy of fuel
and other running expenses, it is but little faster than the sailing vessel; that
to patronize these slow vessels with the mails, the Government would
unjustly discriminate against sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that
we can not in any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the transport
of the mails; that individual enterprise can not support fast steamers; and
that not even American private enterprise can under any conditions furnish
a sufficiently rapid steam mail and passenger marine: then,
. Conceded (Section VII.) that it is the duty of the Government to its people
to establish and maintain an extensive, well-organized, and rapid steam
mail marine, for the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses,
the public character, and the general interests of all classes; that our people
appreciate the importance of commerce, and are willing to pay for liberal
postal facilities; that our trade has greatly suffered for the want of ocean
mails; that we have been forced to neglect many profitable branches of
industry, and many large fields of effort; and that there is positively no
means of gaining and maintaining commercial ascendency except through
an ocean steam mail system:
. Conceded (Section VIII.) that the Government can discharge the clear and
unquestionable duty of establishing foreign mail facilities, only by paying
liberal prices for the transport of the mails for a long term of years, by
creating and sustaining an ocean postal system, by legislating upon it
systematically, and by abandoning our slavish dependence upon Great
Britain:
. Conceded (Section IX.) that the British ocean mail system attains greater
perfection and extent every year; that instead of becoming self-supporting,
it costs the treasury more and more every year; that English statesmen
regard its benefits as far outweighing the losses to the treasury; that so far
from abandoning, they are regularly and systematically increasing it; that it
was never regarded by the whole British public with more favor, than at the
present time; that it is evidently one of the most enduring institutions of the
country; that it necessitates a similar American system; that without it our
people are denied the right and privilege of competition; and that we are
thus far by no means adequately prepared for that competition, or for our
own development.
the mails; that the propeller can not transport them as rapidly or more
cheaply than side-wheel vessels; that with any considerable economy of fuel
and other running expenses, it is but little faster than the sailing vessel; that
to patronize these slow vessels with the mails, the Government would
unjustly discriminate against sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that
we can not in any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the transport
of the mails; that individual enterprise can not support fast steamers; and
that not even American private enterprise can under any conditions furnish
a sufficiently rapid steam mail and passenger marine: then,
. Conceded (Section VII.) that it is the duty of the Government to its people
to establish and maintain an extensive, well-organized, and rapid steam
mail marine, for the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses,
the public character, and the general interests of all classes; that our people
appreciate the importance of commerce, and are willing to pay for liberal
postal facilities; that our trade has greatly suffered for the want of ocean
mails; that we have been forced to neglect many profitable branches of
industry, and many large fields of effort; and that there is positively no
means of gaining and maintaining commercial ascendency except through
an ocean steam mail system:
. Conceded (Section VIII.) that the Government can discharge the clear and
unquestionable duty of establishing foreign mail facilities, only by paying
liberal prices for the transport of the mails for a long term of years, by
creating and sustaining an ocean postal system, by legislating upon it
systematically, and by abandoning our slavish dependence upon Great
Britain:
. Conceded (Section IX.) that the British ocean mail system attains greater
perfection and extent every year; that instead of becoming self-supporting,
it costs the treasury more and more every year; that English statesmen
regard its benefits as far outweighing the losses to the treasury; that so far
from abandoning, they are regularly and systematically increasing it; that it
was never regarded by the whole British public with more favor, than at the
present time; that it is evidently one of the most enduring institutions of the
country; that it necessitates a similar American system; that without it our
people are denied the right and privilege of competition; and that we are
thus far by no means adequately prepared for that competition, or for our
own development.
Page 11
Section X. notices each of the American lines, and presents many facts
corroborating the views advanced in the preceding sections.
PAPER A.
Paper A (page 192) enumerates all the Steamers of the United States.
PAPER B.
Paper B (page 193) gives a list of all the British Ocean Mail Lines.
PAPER C.
Paper C (page 198) presents Projét of Franco-American Navigation.
PAPER D.
Paper D (page 199) gives the Steam Lines between Europe and America.
PAPER E.
Paper E (page 200) gives many extracts from eminent statesmen,
corroborating views herein advanced.
PAPER F.
Paper F (page 219) gives the Steam Lines of the whole world.
PAPER G.
Paper G (page 220) American Mail Lines: Letter of Hon. Horatio King.
PAPER H.
Paper H (page 221) List of British, French, and American Navies.
corroborating the views advanced in the preceding sections.
PAPER A.
Paper A (page 192) enumerates all the Steamers of the United States.
PAPER B.
Paper B (page 193) gives a list of all the British Ocean Mail Lines.
PAPER C.
Paper C (page 198) presents Projét of Franco-American Navigation.
PAPER D.
Paper D (page 199) gives the Steam Lines between Europe and America.
PAPER E.
Paper E (page 200) gives many extracts from eminent statesmen,
corroborating views herein advanced.
PAPER F.
Paper F (page 219) gives the Steam Lines of the whole world.
PAPER G.
Paper G (page 220) American Mail Lines: Letter of Hon. Horatio King.
PAPER H.
Paper H (page 221) List of British, French, and American Navies.
Page 12
Page 13
HEADS OF ARGUMENT.
SECTION I.
PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.
the splendid triumphs of steam: it is the most efficient means of national
progress and development: the forerunner of civilization: important to
the united states as an agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial
country: nature of our people: maritime spirit: various commercial
countries: ours most advantageously situated: the destiny of american
commerce: our commercial rivals: great britain: she resists us by steam
and diplomacy: our position: most approved instruments of commercial
success: portugal and holland: england's wise steam policy: liberal views
of her statesmen: extent of her mail service: her immense steam marine, of
2,161 steamers: our contrast: our dependence on great britain: the united
states mail and commercial steam marine in full: a most unfavorable
comparison.
SECTION II.
NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.
are ocean steam mails desirable and necessary for a commercial people?
the spirit of the age demands them: mutual dependence of nations: fast
mails necessary to control slow freights: the foreign post of every
nation is more or less selfish: if we neglect approved methods, we are
thereby subordinated to the skill of others: the want of a foreign post is
a national calamity: other nations can not afford us due facilities: wars
and accidents forbid: the crimea and the indies an example: many of our
fields of commerce need a post: brazil, the west-indies, and pacific south-
america: mails to the continent of europe by the numerous cunard
vessels: correspondence with africa, china, the east-indies, the mauritius,
SECTION I.
PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.
the splendid triumphs of steam: it is the most efficient means of national
progress and development: the forerunner of civilization: important to
the united states as an agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial
country: nature of our people: maritime spirit: various commercial
countries: ours most advantageously situated: the destiny of american
commerce: our commercial rivals: great britain: she resists us by steam
and diplomacy: our position: most approved instruments of commercial
success: portugal and holland: england's wise steam policy: liberal views
of her statesmen: extent of her mail service: her immense steam marine, of
2,161 steamers: our contrast: our dependence on great britain: the united
states mail and commercial steam marine in full: a most unfavorable
comparison.
SECTION II.
NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.
are ocean steam mails desirable and necessary for a commercial people?
the spirit of the age demands them: mutual dependence of nations: fast
mails necessary to control slow freights: the foreign post of every
nation is more or less selfish: if we neglect approved methods, we are
thereby subordinated to the skill of others: the want of a foreign post is
a national calamity: other nations can not afford us due facilities: wars
and accidents forbid: the crimea and the indies an example: many of our
fields of commerce need a post: brazil, the west-indies, and pacific south-
america: mails to the continent of europe by the numerous cunard
vessels: correspondence with africa, china, the east-indies, the mauritius,
Page 14
and australia: slavish dependence on great britain: desirable for our
diplomatic and consular service: for the control of our squadrons: cases
of suffering: necessary for defense: for cultivating friendly relations
and opening trade: the atlantic telegraph will require faster and heavier
mails: our commerce requires fast steamers for the rapid and easy
transit of passengers: modes of benefiting commerce.
SECTION III.
THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.
the commercial capabilities of ocean steam: steam mails arrive and depart
at absolutely fixed periods: uncertainty is hazardous and costly:
subsidized steamers give a necessarily high speed to the mails: money can
not afford to lie upon the ocean for weeks: compared with sail: steamers
transport certain classes of freight: the havre and the cunard lines: the
cunard propellers: steamers can afford to transport express packages
and goods: goods taken only to fill up: why propellers are cheaper in
some cases: steam in some cases cheaper than the wind: an estimate: the
propeller for coasting: steam on its own receipts has not succeeded on
the ocean: marine and fluvial navigation compared: most freights not
transportable by steam on any conditions: auxiliary freighting and
emigrant propellers: laws of transport: rapid mails and leisure transport
of freight the law of nature: the price of coals rapidly increasing:
anticipated improvements and cheapening in marine propulsion not
realized.
SECTION IV.
COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.
misapprehension of the high cost of steam marine propulsion: views of the
non-professional: high speed necessary for the distances in our country:
what is the cost of high adequate mail speed: fast steamers require
stronger parts in every thing: greater outlay in prime cost: more
frequent and costly repairs: more watchfulness and men: more costly
diplomatic and consular service: for the control of our squadrons: cases
of suffering: necessary for defense: for cultivating friendly relations
and opening trade: the atlantic telegraph will require faster and heavier
mails: our commerce requires fast steamers for the rapid and easy
transit of passengers: modes of benefiting commerce.
SECTION III.
THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.
the commercial capabilities of ocean steam: steam mails arrive and depart
at absolutely fixed periods: uncertainty is hazardous and costly:
subsidized steamers give a necessarily high speed to the mails: money can
not afford to lie upon the ocean for weeks: compared with sail: steamers
transport certain classes of freight: the havre and the cunard lines: the
cunard propellers: steamers can afford to transport express packages
and goods: goods taken only to fill up: why propellers are cheaper in
some cases: steam in some cases cheaper than the wind: an estimate: the
propeller for coasting: steam on its own receipts has not succeeded on
the ocean: marine and fluvial navigation compared: most freights not
transportable by steam on any conditions: auxiliary freighting and
emigrant propellers: laws of transport: rapid mails and leisure transport
of freight the law of nature: the price of coals rapidly increasing:
anticipated improvements and cheapening in marine propulsion not
realized.
SECTION IV.
COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.
misapprehension of the high cost of steam marine propulsion: views of the
non-professional: high speed necessary for the distances in our country:
what is the cost of high adequate mail speed: fast steamers require
stronger parts in every thing: greater outlay in prime cost: more
frequent and costly repairs: more watchfulness and men: more costly
Page 15
fuel, engineers, firemen, and coal-passers: great strength of hull
required: also in engines, boilers, and parts: why the prime cost increases:
theory of repairs: friction and breakages: boilers and furnaces burning
out: repairs twelve to eighteen per cent: depreciation: several lines cited:
uses for more men: extra fuel, and less freight-room: british trade and
coal consumption.
the natural laws of resistance, power, and speed, with table: the
resistance varies as is the square of the velocity: the power, or fuel,
varies as the cube of the velocity: the rationale: authorities cited in
proof of the law: examples, and the formulæ: coal-table; no. i.: quantity
of fuel for different speeds and displacements: deductions from the
table: rates at which increased speed increases the consumption of fuel:
consumption for vessels of 2,500, 3,000, and 6,000 tons displacement:
coal-table; no. ii.: freight-table; no. iii.: as speed and power increase,
freight and passenger room decrease: freight and fare reduced: speed of
various lines: freight-cost: coal and cargo; no. iv.: mr. atherton's views
of freight transport.
SECTION V.
OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN
RECEIPTS.
increase of british mail service: last new line at $925,000 per year: the
system not becoming self-supporting: contract renewals at same or
higher prices: price of fuel and wages increased faster than engine
improvements: large ships run proportionally cheaper than small: an
example, with the figures: the steamer "leviathan," 27,000 tons: steamers
of this class will not pay: she can not transport freight to australia:
reasons for the same: motion her normal condition: must not be made a
dock: delivery of freights: mammoth steamers to brazil: large clippers
lie idle: not even this large class of steamers can live on their own
receipts: efficient mail steamers carry but little except passengers: some
heavy extra expenses in regular mail lines: pacific mail company's large
extra fleet, and its effects: the immense account of items and extras: a
partial list: the havre and collins docks: great expense of feeding
required: also in engines, boilers, and parts: why the prime cost increases:
theory of repairs: friction and breakages: boilers and furnaces burning
out: repairs twelve to eighteen per cent: depreciation: several lines cited:
uses for more men: extra fuel, and less freight-room: british trade and
coal consumption.
the natural laws of resistance, power, and speed, with table: the
resistance varies as is the square of the velocity: the power, or fuel,
varies as the cube of the velocity: the rationale: authorities cited in
proof of the law: examples, and the formulæ: coal-table; no. i.: quantity
of fuel for different speeds and displacements: deductions from the
table: rates at which increased speed increases the consumption of fuel:
consumption for vessels of 2,500, 3,000, and 6,000 tons displacement:
coal-table; no. ii.: freight-table; no. iii.: as speed and power increase,
freight and passenger room decrease: freight and fare reduced: speed of
various lines: freight-cost: coal and cargo; no. iv.: mr. atherton's views
of freight transport.
SECTION V.
OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN
RECEIPTS.
increase of british mail service: last new line at $925,000 per year: the
system not becoming self-supporting: contract renewals at same or
higher prices: price of fuel and wages increased faster than engine
improvements: large ships run proportionally cheaper than small: an
example, with the figures: the steamer "leviathan," 27,000 tons: steamers
of this class will not pay: she can not transport freight to australia:
reasons for the same: motion her normal condition: must not be made a
dock: delivery of freights: mammoth steamers to brazil: large clippers
lie idle: not even this large class of steamers can live on their own
receipts: efficient mail steamers carry but little except passengers: some
heavy extra expenses in regular mail lines: pacific mail company's large
extra fleet, and its effects: the immense account of items and extras: a
partial list: the havre and collins docks: great expense of feeding
Page 16
passengers: views of murray and atherton on the cost of running
steamers, and the necessity of the present mail service.
SECTION VI.
HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?
the transmarine compared with the inland post: our past spasmodic
efforts: need some system: france aroused to steam: the sailing-ship mail:
the naval steam mail: the private enterprise mail: all inadequate and
abandoned: great britain's experience in all these methods: naval vessels
can not be adapted to the mail service: will propellers meet the wants of
mail transport, with or without subsidy? popular errors regarding the
propeller: its advantages and disadvantages: bourne's opinion: robert
murray: propellers too often on the docks: they are very disagreeable
passenger vessels: if propellers run more cheaply it is because they are
slower: compared with sail: unprofitable stock: croskey's line: propellers
live on chances and charters: iron is a material: sending the mails by
slow propellers would be an unfair discrimination against sailing vessels:
individual enterprise can not supply mail facilities: therefore it is the
duty of the government.
SECTION VII.
WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE?
resumé of the previous sections and arguments: it is the duty of the
government to furnish rapid steam mails: our people appreciate the
importance of commerce, and of liberal postal facilities: the government
is established for the benefit of the people: it must foster their interests
and develop their industry: the want of such mails has caused the
neglect of many profitable branches of industry: as a consequence we
have lost immense traffic: the european manufacturing system and ours:
fields of trade naturally pertaining to us: our almost systematic neglect
of them: why is great britain's commerce so large: causes and their
effects: her west-india line receives a larger subsidy than all the foreign
steamers, and the necessity of the present mail service.
SECTION VI.
HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?
the transmarine compared with the inland post: our past spasmodic
efforts: need some system: france aroused to steam: the sailing-ship mail:
the naval steam mail: the private enterprise mail: all inadequate and
abandoned: great britain's experience in all these methods: naval vessels
can not be adapted to the mail service: will propellers meet the wants of
mail transport, with or without subsidy? popular errors regarding the
propeller: its advantages and disadvantages: bourne's opinion: robert
murray: propellers too often on the docks: they are very disagreeable
passenger vessels: if propellers run more cheaply it is because they are
slower: compared with sail: unprofitable stock: croskey's line: propellers
live on chances and charters: iron is a material: sending the mails by
slow propellers would be an unfair discrimination against sailing vessels:
individual enterprise can not supply mail facilities: therefore it is the
duty of the government.
SECTION VII.
WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE?
resumé of the previous sections and arguments: it is the duty of the
government to furnish rapid steam mails: our people appreciate the
importance of commerce, and of liberal postal facilities: the government
is established for the benefit of the people: it must foster their interests
and develop their industry: the want of such mails has caused the
neglect of many profitable branches of industry: as a consequence we
have lost immense traffic: the european manufacturing system and ours:
fields of trade naturally pertaining to us: our almost systematic neglect
of them: why is great britain's commerce so large: causes and their
effects: her west-india line receives a larger subsidy than all the foreign
Page 17
lines of the united states combined: indifference shown by congress to
many important fields of commerce: instances of mail facilities creating
large trade: the peninsular and oriental company's testimony: the british
and brazilian trade: some deductions from the figures: california shorn
of half her glory: the american people not misers: they wish their own
public treasure expended for the benefit of their industry: our
commercial classes complain that they are deprived of the privilege of
competing with other nations.
SECTION VIII.
HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY?
we need a steam mail system: how our lines have been established:
american and british policy contrasted: spasmodic and enduring
legislation: mr. polk's administration endeavored to inaugurate a policy:
gen. rusk endeavored to extend it: the term of service too short:
companies should have longer periods: a legislation of expedients: must
subsidize private companies for a long term of years: should we give to
our postal vessels the naval feature: our mail lines gave an impulse to
ship-building: let us have steam mails on their merits: no naval feature
subterfuges: these vessels highly useful in war: they liberally supply the
navy with experienced engineers when necessary: the british mail packets
generally fit for war service: lord canning's report: expedients proposed
for carrying the mails: by foreign instead of american vessels: degrading
expediency and subserviency: we can not secure mail service by giving the
gross receipts: the general treasury should pay for the transmarine post:
requirements for new contracts: method of making contracts: the lowest
bidder and the land service: the ocean service very different: but little
understood: lowest-bidder system failures: senator rusk's opinion:
injurious effects of lowest bidder: individual efforts and rights.
SECTION IX.
THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.
many important fields of commerce: instances of mail facilities creating
large trade: the peninsular and oriental company's testimony: the british
and brazilian trade: some deductions from the figures: california shorn
of half her glory: the american people not misers: they wish their own
public treasure expended for the benefit of their industry: our
commercial classes complain that they are deprived of the privilege of
competing with other nations.
SECTION VIII.
HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY?
we need a steam mail system: how our lines have been established:
american and british policy contrasted: spasmodic and enduring
legislation: mr. polk's administration endeavored to inaugurate a policy:
gen. rusk endeavored to extend it: the term of service too short:
companies should have longer periods: a legislation of expedients: must
subsidize private companies for a long term of years: should we give to
our postal vessels the naval feature: our mail lines gave an impulse to
ship-building: let us have steam mails on their merits: no naval feature
subterfuges: these vessels highly useful in war: they liberally supply the
navy with experienced engineers when necessary: the british mail packets
generally fit for war service: lord canning's report: expedients proposed
for carrying the mails: by foreign instead of american vessels: degrading
expediency and subserviency: we can not secure mail service by giving the
gross receipts: the general treasury should pay for the transmarine post:
requirements for new contracts: method of making contracts: the lowest
bidder and the land service: the ocean service very different: but little
understood: lowest-bidder system failures: senator rusk's opinion:
injurious effects of lowest bidder: individual efforts and rights.
SECTION IX.
THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.
Page 18
steam mail system inaugurated as the promoter of wealth, power, and
civilization: the effect of the system on commerce: the long period
designated for the experiment: new lines, when, how, and why established:
the workings of the system: first contract made in 1833, liverpool and
isle of man: with rotterdam in 1834: falmouth and gibraltar, 1837:
aberdeen, shetland, and orkneys, 1840: the "savannah," the first ocean
steamer: the sirius and great western: cunard contract made in 1839:
extra pay "within certain limits:" malta, alexandria, suez, east-indies, and
china in 1840: the peninsular and oriental company: west-india service
established in 1840: points touched at: provisional extra pay: panama and
valparaiso line established in 1845: holyhead and kingston in 1848: also
the channel islands: west coast of africa and cape of good hope in 1852:
calcutta via the cape in 1852, and abandoned: plymouth, sydney, and new
south wales also in 1852, and abandoned: investigation of 1851 and 1853,
and new australian contract in 1856: halifax, newfoundland, bermuda,
and st. thomas in 1850: new-york and bermuda soon discontinued:
comparison of british and american subsidies, rates per mile, total
distances, and postal income: the british government pays higher subsidies
than the american: workings and increase of the british service: gen.
rusk's views: speech of hon t. b. king: committee of investigation, 1849:
new investigation ordered in 1853, and instructions: lord canning's
report and its recommendations: great britain will not abandon her mail
system: the new australian line: testimony of atherton and murray: many
extracts from the report: steam indispensable: not self-supporting: the
mail receipts will not pay for it: result of the whole system: another new
service to india and china: shall we run the postal and commercial race
with great britain? canada and the indies.
SECTION X.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.
the mail lines of the united states: the havre and bremen, the pioneers:
the bremen service recently given to mr. vanderbilt: both lines run on the
gross receipts: the california lines: wondrous development of our pacific
possessions: the pacific mail steamship company: its history, services, large
materiel, and usefulness: the united states mail steamship company: its
civilization: the effect of the system on commerce: the long period
designated for the experiment: new lines, when, how, and why established:
the workings of the system: first contract made in 1833, liverpool and
isle of man: with rotterdam in 1834: falmouth and gibraltar, 1837:
aberdeen, shetland, and orkneys, 1840: the "savannah," the first ocean
steamer: the sirius and great western: cunard contract made in 1839:
extra pay "within certain limits:" malta, alexandria, suez, east-indies, and
china in 1840: the peninsular and oriental company: west-india service
established in 1840: points touched at: provisional extra pay: panama and
valparaiso line established in 1845: holyhead and kingston in 1848: also
the channel islands: west coast of africa and cape of good hope in 1852:
calcutta via the cape in 1852, and abandoned: plymouth, sydney, and new
south wales also in 1852, and abandoned: investigation of 1851 and 1853,
and new australian contract in 1856: halifax, newfoundland, bermuda,
and st. thomas in 1850: new-york and bermuda soon discontinued:
comparison of british and american subsidies, rates per mile, total
distances, and postal income: the british government pays higher subsidies
than the american: workings and increase of the british service: gen.
rusk's views: speech of hon t. b. king: committee of investigation, 1849:
new investigation ordered in 1853, and instructions: lord canning's
report and its recommendations: great britain will not abandon her mail
system: the new australian line: testimony of atherton and murray: many
extracts from the report: steam indispensable: not self-supporting: the
mail receipts will not pay for it: result of the whole system: another new
service to india and china: shall we run the postal and commercial race
with great britain? canada and the indies.
SECTION X.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.
the mail lines of the united states: the havre and bremen, the pioneers:
the bremen service recently given to mr. vanderbilt: both lines run on the
gross receipts: the california lines: wondrous development of our pacific
possessions: the pacific mail steamship company: its history, services, large
materiel, and usefulness: the united states mail steamship company: its
Page 19
ramified and large extra service: effect upon the commerce of the gulf:
its heavy losses, and new ships: steamship stocks generally avoided:
constantly far below par: the collins line: a comparison with the cunard:
its sources of heavy outlay, and its enterprise: the american marine
disasters could not have been prevented by human foresight; the
vanderbilt bremen line: the charleston and havana line.
its heavy losses, and new ships: steamship stocks generally avoided:
constantly far below par: the collins line: a comparison with the cunard:
its sources of heavy outlay, and its enterprise: the american marine
disasters could not have been prevented by human foresight; the
vanderbilt bremen line: the charleston and havana line.
Page 20
SECTION I.
PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.
the splendid triumphs of steam: it is the most efficient means of national
progress and development: the forerunner of civilization: important to
the united states as an agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial
country: nature of our people: maritime spirit: various commercial
countries: ours most advantageously situated: the destiny of american
commerce: our commercial rivals: great britain: she resists us by steam
and diplomacy: our position: most approved instruments of commercial
success: portugal and holland: england's wise steam policy: liberal views
of her statesmen: extent of her mail service: her immense steam marine, of
2,161 steamers: our contrast: our dependence on great britain: the united
states mail and commercial steam marine in full: a most unfavorable
comparison.
The agreeable and responsible duty of developing and regulating the most
important discovery of modern times, and the greatest material force known
to men, has been committed to the present generation. The progress of
Steam, from the days of its first application to lifting purposes, through all
of its gradations of application to railway locomotion and steamboat and
steamship propulsion down to the present time, has been a series of
splendid and highly useful triumphs, alike creditable to the genius of its
promoters, and profitable to the nations which have adopted it. However
great the progress of the world, or the prosperity of commercial nations
prior to its introduction, it can not be doubted that it now constitutes the
largest, surest, and most easily available means of progress, prosperity, and
power known to civilized nations; or that the development, wealth, and
independence of any country will be in the ratio of the application of steam
to all of the ordinary purposes of life. It has been canonized among the
sacred elements of national power, and commissioned as the great laborer
of the age. Every civilized nation has adopted it as the best means of
interior development, and as almost the only forerunner of commerce and
PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.
the splendid triumphs of steam: it is the most efficient means of national
progress and development: the forerunner of civilization: important to
the united states as an agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial
country: nature of our people: maritime spirit: various commercial
countries: ours most advantageously situated: the destiny of american
commerce: our commercial rivals: great britain: she resists us by steam
and diplomacy: our position: most approved instruments of commercial
success: portugal and holland: england's wise steam policy: liberal views
of her statesmen: extent of her mail service: her immense steam marine, of
2,161 steamers: our contrast: our dependence on great britain: the united
states mail and commercial steam marine in full: a most unfavorable
comparison.
The agreeable and responsible duty of developing and regulating the most
important discovery of modern times, and the greatest material force known
to men, has been committed to the present generation. The progress of
Steam, from the days of its first application to lifting purposes, through all
of its gradations of application to railway locomotion and steamboat and
steamship propulsion down to the present time, has been a series of
splendid and highly useful triumphs, alike creditable to the genius of its
promoters, and profitable to the nations which have adopted it. However
great the progress of the world, or the prosperity of commercial nations
prior to its introduction, it can not be doubted that it now constitutes the
largest, surest, and most easily available means of progress, prosperity, and
power known to civilized nations; or that the development, wealth, and
independence of any country will be in the ratio of the application of steam
to all of the ordinary purposes of life. It has been canonized among the
sacred elements of national power, and commissioned as the great laborer
of the age. Every civilized nation has adopted it as the best means of
interior development, and as almost the only forerunner of commerce and
Page 21
communication with the outer world. It has thus become an indispensable
necessity of every day life, whether by land or by sea, to the producer, the
consumer, the merchant, the manufacturer, the artisan, the pleasure-seeker,
the statesman, and the state itself, to public liberty, and to the peace of the
world.
The existence of an agent of so great power and influence, is necessarily a
fact of unusual significance to a nation like the United States, which
combines within itself in a high degree, the three most important interests,
of large Agricultural and Mineral Productions, extensive and increasing
Manufactures, and an immense Foreign Commerce and Domestic Trade.
Our country is essentially commercial in its tastes and tendencies; our
people are, as a result of our common schools, bold, inquiring, and
enterprising; and our constitution and laws are well calculated to produce a
nation of restless and vigorous merchants, traders, and travellers. Foreign
commerce is a necessity of our large and redundant agricultural production.
Our extended sea-coast, and necessarily large coasting-trade between the
States, have begotten an unbounded spirit of maritime adventure. The ample
material, and other facilities for building vessels, have also contributed to
this end. As capable as any people on earth of running vessels and
conducting mercantile enterprise, we have found foreign commerce a
profitable field for the investment of labor, intelligence, and capital.
There is scarcely any field of trade in the world which we are not naturally
better calculated to occupy than any other country. Most of the great
commercial nations employ their ships as common carriers for other
nations, and limit their exports to manufactures alone. Great Britain is an
example of this. She exports no products of the soil, for very obvious
reasons. The exports of France partake of the same general character,
domestic manufactures, with a small portion of the products of the soil. So,
also, with the German States and Holland. The United States, to the
contrary, have an immense export trade in the products of the soil. These
exports have the advantage of embracing every production of the temperate
zone, and some few of the more profitable of those of the torrid. These
constitute a large source of wealth, and are daily increasing in quantity,
value, and importance. Combined with the manufactured productions of the
country, and the yield of the mines, they require a large amount of shipping,
necessity of every day life, whether by land or by sea, to the producer, the
consumer, the merchant, the manufacturer, the artisan, the pleasure-seeker,
the statesman, and the state itself, to public liberty, and to the peace of the
world.
The existence of an agent of so great power and influence, is necessarily a
fact of unusual significance to a nation like the United States, which
combines within itself in a high degree, the three most important interests,
of large Agricultural and Mineral Productions, extensive and increasing
Manufactures, and an immense Foreign Commerce and Domestic Trade.
Our country is essentially commercial in its tastes and tendencies; our
people are, as a result of our common schools, bold, inquiring, and
enterprising; and our constitution and laws are well calculated to produce a
nation of restless and vigorous merchants, traders, and travellers. Foreign
commerce is a necessity of our large and redundant agricultural production.
Our extended sea-coast, and necessarily large coasting-trade between the
States, have begotten an unbounded spirit of maritime adventure. The ample
material, and other facilities for building vessels, have also contributed to
this end. As capable as any people on earth of running vessels and
conducting mercantile enterprise, we have found foreign commerce a
profitable field for the investment of labor, intelligence, and capital.
There is scarcely any field of trade in the world which we are not naturally
better calculated to occupy than any other country. Most of the great
commercial nations employ their ships as common carriers for other
nations, and limit their exports to manufactures alone. Great Britain is an
example of this. She exports no products of the soil, for very obvious
reasons. The exports of France partake of the same general character,
domestic manufactures, with a small portion of the products of the soil. So,
also, with the German States and Holland. The United States, to the
contrary, have an immense export trade in the products of the soil. These
exports have the advantage of embracing every production of the temperate
zone, and some few of the more profitable of those of the torrid. These
constitute a large source of wealth, and are daily increasing in quantity,
value, and importance. Combined with the manufactured productions of the
country, and the yield of the mines, they require a large amount of shipping,
Page 22
which, extending to nearly all nations, opens a diversified and rich field of
trade. The exchanges of production between our own and other countries,
are, consequently, very large and general, and must continue to increase to
an indefinite extent, as the States and Territories of the Union fill up, and as
the various new and opening branches of domestic industry develop and
mature.
The extent which this trade will reach in a few generations, its aggregate
value, and the influence which it will wield over the world if judiciously
and energetically promoted, and if wisely protected against encroachment
from abroad, and embarrassment at home, no human foresight can predict
or adequately imagine. With a larger field of operations, at home and
abroad, than any nation ever possessed before, with the pacific commercial
policy of the age, and with the aids of science, the telegraph, and steam to
urge it on, American Commerce has opened before it a glorious career and
an imposing responsibility.
But the conquests of this commerce are not to be the bloodless victories of
power unopposed; not the result of bold adventure without check, or of
simply American enterprise without the Government's aid. Our foe is a
wary, well-scarred, and well-tried old warrior, who has the unequalled
wisdom of experience, and the patient courage that has triumphed over
many defeats. The field has been in his hands for ten generations, and he
knows every byway, every marsh, every foot of defense, and the few
inassailable points to be preserved and guarded. Great Britain, particularly,
knows how essential is a large general commerce for opening a market for
her manufactures. She is dependent on those manufactures, and upon the
carrying trade of the world for a living; and she fosters and protects them
not alone by the reputed and well-known individual enterprise and energy
of her people, but by a wise and forecasting policy of state, a mighty and
irresistible naval and military array, a wisely concerted, liberal, well-
arranged, and long-pursued steam system, and prompt, unflinching
protection of British subjects in their rights throughout the world.
Great Britain is prepared to resist our commercial progress, as she has
already done, step by step, by all the means within her power. She has
wisely brought steam to her aid, and now has a system of long standing at
trade. The exchanges of production between our own and other countries,
are, consequently, very large and general, and must continue to increase to
an indefinite extent, as the States and Territories of the Union fill up, and as
the various new and opening branches of domestic industry develop and
mature.
The extent which this trade will reach in a few generations, its aggregate
value, and the influence which it will wield over the world if judiciously
and energetically promoted, and if wisely protected against encroachment
from abroad, and embarrassment at home, no human foresight can predict
or adequately imagine. With a larger field of operations, at home and
abroad, than any nation ever possessed before, with the pacific commercial
policy of the age, and with the aids of science, the telegraph, and steam to
urge it on, American Commerce has opened before it a glorious career and
an imposing responsibility.
But the conquests of this commerce are not to be the bloodless victories of
power unopposed; not the result of bold adventure without check, or of
simply American enterprise without the Government's aid. Our foe is a
wary, well-scarred, and well-tried old warrior, who has the unequalled
wisdom of experience, and the patient courage that has triumphed over
many defeats. The field has been in his hands for ten generations, and he
knows every byway, every marsh, every foot of defense, and the few
inassailable points to be preserved and guarded. Great Britain, particularly,
knows how essential is a large general commerce for opening a market for
her manufactures. She is dependent on those manufactures, and upon the
carrying trade of the world for a living; and she fosters and protects them
not alone by the reputed and well-known individual enterprise and energy
of her people, but by a wise and forecasting policy of state, a mighty and
irresistible naval and military array, a wisely concerted, liberal, well-
arranged, and long-pursued steam system, and prompt, unflinching
protection of British subjects in their rights throughout the world.
Great Britain is prepared to resist our commercial progress, as she has
already done, step by step, by all the means within her power. She has
wisely brought steam to her aid, and now has a system of long standing at
Page 23
last well matured. Her diplomacy has ever been conspicuous throughout the
world, for ability and zeal, whether in the ministerial or consular service,
and for its persistent advocacy of British rights in trade as well as for its
machinations against the extension of the commerce or the power of this
country. Such action on the part of any wise rival nation is naturally to be
expected; and all that we can object to is that, seeing this policy and its
inevitable tendency, our country should stand still and suffer her trade to be
paralyzed and wrested from her, without an effort to relieve it, or the
employment of any of those commercial agencies and facilities which
experience shows to be all-efficient in such cases. It is utter folly for us to
maintain a simply passive competition; we must either progress or
retrograde. It is wrong to be willing to occupy a secondary place, when
nature and the common wants of the world so clearly indicate that we
should occupy the first; for if, as before assumed, foreign commerce is our
destiny, and if we can not accomplish our highest capabilities except by
commerce, then if we ever attain our true dignity and station as a nation, it
must be by enlarging, liberalizing, strengthening, and encouraging our
foreign trade, by all of the proper, efficient, and honorable means within our
power. It is the duty of the Government, both to itself and to its citizens.
(See Section VII.)
The history of commercial nations admonishes us that no trading people can
long maintain their ascendency without using all of the most approved
means of the age for prosecuting trade. Portugal was at one time the most
powerful commercial nation of the globe; and at another Holland was the
mistress of the seas. But while the latter is now only a fourth-rate
commercial power, the former has sunk into obscurity, and is nearly
forgotten of men. At that time England and France had but a limited foreign
trade and scarcely any commercial reputation. France could more easily
maintain her existence without a foreign trade, than could England; and yet
her matured manufactures and her products of the soil became so valuable
that she sought a foreign market. England, to the contrary, had not territory
enough to remain at home, and yet be a great power. She matured an
immense manufacturing system, and needed a market, as well as the raw
material, and food for her operatives. She began to stretch her arms to the
outer world, and had made very considerable strides in foreign commerce
world, for ability and zeal, whether in the ministerial or consular service,
and for its persistent advocacy of British rights in trade as well as for its
machinations against the extension of the commerce or the power of this
country. Such action on the part of any wise rival nation is naturally to be
expected; and all that we can object to is that, seeing this policy and its
inevitable tendency, our country should stand still and suffer her trade to be
paralyzed and wrested from her, without an effort to relieve it, or the
employment of any of those commercial agencies and facilities which
experience shows to be all-efficient in such cases. It is utter folly for us to
maintain a simply passive competition; we must either progress or
retrograde. It is wrong to be willing to occupy a secondary place, when
nature and the common wants of the world so clearly indicate that we
should occupy the first; for if, as before assumed, foreign commerce is our
destiny, and if we can not accomplish our highest capabilities except by
commerce, then if we ever attain our true dignity and station as a nation, it
must be by enlarging, liberalizing, strengthening, and encouraging our
foreign trade, by all of the proper, efficient, and honorable means within our
power. It is the duty of the Government, both to itself and to its citizens.
(See Section VII.)
The history of commercial nations admonishes us that no trading people can
long maintain their ascendency without using all of the most approved
means of the age for prosecuting trade. Portugal was at one time the most
powerful commercial nation of the globe; and at another Holland was the
mistress of the seas. But while the latter is now only a fourth-rate
commercial power, the former has sunk into obscurity, and is nearly
forgotten of men. At that time England and France had but a limited foreign
trade and scarcely any commercial reputation. France could more easily
maintain her existence without a foreign trade, than could England; and yet
her matured manufactures and her products of the soil became so valuable
that she sought a foreign market. England, to the contrary, had not territory
enough to remain at home, and yet be a great power. She matured an
immense manufacturing system, and needed a market, as well as the raw
material, and food for her operatives. She began to stretch her arms to the
outer world, and had made very considerable strides in foreign commerce
Page 24
side by side with France and the German States, and in the face of the
steady young opposition of the American States.
It now became a contest for supremacy. Her large navy had enabled her to
conquer important foreign territories, which with the supremacy of the seas
would make her the mistress of the world. France was still her equal rival,
and the United States were becoming formidable common carriers,
although they had but little legitimate commerce of their own, and none that
was under their positive control. The commercial men of England finding
their statesmen ready to aid them in their efforts for national progress,
wealth, and glory, directed their attention to steam as an agent of supremacy
and power, both in the Navy and the Commercial Marine. They indicated
and proved the necessity of drawing the bonds between them and foreign
countries more closely; of shortening the distances between them; of
providing the means of rapid, safe, and comfortable transit of English
merchants between their homes and foreign lands; of regular, rapid, reliable
British steam mails to every point with which Englishmen had business, or
could create it; and of government agency as the only means by which this
desirable, this essential service could be rendered to commerce and to the
country. They readily saw that rapid and reliable passenger facilities, and
the rapid and regular transmission of commercial and diplomatic
intelligence would give to British merchants and to British statesmen the
certain control of commerce, and the conformation of the political destinies
of many of the smaller nations of the Eastern and Western hemispheres.
It was not a difficult task to convince the British statesman that it was his
duty to encourage the commerce, on which the wealth, power, and glory of
his country depended, by all the aids known to the constitution; and to
uphold the hands of the merchant by the use of the money which his traffic
had brought into the public coffers. There was no contest between North
and South, East and West. It was the whole of England which was to be
benefited directly or indirectly; and they were willing that it should be any
part rather than none. The evident advantages which the United States
possessed in her more numerous articles of export, (see page 16,) as well as
the rapid strides which her first clippers were making across the ocean,
were reasons urgent enough for the forecasting statesmen of Britain; and
they determined to continue or to obtain the profitable dominion of the seas,
steady young opposition of the American States.
It now became a contest for supremacy. Her large navy had enabled her to
conquer important foreign territories, which with the supremacy of the seas
would make her the mistress of the world. France was still her equal rival,
and the United States were becoming formidable common carriers,
although they had but little legitimate commerce of their own, and none that
was under their positive control. The commercial men of England finding
their statesmen ready to aid them in their efforts for national progress,
wealth, and glory, directed their attention to steam as an agent of supremacy
and power, both in the Navy and the Commercial Marine. They indicated
and proved the necessity of drawing the bonds between them and foreign
countries more closely; of shortening the distances between them; of
providing the means of rapid, safe, and comfortable transit of English
merchants between their homes and foreign lands; of regular, rapid, reliable
British steam mails to every point with which Englishmen had business, or
could create it; and of government agency as the only means by which this
desirable, this essential service could be rendered to commerce and to the
country. They readily saw that rapid and reliable passenger facilities, and
the rapid and regular transmission of commercial and diplomatic
intelligence would give to British merchants and to British statesmen the
certain control of commerce, and the conformation of the political destinies
of many of the smaller nations of the Eastern and Western hemispheres.
It was not a difficult task to convince the British statesman that it was his
duty to encourage the commerce, on which the wealth, power, and glory of
his country depended, by all the aids known to the constitution; and to
uphold the hands of the merchant by the use of the money which his traffic
had brought into the public coffers. There was no contest between North
and South, East and West. It was the whole of England which was to be
benefited directly or indirectly; and they were willing that it should be any
part rather than none. The evident advantages which the United States
possessed in her more numerous articles of export, (see page 16,) as well as
the rapid strides which her first clippers were making across the ocean,
were reasons urgent enough for the forecasting statesmen of Britain; and
they determined to continue or to obtain the profitable dominion of the seas,
Page 25
although it might cost a sum of money far beyond the postal income. They
knew that these postal and passenger facilities were needed by every class
of community, and that there was no one in the kingdom who would not be
in some way benefited by them; and that the sums of money paid for them,
although not apparently returned, were yet returned in a thousand indirect
channels and by a variety of reflex benefits not calculable as a transaction
of exchange.
We, therefore, see to-day, as the fruit of that determination, the proudest and
the most profitable postal and mercantile steam marine that floats the seas.
Several large companies, authorized to transport the mails to all parts of the
world, were immediately organized, and paid liberal allowances for their
peculiar duties. Where the practicability of the service was considered
doubtful, larger sums were paid, and a greater length of time granted for
making the experiment. The contracts were generally made for twelve
years; and when their terms expired they were renewed for another term of
twelve years, which will expire in 1862. Thus many of the lines have been
in operation for the last nineteen years, and have demonstrated the
practicability, the cheapness, the utility, and the necessity of such service.
The entire foreign mail service is conducted by fifteen companies, having
one hundred and twenty-one steamers, with a gross tonnage of 235,488
tons; the net tonnage being 141,293, assuming the engines, boilers, fuel,
etc., to be forty per cent of the whole tonnage, which is altogether too low
an estimate. The whole number of British sea-going steamers is sixteen
hundred and sixty-nine, with an aggregate tonnage of 383,598 tons,
exclusive of engines and boilers, and of 639,330 tons gross, including
engines and boilers. (See paper A, page 192.) We must add to this list the
new steamer "Great Eastern," whose tonnage is twenty-seven thousand
tons, and which will make the entire present mercantile steam tonnage of
Great Britain 660,330 tons. The greater portion of these steamers, exclusive
of those engaged in the foreign mail service, are employed in the coasting
and foreign continental trade; while some few of them run in the American
merchant service, and many others in the subsidized mail service of foreign
countries, such as the lines from Hamburgh and Antwerp to Brazil, and
from those cities to the United States. Some of them are also engaged in the
mail service between Canada and England, under the patronage of the
Canadian government. (See paper D, page 199.) If we add to this list the
knew that these postal and passenger facilities were needed by every class
of community, and that there was no one in the kingdom who would not be
in some way benefited by them; and that the sums of money paid for them,
although not apparently returned, were yet returned in a thousand indirect
channels and by a variety of reflex benefits not calculable as a transaction
of exchange.
We, therefore, see to-day, as the fruit of that determination, the proudest and
the most profitable postal and mercantile steam marine that floats the seas.
Several large companies, authorized to transport the mails to all parts of the
world, were immediately organized, and paid liberal allowances for their
peculiar duties. Where the practicability of the service was considered
doubtful, larger sums were paid, and a greater length of time granted for
making the experiment. The contracts were generally made for twelve
years; and when their terms expired they were renewed for another term of
twelve years, which will expire in 1862. Thus many of the lines have been
in operation for the last nineteen years, and have demonstrated the
practicability, the cheapness, the utility, and the necessity of such service.
The entire foreign mail service is conducted by fifteen companies, having
one hundred and twenty-one steamers, with a gross tonnage of 235,488
tons; the net tonnage being 141,293, assuming the engines, boilers, fuel,
etc., to be forty per cent of the whole tonnage, which is altogether too low
an estimate. The whole number of British sea-going steamers is sixteen
hundred and sixty-nine, with an aggregate tonnage of 383,598 tons,
exclusive of engines and boilers, and of 639,330 tons gross, including
engines and boilers. (See paper A, page 192.) We must add to this list the
new steamer "Great Eastern," whose tonnage is twenty-seven thousand
tons, and which will make the entire present mercantile steam tonnage of
Great Britain 660,330 tons. The greater portion of these steamers, exclusive
of those engaged in the foreign mail service, are employed in the coasting
and foreign continental trade; while some few of them run in the American
merchant service, and many others in the subsidized mail service of foreign
countries, such as the lines from Hamburgh and Antwerp to Brazil, and
from those cities to the United States. Some of them are also engaged in the
mail service between Canada and England, under the patronage of the
Canadian government. (See paper D, page 199.) If we add to this list the
Page 26
271 war steamers, the 220 gunboats, and the Great Eastern, we shall find
that the British Mail, Mercantile, and War Marine consists of the enormous
number of two thousand one hundred and sixty-one steamers, exclusive of
the large number now building. Nearly all of these are adapted to the ocean,
or to the coasting service, and may be classed as sea-going vessels.
It is interesting to trace this rapid progress of steam since its first
application to purposes of mail transport in 1833. An intelligent writer says,
"The rise and progress of the ocean steam mail service of Great Britain is
second in interest to no chapter in the maritime history of the world;" and
while we acknowledge a grateful pride in the triumphs of our transatlantic
brethren, we must blush with shame at our dereliction in this great, and
civilizing, and enriching service of modern times. The steam marine of the
United States, postal, mercantile, and naval, is to-day so insignificant in
extent that we do not feel entirely certain that it is a sufficient nucleus for
the growth of a respectable maritime power. The few ships that we possess
are among the fleetest and the most comfortable that traverse the ocean, and
have excited the admiration of the world wherever they have been seen. But
their number is so small, their service so limited, their field of operation so
contracted, that our large commerce and travel are dependent, in most parts
of the world, on British steam mail lines for correspondence and transport,
or on the slow, irregular, and uncertain communications of sailing vessels.
The question here naturally suggests itself: Have we progressed in ocean
steam navigation in a ratio commensurate with the improvements of the
age, or of our own improvement in every thing else? And has the
Government of the country afforded to the people the facilities of enterprise
and commercial competition which are clearly necessary to enable them to
enter the contest on equal terms with other commercial countries? (See
Section VII.)
The Ocean Mail Service of the United States, consists of eight lines, and
twenty one steamers in commission, with an aggregate tonnage of 48,027
tons. Three of these lines are transatlantic; the Collins, the Havre, and the
Bremen. Two connect us with our Pacific possessions, and incidentally with
Cuba and New-Granada. They are however indispensable lines of coast
navigation. One connects the ports of Charleston, in the United States, and
Havana, in Cuba, another connects New-Orleans with Vera Cruz, and
that the British Mail, Mercantile, and War Marine consists of the enormous
number of two thousand one hundred and sixty-one steamers, exclusive of
the large number now building. Nearly all of these are adapted to the ocean,
or to the coasting service, and may be classed as sea-going vessels.
It is interesting to trace this rapid progress of steam since its first
application to purposes of mail transport in 1833. An intelligent writer says,
"The rise and progress of the ocean steam mail service of Great Britain is
second in interest to no chapter in the maritime history of the world;" and
while we acknowledge a grateful pride in the triumphs of our transatlantic
brethren, we must blush with shame at our dereliction in this great, and
civilizing, and enriching service of modern times. The steam marine of the
United States, postal, mercantile, and naval, is to-day so insignificant in
extent that we do not feel entirely certain that it is a sufficient nucleus for
the growth of a respectable maritime power. The few ships that we possess
are among the fleetest and the most comfortable that traverse the ocean, and
have excited the admiration of the world wherever they have been seen. But
their number is so small, their service so limited, their field of operation so
contracted, that our large commerce and travel are dependent, in most parts
of the world, on British steam mail lines for correspondence and transport,
or on the slow, irregular, and uncertain communications of sailing vessels.
The question here naturally suggests itself: Have we progressed in ocean
steam navigation in a ratio commensurate with the improvements of the
age, or of our own improvement in every thing else? And has the
Government of the country afforded to the people the facilities of enterprise
and commercial competition which are clearly necessary to enable them to
enter the contest on equal terms with other commercial countries? (See
Section VII.)
The Ocean Mail Service of the United States, consists of eight lines, and
twenty one steamers in commission, with an aggregate tonnage of 48,027
tons. Three of these lines are transatlantic; the Collins, the Havre, and the
Bremen. Two connect us with our Pacific possessions, and incidentally with
Cuba and New-Granada. They are however indispensable lines of coast
navigation. One connects the ports of Charleston, in the United States, and
Havana, in Cuba, another connects New-Orleans with Vera Cruz, and
Page 27
another connects Havana and New-Orleans. Beyond these, we have a line
of two steamers running between New-York and New-Orleans, touching at
Havana, and one steamer touching at the same point between New-York
and Mobile. Also four steamers between New-York and Savannah, four
between New-York and Charleston, two between New-York and Norfolk,
two between Philadelphia and Savannah, two between Boston and
Baltimore, four between New-Orleans and Texas, and two between New-
Orleans and Key West. All of these are coast steamers of the best quality;
and some few of them have a nominal mail pay. We have also several
transient steamers which have no routes or mail contracts, and which are
consequently employed in irregular and accidental service, or laid up. They
are the Ericsson, the Washington and the Hermann, the Star of the West, the
Prometheus, the Northern Light, the Daniel Webster, the Southerner, the St.
Louis, laid up in New-York; the Uncle Sam, the Orizaba, and the Brother
Jonathan, belonging to the Nicaragua Transit Company, and the California,
Panamá, Oregon, Northerner, Fremont, and the tow-boat Tobago, belonging
to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, all lying in the Pacific. Also the
Queen of the West, Mr. Morgan's new steamer, in New-York. These, like all
other American steamers when unemployed on mail lines, generally lie in
port for want of a remunerative trade. (See Paper A.)
The aggregate tonnage of these fifty-seven steamers is 94,795 tons.
Eighteen of them, with an aggregate tonnage of 24,845 tons, are engaged in
no service. Twenty-three of them, with 24,071 tons, are engaged in our
coasting trade. Fourteen of them, with 19,813 tons, (Gov. register,) are
engaged in the California, Oregon, Central American, Mexican, and Cuban
mail service; while eight of them, with 25,178 tons aggregate tonnage, are
engaged in the transatlantic mail service proper, between this country and
Europe. It is thus seen that we have in all but 57 ocean steamers, of 94,795
aggregate tons; while Great Britain has sixteen hundred and seventy, with
666,330 aggregate tons; that we have twenty-two of these, of 45,001 tons,
engaged in the foreign and domestic mail service, while she has one
hundred and twenty-one, of 235,488 aggregate tonnage, engaged in the
foreign mail service almost exclusively; and that we have thirty-seven
steamers engaged in the coasting trade and lying still, while she has fifteen
hundred and forty-eight steamers engaged in her coasting trade and
merchant service. (See page 167, for length of British and American mail
of two steamers running between New-York and New-Orleans, touching at
Havana, and one steamer touching at the same point between New-York
and Mobile. Also four steamers between New-York and Savannah, four
between New-York and Charleston, two between New-York and Norfolk,
two between Philadelphia and Savannah, two between Boston and
Baltimore, four between New-Orleans and Texas, and two between New-
Orleans and Key West. All of these are coast steamers of the best quality;
and some few of them have a nominal mail pay. We have also several
transient steamers which have no routes or mail contracts, and which are
consequently employed in irregular and accidental service, or laid up. They
are the Ericsson, the Washington and the Hermann, the Star of the West, the
Prometheus, the Northern Light, the Daniel Webster, the Southerner, the St.
Louis, laid up in New-York; the Uncle Sam, the Orizaba, and the Brother
Jonathan, belonging to the Nicaragua Transit Company, and the California,
Panamá, Oregon, Northerner, Fremont, and the tow-boat Tobago, belonging
to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, all lying in the Pacific. Also the
Queen of the West, Mr. Morgan's new steamer, in New-York. These, like all
other American steamers when unemployed on mail lines, generally lie in
port for want of a remunerative trade. (See Paper A.)
The aggregate tonnage of these fifty-seven steamers is 94,795 tons.
Eighteen of them, with an aggregate tonnage of 24,845 tons, are engaged in
no service. Twenty-three of them, with 24,071 tons, are engaged in our
coasting trade. Fourteen of them, with 19,813 tons, (Gov. register,) are
engaged in the California, Oregon, Central American, Mexican, and Cuban
mail service; while eight of them, with 25,178 tons aggregate tonnage, are
engaged in the transatlantic mail service proper, between this country and
Europe. It is thus seen that we have in all but 57 ocean steamers, of 94,795
aggregate tons; while Great Britain has sixteen hundred and seventy, with
666,330 aggregate tons; that we have twenty-two of these, of 45,001 tons,
engaged in the foreign and domestic mail service, while she has one
hundred and twenty-one, of 235,488 aggregate tonnage, engaged in the
foreign mail service almost exclusively; and that we have thirty-seven
steamers engaged in the coasting trade and lying still, while she has fifteen
hundred and forty-eight steamers engaged in her coasting trade and
merchant service. (See page 167, for length of British and American mail
Page 28
lines, and the miles run per year.) Comparisons are said to be odious, but it
is more odious for such comparisons as these to be possible in these days of
enlightened commercial enterprise and thrift; and especially when so
greatly to the disadvantage of a country which boldly claims an aggregate
civilization, enterprise, and prosperity equalled by those of no other country
on the globe. As regards our steam navy, it is too small to afford adequate
protection to our commerce and citizens; much less to defend the country in
time of war. We have not steamers enough in the navy to place one at each
of our important seaports; much less to send them to foreign stations.
is more odious for such comparisons as these to be possible in these days of
enlightened commercial enterprise and thrift; and especially when so
greatly to the disadvantage of a country which boldly claims an aggregate
civilization, enterprise, and prosperity equalled by those of no other country
on the globe. As regards our steam navy, it is too small to afford adequate
protection to our commerce and citizens; much less to defend the country in
time of war. We have not steamers enough in the navy to place one at each
of our important seaports; much less to send them to foreign stations.
Page 29
SECTION II.
NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.
are ocean steam mails desirable and necessary for a commercial people?
the spirit of the age demands them: mutual dependence of nations: fast
mails necessary to control slow freights: the foreign post of every
nation is more or less selfish: if we neglect approved methods, we are
thereby subordinated to the skill of others: the want of a foreign post is
a national calamity: other nations can not afford us due facilities: wars
and accidents forbid: the crimea and the indies an example: many of our
fields of commerce need a post: brazil, the west-indies, and pacific south-
america: mails to the continent of europe by the numerous cunard
vessels: correspondence with africa, china, the east-indies, the mauritius,
and australia: slavish dependence on great britain: desirable for our
diplomatic and consular service: for the control of our squadrons: cases
of suffering: necessary for defense: for cultivating friendly relations
and opening trade: the atlantic telegraph will require faster and heavier
mails: our commerce requires fast steamers for the rapid and easy
transit of passengers: modes of benefiting commerce.
Having seen that the ocean steam mail service is largely developed in some
countries, especially in Great Britain, and that the second and third
commercial powers of the world, the United States and France, have not
largely employed this important agent in their commerce, the inquiry
naturally arises, whether fast ocean steam mails are desirable and necessary
to the commercial prosperity of a people. Whether this question be
considered in its relative or its natural bearings, the reply is the same.
Relatively considered, a large ocean steam mail service is indispensable to a
people who are largely commercial, because the most noted commercial
rivals of the world employ it, and thus either force them to its use, or the
loss of their commerce, and the gradual transference of their shipping and
trade into the hands of their rivals. Considered in its natural bearings, in its
direct influences and effects per se, it becomes even more evidently
NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.
are ocean steam mails desirable and necessary for a commercial people?
the spirit of the age demands them: mutual dependence of nations: fast
mails necessary to control slow freights: the foreign post of every
nation is more or less selfish: if we neglect approved methods, we are
thereby subordinated to the skill of others: the want of a foreign post is
a national calamity: other nations can not afford us due facilities: wars
and accidents forbid: the crimea and the indies an example: many of our
fields of commerce need a post: brazil, the west-indies, and pacific south-
america: mails to the continent of europe by the numerous cunard
vessels: correspondence with africa, china, the east-indies, the mauritius,
and australia: slavish dependence on great britain: desirable for our
diplomatic and consular service: for the control of our squadrons: cases
of suffering: necessary for defense: for cultivating friendly relations
and opening trade: the atlantic telegraph will require faster and heavier
mails: our commerce requires fast steamers for the rapid and easy
transit of passengers: modes of benefiting commerce.
Having seen that the ocean steam mail service is largely developed in some
countries, especially in Great Britain, and that the second and third
commercial powers of the world, the United States and France, have not
largely employed this important agent in their commerce, the inquiry
naturally arises, whether fast ocean steam mails are desirable and necessary
to the commercial prosperity of a people. Whether this question be
considered in its relative or its natural bearings, the reply is the same.
Relatively considered, a large ocean steam mail service is indispensable to a
people who are largely commercial, because the most noted commercial
rivals of the world employ it, and thus either force them to its use, or the
loss of their commerce, and the gradual transference of their shipping and
trade into the hands of their rivals. Considered in its natural bearings, in its
direct influences and effects per se, it becomes even more evidently
Page 30
necessary, as the means of a ready and reliable knowledge of the condition,
wants, and movements of all those with whom a commercial nation
necessarily has business, or could or should create it.
The spirit of the age demands a more intimate acquaintance and
communication than we have hitherto had with the outer world. Our
knowledge of foreign lands has pointed out innumerable wants hitherto
unknown, and suggested innumerable channels of their supply. Nations
have learned to depend on each other as formerly neighbor depended on his
neighbor for any little necessary or luxury of life. The luxurious spirit of the
times requires the importation and exportation of an immense list of articles
with which foreign countries were formerly unacquainted, but which have
now become as indispensable as air, and light, and water. And if it is not
necessary that these many articles shall be transported from land to land
with the speed of the telegraph or the fleetness of the ocean steamer, it is at
any rate necessary that the facts concerning them, their ample or scarce
supply, their high or low price, their sale or purchase, their shipment or
arrival, their loss, or seizure, or detention, should be made known with all
of the combined speed of the telegraph, the lightning train, and the rapid
ocean mail steamer. If we possess ourselves these facilities of rapid, regular,
and reliable information to an extent that no other nation does, we will be
the first to reach the foreign market with our supplies, the first to bring the
foreign article into the markets of the world, and the proper recipients of the
first and largest profits of the cream of the trade of every land.
If we neglect these precautions, and refuse to establish these facilities,
because their cost is apparent in one small sum of expenditure, while their
large returns in profits diffused among the whole people are not so palpably
apparent to the common eye; if we leave to the genius and enterprise of the
people that which private enterprise and human skill unaided can never
accomplish; in a word, if we fail to keep up with the world around us, and
to progress pari passu with our wise, acute, and experienced commercial
rivals, then, as a matter of course, the information which we receive from
the foreign world must come through others, and those our rivals, and must
be deprived of its value by the advantage which they have already taken of
it. It is idle to suppose that any commercial nation on earth will not so
arrange her foreign post as to exclude others than her own citizens as much
wants, and movements of all those with whom a commercial nation
necessarily has business, or could or should create it.
The spirit of the age demands a more intimate acquaintance and
communication than we have hitherto had with the outer world. Our
knowledge of foreign lands has pointed out innumerable wants hitherto
unknown, and suggested innumerable channels of their supply. Nations
have learned to depend on each other as formerly neighbor depended on his
neighbor for any little necessary or luxury of life. The luxurious spirit of the
times requires the importation and exportation of an immense list of articles
with which foreign countries were formerly unacquainted, but which have
now become as indispensable as air, and light, and water. And if it is not
necessary that these many articles shall be transported from land to land
with the speed of the telegraph or the fleetness of the ocean steamer, it is at
any rate necessary that the facts concerning them, their ample or scarce
supply, their high or low price, their sale or purchase, their shipment or
arrival, their loss, or seizure, or detention, should be made known with all
of the combined speed of the telegraph, the lightning train, and the rapid
ocean mail steamer. If we possess ourselves these facilities of rapid, regular,
and reliable information to an extent that no other nation does, we will be
the first to reach the foreign market with our supplies, the first to bring the
foreign article into the markets of the world, and the proper recipients of the
first and largest profits of the cream of the trade of every land.
If we neglect these precautions, and refuse to establish these facilities,
because their cost is apparent in one small sum of expenditure, while their
large returns in profits diffused among the whole people are not so palpably
apparent to the common eye; if we leave to the genius and enterprise of the
people that which private enterprise and human skill unaided can never
accomplish; in a word, if we fail to keep up with the world around us, and
to progress pari passu with our wise, acute, and experienced commercial
rivals, then, as a matter of course, the information which we receive from
the foreign world must come through others, and those our rivals, and must
be deprived of its value by the advantage which they have already taken of
it. It is idle to suppose that any commercial nation on earth will not so
arrange her foreign post as to exclude others than her own citizens as much
Page 31
as possible from its benefits. This is a paramount duty of the government to
the citizen. It is therefore apparent that our commerce must of necessity
greatly suffer when its conduct is at all dependent on foreigners and
competitors, and that it is exceedingly desirable, for the avoidance of such a
calamity, that we should have independent and ample foreign mail facilities
of our own, wherever it is possible for our people to trade and obtain
wealth.
It is clearly impossible that other nations should afford these facilities, or
that our people should have confidence in them if attempted, or that they
could be in any sense reliable in those many cases of exigency, national
disputes, war, and accident, which usually afford us our best chances of
speculation and profit. A dependence on foreigners for this supply of
information, which never reaches us until it is emasculated of its virtues, is
extremely hazardous. It fails just at the point where it is most desirable.
Foreign nations, especially the commercial European nations, are constantly
at war, and are constantly interrupting their packet service. The late
Crimean and the present Indian wars are a good illustration. Our country,
isolated from the contending nations, and fortified against continual
ruptures by a policy of non-intervention, is peculiarly blessed with the
privilege and ability to regularly and unintermittingly conduct her
commerce and reap her profits, even more securely, while her rivals are
temporarily devoting their attention to war. Such being the fact, it is wholly
desirable and necessary to the end proposed that our steam post should on
all such occasions regularly come and go, even amid the din of battle, and
the conflict of our rivals, who for the time are powerless to oppose our
peaceful and legitimate commerce, and are generally but too glad to avail
its offerings.
There are many instances of the desirableness and the necessity of the
transmarine steam post on important lines of foreign communication where
we have a large trade, and yet no postal means of conducting it. Our
immense trade with Brazil and other portions of South-America, which if
properly fostered would increase with magic rapidity, sends its news and its
freight by the same vessel, or is compelled to use the necessarily selfishly
arranged, and circuitous, and non-connecting lines of Great Britain. A letter
destined for Brazil, four thousand miles distant, must needs go by England,
the citizen. It is therefore apparent that our commerce must of necessity
greatly suffer when its conduct is at all dependent on foreigners and
competitors, and that it is exceedingly desirable, for the avoidance of such a
calamity, that we should have independent and ample foreign mail facilities
of our own, wherever it is possible for our people to trade and obtain
wealth.
It is clearly impossible that other nations should afford these facilities, or
that our people should have confidence in them if attempted, or that they
could be in any sense reliable in those many cases of exigency, national
disputes, war, and accident, which usually afford us our best chances of
speculation and profit. A dependence on foreigners for this supply of
information, which never reaches us until it is emasculated of its virtues, is
extremely hazardous. It fails just at the point where it is most desirable.
Foreign nations, especially the commercial European nations, are constantly
at war, and are constantly interrupting their packet service. The late
Crimean and the present Indian wars are a good illustration. Our country,
isolated from the contending nations, and fortified against continual
ruptures by a policy of non-intervention, is peculiarly blessed with the
privilege and ability to regularly and unintermittingly conduct her
commerce and reap her profits, even more securely, while her rivals are
temporarily devoting their attention to war. Such being the fact, it is wholly
desirable and necessary to the end proposed that our steam post should on
all such occasions regularly come and go, even amid the din of battle, and
the conflict of our rivals, who for the time are powerless to oppose our
peaceful and legitimate commerce, and are generally but too glad to avail
its offerings.
There are many instances of the desirableness and the necessity of the
transmarine steam post on important lines of foreign communication where
we have a large trade, and yet no postal means of conducting it. Our
immense trade with Brazil and other portions of South-America, which if
properly fostered would increase with magic rapidity, sends its news and its
freight by the same vessel, or is compelled to use the necessarily selfishly
arranged, and circuitous, and non-connecting lines of Great Britain. A letter
destined for Brazil, four thousand miles distant, must needs go by England,
Page 32
Portugal, the Coast of Africa, Madeira, and the Cape de Verdes, a distance
of eight thousand miles, in a British packet. One destined for the Pacific
Coast of South-America must go to Panama and await the arrival of the
English packet, with London letters more recently dated, before it can
proceed on to Callao, Lima, or Valparaiso. Letters destined to the West-
Indies can go to Havana only, by American steamers; but they must there
await the British line which takes them to St. Thomas, and there be
distributed and forwarded to the various islands, the Spanish Main, the
Guianas, Venezuela, and New-Granada by some one of the ten different
British steam packet lines running semi-monthly from that station.
So with half of our letters which go to the Continent of Europe: they must
go by the Cunard line to England, and thence by English steamers to the
British Channel, the Baltic, the White Sea, the Mediterranean, Egypt,
Constantinople, or the Black Sea. Those to places along the coast of Africa
and to the Cape of Good Hope are dependent on the same English packet
transit. For our communication with China, India, Australia, the East-Indies
generally, and the Islands of the Pacific, we are entirely and slavishly
dependent, as usual, on Great Britain. Instead of sending our letters and
passengers direct from Panamá or San Francisco to Honolulu, Hong Kong,
Shanghae, Macáo, Calcutta, Ceylón, Bombáy, Madrás, Sydney, Melbourne,
Batavia, the Mauritius, and the Gulf of Mozambique, by a short trunk line
of our own steamers, and from its terminus only, by the British lines, they
now go first to England, as a slavish matter of course, then across the
Continent or through the Mediterranean to Egypt, thence by land to the Red
Sea, and thence to China and the East-Indies; or from England by her steam
lines around the Cape of Good Hope to Australia and the East-Indies; or by
slow and uncertain sailing packets direct from our own country, either
around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope. It is evident to every
reflecting man who has given the subject any attention, that all of these
lines of communication would be very desirable, and very highly profitable
to our people at large; and that the latter and that along the West Coast of
South-America could be easily established by two new contracts for that
purpose, or in some other way, to the great and lasting advantage of our
countrymen.
of eight thousand miles, in a British packet. One destined for the Pacific
Coast of South-America must go to Panama and await the arrival of the
English packet, with London letters more recently dated, before it can
proceed on to Callao, Lima, or Valparaiso. Letters destined to the West-
Indies can go to Havana only, by American steamers; but they must there
await the British line which takes them to St. Thomas, and there be
distributed and forwarded to the various islands, the Spanish Main, the
Guianas, Venezuela, and New-Granada by some one of the ten different
British steam packet lines running semi-monthly from that station.
So with half of our letters which go to the Continent of Europe: they must
go by the Cunard line to England, and thence by English steamers to the
British Channel, the Baltic, the White Sea, the Mediterranean, Egypt,
Constantinople, or the Black Sea. Those to places along the coast of Africa
and to the Cape of Good Hope are dependent on the same English packet
transit. For our communication with China, India, Australia, the East-Indies
generally, and the Islands of the Pacific, we are entirely and slavishly
dependent, as usual, on Great Britain. Instead of sending our letters and
passengers direct from Panamá or San Francisco to Honolulu, Hong Kong,
Shanghae, Macáo, Calcutta, Ceylón, Bombáy, Madrás, Sydney, Melbourne,
Batavia, the Mauritius, and the Gulf of Mozambique, by a short trunk line
of our own steamers, and from its terminus only, by the British lines, they
now go first to England, as a slavish matter of course, then across the
Continent or through the Mediterranean to Egypt, thence by land to the Red
Sea, and thence to China and the East-Indies; or from England by her steam
lines around the Cape of Good Hope to Australia and the East-Indies; or by
slow and uncertain sailing packets direct from our own country, either
around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope. It is evident to every
reflecting man who has given the subject any attention, that all of these
lines of communication would be very desirable, and very highly profitable
to our people at large; and that the latter and that along the West Coast of
South-America could be easily established by two new contracts for that
purpose, or in some other way, to the great and lasting advantage of our
countrymen.
Page 33
The transmarine post is very desirable for the better conduct of our foreign
diplomacy and the consular service. It is now almost impossible for our
ministers and agents abroad to hold any thing like a regular correspondence
with the State Department, unless it be those in Southern and Western
Europe. I was told last year by our Minister in Rio de Janeiro that his
dispatches from the Government at home seldom reached him under four
months; and Mr. Gilmer, the Consul of the United States at Bahia, reports,
in the "Consular Returns" now about to be published, that his dispatches
never come to hand under four months, that they are frequently out six
months, and that many are lost altogether. This is the experience and the
reïterated complaint of nearly every foreign employée of the Government,
who has any zeal in prosecuting his country's business, and may find it
necessary to get instructions or advice from home. Many knowing the
delays, uncertainty, and irregularity of correspondence, make no attempt
whatever to communicate regularly with the Department. We frequently
express great surprise that we have no intelligence from our ministers,
special ambassadors, and agents; but do not reflect that in the majority of
cases dispatches have to be sent by irresponsible and slow-sailing vessels,
or by the steamers of Great Britain, which it may be safely asserted are in
no particular hurry to deliver them to us. Three several letters sent by me at
separate times through the British mail from Rio de Janeiro for New-York
never reached their destination.
Nor is it better with our squadrons on foreign stations. They receive their
orders in the same slow and irregular way, and find it almost as easy to send
a vessel when they wish to communicate with the Navy Department, or
await the movements of their dull old storeships, as to attempt any other
means of intercourse. It may be safely said that they are not actually under
the control of the Department, in many important cases, one time in ten.
Whatever the dispute, it is left entirely at the will of the Commodore, or it
remains unsettled altogether. Our recent accumulated Paraguayan
difficulties is a case in point. American citizens were driven from the
country, and their valuable property confiscated. They applied to the
Commodore for relief, but could not obtain it. Our surveying vessel,
engaged in a permitted scientific exploration, was fired into and had some
of her men killed; and redress being demanded by the Captain from the
Commodore, it was refused. The Commodore feared transcending his
diplomacy and the consular service. It is now almost impossible for our
ministers and agents abroad to hold any thing like a regular correspondence
with the State Department, unless it be those in Southern and Western
Europe. I was told last year by our Minister in Rio de Janeiro that his
dispatches from the Government at home seldom reached him under four
months; and Mr. Gilmer, the Consul of the United States at Bahia, reports,
in the "Consular Returns" now about to be published, that his dispatches
never come to hand under four months, that they are frequently out six
months, and that many are lost altogether. This is the experience and the
reïterated complaint of nearly every foreign employée of the Government,
who has any zeal in prosecuting his country's business, and may find it
necessary to get instructions or advice from home. Many knowing the
delays, uncertainty, and irregularity of correspondence, make no attempt
whatever to communicate regularly with the Department. We frequently
express great surprise that we have no intelligence from our ministers,
special ambassadors, and agents; but do not reflect that in the majority of
cases dispatches have to be sent by irresponsible and slow-sailing vessels,
or by the steamers of Great Britain, which it may be safely asserted are in
no particular hurry to deliver them to us. Three several letters sent by me at
separate times through the British mail from Rio de Janeiro for New-York
never reached their destination.
Nor is it better with our squadrons on foreign stations. They receive their
orders in the same slow and irregular way, and find it almost as easy to send
a vessel when they wish to communicate with the Navy Department, or
await the movements of their dull old storeships, as to attempt any other
means of intercourse. It may be safely said that they are not actually under
the control of the Department, in many important cases, one time in ten.
Whatever the dispute, it is left entirely at the will of the Commodore, or it
remains unsettled altogether. Our recent accumulated Paraguayan
difficulties is a case in point. American citizens were driven from the
country, and their valuable property confiscated. They applied to the
Commodore for relief, but could not obtain it. Our surveying vessel,
engaged in a permitted scientific exploration, was fired into and had some
of her men killed; and redress being demanded by the Captain from the
Commodore, it was refused. The Commodore feared transcending his
Page 34
instructions: he could not communicate with the home authorities much
under a year; and so the case rested, and yet rests. These wants, papable as
they are in times of peace, become doubly pressing in time of war. Let a
conflict commence with England, or France, on whom we depend for mails,
or with their allies, and they could easily surprise and destroy every
squadron which we have upon the high seas months before they would
necessarily hear of a declaration of war, or know why they were captured.
The very contemplation of such possibilities is intolerable, and should be
sufficient of itself, setting aside all considerations of commerce and
diplomacy, to arouse our nation to the adoption of the proper means for its
safety and defense.
An effective steam postal marine is unquestionably most desirable and
necessary for the defense of our country, and for the prosecution of any
foreign war. Lord Canning, the British Post-Master General, recently said in
a report to the House of Lords, that although all of the steam mail packets
might not be able to carry an armament, or be required in the transport
service in time of war, yet the mail facilities which they would then afford
would be more important and necessary than at any other time. He had no
idea that because engaged in a foreign war the postal service would be
useless, but to the contrary, more than ever indispensable. Such proved to
be the fact in the late contest in the Crimea, and such is to-day the case with
regard to the troubles in India and China. Their postal vessels have proven a
first necessity in both of these wars, not only for transport of the troops, but
for speedy intelligence also. Without them, England could not have entered
the Crimean contest, and the French forces would have been compelled to
remain at home. Turkey would have been overawed, and Constantinople
would have fallen before the Russian fleet. We are to-day, and always must
be, liable to a foreign war. We have a great boiling cauldron running over
with excitement all along our southern and south-western borders. Central
America, Cuba, the West-Indies, and South-America are far more foreign
countries to us than Europe or the Mediterranean to England. Cuba will no
doubt be at some day our most important naval station and possession. Even
the defense of our own coast would require an immense transport service;
for Texas is nearly four thousand miles from Maine, and California is seven
thousand from the Atlantic seaboard. No better proof can be given of the
necessity of a large and extra naval transport service than the late Mexican
under a year; and so the case rested, and yet rests. These wants, papable as
they are in times of peace, become doubly pressing in time of war. Let a
conflict commence with England, or France, on whom we depend for mails,
or with their allies, and they could easily surprise and destroy every
squadron which we have upon the high seas months before they would
necessarily hear of a declaration of war, or know why they were captured.
The very contemplation of such possibilities is intolerable, and should be
sufficient of itself, setting aside all considerations of commerce and
diplomacy, to arouse our nation to the adoption of the proper means for its
safety and defense.
An effective steam postal marine is unquestionably most desirable and
necessary for the defense of our country, and for the prosecution of any
foreign war. Lord Canning, the British Post-Master General, recently said in
a report to the House of Lords, that although all of the steam mail packets
might not be able to carry an armament, or be required in the transport
service in time of war, yet the mail facilities which they would then afford
would be more important and necessary than at any other time. He had no
idea that because engaged in a foreign war the postal service would be
useless, but to the contrary, more than ever indispensable. Such proved to
be the fact in the late contest in the Crimea, and such is to-day the case with
regard to the troubles in India and China. Their postal vessels have proven a
first necessity in both of these wars, not only for transport of the troops, but
for speedy intelligence also. Without them, England could not have entered
the Crimean contest, and the French forces would have been compelled to
remain at home. Turkey would have been overawed, and Constantinople
would have fallen before the Russian fleet. We are to-day, and always must
be, liable to a foreign war. We have a great boiling cauldron running over
with excitement all along our southern and south-western borders. Central
America, Cuba, the West-Indies, and South-America are far more foreign
countries to us than Europe or the Mediterranean to England. Cuba will no
doubt be at some day our most important naval station and possession. Even
the defense of our own coast would require an immense transport service;
for Texas is nearly four thousand miles from Maine, and California is seven
thousand from the Atlantic seaboard. No better proof can be given of the
necessity of a large and extra naval transport service than the late Mexican
Page 35
war. But for our steamers it would have taken us years to concentrate an
army on the shores of Mexico. It was a tedious process at the time; for our
ocean mail packets were not then in use. We could now land a larger
number of men there in one month than we then did in a whole year. But
our transport facilities are not yet by any means adequate.
A large postal steam marine is desirable as a means of cultivating the
sympathies and respect of foreign nations, by bringing them into closer
friendly and commercial connection with us; and for creating among them
that respect and consideration which the British statesmen so well know to
be an easy means of conducting diplomacy, and an unfailing source of
commercial advantages. It is not necessary that we shall impose upon
foreign countries in these respects by false pretenses; but it is truly
desirable, and it would be profitable to an extent little imagined, to let them
know our real importance as a nation, and understand our pacific policy and
bona fide intentions. These are important considerations when we wish to
carry any point, establish any line of policy, remove any prejudice; and
nothing will more readily produce them, and arouse attention to our articles
of export, and induce a people to establish a regular business with us, than
these ever-present, convenient, and imposing mail steamers. Nations as well
as individuals estimate us by our appearances; and while it is not desirable
that we shall appear more than we are, it is yet very important that foreign
nations with which we have business shall know our real merits, and respect
us for what we are intrinsically worth. There is evidently no means of our
commercial triumph over other nations without a liberal and widely
extended steam mail service; and as this triumph is of paramount
importance to us, who have so many resources, so is the ocean steam mail
as the only means of securing it. (See views of Gen. Rusk, in papers
appended.)
It has recently been suggested by parties who certainly have not thought
very deeply on the subject, that the completion of the Atlantic Telegraph,
which every body reasonably expects soon to be completed, will so
inaugurate a new era in the transmission of intelligence, that one of its
effects will be the supersession of fast ocean mails, and consequently of
subsidized steamers. It is a first and palpable view of this question that
much of the important intelligence between the two countries requiring
army on the shores of Mexico. It was a tedious process at the time; for our
ocean mail packets were not then in use. We could now land a larger
number of men there in one month than we then did in a whole year. But
our transport facilities are not yet by any means adequate.
A large postal steam marine is desirable as a means of cultivating the
sympathies and respect of foreign nations, by bringing them into closer
friendly and commercial connection with us; and for creating among them
that respect and consideration which the British statesmen so well know to
be an easy means of conducting diplomacy, and an unfailing source of
commercial advantages. It is not necessary that we shall impose upon
foreign countries in these respects by false pretenses; but it is truly
desirable, and it would be profitable to an extent little imagined, to let them
know our real importance as a nation, and understand our pacific policy and
bona fide intentions. These are important considerations when we wish to
carry any point, establish any line of policy, remove any prejudice; and
nothing will more readily produce them, and arouse attention to our articles
of export, and induce a people to establish a regular business with us, than
these ever-present, convenient, and imposing mail steamers. Nations as well
as individuals estimate us by our appearances; and while it is not desirable
that we shall appear more than we are, it is yet very important that foreign
nations with which we have business shall know our real merits, and respect
us for what we are intrinsically worth. There is evidently no means of our
commercial triumph over other nations without a liberal and widely
extended steam mail service; and as this triumph is of paramount
importance to us, who have so many resources, so is the ocean steam mail
as the only means of securing it. (See views of Gen. Rusk, in papers
appended.)
It has recently been suggested by parties who certainly have not thought
very deeply on the subject, that the completion of the Atlantic Telegraph,
which every body reasonably expects soon to be completed, will so
inaugurate a new era in the transmission of intelligence, that one of its
effects will be the supersession of fast ocean mails, and consequently of
subsidized steamers. It is a first and palpable view of this question that
much of the important intelligence between the two countries requiring
Page 36
speedy transmission will be sent through the telegraph, notwithstanding the
necessarily high prices which will be charged for dispatches. These
communications will be sententious, summary, and of great variety. The
markets, prices, important political and other events, private personal and
unelaborated intelligence will come over the wires just as they now come
over existing land lines. The line will create extra facilities for operations
on both sides, and cause more mutual business to be done. It will thus
create the necessity for more correspondence than before, for particulars,
elaboration, items, bills of lading, exchanges, duplicates, minute
instructions, etc., to which there will be no end. The main transaction of any
business being made more quickly, it will be essential for the papers to pass
with greater dispatch. If there were twenty telegraphic wires working day
and night, which never can be the case from their expensiveness, they could
not do in a month the correspondence and business done by one steamer's
mail. Beside this, those who got their dispatches first would have a decided
advantage over those who would be compelled from the mass of business to
wait several days. It is an advantage of the steam mails that all get their
letters and papers at the same time; and that no one has thus the advantage
of the other. It is hardly possible for one unacquainted with the postal
business to conceive how large a mass of mail matter is deposited by each
steamer; and it is only necessary to see this to realize that the Atlantic
Telegraph will never materially interfere with the steamers except to require
of them greater speed and heavier mails.
It is the experience on all of our land routes that the thousands of miles of
telegraph, so far from superseding the mails, have made more mails
necessary, have caused and required them to be much faster, have
necessitated more correspondence, and induced people to live in more
mutual dependence, to have more communication with one another, and to
make the home or the business of a man less than formerly his closed castle,
which none entered, and which no one had any occasion to enter. The
American telegraph has now arrived at great perfection, and sends its
electric throb to every corner of the Union, save California only. At the
same time, the railroads of the country are taxed to their highest capacity.
No period ever witnessed so many, so rapid, and so well-filled mails. It is
evident that no telegraphic system can properly do detailed business. First,
it is and must ever remain too costly. Second, it would require about as
necessarily high prices which will be charged for dispatches. These
communications will be sententious, summary, and of great variety. The
markets, prices, important political and other events, private personal and
unelaborated intelligence will come over the wires just as they now come
over existing land lines. The line will create extra facilities for operations
on both sides, and cause more mutual business to be done. It will thus
create the necessity for more correspondence than before, for particulars,
elaboration, items, bills of lading, exchanges, duplicates, minute
instructions, etc., to which there will be no end. The main transaction of any
business being made more quickly, it will be essential for the papers to pass
with greater dispatch. If there were twenty telegraphic wires working day
and night, which never can be the case from their expensiveness, they could
not do in a month the correspondence and business done by one steamer's
mail. Beside this, those who got their dispatches first would have a decided
advantage over those who would be compelled from the mass of business to
wait several days. It is an advantage of the steam mails that all get their
letters and papers at the same time; and that no one has thus the advantage
of the other. It is hardly possible for one unacquainted with the postal
business to conceive how large a mass of mail matter is deposited by each
steamer; and it is only necessary to see this to realize that the Atlantic
Telegraph will never materially interfere with the steamers except to require
of them greater speed and heavier mails.
It is the experience on all of our land routes that the thousands of miles of
telegraph, so far from superseding the mails, have made more mails
necessary, have caused and required them to be much faster, have
necessitated more correspondence, and induced people to live in more
mutual dependence, to have more communication with one another, and to
make the home or the business of a man less than formerly his closed castle,
which none entered, and which no one had any occasion to enter. The
American telegraph has now arrived at great perfection, and sends its
electric throb to every corner of the Union, save California only. At the
same time, the railroads of the country are taxed to their highest capacity.
No period ever witnessed so many, so rapid, and so well-filled mails. It is
evident that no telegraphic system can properly do detailed business. First,
it is and must ever remain too costly. Second, it would require about as
Page 37
many lines as business men, to give them all equal chances, and no one the
profitable precedence. Next, there is nothing positively accurate and fully
reliable. No signatures can pass over the line. No transaction can be made
final by it. No bank will pay, or ought to pay, money on public telegraphic
drafts. And, as in the land service, so in the ocean. The telegraph across the
ocean will simply create far more business for the mails, and make it
desirable and indispensable that they shall be sent and received by the most
rapid conveyance known to the times. Thus, it is evident that this new and
as yet not fully established agent of international communication, so far
from obviating our rapid transmarine service, will but the more effectually
necessitate it.
Nor must it be forgotten that our commercial prosperity largely depends on
the ready and comfortable transit of passengers. The passenger traffic has
increased with astonishing rapidity during the last eighteen years. Our
smaller merchants can go abroad when mail steamers are plenty, and make
their own purchases and sales, without paying heavy commissions and high
prices to middlemen; do their business on less capital; and thus benefit
themselves and reduce the prices to our consumers. Compared with sailing
vessels, these few mail steamers become the forerunners of trade and
commerce, and create an immense service for the sail. They enable us to
save large sums of interest or advances on merchandise consigned, and give
to us quick returns from the products which we ship abroad. This has long
been evident to Great Britain, and she has acted liberally on the suggestion.
So desirable is the service for the general prosperity of her people, that she
expends annually for her foreign steam mails nearly six millions of dollars,
while they do not return to the treasury much above three. She regards the
expenditure as she does that for the navy and the army, a necessity for the
public preservation and prosperity.
As regards the lines that we now have, they are among the noblest in the
world. For aggregate comfort, convenience, safety, speed, and cheapness,
they are not equalled by the most famous British lines. More luxurious
tables, more neatness, cleanliness, and roominess, more general comforts
than have always been characteristic of our Havre, Liverpool, and
California lines, can not be found in the world. The only objection to them
is, that the service is not sufficient; that the trips are not frequent enough;
profitable precedence. Next, there is nothing positively accurate and fully
reliable. No signatures can pass over the line. No transaction can be made
final by it. No bank will pay, or ought to pay, money on public telegraphic
drafts. And, as in the land service, so in the ocean. The telegraph across the
ocean will simply create far more business for the mails, and make it
desirable and indispensable that they shall be sent and received by the most
rapid conveyance known to the times. Thus, it is evident that this new and
as yet not fully established agent of international communication, so far
from obviating our rapid transmarine service, will but the more effectually
necessitate it.
Nor must it be forgotten that our commercial prosperity largely depends on
the ready and comfortable transit of passengers. The passenger traffic has
increased with astonishing rapidity during the last eighteen years. Our
smaller merchants can go abroad when mail steamers are plenty, and make
their own purchases and sales, without paying heavy commissions and high
prices to middlemen; do their business on less capital; and thus benefit
themselves and reduce the prices to our consumers. Compared with sailing
vessels, these few mail steamers become the forerunners of trade and
commerce, and create an immense service for the sail. They enable us to
save large sums of interest or advances on merchandise consigned, and give
to us quick returns from the products which we ship abroad. This has long
been evident to Great Britain, and she has acted liberally on the suggestion.
So desirable is the service for the general prosperity of her people, that she
expends annually for her foreign steam mails nearly six millions of dollars,
while they do not return to the treasury much above three. She regards the
expenditure as she does that for the navy and the army, a necessity for the
public preservation and prosperity.
As regards the lines that we now have, they are among the noblest in the
world. For aggregate comfort, convenience, safety, speed, and cheapness,
they are not equalled by the most famous British lines. More luxurious
tables, more neatness, cleanliness, and roominess, more general comforts
than have always been characteristic of our Havre, Liverpool, and
California lines, can not be found in the world. The only objection to them
is, that the service is not sufficient; that the trips are not frequent enough;
Page 38
and that the companies are not enabled to sustain a larger steam marine
which would proportionally cheapen the service, and accommodate more
persons and a much larger class of interests. Our experiences of the benefits
of existing lines, limited as those lines are, present an unanswerable
argument for the desirableness and necessity of a liberal steam postal
system, and a large and judicious extension of the present service. (See
views of Senate Committee, 1852, Paper E.)
which would proportionally cheapen the service, and accommodate more
persons and a much larger class of interests. Our experiences of the benefits
of existing lines, limited as those lines are, present an unanswerable
argument for the desirableness and necessity of a liberal steam postal
system, and a large and judicious extension of the present service. (See
views of Senate Committee, 1852, Paper E.)
Page 39
SECTION III.
THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.
the commercial capabilities of ocean steam: steam mails arrive and depart
at absolutely fixed periods: uncertainty is hazardous and costly:
subsidized steamers give a necessarily high speed to the mails: money can
not afford to lie upon the ocean for weeks: compared with sail: steamers
transport certain classes of freight: the havre and the cunard lines: the
cunard propellers: steamers can afford to transport express packages
and goods: goods taken only to fill up: why propellers are cheaper in
some cases: steam in some cases cheaper than the wind: an estimate: the
propeller for coasting: steam on its own receipts has not succeeded on
the ocean: marine and fluvial navigation compared: most freights not
transportable by steam on any conditions: auxiliary freighting and
emigrant propellers: laws of transport: rapid mails and leisure transport
of freight the law of nature: the price of coals rapidly increasing:
anticipated improvements and cheapening in marine propulsion not
realized.
Believing that no further arguments or facts are necessary to show that a
rapid steam mail marine is desirable and essential to the successful
government of the country, to our foreign commerce, and to the growth of
individual interests and a general prosperity of the people, I shall now make
some few inquiries concerning the Commercial Capabilities of steam, as the
most effective agent for the rapid transit of the ocean, and the most
expensive agent for the transport of goods. After this, it will be necessary to
examine into the Cost of Steam, as a subject closely allied to its general
capabilities.
Whatever may be said of the wind as a cheap agent of locomotion, this
much may be safely predicated of steam vessels for the mails; that their
time of departure and arrival has an absolute fixity which is attainable by no
other means, and which is highly conducive to the best interests of all those
THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.
the commercial capabilities of ocean steam: steam mails arrive and depart
at absolutely fixed periods: uncertainty is hazardous and costly:
subsidized steamers give a necessarily high speed to the mails: money can
not afford to lie upon the ocean for weeks: compared with sail: steamers
transport certain classes of freight: the havre and the cunard lines: the
cunard propellers: steamers can afford to transport express packages
and goods: goods taken only to fill up: why propellers are cheaper in
some cases: steam in some cases cheaper than the wind: an estimate: the
propeller for coasting: steam on its own receipts has not succeeded on
the ocean: marine and fluvial navigation compared: most freights not
transportable by steam on any conditions: auxiliary freighting and
emigrant propellers: laws of transport: rapid mails and leisure transport
of freight the law of nature: the price of coals rapidly increasing:
anticipated improvements and cheapening in marine propulsion not
realized.
Believing that no further arguments or facts are necessary to show that a
rapid steam mail marine is desirable and essential to the successful
government of the country, to our foreign commerce, and to the growth of
individual interests and a general prosperity of the people, I shall now make
some few inquiries concerning the Commercial Capabilities of steam, as the
most effective agent for the rapid transit of the ocean, and the most
expensive agent for the transport of goods. After this, it will be necessary to
examine into the Cost of Steam, as a subject closely allied to its general
capabilities.
Whatever may be said of the wind as a cheap agent of locomotion, this
much may be safely predicated of steam vessels for the mails; that their
time of departure and arrival has an absolute fixity which is attainable by no
other means, and which is highly conducive to the best interests of all those
Page 40
for whom commerce is conducted. No reasoning is necessary to show to the
man of business, or even to the pleasure-seeker, the importance of
approximate certainty as to the time when the mail leaves and when he can
receive an answer to his dispatches. He may not be able to give clearly
philosophic reasons for it; yet he feels the necessity in his business; and it
certainly relieves him of many painful doubts, if nothing more. Uncertainty
in commercial operations is always hazardous and costly to the great mass
of the people, who as a general thing pay more for whatever they get, on the
principle that we seldom take a venture in an uncertain thing unless it holds
out inducements of large profit, or unless we get a high price for
guarantying it. So in commercial correspondence, which constitutes the
great bulk of the ocean mails. Let uncertainty prevail for but three or four
days beyond the time when we should have news from abroad, and every
body is in doubt, every body speculates, and in the end every body is
injured.
Nor is this certainty in the time of arrival and departure of the mails more
desirable than their speed. The common sense of the world has settled down
upon the necessity of rapid mails; and all of the ingenuity of the age is now
taxed to its very highest to secure more speed in the transmission of
intelligence. Many interests demand it. Money, which represents labor, is
continually lent and borrowed in bills of exchange, acceptances, deposits,
and in actual cash sent across the seas. The length of time for passing the
bills and correspondence, or the specie itself, thus becomes an exceedingly
important item to those who are to use them, and consequently to the
ultimate consumer for whom they are conducting the commercial
transaction. What community would to-day tolerate the idea of sending
three millions of dollars per week, and five millions of credits between
England and the United States on a sailing ship of whatever quality, with
the probability of keeping it lying unproductive on the ocean for thirty
days? Extend this to weekly shipments of the same amounts, and have at
one time on the waters between the two countries twelve million dollars in
specie and twenty in credits, tossing about the ocean, unproductive and
unsafe, and entailing all of the evils incident to the uncertainty as to the
time when it will arrive. But if this is not sufficient, extend the inquiry to
South-America, and China, and India, and see how enormous and useless a
waste of money and interest is incurred in the many millions which by
man of business, or even to the pleasure-seeker, the importance of
approximate certainty as to the time when the mail leaves and when he can
receive an answer to his dispatches. He may not be able to give clearly
philosophic reasons for it; yet he feels the necessity in his business; and it
certainly relieves him of many painful doubts, if nothing more. Uncertainty
in commercial operations is always hazardous and costly to the great mass
of the people, who as a general thing pay more for whatever they get, on the
principle that we seldom take a venture in an uncertain thing unless it holds
out inducements of large profit, or unless we get a high price for
guarantying it. So in commercial correspondence, which constitutes the
great bulk of the ocean mails. Let uncertainty prevail for but three or four
days beyond the time when we should have news from abroad, and every
body is in doubt, every body speculates, and in the end every body is
injured.
Nor is this certainty in the time of arrival and departure of the mails more
desirable than their speed. The common sense of the world has settled down
upon the necessity of rapid mails; and all of the ingenuity of the age is now
taxed to its very highest to secure more speed in the transmission of
intelligence. Many interests demand it. Money, which represents labor, is
continually lent and borrowed in bills of exchange, acceptances, deposits,
and in actual cash sent across the seas. The length of time for passing the
bills and correspondence, or the specie itself, thus becomes an exceedingly
important item to those who are to use them, and consequently to the
ultimate consumer for whom they are conducting the commercial
transaction. What community would to-day tolerate the idea of sending
three millions of dollars per week, and five millions of credits between
England and the United States on a sailing ship of whatever quality, with
the probability of keeping it lying unproductive on the ocean for thirty
days? Extend this to weekly shipments of the same amounts, and have at
one time on the waters between the two countries twelve million dollars in
specie and twenty in credits, tossing about the ocean, unproductive and
unsafe, and entailing all of the evils incident to the uncertainty as to the
time when it will arrive. But if this is not sufficient, extend the inquiry to
South-America, and China, and India, and see how enormous and useless a
waste of money and interest is incurred in the many millions which by
Page 41
sailing vessels and slow steamers is fruitlessly gilding the ocean for months.
Money is too valuable and interest too high to keep so many millions of it
locked up from the world. At two and three per cent a month, the nation, or,
what is the same thing, its commercial and mercantile classes, as
representing the producing, would soon become bankrupt.
The only avoidance of these evident evils is in a rapid transmission of the
mails, specie, and passengers. And herein consists the chief value of the
rapid ocean steamer. It is an important case which the Telegraph, with all of
its benefits, can never reach. It can never transmit specie; neither the
evidences of debt nor of property. The voluminous mails, with all of their
tedious details, upon which such transactions depend, must go and come on
steamers, and on steamers only. They have the certainty, which will satisfy
men and prevent speculation, gambling, and imposition; they have the
speed, which shortens credit, keeps specie alway in active use, and enables
commercial men to know, meet, and supply the wants of the world before
they become costly or crushing; and they give a rapid and comfortable
transit to passengers, who can thus look after their business, and save much
to themselves and to the producer and consumer. Compared with sailing
vessels their efficiency is really wondrous. Foreign correspondence was
formerly very limited, and the interchange of interests, feelings, and
opinions was slow and tedious. Each nation depended solely on itself; and
instead of the brotherhood now prevailing, communicated through the
costly channels of war, by messages of the cannon, and in powerful, hostile
fleets. But the foreign correspondence of the world is really enormous, and
rapidly increasing, since the introduction of ocean steamers; and no one will
say that they have had a small share in producing that fraternal international
spirit which is now so widely manifested in Peace Congresses, Congresses
of the Five Powers, explanations, concessions, and amicable adjustments of
difficulties. The peaceful influences and the civilization of the times are but
another comment on the capabilities of steam.
There are also certain classes of freights which steam is better calculated
than sailing vessels to transport; certain rich and costly goods which would
either damage or depreciate if not brought speedily into the market. There
are many articles also, as gold and silver ware, jewelry, diamonds, bullion,
etc., and some articles of vertu as well as use, which are costly, and have to
Money is too valuable and interest too high to keep so many millions of it
locked up from the world. At two and three per cent a month, the nation, or,
what is the same thing, its commercial and mercantile classes, as
representing the producing, would soon become bankrupt.
The only avoidance of these evident evils is in a rapid transmission of the
mails, specie, and passengers. And herein consists the chief value of the
rapid ocean steamer. It is an important case which the Telegraph, with all of
its benefits, can never reach. It can never transmit specie; neither the
evidences of debt nor of property. The voluminous mails, with all of their
tedious details, upon which such transactions depend, must go and come on
steamers, and on steamers only. They have the certainty, which will satisfy
men and prevent speculation, gambling, and imposition; they have the
speed, which shortens credit, keeps specie alway in active use, and enables
commercial men to know, meet, and supply the wants of the world before
they become costly or crushing; and they give a rapid and comfortable
transit to passengers, who can thus look after their business, and save much
to themselves and to the producer and consumer. Compared with sailing
vessels their efficiency is really wondrous. Foreign correspondence was
formerly very limited, and the interchange of interests, feelings, and
opinions was slow and tedious. Each nation depended solely on itself; and
instead of the brotherhood now prevailing, communicated through the
costly channels of war, by messages of the cannon, and in powerful, hostile
fleets. But the foreign correspondence of the world is really enormous, and
rapidly increasing, since the introduction of ocean steamers; and no one will
say that they have had a small share in producing that fraternal international
spirit which is now so widely manifested in Peace Congresses, Congresses
of the Five Powers, explanations, concessions, and amicable adjustments of
difficulties. The peaceful influences and the civilization of the times are but
another comment on the capabilities of steam.
There are also certain classes of freights which steam is better calculated
than sailing vessels to transport; certain rich and costly goods which would
either damage or depreciate if not brought speedily into the market. There
are many articles also, as gold and silver ware, jewelry, diamonds, bullion,
etc., and some articles of vertu as well as use, which are costly, and have to
Page 42
be insured at high values unless sent on steamers; and which consequently
can pay a rather better price. As in the case of specie, they are too valuable
to be kept long on the ocean; but in the general traffic of the world there is
so little of this class of freight that steamers can place no reliance on it as a
source of income. These freights have abounded most between France and
England and the United States. This is the principal reason why the New-
York and Havre line of mail steamers has run on so unprecedentedly small a
subsidy; a sum not more than half adequate to the support of a mail line but
for that class of freights. The Cunard line has also derived a large sum of its
support from the same source. All such articles passing by that line come
from England, Ireland, and Scotland, where they are manufactured; and
being shipped by British merchants, are given, as a matter of duty, to their
own steamers. Another reason for the Cunard line getting most of those
more profitable freights is that a steamer leaves every week; every
Saturday; and shippers sending packages weekly are not compelled every
other week to hunt up a new line, and open a new set of accounts, as would
be the case if they attempted to ship by the Collins semi-monthly line.
These freights have hitherto proven a profitable source of income to that
line. As there is no manufacturing done in this country for Europe, the
Cunarders and the Havre as well as the Collins and Vanderbilt lines, have
no freights that pay the handling from the United States to Europe. And not
only has the Cunard line, by starting from home, taken all of these
profitable freights from the Collins, but it has run a weekly line of
propellers from Havre and taken the freight over to Liverpool free of charge
for its New-York and Boston steamers, and thereby shared the freights and
greatly reduced the income of the Havre line. There being a great
superabundance of propeller stock in Great Britain, which can be purchased
frequently at less than half its cost, and these vessels running the short
distance between Havre and Liverpool very cheaply, (See pages 108-13,)
the Cunarders have cut the Havre freights down from forty to fifteen dollars
per ton, and sometimes for months together to ten dollars per ton. As a
matter of course, this price would not pay the handling and care of these
costly articles; but at fifteen dollars it enabled the Cunard line to fill their
ships and derive some profit; as most of them, with the exception of the
Persia, run slowly, use less coal, and have more freight room. All of these
freights are, however, small in quantity, and not much to be relied on from
can pay a rather better price. As in the case of specie, they are too valuable
to be kept long on the ocean; but in the general traffic of the world there is
so little of this class of freight that steamers can place no reliance on it as a
source of income. These freights have abounded most between France and
England and the United States. This is the principal reason why the New-
York and Havre line of mail steamers has run on so unprecedentedly small a
subsidy; a sum not more than half adequate to the support of a mail line but
for that class of freights. The Cunard line has also derived a large sum of its
support from the same source. All such articles passing by that line come
from England, Ireland, and Scotland, where they are manufactured; and
being shipped by British merchants, are given, as a matter of duty, to their
own steamers. Another reason for the Cunard line getting most of those
more profitable freights is that a steamer leaves every week; every
Saturday; and shippers sending packages weekly are not compelled every
other week to hunt up a new line, and open a new set of accounts, as would
be the case if they attempted to ship by the Collins semi-monthly line.
These freights have hitherto proven a profitable source of income to that
line. As there is no manufacturing done in this country for Europe, the
Cunarders and the Havre as well as the Collins and Vanderbilt lines, have
no freights that pay the handling from the United States to Europe. And not
only has the Cunard line, by starting from home, taken all of these
profitable freights from the Collins, but it has run a weekly line of
propellers from Havre and taken the freight over to Liverpool free of charge
for its New-York and Boston steamers, and thereby shared the freights and
greatly reduced the income of the Havre line. There being a great
superabundance of propeller stock in Great Britain, which can be purchased
frequently at less than half its cost, and these vessels running the short
distance between Havre and Liverpool very cheaply, (See pages 108-13,)
the Cunarders have cut the Havre freights down from forty to fifteen dollars
per ton, and sometimes for months together to ten dollars per ton. As a
matter of course, this price would not pay the handling and care of these
costly articles; but at fifteen dollars it enabled the Cunard line to fill their
ships and derive some profit; as most of them, with the exception of the
Persia, run slowly, use less coal, and have more freight room. All of these
freights are, however, small in quantity, and not much to be relied on from
Page 43
year to year, as will be seen below, in consequence of the action of
propellers.
There is another class of business which mail steamers can do at
remunerating prices; but which is exceedingly limited anywhere, and not at
all known on some lines. This is in Express packages. They pay a high
price; but seldom reach more than three or four tons under the most
favorable circumstances. In the early stages of the California lines, when
there was a rush of travel to the gold regions, and a hurried transit required
for a thousand little necessaries of life, the New-York and Aspinwall and the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company's lines transported a large express freight
outward at every voyage, amounting sometimes to two hundred tons; but
the golden days of such cargo have long gone by, and California is now
supplied like the rest of the world by the cheaper and more deliberate
transport of sailing vessels; and the steamers are left to their legitimate
business of mails and passengers. Taking together all of the classes of
freights which steamers having mail payment are capable of transporting,
they amount at present to but an insignificant part of the income by which
these steamers can be run. During the last six years these freights have
reduced more than one hundred per cent; and goods which were then
profitable to the steamer, are now taken only "to fill up." And the chief
reason for this reduction arises not so much from competition between the
steam-lines, which well knew that they could not transport these freights
when reduced to the present low prices, but from the introduction of a large
number of propellers, some of which were originally designed for this
species of trade, and many others which were built during the war in the
Crimea for the transport of troops. These ships were never prosperous
anywhere, and are in nearly all cases at the present found in second hands;
the original proprietors having lost a large share of their investment. Thus,
purchased cheaply, and running with simply an auxiliary steam power, and
making the passages but little shorter than the sailing vessels, and not even
so short as their best passages, they have but little more daily expense than
the sailing vessels, with all of the deceptive advantages of being called
steamers. They thus get these better freights and a large number of
immigrants, which with small interest on prime cost enables them to live.
propellers.
There is another class of business which mail steamers can do at
remunerating prices; but which is exceedingly limited anywhere, and not at
all known on some lines. This is in Express packages. They pay a high
price; but seldom reach more than three or four tons under the most
favorable circumstances. In the early stages of the California lines, when
there was a rush of travel to the gold regions, and a hurried transit required
for a thousand little necessaries of life, the New-York and Aspinwall and the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company's lines transported a large express freight
outward at every voyage, amounting sometimes to two hundred tons; but
the golden days of such cargo have long gone by, and California is now
supplied like the rest of the world by the cheaper and more deliberate
transport of sailing vessels; and the steamers are left to their legitimate
business of mails and passengers. Taking together all of the classes of
freights which steamers having mail payment are capable of transporting,
they amount at present to but an insignificant part of the income by which
these steamers can be run. During the last six years these freights have
reduced more than one hundred per cent; and goods which were then
profitable to the steamer, are now taken only "to fill up." And the chief
reason for this reduction arises not so much from competition between the
steam-lines, which well knew that they could not transport these freights
when reduced to the present low prices, but from the introduction of a large
number of propellers, some of which were originally designed for this
species of trade, and many others which were built during the war in the
Crimea for the transport of troops. These ships were never prosperous
anywhere, and are in nearly all cases at the present found in second hands;
the original proprietors having lost a large share of their investment. Thus,
purchased cheaply, and running with simply an auxiliary steam power, and
making the passages but little shorter than the sailing vessels, and not even
so short as their best passages, they have but little more daily expense than
the sailing vessels, with all of the deceptive advantages of being called
steamers. They thus get these better freights and a large number of
immigrants, which with small interest on prime cost enables them to live.
Page 44
Paradoxical as it may seem, there are yet some cases, even upon the ocean,
in which steam can transport freight cheaper than the winds of heaven. And
this species of trade constitutes one of the best capabilities of steam power
applied to navigation. It is not in the long voyage between Europe and
America, or between the East and California, or yet in the far-off trade
among the calms and pacific seas of the East-Indies and the Pacific Islands;
it is not in the smooth, lake-like seas of the West-Indies, where there is no
freight whose transport price will pay for putting it on and taking it off the
steamer; nor in the trade of Brazil whence a bag of coffee can be
transported five thousand miles to New-York nearly as cheaply as it can
from New-York to Baltimore or to Charleston; but it is in the coasting trade
of almost every country, where the voyage is short. In the trade between
New-York and Baltimore, between Charleston and Savannah, between
Boston and Portland, or between New-Orleans and Key West, or New-
Orleans and Galveston, the small sailing vessels spend one half of their time
in working in and out of the harbors. Sometimes they are two days awaiting
winds, to get out of a harbor, two days in sailing, and two days again in
making and entering their port of destination; whereas a steamer would
make the whole passage in one day to a day and a half. Now, the distance
actually to be run, and for which the steamer will be compelled to burn coal
is not very great; but the trouble of working the vessel in and out, against
adverse winds and currents, and amid storms and calms, is sometimes
excessive, while the delay and cost are disheartening. They have also the
trouble of warping into and out of the docks, which is not the case with
steamers.
Thus, it frequently takes a week for a sailing vessel to do the work that a
steamer will readily do in twenty-four to thirty-six hours. Say that it takes
the sail four times as long as the steamer to accomplish a given voyage. To
do as much business as the steamer would do in the same time, would
require four sailing vessels; four times as many men as one sail requires, or
probably twice as many hands in the aggregate as the steamer would have;
and would incur at least twice the expense of the steamer in feeding them.
Now, there is also a much larger aggregate sum invested in these four sail,
and the owners pay a much larger sum of interest on their prime investment.
Or, in other words, the steamer with but a few more men, but little greater
expense in living, a small coal-bill, an engineer and firemen, and a prime
in which steam can transport freight cheaper than the winds of heaven. And
this species of trade constitutes one of the best capabilities of steam power
applied to navigation. It is not in the long voyage between Europe and
America, or between the East and California, or yet in the far-off trade
among the calms and pacific seas of the East-Indies and the Pacific Islands;
it is not in the smooth, lake-like seas of the West-Indies, where there is no
freight whose transport price will pay for putting it on and taking it off the
steamer; nor in the trade of Brazil whence a bag of coffee can be
transported five thousand miles to New-York nearly as cheaply as it can
from New-York to Baltimore or to Charleston; but it is in the coasting trade
of almost every country, where the voyage is short. In the trade between
New-York and Baltimore, between Charleston and Savannah, between
Boston and Portland, or between New-Orleans and Key West, or New-
Orleans and Galveston, the small sailing vessels spend one half of their time
in working in and out of the harbors. Sometimes they are two days awaiting
winds, to get out of a harbor, two days in sailing, and two days again in
making and entering their port of destination; whereas a steamer would
make the whole passage in one day to a day and a half. Now, the distance
actually to be run, and for which the steamer will be compelled to burn coal
is not very great; but the trouble of working the vessel in and out, against
adverse winds and currents, and amid storms and calms, is sometimes
excessive, while the delay and cost are disheartening. They have also the
trouble of warping into and out of the docks, which is not the case with
steamers.
Thus, it frequently takes a week for a sailing vessel to do the work that a
steamer will readily do in twenty-four to thirty-six hours. Say that it takes
the sail four times as long as the steamer to accomplish a given voyage. To
do as much business as the steamer would do in the same time, would
require four sailing vessels; four times as many men as one sail requires, or
probably twice as many hands in the aggregate as the steamer would have;
and would incur at least twice the expense of the steamer in feeding them.
Now, there is also a much larger aggregate sum invested in these four sail,
and the owners pay a much larger sum of interest on their prime investment.
Or, in other words, the steamer with but a few more men, but little greater
expense in living, a small coal-bill, an engineer and firemen, and a prime
Page 45
outlay of not more than double the capital, will carry four times the freight
and passengers, without incurring probably so much as three times the
expense of one of the sail. After the prime cost the most important item of
expenditure in one of these small steamers is the coal; but the distance run
being so short, and getting into and out of the harbor and docks being so
easy, the vessel does large execution at little expense. The two most
essential benefits, however, of her short voyage are, that she is not
compelled to carry much fuel, and consequently occupies nearly all of her
space with freight; and that the prices of freight on these short voyages are
much larger in proportion than they are on long voyages. Sailing vessels
charge very little more for a thousand miles than they do for five hundred;
but a steamer may have to charge nearly three times as much; especially if
she run fast, consume much fuel, and occupy her cargo-room with coal.
There are distances at which steamers, however large, can not carry a pound
of freight; but occupy all their available space with the power that drives
them. In these long voyages sail becomes much cheaper.
It is by no means essential that these small coasting vessels shall be
propellers; for to acquire the same speed they expend the same power and
have the disadvantage of being deeper in the water, and not being able to go
into all harbors with much freight. They have also the advantage of carrying
more sail, and being generally better able to stand coast storms than a side-
wheel of light draught of water. They are not quite so expensive in prime
construction, but generally require more repairs, and must be on the docks
much oftener. They are, however, much better suited than side-wheel
vessels to voyages where a medium speed is required, and where the steam
can be used at pleasure simply as an auxiliary power. In such cases there is
a profitable economy of fuel. But speed has generally been deemed
essential in this country, and the side-wheel is everywhere used. But
entirely the contrary is the case in Great Britain and France. There the
coasting business is conducted by screws almost altogether; and the speed
does not transcend the limit of economy and commercial capability. They
distinguish between the extremely fast carriage of mails and passengers on
the one hand, and freights on the other; and although they wish the speed
and certainty of steam, yet it is not the costly speed. When they know that a
given quantity of fuel will carry freight eight knots per hour, they would
consider it wasteful and foolish to consume twice that quantity of fuel just
and passengers, without incurring probably so much as three times the
expense of one of the sail. After the prime cost the most important item of
expenditure in one of these small steamers is the coal; but the distance run
being so short, and getting into and out of the harbor and docks being so
easy, the vessel does large execution at little expense. The two most
essential benefits, however, of her short voyage are, that she is not
compelled to carry much fuel, and consequently occupies nearly all of her
space with freight; and that the prices of freight on these short voyages are
much larger in proportion than they are on long voyages. Sailing vessels
charge very little more for a thousand miles than they do for five hundred;
but a steamer may have to charge nearly three times as much; especially if
she run fast, consume much fuel, and occupy her cargo-room with coal.
There are distances at which steamers, however large, can not carry a pound
of freight; but occupy all their available space with the power that drives
them. In these long voyages sail becomes much cheaper.
It is by no means essential that these small coasting vessels shall be
propellers; for to acquire the same speed they expend the same power and
have the disadvantage of being deeper in the water, and not being able to go
into all harbors with much freight. They have also the advantage of carrying
more sail, and being generally better able to stand coast storms than a side-
wheel of light draught of water. They are not quite so expensive in prime
construction, but generally require more repairs, and must be on the docks
much oftener. They are, however, much better suited than side-wheel
vessels to voyages where a medium speed is required, and where the steam
can be used at pleasure simply as an auxiliary power. In such cases there is
a profitable economy of fuel. But speed has generally been deemed
essential in this country, and the side-wheel is everywhere used. But
entirely the contrary is the case in Great Britain and France. There the
coasting business is conducted by screws almost altogether; and the speed
does not transcend the limit of economy and commercial capability. They
distinguish between the extremely fast carriage of mails and passengers on
the one hand, and freights on the other; and although they wish the speed
and certainty of steam, yet it is not the costly speed. When they know that a
given quantity of fuel will carry freight eight knots per hour, they would
consider it wasteful and foolish to consume twice that quantity of fuel just
Page 46
to carry it ten knots; and more especially so, when, in addition to the extra
quantity of fuel, they would lose just its bulk in paying freight room.
England is thus employing most of her vast fleet of coasting ocean steamers
in her own trade, or in the foreign trade lying within a few hundred miles of
her ports. And the voyages being short, her coals being cheap and
convenient, frequently not above three dollars per ton to the coasters, and in
addition to this, the prime cost of these vessels being smaller than in this
country, as both iron and labor are cheaper, she has found them very
profitable at home, and is insinuating them into all the short routes
wherever she can get a foothold. It was not until she attempted the same
species of self-supporting steam navigation with distant countries, that her
propeller system failed her and involved her citizens in loss. Meanwhile it is
more than probable that within the next fifteen years we shall find five
hundred propellers scattered along the coasts of the United States.
Notwithstanding the eminent capabilities of steam when applied to coast
navigation, or to the fluvial navigation of the interior, it has failed to make
the same triumphs in the carriage of freights and passengers upon the ocean.
And it is not alone because the voyage is long and the freights low in price.
Steamers carry freights up the Mississippi river two thousand miles from
New-Orleans, and find it profitable. Some run even as high as three
thousand miles up that river and the Missouri; a voyage nearly as long as to
Europe, and make money by it. But the circumstances are very different.
They do not leave the dock at New-Orleans with even more than enough
fuel on board for the whole trip, as the ocean steamers do. If they did they
could carry no freight. But they stop every twelve to eighteen hours and
take on wood just as they need it, fifty to a hundred cords at a time; and
instead of occupying all of their available room with wood, they have the
steamer full of cargo, and have on board only fifty or sixty tons of fuel at a
time, and only half that weight on an average. None of the best steamers on
those rivers could take enough wood on board for the whole three thousand
miles, even though they should not have a ton of freight. And compared
with ocean steamers of the same engine power, they do not cost half of the
money, I might say generally, not one third of the money. There is no
reason, then, why these steamers should not carry large quantities of freight
and make large sums of money by it. They have the great elements, fuel,
freight capacity, and prime cost in their favor.
quantity of fuel, they would lose just its bulk in paying freight room.
England is thus employing most of her vast fleet of coasting ocean steamers
in her own trade, or in the foreign trade lying within a few hundred miles of
her ports. And the voyages being short, her coals being cheap and
convenient, frequently not above three dollars per ton to the coasters, and in
addition to this, the prime cost of these vessels being smaller than in this
country, as both iron and labor are cheaper, she has found them very
profitable at home, and is insinuating them into all the short routes
wherever she can get a foothold. It was not until she attempted the same
species of self-supporting steam navigation with distant countries, that her
propeller system failed her and involved her citizens in loss. Meanwhile it is
more than probable that within the next fifteen years we shall find five
hundred propellers scattered along the coasts of the United States.
Notwithstanding the eminent capabilities of steam when applied to coast
navigation, or to the fluvial navigation of the interior, it has failed to make
the same triumphs in the carriage of freights and passengers upon the ocean.
And it is not alone because the voyage is long and the freights low in price.
Steamers carry freights up the Mississippi river two thousand miles from
New-Orleans, and find it profitable. Some run even as high as three
thousand miles up that river and the Missouri; a voyage nearly as long as to
Europe, and make money by it. But the circumstances are very different.
They do not leave the dock at New-Orleans with even more than enough
fuel on board for the whole trip, as the ocean steamers do. If they did they
could carry no freight. But they stop every twelve to eighteen hours and
take on wood just as they need it, fifty to a hundred cords at a time; and
instead of occupying all of their available room with wood, they have the
steamer full of cargo, and have on board only fifty or sixty tons of fuel at a
time, and only half that weight on an average. None of the best steamers on
those rivers could take enough wood on board for the whole three thousand
miles, even though they should not have a ton of freight. And compared
with ocean steamers of the same engine power, they do not cost half of the
money, I might say generally, not one third of the money. There is no
reason, then, why these steamers should not carry large quantities of freight
and make large sums of money by it. They have the great elements, fuel,
freight capacity, and prime cost in their favor.
Page 47
There is a large class of freights which are not transportable by steam on
long ocean voyages under any conditions. We will grant that under the most
favorable circumstances, where rich and costly articles are transported in
small bulk, that propellers running at a low rate of speed, or just fast enough
to anticipate sailing vessels, will make a living. But change the class of
these freights into the great average class of those filling the thousands of
sailing vessels, and deprive these screw vessels of an immense emigrant
passenger traffic, and they would not pay their running expenses by fifty
per cent. This style of freights, sailing vessels in their great competition
have reduced to the lowest paying figure. The margin left for profit is so
small that our ship-owners constantly complain that unless there are
changes they must go into other business; and many of them say this
honestly, as is shown by the hundreds of ships which of late years we can
always find lying up, awaiting improvement in business. Now, let even the
slowest and cheapest running screw vessel attempt to carry the same
freights, to say nothing of fast side-wheel mail vessels, and we shall see
against what odds the screw or other steamer has to contend. In the first
place, her engines, boilers, coal, etc., occupy at least forty per cent of her
total registered tonnage. Grant that the additional expense of a steamer over
a sail, that is, wages for engineers, firemen, coal passers, etc., and finding
the same in food and rooms, costs even no more than the loss of an
additional ten per cent of her freight room. In other words, considering her
steam machinery, fuel, extra expenses, etc., to be equal to half of her freight
room, it is evident that she would carry only half as much freight as a
sailing vessel of the same size, and that she would get but half as much
money for it.
It is thus clear, I think, that there is a certain class of ocean freights which
steam can not transport under any conditions so long as there are sailing
vessels on the ocean; and in that class are comprehended all the great
standard and staple articles of the world, constituting in sum seventeen
twentieths of all the freight passing upon the ocean. This being so, it is
utterly idle to suppose that steam in any form can take the place of sail upon
the ocean, even though the present prices for the carriage of standard
articles should increase three hundred per cent.
long ocean voyages under any conditions. We will grant that under the most
favorable circumstances, where rich and costly articles are transported in
small bulk, that propellers running at a low rate of speed, or just fast enough
to anticipate sailing vessels, will make a living. But change the class of
these freights into the great average class of those filling the thousands of
sailing vessels, and deprive these screw vessels of an immense emigrant
passenger traffic, and they would not pay their running expenses by fifty
per cent. This style of freights, sailing vessels in their great competition
have reduced to the lowest paying figure. The margin left for profit is so
small that our ship-owners constantly complain that unless there are
changes they must go into other business; and many of them say this
honestly, as is shown by the hundreds of ships which of late years we can
always find lying up, awaiting improvement in business. Now, let even the
slowest and cheapest running screw vessel attempt to carry the same
freights, to say nothing of fast side-wheel mail vessels, and we shall see
against what odds the screw or other steamer has to contend. In the first
place, her engines, boilers, coal, etc., occupy at least forty per cent of her
total registered tonnage. Grant that the additional expense of a steamer over
a sail, that is, wages for engineers, firemen, coal passers, etc., and finding
the same in food and rooms, costs even no more than the loss of an
additional ten per cent of her freight room. In other words, considering her
steam machinery, fuel, extra expenses, etc., to be equal to half of her freight
room, it is evident that she would carry only half as much freight as a
sailing vessel of the same size, and that she would get but half as much
money for it.
It is thus clear, I think, that there is a certain class of ocean freights which
steam can not transport under any conditions so long as there are sailing
vessels on the ocean; and in that class are comprehended all the great
standard and staple articles of the world, constituting in sum seventeen
twentieths of all the freight passing upon the ocean. This being so, it is
utterly idle to suppose that steam in any form can take the place of sail upon
the ocean, even though the present prices for the carriage of standard
articles should increase three hundred per cent.
Page 48
There are many considerations which affect this question. The ordinary
average passages of the ocean on long voyages are now very rapid; and
some of the clippers have attained a speed which no freighting steamer may
ever be expected to do on the high seas. They do not maintain this high
speed as an average, but it is sufficiently high for all of the ordinary
purposes of transport in the standard articles of commerce, and where the
business of the clipper is done by a fast mail steamer. There is no positive
necessity for the speedy transport that some have attempted to give to
articles, whose presence in the markets, as the ordinary supplies of life, to-
day, next month, or a month later, is a matter of total indifference to every
one except the ship-owner himself. It but little concerns the public whether
a cargo of cotton, or beef or pork, or corn is one month or forty-five days
between the United States and England, so that it is safe in the end. It is an
annual production that must have an annual transit, and however
unnecessarily fast we may become, we can not send more than one crop in
the year. The world frequently becomes too fast in every thing; and crises,
panics, and bankruptcies follow as legitimate consequences. When a
fictitious value is given to every thing, and every globule of air which one
has breathed comes puffing out, a splendid bubble, a magnificent
speculation, and when men have to go so fast that they need a telegraph to
ride them through the world lest they get behind the heated times, no
wonder that the shipper can not sit quietly down in his office and wait thirty
days for a load of corn to reach England, or a load of iron to appear in the
harbor in return. And it does not matter to him that it may not be used there
in six months. He wishes to finish the "operation," to close up the
"transaction" before he goes up town in the evening.
There is a rational distinction between the necessary and the unnecessary
which we must learn to make, and a limit which safety assigns to every
operation. There are some things which must be done rapidly, and others
which may be done at leisure. Between the freight cargo, and the
correspondence which controls it there is a great difference. Rapid transport
of letters, intelligence, and passengers, and leisure transport of freight, is the
law of nature, and to attempt to reverse it is but to attempt that which will
never be successfully done, simply because wholly unnecessary in any
permanent economic sense. And not only is higher speed than that of
clippers unnecessary in ordinary freight transport, but it is clearly
average passages of the ocean on long voyages are now very rapid; and
some of the clippers have attained a speed which no freighting steamer may
ever be expected to do on the high seas. They do not maintain this high
speed as an average, but it is sufficiently high for all of the ordinary
purposes of transport in the standard articles of commerce, and where the
business of the clipper is done by a fast mail steamer. There is no positive
necessity for the speedy transport that some have attempted to give to
articles, whose presence in the markets, as the ordinary supplies of life, to-
day, next month, or a month later, is a matter of total indifference to every
one except the ship-owner himself. It but little concerns the public whether
a cargo of cotton, or beef or pork, or corn is one month or forty-five days
between the United States and England, so that it is safe in the end. It is an
annual production that must have an annual transit, and however
unnecessarily fast we may become, we can not send more than one crop in
the year. The world frequently becomes too fast in every thing; and crises,
panics, and bankruptcies follow as legitimate consequences. When a
fictitious value is given to every thing, and every globule of air which one
has breathed comes puffing out, a splendid bubble, a magnificent
speculation, and when men have to go so fast that they need a telegraph to
ride them through the world lest they get behind the heated times, no
wonder that the shipper can not sit quietly down in his office and wait thirty
days for a load of corn to reach England, or a load of iron to appear in the
harbor in return. And it does not matter to him that it may not be used there
in six months. He wishes to finish the "operation," to close up the
"transaction" before he goes up town in the evening.
There is a rational distinction between the necessary and the unnecessary
which we must learn to make, and a limit which safety assigns to every
operation. There are some things which must be done rapidly, and others
which may be done at leisure. Between the freight cargo, and the
correspondence which controls it there is a great difference. Rapid transport
of letters, intelligence, and passengers, and leisure transport of freight, is the
law of nature, and to attempt to reverse it is but to attempt that which will
never be successfully done, simply because wholly unnecessary in any
permanent economic sense. And not only is higher speed than that of
clippers unnecessary in ordinary freight transport, but it is clearly
Page 49
impossible in any normal condition of trade. Circumstances may, and
doubtless often will exist, which will require some sluggish article to be
transported a long distance in a short time, as in the case of the famine in
Ireland, and which may insure rates at which steam vessels can take small
quantities of such freights; but such occasions will ever be accidental, and
the support of vessels depending on them the questionable support of
expedients, and capricious in the extreme. It will ever be just as impossible
to hurry gross freights across the ocean in a healthy state of commerce as it
will to prevent rapid mails, or forego the comforts of quick passenger
transit.
To say nothing of a vessel which is half filled with its own power,
attempting to compete, in the ordinary freights of the world, with one which
fills every square foot with paying cargo, it is equally important that we
should look at the question of fuel. The coals of the world are not so
plentiful or so cheap that we should consume whole pits in a year in
unnecessary and unproductive service. They are already beginning to fail in
many parts of the world, or to the same effect, are mined and brought to
market at such increasing cost, and applied to so many new purposes day by
day, that in a few years the price will place them entirely beyond the reach
of commercial purposes upon the ocean. It is contended, however, that the
science of engineering is also rapidly advancing, and that we shall soon
have some discovery by which we can have heat without fuel, and power
without heat. But I have heard of those imaginary engineering hopes so
long that I begin to believe them vague, and that we shall yet for a few
generations measure the power applied by the number of pounds of coal
consumed. From past experiences and present indications we can predicate
nothing with more certainty of fuel than that it will indefinitely increase in
price. I am satisfied, therefore, that with all of the capabilities of steam it
can never be applied to general ocean transportation; first, because
undesirable; and second, because impossible even if desirable. But to show
more clearly that it is impossible, I will now make some inquiries
concerning the cost of ocean steam, which is the cardinal point of interest in
marine propulsion.
doubtless often will exist, which will require some sluggish article to be
transported a long distance in a short time, as in the case of the famine in
Ireland, and which may insure rates at which steam vessels can take small
quantities of such freights; but such occasions will ever be accidental, and
the support of vessels depending on them the questionable support of
expedients, and capricious in the extreme. It will ever be just as impossible
to hurry gross freights across the ocean in a healthy state of commerce as it
will to prevent rapid mails, or forego the comforts of quick passenger
transit.
To say nothing of a vessel which is half filled with its own power,
attempting to compete, in the ordinary freights of the world, with one which
fills every square foot with paying cargo, it is equally important that we
should look at the question of fuel. The coals of the world are not so
plentiful or so cheap that we should consume whole pits in a year in
unnecessary and unproductive service. They are already beginning to fail in
many parts of the world, or to the same effect, are mined and brought to
market at such increasing cost, and applied to so many new purposes day by
day, that in a few years the price will place them entirely beyond the reach
of commercial purposes upon the ocean. It is contended, however, that the
science of engineering is also rapidly advancing, and that we shall soon
have some discovery by which we can have heat without fuel, and power
without heat. But I have heard of those imaginary engineering hopes so
long that I begin to believe them vague, and that we shall yet for a few
generations measure the power applied by the number of pounds of coal
consumed. From past experiences and present indications we can predicate
nothing with more certainty of fuel than that it will indefinitely increase in
price. I am satisfied, therefore, that with all of the capabilities of steam it
can never be applied to general ocean transportation; first, because
undesirable; and second, because impossible even if desirable. But to show
more clearly that it is impossible, I will now make some inquiries
concerning the cost of ocean steam, which is the cardinal point of interest in
marine propulsion.
Page 50
SECTION IV.
COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.
misapprehension of the high cost of steam marine propulsion: views of the
non-professional: high speed necessary for the distances in our country:
what is the cost of high adequate mail speed: fast steamers require
stronger parts in every thing: greater outlay in prime cost: more
frequent and costly repairs: more watchfulness and men: more costly
fuel, engineers, firemen, and coal-passers: great strength of hull
required: also in engines, boilers, and parts: why the prime cost increases:
theory of repairs: friction and breakages: boilers and furnaces burning
out: repairs twelve to eighteen per cent: depreciation: several lines cited;
uses for more men: extra fuel, and less freight-room: british trade and
coal consumption:
the natural laws of resistance, power, and speed, with table: the
resistance varies as is the square of the velocity: the power, or fuel,
varies as the cube of the velocity: the rationale: authorities cited in
proof of the law: examples, and the formulæ: coal-table; no. i.: quantity
of fuel for different speeds and displacements: deductions from the
table: rates at which increased speed increases the consumption of fuel:
consumption for vessels of 2,500, 3,000, and 6,000 tons displacement:
coal-table; no. ii.: freight-table; no. iii.: as speed and power increase
freight and passenger room decrease: freight and fare reduced: speed of
various lines: freight-cost: coal and cargo; no. iv.: mr. atherton's views
of freight transport.
The foregoing arguments bring us to the conclusion that steam, however
desirable, can not be profitably employed in commerce generally as an
agent of transport; and that it is best applicable to the rapid conveyance of
the mails, passengers, specie, and costly freights only. That this fact may be
presented in a clearer light, and that we may see the almost incredibly high
cost of rapid steaming, or the attainment of a speed sufficiently high for the
COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.
misapprehension of the high cost of steam marine propulsion: views of the
non-professional: high speed necessary for the distances in our country:
what is the cost of high adequate mail speed: fast steamers require
stronger parts in every thing: greater outlay in prime cost: more
frequent and costly repairs: more watchfulness and men: more costly
fuel, engineers, firemen, and coal-passers: great strength of hull
required: also in engines, boilers, and parts: why the prime cost increases:
theory of repairs: friction and breakages: boilers and furnaces burning
out: repairs twelve to eighteen per cent: depreciation: several lines cited;
uses for more men: extra fuel, and less freight-room: british trade and
coal consumption:
the natural laws of resistance, power, and speed, with table: the
resistance varies as is the square of the velocity: the power, or fuel,
varies as the cube of the velocity: the rationale: authorities cited in
proof of the law: examples, and the formulæ: coal-table; no. i.: quantity
of fuel for different speeds and displacements: deductions from the
table: rates at which increased speed increases the consumption of fuel:
consumption for vessels of 2,500, 3,000, and 6,000 tons displacement:
coal-table; no. ii.: freight-table; no. iii.: as speed and power increase
freight and passenger room decrease: freight and fare reduced: speed of
various lines: freight-cost: coal and cargo; no. iv.: mr. atherton's views
of freight transport.
The foregoing arguments bring us to the conclusion that steam, however
desirable, can not be profitably employed in commerce generally as an
agent of transport; and that it is best applicable to the rapid conveyance of
the mails, passengers, specie, and costly freights only. That this fact may be
presented in a clearer light, and that we may see the almost incredibly high
cost of rapid steaming, or the attainment of a speed sufficiently high for the
Page 51
carriage of important mails, it will be necessary to make some critical
inquiries concerning the working cost of steam power, under any
conditions, as applied to marine propulsion. Much misapprehension
prevails on this point among nearly all classes of the people, and even
among the rulers of the country whose action controls the destiny and uses
of this valuable power. It is hardly to be expected, however, that gentlemen
engaged actively in the all-engrossing pursuits of business or of public life,
with a thousand different sets of ideas to be matured on a thousand different
subjects, such as demand the attention of Congress, and the Departments of
the Executive Government, should be practically or even theoretically
acquainted with a profession which requires years of close application and
study, and a wide field of practical, daily observation and experience. It
would be as absurd for unprofessional gentlemen of any class, as well from
the walks of statesmanship and the Government as from those of quiet
private life, to assume an acquaintance with the theory and practice of
navigation, and the cost, embarrassments, and difficulties attending
steamship enterprise, as it would for any two or three of them to enter an
ocean steamer for the first time of their lives, and essay to work the engines
and navigate the ship across the seas. The skill and knowledge requisite for
such a task would require years of application; and it can not be reasonably
supposed that those entirely unacquainted with the theory and parts of an
engine, should know much about its capabilities, or the cost attending its
use.
But there are approximate conclusions, readily applicable to practice, at
which even the unprofessional can arrive with certainty and security on a
proper presentation of the prominent facts and theories concerned; and that
these may be given to the public in a reliable and intelligible form, for the
removal of the doubts and obscurities which have hung around the subject,
is the chief object of this publication. This inquiry becomes the more
important as the speed of American steamers is proverbially beyond that of
any other steam vessels in the world. From the first conception of fluvial
and marine steam propulsion by Fitch and Fulton, the public and the
inventors themselves regarded the new application of this power with the
more favor as it promised to be a means of shortening the long distances
between the different parts of our own large country. And the same object
has acted as a stimulus ever since to that increase of speed which has placed
inquiries concerning the working cost of steam power, under any
conditions, as applied to marine propulsion. Much misapprehension
prevails on this point among nearly all classes of the people, and even
among the rulers of the country whose action controls the destiny and uses
of this valuable power. It is hardly to be expected, however, that gentlemen
engaged actively in the all-engrossing pursuits of business or of public life,
with a thousand different sets of ideas to be matured on a thousand different
subjects, such as demand the attention of Congress, and the Departments of
the Executive Government, should be practically or even theoretically
acquainted with a profession which requires years of close application and
study, and a wide field of practical, daily observation and experience. It
would be as absurd for unprofessional gentlemen of any class, as well from
the walks of statesmanship and the Government as from those of quiet
private life, to assume an acquaintance with the theory and practice of
navigation, and the cost, embarrassments, and difficulties attending
steamship enterprise, as it would for any two or three of them to enter an
ocean steamer for the first time of their lives, and essay to work the engines
and navigate the ship across the seas. The skill and knowledge requisite for
such a task would require years of application; and it can not be reasonably
supposed that those entirely unacquainted with the theory and parts of an
engine, should know much about its capabilities, or the cost attending its
use.
But there are approximate conclusions, readily applicable to practice, at
which even the unprofessional can arrive with certainty and security on a
proper presentation of the prominent facts and theories concerned; and that
these may be given to the public in a reliable and intelligible form, for the
removal of the doubts and obscurities which have hung around the subject,
is the chief object of this publication. This inquiry becomes the more
important as the speed of American steamers is proverbially beyond that of
any other steam vessels in the world. From the first conception of fluvial
and marine steam propulsion by Fitch and Fulton, the public and the
inventors themselves regarded the new application of this power with the
more favor as it promised to be a means of shortening the long distances
between the different parts of our own large country. And the same object
has acted as a stimulus ever since to that increase of speed which has placed
Page 52
localities all over this country, hitherto days apart, now, probably, but as
many hours. The slow trip through marshes and rivers, over hills and
mountains, and by the meandering roads of the country, between New-York
and Albany, once required from four to six days; but the attainment of
twenty-five miles per hour in our fast river steamers has at length placed
that capital within six hours of the Metropolis. And, as in this instance, so
has the effort been throughout our whole country, and upon the ocean, until
we have attained, both upon the rivers and the high seas, the highest speed
yet known, notwithstanding the important fact that steamship building is a
new and not fully developed species of enterprise in this country. We have
already seen how imperatively the spirit of the age and the genius of our
people demand rapid steam mails by both land and sea, and a rapid
conveyance of passengers; and it would be unreasonable to suppose that if
we required these for the development of our youth, they would be less
necessary for the fruitful uses of manhood and maturity. It is abundantly
evident that the American people are by nature and habit a progressive and
unusually hurrying people; and it is not to be supposed that they will
reverse this constitutional law of their nature in their attempts at ocean
navigation.
To answer the question, "What is the cost of high, adequate mail speed?"
requires something more than an inquiry into the quantity of fuel consumed;
although this is the principal element of its cost. We must consider that the
attainment and maintenance of high speed depend upon the exertion of a
high power; and that,
I. High speed and power require stronger parts in every thing: in the ship's
build, the machinery, the boilers, and all of the working arrangements:
II. High speed and power require a larger outlay in prime cost, in material
and building, for the adequate resistance required by such power:
III. High speed and power require more frequent and costly repairs:
IV. High speed and power require more watchfulness, a more prompt
action, and consequently more persons:
many hours. The slow trip through marshes and rivers, over hills and
mountains, and by the meandering roads of the country, between New-York
and Albany, once required from four to six days; but the attainment of
twenty-five miles per hour in our fast river steamers has at length placed
that capital within six hours of the Metropolis. And, as in this instance, so
has the effort been throughout our whole country, and upon the ocean, until
we have attained, both upon the rivers and the high seas, the highest speed
yet known, notwithstanding the important fact that steamship building is a
new and not fully developed species of enterprise in this country. We have
already seen how imperatively the spirit of the age and the genius of our
people demand rapid steam mails by both land and sea, and a rapid
conveyance of passengers; and it would be unreasonable to suppose that if
we required these for the development of our youth, they would be less
necessary for the fruitful uses of manhood and maturity. It is abundantly
evident that the American people are by nature and habit a progressive and
unusually hurrying people; and it is not to be supposed that they will
reverse this constitutional law of their nature in their attempts at ocean
navigation.
To answer the question, "What is the cost of high, adequate mail speed?"
requires something more than an inquiry into the quantity of fuel consumed;
although this is the principal element of its cost. We must consider that the
attainment and maintenance of high speed depend upon the exertion of a
high power; and that,
I. High speed and power require stronger parts in every thing: in the ship's
build, the machinery, the boilers, and all of the working arrangements:
II. High speed and power require a larger outlay in prime cost, in material
and building, for the adequate resistance required by such power:
III. High speed and power require more frequent and costly repairs:
IV. High speed and power require more watchfulness, a more prompt
action, and consequently more persons:
Page 53
V. High speed and power require more fuel, more engineers, more firemen,
and more coal-stokers.
1. These propositions are nearly all self-evident to every class of mind. That
a high speed attained through the exertion of a high power will require
stronger parts in every thing that exerts a force or resists one, is as manifest
as that a force necessary to remove one ton of weight will have to be
doubled to remove two tons. In the prime construction of the hull this is as
requisite as in any other part. The resistance to a vessel, or the concussion
against the water, at a low rate of speed, will not be very sensibly felt; but if
that speed is considerably increased and the concussion made quicker
without a corresponding increase in the strength of the frame and hull of the
ship generally, we shall find the ship creaking, straining, and yielding to the
pressure, until finally it works itself to pieces, and also disconcerts the
engines, whose stability, bracing, and keeping proper place and working
order depend first and essentially on the permanence and stability of the
hull. If the resistance to a vessel in passing through the water increases as
the square of the velocity, and if in addition to this outward thrust against
the vessel it has to support the greater engine power within it, which has
increased as the cube of the velocity, then the strength of the vessel must be
adequate to resist without injury these two combined forces against which it
has to contend.
The same increased strength is necessary also in the engines and boilers. It
is admitted by the ablest engineers, and verified by practice, as will be
shown in another part of this Section, that to increase the speed of a steamer
from eight to ten knots per hour, it is necessary to double the power, and so
on in the ratio of the cubes of the velocity. Suppose that we wish to gain
these two knots advance on eight. It is evident that, if the boilers have to
generate, and the engines to use twice the power, and exert twice the force,
they must have also twice the strength. The boiler must be twice as strong
and heavy; the various working parts of the engine must be twice as strong:
the shafts, the cranks, the piston and other rods, the beams, the cylinders,
the frame work, whether of wood or iron, and even the iron wheels
themselves, with every thing in any way employed to use the power,
overcome the resistance, and gain the speed. There is no working
arrangement in any way connected with the propulsion of the ship that does
and more coal-stokers.
1. These propositions are nearly all self-evident to every class of mind. That
a high speed attained through the exertion of a high power will require
stronger parts in every thing that exerts a force or resists one, is as manifest
as that a force necessary to remove one ton of weight will have to be
doubled to remove two tons. In the prime construction of the hull this is as
requisite as in any other part. The resistance to a vessel, or the concussion
against the water, at a low rate of speed, will not be very sensibly felt; but if
that speed is considerably increased and the concussion made quicker
without a corresponding increase in the strength of the frame and hull of the
ship generally, we shall find the ship creaking, straining, and yielding to the
pressure, until finally it works itself to pieces, and also disconcerts the
engines, whose stability, bracing, and keeping proper place and working
order depend first and essentially on the permanence and stability of the
hull. If the resistance to a vessel in passing through the water increases as
the square of the velocity, and if in addition to this outward thrust against
the vessel it has to support the greater engine power within it, which has
increased as the cube of the velocity, then the strength of the vessel must be
adequate to resist without injury these two combined forces against which it
has to contend.
The same increased strength is necessary also in the engines and boilers. It
is admitted by the ablest engineers, and verified by practice, as will be
shown in another part of this Section, that to increase the speed of a steamer
from eight to ten knots per hour, it is necessary to double the power, and so
on in the ratio of the cubes of the velocity. Suppose that we wish to gain
these two knots advance on eight. It is evident that, if the boilers have to
generate, and the engines to use twice the power, and exert twice the force,
they must have also twice the strength. The boiler must be twice as strong
and heavy; the various working parts of the engine must be twice as strong:
the shafts, the cranks, the piston and other rods, the beams, the cylinders,
the frame work, whether of wood or iron, and even the iron wheels
themselves, with every thing in any way employed to use the power,
overcome the resistance, and gain the speed. There is no working
arrangement in any way connected with the propulsion of the ship that does
Page 54
not partake of this increase; every pump, every valve, every bolt connected
directly or indirectly with the engine economy of the ship.
2. In the second place, seeing that much greater strength of parts is required
to overcome the increased resistance, it is equally evident that this high
speed and power thus require a larger outlay in every point of the prime
construction of the vessel and engines by which the speed is to be attained.
The hull's heavier timbers cost a higher price according to size than the
direct proportion of size indicates. Large and choice timbers are difficult to
get, and costly. The hull must also be strengthened to a large extra extent by
heavy iron strapping and bracing, which, unlike the rest, cost in the ratio of
the material used. So with the engines. The shaft, which weighs twice as
much, does not cost only twice as much, but frequently three or four or five
times as much. This arises not from the weight of the metal, as is evident;
but from the difficulty of forging pieces that are so large. The persons
engaged in the forging and finishing of the immense shafts, cranks, pistons,
etc., used in our first class steamers, frequently consider that the last and
largest piece is the chef d'œuvre of the art, and that it will never be
transcended, even if equalled again. They have expended all of their skill
and ingenuity in the task, and have not succeeded sometimes until they have
forged two or three new pieces. When a great work of this kind is done, it
may be discovered in the turning, polishing, and fitting up, that it has at last
a flaw, and that it will not do for the service intended. As a matter of course,
it must be thrown aside and a new piece forged. This was but recently the
case with one of the shafts of the "Leviathan," in England. So with the
shafts of the new Collins' steamer "Adriatic." They were forged in Reading,
Pennsylvania, and in addition to their enormous prime cost had to incur that
of shipment from the interior of Pennsylvania to the city of New-York. In
all such cases the prime cost increases immensely, and to an extent that
would hardly be credited by those not practically familiar with the subject.
3. Again, high or increased power and speed require more frequent and
more costly repairs. Friction arises from the pressure of two bodies moving
in opposite directions, and pressure results from the exertion of power, and
in the ratio of the power applied. The amount of friction, therefore, is in the
ratio of the power expended and of the extra weight of parts required for
that power. But the effects of friction require a higher ratio when the power
directly or indirectly with the engine economy of the ship.
2. In the second place, seeing that much greater strength of parts is required
to overcome the increased resistance, it is equally evident that this high
speed and power thus require a larger outlay in every point of the prime
construction of the vessel and engines by which the speed is to be attained.
The hull's heavier timbers cost a higher price according to size than the
direct proportion of size indicates. Large and choice timbers are difficult to
get, and costly. The hull must also be strengthened to a large extra extent by
heavy iron strapping and bracing, which, unlike the rest, cost in the ratio of
the material used. So with the engines. The shaft, which weighs twice as
much, does not cost only twice as much, but frequently three or four or five
times as much. This arises not from the weight of the metal, as is evident;
but from the difficulty of forging pieces that are so large. The persons
engaged in the forging and finishing of the immense shafts, cranks, pistons,
etc., used in our first class steamers, frequently consider that the last and
largest piece is the chef d'œuvre of the art, and that it will never be
transcended, even if equalled again. They have expended all of their skill
and ingenuity in the task, and have not succeeded sometimes until they have
forged two or three new pieces. When a great work of this kind is done, it
may be discovered in the turning, polishing, and fitting up, that it has at last
a flaw, and that it will not do for the service intended. As a matter of course,
it must be thrown aside and a new piece forged. This was but recently the
case with one of the shafts of the "Leviathan," in England. So with the
shafts of the new Collins' steamer "Adriatic." They were forged in Reading,
Pennsylvania, and in addition to their enormous prime cost had to incur that
of shipment from the interior of Pennsylvania to the city of New-York. In
all such cases the prime cost increases immensely, and to an extent that
would hardly be credited by those not practically familiar with the subject.
3. Again, high or increased power and speed require more frequent and
more costly repairs. Friction arises from the pressure of two bodies moving
in opposite directions, and pressure results from the exertion of power, and
in the ratio of the power applied. The amount of friction, therefore, is in the
ratio of the power expended and of the extra weight of parts required for
that power. But the effects of friction require a higher ratio when the power
Page 55
is greatly multiplied, as in the case of high speed. An immensely heavy
shaft exerting an unusual force is certain to greatly heat the journals and
boxes, and thus wear them away far more rapidly. Also a rapid motion of
heavy parts of machinery, and the necessarily severe concussions and
jarrings can not fail destroying costly working parts in the engine, and
necessitating heavy and expensive repairs and substitutions. An ordinary
engine working at a slow and easy rate, will not require one tenth the
repairs necessary if it were working up to a high power and accomplishing a
high speed. With any little derangement the engines can stop and the injury
can be repaired before it reaches any magnitude. But with rapid mail
packets the engines must run on, and the derangement which at first is
small, will amount in the end, when the voyage is completed and the mails
are delivered, to a sum probably ten or twenty times as great as in the case
of the vessel that stops and makes her repairs as she requires them. The
exertion of a high mail power causes many costly parts to burn out from
unrelieved pressure and friction, which would not be the case under other
conditions. It is also nearly impossible for the best built engines in the
world to make fast time without breaking some important part at every trip
or two, or so cracking and injuring it from the continued strain, that a wise
precaution requires its removal to make the steamer perfectly sea-worthy.
Every practical man knows these difficulties, and every steamship owner
estimates their importance according to the immense bills they occasion
month by month, or the delays and losses which they cause unless he has
expended large amounts of capital in providing other ships to take their
place on such occasions of derangement.
Nor is the burning out of heavy brass, and composition, and steel pieces, or
the breaking of large and troublesome parts in the engine the only source of
repairs on a steamship. The boiler department is particularly fruitful in large
bills of repairs, especially if it be necessary to attain a good mail speed. It
stands to reason that if the whole ship can not be filled with boiler power,
which with reasonably high fires, would give enough steam, then the boilers
which are used must be exerted to their highest capacity, or the rapid speed
can not be attained. Many suppose that the boilers may generate twice the
quantity of steam without any appreciable difference in the wear and tear;
but this is a decided error. For high speed, and what I mean by high speed is
simply that which gives a sufficiently rapid transit to the mails, the fires
shaft exerting an unusual force is certain to greatly heat the journals and
boxes, and thus wear them away far more rapidly. Also a rapid motion of
heavy parts of machinery, and the necessarily severe concussions and
jarrings can not fail destroying costly working parts in the engine, and
necessitating heavy and expensive repairs and substitutions. An ordinary
engine working at a slow and easy rate, will not require one tenth the
repairs necessary if it were working up to a high power and accomplishing a
high speed. With any little derangement the engines can stop and the injury
can be repaired before it reaches any magnitude. But with rapid mail
packets the engines must run on, and the derangement which at first is
small, will amount in the end, when the voyage is completed and the mails
are delivered, to a sum probably ten or twenty times as great as in the case
of the vessel that stops and makes her repairs as she requires them. The
exertion of a high mail power causes many costly parts to burn out from
unrelieved pressure and friction, which would not be the case under other
conditions. It is also nearly impossible for the best built engines in the
world to make fast time without breaking some important part at every trip
or two, or so cracking and injuring it from the continued strain, that a wise
precaution requires its removal to make the steamer perfectly sea-worthy.
Every practical man knows these difficulties, and every steamship owner
estimates their importance according to the immense bills they occasion
month by month, or the delays and losses which they cause unless he has
expended large amounts of capital in providing other ships to take their
place on such occasions of derangement.
Nor is the burning out of heavy brass, and composition, and steel pieces, or
the breaking of large and troublesome parts in the engine the only source of
repairs on a steamship. The boiler department is particularly fruitful in large
bills of repairs, especially if it be necessary to attain a good mail speed. It
stands to reason that if the whole ship can not be filled with boiler power,
which with reasonably high fires, would give enough steam, then the boilers
which are used must be exerted to their highest capacity, or the rapid speed
can not be attained. Many suppose that the boilers may generate twice the
quantity of steam without any appreciable difference in the wear and tear;
but this is a decided error. For high speed, and what I mean by high speed is
simply that which gives a sufficiently rapid transit to the mails, the fires
Page 56
must be nurtured up to their highest intensity and every pound of coal must
be burned in every corner of the furnaces which will generate even an
ounce of steam. This continued heat becomes too powerful for the furnaces
and the boilers, and they begin to oxidize, and burn, and melt away, as
would never be the case under ordinary heat. When the ship comes into port
it is found that her furnaces must be "overhauled," her grate bars renewed,
her braces restored, her boilers patched, sometimes all over, several of their
plates taken out, thousands of rivets removed and supplied, and probably
dozens of tubes also removed and replaced with new ones. But this is not
all. The best boilers can not long run in this way. After six to seven years at
the utmost, they must be removed from the ship altogether, and new ones
must be put into their place. This is also a most expensive operation. The
boilers constitute a large share of the cost of the engine power. To put a new
set of boilers in one of the Collins steamers will cost about one hundred and
ten thousand dollars, and this must be done every six years. The boilers of
the West-India Royal Mail Steamers, which run very slowly, last on an
average, six years.[A]
[A] Statement by Mr. Pitcher, builder, before the Committee of the House of
Commons. Murray on the Steam Engine, p. 170, Second Edition.
But this is not all. To restore the boilers, a ship has to be torn literally
almost to pieces. All of the decks in that part must be removed and lost; the
frame of the ship cut to pieces; large and costly timbers removed, and
altogether an expense incurred that is frightful even to the largest
companies. To insure perfect safety and to gratify the wish of the public,
this is generally done long before it is strictly necessary, and when the
boilers are in a perfectly good condition for the working purposes of
ordinary speed. But precaution and safety are among the prerequisites of the
public service, and must be attained at whatever cost. On slow auxiliary
freighting steamers this would be by no means necessary. But the extent and
cost of these repairs on steamers far exceed any thing that would be
imagined. They are supposed to be twelve per cent. per annum of the prime
cost of a vessel of ordinary speed, taking the whole ship's life together at
twelve years at the utmost. Atherton in his "Marine Engine Construction
and Classification," page 32, says of the repairs of steam vessels doing
ordinary service in Great Britain, where all such work is done much cheaper
than in this country: "By the Parliamentary evidence of the highest
be burned in every corner of the furnaces which will generate even an
ounce of steam. This continued heat becomes too powerful for the furnaces
and the boilers, and they begin to oxidize, and burn, and melt away, as
would never be the case under ordinary heat. When the ship comes into port
it is found that her furnaces must be "overhauled," her grate bars renewed,
her braces restored, her boilers patched, sometimes all over, several of their
plates taken out, thousands of rivets removed and supplied, and probably
dozens of tubes also removed and replaced with new ones. But this is not
all. The best boilers can not long run in this way. After six to seven years at
the utmost, they must be removed from the ship altogether, and new ones
must be put into their place. This is also a most expensive operation. The
boilers constitute a large share of the cost of the engine power. To put a new
set of boilers in one of the Collins steamers will cost about one hundred and
ten thousand dollars, and this must be done every six years. The boilers of
the West-India Royal Mail Steamers, which run very slowly, last on an
average, six years.[A]
[A] Statement by Mr. Pitcher, builder, before the Committee of the House of
Commons. Murray on the Steam Engine, p. 170, Second Edition.
But this is not all. To restore the boilers, a ship has to be torn literally
almost to pieces. All of the decks in that part must be removed and lost; the
frame of the ship cut to pieces; large and costly timbers removed, and
altogether an expense incurred that is frightful even to the largest
companies. To insure perfect safety and to gratify the wish of the public,
this is generally done long before it is strictly necessary, and when the
boilers are in a perfectly good condition for the working purposes of
ordinary speed. But precaution and safety are among the prerequisites of the
public service, and must be attained at whatever cost. On slow auxiliary
freighting steamers this would be by no means necessary. But the extent and
cost of these repairs on steamers far exceed any thing that would be
imagined. They are supposed to be twelve per cent. per annum of the prime
cost of a vessel of ordinary speed, taking the whole ship's life together at
twelve years at the utmost. Atherton in his "Marine Engine Construction
and Classification," page 32, says of the repairs of steam vessels doing
ordinary service in Great Britain, where all such work is done much cheaper
than in this country: "By the Parliamentary evidence of the highest
Page 57
authorities on this point, it appears to have been conclusively established,
that the cost of upholding steamship machinery has of late years amounted,
on the average, to about £6 per horse power per annum, being about 12 per
cent. per annum, on the prime cost of the machinery, which annual outlay is
but one of the grand points of current expense in which steamship
proprietors are concerned." Now, if these were the repairs of the slow West-
India Royal mail steamers, which ran but 200 days in the year, and that at a
very moderate speed, and in the machine shops of England, where at that
time (previous to 1852) wages were very low, they can not be less in this
country, on rapid mail steamers, where wages and materials are very high,
and where marine engineering was then in its infancy.
There are some facts on this subject which prove the positions here taken.
The Collins steamers have been running but six years, and yet their repairs
have amounted in all to more than the prime cost of the ships, or to about
eighteen per cent. per annum. They were as well and as strongly built
originally as any ships in the world, as appears from the report which
Commodore M. C. Perry made to the Department regarding them, and from
the fine condition of their hulls at the present time. Their depreciation with
all of these repairs has not been probably above six per cent. per annum.
They will, however, probably depreciate ten per cent. during the next six
years, and at the age of twelve or fourteen years be unfit for service. The
steamers Washington and Hermann, which had strong hulls, have been run
eight years, and are now nearly worthless. Their depreciation has been at
least ten per cent. The steamers Georgia and Ohio, which Commodore
Perry and other superintending navy agents pronounced to be well-built and
powerful steamers, (See Report Sec. Navy, 1852,) ran only five years, and
were laid aside, and said to be worthless. With all of the repairs put upon
these ships, which were admitted to be capable of doing first class war
service, as intended, they depreciated probably seventeen per cent.; as it is
hardly possible that their old iron would sell for more than fifteen per cent.
of their prime cost. These steamers paid much smaller repair bills than the
Collins, and were not so well constructed, or at so high a cost. American
steamers do not, upon the average, last above ten years; but if they reach
twelve or fourteen, they will pay a sum nearly equal to twice their cost, for
repairs and substitutions. Nor is this all. The life of a steamer ends when her
adaptation to profitable service ceases. She may not be rotten, but may be
that the cost of upholding steamship machinery has of late years amounted,
on the average, to about £6 per horse power per annum, being about 12 per
cent. per annum, on the prime cost of the machinery, which annual outlay is
but one of the grand points of current expense in which steamship
proprietors are concerned." Now, if these were the repairs of the slow West-
India Royal mail steamers, which ran but 200 days in the year, and that at a
very moderate speed, and in the machine shops of England, where at that
time (previous to 1852) wages were very low, they can not be less in this
country, on rapid mail steamers, where wages and materials are very high,
and where marine engineering was then in its infancy.
There are some facts on this subject which prove the positions here taken.
The Collins steamers have been running but six years, and yet their repairs
have amounted in all to more than the prime cost of the ships, or to about
eighteen per cent. per annum. They were as well and as strongly built
originally as any ships in the world, as appears from the report which
Commodore M. C. Perry made to the Department regarding them, and from
the fine condition of their hulls at the present time. Their depreciation with
all of these repairs has not been probably above six per cent. per annum.
They will, however, probably depreciate ten per cent. during the next six
years, and at the age of twelve or fourteen years be unfit for service. The
steamers Washington and Hermann, which had strong hulls, have been run
eight years, and are now nearly worthless. Their depreciation has been at
least ten per cent. The steamers Georgia and Ohio, which Commodore
Perry and other superintending navy agents pronounced to be well-built and
powerful steamers, (See Report Sec. Navy, 1852,) ran only five years, and
were laid aside, and said to be worthless. With all of the repairs put upon
these ships, which were admitted to be capable of doing first class war
service, as intended, they depreciated probably seventeen per cent.; as it is
hardly possible that their old iron would sell for more than fifteen per cent.
of their prime cost. These steamers paid much smaller repair bills than the
Collins, and were not so well constructed, or at so high a cost. American
steamers do not, upon the average, last above ten years; but if they reach
twelve or fourteen, they will pay a sum nearly equal to twice their cost, for
repairs and substitutions. Nor is this all. The life of a steamer ends when her
adaptation to profitable service ceases. She may not be rotten, but may be
Page 58
so slow, or of so antiquated construction, or may burn so much more fuel
than more modern competitors, that she can not stand the test of
competition.
4. We thus see that not only are the requisite repairs most extensive and
costly, but of such magnitude as to greatly reduce the earnings of any class
of steam vessels. But this is not the last costly consequence of mail speed. It
requires more cautious watchfulness of the engines, the boilers, the deck,
and of every possible department of the navigation, even including pilotage.
It requires also more promptness and dispatch in every movement, and
hence a much larger aggregate number of men. More men are necessary to
keep up high fires; twice as many men are necessary to pass twice as much
coal; twice as many engineers as under other circumstances are necessary
for the faithful working of the engines, and any accidents and repairs which
are indispensable on the ocean; and a larger number of sailors and officers
is necessary to all of the prompt movements required of the mail steamer.
The Havre mail steamers, the "Arago" and "Fulton," never carry less than
six engineers each, although they could be run across the ocean with three
under a hard working system. But this number insures the greater safety of
the ship under ordinary circumstances, and is absolutely necessary in any
case of accident and danger. It is the same case with the firemen. When, in a
heavy storm, the fire department may be imperfectly manned, the ship has
taken one of the first chances for rendering the engines inefficient, and
being finally lost. And all of these extra and indispensable employées make
an extra drain on the income of the ship, and add to the extreme costliness
of a high adequate mail speed.
5. It is clear, then, that an adequate mail speed requires more fuel, more
engineers, more firemen, more coal-stokers, and more general expense. The
question of fuel is, however, alone the most important of all those affecting
the attainment of high speed, and the item whose economy has been most
desired and sought, both by those attempting to carry freight, and those who
carry the mails and passengers. The principal points of interests concerning
it are, the enormous quantity which both theory and practice show to be
necessary to fast vessels; the large sum to be paid for it, and the steadily
increasing price; and the paying freight room which its necessary carriage
occupies. In fast steaming, the supply of coal to the furnaces frequently
than more modern competitors, that she can not stand the test of
competition.
4. We thus see that not only are the requisite repairs most extensive and
costly, but of such magnitude as to greatly reduce the earnings of any class
of steam vessels. But this is not the last costly consequence of mail speed. It
requires more cautious watchfulness of the engines, the boilers, the deck,
and of every possible department of the navigation, even including pilotage.
It requires also more promptness and dispatch in every movement, and
hence a much larger aggregate number of men. More men are necessary to
keep up high fires; twice as many men are necessary to pass twice as much
coal; twice as many engineers as under other circumstances are necessary
for the faithful working of the engines, and any accidents and repairs which
are indispensable on the ocean; and a larger number of sailors and officers
is necessary to all of the prompt movements required of the mail steamer.
The Havre mail steamers, the "Arago" and "Fulton," never carry less than
six engineers each, although they could be run across the ocean with three
under a hard working system. But this number insures the greater safety of
the ship under ordinary circumstances, and is absolutely necessary in any
case of accident and danger. It is the same case with the firemen. When, in a
heavy storm, the fire department may be imperfectly manned, the ship has
taken one of the first chances for rendering the engines inefficient, and
being finally lost. And all of these extra and indispensable employées make
an extra drain on the income of the ship, and add to the extreme costliness
of a high adequate mail speed.
5. It is clear, then, that an adequate mail speed requires more fuel, more
engineers, more firemen, more coal-stokers, and more general expense. The
question of fuel is, however, alone the most important of all those affecting
the attainment of high speed, and the item whose economy has been most
desired and sought, both by those attempting to carry freight, and those who
carry the mails and passengers. The principal points of interests concerning
it are, the enormous quantity which both theory and practice show to be
necessary to fast vessels; the large sum to be paid for it, and the steadily
increasing price; and the paying freight room which its necessary carriage
occupies. In fast steaming, the supply of coal to the furnaces frequently
Page 59
arrives at a point where many additional tons may be burned and yet
produce no useful effect or increase of power. The draft through the
furnaces and smoke stacks is so rapid and strong as to take off a vast
volume of heat; and this, coupled with a large quantity of heat radiated from
the various highly heated parts and surfaces, requires a consumption of fuel
truly astonishing. If we reflect that at the twelve principal ports of Great
Britain in the year of 1855, the tonnage entered was 6,372,301, and
departed 6,426,566, equal to 12,798,867 total, and this during the war, that
a large part of this was steam tonnage, and that the total imports and exports
of Great Britain for 1856 were 1,600,000,000 dollars, we can somewhat
appreciate the present and future uses of coal, and its inevitably large
increase in price. The two hundred and seventy steamers in the British
Navy, with about 50,000 aggregate horse power, consumed in 1856,
according to a report made to a Committee of the "British Association for
the Advancement of Science," this year, by Rear-Admiral Moorsom,
750,000 tons of coal. The difficulty and cost of mining coal, its distance
from the sea-shore, and the multifarious new applications in its use among
our rapidly increasing population, as well as its almost universal and
increasing demand for marine purposes, all conspire to make it more costly
from year to year; while, as a propelling agent, it is already beyond the
reach of commercial ocean steam navigation. Coal has gone up by a steady
march during the last seven years from two and a half to eight dollars per
ton, which may now be regarded as a fair average price along our Atlantic
seaboard. And that we may see more clearly how essentially the speed and
cost of steam marine navigation depend upon the simple question of fuel
alone, to say nothing further of the impeding causes heretofore mentioned, I
will now present a few inquiries concerning
THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED,
WITH TABLES OF THE SAME.
The resistance to bodies moving through the water increases as the square
of the velocity; and the power, or coal, necessary to produce speed varies or
increases as the cube of the velocity. This is a law founded in nature, and
verified by facts and universal experience. Its enunciation is at first startling
to those who have not reflected on the subject, and who as a general thing
produce no useful effect or increase of power. The draft through the
furnaces and smoke stacks is so rapid and strong as to take off a vast
volume of heat; and this, coupled with a large quantity of heat radiated from
the various highly heated parts and surfaces, requires a consumption of fuel
truly astonishing. If we reflect that at the twelve principal ports of Great
Britain in the year of 1855, the tonnage entered was 6,372,301, and
departed 6,426,566, equal to 12,798,867 total, and this during the war, that
a large part of this was steam tonnage, and that the total imports and exports
of Great Britain for 1856 were 1,600,000,000 dollars, we can somewhat
appreciate the present and future uses of coal, and its inevitably large
increase in price. The two hundred and seventy steamers in the British
Navy, with about 50,000 aggregate horse power, consumed in 1856,
according to a report made to a Committee of the "British Association for
the Advancement of Science," this year, by Rear-Admiral Moorsom,
750,000 tons of coal. The difficulty and cost of mining coal, its distance
from the sea-shore, and the multifarious new applications in its use among
our rapidly increasing population, as well as its almost universal and
increasing demand for marine purposes, all conspire to make it more costly
from year to year; while, as a propelling agent, it is already beyond the
reach of commercial ocean steam navigation. Coal has gone up by a steady
march during the last seven years from two and a half to eight dollars per
ton, which may now be regarded as a fair average price along our Atlantic
seaboard. And that we may see more clearly how essentially the speed and
cost of steam marine navigation depend upon the simple question of fuel
alone, to say nothing further of the impeding causes heretofore mentioned, I
will now present a few inquiries concerning
THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED,
WITH TABLES OF THE SAME.
The resistance to bodies moving through the water increases as the square
of the velocity; and the power, or coal, necessary to produce speed varies or
increases as the cube of the velocity. This is a law founded in nature, and
verified by facts and universal experience. Its enunciation is at first startling
to those who have not reflected on the subject, and who as a general thing
Page 60
suppose that, if a vessel will run 8 miles per hour on a given quantity of
coal, she ought to run 16 miles per hour on double that quantity. I think that
it may be safely asserted that in all cases of high speed, and ordinary
dynamic or working efficiency in the ship, the resistance increases more
rapidly than as the squares. The rationale of the law is this: the power
necessary to overcome the resistance of the water at the vessel's bow and
the friction increases as the square; again, the power necessary to overcome
the natural inertia of the vessel and set it in motion, increases this again as
the square of the velocity, and the two together constitute the aggregate
resistance which makes it necessary that the power for increasing a vessel's
speed shall increase as the cube of the velocity. But whatever the rationale,
the law itself is an admitted fact by all theoretical engineers, and is proven
in practice by all steamships. In evidence of this, I will give the following
opinions.
In his treatise on "The Marine Engine," Mr. Robert Murray, who is a
member of the Board of Trade in Southampton, England, says in speaking
of the "Natural law regulating the speed of a steamer," page 104: "These
results chiefly depend upon the natural law that the power expended in
propelling a steamship through the water varies as the cube of the velocity.
This law is modified by the retarding effect of the increased resisting
surface, consequent upon the weight of the engines and fuel, so that the
horse power increases in a somewhat higher ratio than that named." It must
be understood that when he speaks of power, horse power, etc., it is simply
another form of representing the quantity of coal burned; as the power is in
the direct ratio of the quantity of fuel.
Bourne, the great Scotch writer upon the Screw Propeller, in his large
volume published by Longmans, London, page 145, says, in concluding a
sentence on the expensiveness of vessels: "Since it is known that the
resistance of vessels increases more rapidly than the square of the velocity
in the case of considerable speeds."
Again, at page 236, on "the resistance of bodies moving through the water,"
he says: "In the case of very sharp vessels, the resistance appears to increase
nearly as the square of the velocity, but in case of vessels of the ordinary
coal, she ought to run 16 miles per hour on double that quantity. I think that
it may be safely asserted that in all cases of high speed, and ordinary
dynamic or working efficiency in the ship, the resistance increases more
rapidly than as the squares. The rationale of the law is this: the power
necessary to overcome the resistance of the water at the vessel's bow and
the friction increases as the square; again, the power necessary to overcome
the natural inertia of the vessel and set it in motion, increases this again as
the square of the velocity, and the two together constitute the aggregate
resistance which makes it necessary that the power for increasing a vessel's
speed shall increase as the cube of the velocity. But whatever the rationale,
the law itself is an admitted fact by all theoretical engineers, and is proven
in practice by all steamships. In evidence of this, I will give the following
opinions.
In his treatise on "The Marine Engine," Mr. Robert Murray, who is a
member of the Board of Trade in Southampton, England, says in speaking
of the "Natural law regulating the speed of a steamer," page 104: "These
results chiefly depend upon the natural law that the power expended in
propelling a steamship through the water varies as the cube of the velocity.
This law is modified by the retarding effect of the increased resisting
surface, consequent upon the weight of the engines and fuel, so that the
horse power increases in a somewhat higher ratio than that named." It must
be understood that when he speaks of power, horse power, etc., it is simply
another form of representing the quantity of coal burned; as the power is in
the direct ratio of the quantity of fuel.
Bourne, the great Scotch writer upon the Screw Propeller, in his large
volume published by Longmans, London, page 145, says, in concluding a
sentence on the expensiveness of vessels: "Since it is known that the
resistance of vessels increases more rapidly than the square of the velocity
in the case of considerable speeds."
Again, at page 236, on "the resistance of bodies moving through the water,"
he says: "In the case of very sharp vessels, the resistance appears to increase
nearly as the square of the velocity, but in case of vessels of the ordinary
Page 61
amount of sharpness the resistance increases more rapidly than the square
of the velocity."
Again, on page 231, in speaking of the folly of a company attempting to run
steamers sufficiently rapidly for the mails at the price paid for them, he
says: "At the same time an increased rate of speed has to be maintained,
which is, of course, tantamount to a further reduction of the payment. In
fact, their position upon the Red Sea line is now this, that they would be
better without the mails than with them, as the mere expense of the
increased quantity of fuel necessary to realize the increased speed which
they have undertaken to maintain, will swallow up the whole of the
Government subvention. To increase the speed of a vessel from 8 to 10
knots it is necessary that the engine power should be doubled." This work
of Mr. Bourne is now the standard of authority on the subject of which he
treats, the world over.
Again, Mr. James R. Napier, of London, known as one of the largest and
most skilled engine-builders in Great Britain, in the discussion of the
dynamic efficiency of steamships in the proceedings of the "British
Association" in 1856, page 436, says: "The power in similar vessels, I here
take for granted, at present varies as the cube of the velocity." The power
simply represents the coal; in fact, it is the coal.
Mr. Charles Atherton, the able and distinguished Chief Engineer of Her
Majesty's Royal Dock Yard, at Woolwich, has published a volume, called
"Steamship Capability," a smaller volume on "Marine Engine
Classification," and several elaborate papers for the British Association, the
Society of Arts, London, the Association of Civil Engineers, and the
Artisans' Journal, for the purpose of properly exposing the high cost of
steam freight transport as based on the law above noticed, and the ruinous
expense of running certain classes of vessels of an inferior dynamic
efficiency. When but a few weeks since in London, I asked the Editor of the
"Artisan," if any engineer in England disputed the laws relative to power,
on which Mr. Atherton based his arguments. He replied that he had never
heard of one who did. I asked Mr. Atherton myself, if in the case of the
newest and most improved steamers, with the best possible models for
speed, he had ever found any defect in the law of, the resistance as the
of the velocity."
Again, on page 231, in speaking of the folly of a company attempting to run
steamers sufficiently rapidly for the mails at the price paid for them, he
says: "At the same time an increased rate of speed has to be maintained,
which is, of course, tantamount to a further reduction of the payment. In
fact, their position upon the Red Sea line is now this, that they would be
better without the mails than with them, as the mere expense of the
increased quantity of fuel necessary to realize the increased speed which
they have undertaken to maintain, will swallow up the whole of the
Government subvention. To increase the speed of a vessel from 8 to 10
knots it is necessary that the engine power should be doubled." This work
of Mr. Bourne is now the standard of authority on the subject of which he
treats, the world over.
Again, Mr. James R. Napier, of London, known as one of the largest and
most skilled engine-builders in Great Britain, in the discussion of the
dynamic efficiency of steamships in the proceedings of the "British
Association" in 1856, page 436, says: "The power in similar vessels, I here
take for granted, at present varies as the cube of the velocity." The power
simply represents the coal; in fact, it is the coal.
Mr. Charles Atherton, the able and distinguished Chief Engineer of Her
Majesty's Royal Dock Yard, at Woolwich, has published a volume, called
"Steamship Capability," a smaller volume on "Marine Engine
Classification," and several elaborate papers for the British Association, the
Society of Arts, London, the Association of Civil Engineers, and the
Artisans' Journal, for the purpose of properly exposing the high cost of
steam freight transport as based on the law above noticed, and the ruinous
expense of running certain classes of vessels of an inferior dynamic
efficiency. When but a few weeks since in London, I asked the Editor of the
"Artisan," if any engineer in England disputed the laws relative to power,
on which Mr. Atherton based his arguments. He replied that he had never
heard of one who did. I asked Mr. Atherton myself, if in the case of the
newest and most improved steamers, with the best possible models for
speed, he had ever found any defect in the law of, the resistance as the
Page 62
squares, and the power as the cubes of the velocity. He replied that he had
not; and that he regarded the law as founded in nature, and had everywhere
seen it verified in practice in the many experiments which it was his duty to
conduct with steam vessels in and out of the Royal Navy. I think, therefore,
that with all of these high authorities, the doctrine will be admitted as a law
of power and speed, and consequently of the consumption of coal and the
high cost of running steamers at mail speeds.
It is not my purpose here to discuss this law, or treat generally or specially
of the theory of steam navigation. It will suffice that I point out clearly its
existence and the prominent methods of its application only, as these are
necessary to the general deduction which I propose making, that rapid
steamships can not support themselves on their own receipts. The general
reader can pass over these formulæ to p. 69, and look at their results.
I. TO FIND THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL NECESSARY TO
INCREASE THE SPEED OF A STEAMER.
Suppose that a steamer running eight miles per hour consumes forty tons of
coal per day: how much coal will she consume per day at nine miles per
hour? The calculation is as follows:
83 : 93 :: 40 : required consumption, which is, 56.95 tons. Here the speed
has increased 121/2 per cent., while the quantity of fuel consumed increased
421/2 per cent.
Suppose, again, that we wish to increase the speed from 8 to 10, and from 8
to 16 miles per hour. The formula stands the same, thus:
Miles. Miles. Tons Coal. Tons Coal.
83 : 103 :: 40 : x, = 78.1
83 : 163 :: 40 : x, = 320.
II. TO FIND THE SPEED CORRESPONDING TO A DIMINISHED
CONSUMPTION OF FUEL.
not; and that he regarded the law as founded in nature, and had everywhere
seen it verified in practice in the many experiments which it was his duty to
conduct with steam vessels in and out of the Royal Navy. I think, therefore,
that with all of these high authorities, the doctrine will be admitted as a law
of power and speed, and consequently of the consumption of coal and the
high cost of running steamers at mail speeds.
It is not my purpose here to discuss this law, or treat generally or specially
of the theory of steam navigation. It will suffice that I point out clearly its
existence and the prominent methods of its application only, as these are
necessary to the general deduction which I propose making, that rapid
steamships can not support themselves on their own receipts. The general
reader can pass over these formulæ to p. 69, and look at their results.
I. TO FIND THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL NECESSARY TO
INCREASE THE SPEED OF A STEAMER.
Suppose that a steamer running eight miles per hour consumes forty tons of
coal per day: how much coal will she consume per day at nine miles per
hour? The calculation is as follows:
83 : 93 :: 40 : required consumption, which is, 56.95 tons. Here the speed
has increased 121/2 per cent., while the quantity of fuel consumed increased
421/2 per cent.
Suppose, again, that we wish to increase the speed from 8 to 10, and from 8
to 16 miles per hour. The formula stands the same, thus:
Miles. Miles. Tons Coal. Tons Coal.
83 : 103 :: 40 : x, = 78.1
83 : 163 :: 40 : x, = 320.
II. TO FIND THE SPEED CORRESPONDING TO A DIMINISHED
CONSUMPTION OF FUEL.
Page 63
Murray has given some convenient formulæ, which I will here adopt.
Suppose a vessel of 500 horse power run 12 knots per hour on 40 tons coal
per day: what will be the speed if she burn only 30 tons per day? Thus:
V3 (or cube of the required
40 : 30 :: 123 :
velocity,)
Or,
4 : 3 :: 1728 : V 3,
reduced,
Equation, 3 × 1728 = 5184 = 4V3,
Or, 5184/4 =
3 = V, required velocity.
√1296 = 10.902 knots
Thus, we reduce the quantity of coal one fourth, but the speed is reduced
but little above one twelfth.
III. RELATION BETWEEN THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL, AND
THE LENGTH AND VELOCITY OF VOYAGE.
The consumption of fuel on two or more given voyages will vary as the
square of the velocity multiplied into the distance travelled. Thus, during a
voyage of 1200 miles, average speed 10 knots, the consumption of coal is
150 tons: we wish to know the consumption for 1800 miles at 8 knots.
Thus:
150 tons : C required Consumption :: 102 knots × 1200 miles : 82 knots ×
1800 miles.
Then, C × 100 × 1200 = 150 × 64 × 1800,*
Or, C × 120,000 = 17,280,000
Reduced to C = 1728/12 = 144 tons consumption.
Suppose, again, that we wish to know the rate of speed for 1800 miles, if
the coals used be the same as on another voyage of 1200 miles, with 150
tons coal, and ten knots speed:
Suppose a vessel of 500 horse power run 12 knots per hour on 40 tons coal
per day: what will be the speed if she burn only 30 tons per day? Thus:
V3 (or cube of the required
40 : 30 :: 123 :
velocity,)
Or,
4 : 3 :: 1728 : V 3,
reduced,
Equation, 3 × 1728 = 5184 = 4V3,
Or, 5184/4 =
3 = V, required velocity.
√1296 = 10.902 knots
Thus, we reduce the quantity of coal one fourth, but the speed is reduced
but little above one twelfth.
III. RELATION BETWEEN THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL, AND
THE LENGTH AND VELOCITY OF VOYAGE.
The consumption of fuel on two or more given voyages will vary as the
square of the velocity multiplied into the distance travelled. Thus, during a
voyage of 1200 miles, average speed 10 knots, the consumption of coal is
150 tons: we wish to know the consumption for 1800 miles at 8 knots.
Thus:
150 tons : C required Consumption :: 102 knots × 1200 miles : 82 knots ×
1800 miles.
Then, C × 100 × 1200 = 150 × 64 × 1800,*
Or, C × 120,000 = 17,280,000
Reduced to C = 1728/12 = 144 tons consumption.
Suppose, again, that we wish to know the rate of speed for 1800 miles, if
the coals used be the same as on another voyage of 1200 miles, with 150
tons coal, and ten knots speed:
Page 64
We substitute former consumption, 150 tons for C, as in the equation above,
marked *, and V2 (square of the required velocity) for 64, and have,
150 × 100 × 1200 = 150 × V2 × 1800,
Or, 120,000 = 1800V2,
1200
Reduced, /18 = V2,
And V = √66.66 = 8.15 knots.
From the foregoing easily intelligible formulæ we can ascertain with
approximate certainty the large quantity of coal necessary to increase speed,
the large saving of coal in reducing speed, as well as the means of
accommodating the fuel to the voyage, or the voyage to the fuel. It is not
necessary here to study very closely the economy of fuel, as this is a
question affecting the transport of freight alone. When the mails are to be
transported, economy of fuel is not the object desired, but speed; and,
consequently, we must submit to extravagance of fuel. This large
expenditure of coal is not necessary in the case of freights, as they may be
transported slowly, and, consequently, cheaply. But one of the principal
reasons for rapid transport of the mails is that they may largely anticipate
freights in their time of arrival, and consequently control their movements.
I recently had an excellent opportunity of testing the large quantity of fuel
saved on a slight reduction of the speed, and give it as illustrative of the law
advanced. We were on the United States Mail steamer "Fulton," Captain
Wotton, and running at 13 miles per hour. Some of the tubes became unfit
for use in one of the boilers, and the fires were extinguished and the steam
and water drawn off from this boiler, leaving the other one, of the same
size, to propel the ship. An intelligent gentleman who happened to know
that we were using only one boiler, and consequently, but half the power,
remarked to me that it was very strange that the ship was still going about
eleven miles per hour, without any sail. He said: "It is strange, sir; two
boilers of equal size drove us thirteen miles per hour; and here now but one
boiler drives us nearly eleven miles, or nearly as fast; when common-sense
teaches that the one boiler would drive us only six and a half miles per hour.
How is that?" I then explained to him very clearly the natural law relative to
power and speed, (See Rule II., page 68,) which he at once comprehended
and admitted, but with the remark: "Indeed, sir, I would have testified that
marked *, and V2 (square of the required velocity) for 64, and have,
150 × 100 × 1200 = 150 × V2 × 1800,
Or, 120,000 = 1800V2,
1200
Reduced, /18 = V2,
And V = √66.66 = 8.15 knots.
From the foregoing easily intelligible formulæ we can ascertain with
approximate certainty the large quantity of coal necessary to increase speed,
the large saving of coal in reducing speed, as well as the means of
accommodating the fuel to the voyage, or the voyage to the fuel. It is not
necessary here to study very closely the economy of fuel, as this is a
question affecting the transport of freight alone. When the mails are to be
transported, economy of fuel is not the object desired, but speed; and,
consequently, we must submit to extravagance of fuel. This large
expenditure of coal is not necessary in the case of freights, as they may be
transported slowly, and, consequently, cheaply. But one of the principal
reasons for rapid transport of the mails is that they may largely anticipate
freights in their time of arrival, and consequently control their movements.
I recently had an excellent opportunity of testing the large quantity of fuel
saved on a slight reduction of the speed, and give it as illustrative of the law
advanced. We were on the United States Mail steamer "Fulton," Captain
Wotton, and running at 13 miles per hour. Some of the tubes became unfit
for use in one of the boilers, and the fires were extinguished and the steam
and water drawn off from this boiler, leaving the other one, of the same
size, to propel the ship. An intelligent gentleman who happened to know
that we were using only one boiler, and consequently, but half the power,
remarked to me that it was very strange that the ship was still going about
eleven miles per hour, without any sail. He said: "It is strange, sir; two
boilers of equal size drove us thirteen miles per hour; and here now but one
boiler drives us nearly eleven miles, or nearly as fast; when common-sense
teaches that the one boiler would drive us only six and a half miles per hour.
How is that?" I then explained to him very clearly the natural law relative to
power and speed, (See Rule II., page 68,) which he at once comprehended
and admitted, but with the remark: "Indeed, sir, I would have testified that
Page 65
she ought with one boiler to have gone at only half the speed; or that going
at six miles with one boiler, she would go twelve with two."
As it will be interesting to the general reader to examine the details of the
increased consumption of fuel at increased rates of speed, I present the
following elaborate table recently prepared by Mr. Atherton for his new
edition of "Steamship Capability," according to the formula above noticed,
and the performance of the best type of vessel in the Royal Navy, the
steamer "Rattler." Mr. A. found a higher efficiency in this vessel per horse
power than any other in the Navy, and consequently based the consumption
of coal in the table on the assumption that the mail and passenger vessels
generally should be of as good contractive type as "Rattler." I shall present
also another table showing a much larger consumption of fuel by an inferior
type of vessel. I use these tables because they are thoroughly correct, and
quite as perfect as any that I could construct on the same formula; and
because they carry with them the weight of probably the highest authority
in Great Britain.
COAL TABLE: No. I.
Displacement,[B] Speed, and Fuel consumed per Day, for Mail, Passenger,
and Freight Steamers, whose locomotive performance is equal to that of the
best class of ocean steam vessels; assuming the consumption of fuel to be
41/2 lbs. per indicated horse power per hour, equal to 33,000 lbs. raised one
foot in one minute. The quantity consumed is expressed in tons per day of
24 hours.
at six miles with one boiler, she would go twelve with two."
As it will be interesting to the general reader to examine the details of the
increased consumption of fuel at increased rates of speed, I present the
following elaborate table recently prepared by Mr. Atherton for his new
edition of "Steamship Capability," according to the formula above noticed,
and the performance of the best type of vessel in the Royal Navy, the
steamer "Rattler." Mr. A. found a higher efficiency in this vessel per horse
power than any other in the Navy, and consequently based the consumption
of coal in the table on the assumption that the mail and passenger vessels
generally should be of as good contractive type as "Rattler." I shall present
also another table showing a much larger consumption of fuel by an inferior
type of vessel. I use these tables because they are thoroughly correct, and
quite as perfect as any that I could construct on the same formula; and
because they carry with them the weight of probably the highest authority
in Great Britain.
COAL TABLE: No. I.
Displacement,[B] Speed, and Fuel consumed per Day, for Mail, Passenger,
and Freight Steamers, whose locomotive performance is equal to that of the
best class of ocean steam vessels; assuming the consumption of fuel to be
41/2 lbs. per indicated horse power per hour, equal to 33,000 lbs. raised one
foot in one minute. The quantity consumed is expressed in tons per day of
24 hours.
Page 66
[B] Displacement refers to the number of cubic feet of water displaced by the hull; allowing thirty-five cubic feet to the
ton.
SHIP'S SPEED PER HOUR.—NAUTICAL MILES
DISPLACEMENT. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
TONS. TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS
100 1.04 1.65 2.47 3.51 4.82 6.41 8.32 10.6 13.2 16.3
125 1.20 1.92 2.86 4.07 5.59 7.44 9.66 12.3 15.3 18.9
150 1.36 2.16 3.23 4.60 6.31 8.40 10.9 13.9 17.3 21.3
175 1.51 2.40 3.58 5.10 7.00 9.31 12.1 15.4 19.2 23.6
200 1.65 2.62 3.91 5.57 7.65 10.2 13.2 16.8 21.0 25.8
250 1.92 3.04 4.54 6.47 8.87 11.8 15.3 19.5 24.3 29.9
300 2.25 3.44 5.13 7.30 10.0 13.3 17.3 22.0 27.5 33.8
350 2.40 3.81 5.68 8.09 11.1 14.8 19.2 24.4 30.5 37.5
400 2.62 4.16 6.21 8.85 12.1 16.2 21.0 26.7 33.3 41.0
450 2.84 4.50 6.72 9.57 13.1 17.5 22.7 28.8 36.0 44.3
500 3.04 4.83 7.21 10.3 14.1 18.7 24.3 30.9 38.6 47.5
600 3.43 5.46 8.14 11.6 15.9 21.2 27.5 34.9 43.6 53.7
700 3.81 6.05 9.02 12.8 17.6 23.5 30.4 38.7 48.4 59.5
800 4.16 6.61 9.87 14.0 19.3 25.6 33.3 42.3 52.9 65.0
900 4.50 7.15 10.7 15.2 20.8 27.7 36.0 45.8 57.2 70.4
1000 4.83 7.67 11.4 16.3 22.4 29.8 38.6 49.1 61.3 75.5
1250 5.60 8.90 13.3 18.9 26.0 34.5 44.8 57.0 71.2 87.6
1500 6.33 10.0 15.0 21.4 29.3 39.0 50.6 64.4 80.4 98.9
1750 7.01 11.1 16.6 23.7 32.5 43.2 56.1 71.3 89.1 110
2000 7.66 12.2 18.2 25.9 35.5 47.3 61.3 77.9 97.4 120
2500 8.89 14.1 21.1 30.0 41.2 54.8 71.2 90.5 113 139
3000 10.0 16.0 23.8 33.9 46.5 61.9 80.4 102 128 157
3500 11.1 17.7 26.1 37.6 51.5 68.6 89.0 113 141 174
4000 12.2 19.3 28.8 41.1 56.3 75.0 97.3 124 155 190
5000 14.1 22.4 33.5 47.7 65.4 87.0 113 144 179 221
6000 15.9 25.3 37.8 53.8 73.8 98.3 128 162 203 249
7000 17.7 28.1 41.9 59.6 81.8 109 141 180 224 276
8000 19.3 30.7 45.8 65.2 89.4 119 155 196 245 302
9000 20.9 33.2 49.5 70.5 96.7 129 167 215 265 327
10000 22.4 35.6 53.1 75.6 104 138 179 228 285 350
12500 26.0 41.3 61.7 87.8 120 160 208 265 330 406
15000 29.4 46.6 69.6 99.1 136 181 235 299 373 459
20000 35.6 56.5 84.4 120 165 219 285 362 452 556
25000 41.3 65.6 97.9 139 191 254 330 420 525 645
30000 46.6 74.0 111 157 216 287 373 474 592 728
By the inspection of this table we can see in condensed form the coal-cost of any speed as high as twenty miles per
hour, and for any size of vessel from one hundred tons to thirty thousand tons. Let us find in the left hand column a
vessel of 2,500 tons displacement. Pursuing the line along to the right we find in the second column 8.89 tons of
coal, which a steamer of this displacement would burn in 24 hours, if running, as indicated at the head of the
column, 6 Nautical miles per hour.
In the next column, under the head of 7 Nautical miles per hour, we find that she would burn in one day 14.1 tons;
or one and a half times as much coal to gain one sixth more speed:
ton.
SHIP'S SPEED PER HOUR.—NAUTICAL MILES
DISPLACEMENT. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
TONS. TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS
100 1.04 1.65 2.47 3.51 4.82 6.41 8.32 10.6 13.2 16.3
125 1.20 1.92 2.86 4.07 5.59 7.44 9.66 12.3 15.3 18.9
150 1.36 2.16 3.23 4.60 6.31 8.40 10.9 13.9 17.3 21.3
175 1.51 2.40 3.58 5.10 7.00 9.31 12.1 15.4 19.2 23.6
200 1.65 2.62 3.91 5.57 7.65 10.2 13.2 16.8 21.0 25.8
250 1.92 3.04 4.54 6.47 8.87 11.8 15.3 19.5 24.3 29.9
300 2.25 3.44 5.13 7.30 10.0 13.3 17.3 22.0 27.5 33.8
350 2.40 3.81 5.68 8.09 11.1 14.8 19.2 24.4 30.5 37.5
400 2.62 4.16 6.21 8.85 12.1 16.2 21.0 26.7 33.3 41.0
450 2.84 4.50 6.72 9.57 13.1 17.5 22.7 28.8 36.0 44.3
500 3.04 4.83 7.21 10.3 14.1 18.7 24.3 30.9 38.6 47.5
600 3.43 5.46 8.14 11.6 15.9 21.2 27.5 34.9 43.6 53.7
700 3.81 6.05 9.02 12.8 17.6 23.5 30.4 38.7 48.4 59.5
800 4.16 6.61 9.87 14.0 19.3 25.6 33.3 42.3 52.9 65.0
900 4.50 7.15 10.7 15.2 20.8 27.7 36.0 45.8 57.2 70.4
1000 4.83 7.67 11.4 16.3 22.4 29.8 38.6 49.1 61.3 75.5
1250 5.60 8.90 13.3 18.9 26.0 34.5 44.8 57.0 71.2 87.6
1500 6.33 10.0 15.0 21.4 29.3 39.0 50.6 64.4 80.4 98.9
1750 7.01 11.1 16.6 23.7 32.5 43.2 56.1 71.3 89.1 110
2000 7.66 12.2 18.2 25.9 35.5 47.3 61.3 77.9 97.4 120
2500 8.89 14.1 21.1 30.0 41.2 54.8 71.2 90.5 113 139
3000 10.0 16.0 23.8 33.9 46.5 61.9 80.4 102 128 157
3500 11.1 17.7 26.1 37.6 51.5 68.6 89.0 113 141 174
4000 12.2 19.3 28.8 41.1 56.3 75.0 97.3 124 155 190
5000 14.1 22.4 33.5 47.7 65.4 87.0 113 144 179 221
6000 15.9 25.3 37.8 53.8 73.8 98.3 128 162 203 249
7000 17.7 28.1 41.9 59.6 81.8 109 141 180 224 276
8000 19.3 30.7 45.8 65.2 89.4 119 155 196 245 302
9000 20.9 33.2 49.5 70.5 96.7 129 167 215 265 327
10000 22.4 35.6 53.1 75.6 104 138 179 228 285 350
12500 26.0 41.3 61.7 87.8 120 160 208 265 330 406
15000 29.4 46.6 69.6 99.1 136 181 235 299 373 459
20000 35.6 56.5 84.4 120 165 219 285 362 452 556
25000 41.3 65.6 97.9 139 191 254 330 420 525 645
30000 46.6 74.0 111 157 216 287 373 474 592 728
By the inspection of this table we can see in condensed form the coal-cost of any speed as high as twenty miles per
hour, and for any size of vessel from one hundred tons to thirty thousand tons. Let us find in the left hand column a
vessel of 2,500 tons displacement. Pursuing the line along to the right we find in the second column 8.89 tons of
coal, which a steamer of this displacement would burn in 24 hours, if running, as indicated at the head of the
column, 6 Nautical miles per hour.
In the next column, under the head of 7 Nautical miles per hour, we find that she would burn in one day 14.1 tons;
or one and a half times as much coal to gain one sixth more speed:
Page 67
Again, at 8 miles per hour she burns 21.1 tons; nearly three times as much as at six miles:
At 9 miles she burns 30 tons: above twice as much as at 7, and nearly four times as much as at 6, although the
speed is but half doubled:
At 10 miles per hour she burns 41.2 tons; about twice as much as at 8 miles, although the speed is increased only
one fourth. At 10 she burns 34 per cent. more than at 9, although the increase of speed is only eleven per cent. (See
pages 67 and 68):
At 11 miles per hour she will burn 54.8 or 55 tons; nearly three times as much as at 8 miles per hour, and six times
as much as at 6 miles per hour:
At 12 miles per hour she will burn 71.2; about thirty per cent. more than at eleven miles per hour, although gaining
but 9 per cent. in speed; nearly twice as much as at ten miles per hour, three and a half times as much as at 8, five
times as much as at 7, and above eight times as much as at 6 miles per hour. It is here seen that to double the speed
the consumption of fuel has increased eight-fold, which verifies my statements hitherto made on this subject. We
have already seen that to gain two miles of speed on any stated speed, it was necessary to double the quantity of
fuel used.
At 13 miles per hour she burns 90.5 tons. This is burning two and a fourth times as much coal as if she ran only 10
miles per hour. Now, at this speed, the steamer will reach Southampton or Liverpool in 10 days and 6 hours, which
is equivalent to 10 days and 12 hours burning fuel, allowing six hours for heating and starting, and which would
make an aggregate consumption of 950 tons of coal for the passage of this steamer of 2,500 displacement or
probably 3,000 tons register.
At 14 miles per hour she burns 113 tons. This is nearly three times as much as 10 miles per hour. At this speed the
steamer would reach Southampton or Liverpool in 9 days, 12 hours, and 30 minutes, supposing the distance to be
3,200 miles from New-York, or say 9 days 181/2 hours coal-burning time, and would consume an aggregate of
1,1041/2 tons. As this is but little above the distance from New-York to Southampton, and under that from Panamá
to California, and about the tonnage of the steamers running, the time being within eleven days generally, it will be
seen how large is the cost of running the steamers of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, those on the European
routes, and also those between New-York and Aspinwall. As the route of the Havre and Bremen steamers is much
longer, they are compelled to run slightly slower, or they would be filled up with their own fuel and power. Taking
a Collins steamer of 3,000 tons, which we find in the line below, and we see that in running 14 miles per hour as
they have frequently done, the consumption would be 128 tons per day, or 1,252 tons for the passage. And yet, one
of those steamers could make 12 miles per hour on 80.4 tons per day, or at 11 miles per hour on 61.9, or less than
half that used at 14. But pursuing this table we see that,
At 15 miles per hour she would burn 139 tons, or three and a half times as much as at 10 miles.
At 16 miles per hour she would burn 169 tons, or precisely eight times as much as at 8 miles per hour. Here again
doubling the speed is found to be an enormous expense.
At 17 miles per hour she burns 202 tons per day.
At 18 miles per hour the consumption is 240 tons per day.
At 19 miles per hour she burns 283 tons coal per day; and
At 20 miles per hour she burns 329 tons per day. At 20 miles per hour she would run 480 miles per day, a thing as
yet wholly unheard of, and would consume on the voyage of 6 days and 16 hours, say 6 days and 22 hours, 2,276
tons of coal. It would be clearly impossible for her to carry her own fuel; as the immense boiler and engine power
necessary to secure this speed would of itself fill a ship of this size, to say nothing of the fuel which also would
nearly fill it. Then, we may never expect any such ship to attain any such speed as seventeen, eighteen, or twenty
miles per hour on so long a voyage without recoaling.
At 9 miles she burns 30 tons: above twice as much as at 7, and nearly four times as much as at 6, although the
speed is but half doubled:
At 10 miles per hour she burns 41.2 tons; about twice as much as at 8 miles, although the speed is increased only
one fourth. At 10 she burns 34 per cent. more than at 9, although the increase of speed is only eleven per cent. (See
pages 67 and 68):
At 11 miles per hour she will burn 54.8 or 55 tons; nearly three times as much as at 8 miles per hour, and six times
as much as at 6 miles per hour:
At 12 miles per hour she will burn 71.2; about thirty per cent. more than at eleven miles per hour, although gaining
but 9 per cent. in speed; nearly twice as much as at ten miles per hour, three and a half times as much as at 8, five
times as much as at 7, and above eight times as much as at 6 miles per hour. It is here seen that to double the speed
the consumption of fuel has increased eight-fold, which verifies my statements hitherto made on this subject. We
have already seen that to gain two miles of speed on any stated speed, it was necessary to double the quantity of
fuel used.
At 13 miles per hour she burns 90.5 tons. This is burning two and a fourth times as much coal as if she ran only 10
miles per hour. Now, at this speed, the steamer will reach Southampton or Liverpool in 10 days and 6 hours, which
is equivalent to 10 days and 12 hours burning fuel, allowing six hours for heating and starting, and which would
make an aggregate consumption of 950 tons of coal for the passage of this steamer of 2,500 displacement or
probably 3,000 tons register.
At 14 miles per hour she burns 113 tons. This is nearly three times as much as 10 miles per hour. At this speed the
steamer would reach Southampton or Liverpool in 9 days, 12 hours, and 30 minutes, supposing the distance to be
3,200 miles from New-York, or say 9 days 181/2 hours coal-burning time, and would consume an aggregate of
1,1041/2 tons. As this is but little above the distance from New-York to Southampton, and under that from Panamá
to California, and about the tonnage of the steamers running, the time being within eleven days generally, it will be
seen how large is the cost of running the steamers of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, those on the European
routes, and also those between New-York and Aspinwall. As the route of the Havre and Bremen steamers is much
longer, they are compelled to run slightly slower, or they would be filled up with their own fuel and power. Taking
a Collins steamer of 3,000 tons, which we find in the line below, and we see that in running 14 miles per hour as
they have frequently done, the consumption would be 128 tons per day, or 1,252 tons for the passage. And yet, one
of those steamers could make 12 miles per hour on 80.4 tons per day, or at 11 miles per hour on 61.9, or less than
half that used at 14. But pursuing this table we see that,
At 15 miles per hour she would burn 139 tons, or three and a half times as much as at 10 miles.
At 16 miles per hour she would burn 169 tons, or precisely eight times as much as at 8 miles per hour. Here again
doubling the speed is found to be an enormous expense.
At 17 miles per hour she burns 202 tons per day.
At 18 miles per hour the consumption is 240 tons per day.
At 19 miles per hour she burns 283 tons coal per day; and
At 20 miles per hour she burns 329 tons per day. At 20 miles per hour she would run 480 miles per day, a thing as
yet wholly unheard of, and would consume on the voyage of 6 days and 16 hours, say 6 days and 22 hours, 2,276
tons of coal. It would be clearly impossible for her to carry her own fuel; as the immense boiler and engine power
necessary to secure this speed would of itself fill a ship of this size, to say nothing of the fuel which also would
nearly fill it. Then, we may never expect any such ship to attain any such speed as seventeen, eighteen, or twenty
miles per hour on so long a voyage without recoaling.
Page 68
Seeing thus the enormous increase in the consumption of fuel for a moderate increase in the speed, we are enabled
the better to appreciate the large expense incurred in running ocean steamers sufficiently rapidly for successful
mail and passenger purposes. We will further pursue these inquiries by examining in this table the consumption for
vessels of 6,000 tons, which would make the displacement of the ship nearly 5,000 tons, such as the "Adriatic," the
"Vanderbilt," and the "Niagara." It appears that at 8 miles per hour they would consume 33 tons per day; at 10
miles, 65 tons; at 12 miles, 113 tons; at 13 miles, 144 tons; at 14 miles, 179 tons; at 15 miles, 221 tons; and at 16
miles, 268 tons per day. This is supposing this speed to be maintained on an average across the ocean, in all kinds
of weather, which this size of steamer could not do without more engine and boiler power than any of them have.
With such additional power the ships noticed would have scarcely any available room for freight or any thing else.
One thing is very clear from this table, that when steamers run at very moderately slow rates of speed, their
consumption of fuel is very small; and that when they leave this low freighting speed, for that of the necessarily
rapid mails and passengers, the consumption increases to an extent and with a rapidity that would seem almost
incredible at first view.
COAL TABLE: No. II.
The following coal table is constructed in all respects as the preceding, but for a lower type of vessels, or those
whose coëfficient of Dynamic performance is inferior to that upon which the previous table is estimated. As a
consequence, this style of vessel requires more fuel.
SHIP'S SPEED PER HOUR.—NAUTICAL MILES
DISPLACEMENT. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
TONS. TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS
500 3.95 6.28 9.37 13.4 18.3 24.3 31.6 40.1 50.2 61.7
600 4.46 7.10 10.6 15.1 20.6 27.5 35.7 45.3 56.6 69.8
700 4.95 7.86 11.7 16.6 22.8 30.5 39.5 50.3 62.9 77.3
800 5.41 8.59 12.8 18.2 25.1 33.3 43.3 55.0 68.7 84.5
900 5.85 9.29 13.9 19.7 27.0 36.0 46.8 59.5 74.3 91.5
1000 6.28 9.97 14.8 21.2 29.1 38.7 50.1 63.8 79.7 98.1
1250 7.28 11.5 17.3 24.5 33.8 44.8 58.2 74.1 92.5 114
1500 8.23 13.0 19.5 27.8 38.1 50.7 65.7 83.7 104 128
1750 9.11 14.4 21.5 30.8 42.2 56.1 72.9 92.7 115 143
2000 9.95 15.8 23.6 33.6 46.1 61.5 79.7 101 126 159
2500 11.5 18.3 27.4 39.0 53.5 71.2 92.5 117 147 180
3000 13.0 20.8 30.9 44.0 60.4 80.4 104 132 166 204
3500 14.4 23.0 34.3 48.8 66.9 89.1 115 147 183 226
4000 15.8 25.1 37.4 53.4 73.2 97.5 126 161 201 247
5000 18.3 29.1 43.5 62.0 85.0 113 147 187 232 287
6000 20.6 32.9 49.1 69.9 95.9 127 166 210 264 323
10000 29.1 46.2 69.0 98.2 135 179 232 296 370 455
FREIGHT TABLE: No. III.
Showing the mutual relation of Displacement, Power, Speed, Consumption of Coal, and capacity for Cargo of
vessels of progressively increasing magnitude up to nearly 30,000 tons of Deep-draught Displacement, employed
on a passage of 3,250 nautical miles, without recoaling: showing also the prime cost Expenses per ton of Cargo
conveyed.
the better to appreciate the large expense incurred in running ocean steamers sufficiently rapidly for successful
mail and passenger purposes. We will further pursue these inquiries by examining in this table the consumption for
vessels of 6,000 tons, which would make the displacement of the ship nearly 5,000 tons, such as the "Adriatic," the
"Vanderbilt," and the "Niagara." It appears that at 8 miles per hour they would consume 33 tons per day; at 10
miles, 65 tons; at 12 miles, 113 tons; at 13 miles, 144 tons; at 14 miles, 179 tons; at 15 miles, 221 tons; and at 16
miles, 268 tons per day. This is supposing this speed to be maintained on an average across the ocean, in all kinds
of weather, which this size of steamer could not do without more engine and boiler power than any of them have.
With such additional power the ships noticed would have scarcely any available room for freight or any thing else.
One thing is very clear from this table, that when steamers run at very moderately slow rates of speed, their
consumption of fuel is very small; and that when they leave this low freighting speed, for that of the necessarily
rapid mails and passengers, the consumption increases to an extent and with a rapidity that would seem almost
incredible at first view.
COAL TABLE: No. II.
The following coal table is constructed in all respects as the preceding, but for a lower type of vessels, or those
whose coëfficient of Dynamic performance is inferior to that upon which the previous table is estimated. As a
consequence, this style of vessel requires more fuel.
SHIP'S SPEED PER HOUR.—NAUTICAL MILES
DISPLACEMENT. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
TONS. TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS
500 3.95 6.28 9.37 13.4 18.3 24.3 31.6 40.1 50.2 61.7
600 4.46 7.10 10.6 15.1 20.6 27.5 35.7 45.3 56.6 69.8
700 4.95 7.86 11.7 16.6 22.8 30.5 39.5 50.3 62.9 77.3
800 5.41 8.59 12.8 18.2 25.1 33.3 43.3 55.0 68.7 84.5
900 5.85 9.29 13.9 19.7 27.0 36.0 46.8 59.5 74.3 91.5
1000 6.28 9.97 14.8 21.2 29.1 38.7 50.1 63.8 79.7 98.1
1250 7.28 11.5 17.3 24.5 33.8 44.8 58.2 74.1 92.5 114
1500 8.23 13.0 19.5 27.8 38.1 50.7 65.7 83.7 104 128
1750 9.11 14.4 21.5 30.8 42.2 56.1 72.9 92.7 115 143
2000 9.95 15.8 23.6 33.6 46.1 61.5 79.7 101 126 159
2500 11.5 18.3 27.4 39.0 53.5 71.2 92.5 117 147 180
3000 13.0 20.8 30.9 44.0 60.4 80.4 104 132 166 204
3500 14.4 23.0 34.3 48.8 66.9 89.1 115 147 183 226
4000 15.8 25.1 37.4 53.4 73.2 97.5 126 161 201 247
5000 18.3 29.1 43.5 62.0 85.0 113 147 187 232 287
6000 20.6 32.9 49.1 69.9 95.9 127 166 210 264 323
10000 29.1 46.2 69.0 98.2 135 179 232 296 370 455
FREIGHT TABLE: No. III.
Showing the mutual relation of Displacement, Power, Speed, Consumption of Coal, and capacity for Cargo of
vessels of progressively increasing magnitude up to nearly 30,000 tons of Deep-draught Displacement, employed
on a passage of 3,250 nautical miles, without recoaling: showing also the prime cost Expenses per ton of Cargo
conveyed.
Page 69
POWER. Assumed PASSAGE 3,250 N. M. DIRECT.
Mean or Mid- weight
passage Speed. of Hull Exp
Nominal Indicated Deep
Displacement. and Time. Coal. Cargo. per
H. P. h. p. Displacement.
Engines. Ca
Tons. N. M. H. P. h. p. TONS. D. H. TONS. TONS. TONS. £
8 109 436 1109 16.22 369 1209 2684 2
9 155 620 1155 15. 1 466 1112 2733 2
2,500
10 213 852 1213 13.13 577 999 2788 2 1
11 284 1136 1284 12. 7 699 867 2849 3 1
12 368 1472 1368 11. 7 830 717 2915 4 1
8 172 688 2172 16.22 582 2537 5291 1 1
9 245 980 2245 15. 1 737 2386 5368 1 1
5,000
10 336 1344 2336 13.13 882 2223 5441 2
11 448 1792 2448 12. 7 1103 2000 5551 2 1
12 581 2324 2581 11. 7 1311 1763 5655 3
8 276 1104 4276 16.22 934 5257 10467 1 1
9 388 1552 4388 15. 1 1168 5028 10584 1 1
10 536 2144 4536 13.13 1407 4760 10703 1 1
10,000
11 712 2848 4712 12. 7 1753 4411 10876 2
12 928 3712 4928 11. 7 2094 4025 11047 2
13 1180 4720 5180 10.10 2458 3591 11229 2 1
14 1472 5888 5472 9.16 2848 3104 11424 3 1
8 436 1744 8436 16.22 1476 10826 20738 1
9 620 2480 8620 15. 1 1866 10447 20933 1
10 852 3408 8852 13.13 2236 10030 21118 1 1
20,000
11 1136 4544 9136 12. 7 2797 9466 21398 1 1
12 1472 5888 9472 11. 7 3322 8867 21661 1 1
13 1872 7488 9872 10.10 3900 8178 21950 2
14 2340 9360 10340 9.16 4528 7396 22264 2 1
Mr. Atherton gives this table, which shows the following facts:
That, as the various sized vessels named, increase in speed from 8 to 12, or from 8 to 14 miles per hour, their horse
power, as well consequently as their coal, increases:
That, as the speed increases, so does the weight of the hull and engines:
That, as the speed increases, with the consequent increased coal and engine weight, the cargo decreases: and
That, as the speed increases, with the other necessary conditions noticed, the expense per ton of cargo also
increases in a rapid ratio. In the four cross columns ships of different sizes are considered; of 2,500, 5,000, 10,000,
and 20,000 tons. There is also given the working or indicated horse power, and the nominal horse-power, or that of
33,000 lbs. raised a foot in a minute, which is the general basis of making contracts. It is a fact, however, that
engines generally work up to three or four times their nominal horse power; so that the word horse power has no
positive or useful meaning. Vessels called one hundred nominal horse-power have been known to work up to six
hundred.
Let us take a ship of 5,000 tons. We find that at 8 miles per hour the horse power is 436; but at 12 miles it is 1,472,
nearly four times as great. At 13 miles, it would be nearly 1800 horse, and at 14 it would be above 2100. So, also,
with the weight of engines, boilers, etc. At 8 miles per hour they would weigh 1,109 tons; but at 12 they would
have to weigh, to be large and strong enough, 1,368 tons. At 14 miles, they would weigh nearly 1,600 tons.
Mean or Mid- weight
passage Speed. of Hull Exp
Nominal Indicated Deep
Displacement. and Time. Coal. Cargo. per
H. P. h. p. Displacement.
Engines. Ca
Tons. N. M. H. P. h. p. TONS. D. H. TONS. TONS. TONS. £
8 109 436 1109 16.22 369 1209 2684 2
9 155 620 1155 15. 1 466 1112 2733 2
2,500
10 213 852 1213 13.13 577 999 2788 2 1
11 284 1136 1284 12. 7 699 867 2849 3 1
12 368 1472 1368 11. 7 830 717 2915 4 1
8 172 688 2172 16.22 582 2537 5291 1 1
9 245 980 2245 15. 1 737 2386 5368 1 1
5,000
10 336 1344 2336 13.13 882 2223 5441 2
11 448 1792 2448 12. 7 1103 2000 5551 2 1
12 581 2324 2581 11. 7 1311 1763 5655 3
8 276 1104 4276 16.22 934 5257 10467 1 1
9 388 1552 4388 15. 1 1168 5028 10584 1 1
10 536 2144 4536 13.13 1407 4760 10703 1 1
10,000
11 712 2848 4712 12. 7 1753 4411 10876 2
12 928 3712 4928 11. 7 2094 4025 11047 2
13 1180 4720 5180 10.10 2458 3591 11229 2 1
14 1472 5888 5472 9.16 2848 3104 11424 3 1
8 436 1744 8436 16.22 1476 10826 20738 1
9 620 2480 8620 15. 1 1866 10447 20933 1
10 852 3408 8852 13.13 2236 10030 21118 1 1
20,000
11 1136 4544 9136 12. 7 2797 9466 21398 1 1
12 1472 5888 9472 11. 7 3322 8867 21661 1 1
13 1872 7488 9872 10.10 3900 8178 21950 2
14 2340 9360 10340 9.16 4528 7396 22264 2 1
Mr. Atherton gives this table, which shows the following facts:
That, as the various sized vessels named, increase in speed from 8 to 12, or from 8 to 14 miles per hour, their horse
power, as well consequently as their coal, increases:
That, as the speed increases, so does the weight of the hull and engines:
That, as the speed increases, with the consequent increased coal and engine weight, the cargo decreases: and
That, as the speed increases, with the other necessary conditions noticed, the expense per ton of cargo also
increases in a rapid ratio. In the four cross columns ships of different sizes are considered; of 2,500, 5,000, 10,000,
and 20,000 tons. There is also given the working or indicated horse power, and the nominal horse-power, or that of
33,000 lbs. raised a foot in a minute, which is the general basis of making contracts. It is a fact, however, that
engines generally work up to three or four times their nominal horse power; so that the word horse power has no
positive or useful meaning. Vessels called one hundred nominal horse-power have been known to work up to six
hundred.
Let us take a ship of 5,000 tons. We find that at 8 miles per hour the horse power is 436; but at 12 miles it is 1,472,
nearly four times as great. At 13 miles, it would be nearly 1800 horse, and at 14 it would be above 2100. So, also,
with the weight of engines, boilers, etc. At 8 miles per hour they would weigh 1,109 tons; but at 12 they would
have to weigh, to be large and strong enough, 1,368 tons. At 14 miles, they would weigh nearly 1,600 tons.
Page 70
Now, see the columns "cargo" and "coal," and observe how rapidly that of coal increases, while that of cargo
decreases in the inverse ratio of the coal, the engine, the boiler, and the hull weight combined. The cargo has come
from 1,209 down to 717 tons; and if the speed were increased to 13 or 14 miles per hour, the cargo would be so
reduced as to be unworthy of notice.
The next column shows how much greater the quantity of water displaced as the speed increases. This extra
displacement requires extra power.
In the last column it is observable how rapidly the speed enhances the cost price of transporting cargo. At 13 miles
per hour the cost would be about six pounds sterling per ton, and at 14 knots speed it would be higher than was
ever paid a steamer in the most flush periods of even the best qualities of freights. Freights were about £8 per ton
on the Cunard line before the establishment of the Collins; but they soon came down, and are not now £3, or $15,
on an average. So with passage. The "Great Western" charged £45, the "British Queen" £50; the Cunarders, until
the Collins competition, £40, 19s. The Collins steamers put the price down to £35, and have since reduced it to £30
homeward, and £24 outward. This is but little above half the fare of the Great Western, and something over two
thirds of that formerly charged by the Cunard line. The Report to the House of Commons "on Steam
Communications with India," No. 372 of 1851, second volume, page 395, says, that the average speed of the
Cunard line was 10.443 knots, of the Collins line 11 knots, and of the Havre and Bremen lines 9.875 knots per
hour. The Collins line had then just started, and has since made the average passages one and a half days quicker
than those of the Cunard line. This being the case, it is easy to estimate the gains of a steamer at such rates, when
this column shows us that at 12 miles speed per hour and an average trip of 11 days, the actual prime cost of
moving the freight is much above that which is received for it. It is therefore taken in small quantities only to assist
in paying the running expenses of the steamer.
This table shows another thing very conclusively, that large ships running the same number of miles per hour, run
cheaper and transport freight more cheaply than smaller vessels. It presupposes, however, that they go full both
ways. The engine power and general outlay do not increase as rapidly as the tonnage of the vessel and her capacity
for carrying. While a ship 2,500 tons at 12 miles per hour on a passage of 3,250 miles would make the cost per ton
for the transportation of freight $22.75, one of 20,000 tons, under the same conditions would reduce it to $9 per
ton. Yet it is hardly probable that we shall ever profitably employ steamers of over 10,000 tons tonnage in the
passenger, mail, and freight business.
Again, a ship of 2,500 at 12 miles, running 6,500 miles could not transport cargo at less than $115; one of 5,000
tons would transport it at $52; one of 10,000 tons would transport it at $33 per ton; and one of 20,000 tons burthen,
as for instance the "Leviathan," would transport it at $24 per ton. And while none of the three first named sizes of
vessels would transport it 12,500 miles, the one of 20,000 tons, running 12 miles per hour, would transport it at
$80 per ton; and running 14 miles per hours, at $430 per ton. Two things must, however, not be forgotten in this;
that the ship to do this must always run entirely full and have no waste room; and that these prices are comparisons
between different steamers, and not with sailing vessels, which, running much more slowly and with but little
expense, transport the freight far more cheaply.
The following table will set forth very clearly in a summary view, the Time, Horse-power, Coal, and Cargo for a
steamer of good average quality running on passages of 1,000 miles, 2,000 miles, and 3,000 miles, and at a speed
varying from 6 to 18 miles per hour. It will be observed that a steamer of 3,000 tons can not take power and coal
enough to run on a 2,000 miles passage above 17 knots per hour, and that one of 3,000 tons also can not run on a
3,000 miles passage at a speed above 16 knots per hour. Observe the small quantity of cargo and the large quantity
of coal for a steamer of 3,000 tons on a 3,000 miles passage at 16 miles per hour.
COAL AND CARGO TABLE: No. IV.
Calculated for the mean Displacement of 3,000 Tons.
decreases in the inverse ratio of the coal, the engine, the boiler, and the hull weight combined. The cargo has come
from 1,209 down to 717 tons; and if the speed were increased to 13 or 14 miles per hour, the cargo would be so
reduced as to be unworthy of notice.
The next column shows how much greater the quantity of water displaced as the speed increases. This extra
displacement requires extra power.
In the last column it is observable how rapidly the speed enhances the cost price of transporting cargo. At 13 miles
per hour the cost would be about six pounds sterling per ton, and at 14 knots speed it would be higher than was
ever paid a steamer in the most flush periods of even the best qualities of freights. Freights were about £8 per ton
on the Cunard line before the establishment of the Collins; but they soon came down, and are not now £3, or $15,
on an average. So with passage. The "Great Western" charged £45, the "British Queen" £50; the Cunarders, until
the Collins competition, £40, 19s. The Collins steamers put the price down to £35, and have since reduced it to £30
homeward, and £24 outward. This is but little above half the fare of the Great Western, and something over two
thirds of that formerly charged by the Cunard line. The Report to the House of Commons "on Steam
Communications with India," No. 372 of 1851, second volume, page 395, says, that the average speed of the
Cunard line was 10.443 knots, of the Collins line 11 knots, and of the Havre and Bremen lines 9.875 knots per
hour. The Collins line had then just started, and has since made the average passages one and a half days quicker
than those of the Cunard line. This being the case, it is easy to estimate the gains of a steamer at such rates, when
this column shows us that at 12 miles speed per hour and an average trip of 11 days, the actual prime cost of
moving the freight is much above that which is received for it. It is therefore taken in small quantities only to assist
in paying the running expenses of the steamer.
This table shows another thing very conclusively, that large ships running the same number of miles per hour, run
cheaper and transport freight more cheaply than smaller vessels. It presupposes, however, that they go full both
ways. The engine power and general outlay do not increase as rapidly as the tonnage of the vessel and her capacity
for carrying. While a ship 2,500 tons at 12 miles per hour on a passage of 3,250 miles would make the cost per ton
for the transportation of freight $22.75, one of 20,000 tons, under the same conditions would reduce it to $9 per
ton. Yet it is hardly probable that we shall ever profitably employ steamers of over 10,000 tons tonnage in the
passenger, mail, and freight business.
Again, a ship of 2,500 at 12 miles, running 6,500 miles could not transport cargo at less than $115; one of 5,000
tons would transport it at $52; one of 10,000 tons would transport it at $33 per ton; and one of 20,000 tons burthen,
as for instance the "Leviathan," would transport it at $24 per ton. And while none of the three first named sizes of
vessels would transport it 12,500 miles, the one of 20,000 tons, running 12 miles per hour, would transport it at
$80 per ton; and running 14 miles per hours, at $430 per ton. Two things must, however, not be forgotten in this;
that the ship to do this must always run entirely full and have no waste room; and that these prices are comparisons
between different steamers, and not with sailing vessels, which, running much more slowly and with but little
expense, transport the freight far more cheaply.
The following table will set forth very clearly in a summary view, the Time, Horse-power, Coal, and Cargo for a
steamer of good average quality running on passages of 1,000 miles, 2,000 miles, and 3,000 miles, and at a speed
varying from 6 to 18 miles per hour. It will be observed that a steamer of 3,000 tons can not take power and coal
enough to run on a 2,000 miles passage above 17 knots per hour, and that one of 3,000 tons also can not run on a
3,000 miles passage at a speed above 16 knots per hour. Observe the small quantity of cargo and the large quantity
of coal for a steamer of 3,000 tons on a 3,000 miles passage at 16 miles per hour.
COAL AND CARGO TABLE: No. IV.
Calculated for the mean Displacement of 3,000 Tons.
Page 71
weight
SPEED PASSAGE 1,000 PASSAGE 2,000 PASSAGE 3,000
horse- of hull nautical miles. nautical miles. nautical miles.
—per
power. and
hour. Time. Coal. Cargo. Time. Coal. Cargo. Time. Coal. Cargo.
engines.
N. M. H. P. TONS. D. H. TONS TONS D. H. TONS TONS D. H. TONS TONS
6 52 1252 6.23 72 1711 13.21 144 1675 20.20 216 1639
7 83 1283 5.23 98 1667 11.22 197 1617 17.21 296 1568
8 123 1323 5. 5 128 1612 10.10 256 1548 15.15 384 1484
9 175 1375 4.15 162 1543 9. 6 324 1462 13.21 486 1381
10 241 1441 4. 4 200 1458 8. 8 401 1358 12.12 602 1257
11 320 1520 3.19 242 1358 7.14 484 1237 11. 9 727 1116
12 416 1616 3.11 288 1239 6.23 577 1095 10.10 866 950
13 529 1729 3. 5 339 1100 6.10 678 931 9.15 1017 761
14 661 1861 2.23 393 942 5.23 786 745 8.22 1180 548
15 813 2013 2.19 451 761 5.13 903 535 8. 8 1355 309
16 987 2187 2.14 514 555 5. 5 1028 298 7.19 1542 41
17 1183 2383 2.11 580 327 4.22 1160 37
18 1405 2605 2. 8 650 69
19 1652 2852
20 1927 3127
I will close this long chapter, in which I have endeavored to give a clear, comprehensible, and faithful idea of the
cost of running ocean mail, freight, and passenger steamers, by an extract from that very able and faithful work,
"Steamship Capability." As a summing up of the various laws and facts concerning the consumption of fuel,
weight and power of engines, speed of ships, and their capacity to do business, Mr. Atherton says, page 55: "Now
suppose, for example, that the passage be 1,000 miles, and that, for brevity, we confine our remarks to the engine
department only; which, indeed, will be the department of expense, chiefly affected by variations in the rate of
speed. It appears that the vessel of 5,000 tons' mean displacement, if fitted to run at the speed of eight nautical
miles per hour, will require 172 H.P., and a cargo of 2,738 tons will be conveyed 1,000 miles in five days five
hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 33/100 H.P. per ton of goods.
"If fitted to run at ten nautical miles an hour, the vessel will require 336 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 2,524
tons, and the time to four days four hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 55/100 H.P. per ton of
goods nearly.
"If fitted to run at twelve nautical miles an hour, the vessel will require 581 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to
2,217 tons, and the time to three days eleven hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 91/100 H.P. per
ton of goods.
"If fitted to run at fourteen miles an hour, the vessel will require 923 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 1,802 tons,
and the time to two days twenty-three hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 152/100 H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at sixteen miles per hour, the vessel will require 1,377 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 1,264 tons,
and the time to two days fourteen hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 286/100 H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at eighteen miles per hour, the vessel will require 1,961 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 585 tons,
and the time to two days eight hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 775/100 H.P., per ton of goods.
"And if fitted to run at twenty miles per hour, there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
SPEED PASSAGE 1,000 PASSAGE 2,000 PASSAGE 3,000
horse- of hull nautical miles. nautical miles. nautical miles.
—per
power. and
hour. Time. Coal. Cargo. Time. Coal. Cargo. Time. Coal. Cargo.
engines.
N. M. H. P. TONS. D. H. TONS TONS D. H. TONS TONS D. H. TONS TONS
6 52 1252 6.23 72 1711 13.21 144 1675 20.20 216 1639
7 83 1283 5.23 98 1667 11.22 197 1617 17.21 296 1568
8 123 1323 5. 5 128 1612 10.10 256 1548 15.15 384 1484
9 175 1375 4.15 162 1543 9. 6 324 1462 13.21 486 1381
10 241 1441 4. 4 200 1458 8. 8 401 1358 12.12 602 1257
11 320 1520 3.19 242 1358 7.14 484 1237 11. 9 727 1116
12 416 1616 3.11 288 1239 6.23 577 1095 10.10 866 950
13 529 1729 3. 5 339 1100 6.10 678 931 9.15 1017 761
14 661 1861 2.23 393 942 5.23 786 745 8.22 1180 548
15 813 2013 2.19 451 761 5.13 903 535 8. 8 1355 309
16 987 2187 2.14 514 555 5. 5 1028 298 7.19 1542 41
17 1183 2383 2.11 580 327 4.22 1160 37
18 1405 2605 2. 8 650 69
19 1652 2852
20 1927 3127
I will close this long chapter, in which I have endeavored to give a clear, comprehensible, and faithful idea of the
cost of running ocean mail, freight, and passenger steamers, by an extract from that very able and faithful work,
"Steamship Capability." As a summing up of the various laws and facts concerning the consumption of fuel,
weight and power of engines, speed of ships, and their capacity to do business, Mr. Atherton says, page 55: "Now
suppose, for example, that the passage be 1,000 miles, and that, for brevity, we confine our remarks to the engine
department only; which, indeed, will be the department of expense, chiefly affected by variations in the rate of
speed. It appears that the vessel of 5,000 tons' mean displacement, if fitted to run at the speed of eight nautical
miles per hour, will require 172 H.P., and a cargo of 2,738 tons will be conveyed 1,000 miles in five days five
hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 33/100 H.P. per ton of goods.
"If fitted to run at ten nautical miles an hour, the vessel will require 336 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 2,524
tons, and the time to four days four hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 55/100 H.P. per ton of
goods nearly.
"If fitted to run at twelve nautical miles an hour, the vessel will require 581 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to
2,217 tons, and the time to three days eleven hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 91/100 H.P. per
ton of goods.
"If fitted to run at fourteen miles an hour, the vessel will require 923 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 1,802 tons,
and the time to two days twenty-three hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 152/100 H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at sixteen miles per hour, the vessel will require 1,377 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 1,264 tons,
and the time to two days fourteen hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 286/100 H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at eighteen miles per hour, the vessel will require 1,961 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 585 tons,
and the time to two days eight hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 775/100 H.P., per ton of goods.
"And if fitted to run at twenty miles per hour, there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
Page 72
"Assuming, now, that the cost per ton of goods will be in proportion to the amount of power and tonnage
employed to do the work, it appears that the cost per ton of goods of performing this passage of 1,000 miles, at the
respective speeds of 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 miles, will be proportional to the numbers—33/100, 55/100, 91/100,
152/100, 286/100, and 775/100, which are proportional to the numbers 33, 55, 91, 152, 286, and 775, or nearly as 1, 2,
3, 5, 9, and 23.
"Hence it appears, that in the case of the one thousand miles passage above referred to, the cost of freight per ton
of goods at ten miles per hour, will require to be nearly the double of the rate at eight miles per hour.
"The cost per ton at twelve miles per hour will require to be three times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at fourteen miles per hour will require to be five times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at sixteen miles per hour will require to be nine times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at eighteen miles per hour will require to be twenty-three times the rate at eight miles.
"And at twenty miles per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"By applying the same process of calculation to a ship of 5,000 tons' mean displacement, making a passage of
three thousand miles, we shall find that, at ten miles an hour, the cost of freight per ton will require to be double
the rate of freight at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at twelve miles will require to be three times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at fourteen miles will require to be six times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at sixteen miles will require to be twenty times the rate at eight miles.
"And at eighteen miles per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"Finally, by applying the same process of calculation to a ship of 5,000 tons' mean displacement on a passage of
6,000 miles, it will be found that the cost of freight per ton at ten miles per hour will require to be double the rate
at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at twelve miles per hour will require to be about five times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at fourteen miles per hour will be about sixteen times the rate at eight miles.
"And at sixteen miles per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"Hence, it appears, that for voyages of 1,000 miles and upwards, without re-coaling, the speed of ten nautical miles
per hour would involve about double the cost per ton of eight miles, and may, therefore, be regarded as the
extreme limit that can be generally entertained for the mercantile purpose of goods' conveyance; and that the
attainment on long passages of a higher rate of speed than ten miles (though admissibly practicable) would involve
obligations altogether of an exceptional character, such as the special service of dispatches, mails, passengers,
specie, and the most valuable description of goods can only meet."
employed to do the work, it appears that the cost per ton of goods of performing this passage of 1,000 miles, at the
respective speeds of 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 miles, will be proportional to the numbers—33/100, 55/100, 91/100,
152/100, 286/100, and 775/100, which are proportional to the numbers 33, 55, 91, 152, 286, and 775, or nearly as 1, 2,
3, 5, 9, and 23.
"Hence it appears, that in the case of the one thousand miles passage above referred to, the cost of freight per ton
of goods at ten miles per hour, will require to be nearly the double of the rate at eight miles per hour.
"The cost per ton at twelve miles per hour will require to be three times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at fourteen miles per hour will require to be five times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at sixteen miles per hour will require to be nine times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at eighteen miles per hour will require to be twenty-three times the rate at eight miles.
"And at twenty miles per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"By applying the same process of calculation to a ship of 5,000 tons' mean displacement, making a passage of
three thousand miles, we shall find that, at ten miles an hour, the cost of freight per ton will require to be double
the rate of freight at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at twelve miles will require to be three times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at fourteen miles will require to be six times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at sixteen miles will require to be twenty times the rate at eight miles.
"And at eighteen miles per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"Finally, by applying the same process of calculation to a ship of 5,000 tons' mean displacement on a passage of
6,000 miles, it will be found that the cost of freight per ton at ten miles per hour will require to be double the rate
at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at twelve miles per hour will require to be about five times the rate at eight miles.
"The cost per ton at fourteen miles per hour will be about sixteen times the rate at eight miles.
"And at sixteen miles per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"Hence, it appears, that for voyages of 1,000 miles and upwards, without re-coaling, the speed of ten nautical miles
per hour would involve about double the cost per ton of eight miles, and may, therefore, be regarded as the
extreme limit that can be generally entertained for the mercantile purpose of goods' conveyance; and that the
attainment on long passages of a higher rate of speed than ten miles (though admissibly practicable) would involve
obligations altogether of an exceptional character, such as the special service of dispatches, mails, passengers,
specie, and the most valuable description of goods can only meet."
Page 73
SECTION V.
OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS.
increase of british mail service: last new line at $925,000 per year: the system not becoming self-supporting:
contract renewals at same or higher prices: price of fuel and wages increased faster than engine improvements:
large ships run proportionally cheaper than small: an example, with the figures: the steamer "leviathan,"
27,000 tons: steamers of this class will not pay: she can not transport freight to australia: reasons for the
same: motion her normal condition: must not be made a dock: delivery of freights: mammoth steamers to
brazil: large clippers lie idle: not even this large class of steamers can live on their own receipts: efficient
mail steamers carry but little except passengers: some heavy extra expenses in regular mail lines: pacific mail
company's large extra fleet, and its effects: the immense account of items and extras: a partial list: the havre
and collins docks: great expense of feeding passengers: views of murray and atherton on the cost of running
steamers, and the necessity of the present mail service.
From the foregoing Section it is evident that the cost of running ocean steamers is enormous, and that in the chief
element of expenditure it increases as the cube of the velocity. This, although true, is certainly a startling ratio of
increase, and calculated to arouse attention to the difficulties of postal marine navigation. Seeing that ocean speed
is attainable at so high a cost, we naturally conclude that fast mail steamers can not live on their own receipts upon
the ocean.
Since Great Britain established her first ocean steam mail in 1833, she has gone on rapidly increasing the same
facilities, until her noble lines of communication now extend to every land and compass every sea. The last great
contract which she conceded was last year, to the "European and Australian Company," for carrying the mails on a
second line from Southampton via Suez to Sydney, in Australia, at £185,000, or $925,000 per year. And although
her expenditures for this service have gradually gone up to above five millions of dollars per annum, she continues
the service as a necessity to her commerce, and a branch of facilities and accommodations with which the people
of the Kingdom will not dispense. The British Government set out with the determination to have the advantages
of the system, whether it would pay or not. They believed that the system would eventually become self-
supporting, by reason of the many important improvements then proposed in the steam-engine, and they have ever
since professed to believe the same thing. But their experience points quite the other way; and while the service is
daily becoming more important to them in every sense, it is also becoming year by year more expensive.
Contracts which the Admiralty made with several large and prominent companies in 1838 they renewed at the
same or increased subsidies, after twelve years' operations, in 1850, for another term of twelve years. And so far
from those companies with their many ships on hand being able to undertake the service for less, they demanded
more in almost every case, and received it from the government. The improvements which they anticipated in the
marine engine were more than counterbalanced by the rise in the price of fuel and wages all over the kingdom and
the world. In fact, those improvements have been very few and very small. It still takes nearly as much coal to
evaporate a pound of water as it then did; and the improvements which have been made were generally patents,
and costly in the prime cost of construction to a degree almost preclusive of increased benefits to the general
service. At any rate, the latest steam adaptations and improvements have proven unequal to the end proposed, and
the cost of the ocean service is now far heavier than it ever has been before, simply because of the greater speed
required by the public for the mails and passage.
It had long been hoped that this difficulty of increasing cost in running ocean steamers might finally be overcome
by another means; and the whole available engineering and ship-building talent of Great Britain and the United
States has been directed not entirely to the engine department, but to the hulls and to the production of a large class
of ships, which are admissibly cheaper in proportion to size and expense of running when compared with smaller
vessels, if they are always employed and have full freights and passage. It is well established that large steamers
run proportionally cheaper than small ones. (See Table III., page 76.) This arises from the important fact that the
length increases far more rapidly than the breadth and depth. Consequently the tonnage of the vessel increases
much faster than the resistance. In passing through the water the vessel cuts out a canal as large as the largest part
OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS.
increase of british mail service: last new line at $925,000 per year: the system not becoming self-supporting:
contract renewals at same or higher prices: price of fuel and wages increased faster than engine improvements:
large ships run proportionally cheaper than small: an example, with the figures: the steamer "leviathan,"
27,000 tons: steamers of this class will not pay: she can not transport freight to australia: reasons for the
same: motion her normal condition: must not be made a dock: delivery of freights: mammoth steamers to
brazil: large clippers lie idle: not even this large class of steamers can live on their own receipts: efficient
mail steamers carry but little except passengers: some heavy extra expenses in regular mail lines: pacific mail
company's large extra fleet, and its effects: the immense account of items and extras: a partial list: the havre
and collins docks: great expense of feeding passengers: views of murray and atherton on the cost of running
steamers, and the necessity of the present mail service.
From the foregoing Section it is evident that the cost of running ocean steamers is enormous, and that in the chief
element of expenditure it increases as the cube of the velocity. This, although true, is certainly a startling ratio of
increase, and calculated to arouse attention to the difficulties of postal marine navigation. Seeing that ocean speed
is attainable at so high a cost, we naturally conclude that fast mail steamers can not live on their own receipts upon
the ocean.
Since Great Britain established her first ocean steam mail in 1833, she has gone on rapidly increasing the same
facilities, until her noble lines of communication now extend to every land and compass every sea. The last great
contract which she conceded was last year, to the "European and Australian Company," for carrying the mails on a
second line from Southampton via Suez to Sydney, in Australia, at £185,000, or $925,000 per year. And although
her expenditures for this service have gradually gone up to above five millions of dollars per annum, she continues
the service as a necessity to her commerce, and a branch of facilities and accommodations with which the people
of the Kingdom will not dispense. The British Government set out with the determination to have the advantages
of the system, whether it would pay or not. They believed that the system would eventually become self-
supporting, by reason of the many important improvements then proposed in the steam-engine, and they have ever
since professed to believe the same thing. But their experience points quite the other way; and while the service is
daily becoming more important to them in every sense, it is also becoming year by year more expensive.
Contracts which the Admiralty made with several large and prominent companies in 1838 they renewed at the
same or increased subsidies, after twelve years' operations, in 1850, for another term of twelve years. And so far
from those companies with their many ships on hand being able to undertake the service for less, they demanded
more in almost every case, and received it from the government. The improvements which they anticipated in the
marine engine were more than counterbalanced by the rise in the price of fuel and wages all over the kingdom and
the world. In fact, those improvements have been very few and very small. It still takes nearly as much coal to
evaporate a pound of water as it then did; and the improvements which have been made were generally patents,
and costly in the prime cost of construction to a degree almost preclusive of increased benefits to the general
service. At any rate, the latest steam adaptations and improvements have proven unequal to the end proposed, and
the cost of the ocean service is now far heavier than it ever has been before, simply because of the greater speed
required by the public for the mails and passage.
It had long been hoped that this difficulty of increasing cost in running ocean steamers might finally be overcome
by another means; and the whole available engineering and ship-building talent of Great Britain and the United
States has been directed not entirely to the engine department, but to the hulls and to the production of a large class
of ships, which are admissibly cheaper in proportion to size and expense of running when compared with smaller
vessels, if they are always employed and have full freights and passage. It is well established that large steamers
run proportionally cheaper than small ones. (See Table III., page 76.) This arises from the important fact that the
length increases far more rapidly than the breadth and depth. Consequently the tonnage of the vessel increases
much faster than the resistance. In passing through the water the vessel cuts out a canal as large as the largest part
Page 74
of its body, which is at the middle of the ship. If the vessel be here cut in two, the width and depth, or the beam and
hold being multiplied together will give the square contents of the midship section. Now, when a vessel is doubled
in all of its dimensions, this midship section and consequently the size of the canal which it cuts in the water, does
not increase as rapidly as the solid contents of the whole ship, and consequently, as the tonnage. Hence, the
resistance to the vessel in passing through the water does not increase so rapidly as the tonnage which the vessel
will carry.
To make this clearer, let us suppose a vessel of good proportion, whose length is seven times the beam, or 280 ft.
long, 40 ft. wide, and 30 feet deep. The midship section will be 40 × 30 = 1,200 square feet: the solid contents will
be 40 × 30 × 280 = 336,000 solid feet. Again, let us double these dimensions, and the ship will be 80 ft. wide, 60
ft. deep, and 560 feet long. The midship section will be 80 × 60 = 4,800 square feet: the solid contents will be 80 ×
60 × 560 = 2,688,000 solid feet. Now, comparing the midship sections, and also the said contents in each case we
have,
Midship Section, 4,800
= 4 to 1. Increase as the squares:
Midship Section, 1,200
Solid Contents, 2,688,000
= 8 to 1. Increase as the cubes.
Solid Contents, 336,000
Thus, the midship resistance has increased as four to one, or as the square, while the solid contents, representing
the tonnage, have increased as eight to one, or as the cube. It is evident that the ship has but four times the mid-
section resistance, while she has eight times the carrying capacity. Therefore the engine power, and the coal and
weight necessary to propel a ship of twice the lineal dimensions, or eight times the capacity, would have to be only
four times that of the smaller vessel, speaking in general terms; and as a consequence, the price of freight,
considering the vessels to run at equal speed, would be but half as much in the larger as in the smaller vessel.
The attempt has been made to seize the evident advantages thus offered by increasing the size of the hull, until our
clippers now reach an enormous size, and our steamers are stopping but little short of 30,000 tons. The splendid
steamer "Leviathan" was built on this idea, and must prove a splendid triumph in comparative cheapness if she can
only get business so as to run full, and keep herself constantly employed in her legitimate business, running. But it
is hardly possible that she should be always filled with either freight or passengers. Some of our large clipper ships
have experienced this difficulty. The time necessary to load and unload is too great for short routes, although they
are well calculated for long passages. If one of these large steamers fail to get plenty of business the losses become
exceedingly severe. The prime cost is immense; the interest on the capital and the insurance are very large; and the
current expenses are even beyond those necessary for the government of some cities. These hazards all taken
together more than neutralize the benefits which arise from extra size and extra proportional cheapness; so that
notwithstanding all of the hopes which some have entertained for the cheapening of transport in this way, they are
probably doomed to disappointment in the end; and ocean steaming continues as expensive as ever, and is growing
even more expensive than it has ever been known since its first introduction. (See Coal Tables, pp. 71 and 75.)
It is clear that, notwithstanding all of the advantages to be gained from increased size, steamers can not support
themselves upon the ocean. Let us examine further the case of such a ship as the "Leviathan." I can not see that
there is any normal trade in which she can run successfully. She may transport 6,000 tons of measurement goods to
Australia; but it will be at the expense of fourteen to sixteen thousand tons of coals if the passage is made in fair
time. If not, sailing vessels will subserve all purposes except travel quite as well. And certainly there is no class of
freight for Australia or any other portion of the world, which will pay such an enormous coal-bill, and so many
other expenses, and the interest and insurance on three and a half to four millions of dollars, just to save a few days
in so long a voyage. And if the steamer is to do a freighting as well as passenger business, then a long voyage is
essential to her.
Running is the legitimate business of a steamer. Her costly engines are put in her for locomotion. Her large corps
of engineers, firemen, and coal-passers, are employed for running her, and are of no use when she is lying still,
although necessarily on full pay. Her condition is abnormal and unnatural every day that she is lying at the docks,
and taking or discharging freight; and hence, every day that she is thus employed she is not performing her proper
functions. A sailing ship can better afford to lie still for weeks and await a freight, or slowly receive or discharge
cargo; as she must pay only the interest on her investment, her dockage, the captain, and watchmen, and perhaps
her depreciation. The prime investment is much less. She has no costly engines and boilers. So are her current
hold being multiplied together will give the square contents of the midship section. Now, when a vessel is doubled
in all of its dimensions, this midship section and consequently the size of the canal which it cuts in the water, does
not increase as rapidly as the solid contents of the whole ship, and consequently, as the tonnage. Hence, the
resistance to the vessel in passing through the water does not increase so rapidly as the tonnage which the vessel
will carry.
To make this clearer, let us suppose a vessel of good proportion, whose length is seven times the beam, or 280 ft.
long, 40 ft. wide, and 30 feet deep. The midship section will be 40 × 30 = 1,200 square feet: the solid contents will
be 40 × 30 × 280 = 336,000 solid feet. Again, let us double these dimensions, and the ship will be 80 ft. wide, 60
ft. deep, and 560 feet long. The midship section will be 80 × 60 = 4,800 square feet: the solid contents will be 80 ×
60 × 560 = 2,688,000 solid feet. Now, comparing the midship sections, and also the said contents in each case we
have,
Midship Section, 4,800
= 4 to 1. Increase as the squares:
Midship Section, 1,200
Solid Contents, 2,688,000
= 8 to 1. Increase as the cubes.
Solid Contents, 336,000
Thus, the midship resistance has increased as four to one, or as the square, while the solid contents, representing
the tonnage, have increased as eight to one, or as the cube. It is evident that the ship has but four times the mid-
section resistance, while she has eight times the carrying capacity. Therefore the engine power, and the coal and
weight necessary to propel a ship of twice the lineal dimensions, or eight times the capacity, would have to be only
four times that of the smaller vessel, speaking in general terms; and as a consequence, the price of freight,
considering the vessels to run at equal speed, would be but half as much in the larger as in the smaller vessel.
The attempt has been made to seize the evident advantages thus offered by increasing the size of the hull, until our
clippers now reach an enormous size, and our steamers are stopping but little short of 30,000 tons. The splendid
steamer "Leviathan" was built on this idea, and must prove a splendid triumph in comparative cheapness if she can
only get business so as to run full, and keep herself constantly employed in her legitimate business, running. But it
is hardly possible that she should be always filled with either freight or passengers. Some of our large clipper ships
have experienced this difficulty. The time necessary to load and unload is too great for short routes, although they
are well calculated for long passages. If one of these large steamers fail to get plenty of business the losses become
exceedingly severe. The prime cost is immense; the interest on the capital and the insurance are very large; and the
current expenses are even beyond those necessary for the government of some cities. These hazards all taken
together more than neutralize the benefits which arise from extra size and extra proportional cheapness; so that
notwithstanding all of the hopes which some have entertained for the cheapening of transport in this way, they are
probably doomed to disappointment in the end; and ocean steaming continues as expensive as ever, and is growing
even more expensive than it has ever been known since its first introduction. (See Coal Tables, pp. 71 and 75.)
It is clear that, notwithstanding all of the advantages to be gained from increased size, steamers can not support
themselves upon the ocean. Let us examine further the case of such a ship as the "Leviathan." I can not see that
there is any normal trade in which she can run successfully. She may transport 6,000 tons of measurement goods to
Australia; but it will be at the expense of fourteen to sixteen thousand tons of coals if the passage is made in fair
time. If not, sailing vessels will subserve all purposes except travel quite as well. And certainly there is no class of
freight for Australia or any other portion of the world, which will pay such an enormous coal-bill, and so many
other expenses, and the interest and insurance on three and a half to four millions of dollars, just to save a few days
in so long a voyage. And if the steamer is to do a freighting as well as passenger business, then a long voyage is
essential to her.
Running is the legitimate business of a steamer. Her costly engines are put in her for locomotion. Her large corps
of engineers, firemen, and coal-passers, are employed for running her, and are of no use when she is lying still,
although necessarily on full pay. Her condition is abnormal and unnatural every day that she is lying at the docks,
and taking or discharging freight; and hence, every day that she is thus employed she is not performing her proper
functions. A sailing ship can better afford to lie still for weeks and await a freight, or slowly receive or discharge
cargo; as she must pay only the interest on her investment, her dockage, the captain, and watchmen, and perhaps
her depreciation. The prime investment is much less. She has no costly engines and boilers. So are her current
Page 75
expenses. She has none of the costly employées that I have named, and who can never leave a steamer for a day.
But eternal motion, flush freights, flush business, good prices, and constant employment, are everywhere essential
to the steamer.
Suppose the "Leviathan" steamer running between Liverpool and New-York. She would be occupied ten days at
least in receiving her freight, ten days in running and making port or docks, and ten days in discharging. Then, she
would be employed only one third of her time in the business for which she was constructed, running; while during
two thirds of it she would be acting simply as a pier or dock, over which freight would be handled. Now, with her
costly engines, and costly and necessarily idle employées, she can not afford to be a dock; neither can she afford to
lie still so long. Nor can she on such conditions get the freight necessary to her support. The community on neither
side of the water would wish fifteen thousand tons of any class of freights which she could transport dumped down
upon the docks at one time. They wish it to arrive a little and a little every day, as it is wanted, just enough to
supply the market; and will not lie out of the money which they pay for it, and have it nearly a month in market
before they need it, just to have it come on the "Leviathan." It must come along in small lots, just as they need it,
and it must be shipped the day that it is bought, and delivered as soon as the ship is in, without being the last lot of
fifteen thousand tons, and without keeping the owners so long out of their money. Suppose that A. puts the first lot
of freight in at London: he will be the last to receive, it in New-York. A smaller steamer taking another lot two
days after, will deliver it before the large ship gets half way over. Or, again, the small steamer may leave London
with it when the large steamer has nearly arrived at New-York, and deliver the lot here to the owner in advance.
Beside not wishing so large a lot at once, they do not wish it all in one place. The double advantage of a great
number of small vessels is, that they bring cargo along as it is wanted, and at the same time distribute it at all of the
hundreds of large and small ports, without first delivering it at some great mammoth terminus, and then reshipping
and distributing it to its final destination.
A gentleman, who is a prominent statesman, recently seriously advised me not to think of establishing a line of
mail steamers between the United States and Brazil, for the accommodation of the hundreds of sailing vessels
engaged in that trade, but to get up a mammoth company and run five or six thirty thousand ton steamers, like the
Leviathan, between Norfolk and Rio de Janeiro. He said that the increased size of the steamer would enable me to
carry freight cheaper than sailing vessels. The reasoning was neither very clear nor convincing to me on behalf of
the mysterious capacities which he attributed to large steamers. I suggested that, in the first place, there was no
cargo passing either way between the United States and Brazil which could afford to pay steam transportation
under any circumstances; that so large a cargo could never be obtained at once in Rio de Janeiro or elsewhere; that
the merchants of this country did not wish it all landed at one place; that it would cost as much to remove it from
Norfolk to the place of consumption, as it would from Rio de Janeiro to its final destination; that they did not wish
it delivered all at once, but in small lots at a time, and distributed where it was needed; and that, even if it were at
all practicable, which no business man could for a moment believe, the people would not be willing to have a
fruitful field of industry in shipping occupied by some great overgrown company, with a great coffee monopoly,
which would surely follow. Too much has been expected of large ships. The clipper "Great Republic" is not
freighted half of her time. The "Leviathan" can not pay in freighting unless she runs to Australia and the East-
Indies, and runs slowly, on very little coal. She may do very well with a voluntary cargo, which will load and
unload itself in a hurry, such as a cargo of emigrants, and not steaming at too a high a speed. But it would require a
dozen steamers as tenders to bring these emigrants from Ireland, Bremen, Havre, Hamburgh, Amsterdam, and
other European cities, to her central dépôt in England. She would, however, become a most useful if not
indispensable transport vessel for the British Government.
If the large class of steamers can not live on their own receipts, much less can the small. An adequate speed for the
mails leaves no available space for cargo. The ship may carry two or three hundred tons of freight; but it pays
perhaps but little more than the handling and the extra coal necessary to transport its extra weight. As a general
thing, it may be safely said that when a vessel is well adapted to the mails and passengers she is filled with her
own power, that is, with heavy engines, large boilers, and a large quantity of fuel, as also with her provisions and
baggage. We have already seen how the size and weight of engines and boilers must increase, as well as the bulk
and cost of the fuel, to gain a little speed. But it is not generally known how large a quantity of consumable stores
and baggage go in a well-supported mail packet. The greater the postal efficiency of a steamer the less is it able to
carry freight; and the time will doubtless soon come when the fast mail packets will take nothing except a few
express packages. The Persia now takes scarcely any freight, and the Vanderbilt can not think of doing it when she
makes fast trips. It is very probable that the whole system of the ocean will be materially changed; and that while
But eternal motion, flush freights, flush business, good prices, and constant employment, are everywhere essential
to the steamer.
Suppose the "Leviathan" steamer running between Liverpool and New-York. She would be occupied ten days at
least in receiving her freight, ten days in running and making port or docks, and ten days in discharging. Then, she
would be employed only one third of her time in the business for which she was constructed, running; while during
two thirds of it she would be acting simply as a pier or dock, over which freight would be handled. Now, with her
costly engines, and costly and necessarily idle employées, she can not afford to be a dock; neither can she afford to
lie still so long. Nor can she on such conditions get the freight necessary to her support. The community on neither
side of the water would wish fifteen thousand tons of any class of freights which she could transport dumped down
upon the docks at one time. They wish it to arrive a little and a little every day, as it is wanted, just enough to
supply the market; and will not lie out of the money which they pay for it, and have it nearly a month in market
before they need it, just to have it come on the "Leviathan." It must come along in small lots, just as they need it,
and it must be shipped the day that it is bought, and delivered as soon as the ship is in, without being the last lot of
fifteen thousand tons, and without keeping the owners so long out of their money. Suppose that A. puts the first lot
of freight in at London: he will be the last to receive, it in New-York. A smaller steamer taking another lot two
days after, will deliver it before the large ship gets half way over. Or, again, the small steamer may leave London
with it when the large steamer has nearly arrived at New-York, and deliver the lot here to the owner in advance.
Beside not wishing so large a lot at once, they do not wish it all in one place. The double advantage of a great
number of small vessels is, that they bring cargo along as it is wanted, and at the same time distribute it at all of the
hundreds of large and small ports, without first delivering it at some great mammoth terminus, and then reshipping
and distributing it to its final destination.
A gentleman, who is a prominent statesman, recently seriously advised me not to think of establishing a line of
mail steamers between the United States and Brazil, for the accommodation of the hundreds of sailing vessels
engaged in that trade, but to get up a mammoth company and run five or six thirty thousand ton steamers, like the
Leviathan, between Norfolk and Rio de Janeiro. He said that the increased size of the steamer would enable me to
carry freight cheaper than sailing vessels. The reasoning was neither very clear nor convincing to me on behalf of
the mysterious capacities which he attributed to large steamers. I suggested that, in the first place, there was no
cargo passing either way between the United States and Brazil which could afford to pay steam transportation
under any circumstances; that so large a cargo could never be obtained at once in Rio de Janeiro or elsewhere; that
the merchants of this country did not wish it all landed at one place; that it would cost as much to remove it from
Norfolk to the place of consumption, as it would from Rio de Janeiro to its final destination; that they did not wish
it delivered all at once, but in small lots at a time, and distributed where it was needed; and that, even if it were at
all practicable, which no business man could for a moment believe, the people would not be willing to have a
fruitful field of industry in shipping occupied by some great overgrown company, with a great coffee monopoly,
which would surely follow. Too much has been expected of large ships. The clipper "Great Republic" is not
freighted half of her time. The "Leviathan" can not pay in freighting unless she runs to Australia and the East-
Indies, and runs slowly, on very little coal. She may do very well with a voluntary cargo, which will load and
unload itself in a hurry, such as a cargo of emigrants, and not steaming at too a high a speed. But it would require a
dozen steamers as tenders to bring these emigrants from Ireland, Bremen, Havre, Hamburgh, Amsterdam, and
other European cities, to her central dépôt in England. She would, however, become a most useful if not
indispensable transport vessel for the British Government.
If the large class of steamers can not live on their own receipts, much less can the small. An adequate speed for the
mails leaves no available space for cargo. The ship may carry two or three hundred tons of freight; but it pays
perhaps but little more than the handling and the extra coal necessary to transport its extra weight. As a general
thing, it may be safely said that when a vessel is well adapted to the mails and passengers she is filled with her
own power, that is, with heavy engines, large boilers, and a large quantity of fuel, as also with her provisions and
baggage. We have already seen how the size and weight of engines and boilers must increase, as well as the bulk
and cost of the fuel, to gain a little speed. But it is not generally known how large a quantity of consumable stores
and baggage go in a well-supported mail packet. The greater the postal efficiency of a steamer the less is it able to
carry freight; and the time will doubtless soon come when the fast mail packets will take nothing except a few
express packages. The Persia now takes scarcely any freight, and the Vanderbilt can not think of doing it when she
makes fast trips. It is very probable that the whole system of the ocean will be materially changed; and that while
Page 76
clippers and slow propellers carry the fine freights, fast vessels filled with their own power will carry the mails and
passengers. And in doing this, they can not, of course, support themselves; neither will they conflict with private
enterprise in freight transport. It is now the case to a large extent on most of our American lines.
While the ocean mail steamer must be fast and costly, for the better acceleration of correspondence and the
accommodation of passengers, she must also go at the appointed hour, whether she is repaired or not, and wholly
irrespective of her freight and passenger list. There must be no delays for a lot of freight, or for a company of fifty
passengers who have been delayed by the train. She has the mails, and must go at the hour appointed, whatever it
may cost the company, and however large a lot of costly stores may have to be thrown away. This punctuality,
while it is the means of securing small lots of freight, prevents also the accommodation of the ship's day of sailing
to arrangements which might otherwise be profitable. This punctuality in sailing always necessitates large extra
expense in repairs. It frequently happens that companies of men work through the nights and on Sundays; getting
much increased prices for such untimely labor, and being far less efficient in the night than in the day. If the
steamer has had a long passage from whatever causes, she discharges whatever she has and takes in her coal in a
hurried and costly way, frequently at fifty per cent. advance on the cost necessary for it if she had ample time. The
only means of avoiding these exigencies is by having spare ships, which cost as much as any others, but which add
nothing whatsoever to the company's income. It may be safe to say that in every mail company it is necessary to
have one spare, and consequently unproductive, ship for every three engaged in active service. This thirty-three per
cent. additional outlay would not be necessary except on a mail line, where punctuality was positively demanded.
Yet, it is one of the heavy items of expense to be incurred by every company carrying the mails, and with which
they can not in any wise dispense, however well their ships may be built. The "Pacific Mail Steamship Company"
in running their semi-monthly line from Panama to California and Oregon, keep constantly at their docks eight
unemployed steamers and one tow-boat, ready for all exigencies and accidents, and could keep their mails going if
nearly their whole moving fleet should be sunk at once. No wonder that they have never missed a single trip, or
lost a single passenger by marine accident since they first started in 1850. But there is another class of costs in
running ocean steamers, which amount to large sums in the aggregate, and of which the people are generally
wholly ignorant. I allude to the items, and what may be called "odds and ends." It is easily imaginable that a
company has to pay only the bills for wages, for fuel, and for provisions, and that then the cash-drawer may be
locked for the voyage. Indeed, it is difficult for those accustomed to the marine steam service to sit down and
enumerate by memory in one day the thousand little treasury leaks, the many wastages, the formidable bill of
extras, and the items which are necessary to keep every thing in its place, and to pay every body for what he does.
The oil-bill of a large steamer would be astonishing to a novice, until he saw the urns and oil-cans which cling to
every journal, and jet a constant lubricating stream. The tools employed about a steamer are legion in number, and
cost cash. We hear a couple of cannon fired two or three times as we enter and leave port, or pass a steamer upon
the ocean, and consider it all very fine and inspiring; but we do not reflect that the guns cost money, and that
pound after pound of powder is not given to the company by the Government or the public. The steamer carries
many fine flags and signals, which cost cash. An anchor with the chain is lost; another costs cash. Heavy weather
may be on, and it takes some hours to get into the dock. The extra coal and the tow-boat cost cash. The wheel-
house is torn to pieces against the corner of the pier, and the bulwarks are carried away by heavy seas; but no one
will repair the damage for any thing short of cash. A large number of lights are by law required to be kept burning
on the wheel-houses and in the rigging all night; but no one reflects that it took money first to purchase them, and a
constant outlay to keep them trimmed and burning. People suppose that the captain, or steward, or some body else
can take a match and set the lamp off, and have it burn very nicely; but there are only a few who know that it takes
one man all of his time to clean, fill, adjust, light, and keep these lamps going, as well as have them extinguished at
the proper time.
I saw to-day a case in point as regards accidental expenses. The splendid steamship Adriatic sailed at 12. The wind
was very high from the south, and almost blowing a gale. She was lying on the southern side of the dock, while the
Atlantic was lying with her stern at the end of the dock, near where the Adriatic had to pass in going out. At the
moment of starting, three strong tow-boats were attached to her bow, and endeavored as she went out to draw her
head against the wind, down stream. But they proved insufficient to the task. The vessel crushed down the corner
of the dock, ran into the Atlantic, and carried away her stern bulwarks, crushed one of her own large and costly
iron life-boats, and damaged one of her wheel-houses. Now, who of the two hundred thousand spectators that lined
the docks, would pay the two thousand dollars for the life-boat, a thousand for repairing the dock and vessels, and
the bill for the three tug-boats for two hours each?
passengers. And in doing this, they can not, of course, support themselves; neither will they conflict with private
enterprise in freight transport. It is now the case to a large extent on most of our American lines.
While the ocean mail steamer must be fast and costly, for the better acceleration of correspondence and the
accommodation of passengers, she must also go at the appointed hour, whether she is repaired or not, and wholly
irrespective of her freight and passenger list. There must be no delays for a lot of freight, or for a company of fifty
passengers who have been delayed by the train. She has the mails, and must go at the hour appointed, whatever it
may cost the company, and however large a lot of costly stores may have to be thrown away. This punctuality,
while it is the means of securing small lots of freight, prevents also the accommodation of the ship's day of sailing
to arrangements which might otherwise be profitable. This punctuality in sailing always necessitates large extra
expense in repairs. It frequently happens that companies of men work through the nights and on Sundays; getting
much increased prices for such untimely labor, and being far less efficient in the night than in the day. If the
steamer has had a long passage from whatever causes, she discharges whatever she has and takes in her coal in a
hurried and costly way, frequently at fifty per cent. advance on the cost necessary for it if she had ample time. The
only means of avoiding these exigencies is by having spare ships, which cost as much as any others, but which add
nothing whatsoever to the company's income. It may be safe to say that in every mail company it is necessary to
have one spare, and consequently unproductive, ship for every three engaged in active service. This thirty-three per
cent. additional outlay would not be necessary except on a mail line, where punctuality was positively demanded.
Yet, it is one of the heavy items of expense to be incurred by every company carrying the mails, and with which
they can not in any wise dispense, however well their ships may be built. The "Pacific Mail Steamship Company"
in running their semi-monthly line from Panama to California and Oregon, keep constantly at their docks eight
unemployed steamers and one tow-boat, ready for all exigencies and accidents, and could keep their mails going if
nearly their whole moving fleet should be sunk at once. No wonder that they have never missed a single trip, or
lost a single passenger by marine accident since they first started in 1850. But there is another class of costs in
running ocean steamers, which amount to large sums in the aggregate, and of which the people are generally
wholly ignorant. I allude to the items, and what may be called "odds and ends." It is easily imaginable that a
company has to pay only the bills for wages, for fuel, and for provisions, and that then the cash-drawer may be
locked for the voyage. Indeed, it is difficult for those accustomed to the marine steam service to sit down and
enumerate by memory in one day the thousand little treasury leaks, the many wastages, the formidable bill of
extras, and the items which are necessary to keep every thing in its place, and to pay every body for what he does.
The oil-bill of a large steamer would be astonishing to a novice, until he saw the urns and oil-cans which cling to
every journal, and jet a constant lubricating stream. The tools employed about a steamer are legion in number, and
cost cash. We hear a couple of cannon fired two or three times as we enter and leave port, or pass a steamer upon
the ocean, and consider it all very fine and inspiring; but we do not reflect that the guns cost money, and that
pound after pound of powder is not given to the company by the Government or the public. The steamer carries
many fine flags and signals, which cost cash. An anchor with the chain is lost; another costs cash. Heavy weather
may be on, and it takes some hours to get into the dock. The extra coal and the tow-boat cost cash. The wheel-
house is torn to pieces against the corner of the pier, and the bulwarks are carried away by heavy seas; but no one
will repair the damage for any thing short of cash. A large number of lights are by law required to be kept burning
on the wheel-houses and in the rigging all night; but no one reflects that it took money first to purchase them, and a
constant outlay to keep them trimmed and burning. People suppose that the captain, or steward, or some body else
can take a match and set the lamp off, and have it burn very nicely; but there are only a few who know that it takes
one man all of his time to clean, fill, adjust, light, and keep these lamps going, as well as have them extinguished at
the proper time.
I saw to-day a case in point as regards accidental expenses. The splendid steamship Adriatic sailed at 12. The wind
was very high from the south, and almost blowing a gale. She was lying on the southern side of the dock, while the
Atlantic was lying with her stern at the end of the dock, near where the Adriatic had to pass in going out. At the
moment of starting, three strong tow-boats were attached to her bow, and endeavored as she went out to draw her
head against the wind, down stream. But they proved insufficient to the task. The vessel crushed down the corner
of the dock, ran into the Atlantic, and carried away her stern bulwarks, crushed one of her own large and costly
iron life-boats, and damaged one of her wheel-houses. Now, who of the two hundred thousand spectators that lined
the docks, would pay the two thousand dollars for the life-boat, a thousand for repairing the dock and vessels, and
the bill for the three tug-boats for two hours each?
Page 77
Moreover, we see a pilot get on the steamer at New-York, another at Southampton, and a third at Havre; but we
seldom reflect that the steamer has to pay a large price to each one of them, both going and coming. Take the
coasting steamers, running between New-York and Savannah, or Charleston. It appears singular that the New-York
pilot goes all the way to Savannah, that the Savannah pilot comes all the way to New-York, and that the steamer
pays for both of these men all the time, and feeds them on board all of the time. Yet it is so. Such is the law; and it
amounts to a good many thousands during the year. And all this, the company must pay, as a part of those items
which take cash, but for which the company never gets any credit from the public or the Government. Whenever a
little accident occurs to the steamer, it must be towed a few miles at a high price by a tug-boat. Whenever the
Government or friends and visitors come on board, they expect to be liberally entertained; yet the company must
pay for it, or be considered mean and unworthy of the Government's patronage. Each ship must have an
experienced surgeon, whose wages must be paid like those of other persons employed, and an apothecary's room
and outfit. The ship must be painted and varnished, and overhauled at every trip; the upholstering and furnishing
must be often renewed; stolen articles must be replaced; and the breakages of table-wares constantly renewed. All
of this costs cash.
The steamer also has to pay light dues and port charges wherever she goes. Many of these are exorbitant and
unreasonable. In Havre the "Fulton" and "Arago" must pay nearly twenty-four hundred dollars each on every
departure, or they will not be permitted to leave the docks. This is no small item for each steamer on every passage
that she makes. At New-York she pays wharfage again. It is not so high, but it is a large item, and requires the
cash. Again, there is the great shore establishment which every steam company must maintain. Large docks, and
warehouses, and coaling arrangements, staging, watchmen, porters, and messengers, and a shore-captain equal to
those on board, must all be maintained. The Havre Company pays to the city $4,000 per year for its dock, $1,200
for its annual repairs, and also for sheds, fixtures, etc., extra. They keep also two watchmen at $40 each per month,
and other persons in the dock service. The Collins Company have a necessarily very costly dock both in New-York
and Liverpool. That in New-York would rent for $15,000 per annum. The one in Liverpool is far more costly. On
each they keep a large number of men, with watchmen, gatekeepers, runners, porters, and clerks, and always keep
an office open. Beside this, is the whole paraphernalia of the office of the company. There must be offices, clerks,
bookkeepers, porters, runners, etc.; a president, treasurer, and secretary; an attorney, agents, and agencies; and
newspaper advertising, and a hundred little things which no man can mention. I do not pretend to be able to give
an adequate conception of the innumerable items which so swell the large actual working expenses of regularly
running steamers. Even the charities of a decently managed company are large. Firemen and engineers become
disabled and must be supported; or they are killed in the service of the ship, leaving families which no decent
company can disregard. The amount which the West-India Royal Mail Company pays in this way, and which our
noble American lines advance to the deserving, are beyond all conception of the mere theorist.
There is another source of loss which prevents, mail packets especially, from paying their expenses on their freight
and passenger earnings. The table on all of our steamships has become exceedingly expensive, as it has in our
hotels. Perhaps there is more necessity for it on steamers than in the hotels, as passengers are generally sea-sick,
and need every delicacy of life to keep them up. The supplies which our fine mail packets carry for this purpose
are of almost incredible extent and costliness. No vegetable, fruit, game, or other rarity that can be kept fifteen
days in large masses of ice, is neglected; so that the table of every steamer is necessarily both luxurious and
expensive. Indeed, it has become so much so, and the price of passage fare has been reduced so low on all of the
prominent lines, that as a general rule the steamers are not now making much clear money on their passengers. The
expense of keeping passengers was not half so great six years ago, as it is now; and there appears to be no safe
means of permanent retrenchment. Nothing has been said of Insurance. This is a most costly item. The Havre
Company pay on their two ships, which are worth about $900,000, nine and a half per cent. per annum; and Mr.
Collins pays on his three ships, which are worth about $2,200,000, nine per cent. per annum. On the Havre
steamers this amounts to $85,500 per year, which is nearly as much as the mail pay; and on the Collins, to
$198,000 per annum. And these are among what we call the items of mail steamship expenditure. I do not know
the sums paid by the United States Mail, or by the Pacific Mail Companies.
I will here give the views of Messrs. Murray and Atherton on the cost of steam, as they replied to letters of inquiry,
which I addressed them Sept. 14, 1857. Mr. Murray says in answer to
Query 2. "It is certainly my impression that ocean steamers of sufficient speed to carry the mails with any thing
like regularity, will not pay upon any route with which I am acquainted, without assistance from Government."
seldom reflect that the steamer has to pay a large price to each one of them, both going and coming. Take the
coasting steamers, running between New-York and Savannah, or Charleston. It appears singular that the New-York
pilot goes all the way to Savannah, that the Savannah pilot comes all the way to New-York, and that the steamer
pays for both of these men all the time, and feeds them on board all of the time. Yet it is so. Such is the law; and it
amounts to a good many thousands during the year. And all this, the company must pay, as a part of those items
which take cash, but for which the company never gets any credit from the public or the Government. Whenever a
little accident occurs to the steamer, it must be towed a few miles at a high price by a tug-boat. Whenever the
Government or friends and visitors come on board, they expect to be liberally entertained; yet the company must
pay for it, or be considered mean and unworthy of the Government's patronage. Each ship must have an
experienced surgeon, whose wages must be paid like those of other persons employed, and an apothecary's room
and outfit. The ship must be painted and varnished, and overhauled at every trip; the upholstering and furnishing
must be often renewed; stolen articles must be replaced; and the breakages of table-wares constantly renewed. All
of this costs cash.
The steamer also has to pay light dues and port charges wherever she goes. Many of these are exorbitant and
unreasonable. In Havre the "Fulton" and "Arago" must pay nearly twenty-four hundred dollars each on every
departure, or they will not be permitted to leave the docks. This is no small item for each steamer on every passage
that she makes. At New-York she pays wharfage again. It is not so high, but it is a large item, and requires the
cash. Again, there is the great shore establishment which every steam company must maintain. Large docks, and
warehouses, and coaling arrangements, staging, watchmen, porters, and messengers, and a shore-captain equal to
those on board, must all be maintained. The Havre Company pays to the city $4,000 per year for its dock, $1,200
for its annual repairs, and also for sheds, fixtures, etc., extra. They keep also two watchmen at $40 each per month,
and other persons in the dock service. The Collins Company have a necessarily very costly dock both in New-York
and Liverpool. That in New-York would rent for $15,000 per annum. The one in Liverpool is far more costly. On
each they keep a large number of men, with watchmen, gatekeepers, runners, porters, and clerks, and always keep
an office open. Beside this, is the whole paraphernalia of the office of the company. There must be offices, clerks,
bookkeepers, porters, runners, etc.; a president, treasurer, and secretary; an attorney, agents, and agencies; and
newspaper advertising, and a hundred little things which no man can mention. I do not pretend to be able to give
an adequate conception of the innumerable items which so swell the large actual working expenses of regularly
running steamers. Even the charities of a decently managed company are large. Firemen and engineers become
disabled and must be supported; or they are killed in the service of the ship, leaving families which no decent
company can disregard. The amount which the West-India Royal Mail Company pays in this way, and which our
noble American lines advance to the deserving, are beyond all conception of the mere theorist.
There is another source of loss which prevents, mail packets especially, from paying their expenses on their freight
and passenger earnings. The table on all of our steamships has become exceedingly expensive, as it has in our
hotels. Perhaps there is more necessity for it on steamers than in the hotels, as passengers are generally sea-sick,
and need every delicacy of life to keep them up. The supplies which our fine mail packets carry for this purpose
are of almost incredible extent and costliness. No vegetable, fruit, game, or other rarity that can be kept fifteen
days in large masses of ice, is neglected; so that the table of every steamer is necessarily both luxurious and
expensive. Indeed, it has become so much so, and the price of passage fare has been reduced so low on all of the
prominent lines, that as a general rule the steamers are not now making much clear money on their passengers. The
expense of keeping passengers was not half so great six years ago, as it is now; and there appears to be no safe
means of permanent retrenchment. Nothing has been said of Insurance. This is a most costly item. The Havre
Company pay on their two ships, which are worth about $900,000, nine and a half per cent. per annum; and Mr.
Collins pays on his three ships, which are worth about $2,200,000, nine per cent. per annum. On the Havre
steamers this amounts to $85,500 per year, which is nearly as much as the mail pay; and on the Collins, to
$198,000 per annum. And these are among what we call the items of mail steamship expenditure. I do not know
the sums paid by the United States Mail, or by the Pacific Mail Companies.
I will here give the views of Messrs. Murray and Atherton on the cost of steam, as they replied to letters of inquiry,
which I addressed them Sept. 14, 1857. Mr. Murray says in answer to
Query 2. "It is certainly my impression that ocean steamers of sufficient speed to carry the mails with any thing
like regularity, will not pay upon any route with which I am acquainted, without assistance from Government."
Page 78
Query 5: Can Parliament do better in economy than in her present mail contracts, all things considered? Mr.
Murray replies:
"I do not see how Parliament can avoid paying the large subsidies she does for the mail contracts under present
circumstances."
Query 4: Is the steamship stock of Great Britain, subsidized or unsubsidized, paying stock, and is there much
disposition among capitalists to invest, even in the stock of subsidized companies? He replies:
"I do not think the steamship stock of Great Britain to be in a very nourishing condition: in fact, I know of only
one company (the Peninsular and Oriental) in which I should like to invest money."
Mr. Atherton replies to a query regarding the cost of running steamers as follows:
"As to whether the effective performance of high speed mail service is compatible with ordinary mercantile service
without government subsidy, I am of opinion that the mutual relation of Speed and Cost in connection with long
sea-voyages has never yet been duly appreciated by owners, managers, or agents in charge of steam shipping
affairs. An acceleration of steaming speed involves an increase of cost expenses, and a decrease of mercantile
earnings, as dependent on freight per ton weight far beyond what is generally supposed."
He further says in reply to Query 9, which is as follows:
Do you know of any disposition in the Government to cut down the ocean mail service, as an unproductive
expenditure? He says:
"It is impossible to estimate the national value of an effective mail service throughout the whole globe; the
breaking of one link, though apparently of trivial consequence, impairs the whole system. I can not imagine that
there is any disposition to impair the completeness of the mail system."
From the foregoing considerations it is palpable that fast ocean steamers can not live on their own receipts. And
the same will in most cases hold true of freighting and other steamers of all classes, which depend entirely on
steam as their agent of locomotion. Propellers will hardly form an exception to this rule. If the power and the
passengers fill the hull, if the coal bill and other expenses increase as rapidly as indicated for mail packets, if
engineering improvements do not advance as rapidly as the price of coals, if larger and more cheaply running ships
can not get an adequate support in business, if there are the many leakages and expenses indicated, and if all of the
expenses of running steamers are continually increasing from year to year rather than diminishing, then we may
never expect to see the mail and passenger steamers of the ocean become self-supporting, or less dependent than
now, on the fostering care of the Government and the national treasury.[C]
[C] Since this was written, Mr. Drayton has shown me the receipt for this year's taxes on the Havre Company, which are
$7,782, the two ships being valued at $500,000 only.
Murray replies:
"I do not see how Parliament can avoid paying the large subsidies she does for the mail contracts under present
circumstances."
Query 4: Is the steamship stock of Great Britain, subsidized or unsubsidized, paying stock, and is there much
disposition among capitalists to invest, even in the stock of subsidized companies? He replies:
"I do not think the steamship stock of Great Britain to be in a very nourishing condition: in fact, I know of only
one company (the Peninsular and Oriental) in which I should like to invest money."
Mr. Atherton replies to a query regarding the cost of running steamers as follows:
"As to whether the effective performance of high speed mail service is compatible with ordinary mercantile service
without government subsidy, I am of opinion that the mutual relation of Speed and Cost in connection with long
sea-voyages has never yet been duly appreciated by owners, managers, or agents in charge of steam shipping
affairs. An acceleration of steaming speed involves an increase of cost expenses, and a decrease of mercantile
earnings, as dependent on freight per ton weight far beyond what is generally supposed."
He further says in reply to Query 9, which is as follows:
Do you know of any disposition in the Government to cut down the ocean mail service, as an unproductive
expenditure? He says:
"It is impossible to estimate the national value of an effective mail service throughout the whole globe; the
breaking of one link, though apparently of trivial consequence, impairs the whole system. I can not imagine that
there is any disposition to impair the completeness of the mail system."
From the foregoing considerations it is palpable that fast ocean steamers can not live on their own receipts. And
the same will in most cases hold true of freighting and other steamers of all classes, which depend entirely on
steam as their agent of locomotion. Propellers will hardly form an exception to this rule. If the power and the
passengers fill the hull, if the coal bill and other expenses increase as rapidly as indicated for mail packets, if
engineering improvements do not advance as rapidly as the price of coals, if larger and more cheaply running ships
can not get an adequate support in business, if there are the many leakages and expenses indicated, and if all of the
expenses of running steamers are continually increasing from year to year rather than diminishing, then we may
never expect to see the mail and passenger steamers of the ocean become self-supporting, or less dependent than
now, on the fostering care of the Government and the national treasury.[C]
[C] Since this was written, Mr. Drayton has shown me the receipt for this year's taxes on the Havre Company, which are
$7,782, the two ships being valued at $500,000 only.
Page 79
SECTION VI.
HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?
the transmarine compared with the inland post: our past spasmodic efforts: need some system: france aroused
to steam: the sailing-ship mail: the naval steam mail: the private enterprise mail: all inadequate and
abandoned: great britain's experience in all these methods: naval vessels can not be adapted to the mail
service: will propellers meet the wants of mail transport, with or without subsidy: popular errors regarding
the propeller: its advantages and disadvantages: bourne's opinion: robert murray: propellers too often on the
docks: they are very disagreeable passenger vessels: if propellers run more cheaply it is because they are
slower: compared with sail: unprofitable stock: croskey's line: propellers live on chances and charters: iron as
a material: sending the mails by slow propellers would be an unfair discrimination against sailing vessels:
individual enterprise can not supply mail facilities: therefore it is the duty of the government.
I have endeavored to prove in the foregoing Section that ocean mail steamers can not live on their own receipts.
The question now arises, how can we secure speed for the mails and passengers upon the ocean? With so many
expenses and so small an income the fast ocean steamer can not become profitable to even the most thoroughly
organized and best administered companies. Much less can it be successfully run by individuals and individual
enterprise, which has never so many reliable resources at command as a strong, chartered company. It is true that
there are a few prominent transatlantic routes where steamers can run as auxiliary propellers; but the number of
them is small, and the speed attained will by no means prove sufficient for postal purposes. The transmarine postal
service has been a source of constant annoyance to almost every commercial nation. The overland mails have
generally been self-supporting, and it has been a favorite idea that those on the sea should be so also; although
there is no just reason why either should be necessarily so any more than in the cases of the Navy and the Army;
branches of the service which entail large expenses on the Government, and yet without a moiety of the benefits
which directly flow from the postal service to all classes of community. No nation except Great Britain has come
up to the issue and faced this question boldly. Almost every other country, not excepting our own, has been
hanging back on the subject of the transmarine post, "waiting, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up," in the
improvements of ocean steam navigation, which might obviate the necessity of paying for the ocean transit. But
every hope has been disappointed; and instead of realizing these wishes the case has been growing worse year by
year, until we are at last compelled to move in the matter, or lose our commerce, our ocean prestige, and sink down
contented with a second or third-rate position among commercial nations, and acknowledge ourselves tributary to
the far-seeing and far-reaching, and superior policy of our competitors.
The United States have indeed become galvanically aroused now and then, as in 1847 and '8, to a self-protecting
and a self-developing system; but as soon as one faint effort has been made, we have, instead of pursuing that
effort and developing it fully, relapsed back into our old indifference, and given the whole available talent of the
Government either to the administration, or to the everlasting discussion of petty politics. During the time that
President Buchanan was Secretary of State, some of our noblest efforts for the establishment of ocean mails were
made, with his fullest countenance and aid; but the policy then inaugurated with prospects so hopeful for our
commercial future, and which has operated so healthfully ever since, is now half abandoned, or left without notice
to take care of itself; until it may be to-day said that we have no steam policy, and run our ocean mails only by
expedients. This ever has been and ever will be unfortunate for us, and costly. Individuals and companies build
steamers for the accidents of trade, let them lie still a year or two, then pounce upon some disorganized trade, suck
the life-blood from it like vampires, and at last leave it, the very corpse of commerce, lying at the public door. All
such irregular traffic is injurious to the best interests of the country, destroys all generous and manly competition,
and proves most clearly the want of a Government steam mail system. France has been awaiting the issues of time,
and under a too high expectation for the improvements of the age, until she finds that unless she inaugurates and
sustains a liberal steam policy, and becomes less dependent on foreigners for her mails, she will have the
commerce of the world swept from her shores as by a whirlwind of enterprise. She has now become aroused, and
has determined to establish three great lines of communication, one with the United States, one with the West-
Indies, Central America, the Spanish Main, and Mexico, and one with Brazil and La Plata. She has found, that it
will no longer do to abandon her mails to fate, and that in the end it will be far more profitable to pay even largely
HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?
the transmarine compared with the inland post: our past spasmodic efforts: need some system: france aroused
to steam: the sailing-ship mail: the naval steam mail: the private enterprise mail: all inadequate and
abandoned: great britain's experience in all these methods: naval vessels can not be adapted to the mail
service: will propellers meet the wants of mail transport, with or without subsidy: popular errors regarding
the propeller: its advantages and disadvantages: bourne's opinion: robert murray: propellers too often on the
docks: they are very disagreeable passenger vessels: if propellers run more cheaply it is because they are
slower: compared with sail: unprofitable stock: croskey's line: propellers live on chances and charters: iron as
a material: sending the mails by slow propellers would be an unfair discrimination against sailing vessels:
individual enterprise can not supply mail facilities: therefore it is the duty of the government.
I have endeavored to prove in the foregoing Section that ocean mail steamers can not live on their own receipts.
The question now arises, how can we secure speed for the mails and passengers upon the ocean? With so many
expenses and so small an income the fast ocean steamer can not become profitable to even the most thoroughly
organized and best administered companies. Much less can it be successfully run by individuals and individual
enterprise, which has never so many reliable resources at command as a strong, chartered company. It is true that
there are a few prominent transatlantic routes where steamers can run as auxiliary propellers; but the number of
them is small, and the speed attained will by no means prove sufficient for postal purposes. The transmarine postal
service has been a source of constant annoyance to almost every commercial nation. The overland mails have
generally been self-supporting, and it has been a favorite idea that those on the sea should be so also; although
there is no just reason why either should be necessarily so any more than in the cases of the Navy and the Army;
branches of the service which entail large expenses on the Government, and yet without a moiety of the benefits
which directly flow from the postal service to all classes of community. No nation except Great Britain has come
up to the issue and faced this question boldly. Almost every other country, not excepting our own, has been
hanging back on the subject of the transmarine post, "waiting, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up," in the
improvements of ocean steam navigation, which might obviate the necessity of paying for the ocean transit. But
every hope has been disappointed; and instead of realizing these wishes the case has been growing worse year by
year, until we are at last compelled to move in the matter, or lose our commerce, our ocean prestige, and sink down
contented with a second or third-rate position among commercial nations, and acknowledge ourselves tributary to
the far-seeing and far-reaching, and superior policy of our competitors.
The United States have indeed become galvanically aroused now and then, as in 1847 and '8, to a self-protecting
and a self-developing system; but as soon as one faint effort has been made, we have, instead of pursuing that
effort and developing it fully, relapsed back into our old indifference, and given the whole available talent of the
Government either to the administration, or to the everlasting discussion of petty politics. During the time that
President Buchanan was Secretary of State, some of our noblest efforts for the establishment of ocean mails were
made, with his fullest countenance and aid; but the policy then inaugurated with prospects so hopeful for our
commercial future, and which has operated so healthfully ever since, is now half abandoned, or left without notice
to take care of itself; until it may be to-day said that we have no steam policy, and run our ocean mails only by
expedients. This ever has been and ever will be unfortunate for us, and costly. Individuals and companies build
steamers for the accidents of trade, let them lie still a year or two, then pounce upon some disorganized trade, suck
the life-blood from it like vampires, and at last leave it, the very corpse of commerce, lying at the public door. All
such irregular traffic is injurious to the best interests of the country, destroys all generous and manly competition,
and proves most clearly the want of a Government steam mail system. France has been awaiting the issues of time,
and under a too high expectation for the improvements of the age, until she finds that unless she inaugurates and
sustains a liberal steam policy, and becomes less dependent on foreigners for her mails, she will have the
commerce of the world swept from her shores as by a whirlwind of enterprise. She has now become aroused, and
has determined to establish three great lines of communication, one with the United States, one with the West-
Indies, Central America, the Spanish Main, and Mexico, and one with Brazil and La Plata. She has found, that it
will no longer do to abandon her mails to fate, and that in the end it will be far more profitable to pay even largely
Page 80
for good mails than to do without them. Hence, her offer to give to the American, West-Indian, and Brazilian
service named an annual subvention of fourteen million Francs, or nearly three million dollars, to be continued for
twenty years, which the Government deems a sufficient period for the establishment and test of a system. (See
projêt of Franco-American Navigation, page 198.)
Among the many expedients adopted for the transmission of the foreign post are those of employing ordinary
sailing vessels on the one hand, or the vessels of the war marine on the other. Both systems have been effectually
and forever exploded and abandoned. The objections to sailing vessels are very numerous. They are, in the first
place, too slow. They are too uncertain in their days of sailing and arrival. They can never be placed under the
direction of the Department because they are private property, devoted to private uses, and generally accomplish
their ends by private means; one of the most prominent of which is, to keep back all letters except those going to
their own consignees. If a merchant runs his ship for personal gain it is not to be supposed that he will carry the
letters of his commercial competitors, and thus forestall his own speculations. Sailing vessels have no proper
accommodations for the mails, and can not fairly be forced either to transport or to deliver them. The uncertainties
of cargo are such that they can not sail on fixed days with punctuality. But the great difficulty is their want of
speed and the uncertainty of their progress or arrival. Whenever they have been employed by the British
Government for postal service they have always proven themselves inefficient and unreliable. Whenever they have
been superceded by steamers, the postal income, before small, has gone up rapidly to five, ten, or twenty times the
former income. This was well illustrated in the British and Brazilian lines. The Parliamentary returns for 1842,
when postal service with Brazil and La Plata was performed by a line of fine sailing packets, give the total income
from postages at £5,034, 13d, 6s Lord Canning, the British Post Master General, stated that, in 1852, two years
after the Royal Mail Steam Packets commenced running to Brazil and La Plata, the income from postages was
£44,091, 17s, or nearly nine times as much as when the mails went by sailing vessels.[D] Ship owners have a strong
aversion to receiving letters for the places to which their ships are bound. As a barque was about sailing from New-
York for Demerara in 1855, I called on the owner, who was on the dock, just before the vessel got under way, and
asked that some letters which I held in my hand, might be taken to Georgetown. He said that he could not take
them; that he sailed his vessel to make money; and that he could not do other people's business. As I walked away
from him rather abruptly, he called to me and wished to know to whom the letters were addressed. I told him, to
Sir Edmund Wodehouse, the Governor of the Province; and that they related to the establishment of steam mail
facilities between this country and that Province. He at once begged my pardon and explained; asked that I would
let him send the letters; and said, moreover, that he would at any time be glad to give me a passage there and back
on that business.
[D] See Parliamentary Papers for 1852-3, postal affairs, Report of Lord Canning, July 8, 1853.
The experiment of employing the steamers of the Navy in the postal service has been very fully made by Great
Britain. After attempts on a considerable number of lines, and extending over a period of ten years, this service has
been found inefficient, cumbrous, and more costly, and has been entirely abandoned. Murray, page 172, says that
Mr. Anderson, Managing Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, said before the Parliamentary
Committee as follows: "The postal communication can be done much cheaper by private contract steamers than by
Government boats, because of the merchandise and passengers carried. The steam communication between
Southampton and Alexandria, with vessels of 300 to 400 horse power, was done for 4s 6d, per mile. From Suez to
Ceylon, Calcutta, and Hong Kong, with vessels of 400 to 500 horse power, for 17s, 1d per mile. The East-India
Company's line (of naval vessels) between Suez and Bombay with vessels of only 250 to 300 horse power, cost
30s per mile. Her Majesty's vessels in the Mediterranean cost about 21s per mile." France also tried the
experiment, but soon abandoned the system, as fruitless and exceedingly annoying. It is quite a plausible idea that
our mails should go under the flag of the country, with power to protect them, and that vessels generally supposed
to be idle should be engaged in some useful service. But this presupposes a fact which does not exist. No vessels in
the world are more actively employed than those of the American navy, and there are many stations on which we
could employ twice as many as we have with excellent effect on our commerce and foreign relations generally. We
constantly hear the complaint that the Secretary of the Navy has no steamer for some immediately necessary or
indispensable service. But if he had, and if two dozen steamers were lying all the time idle in our navy yards, they
would probably not be installed six months in the postal service until they would be positively demanded in some
way in that of the nation, and this diversion would at once frustrate all of the postal and commercial plans of the
country.
service named an annual subvention of fourteen million Francs, or nearly three million dollars, to be continued for
twenty years, which the Government deems a sufficient period for the establishment and test of a system. (See
projêt of Franco-American Navigation, page 198.)
Among the many expedients adopted for the transmission of the foreign post are those of employing ordinary
sailing vessels on the one hand, or the vessels of the war marine on the other. Both systems have been effectually
and forever exploded and abandoned. The objections to sailing vessels are very numerous. They are, in the first
place, too slow. They are too uncertain in their days of sailing and arrival. They can never be placed under the
direction of the Department because they are private property, devoted to private uses, and generally accomplish
their ends by private means; one of the most prominent of which is, to keep back all letters except those going to
their own consignees. If a merchant runs his ship for personal gain it is not to be supposed that he will carry the
letters of his commercial competitors, and thus forestall his own speculations. Sailing vessels have no proper
accommodations for the mails, and can not fairly be forced either to transport or to deliver them. The uncertainties
of cargo are such that they can not sail on fixed days with punctuality. But the great difficulty is their want of
speed and the uncertainty of their progress or arrival. Whenever they have been employed by the British
Government for postal service they have always proven themselves inefficient and unreliable. Whenever they have
been superceded by steamers, the postal income, before small, has gone up rapidly to five, ten, or twenty times the
former income. This was well illustrated in the British and Brazilian lines. The Parliamentary returns for 1842,
when postal service with Brazil and La Plata was performed by a line of fine sailing packets, give the total income
from postages at £5,034, 13d, 6s Lord Canning, the British Post Master General, stated that, in 1852, two years
after the Royal Mail Steam Packets commenced running to Brazil and La Plata, the income from postages was
£44,091, 17s, or nearly nine times as much as when the mails went by sailing vessels.[D] Ship owners have a strong
aversion to receiving letters for the places to which their ships are bound. As a barque was about sailing from New-
York for Demerara in 1855, I called on the owner, who was on the dock, just before the vessel got under way, and
asked that some letters which I held in my hand, might be taken to Georgetown. He said that he could not take
them; that he sailed his vessel to make money; and that he could not do other people's business. As I walked away
from him rather abruptly, he called to me and wished to know to whom the letters were addressed. I told him, to
Sir Edmund Wodehouse, the Governor of the Province; and that they related to the establishment of steam mail
facilities between this country and that Province. He at once begged my pardon and explained; asked that I would
let him send the letters; and said, moreover, that he would at any time be glad to give me a passage there and back
on that business.
[D] See Parliamentary Papers for 1852-3, postal affairs, Report of Lord Canning, July 8, 1853.
The experiment of employing the steamers of the Navy in the postal service has been very fully made by Great
Britain. After attempts on a considerable number of lines, and extending over a period of ten years, this service has
been found inefficient, cumbrous, and more costly, and has been entirely abandoned. Murray, page 172, says that
Mr. Anderson, Managing Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, said before the Parliamentary
Committee as follows: "The postal communication can be done much cheaper by private contract steamers than by
Government boats, because of the merchandise and passengers carried. The steam communication between
Southampton and Alexandria, with vessels of 300 to 400 horse power, was done for 4s 6d, per mile. From Suez to
Ceylon, Calcutta, and Hong Kong, with vessels of 400 to 500 horse power, for 17s, 1d per mile. The East-India
Company's line (of naval vessels) between Suez and Bombay with vessels of only 250 to 300 horse power, cost
30s per mile. Her Majesty's vessels in the Mediterranean cost about 21s per mile." France also tried the
experiment, but soon abandoned the system, as fruitless and exceedingly annoying. It is quite a plausible idea that
our mails should go under the flag of the country, with power to protect them, and that vessels generally supposed
to be idle should be engaged in some useful service. But this presupposes a fact which does not exist. No vessels in
the world are more actively employed than those of the American navy, and there are many stations on which we
could employ twice as many as we have with excellent effect on our commerce and foreign relations generally. We
constantly hear the complaint that the Secretary of the Navy has no steamer for some immediately necessary or
indispensable service. But if he had, and if two dozen steamers were lying all the time idle in our navy yards, they
would probably not be installed six months in the postal service until they would be positively demanded in some
way in that of the nation, and this diversion would at once frustrate all of the postal and commercial plans of the
country.
Page 81
But the difficulties in the way of this service are so numerous as to be readily palpable to all who examine it. No
vessel that is well fitted for naval service is well adapted to that of the post. The post requires great speed, and
hence, full-powered vessels. The navy does not require so great speed, and hence, the steamers are seldom more
than auxiliaries. They are built heavier and fuller, and are not so adapted to speed. Filling them with the power
necessary to drive them with sufficient rapidity for mail packets would unfit them for the efficient service of war.
Naval vessels are, moreover, filled and weighted down with guns, stores, men, and a thousand things which would
be in the way if they were employed for the mails. They have no state-rooms, cabins, saloons, etc.; and if they had
them so as to accommodate passengers, they would be unfit for the war service. Unless so fitted they could not
accommodate passengers, as they will not lash themselves up in hammocks under the deck, as thick as grass, as
man-of-war's men will. If they are to be strictly naval vessels while running, they will be filled with their own
men, and could not take passengers even if they had state-room accommodations for them. They would thus be
deprived entirely of this source of income. Again, they could take no freight; and if a passenger mail steamer has to
depend upon both freight and passengers for an income to meet the large expenses, which are generally three, five,
and often even ten times the sum of subsidy received from the Government, then the naval vessel running in the
postal service will be deprived of both these sources of income, and must fall back on the department for all of its
expenses, which would be three, five, and even ten times as much as the sum paid private companies for carrying
the mail.
The average round trips of the Pacific mail steamers from Panamá to San Francisco and Olympia, and back, are,
beyond doubt, enormously expensive; while they receive from the Government only $14,500. This is,
consequently, but a small fractional part of their income. The trip of the "Arago," or "Fulton," to Havre and back,
costs about $45,000, while the mail pay was only $12,500, under the old contract, and is now probably not above
$7,500 per round trip.[E] These estimates are made exclusive of insurance, which is 91/2 per cent.; repairs, 10 per
cent.; and depreciation, at least five per cent. Here, again, the Government gives but a meagre part of the large sum
necessary to keep those packets running. Now, if naval vessels were carrying the same mails, and were deprived of
the income which they receive for freight and passengers, it would evidently cost the Government six to eight
times as much to carry the mails as it now does, saying nothing about the income from the mails, which is trifling.
But this class of vessels never could subserve the purposes of rapid correspondence. If they could carry freight and
passengers, the difficulties would still be insuperable. It would cost twice as much for the department to
accomplish the same object through its officers and its routine as it would for private companies or individuals,
who have but the one business and the one purpose in running their vessels. No man, company, or even department
of the Government, can accomplish two important and difficult ends by the same agency at the same time. Either
the one or the other must suffer and be neglected, or both will be but imperfectly and ineffectively performed.
Many structures of this kind fall of their own superincumbent weight and clumsiness. If naval vessels thus running
even had passengers they would never be satisfied or well treated. A captain and crew, to be agreeable and
satisfactory to passengers, must feel themselves under obligation to them for their patronage, and would be
compelled to exert themselves to merit the best feelings of their patrons. This could never be the case with naval
gentlemen, who would be dependent for their living on the department only. It is probable that no one seriously
entertains such a plan as this for the postal service, as this must be a distinct, partly self-supporting, unbroken, and
continuous service, while that of the Navy must also be distinct, independent, and efficiently directed to one great
cardinal object. Therefore, we can not secure postal service by this means.
[E] This line receives the total postages, ocean and inland, which in 1856 were, according to the Post Master General's
report, $88,483.99, or $7,373.33 per round voyage. (See Letter of the Hon. Horatio King, 1st Asst. Post Master General.)
As much has been said of Propellers during the few years past, I propose examining the question with the view of
ascertaining whether they are adapted to the mail service, and whether we can secure from them sufficient speed
without a subsidy from the Government. It is well known that the British are a far more steady-going people than
ourselves, and not being so rushing do not require so much speed. They have had an easy control of the European
and foreign commerce generally around them; and when competition aroused them to additional efforts they did
not endeavor to outstride themselves, but took merely an additional step of progress and speed, and adopted the
propeller for their coasting business, because it was a little faster than wind, and yet cheaper than full steam. And
because so many propellers have been built for the peculiar short-route trade of Great Britain, many people in this
country can not see why we do not adopt the propeller for our foreign trade. I have already shown (See page 44)
that there are some short routes on which steam is cheaper than the wind, and that on others of greater length
steamers can not transport freight under any conditions. (See latter part of Section IV., on the Cost of Steam.) I do
vessel that is well fitted for naval service is well adapted to that of the post. The post requires great speed, and
hence, full-powered vessels. The navy does not require so great speed, and hence, the steamers are seldom more
than auxiliaries. They are built heavier and fuller, and are not so adapted to speed. Filling them with the power
necessary to drive them with sufficient rapidity for mail packets would unfit them for the efficient service of war.
Naval vessels are, moreover, filled and weighted down with guns, stores, men, and a thousand things which would
be in the way if they were employed for the mails. They have no state-rooms, cabins, saloons, etc.; and if they had
them so as to accommodate passengers, they would be unfit for the war service. Unless so fitted they could not
accommodate passengers, as they will not lash themselves up in hammocks under the deck, as thick as grass, as
man-of-war's men will. If they are to be strictly naval vessels while running, they will be filled with their own
men, and could not take passengers even if they had state-room accommodations for them. They would thus be
deprived entirely of this source of income. Again, they could take no freight; and if a passenger mail steamer has to
depend upon both freight and passengers for an income to meet the large expenses, which are generally three, five,
and often even ten times the sum of subsidy received from the Government, then the naval vessel running in the
postal service will be deprived of both these sources of income, and must fall back on the department for all of its
expenses, which would be three, five, and even ten times as much as the sum paid private companies for carrying
the mail.
The average round trips of the Pacific mail steamers from Panamá to San Francisco and Olympia, and back, are,
beyond doubt, enormously expensive; while they receive from the Government only $14,500. This is,
consequently, but a small fractional part of their income. The trip of the "Arago," or "Fulton," to Havre and back,
costs about $45,000, while the mail pay was only $12,500, under the old contract, and is now probably not above
$7,500 per round trip.[E] These estimates are made exclusive of insurance, which is 91/2 per cent.; repairs, 10 per
cent.; and depreciation, at least five per cent. Here, again, the Government gives but a meagre part of the large sum
necessary to keep those packets running. Now, if naval vessels were carrying the same mails, and were deprived of
the income which they receive for freight and passengers, it would evidently cost the Government six to eight
times as much to carry the mails as it now does, saying nothing about the income from the mails, which is trifling.
But this class of vessels never could subserve the purposes of rapid correspondence. If they could carry freight and
passengers, the difficulties would still be insuperable. It would cost twice as much for the department to
accomplish the same object through its officers and its routine as it would for private companies or individuals,
who have but the one business and the one purpose in running their vessels. No man, company, or even department
of the Government, can accomplish two important and difficult ends by the same agency at the same time. Either
the one or the other must suffer and be neglected, or both will be but imperfectly and ineffectively performed.
Many structures of this kind fall of their own superincumbent weight and clumsiness. If naval vessels thus running
even had passengers they would never be satisfied or well treated. A captain and crew, to be agreeable and
satisfactory to passengers, must feel themselves under obligation to them for their patronage, and would be
compelled to exert themselves to merit the best feelings of their patrons. This could never be the case with naval
gentlemen, who would be dependent for their living on the department only. It is probable that no one seriously
entertains such a plan as this for the postal service, as this must be a distinct, partly self-supporting, unbroken, and
continuous service, while that of the Navy must also be distinct, independent, and efficiently directed to one great
cardinal object. Therefore, we can not secure postal service by this means.
[E] This line receives the total postages, ocean and inland, which in 1856 were, according to the Post Master General's
report, $88,483.99, or $7,373.33 per round voyage. (See Letter of the Hon. Horatio King, 1st Asst. Post Master General.)
As much has been said of Propellers during the few years past, I propose examining the question with the view of
ascertaining whether they are adapted to the mail service, and whether we can secure from them sufficient speed
without a subsidy from the Government. It is well known that the British are a far more steady-going people than
ourselves, and not being so rushing do not require so much speed. They have had an easy control of the European
and foreign commerce generally around them; and when competition aroused them to additional efforts they did
not endeavor to outstride themselves, but took merely an additional step of progress and speed, and adopted the
propeller for their coasting business, because it was a little faster than wind, and yet cheaper than full steam. And
because so many propellers have been built for the peculiar short-route trade of Great Britain, many people in this
country can not see why we do not adopt the propeller for our foreign trade. I have already shown (See page 44)
that there are some short routes on which steam is cheaper than the wind, and that on others of greater length
steamers can not transport freight under any conditions. (See latter part of Section IV., on the Cost of Steam.) I do
Page 82
not propose making the Screw Propeller in any way an exception to the position stated; and shall consequently
maintain that it will never be the means of attaining a rapid and yet cheap mail speed.
There are no greater errors entertained by the public on any subject connected with steam navigation than
concerning the Screw Propeller. It is generally supposed that it is a more economical and effective application of
power than the side-wheel, which is a mistake: it is generally supposed that, with the same amount of power and
all other conditions equal, the propeller will not run as rapidly as the side-wheel, which is true of steaming in a sea-
way or against a head-wind, but a mistake as regards smooth water: it is generally supposed that the engines weigh
less, take up less room, and cost less, which is all a mistake. The best authors on this subject and the most eminent
builders generally agree, that in England and Scotland, where the propeller has attained its greatest perfection, the
difference between the side-wheel and the propeller as an application of power is very slight and hardly
appreciable; or that the same number of tons of coal will drive two ships of the same size at the same speed in
smooth water; but that the side-wheel has greatly the advantage in a head-sea or during rough weather generally.
Many persons who do not understand the subject, have theorized in just the contrary direction. They say that in
rough weather the screw has the advantage, because it is alway in the water, etc. Experience shows just the reverse;
and theory will bear the practice out. If, in the side-wheel one wheel is part of the time out, the other has, at any
rate, the whole force of the engines, and the floats sink to and take hold on a denser, heavier, and less easily
yielding stratum of water; so that the progress is nearly the same. The back current or opposing wave can not
materially affect it, because the float is at the extreme end of the arm where the travel is greatest, and is always
more rapid than the wave. It is not so with the screw. The blade which meets the wave is not placed at the end of a
long arm where the travel is very rapid and the motion more sudden than that of the wave. This blade extends all
the way along from its extreme end, where the motion is rapid, to the centre, or the shaft, where there is no motion;
and all intermediate parts of this blade move so slowly, that the wave of greater rapidity counteracts it, and checks
its progress. The side-wheel applies its power at the extreme periphery, where the travel is greatest, while the
screw applies it all along between the point of extreme rapidity, and the stationary point in the shaft. There is,
moreover, much power lost as the oblique blades of the screw rise and fall in a vertical line while the vessel is
heaving.
In the new edition (1855) of "Bourne on the Propeller," he says in the preface:
"Large vessels, we know, are both physically and commercially more advantageous than small vessels, provided
only they can be filled with cargo; but in some cases in which small paddle vessels have been superseded by large
screw vessels, the superior result due to an increased size of hull has been imputed to a superior efficiency of the
propeller. No fact, however, is more conclusively established than this, that the efficiency of paddles and of the
screw as propelling instruments is very nearly the same; and in cases in which geared engines are employed to
drive a screw vessel, the machinery will take up about the same amount of room as if paddles had been used, and
the result will be much the same as if paddles had been adopted. When direct acting engines, however, are
employed, the machinery will occupy a much less space in screw vessels than is possible in paddle vessels, and the
use of direct acting engines in screw propellers is necessary, therefore, for the realization of the full measure of
advantage, which screw propulsion is able to afford."
Atherton says of the propeller in his "Marine Engine Construction and Classification," page 45:
"Its operation has been critically compared with that of the paddle-wheel, under various conditions of engine
power, and experience has shown that, under circumstances which admit of the screw propeller being favorably
applied, it is equal to the paddle-wheel as an effective means of applying engine power to the propulsion of the
vessel." Again:
I recently addressed to Mr. Atherton the following question: "Taking two ships of the same size, displacement, and
power, or coal, the one a side-wheel, the other screw: What will be their relative speed and carrying capacity in
smooth water? What in a sea-way, or in regular transatlantic navigation?" He replied under address, "Woolwich
Royal Dock Yard, 14 Sept., 1857:
"It is my opinion, based on experiment, that a well-applied screw is quite equal to the paddle-wheel for giving out
the power by which it is itself driven, that is, in smooth water. I can not say from observation or experience what is
the comparative operation at sea."
maintain that it will never be the means of attaining a rapid and yet cheap mail speed.
There are no greater errors entertained by the public on any subject connected with steam navigation than
concerning the Screw Propeller. It is generally supposed that it is a more economical and effective application of
power than the side-wheel, which is a mistake: it is generally supposed that, with the same amount of power and
all other conditions equal, the propeller will not run as rapidly as the side-wheel, which is true of steaming in a sea-
way or against a head-wind, but a mistake as regards smooth water: it is generally supposed that the engines weigh
less, take up less room, and cost less, which is all a mistake. The best authors on this subject and the most eminent
builders generally agree, that in England and Scotland, where the propeller has attained its greatest perfection, the
difference between the side-wheel and the propeller as an application of power is very slight and hardly
appreciable; or that the same number of tons of coal will drive two ships of the same size at the same speed in
smooth water; but that the side-wheel has greatly the advantage in a head-sea or during rough weather generally.
Many persons who do not understand the subject, have theorized in just the contrary direction. They say that in
rough weather the screw has the advantage, because it is alway in the water, etc. Experience shows just the reverse;
and theory will bear the practice out. If, in the side-wheel one wheel is part of the time out, the other has, at any
rate, the whole force of the engines, and the floats sink to and take hold on a denser, heavier, and less easily
yielding stratum of water; so that the progress is nearly the same. The back current or opposing wave can not
materially affect it, because the float is at the extreme end of the arm where the travel is greatest, and is always
more rapid than the wave. It is not so with the screw. The blade which meets the wave is not placed at the end of a
long arm where the travel is very rapid and the motion more sudden than that of the wave. This blade extends all
the way along from its extreme end, where the motion is rapid, to the centre, or the shaft, where there is no motion;
and all intermediate parts of this blade move so slowly, that the wave of greater rapidity counteracts it, and checks
its progress. The side-wheel applies its power at the extreme periphery, where the travel is greatest, while the
screw applies it all along between the point of extreme rapidity, and the stationary point in the shaft. There is,
moreover, much power lost as the oblique blades of the screw rise and fall in a vertical line while the vessel is
heaving.
In the new edition (1855) of "Bourne on the Propeller," he says in the preface:
"Large vessels, we know, are both physically and commercially more advantageous than small vessels, provided
only they can be filled with cargo; but in some cases in which small paddle vessels have been superseded by large
screw vessels, the superior result due to an increased size of hull has been imputed to a superior efficiency of the
propeller. No fact, however, is more conclusively established than this, that the efficiency of paddles and of the
screw as propelling instruments is very nearly the same; and in cases in which geared engines are employed to
drive a screw vessel, the machinery will take up about the same amount of room as if paddles had been used, and
the result will be much the same as if paddles had been adopted. When direct acting engines, however, are
employed, the machinery will occupy a much less space in screw vessels than is possible in paddle vessels, and the
use of direct acting engines in screw propellers is necessary, therefore, for the realization of the full measure of
advantage, which screw propulsion is able to afford."
Atherton says of the propeller in his "Marine Engine Construction and Classification," page 45:
"Its operation has been critically compared with that of the paddle-wheel, under various conditions of engine
power, and experience has shown that, under circumstances which admit of the screw propeller being favorably
applied, it is equal to the paddle-wheel as an effective means of applying engine power to the propulsion of the
vessel." Again:
I recently addressed to Mr. Atherton the following question: "Taking two ships of the same size, displacement, and
power, or coal, the one a side-wheel, the other screw: What will be their relative speed and carrying capacity in
smooth water? What in a sea-way, or in regular transatlantic navigation?" He replied under address, "Woolwich
Royal Dock Yard, 14 Sept., 1857:
"It is my opinion, based on experiment, that a well-applied screw is quite equal to the paddle-wheel for giving out
the power by which it is itself driven, that is, in smooth water. I can not say from observation or experience what is
the comparative operation at sea."
Page 83
I addressed the same inquiry to Mr. Robert Murray, of Southampton, who has written an able work, entitled, "The
Marine Engine," and who is considered excellent authority, and have from him the following reply, dated
Southampton, 19 Sept., 1857:
"With regard to the relative efficiency of the paddle-wheel and screw for full-powered mail steamers, I am
disposed to prefer the paddle-wheel for transatlantic steaming, in which the vessel has to contend with so much
rough weather and heavy sea, and the screw for the Mediterranean and the Pacific routes.
"For auxiliary steamers of any kind the screw has manifestly the advantage.
"With regard to the actual speed obtained from each mode of propulsion in vessels of the same power and form,
and with the propeller in its best trim, I am disposed to prefer the paddle-wheel, either in smooth water, or when
steaming head to wind, but in other conditions the screw." What he means by "other conditions," is evidently when
the screw is running with a fair wind, which is seldom, so as to use her sails. Bourne also states very clearly in two
places that the propeller is by no means so efficient in a sea-way, as a side-wheel steamer, and admits that when a
vessel is steaming at eleven or twelve knots per hour, the sails not only do not aid her, but frequently materially
retard her motion. (See Bourne, page 237.)
All of these authorities agree that the application of a given power produces about the same effect, whether
through the side-wheel or the screw; and if so, it is evident that the screw can not attain the same speed as the side-
wheel, without burning as much fuel, and having as costly and as heavy engines and boilers. Indeed, taking the
whole evidence together, it appears well settled by these authorities, that the screw is equal to the side-wheel only
in smooth water, and that, as a consequence of this distinction, it is not equal to it in general ocean navigation. It
has been seen that much of its power is lost when it contends with head-winds and seas, and that when it has
attained a fair average mail speed, the wind will help it very little, if any, under the most favorable circumstances.
It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that it would cost more to attain a high average mail speed with the propeller
than with the side-wheel. If in attaining this average mail speed the advantages are clearly in favor of the side-
wheel, there is no hope that we shall accomplish the mail service at cheaper rates than heretofore, as this agency
can not be introduced toward that end; for not only is the prime cost of the steamer the same, as also the
consumption of fuel per mile, but there are other and numerous disadvantages connected with the propeller, which
are wholly unknown to the side-wheel.
It is a well-known fact that propellers are compelled to be placed upon the docks three or four times as often as
side-wheels. The screw either breaks, and must be replaced by another, or it cuts the boxes out, or works the stern
of the vessel to pieces. Any one of these requires that the steamer shall be docked, however great the expense; and
as these accidents are constantly occurring in even the best constructed and best regulated propellers, it follows
that they must be constantly on the docks. This species of vessel being built necessarily narrower than the side-
wheel, it rolls more, and is found to be an exceedingly disagreeable passenger vessel. Propellers have become
deservedly unpopular the world over; and if it were possible for them to be faster than the side-wheel, it is hardly
probable that first-class passengers would even then go by them, as they are known to be so exceedingly
uncomfortable.
The propeller, I have before said, is erroneously supposed to run more cheaply than the side-wheel. I think that I
have shown that as a mail packet it will cost more to run it at a given speed. But there are certain cases in which it
does run more cheaply; these are, however, only where the speed is low, and the machinery not geared, and where,
as a consequence, sail can be used to more advantage than on a side-wheel. The economy is not the result of the
application of the power by the screw, as compared with the side-wheel, but of the sail alone; and this economy is
more or less, just as canvas is employed more or less in the propulsion. The screw is the better form of steamer for
using sail; and the low speed at which propellers generally run, is a means of making that sail more effective. We
have already seen, in the section on the cost of steam, that it generally requires twice the original quantity of fuel to
increase the speed from eight to ten knots per hour in either style of steamer. Now, it is a well-known fact that the
transatlantic propeller lines are on the average more than two knots per hour short of the speed of the side-wheels,
which makes their passages across the Atlantic from two to six days longer than by the mail packets. They thus
save from one half to two thirds of the fuel, and deducting its prime cost from the bill of expenses, they add to that
of receipts the freight on the cargo, which occupies the space of the coal saved. They consequently run on much
smaller expenses; but only when their speed is less than that of the side-wheels, and far too low for effective postal
service. Economy thus purchased at the expense of speed may do for freight, and enable propellers to derive some
Marine Engine," and who is considered excellent authority, and have from him the following reply, dated
Southampton, 19 Sept., 1857:
"With regard to the relative efficiency of the paddle-wheel and screw for full-powered mail steamers, I am
disposed to prefer the paddle-wheel for transatlantic steaming, in which the vessel has to contend with so much
rough weather and heavy sea, and the screw for the Mediterranean and the Pacific routes.
"For auxiliary steamers of any kind the screw has manifestly the advantage.
"With regard to the actual speed obtained from each mode of propulsion in vessels of the same power and form,
and with the propeller in its best trim, I am disposed to prefer the paddle-wheel, either in smooth water, or when
steaming head to wind, but in other conditions the screw." What he means by "other conditions," is evidently when
the screw is running with a fair wind, which is seldom, so as to use her sails. Bourne also states very clearly in two
places that the propeller is by no means so efficient in a sea-way, as a side-wheel steamer, and admits that when a
vessel is steaming at eleven or twelve knots per hour, the sails not only do not aid her, but frequently materially
retard her motion. (See Bourne, page 237.)
All of these authorities agree that the application of a given power produces about the same effect, whether
through the side-wheel or the screw; and if so, it is evident that the screw can not attain the same speed as the side-
wheel, without burning as much fuel, and having as costly and as heavy engines and boilers. Indeed, taking the
whole evidence together, it appears well settled by these authorities, that the screw is equal to the side-wheel only
in smooth water, and that, as a consequence of this distinction, it is not equal to it in general ocean navigation. It
has been seen that much of its power is lost when it contends with head-winds and seas, and that when it has
attained a fair average mail speed, the wind will help it very little, if any, under the most favorable circumstances.
It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that it would cost more to attain a high average mail speed with the propeller
than with the side-wheel. If in attaining this average mail speed the advantages are clearly in favor of the side-
wheel, there is no hope that we shall accomplish the mail service at cheaper rates than heretofore, as this agency
can not be introduced toward that end; for not only is the prime cost of the steamer the same, as also the
consumption of fuel per mile, but there are other and numerous disadvantages connected with the propeller, which
are wholly unknown to the side-wheel.
It is a well-known fact that propellers are compelled to be placed upon the docks three or four times as often as
side-wheels. The screw either breaks, and must be replaced by another, or it cuts the boxes out, or works the stern
of the vessel to pieces. Any one of these requires that the steamer shall be docked, however great the expense; and
as these accidents are constantly occurring in even the best constructed and best regulated propellers, it follows
that they must be constantly on the docks. This species of vessel being built necessarily narrower than the side-
wheel, it rolls more, and is found to be an exceedingly disagreeable passenger vessel. Propellers have become
deservedly unpopular the world over; and if it were possible for them to be faster than the side-wheel, it is hardly
probable that first-class passengers would even then go by them, as they are known to be so exceedingly
uncomfortable.
The propeller, I have before said, is erroneously supposed to run more cheaply than the side-wheel. I think that I
have shown that as a mail packet it will cost more to run it at a given speed. But there are certain cases in which it
does run more cheaply; these are, however, only where the speed is low, and the machinery not geared, and where,
as a consequence, sail can be used to more advantage than on a side-wheel. The economy is not the result of the
application of the power by the screw, as compared with the side-wheel, but of the sail alone; and this economy is
more or less, just as canvas is employed more or less in the propulsion. The screw is the better form of steamer for
using sail; and the low speed at which propellers generally run, is a means of making that sail more effective. We
have already seen, in the section on the cost of steam, that it generally requires twice the original quantity of fuel to
increase the speed from eight to ten knots per hour in either style of steamer. Now, it is a well-known fact that the
transatlantic propeller lines are on the average more than two knots per hour short of the speed of the side-wheels,
which makes their passages across the Atlantic from two to six days longer than by the mail packets. They thus
save from one half to two thirds of the fuel, and deducting its prime cost from the bill of expenses, they add to that
of receipts the freight on the cargo, which occupies the space of the coal saved. They consequently run on much
smaller expenses; but only when their speed is less than that of the side-wheels, and far too low for effective postal
service. Economy thus purchased at the expense of speed may do for freight, and enable propellers to derive some
Page 84
profits from certain cargoes; but it can never subserve the purposes of mails and passengers. It must alway be
recollected that the effective speed of the propeller is reduced just in the ratio of the greater economy as compared
with the side-wheel.
It thus appears that with any appreciable economy the propeller must be slower than the side-wheel; and that with
any considerable economy it can be but little faster than sail. It has, however, the advantage over sail of being
rather more reliable and punctual, and can make arrivals and departures rather more matters of certainty. This at
the same time secures to it a better class of freights as well as vast numbers of emigrants which together, enable it
to incur the extra expense over a sailing vessel. The cargo is less in the propeller than in the sail, as much of the
room is occupied by the engines, boilers, and fuel. Hence, the prices must be proportionally higher to meet the
deficit arising from the smaller quantity. But there are very few trades in which propellers can run as noticed on so
long a voyage as 3,000 to 4,000 miles; and these lie between a few countries in Europe and the ports of the United
States. Their support arises chiefly from the emigrant trade; as without this their freights would not on any known
lines enable them to run one month. And this is not simply an assumption of theory, but the experience of all the
European lines. I was recently told in England and France by many persons who had no interest or desire to
deceive me, that propeller stock was invariably a burthen to every body having any thing to do with it, and could
generally be bought at sixty to seventy cents on the dollar, while much of it would not bring half of its cost price.
They cited as an evidence the fact that no line of propellers is permanent, unless in some way connected with a
subsidized company, as in the case of the Cunard screws running between Liverpool and New-York. The Glasgow
line is also an exception, and is said to pay dividends. The screw lines are always hunting a home and a new trade.
(See views of Mr. Murray, page 111.)
The only way in which some lines can run is by getting their stock at half its value and thus having to pay the
interest on a smaller sum. The "General Screw Steam shipping Company" is an example. The Company had from
the first lost money, although they had nine fine steamers, and were compelled finally to close up and sell out. Mr.
Croskey, the United States Consul at Southampton, supposed that they might be put into a new trade and make a
living on a smaller capital stock; that is, if the new company should get them at half their value. The transfer was
made and the "European and American Steamship Company" was established. Some of the vessels were put into
the trade between Bremen and London, Southampton, and New-York; some between Antwerp and Brazil; and
some between Hamburg and Brazil. None of these lines have paid, except, perhaps, the New-York, which has had
large cargoes of emigrants; and Mr. Croskey freely acknowledges that the new Company would have been ruined
but for the Indian Revolt, which enabled him to charter five of the vessels to the Government at good prices, for
the conveyance of troops by way of the Cape of Good Hope to India. Had the lines on which they were running
been profitable they would never have been chartered to the Government. But like the whole propeller service of
the world, this Company took the chances; and it may be safely asserted that but for the opportunities which
vessels of this class find for chartering to the Government they could not live on their own enterprise three years.
The number of these vessels is now very unnecessarily large; and many of them have been built to supply labor to
the establishments, and for taking the chances of Government employment at high prices. Their largest
employment results from casualties rather than from the pursuit of legitimate trade. But the business is overdone,
even for the English market, when foreign war is rather the rule, and peace the exception. But few propellers are
now building; these few being small and intended for the coasting, or the short-line Continental trade, where they
will readily pay. (See page 42 for propeller stock; also pages 44 and 45 for the propeller coasting service.)
It does not materially alter the complexion of this question to say that propellers are generally constructed of iron.
There is not such a difference in their prime cost or their stowage capacity as to enable them to take the large
receipts necessary to their support; while certainly there is no advantage to be gained in speed from iron as a
material of construction. The iron propeller can be constructed cheaper than the wooden in Great Britain, because
of the great scarcity of timber and the large and redundant quantity of iron; and an iron vessel has some advantage
in being able to stow a larger cargo, from the fact that her sides and bottom are not so thick as those of wooden
vessels; but these considerations do not very materially affect the consumption of fuel, and the quantity necessary
to carry a ton of freight. Iron is probably a better material than wood for the construction of propellers, as the part
about the stern, where the screw works, can be made stronger, and as all iron vessels can be rather more readily
divided into water-tight compartments by bulkheads. Yet as a material of construction it offers no transcendent
advantages over the side-wheel for transatlantic navigation, while it is not probably so safe, or so comfortable for
passengers. Yet, it will be well for us to adopt the propeller largely in our coasting trade, and iron as the material of
its construction.
recollected that the effective speed of the propeller is reduced just in the ratio of the greater economy as compared
with the side-wheel.
It thus appears that with any appreciable economy the propeller must be slower than the side-wheel; and that with
any considerable economy it can be but little faster than sail. It has, however, the advantage over sail of being
rather more reliable and punctual, and can make arrivals and departures rather more matters of certainty. This at
the same time secures to it a better class of freights as well as vast numbers of emigrants which together, enable it
to incur the extra expense over a sailing vessel. The cargo is less in the propeller than in the sail, as much of the
room is occupied by the engines, boilers, and fuel. Hence, the prices must be proportionally higher to meet the
deficit arising from the smaller quantity. But there are very few trades in which propellers can run as noticed on so
long a voyage as 3,000 to 4,000 miles; and these lie between a few countries in Europe and the ports of the United
States. Their support arises chiefly from the emigrant trade; as without this their freights would not on any known
lines enable them to run one month. And this is not simply an assumption of theory, but the experience of all the
European lines. I was recently told in England and France by many persons who had no interest or desire to
deceive me, that propeller stock was invariably a burthen to every body having any thing to do with it, and could
generally be bought at sixty to seventy cents on the dollar, while much of it would not bring half of its cost price.
They cited as an evidence the fact that no line of propellers is permanent, unless in some way connected with a
subsidized company, as in the case of the Cunard screws running between Liverpool and New-York. The Glasgow
line is also an exception, and is said to pay dividends. The screw lines are always hunting a home and a new trade.
(See views of Mr. Murray, page 111.)
The only way in which some lines can run is by getting their stock at half its value and thus having to pay the
interest on a smaller sum. The "General Screw Steam shipping Company" is an example. The Company had from
the first lost money, although they had nine fine steamers, and were compelled finally to close up and sell out. Mr.
Croskey, the United States Consul at Southampton, supposed that they might be put into a new trade and make a
living on a smaller capital stock; that is, if the new company should get them at half their value. The transfer was
made and the "European and American Steamship Company" was established. Some of the vessels were put into
the trade between Bremen and London, Southampton, and New-York; some between Antwerp and Brazil; and
some between Hamburg and Brazil. None of these lines have paid, except, perhaps, the New-York, which has had
large cargoes of emigrants; and Mr. Croskey freely acknowledges that the new Company would have been ruined
but for the Indian Revolt, which enabled him to charter five of the vessels to the Government at good prices, for
the conveyance of troops by way of the Cape of Good Hope to India. Had the lines on which they were running
been profitable they would never have been chartered to the Government. But like the whole propeller service of
the world, this Company took the chances; and it may be safely asserted that but for the opportunities which
vessels of this class find for chartering to the Government they could not live on their own enterprise three years.
The number of these vessels is now very unnecessarily large; and many of them have been built to supply labor to
the establishments, and for taking the chances of Government employment at high prices. Their largest
employment results from casualties rather than from the pursuit of legitimate trade. But the business is overdone,
even for the English market, when foreign war is rather the rule, and peace the exception. But few propellers are
now building; these few being small and intended for the coasting, or the short-line Continental trade, where they
will readily pay. (See page 42 for propeller stock; also pages 44 and 45 for the propeller coasting service.)
It does not materially alter the complexion of this question to say that propellers are generally constructed of iron.
There is not such a difference in their prime cost or their stowage capacity as to enable them to take the large
receipts necessary to their support; while certainly there is no advantage to be gained in speed from iron as a
material of construction. The iron propeller can be constructed cheaper than the wooden in Great Britain, because
of the great scarcity of timber and the large and redundant quantity of iron; and an iron vessel has some advantage
in being able to stow a larger cargo, from the fact that her sides and bottom are not so thick as those of wooden
vessels; but these considerations do not very materially affect the consumption of fuel, and the quantity necessary
to carry a ton of freight. Iron is probably a better material than wood for the construction of propellers, as the part
about the stern, where the screw works, can be made stronger, and as all iron vessels can be rather more readily
divided into water-tight compartments by bulkheads. Yet as a material of construction it offers no transcendent
advantages over the side-wheel for transatlantic navigation, while it is not probably so safe, or so comfortable for
passengers. Yet, it will be well for us to adopt the propeller largely in our coasting trade, and iron as the material of
its construction.
Page 85
We have thus seen that to save fuel and carry freight, the speed of the propeller must be low; indeed very low, if it
is to live on its own receipts. It is therefore clearly impossible that with such comparatively low speed it should
carry the mail. Neither can it support itself except by this low speed. By running thus but a fraction faster than the
sailing vessel, it can command on a few prominent lines a large freight; but to give vessels of such speed a subsidy
for carrying the mails would be both to render the mail service inefficient, and to enable the propeller to compete
with the sailing lines of the country at very undue advantage, which would be an unfair discrimination against all
sailing interests. Should the propeller, like the side-wheel, run fast enough on the average trips of the year to carry
the mails, which would certainly be at the expense and abandonment of any considerable freighting business, then
the Government might with propriety pay for the mails, as these steamers would not injure the freighting business
of sailing vessels. The outcry by sail owners against steamers as competitors can not be against the mail packets;
for these carry but little freight; but against these slow screws which should be treated like all other freighting
vessels, notwithstanding the fact that some of their owners have had the impudence to propose them for the paid
mail service and to ask a subsidy from the Government, but the better to cripple the interests of sailing vessels. As
well might Government subsidize fast clippers, because they are a little faster than regular, ordinary sailers. When
the steamer runs with sufficient rapidity for the mails, the sailing ship has nothing to fear from competition, and
has all the benefits of the more rapid correspondence. Thus, Government must pay only where there is a fast mail,
whether it be in a side-wheel or propeller; otherwise it destroys individual competition and cripples private
enterprise.
If, as we have seen from all the facts regarding the expense of running steamers, individual enterprise can not
supply adequately rapid ocean postal facilities, and if such facilities are yet wholly indispensable to the commerce,
the people, and the Government, the only alternative presented is for the Government to pay for them, and to
require, as it has of all the American lines, such a speed as to prevent injurious competition to sailing vessels and
private enterprise. Much capital is made by certain ship owners out of what they call the undue discrimination of
subsidies against their vessels; but they can never lay this charge at the door of the fast and very expensive mail
packets, or elsewhere than upon the slow auxiliary propellers which any of them have a right to attempt to run, and
which the Government never did and never will subsidize. This is the source and the only source of all the vaunted
injurious effects of steam on the sailing stock of the country. It is a question with which the Government has
nothing to do, and which must be settled between propeller owners and sail owners themselves, and with
reference, perhaps, to the wishes of their customers. Mail steamers have enough to do to get money to pay their
coal, provision, repair, and innumerable extras bills, without wrangling over the freighting business. And, from all
this we conclude that the only means of the Government securing an adequate mail speed is by paying for it. (See
remarks of Committee on this subject, Paper E.)
is to live on its own receipts. It is therefore clearly impossible that with such comparatively low speed it should
carry the mail. Neither can it support itself except by this low speed. By running thus but a fraction faster than the
sailing vessel, it can command on a few prominent lines a large freight; but to give vessels of such speed a subsidy
for carrying the mails would be both to render the mail service inefficient, and to enable the propeller to compete
with the sailing lines of the country at very undue advantage, which would be an unfair discrimination against all
sailing interests. Should the propeller, like the side-wheel, run fast enough on the average trips of the year to carry
the mails, which would certainly be at the expense and abandonment of any considerable freighting business, then
the Government might with propriety pay for the mails, as these steamers would not injure the freighting business
of sailing vessels. The outcry by sail owners against steamers as competitors can not be against the mail packets;
for these carry but little freight; but against these slow screws which should be treated like all other freighting
vessels, notwithstanding the fact that some of their owners have had the impudence to propose them for the paid
mail service and to ask a subsidy from the Government, but the better to cripple the interests of sailing vessels. As
well might Government subsidize fast clippers, because they are a little faster than regular, ordinary sailers. When
the steamer runs with sufficient rapidity for the mails, the sailing ship has nothing to fear from competition, and
has all the benefits of the more rapid correspondence. Thus, Government must pay only where there is a fast mail,
whether it be in a side-wheel or propeller; otherwise it destroys individual competition and cripples private
enterprise.
If, as we have seen from all the facts regarding the expense of running steamers, individual enterprise can not
supply adequately rapid ocean postal facilities, and if such facilities are yet wholly indispensable to the commerce,
the people, and the Government, the only alternative presented is for the Government to pay for them, and to
require, as it has of all the American lines, such a speed as to prevent injurious competition to sailing vessels and
private enterprise. Much capital is made by certain ship owners out of what they call the undue discrimination of
subsidies against their vessels; but they can never lay this charge at the door of the fast and very expensive mail
packets, or elsewhere than upon the slow auxiliary propellers which any of them have a right to attempt to run, and
which the Government never did and never will subsidize. This is the source and the only source of all the vaunted
injurious effects of steam on the sailing stock of the country. It is a question with which the Government has
nothing to do, and which must be settled between propeller owners and sail owners themselves, and with
reference, perhaps, to the wishes of their customers. Mail steamers have enough to do to get money to pay their
coal, provision, repair, and innumerable extras bills, without wrangling over the freighting business. And, from all
this we conclude that the only means of the Government securing an adequate mail speed is by paying for it. (See
remarks of Committee on this subject, Paper E.)
Page 86
SECTION VII.
WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE?
resumé of the previous sections and arguments: it is the duty of the government to furnish rapid steam mails:
our people appreciate the importance of commerce, and of liberal postal facilities: the government is
established for the benefit of the people: it must foster their interests and develop their industry: the want of
such mails has caused the neglect of many profitable branches of industry: as a consequence we have lost
immense traffic: the european manufacturing system and ours: fields of trade naturally pertaining to us: our
almost systematic neglect of them: why is great britain's commerce so large: causes and their effects: her
west-india line receives a larger subsidy than all the foreign lines of the united states combined: indifference
shown by congress to many important fields of commerce: instances of mail facilities creating large trade: the
peninsular and oriental company's testimony: the british and brazilian trade: some deductions from the figures:
california shorn of half her glory: the american people not misers: they wish their own public treasure
expended for the benefit of their industry: our commercial classes complain that they are deprived of the
privilege of competing with other nations.
. Conceded (Section I.) that steam mails upon the ocean control the commerce and diplomacy of the world; that
they are essential to our commercial and producing country; that we have not established the ocean mail facilities
commensurate with our national ability and the demands of our commerce; and that we to-day are largely
dependent on, and tributary to our greatest commercial rival, Great Britain, for the postal facilities, which should
be purely national, American, and under our own exclusive control:
. Conceded (Section II.) that fast ocean mails are exceedingly desirable for our commerce, our defenses, our
diplomacy, the management of our squadrons, our national standing, and that they are demanded by our people at
large:
. Conceded (Section III.) that fast steamers alone can furnish rapid transport to the mails; that these steamers can
not rely on freights; that sailing vessels will ever carry staple freights at a much lower figure, and sufficiently
quickly; that while steam is eminently successful in the coasting trade, it can not possibly be so in the transatlantic
freighting business; and that the rapid transit of the mails and the slower and more deliberate transport of freight
is the law of nature:
. Conceded (Section IV.) that high, adequate mail speed is extremely costly, in the prime construction of vessels,
their repairs, and their more numerous employées; that the quantity of fuel consumed is enormous, and ruinous to
unaided private enterprise; and that this is clearly proven both by theory and indisputable facts as well as by the
concurrent testimony of the ablest writers on ocean steam navigation:
. Conceded (Section V.) that ocean mail steamers can not live on their own receipts; that neither the latest nor the
anticipated improvements in steam shipping promise any change in this fact; that self-support is not likely to be
attained by increasing the size of steamers; that the propelling power in fast steamers occupies all of the available
space not devoted to passengers and express freight; and that steamers must be fast to do successful mail and
profitable passenger service:
. Conceded (Section VI.) that sailing vessels can not successfully transport the mails; that the propeller can not
transport them as rapidly or more cheaply than side-wheel vessels; that with any considerable economy of fuel and
other running expenses, it is but little faster than the sailing vessel; that to patronize these slow vessels with the
mails the Government would unjustly discriminate against sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that we can
not in any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the transport of the mails; that individual enterprise can not
support fast steamers; and that not even American private enterprise can under any conditions furnish a
sufficiently rapid steam mail and passenger marine: then,
The inference is clear and unavoidable, and we come irresistibly to the conclusion, that it is the duty of the
Government to its people to establish and maintain an extensive, well-organized, and rapid steam mail marine, for
the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses, the character of the nation, and the public at large; and
as there is positively no other source of adequate and effective support, to pay liberally for the same out of any
funds in the national treasury, belonging to the enterprising, liberal, and enlightened people of the Republic. There
WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE?
resumé of the previous sections and arguments: it is the duty of the government to furnish rapid steam mails:
our people appreciate the importance of commerce, and of liberal postal facilities: the government is
established for the benefit of the people: it must foster their interests and develop their industry: the want of
such mails has caused the neglect of many profitable branches of industry: as a consequence we have lost
immense traffic: the european manufacturing system and ours: fields of trade naturally pertaining to us: our
almost systematic neglect of them: why is great britain's commerce so large: causes and their effects: her
west-india line receives a larger subsidy than all the foreign lines of the united states combined: indifference
shown by congress to many important fields of commerce: instances of mail facilities creating large trade: the
peninsular and oriental company's testimony: the british and brazilian trade: some deductions from the figures:
california shorn of half her glory: the american people not misers: they wish their own public treasure
expended for the benefit of their industry: our commercial classes complain that they are deprived of the
privilege of competing with other nations.
. Conceded (Section I.) that steam mails upon the ocean control the commerce and diplomacy of the world; that
they are essential to our commercial and producing country; that we have not established the ocean mail facilities
commensurate with our national ability and the demands of our commerce; and that we to-day are largely
dependent on, and tributary to our greatest commercial rival, Great Britain, for the postal facilities, which should
be purely national, American, and under our own exclusive control:
. Conceded (Section II.) that fast ocean mails are exceedingly desirable for our commerce, our defenses, our
diplomacy, the management of our squadrons, our national standing, and that they are demanded by our people at
large:
. Conceded (Section III.) that fast steamers alone can furnish rapid transport to the mails; that these steamers can
not rely on freights; that sailing vessels will ever carry staple freights at a much lower figure, and sufficiently
quickly; that while steam is eminently successful in the coasting trade, it can not possibly be so in the transatlantic
freighting business; and that the rapid transit of the mails and the slower and more deliberate transport of freight
is the law of nature:
. Conceded (Section IV.) that high, adequate mail speed is extremely costly, in the prime construction of vessels,
their repairs, and their more numerous employées; that the quantity of fuel consumed is enormous, and ruinous to
unaided private enterprise; and that this is clearly proven both by theory and indisputable facts as well as by the
concurrent testimony of the ablest writers on ocean steam navigation:
. Conceded (Section V.) that ocean mail steamers can not live on their own receipts; that neither the latest nor the
anticipated improvements in steam shipping promise any change in this fact; that self-support is not likely to be
attained by increasing the size of steamers; that the propelling power in fast steamers occupies all of the available
space not devoted to passengers and express freight; and that steamers must be fast to do successful mail and
profitable passenger service:
. Conceded (Section VI.) that sailing vessels can not successfully transport the mails; that the propeller can not
transport them as rapidly or more cheaply than side-wheel vessels; that with any considerable economy of fuel and
other running expenses, it is but little faster than the sailing vessel; that to patronize these slow vessels with the
mails the Government would unjustly discriminate against sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that we can
not in any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the transport of the mails; that individual enterprise can not
support fast steamers; and that not even American private enterprise can under any conditions furnish a
sufficiently rapid steam mail and passenger marine: then,
The inference is clear and unavoidable, and we come irresistibly to the conclusion, that it is the duty of the
Government to its people to establish and maintain an extensive, well-organized, and rapid steam mail marine, for
the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses, the character of the nation, and the public at large; and
as there is positively no other source of adequate and effective support, to pay liberally for the same out of any
funds in the national treasury, belonging to the enterprising, liberal, and enlightened people of the Republic. There
Page 87
is no clearer duty of the Legislative and Executive Government to the industrious people of the country than the
establishment of liberal, large, and ready postal facilities, for the better and more successful conduct of that
industry, whether those facilities be upon land or upon the sea. It is sometimes difficult to extend our vision to any
other sphere than that in which we move and have our experiences; and thus there are many persons who, while
they would revolt at the idea that the Government should refuse to run four-horse coaches to some little
unimportant country town, would be wholly unable to grasp the great commercial world and the wide oceans over
which their own products are to float, and from whose trade the Government derives the large duties which prevent
these same persons having to pay direct taxes. They do not understand the necessity of commerce, to even their
own prosperity, or of the innumerable steam mail lines which must convey the correspondence essential to the safe
and proper conduct of that commerce. But the great mass of the American people understand these questions,
understand the reflex influences of all such facilities, and knowing how essential they are to the proper
development of enterprise and industry in whatever channel or field, boldly claim it as a right that easy postal
communication shall be afforded them as well upon the high seas as upon the interior land routes.
It is generally admitted that the government of a country is established for the benefit of the people; and
constitutions conflicting with this purpose are simply subversive of justice and liberty. If labor is a thing so
desirable and so noble in a people that the protection of its rewards in the form of property becomes one of the
highest attributes of good government, then it is equally an indisputable attribute of that protecting and fostering
government to afford those facilities to labor, which experience shows that it needs, and which the people can not
attain in their individual capacity, or without the intervention of the government. It is idle for a government to say
to the people that they are free, when it denies to them the ordinarily approved means of making and conserving
wealth. The common experience of mankind points to commerce as the next great means to production in creating
national and individual wealth. It equally shows us that foreign commerce can not flourish without liberal foreign
mail facilities, and the means of ready transit of persons, papers, and specie. It also clearly indicates that the most
successful means of accomplishing this, is the employment of subsidized national mail steamships. It therefore
becomes obviously the duty of a paternal government to an industrious, enterprising, producing, and trading
people, to give them the rapid ocean steam mails necessary to the profitable prosecution of their industry.
We have for many years neglected many important fields of foreign trade, and many profitable branches of
industry and art, which we could easily have nurtured into sources of income and wealth, by adopting the foreign
mail system, so wisely introduced and extended by Great Britain. And in the absence of such efforts on our part, a
large and remunerative traffic has been swept from us, and this suicidal neglect has been the means of our
subordination to so many controlling foreign influences. We are at this very hour commercially enslaved by
England, France, Brazil, and the East. How is it that the trade of the world is in the hands of Great Britain; that she
absorbs most of every nation's raw material; and that she and France supply the world with ten thousand articles of
industry, that should furnish work to our manufacturers, and freight to our ships? There are some who will say that
it is because of her manufacturing system. Grant it. But how did she establish that imperious, and overshadowing,
and powerful system, and how does she keep it up? Her energetic people have ever had the fostering care of her
government. Their steam mail system has been established for twenty-four years. It has furnished the people with
the means of easy transport, rapid correspondence, the remittance of specie, and the shipment of light
manufactured goods to every corner of the world; it has invited foreigners from every land to her shores and her
markets; and it has been the means of throwing the raw material of the whole world into the lap of the British
manufacturer and artisan, and enabling them thus to control the markets in every land.
But we can get along, it is said, without such a manufacturing system and such an ubiquity of trade. This is a
mistake. The productions of our soil are not sufficiently indispensable to the outer world to bring us all of the
money we need for importing the millions of foreign follies, to which our people have become attached. It is not
right or best for us that while our "Lowell Drillings" stand preëminent over the world, we should so far neglect the
Brazilian, La Platan, New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and East-Indian trade, that Manchester shall continue, as she
now does, to manufacture an inferior fabric, post it off by her steamers, forestall the market, and cheat us out of
our profits; and that, by means of the reputation which our skill has produced. And a few more crises like the one
through which we have just begun to pass, will open our eyes to the necessity of doing something ourselves to
make money, and show that foreign trade in every form, and the sale of every species of product known to the
industry of a skillful people, must be watched with jealous national and individual care, and nurtured as we would
nurture a young and tender child. There are many fields of trade which may be said to pertain naturally to this
country, and which we have as wholly neglected and yielded to Great Britain, as if she had a divine right to the
establishment of liberal, large, and ready postal facilities, for the better and more successful conduct of that
industry, whether those facilities be upon land or upon the sea. It is sometimes difficult to extend our vision to any
other sphere than that in which we move and have our experiences; and thus there are many persons who, while
they would revolt at the idea that the Government should refuse to run four-horse coaches to some little
unimportant country town, would be wholly unable to grasp the great commercial world and the wide oceans over
which their own products are to float, and from whose trade the Government derives the large duties which prevent
these same persons having to pay direct taxes. They do not understand the necessity of commerce, to even their
own prosperity, or of the innumerable steam mail lines which must convey the correspondence essential to the safe
and proper conduct of that commerce. But the great mass of the American people understand these questions,
understand the reflex influences of all such facilities, and knowing how essential they are to the proper
development of enterprise and industry in whatever channel or field, boldly claim it as a right that easy postal
communication shall be afforded them as well upon the high seas as upon the interior land routes.
It is generally admitted that the government of a country is established for the benefit of the people; and
constitutions conflicting with this purpose are simply subversive of justice and liberty. If labor is a thing so
desirable and so noble in a people that the protection of its rewards in the form of property becomes one of the
highest attributes of good government, then it is equally an indisputable attribute of that protecting and fostering
government to afford those facilities to labor, which experience shows that it needs, and which the people can not
attain in their individual capacity, or without the intervention of the government. It is idle for a government to say
to the people that they are free, when it denies to them the ordinarily approved means of making and conserving
wealth. The common experience of mankind points to commerce as the next great means to production in creating
national and individual wealth. It equally shows us that foreign commerce can not flourish without liberal foreign
mail facilities, and the means of ready transit of persons, papers, and specie. It also clearly indicates that the most
successful means of accomplishing this, is the employment of subsidized national mail steamships. It therefore
becomes obviously the duty of a paternal government to an industrious, enterprising, producing, and trading
people, to give them the rapid ocean steam mails necessary to the profitable prosecution of their industry.
We have for many years neglected many important fields of foreign trade, and many profitable branches of
industry and art, which we could easily have nurtured into sources of income and wealth, by adopting the foreign
mail system, so wisely introduced and extended by Great Britain. And in the absence of such efforts on our part, a
large and remunerative traffic has been swept from us, and this suicidal neglect has been the means of our
subordination to so many controlling foreign influences. We are at this very hour commercially enslaved by
England, France, Brazil, and the East. How is it that the trade of the world is in the hands of Great Britain; that she
absorbs most of every nation's raw material; and that she and France supply the world with ten thousand articles of
industry, that should furnish work to our manufacturers, and freight to our ships? There are some who will say that
it is because of her manufacturing system. Grant it. But how did she establish that imperious, and overshadowing,
and powerful system, and how does she keep it up? Her energetic people have ever had the fostering care of her
government. Their steam mail system has been established for twenty-four years. It has furnished the people with
the means of easy transport, rapid correspondence, the remittance of specie, and the shipment of light
manufactured goods to every corner of the world; it has invited foreigners from every land to her shores and her
markets; and it has been the means of throwing the raw material of the whole world into the lap of the British
manufacturer and artisan, and enabling them thus to control the markets in every land.
But we can get along, it is said, without such a manufacturing system and such an ubiquity of trade. This is a
mistake. The productions of our soil are not sufficiently indispensable to the outer world to bring us all of the
money we need for importing the millions of foreign follies, to which our people have become attached. It is not
right or best for us that while our "Lowell Drillings" stand preëminent over the world, we should so far neglect the
Brazilian, La Platan, New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and East-Indian trade, that Manchester shall continue, as she
now does, to manufacture an inferior fabric, post it off by her steamers, forestall the market, and cheat us out of
our profits; and that, by means of the reputation which our skill has produced. And a few more crises like the one
through which we have just begun to pass, will open our eyes to the necessity of doing something ourselves to
make money, and show that foreign trade in every form, and the sale of every species of product known to the
industry of a skillful people, must be watched with jealous national and individual care, and nurtured as we would
nurture a young and tender child. There are many fields of trade which may be said to pertain naturally to this
country, and which we have as wholly neglected and yielded to Great Britain, as if she had a divine right to the
Page 88
monopoly of the entire commerce of the world. No one can believe that the trade of the islands which gem the
Carribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, or the great Spanish Main, or the Guianas, or the Orinoco and Amazon, or
the extended coast of Brazil, the Platan Republics, or Mexico, and the Central American States lying just at our
door, belongs naturally to Europe, or that their productions should be transported in European ships, or that their
supplies come naturally five thousand miles across the ocean, rather than go a few hundred miles from our own
shores, in our own ships, and for the benefit of our own merchants and producers. Yet, such is the impression
which our apathy of effort in those regions would produce. We have acted as if our people had no right of
information concerning the West-Indies and South-America, until it had gone to Europe and been emasculated of
all its virtues.
The same thing is true of the Pacific South-American, the Chinese, and the East-Indian trade. That of the Pacific
coast is not half so far from us, as it is from Europe; that of China, and the East-Indies, and Australia, is by many
thousand miles nearer to us; and yet the greater portion of the commerce of all three of those great fields is
triumphantly borne off by Great Britain alone. And why is all this? Why is her foreign trade sixteen hundred
millions of dollars per year, while ours is only seven hundred millions? Causes can not fail to produce their effects;
and prime causes, however little understood in their half obscure workings, are yet made manifest as the sun at
noon-day by effects so brilliant and important as these. Here, as ever, the tree is known by its fruits. The tree of
knowledge, of British wisdom, "whose mortal taste brought death into our world," our Western world of
commerce, "with loss of Eden," and many a fair paradise of enterprise and effort, has filled the bleak little islands
of Britain with the golden fruits of every clime, and scattered broadcast among its people the rich ambrosia of
foreign commerce. When it was necessary to command the trade of the West-Indies, Central America, and Mexico,
lying at our southern door, she established the Royal Steam Packet service with thirteen lines and twenty steamers,
and paid it for the first ten years £240,000, and for the present twelve years £270,000 per annum. In addition to this
she pays £25,000 per annum for continuing the same lines down the west coast of South-America to Valparaiso,
and contracts to pay the Royal Mail Company an annual addition of £75,000 in the event of coal, freight,
insurance, etc., being at anytime higher than they were at the date of the contract in 1850. This aggregate sum of
£295,000, or $1,475,000, to say nothing of the increased allowance of £75,000 probably now paid to this one
branch alone of the British service, is considerably greater than that paid for the entire foreign mail service of the
United States.
Now, it is a very extraordinary fact that, with such a field of commerce lying along the sunny side of our republic,
and with such an array of facilities for converting it into European channels, our Government has done literally
nothing to protect the rights of its citizens and give them the means, which they do not now possess, of a fair
competition with other countries for this rich and remunerative trade. Yet such is the fact; all of the petitions and
memorials of the seaboard cities to the contrary notwithstanding. The same is the case with the Pacific and East-
India trade before noticed. While we have a noble chain of communication between the Eastern States and
California and Oregon, which is manifestly essential to the integrity of the Union and the continued possession of
our rich Western territory; while California is admirably situated to command the trade of those vast regions and
concentrate it in the United States; while the British have several lines to China, the Indies, Australia, and Southern
as well as Western Africa; and while our citizens have petitioned Congress year after year for even the most
limited steam mail facilities to those regions, which could be afforded at the smallest price, it is truly astonishing
that these facts and petitions have hitherto been treated with contempt, and almost ruled out of Congress as soon as
presented. Such has been the course of action that, instead of fostering foreign commerce and encouraging the
enterprise and industry of the people, the Government has really repressed that enterprise, and practically
commanded the intelligent commercial classes of this country to look upon foreign trade as forbidden fruit which it
was never intended should be grown upon our soil.
It is not to be disputed that foreign mail steamers, by creating almost unlimited facilities for the conduct of trade,
greatly increase the commerce of the nation with the countries to which they run. The evidences of this position are
patent all around us, and too evident to need recital. The growth of our trade with Germany, France, Switzerland,
and Great Britain since the establishment of the Bremen, Havre, and Liverpool lines of steamers has been
unprecedented in the history of our commerce. That with California has sprung up as by magic at the touch of
steam, and has assumed a magnitude and permanence in eight years which but for the steam mail and passenger
accommodations created, could not have been developed under thirty years. The mail accommodations have
wholly transformed our commerce with Havana and Cuba, until they are wrested from foreign commercial
dominion, as reason suggests that they must ere long be from foreign political thraldom. As well might Europe
Carribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, or the great Spanish Main, or the Guianas, or the Orinoco and Amazon, or
the extended coast of Brazil, the Platan Republics, or Mexico, and the Central American States lying just at our
door, belongs naturally to Europe, or that their productions should be transported in European ships, or that their
supplies come naturally five thousand miles across the ocean, rather than go a few hundred miles from our own
shores, in our own ships, and for the benefit of our own merchants and producers. Yet, such is the impression
which our apathy of effort in those regions would produce. We have acted as if our people had no right of
information concerning the West-Indies and South-America, until it had gone to Europe and been emasculated of
all its virtues.
The same thing is true of the Pacific South-American, the Chinese, and the East-Indian trade. That of the Pacific
coast is not half so far from us, as it is from Europe; that of China, and the East-Indies, and Australia, is by many
thousand miles nearer to us; and yet the greater portion of the commerce of all three of those great fields is
triumphantly borne off by Great Britain alone. And why is all this? Why is her foreign trade sixteen hundred
millions of dollars per year, while ours is only seven hundred millions? Causes can not fail to produce their effects;
and prime causes, however little understood in their half obscure workings, are yet made manifest as the sun at
noon-day by effects so brilliant and important as these. Here, as ever, the tree is known by its fruits. The tree of
knowledge, of British wisdom, "whose mortal taste brought death into our world," our Western world of
commerce, "with loss of Eden," and many a fair paradise of enterprise and effort, has filled the bleak little islands
of Britain with the golden fruits of every clime, and scattered broadcast among its people the rich ambrosia of
foreign commerce. When it was necessary to command the trade of the West-Indies, Central America, and Mexico,
lying at our southern door, she established the Royal Steam Packet service with thirteen lines and twenty steamers,
and paid it for the first ten years £240,000, and for the present twelve years £270,000 per annum. In addition to this
she pays £25,000 per annum for continuing the same lines down the west coast of South-America to Valparaiso,
and contracts to pay the Royal Mail Company an annual addition of £75,000 in the event of coal, freight,
insurance, etc., being at anytime higher than they were at the date of the contract in 1850. This aggregate sum of
£295,000, or $1,475,000, to say nothing of the increased allowance of £75,000 probably now paid to this one
branch alone of the British service, is considerably greater than that paid for the entire foreign mail service of the
United States.
Now, it is a very extraordinary fact that, with such a field of commerce lying along the sunny side of our republic,
and with such an array of facilities for converting it into European channels, our Government has done literally
nothing to protect the rights of its citizens and give them the means, which they do not now possess, of a fair
competition with other countries for this rich and remunerative trade. Yet such is the fact; all of the petitions and
memorials of the seaboard cities to the contrary notwithstanding. The same is the case with the Pacific and East-
India trade before noticed. While we have a noble chain of communication between the Eastern States and
California and Oregon, which is manifestly essential to the integrity of the Union and the continued possession of
our rich Western territory; while California is admirably situated to command the trade of those vast regions and
concentrate it in the United States; while the British have several lines to China, the Indies, Australia, and Southern
as well as Western Africa; and while our citizens have petitioned Congress year after year for even the most
limited steam mail facilities to those regions, which could be afforded at the smallest price, it is truly astonishing
that these facts and petitions have hitherto been treated with contempt, and almost ruled out of Congress as soon as
presented. Such has been the course of action that, instead of fostering foreign commerce and encouraging the
enterprise and industry of the people, the Government has really repressed that enterprise, and practically
commanded the intelligent commercial classes of this country to look upon foreign trade as forbidden fruit which it
was never intended should be grown upon our soil.
It is not to be disputed that foreign mail steamers, by creating almost unlimited facilities for the conduct of trade,
greatly increase the commerce of the nation with the countries to which they run. The evidences of this position are
patent all around us, and too evident to need recital. The growth of our trade with Germany, France, Switzerland,
and Great Britain since the establishment of the Bremen, Havre, and Liverpool lines of steamers has been
unprecedented in the history of our commerce. That with California has sprung up as by magic at the touch of
steam, and has assumed a magnitude and permanence in eight years which but for the steam mail and passenger
accommodations created, could not have been developed under thirty years. The mail accommodations have
wholly transformed our commerce with Havana and Cuba, until they are wrested from foreign commercial
dominion, as reason suggests that they must ere long be from foreign political thraldom. As well might Europe
Page 89
attempt to attach the little island of Nantucket to some of her own dynasties as to deprive the United States of the
control of the trade of Cuba so long as her steam lines are continued to that island.
Mr. Anderson, the Managing Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, recently testified before a
Committee of the House of Commons, that, "the advantages of the communication (between England and
Australia) should not be estimated merely by the postage. After steam communication to Constantinople and the
Levant was opened, our exports to those quarters increased by £1,200,000 a year. The actual value of goods
exported from Southampton alone, last year, (1848-9,) by those steamers is nearly £1,000,000 sterling. Greek
merchants state that the certainty and rapidity of communication enable them to turn their capital over so much
quicker. Forty new Greek establishments have been formed in this country since steam communication was
established. The imports in that trade, fine raw materials, silk, goats' hair, etc., came here to be manufactured.
Supposing the trade to increase one million, and wages amount to £600,000, calculating taxes at 20 per cent., an
income of revenue of £120,000 would result from steam communication."
I am prepared to speak from my own observation, and from the reliable statistics of the Brazilian Government,
from the pen of the late Prime Minister, the Marquis of Paraná, a few facts of the same nature relative to the trade
between Great Britain and the Brazilian Empire. In a paper which I prepared for the New-York Historical Society,
and published in "Brazil and the Brazilians," Philadelphia, Childs & Peterson, I said, at page 618, in speaking of
the trade of Great Britain:
"From 1840 to 1850 her total imports from Brazil made no increase. In 1853, they had advanced one hundred and
fifty per cent. on 1848; and, in 1855, they had advanced over 1848—or the average of the ten years noticed—about
three hundred per cent. This, however, it must be recollected, was in coffee, for reëxportation; a trade which was
lost to our merchants and to our shipping. Her total exports to Brazil from 1840 to 1850 were stationary at about
two and a half million pounds sterling annually. In 1851—the first year after steam by the Royal Mail Company—
they advanced forty per cent.; and, in 1854, they had advanced one hundred and two per cent. on 1850. Thus, her
exports have doubled in five years, from a stationary point before the establishment of steam mail facilities;
whereas ours have been thirteen years in making the same increase. The total trade between Brazil and Great
Britain has increased in an unprecedented ratio. The combined British imports and exports, up to 1850, averaged
£3,645,833 annually; but, in 1855, these had reached £8,162,455. Thus, the British trade increased two hundred
and twenty-five per cent. in five years after the first line of steamers was established to Brazil."
In the analysis of the tables presenting these facts I had occasion to make the following deductions, page 619:
"We see, from a generalization and combination of these tables and analyses, that our greatest advance in the
Brazilian trade has arisen from imports instead of exports; whereas the trade of Great Britain has advanced in both;
and particularly in her exports, which were already large; the tendency being to enrich Great Britain and to
impoverish us: that until 1850 her exports were stationary, while ours were increasing; due, doubtless, to the
superiority of our clipper ships at that period, which placed us much nearer than England to Brazil: that she is now
taking the coffee-trade away from us, and giving it to her own and other European merchants and shipping: that
she is rivalling us in the rubber-trade; wholly distancing us in that of manufactures: and that from 1850 to 1855 she
has doubled a large trade of profitable exports, and increased her aggregate imports and exports two hundred and
twenty-five per cent.; whereas it has taken us thirteen years to double a small trade, composed mostly of imports: it
being evident that, with equal facilities, we could outstrip Great Britain in nearly all the elements of this Brazil
trade, as we were doing for the ten years from 1840 to 1850.
"It will hardly be necessary to suggest to the wise and reflecting merchant or statesman the evident causes
producing this startling effect. It is the effect of steamship mail and passenger facilities, so well understood by the
wise and forecasting British statesmen who established the Southampton, Brazil, and La Plata lines; not as a means
of giving revenue to the General Post-Office, but of encouraging foreign trade and stimulating British industry. If
England by steam has overtaken and neutralized our clippers and embarrassed our trade, then we have only to
employ the same agent, and, from geographical advantages, we feel assured that we will soon surpass her as
certainly, and even more effectually, than she has us. She sweeps our seas, and we offer her no resistance or
competition. Not satisfied with the Royal Mail lines, it is reported that she is making a contract with Mr. Cunard to
run another line along by the side of the Royal Mail, from Liverpool to Aspinwall, and from Panamá to the East-
Indies and China. She gains in these seas an invaluable trade, because she employs the proper means for its
attainment and promotion, while we do not. Hence, although much farther off she is practically much nearer.
control of the trade of Cuba so long as her steam lines are continued to that island.
Mr. Anderson, the Managing Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, recently testified before a
Committee of the House of Commons, that, "the advantages of the communication (between England and
Australia) should not be estimated merely by the postage. After steam communication to Constantinople and the
Levant was opened, our exports to those quarters increased by £1,200,000 a year. The actual value of goods
exported from Southampton alone, last year, (1848-9,) by those steamers is nearly £1,000,000 sterling. Greek
merchants state that the certainty and rapidity of communication enable them to turn their capital over so much
quicker. Forty new Greek establishments have been formed in this country since steam communication was
established. The imports in that trade, fine raw materials, silk, goats' hair, etc., came here to be manufactured.
Supposing the trade to increase one million, and wages amount to £600,000, calculating taxes at 20 per cent., an
income of revenue of £120,000 would result from steam communication."
I am prepared to speak from my own observation, and from the reliable statistics of the Brazilian Government,
from the pen of the late Prime Minister, the Marquis of Paraná, a few facts of the same nature relative to the trade
between Great Britain and the Brazilian Empire. In a paper which I prepared for the New-York Historical Society,
and published in "Brazil and the Brazilians," Philadelphia, Childs & Peterson, I said, at page 618, in speaking of
the trade of Great Britain:
"From 1840 to 1850 her total imports from Brazil made no increase. In 1853, they had advanced one hundred and
fifty per cent. on 1848; and, in 1855, they had advanced over 1848—or the average of the ten years noticed—about
three hundred per cent. This, however, it must be recollected, was in coffee, for reëxportation; a trade which was
lost to our merchants and to our shipping. Her total exports to Brazil from 1840 to 1850 were stationary at about
two and a half million pounds sterling annually. In 1851—the first year after steam by the Royal Mail Company—
they advanced forty per cent.; and, in 1854, they had advanced one hundred and two per cent. on 1850. Thus, her
exports have doubled in five years, from a stationary point before the establishment of steam mail facilities;
whereas ours have been thirteen years in making the same increase. The total trade between Brazil and Great
Britain has increased in an unprecedented ratio. The combined British imports and exports, up to 1850, averaged
£3,645,833 annually; but, in 1855, these had reached £8,162,455. Thus, the British trade increased two hundred
and twenty-five per cent. in five years after the first line of steamers was established to Brazil."
In the analysis of the tables presenting these facts I had occasion to make the following deductions, page 619:
"We see, from a generalization and combination of these tables and analyses, that our greatest advance in the
Brazilian trade has arisen from imports instead of exports; whereas the trade of Great Britain has advanced in both;
and particularly in her exports, which were already large; the tendency being to enrich Great Britain and to
impoverish us: that until 1850 her exports were stationary, while ours were increasing; due, doubtless, to the
superiority of our clipper ships at that period, which placed us much nearer than England to Brazil: that she is now
taking the coffee-trade away from us, and giving it to her own and other European merchants and shipping: that
she is rivalling us in the rubber-trade; wholly distancing us in that of manufactures: and that from 1850 to 1855 she
has doubled a large trade of profitable exports, and increased her aggregate imports and exports two hundred and
twenty-five per cent.; whereas it has taken us thirteen years to double a small trade, composed mostly of imports: it
being evident that, with equal facilities, we could outstrip Great Britain in nearly all the elements of this Brazil
trade, as we were doing for the ten years from 1840 to 1850.
"It will hardly be necessary to suggest to the wise and reflecting merchant or statesman the evident causes
producing this startling effect. It is the effect of steamship mail and passenger facilities, so well understood by the
wise and forecasting British statesmen who established the Southampton, Brazil, and La Plata lines; not as a means
of giving revenue to the General Post-Office, but of encouraging foreign trade and stimulating British industry. If
England by steam has overtaken and neutralized our clippers and embarrassed our trade, then we have only to
employ the same agent, and, from geographical advantages, we feel assured that we will soon surpass her as
certainly, and even more effectually, than she has us. She sweeps our seas, and we offer her no resistance or
competition. Not satisfied with the Royal Mail lines, it is reported that she is making a contract with Mr. Cunard to
run another line along by the side of the Royal Mail, from Liverpool to Aspinwall, and from Panamá to the East-
Indies and China. She gains in these seas an invaluable trade, because she employs the proper means for its
attainment and promotion, while we do not. Hence, although much farther off she is practically much nearer.
Page 90
Suppose that Great Britain had no steamers to the great sea at her threshold, the Mediterranean; and we had the
enterprise to run a great trunk-line to Gibraltar and Malta, and nine branches from these termini to all the great
points of commerce in Mediterranean Europe, Asia, and Africa. Would we not soon command the trade of all
Southern Europe, of Western Asia, and of Africa? But we find her wisely occupying her own territory, and that it is
impossible for us to get possession. If we had been there, she would soon have given us competition. But Great
Britain did not wait for competition to urge her to her duty to her people. She could easily have continued the trade
already possessed; but she could enlarge and invigorate it by steam, and she did it; not from outside pressure, but
for the advantages which it always presents per se. For the same reason we should have established steam to the
West-Indies, Brazil, the Spanish Main, and La Plata long since; to foster a trade naturally ours, but practically
another's. It is preeminently necessary now when steam, under the system of Great Britain, is ruining our trade;
whereas, by a similar process, we could reëstablish ours, if not paralyze theirs. Neutrality is impossible.
Indifference to the present posture of affairs only leads to the ruin of our interests. We must advance and contend
with Great Britain and Europe step by step, and employ the means of which we are generally so boastful, or we
will be forced to retreat from the field, and be harassed into ignominious submission."
As in the case of Brazil and La Plata so is it in that of the Pacific South-American States, and the great fields of
Australia, China, and the East-Indies generally, as before noticed. The trade of Great Britain with those regions has
gone on at a rate of progression truly astonishing. Ours has continued just as much behind it as the slow and
uncertain sailing vessel is behind the rapid and reliable mail steamer. Our Pacific possessions have been shorn of
half their glory and power by the refusal of those steam aids which would by the present time have converted half
the commerce of the fields mentioned into the new channels of American enterprise and transport. The injustice
has operated equally against the people of California and Oregon, and against ourselves of the East; while there is
no good and valid reason for thus making the Pacific coast the ultima thule of civilized, steam enterprise. The
people of the United States, of whatever class, are far from being misers. They do not desire an economy of two or
three millions of dollars per year, which would give them great opportunities of obtaining wealth and power,
merely that the sum so economized may be squandered, with twenty or thirty millions more, on schemes of
doubtful expediency, and of no real or pressing necessity. They do not, indeed, ask that these mail accommodations
may be paid for simply because much money is uselessly otherwise spent; but because these accommodations are
necessary to themselves, to the development of their enterprise and labor, and to the general good of all the active
and industrial, and, consequently, all of the worthy classes. It is a question of little importance to the great people
of this country, whether the Government expends forty millions per year or eighty millions. But it would be a
delightful consolation to them to know that while they might be paying ten, twenty, or thirty millions per year
more than strictly necessary, three or four millions of it at least were so appropriated as to better enable them to
pay the large general tax for the aggregate sum. No one hears any complaint regarding the sum necessary to
support the General Government, except by those in remote districts, who have but an infinitesimal interest
involved, but an imaginary part of the sum to pay, and who, producing but little, and having nothing to do, assume
the right to manage the affairs of those who really have something at stake. The American people are willing and
anxious that their money shall be expended for their own benefit, for the benefit of those who are to come after
them, and for the glory of our great country.
The many instances of our dereliction in the establishment of steam mail facilities, and the failure to establish
locomotive accommodations for our merchants and other business classes call loudly for a change in our affairs,
and the establishment of a national steam policy in the place of the accidental and irregular support hitherto given
to foreign steam enterprise. The nation demands the means of competing with other nations. We have lost much of
the trade of the world without it. The commercial men of this country complain bitterly that the Government gives
them no facilities for conducting our trade or cultivating the large fields of enterprise successfully which I have
named, and competing, on fair terms, with foreign merchants. They see the West-Indies, the Spanish-American
Republics, Brazil, Central America, and Mexico, lying right at our southern door, and the whole Pacific coast, the
East-Indies, China, the Mauritius, Australia, and the Pacific Islands but half as far from California as from
England, all much nearer to us than to Great Britain and other European countries, and offering us a trade which
large as it necessarily is to-day, is yet destined within the coming generation to transcend that of all other portions
of the globe combined, in extent, in richness, and in the profits which it will yield. The capacity of these great
fields for development and expansion is indefinite and almost boundless. There is no doubt that an American trade
could be developed in those regions within the next thirty years whose opulence and magnificence would rival and
far surpass our entire commerce of the world at the present time, and give to our nation a riches and a power which
would enable it to shape the destinies of the entire civilized world.
enterprise to run a great trunk-line to Gibraltar and Malta, and nine branches from these termini to all the great
points of commerce in Mediterranean Europe, Asia, and Africa. Would we not soon command the trade of all
Southern Europe, of Western Asia, and of Africa? But we find her wisely occupying her own territory, and that it is
impossible for us to get possession. If we had been there, she would soon have given us competition. But Great
Britain did not wait for competition to urge her to her duty to her people. She could easily have continued the trade
already possessed; but she could enlarge and invigorate it by steam, and she did it; not from outside pressure, but
for the advantages which it always presents per se. For the same reason we should have established steam to the
West-Indies, Brazil, the Spanish Main, and La Plata long since; to foster a trade naturally ours, but practically
another's. It is preeminently necessary now when steam, under the system of Great Britain, is ruining our trade;
whereas, by a similar process, we could reëstablish ours, if not paralyze theirs. Neutrality is impossible.
Indifference to the present posture of affairs only leads to the ruin of our interests. We must advance and contend
with Great Britain and Europe step by step, and employ the means of which we are generally so boastful, or we
will be forced to retreat from the field, and be harassed into ignominious submission."
As in the case of Brazil and La Plata so is it in that of the Pacific South-American States, and the great fields of
Australia, China, and the East-Indies generally, as before noticed. The trade of Great Britain with those regions has
gone on at a rate of progression truly astonishing. Ours has continued just as much behind it as the slow and
uncertain sailing vessel is behind the rapid and reliable mail steamer. Our Pacific possessions have been shorn of
half their glory and power by the refusal of those steam aids which would by the present time have converted half
the commerce of the fields mentioned into the new channels of American enterprise and transport. The injustice
has operated equally against the people of California and Oregon, and against ourselves of the East; while there is
no good and valid reason for thus making the Pacific coast the ultima thule of civilized, steam enterprise. The
people of the United States, of whatever class, are far from being misers. They do not desire an economy of two or
three millions of dollars per year, which would give them great opportunities of obtaining wealth and power,
merely that the sum so economized may be squandered, with twenty or thirty millions more, on schemes of
doubtful expediency, and of no real or pressing necessity. They do not, indeed, ask that these mail accommodations
may be paid for simply because much money is uselessly otherwise spent; but because these accommodations are
necessary to themselves, to the development of their enterprise and labor, and to the general good of all the active
and industrial, and, consequently, all of the worthy classes. It is a question of little importance to the great people
of this country, whether the Government expends forty millions per year or eighty millions. But it would be a
delightful consolation to them to know that while they might be paying ten, twenty, or thirty millions per year
more than strictly necessary, three or four millions of it at least were so appropriated as to better enable them to
pay the large general tax for the aggregate sum. No one hears any complaint regarding the sum necessary to
support the General Government, except by those in remote districts, who have but an infinitesimal interest
involved, but an imaginary part of the sum to pay, and who, producing but little, and having nothing to do, assume
the right to manage the affairs of those who really have something at stake. The American people are willing and
anxious that their money shall be expended for their own benefit, for the benefit of those who are to come after
them, and for the glory of our great country.
The many instances of our dereliction in the establishment of steam mail facilities, and the failure to establish
locomotive accommodations for our merchants and other business classes call loudly for a change in our affairs,
and the establishment of a national steam policy in the place of the accidental and irregular support hitherto given
to foreign steam enterprise. The nation demands the means of competing with other nations. We have lost much of
the trade of the world without it. The commercial men of this country complain bitterly that the Government gives
them no facilities for conducting our trade or cultivating the large fields of enterprise successfully which I have
named, and competing, on fair terms, with foreign merchants. They see the West-Indies, the Spanish-American
Republics, Brazil, Central America, and Mexico, lying right at our southern door, and the whole Pacific coast, the
East-Indies, China, the Mauritius, Australia, and the Pacific Islands but half as far from California as from
England, all much nearer to us than to Great Britain and other European countries, and offering us a trade which
large as it necessarily is to-day, is yet destined within the coming generation to transcend that of all other portions
of the globe combined, in extent, in richness, and in the profits which it will yield. The capacity of these great
fields for development and expansion is indefinite and almost boundless. There is no doubt that an American trade
could be developed in those regions within the next thirty years whose opulence and magnificence would rival and
far surpass our entire commerce of the world at the present time, and give to our nation a riches and a power which
would enable it to shape the destinies of the entire civilized world.
Page 91
Our commercial classes complain not so much that Great Britain has the monopoly of this trade, which naturally
belongs to the United States; not so much that she conducts that trade by steam facilities, to the detriment of us
who have none; not so much that she has lines of steamers by the dozen, and weekly communication, as well as the
advantage and use of all the other European lines; but that the citizens of the United States are not permitted to
enter into a fair competition for this trade. Our people probably surpass every other people in the world in
individual and aggregate enterprise and energy. They ask as few favors of the Government as any people on earth;
doing every thing that is practicable, and that energy and capital can accomplish, without the intervention of the
Government. But there are some things that, with the entire concentrated skill and ability of the nation, her citizens
can not accomplish; and one of these is the maintenance of steamship mail lines upon the ocean. In ordinary
enterprises competition necessitates improvement; and mechanical improvement and skill, in due course of time,
enable individuals to compass ends otherwise deemed impracticable and unattainable. These attempts have all
been made, in every form, with ocean steam navigation. It was supposed, as elsewhere stated, that, by superior
engines and great economy of fuel, a speed high enough for all ordinary mail purposes could be attained, and yet
leave enough room for freight and passengers to enable the income from these, at rates much higher than on sailing
vessels, to pay for fuel, engineering, and the great additional cost of running a steamer. Vast engineering skill and
ability have been directed to this point both in this country and Europe; and this object has been declared the
commercial desideratum of the age. But all of these efforts have failed in their design; so much so that there is not,
to-day, more than one permanent steam line upon the high seas of the whole world which is not sustained by a
subsidy from some government. Many attempts have been made by British merchants to do a freighting and
passenger business in propellers, without any mail pay, and depending on their receipts alone. These, too, have all
failed. No permanent line of these propellers has been established to any of our American cities, except by
subsidized companies, owning side-wheel steamers also.
The only trade in which it has ever been supposed that steamers of any description whatever could carry freight is
that between Europe and the United States, where there are large quantities of rich, costly goods, in small and
valuable packages, which pay an extra rate of freight, as express goods; but, even here, the steam freighting system
without governmental aid has proved a failure. There have been one or two cases where a steamer could make
money in carrying freight and passengers alone, as between this country and California during the early part of the
gold crisis, and owing to the great distance around the Horn, as well as an unnaturally large passenger trade. This,
however, was a state of commerce wholly abnormal and of short duration, and such as is not likely to occur once
in a century, or last very long; or prove more than an infinitesimal exception to the great general laws of freighting
and commercial transport.
Great Britain has learned this doctrine from experience, and is profiting by it. Her wise merchants and statesmen
know that commerce can be accommodated only by rapid steam mails, which have regular and reliable periods for
arrival and departure; and that, although these mails cost the Government and the people something more than
those slow and uncertain communications which depend on sailing vessels and overland transit, yet they are
enabled, by the facilities which they afford, to monopolize and control the commerce of the world, and divert it
from even the most natural channels into the lap of British wealth. It is in this view of the subject that our
merchants so justly complain that our Government, by refusing to give them the facilities commensurate with the
demands of the age, deprives them of the power or privilege of competing with foreign nations, and palsies their
hands, simply because they are not able, individually and by their associated capital, to do that which the
Government only can do. The reason why our mail steamers require the aid of our Government is that foreign
Governments subsidize their lines; hence our individual enterprise can not compete with their individual enterprise
and that of their Government combined. The reason why foreign Governments thus subsidize their mail lines is,
that those lines can not depend upon their own receipts for support, or run without Governmental aid. This is also
the prime reason for Governmental aid in running our lines. These facts are undisputed by steamshipmen and
merchants, and are verified by the practice of the whole world, and the great number of failures in attempting to
sustain steamers, from year to year, on regular lines, by their receipts alone.
Being thus unable to compete with other countries under our present limited steam arrangements, and considering
the startling expenses which attend the running of steamers, such as their fuel, their extra prime cost, their large
repairs, their depreciation, their wages, their insurance, their dock charges and light dues, their shore
establishments, and the long list which comes under the head of items and accidents, it is unquestionably the duty
of the Government to meet this question in a frank and resolute manner, and afford to the people all those
necessary facilities which they can get in no other way.
belongs to the United States; not so much that she conducts that trade by steam facilities, to the detriment of us
who have none; not so much that she has lines of steamers by the dozen, and weekly communication, as well as the
advantage and use of all the other European lines; but that the citizens of the United States are not permitted to
enter into a fair competition for this trade. Our people probably surpass every other people in the world in
individual and aggregate enterprise and energy. They ask as few favors of the Government as any people on earth;
doing every thing that is practicable, and that energy and capital can accomplish, without the intervention of the
Government. But there are some things that, with the entire concentrated skill and ability of the nation, her citizens
can not accomplish; and one of these is the maintenance of steamship mail lines upon the ocean. In ordinary
enterprises competition necessitates improvement; and mechanical improvement and skill, in due course of time,
enable individuals to compass ends otherwise deemed impracticable and unattainable. These attempts have all
been made, in every form, with ocean steam navigation. It was supposed, as elsewhere stated, that, by superior
engines and great economy of fuel, a speed high enough for all ordinary mail purposes could be attained, and yet
leave enough room for freight and passengers to enable the income from these, at rates much higher than on sailing
vessels, to pay for fuel, engineering, and the great additional cost of running a steamer. Vast engineering skill and
ability have been directed to this point both in this country and Europe; and this object has been declared the
commercial desideratum of the age. But all of these efforts have failed in their design; so much so that there is not,
to-day, more than one permanent steam line upon the high seas of the whole world which is not sustained by a
subsidy from some government. Many attempts have been made by British merchants to do a freighting and
passenger business in propellers, without any mail pay, and depending on their receipts alone. These, too, have all
failed. No permanent line of these propellers has been established to any of our American cities, except by
subsidized companies, owning side-wheel steamers also.
The only trade in which it has ever been supposed that steamers of any description whatever could carry freight is
that between Europe and the United States, where there are large quantities of rich, costly goods, in small and
valuable packages, which pay an extra rate of freight, as express goods; but, even here, the steam freighting system
without governmental aid has proved a failure. There have been one or two cases where a steamer could make
money in carrying freight and passengers alone, as between this country and California during the early part of the
gold crisis, and owing to the great distance around the Horn, as well as an unnaturally large passenger trade. This,
however, was a state of commerce wholly abnormal and of short duration, and such as is not likely to occur once
in a century, or last very long; or prove more than an infinitesimal exception to the great general laws of freighting
and commercial transport.
Great Britain has learned this doctrine from experience, and is profiting by it. Her wise merchants and statesmen
know that commerce can be accommodated only by rapid steam mails, which have regular and reliable periods for
arrival and departure; and that, although these mails cost the Government and the people something more than
those slow and uncertain communications which depend on sailing vessels and overland transit, yet they are
enabled, by the facilities which they afford, to monopolize and control the commerce of the world, and divert it
from even the most natural channels into the lap of British wealth. It is in this view of the subject that our
merchants so justly complain that our Government, by refusing to give them the facilities commensurate with the
demands of the age, deprives them of the power or privilege of competing with foreign nations, and palsies their
hands, simply because they are not able, individually and by their associated capital, to do that which the
Government only can do. The reason why our mail steamers require the aid of our Government is that foreign
Governments subsidize their lines; hence our individual enterprise can not compete with their individual enterprise
and that of their Government combined. The reason why foreign Governments thus subsidize their mail lines is,
that those lines can not depend upon their own receipts for support, or run without Governmental aid. This is also
the prime reason for Governmental aid in running our lines. These facts are undisputed by steamshipmen and
merchants, and are verified by the practice of the whole world, and the great number of failures in attempting to
sustain steamers, from year to year, on regular lines, by their receipts alone.
Being thus unable to compete with other countries under our present limited steam arrangements, and considering
the startling expenses which attend the running of steamers, such as their fuel, their extra prime cost, their large
repairs, their depreciation, their wages, their insurance, their dock charges and light dues, their shore
establishments, and the long list which comes under the head of items and accidents, it is unquestionably the duty
of the Government to meet this question in a frank and resolute manner, and afford to the people all those
necessary facilities which they can get in no other way.
Page 92
Page 93
SECTION VIII.
HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY?
we need a steam mail system: how our lines have been established: american and british policy
contrasted: spasmodic and enduring legislation: mr. polk's administration endeavored to
inaugurate a policy: gen. rusk endeavored to extend it: the term of service too short: companies
should have longer periods: a legislation of expedients: must subsidize private companies for a
long term of years: should we give to our postal vessels the naval feature: our mail lines gave
an impulse to ship-building: let us have steam mails on their merits: no naval feature
subterfuges: these vessels highly useful in war: they liberally supply the navy with experienced
engineers when necessary: the british mail packets generally fit for war service: lord canning's
report: expedients proposed for carrying the mails: by foreign instead of american vessels:
degrading expediency and subserviency: we can not secure mail service by giving the gross
receipts: the general treasury should pay for the transmarine post: requirements for new
contracts: method of making contracts: the lowest bidder and the land service: the ocean
service very different: but little understood: lowest-bidder system failures: senator rusk's
opinion: injurious effects of lowest bidder: individual efforts and rights.
As it will scarcely be denied that the Government should furnish ample and liberal mail facilities,
as well foreign as domestic, to its people, in view of the well-established fact that these facilities
can not be attained in any other way, the question naturally arises, how shall the Government
discharge this clear and unquestionable duty to the citizen? I trust that it will be admitted that we
can not rely on the Sailing-ship mail, or the Naval steam mail, or the Private Enterprise mail; while
it is equally evident that we can not depend on the Foreigner's mail, or should not if we could.
A first step toward this important end, and one which every interest of the country demands, is the
establishment of a governmental steam mail system, a fixed steam policy, based upon common-
sense, and guided by the dictates of justice to the enterprising citizen, at the same time that it is
productive of certain efficiency toward the people. It can not be denied that our legislation on this
subject has hitherto been that of expedients, and merely temporary arrangement. We have had no
wise, immutable purpose, no great fixed rule of action. We have laid no broad foundations for a
system which should extend itself wherever our trade extended, and work equitably with all of the
large interests of the American people. When, by a spasmodic effort, we opened communication in
one direction, and found that we had a few steamers running, we became self-complacently
satisfied with our action, shut our ears to all other equally urgent claims and appeals, forgot that we
had simply commenced instead of having finished, and contented ourselves with the appearance of
a mail system rather than its realization. When we established the two lines to Europe, which were
positively necessary to commerce, it was not so much because those were the only necessary lines,
but because they were urged by parties who stood ready to build the ships, and run them in the
service. The California lines were established because the people would not longer tolerate the
neglect of our large and important interests in the Pacific. But there were several other lines which
were of the greatest importance to our commerce and manufactures, extending to fields where we
could have established the richest trade, but which never enlisted the attention of Congress, simply
because there was no one who made it his special business to press them. This of itself manifested
great want of a matured steam mail system, which should operate equally on all of the great
HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY?
we need a steam mail system: how our lines have been established: american and british policy
contrasted: spasmodic and enduring legislation: mr. polk's administration endeavored to
inaugurate a policy: gen. rusk endeavored to extend it: the term of service too short: companies
should have longer periods: a legislation of expedients: must subsidize private companies for a
long term of years: should we give to our postal vessels the naval feature: our mail lines gave
an impulse to ship-building: let us have steam mails on their merits: no naval feature
subterfuges: these vessels highly useful in war: they liberally supply the navy with experienced
engineers when necessary: the british mail packets generally fit for war service: lord canning's
report: expedients proposed for carrying the mails: by foreign instead of american vessels:
degrading expediency and subserviency: we can not secure mail service by giving the gross
receipts: the general treasury should pay for the transmarine post: requirements for new
contracts: method of making contracts: the lowest bidder and the land service: the ocean
service very different: but little understood: lowest-bidder system failures: senator rusk's
opinion: injurious effects of lowest bidder: individual efforts and rights.
As it will scarcely be denied that the Government should furnish ample and liberal mail facilities,
as well foreign as domestic, to its people, in view of the well-established fact that these facilities
can not be attained in any other way, the question naturally arises, how shall the Government
discharge this clear and unquestionable duty to the citizen? I trust that it will be admitted that we
can not rely on the Sailing-ship mail, or the Naval steam mail, or the Private Enterprise mail; while
it is equally evident that we can not depend on the Foreigner's mail, or should not if we could.
A first step toward this important end, and one which every interest of the country demands, is the
establishment of a governmental steam mail system, a fixed steam policy, based upon common-
sense, and guided by the dictates of justice to the enterprising citizen, at the same time that it is
productive of certain efficiency toward the people. It can not be denied that our legislation on this
subject has hitherto been that of expedients, and merely temporary arrangement. We have had no
wise, immutable purpose, no great fixed rule of action. We have laid no broad foundations for a
system which should extend itself wherever our trade extended, and work equitably with all of the
large interests of the American people. When, by a spasmodic effort, we opened communication in
one direction, and found that we had a few steamers running, we became self-complacently
satisfied with our action, shut our ears to all other equally urgent claims and appeals, forgot that we
had simply commenced instead of having finished, and contented ourselves with the appearance of
a mail system rather than its realization. When we established the two lines to Europe, which were
positively necessary to commerce, it was not so much because those were the only necessary lines,
but because they were urged by parties who stood ready to build the ships, and run them in the
service. The California lines were established because the people would not longer tolerate the
neglect of our large and important interests in the Pacific. But there were several other lines which
were of the greatest importance to our commerce and manufactures, extending to fields where we
could have established the richest trade, but which never enlisted the attention of Congress, simply
because there was no one who made it his special business to press them. This of itself manifested
great want of a matured steam mail system, which should operate equally on all of the great
Page 94
interests of the country, and extend its facilities wherever American industry and enterprise could
find a footing.
We need not only a steam system, but a fixed steam policy that shall extend from generation to
generation, and operate equally, as well at all times and in all fields of American enterprise, as upon
all classes. No such system can be built up in one year or in ten years; much less by one spasmodic
steam effort, even in the right direction, followed by an eternal sleep, or a total indifference. It is
the work of ages. It is not a system which, if set in motion, will work on perpetually of itself,
without assistance. It needs constant care and fostering; and its results prove it worthy of all the
care and attention that can be expended on it. The mature system of Great Britain has not grown up
in a day. It has been constantly before the British public during twenty-four years, and has never
been neglected for an hour. There has been no hiatus in it; for this would have disrupted the system,
broken the chain, and resulted in disastrous failure. Neither has the one great purpose been changed
every few years to suit the caprice of some new cabinet. It was a great cardinal idea, founded in
reason and justice, that has gone on maturing from year to year; and none had the hardihood to
touch it, or trifle with the people's purpose in establishing it; not even so far as to make it a passing
text for demagoguery. It composed and yet composes a part of the far-reaching and controlling
policy of the British crown; a purpose limited not to the visions of to-day, or the financial crises
and panics of to-morrow, or to some new field of British effort, to be developed in a year or two;
but limited to that time only, when men shall cease the strife of commerce, abandon the pursuit of
wealth, yield the palm of enterprise, and unlearn the love of money and its power. There has been
nothing spasmodic in this; nothing fitful, alluring, and evanescent; nothing that held out a hope to
the enterprising man, and deceived him in all the essential conditions of its fulfillment in the end. It
was founded in reason, founded in necessity; and it was well determined that it should endure.
It is creditable to the administration of President Polk, that there was one effort made in this
country to found a similar judicious and fruitful system. We had until that time taken no notice
whatever of marine steam navigation; and British steamers swarmed around our coast north and
south, thick as cruisers in a blockade. (See Paper E.) Indeed, it was a veritable blockade of our
commerce, and told most disastrously upon our enterprise and independence. The Cabinet of Mr.
Polk, headed by our present venerable Chief Magistrate of the Nation, determined to reverse this
system, and did it as effectually as any thing can be accomplished in a country, where a given
policy, however wisely inaugurated, has no guaranty or safeguard against the revolutionary changes
of new administrations. They established a basis of action, and inaugurated three steam lines under
contracts which placed them beyond the attacks of the capricious; well knowing that if the system
had merits, they would be manifested to the country within ten years by the fruits of these lines.
The period was shorter than that designated by Great Britain; yet with the immensely rapid
development of our people it inwrought itself into the affections of the public so effectually, even in
this short time, that none will dare risk his reputation by attacking it boldly, or by other means than
an indirect and harassing guerrilla warfare. But here the effort ended, and the system, deprived of
the aids and new lines which Congress should have extended it, and of that continued development
which was necessary to its perfection and usefulness, has been left to work itself out and die, until
it may be resurrected by another great demonstration of public sentiment, and by an administration
bold enough and far-seeing enough to grasp the interests of the whole country, and do itself and the
people justice. It is due, however, to the reputation of a lamented and departed statesman, the large-
minded and noble Gen. Rusk, of Texas, to say that he made a manly and systematic effort in 1852,
after seeing the fruitful workings of the three lines noticed, to extend, enlarge, and fortify the good
beginnings of President Polk and Secretary Buchanan, by inaugurating several new lines, and
establishing a permanent and recognized basis of action. But in all this he was thwarted by the
find a footing.
We need not only a steam system, but a fixed steam policy that shall extend from generation to
generation, and operate equally, as well at all times and in all fields of American enterprise, as upon
all classes. No such system can be built up in one year or in ten years; much less by one spasmodic
steam effort, even in the right direction, followed by an eternal sleep, or a total indifference. It is
the work of ages. It is not a system which, if set in motion, will work on perpetually of itself,
without assistance. It needs constant care and fostering; and its results prove it worthy of all the
care and attention that can be expended on it. The mature system of Great Britain has not grown up
in a day. It has been constantly before the British public during twenty-four years, and has never
been neglected for an hour. There has been no hiatus in it; for this would have disrupted the system,
broken the chain, and resulted in disastrous failure. Neither has the one great purpose been changed
every few years to suit the caprice of some new cabinet. It was a great cardinal idea, founded in
reason and justice, that has gone on maturing from year to year; and none had the hardihood to
touch it, or trifle with the people's purpose in establishing it; not even so far as to make it a passing
text for demagoguery. It composed and yet composes a part of the far-reaching and controlling
policy of the British crown; a purpose limited not to the visions of to-day, or the financial crises
and panics of to-morrow, or to some new field of British effort, to be developed in a year or two;
but limited to that time only, when men shall cease the strife of commerce, abandon the pursuit of
wealth, yield the palm of enterprise, and unlearn the love of money and its power. There has been
nothing spasmodic in this; nothing fitful, alluring, and evanescent; nothing that held out a hope to
the enterprising man, and deceived him in all the essential conditions of its fulfillment in the end. It
was founded in reason, founded in necessity; and it was well determined that it should endure.
It is creditable to the administration of President Polk, that there was one effort made in this
country to found a similar judicious and fruitful system. We had until that time taken no notice
whatever of marine steam navigation; and British steamers swarmed around our coast north and
south, thick as cruisers in a blockade. (See Paper E.) Indeed, it was a veritable blockade of our
commerce, and told most disastrously upon our enterprise and independence. The Cabinet of Mr.
Polk, headed by our present venerable Chief Magistrate of the Nation, determined to reverse this
system, and did it as effectually as any thing can be accomplished in a country, where a given
policy, however wisely inaugurated, has no guaranty or safeguard against the revolutionary changes
of new administrations. They established a basis of action, and inaugurated three steam lines under
contracts which placed them beyond the attacks of the capricious; well knowing that if the system
had merits, they would be manifested to the country within ten years by the fruits of these lines.
The period was shorter than that designated by Great Britain; yet with the immensely rapid
development of our people it inwrought itself into the affections of the public so effectually, even in
this short time, that none will dare risk his reputation by attacking it boldly, or by other means than
an indirect and harassing guerrilla warfare. But here the effort ended, and the system, deprived of
the aids and new lines which Congress should have extended it, and of that continued development
which was necessary to its perfection and usefulness, has been left to work itself out and die, until
it may be resurrected by another great demonstration of public sentiment, and by an administration
bold enough and far-seeing enough to grasp the interests of the whole country, and do itself and the
people justice. It is due, however, to the reputation of a lamented and departed statesman, the large-
minded and noble Gen. Rusk, of Texas, to say that he made a manly and systematic effort in 1852,
after seeing the fruitful workings of the three lines noticed, to extend, enlarge, and fortify the good
beginnings of President Polk and Secretary Buchanan, by inaugurating several new lines, and
establishing a permanent and recognized basis of action. But in all this he was thwarted by the
Page 95
machinations of narrow-minded men, who deemed it a higher effort to agitate the country and
endeavor to separate the North and the South, than establish and secure those mighty aids to
industry which should give development, wealth, strength, and security to the whole American
Union, and check the fratricidal blow of the disunionist.
It is essential that we shall have in this country a policy on this subject, which shall remain
untouched under the changes of administrations, just as standard commercial laws and regulations
remain untouched. No system of such magnitude can mature or cheapen when but a few years are
assigned to it, and when there is no certainty that it will survive the life of a single ship. Companies
undertaking the mail service under such circumstances must be paid larger sums for their general
establishment, that they may be enabled to meet the exigencies and caprices of irregular legislation,
which may at the close of their contracts suddenly throw a dozen good ships out of employment.
Every well-regulated and efficient company necessarily builds new steamers through all the stages
of its existence; and when the term of its service expires, necessarily has several partially new
ships. If the term of service is to be short, and if there is no rule by which those who do good
service on a line are to have, in renewing contracts, the preference of new and untried parties, then
it is reasonable to infer that they can not themselves incur the expense of so large an establishment
of new and useless vessels, and that their service is either to be inefficient and unreliable, or that
the department must pay a larger price than necessary under a judicious and fixed system. The want
of a reliable system operates injuriously both on the department and on the contractors. It subjects
us to expedients, and to all of the evils of constant lobbying and legislation on the subject. And one
of the first wants of this system is an extension of the term of contracts. The period hitherto
assigned has not been long enough for the proper development of the service. The short term is a
constant premium for building an inferior class of vessels, which shall have become worthless by
the time that the contract expires, so as not to entail loss upon the company. Such vessels are ever
unfit for the mails or passengers. Short terms also keep the subject continually before Congress and
the Executive Government, and foster that extensive and depraved lobbying which has wrought so
injuriously on our legislation. Moreover, there is no reason why the term of service should not be
extended, when it will certainly simplify and cheapen it, if, as I have assumed, the progress of
engineering is not such as to throw well-built ships out of use within twelve years, or in any way
introduce improvements by which the Government could get the service at lower rates. Nor have
we any reliable hope for the future. We wait until commerce has been perverted into unnatural
channels, and then become suddenly and galvanically aroused, when it is too late to effect a change
until two or three years have expired in building ships. We thus find ourselves in the midst of the
difficulty without having foreseen it, and without being prepared for it. The wise man planned the
campaign before others had even contemplated any disturbance of the peace. As a matter of course
he controlled the battle, and brought up the victory in his own way.
The only effectual means of accomplishing the foreign mail service in this country is by liberally
subsidizing private companies for a long term of years, such as will induce them to provide first-
class ships, run them rapidly, and fit them for the most comfortable conveyance of passengers. Lord
Canning in his Report to both houses of Parliament on the contract packet system in 1853, says,
after showing that the naval vessels have been abandoned for the mail service: "There is no
peculiarity in this branch of business which renders it an exception to the general rule, that work is
done more cheaply by contract than by Government agency." But when the idea of performing the
mail service by naval vessels was wholly abandoned in 1837, another question of equal importance
arose, as to how far the mail steam packets might be made efficient as vessels of war in times of
emergency. As a consequence of the discussion nearly all of the mail contracts made from that day
until this by Great Britain contained stipulations requiring the vessels to be capable of carrying an
endeavor to separate the North and the South, than establish and secure those mighty aids to
industry which should give development, wealth, strength, and security to the whole American
Union, and check the fratricidal blow of the disunionist.
It is essential that we shall have in this country a policy on this subject, which shall remain
untouched under the changes of administrations, just as standard commercial laws and regulations
remain untouched. No system of such magnitude can mature or cheapen when but a few years are
assigned to it, and when there is no certainty that it will survive the life of a single ship. Companies
undertaking the mail service under such circumstances must be paid larger sums for their general
establishment, that they may be enabled to meet the exigencies and caprices of irregular legislation,
which may at the close of their contracts suddenly throw a dozen good ships out of employment.
Every well-regulated and efficient company necessarily builds new steamers through all the stages
of its existence; and when the term of its service expires, necessarily has several partially new
ships. If the term of service is to be short, and if there is no rule by which those who do good
service on a line are to have, in renewing contracts, the preference of new and untried parties, then
it is reasonable to infer that they can not themselves incur the expense of so large an establishment
of new and useless vessels, and that their service is either to be inefficient and unreliable, or that
the department must pay a larger price than necessary under a judicious and fixed system. The want
of a reliable system operates injuriously both on the department and on the contractors. It subjects
us to expedients, and to all of the evils of constant lobbying and legislation on the subject. And one
of the first wants of this system is an extension of the term of contracts. The period hitherto
assigned has not been long enough for the proper development of the service. The short term is a
constant premium for building an inferior class of vessels, which shall have become worthless by
the time that the contract expires, so as not to entail loss upon the company. Such vessels are ever
unfit for the mails or passengers. Short terms also keep the subject continually before Congress and
the Executive Government, and foster that extensive and depraved lobbying which has wrought so
injuriously on our legislation. Moreover, there is no reason why the term of service should not be
extended, when it will certainly simplify and cheapen it, if, as I have assumed, the progress of
engineering is not such as to throw well-built ships out of use within twelve years, or in any way
introduce improvements by which the Government could get the service at lower rates. Nor have
we any reliable hope for the future. We wait until commerce has been perverted into unnatural
channels, and then become suddenly and galvanically aroused, when it is too late to effect a change
until two or three years have expired in building ships. We thus find ourselves in the midst of the
difficulty without having foreseen it, and without being prepared for it. The wise man planned the
campaign before others had even contemplated any disturbance of the peace. As a matter of course
he controlled the battle, and brought up the victory in his own way.
The only effectual means of accomplishing the foreign mail service in this country is by liberally
subsidizing private companies for a long term of years, such as will induce them to provide first-
class ships, run them rapidly, and fit them for the most comfortable conveyance of passengers. Lord
Canning in his Report to both houses of Parliament on the contract packet system in 1853, says,
after showing that the naval vessels have been abandoned for the mail service: "There is no
peculiarity in this branch of business which renders it an exception to the general rule, that work is
done more cheaply by contract than by Government agency." But when the idea of performing the
mail service by naval vessels was wholly abandoned in 1837, another question of equal importance
arose, as to how far the mail steam packets might be made efficient as vessels of war in times of
emergency. As a consequence of the discussion nearly all of the mail contracts made from that day
until this by Great Britain contained stipulations requiring the vessels to be capable of carrying an
Page 96
armament, in addition to the requirements of speed and punctuality. The same thing was done in
this country in 1846-7; and one of the principal means of carrying the Collins bill through Congress
was the self-deception of making the steamers equivalent to vessels of war. It was a plea to which
statesmen and enterprising business men resorted, and was used as a means of securing those
commercial facilities which constitutional quibblers would not vote for directly, but which they
would afford if allowed the subterfuge of "defenses" as a means of protecting them against a
certain set of constituencies who foolishly opposed the extension of commerce. Many of these
would not grant one dollar for the aid of that commerce on which the revenues of the country and
their own real prosperity and wealth depended; but they were willing to suffer long and bleed freely
at the old and just, though unrenewable war-cry: "The British and the Hessians." Our case was
rather different from that of Great Britain which had a large steam navy while we had neither naval
nor commercial steamers. There was, consequently, and there yet is, more propriety in demanding a
capacity for the naval service in our vessels than in the case of Great Britain.
In obedience to this very proper spirit we produced some of the noblest vessels that ever floated.
Stronger vessels than the Collins, Aspinwall, and Pacific Mail Steamers were never built in any
country. And although we have fortunately not been compelled to test their capacity in naval
transport or in action, yet there is no doubt that they would do honorable and efficient service in
both, and by no means sully the glory of the American colors. The establishment of these and the
Havre and Bremen lines, certainly gave an impulse to shipbuilding and the manufacture of steam
machinery in this country which could have been given in no other way, and which in a few short
years has demonstrated that we are behind no people on earth in capacity for these noble and
difficult arts. And although we are yet but in our infancy in experience, as compared, especially
with Great Britain, yet the increasing demand for mail facilities, the necessity for a large war
marine, and the rapidly increasing coast steam service, all indicate that we shall require a large
amount of this class of work and a mechanical skill to which our ingenious countrymen have thus
proven themselves entirely adequate. And although it is certainly indispensable that we shall ever
be provided adequately against all the exigencies of foreign war, yet it is to be trusted that bold and
fearless statesmen will support and extend our steam mail service on the tenable grounds of its
necessity to commerce and our citizens at large, and that its productive services will not be
obscured by or subordinated to the subterfuges and deceits of the war marine feature. Let us have
steam mail facilities on high and independent grounds, and for their benefits per se. The system is
abundantly tenable on this ground alone; on this only ground that it will probably ever practically
occupy. Let us also have our war marine, efficiently separate, as it should be. Let both systems be
perfect, both independent, both mutually conducive to the prosperity and the defense of the
country. But there is no doubt that these vessels would do excellent service in a conflict. They
could swarm any particular coast with troops in a few days. They could easily run away from
dangerous vessels, or pursue and overtake others when necessary. They are alway needed for
transport, while the time will probably never again come when mail steamers will not be even more
necessary during war than in times of peace. But this is not all. They fit and train a large number of
marine engineers who are ever ready at a day's warning to enter efficiently on the naval service.
This is a point of greater importance than is generally supposed. Engineers, however skilled in the
shops, are wholly unfit for the service at sea until they have had months of experience, and become
accustomed to sea-sickness. When one of our first American mail steamers sailed for Europe, no
practised marine engineer could be found to work her engines. They took a first-class engineer and
corps of assistants from one of the North River packets; but as soon as the ship got to sea, and
heavy weather came on, all the engineers and firemen were taken deadly sick, and for three days it
was constantly expected that the ship would be lost.
this country in 1846-7; and one of the principal means of carrying the Collins bill through Congress
was the self-deception of making the steamers equivalent to vessels of war. It was a plea to which
statesmen and enterprising business men resorted, and was used as a means of securing those
commercial facilities which constitutional quibblers would not vote for directly, but which they
would afford if allowed the subterfuge of "defenses" as a means of protecting them against a
certain set of constituencies who foolishly opposed the extension of commerce. Many of these
would not grant one dollar for the aid of that commerce on which the revenues of the country and
their own real prosperity and wealth depended; but they were willing to suffer long and bleed freely
at the old and just, though unrenewable war-cry: "The British and the Hessians." Our case was
rather different from that of Great Britain which had a large steam navy while we had neither naval
nor commercial steamers. There was, consequently, and there yet is, more propriety in demanding a
capacity for the naval service in our vessels than in the case of Great Britain.
In obedience to this very proper spirit we produced some of the noblest vessels that ever floated.
Stronger vessels than the Collins, Aspinwall, and Pacific Mail Steamers were never built in any
country. And although we have fortunately not been compelled to test their capacity in naval
transport or in action, yet there is no doubt that they would do honorable and efficient service in
both, and by no means sully the glory of the American colors. The establishment of these and the
Havre and Bremen lines, certainly gave an impulse to shipbuilding and the manufacture of steam
machinery in this country which could have been given in no other way, and which in a few short
years has demonstrated that we are behind no people on earth in capacity for these noble and
difficult arts. And although we are yet but in our infancy in experience, as compared, especially
with Great Britain, yet the increasing demand for mail facilities, the necessity for a large war
marine, and the rapidly increasing coast steam service, all indicate that we shall require a large
amount of this class of work and a mechanical skill to which our ingenious countrymen have thus
proven themselves entirely adequate. And although it is certainly indispensable that we shall ever
be provided adequately against all the exigencies of foreign war, yet it is to be trusted that bold and
fearless statesmen will support and extend our steam mail service on the tenable grounds of its
necessity to commerce and our citizens at large, and that its productive services will not be
obscured by or subordinated to the subterfuges and deceits of the war marine feature. Let us have
steam mail facilities on high and independent grounds, and for their benefits per se. The system is
abundantly tenable on this ground alone; on this only ground that it will probably ever practically
occupy. Let us also have our war marine, efficiently separate, as it should be. Let both systems be
perfect, both independent, both mutually conducive to the prosperity and the defense of the
country. But there is no doubt that these vessels would do excellent service in a conflict. They
could swarm any particular coast with troops in a few days. They could easily run away from
dangerous vessels, or pursue and overtake others when necessary. They are alway needed for
transport, while the time will probably never again come when mail steamers will not be even more
necessary during war than in times of peace. But this is not all. They fit and train a large number of
marine engineers who are ever ready at a day's warning to enter efficiently on the naval service.
This is a point of greater importance than is generally supposed. Engineers, however skilled in the
shops, are wholly unfit for the service at sea until they have had months of experience, and become
accustomed to sea-sickness. When one of our first American mail steamers sailed for Europe, no
practised marine engineer could be found to work her engines. They took a first-class engineer and
corps of assistants from one of the North River packets; but as soon as the ship got to sea, and
heavy weather came on, all the engineers and firemen were taken deadly sick, and for three days it
was constantly expected that the ship would be lost.
Page 97
It is abundantly evident from all of the testimony, that most of the mail packets are capable of
carrying a handsome armament. Mr. Atherton says to me in his letter: "Many of our ocean steamers
are fit for naval service of every description; and they are generally fit for all transport service."
The Report of Lord Canning, the British Post Master General, to which I have referred, was made
in 1853, in obedience to a Treasury Minute issued by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who
directed the Post Master General to form a committee, and report to both houses, on the propriety
of continuing and extending the mail steam packet system; as there had been suggestions that the
sum expended for the mail service was large. These gentlemen after a lengthy investigation of
several months, the examination of a great number of witnesses, and the record of their testimony
in shorthand, made their report, accompanied by the evidence in a large volume. At page 5 of the
report, in speaking of the requirements for naval efficiency, they say:
"In arranging the terms of these contracts, the Government seized the opportunity of requiring that
the vessels should be constructed in a manner that would render them as serviceable for national
defense in war as steam-packets belonging to the Crown would have been if employed in their
stead. A provision to this effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail Company in
1840; and in most of the existing contracts stipulations are to be found requiring that the vessel
should be of a construction and strength fit to carry such an armament as the Admiralty may think
proper. In several cases they must be built of wood and not of iron; and there are some contracts
which confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a valuation when it may be thought
desirable to do so.
"Generally speaking, these stipulations have been fulfilled, as appears from a return which has been
laid before us by the Surveyor of the Navy, showing the number, tonnage, and power of the vessels
constructed by the various companies under contract with the Admiralty for the conveyance of the
mails, distinguishing those built of wood from those built of iron, and stating whether the
companies have in any cases violated the terms of the contracts, and if so, whether any authority
has been given by the Board of Admiralty for the deviation. It results from this return that out of 98
vessels which had been surveyed by the Government officers, one only (the 'Australian') has been
reported as incapable of carrying guns if required, and two iron vessels (the 'Levantine' and the
'Petrel') have been accepted instead of wooden vessels, on Mr. Cunard's Halifax and Bermuda line.
Two other vessels—one belonging to the Australian Royal Mail Company, and the other to Mr.
Macgregor Laird's West Coast of Africa line—had also been accepted (temporarily) by Admiralty
authority, although of less tonnage and power than the contracts prescribed.
"The Surveyor's report upon most of these vessels, as regards their fitness for war purposes, is in
the following terms: 'Not fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted.' This
report accords with the opinion expressed by the Committee of Naval and Artillery officers upon
the vessels which have come under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements of that
Committee, that although the packets they have examined are for the most part of sufficient
strength to carry and fire a certain number of guns, the expense of the alterations which would be
necessary before they could be got ready for service would be very considerable, and that even
when such alterations had been made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in
proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter hostile vessels of equal tonnage without
endangering the honor of the British flag.
"With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion that no expense should be incurred
for the sake of imposing conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels. We believe
the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of false economy. Should a war suddenly break
carrying a handsome armament. Mr. Atherton says to me in his letter: "Many of our ocean steamers
are fit for naval service of every description; and they are generally fit for all transport service."
The Report of Lord Canning, the British Post Master General, to which I have referred, was made
in 1853, in obedience to a Treasury Minute issued by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who
directed the Post Master General to form a committee, and report to both houses, on the propriety
of continuing and extending the mail steam packet system; as there had been suggestions that the
sum expended for the mail service was large. These gentlemen after a lengthy investigation of
several months, the examination of a great number of witnesses, and the record of their testimony
in shorthand, made their report, accompanied by the evidence in a large volume. At page 5 of the
report, in speaking of the requirements for naval efficiency, they say:
"In arranging the terms of these contracts, the Government seized the opportunity of requiring that
the vessels should be constructed in a manner that would render them as serviceable for national
defense in war as steam-packets belonging to the Crown would have been if employed in their
stead. A provision to this effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail Company in
1840; and in most of the existing contracts stipulations are to be found requiring that the vessel
should be of a construction and strength fit to carry such an armament as the Admiralty may think
proper. In several cases they must be built of wood and not of iron; and there are some contracts
which confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a valuation when it may be thought
desirable to do so.
"Generally speaking, these stipulations have been fulfilled, as appears from a return which has been
laid before us by the Surveyor of the Navy, showing the number, tonnage, and power of the vessels
constructed by the various companies under contract with the Admiralty for the conveyance of the
mails, distinguishing those built of wood from those built of iron, and stating whether the
companies have in any cases violated the terms of the contracts, and if so, whether any authority
has been given by the Board of Admiralty for the deviation. It results from this return that out of 98
vessels which had been surveyed by the Government officers, one only (the 'Australian') has been
reported as incapable of carrying guns if required, and two iron vessels (the 'Levantine' and the
'Petrel') have been accepted instead of wooden vessels, on Mr. Cunard's Halifax and Bermuda line.
Two other vessels—one belonging to the Australian Royal Mail Company, and the other to Mr.
Macgregor Laird's West Coast of Africa line—had also been accepted (temporarily) by Admiralty
authority, although of less tonnage and power than the contracts prescribed.
"The Surveyor's report upon most of these vessels, as regards their fitness for war purposes, is in
the following terms: 'Not fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted.' This
report accords with the opinion expressed by the Committee of Naval and Artillery officers upon
the vessels which have come under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements of that
Committee, that although the packets they have examined are for the most part of sufficient
strength to carry and fire a certain number of guns, the expense of the alterations which would be
necessary before they could be got ready for service would be very considerable, and that even
when such alterations had been made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in
proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter hostile vessels of equal tonnage without
endangering the honor of the British flag.
"With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion that no expense should be incurred
for the sake of imposing conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels. We believe
the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of false economy. Should a war suddenly break
Page 98
out, the immediate demand for mail steamers would probably be greater than ever, and it might be
exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a time from their legitimate use for the purpose
of arming them for battle. Moreover, the high charge for the packet service has been borne with the
greater readiness, because it has been supposed by some to include a provision of large but
unknown amount, for the defense of the country; while on the other hand the Naval Estimates have
sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the ground that the force provided for was in
addition to the large reserve of postal war steamers. We accordingly recommend that for the future
the contracts for the conveyance of the mails should be wholly free from stipulations of the nature
we have been describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the power in the
Government to take possession of the vessels in the event of national emergency."
Again, in the resumé, after considering each of the British lines separately, the committee say:
"An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among the public as to the efficiency of our
postal steamers for direct purposes of warfare. We do not believe that those who are charged with
the direction of the military affairs of the country have ever regarded them as likely to be of any
great service in an engagement; but their advantages as an auxiliary force will be very considerable.
They will be available, in the event of the breaking out of hostilities, for the rapid conveyance of
dispatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops and stores. Their speed will be such as
probably to secure them from the risk of capture, and will render them highly valuable for
procuring intelligence of hostile movements. They may also be expected to furnish the Queen's
ships with men trained to steam-navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge which
can not fail to be valuable in several ways."
We have arrived at about the same conclusions in this country as those presented by the British
Post Master General to Parliament in 1853, on this subject. And yet, with our small navy we may at
any time need all of our steam packets for actual service, and the Government should always have
the right to demand them for transport service. We have abundant evidence that our mail packets
are well fitted for carrying an armament, and being highly efficient in war duty. The testimony of
Commodore M. C. Perry, Mr. Cunningham, and others, as published in the Special Report of the
Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is conclusive on this point. They found that they were built with
extraordinary strength and of good materials.
Many expedients have been proposed for the transmission of our foreign mails. It is said that the
late Post Master General entertained the purpose of paying some of the foreign screw lines to carry
the mails, if Congress would permit it; but however all parties disapprove of the contracted policy
proposed by that gentleman, I can not believe that he entertained any purpose so unpatriotic, and so
subversive of American shipping interests. It is true, however, that, as he frequently said, he would
prefer returning to the old packet system, and carrying the mails by sail, if private enterprise could
not carry them across the ocean without a subsidy. But it is a consoling reflection that these
singular views of that worthy gentleman never anywhere took root in Congress. Certainly there is
no reason why this great, and rich, and proud nation should resort, like some little seventh rate
power, to expedients in the carriage of our ocean mails. We are not so poor as to have to live by
practices; not so degraded as to be willing to catch at any little thing that may pass along for
resources. We have a teeming prosperity, an abundant wealth, unending resources, and a people
everywhere clamorous for liberal expenditures for adequate mails. Why shall we degrade ourselves
by depending upon others for our mail facilities? It alway humbles and mortifies me to see one
human being lick the hand of another; one who acknowledges himself a stupid drone that must
needs have a master to direct and protect him. And so with our nation when she stoops to
exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a time from their legitimate use for the purpose
of arming them for battle. Moreover, the high charge for the packet service has been borne with the
greater readiness, because it has been supposed by some to include a provision of large but
unknown amount, for the defense of the country; while on the other hand the Naval Estimates have
sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the ground that the force provided for was in
addition to the large reserve of postal war steamers. We accordingly recommend that for the future
the contracts for the conveyance of the mails should be wholly free from stipulations of the nature
we have been describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the power in the
Government to take possession of the vessels in the event of national emergency."
Again, in the resumé, after considering each of the British lines separately, the committee say:
"An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among the public as to the efficiency of our
postal steamers for direct purposes of warfare. We do not believe that those who are charged with
the direction of the military affairs of the country have ever regarded them as likely to be of any
great service in an engagement; but their advantages as an auxiliary force will be very considerable.
They will be available, in the event of the breaking out of hostilities, for the rapid conveyance of
dispatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops and stores. Their speed will be such as
probably to secure them from the risk of capture, and will render them highly valuable for
procuring intelligence of hostile movements. They may also be expected to furnish the Queen's
ships with men trained to steam-navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge which
can not fail to be valuable in several ways."
We have arrived at about the same conclusions in this country as those presented by the British
Post Master General to Parliament in 1853, on this subject. And yet, with our small navy we may at
any time need all of our steam packets for actual service, and the Government should always have
the right to demand them for transport service. We have abundant evidence that our mail packets
are well fitted for carrying an armament, and being highly efficient in war duty. The testimony of
Commodore M. C. Perry, Mr. Cunningham, and others, as published in the Special Report of the
Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is conclusive on this point. They found that they were built with
extraordinary strength and of good materials.
Many expedients have been proposed for the transmission of our foreign mails. It is said that the
late Post Master General entertained the purpose of paying some of the foreign screw lines to carry
the mails, if Congress would permit it; but however all parties disapprove of the contracted policy
proposed by that gentleman, I can not believe that he entertained any purpose so unpatriotic, and so
subversive of American shipping interests. It is true, however, that, as he frequently said, he would
prefer returning to the old packet system, and carrying the mails by sail, if private enterprise could
not carry them across the ocean without a subsidy. But it is a consoling reflection that these
singular views of that worthy gentleman never anywhere took root in Congress. Certainly there is
no reason why this great, and rich, and proud nation should resort, like some little seventh rate
power, to expedients in the carriage of our ocean mails. We are not so poor as to have to live by
practices; not so degraded as to be willing to catch at any little thing that may pass along for
resources. We have a teeming prosperity, an abundant wealth, unending resources, and a people
everywhere clamorous for liberal expenditures for adequate mails. Why shall we degrade ourselves
by depending upon others for our mail facilities? It alway humbles and mortifies me to see one
human being lick the hand of another; one who acknowledges himself a stupid drone that must
needs have a master to direct and protect him. And so with our nation when she stoops to
Page 99
subserviency and begging, for even so much as the postal charities of other enterprising and
commanding nations.
It has been suggested that the Government could secure the transit of the mails on the receipts,
taking both ocean and inland postage; and indeed a temporary arrangement was made with two of
our contending companies running to Europe, to transport them on these terms; but such
arrangements are temporary only, and can not be made the basis of regular action. They would
operate most unequally on different lines. While on the European lines they would pay probably
one half the sum of subsidy required, on many other, and especially on new and untried lines, they
would not at first pay probably one tenth. And granting that on a given line, the receipts during
fifteen years would amount to as much as the whole subsidy required for that time; yet no company
could live on them, as for the first few years the receipts from the mail would be very small, while
the general income of the line from passengers and freight would also be smaller than at any other
time. Moreover, almost every steam company has to borrow money largely during its first years, in
anticipation of the larger income from increased trade during the last years of its existence. Thus,
while the system of the receipts would operate most unequally, the same aggregate sum given in
the form of a regular annual subsidy operates as an assurance for the company and keeps it alive.
But the postal receipts are not adequate to the support of any ocean line. In the report before cited,
the Committee say, at page 5, that the sum of subsidy then paid was £822,390 per annum, whereas
the postal receipts were only £443,782, or but a fraction over one half. There is probably no regular
service in the world where the postal receipts would pay for the transport, especially where
competition existed.
In making our contracts common-sense must dictate the lines necessary, and the general treasury
should pay for them. There is no good reason why the sums of subsidy to be paid for mail
transportation should be chargeable on the Post Office Department. Nor is it really of much
consequence where the account is settled, as the general treasury must after all meet the bills. It
may create some misapprehension as to the services on which the sums annually voted are
bestowed. But the service, whether sea or inland, is alike incapable of sustaining itself, and is alike
beneficial to every citizen of the Republic. And as this service so greatly benefits commerce, it is
well that it should be paid from the general revenues of the country; from the duties which it
creates. At any rate, almost every Post Master General will feel better disposed to subsidize ocean
mail steamers adequately if the bills are payable by the treasury department, and not chargeable
upon his own.
It would be well in all new contracts that the law of Congress authorizing them should require
strength of vessel, a fair dynamic efficiency of performance, water-tight bulkheads for the safety
both of the vessel, and passengers and mails, and all those other safeguards compatible with speed
and mail efficiency. But the most essential point is the mode of making the contracts. We have
pursued two system in this country, that of the lowest bidder, and that of Congressional contracts.
Some have supposed that as the land mails are submitted to the lowest bidder, so those of the ocean
ought to be also. But the cases are very unlike. The land service is a familiar thing, which every
farmer understands, because running a wagon is one of the first things in life that he learns. Every
body is familiar with the land service, and every body has more or less experimented in it, or in
something very similar to it. But it is far otherwise with that of the ocean. Steamshipping is a
comparatively new, a very difficult, and a very little understood science. But few who know its
difficulties will undertake its hazards. Steam power and its expenses are by no means understood
by the people; and the first mistake made by those unacquainted with it is in supposing it much
cheaper than it really is. This mistake leads to fatal consequences in bidding for the ocean service,
commanding nations.
It has been suggested that the Government could secure the transit of the mails on the receipts,
taking both ocean and inland postage; and indeed a temporary arrangement was made with two of
our contending companies running to Europe, to transport them on these terms; but such
arrangements are temporary only, and can not be made the basis of regular action. They would
operate most unequally on different lines. While on the European lines they would pay probably
one half the sum of subsidy required, on many other, and especially on new and untried lines, they
would not at first pay probably one tenth. And granting that on a given line, the receipts during
fifteen years would amount to as much as the whole subsidy required for that time; yet no company
could live on them, as for the first few years the receipts from the mail would be very small, while
the general income of the line from passengers and freight would also be smaller than at any other
time. Moreover, almost every steam company has to borrow money largely during its first years, in
anticipation of the larger income from increased trade during the last years of its existence. Thus,
while the system of the receipts would operate most unequally, the same aggregate sum given in
the form of a regular annual subsidy operates as an assurance for the company and keeps it alive.
But the postal receipts are not adequate to the support of any ocean line. In the report before cited,
the Committee say, at page 5, that the sum of subsidy then paid was £822,390 per annum, whereas
the postal receipts were only £443,782, or but a fraction over one half. There is probably no regular
service in the world where the postal receipts would pay for the transport, especially where
competition existed.
In making our contracts common-sense must dictate the lines necessary, and the general treasury
should pay for them. There is no good reason why the sums of subsidy to be paid for mail
transportation should be chargeable on the Post Office Department. Nor is it really of much
consequence where the account is settled, as the general treasury must after all meet the bills. It
may create some misapprehension as to the services on which the sums annually voted are
bestowed. But the service, whether sea or inland, is alike incapable of sustaining itself, and is alike
beneficial to every citizen of the Republic. And as this service so greatly benefits commerce, it is
well that it should be paid from the general revenues of the country; from the duties which it
creates. At any rate, almost every Post Master General will feel better disposed to subsidize ocean
mail steamers adequately if the bills are payable by the treasury department, and not chargeable
upon his own.
It would be well in all new contracts that the law of Congress authorizing them should require
strength of vessel, a fair dynamic efficiency of performance, water-tight bulkheads for the safety
both of the vessel, and passengers and mails, and all those other safeguards compatible with speed
and mail efficiency. But the most essential point is the mode of making the contracts. We have
pursued two system in this country, that of the lowest bidder, and that of Congressional contracts.
Some have supposed that as the land mails are submitted to the lowest bidder, so those of the ocean
ought to be also. But the cases are very unlike. The land service is a familiar thing, which every
farmer understands, because running a wagon is one of the first things in life that he learns. Every
body is familiar with the land service, and every body has more or less experimented in it, or in
something very similar to it. But it is far otherwise with that of the ocean. Steamshipping is a
comparatively new, a very difficult, and a very little understood science. But few who know its
difficulties will undertake its hazards. Steam power and its expenses are by no means understood
by the people; and the first mistake made by those unacquainted with it is in supposing it much
cheaper than it really is. This mistake leads to fatal consequences in bidding for the ocean service,
Page 100
as most of those unacquainted with the business would engage to perform a given service for less
than the actual price that it would cost them, and certainly for much less than practical, experienced
men would. And herein consists one of the evils of the lowest bidder system, that inexperienced
persons taking such contracts either perform them inefficiently, or appeal constantly to Congress
for relief, or for increase of their pay. Such cases are exceedingly numerous. Post Master General
Campbell said that the lowest bidder system was "a nuisance." Senator Mallory declared in a
debate about the close of the last Congress, that it was a system which never wrought efficiently,
which never gave final satisfaction, and which generally brought in a set of adventurers. The
department and members of Congress had experienced the annoyance and inefficiency of the
system in the contract for carrying the mails between Key West and New-Orleans through the Gulf.
It was several times given to the lowest bidder, and as often fell through; being finally awarded by
private arrangement to other parties, at more than double the prices of the lowest bidders.
In the elaborate Report made in 1852 to the Senate by Gen. Rusk, as Chairman of the Committee
on the Post Office and Post Roads, of which Messrs. Soulé, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton were
members, in speaking on this subject the Committee said:
"Contracts to carry the ocean mail should, like all other contracts made by the Government, be the
subjects of a fair competition, and granted with reference to the public good, due regard being had
to the excellence of the proposals made, under all the circumstances of the cases which may present
themselves. Your committee are aware that it has been too much the practice to regard the lowest as
the cheapest bid; but experience has taught them that lowness of price and cheapness in the end,
are not convertible terms, as the daily applications, from low bidders, to Congress for indemnity
against losses incurred in the public service, will amply demonstrate. For examples of the kind the
committee would respectfully refer to the numerous applications for remuneration, in connection
with the public printing, which have for years past occupied the time and attention of Congress, and
threaten to continue to do so to a most alarming extent, involving, in the end, an accumulation of
expense infinitely beyond the cost that would have attended the performance of the work, at a fair
and liberal compensation. This may be, by some, called economy, but it is the very worst sort of
economy. It excludes the honest workman, who knows the real value of the service to be
performed, and is unwilling to undertake to do his duty well, at the expense of himself and family;
while it lets in the needy and greedy speculator who, having nothing to lose in point of character or
money, will readily undertake what he can not perform, and become dependent upon the
magnanimity of Congress for remuneration for his losses, real or fictitious. An honest and fair
liberality should characterize the dealings between the Government and individuals, just as much as
those between private citizens; and, when contracts are made, they should be entered into in the
spirit of good faith, and with a full knowledge of the risks to be run, and the expenses to be
incurred."
It is claimed on the other hand that in contracts made by Congress the two Committees have every
opportunity of testing the value of the service to be performed, of ascertaining the sum of subsidy
really necessary to its support, of giving to every applicant a fair and impartial hearing, and of
presenting to Congress any case of doubt and difficulty, or of contested right. When the committees
take any line into consideration it is in effect inviting competition and proposals from every one
else than the projector who supposes that he has better claims to it, or can perform the service at
cheaper rates. Such proceedings are always open and advertised to the world for months and
sometimes for years. And there are many persons who will come forward and make a low bid for a
service after some one else has brought it to the attention of the Government and labored it through
Congress, who would not turn their fingers over, or risk a dollar in bringing it before the nation,
than the actual price that it would cost them, and certainly for much less than practical, experienced
men would. And herein consists one of the evils of the lowest bidder system, that inexperienced
persons taking such contracts either perform them inefficiently, or appeal constantly to Congress
for relief, or for increase of their pay. Such cases are exceedingly numerous. Post Master General
Campbell said that the lowest bidder system was "a nuisance." Senator Mallory declared in a
debate about the close of the last Congress, that it was a system which never wrought efficiently,
which never gave final satisfaction, and which generally brought in a set of adventurers. The
department and members of Congress had experienced the annoyance and inefficiency of the
system in the contract for carrying the mails between Key West and New-Orleans through the Gulf.
It was several times given to the lowest bidder, and as often fell through; being finally awarded by
private arrangement to other parties, at more than double the prices of the lowest bidders.
In the elaborate Report made in 1852 to the Senate by Gen. Rusk, as Chairman of the Committee
on the Post Office and Post Roads, of which Messrs. Soulé, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton were
members, in speaking on this subject the Committee said:
"Contracts to carry the ocean mail should, like all other contracts made by the Government, be the
subjects of a fair competition, and granted with reference to the public good, due regard being had
to the excellence of the proposals made, under all the circumstances of the cases which may present
themselves. Your committee are aware that it has been too much the practice to regard the lowest as
the cheapest bid; but experience has taught them that lowness of price and cheapness in the end,
are not convertible terms, as the daily applications, from low bidders, to Congress for indemnity
against losses incurred in the public service, will amply demonstrate. For examples of the kind the
committee would respectfully refer to the numerous applications for remuneration, in connection
with the public printing, which have for years past occupied the time and attention of Congress, and
threaten to continue to do so to a most alarming extent, involving, in the end, an accumulation of
expense infinitely beyond the cost that would have attended the performance of the work, at a fair
and liberal compensation. This may be, by some, called economy, but it is the very worst sort of
economy. It excludes the honest workman, who knows the real value of the service to be
performed, and is unwilling to undertake to do his duty well, at the expense of himself and family;
while it lets in the needy and greedy speculator who, having nothing to lose in point of character or
money, will readily undertake what he can not perform, and become dependent upon the
magnanimity of Congress for remuneration for his losses, real or fictitious. An honest and fair
liberality should characterize the dealings between the Government and individuals, just as much as
those between private citizens; and, when contracts are made, they should be entered into in the
spirit of good faith, and with a full knowledge of the risks to be run, and the expenses to be
incurred."
It is claimed on the other hand that in contracts made by Congress the two Committees have every
opportunity of testing the value of the service to be performed, of ascertaining the sum of subsidy
really necessary to its support, of giving to every applicant a fair and impartial hearing, and of
presenting to Congress any case of doubt and difficulty, or of contested right. When the committees
take any line into consideration it is in effect inviting competition and proposals from every one
else than the projector who supposes that he has better claims to it, or can perform the service at
cheaper rates. Such proceedings are always open and advertised to the world for months and
sometimes for years. And there are many persons who will come forward and make a low bid for a
service after some one else has brought it to the attention of the Government and labored it through
Congress, who would not turn their fingers over, or risk a dollar in bringing it before the nation,
Page 101
and securing for it a due consideration. These are the adventurers who never produce any thing
themselves by a legitimate and honest effort, but who alway stand back to take the chances of
wresting from some enterprising, more far-seeing, and more industrious person the fruits of the toil
perhaps of years. There are many enterprises in which the public have taken no interest because
ignorant of the facts. Some enterprising individual goes zealously to work, travels thousands and
tens of thousands of miles, ascertains all of the facts bearing upon the question, determines its
feasibility or its impracticability, spends years of time and toil, and many thousands of dollars of
money, indoctrinates the people of his country with the new and interesting facts, travels, writes,
labors day and night for years, finally secures the attention of the Government and Congress, and
asks a fair and reasonable compensation for the necessary service which he proposes performing
for the public. He has contended with every species of opposition, overcome unwonted
embarrassments, foiled the machinations of selfish, interested parties who would through all time
mislead the public if they could but continue a monopoly of trade, and finally succeeded in getting
a bill through Congress for the establishment of the long-sought line.
This done, he supposes that he is of course to be rewarded for the effort, the toil, and the
expenditure of years, and that he will have an opportunity of indemnifying himself for his losses
and sacrifices. He hears many beautiful apostrophes to the principles of equal justice and right
which are said to characterize the legislation of his country, and control the action of the
Government; but he is not prepared to hear that some adventurer has carried off his prize simply
because by chance or by concert he has made his bid one thousand or ten thousand dollars lower
than the prime projector. He becomes disheartened; finds that the country neither appreciates nor
desires honorable effort and enterprise; that it will not reward the citizen in his self-sacrificing
attempts to benefit the country and himself together; and that it will look on with careless
indifference while his almost vested, his equitably vested rights, are neglected or stricken down.
This is certainly one of the practical and demoralizing effects of the lowest bidder system, which
respects no rights, however sacred, simply because based upon a dogma which is technically true.
The system of the lowest bidder is technically correct, but practically wrong. It can not be carried
out in practice without abandoning equity and honest rights under the plea of technicalities and the
action of chances. It is in reality but a species of gambling, a miserable lottery, in which those who
are most honest and truthful are invariably sacrificed. It is proper, then that Congress should not
only establish the postal routes, but also determine either specifically or proximately the
compensation to be paid; or leave this entirely to the discretion and the largest liberty of action of
the Post Master General. Responsibility must attach somewhere if justice is obtained. With the
lowest bidder system it rests and operates nowhere; and the most important operations of the
Government are taken out of the hands of a wise public functionary and the intelligent legislators of
the country, and put into a great wheel of fortune, where the proper person has, probably, but one
chance in a hundred. This although true in every case of contract, is eminently so in cases of
untried lines, where the experiment is to be made, and where it is generally necessary that an
individual shall have spent years in bringing it to light.
I come to the conclusion, therefore, that the Government can discharge the clear and
unquestionable duty of affording liberal mail facilities to the people, only by establishing all of the
lines which the commerce and convenience of the country and the Government require; by
maintaining them as a fixed policy of the country from generation to generation; by encouraging
enterprising companies to continue well-performed services, and enterprising citizens to open new
avenues of trade and wealth; and by paying for the same from the general treasury of the people,
and from the revenues which these postal facilities, more than any other series of influences,
themselves by a legitimate and honest effort, but who alway stand back to take the chances of
wresting from some enterprising, more far-seeing, and more industrious person the fruits of the toil
perhaps of years. There are many enterprises in which the public have taken no interest because
ignorant of the facts. Some enterprising individual goes zealously to work, travels thousands and
tens of thousands of miles, ascertains all of the facts bearing upon the question, determines its
feasibility or its impracticability, spends years of time and toil, and many thousands of dollars of
money, indoctrinates the people of his country with the new and interesting facts, travels, writes,
labors day and night for years, finally secures the attention of the Government and Congress, and
asks a fair and reasonable compensation for the necessary service which he proposes performing
for the public. He has contended with every species of opposition, overcome unwonted
embarrassments, foiled the machinations of selfish, interested parties who would through all time
mislead the public if they could but continue a monopoly of trade, and finally succeeded in getting
a bill through Congress for the establishment of the long-sought line.
This done, he supposes that he is of course to be rewarded for the effort, the toil, and the
expenditure of years, and that he will have an opportunity of indemnifying himself for his losses
and sacrifices. He hears many beautiful apostrophes to the principles of equal justice and right
which are said to characterize the legislation of his country, and control the action of the
Government; but he is not prepared to hear that some adventurer has carried off his prize simply
because by chance or by concert he has made his bid one thousand or ten thousand dollars lower
than the prime projector. He becomes disheartened; finds that the country neither appreciates nor
desires honorable effort and enterprise; that it will not reward the citizen in his self-sacrificing
attempts to benefit the country and himself together; and that it will look on with careless
indifference while his almost vested, his equitably vested rights, are neglected or stricken down.
This is certainly one of the practical and demoralizing effects of the lowest bidder system, which
respects no rights, however sacred, simply because based upon a dogma which is technically true.
The system of the lowest bidder is technically correct, but practically wrong. It can not be carried
out in practice without abandoning equity and honest rights under the plea of technicalities and the
action of chances. It is in reality but a species of gambling, a miserable lottery, in which those who
are most honest and truthful are invariably sacrificed. It is proper, then that Congress should not
only establish the postal routes, but also determine either specifically or proximately the
compensation to be paid; or leave this entirely to the discretion and the largest liberty of action of
the Post Master General. Responsibility must attach somewhere if justice is obtained. With the
lowest bidder system it rests and operates nowhere; and the most important operations of the
Government are taken out of the hands of a wise public functionary and the intelligent legislators of
the country, and put into a great wheel of fortune, where the proper person has, probably, but one
chance in a hundred. This although true in every case of contract, is eminently so in cases of
untried lines, where the experiment is to be made, and where it is generally necessary that an
individual shall have spent years in bringing it to light.
I come to the conclusion, therefore, that the Government can discharge the clear and
unquestionable duty of affording liberal mail facilities to the people, only by establishing all of the
lines which the commerce and convenience of the country and the Government require; by
maintaining them as a fixed policy of the country from generation to generation; by encouraging
enterprising companies to continue well-performed services, and enterprising citizens to open new
avenues of trade and wealth; and by paying for the same from the general treasury of the people,
and from the revenues which these postal facilities, more than any other series of influences,
Page 102
conspire to produce and to conserve. (See Report of Lord Canning, Section IX.: also Report of Gen.
Rusk, Paper E: also remarks of Hon. Edwin Croswell, Paper E.)
Rusk, Paper E: also remarks of Hon. Edwin Croswell, Paper E.)
Page 103
SECTION IX.
THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.
steam mail system inaugurated as the promoter of wealth, power, and civilization: the effect of
the system on commerce: the long period designated for the experiment: new lines, when, how,
and why established: the workings of the system: first contract made in 1833, liverpool and isle
of man: with rotterdam in 1834: falmouth and gibraltar, 1837; aberdeen, shetland, and
orkneys, 1840: the "savannah," the first ocean steamer: the sirius and great western: cunard
contract made in 1839: extra pay "within certain limits:" malta, alexandria, suez, east-indies,
and china in 1840: the peninsular and oriental company: west-india service established in 1840:
points touched at: provisional extra pay: panama and valparaiso line established in 1845:
holyhead and kingston in 1848: also the channel islands: west coast of africa and cape of good
hope in 1852: calcutta via the cape in 1852, and abandoned: plymouth, sydney, and new south
wales also in 1852, and abandoned: investigation of 1851 and 1853, and new australian
contract in 1856: halifax, newfoundland, bermuda, and st. thomas in 1850: new-york and
bermuda soon discontinued: comparison of british and american subsidies, rates per mile, total
distances, and postal income: the british government pays higher subsidies than the american:
workings and increase of the british service: gen. rusk's views: speech of hon. t. b. king:
committee of investigation, 1849: new investigation ordered in 1853, and instructions: lord
canning's report and its recommendations: great britain will not abandon her mail system: the
new australian line: testimony of atherton and murray: many extracts from the report: steam
indispensable: not self-supporting: the mail receipts will not pay for it: result of the whole
system: another new service to india and china: shall we run the postal and commercial race
with great britain? canada and the indies.
It is admitted that it is the clear and unquestionable duty of the Government to establish ample
foreign mail facilities for the nation, and that the only means of accomplishing this is by
guaranteeing a liberal allowance for a long term of years for the transport of the mails, and paying
for the same from the general treasury of the country. We will, therefore, now examine the British
ocean steam mail system, and shall see that the practice of that great nation fully corroborates and
sustains the views which have been advanced in the preceding chapters.
The steamship policy of that nation has not been treated as a matter of slight or secondary
importance. British statesmen from the earliest days of the development of marine steam power
saw the influence which it was likely to exert in the revolutions of commerce and the control of the
nations of the world, and determined, with the sagacious foresight and the firm, fixed purpose for
which they are distinguished, that it should be at once inaugurated as the great instrument of
individual wealth and national power. They properly conceived that the nation which used this
transforming agent most freely in commerce, defenses and diplomacy would unquestionably exert
a high controlling influence over the nations of the earth, and make every land tributary to its
wealth and power. The end justifies the effort, and the few temporary sacrifices and insignificant
expenditures which have been made. The British nation launched at once into an extended foreign
mail system which has been twenty years maturing and untouched, and which, on a small annual
expenditure, has given it the profitable control of every trade and every market on the face of the
globe. It was wisely conceded that a long period would be necessary to make the great experiment
THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.
steam mail system inaugurated as the promoter of wealth, power, and civilization: the effect of
the system on commerce: the long period designated for the experiment: new lines, when, how,
and why established: the workings of the system: first contract made in 1833, liverpool and isle
of man: with rotterdam in 1834: falmouth and gibraltar, 1837; aberdeen, shetland, and
orkneys, 1840: the "savannah," the first ocean steamer: the sirius and great western: cunard
contract made in 1839: extra pay "within certain limits:" malta, alexandria, suez, east-indies,
and china in 1840: the peninsular and oriental company: west-india service established in 1840:
points touched at: provisional extra pay: panama and valparaiso line established in 1845:
holyhead and kingston in 1848: also the channel islands: west coast of africa and cape of good
hope in 1852: calcutta via the cape in 1852, and abandoned: plymouth, sydney, and new south
wales also in 1852, and abandoned: investigation of 1851 and 1853, and new australian
contract in 1856: halifax, newfoundland, bermuda, and st. thomas in 1850: new-york and
bermuda soon discontinued: comparison of british and american subsidies, rates per mile, total
distances, and postal income: the british government pays higher subsidies than the american:
workings and increase of the british service: gen. rusk's views: speech of hon. t. b. king:
committee of investigation, 1849: new investigation ordered in 1853, and instructions: lord
canning's report and its recommendations: great britain will not abandon her mail system: the
new australian line: testimony of atherton and murray: many extracts from the report: steam
indispensable: not self-supporting: the mail receipts will not pay for it: result of the whole
system: another new service to india and china: shall we run the postal and commercial race
with great britain? canada and the indies.
It is admitted that it is the clear and unquestionable duty of the Government to establish ample
foreign mail facilities for the nation, and that the only means of accomplishing this is by
guaranteeing a liberal allowance for a long term of years for the transport of the mails, and paying
for the same from the general treasury of the country. We will, therefore, now examine the British
ocean steam mail system, and shall see that the practice of that great nation fully corroborates and
sustains the views which have been advanced in the preceding chapters.
The steamship policy of that nation has not been treated as a matter of slight or secondary
importance. British statesmen from the earliest days of the development of marine steam power
saw the influence which it was likely to exert in the revolutions of commerce and the control of the
nations of the world, and determined, with the sagacious foresight and the firm, fixed purpose for
which they are distinguished, that it should be at once inaugurated as the great instrument of
individual wealth and national power. They properly conceived that the nation which used this
transforming agent most freely in commerce, defenses and diplomacy would unquestionably exert
a high controlling influence over the nations of the earth, and make every land tributary to its
wealth and power. The end justifies the effort, and the few temporary sacrifices and insignificant
expenditures which have been made. The British nation launched at once into an extended foreign
mail system which has been twenty years maturing and untouched, and which, on a small annual
expenditure, has given it the profitable control of every trade and every market on the face of the
globe. It was wisely conceded that a long period would be necessary to make the great experiment
Page 104
of marine steam mails, and that term was granted in the outset. When the first term of twelve years
had ended, the contracts were renewed for another term of twelve years, in every instance with the
companies first authorized, and the sums of subsidy were in every case increased. Not only thus.
New lines were established all along the course of these experiments, in a quiet executive way,
without agitation, without lobbying, without corruption, just as the Post Master General would put
some short and necessary land route into operation. The last of these lines established was that in
1856, between Southampton and Australia for seven years, at an annual subsidy of £185,000, or
$925,000. And this line was established, not because there was no postal communication; for the
Government already had a semi-monthly line to China, India, and Australia, and another around
Africa; but because the increased demands of British trade, and convenience to the British public,
made it necessary.
During all of this time the system has operated with unbroken regularity. Established on a great
general principle, as well as the highest possible expediency, it has been regarded as a fixed policy
of the Government and the people, and has been suffered to do its excellent work quietly and
undisturbed. The legislation introducing it was not an accident. It was not a spasm of generosity to
the people; but it was a fixed purpose of the British public; the wise and only adequate means
adapted to accomplish an important, an indispensable end. The first contract for carrying the mails
in steamers, was made by the Post Master General in 1833, with the "Mona Isle Steam Company,"
to run semi-weekly between Liverpool and the Isle of Man at £850 per annum. This Company has
run the line ever since, a period of twenty-four years, and at the same price per annum. After this, a
contract was made in 1834 with the "General Steam Navigation Company," for the semi-weekly
conveyance of the mails between London and Rotterdam, and London and Hamburg, at £17,000
per year. The contract was not annulled until 1853, nineteen years, when it was found best to send
the mail by a new route; that is, to Ostend, and over the railways of Belgium. The first contract for
a long voyage was made with Richard Bourne, in 1837, to convey the mails weekly from Falmouth
to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for £29,600 per annum. The contract was
transferred in 1843 to the "Peninsular and Oriental Company," Southampton was substituted for
Falmouth, the weekly trips were changed to three per month, and the subsidy was reduced
accordingly, or to £20,500 per annum. The service has been performed on these terms ever since.
The Aberdeen and Shetland contract was made in 1840, at £900 per year, after a failure to run on
£600, by a previous arrangement. It now continues as then made.
It is known that the first passage across the Atlantic was made in the American steamer
"Savannah," which left Savannah, Georgia, on the 25th May, 1819, and at the end of twenty-two
days arrived in Liverpool, steaming only fourteen days of the time. The Savannah was only 350
tons tonnage, and had an engine of ninety horses' power. Captain Moses Rogers was her
commander. The "Sirius" arrived in New-York on the 23d of April, 1838. The steamer "Great
Western" next followed, in the same year. And although this was only nineteen years ago, it is
instructive to notice the observations which the London Times made at that day. That journal said,
March 31, 1838:
"There is really no mistake in this long-talked of project of navigating the Atlantic ocean by steam.
There is no doubt of the intention to make the attempt, and to give the experiment, as such, a fair
trial. The Sirius is actually getting under way for America."
On the 4th of July, 1839, the British Government entered into a contract with Samuel Cunard of
Halifax for a semi-monthly mail line between Liverpool, and Halifax, and Boston, at the sum of
£60,000 or $300,000 per annum. That contract inaugurated a new era in our American commerce
had ended, the contracts were renewed for another term of twelve years, in every instance with the
companies first authorized, and the sums of subsidy were in every case increased. Not only thus.
New lines were established all along the course of these experiments, in a quiet executive way,
without agitation, without lobbying, without corruption, just as the Post Master General would put
some short and necessary land route into operation. The last of these lines established was that in
1856, between Southampton and Australia for seven years, at an annual subsidy of £185,000, or
$925,000. And this line was established, not because there was no postal communication; for the
Government already had a semi-monthly line to China, India, and Australia, and another around
Africa; but because the increased demands of British trade, and convenience to the British public,
made it necessary.
During all of this time the system has operated with unbroken regularity. Established on a great
general principle, as well as the highest possible expediency, it has been regarded as a fixed policy
of the Government and the people, and has been suffered to do its excellent work quietly and
undisturbed. The legislation introducing it was not an accident. It was not a spasm of generosity to
the people; but it was a fixed purpose of the British public; the wise and only adequate means
adapted to accomplish an important, an indispensable end. The first contract for carrying the mails
in steamers, was made by the Post Master General in 1833, with the "Mona Isle Steam Company,"
to run semi-weekly between Liverpool and the Isle of Man at £850 per annum. This Company has
run the line ever since, a period of twenty-four years, and at the same price per annum. After this, a
contract was made in 1834 with the "General Steam Navigation Company," for the semi-weekly
conveyance of the mails between London and Rotterdam, and London and Hamburg, at £17,000
per year. The contract was not annulled until 1853, nineteen years, when it was found best to send
the mail by a new route; that is, to Ostend, and over the railways of Belgium. The first contract for
a long voyage was made with Richard Bourne, in 1837, to convey the mails weekly from Falmouth
to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for £29,600 per annum. The contract was
transferred in 1843 to the "Peninsular and Oriental Company," Southampton was substituted for
Falmouth, the weekly trips were changed to three per month, and the subsidy was reduced
accordingly, or to £20,500 per annum. The service has been performed on these terms ever since.
The Aberdeen and Shetland contract was made in 1840, at £900 per year, after a failure to run on
£600, by a previous arrangement. It now continues as then made.
It is known that the first passage across the Atlantic was made in the American steamer
"Savannah," which left Savannah, Georgia, on the 25th May, 1819, and at the end of twenty-two
days arrived in Liverpool, steaming only fourteen days of the time. The Savannah was only 350
tons tonnage, and had an engine of ninety horses' power. Captain Moses Rogers was her
commander. The "Sirius" arrived in New-York on the 23d of April, 1838. The steamer "Great
Western" next followed, in the same year. And although this was only nineteen years ago, it is
instructive to notice the observations which the London Times made at that day. That journal said,
March 31, 1838:
"There is really no mistake in this long-talked of project of navigating the Atlantic ocean by steam.
There is no doubt of the intention to make the attempt, and to give the experiment, as such, a fair
trial. The Sirius is actually getting under way for America."
On the 4th of July, 1839, the British Government entered into a contract with Samuel Cunard of
Halifax for a semi-monthly mail line between Liverpool, and Halifax, and Boston, at the sum of
£60,000 or $300,000 per annum. That contract inaugurated a new era in our American commerce
Page 105
with the old world, and gave an impulse to those international interests and those commercial
amities which have bound Great Britain and the United States in the bonds of enduring friendship
and mutual, neighborly dependence. Boston soon proved inadequate to the support of the entire
line, and half of the steamers were sent to New-York; and thus they continue to run to this day. It is
a singular fact that since that contract was made, eighteen years ago, there has never been one
transatlantic steamer except those of Mr. Cunard running to or from that port. This contract was
renewed with Mr. Cunard in 1850, when weekly trips were required for the greater portion of the
year, and the subsidy was advanced, not in the ratio of the service, which was only doubled, but as
three to one, from £60,000 to £173,340, or from $300,000 to $866,700. The experience of twelve
years had demonstrated both the necessity of continuing the line, and of increasing the subsidy
which the Government paid, to such a sum as would secure good steamers, regularity of trips, and
efficiency of service. The Company now has nine steamers, with 18,406 tons aggregate tonnage,
and 6,418 horses' power. The contract, which is to continue for twelve years, until 1862, was so
altered in 1852 as to provide for a weekly service as well in winter as in summer; and it will
continue in force from 1862 until twelve months after notice may be given for the discontinuance
of the line. The compensation for the same is at the rate of 11s 41/2d per mile. Lord Canning's
Report to Parliament in 1853, before noticed, in particularizing on this line, said:
"An additional allowance, within certain limits, is to be made to the contractors in the event of an
increase in the rate of insurance on steam vessels, or in the freight or insurance of coals, as
compared with the rates payable at the date of the contract, if proved to the satisfaction of the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty."
Thus, instead of abandoning this line after an experiment of twelve years, and finding that it could
never be self-supporting, the British Government wisely determined to let their policy produce its
full fruits, and continued it for another similar term of years, with three times the former subsidy,
for only twice the old service. (See Collins and Cunard Lines, Sec. X.)
A contract was made in 1840 for steam to Malta, Corfu, and Alexandria, and the service was
extended in 1845 to Suez, Bombáy, Ceylón, Calcutta, Hong Kong, and Shanghae. It was renewed
again in 1853, terminable in 1862, or after twelve months' notice, with a service between Sydney
and Singapore, with the "Peninsular and Oriental Company;" and the subsidy for the whole service
was increased from £199,600 or $998,000 per annum, to $1,224,000 per annum. The Company
have thirty-nine vessels of 48,835 tons, and 12,850 horses' power, and run 796,637 annually, at 6s
13/4d per mile. The steamers run the whole service of 796,637 miles annually, at this low rate
because much of the service is confined to the Mediterranean, as for example, their line from
Southampton to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar; and also that between Marseilles and
Malta. This is but like the coasting trade at the utmost, and is not ocean navigation proper. Before
the contract was renewed the same company got for the service between Hong Kong and Ceylon,
12s 7d per mile, and for that between Suez and Calcutta, £1, 0s 11/2d per mile.
The contract with the "West-India Royal Mail Packet Company" was made in 1840 for a semi-
monthly service to the West-Indies, Central America, and Mexico, at £240,000, and for 547,296
nautical miles per annum. The contract was renewed on the same terms in 1846, and again in 1850,
when the Brazil service was added, and the subsidy increased to £270,000 or $1,350,000 per
annum, for twelve years, or until 1862, and one year after notice shall have been given. The length
of the routes now run by the Company is 37,000 nautical miles, with thirty-four stopping places.
The West-India service of 393,432 miles, is performed at the rate of 10s 101/2d per mile, under
amities which have bound Great Britain and the United States in the bonds of enduring friendship
and mutual, neighborly dependence. Boston soon proved inadequate to the support of the entire
line, and half of the steamers were sent to New-York; and thus they continue to run to this day. It is
a singular fact that since that contract was made, eighteen years ago, there has never been one
transatlantic steamer except those of Mr. Cunard running to or from that port. This contract was
renewed with Mr. Cunard in 1850, when weekly trips were required for the greater portion of the
year, and the subsidy was advanced, not in the ratio of the service, which was only doubled, but as
three to one, from £60,000 to £173,340, or from $300,000 to $866,700. The experience of twelve
years had demonstrated both the necessity of continuing the line, and of increasing the subsidy
which the Government paid, to such a sum as would secure good steamers, regularity of trips, and
efficiency of service. The Company now has nine steamers, with 18,406 tons aggregate tonnage,
and 6,418 horses' power. The contract, which is to continue for twelve years, until 1862, was so
altered in 1852 as to provide for a weekly service as well in winter as in summer; and it will
continue in force from 1862 until twelve months after notice may be given for the discontinuance
of the line. The compensation for the same is at the rate of 11s 41/2d per mile. Lord Canning's
Report to Parliament in 1853, before noticed, in particularizing on this line, said:
"An additional allowance, within certain limits, is to be made to the contractors in the event of an
increase in the rate of insurance on steam vessels, or in the freight or insurance of coals, as
compared with the rates payable at the date of the contract, if proved to the satisfaction of the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty."
Thus, instead of abandoning this line after an experiment of twelve years, and finding that it could
never be self-supporting, the British Government wisely determined to let their policy produce its
full fruits, and continued it for another similar term of years, with three times the former subsidy,
for only twice the old service. (See Collins and Cunard Lines, Sec. X.)
A contract was made in 1840 for steam to Malta, Corfu, and Alexandria, and the service was
extended in 1845 to Suez, Bombáy, Ceylón, Calcutta, Hong Kong, and Shanghae. It was renewed
again in 1853, terminable in 1862, or after twelve months' notice, with a service between Sydney
and Singapore, with the "Peninsular and Oriental Company;" and the subsidy for the whole service
was increased from £199,600 or $998,000 per annum, to $1,224,000 per annum. The Company
have thirty-nine vessels of 48,835 tons, and 12,850 horses' power, and run 796,637 annually, at 6s
13/4d per mile. The steamers run the whole service of 796,637 miles annually, at this low rate
because much of the service is confined to the Mediterranean, as for example, their line from
Southampton to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar; and also that between Marseilles and
Malta. This is but like the coasting trade at the utmost, and is not ocean navigation proper. Before
the contract was renewed the same company got for the service between Hong Kong and Ceylon,
12s 7d per mile, and for that between Suez and Calcutta, £1, 0s 11/2d per mile.
The contract with the "West-India Royal Mail Packet Company" was made in 1840 for a semi-
monthly service to the West-Indies, Central America, and Mexico, at £240,000, and for 547,296
nautical miles per annum. The contract was renewed on the same terms in 1846, and again in 1850,
when the Brazil service was added, and the subsidy increased to £270,000 or $1,350,000 per
annum, for twelve years, or until 1862, and one year after notice shall have been given. The length
of the routes now run by the Company is 37,000 nautical miles, with thirty-four stopping places.
The West-India service of 393,432 miles, is performed at the rate of 10s 101/2d per mile, under
Page 106
special contract; no advertisement ever having been made for tenders. The Brazilian portion of the
service embraces 153,864 miles annually. Pay per mile for the whole Royal Mail service is 9s 10d
per mile. This Company has twenty steamers, of 29,454 tons, and 9,308 horses' power. On the
Brazil portion of the service the touches are at Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriffe, St. Vincent,
Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janiero, Monte Video, and Buenos Ayres. On the West-India division,
St. Thomas is the central dépôt, after touching at the Azores. Ten branch lines radiate from St.
Thomas to Antigua, Barbados, Blewfields, Carriacou, Carthagena, Aspinwall, (which they call
Colon,) Demarára, Dominíca, Grenáda, Greytown, Gaudaloupe, Havanna, Honduras, Jacmel,
Jamaica, Martinique, Porto Rico, St. Kitt's, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Santa Martha, Tampíco, Tobago,
Trinidad, and Vera Cruz. Lord Canning says:
"It is stipulated that if at any time, from causes recognized by the Lords of the Treasury as being of
a 'distinctly public and national character,' the insurance on steam vessels shall rise above 6l 6s per
cent., the freight of coals above 1l 2s 6d per ton, and the insurance on coals above 2l 2s per cent.,
the Company shall receive an additional sum, to be settled by arbitration, but not to exceed 75,000l
a year in the whole."
The special contract for the West Coast of South-America, with the "Pacific Steam Navigation
Company," for three round trips per month between Panama and Valparaiso, touching at
Buenaventura, Guayaquil, Payta, Lambayeque, Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Aríca, Iquique,
Cobija, Copiápo, Huasco, and Coquimbo, was made in 1845, at £20,000, or $100,000 per annum,
for five years. It was renewed in 1850 for ten years; and hence, expires in 1860, if notice may be
given to that effect; the trips being only semi-monthly, and the subsidy increased to £25,000 per
annum. The Company has seven steamers, of 5,719 tons, and 2,396 horses' power. (See List of
British Mail Lines, Paper B, page 193.)
The contract for running fast packets between Holyhead and Kingston, in Ireland, was made in
1848 with the "City of Dublin Steam Packet Company," for £25,000 per annum, and is terminable
at twelve months' notice after 1860. The line is run twice every day. The service to the Channel
islands, from Southampton to Jersey and Guernsey, was established in 1848, at £4,000 per annum,
for three trips per week. That of the West Coast of Africa was established in 1852, at £21,250 per
annum. Leaving Plymouth, the steamers touch at Madeira, Teneriffe, Goree, Bathurst, Sierra
Leone, Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabár,
Cameroon, and Fernando Po. This contract was made with the "African Steamship Company," for a
monthly service, and terminates in 1862 if twelve months' notice be given. There must be three
steamers of 700 tons each, and the pay is, for 149,880 miles annually, at 2s 6d per mile. The
contract with the "General Screw Steamshipping Company," for service semi-monthly from
Plymouth to the Cape of Good Hope and Calcutta, touching on the return voyage at St. Vincent,
Ascension, Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, Point de Galle, Madrás, and St. Hélena, for £50,000 per
year, to be reduced after two years to £40,000 annually, and that to the Cape of Good Hope and
Port Natál, touching at Mossel and Algoa bays, Buffalo, and Port Francis, for £3,000 per annum,
with the same Company, were both made in 1852; but the service was found impracticable on the
terms, and was abandoned. That from Plymouth every two months to Sydney and New South
Wales, with the "Australian Royal Mail Steam Navigation Co.," for £26,000 per annum, and
touching at St. Vincent, Simon's Bay, or Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope, King George Sound, Port
Philip, and St. Hélena, was made also in 1852; but was likewise soon abandoned, as the subsidy in
each case was too small.
service embraces 153,864 miles annually. Pay per mile for the whole Royal Mail service is 9s 10d
per mile. This Company has twenty steamers, of 29,454 tons, and 9,308 horses' power. On the
Brazil portion of the service the touches are at Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriffe, St. Vincent,
Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janiero, Monte Video, and Buenos Ayres. On the West-India division,
St. Thomas is the central dépôt, after touching at the Azores. Ten branch lines radiate from St.
Thomas to Antigua, Barbados, Blewfields, Carriacou, Carthagena, Aspinwall, (which they call
Colon,) Demarára, Dominíca, Grenáda, Greytown, Gaudaloupe, Havanna, Honduras, Jacmel,
Jamaica, Martinique, Porto Rico, St. Kitt's, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Santa Martha, Tampíco, Tobago,
Trinidad, and Vera Cruz. Lord Canning says:
"It is stipulated that if at any time, from causes recognized by the Lords of the Treasury as being of
a 'distinctly public and national character,' the insurance on steam vessels shall rise above 6l 6s per
cent., the freight of coals above 1l 2s 6d per ton, and the insurance on coals above 2l 2s per cent.,
the Company shall receive an additional sum, to be settled by arbitration, but not to exceed 75,000l
a year in the whole."
The special contract for the West Coast of South-America, with the "Pacific Steam Navigation
Company," for three round trips per month between Panama and Valparaiso, touching at
Buenaventura, Guayaquil, Payta, Lambayeque, Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Aríca, Iquique,
Cobija, Copiápo, Huasco, and Coquimbo, was made in 1845, at £20,000, or $100,000 per annum,
for five years. It was renewed in 1850 for ten years; and hence, expires in 1860, if notice may be
given to that effect; the trips being only semi-monthly, and the subsidy increased to £25,000 per
annum. The Company has seven steamers, of 5,719 tons, and 2,396 horses' power. (See List of
British Mail Lines, Paper B, page 193.)
The contract for running fast packets between Holyhead and Kingston, in Ireland, was made in
1848 with the "City of Dublin Steam Packet Company," for £25,000 per annum, and is terminable
at twelve months' notice after 1860. The line is run twice every day. The service to the Channel
islands, from Southampton to Jersey and Guernsey, was established in 1848, at £4,000 per annum,
for three trips per week. That of the West Coast of Africa was established in 1852, at £21,250 per
annum. Leaving Plymouth, the steamers touch at Madeira, Teneriffe, Goree, Bathurst, Sierra
Leone, Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabár,
Cameroon, and Fernando Po. This contract was made with the "African Steamship Company," for a
monthly service, and terminates in 1862 if twelve months' notice be given. There must be three
steamers of 700 tons each, and the pay is, for 149,880 miles annually, at 2s 6d per mile. The
contract with the "General Screw Steamshipping Company," for service semi-monthly from
Plymouth to the Cape of Good Hope and Calcutta, touching on the return voyage at St. Vincent,
Ascension, Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, Point de Galle, Madrás, and St. Hélena, for £50,000 per
year, to be reduced after two years to £40,000 annually, and that to the Cape of Good Hope and
Port Natál, touching at Mossel and Algoa bays, Buffalo, and Port Francis, for £3,000 per annum,
with the same Company, were both made in 1852; but the service was found impracticable on the
terms, and was abandoned. That from Plymouth every two months to Sydney and New South
Wales, with the "Australian Royal Mail Steam Navigation Co.," for £26,000 per annum, and
touching at St. Vincent, Simon's Bay, or Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope, King George Sound, Port
Philip, and St. Hélena, was made also in 1852; but was likewise soon abandoned, as the subsidy in
each case was too small.
Page 107
About this time the Chancellor of the Exchequer requested a thorough investigation into the foreign
steam packet system. This was made in the most searching manner in 1853; and such was the effect
that it was determined not only to sustain all of the existing lines in all of their integrity, but to
extend the system and afford additional facilities to British commerce and the British people.
Accordingly, a new contract was made last year, 1856, with the "European and Australian Mail
Steam Packet Company" for a monthly service between Southampton, Marseilles, Malta,
Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney, at an annual subsidy of £185,000, or $925,000. The Company has
seven steamers of 13,410 tons, and 3,290 horses' power. They run 336,000 miles per annum, and
receive 11s per mile from the Government. It must be borne in mind, too, that when this line was
established there were already two lines to the East-Indies and China, and one to Australia. This
makes two to Australia, and three to the East generally.
There is also a contract, made in 1850 with Mr. Cunard, for running monthly between Halifax and
Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and New-York, as well as between New-York and Bermuda
and St. Thomas. New-York was soon dropped from the list, doubtless because the British steamers
yielded us more advantage than was gained by the mother country or the Provinces, and the line is
now continued, at the original compensation, £14,700, or $73,500, between Halifax and
Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and St. Thomas, connecting with the Cunard steamers. The
steamers are small coasters, and run at the rate of 3s per mile. Hence, they make 98,000 miles per
annum.
The ocean mail steamers of Great Britain run 2,532,231 miles per year, at a total cost to the
Admiralty of £1,062,797, or $5,333,985. The ocean mail steamers of the United States run 735,732
miles per year, at a total charge on the Post Office Department of $1,329,733. The British steamers
run three and a half times as many miles as ours do, and receive for it a sum more than four times
as large. The average price paid to their principal companies, as the West-India Royal Mail, the
Cunard, the Australian, and the Peninsular and Oriental, including its Mediterranean coasting
service, is 9s 7d, or $2.39 per mile; while the average price paid by us, or for the Collins, Havre,
Bremen, Aspinwall, and Panamá, San Francisco and Oregon, is $1.803/4 per mile. The highest sum
paid per mile by the British Government is 11s 41/4d, or $2.831/2, to the Cunard Company, $2.75 to
the Australian, and $2.46 to the West-India; and the lowest, 6s 13/4d, or $1.531/2 to the Peninsular
and Oriental, much of whose service is coasting. This is saying nothing of the Pacific and the
African coasting lines. The highest sum which we pay is to the Collins line, $3.101/2 per mile; and
the lowest to the Havre, $1.001/2 per mile; while the sums paid to all of the other companies range
but little above the last figures. The lowest rate per mile paid to any of the lines under the contract,
was to the Pacific Mail, $1.70. It must not be forgotten that the low rates per mile of the Havre and
Bremen result from those lines taking the postages, since their contracts expired; a sum by no
means adjusted to the service done. They had ships that they could not let lie idle. Under their
regular contracts the pay per mile of the Bremen line was $2.08, and of the Havre $1.761/2. While
the British Government pays to four of her principal transmarine services an average of $2.39 per
mile, we pay to five of ours an average of $1.803/4 only, or but about two thirds as much as she
does. While our total annual expenditure for foreign mails is $1,329,733, a sum by $20,267 less
than that paid to the single service of the West-India Royal Mail Company, that of Great Britain is
$5,333,985. And, while our total income from transmarine postages is $1,035,740, a sum but little
short of that paid in subsidy, taking the present Bremen and Havre services at the estimates of last
year for sea and inland postages combined, the income from the whole transmarine service of Great
Britain, including ocean and inland postage, was, when the last report was made in 1853, £591,573,
steam packet system. This was made in the most searching manner in 1853; and such was the effect
that it was determined not only to sustain all of the existing lines in all of their integrity, but to
extend the system and afford additional facilities to British commerce and the British people.
Accordingly, a new contract was made last year, 1856, with the "European and Australian Mail
Steam Packet Company" for a monthly service between Southampton, Marseilles, Malta,
Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney, at an annual subsidy of £185,000, or $925,000. The Company has
seven steamers of 13,410 tons, and 3,290 horses' power. They run 336,000 miles per annum, and
receive 11s per mile from the Government. It must be borne in mind, too, that when this line was
established there were already two lines to the East-Indies and China, and one to Australia. This
makes two to Australia, and three to the East generally.
There is also a contract, made in 1850 with Mr. Cunard, for running monthly between Halifax and
Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and New-York, as well as between New-York and Bermuda
and St. Thomas. New-York was soon dropped from the list, doubtless because the British steamers
yielded us more advantage than was gained by the mother country or the Provinces, and the line is
now continued, at the original compensation, £14,700, or $73,500, between Halifax and
Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and St. Thomas, connecting with the Cunard steamers. The
steamers are small coasters, and run at the rate of 3s per mile. Hence, they make 98,000 miles per
annum.
The ocean mail steamers of Great Britain run 2,532,231 miles per year, at a total cost to the
Admiralty of £1,062,797, or $5,333,985. The ocean mail steamers of the United States run 735,732
miles per year, at a total charge on the Post Office Department of $1,329,733. The British steamers
run three and a half times as many miles as ours do, and receive for it a sum more than four times
as large. The average price paid to their principal companies, as the West-India Royal Mail, the
Cunard, the Australian, and the Peninsular and Oriental, including its Mediterranean coasting
service, is 9s 7d, or $2.39 per mile; while the average price paid by us, or for the Collins, Havre,
Bremen, Aspinwall, and Panamá, San Francisco and Oregon, is $1.803/4 per mile. The highest sum
paid per mile by the British Government is 11s 41/4d, or $2.831/2, to the Cunard Company, $2.75 to
the Australian, and $2.46 to the West-India; and the lowest, 6s 13/4d, or $1.531/2 to the Peninsular
and Oriental, much of whose service is coasting. This is saying nothing of the Pacific and the
African coasting lines. The highest sum which we pay is to the Collins line, $3.101/2 per mile; and
the lowest to the Havre, $1.001/2 per mile; while the sums paid to all of the other companies range
but little above the last figures. The lowest rate per mile paid to any of the lines under the contract,
was to the Pacific Mail, $1.70. It must not be forgotten that the low rates per mile of the Havre and
Bremen result from those lines taking the postages, since their contracts expired; a sum by no
means adjusted to the service done. They had ships that they could not let lie idle. Under their
regular contracts the pay per mile of the Bremen line was $2.08, and of the Havre $1.761/2. While
the British Government pays to four of her principal transmarine services an average of $2.39 per
mile, we pay to five of ours an average of $1.803/4 only, or but about two thirds as much as she
does. While our total annual expenditure for foreign mails is $1,329,733, a sum by $20,267 less
than that paid to the single service of the West-India Royal Mail Company, that of Great Britain is
$5,333,985. And, while our total income from transmarine postages is $1,035,740, a sum but little
short of that paid in subsidy, taking the present Bremen and Havre services at the estimates of last
year for sea and inland postages combined, the income from the whole transmarine service of Great
Britain, including ocean and inland postage, was, when the last report was made in 1853, £591,573,
Page 108
or $2,957,865; but little above half the sum paid in subsidy, and including the French, Belgian, and
Dutch routes, where the postal yield was much greater than from the ocean lines. The estimates
which I present below have been made with great care from distances and subsidies furnished me
by the reliable First Assistant Post Master General, Hon. Horatio King, from the last report of the
late Post Master General, and from the report of the British Post Master General, Lord Canning,
before noticed. Every item is consequently authentic.
AMERICAN.
Line. Trips. Distances. Subsidy. Gross Postage. Total Miles Pay per Mile.
Collins, 20 3,100 $385,000 $415,867 124,000 $3.101/2
Bremen, 13 3,700 128,987 128,937 96,000 1.34
Havre, 13 3,270 88,484 88,484 85,020 1.001/2
Aspinwall, 24 3,200 290,000 139,610 153,600 1.883/4
Pacific, 24 4,200 348,250 183,238 201,600 1.70
Havana, 24 669 60,000 6,288 32,112 1.861/2
Vera Cruz, 24 900 29,062 5,960 43,200 .67
3
$1,329,733 $1,035,740 725,732 $1.80 /4 Average.
Total average per mile, $1.803/4. Average of five principal lines, $1.803/4.
BRITISH.
Total
Line. Trips. Distances. Subsidy. Gross Postage. Pay per Mile.
Miles
Cunard, 52 3,100 £173,340 £143,667.10s 304,000 11s 41/2d $2.381/2
Royal
24 11,402 270,000 106,905.00 547,296 9s10 $2.46
Mail,
Pen. and
24 [F] 244,000 178,186.11 796,637 6s 13/4 $1.531/2
Oriental,
Australian, 12 14,000 185,000 33,281.12 336,000 11s00 $2.75
Bermúda
and St. 24 2,042 14,700 98,000 3s00 $0.75
Thomas,
Panamá
and 24 2,718 25,000 5,715.00 130,434 3s10 $0.96
Valparaiso,
3,196.02
West
French, Belgian,
Coast 12 6,245 23,250 149,880 2s 6 $0.621/2
and Dutch
Africa,
Postage.
Channel
156 132 74,430.08 41,184
Islands,
Holyhead 730 64 36,158.09 93,440
and
£1,062,797 £591,573.07s 2,532,231 9s 7d $2.39
Dutch routes, where the postal yield was much greater than from the ocean lines. The estimates
which I present below have been made with great care from distances and subsidies furnished me
by the reliable First Assistant Post Master General, Hon. Horatio King, from the last report of the
late Post Master General, and from the report of the British Post Master General, Lord Canning,
before noticed. Every item is consequently authentic.
AMERICAN.
Line. Trips. Distances. Subsidy. Gross Postage. Total Miles Pay per Mile.
Collins, 20 3,100 $385,000 $415,867 124,000 $3.101/2
Bremen, 13 3,700 128,987 128,937 96,000 1.34
Havre, 13 3,270 88,484 88,484 85,020 1.001/2
Aspinwall, 24 3,200 290,000 139,610 153,600 1.883/4
Pacific, 24 4,200 348,250 183,238 201,600 1.70
Havana, 24 669 60,000 6,288 32,112 1.861/2
Vera Cruz, 24 900 29,062 5,960 43,200 .67
3
$1,329,733 $1,035,740 725,732 $1.80 /4 Average.
Total average per mile, $1.803/4. Average of five principal lines, $1.803/4.
BRITISH.
Total
Line. Trips. Distances. Subsidy. Gross Postage. Pay per Mile.
Miles
Cunard, 52 3,100 £173,340 £143,667.10s 304,000 11s 41/2d $2.381/2
Royal
24 11,402 270,000 106,905.00 547,296 9s10 $2.46
Mail,
Pen. and
24 [F] 244,000 178,186.11 796,637 6s 13/4 $1.531/2
Oriental,
Australian, 12 14,000 185,000 33,281.12 336,000 11s00 $2.75
Bermúda
and St. 24 2,042 14,700 98,000 3s00 $0.75
Thomas,
Panamá
and 24 2,718 25,000 5,715.00 130,434 3s10 $0.96
Valparaiso,
3,196.02
West
French, Belgian,
Coast 12 6,245 23,250 149,880 2s 6 $0.621/2
and Dutch
Africa,
Postage.
Channel
156 132 74,430.08 41,184
Islands,
Holyhead 730 64 36,158.09 93,440
and
£1,062,797 £591,573.07s 2,532,231 9s 7d $2.39
Page 109
Total
Line. Trips. Distances. Subsidy. Gross Postage. Pay per Mile.
Miles
Kingston,
Liv. and
Isle of 112 70 10,032.15 14,560
Man,
Shetland
and 52 200 20,800
Orkneys,
£1,062,797 £591,573.07s 2,532,231 9s 7d $2.39
Total Average per Mile, $2.101/3. Average of four principal lines, $2.39.
[F] The Peninsular and Oriental Company run twice per month between Southampton and Alexandria,
and between Suez and Calcutta and Hong Kong; twice per month between Marseilles and Malta; between
Singapore and Sydney every two months; and three times per month between Southampton and Gibraltar,
touching at Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, and Cadiz.
It would hardly be expected that the lines of this country should run at cheaper rates than those of
Great Britain, as the prime cost of ships and their repairs, fuel, wages, insurance, etc., are much
cheaper there, and as they have more paying freights, in their manufactured goods. It only explains
to us, what has alway seemed a mystery; that while the regular companies in England were making
money, nearly all of those in the United States not only had not made money, but were embarrassed
more or less, and were selling their stocks at sixty to eighty cents on the dollar.
It is pleasing and instructive to examine the steam mail service of Great Britain, and see the
gradual, unfaltering progress that she has made from year to year, since 1833; increasing the mail
facilities and the sums paid for them by constant accretion based on system, rather than by any
spasmodic legislation, or the ruling caprices of the moment. These improvements have not come all
in a mass, or in any one year. Neither have they been abandoned at times of financial
embarrassment, or commercial depression. At such periods they have been as regularly fostered as
in the times of the most flush prosperity; and have ever been properly considered one of the prime
agents and necessities for restoring commerce to its normal condition and a safe equilibrium. The
transmarine service, which cost but £583,793, or $2,918,965, per annum until 1850,[G] now costs
£1,062,797, or $5,333,985; within a fraction of double the sum. While the increase has not been
slow, it has been steady and systematic, just as it was necessary to meet the wants of British
commerce throughout the world. The language of the Hon. Senator Rusk on this subject, in his
Report made to the Senate, Sep. 18th, 1850, found in Senate Ex. Doc. No. 50, 1st Session of 32d
Congress, in Special Rep. Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is forcible and worthy of remembrance. He
says:
[G] See Second Report, Steam Communication with India, 1851. Appendix, page 419.
"The importance of the steam mail service, when considered with reference to the convenience
which it affords to the social intercourse of the country, is as nothing when compared with its vast
bearing upon the commerce of the world. Wherever facilities of rapid travel exist, trade will be
found with its attendant wealth. Of the truth of this proposition, no country, perhaps, affords a more
forcible illustration than Great Britain, as none has ever availed itself, to so great an extent, of the
benefits of easy and rapid intercommunication between the various portions of her almost
boundless empire. The commercial history of England has shown that mail facilities have
uniformly gone hand in hand with the extension of trade; and wherever British subjects are found
Line. Trips. Distances. Subsidy. Gross Postage. Pay per Mile.
Miles
Kingston,
Liv. and
Isle of 112 70 10,032.15 14,560
Man,
Shetland
and 52 200 20,800
Orkneys,
£1,062,797 £591,573.07s 2,532,231 9s 7d $2.39
Total Average per Mile, $2.101/3. Average of four principal lines, $2.39.
[F] The Peninsular and Oriental Company run twice per month between Southampton and Alexandria,
and between Suez and Calcutta and Hong Kong; twice per month between Marseilles and Malta; between
Singapore and Sydney every two months; and three times per month between Southampton and Gibraltar,
touching at Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, and Cadiz.
It would hardly be expected that the lines of this country should run at cheaper rates than those of
Great Britain, as the prime cost of ships and their repairs, fuel, wages, insurance, etc., are much
cheaper there, and as they have more paying freights, in their manufactured goods. It only explains
to us, what has alway seemed a mystery; that while the regular companies in England were making
money, nearly all of those in the United States not only had not made money, but were embarrassed
more or less, and were selling their stocks at sixty to eighty cents on the dollar.
It is pleasing and instructive to examine the steam mail service of Great Britain, and see the
gradual, unfaltering progress that she has made from year to year, since 1833; increasing the mail
facilities and the sums paid for them by constant accretion based on system, rather than by any
spasmodic legislation, or the ruling caprices of the moment. These improvements have not come all
in a mass, or in any one year. Neither have they been abandoned at times of financial
embarrassment, or commercial depression. At such periods they have been as regularly fostered as
in the times of the most flush prosperity; and have ever been properly considered one of the prime
agents and necessities for restoring commerce to its normal condition and a safe equilibrium. The
transmarine service, which cost but £583,793, or $2,918,965, per annum until 1850,[G] now costs
£1,062,797, or $5,333,985; within a fraction of double the sum. While the increase has not been
slow, it has been steady and systematic, just as it was necessary to meet the wants of British
commerce throughout the world. The language of the Hon. Senator Rusk on this subject, in his
Report made to the Senate, Sep. 18th, 1850, found in Senate Ex. Doc. No. 50, 1st Session of 32d
Congress, in Special Rep. Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is forcible and worthy of remembrance. He
says:
[G] See Second Report, Steam Communication with India, 1851. Appendix, page 419.
"The importance of the steam mail service, when considered with reference to the convenience
which it affords to the social intercourse of the country, is as nothing when compared with its vast
bearing upon the commerce of the world. Wherever facilities of rapid travel exist, trade will be
found with its attendant wealth. Of the truth of this proposition, no country, perhaps, affords a more
forcible illustration than Great Britain, as none has ever availed itself, to so great an extent, of the
benefits of easy and rapid intercommunication between the various portions of her almost
boundless empire. The commercial history of England has shown that mail facilities have
uniformly gone hand in hand with the extension of trade; and wherever British subjects are found
Page 110
forming communities, there do we find the hand of the government busy in supplying the means of
easy and safe communication with the mother country. With a view to this, we have beheld
England increasing her steam marine at an enormous expense, and sustaining packet lines
connecting with every quarter of the globe, even in cases where any immediate and direct
remuneration was out of the question. The great object in view was, to draw together the portions
of an empire upon which the sun never sets, and the martial airs of which encircle the globe, and to
make British subjects who dwell in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and even Oceanica, all feel alike
that they are Britons."
The Hon. Thomas Butler King, formerly Chairman of the Naval Committee, in a speech in the
House, 19th July, 1848, said on this subject:
"In the year 1840 a contract was made by the Admiralty with the Royal Mail Steam Packet
Company, at two hundred and forty thousand pounds sterling, or one million two hundred thousand
dollars per annum, for fourteen steamers to carry the mails from Southampton to the West-Indies,
the ports of Mexico in the Gulf, and to New-Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, and Charleston. These
ships are of the largest class, and are to conform in all respects, concerning size and adaptation to
the purposes of war, to the conditions prescribed in the Cunard contracts. They are to make twenty-
four voyages or forty-eight trips a year, leaving and returning to Southampton semi-monthly.
"Another contract has recently been entered into, as I am informed, for two ships to run between
Bermuda and New-York. The West-India line, in consequence of some disasters during the first
years of its service, was relieved from touching at the ports of the United States; but in the spring of
last year it was required to resume its communication with New-Orleans, and is at any time liable
to be required to touch at the other ports on our coast which I have named. Thus it will be
perceived that this system of mail steam-packet service is so arranged as not only to communicate
with Canada and the West-Indies, the ports on the Spanish Main and the Gulf coast of Mexico, but
also to touch at every important port in the United States, from Boston to New-Orleans.
"These three lines employ twenty-five steamers of the largest and most efficient description, where
familiarity with our seaports and the whole extent of our coast would render them the most
formidable enemies in time of war. It is scarcely possible to imagine a system more skillfully
devised to bring down upon us, at any given point, and at any unexpected moment, the whole force
of British power. More especially is this true with respect to our southern coast, where the great
number of accessible and unprotected harbors, both on the Atlantic and the Gulf, would render such
incursions comparatively safe to them, and terrible to us. And when we reflect that the design of
this system is, that it shall draw the means of its support from our own commerce and intercourse,
we should surely have been wanting in the duty we owed to ourselves and to our country, if we had
failed to adopt measures towards the establishment of such an American system of Atlantic steam
navigation as would compete successfully with it."
Previous to the renewal of the several foreign mail contracts, in 1850, the Treasury ordered, 26th
April, 1849, the formation of a Committee in these words: "Ordered, that a Select Committee be
appointed to inquire into the Contract Packet Service." That Committee was composed of Sir
James Hogg, Mr. Cardwell, Sir Wm. Clay, Mr. Cowper, Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Fitz Roy,
Mr. Hastie, Mr. Mangles, Mr. Thomas Baring, Mr. Bankes, Mr. William Brown, Mr. Childers, Mr.
Wilcox, Mr. Crogan, and Mr. Henley. Mr. Elliot was added in the place of Mr. Baring. The
Committee sat seventeen days, and examined fifteen witnesses under oath, many of these being
commanders in the Navy, Secretaries, Presidents, and engineers of the Companies, and other
easy and safe communication with the mother country. With a view to this, we have beheld
England increasing her steam marine at an enormous expense, and sustaining packet lines
connecting with every quarter of the globe, even in cases where any immediate and direct
remuneration was out of the question. The great object in view was, to draw together the portions
of an empire upon which the sun never sets, and the martial airs of which encircle the globe, and to
make British subjects who dwell in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and even Oceanica, all feel alike
that they are Britons."
The Hon. Thomas Butler King, formerly Chairman of the Naval Committee, in a speech in the
House, 19th July, 1848, said on this subject:
"In the year 1840 a contract was made by the Admiralty with the Royal Mail Steam Packet
Company, at two hundred and forty thousand pounds sterling, or one million two hundred thousand
dollars per annum, for fourteen steamers to carry the mails from Southampton to the West-Indies,
the ports of Mexico in the Gulf, and to New-Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, and Charleston. These
ships are of the largest class, and are to conform in all respects, concerning size and adaptation to
the purposes of war, to the conditions prescribed in the Cunard contracts. They are to make twenty-
four voyages or forty-eight trips a year, leaving and returning to Southampton semi-monthly.
"Another contract has recently been entered into, as I am informed, for two ships to run between
Bermuda and New-York. The West-India line, in consequence of some disasters during the first
years of its service, was relieved from touching at the ports of the United States; but in the spring of
last year it was required to resume its communication with New-Orleans, and is at any time liable
to be required to touch at the other ports on our coast which I have named. Thus it will be
perceived that this system of mail steam-packet service is so arranged as not only to communicate
with Canada and the West-Indies, the ports on the Spanish Main and the Gulf coast of Mexico, but
also to touch at every important port in the United States, from Boston to New-Orleans.
"These three lines employ twenty-five steamers of the largest and most efficient description, where
familiarity with our seaports and the whole extent of our coast would render them the most
formidable enemies in time of war. It is scarcely possible to imagine a system more skillfully
devised to bring down upon us, at any given point, and at any unexpected moment, the whole force
of British power. More especially is this true with respect to our southern coast, where the great
number of accessible and unprotected harbors, both on the Atlantic and the Gulf, would render such
incursions comparatively safe to them, and terrible to us. And when we reflect that the design of
this system is, that it shall draw the means of its support from our own commerce and intercourse,
we should surely have been wanting in the duty we owed to ourselves and to our country, if we had
failed to adopt measures towards the establishment of such an American system of Atlantic steam
navigation as would compete successfully with it."
Previous to the renewal of the several foreign mail contracts, in 1850, the Treasury ordered, 26th
April, 1849, the formation of a Committee in these words: "Ordered, that a Select Committee be
appointed to inquire into the Contract Packet Service." That Committee was composed of Sir
James Hogg, Mr. Cardwell, Sir Wm. Clay, Mr. Cowper, Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Fitz Roy,
Mr. Hastie, Mr. Mangles, Mr. Thomas Baring, Mr. Bankes, Mr. William Brown, Mr. Childers, Mr.
Wilcox, Mr. Crogan, and Mr. Henley. Mr. Elliot was added in the place of Mr. Baring. The
Committee sat seventeen days, and examined fifteen witnesses under oath, many of these being
commanders in the Navy, Secretaries, Presidents, and engineers of the Companies, and other
Page 111
eminent men in steam. Mr. Cunard was among the witnesses. After taking evidence and papers
extending over about seven hundred and eighty-three octavo pages, they said in their report, after
recommending that great care should be exercised in making all future contracts:
"1. That so far as the Committee are able to judge, from the evidence they have taken, it appears
that the mails are conveyed at a less cost by Hired Packets than by Her Majesty's Vessels.
"2. That some of the existing Contracts have been put up to public tender, and some arranged by
private negotiation; and that a very large sum beyond what is received from postage is paid on
some of the lines; but considering that at the time these contracts were arranged the success of
these large undertakings was uncertain, Your Committee see no reason to think that better terms
could have been obtained for the public."
This investigation was made to enable the Government to proceed intelligently with the many
contracts which were to expire in 1850; and its immediate consequence was, not only the renewal
of all the old contracts with the same parties at the same or larger pay, but the establishment of
several new services.
The British system had operated to the very highest satisfaction of the public and the Government
for twenty years, until 1853, as it has done ever since; but at that time it was put to a second and
very severe test. It had been suggested, probably by the Lords of the Admiralty, who had to pay the
bills from the Naval fund, that the packet system was too costly, and should be remodelled, and
perhaps reduced. Complaint was thus made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in a Treasury
Minute, dated March 1, 1853, says:
"Important as it is to secure rapid and certain communication with the remote dependencies of this
country, and with other distant states, for national purposes, it is doubtless, under all common
circumstances, from commercial considerations that such facility of correspondence derives its
highest value."
"Her Majesty's Government conceive the time to have arrived when the entire charge of the packet
service should be deliberately examined and reviewed, with joint reference to the questions—how
far the purposes with which the present system was begun have been accomplished—how far the
total amount of service rendered to the State is adequate to the total annual expense—how far there
may be cause for a more than commonly jealous and scrupulous consideration of such further
schemes of extension of the system as particular interests or parties may press, or even such as
public objects may recommend from time to time; lastly, how far, on account of the early period at
which certain of the contracts are terminable, or on account of requisitions put in by the contractors
themselves for the modification of the terms, or for any other reason, it may be prudent to entertain
the question of any revision of those terms, or of laying down any prospective rules with regard to
them; such only, of course, as may comport with the equitable as well as the legal rights of the
parties, and may avoid any disappointment to the just expectations of those classes who may have
felt a peculiar interest in the establishment and extension of these great lines of communication."
After remarking that some of the vessels of some few Companies were unfit for purposes of war,
the "Minute of the Treasury," in instructing the Committee, further says:
"At the same time, it is not to be conceived that, on account of this failure in a portion of the
design, the country has cause to regret having paid a larger price than was intended to be paid
extending over about seven hundred and eighty-three octavo pages, they said in their report, after
recommending that great care should be exercised in making all future contracts:
"1. That so far as the Committee are able to judge, from the evidence they have taken, it appears
that the mails are conveyed at a less cost by Hired Packets than by Her Majesty's Vessels.
"2. That some of the existing Contracts have been put up to public tender, and some arranged by
private negotiation; and that a very large sum beyond what is received from postage is paid on
some of the lines; but considering that at the time these contracts were arranged the success of
these large undertakings was uncertain, Your Committee see no reason to think that better terms
could have been obtained for the public."
This investigation was made to enable the Government to proceed intelligently with the many
contracts which were to expire in 1850; and its immediate consequence was, not only the renewal
of all the old contracts with the same parties at the same or larger pay, but the establishment of
several new services.
The British system had operated to the very highest satisfaction of the public and the Government
for twenty years, until 1853, as it has done ever since; but at that time it was put to a second and
very severe test. It had been suggested, probably by the Lords of the Admiralty, who had to pay the
bills from the Naval fund, that the packet system was too costly, and should be remodelled, and
perhaps reduced. Complaint was thus made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in a Treasury
Minute, dated March 1, 1853, says:
"Important as it is to secure rapid and certain communication with the remote dependencies of this
country, and with other distant states, for national purposes, it is doubtless, under all common
circumstances, from commercial considerations that such facility of correspondence derives its
highest value."
"Her Majesty's Government conceive the time to have arrived when the entire charge of the packet
service should be deliberately examined and reviewed, with joint reference to the questions—how
far the purposes with which the present system was begun have been accomplished—how far the
total amount of service rendered to the State is adequate to the total annual expense—how far there
may be cause for a more than commonly jealous and scrupulous consideration of such further
schemes of extension of the system as particular interests or parties may press, or even such as
public objects may recommend from time to time; lastly, how far, on account of the early period at
which certain of the contracts are terminable, or on account of requisitions put in by the contractors
themselves for the modification of the terms, or for any other reason, it may be prudent to entertain
the question of any revision of those terms, or of laying down any prospective rules with regard to
them; such only, of course, as may comport with the equitable as well as the legal rights of the
parties, and may avoid any disappointment to the just expectations of those classes who may have
felt a peculiar interest in the establishment and extension of these great lines of communication."
After remarking that some of the vessels of some few Companies were unfit for purposes of war,
the "Minute of the Treasury," in instructing the Committee, further says:
"At the same time, it is not to be conceived that, on account of this failure in a portion of the
design, the country has cause to regret having paid a larger price than was intended to be paid
Page 112
simply for the establishment of these noble chains of communication, which well nigh embrace the
world. The organization of a complete postal system upon the ocean, with absolute fixity of
departures, and a general approach to certainty in arrivals, was a great problem, of high interest and
benefit, not to England only, but to all civilized countries; and this problem may now be said to
have been solved by England, for the advantage of mankind at large. It was to all appearance
altogether beyond the reach of merely commercial enterprise; and if the price paid has been high,
the object has been worthy, and the success for all essential purposes complete."
As a consequence of this "Minute," the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury appointed
a Committee, consisting of Viscount Canning, Post Master General of Great Britain, as President;
Hon. Wm. Cowper, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty; Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart.; and Mr.
R. Madox Bromley, Secretary to the Board of Audit. The Committee organized, examined the
Evidence and Report of the Committee of 1849, also the three large volumes of Evidence and
Report taken by the Committee in 1851 on "Steam Communication with India and Australia," and
the many elaborate documents of this class published by the Admiralty. After discussing thoroughly
all of the political, financial, commercial, ethical, and social questions connected with rapid steam
mail communication, they made an elaborate and detailed examination of all the contracts existing
with the Government, and of the affairs of the various companies, with a view to deciding whether
the ocean mail service should be abridged, or continued, or extended. They reported to both Houses
of Parliament, July 8th, 1853. The conclusion of the Committee was, not only that the present
service was demanded by every interest of the country and should be sustained, but that it should
be judiciously extended, so as to meet all of the wants of the British public of whatever class. As
elsewhere remarked, the new line established last year to Australia and India, at a cost of $925,000
per annum, for seven years, was a legitimate result of that test and that report, made in the most
searching manner by the very ablest men of the kingdom; and this, notwithstanding the reports
purposely circulated in this country every few years that Great Britain intends abandoning her
steam mail system. She will abandon that system, as her practice plainly indicates, only when her
people shall have discovered some means of making and preserving wealth without effort,
enterprise, commerce, or manufactures. (See page 99, Mr. Atherton's Reply.) The Report says:
"Before the application of steam to the propulsion of ships, the contracts were often made for short
periods, the Government being able to find, among the vessels already employed in trade, some of
speed sufficient for the purpose; but when it became requisite to dispatch the mails by steam, the
ordinary supply of trading vessels would no longer suffice, and the Government had to call into
existence a new class of packets.
"The postal service between England and the adjacent shores of Ireland, France, and Belgium, was
at first performed by steam packets belonging to the Crown; but for the longer voyages it was
thought better to induce commercial companies to build steamers; and with that view the contracts
were at first made for periods which, unless previously terminated by failure to fulfill their
engagements, would secure to the company the full benefit of their original outlay, by continuing
the employment of their vessels until they might be expected to require extensive repairs, or to
become unfit for continued service. In 1837 steam communication was created with Portugal and
Gibraltar; in 1840 with Egypt, with the West-Indies, and with North-America.
"When the public interest requires the establishment of a postal line on which the ordinary traffic
would not be remunerative for steamers, the subsidy to be allowed in the contract may be
ascertained either by the test of public competition, or by calculating the amount which, on an
world. The organization of a complete postal system upon the ocean, with absolute fixity of
departures, and a general approach to certainty in arrivals, was a great problem, of high interest and
benefit, not to England only, but to all civilized countries; and this problem may now be said to
have been solved by England, for the advantage of mankind at large. It was to all appearance
altogether beyond the reach of merely commercial enterprise; and if the price paid has been high,
the object has been worthy, and the success for all essential purposes complete."
As a consequence of this "Minute," the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury appointed
a Committee, consisting of Viscount Canning, Post Master General of Great Britain, as President;
Hon. Wm. Cowper, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty; Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart.; and Mr.
R. Madox Bromley, Secretary to the Board of Audit. The Committee organized, examined the
Evidence and Report of the Committee of 1849, also the three large volumes of Evidence and
Report taken by the Committee in 1851 on "Steam Communication with India and Australia," and
the many elaborate documents of this class published by the Admiralty. After discussing thoroughly
all of the political, financial, commercial, ethical, and social questions connected with rapid steam
mail communication, they made an elaborate and detailed examination of all the contracts existing
with the Government, and of the affairs of the various companies, with a view to deciding whether
the ocean mail service should be abridged, or continued, or extended. They reported to both Houses
of Parliament, July 8th, 1853. The conclusion of the Committee was, not only that the present
service was demanded by every interest of the country and should be sustained, but that it should
be judiciously extended, so as to meet all of the wants of the British public of whatever class. As
elsewhere remarked, the new line established last year to Australia and India, at a cost of $925,000
per annum, for seven years, was a legitimate result of that test and that report, made in the most
searching manner by the very ablest men of the kingdom; and this, notwithstanding the reports
purposely circulated in this country every few years that Great Britain intends abandoning her
steam mail system. She will abandon that system, as her practice plainly indicates, only when her
people shall have discovered some means of making and preserving wealth without effort,
enterprise, commerce, or manufactures. (See page 99, Mr. Atherton's Reply.) The Report says:
"Before the application of steam to the propulsion of ships, the contracts were often made for short
periods, the Government being able to find, among the vessels already employed in trade, some of
speed sufficient for the purpose; but when it became requisite to dispatch the mails by steam, the
ordinary supply of trading vessels would no longer suffice, and the Government had to call into
existence a new class of packets.
"The postal service between England and the adjacent shores of Ireland, France, and Belgium, was
at first performed by steam packets belonging to the Crown; but for the longer voyages it was
thought better to induce commercial companies to build steamers; and with that view the contracts
were at first made for periods which, unless previously terminated by failure to fulfill their
engagements, would secure to the company the full benefit of their original outlay, by continuing
the employment of their vessels until they might be expected to require extensive repairs, or to
become unfit for continued service. In 1837 steam communication was created with Portugal and
Gibraltar; in 1840 with Egypt, with the West-Indies, and with North-America.
"When the public interest requires the establishment of a postal line on which the ordinary traffic
would not be remunerative for steamers, the subsidy to be allowed in the contract may be
ascertained either by the test of public competition, or by calculating the amount which, on an
Page 113
estimate of the probable receipts and expenditure, will cover the deficiency of receipts, or by
comparing it with the cost of war vessels if employed for the same purpose."
"The objects which appear to have led to the formation of these contracts, and to the large
expenditure involved, were—to afford a rapid, frequent, and punctual communication with those
distant ports which feed the main arteries of British commerce, and with the most important of our
foreign possessions; to foster maritime enterprise; and to encourage the production of a superior
class of vessels which would promote the convenience and wealth of the country in time of peace,
and assist in defending its shores against hostile aggression.
"These expectations have not been disappointed. The ocean has been traversed with a precision and
regularity hitherto deemed impossible—commerce and civilization have been extended—the
colonies have been brought more closely into connection with the Home Government—and
steamships have been constructed of a size and power that, without Government aid, could hardly,
at least for many years, have been produced.
"It is not easy to estimate the pecuniary value of these results, but there is no reason to suppose that
they could have been attained at that time at less cost."
After noticing the objects of the postal contracts, the Report says, in speaking of their results:
"To show what the system is capable of accomplishing, it will be sufficient that we should call
attention to the two great lines of communication which have been opened, the one between this
country and India, the other between this country and America. The mails are dispatched twice a
month in the one case, and once a week in the other, and are conveyed to their destination with a
regularity and rapidity which leaves nothing to be desired. The time occupied in the voyage to and
fro between England and Bombay, which, before the establishment of the Overland Route,
averaged about 224 days, is now no more than 87 days; and the time occupied in the voyage to and
fro between England and the United States, which before 1840 varied from 45 to 105 days, is now
reduced to an average period of 24 days. Nor is the service simply rapid, it is also regular; and the
mercantile community can reckon with the utmost certainty on the punctual departure of the mails
at the appointed times, and can also calculate with great precision the times of their arrival.
"The same results have not been so conspicuous on some other postal lines; but, taking the service
as a whole, it has undoubtedly been brought to a high state of excellence, and its value to the
country, both politically and commercially, is very considerable."
In speaking further of the objects of the Government postal service, after inquiring whether the
foreign mail service should be extended any further, it says:
"The object of the Government in undertaking the transmarine postal service, whether by packets
or by the system of ship letters, is to provide frequent, rapid, and regular communication between
this country and other states, and between different parts of the British Empire. The reasons for
desiring such communication are partly commercial and partly political. In cases where the
interests concerned are chiefly those of commerce, it is generally more important that the postal
service should be regular, than that it should be extremely rapid, though of course rapidity of
communication, where it can be obtained without sacrificing other objects, is of great advantage. It
would clearly be the interest of persons engaged in an important trade, provided there were no legal
impediment in the way, to establish a regular postal communication in connection with it, even
without aid from the state. This, however, would not extend to many cases in which there are
comparing it with the cost of war vessels if employed for the same purpose."
"The objects which appear to have led to the formation of these contracts, and to the large
expenditure involved, were—to afford a rapid, frequent, and punctual communication with those
distant ports which feed the main arteries of British commerce, and with the most important of our
foreign possessions; to foster maritime enterprise; and to encourage the production of a superior
class of vessels which would promote the convenience and wealth of the country in time of peace,
and assist in defending its shores against hostile aggression.
"These expectations have not been disappointed. The ocean has been traversed with a precision and
regularity hitherto deemed impossible—commerce and civilization have been extended—the
colonies have been brought more closely into connection with the Home Government—and
steamships have been constructed of a size and power that, without Government aid, could hardly,
at least for many years, have been produced.
"It is not easy to estimate the pecuniary value of these results, but there is no reason to suppose that
they could have been attained at that time at less cost."
After noticing the objects of the postal contracts, the Report says, in speaking of their results:
"To show what the system is capable of accomplishing, it will be sufficient that we should call
attention to the two great lines of communication which have been opened, the one between this
country and India, the other between this country and America. The mails are dispatched twice a
month in the one case, and once a week in the other, and are conveyed to their destination with a
regularity and rapidity which leaves nothing to be desired. The time occupied in the voyage to and
fro between England and Bombay, which, before the establishment of the Overland Route,
averaged about 224 days, is now no more than 87 days; and the time occupied in the voyage to and
fro between England and the United States, which before 1840 varied from 45 to 105 days, is now
reduced to an average period of 24 days. Nor is the service simply rapid, it is also regular; and the
mercantile community can reckon with the utmost certainty on the punctual departure of the mails
at the appointed times, and can also calculate with great precision the times of their arrival.
"The same results have not been so conspicuous on some other postal lines; but, taking the service
as a whole, it has undoubtedly been brought to a high state of excellence, and its value to the
country, both politically and commercially, is very considerable."
In speaking further of the objects of the Government postal service, after inquiring whether the
foreign mail service should be extended any further, it says:
"The object of the Government in undertaking the transmarine postal service, whether by packets
or by the system of ship letters, is to provide frequent, rapid, and regular communication between
this country and other states, and between different parts of the British Empire. The reasons for
desiring such communication are partly commercial and partly political. In cases where the
interests concerned are chiefly those of commerce, it is generally more important that the postal
service should be regular, than that it should be extremely rapid, though of course rapidity of
communication, where it can be obtained without sacrificing other objects, is of great advantage. It
would clearly be the interest of persons engaged in an important trade, provided there were no legal
impediment in the way, to establish a regular postal communication in connection with it, even
without aid from the state. This, however, would not extend to many cases in which there are
Page 114
political reasons for maintaining such services, while the commercial interests involved are of less
magnitude. Nor is it probable that private communications would be nearly so rapid as those
directed by the Government; for a high rate of speed can only be obtained at a great expense,
which will generally be found to be disproportionate to the benefits directly received from it, unless
under peculiar circumstances of passenger traffic. Lastly, it is to be considered that there are
several services which, if they were not carried on by the British Government, would probably be
undertaken by the Governments of foreign states, and that it is not likely that private individuals or
associations would in such cases enter into competition with them.
"From these considerations we infer that, even upon the lines in the maintenance of which the
greatest commercial interests are involved, private enterprise can not be depended upon for
providing a complete substitute for Government agency; while it is clear that in others, where
regular communications are desired solely or chiefly for political purposes, such agency is
absolutely indispensable. It is, however, obvious, that to establish a Government system in some
cases, and to leave others wholly to private persons, would cause much inconvenience. The
conclusion therefore follows, that it is right that the Government should have the management of
the whole of the transmarine postal communication, as it also has that of the communication within
the country.
"In undertaking this duty, the Government will in the first place have regard to the national
interests, whether political, social, or commercial, involved in the establishment and maintenance
of each particular line. Care must, however, be taken, in cases where the communication is desired
chiefly for commercial purposes, to guard against an undue expenditure of public money for the
benefit of private merchants. The extension of commerce is undoubtedly a national advantage, and
it is quite reasonable that Parliamentary grants should occasionally be employed for the sake of
affording fresh openings for it, by establishing new lines of communication, or introducing new
methods of conveyance, the expense of which, after the first outlay has been incurred, may be
expected to be borne by the parties availing themselves of the facilities offered them. But this
having once been done, and sufficient time having been allowed for the experiment, the further
continuance of the service, unless required for political reasons of adequate importance, should be
made to depend upon the extent to which the parties chiefly interested avail themselves of it, and
upon its tendency to become self-supporting."
Noticing the greater or less sums at which private companies may be induced to undertake short
line postal service, and stating that the line is both benefited and injured by the necessity of
punctual sailing hours, the Report states the reason why subsidies are required, thus:
"The vessels now under contract with the Government are, however, for the most part, required to
maintain high rates of speed. The contractors are also subject to a variety of conditions, designed
partly to secure the efficiency of the postal service, and partly to render their vessels available for
other national purposes wholly unconnected with that service. In return, they are in the receipt of
subsidies largely in excess of the amount of revenue derived from the mails they carry, and those
subsidies are guaranteed to them for terms of years varying from four to twelve, most of which
have at the present time not less than seven or eight years to run. An Estimate printed in the
Appendix, will show that while the amount of the subsidies to foreign and colonial lines, as
contracted for in the past year, was no less than £822,390, the sums received for postage upon these
lines can not be estimated at more than £443,782."
magnitude. Nor is it probable that private communications would be nearly so rapid as those
directed by the Government; for a high rate of speed can only be obtained at a great expense,
which will generally be found to be disproportionate to the benefits directly received from it, unless
under peculiar circumstances of passenger traffic. Lastly, it is to be considered that there are
several services which, if they were not carried on by the British Government, would probably be
undertaken by the Governments of foreign states, and that it is not likely that private individuals or
associations would in such cases enter into competition with them.
"From these considerations we infer that, even upon the lines in the maintenance of which the
greatest commercial interests are involved, private enterprise can not be depended upon for
providing a complete substitute for Government agency; while it is clear that in others, where
regular communications are desired solely or chiefly for political purposes, such agency is
absolutely indispensable. It is, however, obvious, that to establish a Government system in some
cases, and to leave others wholly to private persons, would cause much inconvenience. The
conclusion therefore follows, that it is right that the Government should have the management of
the whole of the transmarine postal communication, as it also has that of the communication within
the country.
"In undertaking this duty, the Government will in the first place have regard to the national
interests, whether political, social, or commercial, involved in the establishment and maintenance
of each particular line. Care must, however, be taken, in cases where the communication is desired
chiefly for commercial purposes, to guard against an undue expenditure of public money for the
benefit of private merchants. The extension of commerce is undoubtedly a national advantage, and
it is quite reasonable that Parliamentary grants should occasionally be employed for the sake of
affording fresh openings for it, by establishing new lines of communication, or introducing new
methods of conveyance, the expense of which, after the first outlay has been incurred, may be
expected to be borne by the parties availing themselves of the facilities offered them. But this
having once been done, and sufficient time having been allowed for the experiment, the further
continuance of the service, unless required for political reasons of adequate importance, should be
made to depend upon the extent to which the parties chiefly interested avail themselves of it, and
upon its tendency to become self-supporting."
Noticing the greater or less sums at which private companies may be induced to undertake short
line postal service, and stating that the line is both benefited and injured by the necessity of
punctual sailing hours, the Report states the reason why subsidies are required, thus:
"The vessels now under contract with the Government are, however, for the most part, required to
maintain high rates of speed. The contractors are also subject to a variety of conditions, designed
partly to secure the efficiency of the postal service, and partly to render their vessels available for
other national purposes wholly unconnected with that service. In return, they are in the receipt of
subsidies largely in excess of the amount of revenue derived from the mails they carry, and those
subsidies are guaranteed to them for terms of years varying from four to twelve, most of which
have at the present time not less than seven or eight years to run. An Estimate printed in the
Appendix, will show that while the amount of the subsidies to foreign and colonial lines, as
contracted for in the past year, was no less than £822,390, the sums received for postage upon these
lines can not be estimated at more than £443,782."
Page 115
The Report further says, as to the mode by which postal communication can be procured, "where
frequent and rapid communication already exists, it is only necessary for the Government to secure
from time to time the services of vessels already engaged in private traffic." But as there are no
such cases in the transmarine routes, and as private enterprise supplies the demand of steam lines
only on the short routes, like the inter-island service of Great Britain, or that to the Continent, or
the service of the Sound, the North River, short coast routes, etc., in the United States, the Report
goes on to say:
"There still remain, however, some cases in which there exists no private communication sufficient
to render such a mode of proceeding practicable. Where this is so, and where a communication has
to be created, it will be necessary that contracts of longer duration should be made, for it is
unreasonable to expect that any person or association of persons should incur the expense and risk
of building vessels, forming costly establishments, and opening a new line of communication at a
heavy outlay of capital, without some security that they will be allowed to continue the service long
enough to reap some benefit from their undertaking. It must be borne in mind, that the expensive
vessels built for the conveyance of the mails at a high rate of speed are not in demand for the
purposes of ordinary traffic, and can not therefore be withdrawn and applied to another service at
short notice. It is, then, fair, that on the first opening of a new line, contracts should be made for
such a length of time as may encourage the building of ships for the purpose, by affording a
prospect of their employment for a considerable number of years. But we see no sufficient reason
for continually renewing such contracts for periods equally long, after the object has once been
attained."
(For the views of the Committee on the adaptation of the mail packets to naval service, see pages
146 and 147.)
The Committee in summing up, presents the result of the investigation and the fruits of the service
in the following impressive light:
"The value of the services thus rendered to the State can not, we think, be measured by a mere
reference to the amount of the postal revenue, or even by the commercial advantages accruing from
it. It is undoubtedly startling, at first sight, to perceive that the immediate pecuniary result of the
Packet System is a loss to the Revenue of about £325,000 a year; but, although this circumstance
shows the necessity for a careful revision of the service, and although we believe that much may be
done to make that service self-supporting, we do not consider that the money thus expended is to be
regarded, even from a fiscal point of view, as a national loss."
It has never been a favorite idea with British statesmen that the packet service should be self-
sustaining; nor have they had any evidence to believe that steam companies could live on the postal
receipts. It is evident from the following that the packet system is sustained without any reference
whatever to the postal income, and for commercial, political, and social purposes alone; only using
the income so far as it goes as a part of the contributions by the people to the general treasury. It
says:
"Your Lordships have seen from our Report that in framing these contracts various objects have
entered into the consideration of the Government, the cost of which ought not in our opinion to be
charged upon the revenues of the General Post Office. A simple comparison of the receipts and
expenditure upon some of the lines is in itself sufficient to prove this. If the Post Office is to be
considered as a department producing revenue, it is not to be supposed that a line of vessels which
frequent and rapid communication already exists, it is only necessary for the Government to secure
from time to time the services of vessels already engaged in private traffic." But as there are no
such cases in the transmarine routes, and as private enterprise supplies the demand of steam lines
only on the short routes, like the inter-island service of Great Britain, or that to the Continent, or
the service of the Sound, the North River, short coast routes, etc., in the United States, the Report
goes on to say:
"There still remain, however, some cases in which there exists no private communication sufficient
to render such a mode of proceeding practicable. Where this is so, and where a communication has
to be created, it will be necessary that contracts of longer duration should be made, for it is
unreasonable to expect that any person or association of persons should incur the expense and risk
of building vessels, forming costly establishments, and opening a new line of communication at a
heavy outlay of capital, without some security that they will be allowed to continue the service long
enough to reap some benefit from their undertaking. It must be borne in mind, that the expensive
vessels built for the conveyance of the mails at a high rate of speed are not in demand for the
purposes of ordinary traffic, and can not therefore be withdrawn and applied to another service at
short notice. It is, then, fair, that on the first opening of a new line, contracts should be made for
such a length of time as may encourage the building of ships for the purpose, by affording a
prospect of their employment for a considerable number of years. But we see no sufficient reason
for continually renewing such contracts for periods equally long, after the object has once been
attained."
(For the views of the Committee on the adaptation of the mail packets to naval service, see pages
146 and 147.)
The Committee in summing up, presents the result of the investigation and the fruits of the service
in the following impressive light:
"The value of the services thus rendered to the State can not, we think, be measured by a mere
reference to the amount of the postal revenue, or even by the commercial advantages accruing from
it. It is undoubtedly startling, at first sight, to perceive that the immediate pecuniary result of the
Packet System is a loss to the Revenue of about £325,000 a year; but, although this circumstance
shows the necessity for a careful revision of the service, and although we believe that much may be
done to make that service self-supporting, we do not consider that the money thus expended is to be
regarded, even from a fiscal point of view, as a national loss."
It has never been a favorite idea with British statesmen that the packet service should be self-
sustaining; nor have they had any evidence to believe that steam companies could live on the postal
receipts. It is evident from the following that the packet system is sustained without any reference
whatever to the postal income, and for commercial, political, and social purposes alone; only using
the income so far as it goes as a part of the contributions by the people to the general treasury. It
says:
"Your Lordships have seen from our Report that in framing these contracts various objects have
entered into the consideration of the Government, the cost of which ought not in our opinion to be
charged upon the revenues of the General Post Office. A simple comparison of the receipts and
expenditure upon some of the lines is in itself sufficient to prove this. If the Post Office is to be
considered as a department producing revenue, it is not to be supposed that a line of vessels which
Page 116
costs the State £240,000 a year, and brings in no more than £56,002, (as is the case with the West-
Indian packets,) or one for which £25,000 is annually paid, and which returns little more than one
fifth of that sum, (as the Pacific line,) can be maintained as a part of its machinery; and, in fact, the
contracts for many of the services have been made without reference to any estimate or opinion on
the part of the Post Master General of their probable value as postal lines."
It thus becomes abundantly evident from the Reports of Parliamentary Committees, from the "Acts
of Parliament," and from the practice of the Admiralty and Post Office Departments, as well as
from the unvarying experiences of twenty-four years, that the steam mail packet system of Great
Britain was primarily adopted, and ever since sustained as the choicest means of giving to that
nation the irresistible control of the world. Watching this system from the germ to its present
maturity, we have seen the overshadowing tree reach higher and higher, and the circle of each
year's growth expand more and more, until the outer ring now embraces the whole civilized and
savage world. An additional evidence of this arrives this very day. The Atlantic brings intelligence
(New-York papers, Nov. 22d) that Great Britain has just completed another mail contract, by which
the Peninsular and Oriental Company are to run a third semi-monthly service to India and China;
so that the Government and people of Great Britain shall have a weekly communication with those
regions, while we have none except through them, although we are many thousand miles nearer to
those countries.
It has been said that we should not attempt to run the postal and commercial race with Great
Britain. Why not? Because she has many colonies, and must needs keep up communication with
them. And why have steam instead of sail to them? Because steam is the means of more readily
controlling them. Grant it; and for the very same reason we wish steam with all the world; not that
we may control the world, for this is costly and unremunerative, as Great Britain finds; but to
conform it, and especially to control its commerce. Great Britain has possessions in the West-
Indies; but they are of the most insignificant importance when compared with the trade of the many
islands and countries near them, which she does not possess, and with the Central American,
Californian, Mexican, Peruvian, Chilian, New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and Spanish markets, which
she controls and uses. So with India and the Mauritius. It is a matter of sore satisfaction that she is
compelled to govern them as a means of reaching their rich trade, which, however rich, is far less
important than that of China for which she so strives. So also with Canada. She was told some
years since that, if she wished to secede from the Kingdom, because the Government would not
assist in building a certain railroad, she might go, and carry peace, also, with her. The Government
would scout the idea of running the Cunard line to Canada alone, and would not touch even at
Halifax, except that the ships are compelled to go in sight of the place; as the "great circle" on
which they sail nearly cuts the city. Great Britain runs that line because her trade with the United
States requires it. That trade is worth to her every year twenty of her Canadas, as that of the West-
Indies is worth a dozen of all the possessions which she has there. As to running the race of
commerce with her, it is simply a sine qua non, on which there is no difference of opinion among
Americans who love their country.
Indian packets,) or one for which £25,000 is annually paid, and which returns little more than one
fifth of that sum, (as the Pacific line,) can be maintained as a part of its machinery; and, in fact, the
contracts for many of the services have been made without reference to any estimate or opinion on
the part of the Post Master General of their probable value as postal lines."
It thus becomes abundantly evident from the Reports of Parliamentary Committees, from the "Acts
of Parliament," and from the practice of the Admiralty and Post Office Departments, as well as
from the unvarying experiences of twenty-four years, that the steam mail packet system of Great
Britain was primarily adopted, and ever since sustained as the choicest means of giving to that
nation the irresistible control of the world. Watching this system from the germ to its present
maturity, we have seen the overshadowing tree reach higher and higher, and the circle of each
year's growth expand more and more, until the outer ring now embraces the whole civilized and
savage world. An additional evidence of this arrives this very day. The Atlantic brings intelligence
(New-York papers, Nov. 22d) that Great Britain has just completed another mail contract, by which
the Peninsular and Oriental Company are to run a third semi-monthly service to India and China;
so that the Government and people of Great Britain shall have a weekly communication with those
regions, while we have none except through them, although we are many thousand miles nearer to
those countries.
It has been said that we should not attempt to run the postal and commercial race with Great
Britain. Why not? Because she has many colonies, and must needs keep up communication with
them. And why have steam instead of sail to them? Because steam is the means of more readily
controlling them. Grant it; and for the very same reason we wish steam with all the world; not that
we may control the world, for this is costly and unremunerative, as Great Britain finds; but to
conform it, and especially to control its commerce. Great Britain has possessions in the West-
Indies; but they are of the most insignificant importance when compared with the trade of the many
islands and countries near them, which she does not possess, and with the Central American,
Californian, Mexican, Peruvian, Chilian, New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and Spanish markets, which
she controls and uses. So with India and the Mauritius. It is a matter of sore satisfaction that she is
compelled to govern them as a means of reaching their rich trade, which, however rich, is far less
important than that of China for which she so strives. So also with Canada. She was told some
years since that, if she wished to secede from the Kingdom, because the Government would not
assist in building a certain railroad, she might go, and carry peace, also, with her. The Government
would scout the idea of running the Cunard line to Canada alone, and would not touch even at
Halifax, except that the ships are compelled to go in sight of the place; as the "great circle" on
which they sail nearly cuts the city. Great Britain runs that line because her trade with the United
States requires it. That trade is worth to her every year twenty of her Canadas, as that of the West-
Indies is worth a dozen of all the possessions which she has there. As to running the race of
commerce with her, it is simply a sine qua non, on which there is no difference of opinion among
Americans who love their country.
Page 117
SECTION X.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.
the mail lines of the united states: the havre and bremen, the pioneers: the bremen service
recently given to mr. vanderbilt: both lines run on the gross receipts: the california lines:
wondrous development of our pacific possessions: the pacific mail steamship company: its history,
services, large materiel, and usefulness: the united states mail steamship company: its ramified
and large extra service: effect upon the commerce of the gulf: its heavy losses, and new ships:
steamship stocks generally avoided: constantly far below par: the collins line: a comparison
with the cunard: its sources of heavy outlay, and its enterprise: the american marine disasters
could not have been prevented by human foresight: the vanderbilt bremen line.
It is not my intention to notice the various lines in detail, or in any wise become their apologist,
eulogist, or prosecutor. As a general thing they have discharged their obligations to the Government
and the people in the most creditable manner; in a much better manner than could have been
expected of them, considering the novelty of such enterprises in this country and our total want of
experience either in steamship building or ocean steam navigation. It is a cause of great gratulation
and satisfaction that springing into the great arena of the mail and passenger strife at a single
bound, our steamers at once took the lead in the race, and have ever since distanced those of the
whole world in speed, comfort, general accommodations, and cheap transit. This may be asserted
as a rule without a single exception. The Collins steamers and the steamer "Vanderbilt" have beaten
the Cunarders by nearly a day and a half on the average voyages; the Havre and Bremen steamers
make just the same time as the Cunarders; and the California steamers of both lines have signally
beaten those of all the English lines in the West-Indies, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific and
Indian oceans. Indeed the triumphs of our steamers generally and specially have been so decided in
every valuable point that we have great reason to be proud of the attainments to which the
legislation of 1846 and '47 led. We have nothing to record to the credit of our legislation since that
period.
The Havre and Bremen services were the first established in the United States; and as the pioneers
in our mail steamshipping they have both proven themselves valuable to the country. The Bremen
line went into the hands of Mr. Vanderbilt during the present year, on the expiration of the old
contract; the "Ocean Steam Navigation Company" being unwilling to attempt the performance of
the service on the small mail pay of the gross ocean and inland postages, even with their old ships.
Mr. Vanderbilt having three ships wholly out of employment, determined to try the service. How
far it will prove remunerative we shall not be able to determine until the steamers shall have run
through one or two winters as well as summers.
The Havre service was continued in the old hands. Mr. Livingston had two fine new ships, which
had been running but little over one year, and which, adapted specially to the mail, passenger, and
transport trade of France, could not easily be withdrawn from the business for which they were
built; while it would have been quite impossible to find for them employment in any other trade.
He, consequently, made a temporary arrangement with the Department for one year, agreeing to
transport the mails, as during the old contract, for the gross ocean and inland postages. With this
small remuneration the Havre line gets a smaller pay than any other running; but one dollar per
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.
the mail lines of the united states: the havre and bremen, the pioneers: the bremen service
recently given to mr. vanderbilt: both lines run on the gross receipts: the california lines:
wondrous development of our pacific possessions: the pacific mail steamship company: its history,
services, large materiel, and usefulness: the united states mail steamship company: its ramified
and large extra service: effect upon the commerce of the gulf: its heavy losses, and new ships:
steamship stocks generally avoided: constantly far below par: the collins line: a comparison
with the cunard: its sources of heavy outlay, and its enterprise: the american marine disasters
could not have been prevented by human foresight: the vanderbilt bremen line.
It is not my intention to notice the various lines in detail, or in any wise become their apologist,
eulogist, or prosecutor. As a general thing they have discharged their obligations to the Government
and the people in the most creditable manner; in a much better manner than could have been
expected of them, considering the novelty of such enterprises in this country and our total want of
experience either in steamship building or ocean steam navigation. It is a cause of great gratulation
and satisfaction that springing into the great arena of the mail and passenger strife at a single
bound, our steamers at once took the lead in the race, and have ever since distanced those of the
whole world in speed, comfort, general accommodations, and cheap transit. This may be asserted
as a rule without a single exception. The Collins steamers and the steamer "Vanderbilt" have beaten
the Cunarders by nearly a day and a half on the average voyages; the Havre and Bremen steamers
make just the same time as the Cunarders; and the California steamers of both lines have signally
beaten those of all the English lines in the West-Indies, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific and
Indian oceans. Indeed the triumphs of our steamers generally and specially have been so decided in
every valuable point that we have great reason to be proud of the attainments to which the
legislation of 1846 and '47 led. We have nothing to record to the credit of our legislation since that
period.
The Havre and Bremen services were the first established in the United States; and as the pioneers
in our mail steamshipping they have both proven themselves valuable to the country. The Bremen
line went into the hands of Mr. Vanderbilt during the present year, on the expiration of the old
contract; the "Ocean Steam Navigation Company" being unwilling to attempt the performance of
the service on the small mail pay of the gross ocean and inland postages, even with their old ships.
Mr. Vanderbilt having three ships wholly out of employment, determined to try the service. How
far it will prove remunerative we shall not be able to determine until the steamers shall have run
through one or two winters as well as summers.
The Havre service was continued in the old hands. Mr. Livingston had two fine new ships, which
had been running but little over one year, and which, adapted specially to the mail, passenger, and
transport trade of France, could not easily be withdrawn from the business for which they were
built; while it would have been quite impossible to find for them employment in any other trade.
He, consequently, made a temporary arrangement with the Department for one year, agreeing to
transport the mails, as during the old contract, for the gross ocean and inland postages. With this
small remuneration the Havre line gets a smaller pay than any other running; but one dollar per
Page 118
mile. The Company have deserved well of the Government for their untiring efforts to perform
their contract; one of the greatest sacrifices being the necessity of building two costly new steamers
just as their contract was about to expire. They suffered most severely from disaster. Both of their
fine and fast steamers, the "Franklin" and the "Humboldt," were lost; and they were compelled to
supply their places by chartering at exorbitantly high prices, until they built the two excellent
vessels now running, the "Arago" and "Fulton." These two steamers run probably more cheaply
than any ever built in any country; otherwise, being as large as they are, about twenty-six hundred
tons each, they could by no means live on the small mail pay now given them. It may be that both
these and the Vanderbilt Bremen steamers are losing money; although the latter vessels are much
smaller, and have the advantage of an immense emigrant trade. I have no means of knowing the
position of affairs in either company.
But no loss to the Havre Company has ever been so great as that of its late President, Mr. Mortimer
Livingston. An honorable and just man in his dealings, both with individuals and the Government,
he eschewed every attempt by which some sought to pervert and deprave the legislation of the
country, and presented all of his views in steamshipping on high, honorable, and tenable grounds.
He pursued the profession in an enlarged spirit of enterprise, and was not unmindful of his duties to
his country, while he endeavored to establish legitimate trade and preserve a profitable private
business which had been well founded long before the introduction of ocean steam. He was a
worthy and most honorable gentleman, and is a loss to the whole public.
Prominent among the steamship enterprises of the country stand the two lines which connect the
Atlantic and Gulf seaboard with our large and rich possessions in the Pacific, California, and
Oregon. Established at a time when California was held by military government, and when Oregon
was a wild untamed wilderness, these lines became the means of developing the richest portion of
the American continent, and binding the far distant western world in close connection with the old
confederacy, notwithstanding the mighty Cordilleras and Rocky Mountains which rose like
forbidding barriers between them. Important as these possessions were, naturally and
geographically, they acquired a new interest about the time that the Pacific and the Aspinwall
Steamship Companies were established. The contracts which were made with these companies
would certainly have ruined them but for the discovery of gold in California. This opened a new
and brilliant field of effort, and the opportunities offered by these companies soon determined tens
of thousands of our hardy and enterprising countrymen to enter and develop it.
It is pleasing in this connection to trace the almost mysterious progress of our Pacific territory
during the past eight years, and the agencies producing it. Among these agencies none have been so
effectual as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. That Company was compelled to form an
establishment of the most effective character four to five thousand miles away from home, and as it
was at the time, thirteen thousand miles distant. The country was wholly new, so much so that it
was, in most parts of the field which it had to occupy, extremely difficult to procure ordinary food
for their operatives. Their ships had to make a voyage more than half of that around the world
before they arrived at their point of service; and they found themselves without a home when there.
The steamer "California," which left New-York on the 6th October, 1848, was the first to bear the
American flag to the Pacific ocean, and the first to salute with a new life the solitudes of that rich
and untrodden territory. She was soon followed by the "Panama" and "Oregon," and in due course
of time by the "Tennessee," the "Golden Gate," the "Columbia," the "John L. Stephens," the
"Sonora," the "Republic," the "Northerner," the "Fremont," the "Tobago," the "St. Louis," and the
"Golden Age." From a small beginning that Company now has the finest steam fleet in the United
their contract; one of the greatest sacrifices being the necessity of building two costly new steamers
just as their contract was about to expire. They suffered most severely from disaster. Both of their
fine and fast steamers, the "Franklin" and the "Humboldt," were lost; and they were compelled to
supply their places by chartering at exorbitantly high prices, until they built the two excellent
vessels now running, the "Arago" and "Fulton." These two steamers run probably more cheaply
than any ever built in any country; otherwise, being as large as they are, about twenty-six hundred
tons each, they could by no means live on the small mail pay now given them. It may be that both
these and the Vanderbilt Bremen steamers are losing money; although the latter vessels are much
smaller, and have the advantage of an immense emigrant trade. I have no means of knowing the
position of affairs in either company.
But no loss to the Havre Company has ever been so great as that of its late President, Mr. Mortimer
Livingston. An honorable and just man in his dealings, both with individuals and the Government,
he eschewed every attempt by which some sought to pervert and deprave the legislation of the
country, and presented all of his views in steamshipping on high, honorable, and tenable grounds.
He pursued the profession in an enlarged spirit of enterprise, and was not unmindful of his duties to
his country, while he endeavored to establish legitimate trade and preserve a profitable private
business which had been well founded long before the introduction of ocean steam. He was a
worthy and most honorable gentleman, and is a loss to the whole public.
Prominent among the steamship enterprises of the country stand the two lines which connect the
Atlantic and Gulf seaboard with our large and rich possessions in the Pacific, California, and
Oregon. Established at a time when California was held by military government, and when Oregon
was a wild untamed wilderness, these lines became the means of developing the richest portion of
the American continent, and binding the far distant western world in close connection with the old
confederacy, notwithstanding the mighty Cordilleras and Rocky Mountains which rose like
forbidding barriers between them. Important as these possessions were, naturally and
geographically, they acquired a new interest about the time that the Pacific and the Aspinwall
Steamship Companies were established. The contracts which were made with these companies
would certainly have ruined them but for the discovery of gold in California. This opened a new
and brilliant field of effort, and the opportunities offered by these companies soon determined tens
of thousands of our hardy and enterprising countrymen to enter and develop it.
It is pleasing in this connection to trace the almost mysterious progress of our Pacific territory
during the past eight years, and the agencies producing it. Among these agencies none have been so
effectual as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. That Company was compelled to form an
establishment of the most effective character four to five thousand miles away from home, and as it
was at the time, thirteen thousand miles distant. The country was wholly new, so much so that it
was, in most parts of the field which it had to occupy, extremely difficult to procure ordinary food
for their operatives. Their ships had to make a voyage more than half of that around the world
before they arrived at their point of service; and they found themselves without a home when there.
The steamer "California," which left New-York on the 6th October, 1848, was the first to bear the
American flag to the Pacific ocean, and the first to salute with a new life the solitudes of that rich
and untrodden territory. She was soon followed by the "Panama" and "Oregon," and in due course
of time by the "Tennessee," the "Golden Gate," the "Columbia," the "John L. Stephens," the
"Sonora," the "Republic," the "Northerner," the "Fremont," the "Tobago," the "St. Louis," and the
"Golden Age." From a small beginning that Company now has the finest steam fleet in the United
Page 119
States, although the difficulties in forming it were probably much greater than any of our other
companies had to contend with.
These steamers found nothing ready to receive them in the Pacific. The Company was compelled to
construct large workshops and foundries for their repair, and now have at Benicia a large and
excellent establishment where they can easily construct a marine engine. They had also to build
their own Dry Dock; for that of the Government at Mare Island was not ready until 1854. Theirs
has ever been most useful to the United States, as it furnished the only accommodations of that
class in the Pacific. They had also to make shore establishments at Panama, San Francisco, and
Astoria, which, with coal dépôts, etc., were extremely costly, owing to materials having to be
transported so far, and labor at the time being so high. The price of labor in California at all times
depends on the profits which can be made by digging gold, and the prices paid for this species of
labor have ever been enormous. Beyond this most unusual price of labor along the Pacific
seaboard, the coals which they have used, whether from the Eastern States or from England, have
been invariably shipped around Cape Horn, and have never cost less than twenty dollars per ton.
For a large portion of the time the Company had to pay thirty dollars per ton for coal, and in one
instance fifty dollars. Coal, like all other provisions of the steamers, has generally been purchased
from those who sent it out on speculation, and took all the advantages of the peculiar market.
Twelve dollars per ton is a low price for freight to California or Panama. In addition to this, the cost
price of the coal, the handling, the wastage, and the insurance, will amount to about eight dollars
per ton, making it never less than twenty dollars delivered. I have frequently seen coals sell even in
Rio de Janeiro, which is but about one third of the distance from us, at eighteen to twenty-four
dollars per ton. The nine steamers running consume about 35,000 tons of coal annually. If the
vessels transporting it be of 1,000 tons each, it will employ something near thirty-five of these
vessels at profitable rates, in this one item of their business alone. Such expenditures are not
necessary to any other steam company in the world. The British lines in the Indian Ocean and the
China Seas are supplied with domestic coal which comes at very reasonable prices, and is shipped
but a short distance.
Yet this Company performs this distant and difficult service with great regularity and at a low price.
They have never lost a trip, a mail-bag, or a passenger by marine disaster during the eight years that
they have been running in the Pacific. This results from the fact of the Company having thirteen
steamers. If all of the steamers now in commission were sunk, they could supply their place from
their reserve fleet and have no hiatus in their service. Such a spare fleet is an enormous expense;
but it is positively indispensable to regular and highly efficient service. It is singular that under
these circumstances they can perform the service at $1.70 cents per mile. It is a notorious fact that
these steamers could not have supported themselves in 1854-55 without the aid which they
obtained from the Government for the services which they performed. They never have transported
much freight, as it would not bear the transhipment at Panamá. The small quantity which they had
was during the first years after the discovery of gold, and then only. They have never at any time
brought any eastward. The Panamá Railroad was a splendid consummation of which the world had
dreamed for years, and toward whose completion this Company was highly instrumental. Yet it did
not enable the steamers to transport freight, and it never will.
These steamers run the 3,300 miles between Panamá and San Francisco by a time-table. They
arrive at either end within a very few hours of thirteen and a half days, including all of the
stoppages, which are also made at specified hours. Thus the average speed of the steamers is about
254 miles per day. They touch at Acapulco and Mazanilla, and supply San Diego, Monterey, San
companies had to contend with.
These steamers found nothing ready to receive them in the Pacific. The Company was compelled to
construct large workshops and foundries for their repair, and now have at Benicia a large and
excellent establishment where they can easily construct a marine engine. They had also to build
their own Dry Dock; for that of the Government at Mare Island was not ready until 1854. Theirs
has ever been most useful to the United States, as it furnished the only accommodations of that
class in the Pacific. They had also to make shore establishments at Panama, San Francisco, and
Astoria, which, with coal dépôts, etc., were extremely costly, owing to materials having to be
transported so far, and labor at the time being so high. The price of labor in California at all times
depends on the profits which can be made by digging gold, and the prices paid for this species of
labor have ever been enormous. Beyond this most unusual price of labor along the Pacific
seaboard, the coals which they have used, whether from the Eastern States or from England, have
been invariably shipped around Cape Horn, and have never cost less than twenty dollars per ton.
For a large portion of the time the Company had to pay thirty dollars per ton for coal, and in one
instance fifty dollars. Coal, like all other provisions of the steamers, has generally been purchased
from those who sent it out on speculation, and took all the advantages of the peculiar market.
Twelve dollars per ton is a low price for freight to California or Panama. In addition to this, the cost
price of the coal, the handling, the wastage, and the insurance, will amount to about eight dollars
per ton, making it never less than twenty dollars delivered. I have frequently seen coals sell even in
Rio de Janeiro, which is but about one third of the distance from us, at eighteen to twenty-four
dollars per ton. The nine steamers running consume about 35,000 tons of coal annually. If the
vessels transporting it be of 1,000 tons each, it will employ something near thirty-five of these
vessels at profitable rates, in this one item of their business alone. Such expenditures are not
necessary to any other steam company in the world. The British lines in the Indian Ocean and the
China Seas are supplied with domestic coal which comes at very reasonable prices, and is shipped
but a short distance.
Yet this Company performs this distant and difficult service with great regularity and at a low price.
They have never lost a trip, a mail-bag, or a passenger by marine disaster during the eight years that
they have been running in the Pacific. This results from the fact of the Company having thirteen
steamers. If all of the steamers now in commission were sunk, they could supply their place from
their reserve fleet and have no hiatus in their service. Such a spare fleet is an enormous expense;
but it is positively indispensable to regular and highly efficient service. It is singular that under
these circumstances they can perform the service at $1.70 cents per mile. It is a notorious fact that
these steamers could not have supported themselves in 1854-55 without the aid which they
obtained from the Government for the services which they performed. They never have transported
much freight, as it would not bear the transhipment at Panamá. The small quantity which they had
was during the first years after the discovery of gold, and then only. They have never at any time
brought any eastward. The Panamá Railroad was a splendid consummation of which the world had
dreamed for years, and toward whose completion this Company was highly instrumental. Yet it did
not enable the steamers to transport freight, and it never will.
These steamers run the 3,300 miles between Panamá and San Francisco by a time-table. They
arrive at either end within a very few hours of thirteen and a half days, including all of the
stoppages, which are also made at specified hours. Thus the average speed of the steamers is about
254 miles per day. They touch at Acapulco and Mazanilla, and supply San Diego, Monterey, San
Page 120
Pedro, Santa Barbara, San Luis, and Obispo, ports of California, from Panamá by a branch line.
This is an extra service, and is not taken into account in calculating the mileage paid the Company.
The steamers have carried probably 175,000 passengers to California, and have brought back about
$200,000,000 in gold. They have also by their semi-monthly line from San Francisco to Oregon
assisted in populating that rich and beautiful agricultural district, and making it available for useful
purposes as a part of the United States. They have converted the wilderness of California into a
smiling garden, and will ere long produce the same effect on Oregon. With that coast
comparatively unprotected, and with the small standing army sustained in this country, they
become very important as a ready means of concentrating on the Pacific coast a large army in a few
days. They also afford a ready transit for the changing crews of our national vessels, which, when
once around the Horn, may remain there several years; having to change their crews only.
The large property of this Company in the Pacific can be made available for no other purpose than
that for which it was created. Any company to be thoroughly effective there, must create its own
stock, and support works on the same general plan as those created by the British East-India
Company. Their success in building up this large establishment on the Pacific was simply an
accident; and that accident the discovery of gold. But for this the Company would have failed in
two years, or gone back pleading to Congress for relief. But the gold crisis saved it, and the
enterprise was very remunerative for the first few years; but since 1853 the profits have been
limited, while for one or two years the Company have sustained actual loss. They calculated too
largely on the prospective business with California, and have too large a sum invested to make
much for the future. And yet, with a smaller investment they could not perform the service, except
in that dangerous, cheap, indecent way, of innumerable wants and deprivations, which the
American people have begun to despise. They have had some few disasters, but none of those of a
fatal character in the Pacific. The "Winfield Scott" was lost in entering the harbor of Acapulco; the
"Tennessee" in entering that of San Francisco in a dense fog. The "San Francisco" was lost, as will
be remembered, on this side, near our coast, as she sailed with troops for the Pacific. The
Nicaragua Transit Company fared much worse with their steamers in the Pacific. They lost the
"North America," the "Independence," the "S. S. Lewis," the "Pioneer," and the "Yankee Blade."
Mr. Wm. Brown also lost his steamer "America," which he was running between San Francisco and
Oregon. She was burned.
Their dividends for four years have been but twelve per cent. And should they be at any time
thrown out of the service, more than half of their property would be irretrievably lost. This
percentage of dividend would be large enough but for such possibilities as these, which may soon
reduce it to a deficit and a loss. Thus it is that steam stock should declare three times the dividend
of other stocks, to be eventually equal to them. And hence it is that, with the clear record of this
Company before the Government, and with an investment of between three and four millions of
dollars, being at the same time free from debt, the stock of the Company is selling at thirty-three
per cent. below par. This is a good exemplification of my views in the preceding Sections
regarding the costs, and hazards, and low values of ocean steam stocks generally. Nor are the
stocks of this Company kept from the public. They are advertised and sold at public auction at
these reduced rates every day in the year in this city; and no one of the five hundred and four
stockholders, among whom these interests are diffused, seems anxious to put "his all" in the
enterprise. And yet there are some people who call such companies a monopoly. If a monopoly,
why do they not come forward, buy the stocks, keep them in their own hands, and profit by them;
especially as a monopoly must be doubly good when it can be bought for two thirds the cash
originally paid for it!
This is an extra service, and is not taken into account in calculating the mileage paid the Company.
The steamers have carried probably 175,000 passengers to California, and have brought back about
$200,000,000 in gold. They have also by their semi-monthly line from San Francisco to Oregon
assisted in populating that rich and beautiful agricultural district, and making it available for useful
purposes as a part of the United States. They have converted the wilderness of California into a
smiling garden, and will ere long produce the same effect on Oregon. With that coast
comparatively unprotected, and with the small standing army sustained in this country, they
become very important as a ready means of concentrating on the Pacific coast a large army in a few
days. They also afford a ready transit for the changing crews of our national vessels, which, when
once around the Horn, may remain there several years; having to change their crews only.
The large property of this Company in the Pacific can be made available for no other purpose than
that for which it was created. Any company to be thoroughly effective there, must create its own
stock, and support works on the same general plan as those created by the British East-India
Company. Their success in building up this large establishment on the Pacific was simply an
accident; and that accident the discovery of gold. But for this the Company would have failed in
two years, or gone back pleading to Congress for relief. But the gold crisis saved it, and the
enterprise was very remunerative for the first few years; but since 1853 the profits have been
limited, while for one or two years the Company have sustained actual loss. They calculated too
largely on the prospective business with California, and have too large a sum invested to make
much for the future. And yet, with a smaller investment they could not perform the service, except
in that dangerous, cheap, indecent way, of innumerable wants and deprivations, which the
American people have begun to despise. They have had some few disasters, but none of those of a
fatal character in the Pacific. The "Winfield Scott" was lost in entering the harbor of Acapulco; the
"Tennessee" in entering that of San Francisco in a dense fog. The "San Francisco" was lost, as will
be remembered, on this side, near our coast, as she sailed with troops for the Pacific. The
Nicaragua Transit Company fared much worse with their steamers in the Pacific. They lost the
"North America," the "Independence," the "S. S. Lewis," the "Pioneer," and the "Yankee Blade."
Mr. Wm. Brown also lost his steamer "America," which he was running between San Francisco and
Oregon. She was burned.
Their dividends for four years have been but twelve per cent. And should they be at any time
thrown out of the service, more than half of their property would be irretrievably lost. This
percentage of dividend would be large enough but for such possibilities as these, which may soon
reduce it to a deficit and a loss. Thus it is that steam stock should declare three times the dividend
of other stocks, to be eventually equal to them. And hence it is that, with the clear record of this
Company before the Government, and with an investment of between three and four millions of
dollars, being at the same time free from debt, the stock of the Company is selling at thirty-three
per cent. below par. This is a good exemplification of my views in the preceding Sections
regarding the costs, and hazards, and low values of ocean steam stocks generally. Nor are the
stocks of this Company kept from the public. They are advertised and sold at public auction at
these reduced rates every day in the year in this city; and no one of the five hundred and four
stockholders, among whom these interests are diffused, seems anxious to put "his all" in the
enterprise. And yet there are some people who call such companies a monopoly. If a monopoly,
why do they not come forward, buy the stocks, keep them in their own hands, and profit by them;
especially as a monopoly must be doubly good when it can be bought for two thirds the cash
originally paid for it!
Page 121
I have noticed this Company thus fully, because its extent of stock, and large field of operation,
make it a fit illustration of the views which I have advanced throughout this work. I have no desire
to depreciate the stock, or in any other way injure the Company, as my own enterprise gives me
quite enough to do.
Many of the views advanced with regard to the Pacific Mail Company will apply to the United
States Mail Steamship Company. That Company, at the outset, built very fine steamers, and ran
them incessantly, until they were unfit for duty. They have constantly supplied their place, and have
at all times, by building and by chartering at the highest prices, kept up a large and costly fleet for
their ramified service. The service contemplated in their original contract, at $1.883/4 cents per
mile, is but about two thirds of that actually performed. The contract required them to run 3,200
miles semi-monthly, but they actually perform semi-monthly 5,200. (See Mr. King's Letter, Paper
G.) The actual service has required nearly twice the number of steamers necessary to do that for
which they contracted, although a part of it is in the coasting trade. Consequently the steamers have
been rapidly worn out, from too heavy duty, and the stock of the Company has never paid as well
as it should. The Company have, morever, suffered severely from disaster. The "Crescent City" was
lost on the Bahama Banks, in 1855; all hands saved. The "Cherokee" was burned when in active
service, in 1853; and the "George Law," or "Central America," but recently foundered at sea in a
terrible gale. They were all good ships; but like those other excellent ships, the "Arctic" and
"Pacific," they could not defy the powers of pure accident. In the same gale the "Empire City" was
dismantled, having all of her upper works swept off, while the "Illinois" was injured by being on
the Colorado Reef. They have both been undergoing most costly repairs for several weeks. While
writing this, the "Philadelphia" is also in the shop. She recently broke her shaft and her cross-tail,
and had to put into Charleston. All of these repairs cost an immense sum of money, and are
calculated, with the severe losses which the Company has sustained, to dishearten the most hopeful
and enterprising. Yet, since these disasters, and the completion of the "Moses Taylor," the Company
are about laying the keel of another fine ship. This is another verification of my statement that the
mail companies are in nearly every instance compelled to build new steamers in the very last years
of their contracted service. The new "Adriatic" attests the same fact on the part of the Collins
Company. (See pages 141 and 142.)
The Company have had at various times the "Falcon," "Ohio," "Georgia," "Crescent City," "El
Dorado," "Cherokee," "Empire City," "Illinois," and "Philadelphia," and now have the three last-
named ships, the "Granáda," the "Star of the West," and the new steamer "Moses Taylor." The
benefits conferred by the Company's lines on the trade of the country generally, and especially on
our southern seaboard and Gulf connections, have been almost incalculable. They found all of these
ports in the undisputed possession of the British, whose steamers furnished the only mail and
locomotive facilities of the times. By their superior speed and accommodations the "Georgia" and
the "Ohio" soon drove those enterprising steamers from our coast, and confined them to the foreign
countries of the Gulf and the Carribean Sea, where they yet rule triumphant in news, transport, and
commerce. Our southern harbors are no longer filled with British cruisers, while in their stead we
have built up a noble war marine, inured thousands of Americans to the ocean steam service, and
made one most effective movement in the direction of successful defenses. (See Letter of Hon.
Edwin Croswell, Paper E, page 200.)
Of the Collins Company it is hardly necessary that I should speak. They have received much the
largest subsidy from the Government; but they have had a most difficult task to perform. Their
ships have never been surpassed in any country, whether as to the excellent style of their prime
make it a fit illustration of the views which I have advanced throughout this work. I have no desire
to depreciate the stock, or in any other way injure the Company, as my own enterprise gives me
quite enough to do.
Many of the views advanced with regard to the Pacific Mail Company will apply to the United
States Mail Steamship Company. That Company, at the outset, built very fine steamers, and ran
them incessantly, until they were unfit for duty. They have constantly supplied their place, and have
at all times, by building and by chartering at the highest prices, kept up a large and costly fleet for
their ramified service. The service contemplated in their original contract, at $1.883/4 cents per
mile, is but about two thirds of that actually performed. The contract required them to run 3,200
miles semi-monthly, but they actually perform semi-monthly 5,200. (See Mr. King's Letter, Paper
G.) The actual service has required nearly twice the number of steamers necessary to do that for
which they contracted, although a part of it is in the coasting trade. Consequently the steamers have
been rapidly worn out, from too heavy duty, and the stock of the Company has never paid as well
as it should. The Company have, morever, suffered severely from disaster. The "Crescent City" was
lost on the Bahama Banks, in 1855; all hands saved. The "Cherokee" was burned when in active
service, in 1853; and the "George Law," or "Central America," but recently foundered at sea in a
terrible gale. They were all good ships; but like those other excellent ships, the "Arctic" and
"Pacific," they could not defy the powers of pure accident. In the same gale the "Empire City" was
dismantled, having all of her upper works swept off, while the "Illinois" was injured by being on
the Colorado Reef. They have both been undergoing most costly repairs for several weeks. While
writing this, the "Philadelphia" is also in the shop. She recently broke her shaft and her cross-tail,
and had to put into Charleston. All of these repairs cost an immense sum of money, and are
calculated, with the severe losses which the Company has sustained, to dishearten the most hopeful
and enterprising. Yet, since these disasters, and the completion of the "Moses Taylor," the Company
are about laying the keel of another fine ship. This is another verification of my statement that the
mail companies are in nearly every instance compelled to build new steamers in the very last years
of their contracted service. The new "Adriatic" attests the same fact on the part of the Collins
Company. (See pages 141 and 142.)
The Company have had at various times the "Falcon," "Ohio," "Georgia," "Crescent City," "El
Dorado," "Cherokee," "Empire City," "Illinois," and "Philadelphia," and now have the three last-
named ships, the "Granáda," the "Star of the West," and the new steamer "Moses Taylor." The
benefits conferred by the Company's lines on the trade of the country generally, and especially on
our southern seaboard and Gulf connections, have been almost incalculable. They found all of these
ports in the undisputed possession of the British, whose steamers furnished the only mail and
locomotive facilities of the times. By their superior speed and accommodations the "Georgia" and
the "Ohio" soon drove those enterprising steamers from our coast, and confined them to the foreign
countries of the Gulf and the Carribean Sea, where they yet rule triumphant in news, transport, and
commerce. Our southern harbors are no longer filled with British cruisers, while in their stead we
have built up a noble war marine, inured thousands of Americans to the ocean steam service, and
made one most effective movement in the direction of successful defenses. (See Letter of Hon.
Edwin Croswell, Paper E, page 200.)
Of the Collins Company it is hardly necessary that I should speak. They have received much the
largest subsidy from the Government; but they have had a most difficult task to perform. Their
ships have never been surpassed in any country, whether as to the excellent style of their prime
Page 122
construction, their large size, or their very unusual speed. They have literally been engaged in a
continual race across the ocean for seven years, determined at whatever cost and hazard to far excel
those of the Cunard line. And this they have done most signally in all points of accommodation and
speed. They have gained one and a half days the advantage over the Cunard line on their average
voyages for the seven years. And this was no small achievement. By reference to Section IV. it will
be seen how great is the cost of attaining and maintaining such speed with a steamer. The Collins
ships, being so much larger than the Cunarders, the four present an aggregate tonnage nearly equal
to the eight by which they run their weekly line. It is, moreover, not proportionally so expensive to
maintain seven or eight ships on a line as four. The prime cost and repairs are by no means so great
when engines are duplicated, or two sets built from the same patterns. Again, the general outlay in
docks, shore establishment, offices, company paraphernalia, advertising, and innumerable items, is
as great for a small as for a large fleet of steamers. The Collins line has to contend against all this.
It also found the Cunard line long and well established, and inwrought into the public favor. It had
the business, and most important of all, it monopolized the only freights passing between the two
countries; those from England to America, which British shippers gave of course to British ships.
They have had also to pay much larger prices for construction, repairs, wages, etc., than the Cunard
Company; and not having so large a service and so large a fleet, they have not had so many reserve
ships to fall back upon; but have been compelled frequently to send their ships off but half repaired,
which of itself entailed immensely heavy expenses in ultimate repairs. There is very much to be
said in favor of this Company, which has endeavored to build the finest ships in the world, and
navigate them the most rapidly. If they have prominently failed in any thing it is in building larger
ships, running them faster, and being far more enterprising with them than was required of the
Company by the contract with the Government. Their disasters have been saddening and severe;
and yet they have resulted from nothing which could have been controlled by human foresight.
There is a great error in supposing that there are more marine disasters among American than
among British ships. Such is not the case, as a careful examination of the lists will show.
Of the mail line belonging to Mr. Vanderbilt, between New-York and Bremen, via Southampton, it
is impossible now to say any thing. The steamers "North Star" and "Ariel," the one of 1,86760/95
tons, and the other of 1,29528/95 tons, have but recently commenced the service, on the gross mail
receipts. Whether Mr. Vanderbilt desires to make the service permanent or not, I am not advised.
The service of the Charleston and Havana line has been performed with great regularity; and
although the return from it in the form of postages has been small, yet it has been of essential
service to the South, in opening communications toward the Gulf, and in establishing much needed
travelling facilities between Charleston, Savannah, and Key West.
continual race across the ocean for seven years, determined at whatever cost and hazard to far excel
those of the Cunard line. And this they have done most signally in all points of accommodation and
speed. They have gained one and a half days the advantage over the Cunard line on their average
voyages for the seven years. And this was no small achievement. By reference to Section IV. it will
be seen how great is the cost of attaining and maintaining such speed with a steamer. The Collins
ships, being so much larger than the Cunarders, the four present an aggregate tonnage nearly equal
to the eight by which they run their weekly line. It is, moreover, not proportionally so expensive to
maintain seven or eight ships on a line as four. The prime cost and repairs are by no means so great
when engines are duplicated, or two sets built from the same patterns. Again, the general outlay in
docks, shore establishment, offices, company paraphernalia, advertising, and innumerable items, is
as great for a small as for a large fleet of steamers. The Collins line has to contend against all this.
It also found the Cunard line long and well established, and inwrought into the public favor. It had
the business, and most important of all, it monopolized the only freights passing between the two
countries; those from England to America, which British shippers gave of course to British ships.
They have had also to pay much larger prices for construction, repairs, wages, etc., than the Cunard
Company; and not having so large a service and so large a fleet, they have not had so many reserve
ships to fall back upon; but have been compelled frequently to send their ships off but half repaired,
which of itself entailed immensely heavy expenses in ultimate repairs. There is very much to be
said in favor of this Company, which has endeavored to build the finest ships in the world, and
navigate them the most rapidly. If they have prominently failed in any thing it is in building larger
ships, running them faster, and being far more enterprising with them than was required of the
Company by the contract with the Government. Their disasters have been saddening and severe;
and yet they have resulted from nothing which could have been controlled by human foresight.
There is a great error in supposing that there are more marine disasters among American than
among British ships. Such is not the case, as a careful examination of the lists will show.
Of the mail line belonging to Mr. Vanderbilt, between New-York and Bremen, via Southampton, it
is impossible now to say any thing. The steamers "North Star" and "Ariel," the one of 1,86760/95
tons, and the other of 1,29528/95 tons, have but recently commenced the service, on the gross mail
receipts. Whether Mr. Vanderbilt desires to make the service permanent or not, I am not advised.
The service of the Charleston and Havana line has been performed with great regularity; and
although the return from it in the form of postages has been small, yet it has been of essential
service to the South, in opening communications toward the Gulf, and in establishing much needed
travelling facilities between Charleston, Savannah, and Key West.
Page 123
PAPER A.
LIST OF AMERICAN OCEAN STEAMERS.
The mail service has 8 lines, and 21 steamers in commission, of 48,027 registered tonnage. Much
of this tonnage belongs to supply ships, as for instance those of the Pacific Mail Steamship
Company. (See Section I.)
Collins Line, 3 steamers, 9,727 tons.
Adriatic, 4,14474/95 tons: Atlantic, 2,84966/99 tons: Baltic, 2,7331/95 tons.
Havre Line, 2 steamers, 4,548 tons.
Arago, 2,240 tons: Fulton, 2,308 tons.
Vanderbilt Bremen Line, 3 steamers, 6,523 tons.
North Star, 1,86760/95 tons: Ariel, 1,29528/95 tons: Vanderbilt[H], 3,36054/95 tons.
[H] Independent, running between New-York, Southampton, and Havre, in connection with the Bremen
steamers.
United States Mail Steamship Company, 6 steamers, 8,544 tons.
Illinois, 2,12365/95 tons: Empire City, 1,75121/95 tons: Philadelphia, 1,2381/95 tons: Granada,
1,05890/95 tons: Moses Taylor, 1,200 tons: Star of the West, chartered, 1,1721/95, (contracting for a
new ship.)
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 13 steamers, 16,421 tons.
Golden Gate, 2,06735/95 tons: Golden Age, 2,280 tons: J. L. Stephens, 2,189 tons: Sonora, 1,616
tons: St. Louis, 1,621 tons: Panamá, 1,08731/95 tons: California, 1,08564/95 tons: Oregon, 1,0999/95
tons: Columbia, 77734/95 tons: Republic, 850 tons: Northerner, 1,010 tons: Fremont, 576 tons:
Tobago, 189 tons.
Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana, 1 steamer, the Isabel, 1,115 tons.
New-Orleans and Mexico, 1 steamer, the Tennessee, 1,1491/2 tons.
The Coasting Service has 8 lines, and 23 steamers, of 24,071 tons registered tonnage.
New-York, Havana, and New-Orleans, 2. The Black Warrior, 1,5561/95 tons: Cahawba, 1,6431/95
tons = 3,199 tons.
LIST OF AMERICAN OCEAN STEAMERS.
The mail service has 8 lines, and 21 steamers in commission, of 48,027 registered tonnage. Much
of this tonnage belongs to supply ships, as for instance those of the Pacific Mail Steamship
Company. (See Section I.)
Collins Line, 3 steamers, 9,727 tons.
Adriatic, 4,14474/95 tons: Atlantic, 2,84966/99 tons: Baltic, 2,7331/95 tons.
Havre Line, 2 steamers, 4,548 tons.
Arago, 2,240 tons: Fulton, 2,308 tons.
Vanderbilt Bremen Line, 3 steamers, 6,523 tons.
North Star, 1,86760/95 tons: Ariel, 1,29528/95 tons: Vanderbilt[H], 3,36054/95 tons.
[H] Independent, running between New-York, Southampton, and Havre, in connection with the Bremen
steamers.
United States Mail Steamship Company, 6 steamers, 8,544 tons.
Illinois, 2,12365/95 tons: Empire City, 1,75121/95 tons: Philadelphia, 1,2381/95 tons: Granada,
1,05890/95 tons: Moses Taylor, 1,200 tons: Star of the West, chartered, 1,1721/95, (contracting for a
new ship.)
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 13 steamers, 16,421 tons.
Golden Gate, 2,06735/95 tons: Golden Age, 2,280 tons: J. L. Stephens, 2,189 tons: Sonora, 1,616
tons: St. Louis, 1,621 tons: Panamá, 1,08731/95 tons: California, 1,08564/95 tons: Oregon, 1,0999/95
tons: Columbia, 77734/95 tons: Republic, 850 tons: Northerner, 1,010 tons: Fremont, 576 tons:
Tobago, 189 tons.
Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana, 1 steamer, the Isabel, 1,115 tons.
New-Orleans and Mexico, 1 steamer, the Tennessee, 1,1491/2 tons.
The Coasting Service has 8 lines, and 23 steamers, of 24,071 tons registered tonnage.
New-York, Havana, and New-Orleans, 2. The Black Warrior, 1,5561/95 tons: Cahawba, 1,6431/95
tons = 3,199 tons.
Page 124
New-York, Havana, and Mobile, 1. The Quaker City, 1,4283/95 tons.
New-York and Savannah, 4. Alabama, 1,26113/95 tons; Florida, 1,26113/95 tons: Augusta, 1,31061/95
tons; Star of the South, (propeller,) 9601/95 tons = 4,793 tons.
New-York and Charleston, 4. Columbia, 1,347 tons: Nashville, 1,220 tons: James Adger, 1,151
tons; Marion, 962 tons = 4,680 tons.
New-York and Virginia, 2. Roanoke, 1,071 tons: Jamestown, 1,300 tons = 2,371 tons.
Philadelphia and Savannah, 2. Key Stone State and State of Georgia, each about 1,300 tons =
2,600 tons.
Boston and Baltimore, 2. Joseph Whitney, 800 tons: Unknown, 800 tons = 1,600 tons.
New-Orleans and Texas. The Charles Morgan, Texas, Mexico, and Atlantic, averaging 600 tons
each=2,400 tons.
New-Orleans and Key West. The General Rusk, 600 tons, and the Calhoun, 400 tons = 1,000 tons.
There are also several propellers running: between New-York and Charleston, New-York and
Portland, and between Philadelphia and the South. They are all, however, small, and irregular in
their trade. The Calhoun is not a regular steamship.
Steamers lying up, 18. Registered tonnage, 24,845 tons.
92
Queen of the Pacific, 2,801 /95 tons.
71
Washington, 1,640 /91 tons.
61
Prometheus, 1,207 /95 tons.
14
St. Louis, 1,621 /45 tons.
52
Brother Jonathan, 1,359 /95 tons.
89
Oregon, 1,004 /95 tons.
Southerner, 900 tons.
45
Herman, 1,734 /95 tons.
91
Northern Light, 1,747 /95 tons.
44
Uncle Sam, 1,433 /95 tons.
California, 1,058 tons.
Northerner, 1,012 tons.
1
Ericsson, 1,902 /95 tons.
33
Star of the West, 1,172 /95 tons.
Daniel Webster, 1,035 tons.
62
Orizaba, 1,450 /95 tons.
Panamá, 1,087 tons.
New-York and Savannah, 4. Alabama, 1,26113/95 tons; Florida, 1,26113/95 tons: Augusta, 1,31061/95
tons; Star of the South, (propeller,) 9601/95 tons = 4,793 tons.
New-York and Charleston, 4. Columbia, 1,347 tons: Nashville, 1,220 tons: James Adger, 1,151
tons; Marion, 962 tons = 4,680 tons.
New-York and Virginia, 2. Roanoke, 1,071 tons: Jamestown, 1,300 tons = 2,371 tons.
Philadelphia and Savannah, 2. Key Stone State and State of Georgia, each about 1,300 tons =
2,600 tons.
Boston and Baltimore, 2. Joseph Whitney, 800 tons: Unknown, 800 tons = 1,600 tons.
New-Orleans and Texas. The Charles Morgan, Texas, Mexico, and Atlantic, averaging 600 tons
each=2,400 tons.
New-Orleans and Key West. The General Rusk, 600 tons, and the Calhoun, 400 tons = 1,000 tons.
There are also several propellers running: between New-York and Charleston, New-York and
Portland, and between Philadelphia and the South. They are all, however, small, and irregular in
their trade. The Calhoun is not a regular steamship.
Steamers lying up, 18. Registered tonnage, 24,845 tons.
92
Queen of the Pacific, 2,801 /95 tons.
71
Washington, 1,640 /91 tons.
61
Prometheus, 1,207 /95 tons.
14
St. Louis, 1,621 /45 tons.
52
Brother Jonathan, 1,359 /95 tons.
89
Oregon, 1,004 /95 tons.
Southerner, 900 tons.
45
Herman, 1,734 /95 tons.
91
Northern Light, 1,747 /95 tons.
44
Uncle Sam, 1,433 /95 tons.
California, 1,058 tons.
Northerner, 1,012 tons.
1
Ericsson, 1,902 /95 tons.
33
Star of the West, 1,172 /95 tons.
Daniel Webster, 1,035 tons.
62
Orizaba, 1,450 /95 tons.
Panamá, 1,087 tons.
Page 125
Fremont, 576 tons.
The registered tonnage of these vessels was furnished me by Mr. S. P. Ingraham, of the New-York
Custom-House.
The registered tonnage of these vessels was furnished me by Mr. S. P. Ingraham, of the New-York
Custom-House.
Page 126
PAPER B.
The following paper, prepared by Mr. Pliny Miles from the reports to which we have alluded,
presents the British steam mail service in full detail.
"The following tabular statement gives the particulars of the ocean mail service of Great Britain,
now carried on almost exclusively by steamships. The numbers in the margin, running from 1 to
15, will point out the different lines in the recapitulation at the close.
Line of Communication, Contractors,
Places Connected.
and Contract Price.
1.—Liverpool and Isle of Man. Mona Isle Liverpool and Douglas, Isle of Man.
Steam Co. Twice a week. $4,250 per
annum.
2.—England and Ireland. City of Dublin Holyhead and Kingstown, near Dublin.
Steam Packet Co. Twice a day. $125,000 a
year.
3.—Scotland and Shetland. Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Wick, Kirkwall, (Orkney,) and Lerwick,
Leith and Clyde Shipping Co. Weekly, (Shetland.)
$6,000 a year.
4.—England, Spain, and Gibraltar. Southampton, Vigo, Oporto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Gibraltar.
Navigation Co. Three times a month.
$102,500.
5.—Mediterranean, India, and China. Southampton, Malta, Alexandria, Suez, Aden,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Navigation Co. Twice a month to India— Shanghae.
monthly to China. $1,121,500.
6.—England and United States. Sam. Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston; and Liverpool and
Cunard. Weekly. $866,700. New-York.
7.—North America, (Colonial.) Sam. Halifax, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and St. Thomas.
Cunard. Monthly. $73,500.
8.—West-Indies, Mexico and South- Southampton, Kingston, (Jamaica,) St. Thomas,
America. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. Vera Cruz and Aspinwall; Southampton, Lisbon,
Semi-monthly to the West-Indies and Gulf Madeira, Teneriffe, St. Vincent, Pernambuco,
of Mexico, and monthly to Brazil. Bahia, Rio Janeiro, Monte Video, Buenos Ayres,
$1,350,000. and St. Thomas.
The following paper, prepared by Mr. Pliny Miles from the reports to which we have alluded,
presents the British steam mail service in full detail.
"The following tabular statement gives the particulars of the ocean mail service of Great Britain,
now carried on almost exclusively by steamships. The numbers in the margin, running from 1 to
15, will point out the different lines in the recapitulation at the close.
Line of Communication, Contractors,
Places Connected.
and Contract Price.
1.—Liverpool and Isle of Man. Mona Isle Liverpool and Douglas, Isle of Man.
Steam Co. Twice a week. $4,250 per
annum.
2.—England and Ireland. City of Dublin Holyhead and Kingstown, near Dublin.
Steam Packet Co. Twice a day. $125,000 a
year.
3.—Scotland and Shetland. Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Wick, Kirkwall, (Orkney,) and Lerwick,
Leith and Clyde Shipping Co. Weekly, (Shetland.)
$6,000 a year.
4.—England, Spain, and Gibraltar. Southampton, Vigo, Oporto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Gibraltar.
Navigation Co. Three times a month.
$102,500.
5.—Mediterranean, India, and China. Southampton, Malta, Alexandria, Suez, Aden,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Navigation Co. Twice a month to India— Shanghae.
monthly to China. $1,121,500.
6.—England and United States. Sam. Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston; and Liverpool and
Cunard. Weekly. $866,700. New-York.
7.—North America, (Colonial.) Sam. Halifax, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and St. Thomas.
Cunard. Monthly. $73,500.
8.—West-Indies, Mexico and South- Southampton, Kingston, (Jamaica,) St. Thomas,
America. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. Vera Cruz and Aspinwall; Southampton, Lisbon,
Semi-monthly to the West-Indies and Gulf Madeira, Teneriffe, St. Vincent, Pernambuco,
of Mexico, and monthly to Brazil. Bahia, Rio Janeiro, Monte Video, Buenos Ayres,
$1,350,000. and St. Thomas.
Page 127
Line of Communication, Contractors,
Places Connected.
and Contract Price.
9.—England, France, and Belgium. Dover and Calais. Dover and Ostend.
Jenkings and Churchward. Daily to
Calais; thrice a week to Ostend. $77,500.
10.—Channel Islands. South-western Southampton, Jersey, and Guernsey.
Railway Company. Thrice a week.
$20,000.
11.—West Coast of South-America. Panama, Callao, and Valparaiso. Allowed to touch
Pacific Steam Navigation Co. Twice a at Buenaventura, Guayaquil, Peyta, Lambayeque,
month. $125,000. Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Aríca, Iquique,
Cobija, Gopiapo, Huasco, and Coquimbo.
12.—Scotland and Orkney. John Stanger, From Scrabster Pier (Thurso) to Stromness,
Esq., of Stromness. Daily in summer; (Orkney.)
every other day in winter. $6,500.
13.—West Coast of Africa. African Plymouth to Madeira, Teneriffe, Goree, Bathurst,
Steamship Co. Monthly. $106,250. Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, Accra,
Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabar,
Cameroon and Fernando Po; omitting Cameroon,
Calabar, and Bonny on return.
14.—South-Africa, Mauritius, and Dartmouth to Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius and
Calcutta. Adam Duncan Dundas, Esq. Calcutta.
Monthly. $205,000.
15.—England and Australia. The Southampton, Marseilles, Malta, Alexandria, Suez,
European and Australian Mail Steam and Sydney.
Packet Co. Monthly. $925,000.
The following are the names of the steamers in service in each line, with the amount of tonnage, the
horse power of each, the draught of water, the number of the officers and crew attached to each
one, and, when it could be obtained, the date that each vessel was surveyed and approved for the
service. Where the date of survey of a vessel is unknown, it is placed as near as possible with
others surveyed at the same time, the vessels in each line being arranged in chronological order:
Draft of
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
1. Liverpool and Isle of Man.
King Orry, 190 429 0 0 22 Dec., 1845
Tynwald, iron, 260 657 8 9 29 Oct., 1846
Benmy Chree, 130 295 6 6 18 June, 1847
Places Connected.
and Contract Price.
9.—England, France, and Belgium. Dover and Calais. Dover and Ostend.
Jenkings and Churchward. Daily to
Calais; thrice a week to Ostend. $77,500.
10.—Channel Islands. South-western Southampton, Jersey, and Guernsey.
Railway Company. Thrice a week.
$20,000.
11.—West Coast of South-America. Panama, Callao, and Valparaiso. Allowed to touch
Pacific Steam Navigation Co. Twice a at Buenaventura, Guayaquil, Peyta, Lambayeque,
month. $125,000. Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Aríca, Iquique,
Cobija, Gopiapo, Huasco, and Coquimbo.
12.—Scotland and Orkney. John Stanger, From Scrabster Pier (Thurso) to Stromness,
Esq., of Stromness. Daily in summer; (Orkney.)
every other day in winter. $6,500.
13.—West Coast of Africa. African Plymouth to Madeira, Teneriffe, Goree, Bathurst,
Steamship Co. Monthly. $106,250. Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, Accra,
Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabar,
Cameroon and Fernando Po; omitting Cameroon,
Calabar, and Bonny on return.
14.—South-Africa, Mauritius, and Dartmouth to Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius and
Calcutta. Adam Duncan Dundas, Esq. Calcutta.
Monthly. $205,000.
15.—England and Australia. The Southampton, Marseilles, Malta, Alexandria, Suez,
European and Australian Mail Steam and Sydney.
Packet Co. Monthly. $925,000.
The following are the names of the steamers in service in each line, with the amount of tonnage, the
horse power of each, the draught of water, the number of the officers and crew attached to each
one, and, when it could be obtained, the date that each vessel was surveyed and approved for the
service. Where the date of survey of a vessel is unknown, it is placed as near as possible with
others surveyed at the same time, the vessels in each line being arranged in chronological order:
Draft of
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
1. Liverpool and Isle of Man.
King Orry, 190 429 0 0 22 Dec., 1845
Tynwald, iron, 260 657 8 9 29 Oct., 1846
Benmy Chree, 130 295 6 6 18 June, 1847
Page 128
Draft of
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
Mona's Queen, iron, 220 508 8 6 22 M'ch, 1853
Total, 4 vessels, 790 2,089 91
2. England and Ireland.
Prince Arthur, iron, 220 418 8 8 26 July, 1852
Llewellyn, iron, 342 654 9 6 29 Oct., 1852
Eblana, iron, 372 685 8 11 31 Jan., 1853
St. Columba, iron, 350 650 8 10 29 Sept., 1853
Total, 4 vessels, 1,284 2,407 115
3. Scotland and Shetland.
Fairy, 120 350 — — 18 —
Duke of 180 500 24
— — —
Richmond,
Total, 2 vessels, 300 850 42
4. England, Spain, and Gibraltar.
Sultan, iron, 420 1,001 14 0 67 Jan., 1853
Madrid, iron, 133 448 10 2 40 Feb., 1853
Tagus, 280 691 14 8 41 Jan., 1854
Alhambra, 140 642 13 7 52 July, 1855
Total, 4 vessels, 973 2,782 200
5. Mediterranean, India, and China.
Lady Mary Wood, 270 619 0 0 40 Feb., 1842
Precursor, 520 1,783 18 0 121 July, 1844
Pekin, iron, 415 1,003 14 0 78 Jan., 1847
Oriental, 420 1,427 13 0 78 M'ch, 1848
Achilles, 430 823 16 0 59 June, 1849
Malta, iron, 460 1,222 0 0 82 Sept., 1848
Hindostan, 500 1,595 16 10 53 July, 1849
Singapore, iron, 465 1,189 12 6 96 M'ch, 1851
Ganges, iron, 465 1,189 14 7 69 June, 1851
Pottinger, iron, 450 1,275 17 6 82 April, 1852
Formosa, screw, iron, 177 658 13 6 60 Aug., 1852
Chusan, screw, iron, 100 765 11 3 45 Aug., 1852
Haddington, iron, 450 1,303 17 7 105 Nov., 1852
Vectis, 400 900 0 0 51 —
Shanghae, screw, iron, 90 825 0 0 60 —
Manila, 60 646 0 0 60 —
Bentinck, 520 1,973 19 3 83 Nov., 1852
Euxine, iron, 430 1,071 15 6 72 Jan., 1853
Bengal, screw, 465 2,185 17 6 115 Feb., 1853
Valetta, 400 984 12 2 51 July, 1853
Norna, screw, 230 1,040 0 0 80 Nov., 1853
Colombo, screw, 450 1,808 0 0 118 Dec., 1853
Ripon, iron, 445 1,400 14 9 94 Dec., 1853
Douro, screw, 230 903 13 3 63 Dec., 1853
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
Mona's Queen, iron, 220 508 8 6 22 M'ch, 1853
Total, 4 vessels, 790 2,089 91
2. England and Ireland.
Prince Arthur, iron, 220 418 8 8 26 July, 1852
Llewellyn, iron, 342 654 9 6 29 Oct., 1852
Eblana, iron, 372 685 8 11 31 Jan., 1853
St. Columba, iron, 350 650 8 10 29 Sept., 1853
Total, 4 vessels, 1,284 2,407 115
3. Scotland and Shetland.
Fairy, 120 350 — — 18 —
Duke of 180 500 24
— — —
Richmond,
Total, 2 vessels, 300 850 42
4. England, Spain, and Gibraltar.
Sultan, iron, 420 1,001 14 0 67 Jan., 1853
Madrid, iron, 133 448 10 2 40 Feb., 1853
Tagus, 280 691 14 8 41 Jan., 1854
Alhambra, 140 642 13 7 52 July, 1855
Total, 4 vessels, 973 2,782 200
5. Mediterranean, India, and China.
Lady Mary Wood, 270 619 0 0 40 Feb., 1842
Precursor, 520 1,783 18 0 121 July, 1844
Pekin, iron, 415 1,003 14 0 78 Jan., 1847
Oriental, 420 1,427 13 0 78 M'ch, 1848
Achilles, 430 823 16 0 59 June, 1849
Malta, iron, 460 1,222 0 0 82 Sept., 1848
Hindostan, 500 1,595 16 10 53 July, 1849
Singapore, iron, 465 1,189 12 6 96 M'ch, 1851
Ganges, iron, 465 1,189 14 7 69 June, 1851
Pottinger, iron, 450 1,275 17 6 82 April, 1852
Formosa, screw, iron, 177 658 13 6 60 Aug., 1852
Chusan, screw, iron, 100 765 11 3 45 Aug., 1852
Haddington, iron, 450 1,303 17 7 105 Nov., 1852
Vectis, 400 900 0 0 51 —
Shanghae, screw, iron, 90 825 0 0 60 —
Manila, 60 646 0 0 60 —
Bentinck, 520 1,973 19 3 83 Nov., 1852
Euxine, iron, 430 1,071 15 6 72 Jan., 1853
Bengal, screw, 465 2,185 17 6 115 Feb., 1853
Valetta, 400 984 12 2 51 July, 1853
Norna, screw, 230 1,040 0 0 80 Nov., 1853
Colombo, screw, 450 1,808 0 0 118 Dec., 1853
Ripon, iron, 445 1,400 14 9 94 Dec., 1853
Douro, screw, 230 903 13 3 63 Dec., 1853
Page 129
Draft of
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
Bombay, 280 1,240 0 0 84 —
Madras, 288 1,217 0 0 82 —
Indus, iron, 450 1,302 17 9 88 Jan., 1854
Candia, screw, iron, 450 2,212 18 9 115 June, 1854
Nubia, 450 2,095 21 0 122 — 1855
Pera, screw, iron, 450 2,013 19 0 129 Jan., 1856
Ava, screw, iron, 320 1,372 17 0 94 Feb., 1856
Alma, screw, iron, 450 2,164 20 0 124 M'ch, 1856
Aden, screw, iron, 210 507 18 9 40 Aug., 1856
Delta, screw, 210 985 0 0 64 — 1856
Delhi, screw, 450 2,400 0 0 125 — 1856
Unknown, 4
vessels.
Total, 39 vessels, 12,850 46,053 2,877
6. England and United States.
Europa, 650 1,777 15 6 88 July, 1848
Canada, 680 1,774 19 6 88 Nov., 1848
Niagara, 630 1,774 19 6 88 Dec., 1849
America, 630 1,729 15 3 88 Jan., 1850
Asia, 800 2,073 19 0 105 May, 1850
Africa, 800 2,050 0 0 105 Oct., 1850
Arabia, 870 2,328 16 7 105 Dec., 1852
Persia, 858 3,587 21 0 165 Feb., 1856
Total, 8 vessels, 5,918 17,092 922
7. North America, (Colonial.)
Merlin, 120 451 0 0 26 May, 1850
Delta, screw, iron, 180 700 12 10 34 June, 1852
Total, 2 vessels, 300 1,151 60
8. West-Indies, Mexico, and South-America.
Dee, 410 1,269 18 0 87 May, 1846
Trent, 450 1,293 17 7 87 April, 1848
Eagle, 263 496 11 10 57 July, 1849
Derwent, 280 708 15 0 66 July, 1850
Magdalena, 760 2,250 19 0 108 May, 1852
Medway, 420 1,305 17 6 72 May, 1852
La Plata, 939 2,404 21 10 114 Aug., 1852
Conway, 270 827 12 10 55 Sept., 1852
Orinoco, 800 2,245 20 11 108 Oct., 1852
Avon, 450 2,069 17 0 94 M'ch, 1853
Teviot, 450 1,258 18 1 97 April, 1853
Paraná, 800 2,222 21 2 120 May, 1853
Clyde, 430 1,335 19 1 87 June, 1853
Thames, 413 1,285 18 3 72 Aug., 1853
Solent, 420 1,805 14 11 88 Oct., 1853
Camilia, iron, 213 640 9 0 34 Oct., 1853
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
Bombay, 280 1,240 0 0 84 —
Madras, 288 1,217 0 0 82 —
Indus, iron, 450 1,302 17 9 88 Jan., 1854
Candia, screw, iron, 450 2,212 18 9 115 June, 1854
Nubia, 450 2,095 21 0 122 — 1855
Pera, screw, iron, 450 2,013 19 0 129 Jan., 1856
Ava, screw, iron, 320 1,372 17 0 94 Feb., 1856
Alma, screw, iron, 450 2,164 20 0 124 M'ch, 1856
Aden, screw, iron, 210 507 18 9 40 Aug., 1856
Delta, screw, 210 985 0 0 64 — 1856
Delhi, screw, 450 2,400 0 0 125 — 1856
Unknown, 4
vessels.
Total, 39 vessels, 12,850 46,053 2,877
6. England and United States.
Europa, 650 1,777 15 6 88 July, 1848
Canada, 680 1,774 19 6 88 Nov., 1848
Niagara, 630 1,774 19 6 88 Dec., 1849
America, 630 1,729 15 3 88 Jan., 1850
Asia, 800 2,073 19 0 105 May, 1850
Africa, 800 2,050 0 0 105 Oct., 1850
Arabia, 870 2,328 16 7 105 Dec., 1852
Persia, 858 3,587 21 0 165 Feb., 1856
Total, 8 vessels, 5,918 17,092 922
7. North America, (Colonial.)
Merlin, 120 451 0 0 26 May, 1850
Delta, screw, iron, 180 700 12 10 34 June, 1852
Total, 2 vessels, 300 1,151 60
8. West-Indies, Mexico, and South-America.
Dee, 410 1,269 18 0 87 May, 1846
Trent, 450 1,293 17 7 87 April, 1848
Eagle, 263 496 11 10 57 July, 1849
Derwent, 280 708 15 0 66 July, 1850
Magdalena, 760 2,250 19 0 108 May, 1852
Medway, 420 1,305 17 6 72 May, 1852
La Plata, 939 2,404 21 10 114 Aug., 1852
Conway, 270 827 12 10 55 Sept., 1852
Orinoco, 800 2,245 20 11 108 Oct., 1852
Avon, 450 2,069 17 0 94 M'ch, 1853
Teviot, 450 1,258 18 1 97 April, 1853
Paraná, 800 2,222 21 2 120 May, 1853
Clyde, 430 1,335 19 1 87 June, 1853
Thames, 413 1,285 18 3 72 Aug., 1853
Solent, 420 1,805 14 11 88 Oct., 1853
Camilia, iron, 213 640 9 0 34 Oct., 1853
Page 130
Draft of
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
Wye, screw, iron, 180 818 14 0 45 Feb., 1854
Atrato, iron, 758 2,906 20 6 127 M'ch, 1854
Tamar, 400 1,873 18 7 93 June, 1854
Prince, 200 446 8 8 35 July, 1854
Total, 20 vessels, 9,306 29,454 1,667
9. England, France, and Belgium.
Alliance, 120 300 7 3 16 —
Vivid, 120 300 7 0 16 —
Violet, 120 300 7 0 16 —
Empress, 100 308 6 6 16 —
Queen, 100 307 6 6 16 —
Ondine, 80 250 6 0 16 —
Total, 6 vessels, 640 1,765 96
10. Channel Islands.
Atalanta, 120 240 8 4 21 Oct., 1846
Wonder, iron, 150 449 0 0 22 Feb., 1853
Courier, iron, 184 440 7 0 18 April, 1853
Dispatch, iron, 183 443 7 6 22 Aug., 1853
Express, iron, 160 380 7 4 24 Nov., 1853
Total, 5 vessels, 797 1,852 107
11. West Coast or South-America.
New-Granada, iron, 210 600 13 0 41 Nov., 1846
Bolivia, iron, 252 705 0 0 41 Oct., 1849
Inca, iron, 370 549 13 0 55 Aug., 1851
Lima, iron, 370 1,122 10 8 55 Nov., 1851
Bogota, iron, 394 1,122 13 6 61 April, 1852
Valdivia, screw, iron, 480 782 13 2 41 Nov., 1853
Valparaiso, iron, 320 839 13 6 84 —
Total, 7 vessels, 2,396 5,719 377
12. Scotland and Orkney.
(Unknown,) 60 250 6 0 16 —
13. West Coast of Africa.
Hope, iron, 120 833 15 0 46 —
Charity, iron, 120 1,007 15 6 52 —
Ethiope, 120 674 0 0 42 —
Candace, 120 900 0 0 46 —
Retriever, 120 900 0 0 46 —
Niger, 120 900 0 0 46 —
Gambia, 130 637 14 0 42 —
Total, 7 vessels, 850 5,951 320
14. South-America, Mauritius, and Calcutta.
Five screw
steamers,
Total, 5 vessels, 2,000 8,000 — — 570 —
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
Wye, screw, iron, 180 818 14 0 45 Feb., 1854
Atrato, iron, 758 2,906 20 6 127 M'ch, 1854
Tamar, 400 1,873 18 7 93 June, 1854
Prince, 200 446 8 8 35 July, 1854
Total, 20 vessels, 9,306 29,454 1,667
9. England, France, and Belgium.
Alliance, 120 300 7 3 16 —
Vivid, 120 300 7 0 16 —
Violet, 120 300 7 0 16 —
Empress, 100 308 6 6 16 —
Queen, 100 307 6 6 16 —
Ondine, 80 250 6 0 16 —
Total, 6 vessels, 640 1,765 96
10. Channel Islands.
Atalanta, 120 240 8 4 21 Oct., 1846
Wonder, iron, 150 449 0 0 22 Feb., 1853
Courier, iron, 184 440 7 0 18 April, 1853
Dispatch, iron, 183 443 7 6 22 Aug., 1853
Express, iron, 160 380 7 4 24 Nov., 1853
Total, 5 vessels, 797 1,852 107
11. West Coast or South-America.
New-Granada, iron, 210 600 13 0 41 Nov., 1846
Bolivia, iron, 252 705 0 0 41 Oct., 1849
Inca, iron, 370 549 13 0 55 Aug., 1851
Lima, iron, 370 1,122 10 8 55 Nov., 1851
Bogota, iron, 394 1,122 13 6 61 April, 1852
Valdivia, screw, iron, 480 782 13 2 41 Nov., 1853
Valparaiso, iron, 320 839 13 6 84 —
Total, 7 vessels, 2,396 5,719 377
12. Scotland and Orkney.
(Unknown,) 60 250 6 0 16 —
13. West Coast of Africa.
Hope, iron, 120 833 15 0 46 —
Charity, iron, 120 1,007 15 6 52 —
Ethiope, 120 674 0 0 42 —
Candace, 120 900 0 0 46 —
Retriever, 120 900 0 0 46 —
Niger, 120 900 0 0 46 —
Gambia, 130 637 14 0 42 —
Total, 7 vessels, 850 5,951 320
14. South-America, Mauritius, and Calcutta.
Five screw
steamers,
Total, 5 vessels, 2,000 8,000 — — 570 —
Page 131
Draft of
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
15. England and Australia.
Oneida, 400 1,600 15 6 84 —
Simla, 630 2,510 17 2 88 —
European, 530 2,200 18 9 115 —
Columbian, 530 2,300 17 6 120 —
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 —
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 —
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 —
Total, 7 vessels, 3,290 13,410 671
RECAPITULATION.
Number
Horse Number Service How Annual
Lines. of Tonnage.
Power. of men. commenced. often. Compensation.
steamers.
2a
1 4 790 2,089 91 1833 $4,250
week
2a
2 4 1,284 2,408 115 1850 125,000
day
1a
3 2 300 850 42 1840 6,000
week
3a
4 4 973 2,782 200 1852 102,500
month
2a
5 35 12,850 46,053 2,877 1853 1,121,500
month
1a
6 9 6,418 18,406 922 1850 866,700
week
1a
7 2 300 1,151 60 1854 73,500
month
3a
8 20 9,308 29,454 1,667 1851 1,350,000
month
1a
9 6 640 1,765 96 1854 77,500
day
3a
10 5 797 1,852 107 1848 20,000
week
2a
11 7 2,396 5,719 378 1852 125,000
month
1a
12 1 60 250 16 1856 6,500
day
1a
13 7 850 5,951 320 1852 106,250
month
1a
14 5 2,000 8,000 575 1856 205,000
month
Total, 121 42,254 140,139 8,137 $5,114,700[I]
Horse Date of
Name, Class, etc. Tonnage. Water. Crew.
Power. Survey.
F. I.
15. England and Australia.
Oneida, 400 1,600 15 6 84 —
Simla, 630 2,510 17 2 88 —
European, 530 2,200 18 9 115 —
Columbian, 530 2,300 17 6 120 —
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 —
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 —
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 —
Total, 7 vessels, 3,290 13,410 671
RECAPITULATION.
Number
Horse Number Service How Annual
Lines. of Tonnage.
Power. of men. commenced. often. Compensation.
steamers.
2a
1 4 790 2,089 91 1833 $4,250
week
2a
2 4 1,284 2,408 115 1850 125,000
day
1a
3 2 300 850 42 1840 6,000
week
3a
4 4 973 2,782 200 1852 102,500
month
2a
5 35 12,850 46,053 2,877 1853 1,121,500
month
1a
6 9 6,418 18,406 922 1850 866,700
week
1a
7 2 300 1,151 60 1854 73,500
month
3a
8 20 9,308 29,454 1,667 1851 1,350,000
month
1a
9 6 640 1,765 96 1854 77,500
day
3a
10 5 797 1,852 107 1848 20,000
week
2a
11 7 2,396 5,719 378 1852 125,000
month
1a
12 1 60 250 16 1856 6,500
day
1a
13 7 850 5,951 320 1852 106,250
month
1a
14 5 2,000 8,000 575 1856 205,000
month
Total, 121 42,254 140,139 8,137 $5,114,700[I]
Page 132
Number
Horse Number Service How Annual
Lines. of Tonnage.
Power. of men. commenced. often. Compensation.
steamers.
7 3,290 13,410 671 1a 925,000
15 1857
month
Total, 121 42,254 140,139 8,137 $5,114,700[I]
Horse Number Service How Annual
Lines. of Tonnage.
Power. of men. commenced. often. Compensation.
steamers.
7 3,290 13,410 671 1a 925,000
15 1857
month
Total, 121 42,254 140,139 8,137 $5,114,700[I]
Page 133
[I] There are some lines not here noticed, which swell the sum to $5,333,985.—
T. R.
T. R.
Page 134
PAPER C.
PROJET OF FRANCO-AMERICAN NAVIGATION.
Mr. Wm. Iselin, of Havre, kindly furnished me the following:
"The French Government has offered the following contracts:
"Havre to New-York, 26 voyages a year, fr.3,100,000, or $620,000.
"Bordeaux to Rio Janeiro, touching at Lisbon, Goree, Bahia, or
Pernambúco, and a branch line from Rio Janeiro to Montevideo and Buenos
Ayres, 24 voyages a year, fr.4,700,000, or $940,000. The Government now
requires 13 departures from Bordeaux and 13 from Marseilles at the same
price.
"Nantes to St. Thomas, thence to Guadalupe, and thence to Martinique, with
the following branch lines:
"No. 1. St. Thomas to St. Martha or Carthagena, and thence to Aspinwall.
"No. 2. St. Thomas to Porto Rico, thence to Havana, Vera Cruz, and
Tampico.
"No. 3. From Martinique to Cayenne.
"The subvention offered is fr.6,200,000, or $1,400,000.
"The total amount of subvention offered for the 3 lines is therefore 14
millions of francs per annum, or $2,800,000.
"The Messageries Impériales have given a tender for the Brazil lines.
"William Iselin of Havre, in connection with Mr. Calley St. Paul, for the
Havre and New-York line; the necessary capital of $3,200,000 is
subscribed; their intention is to have a weekly departure from Havre to
PROJET OF FRANCO-AMERICAN NAVIGATION.
Mr. Wm. Iselin, of Havre, kindly furnished me the following:
"The French Government has offered the following contracts:
"Havre to New-York, 26 voyages a year, fr.3,100,000, or $620,000.
"Bordeaux to Rio Janeiro, touching at Lisbon, Goree, Bahia, or
Pernambúco, and a branch line from Rio Janeiro to Montevideo and Buenos
Ayres, 24 voyages a year, fr.4,700,000, or $940,000. The Government now
requires 13 departures from Bordeaux and 13 from Marseilles at the same
price.
"Nantes to St. Thomas, thence to Guadalupe, and thence to Martinique, with
the following branch lines:
"No. 1. St. Thomas to St. Martha or Carthagena, and thence to Aspinwall.
"No. 2. St. Thomas to Porto Rico, thence to Havana, Vera Cruz, and
Tampico.
"No. 3. From Martinique to Cayenne.
"The subvention offered is fr.6,200,000, or $1,400,000.
"The total amount of subvention offered for the 3 lines is therefore 14
millions of francs per annum, or $2,800,000.
"The Messageries Impériales have given a tender for the Brazil lines.
"William Iselin of Havre, in connection with Mr. Calley St. Paul, for the
Havre and New-York line; the necessary capital of $3,200,000 is
subscribed; their intention is to have a weekly departure from Havre to
Page 135
New-York, by making the fortnightly departures of the French boats
alternate with American Havre and Bremen boats.
"For the line from Nantes to the West-Indies the Company Gautier is said to
have given a tender; but it is doubtful if they can make up their capital."
The Messageries Impériales is one of the largest and strongest companies in
all Europe. They have the following different lines: the Italian, the
Constantinople direct, the Levant, the Egyptian, the Syrian, that of the
Archipelago, the Anatolia, the Thessalian, the Danubian, the Trebizond, the
Algiers, the Oran, and the Tunis lines, and forty-seven sea-steamers. They
have already obtained the Brazilian service.
Mr. Iselin and others have proposed for the United States line, and will
doubtless get it.
The Company Gautier may not get the West-India service, it is said. They
had the line from Havre to New-York, with the steamers Alma, Cadis,
Barcelona, Franc-Contois, Vigo, and the Lyonnaise, and without
subvention. They found it impossible to run it without subsidy, and hence,
sought a new home for their steamers. They attempted to run from Havre to
New-Orleans; but this again failed, after four voyages. They had also the
1,800 ton ether ships, "François Arago," and "Jacquart," which broke down.
These ether engines were built on the principle of De Tremblay; but the
Company are now substituting steam for the ether engines. Thus, the
experience of this Company proves two important positions which I have
taken; that ocean mail steamers can not run on their receipts, and that many
of the gazetted improvements on steam propulsion and the ordinary
methods are valueless.
The Compagnie Gautier have a contract with Spain, for semi-monthly
voyages between Cadiz and Havana, and receive $25,000 per round voyage
for each steamer. They are all English built, iron vessels, of about 1,800
tons each. Lyons is the home of the Company.
alternate with American Havre and Bremen boats.
"For the line from Nantes to the West-Indies the Company Gautier is said to
have given a tender; but it is doubtful if they can make up their capital."
The Messageries Impériales is one of the largest and strongest companies in
all Europe. They have the following different lines: the Italian, the
Constantinople direct, the Levant, the Egyptian, the Syrian, that of the
Archipelago, the Anatolia, the Thessalian, the Danubian, the Trebizond, the
Algiers, the Oran, and the Tunis lines, and forty-seven sea-steamers. They
have already obtained the Brazilian service.
Mr. Iselin and others have proposed for the United States line, and will
doubtless get it.
The Company Gautier may not get the West-India service, it is said. They
had the line from Havre to New-York, with the steamers Alma, Cadis,
Barcelona, Franc-Contois, Vigo, and the Lyonnaise, and without
subvention. They found it impossible to run it without subsidy, and hence,
sought a new home for their steamers. They attempted to run from Havre to
New-Orleans; but this again failed, after four voyages. They had also the
1,800 ton ether ships, "François Arago," and "Jacquart," which broke down.
These ether engines were built on the principle of De Tremblay; but the
Company are now substituting steam for the ether engines. Thus, the
experience of this Company proves two important positions which I have
taken; that ocean mail steamers can not run on their receipts, and that many
of the gazetted improvements on steam propulsion and the ordinary
methods are valueless.
The Compagnie Gautier have a contract with Spain, for semi-monthly
voyages between Cadiz and Havana, and receive $25,000 per round voyage
for each steamer. They are all English built, iron vessels, of about 1,800
tons each. Lyons is the home of the Company.
Page 136
PAPER D.
STEAM LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA.
Collins, steamers Adriatic, Atlantic, and Baltic; (running:)
Havre, steamers Arago, and Fulton; (running:)
Bremen, steamers North Star, and Ariel; (running:)
Havre, in connection with the Bremen. Steamer Vanderbilt; (laid up:)
Cunard, steamers Persia, Arabia, Asia, Africa, Canada, America, Niagara,
and Europa; (running:)
Cunard, screw-steamers Etna, Jura, Emue, Lebanon, and Cambria, (side-
wheel; all running:)
Glasgow, screw-steamers Glasgow, Edinburgh, and New-York; (running:)
Bremen, steamer Ericsson; run temporarily by Mr. Sands; (laid up:)
Liverpool and Portland, screw-steamers Khersonese and Circassian,
General Williams and Antelope; the two latter about 1,500 each, running via
St. John's, N. F., the two former chartered for the East-Indies:
London and Montreal, screw-steamers; (names not known:)
Liverpool and Quebec, screw-steamers; (names not known:)
Liverpool and New-York, screw-steamers City of Manchester, City of
Baltimore, City of Washington, and Kangaroo, (running;) (line ran to
Philadelphia and was withdrawn:)
Hamburg and New-York, screw-steamers Borussia and Hammonia;
building two more steamers, each 2,000 tons, in the Clyde, for same line;
STEAM LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA.
Collins, steamers Adriatic, Atlantic, and Baltic; (running:)
Havre, steamers Arago, and Fulton; (running:)
Bremen, steamers North Star, and Ariel; (running:)
Havre, in connection with the Bremen. Steamer Vanderbilt; (laid up:)
Cunard, steamers Persia, Arabia, Asia, Africa, Canada, America, Niagara,
and Europa; (running:)
Cunard, screw-steamers Etna, Jura, Emue, Lebanon, and Cambria, (side-
wheel; all running:)
Glasgow, screw-steamers Glasgow, Edinburgh, and New-York; (running:)
Bremen, steamer Ericsson; run temporarily by Mr. Sands; (laid up:)
Liverpool and Portland, screw-steamers Khersonese and Circassian,
General Williams and Antelope; the two latter about 1,500 each, running via
St. John's, N. F., the two former chartered for the East-Indies:
London and Montreal, screw-steamers; (names not known:)
Liverpool and Quebec, screw-steamers; (names not known:)
Liverpool and New-York, screw-steamers City of Manchester, City of
Baltimore, City of Washington, and Kangaroo, (running;) (line ran to
Philadelphia and was withdrawn:)
Hamburg and New-York, screw-steamers Borussia and Hammonia;
building two more steamers, each 2,000 tons, in the Clyde, for same line;
Page 137
(running:)
Antwerp and New-York, screw-steamers Belgique, Constitution, Leopold
I., Duc de Brabant, and Congress. Taken off and chartered to British
Government for transporting troops. Names altered:
London, Cork and New-York, screw-steamers Minna and Brenda; (laid
up:)
Havre and New-York, screw-steamers Barcelona, Jacquart, Alma, and
François Arago, withdrawn, and running from Spain to Cuba. (See Paper
C.)
Bremen and New-York. The North Dutch Lloyds are building four screw-
steamers in the Clyde, of near 3,000 each, to run between Bremen and
New-York:
The Continent, Southampton and New-York. Croskey's lino consists of the
following screws, of about 2,300 tons each: the Argo, Calcutta, Queen of
the South, Lady Jocelyn, Hydaspes, Indiana, Jason, and Golden Fleece.
(Most of these steamers have been withdrawn from the route, and five of
them are chartered for troops for India.)
Antwerp and New-York, screw-steamers Belgique, Constitution, Leopold
I., Duc de Brabant, and Congress. Taken off and chartered to British
Government for transporting troops. Names altered:
London, Cork and New-York, screw-steamers Minna and Brenda; (laid
up:)
Havre and New-York, screw-steamers Barcelona, Jacquart, Alma, and
François Arago, withdrawn, and running from Spain to Cuba. (See Paper
C.)
Bremen and New-York. The North Dutch Lloyds are building four screw-
steamers in the Clyde, of near 3,000 each, to run between Bremen and
New-York:
The Continent, Southampton and New-York. Croskey's lino consists of the
following screws, of about 2,300 tons each: the Argo, Calcutta, Queen of
the South, Lady Jocelyn, Hydaspes, Indiana, Jason, and Golden Fleece.
(Most of these steamers have been withdrawn from the route, and five of
them are chartered for troops for India.)
Page 138
PAPER E.
The following numerous extracts from the Senate Reports of 1850 and
1852, and also from the letter of Judge Collamer, then Post Master General,
as well as from a letter by the Hon. Edwin Croswell, will present in detail a
strong corroboration of the views which I have taken in the preceding
Sections. I copy first from the Report of 1852. The Committee was
composed of Hon. Thomas J. Rusk, Chairman, and Messrs. Soulé, Hamlin,
Upham, and Morton. The Report says:
"Your Committee desire to have it understood at the outset, that, regarding
the ocean mail service as the offspring of the wants of all of the producing
classes of the country, they have not felt at liberty to consider the
propositions which have been presented to them, in any other point of view
than as connected with and subservient to the general policy of the
government, which embraces alike every section of the country, and can not
know nor recognize any personal or local influence.
"The system of ocean steam navigation was adopted by the Government for
the joint purpose of extending and advancing the commercial and other
great interests of the country, and, at the same time, providing a marine
force which might be easily made available for the protection of American
rights, in the event of a collision with foreign powers. The attainment of this
double object was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified
the advance of public funds in aid of private enterprise, inasmuch as it was
calculated to insure to the country the acquisition of a powerful means of
maritime defense, with little or no expense, eventually, as the money so
advanced was to be reimbursed in money or in mail service at the option of
the parties concerned, while commerce and the arts would be promoted
during the time of peace.
"At the time when this system was commenced, the ocean mails along our
whole Southern coast were in the hands of foreign carriers, sustained and
encouraged by the British Government, under the forms of contracts to
carry the British mails; while the Cunard line between Liverpool and
The following numerous extracts from the Senate Reports of 1850 and
1852, and also from the letter of Judge Collamer, then Post Master General,
as well as from a letter by the Hon. Edwin Croswell, will present in detail a
strong corroboration of the views which I have taken in the preceding
Sections. I copy first from the Report of 1852. The Committee was
composed of Hon. Thomas J. Rusk, Chairman, and Messrs. Soulé, Hamlin,
Upham, and Morton. The Report says:
"Your Committee desire to have it understood at the outset, that, regarding
the ocean mail service as the offspring of the wants of all of the producing
classes of the country, they have not felt at liberty to consider the
propositions which have been presented to them, in any other point of view
than as connected with and subservient to the general policy of the
government, which embraces alike every section of the country, and can not
know nor recognize any personal or local influence.
"The system of ocean steam navigation was adopted by the Government for
the joint purpose of extending and advancing the commercial and other
great interests of the country, and, at the same time, providing a marine
force which might be easily made available for the protection of American
rights, in the event of a collision with foreign powers. The attainment of this
double object was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified
the advance of public funds in aid of private enterprise, inasmuch as it was
calculated to insure to the country the acquisition of a powerful means of
maritime defense, with little or no expense, eventually, as the money so
advanced was to be reimbursed in money or in mail service at the option of
the parties concerned, while commerce and the arts would be promoted
during the time of peace.
"At the time when this system was commenced, the ocean mails along our
whole Southern coast were in the hands of foreign carriers, sustained and
encouraged by the British Government, under the forms of contracts to
carry the British mails; while the Cunard line between Liverpool and
Page 139
Boston, via Halifax, constituted the only medium of regular steam mail
communication between the United States and Europe. In this way the
commercial interests of the United States were, on the one hand, entirely at
the mercy of British steamers which plied along our Southern coast,
entering our ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge
of the soundings and other peculiarities of our harbors—a knowledge which
might prove infinitely injurious to us in the event of a war with Great
Britain; and on the other, of a foreign line of ocean mail steamers, which,
under the liberal patronage of the British Government, monopolized the
steam mail postage and freights between the two countries. Under such a
state of things, it became necessary to choose whether American commerce
should continue to be thus tributary to British maritime supremacy, or an
American medium of communication should be established through the
intervention of the Federal Government, in the form of advances of
pecuniary means in aid of individual enterprise. It had been found to be
impossible for our merchants to contend successfully, single handed,
against the joint efforts of the British Government and British commercial
influence. Our noble lines of packet ships which had far outstripped the
sailing vessels of all other nations, in point of beauty and swiftness, had
been superseded by the introduction of steamers, the power and capacity of
which recommended them, as the best means of inter-communication by
mail, and of transportation for lighter and more profitable freights, and
American interests were becoming every day more and more tributary to
British ascendency on the ocean.
"Under the circumstances above stated, it was impossible for Congress to
hesitate for a moment which course to pursue, and it was determined to
adopt a policy which, while it would be in strict accordance with the spirit
of our free institutions, should place the country in its proper attitude, and
render its commerce and postal arrangements independent of all foreign or
rival agencies.
"Of the correctness of this determination, experience has furnished the most
ample evidences in the results which thus far have attended the prosecution
of the system. The line between New-York and Chagres via New-Orleans
and its auxiliaries, have, by their superiority in point of swiftness and
accommodation, already superseded the British steamers which had
communication between the United States and Europe. In this way the
commercial interests of the United States were, on the one hand, entirely at
the mercy of British steamers which plied along our Southern coast,
entering our ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge
of the soundings and other peculiarities of our harbors—a knowledge which
might prove infinitely injurious to us in the event of a war with Great
Britain; and on the other, of a foreign line of ocean mail steamers, which,
under the liberal patronage of the British Government, monopolized the
steam mail postage and freights between the two countries. Under such a
state of things, it became necessary to choose whether American commerce
should continue to be thus tributary to British maritime supremacy, or an
American medium of communication should be established through the
intervention of the Federal Government, in the form of advances of
pecuniary means in aid of individual enterprise. It had been found to be
impossible for our merchants to contend successfully, single handed,
against the joint efforts of the British Government and British commercial
influence. Our noble lines of packet ships which had far outstripped the
sailing vessels of all other nations, in point of beauty and swiftness, had
been superseded by the introduction of steamers, the power and capacity of
which recommended them, as the best means of inter-communication by
mail, and of transportation for lighter and more profitable freights, and
American interests were becoming every day more and more tributary to
British ascendency on the ocean.
"Under the circumstances above stated, it was impossible for Congress to
hesitate for a moment which course to pursue, and it was determined to
adopt a policy which, while it would be in strict accordance with the spirit
of our free institutions, should place the country in its proper attitude, and
render its commerce and postal arrangements independent of all foreign or
rival agencies.
"Of the correctness of this determination, experience has furnished the most
ample evidences in the results which thus far have attended the prosecution
of the system. The line between New-York and Chagres via New-Orleans
and its auxiliaries, have, by their superiority in point of swiftness and
accommodation, already superseded the British steamers which had
Page 140
previously plied along our Southern maritime frontier, and the United States
mails for Mexico, South-America, and our possessions on the Pacific are no
longer in the hands of foreign carriers, but are transported in American
steamers of the first class, convertible, at a very small expense, into war
steamers, should occasion require, which have commanded the admiration
of the world by their fleetness and the elegance of their accommodations for
the travelling public. Our Southern ports are, consequently, no longer
frequented by British steamers, commanded by officers of the British
crown, whose legitimate business it is to collect intelligence respecting the
approaches to and defenses of the harbors which they visit, to be made
available for their own purposes, in the event of the existence of hostile
relations.
"A similar result has, to a certain extent, attended the establishment of the
American, or Collins line, between New-York and Liverpool. Previously to
the commencement of this line, the transportation of the United States mail
matter, as well as the finer and more destructible descriptions of
merchandise, requiring rapidity of transmission to and from Europe, had
been monopolized by the British Cunard line; and the British Government
had, within the short space of six years, from the postage on this route
alone, derived a clear income of no less than five million two hundred and
eighty thousand eight hundred dollars, after deducting the amount paid to
the concern under the contract to carry the mails.
"Since the establishment of the Collins line, notwithstanding the combined
efforts of the British Government and commercial interests to confine their
freights and postages to the Cunard line, the revenue to the Post Office
Department of the United States has amounted to several hundreds of
thousands of dollars per annum, whilst a large proportion of the money for
freights has been received by American citizens. The effects of this measure
have, it is true, thus far been but partial, because the trips of this line have
been but twice a month, while those of its rival have, for a considerable
portion of the time been weekly. During the intervals between the trips of
the American line, the postages and freights must, of necessity, enure to the
advantage of the British, and, consequently, the evil referred to has been but
partially remedied."
Speaking of the large steamers built, the Report says:
mails for Mexico, South-America, and our possessions on the Pacific are no
longer in the hands of foreign carriers, but are transported in American
steamers of the first class, convertible, at a very small expense, into war
steamers, should occasion require, which have commanded the admiration
of the world by their fleetness and the elegance of their accommodations for
the travelling public. Our Southern ports are, consequently, no longer
frequented by British steamers, commanded by officers of the British
crown, whose legitimate business it is to collect intelligence respecting the
approaches to and defenses of the harbors which they visit, to be made
available for their own purposes, in the event of the existence of hostile
relations.
"A similar result has, to a certain extent, attended the establishment of the
American, or Collins line, between New-York and Liverpool. Previously to
the commencement of this line, the transportation of the United States mail
matter, as well as the finer and more destructible descriptions of
merchandise, requiring rapidity of transmission to and from Europe, had
been monopolized by the British Cunard line; and the British Government
had, within the short space of six years, from the postage on this route
alone, derived a clear income of no less than five million two hundred and
eighty thousand eight hundred dollars, after deducting the amount paid to
the concern under the contract to carry the mails.
"Since the establishment of the Collins line, notwithstanding the combined
efforts of the British Government and commercial interests to confine their
freights and postages to the Cunard line, the revenue to the Post Office
Department of the United States has amounted to several hundreds of
thousands of dollars per annum, whilst a large proportion of the money for
freights has been received by American citizens. The effects of this measure
have, it is true, thus far been but partial, because the trips of this line have
been but twice a month, while those of its rival have, for a considerable
portion of the time been weekly. During the intervals between the trips of
the American line, the postages and freights must, of necessity, enure to the
advantage of the British, and, consequently, the evil referred to has been but
partially remedied."
Speaking of the large steamers built, the Report says:
Page 141
"It is not to be supposed that engines of such vast dimensions could have
been constructed in a country where there were, as yet, no workshops
adapted to the purpose and where labor is very high, as cheaply as in a
country where every appliance of the kind already existed and where the
prices of labor are proverbially low. Nor can it be reasonably imagined that
vessels of this description could have been navigated on as good terms, by
men taken from this country, where there was little or no competition in this
peculiar branch of maritime service, as by those who were easily to be
found in a country in which the density of population and consequent
competition for employment, caused the wages to be small.
"An attempt seems to have been made, in certain quarters, to create an
impression that the aid heretofore extended by the Government to the
individuals engaged under contracts to carry the ocean mail, has been
induced by feelings of personal friendship, on the part of members of
Congress. Such is not the case. The friends of the system of ocean mail
steam navigation, have, so far as your Committee are advised, considered
this important subject as a matter of great national concern and
independently of the very secondary motive of individual interest. The
question presented to their minds has not been whether A, B, or C should
have a privilege extended to him, but whether the commerce, manufactures,
and agriculture of the country would be benefited by the performance of a
public service through the instrumentality of individual enterprise, under
proper conditions and restrictions. As matters stood at the period when the
system was adopted, Great Britain was exerting herself, successfully, to
make the United States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to
her maritime supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection
between the United States and Europe, the West-Indies and South-America.
There was not a letter sent by ocean steam conveyance, in these quarters,
which did not pay its tribute to the British crown, and not a passenger nor
parcel of merchandise transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean,
which did not furnish profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted
her right to be the 'queen of the ocean,' and, as such, she levied her imposts
upon the industry and intelligence of all of the nations that frequented that
highway of the world.
been constructed in a country where there were, as yet, no workshops
adapted to the purpose and where labor is very high, as cheaply as in a
country where every appliance of the kind already existed and where the
prices of labor are proverbially low. Nor can it be reasonably imagined that
vessels of this description could have been navigated on as good terms, by
men taken from this country, where there was little or no competition in this
peculiar branch of maritime service, as by those who were easily to be
found in a country in which the density of population and consequent
competition for employment, caused the wages to be small.
"An attempt seems to have been made, in certain quarters, to create an
impression that the aid heretofore extended by the Government to the
individuals engaged under contracts to carry the ocean mail, has been
induced by feelings of personal friendship, on the part of members of
Congress. Such is not the case. The friends of the system of ocean mail
steam navigation, have, so far as your Committee are advised, considered
this important subject as a matter of great national concern and
independently of the very secondary motive of individual interest. The
question presented to their minds has not been whether A, B, or C should
have a privilege extended to him, but whether the commerce, manufactures,
and agriculture of the country would be benefited by the performance of a
public service through the instrumentality of individual enterprise, under
proper conditions and restrictions. As matters stood at the period when the
system was adopted, Great Britain was exerting herself, successfully, to
make the United States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to
her maritime supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection
between the United States and Europe, the West-Indies and South-America.
There was not a letter sent by ocean steam conveyance, in these quarters,
which did not pay its tribute to the British crown, and not a passenger nor
parcel of merchandise transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean,
which did not furnish profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted
her right to be the 'queen of the ocean,' and, as such, she levied her imposts
upon the industry and intelligence of all of the nations that frequented that
highway of the world.
Page 142
"In this condition of affairs, the law instituting the system of American
ocean mail steam transportation in its present form was enacted, as the best,
if not the only means of correcting a great evil, and, at the same time,
building up a naval force which should be available for national defense in
the event of a war. The system so instituted was deemed to be not only
calculated to draw forth and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but
it avoided the difficulty of keeping upon hand, in time of peace, a large and,
for the moment at least, useless military marine, which could only be
preserved in a condition for effective service by a vast annual outlay of the
public money.
"It was right and proper, then, in the opinion of your Committee, that these
ocean steam facilities should exist, through the intervention of the
Government, more especially as they were, in all probability, beyond the
reach of private means.
"The transportation of the ocean mails, with the greatest possible advantage
to the important interests of the country at large, is an object of paramount
importance; but which, however desirable, can only be effected at great
expense. It is a matter of comparatively small moment at what precise time
this expense is to be paid, provided that the end in view can be attained with
certainty. The temporary loan of a part of the means required, under proper
securities for reimbursement, appears to be the readiest mode by which the
purpose can be effected. How is this security to be acquired? Simply, by
taking due care that the funds advanced shall be faithfully and honestly
applied to the object for which they are intended, and then holding a lien
upon the ships, for the construction of which they are appropriated, in such
a manner as to insure the reimbursement of the sums advanced in the form
of mail service or money; or, should circumstances require, of ships suitable
for national purposes, as war steamers. This has been done. In all cases the
contractors for the transportation of the ocean mails, have been required to
cause their ships to be built and equipped under the immediate
superintendence of experienced naval officers and under the direction of
naval constructors, appointed by the Government, in such manner as to be
convertible, at the smallest possible expense, into war steamers of the first
class.
ocean mail steam transportation in its present form was enacted, as the best,
if not the only means of correcting a great evil, and, at the same time,
building up a naval force which should be available for national defense in
the event of a war. The system so instituted was deemed to be not only
calculated to draw forth and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but
it avoided the difficulty of keeping upon hand, in time of peace, a large and,
for the moment at least, useless military marine, which could only be
preserved in a condition for effective service by a vast annual outlay of the
public money.
"It was right and proper, then, in the opinion of your Committee, that these
ocean steam facilities should exist, through the intervention of the
Government, more especially as they were, in all probability, beyond the
reach of private means.
"The transportation of the ocean mails, with the greatest possible advantage
to the important interests of the country at large, is an object of paramount
importance; but which, however desirable, can only be effected at great
expense. It is a matter of comparatively small moment at what precise time
this expense is to be paid, provided that the end in view can be attained with
certainty. The temporary loan of a part of the means required, under proper
securities for reimbursement, appears to be the readiest mode by which the
purpose can be effected. How is this security to be acquired? Simply, by
taking due care that the funds advanced shall be faithfully and honestly
applied to the object for which they are intended, and then holding a lien
upon the ships, for the construction of which they are appropriated, in such
a manner as to insure the reimbursement of the sums advanced in the form
of mail service or money; or, should circumstances require, of ships suitable
for national purposes, as war steamers. This has been done. In all cases the
contractors for the transportation of the ocean mails, have been required to
cause their ships to be built and equipped under the immediate
superintendence of experienced naval officers and under the direction of
naval constructors, appointed by the Government, in such manner as to be
convertible, at the smallest possible expense, into war steamers of the first
class.
Page 143
"Nor has experience caused any regret, on the part of the friends of the
system, further than that in some cases, owing to the increase in the tonnage
and power of the ships and other circumstances, the expenses incurred by
the contractors have outrun the receipts, and they have incurred heavy
losses, which might even prove ruinous, if they were forced to sell the
property acquired in this form. It should always be borne in mind, however,
that in these cases, the increase of expenditure thus incurred has been
caused by a laudable ambition on the part of the proprietors of these lines to
do even more than they were required to do under their contracts, with a
view to secure the confidence of the Government and the public. It should
also be remembered that in thus increasing the cost and consequent value of
their ships, these companies have enlarged the security of the Government
for the money loaned, and promoted the safety and comfort of passengers.
It has, in no instance, been charged that the companies referred to have, in
any way, misapplied the aid extended to them, or given to it an improper
direction. The products of their expenditures, even admitting them to have
been greater than they might have been, show for themselves, in placing the
American steam mail service, as far as it has gone, at the head of all others,
in point of accommodation, elegance, strength, and swiftness. Nor is this
all. The establishment of these lines is not to be regarded merely with
reference to the immediate profits arising from the system, in connection
with the transportation of the mails. Millions of money have been saved to
American citizens, which, in the absence of these ocean steam lines, would
have gone to fill foreign coffers. The Committee will refer to one fact in
illustration of the truth of this proposition. Before the Collins line was
established, the Cunard line was receiving £7 10s sterling per ton for
freights; at present (1852) the rate is about £4 sterling. By whom were these
£7 10s sterling paid? By the American consumer, in most instances, upon
articles of British manufacture brought to this country by a British line. At
present the American consumer pays but £4 sterling per ton; and, presuming
that the American merchant makes his importations in the American line,
this freight is paid to our own people and goes to swell the sum of our
national wealth. Thus, it will be seen that, formerly, the American consumer
paid very nearly twice as much for the service, and enriched the British
capitalist; whereas, at present, he not only saves one half of the former cost
of freight to himself but, in paying the remaining half, benefits his fellow
system, further than that in some cases, owing to the increase in the tonnage
and power of the ships and other circumstances, the expenses incurred by
the contractors have outrun the receipts, and they have incurred heavy
losses, which might even prove ruinous, if they were forced to sell the
property acquired in this form. It should always be borne in mind, however,
that in these cases, the increase of expenditure thus incurred has been
caused by a laudable ambition on the part of the proprietors of these lines to
do even more than they were required to do under their contracts, with a
view to secure the confidence of the Government and the public. It should
also be remembered that in thus increasing the cost and consequent value of
their ships, these companies have enlarged the security of the Government
for the money loaned, and promoted the safety and comfort of passengers.
It has, in no instance, been charged that the companies referred to have, in
any way, misapplied the aid extended to them, or given to it an improper
direction. The products of their expenditures, even admitting them to have
been greater than they might have been, show for themselves, in placing the
American steam mail service, as far as it has gone, at the head of all others,
in point of accommodation, elegance, strength, and swiftness. Nor is this
all. The establishment of these lines is not to be regarded merely with
reference to the immediate profits arising from the system, in connection
with the transportation of the mails. Millions of money have been saved to
American citizens, which, in the absence of these ocean steam lines, would
have gone to fill foreign coffers. The Committee will refer to one fact in
illustration of the truth of this proposition. Before the Collins line was
established, the Cunard line was receiving £7 10s sterling per ton for
freights; at present (1852) the rate is about £4 sterling. By whom were these
£7 10s sterling paid? By the American consumer, in most instances, upon
articles of British manufacture brought to this country by a British line. At
present the American consumer pays but £4 sterling per ton; and, presuming
that the American merchant makes his importations in the American line,
this freight is paid to our own people and goes to swell the sum of our
national wealth. Thus, it will be seen that, formerly, the American consumer
paid very nearly twice as much for the service, and enriched the British
capitalist; whereas, at present, he not only saves one half of the former cost
of freight to himself but, in paying the remaining half, benefits his fellow
Page 144
citizen, who in return aids in consuming perhaps the very merchandise
which he has imported.
"Under these circumstances, can any reasonable man doubt the propriety,
even in a pecuniary point of view, of sustaining the present system, which,
at its very commencement, has given such ample proofs of its usefulness?
Your Committee think not, and do not hesitate to give it as their opinion
that, merely as a matter of dollars and cents, the service in question should
be liberally sustained by Congress, and will in the end make ample returns.
"But your Committee regard this proposition as one, the mere money
feature of which is of minor consequence, when brought into comparison
with other more important considerations. The question is no longer
whether certain individuals shall be saved from loss or enabled to make
fortunes, but whether the American shall succumb to the British lines, and
Great Britain be again permitted to monopolize ocean mail steam
transportation, not only between Europe and America, but throughout the
world. We are aspiring to the first place among the nations of the earth, in a
commercial point of view—a place which belongs to us as a matter of right
—and are we to suffer ourselves to be overcome by British commercial
capitalists under the auspices of the British crown? Shall it be said that, at
the very moment when our steamships are admitted to excel those of any
other people on the face of the globe, our enterprising citizens have been
forced to relinquish the proud position they have attained, for the want of a
few thousands of dollars, when the national treasury is full to overflowing?
Let this end be attained and our great commercial rival will have postages
and freights all her own way, while we shall be compelled to contribute, as
heretofore, to her undisputed supremacy.
"With a view to a full and fair understanding of this important subject, your
Committee have communicated, through their Chairman, with the
Executive Departments of the Government and the presidents of the various
companies engaged in carrying the ocean mail by steam, and will now
proceed to lay before the Senate the results of their careful inquiries. It may
not be improper here again to note, by way of illustration, the benefits to be
derived from ocean steam mail transportation, when in successful operation,
as manifested in the case of the British Cunard line, under the auspices of
which he has imported.
"Under these circumstances, can any reasonable man doubt the propriety,
even in a pecuniary point of view, of sustaining the present system, which,
at its very commencement, has given such ample proofs of its usefulness?
Your Committee think not, and do not hesitate to give it as their opinion
that, merely as a matter of dollars and cents, the service in question should
be liberally sustained by Congress, and will in the end make ample returns.
"But your Committee regard this proposition as one, the mere money
feature of which is of minor consequence, when brought into comparison
with other more important considerations. The question is no longer
whether certain individuals shall be saved from loss or enabled to make
fortunes, but whether the American shall succumb to the British lines, and
Great Britain be again permitted to monopolize ocean mail steam
transportation, not only between Europe and America, but throughout the
world. We are aspiring to the first place among the nations of the earth, in a
commercial point of view—a place which belongs to us as a matter of right
—and are we to suffer ourselves to be overcome by British commercial
capitalists under the auspices of the British crown? Shall it be said that, at
the very moment when our steamships are admitted to excel those of any
other people on the face of the globe, our enterprising citizens have been
forced to relinquish the proud position they have attained, for the want of a
few thousands of dollars, when the national treasury is full to overflowing?
Let this end be attained and our great commercial rival will have postages
and freights all her own way, while we shall be compelled to contribute, as
heretofore, to her undisputed supremacy.
"With a view to a full and fair understanding of this important subject, your
Committee have communicated, through their Chairman, with the
Executive Departments of the Government and the presidents of the various
companies engaged in carrying the ocean mail by steam, and will now
proceed to lay before the Senate the results of their careful inquiries. It may
not be improper here again to note, by way of illustration, the benefits to be
derived from ocean steam mail transportation, when in successful operation,
as manifested in the case of the British Cunard line, under the auspices of
Page 145
the British Government. During the first six years of its existence, the line
above named received from the Government no less than $2,550,000, while
the Government received from the Company, in the form of postages, the
enormous sum of $7,836,800, or $5,826,800 net revenue.
"The Government has paid to the line, (the Collins,) for mail service, in the
two years, $770,000, and has received from the line $513,546.80. If the
receipts be deducted from the outlay, the balance against the Government is
$256,453.20 for the whole time, or $128,226.60 per annum.
"Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account current between
the line and the Government, the latter is out of pocket, at the end of the
two first years of the undertaking and under circumstances the most
disadvantageous to the line, $256,453.20, or in other words, has paid
$128,226.60 per annum, for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about
six thousand miles of the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for
which, as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your Committee would
ask, what has the country received in return for this $256,453.20? They will
furnish the answer. The country has received through the proprietors of this
line, in the form of freights and passage money, a no less amount than
$1,979,760.85, in cash; and, if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly
paid to the British line be taken into account, nearly as much more, by
saving the difference in freights and passage money, to say nothing of the
general advantages derived by all of our producing interests from the
existence of this American line, which, as your Committee believe, are
incalculable. The money account will then stand as follows: Government
debtor to $256,453.80; Country creditor to $1,979,760.85 in cash; and if the
former be deducted from the latter, the balance in favor of the country will
stand $1,723,307.05, in cash alone, leaving out of view the duties on
increased importations caused by the establishment of the American line."
Speaking of the Pacific Mail Steam Company, the Report says:
"It will be seen from the above, that the total cost of the six vessels which
have been accepted by the officers whose duty it was to supervise them and
decide whether they had been built in accordance with the requisitions of
the law and terms of the contract, and whose decision is presumed, by your
Committee, to be conclusive in the premises, has been $1,555,069, and that
above named received from the Government no less than $2,550,000, while
the Government received from the Company, in the form of postages, the
enormous sum of $7,836,800, or $5,826,800 net revenue.
"The Government has paid to the line, (the Collins,) for mail service, in the
two years, $770,000, and has received from the line $513,546.80. If the
receipts be deducted from the outlay, the balance against the Government is
$256,453.20 for the whole time, or $128,226.60 per annum.
"Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account current between
the line and the Government, the latter is out of pocket, at the end of the
two first years of the undertaking and under circumstances the most
disadvantageous to the line, $256,453.20, or in other words, has paid
$128,226.60 per annum, for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about
six thousand miles of the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for
which, as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your Committee would
ask, what has the country received in return for this $256,453.20? They will
furnish the answer. The country has received through the proprietors of this
line, in the form of freights and passage money, a no less amount than
$1,979,760.85, in cash; and, if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly
paid to the British line be taken into account, nearly as much more, by
saving the difference in freights and passage money, to say nothing of the
general advantages derived by all of our producing interests from the
existence of this American line, which, as your Committee believe, are
incalculable. The money account will then stand as follows: Government
debtor to $256,453.80; Country creditor to $1,979,760.85 in cash; and if the
former be deducted from the latter, the balance in favor of the country will
stand $1,723,307.05, in cash alone, leaving out of view the duties on
increased importations caused by the establishment of the American line."
Speaking of the Pacific Mail Steam Company, the Report says:
"It will be seen from the above, that the total cost of the six vessels which
have been accepted by the officers whose duty it was to supervise them and
decide whether they had been built in accordance with the requisitions of
the law and terms of the contract, and whose decision is presumed, by your
Committee, to be conclusive in the premises, has been $1,555,069, and that
Page 146
their aggregate tonnage is 7,365 tons, instead of 5,200 tons, the amount
agreed for. In addition to these ships, as your Committee are informed, the
company has in the Pacific seven steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of
five thousand tons, not yet accepted by the Government. The additional
steamers are, and have been, always kept ready to replace the mail steamers
in the event of detention. The cost of these additional steamers has been, it
is stated, about two thirds of that of the accepted steamers of the same class,
say about $1,036,712, making in all an outlay for steamships alone, of
$2,518,337.
"It appears that the whole number of passengers, of all classes, transported
by the Pacific Mail Ship Company, the line in question, previously to
December 31, 1851, from Panama northward, has been 17,016, and from
Oregon southward, 13,332. The prices of passage have constantly
fluctuated, but, on the date above named, the 31st of December, 1851, the
average rates were, for the first cabin, two hundred and twenty-two dollars;
second cabin, one hundred and sixty dollars, and steerage, one hundred and
seven dollars, between Panama and San Francisco. In the early stages of
emigration the prices were increased in consequence of the enormous prices
of labor and supplies on that comparatively unsettled coast, but were
subsequently reduced. At the commencement of the undertaking, the
Company incurred, of necessity, vast expenses in the selection of proper
harbors for taking in provisions, water, coal, etc., and in the construction of
dépôts; and even at present, coal and supplies of every description are sent
to the Pacific viâ Cape Horn, a distance of from thirteen thousand to fifteen
thousand miles.
"The freights from Panama northward, have been small in amount, and
confined to the lighter descriptions of articles sent by express, while the
mails have been very large, amounting in some instances to one hundred
and fifty bags, each, and, together with coal, water, etc., occupying all of
the space not required for passengers. From California, the freights
southward, have consisted of treasure, amounting, it is supposed, to the
value of seventy millions of dollars, but it is extremely difficult to compute
the worth accurately, as a large portion of the gold, etc., sent has been in the
possession of passengers, and the value does not appear in the manifests."
In noticing the Panamá Railroad and the California lines, the Report says:
agreed for. In addition to these ships, as your Committee are informed, the
company has in the Pacific seven steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of
five thousand tons, not yet accepted by the Government. The additional
steamers are, and have been, always kept ready to replace the mail steamers
in the event of detention. The cost of these additional steamers has been, it
is stated, about two thirds of that of the accepted steamers of the same class,
say about $1,036,712, making in all an outlay for steamships alone, of
$2,518,337.
"It appears that the whole number of passengers, of all classes, transported
by the Pacific Mail Ship Company, the line in question, previously to
December 31, 1851, from Panama northward, has been 17,016, and from
Oregon southward, 13,332. The prices of passage have constantly
fluctuated, but, on the date above named, the 31st of December, 1851, the
average rates were, for the first cabin, two hundred and twenty-two dollars;
second cabin, one hundred and sixty dollars, and steerage, one hundred and
seven dollars, between Panama and San Francisco. In the early stages of
emigration the prices were increased in consequence of the enormous prices
of labor and supplies on that comparatively unsettled coast, but were
subsequently reduced. At the commencement of the undertaking, the
Company incurred, of necessity, vast expenses in the selection of proper
harbors for taking in provisions, water, coal, etc., and in the construction of
dépôts; and even at present, coal and supplies of every description are sent
to the Pacific viâ Cape Horn, a distance of from thirteen thousand to fifteen
thousand miles.
"The freights from Panama northward, have been small in amount, and
confined to the lighter descriptions of articles sent by express, while the
mails have been very large, amounting in some instances to one hundred
and fifty bags, each, and, together with coal, water, etc., occupying all of
the space not required for passengers. From California, the freights
southward, have consisted of treasure, amounting, it is supposed, to the
value of seventy millions of dollars, but it is extremely difficult to compute
the worth accurately, as a large portion of the gold, etc., sent has been in the
possession of passengers, and the value does not appear in the manifests."
In noticing the Panamá Railroad and the California lines, the Report says:
Page 147
"Nearly two millions of dollars have already, as your Committee are
informed, been expended on this important work, by a company possessed
of ample means, and the completion of it can not fail to open the way for a
vast commerce, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and at the same
time cause our fellow-citizens in California and Oregon no longer to be
regarded as exiles. This road being once opened, the passage of the Isthmus,
now so much dreaded, will be effected with perfect ease and comfort in a
couple of hours, instead of two or three days, as at present, and families,
instead of individuals, will be enabled to seek homes in the fertile valleys of
our possessions on the Pacific coast. The value of the lines of ocean
steamers, of which your Committee have been speaking, to the commercial
and other great interests of our country and the world at large, can not well
be estimated until this road shall have been finished and put into full
operation. When such shall be the case, the trade between California and
Oregon, as well as that of China and the islands of the Pacific and Indian
oceans and the Atlantic States and Europe, which now passes around Cape
Horn, a distance of some fifteen thousand miles, will be enabled to take a
direct course across the Isthmus of Panama, the passage of which will
require but two or three hours. The United States mail, from San Francisco
to New York, has already been transported within the space of twenty-five
days and eighteen hours, a day less than the time claimed to have been
taken by any other route, at a period, too, when there were but seven or
eight miles of the road in operation. On a late occasion, five hundred
government troops were sent to California by this route, and were placed at
the point of their destination in a little more than thirty-five days, without
any serious desertion or accident of any kind. A similar operation by the
way of Cape Horn would have occupied six months at least. The store-ship
Lexington, which sailed from New-York for San Francisco, during the last
year, arrived at the latter place on the last day of February, 1852, after a
passage of seven months and one day. In a country the military
establishment of which is so small as that of the United States, facilities of
concentrating troops at points distant from each other, in a short time, are of
incalculable value, and may be said to add manifold to the efficiency of the
military force.
"From what has been already said, it will be seen that the Pacific Mail
Steamship Company, independently of the associate line on this side of the
informed, been expended on this important work, by a company possessed
of ample means, and the completion of it can not fail to open the way for a
vast commerce, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and at the same
time cause our fellow-citizens in California and Oregon no longer to be
regarded as exiles. This road being once opened, the passage of the Isthmus,
now so much dreaded, will be effected with perfect ease and comfort in a
couple of hours, instead of two or three days, as at present, and families,
instead of individuals, will be enabled to seek homes in the fertile valleys of
our possessions on the Pacific coast. The value of the lines of ocean
steamers, of which your Committee have been speaking, to the commercial
and other great interests of our country and the world at large, can not well
be estimated until this road shall have been finished and put into full
operation. When such shall be the case, the trade between California and
Oregon, as well as that of China and the islands of the Pacific and Indian
oceans and the Atlantic States and Europe, which now passes around Cape
Horn, a distance of some fifteen thousand miles, will be enabled to take a
direct course across the Isthmus of Panama, the passage of which will
require but two or three hours. The United States mail, from San Francisco
to New York, has already been transported within the space of twenty-five
days and eighteen hours, a day less than the time claimed to have been
taken by any other route, at a period, too, when there were but seven or
eight miles of the road in operation. On a late occasion, five hundred
government troops were sent to California by this route, and were placed at
the point of their destination in a little more than thirty-five days, without
any serious desertion or accident of any kind. A similar operation by the
way of Cape Horn would have occupied six months at least. The store-ship
Lexington, which sailed from New-York for San Francisco, during the last
year, arrived at the latter place on the last day of February, 1852, after a
passage of seven months and one day. In a country the military
establishment of which is so small as that of the United States, facilities of
concentrating troops at points distant from each other, in a short time, are of
incalculable value, and may be said to add manifold to the efficiency of the
military force.
"From what has been already said, it will be seen that the Pacific Mail
Steamship Company, independently of the associate line on this side of the
Page 148
Isthmus, and without taking into view the cost of the railroad, has expended
in the construction of mail steamers alone $2,518,337; and if to this be
added $2,606,440.45, the expense incurred for a similar purpose by the
Company on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, the entire cost of steamships,
to the two companies engaged in the transportation of the California and
Oregon mails, has been $5,124,777.
"It is no more than sheer justice that your Committee should state that the
California lines, east as well as west of the Isthmus of Panama, have proved
themselves worthy in all respects of the confidence of the country. In no
single instance has an accident occurred involving loss of life or serious
injury in any way to the travelling public. Such is the strength of the vessels
employed, that on two several occasion when, owing to dense fogs and
under-currents, cooperating with the defectiveness of the charts of the
Pacific coast, one of the ships of the Aspinwall line struck, at one time,
upon a soft bottom, and, at another, upon a hard sandy bar, she was steamed
off, after thumping, without the slightest injury whatever. Facts such as
these are the more important, inasmuch as several steamers have lately been
lost on the same coast with a great sacrifice of human life, evidently owing
to a want of the strength necessary to resist, effectually, the force of the
winds and waves. In the opinion of your Committee, the security afforded
to travellers by the strong fastenings and heavy timbers of the ocean mail
steamers, built as they are, under the supervision of naval officers, who are
selected on account of their thorough acquaintance with and experience in
such matters, and made capable of sustaining heavy armaments, is a matter
of the greatest moment. Experience has shown that, in the race after gain,
our countrymen are, perhaps, more regardless of risk to human life than the
people of any other country in the world. Scarcely a day passes without
fresh evidences of the truth of this proposition. The river, as well as the sea-
going steamers, are generally built with reference to speed and lightness,
coupled with smallness of draft of water, and hence, in case of touching the
ground, or of violent storms, it is found that if one portion of the frame
gives way, the breaking up of the entire structure follows with a rapidity
that is but too well calculated to show the slight manner in which these
vessels are constructed. Your Committee think that the additional
expenditure of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars is a matter not
worthy of consideration, when brought into comparison with the loss of life,
in the construction of mail steamers alone $2,518,337; and if to this be
added $2,606,440.45, the expense incurred for a similar purpose by the
Company on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, the entire cost of steamships,
to the two companies engaged in the transportation of the California and
Oregon mails, has been $5,124,777.
"It is no more than sheer justice that your Committee should state that the
California lines, east as well as west of the Isthmus of Panama, have proved
themselves worthy in all respects of the confidence of the country. In no
single instance has an accident occurred involving loss of life or serious
injury in any way to the travelling public. Such is the strength of the vessels
employed, that on two several occasion when, owing to dense fogs and
under-currents, cooperating with the defectiveness of the charts of the
Pacific coast, one of the ships of the Aspinwall line struck, at one time,
upon a soft bottom, and, at another, upon a hard sandy bar, she was steamed
off, after thumping, without the slightest injury whatever. Facts such as
these are the more important, inasmuch as several steamers have lately been
lost on the same coast with a great sacrifice of human life, evidently owing
to a want of the strength necessary to resist, effectually, the force of the
winds and waves. In the opinion of your Committee, the security afforded
to travellers by the strong fastenings and heavy timbers of the ocean mail
steamers, built as they are, under the supervision of naval officers, who are
selected on account of their thorough acquaintance with and experience in
such matters, and made capable of sustaining heavy armaments, is a matter
of the greatest moment. Experience has shown that, in the race after gain,
our countrymen are, perhaps, more regardless of risk to human life than the
people of any other country in the world. Scarcely a day passes without
fresh evidences of the truth of this proposition. The river, as well as the sea-
going steamers, are generally built with reference to speed and lightness,
coupled with smallness of draft of water, and hence, in case of touching the
ground, or of violent storms, it is found that if one portion of the frame
gives way, the breaking up of the entire structure follows with a rapidity
that is but too well calculated to show the slight manner in which these
vessels are constructed. Your Committee think that the additional
expenditure of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars is a matter not
worthy of consideration, when brought into comparison with the loss of life,
Page 149
and would rather see even millions devoted to the construction of strong
steamers, than witness the sudden and heart-rending ruptures of the dearest
ties of our nature, caused by the accidents that so frequently occur. Such is
their feeling of stern disapprobation of the reckless indifference respecting
the safety of passengers, daily manifested by some of the proprietors and
officers of steam lines, that they are resolved, so far at least as they are
concerned, not in any way to countenance, directly or indirectly, such a
course of proceeding. In the extension of the system of ocean mail
transportation which they propose to recommend, care will be taken, that
the steamers which carry the Government mails shall be regarded as
national ships, to a certain extent, and as such, under the charge of the law-
making power, and be so built as to secure safety to travellers; and that, in
all contracts, this consideration shall be regarded as one of paramount
importance."
Regarding a few sailing-ship owners in New-York and Boston, who had
memorialized Congress against the Collins and other lines, the Report says:
"The memorialists are loud in their complaints respecting the alleged
improper interference of the Government with matters that should be left, as
they say, entirely to individual enterprise, which in their opinion becomes
paralyzed under the effects of Government patronage bestowed upon some
to the exclusion of others. If the authors of this memorial will take a fair
and dispassionate view of the matter, they will, as your Committee think, be
convinced that they are wrong in their supposition, and that the Government
has not gratuitously meddled in concerns with which it should have nothing
to do. The merchants and ship-owners referred to seem to forget, in the first
place, that the system of ocean steam mail navigation is intended to secure
adequate protection for our commerce from foreign aggression in the event
of war; and in the second, that it was instituted at a moment when the fine
packet ships, to which the memorialists refer with such becoming pride, had
in fact been driven from the ocean to a certain extent by the overwhelming
power of a British mail steam line, sustained by the British Government,
which had monopolized ocean mail and passenger steam transportation, as
well as the freights of lighter and more perishable descriptions of
merchandise. If, as these gentlemen have stated, the sailing ships have been
made to succumb, it has been under the force of an agency more certain and
not less powerful than the one named by them—wielded by foreign
steamers, than witness the sudden and heart-rending ruptures of the dearest
ties of our nature, caused by the accidents that so frequently occur. Such is
their feeling of stern disapprobation of the reckless indifference respecting
the safety of passengers, daily manifested by some of the proprietors and
officers of steam lines, that they are resolved, so far at least as they are
concerned, not in any way to countenance, directly or indirectly, such a
course of proceeding. In the extension of the system of ocean mail
transportation which they propose to recommend, care will be taken, that
the steamers which carry the Government mails shall be regarded as
national ships, to a certain extent, and as such, under the charge of the law-
making power, and be so built as to secure safety to travellers; and that, in
all contracts, this consideration shall be regarded as one of paramount
importance."
Regarding a few sailing-ship owners in New-York and Boston, who had
memorialized Congress against the Collins and other lines, the Report says:
"The memorialists are loud in their complaints respecting the alleged
improper interference of the Government with matters that should be left, as
they say, entirely to individual enterprise, which in their opinion becomes
paralyzed under the effects of Government patronage bestowed upon some
to the exclusion of others. If the authors of this memorial will take a fair
and dispassionate view of the matter, they will, as your Committee think, be
convinced that they are wrong in their supposition, and that the Government
has not gratuitously meddled in concerns with which it should have nothing
to do. The merchants and ship-owners referred to seem to forget, in the first
place, that the system of ocean steam mail navigation is intended to secure
adequate protection for our commerce from foreign aggression in the event
of war; and in the second, that it was instituted at a moment when the fine
packet ships, to which the memorialists refer with such becoming pride, had
in fact been driven from the ocean to a certain extent by the overwhelming
power of a British mail steam line, sustained by the British Government,
which had monopolized ocean mail and passenger steam transportation, as
well as the freights of lighter and more perishable descriptions of
merchandise. If, as these gentlemen have stated, the sailing ships have been
made to succumb, it has been under the force of an agency more certain and
not less powerful than the one named by them—wielded by foreign
Page 150
capitalists and directed by a foreign government claiming for itself the
supremacy of the ocean. The Cunard line of ocean steamers had been in
possession of a monopoly of freights, letter postage, and passage money for
years, in despite of the attempts of the memorialists to resist, successfully,
before the Government of the United States, seeing that American interests
were made tributary to foreign capital, aided by a foreign government,
adopted the wise course of correcting the evil by kindred means, and
placing, at least, to a certain extent, American interests under the auspices
of American intelligence and enterprise. What would have been the
condition of the New-York lines and other ships had not the Government of
the United States thought proper to extend its aid to the establishment of the
Collins line? Would it have been any better than at present? or rather would
it not have been infinitely worse? Had the Cunard line continued to prosper,
as it must have done in the natural course of things, would it not in all
probability have increased its number of ships until it would have
monopolized every description of ocean transportation? Would not the trade
with the United States have been entirely carried on in British steamers,
navigated at small expense, and therefore able to do the carrying trade at
low prices? Again, what would have been the condition of the Southern
coasting business, so far as mails, passengers, and light freights, at least, are
concerned, had the fourteen British steamers then employed been permitted
to operate, unchecked by the American line of mail steamers, between New-
York and Chagres? Would it not have been entirely at the mercy of the
commissioned agents of the British crown, who so well know how to avail
themselves of opportunities to promote their own interests by advancing
those of their government? To carry the inquiry further, what would have
been the condition of our possessions on the Pacific coast, visited as they
would have been by British steamers—for where is the spot on the
inhabited or inhabitable globe to which they do not bear the union jack of
old England—had not the Aspinwall line been established? Such is the
universal pervasion of the money power in British hands, that at present, as
is well known, the Cunard line has extended a branch to Havre, to transport
goods to England almost free of cost, with a view to appropriate to itself the
freights from that quarter, and thus not only crush the American line of
steamers to Havre, but be enabled to underbid the Collins line, and, if
possible, again monopolize the trade with the United States over that route.
Would all this have raised the prices of freights in American sailing vessels,
supremacy of the ocean. The Cunard line of ocean steamers had been in
possession of a monopoly of freights, letter postage, and passage money for
years, in despite of the attempts of the memorialists to resist, successfully,
before the Government of the United States, seeing that American interests
were made tributary to foreign capital, aided by a foreign government,
adopted the wise course of correcting the evil by kindred means, and
placing, at least, to a certain extent, American interests under the auspices
of American intelligence and enterprise. What would have been the
condition of the New-York lines and other ships had not the Government of
the United States thought proper to extend its aid to the establishment of the
Collins line? Would it have been any better than at present? or rather would
it not have been infinitely worse? Had the Cunard line continued to prosper,
as it must have done in the natural course of things, would it not in all
probability have increased its number of ships until it would have
monopolized every description of ocean transportation? Would not the trade
with the United States have been entirely carried on in British steamers,
navigated at small expense, and therefore able to do the carrying trade at
low prices? Again, what would have been the condition of the Southern
coasting business, so far as mails, passengers, and light freights, at least, are
concerned, had the fourteen British steamers then employed been permitted
to operate, unchecked by the American line of mail steamers, between New-
York and Chagres? Would it not have been entirely at the mercy of the
commissioned agents of the British crown, who so well know how to avail
themselves of opportunities to promote their own interests by advancing
those of their government? To carry the inquiry further, what would have
been the condition of our possessions on the Pacific coast, visited as they
would have been by British steamers—for where is the spot on the
inhabited or inhabitable globe to which they do not bear the union jack of
old England—had not the Aspinwall line been established? Such is the
universal pervasion of the money power in British hands, that at present, as
is well known, the Cunard line has extended a branch to Havre, to transport
goods to England almost free of cost, with a view to appropriate to itself the
freights from that quarter, and thus not only crush the American line of
steamers to Havre, but be enabled to underbid the Collins line, and, if
possible, again monopolize the trade with the United States over that route.
Would all this have raised the prices of freights in American sailing vessels,
Page 151
and given an advantage to the memorialists in question, who had at one
time monopolized to themselves the freights, postage, and passage money
in sailing ships? or would not, on the contrary, such a state of things have
operated so to give a British tendency to trade everywhere, and to furnish
freights to British ships, at prices at which the American ship owners could
not afford to navigate their vessels?
"What, the Committee would ask, has the Government of the United States
done in the premises? Having under its charge the control and direction of
the United States mails upon land and sea, it has thought proper to say that
it would pay for the transportation of the mails in American steamers,
which can, if necessary, be converted, at a small expense, into war steamers,
and adopted, if need be, into the navy proper, at an appraised value, and
thereby become efficient protectors of American commerce in the event of a
war. This is the head and front of the Government's offending, and has,
forsooth, aroused the ire of the commercial monopolists of New-York,
Boston, and elsewhere, because they can not any longer enjoy the gains
which, for more than a quarter of a century, they had wrested from the mass
of consumers throughout the land, north, south, east, and west. Your
Committee must say that, in their opinion, such complaints come with a bad
grace from such quarters, and it is to be feared that victorious steam will ere
long, without the aid of the Federal Government, supersede the sailing ships
of the memorialists, through the instrumentality of the discoveries daily in
progress, whereby the navigation of vessels propelled by that power will be
made a matter of comparatively small cost."
Speaking of steam communication with Pará and Rio de Janeiro, the Report
further says:
"When the almost unbounded capacity for trade of the basins of the La
Plata and Amazon is taken into view, embracing as it does a great variety of
useful products which may be advantageously exchanged for the
manufactures and agricultural productions of our own country, the mind is
at a loss what limit to assign to the trade to which civilization and the
extension of commercial facilities must eventually give rise. Nor are the
advantages of this great prospective commerce to be confined to the
immediate intercourse between this country and the regions to which we
refer. While the prevalence of certain winds, and the form of the coast of
time monopolized to themselves the freights, postage, and passage money
in sailing ships? or would not, on the contrary, such a state of things have
operated so to give a British tendency to trade everywhere, and to furnish
freights to British ships, at prices at which the American ship owners could
not afford to navigate their vessels?
"What, the Committee would ask, has the Government of the United States
done in the premises? Having under its charge the control and direction of
the United States mails upon land and sea, it has thought proper to say that
it would pay for the transportation of the mails in American steamers,
which can, if necessary, be converted, at a small expense, into war steamers,
and adopted, if need be, into the navy proper, at an appraised value, and
thereby become efficient protectors of American commerce in the event of a
war. This is the head and front of the Government's offending, and has,
forsooth, aroused the ire of the commercial monopolists of New-York,
Boston, and elsewhere, because they can not any longer enjoy the gains
which, for more than a quarter of a century, they had wrested from the mass
of consumers throughout the land, north, south, east, and west. Your
Committee must say that, in their opinion, such complaints come with a bad
grace from such quarters, and it is to be feared that victorious steam will ere
long, without the aid of the Federal Government, supersede the sailing ships
of the memorialists, through the instrumentality of the discoveries daily in
progress, whereby the navigation of vessels propelled by that power will be
made a matter of comparatively small cost."
Speaking of steam communication with Pará and Rio de Janeiro, the Report
further says:
"When the almost unbounded capacity for trade of the basins of the La
Plata and Amazon is taken into view, embracing as it does a great variety of
useful products which may be advantageously exchanged for the
manufactures and agricultural productions of our own country, the mind is
at a loss what limit to assign to the trade to which civilization and the
extension of commercial facilities must eventually give rise. Nor are the
advantages of this great prospective commerce to be confined to the
immediate intercourse between this country and the regions to which we
refer. While the prevalence of certain winds, and the form of the coast of
Page 152
South-America, are favorable to a direct trade with the continent of North-
America, they are such as to compel the commerce with Europe to pass
along our shores, and thus constitute our Atlantic seaports so many stopping
places at which the ships of the old world may touch in their voyages to and
fro. Heretofore the policy of the governments which occupy the regions
watered by the La Plata and the Amazon, and their respective tributaries,
has been so exclusive in its character as to trammel, if not entirely prevent,
their intercourse with distant nations. The different sovereignties which
have sprung into existence since South-America became independent of
European control, have been so jealous of each other that they have
appeared to try which should be most succesful in expelling foreign
commerce, lest it might bring to some one of them benefits which others
did not and could not possess. A wiser policy, however, appears to be about
to prevail since the fall of Rosas, and there is good reason to believe that,
hereafter, the commerce of those communities with the rest of the world,
will be placed upon a more liberal foundation. Should such be the case, Rio
de Janeiro can not fail to become the great centre of a largely increased
trade in the southern hemisphere."
"Should it be preferred to limit the extent of the American line to Para, at
the mouth of the Amazon, the largest river in the world, there is at present a
Brazilian line between that point and Rio de Janeiro, which, with the lines
between Rio and the mouth of the La Plata, will render the connection
complete.
"Of the Amazon, it is proper to state that it is navigable by the largest
vessels, and presents a line of shore of not less than six thousand miles,
abounding in every description of product, with climates of all temperatures
and soils adapted to all sorts of vegetable growth. As the regions through
which this vast river passes are peopled by communities to which
manufacturing is unknown, it will at once be seen what an immense market
will be opened to American industry in the various departments of the
useful arts. The proposed connection would, together with the intercourse
by steam, which will inevitably be established on the Amazon, draw to that
river the trade of the interior, which at present passes over the Andes on the
backs of sheep and mules to the Pacific ocean, and constitutes a large
portion of the commodities that are transported around Cape Horn. With a
America, they are such as to compel the commerce with Europe to pass
along our shores, and thus constitute our Atlantic seaports so many stopping
places at which the ships of the old world may touch in their voyages to and
fro. Heretofore the policy of the governments which occupy the regions
watered by the La Plata and the Amazon, and their respective tributaries,
has been so exclusive in its character as to trammel, if not entirely prevent,
their intercourse with distant nations. The different sovereignties which
have sprung into existence since South-America became independent of
European control, have been so jealous of each other that they have
appeared to try which should be most succesful in expelling foreign
commerce, lest it might bring to some one of them benefits which others
did not and could not possess. A wiser policy, however, appears to be about
to prevail since the fall of Rosas, and there is good reason to believe that,
hereafter, the commerce of those communities with the rest of the world,
will be placed upon a more liberal foundation. Should such be the case, Rio
de Janeiro can not fail to become the great centre of a largely increased
trade in the southern hemisphere."
"Should it be preferred to limit the extent of the American line to Para, at
the mouth of the Amazon, the largest river in the world, there is at present a
Brazilian line between that point and Rio de Janeiro, which, with the lines
between Rio and the mouth of the La Plata, will render the connection
complete.
"Of the Amazon, it is proper to state that it is navigable by the largest
vessels, and presents a line of shore of not less than six thousand miles,
abounding in every description of product, with climates of all temperatures
and soils adapted to all sorts of vegetable growth. As the regions through
which this vast river passes are peopled by communities to which
manufacturing is unknown, it will at once be seen what an immense market
will be opened to American industry in the various departments of the
useful arts. The proposed connection would, together with the intercourse
by steam, which will inevitably be established on the Amazon, draw to that
river the trade of the interior, which at present passes over the Andes on the
backs of sheep and mules to the Pacific ocean, and constitutes a large
portion of the commodities that are transported around Cape Horn. With a
Page 153
view to this river navigation, Brazil has already entered into a boundary
treaty with Peru, by which she has engaged to establish steamboat
navigation on the Peruvian tributaries of the Amazon, and is preparing to
put seven steamers upon the river, where none have heretofore been.
"The experience of the world has shown that nations do not become
commercial or manufacturing, so long as the products of the soil are
sufficiently abundant to yield them wealth; and, hence, it may be reasonably
inferred that the carrying trade to and from South-America will, if proper
measures be taken, fall into the hands of American ship-owners. By way of
ascertaining what the extent of this trade will be, if reference be had to the
interior or back country as the standard of the commercial resources
furnished by rivers, it will be found that the total area drained by the rivers
of the world is as follows:
Sq.
Miles.
Europe, emptying into the Atlantic, 532,940
Africa, emptying into the Mediterranean, 198,630
Total Old World, 1,731,570
Asia, emptying into the Pacific, 1,767,280
Asia, emptying into the Indian ocean, 1,661,760
Total Asiatic, 3,429,040
North-America, including St. Lawrence and Mississippi
1,476,800
emptying into the Atlantic,
South-America, emptying into the Atlantic—
Amazon and its confluents, 2,048,480
La Plata and all others, 1,329,490
Total South-American 3,377,970
Total American to the Atlantic, 4,854,770
"From the above statement it will be seen that the proposed line of steam
communication will bring within thirty days of each other, the commercial
outlets of navigable streams which drain a back country greater in extent
than that which is drained by all of the navigable streams which empty
themselves into the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian oceans, from those
portions of Europe, Asia, and Africa, which are accessible to American
treaty with Peru, by which she has engaged to establish steamboat
navigation on the Peruvian tributaries of the Amazon, and is preparing to
put seven steamers upon the river, where none have heretofore been.
"The experience of the world has shown that nations do not become
commercial or manufacturing, so long as the products of the soil are
sufficiently abundant to yield them wealth; and, hence, it may be reasonably
inferred that the carrying trade to and from South-America will, if proper
measures be taken, fall into the hands of American ship-owners. By way of
ascertaining what the extent of this trade will be, if reference be had to the
interior or back country as the standard of the commercial resources
furnished by rivers, it will be found that the total area drained by the rivers
of the world is as follows:
Sq.
Miles.
Europe, emptying into the Atlantic, 532,940
Africa, emptying into the Mediterranean, 198,630
Total Old World, 1,731,570
Asia, emptying into the Pacific, 1,767,280
Asia, emptying into the Indian ocean, 1,661,760
Total Asiatic, 3,429,040
North-America, including St. Lawrence and Mississippi
1,476,800
emptying into the Atlantic,
South-America, emptying into the Atlantic—
Amazon and its confluents, 2,048,480
La Plata and all others, 1,329,490
Total South-American 3,377,970
Total American to the Atlantic, 4,854,770
"From the above statement it will be seen that the proposed line of steam
communication will bring within thirty days of each other, the commercial
outlets of navigable streams which drain a back country greater in extent
than that which is drained by all of the navigable streams which empty
themselves into the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian oceans, from those
portions of Europe, Asia, and Africa, which are accessible to American
Page 154
commerce. Settlement and cultivation will, in the course of time, make
these American river basins as rich in products as those of the old world.
"The question next arises, who are to be the carriers of the trade which is
hereafter to spring out of these American river basins, the English or the
Americans? If Great Britain be suffered to monopolize commerce as she
has heretofore done by her steam navigation, her people will enjoy this
great boon; but if, on the contrary, the United States take advantage of
circumstances as they should, the prize will be won by Americans."
"Your Committee would remark, in concluding this Report, that, regarding
as they do the existence and rapid extension of the system of ocean mail
steam navigation, as absolutely essential to the dignity and permanent
prosperity of the country, and as the only means, consistent with the genius
and policy of our free institutions, of acquiring a maritime strength, which,
by keeping pace with the improvements of the age, shall place us upon an
equal footing with other civilized countries of the world, without the
necessity of an overgrown and expensive naval establishment proper, in
time of peace, they would feel themselves derelict in the performance of
their duties, did they not recommend the measure, with the earnestness
which its importance demands.
"Circumstances indicate, with a clearness not to be misunderstood, that in
any future struggle for superiority on the ocean, the contest will be decided
by the power of steam. With a view to this result, England has applied
herself with even more than her wonted energy to the construction of a
regular steam navy which shall be superior to all others. The number of
ships which Great Britain has of this kind, is at present two hundred and
seventy-one, and there are no less than nine royal war steamers in progress
of construction, to say nothing of the mail and other steamers which are
being built. The course thus pursued by the great commercial rival of the
United States, renders a corresponding energy and activity on our part
absolutely necessary, in a national point of view; a steam navy must be
provided for future emergencies in the way proposed by the Committee, or
war steamers must be built at an enormous outlay of public money and kept
ready in the navy yards, or in commission, at an expense which is appalling
to every lover of judicious economy, or the stripes and stars of our country,
these American river basins as rich in products as those of the old world.
"The question next arises, who are to be the carriers of the trade which is
hereafter to spring out of these American river basins, the English or the
Americans? If Great Britain be suffered to monopolize commerce as she
has heretofore done by her steam navigation, her people will enjoy this
great boon; but if, on the contrary, the United States take advantage of
circumstances as they should, the prize will be won by Americans."
"Your Committee would remark, in concluding this Report, that, regarding
as they do the existence and rapid extension of the system of ocean mail
steam navigation, as absolutely essential to the dignity and permanent
prosperity of the country, and as the only means, consistent with the genius
and policy of our free institutions, of acquiring a maritime strength, which,
by keeping pace with the improvements of the age, shall place us upon an
equal footing with other civilized countries of the world, without the
necessity of an overgrown and expensive naval establishment proper, in
time of peace, they would feel themselves derelict in the performance of
their duties, did they not recommend the measure, with the earnestness
which its importance demands.
"Circumstances indicate, with a clearness not to be misunderstood, that in
any future struggle for superiority on the ocean, the contest will be decided
by the power of steam. With a view to this result, England has applied
herself with even more than her wonted energy to the construction of a
regular steam navy which shall be superior to all others. The number of
ships which Great Britain has of this kind, is at present two hundred and
seventy-one, and there are no less than nine royal war steamers in progress
of construction, to say nothing of the mail and other steamers which are
being built. The course thus pursued by the great commercial rival of the
United States, renders a corresponding energy and activity on our part
absolutely necessary, in a national point of view; a steam navy must be
provided for future emergencies in the way proposed by the Committee, or
war steamers must be built at an enormous outlay of public money and kept
ready in the navy yards, or in commission, at an expense which is appalling
to every lover of judicious economy, or the stripes and stars of our country,
Page 155
which have heretofore floated so triumphantly on every sea, must grow
dim, not only before the 'meteor flag of England,' but the standards of the
secondary powers of Europe. If members of Congress are prepared to adopt
either of these latter two alternatives, let them say so, and let a system
which promises, under an honest and faithful discharge of duty on the part
of the executive branch of the Government, to realize the most sanguine
expectations of its friends, be at once abandoned. Let Great Britain be again
the guardian of our commercial interests and the beneficiary of American
trade. Let the Liverpool, Bremen, Havre, California, and other lines, which
have furnished twenty-four as noble sea steamers as ever floated, be
abandoned to their fate, and let the Cunard line and other British steam mail
lines and royal steamers supply their places on the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans, and our Southern seas.
"Your Committee would again repeat that the question to be considered is
not one of mere dollars and cents, or whether certain individuals are to be
sustained, or not, but one of infinitely greater consequence—whether this
proud republic shall now and hereafter exist as a power competent to
maintain her rights upon the ocean. The present condition of political affairs
in Europe is such as, in the opinion of many, to threaten a general war
among the nations of that quarter of the globe, and the United States should
stand ready, and able too, to protect the rights of her citizens upon the
ocean, in such an event. Were such a crisis to take place to-morrow, or the
next year, or within the next five years, is the country prepared for it? The
steam navy proper amounts to sixteen steamers of all classes, which,
together with the twenty-four ocean mail steamers in the employ of the Post
Office Department, would give us a steam naval force not exceeding forty
in all. Is this the position we should occupy, while Great Britain has at
command upwards of three hundred war and mail steamers? France has, it
is believed, upwards of a hundred, and the secondary powers of Europe
have naval steam armaments in proportion, most of them exceeding our
own. This question will be decided by the continuation or rejection of the
system under consideration, which, with all the difficulties attendant upon
new enterprises and under the most embarrassing circumstances, has gone
very far to sustain itself, and promises, at no distant period, to become a
source of large revenue to the Government, and incalculable commercial
advantages, pecuniarily and otherwise, to the country."
dim, not only before the 'meteor flag of England,' but the standards of the
secondary powers of Europe. If members of Congress are prepared to adopt
either of these latter two alternatives, let them say so, and let a system
which promises, under an honest and faithful discharge of duty on the part
of the executive branch of the Government, to realize the most sanguine
expectations of its friends, be at once abandoned. Let Great Britain be again
the guardian of our commercial interests and the beneficiary of American
trade. Let the Liverpool, Bremen, Havre, California, and other lines, which
have furnished twenty-four as noble sea steamers as ever floated, be
abandoned to their fate, and let the Cunard line and other British steam mail
lines and royal steamers supply their places on the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans, and our Southern seas.
"Your Committee would again repeat that the question to be considered is
not one of mere dollars and cents, or whether certain individuals are to be
sustained, or not, but one of infinitely greater consequence—whether this
proud republic shall now and hereafter exist as a power competent to
maintain her rights upon the ocean. The present condition of political affairs
in Europe is such as, in the opinion of many, to threaten a general war
among the nations of that quarter of the globe, and the United States should
stand ready, and able too, to protect the rights of her citizens upon the
ocean, in such an event. Were such a crisis to take place to-morrow, or the
next year, or within the next five years, is the country prepared for it? The
steam navy proper amounts to sixteen steamers of all classes, which,
together with the twenty-four ocean mail steamers in the employ of the Post
Office Department, would give us a steam naval force not exceeding forty
in all. Is this the position we should occupy, while Great Britain has at
command upwards of three hundred war and mail steamers? France has, it
is believed, upwards of a hundred, and the secondary powers of Europe
have naval steam armaments in proportion, most of them exceeding our
own. This question will be decided by the continuation or rejection of the
system under consideration, which, with all the difficulties attendant upon
new enterprises and under the most embarrassing circumstances, has gone
very far to sustain itself, and promises, at no distant period, to become a
source of large revenue to the Government, and incalculable commercial
advantages, pecuniarily and otherwise, to the country."
Page 156
The following is copied from the Report made by Mr. Rusk in 1850, and
published in Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852. Speaking of
the services of the mail steamers in our system of defenses, the Report says:
"The truth is, that, in the opinion of your Committee, the temper of the
times requires that we shall keep pace with the rapid improvements of other
nations in their commercial and military marine, and that the only choice is,
whether it is to be done by constructing vessels for the packet service, at a
boundless expense to the Government, or by aiding private enterprise, and
thus not only eventually avoiding expense, but adding largely to the
revenues of the country. It will be seen from the above extract from Mr.
King's speech, that, in the course of five years, the balance in favor of the
Government from the Cunard line alone was $5,286,000. The New-York
and Liverpool and Bremen lines will come in for a large, if not by far the
greater, share of the postage and freightage heretofore enjoyed by the
Cunard line; and the line to Chagres, for the advantages that have, up to the
time of its partial commencement, been in the exclusive possession of the
British packet establishment in that direction. Nor are the freightage and
postage moneys the only sources of profit. In proportion to the increase of
these facilities will be the extension of trade, and consequently the
Government will receive the duties payable upon all foreign merchandise
brought into the country. Besides, persons in transitu will leave much
money in our cities and along their routes, to say nothing of the porterage
and costs of transportation of goods. To benefit our people is to benefit our
Government; as the more we enrich the former, the more able are they to
contribute to the support of the latter.
"To construct ships and keep them in our navy-yards, subject to the injuries
of time and casualties, does not consist with the notions of the American
people, on the score of economy; nor is it in accordance with received
opinions in regard to the propriety of placing excessive patronage in the
hands of the General Government. At the same time, it is in perfect unison
with the spirit of our free institutions that the arts of peace shall be made
tributary to the purposes of defense, and the same energies which extend the
commerce and manufactures of our country shall, in the event of necessity,
be capable of being made use of for our protection. While the crowned
heads of the Old World keep in constant pay vast armies and navies
published in Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852. Speaking of
the services of the mail steamers in our system of defenses, the Report says:
"The truth is, that, in the opinion of your Committee, the temper of the
times requires that we shall keep pace with the rapid improvements of other
nations in their commercial and military marine, and that the only choice is,
whether it is to be done by constructing vessels for the packet service, at a
boundless expense to the Government, or by aiding private enterprise, and
thus not only eventually avoiding expense, but adding largely to the
revenues of the country. It will be seen from the above extract from Mr.
King's speech, that, in the course of five years, the balance in favor of the
Government from the Cunard line alone was $5,286,000. The New-York
and Liverpool and Bremen lines will come in for a large, if not by far the
greater, share of the postage and freightage heretofore enjoyed by the
Cunard line; and the line to Chagres, for the advantages that have, up to the
time of its partial commencement, been in the exclusive possession of the
British packet establishment in that direction. Nor are the freightage and
postage moneys the only sources of profit. In proportion to the increase of
these facilities will be the extension of trade, and consequently the
Government will receive the duties payable upon all foreign merchandise
brought into the country. Besides, persons in transitu will leave much
money in our cities and along their routes, to say nothing of the porterage
and costs of transportation of goods. To benefit our people is to benefit our
Government; as the more we enrich the former, the more able are they to
contribute to the support of the latter.
"To construct ships and keep them in our navy-yards, subject to the injuries
of time and casualties, does not consist with the notions of the American
people, on the score of economy; nor is it in accordance with received
opinions in regard to the propriety of placing excessive patronage in the
hands of the General Government. At the same time, it is in perfect unison
with the spirit of our free institutions that the arts of peace shall be made
tributary to the purposes of defense, and the same energies which extend the
commerce and manufactures of our country shall, in the event of necessity,
be capable of being made use of for our protection. While the crowned
heads of the Old World keep in constant pay vast armies and navies
Page 157
sustained by the heart's blood of the oppressed people, for the protection
and preservation of their unhallowed power, it is the proud boast of our
country that our soldiers are our citizens, and the sailors, who, in time of
peace, spread the canvas of our commercial marine throughout the world,
are the men who, in time of war, have heretofore directed, and will continue
to direct, our cannon against our foes."
"The simple fact that the ships employed in it [the mail service] may
hereafter, if the Government thinks proper, be purchased and commissioned
as regular war steamers, to be officered and manned as ships of war, should
not and can not prevent the construction of steam or sailing vessels for
ordinary naval purposes. Your Committee are of opinion that, so far from
being an impediment to the proper increase of the Navy, the prosperity of
the ocean steam packet service must operate in favor of an enlargement of
the naval force, the necessity for which is increased in proportion to the
extension of our commercial relations with foreign countries. The routes
upon which lines of steam packets can be sustained and made profitable to
the owners are comparatively few, when we take into view the infinitely
diversified ramifications of trade. Great Britain, with her vast colonial and
general commerce, had, in 1848, but fifteen lines in which national or
contract vessels were employed, including the home stations, as they are
called, or points of connection between the British islands. Nor has the
ocean steam packet system hindered, in the slightest degree, her progress in
the construction of steam or sailing vessels for the naval service. In
speaking of steam vessels available for naval service, Captain W. H. Hall,
of the British Navy, in the course of his examination before the special
Committee of the House of Commons, hereinbefore referred to, says: 'I
some time ago sent to the Admiralty a plan for making the whole of the
merchant steamers available in case of need; and if there were an Act of
Parliament that these ships should be strengthened forward and aft to carry
guns, it might be then done with a very trifling expense; that would give
this country more power than any other country in the world. We have
nearly one thousand steam vessels, half of which, at least, might be made
available in case Government required their services. Our mercantile
steamers are some of the finest in the world, and five hundred of them
might be turned to account. They should all be numbered and classed, so
that Government would merely have to ask for the number of vessels they
and preservation of their unhallowed power, it is the proud boast of our
country that our soldiers are our citizens, and the sailors, who, in time of
peace, spread the canvas of our commercial marine throughout the world,
are the men who, in time of war, have heretofore directed, and will continue
to direct, our cannon against our foes."
"The simple fact that the ships employed in it [the mail service] may
hereafter, if the Government thinks proper, be purchased and commissioned
as regular war steamers, to be officered and manned as ships of war, should
not and can not prevent the construction of steam or sailing vessels for
ordinary naval purposes. Your Committee are of opinion that, so far from
being an impediment to the proper increase of the Navy, the prosperity of
the ocean steam packet service must operate in favor of an enlargement of
the naval force, the necessity for which is increased in proportion to the
extension of our commercial relations with foreign countries. The routes
upon which lines of steam packets can be sustained and made profitable to
the owners are comparatively few, when we take into view the infinitely
diversified ramifications of trade. Great Britain, with her vast colonial and
general commerce, had, in 1848, but fifteen lines in which national or
contract vessels were employed, including the home stations, as they are
called, or points of connection between the British islands. Nor has the
ocean steam packet system hindered, in the slightest degree, her progress in
the construction of steam or sailing vessels for the naval service. In
speaking of steam vessels available for naval service, Captain W. H. Hall,
of the British Navy, in the course of his examination before the special
Committee of the House of Commons, hereinbefore referred to, says: 'I
some time ago sent to the Admiralty a plan for making the whole of the
merchant steamers available in case of need; and if there were an Act of
Parliament that these ships should be strengthened forward and aft to carry
guns, it might be then done with a very trifling expense; that would give
this country more power than any other country in the world. We have
nearly one thousand steam vessels, half of which, at least, might be made
available in case Government required their services. Our mercantile
steamers are some of the finest in the world, and five hundred of them
might be turned to account. They should all be numbered and classed, so
that Government would merely have to ask for the number of vessels they
Page 158
wanted, when they might go to Woolwich, or other places, and put the guns
on board, and then they would be ready for service.'
"Here is the opinion of a captain in the British Navy with reference to the
availability of steam vessels for national defense; and what a lesson does it
teach to us in America, where steam navigation is found penetrating every
portion of the Union, and spreading itself on our maritime and lake frontier
in every direction! Here is found no expression of apprehension lest the
mercantile steamers might interfere with the growth or efficiency of the
Navy to which the witness belonged. This opinion, moreover, is expressed
in a country where, according to the testimony before the Committee
already named, there were, in 1848, 174 war steamers, with an aggregate
horse-power of 44,480 horses; and where Mr. Alexander Gordon states, in a
letter addressed to the same Committee, the Steam Navy had then cost the
country £6,000,000 sterling, or $30,000,000, 'exclusive of all reïnstatements
and expenses during commission;' the same gentleman also alleging that the
annual repairs amounted
to £108,000
Annual cost for coals, 110,000
Depreciation at a moderate allowance, 600,000
Making the total amount of annual cost, £818,000
Or $4,094,000
"The regular employment of the best engineers on board of contract vessels,
and the great experience they would acquire from being constantly on
active duty, would furnish to the naval service, in the event of a war, a corps
that would be invaluable. In speaking of the superiority of the engineers on
board of contract vessels in the employ of the British Government over
those on board of the Queen's ships, a witness before the select Committee
of the House of Commons says: 'Last year there was a universal complaint
of the inferiority of the engineers and all persons connected with steam
employed in her Majesty's service. It was explained, and very easily
explained, by the superior advantages in the merchant service, and
particularly the high wages paid. In all contract steam packets, they have
men on board the vessels who are competent to superintend any alterations
or repairs in the machinery which may be required.'"
on board, and then they would be ready for service.'
"Here is the opinion of a captain in the British Navy with reference to the
availability of steam vessels for national defense; and what a lesson does it
teach to us in America, where steam navigation is found penetrating every
portion of the Union, and spreading itself on our maritime and lake frontier
in every direction! Here is found no expression of apprehension lest the
mercantile steamers might interfere with the growth or efficiency of the
Navy to which the witness belonged. This opinion, moreover, is expressed
in a country where, according to the testimony before the Committee
already named, there were, in 1848, 174 war steamers, with an aggregate
horse-power of 44,480 horses; and where Mr. Alexander Gordon states, in a
letter addressed to the same Committee, the Steam Navy had then cost the
country £6,000,000 sterling, or $30,000,000, 'exclusive of all reïnstatements
and expenses during commission;' the same gentleman also alleging that the
annual repairs amounted
to £108,000
Annual cost for coals, 110,000
Depreciation at a moderate allowance, 600,000
Making the total amount of annual cost, £818,000
Or $4,094,000
"The regular employment of the best engineers on board of contract vessels,
and the great experience they would acquire from being constantly on
active duty, would furnish to the naval service, in the event of a war, a corps
that would be invaluable. In speaking of the superiority of the engineers on
board of contract vessels in the employ of the British Government over
those on board of the Queen's ships, a witness before the select Committee
of the House of Commons says: 'Last year there was a universal complaint
of the inferiority of the engineers and all persons connected with steam
employed in her Majesty's service. It was explained, and very easily
explained, by the superior advantages in the merchant service, and
particularly the high wages paid. In all contract steam packets, they have
men on board the vessels who are competent to superintend any alterations
or repairs in the machinery which may be required.'"
Page 159
Secretary Graham said on this subject to the Senate Committee, 20 March,
1853:
"While their discussions [mail steamers] justify the conclusion that vessels
of this description can not be relied on to supersede those modelled and
built only for purposes of war, it is respectfully suggested that a limited
number of them, employed in time of peace in the transportation of the
mails, would be found a most useful resource of the Government on the
breaking out of war.
"If conforming to the standards required by these contracts, their readiness
to be used at the shortest notice, their capacity as transports for troops and
munitions of war, and their great celerity of motion, enabling them to
overhaul merchantmen, and at the same time escape cruisers, would render
them terrible as guerrillas of the ocean, if fitted with such armaments as
could be readily put upon them in their present condition."
Post Master General Collamer also said on this subject, June 27, 1850:
"There are three modes which have been mentioned of transporting the
mail. The first is by naval steamships, conducted by the Navy, as a national
service. This will occasion so enormous an expense that it is not probable
the project will be entertained.
"The next mode suggested is the sending the mails, from time to time, by
the fastest steamers which are first going. This has one advantage: it gives
occasional aid to the enterprising; but there are many and great objections
to it:
"1st. It is entirely inconsistent with fixed periods of departure and arrival.
"2d. It makes all connections on or with the route uncertain.
"3d. A price must be fixed, to prevent undue exactions of the Government;
and yet no one would be under obligation to take the mail at the price, so
that it would be uncertain of going at all.
1853:
"While their discussions [mail steamers] justify the conclusion that vessels
of this description can not be relied on to supersede those modelled and
built only for purposes of war, it is respectfully suggested that a limited
number of them, employed in time of peace in the transportation of the
mails, would be found a most useful resource of the Government on the
breaking out of war.
"If conforming to the standards required by these contracts, their readiness
to be used at the shortest notice, their capacity as transports for troops and
munitions of war, and their great celerity of motion, enabling them to
overhaul merchantmen, and at the same time escape cruisers, would render
them terrible as guerrillas of the ocean, if fitted with such armaments as
could be readily put upon them in their present condition."
Post Master General Collamer also said on this subject, June 27, 1850:
"There are three modes which have been mentioned of transporting the
mail. The first is by naval steamships, conducted by the Navy, as a national
service. This will occasion so enormous an expense that it is not probable
the project will be entertained.
"The next mode suggested is the sending the mails, from time to time, by
the fastest steamers which are first going. This has one advantage: it gives
occasional aid to the enterprising; but there are many and great objections
to it:
"1st. It is entirely inconsistent with fixed periods of departure and arrival.
"2d. It makes all connections on or with the route uncertain.
"3d. A price must be fixed, to prevent undue exactions of the Government;
and yet no one would be under obligation to take the mail at the price, so
that it would be uncertain of going at all.
Page 160
"4th. It would be impracticable to send agents with all those mails, to take
care of them and make distributions, except at an enormous cost.
"5th. There would be constant difficulty with slow and unsafe boats.
"6th. The great object of obtaining steamships, so constructed, under the
inspection of the Navy Department, as to be suitable for war vessels, and
subject to exclusive appropriation and use as such, would be sacrificed.
"The third project is the making of contracts, for a stated term of years,
upon proposals advertised for in the ordinary method adopted for mail-
coach service. This would not answer for ocean steam service, unless
provision were made for security, in the strength, capacity, and adaptation
of the vessels, with their machinery, etc."
Regarding our steam service in the Gulf, and in reviewing the contract
made by the United States Mail Steamship Company, the Hon. Edwin
Croswell, and associates, in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Postal
Committee, presented the following important reflections:
"As early as the year 1835, the attention of the British Government was
directed to the plan of changing the mode of conveying the mails by the
ships of the East-India Company and the Government, and adopting the
contract system with individuals and companies, with a view to combining
the essential properties of a naval and commercial steam marine.
"In consequence of the Report of the Commissioners appointed by
Parliament to inquire into the management of the English Post Office
Department in 1836, the mail steam packet service was transferred to the
Admiralty. The Report stated the conviction of the Commissioners of
Inquiry that 'the advantages which a System of contract must generally
secure to the public over one of the establishment, however well conducted,
were such that they wish they could have felt justified in recommending
that it should be universally and immediately adopted.'
"The Secretary of the Admiralty stated that, 'in acting upon this opinion, the
Admiralty entered into contracts for conveying the mails by steam vessels
to and from Spain and Portugal, and subsequently between Alexandria and
care of them and make distributions, except at an enormous cost.
"5th. There would be constant difficulty with slow and unsafe boats.
"6th. The great object of obtaining steamships, so constructed, under the
inspection of the Navy Department, as to be suitable for war vessels, and
subject to exclusive appropriation and use as such, would be sacrificed.
"The third project is the making of contracts, for a stated term of years,
upon proposals advertised for in the ordinary method adopted for mail-
coach service. This would not answer for ocean steam service, unless
provision were made for security, in the strength, capacity, and adaptation
of the vessels, with their machinery, etc."
Regarding our steam service in the Gulf, and in reviewing the contract
made by the United States Mail Steamship Company, the Hon. Edwin
Croswell, and associates, in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Postal
Committee, presented the following important reflections:
"As early as the year 1835, the attention of the British Government was
directed to the plan of changing the mode of conveying the mails by the
ships of the East-India Company and the Government, and adopting the
contract system with individuals and companies, with a view to combining
the essential properties of a naval and commercial steam marine.
"In consequence of the Report of the Commissioners appointed by
Parliament to inquire into the management of the English Post Office
Department in 1836, the mail steam packet service was transferred to the
Admiralty. The Report stated the conviction of the Commissioners of
Inquiry that 'the advantages which a System of contract must generally
secure to the public over one of the establishment, however well conducted,
were such that they wish they could have felt justified in recommending
that it should be universally and immediately adopted.'
"The Secretary of the Admiralty stated that, 'in acting upon this opinion, the
Admiralty entered into contracts for conveying the mails by steam vessels
to and from Spain and Portugal, and subsequently between Alexandria and
Page 161
England, with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company.
Contracts were also entered into for the conveyance of the mails between
England and North-America, and England and the West-Indies and Mexico.'
That 'the execution of all these contracts, with the exception of the latter,
had given general satisfaction. But for this exception, the extent and
complication of the plan at its commencement afforded some apology.' That
'the spirit in which the steam contractors had generally executed their
contracts merited notice, as they had in almost every instance exceeded the
horse-power stipulated in their agreements, and thus insured an accuracy in
the delivery of mails which experience has shown, if the letter of the
contract had been adhered to by them, would not have been the case.' And
that 'the contract system had been generally satisfactory to the Admiralty
and the public, and had tended largely to increase the steam tonnage of this
country, (England,) to encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery,
and the regulation and economical management of steam.'
"Such, certainly, were among the valuable results of the system; but these
were not the only considerations that led to its adoption. The English
Government, with the forecast for which that far-reaching power is
distinguished, saw the advantages which an extended steam marine would
give to its commerce over that of every other nation in the world. It saw
also the value of connecting this great branch of the national service with
the commercial and practical skill of the country. It soon formed and
matured its plan, embracing within its scope nearly the entire commercial
world. Steam lines, as stated in the preceding extract from the Admiralty
Report, were established, radiating from England to all the prominent
European ports, to the Mediterranean, to Egypt, the East-Indies and China,
the West-India Islands, South-America and Mexico, the ports in the Gulf of
Mexico and Havana, the United States and the English colonial possessions
in North-America, and to the islands and ports in the Pacific ocean. This
vast chain of intercourse was not only completely established, but it became
a matter of national policy to enlarge, strengthen, and maintain it. By it
much of the commerce of the world by steam, and nearly all the letter-
carrying by steam between this continent and the European ports, and even
the distant parts of our own territory, were engrossed by British ships."
Contracts were also entered into for the conveyance of the mails between
England and North-America, and England and the West-Indies and Mexico.'
That 'the execution of all these contracts, with the exception of the latter,
had given general satisfaction. But for this exception, the extent and
complication of the plan at its commencement afforded some apology.' That
'the spirit in which the steam contractors had generally executed their
contracts merited notice, as they had in almost every instance exceeded the
horse-power stipulated in their agreements, and thus insured an accuracy in
the delivery of mails which experience has shown, if the letter of the
contract had been adhered to by them, would not have been the case.' And
that 'the contract system had been generally satisfactory to the Admiralty
and the public, and had tended largely to increase the steam tonnage of this
country, (England,) to encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery,
and the regulation and economical management of steam.'
"Such, certainly, were among the valuable results of the system; but these
were not the only considerations that led to its adoption. The English
Government, with the forecast for which that far-reaching power is
distinguished, saw the advantages which an extended steam marine would
give to its commerce over that of every other nation in the world. It saw
also the value of connecting this great branch of the national service with
the commercial and practical skill of the country. It soon formed and
matured its plan, embracing within its scope nearly the entire commercial
world. Steam lines, as stated in the preceding extract from the Admiralty
Report, were established, radiating from England to all the prominent
European ports, to the Mediterranean, to Egypt, the East-Indies and China,
the West-India Islands, South-America and Mexico, the ports in the Gulf of
Mexico and Havana, the United States and the English colonial possessions
in North-America, and to the islands and ports in the Pacific ocean. This
vast chain of intercourse was not only completely established, but it became
a matter of national policy to enlarge, strengthen, and maintain it. By it
much of the commerce of the world by steam, and nearly all the letter-
carrying by steam between this continent and the European ports, and even
the distant parts of our own territory, were engrossed by British ships."
Page 162
"Important national considerations, aside from the design to engross for
British bottoms and British capital the trade and intercourse of the
commercial world, and especially with the American continent and islands,
entered into the Government plan. It was ascertained to be a far less
expensive mode of maintaining a naval steam force adapted to the purposes
of Government, and to any emergency that might require these ships for
other than mail purposes, than to build, equip, and keep in service national
steamships of war. The experiment has proved its adequacy to the intended
object; and it continues not only to receive the approval of the Admiralty
and Government of England, but to be continually undergoing enlargement
and expansion."
"The West-India mail steam line was proposed to the British Government in
April, 1839, by sundry merchants of London. A charter was granted to the
contractors in that year, under the title of the Royal Mail Steam Packet
Company. It embraced the following routes:
"1. Outward Atlantic Route.—From Southampton to Madeira, Barbados and
Grenada—steamer, every 15 days.
"2. Trinidad Route.—From Grenada to Trinidad and Barbados—steamer,
every 15 days.
"3. Demarara Route.—From Grenada to Courland Bay, (Tobago)—steamer,
every 15 days.
"4. Northern Islands Route.—From Grenada to St. Vincent, St. Lucia,
Martinique, Dominique, Guadalupe, Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitt's,
Tortola, St. Thomas, and St. John's, (Porto Rico)—steamer, every 15 days.
"5. Jamaica and Mexican Route.—From Grenada to Jacmel, (Hayti,)
Kingston, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico—steamer, every 30 days.
"6. Jamaica and St. Iago de Cuba Route.—From Grenada to Jacmel,
Kingston, St. Iago de Cuba, St. Juan's, (Porto Rico,) and St. Thomas—
steamer, every 30 days.
British bottoms and British capital the trade and intercourse of the
commercial world, and especially with the American continent and islands,
entered into the Government plan. It was ascertained to be a far less
expensive mode of maintaining a naval steam force adapted to the purposes
of Government, and to any emergency that might require these ships for
other than mail purposes, than to build, equip, and keep in service national
steamships of war. The experiment has proved its adequacy to the intended
object; and it continues not only to receive the approval of the Admiralty
and Government of England, but to be continually undergoing enlargement
and expansion."
"The West-India mail steam line was proposed to the British Government in
April, 1839, by sundry merchants of London. A charter was granted to the
contractors in that year, under the title of the Royal Mail Steam Packet
Company. It embraced the following routes:
"1. Outward Atlantic Route.—From Southampton to Madeira, Barbados and
Grenada—steamer, every 15 days.
"2. Trinidad Route.—From Grenada to Trinidad and Barbados—steamer,
every 15 days.
"3. Demarara Route.—From Grenada to Courland Bay, (Tobago)—steamer,
every 15 days.
"4. Northern Islands Route.—From Grenada to St. Vincent, St. Lucia,
Martinique, Dominique, Guadalupe, Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitt's,
Tortola, St. Thomas, and St. John's, (Porto Rico)—steamer, every 15 days.
"5. Jamaica and Mexican Route.—From Grenada to Jacmel, (Hayti,)
Kingston, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico—steamer, every 30 days.
"6. Jamaica and St. Iago de Cuba Route.—From Grenada to Jacmel,
Kingston, St. Iago de Cuba, St. Juan's, (Porto Rico,) and St. Thomas—
steamer, every 30 days.
Page 163
"7. Bermuda, Havana, and Jamaica Route.—From St. Thomas to Bermuda,
Nassau, Havana, Kingston, Jacmel, St. Juan's, and St. Thomas—steamer,
every 30 days.
"8. Homeward Fayal Route.—From St. Thomas to Southampton—steamer,
every 30 days.
"9. Laguayra Route.—From Grenada to Laguayra, Porto Cabello, and St.
Thomas—steamer, every 30 days.
"10. Panama and St. Iago de Cuba Route.—From Kingston (Jamaica) to
Santa Martha, Carthagena, Chagres, and St. Juan de Nicaragua—steamer,
every 30 days.
"11. Honduras Route.—From Havana to Balize, (Honduras)—sailing
schooner, every 30 days."
"The contract system, combining the efficient features of an extended
commercial and Government steam marine, was thus adopted after full
investigation on the subject by the Board of Admiralty, the Treasury, and the
different Government Departments, including the Post Master General. The
merits and benefits of this system have been tested by England. That
Government was the first to engage in it, and, as we have already stated,
fully approve, and are constantly extending it. The Committee of Inquiry of
Parliament, as we have already quoted, say truly that it 'had tended largely
to increase the steam tonnage of that country, to encourage private
enterprise in scientific discovery, and the regulation and economical
management of steam.' After an examination of it in the most scientific and
practical manner, that Government regards it as altogether more economical
for the nation, and for the general public interests, than the exclusive
employment of Government vessels. The ships built by the contract
companies have far exceeded in speed and other essential qualities the ships
constructed by Government. A far greater amount of service was obtained,
at a cost much less than would be incurred by Government in building,
equipping, manning, and running national vessels for even a partial
performance of the same service. Individual and associated skill, enterprise,
and capital were called into requisition, and, aided by Government means,
Nassau, Havana, Kingston, Jacmel, St. Juan's, and St. Thomas—steamer,
every 30 days.
"8. Homeward Fayal Route.—From St. Thomas to Southampton—steamer,
every 30 days.
"9. Laguayra Route.—From Grenada to Laguayra, Porto Cabello, and St.
Thomas—steamer, every 30 days.
"10. Panama and St. Iago de Cuba Route.—From Kingston (Jamaica) to
Santa Martha, Carthagena, Chagres, and St. Juan de Nicaragua—steamer,
every 30 days.
"11. Honduras Route.—From Havana to Balize, (Honduras)—sailing
schooner, every 30 days."
"The contract system, combining the efficient features of an extended
commercial and Government steam marine, was thus adopted after full
investigation on the subject by the Board of Admiralty, the Treasury, and the
different Government Departments, including the Post Master General. The
merits and benefits of this system have been tested by England. That
Government was the first to engage in it, and, as we have already stated,
fully approve, and are constantly extending it. The Committee of Inquiry of
Parliament, as we have already quoted, say truly that it 'had tended largely
to increase the steam tonnage of that country, to encourage private
enterprise in scientific discovery, and the regulation and economical
management of steam.' After an examination of it in the most scientific and
practical manner, that Government regards it as altogether more economical
for the nation, and for the general public interests, than the exclusive
employment of Government vessels. The ships built by the contract
companies have far exceeded in speed and other essential qualities the ships
constructed by Government. A far greater amount of service was obtained,
at a cost much less than would be incurred by Government in building,
equipping, manning, and running national vessels for even a partial
performance of the same service. Individual and associated skill, enterprise,
and capital were called into requisition, and, aided by Government means,
Page 164
contributed to enlarge, extend, and fortify the naval and commercial power
of England.
"The practical operation of this great system of steam lines was to place
within the reach of English vessels, of a semi-national character, and ready
to be converted into ships of war, our entire Southern coast and harbors,
besides yielding to them the foreign trade, commerce, and letter-carrying,
by steam, to and from all parts of our country. To meet and counteract this
state of things, became the object and duty of the American Congress and
Government. It was the more obvious at that time particularly, engaged as
we were in a war with Mexico, and our only means of coast defense of any
force being a single steamer, and she not capable of entering the Southern
harbors, while English steam fleets literally filled and occupied our waters.
To counteract, so far as was demanded by the requirements of our own
commerce, and the defense of our coast, a monopoly so formidable, which
had grown up under the direct and liberal coöperation of the English
Government, and the supposed superiority of English machinery, required
the aid of Congress; for it was evident that unaided American enterprise and
capital could not cope with it. Accordingly, at the close of the session of
1847, the Congress of the United States passed an act authorizing the
Secretary of the Navy to contract with sundry parties and different steam
lines for the construction of ocean steamships, as part of the plan of a
combined naval and commercial steam marine, in connection with the mail
service."
After enumerating the various lines established by Congress, he further
says:
"These (with the previously authorized line from New-York to Bremen)
were the various parts of a complete and important plan adapted to the
growing wants of the public service, and for providing an adequate steam
marine, whenever the exigencies of the country might require it, and for
facilitating intercourse and the transmission of the mails between remote
parts of our own country and other nations. For the due performance of it in
all its ramifications, it required a large aggregate of capital, skill, and
intelligent enterprise. After a lapse of nearly three years, portions of the
undertaking have gone into efficient operation; and already the fruits of it—
its utility, and its advantages and benefits to the American government and
of England.
"The practical operation of this great system of steam lines was to place
within the reach of English vessels, of a semi-national character, and ready
to be converted into ships of war, our entire Southern coast and harbors,
besides yielding to them the foreign trade, commerce, and letter-carrying,
by steam, to and from all parts of our country. To meet and counteract this
state of things, became the object and duty of the American Congress and
Government. It was the more obvious at that time particularly, engaged as
we were in a war with Mexico, and our only means of coast defense of any
force being a single steamer, and she not capable of entering the Southern
harbors, while English steam fleets literally filled and occupied our waters.
To counteract, so far as was demanded by the requirements of our own
commerce, and the defense of our coast, a monopoly so formidable, which
had grown up under the direct and liberal coöperation of the English
Government, and the supposed superiority of English machinery, required
the aid of Congress; for it was evident that unaided American enterprise and
capital could not cope with it. Accordingly, at the close of the session of
1847, the Congress of the United States passed an act authorizing the
Secretary of the Navy to contract with sundry parties and different steam
lines for the construction of ocean steamships, as part of the plan of a
combined naval and commercial steam marine, in connection with the mail
service."
After enumerating the various lines established by Congress, he further
says:
"These (with the previously authorized line from New-York to Bremen)
were the various parts of a complete and important plan adapted to the
growing wants of the public service, and for providing an adequate steam
marine, whenever the exigencies of the country might require it, and for
facilitating intercourse and the transmission of the mails between remote
parts of our own country and other nations. For the due performance of it in
all its ramifications, it required a large aggregate of capital, skill, and
intelligent enterprise. After a lapse of nearly three years, portions of the
undertaking have gone into efficient operation; and already the fruits of it—
its utility, and its advantages and benefits to the American government and
Page 165
people—have been demonstrated. When the various parts shall be
completed, and the plan in all its features shall be in full operation, its
immediate practical results, aside from its prospective effectiveness in
furnishing a class of war steamers for any ultimate purpose of the American
Government, will be found fully to justify the action of Congress and the
participation and favor of the Government, and confirm the public
confidence in its great utility and value."
"When it came to the knowledge of the English government that Congress
had entered into contracts establishing steam lines to Chagres, Havana, and
New-Orleans, its first movement to counteract or discourage the proposed
American line in that direction was to run branches of the Royal West-India
mail line from Bermuda to New-York, and from Jamaica to New-Orleans
and Mobile. Now that the American line to Chagres has gone into full
operation, and the news from the Pacific comes by this line to New-York,
and thence to Liverpool, some fifteen days sooner than the same news
brought by the British line,[J] the English government has revised, enlarged,
and extended its West-India line. It has entered into a new contract with the
Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company, a material feature of which is to run a
mail line direct from Southampton to St. Thomas, and thence to Chagres
and back, twice a month, with steamers of larger capacity and power, and
with a proposed speed of from twelve to fourteen miles per hour. For this
line, five or six new steamships are, under the contract, to be built, while
the old vessels are to form branches from this main line or trunk to other of
the routes of this great and extended plan of steam intercourse and letter-
carrying; at the same time that government will withdraw its branches to the
Balize, Mobile, and New-York, extend its line to Rio de Janeiro, and
enlarge its line in the Pacific, from Panama to Valparaiso, converting it from
a monthly to a semi-monthly route. These movements show not only the
immediate results of American enterprise in ocean steamships, and the
important consequences, aside from any purposes of coast and harbor
defense, to which it has already led, but the strong public reasons on the
part of our Government to foster, continue, and encourage it. It has already
counteracted the best efforts of the large and long-established English steam
lines, and transferred the commerce and letter-carrying so long exclusively
enjoyed by them to American ships. If promoted and favored by the
Congress of the United States, it will still meet and counteract the new
completed, and the plan in all its features shall be in full operation, its
immediate practical results, aside from its prospective effectiveness in
furnishing a class of war steamers for any ultimate purpose of the American
Government, will be found fully to justify the action of Congress and the
participation and favor of the Government, and confirm the public
confidence in its great utility and value."
"When it came to the knowledge of the English government that Congress
had entered into contracts establishing steam lines to Chagres, Havana, and
New-Orleans, its first movement to counteract or discourage the proposed
American line in that direction was to run branches of the Royal West-India
mail line from Bermuda to New-York, and from Jamaica to New-Orleans
and Mobile. Now that the American line to Chagres has gone into full
operation, and the news from the Pacific comes by this line to New-York,
and thence to Liverpool, some fifteen days sooner than the same news
brought by the British line,[J] the English government has revised, enlarged,
and extended its West-India line. It has entered into a new contract with the
Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company, a material feature of which is to run a
mail line direct from Southampton to St. Thomas, and thence to Chagres
and back, twice a month, with steamers of larger capacity and power, and
with a proposed speed of from twelve to fourteen miles per hour. For this
line, five or six new steamships are, under the contract, to be built, while
the old vessels are to form branches from this main line or trunk to other of
the routes of this great and extended plan of steam intercourse and letter-
carrying; at the same time that government will withdraw its branches to the
Balize, Mobile, and New-York, extend its line to Rio de Janeiro, and
enlarge its line in the Pacific, from Panama to Valparaiso, converting it from
a monthly to a semi-monthly route. These movements show not only the
immediate results of American enterprise in ocean steamships, and the
important consequences, aside from any purposes of coast and harbor
defense, to which it has already led, but the strong public reasons on the
part of our Government to foster, continue, and encourage it. It has already
counteracted the best efforts of the large and long-established English steam
lines, and transferred the commerce and letter-carrying so long exclusively
enjoyed by them to American ships. If promoted and favored by the
Congress of the United States, it will still meet and counteract the new
Page 166
efforts of the English Government to recover the ground which American
skill, enterprise, and capital, aided by the Government, have won from
them.
[J] "By the contract of 1846 with the West-India Royal Mail Steam-Packet
Company, the voyage from Chagres to Southampton is performed in 33 days. By
the United States Mail Steamship Company the voyage from Chagres to New-
York, and thence to Liverpool, is performed in 22 days.
"In relation to the comparative cost to the two governments by which these
lines of ocean steamers, in connection with the naval and mail service, are
maintained, it will be seen that the British Government pays as much for its
single West-India and Chagres line as the American Government pays for
all its lines—Liverpool and New-York, New-York and Bremen, New-York
and Havre, New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Chagres, and Panama
and San Francisco. The entire annual payments by the British Government
amount [This was in 1850.—T.R.] to $3,180,000. Those by the American
Government, when all its lines shall be in full service, will be $1,215,000.
The British-West India Mail Steam-Packet Company are paid $3.08 per
mile for mail service: the United States Mail Steamship Company, $1.88
per mile."
The Committee presented some few queries to Commodore M.C. Perry on
the capabilities of the postal steamers for war purposes, to which he replies
thus:
"I now proceed to reply to the first division of the inquiry, as follows:
"Question first: 'Whether the steamships employed in the transportation of
the United States mail, under contract with the Navy Department, or any
other steamships employed in the transportation of our foreign mails, are, in
all respects, suitable for immediate conversion into steamers for war
purposes, capable of carrying the armament or battery appropriate to the
class specified in the contract?'
"In answer to the foregoing (first) question, I am of opinion that they are
not 'in all respects suitable.'
skill, enterprise, and capital, aided by the Government, have won from
them.
[J] "By the contract of 1846 with the West-India Royal Mail Steam-Packet
Company, the voyage from Chagres to Southampton is performed in 33 days. By
the United States Mail Steamship Company the voyage from Chagres to New-
York, and thence to Liverpool, is performed in 22 days.
"In relation to the comparative cost to the two governments by which these
lines of ocean steamers, in connection with the naval and mail service, are
maintained, it will be seen that the British Government pays as much for its
single West-India and Chagres line as the American Government pays for
all its lines—Liverpool and New-York, New-York and Bremen, New-York
and Havre, New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Chagres, and Panama
and San Francisco. The entire annual payments by the British Government
amount [This was in 1850.—T.R.] to $3,180,000. Those by the American
Government, when all its lines shall be in full service, will be $1,215,000.
The British-West India Mail Steam-Packet Company are paid $3.08 per
mile for mail service: the United States Mail Steamship Company, $1.88
per mile."
The Committee presented some few queries to Commodore M.C. Perry on
the capabilities of the postal steamers for war purposes, to which he replies
thus:
"I now proceed to reply to the first division of the inquiry, as follows:
"Question first: 'Whether the steamships employed in the transportation of
the United States mail, under contract with the Navy Department, or any
other steamships employed in the transportation of our foreign mails, are, in
all respects, suitable for immediate conversion into steamers for war
purposes, capable of carrying the armament or battery appropriate to the
class specified in the contract?'
"In answer to the foregoing (first) question, I am of opinion that they are
not 'in all respects suitable.'
Page 167
"Question second: 'And if not suitable for such immediate conversion,
whether they could be altered so as to make them efficient war steamers?'
"Answer: The following named Atlantic steamers maybe converted, by
slight alteration, into war steamers of the first class:
"Of Collins's line. The Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, and Baltic.
"Of Law's line. The Ohio, Georgia, and Illinois.
"Of Mortimer Livingston's line. The Humboldt and Franklin.
"Pacific steamers—of Aspinwall's line. First class, the Golden Gate. Second
class, the Panama, Oregon, California, and Columbia.
"The foregoing vessels of the respective contracts are variously constructed
as to materials, fastening, strength, and model.
"Question third: 'And if so, what alterations would be necessary to be made,
and at what expense, to make them war steamers of the first class:'
"Answer: If these vessels had been originally constructed comformably to
the spirit (though it was not called for by the letter) of the contracts, as they
should have been, and all English mail steamers now are, in anticipation of
their possible conversion, into war vessels, the cost of converting them
would be much less.
"Most of them were completed before I was ordered to their supervision;
but I lost no time, after entering upon the duty, in calling the attention of the
contractors to this important consideration, an observance of which would
not have added more than one per cent upon the cost of construction.
"In altering these vessels so as to make them available for war purposes, the
most simple, expeditious, and economical plan would be to razee them, or
cut off their upper decks and cabins forward and abaft the wheel-houses;
not by tearing them to pieces and defacing the costly ornamental work,
which, though of no value to the Government, still need not be destroyed.
whether they could be altered so as to make them efficient war steamers?'
"Answer: The following named Atlantic steamers maybe converted, by
slight alteration, into war steamers of the first class:
"Of Collins's line. The Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, and Baltic.
"Of Law's line. The Ohio, Georgia, and Illinois.
"Of Mortimer Livingston's line. The Humboldt and Franklin.
"Pacific steamers—of Aspinwall's line. First class, the Golden Gate. Second
class, the Panama, Oregon, California, and Columbia.
"The foregoing vessels of the respective contracts are variously constructed
as to materials, fastening, strength, and model.
"Question third: 'And if so, what alterations would be necessary to be made,
and at what expense, to make them war steamers of the first class:'
"Answer: If these vessels had been originally constructed comformably to
the spirit (though it was not called for by the letter) of the contracts, as they
should have been, and all English mail steamers now are, in anticipation of
their possible conversion, into war vessels, the cost of converting them
would be much less.
"Most of them were completed before I was ordered to their supervision;
but I lost no time, after entering upon the duty, in calling the attention of the
contractors to this important consideration, an observance of which would
not have added more than one per cent upon the cost of construction.
"In altering these vessels so as to make them available for war purposes, the
most simple, expeditious, and economical plan would be to razee them, or
cut off their upper decks and cabins forward and abaft the wheel-houses;
not by tearing them to pieces and defacing the costly ornamental work,
which, though of no value to the Government, still need not be destroyed.
Page 168
"The razeeing should be effected by sawing the top timbers, and cutting off
by sections the whole of the upper dock, excepting the space between the
wheel-houses, thus leaving the greater part of the main deck exposed and
for the accommodation of the armament, and enough of the sides above that
deck to answer for bulwarks and side-ports.
"Below, it would only be necessary to remove the state-rooms not wanted
for the accommodation of the officers, and convert the after-hold and fore
and main orlops into magazines, store-rooms, shot and shell lockers, etc.,
etc.
"According to my calculation, the cost of the conversion of either of the
before mentioned vessels, exclusive of armaments, repair of machinery and
ordinary repair, would not, or certainly ought not, exceed, for steamers of
the first class, $20,000, and for those of the second class, $15,000; and it
could be readily done for this at any of our navy yards, provided that
useless alterations were not made.
"It should be taken into view that those mail steamers, if called into service
as war vessels, would be considered as forming an auxiliary force to the
regularly constructed ships, and hence the impolicy of expending much
money on them. The requisites of sound hulls and powerful engines, with
efficient armaments, should alone be considered, leaving superfluous
ornament out of the question.
"The armaments of the respective vessels would, of course, be a separate
cost; and to arrange the guns on the upper deck, it would only be required to
close up three or four of the hatches or sky-lights; to strengthen the deck by
additional beams and stanchions; to cut ports, and construct the pivot and
other carriages; probably it might be desirable to shift the capstan and
cables.
"With respect to the description and weight of the respective armaments, I
am clearly of opinion that the first-class steamers already named could
easily carry each four 10-inch Paixhan guns on pivots, two forward and two
aft, of the weight of those in the Mississippi; ten 8-inch Paixhans, as side-
guns, ditto.
by sections the whole of the upper dock, excepting the space between the
wheel-houses, thus leaving the greater part of the main deck exposed and
for the accommodation of the armament, and enough of the sides above that
deck to answer for bulwarks and side-ports.
"Below, it would only be necessary to remove the state-rooms not wanted
for the accommodation of the officers, and convert the after-hold and fore
and main orlops into magazines, store-rooms, shot and shell lockers, etc.,
etc.
"According to my calculation, the cost of the conversion of either of the
before mentioned vessels, exclusive of armaments, repair of machinery and
ordinary repair, would not, or certainly ought not, exceed, for steamers of
the first class, $20,000, and for those of the second class, $15,000; and it
could be readily done for this at any of our navy yards, provided that
useless alterations were not made.
"It should be taken into view that those mail steamers, if called into service
as war vessels, would be considered as forming an auxiliary force to the
regularly constructed ships, and hence the impolicy of expending much
money on them. The requisites of sound hulls and powerful engines, with
efficient armaments, should alone be considered, leaving superfluous
ornament out of the question.
"The armaments of the respective vessels would, of course, be a separate
cost; and to arrange the guns on the upper deck, it would only be required to
close up three or four of the hatches or sky-lights; to strengthen the deck by
additional beams and stanchions; to cut ports, and construct the pivot and
other carriages; probably it might be desirable to shift the capstan and
cables.
"With respect to the description and weight of the respective armaments, I
am clearly of opinion that the first-class steamers already named could
easily carry each four 10-inch Paixhan guns on pivots, two forward and two
aft, of the weight of those in the Mississippi; ten 8-inch Paixhans, as side-
guns, ditto.
Page 169
"The second-class steamers could with equal ease carry each two 8-inch
Paixhans on pivots, one forward and one aft, and six 6-inch ditto, as side-
guns.
"With the additional strengthening recommended, I am perfectly satisfied
that the armaments suggested would not, in the least, incommode the
vessels. Indeed, the weight of armament would be actually less than that
which would be taken away by the removal of the upper decks and cabins,
and the miscellaneous articles usually stowed on one or the other of two
decks—such, for instance, as ice, of which not less than forty tons is
generally packed in one mass; nor would the munitions and provisions
required for the war vessel be of greater weight than the goods now carried
as freight, saying nothing of the provisions and stores carried by the
steamers for an average of 150 to 250 souls, including crew and passengers.
"It may again be remarked, that steamers thus brought into service would be
far inferior to regularly constructed and appointed war vessels; yet in the
general operations of a maritime war, they would render good service, and
especially would they be useful, from their great speed, as dispatch vessels,
and for the transportation of troops, always being capable of attack and
defense, and of overhauling or escaping from an enemy."
Captain Skiddy, the Special Naval Constructor appointed by the
Government to superintend the building of all the mail packets, says in a
letter to Com. Perry:
"In reply I will commence with the first-class ships, which are the 'Atlantic,'
'Pacific,' 'Baltic,' and 'Arctic,' of Collins' Liverpool line; the 'Franklin' and
'Humboldt' of Mortimer Livingston's Havre line.
"These ships, although equal in strength, probably, to any steamships afloat,
are not suitable for immediate war purposes, but can be made efficient in
four or six weeks, capable of carrying the armament or battery of a first-
class frigate—say four ten-inch guns and twelve eight-inch guns. These
alterations would consist of a removal of the deck-houses, spar or upper
deck, forward and abaft the paddle-wheel boxes, fitting the after and
forward bulwarks in sections, cutting port-holes, fitting hammock cloths or
nettings, putting in extra beams and knees, and stanchions, moving the
Paixhans on pivots, one forward and one aft, and six 6-inch ditto, as side-
guns.
"With the additional strengthening recommended, I am perfectly satisfied
that the armaments suggested would not, in the least, incommode the
vessels. Indeed, the weight of armament would be actually less than that
which would be taken away by the removal of the upper decks and cabins,
and the miscellaneous articles usually stowed on one or the other of two
decks—such, for instance, as ice, of which not less than forty tons is
generally packed in one mass; nor would the munitions and provisions
required for the war vessel be of greater weight than the goods now carried
as freight, saying nothing of the provisions and stores carried by the
steamers for an average of 150 to 250 souls, including crew and passengers.
"It may again be remarked, that steamers thus brought into service would be
far inferior to regularly constructed and appointed war vessels; yet in the
general operations of a maritime war, they would render good service, and
especially would they be useful, from their great speed, as dispatch vessels,
and for the transportation of troops, always being capable of attack and
defense, and of overhauling or escaping from an enemy."
Captain Skiddy, the Special Naval Constructor appointed by the
Government to superintend the building of all the mail packets, says in a
letter to Com. Perry:
"In reply I will commence with the first-class ships, which are the 'Atlantic,'
'Pacific,' 'Baltic,' and 'Arctic,' of Collins' Liverpool line; the 'Franklin' and
'Humboldt' of Mortimer Livingston's Havre line.
"These ships, although equal in strength, probably, to any steamships afloat,
are not suitable for immediate war purposes, but can be made efficient in
four or six weeks, capable of carrying the armament or battery of a first-
class frigate—say four ten-inch guns and twelve eight-inch guns. These
alterations would consist of a removal of the deck-houses, spar or upper
deck, forward and abaft the paddle-wheel boxes, fitting the after and
forward bulwarks in sections, cutting port-holes, fitting hammock cloths or
nettings, putting in extra beams and knees, and stanchions, moving the
Page 170
windlass below, building magazines, shell-rooms, officers' rooms, etc., etc.
The cost of all these alterations and fixtures would not exceed ($15,000 or
$20,000) twenty thousand dollars each ship. These ships would then be
relieved of about one hundred and fifty tons weight, or nearly double the
weight of guns and carriages, with less resistance to water and wind, adding
an increase to their already great speed."
In the case of all these steamers, that is, of the Havre and Bremen, the
Collins, the Aspinwall, and the Pacific lines, Commodore Perry reported
that they "were capable of being easily converted into war steamers of the
first class."
The cost of all these alterations and fixtures would not exceed ($15,000 or
$20,000) twenty thousand dollars each ship. These ships would then be
relieved of about one hundred and fifty tons weight, or nearly double the
weight of guns and carriages, with less resistance to water and wind, adding
an increase to their already great speed."
In the case of all these steamers, that is, of the Havre and Bremen, the
Collins, the Aspinwall, and the Pacific lines, Commodore Perry reported
that they "were capable of being easily converted into war steamers of the
first class."
Page 171
PAPER F.
OCEAN STEAM LINES OF THE WORLD.
LINE. SERVICE. Ships. Tonnage.
Cunard, Paddle- Liverpool, New-York,
8 12,000
wheel, Boston, and Halifax,
Liverpool, New-York,
Cunard, Screw, 4 4,800
Boston, and Halifax,
North Atlantic
St. John's and Portland, 3 4,800
Steamship Co.,
Bremen, Antwerp,
European and
Southampton, & New- 4 10,000
American S. S. Co.,
York,
European and Bremen, Antwerp,
4 9,000
American S. S. Co., Southampton, to Brazil,
London and
London and Montreal, 2 1,870
Canada,
Liverpool and
Liverpool and Quebec, 4 5,000
Canadian,
Liv., Philadelphia,
Liverpool and New-York, 4 8,700
and New-York,
Glasgow and New-
Glasgow and New-York, 3 6,200
York,
Belgian
Antwerp and New-York, 4 8,800
Transatlantic,
Belgian
Antwerp and Brazil, 5 6,500
Transatlantic,
Hamburg and
Hamburg and New-York, 4 7,300
American,
Hamburg and Hamburg and Rio de
2 4,500
Brazilian,[K] Janeiro,
Genoa and Genoa, and Rio de
4 8,000
Brazilian, Janeiro,
OCEAN STEAM LINES OF THE WORLD.
LINE. SERVICE. Ships. Tonnage.
Cunard, Paddle- Liverpool, New-York,
8 12,000
wheel, Boston, and Halifax,
Liverpool, New-York,
Cunard, Screw, 4 4,800
Boston, and Halifax,
North Atlantic
St. John's and Portland, 3 4,800
Steamship Co.,
Bremen, Antwerp,
European and
Southampton, & New- 4 10,000
American S. S. Co.,
York,
European and Bremen, Antwerp,
4 9,000
American S. S. Co., Southampton, to Brazil,
London and
London and Montreal, 2 1,870
Canada,
Liverpool and
Liverpool and Quebec, 4 5,000
Canadian,
Liv., Philadelphia,
Liverpool and New-York, 4 8,700
and New-York,
Glasgow and New-
Glasgow and New-York, 3 6,200
York,
Belgian
Antwerp and New-York, 4 8,800
Transatlantic,
Belgian
Antwerp and Brazil, 5 6,500
Transatlantic,
Hamburg and
Hamburg and New-York, 4 7,300
American,
Hamburg and Hamburg and Rio de
2 4,500
Brazilian,[K] Janeiro,
Genoa and Genoa, and Rio de
4 8,000
Brazilian, Janeiro,
Page 172
LINE. SERVICE. Ships. Tonnage.
Southampton, West-
Royal Mail Co., Indies, Central America, 18 21,510
South-America,
Southampton, Per., Rio,
Royal Mail Co., 4 6,820
Bahia, and La Plata,
Pacific Steam Panama to Valparaiso and
7 5,719
Navigation Co., intermediate,
Portugal, Spain, Malta,
Peninsular and
Alexandria, East-Indies, 39 49,416
Oriental Co.,
China, and Australia,
Europ. and
Southampton, Alexandria,
Australian Royal 7 15,500
Suez, and Sydney,
Mail Co.,
Australian Royal
Transport and other, 4 7,800
Mail Co.,
Rotterdam and Rotterdam, Leghorn, and
4 1,900
Mediterranean, Trieste,
North of Europe
Steam Navigation African, 4 3,200
Co.,
Liverpool and
McIver's, 10 9,000
Mediterranean,
McIver's, Liverpool and Havre, 2 2,000
Liverpool and
Bibby's, 11 11,700
Mediterranean,
Liverpool and
Fowler's, 6 7,500
Mediterranean,
Liverpool and
Dixon's, 4 8,800
Mediterranean,
Liverpool and
Liverpool and Australia, 2 7,000
Australian,
London and
London and Australia, 4 7,500
Australian,
London, Liverpool, and
African, 5 5,000
Africa,
Southampton, West-
Royal Mail Co., Indies, Central America, 18 21,510
South-America,
Southampton, Per., Rio,
Royal Mail Co., 4 6,820
Bahia, and La Plata,
Pacific Steam Panama to Valparaiso and
7 5,719
Navigation Co., intermediate,
Portugal, Spain, Malta,
Peninsular and
Alexandria, East-Indies, 39 49,416
Oriental Co.,
China, and Australia,
Europ. and
Southampton, Alexandria,
Australian Royal 7 15,500
Suez, and Sydney,
Mail Co.,
Australian Royal
Transport and other, 4 7,800
Mail Co.,
Rotterdam and Rotterdam, Leghorn, and
4 1,900
Mediterranean, Trieste,
North of Europe
Steam Navigation African, 4 3,200
Co.,
Liverpool and
McIver's, 10 9,000
Mediterranean,
McIver's, Liverpool and Havre, 2 2,000
Liverpool and
Bibby's, 11 11,700
Mediterranean,
Liverpool and
Fowler's, 6 7,500
Mediterranean,
Liverpool and
Dixon's, 4 8,800
Mediterranean,
Liverpool and
Liverpool and Australia, 2 7,000
Australian,
London and
London and Australia, 4 7,500
Australian,
London, Liverpool, and
African, 5 5,000
Africa,
Page 173
LINE. SERVICE. Ships. Tonnage.
Southampton and Cape
Union Screw Co., 3 1,800
Good Hope,
Luzo-Brazileira, Lisbon and Brazil, 4 8,000
Very large Mediterranean
Austrian Lloyds, — Unknown
service,
Messageries Mediterranean, Black Sea,
50 Unknown[L]
Impériales, Levant,
W. Hartlepool
Hartlepool, Hamburg, and
Steam Navigation 6 Unknown
St. Petersburg,
Co.,
Danube Steam Vienna, Galatz, and
6 Unknown
Navigation Co., Constantinople,
Hamburg and Hamburg, Southampton,
2 2,000
Spanish, and all Spanish ports,
East-India Suez and India, and the
12 11,471
Company, Bombay Mail lines,
Cadiz, Havana, and
Spanish and Cuban, 5 9,000
Mexico,
Companhia Rio de Janeiro to the
7 5,500
Brazileira, Amazon and La Plata,
Collins Company, New-York and Liverpool, 3 9,727
Havre Steam New-York, Southampton,
2 4,548
Navigation Co., and Havre,
Cornelius New-York, Southampton,
3 6,523
Vanderbilt, and Bremen,
New-York, Havana,
United States Mail
Aspinwall, & New- 6 8,544
Steamship Co.,
Orleans,
Pacific Mail Panamá, California, and
13 16,421
Steamship Co., Oregon,
New-York and New-York, Havana, and
2 3,198
New-Orleans, New-Orleans,
New-York and New-York, Havana, and
1 1,300
Alabama, Mobile,
Charleston and Charleston, Key West, and
1 1,115
Havana, Havana,
Southampton and Cape
Union Screw Co., 3 1,800
Good Hope,
Luzo-Brazileira, Lisbon and Brazil, 4 8,000
Very large Mediterranean
Austrian Lloyds, — Unknown
service,
Messageries Mediterranean, Black Sea,
50 Unknown[L]
Impériales, Levant,
W. Hartlepool
Hartlepool, Hamburg, and
Steam Navigation 6 Unknown
St. Petersburg,
Co.,
Danube Steam Vienna, Galatz, and
6 Unknown
Navigation Co., Constantinople,
Hamburg and Hamburg, Southampton,
2 2,000
Spanish, and all Spanish ports,
East-India Suez and India, and the
12 11,471
Company, Bombay Mail lines,
Cadiz, Havana, and
Spanish and Cuban, 5 9,000
Mexico,
Companhia Rio de Janeiro to the
7 5,500
Brazileira, Amazon and La Plata,
Collins Company, New-York and Liverpool, 3 9,727
Havre Steam New-York, Southampton,
2 4,548
Navigation Co., and Havre,
Cornelius New-York, Southampton,
3 6,523
Vanderbilt, and Bremen,
New-York, Havana,
United States Mail
Aspinwall, & New- 6 8,544
Steamship Co.,
Orleans,
Pacific Mail Panamá, California, and
13 16,421
Steamship Co., Oregon,
New-York and New-York, Havana, and
2 3,198
New-Orleans, New-Orleans,
New-York and New-York, Havana, and
1 1,300
Alabama, Mobile,
Charleston and Charleston, Key West, and
1 1,115
Havana, Havana,
Page 174
LINE. SERVICE. Ships. Tonnage.
Savannah
New-York and Savannah, 4 4,793
Steamship Co.,
New-York and
Charleston St. S. New-York and Charleston, 4 4,680
Co.,
New-York and New-York Norfolk, and
2 2,371
Virginia, Richmond,
Philadelphia and Philadelphia and
2 2,600
Savannah, Savannah,
Boston and
Boston and Baltimore, 2 1,600
Baltimore,
Texas Steamship New-Orleans and
4 2,400
Co., Galveston,
Southern Steamship New-Orleans and Key
2 1,000
Co., West,
Mexican Steamship New-Orleans, Tampico
1 960
Co., and Vera Cruz,
[K] Building another steamer of 2,500 tons for the Brazil line.
[L] These vessels average about 250 horses' power each. Their tonnage is large,
probably 1,200 tons each.
There are several other lines of ocean steamers in Europe; but it is almost
impossible to ascertain anything definite about them. The list above
embraces all of the most important companies of the world. The lines are
continually changing, while the vessels are passing into new hands almost
every week.
Savannah
New-York and Savannah, 4 4,793
Steamship Co.,
New-York and
Charleston St. S. New-York and Charleston, 4 4,680
Co.,
New-York and New-York Norfolk, and
2 2,371
Virginia, Richmond,
Philadelphia and Philadelphia and
2 2,600
Savannah, Savannah,
Boston and
Boston and Baltimore, 2 1,600
Baltimore,
Texas Steamship New-Orleans and
4 2,400
Co., Galveston,
Southern Steamship New-Orleans and Key
2 1,000
Co., West,
Mexican Steamship New-Orleans, Tampico
1 960
Co., and Vera Cruz,
[K] Building another steamer of 2,500 tons for the Brazil line.
[L] These vessels average about 250 horses' power each. Their tonnage is large,
probably 1,200 tons each.
There are several other lines of ocean steamers in Europe; but it is almost
impossible to ascertain anything definite about them. The list above
embraces all of the most important companies of the world. The lines are
continually changing, while the vessels are passing into new hands almost
every week.
Page 175
PAPER G.
The following official letter from Hon. Horatio King explains itself.
Post-Office Department,
Washington, Nov. 12, 1857. }
Sir: In answer to your letter of 10th inst., I have to inform you, that the
ocean mail steamship lines now under contract with the Government for the
conveyance of mails, are as follows, namely:
1. The New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, performing twenty round
trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $385,000. Length of route,
3,100 miles.
2. The New-York and Bremen Line, viâ Southampton, performing thirteen
round trips per annum, for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea
and inland.) Length of route, 3,700 miles.
3. The New-York and Havre Line, viâ Southampton, performing thirteen
round trips per annum for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea
and inland.) Length of route, 3,270 miles.
4. The New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, performing
twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $290,000.
Length of routes 2,000 miles from New-York to Aspinwall direct; 2,000
miles from New-York to New-Orleans viâ Havana; and 1,200 miles from
Havana to Aspinwall; making in all, 5,200 miles.
5. The Astoria, San Francisco, and Panama Line, performing twenty-four
round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $348,250. Length of
route, 4,200 miles.
6. The Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana Line, performing
twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $60,000.
The following official letter from Hon. Horatio King explains itself.
Post-Office Department,
Washington, Nov. 12, 1857. }
Sir: In answer to your letter of 10th inst., I have to inform you, that the
ocean mail steamship lines now under contract with the Government for the
conveyance of mails, are as follows, namely:
1. The New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, performing twenty round
trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $385,000. Length of route,
3,100 miles.
2. The New-York and Bremen Line, viâ Southampton, performing thirteen
round trips per annum, for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea
and inland.) Length of route, 3,700 miles.
3. The New-York and Havre Line, viâ Southampton, performing thirteen
round trips per annum for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea
and inland.) Length of route, 3,270 miles.
4. The New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, performing
twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $290,000.
Length of routes 2,000 miles from New-York to Aspinwall direct; 2,000
miles from New-York to New-Orleans viâ Havana; and 1,200 miles from
Havana to Aspinwall; making in all, 5,200 miles.
5. The Astoria, San Francisco, and Panama Line, performing twenty-four
round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $348,250. Length of
route, 4,200 miles.
6. The Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana Line, performing
twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $60,000.
Page 176
Length of route, 669 miles.
7. The New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, performing twenty-four round
trips per annum, at $1,210.93 the round trip. Length of route, 900 miles.
The contracts on these lines expire as follows, namely:
New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, 27th April, 1860.
New-York and Bremen Line, 1st June, 1858.
New-York and Havre Line, 1st June, 1858.
New-York, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, 1st Oct., 1859.
Astoria and Panama Line, 1st Oct., 1858.
Charleston and Havana Line, 30th June, 1859.
New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, 30th June, 1858.
I am very respectfully your obedient servant,
Horatio King.
To Dr. Thomas Rainey.
7. The New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, performing twenty-four round
trips per annum, at $1,210.93 the round trip. Length of route, 900 miles.
The contracts on these lines expire as follows, namely:
New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, 27th April, 1860.
New-York and Bremen Line, 1st June, 1858.
New-York and Havre Line, 1st June, 1858.
New-York, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, 1st Oct., 1859.
Astoria and Panama Line, 1st Oct., 1858.
Charleston and Havana Line, 30th June, 1859.
New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, 30th June, 1858.
I am very respectfully your obedient servant,
Horatio King.
To Dr. Thomas Rainey.
Page 177
PAPER H.
THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND AMERICAN NAVIES.
The following list is kindly furnished me by Hon. Wm. A. Harris, of
Washington. The French list is taken from the "Tableau General des
Batiments a Voiles et a Vapeur composant les Flottes de la Marine
Impériale Francaise."
SAILING VESSELS.
Ships of 120 guns.—Ocean, Friedland, Ville de Paris, Valmy.
Ships of 100 guns.—Hercule, Temmasses, Tage Turenne.
Ships of 90 guns.—Jena, Suffren, Bayard, Breslau, Hector, Achille, Eole,
Santi-Petri, Tilsitt, Sceptic, Castiglione.
Ships of 86 guns.—Diademe, Neptune, Jupiter.
Ships of 82 guns.—Marengo, Trident, Ville de Marsailles, Alger, Triton,
Duperre, Genereux, Latour d'Auvergne, Saint-Louis.
Frigates of 60 guns.—Iphigenie, Independante, Didon, Uranie, Belle-
Poulle, Surveillante, Andromaque, Forte, Minerve, Melpomene,
Perseverante, Renomme, Vengeance, Etrepienante, Victoire, Semiramis,
Guerrierre, Pallas, Semillante.
Frigates of 52 guns.—Alceste, Calypso, Sirene, Atlante, Andromede,
Nereide, Zenobie, Sybille.
Frigates of 50 guns.—Reine Blanche, Cleopatre, Danae, Virginie,
Poursuivante, Pandore, Nemesis, Bellonné, Amazone, Astrée, Junon,
Hermione, Dryade, Circe, Flore.
THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND AMERICAN NAVIES.
The following list is kindly furnished me by Hon. Wm. A. Harris, of
Washington. The French list is taken from the "Tableau General des
Batiments a Voiles et a Vapeur composant les Flottes de la Marine
Impériale Francaise."
SAILING VESSELS.
Ships of 120 guns.—Ocean, Friedland, Ville de Paris, Valmy.
Ships of 100 guns.—Hercule, Temmasses, Tage Turenne.
Ships of 90 guns.—Jena, Suffren, Bayard, Breslau, Hector, Achille, Eole,
Santi-Petri, Tilsitt, Sceptic, Castiglione.
Ships of 86 guns.—Diademe, Neptune, Jupiter.
Ships of 82 guns.—Marengo, Trident, Ville de Marsailles, Alger, Triton,
Duperre, Genereux, Latour d'Auvergne, Saint-Louis.
Frigates of 60 guns.—Iphigenie, Independante, Didon, Uranie, Belle-
Poulle, Surveillante, Andromaque, Forte, Minerve, Melpomene,
Perseverante, Renomme, Vengeance, Etrepienante, Victoire, Semiramis,
Guerrierre, Pallas, Semillante.
Frigates of 52 guns.—Alceste, Calypso, Sirene, Atlante, Andromede,
Nereide, Zenobie, Sybille.
Frigates of 50 guns.—Reine Blanche, Cleopatre, Danae, Virginie,
Poursuivante, Pandore, Nemesis, Bellonné, Amazone, Astrée, Junon,
Hermione, Dryade, Circe, Flore.
Page 178
Frigates of 46 guns.—Thetis, Armide, Grigone, Margicienne, Africane,
Penelope, Médee.
Frigates of 40 guns.—Constitution, Psyche, Clorinde, Heliopolis, Jeanne
d'Arc, Algerie, Resolue, Tiris, Ceres, Armorique.
Corvettes of 30 guns.—Ariane, Thisbe, Heroïne, Alemene, Embuscade,
Sabine, Aventure, Favorite, Jeanne-Hochette, Corneline, Circe, Cybele.
Corvettes of 28 guns.—Arethuse, Bayonnaise, Arthemise, Galatée,
Serieuse, Eurydice, Capricieuse, Constantine.
Corvettes of 24 guns.—Brillante, Naide, Creole, Danaide, Triomphante.
Corvettes of 20 guns.—Camille, Bergere, Iguala, Coquette, Echo.
Corvettes of 16 guns.—Diligente, Cornelie, Egle, Perle, Oritie.
Corvettes of 14 guns.—Astrolabe, Zélee, Prevoyante, Expeditive,
Recherche, Active, Indienne, Sarcelle, Prudente, Indefatigable, Emulation.
Brigs of 20 guns.—Ducouedic, Palinure, Cygene, Alcibiade, Adonis,
Hussard, Chasseur, Griffon, d'Hassar, Meleagre, Acteon, Bisson,
Lapeirousse, Cassard, Oreste, Pylade, Nisus, Euryale, Beaumanvir, Chevert,
Droupot, Alacryti, Voltigeur.
Brigs of 18 guns.—Mercure, Dragon, Faune, Genie, Faucon, Grenadier,
Entreprenant, Fanfaron, Janus, Victor, Olivier, Zebre, Obligardo, Alerte,
Cuirassier.
Brigs of 10 guns.—Volage, Surprise, Fleche, Alcyon, Comete, Sylphe,
Dupetit-Lhouars, Bougainville, Argus, Fabert, Lutin, Cerf, Messaeer,
Papillon, Rossignol, Agile, Geyer, Inconstant, Zephir, Railleur, Russee,
Lynx.
Brigs of 8 guns.—Allouette, Alsacienne, Malouine, Tactique, Virgie,
Eglantine, Panthere.
Penelope, Médee.
Frigates of 40 guns.—Constitution, Psyche, Clorinde, Heliopolis, Jeanne
d'Arc, Algerie, Resolue, Tiris, Ceres, Armorique.
Corvettes of 30 guns.—Ariane, Thisbe, Heroïne, Alemene, Embuscade,
Sabine, Aventure, Favorite, Jeanne-Hochette, Corneline, Circe, Cybele.
Corvettes of 28 guns.—Arethuse, Bayonnaise, Arthemise, Galatée,
Serieuse, Eurydice, Capricieuse, Constantine.
Corvettes of 24 guns.—Brillante, Naide, Creole, Danaide, Triomphante.
Corvettes of 20 guns.—Camille, Bergere, Iguala, Coquette, Echo.
Corvettes of 16 guns.—Diligente, Cornelie, Egle, Perle, Oritie.
Corvettes of 14 guns.—Astrolabe, Zélee, Prevoyante, Expeditive,
Recherche, Active, Indienne, Sarcelle, Prudente, Indefatigable, Emulation.
Brigs of 20 guns.—Ducouedic, Palinure, Cygene, Alcibiade, Adonis,
Hussard, Chasseur, Griffon, d'Hassar, Meleagre, Acteon, Bisson,
Lapeirousse, Cassard, Oreste, Pylade, Nisus, Euryale, Beaumanvir, Chevert,
Droupot, Alacryti, Voltigeur.
Brigs of 18 guns.—Mercure, Dragon, Faune, Genie, Faucon, Grenadier,
Entreprenant, Fanfaron, Janus, Victor, Olivier, Zebre, Obligardo, Alerte,
Cuirassier.
Brigs of 10 guns.—Volage, Surprise, Fleche, Alcyon, Comete, Sylphe,
Dupetit-Lhouars, Bougainville, Argus, Fabert, Lutin, Cerf, Messaeer,
Papillon, Rossignol, Agile, Geyer, Inconstant, Zephir, Railleur, Russee,
Lynx.
Brigs of 8 guns.—Allouette, Alsacienne, Malouine, Tactique, Virgie,
Eglantine, Panthere.
Page 179
Corvettes de charge 32 guns, 800 horse power.—Proserpine, Adour,
Abondante, Oise, Caravane, Allier, Agathe, Fortune, Aube, Egerie, Rhin,
Somme, Meurthe, Mosselle.
Sloops of 28 guns, 600 tons.—Perdrix, Loire, Provencale, Marsouin.
Sloops of 20 Guns, 550 Tons.—Robuste, Giraffe, Chandernagor,
Cormoran.
Sloops of 16 guns, 300 tons.—Hecla, Dore, Cyclope, Vulcain, Lamproie,
Volcan, Bucephale, Licome, Lezard, Mahe, Lionne.
Sloops of 12 guns, 200 tons.—Anna, Pintado, Menagere.
Sloops of 8 guns, 150 tons.—Pourvoyeur, Seudre.
Sloops of 6 guns, 90 tons.—Vigilant, Pilote, Ile d'Oleron, Mayottais.
Schooners of 6 guns.—Merange, Estafete, Gazelle, Hirondelle, Topaze,
Beaucir, Euroquoise, Décidée, Jouvencelle, Tonguille, Amaranthe, Fauvette,
Legere, Encelade, Etoile, Fine, Doris, Brestoise, Mouche, Bella Helene,
Eugenie, Tafne, Parisienne, Gentille, Ibir, Mignonne, Souris, Egle, Iris,
Papeiti, Sultan, Agathe, Touronnaise, Daphne, Levrette, Bose, Dorade.
Cutters of 4 guns.—Rodeur, Furet, Moustique, Espeigle, Moutin, Favori,
Levrier, Eperlan, Renard, Eclair, Goelund, Chamois, Emeraude, Esperance,
Cupidon, Orglae, Aigle d'Or, Colibi, Antilope, Seybouse, Pluvier, Ecureuil,
No. 1, Ecureuil, No. 2, Mirmidon, Capelan, Corvril, Boberach, Palmer,
Belette, Colombe, Cigorle, Tafnal, Amiral, Papillon.
SAILING SHIPS CHANGED INTO STEAMSHIPS.
Ships of 120 guns.—Montibello 650, Souverain 650, Desaix 650, Louis
XIV. 650, Bretagne 960.
Ships of 100 guns.—Fleurus 650, Ulm 650, Dugay-Etains 650, Annibal
650, Eyleau 650, Prince Jerome 650, Navarin 650, Austerlitz 650, Wagram
650, Massena 650.
Abondante, Oise, Caravane, Allier, Agathe, Fortune, Aube, Egerie, Rhin,
Somme, Meurthe, Mosselle.
Sloops of 28 guns, 600 tons.—Perdrix, Loire, Provencale, Marsouin.
Sloops of 20 Guns, 550 Tons.—Robuste, Giraffe, Chandernagor,
Cormoran.
Sloops of 16 guns, 300 tons.—Hecla, Dore, Cyclope, Vulcain, Lamproie,
Volcan, Bucephale, Licome, Lezard, Mahe, Lionne.
Sloops of 12 guns, 200 tons.—Anna, Pintado, Menagere.
Sloops of 8 guns, 150 tons.—Pourvoyeur, Seudre.
Sloops of 6 guns, 90 tons.—Vigilant, Pilote, Ile d'Oleron, Mayottais.
Schooners of 6 guns.—Merange, Estafete, Gazelle, Hirondelle, Topaze,
Beaucir, Euroquoise, Décidée, Jouvencelle, Tonguille, Amaranthe, Fauvette,
Legere, Encelade, Etoile, Fine, Doris, Brestoise, Mouche, Bella Helene,
Eugenie, Tafne, Parisienne, Gentille, Ibir, Mignonne, Souris, Egle, Iris,
Papeiti, Sultan, Agathe, Touronnaise, Daphne, Levrette, Bose, Dorade.
Cutters of 4 guns.—Rodeur, Furet, Moustique, Espeigle, Moutin, Favori,
Levrier, Eperlan, Renard, Eclair, Goelund, Chamois, Emeraude, Esperance,
Cupidon, Orglae, Aigle d'Or, Colibi, Antilope, Seybouse, Pluvier, Ecureuil,
No. 1, Ecureuil, No. 2, Mirmidon, Capelan, Corvril, Boberach, Palmer,
Belette, Colombe, Cigorle, Tafnal, Amiral, Papillon.
SAILING SHIPS CHANGED INTO STEAMSHIPS.
Ships of 120 guns.—Montibello 650, Souverain 650, Desaix 650, Louis
XIV. 650, Bretagne 960.
Ships of 100 guns.—Fleurus 650, Ulm 650, Dugay-Etains 650, Annibal
650, Eyleau 650, Prince Jerome 650, Navarin 650, Austerlitz 650, Wagram
650, Massena 650.
Page 180
Ships of 90 guns.—Inflexible 450, Dugueschin 450, Donnawerth 600,
Fontenoy 600, Charlemagne 450, Duquesne 450, Tourville 450, Alexandre
600, Jean-Bart 450.
STEAM VESSELS.
Ships of 90 guns, 960 horse power.—Napoleon, Imperiel, Algesiras.
Frigates of 650 horse power.—Mogador, Isly.
Frigates of 540 horse power.—Descartes, Vauban.
Frigates of 450 horse power.—Gomer, Asmodee, Labrador, Magellan,
Montezuma, Cacique, Panama, Eldorado, Pomone, Albatros, Sane,
Orenoque, Ch. Columb, Canada, Ulloa, Darien, Caffarelli.
MIXED FRIGATES—(New Construction.)
800 horse power, 50 guns.—Imperatrice Eugenie, Indomitable, Foudre,
Audacieuse.
Corvettes of 400 horse power.—Infernal, Reine Hortense, Bertholet,
Catinat, Rolland, Phlegeton, Laplace, Primaugnet, Dassas.
Corvettes of 320 horse power.—Prony, Caton, Colbert.
Corvettes of 300 horse power.—Patriote, Eumenide, Gorgone, Tanger,
Coligny, Tisiphone.
Corvettes of 220 horse power.—Espadon, Veloce, Lavoisier, Cameleon,
Gassendi, Pluton, Archimede, Duchayla, Phoque, Elan, Caiman, Titan,
Cassini, Chaptal, Newton.
ADVICE VESSELS.
Of 200 horse power.—Monette, Heron, Laborieux, Eclaireur, Phenix,
Lucifer, Biche, Goeland, Promethee, Souffleur, Milan, Aigle, Megere,
Fontenoy 600, Charlemagne 450, Duquesne 450, Tourville 450, Alexandre
600, Jean-Bart 450.
STEAM VESSELS.
Ships of 90 guns, 960 horse power.—Napoleon, Imperiel, Algesiras.
Frigates of 650 horse power.—Mogador, Isly.
Frigates of 540 horse power.—Descartes, Vauban.
Frigates of 450 horse power.—Gomer, Asmodee, Labrador, Magellan,
Montezuma, Cacique, Panama, Eldorado, Pomone, Albatros, Sane,
Orenoque, Ch. Columb, Canada, Ulloa, Darien, Caffarelli.
MIXED FRIGATES—(New Construction.)
800 horse power, 50 guns.—Imperatrice Eugenie, Indomitable, Foudre,
Audacieuse.
Corvettes of 400 horse power.—Infernal, Reine Hortense, Bertholet,
Catinat, Rolland, Phlegeton, Laplace, Primaugnet, Dassas.
Corvettes of 320 horse power.—Prony, Caton, Colbert.
Corvettes of 300 horse power.—Patriote, Eumenide, Gorgone, Tanger,
Coligny, Tisiphone.
Corvettes of 220 horse power.—Espadon, Veloce, Lavoisier, Cameleon,
Gassendi, Pluton, Archimede, Duchayla, Phoque, Elan, Caiman, Titan,
Cassini, Chaptal, Newton.
ADVICE VESSELS.
Of 200 horse power.—Monette, Heron, Laborieux, Eclaireur, Phenix,
Lucifer, Biche, Goeland, Promethee, Souffleur, Milan, Aigle, Megere,
Page 181
Sentinelle.
Of 180 horse power.—Petrel, Reguin, Epervier, Dauphin.
Of 160 horse power.—Ardent, Crocodile, Phare, Fulton, Meteore, Chimere,
Vantour, Styx, Acheron, Cerbere, Tartare, Phæton, Cocyte, Tonnerre,
Gregois, Grondeur, Euphrate, Tenare, Australie, Narval, Bruddon, Solon,
Etna, Sesostris.
Of 120 horse power.—Castor, Brazier, Flambeau, Vedette, Passe-Partout,
Pelican, Ramier, Salamandre, Ariel, Daim, Flambart, Marceau.
Of 100 horse power.—Anacreon, Averne, Tantale, Galilee.
Of 80 horse power.—Galibi, Voyageur, Marabout, Alecton, Rubis, Eperlan.
Of 60 horse power.—Antilope, Chacul, Liamone, Var.
Of 40 horse power.—Grand-Bassam, Ebrie.
Of 30 horse power.—Basilic, Serpent, Pinogouin, Guet n'Dar.
Of 20 horse power.—Oyapock, Acbar.
FLOATING BATTERIES.
Devastation, Lave, Tonnate, Foudroyante.
GUN BOATS.
Stridente, Mitraille, Etincelle, Bombe, Eclair, Flamme, Alarme, Coulevaine,
Doilleuse, Alerte, Meurtriere, Bourasque, Raffale, Fusee, Foudre, Fleche,
Grenade, Mutine, Tourmente.
MIXED TRANSPORTS.
Of 180 horse power.—Petrel, Reguin, Epervier, Dauphin.
Of 160 horse power.—Ardent, Crocodile, Phare, Fulton, Meteore, Chimere,
Vantour, Styx, Acheron, Cerbere, Tartare, Phæton, Cocyte, Tonnerre,
Gregois, Grondeur, Euphrate, Tenare, Australie, Narval, Bruddon, Solon,
Etna, Sesostris.
Of 120 horse power.—Castor, Brazier, Flambeau, Vedette, Passe-Partout,
Pelican, Ramier, Salamandre, Ariel, Daim, Flambart, Marceau.
Of 100 horse power.—Anacreon, Averne, Tantale, Galilee.
Of 80 horse power.—Galibi, Voyageur, Marabout, Alecton, Rubis, Eperlan.
Of 60 horse power.—Antilope, Chacul, Liamone, Var.
Of 40 horse power.—Grand-Bassam, Ebrie.
Of 30 horse power.—Basilic, Serpent, Pinogouin, Guet n'Dar.
Of 20 horse power.—Oyapock, Acbar.
FLOATING BATTERIES.
Devastation, Lave, Tonnate, Foudroyante.
GUN BOATS.
Stridente, Mitraille, Etincelle, Bombe, Eclair, Flamme, Alarme, Coulevaine,
Doilleuse, Alerte, Meurtriere, Bourasque, Raffale, Fusee, Foudre, Fleche,
Grenade, Mutine, Tourmente.
MIXED TRANSPORTS.
Page 182
Ariege, Adour, Durance, Loiret, Gironde, Marne, Aube, Rhin, Charente,
Nievre, Rhone, Tarn, Mosselle, Yonne, Saone, Loire, Isere, Dordogne,
Allier, Meurthe, Finestere, Meuse, Oise, Somme, Garone.
GENERAL RECAPITULATION.
SAILING VESSELS.
Guns.
31 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2,866
61 frigates, mounting an aggregate of 3,028
49 corvettes, mounting an aggregate of 1,024
57 brigs, mounting an aggregate of 1,006
14 corvettes de charge, mounting an aggregate of 448
28 sloops, mounting an aggregate of 444
38 schooners, mounting an aggregate of 228
33 cutters, mounting an aggregate of 132
317 sailing vessels, carrying a grand aggregate of 9,176
STEAM VESSELS.
Guns.
27 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2,680
21 frigates, mounting an aggregate of 336
4 frigates, (new construction,), mounting an aggregate of 200
34 corvettes of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 939
76 advice boats, mounting an aggregate of 456
4 floating batteries, mounting an aggregate of 64
19 gun boats, mounting an aggregate of 76
25 mixed transports, mounting an aggregate of 150
220 sailing vessels, mounting an aggregate of 4,901
ORDINARY CLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
Nievre, Rhone, Tarn, Mosselle, Yonne, Saone, Loire, Isere, Dordogne,
Allier, Meurthe, Finestere, Meuse, Oise, Somme, Garone.
GENERAL RECAPITULATION.
SAILING VESSELS.
Guns.
31 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2,866
61 frigates, mounting an aggregate of 3,028
49 corvettes, mounting an aggregate of 1,024
57 brigs, mounting an aggregate of 1,006
14 corvettes de charge, mounting an aggregate of 448
28 sloops, mounting an aggregate of 444
38 schooners, mounting an aggregate of 228
33 cutters, mounting an aggregate of 132
317 sailing vessels, carrying a grand aggregate of 9,176
STEAM VESSELS.
Guns.
27 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2,680
21 frigates, mounting an aggregate of 336
4 frigates, (new construction,), mounting an aggregate of 200
34 corvettes of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 939
76 advice boats, mounting an aggregate of 456
4 floating batteries, mounting an aggregate of 64
19 gun boats, mounting an aggregate of 76
25 mixed transports, mounting an aggregate of 150
220 sailing vessels, mounting an aggregate of 4,901
ORDINARY CLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
Page 183
2 admirals in time of peace, and 3 in time of war; 13 vice admirals; 22 rear
admirals; 113 captains of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 235 captains of
frigates; 679 lieutenants of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 550 ensigns of
ships; 109 midshipmen of 1st class; 165 midshipmen of the 2d class.
With respect to the classes of midshipmen, the admiral minister of marine
regulates yearly the number of young gentlemen who may be received in
the service.
According to the navy list for 1856, (July,) the effective force of the navy of
Great Britain was at that period:
Guns.
Sailing vessels, 269, carrying an aggregate of 9,362
Steam vessels, 258, carrying an aggregate of 4,518
Total, 527, carrying an aggregate of 13,880
The classification of officers was:
In service. On half pay. Retired. Total.
Admirals, 21 15 — 36
Vice-admirals, 27 19 — 46
Rear-admirals, 51 55 129 235
Captains of ships, 396 60 318 774
Commanders, 551 64 286 901
Lieutenants, 1,139 668 — 1,807
NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Name. Rate. Where built. When built
SHIPS OF THE LINE, (10.)
Pennsylvania, 120 Philadelphia, 1837
Columbus, 80 Washington, 1819
Ohio, 84 New-York, 1820
North-Carolina, 84 Philadelphia, 1820
Delaware, 84 Norfolk, 1820
Alabama, 84
admirals; 113 captains of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 235 captains of
frigates; 679 lieutenants of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 550 ensigns of
ships; 109 midshipmen of 1st class; 165 midshipmen of the 2d class.
With respect to the classes of midshipmen, the admiral minister of marine
regulates yearly the number of young gentlemen who may be received in
the service.
According to the navy list for 1856, (July,) the effective force of the navy of
Great Britain was at that period:
Guns.
Sailing vessels, 269, carrying an aggregate of 9,362
Steam vessels, 258, carrying an aggregate of 4,518
Total, 527, carrying an aggregate of 13,880
The classification of officers was:
In service. On half pay. Retired. Total.
Admirals, 21 15 — 36
Vice-admirals, 27 19 — 46
Rear-admirals, 51 55 129 235
Captains of ships, 396 60 318 774
Commanders, 551 64 286 901
Lieutenants, 1,139 668 — 1,807
NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Name. Rate. Where built. When built
SHIPS OF THE LINE, (10.)
Pennsylvania, 120 Philadelphia, 1837
Columbus, 80 Washington, 1819
Ohio, 84 New-York, 1820
North-Carolina, 84 Philadelphia, 1820
Delaware, 84 Norfolk, 1820
Alabama, 84
Page 184
Name. Rate. Where built. When built
Virginia, 84
Vermont, 84 Boston, 1848
New-York, 84
New-Orleans, 84
FRIGATES, (18.)
Independence, 56 Boston, 1814
United States, 50 Philadelphia, 1797
Constitution, 50 Boston, 1797
Potomac, 50 Washington, 1821
Brandywine, 50 Washington, 1825
Columbia, 50 Washington, 1836
Congress, 50 Portsmouth, N. H. 1841
Cumberland, 50 Boston, 1842
Savannah, 50 New-York, 1842
Raritan, 50 Philadelphia, 1843
Santee, 50
Sabine, 50
St. Lawrence, 50 Norfolk, 1847
SLOOPS OF WAR, (19.)
Constellation, 22 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1854
Macedonian, 22 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1836
Portsmouth, 22 Portsmouth, N.H. 1843
Plymouth, 22 Boston, 1843
St. Mary's, 22 Washington, 1844
Jamestown, 22 Norfolk, 1844
Germantown, 22 Philadelphia, 1846
Saratoga, 20 Portsmouth, N.H. 1842
John Adams, 20 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1831
Vincennes, 20 New-York, 1826
Falmouth, 20 Boston, 1827
Vandalia, 20 Philadelphia, 1828
St. Louis, 20 Washington, 1828
Cyane, 20 Boston, 1837
Levant, 20 New-York, 1837
Decatur, 16 New-York, 1839
Marion, 16 Boston, 1839
Virginia, 84
Vermont, 84 Boston, 1848
New-York, 84
New-Orleans, 84
FRIGATES, (18.)
Independence, 56 Boston, 1814
United States, 50 Philadelphia, 1797
Constitution, 50 Boston, 1797
Potomac, 50 Washington, 1821
Brandywine, 50 Washington, 1825
Columbia, 50 Washington, 1836
Congress, 50 Portsmouth, N. H. 1841
Cumberland, 50 Boston, 1842
Savannah, 50 New-York, 1842
Raritan, 50 Philadelphia, 1843
Santee, 50
Sabine, 50
St. Lawrence, 50 Norfolk, 1847
SLOOPS OF WAR, (19.)
Constellation, 22 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1854
Macedonian, 22 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1836
Portsmouth, 22 Portsmouth, N.H. 1843
Plymouth, 22 Boston, 1843
St. Mary's, 22 Washington, 1844
Jamestown, 22 Norfolk, 1844
Germantown, 22 Philadelphia, 1846
Saratoga, 20 Portsmouth, N.H. 1842
John Adams, 20 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1831
Vincennes, 20 New-York, 1826
Falmouth, 20 Boston, 1827
Vandalia, 20 Philadelphia, 1828
St. Louis, 20 Washington, 1828
Cyane, 20 Boston, 1837
Levant, 20 New-York, 1837
Decatur, 16 New-York, 1839
Marion, 16 Boston, 1839
Page 185
Name. Rate. Where built. When built
Dale, 16 Philadelphia, 1839
Preble, 16 Portsmouth, N. H. 1839
BRIGS, (3.)
Bainbridge, 6 Boston, 1842
Perry, 6 Norfolk, 1843
Dolphin, 4 New-York, 1836
SCHOONER.
Fenimore Cooper, 3 Purchased, 1852
STEAMERS.
Screw Steamers, 1st class.
Franklin, 50
Merrimack, 40 Boston, 1855
Wabash, 40 Philadelphia, 1855
Minnesota, 40 Washington, 1855
Roanoke, 40 Norfolk, 1855
Colorado,
Niagara,
Screw Steamer, 2d class.
San Jacinto, 13 New-York, 1850
Screw Steamers, 3d class.
Massachusetts, 9 Transferred from War Dep't.
Princeton, 10 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1851
Side-wheel Steamers, 1st class.
Mississippi, 10 Philadelphia, 1841
Susquehanna, 15 Philadelphia, 1850
Powhatan, 9 Norfolk, 1850
Side-wheel Steamer, 2d class.
Saranac, 6 Portsmouth, N. H. 1848
Side-wheel Steamers, 3d class.
Michigan, 1 Erie, Pa., 1844
Fulton, 5 New-York, 1837
Alleghany, 10 Pittsburgh, Pa., 1847
Water Witch, 2 Washington, 1845
John Hancock, 2 Boston, 1850
STEAM TENDERS.
Dale, 16 Philadelphia, 1839
Preble, 16 Portsmouth, N. H. 1839
BRIGS, (3.)
Bainbridge, 6 Boston, 1842
Perry, 6 Norfolk, 1843
Dolphin, 4 New-York, 1836
SCHOONER.
Fenimore Cooper, 3 Purchased, 1852
STEAMERS.
Screw Steamers, 1st class.
Franklin, 50
Merrimack, 40 Boston, 1855
Wabash, 40 Philadelphia, 1855
Minnesota, 40 Washington, 1855
Roanoke, 40 Norfolk, 1855
Colorado,
Niagara,
Screw Steamer, 2d class.
San Jacinto, 13 New-York, 1850
Screw Steamers, 3d class.
Massachusetts, 9 Transferred from War Dep't.
Princeton, 10 Rebuilt, Norfolk, 1851
Side-wheel Steamers, 1st class.
Mississippi, 10 Philadelphia, 1841
Susquehanna, 15 Philadelphia, 1850
Powhatan, 9 Norfolk, 1850
Side-wheel Steamer, 2d class.
Saranac, 6 Portsmouth, N. H. 1848
Side-wheel Steamers, 3d class.
Michigan, 1 Erie, Pa., 1844
Fulton, 5 New-York, 1837
Alleghany, 10 Pittsburgh, Pa., 1847
Water Witch, 2 Washington, 1845
John Hancock, 2 Boston, 1850
STEAM TENDERS.
Page 186
Name. Rate. Where built. When built
Despatch, Purchased, 1855
Engineer Purchased,
Arctic, Purchased, 1855
STORE-SHIPS.
Relief, 6 Philadelphia, 1836
Supply, 4 Purchased, 1846
Warren, Boston, 1826
Fredonia, 4 Purchased, 1846
Release, 2 Purchased, 1855
The United States Navy has 64 Captains, 96 Commanders, 311 Lieutenants,
69 Surgeons, 43 Passed Assistant Surgeons, 37 Assistant Surgeons, 64
Pursers, 24 Chaplains, 12 Mathematicians, 24 Masters, 24 Passed
Midshipmen, 30 Midshipmen, and 145 Probationary Midshipmen and
Students.—Taken from the Navy Register of 1857.
Transcriber's Note.
To aid clarity, ditto marks have been replaced with full text throughout.
Despatch, Purchased, 1855
Engineer Purchased,
Arctic, Purchased, 1855
STORE-SHIPS.
Relief, 6 Philadelphia, 1836
Supply, 4 Purchased, 1846
Warren, Boston, 1826
Fredonia, 4 Purchased, 1846
Release, 2 Purchased, 1855
The United States Navy has 64 Captains, 96 Commanders, 311 Lieutenants,
69 Surgeons, 43 Passed Assistant Surgeons, 37 Assistant Surgeons, 64
Pursers, 24 Chaplains, 12 Mathematicians, 24 Masters, 24 Passed
Midshipmen, 30 Midshipmen, and 145 Probationary Midshipmen and
Students.—Taken from the Navy Register of 1857.
Transcriber's Note.
To aid clarity, ditto marks have been replaced with full text throughout.
Page 187
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